[Senate Hearing 108-241]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]


                                                 S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                                  2004

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                                   ON

                                S. 1050

     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY 
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND 
   FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR 
                             OTHER PURPOSES

                               ----------                              

                                 PART 1

                            MILITARY POSTURE
                             SERVICE CHIEFS
                          SERVICE SECRETARIES
                    UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS
                       BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
      ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                            HOMELAND DEFENSE

                               ----------                              

          FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 6, 13, 18, 20; APRIL 8, 2003




         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                              2004--Part 1

  MILITARY POSTURE  b   SERVICE CHIEFS  b   SERVICE SECRETARIES  b   
  UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS  b   BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE  b   
   ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  b   
                            HOMELAND DEFENSE

                                                 S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 1

 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                                  2004

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               before the

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                      ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                                   ON

                                S. 1050

     TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY 
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND 
   FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE 
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR 
                             OTHER PURPOSES

                               __________

                                 PART 1

                            MILITARY POSTURE
                             SERVICE CHIEFS
                          SERVICE SECRETARIES
                    UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS
                       BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
      ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                            HOMELAND DEFENSE

                               __________

          FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 6, 13, 18, 20; APRIL 8, 2003


         Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                    JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JACK REED, Rhode Island
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  BILL NELSON, Florida
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    EVAN BAYH, Indiana
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

                    Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

             Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                    CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                            Military Posture
                           february 13, 2003

                                                                   Page

Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense...................    10
Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff....    25

                             Service Chiefs
                           february 25, 2003

Shinseki, Gen. Eric K., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army..   115
Clark, Adm. Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............   184
Hagee, Gen. Michael W., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.....   203
Jumper, Gen. John P., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air 
  Force..........................................................   217

                          Service Secretaries
                             march 6, 2003

White, Hon. Thomas E., Secretary of the Army.....................   336
Johnson, Hon. Hansford T., Acting Secretary of the Navy..........   361
Roche, Hon. James G., Secretary of the Air Force.................   375

    Unified and Regional Commanders on Their Military Strategy and 
                        Operational Requirements
                             march 13, 2003

Fargo, Adm. Thomas B., USN, Commander in Chief, United States 
  Pacific Command................................................   495
LaPorte, Gen. Leon J., USA, Commander in Chief, United Nations 
  Command, U.S. Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command Korea......   519
Hill, Gen. James T., USA, Commander in Chief, United States 
  Southern Command...............................................   533

                       Ballistic Missile Defense
                             march 18, 2003

Aldridge, Hon. Edward C. ``Pete,'' Jr., Under Secretary of 
  Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.............   588
Christie, Hon. Thomas P., Director of Operational Test and 
  Evaluation, Department of Defense..............................   593
Crouch, Hon. J.D., II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  International Security Policy..................................   598
Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense 
  Agency.........................................................   605

      Atomic Energy Defense Activities of the Department of Energy
                             march 20, 2003

Abraham, Hon. Spencer, Secretary of Energy.......................   677

                            Homeland Defense
                             april 8, 2003

McHale, Hon. Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 
  Defense........................................................   751
Eberhart, Gen. Ralph E., USAF, Commander, United States Northern 
  Command........................................................   758
Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander, United States 
  Strategic Command..............................................   764


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                                  2004

                              ----------                              


                      THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2003

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                            MILITARY POSTURE

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in 
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe, Allard, 
Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, 
Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, 
Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
    Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff 
director; and Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, chief clerk.
    Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, 
professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Brian 
R. Green, professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, 
professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff 
member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; 
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, 
professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional 
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; 
Ann M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional 
staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Scott 
W. Stucky, general counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
    Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, 
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 
staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Kenneth M. 
Crosswait, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, 
professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional 
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; 
Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, 
minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Christina 
D. Still, professional staff member; and Bridget M. Whalan, 
special assistant.
    Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C. 
Brewer, Sara R. Mareno, and Nicholas W. West.
    Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling, 
assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to 
Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; 
James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, 
assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II and Rick 
Dearborn, assistants to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, 
Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant 
to Senator Talent; James W. Irwin, assistant to Senator 
Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator Graham; Henry J. 
Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Sharon L. Waxman and 
Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans 
and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Aaron Scholer, 
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to 
Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator 
Akaka; William K. Sutey and Douglas Bush, assistants to Senator 
Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; 
William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd 
Rosenblum and Rashid Hallaway, assistants to Senator Bayh; 
Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, 
assistant to Senator Pryor.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive 
testimony from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers on 
the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces as it affects the budget 
for fiscal year 2004 and in the future.
    Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, we welcome you back 
before the committee and commend you once again for the 
outstanding service you both continue to provide to our Nation 
and to our men and women in uniform. I observe, as one who has 
been in that building, a very close and trusting working 
partnership between the two of you, and that's for the best 
interests of the men and women in the Armed Forces and indeed, 
the country. Our Nation could not have a better team guiding 
our military during these challenging times.
    As we meet this morning, tens of thousands of our service 
members have departed their families, their homes, their jobs, 
and are engaged around the world in the global war on 
terrorism. Indeed, many of them have taken up posts here at 
home in defense of our own Nation. Many thousands more are 
preparing for possible conflict in Iraq and the Persian Gulf 
region. These very men and women in uniform deserve our 
strongest support, and their families here at home. They will 
get it.
    President Bush stated in the new national security strategy 
for the United States, ``Defending our Nation against these 
enemies is the first fundamental commitment for the Federal 
Government.'' Today, that task has changed dramatically. 
Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial 
capabilities to endanger America. Now shadowy networks have 
demonstrated the ability to inflict great chaos or suffering on 
our shores for less than it costs to produce a single tank or 
airplane. To defeat this threat, we must make use of every tool 
in our arsenal.
    Clearly, homeland security is now our Nation's most urgent 
priority. The active involvement of our Armed Forces in 
defending America, supporting the Nation's homeland security 
infrastructure is essential. This committee's most urgent duty 
in the 108th Congress must be to insure that the land, sea, 
air, space, and cyberspace closest to our shores are defended, 
and to be prepared, if necessary, to defeat those who would 
bring harm to our shores.
    At the same time, however, we must remember, the defense of 
our homeland begins in the distant battlefields of the world. 
Our forward deployed forces are and will remain our first line 
of defense and deterrence. The morale and readiness of these 
forces are fundamental to the security of our Nation. It's 
critical that we fully honor the services of our men and women 
in uniform and that we keep faith in their dedication to duty 
through the timely modernization of their equipment and 
facilities, and sustain investment in those programs that 
enhance the quality of life for our service personnel and their 
families.
    That message was reinforced as I visited each of our 
service secretaries, our service chiefs, and their staffs 
during December, preparing once again to assume the 
chairmanship of this distinguished committee. I'd like to thank 
you, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, for affording me the 
complete and open access to each of the services on the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff. The briefings were of 
great benefit to me and my staff as we now assume our duties.
    I am encouraged by my initial review of the President's 
defense budget request. The fiscal year 2004 request of $379.9 
billion represents a $15.3 billion increase over the fiscal 
year 2003 level. This is a modest real increase in defense 
spending, 2.5 percent, but the 2004 budget request is almost 
$52 billion above the fiscal year 2002 enacted level, a 
significant increase by any measure.
    The sustained increases in defense spending we have made 
over the past 3 or 4 years are, I think, making real strong 
progress to shore up the needs of this country to protect 
itself both here at home and abroad. We will begin fielding 
components of a national missile defense this year, filling a 
key role of President Bush and indeed preceding Presidents and 
many Members of Congress have been in strong support through 
these years.
    The increased use of unmanned systems, a key initiative of 
this committee when I was first its chairman, has become a 
reality and a substantial funding for these systems in the 
budget will build on the initial successes we have seen so 
vividly thus far in the global war on terrorism.
    Funding for Navy shipbuilding is increasing, not as much as 
we wish, but clearly the curve is headed up with construction 
of seven new ships in the budget before us.
    I am encouraged by what I have seen so far, but I must add 
a note of caution. This budget proposes only a modest increase 
in defense spending at a time when our military is engaged in 
one war, the global war on terrorism; another war could be 
lurking; indeed, a third in the Pacific, the Korean Peninsula 
poses another growing threat. We are putting extraordinary 
demands on our forces around the world. We are blessed with a 
military that has responded to these demands with extraordinary 
success, and that military is composed not only of the regular 
forces, but the National Guard and the Reserves.
    Even the best military in the history of the world has its 
limits. People, facilities, equipment, and families can only do 
so much with limited resources. As we review the budget request 
over the next few years and months, we need to carefully 
analyze the effect of this long-term stress on our men and 
women in uniform and their families, and consider the 
investments needed to ensure we have the people and the 
capabilities to carry on the objectives that have been laid 
down by our courageous President.
    Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service, and your 
continued commitment to the uniformed and civilian personnel of 
your department. All you've given in protecting our homeland 
and your focus on preparing our Armed Forces to meet the 
expected and unexpected stress of the future have greatly 
enhanced our national security.
    Senator Levin.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

    Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join 
you in thanking our witnesses today, thanking you for your 
service, and thanking you for coming to share with us your 
thoughts on the issues which face our Nation and the world.
    Our Armed Forces stand on the brink of possible military 
action in the next few weeks. As many as 250,000 of our 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will be in the Persian 
Gulf region preparing for a possible war against Iraq. Almost 
40,000 more stand on the front lines in Korea, within range of 
North Korean artillery and rockets. Thousands of additional 
American troops are risking their lives every day in continued 
operations in the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan and 
other hot spots around the world. Of course, many more continue 
to work to keep the peace and work to build a more stable 
future in the Balkans and elsewhere. To support these efforts, 
the President has already called up more than 100,000 members 
of the Reserve component to active duty.
    Many questions have been raised in recent months about our 
policy moves on Iraq, Korea, and elsewhere. Concerns have been 
raised about our proclivity to proceed unilaterally; about a 
rising tide of anti-Americanism overseas; about the risk that 
the focus on Iraq has reduced our focus on the war against 
terrorism, which has to be fought and won here at home as well 
as overseas; about whether our refusal to talk directly with 
the North Korean regime as urged by our South Korean allies may 
be undermining our interests in that area of the world; and 
about the degree of our commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan 
and the possible consequences of a similar lack of follow-
through in Iraq.
    I share many of those concerns. I believe that America is 
at its strongest and at its best when we make common cause with 
other nations in pursuit of common goals. I believe that the 
path to a safer world and a more secure America rarely comes 
from a go-it-alone approach. Specifically, I believe that in 
the absence of an imminent threat, it is in our interest to 
have a U.N. resolution authorizing member states to take 
military action before initiating a preemptive attack against 
Iraq.
    If there is any chance of disarming Saddam Hussein without 
war, it is for the United Nations to speak with one voice. If 
military force is used, the best way of reducing both short-
term risks, including the risks to the U.S. and the Coalition 
Forces, and the long-term risks, including the risk of 
terrorist attacks on our people throughout the world, is also a 
U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force.
    Supporting U.N. inspections is an essential step if we're 
going to keep the Security Council together. We can show 
support for those U.N. inspections by sharing with the U.N. 
inspectors the balance of our significant intelligence 
information about suspect sites, by quickly getting U-2 
aircraft in the air over Iraq without condition, with or 
without Saddam Hussein's approval, and by giving the inspectors 
the time they need to finish their work, as long as the 
inspections are unimpeded.
    Yesterday I talked about statements by the administration 
that all useful intelligence information in our possession has 
now been shared with the U.N. inspectors. Condoleezza Rice told 
us exactly that at the White House 10 days ago. George Tenet 
told us at an open Intelligence Committee hearing 2 days ago 
exactly that. They were in error. Director Tenet acknowledged 
yesterday right here that we still have information and we will 
be sharing it.
    The premature declaration that we've already shared all 
useful intelligence makes us seem excessively eager to bring 
inspections to a close. Top administration officials from the 
beginning said inspections were useless and that inspectors 
couldn't find anything without Saddam showing them where it 
was.
    That's what he's supposed to do, but there is at least a 
chance inspections will prove useful even without his 
cooperation. Inspectors caught him in lies about his biological 
weapons programs in the 1990s, and in this morning's papers it 
appears they're catching him in lies about the range of 
missiles that he is currently developing.
    Another way to support the inspectors is to back up their 
request for U-2 surveillance planes with a U.N. resolution that 
says that any interference with those planes by Saddam Hussein 
will be considered an act of war against the United Nations. 
During the State of the Union speech President Bush noted that, 
``Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the 
United Nations.'' Secretary Powell, during his address to the 
U.N. Security Council a week ago, noted that ``Iraq has also 
refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would 
give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved 
before, during, and after inspections.''
    In The New York Times on January 30, a senior White House 
official is quoted as describing Iraq's refusal to allow the U-
2 surveillance flights, ``the biggest material breach of all, 
so far.''
    I met with Dr. Blix and his staff on January 31 in New 
York. They told me that U-2 flights would be very useful 
because of their ability to observe large areas of Iraq over 
extended periods of time. U-2 flights would be particularly 
helpful to track trucks that appear to be moving items from one 
suspicious place to another and to track mobile labs. 
Satellites can't track suspicious vehicles; U-2s can.
    For this reason, I was astonished to read on Tuesday that 
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher characterized what 
appeared to be an agreement to implement U-2 flights as, 
``nothing worth getting excited about.'' If Iraq's refusal to 
allow U-2 surveillance is cited by the President, characterized 
by the White House as a big material breach, if Secretary 
Powell is right when he says that U-2 surveillance flights 
would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved 
before, during, and after inspections, then minimizing their 
usefulness at this point can only be explained as further 
disdain for the inspection's effort.
    It may be unlikely that inspectors will catch Saddam with 
the goods without his cooperation. It's at least possible, 
however, and we should increase that possibility by sharing all 
our useful intelligence and using the U-2.
    Supporting the inspectors in these and other ways is not 
inconsistent with the position that the administration has 
correctly taken that the burden is on Saddam Hussein to show 
where the prohibited material is or what he's done with it. The 
fact that he hasn't carried his burden is undeniable but how 
best to deal with his deceit and deception is still ours and 
the world's challenge.
    At the same time that our Nation faces these vital issues 
of war and peace, our committee will be asked to address a wide 
range of other issues affecting the Department of Defense over 
the next year, including many of the budget issues which the 
chairman has just gone through. But we're also told that the 
administration is considering a wide array of far reaching 
proposals that would change the way the Department of Defense 
operates and the role of Congress in overseeing these 
operations.
    For example, we're told that the administration is 
considering a proposal--I emphasize the word considering--that 
would:
    One, alter congressional oversight and control over defense 
expenditures by putting the Department on a 2-year budget cycle 
or raising the threshold for reprogramming funds without 
congressional approval.
    Two, that they are considering a proposal to change the 
role played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by replacing the 
current 4-year term served by the service chiefs with 2-year 
terms renewable at the discretion of the Secretary; requiring 
the Joint Staff to report to the Secretary of Defense, rather 
than to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and requiring 
secretarial approval of all appointments to the Joint Staff and 
by striking the statutory requirement that the Joint Staff be 
``independently organized and operated.''
    Three, that's apparently under consideration, we're told, 
is to change the role played by the Reserves in our Armed 
Forces by, for instance, making it easier to shift money from 
Reserve Forces to Active-Duty Forces without the need for 
congressional approval, and eliminating the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the highest ranking advocate 
for the interests of the Reserve Forces in the Department.
    Four, we're told that under consideration is altering the 
treatment of the Department's civilian employees by denying 
them the right to union representation, eliminating grievance 
procedures, making it easier to fire them, and making it easier 
to transfer work currently performed by civilian employees to 
the private sector without allowing them to compete for their 
jobs.
    Finally, we're told that under consideration is a proposal 
to give the administration the authority to reorganize the 
Department without regard to legislative requirements and to 
abolish a significant number of positions, including the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict, the DOD official responsible for 
coordinating the Department's efforts to combat terrorism.
    Mr. Chairman, I emphasize that these proposals are 
apparently only under consideration. Many of them may never 
become formal legislative proposals submitted to Congress. But 
in view of the far-reaching impact that they could have if 
enacted, our members should be aware that we may have to 
address some of them in the coming year.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to utilize the presence of 
Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers to extend our gratitude to 
the men and women of the Department of Defense, military and 
civilian alike, for the extraordinary work that they do for us 
every hour of every day to ensure our Nation's security.
    There may not be unanimity around here on a number of 
issues, but there is unanimity around here on at least one 
thing. All of us and the American people will stand behind our 
uniformed forces if they are engaged in military conflict. 
Should they be so engaged, we will provide our men and women in 
uniform with everything that they need to ensure that they 
prevail promptly and with minimal casualties.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
    During the course of the hearing this morning, I will 
introduce into the record a letter from the Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with regard to his 
perspectives on the very important matter that my colleague has 
raised concerning the flow of intelligence information from our 
Government to the Security Council and to Hans Blix' 
organization.
    I have been present at I think most of the meetings that my 
distinguished colleague has had with the director and/or his 
staff. I have views somewhat different on the same facts; I 
basically believe there has been a very orderly and carefully 
prepared flow of information from our Government. That flow is 
controlled only in a manner to enhance and to support the work 
by Blix and his team.
    But nevertheless, I felt it important and I asked the 
director to prepare a letter, which he ensured me about 20 
minutes ago would be forthcoming, and I will share it with you 
and we may have further comments on this important subject as 
the day goes on. But I just wanted to tell Secretary Rumsfeld, 
this is a matter which is being addressed by Director Tenet and 
his staff.
    [The information referred to follows:]
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    Gentlemen and ladies of the committee, we now have a quorum 
present. We have a very important piece of business, and I ask 
your support, Mr. Secretary and General, for a minute while we 
attend to the following.
    I ask the committee now to consider a resolution for the 
committee funding and committee rules for the 108th Congress. 
Senator Levin and I have worked together on both of these 
items. Under Senate rules, each committee of the Senate is 
required to report out a resolution at the beginning of each 
Congress authorizing that committee to make expenditures out of 
the contingent funds of the Senate to defray its expenses, 
including staff salaries and administrative expenses for a 2-
year period.
    The committee staff has worked together to prepare this 
resolution on the committee budget and it is before us today. 
You and I, Senator Levin, have reviewed that and have 
authenticated this work. The proposed budget is in line with 
the funding guidelines provided by the Rules Committee. If 
there are no questions before the committee, I proceed to seek 
a vote.
    Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I support this and thank you 
for you and your staff's great work on it.
    Chairman Warner. Would you then, Senator Levin, make the 
motion to report out the committee's funding resolution?
    Senator Levin. So moved.
    Senator Inhofe. Second.
    Chairman Warner. The motion is agreed to.
    In addition, the committee must adopt its rules for the 
108th Congress. Senator Levin and I have reviewed the rules and 
have agreed that no changes from the previous Congress are 
required. Therefore, I recommend that the committee adopt the 
rules that were followed by the 107th Congress. A copy of the 
rules has been provided to each member. Any questions? Hearing 
none, I turn to Senator Levin.
    Senator Levin. I move the adoption of the rules.
    Senator Allard. Second.
    Chairman Warner. All in favor, say aye. [Chorus of ayes.]
    Both motions are voted in block. Thank you very much.
    Senator Byrd. The chair didn't ask for the negatives.
    Chairman Warner. Very well, I will repeat that again. Is 
there any objection? Hearing none, the rules are adopted in 
block, the budget is adopted in block, and I thank our 
distinguished former president pro tempore, who is always 
correct.
    Senator Levin. Even when he's not correct, he's always 
correct, which is rarely. [Laughter.]
    Chairman Warner. Now, Mr. Secretary, we anxiously await the 
message by yourself and your distinguished Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. My understanding, as we discussed this 
morning, is that you have a very lengthy statement, which you 
have now condensed, and you will give us the condensed version, 
but we accept into the record the full statements by all 
witnesses present today.

   STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 
committee. I appreciate this opportunity to update the 
committee on our progress in transforming the Department of 
Defense and to discuss the President's budget for fiscal years 
2004 to 2009.
    We are, of course, engaged in a war on terror in an effort 
to protect America and our allies in a time when terrorist 
networks and terrorist states are trying to get weapons of mass 
destruction. Our Nation is fortunate to have so many brave men 
and women who voluntarily risk their lives to defend our 
country. Sixty-three American service members have died since 
the global war on terror began. Already this year, six have 
given their lives. We are grateful to all who serve and to 
their families who worry about them understandably, and endure 
the separations from them. The families also serve our country. 
We have a responsibility to give them the resources they need 
to defend the country in this new century.
    We have entered what may very well prove to be the most 
dangerous security environment the world has known, and the 
more we learn, the more we realize how large and demanding 
these new challenges are proving to be.
    The 2004 numbers represented our best estimate at the time 
the budget was developed. It may well change over the coming 
period as we learn more about the demands of safety on a 
worldwide basis. There is no doubt in my mind, for example, 
that we will be back with a supplemental, and reasonably soon, 
to fund the global war on terrorism as well as the cost of 
flowing forces in connection with support to the diplomacy in 
Iraq.
    We also have intense efforts underway to transform the 
Department and streamline and modernize to save the taxpayers 
money. As those efforts succeed, we ought to be able to shift 
some of those resources towards more urgent and more productive 
uses. President Bush vowed that on taking office he would order 
an immediate comprehensive review of our military. He said he 
would give his team at the Department a broad mandate to 
challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of 
American defense for the decades to come.
    Mr. Chairman, for the past 2 years we have pursued the 
goals he set out. We have fashioned a new defense strategy, a 
new approach to sizing our forces, a new approach to balancing 
risks. We have reorganized the Department to better focus on 
space activities. We've adopted a new unified command plan 
which establishes a new Northern Command to better defend the 
homeland, a Joint Forces Command that focuses on 
transformation, and a new Strategic Command (STRATCOM) 
responsible for early warning of and defense against missile 
attack and the conduct of long range attack.
    We have expanded the mission of the Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) so that it can not only support missions 
directed by regional combatant commanders, but also plan and 
execute its own missions in the global war on terror.
    We have reorganized and revitalized the missile defense 
research, development, and testing program, freed from the 
constraints the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. We have 
completed a nuclear posture review with a new approach to 
deterrence that will enhance our security while permitting 
historic deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
    We have moved from a threat-based to a capability-based 
approach to defense planning, focusing not only on who might 
threaten us or where we might be threatened, or even when, but 
more on how we might be threatened and what portfolio of 
capabilities we will need to deter and defend against these new 
threats. These are critically important accomplishments. They 
will benefit our national security for many years to come.
    But as important as these changes are, they must be only 
the beginning. To win the global war on terror, our Armed 
Forces need to be flexible, light, and agile so that they can 
respond quickly to sudden changes. The same is true of the men 
and women who support them in the Department. They also need to 
be flexible, light, and agile so we can move money and shift 
people, and design and buy new weapons more quickly and respond 
to the frequent sudden changes in our security environment.
    Today we simply do not have that kind of agility. In an age 
when terrorists move information with the speed of an e-mail, 
money at the speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed 
of a commercial jetliner, the Defense Department is still 
bogged down in micromanagement and bureaucratic processes of 
the industrial age, not the information age. Some of these 
difficulties are self imposed to be sure, some of them are the 
result of law and regulation, but together they have created a 
culture that too often stifles innovation.
    Consider just a few of the obstacles that we are faced with 
every day. Think of this 2004 budget that we consider today. It 
was developed by the Department from March to December of last 
year, the year 2002. This is for the 2004 budget. The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) considered it from December to 
February of this year when the President presented it to 
Congress this month. Congress will be likely considering it 
from now until October or November of this year, and if as in 
the past, changing 10 or 20 percent of what the President 
proposed. DOD will then live with what's left during the period 
from October of this year to September 2004. That means that at 
any given time during the fiscal year of that budget, that 
plan, it will be between 14 and 30 months old while we're 
trying to implement what Congress provides.
    We will be doing this in a world that's changing more 
rapidly than that. At a minimum, the budget will be something 
like a year to 2\1/2\ years out of date at any given time. The 
Department spends an average of about $42 million an hour. If 
we are permitted to move $15 million from one account to 
another, nothing more than that without getting permission from 
between four and six different congressional committees, a 
process that can take several months to complete.
    Today we estimate we have some 300,000 uniformed people 
doing non-military jobs. Yet, we're calling up Reserves to 
fight the global war on terror. We need to prepare and submit 
some 26,000 pages of justification and over 800 required 
reports to Congress each year. Many have, I believe, value at 
the outset but have only limited value years later. These 
reports consume many thousands of hours on the part of the 
Department personnel. These problems make it increasingly 
difficult to balance risks.
    Consider these facts. I am told that the last time I was 
Secretary of Defense, the 1977 Defense Authorization Bill was 
16 pages long. In 2001, it has grown to 534 pages. In 1977, 
Congress made a total of 46 changes to the Army and Defense 
Agency research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) 
programs. In 2001, that number had grown from 46 to 450 
individual changes made by Congress. Every change that Congress 
makes in a program to increase something, there is a cost 
elsewhere in the budget that has to be subtracted. For example, 
we add something one place, we may have to reduce funding for 
housing, spare parts, or transformation. Of course it makes it 
very difficult to balance risks.
    But the point is this: We're fighting the first wars of the 
21st century with a Department that was really fashioned to 
meet the challenges of the mid-20th century, and we need 
together to find ways that we can fix that.
    Last year Congress enacted historic legislation to create a 
new Department of Homeland Security and rearrange the 
Government to be better prepared for attacks against our homes, 
schools, and places of work. I hope we can now address the 
Department of Defense. We're already working with a number of 
you on the committee, through your staffs, to fashion 
legislation to present to you to bring the Defense Department 
into the 21st century, and to transform how it moves money, how 
it manages people, and how it buys weapons.
    I must say, at this point, that I listened to Senator Levin 
and I have not heard of many, if not most, of the things that 
were being cited by the Senator, and I wouldn't want any 
impression to be left that that litany of items are things that 
we've concluded, because we haven't. Indeed, we decided to work 
with your staffs and work with the members in this body and the 
other body so that we can fashion some sort of an omnibus bill 
that has a reasonable chance of being approved.
    We're looking at, among other things, proposals to 
establish a national security personnel system that could give 
us somewhat greater flexibility as to how we handle and manage 
our civilian personnel. A nonintuitive effect is the difficulty 
in managing wonderful people on the civilian side. It's a 
difficult element of the Department to manage, and as a result, 
we find that people are constantly using people in uniform 
instead of civilians, which wasn't the intention at all. 
They're using them because they can move them in and move them 
out and direct them better than they can the civilian force.
    We find that people are also using contractors much more 
than probably makes sense to avoid the difficulties in having a 
civilian population that the Department really doesn't manage. 
They are more managed by the Office of Personnel Management.
    We are talking about the possibility with your staffs and 
members about a one-time reorganization with fast track 
approval procedures.
    We think we need to establish more flexible rules for the 
flow of money through the Department. We're talking about the 
possibility of establishing a 2-year budget cycle, so that the 
hundreds of people who invest time and energy to review each 
major program each year can be freed up to consider in 1 year 
the tasks of implementation and performance and methods.
    We're trying to figure out ways that we can eliminate some 
of the regulations that make it difficult for many small 
enterprises to do business with the Department. We think it's 
important that they have the opportunity to do business with 
the Department.
    We're looking at ways to expand our authority for 
competitive outsourcing so that we can get military personnel 
out of non-military tasks and back into the field. We are also 
trying to establish more flexible military retirement rules so 
those who want to serve longer may have the option to do so.
    We're consulting with all of you as I said, and I hope we 
can find some approach that will help us achieve those goals.
    Where we have authority to fix problems, we're working hard 
to do so, but to get the kind of flexibility that we're 
required to have in this new security environment, I believe 
we're going to end up needing legislative relief and we will 
need your help in working with us on that.
    As to the defense budget, last year's budget, the fiscal 
year 2003 request, was finalized just as our review process was 
nearing completion. We were able to begin funding some 
transforming initiatives as the new defense strategy came into 
focus. But it is this year's budget, the fiscal year 2004 
budget request before you, that is really the first to reflect 
the new defense strategies and policies.
    Balancing risks between near- and long-term challenges is 
difficult. It's difficult in peacetime, but today to best serve 
our country we need to accomplish three challenges at once. To 
successfully fight the global war on terror, prepare for near-
term threats by making long delayed investments in readiness, 
people, and modernization, and also preparing for the future by 
continuing the process of transforming.
    The fiscal year 2004 budget request before you is designed 
to help do all three. Our defense review identified six goals 
that drive our efforts.
    First, we have to be able to defend the homeland and bases 
of operation overseas.
    Second, we have to project and sustain forces in distant 
theaters.
    Third, we have to be able to deny enemy sanctuary.
    Fourth, we have to improve our space capabilities and 
maintain unhindered access to space.
    Fifth, we must harness our country's advantages in 
information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. 
forces so they can truly fight jointly.
    Sixth, we have to be able to protect U.S. information 
networks from attack and to be able to disable the information 
networks of our adversaries.
    The fiscal year 2004 budget request has funds to support 
each of these important tasks. Over the next 6 years, we have 
proposed a 30-percent increase in procurement funding and a 65-
percent increase in funding for research, development, testing, 
and evaluation, above the fiscal year 2002 baseline budget, a 
total investment of about $150 billion.
    The total investment in transforming military capabilities 
in the fiscal year 2004 budget request is estimated at $24.3 
billion, and about $240 billion over the next 6 years.
    To prepare for the threats we will face later in this 
decade, the fiscal year 2004 budget request increased 
investments in a number of areas. Over the next 6 years, the 
President has requested a 15-percent increase in military 
personnel accounts above the 2002 baseline budget, and an 
increase in funding for family housing by 10 percent over that 
period. Over the next 6 years, we have requested a 20-percent 
increase for operations and maintenance accounts above the 2002 
baseline budget. We've added $40 billion for maintenance for 
all services and $6 billion for facility sustainment over that 
period.
    These investments should help to put a stop to the past 
practice of raiding the investment accounts to pay for the 
immediate operation and maintenance needs.
    The fiscal year 2004 budget does not, I repeat, does not 
include funds for operations for the global war on terror. Last 
year we requested, but Congress did not provide, the $10 
billion that we knew we would need for the first few months to 
conduct the global war on terror, including the combat air 
patrols over the United States, the force protection in the 
United States, and the other aspects of it. Because we're still 
without those funds, every month since October 2002--October, 
November, December 2002, January, and now February 2003, we've 
had to borrow from other programs to pay for the cost of war, 
robbing Peter to pay Paul. That does not include the cost of 
preparations for a possible contingency in Iraq and the cost of 
the flow of forces that has taken place thus far in support of 
the diplomacy.
    Indeed, shifting money around in this way is we believe 
inefficient and ultimately the most expensive method possible 
for funding. We will be coming to you later this year for a 
2003 war supplemental to get the money we had wanted a year ago 
and we knew would be necessary. In the end, to make up for the 
cost of having to shift funds, we will probably need somewhat 
more money than would otherwise have been the case. This 
pattern has been fundamentally harmful to our ability to manage 
the Department and show respect for taxpayers' money.
    In the fiscal year 2004 request, we've increased the 
shipbuilding budget by $2.7 billion, making good on our hope 
expressed last year that we could increase shipbuilding from 
five to seven ships per year. We increased the special 
operations budget by $1.5 billion to pay for equipment that was 
lost in the global war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, and an additional 1,890 people.
    We increased military and civilian pay by $3.7 billion.
    We increased missile defense by $1.5 billion, including 
increased funds for research and development (R&D) of promising 
new technologies and to deploy a small number of interceptors 
beginning in 2004.
    The President asked Congress for a total of $379.9 billion 
for fiscal year 2004. That's a $15.3 billion increase over last 
year's budget. That's a large amount of the taxpayers' money 
but even with that increase as large as it is, we still have to 
make some tough choices between competing demands.
    Let me state it straight out. Despite the significant 
increase in shipbuilding, we did not get the shipbuilding rate 
up to the desired rate of close to 10 ships per year. Because 
of planned retirements of other ships, we will drop below a 300 
ship fleet during the course of the Future Years Defense Plan 
(FYDP).
    The Navy is in the process of transforming and we have had 
increased shipbuilding in 2004, but we do not want to lock 
ourselves into a shipbuilding program until we know more 
precisely which ships we will want to build in the outyears.
    We have not been able to modernize our tactical air forces 
fast enough to reduce the average age of the Defense 
Department's aircraft fleet. We have not fully resolved our so-
called high demand low density problems, systems like Joint 
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), which because 
they have been chronically underfunded in the past will still 
be in short supply in this budget.
    We opted not to modernize a number of legacy programs, 
taking on some near-term risks to transforming capabilities 
that we will need in this fast moving world.
    We did not achieve the level of growth in science and 
technology (S&T) accounts that we had hoped for. Our request is 
$10.2 billion, or 2.69 percent of the 2004 budget. That's below 
the goal of 3 percent, although because the budget is up, the 
actual amount is rising.
    Now that's the bad news, but there's good news as well. In 
making difficult choices between competing priorities, we made 
better choices because we followed the new approach to try to 
balance risks that we developed in last year's defense review, 
an approach that tries to take into account not just the risks 
in operations and in contingency plans but also the risks to 
people, modernization, and to the future. The result is a more 
balanced approach and we hope a more coherent program. As such, 
it's a program that can be adversely unbalanced unintentionally 
unless we are careful and work together as you and the 
Appropriations Committee in the other chamber of Congress 
complete your work.
    While we're requesting increased funds, the services have 
stepped up to the plate and will be cancelling, slowing, or 
restructuring a number of programs. In all, the Army, Navy, and 
Air Force have achieved savings of some $80 billion over the 
FYDP, money that will be reinvested by the Services in 
capabilities they believe are important for this new security 
environment.
    As a result of these strategic investments and decisions, 
we can now see the effects of transforming beginning to unfold. 
Consider some of the changes that are taking place.
    Today the missile defense research, development, and 
testing program has been revitalized and we are on track for a 
limited land-sea deployment in 2004 and 2005.
    Today we're converting four Trident submarines into 
conventional nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarines 
(SSGNs) capable of delivering special forces and cruise 
missiles, a part of the nuclear posture review.
    Today we're proposing to build the nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier CVN 21 in 2007, which will include many, if not all, of 
the new capabilities that were previously scheduled to be 
introduced only in 2011.
    Today we have seen targeted pay raises and other reforms 
help retain mid-career officers and non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) so that fewer of them leave the Service while still in 
their prime, and so the country can continue to benefit from 
their enormous talents and skills.
    These are positive changes that will ensure that future 
administrations will have the capabilities they need to defend 
the country.
    Finally, I believe that the transparency of the process 
that we've used to develop this budget has been unprecedented. 
For several months now we have been providing detailed 
briefings to those interested in defense here on Capitol Hill 
so that Congress is not simply being presented with the 
President's budget today but has been kept in the loop as 
decisions have been made. Our goal was to ensure that Members 
and staff had every opportunity to better understand the 
thinking that lies behind these proposals. I'm told that the 
extent of consultation from the Department to Congress this 
year has been unprecedented.
    We hope that this spirit of openness and cooperation can 
continue in the period ahead. We need to work together to bring 
DOD out of the industrial age and help get in range for the 
fast paced security environment we live in.
    I close by saying that transformation is not an event, 
there is not a point at which the Defense Department will move 
from being untransformed to transformed. Our goal is to set in 
motion a process of continuing transformation in a culture that 
will keep the United States several steps ahead of potential 
adversaries. To do that, we need not only resources but equally 
we need the ability to use them with speed and agility, so that 
we can respond quickly to the new threats we will face as the 
century unfolds.
    I feel deeply about the urgency of seeing that we transform 
the Department and enable it to serve the American people and 
our friends and allies in a responsible way in the 21st 
century. We will have to work together if we are to best serve 
the country.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld

                              INTRODUCTION

    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this 
opportunity to update the committee on our progress in transforming the 
Department of Defense for the 21st century and to discuss the 
President's budget for fiscal year 2004-2009.
    President Bush vowed that, on taking office, he would order ``an 
immediate, comprehensive review of our military--the structure of its 
forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement.'' 
He warned of new dangers--of ``barbarism emboldened by technology,'' 
the proliferation of ``weapons of mass destruction . . . car bombers 
and plutonium merchants give his team at the Department of Defense ``a 
broad mandate to challenge the status quo and envision a new 
architecture of American defense for decades to come.''
    The goal, he said, would be ``to move beyond marginal 
improvements--to replace existing programs with new technologies and 
strategies.'' Doing this, he said, ``will require spending more--and 
spending more wisely.''
    Mr. Chairman, for the past 2 years, we have pursued the goals he 
set out. We have:

         Fashioned a new defense strategy.
         Replaced the decade-old two Major Theater War approach 
        with a new approach to sizing our forces that allows us to 
        provide for homeland defense, undertake a major regional 
        conflict and win decisively, including occupying a country and 
        changing the regime if necessary, simultaneously swiftly defeat 
        another aggressor in another theater, and in addition have the 
        capability of conducting a number of lesser contingencies.
         Developed a new approach to balancing risks that takes 
        into account not just the risks to immediate war plans, but 
        also the risks to people and transformation.
         Reorganized the Department to better focus our space 
        activities.
         Adopted a new Unified Command Plan, which establishes 
        the new Northern Command to better defend the homeland; a Joint 
        Forces Command that focuses on transformation; and a new 
        Strategic Command responsible for early warning of, and defense 
        against, missile attack and the conduct of long-range attacks.
         Expanded the mission of the Special Operations 
        Command, so that it can not only support missions directed by 
        the regional combatant commanders, but also plan and execute 
        its own missions in the global war on terror, supported by 
        other combatant commands.
         Initiated work with Allies to develop a new North 
        Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command structure and begin 
        work on a new NATO Response Force.
         Took steps to attract and retain talent in our Armed 
        Forces, with targeted pay raises and quality of life 
        improvements.
         Made a number of tough program decisions, including 
        replacement of the Crusader, B-1 modernization, and the Navy 
        ``area-wide'' restructuring.
         Instituted ``realistic budgeting,'' giving Congress 
        more realistic estimates of what programs can be expected to 
        cost, rather than coming back for annual non-emergency 
        supplementals.
         Reorganized and revitalized the missile defense 
        research, development and testing program, freed from the 
        constraints of the ABM Treaty.
         Completed the Nuclear Posture Review, with a new 
        ``approach to deterrence that will enhance our security, while 
        permitting historic deep reductions in offensive nuclear 
        weapons.
         Moved from a ``threat-based'' to a ``capabilities-
        based'' approach to defense planning, focusing not only on who 
        might threaten us, or where, or when--and more on how we might 
        be threatened, and what portfolio of capabilities we will need 
        to deter and defend against those new threats.

    These are important accomplishments. They represent some of the 
most significant changes in the strategy and structure of our Armed 
Forces in at least a generation.
    But as important as these changes are, they must be only the 
beginning. Because transforming is about more than developing new 
strategies and structures--it is about changing culture, about 
encouraging new ways of thinking, so we can develop new ways of 
fighting and provide our Armed Forces the tools they need to defend our 
way of life in the 21st century.
    We are working to promote a culture in the Defense Department that 
rewards unconventional thinking--a climate where people have freedom 
and flexibility to take risks and try new things. We are working to 
instill a more entrepreneurial approach to developing military 
capabilities, one that encourages people to behave less like 
bureaucrats; one that does not wait for threats to emerge and be 
``validated,'' but rather anticipates them before they emerge--and 
develops and deploys new capabilities quickly, to dissuade and deter 
those threats.
    Most agree that to win the global war on terror, our Armed Forces 
need to be flexible, light, and agile--so they can respond quickly to 
sudden changes. Well, the same is true of the men and women who support 
them in the Department of Defense. They also need to be flexible, 
light, and agile--so they can move money, shift people, and design and 
buy new weapons quickly, and respond to sudden changes in our security 
environment.
    Today, we do not have that kind of agility. In an age when 
terrorists move information at the speed of an email, money at the 
speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed of a commercial 
jetliner, the Defense Department is bogged down in the micromanagement 
and bureaucratic processes of the industrial age--not the information 
age. Some of our difficulties are self-imposed, to be sure. Some are 
the result of law and regulation. Together they have created a culture 
that too often stifles innovation. Consider just a few of the obstacles 
we face each day:

         Think of this fiscal year 2004 budget--it was 
        developed by the Department of Defense from March 2002 to 
        December 2002. OMB considered it from December 2002 to February 
        2003 when the President presented it to Congress. Congress will 
        be considering it from February 2003 to probably October or 
        November 2003 and, as in the past, making 10-20 percent changes 
        in what he proposed. DOD will then try to live with what's left 
        during the period October 2003 to September 2004. That means 
        that at any given time during the fiscal year of that budget, 
        it will be 14 months to 30 months old while we are trying to 
        implement what Congress gives us. All this in a world that is 
        changing monthly before our eyes.
         The Department of Defense spends an average of $42 
        million an hour--yet we are not allowed to move $15 million 
        from one account to another without getting permission from 4-6 
        different congressional committees, a process that can take 
        several months to complete.
         Today, we estimate we have some 320,000 uniformed 
        people doing non-military jobs, yet we are calling up Reserves 
        to fight the global war on terror.
         We must prepare and submit 26,000 pages of 
        justification and over 800 required reports to Congress each 
        year--many of marginal value and most probably never read--
        consuming hundreds of thousands of manhours.
         Despite 128 acquisition reform studies, we have a 
        system in the Defense Department that since 1975 has doubled 
        the time it takes to produce a new weapons system--in an era 
        when technology moves so fast that new technologies often 
        become obsolete in months and years, not decades.
         Since September 11, our force protection costs have 
        gone up by some $5 billion annually. But because we are 
        required to keep some 20 percent plus more facilities capacity 
        than are needed to support the force, we are effectively 
        wasting something like $1 billion every year on force 
        protection alone for bases and facilities we do not need. We 
        need to follow through with the base closure process that 
        Congress authorized last year without changes.
         We have to contend with growing micromanagement of the 
        Defense budget, making it increasingly difficult to balance 
        risks. Consider these facts:

                 The last time I was Secretary of Defense, the 
                1977 defense authorization bill was 16-pages long--in 
                the year 2001 it had grown to 534 pages.
                 In 1977, Congress made a total of 46 changes 
                to Army and Defense Agency research, development, 
                testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs; by 2001 that 
                number had grown to 450 individual changes. For every 
                change Congress makes in a program, there is a cost 
                elsewhere in the budget--every plus-up in one place 
                means we must reduce funds for something else, be it 
                housing, or spare parts or transformation--making it 
                exceedingly difficult to balance risks.

         We spend millions of taxpayer dollars training top-
        notch officers and senior enlisted, giving them experience--and 
        then we shove them out the door in their 40s and early 50s, 
        when they are at the top of their game--and we will be paying 
        60 percent of their base pay and providing them with 
        comprehensive healthcare for the rest of their lives. The loss 
        in talent and experience to the Department and the country is 
        sizable.
         We bounce officers around from assignment to 
        assignment every 16, 18, 22 months, so many end up skipping 
        across the tops of the waves so fast they don't have time to 
        learn from their own mistakes.
         We rely on almost 1,800 antiquated legacy information 
        systems to run the Defense finance end accounting systems--
        ensuring we cannot produce timely and accurate management 
        information.
         We have the equivalent of an Army heavy division's 
        worth of auditors, inspectors, and investigators.
         We have thousands of people focused on developing and 
        justifying budgets, and a fraction of those focused on ensuring 
        effective implementation and desired outcomes.

    The point is this, we are fighting the first wars of the 21st 
century with a Defense Department that was fashioned to meet the 
challenges of the mid-20th century. We have an industrial age 
organization, yet we are living in an information age world, where new 
threats emerge suddenly, often without warning, to surprise us. We 
cannot afford not to change and rapidly, if we hope to live in that 
world.
    Some of the fault for this lies with the executive branch; some 
lies with the legislative branch, and some is simply due to the fast 
pace of events. But the American people do not care about blame--for 
their sake we need to get to work fixing the problems.
    Last year, Congress and the administration did just that, when we 
faced up to the fact that our Government was not organized to deal with 
the new threats to the American homeland. You enacted historic 
legislation to create a new Department of Homeland Security and 
rearrange our Government to be better prepared for potential attacks 
against our homes and schools and places of work.
    We must now address the Department of Defense. We are already 
working with a number of you to fashion legislation to bring the 
Defense Department into the 21st century--to transform how it moves 
money, manages people, and buys weapons. We are looking at, among other 
things, proposals to:

         Establish a National Security Personnel System that 
        will give the Department of Defense greater flexibility in how 
        it handles and manages its civilian personnel--so we can 
        attract and retain and improve the performance of our 700,000-
        plus civilian work force. Today it is managed outside the 
        Department. The unintentional effect has been that the 
        Department uses military personnel and contractors rather than 
        civilians, since they can be more easily managed.
         A one-time reorganization of the Department, with 
        ``fast track'' approval procedures.
         Move a number of the non-military functions that have 
        been thrust on DOD over the years to other Departments that can 
        provide similar or better services, so DOD can focus on the 
        tasks where it must excel: defending our country in a dangerous 
        new century.
         Transfer some 1,800 personnel who conduct background 
        investigations to the Office of Personnel Management. Since the 
        President has no authority to transfer functions across the 
        executive branch, we will urge that he be given that authority.
         Establish more flexible rules for the flow of money 
        through the Department, giving us the ability to move larger 
        sums between programs and priorities, so we can respond quickly 
        to urgent needs.
         Streamline acquisition rules and procedures, to give 
        the Department greater speed and flexibility in the development 
        and deployment of new capabilities.
         Establish a 2-year budget cycle so that the hundreds 
        who invest time and energy to rebuild major programs every year 
        can be freed up and not be required to do so on an annual 
        basis.
         Eliminate some of the onerous regulations that make it 
        impossible or unattractive for many small enterprises to do 
        business with the Department.
         Expand authority for competitive outsourcing, so we 
        can get military personnel out of non-military tasks and back 
        into the field. There is no reason, for example, that the 
        Defense Department should be in the business of making 
        eyeglasses, when the private sector makes them better, faster, 
        and cheaper. But we are. That needs to change.
         Clarify environmental statutes which restrict access 
        to, and sustainment of, training and test ranges essential for 
        the readiness of our troops and the effectiveness of our 
        weapons systems in the global war on terror.
         Expand our flexibility to extend tour lengths for 
        military leaders, and fully credit them for joint duty 
        assignments.
         Establish more flexible military retirement rules, so 
        that those who want to serve longer have the option of doing 
        so--so we can retain talent instead of automatically pushing it 
        out the door.
         Establish sunset procedures for the hundreds of 
        required reports so that we can discontinue those that have 
        outlived their usefulness. We simply must find better ways to 
        exchange data between DOD and Congress, so that you get the 
        information you need to assess performance and we do not have 
        to employ armies of personnel and consultants preparing 
        information you no longer need.

    Let there be no doubt, some of the obstacles we face today are 
self-imposed. Where we have authority to fix those problems, we are 
working hard to do so. For example, we are modernizing our financial 
management structures, to replace some 1,800 information systems so we 
can produce timely and accurate management information. We are reducing 
staffing layers to increase speed and efficiency. We are modernizing 
our acquisition structures to reduce the length of time it takes to 
field new systems and drive innovation. We are working to push joint 
operational concepts throughout the Department, so we train and prepare 
for war the way we will fight it--jointly. We are taking steps to 
better measure and track performance.
    We are doing all these things, and more. But to get the kind of 
agility and flexibility that are required in the 21st century security 
environment, we must have legislative relief. We must work together--
Congress and the administration--to transform not only the U.S. Armed 
Forces, but the Defense Department that serves them and prepares them 
for battle. The lives of the service men and women in the field--and of 
our friends and families here at home--depend on our ability to do so.
2004 Defense Budget
    At the same time, we are taking steps to implement the changes 
agreed upon in the defense review. Last year's budget--the fiscal year 
2003 request--was finalized just as that review process was nearing 
completion. It included a top-line increase, and made important, and 
long-delayed investments in readiness, people, maintenance, and 
replacement of aging systems and facilities. We were able to begin 
funding some transforming initiatives as the new defense strategy came 
into focus.
    But it is really this year's budget--the fiscal year 2004 request 
before you today--that is the first to fully reflect the new defense 
strategies and policies.
    We submit this budget to you at a time of war. Our experience in 
the global war on terror has validated the strategic decisions that 
were made.
    When our Nation was attacked, there was a great deal of pressure to 
put off transformation--people cautioned, you can't fight the global 
war on terrorism and simultaneously transform this institution. The 
opposite is the case. The global war on terror has made transforming an 
even more urgent priority. Our experience on September 11 made clear, 
our adversaries are transforming the ways in which they will threaten 
our people. We cannot stand still.
    The reality is that while the global war on terror is an impetus 
for change, it also complicates our task. Balancing risk between near- 
and long-term challenges is difficult even in peacetime. But today, we 
must accomplish three difficult challenges at once:

        (1) successfully fight the global war on terror;
        (2) prepare for near-term threats by making long delayed 
        investments in readiness, people, and modernization; and
        (3) prepare for the future by transforming for the 21st 
        century.

    The 2004 budget request before you today is designed to help us do 
all three.
    Our defense review identified six goals that drive our 
transformation efforts:

         First, we must be able to defend the U.S. homeland and 
        bases of operation overseas;
         Second, we must be able to project and sustain forces 
        in distant theaters;
         Third, we must be able to deny enemies sanctuary;
         Fourth, we must improve our space capabilities and 
        maintain unhindered access to space;
         Fifth, we must harness our advantages in information 
        technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces, so they 
        can fight jointly; and
         Sixth, we must be able to protect U.S. information 
        networks from attack--and to disable the information networks 
        of our adversaries.

    The President's 2004 budget requests funds for investments that 
will support each of these. For example:

         For programs to help defend the U.S. homeland and 
        bases of operation overseas--such as missile defense--we are 
        requesting $7.9 billion in the 2004 budget, and $55 billion 
        over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
         For programs to project and sustain forces in distant 
        theaters--such as new unmanned underwater vehicle program and 
        the Future Combat Systems--we are requesting $8 billion in 
        2004, and $96 billion over the FYDP.
         For programs to deny enemies sanctuary--such as 
        unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and the conversion of SSBN to 
        SSGN submarines--we are requesting $5.2 billion in 2004 and $49 
        billion over the FYDP.
         For programs to enhance U.S. space capabilities--such 
        as Space Control Systems--we are requesting $300 million in 
        2004 and $5 billion over the FYDP.
         For programs to harness our advantages in information 
        technology--such as laser satellite communications, Joint 
        Tactical Radio, and the Deployable Joint Command and Control 
        System--we are requesting $2.7 billion in 2004 and $28 billion 
        over the FYDP.
         For programs to protect U.S. information networks and 
        attack those of our adversaries--such as the Air and Space 
        Operations Center--we are requesting $200 million in 2004 and 
        $6 billion over the FYDP.

    Over the next 6 years, we have proposed a 30-percent increase in 
procurement funding and a 65-percent increase in funding for RDT&E 
above the 2002 baseline budget--a total investment of around $150 
billion annually.
    In addition to these increases, RDT&E spending will rise from 36 
percent to 42 percent of the overall investment budget. This shift 
reflects a decision to accelerate the development of needed next 
generation systems, and by accepting some near-term risk.
    Among the more important transformational investments we propose is 
our request for funds to establish a new joint national training 
capability. In the 21st century, we will fight wars jointly. Yet our 
forces still too often train and prepare for war as individual 
services. That needs to change. To ensure that U.S. forces train like 
they fight and fight like they train, we have budgeted $1.8 billion 
over the next 6 years to fund range improvements and permit more of 
both live and virtual joint training--an annual investment of $300 
million.
    The total investment in transforming military capabilities in the 
2004 request is $24.3 billion, and about $240 billion over the FYDP.
    But even as we continue to transform for the future, we must also 
recognize that new and unexpected dangers are waiting for us over the 
horizon. To prepare for the threats we will face later in this decade, 
the 2004 budget requests increased investments in a number of critical 
areas: readiness, quality of life improvements for the men and women in 
uniform, and increased investments to make certain existing 
capabilities are properly maintained and replenished.
    Over the next 6 years, the President has requested a 15-percent 
increase for military personnel accounts, above the 2002 baseline 
budget, and an increase in funding for family housing by 10 percent 
over the same period. The 2004 budget includes $1 billion for targeted 
military pay raises, ranging from 2 percent to 6.25 percent. Out of 
pocket expenses for those living in private housing drop from 7.5 
percent to 3.5 percent in 2004, and are on target for total elimination 
by 2005.
    Over the next 6 years, we have requested a 20-percent increase for 
operation and maintenance accounts above the 2002 baseline budget. We 
have added $40 billion for readiness of all the services and $6 billion 
for facilities sustainment over the same period. These investments 
should stabilize funding for training, spares, and tempo of operations 
(OPTEMPO), and put a stop to the past practice of raiding the 
investment accounts to pay for the immediate operation and maintenance 
needs, so we stop robbing the future to pay today's urgent bills.
    This 2004 budget does not include funds for operations in the 
global war on terror. Last year, we requested, but Congress did not 
provide, the $10 billion we knew we would need for the first few months 
of the global war on terror. Because of that, every month since October 
2002--October, November, December in 2002 and January and now February 
in 2003--we have had to borrow from other programs to pay for the costs 
of the war--robbing Peter to pay Paul. That does not include the costs 
of preparations for a possible contingency in Iraq. This pattern is 
fundamentally harmful to our ability to manage the Department. It 
causes waste and harmful management practices which consume management 
time that we cannot afford in a time of war and which are unfair to the 
taxpayers.
    In our 2004 request:

         We increased the shipbuilding budget by $2.7 billion 
        making good on our hope last year that we could increase 
        shipbuilding from five to seven ships.
         We increased the Special Operations budget by $1.5 
        billion, to pay for equipment lost in the global war on terror 
        and an additional 1,890 personnel.
         We increased military and civilian pay by $3.7 
        billion.
         We increased missile defense by $1.5 billion, 
        including increased funds for research and development of 
        promising new technologies, and to deploy a small number of 
        interceptors beginning in 2004.

    The President has asked Congress for a total of $379.9 billion for 
fiscal year 2004--a $15.3 billion increase over last year's budget.
    That is a large amount of the taxpayer's hard-earned money. To put 
it in context, when I was in Congress in the 1960s, the United States 
had the first $100 billion budget for the entire U.S. Government. 
Nonetheless, for 2004, the DOD budget will amount to roughly 3.4 
percent of Gross Domestic Products (GDP)--still historically low. In 
the mid-1980s, for example, the U.S. was dedicating around 6 percent of 
GDP to defense.
    Nonetheless, it is a significant investment. But compared with the 
costs in lives and treasure of another attack like the one we 
experienced on September 11--or a nuclear, chemical, or biological 
attack that would be vastly worse--less than 3\1/2\ cents on the dollar 
is a prudent investment in security and stability.
    But even that increase, as large as it is, only gets us part of the 
way. Our challenge is to do three difficult things at once:

         Win the global war on terror;
         Prepared for the threats we will face later this 
        decade; and
         Continue transforming for the threats we will face in 
        2010 and beyond.

    Any one of those challenges is difficult--and expensive. Taking on 
all three, as we must, required us to make tough choices between 
competing demands. Which meant that, inevitably, some desirable 
capabilities did not get funded.
    So let me state it straight out:

         Despite the significant increase in shipbuilding, we 
        did not get the shipbuilding rate up to the desired steady 
        state of 10 ships per year. Because of planned retirements of 
        other ships, we will drop below a 300-ship fleet during the 
        course of the FYDP. The Navy is in the process of transforming, 
        and has two studies underway for amphibious ships and for 
        submarines--we have increased shipbuilding in 2004, but we do 
        not want to lock ourselves into a shipbuilding program now 
        until we know precisely which ships we will want to build in 
        the outyears.
         We have not been able to modernize our tactical air 
        forces fast enough to reduce the average age of our aircraft 
        fleet.
         We have had to delay completing replenishment of all 
        inadequate family housing by 2007--though we got close!
         We have not fully resolved our so-called ``high-
        demand/low-density'' problems--systems like JSTARS, which, 
        because they have been chronically underfunded in the past, 
        will still be in short supply in this budget.
         We opted not to modernize a number of legacy 
        programs--taking on some near-term risks to fund transforming 
        capabilities we will need in this fast moving world.
         We did not achieve the level of growth in the science 
        and technology (S&T) accounts we had hoped for. Our request is 
        $10.2 billion, or 2.69 percent of the 2004 budget. That is 
        below the goal of 3 percent.
         We have delayed investments to completely fix the 
        recapitalization rate for DOD infrastructure. We are reviewing 
        out worldwide base structure, and starting the basic steps to 
        prepare for the 2005 BRAC. We want to think carefully about how 
        best to match our base structure and force structure. We still 
        intend to get the rate down from 148 years to 67 years by 2008, 
        and we expect to accelerate facilities investments in 2006 
        after we have made the needed decisions with respect to our 
        base structure at home and abroad.

    That's the bad news. But there is the good news as well: in making 
difficult choices between competing priorities, we made better choices 
this year because we followed the new approach to balancing risks that 
we developed in last year's defense review--an approach that takes into 
account not just the risks in operations and contingency plans, but 
also the risks to people, modernization, and the future--risks that, in 
the past, had been crowded out by more immediate pressing demands. The 
result is a more balanced approach and a more coherent program.
    While we are requesting increased funds, the Services have stepped 
up to the plate and will be canceling, slowing, or restructuring a 
number of programs--to invest the savings in transforming capabilities. 
For example:

         The Army came up with savings of some $22 billion over 
        the 6-year FYDP, by terminating 24 systems, including Crusader, 
        the Bradley A3, and Abrams upgrades and reducing or 
        restructuring another 24 including medium tactical vehicles. 
        The Army used these savings to help pay for new 
        transformational capabilities, such as the Future Combat 
        Systems.
         The Navy reallocated nearly $39 billion over the FYDP, 
        by retiring 26 ships and 259 aircraft, and merging the Navy and 
        Marine air forces. They invested these savings in new ship 
        designs and aircraft.
         The Air Force shifted funds and changed its business 
        practices to account for nearly $21 billion over the FYDP. It 
        will retire 114 fighter and 115 mobility/tanker aircraft. The 
        savings will be invested in readiness, people, modernization 
        and new system starts and cutting edge systems like unmanned 
        aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles 
        (UCAVs).

    In all, by retiring or restructuring less urgent programs, we have 
achieved savings of some $80 billion over the FYDP--money that will be 
reinvested by the Services in capabilities necessary for the 21st 
century.
    Finding those savings is important, both in terms of freeing up 
resources for more urgent priorities, and because it is respectful of 
the taxpayers' hard-earned money. We feel a deep obligation to not 
waste the taxpayers' dollars. We need to show the taxpayers that we are 
willing to stop doing things that we know we don't need to be doing, 
and take that money and put it into investments we need.
    Some critics may argue we cut too deeply. We did cancel a number of 
programs that were troubled, to be sure, but also others that were not 
troubled--but which simply did not fit with our new defense strategy. 
In a world of unlimited resources, they would have been nice to have. 
But in a world where needs outstrip available funds, we cannot do 
everything. Something has to give.
    Still others argue from the opposite direction--saying that we did 
not cut deeply enough. They ask: what happened to your hit list? The 
answer is: we never had a ``hit list.'' What we had was a new defense 
strategy, and we reviewed all the programs in the pipeline to see if 
they fit into that defense strategy and the new security environment we 
face.
    Some were eliminated. In other cases, it made more sense to scale 
them back or change them. For example, the Comanche helicopter program 
was born in the 1980s, and the Army planned to buy around 1,200 of 
them. But in the interim, the Army decided to change its structure. In 
the way the Army plans to fight in the decades ahead, the role of the 
helicopter changes--it will be used more for reconnaissance and light 
attack. For that mission 1,200 helicopters weren't needed--so we 
brought the number down to about 650.
    In still other areas, we set up competition for future missions. 
For example, in tactical aircraft, by 2010 the F-22 will be nearing the 
end of its planned production run, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will 
be coming on line, a number of UCAVs will be ready, and hypersonic 
systems could be within reach. As a result, future Presidents will have 
a rich menu of choices for strike operations we don't now have.
    We are transforming the way we develop new systems. The old way was 
to develop a picture of the perfect system, and then build the system 
to meet that vision of perfection, however long it took or cost. The 
result was that, as technology advanced, and with it dreams of what a 
perfect system could do, capabilities were taking longer and longer to 
develop and the cost of systems increased again and again--time is 
money.
    Our approach is to start with the basics, simpler items, and 
rollout early models faster--and then add capabilities to the basic 
system as they become available. This is what the private sector does--
companies bring a new car or aircraft on line, for example, and then 
update it over a period of years with new designs and technologies. We 
intend to do the same.
    Take, for example, our approach to ballistic missile defense. 
Instead of taking a decade or more to develop someone's vision of a 
``perfect'' shield, we have instead decided to develop and put in place 
a rudimentary system by 2004--one which should make us somewhat safer 
than we are now--and then build on that foundation with increasingly 
effective capabilities as the technologies mature.
    We intend to apply this ``spiral development'' approach to a number 
of systems, restructured programs, and new starts alike over the course 
of the FYDP. The result should be that new capabilities will be 
available faster, so we can better respond to fast moving adversaries 
and newly emerging threats.
    As a result of all these strategic investments and decisions, we 
can now see the effects of transforming begin to unfold. Consider just 
some of the changes that are taking place:

         Today, the missile defense research, development, and 
        testing program has been revitalized and we are on track for 
        limited land/sea deployment in 2004-2005.
         Today, the Space Based Radar, which will help provide 
        near-persistent 24/7/365 coverage of the globe, is scheduled to 
        be ready in 2012.
         In this budget, we believe SBIRS-High is properly 
        funded.
         Today, we are converting four Trident SSBN subs into 
        conventional SSGNs, capable of delivering special forces and 
        cruise missiles to denied areas. Today, we are proposing to 
        build the CVN-21 aircraft carrier in 2007, which will include 
        many new capabilities that were previously scheduled to be 
        introduced only in 2011.
         Today, instead of one UCAV program in development, the 
        X-45, which was designed for a limited mission: suppression of 
        enemy air defense, we have set up competition among a number of 
        programs that will produce UCAVs able to conduct a broad range 
        of missions.
         Today, we are revitalizing the B-1 fleet by reducing 
        its size and using savings to modernize remaining aircraft with 
        precision weapons, self-protection systems, and reliability 
        upgrades--and thanks to these efforts, I am told the B-1 now 
        has the highest mission capable rates in the history of the 
        program.
         Today, in place of the Crusader, the Army is building 
        a new family of precision artillery--including precisions 
        munitions and Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon for the Future Combat 
        Systems.
         Today, we have seen targeted pay-raises and other 
        reforms help retain mid-career officers and NCOs, so that fewer 
        of them leave the Service while still in their prime, so the 
        country can continue to benefit from their talent and 
        experience.

    These are positive changes that will ensure that future 
administrations will have the capabilities they need to defend the 
country, as well as a menu of choices which they can then select from 
to shape the direction of the Department a decade from now, as the 21st 
century security environment continues to change and evolve.

                               CONCLUSION

    Finally, I believe that the transparency of the process we have 
used to develop this budget has been unprecedented. For several months 
now, we have been providing detailed briefings to those interested in 
defense here on Capitol Hill, so that Congress is not simply being 
presented with the President's budget today, but has been kept in the 
loop as decisions were being made. Our goal was to ensure that Members 
and staff have had every opportunity to better understand the thinking 
that lies behind these proposals. I am told that the extent of 
consultation from the Defense Department to Congress this year has been 
unprecedented.
    I hope you will take this as evidence of the fact that we are 
serious about our commitment to transform not only our Armed Forces, 
but to transform DOD's relationship with Congress as well. Whether each 
Member will agree with each of the individual decisions and 
recommendations that have been made in this budget, the fact is that it 
has been developed in an unprecedented spirit of openness and 
cooperation.
    We hope that this spirit of openness and cooperation can continue 
as Congress deliberates this year both the President's budget and the 
legislation we are now discussing with you and will be sending to 
transform the way the Defense Department operates. We must work 
together to bring DOD out of the industrial age, and help get it 
arranged for the fast-paced security environment of the 21st century.
    I close by saying that transformation is not an event--it is a 
process. There is no point at which the Defense Department will move 
from being ``untransformed'' to ``transformed.'' Our goal is to set in 
motion a process of continuing transformation, and a culture that will 
keep the United States several steps ahead of any potential 
adversaries.
    To do that we need not only resources, but equally, we need the 
freedom to use them with speed and agility, so we can respond quickly 
to the new threats we will face as this century unfolds.
    Thank you Mr. Chairman.

    Chairman Warner. Before I go on to General Myers, you said 
the level of consultation was unprecedented, and that was in a 
positive vein. I assure you that we have achieved a high water 
mark of any President and his team of trying to keep Congress 
informed. Thank you.
    General Myers.

   STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT 
                        CHIEFS OF STAFF

    General Myers. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, 
distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today and to report on the 
state of the United States Armed Forces. Mr. Chairman, you have 
already said that my prepared remarks will be entered in the 
record and I thank you for that. I will just make a few short 
introductory remarks and we'll get on to questions.
    Today around the world our soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
marines, and coastguardsmen remain engaged in a wide variety of 
missions. Many of these missions are done far from the public 
eye. Yet, there is no more important task before them than to 
bring the fight to the terrorists. Active duty, Reserve, and 
DOD civilians, together with members of the interagency and 
coalition partners, form one team in this effort.
    Our service men and women remain a highly effective 
instrument of national power. Every day this team helps disrupt 
and capture terrorist cells around the world. In addition, our 
combined efforts in Afghanistan have accomplished a great deal 
over the past year. We have restored hope to the people of 
Afghanistan and that nation is on the way to recovery. Clearly, 
there is still much work to be done in Afghanistan, as there is 
on the war on terrorism.
    As the President and Secretary of Defense have said, this 
war will last a long time. But let there be no doubt, we will 
win this conflict. No matter what task we in the Armed Forces 
confront, I am convinced that improving our joint warfighting 
capability will be central to our future success.
    So let me take a minute to share with you what we are doing 
in that area. As you look at joint warfighting today and 
tomorrow, improving our command and control capabilities is the 
single most essential investment we can make, in my view. 
Enhanced command and control combined with intelligence that is 
rapidly shared among the warfighters will allow our joint 
commanders to integrate and unite separate service capabilities 
in a single operation or across the campaign. In my view that 
translates directly to increased efficiencies but more 
importantly to increased effectiveness.
    To reinforce this potential, the President directed Joint 
Forces Command to focus on transforming our joint team to meet 
the challenges of this new century. As a result, this command's 
efforts included the first major joint field experiment, 
Millennium Challenge 02. This experiment demonstrated a variety 
of new concepts and systems that enable critical command and 
control, collaborative information sharing and time sensitive 
targeting capabilities. Investment in these capabilities is 
essential to winning in combat today and particularly in the 
future.
    In fact, General Franks and Central Command are using 
concepts, technologies, and capabilities from Millennium 
Challenge 02 in their current operational planning for Iraq.
    One of the positive results from Millennium Challenge 02 is 
the potential for a joint commander to communicate with his or 
her forces while en route to a crisis area. Near-term technical 
solutions will allow the joint team to keep situational 
awareness of the battlefield while converging from dispersed 
areas. Most importantly, they will allow a commander to employ 
forces without sectors or deconfliction matrices we've used in 
the past, making us much more efficient and effective on the 
battlefield.
    Joint Forces Command's efforts in these areas will help us 
ensure that operational concepts and technical command and 
control solutions that we develop in the future are in effect 
born joint.
    Our emerging command and control, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities must allow the 
Services to rapid and repeatedly plug into each other's 
information and then play or operate as one joint team. As 
such, future weapons systems and delivery platforms must be 
weighted towards what they bring to the joint warfighting team. 
Our approach to improving command and control networks reflects 
our larger approach to upgrading our forces in general.
    Clearly, we must balance near-term recapitalization and 
modernization with long-term investments to transform the force 
for the future. In the first case, we are ensuring our joint 
team is as capable as possible for today's missions, and in the 
second case, we are ensuring we are relevant to dominate a 
range of military operations for tomorrow.
    With your support, we can ensure our men and women in 
uniform have the best tools and technologies possible.
    Investments in hardware are only part of the task to keep 
our force ready. To meet these challenges, we must continue to 
invest in our people and their skills. Your commitment to 
improving joint professional military education will be one way 
to ensure our warfighters have the intellectual foundation to 
meet the unknown challenges they will face, and your support to 
fund the training and to equip our troops with the most capable 
systems sends a very powerful message of support.
    You also demonstrated your commitment by ensuring they have 
the quality of life they deserve, in terms of pay, housing, and 
medical care. This committee, along with the rest of Congress 
and administration, has made quality of life improvements a top 
priority.
    Our world class troops and their families deserve first 
class support and you have always been there for them, and on 
their behalf I thank you for your continued support.
    [The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]
           Prepared Statement by Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF
    It is an honor to report to Congress on the state of the U.S. Armed 
Forces.
    Today, our Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 
coastguardsmen operate in an environment characterized by opportunity 
and danger. In the wake of September 11, U.S. forces are now deployed 
to an unprecedented number of locations. Our forces also operate with a 
wider array of coalition partners to accomplish more diverse missions.
    These operations are required, as the world remains a dangerous 
place. In recent months, terrorists have successfully conducted 
numerous attacks--in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. The 
loss of innocent lives serves as a poignant reminder that terrorists' 
evil has no moral or territorial limits. Coalition discoveries in 
Afghanistan and other places confirm that al Qaeda actively seeks 
weapons of mass destruction. This network remains active and determined 
to conduct more attacks against the U.S. and our allies.
    At the same time, other threats to U.S. interests have not abated. 
U.S. Armed Forces remain focused on preparing for potential regional 
conflict. The proliferation of advanced technology, weapons, and 
associated expertise has increased the probability that our adversaries 
will be capable in the future of fielding significantly more robust and 
lethal means to attack the U.S. and our interests. In December 2002, 
North Korea announced that it would resume its nuclear program. Iraq 
has used chemical and biological weapons in the past and would likely 
use them again in the future. Iraq is also aggressively seeking nuclear 
weapons. These facts create imperatives for our Nation's Armed Forces. 
All the while, U.S. forces remain prepared to confront the consequences 
of factional strife in distant lands and respond to humanitarian 
disasters.
    The President's National Security Strategy provides a new focus for 
our Nation's Armed Forces. Based on detailed analysis in the most 
recent 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Department adopted 
a new defense strategy. Today, we must be ready to assure our allies, 
while we dissuade, deter, and defeat any adversary. We possess the 
forces necessary to defend the United States homeland and deter forward 
in four critical regions. If required, we will swiftly defeat the 
efforts of two adversaries in an overlapping timeframe, while having 
the ability to ``win decisively'' in one theater. In addition, our 
forces are able to conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies, 
maintain a sufficient force generation capability, and support a 
strategic Reserve.
    At home, the establishment of the United States Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) has significantly improved the preparedness, responsiveness, 
and integration between the U.S. military and other Federal agencies 
defending our homeland. NORTHCOM is an integral part of the rapidly 
expanding interagency network supporting homeland defense.
    Our Nation's entire Armed Forces remain as engaged today as at any 
time since the Second World War. The war on terrorism remains our 
primary focus. In concert with other instruments of national power, our 
Armed Forces are tracking down al Qaeda in Afghanistan and around the 
world. Simultaneously, we are operating in the No-Fly Zones over Iraq, 
enforcing U.N. sanctions in the Arabian Gulf, facilitating 
reconstruction in Afghanistan, conducting peacekeeping operations in 
the Balkans, supporting our partners in South America against narcotics 
trafficking and terrorist cells, preserving stability in the Korean 
Peninsula, and defending the American homeland. Clearly, the American 
people should know that their Armed Forces are operating at a high 
tempo.
    As a result of this unprecedented strategic environment, I have 
established three priorities as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
To win the war on terrorism, to improve joint warfighting, and to 
transform our Nation's military to face the dangers of the 21st 
century. These priorities also reflect the priorities of the Secretary 
of Defense. Combined with the President's vision, the Secretary's 
leadership, the support of Congress and the selfless service of our 
Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and 
civilian workforce--our Nation's Armed Forces are making progress in 
each of these areas.
    Al Qaeda was not created in a single day. It formed over the course 
of a decade or more prior to September 11, 2001. It cannot be destroyed 
in a day or a year--it will require a commitment of many years. We 
recognize that dangerous and difficult work remains. The following 
highlights recent successes and describes what additional actions are 
required to protect our Nation in our dynamic security environment.

                            WAR ON TERRORISM

    For the past 16 months, the U.S. Armed Forces, in concert with 
other Federal agencies and our coalition partners, have conducted a 
determined campaign to defeat the most potent threat to our way of 
life--global terrorist organizations. Operation Enduring Freedom has 
dealt a severe blow to the al Qaeda transnational network. About 50 key 
al Qaeda officials, operatives, and logisticians have been killed or 
captured. Numerous other operatives have also been removed; however, al 
Qaeda remains a formidable and adaptive peril to our Nation and our 
partners.
    Our successes reflect the careful integration of all instruments of 
national power. This war against terrorists requires the inclusive 
commitment of the military, financial, economic, law enforcement, and 
intelligence resources of our Nation. On the international level, the 
military support and cooperation has been remarkable. Until August of 
last year, when we determined it was no longer required, NATO provided 
Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to supplement our E-3 aircraft 
patrolling over American cities. NATO allies remain with us in 
Afghanistan and patrolling the oceans to interdict terrorists and their 
weapons or resources. More than 90 nations share our resolve and 
contribute daily to the goal of destroying al Qaeda. As part of this 
effort, numerous bilateral counterterrorist exercises and exchanges 
have been conducted around the world.
    At the national level, the Defense Department has made numerous 
adjustments. The creation of the Joint Interagency Task Force for 
Counterterrorism enables the rapid flow of information and analysis 
from national resources to the battlefield. Likewise, Combatant 
Commanders established Joint Interagency Coordination Groups to share 
information, coordinate actions, and streamline operations among 
military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. At U.S. Special 
Operations Command, the Counterterrorism Campaign Support Group 
combines the expertise and resources of the Departments of State, 
Treasury, and Justice and the CIA with our Special Operations warriors 
at the operational level. The Counterterrorism Campaign Support Group 
fuses intelligence, interagency, and military activities in a seamless 
organization.

                      CURRENT OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

    In Afghanistan, our greatest success has been to deny al Qaeda an 
operating haven. Today, Afghanistan has the first true chance for peace 
in 23 years. More than 2 million Afghan people have returned home. We 
are in the final stages of Phase III (Decisive Operations). Phase III 
has severely degraded al Qaeda's operational capabilities and their 
ability to train new members. Their support continues to decline among 
the Afghan people. Pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda resistance remain 
within Afghanistan primarily along the Pakistani border. Nonetheless, 
overall conditions may permit us to soon shift to Phase IV (Stability 
Operations). Once the President decides to move into Phase IV, we will 
increase the civil and reconstruction assistance to the Afghan 
government. Stability operations will require a great deal of support 
from the international community to be successful.
    This past year, a key task to promote stability began with training 
of the Afghan National Army. The U.S. spearheaded the development of 
this force with training, equipment, and force structure requirements. 
The Afghan National Army's first five battalions have completed basic 
training at the Kabul Military Training Center. More than 1,300 troops 
began advanced training as of December. The sixth battalion is 
currently in basic training and soon we will begin select officer 
training. The French have funded the initial salaries for the recruits 
for all six battalions and provided half of the training. Recently 
trained forces are integrating with our forces throughout the 
countryside. To date, the international community has donated $40 
million worth of equipment. Our military forces will be part of an 
ongoing commitment to provide equipment and expertise.
    The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan 
continues its role mandated by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security 
Council resolutions. Today, Germany and the Netherlands are preparing 
to share leadership responsibilities of the International Security 
Assistance Force as they take over in February 2003. They follow the 
example set by the United Kingdom and Turkey. Twenty-two nations 
contribute more than 4,500 troops to this vital mission.
    In January 2002, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) proposed a 
concept of operations to disrupt terrorist operations in and around 
Yemen. Central to this plan, CENTCOM proposed to strengthen Yemeni 
Special Forces, capability for counterterrorism operations and expand 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Yemeni 
Special Forces have been trained on counterterrorism tactics and 
procedures and are currently receiving maritime counterterrorism 
training. The working relationship between the U.S. and Yemeni 
Government has greatly improved as a result of this training program.
    CENTCOM also established Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) 
as part of its Theater Counterterrorism Campaign. In December 2002, 
JTF-HOA stood up while embarked on U.S.S. Mount Whitney. JTF-HOA 
provides CENTCOM a regional counterterrorism focus in East Africa and 
Yemen. It exercises command and control of counterterrorism operations 
for this area. The JTF-HOA staff will remain embarked on U.S.S. Mount 
Whitney for 4 to 6 months until the infrastructure is in place ashore 
at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.
    Meanwhile, CENTCOM and Allied Forces continue Maritime Interception 
Operations in the Arabian Gulf to enforce U.N. sanctions against Iraq. 
In 2002, Coalition Forces diverted over 800 vessels suspected of 
carrying illegal Iraqi oil. This reflects a significant increase over 
the 115 vessels diverted in 2001.
    United States European Command (EUCOM), through its Special 
Operations Command, Europe, began the Georgia Train and Equip Program 
to build a Georgian capability to deal with the terrorist presence in 
the Pankisi Gorge. EUCOM developed a plan to train three staffs, four 
battalions and one Mechanized/Armor company team. EUCOM has completed 
training the Georgian Ministry of Defense staff, the Land Forces 
Command staff and the first battalion. In December, Commander, EUCOM 
directed Marine Forces Europe to assume the Georgia Train and Equip 
Program mission, which will resume training in February. Six other 
allies contributed nearly $2 million in materiel reflecting the 
international nature of this program.
    In July, the President approved Expanded Maritime Interception 
Operations to interdict terrorists and their resources. With this 
order, the President authorized commanders to stop, board, and search 
merchant ships identified to be transporting terrorists and/or 
terrorist-related materiel. Expanded Maritime Interception Operations 
are focused on EUCOM and CENTCOM's Areas of Responsibility (AORs) while 
PACOM and the other Combatant Commanders are developing Expanded 
Maritime Interception Operations plans. Eleven nations provide forces 
for Maritime Interception Operations within the CENTCOM AOR. German and 
Spanish senior officers command parts of these operations--reflecting 
the coalition commitment to the war on terrorism. So far, EUCOM's 
Maritime Interception Operations have stopped 14 ships. NATO maritime 
and air forces support the Maritime Interception Operations within 
EUCOM's AOR.
    In Europe, we support NATO's plan to transition Stabilization 
Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a minimal presence and Kosovo forces to 
a reduced presence by the end of 2004. In the spring of 2003, the NATO 
Military Committee will review the proposed force structure reductions 
and restructuring for Bosnia and Kosovo. Our presence in the Balkans 
has not only promoted peace in the region, it has also enhanced our 
ability to conduct counterterrorism operations.
    During this past year in support of Operation Enduring Freedom--
Philippines, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has provided the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines military advice and assistance in targeting Abu 
Sayyaf Group terrorist activities in the Philippines. U.S. forces could 
be available to provide follow-on advice and assistance if requested by 
the Government of Philippines, and approved by the President and the 
Secretary of Defense. In concert with these efforts supporting 
Operation Enduring Freedom, Congress has approved the Security 
Assistance Funding necessary to provide counterterrorism training for 
the armed forces of the Philippines. Training will begin in the 
February/March timeframe.
    United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) continues to support 
counter-narcotics trafficking and counterterrorism efforts in South 
America. In accordance with new Presidential policy and expanded 
legislative authority, we are assisting the Colombian military in its 
fight against designated terrorist organizations by providing advice, 
training, and equipment. Our current operations are built on 
preexisting counter-narcotics missions. U.S. troops are currently 
training the Colombian military to protect critical infrastructures, 
such as the Cano Limon Pipeline. In addition personnel will deploy in 
fiscal year 2003 to serve as Operations and Intelligence Planning 
Assistance Teams at selected units to assist the Colombian military in 
its fight against terrorism. This assistance will continue over the 
next several years. The U.S. military presence in Colombia is limited 
to the troop caps established by Congress, in terms of uniformed and 
contract personnel.
    The Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is a focal 
point of increased drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, 
document fraud, and Islamic terrorist-supported activities. U.S. and 
Brazilian officials estimate that between $10-$12 billion USD/year 
flows through the Tri-Border Area, some of which is diverted to known 
terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas.
    Commander, SOUTHCOM continues detainee operations (detention and 
intelligence collection missions) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. While the 
detainees are not entitled to the status of Enemy Prisoners of War, the 
President and the Secretary of Defense have directed that the U.S. 
Armed Forces treat them humanely and to the extent appropriate and 
consistent with military necessity, consistent with the principles of 
the Geneva Conventions. SOUTHCOM has constructed an additional 190 
medium security units to augment the 816 holding units and fortified 
billeting structures for U.S. military personnel assigned. Almost 2,000 
U.S. military personnel are deployed to Guantanamo Bay in support of 
detainee operations. The President issued an order on November 13, 
2001, authorizing use of military commissions to prosecute individuals 
subject to the order for offenses against the laws of war and other 
applicable laws. To date, no one has been made specifically subject to 
the order, and therefore, no one has been prosecuted by military 
commission. The Secretary of Defense appointed the Secretary of the 
Army to lead war crimes investigations. A few of those detained at 
Guantanamo determined to be of no intelligence or law enforcement value 
or threat to the U.S. or its interests, have been released and returned 
to their countries of origin.
    We view Guantanamo Bay as a national asset that supports our work 
in securing intelligence vital to success in the war on terrorism and 
protection of our homeland. It also supports interagency and 
international intelligence and law enforcement efforts. Interrogations 
at Guantanamo Bay have resulted in intelligence of high value. 
Information gathered from known terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay has 
helped us to define and disrupt the global terrorist threat.

                       UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 2002

    On 1 October 2002, we implemented the 2002 Unified Command Plan, as 
directed by the President. The 2002 Unified Command Plan, and its 
subsequent Change 1, created United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 
disestablished United States Space Command (SPACECOM) and combined 
SPACECOM's missions and forces with United States Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM), thereby establishing a ``new'' STRATCOM.

          UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND HOMELAND SECURITY

    NORTHCOM's mission is to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and 
aggression aimed at the U.S. and its territories. When directed, 
NORTHCOM provides military assistance to civil authorities, including 
consequence management. Commander, NORTHCOM is dual-hatted as 
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD has 
control of the air defense of CONUS. Land and Maritime operations are 
controlled by NORTHCOM.
    NORTHCOM stood up its combatant command staff and accepted Homeland 
Defense missions and tasks from United States Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM) and other combatant commands. It has also developed a plan to 
reach its full operational capability. Currently, NORTHCOM is engaged 
with Federal and State agencies, the National Guard and NORAD to plan 
and exercise a variety of homeland defense and civil support tasks. 
Simultaneously, NORTHCOM is cultivating closer relationships with our 
North American neighbors.
    As part of this effort, NORTHCOM's Standing Joint Task Force Civil 
Support provides command and control for DOD forces supporting the lead 
Federal agency managing the consequences of chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incidents in addition to 
natural disasters. As such, Joint Task Force Civil Support provides a 
sustained planning staff that has formed a habitual relationship with 
key Federal and State agencies plus communities nationwide.
    NORAD's responsibilities for air and ground early warning systems 
and alert fighter support in defense of CONUS, Canada and Alaska remain 
unchanged. In addition, NORAD is identifying the infrastructure needed 
for the defense of the National Capital Region.
    On December 9, 2002, the U.S. and Canada agreed to create a new bi-
national land, maritime, and civil support military planning group at 
NORAD to help examine potential responses to threats and attacks on the 
U.S. or Canada. This initiative will advance our ability to defend our 
Nation.
    Last year Operation Noble Eagle flew over 14,000 sorties even while 
our current operations overseas required key resources. These sorties 
represent NORAD's contributions to Operation Noble Eagle and defense of 
the American homeland.

                    UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

    United States STRATCOM's mission is to establish and provide full-
spectrum global strike, coordinate space and information operations 
capabilities to meet both deterrent and decisive national security 
objectives. STRATCOM retains its nuclear triad of submarine, bomber, 
and missile forces.
    On 10 January 2003, the President signed Change 2 to the Unified 
Command Plan. This latest change assigned four emergent missions to 
STRATCOM and reflects the U.S. military's increased emphasis on a 
global view. These new missions include missile defense, global strike, 
DOD information operations and global command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Missile 
defense is an inherently multi-command and multi-regional task. 
STRATCOM will serve as the primary advocate in the development of 
missile defense operational architecture. With its global strike 
responsibilities, the Command will provide a core cadre to plan and 
execute nuclear, conventional, and information operations anywhere in 
the world. STRATCOM serves as the DOD advocate for integrating the 
desired military effects of information operations. These initiatives 
represent a major step in transforming our military and in implementing 
the new strategic triad envisioned in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.
    STRATCOM will also continue the former U.S. Space Command's legacy 
of providing space support for our joint team. The Global Positioning 
System (GPS) offers an excellent example of how space systems enhance 
our Joint Warfighting Team. The GPS's worldwide position, navigation, 
and timing information give U.S. forces an all-weather, precision 
engagement capability. As an example of one application, the U.S. Army 
fielded a blue force tracking system--a space-based tool that gives 
commanders awareness of their units' locations.
    U.S. military space superiority requires continued advances in 
space control and access along with the cooperation of our allies. The 
European Union, for example, is developing Galileo, a civil satellite 
navigation system that risks our enhancement to military GPS. As 
currently designed, the Galileo signal will operate in the same 
bandwidth as our GPS system's civil and military signals. When Galileo 
begins operating, its signals will directly overlay the spectrum 
associated with our new GPS military code. Continued negotiations to 
resolve this political issue with the European Union is essential to 
ensuring our joint team maintains the advantages of GPS in combat.
    Concurrent with these ongoing operations, the Services, Joint 
Staff, and Combatant Commands have pursued a 15-percent major 
headquarters reduction. To date, DOD headquarters personnel have been 
reduced by more than 11 percent. Given commitments around the world 
today, any further reductions beyond those already taken could 
adversely impact our ability to meet the demands of the war on 
terrorism, Homeland Security, global military presence and respond to 
any new threats. Nonetheless, the Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders, 
and I continue to explore ways to reduce and streamline headquarters 
functions.

                     ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION

    Antiterrorism/Force Protection remains a top priority for all 
commanders. Our adversaries--unable to confront or compete with the 
United States militarily--have and will continue to use terrorist acts 
to attack U.S. citizens, property, and interests--to include military 
bases and personnel. In the fiscal year 2003 budget, the Antiterrorism/
Force Protection portion of the Combating Terrorism budget totaled $9.3 
billion. The terrorist threat environment has forced us to maintain a 
higher worldwide Force Protection Condition for longer periods of time. 
In the short term, this task is being met with an increase in manpower.
    For example, EUCOM is currently at Force Protection Condition 
Bravo. In the short-term, additional troops are required to guard U.S. 
military bases throughout EUCOM's theater. In the long-term, the 
Secretary of Defense directed us to pursue new technologies that will 
reduce the manpower footprint while improving force protection, as well 
as seeking host nation support for the force protection mission.
    The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund helped provide 
immediate Antiterrorism/Force Protection off-the-shelf technology to 
Combatant Commanders to satisfy emergent requirements that could not 
wait for the normal budget process or long-term technical solutions. 
Last year's funded systems included explosive detection systems that 
enhanced access control, intrusion detection systems that provided 
broader perimeter security while reducing manpower requirements and 
chemical/biological (Chem/Bio) detection systems to improve 
installation defense capabilities. The Department authorized $47 
million this past year for the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative 
Fund, nearly twice the fiscal year 2000 expenditure.
    To support the Combatant Commanders' Antiterrorism/Force Protection 
efforts, the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams will 
visit 95 military installations worldwide this year. Joint Staff 
Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams assess physical security 
measures, infrastructure support and structural vulnerabilities, 
intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities and the 
installation's ability to respond to terrorist incidents. Over 500,000 
personnel received ``General Antiterrorism Awareness'' training last 
year. This on-line training is now also available to DOD family 
members.
    The Defense Department also finalized prescriptive antiterrorism 
engineering and construction standards to improve survivability of our 
personnel from the effects of an explosive device. In large part 
because the Pentagon renovation project followed design strategies 
based on these new antiterrorism construction standards, the damage and 
loss of life from the Pentagon attack was significantly reduced.
    U.S. forces' antiterrorism capabilities are seen as a standard 
worldwide. NATO sought U.S. military expertise to improve antiterrorism 
training for all NATO forces. As a result, last summer, NATO approved 
policy guidance that clarified antiterrorism responsibilities for non-
Article 5 operations, delineated minimum unit antiterrorism plan 
requirements and increased emphasis on weapons of mass destruction 
defense and consequence management planning. The U.S. will assist NATO 
to implement this important guidance.
    We are working hard to expand and improve our capabilities to 
protect our personnel against chem/bio agents. DOD initiated 
vaccinating select segments of the force against anthrax and smallpox. 
Our medical treatment capabilities must expand to include improved 
treatment against weapons of mass destruction while providing 
additional medical countermeasures, surveillance systems and response 
teams.
    We improved overall joint force readiness by our recent procurement 
of improved chem/bio defensive protective clothing, masks, and 
detection systems. This equipment is significantly more reliable, 
better at agent detection and further enhances our forces' overall 
capability to operate in the chem/bio environment.
    In the area of installation protection, we have improved detection 
systems plus consequence management assessment and training 
capabilities at 23 of our overseas bases. In addition, we performed a 
thorough assessment of our detection and first responder capabilities 
at nine key CONUS installations. These lessons learned will guide 
development of a comprehensive plan to improve chem/bio defense at more 
than 200 bases over the next 6 years. Although we improved our chem/bio 
capabilities, fighting a war in this environment remains a serious 
challenge. Therefore, we must continue to fund research, development, 
and acquisition projects that ensure our forces can operate 
successfully in this adverse environment.

                    READINESS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

    The readiness of our general-purpose forces, whether forward 
deployed, operating in support of contingency operations or in Homeland 
Defense, continues to be solid. U.S. forces are well trained and in 
general, possess the personnel, equipment, and resources needed to 
accomplish the military objectives outlined in the Defense Strategy.
    In light of the current pace of operations, it is notable that 
active U.S. Army divisions maintain high readiness levels. U.S. Air 
Force aircraft mission capable rates improved over the past 6 months. 
U.S. Navy forces continue to meet readiness goals for both the deployed 
and non-deployed segments of the force. The U.S. Marine Corps is ready 
to meet the demands of current and potential operations. While ongoing 
global operations increased the workload on the Nation's military 
focus, these forces remain prepared to accomplish their wartime tasks.
    Material readiness has improved substantially in part, due to the 
tremendous support of Congress. One example is munitions, where recent 
supplemental measures have allowed Combatant Commanders to increase 
stockpiles of key all-weather and advanced precision-guided munitions. 
These munitions enable the joint team to place at risk a wide array of 
enemy targets. Funding increases this past year dramatically increased 
precision-guided munitions production rates, and selected production 
rates should be near maximum capacity by August 2003. Continued 
congressional support is critical to build munitions and materiel 
inventories to levels that meet warfighting requirements.
    While the force is ready, this past year significantly stressed the 
readiness of several critical enablers. Our intelligence forces operate 
under increased pressure as a result of the war on terrorism. Key skill 
sets (like targeteers, linguists, and police-like investigative skills) 
are in short supply. Recognizing this fact, our intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance forces must mature into a more 
adaptable and flexible contingency collection capability. Many systems 
were developed to meet a cold war threat and provide excellent force-
on-force collection capability. The ingenuity of our soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen has allowed many systems to perform 
a valuable role in the war on terrorism.
    The present posture of the military intelligence forces, for the 
long-term war on terrorism is improving, but many challenges remain. 
This global war clearly demonstrates the need for persistent long-
loiter intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. 
Military intelligence also requires low observable unmanned aerial 
vehicle systems, close-access sensors, and a greater emphasis on human 
intelligence collection. In addition, all intelligence communities must 
provide an information architecture that provides a ``push and pull'' 
capability for the joint warfighter, law enforcement and counter-
intelligence personnel. We must shift our attitudes away from the 
mindset of a ``need to know'' to one of ``need to share.''
    Our strategic mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and prepositioned 
materiel) provides us the capability to swiftly move forces around the 
world. The U.S. remains the only nation who can routinely move units 
and materiel globally with confidence and speed. While our airlift and 
air refueling assets performed magnificently in support of the war on 
terrorism, this high operational demand is accelerating the aging of C-
5 and tanker aircraft and created unanticipated wear and tear on our C-
17 fleet. As a result, strategic airlift remains one of our top 
priorities. The C-17 multi-year procurement plus the C-5 Re-engining 
and Reliability Enhancement Programs are major steps to meet the 
minimum wartime airlift capacity of 54.5 million ton miles/day. The 
follow-on multi-year procurement with Boeing for 60+ C-17s will bring 
the total C-17 fleet to 180 aircraft in 2007. As a corollary priority, 
replacing the 40-year-old KC-135 air refueling fleet is an essential 
joint warfighting requirement.
    With congressional support, our strategic sealift achieved the 
Mobility Requirements Study-05 goals for surge and prepositioned fleet 
sealift requirements. The maintenance of our organic sealift fleet 
remains a high priority to ensure we can deploy sufficient force to 
support routine and contingency operations. To support greater levels 
of mobilization, DOD can also access additional U.S. commercial 
shipping through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. This 
agreement is critical to ensure that adequate sealift capacity (and 
associated mariners) is available to support DOD requirements during 
wartime. We are working closely with the Department of Transportation 
to ensure these requirements can be met.
    Our prepositioned material reduced response time in key theaters. 
This critical readiness program enables our success in the war on 
terrorism and other contingency operations.
    For intratheater mobility, the Department recognizes the Joint 
Venture, High-Speed Vessel as a promising delivery platform. This 
vessel employs off-the-shelf technology and can operate in austere 
locations where mature seaports do not exist. Combatant Commanders 
praise this vessel for rapidly and efficiently moving personnel and 
equipment. Future operations will also rely on strong enroute 
infrastructures that support strategic mobility requirements. The 
dynamic nature of the war on terrorism and other potential 
contingencies dictates that we be prepared to establish new enroute 
bases to support deployments to austere locations. In addition, we must 
fully fund the existing enroute infrastructure to sustain its 
capability. Future success in operations depends upon effective 
training today and tomorrow.
    Last May, I wrote Congress about my grave concern over the adverse 
impacts and unforeseen consequences that the application of various 
environmental laws are having on military training and testing 
activities and consequentially on the readiness of our Armed Forces. 
Last year, Congress provided temporary relief, but only for one 
statute. While measuring the impact of inflexible or overbroad 
environmental requirements is difficult, my professional assessment is 
that the impacts and consequently the challenge we face in providing 
the most effective training weapons and sensors, has grown. Enough is 
known right now to convince me that we need relief. We are not 
abandoning our outstanding stewardship over the lands entrusted to us 
or retreating from environmental protection requirements. We are trying 
to restore balance when environmental requirements adversely affect 
uniquely military activities necessary to prepare for combat. I ask 
that you carefully consider the proposed changes that the DOD brings 
forward and provide the tailored relief we seek.
    The current pace of operations and future potential operations 
continues to require the Services and Combatant Commanders to carefully 
manage assets and units that are in high demand, but in small numbers. 
The demand for critical capabilities (such as manned and unmanned 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, special 
operations forces, intelligence analysts and linguists and command and 
control assets) increased significantly as a result of multiple 
contingencies. We will continue to prioritize the tasks given these 
critical units to preserve our surge capability for future operations.
    Our number one asset remains the men and women serving in the Armed 
Forces. They have the educational depth, the innovative spirit and 
mental agility that transforms technology into an effective military 
force. Their service and dedication deserve our full support to seek 
ways to improve their quality of life. The administration, Congress, 
and DOD made raising their standard of living a top priority. This 
year's legislation provided an across-the-board military pay raise of 
4.1 percent and targeted increases of up to 6.5 percent for junior 
personnel. This year's out-of-pocket housing expense reduction from 
11.3 percent to 7.5 percent is a sound investment, as are future 
targeted pay increases based on the Employment Cost Index plus one half 
percent. Our troops and their families greatly appreciate continued 
congressional support for these initiatives, plus efforts to improve 
family and unaccompanied housing. Such congressional action directly 
impacts recruitment, retention, and family welfare. I view these all as 
inseparable from operational combat readiness.
    No discussion of those who serve is complete without mentioning the 
exceptional service of our guardsmen and reservists. In the first 15 
months of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), nearly 85,000 of them 
served on active duty. Like their active duty counterparts, their 
service balances their duty to the Nation and their commitment to their 
families. These citizen-warriors, however, must also balance an 
obligation to their civilian employers. These past few months 
demonstrated our increased reliance on our Reserve components to defend 
the Nation's coastlines, skies, and heartland, as well as protect our 
interests worldwide. We also gained a deeper appreciation that today's 
Reserve personnel have the competence, dedication, and leadership that 
make them indistinguishable from their active-duty counterparts.

                IMPROVING JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES

    The U.S. Armed Forces' ability to conduct joint warfare is better 
today than anytime in our history, due in part to the tremendous 
support of Congress. Nonetheless, many challenges remain. Our joint 
team is comprised of the individual warfighting capabilities of the 
services. To improve our joint warfighting capability, we must maximize 
the capabilities and effects of the separate units and weapons systems 
to accomplish the mission at hand--without regard to the color of the 
uniforms of those who employ them. This challenge demands that we 
integrate service core competencies together in such a way that makes 
the whole greater than the sum of its parts. Our operational 
architectures must be inclusive and not exclusive in terms of 
capabilities and desired effects. We must integrate--not deconflict--
our operations.
    To support these efforts, on 1 October 2002, we changed the mission 
and focus of JFCOM. Today, the men and women of JFCOM concentrate on 
improving our Joint Warfighting capability as we transform to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century. In the future, they will be converting 
strategy and policy guidance into fielded capabilities at the 
operational level through the development of joint concepts and 
integrated architectures.
    JFCOM is contributing to the efforts that develop and define the 
Joint Operations Concept, and the related operational concepts, that 
will link our defense strategy and our emerging Joint Vision with 
service operational concepts. It will help senior military and civilian 
leaders synchronize service modernization, guide experimentation and 
inform acquisition strategies that will guide materiel and non-material 
improvements for the joint force. In support of this effort, JFCOM 
conducts joint experimentation to validate the operational utility of 
joint concepts. The results will drive changes across all areas of 
doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, 
personnel and facilities.
    To improve joint warfare, we must focus on improving the accuracy 
and timeliness of the Combatant Commanders information used to command 
and control the joint force. With shared information, commanders can 
integrate discrete capabilities; without it, they must segregate 
operations into time and space. For these reasons, we must emphasize 
the Joint Operations Concept to solve the interoperability challenges 
of our legacy command and control, communication, and computer systems 
and ensure future systems are ``born joint.''
    JFCOM is working aggressively towards our goal of seamless C\4\ISR 
interoperability by fiscal year 2008. To achieve that goal, JFCOM will 
set the operational requirements and prioritize the integrated 
architectures under development for future battle management command 
and control systems. In addition, JFCOM will exercise oversight and 
directive authority of three major interoperability efforts: the 
Deployable Joint Command and Control system, Single Integrated Air 
Picture, and Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures. The Services 
and Defense agencies, in coordination with JFCOM, will retain 
acquisition authority for these and all other battle management command 
and control programs and initiatives.
    We are convinced that the Deployable Joint Command and Control 
system under development by the Navy is the materiel and technological 
solution to provide intelligence processing, mission planning, and 
control of combat operations for the standing joint force headquarters. 
The first Deployable Joint Command and Control suite is scheduled for 
delivery in fiscal year 2005. Together with the Air Force's Family of 
Interoperable Operational Pictures, the Army's Single Integrated Air 
Picture, and JFCOM's Joint Interoperability and Integration programs, 
this effort will allow the joint force to truly transform the way it 
plans, coordinates, and executes joint operations. We need continued 
congressional support for these critical battle management command and 
control programs.
    Our experiences in Afghanistan illustrated how important timely and 
responsive command and control was to control sea, land, and air forces 
in areas with primitive or nonexistent communications infrastructures. 
To meet this challenge in the Arabian Gulf area of operations, CENTCOM 
deployed a prototype battle management command and control system to 
support its Internal Look exercise in Qatar and for potential future 
operations. DOD will leverage the lessons learned from this prototype 
to help guide the development of future battle management command and 
control systems.
    We must also develop command and control systems that can rapidly 
deploy anywhere in the world, to support joint and coalition forces 
with ``plug and play'' ease and that are also scalable to respond to 
changing circumstances. Programs such as the Joint Tactical Radio 
System, Mobile User Objective System, and the Joint Command and Control 
capability (the follow-on to Global Command and Control System) are 
systems that were truly ``born joint.'' We also must ensure that we 
have the necessary military satellite communications systems that can 
provide the high bandwidth required to support our forces in austere 
environments such as Afghanistan.
    The role of command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance underscores the 
importance of managing and developing the radio frequency spectrum. 
Highly mobile, widely dispersed forces require significant radio 
frequency spectrum to operate effectively and efficiently. This 
military requirement is increasing at the same time that the private 
sector's demand for spectrum is growing. While it is important to 
provide additional spectrum to meet growing industry requirements, we 
must ensure the availability of spectrum to provide future military 
requirements.
    In today's dynamic strategic environment, events in one area may 
quickly affect events in another. This reality requires a more 
responsive planning process to capitalize on the improved C\4\ networks 
and where deliberate- and crisis-action planning complement each other. 
Improvements in war planning are required to close the time gap between 
deliberate- and crisis-action planning. These initiatives range from 
changing doctrine to developing new automated planning tools for Time-
Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) development. The Joint Staff, in 
collaboration with the Combatant Commanders' staff, is developing a 
single shared planning process for deliberate and crisis planning. This 
initiative will develop tools and processes to reduce the deliberate 
planning cycle, facilitate the transition to crisis planning, and 
exploit new technology to respond to evolving world affairs. The end 
results will be greatly improved flexibility for the President and the 
Secretary of Defense.
    Improving Joint Warfighting requires more than technical solutions. 
My exercise program supports the Combatant Commanders' ability to 
sharpen our soldier, sailor, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen's 
warfighting edge. It enables operational commanders to better train 
their battle staffs and forces in joint and combined operations while 
evaluating their war plans. It also allows DOD to enhance and evaluate 
interoperability among the Services. Exercises focusing on strategic, 
national, and theater-level joint tasks consistently challenge leaders 
throughout DOD, interagency and allies with timely and relevant 
scenarios--including terrorism, cyber attack, continuity of government, 
and operations. Routinely, these exercises provide access to critical 
bases of operation around the world as venues for practicing impending 
joint/combined operations. These exercises also allow the opportunity 
to enhance the capabilities of the military forces of allied nations 
and ensure their continued support in the war on terrorism. The U.S. 
military is advancing and transforming at a rate that greatly outpaces 
our allies. We must work hard to help them close that gap.
    Since fiscal year 1996, the number of joint exercises decreased 
from 277 to 191. This resulted from the reduction of joint exercise 
transportation funds to $319 million. In order to balance operational 
and exercise requirements, DOD limits C-17 support to 34,000 equivalent 
flying hours and roll-on/roll-off ships to 1,100 steaming days. Any 
further decrease in funding will force major reductions or 
cancellations of high-priority joint/combined exercises and have a 
detrimental impact on our joint warfighting capability.
    The Defense Department will establish a Joint National Training 
Capability to support joint operations by leveraging live, virtual, and 
constructive technologies. As a first step, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Personnel and Readiness and I will identify specific 
capabilities for the establishment of the Joint National Training 
Capability by 1 October 2004. The Joint National Training Capability 
will then exercise DOD's ability to execute key joint training tasks 
through several scheduled annual events.
    We must improve our joint warfighting capabilities by learning from 
previous operations. The Combatant Commands, Services, and Joint Staff 
continue to capture and apply lessons learned from Operation Enduring 
Freedom. One of the key lessons learned was the positive impact Theater 
Security Cooperation had on our operations in Afghanistan. It helped 
create the foundation that allowed our air, naval, and ground forces to 
gain access to the region's airspace and basing. Another valuable 
lesson was the tremendous force multiplier of merging Special 
Operations Forces on the ground with space forces' communications and 
navigation capabilities to the air and naval forces' precision attack 
capabilities.
    In addition to meeting other objectives, Joint Professional 
Military Education is one means to ensure that future warfighters 
capitalize on the lessons of the past to improve joint warfighting. 
Joint Professional Military Education develops U.S. military leaders 
capable of executing the war on terrorism, improving joint warfighting, 
and transforming the force. Currently there is an ongoing 
congressionally-mandated independent study of Joint Officer Management 
and Joint Professional Military Education. This study will provide 
valuable insights on ways to improve and expand joint officer 
development. We anticipate completion of this study in early 2003.
    In concert with the independent study, the Joint Staff is also 
exploring ways to improve Joint Officer Management and Joint 
Professional Military Education. We identified requirements to provide 
joint distance-learning programs to our Reserve components and to 
active duty Non-Commissioned Officers to improve their expertise in 
joint operations. In a similar fashion, I directed the National Defense 
University to revise the CAPSTONE curriculum for newly selected Flag 
and General Officers. My goal is to ensure our new Flag and General 
Officers gain a better foundation of joint, interagency, and multi-
national operations at the operational level.
    I charged the Joint Staff with developing recommendations for 
several areas of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional 
Military Education that I believe need to be revised. We need one set 
of effective and enforceable rules for how the Services assign and 
manage joint billets. We must also bring the tour length requirements 
and recognition of joint credit in line with current operations. The 
Combatant Commanders and I should be the driving force in the 
production of Joint Specialty Officers. Finally, my goal is to make the 
annual report to Congress a more meaningful set of metrics that more 
accurately reports each Service's support of the joint community. We 
look forward to working with you and your staffs this year, to 
incorporate these changes along with those of the independent study.
    In addition, joint doctrine provides the foundation for joint 
education, training, and exercises. We are developing joint doctrine 
for Homeland Security, Civil Support, Joint Close Air Support, Joint 
Planning, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield 
Explosives Consequence Management; and Intelligence Support to 
Targeting. The new Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System ensures 
the warfighters have the most current joint doctrine. This system also 
provides joint doctrine to education and training audiences. Joint 
doctrine continues to improve the readiness of the joint warfighter to 
operate effectively and efficiently in a complex operational 
environment.

                TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES

    As the U.S. military meets the challenges of the 21st century, we 
must transform how we organize, support, and fight as joint 
warfighters. Transforming the joint force requires embracing 
intellectual, cultural, as well as technological, change. We are in the 
process of revising our Joint Vision. This new vision will provide a 
broad description of what our Armed Forces must and can become. From 
our Joint Vision and the Defense Strategy, we are crafting a Joint 
Operations Concept. It will link the tasks given our Armed Forces to 
the Joint Vision, joint operating concepts, and Joint Warfighter 
architectures. These joint concepts and architectures will provide 
further guidance to each Service.
    In its broadest sense, the Joint Operations Concept will describe 
how the joint force will operate, while helping transform the U.S. 
Armed Forces to a capabilities-based force.
    The Joint Operations Concept cannot shape the future joint force 
alone. It requires experimentation and assessment to determine the 
value of the Service and joint warfighting concepts in the context of 
future joint operations and the future environment. From these efforts, 
we will identify the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities changes needed to 
create the future joint force. In this manner, we can scrutinize 
current capabilities and proposed systems to highlight gaps and 
identify overlapping capabilities.
    Using these architectures, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
will implement methodologies to assess both legacy and proposed systems 
in the aggregate. As a result, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
will define and validate desired joint capabilities and derive mission 
area requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council shall 
consider the full range of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities solutions to 
advance joint warfighting. In this manner, the Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council will further reorient our force planning to a 
capabilities-based framework. The Joint Operations Concept will allow 
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to adopt a synchronized, 
collaborative, and integrated systems engineering approach to sizing 
and shaping our forces.
    In support of our transformation efforts, JFCOM spearheaded the 
Nation's first major joint field experiment with Millennium Challenge 
02. Millennium Challenge 02 demonstrated a variety of new concepts and 
systems that enabled critical command and control, collaborative 
information sharing, and time-sensitive targeting capabilities. These 
systems are essential to the fielding of the Standing Joint Force 
Headquarters. While Millennium Challenge 02 focused on materiel 
capabilities, it yielded insights critical for non-materiel changes in 
doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel, and facilities.
    One example was the Joint Fires Initiative, which offered an 
interim automated capability to manage time-sensitive target 
engagement. The Joint Fires Initiative enabled the Joint Task Force, 
Component Commanders and their staffs to use available information 
technology, web-based collaborative tools to accelerate the joint 
force's ability to identify, attack, and assess priority targets. It 
blended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources, 
combat units and Commanders' decision processes to permit real-time 
execution.
    A second initiative in Millennium Challenge 02 was Joint Enroute 
Mission Planning and Rehearsal System--Near Term. This system enables 
Theater and Joint Task Force Commanders to remain connected with their 
forward and rear headquarters when enroute to or from contingency 
locations. It permits a wide scale of communications and collaborative 
tools to prevent a ``leadership blackout'' during a commander's travel.
    The Joint Fires Initiative and Joint Enroute Mission Planning and 
Rehearsal System--Near Term are part of fielding a broader 
Collaborative Information Environment. Today's Collaborative 
Information Environment is powered by high-speed connectivity and real-
time collaborative tools to share information in an unprecedented 
manner. This environment will permit commanders to receive more 
accurate information faster. As such, it will be critical part for U.S. 
forces to operate faster than our adversaries.
    To meet this challenge, the joint force must have access to 
superior information. This requires long-term investment to meet the 
demands of responsive, targeted, intrusive, and persistent collection. 
Our current operational environment and the nature of these dynamic 
threats demand that our joint force have the real-time ability to 
monitor, track, characterize, and report on moving objects and events. 
We must capitalize on emerging technology such as small, expendable 
satellites, and long-dwell UAVs. These promising platforms will enable 
the joint force to gain persistent surveillance. The information gained 
from these platforms must not flow into stovepipes, but must be part of 
a ``system of systems'' that blends with human and technical data from 
strategic, theater, tactical, and commercial programs.
    With this improved and more complete data, the Intelligence 
Community must develop tools to assist in information management that 
can accommodate ``analytic discovery'' and data visualization 
techniques. Our military intelligence community requires a highly 
skilled work force trained to mine, manipulate, integrate, and display 
relevant information. To effectively employ these collection 
opportunities, new techniques and tools must be developed.
    While we are expending considerable effort to make sure we procure 
systems that are interoperable across the Services, we must continue 
placing emphasis on systems that allow interoperability with our 
allies. A way to do this is to allow allies to participate in many of 
our procurement projects. This will have the dual advantage of helping 
to lower project cost to the American taxpayer and increasing 
interoperability with those allied forces that will accompany us into 
the breach. The Joint Strike Fighter reflects one success story of 
allied and U.S. combined procurement. The Joint Strike Fighter set the 
standard for how we should approach new procurements, welcoming key 
allied participation in the development and production of future 
systems. Such an acquisition strategy will increase interoperability, 
help allied transformation, and reduce direct U.S. development costs.
    Transforming military forces to meet a dynamic 21st century 
security environment is not a unique American task. At the Prague 
summit, NATO leaders agreed to establish an allied command for 
transformation in Norfolk, Virginia. The proposed NATO Command will 
work with JFCOM. This close and cooperative relationship will allow the 
U.S. and our NATO allies to keep abreast of advances in contemporary 
warfare.
    Our efforts to improve our allies' warfighting capabilities reach 
far beyond NATO. The Combatant Commanders and I share the Secretary of 
Defense's vision of a long-term plan to balance burden sharing, 
leverage U.S. technological superiority and use a proactive Theater 
Security Cooperation strategy to transform allied forces into lethal, 
offensive-minded, combined-arms forces. This initiative is as much 
about doctrine, warfighting mindset and organizational structure as it 
is about platforms and weapon systems. Theater Security Cooperation 
will allow the U.S. to modify force structure and posture to optimize 
the mobility, lethality, and interoperability of our forward forces.

                               CONCLUSION

    With Congress' support, this past year we have made progress in the 
war on terrorism, specifically, and overall capabilities. Al Qaeda and 
their global network were not created in a single day, but over a 
decade. At the same time, the Nation's Armed Forces must be prepared 
for other threats to our interests. Confronting them will require 
determined and disciplined use of all instruments of American power. 
Congressional support ensures that our military forces are the most 
competent and capable military tools possible.
    The men and women of our Armed Forces have performed in a 
magnificent manner this past year. They stand ready for the challenges 
ahead. They deserve our best efforts in training, equipping, and caring 
for them and their families. Thank you for the opportunity to provide 
my report on our Nation's finest--our soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
marines, and coastguardsmen.

    Chairman Warner. General, let me initiate the first 
questions here for a 6-minute round. We have excellent 
attendance by our committee.
    So I start with you, General, and I ask for just a short 
answer to this question, which is important to this record. Is 
it your professional judgment that the Armed Forces which are 
under your supervision are prepared to meet any contingency for 
the use of force that may be required in Iraq and/or Korea, and 
hopefully will not be required in either Iraq and/or Korea, and 
to continue the high level of activity against worldwide 
terrorism?
    General Myers. I will give you a real short answer. 
Absolutely.
    Chairman Warner. Now Mr. Secretary, it was reported in the 
press this morning that Secretary Powell appeared before 
committees of Congress yesterday and said that an Army general 
would be the person that would be placed in charge should we 
have to use force in the Iraqi situation and in the aftermath 
of what we all anticipate would be a successful military 
operation.
    The distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Lugar, is reported to say we are way behind 
here, between the administration and Congress, in understanding 
what would take place in the aftermath of such use of force.
    Now in my judgment, our President has in a very courageous 
and proper manner pursued the diplomatic route to resolve this 
problem in Iraq. He is continuing to do that with the 
leadership of the Prime Minister of Great Britain and other 
world leaders. I think progress is being made. We will know 
more after tomorrow's report by Hans Blix. But it is clear that 
we have forward deployed our forces first and foremost to 
support the diplomatic efforts. Diplomacy will not succeed 
unless it is clearly perceived by the enemy that frankly we 
mean business if diplomacy fails. So I commend the President 
and others.
    But I think given that we are about to go out for a recess 
here in a week or so amidst a rapid progression of events, that 
should force be used to bring a conclusion to that conflict, 
what is the likely scenario involving your Department? Will 
other militaries of the world be involved and is it just a role 
of security or will the U.S. military be placed in a position 
of a high commissioner and/or governor of some type of the 
territory of Iraq in order to keep the integrity of that 
territory as it exists now?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments 
to try to respond to that. The Government has spent a good deal 
of time over many months thinking these various elements 
through. The answer to your question depends to some extent on 
what takes place. Your question suggested no decision has been 
made to use force but in the event force were used, it could 
happen in several ways.
    For example, Saddam Hussein could leave today, and the 
question would be how does the United States then act to see 
that the principal goals of the United States are achieved, 
namely that the weapons of mass destruction are found and 
destroyed, that they're disarmed. That whatever government 
takes over is a government that does not develop weapons of 
mass destruction, the government does not help terrorists, does 
not threaten its neighbors, and puts the country on a path 
towards appropriate representation and protection for the 
various religious and minority elements in the country. Those 
are the principal goals.
    So that is one way it could happen, he could leave. Another 
way is that he could leave and turn it over to somebody else 
who is equally unacceptable. Another way would be that someone 
could help him leave and take over control. A third is that 
force would have to be used. Depending on what happened and the 
circumstance in the country, we would determine how long and in 
what role the military would have to play.
    Clearly, the goal would be to go in and see that what 
resulted was better than what was there beforehand. That means 
that the United States simply has to be willing to stay there 
as long as is necessary to see that that is done, but not one 
day longer. We have no interest in other people's land or 
territory. We have no interest in other people's oil, as some 
articles seem to suggest. So exactly how long it would be and 
what it would look like would vary.
    The principles that would pertain insofar as the Department 
of Defense is concerned: First, we would have military 
capability in there sufficient to find and destroy the weapons 
of mass destruction and to find and deal with any terrorist 
networks that exist in the country, which we know is the case. 
It would be my goal to internationalize it as rapidly as 
possible, to have other countries participate. Very likely the 
participation would be in the humanitarian, civil, and 
reconstruction areas earliest, as opposed to finding the 
weapons of mass destruction, for example. There just are not a 
lot of countries that really would be involved in that that I 
can think of, although we would welcome help from a number that 
have already offered assistance.
    The next task would be to put the country on a transition 
so that the outsiders are not running it. That means you would 
have to find a way to see that the Iraqi opposition from the 
outside, the Iraqis from the inside who had not been a party to 
the repressiveness of this regime, and the weapons of mass 
destruction programs of this regime would in a different way 
have an Iraqi solution, just as Afghanistan had an Afghanistan 
solution. So the goal would be to get them on a path so that 
increasingly more and more was handled and managed by the Iraqi 
people themselves and that less and less was managed by the 
international community.
    Chairman Warner. I think your response reflects that we 
have given this a good deal of consideration and that we have 
clear plans in place and are ready to proceed.
    Quickly to a second question, and that involves the very 
disturbing news with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) thus far being unable to reconcile 
differences among the member nations as to NATO's ability to 
provide such security as the government of Turkey feels is 
essential, given the fluidity of this situation. I commend you 
for stepping up to say if NATO doesn't, the U.S. will. That's 
proper.
    But does not this action thus far violate the time tested 
fundamental belief of NATO of over a half century, that an 
attack on one is an attack on all, and could not a persistence 
of this type of policy by member nations begin to erode NATO so 
it becomes a less effective organization?
    Lastly, the United States is the major financial 
contributor to NATO, the major troop contributor, and the major 
technical contributor--particularly the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS)--and now the American taxpayers will be 
required to foot an additional bill of the costs associated 
with our proper decision to place such forces in the position 
of Turkey to protect their interests. So we're getting hit 
twice as a consequence of the inability of NATO to reconcile 
this issue. Do you have some views?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I do and I expressed them in a 
recent meeting and I might add that a member of the committee, 
Senator McCain, also expressed some opinions over there that 
were very much on the mark, in my view.
    The situation is that the vote was 16 to 3 in favor of 
initiating planning to send defensive capabilities to Turkey so 
that they would be protected. You can't do anything at the last 
minute in life. You have to plan it, you have to get things 
moving, things moved by ship. The position of the three 
countries that it was premature to plan, it seems to me, was 
unfortunate.
    We did say that the United States and the other 16 
countries would step forward and see that Turkey, in fact, had 
AWACS, chem-bio detection, and Patriot batteries. It would not 
be simply the United States that would provide that. We decided 
immediately that Turkey must have those capabilities and we 
must begin the planning. My feeling is that it's unfortunate 
that the three countries have delayed us this long.
    There's no question, as you suggest, that to the extent we 
do not interest ourselves in every 1 of the 19 members, but 
goodness, Turkey is a moderate Muslim country, the only country 
in NATO that borders Iraq. To not behave in a way that 
recognized that and allowed for that planning, I think was most 
unfortunate.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Senator Levin.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, General Myers has some news 
that I didn't have time to read and I will let him comment on 
it.
    General Myers. As we're speaking, I think NATO is also 
looking at ways to deploy the help that Turkey needs, at least 
part of AWACS and the missile defense assets in a way that 
would not require political approval. They think they may have 
that legal authority without going through the political 
process. They are looking at that. There may be an announcement 
here at about 11:00 on those issues.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
    Senator Levin.
    Senator Levin. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, the 
administration's Nuclear Posture Review called for improving 
our nuclear weapons capability, and the administration 
requested funds in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to 
study a so-called nuclear penetrator.
    If the United States sends signals that we're considering 
new uses for nuclear weapons, isn't it more likely that other 
nations will also want to explore greater use or new uses for 
nuclear weapons, and that other nations won't listen to our 
pleas to stay non-nuclear or to stay in the nonproliferation 
treaty, but rather would say you're even relying on them more, 
you're looking at new ways to use nuclear weapons, so why 
shouldn't we?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think that the first thing 
we have to say is that the task of the Department of Defense, 
indeed the first responsibility of a President of the United 
States, is to provide for the security of the country. The 
Department of Defense assists the President in developing 
contingency plans and studying a variety of things on a 
continuing basis. To not do so, it seems to me, is to misserve 
the country.
    The world is experiencing an enormous amount of underground 
tunneling and activities, activities underground that are for 
production, for manufacturing, they are for development, for 
storage. The problem of not having visibility into them and 
when one has visibility, not having the ability to penetrate 
and reach them creates a very serious obstacle to U.S. national 
security.
    To the extent that we say to ourselves, that this is going 
to be the ultimate solution, we're unwilling to even study the 
idea of penetrating capability and therefore we make it 
advantageous for people to engage in that type of tunneling, I 
think that it would create an incentive rather than a 
disincentive.
    Senator Levin. Mr. Secretary, Title 10 requires the 
Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test and 
Evaluation, which is our independent test authority at the 
Pentagon, to certify that appropriate operational testing has 
been completed prior to putting weapon systems into production. 
That law exists to prevent the production and fielding of a 
weapon system that doesn't work right.
    Your budget request seeks a waiver of the operational 
testing requirements to enable you to implement your plans to 
deploy a national missile defense system in 2004. How do you 
justify bypassing operational testing requirements?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess I would justify it very easily 
in this sense. If you think about it, it is a perfectly 
rational thing to have a testing requirement. So if you take 
the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, for example, and it is 
moving along the track and it has not been fully tested and 
it's not ready for deployment, and you start using it because 
you're in a conflict, you find that it's advantageous to use 
it. In the process of using it you find things that could be 
changed and improved on it. Now it has never been fully 
completed through the process with the stamp of approval of the 
testing organization.
    The same thing happened during Operation Desert Storm as I 
recall, or Kosovo, with JSTAR.
    General Myers. Joint Stars.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Joint Stars, the exact same thing.
    So on the one hand, it makes sense to have the requirement. 
On the other hand, it makes sense to waive it when reasonable 
people look at the situation and say that it's time to do that.
    Now, why do it with respect to missile defense? Well, I 
happen to think that thinking we cannot deploy something until 
you have everything perfect, every I dotted and every T 
crossed, is probably not a good idea. In the case of missile 
defense, I think we need to get something out there in the 
ground, at sea, and in a way that we can test it, we can look 
at it, we can develop it, we can evolve it, and learn from the 
experimentation with it. It happens that it also provides a 
minimal missile defense capability.
    Senator Levin. If it works.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. If it works, of course. The same thing 
with Predator. I mean, Predator--things do not tend to work or 
not work; they tend to work either as well as you hoped or 
somewhere less well than you hoped. In the case of Predator, it 
didn't work or not work, it did an awful lot that was very 
valuable in Afghanistan and is still doing it today, but it 
didn't do a lot of things that it might have done, because 
people didn't ever have that experience in using it, and the 
same thing would be true with missile defense.
    Senator Levin. Thank you. General Myers, we have a copy of 
a draft legislative proposal that has been circulating inside 
the Department of Defense. If this legislation were passed, the 
Joint Staff would report to the Secretary instead of to the 
Chairman, and the Secretary would have to approve all 
appointments to the Joint Staff. The draft amendment would 
strike the statutory requirement that the Joint Staff be 
``independently organized and operated.'' Then we also have the 
memorandum signed by David Chu requesting a legislative 
proposal be drafted that would reduce the term served by the 
service chiefs from 4 years to 2-year renewable terms.
    It seems to me that these proposals taken together or 
separately would lessen the ability of the uniformed military 
to provide independent military advice to the civilian 
leadership in the executive branch and Congress. That's my 
view, but what is your view of these proposals?
    General Myers. Senator Levin, I'm at a little bit of a 
disadvantage because I haven't seen the drafts yet, and I don't 
know if we will, because the Secretary and I have talked in 
general about how better to arrange ourselves, if there are 
ways to make ourselves more efficient and effective. As far as 
I know, we have just had some preliminary discussions, we've 
talked about maybe having somebody look at this from the 
outside that might be able to provide some help in that area.
    Senator Levin. Would you be supporting these proposals?
    General Myers. Well, I would have to look at them. I have 
not seen the draft proposals. I think the way we're arranged 
today is fundamentally sound, so I'd have to look and see how 
they want to change that.
    Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, do you have a comment on 
that important question?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I haven't seen the draft either, 
and therefore I don't know really how I could comment because I 
am not familiar with it. General Myers and I have talked about 
the way the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) function, and in some cases it's my personal view 
that it looks like it duplicates things and requires things to 
go through double chops. At least the thought has been 
expressed to me by a number of people who have looked from the 
outside as to whether there might be a way to merge some of 
those pieces in a way that did not in any way inhibit the 
Chairman's responsibility under the law to be able to provide 
military advice to the President, the National Security 
Council, and the Secretary of Defense. We talked about getting 
together some folks to look at this and examine it.
    Chairman Warner. So you promise to keep Congress and this 
committee fully informed, should this thing begin to take on a 
life of its own?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed. I take it somebody was up 
talking about it already.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to say this 
about the comments by the distinguished Senator from Michigan. 
Every time I hear the argument that we don't want to enhance 
our nuclear capability because they will do the same thing, if 
you carry that to its logical conclusion, if we just disarmed, 
then everyone else would disarm too and we wouldn't have these 
problems.
    I'm very proud of you, Mr. Secretary, for using the words 
that you used. I wrote them down. You said we are in the most 
dangerous security environment the world has ever known, and I 
agree with that. Just yesterday, when Director Tenet called to 
our attention the capabilities of what the North Koreans have 
right now, a missile that could reach the United States of 
America, and we know that they are trading systems and 
technology with countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and 
Pakistan. It's a very frightening thing.
    I carry with me a veto message by former President Clinton 
of our 1996 Defense Authorization Bill wherein he states his 
justification for vetoing it: ``First, the bill requires 
deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system able to 
defend all 50 States from a long-range missile threat that our 
intelligence committee does not think exists.'' I wish that 
veto had not taken place.
    I would single out this one thing in here as the most 
significant thing, and I say that not so much as a Senator, but 
my wife and I have 19 kids and grandkids, and I am deeply, 
gravely concerned. Do you feel that this budget give you all 
the money necessary for you to get something deployed against a 
missile attack, at least a partial missile attack, or do you 
need something more in there? Can you share with us what you 
have?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we spent a good deal of time 
looking at the issues of missile defense of various ranges: 
short, medium, and ICBM range. We ended up creating a budget 
that we believe at this state of our knowledge is appropriate. 
It will do what I said. It will give us something in the ground 
that will serve as a test bed so we can evolve it. It will give 
us the capability to look at the sea based option, which I 
believe is important. It will also give us as a result of that 
test bed some minimal capability. To have gone further at this 
stage, we felt would have been invalid. So I'm comfortable with 
this level of funding in this particular instance.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General 
Myers, I chair the Environment and Public Works Committee and 
there's an issue that will come before it and this committee 
and that is encroachment on our ranges. I guess going a little 
overboard on my concern on our ability to train our kids, I was 
deeply concerned when you took away the live-fire training 
capability at Vieques. At the UDARI range in Kuwait, we lost 
five lives, four of whom were Americans, and the accident 
report said that they did not have that live-fire training. I 
look at what the environmental encroachment is doing to our 
different ranges.
    Just a few minutes ago, I had General Kelley from the 
Marines talking about Camp Lejeune and Pendleton. Right now, 
only 30 percent of Camp Pendleton can be used for training. At 
Camp Lejeune, the red cockaded woodpecker is using up so much 
of the range.
    You are such good stewards of the environment that you're 
your own worst enemy because the better job you do, the more 
endangered species there are out there. I am very much 
concerned about it and I would like to have you share with us 
very briefly your concern. I do have one quote that you made 
which is rather lengthy, so I know what your concern is. Would 
you do that briefly?
    General Myers. Senator Inhofe, I will try to do it as 
briefly as I can. I don't think you can be too concerned about 
this subject. I think the best quality of life you can provide 
for our Armed Forces is proper training so if they are used in 
combat or peacekeeping or whatever, they are prepared for that 
task. Some of the uses of the environmental laws that we see 
today, where groups will now bring the Department of Defense 
into court, were never intended, I don't think, by the folks 
who drafted the environmental protection statutes. They can 
bring us into court and can stop training, whether it's 
aircraft or land or on the sea for that matter, and it can be 
very detrimental to our effectiveness and in the end will put 
our men and women in harm's way simply because they haven't 
been properly trained.
    Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. I know before this 
committee a couple years ago, they testified that we were 
spending more money in Camp Lejeune to protect the species than 
we were on ammunition. It has to be addressed and I'm hoping 
that we will be doing that.
    Lastly, Secretary Rumsfeld, when you go back, and I'm going 
from memory now, but as I recall in terms of percentage of GDP, 
during the entire 20th century, during each year at peace, 
defense spending represented 5.7 percent of GDP. We went down 
to an all time low during the Clinton administration of about 
2.8 percent. Even with this enhanced budget it's only 3.3 
percent. When you look at the proliferation that's out there 
and the fact that maybe we should relook at our strategy, maybe 
we should be able to defend America on three regional fronts. 
But as you have looked at this and look into the future in 
terms of a percentage of GDP, what do you see in the future, 
number one? Number two, in spite of all the problems you have 
right now, will you be considering that?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it's something that someone in 
our position has to consider. It is hard to fully appreciate 
the magnitude of the change that's taken place in terms of our 
security and the difficulty. If one just takes the intelligence 
task, we had the luxury, it sounds funny to use the word 
luxury, of watching the Soviet Union, a closed society, and not 
having to worry about very many other things. We could learn 
about it, know about it, and over time we found it quite 
predictable.
    Today we're dealing with not one target for intelligence, 
but dozens. We're looking at ungoverned areas all across the 
globe where the governments simply do not control their own 
real estate. We're dealing with countries that are every bit as 
closed or more closed than the Soviet Union was. We're getting 
information on North Korea, for example, that is just 
enormously difficult.
    So instead of at the end of the Cold War dropping the intel 
budgets down and changing the projection by some $35 billion 
over that period, I'm told, from what the pre-Cold War budgets 
had been directed or projected to be for intelligence, it's 
something like $35 billion less, while the task has gotten much 
greater. So the question is, how do we adjust our thinking in 
that regard and how do we see that we gain the kinds of 
knowledge and information and have the kinds of not just 
technological but human intelligence capabilities? That's true 
in other areas as well. I just take that one example since it's 
such an important one.
    Senator Inhofe. I thank both of you for your courageous 
answers. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. We 
are of course proceeding under the early bird rule, and the 
first early bird to arrive this morning was our distinguished 
Senator from Massachusetts.
    Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 
join as I am sure all of us do with the words of Senator Levin 
in commending you, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, for all 
that you're doing for the service men and women of this 
country. It is enormously impressive.
    Let me move to the issue I mentioned prior to the start of 
these hearings, Mr. Secretary, and that is the Nuclear Posture 
Review. Many of us are concerned about the position of the 
administration on nuclear weapons. Over the last half century 
we have made great strides on arms control. We signed the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the ABM Treaty, the 
START-I Treaty, and the START-II Treaty, creating an arms 
control regime that has successfully prevented the use of 
nuclear weapons for more than half a century.
    Despite this progress, the Bush administration seems to be 
taking us in a new direction. The administration has presented 
a Nuclear Posture Review that suggests grave changes in our 
policy on the use of nuclear weapons and the dangers that this 
administration may well be igniting a new arms race.
    Under the Nuclear Posture Review as reported in The Los 
Angeles Times January 25, Strategic Command is developing plans 
for the use of nuclear weapons against nations like Iraq that 
do not have nuclear weapons. They mention other countries as 
well, such as Syria, Libya, and Iran.
    As you well understand, a nuclear weapon is not just 
another weapon in an arsenal. Until now we have always kept 
them in a class of their own for good reasons, because of their 
enormous destructive power and our profound commitment to do 
all we can to see that they are never used again. So wouldn't 
the action in the Nuclear Posture Review violate a long-held 
commitment under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to not 
attacking non-nuclear states that are not aligned with nuclear 
states?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I have no idea what you're 
reading from, but I----
    Senator Kennedy. Well, the Nuclear Posture Review----
    Secretary Rumsfeld. No, no, the news article.
    Senator Kennedy. That's what I'm referring to, a very well 
publicized article titled: ``U.S. Weighs Tactical Nuclear 
Strike in Iraq.'' There have been exchanges on it.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Exchanges between who and whom? I never 
heard of this article.
    Senator Kennedy. All right. But you're familiar with the 
Nuclear Posture Review?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. You bet. We spent 18 months developing 
it.
    Senator Kennedy. Did they also consider in the 
administration's classified Nuclear Posture Review that said 
nuclear weapons should be considered against targets able to 
withstand conventional attack, in retaliation for an attack, in 
retaliation for attacks with nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons, or in the event of surprising military developments? 
It identified seven countries--China, Russia, Iraq, North 
Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria as possible targets. That's in 
it. If you're not familiar with it, I will move on.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me just make a quick comment.
    Senator Kennedy. Okay.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Our policy historically has been 
generally that we will not foreclose the possible use of 
nuclear weapons if attacked. If you think back to Europe, we 
always said we would not agree to a ``no first use policy'' 
because we would have to defend against overwhelming 
conventional capability.
    The second thing we've had as a general policy of our 
country is not to rule out various options.
    The third thing we have as a record is that those weapons, 
as you said, have not been fired in anger since 1945.
    Does the Department have an obligation and have they in 
successive administrations of both political parties had 
procedures whereby we would conceivably use nuclear weapons? 
Yes.
    Senator Kennedy. Well, I thought also there were assurances 
about non-first use against countries that didn't have nuclear 
weapons, that that was included as well.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm familiar with that.
    Senator Kennedy. All right. There have been such countries 
included, as I understand it, in the Nuclear Posture Review. 
That's a change, and that's what I'm asking about.
    But let me just go on. Is the United States seriously 
considering using any nuclear weapons against Iraq?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The United States has historically had 
strategic offensive nuclear weapons and theater nuclear 
weapons. As a part of contingency planning, the United States 
has in my adult lifetime always had contingency plans to do a 
variety of things. The question you asked was not that. The 
question you asked was are we seriously considering something. 
The only person in the United States who has the power to use 
weapons of that nature is the President of the United States. 
It seems to me that if one looks at our record, we went through 
the Korean War, we went through the Vietnam War, we've gone 
through the war on terror and we have not used nuclear weapons. 
That ought to say something about the threshold with respect to 
nuclear weapons.
    Senator Kennedy. On February 4, Richard Pearl, Chairman of 
the Defense Policy Board, stated that he believed the military 
can win in Iraq with precision bombs, that is his position 
about it.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. That's my position.
    Senator Kennedy. In the House of Commons, Prime Minister 
Blair said, ``the notion that we have plans to use nuclear 
weapons in Iraq is completely false.'' Would you agree with 
that statement?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I agree with the statement 
made that we have every confidence that in the event force is 
to be used in Iraq, that we could do what needs to be done 
using conventional capabilities.
    Senator Kennedy. Well, just to finish, Mr. Chairman, I'm 
concerned that the use of nuclear weapons in Iraq in the 
absence of an imminent overwhelming threat to our national 
security would bring a near total breakdown in our relations 
with the rest of the world, particularly in regards to the Arab 
world.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, I'd like to just make 
sure the record is very clear here. You have raised a very 
sensitive subject and the implication of it from the article is 
that there is a likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used. 
I think that implication is an unfortunate one.
    Senator Kennedy. Okay. Well, last year the Republicans 
attempted to repeal the restrictions on nuclear weapons with a 
yield of five kilotons or less, the so-called ``mini-nukes.'' 
Now what is your position on that? Are you for continuing the 
Spratt amendment or are you for repealing it? That is the one 
that has had the prohibition about research and development 
below the five kilotons. That's a fairly good indication as 
well as to where the administration is thinking.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't think it is.
    Senator Kennedy. It may not for you but it certainly is for 
many of us, if you're thinking of repealing what has been now 
for a number of years the restrictions for no testing below 
certain kinds of kilotons because of the increased possible use 
of them and the dangers of the proliferation of small weapons 
like this, getting into the hands of terrorists. Those are 
serious policy issues and questions. We were going to continue 
the Spratt moratorium, that would certainly send a signal. If 
you are for changing or altering that, that would certainly be 
an indicator of a changed position of the administration.
    Chairman Warner. Senator, your question is important but we 
are way over time. I wonder if the Secretary could answer that 
for the record.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I would be happy to. I think it's 
terribly important to distinguish between the process of 
research and development and analysis, as opposed to the 
process of development and deployment, let alone use of a 
weapon. Those distinctions, it seems to me, get blurred in a 
discussion like this, and I think they need to be in very 
separate boxes.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The law that the administration has asked Congress to repeal is the 
so-called Precision Low-Yield Weapon Development (PLYWD) law 
(Sec. 3136, PL 103-160). The PLYWD law prohibits research that could 
lead to the development or production of a new low-yield warhead with a 
yield at or below 5 Kt. This law is a serious impediment to 
intellectual and technical research to explore and understand the 
capability of low-yield options in conjunction with advanced technology 
to place existing or emerging WMD facilities at risk with relatively 
low-levels of collateral damage. Conducting research on potential new 
weapons utilizing new technologies will enhance deterrence, not lower 
the nuclear threshold.
    Repealing the law does not reflect a change in policy; low-yield 
nuclear weapons are not new. The U.S. has had low-yield nuclear weapons 
for decades. Repeal of the so-called PLYWD law falls far short of 
committing the United States to developing, producing, and deploying 
new, low-yield warheads. Such warhead concepts could not proceed to 
full-scale development, much less production and deployment, unless 
Congress authorizes and appropriates the substantial funds required to 
do this.
    Conducting research and development to hold at risk facilities 
associated with weapons of mass destruction will not undermine our 
efforts to limit proliferation internationally. Nations seek and 
develop nuclear capabilities to address their regional security 
concerns, not because the U.S. has low-yield nuclear weapons. Quite the 
opposite is true. An effective U.S. deterrent would help deter 
potential aggressors from trying to acquire WMD or threatening its use 
against U.S. territory, troops, allies, and friends.
    Today, as well as in the future, the U.S. cannot predict with 
confidence what nations or non-state actors may pose a threat to our 
vital interests or those of our allies. The U.S. must possess forces 
sufficient to dissuade and deter any potential adversary armed with WMD 
and to assure our allies and friends of our commitment to their 
security. Research and development aimed at finding ways to place 
threatening facilities such as those associated with WMD at risk are 
fully consistent with maintaining an effective deterrent. Just because 
a nuclear weapon has a relatively low yield, compared to the so-called 
``hard target killers'' from the Cold War, does not make them any 
easier to use. During the height of the Cold War, the U.S. possessed 
many types of low yield weapons. Deterrence worked; none were used. As 
with all nuclear weapons, the President is the sole authority for 
employment. A president would consider use of any nuclear weapon only 
in the most grave situations.

    Chairman Warner. The Senator from Maine.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, at 
the same time that we are deploying troops around the globe for 
the war against terrorism, as well as to prepare for a 
potential war in Iraq, we have a number of existing deployments 
that continue to require extensive resources to maintain. We 
have, for example, some 37,000 troops in Korea and more than 
70,000 troops in Germany. With the increasing demands on our 
military, I believe that it is time for us to reevaluate the 
need for those existing deployments.
    For instance, our large presence in Germany is largely a 
legacy of the Cold War, and arguably, that threat no longer 
exists. Is the Department reexamining the need for large 
deployments in Germany and Korea?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the President asked me, when 
he asked me to serve as Secretary of Defense, to review our 
defense posture and our circumstance around the world. We have 
been doing that. There is no question but that the arrangements 
of our current force deployments have an advantage in that they 
are forward deployed and they serve to reassure the world and 
the nations that we have the ability to deter and defend 
against various types of threats.
    It is quite clear to me that you're correct, that the 
deployments we have, for example, in Korea, which is one of the 
places you mentioned, can be reviewed in cooperation with the 
South Korean government and, as a matter of fact, the new 
President of South Korea has suggested that we look at our 
relationship and see that we rebalance it in some way, and I 
have accepted that invitation. We had previously been looking 
at it on a private basis, a unilateral basis, and General 
LaPorte has been working on it now for many months and we will 
very soon, as soon as the new government is in place, begin 
somewhat more formal discussions about how we can ensure the 
defense of the peninsula and still have--for one thing, I would 
like to see a number of our forces moved away from the Seoul 
area and from the area near the de-militarized zone (DMZ), and 
be more oriented towards an air hub and a sea hub, with the 
ability to reinforce so that there is still a strong deterrent. 
Possibly with our improved capabilities of moving people, some 
of those forces come back home. We'll see.
    Now General Jones in Europe is doing the same thing. There 
is no question but that right now, for example, we're trying to 
move some forces from Germany down to Italy, and Austria is 
causing a difficulty with respect to moving the forces through 
Austria by rail, which means we may have to go up to Rotterdam 
or possibly by train through two or three or four countries 
instead of directly.
    Therefore, it's clear that it's better for us probably not 
to have such a heavy concentration. I think it would, however, 
be a mistake to suggest that if we do end up reducing some of 
those forces or moving them to other countries, that it had 
anything to do with our relationships with those countries, 
because it simply doesn't. It is something that we have been 
involved in over many months now and are in the process of 
working with other countries on.
    Senator Collins. I would now like to turn to the 
shipbuilding budget, which will probably come as no surprise to 
you. I'm pleased that the fiscal year 2004 budget submission 
appears to turn the corner on shipbuilding and it is a marked 
improvement over last year. However, even with budgeting for 7 
ships, the Navy's fleet is still going to drop, as you 
indicated, below 300 ships in the coming years. The Chief of 
Naval Operations (CNO) has repeatedly testified, and I talked 
to him just recently, that our Nation requires a fleet of 375 
ships in order to fulfill all of the Navy's mission 
requirements.
    Now I appreciate your testimony that you don't want to lock 
the Department into a shipbuilding program until you're certain 
what kinds of ships you need and what the mix should be. But 
how are you going to remedy the deficit we have in coming years 
if we don't start making more of that investment now? Again, I 
applaud you for putting 7 ships in, that's a big improvement 
over 5 of last year, but it still is not at the rate we need, 
which is more like 10 or 11 ships a year.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, this is a tough area and we 
are pleased that the numbers are coming up but we're 
disappointed that the total number of ships are going to drop 
below 300 for a period, and then be back up by the end of the 
forward year of the defense plan.
    The CNO is an enormously able man who is doing a superb job 
for the country, Adm. Vernon Clark. I know he has testified to 
the number 375 for a number of years, if I'm not mistaken. We 
have a group of people that are looking at doing a shipbuilding 
study and analyzing not just numbers but, more importantly, 
types of ships and capabilities of ships: lethality, what they 
bring. That study, I don't know when it will be through. You're 
involved in it, Dov.
    Dr. Zakheim. Senator, we're looking specifically at issues 
like amphibious shipping, forcible entry, and also underwater 
requirements. Senator, we have research and development money 
for a new Littoral combat ship. That's why we have some 
confidence that as the numbers begin to really go up in the 
outyears, like 2009, that those are real numbers because those 
ships are going to be much less expensive.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr. 
Secretary, let me commend you for your representation of our 
country. You had not only remarkable eloquence but remarkable 
restraint, and both were noted.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm not noted for restraint.
    Senator Reed. I agree. [Laughter.]
    As we all understand, the American public is terribly 
concerned about developments around the globe and even within 
the United States with the heightened alerts, with conflicts 
potentially in the Persian Gulf, and with the war on terror. 
They're also a bit confused. As I go back to my home State of 
Rhode Island, one of the confusing elements is the apparent 
disparate treatment between the threat posed by Iraq and the 
threat posed by North Korea. North Korea has a military force 
capable of a surprise attack, clearly Iraq does not. North 
Korea has ejected U.N. inspectors, Iraq grudgingly, 
reluctantly, and noncooperatively has allowed them into their 
country. Our response to the North Korean situation has been to 
refer it to the United Nations, our response to the Iraq 
situation has been to, we hope, encourage the United Nations 
enforcement but prepare to go it alone.
    I wonder, Mr. Secretary, since you are responsible for 
military planning, are we discounting a more serious threat 
posed by North Korea, the threat that they will within weeks 
have nuclear weapons or marketable plutonium because of our 
concentration or preoccupation with Iraq?
    Second, what can we do right now with respect to North 
Korea to try to moderate their behavior?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me try and again 
demonstrate restraint, since this is a matter that the 
President and Secretary Powell are wrestling with extensively. 
My impression of these two very different situations, each 
dangerous to be sure, is that the U.S. policy over a period of 
time has been to some extent the same. Both have gone to the 
United Nations.
    The difference is in the case of Iraq, it's been 12 years. 
They have tried political and diplomatic efforts through the 
United Nations, now up to some 17 resolutions. They have tried 
economic sanctions and they haven't worked. Iraq over a period 
of time has used chemical weapons against its own people and 
its neighbors. They have fired Scud missiles at three or four 
of their neighbors. They invaded Kuwait. They threatened to 
destabilize some of their neighbors. They struck with, as a 
terrorist state, and are developing weapons of mass 
destruction. It seems to me that that one is at the end of the 
cycle.
    Conversely, one had hoped that North Korea, as a result of 
the Agreed Framework, was at a stop with respect to nuclear 
weapons. The public assessment is that they have one or two 
weapons. The public assessment is that if they restart the 
reprocessing plant, they can have six to eight additional, or 
they could have material for six to eight additional weapons 
but not have weaponized them immediately. I see North Korea as 
a threat as a proliferator more than I see them as a nuclear 
threat on the peninsula.
    Now, I could be wrong, but they sell almost anything. They 
are the world's greatest proliferator of missile technology, 
and what concerns me is that risk. I think that the decision by 
the President and the Secretary of State to have that problem 
seen as a world problem is correct, that it is a problem for 
the world, that proliferation represents a terribly dangerous 
thing. There are a lot of countries sitting around waiting to 
buy that type of material.
    We can't unilaterally as a country win things politically 
or economically; it takes enormous cooperation from other 
nations. It's pretty clear that the proliferation regimes that 
exist in the world worked pretty well before, but they're not 
working very well right now. For example, we stopped that ship 
going towards Yemen, and we had no legal authority to stop it, 
so we had to let it go. It was more missile technology coming 
from North Korea, and the same thing is going to be true. 
Unless the world wakes up and says this is a dangerous thing, 
and creates a set of regimes that will in fact get cooperation 
to stop those weapons, we are going to be facing a very serious 
situation in the next 5 years.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me raise 
another issue which is related to North Korea, because reports 
today indicate that they have the missile capability to reach 
the west coast of the United States, which underscores the 
importance of developing and deploying an effective missile 
defense system.
    You have indicated in your budget that you are proposing a 
limited deployment, and I think in response to Senator Levin 
you said that this will be done without operational testing. 
The first question I have is, can I assume that you will 
conduct operational testing even though it will come after the 
deployment?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course. I don't even know that it's 
correct to say it will be deployed without operational testing. 
I think this is an unusual situation and I would characterize 
what we have proposed as simultaneously a test bed as well as a 
minimal deployment. It is both things, and the words are hot 
button words because the testing is required before deployment, 
but not before a test bed. Yet, the reality is the test bed 
offers a deployable minimal capability.
    Senator Reed. I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, in terms of 
these are hot button words and that's why I think it's very 
important to pick words carefully, because the last missile 
test was a failure; they've had great successes and some 
failures, it's still a very primitive system.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
    Senator Reed. We need a booster rocket that has not yet 
been integrated into the system. My suggestion was that using 
the word deployment gives it a little more credibility, the 
system that we use today, than in fact it has.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder, but let me tell you the dilemma I went through. On 
the one hand if you call it a deployment, it has a greater 
deterrent effect. If you call it a deployment when in fact it 
is very minimal and would, it is what it is, then it's 
overstating it. If you call it a test bed, someone who's 
against deployment is going to call it a deployment, because 
the reality is it has a minimal capability. Then they're going 
to say you deployed it before you tested it. So no matter which 
way we went, someone wasn't going to like it.
    My attitude is, we have an obligation. It is a fact, George 
Tenet declassified it yesterday as I understand it, that the 
North Koreans very likely do have a two-stage with a kick motor 
capability, which could reach the United States. We also 
assessed that they have a limited number of nuclear weapons. 
Now, that's not a happy combination. Having that test bed, that 
minimally deployed system, is not a bad thing, I'd say.
    Senator Reed. Thank you for your responses and your 
restraint.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Ensign.
    Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make 
just a couple of brief comments and then get into a little 
questioning.
    I have read through your statement and there are a couple 
of things I was very pleased about. I think you're right on 
target with the idea--and this doesn't just apply to missile 
defense, I think it applies to many other weapon systems--the 
idea of not waiting until you have a perfect system before 
deploying it. I think that our experience is showing us that 
weapons systems are taking far too long to develop.
    I don't know if it was in your testimony from today or some 
of the previous things that I've read from you, but I remember 
reading that the length of time today required to bring new 
weapons systems on line is two or three times longer than it 
was 20 years ago. Yet, technology is advancing the speed with 
which new things should be happening and instead, we're going 
the other way. So taking a whole new look at the way the 
Department of Defense does things is absolutely critical at 
this point.
    I've said for a long time that the Department of Defense 
probably has enough money right now if you were able to do 
things the right way. In other words, if you didn't have all 
the rules and regulations that you had to do things, and you 
could actually get the money to the things that the money needs 
to be gotten to, and didn't have all the bureaucratic 
procedures and have to spend all of that money doing all the 
bureaucratic things that you have to do, you probably--I don't 
know that that number is accurate, but you would certainly have 
a lot more money to put to weapons systems and quality of life 
issues, and taking care of the military the way that it needs 
to be taken care of.
    So I'm very excited about the new direction, and as the new 
chairman for the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, 
I'm committing to work with you on some of these issues. We 
have a role. We have to hold you accountable. But at the same 
time, we have to recognize that you have a lot more expertise 
in these areas and we have to able to take your direction and 
empower you to do the things that are going to be necessary to 
transform, or at least begin a major transformation of, our 
Department of Defense.
    Now to get to my first question, do you have any idea how 
much money you could save in some of the reparations? I 
understand we're probably not going to cut the defense budget, 
but how much money from the proposals that you put together, 
have you put a number together, or maybe Dr. Zakheim, you can 
tell us if there's a total amount estimate of savings if all of 
the reforms that you wanted were put through.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. No, Senator. First of all, thank you 
for your encouragement on the kinds of changes that we really 
believe we need, and we look forward to working with you on 
that. We have not put together a number. I have kind of off the 
top of my head said that in organizations that I have run, I 
have generally been able to save something around 5 percent if 
you get at it and work at it hard. Now that doesn't sound like 
a big percentage, but when you've got a $380 billion budget, 
it's a pile of money. I'm just guessing.
    But there is no question that we're required to do so many 
things we ought not have to do, and people are wasting so much 
time doing things they don't have to do, that we could do an 
awful lot better job for the country.
    Senator Ensign. On the idea of using our resources better, 
one concern I have is that, we are taking the bulk of the 
responsibility in an area that I consider to be primarily a 
European problem. We have been a great friend to the Europeans 
in the Balkans. We handled the situation for them and continue 
to handle a great deal of that over there, and it seems to have 
been taken off the table when we were trying to solve this 
situation with NATO and Turkey, the idea of taking our 
peacekeepers away from there and allowing the Europeans to 
handle the peacekeeping operation. Can you make some comments 
on your feelings about that?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Sure. I think what happened in the 
Balkans, Europe seemed to need our involvement, to put it 
graciously. Fair enough. We decided to get involved, which in 
my view was the right decision. We underestimated--as I recall, 
in Bosnia they said we'd be out by Christmas. Not so. I think 
it's important to be realistic about things, and it takes time.
    What you have to do if you put troops in is build up the 
civil side, the rule of law, the courts, the police, the border 
patrol, they have to have that capability. The U.N. and the 
European Union (EU) and the people charged with that 
responsibility did not move as aggressively, in my view, as 
they might have. Joe Ralston, our European commander during 
that period, has done a great job in beginning to pull our 
troops--not our troops but all NATO troops that are in there--
down in a measured way. There is a better effort now going on 
getting that civil side working.
    Now, it's still a dangerous part of the world and we have 
to be aware of that. There are countries that have offered to 
help back fill some of that, Senator, for us because of our 
involvement in the global war on terrorism, and we have looked 
at that.
    Senator Ensign. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Just one 
quick comment not requiring a response and that is, I 
appreciate you not taking any of our options off the table. I 
consider us the good guys, and I would rather have the good 
guys having all of their weapon systems and all of their 
capabilities far superior to the bad guys in the world. So, I 
applaud your efforts and say keep going.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you.
    Senator Bayh.
    Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I 
want to thank you and your colleagues for being with us today. 
We know you're busy, and we appreciate your enabling us to do 
our constitutional responsibilities here.
    General and Doctor, I hope you won't take personal offense 
if my inquiries are directed to the Secretary, and Mr. 
Secretary, I hope you won't take personal offense at that 
either.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I will have to hear the question before 
I will answer that. [Laughter.]
    Senator Bayh. Fair enough. Mr. Secretary, the Cold War 
ended 14 years ago and the shifting of the geopolitical, for 
lack of a better term, tectonic plates that began at that time 
has begun to reveal some fissures that only now are coming to 
full relief. That said, I want to follow up on a question that 
the chairman asked you about NATO. Simply put, what do you view 
as the future mission or role of NATO? Let me follow up on that 
just with one other comment that the chairman also alluded to. 
We now have an alliance that has a couple major countries in it 
that are unwilling to support us in our effort to enforce 
United Nations resolutions. Those same countries are apparently 
unwilling to take steps to defend another member of the 
alliance. What good is an alliance that is willing to take 
neither proactive steps nor defensive measures?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I have a feeling you're trying to put 
me in a position of defending Germany and France.
    Senator Bayh. It's hard to defend the indefensible.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. But first let me say, if one looked 
down from Mars on the globe, we'd find there are several 
handfuls of countries that believe in free political 
institutions and free economic institutions, and most of them 
are in NATO, a large fraction of them in the whole word are in 
NATO. Like minded countries working together in a world that's 
dangerous and untidy is a good thing. I may as a former 
ambassador to NATO, having lived it, have a bit of a bias on 
the subject, but I believe that NATO, since the Cold War ended 
and NATO has migrated into understanding the importance of 
doing things outside of the NATO treaty area, has the potential 
to bring a multinational approach to some problems in the world 
that can be enormously beneficial.
    To get something accomplished it is frequently vastly 
better to work with other countries, because things don't fit 
solely as political, economic, or military. They tend to be a 
blend. Again, we need the political and the economic support as 
well as the military support. So I'm disappointed at the 
situation in NATO where they have refused to assist Turkey with 
planning.
    On the other hand, I have been around so long that I have 
seen many times in our alliance where we've had bumps. We had 
the natural gas pipeline during the Reagan administration, we 
had the Mansfield amendment back then, and Senator Warner will 
remember back in the 1970s. It's never been perfect, it's 
always been a little bumpy. This one is interesting because the 
division is not between the United States and Europe, the 
division is within Europe.
    Senator Bayh. Correct. So your response is that although 
occasionally aggravating and not perfect, it's better than the 
alternative, particularly when we look at the breadth of 
challenges that we face. I think Director Tenet mentioned that 
yesterday, that the cooperation continues to be excellent in 
the intelligence community. But I thought it was important to 
raise this subject. It's something that I think we have to give 
some thought to going forward.
    General Myers. Senator, can I just--let me----
    Senator Bayh. If you can be brief, General, because the 
clock is running on me.
    General Myers. I will try to do that, Senator. You asked 
about the future role and the Secretary covered a part of that. 
The other part is that at the time we are discussing this issue 
in NATO right now about Article IV and support for Turkey, 
we're also redoing the command and control structure that has 
to be done to get out of the Cold War model that we've had. The 
NATO response force is an idea that we took into NATO that's 
being implemented.
    I will keep it short, but there are probably 9 or 10 good 
things that NATO has done really well lately, to include their 
support in Afghanistan.
    Senator Bayh. It's important to emphasize this organization 
is going to retain its vitality and its mission going forward, 
I think is a thought that's in order here.
    If I could just move on, Mr. Secretary, I want to second 
what Senator Collins said with regard to the role of our forces 
in South Korea. I'm delighted to hear that you're giving some 
thought to possibly repositioning them. It seems to me right 
now that they are insufficient to either fight or deter 
successfully. They are not uniformly popular in the country, 
and so some rethinking of the presence there is in order.
    Just one other question and a couple of quick comments, 
because 6 minutes runs by very quickly. Mr. Secretary, we live 
in a world unfortunately of multiple threats these days, as you 
know better than any of the rest of us. We hope that it doesn't 
come to fighting in any of them but we have to be prepared to 
take force, if necessary, in more than one place. Specifically 
I'd like to ask you, and I know it's not our policy and we've 
said repeatedly we don't intend to use force, but I want to ask 
you about North Korea in the context of Iraq. If it came to 
that, and I know we don't intend to, and I don't want to try 
and bait you over that line here, but if we decided that we had 
no choice except to take military action against the 
reprocessing facility and their launch sites, could we do that 
while fully engaged in Iraq? Do we have the capability?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, if I answer that, the 
newspapers throughout Asia are going to say that the Secretary 
of Defense rattled the sabers, and the President is on a 
diplomatic track.
    Senator Bayh. Let me step back from the question, but I 
think you can understand where we sit. It's important to look 
at the potentialities that are out there and be reassured.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
    Senator Bayh. So let me step back from that specific 
question and just say, do we have the ability to act both in 
Iraq and in other potential hot spots around the world in a way 
that would defend America's security?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we have a defense strategy and 
a force sizing construct that says we can win decisively and 
conquer a country in one theater, and near simultaneously 
swiftly defeat an adversary in another theater, and at the same 
time successfully pursue a number of lesser contingencies, for 
example, Bosnia or Kosovo, or what we're doing in Afghanistan.
    Senator Bayh. I would trust in your budget that you're 
embedding additional capabilities to address multiple 
situations simultaneously.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, as I indicated, our budget does 
not include money for the global war on terror. Nor does it 
include money for the force flows in support of Iraq. We're 
going to have to have a supplemental for that, which I'm told 
is traditional.
    Senator Bayh. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. If I could 
just make two comments without requesting any response. I know 
this is a recurring source of aggravation for you, Mr. 
Chairman. I couldn't help but notice in The Washington Post 
today a front page story saying special operations units are 
already in Iraq. It cites sources or experts familiar with 
Pentagon planning, and then two military officials with direct 
knowledge of their activities, etcetera, etcetera. This subject 
of leaks, there was a great deal of hue and cry about a leak 
from Congress a while back with regard to a single somewhat 
innocuous intercept in Afghanistan.
    I know you're doing your best on this, but if this kind of 
leaking takes place, it's hard to--I would request that you do 
all you can because we are going to try and do all we can from 
our end.
    Finally, regarding the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), I mentioned yesterday to Director Tenet that 
there is a potential there, with our growing military 
involvement, for that not only to bite our personnel there but 
possibly here domestically as well, if you think about this 
incident where they had a bombing of a fairly large, a hardened 
target in Bogota a few days ago. There is a great deal of 
travel back and forth between Colombia and the U.S., and it's 
not beyond the realm of possibility that they may decide to 
take that conflict at some future date to U.S. soil. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, might I just comment on 
that?
    Chairman Warner. The Senator's time has almost been double 
now.
    I want to encourage General Myers to respond to the 
important questions about NATO. I do believe you had testified 
about nine points. Not now, but in the record.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    1. Every nation that has led ISAF in Afghanistan has been a NATO 
Ally. Beginning with ISAF III in January, NATO, as an Alliance, began 
supporting the German/Dutch command of the ISAF mission. NATO is 
exploring providing increased support, including possibly taking 
command.
    2. Prague Capabilities Commitment. Heads of state and government 
made political commitments to focused, achievable improvements in 
military capabilities.
    3. NATO Response Force. This will be a driver for force 
modernization and will give NATO a credible 21st century military 
force.
    4. Command Structure Review. Allies made a commitment to joint 
operations and a considerably leaner structure that includes an Allied 
Command Transformation.
    5. NATO Enlargement. We are on the road to successful accession of 
seven nations into NATO.
    6. NATO-Russia Council. We have seen the development of a 
significant relationship between Russia and NATO.
    7. Balkans Transition to EU command/control. NATO is developing a 
good working relationship with the EU Security apparatus, resulting in 
actual military capabilities and EU assumption of the NATO mission in 
Macedonia.
    8. Political guidance for defense against terrorism. The Alliance 
is committed to acting against terrorists, as well as those who harbor 
them.
    9. European sealift and airlift clearinghouse organizations. These 
are nascent means of improving the deployability of European forces.

    Chairman Warner. Do you wish to say something, Mr. 
Secretary?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I do. I think the Senator is exactly 
correct about leaks. I think they are just dangerous. They put 
people's lives at risk, and I think people have a duty to 
manage their mouths and not put people's lives at risk. I would 
also add that I think it's the obligation of people who find 
people leaking to tell responsible authorities because folks 
that do it and put people's lives at risk ought to be in jail.
    General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make sure the 
record is clear. I thought I heard Senator Bayh say that we 
were not able to fight successfully in Korea. You said we were 
not positioned to.
    Senator Bayh. No, no, I didn't, and I don't want to take 
any more time. With 37,000 troops, it seemed to me that they 
were unlikely to be essential to fighting a successful war 
there.
    Chairman Warner. We must turn now to Senator Allard.
    Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pursue 
your comment about the capability of Korea to reach the 
mainland with a missile strike. We had testimony from Director 
Tenet yesterday, and he did make the statement that they have 
missile capability to reach the west coast and that's the first 
time I'd ever heard that statement. So, you made a statement 
here and the nature of your statement that you made, it wasn't 
clear to me whether you were just stating a fact that he had 
made that statement or whether you have evidence that makes you 
believe that Korea can reach the west coast with a missile.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I chaired the Ballistic 
Missile Commission back in 1998, I guess it was, or 1997, and 
there is no question but that North Korea launched a type of 
Dong II, a two-stage ballistic missile with a kick motor on it, 
and the kick motor did not work. It apparently did not put it 
into orbit or give it the sufficient distance that they needed. 
But that was years ago, and they are clearly capable in missile 
technology, they sell it all the over the world, and there 
isn't a doubt in my mind but that by now they have a capability 
to reach portions of the United States.
    Senator Allard. In my view, and it must be your view too, 
that makes our missile defense system even more critical. As 
one American who wants to make sure we protect the borders of 
this country, I am very appreciative of you and this 
administration for pushing forward on missile defense. If we 
had taken the advice of those who opposed missile defense, I 
think we'd have a vulnerability today that would have to be of 
concern to this country, and I think it still exists, but at 
least we have somewhat of a leg up when the administration is 
talking about deploying a missile defense system, and I just 
want to thank you and the administration for that forward 
thinking type of effort on the part of this country. It's that 
type of effort that's going to make sure we remain a free 
country.
    I also would like to compliment you on being willing to 
look at many new programs in the Pentagon. I've always viewed 
you as somebody who is willing to shake the tree a little bit 
and I appreciate that in you. It doesn't hurt programs that 
have been around a long time to go back and reevaluate them and 
make them rejustify why they have to be there. If we want our 
taxpayer dollars to do the most for the American people towards 
defending this country, I think that has to happen. Even in an 
institution that you and I strongly support, which is the 
Department of Defense, we need to look hard to make sure that 
we are doing everything we can to do the best in trying to 
protect the country with as few tax dollars as we possibly can, 
and I commend you for that.
    Also, one other thing I wanted to bring up was the Air 
Force's evolve expendable launch vehicle (EELV). The market on 
launch vehicles and the industrial base associated with that 
has really changed dramatically in the last year or 2 and I 
have been one that always pushed that we needed to have 
competition, because I think it brings the best out and gives 
you some choice and some duplication that perhaps maybe we 
need. There are some areas in defense where duplication makes 
sense and some where it doesn't. This is one of those areas 
where I always thought it made a lot of sense. Can you talk a 
little bit about what you think might be our capability in 
maintaining that competitive system in the expendable launch 
vehicle area?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The guy sitting next to me is an expert 
on the subject, the former commander of the Space Command, and 
I think I will let Dick Myers comment on it.
    Senator Allard. General Myers.
    General Myers. Senator Allard, I think I can go a little 
way towards addressing your question. I don't know if I can go 
all the way. Obviously the business case has changed 
dramatically since the idea that we would have competition for 
our new expendable launch vehicles, and I think both of the 
industrial competitors in that program have developed very good 
launch systems. They're developing capability on both the east 
and west coasts for those systems.
    My understanding is given this change in the business case 
that was present just 3 or 4 years ago in contrast with today, 
the Air Force along with the folks up in the Secretary's office 
in acquisition, technology, and logistics are looking at the 
way ahead for this program. To my knowledge, they have not made 
a judgment in terms of how to handle the competitive piece of 
this, but I think that's under a serious discussion right now.
    Senator Allard. I understand that in the President's budget 
there have been some dollars put in there to try to sustain 
this competitive environment, and I would urge you to try to do 
that, because I think it's vital that we have some launch 
capability out there and if one system goes bad, it's always 
nice to have a little bit of redundancy.
    General Myers. Well, the EELV, make no mistake about it, is 
absolutely essential to our space capability because they are 
the launch vehicles for the future. I think we have a handful 
of Titan IVs left and a few other kind of rockets, but we're 
going to go to the EELV, that's a given. The question is, do we 
have enough launches in the cue to sustain the two competitors. 
I have to tell you, I'm not totally up to speed on that issue 
other than I understand it was being looked at in a very 
serious way by the Air Force and by Pete Aldridge.
    Dr. Zakheim. Just to be specific, Senator, we have in the 
2004 budget funds for four launches, and that's in addition to 
the launch that's taking place this month.
    Senator Allard. I see, thank you.
    Back to missile defense, you've expressed a willingness in 
the past to sort of bring in other countries in the missile 
defense area, get them involved to a certain degree. Do you 
have plans to bring in our closest allies in this effort, for 
example, Britain or maybe Canada? Is there any hope at all that 
we could get Russia involved in a partnership that wouldn't put 
us at increased risk on our technology?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you're correct, we are engaged 
in discussions with a number of countries, including the United 
Kingdom (U.K.). In fact, the U.K. made an announcement within 
the last week or 2 about their upgrade and their interest in 
cooperating with us in improving their security situation as a 
result. But there are any number of countries that come in and 
we do discuss these things. With respect to Russia, the answer 
is yes, there is a possibility we could cooperate. There are a 
number of things we could do with Russia on missile defense. 
Indeed, my recollection is there was a working group that was 
going back in the 1990s but for some reason it was discontinued 
in the late 1990s, and I have had discussions with Minister of 
Defense Ivanov on this subject and I suspect we will continue.
    Senator Allard. Thank you. My time has expired.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
    Senator Akaka.
    Before, Senator, you address the witnesses, could I put 
into the record following the important questions from our 
colleague from Colorado, the communication that I, Senator 
Levin, Senator Roberts, and Senator Rockefeller received. I 
asked the Director of Central Intelligence to elaborate on the 
comments he made about the Korean missile yesterday.
    The essence of it is, the testimony is consistent with 
previously unclassified judgments, the capability of the Taepo 
Dong-2 to reach the United States is not a new judgment, and he 
elaborates on that. Without objection, it will go into today's 
record.
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    Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome 
the Secretary and the Chief here to this hearing.
    Mr. Secretary, as mentioned in your answer to Senator Reed, 
the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, testified before this 
committee yesterday that North Korea has a missile capable of 
reaching the west coast of the United States, which means that 
obviously they have the capacity to hit Hawaii. It is my 
understanding that the current Cobra Dane Radar that is to be 
part of the ground based missile defense test bed in Alaska 
cannot discriminate warheads on missiles launched from North 
Korea. Considering that North Korea is the stated reason for 
the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, are you 
requesting money in this budget to build a dedicated 
operational and X-band radar, which the Department has said is 
required for warhead discrimination?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first let me make a comment 
and then I would like to get the rest of the question answered 
for the record. North Korea is, I don't believe, the stated 
single reason for deploying a missile defense capability or a 
test bed, depending on which one someone likes to call it. It 
is to develop a capability, a missile defense capability more 
broadly and to test capabilities, and it would not simply be 
the Alaska interceptors or that radar. It would be multiple 
radars and multiple interceptors if, in fact, decisions are 
made to go forward with a fuller deployment, and it would 
require upgrading radars. But we will get you a precise answer.
    General Myers. The only thing I would add to it is when we 
think about missile defense, the Secretary took the labels off 
of national missile defense. Now we have missile defense. 
Whether it's strategic or tactical or national or local depends 
on where you are and where the missile is coming from. I think 
that's very helpful to the folks who we have fielded around the 
world and to our allies and our partners as well. So it is 
missile defense, it's more than just the pieces we've talked 
about.
    Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, we will be looking forward to 
hearing more about that.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we have developed a 
research, development, and test program that focuses on missile defense 
as a single integrated ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, no 
longer differentiating between theater and national missile defense. In 
programmatic terms, we no longer speak of national or theater missile 
defense. Operationally, the terms can take on different meanings 
depending on where you live. The distinction between them made sense a 
decade ago, when we faced the stark difference between a Soviet ICBM 
threat and an Iraqi Scud. Now it no longer does. The same North Korean 
missile aimed at Japan could be a national threat to our ally, but a 
theater threat to us--unless it were retargeted toward the United 
States, in which case it would become national again. Furthermore, at 
some point in time, a short-range missile could threaten our homeland 
just as well as an ICBM could, if, say, it were launched from the sea 
off our coast.

    Senator Akaka. General Myers, in your posture statement, 
you mention the 2002 Unified Command Plan, the plan which 
created the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and 
determined how it will provide military assistance to the 
Homeland Security Department. Given the fact that Hawaii does 
not fall within the jurisdiction of NORTHCOM, how will the 
Department ensure that there is appropriate coordination 
between NORTHCOM and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) regarding 
homeland security for Hawaii and the Pacific Island 
territories?
    General Myers. Senator, I can answer the military part of 
that. The responsibility that NORTHCOM has is for the 
continental 48 States and Alaska, and PACOM has responsibility 
for Hawaii. So for the military part of that, PACOM and Admiral 
Tom Fargo will handle that portion.
    In terms of the relationship between the Homeland Security 
Department and Hawaii and those functions, you're going to have 
to ask Secretary Ridge. I'm not familiar with how he is going 
to work that with your State.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you. General Myers, your response to 
Senator Warner's question on the readiness of troops was that 
our troops are ``absolutely ready.'' You also mentioned the 
negative effects of environmental loss on military readiness. 
Can you reconcile these two statements? What exactly is the 
impact of environmental encroachment on the readiness of our 
troops?
    General Myers. One of the cases that I think is probably 
right before our eyes is the one in Guam where the Navy is 
prohibited from flying because of the Migratory Bird Act, and 
the case that is being talked about in the sense of a court 
case is the chance that an aircraft might hit a bird and that 
would be in violation of the act. If that court case shuts down 
a training range in Guam, then we're going to have to look for 
work-arounds. You might be able to do it in one location, but 
as you have to do that in other locations--I mean, I have been 
flying for 37 years and we have many bird strikes. It's nothing 
against the bird or against the species. [Laughter.]
    So we have to find a way to address this in a more rational 
way so that an act like the Migratory Bird Act, which is an 
important environmental act, does not limit our training. 
That's one example. There are some other ones as well, but I 
think we need to find some ways to work around it so we can 
conduct our military training in harmony with the need to 
protect the environment.
    I think Senator Inhofe said it well, and I didn't have to 
repeat it, but the Department of Defense spends enormous 
amounts of money in complying with environmental law. When I 
was Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, Vandenberg 
Air Force Base sits in a State that is very environmentally 
conscious. I think the State of California will tell you that 
we were great stewards of the land at Vandenberg. We handle 
some very dangerous stuff out there in terms of rockets and the 
fuels and the things we do. So, I would just say we go to 
enormous effort to try to do this right, but in a few cases 
it's inhibiting our training.
    Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses. Mr. Chairman, 
my time has expired.
    Chairman Warner. We wish to clarify, the ranking member and 
myself, this very important exchange on the environment. I hope 
you will elaborate in the record as to other problems, but I 
believe this committee, under the leadership of our 
distinguished ranking member, cured one problem last year.
    Senator Levin. That was the Migratory Bird Act.
    General Myers. I think that one was----
    Senator Levin. Well, the one example you used this morning 
is the one we've taken care of, we legislated that issue so 
that the Migratory Bird Act no longer applies to military 
readiness activities, including training. Not saying there 
aren't other problems, but we did at least cure that one.
    General Myers. We appreciate that very much. We did make 
some headway.
    Chairman Warner. More work remains to be done by Congress, 
working with the environmental community to try and resolve 
other problems, and I think it will be important and 
responsive.
    General Myers. I will get you a statement for the record of 
those other issues that are still outstanding.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    In February, I expressed my concern over the adverse impacts and 
unforeseen consequences the application of various environmental laws 
are having on military training and testing activities, and, 
consequently, on the readiness of our Armed Forces. These are not novel 
concerns. The Vice Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 
Force testified about these issues before the Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee in July 2002. Various senior military officers 
and political appointees of the military departments and DOD have 
testified before the respective Armed Services Committees on these same 
concerns over the past 2 years. Although Congress began consideration 
of these important issues last year, it was only able to provide 
temporary relief with respect to one statute, the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act. While grateful for this support, we believe more needs to be done.
    Although measuring the full impact of environmental requirements on 
readiness is difficult, my professional assessment is that the impacts, 
and consequently the challenges, we face in providing the most 
effective training and equipment have grown rather than diminished. For 
example, the deployment of a critical new defensive sensor to deal with 
the threat of quiet diesel submarines deployed by North Korea, Iran, 
and other potential adversaries was recently restricted by court order 
despite an unprecedented research program by the Navy to ensure that 
marine mammals would not be injured. Diverse examples of encroachment 
abound, ranging from our inability to train with smoke on military 
ranges to limitations on stationing and use of high performance fighter 
aircraft such as the F-22 due to the Noise Control Act.
    I assure you, we are working on better ways to quantify how 
encroachment affects our ability to train and equip our forces; however 
enough is known right now to convince me that we need legislative 
relief.
    This year, the Services are seeking legislative clarification where 
laws are being applied beyond their original legislative intent, 
creating a vast amount of unnecessary litigation. Our proposal would 
confirm--not change--two Clinton administration environmental policies 
that support military readiness, but are threatened by lawsuits.
    First, it would confirm the military bases' ``Integrated Natural 
Resources Management Plans'' may, if sufficiently protective, 
substitute for Endangered Species Act ``critical habitat'' on military 
bases. These plans, developed in cooperation with State and Federal 
regulators, have made Department of Defense one of the best stewards of 
endangered species in the world. Unlike our plans, critical habitat 
designation can impose rigid limitations on military use of our bases, 
denying Commanders the flexibility to manage their lands for the 
benefit of both readiness and endangered species.
    The Department of Defense bill would also codify Clinton 
administration policies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act that 
support vital antisubmarine warfare (ASW) programs. The prior 
administration adopted science-based policies under this act that 
focused regulation on biologically significant impacts on animals. 
Under this policy, the Navy was able to work with regulators to get 
permits for ASW technologies needed to protect our carrier battle 
groups. But litigants have succeeded in overturning these policies, and 
have obtained an injunction limiting testing of this vital ASW 
technology.
    Our mission is to be prepared to defend the country wherever and 
whenever necessary. Readiness requires anticipating conflicts and 
developing weapons, sensors, and tactics necessary to prevail. It is 
vitally important that we are not constrained in fully training our 
Service men and women as we innovate to meet tomorrow's conflicts. 
Modern warfare is a ``come as you are'' affair. The soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and marines who saw action in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 
used the weapons, sensors, and tactics that they trained with the 
previous summer. We have learned that a host of factors and decisions, 
including urban sprawl, regulations, litigation, and accommodations, 
although reasonable when viewed in isolation, have cumulatively 
diminished the military departments' ability to train and test 
effectively. Our troops are ``ready'' when they deploy, but it is 
becoming more and more difficult to ensure this status because we 
cannot use the military test and training ranges and at-sea operating 
areas for the purposes for which they are dedicated. We have to resort 
to ``workarounds'' that are increasingly burdensome.
    An equally important encroachment concern is transporting units 
away from their home installations for months at a time for necessary 
training prior to deployment overseas. This workaround imposes a 
particular burden on our military families, not just the troops. 
Workarounds also segment training so that we can't ``train as we 
fight.'' This makes effective training more difficult and less 
realistic. In a world where any country with money can buy the best 
weapons, training is critical to victory. We owe this critical edge, 
the winning edge, to the young men and women we send in harm's way.
    We are not abandoning our outstanding stewardship over the lands 
entrusted to us or shrinking from environmental protection 
requirements. We are trying to restore balance where environmental 
requirements adversely affect uniquely military activities necessary to 
prepare for combat. We ask that you carefully consider the proposed 
changes that the Department of Defense brings forward and provide the 
tailored but effective relief we seek.

    Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions, before you begin, the 
Secretary must be back at the Pentagon to receive a foreign 
minister of defense. I want to conduct this in such a way that 
everyone gets one round, so I shall have to be somewhat abrupt 
on the 6 minutes.
    Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you can hold me 
to my time.
    Mr. Secretary, I think it is past time that we evaluate our 
force structure and deployment situation, particularly in 
Europe. The situation is greatly changed today. We don't have 
the same threats, they don't come from the same areas of the 
world, and your comments today that Austria is blocking or 
refusing to allow the transport of military equipment is just a 
stunning development. It must be extremely frustrating for you 
and the Department of Defense leadership.
    I talked with a number of Senators just briefly yesterday 
and will submit a letter to you today that calls on the 
Department of Defense to conduct a study of where we are in 
Europe, to reevaluate how we should deploy our resources there 
to consider first of all our national defense, and second 
consider the tempo of deployment of our personnel and 
separation from families and that sort of thing.
    I guess my question to you would be, would you conduct such 
a study? If one is already in the works, would you share it 
with us? I would just say that virtually every Senator I've 
talked to shared that view strongly. Senator Collins and 
Senator Bayh mentioned it, and I think 15 Senators that signed 
this letter indicate that we think it's past due. We are doing 
that in the United States, let's do it around the world also.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly. We have to look at our base 
structure across the globe. We're already conducting the study, 
it's well underway. We have not only one going on in the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, we have one going on with the area 
of responsibility from commanders in each case, and it requires 
a good deal of sensitivity because it just has--a base in the 
United States has to be coordinated with the Congressmen, 
Senators, and the local people, and so too with our allies 
around the world. We have to make sure we all work off the same 
sheet of music and that we bring them along in terms of those 
discussions. So we will be happy to have a hearing or share 
that, and we don't need to do anything separate because it's 
well underway.
    Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, you served in Europe in 
NATO, and you served as Secretary of Defense previously and 
have observed this whole situation for many years. It's odd to 
me and I would like to ask you if you agree, that we talk about 
multi-lateralism and unilateralism, whereas at this point it 
appears that 16 nations in Europe support our position and only 
three oppose our position.
    What do you do in circumstances like that? Aren't we 
getting to a point in history where we simply have to make sure 
we have broad support among nations of goodwill and try to make 
sure with that support we defend our just national interests?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. We do indeed. I was hoping to come back 
to Senator Levin. He kept talking about us proceeding 
unilaterally and going it alone in the opening statement. I 
didn't have a chance to comment, but you're quite right. We 
have today 90 nations in the global war on terrorism. We don't 
have a single coalition, we have multiple coalitions. The 
mission determines which countries feel they want to 
participate in that coalition. We ought not have a situation 
where the coalition determines the mission, because then it 
stops everything, because there's always somebody who's not 
going to like it.
    Now, it is of value to have countries. In the case of Iraq, 
we have dozens of countries participating already in a variety 
of different ways in terms of basing and overflight and what 
have you, offering forces, and it seems to me that you're 
correct. We do have to think through what we believe is in our 
country's best interests and in the world's best interests. 
Then what we have to do is go out and persuade other countries 
that that is something that needs to be done and then we have 
to work with those like-thinking countries to get it done.
    In the case of military activity, we can do that without 
unanimity. For example, on the Turkey thing, we can go ahead 
and help Turkey using the 16 countries and not the 3 that are 
blocking it in NATO. Who loses in that case? NATO loses. 
Turkey's not going to lose. We're going to see that they get 
what they need, the 16 countries are. So it seems to me that 
your point is a valid one.
    Senator Sessions. As NATO has expanded the consensus or 
unanimity rule answers itself. It's very unlikely, it seems to 
me, that everyone is going to agree on even important policies. 
Of course, in the United Nations, we have the permanent 
Security Council veto so one nation there, China or Russia, has 
an absolute veto on U.N. military action, so it's just plainly 
obvious to me that we need to be respectful of those 
organizations, seek their support, confer with them, but 
ultimately we're going to have to do what the consensus of the 
world believes is good for the world, and our country in 
defending our own interests.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. That certainly is the obligation of 
this body and the President of the United States, to do that. I 
will say this. The expansion of NATO has had an interesting 
effect. The newer countries coming in are countries that have 
lived under dictatorships and under communism, and they tend to 
bring an energy and an awareness and a sensitivity to those 
dangers that's fresh and helpful to the institution.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator Pryor, 
to be followed by Senator Ben Nelson and Senator Bill Nelson, 
and then I will move down the order from there.
    Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I have a 
couple of very quick questions from Senator Robert Byrd, who 
could not be here at this moment. Mr. Secretary, what are your 
estimates of how much a war with Iraq might cost?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. That is an answer that unfortunately I 
believe is not knowable. I am told there are people at the OMB 
that have estimated it at something between $50 and $60 
billion. The one thing I do know is it would cost, if the 
President decided that it was necessary and force had to be 
used--a heck of a lot less than September 11 cost, and 
September 11 would cost a heck of a lot less than a chemical or 
biological September 11.
    Senator Pryor. Thank you for that answer. You have said 
that you expect to send a supplemental appropriations request 
to Congress soon. How much will the Pentagon request in that 
supplemental and are there two variations of that, one in the 
event that we continue with weapons inspections and the other 
in the event we're at war, or will it just be one supplemental 
request?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know. It's a matter that the 
OMB and the White House are working on. We do know certain 
facts. One fact is that we're spending about $1.5 or $6 billion 
a month since October 1 for the global war on terror. So we've 
already spent October, November, December, January, 4 months, 
which is $6 billion, and a portion of February, and that does 
not count the cost of the force flow for Iraq, which is 
probably in the neighborhood of $2 billion-plus.
    So for the year, if the global war on terror went on at a 
billion-five and you had to add some additional force flow, 
it's pretty clear that even without a conflict in Iraq, we 
would be well short and need a supplemental of roughly that 
magnitude, but that's something that depends on what takes 
place and we will know more about that as we go forward.
    Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to talk about the 
C-130J program, which I know General Myers is very familiar 
with. As we continue this war on terrorism, the C-130J seems to 
me to be a very important part of that effort as well as all 
the efforts that the military is involved with. Something that 
my staff has talked to me about--and again, I'm new here--but 
we talked about the C-130J multiyear proposals and as I 
understand it, are you making that proposal because it may help 
you plan and even may help you save money on the program?
    Dr. Zakheim. Well, we are certainly looking at that. As I 
understand it, the current estimate is that it will save some 
money. We're refining that as we speak and I have every 
certainty that we will be finalizing that very soon.
    Senator Pryor. It just so happens that the Little Rock Air 
Force Base is the premier training facility for C-130Js, not 
just for our forces but for anybody in the world. Do you see 
that changing any time in the future? General Myers, you may 
want to take a crack at that one.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me make a comment. Congress passed 
a proposal for base closings and what we decided to do is to 
try to proceed in an orderly way and not comment on individual 
bases prospectively. It just seems to me that the process has 
to be an open one, it has to be one that is done in a serious 
and nonpartisan way. One of the reasons that they didn't have a 
base realignment and closure (BRAC) for several years was the 
accusations that they were not looked at in a fair and open and 
balanced way, and I want to see that this is done that way. 
Therefore, I'm not inclined to speculate about the future.
    Senator Pryor. General Myers.
    General Myers. I think it would be speculation on my part. 
I sit here with a blue uniform, but I am not that familiar with 
Air Force plans.
    Senator Pryor. Another facility that I just want you all to 
be sensitized to and know about and be aware of is the Pine 
Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. Right now it is in the process of 
disposing of chemical weapons. It's the only active chemical 
defense arsenal in the Department of Defense, and it also has a 
joint venture with the American Red Cross where they do 
readiness training for first responders. It seems to have a 
very varied and important mission in today's world. Just as you 
all are considering your plans in the future, I just want you 
to again be reminded of the asset that you have currently in 
the Department of Defense and be mindful that it's there and 
actually has enough real estate to expand. For example, I think 
the DOD made a determination in the late 1990s that if you do a 
vaccine program that would be the best facility that you 
currently have. So, I just wanted to remind you to be aware of 
that.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Ben Nelson.
    Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, 
General Myers, I appreciate very much your being here again 
today to help us understand some of the difficulties in the 
world today that certainly you face each and every day.
    Mr. Secretary, you made a prediction this past weekend that 
within a year or 2 or 3, North Korea would become the leading 
example of why in your view international agreements designed 
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons are failing, and today 
you elaborated a bit on your thoughts about cooperation, that 
it isn't necessarily working in the world the way that we would 
like to see it.
    Do you believe that, in many respects, North Korea's 
proliferation and supply of weapons and other armaments and 
related materials might expand to a more aggressive program 
that would ultimately lead to an arms race in Asia, which is 
obviously something that we don't want? Do you have any 
thoughts about that that you might share? I have a couple of 
related questions, but that's my first question.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I look at the situation with North 
Korea in this way. They will sell anything they have to anyone 
who wants it. They have been demonstrating that for years. 
You're correct. An announced or demonstrated nuclear capability 
and obviously relatively sophisticated ballistic missile 
capability on the part of North Korea is something that the 
neighbors have to be attentive to. The neighbors to the south, 
the neighbors to the north, and to the west, and to the east.
    Now, there are a number of states in that neighborhood who 
have the ability to have nuclear weapons in relatively short 
periods if they wish to have them. That is not a good thing for 
the world. I also look at North Korea as a danger, not simply 
in Northeast Asia but a danger to the world. I mean, this is 
clearly a world problem. If you have a country that is capable 
of producing nuclear material sufficient to fashion six to 
eight nuclear weapons in a relatively short of period of months 
and is known to be selling them, it's a terrorist state, and 
that's a problem. It's not a problem to the United States, it's 
a problem to the world.
    It seems to me that this is the reason I feel that the 
President is correct in attempting to see, which is now 
successful, in getting that problem put into the United 
Nations. Because the solution to proliferation can't be 
unilateral, it has to be a strong, fully enforced, agreed upon 
set of restrictions so that those kinds of weapons can be 
stopped and interdicted.
    Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, obviously the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty that North Korea was the first to 
withdraw from is not working today. Do you have any thoughts 
about what we might do to bring the rest of the world together 
where we could do something to deal with nonproliferation and 
nonsupplying of material and materiel to the rest of the world, 
particularly to those states and groups that would do harm to 
our neighbors and clearly do us harm as well?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I do have some ideas. They're not well 
developed, but we would not be facing the problem in Iraq today 
if the technologically advanced countries of the world had seen 
the danger and strictly enforced economic sanctions against 
Iraq sufficient that it would cause them to discontinue their 
weapons of mass destruction programs. We would not have this 
problem today.
    Now, how do you get countries to step up and do something 
that is against their immediate self-interests in exchange for 
something that's in favor of their self-interest over the 
longer period? That is to say, stop commercial sales, stop 
pretending that dual use things are going to be used for good 
things and not bad things, and strictly enforce and prevent a 
country that's clearly in violation and clearly engaged in 
trafficking in these capabilities in a way that puts the world 
at risk.
    I think the only way you do that is to go to their publics. 
I think the people of those countries have to be sufficiently 
concerned that they require their governments to behave in a 
rational way and not just a rational way for an immediate self 
gratification of some commercial license, but in a rational way 
that looks down 5 or 10 years and sees, for example, in the 
Middle East the possibility of four, five, or six countries 
having nuclear weapons, which is not a pretty picture.
    Senator Ben Nelson. It's predictable with the direction 
things are going today. Let me commend you for, if not being 
patient, acquiring the appearance of patience, and I thank you 
for your answers today.
    Chairman Warner. We thank you, Senator.
    Senator Bill Nelson.
    Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are in the 
midst of enormous change and enormous challenge. Thank you for 
trying to get your arms around this problem and steering us in 
a direction that best protects our country.
    On this debate about missile testing, why don't we just 
call it what it is instead of getting hung up on the labels? 
Say that we're going to deploy while we are still in the 
testing phase.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. That's what I tried to do.
    Senator Bill Nelson. I think it speaks for itself. One of 
the policy questions that I think you're going to have to 
answer, particularly since it looks like we're going to have 
the needs of our United States military overseas for the 
foreseeable future in nation building, and if you don't like 
that term, then use the term establishing political and 
economic stability. We're trying to do that in Afghanistan. We 
thought that it might only take us a year in Bosnia and we're 
in the seventh year, and clearly that will be the situation in 
Iraq as well.
    The policy question is, are we going to continue to do that 
with other than the active duty military? My wife and I went on 
Thanksgiving to have Thanksgiving dinner with our troops in 
Bosnia and what I found was a Pennsylvania National Guard unit. 
They were pumped, they knew they were there for 6 months and 
they were going to rotate back.
    I have been going to a lot of our National Guard ceremonies 
all over Florida, telling them that I'm there on behalf of a 
grateful nation for their service. But they went into the 
Guard--as did the Reserves--thinking that when their country 
called, that they were ready to respond and they are well 
prepared by the way, there is no question about their 
professionalism, but there is a question about their obligation 
and the length of time. Would you briefly comment and then we 
can carry on this dialogue for some period of time, because 
this is a policy question we have to ask. Do we up the active 
duty troops in order to keep the Guard and the Reserves as what 
they were intended to be?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first, thank you for visiting 
the troops. They appreciate it and we all appreciate it.
    Second, I do worry a bit about the phrase ``nation 
building.'' I take it as a little bit arrogant that we think we 
might know how to build a nation for somebody else. I like to 
think of it as our responsibility. For example, in Afghanistan 
we are trying to create a security environment that is 
hospitable to their rebuilding their own nation, and do that 
with the cooperation of other nations. I think that's what 
we're trying to do there, and clearly that's what one would 
have to do in Iraq if it came to that.
    With respect to the end strength issue, there are so many 
things we can do to make better use of the current end strength 
we have in uniform. We can pull down in places where they have 
been for too long. In the Sinai, we're pulling out about half 
of those. There are four other places where we're in the 
process of doing the same thing. We're looking at the bigger 
chunks in Asia and in Europe, and we're going to do that.
    There's also a way that General Myers and I are working 
hard on trying to figure out a better way to alert, mobilize, 
and deploy Guard and Reserve Forces so that they continue to 
feel what they feel now. They're proud to be called, they're 
proud to serve, but they want to serve in something that's real 
and they don't want to get called up four or five or six times 
in a short period of time because it's very difficult for their 
families, it's difficult for their employers. But they are 
pumped and doing a terrific job.
    What we have to do is get a more nuanced system. At the 
present time, our deployment system is basically one big switch 
over here, peace, and the other is World War III over there, 
and you pull it and everything happens. We're trying to figure 
out how to disaggregate this thing in a way that's respectful 
of the Guard and Reserve and their employers and their 
families. If we need additional end strength we will be up to 
ask for it, but at the moment I don't think we do. If we can 
get the people in uniform that are doing jobs that are not 
military jobs, that will save some people right there.
    Senator Bill Nelson. If they know they are there for 6 
months, they're ready and they're pumped. But if suddenly 
that's a year, and then they're coming home after that year and 
they suddenly get diverted someplace else, then you have 
another whole situation with regard to our promise to them and 
our promise to their employers.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you're exactly right. The 
other thing I didn't mention, which I should have, is that back 
in the 1970s after Vietnam, the Department of Defense took 
certain skills and put them in the Reserves, 100 percent in the 
Reserves. They did it so that if they were ever to go to war 
again, there would have to be a major call-up. That's not a 
good idea, because we're going to have a series of these things 
just as sure as we're sitting here, and what we have to do is 
make sure we have people on active duty to do all the skills so 
that we do not have to keep calling those same people up four 
or five times.
    Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, assured access to space 
is another issue, not only what was brought up here earlier on 
the EELVs, but the technologies that you all clearly have an 
interest in at DOD and other agencies in developing as a 
follow-on to the space shuttle. We are at a point that 
decisions are going to have to be made over the next several 
months on that, and you all at DOD have to weigh in on that, 
because it's going to be extremely important to you. You have 
to have a backup system other than these two EELVs, and right 
now the only capability other than that, once all the EELVs are 
gone, is the space shuttle.
    Chairman Warner. Senator, thank you. The Senate, indeed 
Congress is fortunate to have your services, having given much 
of your life and career to this subject. You're following in 
the shoes of your distinguished predecessor who was on this 
committee, Senator Graham.
    Senator Bill Nelson. Well, bless you. Mr. Chairman, I would 
just conclude by saying two names, Scott Speicher, let's not 
forget him.
    Chairman Warner. That's an important message and I share 
with you that message.
    Senator Dayton.
    Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary. It 
is a perilous irony, the fact that we're talking here about a 
$400 billion expenditure for the most overwhelming military 
force the world has ever known, and at the same time we're 
telling our citizens to go get out and get duct tape and 
plastic wrap and water. You said yourself, sir, today, that 
this is the most dangerous security environment the world has 
ever known.
    It reminded me of the ominous forewarnings of condition 
orange, what Robert Kennedy said after the Cuban missile 
crisis: ``No action is taken against an adversary in a vacuum. 
Escalation on one side brings a counter-response. A government 
or people will fail to understand this only at their great 
peril.''
    It seems to me that for the last 55 years our leaders have 
understood that. Both Republican and Democratic Presidents also 
faced dangerous dictators who had weapons of mass destruction, 
the heads of countries that were hostile to the United States, 
the former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, but none of those 
Presidents attacked those countries to eliminate that threat, 
and the threat was ongoing, it was dealt with and contained 
diplomatically, and the peace and security of this Nation were 
preserved.
    The principal reason I believe that they didn't do so was 
because of mutual assured destruction, because we knew that 
their country could inflict destruction on our citizens, our 
countryside, our cities, that was intolerable to us, just as we 
could annihilate them.
    I guess my question, sir, is why would we expect that Iraq 
will be any different? If the United States invades that 
country, is destroying their cities, their citizens, causing 
casualties among their citizens, why won't we expect that they 
will retaliate within the United States with every destructive 
force that they could marshall, and why wouldn't we expect that 
Osama bin Laden would do his utmost to exploit that situation 
and to twist it in the eyes of the world to be seen as 
something different from what it is? How do you assess our 
ability to protect our citizens in their cities and their 
schools and their homes from retaliation if we invade Iraq?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me say several things 
about that statement. First, if one goes back to the Soviet 
Union and mutually assured destruction, one thing we know is 
that time was on our side. If we could contain the Soviet 
Union, which had massive nuclear capability and was attempting 
to expand its interests throughout the world, in Africa, Latin 
American and Europe, and was a serious conventional as well as 
unconventional military threat, we felt if we could contain it 
for a long enough period, that their economic situation would 
change because it was a rotten system. We were right.
    With terrorist states that have demonstrated their 
willingness to use weapons of mass destruction on their own 
people, that fire ballistic missiles into their neighboring 
countries, that invade their neighboring countries, time is not 
on our side. These weapons that they have are such enormous 
power and they are not constrained. These are single dictators. 
These are not--I'm not going to start naming names again, I 
just make more news that I don't need to make.
    Let me start that sentence over by saying that these are 
not democratic systems, they aren't even systems like the old 
Soviet Union that had a Politburo where all power was not 
concentrated in a single person. They discussed things. You can 
go back and read the history books. These people, the dictators 
in the terrorist states today, don't have to discuss things 
with anybody. They can furthermore act in a way that masks what 
they have done. They can use a terrorist network to disseminate 
a weapon of mass destruction.
    It seems to me that what we need to remember is the last 
phrase I believe you used was something to the effect that 
Osama bin Laden would conduct a retaliatory attack or 
something.
    Senator Dayton. I said take advantage of the situation or 
exploit the situation.
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Right. What situation was he taking 
advantage of on September 11? I mean my goodness, they don't 
need excuses, they just do it. We see threat reports every day, 
dozens and dozens of them. In the last 6 months there have been 
terrorist attacks probably in what, 8, 10, 12 countries?
    Senator Dayton. I would move to my next question. If you 
conclude Iraq as synonymous with al Qaeda as an ongoing 
terrorist threat, I guess I would make a distinction between 
them and just point out--and I don't disagree with your 
assessment of the dictator there or the single control that he 
apparently has--the actions that you and others have described 
essentially took place 12 years ago. I don't think containment 
has been the complete failure that you've described it to be 
with Iraq, and I would just say that we didn't know time was on 
our side when we were dealing with the Soviet Union.
    What we did know was that if we went in there militarily, 
we were going to experience what Winston Churchill said of 
World War I, ``the price of victory is so great as to be 
indistinguishable from the cost of defeat.'' We're going to, I 
fear, inflict serious damage on this country, and that was my 
question. What is our ability to defend this country, protect 
our citizens if we go in in the next 2 weeks or 2 months into 
that country militarily and start inflicting destruction on 
them?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd like to make two points on it. 
Number one. Let's go back in time to September 2000, 1 year 
before September 11, 2001. What if we had scraps of 
information, a telephone call, a credit card, a person learning 
how to fly and didn't care about landing, 5 or 8 or 10 of them, 
and we started connecting the dots. What would have been 
sufficient to cause us to take a preemptive act to stop that 
act? This is a society that for decades has thought of itself 
as being willing to absorb an attack and not do anything until 
after we've taken that attack, then marshall our resources and 
go out and do something about it. That's been our way.
    I think today, post-September 11, an awful lot of people in 
our country properly would say well, by golly, if we had scraps 
of information and we could put it together, we should have 
preempted that attack. That's my guess.
    Senator Dayton. If you could have found al Qaeda and 
prevented it, absolutely. My time is up.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
    Senator Clinton.
    Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 
Secretary, I want to follow up along the lines of what Senator 
Bill Nelson was asking and also Senator Dayton, because I think 
that in connected ways, they are focusing on the same issues 
with respect to how we are going to defend ourselves at home. 
As I understand it, in response to the threat level being 
raised to orange, the Pentagon has deployed heat seeking 
stinger anti-aircraft missiles at strategic locations around 
Washington, DC, and F-16s have been put on 24-hour alert in 
Washington, as well as deploying additional detection radars. 
Can you tell me whether similar steps have been taken in New 
York?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we don't talk about 
deployments and I would like to take a minute to explain why. 
We change how we're arranged in a defensive and deterrent 
standpoint from time to time with respect to combat air 
patrols, and I know you're familiar with how we're doing that 
with respect to the east coast and other portions of the 
country. To the extent we announce them, it demystifies the 
problems for others, the people who would attack. To the extent 
we regularize them, we demystify them.
    So what we do is we do things on an irregular basis. It's 
not thoughtless and random, but it is in fact irregular, and 
it's designed to do that to maximize the deterrent effect and 
to maximize our ability to defend at times when we believe the 
threat level requires it.
    Senator Clinton. I certainly understand and appreciate that 
and would not want to have any specific information, but 
clearly some of what has been deployed around Washington is 
visible to the naked eye and, therefore, we know it. There have 
been no similar reports of anything visible to the naked eye 
with respect to New York. Since we also have reason to believe 
that New York and Washington remain at the top of the 
terrorists' lists of targets, perhaps in another setting, I 
could at least be advised as to what if any actions, 
irregularly or regularly, are occurring with respect to New 
York.
    Let me just move on, because I think that it ties into an 
ongoing concern of mine which is the readiness of our first 
responders here at home, whether they are dealing with an al 
Qaeda attack such as we saw on September 11, or a retaliatory 
attack in the wake of military action in Iraq. One of the 
problems that we are seeing surface that I talked to now 
Assistant Secretary McHale about during his confirmation 
hearings, is that many of the people who are being called up, 
who are pumped, who are ready to go, are first responders. 
They're police officers, they're fire fighters, they're EMTs, 
they are others who provide the first line of defense here at 
home.
    Today I sent a letter to you, Mr. Secretary, and I'd like, 
Mr. Chairman, to make it part of the record.
    Chairman Warner. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    Senator Clinton. That letter requests information as to the 
extent to which Reserve call-ups are impacting on our first 
responders. Because as we go forward with the planning that I 
understand you're doing with respect to how we deal with Guard 
and Reserve Forces, whether we confront redeployments of our 
end forces abroad, I think we have to recognize that if we're 
fighting a multifront war, which we may very well be, we know 
we're fighting one here at home already as well as against al 
Qaeda, and there may be others to come, we have to be sure that 
our first responder front line defenders have adequate force 
strength.
    There are a number of reports that have surfaced in the 
press about what local officials are confronting. A number of 
mayors and county executives have said that as many as 10 
percent of first responders are also in the Reserves. I know in 
New York City, 300 of our fire fighters are in the Reserves.
    We also know that the cost to our communities at a time of 
decreased budgets, and I would argue inadequate Federal 
resources for our first responders, means that the police 
department in New York City spends more than $200,000 a week to 
cover their reservists, and the fire department spends more 
than $100,000 a week. A small community like the Niagara Falls 
Police Department spent $350,000 last year.
    Nobody begrudges that. We want to continue to support our 
first responders. But I think as you look at the connections 
between what we have to be ready to do here at home as well as 
our force abroad, I hope that you will take that into account. 
It's not only at the local level; clearly it affects Customs 
officials, FEMA officials, Secret Service and others. I will 
look forward to having a response to this letter, because I 
know this is an issue that you will have to look into, but I 
hope that it is part of what we go forward in planning.
    Finally, General Myers, I am concerned, as I was when I was 
First Lady, about the unexplained illnesses that many of our 
men and women return from the Persian Gulf suffering from. I 
was asked by the President to look into this during the last 
part of the 1990s and we came up with an independent blue 
ribbon commission to investigate the issues raised by these 
undiagnosed illnesses and the treatment that many of our 
veterans received, and there was a final report submitted to 
the President in January 1997, including a slate of 
recommendations to ensure that Gulf War veterans received all 
the care that they needed.
    With U.S. troops once again being deployed to the Persian 
Gulf, and without us really knowing what caused a lot of the 
problems, we look at a number of sources, and I have to say, 
Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area that we want to go into 
in some depth in this committee, because we're seeing the same 
thing with respect to the first responders who responded to 
Ground Zero. The combination of whatever was in the air when 
those buildings were attacked and collapsed has caused 
extraordinary respiratory, pulmonary dysfunction and distress, 
and we're only beginning to try to understand it. Similarly 
when we saw our men and women coming back from the Gulf, we 
know that similar kinds of issues occurred, and now we have an 
added challenge of biological, chemical, and radiological 
potential attacks as well.
    Now a year ago, in February 2002, a General Accounting 
Office (GAO) official testified before the House Veterans 
Affairs Committee that while military medical surveillance 
policies had been established, much still needed to be done to 
implement the system, and I would hope that we could get a 
report, General Myers or Mr. Secretary, about what we are doing 
to ensure proper implementation. Once somebody is a veteran it 
may be too late, so I would like to make sure that our Active-
Duty Forces are getting the surveillance that they need for 
medical monitoring and health tracking before being deployed to 
the Gulf so that we can know and have a better research base to 
understand what they have been and might be exposed to, and I 
look forward to getting that information.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The DOD has applied medical lessons learned from the Gulf War to 
help protect the health of military personnel before, during, and 
following deployments.
    Subsequent to the publication of the final report of the 
Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses on 
December 31, 1996, DOD published the following policy: Department of 
Defense Directive (DODD) 6490.2, ``Joint Medical Surveillance,'' and 
Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6490.3, ``Implementation and 
Application of Joint Medical Surveillance for Deployments.'' On 
December 4, 1998, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (OCJCS) issued a memorandum on ``Deployment Health Surveillance 
and Readiness'' that supported implementation of the DODD and DODI. On 
February 1, 2002, the OCJCS updated the memorandum for health 
surveillance and readiness during all deployments. The memorandum 
provides standardized procedures, including occupational and 
environmental health surveillance procedures, for assessing health 
readiness and conducting health surveillance in support of all military 
deployments.
    The DOD has developed and implemented a Force Health Protection 
(FHP) strategy that promotes and sustains the health of service members 
during their entire length of service. This adds an additional level of 
confidence to the specific programs for promoting and sustaining the 
health of military personnel prior to, during, and after deployments. 
Programs are in place to promote the fitness and health of personnel 
before they deploy, to protect them from disease and injury during 
deployment, and to provide comprehensive treatment for deployment-
related health conditions. The DOD has appointed a Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness to 
assure sustained focus on this strategy.
    The DOD has implemented a Defense Medical Surveillance System 
(DMSS), which integrates numerous health, personnel, and deployment 
data sources. The DMSS database contains longitudinal health data on 
Service members (e.g., hospitalizations, ambulatory visits, reportable 
diseases), as well as integrated personnel and deployment data. The DOD 
has established a Serum Repository to archive periodic serum samples 
for all service members.
    The DOD has instituted a deployment health surveillance program, 
which validates individuals' medical readiness to deploy. It includes 
pre-deployment and post-deployment health assessments (with copies 
archived in DMSS), complete immunizations, and other protective 
measures, and addresses health concerns upon return from deployments. 
This is another step in providing periodic longitudinal health 
monitoring of service members from the time they enter military service 
and includes periodic medical, dental, and readiness assessments; 
physical fitness testing; and comprehensive health care through the 
military health system.
    Improved deployment health protection countermeasures are being 
designed to protect our Service members against an increasingly broad 
range of threats. Such countermeasures include the fielding of new 
biological and chemical warfare agent detection and alarm systems; the 
operational testing of integrated electronic medical surveillance and 
emergency response networks; current vaccines and anti-malarial drugs; 
and research on the next generation of vaccines and pharmaceuticals.
    The Department has been conducting ongoing monitoring and weekly 
reporting of disease and non-battle injuries (DNBI) during deployments. 
We have enabled daily DNBI monitoring in order to increase the 
sensitivity of this capability to detect the earliest occurrence of a 
natural, chemical, or biological agent exposure. In addition, all 
deployed medical units report through command channels at least daily 
on their current situation enabling immediate notification of any 
potential disease outbreak.
    The DOD has implemented improved occupational and environmental 
health surveillance programs for protecting Service members' health 
during deployment. The DOD has implemented operational risk management 
programs throughout the services that provide focus for all commanders 
to effectively manage both safety and environmental health risks and to 
mitigate the impact on our Service members.
    The DOD has implemented improved environmental and clinical 
laboratory capabilities in theater. The DOD now routinely deploys 
preventive medicine, environmental health, theater medical 
surveillance, and forward laboratory teams in support of worldwide 
operations.
    The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center develops products that 
assist our understanding of endemic diseases, vectors, and industrial 
hazards worldwide. All Services utilize these products to increase 
their knowledge of areas of operations and develop an initial 
assessment strategy during bed down operations and incrementally 
throughout the deployment. Preplanning and on-site environmental 
assessments of staging areas and base sites have been critical to 
protecting our Service members and documenting any potential ambient 
exposures. The integration of operational risk management provides 
field commanders the necessary information upon which they can act.
    The DOD has improved health risk communication through the 
provision of regionally-specific medical intelligence, environmental 
risk assessments, medical threat briefings, pocket-sized health guides, 
and deployment-focused web sites. 
    The DOD has established three deployment health centers for health 
surveillance, clinical care, and health research that focus on the 
prevention, treatment, and understanding of deployment-related health 
concerns.
    The DOD has coordinated with the VA to address deployment-related 
health concerns of Service members and veterans by jointly developing a 
Post-Deployment Health Evaluation and Management Clinical Practice 
Guideline (CPG), and by electronically sharing medical information 
through the Federal Health Information Exchange.
    The DOD has taken steps to improve deployment-related medical 
record keeping by developing the Composite Health Care System II (CHCS 
II), the Theater Medical Information Program (TMIP), medical evacuation 
automated patient tracking and by expanding the electronic tracking and 
centralized collection of immunization data.
    The DOD is working to improve tracking of individual and unit 
locations during deployment and development of a comprehensive Defense 
Integrated Military Human Resources System.
    The joint force is superbly trained and comprised of dedicated men 
and women who represent DOD's most vital resource. Implementation of 
DOD's Force Health Protection Strategy is a critical component of our 
overall Force Protection strategy and is essential to maintaining the 
health and fitness of servicemembers during their entire career. Force 
Health Protection programs have important life-long implications for 
health. The DOD has made tremendous strides since the Gulf War in 
monitoring and tracking the health of our personnel prior to, during, 
and following deployments. We will continually seek to improve these 
programs because Force Health Protection directly improves our 
readiness posture and the capability of our servicemembers.

    Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
    Senator Clinton. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, and I can speak from 
firsthand experience, having gone with you out to Walter Reed 
to visit the veterans who returned from Afghanistan, of the 
depth of your sincerity with regard to the subjects of which 
you speak. We thank you, and I do hope that you spearhead on 
this committee those efforts.
    Senator Levin, I think we have conducted a very successful 
hearing. If you have no further comments, we thank you, Mr. 
Secretary. We thank you, General, and we thank you, Dr. 
Zakheim.
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

             Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

                      FAMILY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION

    1. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, included in 
the $4.0 billion request for family housing for fiscal year 2004 is 
$346 million for family housing privatization of 36,262 units. This 
seems to me to be one of those truly transformational programs that 
goes directly to improving morale and helping the troops and their 
families make a positive decision about making the military a career. 
Inadequate, unattractive housing like the infamous Tarawa Terrace 
housing area at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina is simply unacceptable 
when we ask so much of our military personnel and their families. Is 
this privatization program the quickest, most cost effective way to 
replace the inadequate housing which exists all across the military?
    Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Yes, housing privatization is 
the quickest and most cost-effective approach to addressing DOD's 
inadequate housing. Housing privatization is transforming and 
revitalizing military family housing at an accelerated pace. 
    In January 2001, the Department had about 180,000 inadequate family 
housing units. Today, primarily through housing privatization and our 
military construction program, we have reduced that number to roughly 
163,000. This number will continue to come down as we pursue the goal 
to eliminate inadequate housing by 2007. As of March 2003, we have 
awarded 18 projects totaling 27,884 family housing units. Additionally, 
we project that the services will privatize over 38,000 family housing 
units during fiscal year 2003, and over 36,000 family housing units 
during fiscal year 2004. The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget 
includes our plan to privatize about 102,000 family housing units by 
the end of fiscal year 2004.
    Housing privatization is cost-effective and allows DOD to tap the 
expertise of the private sector to address a large problem. Our policy 
requires that privatization yield at least three times the amount of 
housing that would be provided using traditional military construction. 
The projects awarded thus far leverage upfront appropriations by a 
ratio of 10:1. This means that DOD has invested $290 million, to obtain 
about $2.9 billion worth of equivalent MILCON housing improvements. 
Finally, our economic analyses indicate that when we look at long-term 
costs over the 50-year term of most of our deals, privatization is 
about 10 percent less costly.

    2. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, what has 
been our experience thus far with this housing in terms of quality of 
construction and the ongoing maintenance by the contractor?
    Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Surveys of military tenants 
living in new and renovated privatized housing have given high marks to 
quality of construction and housing maintenance. Privatized housing 
must comply with local and State construction codes and standards, as 
well as DOD project specifications. In fact, in many of our early 
projects, the immediate improvement in housing maintenance won over 
residents to privatization well before any new units were constructed.

    3. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, are we 
devoting enough resources to family housing privatization?
    Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Yes, we are devoting enough 
resources to housing privatization. We believe the current number of 
privatization projects in the pipeline and our fiscal year 2004 funding 
request is sufficient to keep us on track to eliminate our remaining 
inadequate family housing.

             REFORMING THE WAY THE DEPARTMENT DOES BUSINESS

    4. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, regarding that aspect of 
transformation which involves reforming the way in which the Department 
of Defense (DOD) does business, I understand there is a long history of 
disagreements and mistrust between Congress and the Pentagon that 
apparently led to all the strings now attached to or perhaps strangling 
DOD.
    In part based on my own experience running the Departments of 
Transportation and Labor, and the American Red Cross, I want to support 
you in your desire for a more free hand to make sensible, cost-
effective decisions. However, looking at it from this side of the 
table, what your request seems to me to be saying is: ``Trust me.'' How 
can we strike the balance that gives you the help you need in your 
commendable desire to operate in a more business-like way while not 
abdicating our proper congressional oversight role?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. We developed the system we live under today 
over the last 100 years--it is an industrial age system trying to meet 
the needs of an information age security environment.
    Times have changed and we need change in order to meet the new 
threats we face today and will face in the future. It is imperative 
that we move away from industrial age policies to those that would 
allow us to face asymmetric threats of today's world. We don't have the 
luxury of knowing when and where he will strike next. Common sense 
dictates that we be lighter and quicker if we are going to protect the 
United States from the cold-blooded killers we face today.
    I'm not asking you to ``trust me,'' but instead I'm saying look at 
our track record. Our personnel system is based on the performance of 
20 years of demonstration projects with over 30,000 employees currently 
working in those programs--working in an environment that promotes and 
rewards initiative and hard work instead longevity. Our record on the 
environment is a strong one. Over the past decade, the department has 
spent $48 billion to clean up sites from past activities and invested 
in new technology and programs to improve pollution prevention and 
ensure compliance with environmental laws. The Department manages 25 
million acres of the Nation's land that includes over 300 threatened 
and endangered species that are protected on our ranges and 
installations. In many cases populations are maintained and restored 
under our stewardship. For example, on San Clemente Island in 
California's Channel Islands, islands often referred to as America's 
Galapagos Islands, the Navy has brought the island's endangered 
loggerhead shrike back from the brink of extinction. In the mid-1990s 
the population of these birds had declined to 13, making it one of the 
Nation's most endangered species. I challenge anyone to compare our 
environmental record. No, I'm not asking you to ``trust me'', just 
judge us on our record.
    We do not challenge or seek to weaken Congress's oversight role. We 
welcome your reviews of our programs, understanding it is your 
constitutional responsibility. But together we share a common 
responsibility to provide the finest defense for the citizens of the 
United States. To do that we must shed the policies that have 
accumulated in the past and handicap us today.

    5. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, among the proposals you have 
discussed, could you prioritize them in terms of their importance to 
the Department? Which gives the greatest leverage in savings to the 
Department?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. To completely answer this question, I need to 
provide some background on how we got to where we are today. Over a 
year ago I challenged my staff to provide me with proposals that would 
make the Department more suited to face the challenges we would face in 
the 21st century. They did an excellent job. As we gathered all the 
inputs, we took a hard look at each proposal to make sure it would have 
the desired effect. We thinned the list down to what we considered our 
top priorities and worked with the administration to review them.
    We worked closely with OMB, OPM, EPA, and other agencies and what 
came out of this process were the top priorities for the Department. So 
to answer your question, I have to tell you what you have in front of 
you are the Department's top priorities.
    As far as the greatest leverage in savings, I don't think you can 
look at them in that manner. How do you put a dollar figure on a more 
motivated employee? How do you measure the life of a soldier, whose 
life is saved because of the realistic training he had before going to 
war? And finally, what price do you assign the ability to detect the 
advanced submarines of today so that a carrier battle group can carry 
out its duties in battle? The savings to the Department are real and 
tangible, but you cannot assign a dollar amount to them.

                          JUNIOR ROTC PROGRAM

    6. Senator Dole. General Myers, I've long been concerned about the 
fact that our young people seemed to have been turning away from public 
service in recent years. There's so much cynicism and doubt. I want to 
help inspire them to realize that public service, service to their 
country, is a noble thing to do and a great way to give back for all 
the blessings of this great country.
    I have heard many good things about the Junior ROTC program and how 
well it has worked, particularly in many challenging inner city 
schools. Could you comment on the experience the military services have 
had with Junior ROTC?
    General Myers. The Services like the Junior ROTC program, and the 
program is extremely popular with educators and community leaders. 
Junior ROTC was originally an Army program; however, since 1964 all the 
Services offer the program and benefit from its instruction designed to 
teach citizenship and leadership, while instilling self-esteem, 
teamwork, and self-discipline. Although Junior ROTC is not a recruiting 
tool, traditionally about 45 percent of high school graduates with more 
than 2 years participation in the program end up with some military 
affiliation. Recent surveys reveal that youth who have been exposed to 
people with military experience enjoy a far greater understanding of 
the nature of military life than those who had no such exposure. A 
challenge confronted by recruiter's centers on the fact that a smaller 
military generates fewer veterans in communities and schools around the 
Nation. The Junior ROTC program represents an excellent means to 
address that problem. Moreover, the program builds better citizens, 
which strengthens the Nation and generates military awareness among 
youth and those who influence their career decisions.

    7. Senator Dole. General Myers, are we doing enough to make the 
Junior ROTC program more widely available, particularly to urban and 
inner city schools?
    General Myers. All interested schools are urged to apply to the 
Department of Defense for this program. Currently 450,000 students in 
2,900 secondary schools participate. Additionally, there are more than 
750 secondary schools on Service waiting lists with more applying. We 
will achieve the previously funded goal of 3,500 units by fiscal year 
2006; however, funding for expansion beyond this is not programmed at 
this time.

    8. Senator Dole. General Myers, is this very cost-effective program 
adequately funded?
    General Myers. Yes. The Department recognizes the strength of this 
program and continues its growth to meet our needs. In fiscal year 
2003, the Department budgeted over $252 million in JROTC, a 5-percent 
increase from fiscal year 2002.

                            FORCE READINESS

    9. Senator Dole. General Myers, in your prepared testimony you 
describe in some detail that U.S. forces are widely deployed and that 
threats to U.S. interests have not abated. You add that we have the 
capability to be militarily successful across a broad range of 
contingencies. As I look at the immense task facing our Armed Forces, I 
have some concerns about our ability to maintain the high combat-ready 
status of our forces. To consider the possibility of war in Iraq, while 
facing the reality of the ongoing war against terrorism focused in 
Afghanistan and the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, it 
really is daunting. What I want to ask you about is readiness. I know 
that you understand the importance of and want to sustain proper levels 
of training, ensure adequate supplies of equipment and spares, and 
perform needed equipment maintenance. How long can we sustain this 
deployment pace? If another deployment is required within the next 6 
months, will we be able to support it with trained and ready forces?
    General Myers. Our forces are postured and ready to conduct 
operations as directed by the President. We can maintain and sustain 
this posture for the foreseeable future by maintaining readiness levels 
through a variety of measures to include in-theater training and select 
unit rotations. However, the current pace of operations and future 
potential operations is not cost-free, and requires the services and 
Combatant Commanders to carefully manage assets and units that are in 
high demand, but in small numbers. The demand for critical capabilities 
(such as manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance assets, Special Operations Forces, intelligence analysts 
and linguists and command/control assets) has increased significantly 
with multiple contingencies. We will continue to prioritize the use of 
these critical units to preserve our surge capability to support future 
operations with trained and ready forces.

    10. Senator Dole. General Myers, are we getting stretched too thin? 
Can we feel confident that the safety of the equipment and of our men 
and women is not being compromised?
    General Myers. While our current posture of engagement is 
demanding, we are not stretched too thin. We possess the forces 
necessary to meet the demands of the Defense Strategy. Certainly our 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are working at an increased 
operational pace; a pace we would not want to sustain indefinitely, but 
when vital U.S. interests are at risk, our Armed Forces are eager to 
meet these challenges. Furthermore, the safety of our Armed Forces 
remains a top priority of mine and it is shared by the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Our forces have the best training and equipment available to 
ensure their safety is not compromised. Finally, we must continue to 
fund our forces' training and associated operations and maintenance 
accounts, to ensure their continued readiness and safety is sustained.

    11. Senator Dole. General Myers, are you seeing an impact on morale 
of the troops? How about the families?
    General Myers. The morale of troops is high. Service members are 
reporting a great deal of satisfaction with military life. Thanks to 
the help of Congress, several years of steady improvements in pay, 
benefits, and attention to quality of life issues have all contributed 
to high morale.
    We are aggressively working to ensure families have the support 
they need during these stressful times and that the families have been 
contacted or receive information as quickly as possible to help them 
prepare for mobilization and deployment. Further, the family support 
professional and volunteer staffs are making every effort to reach out 
to the spouses, children, and parents of our Service members. Military 
families come together in times like these. This is part of the 
military's true strength.

    12. Senator Dole. General Myers, are there lessons that have been 
learned from the tragedies which occurred at Fort Bragg? Are the 
military services doing enough to ensure family readiness in this time 
of rapidly repeated deployments?
    General Myers. The Services already have plans to assist Service 
members and families with reunion once this contingency is complete. 
Helping families reunite is part of our family support tradition. In 
the process, if our professionals identify Service members and families 
in stress during reunion, we will provide additional professional 
resources to assist them.
    All the Services have programs in place or have redirected 
resources to expand current capabilities to meet a wide variety of 
family needs during sustainment and post-operational phases. They are 
also using traditional media and technology to reach out to the Total 
Force, including those off the installations and Guard and Reserves to 
help keep family members connected.

    13. Senator Dole. General Myers, how can we in Congress help you?
    General Myers. With Congress' strong support, we have made 
significant progress in the war on terrorism and our overall military 
capabilities. However, maintaining readiness to meet the threats is a 
long-term commitment requiring critical congressional support. Timely 
approval of Defense budget supplemental funding is essential to 
maintaining current operations without negatively impacting readiness, 
training, and re-setting the force. With Congress' continued unwavering 
support, we will sustain our Armed Forces most decisive element--the 
individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine . . . and will ensure we 
are prepared to meet all the threats to our national interests.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                       FORCE REQUIREMENTS IN IRAQ

    14. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, any invasion of Iraq 
will likely require a large number of U.S. troops to serve in an 
occupation/stabilization force after the fighting stops. The size of 
this force will be larger if the United States attacks Iraq without 
U.N. sanction or NATO cooperation. If a war with Iraq takes place and 
substantial U.S. military forces are required to occupy Iraq in its 
aftermath, how would providing a large occupation force impact other 
operations in the global war on terrorism?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. We cannot provide an exact answer to your 
question until more is known about the nature of the post-conflict 
environment. However, the U.S. Government will continue to pursue the 
various elements of this global war on terror simultaneously with any 
post-war operations in Iraq. The conflict with Iraq is an integral part 
of the larger global war on terrorism. Preventing regimes that support 
terror from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective in 
this war. The ``Coalition of the Willing'' supporting the war in Iraq 
continues to build. We expect both the U.N. and NATO to contribute to 
the post-war effort. This participation will relieve many U.S. troops 
who participated in the war effort, allowing us to remain prepared for 
other contingencies, including other aspects of the war on terrorism.

    15. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, will the United States 
need to mobilize additional Reserve Forces to carry out this occupation 
and stabilization mission?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The U.S. should not need to mobilize additional 
forces to maintain post-war stability in Iraq. We have mobilized 
sufficient forces to continue our ongoing operations, meet our 
international commitments, and continue to protect the American 
homeland. After we have liberated Iraq, we expect a ``Coalition of the 
Willing'' will aid the U.S. in maintaining stability in Iraq as a 
representative Iraqi government is formed. We expect many nations that 
are not currently participating in military operations will support 
post-war stability operations in Iraq. Consequently, the U.S. will have 
the opportunity to reduce the number of troops committed to Iraq after 
liberation is complete.

                       OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

    16. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, forces in Afghanistan 
continue to conduct dangerous combat operations. In recent weeks, U.S. 
forces completed the largest ground battle with al Qaeda and Taliban 
elements since Operation Anaconda. Are U.S. operations being hampered 
by the ``safe haven'' in the ungoverned areas of western Pakistan that 
al Qaeda and Taliban forces are using?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Pursuing the Taliban and al Qaeda elements in 
the Afghan-Pakistan border area is an important mission. The U.S. will 
not allow elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda operating in this area 
to succeed in destabilizing the newly formed Afghan government. U.S. 
and Coalition Forces, in close coordination with Pakistani military 
forces operating in western Pakistan, will continue to target those 
border areas harboring remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban forces. We will 
work closely with the Pakistani government to target and destroy the 
remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in those areas.

    17. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how do you see U.S. 
combat operations in Afghanistan evolving over the next year and do you 
feel the combatant commander has sufficient forces to accomplish the 
missions laid out by the President?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. combat operations will continue to focus 
on targeting and destroying the remnants of terrorist forces in 
Afghanistan. We are also in the initial stages of increased stability 
operations with the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The 
Commanding General of Combined Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram has 
sufficient forces in Afghanistan to successfully accomplish the 
missions laid out by the President.

                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

    18. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President's budget 
includes a significant increase in funding for Special Operations 
Forces (SOFs). SOFs are busier than ever, but there are real limits to 
how big these forces can be without compromising their quality. In 
future years, how do you see the Department managing the challenge of 
ever-increasing operational tempo for these forces with the inherently 
limited size of Special Operations units?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree with the basic thrust of this question. 
SOF can not be mass-produced. It is the human dimension of Special 
Operations Forces, not necessarily the hardware, which makes U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) such a capable command. We are 
therefore looking at several ways to mitigate the OPTEMPO impacts the 
war on terrorism has on SOF units.
    The worldwide operational tempo for SOF has been significant over 
recent years. However, the quality of SOF personnel has remained high 
and the retention of seasoned professionals has consistently met 
readiness requirements, though its something we monitor very carefully. 
One reason that SOF personnel growth must be limited is that gaining 
the required proficiency and specialization in key SOF capabilities 
takes time. This limits how rapidly the force can grow.
    Over the past year, we conducted a comprehensive study to review 
the alignment of SOFs with the defense strategy. The study underscored 
the need to increase the size of our SOFs in a prudent, measured 
fashion. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2004 includes 
more than 1,890 new SOF personnel, an increase of approximately 4 
percent. These new personnel will be spread among the USSOCOM 
headquarters, its component commands, and the regional special 
operations commands.
    We are also conducting an assessment of both SOF core and 
collateral missions and capabilities required for the global war on 
terrorism. As we transform the services, it is likely that some 
conventional forces could perform missions now commonly associated with 
SOF. If other forces become able to perform certain collateral 
missions, it should be possible for our SOFs to concentrate more fully 
on the core missions needed to win the war on terrorism.
    For example, the USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps are examining 
how SOF and U.S. Marine forces can operate together to undertake a 
range of contingencies that might have been done exclusively by SOF in 
the past. Likewise, certain ``train and equip'' missions combined with 
a more effective phasing of operations may allow SOFs to be employed 
earlier in an operation to set the parameters of the effort, and then 
be replaced by conventional forces.

    19. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how will managing this 
challenge affect the global war on terrorism in the long term?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Our strategic focus initially is on disrupting, 
defeating, and destroying al Qaeda, with a particular emphasis on its 
leadership and operational planning and coordination structure. The 
USSOCOM is playing a key role in this effort. As the lead command for 
the Department's global war on terror, USSOCOM will plan and 
selectively execute combat missions against terrorists and terrorist 
organizations around the world.
    This expanded operational role is in addition to the traditional 
role that the USSOCOM plays (i.e. providing SOFs and materiel to the 
various regional Combatant Commanders, who then plan and direct 
missions that fall within their purview).
    The war against terrorism requires seamless cooperation and 
collaboration by the Department of Defense with many Federal agencies 
and departments, ranging from the Department of State and our 
Ambassadors overseas to the Intelligence Community, the Departments of 
Justice and Treasury, and others. USSOCOM has recognized this need for 
cross-functional coordination, and has established a planning 
capability that is augmented by interagency liaisons. Contingency 
planning will be done more rapidly than is traditionally the case since 
we often are dealing with fleeting targets and fragmentary 
intelligence. Of course, SOFs are not always the best option, or the 
only option. Cooperative host nation security forces, other allies, or 
other arms of the U.S. Government may prove better positioned to 
undertake key missions successfully.
    Since the global war on terrorism began, we have pointed out that 
it is a war unlike any other war that our country has ever fought. 
Victory requires new ways of thinking, new ways of fighting, and a good 
deal of patience and fortitude. As we move forward in transforming the 
Department, the role of our SOFs--their missions required capabilities, 
and organizational structures and manning--will be a core element of 
attention. Their effectiveness and the retention and recruitment of 
others to join the ranks of our SOFs will not be jeopardized.

                             RESERVE FORCES

    20. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, current and future 
operations in the global war on terrorism are increasingly requiring 
mobilization of large numbers of Reserve component forces. Mobilization 
of these patriotic citizen-soldiers is, of course, a burden on 
thousands of families and communities nationwide. Looking into the 
future, what do you think the long-term impact of extended and frequent 
Reserve mobilizations will be on the strength and vitality of the 
Reserve Forces?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Reserve Forces are and will continue to be an 
indispensable part of the total military posture of the department. One 
of the most immediate factors affecting the long-term impact on Reserve 
Forces is how well mobilization and demobilization are managed. In an 
effort to limit disruption for reservists, their employers, families, 
and communities, DOD policy directed that initial orders to active duty 
not exceed 12 months. DOD policy also has stressed the principles of 
using Reserve components judiciously, considering the expectations of 
individual members, relying on volunteers to the maximum extent 
feasible, ensuring guardsmen and reservists are brought on active duty 
only to perform meaningful tasks and retaining them on active duty only 
as long as absolutely necessary. If history is a predictor of future 
success, the steps we have taken should mitigate any adverse impact on 
recruiting and retention. In fact, when reservists feel that their 
service is meaningful, they are more likely to remain with us.
    The frequency and duration of Reserve mobilizations can be reduced 
through rebalancing Active and Reserve Force mix and reassigning 
missions to take advantage of Active and Reserve core competencies. 
Rebalancing the existing force mix can expand and enhance Total Force 
capabilities within current end strength. Changes are being considered 
across the full spectrum of capabilities in each component, to increase 
force agility, enable better management of operational tempo, and to 
foster closer integration between Active and Reserve components. These 
changes will allow the Services to lessen stress and enhance the 
strength and vitality of the Reserve Force.
    In addition, current force management policies and systems are not 
as efficient or consistent with the way the force is used. Personnel 
management practices are being streamlined to achieve greater 
flexibility in accessing and managing personnel throughout a military 
career that may span both Active and Reserve service--or across a 
``continuum of service.'' Creating the conditions for ``seamless'' flow 
between regular and Reserve service, and providing for varying levels 
of part-time participation will improve efficiency of force management 
and provide more flexibility for recruiting and retaining a quality 
force.
    Financial incentives, meaningful training, and proper use of our 
Reserve Force are required to ensure retention of trained human 
resources, but, first and foremost, is the need to attract quality 
individuals into Reserve military service. Strengthening recruiting 
efforts in the college market bolsters the Reserve Force through 
improved quality and service, given that there is a direct correlation 
between education levels and retention beyond the initial military 
enlistment.
    In the future, we see the Reserves as a terrific way to bring 
diverse skills and experience to the military from the civil sector, 
that is hard to grow, train, and maintain in the regular forces. These 
may include medical, language, information technology and other 
technical skills. This will necessitate innovative affiliation programs 
and alternatives for accessing and retaining individuals into the 
Reserve components. The result can be a more cost-effective way to 
provide the military with cutting-edge technology and exposure to the 
new and innovative practices and approaches employed by industry and 
the private sector.
    The Reserve components will continue to be a significant and cost-
effective part of the Total Force, and force rebalancing and creative 
force management can only enhance the strength and vitality of this 
essential element of the military and the American society.

    21. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, in addition, is the 
current mobilization causing you to re-think both the size and 
structure of the Reserve Forces?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The current mobilization by itself does not 
cause the Department to re-think the size and structure of the Reserve 
Forces. What it does do is confirm that the strategic landscape and 
evolving geo-political environment, as described in many of our 
national security documents, requires that the U.S. possess 
capabilities that are responsive, agile, and able to meet these 
emerging challenges of the 21st century. The current mobilization also 
helps in gaining insight on whether the force size, structure, and mix 
are optimized to execute the U.S. Defense Strategy in support of the 
National Security Strategy.
    The Department has embarked on an ambitious transformation to meet 
these challenges. As we continue to progress in our transformation, we 
are examining ways to significantly increase the value of each element 
of our military, to include exploration of opportunities to restructure 
and reorganize our force appropriately. This includes the Reserve 
component. In order to ensure that we progress on this path of 
transformation smartly, we initiated a series of analytical studies to 
determine what is the best force structure to support our strategy for 
the 21st century and what is the appropriate mix of the force in our 
Active and Reserve components.
    The first study, which resulted from the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, was the ``Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National 
Defense.'' This study focused on how we could best utilize our Reserve 
component forces in a more efficient and effective manner. Some 
innovative concepts derived from this study include: the establishment 
of what we call a ``continuum of service,'' a personnel management 
process to better integrate the Active and Reserve Forces by making it 
easier for personnel to move back and forth between Active and Reserve 
service several times during a career, potentially increasing their 
level of participation and resulting in more engaged and longer service 
to the Department; increased use of volunteerism for select individuals 
and units to expedite the mobilization process making Reserve call-ups 
more responsive; and creating Reserve capabilities stateside that 
Combatant Commanders can utilize with reach back techniques that reduce 
theater footprint, deployment costs, and relieve deployment 
requirements and stress in some of our Reserve component forces.
    The second study is the ``Operational Availability Study.'' 
Directed in Defense Planning Guidance 2004, this study assesses how 
best to utilize future joint military capabilities and force employment 
timelines to execute the Defense Strategy. Emerging insights evolving 
from this study include recommendations of future force size, 
structure, and mix required to support the Defense Strategy in the 21st 
century.
    The third study, ``AC/RC Mix and Strategic Surprise'' examines 
innovative management techniques and force structure adjustments that 
improve the agility and responsiveness of the Reserve components.

    22. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, are the kinds of units 
that are in the various Reserve components the right ones?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The demands on the Department of Defense have 
evolved since the end of the Cold War and appear to be increasing 
exponentially in the 21st century as we continue the global war on 
terrorism. Both Active and Reserve components are being used more 
frequently and in a wider variety of missions.
    In the past, the Reserve components were structured as a repository 
for capabilities needed to meet the later phases of major theater wars. 
Due in a large part to the changing strategic landscape and 
geopolitical environment over the past years, reliance on Reserve 
capabilities has increased dramatically and migrated into every 
deployment across the spectrum of conflict. As a result, capabilities 
that reside predominantly in the Reserves today, such as civil affairs, 
port opening, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies, and Combat Search 
and Rescue, are needed early and often, and must be mobilized quickly 
in a deployment. This reliance in every operation degrades the 
military's responsiveness, flexibility, and agility needed to support 
the Defense Strategy and meet the emerging challenges of the 21st 
century.
    In that regard, the Department is finalizing two major studies that 
address this very issue of rebalancing the force to meet the National 
Security Strategy. The ``Review of Reserve Component Contributions to 
National Defense'' and the ``Operational Availability Study'' will 
recommend ways to rebalance the Total Force within current end-strength 
to make a more effective and judicious use of all components, not just 
for today but also as we transform to the future force.

                              SPACE ASSETS

    23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the recent Space 
Shuttle Columbia tragedy has the Nation reassessing the value of space 
exploration, experimentation, and operations. Many of us understand the 
inherent and essential military value of space as an operational 
medium. The President's budget for fiscal year 2004 demonstrates a 
significant commitment to upgrading and expanding U.S. military space 
assets. Could you expand on the role of space in defense transformation 
and how transformation in military space assets will evolve in the 
coming years?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. It would be difficult to achieve our national 
security objectives without the capabilities provided by our national 
security space systems. For example: communications, reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and precision navigation are all integral to our 
peacetime and crisis responsibilities and the effectiveness of our 
military forces. We are looking at entirely new areas and technologies 
that could transform our military strategies. The modernization 
investments we are making are to provide highly advanced space system 
capabilities and the science and technology investments are to provide 
the technologies that would allow entirely new capabilities to be 
developed transforming how we use space to meet our mission needs. We 
will be demonstrating, acquiring, and fielding these capabilities over 
the years to come. Some examples, not in priority order or inclusive 
are:

         Developing persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 
        reconnaissance (ISR), including moving target tracking and 
        maintaining a common operating picture of the battlefield. 
        Space-based radar (SBR) is a key element and will provide the 
        capability to look deeply and persistently into areas that are 
        inaccessible to current platforms due to political 
        restrictions, geographical constraints, or the technological 
        limitations of legacy systems
         Developing an advanced space delivery vehicle, the 
        Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), capable of delivering and dispensing 
        conventional payloads worldwide from and through space within 
        minutes of tasking with precision accuracy and an array of 
        conventional payloads to include effectively attacking soft and 
        hardened fixed targets, and mobile targets.
         Developing a reusable, quick-reaction launch 
        capability to deploy small satellites required to fill short-
        term, focused warfighter needs in ISR and communications. 
        Developing the capability to perform on-orbit servicing of 
        satellites (refueling and component change out) to extend 
        lifetimes and upgrade/fix components.
         Providing total space awareness and the ability to 
        control all areas of space whenever necessary, including 
        protection of vital space assets and space denial to 
        adversaries.
         Transformational Military Satellite Communications 
        with laser-com in conjunction with the advanced extremely high 
        frequency (AEHF) satellites to provide greatly expanded 
        capacity for survivable and jam-resistant communications and 
        data throughput for global transmission to tactical joint 
        warfighters.
         Deployment of the Space-based Infrared Satellite 
        (SBIRS)-High is key to enabling the transformational ability to 
        defend the United States against ballistic missile attack and 
        significantly improve our capabilities in the four mission 
        areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical 
        intelligence, and battle space characterization.

    24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have long argued 
that a national space policy that limits DOD's role in reusable launch 
vehicle development may need to be revisited to allow significant DOD 
contribution to the Space Launch Initiative. What is your position on 
the future of cooperation with NASA for critical common space functions 
such as space lift, both expendable and reusable?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The current national space policy does not 
preclude or limit DOD investment in reuseable launch vehicle (RLV) 
development--it assigns lead responsibility for expendable launch 
vehicle (ELV) development to DOD and lead responsibility for RLV 
development to NASA. I believe it is vital for DOD and NASA to 
coordinate research and development efforts in areas of common need.
    The Department of Defense and NASA are collaborating on 
technologies supporting the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI) 
designed to overcome the barriers of high speed/hypersonic flight, 
space access, and space technology. NAI coordinates ongoing and new DOD 
investments proposed in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget request 
with those of NASA under the Space Launch Initiative/Next Generation 
Launch Technology (SLI-NGLT) program. This initiative will develop and 
demonstrate a portfolio of critical technologies that will enable the 
achievement of many common aerospace goals--such as supersonic/
hypersonic capabilities; safe, affordable, launch-on-demand space 
access; and responsive payloads for quick deployment and employment of 
space capabilities--and help to ensure continued American aerospace 
leadership in the 21st century.

    25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you anticipate 
using the shuttle to meet DOD and Air Force space delivery requirements 
in the future?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. At this time, DOD and the Air Force have no 
plans to use the space shuttle to satisfy DOD space delivery 
requirements. We plan on meeting our assured access to space needs with 
the new EELV systems. EELV will satisfy all planned and programmed 
spacelift requirements, and has the flexibility and redundancy to 
eliminate the need for DOD to maintain the shuttle as a back up 
capability. The EELV is less expensive than the shuttle and eliminates 
the extensive lead time for payload integration on the shuttle. The 
shuttle Columbia was the only orbiter capable of carrying large DOD 
payloads; the modifications of the other shuttles to service the 
International Space Station limit their payload capacity.
    DOD will continue to fly small Space Test Program (STP) experiments 
on the shuttle as a means of getting science and technology payloads 
into orbit. Flying STP on the shuttle makes use of available cargo 
space on the shuttle at a minimal cost to DOD (approximately $3 million 
a year for six payloads).

                            NUCLEAR TESTING

    26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, currently, the United 
States can perform a nuclear test within 24-36 months of receiving the 
applicable Presidential Decision Directive. Do you believe that 
nuclear-test-readiness should be shortened? What do you think is the 
appropriate time frame: 3 months, 6 months, a year?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. Following the 1992 moratorium on 
underground nuclear testing, the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) 
has dealt successfully with problems that were discovered in the 
stockpile. There are, however, no guarantees that it can continue to do 
so indefinitely. As the stockpile ages, the accumulation of 
modifications or the discovery of other latent problems may exceed 
SSP's capabilities. Should this situation arise, it may become 
necessary to conduct underground nuclear tests to confirm the safety or 
reliability of the warhead in question.
    Should nuclear testing be required, we must be prepared to conduct 
the necessary tests in a timely fashion so that the Department of 
Energy's weapon laboratories can resolve a question about stockpile 
safety and reliability. We believe that the current 24-36 month test 
readiness posture is too long and must be shortened. The Department is 
working with the Department of Energy on an initiative directed by 
Congress (Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, PL 107-
314, Sec. 3142) to develop plans for moving to higher levels of test 
readiness.

    27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the chairman of the 
Nuclear Weapons Council has established a panel to examine ``the risks 
associated with not testing our nuclear weapons.'' Do you believe that 
there is currently a reason to be concerned with the long-term 
capability of stockpile stewardship? What, in particular, is the cause 
for concern?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. To date, the experts have not raised any safety 
or reliability concerns that would lead me to make a recommendation to 
the President that the U.S. should resume testing. Since the United 
States conducted its last nuclear test more than 10 years ago, 
scientists have relied on a combination of non-nuclear experiments and 
computer simulations as part of the SSP to attest to the safety, 
security, and reliability of our nuclear weapons. There are no 
guarantees, however, that the Department of Energy's scientists and 
engineers will be able to depend on SSP indefinitely. It is prudent to 
be prepared and thoroughly examine the basis for confidence in the 
stockpile and the Nation's ability to continue to certify weapons as 
safe and reliable. The purpose of this panel established by the Nuclear 
Weapons Council is to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of our 
nuclear program, including test readiness.

                             SCOTT SPEICHER

    28. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I'm sure you are 
familiar with the case of Captain Scott Speicher, who was lost over 
Iraq in the opening hours of the Gulf War. Is there new information on 
the status of Captain Scott Speicher?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. We continue to receive new reporting on Captain 
Speicher. We thoroughly analyze and review every report for relevancy 
to his case.

    29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, to your knowledge, are 
regional intelligence agencies in the Middle East cooperating with U.S. 
efforts to resolve his status?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The Intelligence Community requested 
intelligence information and assistance on the Captain Speicher case 
from numerous countries, including those in the Middle East.

               TESTING OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

    30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I appreciate the 
Department of Defense's efforts to date to investigate and declassify 
information on the Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD) and Project 112 
chemical and biological testing. It is critical that the United States 
come clean on this issue and that our veterans who may have been 
exposed to dangerous chemicals in these tests are notified so that they 
can seek treatment. While the full information on the location, nature, 
and military personnel involved in these tests has yet to come out, I 
believe we are making progress on this issue and I thank you for your 
efforts. In the coming year and in the future, when do you expect full 
disclosure of the SHAD/Project 112 testing programs will be complete?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense is committed to 
completing its investigation of Project 112/SHAD and releasing all 
medically relevant information by June 2003.

    31. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, beyond the SHAD/
Project 112 disclosure program, do you support expansion of these 
efforts into ALL Cold War-era chemical and biological weapons testing?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. If the Department of Veterans Affairs requests 
information from DOD necessary for adjudication of veterans' benefits 
claims, DOD would attempt to be responsive, to the extent feasible and 
consistent with continuing national security classification 
requirements.

    32. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what can Congress do 
to assist the DOD with these efforts?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs 
have all the authority necessary to address these issues.

                        JOINT SIMULATION PROGRAM

    33. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have been made aware 
of a DOD Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) directing the cancellation 
of the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) program in fiscal year 2004 and 
through the FYDP. I and other members on the Armed Services Committee 
who care deeply about the pace and scope of efforts to increase joint 
experimentation, joint training, creation of a standing joint 
operational headquarters, and joint requirements and acquisition 
validation, are troubled by this development.
    The program is intended to provide a joint simulation capability to 
``integrate'' service simulations allowing for joint training and 
experimentation at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This 
kind of tool is essential to any effort to move the military 
establishment to greater joint training, doctrine, and experimentation.
    This program has received significant congressional attention and 
support over the years, despite its ups and downs. There is great 
concern that we have abandoned the single tool essential to successful 
joint training and experimentation. What analysis (program management, 
operational requirements, etc.) informs this decision and provides the 
compelling justification for so dramatic and comprehensive a reduction?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department added significant resources on 
three occasions to provide full funding for the JSIMS program and keep 
it on schedule. In August 1999, $7.9 million was reprogrammed to ensure 
an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of April 2001. In August 2000, 
an additional $265.5 million was allocated for fiscal year 2002-2007 to 
support a rescheduled IOC of March 2002. Several months later, during 
the budget review, a further $7.4 million increase was approved for 
fiscal year 2001-2002, to address shortfalls identified late in the 
process by the program office.
    Several changes also were made to the management structure in an 
attempt to improve program performance and keep development on track. 
In December 1999, the program was given an ACAT-1D (Acquisition 
Category 1D) designation to increase management oversight. In January 
2000, the Army was directed to appoint a full-time program manager. At 
the same time, the program office was instructed to produce a cost 
estimate, split JSIMS development into blocks, and develop appropriate 
acquisition documents. Although some of these measures were adopted, 
problems persisted. By December 2002, the official IOC date had slid to 
March 2005.
    In addition to standard ACAT-1D oversight, there were at least four 
other reviews to assist program management, two of which were led by 
former Directors of Defense Research and Engineering. In December 1999, 
the Senior Review Board directed the program office to reconfigure its 
development plan around the Department's High-Level Architecture 
standard. Then, in 2001, an independent panel led by Dr. Anita Jones 
concluded that JSIMS needed to establish sound performance-prediction 
capabilities and improve its integration with its major partners, like 
the Army's Warfighter Simulation program. That same year, an audit 
conducted by the Army Materiel Command concluded that current 
engineering practices would not resolve performance issues within cost 
and schedule constraints. Finally, in December 2002, another 
independent review team, this time headed by Dr. Dolores Etter, 
recommended looking externally for commercial technologies and 
strategies that support scalability in order to facilitate spiral 
development for future JSIMS blocks. Dr. Etter's team also recommended 
an independent outside assessment of the JSIMS architecture. All of 
these reviews, in addition to numerous ACAT-1D assessments, highlighted 
serious concerns about the technical and performance standards for 
JSIMS. The decision to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) before 
proceeding with further JSIMS development is consistent with the 
results of these reviews.

    34. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what alternatives are 
DOD/JFCOM considering to meet the requirement for a simulation tool 
that supports joint training, joint experimentation, and joint program 
evaluation?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. This question will be addressed by the AoA and 
cannot be definitively answered before the study is complete. Final 
guidance is now being developed, but the AoA will likely consider the 
following alternatives: (1) continuing the JSIMS program, (2) 
separating the joint and service JSIMS elements and pursuing them as 
independent programs, (3) modifying existing simulations, and (4) 
commercial sources.

    35. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how will DOD/JFCOM 
support, and who will be responsible for a new joint simulation program 
in the fiscal year 2004 request?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. A new joint simulation is not funded in the 
fiscal year 2004 budget. The Department has initiated an AoA to 
identify the most cost-effective approach for meeting joint and service 
training requirements. Until the AoA is complete, we cannot say whether 
a new program ultimately might be needed.

    36. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, Congress appropriated 
millions of dollars for JSIMS and its related Service programs in 
fiscal year 2003, how does DOD/JFCOM propose to use that funding now 
that they are all (with one exception) zeroed in the fiscal year 2004 
request and FYDP?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. All fiscal year 2003 funds remained with the 
program to ensure delivery of Block I software in accordance with 
program office estimates. The JSIMS Software Support Facility was 
funded at $14 million in fiscal year 2004, using monies originally 
planned for the JSIMS Program Office. The remaining $168.6 million in 
fiscal year 2004 funding proposed in the fiscal year 2003 President's 
budget was allocated to other priorities.

    37. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the current 
state of analysis and planning leading to creation of a Joint National 
Training Capability (JNTC)? What are the overarching challenges 
identified at this point to creation of a JNTC? How does cancellation 
of the JSIMS and related Service simulation programs contribute to the 
challenge or facilitate the creation of a JNTC?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The JNTC program has an approved budget, and 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is setting up a Joint Management Office. 
The implementation plan, now being drafted, will define what will be 
required to support JNTC certification and accreditation. Fiscal year 
2003 activities will include establishing and testing technical support 
requirements, determining opposing force capabilities, developing and 
testing data collection methods, and establishing and testing the 
exercise-control architecture. JFCOM is leading the planning for JNTC 
events in fiscal year 2004 and beyond.
    The overarching challenge for the program is to create a solution 
within a high-level architecture that provides for rapid integration of 
live, virtual, and constructive components so that trainees are 
immersed in a seamless, combat-like environment, without realizing that 
some aspects are virtual or constructive.
    JSIMS and JNTC are independent of each other, although JSIMS could 
be used by JNTC if it met JNTC requirements. Without JSIMS, JNTC will 
use legacy systems, complemented if necessary by new systems, to meet 
its objectives.

                           THE NATIONAL GUARD

    38. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, as major contributors 
to the force structure and capability of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air 
Force, the National Guard must be a part of the plan to transform our 
military services and the command and control of the Department of 
Defense. While holding the National Guard forces in strategic reserve 
for the Active components may have successfully maintained a force for 
strategic reserve, the National Guard no longer operates only as a 
strategic reserve. Now, more than ever, the Army and Air National Guard 
are critical components of the Total Force and used in a much different 
manner than just 15 years ago. Such ``increased reliance'' upon our 
National Guard forces emphasizes that DOD should expand the authority 
of the National Guard Bureau within the Department of Defense to that 
of a separate entity. What is DOD doing to elevate the status of the 
National Guard Bureau to an independent agency status within DOD?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department has no plans to elevate the 
status of the National Guard Bureau to an independent agency. The 
Department of Defense has sought and continues to stress full 
integration of the Reserve components, with each component making up an 
integral piece of the parent service. Both the Army and Air National 
Guard are essential parts of our seven Reserve components and account 
for approximately 33.8 percent and 19.7 percent of their parent service 
respectively (combined, 36.2 percent of the two services). We will 
continue to work closely with the National Guard Bureau to focus our 
efforts on the objective of complete integration of all of our Reserve 
components into the Total Force.
                                 ______
                                 
                Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

                     NEWPORT CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEPOT

    39. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am pleased to see the 
accelerated neutralization initiative at the Newport Chemical Weapons 
Depot is on schedule to be completed as early as April 2004. What 
specifically does the Department of Defense intend to do with the 
facility once demilitarization is completed?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army is conducting a study to ascertain 
reusability of the facilities. We will report our findings to Congress 
no later than March 31, 2003 as requested in the Senate Report 107-202 
(page 20).
    Note: A report was provided to Congress by the Army on March 31, 
2003, and a summary of the answer to Senator Bayh's questions from that 
report is as follows:
    All of the buildings involved with the neutralization process fall 
within the RCRA permit area. The chemical defense building (CDB) at 
Newport can not easily be fenced off from the rest of the site and 
excluded from this permit. As a result, the CDB is not compatible for 
any uses other than the demilitarization process.
    A portion of the partially completed CDB structure has been 
enclosed from the elements, and is now being used by the 
demilitarization contractor to support the construction activities 
associated with the chemical neutralization process. Once the 
neutralization process starts, it is anticipated the building will be 
used to support the chemical demilitarization effort.
    There are no current or potential Army requirements identified for 
any of the facilities at Newport Chemical Depot, IN, including the 
Chemical Demilitarization Building. The neutralization process is to 
run from September 2003 to May 2004. Until completion, the Army will 
not be able to give a full evaluation for other uses of the facilities. 
If any facilities remain after the decontamination/clean-up process, 
potential reuse by the Army or other entities will be reevaluated.

    40. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, I wrote to 
you in November 2002 seeking your assistance in strengthening temporary 
flight restrictions currently in place over the Nation's eight chemical 
weapons depots. Unfortunately, it appears as though nothing has been 
done to deter pilots from violating the airspace over these facilities. 
In the last year alone, there have been almost 50 incursions of the 
airspace above Newport in my home state. I would like to know what 
specific steps you have taken to deter such incursions? In addition, I 
would like to know what the Pentagon has done to coordinate efforts 
with the Federal Aviation Administration to enforce the flight 
restrictions, and to report those who violate them?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Bayh, the Department of Defense shares 
your concern about violations of temporary flight restrictions over 
chemical weapons depot sites. However, DOD is not the lead Federal 
agency for either the establishment or the enforcement of temporary 
flight restrictions. If a violation occurs while we are flying a combat 
air patrol, DOD aircraft can intercept the offending aircraft and force 
it to change direction, or, in dire circumstances, shoot it down. 
Currently, the only option short of this is the imposition of 
administrative sanctions by the Federal Aviation Administration. We 
believe that there should be penalty options between these two 
extremes, and are working with other interagency members to define what 
these might be and how they might be implemented, using the National 
Capital Region as a guide.
    While DOD's actions are limited during periods of airspace 
violations over chemical weapons depots, the Department of Defense has 
taken significant steps to accelerate the chemical weapons destruction 
process at three of the remaining eight chemical stockpile sites. 
Accelerated destruction of these weapons equates to an accelerated 
reduction of risk to the public. The Army is implementing accelerated 
destruction of bulk chemical agent at the Aberdeen, Maryland and 
Newport, Indiana stockpiles. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment 
(ACWA) program, under the direction of Under Secretary Aldridge, is 
accelerating destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile at Pueblo, 
Colorado. 
    General Myers. The DOD shares your concern about violations of 
temporary flight restrictions over chemical weapons depot sites. 
However, DOD is not the lead Federal agency for either the 
establishment or the enforcement of restricted airspace. If a 
restricted airspace is violated, DOD can scramble alert fighter 
aircraft or divert fighters flying combat air patrol to intercept the 
offending aircraft and attempt to force it to vacate the area. If the 
aircraft fails to respond to direction from DOD fighter aircraft and 
remains a threat to the protected asset, the DOD fighters could shoot 
down the threat as a last resort.
    The best way to keep aircraft from violating restricted airspace is 
through a thorough education program from the FAA, and establishment of 
significant penalties for violators by the FAA and law enforcement 
agencies. DOD continues to work with the Interagency, especially the 
new Department of Homeland Security, to establish security requirements 
and procedures to strengthen these temporary flight restrictions over 
sensitive areas.

                             BASE CLOSURES

    41. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have supported your goal 
for a new round of base closures in 2005 and applaud your efforts to 
bring our military force in line with our infrastructure. Looking ahead 
to the base closure and realignment process, and recognizing the 
Department's emphasis on joint service training and response, I would 
think that multiple service support in our shore establishment is 
critical from both a capability as well as an efficiency standpoint. Do 
you plan to include base closure criteria in the process that considers 
joint service support, and rewards those activities? In addition, as we 
examine the vital role that DOD plays in securing the homeland, will 
homeland defense capability be included in the base closure and 
realignment criteria?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. Section 2913(b) of the BRAC statute requires me 
to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in the 
making of closure and realignment recommendations. The statute further 
provides that military value shall include at a minimum the 
preservation of military installations in the United States as staging 
areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions. 
Consistent with these statutory requirements, I will make specific 
recommendations for military value selection criteria when I publish 
the selection criteria for public comment, no later than December 31, 
2003.

    42. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I would like to know how, or 
if, September 11 has changed your thinking about the location and 
distribution of our military bases and installations in the United 
States?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The events of September 11, 2001, have 
confirmed in my mind that the Department must act now to review our 
basing requirements. We are looking at and experiencing different 
threats than we were a decade ago, and our forces must be stationed 
appropriately to respond to contingencies and support the global war on 
terrorism.

                             TRANSFORMATION

    43. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, it is my understanding that 
you are proposing to terminate the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank and the 
M-113 family of armored vehicles. I am concerned about this decision 
and believe these time proven and effective systems have a critical 
role in the transformed Armed Forces. Of particular concern to me is 
how you will maintain these systems in outyears. Specifically, can you 
tell in detail how you will provide for transmission replacement and 
maintenance of these vehicles?
    Secretary Rumsfeld. The program the Department plans to terminate 
is the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) Retrofit Program. The M1A1 
Abrams Integrated Maintenance (AIM) program continues. This program 
remains effectively the same as planned in the Army's original 
recapitalization of the legacy force and modernization strategy. The 
AIM program will refurbish 790 M1A1 tanks at a planned rate of 135 
tanks per year from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006 and 115 
tanks in fiscal year 2007. Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, Lima Army 
Tank Plant in Ohio, and General Dynamics Land Systems Division, will 
perform the work. The M1A1 incorporates rebuilt, service life extension 
AGT 1500 engines, and selected subsystem improvements. To control 
costs, the AIM program plans to provide the transmission replacement 
and maintenance on these vehicles using existing stocks, to develop 
innovative repair and rebuild programs, to use excess vehicle line 
replaceable units, and to re-engineer components that are no longer 
procurable.
    The M113 Family of Vehicles system upgrade program is effectively 
terminated in fiscal year 2004. The remaining M113 work is the 
conversion of 77 M577A2s to M1068A3s (a conversion from an older to the 
new command post carrier variant of the M113), the incorporation of 
government-furnished equipment transmissions, and 476 sets of track for 
1st Cavalry Division M113s.

    [Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee adjourned.]


DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                                  2004

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2003

                                       U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                    Washington, DC.

                             SERVICE CHIEFS

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room 
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner 
(chairman) presiding.
    Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, 
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, 
Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Reed, Bill Nelson, Dayton, 
Clinton, and Pryor.
    Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff 
director; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, chief clerk; and Gabriella 
Eisen, nominations clerk.
    Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green, 
professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional 
staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; 
Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, 
professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional 
staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; 
Ann M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional 
staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Joseph 
T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general 
counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
    Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, 
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 
staff member; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member; 
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton 
Greene, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional 
staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K. 
Levine, minority counsel; and Bridget M. Whalan, special 
assistant.
    Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent, Sara R. Mareno, and 
Nicholas W. West.
    Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling, 
assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, assistant to Senator 
McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson 
Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant 
to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to 
Senator Collins; James W. Irwin, assistant to Senator 
Chambliss; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Mieke 
Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Terrence E. Sauvain 
and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, 
assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey and Peter A. 
Contostavlos, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew 
Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Randy Massanelli, 
assistant to Senator Pryor.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

    Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee 
meets this morning to receive testimony from the chiefs of the 
military services in their annual posture statement on behalf 
of their respective branches to our committee. This is in 
regard to the President's fiscal year 2004 defense budget.
    Each of you bring great distinction to your Services and we 
are proud to have you here today. Last week, Senator Levin, 
Senator Roberts, Senator Rockefeller, and I had the privilege 
of visiting with U.S. military personnel in the Persian Gulf 
region, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I say to you most 
respectfully and humbly, you have rightful pride in your men 
and women in the Armed Forces.
    We met with them at each stop last week, and they are the 
best, well-trained force to be found anywhere in the world 
today.
    We arose this morning to hear about the diplomatic efforts 
which are properly being pursued by our President and other 
world leaders in this problem with regard to Iraq. But that 
diplomacy begins with the men and women in uniform of the 
United States and other nations that are trying to secure peace 
in that part of the world and the elimination of weapons of 
mass destruction from Saddam Hussein and his regime.
    We would not see the diplomacy working at its hopefully 
best, be it in the Security Council or in the capitals of the 
world, had it not been for the foresight of our President and 
other world leaders to move in position their best and finest 
of the Armed Forces to make possible such progress that we all 
hope and pray for in diplomacy.
    That reflects directly upon each of you individually and 
those of you in your respective branches who made possible 
these fine, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
    Each year we have this hearing, but today it is a most 
important one. The honest and forthright observations of the 
Service Chiefs, professional as well as personal, are 
absolutely essential for the continuing work of this committee 
and the work of the Senate as a body at such times as we bring 
forth the bill and, indeed, the nominations that are frequently 
before the Senate with regard to the men and women of the Armed 
Forces.
    Time and time again, you and your predecessors have 
summoned the courage to point out the challenges to current and 
future readiness. Those of us who have been on this committee 
for many years, as Senator Levin and I have, can recall 
predecessors who have been in your positions whose forthright 
testimony has enabled this committee to give greater support to 
the men and women of the Armed Forces, and we are respectful of 
what you do to make that possible.
    Together you represent more than 120 years of military 
experience and distinguished service to the Nation. 
Individually, your understanding of what is required to 
organize, equip, train, and sustain your service in peacetime 
and in wartime is second to none.
    When General Myers testified before the committee 2 weeks 
ago, I asked him this question. I asked him whether he believed 
the Armed Forces were prepared to meet any contingency of the 
use of force as may be required in Iraq and continue their high 
level of activity against worldwide terrorism. His response was 
unhesitating. His response was succinct, one word: 
``Absolutely.''
    I and many others who have pondered the question over the 
past several months were assured by his confidence and his 
certainty. Clearly, much of your work and opinions contributed 
to the conclusion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Today, homeland security is our Nation's foremost urgent 
priority. As Senator Levin and I met with the troops in these 
far-most regions, we said to them that homeland defense begins 
right where they are, because to the extent they can deter, 
interdict, or if necessary, crush terrorists is the extent to 
which there is less chance that that terrorism is brought to 
the shores of our country against their families, against all 
of us here at home. Homeland defense begins beyond the shores 
of this Nation.
    As we meet this morning, our Armed Forces are fighting the 
war with terror with over 40 coalition partners from 
Afghanistan to the Philippines. In the case of Iraq, our 
President has quite properly, together with other world 
leaders, chosen the diplomatic path, working through the United 
Nations and the Security Council. But as I said earlier, we 
must ever be mindful that diplomacy can only be as effective as 
there is a clear and present credible military threat to use 
force to back up that diplomacy. Your troops are doing exactly 
that.
    The President's fiscal year 2004 defense budget request of 
$379.9 billion continues to increase in real terms the amount 
of funding available for each of the Services in total. This 
budget continues the President's considerable progress to date 
and continues his ongoing commitment to safeguard America, our 
allies, and our friends. It is increasingly clear, however, 
that today's global challenges are requiring much more of the 
Armed Forces.
    It is our responsibility on this committee, and Congress as 
a whole, to carefully monitor the degree to which these 
increase demands stress the overall readiness of the forces, 
the readiness of the individual service person, and the 
readiness of their families. We encountered on this trip some 
areas that we will bring to your attention this morning, areas 
in which we have concern, in all probability you have concern, 
and we need to know your recommendations how we can jointly 
work with you to correct it.
    As we discuss and debate this budget request in the days 
and weeks ahead, as is the duty of this committee and Congress, 
on one thing we can all agree: the commitment, the dedication, 
and performance of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines 
in service to their Nation and that of their families in 
homeland defense is truly a remarkable blessing on this Nation. 
I thank you.
    Senator Levin.

                STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

    Senator Levin. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As we meet and as our troops continue to flow towards the 
Iraq region, there are many issues relative to Iraq that are 
being debated here at home, around the world, and at the United 
Nations. It is appropriate that those issues be debated, 
including the question of whether or not it would be wise to 
initiate an attack against Iraq without the support of the 
world community acting through the United Nations, the fallout 
of such an attack long-term and short-term, what the 
alternatives are in terms of disarming or containing Saddam 
Hussein, and whether the world will be more or less secure if 
such an attack takes place without a unified world community 
speaking through the United Nations.
    There are many issues that are worthy of debate. But one 
thing is clear to me, that if in fact such an attack occurs, 
the short-term military outcome is not in doubt. I also believe 
very firmly that the Iraqi leaders should not infer from these 
debates that America will not be united in support of its 
forces in the field. Regardless of where we stand on the issues 
being debated, this country will be united if and when the time 
comes. We will provide our men and women in uniform with 
everything that they need to ensure that they prevail.
    As Senator Warner has mentioned, Senator Roberts, Senator 
Rockefeller, the chairman, and I just returned from the region. 
There was no doubt in our mind before we left that our military 
is by far the best-trained, best-equipped, and most capable 
fighting force in the world today, and nothing that we saw on 
our trip in any way raises any uncertainty about that 
conclusion.
    But our visit reassured us that there is a uniformly high 
state of morale among our forces and a willingness to implement 
orders from the Commander in Chief, whatever those orders may 
be. Their readiness can be attributed in significant measure to 
the hard work that the Service Chiefs and their staffs have put 
forward in support of their responsibilities, and we give to 
our Service Chiefs for that our heartfelt thanks for your 
efforts.
    But I think you would be the first to join us and all the 
members of this committee in saying that the real gratitude is 
owing to the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces.
    I want to join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses here 
today. First, I want to extend a special thanks to General 
Shinseki, who is making his final appearance before the 
committee at a posture hearing. I do not think we can give you 
any assurance it will be your last appearance before the 
committee, however, so do not relax too much.
    Let me put this simply, though. Today our tribute will come 
more fully at a later time, but let me just simply say that 
you, sir, are the embodiment of service to our Nation and a 
commitment to the men and women whom you command. You have been 
truly a role model and we salute you for it.
    I also want to give a special welcome to General Hagee, who 
is making, I believe, his first appearance at a posture 
hearing, and we welcome you as well as our other witnesses who 
have been here before and will be here again. All of you are 
very much in our thoughts these days. We are grateful to you 
for what you have done to prepare our troops should war come, 
and that service will indeed serve them and our Nation well 
should in fact that moment arrive.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
    We will have 6-minute rounds. But before I proceed, I join 
Senator Levin in acknowledging your service, General Shinseki. 
There are moments in one's life that you never forget, and I 
recall Senator Inouye introducing you to this committee and I 
never have heard a more eloquent, more heartfelt introduction 
than that given by our distinguished senior colleague. You have 
lived up in every way to what he said. Thank you, sir.
    All right, I will start off, ladies and gentlemen, just as 
soon as we get organized up here. But we will start with the 
opening statements. We will start with you, General.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED 
                          STATES ARMY

    General Shinseki. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both you and 
Senator Levin, for the kind comments. That moment that you 
recollect was a high point as well, as has been the last 3\1/2\ 
years of my opportunity to work with the members of the 
committee. I will always consider that a high point.
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, other distinguished members of 
the committee: I am honored to be here this morning with the 
Service Chiefs and reporting to you on the posture of the Army 
and its readiness. Today, as both the chairman and the ranking 
member have indicated, across the joint force, soldiers are 
serving magnificently alongside their joint brethren, defending 
our freedom in this world against terrorism and preparing for 
other contingencies. In the Army alone, nearly 220,000 soldiers 
are forward stationed overseas and more than 124,000 of our 
Reserve component have been mobilized to this point.
    In the past 6 months, I have visited a good many of them. I 
have stood on the ground with them on their operational 
deployments. I have talked with them where they worked, where 
they played, and where they ate. I have even visited them here 
at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. We have had candid and 
frank discussions about your Army's readiness to respond to the 
Nation's calls.
    The Army is ready. We have the best Army in the world, not 
the largest but the best-led, best-trained, and best-equipped. 
It is about more than just equipment. We have the best soldiers 
on top of everything. Their determination and commitment are as 
firm as I have seen in my years of service and they are 
immensely proud to serve this Nation. They will take any 
objective, and they will accomplish any mission that we send 
them on.
    I am proud of what I have seen and I am daily reassured of 
my assessment. Soldiers are standing by for orders in 100 camps 
and stations and they will fight and win decisively this war on 
terrorism or any other war we might be sent to fight.
    We want to project that degree of readiness that is 
reflected today, project that readiness into the future, and to 
do so we long decided we must have a more responsive, a more 
deployable, more agile and versatile, as equally lethal and 
survivable a force as we have today. We began that work about 
3\1/2\ years ago.
    We knew then that there was a war in our future. We just 
did not know when, where, or against whom. The relative 
predictability all of us had gotten used to during the Cold War 
had given way to a continuing chaos of unpredictability. Voices 
inside and outside the Army suggested change.
    With the unwavering support of the administration and this 
Congress, we are transforming rapidly to be more capable of 
dominating future crises. To mitigate the risk that is always 
inherent any time an institution undertakes comprehensive and 
fundamental change, we structured that transformation along 
three broad, mutually supporting vectors.
    On the near-term axis, we committed to keeping the 
readiness of today's legacy combat formations at the 
appropriate level. Then, to fix longstanding operational gaps 
we have had between our heavy and light components of that 
legacy force, we are fielding six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams 
to give us added capabilities in that midterm axis, even as we 
are designing our future force capabilities.
    Then finally, it is on that third and final axis that we 
are readying the Army for its long-term responsibilities. We 
are developing future concepts and technologies that will 
provide consistent capability overmatch through the middle of 
the century. Our Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision 
that is coming up in May of this year is the next major 
milestone and we intend to begin fielding this Objective Force 
by 2008.
    Balancing these requirements over time dictates difficult 
but prudent funding decisions and the Army's fiscal year 2004 
budget strikes that essential balance to maintain readiness 
throughout the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) period and 
beyond, and your support remains essential.
    We are already seeing dividends from our investments in 
future readiness: technologies that are coming on line early, 
superior body armor today, robots in caves, antitank warheads 
on unmanned aerial vehicles today, and unprecedented Blue Force 
tracking capabilities today. During the largest joint exercise 
in our history, Millennium Challenge 2002, with the help of the 
Air Force we air-delivered a Stryker platoon onto a dirt strip 
out at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.
    Just 3 years after the Army described its requirement for 
this interim force, we are demonstrating the increased 
strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities the Stryker 
Brigade Combat Teams will provide to combatant commanders. This 
summer the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team will join us in 
the war on terrorism.
    So it is not just about capabilities in 2008 and beyond. It 
is enabling soldiers today.
    People remain the engine behind all of our magnificent 
moments as an Army and their well-being is inextricably linked 
to our readiness as we describe it today. My thanks to the 
members of this committee for your help with pay raises, health 
care, retirement benefits, housing, and other well-being 
programs that have taken better care of our people than I can 
remember. Our soldiers, civilians, retirees, and veterans and 
their families appreciate it in more ways than I can describe.
    Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for your unwavering support, 
unwavering bipartisan support of this committee, and the 
leadership of this committee and its devotion to our soldiers. 
You keep us the most respected land force in the world. Mr. 
Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to your questions and 
the questions of the committee.
    [The prepared statement of General Shinseki and the Army 

Posture Statement follow:]

            Prepared Statement by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, USA

    Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you 
for this opportunity to report to you today on the posture of the 
United States Army.
    America's Armed Forces are the most powerful in the world. 
America's Army remains the most respected landpower to our friends and 
allies and the most feared ground force to those who would threaten the 
interests of the United States.
    Since before the birth of the Nation, American soldiers have 
instilled hope in a noble dream of liberty. They have remained on point 
for the Nation through nine wars, and the intervals of peace in the 
years between--defending the Constitution and preserving freedom. 
Magnificent in their selfless service, long in their sense of duty, and 
deep in their commitment to honor, soldiers have kept the United States 
the land of the free and the home of the brave. This is our legacy. Our 
soldiers who serve today preserve it.
    In October 1999, we unveiled our vision for the future--``Soldiers, 
on point for the Nation, transforming this, the most respected army in 
the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant 
across the full spectrum of operations.'' The attacks against our 
Nation on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism validate 
the Army's vision--people, readiness, transformation--and our efforts 
to change quickly into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, 
lethal, survivable, and sustainable force.
    While helping to fight the global war on terrorism, the Army is in 
the midst of a profound transformation. Readiness remains our constant 
imperative--today, tomorrow, and the day after. Transformation, 
therefore, advances on three broad axes: perpetuating the Army's legacy 
by maintaining today's readiness and dominance; bridging the 
operational gap with an Interim Force of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams; 
and fielding the Objective Force to fight and win conflicts in the 
years beyond this decade.
    As they have throughout the Army's 227-year history, soldiers 
remain the centerpiece of our formations. Versatile and decisive across 
the full spectrum of joint missions, land forces have demonstrated time 
and again the quality of their precision in joint operations. Our 
responsibility is to provide soldiers with the critical capabilities 
needed for the tough missions we send them on.
    After 3\1/2\ years of undiminished support from the administration 
and Congress, and the incredible dedication of soldiers and Department 
of the Army civilians, we have begun to deliver the Army vision. With 
continued strong support, we will win the war against global terrorism, 
meet our obligations to our friends and allies, remain ready to prevail 
over the unpredictable, and transform ourselves for decisive victories 
on future battlefields.
    We have achieved sustainable momentum in Army transformation; the 
framework is in place to see the Objective Force fielded, this decade.

                   THE ARMY--AT WAR AND TRANSFORMING

    The United States is at war, and the Army serves the Nation by 
defending the Constitution and our way of life. It is our nonnegotiable 
contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars, 
decisively.
    In the weeks immediately following the attacks of September 11, 
2001, Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrated Afghanistan, 
penetrated al Qaida and Taliban strongholds, and leveraged all 
available long-range, joint fires, enabling the Northern Alliance to 
begin dismantling the Taliban. By January 2002, U.S. and Allied 
conventional force reinforcements began to set the stage for Operation 
Anaconda, where soldiers, demonstrating courage and determination under 
the most challenging conditions, defeated al Qaida at altitude on the 
escarpments overlooking the Shah-e-kot Valley.
    Today, more than 198,000 soldiers remain deployed and forward 
stationed in 120 countries around the globe, conducting operations and 
training with our friends and allies. Decisively engaged in the joint 
and combined fight against global terrorism, soldiers are serving with 
distinction--at home and abroad. Soldiers from both the active and the 
Reserve component have remained ``on point'' for the Nation in the 
Balkans for 7 years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for 12 years, in the 
Sinai for 21 years, and in Korea and Europe for over 50 years. At the 
publication of the Army Posture Statement, there were more than 110,000 
Reserve component soldiers mobilized for active Federal service in 
support of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom. Even 
as we transform, soldiers will remain ready to answer the calls of the 
Nation to defeat well-trained, determined, and dangerous adversaries 
who miscalculate in taking on the best-led, the best-equipped, and the 
best-trained Army in the world.
    At war and transforming, the Army is accelerating change to harness 
the power of new technologies, different organizations, and revitalized 
leader development initiatives to remain at the head of the line. To 
accomplish this, Army transformation advances along three major axes 
towards attainment of the Objective Force. We selectively recapitalize 
and modernize today's capabilities to extend our overmatch in staying 
ready to defend our homeland, keep the peace in areas important to the 
Nation, and win the war against global terrorism. Stryker Brigade 
Combat Teams--our Interim Force--will bridge the current operational 
gap between our rapidly-deployable light forces and our later-arriving 
heavy forces, paving the way for the arrival of the Objective Force. By 
2010, the Army's Objective Force--organized, equipped, and trained for 
ground dominance, cyber-warfare, and space exploitation--will provide 
the Nation the capabilities it must have to remain the global leader, 
the strongest economy in the world, and the most respected and feared 
military force, by our friends and allies and our enemies, 
respectively.
    The surprise attacks against our Nation and Operation Enduring 
Freedom, in response to those attacks, validated the Army vision and 
provided momentum to our efforts to transform ourselves into an 
instrument of national power that provides full spectrum operational 
capabilities that are strategically responsive and capable of decisive 
victory. In a little over 3 years, we have begun to realize the Army 
vision--people, readiness, and transformation.
    The transforming Army is enriching as a profession and nurturing to 
families whose sacrifice has borne the readiness of the force for the 
past 10 years. Our well-being initiatives are our commitment to reverse 
this trend by giving our people the opportunity to become self-reliant; 
setting them up for personal growth and success; aggressively investing 
in family housing; and revitalizing single-soldier living space in our 
barracks. Our manning initiatives have filled our line divisions and 
other early deploying units to dampen the internal turbulence of 
partially filled formations and help put a measure of predictability 
back into the lives of our families.
    The Army has carefully balanced the risk between remaining ready 
for today's challenges and preparing for future crises. With unwavering 
support from the administration, Congress, our soldiers, and Department 
of the Army civilians, the Army has made unprecedented progress in its 
efforts to transform.
    We will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the first 
Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) this summer and demonstrate the 
increased responsiveness, deployability, agility, verastility, 
lethality, survivability, and sustainability that SBCTs provide to 
combatant commanders. In a little over 3 years from initial concept to 
fielded capability, the SBCTs will allow us to glimpse the potential 
for acquisition reform in paving the way for delivery of the Objective 
Force.
    We have constructed the framework for achieving the Objective Force 
this decade: a Transformation Campaign Plan with Roadmap; the Objective 
Force White Paper; the Operational and Organizational plans for the 
Objective Force Unit of Action; and the Operational Requirements 
Document for the Future Combat System of Systems.
    Additionally, the Army is poised to fill ground maneuver's most 
critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with 
Comanche, a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft that is a 
cornerstone of the Objective Force.
    All along the way, we have tested our concepts in wargames and 
experiments, checked and rechecked our azimuth to the Objective Force 
weekly and monthly, and look forward to a successful Future Combat 
System Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision in May of this 
year.
    However, we cannot accelerate Army transformation without 
transforming the way the Army does business--from transformation of 
logistics and acquisition to personnel and installation transformation. 
Revolutionizing Army business management practices achieves the best 
value for taxpayers' dollars; conserves limited resources for 
investment in people, readiness, and transformation; enhances 
management of personnel systems, installations, and contracting; and 
augments our potential to accelerate arrival of the Objective Force. 
Changing the Army is first about changing the way we think, and better 
business practices represent practical application of common sense 
initiatives that best serve the Army and our Nation.
    We are proud of our progress. We are grateful for the strong 
congressional support that has helped put the Army on its approach 
march to the Objective Force. The Army 2003 Posture Statement describes 
our tremendous progress in transformation--an orchestrated campaign, 
synchronized with OSD and joint transformation, to achieve the 
Objective Force and keep America's Army the dominant landpower in the 
world.

        THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT--THE REQUIREMENT TO TRANSFORM

    During the last two decades of the 20th century, information-age 
technologies dramatically changed the political, economic, and military 
landscapes. Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, and 
operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo illustrated the requirement 
for transforming our forces to meet the evolving, strategic 
requirements of our Nation. Survivable and extremely lethal, our heavy 
forces effectively met the requirements for which they were designed; 
yet, they were slow to deploy and difficult to sustain. Conversely, our 
light forces were rapidly deployable, but they lacked the protection, 
lethality, and tactical mobility that we seek across the spectrum of 
military operations. We were successful in winning the Cold War and, as 
a result, smaller than we had been in 40 years. The Army no longer had 
the luxury of specialized forces built to confront a single and 
narrowly defined threat like the Warsaw Pact countries.
    Today's challenges are more complex; threats are elusive and 
unpredictable. The fight against international terrorism has 
overshadowed, but not eliminated, other potential crises. Tension 
between India and Pakistan persists; stability between China and Taiwan 
is tenuous; and concern over North Korea escalates. Threats of 
transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD)--often financed by organized crime, illicit drug 
transactions, trafficking in women and children, and the sale of arms--
further complicate the security environment. Geopolitical trends such 
as scarce resources, youth population-spike in underdeveloped 
countries, aging populations in developed countries, and the growth of 
mega-cities, among others, presage a future strategic environment of 
diverse and widely distributed threats.
    Fully appreciating the internal and external difficulties that 
profound change engenders, we assessed the operational challenges of 
the new century against the capabilities of our Cold War Army, 
recognized the opportunity to leverage the inherent combat power of the 
technological revolution, and set a clear path ahead--the Army vision.
    The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) reaffirms our military's 
highest priority--defending the United States. To do this effectively, 
we assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition; 
deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and 
decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails. The NSS directs 
the military to transform to a capabilities-based force ready to 
respond to unpredictable adversaries and security crises. The Objective 
Force meets these NSS requirements, and Army transformation will 
enhance our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations, achieve 
decisive results at the time and place of our choosing, and safeguard 
the Nation's ability to exercise our right of self-defense through 
preemption, when required.
    The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a capabilities-based 
approach to defense planning that provides broader military options 
across the operational spectrum, from pre- to post-conflict operations. 
The force-sizing construct--1-4-2-1--takes into account the number, 
scope, and simultaneity of tasks assigned the military: it sizes the 
force for defense of the U.S. homeland (1), forward deterrence in four 
critical regions (4), the conduct of simultaneous warfighting missions 
in two regions (2)--while preserving the President's option to call for 
decisive victory in one of those conflicts (1)--and participation in 
multiple, smaller contingency operations.
    the army--serving today, balancing risk, managing transformation
    Soldiers are the most precise and responsive means to strike and 
then control enemy centers of gravity on the ground--where people live, 
work, and govern. American soldiers are disciplined, professional, and 
trained for success in diverse missions; they are the foundation of a 
flexible force that accomplishes its missions in the non-linear 
battlespace by integrating new, innovative technologies and techniques 
with current systems and doctrine. Our people adapt under the harshest 
conditions, whether in the deserts of Kuwait and the Sinai, the 
mountains and rice paddies of Korea, or the tropics of the Democratic 
Republic of Timor-Leste.
    These demanding commitments mean we must nurture a balance between 
current and near-term readiness and our transformation to meet future 
challenges. The Army has accepted reasonable operational risk in the 
mid-term in order to fund our transformation to the Objective Force. To 
avoid unacceptable risk, we are monitoring closely the current 
operational situation as we support the combatant commanders in the war 
against terror, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute the long-term 
effort to defeat transnational threats. We have designed and 
implemented the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) to provide a 
precision, predictive tool with which to monitor the Army and make 
appropriate adjustments to preserve current readiness. Our surge 
capacity in the industrial base further reduces current risk by keeping 
production lines warm and responsive. Our first Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team will provide the combatant commanders with a new capability to 
further mitigate operational risk--even as we transform to the 
Objective Force.

    REALIZING THE ARMY VISION--PEOPLE, READINESS, AND TRANSFORMATION

    In 1999, the Army announced its vision to transform into a more 
strategically responsive force, dominant across the full spectrum of 
military operations. The Army vision addresses three essential 
components: people, readiness, and transformation. Soldiers are the 
heart of the Army, the centerpiece of our formations, and the 
foundation of our combat power. Readiness remains our overarching 
imperative; it is the means by which we execute our nonnegotiable 
contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars, 
decisively. To preserve readiness while rapidly changing, 
transformation advances on three major axes: preserving our Army legacy 
by maintaining readiness and dominance today; bridging the operational 
gap with Stryker Brigades, the Interim Force; and fielding the 
Objective Force this decade to keep the Army dominant in the years 
beyond this decade.
    Realizing the Army vision requires the concerted effort of the 
entire Army, across all components--from warfighting to institutional 
support organizations. The Army published its Transformation Campaign 
Plan in April 2001 to synchronize and guide this complex undertaking. 
The November 2001 Objective Force White Paper describes the advanced 
capabilities and core technologies needed to build the Objective Force. 
The Army's June 2002 Army transformation Roadmap defines transformation 
as a continuous process--with specific waypoints--that increases our 
contributions to the Joint Force while achieving the six Department of 
Defense (DOD) critical operational goals. The result will be a more 
strategically responsive and full spectrum dominant force capable of 
prompt and sustained land combat operations as a member of the Joint 
Force.
    In support of the emerging joint operational concepts and 
architectures, the Army--as the major landpower component--continues to 
develop ground concepts for a full spectrum and multidimensional force. 
These concepts are producing a Joint Force that presents potential 
enemies with multiple dilemmas across the operational dimensions--
complicating their plans, dividing their focus, and increasing their 
chances of miscalculation.
    In future joint operations, Objective Force units will be capable 
of directing major operations and decisive land campaigns with Army 
headquarters. Objective Force headquarters at all levels will provide 
the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with seamless, joint battle command and 
decision superiority. The modularity and scalability of our Objective 
Force formations will provide an unprecedented degree of flexibility 
and adaptability to the combatant commander--providing the right force 
at the right time for decisive outcomes.

                   PEOPLE--OUR MOST VALUABLE RESOURCE

    The Army vision begins and ends talking about people. People are 
central to everything else we do in the Army. Platforms and 
organizations do not defend this Nation; people do. Units do not train, 
stay ready, grow and develop leadership--they do not sacrifice and take 
risks on behalf of the Nation. People do. Institutions do not 
transform; people do. People remain the engine behind all of our 
magnificent moments as an Army, and the well-being of our people--the 
human dimension of our transformation--is inextricably linked to Army 
readiness.
    In our vision, we recommitted ourselves to doing two things well 
each and every day--training soldiers and civilians and growing them 
into competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders who 
succeed in situations of great uncertainty. We are dedicated to 
preparing our soldiers to lead joint formations, to enabling our 
headquarters to command and control joint forces, and to providing to 
those joint formations the capabilities only the Army can bring to the 
fight: the ability to control terrain and populations.
Manning the Force
    The objective of our manning strategy is to ensure we have the 
right people in the right places to fully capitalize on their 
warfighting expertise--this is the Army's commitment to the Nation, 
Army leaders, soldiers, and our families. Correctly manning our units 
is vital to assuring that we fulfill our missions as a strategic 
element of national policy; it enhances predictability for our people; 
and it ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform their 
assigned tasks. In fiscal year 2000, we implemented a strategy to man 
our forces to 100 percent of authorized strength, starting with 
divisional combat units. The program expanded in fiscal year 2001 and 
fiscal year 2002 to include early deploying units. In fiscal year 2002, 
we maintained our manning goals and continued to fill our divisions, 
Armored Cavalry Regiments, and selected early deploying units to 100 
percent in the aggregate, with a 93 to 95 percent skill and grade-band 
match. We remain on target to accomplish our long-term goal of filling 
all Army units to 100 percent of authorized strength.

                   RECRUITING AND RETAINING THE FORCE

    In 1999, the Army missed its recruiting goals for the active 
component (AC) by about 6,300 inductees, and for the Reserve component 
by some 10,000. Our recruiting situation was simply unacceptable, and 
we committed ourselves to decisive steps and reversed that trend.
    In fiscal year 2002, the AC achieved 100 percent of its goal in 
recruiting and retention for the third consecutive year. The Army 
exceeded its AC 79,500 enlisted accession target in fiscal year 2002 
and exceeded our aggregate fiscal year 2002 retention objective of 
56,800 soldiers in all three categories by 1,437. We are poised to make 
the fiscal year 2003 accession target of 73,800, and we expect to meet 
our active component fiscal year 2003 retention target of 57,000. The 
fiscal year 2004 accession target is set at 71,500.
    The Army Reserve has met mission for the last 2 years, and its 
recruiting force is well structured to meet fiscal year 2004 
challenges. The Army Reserve continues to maintain a strong selected 
Reserve strength posture at 205,484 as of January 17, 2003--over 100.2 
percent of the fiscal year 2003 End Strength Objective. Overcoming many 
recruiting and retention challenges in fiscal year 2002, the Army 
National Guard (ARNG) exceeded end strength mission, accessions were 
104.5 percent of goal, and we exceeded reenlistment objectives.
    To ensure that we continue to recruit and retain sufficient 
numbers, we are monitoring the current environment--the global war on 
terrorism (GWOT) and frequent deployments--to determine impact on 
morale, unit cohesiveness, combat effectiveness, and support of well-
being programs that draw quality people to the Army. We continue to 
examine innovative recruiting and retention initiatives. The challenges 
we face in fiscal year 2003 and 2004 are two-fold: increase recruiter 
productivity and recruiting resources necessary to maintain recruiting 
momentum when the economy becomes more robust. Resourcing recruiting 
pays dividends well beyond accessions in the year of execution. For 
example, Army advertising in fiscal year 2002 influenced not only 
fiscal year 2002 accessions, but also potential recruits who will be 
faced with enlistment decisions in fiscal year 2003 and beyond.

               RESERVE COMPONENT FULL-TIME SUPPORT (FTS)

    Today, more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve 
component (RC). The GWOT and homeland defense are significant 
undertakings that demand a high level of resourcing. The RC has been 
key to our success in these operations. To ensure the Army's RC 
continues to meet ever-increasing demands with trained and ready units, 
the Army plans to increase full-time support authorizations 2 percent 
each year through fiscal year 2012, increasing the FTS from the current 
level of 69,915 to a level of 83,046. The Army recognizes additional 
full-time support authorizations as the number one priority of the Army 
National Guard and Army Reserve leadership.

                           CIVILIAN COMPONENT

    As a comprehensive effort to consolidate, streamline, and more 
effectively manage the force, the Army has begun an initiative to 
transform our civilian personnel system. High quality, well-trained 
civilians are absolutely essential to the readiness of our force and 
our ability to sustain operations today and in the future. Recruiting, 
training, and retaining a highly-skilled, dedicated civilian workforce 
is critical in meeting our obligations to the combatant commanders and 
the Nation. Aggressive transformation of our civilian force--in which 
projections through fiscal year 2005 indicate a 16-percent annual 
turnover due to retirements and other losses--will ensure we continue 
to meet those obligations.
    As of fiscal year 2002, the Army employed 277,786 civilian 
personnel. To forecast future civilian workforce needs with precision, 
we developed the Civilian Forecasting System, a sophisticated 
projection model that predicts future civilian personnel requirements 
under various scenarios. The Army is working closely with the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other Federal agencies to 
demonstrate the power of this system so they can fully leverage its 
capabilities, as well.
    The Civilian Personnel Management System XXI (CPMS XXI) has 
identified the reforms necessary to hire, train, and grow a civilian 
component that supports the transforming Army. To achieve this, we have 
redefined the way civilians are hired, retained, and managed. Mandatory 
experiential assignments will become the vehicle by which we develop 
future leaders. CPMS XXI fully responds to current mandates in the 
President's Management Agenda and incorporates the results of the Army 
Training and Leader Development Panels. For example, two initiatives 
for recruiting well-trained civilians are:

         The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development 
        System--a centrally managed program that accesses and trains 
        civilian interns and grows a resource pool of personnel who can 
        accede to senior professional positions.
         The DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 and 
        fiscal year 2003 provided direct hire authority for critical, 
        hard-to-fill medical health care occupations and enabled the 
        reduction in average fill-time for these positions to 29 days.
Army Well-Being
    The readiness of the Army is inextricably linked to the well-being 
of our people, and Army well-being is the human dimension of our 
transformation. Well-being responds to the physical, material, mental, 
and spiritual needs of all Army people--soldiers, civilians, retirees, 
veterans, and their families. We recognize the fundamental relationship 
between well-being programs and institutional outcomes such as 
readiness, retention, and recruiting. To support mission preparedness 
as well as individual aspirations, well-being integrates policies, 
programs, and human resource issues into a holistic, systematic 
framework that provides a path to personal growth and success and gives 
our people the opportunity to become self-reliant. We recruit soldiers, 
but we retain families. Well-being programs help make the Army the 
right place to raise a family. When our families are cared for, 
soldiers can better focus on their mission--training, fighting, and 
winning our Nation's wars, decisively.
    Soldiers appreciate the Nation's devotion to them, and they are 
grateful for the country's recognition of their service and sacrifices. 
Recent improvements to the Montgomery GI Bill, Tricare for Life, 
Tricare Reform, Retired Pay Reform, the 4.1 percent general pay 
increase, and additional pay increases in 2003, are all important to 
soldiers and their families. These initiatives have helped the Army 
respond to the well-being needs of our people. Army voluntary education 
programs improve our combat readiness by expanding soldier skills, 
knowledge, and aptitudes to produce confident, competent leaders. Other 
well-being initiatives include:

         Spouse Employment Summit. The Army is developing 
        partnerships with the private sector to enhance employment 
        opportunities for Army spouses and provide improved job 
        portability for them.
         Spouse Orientation and Leader Development (SOLD). SOLD 
        connects Army spouses and enhances their opportunity to serve 
        as valued leaders who contribute to the readiness and future of 
        the Army and our Nation.
         Army University Access Online. eArmyU offers soldiers 
        access to a variety of on-line, post-secondary programs and 
        related educational services. www.eArmyU.com is a comprehensive 
        web-portal widely accessible to soldiers, including those in 
        Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kuwait.
         In-State Tuition. To level the playing field for 
        access to education opportunities, the Army is working to 
        encourage States to grant in-State status for military 
        personnel and families at public colleges and universities in 
        their soldier's state of legal residence and state of 
        assignment.
         High School Senior Stabilization. This policy enhances 
        predictability by allowing families to request stabilization at 
        their sponsor's current duty location if they have a child who 
        will graduate from high school during that year.
         Secondary Education Transition Study (SETS) Memorandum 
        of Agreement (MOA). Facilitated by the Army, this agreement 
        among participating school superintendents is their commitment 
        to partner and improve high school transitions for DOD 
        children. Currently, over 110 school superintendents have 
        signed the SETS MOA.

Leader Development--Training Soldiers and Civilians, Our Growing 
        Leaders
    The Army is a profession--the Profession of Arms. Conducting 
decisive ground combat operations in defense of the United States and 
its interests is a core competency of this profession. The development 
of each member of the Army is the foundation of lifelong devotion to 
duty--while in uniform and upon returning to the civilian sector.
    By its nature, our profession is extraordinarily complex and 
dangerous. The American people entrust the Army with the sacred 
responsibility to apply lethal force in defense of U.S. interests. As 
such, the Profession of Arms must remain firmly grounded in 
constitutional values and must constantly change and grow to preserve 
its competitive advantage in an evolving strategic environment. At all 
levels, our leaders--military and civilian--must apply their 
professional knowledge in increasingly varied and unique situations 
that are characteristic of today's strategic environment. Ultimately, 
we must grow professional Army leaders who provide wise and discerning 
military judgments founded on long experience and proven professional 
expertise. This capacity is developed only through a lifetime of 
education and dedicated service--in peace and in war.
    Soldiers serve the Nation with the full realization that their duty 
may require them to make the supreme sacrifice for others among their 
ranks. Soldiers fighting the war on terrorism today, those who will 
fight our future wars, and those who have fought in our past wars are 
professional warfighters and a precious national asset. To ensure we 
remain the greatest landpower in the world defending the greatest 
country in the world, the Army and the Nation rely upon their unique 
and hard-earned experiences and skills. To develop the operational 
skills required to defend the Nation, training must remain our number 
one priority.
    The evolving strategic environment, the gravity of our 
responsibilities, and the broad range of tasks the Army performs 
require us to review and periodically update the way we educate, train, 
and grow professional warfighters. The Army's strategic 
responsibilities to the Nation and combatant commanders now embrace a 
wider range of missions. Those missions present our leaders with even 
greater challenges than previously experienced. Therefore, leader 
development is the lifeblood of the profession. It is the deliberate, 
progressive, and continuous process that trains and grows soldiers and 
civilians into competent, confident, self-aware, and decisive leaders 
prepared for the challenges of the 21st century in combined arms, 
joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
    In June 2000, we convened the Army Training and Leader Development 
Panel (ATLDP). The ATLDP's purpose is to identify skill sets required 
of Objective Force soldier and civilian leaders. Further, ATLDP 
assesses the ability of current training and leader development systems 
and policies to enhance these required skills. In May 2001, the Army 
Training and Leader Development Panel Phase I (Officer Study) 
identified 7 strategic imperatives and generated 89 recommendations. 
With those, we validated the requirement to transform our Officer 
Education System (OES)--from the Officer Basic Course through the 
Command and General Staff Officer Course. Additionally, the panel 
reconfirmed the value of Joint Professional Military Education II (JPME 
II) in preparing our leaders for joint assignments. The most 
significant product of the officer ATLDP is our OES transformation.
    ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study) identified three high-payoff 
institutional training and education initiatives for lieutenants, 
captains, and majors. The first of these is the Basic Officer Leader 
Course (BOLC). BOLC will provide a tough, standardized, graduate-level, 
small-unit leadership experience for newly commissioned officers. The 
second of these initiatives is the Combined Arms Staff Course for staff 
officers, and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course for company 
commanders. Both courses will capitalize on advanced distributed 
learning and intensive resident training methods. The third initiative, 
Intermediate Level Education (ILE), will provide all majors with the 
same common core of operational instruction, and it will provide 
additional educational opportunities that are tailored to the officer's 
specific career field, branch, or functional area. Beyond ILE, Army 
officers continue to attend Joint or Senior Service Colleges to develop 
leader skills and knowledge appropriate to the operational and 
strategic levels of the profession.
    Completed in May 2002, the ATLDP Phase II (noncommissioned officer 
(NCO) Study) resulted in 78 findings and recommendations extending 
across 6 imperatives--Army culture, NCO Education Systems (NCOES), 
training, systems approach to training, training and leader development 
model, and lifelong learning. Among others, the ATLDP Phase II 
recommended building new training and leader development tools for NCOs 
to replace current methods, as required. The ATLDP Phase III (Warrant 
Officer Study) culminated with 63 recommendations extending across 4 
crucial imperatives. Recommendations included clarifying the warrant 
officer's unique role in the Army and improving the Warrant Officer 
Education System to ensure timely training and promotion. The Civilian 
Training and Leader Development Panel (Phase IV) study results are 
complete, and we are forming the Implementation Process Action Team (I-
PAT). I-PAT will identify actions the Army must take to increase the 
professional development of our civilian workforce. At the senior 
leader level, the Army initiated the Army Strategic Leadership Course 
(ASLC). The program is aimed at teaching principles of strategic 
leadership, with emphasis on visioning, campaign planning, leading 
change, and transformation. To date, we have completed 12 of the 
foundation courses and 3 alumni courses, training the majority of the 
Army's general officers.

                  READINESS--WINNING OUR NATION'S WARS

Homeland Security (HLS)
    Defending our Nation--abroad and at home--against foreign and 
domestic threats is fundamental to the Army's legacy, and our 
warfighting focus provides capabilities relevant to HLS requirements. 
HLS missions range from traditional warfighting competencies that 
defeat external threats to the non-combat tasks associated with 
supporting civil authorities in domestic contingencies. Operation Noble 
Eagle mobilized over 16,000 Army National Guard soldiers to protect 
critical infrastructure. These soldiers assisted the Department of 
Transportation in securing our Nation's airports while also playing a 
vital role in securing our Nation's borders. The Army is moving forward 
to provide one Civil Support Team to each State, as required by the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The Civil 
Support Teams support Incident Commanders and identify chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) agents and 
substances, assess current and projected consequences, advise on 
response measures, and assist with appropriate requests for additional 
support. To date, OSD has certified 30 of 32 teams, and the Army is 
working to establish additional teams. Collectively, the certified 
teams have performed 890 operational missions since September 11, 2001. 
The Army remains committed to HLS, dedicating AC and RC staffs to focus 
on training, doctrine, planning, and execution of DOD missions in 
support of civil authorities.

                            MISSILE DEFENSE

    Robust Missile Defense is a vital warfighting requirement that 
protects both our homeland and our deployed forces. Missile Defense 
includes far more than a reactive capability to shoot down missiles in 
their reentry phase. Missile Defense requires a coherent system of 
sensors; battle command; weapons systems; and active, passive, 
proactive, and reactive operational concepts, all aimed at destroying 
enemy missiles--not only during their reentry phases. Missile Defense 
must also be able to destroy enemy missiles on the ground, before they 
launch or during their boost phase once launched. Missile Defense is 
inherently a joint capability to which the Army is a major contributor.
    The Army is deploying and employing Ground Mobile Defense assets to 
contribute to this warfighting capability, accelerating the fielding of 
the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC3) system, and developing 
directed energy weapons that will bring new defense measures to the 
Army and the Nation. We are postured to assume control of the Medium 
Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program in fiscal year 2003 and 
intend to begin fielding by fiscal year 2012.
    MEADS is a transformational program of Objective Force quality and 
a significant improvement on Patriot's capabilities. It will be more 
mobile and more deployable (C-130 capable) than Patriot and cover a 
360-degree radius to Patriot's 120 degrees. It will be effective 
against low radar, cross section cruise missile targets; and require 
only 30 percent of Patriot's manpower. MEADS will be more accurate and 
more sustainable than Patriot.

                       CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION

    In Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145, Congress directed the DOD to 
destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. In turn, the 
Secretary of Defense delegated management of all chemical munitions 
disposal to the Department of the Army. On November 29, 2000, the 
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, using incineration-based 
technology, completely destroyed the last stockpiles stored at the 
Atoll, and closure operations began in January 2001. The Tooele 
Chemical Agent Disposal Facility has incinerated 44 percent of the 
chemical agents and 81 percent of the munitions stored there. Disposal 
operations at these two sites destroyed 30 percent of the total U.S. 
chemical weapons stockpiles. Construction of incineration facilities at 
Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, is 
complete. Systemization activities are ongoing at Aberdeen, Anniston, 
Umatilla, and Pine Bluff. The plan to accelerate the disposal of bulk 
agents using a neutralization process at Aberdeen, Maryland, and 
Newport, Indiana, has been approved. Anniston and Aberdeen are 
scheduled to start destruction in second quarter fiscal year 2003, and 
Newport is scheduled to begin in first quarter fiscal year 2004.
    To comply with treaty agreements and the congressional mandate, we 
must complete the destruction of these weapons by 2007. The treaty 
allows for a one time, 5-year extension to this deadline. With 
continued funding and minimal schedule changes, we will safely destroy 
the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions at eight 
existing CONUS sites.
Training the Force
    In October 2002, the Army released Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training 
the Force. Synchronized with other field manuals and publications being 
updated to respond to changes in Army, joint, multinational, and 
interagency operations, FM 7-0 is the capstone doctrinal manual for 
Army training and leader development. It provides the developmental 
methodology for training and growing competent, confident soldiers, and 
it addresses both current and future Objective Force training 
requirements.
    We are transforming the way we fight future wars, and the Army is 
participating fully in a DOD-sponsored program to transform how forces 
train to fight. This effort involves four major initiatives: building 
upon existing service interoperability training; linking component and 
joint command staff planning and execution; enhancing existing joint 
training exercises to address joint interoperability; and studying the 
requirement for dedicated joint training environments for functional 
warfighting and complex joint tasks. The Army is scheduled to host the 
first joint National Training Center (NTC) event at Fort Irwin, 
California, in May 2003. During June 2003, the U.S. Army Forces Command 
will execute the second joint NTC event--JCS exercise Roving Sands.
    During the late 1990s, funding for the recapitalization and 
modernization of the Army's Combat Training Centers was reduced, 
eroding their capability to support their critical missions. 
Additionally, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment 
and current force instrumentation systems have become difficult to 
maintain. The Army's Combat Training Center modernization program will 
ensure that our premier training areas (NTC at Fort Irwin, Combat 
Maneuver Training Center in Germany, the Joint Readiness Training 
Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack Center of Excellence 
near Gila Bend, Arizona) are modernized to provide high quality, 
realistic, full-spectrum joint training. To address these problems, the 
Army will invest nearly $700 million over the next 6 years to modernize 
these training centers.

                                OPTEMPO

    In accordance with congressional directives, the Army developed a 
new methodology to prepare budget requests that accurately reflect 
operations and maintenance requirements. In the report submitted in 
July 2002, the Army outlined updated processes that ensure consistency 
in reporting of tank miles and reflect requirements and execution with 
more precision. Management controls initiated in fiscal year 2001 to 
prevent migration of tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) funds to other areas 
were highly successful and remain in effect.
    The Army's combined arms training strategy determines the 
resourcing requirements to maintain the combat readiness of our forces. 
For the AC, the Army requires 800 ground OPTEMPO miles per year for the 
M1 Abrams tank and corresponding training support; the AC flying hour 
program requires an average of 14.5 live flying hours per aircrew each 
month. Both Army National Guard and the Army Reserve aircrew training 
strategies require 9.0 hours per crew each month. The ARNG ground 
OPTEMPO requirement is a composite average of 174 miles in fiscal year 
2004, and the Army Reserve (USAR) ground OPTEMPO requirement is 200 
tank-equivalent miles in fiscal year 2004.
    While this describes the Army's training strategy, actual execution 
levels from unit to unit have varied depending upon factors such as 
ongoing operations, safety of flight messages, and adequate manning of 
combat formations. To this end, the Army has fully funded its AC ground 
OPTEMPO requirement, while its AC flying program is funded to its 
historical execution level of 13.1 flying hours. The RC air and ground 
OPTEMPO are similarly funded to their execution levels, rather than 
their requirement. Although the Army has not always been able to 
execute the training strategy, we have taken steps to have all units 
execute the prescribed training strategy in fiscal year 2003, fiscal 
year 2004, and beyond.
Force Protection and Antiterrorism
    Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate 
hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel and includes 
family members, resources, facilities, and critical information. In the 
war on terrorism, the area of operations extends from Afghanistan to 
the east coast and across the United States. Naturally, force 
protection and antiterrorism measures have increased across Army 
installations in the Continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.
    Findings from the Cole Commission, the Downing Report on the Khobar 
Towers bombing, and Army directives to restrict access to installations 
have all led to thorough assessments by the Department of the Army 
Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and 
commanders. Our efforts focus on improved force protection policy and 
doctrine; more rigorous training and exercises; improved threat 
reporting and coordination with national intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies; enhanced detection and deterrence capabilities 
for CBRNE threats; increased capabilities and protection for access 
control; and expanded assessments of Major Commands (MACOM) and 
installation force protection programs. Both operational and 
installation environments rely upon secure, networked information 
infrastructure to execute daily enterprise-wide processes and 
decisionmaking, so the parameters of force protection include 
contemporary and evolving cyber threats, as well.
    The Army's Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) secures the 
Army's portion of the Global Information Grid, secures the digitized 
force, and supports information superiority and network security 
defense-in-depth initiatives. ISSP provides the capability to detect 
system intrusions and alterations and react to information warfare 
attacks in a measured and coordinated manner. To the greatest extent 
possible, it protects warfighters' secure communications--from the 
sustaining base to the foxhole.
    Soldiers, active and Reserve, are heavily engaged in force 
protection and antiterrorism missions. Soldiers guard military 
installations, nuclear power plants, dams and power generation 
facilities, tunnels, bridges, rail stations, and emergency operations 
centers. During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
nearly 1,500 ARNG soldiers provided security, and soldiers guarded key 
infrastructure sites during Super Bowl XXXVII in January 2003. Over 
12,500 RC soldiers are currently mobilized for Operation Noble Eagle to 
fulfill force protection requirements, and in February 2003, over 8,000 
Army National Guard soldiers will support Air Force security 
requirements--a requirement that could reach 9,500 soldiers. Security 
of detention facilities and detainees at Guantanamo Bay Detention--a 
long-term detainee mission--requires approximately 1,500 Army 
personnel, 50 percent of whom are military police. Army Reserve 
Internment and Resettlement battalions on 6-month rotations impact 
military police availability to CONUS force protection requirements.
Sustainment
    The Army is revolutionizing its logistics process. One initiative, 
the Single Stock Fund (SSF), redirected more than $540 million worth of 
secondary items from stocks to satisfy customer demands between May 
2000--SSF inception--and November 2002. During that same period, we 
redistributed more than $218 million worth of secondary items from the 
authorized stockage levels to meet higher priority readiness 
requirements. By extending--national visibility of stockage locations--
and capitalizing inventories into the Army Working Capital Fund--we 
reduced customer wait time by an average of 18.5 percent. The SSF will 
continue to reduce inventory requirements and generate even more 
savings for the Army by creating greater flexibility for the management 
of inventories.
    Another initiative, the National Maintenance Program (NMP), 
enhances weapon system readiness, reliability, and availability rates 
by bringing Army Class IX repair parts to a single national standard. 
Ultimately, increased reliability will reduce overall weapon system 
operating and support cost. Additionally, the NMP centralizes the 
management and control of Army maintenance activities for components 
and end items. NMP will produce appropriately sized Army maintenance 
capacity that still meets total maintenance requirements.
Strategic Readiness Reporting
    The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 
requires the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive 
readiness reporting system that objectively measures readiness to 
support the NSS. The Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS) responds 
to and provides a baseline in achieving this critical initiative.
    SRS is a precision readiness measurement tool that provides Army 
leadership with accurate, objective, predictive, and actionable 
readiness information to dramatically enhance resource management 
toward one end--strategic readiness to defend the United States. The 
Army Scorecard--a product of SRS--will integrate readiness data from 
the business arena and the operating, generating, and sustaining forces 
of both the active and Reserve component. Army Scorecard methodology 
focuses on four critical areas: People--investing in soldiers and their 
families; Readiness--maintaining the support capability to the 
combatant commanders' operational requirements; Transformation--
transforming the Army into the Objective Force; and application of 
sound business practices.
    SRS markedly improves how we measure readiness. It gathers timely 
information with precision and expands the scope of the data 
considered. We are further developing this system to leverage leading 
indicators and predict trends--solving problems that affect readiness 
before they become problems, from well-being to weapons platforms. SRS 
will help enable the Army preserve readiness to support combatant 
commanders, invest in soldiers and their families, identify and adopt 
sound business practices, and transform the Army to the Objective 
Force.
Installations
    Army installations are our Nation's power projection platforms, and 
they provide critical training support to the Army and other members of 
the joint team. Additionally, soldiers, families, and civilians live 
and work on Army installations. The quality of our infrastructure 
directly affects the readiness of the Army and the well-being of our 
soldiers, families, and civilians.
    The Army has traditionally accepted substantial risk in 
infrastructure to maintain its current warfighting readiness. However, 
a decade of chronic under funding has led to a condition in which over 
50 percent of our facilities and infrastructure are in such poor 
condition that commanders rated them as ``adversely affecting mission 
requirements.'' Our facilities maintenance must improve. Over the past 
2 years, with the help of the administration and Congress, the Army has 
begun to rectify this situation with significant increases in funding 
and innovative business practices. These efforts have been dramatically 
successful as we continue to correct a problem that was 10 years in the 
making. Thus, in an effort to prevent future degradation of our 
facilities, the Army has increased its funding for facilities 
sustainment to 93 percent of requirement beginning in fiscal year 2004.

            TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (TIM)

    Recognizing the requirement to enhance support to commanders, the 
Secretary of the Army directed the reorganization of the Army's 
management structure. On October 1, 2002, the Army placed the 
management of Army installations under the Installation Management 
Agency (IMA). IMA is a new field-operating agency of the Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM). Its mission is to 
provide equitable, efficient, and effective management of Army 
installations worldwide to support readiness; enable the well-being of 
soldiers, civilians, and family members; improve infrastructure; and 
preserve the environment. This new management approach eliminates the 
migration of base operations funds to other operational accounts below 
the HQDA level. It also enables the development of multi-functional 
installations to support evolving force structure and Army 
transformation needs. The Army is poised to capitalize on opportunities 
TIM gives us to provide excellence in installations.
    Two programs that significantly increase the well-being of our 
soldiers and their families are the Barracks and the Family Housing 
programs. The Army established the Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP) in 
the late 1990s to improve single soldiers' housing conditions. Through 
2002, we have upgraded or funded-for-upgrade 70 percent of our 
permanent party barracks to soldier suites that consist of two single 
bedrooms with a shared bath and common area. The Army will continue the 
BUP until all permanent party barracks achieve this standard.
    With the strong support of Congress, the Army established the 
Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) for our families. This program 
capitalizes on commercial expertise and private capital to perform a 
non-core function for the Army--family housing management. The program 
provides greater value to the Army by eliminating the housing deficit 
at our first 11 sites, while leveraging a $209 million Army investment 
into $4.1 billion of initial private development. The Army's 
privatization program began with 4 pilot projects and will expand to 18 
active projects by the end of fiscal year 2003. Pending OSD and 
congressional approval, 28 projects are planned through 2006 that will 
impact over 72,000 housing units or 80 percent of Army Family Housing 
in the United States. By the end of 2007, we will have the programs and 
projects in place to meet the OSD goal of eliminating inadequate family 
housing. We will accomplish this goal through RCI and increased Army 
investment in family housing Military Construction (MILCON) at non-
privatized installations. The RC enhances RCI through real property 
exchange authority that is only available to the RC. This legislative 
authority allows the exchange of RC owned property with public or 
private entities and has a tremendous potential to improve future 
Reserve component infrastructure at no governmental cost.
    The Army has also aggressively reduced its financial burden and 
physical footprint by disposing of 34 percent of its facilities from a 
1990 high of 116 billion square feet. The Army anticipates that the 
congressional fiscal year 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
authority will permit additional appropriate reductions. BRAC will 
enable the Army to dispose of excess infrastructure and realign the 
remaining facilities with the requirements of the transforming Army and 
the Objective Force. BRAC will also allow the Army to re-allocate 
resources from closed or realigned installations to other high priority 
requirements.
    The Army continues to improve its utilities infrastructure by 
divesting itself of non-core utility systems' operation and maintenance 
through privatization. As of December 2002, we had privatized 64 of the 
351 systems in the program, and we have an additional 104 presently 
under negotiation.
    As part of our Army Knowledge Management (AKM)--described later in 
more detail--we are modernizing our Installation Information 
Infrastructure--info-structure--to support a network centric, 
knowledge-based Army. The Installation Information Infrastructure 
Modernization Program (I3MP) executes a multi-year, $3.2 billion 
program for upgrades to optical fiber and copper cable, installation of 
advanced digital equipment, and upgrades to Defense Global Information 
Grid gateways. This program will ensure worldwide, high-speed data 
connectivity at Army installations. To date, we have completed 22 of 95 
CONUS installations and initiated upgrades at four installations 
outside of the CONUS. We plan to complete I3MP in 2009.

               TRANSFORMATION--CHANGING THE WAY WE FIGHT

    The Army is fundamentally changing the way we fight and creating a 
force more responsive to the strategic requirements of the Nation. We 
are building a joint precision maneuver capability that can enter a 
theater at the time and place of our choosing, maneuver at will to gain 
positional advantage, deliver precise joint fires and, if necessary, 
close with and destroy the enemy.
    The Objective Force is an army designed from the bottom up around a 
single, networked, integrated C\4\ISR architecture that will link us to 
joint, interagency, and multi-national forces. It will be a rapidly 
deployable, mounted formation, seamlessly integrated into the joint 
force and capable of delivering decisive victory across the spectrum of 
military operations. Consolidated, streamlined branches and military 
operational specialties comprised of professional warfighters will be 
poised to transition rapidly from disaster relief to high-end 
warfighting operations.
    The Objective Force and its Future Combat System of Systems will 
leverage and deliver with precision the combat power of joint and 
strategic assets. It is a capabilities-based force that rapidly 
responds to the requirements of the strategic environment in which our 
soldiers will be the most strategically relevant and decisively capable 
landpower--no matter the mission, no matter the threats, no matter the 
risks.
    In the final analysis, the Army's combat power does not wear tracks 
or wheels--it wears boots. No platform or weapon system can match a 
soldier's situational curiosity and awareness. It is the soldiers' 
ability to discern and to think, their ingenuity and resourcefulness, 
their endurance and perseverance, and their plain grit that make them 
the most reliable precision weapon in our inventory. Soldiers remain 
the centerpiece of our formations.
    To help guide our transformation efforts, the Army leverages 
lessons-learned from extensive experimentation and wargaming. We are 
working to harness the power of knowledge, the benefits of science and 
technology, and innovative business solutions to transform both the 
Operational and Institutional Army into the Objective Force. The Army's 
annual Title 10 Wargames provide critical insights for developing the 
Objective Force. Likewise, results from joint experiments--Millennium 
Challenge 2002 and other service Title 10 Wargames like Global 
Engagement, Navy Global, and Expeditionary Warrior, to name a few--also 
inform these efforts.
    The Army is fully committed to joint experimentation as a means to 
examine and assess Objective Force contributions to the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of joint warfare. The Army has 
established a joint/Army Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) 
Task Force to ensure that Army CD&E efforts are synchronized with joint 
CD&E. This task force makes certain that joint experiment lessons-
learned inform the design and development of the Objective Force. This 
year, the Army's Title 10 Wargame--co-hosted by Commander, Joint Forces 
Command--will focus on the Joint Force that will fight the next battle. 
Linked to Joint Forces Command's Pinnacle Impact 03 experiment, it will 
be conducted within the context of a future 1-4-2-1 global scenario and 
the emerging Joint Operations Concept. The Army is committed to these 
efforts, and in this budget we have nearly doubled last year's funding 
of these exercises.
    Joint, interagency, multinational, and Army warfighting experiments 
provide invaluable opportunities for the Army to experiment with 
innovative approaches to warfighting and to test new tactics, 
techniques, procedures, organizations, processes, and technology. In 
Millennium Challenge 2002, the largest joint experiment in U.S. 
history, the Army demonstrated four vital capabilities it brings to the 
joint fight:

         the ability to attain and maintain information 
        superiority (knowledge);
         the ability to conduct decisive maneuver to enable 
        dominant joint maneuver;
         the ability to defeat the opposition in an anti-access 
        environment through rapid entry and employment capabilities; 
        and
         the ability to support and sustain rapid combat power 
        efficiently by reducing the operational and tactical logistics 
        footprint.

    To evaluate the effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
(SBCT) concepts for battalion and company operations in a Joint Force, 
the Army employed a SBCT unit during Millennium Challenge. Less than 4 
weeks after Stryker vehicles were delivered to the first unit at Fort 
Lewis, the unit demonstrated rapid air and sealift deployability and--
integrated into the exercise well. Additionally, when given a mission 
on short notice to support a Marine Corps unit in ground operations, 
the SBCT unit demonstrated its agility and versatility.
Balancing Risk As We Manage Change
    Balancing risk is integral to Army transformation. To maintain 
current readiness while we transform, we are managing operational risk: 
risk in current readiness for near-term conflicts with future risk--the 
ability to develop new capabilities and operational concepts that will 
dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. The Army has 
accepted risk in selective modernization and recapitalization, and we 
continue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, the 
well-being of our people, transformation, the war on terrorism, and new 
operational commitments. Since 1999, the Army has terminated 29 
programs and restructured 20 others for a total savings of $12.8 
billion. These funds were reallocated to resource the Stryker Brigades 
and essential Objective Force research and development.
    In Program Budget 2004 and its associated Five-Year Defense Plan 
(FYDP), the Army has generated an additional $22 billion of savings by 
terminating 24 additional systems and reducing or restructuring 24 
other systems. To accelerate achieving the Objective Force capabilities 
and mitigating operational risk, the Army reinvested these savings in 
the development of transformational capabilities in these and other 
programs:

         Future Combat System--$13.5 billion
         Precision Munitions--$3.2 billion
         Sensors and Communications--$2.3 billion
         Science and Technology--$1.1 billion
         Missile and Air Defense--$1.1 billion

    The operational risk associated with the decreased funding for 
certain current programs is acceptable as long as we field Stryker 
Brigades on schedule and accelerate the fielding of the Objective Force 
for arrival this decade. We will continue to reassess the risk 
associated with system reductions and related organizational changes 
against operational requirements and the strategic environment.
An Information Enabled Army
    Achieving the full spectrum dominance of the Objective Force 
requires changing the way we fight. Changing the way we fight requires 
a holistic transformation of Logistics, Personnel, Installation 
Management, Acquisition, Aviation, business practices--every aspect of 
the Army must transform. The Objective Force requires innovative 
changes and out-of-the-box ingenuity in the way we take care of our 
people and manage the information and material that enhances their 
readiness and answers their needs--both personal and professional, at 
home and in the short sword warfight at foxhole level. Simply put, we 
cannot achieve the Objective Force capabilities without leveraging the 
full potential of the technological advances that our Nation's 
industrial base and science and technology communities are developing. 
The Army has consolidated management of Information Technologies (IT) 
into a single effort--Army Knowledge Management (AKM). AKM capitalizes 
on IT resources unique to our Nation and harnesses them for 
transformation, for the Army, and for the combatant commanders.
    Information management is critical to achieving the Army vision, 
and AKM supports transformation through the development and 
implementation of a network-centric, knowledge-based Army architecture 
interoperable with the joint system. AKM will accelerate the detect-
decide-deliver planning processes and enable warfighters to see the 
adversary first--before our forces are detected; understand the Common 
Relevant Operating Picture first; act against adversaries first; and 
finish the warfight with decisive victories--see first, understand 
first, act first, finish decisively. AKM will provide knowledge at the 
point of decision for all leaders--from the factory to the foxhole.
    Enabling collaborative mission planning and execution among widely 
dispersed locations around the globe, AKM will provide a rapid and 
seamless flow and exchange of actionable information and knowledge. The 
network-centric operations that AKM enables will decrease our logistic 
footprint and enhance sustainability of the Objective Force through 
multi-nodal distribution networks--reaching forward to the theater and 
back to installations. Advanced information technologies will 
dramatically enhance Battle Command. Command, Control, Communications, 
and Computer (C\4\) decision tools seamlessly linked to Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets produce a radically 
improved Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP) and enable battle 
command.
    AKM will dramatically enhance the warfighter's ability to 
distribute, process, fuse, and correlate unprecedented amounts of 
actionable data into information--securely, reliably, and quickly 
enough to enable leaders to synchronize and mass effects for decisive 
results. Network-centric operations enable information awareness, 
information access, and information delivery.
    The Army Knowledge Enterprise (AKE) construct describes the Army's 
process to enable improved strategic and tactical information 
distribution and collaboration. In short, AKE leverages the ingenuity 
and resourcefulness of our people in shaping the environment to achieve 
dominance and helps leaders achieve decision superiority and mission 
efficiencies.
    Integration and refinement of existing Army networks is the first 
step in achieving a network-centric, information-enabled force that 
creates efficiencies and provides secure, reliable, actionable 
information communications. To this end, the Army activated the Network 
Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM). NETCOM is the Army's single 
authority assigned to operate, manage, and defend the Army's 
information infrastructure. NETCOM has assumed technical control of all 
Army networks--active, Guard, and Reserve. This new policy allows 
NETCOM to evaluate any system, application, or piece of equipment that 
touches the Army Networks. NETCOM will improve the capacity, 
performance, and security of our networks at every level.
    Among others, one tangible product of NETCOM is the consolidation 
and removal of redundant servers across the Army. This example of 
better business practice will harvest significant savings in 
resources--both dollars and managers--while increasing the 
effectiveness of the network. Since the first quarter fiscal year 2002, 
we have reduced the number of servers Army-wide by 16 percent--311 in 
the National Capitol Region alone.
    Army Knowledge Online (AKO) begins to allow the Army to 
decentralize the management of information. AKO is the Army's secure, 
web-based, internet service that leverages the Army's intellectual 
capital to better organize, train, equip, and maintain our force. It 
gives our people a means to collaborate, to improve their situational 
awareness, and to access their personnel data. Already, hard-copy 
processes that formerly took days and weeks can now be accomplished 
almost instantly--from pay to personnel actions to assignments, to name 
a few. AKO is just an early glimpse of the potential capabilities of a 
network-centric, knowledge-based organization that harnesses the 
potential of the global infostructure.

                 OPERATIONAL ARMY--THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

    The Army is actively engaged in global operations supporting 
combatant commanders today, but it is our obligation to prepare for the 
future, as well. The Objective Force is the Army's future full-spectrum 
force that will be organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more 
strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, 
survivable, and sustainable than we are today--across the full spectrum 
of military operations as an integral member of a cohesive joint team.
    The Nation will continue to face adaptive, asymmetric threats that 
capitalize on the power of information. To dominate and maintain 
superiority over these emerging challenges, the Army is changing the 
way we fight--a paradigm shift more significant than the 20th century's 
introduction of the tank and the helicopter. The Army is changing from 
sequential and linear operations to distributed and simultaneous 
operations. The Objective Force--characterized by networks of people 
enabled with systems that provide actionable information and decision 
superiority--will dissuade, deter, or decisively defeat our adversaries 
anytime, anyplace, and anywhere.
    The Objective Force will consist of command structures scaled to 
meet Joint Force Commander requirements and modular combined-arms units 
tailored according to each situation. Objective Force integrated, 
mobile, air-ground teams will conduct mounted and dismounted operations 
and employ both manned and unmanned platforms to achieve decisive 
victories. Capable of forcible entry and operations in austere 
environments to address the spectrum of military operations--from 
humanitarian assistance to warfighting--the Objective Force will 
conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations and master 
transitions between phases of operations. It will be an offensively 
oriented, multi-dimensional force enabled by advanced information 
technologies that give soldiers real-time intelligence and actionable 
information.
    The Objective Force will arrive in theater combat capable--
deployment will be synonymous with employment. The Objective Force will 
be strategically responsive and rapidly deployable on the U.S. Air 
Force family of inter-theater and intra-theater aircraft. An Objective 
Force Unit of Action (UA) will deploy on approximately one-third the 
number of aircraft required to deploy a heavy brigade combat team 
today. It will be operationally deployable and capable of operational 
maneuver over strategic distances by air, land, or sea. Soldiers will 
overcome anti-access and area denial strategies and environments 
through precision maneuver and decision superiority.
    Equipped with new systems designed to meet the needs of the Army's 
future fighting formations, the Objective Force will be a networked 
system of systems. This system of systems includes soldiers equipped 
with the Land Warrior system; a family of 18 integrated, synchronized, 
manned, and unmanned Future Combat Systems (FCS); and critical 
complementary systems such as the Comanche and the Future Tactical 
Truck System. The components of the FCS are being synchronously 
developed and fielded as a complete family to achieve the warfighting 
capabilities the Nation requires to defeat adaptive, asymmetric 
conventional and unconventional adversaries.
    Soldiers are the centerpiece of the Army's formation--not 
equipment. Soldiers of the Objective Force will leverage dominant 
knowledge to gain decision superiority over any adversary. They will 
seamlessly integrate Objective Force capabilities with the capabilities 
of Joint Forces, Special Operations Forces, other Federal agencies, and 
multinational forces. The Objective Force soldiers will enable the 
United States to achieve its national security goals in a crisis, 
rather than simply inflict punitive strikes on an adversary. Employing 
FCS capabilities in formations called Units of Action (UA) and Units of 
Employment (UE), Objective Force soldiers will provide campaign quality 
staying power--that means precision fire and maneuver to control 
terrain, people, and resources, without having to resort to 
indiscriminate collateral damage. The Land Warrior system will 
integrate individual soldiers in the network while providing them 
increased protection and lethality. FCS will give soldiers the 
capability to destroy any adversary in any weather and environment with 
smaller calibers, greater precision, more devastating target effects, 
and at longer-ranges than available today.
    Joint C\4\ISR--a network-centric information architecture nested 
within the Global Information Grid--will connect the Objective Force's 
system of systems. Capitalizing on the synergistic power of the 
information network enterprise, every Objective Force soldier and 
platform will be capable of sensing and engaging the enemy while 
maintaining situational awareness of friendly forces. Advanced 
information technologies and C\4\ISR decision tools and assets will 
enhance the Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP). The Objective 
Force will identify, locate, and engage critical targets with lethal or 
non-lethal affects and assess battle damage on those targets. The joint 
C\4\ISR linkages will enable the attack of targets with whatever joint 
or Army assets are available for immediate employment, whether the 
force is in contact or out of contact. Similarly, enhanced situational 
awareness will facilitate multi-layered active and passive defense 
measures--including both offensive and defensive counter air against 
air and non-air breathing, manned, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
    The CROP and network-centric operations will enhance sustainability 
of the Objective Force through multi-nodal distribution networks that 
reach forward to the area of operations or reach back to the Home 
Station Operations Center. Increased reliability through equipment 
design and commonality among the FCS family of systems will enhance 
sustainability while reducing logistics demands. Advanced technologies 
will enable robust Objective Force operations while shrinking the 
logistics footprint and lift requirements of deployed forces.
    The FCS is a transformational approach to meeting this Nation's 
requirements for the Objective Force. We designed and will field the 
FCS family in a carefully balanced manner to avoid optimizing a 
component at the expense of sub-optimizing the overarching capabilities 
of Objective and Joint Forces. The acquisition and requirements 
development processes are being updated to accommodate the Department 
of Defense's (DOD) direction to field a networked system of systems 
rapidly through spiral development and an open architecture that allows 
maturing technological insertions as they occur.
    The Army embraces the ongoing DOD and Joint Staff Capabilities and 
Acquisition processes reform efforts to achieve revolutionary 
capabilities in the fielding of a new generation of equipment. This 
collaborative DOD and JCS effort enables the Army to design new 
information-age capable organizations holistically, use evolutionary 
acquisition strategies to equip those organizations, and see the 
Objective Force fielded before the end of this decade.

       SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY--MOVING TOWARD THE TRANSFORMED ARMY

    Preempting our adversaries' technological surprises over the past 3 
years, Army science and technology (S&T) investments are already 
providing America's Army with sustained overmatch in all materiel 
systems. The Army has increased and focused its S&T investments. We are 
demonstrating the enabling joint interoperable technologies essential 
for Objective Force capabilities and accelerating their arrival. Our 
S&T program is pursuing a wide spectrum of technologies for unmanned 
air and ground systems that will expand the range of joint warfighting 
capabilities, reduce risk to soldiers, and reduce the logistics 
footprint of the force. Realizing the full potential of unmanned 
systems requires technological development in sensors that improve 
navigation and mission performance, in intelligent systems for semi-
autonomous or autonomous operation, in networked communications for 
manned-unmanned teaming, and in human-robotic interfaces, among many 
others.
    The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army 
partnership contracted for a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to 
accelerate the transition of FCS to the System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD) Phase, with a Milestone B decision in May 2003. The 
Army is on track to achieve first unit equipped in 2008 and an initial 
operating capability of one Objective Force Unit of Action (UA) in 
2010. To accelerate development and in partnership DARPA, the focus on 
key transformation technologies for the FCS has been narrowed to the 
systems with the most promise. Our highest priority S&T efforts remain 
technological advances for FCS.
    The Army will field FCS as a family of systems built on information 
age technologies embedded in manned and unmanned air and ground 
platforms. Integral to joint fires, the family of systems will 
integrate long-range air- and ground-based sensors with long-range 
cannon and missile precision munitions. The family of systems will also 
provide increased joint capabilities to conduct battle command, 
reconnaissance, mounted combat operations, dismounted combat 
operations, medical treatment and evacuation, and maintenance and 
recovery. To provide decisive lethality, FCS will employ networked, 
precision, and loitering attack munitions fired from modular, easily 
transportable containers. Finally, FCS will leverage embedded, real-
time interactive, virtual, distributed, collaborative, joint 
simulations for training and mission rehearsal.

                  ENABLING THE OBJECTIVE FORCE SOLDIER

    Eighteen systems, both manned and unmanned, the Objective Force 
soldier, and C\4\ISR, together, comprise the FCS. Manned and unmanned 
reconnaissance capabilities are part of the FCS family of systems' 
interdependent networked air- and ground-based maneuver, maneuver 
support, and sustainment systems.
    There are 10 Unmanned Systems: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4; Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)--the 
Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE), the Armed Robotic 
Vehicle (ARV), and the Small (manpackable) Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
(MUGV); Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS); and Unattended Munitions--the 
Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Launch System (LS) and Intelligent Munitions 
Systems (IMS).
    There are eight manned systems: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV); 
Command and Control Vehicle (C2V); Reconnaissance and Surveillance 
Vehicle (RSV); Line-of-Sight, Beyond-Line-of-Sight Mounted Combat 
System (LOS/BLOS MCS); NLOS-Mortar; Medical Vehicle (MV); the FCS 
Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV); and the Non-Line-of-Sight 
(NLOS) Cannon.
    Decisive warfighting is about fires and maneuver: fires enable 
maneuver, and maneuver enables fires. Joint and organic close, 
supporting, indirect fires destroy the enemy, suppress the enemy's 
capabilities, protect our forces, and enable ground units to maneuver. 
The ICV, the Unattended Munitions NLOS-LS, IMS, C2V, MCS, NLOS-Mortar, 
and NLOS Cannon are important elements of the FCS that will enable the 
Objective Force to conduct distributed and simultaneous joint combat 
operations. With joint fires, the NLOS cannon is critical to support 
and protect our land forces in hostile environments. NLOS-LS NetFires 
is a platform-independent family of missiles with precision attack and 
loitering capability. Both Precision Guided Mortar Munitions and 
Excalibur precision cannon munitions will enhance organic maneuver 
fires. A new, joint fire support, battle command, and fire support 
architecture will allow rapid engagement of targets by any Army or 
joint asset.
    For over 227 years, soldiers have remained the centerpiece of our 
formations. The Land Warrior program--another key S&T initiative--
responds to this legacy and enhances our soldiers combat power 
generation capability. The Land Warrior program will develop a 
lightweight, low observable, enhanced-armor protection, fighting 
ensemble for the individual Objective Force soldier. Through networked 
connectivity to the FCS-equipped, maneuver Unit of Action, Land Warrior 
soldiers will enable revolutionary lethality, mobility, survivability, 
and sustainability for the individual warfighter while reducing 
logistics demands.
    Future Combat Systems are networked in the joint C\4\ISR 
architecture--including networked communications, networked options, 
sensors, battle command systems, training, and both manned and unmanned 
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. These networked systems 
will dramatically enhance situational awareness and understanding and 
operational level synchronization well beyond today's standards. 
Improved C\4\ISR capabilities will enable network-centric Objective 
Force operations. The results of the investments will allow leaders to 
capitalize on sensor and processing technology to see, understand, and 
shape the battlespace before the enemy can react--increasing combat 
force effectiveness and survivability. The S&T program will develop and 
demonstrate real-time, continuous situational understanding by 
integrating data from manned and unmanned air- and ground-based 
sensors.
    S&T investments in military logistics are an important enabler for 
the Objective Force. We are placing our emphasis on sustainment's big 
drivers--fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and water--to dramatically 
reduce our logistics footprint and lift requirements in these areas. 
Key technologies include on-board water generation, real-time logistics 
command and control processes and distribution management, enhanced 
multi-purpose munitions and packaging, efficient propulsion and power 
technologies, real-time diagnostics and prognostics, and Micro-Electro 
Mechanical Systems (MEMS).

                        TRANSFORMATIONAL SYSTEMS

    Several transformational systems were under development prior to 
announcement of the Army vision in October 1999. The Army has completed 
an extensive analysis to identify those systems that complement FCS and 
the Objective Force system of systems.
    The Comanche Helicopter is the centerpiece of the Aviation 
Modernization Plan (AMP) and represents the first new system to reach 
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) within the Army's Objective Force. 
Comanche is our armed reconnaissance platform with attack capabilities. 
It will leverage the situational awareness and situational curiosity of 
a scout augmented with revolutionary, state-of-the-art ISR 
technologies. Comanche supports vertical and horizontal maneuver as an 
integral part of network-centric operations and extends human eyes and 
decisionmaking beyond the ground maneuver force. Utilizing stealth 
technologies, it will network with all joint C\4\ISR and joint weapons 
systems. Comanche will leverage maximum effect of future standoff 
precision weapon systems such as the Common Missile and allow us to 
maneuver ground formations based upon full knowledge of the situation. 
Augmented with armed or unarmed UAVs, Comanche will fill ground 
maneuver's most critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial 
reconnaissance--with a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft. 
The Comanche program is already well on its way to giving the Army a 
capability pivotal to transforming the way we will fight.
    Several other transformational systems will empower the Objective 
Force with the knowledge dominance and battle command to provide 
decision superiority across the spectrum of operations. The Warfighter 
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) System, Medium Extended Air 
Defense System (MEADS), the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and the 
Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S) will enable Objective 
Force joint C\4\ISR capabilities. These programs will provide the 
tactical enterprise level networks that will ensure seamless, secure, 
digital connectivity between the Objective, Interim, and today's 
forces. The Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A) 
architecture provides Army network-centric ISR connectivity from 
national agencies to joint systems to Objective Force Units of Action 
as part of the integrated Department of Defense DCGS architecture. 
DCGS-A will enable interoperable tasking, processing, and exploitation 
capabilities. The Aerial Common Sensor brings improved signal 
intelligence collection and precision geolocation capabilities, as well 
as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signals (MASINT) 
sensor packages. Another system, Prophet, uses communications 
intelligence to depict the battlespace and further enhance situational 
awareness. These C\4\ISR systems greatly enhance the Objective Force's 
ability to gain actionable information superiority and decision 
dominance over all adversaries and expand the range of options for the 
Joint Force combatant commanders.
    Transformational systems will provide the Objective Force with 
strategic and tactical maneuver capabilities. The Theater Support 
Vessel will support rapid intra-theater lift requirements, provide the 
capability to conduct operational maneuver and repositioning, and 
enable units to conduct enroute mission planning and rehearsal. The 
Future Tactical Truck System will have commonality with FCS and will 
support the Objective Force by enabling command, control, and 
transportation of cargo, equipment, and personnel. The Tactical 
Electric Power (TEP) generators will provide power to Objective Force 
units where fixed power grids are not available.
    Transformational systems provide the Objective Force with other 
important capabilities, as well. CBRNE effects systems support the 
Objective Force across the spectrum of military operations and improve 
capabilities to conduct homeland security activities. Engineer, civil 
affairs, and psychological operations vehicles will enable mobility and 
enhance civil affairs and PSYOPs capabilities. The Up-Armored High 
Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) will improve Objective 
Force soldier survivability and lethality. The Multi-Mission Radar will 
provide the capability to detect and track aircraft, artillery, and 
other projectiles, then queue appropriate weapons systems and airspace 
synchronization systems. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HIMARS) is a lighter weight, more deployable multiple rocket launcher 
capability that will integrate into the joint fires network.
Bridging the Capabilities Gap--Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
    Announcing our intent to field an Interim Force in October 1999, 
the Army responded to a capabilities gap between its lethal, 
survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its rapidly deployable 
light forces that lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility 
that we seek. Just 2\1/2\ years later in 2002, the Army began fielding 
the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to bridge that gap. In 2003--less 
than 4 years after the announcement--we are on track to achieve IOC 
with the first SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. Stryker Brigades will 
provide the combatant commander vastly increased operational and 
tactical flexibility to execute fast-paced, distributed, non-contiguous 
operations.
    Stryker Brigade Combat Teams respond to combatant commander 
requirements across the spectrum of military operations. Optimized for 
combat in complex and urban terrain, the Stryker Brigades will be 
decisive in other major combat operations, as well. The SBCT 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron 
provides both organic human intelligence capabilities and UAVs embedded 
at the brigade level. Its military intelligence and signal companies--
working through a digitally enabled battle command bridge--leverage 
theater and national assets to create an information-enabled force. 
SBCTs will use this enhanced joint C\4\ISR capability to revolutionize 
combat paradigms from ``make contact, develop the situation, maneuver 
the forces'' to ``understand the situation, maneuver the forces, make 
contact at the time and place of your own choosing, and finish 
decisively.''
    Moreover, leveraging platform commonality, enhancing logistics 
practices and enablers, and reorganizing logistics formations, the SBCT 
is vastly more deployable and sustainable than our heavy forces, while 
significantly increasing combat power generating capabilities. 
Augmented for sustained operations, the SBCT requires 37 percent fewer 
CSS personnel than a digitized heavy brigade. While capitalizing on 
these advantages, developing and available technologies allow us to 
mass effects--rather than massing formations--and create a robust, 
reliable capability to conduct operational maneuver over strategic 
distances.
    Finally, SBCTs provide an invaluable means of spearheading 
transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned 
officers--tomorrow's commanders and command sergeants major--in the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures that will inform employment of the 
Objective Force.
    The Army has resourced six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams to 
contribute to fulfilling the 1-4-2-1 defense construct and national 
security requirements; however, at this time, the Secretary of Defense 
has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades. The 
Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with a plan for Stryker 
Brigades 5 and 6.
    Fielding of the SBCTs affects the entire Army: active and Reserve 
components; heavy and light forces; CONUS and OCONUS. Current fielding 
timelines will enhance the Nation's ability to fight and win the GWOT 
and conduct major combat operations. The transformation of four active 
component brigades to SBCTs provides a rotational base with three of 
the SBCTs focused on the Pacific theater. One of the two SBCTs fielded 
at Fort Lewis will be forward-based in Europe not later than 2007. The 
Stryker Cavalry Regiment will support the XVIII Airborne Corps' 
critical need for robust, armed reconnaissance. The conversion of a 
Reserve component brigade to an SBCT will enhance our strategic Reserve 
and support the GWOT, smaller scale contingencies, and homeland defense 
missions. Additionally, SBCT stationing provides rapid, strategic 
responsiveness through power projection platforms capable of supporting 
four critical regions described in the 1-4-2-1 defense construct. The 
first SBCT will attain Initial Operational Capability in the summer of 
2003.
Preserving the Army's Legacy
    Today's force guarantees the Army's near-term warfighting readiness 
to fight and win our Nation's wars, decisively. Because the Army 
bypassed a procurement generation, the Army's Combat Support and Combat 
Service Support systems now exceed their 20-year expected life cycle, 
and 75 percent of our critical combat systems exceed their expected 
half-life cycle. To maintain operational readiness while preserving 
resources for transformation, the Army is recapitalizing and 
selectively modernizing a portion of the current force. The 
modernization program addresses the critical issue of AC and RC 
interoperability and serves as a bridge to mesh these two components 
seamlessly. In general, the Army increased funding for programs that 
are clearly transformational and support the Defense transformation 
goals, sustained funding for high priority systems that will transition 
to the Objective Force, and reduced funding for systems not essential 
to Army transformation. The Army remains committed to its 17-system 
recapitalization program, but we have reduced the prioritized 
recapitalization program from three-and-one-third divisions to two 
divisions.
    Army Special Operations Forces are an indispensable part of the 
Army and will continue to provide unique capabilities to the Joint 
Force and Land Component Commanders. In response to the increasing 
requirement for Special Operations Forces in support of joint campaign 
plans, the Army has validated and resourced growth in its SOF 
structure. The recent initiatives will transfer 1,788 manpower spaces 
to Major Force Program-11 beginning in fiscal year 2003. Since the 
commencement of Army Special Operations Forces operations in support of 
the GWOT, the U.S. Army has provided over $1.4 billion in new equipment 
to enhance Special Operations Forces firepower, communications, and 
ground and air mobility.
    The Army will remain the largest user of space-based capabilities 
among the Services. Army space assets are providing tangible support to 
the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom--they ensure Army 
and Joint Force Commanders optimize communications, satellite 
intelligence, global positioning system, imagery, weather, missile 
warning, and other space-based capabilities in every aspect of planning 
and operations. We are working diligently with the joint and 
interagency space community to ensure that Army and joint space systems 
continue to provide their essential capabilities now and for the 
Objective Force.

               AVIATION TRANSFORMATION AND RESTRUCTURING

    Aviation transformation further demonstrates the Army's hard 
choices in balancing risk to resource transformation. Our interim 
plan--now in progress--lowers operating and sustainment costs while 
posturing aviation for arrival of the Objective Force by 2010. Apache 
modernization is an integral part of the Army Aviation Transformation 
Plan. The AH-64D Longbow heavy attack team will enhance domination of 
the maneuver battlespace and provide the ground commander with a 
versatile, long-range weapon system against a range of fixed and moving 
targets. The UH-60 Blackhawk continues to be the assault workhorse of 
Army Aviation, executing over 40 percent of the Army's annual flying 
hours. We are extending the life of the UH-60 while providing it with 
capabilities required of the future battlespace. Similarly, the Army is 
fully committed to the CH-47F Chinook program. Its heavy-lift 
capability is invaluable to transforming the Army. As we restructure 
and standardize attack and lift formations across the force, we will 
also adjust the stationing and alignment of Reserve component aviation 
units to mitigate the near-term risk.
    Army National Guard Aviation comprises almost 50 percent of the 
Army's aviation force and is one of the Nation's most valuable assets 
both for wartime and for peacetime missions. Essential for successful 
execution of the Nation's military strategy, the ARNG currently has 
aviation units deployed in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bosnia, Europe, and 
Saudi Arabia, as well as Central and South America.

         ARMY NATIONAL GUARD RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVE (ARNGRI)

    ARNGRI seeks to transform a sizeable portion of ARNG combat 
structure into more deployable, flexible fighting forces to support 
Army requirements at home and abroad. ARNGRI will introduce two new 
organizations into the force structure: Mobile Light Brigades and 
Multi-Functional Divisions. These organizations will provide full 
spectrum capabilities in support of combatant commanders. The Mobile 
Light Brigades will operate as a subordinate unit to the multi-
functional divisions, which will also contain two combat support/combat 
service support brigades and be capable of supporting either major 
combat or homeland security operations.

                ARMY RESERVE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVES

    By providing responsive force generating capability and technically 
trained individuals, the USAR facilitates our capability to conduct 
extended campaigns in multiple theaters and to sustain joint 
operations. Army Reserve initiatives ensure the USAR is missioned, 
organized, and equipped to provide interoperability across the full 
spectrum of military operations. Transformational organizations include 
experimentation forces and information operations, joint augmentation, 
network security, and interagency units.
    The Readiness Command Restructuring initiative and Federal Reserve 
Restructuring Initiative will help the USAR fulfill these new mission 
requirements. These initiatives lend greater flexibility to efforts 
that enhance responsiveness to America's foreign and domestic 
protection needs. Regional Readiness Commands will focus on individual 
and unit readiness, leader development, training, and growth which will 
demand a new personnel system that achieves holistic life-cycle 
management for Army Reserve soldiers.

        INSTITUTIONAL ARMY--TRANSFORMING THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS

    We have made great strides in revolutionizing our business 
management practices by starting at the very top. Last year, we 
realigned our headquarters by reorganizing and realigning 
responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Army Staff--streamlining 
coordination, tasking, and decisionmaking--resulting in a more 
responsive and efficient organization. This initiative allowed us to 
eliminate unnecessary functions and redistribute 585 manpower spaces to 
accomplish core competencies.
    As previously discussed, the Army has addressed the management of 
its installations, personnel systems, and contracting in its 
Transformation of Installation Management (TIM). We are aggressively 
pursuing efforts to outsource non-core functions. The Army will reap 
substantial dividends in efficiency and effectiveness through these 
strategic realignments of human and physical capital.

                        PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION

    The Secretary of the Army's key management initiative is personnel 
transformation. Its goal is to modernize and integrate human resource 
programs, policies, processes, and systems into a multi-component force 
that includes civilians and contractors. We will evaluate our processes 
and implement the most efficient program, policies, and organizations 
to support the Objective Force.
    The centerpiece of personnel transformation is a comprehensive 
effort focused on a potential Army-wide implementation of unit manning 
and unit rotation. We are aggressively examining the feasibility of a 
unit manning and rotation system that would better support the new 
national defense strategy, improve cohesion and combat readiness within 
the operational Army, provide highly cohesive well-trained units to 
combatant commanders, and improve well-being for families by providing 
greater stability and predictability in assignments. The Army currently 
uses unit rotations in support of operational missions in the Balkans, 
Sinai, and Afghanistan. The Army is studying the use of unit rotations 
for other locations and in the war on terrorism. Units would know of 
these rotations well in advance, providing families with greater 
predictability and enabling focused preparation, both of which 
contribute to increased combat readiness of the unit.
    Unit manning seeks to synchronize the life cycle of a unit with the 
life cycle of the soldier within that unit. All soldiers and leaders 
would be stabilized, resulting in a significant increase in cohesion 
and combat readiness over our present individual replacement system. 
Such a system has significant second and third order effects across the 
force--training and leader development, recruiting and retention, unit 
readiness levels, and total Army end strength, among others. All of 
these are being studied intensively, and we anticipate senior Army 
leadership decisions on unit manning and unit rotation in July 2003.

                               THIRD WAVE

    Because we operate in an environment in which there are increasing 
demands for military capabilities--the Secretary of the Army's Third 
Wave initiative seeks to ensure that we are achieving the best value 
possible for our taxpayers' dollars.
    There are three phases to the Third Wave process. First, we 
determined what activities were core or non-core to the Army's mission. 
In the second phase, we are validating the breakout between core and 
non-core functions by determining if any non-core functions should be 
exempted. This phase has an anticipated completion date of mid- to 
late-February 2003. Upon completion, the Army leadership will notify 
Congress of the results of this phase. In the third phase, key Army 
leaders will assess appropriate plans to execute non-core functions, 
select the best means to proceed, and develop implementation plans. At 
this time, we do not know how many of the 214,000 jobs identified as 
potentially non-core functions in Phase I will be included in 
implementation plans. Although implementation plans will target 
execution in fiscal years 2005-2009, some implementation plans may be 
delayed beyond that period.
    The implementation of competitive sourcing of non-core functions 
will adhere to OMB Circular A-76 and related statutory provisions. 
Exceptions to the requirement for public-private competition are 
limited, such as where 10 or fewer civilian employees perform the 
function or where legal restrictions against using the A-76 process 
apply to the function. To lower costs for taxpayers and improve program 
performance to citizens, OMB has undertaken major revisions to the 
processes and practices in OMB Circular A-76 to improve the public-
private competition process.

                       ACQUISITION TRANSFORMATION

    The Army is leading the way in acquisition reform within DOD's 
broad transformation of defense acquisition policies and procedures. 
The Army's FCS program may prove to be the largest DOD acquisition 
effort that fully embraces the concepts of evolutionary acquisition and 
spiral development--leveraging the potential of rapid advancement 
within individual technologies by allowing for changes within programs 
as technologies mature.
    The FCS program is evolutionary in its design and incorporates 
periodic blocked improvements within its 19 systems--the Objective 
Force soldier and 18 manned and unmanned systems. Within these 19 
systems are 540 spirally developing technologies. The Army's use of a 
Lead System Integrator (LSI) enables a ``best of the best'' approach to 
selection from competing industry efforts. Our unprecedented 
partnership with DARPA ensures the FCS effort leverages that agency's 
DOD-wide perspective and resources to produce the best capability and 
value for the Joint Force.
    The Army continues to revise its acquisition policies and 
applicable regulatory guidance. On October 3, 2001, the Army approved 
an acquisition reorganization that transferred control of all 
acquisition program management to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) 
and eliminated duplication of effort in two major Army commands. 
Effective October 2002, 12 Program Executive Officers (PEO) report to 
the AAE, and their subordinate PEOs assumed management of all Army 
acquisition programs, regardless of acquisition category. The plan 
ensures that there is only one chain of authority for acquisition 
programs within the Army. In addition, the plan clearly holds program 
managers responsible and accountable for the life cycle management of 
their assigned programs.
    We have also transformed the way we conduct business through the 
organization of the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) that realigns our 
previously decentralized installation and information technology 
contracting processes into one organization. Responsible for all 
contracts over $500,000 and tasked to eliminate redundant contracts, 
ACA leverages Army-wide requirements to achieve economies of scale. ACA 
supports Army transformation efforts by aligning all base support 
contracting into a single organization that best supports installation 
management transformation. All of these initiatives use information 
technology to leverage enterprise-wide buying capabilities. 
Additionally, ACA will act as the single coordinating element and form 
the base from which to deploy contingency-contracting, operational 
support to the warfighting commands. The ACA and other contracting 
activities will continue to support small business awards in the 
outstanding manner it did in fiscal year 2002.

                        LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

    We cannot transform the Army without a transformation in logistics. 
We must incorporate the logistician's view into the design of our 
systems even before we begin to build platforms. Collaboration between 
the acquisition and logistics communities will give the Objective Force 
the rapid deployability and sustainability we demand--by design--
without compromising warfighting capability.
    Designing the right logistics architecture--systems, business 
processes, enterprise, for example--is fundamental to success. The 
Army's logistics transformation will focus on creating an overarching 
corporate logistics enterprise that employs industries' best business 
practices. Within this enterprise, the Army established three principal 
goals for logistics transformation: enhance strategic mobility and 
deployability; optimize the logistics footprint; and reduce the cost of 
logistics support without reducing readiness or warfighting capability.
    The Army's mobility and deployability goals for the Objective Force 
are to deploy a combat brigade within 96 hours after lift off, a 
division on the ground in 120 hours, and a five-division corps in 
theater in 30 days. To achieve this strategic responsiveness, the Army 
Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) serves as a catalyst to bring about 
force projection changes both in the Army's and in our sister Services' 
lift programs.
    Platforms like the Intra-Theater Support Vessel (TSV) and Inter-
Theater Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS) provide 
transformational capabilities for operational and strategic maneuver 
and sustainment of Army formations.
    Because strategic air and sealift cannot meet deployment 
requirements, Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) ashore and afloat 
continue to be a critical component of Army power projection. The Army 
is currently participating in a joint-led Worldwide Prepositioning 
Study to determine if location, mix, and capabilities in existing 
stocks of combat, combat support, and combat service support require 
adjustments to meet the defense strategy more effectively.
    The Objective Force requires the Army to optimize its logistics 
footprint to produce a smaller, more agile, responsive, and flexible 
sustainment organization. To achieve this goal, we will leverage 
technology and innovative sustainment concepts. The Army is already 
developing and integrating key enablers to provide a transformed, 
corporate logistics enterprise. Some of these enablers include embedded 
diagnostics and prognostics, tactical logistics data digitization 
(TLDD), serial number tracking, and the Global Combat Service Support-
Army (GCSS-A) system that utilizes a commercial Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) solution. The ERP approach changes the Army's logistics 
automation systems strategy from one of custom code development for 
unique Army requirements to adoption of a commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) product.
    The selective use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) to augment military logistics force structure provides 
commanders with the flexibility to reallocate manpower, resources, and 
materiel by adding contractors to the equation of logistics support. In 
addition to providing services and some supply support, these 
contractors can quickly deploy to establish base camps, receive and 
process soldiers as they begin arriving in theater, and reverse the 
process when soldiers go home.
    Current initiatives that help reduce costs without reducing 
readiness or warfighting capability include the National Maintenance 
Program and the Single Stock Fund (SSF). As previously discussed, 
programs provide two basic building blocks for a revolutionary change 
in logistics business practices.

                      ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

    Congress designated the Army as the lead agent for DOD vaccine, 
drug, and development programs for medical countermeasures to 
battlefield threats. This includes vaccines against naturally occurring 
infectious diseases of military significance, combat casualty care, 
military operational medicine, and telemedicine research. The program 
also funds Food and Drug Administration requirements for technology 
transition to advanced development.
    The medical force provides the requisite medical intervention and 
care for the Joint Force deployed around the globe. With its Medical 
Reengineering Initiative (MRI), the Army Medical Department has 
transformed 28 percent of its Corps, and echelon above Corps, force 
structure to an organizational structure that promotes scalability 
through easily tailored, capabilities-based packages. These packages 
result in improved tactical mobility, reduced footprint, and increased 
modularity for flexible task organization. MRI supports both the 
current forces and the Stryker Brigades, and is the bridge to the 
Objective Medical Force. We have implemented innovative strategies to 
make the most efficient use of our budget. Medical modernization, which 
includes the acquisition of current medical equipment and technology, 
is partially funded within MRI units.

                      BUSINESS INITIATIVES COUNCIL

    In June 2001, the Secretary of Defense established the Department 
of Defense Business Initiatives Council (DOD BIC). The DOD BIC's goal 
is to improve business operations and processes by identifying and 
implementing initiatives that expand capabilities, improve efficiency 
and effectiveness, and create resource savings in time, money, or 
manpower.
    The Army has aggressively explored ways to improve its internal 
business practices, and has established the Army BIC, under the 
leadership of the Secretary and the G-8. Effective November 13, 2002, 
the Secretary of the Army has approved a total of 35 initiatives under 
the Army BIC. Subsequently, the Army submitted a number of the 
initiatives through the formal DOD BIC process for implementation 
across the Services and other DOD activities. The BIC process has 
helped to create a culture of innovation and inter-service cooperation. 
The superb level of cooperation across the military departments, the 
Joint Staff, and OSD has made this possible.

                       A COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE

    With the continued strong support of the administration, Congress, 
our soldiers, and our Department of the Army civilians, and the 
greatest industrial base and science and technology communities in the 
world, the Army will field the Objective Force--this decade.
    By 2010, we will have fielded the first operationally capable 
Objective Force unit equipped with the Future Combat Systems. Our 
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will be providing to combatant commanders 
capabilities not currently available--enhanced strategic responsiveness 
and the ability to operate in a distributed, non-linear battlespace. 
Through selective recapitalization and modernization of systems that 
enable our soldiers to preserve our legacy today, we will have 
sustained a decisive-win capability at a high state of readiness as an 
integral part of the Joint Force. We will have significantly improved 
the well-being of our people and sustainment of Army infrastructure.
    We remain committed to our legacy--preserving America's freedoms. 
In peace and in war, the Army's soldiers serve the Nation with 
unmatched courage, indomitable will, pride, and plain grit--as they 
have for over 227 years. Soldiers will continue to fight and win the 
Nation's wars, decisively--it is our sacred duty and our non-negotiable 
contract with the American people.

      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
    Admiral.

    STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Admiral Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and 
members of the committee: Good morning and thank you for the 
opportunity to be with you here this morning to talk about our 
Navy and the challenges that we are facing today in the world.
    Mr. Chairman, I submitted a statement and if we could make 
that full statement a part of the record.
    Chairman Warner. The full statements of all witnesses will 
be included in the record.
    Admiral Clark. We are facing a period of great challenge 
and a period of great accomplishment. I am proud of what our 
people are doing on the point. I could not in fact be prouder 
of what our sailors are doing today in the world, involved in 
the global war on terrorism. It is hard work. We have great 
young men and women who are working the challenge and the task. 
They are innovators. They have great ideas. They are making our 
Navy better every day, and that is their task.
    I also want to make sure that I express my appreciation to 
this committee and to Congress at large for the help that you 
have played in your support in making our Navy stronger. I am 
grateful for the support of this body in the progress that we 
have made in improving our Navy. I will tell you that we are 
enjoying the best retention that we have ever experienced in my 
entire career, and frankly, in our Navy's history. The pay, the 
allowances, housing, the readiness that Congress has provided 
for our force is making a real difference.
    I want to also thank my partners here at the table, my 
Service Chief partners. These guys are committed to jointness 
and I will tell you, it is a pleasure to serve with them. In my 
estimation, our military is more joint than it has ever been 
before and I say without hesitation that all of the Services 
are needed equally to accomplish the task and the mission that 
is before us, and this group of people is working effectively 
together to get the job done.
    Last year when I appeared before this committee, I talked 
about current readiness and manpower as my highest priorities. 
I believe those decisions were right. I believe it postured us 
for the global war on terrorism. Our recommendations and the 
President's submission of the budget and the congressional 
affirmation has made a great difference in the readiness of 
your Navy.
    We have reduced near-term operational risks, we have 
deepened the growth and the development of our sailors, and we 
are seeing the results in our deployments and in our people 
today. Those investments have made today possible. This 
morning, 51 percent of my ships are deployed overseas. Of my 
306 ships, 195 of them are under way this morning, 6 of the 12 
carrier battle groups and two-thirds of the amphibious force 
carrying the marines.
    They are under way in support of the Nation's interests, 
leading the defense of the United States of America away from 
our shores, sending, I like to say, the sovereignty of the 
United States of America anywhere we have to take it--capable, 
persistent, joint, ready forces. They are demonstrating on an 
hourly basis the return on investment that this body has made 
in our Navy.
    I am proud of the budget submission this year. It is not 
without debate, to be sure, and I look forward to the 
discussion today. This year we seek to sustain the advances 
made in current readiness and in manpower and to focus on 
future readiness and transformation.
    Seapower 21, which is our vision for the future and 
detailed in my full statement, is about a dispersed, network-
centric, joint, sea-based force, a force capable of projecting 
offensive power, a force capable of projecting defensive 
power--I call that Sea Strike and Sea Shield. I talk about that 
in terms of being a sea-based force, exploiting our operational 
advantage, the largest maneuver space on the planet, the 
world's oceans.
    In our investment strategy this year, we have assessed the 
risks between current readiness and future readiness, and I 
believe that it is appropriately balanced. We invest today to 
support the global war on terrorism and win today's fight, and 
we must invest in the capabilities to win tomorrow's fight as 
well. That involves tough decisions, to be sure, and I am 
looking forward to talking about them today.
    The threat assessment is straightforward. I think we all 
understand it. But in my judgment this has allowed us to take 
some steps to better prepare for the future. You all know that 
my focus in the previous 2 years has been on making sure that 
we won the battle for people, making sure that our current 
force was really ready to go. I think we have made great 
progress in those areas, and I do believe it is time to shine 
the spotlight on the future.
    The proposals before Congress allow us to divest of older, 
less capable equipment and to move toward that future. 
Certainly numbers are important and I have talked about them in 
my previous 2 years coming before this body to testify. Numbers 
have a quality all of their own. We have to buy capability and 
lethality into the systems that we field and put to sea.
    So, as I understand it, we are going to have a closed 
session today. I look forward to discussing the future threat 
and our readiness to deal with the future threat.
    Last year, our challenge was to find the money to 
recapitalize our Navy. I believe that we are on the way and the 
budget that is sent before you today increases the number of 
ships that we are buying and the number of aircraft that we are 
procuring for the future. We are bringing very important 
capability into the force like: the heart of our family of 
ships for the future, CVN-21, the first new carrier design in 
over 40 years; the Littoral Combat Ship, a revolutionary part 
of the family of ships, built with plug and play technology, a 
ship that will enable us to move rapidly into the 21st century, 
conceived with unmanned vehicles in mind.
    This budget will continue F/A-18E/Fs, which are deployed 
now, Mr. Chairman, for the first time. This budget introduces a 
new airplane, the EA-18G, to replace the jammer of old.
    LPD-17 is maturing, with multiple ships under construction. 
Joint Strike Fighter is in the budget. New helicopters, new 
support ships, and major investments in the new Hawkeye will 
provide the eyes and ears of the fleet.
    With the President's commitment to missile defense, this 
budget moves us towards sea-based missile defense in the year 
2004. Unmanned vehicles are on the horizon in partnership with 
my friend, General John Jumper, sitting at the end of the 
table.
    In short, this budget continues the commitment to build the 
culture of readiness in our Navy. It focuses on people, our 
capital asset. It sustains our commitment to the growth and 
development of our sailors. It moves us to the future built 
upon the principles of Seapower 21, our vision for the future, 
with a new focus on future readiness.
    This morning, 151 of my 306 ships are deployed. There are 
another 170 ships under way as part of the Military Sealift 
Command supporting the rest of the military structure: the 
Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. This force is ready 
and it is the most ready it has been in my entire military 
life. I am proud of the accomplishments and the gains that we 
have made.
    We add to all of that and we look at the challenges that 
are ahead of us. Mr. Chairman, I believe that this budget 
proposes the right balance as we move to the future engaging in 
the global war on terrorism, and I look forward to your 
questions as we move forward in the hearing.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, USN

    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the 
opportunity to appear today. The investment you've made in America's 
Navy has been vital to the Nation's security and your Navy's ability to 
project more power, more protection, and more freedom to the far 
corners of the Earth. I speak for the entire fleet in thanking you for 
your exceptional and continuous support.

     I: YOUR NAVY TODAY--ENHANCED CAPABILITIES FOR THE JOINT FORCE

    This is a time of tremendous challenge and accomplishment for our 
Navy. Our men and women operating in the air, on and under the sea, and 
on the ground are at the leading edge of the global war on terrorism.
    Today, there are 151 ships on deployment, fully half of the Navy; 
this includes 6 of 12 aircraft carriers, and 8 of our 12 big deck 
amphibious ships (LHA/LHD). They are deployed in support of the 
Nation's interests in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Indian 
Ocean, and the Western Pacific. Still others are preparing for 
deployment or continuing operations like strategic deterrent and 
counter-drug patrols in support of other national imperatives.
      
    
    
      
    The Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) is also actively engaged 
in supporting the war on terrorism; today, almost 75 percent of MSC's 
total force is carrying combat equipment for land-based forces and 
logistics support for Navy carrier battle group and amphibious ready 
groups. Nineteen of our 20 large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships 
(LMSRs), all 8 fast sealift ships, and half of our 72 ship Ready 
Reserve Fleet are actively supporting the Joint Force.
    These forces are operating with purpose, leading the defense of the 
United States away from our own shores and our own homes. After all, 
this new century is fraught with profound dangers: rogue nations in 
possession of weapons of mass destruction, potential conflict between 
regional competitors, widely dispersed and well-funded terrorist 
organizations, and failed states that deliver only tyranny and despair 
to their people.
    We frequently talk about the asymmetric challenges such enemies 
might present, assuming these advantages belong only to potential 
adversaries. Your Navy possesses asymmetric strengths all its own: its 
persistence, precision, independence, and agility are but a few.
    More importantly, our naval strengths are critical to our joint 
combat effectiveness. Our forward deployed, combat ready naval forces--
sustained by naval and civilian shipmates around the world--are proving 
every day the unique and lasting value of sovereign, lethal forces 
projecting offensive and defensive power from the sea.
    There are numerous recent examples of the enhanced capability our 
Navy brings to the Joint Force.

         In Operation Enduring Freedom, Navy aircraft carrier-
        based tactical aircraft and long range, land-based Air Force 
        tankers and bombers combined with Navy SEALs on the ground and 
        Army Special Forces on horseback to deliver devastating strikes 
        on Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan. Since then, our 
        newest combat aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, has been 
        flying combat sorties from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln in 
        Operation Southern Watch, demonstrating its increased range and 
        payload capability. In combination with Tomahawk missiles from 
        widely dispersed ships and submarines, this joint power 
        projection force gives the Nation the ability to reach across 
        the globe with precise, persistent striking power.
         The Peleliu and Bataan Amphibious Ready Groups, 
        operating in the Arabian Sea, launched and sustained marines 
        from the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units more than 450 
        miles inland at ``Camp Rhino,'' to support the initial forward 
        operating base in Afghanistan. This was the longest-range 
        expeditionary airfield seizure operation ever launched from 
        amphibious ships at sea. During the same timeframe, the carrier 
        Kitty Hawk also provided an agile, sovereign Afloat Forward 
        Staging Base (AFSB) for joint Special Operations Forces and 
        their lift, attack, and command and control assets. Permanently 
        installed command, control, communications, computers, 
        intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) suites 
        and information technologies on all these ships enhanced the 
        entire joint team's knowledge superiority picture and connected 
        these Joint Forces with other forces and commands in the 
        theater and around the world, all from the security our ships 
        enjoy in the maritime domain.
         The Aegis cruiser U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG 70) completed 
        three medium range ballistic missile defense tests last year, 
        successfully acquiring, tracking, and hitting target ballistic 
        missiles in the mid-course or ascent phases with a Standard 
        Missile 3 (SM-3) in all three tests. Lake Erie and the Aegis 
        destroyer U.S.S. John Paul Jones also supported three 
        successive Missile Defense Agency intercontinental class 
        ballistic missile tests; the Aegis system performed exactly as 
        predicted in each of these tests, acquiring the targets 
        immediately and passing high fidelity digital track data to 
        national nodes ashore. These cruisers' and destroyers' organic 
        Aegis Weapons System and their SPY-1 multi-function, phased 
        array radars, demonstrate the capability and capacity to 
        conduct a sea-based missile defense against those ballistic 
        missiles that can target our homeland, allies, forward 
        operating bases, and Joint Forces ashore. They could also 
        provide important surveillance and cueing of intercontinental 
        class weapons directed at our homeland.
         The Navy's Military Sealift Command is actively 
        providing combat logistics support to U.S. Navy ships, is 
        prepositioning joint military supplies and equipment at sea, 
        and is providing sealift and ocean transportation of defense 
        cargo. MSC's high quality shipping, augmented by charters, 
        continues its sealift of the Army's 3rd and 4th Infantry 
        Divisions, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, and V Corps. 
        Fifteen of our deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) 
        provide the majority of combat supplies and equipment for our 
        Marine force, and 11 of these have already offloaded equipment 
        in support of contingency operations. MSC is also delivering 
        fuel and aviation support equipment and supplies to deployed 
        Air Forces. In short, 95 percent of all equipment and supplies 
        needed by U.S. forces in time of crisis moves by sea on MSC-
        controlled ships.
         The U.S.S. Florida (SSBN-728), an Ohio-class fleet 
        ballistic missile submarine, successfully launched two Tomahawk 
        missiles, confirming the ability to launch a Tomahawk from a 
        configuration similar to the tightly packed cluster of Tomahawk 
        All-Up-Rounds (AUR) we will use in the SSGN. This experiment 
        was conducted in support of the SSGN program's Sea Trial 
        experiment, Giant Shadow, which also explored how a network of 
        forces, including special warfare forces, and various unmanned 
        aerial, underwater, and ground vehicles and sensors could be 
        used to provide surveillance, collect real-time intelligence, 
        and develop and launch a time critical strike in support of the 
        Joint Force Commander. This included the first vertical launch 
        of a UUV, testing of nuclear-biological-chemical sensors, and 
        the insertion of SEALs from one of the submarines we will 
        convert to an SSGN.

    These examples represent the return on investment the American 
people have made in our Navy: an agile, connected fleet that enhances 
deterrence, sustains our access, conducts precision strikes, exercises 
joint command and control, enhances knowledge superiority, responds to 
crisis, projects, sustains and operates with the Joint Force ashore, 
and leverages the priceless advantage of our command of the seas. It is 
why we are a critical component of the Nation's joint defenses in 
peace, in crisis, and in conflict.
    None of the foregoing would be possible without the energy, 
expertise, and enthusiasm of our active and Reserve sailors, and our 
marine and civilian shipmates in the Department of the Navy. After all, 
it is people that put capability to practice, and it is their dedicated 
service that makes these capabilities ready--around the world and 
around the clock.

       II: A CULTURE OF READINESS--A COMMITMENT TO TRANSFORMATION

    This century's dangerous and uncertain strategic environment places 
a premium on credible combat forces that possess speed of response, 
immediate employability, and the flexible force packaging that brings 
the right capability to bear at the right time. It demands forces that 
can pair this capability with readiness, both today and in the future.
    Readiness is the Navy's watchword. Readiness is the catalyst that 
brings combat power, speed of response, and the ability to disrupt an 
enemy's intentions in both crisis and conflict. Readiness brings 
capability to bear wherever and whenever it is needed. We are making 
readiness a key element of our Navy's culture.
    The forces we've placed forward today--the 6 carrier battle 
groups--the 3 Amphibious Ready Groups, the Amphibious Task Forces 
comprised of 14 additional amphibious ships, and the 11 offloaded 
Maritime Preposition Ships all supporting a Marine Expeditionary Force 
of 50,000 marines--our multi-mission surface ships and submarines--the 
dozens of Military Sealift Command ships transporting the rest of the 
Joint Force--are the most ready force in our history, properly manned, 
superbly trained, and well provisioned with ordnance, repair parts, and 
supplies so they can provide both rotational deployment and surge 
capability. Our operational forces are ready earlier and are deploying 
at a higher state of readiness than ever before.
    A greater percentage of our ships are underway today than at any 
time in the last dozen years. Our ability to do so is the direct result 
of two things: the investment of the American people and the 
extraordinary commitment and accomplishment of our men and women in the 
Navy this past year. We made a concerted effort in last year's budget 
request to improve our current readiness and reduce our immediate 
operational risk and I am proud to report to you today that this force 
is ready to fight and win!
    At the same time, it is apparent that the 21st century sets the 
stage for tremendous increases in precision, reach, and connectivity, 
ushering in a new era of joint operational effectiveness. We clearly 
will be able to integrate sea, land, air, and space through enhanced 
network technology to a greater extent than ever before. In this new, 
unified battlespace, the sea will provide the vast maneuver area from 
which to project direct and decisive power.
    To navigate the challenges ahead and realize the opportunities, we 
developed this past year a clear, concise vision--Sea Power 21--for 
projecting decisive joint capabilities from the sea. It is a vision 
that stresses our asymmetric strengths of information dominance, 
advanced technology, and highly skilled and motivated professionals.
    Sea Power 21 advances American naval power to a broadened strategy 
in which naval forces are fully integrated into global joint operations 
across this unified battlespace and against both regional and 
transnational aggressors. It provides the transformational framework 
for how we will organize, align, integrate, and transform our Navy to 
meet the challenges that lie ahead.
    It also includes the transformed organizational processes that will 
accelerate operational concepts and technologies to the fleet; shape 
and educate the workforce needed to operate tomorrow's fleet; and 
harvest the efficiencies needed to invest in the Navy of the future.
    The capabilities needed to fulfill this broadened strategy are 
grouped into three core operational concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, 
and Sea Basing, which are enabled by FORCEnet. The triad of transformed 
organizational processes that supports these concepts is: Sea Warrior, 
Sea Trial, and Sea Enterprise.
      
    
    
      
    Together, these concepts will provide increased power, protection, 
and freedom for America.

         Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent 
        offensive power. Sea Strike operations are how the 21st century 
        Navy will exert direct, decisive, and sustained influence in 
        joint campaigns. Sea Strike capabilities will provide the Joint 
        Force Commander with a potent mix of weapons, ranging from 
        long-range precision strike, to clandestine land-attack in 
        anti-access environments, to the swift insertion of ground 
        forces.
         Sea Shield is the projection of layered, global 
        defensive assurance. It is about extending our defenses beyond 
        naval forces, to the Joint Force and allies and providing a 
        defensive umbrella deep inland. Sea Shield takes us beyond 
        unit, fleet, and task force defense to provide the Nation with 
        sea-based theater and strategic defense.
         Sea Basing is the projection of operational 
        independence. Sea Basing will use the fleet's extended reach of 
        modern, networked weapons and sensors to maximize the vast 
        maneuver space of the world's oceans. It is about extending 
        traditional naval advantages to the Joint Force with more 
        security, connectivity, and mobility from netted forces at sea.
         FORCEnet is the enabler of our knowledge supremacy and 
        hence, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. It is the total 
        systems approach and architectural framework that will 
        integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, 
        weapons, and platforms into a networked, distributed force and 
        provide greater situational awareness, accelerated speed of 
        decision, and greatly distributed combat power.

    Our transformed organizational processes are:

         Sea Warrior is our commitment to the growth and 
        development of our sailors. It serves as the foundation of 
        warfighting effectiveness by ensuring the right skills are in 
        the right place at the right time.
         Sea Trial is a continual process of rapid concept and 
        technology development that will deliver enhanced capabilities 
        to our sailors as swiftly as possible. The Commander, U.S. 
        Fleet Forces Command is leading this effort and developing new 
        concepts and technologies, such as the Joint Fires Network and 
        High Speed Vessels.
         Sea Enterprise is our process to improve 
        organizational alignment, refine requirements, and reinvest the 
        savings to buy the platforms and systems needed to transform 
        our Navy. It is the means by which we will capture efficiencies 
        and prioritize investments.

    Sea Power 21 is dedicated to a process of continual innovation and 
is committed to total jointness. It extends American naval superiority 
from the high seas, throughout the littorals, and beyond the sea. It 
both enhances and leverages persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities and precision weaponry to amplify the 
Nation's striking power, elevate our capability to project both defense 
and offense, and open the door to the afloat positioning of additional 
joint capabilities, assets, and forces.
    Sea Power 21 will extend the advantages of naval forces--speed of 
response, agility, immediate employability, and security--to the 
unified, joint warfighting team. It will increase our deterrence, 
crisis control, and warfighting power. It will ensure our naval forces 
are fully integrated into global joint operations to bring more power, 
more protection, and more freedom to America.
    We will put our Sea Power 21 vision into practice through a new 
Global Concept of Operations (CONOPs) to distribute our combat striking 
power to a dispersed, networked fleet. This will optimize our flexible 
force structure and create additional, scaleable, independent operating 
groups capable of responding simultaneously around the world. This 
distribution of assets will take us from 19 strike capable groups to 37 
strike capable groups with the full implementation of the Global 
CONOPs.
      
    
    
      
         Carrier Strike Groups will remain the core of our 
        Navy's warfighting strength. No other force package matches 
        their sustained power projection ability, extended situational 
        awareness, and survivability.
         Expeditionary Strike Groups will augment our 
        traditional Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit 
        team with strike-capable surface combatants and submarines to 
        prosecute Sea Strike missions in lesser-threat environments. 
        When combined with a Carrier Strike Group, the resulting 
        Expeditionary Strike Force will possess the full range of our 
        netted, offensive, and defensive power. We will deploy at least 
        one pilot ESG this year.
         Missile Defense Surface Action Groups will increase 
        international stability by providing security to allies and 
        Joint Forces ashore from short- and medium-range ballistic 
        missile threats.
         Our future SSGN forces--specially modified Trident 
        submarines--will provide large volume clandestine strike with 
        cruise missiles and the capability to support and insert 
        Special Operations Forces.
         An enhanced-capability Combat Logistics Force and 
        Maritime Prepositioned Force will sustain a more widely 
        dispersed and capable Navy/Marine Corps team.

    It is our intention to continue to nurture this culture of 
readiness and invest in this vision in the years ahead.

                III. OUR FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

    This past year, the Navy improved its current readiness by properly 
funding our current readiness accounts, deepening the growth and 
development of our people, and developing innovative operational 
concepts and capabilities.
    This year, we intend to:

         Sustain our current readiness gains to support the war 
        on terror;
         Deepen the growth and development of our people into 
        the 21st century, high-technology personnel force that is our 
        future; and
         Invest in our bold new Navy vision--Sea Power 21--to 
        recapitalize and transform our force and improve its ability to 
        operate as an agile, lethal, and effective member of our joint, 
        networked warfighting team.

    At the same time, we will continue to actively harvest the 
efficiencies needed to fund and support these priorities in both fiscal 
year 2004 and beyond. Our Navy budget request for fiscal year 2004 
supports this intent and includes:

         Seven new construction ships, 2 more SSBN-to-SSGN 
        conversions, 1 cruiser conversion, and 100 new aircraft;
         Investment in accelerated transformational 
        capabilities, including the next-generation aircraft carrier 
        (CVN-21), the transformational destroyer (DD(X)), and Littoral 
        Combat Ship (LCS), the Joint Strike Fighter, the Advanced 
        Hawkeye (E-2C RMP) Upgrade Program, and the EA-18G Electronic 
        Attack aircraft;
         A 4.1 percent average pay increase in targeted and 
        basic pay raises, and a reduction in average out-of-pocket 
        housing costs from 7.5 percent to 3.5 percent;
         Investment in housing and Public Private Venture that 
        will help eliminate inadequate family housing by fiscal year 
        2007 and enable us to house shipboard sailors ashore when their 
        vessel is in homeport by fiscal year 2008;
         Continued investment in key operational readiness 
        accounts that includes an increase in aviation depot 
        maintenance funding; improvement in our annual deferred 
        maintenance backlog for our ships, submarines, and aircraft 
        carriers; and sustained funding for our ordnance, ship 
        operations, and flying hours accounts;
         Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Integration, a 
        process that will maximize our forward-deployed combat power, 
        optimize the core capability of naval aviation forces, 
        introduce 200 modern aircraft across the fiscal year 2004 to 
        fiscal year 2009 program and save billions of dollars;
         Divestiture of aging, legacy ships, systems and 
        aircraft, producing nearly $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2004 for 
        reinvestment in recapitalization;
         Improvements in the quality of our operational 
        training through a Training Resource Strategy; and
         Investment in transformational unmanned underwater 
        vehicles (UUV), unmanned aviation vehicles (UAV), experimental 
        hull forms, and other technologies.
A. Sustaining our Current Readiness
    Your investment last year produced the most ready force in our 
history! Training, maintenance, spare parts, ordnance, and fuel 
accounts enabled our fleet to be ready earlier, deploy at a higher 
state of readiness, and as we are witnessing today, build a more 
responsive surge capability. These investments were vital to sustaining 
the war on terrorism, assuring friends and allies and leading the 
Nation's global response to crisis.

         Ship operations and flying hours requests funds for 
        ship operations OPTEMPO of 54.0 days per quarter for our 
        deployed forces and 28 days per quarter for our non-deployed 
        forces. The flying hours request receives an additional $137 
        million this year to sustain the investment level we 
        established in support of last year's budget. This level of 
        steaming and flying hours will enable our ships and airwings to 
        achieve required readiness 6 months prior to deployment, 
        sustain readiness during deployment, and increase our ability 
        to surge in crisis. However, sustained OPTEMPO at levels above 
        this force-wide target, as is beginning to occur during fiscal 
        year 2003's time of accelerated and extended deployments, will 
        cause our current year execution to run both ahead and in 
        excess of the existing plan.
         Ship and Aviation Maintenance. Last year, we reduced 
        our major ship depot maintenance backlog by 27 percent and 
        aircraft depot level repair back orders by 17 percent; provided 
        32 additional ships with depot availabilities; ramped up 
        ordnance and spare parts production; maintained a steady 
        ``mission capable'' rate in deployed aircraft; and fully funded 
        aviation initial outfitting. Our request for fiscal year 2004 
        aviation maintenance funding adds over $210 million to fiscal 
        year 2003's investment and will increase the number of engine 
        spares, improve the availability of non-deployed aircraft, and 
        meet our 100 percent deployed airframe goals.
          Our ship maintenance request continues to `buy-down' the 
        annual deferred maintenance backlog and sustains our overall 
        ship maintenance requirement. The aggregate level of funding 
        for ship maintenance actually declines from fiscal year 2003 to 
        fiscal year 2004, due in part to the positive effects of the 
        additional maintenance funding provided in supplemental 
        appropriations in the previous year, in part to the accelerated 
        retirement of the oldest and most maintenance-intensive surface 
        ships, and as a result of scheduling and timing.
         Shore Installations. The fiscal year 2004 request 
        provides 93 percent of the modeled sustainment cost for 
        facilities, an increase from fiscal year 2003's 84 percent. 
        Although the overall investment in facility recapitalization 
        has reduced from last year, slowing the replacement rate of 
        facilities, our increased investment in sustainment will better 
        maintain existing facilities as we continue to pursue 
        innovations to improve our base infrastructure. Our Base 
        Operations Support funding request is based on sustaining the 
        current level of common installation and important community 
        and personnel support functions; we have factored in management 
        and business efficiencies to reduce the cost of providing these 
        services. We continue to support a Base Realignment and Closure 
        effort in fiscal year 2005 to focus our future investment and 
        improve our recapitalization rate in the years ahead.
         Precision-guided munitions receive continued 
        investment in our fiscal year 2004 request with emphasis on 
        increasing inventory levels for the Joint Stand-Off Weapon 
        (JSOW), optimizing the Navy's Joint Direct Attack Munition 
        (JDAM) production rate and commencing full rate production 
        under multi-year procurement for the Tactical Tomahawk 
        (TACTOM). Our partnership with the Air Force in several of our 
        munitions programs will continue to help us optimize both our 
        inventories and our research and development investment.
         Training readiness. The Training Resource Strategy 
        (TRS) has been developed to provide for more complex threat 
        scenarios, improve the training of our deploying ships, 
        aircraft, sailors, and marines, and support the range and 
        training technology improvements necessary to ensure the long-
        term combat readiness of deploying naval forces. The TRS has 
        identified the training facilities necessary to provide this 
        superior level of training as well. Their dispersed character 
        is more like the battlefield environment our forces will face 
        today and tomorrow and will better challenge our deploying 
        forces--before they are challenged in combat. Our fiscal year 
        2004 request includes $61 million to support the TRS.
          At the same time, encroachment and environmental issues 
        continue to impact our ability to maintain an acceptable level 
        of access to our valuable testing and training ranges and 
        operating areas. As a result, we are looking for a balanced 
        approach that would protect our environmental obligations and 
        our ability to both train in realistic scenarios and develop 
        transformational systems for our future. Our approach would be 
        limited to only the most critical issues, such as the 
        designation of critical habitat on military lands designated 
        for military training, and the scientific measurements that 
        achieve an appropriate balance between our environmental 
        concerns and our obligation to ensure our sailors are properly 
        trained and our transformational systems are properly tested. 
        We will focus the use of our ranges for these purposes while 
        continuing to be an excellent steward of these environmental 
        resources. We look forward to working with Congress and the 
        American people on this important and urgent issue impacting 
        our sailors and marines.
B. Deepening the Growth and Development of our People
    We are winning the battle for people. Thanks to superb leadership 
in the fleet and the full support of the American people and Congress, 
we are making solid progress in addressing long-standing manpower and 
quality of service issues vital to having what it takes to win the 
competition for talent today and tomorrow.
    We are enjoying now the best manning I have witnessed in my career. 
With few exceptions, we achieved C-2 manning status for all deploying 
battle group units at least 6 months prior to deployment. These 
accomplishments enabled our Navy to develop a more responsive force, 
one that surged forward with the right people, at the right time, to 
fulfill our national security requirements.
      
    
    
      
    Retention is at record levels and recruiting has never been better. 
We achieved a 58.7 percent Zone A (<6 years of service (YOS)) 
reenlistment rate, 74.5 percent Zone B reenlistment rate (6-10 YOS), 
and a Zone C (10-14 YOS) reenlistment rate of 87.4 percent in 2002. 
While we are also off to a great start in fiscal year 2003, we are 
instituting measures to ensure our annualized reenlistment rate meets 
our established goals (Zone A--56 percent, B--73 percent, C--86 
percent).
    Additionally, attrition for first term sailors was reduced by 23 
percent from fiscal year 2001 levels. Ninety two percent of our 
recruits are high school graduates and 6 percent of them have some 
college education.
      
    
    
      
    These tremendous accomplishments allowed us to reduce at-sea 
manning shortfalls last year and reduce our recruiting goals. We were 
also able to increase the overall number of E-4 to E-9s in the Navy by 
1.3 percent to 71.5 percent working toward a goal of 75.5 percent by 
fiscal year 2007. This healthy trend allows us to retain more of our 
experienced leaders to manage and operate the increasingly technical 
21st century Navy.
    Targeted pay raises, reenlistment bonuses, improved allowances, 
enhanced educational benefits, retirement reforms, support for improved 
family services, and better medical benefits are making a difference 
and can be directly attributed to congressional support and the 
outstanding work of our Navy leaders in our ships, squadrons, bases, 
and stations.
    Our fiscal year 2004 request capitalizes on last year's 
accomplishments and provides the opportunity to align our manpower and 
skills mix to balance our end strength and shape our 21st century 
workforce. As part of Sea Power 21's transformed organizational process 
improvements we will begin our Sea Warrior process.
    Our goal is to create a Navy in which all sailors are optimally 
assessed, trained, and assigned so that they can contribute their 
fullest to mission accomplishment. It is important that we sustain our 
manpower progress by furthering our supporting initiatives to include:

         Perform to serve will align our Navy personnel 
        inventory and skill sets through a centrally managed 
        reenlistment program. This initiative makes Commander, Navy 
        Personnel Command the final authority for first term 
        reenlistments and extensions and will steer sailors in over-
        manned ratings into skill areas where they are most needed. It 
        provides the training necessary to ensure these sailors will 
        succeed in their new rating. Most importantly, it will help us 
        manage our skills profile.
         Navy Knowledge Online introduces our integrated web-
        based lifelong learning initiative for personnel development 
        and learning management. It connects sailors to the right 
        information in a collaborative learning environment, tracks 
        their individual skills and training requirements, and provides 
        lifelong support between our rating, leadership, and personal 
        development learning centers and our sailors.
         Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through our Commitment to 
        Education and Learning) is transforming the way we train and 
        educate our people. A more responsive organizational structure 
        has been established to include the Navy Chief Learning 
        Officer, Naval Personnel Development Command, and Human 
        Performance Center. We also partnered with fleet, industry, and 
        academia to improve individual training and education as well 
        as with colleges, through the Commissioned Navy College 
        Program, to provide rating-related Associate and Bachelor 
        degrees.
         Project SAIL (Sailor Advocacy through Interactive 
        Leadership) will web-base and revolutionize the personnel 
        assignment process by putting more choice in the process for 
        both gaining commands and sailors. It will empower our people 
        to make more informed career decisions and for the first time, 
        create a more competitive, market-oriented process.

    Our Sea Swap initiative is underway now, with the first crew-change 
on U.S.S. Fletcher taking place in the Western Australia port of 
Fremantle last month. We will continue this pilot with another crew 
change this summer and we intend to continue to examine pilot programs 
in optimal manning, rotational crewing, assignment incentive pay, 
rating identification tools, and rate training.
    Your support of our fiscal year 2004 request for a targeted pay 
raise that recognizes and reaffirms the value of our career force and 
acts as an incentive to junior personnel to stay Navy is critical to 
staying the course. So, too, is continuing the reduction of average 
out-of-pocket housing expenses and the extension and enhancement of 
essential special pay and bonus authorities. All these efforts enable 
our Navy to sustain our forces in the war on terrorism, continue the 
increase in our Top 6 (E4 to E9), and develop the 21st century, high-
technology personnel force that is our future.
C. Investing in Sea Power 21
    Our 21st century Navy will be a joint, netted, dispersed power 
projection force and Sea Power 21 is the framework for how our Navy 
will organize, integrate, and transform. It prescribes a strategy-to-
concepts-to-capabilities continuum by which current and future naval 
forces will exploit the opportunity that information dominance and 
rapid, highly accurate power projection and defensive protection 
capabilities bring to us.
    Together, these concepts will compress our speed of response and 
provide the Nation with immediately employable, secure and sovereign 
forward ``capability sets'' from which to project firepower, forces, 
command and control, and logistics ashore.
    The following describes the core capabilities, and our initial 
investments in our highest priority programs that support this vision.
    Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent offensive 
power. The core capabilities include: Time Sensitive Strike; 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Ship to Objective 
Maneuver; and Electronic Warfare and Information Operations. We are 
already investing in impressive programs that will provide the 
capabilities necessary to support Sea Strike; these include the 
following fiscal year 2004 priorities:
      
    
    
      
         F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The F/A-18E/F is in full rate 
        production and when combined with this year's request for the 
        EA-18G, will be the backbone of Navy sea-based precision and 
        time-critical strike, electronic attack and airborne tactical 
        reconnaissance. It is in the fifth of a 5-year multi-year 
        procurement (MYP) contract (fiscal years 2000-2004) that will 
        yield $700 million in total savings. The second multi-year 
        contract for 210 aircraft will yield approximately $1 billion 
        in savings as compared to the single-year price. The Super 
        Hornet employs new knowledge dominance technologies, such as 
        the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Tactical 
        Forward Looking Infrared System, Shared Reconnaissance System, 
        and Multi-Informational Display System data link. It provides a 
        40-percent increase in combat radius, a 50-percent increase in 
        endurance, 25 percent greater weapons payload, 3 times the 
        ordnance bring back, and is more survivable than our older 
        Hornets; most importantly, it has the growth capacity to remain 
        a mainstay of our tactical aviation for years to come. Three of 
        these squadrons are already deployed today at one-third the 
        operational cost of our legacy F-14 aircraft. Fiscal year 2004 
        budgets for 42 E/F aircraft; this program maximizes the return 
        on our procurement dollars through a multi-year procurement 
        contract and a minimum economic order quantity buy.
         EA-18G. The EA-18G will replace the aging EA-6B 
        Prowler for Joint Force electronic attack. Using the 
        demonstrated growth capacity of the F/A-18E/F, the EA-18G 
        Growler will quickly recapitalize our electronic attack 
        capability at lower procurement cost with significant savings 
        in operating and support costs and 3 years earlier than 
        previously planned, all while providing the growth potential 
        for future electronic warfare (EW) system improvements. It will 
        use the Improved Capability Three (ICAP III) receiver suite and 
        provide selective reactive jamming capability to the 
        warfighter. This will both improve the lethality of the air 
        wing and enhance the commonality of aircraft on the carrier 
        deck. It will dramatically accelerate the replacement of our 
        aging Airborne Electronic Attack capability. Engineering and 
        developmental efforts commence with our fiscal year 2004 budget 
        request.
         JSF. The Joint Strike Fighter will enhance our Navy 
        precision with unprecedented stealth and range as part of the 
        family of tri-service, next-generation strike aircraft. It will 
        maximize commonality and technological superiority while 
        minimizing life cycle cost. The fiscal year 2004 budget 
        requests $2.2 billion in accelerated development funds; initial 
        production is planned for fiscal year 2006.
         MV-22. The Joint Service MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor, 
        Vertical/Short Take-Off or Landing (V/STOL) aircraft represents 
        a revolutionary change in aircraft capability. It will project 
        marines and equipment ashore from our amphibious shipping, 
        operationalizing Ship to Objective Maneuver from the Sea Base 
        and improving our expeditionary mobility and force entry needs 
        for the 21st century. The MV-22 program has been restructured, 
        redesigned, rebuilt, and is undergoing testing to deliver an 
        operationally deployable aircraft on the restructured schedule. 
        The MV-22 will replace the Vietnam-era CH-46E and CH-53D 
        helicopters, delivering improved readiness, upgraded 
        capability, and significantly enhanced survivability. It is 
        overwhelmingly superior to our legacy CH-46E providing twice 
        the speed, five times the range, and three times the payload 
        capacity.
         Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV). We increased our 
        commitment to a focused array of unmanned air vehicles that 
        will support and enhance both Sea Shield and Sea Strike 
        missions with persistent, distributed, netted sensors. We are 
        initiating the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV this 
        year to develop a persistent, multi-mission platform capable of 
        both Sea Shield and Sea Strike surveillance and reconnaissance 
        of maritime and land targets, communications relay, and some 
        intelligence collection. We have provided funding for testing, 
        experimentation, and/or demonstration of the Fire Scout 
        Demonstration Systems, Global Hawk Maritime demonstration and 
        the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle-Navy (UCAV-N) demonstration 
        vehicle as well.

    Sea Shield is the projection of layered, global defensive power. It 
will soon enhance deterrence and warfighting power by way of real-time 
integration with joint and coalition forces, high speed littoral attack 
platforms setting and exploiting widely distributed sensors, and the 
direct projection of defensive powers in the littoral and deep inland. 
It will enhance homeland defense, assure, and eventually sustain our 
access in the littorals and across the globe. Sea Shield capabilities 
include Homeland Defense, Sea and Littoral Control, and Theater Air and 
Missile Defense.
      
    
    
      
    Our highest priority Sea Shield programs this year include:

         Missile Defense. Our Navy is poised to contribute 
        significantly in fielding initial sea-based missile defense 
        capabilities to meet the near-term ballistic missile threat to 
        our homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies 
        and we are working closely with the Missile Defense Agency 
        (MDA) to that end. As partners, U.S.S. Lake Erie will be 
        transferred to MDA to facilitate a more robust testing program 
        for missile defense. In turn, MDA is requesting funds to 
        upgrade three Aegis guided missile destroyers (DDG) for ICBM 
        surveillance and tracking duties and procurement of up to 20 
        standard missile interceptors to help us provide a limited at 
        sea capability to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic 
        missiles in the boost and ascent phases of flight. Our sea-
        based missile defense programs experienced tremendous success 
        on the test range during 2002, and we look forward to building 
        on these successes and developing a vital capability for our 
        Nation.
         CG Conversion. The first Cruiser Conversion begins in 
        fiscal year 2004. The Cruiser Conversion Program is a mid-life 
        upgrade for our existing Aegis cruisers that will ensure 
        modern, relevant combat capability well into this century and 
        against evolving threats. These warships will provide enhanced 
        land attack and area air defense to the Joint Force Commander. 
        Core to these conversions is installation of the Cooperative 
        Engagement Capability, which enhances and leverages the air 
        defense capability of these ships, and the 5/62 caliber Gun 
        System with Extended Range Guided Munitions to be used in 
        support of the Marine Corps Ship-to-Objective-Maneuver 
        doctrine. These converted cruisers could also be available for 
        integration into ballistic missile defense missions when that 
        capability matures.
         Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). We will continue 
        development of UUVs for minefield reconnaissance in the 
        littoral and other surveillance missions, including funding 
        that will result in initial operating capability for the Long-
        term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) in fiscal year 2005.

    Sea Basing is the projection of operational independence. Our 
future investments will exploit the largest maneuver areas on the face 
of the Earth: the sea. Sea Basing serves as the foundation from which 
offensive and defensive fires are projected--making Sea Strike and Sea 
Shield a reality. Sea Basing capabilities include: Joint Command and 
Control, Afloat Power Projection, and Integrated Joint Logistics. Our 
intent is to minimize as much as possible, our reliance on shore-based 
support nodes.
      
    
    
      
    Our highest priority investments include:

         Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Our most transformational 
        effort and number one budget priority, the Littoral Combat Ship 
        will be the first Navy ship to separate capability from hull 
        form and provide a robust, affordable, focused-mission ship to 
        enhance our ability to establish sea superiority not just for 
        our Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups, but 
        for future joint logistics, command and control, and pre-
        positioned ships moving to support forces ashore. They will be 
        dispersed and netted, both leveraging and enhancing the 
        knowledge superiority and defense of the theater Joint Force. 
        We will separate capability from hull form by developing 
        `tailorable' mission modules that we can use to ``forward fit 
        and fight'' these small, minimally manned, persistent, high-
        speed vessels across the globe. They will counter anti-access 
        threats, namely small, fast surface craft carrying anti-ship 
        missiles, torpedo-armed ultra-quiet diesel submarines, and 
        large numbers of inexpensive mines. They will be the backbone 
        of our carrier and expeditionary strike group organic mine 
        warfare capability. By employing networked sensors, modular 
        mission payloads, a variety of manned and unmanned vehicles, 
        and an innovative hull design, they will have the inherent 
        capacity for further transformation by developing future 
        modules for other missions. We will capitalize on DOD 
        initiatives, spiral development, and new acquisition methods to 
        streamline the acquisition process, and begin construction of 
        the first LCS by 2005. The fiscal year 2004 budget accelerates 
        development and construction of nine LCS in the FYDP, key to 
        ramping surface force structure to Global CONOPs levels outside 
        the FYDP.
         DD(X). The DD(X) advanced multi-mission destroyer will 
        bring revolutionary improvements to precision strike and joint 
        fires. Transformational and leap ahead technologies include: an 
        integrated power system and electric drive; the Advanced Gun 
        System with high rate of fire and magazine capability; the new 
        Multi-Function Radar/Volume Search Radar suite; optimal manning 
        through advanced system automation, stealth through reduced 
        acoustic, magnetic, IR, and radar cross-section signature; and 
        enhanced survivability through automated damage control and 
        fire protection systems. Armed with an array of land attack 
        weapons it will provide persistent, distributed offensive fires 
        in support of Joint Forces ashore. The capacity in both hull 
        form and integrated electric power system will allow us to 
        spiral its development to CG(X) and other transformational 
        systems, like the electro-magnetic rail gun, in the years 
        ahead.
         CVN-21. We have accelerated transformational 
        technologies from the CVNX development plan into CVN-21 while 
        sustaining the CVNX-1 development schedule submitted last year. 
        This is the first new carrier design since 1967. The fiscal 
        year 2004 budget request provides $1.5 billion in RDT&E and 
        advanced procurement for the first CVN-21 and programs for 
        split-funded construction beginning in fiscal year 2007. The 
        transformational technologies include a new electrical 
        generation and distribution system, improved flight deck design 
        with Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System, improved sortie 
        generation, enhanced survivability, reduced manning, and 
        incorporation of a flexible infrastructure that will allow the 
        insertion of new capabilities as they evolve. CVN-21 will be 
        the centerpiece of our Carrier Strike Groups in the future and 
        will replace U.S.S. Enterprise in fiscal year 2014.
         Virginia-class submarine (SSN-774). The first four 
        ships of this class are under construction: Virginia will 
        commission in 2004; the keel was laid for Texas (SSN-775) in 
        July 2002; Hawaii (SSN-776) was begun in 2001; and North 
        Carolina (SSN-777) in 2002. This class will replace Los 
        Angeles-class (SSN-688) attack submarines and will incorporate 
        new capabilities, including an array of unmanned vehicles, and 
        the ability to support Special Warfare forces. It will be an 
        integral part of the joint, networked, dispersed fleet of the 
        21st century.
         SSGN Conversions. We have requested two additional 
        conversions in fiscal year 2004; these ships will be configured 
        to carry more than 150 Tomahawk missiles, enabling covert, 
        large-volume strike. The SSGN will also have the capability to 
        support Special Operations Forces for an extended period, 
        providing clandestine insertion and retrieval by lockout 
        chamber, dry deck shelters or the Advanced Seal Delivery 
        System, and they will be arrayed with a variety of unmanned 
        systems to enhance the Joint Force Commander's knowledge of the 
        battlespace. We will leverage the existing Trident submarine 
        infrastructure to optimize their on-station time. The first two 
        ships, the U.S.S. Ohio and U.S.S. Florida, enter the shipyard 
        in fiscal year 2003 to begin their refueling and conversion. 
        U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Georgia will begin their conversion 
        in fiscal year 2004. We expect this capability to be 
        operational for the first SSGN in fiscal year 2007.
         Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF(F)). MPF(F) 
        ships will serve a broader operational function than current 
        prepositioned ships, creating greatly expanded operational 
        flexibility and effectiveness. We envision a force of ships 
        that will enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by the 
        at-sea assembly of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that arrives 
        by high-speed airlift or sealift from the United States or 
        forward operating locations or bases. These ships will off-load 
        forces, weapons, and supplies selectively while remaining far 
        over the horizon, and they will reconstitute ground maneuver 
        forces aboard ship after completing assaults deep inland. They 
        will sustain in-theater logistics, communications, and medical 
        capabilities for the Joint Force for extended periods as well.

    Other advances in sea basing could enable the flow of Marine and 
Army forces at multiple and probably austere points of entry as a 
coherent, integrated combined arms team capable of concentrating lethal 
combat power rapidly and engaging an adversary upon arrival. The 
ability of the Naval Services to promote the successful transformation 
of deployment practices of the other Services will dramatically improve 
the overall ability of the Joint Force to counter our adversaries' 
strategies of area-denial and/or anti-access. We are programming RDTE 
funds to develop the future MPF and examine alternative sea-basing 
concepts in fiscal year 2008.
    FORCEnet is the enabler of the foregoing capabilities, and the 
operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in 
the joint, information age. It will allow systems, functions, and 
missions to be aligned to transform situational awareness, accelerate 
speed of decisions, and allow naval forces to greatly distribute its 
combat power in the unified, joint battlespace. It puts the theory of 
network-centric warfare into practice. We are just beginning this 
effort and we have requested $15 million in funds to administer the 
development of FORCEnet, the cornerstone of our future C\4\I 
architecture that will integrate sensors, networks, decision aids, 
warriors, and weapons. Programs that will enable the future force to be 
more networked, highly adaptive, human-centric, integrated, and enhance 
speed of command include:

         E-2C Advanced Hawkeye Radar Modernization Program. E-2 
        Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) program will modernize the E-2 weapons 
        system by replacing the current radar and other aircraft system 
        components to improve nearly every facet of tactical air 
        operations. The modernized weapons system will be designed to 
        maintain open ocean capability while adding transformational 
        surveillance and Theater Air and Missile Defense capabilities 
        against emerging air threats in the high clutter and jamming 
        environment. The advanced Hawkeye will be a critical 
        contributor to Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air, and 
        to Sea Strike and Shield. The fiscal year 2004 budgets over 
        $350 million for continued development with first production 
        planned for fiscal year 2008.
         Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). NMCI continues 
        to bring together Navy personnel, government civilians, and 
        contractors into a single computing environment. This program 
        is fostering fundamental changes in the way we support critical 
        warfighting functions, conduct Navy business, and train and 
        advance sailors. Fiscal year 2004 funding of $1.6 billion 
        continues user seat rollout and cutover to the NMCI 
        architecture, progressing toward a target end-state of 365,000 
        seats. Although NMCI seat cutover was slowed initially by the 
        need to resolve the challenges of numerous, disparate legacy 
        applications, the transition to NMCI has succeeded in 
        eliminating more than 70,000 legacy IT applications and we are 
        on track for the future.

    Sea Trial. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) is now in 
charge of our Navy's revitalized process of experimentation, and is 
rapidly developing emergent concepts and experimenting with new 
technologies to speed delivery of innovation to the fleet. CFFC will 
reach throughout the military and beyond to coordinate concept and 
technology development in support of future warfighting effectiveness. 
Embracing spiral development, the right technologies and concepts will 
then be matured through targeted investment and rapid prototyping.
    CFFC is working in concert with the U.S. Joint Forces Command to 
refine the Sea Trial process and integrate select wargames, 
experimentation, and exercises. We are already testing new operational 
concepts and technologies like the Collaborative Information 
Environment, Joint Fires Initiative, and the Navy Joint Semi-Automated 
Force Simulation in operations and exercises. We will continue to 
pursue evaluation of multiple platforms and systems, including 
experimental hull forms and electromagnetic rail guns, among others.
    The Systems Commands and Program Executive Offices will be integral 
partners in this effort, bringing concepts to reality through 
technology innovation and application of sound business practices.

             IV. HARVESTING EFFICIENCIES FOR TRANSFORMATION

    We are working hard to identify and harvest the efficiencies needed 
to balance competing priorities and invest in our Sea Power 21 vision. 
Called Sea Enterprise, this process is intended to ensure our 
warfighting capability both now and in the future. It will help 
identify and produce those initiatives that both optimize our 
warfighting capability and streamline our organization and processes; 
to make it operate more efficiently, to reduce our overhead and to 
produce the savings needed for investment in recapitalization and our 
future. We have already identified several initiatives that have 
produced over $40 billion in savings and cost avoidance across the 
defense program--and many more billions outside the FYDP--to help fund 
our future. A few of the highlights include:

         USN-USMC Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) Integration plan 
        shows the promise of cross-service partnerships. It will 
        maximize forward deployed combat power, enhance our 
        interoperability, more fully integrate our services, and save 
        $975 million across the FYDP. This aggressive effort introduces 
        200 modern aircraft in the next 6 years while retiring legacy 
        F-14, F/A-18A/B, S-3, and EA-6B airframes, and it reduces our 
        F/A-18E/F and JSF total buy requirements by 497 aircraft while 
        enhancing our warfighting capability. There is more than $30 
        billion in projected cost avoidance outside the FYDP as well.
      
    
    
      
         Partnerships. We are pursuing other promising 
        partnerships to include new munitions with the U.S. Air Force, 
        common communications and weapons systems with the U.S. Coast 
        Guard's Deepwater Integrated Systems program, and joint 
        experiments with high-speed vessels with the U.S. Army. We will 
        continue to leverage the gains made in programs like joint 
        weapons development (JDAM, JSOW, AMRAAM) as well.
         Identifying savings within the force for 
        recapitalization. Last year, we promised we would sharpen our 
        focus on our force structure in the years ahead--to buy the 
        ships, aircraft, and the capabilities needed for tomorrow's 
        Navy. At the same time, we cannot overlook the important gains 
        our focus on current readiness made these last few years; it 
        produced the more responsive force on deployment today. As a 
        result, we are obligated to look hard at the ways we could 
        balance these priorities and our discretionary investments to 
        both satisfy the near term operational risks and prepare for 
        the long-term risks of an uncertain future. This year, we made 
        some hard choices across the fleet to do more to address our 
        future risk, sustain our current readiness gains, and strike 
        this balance. We identified several aging, legacy systems with 
        limited growth potential and high operating and support costs, 
        and ultimately, we accelerated the retirement of 11 ships and 
        70 aircraft, divested more than 50 systems, and eliminated 
        70,000 legacy IT applications. We are using the savings to 
        recapitalize, modernize other legacy platforms, and invest in 
        Sea Power 21. These initiatives result in an acceptable 
        operational risk in the near term because of our emphasis on 
        sustaining our current readiness gains. Equally important, 
        these difficult decisions yielded $1.9 billion for reinvestment 
        and will do much to help reduce our future risk.
         Improved business operations and processes. We are 
        improving both the way we run the fleet and our ability to 
        control costs. The LPD-DDG swap produced savings sufficient to 
        purchase a third guided missile destroyer in fiscal year 2004. 
        We are using multi-year procurement contacts and focusing where 
        possible on economic order quantity purchase practices to 
        optimize our investments. We conducted the Workload Validation 
        Review, and made Performance Based Logistics improvements. 
        Other initiatives like piloting mission funding for two of our 
        public shipyards, Enterprise Resource Planning, strategic 
        sourcing, NMCI, and eBusiness are helping us find the funds 
        necessary to emerge with the optimal force structure, a healthy 
        industrial base and an efficient and appropriately sized 
        infrastructure.
         Installation Claimant Consolidation. In October 2003 
        we will establish a single shore installation organization, 
        Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC), to globally 
        manage all shore installations, promote ``best practices'' 
        development in the regions, and provide economies of scale, 
        increased efficiency, standardization of policies where 
        practicable and improved budgeting and funding execution. This 
        initiative has the potential to save approximately $1.6 billion 
        in the next 6 years.

    We will continue to pursue the efficiencies that improve our 
warfighting capability. We are committed to producing the level 
investment stream that will help implement our bold new Navy vision and 
produce the number of future ships, aircraft, and systems we need to 
counter the 21st century threat. Harvesting savings for reinvestment is 
an important part of that effort, and we will continue to examine the 
potential efficiencies while weighing the operational risks, both now 
and in the future.

                             V. CONCLUSION

    We are affecting positive change in our Navy. We will continue our 
culture of readiness and our commitment to transformation while 
pursuing those efficiencies that both make us good stewards of the 
public's funds, and improve our warfighting capability. I have made it 
plain to our men and women in the Navy that mission accomplishment 
means both warfighting effectiveness and resourcefulness.
    At the same time, our people remain at the heart of all we do; they 
are the real capital assets in our Navy. We have invested heavily to do 
what is right for the people who are investing themselves in our Navy. 
``Growth and development'' is our byline. As we look to the future, we 
will build on the impressive progress we have made in recruiting, 
assigning, and retaining our military and civilian professionals. 
Active leadership is making it happen today and will do so in the years 
to come.
    There are still more challenges and opportunities in the year 
ahead. We will continue prosecuting the global war on terrorism. This 
entails being ready to respond--to surge and sustain warfighting 
capabilities--in support of the war, as well as preparing our force for 
the battles of tomorrow.
    But by implementing our bold new Navy vision, harvesting 
efficiencies for reinvestment, adding potent new platforms to the 
fleet, and launching an integrated Navy-wide experimentation plan, we 
are creating the future capabilities and force structure required to 
counter these 21st century threats.
    I thank the committee for your continued strong support of our 
Navy, our sailors, and our civilian shipmates. Working together, I am 
confident we will make our great Navy even better and provide our 
Nation with more power, more protection, and more freedom in the years 
ahead.

    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Admiral.
    General Hagee.

  STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL W. HAGEE, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE 
                          MARINE CORPS

    General Hagee. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, ladies and 
gentlemen of the committee: It is an honor for me to be here 
this morning. Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, on behalf of 
those marines over in the Gulf, I would like to thank you very 
much for you and your delegation's recent visit over there. It 
meant a great deal to them to see you there and I thank you for 
that.
    Chairman Warner. We thank you.
    General Hagee. Sir, along with our sister services, the 
Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a key role in the 
global war on terrorism and in the establishment of stability 
and security in many of the world's trouble spots. Marines, 
both active and Reserve, are operating side by side with 
soldiers, sailors, airmen, NGOs, diplomats, and many others in 
diverse locations around the globe from Afghanistan to the 
Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Turkey, the Georgian 
Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines.
    Today marines are flying from Bagram Air Base in 
Afghanistan, from Navy carriers at sea, and from bases around 
the Arabian Gulf. In fact, 63 percent of the Marine Corps 
operating forces are currently deployed and almost 90 percent 
are either deployed, forward stationed, or forward based.
    Marine Corps operations throughout the past year have 
highlighted the versatility and utility of our expeditionary 
forces. Although we have had one of our busiest years in terms 
of operational deployments, participation in realistic 
worldwide exercises remain critical to supporting the theater 
security cooperation plans and ensuring that we maintained a 
ready and capable force.
    Sir, your marines are ready. Along with the Navy, we are 
moving out with new organizational concepts, as mentioned by 
the CNO, including TACAIR integration and carrier and 
expeditionary strike groups that will make us more responsive 
and more flexible.
    The fiscal year 2004 budget continues our effort to 
modernize and transform the force. Support that you in Congress 
have provided over the last 2 years has helped us make real 
progress in our modernization, transformation, personnel, and 
readiness accounts. Marines and their families have benefited 
from targeted pay raises and improved family housing and 
barracks. Increases in the basic allowance for housing have 
significantly reduced out-of-pocket cost of living expenses for 
our marines.
    Regarding modernization and transformation, our top ten 
Marine Corps ground programs are adequately founded over the 
near-term. Among these are the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the 
Lightweight 155-Howitzer. On the aviation side, we are on track 
for funding for the V-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the 
Four-Bladed Cobra and Huey upgrades. Finally, we continue to 
make needed progress in readiness.
    Having recently come from the operating forces, I can tell 
you there is a marked positive improvement in the way we have 
funded for readiness now compared to just a few years ago.
    My main concern today echoes one of the concerns of the 
Secretary of Defense, in that without supplemental funding, we 
are spending tomorrow's dollars today. We are very grateful for 
the additional funding provided last week in the fiscal year 
2003 omnibus appropriations bill. This funding provides a 
measure of relief to those programs that were bearing the costs 
of the global war on terrorism. Thank you for your timely 
action.
    That said, our contingency requirements are significant and 
they greatly exceed the funding provided. We ask for your 
support and timely passage of the administration's upcoming 
supplemental request.
    That concern notwithstanding, we are currently doing what 
we are trained to do. We are ready to support the Nation 
through whatever challenges may lie ahead. We are on solid 
ground regarding our mission and our direction. We will remain 
your only sea-based, rotational, truly expeditionary combined 
arms force ready to answer the call as part of an integrated 
Joint Force.
    Sir, I would like to thank this committee on behalf of all 
the marines for your continued support, and I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Hagee follows:]

           Prepared Statement by Gen. Michael W. Hagee, USMC

    Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the 
committee; it is my honor to report to you on the state of your United 
States Marine Corps. First, on behalf of all marines, I want to thank 
the committee for your continued support. Your sustained commitment to 
improving the warfighting capabilities of our Nation's Armed Forces and 
to improving the quality of life of our Service men and women and their 
families is vital to the security of our Nation, especially now, at 
this time of impending crisis.

                            I. INTRODUCTION

    The Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a key role in the 
global war on terrorism and in the establishment of stability and 
security in many of the world's trouble spots. Marines, both active and 
Reserve, are operating side-by-side in diverse locations, from 
Afghanistan, to the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Turkey, the 
Georgian Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines. At 
the same time, the Corps maintains a host of other commitments around 
the world that support U.S. national security, military, and foreign 
cooperation and security strategies. The powerful capability that the 
naval services bring to our Joint Forces is a central element of our 
Nation's military power.
    Marine Corps' operations throughout the past year have highlighted 
the versatility and expeditionary nature of our forces. Missions in 
support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle marked the most 
visible accomplishments of our forward-deployed forces. Marine Air 
Control Squadrons continue to provide air control, surveillance, and 
air traffic control support to Operation Enduring Freedom during their 
deployments to the Central Command area of responsibility. Elsewhere, 
the Marine Corps continues to support Operation Joint Forge in the 
Balkans by sending civil affairs teams to Bosnia.
    Even as the Marine Corps saw one of our busiest years in terms of 
operational deployments, participation in realistic, worldwide 
exercises remained critical to supporting the Combatant Commander's 
Theater Security Cooperation Plans and ensuring that we maintained a 
ready and capable force. Over the last year, marines participated in 
more than 200 service, joint, and combined exercises. These included 
live-fire, field training, command post, and computer-assisted 
exercises. Participants varied in size from small units to Marine 
Expeditionary Forces. Overseas, Marine Expeditionary Units (Special 
Operations Capable) conducted exercises in Jordan, Italy, Croatia, 
Tunisia, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and Kuwait.
    At home, Marine Reserve units were designated as ``on call'' forces 
to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency's role in homeland 
security. In addition, the Marine Corps also conducted numerous 
training operations and internal exercises. This important training 
helps develop individual and unit proficiency and competency. It also 
allows the Marine Corps to examine unit operational skills and ensures 
that each unit has the capabilities required to execute our full range 
of missions.
    The Marine Corps continues to contribute to the Nation's 
counterdrug effort, participating in numerous counterdrug operations in 
support of Joint Task Force Six, Joint Interagency Task Force-East, and 
Joint Interagency Task Force-West. These missions are conducted in the 
Andean region of South America, along the U.S. Southwest border, and in 
several domestic ``hot spots'' that have been designated as High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Individual marines and task-organized 
units are assigned to these missions in order to provide support for 
domestic drug-law enforcement throughout the United States, and to 
provide conventional training to military forces in South America that 
execute counternarcotics missions. Marine operational and intelligence 
teams also support Colombian military efforts to combat narco-
terrorism. Marines of our Reserve Forces have executed the majority of 
these missions.
    Our successes in these global operations and exercises have not 
been achieved alone. We have worked closely alongside the Navy, our 
sister Services, and Federal agencies to realize the true potential of 
joint, interoperable forces in the new environment of 21st century 
warfare. The superior operational and personnel readiness levels we 
have been able to maintain directly reflect the strong, sustained 
support of Congress in last year's National Defense Authorization and 
Appropriations Acts. In fiscal year 2004, we seek your continued 
support for the President's budget so we can consolidate the gains made 
to date, improve those areas where shortfalls remain, and continue 
transforming the way the Navy-Marine Corps team will fight in the 21st 
century.

                        II. BUILDING ON SUCCESS

    The President's fiscal year 2004 budget, together with your 
support, will provide a strong foundation on which we can continue 
building on our successes. Our focus is on improving our ability to 
operate as an agile, lethal, ready, and effective member of a broader 
Joint Force that takes the complementary capabilities provided by each 
Service, and blends them into an integrated and effective force for 
meeting future challenges.
    Increases in our Military Personnel accounts have a positive effect 
on the retention of our most valued assets--our marines. Given the 
increasing pressure to modernize and transform the force, the Marine 
Corps is constantly working to identify and assess program tradeoffs to 
enable the most effectively balanced approach between competing demands 
and programs. These tradeoffs occur within a larger context of the 
Department's overall program tradeoff decisions, which is driving the 
Navy and Marine Corps to work more closely than ever before in our 
planning, budgeting, and decisionmaking. An additional concern that 
complicates this process is the sizeable unfunded cost of the ongoing 
global war on terrorism.
    Challenges also arise from the changing realities of our national 
security environment. The Marine Corps is committed to the idea that we 
will fight as an integral part of a joint team. We continue to place 
high priority on interoperability, shared concept development, and 
participation in joint exercises with our sister Services. 
Additionally, the security environment now demands that we pay more 
attention to our role in homeland defense, our critical infrastructure, 
and force protection--even as we deploy more forces overseas. These 
challenges demand that we balance competing priorities while remaining 
focused on maintaining excellence in warfighting.
Adapting to a Changing, Dynamic World
    While we adapt the advantages of technology to meet the changing 
face of warfare, we draw strength from the unique culture and core 
values that make us `marines.' We look for innovation in four broad 
areas to address future challenges:

         Transformational technology
         New operational concepts
         Refined organizations
         Better business practices

    Innovative approaches culled from these efforts should provide 
insight into new capabilities that we can adapt for future warfighting. 
In this regard, we are currently engaged in an immediate and critical 
tasking to define how we, along with our partners in the Navy, intend 
to project naval power ashore in the 2015-2025 timeframe. This effort 
requires the intellectual rigor and participation of all the elements 
of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and is influencing the entire 
Marine Corps--from our structure and training to the way we will fight 
on future battlefields as an integral component of a Joint Force.
Technology and Experimentation
    The plan for realizing future joint concepts consists of three 
closely related processes: (1) Joint Concept Development, (2) Joint 
Experimentation and Assessment, and (3) Joint Integration & 
Implementation. The overall process is more commonly known as Joint 
Concept Development and Experimentation. In order to ensure support and 
engagement throughout this process, the Marine Corps reorganized to 
establish three Joint Concept Development and Experimentation divisions 
under the cognizance of the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command. These three organizations are key elements of 
Marine Corps transformation and enable full Marine Corps involvement in 
joint experimentation and transformation as well as the Navy's Sea 
Trial process for naval experimentation and transformation.
    The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory maintains cognizance over 
Marine Corps-specific experimentation--with a focus on the tactical 
level--to develop enhanced warfighting capabilities for the future. 
Technologies and procedures are field tested in experiments conducted 
with the operating forces. In addition, the lab coordinates closely 
with the Office of Naval Research to identify promising technologies 
that support the next generation of warfighting capabilities.
New Concepts and Organizations
    The Marine Corps is streamlining force development from concept to 
acquisition under the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development. Our 
Expeditionary Force Development System is a single system of dynamic 
functions integrated into a process that produces and sustains 
capabilities to meet the needs of the Marine Corps and the combatant 
commanders. The Marine Corps advocates for ground combat, aviation 
combat, command and control, and combat service support, as well as the 
Marine Requirements Oversight Council, are key participants in the 
process. The Expeditionary Force Development System continuously 
examines and evaluates current and emerging concepts and capabilities 
to improve and sustain a modern Marine Corps. The system is compatible 
with and supports naval and joint transformation efforts and integrates 
transformational, modernization, and legacy capabilities and processes. 
This integrated, concept-based driver for transformation is currently 
working on several ideas that will influence the future Marine Corps.
    Expeditionary Strike Groups. The Marine Corps and Navy are engaged 
in a series of experiments that will explore the Expeditionary Strike 
Group concept. This concept will combine the capabilities of surface 
action groups, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft with those of 
Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units (Special 
Operations Capable), to provide greater combat capabilities to regional 
combatant commanders. In the near future, the Navy-Marine Corps team 
will conduct a pilot deployment on the west coast to test the 
Expeditionary Strike Group concept. Navy combatants have already been 
incorporated within the existing training and deployment cycle of the 
Amphibious Ready Group. This experiment will also allow us to test 
command-and-control arrangements for the Expeditionary Strike Group. It 
will provide critical information to support the future implementation 
of the concept and highlight any needed changes in service doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, 
and facilities.
    Tactical Aviation Integration. The Navy and Marine Corps team has 
embarked on a Tactical Aircraft (Strike-fighter) Integration plan that 
will enhance core combat capabilities and provide a more potent, 
cohesive, and affordable fighting force. This integration is the 
culmination of a long-term effort to generate greater combat capability 
from naval fixed-wing strike and fighter aircraft, and represents a 
shared commitment to employ the Department of the Navy's resources as 
judiciously as possible. This integration has been ongoing for several 
years, with four Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet squadrons operating as part 
of embarked carrier air wings. This Navy-Marine Corps effort will 
guarantee that naval aviation will be integrated as never before, and 
will effectively support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and the joint 
warfighter. Specifically, the integration plan:

         Reinforces our expeditionary ethos
         Provides a smaller, more capable, more affordable 
        force for the Department of the Navy
         Integrates Marine strike fighters in 10 Navy Carrier 
        Air Wings
         Integrates three Navy strike fighter squadrons into 
        the Marine Unit Deployment Program
         Includes the global sourcing of all DON strike fighter 
        assets and ensures their support to Marine Air-Ground Task 
        Forces and regional combatant commanders
         Provides increased combat capability forward
         Complements the enhanced seabasing concept

    A cornerstone of this plan is Department of the Navy funding and 
maintenance of legacy aircraft at the highest levels of readiness until 
the Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18E/F replace them. This requires an 
unwavering commitment to level funding of strike fighter readiness 
across the Department of the Navy. These integration-driven readiness 
levels will allow the Navy-Marine Corps team to surge more aircraft 
than what is possible today.
    Enhanced Networked Seabasing. Fully networked, forward-deployed 
naval forces and platforms that are integrated into our seabasing 
capability will provide naval power projection for Joint Force 
Commanders. These forces will use the sea as a means of maneuver, 
enabling a broad range of joint campaign operations. Sea-based 
operations incorporate, integrate, protect, and sustain all aspects of 
naval power projection, from space to the ocean floor, from blue water 
to the littorals and inland--without dependence on land bases within 
the Joint Operating Area. Seabasing will provide enhanced capabilities 
to the naval force, such as rapid force closure, phased arrival and 
assembly at sea, selective offload of equipment tailored for individual 
missions, and force reconstitution for follow-on employment. The 
traditional naval qualities of persistence and sustainment--enhanced by 
advanced force-wide networks--underpin the staying power and 
flexibility of the sea base. Naval platforms can stay on-station, where 
they are needed, for extended periods of time. The at-sea 
maneuverability of the seabase, coupled with advanced underway 
replenishment technologies and techniques, will ensure force readiness 
over time.
    Integrated Logistics Capabilities. The Integrated Logistics 
Capabilities effort began as a unique collection of military, industry, 
and academic organizations collaborating to develop a future vision of 
Marine Corps logistics processes. The product is a set of 
transformational initiatives that will provide better support to the 
warfighter. The purpose of the Integrated Logistics Capabilities 
concept and process is to implement a transformation strategy, based on 
best practices, that provides the framework for the execution of agile, 
effective logistics support to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, with 
the focus of streamlining the logistics chain.
    Capabilities are being conceptually refined and incrementally 
validated in the operating forces as they are identified and 
recommended. An assessment of the Proof-of-Concept, published in 
November 2002 by the Center for Naval Analysis, reflected improved 
supply response time (68 percent reduction in time) and overall repair 
cycle time (33 percent reduction).
    Over both the mid- and long-term, improved combat effectiveness and 
efficiencies in the logistics chain are expected. However, efficiencies 
cannot be fully realized until the people, process, and technology 
changes are applied across the entire operating force. The logistics 
transformation and process modernization, together with the cutting 
edge suite of technologies provided by the Global Combat Support 
System, will greatly enhance the combat capabilities of Marine forces.
    Reestablishment of Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies. We have 
validated the requirement to reestablish our Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison 
Companies (ANGLICO). These companies will provide our commanders a 
liaison capability with foreign area expertise to plan, coordinate, and 
employ terminal control of fires in support of joint, allied, and 
coalition forces. ANGLICO will be reestablished with a company on each 
coast and a separate brigade platoon in Okinawa. Each company will have 
a habitual relationship with the Reserves. Full operational capability 
is expected by late summer 2004.
    Marine Corps-U.S. Special Operations Command Initiatives. Today, 
105 marines are filling Special Forces billets around the world. In 
addition to providing the current Chief of Staff to U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Marine Corps provides support to and 
ensures interoperability with Special Forces through the actions of the 
SOCOM-Marine Corps Board. That board met twice in 2002 and developed 
initiatives in the areas of Operations, Training and Education, 
Communications/C\4\, Information Operations, Psychological Operations, 
Civil Affairs, Intelligence, Aviation, Future Concepts, and Equipment 
and Technology. One of the initiatives, pursued in coordination with 
the Naval Special Warfare Command, is the Marine Corps' first sizeable 
contribution of forces to the Special Operations Command. Consisting of 
81 marines and 5 sailors, a detachment has been organized, trained, and 
equipped to conduct special reconnaissance, direct action, coalition 
support, foreign internal defense, and other special operations 
missions, and will begin training at Camp Pendleton, California, in 
June 2003. They will subsequently transfer to the operational control 
of USSOCOM during October 2003 and deploy in April 2004 as augmentation 
to a Naval Special Warfare Squadron supporting both U.S. Pacific 
Command and U.S. Central Command.
Better Business Practices
    We continue to seek out and use better business practices to 
achieve greater cost-effectiveness, improve performance, and sharpen 
our focus on our warfighting core competencies. In line with the 
competitive sourcing initiatives in the President's Management Agenda, 
we are increasing emphasis across our supporting establishment on 
competing our commercial activities with the private sector. We are 
complementing this initiative with continued development of an 
effective activity-based costing and management initiative across our 
installations. This allows us to focus on the true cost of various 
functions and services and to develop benchmarks that enable us to 
improve performance and to focus analyses on cost-saving initiatives. 
This will occur both in commercial areas that we compete, and in non-
commercial areas that cannot be competed. Competitions completed to 
date have resulted in saving millions of dollars annually and returning 
almost 900 marines to the operating forces. We will continue to seek 
additional competition candidates. Activity-Based Costing and 
Management initiatives provided our installation commanders with cost 
and performance information that enabled them to save over $37 million 
last year. As we refine our databases, we expect continuing increases 
both in performance and cost effectiveness.
    Through all of the efforts outlined above, the Marine Corps is 
building on today's success. As we build on our current capabilities, 
embrace innovation, and transform to meet the daunting conventional and 
asymmetric threats to U.S. security in the 21st century, we will 
continue to be the Nation's Total Force in Readiness, fielding warriors 
whose unique seabased expeditionary and combined-arms capabilities will 
be critical to success in crisis and conflict. In the process of 
balancing our programs to meet these goals, we will focus on two 
primary objectives: (1) our main effort--maintaining excellence in 
warfighting, and (2) taking care of our marines and families.

                      III. TAKING CARE OF OUR OWN

    Providing for the needs of our marines, their families, and our 
civilian marines remain among our top priorities. The most advanced 
aircraft, ship, or weapons system is of no value without highly-
motivated and well-trained people. People and leadership remain the 
real foundations of the Corps' capabilities. It is important to note 
that the Marine Corps operates as a Total Force, including elements of 
both active and Reserve components. We continue to strengthen the 
exceptional bonds within our Total Force by further integrating the 
Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing operations and training.
Human Resources
    End Strength. The congressionally-authorized increase in Marine 
Corps end strength to 175,000 in response to the global war on 
terrorism is very much appreciated. This increase of 2,400 marines 
allows us to sustain the increased missions associated with the 
activation of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (antiterrorism), 
enabling us to replace marines in the active units that we ``borrowed'' 
in standing up the brigade, and continue to provide the Nation with a 
robust, scalable force option specifically dedicated to antiterrorism.
    Recruiting. Sustaining our ranks with the highest quality young men 
and women is the mission of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command. 
Recruiting Command has consistently accomplished this mission for more 
than the past 7 years for enlisted recruiting and 12 years for officer 
recruiting. These achievements provide the momentum fueling the 
continuous pursuit to improve the recruiting process and enhance the 
quality of life for our recruiters. To continue to attract America's 
finest youth, Recruiting Command has provided recruiters with the best 
tools available to accomplish their mission. The Marine Corps supports 
the National Call to Service Act and continues to work closely with DOD 
in developing an implementation policy. We expect to commence enlisting 
individuals under this program commencing October 1, 2003. The Marine 
Corps Reserve achieved its fiscal year 2002 recruiting goals, 
accessioning 5,904 non-prior service marines and 4,213 prior service 
marines. With regard to our Reserve component, our most challenging 
recruiting and retention issue is the ability to fill out our Selected 
Marine Corps Reserve units with qualified officers. The Marine Corps 
recruits Reserve officers almost exclusively from the ranks of those 
who have first served a tour as an active duty Marine officer.
    While this practice ensures our Selected Marine Corps Reserve unit 
officers have the proven experience, knowledge, and leadership 
abilities when we need it the most--during mobilization--it limits the 
recruiting pool that we can draw from to staff our units. As a result, 
the Selected Reserve currently has a shortage of company grade (second 
lieutenant to captain) officers. We are exploring methods to increase 
the Reserve participation of company grade officers through increased 
recruiting efforts, increased command focus on emphasizing Reserve 
participation upon leaving active duty, and Reserve officer programs 
for qualified enlisted marines. We are also pursuing the legislative 
authority to provide an affiliation bonus to Reserve officers as an 
additional incentive for participation in the Selected Marine Corps 
Reserve.
    Retention. Retaining the best and the brightest marines has always 
been a major goal of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is by design a 
youthful service, however, it is of paramount importance to retain the 
highest quality marines to lead our young force. History has proven 
that leadership in the Staff Noncommissioned Officer ranks has been the 
major contributor to the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. The 
Marine Corps has two retention standards. Our First Term Alignment Plan 
has consistently achieved its reenlistment requirements over the past 8 
years. With one-third of the current fiscal year completed, we have 
achieved 87 percent of our first-term retention goal. A look at our 
Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (second tour and beyond) demonstrates 
that we have already retained 51 percent of our goal for this fiscal 
year. Both of these trends indicate healthy continuation rates in our 
career force.
    Current officer retention is at an 18-year high, continuing the 
strong performance of the last 2 years. Despite this positive trend, we 
cannot become complacent. As a Corps, we will continue to target 
specific qualifications and skills through continuation pay. Military 
compensation that is competitive with the private sector provides the 
flexibility required to meet the challenge of maintaining stability in 
manpower planning.
    Marine Corps Reserve--Partners in the Total Force. It is important 
to note that the Marine Corps operates as a Total Force, including 
elements of both active and Reserve components. We continue to 
strengthen the exceptional bonds within our Total Force by further 
integrating the Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing training and 
operations. Concurrent with the various initiatives underway to improve 
integration and update capabilities, the Marine Corps Reserve continues 
to support its primary mission of augmentation and reinforcement. 
Reserve units and marines provided over 1.8 million man-days in fiscal 
year 2002. Reserves provided support at all levels within the Marine 
Corps and at combatant commands and high-level staffs.
    As we enter the 21st century, the overall structure of Marine 
Forces Reserve will retain the current basic structure. However, Marine 
Forces Reserve is currently working to create new capabilities 
identified as part of its comprehensive review. Both as a structural 
and an operational change, Marine Forces Reserve is increasing its 
operational ties with the Warfighting Commanders by improving lines of 
communication with our operating forces. These increased operational 
ties will improve interoperability, increase training opportunities, 
and enhance the warfighting capabilities of the Total Force.
    Mobilization. Since the events of September 11, the Marine Corps 
judiciously activated Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) marines in 
response to both internal and joint operational requirements. The 
Marine Corps has maximized the use of individual volunteers to meet 
these requirements primarily in the areas of staff augmentation and 
force protection. In addition, Selected Marine Corps Units (SMCR) were 
activated for force protection requirements in support of homeland 
security. Because of emerging requirements associated with war on 
terrorism, we began involuntary recall of some of our IRRs on January 
17, 2003.
    Stop Loss. On January 15, 2003, the Marine Corps instituted Stop 
Loss across the Marine Corps to meet the emerging requirements 
associated with the expanding war on terrorism. Stop Loss was initiated 
to provide unit stability/cohesion, maintain unit readiness, meet 
expanded force protection requirements, and to reduce the requirement 
to active IRR personnel. We will continue to make judicious use of this 
authority and continue to discharge marines for humanitarian, physical 
disability, administrative, and disciplinary reasons. We have 
instructed our general officers to continue to use a common sense 
approach and have authorized them to release marines from active duty 
if it is in the best interest of the Marine Corps and the marine.
Education
    Our leaders--especially our noncommissioned officers--throughout 
the entire chain of command have kept the Corps successful and 
victorious. Their sense of responsibility is the cornerstone of our 
hard-earned successes. We will continue to develop leaders who can 
think on their feet, act independently, and succeed. In the future, as 
today, leaders will continue to instill stamina and toughness in each 
individual while simultaneously reinforcing character that values 
honor, integrity, and taking care of our fellow marines--including 
treating each other with dignity and respect. Aggressive and informed 
leadership demands education, training, and mentoring. The importance 
of these key elements cannot be over-emphasized, and we must attend to 
each at every opportunity.
    Marine Corps University has responsibility and authority for the 
planning, coordinating, and overseeing all education for our marines. 
The university is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges 
and Schools to confer Masters degrees and currently offers a Masters of 
Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, and a Masters of 
Military Studies at the Command and Staff College. The Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff currently accredits the War College, Command and 
Staff College, and the College of Continuing Education for Phase I 
Joint Education. The President of the University also exercises command 
authority over the Expeditionary Warfare School and the Staff 
Noncommissioned Officer Academies worldwide. Notable accomplishments 
include Department of Education approval of a Masters of Operational 
Studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting, which is the first step 
toward our third Master's degree program.
    Plans for the future include providing coordination and continuity 
through a coherent education plan for all marines. Our goal is to 
develop better warfighting leaders at all levels through an increased 
emphasis on relevant, structured education--at the graduate and 
undergraduate level--through both resident programs and distance 
education. Our intent is to greatly expand beyond the current emphasis 
on field-grade officers to support leadership development throughout 
the training and education continuum from marine private through 
general officer and to specifically bring senior noncommissioned 
officers further along the education continuum.
    Our lifelong learning mission is to establish an integrated 
approach to learning; providing marines with one destination for 
enrollment in a college program, access to research tools such as 
books, periodicals, and the Internet, basic skills enhancement, and 
nonresident courses. In the face of a requirement to increase tuition 
assistance from 75 percent to 100 percent of tuition costs, and the 
rate from $187.50 per semester hour to $250 per semester hour, the 
Marine Corps added the necessary funds to expand the tuition assistance 
program in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which provides sustainment until 
fiscal year 2009.
Quality of Life/Quality of Service
    Congressional support for increases in the Basic Allowance for 
Housing, as well as the aggressive Marine Corps use of the Public 
Private Venture (PPV) authority provided by Congress 5 years ago, are 
resulting in dramatic improvements to the housing of our marines and 
their families. Your continued support of our budget to help us achieve 
zero out-of-pocket expenses by fiscal year 2005 is greatly appreciated. 
The condition of other infrastructure, such as our barracks, 
workspaces, and training ranges, are also key factors in overall 
quality of life. While our infrastructure budgets reflect only the 
minimal essential military construction and re-capitalization 
necessary, they will allow us to achieve a re-capitalization rate of 67 
years within the FYDP (down from 100 years in fiscal year 1999) and an 
improvement of our facilities readiness by fiscal year 2013.
    We have been aggressively working to reduce the number of marines 
and civilian marines in non-core business areas, reapplying the marines 
to other operational requirements, and looking to optimize the use of 
civil service/contractor support where appropriate. Our track record is 
good. By example, we have reapplied marines in the garrison food 
service and mobile equipment areas back to the operating forces and 
competed a significant number of civilian positions. We will continue 
this process in line with the President's Management Agenda to review 
50 percent of our positions by fiscal year 2008. By ensuring that 
quality of service remains high, we will help maintain our successful 
record of recruitment and retention.
Families
    The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force prepared to deploy on 
short notice to accomplish assigned missions. While we may recruit 
marines, we almost always retain families--it becomes a family decision 
for a marine to stay for an entire career. Because of our expeditionary 
culture, deployment support is provided to marines and their families 
as part of our normal operations, largely through the efforts of Marine 
Corps Community Services. In addition to concerted efforts to improve 
housing and family services, security and support is offered during 
pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment phases of our 
operations. The Marine Corps also offers numerous programs focused on 
new parent support and the prevention of domestic violence, as well as 
services and programs for infants, toddlers, children, and teens. The 
Exceptional Family Member Program focuses on assistance to service 
personnel who have a family member with special needs before, during, 
and after Permanent Change of Station Orders.
Safety
    Ensuring a safe command climate and working environment remains a 
critical concern for the Marine Corps. Often, the settings and the work 
our marines do are dangerous, but effective command climates 
continually mitigate those dangers through planning and leadership. Our 
safety programs are integral to force protection and operational 
readiness. Leadership and programming in safety awareness and standards 
are vital to providing marines and their families with a meaningful 
quality of life and service. On the heels of a very successful year 
prior, fiscal year 2002 was a disappointing year for safety in the 
Corps, as we lost more marines to mishaps in fiscal year 2002 than we 
had in any single year for the preceding decade. Our aviation mishap 
rate increased as well (from 1.40 to 3.9 class A mishaps per 100,000 
flight hours).
    These results do not indicate a lack of desire to safeguard 
marines. Rather, several factors were involved that made it 
particularly difficult to prevent mishaps through normal operational 
risk management efforts. Demographically, the Marine Corps is a younger 
force than the other Services (by an average 6 to 8 years), with 
maturity being a contributing factor in many mishaps; however, none of 
these factors are excuses for any failure to avoid preventable mishaps. 
Our leadership at all levels is deeply concerned about the negative 
trend and we are actively involved in multiple efforts to improve 
readiness and save our most precious marines and valuable equipment.

             IV. OUR MAIN EFFORT--EXCELLENCE IN WARFIGHTING

    Marines have a vision for the future, and we are moving forward 
with the modernization and transformation efforts needed to make this 
vision a reality. We fully understand that our vision cannot be 
achieved independent of our sister Services. Each of the Services has 
its own critical role to play in providing for our Nation's collective 
security; however, it is important that each of our contributions be, 
simultaneously, both unique and complementary. In particular, the Corps 
stresses the importance of our key partnership with the Navy. The Navy-
Marine Corps team has never been stronger, or more necessary for our 
Nation.
    We have stated that our first concern is with the care and 
stewardship of our people. This philosophy extends to the rest of our 
programming in that we focus on procuring the programs and equipment 
that will maximize the abilities of our marines to perform effectively 
in combat. With the foundation of requirements drawn from our emerging 
concepts, the Marine Corps is transforming its warfighting systems and 
assets throughout the elements of our Marine forces. The following 
examples reflect but a few of our transformation and modernization 
efforts. A more comprehensive description of the Marine Corps' entire 
acquisition program can be found in the publication entitled Marine 
Corps Concepts & Programs 2003.
Training
    We believe the enduring wisdom, ``you train the way you fight.'' 
Because of this, our training exercises are becoming ever more joint 
and combined to provide our marines with the experience they will need 
when called upon to respond to crises--because there is no doubt that 
we will work alongside our sister Services and coalition partners from 
other nations in such circumstances. The Marine Corps Combat Training 
Center at Twentynine Palms, California, focuses on integrated live fire 
and maneuver, as well as combined arms training, and will continue to 
play a central role as our foremost training and testing site for 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Ongoing initiatives will expand the 
role of the Combat Training Center and transform it into a ``Center of 
Excellence'' that will focus the training efforts across our operating 
forces. The Combat Training Center facilitates and supports the 
development of new concepts and capabilities, thereby reinforcing our 
combat effectiveness, enhancing joint interoperability, and supporting 
Dodd transformation efforts.
    The future role of the Combat Training Center will grow beyond its 
current emphasis on battalion-level integrated live fire, combined arms 
training to support expanded training opportunities for all elements 
(ground, air, combat service support, and command) of Marine Air-Ground 
Task Forces up to and including a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This 
will include enabling multi-site, distributed training evolutions that 
tie together units from various bases; and investing in technology that 
simultaneously links live, virtual, and constructive training. 
Additionally, improvements to the existing Expeditionary Air Field and 
construction of a large-scale urban training facility are being studied 
as possible ways to enhance training opportunities at Twentynine Palms. 
All of these efforts have the potential to increase the capability of 
our training center to support evolving training requirements, enabling 
the Corps to maintain its focus on uniquely marine training skills, 
while providing a vehicle to further integrate Marine Corps 
capabilities into those of the Joint Force.
Infrastructure
    Marine Corps infrastructure consists of 15 major bases and stations 
and 185 Reserve facilities in the United States and Japan. In keeping 
with the Corps' expeditionary nature, these installations are 
strategically located near air and seaports of embarkation, and are 
serviced by major truck routes and railheads to allow for the rapid and 
efficient movement of marines and materiel. Recognized as the ``fifth 
element'' of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force because of the close link 
to the operating forces and their operational readiness, the condition 
of the Corps' bases and stations is of vital importance. With the 
ability to train as an integrated force being a fundamental requirement 
of the Corps, infrastructure development planning is designed to 
provide the facilities, training areas, and ranges (both air and 
ground) to accomplish this requirement while minimizing excess and 
redundant capacities. With increasing encroachment pressures and 
constrained fiscal resources, the Marine Corps face significant 
challenges to provide and maintain a lean and efficient infrastructure 
that fully meets changing mission demands.
    Blount Island Acquisition. We are committed to undertake the wisest 
possible course to conserve our real property and, when necessary, to 
acquire any additional property that is mission critical. The Blount 
Island facility in Jacksonville, Florida, is a national asset that must 
be acquired to ensure its availability for long-term use. Blount 
Island's peacetime mission of supporting the Maritime Pre-positioning 
Force is vitally important, while its wartime capability of supporting 
large-scale logistics sustainment from the continental United States 
gives it strategic significance. The facility will play a vital role in 
the national military strategy as the site for maintenance operations 
of the Maritime Pre-positioning Force for years to come. The Marine 
Corps plans to acquire the Blount Island facility in two phases. Phase 
1, funded in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001, is currently in 
progress and will acquire interests in approximately 311 acres of land 
for the primary purpose of ensuring public safety on parcels adjacent 
to the leased central management operational area. Phase 2, planned for 
fiscal year 2004, involves acquisition of the central maintenance 
operational area, consisting of over 1,000 acres.
    Training at Eglin Air Force Base. With cessation of training at 
Vieques, Puerto Rico, the established training ranges, quality of 
training support, and proximity to the ocean available at Eglin Air 
Force Base, Florida, can provide Naval Expeditionary Forces with an 
alternative training capability. Eglin's capabilities, location, and 
tenant commands provide the opportunity to facilitate joint training 
between Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Special Operations 
Forces. Development of an expeditionary force training capability at 
Eglin can support the Secretary of Defense's vision and direction for 
training transformation and the development of a Joint National 
Training Capability. This type of training will be critical to naval 
expeditionary combat-readiness.
    The Marine Corps proposes to execute two 10-day training exercises 
with a Marine Expeditionary Unit at Eglin each year. These exercises 
include a variety of scenarios such as amphibious landings, raids, 
mechanized operations, helicopter operations, and live fire and 
maneuver exercises. No final decision on training activities will be 
made until an environmental assessment currently underway is completed. 
The Navy and Marine Corps are actively working to develop and sustain 
cooperative relationships with the local community and the State of 
Florida.
    Encroachment and Environmental Issues. Encroachment--defined as any 
deliberative action that can cause the loss of, or restrict, the use of 
land, airspace, frequency, or sea maneuver areas--is a serious threat 
to the operational readiness of the Corps. Urban and residential areas 
now surround many Marine installations that were originally remotely 
situated. This growth is often accompanied by pressure for access to 
Marine Corps resources, or demands to curtail Marine Corps operations 
to make them more compatible with surrounding land uses. The Corps' 
training lands often provide excellent habitat for threatened and 
endangered species, serving as islands of biodiversity amid the crush 
of densely populated urban areas that surround many of our 
installations. The Marine Corps is proactively engaged with Federal, 
State, and local agencies and governments, as well as nongovernmental 
organizations, to provide win-win solutions to these encroachment 
pressures, and ensure compatible land usage and environmental security 
without degrading training and mission readiness. Unimpeded access to 
our installations and ranges is critical to the Marine Corps remaining 
America's ``Force in Readiness.''
    Our Nation has crafted a strong environmental code of conduct 
structured on a wide range of Federal, State, and local laws and 
regulations. Vague or inflexible environmental requirements, however, 
can present significant challenges for marines performing their primary 
mission. We support ongoing efforts to seek clarity and limited 
flexibility in certain environmental laws, so that we may more 
effectively balance our training requirements with our long-term 
environmental stewardship responsibilities. Our ultimate goal is to 
``train the way we fight,'' while preserving the natural environment. 
Today, marines at all levels perform their jobs with an increased 
awareness of potential environmental impacts. All of our bases and 
stations, for example, have implemented Integrated Natural Resource 
Management Plans and aggressive pollution prevention programs. The hard 
work does not end with these initiatives. The impact of encroachment on 
the Corps' ability to fully utilize its installations are varied and 
require constant vigilance and attention to ensure that operational 
readiness is not diminished.
Command and Control
    Interoperability is the key to improving naval expeditionary 
command and control effectiveness, especially as we begin to integrate 
battlespace sensors residing in our manned and unmanned aerial, space, 
and ground vehicles. This is particularly true as the Marine Corps 
continues to work routinely with a range of government, non-government, 
and international agencies. The command, control, communication, and 
computer (C\4\) end-to-end interoperability of the Global Information 
Grid will serve to enhance our ability to conduct joint, multi-
department, and multi-agency operations through the use of technology, 
standards, architectures, and tools.
    The Marine Corps works closely with the Joint Staff, combatant 
commanders, operating forces, and other Services to ensure that, where 
possible, joint concepts of operations are developed for common 
capabilities. An example of this process is occurring with the 
development of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which combines numerous 
single function programs of current inventories into a single, 
interoperable, joint radio program that will provide secure digital 
communications while enhancing wideband tactical networking.
Intelligence
    Our fiscal year 1996-2003 enhancements to Marine Intelligence 
Support are paying off during Operation Enduring Freedom and the global 
war on terrorism. Intelligence Support organic to Marine Forces 
combined with capabilities from our Marine Corps Intelligence Activity 
in Quantico, Virginia, to provide federated production (reachback) 
support has been validated through current operations. Marine 
Expeditionary Unit's forward deployed with organic all-source 
intelligence collection and production capabilities provide current 
intelligence support to Marine and Special Operations units. Our 
deployed signals intelligence, human intelligence, ground sensor, and 
reconnaissance teams provide the commander current situational 
awareness. All-source intelligence marines have the systems and 
training to integrate organic collection, network with the Joint Force 
on the ground, and effectively reach back to the Marine Corps 
Intelligence Activity and joint centers at secure locations.
Mobility
    While the global war on terrorism has demonstrated the current 
capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team, our continuous 
transformation and modernization efforts hold even greater potential 
for increasing naval power projection capabilities in the future. Many 
of these efforts focus on increased speed, range, payload, and 
flexibility of maneuver units--mobility. This concept includes a vision 
of an all-vertical lift Air Combat Element, with the introduction of 
tiltrotor and short-take-off/vertical-landing (STOVL) aircraft. The 
following initiatives are some of the keys to the achievement of Marine 
Corps operational mobility objectives:
    MV-22 Osprey. The MV-22 remains the Marine Corps' number one 
aviation acquisition priority. While fulfilling the critical Marine 
Corps medium lift requirement, the MV-22's increased capabilities of 
range, speed, payload, and survivability will generate truly 
transformational tactical and operational opportunities. With the 
Osprey, Marine forces operating from the sea base will be able to take 
the best of long-range maneuver and strategic surprise, and join it 
with the best of the sustainable forcible-entry capability. Ospreys 
will replace our aging fleets of CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea 
Stallion helicopters.
    KC-130J. The KC-130J will bring increased capability and mission 
flexibility to the planning table with its satellite communications 
system, survivability, and enhancements in aircraft systems, night 
systems, and rapid ground refueling. The KC-130J is procured as a 
commercial off-the-shelf aircraft that is currently in production. We 
are pursuing a multi-year program for purchase with the U.S. Air Force.
    Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV) is the Marine Corps' only Acquisition Category 
1D program and will be one of the principal enablers of the 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare concept. AAAV will provide never before 
realized high-speed land and water maneuver, a highly lethal day/night 
fighting ability, and advanced armor and nuclear-biological-chemical 
protection. This--coupled with a systematic integration into emerging 
service and Joint Command and Control networked information, 
communications, and intelligence architectures--will provide the Marine 
Corps with increased operational tempo, survivability, and lethality 
across the spectrum of operations.
    Maritime Pre-positioning Force. The Maritime Pre-positioning Force 
(Future) will be the true enabler of primarily sea-based operations. 
When it becomes operational, the future Maritime Pre-positioning Force 
role will expand beyond that of today, and will provide a true 
seabasing capability. In this regard, it will serve four functions that 
the current capability cannot: (1) Phased at-sea arrival and assembly 
of units; (2) Selective offload of equipment and cargo; (3) Long-term, 
sea-based sustainment of the landing force; and (4) At-sea 
reconstitution and redeployment of the force. The naval services are 
exploring several new technology areas during the development of 
Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future). Currently, the Maritime Pre-
positioning Force (Future) program is conducting an analysis of 
alternatives to inform an acquisition decision by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense.
    High-Speed Vessel (HSV). High-speed vessels will enhance the Marine 
Corps' capability to perform a wide range of missions, from providing 
support to a theater security cooperation plan to sustaining long-term 
operations ashore. High-speed vessels can enhance our ability to 
conduct sea-based operations and use the sea as maneuver space. HSVs do 
not have the loitering and forcible entry capabilities of amphibious 
ships or the pre-positioning capacity of our Maritime Prepositioned 
Force Squadrons. However, their shallow draft, high speed, 
maneuverability, and open architecture make them a valuable link in a 
seamless logistics system that extends from source of supply to the sea 
base and the Joint Force, enabling a faster, more responsive, and 
capable deployment of a range of force modules from forward-based 
``hubs'' such as Okinawa, or from the United States. The Marine Corps 
is currently testing and validating these concepts by employing a high-
speed vessel in the Pacific theater as a form of strategic lift.
    Power Projection Platforms. Combined with embarked marines, naval 
expeditionary warships provide the Nation with forward-presence and 
flexible crisis response forces. They also provide a truly unparalleled 
expeditionary forcible-entry capability. As part of a joint effort, the 
Marine Corps will remain capable of getting to the fight rapidly in 
order to decisively deter or defeat adversaries who try to impose their 
will on our country or its allies. A fiscally constrained programmatic 
goal of 12 Amphibious Ready Groups--one that deliberately accepts 
increased operational risk by attempting to balance force structure 
with available resources--does not change the warfighting requirement 
to lift the Assault Echelons of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades via 
future platforms for amphibious shipping. The Marine Corps supports the 
LPD-17 and a modified LHD-8 (``Plug Plus'') ship design in fiscal year 
2007 and will evaluate the adequacy of the R&D and SCN funding for the 
development of future LHA(R) ships for the remainder of the class.
    Mine Countermeasure Capabilities. Naval expeditionary forces 
require an effective countermine warfare capability to open and 
maintain sea lines of communication and to operate within the littoral 
battle space. This is probably our greatest concern when it comes to 
projecting power in an anti-access environment. With respect to mine 
countermeasures, we require a family of capabilities that encompasses 
mine detection, location, neutralization, marking, and data 
dissemination. Designed to provide an organic mine countermeasures 
capability within operationally acceptable timelines and with 
acceptable levels of operational risk, this next generation of systems 
includes the Advanced Mine Detector, the Assault Breacher Vehicle, the 
Remote Minehunting System, and the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance 
System. Our most critical mine countermeasures deficiencies exist in 
the area near the shoreline through the high water mark and beyond, 
where detection and neutralization capabilities are extremely limited. 
Given the broad proliferation of known and unknown mined areas 
throughout the world, we must improve our ability to operate in this 
exceptionally lethal environment. Our intent is to leverage America's 
strength in technology to dramatically improve our ability to locate 
and avoid or neutralize mines and obstacles as necessary, and 
eventually remove the man from the minefield.
Fires and Effects
    With the increased range and speed of expeditionary mobility 
assets, the landward area of influence of naval forces has increased by 
an order of magnitude. Consequently, the Nation requires weapon systems 
with correspondingly greater range, lethality, flexibility, and 
tactical mobility. A range of lethal and non-lethal fire-support 
programs is moving the Corps in that direction. The development and 
acquisition of non-lethal weapons systems will expand the number of 
options available to commanders confronted with situations in which the 
use of deadly force is inappropriate. The Marine Corps is developing a 
robust non-lethal capability that will address the non-lethal core 
requirements of clearing facilities, crowd control, and area denial. 
Additionally, we are enhancing the capabilities with which we can 
affect our adversaries that defy the traditional concept of weapons and 
fire-support means. Technical advances in directed-energy weapons hold 
much promise for future capabilities in this area.
    Joint Strike Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter is the next-
generation strikefighter for the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy and 
will replace the Marine Corps' AV-8B and F/A-18A/C/Ds. The JSF family 
of aircraft will include a STOVL variant, a conventional take-off and 
landing (CTOL) variant, and an aircraft carrier-capable variant. 
Commonality between the variants will reduce both development and life-
cycle costs and will result in significant savings when compared to the 
development of three separate aircraft. The Marine Corps requires that 
its STOVL variant be able to operate from large-deck amphibious ships, 
austere sites, and forward operating bases. The STOVL Joint Strike 
Fighter version can use from three to five times more airfields around 
the world than our existing conventional take-off and landing aircraft. 
Moreover, because the STOVL variant can operate from both conventional 
carriers and amphibious assault ship decks, it thereby effectively 
doubles the number of platforms available for seabased operations. The 
advantages of a stealthy STOVL strike fighter--capable of taking off 
from an expeditionary base on land or at sea, flying at supersonic 
cruise, accomplishing its mission with advanced sensors and weapons, 
and then returning to its expeditionary site--are dramatic. The STOVL 
Joint Strike Fighter will provide the reliability, survivability, and 
lethality that marines will need in the years ahead, and transform the 
very foundations of naval tactical air power for the 21st century.
    Naval Surface Fire Support. Our ability to provide fires in support 
of expeditionary forces operations beyond the beach has not kept pace 
with the dramatic increases in mobility. Critical deficiencies 
currently exist in the capability of the Navy to provide all-weather, 
accurate, lethal, and responsive fire support throughout the depth of 
the littoral in support of expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps 
supports the Navy's near-term efforts to develop an enhanced naval 
surface fire support capability with the fielding of the 5-inch/62-
caliber naval gun and the development of extended-range munitions. In 
the far-term, the Marine Corps supports the development and fielding of 
the Advanced Destroyer [DD(X)], armed with 155 mm Advanced Gun Systems 
and Land Attack Missiles, to fully meet our naval surface fire support 
requirements. Our Nation's expeditionary forces ashore will remain at 
considerable risk for want of suitable sea-based fire support until 
DD(X) joins the fleet in significant numbers.
    Indirect Fire-Support. A triad of indirect fire-support programs 
will provide needed firepower enhancements for marines in the near- to 
mid-term. The first element of the triad is the Lightweight-155 mm (LW-
155) towed howitzer needed to replace our current M-198 howitzer, which 
is at the end of its service life. The LW-155 is a joint Marine Corps-
Army effort that will meet or exceed all the requirements of the 
current system while significantly reducing its weight.
    The second element, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HIMARS), will deliver very high volumes of rocket artillery in support 
of the ground scheme of maneuver. The HIMARS will provide accurate, 
responsive general support and general support reinforcing indirect 
fires at long range, under all weather conditions, and throughout all 
phases of combat operations ashore. It will fire both precision and 
area munitions to a maximum range of 36 miles.
    The Expeditionary Fire Support System, the third system of the 
land-based fire support triad, will accompany marines in any 
expeditionary mode of operation. It will be the primary indirect fire-
support system for the vertical assault element of the ship-to-
objective maneuver force. The Expeditionary Fire Support System, as a 
system, will be internally transportable by helicopter or tiltrotor 
aircraft to allow the greatest range and flexibility of employment for 
our future operations.
    Information Operations. Defense planners are engaged in studies 
exploring Information Operations as a core military competency, fully 
integrated into both deliberate and crisis action planning. The Marine 
Corps intends to enhance our operational capability in both offensive 
and defensive Information Operations. Marine Corps doctrine and 
warfighting publications are being reviewed and revised to acknowledge 
Information Operations as a core warfighting capability fundamental to 
all operations spanning the spectrum of conflict with equal 
significance during non-combatant and humanitarian operations. We 
recognize a requirement to develop and train an Information Operations 
career force of trained professionals from the ground up in support of 
joint and interagency efforts.
    New Weapons Technologies. The Corps is particularly interested in 
adapting truly transformational weapon technologies. We have forged 
partnerships throughout the Department of Defense, other agencies, and 
with industry over the past several years in an effort to develop and 
adapt the most hopeful areas of science and technology. Several notable 
programs with promising technologies include: (1) advanced tactical 
lasers, (2) high-power microwave, non-lethal active denial systems, (3) 
free electron lasers, (4) electromagnetic guns (rail guns), and (5) 
common modular missiles for aircraft.
Logistics and Combat Service Support
    The Marine Corps logistics' vision is to significantly enhance the 
expeditionary and joint warfighting capabilities of our operating 
forces. Key warfighting capabilities encompassed in our future 
concepts--Enhanced Networked Seabasing and Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver--
will be defined by our logistic capabilities and limitations. Hence, we 
are committed to exploring and implementing actions to increase combat 
power, operational versatility, and deployability. The concept of 
focused logistics in Joint Vision 2020 is guiding the Marine Corps as 
we strive to increase the sustained forward-deployed capability of our 
forces. Future force combat service support--and the Marine Corps 
logistics that enables it--will be changing as we shift more of our 
operations to the sea base. At the forefront of this effort is the 
Marine Corps Logistics Campaign Plan that outlines essential objectives 
and tasks based upon overarching Marine Corps, naval, joint, and DOD 
concepts and guidance. Our strategy encompasses four pillars:
    Logistics Information Fusion and C2. A key to current and emerging 
warfighting capabilities is a robust and responsive logistics 
information technology capability--one that is integrated with our 
command-and-control architecture and interoperable with naval and joint 
systems. The Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) and 
shared data environment, along with the Common Logistics Command and 
Control System, provide logisticians across the Marine Corps with a set 
of common logistics assessment, planning, and execution tools that are 
interoperable with the common operating picture.
    Seamless Distribution. The single capability that defines Marine 
forces in a joint environment is its ability to sustain itself over an 
extended period of time. The principal goal is to move from defining 
sustainment in terms of deployable ``days of supply'' to a continuous 
uninterrupted sustainment capability for the force. A key element in 
achieving this is integrating current distribution processes and 
systems into broader naval and joint distribution processes. Achieving 
this capability will not only greatly enhance naval operations, but 
will be transferable to the task of sustaining Joint Forces and 
operations.
    Enhanced Equipment Readiness. The bulk of our logistics effort and 
associated ``footprint'' is driven by its equipment-support activities. 
The Marine Corps seeks to reduce the required level of support for 
equipment by greatly improving the reliability, availability, and 
maintainability of ground tactical equipment.
    Enterprise Integration. Achieving the emerging warfighting 
capabilities envisioned by future concepts require dynamic shifts in 
our logistics processes and organizations. Leading this effort toward 
logistics modernization is true enterprise integration consisting of 
GCSS-MC, process reengineering, and organizational reform.

                             V. CONCLUSION

    The major challenges confronting the Marine Corps today center on 
organizing, training, and equipping our force to better support Joint 
Force Commanders, now and in the future. The modernization programs and 
the transformational systems that we are pursuing are key to our 
ability to meet the Nation's wartime, crisis, and peacetime 
requirements. We have put into place well-conceived programs addressing 
the needs of our marines and their families, the requirement to enhance 
the current readiness of legacy systems, the critical role 
infrastructure plays in present and future readiness, and the balance 
between modernization and transformation.
    Our capabilities, combined with those of our sister Services and 
Special Operations Forces, form the integrated array of military 
capabilities America needs to confront an increasingly varied and 
threatening national security landscape. You can remain justifiably 
proud of what your Marine Corps contributes as America's forward 
engagement and expeditionary combined-arms force. We are grateful for 
the unwavering support you provide in this vitally important work.

    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
    General Jumper.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED 
                        STATES AIR FORCE

    General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished 
members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you here today. I am proud to represent the 
airmen of our United States Air Force who serve proudly beside 
the soldiers, sailors, and marines represented at the table 
here today.
    I would like to echo my support and my thanks for what this 
committee has done to improve the readiness of our forces 
around the world. There is nothing that contributes more to 
retention than to give that crew chief on the flight line the 
part he needs to fix his airplane. I share Vern Clark's 
sentiment; it has never been better in our United States Air 
Force, but it is due to the support that is felt from this 
committee, and we thank you for that.
    This year we celebrate 100 years of powered flight. Many of 
those celebrations will go on in Senator Dole's State and 
around the United States. We have come a long way since those 
days. We find ourselves in a much different world than we 
expected as we face a variety of threats from the linear 
battlefields of Iraq to the cave environments of Afghanistan.
    But these challenges have been and will continue to be met 
through a force of dedicated airmen from the active duty, the 
Guard, and the Reserve. We have all had a busy year and our 
tempo continues unchecked. Over the skies of our own United 
States, we have flown more than 25,000 fighter sorties. Today, 
the 390th Fighter Squadron from Mountain Home, Idaho, is 
overhead the Capitol even as we sit here today. They have been 
joined by tanker, airlift, and surveillance sorties 75 percent 
of which have been flown by our National Guard and Reserve over 
the United States.
    We have 14,000 airmen in and around Afghanistan today and 
have contributed to the joint effort nearly 70,000 sorties, 
including 8,000 tanker sorties, which are the heart and soul of 
our global strike effort.
    All of these things are joined by efforts in Operations 
Northern and Southern Watch, where we have had 9,000 airmen 
deployed, have flown over 14,000 sorties in this past year, and 
along with our Marine and Navy colleagues have gotten shot at 
from the ground in Iraq virtually every day of the year.
    We have also been engaged in significant humanitarian 
efforts around the world. We are all familiar with the 
disasters in Guam and, closer to home, the firefighting efforts 
that we have all been a part of.
    All this to say that our tempo is high and our people have 
been sprinting for a long time, but they never fail to answer 
the call, as you saw during your visit to overseas, Mr. 
Chairman.
    To deal with the tempo problems that have emerged since the 
demise of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold War, we 
have organized ourselves into air expeditionary forces, 
borrowing a chapter from the book of the Navy and the Marine 
Corps, trying to get ourselves into a deployable rotational 
scheme that puts predictability into the lives of our people. 
Again, this is a total force effort and includes our National 
Guard and Reserve.
    This scheme has served to graphically point out many of our 
shortages in our personnel, manning, and critical skills. We 
are having to pull 23,000 of our airmen forward from future 
rotation force packages to deal with the current situation as 
we get ready for what the President might ask us to do in 
Southwest Asia. These shortages in combat engineers, medical, 
combat communications, and security forces are but a few 
examples of what we are trying to deal with.
    Another point of stress is our aging aircraft. Along with 
our colleagues in the Navy, our average aircraft age is now 
about 23 years of age. It is the oldest we have ever had to 
deal with, and corrosion and fatigue problems that we have 
never seen before are emerging. We are looking at costs of 
repairing these aircraft rising at more than 10 percent a year.
    Engines are another problem. We have had to add inspections 
that have increased our manhours by about 200,000 manhours just 
to inspect engines in the field to catch problems before they 
happen.
    Our space systems are little different. We have done a 
great job, with the help of this committee, to replace our 
aging launch fleet with the Atlas IV with the Atlas V and the 
Delta IV rockets as well as the EELV launch systems that are 
coming into service. It is hard to believe that our defense 
satellite program is now 32 years old and our Minuteman III 
systems are 30 years old, but it is true.
    What are we doing to deal with these issues? You have seen 
the people. We have all seen the people. They will not quit. 
They will do whatever we ask them to do. Like Vern, our 
recruiting and our retention is better than it has ever been.
    One of the things that we have been asked to do by our 
Secretary of Defense as a part of his personnel transformation 
initiative is to make sure that we are making the best use of 
our people. One of the initiatives we have had at Robins Air 
Force Base in Georgia is to blend a wing of National Guard and 
active and bring them together under the leadership of a 
National Guard wing commander to make best use of the great 
experience in that Guard unit and the ready response of our 
active personnel.
    This, along with other initiatives, has been approved by 
our Secretary of Defense, and this includes educational 
opportunities. Our Secretary of the Air Force has gone with the 
Secretary of the Navy and blended the postgraduate education of 
the Naval Postgraduate School with the Air Force Institute of 
Technology so that we are not double-teaching and we share the 
same professors and the same curricula. We have even opened 
some postgraduate education opportunities to our enlisted 
force. Today at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base at the Air 
Force Institute of Technology, you will find seven Marine Corps 
enlisted along with eight U.S. Air Force enlisted enrolled 
getting master's degrees.
    All these people, Mr. Chairman, are marvelous. I had the 
opportunity this year to go give Air Force crosses to the 
widows of two of our airmen who died in Afghanistan, Senior 
Airman Jason Cunningham and Tech Sergeant John Chapman. We have 
another of those heroes with us here today. I would like to 
introduce Staff Sergeant Allen Yoshida, who is seated behind me 
here tonight. Allen was badly wounded in Afghanistan and we 
have asked him as he recovers to be a part of our effort, 
another one of the Secretary of Defense's efforts, to 
streamline our acquisition process.
    It is Sergeant Yoshida, with his direct operational 
experience, who is working directly with our acquisition 
community to get the pieces of equipment rapidly fielded that 
will make the job of the combat controller on the ground that 
much easier. We salute his service, Mr. Chairman.
    All of these acquisition initiatives are not just with what 
we do on the ground, but we have seen similar acquisition 
initiatives streamlines into our remotely piloted aircraft as 
well. As Vern Clark pointed out, we have efforts with the 
United States Navy to put ourselves together where we can in 
the remotely piloted vehicle and the conventionally armed 
unmanned vehicle programs as well.
    We have continued our development of the F/A-22. This 
airplane will give us 24-hour stealth capability for the first 
time. It has already got the qualities of the best air-to-air 
fighter in the world, but its main focus will be on what it can 
do air-to-ground, and as it moves into the future, to add the 
ability to hit moving targets in and under the weather with the 
F-22.
    Blending with the United States Army's concept of 
operations, which calls for brigade combat teams behind enemy 
lines, the F/A-22 will be able to reach the sergeants on the 
ground and put ordnance on the ground in support of them in a 
rapid way.
    We are also working toward the notion of integrating, as 
Vern Clark said, and networking along with the other Services, 
and we have asked for the Multi-Sensor Command and Control 
Aircraft to be a part of this transformation. It will 
horizontally integrate at the machine level manned, unmanned, 
and space platforms. It will allow us to coordinate our defense 
to things like cruise missiles, to which we think we are very 
vulnerable today, and it will be able to join in quickly with 
naval and land forces to do rapid targeting.
    Vern Clark likes to say that his favorite word for the 
decade is ``persistence,'' and I could not agree with him more. 
As we do remotely piloted aircraft into the future, such as 
Predator and Global Hawk, and we bring the Predator B on line 
with its six weapon stations and the ability to loiter for more 
than 30 hours, we will see great leverage come to those on the 
battlefield.
    Sir, I can tell you that one of the great improvements we 
have seen is in readiness and one of the great worries that I 
have is to make sure that we keep our training ranges available 
for all of our air, land, and sea forces. We have seen much 
about encroachment issues. Another one of Secretary Rumsfeld's 
initiatives is to maintain the edge we have in our training 
with his range readiness and preservation initiatives, which we 
ask for our support, Mr. Chairman.
    Sir, there are many other initiatives under way, not only 
in the Air Force but in the Department of Defense, that have to 
do with streamlining processes and unloading administrative 
burdens. I think we are going to see great improvements in all 
these in the future.
    Once again, let me thank all of the members of the 
committee for their support. Sir, your Air Force has never been 
more ready, and we are ready to do anything the President asks.
    Thank you very much, sir.
    [The prepared statement of General Jumper follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF

    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Air Force has an 
unlimited horizon for air and space capabilities. Our Service was borne 
of innovation, and we remain focused on identifying and developing the 
concepts of operations, advanced technologies, and integrated 
operations required to provide the Joint Force with unprecedented 
capabilities and to remain the world's dominant air and space force.
    The Wright brothers' historic flight in 1903 ushered in the dawn of 
a dramatic era of scientific, cultural, and technological advances. As 
the Air Force celebrates this centennial of powered flight, we do so 
with the recognition that, despite the daunting challenges of a more 
dynamic security environment, the next hundred years will witness 
equally fantastic achievements. The 2003 Air Force Posture Statement 
reflects this optimism. In this report, we relate some of our 
accomplishments of 2002 as well as our vision of an innovative and 
adaptive force capable of guaranteeing American air and space dominance 
for the decades to come. Our successes are America's successes; they 
are the direct result of the selfless and unconditional service by men 
and women of the total Air Force and their families.
    During the past year, and in the midst of combat and a variety of 
contingency operations, we evaluated, implemented, and validated a host 
of technological advances, organizational changes, and concepts of 
operation. These enabled us to deliver desired effects faster and with 
greater precision than at any time in the history of warfare. Such 
adaptation is characteristic of our Service, as airmen continually 
strive to push innovation ever forward en route to unprecedented air 
and space capabilities for combatant commanders, the Joint Force, and 
our Nation. In the year ahead, we will move our expeditionary Air Force 
closer to realizing the transformational imperatives of this new era, 
machine-to-machine digital integration of manned, unmanned and space 
assets, and joint command and control. Our concepts of operations 
leverage this integration, and expand our asymmetric advantages in air 
and space--advantages that are fundamental to defending America's 
interests, assuring our allies and coalition partners, and winning the 
Nation's wars.
    We recognize the responsibility for America's security is not one 
we shoulder alone. We work tirelessly toward developing and training 
professional airmen, transitioning new technologies into warfighting, 
and integrating the capabilities of our sister Services, other 
government agencies, and those of our friends abroad to act in the most 
efficient and effective manner across all operations--from humanitarian 
to combat missions. At the same time, we pay special attention to the 
consolidating aerospace industry, our acquisition processes, and our 
critical modernization challenges, to ensure we will be able to draw 
upon our core competencies for decades to come.
    Blessed with full endorsement from the American people, Congress, 
and the President, we will remain the world's dominant Air Force. We 
are honored to serve with America's airmen, and we sincerely appreciate 
the confidence in our commitment and capability to provide our great 
Nation with superiority in air and space.

                              INTRODUCTION

    As America approaches the 100th anniversary of powered flight, the 
Air Force realizes that the Nation is only in the adolescence of air 
and space capabilities. Yet we envision a future that will manifest 
dramatic advances in propulsion, operational employment, weapons 
systems, information technology, education, and training for our air 
and space forces. It is a future of unprecedented, seamless integration 
of air and space capabilities with joint command and control at the 
operational level of war, and machine-to-machine integration at the 
tactical level. We are pursuing these changes--some elementary, others 
revolutionary--which will dramatically escalate the capabilities 
available to the Joint Forces of the United States, perpetuate American 
air and space dominance, and redefine the nature of warfare.
    If there was any ambiguity about the nature of the security 
environment in this new century, the attacks of September 11, 2001 
crystallized the setting. Just as the turmoil of the previous decade 
eluded prediction, the dynamic setting of the decades ahead poses even 
greater predictive challenges as centers of power and sources of 
conflict migrate from traditional origins. No longer will it suffice to 
prepare for real and perceived threats from nation-states. Instead, 
America must apply the sum of our operational experiences and 
experimentation to develop dynamic, flexible, and adaptable forces, 
capable of dissuading, deterring, and defeating a much wider range of 
potential adversaries, while still assuring our friends and allies.
    This fluid setting underscores the need for doctrinal agility, and 
expeditious and responsive acquisition, planning, and execution across 
the spectrum of capabilities in support of homeland security--from the 
most difficult anti-access scenario to humanitarian relief. As new 
generations of technology proliferate among potential adversaries, we 
also are reminded of the need to keep pushing technology forward. In 
less than 100 years, we elevated from a Kitty Hawk biplane flying 100 
feet on a 12-second flight, to a host of sophisticated, stealthy aerial 
vehicles capable of reaching any place in the world, and an array of 
satellites that circle the globe continuously. We do not rest on these 
achievements, but instead engage a new generation of innovation. 
Therefore, our mission is to make calculated research, development, and 
procurement decisions with the resolve to integrate all of our combat, 
information, and support systems into an enterprise architecture that 
contributes joint air and space capabilities to help win the Nation's 
wars.
    Meeting these requirements also warrants our continued 
transformation into an expeditionary force with the culture, 
composition, and capabilities to fulfill our evolving operational 
tasks. As the scope of global contingencies requiring American 
involvement has multiplied, we have witnessed the substantial value of 
agility, rapid response, and integration. Thus, we are becoming ever 
more responsive in time, technology, and training, and in the process, 
we are elevating Air Force contributions to joint capabilities, while 
developing our airmen as joint warfighters.
    A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld laid out a number of key priorities 
for the Department of Defense (DOD). All of these--from pursuing the 
global war on terrorism and strengthening joint warfighting 
capabilities, to streamlining the DOD processes and improving 
interagency integration--demand across-the-board changes in the way the 
Defense Department operates. The Air Force has taken advantage of this 
opportunity to evaluate and strengthen our capabilities, and to 
fundamentally drive our investment strategy.
    As we contemplate more than a decade of unprecedented success using 
air and space power, we recognize that we never fight alone. The 
emerging interdependence of joint, coalition, and alliance partnerships 
throughout a decade of contingency warfare has been a profound lesson 
learned. Through cooperative planning, we will realize the full 
potential of our Service--bringing to bear fully integrated air and 
space capabilities.
    It is our imperative to approach this planning and integration with 
innovation and vision, fundamentally focused on capabilities. All of 
the Armed Forces are focusing on meeting the Quadrennial Defense 
Review's ``1-4-2-1'' force-shaping construct, by defining the 
fundamental capabilities required to meet the challenges of a changing 
world. These are: to defend the United States through homeland 
security; to deter aggression and coercion in the four critical regions 
of Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Asian littorals; to 
swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while being 
capable of decisive victory in one of those conflicts; and to conduct a 
number of smaller scale contingencies. A revitalized, capabilities-
focused approach to operational military requirements will allow us to 
meet these missions.
    Our focus on capabilities for an uncertain future has inspired us 
to adapt anew the way we organize, train, and equip our forces. We have 
begun by developing Task Force Concepts of Operations (TF CONOPs), 
which will define how we will fight and integrate our air and space 
capabilities with joint, coalition, and alliance forces. The 
requirements that emerge from these operational concepts will guide a 
reformed acquisition process that will include more active, continuous 
partnerships among requirement, development, operational, test, and 
industry communities working side-by-side at the program level.
    This process can only be successful with the help of a vibrant 
defense industry. Yet today the aerospace industry is consolidating to 
a point that threatens to diminish the advantages of competition. This, 
in turn, can lead to loss of innovation, diminished technical skill 
base, lower cost efficiencies, and other challenges. We must foster 
increased competition to ensure the long-term health of an industrial 
sector critical to our national security. While the Air Force will 
continue to advance the vision and associated capabilities for air and 
space, we also must challenge industry in order for it to stay on the 
cutting edge of technology and efficient management practices.
    Finally, transforming our force will not be possible without a 
process to educate, train, and offer experience to the right mix of 
Active Duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and civilian airmen 
who understand the nature of our changing security environment. To 
achieve this, we will evolve what we have traditionally called the 
``personnel'' function in new ways so as to blend Professional Military 
Education, advanced academic degrees, and assignment policies under the 
auspices of ``Force Development.''
    This is the United States Air Force in 2003--inherently innovative, 
tirelessly dedicated, and comprised of the very best airmen and 
capabilities in the world to ensure American security and defend her 
interests. This is what our Nation expects, and we will continually 
meet that expectation.

                               WHAT WE DO

    The United States Armed Forces exist to fight and win our Nation's 
wars, which no service can accomplish alone. The Air Force's pivotal 
role is to deliver fully capable and integrated air and space power to 
the Joint Force Commander (JFC). By dominating the media of elevation, 
the Air Force offers unique warfighting capabilities that leverage the 
strengths of surface forces and expand the range of potential effects.
    Air and space are realms with unlimited horizons for discovery and 
development. While the Air Force has made tremendous strides in 
realizing the visions of early airmen and exploiting the operational 
potential in each medium, we know there is an array of capabilities as 
yet undiscovered. As the Air Force strives to realize these 
possibilities, we deliver a multitude of air and space achievements for 
joint warfighting.
    Although relatively short, Air Force history reveals fundamental 
competencies that are core to developing and delivering air and space 
power--those unique institutional qualities that set the Air Force 
apart from the other Services and any other military force in the 
world. By identifying and keeping these competencies foremost in our 
vision, we are able to more effectively advance the unique 
capabilities, as well as the ultimate effects, the Air Force provides 
to the Joint Force and the Nation.
    The Air Force continually develops areas of expertise that make us 
the preeminent air and space force in the world. Previously, we 
distilled these into six distinctive capabilities which we referred to 
as our ``core competencies''--Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack, 
Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority, 
and Agile Combat Support. However, just as our concepts of operations 
and capabilities continuously evolve, so also does the way in which we 
articulate Air Force competencies. With deeper refinement, we learned 
there are more fundamental elements to what we are as an Air Force and 
how we develop our capabilities for joint warfighting. These are our 
underlying institutional air and space core competencies, those that, 
in fact, make the six distinctive capabilities possible: Developing 
Airmen, Technology-to-Warfighting, and Integrating Operations. These 
three air and space core competencies form the basis through which we 
organize, train, and equip and from which we derive our strengths as a 
service.

    (1) Developing Airmen: The heart of combat capability

    The ultimate source of air and space combat capability resides in 
the men and women of the Air Force. The potential of technology, 
organization, and strategy are diminished without professional airmen 
to leverage their value. Our Total Force of active duty, Guard, 
Reserve, and civilian personnel are our largest investment and most 
critical asset. They are airmen, steeped in our expeditionary Service 
ethos. Therefore, from the moment they step into the Air Force through 
their last day of service, we are dedicated to ensuring they receive 
the precise education, training, and professional development necessary 
to provide a quality edge second to none. The full spectrum 
capabilities of our Air Force stem from the collective abilities of our 
personnel; and the abilities of our people stem from career-long 
development of professional airmen.

    (2) Technology-to-Warfighting: The tools of combat capability

    The vision of airmen in employing air and space power fundamentally 
altered how we address conflict. As the leader in military application 
of air and space technology, the Air Force is committed to innovation 
and possesses a vision to guide research, development, and fielding of 
unsurpassed capabilities. Just as the advent of aircraft revolutionized 
joint warfighting, recent advances in low observable technologies, 
space-based systems, manipulation of information, precision, and small, 
smart weapons offer no less dramatic advantages for combatant 
commanders. The Air Force nurtures and promotes its ability to 
translate vision into operational capability in order to produce 
desired effects. Our innovative operational concepts illuminate the 
capabilities we need, allowing us to develop unsurpassed capabilities 
to prevail in conflict and avert technological surprise.
    The F/A-22 is demonstrative of this ability to adapt technology to 
warfighting capabilities. Originally envisioned as an air superiority 
fighter, it has been transformed into a multi-role system. The F/A-22 
not only brings to bear warfighting capabilities without equal for 
decades to come, but also includes those we did not foresee at its 
inception. Collectively, the platform's supercruise, stealth, 
maneuverability, and novel avionics will deliver the ability to create 
crucial battlefield effects to the hands of the warfighter, and allow 
access to revolutionary concepts of operations.

    (3) Integrating Operations: Maximizing combat capabilities

    Effectively integrating the diverse capabilities found in all four 
Services remains pivotal to successful joint warfighting. The Air Force 
contributes to this enduring objective as each element of air and space 
power brings unique and essential capabilities to the Joint Force. Our 
inherent ability to envision, experiment, and ultimately execute the 
union of a myriad of platforms and people into a greater synergistic 
whole is the key to maximizing these capabilities. In so doing, we are 
able to focus acquisition and force planning on systems that enable 
specific, effects-based capabilities, rather than on individual 
platforms.
    Embedded in our exploration of innovative operational concepts is 
the efficient integration of all military systems--air, land, maritime, 
space, and information--to ensure maximum flexibility in the joint 
delivery of desired effects across the spectrum of conflict, from war 
to operations short of war. However, effective integration involves 
more than smart technology investment--it also requires investigation 
of efficient joint and service organization and innovative operational 
thinking. Thus, investments in our people to foster intellectual 
flexibility and critical analysis are equally as important as our 
technology investments.
    Collectively, our air and space core competencies reflect the 
visions of the earliest airmen and serve to realize the potential of 
air and space forces. We foster ingenuity and adventure in the 
development of the world's most professional airmen. We seek to 
translate new technologies into practical systems while we encourage 
intellectual innovation at every level of war. We drive relentlessly 
toward integration in order to realize the potential and maturation of 
air and space capabilities.
    Our proficiency in the three institutional air and space core 
competencies underpins our ability to deliver the Air Force's six 
distinctive capabilities in joint warfighting. In turn, our 
capabilities enable desired effects across the spectrum of joint 
operations through our task forces drawn from our air and space 
expeditionary forces. The results of this relationship between core 
competencies, distinctive capabilities, and operational effects are 
manifest in the array of successful missions the Air Force accomplished 
in the past year and those we continue to execute.
Expeditionary Construct
    Our core competencies reflect a legacy of innovation and adaptation 
to accomplish our mission. This point is underscored by the fact that, 
in spite of over a 30-percent reduction in manpower in the past 12 
years, we have faced an exponential increase in worldwide taskings. 
Intensifying operations tempo (OPTEMPO) requires significant changes in 
the way our force trains, organizes, and deploys to support JFC 
requirements. We are a truly expeditionary force--the nature off our 
``business'' is deployed operations.
    The Air Force meets JFC requirements by presenting forces and 
capabilities through our Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) 
construct. This divides our combat forces into 10 equivalent AEFs, each 
possessing air and space warfighting and associated mobility and 
support capabilities. A key element of our ability to deliver these 
tailored and ready expeditionary forces is our development of Task 
Force Concepts of Operations. Our TF CONOPs describe how we fight and 
how we integrate with out sister services and outside agencies. They 
are the fundamental blueprints for how we go to war. Combined with our 
AEF construct--the principal tool we use to present expeditionary 
wings, groups, and squadrons--TF CONOPs will guide our decisions in 
operational planning, enable us to provide scalable, quick-reacting, 
tasked-organized units from the 10 standing AEFs, and sustain our 
ability to ensure trained and ready forces are available to satisfy 
operational plans and contingency requirements.
    The AEF construct incorporates a 15-month cycle during which two 
AEFs are designated as lead for a 90-day ``eligibility'' period. During 
this period, the two are either deployed or on alert for daily, 
worldwide expeditionary taskings, for which they are tailored and 
presented to the JFC as expeditionary squadrons, groups, and wings 
(depending on the specific requirement). Meanwhile, the remaining eight 
AEFs are in various stages of reconstituting, training, or preparatory 
spin-up. It is during this preparatory time (approximately 2 months) 
that we integrate the training-to-task of AEF squadrons immediately 
prior to their on-call window.
    Yet, it is important to note that while our combat forces cycle 
through deployment vulnerability periods, they sustain wartime 
readiness throughout the 15-month training and preparation cycle--a 
critical drive of our 90-day eligibility window. Our AEF cycle thus 
precludes the need for ``tiered'' readiness by allowing our combat 
forces to remain current and capable for any contingency or operational 
plan.
    While ensuring necessary capabilities for the JFC, AEF cycles allow 
us to provide our airmen with a more stable and predictable environment 
in which to train, re-fit, and equip. In addition, AEF scheduling makes 
it easier and more practicable for the Air Reserve Component (ARC) 
forces--Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG)--
to bring their essential contributions to bear by allowing them to plan 
definitive absences from their civilian employment. This is a critical 
advantage of the AEF construct, as ARC forces comprise nearly half of 
the forces assigned to AEFs and contribute the majority of forces for 
some mission areas.
Operations in 2002
    Confident in our air and space capabilities, and committed to 
meeting any mission tasked, the Air Force completed an unprecedented 
array of operations and exercises in 2002. From the mountain ranges in 
Afghanistan and the jungles of the Philippines to the deserts of the 
Middle East, and across every continent and body of water, the Air 
Force joined with land and naval forces to secure America's national 
objectives. With each mission, the Joint Force grows more capable as it 
applies vision, experimentation, and integration to every undertaking. 
We do not act as individual services, but in concert as joint 
warfighters, as we prevail in the war on terrorism and in all 
undertakings.
    Assuring our Nation's citizens, the Air Force conducts a range of 
alert postures involving more than 200 military aircraft at over 20 
airbases for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). In conjunction with 
unprecedented NATO airborne warning support and other U.S. assets, we 
have provided continuous combat air patrols over sensitive/high risk 
areas, and random patrols over other metropolitan areas and key 
infrastructure. Last year, we flew over 25,000 ONE fighter, tanker, 
airlift, and airborne warning sorties, made possible only through the 
mobilization of over 30,000 Reserve component airmen. In fact, the ANG 
and AFRC have effected over 75 percent of the total ONE missions. We 
will continue this critical mission, as we execute our most fundamental 
responsibility--homeland defense.
    Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the USAF has 
maintained a continuous, steady-force presence in Afghanistan and the 
rest of the area of responsibility with more than 14,000 airmen. Air 
Force assets provide crucial intelligence and situation awareness, 
combat power, and support capabilities for the combatant commander. A 
key reason for American military success in the region is the 
performance of Air Force special operations airmen. Working in teams 
with other special forces, ground units, and coalition elements, airmen 
special operators heroically bring to bear the full weight of air and 
space capabilities--from the ground. They introduce our adversaries to 
the full lethality of our airmen, fully integrated on the ground, in 
the air, and from space.
    Fully engaged in all aspects of the war on terrorism, from mobility 
to close air support, our aircraft and crews flew more than 40,000 OEF 
sorties in 2002--over 70 percent of all coalition sorties. Over 8,000 
refueling missions marked the linchpin capability for the joint fight--
the tanker force--while the magnificent achievements of airlift assets 
rounded out overwhelming mobility efforts. Simply put, Air Force 
mobility forces made operations in a distant, land-locked nation 
possible.
    Beyond air operations, we operated and maintained several 
constellations of earth-orbiting satellites. In 2002, we launched 18 
missions with a 100-percent success rate--including the first space 
launches using Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. These activities 
bolstered America's assured access to space and ensured vigorous, 
global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile 
warning, precision navigation and timing, communications, and weather 
systems. In addition, manned, unmanned, and space ISR assets not only 
delivered unprecedented battlefield awareness, but with the Predator 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), also introduced transformational combat 
capabilities.
    ONE and OEF levied particularly heavy demands on our security 
forces. In CONUS and forward locations, increased alert postures 
warranted significant increases in security personnel who constitute a 
critical element of our force protection capabilities. These demands 
have raised our force protection posture worldwide and have forced us 
to adjust to a new ``steady state'' condition. Security forces bear the 
brunt of the adjustment effort despite a resultant baseline shortfall 
of approximately 8,000 personnel to meet the alert postures. In the 
near term, we involuntarily extended for a second year nearly 9,500 ARC 
security forces. However, in order to relieve these ARC forces, we 
concluded a 2-year agreement with the Army for short-term support, and 
initiated several ongoing efforts to combine technology, new processes, 
and some manpower shifts to achieve a long-term adjustment to this new 
era.
    As we adjust, we continue to deliver force protection through the 
integrated application of counter and antiterrorism operations, and 
preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosive (CBRNE) incidents. We employ a tailored selection and 
application of multi-layered active and passive, offensive and 
defensive measures. Intelligence and counterintelligence programs 
support this integrated effort and remain critical to our success. In 
this regard, we continued to develop and employ all-source intelligence 
systems, cross-functional intelligence analysis procedures, and an 
operational planning process to implement force protection operations 
that deter, detect, deny, and destroy threats. Our goal is to see 
first, understand first, and act first.
    Though engaged in these security enhancements and the global war on 
terrorism, our combat operations were not limited to OEF in 2002. Iraqi 
forces fired on coalition aircraft over 400 times during 14,000 sorties 
supporting Operations Northern Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW). 
The Air Force maintained a continuous, regional presence of more than 
9,000 airmen, while air and space assets provided vital intelligence, 
situation awareness, and indications and warning to monitor Iraq's 
compliance with United Nations' directives.
    Whether on the ground or in the skies, our airmen also conducted a 
host of other missions above-and-beyond standing security requirements 
around the globe. Even though the war on terrorism is our national 
military focus, airmen joined soldiers, sailors, and marines in the 
Balkans, South America, Europe, Asia, and around the world to assure 
our friends and allies, while deterring and dissuading our adversaries.
    Worldwide humanitarian and non-combat evacuation operations 
missions remain other key tasks for Air Force personnel. In 2002, for 
example, airlift crews exceeded 2.4 million airdropped daily ration 
deliveries in Afghanistan, evacuated allied personnel at threatened 
locations around the world, and flew typhoon relief missions to Guam, 
while our explosive ordnance specialists removed unexploded munitions 
in Africa. Yet, while conducting unprecedented food, medical, civil 
engineering, and evacuation relief efforts in warring regions, we were 
also on call to perform critical, quick-response missions during 
natural or man-made crises at home. Through explosive ordnance 
disposal, firefighting, law enforcement support, and rapid medical 
response expertise, we conducted daily operations in support of local, 
State, and Federal agencies. During the wildfire season, ANG and AFRC 
C-130s equipped with modular airborne fire fighting systems flew nearly 
200 sorties while assisting U.S. Forest Service firefighting efforts in 
numerous States. In addition, when Hurricane Lili endangered Louisiana, 
Air Force aeromedical and critical care forces rolled in with C-9 
aircraft to transport and safeguard 40 patients from threatened 
hospitals.
Training Transformation
    Training is a unique American military strength. As potential 
adversaries work to overcome our technological superiority, it is 
imperative we enhance this strength through improved proficiency at the 
tactical level and integration at the joint level. Training is integral 
to our core competencies and the critical enabler for military 
capabilities, so we are engaged with the other services, unified 
commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in 
developing and implementing a training transformation plan. Our 
objective is to train as we will fight and increase the joint context 
of our exercises through live, virtual, distributed, and constructive 
environments. It is the realism of this training that gives us the edge 
in combat. This involves not only modernizing the integration of space 
and information operations on our ranges, but also planning for their 
sustainment to meet future test and training missions while 
implementing environmentally sound use and management to ensure long-
term availability. Additionally, to expand range support for current 
and emerging missions, we are embarking on a new effort to identify and 
procure environmental, airspace, and spectrum resources at home and 
abroad. Balancing competing economic and environmental needs for these 
resources is a growing challenge we face with our regulatory and 
community partners. To support this effort, DOD developed the Range and 
Readiness Preservation Initiative. This legislation recommends 
clarification to environmental laws that, as currently written and 
interpreted, can adversely affect resources available to support 
training activities at ranges.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Exercises, Interoperability Training, and 
        Experimentation
    We advanced joint and combined interoperability skills with our 
sister services and those of 104 nations throughout 111 JCS exercises 
and Joint Task Force (JTF) experimentation, conducted in 40 foreign 
countries. Exercises ranged from large field training such as Bright 
Star, to command post exercises like Positive Response, to smaller, but 
equally valuable, humanitarian exercises, as in the school 
construction, well drilling, and medical clinic visits of New Horizons-
Jamaica. These activities provided realistic training and enhanced the 
effectiveness of all participating nations' forces.
Task Force Enduring Look
    Success in future operations hinges upon our ability to learn from 
previous operations and exercises. To ensure we learn from ongoing 
operations and adapt accordingly, we established Task Force Enduring 
Look (TFEL). TFEL is responsible for Air Force-wide data collection, 
exploitation, documentation, and reporting for our efforts in ONE/OEF. 
The objective for TFEL is clear--provide superior support to the 
warfighter and properly recognize and apply lessons learned during 
rather than only at the conclusion of these operations.
    Through extensive investigation and analysis, TFEL examines joint 
warfighting effectiveness, determines implications, and shapes future 
Air Force transformation of expeditionary air and space power. The task 
force documents lessons learned in a variety of products that cover 
every conceivable subject matter. As derivative campaigns unfold, TFEL 
will broaden its assessments in follow-on reports. Applying the lessons 
in these reports and adapting from our past experiences will help 
ensure we prevail in future operations.
    We are able to accomplish the full spectrum of air and space 
missions and improve our capabilities through lessons learned, by 
focusing on the best way to organize, train, and equip. Creativity, 
ingenuity, and innovation are the hallmarks of all that we do, all of 
which begins with our people.
                               who we are
        ``No arsenal and no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so 
        formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. 
        It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It 
        is a weapon that we as Americans do have.'' President Ronald 
        Reagan, 20 January 1981

    America is blessed with vast resources, and chief among these is 
her people. In the same way, the Air Force relies on the officers, 
enlisted, civilians, and contractors that comprise our Total Force--
active duty, Guard, and Reserve--for cultural strength and unbridled 
skill. Air Force strength will never reside in systems alone, but in 
the airmen operating them. Nor will our capabilities improve solely 
through technology, but instead through the adaptive insight of our 
creative and selfless professionals.
    Therefore, we recruit and retain a remarkably diverse group to 
ensure we reach the fullest potential of air and space forces. Their 
backgrounds reflect the cross-section of American culture--all races, 
religions, economic and educational backgrounds, skill and management 
levels, men and women--and make this Air Force the tremendous 
organization it is today. Just as diverse individual citizens find 
unity in the term American, our personnel embrace an identity and 
fundamental perspective as airmen.
    The underlying qualities found in all airmen emanate from our core 
values--integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all 
that we do. Embedded in these core values are the inherent 
characteristics of our confident, capable airmen--courage, tenacity, 
professionalism, vision, pride, and, when faced with seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles, heroism. Indeed, today's airmen carry on the 
traditions and visions of the earliest generation of airmen while 
preparing for the challenges of the future.
    The diversity of our airmen energizes the advancement of America's 
air and space power. Airmen embrace transformational ideas and seek to 
apply them to every aspect of the Air Force, from organizational 
constructs to concepts of operations and employment. They are able 
stewards of the Nation's space programs, advancing ideas and 
technologies for national security, as well as for the environmental 
and economic benefit of our Nation and the world. Yet, ultimately our 
standout advantage is our warrior airmen themselves, who demonstrate 
skills and dedication in combat unsurpassed by any in history. Whether 
maintaining safe skies across the United Nations' sanctioned no-fly one 
in Iraq, hunting down terrorists in the jungles of the Philippines, or 
paying the ultimate price while rescuing fellow Americans in a battle 
on an Afghan ridge, our airmen are proven combat veterans. Their 
selflessness resonates the very best of our Service.
    Airmen are expeditionary--our natural state of operations is not 
``home station,'' but rather, deployed. After two successful cycles, 
our AEF construct has been validated as an effective means of meeting 
our Nation's expeditionary requirements. Yet we continue to enhance the 
construct by initiating significant organizational change to ensure 
nearly every airman belongs to 1 of the 10 AEFs. The effect has been a 
change to our airmen's mindset and culture, where an individual's AEF 
association cultivates an expeditionary perspective and a clearer 
appreciation for joint warfighting requirements and capabilities.
Force Development--A New Leadership Development Paradigm
    In the past, we addressed aspects of career development, education, 
and assignments individually, but not necessarily in a coordinated, 
connected approach. Recognizing this, and to prepare for the future 
more ably, we introduced a systemic, deliberate force development 
construct that evolves professional airmen into Joint Force warriors. 
This construct coordinates doctrine and policies, concentrated to 
provide the right level, timing, and focus of education, training, and 
experience for all airmen, while encompassing personal, team, and 
institutional leadership skills across tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels.
    In the 21st century, we need air and space warriors with mastery of 
their primary skills and others who possess competency beyond their own 
specialty. However, this diversity must be deliberate to ensure the 
correct skills are paired according to institutional requirements. 
Force development encourages many to obtain a deep perspective in their 
functional area, but at the same time offers the broader perspective we 
need to complement our leadership team. We begin this transformation 
with the active duty officer corps and will eventually encompass the 
civilian, enlisted, and Reserve component to better meet the expanding 
challenges of tomorrow.
Education and Technical Training--Emphasis on Joint Leadership/Warfare
    As opportunities resident in advancing technologies unfold, it is 
imperative that the Air Force be able to draw upon a vibrant collection 
of educated, technically skilled, and technologically savvy airmen--
both uniformed and civilian alike. We are answering this fundamental 
need in fiscal year 2003 with aggressive and innovative initiatives to 
enhance the abilities and breadth of our force. Agile, flexible 
training is an essential investment in human capital, and our 
initiatives will ensure our investment delivers the right training to 
the right people at the right time.
    In August 2002, we began our groundbreaking Enlisted-to-Air Force 
Institute of Technology (AFIT) program. An initial cadre of senior NCOs 
began receiving world-class, graduate education to optimize them for 
greater responsibilities and challenging follow-on assignments. We will 
also provide a major influx of officers into AFIT, Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), and civilian institutions. In addition, because more than 
42 percent of our civilian force will be eligible for retirement in the 
next 5 years, we are committing significant resources to pay for 
advanced education as well as cross-functional career broadening.
    Future military missions and contingencies will require greater 
sophistication and understanding of the security environment, and our 
expeditionary force requires airmen with international insight, foreign 
language proficiency, and cultural understanding. We are working 
diligently to expand the cadre of professionals with such skill sets 
and experiences. Our education initiatives will contribute to a major 
corporate culture shift that fosters appropriate development throughout 
our airmen's careers to meet evolving force requirements.
Diversity
    Foremost among our efforts to enhance the capabilities of our 
airmen is a passionate drive for diversity. Diversity is a warfighting 
issue; it is a readiness issue. We must attract people from all 
segments of American society and tap into the limitless talents and 
advantages resident in our diverse population if we hope to reach our 
fullest potential as a fighting force. Nurturing rich representation 
from all demographics opens the door to creativity and ingenuity, 
offering an unparalleled competitive edge for air and space 
development. Today's multi-threat world also mandates that we 
invigorate in our airmen the ability to effectively think across 
cultural boundaries and functional paradigms (or stovepipes). We will 
thus recruit, train, and retain airmen without intellectual boundaries, 
uniquely capable of integrating people, weapons, ideas, and systems to 
achieve air and space dominance.
Recruiting
    It takes tremendous effort to identify and develop such airmen, yet 
the return for the Nation is immeasurable. Increased advertising, an 
expanded recruiting force with broader access to secondary school 
students, and competitive compensation prepare us to meet recruiting 
goals. Despite the challenge of mustering such a diverse and skilled 
collection of Americans, we exceeded our fiscal year 2002 enlisted 
recruiting goals and expect to surpass fiscal year 2003 objectives. We 
will adapt our goals to meet new force objectives; however, the 
capacity limitations of Basic Military Training and Technical Training 
School quotas will continue to challenge Total Force recruiting 
efforts.
    Officer recruitment presents similar challenges, yet we continue to 
attract America's best and brightest. However, we are particularly 
concerned with military and civilian scientists and engineers. We fell 
short of our accession goal for this group and have begun all-out 
recruitment and retention efforts for these critical specialties. For 
example, in fiscal year 2003 we plan to begin a college sponsorship 
program to attract scientists and engineers from universities lacking 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. In addition, we 
continue to find recruiting health care professionals especially 
difficult, so we are making adjustments to ensure improvement.
    We will also closely monitor ARC recruitment. Historically, the ANG 
and AFRC access close to 25 percent of eligible, separating active duty 
Air Force members (i.e. no break in service.) Continued high OPTEMPO 
may negatively impact our efforts in attracting Air National guardsmen, 
as well as drawing separating active duty airmen to the Air Force 
Reserve. As a result, recruiting will have to ``make up'' a substantial 
portion of accessions from that market by developing alternatives.
Retention
    The Air Force is a retention-based force. The critical skill sets 
we develop in our airmen are not easily replaced, so we expend every 
effort to retain our people--the impetus for our ``re-recruiting'' 
efforts. Overall retention plans include robust compensation packages 
that reward service, provide for a suitable standard of living, ensure 
a high quality of life, and retain the caliber of professionals we need 
to decisively win America's wars.
    For fiscal year 2002, it was difficult to calculate accurate 
retention results due to Air Force implementation of Stop Loss. 
Nonetheless, we continue to reap the benefits of an aggressive 
retention program, aided by bonuses, targeted pay raises, and quality 
of life improvements. Introducing the Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
for select office; specialties reinforces our commitment to target 
specific skill suffering significant retention challenges. However, 
many airmen retained under Stop Loss will separate throughout fiscal 
year 2003--a fact of particular concern for our rated force.
    Bonuses and special pay programs continue to be effective tools in 
retaining our members. The ANG has placed particular emphasis on 
aircraft maintenance fields, security forces, and communication and 
intelligence specialists, among others, by offering enlistment and 
reenlistment bonuses, Student Loan Repayment program, and the 
Montgomery GI Bill Kicker program. Another example is the flexible 
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program--an important part of our 
multi-faceted plan to retain pilots. In conjunction with our rated 
recall program, our fiscal year 2002 plan resulted in a substantial 
increase in committed personnel. We have a similarly designed ACP 
program in fiscal year 2003, and developed extensions to include 
navigators and air battle managers.
Summary
    Regardless of AEF deployment or home station missions, our airmen 
accomplish their duties with firm commitment and resolute action. It's 
what we do. It's who we are: a practical, technically sound, ingenious 
force of uniformed and civilian airmen derived from this richly diverse 
nation to create the world's premier air and space power.

                           WHERE WE'RE GOING

    The first hundred years of powered flight witnessed tremendous and 
enduring innovation. We commemorate this centennial during 2003 with 
the theme, Born of Dreams, Inspired by Freedom, which recognizes the 
remarkable accomplishments of generations of airmen. Today's airmen are 
equally impassioned to bring dreams to reality as we pursue our vision 
of tomorrow's Air Force, Unlimited Horizon. Through this vision, we 
build a bridge from today's existing capabilities to those required to 
win tomorrow's wars.
    Ultimately, our success will be measured by our ability to provide 
our forces with assured freedom to attack and freedom from attack. 
Achieving such victory in tomorrow's battlespace will demand our full 
integration with fellow services, allies, and coalition partners--an 
essential part of the expeditionary construct. Through our security 
cooperation efforts, we build these international defense relationships 
and allied capabilities to ensure we have the access, interoperability, 
and international support for our worldwide commitments. Toward this 
requirement, we are working with our sister services to develop truly 
joint concepts of operations that integrate the full spectrum of land, 
sea, air, space, and information warfighting capabilities. When America 
places its men and women in uniform into harm's way, we owe them 
preeminent resources, planning, and organization to achieve victory 
over any adversary.
Capabilities-Based CONOPs
    While adapting to the new strategic environment, our principal 
focus has been transitioning from a platform-based garrison force to a 
capabilities-based expeditionary force. No longer platform-centric, we 
are committed to making warfighting effects, and the capabilities we 
need to achieve them, the driving force behind our ongoing 
transformation. From this point forward, all of our operational, 
programming, and budget decisions will be supported by a predefined 
capability.
    Our emerging TF CONOPs will help make this essential shift by 
providing solutions to a variety of problems warfighters can expect to 
encounter in the future. Whether detailing our plans for operating in 
an anti-access environment or identifying how to deliver humanitarian 
rations to refugees, TF CONOPs lend focus on the essential elements 
required to accomplish the mission. They cover the complete spectrum of 
warfighting capabilities (deep strike, information, urban, 
psychological operations, etc.) and enable us to tailor forces 
(expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons) from existing AEFs to meet 
JFC's requirements. Responsibility for CONOPs development falls to the 
major commands, with a senior officer on the HQ USAF air staff assigned 
to each CONOPs to serve as their ``Champion,'' facilitating the 
process.
    TF CONOPs directly support Secretary Rumsfeld's efforts to free 
scarce resources trapped in bureaucracy and push them to the 
warfighter. They will also be the focal point for a capabilities-based 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM). In support of this effort, our 
Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment analyzes and assesses 
shortfalls, health, risks, and opportunities, while prioritizing 
required future capabilities. This helps CONOPs developers articulate 
any disconnects between required capabilities and developing programs, 
while providing senior Air Force leadership an operational, 
capabilities-based focus for acquisition program decisionmaking. TF 
CONOPs include:

         Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) employs joint power-
        projection capabilities to engage anti-access and high-value 
        targets, gain access to denied battlespace, and maintain 
        battlespace access for all required joint/coalition follow-on 
        operations.
         Global Response Task Force (GRTF) combines 
        intelligence and strike systems to attack fleeting or emergent, 
        high-value, or high-risk targets by surgically applying air and 
        space power in a narrow window of opportunity, anywhere on the 
        globe, within hours.
         Homeland Security Task Force (HLSTF) leverages Air 
        Force capabilities with joint and interagency efforts to 
        prevent, protect, and respond to threats against our homeland--
        whether within or beyond U.S. territories.
         Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
        Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (Space & C\4\ISR) 
        Task Force harnesses horizontal integration of manned, 
        unmanned, and space systems to provide persistent situation 
        awareness and executable decision-quality information to the 
        JFC.
         Global Mobility Task Force (GMTF) provides regional 
        combatant commanders with the planning, command and control 
        (C\2\), and operations capabilities to enable rapid, timely, 
        and effective projection, employment, and sustainment of U.S. 
        power in support of U.S. global interests--precision delivery 
        for operational effects.
         Nuclear Response Task Force (NRTF) provides the 
        deterrent ``umbrella'' under which conventional forces operate, 
        and, if deterrence fails, avails a rapid scalable response.
         Air and Space Expeditionary CONOPs is the overarching 
        context, which identifies and sequences distinctive 
        capabilities and broad-based functions that air and space power 
        provide the JFC to generate desired effects for national 
        military objectives.

    The Air Force is transforming around these Task Force Concepts of 
Operations. In addition to serving as a roadmap for operators, the TF 
construct will form the basis for resource allocation, future system 
acquisitions, and POM submissions in order to find capabilities-based 
solutions to warfighter problems.
Science and Technology (S&T)--Wellspring of Air and Space Capabilities
    Reaching these warfighter solutions rests in large measure with 
research and development. Through robust investment and deliberate 
focus in science and technology, the Air Force invigorates our core 
competency of technology-to-warfighting. Combined with innovative 
vision, S&T opens the direct route towards transforming air and space 
capabilities. Therefore, we continue long-term, stable investment in 
S&T to ensure we realize future capabilities, as well as those that may 
immediately affect existing systems.
    We are improving our S&T planning and collaboration with other 
services and agencies to ensure; we: 1) encourage an operational pull 
that conveys to the S&T community a clear vision of the capabilities we 
need for the future; 2) address the full spectrum of future needs in a 
balanced and well-thought out manner; and 3) enhance our ability to 
demonstrate and integrate promising technologies. Some of these new 
technologies--UAV systems, laser-based communications, space-based 
radar, and others--show clear promise for near-term, joint warfighting 
applications. Others present opportunities we can only begin to 
imagine. We are exploring each of these technologies, and our 
investment will deliver the required capabilities of our CONOPs.
Executive Agent for Space
    Embedded in all of our TF ONOPs, and indeed within most military 
operations, is an extensive reliance on systems resident in space. The 
Air Force proudly fulfills the role of the Department of Defense 
Executive Agent for Space with confidence and enthusiasm. Our ability 
to execute this tremendous responsibility stems from a natural outflow 
of our core competencies and distinctive capabilities. Accordingly, and 
in conjunction with the other Services and agencies, we are shaping a 
new and comprehensive approach to national security space management 
and organization.
    Our capstone objective is to realize the enormous potential in the 
high ground of space, and to employ the full spectrum of space-based 
capabilities to enable joint warfighting and to protect our national 
security. The key to achieving this end is wholesale integration: 
through air, land, space, and sea; across legacy and future systems; 
among existing and evolving concepts of operations; and between 
organizations across all sectors of government. We will continue to 
deliver unity of vision, effort, and execution to fulfill our mission 
of delivering the most advanced space capabilities for America.
Drawing Effects from Space
    Our horizon is truly unlimited, extending beyond the atmospheric 
environs of airpower to the reaches of outer space. Our proud Air Force 
tradition of airpower is joined by an equally proud and continually 
developing tradition of space power.
    In the early days of the space age, only those at the strategic 
level received and exploited the benefits of space capabilities. The 
current state of affairs, however, is decidedly different. The former 
distinctions between classified and unclassified programs among 
military, civil, and commercial applications are growing increasingly 
blurred--in some cases, they are virtually seamless. In short, space 
capabilities now are woven deeply into the fabric of modern society, 
and they have altered forever the way we fight wars, defend our 
homeland, and live our lives.
    It is in this context and this understanding of the widespread and 
increasing importance of space systems that we strive to meet present 
and future national security challenges by providing dominant space 
capabilities that will:

         Exploit Space for Joint Warfighting. Space 
        capabilities are integral to modern warfighting forces, 
        providing critical surveillance and reconnaissance information, 
        especially over areas of high risk or denied access for 
        airborne platforms. They provide weather and other earth-
        observation data, global communications, precision navigation, 
        and guidance to troops on the ground, ships at sea, aircraft in 
        flight, and weapons en route to targets. All of these 
        capabilities, and more, make possible the tremendous success 
        our joint warfighters achieve during combat operations.
          We will enhance these existing capabilities and, where it 
        makes sense, pursue new ones such as the Transformational 
        Communications System (TCS), which will strive to dramatically 
        increase bandwidth and access for warfighters, and Space Based 
        Radar, which will complement the airborne Joint Surveillance 
        Target and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) while migrating Ground 
        Moving Target Indicators (GMTI) into space. We will also 
        develop methods and technologies to enhance our Nation's 
        ability to conduct rapid and accurate global strike operations 
        anywhere in pursuit of U.S. interests.
         Pursue Assured Access to Space. We cannot effectively 
        exploit space for joint warfighting if we do not have 
        responsive, reliable, and assured access to space. In August 
        2002, the new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle got off to a 
        strong start with the successful launch of Lockheed Martin's 
        Atlas V booster. Boeing's Delta IV program added to the 
        Nation's quiver of modern launch vehicles with liftoff in 
        November 2002. We will also pursue advanced and highly 
        versatile reusable launchers and small expendables with 
        extremely short response times to achieve long-term assured 
        access, while taking the necessary steps to maintain and 
        improve our space launch infrastructure.
         Preserve our Freedom to Act in Space. We must be able 
        to act freely in space, or risk losing those capabilities 
        essential to joint warfighting. We initiated efforts to 
        increase our space situation awareness, beginning with the new 
        Space Situation Awareness Integration Office at Air Force Space 
        Command, and a similar program at the Space and Missile Systems 
        Center. Future efforts are planned to develop strategy, 
        doctrine, and programs to improve the protection of our own 
        space capabilities while denying the benefits of joint space 
        capabilities to our adversaries.

    As it is with all Air Force capabilities, the most important 
resource for national space capabilities is neither technological nor 
fiscal--it is human. Our Space Professional Strategy fulfills a Space 
Commission recommendation to develop space professionals and nurture a 
cadre to lead our national security space endeavors at all levels in 
the decades ahead. These space-expert airmen will be the core stewards 
of space operations, and shoulder the responsibility for aggressively 
advancing joint warfighting capabilities into the high ground frontier.
Horizontal Integration of Manned, Unmanned, and Space Assets
    The essence of transformation is found in leveraging the Nation's 
technological dominance to create maximum asymmetrical advantage. 
Airmen seek unrestricted boundaries when looking at war planning from a 
theater-wide perspective, or talking about national elements of power. 
Simply stated, it is in the way we think--we must take advantage of it.
    Our foremost objective is to develop the capability to conduct 
rapid and precise operations to achieve desired effects and shape the 
battlespace for the Joint Force. This requires interfacing numerous DOD 
and national assets--the seamless, horizontal integration of manned, 
unmanned, and space-based systems. An essential element is designing 
systems that use digital-level, machine-to-machine conversations to 
expedite data flow and ensure the JFC receives timely, decision-quality 
information. Such integration will dramatically shorten the find, fix, 
track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) cycle. In the end, we know 
that neither JFC's guiding operations, nor special operators putting 
iron on targets, care what source provides the target data. It is an 
effect they seek, and what we will provide.
    Key to the warfighter's success is Predictive Battlespace Awareness 
(PBA). PBA requires in-depth study of an adversary well before 
hostilities begin. Ultimately, we want to be able to anticipate his 
actions to the maximum extent possible. PBA-derived insights allow us 
to utilize critical ISR assets for confirmation rather than pure 
discovery once hostilities begin. We are then able to analyze 
information to assess current conditions, exploit emerging 
opportunities, anticipate future actions, and act with a degree of 
speed and certainty unmatched by our adversaries.
    Along this path, we are transitioning from collecting data through 
a myriad of independent systems (Rivet Joint, AWACS, JSTARS, space-
based assets, etc) to a Multi-sensor Command and Control Constellation 
(MC2C) capable of providing the JFC with real-time, enhanced 
battlespace awareness. Today, this transition is restricted by the 
necessity to rely on low density/high demand (LD/HD) C\4\ISR assets. 
The limitation inherent in LD/HD platforms forces us to shift their 
exploitation capabilities between theaters to cover emerging global 
threats and events. This suboptimizes overall battlespace awareness and 
limits our efforts at predictive analysis. In the interim, responsive 
space-based ISR assets will help mitigate our over-stressed LD/HD 
systems. Yet ultimately, we need a synergistic combination of military 
and commercial assets, advanced data processing capabilities, and 
assured reachback to achieve true battlespace awareness.
    In the future, a single widebody platform employing tunable 
antennas and sensors--Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft 
(MC2A)--will replace many of the C\4\ISR functions of today's 
specialized, but independent assets. Air, ground, and space assets will 
comprise the MC2C, which will elevate Joint Forces Air Component 
Commanders' ability to command and control air assets. Additionally, 
every platform will be a sensor on the integrated network. Regardless 
of mission function (C2, ISR, shooters, tankers, etc), any data 
collected by a sensor will be passed to all network recipients. This 
requires networking all air, space, ground, and sea-based ISR systems, 
command and control (C2) nodes, and strike platforms to achieve shared 
battlespace awareness and a synergy to maximize our ability to achieve 
the JFC's desired effects.
    Uniting joint and coalition information presents the most difficult 
challenge in providing one common operational picture for key 
decisionmakers. We are working closely with our sister services to 
eliminate the seams between existing systems and taking the necessary 
steps to ensure all future acquisitions are planned and funded to meet 
the interoperability requirements of future joint CONOPs.
    A critical element of successful information merging is 
communications, as bandwidth is finite and requires careful management. 
Long-range or penetrating systems must communicate beyond the horizon 
despite adversaries' attempts to exploit or interrupt these links. To 
counter disruption, all systems must be reliable, secure, and 
bandwidth-efficient. The PBA construct facilitates this objective by 
eliminating constrictive, stove-piped communications systems while 
emphasizing networked operations.
    We will realize the vision of horizontal integration in our TF 
CONOPs. GSTF, for example, will deliver the right-sized mix of assets 
with appropriate sensors capable of penetrating into enemy airspace. 
Such sensors may be low observable and/or expendable, mounted on either 
ISR platforms or imbedded into strike platforms. Sensors may consist of 
Special Operations Forces, inserted before the commencement of 
hostilities, who communicate with attack platforms during combat via 
secure electronic writing tablets, annotating targets, and threats on 
the imagery display with a stylus. As technology progresses, and where 
it makes sense, a significant portion of ISR functionality will likely 
migrate to space, affording 24/7 persistence and penetration. Likewise, 
advanced defensive counterspace capabilities will afford these systems 
protection from enemy actions.
    Combining manned, unmanned, and space-based assets with dynamic C2 
and PBA transforms disparate collection and analysis activities into a 
coherent process, allowing the warfighter to make timely, confident, 
and capable combat decisions. This is what the Air Force brings to the 
joint fight. It is what air and space warriors are all about. We unlock 
the intellectual potential of airmen who think across the dimensions of 
mediums and systems capabilities for the joint warfighter.
Addressing the Recapitalization Challenges
    Despite new CONOPs and visions for future capabilities, we cannot 
rely on intellectual flexibility to eradicate the challenge of old 
systems and technologies. Though creativity may temporarily reduce the 
negative impacts of aging systems on our operational options, 
ultimately there are impassable limits created by air and space system 
hardware issues.
    We have made tremendous strides in modernizing and improving 
maintenance plans for our aircraft; however, the tyranny of age has 
introduced new problems for old aircraft. Reality dictates that if we 
completely enhance the avionics and add new engines to 40-year-old 
tankers and bombers, they are still 40-year-old aircraft, and subject 
to fleet-threatening problems such as corrosion and structural failure.
    This is equally true for our tighter aircraft, where once cutting-
edge F-117s now average over 15 years of age, and mainstay air-
dominance F-15Cs are averaging nearly 20 years of service. With double-
digit surface-to-air missile systems, next-generation aircraft, and 
advanced cruise missile threats proliferating, merely maintaining our 
aging fighter and attack aircraft will be insufficient. In fact, the 
dramatic advances offered in many of our TF CONOPs cannot be realized 
without the addition of the unique capabilities incorporated in the F/
A-22. Simply stated, our legacy systems cannot ensure air dominance in 
future engagements--the fundamental element for Joint Force access and 
operations. We will thus continue executive oversight of F/A-22 
acquisition in order to ensure program success. While keeping our 
funding promises, we will procure the only system in this decide that 
puts munitions on targets, and which is unequally capable of detecting 
and intercepting aircraft and cruise missiles.
    Although ultimately solving these recapitalization challenges 
requires acquisition of new systems, we will continue to find 
innovative means to keep current systems operationally effective in the 
near term. We know that just as new problems develop with old systems, 
so too do new opportunities for employment, such as our employment of 
B-1s and B-52s in a close air support role during OEF. We will also 
pursue new options for these long-range strike assets in a standoff 
attack role for future operations.
    Unlike with the aforementioned air-breathing assets, we cannot make 
service life extensions or other modifications to our orbiting space 
systems. Satellites must be replaced regularly to account for hardware 
failures, upgrade their capabilities, and avoid significant coverage 
gaps. Additionally, we must improve outmoded ground control stations, 
enhance protective measures, continue to address new space launch 
avenues, and address bandwidth limitations in order to continue 
leveraging space capabilities for the joint warfighter. We are 
exploring alternatives for assuring access to space, and a key aspect 
of this effort will be invigorating the space industrial base.
    Finally, it is imperative that we address the growing deficiencies 
in our infrastructure. Any improvements we may secure for our air and 
space systems will be limited without a commensurate address of 
essential support systems. Deteriorated roofs, waterlines, electrical 
networks, and airfields are just some of the infrastructure elements 
warranting immediate attention. Our ability to generate air and space 
capabilities preeminently rests with the ingenuity of visionary ideas, 
yet intellectual versatility must be supported by viable systems and 
structures to realize our Service potential.
Organizational Adaptations
    Commensurate with our drive to enhance air and space capabilities 
is our identification and development of organizational structures to 
aid these advances. In 2002, we initiated numerous adaptations to more 
efficiently and effectively exploit Air Force advantages for the joint 
warfighter.
Warfighting Integration Deputate
    Comprehensive integration of the Air Force's extensive C\4\ISR 
systems is paramount for our future capabilities. This requires an 
enterprise approach of total information-cycle activities including 
people, processes, and technology. To achieve this, we created a new 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration (AF/XI), which brings 
together the operational experience and the technical expertise of 
diverse elements (C\4\ISR, systems integration, modeling and 
simulation, and enterprise architecture specialties.)
    This new directorate will close the seams in the F2T2EA kill chain 
by guiding the integration of manned, unmanned, and space C\4\ISR 
systems. AF/XI's leadership, policy, and resource prioritization will 
capitalize on the technologies, concepts of operations, and 
organizational changes necessary to achieve horizontal integration and 
interoperability.
    Success has been immediate. AF/XI worked with the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Air and Space Operations to champion increased Air Operations 
Center weapon system funding in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which 
accelerated the stabilization and standardization of the weapon system. 
Subsequently, the base-lined weapon system now has a modernization 
plan, which is both viable and affordable. AF/XI also led analysis that 
highlighted imbalances among collection and exploitation capabilities. 
As a result, we plan to accelerate ground processing and exploitation 
capabilities within the future years defense program to close the gap. 
Major contributions in management of the complex information 
environment will continue, as AF/XI makes better use of scarce 
resources, allowing the Air Force to provide the joint warfighter the 
capabilities to dominate the battlespace.
Chief Information Officer (AF/CIO)
    Partnered with AF/XI, the AF/CIO shares responsibility to spearhead 
the transformation to an information-driven, network-centric Air Force. 
These two organizations orchestrate the integration within our 
information enterprise, and establish processes and standards to 
accelerate funding and ensure priorities match our integrated 
information vision.
    The AF/CIO's specific mission is to promote the most effective and 
efficient application, acquisition, and management of information 
technology resources under an enterprise architecture. The goal is to 
provide the roadmap for innovation and to function as a blueprint for 
the overall leverage of valuable information technology. Enterprise 
architecture will use models and processes to capture the complex 
interrelationships between the Air Force's systems and platforms. A 
resultant example is basing Information Technology (IT) investment 
decisions on sound business cases, approved Air Force standards, and, 
ultimately, how a particular technology contributes to specific 
capabilities. Additionally, we are institutionalizing enterprise 
architecting as a key construct in defining mission information 
requirements and promoting interoperability.
    Currently, the wide variety of IT standards limits C2 processes and 
information and decision support to our warfighters. The AF/CIO-AF/XI 
team is tackling this and all other integration challenges as they 
develop an enterprise architecture that spans the entire Air Force, 
while also staying in harmony with other services' efforts.
Blended Wing
    We do nothing in today's Air Force without Guard, Reserve, and 
civilian personnel working alongside active duty airmen. A fundamental 
initiative of Air Force transformation is formalizing this integration 
under the Future Total Force (FTF). As part of the FTF, we are pursuing 
innovative organizational constructs and personnel policies to meld the 
components into a single, more homogenous force. FTF integration will 
create efficiencies, cut costs, ensure stability, retain invaluable 
human capital, and, above all, increase our combat capabilities.
    A key effort is to ``blend,'' where sensible, units from two or 
more components into a single wing with a single commander. This level 
of integration is unprecedented in any of the Services, where active 
duty, Guard, and Reserve personnel share the same facilities and 
equipment, and together, execute the same mission. In essence, blending 
provides two resource pools within a single wing--one, a highly 
experienced, semi-permanent Reserve component workforce, offering 
stability and continuity; the other, a force of primarily active duty 
personnel able to rotate to other locations as needs dictate.
    The first blended wing opportunity arose with the consolidation of 
the B1-B fleet. The move left behind an experienced but underutilized 
pool of Guard personnel at Robins AFB, GA. Meanwhile, the collocated 
93rd Air Control Wing (ACW) (active duty E-8 Joint STARS), suffered 
from high tempo and low retention. Hence, Secretary Roche directed that 
the two units merge, and on 1 October 2002, the blended wing concept 
became a reality with the activation of the 116th ACW.
    The 116th ACW tackled many pioneering challenges: from legal 
questions surrounding the command of combined active-Reserve component 
units, to programmatic issues with funding the program from two 
separate accounts, to integrating different personnel systems used by 
each component. Airmen from both components are working through these 
issues successfully, making the 116th an example for future FTF 
blending. Yet, some additional Title 10 and Title 32 provisions still 
need to be changed to make the FTF a reality. Meanwhile, parallel 
efforts, such as placing Reserve pilots and maintenance personnel 
directly into active duty flying organizations under the Fighter 
Associate Program, add to this leveraging of highly experienced 
reservists to promote a more stable, experienced workforce.
    As organizational constructs, blending and associate programs lay 
an important foundation for a capabilities-based, expeditionary air and 
space force, which are inherently flexible and ideal to meet rotational 
AEF requirements. In a resource-constrained environment, blending 
promotes efficiencies and synergies by leveraging each component's 
comparative strengths, freeing funds for modernization while sustaining 
combat effectiveness, and effecting warfighting capabilities greater 
than the sum of its parts.
Combat Wing
    The comprehensive evaluations in our ongoing transformation include 
examining our wing structure. Given all of the lessons gleaned from 
expeditionary operations over the past decades, we asked, ``Could we 
derive advantages in revised wing organization for both force 
development and combat capability'' The answer was ``Yes,'' and we 
enacted changes to create the Combat Wing Organization (CWO).
    The central aspect of the CWO is the new Mission Support Group. 
This will merge former support and logistics readiness groups, and 
contracting and aerial port squadrons, as applicable. Within this 
group, we will hone expeditionary skills from crisis action planning, 
personnel readiness, and working with the joint system for load 
planning and deployment, to communications, contingency bed down, and 
force protection. Currently, all of these aspects exist in skill sets 
that none of our officers have in total. But the new expeditionary 
support discipline will address this and provide our officers the 
expertise in all aspects of commanding expeditionary operations. With 
this reorganization, each wing will now have one individual responsible 
for the full range of deployment and employment tasks--the Mission 
Support Group Commander.
    The restructuring will retain the operations group; however, group 
commanders will become more active in the operational level of war. 
Squadron commanders will be role models for operators in the wings, 
ready to lead the first exercise and combat missions. Similarly, we 
will establish a maintenance group responsible for base-level weapons 
system maintenance and sortie production rates. Like their operator 
counterparts, maintenance squadron and group commanders will be role 
models for all wing maintainers. Meanwhile, medical groups will retain 
their current organization, although we are working changes to home and 
deployed medical operations for future implementation.
    Flying and fixing our weapons systems, as well as mission support, 
are essential skill sets. Each requires the highest expertise, 
proficiency, and leadership. The new wing organization allows 
commanders to fully develop within specific functional areas to plan 
and execute air and space power as part of expeditionary units, while 
also giving maintenance and support personnel focused career 
progression. This re-organization does not fix something that is 
broken--it makes a great structure exceptional.
Acquisition and Business Transformation
    To achieve our vision of an agile, flexible, responsive, and 
capabilities-based air and space force, we must transform the processes 
that provide combatant commanders with air and space capabilities. An 
example of this in action is the Air Force's efforts to carry out the 
responsibilities of DOD Space Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). The 
Secretary of the Air Force delegated those responsibilities to the 
Under Secretary of the Air Force, under whose leadership immediate 
benefit was realized. Adapting an effective process already in use at 
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Under Secretary 
instituted a new streamlined space acquisition program review and 
milestone decisionmaking process. This new process was used for the 
first time in August 2002 in developing a contract for the National 
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. This effort 
creates an opportunity for the Air Force to apply performance and cost 
accountability to defense industrial firms through their chief 
financial officers and board of directors by linking executive 
compensation to contract performance.
    In addition to the major process changes for DOD space, the Air 
Force's Business Transformation Task Force directs and integrates 
further process improvement and adaptation. Core business and 
operations support processes--such as acquisition, logistics, 
maintenance, training, medical and dental, among others--are crucial, 
as they ultimately determine our overall enterprise effectiveness and 
directly sustain combat capabilities. An additional category of 
processes called ``enablers'' completes the Air Force enterprise. 
Examples of ``enablers'' include management of human resources, 
finances, contracts, property plant and equipment, and information. The 
enablers are important as they facilitate our core capabilities and 
determine the overall efficiency of our enterprise.
    The Air Force will enact business transformation from an integrated 
enterprise perspective, examining every process and associated link. 
Accordingly, we will employ industry best practices and identify 
management metrics to improve process efficiency without degrading our 
enterprise effectiveness, expand our customer's self-service management 
capability and free up needed resources for the operational 
communities, and provide real-time, accurate financial data for better 
decisionmaking. Already, acquisition reform has effected notable 
improvements, including:

    (1) Streamlined our acquisition and contracting regulations, 
replacing lengthy prescriptive sets of rules with brief documents that 
emphasize speed, innovation, sensible risk management, and elimination 
of time-consuming process steps that have little value. As previously 
mentioned, our new National Security Space acquisition process is an 
example of progress in this area.
    (2) Created a Program Executive Office for Services to bring new 
efficiency to the growing area of services contracts. This key area, 
which accounts for nearly half of our procurement budget, had no prior 
centralized coordination and oversight.
    (3) Developed and initiated System Metric and Reporting Tool 
(SMART), putting real-time program status information on everyone's 
desktop. This web-based application pulls data from dozens of legacy 
reporting systems to give everyone from program managers up to senior 
leadership direct visibility into the ``health'' of hundreds of 
acquisition and modernization programs. When fully deployed in fiscal 
year 2003, it will automate the tedious and laborious process of 
creating Monthly Acquisition Reports and possibly Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summary reporting to OSD.
    (4) Empowered ``high powered teams'' of requirements and 
acquisition professionals to create spiral development plans to deliver 
initial capability to warfighters more quickly, and add capability 
increments in future spirals.
    (5) Designed a Reformed Supply Support Program to improve the 
spares acquisition process by integrating the support contractor into 
the government supply system. Contractors now have the same capability 
as government inventory control points to manage parts, respond to base 
level requisitions, track spares levels, and monitor asset movement.
    (6) Continued, with OSD support, expansion of the Reduction in 
Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) program, to identify critical cost 
drivers, fund investments to address them, and generate cost savings 
and cost avoidance. We also created standard processes and a business 
case analysis model to use for initiatives within R-TOC. In fiscal year 
2003, OSD allocated $24.9 million no-offset investments to R-TOC that 
will return $53.2 million through fiscal year 2008. A planned $37.1 
million investment across the FYDP will save a projected $331 million 
in operations and maintenance through fiscal year 2009.

    These initiatives are only the beginning of a comprehensive and 
aggressive approach to reforming business practices. Our efforts today 
will have a direct effect on efficient and effective air and space 
capability acquisition, both immediately and in the future.
Ensuring Readiness
    Integrating systems and expanding business practices will not only 
have dramatic effects on air and space capabilities, but also reduce 
readiness challenges. However, we still face daunting, but 
surmountable, obstacles. We must overcome a multitude of installations 
and logistical issues to secure flexible and timely execution of 
expeditionary requirements for joint warfighting.
    Reconstituting and reconfiguring our expeditionary basing systems 
and wartime stocks is a critical element of our force projection 
planning. While we made significant strides in funding, we require 
additional investments in bare base systems, vehicles, spares, 
munitions, and prepositioning assets. Our infrastructure investment 
strategy focuses on three simultaneous steps. First, we must dispose of 
excess facilities. Second, we must fully sustain our facilities and 
systems so they remain combat effective throughout their expected life. 
Third, we must establish a steady investment program to restore and 
modernize our facilities and systems, while advancing our ability to 
protect our people and resources from the growing threat of terrorism 
at current, planned, and future operating locations--at home or abroad.
    We are making progress. Improved vehicle fleet funding allowed us 
to replace some aging vehicles with more reliable assets, including 
alternative fuel versions to help meet Federal fuel reduction mandates. 
Targeted efficiencies in spares management and new fuels mobility 
support equipment will improve supply readiness. In addition, our 
spares campaign restructured Readiness Spares Packages and repositioned 
assets to contingency sites. Moreover, to increase munitions readiness, 
we expanded our Afloat Prepositioning Fleet capabilities, and continue 
acquiring a broad mix of effects-based munitions in line with the 
requirements of all TF CONOPs.
    Finally, our ``Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan'' calls 
for major transformation in financial and infrastructure capitalization 
to ensure Air Force hardware is safe and ready to operate across the 
threat spectrum. To support this plan, we increased funding in fiscal 
year 2004 for depot facilities and equipment modernization. We also 
began a significant push to require weapon systems managers to 
establish their product support and depot maintenance programs early in 
the acquisition cycle and to plan and program the necessary investment 
dollars required for capacity and capability. Additionally, we are 
partnering with private industry to adopt technologies to meet 
capability requirements. The results from these efforts will be 
enhanced, more agile warfighter support through the critical enabler of 
infrastructure.
Expanding AEF Personnel
    The attacks of September 11 significantly increased workload and 
stress in a number of mission areas for our expeditionary forces. 
Manning for these operations is drawn from our existing AEF packages. 
In order to accommodate increased contingency requirements, we are 
exploring options to augment the existing AF construct. Recent and 
ongoing efforts to maximize the identification of deployable forces and 
align them with AEF cycle, assisted in meeting immediate critical 
warfighting requirements. However, some career fields remain seriously 
stressed by the war on terrorism. Accordingly, our efforts focus on 
changing processes that drive requirements not tuned to our AEF rhythm. 
We developed formulas to measure, and gathered quantitative data to 
evaluate, the relative stress amongst career fields to redirect 
resources to the most critical areas. We also began a critical review 
of blue-suit utilization, to ensure uniform airmen are used only where 
absolutely necessary, and maximize the use of the civilian and contract 
workforce for best service contribution and military essentiality.
    We are refocusing uniformed manpower allocation on our distinctive 
capabilities to reduce the stress on our active force. Additionally, we 
are carefully considering technologies to relieve the increased 
workload. These efforts exist within our longer-term work to 
reengineer, transform, and streamline Air Force operations and 
organizations, and have allowed us already to realign some new recruits 
into our most stressed career fields.
Summary
    As the two mediums with the most undeveloped potential, air and 
space represent the largest growth areas for national security and the 
greatest frontiers for joint warfighting. As such, air and space 
operations will play an ever-increasing role in the security of America 
and her allies. The Air Force will exploit technology, innovative 
concepts of operations, organizational change, and our ability to 
embrace creative ideas and new ways of thinking. We will bring to bear 
the full suite of air and space capabilities for tomorrow's Joint Force 
Commander--drawing from every resource, integrating closely with all 
Services, and overcoming any obstacle to succeed.

                              NEXT HORIZON

    The events of the last year have emphasized the dynamics of a new 
international security era. The decade of new states following the Cold 
War has been followed by the rise of non-state actors, many following a 
path of aggression and destruction. Yet, just as America adapted to new 
global dynamics in the past, we will again confront emerging challenges 
with confidence and faith in our ability to meet the demands of 
assuring freedom.
    The Air Force remains dedicated to drawing on its innovation, 
ingenuity, and resolve to develop far-reaching capabilities. The 
ability to deliver effects across the spectrum of national security 
requirements is the cornerstone of the vision and strategy of Air Force 
planning and programming. In conjunction, and increasingly in 
integration with ground, naval, marine, and other national agency 
systems, the Air Force will play a central role in elevating joint 
operations. We recognize the greatest potential for dominant American 
military capabilities lies in the integration of our air and space 
systems with those of other services and agencies, and our success in 
this objective will be evident in every mission to deter, dissuade, or 
decisively defeat any adversary.

    Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
    Those were excellent statements. Now we will proceed to 
questions. Let us start off with the question of the readiness 
of our troops. It seems to me there are two areas of readiness. 
The overall readiness I think you have addressed, but three of 
us on this committee who went overseas observed the readiness 
of those forward-deployed troops in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
the Gulf region.
    There were areas which concerned us, like the Joint Special 
Operations Center (JSOC), Special Operations SEAL teams, and 
things like that. Some of those individuals have been on a 
rotation cycle to where they were back again many times. I 
wonder if you all could just touch on that readiness situation. 
Since you brought fortunately the sergeant, why do we not start 
with the Air Force on that question.
    Are you concerned about the ability to maintain that 
OPTEMPO of those critical skills I mentioned as well as others?
    General Jumper. Yes, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld and I are 
concerned. Secretary Rumsfeld has rightfully asked us to go 
forward and to make sure that everything that we are doing with 
our people in uniform are things that need to be done by people 
in uniform, and to take those things that do not need to be 
done by people in uniform and shift those slots back over to 
uniformed slots so that we can relieve the tension on our 
deployed forces.
    In the Air Force alone, we found 12,000 people doing what 
we think does not have to be done by people in uniform. That 
would go a long way to relieving some of the pressure that we 
feel on those slots. So it is not just a matter of adding end 
strength. It is a matter of making efficiencies out of what you 
have and making sure you police up the battlefield, sir, and go 
out and find where bodies have migrated off to and make sure 
they get them back to military business. That is part of the 
solution that we are working on.
    Chairman Warner. My question was more narrowly directed to 
those members of the Air Force who are participating on combat 
teams in those regions right now.
    General Jumper. Yes, sir. Especially in the Special 
Operations Forces, they have not been sized for long-term 
sustained operations.
    Chairman Warner. Do you see a window which is a matter of 
constraint?
    General Jumper. Not a particular window, Mr. Chairman. I do 
see a need to bolster up, especially in our combat search and 
rescue forces, which is the Air Force portion of this, and our 
combat controllers, of which Sergeant Yoshida is a part. We 
need to take a look at bolstering up those career fields to be 
able to sustain, especially in this war against terrorism, and 
that kind of activity.
    Chairman Warner. General Shinseki, we will shift to you 
because you have the majority of those people.
    General Shinseki. I do, Mr. Chairman. They are stressed and 
we are using them on multiple missions that a few years ago 
were not anticipated. The first step has been for Special 
Operations Command, and then my Army commander who is part of 
that, to look hard at the missions they are performing today. 
The ones that can be returned to conventional forces, we are 
taking that under our decisions now, so that we husband our 
Special Operating Forces for the key missions that they need to 
focus on.
    Many more missions today than back in 1996, 1997, when we 
saw these requirements expanding. Another thing, the Secretary 
of Defense has asked the commander of Special Operations 
Command to look at his capabilities and see what additional 
requirements he might have. That analysis has been provided and 
is being staffed.
    In advance of that, the Army has in next year's budget 
already added something of the order of 1,800 or 1,900 
additional Special Operations authorizations and about a 
billion dollars to give Special Operations Command added 
capabilities.
    Chairman Warner. Do you see any constraints on the time in 
those regions that we visited, the ability to maintain that 
high OPTEMPO of those particular skills, say in the next 60 to 
90 days?
    General Shinseki. There is stress today and, as I say, the 
decision to pull some of our very best special operators off 
missions that they can be relieved of will give us a bigger 
inventory to deal with that rotation cycle.
    Chairman Warner. Admiral Clark.
    Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, it is well documented, and I 
talked about the number of ships that I had deployed, 51 
percent of my great Navy. I talked about 170 additional ships. 
That is the Military Sealift Command. That is pressed forward. 
A lot of those are civilian manned.
    But I look back over the course of time since September 11 
and the start of this process, we have had 9 of our 12 carrier 
battle groups deployed. We are watching the tempo very 
carefully. I feel good about our readiness. But that does not 
mean that there are not areas where you have real challenges, 
and the Special Forces teams are one of those areas that you 
have identified.
    So today I have six carriers over there. Am I concerned 
over the next 60 to 90 days? No, I am very confident. But you 
will recall that the previous two times I have come before you 
I have said that at the top of my list was the current 
readiness challenge, and we have invested significantly in 
that. There are always areas where there will be pockets that 
we have to manage and watch carefully, and we are doing it.
    Chairman Warner. General Hagee.
    General Hagee. Sir, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 
we have 63 percent of the Marine Corps forward deployed. I 
would associate myself with what the Chief of Naval Operations 
said. For the near term, we can maintain that. We will continue 
to watch that to see if we need to do any rotation.
    We do not have any Special Operating Forces per se, but we 
are working with Special Operations Command to see if there are 
some of the capabilities that we have currently in theater that 
can help relieve some of their pressure.
    Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, as we visited with the troops 
there is no question about their having been well trained and 
their commitment and their morale is high. But there is not a 
one of us that did not look into their faces and share with 
them the thoughts that they shared with us about, if force is 
required to remove Saddam Hussein and to dismantle the weapons 
of mass destruction, we could be confronted with in the early 
stages of that combat weapons of mass destruction inflicted 
upon our own forces.
    I think each of you this morning should touch on the 
training and your level of confidence in that training and our 
ability of the troops to carry out their missions. General 
Shinseki, we will start with you.
    General Shinseki. This is the toughest part of our training 
requirement. It is the part of the operation that has the 
greatest risk and also the greatest constraints on physical 
performance applied to it. Being inside of our overgarments, 
masks, and gloves we restrict our senses, and it is the part 
that deserves a considerable amount of training effort.
    That training does go on, whether it is at home station in 
the middle of winter at Fort Stewart, Georgia, or out at the 
National Training Center in California in August. You can 
expect in your training cycle to be put into full mission 
oriented protective posture (MOPP-4) protective environment and 
be required to operate.
    So in terms of discipline, in terms of stamina, in terms of 
the confidence that our equipment is functional at the 
individual level, all of that is there. I think our commanders 
have good visibility along with the responsibility to make sure 
that that piece of their training is addressed in concert with 
all the other training they have to go and get accomplished to 
maintain the highest readiness standards.
    But training in our nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) 
equipment is part of that, individually and as well as units. 
Units that operate in that environment, if they're 
contaminated, can be expected to operate for an extended period 
in the environment. Units that have an opportunity to 
decontaminate their own equipment and themselves individually 
rehearse this as part of their responsibilities.
    The training level is there. I say again, this is the 
toughest part of our operation, but the requirement to meet the 
training standard is there and commanders execute this.
    Chairman Warner. But in your personal judgment, do you have 
a high degree of confidence in their ability to endure and 
carry out the mission?
    General Shinseki. I do.
    Chairman Warner. Admiral.
    Admiral Clark. I second that completely. My conviction is 
that we have made great investments in the current readiness 
part of our budget. In previous testimony before this 
committee, I have talked about that as a priority issue. I will 
tell you that my manning is better in my battle group and 
amphibious forces than it has ever been since I have been in 
the Navy. It is that way because we have invested in it. We 
have invested in the training cycle and are constantly 
improving it so that we know we have it right.
    Now, does that mean that there is no reason for concern? Of 
course that would be a foolish thing to say when you talk about 
potential conflict. But Mr. Chairman, I am very confident in 
the readiness of our force.
    Chairman Warner. The ability to cope with that contingency?
    Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you.
    General.
    General Hagee. Senator, I am absolutely confident in our 
ability to operate in that environment. As the chairman knows, 
just a few months ago I was in command of the unit that is over 
in Kuwait right now. In the 2 years I was in command, there was 
nothing more important than the NBC readiness. To give you some 
statistics, we have enough Saratoga suits to give three to each 
individual. We have filters for the gas masks, enough for three 
for each individual. We have 14 so-called Fox vehicles. These 
are specially equipped vehicles to detect chemicals in the 
atmosphere or in the ground. We have seven biological detection 
units from the Army with the marines that are there, 
specifically put together to detect biological agents.
    Right now, 94 percent of our marines have had their 
smallpox vaccination. If you include the ones that we exempted, 
they are at 99 percent. We have 85 percent of the marines who 
have had three or more anthrax vaccinations. If you look at the 
ones that have had one or more, we are in the low 90 percent.
    Sir, we are ready and we can operate in that environment.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
    General Jumper.
    General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, we train, as the other 
Services do, every day in this environment. I have every 
confidence that we can sustain operations in this environment. 
We are under way fully with our anthrax and smallpox 
vaccination program. We have the detectors around the 
perimeters of our air bases and we practice in this environment 
as part of our normal readiness training. Sir, we are ready.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 10:28 a.m., the hearing was recessed, the 
committee proceeded to other business, and the hearing was 
reconvened at 10:29 a.m.]
    Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
    Senator Levin. Thank you very much.
    General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the 
Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a 
successful completion of the war?
    General Shinseki. In specific numbers, I would have to rely 
on combatant commanders' exact requirements.
    Senator Levin. How about a range?
    General Shinseki. I would say that what has been mobilized 
to this point, something on the order of several hundred 
thousand soldiers, is probably a figure that would be required. 
We are talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of 
geography that is fairly significant with the ethnic tensions 
that could lead to other problems. It takes a significant 
ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment 
to make sure that people are fed, that water is distributed--
all the normal responsibilities that go along with 
administering a situation like this.
    Senator Levin. What effect would that type of an occupation 
to that extent have on two things: one is our OPTEMPO, which 
you have talked about, already stressed; two is the ability of 
the Army to fulfill the other missions that we have?
    General Shinseki. Well, if it were an extended requirement 
for presence of U.S.-only Army forces, it would have 
significant long-term effect and, therefore, the assistance 
from friends and allies would be helpful.
    Senator Levin. Some of the service personnel with whom we 
chatted on our trip indicated a belief that there may be some 
equipment that they needed but did not have, equipment which 
might be, they thought was, in the hands of non-deployed units. 
I'm just wondering whether any of you are aware of any such 
equipment and whether you would just double-check it. We were 
given one example particularly, something called a Laser Viper. 
But are any of you aware of that situation, where we have the 
most advanced equipment not in the hands of the deployed 
forces, but in the hands of nondeployed forces?
    General Shinseki. I am not aware of any specifics, but I 
would not doubt that there is possibly an opportunity to 
discover something.
    Senator Levin. If you would just all check that issue out, 
because that is obviously something relevant.
    General Shinseki. I will find that information, sir.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    I am not aware of any specific instance of the above situation in 
today's deployed forces. Given the cycle in which Navy ships and 
aircraft deploy (known as the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC)), 
and the program manager methodology utilized by NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and 
SPAWAR to introduce new technology into the operating fleet, the most 
modern equipment approved for in-service use would have been installed 
during the unit's last extended maintenance availability prior to the 
commencement of training operations.
    However, the situation of the ``most advanced equipment, not 
(being) in the hands of the deployed forces'' is indeed possible, given 
that, (a) many ships are currently deployed outside of their scheduled 
deployment in support of overseas operations and hence may have missed 
some equipment modernization opportunities and, (b) the ease of 
installation and ready availability of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
equipment allows for these systems to be directly procured and 
installed by non-deployed ships crews, outside of the above IDTC and 
program management scenarios (in the past, this has typically been in 
the areas of shipboard navigation aids, computer peripherals, and 
similar technology).

    Senator Levin. On the end strength issue, last year our 
Services indicated they needed additional end strength. Only 
the Marines have received additional end strength in this 
budget request. Admiral Clark, your number one unfunded 
priority was for 4,400 additional active duty personnel. That 
was unfunded last year. Your budget proposal for this year has 
an end strength reduction of 1,900 active duty personnel, along 
with a reduction of 2,000 Reserve component personnel. The Navy 
is busier than it was last year. How do you square that?
    Admiral Clark. Well, I square it like this. My proposal 
also reduces the total number of ships that we will have in the 
Navy as we seek to move toward a modernized and redesigned 
Navy. My recommendation to the Secretary and him to the 
President was that there were ships that we needed to 
decommission and move on, and that is why the numbers are 
smaller.
    I will say this, Congress has given us authority to be in 
an over-end strength posture. So in terms of the number of 
people, I have shortfalls in the existing execution year in 
people.
    One of the reasons is that we have had the success that we 
are realizing tremendous success in the battle for people. 
Young people today want to serve, but I do have shortfalls 
there that need to be addressed with supplemental 
appropriations.
    Senator Levin. General Jumper, your predecessor said the 
Air Force needed an increase in end strength of 10,000 airmen. 
The pace of operations has picked up considerably since then 
and yet the Air Force did not get an increase in authorized end 
strength last year and it did not, apparently, ask for an 
increase this year.
    Do you have the personnel you need and how do you square 
those facts?
    General Jumper. Sir, we are in fact stressed, as I stated 
before. One of the things the Secretary of Defense has asked us 
to do, and we are doing, is finding those airmen out there that 
are not doing things that uniformed people need to be doing and 
to police those up and move those slots into slots that do 
require uniformed people.
    We have another issue in that we have previous year 
commitments of almost 4,500 slots that were taken as a result 
of privatization actions that were actually not taken off the 
books. We are having to reduce those as well as part of this 
budget activity.
    So we continue to look for these efficiencies. We will 
continue to apply them where we can. If they do not do the job, 
I will be the first to go back to the Secretary of Defense and 
ask for the relief that we need to get that job done.
    Senator Levin. Thank you.
    I would ask all of you this. I have a copy of the draft 
legislative proposal which has been circulating inside the 
Department of Defense. Under that draft, the Joint Staff would 
report to the Secretary instead of to the Chairman. The 
Secretary would have to approve all appointments to the Joint 
Staff. The draft amendment would strike the statutory 
requirement that the Joint Staff be ``independently organized 
and operated.'' We also have a copy of a memorandum signed by 
David Chu requesting a legislative proposal that would reduce 
the terms served by the service chiefs from 4 years to 2-year 
renewable terms.
    [The information referred to follows:]
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    
    
      
    I think these proposals, taken together or separately, 
would undermine the ability of the uniformed military to 
provide independent military advice to the civilian leadership, 
to the executive branch, and to Congress. That is my view.
    More importantly, would you tell us quickly whether you 
support those proposals, General Shinseki?
    General Shinseki. Senator Levin, I have not seen the exact 
language here, but I have heard that there have been 
discussions. This is a chief at the end of a 4-year service and 
I think that the 4-year term, at least for me, has been helpful 
in continuity. I am looking at the fact that, 4 years here, I 
am about to field the first Stryker Brigade. At the end of 4 
years here, the Army is about to have its first major 
acquisition milestone decision in May of this year for the 
Future Combat System. It has taken considerable effort, 4 
years, to put these programs together.
    I think it is helpful to have a long-term perspective. I 
know there are others who have responsibility in this area, 
whether it is here in Congress or over in Defense, combatant 
commanders and service chiefs. All of us have responsibilities. 
But for a service chief a longer term perspective is helpful.
    I think that some of the early inertia that the Army had to 
overcome in order to get its transformation legs moving and 
develop some momentum would have been different had it been 
just a 2-year term of service. I believe that the Joint Staff 
as it exists today serves both the Chairman and the Joint 
Chiefs. I look to them as part of keeping my role as a member 
of the Joint Chiefs, keeping me abreast of those issues. I look 
for them to continue to do that.
    Senator Levin. To maintain that independence?
    General Shinseki. That is correct, for the Joint Chiefs.
    Senator Levin. Do you want to give us quick answers? My 
time is up. Do you agree with these proposals?
    Admiral Clark. First of all, I had not heard of the first 
part of your proposal. This is the first I have heard of it.
    Senator Levin. What was the first you heard of?
    Admiral Clark. The proposal for the Joint Staff, the chain 
of command and the way you lashed it up; I had not heard that.
    Senator Levin. Okay. We will send you all a copy, by the 
way. We would not want you to be in the dark about what is 
floating around the Pentagon.
    Admiral Clark. My sense is that I serve at the pleasure of 
the President, and it seems to me that the experience you glean 
in 2-year assignments is not the best way to go. Again, I am 
not sure the status of that proposal and I have not been asked 
to comment on it.
    I know that there is a tenure issue here, and how long it 
takes and the nature of your contribution. For me, it is a 
pleasure to serve in a position like this, and if the President 
makes a judgment that there are going to be 2-year tours 
instead of 4-year tours, obviously that is the way we are going 
to go.
    The experience related to it is, I find myself now at a 
point where there is a great learning curve in these 
assignments. I would also say that 4 years that we currently 
have is a considerable period to serve. What I believe is 
required is that we need a construct that serves the President 
and serves the Service and provides for independent assessment 
by the Chiefs.
    Senator Levin. General?
    General Hagee. Sir, I had not seen the proposal either and, 
in the interest of time, I would agree with Admiral Clark.
    General Jumper. Sir, we have not been briefed on the 
details of such a proposal nor have we had a chance to discuss 
this with the Secretary of Defense. I will say that I would 
think the Secretary would want his service chiefs in position 
long enough to be able to make a difference and to establish a 
rapport with one another, to be able to deal with the joint 
issues that we deal with every day.
    Senator Levin. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I will address this first question to you, General 
Shinseki, because Admiral Clark and General Jumper have already 
responded to the end strength question that Senator Levin had 
posed.
    Since the early 1990s, the Army has been cut by more than 
34 percent and undergoing a 300-percent increase in mission 
rates. The average frequency of Army contingency deployments 
has increased from 1 every 4 years to 1 every 14 weeks. During 
the same period of time, the Army lost a third of its force 
structure, 21 percent of its infrastructure and 37 percent of 
its budget authority.
    Now, all of this is before September 11 and then the 
potential problems that we are gearing up for right now. To put 
it in perspective, in fiscal year 1989, the Operation Desert 
Storm-size deployment of 261,000 active troops would require 53 
percent of the Army's deployable end strength and only a sixth 
of its forward-staging troops. Today that same deployment would 
require 86 percent of deployable end strength.
    Now, that gets into the problem that we are having, of 
course, with our Reserve component. They are doing a great job, 
but we all know that we are having problems with certain 
critical MOSs and there is not a person at this table up here 
that does not have a lot of deployments in his or her State. I 
know you all answer the question, yes, we are ready and all 
that, but how long can you sustain this? Then specifically on 
end strength, General Shinseki, where are you? What are your 
feelings?
    General Shinseki. Senator, I think the last 3 years that I 
have appeared before this committee, I have indicated that the 
mission profile that the Army has been asked to address is 
bigger than the size of the active component formations that we 
had and that end strength was an issue.
    But if you recall 3 years ago, recruiting was a challenge 
and we had to go take care of that. In the last 3 years, 
recruiting and retention is no longer the issue. So we are able 
to fill our ranks. Prior to this mobilization expansion for a 
potential Southwest Asia scenario, I think you would have found 
something on the order of 25,000 to 30,000 Reserve component 
soldiers mobilized each and every day routinely for the Sinai, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo. I think this is an indication that our 
reliance on the Reserves. Their response has been fantastic, 
but the fact that we are relying on them so heavily for those 
routine day-to-day missions suggests that there is an end 
strength issue here.
    Those numbers are constantly reviewed. We have made the 
case that end strength is an issue for the Army, and we will 
continue to do that.
    Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
    Now, for all of you, I want to first thank you because you 
have each had someone come into my office. We have had 
briefings on this next issue that concern me. It concerns me, 
not just because it has been of concern to this committee for a 
long time, but I also chair the Environment and Public Works 
Committee.
    That is, environmental encroachment. We have had briefings 
from each one of the four Services. General Hagee, we know what 
is happening out at Camp Pendleton. We know that we will be 
able to use about 30 percent of the land area there. General 
Shinseki, we have the same problem at Fort Bragg and other 
places. Of course, we know what has happened by losing the 
Vieques Range. That puts more burdens on the ranges that we 
have here in CONUS.
    So I would like to have each one of you just very briefly 
talk about how serious of a problem this is. Then for the 
record, I would like to have you inform this committee as to 
the monetary costs, as near as you can determine them, of 
complying with these environmental regulations.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                       ENVIRONMENTAL ENCROACHMENT

    General Shinseki. Encroachment on training and testing ranges is a 
significant issue for the Army. Our soldiers must train as they intend 
to fight because they will surely fight as they have been trained. 
Environmentally based restrictions on training add artificiality into 
training. Compliance with environmental laws can also restrict access 
to land needed for maneuver and live-fire and restrict the available 
times and durations of training activities.
    The Army has spent more than $74 million over the past 5 years for 
compliance with the Endangered Species Act. Given the significantly 
increasing requirements brought about by pending critical habitat 
designations, we anticipate significant increases in cost both to 
maintain compliance and find training alternatives.
    In addition, there are indirect costs associated with deploying 
units to alternative training sites when their home station does not 
support all necessary training requirements. For example, the 25th 
Infantry Division (Light) in Hawaii cannot conduct all of the 18 
required combined arms live-fire exercises at their home station range, 
Makua Military Range, due to a NEPA-based lawsuit settlement. Rather, 
they must conduct a number of these exercises while deployed to the 
continental U.S. or overseas. In addition, other units in Hawaii 
(National Guard and Marines) that would also train at Makua are unable 
to do so and must deploy or develop alternatives (suboptimal training 
methods) for their displaced live-fire training.
    At Fort Richardson, Alaska, the Army is currently engaged in a 
lawsuit where the plaintiffs allege that live-fire training violates 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). They 
are seeking to shut down training at the Eagle River Flats (ERF) range. 
The RCRA allegation argues that munitions fired into or onto ERF fall 
within the definition of RCRA statutory solid waste. If munitions used 
for their intended purpose are considered to be statutory solid waste, 
the Army could be forced to perform corrective action or remediation of 
ERF. Live-fire training during the remediation would be impossible and 
the only mortar and artillery impact area at Fort Richardson would be 
lost for training. The CERCLA allegations are that the act of firing 
munitions onto an operational range constitutes a release of hazardous 
substances requiring reporting, characterization, and remediation. If 
the court agrees with the plaintiff, then live-fire training and 
testing operation at every Army range could be subject to CERCLA 
response requirements. These findings would not only dramatically 
impact the readiness of the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Alaska, the 
largest infantry brigade in the Army, but the entire Department of 
Defense (DOD).
    Further lawsuits could compel the Environmental Protection Agency 
and State regulators in all U.S. regions to enforce the same standards 
on other military ranges. Live-fire training would be severely 
constrained and military readiness would decrease dramatically. The 
requirement to conduct RCRA corrective action or CERCLA response 
actions on operational ranges would constitute a huge financial burden. 
The Army estimates that the cost to conduct RCRA or CERCLA-type clean 
up on Army operational ranges would range from $14 billion to $140 
billion. This does not include money that would be required to move 
displaced training to another location during the cleanup. Moreover, if 
these standards are applied across the DOD, it is unlikely that 
alternative live-fire training sites would even be available.
    Admiral Clark. While the fiscal year 2003 Department of the Navy 
(DON) environmental compliance budget is approximately $1 billion, no 
specific lines are tied directly or exclusively to encroachment 
mitigation. DON budgets the funding required to comply with existing 
environmental laws applicable to installations, ships, and aircraft. 
These laws and regulations in turn have encroachment impacts if they 
alter training time or space available while we maintain the property 
the taxpayers have entrusted in us.
    The effects of encroachment go beyond the environmental programs 
due to the fact that when encroachment occurs there are potential costs 
associated with delays, cancellations, modifications, and movement of 
training to different locations. Operational costs may increase in the 
form of more steaming days and/or flying hours required to complete an 
exercise, and personnel costs may rise from paying travel per diem over 
a longer time period.
    The final cost has no fiscal figure but carries the most weight and 
burden of encroachment on our troops. Should an exercise move to an 
alternate location because of encroachment concerns, it means the 
sailor could incur a longer time away from home due to transit time to 
the training site. During this higher state of operational tempo as we 
prosecute the global war on terror, all possible options are used to 
ensure the sailor maximum time with family while home. It is also why 
Navy strives to accomplish most unit level training near the home base, 
but unfortunately there are times when this goal cannot be achieved due 
to encroachment.
    General Hagee. For fiscal year 2004, the Marine Corps has budgeted 
the following to meet environmental compliance, pollution prevention, 
and conservation requirements:
                                                       [In thousands    
                                                         of dollars]    

    Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps                 121,975    
    Military Construction                                     31,200    
    Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve           9,245    
    Defense Working Capital Fund                               2,966    

    General Jumper did not respond in time for printing. When received, 
answer will be retained in committee files.

    General Shinseki. I would tell you the Army must train. 
Otherwise, our presence on a piece of ground is not useful to 
us. So we have made the importance of meeting our training 
requirements a high priority, and where we have forces located 
we have had to work with folks responsible for the environment 
and find ways to continue to train. I think we have done that 
by demonstrating we are good stewards.
    But this is an issue that we continue to work, whether it 
is in the National Training Center where you have the Desert 
Tortoise or Fort Bragg, Fort Polk, Fort Benning, where the Red-
Cockaded Woodpecker exists.
    Senator Inhofe. General, I know you have been good 
stewards, all of you have, and that is the problem. You are 
such good stewards, you are getting more and more of the 
critters coming in and more and more of the problems. For 
example, look at Fort Bragg. Camp Lejeune is a good example, 
General Hagee, where I have been down there at 2-year intervals 
and I see more and more of these areas where they are not able 
to train.
    So I am concerned about this, and again for the sake of 
time I will just go ahead and ask you for the record if you 
would submit that.
    General Shinseki, one other question for you is. First of 
all, I thank you for all the effort that you made in coming up 
with an NLOS cannon compromise that gets into our Future Combat 
System. I think it is good. I would ask you, does the budget 
adequately fund that program to meet the congressionally-
mandated time line, that is fielding this by 2008?
    General Shinseki. It does, Senator.
    Senator Inhofe. Okay, good.
    General Jumper, I know one of the big controversial things 
in the costs would be, what are you going to use for tankers? 
There are several proposals out there. The KC-135 Es and Rs--I 
think now four-fifths of them are converted to Romeos--but also 
the proposal for the leasing of 100 767s, which I think people 
have to understand is the first step. If that were to happen, I 
would assume we would end up with 400 or 500 of these things.
    My concern is this. You are going to have to come to this 
committee for ratification of that lease agreement, is that 
correct?
    General Jumper. That is correct.
    Senator Inhofe. When you do come to this committee for 
ratification, will you come in with an established training, 
basing, and maintenance plan for that equipment?
    General Jumper. Sir, the plan that we have for training is 
not established yet. What the initial plan would be, to start 
off, as we did with the C-17, and that would be that as a few 
airplanes become available then that training would probably be 
done on a contract.
    As you reach a certain level of aircraft--in the C-17 
example it was 20 aircraft--then you make a decision on 
centralizing the training. So at that time, we would come 
forward with a plan on how and when that would be done sir.
    Senator Inhofe. Yes, I remember the C-17. We went through 
that for a number of years.
    General Jumper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Inhofe. It is a successful program. However, it is 
a little bit different than this because you are talking about 
a leasing operation where you are going to have these 
conversions and then a major training effort. I would just say 
this: if you are not in a position to come before this 
committee with the training and the basing and maintenance, I 
am probably going to oppose the lease altogether, because there 
are some alternatives out there and I think we really need to 
see how this overall program is going to work before we get 
into something as far-reaching as this program you are 
contemplating right now.
    General Jumper. I understand, Senator.
    Senator Inhofe. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
    Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    First let me begin by thanking and commending General 
Shinseki for his great service to the Army and the Nation, and 
also Patty Shinseki, who has served with equal distinction at 
least. Thank you.
    There is a recurrent theme in today's questioning about 
manpower and end strength and I think that emanates from the 
common sense view that it is very difficult to interject 
military forces into a region and it is sometimes more 
difficult to get them out. So I think we all are anticipating 
not only successful military operations, but long-term 
operations.
    I know you have responded, but could you particularly 
respond to the issue of Reserve and National Guard, because 
what I have seen, as Senator Inhofe has suggested, in my home 
State we have mobilized practically all the Guard and Reserve 
Forces we have for 1 year. A more specific question is, what do 
we have to do now to ensure that we do not run into a wall a 
year from now and there are not any willing able National 
Guard, Reserves, to fulfil critical missions, many of which 
might be particularly germane to the Reserves and the Guards 
since civil affairs, distribution of water, distribution of 
food, as General Shinseki suggested there is a lot more of 
those qualified individuals in the Reserves than the Active 
Forces.
    Could you comment, and I will ask all of you gentlemen to 
do so.
    General Shinseki. Certainly, Senator. I think this is part 
of that larger discussion about right-sizing the force, the end 
strength issue that I addressed earlier. Then once that issue 
is addressed, then it is the appropriate mix between active and 
Reserve components.
    Day to day, we should be able to handle that out of the 
available inventory of our active component formations, and 
then have on those unusual circumstances when you have to surge 
for a large operation a requirement to go to our Reserve 
components. That is not what is happening right now. So it is a 
right-sizing of the force and a decision on how to best achieve 
the right mix and balance here.
    Having said that, our Reserve component soldiers have been 
absolutely fantastic in their response to these call-ups, many 
of them, on very short notice. They have done what we have 
asked them to do in days when we would have normally wanted to 
give them weeks to respond.
    Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, from your perspective?
    Admiral Clark. I do not have the same circumstances the 
General does, but I do have the issue for us and where we are 
in the manning circumstances about force protection. We have 
used a number of these individuals in the force protection 
role. I have about 5,000 people called up today, so my numbers 
are dramatically different than the other Services.
    We will be able to sustain this where we are. The challenge 
is: how do you get the right mix so that you are not constantly 
calling on the Reserve structure to now handle what is in 
effect from where I sit a new requirement for security? We are 
moving and will in this budget this year bring more active duty 
people into the structure to take care of basic force 
protection challenges that we face.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    General Hagee.
    General Hagee. Yes, sir. The Marine Reserve is pretty much 
a mirror image of our Active-Duty Force, except for certain 
functions like PSYOPS and civil affairs. We have approximately 
14,000 Reserves on active duty right now and that is a result 
of our prep for what action we might have to take in Southwest 
Asia. We can maintain that in the near term.
    Senator Reed. General Jumper.
    General Jumper. Sir, I think one of the challenges we all 
have is to try to determine the new background level baseline 
activity that is going to be required of all of our Services as 
we go through the dynamics that we are going through now. 
Certainly with the addition of Afghanistan, the aftermath of 
Kosovo, all of us have had to rise to a new, higher level of 
basic activity in all of our Services.
    This also dictates how the mix has to go between the active 
and the Reserve. We have done some minor adjustments in the Air 
Force with combat search and rescue forces, substituting one 
capability in the Reserve Forces for active duty combat search 
and rescue.
    So I think this is going to be an iterative process. I do 
not think we are going to be able to answer the question of the 
right mix or even the right tempo of activity for some time 
until we see how we baseline out again.
    Senator Reed. Thank you.
    Admiral Clark, I noticed that the budget proposal cuts over 
$400 million in submarine research and development, but my 
hunch is that a lot of our research and development funds, not 
just within the Navy but throughout the Services, are being 
cut. What is the impact in terms of future technology from 
these cuts in research and development?
    Admiral Clark. I do not know exactly which budget line you 
are referring to, but obviously research and development is the 
lifeblood for future development. So we have a strong R&D 
budget in this submit. But obviously, your question, what is 
the role, is the lifeblood, so it has to be right.
    I would be happy to address the specific if you have it. In 
terms of the total macro numbers by community, I really do not 
do it that way.
    Senator Reed. We will specifically get you some 
information, then.
    My time has expired. Thank you.
    Senator McCain [presiding]. Senator Allard.
    Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Jumper, we have the Air Force Academy in the State 
of Colorado. We have a number of allegations that are surfacing 
now about women who have been raped at the Academy. There was a 
problem in the early 1990s with some sexual harassment cases, 
and I know that the Academy tried to deal with the problem by 
putting in place some procedures to allow women to go ahead and 
report a rape case or sexual harassment. Then, there was a GAO 
report in 1994 that had some recommendations on what could be 
done as far as the procedures concerned.
    Since the investigative reporters have brought up this 
situation and consequently we have had a number of women who 
have contacted my office. I think we are up to about 16 now. 
There is one common thread. I mean, there is a number of common 
threads that run through with these cases, but there is one 
common thread and that is that they are working under an honor 
system in the Academy. They are encouraged to step forward and 
they are given an amnesty opportunity. Then, they are brought 
in and the case is investigated. They are put in a position 
where if they want to stay in, continue to be in the Air Force 
as a career, they have to lie.
    So this really puts them in a box, and I hope you will take 
a close look at what is happening at the Academy. I was hoping 
maybe you might have a comment or two.
    General Jumper. Senator, I could take up the rest of your 
day with my comments on this subject. First of all, let me 
assure you and other members of the committee that there is no 
place in the United States Air Force for any potential officer 
who would treat any other potential officer in the way that has 
been alleged.
    Secretary of the Air Force Jim Roche and I are the personal 
action officers on this particular issue. Before this came to 
light in the press, we had other indications that some of the 
processes by which these infractions are reported were not as 
they should be. There have also been suggestions that women who 
surface these are encouraged not to press charges because the 
circumstances they found themselves in leading up to the crime 
may have compromised their situation.
    Let there be no doubt that assault and rape are crimes of 
violence, and crimes of violence will be treated separately 
from the circumstances that one might find themselves in 
leading up to that crime of violence.
    We have a team out there right now looking at the very 
processes you mentioned, Senator, to make sure that anyone at 
the Academy has a clear channel to report these criminal 
activities and that we have the means to deal with them 
appropriately.
    Senator Allard. I appreciate your comments, General Jumper. 
I think there are two problems there. Number one, maybe some of 
these cases in the past need to be reviewed a little closer. 
Number two, I think most of the women that are contacting my 
office are concerned about the future. I see that you are too 
in the comments that you just made before this committee. It is 
important to make sure this process is corrected so that we 
have a team--we do not have a victim within the team that 
somehow or other gets themselves in an untenable situation.
    I appreciate your comment.
    General Jumper. Senator, if I could just add one comment. I 
have two daughters in the Air Force, and I have a third one who 
will start ROTC next year. So you are looking at a dad who has 
little tolerance for this stuff.
    Senator Allard. General, I understand. Very good. Thank you 
for your comments.
    I would like to move on to another issue within my 6 minute 
period here, and that is missile defense. I am very interested 
developing and getting our missile defense system deployed out 
there. I think it is a high priority for the President also.
    The Missile Defense Agency is developing these systems, but 
I think ultimately you are going to be the users of that 
system. So my question is, are you all prepared to make the 
ballistic missile system a core mission for each of your 
branches of the Services? I am talking Navy, Air Force, and 
Army. I am assuming it may already be becoming a part of your 
core mission.
    So I would like to have each one of you comment on that if 
you would, please. We will start with General Shinseki and we 
will just move on down the table, Admiral Clark and then 
General Jumper if you would, please.
    General Shinseki. Senator, the Army has had a long 
tradition of association with missiles and, yes, we are part of 
this National Missile Defense Program. Our contributions 
currently have to do with, even as the National Missile Defense 
Program is being stood up, our capabilities are in the terminal 
attack business with our Patriots and our THAAD missiles. Right 
now they represent about the only point to point attack, 
missile to missile attack capability. Even as other 
capabilities are being stood up, we are already part of this 
effort.
    Senator Allard. As a part of your core mission now; is that 
where we are?
    General Shinseki. We have been part of missile defense as 
part of this.
    Senator Allard. Core mission?
    General Shinseki. Yes.
    Senator Allard. Admiral Clark.
    Admiral Clark. We have had an incredibly successful testing 
year the last 12 months, six for six and three direct hits. 
Three were tracking exercises. We absolutely are prepared to 
move into the future on this.
    Now, as to whether it is core or not, missile defense has 
been a core, but different kinds, near as opposed to ballistic 
missile, long-range capabilities. The proposal put forward 
would have us moving to an interim capability in 2004. We 
anxiously are pursuing that. In fact, the Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency was coming forward with a proposal to 
build a test platform and I came forward with a counterproposal 
that I commit a ship now to that program so we do not lose time 
in that effort. We are on board and moving forward.
    Senator Allard. I think a big part of that is this concept 
of the spiral development.
    Admiral Clark. Correct.
    Senator Allard. I think you can play a key role in getting 
it started there.
    Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
    Senator Allard. Thank you.
    General Jumper.
    General Jumper. Sir, we will certainly consider it core to 
the Air Force, whatever our role emerges in the future. We know 
that we have a significant program with the Airborne Laser 
already under way. It will blend in with this program, and we 
will be working with STRATCOM and Northern Command as their 
roles work out, and our components will then be a part of the 
implementation, however it is designated.
    Senator Allard. Thank you all.
    My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator McCain. Senator Dayton.
    Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Shinseki, I want to thank you also for your 
distinguished service and recall that when I attended this 
hearing 2 years ago and each of you--and this was my first 
time--expressed your own views directly to this committee, 
regardless of other considerations and pressures as others did 
as well. I certainly in subsequent years, especially last year, 
had the chance to see how vital that is and how courageous at 
times it requires someone to be. I want to thank you 
specifically for that.
    I want to follow up on Senator Inhofe's question a little 
more regarding the NLOS cannon system. What specifically is in 
the fiscal year 2004 request for that, what components of that 
development? Are those locked into fiscal year 2004? Then are 
we set up now step by step? You said fiscal year 2008 is the 
expected deployment.
    General Shinseki. Well Senator, we took the moneys that 
were available coming out of the Crusader program, focused it 
into the Non-Line of Sight Cannon. This Congress added 
additional moneys to ensure that the development would be 
visible and continue, and that is all on track.
    This year in the fiscal year 2004 budget, we have taken 
that Non-Line of Sight Cannon program element, which was a 
separate element, put it together with Future Combat System 
overall, those vehicles, because it is thought that this Non-
Line of Sight Cannon will provide us the common chassis on 
which all the other systems would ride. We watch that very 
closely, and that is addressed in the budget.
    Senator Dayton. Thank you.
    One question I will ask each of you, and again I will start 
with General Shinseki again. On the budget proposal for the 5 
out years, it is basically in the DOD component for this coming 
fiscal year $379.9 billion and then for the next 5 years it is 
approximately $20 billion. Actually, it is a 5-percent increase 
initially, but 4 percent at the end. So my thought was, if you 
spend that increment of funding over the course of the plan you 
have laid out here, what in fiscal year 2009 will be the major 
developments or improvements or next steps forward, 
irrespective of service areas? Does that progression reflect 
your own priorities, your own view of what we most importantly 
need to do to be ready to fight whatever we have to fight in 
2009?
    General Shinseki. If you look out, the Army is extending 
from the fiscal year 2004 budget, but from fiscal year 2004 to 
fiscal year 2009 you will see that on the moneys generated, 
Future Combat System, that new capability that we are looking 
at in 2010, that we will begin to field that in 2008 in small 
increments, and the first brigade-sized element in 2010. So the 
Future Combat System, precision munitions, sensors and 
communications, what lashes this together is the C\4\ISR, if 
you will, the ability to link all these capabilities. 
Additionally, missile defense technology, a significant 
investment of about a billion dollars; about a billion dollars 
in science and technology as well. So these are the major 
categories that we will see accomplished in 2010.
    Senator Dayton. Admiral?
    Admiral Clark. Senator, the major issues are the 
recapitalization of the existing force and then moving forward 
with transformation. I have testified before this committee in 
previous years over the challenges that I face in that 
recapitalization issue and that I need $12 billion a year in my 
SCN account, for example, and have not had it.
    As I move toward the out years and will we be doing 
everything we need to do, the out years, we are doing 
everything we can to turn dollars into investment in the future 
for recapitalization, modernization, and transformation. I am 
encouraged by the out years. It is easy to see the improvement 
in the out years, but we have moved the budget in a way that 
puts the resources in the ship construction account, that puts 
the resources into the transformation we need in the aviation 
side of the house.
    For example, General Jumper and I are working--this will be 
reflected in future budgets--on how we can team to make the 
unmanned combat air vehicles and how we can get there quicker. 
I absolutely see the kind of transformational things that we 
need in the future as well as the number of ships that we need 
to build so that we can recapitalize for the first half of the 
20th century.
    Senator Dayton. Thank you.
    General?
    General Hagee. Some of those transformation items that we 
have talked about as far as the Marine Corps would be the 
Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle. In fiscal year 2009 we are 
going to start seeing, I believe, the Joint Strike Fighter 
coming off; tiltrotor technology, which right now is doing very 
well in the testing, will be available. We will be in the 
middle of our upgrade of our Huey and Cobra to a four-rotor 
blade on each one of those helicopters.
    We will have a replacement for the LHA. We will also have a 
way ahead for the replacement for our Maritime Prepositioned 
Force.
    Senator Dayton. Thank you.
    General Jumper. Sir, I think we will begin to see some of 
Secretary Rumsfeld's initiatives in transformation starting to 
come to fruition, where we streamline processes; we get the 
operational community, and the acquisition community, the 
scientific community together during the development of 
programs, and we start to get things out much quicker to the 
field.
    As far as the Air Force is concerned, I think we are going 
to see an increase in our ability to talk directly between 
space, air, land, and sea platforms, so that we can get the 
machine-to-machine interfaces that right now go through travel 
communities and analog eyeballs in order to interpret results.
    I think we will see a great uptick in our ability to 
network. I call it the cursor over the target. The sum of the 
wisdom of all of our systems talking to one another equals a 
cursor over the target that we can act on immediately. I think 
that we will see great improvements in our ability to deal with 
future threats such as cruise missiles, which is a big worry of 
mine, and mobile targets in and under the weather, in and under 
the camouflage, being able to work with General Shinseki's 
concept of operations to help our folks on the ground, all 
these things.
    The next generation of strike technology, whether it is a 
bomber, whether it is in orbit, from orbit, or through orbit, 
are going to be questions we are going to be asking in the 
coming months to prepare for future threats.
    Senator Dayton. Thank you.
    Although my time has expired, you say you have the 
resources you need, so I would say that anything that is not in 
this, especially in these out years, that you think is either 
not in that should be or that you think is underfunded, I would 
appreciate having that in writing in the next month or so. But 
I thank you all.
    Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
    Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Senator Sessions.
    Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I thank each of you for the tremendous service you have 
rendered. You have led in changing our military establishment 
and transforming it to a more lethal and mobile force that we 
respect, that leaves us with the capability of affecting world 
events in a positive way. We really appreciate that, all of 
you.
    I know there are things that remain to be done. There will 
be challenges you need to face, and whenever you make a change 
someone is not going to be happy. But I think the change is 
going in the right direction and I salute you for that.
    I know that some may want to continue to discuss and debate 
the niceties of the situation in Iraq, but I would just recall 
that we have voted 77 Senators and overwhelmingly in the House 
to authorize the President to take the action he believes is 
necessary without a UN vote, without a NATO vote, and I expect 
that the President will do that. It strikes me as really 
ludicrous or really worse, pernicious that France and Germany 
would suggest that we need to give at least 4 more months to 
the inspectors when Saddam Hussein could, within a few hours, 
disclose his weapons of mass destruction and the matter would 
be settled and we would not have a problem.
    So we need to give him more time to do something he could 
do in one day is beyond me. So I hope the President will 
continue to press on the United Nations the need for them to be 
responsible, be relevant, and to honor the resolutions that 
they have previously issued.
    Gentlemen, on the Guard and Reserve, there is some concern 
about whether we have them configured properly and whether or 
not we are able to call them up in a timely fashion and we have 
the right forces to call up. They are prepared to serve. 
Alabama has the highest per capita National Guard service in 
activation of any State in the country, and we are proud of 
that and willing to serve on that.
    I visited Opelika and Brundage and my old Army Reserve unit 
that I spent 10 years in has been activated for the second 
time. They are in Kuwait. They were there 11 years ago.
    I would just ask, are you satisfied where we are with the 
Reserves in terms of training? First, I would like to say the 
training and their capability and their equipment are maybe not 
perfect, but is so far superior to what it used to be. It is so 
close to active duty in most instances.
    But are you satisfied we are configured correctly and that 
we are using them as wisely as we can? General Shinseki, I 
guess you have the most. Maybe you can give your thoughts.
    General Shinseki. Senator, as I said, we have used them a 
lot more than I would have expected. I have watched this now 
for a number of years and I have talked about the end strength 
of the Army and the fact that we have gone to the Reserve 
component for many of those routine missions. I mean, they are 
in the Sinai today, they are in Bosnia, they are about to go to 
Kosovo; this suggests that for these ongoing operations that we 
are going to them far more frequently than I think any of us 
expected.
    I do know that there is stress on them. For these missions, 
we have the time to bring them up to the mission standard and 
they deploy and do a fantastic job. For a large-scale expansion 
on short notice, which is really what the members of the Guard 
and the Reserve have their focus on, this adds to the 
challenge. When they are being used for those routine day-to-
day missions, it adds to the stress.
    Are they able to do it? Yes. Are they better today than 
they were 5 or 10 years ago today? Much, much better. A lot of 
effort on their part and ours to get them resources and 
training to the standard. But there is stress on their 
formations and following this set of mobilizations we are going 
to have to take a good hard look at right-sizing the force and 
getting to the right mix. Those studies are under way.
    Senator Sessions. So those studies are under way?
    General Shinseki. Yes.
    Senator Sessions. Any of you want to comment further on 
that? [No response.]
    One of the things that we need to continue to strive for in 
our transformation are new methods of warfare: Special Forces, 
which I hear you say are most stressed; precision-guided 
munitions that we need enough of; and unmanned aerial vehicles 
and maybe unmanned ground vehicles. Those are transformational 
matters of great importance and it seems that we are somewhat 
stressed in each one of those areas and we could perhaps be 
further along in each one of those areas than we are today.
    It strikes me that in any likely conflict in the next 
decade these fores are going to be key to our success.
    I will start with General Shinseki again. Do you have any 
comments or are we where we need to be with regard to these 
type forces and should we strive to do more?
    General Shinseki. Special Operations Forces?
    Senator Sessions. The Special Operations Forces, the 
unmanned aerial vehicles, the precision-guided munitions, and 
things of that nature that represent modern warfare.
    General Shinseki. Special Operations Forces, you have 
already begun to see some adjustments on the part of the Army. 
Even before this latest expanded call-up or requirement for 
Special Operations Forces, in this next budget we have added 
something on the order of 1,800, perhaps 1,900, additional 
people that come from the Army, and it takes us a certain 
amount of time to grow that capability and then transition them 
to the Special Operations Forces.
    We are even recruiting directly off the street for 
youngsters with particular skills and capabilities that may go 
directly into that kind of unit. So we are looking at that. We 
have added to their budget in fiscal year 2004. So those things 
are under way.
    As I indicated earlier, we are investing in precision 
munitions. In some ways if you look at the efforts of the Army 
to digitize in the 1990s, it was the term that was used to 
describe what we were doing to create better situational 
awareness for our units and our formations so we could more 
precisely target those things we wanted to bring our fires 
against. Much of that investment is being realized today.
    For the ground combat formations, it is distinguishing 
between ourselves, our friends, and those adversaries who we 
want to target. Much of that is going on, a complement of now 
precision fires being able to link into that. Those investments 
are being made.
    Senator Sessions. Admiral, a comment?
    Admiral Clark. If I could. We have made a lot of progress 
in the PGM world. I feel real good about where we are. We are 
on a curve. We have not flattened out. This is a good news 
story. General Jumper and I are working together to make sure 
that we have the right mix of weapons and we have a great 
partnering relationship going on with the Air Force.
    I am really excited about what is happening in unmanned 
vehicles. I absolutely believe this is one of the most 
important technologies for us to pursue. We had a successful 
flight of one of the unmanned prototypes this last week, a 
combat vehicle, and this is all headed in the right direction. 
Again, this is an area where the Air Force and the Navy are 
working hand in glove, seeking to chart a path together so that 
we can optimize and get the most bang for the buck for the 
taxpayers' resources.
    The area where I am a little more concerned is the SOF 
question you raise. We have to look at this carefully. By the 
way, with the command relationship that exists, some of these 
forces work directly for Special Operations Command and not for 
the Navy per se. But we know that they are turning this force 
tightly.
    The demand on this resource is significant and I would 
expect that we are going to see a requirement to increase this 
force structure.
    Senator Sessions. General Hagee?
    General Hagee. Sir, I would strongly agree about the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles.
    Senator Sessions. Could I just interrupt. I notice that the 
Navy sent out a memo, according to The Washington Times 
article, that a capability gap exists and that a sense of 
urgency needs to be placed on unmanned aerial vehicles. Would 
you agree with that, Admiral Clark?
    Admiral Clark. I do agree with it and that is why I am so 
excited to report to you that we had a very successful flight 
last week. We have unmanned vehicles. Now, I am talking about 
the next generation. General Jumper and I are working on 
unmanned combat vehicles that will be carrier-capable. If you 
look at the nature of our operations cyclic off the carrier 
or--we need more dwell time.
    My favorite new word in the last year is ``persistence''-- 
persistent combat capability. We need that capability, and I 
believe that the unmanned regime is going to give us great 
capability. It is coming. There are investments for it in this 
budget and there will be, and we are working on additional 
things now for the future.
    General Hagee. Sir, we are also working with the Navy and 
the Air Force in the unmanned aerial vehicle area, both with 
sensors and the combat unmanned aerial vehicles. We are also 
working on the ground unmanned vehicles, too, mostly in the 
sensor area.
    As I mentioned before, we are working with Special 
Operations Command. In fact this afternoon, I am meeting with 
General Holland trying to identify those areas where Marine 
forces that are already forward deployed might be able to 
relieve some of the stress on his forces.
    Senator Sessions. Thank you.
    General Jumper. Sir, I am very proud of how we are getting 
this stuff out in the field in efforts like we described with 
Sergeant Yoshida, who is working directly with commercial 
industry, with our acquisition community, to take off-the-shelf 
technology, get them into the hands of our combat controllers, 
and do it now. I think that is a good model for the future.
    On things like the unmanned air vehicle, we are making the 
Predator UAV as quickly as we can. We are making two a month. 
One of the problems that we have is we have to balance the 
things we are trying to do with that vehicle with our ability 
to have a stable production line, because since 1999, we have 
added the laser designation capability to the Predator, we have 
added the Hellfire missile to the Predator, and other special 
capabilities that we keep going back then and trying to refit 
into the ones that are being manufactured now.
    We have a Predator B on the way that is going to have six 
weapons stations on it and it will improve that capability 
significantly.
    Then with the precision-guided munitions, if you recall, 
Senator, back as recent as the Kosovo war we did not have the 
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The JDAM, which is GPS-
guided, is on everybody's tongue now. We did not even have it 
in Kosovo. We were dropping prototypes out of the B-2.
    Since then we have tens of thousands of these things that 
Admiral Clark and I are out procuring at a rate of about 2,500 
a month by July of this year, as quickly as we can make them. 
So I think the emphasis is there. I could go on and on, but I 
think the emphasis is there and we have a deep appreciation for 
what you are talking about, sir.
    Senator Sessions. Well, we do not want to run short.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Senator Kennedy.
    Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I join with all the members of the committee in commending 
all of you for the job that you have done preparing our Armed 
Forces to deal with the eventualities that we are going to be 
facing, appear to be facing very soon in terms of Iraq. At the 
time when these servicemen are called to perform, all of us are 
going to be strongly behind them.
    I am glad we talked earlier, in response to questions, 
about the preparedness of the servicemen and women. I do not 
believe that this conflict in Iraq is going to last a very long 
time. I myself am most concerned about Osama bin Laden and al 
Qaeda, the security issues that are presented by them still, 
and those issues that are presented by them in terms of terror 
here at home and around the world.
    I am very concerned about North Korea and the dangers that 
they have in terms of production of nuclear weapons grade 
plutonium.
    I am glad that General Shinseki and others talked about the 
training of our troops to deal with chemical and biological 
weapons. I am sure that the real challenge that we are going to 
face, I think, eventually is whether as a result of this 
conflict, with the inspections if they fail and they are not 
followed through or cannot be completed, is the danger of a 
recruiting ground for al Qaeda in Iraq and among the Arab 
world.
    General Shinseki, we talked about feeding the people in 
Iraq, 24 million Iraqis, 60 percent of them being fed and 
probably food being stored in barns. It is not difficult to 
assume that those barns are going to be burned down. So you end 
up with individuals that after 3 days may not be looking at 
American servicemen and women as liberators.
    Setting up the local police, when you have these 
bloodletting feuds that have lasted over a lifetime, a judicial 
system in a country that has never known a judicial system. How 
is that going to be developed? What is going to happen in terms 
of American servicemen if the Kurds start going over and 
reclaiming their old lands? Are we going to become involved and 
embroiled in that? What are going to be the orders to our 
servicemen?
    We read in this morning's papers we are 2 to 3 weeks away 
from moving, so there must be some instructions. What is going 
to happen when the Shi'a move into the southern part of Iran to 
reclaim their religious cities? Where are American servicemen 
going to be over there?
    So these are some of the concerns. At the same time, we are 
seeing the North Koreans moving ahead in terms of their 
production of weapons-grade plutonium. It appears to me that we 
have developed and sustained a two-war military to only have it 
run by an administration with a one-war attention span. Will we 
resolve the crisis before or after in terms of, in Iraq, before 
or after the North Koreans produce a few more bombs?
    What is your thinking today in looking at the danger that 
that poses to the security in the Pacific, the dangers of an 
arms race there, of real conflict? What are your plans in terms 
of telling this committee how we ought to be considering the 
issues of using whatever is going to be necessary in terms of 
force in order to protect our interests there?
    What is the timing going to be? What should we know, given 
those realities today and given the challenges that are 
presented?
    I do not think anyone is doubting that these men and women 
are going to be able to get into Baghdad. That is, at least for 
some of us, just going to be the beginning. I want to bring up 
the whole questions about the Reserve and the Guard. In my 
State, Massachusetts, we are proud of the ones that have served 
well, the highest activation since World War II, with all the 
implications that has in terms of primary responders that you 
have talked about.
    At a time that we see additional troops going to the 
Philippines, additional troops going to Colombia. Primarily my 
focus of the question is on North Korea, your statement of 
whether we are going to have enough time in North Korea, and 
then I am going to run out of time.
    But I want to hear from General Shinseki about the 
administration's cut on Impact Aid for schools, $130 million, 
cutting back on school budgets in districts where servicemen 
are going over to Iraq and these Impact Aid funds are 30, 40, 
or 50 percent of school budgets. It is beyond belief to me on 
this matter.
    If someone could make a comment, just if they would on that 
and the other issue about how they see this unfolding 
responsibility on the military and how that fits into the 
timing for our security interests in North Korea, with its 
imminency of developing the weapons-grade plutonium.
    General Shinseki. Senator, I think you have described quite 
well this challenging and complex environment we find ourselves 
in today. Had we sat back 3 years ago and described it, it 
would not have been exactly as we see it. Maybe it is a good 
caution to us that in this business of trying to anticipate it 
is not precise and sometimes you have to have a little of added 
capability to be able to adjust to these unanticipated 
surprises.
    I think in our discussions of two major combat operations, 
one a decisive defeat and the other a significant, swiftly 
defeat the efforts, you can add a third major contingency here 
and that is the global war on terrorism. Several years ago that 
was not seen as a requirement. So the stress on the 
requirements has certainly spread, at least in the case of the 
Army, our ground forces cover more missions than we would have 
anticipated.
    We are concerned about what appears to be happening in 
North Korea, but we also know that there are actions under way 
to deal with that. For the present, we look at our people on 
the ground there and look at what requirements we may be asked 
to provide to the combatant commander should tensions go any 
higher. We are in the process of doing that and, as I indicated 
earlier, to meet his requirements it would probably involve 
additional mobilization of our Reserve components.
    But I think your questions are appropriate. I would say 
that in the aftermath of this series of crises, as we think 
about where we position U.S. military presence for the future, 
these are issues that ought to impact the strategy that 
outlines where those capabilities ought to be positioned.
    Senator Kennedy. If any of the others want to add to that?
    General Jumper. Sir, could I comment on the Impact Aid?
    Senator Kennedy. Sure.
    General Jumper. I just learned about this yesterday, as a 
matter of fact. I am not sure exactly what happened, but it is 
certainly of concern to the Air Force and, as the father of a 
child who goes to a school that benefits from this sort of aid, 
it is something that we will go back and look into. It was not 
something that was recommended by my service, I can tell you.
    Senator Kennedy. It is a $115 million cutback. Thank you.
    I know my time is up. The policy decisions are not made by 
you. They are made by the administration and obviously to the 
extent Congress does. So everyone has a high regard for all of 
you, and I think it is almost because of the extraordinary high 
regard that we have for all of you we want to make sure that 
you have what you need to do the job and not being asked to do 
things which put you at undue risk.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you.
    Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Shinseki, I want to join my colleagues in thanking 
you for your extraordinary service.
    I also want to pursue the issue of the readiness of our 
troops to face a biological or chemical attack. Last July, the 
Army Audit Agency submitted a report that was critical of the 
Army's preparedness to deal with such an attack, and the 
results of the audit were very troubling. Of 25 units reviewed 
at Fort Hood and Fort Lewis, 18 of them were found not to be 
proficient in operating chemical and biological defensive 
equipment. Inspectors also found that many units were not 
performing adequate maintenance on their chem-bio equipment.
    There have been other reports, recently by ``60 Minutes'' 
and others, that have also raised very troubling questions 
about whether our troops would be adequately prepared and 
protected if they face chemical or biological weapons.
    First, could you tell me how the Army has responded to 
these audits and reports? Second, are you personally confident 
that our troops are adequately trained, equipped, and prepared 
to face a chemical or biological attack?
    General Shinseki. Senator, just a point of clarification. 
Was that report a year ago or 2 years ago that you are 
referring to?
    Senator Collins. I believe it was last July, just this past 
year.
    General Shinseki. Last July. Okay, there have been several 
of these surveys. In some cases, we have asked these agencies 
to go out and take a look because of things we have heard. The 
one I am most familiar with was several years ago. I would have 
to go back and take a look at this report.
    I will tell you when we looked several years ago, when we 
talk about a battalion sized unit, 2 years ago our problem 
areas were with the two soldiers who were on the battalion 
level staff that had responsibilities for certain select pieces 
of equipment. So in a 500 to 800 person organization, the focus 
of that investigation was we found some shortcomings in 
training and maintenance at that level, and we have gone to 
work and corrected those things.
    I will have to look and see specifically what this last 
July report was about. But whenever we discover there is some 
concern, we go back out there and ensure that the commanders 
are doing, and are resourced to do, what it is we expect of 
them. The training that goes along with operating in this 
environment is part of our mission set that we train to.
    As I say, whether you are at garrison at Fort Stewart in 
the wintertime or August in the National Training Center, you 
can expect that these tasks are part of that set of skills that 
individuals have to train to.
    The answer to your question: I am confident we are training 
and that standards are significant. This is the toughest part 
of our training mission. For those units that are currently on 
the ground in the forward areas, I can tell you they are 
dealing with this requirement on a daily basis.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Admiral Clark, I am pleased that the budget this year turns 
the corner on shipbuilding and provides for funding for 12 
ships. But nevertheless, the Navy is still dealing with a 
legacy of underfunding year after year and the result of that 
with the planned retirement of the Spruance class destroyers is 
that the fleet is projected to fall under 300 ships in coming 
years, bottoming out at, I think, 291 ships in the year 2006.
    You have testified in the past that ideally to meet mission 
requirements you would need a fleet of approximately 375 ships. 
Is that still your judgment, that a fleet ideally would be 
about that size?
    Admiral Clark. Yes, Senator, it is.
    Senator Collins. I would like to talk to you about how we 
can recapitalize our fleet, not only through new construction 
but also modernization of the Arleigh Burke class of 
destroyers. It seems to me that one way that we can reduce 
total life-cycle costs is by reducing the crew size on our DDGs 
using the technological breakthroughs and designs that we have 
learned in designing the DD(X).
    What are your thoughts on modernization of the DDGs to make 
sure we are maximizing their useful life and also reducing 
overall costs by reducing the size of the crew?
    Admiral Clark. I think that is absolutely the right 
direction to go. We have been doing some experimenting with 
Smartship for the last several years. We see a lot of that 
manifested in the design of DD(X). While we do not know exactly 
how many people DD(X) is going to have on it, we know it is 
going to be dramatically less than what we have on our main 
line ships of the line today.
    When DDG comes up for its midlife--and we must begin to 
project toward that midlife upgrade--we are going to need to 
apply the improvements that technology will allow us to bring 
to bear.
    Senator, when we talk about the total number of ships and 
we talk about capability like DDG, the Burke class is a great 
ship. It is a terrific ship. Still building them. But one of 
the things that I do not believe that we have always done as 
well as we should have done in our Navy is start thinking right 
up front, where is the midlife improvement on this platform?
    Because if we do not do that, looking back over time, you 
lose the ship early. The taxpayer does not get the return on 
investment that it laid out when it invested in the platform. 
So we clearly, we are not there yet on DDG. We are still 
building them. But we have to be moving toward that with the 
things that we have discovered in some of our Smartship 
experimentation.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    General Jumper, my time has expired, but I just want to 
associate myself with the concerns expressed by Senator Allard 
on the allegations involving rape and other sexual assault at 
the Air Force Academy. One of my proudest responsibilities is 
to recommend young men and women to attend our Service 
academies, and the idea that I am recommending young women who 
then may be at risk of sexual assault is just appalling to me. 
I know that it is to you as well.
    I just want to let you know that in my capacity as chairman 
of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I, along with Senator 
Lieberman, have asked the Inspector General of the Department 
of Defense to investigate these allegations. I am pleased to 
hear your comments as well this morning.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Collins, I assure you that when I 
first learned of this problem several weeks ago, in 
consultation with our colleague the Senator from Colorado, we 
have taken those steps to posture this committee so that we can 
review the findings. We urged the appropriate Air Force 
officials, including our witness today, to initiate these 
steps.
    I thank the Senator for her concern because I likewise, 
along with every member of this committee, take such pride. As 
a matter of fact, my Academy Day is coming up soon, when some 
400 or 500 nominees or applicants and their families gather 
here at the Senate to review those options.
    I thank the Senator.
    Senator Pryor, would you indulge me? I just wish to make an 
announcement to the committee. Senator Levin and I have 
arranged for tomorrow morning a classified briefing for the 
entire committee on the efforts to date by the administration 
with regard to the planning for the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. 
This is an interagency effort. We will have briefers from the 
various departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
initially tasked with this. I hope Senators can schedule their 
time to be available for this briefing.
    Thank you, Senator Pryor.
    Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I, too, want to concur with Senator Collins' statements a 
few moments ago about the academies, and I know that you are 
going to do everything in your power to do what we need to do 
to make that situation right.
    Also, I want to just thank you all for being here today, 
thank you for your service to this great country. I think the 
war on terrorism has touched every person in our Nation in 
various ways and certainly everyone in this room is touched by 
it in some way. I know that you cannot pick up the paper in 
Little Rock without reading about the Little Rock Air Force 
Base or the fact that many of our National Guard units have 
been called up, including our Air National Guard unit there in 
Fort Smith, and what is going on at the Army's Pine Bluff 
Arsenal as part of the war on terrorism.
    It has touched many lives, not just in my State, but all 
over this great country.
    Also, I must say on a personal note, Senator Warner, that 
when I was the Attorney General of Arkansas, my director of 
operations was a one-star general in the Arkansas National 
Guard, and he has been called up now for I think over 6 months 
now. Part of his responsibility is to assess readiness of 
various National Guard units around the country and to call 
them up as need be. He is now in Georgia doing that.
    I know that preparedness is something that you are very 
focused on. I appreciate your comments about preparedness today 
and the lessons learned in this environment we find ourselves 
in today. I can assure you, and I think I can speak for the 
committee, that we are going to do everything in our power to 
make sure that our men and women are the best-trained and best-
equipped in the world. We are just going to do our part on this 
committee to continue to make sure that you can complete your 
mission and the mission of the United States of America.
    I really only have one question today, Mr. Chairman, and 
that is about retention. Some of you mentioned that in your 
opening statements. I know it is something in the last several 
years that has received a lot of publicity and attention, as it 
should. It is an important part of our military picture and an 
important part of our preparedness. I would like to hear from 
each one of you today, if possible, about how you feel we are 
doing and your particular branch is doing on the issue of 
retention and what we need to do to get you to the level where 
you are very satisfied with retention.
    General Shinseki. Senator, up until this point, retention 
has not been an issue for us. In fact, if there was a challenge 
it was recruiting 3 years ago. We fixed that. The last 3 years 
we have met our recruiting targets. But at the same time, our 
retention requirements we exceeded each year in each of our 
components.
    The stress on the force right now may affect decisions 
after this mobilization period is over about primarily Reserve 
component soldiers, whether they stay in their formations or 
not, and I think that is something we have to pay attention to. 
I think whatever we can do to work with employers of those 
soldiers is also important, and we do. We go out and through 
our contacts engage those employers, thank them for what they 
do, and explain how important this is.
    But there is stress out there. I think we are all aware of 
it.
    Admiral Clark. Senator, I always love this question because 
we are doing better than we ever have in our history. We are 
going through a period for the last 2 years we have had the 
highest retention we have ever had in the history of the 
institution. Part of this reason is because young men and women 
want to be part of the solution. Young Americans want to be 
there, and that is what we are seeing.
    With regard to recruiting, last year we took 7,500 out of 
the plan because we had more people than end strength would 
allow us to have. So I would just sum it up like this: our 
young people are responding to the challenge.
    Now, make no mistake. They are responding to a whole series 
of signals. One is the global war on terrorism. But they are 
responding to signals that they have received from the American 
people and from Congress as well. There have been major things 
done to help us win this battle for people.
    I would tell you that at this stage of the year I am 
running about 20 points over my annual targets. But I will tell 
you why this is; there are reenlistment incentives for people 
to stay. When those reenlistment incentives run out, well, we 
will see a change in the way that they respond.
    So very much what has become evident to me in my 2\1/2\ 
years in this post is that they are looking for signals from 
the American people and they like the signals that they are 
getting from the American people and from Congress. Congress 
has helped us put together financial incentive packages and the 
things that they are responding to.
    But more than anything else, my summation of what is going 
on with our young people is they want to make a difference. I 
would ask you to continue to support us on the issues that 
allow us to create and shape the force the way we need to shape 
it for the 21st century. There are financial tools that are 
involved there and the help of Congress is critical.
    Thank you.
    General Hagee. Senator, I could not agree more with the 
Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to thank this committee 
and Congress for the support that you have given us and our 
young men and women in uniform. Quality of life makes a 
difference. Selective reenlistment bonus makes a difference. 
Those are some of the things that the Admiral was talking 
about. Obviously they want to serve.
    As far as the Marine Corps specifically is concerned, we 
have had the best year in retention in our officer corps this 
year over the last 18 years. This year on our retention of our 
first term enlistees, in January we had already retained 80 
percent of what we wanted to retain for the entire year. So 
like the Navy, we are doing very well in retention both on the 
enlisted and the officer side.
    General Jumper. Senator, in the Air Force we are 
experiencing similar results. Our recruiting for last year was 
finished by the end of April. Our retention numbers are higher 
than they have been in years, and we set very high retention 
standards because we spend so much money training many of our 
technical people. We have experienced up to 20 points better 
than the goals that we have set.
    I think I agree completely with Admiral Clark. Once you 
expose the youngsters out there today, who many think do not 
have the capacity to be dedicated, patriotic, or committed, 
once you expose them to success in military life, then they 
cannot turn back. They are proud of what they do. They are 
proud to serve.
    The incentives that have been supported by this committee 
have been a great help. As a result, we are experiencing the 
highest pilot retention we have had in quite a few years.
    So we thank the committee, Mr. Chairman and Senators, for 
all you have done, and we need to continue to do this to keep 
the quality of our force as high as it is.
    Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Dole.
    Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    An important aspect of overall readiness is certainly 
family readiness, and I would like to pursue a couple of 
questions in this area. Having just been at Fort Bragg this 
past week as well as Marine Air Station Cherry Point and 
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, as I talked with commanders, 
with enlisted personnel, with the spouses--many of the spouses, 
their partners had been deployed; others were about to be 
deployed. An issue that came up time and again was one that 
Senator Kennedy brought up on Impact Aid and the fact that the 
children of these men and women who are being repeatedly 
deployed deserve to have a quality education in a well-funded 
school.
    General Jumper, I appreciate your responding to the 
question, but I would like to ask the rest of the panel if you 
would also speak to Impact Aid and how you see this in terms of 
the importance to your people and your families. I am concerned 
about this issue, and I would like to hear each of you respond 
to that issue as well.
    General Shinseki. Senator, the Army has been interested in 
working a wide range of education issues because they have been 
important to our service members, the education of their family 
members. Impact Aid is a piece of that and it is important to 
our service members, seeing the education of their children.
    Admiral Clark. I align myself with the General's comments. 
We have a saying, we recruit individuals, we retain families.
    Senator Dole. Yes.
    Admiral Clark. We believe that. Clearly one of the major 
issues for a service member is making sure that their children, 
that they have the kind of opportunity that they dream of for 
them. So every one of these programs are critical.
    I would say that one of the challenges for us--and this is 
an issue for the committee and as we look at what it takes to 
compete in the marketplace--is what kind of tools do the 
Services need and what kind of issues are the service members 
looking at when they make decisions about whether they are 
going to serve or not.
    We know that, first and foremost, it has to be an 
attractive, appealing lifestyle. But I will tell you, Senator, 
one of the things that has been real clear to me. The men and 
women who are serving today, they are not missing the signal 
that is coming from the citizens of the United States of 
America, and that citizenry is saying to our people today: we 
appreciate your service. Everything we can do to send that 
signal will benefit our institutions greatly.
    General Hagee. Senator, I would also like to associate 
myself with General Shinseki and Admiral Clark's comments. When 
the marine out in the field knows that his family is taken care 
of, he can better focus on his or her job than if he is worried 
about what is going on back on the home front. Our young men 
and women today are highly educated and they want their 
families to be educated.
    Senator Dole. Let me raise another issue in this area. The 
budget includes a $4 billion request for family housing for 
fiscal year 2004 and about $346 million of that is for family 
housing privatization. I am very interested in this. It is a 
truly transformational program that seems to me to go directly 
to the issue of morale of our troops and also to the fact that 
if a young couple has attractive housing they are more likely 
to make a decision to stay in the military, to make it a 
career.
    I would like to have each of you comment on this, whether 
or not this privatization as a way to move in the future might 
be the most cost-effective and the quickest way to eliminate 
alot of this substandard housing which of course exists across 
all branches of the Services.
    I was particularly interested in the planned community 
concept at Fort Bragg. But if you could talk with me a bit, 
just respond briefly now and maybe more for the record, about 
how you see privatization, for example the quality of 
construction, how cost-efficient is it, and long-term plans for 
maintenance. I think this could be a great asset and I would be 
very interested in how each of you see privatization.
    General Shinseki. Senator, it is an important initiative. 
We started this about 2 years ago. Fort Bragg is in the second 
tranche of posts. We started with Fort Sill, Fort Lewis, and a 
number of others. For us, this was the only solution because to 
generate the kinds of resources to do this on our own was not 
possible. So this Residential Communities Initiative, in which 
we get assistance from outside, has been a significant 
momentum-builder in addressing our housing needs. It is 
important. We think it works and we are expanding the 
experiment to multiple locations.
    Senator Dole. Are we devoting enough resources for this 
family housing in this budget?
    General Shinseki. In terms of privatization, we are.
    Admiral Clark. We are moving forward and we got permission 
from Congress last year to start a privatization public-private 
venture in the area of bachelor quarters as opposed to the 
house itself. Frankly, Senator, that is the area where we are 
more behind.
    But here is what I have to say. I do not really want to 
build more military housing if I do not have to. When I talk to 
our people, I ask them: How many of you have your own place? I 
want them to have a stake in America. I want them to have their 
own place, not a military place, especially when we get to 
career people. That is what I tell them.
    What has happened over the course of the last 4 years as we 
have sought to buy down the out-of-pocket costs--we make 
another big step in it in this budget--is that we are seeing 
our service members get to a position that they can compete in 
the market.
    Now, in the area of bachelor quarters, that is a different 
story. We are very much, again, experimenting with solutions 
here and we want to move toward that as rapidly as possible. We 
will have our substandard housing off the record by the end of 
this FYDP. It will be gone. That has been the objective.
    But the most exciting thing for me is to see a young 
service member who owns their home for the first time. That is 
what I want for them. What is being done for them now is making 
that more of a possibility.
    General Hagee. Senator, we strongly support the public-
private venture. We started several years ago in Hawaii. It has 
been a great success. In fact, just last year the residents 
threw a party for all the maintenance people. That is the 
response that they had to public-private venture. We opened up 
a series of houses in Camp Pendleton last year and without 
public-private venture we would not be able to reduce the 
number of inadequate houses that we have.
    We are joining with the Navy on the experiment on PPV in 
the BEQ area and I am quite excited about that.
    Senator Dole. Great. Thank you.
    General Jumper. Senator, we have quite a few bases that are 
in fairly remote locations and we have about 38 projects 
planned that will address about 40,000 family housing units. I 
believe we are the only Service that does not get finished by 
the Secretary of Defense's goal of 2007, but that mostly has to 
do with northern tier bases where we would have to displace 
people. We just cannot do the shell game fast enough to fulfill 
the requirement. But we are pushing full speed ahead as quickly 
as we can.
    Senator Dole. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Senator Bill Nelson.
    Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Jumper, is the Air Force committed to extend both 
contractors on the EELV over the next 5 years?
    General Jumper. Sir, there is no reason that I know of to 
deviate from that path. I know there are some studies underway 
and we have not seen the results of those studies, but the 
current program is to stick with both the Atlas and the Delta 
programs.
    Senator Bill Nelson. According to that answer then, is 
there money in the fiscal year 2004 budget that will enable 
that to occur?
    General Jumper. As far as I know, we are adequately funded, 
sir. I will get back if there is any doubt, but nothing has 
been brought to my attention that would argue otherwise.
    Senator Bill Nelson. If there is any doubt, please get 
back.
    General Jumper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Bill Nelson. Needless to say, it is important that 
we have assured access to space.
    Now, I just found this out and this alarms me, because 20 
years ago, as the Congressman representing Orlando, we started 
the simulation center there, for the Navy, and pretty soon all 
of the Services came together and that became a simulation 
center. For obvious reasons, this was cost effective on our 
training and so forth.
    I have just been told that that is being zeroed out in the 
fiscal year 2004 budget, which is hard for me to even imagine. 
I would like each of your comments?
    General Shinseki. Senator, I am not specifically sure what 
is being zeroed out. But the Army's simulations efforts are in 
Orlando, as you describe, and we continue to operate there. 
What you would have known as Simulation, Training, and 
Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) is there.
    Admiral Clark. I am unaware of any move to zero out 
Orlando. Orlando has been a key part in helping us put forth a 
transformational approach to training. In fact, key members of 
that organization have been on my task force who work toward 
the revolution in training in the Navy.
    I will look into it, Senator, and see if there is anything. 
If there are any cuts there, I am unaware.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The Navy contribution to the Joint Simulation Center in Orlando, 
Florida is the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division 
(NAWCTSD). There are no cuts of any kind scheduled for NAWCTSD in 
fiscal year 2004 or the Future Years Defense Program.

    Senator Bill Nelson. General Hagee.
    General Hagee. Sir, I am also unaware of any cuts there.
    Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper.
    General Jumper. Sir, we have our modeling and simulation 
center there and I am unaware of this. We do a lot of work down 
there.
    Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Well, if you would check, 
because there is a DOD program decision memorandum, PDM, 
directing the cancellation of the joint simulation system 
program in the fiscal year 2004 budget, and that just seems to 
me about as contrary as we can be as to what we need to be 
doing.
    General Shinseki.
    General Shinseki. Senator, that is a project and an effort 
all of us participated in. It is one that was not delivering 
and I believe that is correct, that joint simulation system was 
having difficulty meeting its contract. I believe that is the 
reason it was scrutinized and decided to be lined through.
    I will provide more information for the record.
    [The information referred to follows:]
              Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Termination
    The JSIMS program was terminated in the Program Decision Memorandum 
1 (PDM 1) decrement. While it did not cite a specific rationale for the 
termination, the program has been under close scrutiny the past year 
because of significant delays in achieving critical milestones, 
increasing costs, and little to show for the large investment. However, 
the PDM directed completion of JSIMS Block 1 by June 2003, which should 
provide the Joint Warfighting Training Center a Joint Task Force 
component-level training capability. The PDM also directed completion 
of an analysis of alternatives to identify a cost-effective method of 
meeting future Joint and Service training requirements. In subsequent 
guidance to the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense also 
recognized the Army's significant investment in the Warfighter 
Simulation program and provided guidance to continue that effort. With 
the requisite resources, we can meet our Title X training and have the 
capability to link with any future joint training solution.

    Senator Bill Nelson. I think we all ought to be aware, 
because your colleagues do not seem to be aware of that. I 
would like a justification as to how that is in the best 
interests of the defense of the country as we train our troops 
and try to be cost effective with simulators.
    Let me ask you again, General. There are rumors that we are 
going to have some amassing of opponents, the enemy, in the 
area of northeast Afghanistan for some kind of spring 
offensive. It could be in Afghanistan, it could be right across 
the line in very forbidding territory where there is a bunch of 
tribals.
    I would like your comment on how we are going to meet that 
kind of resistance, that kind of attempt to blunt some of the 
success that we have had in Afghanistan from a military 
standpoint.
    General Shinseki. I am not specifically sure on exactly 
this tip, but all along that border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, there are operations ongoing and we do from time to 
time see a buildup of capabilities. The combatant commander 
there, Lieutenant General Dan McNeil, working for General Tom 
Franks, focuses on those day-to-day operations. We provide him 
the capabilities to conduct those day-to-day operations.
    This specific buildup for a springtime offensive, all of us 
anticipate when the weather gets better activity goes up. But 
the specific area you are referring to I probably want to take 
a look at and give you a better answer.

    [The information referred to follows:]

                       Operation Enduring Freedom

    The Central Command Combatant Commander is better prepared to 
answer operational questions such as this. As a force provider for this 
operation, the Army's responsibility is to provide trained and ready 
forces to the combatant commander. The Army has provided all forces 
that the combatant commander has requested and is prepared to provide 
additional forces if required.

    Senator Bill Nelson. Does your commander have sufficient 
forces to repel such an offensive?
    General Shinseki. I believe he does. I will be certain to 
ask that very question just because you have asked it.
    Senator Bill Nelson. I ask it for obvious reasons, because 
we are going to have our attention diverted to another part of 
the world and we sure do not want to be losing ground. I mean, 
it is irritating enough that there seems to be a lessening 
cooperation from President Musharraf in Pakistan. But sooner or 
later, if that is where the al Qaeda leadership is, we are 
going to have to go in there and root them out, and not the 
least of which we are going to have to be prepared in case 
there is a counteroffensive from them on us.
    So in whatever kind of setting you want to discuss this or 
your designee, I would be most appreciative.
    General Shinseki. Senator, I would be happy to do that. 
There is coordination that goes on between our people and folks 
on the other side to ensure coordinated activities.
    Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, General.
    Mr. Chairman, as I conclude, I would like at an appropriate 
setting, perhaps a closed setting, for us also to talk about 
the new military role that is apparently occurring in the 
Philippines, which I do not necessarily disagree with, but I 
would like to know how we think that that is going to be able 
to help us stamp out the terrorist activity in that part of the 
world.
    It is going to be there. It is going to be in other 
countries, and as a member of your committee, I want to have 
some assurance that we are doing what we should. Is the new 
role symbolized by the more combat-capable, combat-ready, 
combat-insertive position that we are talking about in the 
Philippines?
    Chairman Warner. Senator, the question of the Philippines 
will be a part of our briefing tomorrow morning, and I wish to 
say to the committee that we have a closed session scheduled 
immediately at the conclusion of this round of questions, at 
which time the Senator may pose that question. So there is the 
first opportunity you would have to raise that question with 
regard to the Philippines.
    Like you, I would like to know exactly the circumstances 
under which this decision was made and what the expectations 
are with regard to those deployments.
    I thank the Senator.
    Senator Chambliss.
    Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, let me just say that this Senator has a great 
appreciation for the job each of you do, for your great 
leadership you are providing, and for those men and women that 
serve under you, and to each of you, I say thank you for that.
    I also have a great appreciation for the job that the 
administration is doing and the leadership that this 
administration is providing with respect to winning the war on 
terrorism, and thank goodness we have people who are willing to 
make a tough and hard decision, knowing that they have under 
them leadership like you and the men and women that serve under 
you to carry out the jobs assigned to each of them that will 
ensure that my children and my grandchildren are going to live 
in the same safe, free, and open America that my generation has 
enjoyed.
    So for that I say thank you, and I hope you will express 
that to each of the men and women that serve under you at every 
opportunity.
    General Jumper, you know my fondness for Robins Air Force 
Base and the great job that the men and women, civilian and 
military, do there, and I appreciate your comments regarding 
the 116th. That decision was just a great vision on the part of 
Secretary Roche, you, and the folks like Paul Weaver over on 
the Guard side, any number of folks who participated in that. 
It is going to be a model for where the future of the armed 
services are going to go, irrespective of what branch we are 
looking at.
    I am very proud of those folks.
    General Jumper. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Chambliss. I have had the opportunity to visit 
Robins Air Force Base many times, particularly recently. 
General Shinseki, I will tell you that recently I was at Fort 
McPherson, Fort Gillem, and Fort Stewart, and you all are 
correct that the quality of the force out there today is second 
to none. It is well-prepared, well-trained, and the men and 
women that are being called on to defend freedom are in my 
opinion the best-trained, best-service organization that the 
world has ever seen. That is thanks in large part to your 
leadership.
    General Jumper, four weapons systems that I have a keen 
interest in are C-17, C-130, F-22, and Joint Surveillance and 
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). From a budgetary 
standpoint, I think the C-17 is moving forward in a very good 
manner. The decision on the multi-year several years ago, I 
think, was one of the best business decisions that any branch 
has ever made, particularly the Air Force.
    I would like for you to give us just a quick budget update 
on the other three weapons systems, if you will, as it is 
reflected in this current budget.
    General Jumper. Yes, sir. Well, starting with the F/A-22, 
we have the production cap of $43 billion. We are sticking 
within that cap. We are on track to begin our operational tests 
later in this year as we finish up our developmental testing. 
The airplane is achieving astonishing results when you talk to 
the people that fly it.
    We continue to have some problems with software stability 
that we are working very hard, and, of course, we are at the 
critical part of the airplane's development now where it 
continues to go from the development phase into the production 
phase and the ensuing production problems that you get when you 
start up production.
    So we are working our way through those, but we have not 
come back to ask for any more money, nor do we intend to. We 
intend to live within that cap.
    The JSTARS, of course, is a magnificent sensing device that 
we join with the ground forces to give them targets, moving 
target indications on the ground. The mission of the 116th is 
to train their people up to speed and get the backenders up to 
speed. We had a few slowdowns in the training for the 
backenders that we are working our way through as we get that 
first surge of people who have transitioned from other systems 
in the National Guard through that training. We are working our 
way through that now.
    Then the C-130, I believe is the other one you mentioned. 
All of the problems we had with the C-130J I think have been 
reconciled and that is going forward now for OMB consideration. 
So I think everything is on track, not without challenges, but 
working our way through all of it.
    Senator Chambliss. Are we going to be able to provide the 
service to the customer out there with respect to JSTARS by 
stopping at 17 instead of going to the full complement of 19 
and moving on to the 767, where we are going to have that gap? 
Are you comfortable with that?
    General Jumper. Sir, we are working hard to make sure that 
we do not have any more of a gap than we can stand. We are 
proposing a transition into the Boeing 767 with the next 
generation of JSTARS improvements and this will be the baseline 
aircraft for our multi-sensor command and control aircraft that 
will do the sort of integration with space, unmanned, and 
manned platforms that we think will take us into the future--
talking directly to satellites, controlling UAVs, being able to 
join with the other Services to provide command and control 
depending on who is first on the scene, being able to 
distribute signals around the battle space, and being able to 
deal with things like cruise missiles.
    We use the next generation of the JSTARS platform in a 
Boeing 767 as our baseline for that activity. We took some 
decreases in funding, but we think we can work our way through 
that and we look forward to keeping this program vital and 
pressing on with it. I think it is going to be very vital for 
all the Services.
    Senator Chambliss. Thank you. All of you, thanks again.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Senator Clinton.
    Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I listened 
carefully to Senator Nelson's questions about the Philippines. 
Will there also be additional information available about 
current involvement in Colombia that the committee could be 
advised of?
    Chairman Warner. I will advise the Senator that there is no 
reason why that question could not be asked if you are able 
schedule-wise to join us at the closed session.
    Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to start by thanking General Shinseki for his 
incredible work. General Shinseki has done a tremendous job on 
behalf of the Army, and I am very grateful to his lifetime of 
service and look forward to your continuing service in whatever 
form that takes.
    Admiral Clark, in late January, the Pentagon announced that 
it was sending eight Coast Guard cutters and several port 
security units to the Persian Gulf. As I understand it, this is 
the first deployment of Coast Guard patrol boats overseas since 
the Vietnam War. Is that correct as far as you know?
    Admiral Clark. Actually, Senator, the cutters have been 
deploying with us periodically and working up with us. Part of 
our agreement is that in time of crisis they will come work for 
us. The only way to make that work is to periodically do it. So 
they periodically are deploying with our carrier battle groups.
    Senator Clinton. What are the numbers that are currently 
deployed? Do you have that?
    Admiral Clark. I am sorry, I do not. We would be happy to 
get that for you.
    [The information referred to follows:]

    The number of Coast Guard cutters deploying to the Persian Gulf 
are:

    378-foot high endurance cutters

        USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)--homeport: Alameda, CA
        USCGC Dallas (WHEC 716)--homeport: North Charleston, SC

    225-foot seagoing buoy tender

        USCGC Walnut (WLB 205)--homeport: Honolulu, HI

    110-foot patrol boats

        USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)--homeport: South Portland, ME
        USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)--homeport: Sandy Hook, NJ
        USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)--homeport: Atlantic Beach, NC
        USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)--homeport: Miami, FL
        USCGC Grand Isle (WPB 1338)--homeport: Gloucester, MA
        USCGC Bainbridge Island (WPB 1343)--homeport: Sandy Hook, NJ
        USCGC Pea Island (WPB 1347)--homeport: St. Petersburg, FL
        USCGC Knight Island (WPB 1348)--homeport: St. Petersburg, FL

    Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Admiral. Because in 
New York, as well as many other coastal States and cities, we 
count on the Coast Guard to guard our ports against terrorist 
threats and other emergencies like the one we just had the 
other day with the explosion at Staten Island. The Coast Guard 
was the first responder. We could not have responded without 
their lead and assistance.
    So I would like some additional information that I will 
submit to you in writing, so that I have a better idea of the 
criteria that are used to deploy the cutters, how long they are 
expected to be deployed, what are the missions that they 
perform, and how we anticipate replacing those functions that 
are going to be left behind as they deploy with you.
    I want to ask each of the chiefs a question that has been a 
concern of mine for many years, ever since President Clinton 
asked me to look into the Gulf War, the Gulf War Syndrome, and 
I went out to Bethesda to Walter Reed and met with a number of 
veterans who returned from the gulf suffering from unknown 
symptoms.
    I became convinced in my own mind and based on the research 
that we were doing that this was real, this was something that 
had to be addressed. The President appointed a commission to do 
so.
    Now, with U.S. troops being deployed again to the Persian 
Gulf, I know that you are spending a lot of time and attention 
trying to make sure that we do not send young men and women to 
war where they are out of harm's way in a conventional and 
traditional sense, but they return home debilitated and have to 
be separated from the Service and have ongoing chronic health 
conditions.
    So I would appreciate each of the Services giving me a 
brief overview and then I would like to arrange a briefing that 
my staff is currently working on to get more indepth 
information, because clearly the February 2002 GAO report 
before the House Veterans Affairs Committee seemed to conclude 
that, while military medical surveillance policies had been 
established, still a lot needed to be done to implement the 
system. I think we want to do everything possible to protect 
our troops this time around.
    If I could just have a brief overview comment from each of 
the Service Chiefs about that and then, as I say, I look 
forward to a more indepth briefing. General Shinseki.
    General Shinseki. Senator, I would say, first of all, we 
all share the concern coming out of the last gulf operation, 
and the conclusions were less conclusive than we would like. 
There was a variety of issues that continue today to be 
studied.
    I think since that last operation, however, we have 
expanded our detection and sensing capabilities in some rather 
significant ways, not just in chemical, but also biological 
threats. I think we are concerned. We have gone back to look at 
what the conditions might have been then. We pay attention to 
it, better detection, better training. But still there are a 
host of unknowns here, exactly what the causes were of that 
gulf illness.
    Senator Clinton. Thank you.
    Admiral Clark?
    Admiral Clark. My problem is a little different than 
General Shinseki's. Our issue is providing fundamentally 
protective gear for attack at sea, and we have some built-in 
systems to protect our people inside the ships. I would just 
tell you that we have made significant investments. In an open 
forum I would put it this way: we have made significant 
investments and we are ready.
    Senator Clinton. General Hagee?
    General Hagee. We share your concern, Senator. As General 
Shinseki mentioned, we have vehicles, platforms out there that 
did not exist 10 years ago during Operation Desert Storm, 
platforms that can identify and detect chemical and biological 
agents that are in the air and in the ground. We have also 
collected information on every single one of our marines so 
that we have good medical data baseline to try to, if anything 
happens, to try to determine what change has occurred.
    Senator Clinton. I really applaud you for that and I hope 
that every Service can move toward that. We have found post-
September 11 in New York the fire department had baseline 
screenings, the police department did not. It is much more 
difficult to figure out what the exposures led to when you do 
not know what the starting point was. So I very much appreciate 
what the Marine Corps has done on that.
    General Jumper. Senator, I agree with General Hagee. I 
think the baselining activity plus the steps that have been set 
up to gather data around the locations is much more 
sophisticated than we saw last time, and hopefully the root 
causes of these things can be determined in time to be of help.
    Senator Clinton. I thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I think this has not only implications for 
our men and women in uniform, but rather significant civilian 
ramifications as well. I greatly appreciate the chiefs taking 
this on as an issue and I look forward to following with great 
concern what we learn and how we respond.
    Chairman Warner. Senator, I know firsthand of your deep 
concern about the veterans who have returned from Afghanistan 
and other far-flung parts of the globe as to their health, and 
I commend you for those initiatives that you have undertaken.
    Senator Roberts.
    Senator Roberts. Thank you.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and what has been 
referred to doubtless all at the table as your favorite word, 
for persevering in your command and, quite frankly, here at the 
hearing.
    General Shinseki, well done, sir.
    General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Roberts. You have provided outstanding leadership 
and I think your legacy is going to be better transformation of 
the legacy weaponry, and so you have achieved a great deal and 
we thank you for that.
    General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Roberts. Thank you for working with our former 
Commandant, General Jim Jones, who is the SACEUR. I think 
before a hearing some time ago, I said we did not need two tips 
and two spears; we needed one tip and one spear. We have done 
that in regards to working with the Marine Corps and the Marine 
Corps working with you, sir. So we thank you for your 
innovative leadership.
    General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Roberts. As a survivor along with Senator Levin of 
Senator Warner's forced march, which was disguised as a CODEL, 
to possible war zone countries where we are fighting and in my 
opinion winning the war on terrorism, I want to say that we 
have an obligation to meet with a number of men and women in 
uniform on the front lines. As chairman of the Intelligence 
Committee, I want to go out and check the intelligence to our 
warfighters. We went to Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Qatar as well 
as other locations, and we survived. I think we did, Carl. I am 
not quite sure.
    But at any rate, I can report that the cooperation between 
our intelligence and our military personnel is as close as it 
has ever been. We now have in place information systems that 
will allow rapid access to current intelligence from the 
commander all the way down to the marine or soldier in the 
field.
    It is my judgment that we are really learning the lessons 
of Operation Desert Storm and September 11.
    Mr. Chairman, I hope we would not spend too much time 
arguing about who constitutes the greatest threat to us right 
this second. Is it Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il, Supreme Leader 
Ali Khamani in Iran, or Osama bin Laden? They are all major 
threats, all challenges to U.S. security here at home. They get 
worse with time if not acted upon. They all represent very 
unique geopolitical circumstances. They demand very tailored 
situations or solutions, and they all demand action now, but 
different kinds of action.
    I have more or less a speech on this and I would ask 
permission that my full statement be inserted in the record at 
this point.
    Chairman Warner. Without objection.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts

    Thank you Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership. I 
want to thank Admiral Clark and General Jumper for their perseverance 
not only in service to our Nation but also in communicating with this 
committee. General Shinseki, well done, sir. Thank you for your 
leadership as Chief of Staff of the Army. Your legacy will be 
transformation, the shift from the systems of the past to the platforms 
and capabilities of the future.
    Last week, along with Senator Levin, I survived Senator Warner's 
forced march to possible war zone countries in which we are fighting 
and, in my opinion, winning the war on terrorism. I had the pleasure of 
visiting our men and women in uniform on the front lines.
    As chairmen and ranking members of the Intelligence Committee and 
Armed Services Committee, we were able to talk directly to the folks 
getting the job done for America's security from their stations in 
Kuwait, Afghanistan, Qatar, and other locations.
    I can report that the cooperation between our intelligence and 
military personnel is as close as it has ever been. We now have in 
place information systems that will allow rapid access to current 
intelligence from the combatant commander all the way down to the 
marine or soldier in the field.
    I also observed a keen appreciation for the need to fully share 
intelligence information. It is my judgment that we are learning the 
lessons of Operation Desert Storm and September 11 well.

                                THREATS

    I hope we do not spend too much time today arguing about who 
constitutes the greatest threat to us right this second. Is it Saddam 
Hussein, Kim Jong Il, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, or Osama bin 
Laden? They are all major threats, challenges to U.S. security here at 
home that get worse with time if not acted upon.
    They all represent unique geopolitical circumstances demanding 
tailored solutions. Indeed, they all demand action now but different 
kinds of action. Just because the military instrument of power is the 
choice for responding to Osama bin Laden and may become the choice for 
responding to Iraq, it by no means suggests force is appropriate right 
now for North Korea or ever in the case of Iran.
    It's not that simple and we ought not to mistake complexities in 
the threat picture for contradictions in policy. For example, North 
Korea, as dangerous and unstable as it is, has not invaded its neighbor 
to the south since 1953.
    We cannot say the same for Saddam Hussein who invaded Kuwait in 
1990 with what looked at the time like intentions for Saudi Arabia as 
well. Not to mention the fact that, to my knowledge, North Korea is not 
currently harboring senior members of a terror network led by a close 
associate of Osama bin Laden, Mr. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

                                  IRAQ

    But this is really beside the point. In passing H.J. Res 114, 
Congress specifically authorized the President to ``use the Armed 
Forces of the United States in order to: (1) defend the national 
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by 
Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council 
resolutions regarding Iraq.'' Colleagues, that resolution passed the 
Senate 77 to 23 on October 11, 2002.
    This action was, of course, in addition to the Iraq Liberation Act, 
which Congress passed and President Clinton signed in to law October 
31, 1998. That act clearly states the U.S. should foster regime change 
in Iraq.
    Lastly, on November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council passed 
Resolution 1441 which gave Iraq one last opportunity to comply with its 
disarmament obligations.
    Now, months later, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has 
told us unequivocally that ``Iraq has in place an active effort to 
deceive the U.N. inspectors and deny them access. This effort is 
directed by the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given 
clear directions to its operational forces to hide banned materials in 
their possession.''
    Further, the DCI stated ``Iraq's biological weapons program 
includes mobile research and production facilities that will be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the inspectors to find. Baghdad began 
this program in the mid-1990s--during a time when inspectors were in 
the country.''
    Even the latest U.N. assessments directed by Dr. Blix indicate 
Saddam Hussein is still not complying. Colleagues, let us be candid. No 
amount of U-2 surveillance flights nor increase in the number of 
inspectors will solve this problem, at the very least with respect to 
biological weapons. Let's be honest. The U.S. Government has bent over 
backwards to manage the threat from Saddam Hussein without further 
military action.
    I thank the chair.

    Senator Roberts. I want to go first of all to the 
commandant and ask him a question in regards to SOCOM, and I 
know that they have a lot of operations. Everybody has 
operation stress. But I understand we have 81 marines, 5 
sailors organized, trained, and equipped for special 
reconnaissance and direct action and other special operations 
missions, who will be under the SOCOM operational control by 
October of this year. I understand the answer is yes; is that 
correct?
    General Hagee. That is correct, sir.
    Senator Roberts. All right. I hope we can continue that 
partnership.
    I am going to get down to your warfighting lab in Quantico, 
VA, as soon as I can. I apologize for not coming sooner. One of 
the questions I had as we were out to Camp Commando and Camp 
Coyote out there in Kuwait; I was so proud of our marines, who 
are operating basically in a sand trap and still performing and 
training their mission, and I am not surprised. You already 
answered this question in splendid fashion about our WMD 
capability and I thank you for that answer.
    I have a question for General Jumper. Do you remember the 
old baseball combination--you and I are not too far off in age 
difference--of Tinkers to Evers to Chance?
    General Jumper. I am afraid not, sir.
    Senator Roberts. You do not? Well, anybody else? Somebody 
say they remember that. Will you, please?
    Senator Clinton. Over here, Pat. I remember.
    Senator Roberts. Admiral Clark?
    Okay, thank you. I thank Senator Clinton.
    Well, Senator Inhofe talked about Tinkers to Evers to 
Chance when he mentioned the KC-135s and the lease agreement 
that we are now working with under the national security 
requirements. So General Jumper, I am not opposed to Tinker, 
but I do not want to take a chance.
    General Jumper. Yes, sir.
    Senator Roberts. So consequently I would like to ask, if 
the lease proposal under review is not approved, how will 
procurement of replacement tankers be accelerated? I do not see 
any plans down the road to do that other than to retire the 68, 
who really should be retired. I do not think we have any other 
alternative than to go to the lease agreement. Now, that is a 
tough thing. I do not want to get you in between Jim and 
myself, but that is where you are.
    General Jumper. Sir, it is a tough decision we have to 
make. As a matter of fact, the plan to accelerate the 
procurement plan which we already had on the books was the 
lease, and we put this lease agreement on the table for 
everyone to take a look at. It has been thoroughly scrutinized 
and the Secretary of Defense is looking at it now along with 
his lease committee there in the building and we are awaiting 
the decision.
    Senator Roberts. I hope the decision comes soon, and I 
would point out that the distinguished chairman and ranking 
member are on record as supporting this. I do not have to say 
that; they will, but I thought I would anyway.
    General Shinseki, recent reports indicate the Secretary of 
Defense is considering realignment of our force structure in 
Europe. I know that our new SACEUR thinks the same way. As part 
of this review, let me ask you, is the Army considering 
bringing any force structure from Europe back to the United 
States?
    General Shinseki. Senator, we await the analysis that 
General Jones is undertaking at this point. What we have always 
said is a clear strategy is the best route to that long-term 
stationing set of decisions, and we think General Jones's 
insights will be helpful here. If the answer is to bring forces 
home, we will do that. If it is to keep what we have there, 
albeit in different configurations and locations, we are 
prepared to support that as well.
    Senator Roberts. I thank you very much.
    My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, could I just have 10 seconds 
for the record there. Just so that I do not mislead anybody, my 
statement has been consistently that whether or not I would 
support that lease will depend upon the numbers and the facts 
as provided to us. I have been one that is more than willing to 
look at that as an option, but I just do not want to mislead my 
good friend from Kansas by my silence.
    Senator Roberts. If the Senator would yield, I will be 
happy to be a blocking back for him any time on this decision, 
and we will just let you carry the ball, sir.
    Senator Levin. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Members of the committee, it is now the 
completion of the first round. We have had an excellent hearing 
this morning and the attendance has been at an all-time high, 
showing the concern of our members.
    It is the intention of the chair, in consultation with my 
ranking member, to go into a closed session now. But the 
ranking member does have a prior commitment which requires his 
asking one or two questions now before the closed session, and 
I am happy to accommodate him.
    Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to just ask General Shinseki about his reference to 
the missile defense system. I believe Senator Allard raised 
this issue. On January 2, Secretary Rumsfeld established some 
new procedures for the development and oversight of missile 
defense programs. This is what the memo said, ``The Secretary 
of Defense will decide whether to use test assets for emergency 
or contingency deployment based on an assessment of military 
utility, progress in development, and recommendation by the 
Director of MDA and military Services.''
    The President has now decided to deploy a national missile 
defense system in 2004 and the Department of Defense has asked 
to waive the legal requirement for independent operational 
testing of this system prior to deployment. I understand, 
General Shinseki, that the Army is going to be asked to operate 
this national missile defense system starting in 2004.
    Here is my question: have you provided an assessment of the 
military utility of the national missile defense system to be 
deployed in 2004?
    General Shinseki. I do not recall providing personally a 
specific recommendation of that sort.
    Senator Levin. All right. Will you check your records and 
if there has been such an assessment, would you share that with 
this committee?
    General Shinseki. I will do that, Senator.
    Senator Levin. Prior to the decision to deploy, did 
Secretary Rumsfeld ask you for advice regarding the military 
utility of the national missile defense system as it would 
exist in 2004?
    General Shinseki. I am not aware of that request.
    Senator Levin. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. That concludes your questions?
    Senator Levin. May I just have one question of General 
Jumper? It has to get to this issue of the Predators. We were 
out there. We have seen the value of the Predators just in so 
many places now, most recently where we visited in the last 
week. Is there any way of increasing the production from over 
three a month?
    The demand on these assets is huge. Their value is extreme. 
They can make a huge difference. Everybody wants them, but we 
need them in that theater I guess as much as anyplace. What 
efforts have been made to increase, get a new production line 
going somewhere else, get a license agreement going out?
    General Jumper. Sir, there are several mitigating features 
of the Predator. First, it was an advanced concept technology 
demonstration (ACTD), that is, that was handed to the Service. 
In that technology demonstration it took one ground station to 
fly one Predator. One of the things we are trying to do in the 
development is figure out how to fly several airplanes from one 
ground station. Until we get that problem solved, there is 
really no use in upping the numbers of productions because we 
are ground station-limited in the number of airplanes that we 
can put up at any one time.
    We are working hard to solve this problem and once we do 
and once we get the Predator B model under contract, then we 
are going to have to decide if we want to shift all to B models 
or have a mix of As and Bs. We have decided already we are 
going to buy 128 of these things, if that is the force 
structure that we need, and I think the program we are in right 
now will answer a bunch of very important questions before we 
make a decision about whether to open another production line 
or not.
    But we will keep you close to that, Senator, because it is 
a concern of ours as well.
    Senator Levin. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. I join my colleague's view about that. We 
went to certain sites on our trip. I think we are going to have 
to revisit your current objectives and perhaps have Congress 
inject itself in that decisionmaking, because the dependence on 
this system, not only by the military--you know of other 
segments of our Government that are drawing down those assets, 
and the remarkable performance to date and the versatility of 
this system, it just extrapolates into saving lives of the men 
and women of the Armed Forces and others involved in this 
system. So shall we conclude saying that the attention of 
Congress is at full span on this.
    General Jumper. Absolutely, sir.
    Chairman Warner. We are there to support you.
    General Jumper. I understand and I appreciate that very 
much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you.
    Yes, go ahead.
    Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, you very kindly have requested 
certain information from the CIA at our last meeting relative 
to suspect site numbers. There was a very strong disagreement 
here between myself and Mr. Tenet relative to what had been 
supplied to the U.N. and the chairman was very much involved in 
a number of conversations in this regard, as were Senator 
Roberts and others.
    The record is clear that this is a significant issue about 
which some of the statements made by the CIA in letters to me 
were in my judgment significantly different from some of the 
statements that Director Tenet made before this committee and 
the Intelligence Committee. In an effort to amplify or clarify 
that issue, I believe that the chairman had indicated that he 
had requested the CIA for a letter at our last meeting, which I 
believe was the 13th of February.
    But I just wanted for the record to determine whether or 
not such a letter has been received?
    Chairman Warner. I wish to advise my colleague and other 
members of the committee that that letter has not been 
received. But in the context of my requesting in an open 
hearing of the Director of the CIA for such letter, I indicated 
my own judgment, having reviewed I think almost all the facts 
that you had before you with the exception of your important 
visit to meet with Hans Blix. It was my judgment that the 
administration had in good faith provided on a real-time basis 
as much information as it possessed that was relevant to the 
inspections.
    But you are correct, the letter which I requested has not 
yet been received.
    Senator Levin. I had set forth on the record the 
discrepancies, not in numbers but in terms of overall rank of 
percentage that was very significantly different in terms of 
what the classified information was supplied to me and the 
representations of the Director at the Intelligence Committee 
and before this committee.
    It is a very important issue. I think it is very important 
that the CIA carry out not just its commitment to the chairman 
that they supply a letter in this regard, but, frankly, a 
number of commitments that it has made to me that it has not 
carried out in terms of written updates, and a letter to Mr. 
Tenet will be going from me relative to those commitments this 
afternoon.
    But I want to thank the chair for this bringing us up-to-
date on that letter, which was not yet forthcoming from the CIA 
to him. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. At this time the open portion of this 
hearing is concluded. But again, I wish to commend our four 
distinguished witnesses for an excellent hearing, and I thank 
my colleagues who turned out in strong numbers to receive this 
important testimony today and ask questions.
    [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

                   SHIPBUILDING FUNDING ALTERNATIVES

    1. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, in reviewing the budget request, 
it appears that the first ship for two classes of ships, the Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) and the DD(X) destroyer, will be funded with 
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds. However the 
first aircraft carrier of a new class, the CVN-21, is to be funded from 
the shipbuilding account, split over fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Why is 
it that the first ships of two classes were funded with RDT&E funds, 
but the CVN-21 was not?
    Admiral Clark. In the case of LCS and DD(X), both new hull designs 
with multiple transformational technologies, the use of RDT&E for the 
lead ships will aid in stabilizing these new construction programs 
through better management of the inherently higher risks. Furthermore, 
yearly review of RDT&E budgets will improve the fidelity in the 
execution year budget requirement and allow flexibility to adjust out 
year budgets if critical technologies are delayed or require additional 
maturation. While CVN-21 will also incorporate transformational 
technologies, the hull form will be similar to current proven carrier 
designs, thus incurring less risk in ship construction than LCS and 
DD(X). As such, funding CVN-21 in SCN is appropriate.

                          LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

    2. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, last month the Naval Warfare 
Development Command published the Concept of Operations for the LCS, in 
which it stated: the LCS will contribute to Sea Shield through its 
unique capability to respond quickly, to operate in the littoral 
environment, and to conduct focused missions with a variety of 
networked off board systems. The budget request calls for the first of 
these ships to be purchased with RDT&E funds in fiscal year 2005, even 
though it appears the requirement has not yet been finalized. What is 
your vision for the LCS? How will it contribute to the overall 
effectiveness of the fleet?
    Admiral Clark. My vision for the LCS is a networked, fast, 
stealthy, shallow draft vessel designed to gain and sustain our access 
to the littoral to enable the flow of Joint Forces ashore. LCS will use 
a system of systems approach, employing networked sensors, modular 
mission payloads, and a variety of unmanned vehicles. It will have 
robust self-defense capability at its core and an open computing 
architecture that will enable the modularity we seek.
    Key to LCS's capability will be the use of mission modules which 
will allow LCS to perform a specific mission such as anti-submarine 
warfare, mine warfare, or anti-surface warfare. Furthermore, these 
modules will be forward staged and capable of being rapidly installed, 
enabling LCS to be quickly modified to change missions as operational 
priority dictates.
    LCS will assure the Joint Forces access to contested littorals, and 
will defeat the anti-access strategies any potential adversary may 
employ. Equally important, the mission-tailored LCS permits our large, 
multi-mission combatant ships to conduct those missions for which they 
were optimally designed, such as ballistic missile defense, area air 
defense, and naval surface fire support to our marines and other Joint 
Forces ashore.

    3. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, how much additional funding would 
be required in fiscal year 2004 to accelerate the development of this 
ship?
    Admiral Clark. An additional $35 million in fiscal year 2004 would 
reduce risk in development of anti-submarine, anti-surface, and mine 
hunting mission modules for Flight 0 of the LCS.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                           RESERVE COMPONENT

    4. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, I continue to be impressed with the greater role 
that our Reserve component service members play in our National 
Military Strategy. For example, General Shinseki's statement that 
``today, more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve 
component.'' General Jumper's statement that ``Air Reserve Component 
Forces comprise nearly half of the forces assigned to the Air and Space 
Expeditionary Force squadrons, groups, wings, and contribute the 
majority of forces for some mission areas.'' Even the Navy, which 
traditionally has a much smaller Reserve Force, is making history. 
According to press accounts, ``A group of naval reservists from Texas 
and Arizona are making history on the deck of the U.S.S. Theodore 
Roosevelt (CVN-71). For the first time since the Korean War, an entire 
Naval Air Reserve Squadron has been deployed aboard an aircraft 
carrier, Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 201 flying F/A-18s.'' Admiral 
Clark, I am sure you are receiving the same reports I am. VFA-201 has 
the best sortie completion rate--100 percent, best carrier landing 
boarding rate, day/night landing grades and readiness, and during 
COMPUTEX scored 100 percent on missile and bomb drops.
    Please explain how the fiscal year 2004 Defense budget provides 
adequate training and modernization funds for Reserves so you can 
continue to rely on them over a sustained period of time, in modern 
equipment like VFA-201 has?
    General Shinseki. The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget provides 
adequate training dollars; however, the Army lacks adequate 
modernization/equipment funding for the Reserve components. With 
support from Congress, we have made great strides in improving the 
training dollars for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
    Admiral Clark. Navy formally reviews Naval Reserve modernization 
requirements as a part of its resource allocation process. As a result 
of that assessment, the validity and priority of those requirements are 
judged in the context of all other Navy and Naval Reserve modernization 
requirements.
    I am pleased to report that the fiscal year 2004 Defense budget 
funded Naval Reserve modernization accounts at a higher level than 
Defense budgets of the past 3 years (fiscal year 2004 is approximately 
$32 million higher than fiscal year 2003). The fiscal year 2004 budget 
continues modernization of the Naval Reserve Air Fleet by providing 
funds to procure an additional C-40A ``Clipper'' aircraft. The C-40 is 
a derivative of the Boeing 727 and is replacing the aging fleet of C-9 
logistics aircraft. Additionally, the Flying Hour Program is funded to 
meet 100 percent of the notional training requirement for Reserve 
pilots. The increased operating and modernization funds have been 
targeted to sustain a level of Reserve participation in Navy operations 
that are essential for us to continue to project influence throughout 
the globe.
    As always, there have been some reductions and some increases in 
the individual procurement accounts that reflect the changing 
priorities of a transforming Navy undergoing recapitalization. A good 
example of this is the integration of Navy and Marine Corps tactical 
aviation forces that tailors future force structure in recognition of 
increased capability of the airframes and munitions. One outgrowth of 
this restructuring was the disestablishment of a Naval Reserve and a 
Marine Corps Reserve Fighter/Attack squadron in the fiscal year 2004 
Defense budget request.
    The decisions reflected in the budget demonstrate Navy's intent to 
invest in those priorities, to the extent it is affordable. 
Unfortunately, there are also always high-priority requirements that 
could not be funded. Within constrained top-lines, lower priority 
requirements--both active and Reserve--will not be funded. Those that 
cannot be funded are considered for inclusion in Navy's list of high-
priority unfunded programs, a copy of which is made available to 
Congress. Historically, Congress has aided Reserve Modernization 
through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA). 
Dramatic decreases in NGREA have had an impact on Reserve 
modernization.
    General Hagee. The Marine Corps has built an efficient and 
effective Total Force. Maintaining our expeditionary readiness depends 
upon high-quality Marine reservists as a key part of our Total Force. 
Their training, leadership, quality of life, and equipment 
modernization will continue to be of the utmost importance.
    The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget request provides funding in the 
Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve (O&MMCR) and Reserve 
Personnel Marine Corps (RPMC) appropriations that will adequately 
support the training requirements of Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) 
units and personnel. In fiscal year 2004, MARFORRES units are scheduled 
to conduct live-fire exercises and participate in amphibious, desert, 
jungle, mountain, and cold weather training. Fiscal year 2004 funding 
will support individual and unit participation in Total Force exercises 
such as: Combined Arms Exercise and Desert Scimitar in Twentynine 
Palms, CA; Weapons and Tactics Instructor course in Yuma, AZ; Ulchi 
Focus Lens in Korea; Cobra Gold in Thailand; Kernal Blitz in CA; 
Rolling Thunder in Fort Bragg, NC; and UNITAS in South American 
countries. These exercises provide operational tempo (OPTEMPO) relief 
to the active component and provide increased opportunities for 
reservists to support the Total Force effort throughout the world. 
However, the execution of these exercises, rely heavily on robust OMMCR 
appropriations and RPMC Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) budgets.
    One of the Marine Corps pillars of readiness focuses on ongoing 
modernization initiatives. The Marine Corps makes every effort to 
resource the Reserve component at levels similar to the active 
component. This effort gives the Reserve Forces the ability to fully 
integrate into the Total Force, especially during periods of 
mobilization when augmenting and reinforcing the active component in 
sustained combat operations. The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget 
provides funding for a series of incremental and affordable 
modernization efforts for our legacy systems including: upgrades to 
aviation systems (CH-46E, CH-53E, C-130T, and F/A-18A) and ground 
systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Product. Improvement 
Program; and new procurements of ground systems (Thermal Weapons Site, 
the Lightweight 155 Towed Howitzer, and the High Mobility Artillery 
Rocket System (HIMARS)).
    General Jumper. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2004 
and the out years provide the resources for the Air Force Reserve 
Command to undertake one of the biggest aircraft modernizations in the 
past 2 decades, after the procurement hiatus in the 1990s. Force 
structure associated with the C-141 will be realigned to support newly 
built C-17 Globemaster IIIs, C-5As, and KC-135s. C-5 B-models will be 
added to the AFRC fleet. The upgraded KC-135R air refueling tanker will 
replace the last of AFRC's KC-135 E-models. The oldest C-130Es in the 
fleet will be replaced by newer more capable H-model C-130s and newly 
built C-130J aircraft. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget provides 
a much needed jumpstart to the Air Force Reserve equipment 
modernization program, ensuring that the Air Force Reserve remains a 
robust and capable partner in the Total Force team.
    Additionally, the budget covers the cost of training Air Force 
Reserve personnel that have been called on in great numbers to 
participate in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Noble Eagle, and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Participation levels have risen sharply since 
September 11, 2001, further increasing pressure on  available training 
dollars. The Air Force Reserve continues to make great strides in 
efficient resource management by outsourcing support jobs and 
partnering with the active component to maximize long-term combat 
capability through the rebalancing of the Active/Reserve Force mix.

    5. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, what antiquated Reserve policies still exist in 
statute that you would like us to change that negatively affect the way 
you do business today? By incorporating Reserves in an even greater 
effort into the Total Force?
    General Shinseki. There are several ongoing studies by the General 
Accounting Office, the Wexford Group, the Army Staff, and others that 
are looking into issues like active component/Reserve component 
program, compensation reform, duty statuses, etc. The Army and the 
Department of Defense will be studying the recommendations with great 
interest and will alert Congress to any recommended policy changes that 
require legislative action.
    Admiral Clark. It would be premature to request a statutory change 
prior to completion of the Department's studies on Total Force 
integration and the mobilization/force deployment process.
    That said, we have made modifications to our internal policies and 
coordinated changes to Department of Defense policies to improve 
Reserve integration. These changes include the minimization of second-
year involuntary recalls, implementation of a narrowly focused active 
and Reserve stop-loss policy (in effect for 5 weeks, affecting fewer 
than 100 sailors), and implementation of the Navy-Marine Corps 
Mobilization Processing System (NMCMPS), which provides web-based 
requirements, sourcing, and processing.
    General Hagee. First, the Marine Corps Reserve is an integral part 
of the Marine Corps Total Force concept. Our Selective Marine Corps 
Reserve Units are a mirror image of our active component units allowing 
them to quickly integrate into our active component fulfilling their 
traditional roles of augmenting and reinforcing Marine Expeditionary 
Forces. Second, there are currently no statutory restrictions that 
negatively impact the Marine Corps Reserve's ability to support the 
total force. However, legislative assistance in the following areas 
will allow the Marine Corps to provide a greater level of continuous 
support to the Total Force.

         Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB-SR)--Selected Reserve 
        Benefits Obligation Period Reduction. This would modify the 
        eligibility criteria to ``not less than 4 years'' in order to 
        allow the Services the option of offering MGIB-SR benefits to 
        recruits incurring a 4x4 contractual obligation in addition to 
        the obligation period of ``not less than 6 years'' required for 
        MGIB-SR benefits. This would increase the potential pool of 
        SMCR recruits.
         Consistency in Reserve Strength Accounting and 
        Management. This proposal would revise Title 10, U.S.C. Section 
        115 exempting Reserve personnel serving on active duty for 180 
        days or more from counting against active duty end strength. 
        Approval of this change would ensure that a Reserve member who 
        is exempt from counting against active duty end strength would 
        also be exempt from counting against active duty grade strength 
        and would be exempt from inclusion on the active duty list. 
        This revision would likely remove barriers to Reserve component 
        participation and greatly enhance our flexibility in employing 
        reservists in support of operational requirements.
         Limitation of Initial Payment of Enlistment and 
        Reenlistment Bonuses for the Selected Reserve. Currently, Title 
        37 limits the initial payment of these bonuses to one-half of 
        the total value. By increasing the initial payment amounts, the 
        recruiting and retention value of these bonuses would be 
        greatly enhanced and increase SMCR recruiting and retention 
        efforts.

    General Jumper. A number of proposals have been included in the DOD 
Omnibus submission to Congress, or are being submitted through the 
fiscal year 2005 Unified Legislation and Budgeting cycle, to align 
Reserve policies with the new steady state. We have always worked as a 
team in the Air Force and will continue to set the standards for Total 
Force commitment through discussion of these current initiatives and 
those that may arise at a future date, to include the following:

         Extending Hostile Fire and Imminent Danger Pay to 
        Reserve component Members on Inactive Duty
         Position Vacancy (Below the Zone) Promotion 
        Consideration in Time of War or National Emergency
         Military Leave for Mobilized Federal Civilian 
        Employees
         Streamline the process to continue Officers on the 
        Reserve Active Status List

                                  PAY

    6. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, I am looking at the pay tables here. In 2000, the 
law prescribed military pay raises to be ECI plus 0.5 percent. 
According to the tables, E-1s to E-3s will receive a 2-percent pay 
raise. Is that enough?
    General Shinseki. Since fiscal year 2000, military pay has improved 
substantially relative to the 70th percentile benchmarks recommended by 
the 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation for junior officers 
and junior enlisted personnel. Only the most junior enlisted personnel 
and officers would receive less than 3.7 percent or Employment Cost 
Index (ECI) plus 0.5 percent. E-1s would receive 2 percent while E-2s 
would receive 3.2 percent. It should be noted, however, that these pay 
grades are transitional-members are in them for a short time. Their pay 
is now close to the 90th percentile while pay for mid-grade and senior 
noncommissioned officers is still below our target. We continue to 
support military pay raises of ECI +0.5 percent; however, we believe it 
is appropriate to redistribute the pay raise--putting more pay where it 
is needed while being assured that entry-level pay is very competitive.
    Admiral Clark. I believe that it is enough for E-1s. We have 
proposed a 3.2-percent raise for E-2s and E-3s. That said, when we 
request targeted pay raises, we do so with one principal objective in 
mind: provide incentive in a competitive work force. We expect our E-1 
to E-3 personnel to move quickly through those pay grades and on to 
positions of leadership at the petty officer level. I remain convinced 
that targeted pay raises in these leadership pay grades are a valuable 
motivator of performance in our most junior personnel.
    General Hagee. The 2 percent pay raise is focused on E-1s only. E-
1s are automatically promoted to E-2 after 6 months of service, which 
is normally about the time they complete their MOS training and go to 
their first duty station. E-2s are scheduled for a 3.2-percent raise 
and E-3s are scheduled for a 3.7-percent raise. Congress instituted the 
ECI +0.5 percent to close the gap between military and comparable 
private sector pay and currently E-1s are at or near the 90th 
percentile.
    General Jumper. The proposed pay raise, if approved, will increase 
E-1 pay by 2 percent. This is approximate to the increase in inflation. 
Personnel in grades of E-2 will receive a pay raise equal to the ECI 
(3.2 percent) and E-3s will receive a 3.7-percent raise.
    Our junior enlisted personnel entering the Service in the grades of 
E-1/E-2 are in the transition phase of their career. An E-1 will 
advance to the grade of E-2 once they reach 6 months time-in-grade 
(TIG). An E-2 will advance to E-3 when reaching 10 months TIG. Upon 
completion of basic training and tech school, most airmen will already 
have advanced to the grade of E-3.
    The proposed raise continues our efforts of previous years to 
reduce the disparity between military pay and private sector, which 
contributes to quality force retention. Additional targeting will also 
result from a redistribution of the pay raises. Our most junior 
members' compensation is now close to the 90th percentile of comparable 
civilians while pay for Senior NCOs is still below the 70th percentile 
target. We believe it is appropriate to redistribute the pay raise--
putting more pay where it is needed while ensuring the entry-level pay 
remains very competitive.

    7. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, what is the projected pay raise for general and 
flag officers?
    General Shinseki. The projected pay raise for general officers for 
2004 is 3.7 percent, ECI plus 0.5 percent; however, general officer pay 
is capped at Executive Schedule Level III, which is currently $142,500.
    Admiral Clark. The projected 2004 pay raise for flag officers in 
the pay grades of O-7 through O-9 is 3.7 percent, which equates to the 
by law increase of ECI plus 0.5 percent. The statutory requirement that 
caps flag officer pay at the equivalent rate for level III of the 
Executive Schedule is expected to result in no increase in basic pay 
for officers in the pay grade of O-10.
    General Hagee. The projected pay raise for O-7 through O-10 general 
and flag officers is 3.7 percent (ECI0 +0.5 percent).
    General Jumper. Their projected fiscal year 2004 pay raise is 3.7 
percent. Unless overt action is taken, the four-star pay will remain 
capped, which may create a situation in which there is virtually no 
difference in three- and four-star pay.
Currently:
        - 3-star base pay: $11,319.60
        - 4-star base pay: $11,874.90 (capped)

Projected:
        - 3-star base pay with 3.7 percent increase: $11,738.40
        - 4-star base pay: $11,874.90 (capped)

    8. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, if it is enough for E-1s, then is it enough for 
generals and admirals?
    General Shinseki. The projected pay raise for all our career 
noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers is 3.7 percent, ECI 
+0.5 percent, in recognition of their commitment to service and 
associated responsibilities commensurate with their grade. E-1 pay is 
now close to the 90th percentile relative to their civilian 
counterparts based on experience and education. Additionally, E-1s are 
only in this pay grade for a very short period of time.
    Admiral Clark. We are trying to retain the best people in the Navy, 
from E-1 to O-10. To do that, my folks need to have not only superior 
job content and quality of service, but they need a pay system that 
produces powerful incentives for promotion and retention.
    Right now, Navy flag officers are paid at or near the 70th 
percentile of comparably educated civilians, a level determined by the 
9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) as necessary to 
enable the military to recruit and retain the quantity and quality of 
personnel it requires. By contrast, personnel in pay grade E-1 are 
currently at the 90th percentile. Accordingly, I believe that the 3.7-
percent pay raise (Employment Cost Index +0.5 percent), provided for in 
37 U.S.C. Sec. 1009, is appropriate to maintain flag and general 
officer pay at a level consistent with their responsibilities, while a 
2 percent raise for E-1s will help maintain their purchasing power, 
similar to or above that of their civilian counterparts.
    General Hagee. Congress instituted the ECI +0.5 pay raise to close 
the gap between military pay and comparable private sector pay. After 
considering the relative value of military compensation against the 
private sector wages by age, education level, and experience, DOD 
targeted the pay raise to more aggressively close the gap between NCOs/
SNCOs and their private sector counterparts. All enlisted personnel E-3 
and above will receive a 3.7-percent pay raise or more, consistent with 
properly targeting the pay raise to bring them closer to the 
recommended 70th percentile of their civilian counterparts. Similarly, 
all officers, except second and first lieutenants with no prior 
enlisted service, to include general officers, will receive a 3.7-
percent pay raise consistent with the 9th QRMC review. These officers 
will receive a 3.2-percent pay raise keeping them above the 70th 
percentile.
    General Jumper. In line with the 9th QRMC, DOD is targeting pay 
increases for our mid-level to senior enlisted personnel ranging from 
4.6 percent to 6.25 percent. Pay for E-1s will increase 2 percent, 
approximately equal to the increase in inflation. A 2-percent pay raise 
will maintain the purchasing power of E-1 pay and will maintain their 
compensation close to the 90th percentile of comparable civilians 
(recent high school/college graduates). E-2s and O-1/O-2s will receive 
a 3.2-percent pay raise, which is equal to the ECI. All others will 
receive 3.7 percent to include generals and admirals. A 3.7-percent 
increase for general officers will slightly improve their purchasing 
power and maintain their compensation close to that of CEOs leading 
small companies (revenue under $2 million/year).*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Source: Executive Compensation, June 2001

    9. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, what effect will this have on those E-1s on the 
lower end of the pay scale with respect to getting the last of our 
military personnel off of food stamps, or will we backslide and be 
putting personnel back on food stamps?
    General Shinseki. There has been a steady and noteworthy decline in 
the number of members on food stamps since the first survey of 
participants in 1991. In 1991, there were 19,400 members on food stamps 
among all Services. Today, the Department of Defense estimates that 
there are 2,000 members on food stamps--we estimate that 1,155 are 
soldiers. The decrease in food stamp participation is primarily due to 
increases in military base pay, basic allowance for housing and 
subsistence, and implementation of the Family Subsistence Supplemental 
Allowance (FSSA). Eligibility for FSSA is based on USDA criteria for 
food stamps, except income for FSSA purposes, includes the value of 
government quarters. The USDA does not count the value of government 
quarters in determining eligibility. We know the majority of soldiers 
on food stamps live on-base, approximately 60 percent. However, since 
the FSSA requires the soldiers to count their housing as income, these 
soldiers are not eligible for FSSA and continue to receive food stamps. 
The majority of FSSA participants for the Army range from E-3s to E-5s. 
The proposed pay raise provides a raise equivalent to the employment 
cost index to E-2s and the employment cost index plus 0.5 percent to E-
3s and E-4s. We do not believe the proposed 2 percent pay raise for E-
1s will impact food stamp usage.
    Admiral Clark. As of the end of fiscal year 2002, there were 23 
Navy E-1s on food stamps, or 0.03 percent of the Navy E-1 population. 
While that is still 23 too many, we expect that the proposed 2 percent 
basic pay raise for E-1s in 2004, as well as the increases in basic 
allowance for housing (BAH) associated with the continued buy down of 
out-of-pocket expenses, will continue to drive that number down.
    General Hagee. The food stamp program is administered by the States 
and, therefore, the USMC does not have access to this data. The NDAA 00 
established a family subsistence allowance to help military families. 
The maximum amount of FSSA is $500/month and is paid based on family 
size and household income based guidelines as determined by the 
Department of Agriculture. During 2002, we paid out $78,000 in FSSA to 
48 marines. Only one was an E-1, with the majority of the recipients 
being E-3 and above with large families. We believe that the continuing 
raises in basic pay and reduction of BAH out-of-pocket expenses will 
reduce the number of marines participating in FSSA.
    General Jumper. Military pay for our airmen in the grades of E-1/E-
2 attending basic training and technical school is relatively high 
compared to their private sector counterparts so we do not consider the 
projected pay raise for E-1/E-2s to be a problem. In fact, airmen enter 
the Air Force earning basic pay already close to 90 percent of their 
civilian counterparts with the same education and experience 
background. Additionally, airmen, depending on their specialty skill, 
may be eligible for a variety of separate pays, allowances, and bonuses 
in addition to the tax advantages they receive for nontaxable income.
    Since the Services implemented the FSSA program in 2001, only 15 AF 
active duty personnel are currently certified to receive FSSA. To 
qualify for FSSA, an airmen's household income level must be less than 
the USDA Food Stamp Program (130th of poverty level). FSSA is a 
voluntary monthly tax-free cash allowance (up to $500/month) paid to a 
member and must be reported as income to all federally-funded income 
assistance programs (School Lunch Program; Women, Infant, and Children 
(WIC); and Food Stamps: Earned Income Tax Credit). In February each 
year, members must recertify for FSSA to show that their income is 
below the USDA Food Stamp Program eligibility level. In 2002, 27 
members qualified for FSSA. FSSA eligibility will fluctuate throughout 
the year as a result of changes in the member's income level 
(promotions, annual pay raises, special/incentive pays and bonuses, or 
other household income). While it is difficult to determine exactly how 
the number of personnel certified/qualified for FSSA will increase or 
decrease, the pay raises proposed will certainly be a step in the right 
direction toward reducing such numbers.
    Of the 15 families currently receiving FSSA, there are 7 E-3s with 
5-6 members in household, 2 E-4s with 6-7 members in household, and 6 
in the grades of E-5 and E-6 with 8-11 members in household. Average 
FSSA amount paid to eligible members is $308 per month. There are no 
members below the grade of E-3 currently receiving FSSA.

                              END STRENGTH

    10. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, last year, I supported a legislative proposal with 
my friend Senator Max Cleland, which called for an increase in end 
strength based on your personnel requirements. The Army reported to the 
committee that they may need 42,000 to 43,000 additional soldiers, the 
Air Force 22,000 to 30,000 additional airmen, the Navy 10,000 
additional sailors, and the Marine Corps an additional 5,000 marines.
    You and your personnel chiefs were quite clear that the requirement 
was driven by the war on terrorism and operations after September 11. 
The first 100,000 Reserve and national guardsmen that you called up for 
Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom have just returned home. We 
are engaged all over the world. Our men and women in uniform may be 
asked to do more this year than last.
    How do you propose to manage an even lower military end strength 
with increased requirements for more personnel in even more places 
(i.e., homeland security, Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, etc.)?
    General Shinseki. While the congressionally-mandated fiscal year 
2002 active Army end strength was 480,000, the Army exceeded this end 
strength target, as well as the budgeted average strength of 474,000 
man-years. The Army finished fiscal year 2002 with an end strength of 
486,543 (78,158 officers, 404,305 enlisted, and 4,080 cadets). The Army 
was allowed to exceed the end strength targets only because of the 2-
percent flex authorized by Congress. The Army will continue to utilize 
this flex and continue to use Reserve component (RC) forces to meet 
current and emerging requirements for the global war on terrorism and 
the new strategic environment.
    This is a complex question that has no simple answer. Looking at 
our history since September 11, we have had a 480,000 Active-Duty Force 
and a sustained force of 30,000 mobilized RC soldiers on active duty 
status. The Army views these requirements as a new operational plateau 
and not as a spike. The recent increase in mobilization of the RC is a 
spike for the potential war against Iraq and increased threat levels. 
But even after the immediate spike subsides, we see the Army's 
operational requirements maintaining a new plateau. This coming June, 
both the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) will become RC operations to mitigate active component (AC) 
tempo. This will require the mobilization of portions of an RC division 
for SFOR and portions of another RC division for KFOR to sustain the 
operations. During this period of mobilization, RC soldiers will be in 
an active duty status. These requirements are additive to the support 
the RC is already providing to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation 
Noble Eagle to support homeland defense and the global war on 
terrorism. Any increase in end strength will be tied to how long we 
expect the RC to maintain that operations tempo. The Army continues to 
look at whether or not the 480,000 Active-Duty Force is right and 
whether we have the right AC/RC mix in our combat, combat support, and 
combat service support formations, as well as addressing our current 
high demand/low density units.
    Admiral Clark. Embedded in our military end strength projections 
are various platform decommissionings offset by increases in 
Antiterrorism/Force Protection manning. Accelerating the retirement of 
our oldest, least capable, and most maintenance-intensive platforms was 
one of the most difficult decisions the Navy made this year. While 
aggregate warfighting capability is a better metric than the number of 
ships and aircraft in our inventory, we recognize that below a certain 
threshold numbers do matter. However, all of our analyses suggest that 
the near-term inactivations we are proposing do not compromise our 
ability to accomplish our mission, and that the fastest and most 
efficient way to recapitalize and transform the fleet is to pursue 
vertical cuts in our least capable type-model series, both in ships and 
in aircraft, and apply those savings toward procuring new ships and 
aircraft.
    In summary, Navy end strength is based on requirements that are 
largely force structure based. As older, more manpower intensive 
platforms are taken off line and replaced by more efficient ships and 
aircraft the requisite end strength decreases in concert.
    General Hagee. The Marine Corps asked for and was granted an end 
strength increase of 2,400 marines for fiscal year 2003. This increase 
was greatly appreciated and came at the right time. The 2,400 marines 
were used to replenish units depleted by standing up the 4th MEB (MEB 
Hqtrs/ AT Battalion/Chemical Biological Incident Response Force/
Security Force Company). Coinciding with the end strength increase to 
175,000, the USMC continues to look at ways to return marines to the 
operating forces. Military-civilian conversions, A-76, and outsourcing 
efforts have allowed us to return approximately 900 marines to the 
operating forces. We believe that 175,000 active component end strength 
is sufficient to meet our current mission requirements.
    General Jumper. We are examining opportunities to optimize use of 
the current end strength. We continue to look for those airmen doing 
things that uniformed people should not be doing, or those who are 
supporting agencies outside the Air Force that do not necessarily have 
to be military or Air Force resources. I would characterize this 
portion as a force and skills ``mix'' issue. Over the past year, we 
have been reviewing our core competencies--those things that we as an 
Air Force do better than anyone else, or things that we do that are 
very difficult for others to duplicate, as part of an ongoing effort to 
find areas where we can realign our military personnel from ``non-
military'' jobs into those that must be military. These core 
competencies will be implemented in a program we call the Human Capital 
Task Force, which will ensure our military force structure is placed in 
those functional areas with the highest demand and appropriateness for 
uniformed airmen. The remaining areas we've determined to not be core 
competencies, although essential, but not necessarily required to be 
performed by military members--will be studied as to whether this work 
can best be accomplished by our outstanding Federal civilian workforce 
or by outside contractors through competitive sourcing studies or an 
alternative to competitive sourcing. In addition, part of our long-term 
strategy is to overhaul our entire requirements determination process 
to better focus on core competencies.
    Though we cannot definitively tell you we will not need additional 
end strength until we are confident we have our skills mix issue 
resolved, there is no doubt ``solving'' this issue will be very 
expensive. We are looking for creative ways to pay for the increase in 
contractor costs or an increase in civilian pay dollars to pay for the 
non-``blue-suit'' work that is currently being performed by the 
military we will reassign.

                     NATIONAL CALL TO SERVICE PLAN

    11. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, my staff was recently briefed on the implementation 
of the Call to Service Plan, which Senator Bayh and I were successful 
in including in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2003. I thank the Marine Corps in particular for embracing the program 
in the commandant's statement. While I am encouraged by the new 
enthusiasm shown by the Department of Defense, compared to last year, I 
would like you to discuss how you plan to maintain this new level of 
effort to ensure this program is fully utilized. How do you intend to 
implement the 18-18-18 enlistment option approved last year?
    General Shinseki. We are not participating in the 18-18-18 since it 
was replaced by the National Call to Service Enlistment Option. 
Participants in the National Service enlistment option, upon completion 
of initial entry training, will serve in the AC for a period of 15 
months. They may then stay in the AC or choose to serve 24 months in 
the Selected Reserve. Upon completion, they may continue in the 
Selected Reserve, serve in the Individual Ready Reserve, or serve in a 
National Service Program, or any combination of the above. The Army 
will offer the incentives specified for the National Service option 
which includes the choice of one of the following: (1) payment of a 
bonus in the amount of $5,000; (2) up to $18,000 repayment on 
qualifying student loans; (3) entitlement to an allowance for 
educational assistance at the monthly rate payable for basic 
educational assistance allowances for a total of 12 months (now at $900 
per month); or (4) entitlement to an allowance for educational 
assistance at 50 percent of the monthly rate payable for basic 
educational assistance allowances for a total of 36 months (now at $366 
per month). Twenty-four military occupation specialties have been 
identified for participation in this program.
    Admiral Clark. Navy, in coordination with DOD and the other 
Services, is in the process of developing an implementation plan, which 
will take effect 01 October 2003 (fiscal year 2004). The overarching 
theme for Navy's implementation of the National Call to Service (NCS) 
enlistment option is to utilize the program to bolster our Selected 
Reserve (SELRES) force readiness. NCS candidates will be afforded the 
full range of active duty training, given fleet experience and then, if 
they choose not to reenlist in the Active Force, they will be 
transferred to our Selective Reserve Force as a readiness multiplier. 
Our plan for fiscal year 2004 will goal NCS accessions at 1 percent of 
total non-prior service accessions ( cents450). Future annual accession 
goals, as well as the accession skill mix, will be directly tied to 
projected SELRES manning shortfalls.
    General Hagee. Marine Corps, in coordination with DOD and the other 
Services, is in the process of developing an implementation plan which 
will take effect 01 Oct 03 (fiscal year 2004). The overarching theme 
for USMC's implementation of the NCS enlistment option is to utilize 
the program to ultimately bolster our SELRES force readiness. NCS 
candidates will be afforded entry-level recruit and MOS training, given 
operating force experience and then, if they choose not to reenlist in 
the Active Force, they will be transferred to our Selective Reserve 
Force as a readiness multiplier. Our plans for fiscal year 2004 will 
set the goal for NCS accessions at approximately 0.5 percent of total 
non-prior service accessions (175) ramping up to 1 percent by fiscal 
year 2006.
    General Jumper. Senator we also have embraced this program. Our 
strategy is to use this program to reach out to the market that may 
find this type of enlistment more attractive than traditional 
enlistments. We plan to reach out to individuals currently in college 
or those completing it in the near future. Additionally, efforts are 
underway to ensure we maximize the output of this program to help 
improve the staffing in our Air Reserve components. Currently, we have 
identified at least 29 different skills across the Total Air Force that 
will be staffed with people that enter through the NCS program. These 
29 skills were selected in large part because they are also utilized in 
the Reserve component and will allow members to transfer easily. These 
include security force positions, flight line positions, medical 
positions, and numerous others.

    12. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, what percentage of your total force will be made up 
of personnel under this type of contract?
    General Shinseki. We will begin with an initial cap of 2 percent of 
the annual accession mission. The percentage of the total force will 
initially be significantly less than 1 percent.
    Admiral Clark. Due to the short-term nature of the NCS contract 
(average length of time on active duty projected to be 20 months), and 
the Navy's vision of setting accession goals based on SELRES manning 
shortfall requirements, it is anticipated that the first cut will 
produce a steady state average of NCS contracts in the total enlisted 
force will be approximately 1 percent (3,000-3,500 NCS contracts on 
active duty at any given time). We will evaluate progress in the 
future.
    General Hagee. Present plans call for USMC to access 0.5 percent 
(175) in fiscal year 2004 and ramp up to 1 percent (350) of our annual 
enlisted accessions by fiscal year 2006.
    General Jumper. Senator our current plan is to enlist 1 percent 
(approximately 370 people), of our total non-prior service accessions 
in fiscal year 2004. We have identified at least 29 different skills 
across the Total Air Force that will be staffed with people that enter 
through the National Call to Service Program. The 1 percent will be 
divided across the 29 skills.

    13. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, what role would the National Service Plan member 
fill in your Service? I would like to encourage you to come back to the 
committee and myself for further help in using this program to increase 
end strength.
    General Shinseki. Participants who enlist for the 15-month term of 
service will attend the same training as those who enlist for a longer 
term of service in the same specialty. Specialties with a total 
training time of less than 16 weeks and facilitate Reserve duty or 
National Service will be open to this option. This enlistment option 
will be open to 24 military occupation specialties including combat, 
combat support, and combat service support. After training, 
participants in this option are subject to both overseas assignments, 
except Germany and Hawaii, and stateside assignments.
    Admiral Clark. While on active duty, NCS recruits will be utilized 
in the Navy to fulfill the same functions as recruits coming in under 
longer-term contracts. All NCS recruits will attend boot camp, a Navy 
``A'' school, and will be worldwide assignable to sea and shore 
billets. At the completion of their active duty contract, they will be 
afforded the opportunity to either reenlist in the Active Force or 
transfer to the SELRES. While attached to the SELRES, NCS members will 
fill manning gaps in targeted ratings. The skill mix for NCS accessions 
will be directly linked to projected SELRES manning shortfalls.
    General Hagee. The ultimate goal for our NCS marines is to support 
the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) in meeting manning shortfalls 
and support their emerging homeland security missions. A majority of 
the NCS marines would be tied to ATIFP missions and would be trained in 
infantry, NBC, and MP MOSs. Active duty would be spent serving with the 
4th MEB (AT), Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), 
Marine Security Forces, and Base/Station MPs. Assignments in the SMCR 
would be tied to Security Battalions, CBIRF, and other units assigned 
to homeland security missions. We are also planning on offering a 
limited number of NCS marines extended training in critical skill areas 
in short MOSs (i.e. intelligence, linguists, aerial navigators, etc.) 
so that we can assign these NCS marines directly into these critically 
short billets within the SMCR.
    General Jumper. Senator, we have identified many different skills 
in which these members will be utilized. These skills stretch across 
the Air Force and can also be utilized in one of our Air Reserve 
components. Members enlisted under the National Service Plan are not in 
addition to, but will count against our current authorized end 
strength.

    14. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, if you were authorized the increase in end strength 
required to meet your commitments, how quickly would you be able to 
fill out the ranks of currently undermanned units?
    General Shinseki. Any increase in end strength will be tied to how 
long we expect the Reserve components to maintain their current 
operations tempo. The Army continues to look at whether or not the 
480,000 Active-Duty Force is right and whether we have the right active 
component/Reserve component mix in our combat, combat support, and 
combat service support formations, as well as addressing our current 
high-demand/low-density units. Additionally, the Army derives end 
strength requirements from the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, which 
currently is ongoing. The TAA and other efforts to move soldiers from 
supporting roles to units will affect the increase in end strength 
requirements.
    Given current recruiting and retention resources, and current 
retention rates, the Army has the ability to increase end strength by 
approximately 7,700 in fiscal year 2004. An increase in resources or 
efficiencies will have a commensurate increase in the ability to 
increase the Army's end strength.
    Admiral Clark. As a result of congressional authority to operate 
above strength controls, yet within the NDAA authorization of +2 
percent, Navy active-duty end strength levels are already sufficient.
    General Hagee. The Marine Corps is very satisfied with the NDAA for 
fiscal year 2003 increase of 2,400 marines. The Marine Corps believes 
that 175,000 active marines are sufficient to meet our traditional 
mission requirements. We are currently not experiencing any problems in 
recruiting, training, and retaining marines to meet this increase.
    General Jumper. It is difficult to provide a definitive answer, as 
there are several issues involved including the recruiting and training 
pipelines. In the ideal environment, it takes between 12 and 18 months 
to recruit and train additional personnel.

    15. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, would you need to reactivate units and squadrons 
that were decommissioned during the down-sizing of the 1990s?
    General Shinseki. No. Soldiers who enter the Army under this plan 
would be integrated into existing units.
    Admiral Clark. I foresee no need to re-commission units at this 
time. We are using the National Call to Service Plan to complement our 
Reserve Force and to meet Reserve requirements for trained junior 
personnel.
    General Hagee. A. Marine Corps force structure is based on the 
minimum manpower and equipment needed to provide required combat 
capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War, our requirements have 
increased while end strength has decreased. Specifically, since a 
recent high of over 191,000 in 1991, we now stand at 175,000 active 
duty marines. This is at a time when we find ourselves engaged in a 
major theater war as well as numerous other vital missions.
    B. In recent years, with the help of a modest end strength 
increase, we have reactivated selective units in order to meet emergent 
threats and provide our regional combatant commanders with the 
capabilities they require. Our reactivation of the 4th Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) and our active component Air 
Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) are examples.
    C. Through a combination of specific force structure realignments 
and institutional process improvements, the Corps has enjoyed 
unprecedented efficiencies in manpower allocation. In spite of this, we 
currently are able to man our Active-Duty Forces at only 94 percent of 
their validated requirement. Given this shortage of manpower to meet 
our current requirements, and without presupposing another end strength 
increase, I do not believe it is prudent for us to seek reactivation of 
previously decommissioned units.
    General Jumper. At this time there are no plans to reactivate any 
units or squadrons inactivated during the downsizing of the 1990s. New 
squadrons would only be required if additional force structure or 
mission changes were directed. Additionally, end strength increases do 
not generate the need for additional squadrons. We are analyzing our 
force requirements to determine if there are opportunities to realign 
military manpower from non-military essential functions into high-
stress, high-PERSTEMPO career fields within existing units. We would 
then backfill the losing functions with civilian manpower or contract 
support, depending on the availability of resources.

    16. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, what increases in procurement would be required to 
ensure that these service members are properly equipped?
    General Shinseki. None. Soldiers who enter the Army under this plan 
would be integrated into existing units, assigned to authorized unit 
positions, and utilize equipment authorized by the units. However, 
there may be some additional cost associated with the procurement of 
personal items such as initial uniform issue items that would be based 
upon the number of soldiers entering the Army under this program.
    Admiral Clark. Thus far, we have identified no additional 
procurement needs to facilitate implementation of Navy's NCS program, 
largely because the program will be operated within our existing 
strength authorization and NCS members will perform duties associated 
with existing requirements.
    If, however, at some point, Navy leadership deems it necessary to 
activate previously decommissioned activities (ships, squadrons, bases, 
etc.), part of the consideration of such a decision will involve a 
detailed evaluation of the mission and structure of commands identified 
for reactivation, in order to determine procurement needs associated 
with their activation/reestablishment.
    General Hagee. This question is a follow-on to QFR #15 which asked, 
``Would you need to reactivate units and squadrons that were 
decommissioned during the down-sizing of the 1990s?'' The Marine Corps' 
response indicated that there was no need to reactivate any units or 
squadrons.
    In light of the Marine Corps' response to QFR #15, this question is 
not applicable.
    General Jumper. We plan to enlist 1 percent (approximately 370) of 
our total non-prior service accessions in fiscal year 2004 through the 
NCS plan. As there is currently no increase in end strength associated 
with the NCS plan, the cost to equip these members is included in the 
budget.

                           CONCURRENT RECEIPT

    17. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, I am on record as a strong supporter of concurrent 
receipt since 1991. I believe military retirement pay is pay for 
services rendered to a serviceman or woman after 20 years of dedicated 
military service. Disability pay is pay to a serviceman or woman 
because of physical or mental pain or suffering caused by their years 
of service in the military. The pays are different. The pays are 
separate. Military retirement pay should not be offset by disability 
pay. The Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act on 
``Special Compensation for Combat-Related Disabled Uniformed Services 
Retirees'' addressed only a small portion of retired service members 
not being fairly compensated for their service to this country and 
disabilities acquired during that service. Senator Harry Reid and I 
have re-introduced legislation to ensure that all service members are 
fairly compensated. What are your views on this legislation and this 
issue?
    General Shinseki. Of course, the Army is most grateful to our 
veterans, especially those who have served long and faithful careers. 
We realize that there is no payment that can ever fully repay these 
brave soldiers for the sacrifices they have made. However, we must 
temper this emotionally charged issue with the position of the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, which the Army supports. We cannot pay 
anyone twice--that is, both retired pay and disability pay--for the 
same service. Further, we must keep in mind our obligation to those who 
are serving now and may be putting their lives on the line in combat in 
the weeks and months ahead. Would we be able to support these troops 
after paying the $45 billion, 10-year cost for concurrent receipt that 
DOD estimates?
    The Army is grateful to the President for signing ``Combat Related 
Special Compensation'' into law. This new law will compensate military 
retirees who served 20 years and were wounded in combat or combat-
related training. The Army is part of a DOD committee working together 
to develop guidelines for executing this compensation program by June.
    Admiral Clark. Like all Americans, I believe we owe our veterans a 
great debt of gratitude, particularly those serving long and faithful 
careers. We must always remember that our Nation has remained strong 
because of the brave men and women who were willing to fight and risk 
their lives to protect their fellow citizens. However, we must also 
recognize the significant obligation this bill will place on the 
Military Retirement Fund without identifying appropriations.
    I cannot support concurrent receipt of retired pay and disability 
compensation that goes into effect prior to appropriation of funds to 
cover the cost to the Military Retirement Fund and manpower and 
personnel accounts. To do otherwise would put other critical programs 
at risk.
    General Hagee. The Marine Corps has always supported fair and 
equitable treatment of retired marines and acknowledges that the issue 
of concurrent receipt needs to be fully addressed. The NDAA fiscal year 
2003 provides special compensation for military retirees with combat-
related disabilities (CRSC). Though this is not concurrent receipt, we 
believe that this is an important first step. The Marine Corps' major 
concern lies with the appropriation of additional funding to support 
any legislative change concerning concurrent receipt. Compelling the 
Services to pay the bill out of existing funds would result in serious 
cuts in modernization and readiness, as well as potential cuts in 
current programs to our active and Reserve marines.
    General Jumper. Senator McCain, the Department has traditionally 
opposed legislative attempts to repeal the ban on concurrent receipt of 
full retired pay and VA disability compensation. This opposition is 
based on 100+ years of historical precedent, and a longstanding 
administration belief against ``duplicate payments'' for same period of 
service. However, we recognize the importance of properly compensating 
veterans for service injuries, and that there are two competing 
viewpoints on whether concurrent receipt is justified.
    Proponents of retaining the ban argue that offsets are common to 
other Federal payments (for example, Dependency and Indemnity 
Compensation offsets the Survivor Benefit Plan annuity). Ending this 
offset would set an expensive precedent for reduction/elimination of 
similar offsets among Federal programs. OSD reports a rough cost 
estimate of $41 billion in increased direct spending for the first 10-
year period if the ban on concurrent receipt were lifted ($3 billion in 
the first year alone, and $14 billion in increased accrual payments by 
DOD to the military retirement trust fund for the same 10-year period). 
Also, retired or ``retainer pay'' implies possible future service, and 
since a disabled retiree is not fit for recall, offset is appropriate.
    Proponents of repealing the ban argue the offset is unfair. Civil 
service retirees and prior service retirees typically are able to 
receive disability compensation from VA with no corresponding offset 
(though no other agency provides for disability and retirement pay from 
that agency). Another argument is that VA disability recipients are 
entitled to other Federal benefits, so why not military retired pay? As 
an alternative to ``full'' concurrent receipt, OSD estimates the ban 
could be lifted for 100 percent disabled retirees at a much-reduced 
cost of $50 million/year. The Air Force has not budgeted for this item 
in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget and cannot absorb or support 
the significant costs without additional funding. If additional funding 
were provided by Congress to cover the cost of lifting the ban, we 
would support such legislation.

                              ENCROACHMENT

    18. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, the loss of Vieques, and the increasing impact of 
encroachment on operations and training at bases and ranges, concern me 
greatly. We passed legislation last year that will help to reduce some 
encroachment concerns at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) and to a smaller 
degree at Luke AFB, but there is much more to be done. Please discuss 
what actions your Services are taking to protect the viability of 
military ranges and bases, especially against encroachment.
    General Shinseki. The Army is working internally and with other 
agencies to mitigate the effects that encroachment has on our training 
and readiness. Our principal internal effort is the Sustainable Range 
Program (SRP). The objective of SRP is to maximize the capability, 
availability, and accessibility of ranges and training land to support 
doctrinal training and testing requirements. SRP is based on three 
tenets:

    (1) Scientifically Defensible Information. The Army is developing 
and maintaining complete data on all aspects of ranges--operational 
characteristics of training facilities, physical characteristics of 
real property, and data on the range as part of the natural and 
cultural environment.
    (2) Integrated Management. We are integrating the management of 
ranges across the four disciplines that directly affect them: range 
operations and modernization; facilities and installation management; 
munitions management and safety; and environmental management.
    (3) Outreach. The Army is working to inform political leadership, 
regulators, and communities to improve understanding of the Army's need 
for training and testing and the Army's more sophisticated range 
management approach.

    The Army is developing both an overarching Army regulation and 
detailed implementing guidance to the field on the SRP. Specific 
programs that will support sustainment of ranges and minimize the 
impacts of encroachment include: implementation of the Army Range and 
Training Land Strategy, quantification of encroachment impacts in the 
Army Installation Status Report, implementation of Army Compatible Use 
Buffers (utilizing authorities granted by Congress in Section 2811 in 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003), and the 
implementation of mission-focused environmental management systems on 
all Army installations.
    I would like to comment specifically on the Army's efforts to 
implement the authority Congress granted the military departments 
earlier this year to acquire buffer zones around our installations. 
Fort Bragg pioneered this type of agreement, and now, Fort Carson, 
Colorado, has moved out and implemented one of our first agreements 
under the new legislation. Under a cooperative agreement between The 
Nature Conservancy and Fort Carson, The Nature Conservancy has 
negotiated a renewable lease with a private landowner that establishes 
a conservation easement and precludes development on about 30,000 acres 
and 14 linear miles of perimeter on the Fort Carson's southern 
boundary. We are excited about the prospects this new authority 
presents and will be working hard to identify suitable properties and 
resources to implement the program fully.
    The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the Services 
to develop overarching Department policy for sustainment of ranges and 
operating areas. This policy will support the long-term planning and 
programming necessary to ensure our ranges and training areas meet 
mission needs now and in the future.
    Admiral Clark. Beginning on the east coast, Navy is implementing 
the Training Resource Strategy (TRS), which ties together multiple 
ranges for fleet training. This plan distributes our training across 
all ranges instead of relying on a single site as we did at Vieques and 
consequently lessens the impact of short-term or seasonal encroachment 
at anyone range on our overall training program. TRS also supports a 
more realistic training scenario for our forces by providing larger, 
multi-dimensional training areas that were not available at Vieques.
    Taking advantage of legislation passed last year, Navy is 
developing an ``Encroachment Partnering'' (EP) program. This program 
allows acquisition of real estate interests on lands in the vicinity of 
military properties to reduce incompatible land uses that impact 
mission capabilities. As described below, funded programs are in place 
to conduct long-term sustainable planning for Navy ranges, to include 
identifying locations where EP projects can reduce the impacts 
associated with urban encroachment. For example, EP projects may 
support preservation of off-base habitat for species as cities expand, 
reducing species reliance on military lands. EP projects can also be 
used to reduce commercial and residential development in areas subject 
to noise or other indirect effects from training or testing. EP extends 
the options available for installations to conduct compatible land use 
planning with States and local governments, and can support positive 
partnerships with conservation groups and local stakeholders.
    In fiscal year 2004, the Navy has budgeted approximately $800 
million for compliance, pollution prevention, and conservation to meet 
our environmental obligations and manage natural resources. 
Additionally, the President's budget for fiscal year 2004 provides 
approximately $98 million across the FYDP to support a range 
sustainment program that will include development of management plans 
for each of our training range complexes, based upon current and 
anticipated operational requirements, and including detailed 
environmental and land-use planning.
    An important component of the range sustainability program is 
ensuring an ongoing dialogue occurs with all stakeholders, including 
local citizens and community planning organizations, as well as 
national and State resource agencies. Since encroachment impacts are 
often manifested via inappropriate regulatory restrictions or citizen 
lawsuits, this coordinated planning and outreach effort is critical to 
controlling the adverse impacts of encroachment. 
    General Hagee. The Marine Corps is engaged in many ways to protect 
the viability of our military ranges and bases, especially against 
encroachment. The Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps (OMMC) budget 
for environmental compliance and protection has held steady over the 
last several years at approximately $120 million per year. Our budgets 
are requirements based and our steady funding is attributable to the 
fact that environmental legislation has remained consistent since 1996. 
Previous investments to improve environmental compliance have also 
resulted in associated cost decreases. Additionally, the conservation 
portion of our budget has increased from about $1 million OMMC in 
fiscal year 1992 to about $15 million in fiscal year 2003.
    Every Marine Corps base, station, or range with natural resource 
responsibilities has in place an Integrated Natural Resource Management 
Plan (INRMP) which provides for the conservation and rehabilitation of 
natural resources. These plans are prepared in cooperation with 
regulatory agencies. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) policy 
acknowledges that INRMPs can be acceptable substitutes for critical 
habitat designation. It is this policy we seek to have Congress codify.
    Critical habitat designation under the Endangered Species Act 
presents the single greatest encroachment concern for the Marine Corps. 
The standard under the Endangered Species Act is that critical habitat 
cannot be adversely modified. Currently, we do not train on lands 
subject to critical habitat designation to ensure no adverse 
modification. The Marine Corps' ultimate concern is that once land is 
designated as critical habitat, land management authority transfers 
from the commanding general of the installation to the regulatory 
agencies and, via the courts, special interest groups. The Marine Corps 
has worked with FWS to develop a scientifically and legally based 
policy that precludes the need to designate critical habitat. The 
Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative (RRPI) has within it a 
provision that would codify current FWS practice. Absent legislation, 
environmental litigation may still cause 57 percent of the 125,000 acre 
Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton, California and 65 percent of 
the 23,000 acre Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar, California to 
be designated critical habitat.
    The Marine Corps is pursuing Encroachment Partnering opportunities 
per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (10 USC 
2684A, Sec 2811a) as another tool for addressing encroachment. This 
legislation allows entry into an agreement with an eligible entity such 
as a private conservation organization or State, to address the use or 
development of real property in the vicinity of a military 
installation. The purpose of Encroachment Partnering agreements are 
twofold: limit development or use of property that would be 
incompatible with the mission of the installation and/or preserve 
habitat on the property that would relieve current or anticipated 
environmental restrictions for the installation.
    MCB Camp Pendleton is participating in the South Coast Conservation 
Forum, a group whose goal is to acquire lands that will be set aside to 
protect as many of the 50 listed species in the local Southern 
California area as possible. MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina is a 
member of the Onslow Bight Forum, a group dedicated to sharing 
information and discussing potential buffer land partnering 
opportunities in coastal North Carolina.
    The Marine Corps recognized that evidence of negative encroachment 
impacts, though persuasive, were largely anecdotal. Consequently, the 
Marine Corps set out to establish quantitative data regarding this 
issue. Selecting MCB Camp Pendleton as the subject of the study, we 
examined encroachment impacts on the capability of the installation to 
support unit operational readiness requirements for a Marine Air Ground 
Task Force. Study results found that combat arms elements were able to 
accomplish only 69 percent of established standards for non-firing 
field training while conducting an amphibious operation at Camp 
Pendleton. A second phase of this study is on the verge of completion. 
A final report of some 760 tasks is due to the Commanding General, MCB 
Camp Pendleton this month. Initial results from the final report's 
findings are consistent with those of the preliminary assessment. On 
average, the units evaluated were able to complete their required tasks 
to just below 70 percent of the established standard, while conducting 
an amphibious operation at Camp Pendleton. Endangered species were the 
largest contributing encroachment factor in this study. These findings 
reinforce that for the Marine Corps, endangered species issues are at 
the forefront of the Service encroachment debate.
    As a necessary follow-on effort to the Camp Pendleton study, a 
Headquarters Marine Corps Range Management System (RMS) has been 
funded, including monies programmed through fiscal year 2004, to build 
a Corps-wide ability to relate training standards to ranges. Intent is 
to have the RMS in place within the next 18 months. RMS will have broad 
utilization from the unit through institutional level. This system is 
envisioned to be able to plan and develop training, schedule ranges and 
training areas, perform training cost/benefit analysis, and very 
importantly, measure the effects of encroachment on our installations 
ability to support unit operational readiness requirements.
    To conclude, the Marine Corps needs solutions as outlined in the 
RRPI, embedded in law, that requires consideration, accommodation, and 
protection of lands used for military training and operations. RRPI 
passage, including the provision that addresses critical habitat 
designation, has direct national security implications, and is a Marine 
Corps priority.
    General Jumper. The Air Force is also greatly concerned with the 
increasing impact encroachment is having on our operations and 
training. The Air Force has made it a priority to define and quantify 
the resources needed to support our mission requirements and to measure 
and communicate the impacts of encroachment on mission readiness. The 
Air Force has a four-prong strategy to address encroachment issues:

    (1) Identify and quantify the resource base needed to perform the 
AF mission, and quantify the readiness impairments resulting from 
resource denial (encroachment). To accomplish this, the Air Force is 
developing the Resource Capability Model (RCM) that will more precisely 
identify natural, physical, and statutorily controlled resources needed 
to conduct readiness activities to better inform decisionmakers both 
within the Air Force and among our community and regulatory partners.
    (2) Continue to institute dialogue with other Federal resource 
management agencies (such as the Department of the Interior, 
Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Commerce) to develop 
regulatory or administrative improvements that can relieve military 
resource encroachment.
    (3) Enhance outreach and communications with States, local 
governments, and interested organizations regarding how unintended 
consequences of resource management programs can impair military 
readiness.
    (4) Explore the possible need for statutory modifications to 
prevent unintended impacts to military readiness from resource denial 
or degradation. One such effort to obtain statutory modifications is to 
support the RRPI. It is a legislative proposal that will provide the 
needed clarification to specific environmental statutes in order to 
protect access to our training resources while continuing to protect 
the environment. Those specific statutes include the Endangered Species 
Act, the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, the Compensation and Liability 
Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 
    More specifically, the Air Force is conducting mitigation measures 
to address encroachment issues that impact our operations. For example, 
at the Barry M. Goldwater Range, the Air Force routinely monitors 
target areas for Sonoran Pronghorn movements and will divert or cancel 
live missions projected near Pronghorn areas. At Eglin AFB, we 
electronically tag and track endangered Gulf Sturgeon to ensure they 
are not impacted by our operations. At Nellis AFB, the Air Force is 
acquiring 417 acres on the north departure zone due to urban 
encroachment off of the southern departure zone.
    Through the application of mitigation measures, together with our 
strategic four-prong approach which includes the provisions of the 
RRPI, the Air Force will continue to fulfill its dual mission of 
protecting the lives and well-being of our citizens and to protect the 
environment.

                             TRANSFORMATION

    19. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, when transformation was first discussed, we talked 
about a revolution in military affairs, and ``skipping a generation of 
technology.'' We talked about taking advantage of emerging technology 
to decrease the size of our military forces while increasing their 
mobility and lethality. Kenneth J. Krieg, Special Assistant to the 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, recently came over to brief 
our staffs on the current status of transformation. His briefing had 
little to do with warfighting. I would characterize his briefing as 
more of a major reform of DOD bureaucracy. When Dov Zakheim, Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) came to the Hill and briefed this 
year's budget, he talked at length about what a transformational budget 
this is. Yet it is very telling that in your R&D budget, while there is 
$870 million for the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 
there is $5.5 billion for continued development for three short range 
fighter programs, all three of which were considered to be candidates 
for the chopping block 2 years ago to provide money for 
transformational programs and technologies. What has happened to 
transformation?
    General Shinseki. The Army is firmly committed to its 
transformation efforts. In this President's budget and its associated 
Future Year Defense Plan, the Army has generated approximately $22 
billion of savings by terminating 24 systems ($13.9 billion) and 
reducing or restructuring an additional 24 ($8.6 billion) in order to 
fund transformation and other higher priority programs. The Army 
reinvested these savings into: Future Combat System ($13.5 billion), 
Precision Munitions ($3.2 billion), Sensor and Communications ($2.3 
billion), Science & Technology ($1.1 billion), Missile and Air Defense 
($1.1 billion), and other smaller high priority systems.
    Admiral Clark. Transformation remains embedded in everything we do, 
and the Navy is committed to what we see as joint transformation at the 
Service level. To this end, transformation is about more than investing 
in new technologies, although that is certainly an important part of 
it. It is also about developing new operational concepts such as the 
Global Concepts of Operations; new processes such as Sea Warrior, Sea 
Trial and Sea Enterprise; and new organizations such as Navy-Marine 
Corp Tactical Aviation Integration, all of which I described in my 
testimony. These initiatives are in important ways about maximizing the 
effectiveness of the capital assets in which we have already invested.
    Transformation is also about investing in programs that will result 
in major increases in warfighting effectiveness, including the next-
generation aircraft carrier (CVN-21), the transformational destroyer 
(DD(X)) and LCS, the SSGN, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the Advanced 
Hawkeye (E-2C RMP) Upgrade Program. At the same time, not all of our 
investments are for new things. Service life extensions, product 
improvements, and modifications to current equipment may offer 
significant future returns on investment, such as the cruiser 
conversion plan. Other modernization programs are not transformational 
by themselves, but are necessary to provide the supporting structure to 
deliver new transformational initiatives.
    General Hagee. Transformation is not merely about ``skipping a 
generation of technology'' or developing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and 
other future technologies. Transformation is also about developing new 
operational concepts, organizational constructs, and business reforms 
that will enable us to realize our vision of future warfighting. While 
future technologies play some part in achieving these transformational 
capabilities, many of the currently existing or planned programs and 
technologies also support the transformation of the Marine Corps. 
Indeed, if we can achieve a transformational capability through changes 
in our organizations or operating concepts, then we may be able to 
reallocate some of those savings to develop capabilities that can only 
be realized through future technologies. Many of the existing or 
planned programs are not, of themselves, transformational. But, 
enhancements in their reliability, availability, and maintainability 
over previous systems will allow us to pursue that next generation of 
technology without sacrificing the warfighting capabilities of today. 
Regardless, transformation should only be judged by the improvements in 
the overall capabilities of the Nation's warfighters.
    General Jumper. Senator, transformation is alive and well in the 
Air Force. We are investing more than $95 billion over the FYDP in 
transformational capabilities. These capabilities are provided by a 
variety of programs and initiatives, including the F/A-22 Raptor and F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter programs you referred to, but not limited to 
them. Transformation as we see it is not just about new programs, but 
about exploiting new approaches to the operational concepts and 
organizational structures we develop for the employment of both new and 
existing technologies. Further, the AF is not transforming in a 
vacuum--the unique air and space capabilities we provide are just one 
part of an integrated joint, interagency, and coalition team. Ensuring 
that the entire team is equipped with complementary and synergistic 
capabilities and platforms is important as we transform the Air Force.
    It is easy to fall into the trap of focusing on a particular system 
when discussing transformation. Truth is that the transformed Joint 
Forces will be composed of a ``system of systems'' connected through 
operating concepts and organizational constructs. Those forces will be 
more network-centric, less platform-centric, and able to better conduct 
effects-based operations by increasing information sharing.
    They will have C\4\ISR capabilities that provide a joint common 
relevant operational situational awareness of the battlespace, rapid 
and robust sensor-to-shooter  targeting, reachback and other necessary 
prerequisites for network-centric warfare. They will do it with 
integrated Air Force capabilities and systems we are developing and 
investing in now--including the Space Based Radar, the Advanced 
Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation, laser-based 
communications, the Distributed Common Ground System, and Global 
Positioning System Blocks IIF & III. They will do it by bringing 
together these capabilities, along with the F/A-22 and F-35, to provide 
an overwhelming ability to see, reach out, and touch any possible 
adversary with the right tool to achieve the intended effect.
    To more directly address your comments about the short-range 
fighter programs we're pursuing, I'd like to expand on some of the 
transformational capabilities the F/A-22 will bring to the United 
States. The Raptor combines air dominance, SEAD/DEAD (suppression/
destruction of enemy air defenses), and precision attack capabilities 
in one platform. Its stealth, supercruise, maneuverability, and 
integrated avionics will allow us to overcome night-operating 
limitations in heavily defended areas, and bring persistent stealth to 
the battlespace. Our warfighting commanders will have a greatly 
enhanced ability to overcome anti-access environments, to ``kick down 
the door'' to clear the way for follow-on forces and missions.
    Complementing the F/A-22's superior air dominance and ground attack 
``kick down the door'' capability, the F-35 provides persistent, 
follow-on ground attack. It will give our joint and allied air forces a 
greatly improved stealth platform with enhanced strike capabilities at 
a lower cost by capitalizing on joint investments by the Air Force, 
Navy, Marine Corps, and allies. In addition to reduced procurement 
costs, the F-35 will also be cheaper to maintain and operate. The F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter is the ideal weapons platform to replace our aging 
strike fighters.
    Finally, the Air Force is fully committed to capitalizing on the 
warfighting capabilities inherent with UAVs. From a historical 
perspective, we are in a ``Billy Mitchell era'' with regard to UAV 
development. The recently completed Defense Science Board study of UAVs 
noted that the loss rates of existing UAVs are over 50 times higher 
than for existing manned platforms. They also reported that these UAVs 
can cost over $40 million each. Our R&D investment of $870 million for 
UAVs is thus sizeable given the maturity of their development. They, 
therefore, require a more substantial investment to successfully 
transition these programs to production and deployment. The differences 
you see in our R&D investment is more a factor of the development 
maturity of the programs than any lack of commitment for UAVs. As the 
development of UAVs matures, our investment will increase accordingly.

    20. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, why are we now allowing evolutionary, traditional 
platforms to be labeled transformational?
    General Shinseki. Army transformation consists of three primary 
vectors--the current Legacy Force, the Stryker Brigades, and the 
Objective Force. Over the last 3 years, the Army has undertaken 
transforming itself into a force that is more strategically responsive 
and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations. 
While Army transformation encompasses these three vectors, the Army has 
worked in concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense as to 
which systems are considered transformational. The Army has 19 systems 
recognized by the Department as transformational, and they include the 
Future Combat Systems, the Warfighter Information Network Tactical, 
Comanche, and the Joint Tactical Radio System. Current Army platforms 
such as the Apache, Abrams, and Bradley while crucial to the Army's 
transformation efforts, have not been classified as transformational.
    Admiral Clark. The President's stated goal is to `skip a 
generation' of technology and accelerate transformational technologies. 
For example, aircraft carriers are indeed a `traditional platform,' 
however, in CVN-21 we have leapt from the CVN(X) development plan into 
CVN-21 within about the same timeline. The transformational 
technologies include a new electrical generation and distribution 
system, improved flight deck design with Electromagnetic Aircraft 
Launching System, Advanced Arresting Gear, improved sortie generation, 
enhanced survivability, reduced manning, and incorporation of a 
flexible infrastructure that will allow the insertion of new 
capabilities as they evolve.
    General Hagee. Platforms themselves should not be viewed as 
traditional or transformational. Instead, the innovative and relevant 
capabilities that these platforms help support better demonstrate the 
transformation of our force. The new operational concepts we develop 
first describe our vision of future warfighting, and indicate the 
capabilities that will be required to achieve this vision. Some of 
these capabilities can then be achieved only through the employment of 
leap-ahead technologies and with the development of new platforms, such 
as the V-22 Osprey. Often, however, these capabilities will rely 
equally on platforms already on hand--for mobility, fire support, 
combat service, or communications, for example. In fact, we 
intentionally leverage these investments, in both dollars and training, 
whenever possible to achieve new capabilities as efficiently as 
possible. I think it is more useful to evaluate our transformation 
based on the new or dramatically improved capabilities we provide to 
joint warfighters, rather than upon an appraisal of any individual 
platform.
    General Jumper. We primarily judge the transformational qualities 
of our platforms based on whether the platform provides a significant 
improvement to our joint warfighting capabilities that enable new 
concepts for military operations. For instances that allow the 
measurement of warfighting capability, ``significant improvement'' is 
usually interpreted to mean a near order of magnitude improvement in 
our warfighting capability. Another factor that contributes to our 
assessment is the contribution of our platforms to Secretary Rumsfeld's 
``Critical Operational Goals of Transformation.'' If our platforms 
provide a substantial contribution towards the satisfaction of these 
goals, it may be labeled transformational.
    Not all of our platforms contribute to our transformation through 
the implementation of new technologies. Some platforms become 
transformational through use of existing technologies in new innovative 
ways to significantly improve our warfighting capabilities. There is no 
time element associated with our criteria. We judge our platforms based 
on their contribution to our warfighting capabilities. Consequently, it 
is entirely consistent with our viewpoint to have platforms that 
preceded ``transformation'' as a DOD initiative to be labeled 
transformational.

    21. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, what time line are we looking at for OSD's desired 
bureaucratic reforms to actually have an impact on the battlefield for 
our warfighters?
    General Shinseki. On the DOD level, it is my understanding that 
many of the proposed bureaucratic reforms require congressional action 
and assistance in order to begin implementation, and will be forwarded 
to Congress as part of a comprehensive transformation package.
    Speaking from the Army's perspective, we have ongoing and emerging 
efforts to identify and institute changes to our internal business 
processes. The primary focus of our business process reforms has been 
two-fold: free up resources available for higher priority programs, and 
streamline processes and procedures to use our soldiers' and civilians' 
time more efficiently. A few of these reforms will have near-term 
impacts (within 1 year) in terms of freeing up personnel resources for 
other activities or streamlining processes, but the majority take a 
longer time to implement.
    The Army's current internal business reform process, known as the 
Army Business Initiative Council (Army BIC), has focused the majority 
of its efforts on identifying and implementing mid-level improvements 
intended to produce near-term savings and efficiencies. To date, 
Secretary White, as part of the Army BIC process, has approved 53 
initiatives. Some of those initiatives can be implemented simply by 
changing old and outdated regulations and policies. Others require the 
assistance of Congress to change statutory law.
    One example of an initiative that has been approved by the BIC for 
action, and championed by the Army, was recently forwarded to this 
committee as part of the proposed National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2004. The initiative will allow the Army and the other 
Services to get out of the business of purchasing, administering, and 
paying for government cellular phones and is intended to save funding 
and free up manpower for other, more important tasks. Instead, for 
those with a validated government need for cellular phone use, we would 
instead use the authority being sought from your committee to provide 
them with a flat-rate stipend to use their personal phone for 
government business.
    Another initiative approved for implementation within the Army is 
to update the Common Tables of Allowance, which will help ensure 
equipment authorizations for our combat units and more accurately 
reflect their current requirements, and thus make them better prepared 
to carry out their combat mission when called upon to do so.
    The above initiative is more representative of the type of 
initiatives approved by the Army BIC; less than 20 percent of all 
approved Army BIC initiatives require congressional action for 
implementation. However, we do look forward to working with your 
committee on those Army BIC initiatives which require congressional 
assistance in the near future.
    Admiral Clark. Secretary Rumsfeld is pursuing a number of 
initiatives. I believe some of them will have immediate impact and some 
will take longer to mature, but in the end we will be a more 
streamlined, agile Department.
    General Hagee. The Secretary of Defense's Transformation Planning 
Guidance provides a strategy and timeline for the development and 
fielding of new capabilities for our joint warfighters. Within the next 
2-3 years, we can expect to see transformational changes to the 
interoperability of our forces, especially in terms of joint planning 
and communications, by taking into account lessons learned from joint 
training and ongoing operations, as well as the results from advanced 
technology demonstrations and experimentation. During the next decade, 
our ongoing efforts to develop new joint operational concepts will 
begin to promote the true integration of the various capabilities the 
Services provide as we work to meet the six operational goals 
established in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Finally, the 
Chairman's Joint Vision articulates our far-term view of future 
operations and describes the capabilities that will reach the field in 
15 to 20 years. I believe that this consistent emphasis on developing 
capabilities that are ``born-joint'' for the near-, mid-, and far-term 
will fundamentally change our acquisition, training, and planning 
processes, and truly transform the way the way we operate on tomorrow's 
battlefield.
    General Jumper. Our new mind set for capabilities development, 
which we call ``Agile Acquisition,'' is beginning to take hold and pay 
dividends. Over the past 18 months we have proven to ourselves that we 
can, in fact, reform our processes and deliver new capabilities to the 
warfighter faster. For wartime specific requirements we use the Rapid 
Response Process (RRP). RRP delivers approval to proceed with material 
solutions submitted by MAJCOM combatant commanders to CSAF within 19 
days. Success to date--the acquisition and fielding of 33 urgent Combat 
Mission Need Statements valued in excess of $308 million across 12 
platforms. Outside of wartime specific requirements, we have also 
accelerated some warfighter acquisition initiatives from 3 years to 
less than 1 year for contract award. One such example is the Joint 
Warning and Reporting Network for detecting, analyzing, and warning of 
potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
hazards.
    The challenge now is to take these successes and institutionalize 
them so that they become the way we do business. The AF is working with 
OSD to ensure that all policies (both OSD and AF) foster collaboration, 
initiative, trust, and partnering. All of this is fixed on the twin 
goals of Agile Acquisition: reduced cycle time and increased 
credibility. Additionally, we are aggressively developing training 
programs to not only teach people new processes, but also to change the 
work culture to one that accepts the urgency of Agile Acquisition.

                              ``GO PILLS''

    22. Senator McCain. General Jumper, there have been reports in the 
press regarding an Air Force policy which authorizes Air Force pilots 
to take amphetamines called ``go pills'' as a ``fatigue-management 
tool''. The reports I saw described that Air Force tactical aviation 
pilots, not just bomber crews, use the ``go pills'' during combat air 
patrol (CAP) missions.
    Can you describe to me why does the Air Force finds it necessary to 
use amphetamines as a fatigue-management tool and Navy and Marine Corps 
pilots do not use it, but are subjected to similar combat air patrol 
missions? I believe some of our citizens may find it disconcerting to 
learn that Air Force combat air patrols over cities since September 11 
were flown by Air Force pilots using amphetamines.
    General Jumper. I can't speak for the Navy or Marine Corps, but 
I'll be happy to answer your concerns about the Air Force's policy for 
use of ``go pills'' as a fatigue-management tool. It is part of a 
comprehensive program that includes strict usage control and prefers 
fatigue management over pharmacological use. The policy grew out of a 
need to be able to sustain operations on long-duration missions, often 
at night. From 1972 to 1995 the Air Force sustained 96 serious mishaps 
in which fatigue was cited as a factor; there were no mishaps in which 
the use of stimulants was a factor.
    The Air Force conducted a comprehensive 18-month review on the 
effects of the medication and concluded that the pills provide an extra 
margin of safety by helping aircrews counter fatigue. Use of the pills 
is completely voluntary at the discretion of the aircrew, and use is 
approved in each case in writing by commanders, normally for missions 
over 8 hours for fighter aircraft or 12 hours for bombers. Individuals 
are informed that ``go pills should only be used in conjunction with 
fatigue-management tools or after all fatigue-management tools have 
been exhausted.''

                           RESERVE COMPONENT

    23. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, in your statement you talk 
about the importance of the Reserve component in supporting defense 
requirements. The significant number of Reserve personnel activated 
since September 11 clearly validates your comments. As you stated, 
today more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve component 
(RC). The Secretary of Defense has commented that there are functions 
and capabilities now residing only in the RC that need to exist in our 
Active-Duty Forces. I see this as another indication of the need to 
increase your end strength. Please explain how you intend to migrate 
capabilities back in to the active component (AC) under current end 
strength limitations.
    General Shinseki. While the congressionally-mandated fiscal year 
2002 active Army end strength was 480,000, the Army exceeded this end 
strength target, as well as the budgeted average strength of 474,000 
man-years. The Army finished fiscal year 2002 with an end strength of 
486,543 (78,158 officers, 404,305 enlisted, and 4,080 cadets). The Army 
was allowed to exceed the end strength targets only because of the 2 
percent flex authorized by Congress. The Army will continue to utilize 
this flex and continue to use RC forces to meet current and emerging 
requirements for the global war on terrorism and the new strategic 
environment.
    The Army's AC and RC force mix is the result of deliberate actions 
to balance risks and priorities in light of operational requirements as 
well as resource constraints. The Army continues to adjust its force 
structure based on the ``1-4-2-1'' force-sizing construct. The Army's 
force mix is designed to support the geographic combatant commander's 
requirements and is determined using the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 
process. To stay within constant end strength levels, adding 
capabilities to the Active Force will require the transfer of some 
mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve Force. A number of 
options exist to reduce risk including the conversion of lower demand 
structure inside the Active Force; converting key capabilities held in 
the RC, but needed intermittently; and changes in Reserve personnel 
management to increase access by enhancing volunteerism and diminishing 
involuntary mobilization.
    Additionally, for the Program Objective Memorandum 2004-2009, over 
19,500 spaces were programmed for change within the Active, Guard, and 
Reserve Force structure. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has activated 
or has programmed to activate through fiscal year 2009, a total of 68 
active, 102 National Guard, and 85 Reserve units that fall into these 
high-demand categories: aviation, chemical, civil affairs/psychological 
operations, and military police. The enhanced force capabilities 
address the most urgent needs.
    Currently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction 
with the Joint Staff has undertaken a study to improve operational 
availability of all military forces. As part of this study, the AC/RC 
mix is being studied in the context of short-notice, short-duration 
major combat operations. This study is incomplete and will be continued 
as part of Defense planning for fiscal year 2005 to determine any 
recommended force structure changes.

    24. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, I noted that the Army intends 
to invest nearly $700 million over the next 6 years to modernize key 
training ranges, such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, 
the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack 
Center near Gila Bend. What improvements will these funds be directed 
towards?
    General Shinseki. The Combat Training Center (CTC) modernization 
program modernizes the maneuver CTCs, the National Training Center 
(NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Combat Maneuver 
Training Center, and establishes the Deep Attack Center of Excellence. 
This allows the CTC program to develop its leaders, keep pace with Army 
transformation, provide high-quality, full-spectrum training 
operations, and realistic joint and combined arms training. During the 
next 6 years, the Army will invest nearly $700 million to modernize and 
establish these training centers. The $700 million provides for 
opposing forces surrogate vehicles, surrogate tank vehicles, common 
training instrumentation architecture, objective instrumentation 
systems, and NTC military operations on urbanized terrain.
    The Deep Attack Center of Excellence is designed for corps level 
attack aviation training with Air Force integration. It will provide a 
rigorous, integrated, live CTC-type collective training experience for 
corps and divisional attack battalions, other service attack systems, 
and respective enabling command, control, and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance elements along with other combined 
arms systems in a joint environment.

                            SHIP RETIREMENTS

    25. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, the President's budget includes 
the retirement of the Spruance-class destroyers. I have two concerns 
here. First, today's Navy routinely operates in littoral waters 
increasingly populated by a very capable diesel submarine threat, yet 
we are doing away with a class of ships designed to counter that 
threat. Second, these destroyers have been equipped, at significant 
cost, to be able to carry Tomahawk missiles. What is the Navy doing to 
manage the loss of both a key antisubmarine warfare (ASW) asset and a 
capable strike platform?
    Admiral Clark. The Spruance-class was designed to counter the 
Soviet Navy's blue water nuclear submarine threat, which we no longer 
face. Current Navy warfighting analysis indicates decommissioning this 
class of ship does not affect our ability to prosecute diesel 
submarines in the littoral. Our development of LCS and its capabilities 
inherent in the antisubmarine warfare mission module will provide us a 
new and better capability to prosecute diesel submarines at a lower 
cost.
    A key issue for littoral ASW is the ability to operate a 
helicopter. The number of available helo spots exceeds the inventory of 
helicopters available in the fleet, even with the accelerated 
decommissioning of the Spruance-class.
    Available verticle launch system (VLS) cells lost by the 
decommissioning of the Spruance-class are gained back by the 
commissionings of DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyers. These ships will 
provide substantially more combat capability in every warfare area and 
96 VLS cells compared to the 61 on Spruance-class ships. The number of 
VLS cells in the fleet by fiscal year 2004 is greater than in fiscal 
year 2003 even with the decommissionings, and rises steadily 
thereafter.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Fiscal Year
         Weapon Systems         --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total VLS Cells................    6,869    7,131    6,870    6,949    6,993    7,316  \1\ 7,8    8,316    8,508
                                                                                            16
Total Helo Spots \2\...........      164      166      152      153      152      158      166      170     174
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ SSGN IOC
\2\ Helo Spots exceed LAMPS inventory


    26. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, you state that we currently have 
151 ships deployed. How can you maintain that OPTEMPO, and stay within 
PERSTEMPO while retiring these ships? Would it not make more sense to 
hold off retiring these ships until after world wide requirements have 
dropped off? Perhaps sometime after the Iraq situation has been 
resolved?
    Admiral Clark. Our Navy is at the highest state of readiness that 
I've ever witnessed in my career. This is duel in no small part, to the 
tradeoffs we have made between quantity and capability--including the 
accelerated retirement of some of our ships. Last year, I promised we 
would sharpen our focus on our force structure in the years ahead--to 
buy the ships, aircraft, and the capabilities needed for tomorrow's 
Navy while at the same time, maintaining our ability to meet 
operational requirements. As a result, we took a hard look at the ways 
we could balance these priorities and our discretionary investments to 
both satisfy the near-term operational risks and prepare for the long-
term risks of an uncertain future. We identified several aging, legacy 
systems with limited growth potential and high operating and support 
costs, and ultimately, accelerated the retirement of 11 ships and 70 
aircraft, divested more than 50 systems and eliminated thousands of 
legacy IT applications. These initiatives result in an acceptable 
operational risk in the near term because of our emphasis on sustaining 
our current readiness gains. Equally important these difficult 
decisions yielded $1.9 billion for reinvestment and will do much to 
help reduce our future risk.

                              ENVIRONMENT

    27. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, I am aware of a number of 
environmental issues that are in the works on the Commerce Committee 
that have military implications. Would you elaborate on some of the 
specific issues surrounding the Marine Mammal Protection Act and how 
they are impacting naval readiness?
    Admiral Clark. The definition of the term ``harassment'' of marine 
mammals in the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) is a source of 
confusion because the definition is tied to vague and ambiguous terms 
such as ``annoyance'' and ``potential to disturb.'' These terms apply 
to even the slightest changes in marine mammal behavior and are ripe 
for litigation that leads to increased restrictions on training and 
testing.
    In November 2002, a Federal District Court judge in San Francisco 
presiding over a case brought by special interest groups alleging 
violation of the MMPA, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) issued a court order that strictly 
limits employment of the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low 
Frequency Active (SURTASS LFA) sonar system. This advanced system is 
designed to detect and track the growing number of quiet diesel 
submarines possessed by nations which could threaten our vital national 
security. After highlighting what the court viewed as flaws in 
regulatory agency implementation of the MMPA and ESA, and despite the 
Navy's unprecedented efforts to comply with NEPA, the court issued a 
preliminary injunction restricting Navy's deployment of SURTASS LFA to 
only a small area in the Western Pacific. As a result of the inherent 
structural flaws in the laws themselves as applied to worldwide 
military readiness activities, the Navy now finds the deployment and 
operation of one of our most important national security assets 
constrained by a Federal Court as a result of litigation brought by 
special interest groups that is specifically designed to deny the Navy 
use of the system. Future testing and employment of SURTASS LFA (and 
potentially other Navy training and testing programs) are in jeopardy 
because of flaws in the MMPA, which was originally enacted to protect 
whales from commercial exploitation and to prevent dolphins and other 
marine mammals from accidental death or injury during commercial 
fishing operations.
    The submarine threat today is real and in some ways has become more 
challenging than during the Cold War. Many nations are capable of 
employing quiet-diesel submarines to deny access or significantly delay 
execution of joint and coalition operations in support of our vital 
interests. Of the approximately 500 non-U.S. submarines in the world, 
almost half that number are operated by non-allied nations. Of greatest 
concern are the new ultra-quiet diesel-electric submarines armed with 
deadly torpedoes and cruise missiles being produced or acquired by the 
People's Republic of China, Iran, and North Korea. These diesel 
submarines are very difficult to detect outside the range at which they 
can launch attacks against U.S. and allied ships using passive sonar 
systems. Active systems like SURTASS LFA, when used in conjunction with 
other antisubmarine sensor and weapons systems, are necessary to 
detect, locate, and destroy or avoid hostile submarines before they 
close within range of our forces.
    While recognizing the national security need for SURTASS LFA, 
nevertheless, the Federal District Court judge deciding the LFA lawsuit 
was constrained by the broad language of the MMPA, which was not 
drafted with application to military readiness activities in mind. 
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' failure to produce scientific evidence 
contradicting the independent scientific research sponsored by the Navy 
in coordination with numerous outside experts that the system could be 
operated with negligible harm to marine mammals, the court opined that 
Navy training must be restricted. In reaching this conclusion, the 
court noted that under the definition of harassment, the phrase 
``potential to disturb'' hinged on the word ``potential'' and extended 
to individual animals. Quoting from the opinion, the judge said, ``In 
fact, by focusing on potential harassment, the statute appears to 
consider all the animals in a population to be harassed if there is the 
potential for the act to disturb the behavior patterns of the most 
sensitive individual in the group.'' (Emphasis added.) Interpreting the 
law this broadly would require authorization (permits) for harassment 
of potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of marine mammals based on 
the benign behavioral responses of one or two of the most sensitive 
animals.
    Highlighting how difficult it would be to apply the MMPA to 
worldwide military readiness activities under such a broad 
interpretation of harassment, the court also pointed out that a 
separate structural flaw in the MMPA limits permits for harassment to 
no more than a ``small number'' of marine mammals. Overturning the 
regulatory agency's decades-old interpretation of the MMPA, the court 
also said that the ``small number'' of animals affected cannot be 
defined in terms of whether there would be negligible impact on the 
species, but rather is an absolute number that must be determined to be 
``small.'' The court's far-reaching opinion underscores shortcomings in 
the MMPA, which apply to any worldwide military readiness activity, or 
any grouping of military training activities that might be submitted 
for an overall review of impact on the environment.
    Other examples of how the MMPA affects testing and training follow:

        Navy Research: During the last 6 years of Navy research on how 
        to counter mines and detect submarines in shallow water, over 
        78 percent of the tests have been delayed, scaled back, or 
        cancelled due to the impact of environmental regulations.
        Shallow Water Training Range: Lack of clarity in the definition 
        of ``harassment'' is delaying the establishment of shallow 
        water training ranges to prepare sailors for the Navy's most 
        difficult battlefield--shallow water antisubmarine warfare.

                 Navy's fleet exercises face severe limitations 
                to avoid potential ``harassment'' of marine mammals.
                 Exercises to protect ships from submarines and 
                mines in narrow, shallow straits, such as the Strait of 
                Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, have been moved to less 
                realistic conditions in deep water.
                 Some exercises forced to adopt aerial and 
                other visual surveys for sea turtles and marine mammals 
                can only be done in daylight. The mitigation denies the 
                ability to train at night.

    To address these issues, I ask for your consideration of the 
narrowly focused amendments to the MMPA proposed by DOD in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, which has now been 
transmitted by the President to Congress. Our proposal to clarify the 
definition of ``harassment'' and allow authorization of activities 
under the MMPA that would have a ``negligible'' impact on a stock or 
species, and follow recommendations made in a report to Congress by the 
National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences in 
2000. According to the NRC, if the current definition of Level B 
harassment (detectable changes in behavior) were applied to commercial 
shipping and recreational boating as strenuously as it is applied to 
scientific and naval activities, the result would be crippling 
regulation of nearly every motorized vessel operating in U.S. waters.
    The DOD proposed amendment to the MMPA will ensure protection of 
marine mammals while allowing sufficient flexibility to conduct 
training and other operations essential to national security. Left 
unchanged, the MMPA will continue to be the subject of litigation 
brought by special interest groups and could lead to restrictions on 
other sonar systems in use by the fleet for over 30 years.

                            AVIATION SAFETY

    28. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, an article in the November 4, 
2002 Defense News delineated a key and expanding roll for rotary wind 
aircraft in battle group operations as you invest in MH-60R and MH-60S 
helicopters. I was surprised to learn that the Navy has elected not to 
include the Cockpit Air Bag System (CABS) crash-activated, inflatable 
protection system in these new airframes.  Analysis of crash date shows 
that airbags will save one aviator of every three that is killed in 
what are considered survivable crash sequences. The Army is currently 
equipping its rotary fleet with CABS, why has the Navy elected to 
forego this readily available means of protecting the aircraft's most 
valuable asset?
    Admiral Clark. The U.S. Navy, through Naval Air Systems Command 
engineering processes, has a hazard analysis and risk management 
program, which it applies to all type/model/series of Navy and Marine 
Corps aircraft. The Navy recognizes the benefits of CABS and has 
included it in both the MH-60S and MH-60R Operational Requirements 
Documents (ORD) as elements of the block upgrade program. Through the 
evolutionary acquisition process, these block upgrades will improve 
aircrew survivability and protect our most valuable assets.

                LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) PROCUREMENT 

    29. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark and General Jumper, last year the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was not in the fiscal year 2003 proposed 
budget. I am impressed that you have been able to accelerate 
development and construction of Littoral Combat Ships in this year's 
budget, and your 6-year funding plan, including beginning construction 
next year. How have you been able to do this without leasing? As I 
understand it, the basis for why the Air Force needs to lease KC-767 
tankers is because our acquisition process is too slow and laborious. 
General Jumper, perhaps your acquisition people need to speak with 
Admiral Clark's. Please comment.
    Admiral Clark. LCS brings a new approach to ship development. The 
LCS acquisition, a streamlined derivative of the traditional approach, 
focuses principally on developing a ship to accommodate modular combat 
systems. These combat systems modules will be developed separately from 
ship construction. In line with recent DOD initiatives to streamline 
and tailor the acquisition process, the Navy has planned for LCS to 
begin construction no later than fiscal year 2005. LCS program 
initiation in fiscal year 2003 affords an opportunity to employ 
innovative spiral development and acquisition methods from the keel up. 
Lessons learned from Navy experimentation with small high-speed ships 
and innovative hull forms such as Hybrid Deep Vee Demonstrator (HDV(D)-
100), High Speed Vessel (HSV), Coastal Waters Interdiction Platform 
(CWIP), TRITON, and SLICE has proven invaluable in reducing program 
risk. Collaboration between the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater 
program and with allied nations facilitates cost effective development 
and procurement of the LCS and its associated mission capability 
modules.
    Early LCS flights will heavily leverage existing technologies and 
ship designs, thereby accelerating the timeline for requirements 
development and acquisition, which will keep delivery times for LCS 
significantly shorter than traditional ship programs.
    General Jumper. Sir, the Littoral Combat Ship will be a great asset 
to the Navy once it has been designed, built, tested, then inserted 
into the fleet. With this year's proposed budget, the Navy has funded 
their program earlier in the FYDP just as the USAF has accelerated our 
KC-135 Replacement Tanker Program into the FYDP. Both programs should 
deliver their first new systems to the warfighter toward the end of the 
FYDP. Both programs rely upon industry to design and provide suitable 
platforms for the missions. So, in essence, both the Air Force and the 
Navy used similar methods to accelerate both programs a similar amount 
of time.
    However, while the Navy must wait on industry to design and develop 
their new Littoral Combat Ship, the Air Force can immediately leverage 
the commercial 767 Tanker Transport design and development work 
performed by Boeing for the Italian and Japanese Air Forces. Just as 
the Navy has leased ships in the past to deploy combat support quickly, 
the USAF believes that leasing air-refueling tankers is a good approach 
to quickly replace our 43-plus-year-old KC-135E aircraft.
    The KC-767 leasing proposal, if approved by DOD and Congress, will 
have lower upfront costs than a traditional procurement and will field 
67 new KC-767 tankers within the FYDP, compared to one aircraft via 
traditional procurement. In addition, the leased KC-767 program could 
provide the taxpayers with the benefits of immediate high rate 
production, at a lower cost than achievable through a traditional 
approach. These innovations in the acquisition process support our 
Nation's security needs significantly faster, while providing 
responsible stewardship of our taxpayers' dollars.

                      BOEING AND DELTA IV ROCKETS

    30. Senator McCain. General Jumper, an article in the Wall Street 
Journal on February 12, 2003 reported the Air Force will pay the Boeing 
Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation $538 million to keep both 
companies in the rocket-launch business because of the continuing 
downturn in the commercial-satellite market. Is this a Department of 
Defense policy or is Secretary Roche proposing this policy on his own?
    General Jumper. The Air Force and DOD together are committed to 
providing the capability to launch our Nation's national security 
payloads required by today's warfighters. The fiscal year 2004 
President's budget provides funding for assured access initiatives to 
provide that capability.

    31. Senator McCain. General Jumper, attempts in the past to 
artificially keep two defense companies in a particular sector of the 
defense market for the sake of competition has not produced competition 
at all. In fact, there have been many independent reports that no 
efficiencies were ever realized. Does it make sense to try and keep two 
defense companies in the rocket-launch business when there may only be 
enough business for one corporation?
    General Jumper. Although competition is one of the benefits of this 
approach, the overarching need is to assure access to space for 
national security, and to do that we need to have two launch providers 
that can back each other up. When compared to heritage launch systems, 
Air Force estimates show that the EELV program still meets and exceeds 
the 25-percent cost saving goal even after the assured access 
initiatives are considered.

    32. Senator McCain. General Jumper, what other options are you 
examining with regard to this rather questionable policy on the Air 
Force's rocket-launch program?
    General Jumper. We have examined several options for providing 
assured access to space, such as foreign launch providers and greater 
utilization of the space shuttle, and have determined that maintaining 
two competing contractors to provide assured access is the best 
approach to meet the growing warfighter demands of our space assets now 
and in the future.

                           F-15 CLS CONTRACT

    33. Senator McCain. General Jumper, it has recently been brought to 
our attention that the contract for F-15 Contractor Logistic Support 
was awarded to a company whose bid was nearly 50 percent higher than 
the company that currently holds the contract. Rather than stay with 
the L-3 Corporation that has been performing this task in a fully 
satisfactory manner for $68.8 million, the Air Force chose to go with a 
bid by Boeing of $100.2 million. In fact, a recent decision to move the 
facility to St. Louis vice Seymour Johnson AFB will make the price 
difference between the two contract bids greater than $32 million due 
to much higher work rates. Are you aware of this issue? If not, will 
you please look into it and get back to this committee.
    General Jumper. This refers to a contract award that includes the 
acquisition of new F-15 training devices as well as upgrades and 
contractor logistics support for some older devices. The requirement 
under the solicitation was not the same as the previous contract. The 
request for proposal (RFP) was not asking for business as usual; 
therefore, minimally addressing the requirements would likely increase 
perceived risk for implementation of future aircraft modifications and 
upgrades. The RFP clearly stated that award would be made on a best 
value basis, with the combination of evaluation factors other than 
price (technical/management and past performance) being significantly 
more important than cost or price. Boeing's technical proposal received 
high ratings, while the technical proposal of L-3 Communications was 
marginal and had several significant weaknesses. It was the 
determination of the Order Award Authority that the technical 
advantages of Boeing's proposal outweighed the increased cost. This 
decision is consistent with Section M, of the RFP which states that the 
best value decision, ``. . . may result in an award to a higher-rated, 
higher-priced offeror, where the decision is consistent with the 
evaluation factors and the Order Award Authority reasonably determines 
that the technical superiority and/or overall business approach of the 
higher priced offeror outweighs the cost difference.''
    Location of the training system support center (TSSC) at the Boeing 
facility in St. Louis did not increase cost differences between the L-3 
and Boeing offers. The Boeing order includes fixed prices for operation 
of the TSSC.

                      BOEING KC-767 AERIAL TANKER

    34. Senator McCain. General Jumper, I continue to be troubled by 
your Service's push to lease 100 KC-767 tankers under terms that are 
clearly a disservice to the taxpayers of this country. In the context 
of your Service's desire for this lease at any cost, the retirement of 
KC-135s with relatively few flight hours concerns me.
    Just last April at a press briefing with Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers, stated the 
following about the Air Force KC-135 aerial tanker fleet: ``the fleet 
is relatively healthy. These are older aircraft, but have lots of 
flying hours left on them. They've been re-engined. We are putting new 
avionics in the cockpit. There's been a lot of work done on those 
particular aircraft to keep them modern. . .''
    Let me review some of the highlights of the information that has 
been provided to Congress by independent export, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the General Accounting Office, the Department of 
Defense Inspector General, and the Congressional Budget Office. These 
are not my facts, these are facts reported by these agencies.

    GAO (2002):

         ``The current fleet of KC-135s have between 12,000 to 
        14,000 flying hours on them--only 33 percent of the lifetime 
        flying hour limit and no KC-135s will meet the limit until 
        2040.''
         ``While the KC-135 is an average of 41 years old, its 
        airframe hours and cycles are relatively low. With proper 
        maintenance and upgrades, we believe the aircraft may be 
        sustainable for another 41 years.''
         ``The Boeing Company, manufacturer of the KC-135, 
        projected that the aircraft could fly for many years beyond the 
        turn of the century, based on average hours flown, and a 
        projected utilization of about 300 hours a year per aircraft.''
         ``In fact, when I inquired about the average hours per 
        year for KC-135s, GAO said the Air Force reported, ``the KC-135 
        fleet is averaging about 300 hours per year,'' including 
        Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle data.
         ``The Air Force Mobility Command has higher priorities 
        like replacing the C-5A, there is no requirement to begin 
        replacing KC-135s before fiscal year 2013.''

    OMB (2002):
         Director Mitch Daniels: ``The current fleet of KC-135s 
        is in good condition; there are higher priorities in terms of 
        modernization for the Department of Defense''.

    Air Force (2002):
         In the February 2003 issue of Military Magazine, you 
        reported that the mission capable rate for KC-135 tankers 
        improved 3.7 percent, up to 79.5 percent last year the second 
        highest in the Air Force inventory. The B-2 bomber mission 
        capable rate by comparison is only 42.1 percent, and that is up 
        10.6 percent over the previous year.
         According to the Air Force ``Tanker Requirement Study 
        05'', replacing the KC-135 fleet with leased Boeing 767 tankers 
        would not solve, and could exacerbate, the shortfalls 
        identified in the TRS-05.

    I believe the above information clearly shows that we are 
prematurely retiring flight hour young KC-135s. The fact is there are 
aircraft in the DOD inventory as old as the KC-135s with as much as 
five times the number of flight hours that are still in service and 
will be for some time.
    I would like you to explain why you believe that the KC-135s need 
to be replaced 10 years earlier than the Air Force's most recent study, 
in spite of several independent assessments that we do not need to 
begin replacing the aircraft until 2013, and in fact, the airframes 
will not reach their flight hour limits until after 2040.
    General Jumper. The Air Force has an obligation to spend the 
taxpayer's money wisely, while providing a robust, reliable, and 
flexible air refueling force. Studies, such as the one referenced, are 
intended to provide planning information to senior leaders to allow 
them to make informed decisions rather than dictate a specific way 
ahead. Competing priorities and limited budget demand our leaders make 
choices based on risk. Today, our most pressing tanker risk is a delay 
in the recapitalization process. With over 90 percent of our air 
refueling capability resting on our venerable KC-135 fleet, replacement 
needs to begin as soon as possible. The Air Force simply cannot accept 
the risk of unknown systemic failures that could ground the fleet and 
cripple the global reach of U.S. and coalition forces.
    Every weapons system is unique and comparisons to the KC-135 should 
be taken in proper context. The KC-135 is the oldest combat weapon 
system in the Air Force inventory and particularly susceptible to 
corrosion due to its design and basing history. An abundance of hidden 
joints and layered body skins on the KC-135 provide ample opportunity 
for moisture to accumulate, which has only been exacerbated by extended 
operation in damp and coastal climates.
    Subsequent to April 2002, more about the effects of corrosion were 
learned. We  have also gained an appreciation for how much the 
projected operations and support (O&S) costs for the KC-135 fleet have 
grown since the completion of the Economic Service Life Study (ESLS). 
Originally, the ESLS estimated annual cost would escalate from $2.1 
billion per year to $3.0 billion by 2040. However, 18 months after the 
ESLS completion, we determined the average annual O&S cost estimate 
increased by $250 million over study projections. This equates to an 
11.9 percent annum increase in O&S, the equivalent of the operations 
and maintenance requirements for 62 KC-135s. The updated ESLS data now 
reflects that the annual cost would escalate from $2.2 billion to $3.4 
billion by 2040. While it is true that KC-135s are young in hours 
compared to structural design life, this fact does nothing to protect 
the airframes from the corrosive effects of years of exposure to the 
elements.
    With an average of about 17,000 flight hours versus a design limit 
of about 36,000 hours, you would not expect to see stress-induced metal 
fatigue on KC-135s. In general, that is the case. Instead, we are 
seeing age induced corrosion similar to rust, and cracked hoses and 
wiring, just as you would on a low mileage, 43-year old automobile. 
Repairing and preventing this type of corrosion is both difficult and 
expensive. The Air Force is now in the process of incrementally 
replacing the entire aircraft structure over the next 40 years.
    The combined effects of aging, the surge in demand due to the 
global war on terrorism, and the heightened steady-state stress of a 
post-September 11 world have compelled the Air Force to accelerate 
plans to replace the KC-135. Increasing costs and decreasing 
reliability and maintainability, in light of our future expectations, 
have reached the point where it no longer makes sense to continue 
investing limited resources to keep our oldest and least capable 
tankers flying.
    In summary, the Air Force simply cannot accept the risk of unknown 
systemic failures that could ground the fleet and cripple the global 
reach of U.S. and coalition forces. Today, our most pressing tanker 
risk is a delay in the recapitalization process.

    35. Senator McCain. General Jumper, what programs do you intend to 
shift funds from to enable you to pay for a lease of Boeing 767s in the 
near-term and in the long-term?
    General Jumper. The Air Force is working to identify sources to pay 
for a potential lease. If DOD approves the lease, we will submit the 
sources with reprogramming actions, budget submissions, and budget 
amendments as required.

                       NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

    36. Senator McCain. General Hagee, the retirement of 19 Spruance-
class destroyers reduces the number of 5-inch guns available for fire 
support missions by 38. This is an area where the Navy has had a 
chronic shortfall in capability since the battleships were retired in 
the early 1990s. What impact on the Marine Corps' ability to conduct 
amphibious operations will this additional reduction in naval guns 
have?
    General Hagee. The Navy's current Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) 
capability lacks sufficient range and lethality to adequately support 
the Marine Corps' concept of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). Also, 
the fire support system on the Spruance-class destroyers is not capable 
of receiving calls-for-fire via data transmission from the Advanced 
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). While the Marine Corps 
is at significant risk today in terms of NSFS support for expeditionary 
operations, the retirement of these ships, to be completed by fiscal 
year 2006, will not significantly increase this risk.
    The Navy has already started fielding the 5-inch/62-caliber naval 
gun on newly built Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The Navy is 
scheduled to field the Naval Fires Control System (NFCS) in fiscal year 
2004 to provide the capability to receive and process digital data 
calls for fire, and the 5-inch Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM) 
will be fielded in fiscal year 2006. The introduction of these systems 
will provide an enhanced capability to provide NSFS support to 
expeditionary forces that does not reside in the current fleet of 
surface combatants.
    The Navy plans to fully meet the Marine Corps' NSFS requirements in 
the far term with the fielding of DD(X). The Marine Corps requires that 
each DD(X) be fielded with two 155-mm Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) and a 
total magazine capacity of at least 900 extended-range munitions. This 
configuration for DD(X) will be sufficient to meet minimum Marine Corps 
NSFS requirements for gun-launched munitions, assuming a total of 24 
DD(X) will be built.

                                AIRCRAFT

    37. Senator McCain. General Hagee, the V-22 is rapidly approaching 
what is theoretically a final key decision point. The Marine Corps 
demonstrated unprecedented flexibility last year in moving off of ships 
in the Indian Ocean to a base of operations hundreds of miles inland in 
Afghanistan. A force deployment of this type was thought to be beyond 
your current air fleet. Does the success of your operations in 
Afghanistan mitigate the requirement for the V-22?
    General Hagee. The MV-22 remains our number one aviation 
acquisition priority.
    We remain proud of the Marine Corps' contributions in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and our current operations today. These 
successes highlight the Marine Corps' role in national security as a 
truly expeditionary force in readiness.
    These successes were not without risk and limitations. Issues of 
force protection, establishment, and maintaining intermediate support 
bases, limitation in total number of personnel allowed in country, 
fuel, and range limitations, long range MEDEV AC, and our ability to 
conduct ``Be Prepared To'' (BPT) missions highlighted the need to field 
improved systems like the MV-22 to our Fleet Marine Forces.
    The V-22's speed, range, payload, survivability, and self-
deployability attributes have implications on the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. Its use in OEF would have given the 
Joint Task Force commander an increased operational flexibility that 
would have spanned across all warfighting functions. Specifically in 
OEF the MV-22 would have:

        - Minimized risk
        - Increased operational flexibility
        - Provided a responsive sustainment capability
        - Decreased survivability concerns
        - Increased mission success for BPT

    38. Senator McCain. General Hagee, why does the Marine Corps 
continue to invest in its aging Huey fleet instead of upgrading to an 
H-60 variant that would align the Marine Corps with the future Navy 
rotary wing force? This would dramatically streamline training and 
logistical support, and provide commonality of parts support between 
Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups.
    General Hagee. The Marine Corps has chosen to remanufacture both 
legacy H-1, the AH-1W, and UH-1N airframes with a focus on commonality 
as a way of reducing the logistical and manpower demands. This decision 
was controversial at Milestone II and remains a point of discussion 
because some feel that a combination of AH-64D Apaches and a variant of 
the H-60 Blackhawk (MH-60S Seahawk Combat Search and Rescue variant) 
with over 1,500 operated by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and 
several other nations, would save money for the government through 
economies of scale in procurement, and shared maintenance and support 
burdens.
    However, repeated independent analysis has revealed that intra-
service commonality between the Huey and Cobra would yield greater 
benefits in areas of personnel manning requirements and logistics. Most 
recently, an analysis of alternatives for the H-1 upgrades program was 
reviewed and updated by OSD. The conclusion, once again, was that the 
AH-1Z/UH-1Y combination is the most cost effective option that meets 
the Marine Corps recapitalization and warfighting requirements. The 
commonality of 84 percent between the AH-1Z and UH-1Y results in 
significant cost savings, logistics and deployability advantages for 
the Y/Z fleet over the life cycle. All other alternatives considered 
for our attack and utility requirements would adversely impact our 
current manpower force structure and would be cost prohibited in 
procurement and life-cycle support. In order to meet USMC Utility 
Helicopter ORD Thresholds, the MH-60S would require the many additions 
and modifications to include: Digital moving map system, Helmet mounted 
display system, Aircraft Survivability suite (radar and laser 
detection, IR/RF countermeasures), crew served gun system, forward 
firing ordnance (2.75,, rocket) system with pilot sight, UHF DAMA 
SATCOM, FLIR with LDRS, Modifications for ballistic tolerances 
(OBIGGS), cockpit software, and ergonomic fixes.
                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                                  B-1

    39. Senator Cornyn. General Jumper, there is little doubt that the 
B-1 has played an important role in Operation Enduring Freedom. I would 
like to get your thoughts on how the B-1 has performed and how you 
envision the B-1s role in the future?
    General Jumper. The B-1 performed magnificently during Operation 
Enduring Freedom, delivering 39 percent of all total tonnage and 67 
percent of all JDAM dropped in Afghanistan while flying only 35 percent 
of bomber strike sorties and 12 percent of all Air Force sorties. 
Moreover, the B-1 maintained a 78-percent Mission Capable rate while 
deployed. The B-1 will continue to function as the backbone of the 
bomber fleet in direct attack operations conducted in permissive and 
semi-permissive threat environments. A non-permissive threat 
environment will necessitate the use of standoff munitions to ensure 
survivability. Armed with a full complement of 24 long-range, 
precision, stealthy JASSM-ERs, the B-1 provides critical capabilities 
to the Global Strike (GS) CONOPs while providing enhanced key 
capabilities to the Global Response (GR) CONOPs.

                                  V-22

    40. Senator Cornyn. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, I understand that Under Secretary of Defense Pete 
Aldridge was ``encouraged'' after being briefed recently on the V-22 
flight test program and that he believes he should have enough 
information by May whether to continue the V-22's production schedule. 
From an operational perspective, how would an aircraft with 
capabilities such as the V-22s help you in the global war on terrorism?
    General Shinseki. The Army does not have an operational requirement 
for an aircraft with the capabilities such as the V-22.
    Admiral Clark. The V-22 will save American lives in all military 
operations, including the global war on terrorism. With twice the speed 
of CH-46, the V-22 will deliver combat forces to the objective area 
sooner, with less exposure time spent en route. The range of the V-22, 
five times that of the CH-46, will increase our reach from forward 
bases and amphibious shipping, allowing us to influence much more of 
the battlespace simultaneously. The payload capacity of the V-22, three 
times that of the CH-46, will enable the swift delivery and rapid re-
supply of combat forces deep within enemy territory, vastly 
complicating the enemy's attempts to attack us. With aerial refueling 
support, the V-22 is capable of self-deploying worldwide. The self-
deploying capability combined with the increased speed of the V-22 will 
allow an initial response to threats much more rapidly than with our 
current helicopters. The V-22 gives our Marines and Special Forces the 
capability to strike the terrorists at any time, in any place, with 
devastating effect and with reduced risk. The V-22 will be a force 
multiplier that translates into shorter conflicts and reduced friendly 
casualties.
    General Hagee. The speed, range, payload, survivability, and self-
deployment attributes of the V-22 will provide the Joint Force 
commander with unprecedented operational reach, expanded area of 
influence, and the ability to leverage netted forces to deter or defeat 
adversaries. The MV-22 will help meet the requirements for increased 
flexibility and adaptiveness while overcoming the physical and 
political challenges of access denial.

         Global self-deployability will enable combatant 
        commanders to reduce their strategic airlift requirements while 
        expediting warfighting capabilities from inside or outside 
        their theater.
         The unparallel survivability of the MV-22 is a salient 
        feature that ensures that the MV-22 not only gets to the fight 
        first but returns.
         The increased operational reach, provided by the MV-
        22, will allow the Joint Force Commander to conduct operations 
        from deep in the sea-based to deep in the landmass. The 
        combinations of a forward presence force with the capability to 
        be augmented by global self-deployable MV-22s will enhance at-
        sea-arrival and assembly operations or expeditionary land-based 
        operations. Eliminating the breakdown and build up period 
        associated with rotorcraft, the MV-22 will be able to support 
        operations on arrival in theater. The increases in speed and 
        range will allow the Joint Force Commander to leverage off of 
        the MV-22's sortie cycle efficiency to increase the tempo of 
        operations. The increases in sortie cycle efficiency will 
        permit expeditious movement of troops and supplies while always 
        retaining the ability to mass forces from a distributed and 
        dispersed environment.
         The combinations of the V-22's attributes 
        exponentially increase the Joint Force commander's possibility 
        of options in the planning and execution phases. The 
        sanctuaries of time, space, and the tyranny of distance that 
        protects terrorist operations and cells will be reduced. The 
        MV-22 will reduce the execution timelines and increase the 
        amount of intelligence that we can act on.
         The introduction of the V-22 will help shape the 
        operational environment and underwrite general deterrence 
        thereby assuring allies and dissuading aggression among other 
        things. Fielding the MV-22 will contribute to general 
        deterrence by conveying the impression that U.S. forces are not 
        only the most powerful forces in the world today, but are 
        likely to stay that way.

    General Jumper. The CV-22 would give the USAF a transformational 
leap forward in our ability to infiltrate and resupply Special 
Operations Forces. This platform will meet the long-standing 
requirement for long-range, night/adverse weather clandestine 
penetration of politically and/or militarily denied areas, in order to 
support special operations missions, most within one period of 
darkness. Additionally, the CV-22 has twice the combat radius of the 
MH-53, can fly 1.9 times as fast, and can carry 10,000 lbs. more 
payload.
                                 ______
                                 
                Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                     SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING

    41. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, for the second consecutive year, 
the Navy is requesting a real decrease in its S&T budget. After 
removing ``pass through'' and ``devolved'' programs that are managed by 
Navy for Joint Forces Command and OSD, the Navy S&T fiscal year 2004 
request is down 3.6 percent from fiscal year 2003 requested levels in 
constant dollars.
    How are declining S&T budgets that are projected out through the 
years of the FYDP consistent with efforts of transformation? Is this a 
reflection that the value of your S&T activities in the past have had 
in supporting your warfighters?
    Admiral Clark. The Navy's fiscal year 2004 President's budget 
request for science and technology shows an increase from the fiscal 
year 2003 budget request as shown in the table below.

                            NAVAL S&T BUDGET
                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         President's Budget Request
          Budget Activity          -------------------------------------
                                     Fiscal Year 2003   Fiscal Year 2004
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic Research (6.1)..............                410                457
Applied Research (6.2)............                580                536
Advanced Technology Development                   617                721
 (6.3)............................
                                   -------------------------------------
  Total Naval Science & Technology              1,607              1,714
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Pass-through
    The Department of Defense appointed U.S. Joint Forces Command 
(JFCOM) as the ``transformation laboratory'' of the United States 
military. JFCOM develops future concepts for joint warfighting. All of 
the Services help fund the unified commands. The U.S. Joint Forces 
Command is one of the nine unified commands and is budgeted in the 6.3 
portion of the naval science technology request.
    Given the expanded mission of JFCOM, it may be more appropriate to 
place JFCOM funding in a defense wide budget activity. Pending a 
defense wide line, it may be appropriate to move the funding (which is 
for prototypes, demonstrations, and concept development) up to the 
higher Navy R&D budget activities (i.e. 6.4-6.7).
    The JFCOM programs elements are listed below.

                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Fiscal year 2004
             PE Title                   PE Number         President's
                                                         Budget Request
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Technical Information                  0603727N                 151
 Presentation System.............
Joint Warfare Experiments........           0603757N                13.7
                                                      ------------------
  JFCOM Total....................                                  164.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Devolvement
    Although several programs devolved from OSD to Navy, the largest 
devolved program, the University Research Initiative (URI) program, 
will now be managed by Navy in support of naval needs and technologies. 
$71 million is being requested for URI in fiscal year 2004. Navy will 
now be in charge of URI funding, topics, and the programs executed 
therein. In the past, Navy competed through OSD for these funds 
annually and could not incorporate these efforts into our long-term S&T 
planning. This provides an opportunity to enhance Navy's world class 
basic research program, which is the cornerstone for future 
transformational opportunities. Factoring in the URI program, Navy 
actually has real growth of 1.0 percent over the fiscal year 2003 
President's budget request. Beyond fiscal year 2004, there is real 
growth in fiscal year 2005 as well.
    While Basic Research (6.1) has benefited from the devolvement of 
the URI program to Navy, there remain difficult choices in 6.2 and 6.3 
funding to maintain the best possible portfolio in the face of the 
significantly constrained budgetary environment. This environment has 
necessitated significant cuts in the Future Naval Capabilities--
designed to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter--in order to 
focus only on the highest priority projects within the 6.2 and 6.3 
portfolio.
Transformation
    As for transformation, Navy S&T programs directly support and 
enable transformation. The fiscal year 2004 budget request contains 
several transformational initiatives, reflecting OSD and Navy 
leadership priorities. Examples of new initiatives and ongoing programs 
include the following:

        - Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle-Navy (UCAV-N)
        - Electric Power Technologies such as the Free Electron Laser 
        and High Temperature Superconducting Motor
        - Advanced Multi-function RF System (AMRFS)
        - Wideband Gap Power Devices
        - Functional Materials-Hypersonic Weapons
        - Virtual At-Sea Training (VAST)

    Recent experience in Operation Enduring Freedom, where thermobaric 
weapons and a knowledge web system were among several programs that 
transitioned directly from S&T to the fleet, demonstrates the current 
value Navy places in its S&T programs. The investment transformation 
described above will provide continued support to the warfighter.

    42. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, are we sacrificing the next wave 
of transformation (15-20 years out) that will be driven by today's 
scientific advances by underinvesting in S&T? What programs were cut in 
order to achieve the 3.6 percent savings?
    Admiral Clark. The next wave of naval transformation (15-20 years 
out) requires a robust and strategically balanced investment in Navy's 
basic research (6.1) account which funds the Department's science 
requirements. The fiscal year 2004 6.1 budget request ($456.6 million) 
shows significant growth compared to the fiscal year 2003 request 
($409.9 million), due to the devolvement of the URI program. This is a 
real increase to the Navy 6.1 program and increases the core funding 
available for Navy discovery and invention, the bedrock of future naval 
transformation.
    While the overall portfolio for S&T increased, there have been both 
increases and decreases to specific programs, mostly in response to 
Navy and OSD leadership priorities focused on naval transformation. For 
example, increases can be found in the UCAV-N program, the Supersonic 
Cruise Missile program, and the High Altitude Auroral Research Program 
(HAARP).
    Though Core National Naval Responsibilities initiatives were 
protected from reductions, there remain difficult choices in 6.2 and 
6.3 funding to maintain the best possible portfolio in the face of a 
significantly constrained budgetary environment. This environment has 
necessitated significant cuts in the Future Naval Capabilities--
designed to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter--in order to 
focus only on the highest priority projects within the 6.2 and 6.3 
portfolio.

                       NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY 

    43. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, a recent article in Defense 
Horizons titled ``The Silence of the Labs'' described the ongoing 
deterioration of the Navy's S&T capability, especially at the Naval 
Research Laboratory (NRL). What role does NRL play in achieving the 
vision of Sea Power 21? What steps are being taken to ensure that this 
organization's important capabilities are not degraded as we seek to 
transform the Navy?
    Admiral Clark. The Naval Transformational Roadmap supports 
transformation through the components which comprise Sea Power 21: Sea 
Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet. Each of these components 
is enabled by naval science. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has 
aligned its science and technology (S&T) investment with Naval Strategy 
with the strategic goal of naval science being to provide the 
foundation for overwhelming and enduring technological superiority for 
American naval forces. The NRL is the Navy's corporate laboratory. As 
such, it is responsible for execution of much of ONR's S&T investment 
in support of Sea Power 21.
    The role of supporting transformation is not a new one for NRL. 
Since 1923, the lab has been the source of numerous technological 
innovations that have made significant contributions to transforming 
the fleet and creating modern naval warfare. A few of these include: 
developing the first U.S. radar; inventing the key concepts leading to 
the Global Positioning System (GPS); and developing, in partnership 
with industry, GPS's four prototypes and first operational satellite. 
More recent achievements include an electronic warfare decoy, the ALE-
50, which protected combat aircraft over Kosovo, a decoy so effective 
it earned the nickname ``Little Buddy'' from U.S. pilots. Another 
innovation seeing action in Kosovo was Specific Emitter Identification 
technology, which identifies any radar by its unique characteristics 
with such accuracy as to ``fingerprint'' it. In fact, it can 
distinguish between identical models produced off the same assembly 
line. Selected by the National Security Agency as the national 
standard, Coast Guard vessels, naval warships, and aircraft use it to 
support drug interdiction, enforce treaties, and monitor the movement 
of materials used in weapons of mass destruction.
    NRL's capabilities are, therefore, very important to achieving the 
vision of Sea Power 21, which seeks to leverage innovative 
organizations, concepts, and technologies with the stated aim of 
achieving order of magnitude increases in warfighting effectiveness. 
For example, among other things, the vision calls for the use of 
unmanned platforms and an improved intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capability. NRL has world-class expertise in both these 
areas, and in numerous others of importance.
    The problems discussed in ``The Silence of the Labs'' are not new 
and, in fact, were validated in a recently-released tri-Service lab 
study conducted under the auspices of the Naval Research Advisory 
Committee (NRAC). The study, chartered by the Director, Defense 
Research and Engineering, produced a report called ``Science and 
Technology Community in Crisis,'' which argued that the future 
viability of the Defense Department's S&T capability is threatened by 
increasing losses of key technical personnel, insufficient levels of 
funding for facility and equipment modernization, and bureaucratic 
impediments that often produce counter-productive results in the 
research environment.
    The NRAC panel emphasized, in particular, the serious demographic 
challenge the labs face over the next several years, when retirements 
are expected to claim much of their experienced scientific and 
engineering talent. Because replacing that talent is a top priority, we 
are already taking steps to improve the labs' ability to recruit, hire, 
and retain the best technical personnel. For example, we are supporting 
lab efforts to utilize, to the fullest extent, the personnel 
demonstration pilots established at a number of labs including the NRL. 
These pilots, which Congress authorized in Section 342 of the Fiscal 
Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, encourage participating 
labs to experiment with a variety of innovative personnel practices, 
each adapted to the many unique lab environments found within and 
across the Services. While they do not completely solve the personnel 
problems, these demonstrations have improved our ability to recruit and 
retain some of the best and brightest technical talent on the market. 
Another example is an initiative by the Chief of Naval Research 
specifically aimed at revitalizing the S&T workforce in our labs and 
centers. This collaborative effort, which also includes academic 
partners, has a number of components. For example, it provides 
scholarships at participating universities in return for obligated 
service in our labs. It also envisions retraining retired military 
technology officers and bringing them back into the labs where their 
valuable experience as warfighters can be infused into our research 
efforts. We are also supporting other congressionally authorized lab 
reform efforts including utilization of the experimental authority to 
hire scientific and  technical personnel which you authorized in 
Section 1113 of the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization 
Act.

             SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNFUNDED PRIORITY LIST

    44. Senator Reed. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee, 
and General Jumper, please provide a detailed list of high priority 
science and technology (S&T) projects which are supportive of your 
efforts to transform your Services that you were not able to adequately 
invest in with the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
    General Shinseki. The Army's unfunded priorities provided to 
Congress included two S&T efforts that we were unable to fully fund in 
the fiscal year 2004 budget: $28 million for Future Combat Systems 
manufacturing technology (Man Tech) and $12 million for the Future 
Tactical Truck System (FTTS). The Man Tech funding would provide 
technology solutions to avoid costs in developing munitions and sensors 
critical to FCS. These include micro electro-mechanical systems for 
safe and arm functionality, reducing the size and increasing 
performance of inertial measurement units in munitions, and uncooled 
infrared sensors for target detection and identification. The FTTS S&T 
program is a new effort pursuing technologies for next generation 
medium and heavy tactical cargo vehicles. The primary goals of the FTTS 
program are to determine the tactical efficiencies of a hybrid-electric 
vehicle to reduce logistics demands and increase mobility and 
survivability by adding technologies such as enhanced situational 
awareness and add-on armors. The FTTS funding would provide embedded 
prognostics and intelligent load handling, a vehicle/load alignment 
system, and a smart load conforming tie-down system.
    Admiral Clark.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Fiscal
                Title                    Year           Comments
                                         2004
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electric Based Weapons...............    61.00  Accelerated research and
                                                 development of the
                                                 electrical components,
                                                 electrical control
                                                 systems, and material
                                                 technologies needed to
                                                 support electric
                                                 weapons deployment is a
                                                 very high risk,
                                                 extremely high payoff
                                                 investment area.
                                                 However, significant
                                                 investments in these
                                                 areas will provide a
                                                 revolution in Naval
                                                 Fires, Time Critical
                                                 Strike, and Platform
                                                 Self-Defense while
                                                 significantly reducing
                                                 the logistics'
                                                 footprint required to
                                                 support this mission
                                                 area. Products include
                                                 Electromagnetic Gun
                                                 Naval Fires, advanced
                                                 directed energy self-
                                                 defense weapons, and
                                                 Free Electron Laser
                                                 100KW demonstration.
CVN-21/Advanced Capability Ship......    49.00  Accelerated research and
                                                 development of the
                                                 electrical components,
                                                 electrical control
                                                 systems, and material
                                                 technologies needed to
                                                 support significant
                                                 expansion of electric
                                                 power systems and
                                                 reduction of high
                                                 maintenance fluid
                                                 systems is a complex
                                                 high risk, high payoff
                                                 investment area.
                                                 However, significant
                                                 investments in these
                                                 areas will ``unlock''
                                                 the significant amount
                                                 of propulsion power for
                                                 enhanced warfighting
                                                 capability, such as
                                                 higher sortie rates,
                                                 increased striking
                                                 capability, and
                                                 improved self-defense
                                                 while significantly
                                                 reducing system
                                                 maintenance and
                                                 logistics footprint
                                                 required to support
                                                 these platforms.
FORCENET.............................    45.00  Develop and demonstrate
                                                 a shipboard ADM of an
                                                 Advanced Multifunction
                                                 RF System (AMRF-C) that
                                                 will encompass current,
                                                 planned, and future-
                                                 growth comms, EW, and
                                                 LPI radar functions in
                                                 C, X, and Ku Bands for
                                                 LCS, DD(X) subs, and
                                                 CVN-21. Demonstrate
                                                 wide- and narrow-band
                                                 anti-jam (AJ)
                                                 waveforms, a wideband
                                                 AJ high altitude UAV
                                                 comms and network
                                                 package, and a
                                                 narrowband AJ/LPI/LPD
                                                 comms and network
                                                 package (JTRS)
                                                 necessary for planned
                                                 and future FORCENET
                                                 use. Develop
                                                 technologies and
                                                 architectures to
                                                 support high data rate,
                                                 uninterruptible network
                                                 to deployed sea base
                                                 and forces projected
                                                 ashore.
Space S&T............................    17.10  Provide the next
                                                 generation of
                                                 technologies to enhance
                                                 and transform both
                                                 naval and joint
                                                 warfighting
                                                 capabilities. The
                                                 enhancement of space-
                                                 based communications,
                                                 navigation, ISR, METOC,
                                                 and space control all
                                                 hinge on the
                                                 development of
                                                 spacecraft, payloads,
                                                 and components which
                                                 are more robust,
                                                 responsive, covert, and
                                                 economical. Examples of
                                                 target technologies are
                                                 micro-satellites, MEMS,
                                                 high bandwidth encoding
                                                 techniques, autonomous
                                                 operations, etc.
Precision Strike/Solutions to GPS        60.10  Provide jam-resistant
 Jamming.                                        missile guidance by
                                                 ultra-tightly-coupled
                                                 GPS/INS system  when
                                                 stand alone GPS
                                                 receiver is jammed,
                                                 thereby, circumventing
                                                 jammer threats. The
                                                 ultra-tightly-coupled
                                                 GPS/INS will increase
                                                 precision flight time
                                                 of weapon to target and
                                                 hands off to inertial
                                                 navigation to guide the
                                                 weapon when jammed for
                                                 the last few minutes of
                                                 flight. Precision
                                                 navigation, guidance,
                                                 and control in a GPS
                                                 denied environment; Nav
                                                 by imagery, low cost
                                                 MEMS and laser IMUs and
                                                 weapon integrated
                                                 precision timekeeping.
                                                 Precision target
                                                 location sensors across
                                                 EM/optical spectrum and
                                                 signal/image track
                                                 processors both on and
                                                 off-board surface, air,
                                                 and gun launched
                                                 weapons. Network,
                                                 computational, and
                                                 mission planning
                                                 technology for
                                                 precision targeting.
                                                 Aircraft and weapon
                                                 airframe and propulsion
                                                 technologies to counter
                                                 emerging threat
                                                 spectrum.
Littoral ASW (LASW)..................    50.00  Significantly increase
                                                 ASW applied research to
                                                 provide technology to
                                                 meet the 2015 threat.
                                                 Develop components of
                                                 advanced off-board
                                                 distributed systems.
                                                 Develop technology for
                                                 cross platform sensor
                                                 level fusion and
                                                 estimating performance
                                                 of advanced sensors.
                                                 Demonstrate airborne
                                                 electromagnetic
                                                 detection system for
                                                 Multi-Mode Aircraft and
                                                 Unmanned Air Vehicles
                                                 (UAVs). Demonstrate
                                                 wide area cueing using
                                                 advanced electro-optic/
                                                 infrared systems and
                                                 high altitude long
                                                 endurance UAVs.
                                                 Demonstrate components
                                                 for transition to light
                                                 weight torpedo plan
                                                 product improvement
                                                 program.
MANTECH..............................     5.50  Although Navy previously
                                                 committed to Congress
                                                 to funding the program
                                                 at $60 million per
                                                 year, PB04 (fiscal year
                                                 2004) request is only
                                                 $54.5 million.
Academic Research Fleet Renewal--        80.00  There is a pressing need
 UNOLS.                                          to modernize the
                                                 country's aging
                                                 Academic Oceanographic
                                                 Research Fleet through
                                                 an orderly, phased
                                                 renewal plan with
                                                 construction of 4 new
                                                 Ocean Class ships and 3
                                                 new Regional Class
                                                 ships over the next 10
                                                 years.
Seabasing/STOM.......................    24.00  Logistics planning and
                                                 execution from CONUS to
                                                 Seabase and Objective.
                                                 Develop capabilities to
                                                 support command and
                                                 control on the move
                                                 from the Seabase to the
                                                 Objective. Naval
                                                 Surface Fire Support
                                                 improvements in range,
                                                 projectiles/fusing,
                                                 precision, and volume
                                                 of fire. Ammunition
                                                 resupply of surface
                                                 combatants.
Organic MCM..........................     6.00  Protective Mining--
                                                 Protect sea basing.
                                                 Integrated joint
                                                 command and control for
                                                 multiple, cooperating
                                                 unmanned systems.
Mine Countermeasures Reconnaissance..    30.00  Develop clandestine
                                                 approaches to
                                                 countermeasures
                                                 networked minehunting
                                                 using fully
                                                 reconnaissance
                                                 autonomous, cooperative
                                                 vehicles with
                                                 classification sensors
                                                 reporting tactical
                                                 control ID indicators.
                                                 Develop and demonstrate
                                                 mission capability
                                                 package for LCS using
                                                 coordinated swarms of
                                                 autonomous,
                                                 interactive, underwater
                                                 vehicles engaged in
                                                 networked minehunting.
  Total..............................   427.70
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    General Hagee. The Marine Corps looks for innovation in four broad 
areas to address future challenges, e.g., transformational 
technologies. Our commitment to S&T, rooted in the axiom that forward 
thinking now equates to tangible transformation today, manifests as 
programmed growth in fiscal year 2004. Promising projects such as the 
Expeditionary Tactical Communications System, the Joint High Speed 
Vessel, and the Target Handoff System (experimental) support, on the 
move command and control, Sea-Basing and Sea Strike respectively. We 
are also transforming the way we do business through proactive joint 
experimentation. To support this effort, three Joint Concept 
Development and Experimentation (JCDE) divisions were established and 
have already leveraged concepts amongst the Services. While JCDE is 
adequately funded, have noted the benefits to be achieved by increasing 
the funding for this effort and the Center for Emerging Threats and 
Opportunities.
    Attached you will find a detailed listing of unfunded fiscal year 
2004 Department of the Navy S&T programs. (See Admiral Clark's response 
to same question.) These programs support our transformational efforts.
    General Jumper. One of the most important efforts currently ongoing 
within our S&T program is the work we're doing to enhance the 
Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) kit equipment carried by the Air Force 
Special Tactics Controllers who perform operations deep in enemy 
territory to help identify who the terrorists are, where their weapons 
are located, and who the innocent civilians are. Using very rapid 
spirals to speed development, prototyping, testing, production, and 
fielding, the Air Force is working to realize significant enhancements 
to these kits, while reducing weight and size. The following list is a 
representative summary of high priority S&T efforts, including 
enhancements to the BAO kit, for which the Air Force could use 
additional funding in fiscal year 2004. A more detail