    [Senate Hearing 108-241]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1050

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 1

                                MILITARY POSTURE
                                 SERVICE CHIEFS
                              SERVICE SECRETARIES
                        UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS
                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
          ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                                HOMELAND DEFENSE

                                   ----------

              FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 6, 13, 18, 20; APRIL 8, 2003

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                  2004--Part 1

      MILITARY POSTURE  b   SERVICE CHIEFS  b   SERVICE SECRETARIES  b
      UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS  b   BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE  b
       ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  b
                                HOMELAND DEFENSE

                                                     S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 1

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1050

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
    PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR
                                 OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 1

                                MILITARY POSTURE
                                 SERVICE CHIEFS
                              SERVICE SECRETARIES
                        UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS
                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
          ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
                                HOMELAND DEFENSE

                                   __________

              FEBRUARY 13, 25; MARCH 6, 13, 18, 20; APRIL 8, 2003

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    87-323 PDF                 WASHINGTON DC:  2004
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman

    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CARL LEVIN, Michigan
    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    PAT ROBERTS, Kansas                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               JACK REED, Rhode Island
    SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine              DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
    JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada                  BILL NELSON, Florida
    JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri            E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
    SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia             MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
    LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina    EVAN BAYH, Indiana
    ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina       HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
    JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

                        Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director

                 Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                                Military Posture
                               february 13, 2003

                                                                       Page

    Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Secretary of Defense...................    10
    Myers, Gen. Richard B., USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff....    25

                                 Service Chiefs
                               february 25, 2003

    Shinseki, Gen. Eric K., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army..   115
    Clark, Adm. Vernon E., USN, Chief of Naval Operations............   184
    Hagee, Gen. Michael W., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.....   203
    Jumper, Gen. John P., USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air
      Force..........................................................   217

                              Service Secretaries
                                 march 6, 2003

    White, Hon. Thomas E., Secretary of the Army.....................   336
    Johnson, Hon. Hansford T., Acting Secretary of the Navy..........   361
    Roche, Hon. James G., Secretary of the Air Force.................   375

        Unified and Regional Commanders on Their Military Strategy and
                            Operational Requirements
                                 march 13, 2003

    Fargo, Adm. Thomas B., USN, Commander in Chief, United States
      Pacific Command................................................   495
    LaPorte, Gen. Leon J., USA, Commander in Chief, United Nations
      Command, U.S. Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command Korea......   519
    Hill, Gen. James T., USA, Commander in Chief, United States
      Southern Command...............................................   533

                           Ballistic Missile Defense
                                 march 18, 2003

    Aldridge, Hon. Edward C. ``Pete,'' Jr., Under Secretary of
      Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.............   588
    Christie, Hon. Thomas P., Director of Operational Test and
      Evaluation, Department of Defense..............................   593
    Crouch, Hon. J.D., II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      International Security Policy..................................   598
    Kadish, Lt. Gen. Ronald T., USAF, Director, Missile Defense
      Agency.........................................................   605

          Atomic Energy Defense Activities of the Department of Energy
                                 march 20, 2003

    Abraham, Hon. Spencer, Secretary of Energy.......................   677

                                Homeland Defense
                                 april 8, 2003

    McHale, Hon. Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
      Defense........................................................   751
    Eberhart, Gen. Ralph E., USAF, Commander, United States Northern
      Command........................................................   758
    Ellis, Adm. James O., Jr., USN, Commander, United States
      Strategic Command..............................................   764

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                MILITARY POSTURE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
    room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe, Allard,
    Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn,
    Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson,
    Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
        Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director; and Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, chief clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Brian
    R. Green, professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt,
    professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff
    member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member;
    Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
    professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
    staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
    Ann M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
    staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Scott
    W. Stucky, general counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
    staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Kenneth M.
    Crosswait, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
    Maren R. Leed, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling,
    minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Christina
    D. Still, professional staff member; and Bridget M. Whalan,
    special assistant.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C.
    Brewer, Sara R. Mareno, and Nicholas W. West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
    assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to
    Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe;
    James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl,
    assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II and Rick
    Dearborn, assistants to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney,
    Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant
    to Senator Talent; James W. Irwin, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator Graham; Henry J.
    Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Sharon L. Waxman and
    Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans
    and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Aaron Scholer,
    assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator
    Akaka; William K. Sutey and Douglas Bush, assistants to Senator
    Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson;
    William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd
    Rosenblum and Rashid Hallaway, assistants to Senator Bayh;
    Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
    assistant to Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive
    testimony from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers on
    the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces as it affects the budget
    for fiscal year 2004 and in the future.
        Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, we welcome you back
    before the committee and commend you once again for the
    outstanding service you both continue to provide to our Nation
    and to our men and women in uniform. I observe, as one who has
    been in that building, a very close and trusting working
    partnership between the two of you, and that's for the best
    interests of the men and women in the Armed Forces and indeed,
    the country. Our Nation could not have a better team guiding
    our military during these challenging times.
        As we meet this morning, tens of thousands of our service
    members have departed their families, their homes, their jobs,
    and are engaged around the world in the global war on
    terrorism. Indeed, many of them have taken up posts here at
    home in defense of our own Nation. Many thousands more are
    preparing for possible conflict in Iraq and the Persian Gulf
    region. These very men and women in uniform deserve our
    strongest support, and their families here at home. They will
    get it.
        President Bush stated in the new national security strategy
    for the United States, ``Defending our Nation against these
    enemies is the first fundamental commitment for the Federal
    Government.'' Today, that task has changed dramatically.
    Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial
    capabilities to endanger America. Now shadowy networks have
    demonstrated the ability to inflict great chaos or suffering on
    our shores for less than it costs to produce a single tank or
    airplane. To defeat this threat, we must make use of every tool
    in our arsenal.
        Clearly, homeland security is now our Nation's most urgent
    priority. The active involvement of our Armed Forces in
    defending America, supporting the Nation's homeland security
    infrastructure is essential. This committee's most urgent duty
    in the 108th Congress must be to insure that the land, sea,
    air, space, and cyberspace closest to our shores are defended,
    and to be prepared, if necessary, to defeat those who would
    bring harm to our shores.
        At the same time, however, we must remember, the defense of
    our homeland begins in the distant battlefields of the world.
    Our forward deployed forces are and will remain our first line
    of defense and deterrence. The morale and readiness of these
    forces are fundamental to the security of our Nation. It's
    critical that we fully honor the services of our men and women
    in uniform and that we keep faith in their dedication to duty
    through the timely modernization of their equipment and
    facilities, and sustain investment in those programs that
    enhance the quality of life for our service personnel and their
    families.
        That message was reinforced as I visited each of our
    service secretaries, our service chiefs, and their staffs
    during December, preparing once again to assume the
    chairmanship of this distinguished committee. I'd like to thank
    you, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, for affording me the
    complete and open access to each of the services on the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff. The briefings were of
    great benefit to me and my staff as we now assume our duties.
        I am encouraged by my initial review of the President's
    defense budget request. The fiscal year 2004 request of $379.9
    billion represents a $15.3 billion increase over the fiscal
    year 2003 level. This is a modest real increase in defense
    spending, 2.5 percent, but the 2004 budget request is almost
    $52 billion above the fiscal year 2002 enacted level, a
    significant increase by any measure.
        The sustained increases in defense spending we have made
    over the past 3 or 4 years are, I think, making real strong
    progress to shore up the needs of this country to protect
    itself both here at home and abroad. We will begin fielding
    components of a national missile defense this year, filling a
    key role of President Bush and indeed preceding Presidents and
    many Members of Congress have been in strong support through
    these years.
        The increased use of unmanned systems, a key initiative of
    this committee when I was first its chairman, has become a
    reality and a substantial funding for these systems in the
    budget will build on the initial successes we have seen so
    vividly thus far in the global war on terrorism.
        Funding for Navy shipbuilding is increasing, not as much as
    we wish, but clearly the curve is headed up with construction
    of seven new ships in the budget before us.
        I am encouraged by what I have seen so far, but I must add
    a note of caution. This budget proposes only a modest increase
    in defense spending at a time when our military is engaged in
    one war, the global war on terrorism; another war could be
    lurking; indeed, a third in the Pacific, the Korean Peninsula
    poses another growing threat. We are putting extraordinary
    demands on our forces around the world. We are blessed with a
    military that has responded to these demands with extraordinary
    success, and that military is composed not only of the regular
    forces, but the National Guard and the Reserves.
        Even the best military in the history of the world has its
    limits. People, facilities, equipment, and families can only do
    so much with limited resources. As we review the budget request
    over the next few years and months, we need to carefully
    analyze the effect of this long-term stress on our men and
    women in uniform and their families, and consider the
    investments needed to ensure we have the people and the
    capabilities to carry on the objectives that have been laid
    down by our courageous President.
        Again, gentlemen, thank you for your service, and your
    continued commitment to the uniformed and civilian personnel of
    your department. All you've given in protecting our homeland
    and your focus on preparing our Armed Forces to meet the
    expected and unexpected stress of the future have greatly
    enhanced our national security.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join
    you in thanking our witnesses today, thanking you for your
    service, and thanking you for coming to share with us your
    thoughts on the issues which face our Nation and the world.
        Our Armed Forces stand on the brink of possible military
    action in the next few weeks. As many as 250,000 of our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will be in the Persian
    Gulf region preparing for a possible war against Iraq. Almost
    40,000 more stand on the front lines in Korea, within range of
    North Korean artillery and rockets. Thousands of additional
    American troops are risking their lives every day in continued
    operations in the global war on terrorism in Afghanistan and
    other hot spots around the world. Of course, many more continue
    to work to keep the peace and work to build a more stable
    future in the Balkans and elsewhere. To support these efforts,
    the President has already called up more than 100,000 members
    of the Reserve component to active duty.
        Many questions have been raised in recent months about our
    policy moves on Iraq, Korea, and elsewhere. Concerns have been
    raised about our proclivity to proceed unilaterally; about a
    rising tide of anti-Americanism overseas; about the risk that
    the focus on Iraq has reduced our focus on the war against
    terrorism, which has to be fought and won here at home as well
    as overseas; about whether our refusal to talk directly with
    the North Korean regime as urged by our South Korean allies may
    be undermining our interests in that area of the world; and
    about the degree of our commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan
    and the possible consequences of a similar lack of follow-
    through in Iraq.
        I share many of those concerns. I believe that America is
    at its strongest and at its best when we make common cause with
    other nations in pursuit of common goals. I believe that the
    path to a safer world and a more secure America rarely comes
    from a go-it-alone approach. Specifically, I believe that in
    the absence of an imminent threat, it is in our interest to
    have a U.N. resolution authorizing member states to take
    military action before initiating a preemptive attack against
    Iraq.
        If there is any chance of disarming Saddam Hussein without
    war, it is for the United Nations to speak with one voice. If
    military force is used, the best way of reducing both short-
    term risks, including the risks to the U.S. and the Coalition
    Forces, and the long-term risks, including the risk of
    terrorist attacks on our people throughout the world, is also a
    U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force.
        Supporting U.N. inspections is an essential step if we're
    going to keep the Security Council together. We can show
    support for those U.N. inspections by sharing with the U.N.
    inspectors the balance of our significant intelligence
    information about suspect sites, by quickly getting U-2
    aircraft in the air over Iraq without condition, with or
    without Saddam Hussein's approval, and by giving the inspectors
    the time they need to finish their work, as long as the
    inspections are unimpeded.
        Yesterday I talked about statements by the administration
    that all useful intelligence information in our possession has
    now been shared with the U.N. inspectors. Condoleezza Rice told
    us exactly that at the White House 10 days ago. George Tenet
    told us at an open Intelligence Committee hearing 2 days ago
    exactly that. They were in error. Director Tenet acknowledged
    yesterday right here that we still have information and we will
    be sharing it.
        The premature declaration that we've already shared all
    useful intelligence makes us seem excessively eager to bring
    inspections to a close. Top administration officials from the
    beginning said inspections were useless and that inspectors
    couldn't find anything without Saddam showing them where it
    was.
        That's what he's supposed to do, but there is at least a
    chance inspections will prove useful even without his
    cooperation. Inspectors caught him in lies about his biological
    weapons programs in the 1990s, and in this morning's papers it
    appears they're catching him in lies about the range of
    missiles that he is currently developing.
        Another way to support the inspectors is to back up their
    request for U-2 surveillance planes with a U.N. resolution that
    says that any interference with those planes by Saddam Hussein
    will be considered an act of war against the United Nations.
    During the State of the Union speech President Bush noted that,
    ``Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the
    United Nations.'' Secretary Powell, during his address to the
    U.N. Security Council a week ago, noted that ``Iraq has also
    refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would
    give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved
    before, during, and after inspections.''
        In The New York Times on January 30, a senior White House
    official is quoted as describing Iraq's refusal to allow the U-
    2 surveillance flights, ``the biggest material breach of all,
    so far.''
        I met with Dr. Blix and his staff on January 31 in New
    York. They told me that U-2 flights would be very useful
    because of their ability to observe large areas of Iraq over
    extended periods of time. U-2 flights would be particularly
    helpful to track trucks that appear to be moving items from one
    suspicious place to another and to track mobile labs.
    Satellites can't track suspicious vehicles; U-2s can.
        For this reason, I was astonished to read on Tuesday that
    State Department spokesman Richard Boucher characterized what
    appeared to be an agreement to implement U-2 flights as,
    ``nothing worth getting excited about.'' If Iraq's refusal to
    allow U-2 surveillance is cited by the President, characterized
    by the White House as a big material breach, if Secretary
    Powell is right when he says that U-2 surveillance flights
    would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved
    before, during, and after inspections, then minimizing their
    usefulness at this point can only be explained as further
    disdain for the inspection's effort.
        It may be unlikely that inspectors will catch Saddam with
    the goods without his cooperation. It's at least possible,
    however, and we should increase that possibility by sharing all
    our useful intelligence and using the U-2.
        Supporting the inspectors in these and other ways is not
    inconsistent with the position that the administration has
    correctly taken that the burden is on Saddam Hussein to show
    where the prohibited material is or what he's done with it. The
    fact that he hasn't carried his burden is undeniable but how
    best to deal with his deceit and deception is still ours and
    the world's challenge.
        At the same time that our Nation faces these vital issues
    of war and peace, our committee will be asked to address a wide
    range of other issues affecting the Department of Defense over
    the next year, including many of the budget issues which the
    chairman has just gone through. But we're also told that the
    administration is considering a wide array of far reaching
    proposals that would change the way the Department of Defense
    operates and the role of Congress in overseeing these
    operations.
        For example, we're told that the administration is
    considering a proposal--I emphasize the word considering--that
    would:
        One, alter congressional oversight and control over defense
    expenditures by putting the Department on a 2-year budget cycle
    or raising the threshold for reprogramming funds without
    congressional approval.
        Two, that they are considering a proposal to change the
    role played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff by replacing the
    current 4-year term served by the service chiefs with 2-year
    terms renewable at the discretion of the Secretary; requiring
    the Joint Staff to report to the Secretary of Defense, rather
    than to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and requiring
    secretarial approval of all appointments to the Joint Staff and
    by striking the statutory requirement that the Joint Staff be
    ``independently organized and operated.''
        Three, that's apparently under consideration, we're told,
    is to change the role played by the Reserves in our Armed
    Forces by, for instance, making it easier to shift money from
    Reserve Forces to Active-Duty Forces without the need for
    congressional approval, and eliminating the Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the highest ranking advocate
    for the interests of the Reserve Forces in the Department.
        Four, we're told that under consideration is altering the
    treatment of the Department's civilian employees by denying
    them the right to union representation, eliminating grievance
    procedures, making it easier to fire them, and making it easier
    to transfer work currently performed by civilian employees to
    the private sector without allowing them to compete for their
    jobs.
        Finally, we're told that under consideration is a proposal
    to give the administration the authority to reorganize the
    Department without regard to legislative requirements and to
    abolish a significant number of positions, including the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
    Intensity Conflict, the DOD official responsible for
    coordinating the Department's efforts to combat terrorism.
        Mr. Chairman, I emphasize that these proposals are
    apparently only under consideration. Many of them may never
    become formal legislative proposals submitted to Congress. But
    in view of the far-reaching impact that they could have if
    enacted, our members should be aware that we may have to
    address some of them in the coming year.
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to utilize the presence of
    Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers to extend our gratitude to
    the men and women of the Department of Defense, military and
    civilian alike, for the extraordinary work that they do for us
    every hour of every day to ensure our Nation's security.
        There may not be unanimity around here on a number of
    issues, but there is unanimity around here on at least one
    thing. All of us and the American people will stand behind our
    uniformed forces if they are engaged in military conflict.
    Should they be so engaged, we will provide our men and women in
    uniform with everything that they need to ensure that they
    prevail promptly and with minimal casualties.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
        During the course of the hearing this morning, I will
    introduce into the record a letter from the Director of the
    Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with regard to his
    perspectives on the very important matter that my colleague has
    raised concerning the flow of intelligence information from our
    Government to the Security Council and to Hans Blix'
    organization.
        I have been present at I think most of the meetings that my
    distinguished colleague has had with the director and/or his
    staff. I have views somewhat different on the same facts; I
    basically believe there has been a very orderly and carefully
    prepared flow of information from our Government. That flow is
    controlled only in a manner to enhance and to support the work
    by Blix and his team.
        But nevertheless, I felt it important and I asked the
    director to prepare a letter, which he ensured me about 20
    minutes ago would be forthcoming, and I will share it with you
    and we may have further comments on this important subject as
    the day goes on. But I just wanted to tell Secretary Rumsfeld,
    this is a matter which is being addressed by Director Tenet and
    his staff.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Gentlemen and ladies of the committee, we now have a quorum
    present. We have a very important piece of business, and I ask
    your support, Mr. Secretary and General, for a minute while we
    attend to the following.
        I ask the committee now to consider a resolution for the
    committee funding and committee rules for the 108th Congress.
    Senator Levin and I have worked together on both of these
    items. Under Senate rules, each committee of the Senate is
    required to report out a resolution at the beginning of each
    Congress authorizing that committee to make expenditures out of
    the contingent funds of the Senate to defray its expenses,
    including staff salaries and administrative expenses for a 2-
    year period.
        The committee staff has worked together to prepare this
    resolution on the committee budget and it is before us today.
    You and I, Senator Levin, have reviewed that and have
    authenticated this work. The proposed budget is in line with
    the funding guidelines provided by the Rules Committee. If
    there are no questions before the committee, I proceed to seek
    a vote.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I support this and thank you
    for you and your staff's great work on it.
        Chairman Warner. Would you then, Senator Levin, make the
    motion to report out the committee's funding resolution?
        Senator Levin. So moved.
        Senator Inhofe. Second.
        Chairman Warner. The motion is agreed to.
        In addition, the committee must adopt its rules for the
    108th Congress. Senator Levin and I have reviewed the rules and
    have agreed that no changes from the previous Congress are
    required. Therefore, I recommend that the committee adopt the
    rules that were followed by the 107th Congress. A copy of the
    rules has been provided to each member. Any questions? Hearing
    none, I turn to Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. I move the adoption of the rules.
        Senator Allard. Second.
        Chairman Warner. All in favor, say aye. [Chorus of ayes.]
        Both motions are voted in block. Thank you very much.
        Senator Byrd. The chair didn't ask for the negatives.
        Chairman Warner. Very well, I will repeat that again. Is
    there any objection? Hearing none, the rules are adopted in
    block, the budget is adopted in block, and I thank our
    distinguished former president pro tempore, who is always
    correct.
        Senator Levin. Even when he's not correct, he's always
    correct, which is rarely. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Warner. Now, Mr. Secretary, we anxiously await the
    message by yourself and your distinguished Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff. My understanding, as we discussed this
    morning, is that you have a very lengthy statement, which you
    have now condensed, and you will give us the condensed version,
    but we accept into the record the full statements by all
    witnesses present today.

       STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
    committee. I appreciate this opportunity to update the
    committee on our progress in transforming the Department of
    Defense and to discuss the President's budget for fiscal years
    2004 to 2009.
        We are, of course, engaged in a war on terror in an effort
    to protect America and our allies in a time when terrorist
    networks and terrorist states are trying to get weapons of mass
    destruction. Our Nation is fortunate to have so many brave men
    and women who voluntarily risk their lives to defend our
    country. Sixty-three American service members have died since
    the global war on terror began. Already this year, six have
    given their lives. We are grateful to all who serve and to
    their families who worry about them understandably, and endure
    the separations from them. The families also serve our country.
    We have a responsibility to give them the resources they need
    to defend the country in this new century.
        We have entered what may very well prove to be the most
    dangerous security environment the world has known, and the
    more we learn, the more we realize how large and demanding
    these new challenges are proving to be.
        The 2004 numbers represented our best estimate at the time
    the budget was developed. It may well change over the coming
    period as we learn more about the demands of safety on a
    worldwide basis. There is no doubt in my mind, for example,
    that we will be back with a supplemental, and reasonably soon,
    to fund the global war on terrorism as well as the cost of
    flowing forces in connection with support to the diplomacy in
    Iraq.
        We also have intense efforts underway to transform the
    Department and streamline and modernize to save the taxpayers
    money. As those efforts succeed, we ought to be able to shift
    some of those resources towards more urgent and more productive
    uses. President Bush vowed that on taking office he would order
    an immediate comprehensive review of our military. He said he
    would give his team at the Department a broad mandate to
    challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of
    American defense for the decades to come.
        Mr. Chairman, for the past 2 years we have pursued the
    goals he set out. We have fashioned a new defense strategy, a
    new approach to sizing our forces, a new approach to balancing
    risks. We have reorganized the Department to better focus on
    space activities. We've adopted a new unified command plan
    which establishes a new Northern Command to better defend the
    homeland, a Joint Forces Command that focuses on
    transformation, and a new Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
    responsible for early warning of and defense against missile
    attack and the conduct of long range attack.
        We have expanded the mission of the Special Operations
    Command (SOCOM) so that it can not only support missions
    directed by regional combatant commanders, but also plan and
    execute its own missions in the global war on terror.
        We have reorganized and revitalized the missile defense
    research, development, and testing program, freed from the
    constraints the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. We have
    completed a nuclear posture review with a new approach to
    deterrence that will enhance our security while permitting
    historic deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
        We have moved from a threat-based to a capability-based
    approach to defense planning, focusing not only on who might
    threaten us or where we might be threatened, or even when, but
    more on how we might be threatened and what portfolio of
    capabilities we will need to deter and defend against these new
    threats. These are critically important accomplishments. They
    will benefit our national security for many years to come.
        But as important as these changes are, they must be only
    the beginning. To win the global war on terror, our Armed
    Forces need to be flexible, light, and agile so that they can
    respond quickly to sudden changes. The same is true of the men
    and women who support them in the Department. They also need to
    be flexible, light, and agile so we can move money and shift
    people, and design and buy new weapons more quickly and respond
    to the frequent sudden changes in our security environment.
        Today we simply do not have that kind of agility. In an age
    when terrorists move information with the speed of an e-mail,
    money at the speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed
    of a commercial jetliner, the Defense Department is still
    bogged down in micromanagement and bureaucratic processes of
    the industrial age, not the information age. Some of these
    difficulties are self imposed to be sure, some of them are the
    result of law and regulation, but together they have created a
    culture that too often stifles innovation.
        Consider just a few of the obstacles that we are faced with
    every day. Think of this 2004 budget that we consider today. It
    was developed by the Department from March to December of last
    year, the year 2002. This is for the 2004 budget. The Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB) considered it from December to
    February of this year when the President presented it to
    Congress this month. Congress will be likely considering it
    from now until October or November of this year, and if as in
    the past, changing 10 or 20 percent of what the President
    proposed. DOD will then live with what's left during the period
    from October of this year to September 2004. That means that at
    any given time during the fiscal year of that budget, that
    plan, it will be between 14 and 30 months old while we're
    trying to implement what Congress provides.
        We will be doing this in a world that's changing more
    rapidly than that. At a minimum, the budget will be something
    like a year to 2\1/2\ years out of date at any given time. The
    Department spends an average of about $42 million an hour. If
    we are permitted to move $15 million from one account to
    another, nothing more than that without getting permission from
    between four and six different congressional committees, a
    process that can take several months to complete.
        Today we estimate we have some 300,000 uniformed people
    doing non-military jobs. Yet, we're calling up Reserves to
    fight the global war on terror. We need to prepare and submit
    some 26,000 pages of justification and over 800 required
    reports to Congress each year. Many have, I believe, value at
    the outset but have only limited value years later. These
    reports consume many thousands of hours on the part of the
    Department personnel. These problems make it increasingly
    difficult to balance risks.
        Consider these facts. I am told that the last time I was
    Secretary of Defense, the 1977 Defense Authorization Bill was
    16 pages long. In 2001, it has grown to 534 pages. In 1977,
    Congress made a total of 46 changes to the Army and Defense
    Agency research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
    programs. In 2001, that number had grown from 46 to 450
    individual changes made by Congress. Every change that Congress
    makes in a program to increase something, there is a cost
    elsewhere in the budget that has to be subtracted. For example,
    we add something one place, we may have to reduce funding for
    housing, spare parts, or transformation. Of course it makes it
    very difficult to balance risks.
        But the point is this: We're fighting the first wars of the
    21st century with a Department that was really fashioned to
    meet the challenges of the mid-20th century, and we need
    together to find ways that we can fix that.
        Last year Congress enacted historic legislation to create a
    new Department of Homeland Security and rearrange the
    Government to be better prepared for attacks against our homes,
    schools, and places of work. I hope we can now address the
    Department of Defense. We're already working with a number of
    you on the committee, through your staffs, to fashion
    legislation to present to you to bring the Defense Department
    into the 21st century, and to transform how it moves money, how
    it manages people, and how it buys weapons.
        I must say, at this point, that I listened to Senator Levin
    and I have not heard of many, if not most, of the things that
    were being cited by the Senator, and I wouldn't want any
    impression to be left that that litany of items are things that
    we've concluded, because we haven't. Indeed, we decided to work
    with your staffs and work with the members in this body and the
    other body so that we can fashion some sort of an omnibus bill
    that has a reasonable chance of being approved.
        We're looking at, among other things, proposals to
    establish a national security personnel system that could give
    us somewhat greater flexibility as to how we handle and manage
    our civilian personnel. A nonintuitive effect is the difficulty
    in managing wonderful people on the civilian side. It's a
    difficult element of the Department to manage, and as a result,
    we find that people are constantly using people in uniform
    instead of civilians, which wasn't the intention at all.
    They're using them because they can move them in and move them
    out and direct them better than they can the civilian force.
        We find that people are also using contractors much more
    than probably makes sense to avoid the difficulties in having a
    civilian population that the Department really doesn't manage.
    They are more managed by the Office of Personnel Management.
        We are talking about the possibility with your staffs and
    members about a one-time reorganization with fast track
    approval procedures.
        We think we need to establish more flexible rules for the
    flow of money through the Department. We're talking about the
    possibility of establishing a 2-year budget cycle, so that the
    hundreds of people who invest time and energy to review each
    major program each year can be freed up to consider in 1 year
    the tasks of implementation and performance and methods.
        We're trying to figure out ways that we can eliminate some
    of the regulations that make it difficult for many small
    enterprises to do business with the Department. We think it's
    important that they have the opportunity to do business with
    the Department.
        We're looking at ways to expand our authority for
    competitive outsourcing so that we can get military personnel
    out of non-military tasks and back into the field. We are also
    trying to establish more flexible military retirement rules so
    those who want to serve longer may have the option to do so.
        We're consulting with all of you as I said, and I hope we
    can find some approach that will help us achieve those goals.
        Where we have authority to fix problems, we're working hard
    to do so, but to get the kind of flexibility that we're
    required to have in this new security environment, I believe
    we're going to end up needing legislative relief and we will
    need your help in working with us on that.
        As to the defense budget, last year's budget, the fiscal
    year 2003 request, was finalized just as our review process was
    nearing completion. We were able to begin funding some
    transforming initiatives as the new defense strategy came into
    focus. But it is this year's budget, the fiscal year 2004
    budget request before you, that is really the first to reflect
    the new defense strategies and policies.
        Balancing risks between near- and long-term challenges is
    difficult. It's difficult in peacetime, but today to best serve
    our country we need to accomplish three challenges at once. To
    successfully fight the global war on terror, prepare for near-
    term threats by making long delayed investments in readiness,
    people, and modernization, and also preparing for the future by
    continuing the process of transforming.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request before you is designed
    to help do all three. Our defense review identified six goals
    that drive our efforts.
        First, we have to be able to defend the homeland and bases
    of operation overseas.
        Second, we have to project and sustain forces in distant
    theaters.
        Third, we have to be able to deny enemy sanctuary.
        Fourth, we have to improve our space capabilities and
    maintain unhindered access to space.
        Fifth, we must harness our country's advantages in
    information technology to link up different kinds of U.S.
    forces so they can truly fight jointly.
        Sixth, we have to be able to protect U.S. information
    networks from attack and to be able to disable the information
    networks of our adversaries.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request has funds to support
    each of these important tasks. Over the next 6 years, we have
    proposed a 30-percent increase in procurement funding and a 65-
    percent increase in funding for research, development, testing,
    and evaluation, above the fiscal year 2002 baseline budget, a
    total investment of about $150 billion.
        The total investment in transforming military capabilities
    in the fiscal year 2004 budget request is estimated at $24.3
    billion, and about $240 billion over the next 6 years.
        To prepare for the threats we will face later in this
    decade, the fiscal year 2004 budget request increased
    investments in a number of areas. Over the next 6 years, the
    President has requested a 15-percent increase in military
    personnel accounts above the 2002 baseline budget, and an
    increase in funding for family housing by 10 percent over that
    period. Over the next 6 years, we have requested a 20-percent
    increase for operations and maintenance accounts above the 2002
    baseline budget. We've added $40 billion for maintenance for
    all services and $6 billion for facility sustainment over that
    period.
        These investments should help to put a stop to the past
    practice of raiding the investment accounts to pay for the
    immediate operation and maintenance needs.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget does not, I repeat, does not
    include funds for operations for the global war on terror. Last
    year we requested, but Congress did not provide, the $10
    billion that we knew we would need for the first few months to
    conduct the global war on terror, including the combat air
    patrols over the United States, the force protection in the
    United States, and the other aspects of it. Because we're still
    without those funds, every month since October 2002--October,
    November, December 2002, January, and now February 2003, we've
    had to borrow from other programs to pay for the cost of war,
    robbing Peter to pay Paul. That does not include the cost of
    preparations for a possible contingency in Iraq and the cost of
    the flow of forces that has taken place thus far in support of
    the diplomacy.
        Indeed, shifting money around in this way is we believe
    inefficient and ultimately the most expensive method possible
    for funding. We will be coming to you later this year for a
    2003 war supplemental to get the money we had wanted a year ago
    and we knew would be necessary. In the end, to make up for the
    cost of having to shift funds, we will probably need somewhat
    more money than would otherwise have been the case. This
    pattern has been fundamentally harmful to our ability to manage
    the Department and show respect for taxpayers' money.
        In the fiscal year 2004 request, we've increased the
    shipbuilding budget by $2.7 billion, making good on our hope
    expressed last year that we could increase shipbuilding from
    five to seven ships per year. We increased the special
    operations budget by $1.5 billion to pay for equipment that was
    lost in the global war on terror, particularly in Afghanistan
    and Pakistan, and an additional 1,890 people.
        We increased military and civilian pay by $3.7 billion.
        We increased missile defense by $1.5 billion, including
    increased funds for research and development (R&D) of promising
    new technologies and to deploy a small number of interceptors
    beginning in 2004.
        The President asked Congress for a total of $379.9 billion
    for fiscal year 2004. That's a $15.3 billion increase over last
    year's budget. That's a large amount of the taxpayers' money
    but even with that increase as large as it is, we still have to
    make some tough choices between competing demands.
        Let me state it straight out. Despite the significant
    increase in shipbuilding, we did not get the shipbuilding rate
    up to the desired rate of close to 10 ships per year. Because
    of planned retirements of other ships, we will drop below a 300
    ship fleet during the course of the Future Years Defense Plan
    (FYDP).
        The Navy is in the process of transforming and we have had
    increased shipbuilding in 2004, but we do not want to lock
    ourselves into a shipbuilding program until we know more
    precisely which ships we will want to build in the outyears.
        We have not been able to modernize our tactical air forces
    fast enough to reduce the average age of the Defense
    Department's aircraft fleet. We have not fully resolved our so-
    called high demand low density problems, systems like Joint
    Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), which because
    they have been chronically underfunded in the past will still
    be in short supply in this budget.
        We opted not to modernize a number of legacy programs,
    taking on some near-term risks to transforming capabilities
    that we will need in this fast moving world.
        We did not achieve the level of growth in science and
    technology (S&T) accounts that we had hoped for. Our request is
    $10.2 billion, or 2.69 percent of the 2004 budget. That's below
    the goal of 3 percent, although because the budget is up, the
    actual amount is rising.
        Now that's the bad news, but there's good news as well. In
    making difficult choices between competing priorities, we made
    better choices because we followed the new approach to try to
    balance risks that we developed in last year's defense review,
    an approach that tries to take into account not just the risks
    in operations and in contingency plans but also the risks to
    people, modernization, and to the future. The result is a more
    balanced approach and we hope a more coherent program. As such,
    it's a program that can be adversely unbalanced unintentionally
    unless we are careful and work together as you and the
    Appropriations Committee in the other chamber of Congress
    complete your work.
        While we're requesting increased funds, the services have
    stepped up to the plate and will be cancelling, slowing, or
    restructuring a number of programs. In all, the Army, Navy, and
    Air Force have achieved savings of some $80 billion over the
    FYDP, money that will be reinvested by the Services in
    capabilities they believe are important for this new security
    environment.
        As a result of these strategic investments and decisions,
    we can now see the effects of transforming beginning to unfold.
    Consider some of the changes that are taking place.
        Today the missile defense research, development, and
    testing program has been revitalized and we are on track for a
    limited land-sea deployment in 2004 and 2005.
        Today we're converting four Trident submarines into
    conventional nuclear-powered cruise missile attack submarines
    (SSGNs) capable of delivering special forces and cruise
    missiles, a part of the nuclear posture review.
        Today we're proposing to build the nuclear-powered aircraft
    carrier CVN 21 in 2007, which will include many, if not all, of
    the new capabilities that were previously scheduled to be
    introduced only in 2011.
        Today we have seen targeted pay raises and other reforms
    help retain mid-career officers and non-commissioned officers
    (NCOs) so that fewer of them leave the Service while still in
    their prime, and so the country can continue to benefit from
    their enormous talents and skills.
        These are positive changes that will ensure that future
    administrations will have the capabilities they need to defend
    the country.
        Finally, I believe that the transparency of the process
    that we've used to develop this budget has been unprecedented.
    For several months now we have been providing detailed
    briefings to those interested in defense here on Capitol Hill
    so that Congress is not simply being presented with the
    President's budget today but has been kept in the loop as
    decisions have been made. Our goal was to ensure that Members
    and staff had every opportunity to better understand the
    thinking that lies behind these proposals. I'm told that the
    extent of consultation from the Department to Congress this
    year has been unprecedented.
        We hope that this spirit of openness and cooperation can
    continue in the period ahead. We need to work together to bring
    DOD out of the industrial age and help get in range for the
    fast paced security environment we live in.
        I close by saying that transformation is not an event,
    there is not a point at which the Defense Department will move
    from being untransformed to transformed. Our goal is to set in
    motion a process of continuing transformation in a culture that
    will keep the United States several steps ahead of potential
    adversaries. To do that, we need not only resources but equally
    we need the ability to use them with speed and agility, so that
    we can respond quickly to the new threats we will face as the
    century unfolds.
        I feel deeply about the urgency of seeing that we transform
    the Department and enable it to serve the American people and
    our friends and allies in a responsible way in the 21st
    century. We will have to work together if we are to best serve
    the country.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this
    opportunity to update the committee on our progress in transforming the
    Department of Defense for the 21st century and to discuss the
    President's budget for fiscal year 2004-2009.
        President Bush vowed that, on taking office, he would order ``an
    immediate, comprehensive review of our military--the structure of its
    forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement.''
    He warned of new dangers--of ``barbarism emboldened by technology,''
    the proliferation of ``weapons of mass destruction . . . car bombers
    and plutonium merchants give his team at the Department of Defense ``a
    broad mandate to challenge the status quo and envision a new
    architecture of American defense for decades to come.''
        The goal, he said, would be ``to move beyond marginal
    improvements--to replace existing programs with new technologies and
    strategies.'' Doing this, he said, ``will require spending more--and
    spending more wisely.''
        Mr. Chairman, for the past 2 years, we have pursued the goals he
    set out. We have:

             Fashioned a new defense strategy.
             Replaced the decade-old two Major Theater War approach
            with a new approach to sizing our forces that allows us to
            provide for homeland defense, undertake a major regional
            conflict and win decisively, including occupying a country and
            changing the regime if necessary, simultaneously swiftly defeat
            another aggressor in another theater, and in addition have the
            capability of conducting a number of lesser contingencies.
             Developed a new approach to balancing risks that takes
            into account not just the risks to immediate war plans, but
            also the risks to people and transformation.
             Reorganized the Department to better focus our space
            activities.
             Adopted a new Unified Command Plan, which establishes
            the new Northern Command to better defend the homeland; a Joint
            Forces Command that focuses on transformation; and a new
            Strategic Command responsible for early warning of, and defense
            against, missile attack and the conduct of long-range attacks.
             Expanded the mission of the Special Operations
            Command, so that it can not only support missions directed by
            the regional combatant commanders, but also plan and execute
            its own missions in the global war on terror, supported by
            other combatant commands.
             Initiated work with Allies to develop a new North
            Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command structure and begin
            work on a new NATO Response Force.
             Took steps to attract and retain talent in our Armed
            Forces, with targeted pay raises and quality of life
            improvements.
             Made a number of tough program decisions, including
            replacement of the Crusader, B-1 modernization, and the Navy
            ``area-wide'' restructuring.
             Instituted ``realistic budgeting,'' giving Congress
            more realistic estimates of what programs can be expected to
            cost, rather than coming back for annual non-emergency
            supplementals.
             Reorganized and revitalized the missile defense
            research, development and testing program, freed from the
            constraints of the ABM Treaty.
             Completed the Nuclear Posture Review, with a new
            ``approach to deterrence that will enhance our security, while
            permitting historic deep reductions in offensive nuclear
            weapons.
             Moved from a ``threat-based'' to a ``capabilities-
            based'' approach to defense planning, focusing not only on who
            might threaten us, or where, or when--and more on how we might
            be threatened, and what portfolio of capabilities we will need
            to deter and defend against those new threats.

        These are important accomplishments. They represent some of the
    most significant changes in the strategy and structure of our Armed
    Forces in at least a generation.
        But as important as these changes are, they must be only the
    beginning. Because transforming is about more than developing new
    strategies and structures--it is about changing culture, about
    encouraging new ways of thinking, so we can develop new ways of
    fighting and provide our Armed Forces the tools they need to defend our
    way of life in the 21st century.
        We are working to promote a culture in the Defense Department that
    rewards unconventional thinking--a climate where people have freedom
    and flexibility to take risks and try new things. We are working to
    instill a more entrepreneurial approach to developing military
    capabilities, one that encourages people to behave less like
    bureaucrats; one that does not wait for threats to emerge and be
    ``validated,'' but rather anticipates them before they emerge--and
    develops and deploys new capabilities quickly, to dissuade and deter
    those threats.
        Most agree that to win the global war on terror, our Armed Forces
    need to be flexible, light, and agile--so they can respond quickly to
    sudden changes. Well, the same is true of the men and women who support
    them in the Department of Defense. They also need to be flexible,
    light, and agile--so they can move money, shift people, and design and
    buy new weapons quickly, and respond to sudden changes in our security
    environment.
        Today, we do not have that kind of agility. In an age when
    terrorists move information at the speed of an email, money at the
    speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed of a commercial
    jetliner, the Defense Department is bogged down in the micromanagement
    and bureaucratic processes of the industrial age--not the information
    age. Some of our difficulties are self-imposed, to be sure. Some are
    the result of law and regulation. Together they have created a culture
    that too often stifles innovation. Consider just a few of the obstacles
    we face each day:

             Think of this fiscal year 2004 budget--it was
            developed by the Department of Defense from March 2002 to
            December 2002. OMB considered it from December 2002 to February
            2003 when the President presented it to Congress. Congress will
            be considering it from February 2003 to probably October or
            November 2003 and, as in the past, making 10-20 percent changes
            in what he proposed. DOD will then try to live with what's left
            during the period October 2003 to September 2004. That means
            that at any given time during the fiscal year of that budget,
            it will be 14 months to 30 months old while we are trying to
            implement what Congress gives us. All this in a world that is
            changing monthly before our eyes.
             The Department of Defense spends an average of $42
            million an hour--yet we are not allowed to move $15 million
            from one account to another without getting permission from 4-6
            different congressional committees, a process that can take
            several months to complete.
             Today, we estimate we have some 320,000 uniformed
            people doing non-military jobs, yet we are calling up Reserves
            to fight the global war on terror.
             We must prepare and submit 26,000 pages of
            justification and over 800 required reports to Congress each
            year--many of marginal value and most probably never read--
            consuming hundreds of thousands of manhours.
             Despite 128 acquisition reform studies, we have a
            system in the Defense Department that since 1975 has doubled
            the time it takes to produce a new weapons system--in an era
            when technology moves so fast that new technologies often
            become obsolete in months and years, not decades.
             Since September 11, our force protection costs have
            gone up by some $5 billion annually. But because we are
            required to keep some 20 percent plus more facilities capacity
            than are needed to support the force, we are effectively
            wasting something like $1 billion every year on force
            protection alone for bases and facilities we do not need. We
            need to follow through with the base closure process that
            Congress authorized last year without changes.
             We have to contend with growing micromanagement of the
            Defense budget, making it increasingly difficult to balance
            risks. Consider these facts:

                     The last time I was Secretary of Defense, the
                    1977 defense authorization bill was 16-pages long--in
                    the year 2001 it had grown to 534 pages.
                     In 1977, Congress made a total of 46 changes
                    to Army and Defense Agency research, development,
                    testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) programs; by 2001 that
                    number had grown to 450 individual changes. For every
                    change Congress makes in a program, there is a cost
                    elsewhere in the budget--every plus-up in one place
                    means we must reduce funds for something else, be it
                    housing, or spare parts or transformation--making it
                    exceedingly difficult to balance risks.

             We spend millions of taxpayer dollars training top-
            notch officers and senior enlisted, giving them experience--and
            then we shove them out the door in their 40s and early 50s,
            when they are at the top of their game--and we will be paying
            60 percent of their base pay and providing them with
            comprehensive healthcare for the rest of their lives. The loss
            in talent and experience to the Department and the country is
            sizable.
             We bounce officers around from assignment to
            assignment every 16, 18, 22 months, so many end up skipping
            across the tops of the waves so fast they don't have time to
            learn from their own mistakes.
             We rely on almost 1,800 antiquated legacy information
            systems to run the Defense finance end accounting systems--
            ensuring we cannot produce timely and accurate management
            information.
             We have the equivalent of an Army heavy division's
            worth of auditors, inspectors, and investigators.
             We have thousands of people focused on developing and
            justifying budgets, and a fraction of those focused on ensuring
            effective implementation and desired outcomes.

        The point is this, we are fighting the first wars of the 21st
    century with a Defense Department that was fashioned to meet the
    challenges of the mid-20th century. We have an industrial age
    organization, yet we are living in an information age world, where new
    threats emerge suddenly, often without warning, to surprise us. We
    cannot afford not to change and rapidly, if we hope to live in that
    world.
        Some of the fault for this lies with the executive branch; some
    lies with the legislative branch, and some is simply due to the fast
    pace of events. But the American people do not care about blame--for
    their sake we need to get to work fixing the problems.
        Last year, Congress and the administration did just that, when we
    faced up to the fact that our Government was not organized to deal with
    the new threats to the American homeland. You enacted historic
    legislation to create a new Department of Homeland Security and
    rearrange our Government to be better prepared for potential attacks
    against our homes and schools and places of work.
        We must now address the Department of Defense. We are already
    working with a number of you to fashion legislation to bring the
    Defense Department into the 21st century--to transform how it moves
    money, manages people, and buys weapons. We are looking at, among other
    things, proposals to:

             Establish a National Security Personnel System that
            will give the Department of Defense greater flexibility in how
            it handles and manages its civilian personnel--so we can
            attract and retain and improve the performance of our 700,000-
            plus civilian work force. Today it is managed outside the
            Department. The unintentional effect has been that the
            Department uses military personnel and contractors rather than
            civilians, since they can be more easily managed.
             A one-time reorganization of the Department, with
            ``fast track'' approval procedures.
             Move a number of the non-military functions that have
            been thrust on DOD over the years to other Departments that can
            provide similar or better services, so DOD can focus on the
            tasks where it must excel: defending our country in a dangerous
            new century.
             Transfer some 1,800 personnel who conduct background
            investigations to the Office of Personnel Management. Since the
            President has no authority to transfer functions across the
            executive branch, we will urge that he be given that authority.
             Establish more flexible rules for the flow of money
            through the Department, giving us the ability to move larger
            sums between programs and priorities, so we can respond quickly
            to urgent needs.
             Streamline acquisition rules and procedures, to give
            the Department greater speed and flexibility in the development
            and deployment of new capabilities.
             Establish a 2-year budget cycle so that the hundreds
            who invest time and energy to rebuild major programs every year
            can be freed up and not be required to do so on an annual
            basis.
             Eliminate some of the onerous regulations that make it
            impossible or unattractive for many small enterprises to do
            business with the Department.
             Expand authority for competitive outsourcing, so we
            can get military personnel out of non-military tasks and back
            into the field. There is no reason, for example, that the
            Defense Department should be in the business of making
            eyeglasses, when the private sector makes them better, faster,
            and cheaper. But we are. That needs to change.
             Clarify environmental statutes which restrict access
            to, and sustainment of, training and test ranges essential for
            the readiness of our troops and the effectiveness of our
            weapons systems in the global war on terror.
             Expand our flexibility to extend tour lengths for
            military leaders, and fully credit them for joint duty
            assignments.
             Establish more flexible military retirement rules, so
            that those who want to serve longer have the option of doing
            so--so we can retain talent instead of automatically pushing it
            out the door.
             Establish sunset procedures for the hundreds of
            required reports so that we can discontinue those that have
            outlived their usefulness. We simply must find better ways to
            exchange data between DOD and Congress, so that you get the
            information you need to assess performance and we do not have
            to employ armies of personnel and consultants preparing
            information you no longer need.

        Let there be no doubt, some of the obstacles we face today are
    self-imposed. Where we have authority to fix those problems, we are
    working hard to do so. For example, we are modernizing our financial
    management structures, to replace some 1,800 information systems so we
    can produce timely and accurate management information. We are reducing
    staffing layers to increase speed and efficiency. We are modernizing
    our acquisition structures to reduce the length of time it takes to
    field new systems and drive innovation. We are working to push joint
    operational concepts throughout the Department, so we train and prepare
    for war the way we will fight it--jointly. We are taking steps to
    better measure and track performance.
        We are doing all these things, and more. But to get the kind of
    agility and flexibility that are required in the 21st century security
    environment, we must have legislative relief. We must work together--
    Congress and the administration--to transform not only the U.S. Armed
    Forces, but the Defense Department that serves them and prepares them
    for battle. The lives of the service men and women in the field--and of
    our friends and families here at home--depend on our ability to do so.
    2004 Defense Budget
        At the same time, we are taking steps to implement the changes
    agreed upon in the defense review. Last year's budget--the fiscal year
    2003 request--was finalized just as that review process was nearing
    completion. It included a top-line increase, and made important, and
    long-delayed investments in readiness, people, maintenance, and
    replacement of aging systems and facilities. We were able to begin
    funding some transforming initiatives as the new defense strategy came
    into focus.
        But it is really this year's budget--the fiscal year 2004 request
    before you today--that is the first to fully reflect the new defense
    strategies and policies.
        We submit this budget to you at a time of war. Our experience in
    the global war on terror has validated the strategic decisions that
    were made.
        When our Nation was attacked, there was a great deal of pressure to
    put off transformation--people cautioned, you can't fight the global
    war on terrorism and simultaneously transform this institution. The
    opposite is the case. The global war on terror has made transforming an
    even more urgent priority. Our experience on September 11 made clear,
    our adversaries are transforming the ways in which they will threaten
    our people. We cannot stand still.
        The reality is that while the global war on terror is an impetus
    for change, it also complicates our task. Balancing risk between near-
    and long-term challenges is difficult even in peacetime. But today, we
    must accomplish three difficult challenges at once:

            (1) successfully fight the global war on terror;
            (2) prepare for near-term threats by making long delayed
            investments in readiness, people, and modernization; and
            (3) prepare for the future by transforming for the 21st
            century.

        The 2004 budget request before you today is designed to help us do
    all three.
        Our defense review identified six goals that drive our
    transformation efforts:

             First, we must be able to defend the U.S. homeland and
            bases of operation overseas;
             Second, we must be able to project and sustain forces
            in distant theaters;
             Third, we must be able to deny enemies sanctuary;
             Fourth, we must improve our space capabilities and
            maintain unhindered access to space;
             Fifth, we must harness our advantages in information
            technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces, so they
            can fight jointly; and
             Sixth, we must be able to protect U.S. information
            networks from attack--and to disable the information networks
            of our adversaries.

        The President's 2004 budget requests funds for investments that
    will support each of these. For example:

             For programs to help defend the U.S. homeland and
            bases of operation overseas--such as missile defense--we are
            requesting $7.9 billion in the 2004 budget, and $55 billion
            over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
             For programs to project and sustain forces in distant
            theaters--such as new unmanned underwater vehicle program and
            the Future Combat Systems--we are requesting $8 billion in
            2004, and $96 billion over the FYDP.
             For programs to deny enemies sanctuary--such as
            unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and the conversion of SSBN to
            SSGN submarines--we are requesting $5.2 billion in 2004 and $49
            billion over the FYDP.
             For programs to enhance U.S. space capabilities--such
            as Space Control Systems--we are requesting $300 million in
            2004 and $5 billion over the FYDP.
             For programs to harness our advantages in information
            technology--such as laser satellite communications, Joint
            Tactical Radio, and the Deployable Joint Command and Control
            System--we are requesting $2.7 billion in 2004 and $28 billion
            over the FYDP.
             For programs to protect U.S. information networks and
            attack those of our adversaries--such as the Air and Space
            Operations Center--we are requesting $200 million in 2004 and
            $6 billion over the FYDP.

        Over the next 6 years, we have proposed a 30-percent increase in
    procurement funding and a 65-percent increase in funding for RDT&E
    above the 2002 baseline budget--a total investment of around $150
    billion annually.
        In addition to these increases, RDT&E spending will rise from 36
    percent to 42 percent of the overall investment budget. This shift
    reflects a decision to accelerate the development of needed next
    generation systems, and by accepting some near-term risk.
        Among the more important transformational investments we propose is
    our request for funds to establish a new joint national training
    capability. In the 21st century, we will fight wars jointly. Yet our
    forces still too often train and prepare for war as individual
    services. That needs to change. To ensure that U.S. forces train like
    they fight and fight like they train, we have budgeted $1.8 billion
    over the next 6 years to fund range improvements and permit more of
    both live and virtual joint training--an annual investment of $300
    million.
        The total investment in transforming military capabilities in the
    2004 request is $24.3 billion, and about $240 billion over the FYDP.
        But even as we continue to transform for the future, we must also
    recognize that new and unexpected dangers are waiting for us over the
    horizon. To prepare for the threats we will face later in this decade,
    the 2004 budget requests increased investments in a number of critical
    areas: readiness, quality of life improvements for the men and women in
    uniform, and increased investments to make certain existing
    capabilities are properly maintained and replenished.
        Over the next 6 years, the President has requested a 15-percent
    increase for military personnel accounts, above the 2002 baseline
    budget, and an increase in funding for family housing by 10 percent
    over the same period. The 2004 budget includes $1 billion for targeted
    military pay raises, ranging from 2 percent to 6.25 percent. Out of
    pocket expenses for those living in private housing drop from 7.5
    percent to 3.5 percent in 2004, and are on target for total elimination
    by 2005.
        Over the next 6 years, we have requested a 20-percent increase for
    operation and maintenance accounts above the 2002 baseline budget. We
    have added $40 billion for readiness of all the services and $6 billion
    for facilities sustainment over the same period. These investments
    should stabilize funding for training, spares, and tempo of operations
    (OPTEMPO), and put a stop to the past practice of raiding the
    investment accounts to pay for the immediate operation and maintenance
    needs, so we stop robbing the future to pay today's urgent bills.
        This 2004 budget does not include funds for operations in the
    global war on terror. Last year, we requested, but Congress did not
    provide, the $10 billion we knew we would need for the first few months
    of the global war on terror. Because of that, every month since October
    2002--October, November, December in 2002 and January and now February
    in 2003--we have had to borrow from other programs to pay for the costs
    of the war--robbing Peter to pay Paul. That does not include the costs
    of preparations for a possible contingency in Iraq. This pattern is
    fundamentally harmful to our ability to manage the Department. It
    causes waste and harmful management practices which consume management
    time that we cannot afford in a time of war and which are unfair to the
    taxpayers.
        In our 2004 request:

             We increased the shipbuilding budget by $2.7 billion
            making good on our hope last year that we could increase
            shipbuilding from five to seven ships.
             We increased the Special Operations budget by $1.5
            billion, to pay for equipment lost in the global war on terror
            and an additional 1,890 personnel.
             We increased military and civilian pay by $3.7
            billion.
             We increased missile defense by $1.5 billion,
            including increased funds for research and development of
            promising new technologies, and to deploy a small number of
            interceptors beginning in 2004.

        The President has asked Congress for a total of $379.9 billion for
    fiscal year 2004--a $15.3 billion increase over last year's budget.
        That is a large amount of the taxpayer's hard-earned money. To put
    it in context, when I was in Congress in the 1960s, the United States
    had the first $100 billion budget for the entire U.S. Government.
    Nonetheless, for 2004, the DOD budget will amount to roughly 3.4
    percent of Gross Domestic Products (GDP)--still historically low. In
    the mid-1980s, for example, the U.S. was dedicating around 6 percent of
    GDP to defense.
        Nonetheless, it is a significant investment. But compared with the
    costs in lives and treasure of another attack like the one we
    experienced on September 11--or a nuclear, chemical, or biological
    attack that would be vastly worse--less than 3\1/2\ cents on the dollar
    is a prudent investment in security and stability.
        But even that increase, as large as it is, only gets us part of the
    way. Our challenge is to do three difficult things at once:

             Win the global war on terror;
             Prepared for the threats we will face later this
            decade; and
             Continue transforming for the threats we will face in
            2010 and beyond.

        Any one of those challenges is difficult--and expensive. Taking on
    all three, as we must, required us to make tough choices between
    competing demands. Which meant that, inevitably, some desirable
    capabilities did not get funded.
        So let me state it straight out:

             Despite the significant increase in shipbuilding, we
            did not get the shipbuilding rate up to the desired steady
            state of 10 ships per year. Because of planned retirements of
            other ships, we will drop below a 300-ship fleet during the
            course of the FYDP. The Navy is in the process of transforming,
            and has two studies underway for amphibious ships and for
            submarines--we have increased shipbuilding in 2004, but we do
            not want to lock ourselves into a shipbuilding program now
            until we know precisely which ships we will want to build in
            the outyears.
             We have not been able to modernize our tactical air
            forces fast enough to reduce the average age of our aircraft
            fleet.
             We have had to delay completing replenishment of all
            inadequate family housing by 2007--though we got close!
             We have not fully resolved our so-called ``high-
            demand/low-density'' problems--systems like JSTARS, which,
            because they have been chronically underfunded in the past,
            will still be in short supply in this budget.
             We opted not to modernize a number of legacy
            programs--taking on some near-term risks to fund transforming
            capabilities we will need in this fast moving world.
             We did not achieve the level of growth in the science
            and technology (S&T) accounts we had hoped for. Our request is
            $10.2 billion, or 2.69 percent of the 2004 budget. That is
            below the goal of 3 percent.
             We have delayed investments to completely fix the
            recapitalization rate for DOD infrastructure. We are reviewing
            out worldwide base structure, and starting the basic steps to
            prepare for the 2005 BRAC. We want to think carefully about how
            best to match our base structure and force structure. We still
            intend to get the rate down from 148 years to 67 years by 2008,
            and we expect to accelerate facilities investments in 2006
            after we have made the needed decisions with respect to our
            base structure at home and abroad.

        That's the bad news. But there is the good news as well: in making
    difficult choices between competing priorities, we made better choices
    this year because we followed the new approach to balancing risks that
    we developed in last year's defense review--an approach that takes into
    account not just the risks in operations and contingency plans, but
    also the risks to people, modernization, and the future--risks that, in
    the past, had been crowded out by more immediate pressing demands. The
    result is a more balanced approach and a more coherent program.
        While we are requesting increased funds, the Services have stepped
    up to the plate and will be canceling, slowing, or restructuring a
    number of programs--to invest the savings in transforming capabilities.
    For example:

             The Army came up with savings of some $22 billion over
            the 6-year FYDP, by terminating 24 systems, including Crusader,
            the Bradley A3, and Abrams upgrades and reducing or
            restructuring another 24 including medium tactical vehicles.
            The Army used these savings to help pay for new
            transformational capabilities, such as the Future Combat
            Systems.
             The Navy reallocated nearly $39 billion over the FYDP,
            by retiring 26 ships and 259 aircraft, and merging the Navy and
            Marine air forces. They invested these savings in new ship
            designs and aircraft.
             The Air Force shifted funds and changed its business
            practices to account for nearly $21 billion over the FYDP. It
            will retire 114 fighter and 115 mobility/tanker aircraft. The
            savings will be invested in readiness, people, modernization
            and new system starts and cutting edge systems like unmanned
            aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles
            (UCAVs).

        In all, by retiring or restructuring less urgent programs, we have
    achieved savings of some $80 billion over the FYDP--money that will be
    reinvested by the Services in capabilities necessary for the 21st
    century.
        Finding those savings is important, both in terms of freeing up
    resources for more urgent priorities, and because it is respectful of
    the taxpayers' hard-earned money. We feel a deep obligation to not
    waste the taxpayers' dollars. We need to show the taxpayers that we are
    willing to stop doing things that we know we don't need to be doing,
    and take that money and put it into investments we need.
        Some critics may argue we cut too deeply. We did cancel a number of
    programs that were troubled, to be sure, but also others that were not
    troubled--but which simply did not fit with our new defense strategy.
    In a world of unlimited resources, they would have been nice to have.
    But in a world where needs outstrip available funds, we cannot do
    everything. Something has to give.
        Still others argue from the opposite direction--saying that we did
    not cut deeply enough. They ask: what happened to your hit list? The
    answer is: we never had a ``hit list.'' What we had was a new defense
    strategy, and we reviewed all the programs in the pipeline to see if
    they fit into that defense strategy and the new security environment we
    face.
        Some were eliminated. In other cases, it made more sense to scale
    them back or change them. For example, the Comanche helicopter program
    was born in the 1980s, and the Army planned to buy around 1,200 of
    them. But in the interim, the Army decided to change its structure. In
    the way the Army plans to fight in the decades ahead, the role of the
    helicopter changes--it will be used more for reconnaissance and light
    attack. For that mission 1,200 helicopters weren't needed--so we
    brought the number down to about 650.
        In still other areas, we set up competition for future missions.
    For example, in tactical aircraft, by 2010 the F-22 will be nearing the
    end of its planned production run, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will
    be coming on line, a number of UCAVs will be ready, and hypersonic
    systems could be within reach. As a result, future Presidents will have
    a rich menu of choices for strike operations we don't now have.
        We are transforming the way we develop new systems. The old way was
    to develop a picture of the perfect system, and then build the system
    to meet that vision of perfection, however long it took or cost. The
    result was that, as technology advanced, and with it dreams of what a
    perfect system could do, capabilities were taking longer and longer to
    develop and the cost of systems increased again and again--time is
    money.
        Our approach is to start with the basics, simpler items, and
    rollout early models faster--and then add capabilities to the basic
    system as they become available. This is what the private sector does--
    companies bring a new car or aircraft on line, for example, and then
    update it over a period of years with new designs and technologies. We
    intend to do the same.
        Take, for example, our approach to ballistic missile defense.
    Instead of taking a decade or more to develop someone's vision of a
    ``perfect'' shield, we have instead decided to develop and put in place
    a rudimentary system by 2004--one which should make us somewhat safer
    than we are now--and then build on that foundation with increasingly
    effective capabilities as the technologies mature.
        We intend to apply this ``spiral development'' approach to a number
    of systems, restructured programs, and new starts alike over the course
    of the FYDP. The result should be that new capabilities will be
    available faster, so we can better respond to fast moving adversaries
    and newly emerging threats.
        As a result of all these strategic investments and decisions, we
    can now see the effects of transforming begin to unfold. Consider just
    some of the changes that are taking place:

             Today, the missile defense research, development, and
            testing program has been revitalized and we are on track for
            limited land/sea deployment in 2004-2005.
             Today, the Space Based Radar, which will help provide
            near-persistent 24/7/365 coverage of the globe, is scheduled to
            be ready in 2012.
             In this budget, we believe SBIRS-High is properly
            funded.
             Today, we are converting four Trident SSBN subs into
            conventional SSGNs, capable of delivering special forces and
            cruise missiles to denied areas. Today, we are proposing to
            build the CVN-21 aircraft carrier in 2007, which will include
            many new capabilities that were previously scheduled to be
            introduced only in 2011.
             Today, instead of one UCAV program in development, the
            X-45, which was designed for a limited mission: suppression of
            enemy air defense, we have set up competition among a number of
            programs that will produce UCAVs able to conduct a broad range
            of missions.
             Today, we are revitalizing the B-1 fleet by reducing
            its size and using savings to modernize remaining aircraft with
            precision weapons, self-protection systems, and reliability
            upgrades--and thanks to these efforts, I am told the B-1 now
            has the highest mission capable rates in the history of the
            program.
             Today, in place of the Crusader, the Army is building
            a new family of precision artillery--including precisions
            munitions and Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon for the Future Combat
            Systems.
             Today, we have seen targeted pay-raises and other
            reforms help retain mid-career officers and NCOs, so that fewer
            of them leave the Service while still in their prime, so the
            country can continue to benefit from their talent and
            experience.

        These are positive changes that will ensure that future
    administrations will have the capabilities they need to defend the
    country, as well as a menu of choices which they can then select from
    to shape the direction of the Department a decade from now, as the 21st
    century security environment continues to change and evolve.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Finally, I believe that the transparency of the process we have
    used to develop this budget has been unprecedented. For several months
    now, we have been providing detailed briefings to those interested in
    defense here on Capitol Hill, so that Congress is not simply being
    presented with the President's budget today, but has been kept in the
    loop as decisions were being made. Our goal was to ensure that Members
    and staff have had every opportunity to better understand the thinking
    that lies behind these proposals. I am told that the extent of
    consultation from the Defense Department to Congress this year has been
    unprecedented.
        I hope you will take this as evidence of the fact that we are
    serious about our commitment to transform not only our Armed Forces,
    but to transform DOD's relationship with Congress as well. Whether each
    Member will agree with each of the individual decisions and
    recommendations that have been made in this budget, the fact is that it
    has been developed in an unprecedented spirit of openness and
    cooperation.
        We hope that this spirit of openness and cooperation can continue
    as Congress deliberates this year both the President's budget and the
    legislation we are now discussing with you and will be sending to
    transform the way the Defense Department operates. We must work
    together to bring DOD out of the industrial age, and help get it
    arranged for the fast-paced security environment of the 21st century.
        I close by saying that transformation is not an event--it is a
    process. There is no point at which the Defense Department will move
    from being ``untransformed'' to ``transformed.'' Our goal is to set in
    motion a process of continuing transformation, and a culture that will
    keep the United States several steps ahead of any potential
    adversaries.
        To do that we need not only resources, but equally, we need the
    freedom to use them with speed and agility, so we can respond quickly
    to the new threats we will face as this century unfolds.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Warner. Before I go on to General Myers, you said
    the level of consultation was unprecedented, and that was in a
    positive vein. I assure you that we have achieved a high water
    mark of any President and his team of trying to keep Congress
    informed. Thank you.
        General Myers.

       STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
                            CHIEFS OF STAFF

        General Myers. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin,
    distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today and to report on the
    state of the United States Armed Forces. Mr. Chairman, you have
    already said that my prepared remarks will be entered in the
    record and I thank you for that. I will just make a few short
    introductory remarks and we'll get on to questions.
        Today around the world our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and coastguardsmen remain engaged in a wide variety of
    missions. Many of these missions are done far from the public
    eye. Yet, there is no more important task before them than to
    bring the fight to the terrorists. Active duty, Reserve, and
    DOD civilians, together with members of the interagency and
    coalition partners, form one team in this effort.
        Our service men and women remain a highly effective
    instrument of national power. Every day this team helps disrupt
    and capture terrorist cells around the world. In addition, our
    combined efforts in Afghanistan have accomplished a great deal
    over the past year. We have restored hope to the people of
    Afghanistan and that nation is on the way to recovery. Clearly,
    there is still much work to be done in Afghanistan, as there is
    on the war on terrorism.
        As the President and Secretary of Defense have said, this
    war will last a long time. But let there be no doubt, we will
    win this conflict. No matter what task we in the Armed Forces
    confront, I am convinced that improving our joint warfighting
    capability will be central to our future success.
        So let me take a minute to share with you what we are doing
    in that area. As you look at joint warfighting today and
    tomorrow, improving our command and control capabilities is the
    single most essential investment we can make, in my view.
    Enhanced command and control combined with intelligence that is
    rapidly shared among the warfighters will allow our joint
    commanders to integrate and unite separate service capabilities
    in a single operation or across the campaign. In my view that
    translates directly to increased efficiencies but more
    importantly to increased effectiveness.
        To reinforce this potential, the President directed Joint
    Forces Command to focus on transforming our joint team to meet
    the challenges of this new century. As a result, this command's
    efforts included the first major joint field experiment,
    Millennium Challenge 02. This experiment demonstrated a variety
    of new concepts and systems that enable critical command and
    control, collaborative information sharing and time sensitive
    targeting capabilities. Investment in these capabilities is
    essential to winning in combat today and particularly in the
    future.
        In fact, General Franks and Central Command are using
    concepts, technologies, and capabilities from Millennium
    Challenge 02 in their current operational planning for Iraq.
        One of the positive results from Millennium Challenge 02 is
    the potential for a joint commander to communicate with his or
    her forces while en route to a crisis area. Near-term technical
    solutions will allow the joint team to keep situational
    awareness of the battlefield while converging from dispersed
    areas. Most importantly, they will allow a commander to employ
    forces without sectors or deconfliction matrices we've used in
    the past, making us much more efficient and effective on the
    battlefield.
        Joint Forces Command's efforts in these areas will help us
    ensure that operational concepts and technical command and
    control solutions that we develop in the future are in effect
    born joint.
        Our emerging command and control, intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities must allow the
    Services to rapid and repeatedly plug into each other's
    information and then play or operate as one joint team. As
    such, future weapons systems and delivery platforms must be
    weighted towards what they bring to the joint warfighting team.
    Our approach to improving command and control networks reflects
    our larger approach to upgrading our forces in general.
        Clearly, we must balance near-term recapitalization and
    modernization with long-term investments to transform the force
    for the future. In the first case, we are ensuring our joint
    team is as capable as possible for today's missions, and in the
    second case, we are ensuring we are relevant to dominate a
    range of military operations for tomorrow.
        With your support, we can ensure our men and women in
    uniform have the best tools and technologies possible.
        Investments in hardware are only part of the task to keep
    our force ready. To meet these challenges, we must continue to
    invest in our people and their skills. Your commitment to
    improving joint professional military education will be one way
    to ensure our warfighters have the intellectual foundation to
    meet the unknown challenges they will face, and your support to
    fund the training and to equip our troops with the most capable
    systems sends a very powerful message of support.
        You also demonstrated your commitment by ensuring they have
    the quality of life they deserve, in terms of pay, housing, and
    medical care. This committee, along with the rest of Congress
    and administration, has made quality of life improvements a top
    priority.
        Our world class troops and their families deserve first
    class support and you have always been there for them, and on
    their behalf I thank you for your continued support.
        [The prepared statement of General Myers follows:]
               Prepared Statement by Gen. Richard B. Myers, USAF
        It is an honor to report to Congress on the state of the U.S. Armed
    Forces.
        Today, our Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
    coastguardsmen operate in an environment characterized by opportunity
    and danger. In the wake of September 11, U.S. forces are now deployed
    to an unprecedented number of locations. Our forces also operate with a
    wider array of coalition partners to accomplish more diverse missions.
        These operations are required, as the world remains a dangerous
    place. In recent months, terrorists have successfully conducted
    numerous attacks--in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. The
    loss of innocent lives serves as a poignant reminder that terrorists'
    evil has no moral or territorial limits. Coalition discoveries in
    Afghanistan and other places confirm that al Qaeda actively seeks
    weapons of mass destruction. This network remains active and determined
    to conduct more attacks against the U.S. and our allies.
        At the same time, other threats to U.S. interests have not abated.
    U.S. Armed Forces remain focused on preparing for potential regional
    conflict. The proliferation of advanced technology, weapons, and
    associated expertise has increased the probability that our adversaries
    will be capable in the future of fielding significantly more robust and
    lethal means to attack the U.S. and our interests. In December 2002,
    North Korea announced that it would resume its nuclear program. Iraq
    has used chemical and biological weapons in the past and would likely
    use them again in the future. Iraq is also aggressively seeking nuclear
    weapons. These facts create imperatives for our Nation's Armed Forces.
    All the while, U.S. forces remain prepared to confront the consequences
    of factional strife in distant lands and respond to humanitarian
    disasters.
        The President's National Security Strategy provides a new focus for
    our Nation's Armed Forces. Based on detailed analysis in the most
    recent 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Department adopted
    a new defense strategy. Today, we must be ready to assure our allies,
    while we dissuade, deter, and defeat any adversary. We possess the
    forces necessary to defend the United States homeland and deter forward
    in four critical regions. If required, we will swiftly defeat the
    efforts of two adversaries in an overlapping timeframe, while having
    the ability to ``win decisively'' in one theater. In addition, our
    forces are able to conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies,
    maintain a sufficient force generation capability, and support a
    strategic Reserve.
        At home, the establishment of the United States Northern Command
    (NORTHCOM) has significantly improved the preparedness, responsiveness,
    and integration between the U.S. military and other Federal agencies
    defending our homeland. NORTHCOM is an integral part of the rapidly
    expanding interagency network supporting homeland defense.
        Our Nation's entire Armed Forces remain as engaged today as at any
    time since the Second World War. The war on terrorism remains our
    primary focus. In concert with other instruments of national power, our
    Armed Forces are tracking down al Qaeda in Afghanistan and around the
    world. Simultaneously, we are operating in the No-Fly Zones over Iraq,
    enforcing U.N. sanctions in the Arabian Gulf, facilitating
    reconstruction in Afghanistan, conducting peacekeeping operations in
    the Balkans, supporting our partners in South America against narcotics
    trafficking and terrorist cells, preserving stability in the Korean
    Peninsula, and defending the American homeland. Clearly, the American
    people should know that their Armed Forces are operating at a high
    tempo.
        As a result of this unprecedented strategic environment, I have
    established three priorities as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
    To win the war on terrorism, to improve joint warfighting, and to
    transform our Nation's military to face the dangers of the 21st
    century. These priorities also reflect the priorities of the Secretary
    of Defense. Combined with the President's vision, the Secretary's
    leadership, the support of Congress and the selfless service of our
    Nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and
    civilian workforce--our Nation's Armed Forces are making progress in
    each of these areas.
        Al Qaeda was not created in a single day. It formed over the course
    of a decade or more prior to September 11, 2001. It cannot be destroyed
    in a day or a year--it will require a commitment of many years. We
    recognize that dangerous and difficult work remains. The following
    highlights recent successes and describes what additional actions are
    required to protect our Nation in our dynamic security environment.

                                WAR ON TERRORISM

        For the past 16 months, the U.S. Armed Forces, in concert with
    other Federal agencies and our coalition partners, have conducted a
    determined campaign to defeat the most potent threat to our way of
    life--global terrorist organizations. Operation Enduring Freedom has
    dealt a severe blow to the al Qaeda transnational network. About 50 key
    al Qaeda officials, operatives, and logisticians have been killed or
    captured. Numerous other operatives have also been removed; however, al
    Qaeda remains a formidable and adaptive peril to our Nation and our
    partners.
        Our successes reflect the careful integration of all instruments of
    national power. This war against terrorists requires the inclusive
    commitment of the military, financial, economic, law enforcement, and
    intelligence resources of our Nation. On the international level, the
    military support and cooperation has been remarkable. Until August of
    last year, when we determined it was no longer required, NATO provided
    Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to supplement our E-3 aircraft
    patrolling over American cities. NATO allies remain with us in
    Afghanistan and patrolling the oceans to interdict terrorists and their
    weapons or resources. More than 90 nations share our resolve and
    contribute daily to the goal of destroying al Qaeda. As part of this
    effort, numerous bilateral counterterrorist exercises and exchanges
    have been conducted around the world.
        At the national level, the Defense Department has made numerous
    adjustments. The creation of the Joint Interagency Task Force for
    Counterterrorism enables the rapid flow of information and analysis
    from national resources to the battlefield. Likewise, Combatant
    Commanders established Joint Interagency Coordination Groups to share
    information, coordinate actions, and streamline operations among
    military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. At U.S. Special
    Operations Command, the Counterterrorism Campaign Support Group
    combines the expertise and resources of the Departments of State,
    Treasury, and Justice and the CIA with our Special Operations warriors
    at the operational level. The Counterterrorism Campaign Support Group
    fuses intelligence, interagency, and military activities in a seamless
    organization.

                          CURRENT OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

        In Afghanistan, our greatest success has been to deny al Qaeda an
    operating haven. Today, Afghanistan has the first true chance for peace
    in 23 years. More than 2 million Afghan people have returned home. We
    are in the final stages of Phase III (Decisive Operations). Phase III
    has severely degraded al Qaeda's operational capabilities and their
    ability to train new members. Their support continues to decline among
    the Afghan people. Pockets of Taliban and al Qaeda resistance remain
    within Afghanistan primarily along the Pakistani border. Nonetheless,
    overall conditions may permit us to soon shift to Phase IV (Stability
    Operations). Once the President decides to move into Phase IV, we will
    increase the civil and reconstruction assistance to the Afghan
    government. Stability operations will require a great deal of support
    from the international community to be successful.
        This past year, a key task to promote stability began with training
    of the Afghan National Army. The U.S. spearheaded the development of
    this force with training, equipment, and force structure requirements.
    The Afghan National Army's first five battalions have completed basic
    training at the Kabul Military Training Center. More than 1,300 troops
    began advanced training as of December. The sixth battalion is
    currently in basic training and soon we will begin select officer
    training. The French have funded the initial salaries for the recruits
    for all six battalions and provided half of the training. Recently
    trained forces are integrating with our forces throughout the
    countryside. To date, the international community has donated $40
    million worth of equipment. Our military forces will be part of an
    ongoing commitment to provide equipment and expertise.
        The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
    continues its role mandated by the Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security
    Council resolutions. Today, Germany and the Netherlands are preparing
    to share leadership responsibilities of the International Security
    Assistance Force as they take over in February 2003. They follow the
    example set by the United Kingdom and Turkey. Twenty-two nations
    contribute more than 4,500 troops to this vital mission.
        In January 2002, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) proposed a
    concept of operations to disrupt terrorist operations in and around
    Yemen. Central to this plan, CENTCOM proposed to strengthen Yemeni
    Special Forces, capability for counterterrorism operations and expand
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Yemeni
    Special Forces have been trained on counterterrorism tactics and
    procedures and are currently receiving maritime counterterrorism
    training. The working relationship between the U.S. and Yemeni
    Government has greatly improved as a result of this training program.
        CENTCOM also established Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA)
    as part of its Theater Counterterrorism Campaign. In December 2002,
    JTF-HOA stood up while embarked on U.S.S. Mount Whitney. JTF-HOA
    provides CENTCOM a regional counterterrorism focus in East Africa and
    Yemen. It exercises command and control of counterterrorism operations
    for this area. The JTF-HOA staff will remain embarked on U.S.S. Mount
    Whitney for 4 to 6 months until the infrastructure is in place ashore
    at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.
        Meanwhile, CENTCOM and Allied Forces continue Maritime Interception
    Operations in the Arabian Gulf to enforce U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
    In 2002, Coalition Forces diverted over 800 vessels suspected of
    carrying illegal Iraqi oil. This reflects a significant increase over
    the 115 vessels diverted in 2001.
        United States European Command (EUCOM), through its Special
    Operations Command, Europe, began the Georgia Train and Equip Program
    to build a Georgian capability to deal with the terrorist presence in
    the Pankisi Gorge. EUCOM developed a plan to train three staffs, four
    battalions and one Mechanized/Armor company team. EUCOM has completed
    training the Georgian Ministry of Defense staff, the Land Forces
    Command staff and the first battalion. In December, Commander, EUCOM
    directed Marine Forces Europe to assume the Georgia Train and Equip
    Program mission, which will resume training in February. Six other
    allies contributed nearly $2 million in materiel reflecting the
    international nature of this program.
        In July, the President approved Expanded Maritime Interception
    Operations to interdict terrorists and their resources. With this
    order, the President authorized commanders to stop, board, and search
    merchant ships identified to be transporting terrorists and/or
    terrorist-related materiel. Expanded Maritime Interception Operations
    are focused on EUCOM and CENTCOM's Areas of Responsibility (AORs) while
    PACOM and the other Combatant Commanders are developing Expanded
    Maritime Interception Operations plans. Eleven nations provide forces
    for Maritime Interception Operations within the CENTCOM AOR. German and
    Spanish senior officers command parts of these operations--reflecting
    the coalition commitment to the war on terrorism. So far, EUCOM's
    Maritime Interception Operations have stopped 14 ships. NATO maritime
    and air forces support the Maritime Interception Operations within
    EUCOM's AOR.
        In Europe, we support NATO's plan to transition Stabilization
    Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina to a minimal presence and Kosovo forces to
    a reduced presence by the end of 2004. In the spring of 2003, the NATO
    Military Committee will review the proposed force structure reductions
    and restructuring for Bosnia and Kosovo. Our presence in the Balkans
    has not only promoted peace in the region, it has also enhanced our
    ability to conduct counterterrorism operations.
        During this past year in support of Operation Enduring Freedom--
    Philippines, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) has provided the Armed Forces
    of the Philippines military advice and assistance in targeting Abu
    Sayyaf Group terrorist activities in the Philippines. U.S. forces could
    be available to provide follow-on advice and assistance if requested by
    the Government of Philippines, and approved by the President and the
    Secretary of Defense. In concert with these efforts supporting
    Operation Enduring Freedom, Congress has approved the Security
    Assistance Funding necessary to provide counterterrorism training for
    the armed forces of the Philippines. Training will begin in the
    February/March timeframe.
        United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) continues to support
    counter-narcotics trafficking and counterterrorism efforts in South
    America. In accordance with new Presidential policy and expanded
    legislative authority, we are assisting the Colombian military in its
    fight against designated terrorist organizations by providing advice,
    training, and equipment. Our current operations are built on
    preexisting counter-narcotics missions. U.S. troops are currently
    training the Colombian military to protect critical infrastructures,
    such as the Cano Limon Pipeline. In addition personnel will deploy in
    fiscal year 2003 to serve as Operations and Intelligence Planning
    Assistance Teams at selected units to assist the Colombian military in
    its fight against terrorism. This assistance will continue over the
    next several years. The U.S. military presence in Colombia is limited
    to the troop caps established by Congress, in terms of uniformed and
    contract personnel.
        The Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is a focal
    point of increased drug and arms trafficking, money laundering,
    document fraud, and Islamic terrorist-supported activities. U.S. and
    Brazilian officials estimate that between $10-$12 billion USD/year
    flows through the Tri-Border Area, some of which is diverted to known
    terrorist groups such as Hizballah and Hamas.
        Commander, SOUTHCOM continues detainee operations (detention and
    intelligence collection missions) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. While the
    detainees are not entitled to the status of Enemy Prisoners of War, the
    President and the Secretary of Defense have directed that the U.S.
    Armed Forces treat them humanely and to the extent appropriate and
    consistent with military necessity, consistent with the principles of
    the Geneva Conventions. SOUTHCOM has constructed an additional 190
    medium security units to augment the 816 holding units and fortified
    billeting structures for U.S. military personnel assigned. Almost 2,000
    U.S. military personnel are deployed to Guantanamo Bay in support of
    detainee operations. The President issued an order on November 13,
    2001, authorizing use of military commissions to prosecute individuals
    subject to the order for offenses against the laws of war and other
    applicable laws. To date, no one has been made specifically subject to
    the order, and therefore, no one has been prosecuted by military
    commission. The Secretary of Defense appointed the Secretary of the
    Army to lead war crimes investigations. A few of those detained at
    Guantanamo determined to be of no intelligence or law enforcement value
    or threat to the U.S. or its interests, have been released and returned
    to their countries of origin.
        We view Guantanamo Bay as a national asset that supports our work
    in securing intelligence vital to success in the war on terrorism and
    protection of our homeland. It also supports interagency and
    international intelligence and law enforcement efforts. Interrogations
    at Guantanamo Bay have resulted in intelligence of high value.
    Information gathered from known terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay has
    helped us to define and disrupt the global terrorist threat.

                           UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN 2002

        On 1 October 2002, we implemented the 2002 Unified Command Plan, as
    directed by the President. The 2002 Unified Command Plan, and its
    subsequent Change 1, created United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM),
    disestablished United States Space Command (SPACECOM) and combined
    SPACECOM's missions and forces with United States Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM), thereby establishing a ``new'' STRATCOM.

              UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND HOMELAND SECURITY

        NORTHCOM's mission is to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
    aggression aimed at the U.S. and its territories. When directed,
    NORTHCOM provides military assistance to civil authorities, including
    consequence management. Commander, NORTHCOM is dual-hatted as
    Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD has
    control of the air defense of CONUS. Land and Maritime operations are
    controlled by NORTHCOM.
        NORTHCOM stood up its combatant command staff and accepted Homeland
    Defense missions and tasks from United States Joint Forces Command
    (JFCOM) and other combatant commands. It has also developed a plan to
    reach its full operational capability. Currently, NORTHCOM is engaged
    with Federal and State agencies, the National Guard and NORAD to plan
    and exercise a variety of homeland defense and civil support tasks.
    Simultaneously, NORTHCOM is cultivating closer relationships with our
    North American neighbors.
        As part of this effort, NORTHCOM's Standing Joint Task Force Civil
    Support provides command and control for DOD forces supporting the lead
    Federal agency managing the consequences of chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incidents in addition to
    natural disasters. As such, Joint Task Force Civil Support provides a
    sustained planning staff that has formed a habitual relationship with
    key Federal and State agencies plus communities nationwide.
        NORAD's responsibilities for air and ground early warning systems
    and alert fighter support in defense of CONUS, Canada and Alaska remain
    unchanged. In addition, NORAD is identifying the infrastructure needed
    for the defense of the National Capital Region.
        On December 9, 2002, the U.S. and Canada agreed to create a new bi-
    national land, maritime, and civil support military planning group at
    NORAD to help examine potential responses to threats and attacks on the
    U.S. or Canada. This initiative will advance our ability to defend our
    Nation.
        Last year Operation Noble Eagle flew over 14,000 sorties even while
    our current operations overseas required key resources. These sorties
    represent NORAD's contributions to Operation Noble Eagle and defense of
    the American homeland.

                        UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        United States STRATCOM's mission is to establish and provide full-
    spectrum global strike, coordinate space and information operations
    capabilities to meet both deterrent and decisive national security
    objectives. STRATCOM retains its nuclear triad of submarine, bomber,
    and missile forces.
        On 10 January 2003, the President signed Change 2 to the Unified
    Command Plan. This latest change assigned four emergent missions to
    STRATCOM and reflects the U.S. military's increased emphasis on a
    global view. These new missions include missile defense, global strike,
    DOD information operations and global command, control, communications,
    computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Missile
    defense is an inherently multi-command and multi-regional task.
    STRATCOM will serve as the primary advocate in the development of
    missile defense operational architecture. With its global strike
    responsibilities, the Command will provide a core cadre to plan and
    execute nuclear, conventional, and information operations anywhere in
    the world. STRATCOM serves as the DOD advocate for integrating the
    desired military effects of information operations. These initiatives
    represent a major step in transforming our military and in implementing
    the new strategic triad envisioned in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.
        STRATCOM will also continue the former U.S. Space Command's legacy
    of providing space support for our joint team. The Global Positioning
    System (GPS) offers an excellent example of how space systems enhance
    our Joint Warfighting Team. The GPS's worldwide position, navigation,
    and timing information give U.S. forces an all-weather, precision
    engagement capability. As an example of one application, the U.S. Army
    fielded a blue force tracking system--a space-based tool that gives
    commanders awareness of their units' locations.
        U.S. military space superiority requires continued advances in
    space control and access along with the cooperation of our allies. The
    European Union, for example, is developing Galileo, a civil satellite
    navigation system that risks our enhancement to military GPS. As
    currently designed, the Galileo signal will operate in the same
    bandwidth as our GPS system's civil and military signals. When Galileo
    begins operating, its signals will directly overlay the spectrum
    associated with our new GPS military code. Continued negotiations to
    resolve this political issue with the European Union is essential to
    ensuring our joint team maintains the advantages of GPS in combat.
        Concurrent with these ongoing operations, the Services, Joint
    Staff, and Combatant Commands have pursued a 15-percent major
    headquarters reduction. To date, DOD headquarters personnel have been
    reduced by more than 11 percent. Given commitments around the world
    today, any further reductions beyond those already taken could
    adversely impact our ability to meet the demands of the war on
    terrorism, Homeland Security, global military presence and respond to
    any new threats. Nonetheless, the Service Chiefs, Combatant Commanders,
    and I continue to explore ways to reduce and streamline headquarters
    functions.

                         ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION

        Antiterrorism/Force Protection remains a top priority for all
    commanders. Our adversaries--unable to confront or compete with the
    United States militarily--have and will continue to use terrorist acts
    to attack U.S. citizens, property, and interests--to include military
    bases and personnel. In the fiscal year 2003 budget, the Antiterrorism/
    Force Protection portion of the Combating Terrorism budget totaled $9.3
    billion. The terrorist threat environment has forced us to maintain a
    higher worldwide Force Protection Condition for longer periods of time.
    In the short term, this task is being met with an increase in manpower.
        For example, EUCOM is currently at Force Protection Condition
    Bravo. In the short-term, additional troops are required to guard U.S.
    military bases throughout EUCOM's theater. In the long-term, the
    Secretary of Defense directed us to pursue new technologies that will
    reduce the manpower footprint while improving force protection, as well
    as seeking host nation support for the force protection mission.
        The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund helped provide
    immediate Antiterrorism/Force Protection off-the-shelf technology to
    Combatant Commanders to satisfy emergent requirements that could not
    wait for the normal budget process or long-term technical solutions.
    Last year's funded systems included explosive detection systems that
    enhanced access control, intrusion detection systems that provided
    broader perimeter security while reducing manpower requirements and
    chemical/biological (Chem/Bio) detection systems to improve
    installation defense capabilities. The Department authorized $47
    million this past year for the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative
    Fund, nearly twice the fiscal year 2000 expenditure.
        To support the Combatant Commanders' Antiterrorism/Force Protection
    efforts, the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams will
    visit 95 military installations worldwide this year. Joint Staff
    Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams assess physical security
    measures, infrastructure support and structural vulnerabilities,
    intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities and the
    installation's ability to respond to terrorist incidents. Over 500,000
    personnel received ``General Antiterrorism Awareness'' training last
    year. This on-line training is now also available to DOD family
    members.
        The Defense Department also finalized prescriptive antiterrorism
    engineering and construction standards to improve survivability of our
    personnel from the effects of an explosive device. In large part
    because the Pentagon renovation project followed design strategies
    based on these new antiterrorism construction standards, the damage and
    loss of life from the Pentagon attack was significantly reduced.
        U.S. forces' antiterrorism capabilities are seen as a standard
    worldwide. NATO sought U.S. military expertise to improve antiterrorism
    training for all NATO forces. As a result, last summer, NATO approved
    policy guidance that clarified antiterrorism responsibilities for non-
    Article 5 operations, delineated minimum unit antiterrorism plan
    requirements and increased emphasis on weapons of mass destruction
    defense and consequence management planning. The U.S. will assist NATO
    to implement this important guidance.
        We are working hard to expand and improve our capabilities to
    protect our personnel against chem/bio agents. DOD initiated
    vaccinating select segments of the force against anthrax and smallpox.
    Our medical treatment capabilities must expand to include improved
    treatment against weapons of mass destruction while providing
    additional medical countermeasures, surveillance systems and response
    teams.
        We improved overall joint force readiness by our recent procurement
    of improved chem/bio defensive protective clothing, masks, and
    detection systems. This equipment is significantly more reliable,
    better at agent detection and further enhances our forces' overall
    capability to operate in the chem/bio environment.
        In the area of installation protection, we have improved detection
    systems plus consequence management assessment and training
    capabilities at 23 of our overseas bases. In addition, we performed a
    thorough assessment of our detection and first responder capabilities
    at nine key CONUS installations. These lessons learned will guide
    development of a comprehensive plan to improve chem/bio defense at more
    than 200 bases over the next 6 years. Although we improved our chem/bio
    capabilities, fighting a war in this environment remains a serious
    challenge. Therefore, we must continue to fund research, development,
    and acquisition projects that ensure our forces can operate
    successfully in this adverse environment.

                        READINESS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

        The readiness of our general-purpose forces, whether forward
    deployed, operating in support of contingency operations or in Homeland
    Defense, continues to be solid. U.S. forces are well trained and in
    general, possess the personnel, equipment, and resources needed to
    accomplish the military objectives outlined in the Defense Strategy.
        In light of the current pace of operations, it is notable that
    active U.S. Army divisions maintain high readiness levels. U.S. Air
    Force aircraft mission capable rates improved over the past 6 months.
    U.S. Navy forces continue to meet readiness goals for both the deployed
    and non-deployed segments of the force. The U.S. Marine Corps is ready
    to meet the demands of current and potential operations. While ongoing
    global operations increased the workload on the Nation's military
    focus, these forces remain prepared to accomplish their wartime tasks.
        Material readiness has improved substantially in part, due to the
    tremendous support of Congress. One example is munitions, where recent
    supplemental measures have allowed Combatant Commanders to increase
    stockpiles of key all-weather and advanced precision-guided munitions.
    These munitions enable the joint team to place at risk a wide array of
    enemy targets. Funding increases this past year dramatically increased
    precision-guided munitions production rates, and selected production
    rates should be near maximum capacity by August 2003. Continued
    congressional support is critical to build munitions and materiel
    inventories to levels that meet warfighting requirements.
        While the force is ready, this past year significantly stressed the
    readiness of several critical enablers. Our intelligence forces operate
    under increased pressure as a result of the war on terrorism. Key skill
    sets (like targeteers, linguists, and police-like investigative skills)
    are in short supply. Recognizing this fact, our intelligence,
    surveillance and reconnaissance forces must mature into a more
    adaptable and flexible contingency collection capability. Many systems
    were developed to meet a cold war threat and provide excellent force-
    on-force collection capability. The ingenuity of our soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen has allowed many systems to perform
    a valuable role in the war on terrorism.
        The present posture of the military intelligence forces, for the
    long-term war on terrorism is improving, but many challenges remain.
    This global war clearly demonstrates the need for persistent long-
    loiter intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms.
    Military intelligence also requires low observable unmanned aerial
    vehicle systems, close-access sensors, and a greater emphasis on human
    intelligence collection. In addition, all intelligence communities must
    provide an information architecture that provides a ``push and pull''
    capability for the joint warfighter, law enforcement and counter-
    intelligence personnel. We must shift our attitudes away from the
    mindset of a ``need to know'' to one of ``need to share.''
        Our strategic mobility triad (airlift, sealift, and prepositioned
    materiel) provides us the capability to swiftly move forces around the
    world. The U.S. remains the only nation who can routinely move units
    and materiel globally with confidence and speed. While our airlift and
    air refueling assets performed magnificently in support of the war on
    terrorism, this high operational demand is accelerating the aging of C-
    5 and tanker aircraft and created unanticipated wear and tear on our C-
    17 fleet. As a result, strategic airlift remains one of our top
    priorities. The C-17 multi-year procurement plus the C-5 Re-engining
    and Reliability Enhancement Programs are major steps to meet the
    minimum wartime airlift capacity of 54.5 million ton miles/day. The
    follow-on multi-year procurement with Boeing for 60+ C-17s will bring
    the total C-17 fleet to 180 aircraft in 2007. As a corollary priority,
    replacing the 40-year-old KC-135 air refueling fleet is an essential
    joint warfighting requirement.
        With congressional support, our strategic sealift achieved the
    Mobility Requirements Study-05 goals for surge and prepositioned fleet
    sealift requirements. The maintenance of our organic sealift fleet
    remains a high priority to ensure we can deploy sufficient force to
    support routine and contingency operations. To support greater levels
    of mobilization, DOD can also access additional U.S. commercial
    shipping through the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. This
    agreement is critical to ensure that adequate sealift capacity (and
    associated mariners) is available to support DOD requirements during
    wartime. We are working closely with the Department of Transportation
    to ensure these requirements can be met.
        Our prepositioned material reduced response time in key theaters.
    This critical readiness program enables our success in the war on
    terrorism and other contingency operations.
        For intratheater mobility, the Department recognizes the Joint
    Venture, High-Speed Vessel as a promising delivery platform. This
    vessel employs off-the-shelf technology and can operate in austere
    locations where mature seaports do not exist. Combatant Commanders
    praise this vessel for rapidly and efficiently moving personnel and
    equipment. Future operations will also rely on strong enroute
    infrastructures that support strategic mobility requirements. The
    dynamic nature of the war on terrorism and other potential
    contingencies dictates that we be prepared to establish new enroute
    bases to support deployments to austere locations. In addition, we must
    fully fund the existing enroute infrastructure to sustain its
    capability. Future success in operations depends upon effective
    training today and tomorrow.
        Last May, I wrote Congress about my grave concern over the adverse
    impacts and unforeseen consequences that the application of various
    environmental laws are having on military training and testing
    activities and consequentially on the readiness of our Armed Forces.
    Last year, Congress provided temporary relief, but only for one
    statute. While measuring the impact of inflexible or overbroad
    environmental requirements is difficult, my professional assessment is
    that the impacts and consequently the challenge we face in providing
    the most effective training weapons and sensors, has grown. Enough is
    known right now to convince me that we need relief. We are not
    abandoning our outstanding stewardship over the lands entrusted to us
    or retreating from environmental protection requirements. We are trying
    to restore balance when environmental requirements adversely affect
    uniquely military activities necessary to prepare for combat. I ask
    that you carefully consider the proposed changes that the DOD brings
    forward and provide the tailored relief we seek.
        The current pace of operations and future potential operations
    continues to require the Services and Combatant Commanders to carefully
    manage assets and units that are in high demand, but in small numbers.
    The demand for critical capabilities (such as manned and unmanned
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, special
    operations forces, intelligence analysts and linguists and command and
    control assets) increased significantly as a result of multiple
    contingencies. We will continue to prioritize the tasks given these
    critical units to preserve our surge capability for future operations.
        Our number one asset remains the men and women serving in the Armed
    Forces. They have the educational depth, the innovative spirit and
    mental agility that transforms technology into an effective military
    force. Their service and dedication deserve our full support to seek
    ways to improve their quality of life. The administration, Congress,
    and DOD made raising their standard of living a top priority. This
    year's legislation provided an across-the-board military pay raise of
    4.1 percent and targeted increases of up to 6.5 percent for junior
    personnel. This year's out-of-pocket housing expense reduction from
    11.3 percent to 7.5 percent is a sound investment, as are future
    targeted pay increases based on the Employment Cost Index plus one half
    percent. Our troops and their families greatly appreciate continued
    congressional support for these initiatives, plus efforts to improve
    family and unaccompanied housing. Such congressional action directly
    impacts recruitment, retention, and family welfare. I view these all as
    inseparable from operational combat readiness.
        No discussion of those who serve is complete without mentioning the
    exceptional service of our guardsmen and reservists. In the first 15
    months of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), nearly 85,000 of them
    served on active duty. Like their active duty counterparts, their
    service balances their duty to the Nation and their commitment to their
    families. These citizen-warriors, however, must also balance an
    obligation to their civilian employers. These past few months
    demonstrated our increased reliance on our Reserve components to defend
    the Nation's coastlines, skies, and heartland, as well as protect our
    interests worldwide. We also gained a deeper appreciation that today's
    Reserve personnel have the competence, dedication, and leadership that
    make them indistinguishable from their active-duty counterparts.

                    IMPROVING JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES

        The U.S. Armed Forces' ability to conduct joint warfare is better
    today than anytime in our history, due in part to the tremendous
    support of Congress. Nonetheless, many challenges remain. Our joint
    team is comprised of the individual warfighting capabilities of the
    services. To improve our joint warfighting capability, we must maximize
    the capabilities and effects of the separate units and weapons systems
    to accomplish the mission at hand--without regard to the color of the
    uniforms of those who employ them. This challenge demands that we
    integrate service core competencies together in such a way that makes
    the whole greater than the sum of its parts. Our operational
    architectures must be inclusive and not exclusive in terms of
    capabilities and desired effects. We must integrate--not deconflict--
    our operations.
        To support these efforts, on 1 October 2002, we changed the mission
    and focus of JFCOM. Today, the men and women of JFCOM concentrate on
    improving our Joint Warfighting capability as we transform to meet the
    challenges of the 21st century. In the future, they will be converting
    strategy and policy guidance into fielded capabilities at the
    operational level through the development of joint concepts and
    integrated architectures.
        JFCOM is contributing to the efforts that develop and define the
    Joint Operations Concept, and the related operational concepts, that
    will link our defense strategy and our emerging Joint Vision with
    service operational concepts. It will help senior military and civilian
    leaders synchronize service modernization, guide experimentation and
    inform acquisition strategies that will guide materiel and non-material
    improvements for the joint force. In support of this effort, JFCOM
    conducts joint experimentation to validate the operational utility of
    joint concepts. The results will drive changes across all areas of
    doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education,
    personnel and facilities.
        To improve joint warfare, we must focus on improving the accuracy
    and timeliness of the Combatant Commanders information used to command
    and control the joint force. With shared information, commanders can
    integrate discrete capabilities; without it, they must segregate
    operations into time and space. For these reasons, we must emphasize
    the Joint Operations Concept to solve the interoperability challenges
    of our legacy command and control, communication, and computer systems
    and ensure future systems are ``born joint.''
        JFCOM is working aggressively towards our goal of seamless C\4\ISR
    interoperability by fiscal year 2008. To achieve that goal, JFCOM will
    set the operational requirements and prioritize the integrated
    architectures under development for future battle management command
    and control systems. In addition, JFCOM will exercise oversight and
    directive authority of three major interoperability efforts: the
    Deployable Joint Command and Control system, Single Integrated Air
    Picture, and Family of Interoperable Operational Pictures. The Services
    and Defense agencies, in coordination with JFCOM, will retain
    acquisition authority for these and all other battle management command
    and control programs and initiatives.
        We are convinced that the Deployable Joint Command and Control
    system under development by the Navy is the materiel and technological
    solution to provide intelligence processing, mission planning, and
    control of combat operations for the standing joint force headquarters.
    The first Deployable Joint Command and Control suite is scheduled for
    delivery in fiscal year 2005. Together with the Air Force's Family of
    Interoperable Operational Pictures, the Army's Single Integrated Air
    Picture, and JFCOM's Joint Interoperability and Integration programs,
    this effort will allow the joint force to truly transform the way it
    plans, coordinates, and executes joint operations. We need continued
    congressional support for these critical battle management command and
    control programs.
        Our experiences in Afghanistan illustrated how important timely and
    responsive command and control was to control sea, land, and air forces
    in areas with primitive or nonexistent communications infrastructures.
    To meet this challenge in the Arabian Gulf area of operations, CENTCOM
    deployed a prototype battle management command and control system to
    support its Internal Look exercise in Qatar and for potential future
    operations. DOD will leverage the lessons learned from this prototype
    to help guide the development of future battle management command and
    control systems.
        We must also develop command and control systems that can rapidly
    deploy anywhere in the world, to support joint and coalition forces
    with ``plug and play'' ease and that are also scalable to respond to
    changing circumstances. Programs such as the Joint Tactical Radio
    System, Mobile User Objective System, and the Joint Command and Control
    capability (the follow-on to Global Command and Control System) are
    systems that were truly ``born joint.'' We also must ensure that we
    have the necessary military satellite communications systems that can
    provide the high bandwidth required to support our forces in austere
    environments such as Afghanistan.
        The role of command, control, communications, computers,
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance underscores the
    importance of managing and developing the radio frequency spectrum.
    Highly mobile, widely dispersed forces require significant radio
    frequency spectrum to operate effectively and efficiently. This
    military requirement is increasing at the same time that the private
    sector's demand for spectrum is growing. While it is important to
    provide additional spectrum to meet growing industry requirements, we
    must ensure the availability of spectrum to provide future military
    requirements.
        In today's dynamic strategic environment, events in one area may
    quickly affect events in another. This reality requires a more
    responsive planning process to capitalize on the improved C\4\ networks
    and where deliberate- and crisis-action planning complement each other.
    Improvements in war planning are required to close the time gap between
    deliberate- and crisis-action planning. These initiatives range from
    changing doctrine to developing new automated planning tools for Time-
    Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) development. The Joint Staff, in
    collaboration with the Combatant Commanders' staff, is developing a
    single shared planning process for deliberate and crisis planning. This
    initiative will develop tools and processes to reduce the deliberate
    planning cycle, facilitate the transition to crisis planning, and
    exploit new technology to respond to evolving world affairs. The end
    results will be greatly improved flexibility for the President and the
    Secretary of Defense.
        Improving Joint Warfighting requires more than technical solutions.
    My exercise program supports the Combatant Commanders' ability to
    sharpen our soldier, sailor, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen's
    warfighting edge. It enables operational commanders to better train
    their battle staffs and forces in joint and combined operations while
    evaluating their war plans. It also allows DOD to enhance and evaluate
    interoperability among the Services. Exercises focusing on strategic,
    national, and theater-level joint tasks consistently challenge leaders
    throughout DOD, interagency and allies with timely and relevant
    scenarios--including terrorism, cyber attack, continuity of government,
    and operations. Routinely, these exercises provide access to critical
    bases of operation around the world as venues for practicing impending
    joint/combined operations. These exercises also allow the opportunity
    to enhance the capabilities of the military forces of allied nations
    and ensure their continued support in the war on terrorism. The U.S.
    military is advancing and transforming at a rate that greatly outpaces
    our allies. We must work hard to help them close that gap.
        Since fiscal year 1996, the number of joint exercises decreased
    from 277 to 191. This resulted from the reduction of joint exercise
    transportation funds to $319 million. In order to balance operational
    and exercise requirements, DOD limits C-17 support to 34,000 equivalent
    flying hours and roll-on/roll-off ships to 1,100 steaming days. Any
    further decrease in funding will force major reductions or
    cancellations of high-priority joint/combined exercises and have a
    detrimental impact on our joint warfighting capability.
        The Defense Department will establish a Joint National Training
    Capability to support joint operations by leveraging live, virtual, and
    constructive technologies. As a first step, the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Personnel and Readiness and I will identify specific
    capabilities for the establishment of the Joint National Training
    Capability by 1 October 2004. The Joint National Training Capability
    will then exercise DOD's ability to execute key joint training tasks
    through several scheduled annual events.
        We must improve our joint warfighting capabilities by learning from
    previous operations. The Combatant Commands, Services, and Joint Staff
    continue to capture and apply lessons learned from Operation Enduring
    Freedom. One of the key lessons learned was the positive impact Theater
    Security Cooperation had on our operations in Afghanistan. It helped
    create the foundation that allowed our air, naval, and ground forces to
    gain access to the region's airspace and basing. Another valuable
    lesson was the tremendous force multiplier of merging Special
    Operations Forces on the ground with space forces' communications and
    navigation capabilities to the air and naval forces' precision attack
    capabilities.
        In addition to meeting other objectives, Joint Professional
    Military Education is one means to ensure that future warfighters
    capitalize on the lessons of the past to improve joint warfighting.
    Joint Professional Military Education develops U.S. military leaders
    capable of executing the war on terrorism, improving joint warfighting,
    and transforming the force. Currently there is an ongoing
    congressionally-mandated independent study of Joint Officer Management
    and Joint Professional Military Education. This study will provide
    valuable insights on ways to improve and expand joint officer
    development. We anticipate completion of this study in early 2003.
        In concert with the independent study, the Joint Staff is also
    exploring ways to improve Joint Officer Management and Joint
    Professional Military Education. We identified requirements to provide
    joint distance-learning programs to our Reserve components and to
    active duty Non-Commissioned Officers to improve their expertise in
    joint operations. In a similar fashion, I directed the National Defense
    University to revise the CAPSTONE curriculum for newly selected Flag
    and General Officers. My goal is to ensure our new Flag and General
    Officers gain a better foundation of joint, interagency, and multi-
    national operations at the operational level.
        I charged the Joint Staff with developing recommendations for
    several areas of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional
    Military Education that I believe need to be revised. We need one set
    of effective and enforceable rules for how the Services assign and
    manage joint billets. We must also bring the tour length requirements
    and recognition of joint credit in line with current operations. The
    Combatant Commanders and I should be the driving force in the
    production of Joint Specialty Officers. Finally, my goal is to make the
    annual report to Congress a more meaningful set of metrics that more
    accurately reports each Service's support of the joint community. We
    look forward to working with you and your staffs this year, to
    incorporate these changes along with those of the independent study.
        In addition, joint doctrine provides the foundation for joint
    education, training, and exercises. We are developing joint doctrine
    for Homeland Security, Civil Support, Joint Close Air Support, Joint
    Planning, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield
    Explosives Consequence Management; and Intelligence Support to
    Targeting. The new Joint Doctrine Electronic Information System ensures
    the warfighters have the most current joint doctrine. This system also
    provides joint doctrine to education and training audiences. Joint
    doctrine continues to improve the readiness of the joint warfighter to
    operate effectively and efficiently in a complex operational
    environment.

                    TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES

        As the U.S. military meets the challenges of the 21st century, we
    must transform how we organize, support, and fight as joint
    warfighters. Transforming the joint force requires embracing
    intellectual, cultural, as well as technological, change. We are in the
    process of revising our Joint Vision. This new vision will provide a
    broad description of what our Armed Forces must and can become. From
    our Joint Vision and the Defense Strategy, we are crafting a Joint
    Operations Concept. It will link the tasks given our Armed Forces to
    the Joint Vision, joint operating concepts, and Joint Warfighter
    architectures. These joint concepts and architectures will provide
    further guidance to each Service.
        In its broadest sense, the Joint Operations Concept will describe
    how the joint force will operate, while helping transform the U.S.
    Armed Forces to a capabilities-based force.
        The Joint Operations Concept cannot shape the future joint force
    alone. It requires experimentation and assessment to determine the
    value of the Service and joint warfighting concepts in the context of
    future joint operations and the future environment. From these efforts,
    we will identify the doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
    leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities changes needed to
    create the future joint force. In this manner, we can scrutinize
    current capabilities and proposed systems to highlight gaps and
    identify overlapping capabilities.
        Using these architectures, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    will implement methodologies to assess both legacy and proposed systems
    in the aggregate. As a result, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
    will define and validate desired joint capabilities and derive mission
    area requirements. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council shall
    consider the full range of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel,
    leadership and education, personnel, and facilities solutions to
    advance joint warfighting. In this manner, the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council will further reorient our force planning to a
    capabilities-based framework. The Joint Operations Concept will allow
    the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to adopt a synchronized,
    collaborative, and integrated systems engineering approach to sizing
    and shaping our forces.
        In support of our transformation efforts, JFCOM spearheaded the
    Nation's first major joint field experiment with Millennium Challenge
    02. Millennium Challenge 02 demonstrated a variety of new concepts and
    systems that enabled critical command and control, collaborative
    information sharing, and time-sensitive targeting capabilities. These
    systems are essential to the fielding of the Standing Joint Force
    Headquarters. While Millennium Challenge 02 focused on materiel
    capabilities, it yielded insights critical for non-materiel changes in
    doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education,
    personnel, and facilities.
        One example was the Joint Fires Initiative, which offered an
    interim automated capability to manage time-sensitive target
    engagement. The Joint Fires Initiative enabled the Joint Task Force,
    Component Commanders and their staffs to use available information
    technology, web-based collaborative tools to accelerate the joint
    force's ability to identify, attack, and assess priority targets. It
    blended intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources,
    combat units and Commanders' decision processes to permit real-time
    execution.
        A second initiative in Millennium Challenge 02 was Joint Enroute
    Mission Planning and Rehearsal System--Near Term. This system enables
    Theater and Joint Task Force Commanders to remain connected with their
    forward and rear headquarters when enroute to or from contingency
    locations. It permits a wide scale of communications and collaborative
    tools to prevent a ``leadership blackout'' during a commander's travel.
        The Joint Fires Initiative and Joint Enroute Mission Planning and
    Rehearsal System--Near Term are part of fielding a broader
    Collaborative Information Environment. Today's Collaborative
    Information Environment is powered by high-speed connectivity and real-
    time collaborative tools to share information in an unprecedented
    manner. This environment will permit commanders to receive more
    accurate information faster. As such, it will be critical part for U.S.
    forces to operate faster than our adversaries.
        To meet this challenge, the joint force must have access to
    superior information. This requires long-term investment to meet the
    demands of responsive, targeted, intrusive, and persistent collection.
    Our current operational environment and the nature of these dynamic
    threats demand that our joint force have the real-time ability to
    monitor, track, characterize, and report on moving objects and events.
    We must capitalize on emerging technology such as small, expendable
    satellites, and long-dwell UAVs. These promising platforms will enable
    the joint force to gain persistent surveillance. The information gained
    from these platforms must not flow into stovepipes, but must be part of
    a ``system of systems'' that blends with human and technical data from
    strategic, theater, tactical, and commercial programs.
        With this improved and more complete data, the Intelligence
    Community must develop tools to assist in information management that
    can accommodate ``analytic discovery'' and data visualization
    techniques. Our military intelligence community requires a highly
    skilled work force trained to mine, manipulate, integrate, and display
    relevant information. To effectively employ these collection
    opportunities, new techniques and tools must be developed.
        While we are expending considerable effort to make sure we procure
    systems that are interoperable across the Services, we must continue
    placing emphasis on systems that allow interoperability with our
    allies. A way to do this is to allow allies to participate in many of
    our procurement projects. This will have the dual advantage of helping
    to lower project cost to the American taxpayer and increasing
    interoperability with those allied forces that will accompany us into
    the breach. The Joint Strike Fighter reflects one success story of
    allied and U.S. combined procurement. The Joint Strike Fighter set the
    standard for how we should approach new procurements, welcoming key
    allied participation in the development and production of future
    systems. Such an acquisition strategy will increase interoperability,
    help allied transformation, and reduce direct U.S. development costs.
        Transforming military forces to meet a dynamic 21st century
    security environment is not a unique American task. At the Prague
    summit, NATO leaders agreed to establish an allied command for
    transformation in Norfolk, Virginia. The proposed NATO Command will
    work with JFCOM. This close and cooperative relationship will allow the
    U.S. and our NATO allies to keep abreast of advances in contemporary
    warfare.
        Our efforts to improve our allies' warfighting capabilities reach
    far beyond NATO. The Combatant Commanders and I share the Secretary of
    Defense's vision of a long-term plan to balance burden sharing,
    leverage U.S. technological superiority and use a proactive Theater
    Security Cooperation strategy to transform allied forces into lethal,
    offensive-minded, combined-arms forces. This initiative is as much
    about doctrine, warfighting mindset and organizational structure as it
    is about platforms and weapon systems. Theater Security Cooperation
    will allow the U.S. to modify force structure and posture to optimize
    the mobility, lethality, and interoperability of our forward forces.

                                   CONCLUSION

        With Congress' support, this past year we have made progress in the
    war on terrorism, specifically, and overall capabilities. Al Qaeda and
    their global network were not created in a single day, but over a
    decade. At the same time, the Nation's Armed Forces must be prepared
    for other threats to our interests. Confronting them will require
    determined and disciplined use of all instruments of American power.
    Congressional support ensures that our military forces are the most
    competent and capable military tools possible.
        The men and women of our Armed Forces have performed in a
    magnificent manner this past year. They stand ready for the challenges
    ahead. They deserve our best efforts in training, equipping, and caring
    for them and their families. Thank you for the opportunity to provide
    my report on our Nation's finest--our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and coastguardsmen.

        Chairman Warner. General, let me initiate the first
    questions here for a 6-minute round. We have excellent
    attendance by our committee.
        So I start with you, General, and I ask for just a short
    answer to this question, which is important to this record. Is
    it your professional judgment that the Armed Forces which are
    under your supervision are prepared to meet any contingency for
    the use of force that may be required in Iraq and/or Korea, and
    hopefully will not be required in either Iraq and/or Korea, and
    to continue the high level of activity against worldwide
    terrorism?
        General Myers. I will give you a real short answer.
    Absolutely.
        Chairman Warner. Now Mr. Secretary, it was reported in the
    press this morning that Secretary Powell appeared before
    committees of Congress yesterday and said that an Army general
    would be the person that would be placed in charge should we
    have to use force in the Iraqi situation and in the aftermath
    of what we all anticipate would be a successful military
    operation.
        The distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee, Senator Lugar, is reported to say we are way behind
    here, between the administration and Congress, in understanding
    what would take place in the aftermath of such use of force.
        Now in my judgment, our President has in a very courageous
    and proper manner pursued the diplomatic route to resolve this
    problem in Iraq. He is continuing to do that with the
    leadership of the Prime Minister of Great Britain and other
    world leaders. I think progress is being made. We will know
    more after tomorrow's report by Hans Blix. But it is clear that
    we have forward deployed our forces first and foremost to
    support the diplomatic efforts. Diplomacy will not succeed
    unless it is clearly perceived by the enemy that frankly we
    mean business if diplomacy fails. So I commend the President
    and others.
        But I think given that we are about to go out for a recess
    here in a week or so amidst a rapid progression of events, that
    should force be used to bring a conclusion to that conflict,
    what is the likely scenario involving your Department? Will
    other militaries of the world be involved and is it just a role
    of security or will the U.S. military be placed in a position
    of a high commissioner and/or governor of some type of the
    territory of Iraq in order to keep the integrity of that
    territory as it exists now?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, let me take a few moments
    to try to respond to that. The Government has spent a good deal
    of time over many months thinking these various elements
    through. The answer to your question depends to some extent on
    what takes place. Your question suggested no decision has been
    made to use force but in the event force were used, it could
    happen in several ways.
        For example, Saddam Hussein could leave today, and the
    question would be how does the United States then act to see
    that the principal goals of the United States are achieved,
    namely that the weapons of mass destruction are found and
    destroyed, that they're disarmed. That whatever government
    takes over is a government that does not develop weapons of
    mass destruction, the government does not help terrorists, does
    not threaten its neighbors, and puts the country on a path
    towards appropriate representation and protection for the
    various religious and minority elements in the country. Those
    are the principal goals.
        So that is one way it could happen, he could leave. Another
    way is that he could leave and turn it over to somebody else
    who is equally unacceptable. Another way would be that someone
    could help him leave and take over control. A third is that
    force would have to be used. Depending on what happened and the
    circumstance in the country, we would determine how long and in
    what role the military would have to play.
        Clearly, the goal would be to go in and see that what
    resulted was better than what was there beforehand. That means
    that the United States simply has to be willing to stay there
    as long as is necessary to see that that is done, but not one
    day longer. We have no interest in other people's land or
    territory. We have no interest in other people's oil, as some
    articles seem to suggest. So exactly how long it would be and
    what it would look like would vary.
        The principles that would pertain insofar as the Department
    of Defense is concerned: First, we would have military
    capability in there sufficient to find and destroy the weapons
    of mass destruction and to find and deal with any terrorist
    networks that exist in the country, which we know is the case.
    It would be my goal to internationalize it as rapidly as
    possible, to have other countries participate. Very likely the
    participation would be in the humanitarian, civil, and
    reconstruction areas earliest, as opposed to finding the
    weapons of mass destruction, for example. There just are not a
    lot of countries that really would be involved in that that I
    can think of, although we would welcome help from a number that
    have already offered assistance.
        The next task would be to put the country on a transition
    so that the outsiders are not running it. That means you would
    have to find a way to see that the Iraqi opposition from the
    outside, the Iraqis from the inside who had not been a party to
    the repressiveness of this regime, and the weapons of mass
    destruction programs of this regime would in a different way
    have an Iraqi solution, just as Afghanistan had an Afghanistan
    solution. So the goal would be to get them on a path so that
    increasingly more and more was handled and managed by the Iraqi
    people themselves and that less and less was managed by the
    international community.
        Chairman Warner. I think your response reflects that we
    have given this a good deal of consideration and that we have
    clear plans in place and are ready to proceed.
        Quickly to a second question, and that involves the very
    disturbing news with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) thus far being unable to reconcile
    differences among the member nations as to NATO's ability to
    provide such security as the government of Turkey feels is
    essential, given the fluidity of this situation. I commend you
    for stepping up to say if NATO doesn't, the U.S. will. That's
    proper.
        But does not this action thus far violate the time tested
    fundamental belief of NATO of over a half century, that an
    attack on one is an attack on all, and could not a persistence
    of this type of policy by member nations begin to erode NATO so
    it becomes a less effective organization?
        Lastly, the United States is the major financial
    contributor to NATO, the major troop contributor, and the major
    technical contributor--particularly the Airborne Warning and
    Control System (AWACS)--and now the American taxpayers will be
    required to foot an additional bill of the costs associated
    with our proper decision to place such forces in the position
    of Turkey to protect their interests. So we're getting hit
    twice as a consequence of the inability of NATO to reconcile
    this issue. Do you have some views?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I do and I expressed them in a
    recent meeting and I might add that a member of the committee,
    Senator McCain, also expressed some opinions over there that
    were very much on the mark, in my view.
        The situation is that the vote was 16 to 3 in favor of
    initiating planning to send defensive capabilities to Turkey so
    that they would be protected. You can't do anything at the last
    minute in life. You have to plan it, you have to get things
    moving, things moved by ship. The position of the three
    countries that it was premature to plan, it seems to me, was
    unfortunate.
        We did say that the United States and the other 16
    countries would step forward and see that Turkey, in fact, had
    AWACS, chem-bio detection, and Patriot batteries. It would not
    be simply the United States that would provide that. We decided
    immediately that Turkey must have those capabilities and we
    must begin the planning. My feeling is that it's unfortunate
    that the three countries have delayed us this long.
        There's no question, as you suggest, that to the extent we
    do not interest ourselves in every 1 of the 19 members, but
    goodness, Turkey is a moderate Muslim country, the only country
    in NATO that borders Iraq. To not behave in a way that
    recognized that and allowed for that planning, I think was most
    unfortunate.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Levin.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, General Myers has some news
    that I didn't have time to read and I will let him comment on
    it.
        General Myers. As we're speaking, I think NATO is also
    looking at ways to deploy the help that Turkey needs, at least
    part of AWACS and the missile defense assets in a way that
    would not require political approval. They think they may have
    that legal authority without going through the political
    process. They are looking at that. There may be an announcement
    here at about 11:00 on those issues.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, the
    administration's Nuclear Posture Review called for improving
    our nuclear weapons capability, and the administration
    requested funds in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to
    study a so-called nuclear penetrator.
        If the United States sends signals that we're considering
    new uses for nuclear weapons, isn't it more likely that other
    nations will also want to explore greater use or new uses for
    nuclear weapons, and that other nations won't listen to our
    pleas to stay non-nuclear or to stay in the nonproliferation
    treaty, but rather would say you're even relying on them more,
    you're looking at new ways to use nuclear weapons, so why
    shouldn't we?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think that the first thing
    we have to say is that the task of the Department of Defense,
    indeed the first responsibility of a President of the United
    States, is to provide for the security of the country. The
    Department of Defense assists the President in developing
    contingency plans and studying a variety of things on a
    continuing basis. To not do so, it seems to me, is to misserve
    the country.
        The world is experiencing an enormous amount of underground
    tunneling and activities, activities underground that are for
    production, for manufacturing, they are for development, for
    storage. The problem of not having visibility into them and
    when one has visibility, not having the ability to penetrate
    and reach them creates a very serious obstacle to U.S. national
    security.
        To the extent that we say to ourselves, that this is going
    to be the ultimate solution, we're unwilling to even study the
    idea of penetrating capability and therefore we make it
    advantageous for people to engage in that type of tunneling, I
    think that it would create an incentive rather than a
    disincentive.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Secretary, Title 10 requires the
    Department of Defense's Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation, which is our independent test authority at the
    Pentagon, to certify that appropriate operational testing has
    been completed prior to putting weapon systems into production.
    That law exists to prevent the production and fielding of a
    weapon system that doesn't work right.
        Your budget request seeks a waiver of the operational
    testing requirements to enable you to implement your plans to
    deploy a national missile defense system in 2004. How do you
    justify bypassing operational testing requirements?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess I would justify it very easily
    in this sense. If you think about it, it is a perfectly
    rational thing to have a testing requirement. So if you take
    the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, for example, and it is
    moving along the track and it has not been fully tested and
    it's not ready for deployment, and you start using it because
    you're in a conflict, you find that it's advantageous to use
    it. In the process of using it you find things that could be
    changed and improved on it. Now it has never been fully
    completed through the process with the stamp of approval of the
    testing organization.
        The same thing happened during Operation Desert Storm as I
    recall, or Kosovo, with JSTAR.
        General Myers. Joint Stars.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Joint Stars, the exact same thing.
        So on the one hand, it makes sense to have the requirement.
    On the other hand, it makes sense to waive it when reasonable
    people look at the situation and say that it's time to do that.
        Now, why do it with respect to missile defense? Well, I
    happen to think that thinking we cannot deploy something until
    you have everything perfect, every I dotted and every T
    crossed, is probably not a good idea. In the case of missile
    defense, I think we need to get something out there in the
    ground, at sea, and in a way that we can test it, we can look
    at it, we can develop it, we can evolve it, and learn from the
    experimentation with it. It happens that it also provides a
    minimal missile defense capability.
        Senator Levin. If it works.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. If it works, of course. The same thing
    with Predator. I mean, Predator--things do not tend to work or
    not work; they tend to work either as well as you hoped or
    somewhere less well than you hoped. In the case of Predator, it
    didn't work or not work, it did an awful lot that was very
    valuable in Afghanistan and is still doing it today, but it
    didn't do a lot of things that it might have done, because
    people didn't ever have that experience in using it, and the
    same thing would be true with missile defense.
        Senator Levin. Thank you. General Myers, we have a copy of
    a draft legislative proposal that has been circulating inside
    the Department of Defense. If this legislation were passed, the
    Joint Staff would report to the Secretary instead of to the
    Chairman, and the Secretary would have to approve all
    appointments to the Joint Staff. The draft amendment would
    strike the statutory requirement that the Joint Staff be
    ``independently organized and operated.'' Then we also have the
    memorandum signed by David Chu requesting a legislative
    proposal be drafted that would reduce the term served by the
    service chiefs from 4 years to 2-year renewable terms.
        It seems to me that these proposals taken together or
    separately would lessen the ability of the uniformed military
    to provide independent military advice to the civilian
    leadership in the executive branch and Congress. That's my
    view, but what is your view of these proposals?
        General Myers. Senator Levin, I'm at a little bit of a
    disadvantage because I haven't seen the drafts yet, and I don't
    know if we will, because the Secretary and I have talked in
    general about how better to arrange ourselves, if there are
    ways to make ourselves more efficient and effective. As far as
    I know, we have just had some preliminary discussions, we've
    talked about maybe having somebody look at this from the
    outside that might be able to provide some help in that area.
        Senator Levin. Would you be supporting these proposals?
        General Myers. Well, I would have to look at them. I have
    not seen the draft proposals. I think the way we're arranged
    today is fundamentally sound, so I'd have to look and see how
    they want to change that.
        Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, do you have a comment on
    that important question?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I haven't seen the draft either,
    and therefore I don't know really how I could comment because I
    am not familiar with it. General Myers and I have talked about
    the way the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense (OSD) function, and in some cases it's my personal view
    that it looks like it duplicates things and requires things to
    go through double chops. At least the thought has been
    expressed to me by a number of people who have looked from the
    outside as to whether there might be a way to merge some of
    those pieces in a way that did not in any way inhibit the
    Chairman's responsibility under the law to be able to provide
    military advice to the President, the National Security
    Council, and the Secretary of Defense. We talked about getting
    together some folks to look at this and examine it.
        Chairman Warner. So you promise to keep Congress and this
    committee fully informed, should this thing begin to take on a
    life of its own?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed. I take it somebody was up
    talking about it already.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to say this
    about the comments by the distinguished Senator from Michigan.
    Every time I hear the argument that we don't want to enhance
    our nuclear capability because they will do the same thing, if
    you carry that to its logical conclusion, if we just disarmed,
    then everyone else would disarm too and we wouldn't have these
    problems.
        I'm very proud of you, Mr. Secretary, for using the words
    that you used. I wrote them down. You said we are in the most
    dangerous security environment the world has ever known, and I
    agree with that. Just yesterday, when Director Tenet called to
    our attention the capabilities of what the North Koreans have
    right now, a missile that could reach the United States of
    America, and we know that they are trading systems and
    technology with countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and
    Pakistan. It's a very frightening thing.
        I carry with me a veto message by former President Clinton
    of our 1996 Defense Authorization Bill wherein he states his
    justification for vetoing it: ``First, the bill requires
    deployment by 2003 of a costly missile defense system able to
    defend all 50 States from a long-range missile threat that our
    intelligence committee does not think exists.'' I wish that
    veto had not taken place.
        I would single out this one thing in here as the most
    significant thing, and I say that not so much as a Senator, but
    my wife and I have 19 kids and grandkids, and I am deeply,
    gravely concerned. Do you feel that this budget give you all
    the money necessary for you to get something deployed against a
    missile attack, at least a partial missile attack, or do you
    need something more in there? Can you share with us what you
    have?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we spent a good deal of time
    looking at the issues of missile defense of various ranges:
    short, medium, and ICBM range. We ended up creating a budget
    that we believe at this state of our knowledge is appropriate.
    It will do what I said. It will give us something in the ground
    that will serve as a test bed so we can evolve it. It will give
    us the capability to look at the sea based option, which I
    believe is important. It will also give us as a result of that
    test bed some minimal capability. To have gone further at this
    stage, we felt would have been invalid. So I'm comfortable with
    this level of funding in this particular instance.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General
    Myers, I chair the Environment and Public Works Committee and
    there's an issue that will come before it and this committee
    and that is encroachment on our ranges. I guess going a little
    overboard on my concern on our ability to train our kids, I was
    deeply concerned when you took away the live-fire training
    capability at Vieques. At the UDARI range in Kuwait, we lost
    five lives, four of whom were Americans, and the accident
    report said that they did not have that live-fire training. I
    look at what the environmental encroachment is doing to our
    different ranges.
        Just a few minutes ago, I had General Kelley from the
    Marines talking about Camp Lejeune and Pendleton. Right now,
    only 30 percent of Camp Pendleton can be used for training. At
    Camp Lejeune, the red cockaded woodpecker is using up so much
    of the range.
        You are such good stewards of the environment that you're
    your own worst enemy because the better job you do, the more
    endangered species there are out there. I am very much
    concerned about it and I would like to have you share with us
    very briefly your concern. I do have one quote that you made
    which is rather lengthy, so I know what your concern is. Would
    you do that briefly?
        General Myers. Senator Inhofe, I will try to do it as
    briefly as I can. I don't think you can be too concerned about
    this subject. I think the best quality of life you can provide
    for our Armed Forces is proper training so if they are used in
    combat or peacekeeping or whatever, they are prepared for that
    task. Some of the uses of the environmental laws that we see
    today, where groups will now bring the Department of Defense
    into court, were never intended, I don't think, by the folks
    who drafted the environmental protection statutes. They can
    bring us into court and can stop training, whether it's
    aircraft or land or on the sea for that matter, and it can be
    very detrimental to our effectiveness and in the end will put
    our men and women in harm's way simply because they haven't
    been properly trained.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. I know before this
    committee a couple years ago, they testified that we were
    spending more money in Camp Lejeune to protect the species than
    we were on ammunition. It has to be addressed and I'm hoping
    that we will be doing that.
        Lastly, Secretary Rumsfeld, when you go back, and I'm going
    from memory now, but as I recall in terms of percentage of GDP,
    during the entire 20th century, during each year at peace,
    defense spending represented 5.7 percent of GDP. We went down
    to an all time low during the Clinton administration of about
    2.8 percent. Even with this enhanced budget it's only 3.3
    percent. When you look at the proliferation that's out there
    and the fact that maybe we should relook at our strategy, maybe
    we should be able to defend America on three regional fronts.
    But as you have looked at this and look into the future in
    terms of a percentage of GDP, what do you see in the future,
    number one? Number two, in spite of all the problems you have
    right now, will you be considering that?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it's something that someone in
    our position has to consider. It is hard to fully appreciate
    the magnitude of the change that's taken place in terms of our
    security and the difficulty. If one just takes the intelligence
    task, we had the luxury, it sounds funny to use the word
    luxury, of watching the Soviet Union, a closed society, and not
    having to worry about very many other things. We could learn
    about it, know about it, and over time we found it quite
    predictable.
        Today we're dealing with not one target for intelligence,
    but dozens. We're looking at ungoverned areas all across the
    globe where the governments simply do not control their own
    real estate. We're dealing with countries that are every bit as
    closed or more closed than the Soviet Union was. We're getting
    information on North Korea, for example, that is just
    enormously difficult.
        So instead of at the end of the Cold War dropping the intel
    budgets down and changing the projection by some $35 billion
    over that period, I'm told, from what the pre-Cold War budgets
    had been directed or projected to be for intelligence, it's
    something like $35 billion less, while the task has gotten much
    greater. So the question is, how do we adjust our thinking in
    that regard and how do we see that we gain the kinds of
    knowledge and information and have the kinds of not just
    technological but human intelligence capabilities? That's true
    in other areas as well. I just take that one example since it's
    such an important one.
        Senator Inhofe. I thank both of you for your courageous
    answers. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. We
    are of course proceeding under the early bird rule, and the
    first early bird to arrive this morning was our distinguished
    Senator from Massachusetts.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
    join as I am sure all of us do with the words of Senator Levin
    in commending you, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, for all
    that you're doing for the service men and women of this
    country. It is enormously impressive.
        Let me move to the issue I mentioned prior to the start of
    these hearings, Mr. Secretary, and that is the Nuclear Posture
    Review. Many of us are concerned about the position of the
    administration on nuclear weapons. Over the last half century
    we have made great strides on arms control. We signed the
    Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the ABM Treaty, the
    START-I Treaty, and the START-II Treaty, creating an arms
    control regime that has successfully prevented the use of
    nuclear weapons for more than half a century.
        Despite this progress, the Bush administration seems to be
    taking us in a new direction. The administration has presented
    a Nuclear Posture Review that suggests grave changes in our
    policy on the use of nuclear weapons and the dangers that this
    administration may well be igniting a new arms race.
        Under the Nuclear Posture Review as reported in The Los
    Angeles Times January 25, Strategic Command is developing plans
    for the use of nuclear weapons against nations like Iraq that
    do not have nuclear weapons. They mention other countries as
    well, such as Syria, Libya, and Iran.
        As you well understand, a nuclear weapon is not just
    another weapon in an arsenal. Until now we have always kept
    them in a class of their own for good reasons, because of their
    enormous destructive power and our profound commitment to do
    all we can to see that they are never used again. So wouldn't
    the action in the Nuclear Posture Review violate a long-held
    commitment under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty to not
    attacking non-nuclear states that are not aligned with nuclear
    states?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I have no idea what you're
    reading from, but I----
        Senator Kennedy. Well, the Nuclear Posture Review----
        Secretary Rumsfeld. No, no, the news article.
        Senator Kennedy. That's what I'm referring to, a very well
    publicized article titled: ``U.S. Weighs Tactical Nuclear
    Strike in Iraq.'' There have been exchanges on it.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exchanges between who and whom? I never
    heard of this article.
        Senator Kennedy. All right. But you're familiar with the
    Nuclear Posture Review?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. You bet. We spent 18 months developing
    it.
        Senator Kennedy. Did they also consider in the
    administration's classified Nuclear Posture Review that said
    nuclear weapons should be considered against targets able to
    withstand conventional attack, in retaliation for an attack, in
    retaliation for attacks with nuclear, chemical, or biological
    weapons, or in the event of surprising military developments?
    It identified seven countries--China, Russia, Iraq, North
    Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria as possible targets. That's in
    it. If you're not familiar with it, I will move on.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me just make a quick comment.
        Senator Kennedy. Okay.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Our policy historically has been
    generally that we will not foreclose the possible use of
    nuclear weapons if attacked. If you think back to Europe, we
    always said we would not agree to a ``no first use policy''
    because we would have to defend against overwhelming
    conventional capability.
        The second thing we've had as a general policy of our
    country is not to rule out various options.
        The third thing we have as a record is that those weapons,
    as you said, have not been fired in anger since 1945.
        Does the Department have an obligation and have they in
    successive administrations of both political parties had
    procedures whereby we would conceivably use nuclear weapons?
    Yes.
        Senator Kennedy. Well, I thought also there were assurances
    about non-first use against countries that didn't have nuclear
    weapons, that that was included as well.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm familiar with that.
        Senator Kennedy. All right. There have been such countries
    included, as I understand it, in the Nuclear Posture Review.
    That's a change, and that's what I'm asking about.
        But let me just go on. Is the United States seriously
    considering using any nuclear weapons against Iraq?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The United States has historically had
    strategic offensive nuclear weapons and theater nuclear
    weapons. As a part of contingency planning, the United States
    has in my adult lifetime always had contingency plans to do a
    variety of things. The question you asked was not that. The
    question you asked was are we seriously considering something.
    The only person in the United States who has the power to use
    weapons of that nature is the President of the United States.
    It seems to me that if one looks at our record, we went through
    the Korean War, we went through the Vietnam War, we've gone
    through the war on terror and we have not used nuclear weapons.
    That ought to say something about the threshold with respect to
    nuclear weapons.
        Senator Kennedy. On February 4, Richard Pearl, Chairman of
    the Defense Policy Board, stated that he believed the military
    can win in Iraq with precision bombs, that is his position
    about it.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That's my position.
        Senator Kennedy. In the House of Commons, Prime Minister
    Blair said, ``the notion that we have plans to use nuclear
    weapons in Iraq is completely false.'' Would you agree with
    that statement?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I agree with the statement
    made that we have every confidence that in the event force is
    to be used in Iraq, that we could do what needs to be done
    using conventional capabilities.
        Senator Kennedy. Well, just to finish, Mr. Chairman, I'm
    concerned that the use of nuclear weapons in Iraq in the
    absence of an imminent overwhelming threat to our national
    security would bring a near total breakdown in our relations
    with the rest of the world, particularly in regards to the Arab
    world.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, Senator, I'd like to just make
    sure the record is very clear here. You have raised a very
    sensitive subject and the implication of it from the article is
    that there is a likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used.
    I think that implication is an unfortunate one.
        Senator Kennedy. Okay. Well, last year the Republicans
    attempted to repeal the restrictions on nuclear weapons with a
    yield of five kilotons or less, the so-called ``mini-nukes.''
    Now what is your position on that? Are you for continuing the
    Spratt amendment or are you for repealing it? That is the one
    that has had the prohibition about research and development
    below the five kilotons. That's a fairly good indication as
    well as to where the administration is thinking.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't think it is.
        Senator Kennedy. It may not for you but it certainly is for
    many of us, if you're thinking of repealing what has been now
    for a number of years the restrictions for no testing below
    certain kinds of kilotons because of the increased possible use
    of them and the dangers of the proliferation of small weapons
    like this, getting into the hands of terrorists. Those are
    serious policy issues and questions. We were going to continue
    the Spratt moratorium, that would certainly send a signal. If
    you are for changing or altering that, that would certainly be
    an indicator of a changed position of the administration.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, your question is important but we
    are way over time. I wonder if the Secretary could answer that
    for the record.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I would be happy to. I think it's
    terribly important to distinguish between the process of
    research and development and analysis, as opposed to the
    process of development and deployment, let alone use of a
    weapon. Those distinctions, it seems to me, get blurred in a
    discussion like this, and I think they need to be in very
    separate boxes.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The law that the administration has asked Congress to repeal is the
    so-called Precision Low-Yield Weapon Development (PLYWD) law
    (Sec. 3136, PL 103-160). The PLYWD law prohibits research that could
    lead to the development or production of a new low-yield warhead with a
    yield at or below 5 Kt. This law is a serious impediment to
    intellectual and technical research to explore and understand the
    capability of low-yield options in conjunction with advanced technology
    to place existing or emerging WMD facilities at risk with relatively
    low-levels of collateral damage. Conducting research on potential new
    weapons utilizing new technologies will enhance deterrence, not lower
    the nuclear threshold.
        Repealing the law does not reflect a change in policy; low-yield
    nuclear weapons are not new. The U.S. has had low-yield nuclear weapons
    for decades. Repeal of the so-called PLYWD law falls far short of
    committing the United States to developing, producing, and deploying
    new, low-yield warheads. Such warhead concepts could not proceed to
    full-scale development, much less production and deployment, unless
    Congress authorizes and appropriates the substantial funds required to
    do this.
        Conducting research and development to hold at risk facilities
    associated with weapons of mass destruction will not undermine our
    efforts to limit proliferation internationally. Nations seek and
    develop nuclear capabilities to address their regional security
    concerns, not because the U.S. has low-yield nuclear weapons. Quite the
    opposite is true. An effective U.S. deterrent would help deter
    potential aggressors from trying to acquire WMD or threatening its use
    against U.S. territory, troops, allies, and friends.
        Today, as well as in the future, the U.S. cannot predict with
    confidence what nations or non-state actors may pose a threat to our
    vital interests or those of our allies. The U.S. must possess forces
    sufficient to dissuade and deter any potential adversary armed with WMD
    and to assure our allies and friends of our commitment to their
    security. Research and development aimed at finding ways to place
    threatening facilities such as those associated with WMD at risk are
    fully consistent with maintaining an effective deterrent. Just because
    a nuclear weapon has a relatively low yield, compared to the so-called
    ``hard target killers'' from the Cold War, does not make them any
    easier to use. During the height of the Cold War, the U.S. possessed
    many types of low yield weapons. Deterrence worked; none were used. As
    with all nuclear weapons, the President is the sole authority for
    employment. A president would consider use of any nuclear weapon only
    in the most grave situations.

        Chairman Warner. The Senator from Maine.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, at
    the same time that we are deploying troops around the globe for
    the war against terrorism, as well as to prepare for a
    potential war in Iraq, we have a number of existing deployments
    that continue to require extensive resources to maintain. We
    have, for example, some 37,000 troops in Korea and more than
    70,000 troops in Germany. With the increasing demands on our
    military, I believe that it is time for us to reevaluate the
    need for those existing deployments.
        For instance, our large presence in Germany is largely a
    legacy of the Cold War, and arguably, that threat no longer
    exists. Is the Department reexamining the need for large
    deployments in Germany and Korea?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the President asked me, when
    he asked me to serve as Secretary of Defense, to review our
    defense posture and our circumstance around the world. We have
    been doing that. There is no question but that the arrangements
    of our current force deployments have an advantage in that they
    are forward deployed and they serve to reassure the world and
    the nations that we have the ability to deter and defend
    against various types of threats.
        It is quite clear to me that you're correct, that the
    deployments we have, for example, in Korea, which is one of the
    places you mentioned, can be reviewed in cooperation with the
    South Korean government and, as a matter of fact, the new
    President of South Korea has suggested that we look at our
    relationship and see that we rebalance it in some way, and I
    have accepted that invitation. We had previously been looking
    at it on a private basis, a unilateral basis, and General
    LaPorte has been working on it now for many months and we will
    very soon, as soon as the new government is in place, begin
    somewhat more formal discussions about how we can ensure the
    defense of the peninsula and still have--for one thing, I would
    like to see a number of our forces moved away from the Seoul
    area and from the area near the de-militarized zone (DMZ), and
    be more oriented towards an air hub and a sea hub, with the
    ability to reinforce so that there is still a strong deterrent.
    Possibly with our improved capabilities of moving people, some
    of those forces come back home. We'll see.
        Now General Jones in Europe is doing the same thing. There
    is no question but that right now, for example, we're trying to
    move some forces from Germany down to Italy, and Austria is
    causing a difficulty with respect to moving the forces through
    Austria by rail, which means we may have to go up to Rotterdam
    or possibly by train through two or three or four countries
    instead of directly.
        Therefore, it's clear that it's better for us probably not
    to have such a heavy concentration. I think it would, however,
    be a mistake to suggest that if we do end up reducing some of
    those forces or moving them to other countries, that it had
    anything to do with our relationships with those countries,
    because it simply doesn't. It is something that we have been
    involved in over many months now and are in the process of
    working with other countries on.
        Senator Collins. I would now like to turn to the
    shipbuilding budget, which will probably come as no surprise to
    you. I'm pleased that the fiscal year 2004 budget submission
    appears to turn the corner on shipbuilding and it is a marked
    improvement over last year. However, even with budgeting for 7
    ships, the Navy's fleet is still going to drop, as you
    indicated, below 300 ships in the coming years. The Chief of
    Naval Operations (CNO) has repeatedly testified, and I talked
    to him just recently, that our Nation requires a fleet of 375
    ships in order to fulfill all of the Navy's mission
    requirements.
        Now I appreciate your testimony that you don't want to lock
    the Department into a shipbuilding program until you're certain
    what kinds of ships you need and what the mix should be. But
    how are you going to remedy the deficit we have in coming years
    if we don't start making more of that investment now? Again, I
    applaud you for putting 7 ships in, that's a big improvement
    over 5 of last year, but it still is not at the rate we need,
    which is more like 10 or 11 ships a year.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, this is a tough area and we
    are pleased that the numbers are coming up but we're
    disappointed that the total number of ships are going to drop
    below 300 for a period, and then be back up by the end of the
    forward year of the defense plan.
        The CNO is an enormously able man who is doing a superb job
    for the country, Adm. Vernon Clark. I know he has testified to
    the number 375 for a number of years, if I'm not mistaken. We
    have a group of people that are looking at doing a shipbuilding
    study and analyzing not just numbers but, more importantly,
    types of ships and capabilities of ships: lethality, what they
    bring. That study, I don't know when it will be through. You're
    involved in it, Dov.
        Dr. Zakheim. Senator, we're looking specifically at issues
    like amphibious shipping, forcible entry, and also underwater
    requirements. Senator, we have research and development money
    for a new Littoral combat ship. That's why we have some
    confidence that as the numbers begin to really go up in the
    outyears, like 2009, that those are real numbers because those
    ships are going to be much less expensive.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Mr.
    Secretary, let me commend you for your representation of our
    country. You had not only remarkable eloquence but remarkable
    restraint, and both were noted.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm not noted for restraint.
        Senator Reed. I agree. [Laughter.]
        As we all understand, the American public is terribly
    concerned about developments around the globe and even within
    the United States with the heightened alerts, with conflicts
    potentially in the Persian Gulf, and with the war on terror.
    They're also a bit confused. As I go back to my home State of
    Rhode Island, one of the confusing elements is the apparent
    disparate treatment between the threat posed by Iraq and the
    threat posed by North Korea. North Korea has a military force
    capable of a surprise attack, clearly Iraq does not. North
    Korea has ejected U.N. inspectors, Iraq grudgingly,
    reluctantly, and noncooperatively has allowed them into their
    country. Our response to the North Korean situation has been to
    refer it to the United Nations, our response to the Iraq
    situation has been to, we hope, encourage the United Nations
    enforcement but prepare to go it alone.
        I wonder, Mr. Secretary, since you are responsible for
    military planning, are we discounting a more serious threat
    posed by North Korea, the threat that they will within weeks
    have nuclear weapons or marketable plutonium because of our
    concentration or preoccupation with Iraq?
        Second, what can we do right now with respect to North
    Korea to try to moderate their behavior?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me try and again
    demonstrate restraint, since this is a matter that the
    President and Secretary Powell are wrestling with extensively.
    My impression of these two very different situations, each
    dangerous to be sure, is that the U.S. policy over a period of
    time has been to some extent the same. Both have gone to the
    United Nations.
        The difference is in the case of Iraq, it's been 12 years.
    They have tried political and diplomatic efforts through the
    United Nations, now up to some 17 resolutions. They have tried
    economic sanctions and they haven't worked. Iraq over a period
    of time has used chemical weapons against its own people and
    its neighbors. They have fired Scud missiles at three or four
    of their neighbors. They invaded Kuwait. They threatened to
    destabilize some of their neighbors. They struck with, as a
    terrorist state, and are developing weapons of mass
    destruction. It seems to me that that one is at the end of the
    cycle.
        Conversely, one had hoped that North Korea, as a result of
    the Agreed Framework, was at a stop with respect to nuclear
    weapons. The public assessment is that they have one or two
    weapons. The public assessment is that if they restart the
    reprocessing plant, they can have six to eight additional, or
    they could have material for six to eight additional weapons
    but not have weaponized them immediately. I see North Korea as
    a threat as a proliferator more than I see them as a nuclear
    threat on the peninsula.
        Now, I could be wrong, but they sell almost anything. They
    are the world's greatest proliferator of missile technology,
    and what concerns me is that risk. I think that the decision by
    the President and the Secretary of State to have that problem
    seen as a world problem is correct, that it is a problem for
    the world, that proliferation represents a terribly dangerous
    thing. There are a lot of countries sitting around waiting to
    buy that type of material.
        We can't unilaterally as a country win things politically
    or economically; it takes enormous cooperation from other
    nations. It's pretty clear that the proliferation regimes that
    exist in the world worked pretty well before, but they're not
    working very well right now. For example, we stopped that ship
    going towards Yemen, and we had no legal authority to stop it,
    so we had to let it go. It was more missile technology coming
    from North Korea, and the same thing is going to be true.
    Unless the world wakes up and says this is a dangerous thing,
    and creates a set of regimes that will in fact get cooperation
    to stop those weapons, we are going to be facing a very serious
    situation in the next 5 years.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me raise
    another issue which is related to North Korea, because reports
    today indicate that they have the missile capability to reach
    the west coast of the United States, which underscores the
    importance of developing and deploying an effective missile
    defense system.
        You have indicated in your budget that you are proposing a
    limited deployment, and I think in response to Senator Levin
    you said that this will be done without operational testing.
    The first question I have is, can I assume that you will
    conduct operational testing even though it will come after the
    deployment?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course. I don't even know that it's
    correct to say it will be deployed without operational testing.
    I think this is an unusual situation and I would characterize
    what we have proposed as simultaneously a test bed as well as a
    minimal deployment. It is both things, and the words are hot
    button words because the testing is required before deployment,
    but not before a test bed. Yet, the reality is the test bed
    offers a deployable minimal capability.
        Senator Reed. I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, in terms of
    these are hot button words and that's why I think it's very
    important to pick words carefully, because the last missile
    test was a failure; they've had great successes and some
    failures, it's still a very primitive system.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
        Senator Reed. We need a booster rocket that has not yet
    been integrated into the system. My suggestion was that using
    the word deployment gives it a little more credibility, the
    system that we use today, than in fact it has.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I guess beauty is in the eye of the
    beholder, but let me tell you the dilemma I went through. On
    the one hand if you call it a deployment, it has a greater
    deterrent effect. If you call it a deployment when in fact it
    is very minimal and would, it is what it is, then it's
    overstating it. If you call it a test bed, someone who's
    against deployment is going to call it a deployment, because
    the reality is it has a minimal capability. Then they're going
    to say you deployed it before you tested it. So no matter which
    way we went, someone wasn't going to like it.
        My attitude is, we have an obligation. It is a fact, George
    Tenet declassified it yesterday as I understand it, that the
    North Koreans very likely do have a two-stage with a kick motor
    capability, which could reach the United States. We also
    assessed that they have a limited number of nuclear weapons.
    Now, that's not a happy combination. Having that test bed, that
    minimally deployed system, is not a bad thing, I'd say.
        Senator Reed. Thank you for your responses and your
    restraint.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Ensign.
        Senator Ensign. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make
    just a couple of brief comments and then get into a little
    questioning.
        I have read through your statement and there are a couple
    of things I was very pleased about. I think you're right on
    target with the idea--and this doesn't just apply to missile
    defense, I think it applies to many other weapon systems--the
    idea of not waiting until you have a perfect system before
    deploying it. I think that our experience is showing us that
    weapons systems are taking far too long to develop.
        I don't know if it was in your testimony from today or some
    of the previous things that I've read from you, but I remember
    reading that the length of time today required to bring new
    weapons systems on line is two or three times longer than it
    was 20 years ago. Yet, technology is advancing the speed with
    which new things should be happening and instead, we're going
    the other way. So taking a whole new look at the way the
    Department of Defense does things is absolutely critical at
    this point.
        I've said for a long time that the Department of Defense
    probably has enough money right now if you were able to do
    things the right way. In other words, if you didn't have all
    the rules and regulations that you had to do things, and you
    could actually get the money to the things that the money needs
    to be gotten to, and didn't have all the bureaucratic
    procedures and have to spend all of that money doing all the
    bureaucratic things that you have to do, you probably--I don't
    know that that number is accurate, but you would certainly have
    a lot more money to put to weapons systems and quality of life
    issues, and taking care of the military the way that it needs
    to be taken care of.
        So I'm very excited about the new direction, and as the new
    chairman for the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee,
    I'm committing to work with you on some of these issues. We
    have a role. We have to hold you accountable. But at the same
    time, we have to recognize that you have a lot more expertise
    in these areas and we have to able to take your direction and
    empower you to do the things that are going to be necessary to
    transform, or at least begin a major transformation of, our
    Department of Defense.
        Now to get to my first question, do you have any idea how
    much money you could save in some of the reparations? I
    understand we're probably not going to cut the defense budget,
    but how much money from the proposals that you put together,
    have you put a number together, or maybe Dr. Zakheim, you can
    tell us if there's a total amount estimate of savings if all of
    the reforms that you wanted were put through.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. No, Senator. First of all, thank you
    for your encouragement on the kinds of changes that we really
    believe we need, and we look forward to working with you on
    that. We have not put together a number. I have kind of off the
    top of my head said that in organizations that I have run, I
    have generally been able to save something around 5 percent if
    you get at it and work at it hard. Now that doesn't sound like
    a big percentage, but when you've got a $380 billion budget,
    it's a pile of money. I'm just guessing.
        But there is no question that we're required to do so many
    things we ought not have to do, and people are wasting so much
    time doing things they don't have to do, that we could do an
    awful lot better job for the country.
        Senator Ensign. On the idea of using our resources better,
    one concern I have is that, we are taking the bulk of the
    responsibility in an area that I consider to be primarily a
    European problem. We have been a great friend to the Europeans
    in the Balkans. We handled the situation for them and continue
    to handle a great deal of that over there, and it seems to have
    been taken off the table when we were trying to solve this
    situation with NATO and Turkey, the idea of taking our
    peacekeepers away from there and allowing the Europeans to
    handle the peacekeeping operation. Can you make some comments
    on your feelings about that?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Sure. I think what happened in the
    Balkans, Europe seemed to need our involvement, to put it
    graciously. Fair enough. We decided to get involved, which in
    my view was the right decision. We underestimated--as I recall,
    in Bosnia they said we'd be out by Christmas. Not so. I think
    it's important to be realistic about things, and it takes time.
        What you have to do if you put troops in is build up the
    civil side, the rule of law, the courts, the police, the border
    patrol, they have to have that capability. The U.N. and the
    European Union (EU) and the people charged with that
    responsibility did not move as aggressively, in my view, as
    they might have. Joe Ralston, our European commander during
    that period, has done a great job in beginning to pull our
    troops--not our troops but all NATO troops that are in there--
    down in a measured way. There is a better effort now going on
    getting that civil side working.
        Now, it's still a dangerous part of the world and we have
    to be aware of that. There are countries that have offered to
    help back fill some of that, Senator, for us because of our
    involvement in the global war on terrorism, and we have looked
    at that.
        Senator Ensign. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Just one
    quick comment not requiring a response and that is, I
    appreciate you not taking any of our options off the table. I
    consider us the good guys, and I would rather have the good
    guys having all of their weapon systems and all of their
    capabilities far superior to the bad guys in the world. So, I
    applaud your efforts and say keep going.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I
    want to thank you and your colleagues for being with us today.
    We know you're busy, and we appreciate your enabling us to do
    our constitutional responsibilities here.
        General and Doctor, I hope you won't take personal offense
    if my inquiries are directed to the Secretary, and Mr.
    Secretary, I hope you won't take personal offense at that
    either.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I will have to hear the question before
    I will answer that. [Laughter.]
        Senator Bayh. Fair enough. Mr. Secretary, the Cold War
    ended 14 years ago and the shifting of the geopolitical, for
    lack of a better term, tectonic plates that began at that time
    has begun to reveal some fissures that only now are coming to
    full relief. That said, I want to follow up on a question that
    the chairman asked you about NATO. Simply put, what do you view
    as the future mission or role of NATO? Let me follow up on that
    just with one other comment that the chairman also alluded to.
    We now have an alliance that has a couple major countries in it
    that are unwilling to support us in our effort to enforce
    United Nations resolutions. Those same countries are apparently
    unwilling to take steps to defend another member of the
    alliance. What good is an alliance that is willing to take
    neither proactive steps nor defensive measures?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I have a feeling you're trying to put
    me in a position of defending Germany and France.
        Senator Bayh. It's hard to defend the indefensible.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. But first let me say, if one looked
    down from Mars on the globe, we'd find there are several
    handfuls of countries that believe in free political
    institutions and free economic institutions, and most of them
    are in NATO, a large fraction of them in the whole word are in
    NATO. Like minded countries working together in a world that's
    dangerous and untidy is a good thing. I may as a former
    ambassador to NATO, having lived it, have a bit of a bias on
    the subject, but I believe that NATO, since the Cold War ended
    and NATO has migrated into understanding the importance of
    doing things outside of the NATO treaty area, has the potential
    to bring a multinational approach to some problems in the world
    that can be enormously beneficial.
        To get something accomplished it is frequently vastly
    better to work with other countries, because things don't fit
    solely as political, economic, or military. They tend to be a
    blend. Again, we need the political and the economic support as
    well as the military support. So I'm disappointed at the
    situation in NATO where they have refused to assist Turkey with
    planning.
        On the other hand, I have been around so long that I have
    seen many times in our alliance where we've had bumps. We had
    the natural gas pipeline during the Reagan administration, we
    had the Mansfield amendment back then, and Senator Warner will
    remember back in the 1970s. It's never been perfect, it's
    always been a little bumpy. This one is interesting because the
    division is not between the United States and Europe, the
    division is within Europe.
        Senator Bayh. Correct. So your response is that although
    occasionally aggravating and not perfect, it's better than the
    alternative, particularly when we look at the breadth of
    challenges that we face. I think Director Tenet mentioned that
    yesterday, that the cooperation continues to be excellent in
    the intelligence community. But I thought it was important to
    raise this subject. It's something that I think we have to give
    some thought to going forward.
        General Myers. Senator, can I just--let me----
        Senator Bayh. If you can be brief, General, because the
    clock is running on me.
        General Myers. I will try to do that, Senator. You asked
    about the future role and the Secretary covered a part of that.
    The other part is that at the time we are discussing this issue
    in NATO right now about Article IV and support for Turkey,
    we're also redoing the command and control structure that has
    to be done to get out of the Cold War model that we've had. The
    NATO response force is an idea that we took into NATO that's
    being implemented.
        I will keep it short, but there are probably 9 or 10 good
    things that NATO has done really well lately, to include their
    support in Afghanistan.
        Senator Bayh. It's important to emphasize this organization
    is going to retain its vitality and its mission going forward,
    I think is a thought that's in order here.
        If I could just move on, Mr. Secretary, I want to second
    what Senator Collins said with regard to the role of our forces
    in South Korea. I'm delighted to hear that you're giving some
    thought to possibly repositioning them. It seems to me right
    now that they are insufficient to either fight or deter
    successfully. They are not uniformly popular in the country,
    and so some rethinking of the presence there is in order.
        Just one other question and a couple of quick comments,
    because 6 minutes runs by very quickly. Mr. Secretary, we live
    in a world unfortunately of multiple threats these days, as you
    know better than any of the rest of us. We hope that it doesn't
    come to fighting in any of them but we have to be prepared to
    take force, if necessary, in more than one place. Specifically
    I'd like to ask you, and I know it's not our policy and we've
    said repeatedly we don't intend to use force, but I want to ask
    you about North Korea in the context of Iraq. If it came to
    that, and I know we don't intend to, and I don't want to try
    and bait you over that line here, but if we decided that we had
    no choice except to take military action against the
    reprocessing facility and their launch sites, could we do that
    while fully engaged in Iraq? Do we have the capability?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, if I answer that, the
    newspapers throughout Asia are going to say that the Secretary
    of Defense rattled the sabers, and the President is on a
    diplomatic track.
        Senator Bayh. Let me step back from the question, but I
    think you can understand where we sit. It's important to look
    at the potentialities that are out there and be reassured.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely.
        Senator Bayh. So let me step back from that specific
    question and just say, do we have the ability to act both in
    Iraq and in other potential hot spots around the world in a way
    that would defend America's security?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we have a defense strategy and
    a force sizing construct that says we can win decisively and
    conquer a country in one theater, and near simultaneously
    swiftly defeat an adversary in another theater, and at the same
    time successfully pursue a number of lesser contingencies, for
    example, Bosnia or Kosovo, or what we're doing in Afghanistan.
        Senator Bayh. I would trust in your budget that you're
    embedding additional capabilities to address multiple
    situations simultaneously.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, as I indicated, our budget does
    not include money for the global war on terror. Nor does it
    include money for the force flows in support of Iraq. We're
    going to have to have a supplemental for that, which I'm told
    is traditional.
        Senator Bayh. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. If I could
    just make two comments without requesting any response. I know
    this is a recurring source of aggravation for you, Mr.
    Chairman. I couldn't help but notice in The Washington Post
    today a front page story saying special operations units are
    already in Iraq. It cites sources or experts familiar with
    Pentagon planning, and then two military officials with direct
    knowledge of their activities, etcetera, etcetera. This subject
    of leaks, there was a great deal of hue and cry about a leak
    from Congress a while back with regard to a single somewhat
    innocuous intercept in Afghanistan.
        I know you're doing your best on this, but if this kind of
    leaking takes place, it's hard to--I would request that you do
    all you can because we are going to try and do all we can from
    our end.
        Finally, regarding the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
    Colombia (FARC), I mentioned yesterday to Director Tenet that
    there is a potential there, with our growing military
    involvement, for that not only to bite our personnel there but
    possibly here domestically as well, if you think about this
    incident where they had a bombing of a fairly large, a hardened
    target in Bogota a few days ago. There is a great deal of
    travel back and forth between Colombia and the U.S., and it's
    not beyond the realm of possibility that they may decide to
    take that conflict at some future date to U.S. soil. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, might I just comment on
    that?
        Chairman Warner. The Senator's time has almost been double
    now.
        I want to encourage General Myers to respond to the
    important questions about NATO. I do believe you had testified
    about nine points. Not now, but in the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        1. Every nation that has led ISAF in Afghanistan has been a NATO
    Ally. Beginning with ISAF III in January, NATO, as an Alliance, began
    supporting the German/Dutch command of the ISAF mission. NATO is
    exploring providing increased support, including possibly taking
    command.
        2. Prague Capabilities Commitment. Heads of state and government
    made political commitments to focused, achievable improvements in
    military capabilities.
        3. NATO Response Force. This will be a driver for force
    modernization and will give NATO a credible 21st century military
    force.
        4. Command Structure Review. Allies made a commitment to joint
    operations and a considerably leaner structure that includes an Allied
    Command Transformation.
        5. NATO Enlargement. We are on the road to successful accession of
    seven nations into NATO.
        6. NATO-Russia Council. We have seen the development of a
    significant relationship between Russia and NATO.
        7. Balkans Transition to EU command/control. NATO is developing a
    good working relationship with the EU Security apparatus, resulting in
    actual military capabilities and EU assumption of the NATO mission in
    Macedonia.
        8. Political guidance for defense against terrorism. The Alliance
    is committed to acting against terrorists, as well as those who harbor
    them.
        9. European sealift and airlift clearinghouse organizations. These
    are nascent means of improving the deployability of European forces.

        Chairman Warner. Do you wish to say something, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do. I think the Senator is exactly
    correct about leaks. I think they are just dangerous. They put
    people's lives at risk, and I think people have a duty to
    manage their mouths and not put people's lives at risk. I would
    also add that I think it's the obligation of people who find
    people leaking to tell responsible authorities because folks
    that do it and put people's lives at risk ought to be in jail.
        General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to make sure the
    record is clear. I thought I heard Senator Bayh say that we
    were not able to fight successfully in Korea. You said we were
    not positioned to.
        Senator Bayh. No, no, I didn't, and I don't want to take
    any more time. With 37,000 troops, it seemed to me that they
    were unlikely to be essential to fighting a successful war
    there.
        Chairman Warner. We must turn now to Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pursue
    your comment about the capability of Korea to reach the
    mainland with a missile strike. We had testimony from Director
    Tenet yesterday, and he did make the statement that they have
    missile capability to reach the west coast and that's the first
    time I'd ever heard that statement. So, you made a statement
    here and the nature of your statement that you made, it wasn't
    clear to me whether you were just stating a fact that he had
    made that statement or whether you have evidence that makes you
    believe that Korea can reach the west coast with a missile.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I chaired the Ballistic
    Missile Commission back in 1998, I guess it was, or 1997, and
    there is no question but that North Korea launched a type of
    Dong II, a two-stage ballistic missile with a kick motor on it,
    and the kick motor did not work. It apparently did not put it
    into orbit or give it the sufficient distance that they needed.
    But that was years ago, and they are clearly capable in missile
    technology, they sell it all the over the world, and there
    isn't a doubt in my mind but that by now they have a capability
    to reach portions of the United States.
        Senator Allard. In my view, and it must be your view too,
    that makes our missile defense system even more critical. As
    one American who wants to make sure we protect the borders of
    this country, I am very appreciative of you and this
    administration for pushing forward on missile defense. If we
    had taken the advice of those who opposed missile defense, I
    think we'd have a vulnerability today that would have to be of
    concern to this country, and I think it still exists, but at
    least we have somewhat of a leg up when the administration is
    talking about deploying a missile defense system, and I just
    want to thank you and the administration for that forward
    thinking type of effort on the part of this country. It's that
    type of effort that's going to make sure we remain a free
    country.
        I also would like to compliment you on being willing to
    look at many new programs in the Pentagon. I've always viewed
    you as somebody who is willing to shake the tree a little bit
    and I appreciate that in you. It doesn't hurt programs that
    have been around a long time to go back and reevaluate them and
    make them rejustify why they have to be there. If we want our
    taxpayer dollars to do the most for the American people towards
    defending this country, I think that has to happen. Even in an
    institution that you and I strongly support, which is the
    Department of Defense, we need to look hard to make sure that
    we are doing everything we can to do the best in trying to
    protect the country with as few tax dollars as we possibly can,
    and I commend you for that.
        Also, one other thing I wanted to bring up was the Air
    Force's evolve expendable launch vehicle (EELV). The market on
    launch vehicles and the industrial base associated with that
    has really changed dramatically in the last year or 2 and I
    have been one that always pushed that we needed to have
    competition, because I think it brings the best out and gives
    you some choice and some duplication that perhaps maybe we
    need. There are some areas in defense where duplication makes
    sense and some where it doesn't. This is one of those areas
    where I always thought it made a lot of sense. Can you talk a
    little bit about what you think might be our capability in
    maintaining that competitive system in the expendable launch
    vehicle area?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The guy sitting next to me is an expert
    on the subject, the former commander of the Space Command, and
    I think I will let Dick Myers comment on it.
        Senator Allard. General Myers.
        General Myers. Senator Allard, I think I can go a little
    way towards addressing your question. I don't know if I can go
    all the way. Obviously the business case has changed
    dramatically since the idea that we would have competition for
    our new expendable launch vehicles, and I think both of the
    industrial competitors in that program have developed very good
    launch systems. They're developing capability on both the east
    and west coasts for those systems.
        My understanding is given this change in the business case
    that was present just 3 or 4 years ago in contrast with today,
    the Air Force along with the folks up in the Secretary's office
    in acquisition, technology, and logistics are looking at the
    way ahead for this program. To my knowledge, they have not made
    a judgment in terms of how to handle the competitive piece of
    this, but I think that's under a serious discussion right now.
        Senator Allard. I understand that in the President's budget
    there have been some dollars put in there to try to sustain
    this competitive environment, and I would urge you to try to do
    that, because I think it's vital that we have some launch
    capability out there and if one system goes bad, it's always
    nice to have a little bit of redundancy.
        General Myers. Well, the EELV, make no mistake about it, is
    absolutely essential to our space capability because they are
    the launch vehicles for the future. I think we have a handful
    of Titan IVs left and a few other kind of rockets, but we're
    going to go to the EELV, that's a given. The question is, do we
    have enough launches in the cue to sustain the two competitors.
    I have to tell you, I'm not totally up to speed on that issue
    other than I understand it was being looked at in a very
    serious way by the Air Force and by Pete Aldridge.
        Dr. Zakheim. Just to be specific, Senator, we have in the
    2004 budget funds for four launches, and that's in addition to
    the launch that's taking place this month.
        Senator Allard. I see, thank you.
        Back to missile defense, you've expressed a willingness in
    the past to sort of bring in other countries in the missile
    defense area, get them involved to a certain degree. Do you
    have plans to bring in our closest allies in this effort, for
    example, Britain or maybe Canada? Is there any hope at all that
    we could get Russia involved in a partnership that wouldn't put
    us at increased risk on our technology?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you're correct, we are engaged
    in discussions with a number of countries, including the United
    Kingdom (U.K.). In fact, the U.K. made an announcement within
    the last week or 2 about their upgrade and their interest in
    cooperating with us in improving their security situation as a
    result. But there are any number of countries that come in and
    we do discuss these things. With respect to Russia, the answer
    is yes, there is a possibility we could cooperate. There are a
    number of things we could do with Russia on missile defense.
    Indeed, my recollection is there was a working group that was
    going back in the 1990s but for some reason it was discontinued
    in the late 1990s, and I have had discussions with Minister of
    Defense Ivanov on this subject and I suspect we will continue.
        Senator Allard. Thank you. My time has expired.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Akaka.
        Before, Senator, you address the witnesses, could I put
    into the record following the important questions from our
    colleague from Colorado, the communication that I, Senator
    Levin, Senator Roberts, and Senator Rockefeller received. I
    asked the Director of Central Intelligence to elaborate on the
    comments he made about the Korean missile yesterday.
        The essence of it is, the testimony is consistent with
    previously unclassified judgments, the capability of the Taepo
    Dong-2 to reach the United States is not a new judgment, and he
    elaborates on that. Without objection, it will go into today's
    record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome
    the Secretary and the Chief here to this hearing.
        Mr. Secretary, as mentioned in your answer to Senator Reed,
    the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, testified before this
    committee yesterday that North Korea has a missile capable of
    reaching the west coast of the United States, which means that
    obviously they have the capacity to hit Hawaii. It is my
    understanding that the current Cobra Dane Radar that is to be
    part of the ground based missile defense test bed in Alaska
    cannot discriminate warheads on missiles launched from North
    Korea. Considering that North Korea is the stated reason for
    the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, are you
    requesting money in this budget to build a dedicated
    operational and X-band radar, which the Department has said is
    required for warhead discrimination?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first let me make a comment
    and then I would like to get the rest of the question answered
    for the record. North Korea is, I don't believe, the stated
    single reason for deploying a missile defense capability or a
    test bed, depending on which one someone likes to call it. It
    is to develop a capability, a missile defense capability more
    broadly and to test capabilities, and it would not simply be
    the Alaska interceptors or that radar. It would be multiple
    radars and multiple interceptors if, in fact, decisions are
    made to go forward with a fuller deployment, and it would
    require upgrading radars. But we will get you a precise answer.
        General Myers. The only thing I would add to it is when we
    think about missile defense, the Secretary took the labels off
    of national missile defense. Now we have missile defense.
    Whether it's strategic or tactical or national or local depends
    on where you are and where the missile is coming from. I think
    that's very helpful to the folks who we have fielded around the
    world and to our allies and our partners as well. So it is
    missile defense, it's more than just the pieces we've talked
    about.
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, we will be looking forward to
    hearing more about that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, we have developed a
    research, development, and test program that focuses on missile defense
    as a single integrated ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, no
    longer differentiating between theater and national missile defense. In
    programmatic terms, we no longer speak of national or theater missile
    defense. Operationally, the terms can take on different meanings
    depending on where you live. The distinction between them made sense a
    decade ago, when we faced the stark difference between a Soviet ICBM
    threat and an Iraqi Scud. Now it no longer does. The same North Korean
    missile aimed at Japan could be a national threat to our ally, but a
    theater threat to us--unless it were retargeted toward the United
    States, in which case it would become national again. Furthermore, at
    some point in time, a short-range missile could threaten our homeland
    just as well as an ICBM could, if, say, it were launched from the sea
    off our coast.

        Senator Akaka. General Myers, in your posture statement,
    you mention the 2002 Unified Command Plan, the plan which
    created the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and
    determined how it will provide military assistance to the
    Homeland Security Department. Given the fact that Hawaii does
    not fall within the jurisdiction of NORTHCOM, how will the
    Department ensure that there is appropriate coordination
    between NORTHCOM and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) regarding
    homeland security for Hawaii and the Pacific Island
    territories?
        General Myers. Senator, I can answer the military part of
    that. The responsibility that NORTHCOM has is for the
    continental 48 States and Alaska, and PACOM has responsibility
    for Hawaii. So for the military part of that, PACOM and Admiral
    Tom Fargo will handle that portion.
        In terms of the relationship between the Homeland Security
    Department and Hawaii and those functions, you're going to have
    to ask Secretary Ridge. I'm not familiar with how he is going
    to work that with your State.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you. General Myers, your response to
    Senator Warner's question on the readiness of troops was that
    our troops are ``absolutely ready.'' You also mentioned the
    negative effects of environmental loss on military readiness.
    Can you reconcile these two statements? What exactly is the
    impact of environmental encroachment on the readiness of our
    troops?
        General Myers. One of the cases that I think is probably
    right before our eyes is the one in Guam where the Navy is
    prohibited from flying because of the Migratory Bird Act, and
    the case that is being talked about in the sense of a court
    case is the chance that an aircraft might hit a bird and that
    would be in violation of the act. If that court case shuts down
    a training range in Guam, then we're going to have to look for
    work-arounds. You might be able to do it in one location, but
    as you have to do that in other locations--I mean, I have been
    flying for 37 years and we have many bird strikes. It's nothing
    against the bird or against the species. [Laughter.]
        So we have to find a way to address this in a more rational
    way so that an act like the Migratory Bird Act, which is an
    important environmental act, does not limit our training.
    That's one example. There are some other ones as well, but I
    think we need to find some ways to work around it so we can
    conduct our military training in harmony with the need to
    protect the environment.
        I think Senator Inhofe said it well, and I didn't have to
    repeat it, but the Department of Defense spends enormous
    amounts of money in complying with environmental law. When I
    was Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, Vandenberg
    Air Force Base sits in a State that is very environmentally
    conscious. I think the State of California will tell you that
    we were great stewards of the land at Vandenberg. We handle
    some very dangerous stuff out there in terms of rockets and the
    fuels and the things we do. So, I would just say we go to
    enormous effort to try to do this right, but in a few cases
    it's inhibiting our training.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responses. Mr. Chairman,
    my time has expired.
        Chairman Warner. We wish to clarify, the ranking member and
    myself, this very important exchange on the environment. I hope
    you will elaborate in the record as to other problems, but I
    believe this committee, under the leadership of our
    distinguished ranking member, cured one problem last year.
        Senator Levin. That was the Migratory Bird Act.
        General Myers. I think that one was----
        Senator Levin. Well, the one example you used this morning
    is the one we've taken care of, we legislated that issue so
    that the Migratory Bird Act no longer applies to military
    readiness activities, including training. Not saying there
    aren't other problems, but we did at least cure that one.
        General Myers. We appreciate that very much. We did make
    some headway.
        Chairman Warner. More work remains to be done by Congress,
    working with the environmental community to try and resolve
    other problems, and I think it will be important and
    responsive.
        General Myers. I will get you a statement for the record of
    those other issues that are still outstanding.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        In February, I expressed my concern over the adverse impacts and
    unforeseen consequences the application of various environmental laws
    are having on military training and testing activities, and,
    consequently, on the readiness of our Armed Forces. These are not novel
    concerns. The Vice Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
    Force testified about these issues before the Senate Environment and
    Public Works Committee in July 2002. Various senior military officers
    and political appointees of the military departments and DOD have
    testified before the respective Armed Services Committees on these same
    concerns over the past 2 years. Although Congress began consideration
    of these important issues last year, it was only able to provide
    temporary relief with respect to one statute, the Migratory Bird Treaty
    Act. While grateful for this support, we believe more needs to be done.
        Although measuring the full impact of environmental requirements on
    readiness is difficult, my professional assessment is that the impacts,
    and consequently the challenges, we face in providing the most
    effective training and equipment have grown rather than diminished. For
    example, the deployment of a critical new defensive sensor to deal with
    the threat of quiet diesel submarines deployed by North Korea, Iran,
    and other potential adversaries was recently restricted by court order
    despite an unprecedented research program by the Navy to ensure that
    marine mammals would not be injured. Diverse examples of encroachment
    abound, ranging from our inability to train with smoke on military
    ranges to limitations on stationing and use of high performance fighter
    aircraft such as the F-22 due to the Noise Control Act.
        I assure you, we are working on better ways to quantify how
    encroachment affects our ability to train and equip our forces; however
    enough is known right now to convince me that we need legislative
    relief.
        This year, the Services are seeking legislative clarification where
    laws are being applied beyond their original legislative intent,
    creating a vast amount of unnecessary litigation. Our proposal would
    confirm--not change--two Clinton administration environmental policies
    that support military readiness, but are threatened by lawsuits.
        First, it would confirm the military bases' ``Integrated Natural
    Resources Management Plans'' may, if sufficiently protective,
    substitute for Endangered Species Act ``critical habitat'' on military
    bases. These plans, developed in cooperation with State and Federal
    regulators, have made Department of Defense one of the best stewards of
    endangered species in the world. Unlike our plans, critical habitat
    designation can impose rigid limitations on military use of our bases,
    denying Commanders the flexibility to manage their lands for the
    benefit of both readiness and endangered species.
        The Department of Defense bill would also codify Clinton
    administration policies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act that
    support vital antisubmarine warfare (ASW) programs. The prior
    administration adopted science-based policies under this act that
    focused regulation on biologically significant impacts on animals.
    Under this policy, the Navy was able to work with regulators to get
    permits for ASW technologies needed to protect our carrier battle
    groups. But litigants have succeeded in overturning these policies, and
    have obtained an injunction limiting testing of this vital ASW
    technology.
        Our mission is to be prepared to defend the country wherever and
    whenever necessary. Readiness requires anticipating conflicts and
    developing weapons, sensors, and tactics necessary to prevail. It is
    vitally important that we are not constrained in fully training our
    Service men and women as we innovate to meet tomorrow's conflicts.
    Modern warfare is a ``come as you are'' affair. The soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines who saw action in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001
    used the weapons, sensors, and tactics that they trained with the
    previous summer. We have learned that a host of factors and decisions,
    including urban sprawl, regulations, litigation, and accommodations,
    although reasonable when viewed in isolation, have cumulatively
    diminished the military departments' ability to train and test
    effectively. Our troops are ``ready'' when they deploy, but it is
    becoming more and more difficult to ensure this status because we
    cannot use the military test and training ranges and at-sea operating
    areas for the purposes for which they are dedicated. We have to resort
    to ``workarounds'' that are increasingly burdensome.
        An equally important encroachment concern is transporting units
    away from their home installations for months at a time for necessary
    training prior to deployment overseas. This workaround imposes a
    particular burden on our military families, not just the troops.
    Workarounds also segment training so that we can't ``train as we
    fight.'' This makes effective training more difficult and less
    realistic. In a world where any country with money can buy the best
    weapons, training is critical to victory. We owe this critical edge,
    the winning edge, to the young men and women we send in harm's way.
        We are not abandoning our outstanding stewardship over the lands
    entrusted to us or shrinking from environmental protection
    requirements. We are trying to restore balance where environmental
    requirements adversely affect uniquely military activities necessary to
    prepare for combat. We ask that you carefully consider the proposed
    changes that the Department of Defense brings forward and provide the
    tailored but effective relief we seek.

        Chairman Warner. Senator Sessions, before you begin, the
    Secretary must be back at the Pentagon to receive a foreign
    minister of defense. I want to conduct this in such a way that
    everyone gets one round, so I shall have to be somewhat abrupt
    on the 6 minutes.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, you can hold me
    to my time.
        Mr. Secretary, I think it is past time that we evaluate our
    force structure and deployment situation, particularly in
    Europe. The situation is greatly changed today. We don't have
    the same threats, they don't come from the same areas of the
    world, and your comments today that Austria is blocking or
    refusing to allow the transport of military equipment is just a
    stunning development. It must be extremely frustrating for you
    and the Department of Defense leadership.
        I talked with a number of Senators just briefly yesterday
    and will submit a letter to you today that calls on the
    Department of Defense to conduct a study of where we are in
    Europe, to reevaluate how we should deploy our resources there
    to consider first of all our national defense, and second
    consider the tempo of deployment of our personnel and
    separation from families and that sort of thing.
        I guess my question to you would be, would you conduct such
    a study? If one is already in the works, would you share it
    with us? I would just say that virtually every Senator I've
    talked to shared that view strongly. Senator Collins and
    Senator Bayh mentioned it, and I think 15 Senators that signed
    this letter indicate that we think it's past due. We are doing
    that in the United States, let's do it around the world also.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly. We have to look at our base
    structure across the globe. We're already conducting the study,
    it's well underway. We have not only one going on in the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, we have one going on with the area
    of responsibility from commanders in each case, and it requires
    a good deal of sensitivity because it just has--a base in the
    United States has to be coordinated with the Congressmen,
    Senators, and the local people, and so too with our allies
    around the world. We have to make sure we all work off the same
    sheet of music and that we bring them along in terms of those
    discussions. So we will be happy to have a hearing or share
    that, and we don't need to do anything separate because it's
    well underway.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Secretary, you served in Europe in
    NATO, and you served as Secretary of Defense previously and
    have observed this whole situation for many years. It's odd to
    me and I would like to ask you if you agree, that we talk about
    multi-lateralism and unilateralism, whereas at this point it
    appears that 16 nations in Europe support our position and only
    three oppose our position.
        What do you do in circumstances like that? Aren't we
    getting to a point in history where we simply have to make sure
    we have broad support among nations of goodwill and try to make
    sure with that support we defend our just national interests?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We do indeed. I was hoping to come back
    to Senator Levin. He kept talking about us proceeding
    unilaterally and going it alone in the opening statement. I
    didn't have a chance to comment, but you're quite right. We
    have today 90 nations in the global war on terrorism. We don't
    have a single coalition, we have multiple coalitions. The
    mission determines which countries feel they want to
    participate in that coalition. We ought not have a situation
    where the coalition determines the mission, because then it
    stops everything, because there's always somebody who's not
    going to like it.
        Now, it is of value to have countries. In the case of Iraq,
    we have dozens of countries participating already in a variety
    of different ways in terms of basing and overflight and what
    have you, offering forces, and it seems to me that you're
    correct. We do have to think through what we believe is in our
    country's best interests and in the world's best interests.
    Then what we have to do is go out and persuade other countries
    that that is something that needs to be done and then we have
    to work with those like-thinking countries to get it done.
        In the case of military activity, we can do that without
    unanimity. For example, on the Turkey thing, we can go ahead
    and help Turkey using the 16 countries and not the 3 that are
    blocking it in NATO. Who loses in that case? NATO loses.
    Turkey's not going to lose. We're going to see that they get
    what they need, the 16 countries are. So it seems to me that
    your point is a valid one.
        Senator Sessions. As NATO has expanded the consensus or
    unanimity rule answers itself. It's very unlikely, it seems to
    me, that everyone is going to agree on even important policies.
    Of course, in the United Nations, we have the permanent
    Security Council veto so one nation there, China or Russia, has
    an absolute veto on U.N. military action, so it's just plainly
    obvious to me that we need to be respectful of those
    organizations, seek their support, confer with them, but
    ultimately we're going to have to do what the consensus of the
    world believes is good for the world, and our country in
    defending our own interests.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That certainly is the obligation of
    this body and the President of the United States, to do that. I
    will say this. The expansion of NATO has had an interesting
    effect. The newer countries coming in are countries that have
    lived under dictatorships and under communism, and they tend to
    bring an energy and an awareness and a sensitivity to those
    dangers that's fresh and helpful to the institution.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Senator Pryor,
    to be followed by Senator Ben Nelson and Senator Bill Nelson,
    and then I will move down the order from there.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I have a
    couple of very quick questions from Senator Robert Byrd, who
    could not be here at this moment. Mr. Secretary, what are your
    estimates of how much a war with Iraq might cost?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That is an answer that unfortunately I
    believe is not knowable. I am told there are people at the OMB
    that have estimated it at something between $50 and $60
    billion. The one thing I do know is it would cost, if the
    President decided that it was necessary and force had to be
    used--a heck of a lot less than September 11 cost, and
    September 11 would cost a heck of a lot less than a chemical or
    biological September 11.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you for that answer. You have said
    that you expect to send a supplemental appropriations request
    to Congress soon. How much will the Pentagon request in that
    supplemental and are there two variations of that, one in the
    event that we continue with weapons inspections and the other
    in the event we're at war, or will it just be one supplemental
    request?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I don't know. It's a matter that the
    OMB and the White House are working on. We do know certain
    facts. One fact is that we're spending about $1.5 or $6 billion
    a month since October 1 for the global war on terror. So we've
    already spent October, November, December, January, 4 months,
    which is $6 billion, and a portion of February, and that does
    not count the cost of the force flow for Iraq, which is
    probably in the neighborhood of $2 billion-plus.
        So for the year, if the global war on terror went on at a
    billion-five and you had to add some additional force flow,
    it's pretty clear that even without a conflict in Iraq, we
    would be well short and need a supplemental of roughly that
    magnitude, but that's something that depends on what takes
    place and we will know more about that as we go forward.
        Senator Pryor. Secretary Rumsfeld, I want to talk about the
    C-130J program, which I know General Myers is very familiar
    with. As we continue this war on terrorism, the C-130J seems to
    me to be a very important part of that effort as well as all
    the efforts that the military is involved with. Something that
    my staff has talked to me about--and again, I'm new here--but
    we talked about the C-130J multiyear proposals and as I
    understand it, are you making that proposal because it may help
    you plan and even may help you save money on the program?
        Dr. Zakheim. Well, we are certainly looking at that. As I
    understand it, the current estimate is that it will save some
    money. We're refining that as we speak and I have every
    certainty that we will be finalizing that very soon.
        Senator Pryor. It just so happens that the Little Rock Air
    Force Base is the premier training facility for C-130Js, not
    just for our forces but for anybody in the world. Do you see
    that changing any time in the future? General Myers, you may
    want to take a crack at that one.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me make a comment. Congress passed
    a proposal for base closings and what we decided to do is to
    try to proceed in an orderly way and not comment on individual
    bases prospectively. It just seems to me that the process has
    to be an open one, it has to be one that is done in a serious
    and nonpartisan way. One of the reasons that they didn't have a
    base realignment and closure (BRAC) for several years was the
    accusations that they were not looked at in a fair and open and
    balanced way, and I want to see that this is done that way.
    Therefore, I'm not inclined to speculate about the future.
        Senator Pryor. General Myers.
        General Myers. I think it would be speculation on my part.
    I sit here with a blue uniform, but I am not that familiar with
    Air Force plans.
        Senator Pryor. Another facility that I just want you all to
    be sensitized to and know about and be aware of is the Pine
    Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. Right now it is in the process of
    disposing of chemical weapons. It's the only active chemical
    defense arsenal in the Department of Defense, and it also has a
    joint venture with the American Red Cross where they do
    readiness training for first responders. It seems to have a
    very varied and important mission in today's world. Just as you
    all are considering your plans in the future, I just want you
    to again be reminded of the asset that you have currently in
    the Department of Defense and be mindful that it's there and
    actually has enough real estate to expand. For example, I think
    the DOD made a determination in the late 1990s that if you do a
    vaccine program that would be the best facility that you
    currently have. So, I just wanted to remind you to be aware of
    that.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Ben Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
    General Myers, I appreciate very much your being here again
    today to help us understand some of the difficulties in the
    world today that certainly you face each and every day.
        Mr. Secretary, you made a prediction this past weekend that
    within a year or 2 or 3, North Korea would become the leading
    example of why in your view international agreements designed
    to stop the spread of nuclear weapons are failing, and today
    you elaborated a bit on your thoughts about cooperation, that
    it isn't necessarily working in the world the way that we would
    like to see it.
        Do you believe that, in many respects, North Korea's
    proliferation and supply of weapons and other armaments and
    related materials might expand to a more aggressive program
    that would ultimately lead to an arms race in Asia, which is
    obviously something that we don't want? Do you have any
    thoughts about that that you might share? I have a couple of
    related questions, but that's my first question.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I look at the situation with North
    Korea in this way. They will sell anything they have to anyone
    who wants it. They have been demonstrating that for years.
    You're correct. An announced or demonstrated nuclear capability
    and obviously relatively sophisticated ballistic missile
    capability on the part of North Korea is something that the
    neighbors have to be attentive to. The neighbors to the south,
    the neighbors to the north, and to the west, and to the east.
        Now, there are a number of states in that neighborhood who
    have the ability to have nuclear weapons in relatively short
    periods if they wish to have them. That is not a good thing for
    the world. I also look at North Korea as a danger, not simply
    in Northeast Asia but a danger to the world. I mean, this is
    clearly a world problem. If you have a country that is capable
    of producing nuclear material sufficient to fashion six to
    eight nuclear weapons in a relatively short of period of months
    and is known to be selling them, it's a terrorist state, and
    that's a problem. It's not a problem to the United States, it's
    a problem to the world.
        It seems to me that this is the reason I feel that the
    President is correct in attempting to see, which is now
    successful, in getting that problem put into the United
    Nations. Because the solution to proliferation can't be
    unilateral, it has to be a strong, fully enforced, agreed upon
    set of restrictions so that those kinds of weapons can be
    stopped and interdicted.
        Senator Ben Nelson. In that regard, obviously the Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Treaty that North Korea was the first to
    withdraw from is not working today. Do you have any thoughts
    about what we might do to bring the rest of the world together
    where we could do something to deal with nonproliferation and
    nonsupplying of material and materiel to the rest of the world,
    particularly to those states and groups that would do harm to
    our neighbors and clearly do us harm as well?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I do have some ideas. They're not well
    developed, but we would not be facing the problem in Iraq today
    if the technologically advanced countries of the world had seen
    the danger and strictly enforced economic sanctions against
    Iraq sufficient that it would cause them to discontinue their
    weapons of mass destruction programs. We would not have this
    problem today.
        Now, how do you get countries to step up and do something
    that is against their immediate self-interests in exchange for
    something that's in favor of their self-interest over the
    longer period? That is to say, stop commercial sales, stop
    pretending that dual use things are going to be used for good
    things and not bad things, and strictly enforce and prevent a
    country that's clearly in violation and clearly engaged in
    trafficking in these capabilities in a way that puts the world
    at risk.
        I think the only way you do that is to go to their publics.
    I think the people of those countries have to be sufficiently
    concerned that they require their governments to behave in a
    rational way and not just a rational way for an immediate self
    gratification of some commercial license, but in a rational way
    that looks down 5 or 10 years and sees, for example, in the
    Middle East the possibility of four, five, or six countries
    having nuclear weapons, which is not a pretty picture.
        Senator Ben Nelson. It's predictable with the direction
    things are going today. Let me commend you for, if not being
    patient, acquiring the appearance of patience, and I thank you
    for your answers today.
        Chairman Warner. We thank you, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are in the
    midst of enormous change and enormous challenge. Thank you for
    trying to get your arms around this problem and steering us in
    a direction that best protects our country.
        On this debate about missile testing, why don't we just
    call it what it is instead of getting hung up on the labels?
    Say that we're going to deploy while we are still in the
    testing phase.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. That's what I tried to do.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I think it speaks for itself. One of
    the policy questions that I think you're going to have to
    answer, particularly since it looks like we're going to have
    the needs of our United States military overseas for the
    foreseeable future in nation building, and if you don't like
    that term, then use the term establishing political and
    economic stability. We're trying to do that in Afghanistan. We
    thought that it might only take us a year in Bosnia and we're
    in the seventh year, and clearly that will be the situation in
    Iraq as well.
        The policy question is, are we going to continue to do that
    with other than the active duty military? My wife and I went on
    Thanksgiving to have Thanksgiving dinner with our troops in
    Bosnia and what I found was a Pennsylvania National Guard unit.
    They were pumped, they knew they were there for 6 months and
    they were going to rotate back.
        I have been going to a lot of our National Guard ceremonies
    all over Florida, telling them that I'm there on behalf of a
    grateful nation for their service. But they went into the
    Guard--as did the Reserves--thinking that when their country
    called, that they were ready to respond and they are well
    prepared by the way, there is no question about their
    professionalism, but there is a question about their obligation
    and the length of time. Would you briefly comment and then we
    can carry on this dialogue for some period of time, because
    this is a policy question we have to ask. Do we up the active
    duty troops in order to keep the Guard and the Reserves as what
    they were intended to be?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, first, thank you for visiting
    the troops. They appreciate it and we all appreciate it.
        Second, I do worry a bit about the phrase ``nation
    building.'' I take it as a little bit arrogant that we think we
    might know how to build a nation for somebody else. I like to
    think of it as our responsibility. For example, in Afghanistan
    we are trying to create a security environment that is
    hospitable to their rebuilding their own nation, and do that
    with the cooperation of other nations. I think that's what
    we're trying to do there, and clearly that's what one would
    have to do in Iraq if it came to that.
        With respect to the end strength issue, there are so many
    things we can do to make better use of the current end strength
    we have in uniform. We can pull down in places where they have
    been for too long. In the Sinai, we're pulling out about half
    of those. There are four other places where we're in the
    process of doing the same thing. We're looking at the bigger
    chunks in Asia and in Europe, and we're going to do that.
        There's also a way that General Myers and I are working
    hard on trying to figure out a better way to alert, mobilize,
    and deploy Guard and Reserve Forces so that they continue to
    feel what they feel now. They're proud to be called, they're
    proud to serve, but they want to serve in something that's real
    and they don't want to get called up four or five or six times
    in a short period of time because it's very difficult for their
    families, it's difficult for their employers. But they are
    pumped and doing a terrific job.
        What we have to do is get a more nuanced system. At the
    present time, our deployment system is basically one big switch
    over here, peace, and the other is World War III over there,
    and you pull it and everything happens. We're trying to figure
    out how to disaggregate this thing in a way that's respectful
    of the Guard and Reserve and their employers and their
    families. If we need additional end strength we will be up to
    ask for it, but at the moment I don't think we do. If we can
    get the people in uniform that are doing jobs that are not
    military jobs, that will save some people right there.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If they know they are there for 6
    months, they're ready and they're pumped. But if suddenly
    that's a year, and then they're coming home after that year and
    they suddenly get diverted someplace else, then you have
    another whole situation with regard to our promise to them and
    our promise to their employers.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you're exactly right. The
    other thing I didn't mention, which I should have, is that back
    in the 1970s after Vietnam, the Department of Defense took
    certain skills and put them in the Reserves, 100 percent in the
    Reserves. They did it so that if they were ever to go to war
    again, there would have to be a major call-up. That's not a
    good idea, because we're going to have a series of these things
    just as sure as we're sitting here, and what we have to do is
    make sure we have people on active duty to do all the skills so
    that we do not have to keep calling those same people up four
    or five times.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, assured access to space
    is another issue, not only what was brought up here earlier on
    the EELVs, but the technologies that you all clearly have an
    interest in at DOD and other agencies in developing as a
    follow-on to the space shuttle. We are at a point that
    decisions are going to have to be made over the next several
    months on that, and you all at DOD have to weigh in on that,
    because it's going to be extremely important to you. You have
    to have a backup system other than these two EELVs, and right
    now the only capability other than that, once all the EELVs are
    gone, is the space shuttle.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, thank you. The Senate, indeed
    Congress is fortunate to have your services, having given much
    of your life and career to this subject. You're following in
    the shoes of your distinguished predecessor who was on this
    committee, Senator Graham.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Well, bless you. Mr. Chairman, I would
    just conclude by saying two names, Scott Speicher, let's not
    forget him.
        Chairman Warner. That's an important message and I share
    with you that message.
        Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary. It
    is a perilous irony, the fact that we're talking here about a
    $400 billion expenditure for the most overwhelming military
    force the world has ever known, and at the same time we're
    telling our citizens to go get out and get duct tape and
    plastic wrap and water. You said yourself, sir, today, that
    this is the most dangerous security environment the world has
    ever known.
        It reminded me of the ominous forewarnings of condition
    orange, what Robert Kennedy said after the Cuban missile
    crisis: ``No action is taken against an adversary in a vacuum.
    Escalation on one side brings a counter-response. A government
    or people will fail to understand this only at their great
    peril.''
        It seems to me that for the last 55 years our leaders have
    understood that. Both Republican and Democratic Presidents also
    faced dangerous dictators who had weapons of mass destruction,
    the heads of countries that were hostile to the United States,
    the former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, but none of those
    Presidents attacked those countries to eliminate that threat,
    and the threat was ongoing, it was dealt with and contained
    diplomatically, and the peace and security of this Nation were
    preserved.
        The principal reason I believe that they didn't do so was
    because of mutual assured destruction, because we knew that
    their country could inflict destruction on our citizens, our
    countryside, our cities, that was intolerable to us, just as we
    could annihilate them.
        I guess my question, sir, is why would we expect that Iraq
    will be any different? If the United States invades that
    country, is destroying their cities, their citizens, causing
    casualties among their citizens, why won't we expect that they
    will retaliate within the United States with every destructive
    force that they could marshall, and why wouldn't we expect that
    Osama bin Laden would do his utmost to exploit that situation
    and to twist it in the eyes of the world to be seen as
    something different from what it is? How do you assess our
    ability to protect our citizens in their cities and their
    schools and their homes from retaliation if we invade Iraq?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, let me say several things
    about that statement. First, if one goes back to the Soviet
    Union and mutually assured destruction, one thing we know is
    that time was on our side. If we could contain the Soviet
    Union, which had massive nuclear capability and was attempting
    to expand its interests throughout the world, in Africa, Latin
    American and Europe, and was a serious conventional as well as
    unconventional military threat, we felt if we could contain it
    for a long enough period, that their economic situation would
    change because it was a rotten system. We were right.
        With terrorist states that have demonstrated their
    willingness to use weapons of mass destruction on their own
    people, that fire ballistic missiles into their neighboring
    countries, that invade their neighboring countries, time is not
    on our side. These weapons that they have are such enormous
    power and they are not constrained. These are single dictators.
    These are not--I'm not going to start naming names again, I
    just make more news that I don't need to make.
        Let me start that sentence over by saying that these are
    not democratic systems, they aren't even systems like the old
    Soviet Union that had a Politburo where all power was not
    concentrated in a single person. They discussed things. You can
    go back and read the history books. These people, the dictators
    in the terrorist states today, don't have to discuss things
    with anybody. They can furthermore act in a way that masks what
    they have done. They can use a terrorist network to disseminate
    a weapon of mass destruction.
        It seems to me that what we need to remember is the last
    phrase I believe you used was something to the effect that
    Osama bin Laden would conduct a retaliatory attack or
    something.
        Senator Dayton. I said take advantage of the situation or
    exploit the situation.
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Right. What situation was he taking
    advantage of on September 11? I mean my goodness, they don't
    need excuses, they just do it. We see threat reports every day,
    dozens and dozens of them. In the last 6 months there have been
    terrorist attacks probably in what, 8, 10, 12 countries?
        Senator Dayton. I would move to my next question. If you
    conclude Iraq as synonymous with al Qaeda as an ongoing
    terrorist threat, I guess I would make a distinction between
    them and just point out--and I don't disagree with your
    assessment of the dictator there or the single control that he
    apparently has--the actions that you and others have described
    essentially took place 12 years ago. I don't think containment
    has been the complete failure that you've described it to be
    with Iraq, and I would just say that we didn't know time was on
    our side when we were dealing with the Soviet Union.
        What we did know was that if we went in there militarily,
    we were going to experience what Winston Churchill said of
    World War I, ``the price of victory is so great as to be
    indistinguishable from the cost of defeat.'' We're going to, I
    fear, inflict serious damage on this country, and that was my
    question. What is our ability to defend this country, protect
    our citizens if we go in in the next 2 weeks or 2 months into
    that country militarily and start inflicting destruction on
    them?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd like to make two points on it.
    Number one. Let's go back in time to September 2000, 1 year
    before September 11, 2001. What if we had scraps of
    information, a telephone call, a credit card, a person learning
    how to fly and didn't care about landing, 5 or 8 or 10 of them,
    and we started connecting the dots. What would have been
    sufficient to cause us to take a preemptive act to stop that
    act? This is a society that for decades has thought of itself
    as being willing to absorb an attack and not do anything until
    after we've taken that attack, then marshall our resources and
    go out and do something about it. That's been our way.
        I think today, post-September 11, an awful lot of people in
    our country properly would say well, by golly, if we had scraps
    of information and we could put it together, we should have
    preempted that attack. That's my guess.
        Senator Dayton. If you could have found al Qaeda and
    prevented it, absolutely. My time is up.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Dayton.
        Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
    Secretary, I want to follow up along the lines of what Senator
    Bill Nelson was asking and also Senator Dayton, because I think
    that in connected ways, they are focusing on the same issues
    with respect to how we are going to defend ourselves at home.
    As I understand it, in response to the threat level being
    raised to orange, the Pentagon has deployed heat seeking
    stinger anti-aircraft missiles at strategic locations around
    Washington, DC, and F-16s have been put on 24-hour alert in
    Washington, as well as deploying additional detection radars.
    Can you tell me whether similar steps have been taken in New
    York?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we don't talk about
    deployments and I would like to take a minute to explain why.
    We change how we're arranged in a defensive and deterrent
    standpoint from time to time with respect to combat air
    patrols, and I know you're familiar with how we're doing that
    with respect to the east coast and other portions of the
    country. To the extent we announce them, it demystifies the
    problems for others, the people who would attack. To the extent
    we regularize them, we demystify them.
        So what we do is we do things on an irregular basis. It's
    not thoughtless and random, but it is in fact irregular, and
    it's designed to do that to maximize the deterrent effect and
    to maximize our ability to defend at times when we believe the
    threat level requires it.
        Senator Clinton. I certainly understand and appreciate that
    and would not want to have any specific information, but
    clearly some of what has been deployed around Washington is
    visible to the naked eye and, therefore, we know it. There have
    been no similar reports of anything visible to the naked eye
    with respect to New York. Since we also have reason to believe
    that New York and Washington remain at the top of the
    terrorists' lists of targets, perhaps in another setting, I
    could at least be advised as to what if any actions,
    irregularly or regularly, are occurring with respect to New
    York.
        Let me just move on, because I think that it ties into an
    ongoing concern of mine which is the readiness of our first
    responders here at home, whether they are dealing with an al
    Qaeda attack such as we saw on September 11, or a retaliatory
    attack in the wake of military action in Iraq. One of the
    problems that we are seeing surface that I talked to now
    Assistant Secretary McHale about during his confirmation
    hearings, is that many of the people who are being called up,
    who are pumped, who are ready to go, are first responders.
    They're police officers, they're fire fighters, they're EMTs,
    they are others who provide the first line of defense here at
    home.
        Today I sent a letter to you, Mr. Secretary, and I'd like,
    Mr. Chairman, to make it part of the record.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Clinton. That letter requests information as to the
    extent to which Reserve call-ups are impacting on our first
    responders. Because as we go forward with the planning that I
    understand you're doing with respect to how we deal with Guard
    and Reserve Forces, whether we confront redeployments of our
    end forces abroad, I think we have to recognize that if we're
    fighting a multifront war, which we may very well be, we know
    we're fighting one here at home already as well as against al
    Qaeda, and there may be others to come, we have to be sure that
    our first responder front line defenders have adequate force
    strength.
        There are a number of reports that have surfaced in the
    press about what local officials are confronting. A number of
    mayors and county executives have said that as many as 10
    percent of first responders are also in the Reserves. I know in
    New York City, 300 of our fire fighters are in the Reserves.
        We also know that the cost to our communities at a time of
    decreased budgets, and I would argue inadequate Federal
    resources for our first responders, means that the police
    department in New York City spends more than $200,000 a week to
    cover their reservists, and the fire department spends more
    than $100,000 a week. A small community like the Niagara Falls
    Police Department spent $350,000 last year.
        Nobody begrudges that. We want to continue to support our
    first responders. But I think as you look at the connections
    between what we have to be ready to do here at home as well as
    our force abroad, I hope that you will take that into account.
    It's not only at the local level; clearly it affects Customs
    officials, FEMA officials, Secret Service and others. I will
    look forward to having a response to this letter, because I
    know this is an issue that you will have to look into, but I
    hope that it is part of what we go forward in planning.
        Finally, General Myers, I am concerned, as I was when I was
    First Lady, about the unexplained illnesses that many of our
    men and women return from the Persian Gulf suffering from. I
    was asked by the President to look into this during the last
    part of the 1990s and we came up with an independent blue
    ribbon commission to investigate the issues raised by these
    undiagnosed illnesses and the treatment that many of our
    veterans received, and there was a final report submitted to
    the President in January 1997, including a slate of
    recommendations to ensure that Gulf War veterans received all
    the care that they needed.
        With U.S. troops once again being deployed to the Persian
    Gulf, and without us really knowing what caused a lot of the
    problems, we look at a number of sources, and I have to say,
    Mr. Chairman, I think this is an area that we want to go into
    in some depth in this committee, because we're seeing the same
    thing with respect to the first responders who responded to
    Ground Zero. The combination of whatever was in the air when
    those buildings were attacked and collapsed has caused
    extraordinary respiratory, pulmonary dysfunction and distress,
    and we're only beginning to try to understand it. Similarly
    when we saw our men and women coming back from the Gulf, we
    know that similar kinds of issues occurred, and now we have an
    added challenge of biological, chemical, and radiological
    potential attacks as well.
        Now a year ago, in February 2002, a General Accounting
    Office (GAO) official testified before the House Veterans
    Affairs Committee that while military medical surveillance
    policies had been established, much still needed to be done to
    implement the system, and I would hope that we could get a
    report, General Myers or Mr. Secretary, about what we are doing
    to ensure proper implementation. Once somebody is a veteran it
    may be too late, so I would like to make sure that our Active-
    Duty Forces are getting the surveillance that they need for
    medical monitoring and health tracking before being deployed to
    the Gulf so that we can know and have a better research base to
    understand what they have been and might be exposed to, and I
    look forward to getting that information.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The DOD has applied medical lessons learned from the Gulf War to
    help protect the health of military personnel before, during, and
    following deployments.
        Subsequent to the publication of the final report of the
    Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses on
    December 31, 1996, DOD published the following policy: Department of
    Defense Directive (DODD) 6490.2, ``Joint Medical Surveillance,'' and
    Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 6490.3, ``Implementation and
    Application of Joint Medical Surveillance for Deployments.'' On
    December 4, 1998, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff (OCJCS) issued a memorandum on ``Deployment Health Surveillance
    and Readiness'' that supported implementation of the DODD and DODI. On
    February 1, 2002, the OCJCS updated the memorandum for health
    surveillance and readiness during all deployments. The memorandum
    provides standardized procedures, including occupational and
    environmental health surveillance procedures, for assessing health
    readiness and conducting health surveillance in support of all military
    deployments.
        The DOD has developed and implemented a Force Health Protection
    (FHP) strategy that promotes and sustains the health of service members
    during their entire length of service. This adds an additional level of
    confidence to the specific programs for promoting and sustaining the
    health of military personnel prior to, during, and after deployments.
    Programs are in place to promote the fitness and health of personnel
    before they deploy, to protect them from disease and injury during
    deployment, and to provide comprehensive treatment for deployment-
    related health conditions. The DOD has appointed a Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Force Health Protection and Readiness to
    assure sustained focus on this strategy.
        The DOD has implemented a Defense Medical Surveillance System
    (DMSS), which integrates numerous health, personnel, and deployment
    data sources. The DMSS database contains longitudinal health data on
    Service members (e.g., hospitalizations, ambulatory visits, reportable
    diseases), as well as integrated personnel and deployment data. The DOD
    has established a Serum Repository to archive periodic serum samples
    for all service members.
        The DOD has instituted a deployment health surveillance program,
    which validates individuals' medical readiness to deploy. It includes
    pre-deployment and post-deployment health assessments (with copies
    archived in DMSS), complete immunizations, and other protective
    measures, and addresses health concerns upon return from deployments.
    This is another step in providing periodic longitudinal health
    monitoring of service members from the time they enter military service
    and includes periodic medical, dental, and readiness assessments;
    physical fitness testing; and comprehensive health care through the
    military health system.
        Improved deployment health protection countermeasures are being
    designed to protect our Service members against an increasingly broad
    range of threats. Such countermeasures include the fielding of new
    biological and chemical warfare agent detection and alarm systems; the
    operational testing of integrated electronic medical surveillance and
    emergency response networks; current vaccines and anti-malarial drugs;
    and research on the next generation of vaccines and pharmaceuticals.
        The Department has been conducting ongoing monitoring and weekly
    reporting of disease and non-battle injuries (DNBI) during deployments.
    We have enabled daily DNBI monitoring in order to increase the
    sensitivity of this capability to detect the earliest occurrence of a
    natural, chemical, or biological agent exposure. In addition, all
    deployed medical units report through command channels at least daily
    on their current situation enabling immediate notification of any
    potential disease outbreak.
        The DOD has implemented improved occupational and environmental
    health surveillance programs for protecting Service members' health
    during deployment. The DOD has implemented operational risk management
    programs throughout the services that provide focus for all commanders
    to effectively manage both safety and environmental health risks and to
    mitigate the impact on our Service members.
        The DOD has implemented improved environmental and clinical
    laboratory capabilities in theater. The DOD now routinely deploys
    preventive medicine, environmental health, theater medical
    surveillance, and forward laboratory teams in support of worldwide
    operations.
        The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center develops products that
    assist our understanding of endemic diseases, vectors, and industrial
    hazards worldwide. All Services utilize these products to increase
    their knowledge of areas of operations and develop an initial
    assessment strategy during bed down operations and incrementally
    throughout the deployment. Preplanning and on-site environmental
    assessments of staging areas and base sites have been critical to
    protecting our Service members and documenting any potential ambient
    exposures. The integration of operational risk management provides
    field commanders the necessary information upon which they can act.
        The DOD has improved health risk communication through the
    provision of regionally-specific medical intelligence, environmental
    risk assessments, medical threat briefings, pocket-sized health guides,
    and deployment-focused web sites.
        The DOD has established three deployment health centers for health
    surveillance, clinical care, and health research that focus on the
    prevention, treatment, and understanding of deployment-related health
    concerns.
        The DOD has coordinated with the VA to address deployment-related
    health concerns of Service members and veterans by jointly developing a
    Post-Deployment Health Evaluation and Management Clinical Practice
    Guideline (CPG), and by electronically sharing medical information
    through the Federal Health Information Exchange.
        The DOD has taken steps to improve deployment-related medical
    record keeping by developing the Composite Health Care System II (CHCS
    II), the Theater Medical Information Program (TMIP), medical evacuation
    automated patient tracking and by expanding the electronic tracking and
    centralized collection of immunization data.
        The DOD is working to improve tracking of individual and unit
    locations during deployment and development of a comprehensive Defense
    Integrated Military Human Resources System.
        The joint force is superbly trained and comprised of dedicated men
    and women who represent DOD's most vital resource. Implementation of
    DOD's Force Health Protection Strategy is a critical component of our
    overall Force Protection strategy and is essential to maintaining the
    health and fitness of servicemembers during their entire career. Force
    Health Protection programs have important life-long implications for
    health. The DOD has made tremendous strides since the Gulf War in
    monitoring and tracking the health of our personnel prior to, during,
    and following deployments. We will continually seek to improve these
    programs because Force Health Protection directly improves our
    readiness posture and the capability of our servicemembers.

        Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, and I can speak from
    firsthand experience, having gone with you out to Walter Reed
    to visit the veterans who returned from Afghanistan, of the
    depth of your sincerity with regard to the subjects of which
    you speak. We thank you, and I do hope that you spearhead on
    this committee those efforts.
        Senator Levin, I think we have conducted a very successful
    hearing. If you have no further comments, we thank you, Mr.
    Secretary. We thank you, General, and we thank you, Dr.
    Zakheim.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

                          FAMILY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION

        1. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, included in
    the $4.0 billion request for family housing for fiscal year 2004 is
    $346 million for family housing privatization of 36,262 units. This
    seems to me to be one of those truly transformational programs that
    goes directly to improving morale and helping the troops and their
    families make a positive decision about making the military a career.
    Inadequate, unattractive housing like the infamous Tarawa Terrace
    housing area at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina is simply unacceptable
    when we ask so much of our military personnel and their families. Is
    this privatization program the quickest, most cost effective way to
    replace the inadequate housing which exists all across the military?
        Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Yes, housing privatization is
    the quickest and most cost-effective approach to addressing DOD's
    inadequate housing. Housing privatization is transforming and
    revitalizing military family housing at an accelerated pace.
        In January 2001, the Department had about 180,000 inadequate family
    housing units. Today, primarily through housing privatization and our
    military construction program, we have reduced that number to roughly
    163,000. This number will continue to come down as we pursue the goal
    to eliminate inadequate housing by 2007. As of March 2003, we have
    awarded 18 projects totaling 27,884 family housing units. Additionally,
    we project that the services will privatize over 38,000 family housing
    units during fiscal year 2003, and over 36,000 family housing units
    during fiscal year 2004. The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget
    includes our plan to privatize about 102,000 family housing units by
    the end of fiscal year 2004.
        Housing privatization is cost-effective and allows DOD to tap the
    expertise of the private sector to address a large problem. Our policy
    requires that privatization yield at least three times the amount of
    housing that would be provided using traditional military construction.
    The projects awarded thus far leverage upfront appropriations by a
    ratio of 10:1. This means that DOD has invested $290 million, to obtain
    about $2.9 billion worth of equivalent MILCON housing improvements.
    Finally, our economic analyses indicate that when we look at long-term
    costs over the 50-year term of most of our deals, privatization is
    about 10 percent less costly.

        2. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, what has
    been our experience thus far with this housing in terms of quality of
    construction and the ongoing maintenance by the contractor?
        Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Surveys of military tenants
    living in new and renovated privatized housing have given high marks to
    quality of construction and housing maintenance. Privatized housing
    must comply with local and State construction codes and standards, as
    well as DOD project specifications. In fact, in many of our early
    projects, the immediate improvement in housing maintenance won over
    residents to privatization well before any new units were constructed.

        3. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, are we
    devoting enough resources to family housing privatization?
        Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers. Yes, we are devoting enough
    resources to housing privatization. We believe the current number of
    privatization projects in the pipeline and our fiscal year 2004 funding
    request is sufficient to keep us on track to eliminate our remaining
    inadequate family housing.

                 REFORMING THE WAY THE DEPARTMENT DOES BUSINESS

        4. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, regarding that aspect of
    transformation which involves reforming the way in which the Department
    of Defense (DOD) does business, I understand there is a long history of
    disagreements and mistrust between Congress and the Pentagon that
    apparently led to all the strings now attached to or perhaps strangling
    DOD.
        In part based on my own experience running the Departments of
    Transportation and Labor, and the American Red Cross, I want to support
    you in your desire for a more free hand to make sensible, cost-
    effective decisions. However, looking at it from this side of the
    table, what your request seems to me to be saying is: ``Trust me.'' How
    can we strike the balance that gives you the help you need in your
    commendable desire to operate in a more business-like way while not
    abdicating our proper congressional oversight role?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We developed the system we live under today
    over the last 100 years--it is an industrial age system trying to meet
    the needs of an information age security environment.
        Times have changed and we need change in order to meet the new
    threats we face today and will face in the future. It is imperative
    that we move away from industrial age policies to those that would
    allow us to face asymmetric threats of today's world. We don't have the
    luxury of knowing when and where he will strike next. Common sense
    dictates that we be lighter and quicker if we are going to protect the
    United States from the cold-blooded killers we face today.
        I'm not asking you to ``trust me,'' but instead I'm saying look at
    our track record. Our personnel system is based on the performance of
    20 years of demonstration projects with over 30,000 employees currently
    working in those programs--working in an environment that promotes and
    rewards initiative and hard work instead longevity. Our record on the
    environment is a strong one. Over the past decade, the department has
    spent $48 billion to clean up sites from past activities and invested
    in new technology and programs to improve pollution prevention and
    ensure compliance with environmental laws. The Department manages 25
    million acres of the Nation's land that includes over 300 threatened
    and endangered species that are protected on our ranges and
    installations. In many cases populations are maintained and restored
    under our stewardship. For example, on San Clemente Island in
    California's Channel Islands, islands often referred to as America's
    Galapagos Islands, the Navy has brought the island's endangered
    loggerhead shrike back from the brink of extinction. In the mid-1990s
    the population of these birds had declined to 13, making it one of the
    Nation's most endangered species. I challenge anyone to compare our
    environmental record. No, I'm not asking you to ``trust me'', just
    judge us on our record.
        We do not challenge or seek to weaken Congress's oversight role. We
    welcome your reviews of our programs, understanding it is your
    constitutional responsibility. But together we share a common
    responsibility to provide the finest defense for the citizens of the
    United States. To do that we must shed the policies that have
    accumulated in the past and handicap us today.

        5. Senator Dole. Secretary Rumsfeld, among the proposals you have
    discussed, could you prioritize them in terms of their importance to
    the Department? Which gives the greatest leverage in savings to the
    Department?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. To completely answer this question, I need to
    provide some background on how we got to where we are today. Over a
    year ago I challenged my staff to provide me with proposals that would
    make the Department more suited to face the challenges we would face in
    the 21st century. They did an excellent job. As we gathered all the
    inputs, we took a hard look at each proposal to make sure it would have
    the desired effect. We thinned the list down to what we considered our
    top priorities and worked with the administration to review them.
        We worked closely with OMB, OPM, EPA, and other agencies and what
    came out of this process were the top priorities for the Department. So
    to answer your question, I have to tell you what you have in front of
    you are the Department's top priorities.
        As far as the greatest leverage in savings, I don't think you can
    look at them in that manner. How do you put a dollar figure on a more
    motivated employee? How do you measure the life of a soldier, whose
    life is saved because of the realistic training he had before going to
    war? And finally, what price do you assign the ability to detect the
    advanced submarines of today so that a carrier battle group can carry
    out its duties in battle? The savings to the Department are real and
    tangible, but you cannot assign a dollar amount to them.

                              JUNIOR ROTC PROGRAM

        6. Senator Dole. General Myers, I've long been concerned about the
    fact that our young people seemed to have been turning away from public
    service in recent years. There's so much cynicism and doubt. I want to
    help inspire them to realize that public service, service to their
    country, is a noble thing to do and a great way to give back for all
    the blessings of this great country.
        I have heard many good things about the Junior ROTC program and how
    well it has worked, particularly in many challenging inner city
    schools. Could you comment on the experience the military services have
    had with Junior ROTC?
        General Myers. The Services like the Junior ROTC program, and the
    program is extremely popular with educators and community leaders.
    Junior ROTC was originally an Army program; however, since 1964 all the
    Services offer the program and benefit from its instruction designed to
    teach citizenship and leadership, while instilling self-esteem,
    teamwork, and self-discipline. Although Junior ROTC is not a recruiting
    tool, traditionally about 45 percent of high school graduates with more
    than 2 years participation in the program end up with some military
    affiliation. Recent surveys reveal that youth who have been exposed to
    people with military experience enjoy a far greater understanding of
    the nature of military life than those who had no such exposure. A
    challenge confronted by recruiter's centers on the fact that a smaller
    military generates fewer veterans in communities and schools around the
    Nation. The Junior ROTC program represents an excellent means to
    address that problem. Moreover, the program builds better citizens,
    which strengthens the Nation and generates military awareness among
    youth and those who influence their career decisions.

        7. Senator Dole. General Myers, are we doing enough to make the
    Junior ROTC program more widely available, particularly to urban and
    inner city schools?
        General Myers. All interested schools are urged to apply to the
    Department of Defense for this program. Currently 450,000 students in
    2,900 secondary schools participate. Additionally, there are more than
    750 secondary schools on Service waiting lists with more applying. We
    will achieve the previously funded goal of 3,500 units by fiscal year
    2006; however, funding for expansion beyond this is not programmed at
    this time.

        8. Senator Dole. General Myers, is this very cost-effective program
    adequately funded?
        General Myers. Yes. The Department recognizes the strength of this
    program and continues its growth to meet our needs. In fiscal year
    2003, the Department budgeted over $252 million in JROTC, a 5-percent
    increase from fiscal year 2002.

                                FORCE READINESS

        9. Senator Dole. General Myers, in your prepared testimony you
    describe in some detail that U.S. forces are widely deployed and that
    threats to U.S. interests have not abated. You add that we have the
    capability to be militarily successful across a broad range of
    contingencies. As I look at the immense task facing our Armed Forces, I
    have some concerns about our ability to maintain the high combat-ready
    status of our forces. To consider the possibility of war in Iraq, while
    facing the reality of the ongoing war against terrorism focused in
    Afghanistan and the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, it
    really is daunting. What I want to ask you about is readiness. I know
    that you understand the importance of and want to sustain proper levels
    of training, ensure adequate supplies of equipment and spares, and
    perform needed equipment maintenance. How long can we sustain this
    deployment pace? If another deployment is required within the next 6
    months, will we be able to support it with trained and ready forces?
        General Myers. Our forces are postured and ready to conduct
    operations as directed by the President. We can maintain and sustain
    this posture for the foreseeable future by maintaining readiness levels
    through a variety of measures to include in-theater training and select
    unit rotations. However, the current pace of operations and future
    potential operations is not cost-free, and requires the services and
    Combatant Commanders to carefully manage assets and units that are in
    high demand, but in small numbers. The demand for critical capabilities
    (such as manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance and
    reconnaissance assets, Special Operations Forces, intelligence analysts
    and linguists and command/control assets) has increased significantly
    with multiple contingencies. We will continue to prioritize the use of
    these critical units to preserve our surge capability to support future
    operations with trained and ready forces.

        10. Senator Dole. General Myers, are we getting stretched too thin?
    Can we feel confident that the safety of the equipment and of our men
    and women is not being compromised?
        General Myers. While our current posture of engagement is
    demanding, we are not stretched too thin. We possess the forces
    necessary to meet the demands of the Defense Strategy. Certainly our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are working at an increased
    operational pace; a pace we would not want to sustain indefinitely, but
    when vital U.S. interests are at risk, our Armed Forces are eager to
    meet these challenges. Furthermore, the safety of our Armed Forces
    remains a top priority of mine and it is shared by the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff. Our forces have the best training and equipment available to
    ensure their safety is not compromised. Finally, we must continue to
    fund our forces' training and associated operations and maintenance
    accounts, to ensure their continued readiness and safety is sustained.

        11. Senator Dole. General Myers, are you seeing an impact on morale
    of the troops? How about the families?
        General Myers. The morale of troops is high. Service members are
    reporting a great deal of satisfaction with military life. Thanks to
    the help of Congress, several years of steady improvements in pay,
    benefits, and attention to quality of life issues have all contributed
    to high morale.
        We are aggressively working to ensure families have the support
    they need during these stressful times and that the families have been
    contacted or receive information as quickly as possible to help them
    prepare for mobilization and deployment. Further, the family support
    professional and volunteer staffs are making every effort to reach out
    to the spouses, children, and parents of our Service members. Military
    families come together in times like these. This is part of the
    military's true strength.

        12. Senator Dole. General Myers, are there lessons that have been
    learned from the tragedies which occurred at Fort Bragg? Are the
    military services doing enough to ensure family readiness in this time
    of rapidly repeated deployments?
        General Myers. The Services already have plans to assist Service
    members and families with reunion once this contingency is complete.
    Helping families reunite is part of our family support tradition. In
    the process, if our professionals identify Service members and families
    in stress during reunion, we will provide additional professional
    resources to assist them.
        All the Services have programs in place or have redirected
    resources to expand current capabilities to meet a wide variety of
    family needs during sustainment and post-operational phases. They are
    also using traditional media and technology to reach out to the Total
    Force, including those off the installations and Guard and Reserves to
    help keep family members connected.

        13. Senator Dole. General Myers, how can we in Congress help you?
        General Myers. With Congress' strong support, we have made
    significant progress in the war on terrorism and our overall military
    capabilities. However, maintaining readiness to meet the threats is a
    long-term commitment requiring critical congressional support. Timely
    approval of Defense budget supplemental funding is essential to
    maintaining current operations without negatively impacting readiness,
    training, and re-setting the force. With Congress' continued unwavering
    support, we will sustain our Armed Forces most decisive element--the
    individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine . . . and will ensure we
    are prepared to meet all the threats to our national interests.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                           FORCE REQUIREMENTS IN IRAQ

        14. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, any invasion of Iraq
    will likely require a large number of U.S. troops to serve in an
    occupation/stabilization force after the fighting stops. The size of
    this force will be larger if the United States attacks Iraq without
    U.N. sanction or NATO cooperation. If a war with Iraq takes place and
    substantial U.S. military forces are required to occupy Iraq in its
    aftermath, how would providing a large occupation force impact other
    operations in the global war on terrorism?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We cannot provide an exact answer to your
    question until more is known about the nature of the post-conflict
    environment. However, the U.S. Government will continue to pursue the
    various elements of this global war on terror simultaneously with any
    post-war operations in Iraq. The conflict with Iraq is an integral part
    of the larger global war on terrorism. Preventing regimes that support
    terror from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key objective in
    this war. The ``Coalition of the Willing'' supporting the war in Iraq
    continues to build. We expect both the U.N. and NATO to contribute to
    the post-war effort. This participation will relieve many U.S. troops
    who participated in the war effort, allowing us to remain prepared for
    other contingencies, including other aspects of the war on terrorism.

        15. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, will the United States
    need to mobilize additional Reserve Forces to carry out this occupation
    and stabilization mission?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The U.S. should not need to mobilize additional
    forces to maintain post-war stability in Iraq. We have mobilized
    sufficient forces to continue our ongoing operations, meet our
    international commitments, and continue to protect the American
    homeland. After we have liberated Iraq, we expect a ``Coalition of the
    Willing'' will aid the U.S. in maintaining stability in Iraq as a
    representative Iraqi government is formed. We expect many nations that
    are not currently participating in military operations will support
    post-war stability operations in Iraq. Consequently, the U.S. will have
    the opportunity to reduce the number of troops committed to Iraq after
    liberation is complete.

                           OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

        16. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, forces in Afghanistan
    continue to conduct dangerous combat operations. In recent weeks, U.S.
    forces completed the largest ground battle with al Qaeda and Taliban
    elements since Operation Anaconda. Are U.S. operations being hampered
    by the ``safe haven'' in the ungoverned areas of western Pakistan that
    al Qaeda and Taliban forces are using?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Pursuing the Taliban and al Qaeda elements in
    the Afghan-Pakistan border area is an important mission. The U.S. will
    not allow elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda operating in this area
    to succeed in destabilizing the newly formed Afghan government. U.S.
    and Coalition Forces, in close coordination with Pakistani military
    forces operating in western Pakistan, will continue to target those
    border areas harboring remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban forces. We will
    work closely with the Pakistani government to target and destroy the
    remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in those areas.

        17. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how do you see U.S.
    combat operations in Afghanistan evolving over the next year and do you
    feel the combatant commander has sufficient forces to accomplish the
    missions laid out by the President?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. U.S. combat operations will continue to focus
    on targeting and destroying the remnants of terrorist forces in
    Afghanistan. We are also in the initial stages of increased stability
    operations with the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The
    Commanding General of Combined Joint Task Force 180 in Bagram has
    sufficient forces in Afghanistan to successfully accomplish the
    missions laid out by the President.

                           SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President's budget
    includes a significant increase in funding for Special Operations
    Forces (SOFs). SOFs are busier than ever, but there are real limits to
    how big these forces can be without compromising their quality. In
    future years, how do you see the Department managing the challenge of
    ever-increasing operational tempo for these forces with the inherently
    limited size of Special Operations units?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. I agree with the basic thrust of this question.
    SOF can not be mass-produced. It is the human dimension of Special
    Operations Forces, not necessarily the hardware, which makes U.S.
    Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) such a capable command. We are
    therefore looking at several ways to mitigate the OPTEMPO impacts the
    war on terrorism has on SOF units.
        The worldwide operational tempo for SOF has been significant over
    recent years. However, the quality of SOF personnel has remained high
    and the retention of seasoned professionals has consistently met
    readiness requirements, though its something we monitor very carefully.
    One reason that SOF personnel growth must be limited is that gaining
    the required proficiency and specialization in key SOF capabilities
    takes time. This limits how rapidly the force can grow.
        Over the past year, we conducted a comprehensive study to review
    the alignment of SOFs with the defense strategy. The study underscored
    the need to increase the size of our SOFs in a prudent, measured
    fashion. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2004 includes
    more than 1,890 new SOF personnel, an increase of approximately 4
    percent. These new personnel will be spread among the USSOCOM
    headquarters, its component commands, and the regional special
    operations commands.
        We are also conducting an assessment of both SOF core and
    collateral missions and capabilities required for the global war on
    terrorism. As we transform the services, it is likely that some
    conventional forces could perform missions now commonly associated with
    SOF. If other forces become able to perform certain collateral
    missions, it should be possible for our SOFs to concentrate more fully
    on the core missions needed to win the war on terrorism.
        For example, the USSOCOM and the U.S. Marine Corps are examining
    how SOF and U.S. Marine forces can operate together to undertake a
    range of contingencies that might have been done exclusively by SOF in
    the past. Likewise, certain ``train and equip'' missions combined with
    a more effective phasing of operations may allow SOFs to be employed
    earlier in an operation to set the parameters of the effort, and then
    be replaced by conventional forces.

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how will managing this
    challenge affect the global war on terrorism in the long term?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Our strategic focus initially is on disrupting,
    defeating, and destroying al Qaeda, with a particular emphasis on its
    leadership and operational planning and coordination structure. The
    USSOCOM is playing a key role in this effort. As the lead command for
    the Department's global war on terror, USSOCOM will plan and
    selectively execute combat missions against terrorists and terrorist
    organizations around the world.
        This expanded operational role is in addition to the traditional
    role that the USSOCOM plays (i.e. providing SOFs and materiel to the
    various regional Combatant Commanders, who then plan and direct
    missions that fall within their purview).
        The war against terrorism requires seamless cooperation and
    collaboration by the Department of Defense with many Federal agencies
    and departments, ranging from the Department of State and our
    Ambassadors overseas to the Intelligence Community, the Departments of
    Justice and Treasury, and others. USSOCOM has recognized this need for
    cross-functional coordination, and has established a planning
    capability that is augmented by interagency liaisons. Contingency
    planning will be done more rapidly than is traditionally the case since
    we often are dealing with fleeting targets and fragmentary
    intelligence. Of course, SOFs are not always the best option, or the
    only option. Cooperative host nation security forces, other allies, or
    other arms of the U.S. Government may prove better positioned to
    undertake key missions successfully.
        Since the global war on terrorism began, we have pointed out that
    it is a war unlike any other war that our country has ever fought.
    Victory requires new ways of thinking, new ways of fighting, and a good
    deal of patience and fortitude. As we move forward in transforming the
    Department, the role of our SOFs--their missions required capabilities,
    and organizational structures and manning--will be a core element of
    attention. Their effectiveness and the retention and recruitment of
    others to join the ranks of our SOFs will not be jeopardized.

                                 RESERVE FORCES

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, current and future
    operations in the global war on terrorism are increasingly requiring
    mobilization of large numbers of Reserve component forces. Mobilization
    of these patriotic citizen-soldiers is, of course, a burden on
    thousands of families and communities nationwide. Looking into the
    future, what do you think the long-term impact of extended and frequent
    Reserve mobilizations will be on the strength and vitality of the
    Reserve Forces?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Reserve Forces are and will continue to be an
    indispensable part of the total military posture of the department. One
    of the most immediate factors affecting the long-term impact on Reserve
    Forces is how well mobilization and demobilization are managed. In an
    effort to limit disruption for reservists, their employers, families,
    and communities, DOD policy directed that initial orders to active duty
    not exceed 12 months. DOD policy also has stressed the principles of
    using Reserve components judiciously, considering the expectations of
    individual members, relying on volunteers to the maximum extent
    feasible, ensuring guardsmen and reservists are brought on active duty
    only to perform meaningful tasks and retaining them on active duty only
    as long as absolutely necessary. If history is a predictor of future
    success, the steps we have taken should mitigate any adverse impact on
    recruiting and retention. In fact, when reservists feel that their
    service is meaningful, they are more likely to remain with us.
        The frequency and duration of Reserve mobilizations can be reduced
    through rebalancing Active and Reserve Force mix and reassigning
    missions to take advantage of Active and Reserve core competencies.
    Rebalancing the existing force mix can expand and enhance Total Force
    capabilities within current end strength. Changes are being considered
    across the full spectrum of capabilities in each component, to increase
    force agility, enable better management of operational tempo, and to
    foster closer integration between Active and Reserve components. These
    changes will allow the Services to lessen stress and enhance the
    strength and vitality of the Reserve Force.
        In addition, current force management policies and systems are not
    as efficient or consistent with the way the force is used. Personnel
    management practices are being streamlined to achieve greater
    flexibility in accessing and managing personnel throughout a military
    career that may span both Active and Reserve service--or across a
    ``continuum of service.'' Creating the conditions for ``seamless'' flow
    between regular and Reserve service, and providing for varying levels
    of part-time participation will improve efficiency of force management
    and provide more flexibility for recruiting and retaining a quality
    force.
        Financial incentives, meaningful training, and proper use of our
    Reserve Force are required to ensure retention of trained human
    resources, but, first and foremost, is the need to attract quality
    individuals into Reserve military service. Strengthening recruiting
    efforts in the college market bolsters the Reserve Force through
    improved quality and service, given that there is a direct correlation
    between education levels and retention beyond the initial military
    enlistment.
        In the future, we see the Reserves as a terrific way to bring
    diverse skills and experience to the military from the civil sector,
    that is hard to grow, train, and maintain in the regular forces. These
    may include medical, language, information technology and other
    technical skills. This will necessitate innovative affiliation programs
    and alternatives for accessing and retaining individuals into the
    Reserve components. The result can be a more cost-effective way to
    provide the military with cutting-edge technology and exposure to the
    new and innovative practices and approaches employed by industry and
    the private sector.
        The Reserve components will continue to be a significant and cost-
    effective part of the Total Force, and force rebalancing and creative
    force management can only enhance the strength and vitality of this
    essential element of the military and the American society.

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, in addition, is the
    current mobilization causing you to re-think both the size and
    structure of the Reserve Forces?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The current mobilization by itself does not
    cause the Department to re-think the size and structure of the Reserve
    Forces. What it does do is confirm that the strategic landscape and
    evolving geo-political environment, as described in many of our
    national security documents, requires that the U.S. possess
    capabilities that are responsive, agile, and able to meet these
    emerging challenges of the 21st century. The current mobilization also
    helps in gaining insight on whether the force size, structure, and mix
    are optimized to execute the U.S. Defense Strategy in support of the
    National Security Strategy.
        The Department has embarked on an ambitious transformation to meet
    these challenges. As we continue to progress in our transformation, we
    are examining ways to significantly increase the value of each element
    of our military, to include exploration of opportunities to restructure
    and reorganize our force appropriately. This includes the Reserve
    component. In order to ensure that we progress on this path of
    transformation smartly, we initiated a series of analytical studies to
    determine what is the best force structure to support our strategy for
    the 21st century and what is the appropriate mix of the force in our
    Active and Reserve components.
        The first study, which resulted from the Quadrennial Defense
    Review, was the ``Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National
    Defense.'' This study focused on how we could best utilize our Reserve
    component forces in a more efficient and effective manner. Some
    innovative concepts derived from this study include: the establishment
    of what we call a ``continuum of service,'' a personnel management
    process to better integrate the Active and Reserve Forces by making it
    easier for personnel to move back and forth between Active and Reserve
    service several times during a career, potentially increasing their
    level of participation and resulting in more engaged and longer service
    to the Department; increased use of volunteerism for select individuals
    and units to expedite the mobilization process making Reserve call-ups
    more responsive; and creating Reserve capabilities stateside that
    Combatant Commanders can utilize with reach back techniques that reduce
    theater footprint, deployment costs, and relieve deployment
    requirements and stress in some of our Reserve component forces.
        The second study is the ``Operational Availability Study.''
    Directed in Defense Planning Guidance 2004, this study assesses how
    best to utilize future joint military capabilities and force employment
    timelines to execute the Defense Strategy. Emerging insights evolving
    from this study include recommendations of future force size,
    structure, and mix required to support the Defense Strategy in the 21st
    century.
        The third study, ``AC/RC Mix and Strategic Surprise'' examines
    innovative management techniques and force structure adjustments that
    improve the agility and responsiveness of the Reserve components.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, are the kinds of units
    that are in the various Reserve components the right ones?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The demands on the Department of Defense have
    evolved since the end of the Cold War and appear to be increasing
    exponentially in the 21st century as we continue the global war on
    terrorism. Both Active and Reserve components are being used more
    frequently and in a wider variety of missions.
        In the past, the Reserve components were structured as a repository
    for capabilities needed to meet the later phases of major theater wars.
    Due in a large part to the changing strategic landscape and
    geopolitical environment over the past years, reliance on Reserve
    capabilities has increased dramatically and migrated into every
    deployment across the spectrum of conflict. As a result, capabilities
    that reside predominantly in the Reserves today, such as civil affairs,
    port opening, Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies, and Combat Search
    and Rescue, are needed early and often, and must be mobilized quickly
    in a deployment. This reliance in every operation degrades the
    military's responsiveness, flexibility, and agility needed to support
    the Defense Strategy and meet the emerging challenges of the 21st
    century.
        In that regard, the Department is finalizing two major studies that
    address this very issue of rebalancing the force to meet the National
    Security Strategy. The ``Review of Reserve Component Contributions to
    National Defense'' and the ``Operational Availability Study'' will
    recommend ways to rebalance the Total Force within current end-strength
    to make a more effective and judicious use of all components, not just
    for today but also as we transform to the future force.

                                  SPACE ASSETS

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the recent Space
    Shuttle Columbia tragedy has the Nation reassessing the value of space
    exploration, experimentation, and operations. Many of us understand the
    inherent and essential military value of space as an operational
    medium. The President's budget for fiscal year 2004 demonstrates a
    significant commitment to upgrading and expanding U.S. military space
    assets. Could you expand on the role of space in defense transformation
    and how transformation in military space assets will evolve in the
    coming years?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. It would be difficult to achieve our national
    security objectives without the capabilities provided by our national
    security space systems. For example: communications, reconnaissance,
    surveillance, and precision navigation are all integral to our
    peacetime and crisis responsibilities and the effectiveness of our
    military forces. We are looking at entirely new areas and technologies
    that could transform our military strategies. The modernization
    investments we are making are to provide highly advanced space system
    capabilities and the science and technology investments are to provide
    the technologies that would allow entirely new capabilities to be
    developed transforming how we use space to meet our mission needs. We
    will be demonstrating, acquiring, and fielding these capabilities over
    the years to come. Some examples, not in priority order or inclusive
    are:

             Developing persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
            reconnaissance (ISR), including moving target tracking and
            maintaining a common operating picture of the battlefield.
            Space-based radar (SBR) is a key element and will provide the
            capability to look deeply and persistently into areas that are
            inaccessible to current platforms due to political
            restrictions, geographical constraints, or the technological
            limitations of legacy systems
             Developing an advanced space delivery vehicle, the
            Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), capable of delivering and dispensing
            conventional payloads worldwide from and through space within
            minutes of tasking with precision accuracy and an array of
            conventional payloads to include effectively attacking soft and
            hardened fixed targets, and mobile targets.
             Developing a reusable, quick-reaction launch
            capability to deploy small satellites required to fill short-
            term, focused warfighter needs in ISR and communications.
            Developing the capability to perform on-orbit servicing of
            satellites (refueling and component change out) to extend
            lifetimes and upgrade/fix components.
             Providing total space awareness and the ability to
            control all areas of space whenever necessary, including
            protection of vital space assets and space denial to
            adversaries.
             Transformational Military Satellite Communications
            with laser-com in conjunction with the advanced extremely high
            frequency (AEHF) satellites to provide greatly expanded
            capacity for survivable and jam-resistant communications and
            data throughput for global transmission to tactical joint
            warfighters.
             Deployment of the Space-based Infrared Satellite
            (SBIRS)-High is key to enabling the transformational ability to
            defend the United States against ballistic missile attack and
            significantly improve our capabilities in the four mission
            areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical
            intelligence, and battle space characterization.

        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have long argued
    that a national space policy that limits DOD's role in reusable launch
    vehicle development may need to be revisited to allow significant DOD
    contribution to the Space Launch Initiative. What is your position on
    the future of cooperation with NASA for critical common space functions
    such as space lift, both expendable and reusable?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The current national space policy does not
    preclude or limit DOD investment in reuseable launch vehicle (RLV)
    development--it assigns lead responsibility for expendable launch
    vehicle (ELV) development to DOD and lead responsibility for RLV
    development to NASA. I believe it is vital for DOD and NASA to
    coordinate research and development efforts in areas of common need.
        The Department of Defense and NASA are collaborating on
    technologies supporting the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI)
    designed to overcome the barriers of high speed/hypersonic flight,
    space access, and space technology. NAI coordinates ongoing and new DOD
    investments proposed in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget request
    with those of NASA under the Space Launch Initiative/Next Generation
    Launch Technology (SLI-NGLT) program. This initiative will develop and
    demonstrate a portfolio of critical technologies that will enable the
    achievement of many common aerospace goals--such as supersonic/
    hypersonic capabilities; safe, affordable, launch-on-demand space
    access; and responsive payloads for quick deployment and employment of
    space capabilities--and help to ensure continued American aerospace
    leadership in the 21st century.

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you anticipate
    using the shuttle to meet DOD and Air Force space delivery requirements
    in the future?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. At this time, DOD and the Air Force have no
    plans to use the space shuttle to satisfy DOD space delivery
    requirements. We plan on meeting our assured access to space needs with
    the new EELV systems. EELV will satisfy all planned and programmed
    spacelift requirements, and has the flexibility and redundancy to
    eliminate the need for DOD to maintain the shuttle as a back up
    capability. The EELV is less expensive than the shuttle and eliminates
    the extensive lead time for payload integration on the shuttle. The
    shuttle Columbia was the only orbiter capable of carrying large DOD
    payloads; the modifications of the other shuttles to service the
    International Space Station limit their payload capacity.
        DOD will continue to fly small Space Test Program (STP) experiments
    on the shuttle as a means of getting science and technology payloads
    into orbit. Flying STP on the shuttle makes use of available cargo
    space on the shuttle at a minimal cost to DOD (approximately $3 million
    a year for six payloads).

                                NUCLEAR TESTING

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, currently, the United
    States can perform a nuclear test within 24-36 months of receiving the
    applicable Presidential Decision Directive. Do you believe that
    nuclear-test-readiness should be shortened? What do you think is the
    appropriate time frame: 3 months, 6 months, a year?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes. Following the 1992 moratorium on
    underground nuclear testing, the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP)
    has dealt successfully with problems that were discovered in the
    stockpile. There are, however, no guarantees that it can continue to do
    so indefinitely. As the stockpile ages, the accumulation of
    modifications or the discovery of other latent problems may exceed
    SSP's capabilities. Should this situation arise, it may become
    necessary to conduct underground nuclear tests to confirm the safety or
    reliability of the warhead in question.
        Should nuclear testing be required, we must be prepared to conduct
    the necessary tests in a timely fashion so that the Department of
    Energy's weapon laboratories can resolve a question about stockpile
    safety and reliability. We believe that the current 24-36 month test
    readiness posture is too long and must be shortened. The Department is
    working with the Department of Energy on an initiative directed by
    Congress (Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, PL 107-
    314, Sec. 3142) to develop plans for moving to higher levels of test
    readiness.

        27. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, the chairman of the
    Nuclear Weapons Council has established a panel to examine ``the risks
    associated with not testing our nuclear weapons.'' Do you believe that
    there is currently a reason to be concerned with the long-term
    capability of stockpile stewardship? What, in particular, is the cause
    for concern?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. To date, the experts have not raised any safety
    or reliability concerns that would lead me to make a recommendation to
    the President that the U.S. should resume testing. Since the United
    States conducted its last nuclear test more than 10 years ago,
    scientists have relied on a combination of non-nuclear experiments and
    computer simulations as part of the SSP to attest to the safety,
    security, and reliability of our nuclear weapons. There are no
    guarantees, however, that the Department of Energy's scientists and
    engineers will be able to depend on SSP indefinitely. It is prudent to
    be prepared and thoroughly examine the basis for confidence in the
    stockpile and the Nation's ability to continue to certify weapons as
    safe and reliable. The purpose of this panel established by the Nuclear
    Weapons Council is to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of our
    nuclear program, including test readiness.

                                 SCOTT SPEICHER

        28. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I'm sure you are
    familiar with the case of Captain Scott Speicher, who was lost over
    Iraq in the opening hours of the Gulf War. Is there new information on
    the status of Captain Scott Speicher?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. We continue to receive new reporting on Captain
    Speicher. We thoroughly analyze and review every report for relevancy
    to his case.

        29. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, to your knowledge, are
    regional intelligence agencies in the Middle East cooperating with U.S.
    efforts to resolve his status?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Intelligence Community requested
    intelligence information and assistance on the Captain Speicher case
    from numerous countries, including those in the Middle East.

                   TESTING OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

        30. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I appreciate the
    Department of Defense's efforts to date to investigate and declassify
    information on the Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD) and Project 112
    chemical and biological testing. It is critical that the United States
    come clean on this issue and that our veterans who may have been
    exposed to dangerous chemicals in these tests are notified so that they
    can seek treatment. While the full information on the location, nature,
    and military personnel involved in these tests has yet to come out, I
    believe we are making progress on this issue and I thank you for your
    efforts. In the coming year and in the future, when do you expect full
    disclosure of the SHAD/Project 112 testing programs will be complete?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Defense is committed to
    completing its investigation of Project 112/SHAD and releasing all
    medically relevant information by June 2003.

        31. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, beyond the SHAD/
    Project 112 disclosure program, do you support expansion of these
    efforts into ALL Cold War-era chemical and biological weapons testing?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. If the Department of Veterans Affairs requests
    information from DOD necessary for adjudication of veterans' benefits
    claims, DOD would attempt to be responsive, to the extent feasible and
    consistent with continuing national security classification
    requirements.

        32. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what can Congress do
    to assist the DOD with these efforts?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs
    have all the authority necessary to address these issues.

                            JOINT SIMULATION PROGRAM

        33. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have been made aware
    of a DOD Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) directing the cancellation
    of the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) program in fiscal year 2004 and
    through the FYDP. I and other members on the Armed Services Committee
    who care deeply about the pace and scope of efforts to increase joint
    experimentation, joint training, creation of a standing joint
    operational headquarters, and joint requirements and acquisition
    validation, are troubled by this development.
        The program is intended to provide a joint simulation capability to
    ``integrate'' service simulations allowing for joint training and
    experimentation at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This
    kind of tool is essential to any effort to move the military
    establishment to greater joint training, doctrine, and experimentation.
        This program has received significant congressional attention and
    support over the years, despite its ups and downs. There is great
    concern that we have abandoned the single tool essential to successful
    joint training and experimentation. What analysis (program management,
    operational requirements, etc.) informs this decision and provides the
    compelling justification for so dramatic and comprehensive a reduction?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department added significant resources on
    three occasions to provide full funding for the JSIMS program and keep
    it on schedule. In August 1999, $7.9 million was reprogrammed to ensure
    an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of April 2001. In August 2000,
    an additional $265.5 million was allocated for fiscal year 2002-2007 to
    support a rescheduled IOC of March 2002. Several months later, during
    the budget review, a further $7.4 million increase was approved for
    fiscal year 2001-2002, to address shortfalls identified late in the
    process by the program office.
        Several changes also were made to the management structure in an
    attempt to improve program performance and keep development on track.
    In December 1999, the program was given an ACAT-1D (Acquisition
    Category 1D) designation to increase management oversight. In January
    2000, the Army was directed to appoint a full-time program manager. At
    the same time, the program office was instructed to produce a cost
    estimate, split JSIMS development into blocks, and develop appropriate
    acquisition documents. Although some of these measures were adopted,
    problems persisted. By December 2002, the official IOC date had slid to
    March 2005.
        In addition to standard ACAT-1D oversight, there were at least four
    other reviews to assist program management, two of which were led by
    former Directors of Defense Research and Engineering. In December 1999,
    the Senior Review Board directed the program office to reconfigure its
    development plan around the Department's High-Level Architecture
    standard. Then, in 2001, an independent panel led by Dr. Anita Jones
    concluded that JSIMS needed to establish sound performance-prediction
    capabilities and improve its integration with its major partners, like
    the Army's Warfighter Simulation program. That same year, an audit
    conducted by the Army Materiel Command concluded that current
    engineering practices would not resolve performance issues within cost
    and schedule constraints. Finally, in December 2002, another
    independent review team, this time headed by Dr. Dolores Etter,
    recommended looking externally for commercial technologies and
    strategies that support scalability in order to facilitate spiral
    development for future JSIMS blocks. Dr. Etter's team also recommended
    an independent outside assessment of the JSIMS architecture. All of
    these reviews, in addition to numerous ACAT-1D assessments, highlighted
    serious concerns about the technical and performance standards for
    JSIMS. The decision to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) before
    proceeding with further JSIMS development is consistent with the
    results of these reviews.

        34. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what alternatives are
    DOD/JFCOM considering to meet the requirement for a simulation tool
    that supports joint training, joint experimentation, and joint program
    evaluation?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. This question will be addressed by the AoA and
    cannot be definitively answered before the study is complete. Final
    guidance is now being developed, but the AoA will likely consider the
    following alternatives: (1) continuing the JSIMS program, (2)
    separating the joint and service JSIMS elements and pursuing them as
    independent programs, (3) modifying existing simulations, and (4)
    commercial sources.

        35. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, how will DOD/JFCOM
    support, and who will be responsible for a new joint simulation program
    in the fiscal year 2004 request?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. A new joint simulation is not funded in the
    fiscal year 2004 budget. The Department has initiated an AoA to
    identify the most cost-effective approach for meeting joint and service
    training requirements. Until the AoA is complete, we cannot say whether
    a new program ultimately might be needed.

        36. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, Congress appropriated
    millions of dollars for JSIMS and its related Service programs in
    fiscal year 2003, how does DOD/JFCOM propose to use that funding now
    that they are all (with one exception) zeroed in the fiscal year 2004
    request and FYDP?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. All fiscal year 2003 funds remained with the
    program to ensure delivery of Block I software in accordance with
    program office estimates. The JSIMS Software Support Facility was
    funded at $14 million in fiscal year 2004, using monies originally
    planned for the JSIMS Program Office. The remaining $168.6 million in
    fiscal year 2004 funding proposed in the fiscal year 2003 President's
    budget was allocated to other priorities.

        37. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, what is the current
    state of analysis and planning leading to creation of a Joint National
    Training Capability (JNTC)? What are the overarching challenges
    identified at this point to creation of a JNTC? How does cancellation
    of the JSIMS and related Service simulation programs contribute to the
    challenge or facilitate the creation of a JNTC?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The JNTC program has an approved budget, and
    Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is setting up a Joint Management Office.
    The implementation plan, now being drafted, will define what will be
    required to support JNTC certification and accreditation. Fiscal year
    2003 activities will include establishing and testing technical support
    requirements, determining opposing force capabilities, developing and
    testing data collection methods, and establishing and testing the
    exercise-control architecture. JFCOM is leading the planning for JNTC
    events in fiscal year 2004 and beyond.
        The overarching challenge for the program is to create a solution
    within a high-level architecture that provides for rapid integration of
    live, virtual, and constructive components so that trainees are
    immersed in a seamless, combat-like environment, without realizing that
    some aspects are virtual or constructive.
        JSIMS and JNTC are independent of each other, although JSIMS could
    be used by JNTC if it met JNTC requirements. Without JSIMS, JNTC will
    use legacy systems, complemented if necessary by new systems, to meet
    its objectives.

                               THE NATIONAL GUARD

        38. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Rumsfeld, as major contributors
    to the force structure and capability of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air
    Force, the National Guard must be a part of the plan to transform our
    military services and the command and control of the Department of
    Defense. While holding the National Guard forces in strategic reserve
    for the Active components may have successfully maintained a force for
    strategic reserve, the National Guard no longer operates only as a
    strategic reserve. Now, more than ever, the Army and Air National Guard
    are critical components of the Total Force and used in a much different
    manner than just 15 years ago. Such ``increased reliance'' upon our
    National Guard forces emphasizes that DOD should expand the authority
    of the National Guard Bureau within the Department of Defense to that
    of a separate entity. What is DOD doing to elevate the status of the
    National Guard Bureau to an independent agency status within DOD?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department has no plans to elevate the
    status of the National Guard Bureau to an independent agency. The
    Department of Defense has sought and continues to stress full
    integration of the Reserve components, with each component making up an
    integral piece of the parent service. Both the Army and Air National
    Guard are essential parts of our seven Reserve components and account
    for approximately 33.8 percent and 19.7 percent of their parent service
    respectively (combined, 36.2 percent of the two services). We will
    continue to work closely with the National Guard Bureau to focus our
    efforts on the objective of complete integration of all of our Reserve
    components into the Total Force.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

                         NEWPORT CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEPOT

        39. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I am pleased to see the
    accelerated neutralization initiative at the Newport Chemical Weapons
    Depot is on schedule to be completed as early as April 2004. What
    specifically does the Department of Defense intend to do with the
    facility once demilitarization is completed?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army is conducting a study to ascertain
    reusability of the facilities. We will report our findings to Congress
    no later than March 31, 2003 as requested in the Senate Report 107-202
    (page 20).
        Note: A report was provided to Congress by the Army on March 31,
    2003, and a summary of the answer to Senator Bayh's questions from that
    report is as follows:
        All of the buildings involved with the neutralization process fall
    within the RCRA permit area. The chemical defense building (CDB) at
    Newport can not easily be fenced off from the rest of the site and
    excluded from this permit. As a result, the CDB is not compatible for
    any uses other than the demilitarization process.
        A portion of the partially completed CDB structure has been
    enclosed from the elements, and is now being used by the
    demilitarization contractor to support the construction activities
    associated with the chemical neutralization process. Once the
    neutralization process starts, it is anticipated the building will be
    used to support the chemical demilitarization effort.
        There are no current or potential Army requirements identified for
    any of the facilities at Newport Chemical Depot, IN, including the
    Chemical Demilitarization Building. The neutralization process is to
    run from September 2003 to May 2004. Until completion, the Army will
    not be able to give a full evaluation for other uses of the facilities.
    If any facilities remain after the decontamination/clean-up process,
    potential reuse by the Army or other entities will be reevaluated.

        40. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, I wrote to
    you in November 2002 seeking your assistance in strengthening temporary
    flight restrictions currently in place over the Nation's eight chemical
    weapons depots. Unfortunately, it appears as though nothing has been
    done to deter pilots from violating the airspace over these facilities.
    In the last year alone, there have been almost 50 incursions of the
    airspace above Newport in my home state. I would like to know what
    specific steps you have taken to deter such incursions? In addition, I
    would like to know what the Pentagon has done to coordinate efforts
    with the Federal Aviation Administration to enforce the flight
    restrictions, and to report those who violate them?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Bayh, the Department of Defense shares
    your concern about violations of temporary flight restrictions over
    chemical weapons depot sites. However, DOD is not the lead Federal
    agency for either the establishment or the enforcement of temporary
    flight restrictions. If a violation occurs while we are flying a combat
    air patrol, DOD aircraft can intercept the offending aircraft and force
    it to change direction, or, in dire circumstances, shoot it down.
    Currently, the only option short of this is the imposition of
    administrative sanctions by the Federal Aviation Administration. We
    believe that there should be penalty options between these two
    extremes, and are working with other interagency members to define what
    these might be and how they might be implemented, using the National
    Capital Region as a guide.
        While DOD's actions are limited during periods of airspace
    violations over chemical weapons depots, the Department of Defense has
    taken significant steps to accelerate the chemical weapons destruction
    process at three of the remaining eight chemical stockpile sites.
    Accelerated destruction of these weapons equates to an accelerated
    reduction of risk to the public. The Army is implementing accelerated
    destruction of bulk chemical agent at the Aberdeen, Maryland and
    Newport, Indiana stockpiles. The Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment
    (ACWA) program, under the direction of Under Secretary Aldridge, is
    accelerating destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile at Pueblo,
    Colorado.
        General Myers. The DOD shares your concern about violations of
    temporary flight restrictions over chemical weapons depot sites.
    However, DOD is not the lead Federal agency for either the
    establishment or the enforcement of restricted airspace. If a
    restricted airspace is violated, DOD can scramble alert fighter
    aircraft or divert fighters flying combat air patrol to intercept the
    offending aircraft and attempt to force it to vacate the area. If the
    aircraft fails to respond to direction from DOD fighter aircraft and
    remains a threat to the protected asset, the DOD fighters could shoot
    down the threat as a last resort.
        The best way to keep aircraft from violating restricted airspace is
    through a thorough education program from the FAA, and establishment of
    significant penalties for violators by the FAA and law enforcement
    agencies. DOD continues to work with the Interagency, especially the
    new Department of Homeland Security, to establish security requirements
    and procedures to strengthen these temporary flight restrictions over
    sensitive areas.

                                 BASE CLOSURES

        41. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I have supported your goal
    for a new round of base closures in 2005 and applaud your efforts to
    bring our military force in line with our infrastructure. Looking ahead
    to the base closure and realignment process, and recognizing the
    Department's emphasis on joint service training and response, I would
    think that multiple service support in our shore establishment is
    critical from both a capability as well as an efficiency standpoint. Do
    you plan to include base closure criteria in the process that considers
    joint service support, and rewards those activities? In addition, as we
    examine the vital role that DOD plays in securing the homeland, will
    homeland defense capability be included in the base closure and
    realignment criteria?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. Section 2913(b) of the BRAC statute requires me
    to ensure that military value is the primary consideration in the
    making of closure and realignment recommendations. The statute further
    provides that military value shall include at a minimum the
    preservation of military installations in the United States as staging
    areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions.
    Consistent with these statutory requirements, I will make specific
    recommendations for military value selection criteria when I publish
    the selection criteria for public comment, no later than December 31,
    2003.

        42. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, I would like to know how, or
    if, September 11 has changed your thinking about the location and
    distribution of our military bases and installations in the United
    States?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The events of September 11, 2001, have
    confirmed in my mind that the Department must act now to review our
    basing requirements. We are looking at and experiencing different
    threats than we were a decade ago, and our forces must be stationed
    appropriately to respond to contingencies and support the global war on
    terrorism.

                                 TRANSFORMATION

        43. Senator Bayh. Secretary Rumsfeld, it is my understanding that
    you are proposing to terminate the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank and the
    M-113 family of armored vehicles. I am concerned about this decision
    and believe these time proven and effective systems have a critical
    role in the transformed Armed Forces. Of particular concern to me is
    how you will maintain these systems in outyears. Specifically, can you
    tell in detail how you will provide for transmission replacement and
    maintenance of these vehicles?
        Secretary Rumsfeld. The program the Department plans to terminate
    is the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) Retrofit Program. The M1A1
    Abrams Integrated Maintenance (AIM) program continues. This program
    remains effectively the same as planned in the Army's original
    recapitalization of the legacy force and modernization strategy. The
    AIM program will refurbish 790 M1A1 tanks at a planned rate of 135
    tanks per year from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006 and 115
    tanks in fiscal year 2007. Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, Lima Army
    Tank Plant in Ohio, and General Dynamics Land Systems Division, will
    perform the work. The M1A1 incorporates rebuilt, service life extension
    AGT 1500 engines, and selected subsystem improvements. To control
    costs, the AIM program plans to provide the transmission replacement
    and maintenance on these vehicles using existing stocks, to develop
    innovative repair and rebuild programs, to use excess vehicle line
    replaceable units, and to re-engineer components that are no longer
    procurable.
        The M113 Family of Vehicles system upgrade program is effectively
    terminated in fiscal year 2004. The remaining M113 work is the
    conversion of 77 M577A2s to M1068A3s (a conversion from an older to the
    new command post carrier variant of the M113), the incorporation of
    government-furnished equipment transmissions, and 476 sets of track for
    1st Cavalry Division M113s.

        [Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                 SERVICE CHIEFS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
    SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
    Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss,
    Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Reed, Bill Nelson, Dayton,
    Clinton, and Pryor.
        Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, chief clerk; and Gabriella
    Eisen, nominations clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
    professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
    staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member;
    Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
    professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
    staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
    Ann M. Mittermeyer, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
    staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Joseph
    T. Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general
    counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
    staff member; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional staff member;
    Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton
    Greene, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional
    staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K.
    Levine, minority counsel; and Bridget M. Whalan, special
    assistant.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent, Sara R. Mareno, and
    Nicholas W. West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
    assistant to Senator Warner; Dan Twining, assistant to Senator
    McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson
    Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant
    to Senator Sessions; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to
    Senator Collins; James W. Irwin, assistant to Senator
    Chambliss; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Mieke
    Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Terrence E. Sauvain
    and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey and Peter A.
    Contostavlos, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew
    Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Randy Massanelli,
    assistant to Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee
    meets this morning to receive testimony from the chiefs of the
    military services in their annual posture statement on behalf
    of their respective branches to our committee. This is in
    regard to the President's fiscal year 2004 defense budget.
        Each of you bring great distinction to your Services and we
    are proud to have you here today. Last week, Senator Levin,
    Senator Roberts, Senator Rockefeller, and I had the privilege
    of visiting with U.S. military personnel in the Persian Gulf
    region, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I say to you most
    respectfully and humbly, you have rightful pride in your men
    and women in the Armed Forces.
        We met with them at each stop last week, and they are the
    best, well-trained force to be found anywhere in the world
    today.
        We arose this morning to hear about the diplomatic efforts
    which are properly being pursued by our President and other
    world leaders in this problem with regard to Iraq. But that
    diplomacy begins with the men and women in uniform of the
    United States and other nations that are trying to secure peace
    in that part of the world and the elimination of weapons of
    mass destruction from Saddam Hussein and his regime.
        We would not see the diplomacy working at its hopefully
    best, be it in the Security Council or in the capitals of the
    world, had it not been for the foresight of our President and
    other world leaders to move in position their best and finest
    of the Armed Forces to make possible such progress that we all
    hope and pray for in diplomacy.
        That reflects directly upon each of you individually and
    those of you in your respective branches who made possible
    these fine, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
        Each year we have this hearing, but today it is a most
    important one. The honest and forthright observations of the
    Service Chiefs, professional as well as personal, are
    absolutely essential for the continuing work of this committee
    and the work of the Senate as a body at such times as we bring
    forth the bill and, indeed, the nominations that are frequently
    before the Senate with regard to the men and women of the Armed
    Forces.
        Time and time again, you and your predecessors have
    summoned the courage to point out the challenges to current and
    future readiness. Those of us who have been on this committee
    for many years, as Senator Levin and I have, can recall
    predecessors who have been in your positions whose forthright
    testimony has enabled this committee to give greater support to
    the men and women of the Armed Forces, and we are respectful of
    what you do to make that possible.
        Together you represent more than 120 years of military
    experience and distinguished service to the Nation.
    Individually, your understanding of what is required to
    organize, equip, train, and sustain your service in peacetime
    and in wartime is second to none.
        When General Myers testified before the committee 2 weeks
    ago, I asked him this question. I asked him whether he believed
    the Armed Forces were prepared to meet any contingency of the
    use of force as may be required in Iraq and continue their high
    level of activity against worldwide terrorism. His response was
    unhesitating. His response was succinct, one word:
    ``Absolutely.''
        I and many others who have pondered the question over the
    past several months were assured by his confidence and his
    certainty. Clearly, much of your work and opinions contributed
    to the conclusion of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
        Today, homeland security is our Nation's foremost urgent
    priority. As Senator Levin and I met with the troops in these
    far-most regions, we said to them that homeland defense begins
    right where they are, because to the extent they can deter,
    interdict, or if necessary, crush terrorists is the extent to
    which there is less chance that that terrorism is brought to
    the shores of our country against their families, against all
    of us here at home. Homeland defense begins beyond the shores
    of this Nation.
        As we meet this morning, our Armed Forces are fighting the
    war with terror with over 40 coalition partners from
    Afghanistan to the Philippines. In the case of Iraq, our
    President has quite properly, together with other world
    leaders, chosen the diplomatic path, working through the United
    Nations and the Security Council. But as I said earlier, we
    must ever be mindful that diplomacy can only be as effective as
    there is a clear and present credible military threat to use
    force to back up that diplomacy. Your troops are doing exactly
    that.
        The President's fiscal year 2004 defense budget request of
    $379.9 billion continues to increase in real terms the amount
    of funding available for each of the Services in total. This
    budget continues the President's considerable progress to date
    and continues his ongoing commitment to safeguard America, our
    allies, and our friends. It is increasingly clear, however,
    that today's global challenges are requiring much more of the
    Armed Forces.
        It is our responsibility on this committee, and Congress as
    a whole, to carefully monitor the degree to which these
    increase demands stress the overall readiness of the forces,
    the readiness of the individual service person, and the
    readiness of their families. We encountered on this trip some
    areas that we will bring to your attention this morning, areas
    in which we have concern, in all probability you have concern,
    and we need to know your recommendations how we can jointly
    work with you to correct it.
        As we discuss and debate this budget request in the days
    and weeks ahead, as is the duty of this committee and Congress,
    on one thing we can all agree: the commitment, the dedication,
    and performance of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
    in service to their Nation and that of their families in
    homeland defense is truly a remarkable blessing on this Nation.
    I thank you.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As we meet and as our troops continue to flow towards the
    Iraq region, there are many issues relative to Iraq that are
    being debated here at home, around the world, and at the United
    Nations. It is appropriate that those issues be debated,
    including the question of whether or not it would be wise to
    initiate an attack against Iraq without the support of the
    world community acting through the United Nations, the fallout
    of such an attack long-term and short-term, what the
    alternatives are in terms of disarming or containing Saddam
    Hussein, and whether the world will be more or less secure if
    such an attack takes place without a unified world community
    speaking through the United Nations.
        There are many issues that are worthy of debate. But one
    thing is clear to me, that if in fact such an attack occurs,
    the short-term military outcome is not in doubt. I also believe
    very firmly that the Iraqi leaders should not infer from these
    debates that America will not be united in support of its
    forces in the field. Regardless of where we stand on the issues
    being debated, this country will be united if and when the time
    comes. We will provide our men and women in uniform with
    everything that they need to ensure that they prevail.
        As Senator Warner has mentioned, Senator Roberts, Senator
    Rockefeller, the chairman, and I just returned from the region.
    There was no doubt in our mind before we left that our military
    is by far the best-trained, best-equipped, and most capable
    fighting force in the world today, and nothing that we saw on
    our trip in any way raises any uncertainty about that
    conclusion.
        But our visit reassured us that there is a uniformly high
    state of morale among our forces and a willingness to implement
    orders from the Commander in Chief, whatever those orders may
    be. Their readiness can be attributed in significant measure to
    the hard work that the Service Chiefs and their staffs have put
    forward in support of their responsibilities, and we give to
    our Service Chiefs for that our heartfelt thanks for your
    efforts.
        But I think you would be the first to join us and all the
    members of this committee in saying that the real gratitude is
    owing to the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces.
        I want to join our chairman in welcoming our witnesses here
    today. First, I want to extend a special thanks to General
    Shinseki, who is making his final appearance before the
    committee at a posture hearing. I do not think we can give you
    any assurance it will be your last appearance before the
    committee, however, so do not relax too much.
        Let me put this simply, though. Today our tribute will come
    more fully at a later time, but let me just simply say that
    you, sir, are the embodiment of service to our Nation and a
    commitment to the men and women whom you command. You have been
    truly a role model and we salute you for it.
        I also want to give a special welcome to General Hagee, who
    is making, I believe, his first appearance at a posture
    hearing, and we welcome you as well as our other witnesses who
    have been here before and will be here again. All of you are
    very much in our thoughts these days. We are grateful to you
    for what you have done to prepare our troops should war come,
    and that service will indeed serve them and our Nation well
    should in fact that moment arrive.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
        We will have 6-minute rounds. But before I proceed, I join
    Senator Levin in acknowledging your service, General Shinseki.
    There are moments in one's life that you never forget, and I
    recall Senator Inouye introducing you to this committee and I
    never have heard a more eloquent, more heartfelt introduction
    than that given by our distinguished senior colleague. You have
    lived up in every way to what he said. Thank you, sir.
        All right, I will start off, ladies and gentlemen, just as
    soon as we get organized up here. But we will start with the
    opening statements. We will start with you, General.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
                              STATES ARMY

        General Shinseki. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both you and
    Senator Levin, for the kind comments. That moment that you
    recollect was a high point as well, as has been the last 3\1/2\
    years of my opportunity to work with the members of the
    committee. I will always consider that a high point.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, other distinguished members of
    the committee: I am honored to be here this morning with the
    Service Chiefs and reporting to you on the posture of the Army
    and its readiness. Today, as both the chairman and the ranking
    member have indicated, across the joint force, soldiers are
    serving magnificently alongside their joint brethren, defending
    our freedom in this world against terrorism and preparing for
    other contingencies. In the Army alone, nearly 220,000 soldiers
    are forward stationed overseas and more than 124,000 of our
    Reserve component have been mobilized to this point.
        In the past 6 months, I have visited a good many of them. I
    have stood on the ground with them on their operational
    deployments. I have talked with them where they worked, where
    they played, and where they ate. I have even visited them here
    at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. We have had candid and
    frank discussions about your Army's readiness to respond to the
    Nation's calls.
        The Army is ready. We have the best Army in the world, not
    the largest but the best-led, best-trained, and best-equipped.
    It is about more than just equipment. We have the best soldiers
    on top of everything. Their determination and commitment are as
    firm as I have seen in my years of service and they are
    immensely proud to serve this Nation. They will take any
    objective, and they will accomplish any mission that we send
    them on.
        I am proud of what I have seen and I am daily reassured of
    my assessment. Soldiers are standing by for orders in 100 camps
    and stations and they will fight and win decisively this war on
    terrorism or any other war we might be sent to fight.
        We want to project that degree of readiness that is
    reflected today, project that readiness into the future, and to
    do so we long decided we must have a more responsive, a more
    deployable, more agile and versatile, as equally lethal and
    survivable a force as we have today. We began that work about
    3\1/2\ years ago.
        We knew then that there was a war in our future. We just
    did not know when, where, or against whom. The relative
    predictability all of us had gotten used to during the Cold War
    had given way to a continuing chaos of unpredictability. Voices
    inside and outside the Army suggested change.
        With the unwavering support of the administration and this
    Congress, we are transforming rapidly to be more capable of
    dominating future crises. To mitigate the risk that is always
    inherent any time an institution undertakes comprehensive and
    fundamental change, we structured that transformation along
    three broad, mutually supporting vectors.
        On the near-term axis, we committed to keeping the
    readiness of today's legacy combat formations at the
    appropriate level. Then, to fix longstanding operational gaps
    we have had between our heavy and light components of that
    legacy force, we are fielding six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
    to give us added capabilities in that midterm axis, even as we
    are designing our future force capabilities.
        Then finally, it is on that third and final axis that we
    are readying the Army for its long-term responsibilities. We
    are developing future concepts and technologies that will
    provide consistent capability overmatch through the middle of
    the century. Our Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision
    that is coming up in May of this year is the next major
    milestone and we intend to begin fielding this Objective Force
    by 2008.
        Balancing these requirements over time dictates difficult
    but prudent funding decisions and the Army's fiscal year 2004
    budget strikes that essential balance to maintain readiness
    throughout the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) period and
    beyond, and your support remains essential.
        We are already seeing dividends from our investments in
    future readiness: technologies that are coming on line early,
    superior body armor today, robots in caves, antitank warheads
    on unmanned aerial vehicles today, and unprecedented Blue Force
    tracking capabilities today. During the largest joint exercise
    in our history, Millennium Challenge 2002, with the help of the
    Air Force we air-delivered a Stryker platoon onto a dirt strip
    out at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.
        Just 3 years after the Army described its requirement for
    this interim force, we are demonstrating the increased
    strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities the Stryker
    Brigade Combat Teams will provide to combatant commanders. This
    summer the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team will join us in
    the war on terrorism.
        So it is not just about capabilities in 2008 and beyond. It
    is enabling soldiers today.
        People remain the engine behind all of our magnificent
    moments as an Army and their well-being is inextricably linked
    to our readiness as we describe it today. My thanks to the
    members of this committee for your help with pay raises, health
    care, retirement benefits, housing, and other well-being
    programs that have taken better care of our people than I can
    remember. Our soldiers, civilians, retirees, and veterans and
    their families appreciate it in more ways than I can describe.
        Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for your unwavering support,
    unwavering bipartisan support of this committee, and the
    leadership of this committee and its devotion to our soldiers.
    You keep us the most respected land force in the world. Mr.
    Chairman, thank you, and I look forward to your questions and
    the questions of the committee.
        [The prepared statement of General Shinseki and the Army

    Posture Statement follow:]

                Prepared Statement by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, USA

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
    for this opportunity to report to you today on the posture of the
    United States Army.
        America's Armed Forces are the most powerful in the world.
    America's Army remains the most respected landpower to our friends and
    allies and the most feared ground force to those who would threaten the
    interests of the United States.
        Since before the birth of the Nation, American soldiers have
    instilled hope in a noble dream of liberty. They have remained on point
    for the Nation through nine wars, and the intervals of peace in the
    years between--defending the Constitution and preserving freedom.
    Magnificent in their selfless service, long in their sense of duty, and
    deep in their commitment to honor, soldiers have kept the United States
    the land of the free and the home of the brave. This is our legacy. Our
    soldiers who serve today preserve it.
        In October 1999, we unveiled our vision for the future--``Soldiers,
    on point for the Nation, transforming this, the most respected army in
    the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant
    across the full spectrum of operations.'' The attacks against our
    Nation on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism validate
    the Army's vision--people, readiness, transformation--and our efforts
    to change quickly into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
    lethal, survivable, and sustainable force.
        While helping to fight the global war on terrorism, the Army is in
    the midst of a profound transformation. Readiness remains our constant
    imperative--today, tomorrow, and the day after. Transformation,
    therefore, advances on three broad axes: perpetuating the Army's legacy
    by maintaining today's readiness and dominance; bridging the
    operational gap with an Interim Force of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams;
    and fielding the Objective Force to fight and win conflicts in the
    years beyond this decade.
        As they have throughout the Army's 227-year history, soldiers
    remain the centerpiece of our formations. Versatile and decisive across
    the full spectrum of joint missions, land forces have demonstrated time
    and again the quality of their precision in joint operations. Our
    responsibility is to provide soldiers with the critical capabilities
    needed for the tough missions we send them on.
        After 3\1/2\ years of undiminished support from the administration
    and Congress, and the incredible dedication of soldiers and Department
    of the Army civilians, we have begun to deliver the Army vision. With
    continued strong support, we will win the war against global terrorism,
    meet our obligations to our friends and allies, remain ready to prevail
    over the unpredictable, and transform ourselves for decisive victories
    on future battlefields.
        We have achieved sustainable momentum in Army transformation; the
    framework is in place to see the Objective Force fielded, this decade.

                       THE ARMY--AT WAR AND TRANSFORMING

        The United States is at war, and the Army serves the Nation by
    defending the Constitution and our way of life. It is our nonnegotiable
    contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
    decisively.
        In the weeks immediately following the attacks of September 11,
    2001, Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrated Afghanistan,
    penetrated al Qaida and Taliban strongholds, and leveraged all
    available long-range, joint fires, enabling the Northern Alliance to
    begin dismantling the Taliban. By January 2002, U.S. and Allied
    conventional force reinforcements began to set the stage for Operation
    Anaconda, where soldiers, demonstrating courage and determination under
    the most challenging conditions, defeated al Qaida at altitude on the
    escarpments overlooking the Shah-e-kot Valley.
        Today, more than 198,000 soldiers remain deployed and forward
    stationed in 120 countries around the globe, conducting operations and
    training with our friends and allies. Decisively engaged in the joint
    and combined fight against global terrorism, soldiers are serving with
    distinction--at home and abroad. Soldiers from both the active and the
    Reserve component have remained ``on point'' for the Nation in the
    Balkans for 7 years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for 12 years, in the
    Sinai for 21 years, and in Korea and Europe for over 50 years. At the
    publication of the Army Posture Statement, there were more than 110,000
    Reserve component soldiers mobilized for active Federal service in
    support of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom. Even
    as we transform, soldiers will remain ready to answer the calls of the
    Nation to defeat well-trained, determined, and dangerous adversaries
    who miscalculate in taking on the best-led, the best-equipped, and the
    best-trained Army in the world.
        At war and transforming, the Army is accelerating change to harness
    the power of new technologies, different organizations, and revitalized
    leader development initiatives to remain at the head of the line. To
    accomplish this, Army transformation advances along three major axes
    towards attainment of the Objective Force. We selectively recapitalize
    and modernize today's capabilities to extend our overmatch in staying
    ready to defend our homeland, keep the peace in areas important to the
    Nation, and win the war against global terrorism. Stryker Brigade
    Combat Teams--our Interim Force--will bridge the current operational
    gap between our rapidly-deployable light forces and our later-arriving
    heavy forces, paving the way for the arrival of the Objective Force. By
    2010, the Army's Objective Force--organized, equipped, and trained for
    ground dominance, cyber-warfare, and space exploitation--will provide
    the Nation the capabilities it must have to remain the global leader,
    the strongest economy in the world, and the most respected and feared
    military force, by our friends and allies and our enemies,
    respectively.
        The surprise attacks against our Nation and Operation Enduring
    Freedom, in response to those attacks, validated the Army vision and
    provided momentum to our efforts to transform ourselves into an
    instrument of national power that provides full spectrum operational
    capabilities that are strategically responsive and capable of decisive
    victory. In a little over 3 years, we have begun to realize the Army
    vision--people, readiness, and transformation.
        The transforming Army is enriching as a profession and nurturing to
    families whose sacrifice has borne the readiness of the force for the
    past 10 years. Our well-being initiatives are our commitment to reverse
    this trend by giving our people the opportunity to become self-reliant;
    setting them up for personal growth and success; aggressively investing
    in family housing; and revitalizing single-soldier living space in our
    barracks. Our manning initiatives have filled our line divisions and
    other early deploying units to dampen the internal turbulence of
    partially filled formations and help put a measure of predictability
    back into the lives of our families.
        The Army has carefully balanced the risk between remaining ready
    for today's challenges and preparing for future crises. With unwavering
    support from the administration, Congress, our soldiers, and Department
    of the Army civilians, the Army has made unprecedented progress in its
    efforts to transform.
        We will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the first
    Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) this summer and demonstrate the
    increased responsiveness, deployability, agility, verastility,
    lethality, survivability, and sustainability that SBCTs provide to
    combatant commanders. In a little over 3 years from initial concept to
    fielded capability, the SBCTs will allow us to glimpse the potential
    for acquisition reform in paving the way for delivery of the Objective
    Force.
        We have constructed the framework for achieving the Objective Force
    this decade: a Transformation Campaign Plan with Roadmap; the Objective
    Force White Paper; the Operational and Organizational plans for the
    Objective Force Unit of Action; and the Operational Requirements
    Document for the Future Combat System of Systems.
        Additionally, the Army is poised to fill ground maneuver's most
    critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with
    Comanche, a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft that is a
    cornerstone of the Objective Force.
        All along the way, we have tested our concepts in wargames and
    experiments, checked and rechecked our azimuth to the Objective Force
    weekly and monthly, and look forward to a successful Future Combat
    System Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision in May of this
    year.
        However, we cannot accelerate Army transformation without
    transforming the way the Army does business--from transformation of
    logistics and acquisition to personnel and installation transformation.
    Revolutionizing Army business management practices achieves the best
    value for taxpayers' dollars; conserves limited resources for
    investment in people, readiness, and transformation; enhances
    management of personnel systems, installations, and contracting; and
    augments our potential to accelerate arrival of the Objective Force.
    Changing the Army is first about changing the way we think, and better
    business practices represent practical application of common sense
    initiatives that best serve the Army and our Nation.
        We are proud of our progress. We are grateful for the strong
    congressional support that has helped put the Army on its approach
    march to the Objective Force. The Army 2003 Posture Statement describes
    our tremendous progress in transformation--an orchestrated campaign,
    synchronized with OSD and joint transformation, to achieve the
    Objective Force and keep America's Army the dominant landpower in the
    world.

            THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT--THE REQUIREMENT TO TRANSFORM

        During the last two decades of the 20th century, information-age
    technologies dramatically changed the political, economic, and military
    landscapes. Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, and
    operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo illustrated the requirement
    for transforming our forces to meet the evolving, strategic
    requirements of our Nation. Survivable and extremely lethal, our heavy
    forces effectively met the requirements for which they were designed;
    yet, they were slow to deploy and difficult to sustain. Conversely, our
    light forces were rapidly deployable, but they lacked the protection,
    lethality, and tactical mobility that we seek across the spectrum of
    military operations. We were successful in winning the Cold War and, as
    a result, smaller than we had been in 40 years. The Army no longer had
    the luxury of specialized forces built to confront a single and
    narrowly defined threat like the Warsaw Pact countries.
        Today's challenges are more complex; threats are elusive and
    unpredictable. The fight against international terrorism has
    overshadowed, but not eliminated, other potential crises. Tension
    between India and Pakistan persists; stability between China and Taiwan
    is tenuous; and concern over North Korea escalates. Threats of
    transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD)--often financed by organized crime, illicit drug
    transactions, trafficking in women and children, and the sale of arms--
    further complicate the security environment. Geopolitical trends such
    as scarce resources, youth population-spike in underdeveloped
    countries, aging populations in developed countries, and the growth of
    mega-cities, among others, presage a future strategic environment of
    diverse and widely distributed threats.
        Fully appreciating the internal and external difficulties that
    profound change engenders, we assessed the operational challenges of
    the new century against the capabilities of our Cold War Army,
    recognized the opportunity to leverage the inherent combat power of the
    technological revolution, and set a clear path ahead--the Army vision.
        The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) reaffirms our military's
    highest priority--defending the United States. To do this effectively,
    we assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition;
    deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
    decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails. The NSS directs
    the military to transform to a capabilities-based force ready to
    respond to unpredictable adversaries and security crises. The Objective
    Force meets these NSS requirements, and Army transformation will
    enhance our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations, achieve
    decisive results at the time and place of our choosing, and safeguard
    the Nation's ability to exercise our right of self-defense through
    preemption, when required.
        The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a capabilities-based
    approach to defense planning that provides broader military options
    across the operational spectrum, from pre- to post-conflict operations.
    The force-sizing construct--1-4-2-1--takes into account the number,
    scope, and simultaneity of tasks assigned the military: it sizes the
    force for defense of the U.S. homeland (1), forward deterrence in four
    critical regions (4), the conduct of simultaneous warfighting missions
    in two regions (2)--while preserving the President's option to call for
    decisive victory in one of those conflicts (1)--and participation in
    multiple, smaller contingency operations.
        the army--serving today, balancing risk, managing transformation
        Soldiers are the most precise and responsive means to strike and
    then control enemy centers of gravity on the ground--where people live,
    work, and govern. American soldiers are disciplined, professional, and
    trained for success in diverse missions; they are the foundation of a
    flexible force that accomplishes its missions in the non-linear
    battlespace by integrating new, innovative technologies and techniques
    with current systems and doctrine. Our people adapt under the harshest
    conditions, whether in the deserts of Kuwait and the Sinai, the
    mountains and rice paddies of Korea, or the tropics of the Democratic
    Republic of Timor-Leste.
        These demanding commitments mean we must nurture a balance between
    current and near-term readiness and our transformation to meet future
    challenges. The Army has accepted reasonable operational risk in the
    mid-term in order to fund our transformation to the Objective Force. To
    avoid unacceptable risk, we are monitoring closely the current
    operational situation as we support the combatant commanders in the war
    against terror, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute the long-term
    effort to defeat transnational threats. We have designed and
    implemented the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) to provide a
    precision, predictive tool with which to monitor the Army and make
    appropriate adjustments to preserve current readiness. Our surge
    capacity in the industrial base further reduces current risk by keeping
    production lines warm and responsive. Our first Stryker Brigade Combat
    Team will provide the combatant commanders with a new capability to
    further mitigate operational risk--even as we transform to the
    Objective Force.

        REALIZING THE ARMY VISION--PEOPLE, READINESS, AND TRANSFORMATION

        In 1999, the Army announced its vision to transform into a more
    strategically responsive force, dominant across the full spectrum of
    military operations. The Army vision addresses three essential
    components: people, readiness, and transformation. Soldiers are the
    heart of the Army, the centerpiece of our formations, and the
    foundation of our combat power. Readiness remains our overarching
    imperative; it is the means by which we execute our nonnegotiable
    contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
    decisively. To preserve readiness while rapidly changing,
    transformation advances on three major axes: preserving our Army legacy
    by maintaining readiness and dominance today; bridging the operational
    gap with Stryker Brigades, the Interim Force; and fielding the
    Objective Force this decade to keep the Army dominant in the years
    beyond this decade.
        Realizing the Army vision requires the concerted effort of the
    entire Army, across all components--from warfighting to institutional
    support organizations. The Army published its Transformation Campaign
    Plan in April 2001 to synchronize and guide this complex undertaking.
    The November 2001 Objective Force White Paper describes the advanced
    capabilities and core technologies needed to build the Objective Force.
    The Army's June 2002 Army transformation Roadmap defines transformation
    as a continuous process--with specific waypoints--that increases our
    contributions to the Joint Force while achieving the six Department of
    Defense (DOD) critical operational goals. The result will be a more
    strategically responsive and full spectrum dominant force capable of
    prompt and sustained land combat operations as a member of the Joint
    Force.
        In support of the emerging joint operational concepts and
    architectures, the Army--as the major landpower component--continues to
    develop ground concepts for a full spectrum and multidimensional force.
    These concepts are producing a Joint Force that presents potential
    enemies with multiple dilemmas across the operational dimensions--
    complicating their plans, dividing their focus, and increasing their
    chances of miscalculation.
        In future joint operations, Objective Force units will be capable
    of directing major operations and decisive land campaigns with Army
    headquarters. Objective Force headquarters at all levels will provide
    the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with seamless, joint battle command and
    decision superiority. The modularity and scalability of our Objective
    Force formations will provide an unprecedented degree of flexibility
    and adaptability to the combatant commander--providing the right force
    at the right time for decisive outcomes.

                       PEOPLE--OUR MOST VALUABLE RESOURCE

        The Army vision begins and ends talking about people. People are
    central to everything else we do in the Army. Platforms and
    organizations do not defend this Nation; people do. Units do not train,
    stay ready, grow and develop leadership--they do not sacrifice and take
    risks on behalf of the Nation. People do. Institutions do not
    transform; people do. People remain the engine behind all of our
    magnificent moments as an Army, and the well-being of our people--the
    human dimension of our transformation--is inextricably linked to Army
    readiness.
        In our vision, we recommitted ourselves to doing two things well
    each and every day--training soldiers and civilians and growing them
    into competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders who
    succeed in situations of great uncertainty. We are dedicated to
    preparing our soldiers to lead joint formations, to enabling our
    headquarters to command and control joint forces, and to providing to
    those joint formations the capabilities only the Army can bring to the
    fight: the ability to control terrain and populations.
    Manning the Force
        The objective of our manning strategy is to ensure we have the
    right people in the right places to fully capitalize on their
    warfighting expertise--this is the Army's commitment to the Nation,
    Army leaders, soldiers, and our families. Correctly manning our units
    is vital to assuring that we fulfill our missions as a strategic
    element of national policy; it enhances predictability for our people;
    and it ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform their
    assigned tasks. In fiscal year 2000, we implemented a strategy to man
    our forces to 100 percent of authorized strength, starting with
    divisional combat units. The program expanded in fiscal year 2001 and
    fiscal year 2002 to include early deploying units. In fiscal year 2002,
    we maintained our manning goals and continued to fill our divisions,
    Armored Cavalry Regiments, and selected early deploying units to 100
    percent in the aggregate, with a 93 to 95 percent skill and grade-band
    match. We remain on target to accomplish our long-term goal of filling
    all Army units to 100 percent of authorized strength.

                       RECRUITING AND RETAINING THE FORCE

        In 1999, the Army missed its recruiting goals for the active
    component (AC) by about 6,300 inductees, and for the Reserve component
    by some 10,000. Our recruiting situation was simply unacceptable, and
    we committed ourselves to decisive steps and reversed that trend.
        In fiscal year 2002, the AC achieved 100 percent of its goal in
    recruiting and retention for the third consecutive year. The Army
    exceeded its AC 79,500 enlisted accession target in fiscal year 2002
    and exceeded our aggregate fiscal year 2002 retention objective of
    56,800 soldiers in all three categories by 1,437. We are poised to make
    the fiscal year 2003 accession target of 73,800, and we expect to meet
    our active component fiscal year 2003 retention target of 57,000. The
    fiscal year 2004 accession target is set at 71,500.
        The Army Reserve has met mission for the last 2 years, and its
    recruiting force is well structured to meet fiscal year 2004
    challenges. The Army Reserve continues to maintain a strong selected
    Reserve strength posture at 205,484 as of January 17, 2003--over 100.2
    percent of the fiscal year 2003 End Strength Objective. Overcoming many
    recruiting and retention challenges in fiscal year 2002, the Army
    National Guard (ARNG) exceeded end strength mission, accessions were
    104.5 percent of goal, and we exceeded reenlistment objectives.
        To ensure that we continue to recruit and retain sufficient
    numbers, we are monitoring the current environment--the global war on
    terrorism (GWOT) and frequent deployments--to determine impact on
    morale, unit cohesiveness, combat effectiveness, and support of well-
    being programs that draw quality people to the Army. We continue to
    examine innovative recruiting and retention initiatives. The challenges
    we face in fiscal year 2003 and 2004 are two-fold: increase recruiter
    productivity and recruiting resources necessary to maintain recruiting
    momentum when the economy becomes more robust. Resourcing recruiting
    pays dividends well beyond accessions in the year of execution. For
    example, Army advertising in fiscal year 2002 influenced not only
    fiscal year 2002 accessions, but also potential recruits who will be
    faced with enlistment decisions in fiscal year 2003 and beyond.

                   RESERVE COMPONENT FULL-TIME SUPPORT (FTS)

        Today, more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve
    component (RC). The GWOT and homeland defense are significant
    undertakings that demand a high level of resourcing. The RC has been
    key to our success in these operations. To ensure the Army's RC
    continues to meet ever-increasing demands with trained and ready units,
    the Army plans to increase full-time support authorizations 2 percent
    each year through fiscal year 2012, increasing the FTS from the current
    level of 69,915 to a level of 83,046. The Army recognizes additional
    full-time support authorizations as the number one priority of the Army
    National Guard and Army Reserve leadership.

                               CIVILIAN COMPONENT

        As a comprehensive effort to consolidate, streamline, and more
    effectively manage the force, the Army has begun an initiative to
    transform our civilian personnel system. High quality, well-trained
    civilians are absolutely essential to the readiness of our force and
    our ability to sustain operations today and in the future. Recruiting,
    training, and retaining a highly-skilled, dedicated civilian workforce
    is critical in meeting our obligations to the combatant commanders and
    the Nation. Aggressive transformation of our civilian force--in which
    projections through fiscal year 2005 indicate a 16-percent annual
    turnover due to retirements and other losses--will ensure we continue
    to meet those obligations.
        As of fiscal year 2002, the Army employed 277,786 civilian
    personnel. To forecast future civilian workforce needs with precision,
    we developed the Civilian Forecasting System, a sophisticated
    projection model that predicts future civilian personnel requirements
    under various scenarios. The Army is working closely with the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other Federal agencies to
    demonstrate the power of this system so they can fully leverage its
    capabilities, as well.
        The Civilian Personnel Management System XXI (CPMS XXI) has
    identified the reforms necessary to hire, train, and grow a civilian
    component that supports the transforming Army. To achieve this, we have
    redefined the way civilians are hired, retained, and managed. Mandatory
    experiential assignments will become the vehicle by which we develop
    future leaders. CPMS XXI fully responds to current mandates in the
    President's Management Agenda and incorporates the results of the Army
    Training and Leader Development Panels. For example, two initiatives
    for recruiting well-trained civilians are:

             The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development
            System--a centrally managed program that accesses and trains
            civilian interns and grows a resource pool of personnel who can
            accede to senior professional positions.
             The DOD Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 and
            fiscal year 2003 provided direct hire authority for critical,
            hard-to-fill medical health care occupations and enabled the
            reduction in average fill-time for these positions to 29 days.
    Army Well-Being
        The readiness of the Army is inextricably linked to the well-being
    of our people, and Army well-being is the human dimension of our
    transformation. Well-being responds to the physical, material, mental,
    and spiritual needs of all Army people--soldiers, civilians, retirees,
    veterans, and their families. We recognize the fundamental relationship
    between well-being programs and institutional outcomes such as
    readiness, retention, and recruiting. To support mission preparedness
    as well as individual aspirations, well-being integrates policies,
    programs, and human resource issues into a holistic, systematic
    framework that provides a path to personal growth and success and gives
    our people the opportunity to become self-reliant. We recruit soldiers,
    but we retain families. Well-being programs help make the Army the
    right place to raise a family. When our families are cared for,
    soldiers can better focus on their mission--training, fighting, and
    winning our Nation's wars, decisively.
        Soldiers appreciate the Nation's devotion to them, and they are
    grateful for the country's recognition of their service and sacrifices.
    Recent improvements to the Montgomery GI Bill, Tricare for Life,
    Tricare Reform, Retired Pay Reform, the 4.1 percent general pay
    increase, and additional pay increases in 2003, are all important to
    soldiers and their families. These initiatives have helped the Army
    respond to the well-being needs of our people. Army voluntary education
    programs improve our combat readiness by expanding soldier skills,
    knowledge, and aptitudes to produce confident, competent leaders. Other
    well-being initiatives include:

             Spouse Employment Summit. The Army is developing
            partnerships with the private sector to enhance employment
            opportunities for Army spouses and provide improved job
            portability for them.
             Spouse Orientation and Leader Development (SOLD). SOLD
            connects Army spouses and enhances their opportunity to serve
            as valued leaders who contribute to the readiness and future of
            the Army and our Nation.
             Army University Access Online. eArmyU offers soldiers
            access to a variety of on-line, post-secondary programs and
            related educational services. www.eArmyU.com is a comprehensive
            web-portal widely accessible to soldiers, including those in
            Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kuwait.
             In-State Tuition. To level the playing field for
            access to education opportunities, the Army is working to
            encourage States to grant in-State status for military
            personnel and families at public colleges and universities in
            their soldier's state of legal residence and state of
            assignment.
             High School Senior Stabilization. This policy enhances
            predictability by allowing families to request stabilization at
            their sponsor's current duty location if they have a child who
            will graduate from high school during that year.
             Secondary Education Transition Study (SETS) Memorandum
            of Agreement (MOA). Facilitated by the Army, this agreement
            among participating school superintendents is their commitment
            to partner and improve high school transitions for DOD
            children. Currently, over 110 school superintendents have
            signed the SETS MOA.

    Leader Development--Training Soldiers and Civilians, Our Growing
            Leaders
        The Army is a profession--the Profession of Arms. Conducting
    decisive ground combat operations in defense of the United States and
    its interests is a core competency of this profession. The development
    of each member of the Army is the foundation of lifelong devotion to
    duty--while in uniform and upon returning to the civilian sector.
        By its nature, our profession is extraordinarily complex and
    dangerous. The American people entrust the Army with the sacred
    responsibility to apply lethal force in defense of U.S. interests. As
    such, the Profession of Arms must remain firmly grounded in
    constitutional values and must constantly change and grow to preserve
    its competitive advantage in an evolving strategic environment. At all
    levels, our leaders--military and civilian--must apply their
    professional knowledge in increasingly varied and unique situations
    that are characteristic of today's strategic environment. Ultimately,
    we must grow professional Army leaders who provide wise and discerning
    military judgments founded on long experience and proven professional
    expertise. This capacity is developed only through a lifetime of
    education and dedicated service--in peace and in war.
        Soldiers serve the Nation with the full realization that their duty
    may require them to make the supreme sacrifice for others among their
    ranks. Soldiers fighting the war on terrorism today, those who will
    fight our future wars, and those who have fought in our past wars are
    professional warfighters and a precious national asset. To ensure we
    remain the greatest landpower in the world defending the greatest
    country in the world, the Army and the Nation rely upon their unique
    and hard-earned experiences and skills. To develop the operational
    skills required to defend the Nation, training must remain our number
    one priority.
        The evolving strategic environment, the gravity of our
    responsibilities, and the broad range of tasks the Army performs
    require us to review and periodically update the way we educate, train,
    and grow professional warfighters. The Army's strategic
    responsibilities to the Nation and combatant commanders now embrace a
    wider range of missions. Those missions present our leaders with even
    greater challenges than previously experienced. Therefore, leader
    development is the lifeblood of the profession. It is the deliberate,
    progressive, and continuous process that trains and grows soldiers and
    civilians into competent, confident, self-aware, and decisive leaders
    prepared for the challenges of the 21st century in combined arms,
    joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
        In June 2000, we convened the Army Training and Leader Development
    Panel (ATLDP). The ATLDP's purpose is to identify skill sets required
    of Objective Force soldier and civilian leaders. Further, ATLDP
    assesses the ability of current training and leader development systems
    and policies to enhance these required skills. In May 2001, the Army
    Training and Leader Development Panel Phase I (Officer Study)
    identified 7 strategic imperatives and generated 89 recommendations.
    With those, we validated the requirement to transform our Officer
    Education System (OES)--from the Officer Basic Course through the
    Command and General Staff Officer Course. Additionally, the panel
    reconfirmed the value of Joint Professional Military Education II (JPME
    II) in preparing our leaders for joint assignments. The most
    significant product of the officer ATLDP is our OES transformation.
        ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study) identified three high-payoff
    institutional training and education initiatives for lieutenants,
    captains, and majors. The first of these is the Basic Officer Leader
    Course (BOLC). BOLC will provide a tough, standardized, graduate-level,
    small-unit leadership experience for newly commissioned officers. The
    second of these initiatives is the Combined Arms Staff Course for staff
    officers, and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course for company
    commanders. Both courses will capitalize on advanced distributed
    learning and intensive resident training methods. The third initiative,
    Intermediate Level Education (ILE), will provide all majors with the
    same common core of operational instruction, and it will provide
    additional educational opportunities that are tailored to the officer's
    specific career field, branch, or functional area. Beyond ILE, Army
    officers continue to attend Joint or Senior Service Colleges to develop
    leader skills and knowledge appropriate to the operational and
    strategic levels of the profession.
        Completed in May 2002, the ATLDP Phase II (noncommissioned officer
    (NCO) Study) resulted in 78 findings and recommendations extending
    across 6 imperatives--Army culture, NCO Education Systems (NCOES),
    training, systems approach to training, training and leader development
    model, and lifelong learning. Among others, the ATLDP Phase II
    recommended building new training and leader development tools for NCOs
    to replace current methods, as required. The ATLDP Phase III (Warrant
    Officer Study) culminated with 63 recommendations extending across 4
    crucial imperatives. Recommendations included clarifying the warrant
    officer's unique role in the Army and improving the Warrant Officer
    Education System to ensure timely training and promotion. The Civilian
    Training and Leader Development Panel (Phase IV) study results are
    complete, and we are forming the Implementation Process Action Team (I-
    PAT). I-PAT will identify actions the Army must take to increase the
    professional development of our civilian workforce. At the senior
    leader level, the Army initiated the Army Strategic Leadership Course
    (ASLC). The program is aimed at teaching principles of strategic
    leadership, with emphasis on visioning, campaign planning, leading
    change, and transformation. To date, we have completed 12 of the
    foundation courses and 3 alumni courses, training the majority of the
    Army's general officers.

                      READINESS--WINNING OUR NATION'S WARS

    Homeland Security (HLS)
        Defending our Nation--abroad and at home--against foreign and
    domestic threats is fundamental to the Army's legacy, and our
    warfighting focus provides capabilities relevant to HLS requirements.
    HLS missions range from traditional warfighting competencies that
    defeat external threats to the non-combat tasks associated with
    supporting civil authorities in domestic contingencies. Operation Noble
    Eagle mobilized over 16,000 Army National Guard soldiers to protect
    critical infrastructure. These soldiers assisted the Department of
    Transportation in securing our Nation's airports while also playing a
    vital role in securing our Nation's borders. The Army is moving forward
    to provide one Civil Support Team to each State, as required by the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The Civil
    Support Teams support Incident Commanders and identify chemical,
    biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) agents and
    substances, assess current and projected consequences, advise on
    response measures, and assist with appropriate requests for additional
    support. To date, OSD has certified 30 of 32 teams, and the Army is
    working to establish additional teams. Collectively, the certified
    teams have performed 890 operational missions since September 11, 2001.
    The Army remains committed to HLS, dedicating AC and RC staffs to focus
    on training, doctrine, planning, and execution of DOD missions in
    support of civil authorities.

                                MISSILE DEFENSE

        Robust Missile Defense is a vital warfighting requirement that
    protects both our homeland and our deployed forces. Missile Defense
    includes far more than a reactive capability to shoot down missiles in
    their reentry phase. Missile Defense requires a coherent system of
    sensors; battle command; weapons systems; and active, passive,
    proactive, and reactive operational concepts, all aimed at destroying
    enemy missiles--not only during their reentry phases. Missile Defense
    must also be able to destroy enemy missiles on the ground, before they
    launch or during their boost phase once launched. Missile Defense is
    inherently a joint capability to which the Army is a major contributor.
        The Army is deploying and employing Ground Mobile Defense assets to
    contribute to this warfighting capability, accelerating the fielding of
    the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC3) system, and developing
    directed energy weapons that will bring new defense measures to the
    Army and the Nation. We are postured to assume control of the Medium
    Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program in fiscal year 2003 and
    intend to begin fielding by fiscal year 2012.
        MEADS is a transformational program of Objective Force quality and
    a significant improvement on Patriot's capabilities. It will be more
    mobile and more deployable (C-130 capable) than Patriot and cover a
    360-degree radius to Patriot's 120 degrees. It will be effective
    against low radar, cross section cruise missile targets; and require
    only 30 percent of Patriot's manpower. MEADS will be more accurate and
    more sustainable than Patriot.

                           CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION

        In Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145, Congress directed the DOD to
    destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. In turn, the
    Secretary of Defense delegated management of all chemical munitions
    disposal to the Department of the Army. On November 29, 2000, the
    Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, using incineration-based
    technology, completely destroyed the last stockpiles stored at the
    Atoll, and closure operations began in January 2001. The Tooele
    Chemical Agent Disposal Facility has incinerated 44 percent of the
    chemical agents and 81 percent of the munitions stored there. Disposal
    operations at these two sites destroyed 30 percent of the total U.S.
    chemical weapons stockpiles. Construction of incineration facilities at
    Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, is
    complete. Systemization activities are ongoing at Aberdeen, Anniston,
    Umatilla, and Pine Bluff. The plan to accelerate the disposal of bulk
    agents using a neutralization process at Aberdeen, Maryland, and
    Newport, Indiana, has been approved. Anniston and Aberdeen are
    scheduled to start destruction in second quarter fiscal year 2003, and
    Newport is scheduled to begin in first quarter fiscal year 2004.
        To comply with treaty agreements and the congressional mandate, we
    must complete the destruction of these weapons by 2007. The treaty
    allows for a one time, 5-year extension to this deadline. With
    continued funding and minimal schedule changes, we will safely destroy
    the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions at eight
    existing CONUS sites.
    Training the Force
        In October 2002, the Army released Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training
    the Force. Synchronized with other field manuals and publications being
    updated to respond to changes in Army, joint, multinational, and
    interagency operations, FM 7-0 is the capstone doctrinal manual for
    Army training and leader development. It provides the developmental
    methodology for training and growing competent, confident soldiers, and
    it addresses both current and future Objective Force training
    requirements.
        We are transforming the way we fight future wars, and the Army is
    participating fully in a DOD-sponsored program to transform how forces
    train to fight. This effort involves four major initiatives: building
    upon existing service interoperability training; linking component and
    joint command staff planning and execution; enhancing existing joint
    training exercises to address joint interoperability; and studying the
    requirement for dedicated joint training environments for functional
    warfighting and complex joint tasks. The Army is scheduled to host the
    first joint National Training Center (NTC) event at Fort Irwin,
    California, in May 2003. During June 2003, the U.S. Army Forces Command
    will execute the second joint NTC event--JCS exercise Roving Sands.
        During the late 1990s, funding for the recapitalization and
    modernization of the Army's Combat Training Centers was reduced,
    eroding their capability to support their critical missions.
    Additionally, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment
    and current force instrumentation systems have become difficult to
    maintain. The Army's Combat Training Center modernization program will
    ensure that our premier training areas (NTC at Fort Irwin, Combat
    Maneuver Training Center in Germany, the Joint Readiness Training
    Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack Center of Excellence
    near Gila Bend, Arizona) are modernized to provide high quality,
    realistic, full-spectrum joint training. To address these problems, the
    Army will invest nearly $700 million over the next 6 years to modernize
    these training centers.

                                    OPTEMPO

        In accordance with congressional directives, the Army developed a
    new methodology to prepare budget requests that accurately reflect
    operations and maintenance requirements. In the report submitted in
    July 2002, the Army outlined updated processes that ensure consistency
    in reporting of tank miles and reflect requirements and execution with
    more precision. Management controls initiated in fiscal year 2001 to
    prevent migration of tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) funds to other areas
    were highly successful and remain in effect.
        The Army's combined arms training strategy determines the
    resourcing requirements to maintain the combat readiness of our forces.
    For the AC, the Army requires 800 ground OPTEMPO miles per year for the
    M1 Abrams tank and corresponding training support; the AC flying hour
    program requires an average of 14.5 live flying hours per aircrew each
    month. Both Army National Guard and the Army Reserve aircrew training
    strategies require 9.0 hours per crew each month. The ARNG ground
    OPTEMPO requirement is a composite average of 174 miles in fiscal year
    2004, and the Army Reserve (USAR) ground OPTEMPO requirement is 200
    tank-equivalent miles in fiscal year 2004.
        While this describes the Army's training strategy, actual execution
    levels from unit to unit have varied depending upon factors such as
    ongoing operations, safety of flight messages, and adequate manning of
    combat formations. To this end, the Army has fully funded its AC ground
    OPTEMPO requirement, while its AC flying program is funded to its
    historical execution level of 13.1 flying hours. The RC air and ground
    OPTEMPO are similarly funded to their execution levels, rather than
    their requirement. Although the Army has not always been able to
    execute the training strategy, we have taken steps to have all units
    execute the prescribed training strategy in fiscal year 2003, fiscal
    year 2004, and beyond.
    Force Protection and Antiterrorism
        Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate
    hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel and includes
    family members, resources, facilities, and critical information. In the
    war on terrorism, the area of operations extends from Afghanistan to
    the east coast and across the United States. Naturally, force
    protection and antiterrorism measures have increased across Army
    installations in the Continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.
        Findings from the Cole Commission, the Downing Report on the Khobar
    Towers bombing, and Army directives to restrict access to installations
    have all led to thorough assessments by the Department of the Army
    Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and
    commanders. Our efforts focus on improved force protection policy and
    doctrine; more rigorous training and exercises; improved threat
    reporting and coordination with national intelligence and law
    enforcement agencies; enhanced detection and deterrence capabilities
    for CBRNE threats; increased capabilities and protection for access
    control; and expanded assessments of Major Commands (MACOM) and
    installation force protection programs. Both operational and
    installation environments rely upon secure, networked information
    infrastructure to execute daily enterprise-wide processes and
    decisionmaking, so the parameters of force protection include
    contemporary and evolving cyber threats, as well.
        The Army's Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) secures the
    Army's portion of the Global Information Grid, secures the digitized
    force, and supports information superiority and network security
    defense-in-depth initiatives. ISSP provides the capability to detect
    system intrusions and alterations and react to information warfare
    attacks in a measured and coordinated manner. To the greatest extent
    possible, it protects warfighters' secure communications--from the
    sustaining base to the foxhole.
        Soldiers, active and Reserve, are heavily engaged in force
    protection and antiterrorism missions. Soldiers guard military
    installations, nuclear power plants, dams and power generation
    facilities, tunnels, bridges, rail stations, and emergency operations
    centers. During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah,
    nearly 1,500 ARNG soldiers provided security, and soldiers guarded key
    infrastructure sites during Super Bowl XXXVII in January 2003. Over
    12,500 RC soldiers are currently mobilized for Operation Noble Eagle to
    fulfill force protection requirements, and in February 2003, over 8,000
    Army National Guard soldiers will support Air Force security
    requirements--a requirement that could reach 9,500 soldiers. Security
    of detention facilities and detainees at Guantanamo Bay Detention--a
    long-term detainee mission--requires approximately 1,500 Army
    personnel, 50 percent of whom are military police. Army Reserve
    Internment and Resettlement battalions on 6-month rotations impact
    military police availability to CONUS force protection requirements.
    Sustainment
        The Army is revolutionizing its logistics process. One initiative,
    the Single Stock Fund (SSF), redirected more than $540 million worth of
    secondary items from stocks to satisfy customer demands between May
    2000--SSF inception--and November 2002. During that same period, we
    redistributed more than $218 million worth of secondary items from the
    authorized stockage levels to meet higher priority readiness
    requirements. By extending--national visibility of stockage locations--
    and capitalizing inventories into the Army Working Capital Fund--we
    reduced customer wait time by an average of 18.5 percent. The SSF will
    continue to reduce inventory requirements and generate even more
    savings for the Army by creating greater flexibility for the management
    of inventories.
        Another initiative, the National Maintenance Program (NMP),
    enhances weapon system readiness, reliability, and availability rates
    by bringing Army Class IX repair parts to a single national standard.
    Ultimately, increased reliability will reduce overall weapon system
    operating and support cost. Additionally, the NMP centralizes the
    management and control of Army maintenance activities for components
    and end items. NMP will produce appropriately sized Army maintenance
    capacity that still meets total maintenance requirements.
    Strategic Readiness Reporting
        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
    requires the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive
    readiness reporting system that objectively measures readiness to
    support the NSS. The Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS) responds
    to and provides a baseline in achieving this critical initiative.
        SRS is a precision readiness measurement tool that provides Army
    leadership with accurate, objective, predictive, and actionable
    readiness information to dramatically enhance resource management
    toward one end--strategic readiness to defend the United States. The
    Army Scorecard--a product of SRS--will integrate readiness data from
    the business arena and the operating, generating, and sustaining forces
    of both the active and Reserve component. Army Scorecard methodology
    focuses on four critical areas: People--investing in soldiers and their
    families; Readiness--maintaining the support capability to the
    combatant commanders' operational requirements; Transformation--
    transforming the Army into the Objective Force; and application of
    sound business practices.
        SRS markedly improves how we measure readiness. It gathers timely
    information with precision and expands the scope of the data
    considered. We are further developing this system to leverage leading
    indicators and predict trends--solving problems that affect readiness
    before they become problems, from well-being to weapons platforms. SRS
    will help enable the Army preserve readiness to support combatant
    commanders, invest in soldiers and their families, identify and adopt
    sound business practices, and transform the Army to the Objective
    Force.
    Installations
        Army installations are our Nation's power projection platforms, and
    they provide critical training support to the Army and other members of
    the joint team. Additionally, soldiers, families, and civilians live
    and work on Army installations. The quality of our infrastructure
    directly affects the readiness of the Army and the well-being of our
    soldiers, families, and civilians.
        The Army has traditionally accepted substantial risk in
    infrastructure to maintain its current warfighting readiness. However,
    a decade of chronic under funding has led to a condition in which over
    50 percent of our facilities and infrastructure are in such poor
    condition that commanders rated them as ``adversely affecting mission
    requirements.'' Our facilities maintenance must improve. Over the past
    2 years, with the help of the administration and Congress, the Army has
    begun to rectify this situation with significant increases in funding
    and innovative business practices. These efforts have been dramatically
    successful as we continue to correct a problem that was 10 years in the
    making. Thus, in an effort to prevent future degradation of our
    facilities, the Army has increased its funding for facilities
    sustainment to 93 percent of requirement beginning in fiscal year 2004.

                TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (TIM)

        Recognizing the requirement to enhance support to commanders, the
    Secretary of the Army directed the reorganization of the Army's
    management structure. On October 1, 2002, the Army placed the
    management of Army installations under the Installation Management
    Agency (IMA). IMA is a new field-operating agency of the Assistant
    Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM). Its mission is to
    provide equitable, efficient, and effective management of Army
    installations worldwide to support readiness; enable the well-being of
    soldiers, civilians, and family members; improve infrastructure; and
    preserve the environment. This new management approach eliminates the
    migration of base operations funds to other operational accounts below
    the HQDA level. It also enables the development of multi-functional
    installations to support evolving force structure and Army
    transformation needs. The Army is poised to capitalize on opportunities
    TIM gives us to provide excellence in installations.
        Two programs that significantly increase the well-being of our
    soldiers and their families are the Barracks and the Family Housing
    programs. The Army established the Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP) in
    the late 1990s to improve single soldiers' housing conditions. Through
    2002, we have upgraded or funded-for-upgrade 70 percent of our
    permanent party barracks to soldier suites that consist of two single
    bedrooms with a shared bath and common area. The Army will continue the
    BUP until all permanent party barracks achieve this standard.
        With the strong support of Congress, the Army established the
    Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) for our families. This program
    capitalizes on commercial expertise and private capital to perform a
    non-core function for the Army--family housing management. The program
    provides greater value to the Army by eliminating the housing deficit
    at our first 11 sites, while leveraging a $209 million Army investment
    into $4.1 billion of initial private development. The Army's
    privatization program began with 4 pilot projects and will expand to 18
    active projects by the end of fiscal year 2003. Pending OSD and
    congressional approval, 28 projects are planned through 2006 that will
    impact over 72,000 housing units or 80 percent of Army Family Housing
    in the United States. By the end of 2007, we will have the programs and
    projects in place to meet the OSD goal of eliminating inadequate family
    housing. We will accomplish this goal through RCI and increased Army
    investment in family housing Military Construction (MILCON) at non-
    privatized installations. The RC enhances RCI through real property
    exchange authority that is only available to the RC. This legislative
    authority allows the exchange of RC owned property with public or
    private entities and has a tremendous potential to improve future
    Reserve component infrastructure at no governmental cost.
        The Army has also aggressively reduced its financial burden and
    physical footprint by disposing of 34 percent of its facilities from a
    1990 high of 116 billion square feet. The Army anticipates that the
    congressional fiscal year 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
    authority will permit additional appropriate reductions. BRAC will
    enable the Army to dispose of excess infrastructure and realign the
    remaining facilities with the requirements of the transforming Army and
    the Objective Force. BRAC will also allow the Army to re-allocate
    resources from closed or realigned installations to other high priority
    requirements.
        The Army continues to improve its utilities infrastructure by
    divesting itself of non-core utility systems' operation and maintenance
    through privatization. As of December 2002, we had privatized 64 of the
    351 systems in the program, and we have an additional 104 presently
    under negotiation.
        As part of our Army Knowledge Management (AKM)--described later in
    more detail--we are modernizing our Installation Information
    Infrastructure--info-structure--to support a network centric,
    knowledge-based Army. The Installation Information Infrastructure
    Modernization Program (I3MP) executes a multi-year, $3.2 billion
    program for upgrades to optical fiber and copper cable, installation of
    advanced digital equipment, and upgrades to Defense Global Information
    Grid gateways. This program will ensure worldwide, high-speed data
    connectivity at Army installations. To date, we have completed 22 of 95
    CONUS installations and initiated upgrades at four installations
    outside of the CONUS. We plan to complete I3MP in 2009.

                   TRANSFORMATION--CHANGING THE WAY WE FIGHT

        The Army is fundamentally changing the way we fight and creating a
    force more responsive to the strategic requirements of the Nation. We
    are building a joint precision maneuver capability that can enter a
    theater at the time and place of our choosing, maneuver at will to gain
    positional advantage, deliver precise joint fires and, if necessary,
    close with and destroy the enemy.
        The Objective Force is an army designed from the bottom up around a
    single, networked, integrated C\4\ISR architecture that will link us to
    joint, interagency, and multi-national forces. It will be a rapidly
    deployable, mounted formation, seamlessly integrated into the joint
    force and capable of delivering decisive victory across the spectrum of
    military operations. Consolidated, streamlined branches and military
    operational specialties comprised of professional warfighters will be
    poised to transition rapidly from disaster relief to high-end
    warfighting operations.
        The Objective Force and its Future Combat System of Systems will
    leverage and deliver with precision the combat power of joint and
    strategic assets. It is a capabilities-based force that rapidly
    responds to the requirements of the strategic environment in which our
    soldiers will be the most strategically relevant and decisively capable
    landpower--no matter the mission, no matter the threats, no matter the
    risks.
        In the final analysis, the Army's combat power does not wear tracks
    or wheels--it wears boots. No platform or weapon system can match a
    soldier's situational curiosity and awareness. It is the soldiers'
    ability to discern and to think, their ingenuity and resourcefulness,
    their endurance and perseverance, and their plain grit that make them
    the most reliable precision weapon in our inventory. Soldiers remain
    the centerpiece of our formations.
        To help guide our transformation efforts, the Army leverages
    lessons-learned from extensive experimentation and wargaming. We are
    working to harness the power of knowledge, the benefits of science and
    technology, and innovative business solutions to transform both the
    Operational and Institutional Army into the Objective Force. The Army's
    annual Title 10 Wargames provide critical insights for developing the
    Objective Force. Likewise, results from joint experiments--Millennium
    Challenge 2002 and other service Title 10 Wargames like Global
    Engagement, Navy Global, and Expeditionary Warrior, to name a few--also
    inform these efforts.
        The Army is fully committed to joint experimentation as a means to
    examine and assess Objective Force contributions to the strategic,
    operational, and tactical levels of joint warfare. The Army has
    established a joint/Army Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E)
    Task Force to ensure that Army CD&E efforts are synchronized with joint
    CD&E. This task force makes certain that joint experiment lessons-
    learned inform the design and development of the Objective Force. This
    year, the Army's Title 10 Wargame--co-hosted by Commander, Joint Forces
    Command--will focus on the Joint Force that will fight the next battle.
    Linked to Joint Forces Command's Pinnacle Impact 03 experiment, it will
    be conducted within the context of a future 1-4-2-1 global scenario and
    the emerging Joint Operations Concept. The Army is committed to these
    efforts, and in this budget we have nearly doubled last year's funding
    of these exercises.
        Joint, interagency, multinational, and Army warfighting experiments
    provide invaluable opportunities for the Army to experiment with
    innovative approaches to warfighting and to test new tactics,
    techniques, procedures, organizations, processes, and technology. In
    Millennium Challenge 2002, the largest joint experiment in U.S.
    history, the Army demonstrated four vital capabilities it brings to the
    joint fight:

             the ability to attain and maintain information
            superiority (knowledge);
             the ability to conduct decisive maneuver to enable
            dominant joint maneuver;
             the ability to defeat the opposition in an anti-access
            environment through rapid entry and employment capabilities;
            and
             the ability to support and sustain rapid combat power
            efficiently by reducing the operational and tactical logistics
            footprint.

        To evaluate the effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
    (SBCT) concepts for battalion and company operations in a Joint Force,
    the Army employed a SBCT unit during Millennium Challenge. Less than 4
    weeks after Stryker vehicles were delivered to the first unit at Fort
    Lewis, the unit demonstrated rapid air and sealift deployability and--
    integrated into the exercise well. Additionally, when given a mission
    on short notice to support a Marine Corps unit in ground operations,
    the SBCT unit demonstrated its agility and versatility.
    Balancing Risk As We Manage Change
        Balancing risk is integral to Army transformation. To maintain
    current readiness while we transform, we are managing operational risk:
    risk in current readiness for near-term conflicts with future risk--the
    ability to develop new capabilities and operational concepts that will
    dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. The Army has
    accepted risk in selective modernization and recapitalization, and we
    continue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, the
    well-being of our people, transformation, the war on terrorism, and new
    operational commitments. Since 1999, the Army has terminated 29
    programs and restructured 20 others for a total savings of $12.8
    billion. These funds were reallocated to resource the Stryker Brigades
    and essential Objective Force research and development.
        In Program Budget 2004 and its associated Five-Year Defense Plan
    (FYDP), the Army has generated an additional $22 billion of savings by
    terminating 24 additional systems and reducing or restructuring 24
    other systems. To accelerate achieving the Objective Force capabilities
    and mitigating operational risk, the Army reinvested these savings in
    the development of transformational capabilities in these and other
    programs:

             Future Combat System--$13.5 billion
             Precision Munitions--$3.2 billion
             Sensors and Communications--$2.3 billion
             Science and Technology--$1.1 billion
             Missile and Air Defense--$1.1 billion

        The operational risk associated with the decreased funding for
    certain current programs is acceptable as long as we field Stryker
    Brigades on schedule and accelerate the fielding of the Objective Force
    for arrival this decade. We will continue to reassess the risk
    associated with system reductions and related organizational changes
    against operational requirements and the strategic environment.
    An Information Enabled Army
        Achieving the full spectrum dominance of the Objective Force
    requires changing the way we fight. Changing the way we fight requires
    a holistic transformation of Logistics, Personnel, Installation
    Management, Acquisition, Aviation, business practices--every aspect of
    the Army must transform. The Objective Force requires innovative
    changes and out-of-the-box ingenuity in the way we take care of our
    people and manage the information and material that enhances their
    readiness and answers their needs--both personal and professional, at
    home and in the short sword warfight at foxhole level. Simply put, we
    cannot achieve the Objective Force capabilities without leveraging the
    full potential of the technological advances that our Nation's
    industrial base and science and technology communities are developing.
    The Army has consolidated management of Information Technologies (IT)
    into a single effort--Army Knowledge Management (AKM). AKM capitalizes
    on IT resources unique to our Nation and harnesses them for
    transformation, for the Army, and for the combatant commanders.
        Information management is critical to achieving the Army vision,
    and AKM supports transformation through the development and
    implementation of a network-centric, knowledge-based Army architecture
    interoperable with the joint system. AKM will accelerate the detect-
    decide-deliver planning processes and enable warfighters to see the
    adversary first--before our forces are detected; understand the Common
    Relevant Operating Picture first; act against adversaries first; and
    finish the warfight with decisive victories--see first, understand
    first, act first, finish decisively. AKM will provide knowledge at the
    point of decision for all leaders--from the factory to the foxhole.
        Enabling collaborative mission planning and execution among widely
    dispersed locations around the globe, AKM will provide a rapid and
    seamless flow and exchange of actionable information and knowledge. The
    network-centric operations that AKM enables will decrease our logistic
    footprint and enhance sustainability of the Objective Force through
    multi-nodal distribution networks--reaching forward to the theater and
    back to installations. Advanced information technologies will
    dramatically enhance Battle Command. Command, Control, Communications,
    and Computer (C\4\) decision tools seamlessly linked to Intelligence,
    Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets produce a radically
    improved Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP) and enable battle
    command.
        AKM will dramatically enhance the warfighter's ability to
    distribute, process, fuse, and correlate unprecedented amounts of
    actionable data into information--securely, reliably, and quickly
    enough to enable leaders to synchronize and mass effects for decisive
    results. Network-centric operations enable information awareness,
    information access, and information delivery.
        The Army Knowledge Enterprise (AKE) construct describes the Army's
    process to enable improved strategic and tactical information
    distribution and collaboration. In short, AKE leverages the ingenuity
    and resourcefulness of our people in shaping the environment to achieve
    dominance and helps leaders achieve decision superiority and mission
    efficiencies.
        Integration and refinement of existing Army networks is the first
    step in achieving a network-centric, information-enabled force that
    creates efficiencies and provides secure, reliable, actionable
    information communications. To this end, the Army activated the Network
    Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM). NETCOM is the Army's single
    authority assigned to operate, manage, and defend the Army's
    information infrastructure. NETCOM has assumed technical control of all
    Army networks--active, Guard, and Reserve. This new policy allows
    NETCOM to evaluate any system, application, or piece of equipment that
    touches the Army Networks. NETCOM will improve the capacity,
    performance, and security of our networks at every level.
        Among others, one tangible product of NETCOM is the consolidation
    and removal of redundant servers across the Army. This example of
    better business practice will harvest significant savings in
    resources--both dollars and managers--while increasing the
    effectiveness of the network. Since the first quarter fiscal year 2002,
    we have reduced the number of servers Army-wide by 16 percent--311 in
    the National Capitol Region alone.
        Army Knowledge Online (AKO) begins to allow the Army to
    decentralize the management of information. AKO is the Army's secure,
    web-based, internet service that leverages the Army's intellectual
    capital to better organize, train, equip, and maintain our force. It
    gives our people a means to collaborate, to improve their situational
    awareness, and to access their personnel data. Already, hard-copy
    processes that formerly took days and weeks can now be accomplished
    almost instantly--from pay to personnel actions to assignments, to name
    a few. AKO is just an early glimpse of the potential capabilities of a
    network-centric, knowledge-based organization that harnesses the
    potential of the global infostructure.

                     OPERATIONAL ARMY--THE OBJECTIVE FORCE

        The Army is actively engaged in global operations supporting
    combatant commanders today, but it is our obligation to prepare for the
    future, as well. The Objective Force is the Army's future full-spectrum
    force that will be organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more
    strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,
    survivable, and sustainable than we are today--across the full spectrum
    of military operations as an integral member of a cohesive joint team.
        The Nation will continue to face adaptive, asymmetric threats that
    capitalize on the power of information. To dominate and maintain
    superiority over these emerging challenges, the Army is changing the
    way we fight--a paradigm shift more significant than the 20th century's
    introduction of the tank and the helicopter. The Army is changing from
    sequential and linear operations to distributed and simultaneous
    operations. The Objective Force--characterized by networks of people
    enabled with systems that provide actionable information and decision
    superiority--will dissuade, deter, or decisively defeat our adversaries
    anytime, anyplace, and anywhere.
        The Objective Force will consist of command structures scaled to
    meet Joint Force Commander requirements and modular combined-arms units
    tailored according to each situation. Objective Force integrated,
    mobile, air-ground teams will conduct mounted and dismounted operations
    and employ both manned and unmanned platforms to achieve decisive
    victories. Capable of forcible entry and operations in austere
    environments to address the spectrum of military operations--from
    humanitarian assistance to warfighting--the Objective Force will
    conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations and master
    transitions between phases of operations. It will be an offensively
    oriented, multi-dimensional force enabled by advanced information
    technologies that give soldiers real-time intelligence and actionable
    information.
        The Objective Force will arrive in theater combat capable--
    deployment will be synonymous with employment. The Objective Force will
    be strategically responsive and rapidly deployable on the U.S. Air
    Force family of inter-theater and intra-theater aircraft. An Objective
    Force Unit of Action (UA) will deploy on approximately one-third the
    number of aircraft required to deploy a heavy brigade combat team
    today. It will be operationally deployable and capable of operational
    maneuver over strategic distances by air, land, or sea. Soldiers will
    overcome anti-access and area denial strategies and environments
    through precision maneuver and decision superiority.
        Equipped with new systems designed to meet the needs of the Army's
    future fighting formations, the Objective Force will be a networked
    system of systems. This system of systems includes soldiers equipped
    with the Land Warrior system; a family of 18 integrated, synchronized,
    manned, and unmanned Future Combat Systems (FCS); and critical
    complementary systems such as the Comanche and the Future Tactical
    Truck System. The components of the FCS are being synchronously
    developed and fielded as a complete family to achieve the warfighting
    capabilities the Nation requires to defeat adaptive, asymmetric
    conventional and unconventional adversaries.
        Soldiers are the centerpiece of the Army's formation--not
    equipment. Soldiers of the Objective Force will leverage dominant
    knowledge to gain decision superiority over any adversary. They will
    seamlessly integrate Objective Force capabilities with the capabilities
    of Joint Forces, Special Operations Forces, other Federal agencies, and
    multinational forces. The Objective Force soldiers will enable the
    United States to achieve its national security goals in a crisis,
    rather than simply inflict punitive strikes on an adversary. Employing
    FCS capabilities in formations called Units of Action (UA) and Units of
    Employment (UE), Objective Force soldiers will provide campaign quality
    staying power--that means precision fire and maneuver to control
    terrain, people, and resources, without having to resort to
    indiscriminate collateral damage. The Land Warrior system will
    integrate individual soldiers in the network while providing them
    increased protection and lethality. FCS will give soldiers the
    capability to destroy any adversary in any weather and environment with
    smaller calibers, greater precision, more devastating target effects,
    and at longer-ranges than available today.
        Joint C\4\ISR--a network-centric information architecture nested
    within the Global Information Grid--will connect the Objective Force's
    system of systems. Capitalizing on the synergistic power of the
    information network enterprise, every Objective Force soldier and
    platform will be capable of sensing and engaging the enemy while
    maintaining situational awareness of friendly forces. Advanced
    information technologies and C\4\ISR decision tools and assets will
    enhance the Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP). The Objective
    Force will identify, locate, and engage critical targets with lethal or
    non-lethal affects and assess battle damage on those targets. The joint
    C\4\ISR linkages will enable the attack of targets with whatever joint
    or Army assets are available for immediate employment, whether the
    force is in contact or out of contact. Similarly, enhanced situational
    awareness will facilitate multi-layered active and passive defense
    measures--including both offensive and defensive counter air against
    air and non-air breathing, manned, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
        The CROP and network-centric operations will enhance sustainability
    of the Objective Force through multi-nodal distribution networks that
    reach forward to the area of operations or reach back to the Home
    Station Operations Center. Increased reliability through equipment
    design and commonality among the FCS family of systems will enhance
    sustainability while reducing logistics demands. Advanced technologies
    will enable robust Objective Force operations while shrinking the
    logistics footprint and lift requirements of deployed forces.
        The FCS is a transformational approach to meeting this Nation's
    requirements for the Objective Force. We designed and will field the
    FCS family in a carefully balanced manner to avoid optimizing a
    component at the expense of sub-optimizing the overarching capabilities
    of Objective and Joint Forces. The acquisition and requirements
    development processes are being updated to accommodate the Department
    of Defense's (DOD) direction to field a networked system of systems
    rapidly through spiral development and an open architecture that allows
    maturing technological insertions as they occur.
        The Army embraces the ongoing DOD and Joint Staff Capabilities and
    Acquisition processes reform efforts to achieve revolutionary
    capabilities in the fielding of a new generation of equipment. This
    collaborative DOD and JCS effort enables the Army to design new
    information-age capable organizations holistically, use evolutionary
    acquisition strategies to equip those organizations, and see the
    Objective Force fielded before the end of this decade.

           SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY--MOVING TOWARD THE TRANSFORMED ARMY

        Preempting our adversaries' technological surprises over the past 3
    years, Army science and technology (S&T) investments are already
    providing America's Army with sustained overmatch in all materiel
    systems. The Army has increased and focused its S&T investments. We are
    demonstrating the enabling joint interoperable technologies essential
    for Objective Force capabilities and accelerating their arrival. Our
    S&T program is pursuing a wide spectrum of technologies for unmanned
    air and ground systems that will expand the range of joint warfighting
    capabilities, reduce risk to soldiers, and reduce the logistics
    footprint of the force. Realizing the full potential of unmanned
    systems requires technological development in sensors that improve
    navigation and mission performance, in intelligent systems for semi-
    autonomous or autonomous operation, in networked communications for
    manned-unmanned teaming, and in human-robotic interfaces, among many
    others.
        The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army
    partnership contracted for a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to
    accelerate the transition of FCS to the System Development and
    Demonstration (SDD) Phase, with a Milestone B decision in May 2003. The
    Army is on track to achieve first unit equipped in 2008 and an initial
    operating capability of one Objective Force Unit of Action (UA) in
    2010. To accelerate development and in partnership DARPA, the focus on
    key transformation technologies for the FCS has been narrowed to the
    systems with the most promise. Our highest priority S&T efforts remain
    technological advances for FCS.
        The Army will field FCS as a family of systems built on information
    age technologies embedded in manned and unmanned air and ground
    platforms. Integral to joint fires, the family of systems will
    integrate long-range air- and ground-based sensors with long-range
    cannon and missile precision munitions. The family of systems will also
    provide increased joint capabilities to conduct battle command,
    reconnaissance, mounted combat operations, dismounted combat
    operations, medical treatment and evacuation, and maintenance and
    recovery. To provide decisive lethality, FCS will employ networked,
    precision, and loitering attack munitions fired from modular, easily
    transportable containers. Finally, FCS will leverage embedded, real-
    time interactive, virtual, distributed, collaborative, joint
    simulations for training and mission rehearsal.

                      ENABLING THE OBJECTIVE FORCE SOLDIER

        Eighteen systems, both manned and unmanned, the Objective Force
    soldier, and C\4\ISR, together, comprise the FCS. Manned and unmanned
    reconnaissance capabilities are part of the FCS family of systems'
    interdependent networked air- and ground-based maneuver, maneuver
    support, and sustainment systems.
        There are 10 Unmanned Systems: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
    Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4; Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)--the
    Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE), the Armed Robotic
    Vehicle (ARV), and the Small (manpackable) Unmanned Ground Vehicle
    (MUGV); Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS); and Unattended Munitions--the
    Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Launch System (LS) and Intelligent Munitions
    Systems (IMS).
        There are eight manned systems: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV);
    Command and Control Vehicle (C2V); Reconnaissance and Surveillance
    Vehicle (RSV); Line-of-Sight, Beyond-Line-of-Sight Mounted Combat
    System (LOS/BLOS MCS); NLOS-Mortar; Medical Vehicle (MV); the FCS
    Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV); and the Non-Line-of-Sight
    (NLOS) Cannon.
        Decisive warfighting is about fires and maneuver: fires enable
    maneuver, and maneuver enables fires. Joint and organic close,
    supporting, indirect fires destroy the enemy, suppress the enemy's
    capabilities, protect our forces, and enable ground units to maneuver.
    The ICV, the Unattended Munitions NLOS-LS, IMS, C2V, MCS, NLOS-Mortar,
    and NLOS Cannon are important elements of the FCS that will enable the
    Objective Force to conduct distributed and simultaneous joint combat
    operations. With joint fires, the NLOS cannon is critical to support
    and protect our land forces in hostile environments. NLOS-LS NetFires
    is a platform-independent family of missiles with precision attack and
    loitering capability. Both Precision Guided Mortar Munitions and
    Excalibur precision cannon munitions will enhance organic maneuver
    fires. A new, joint fire support, battle command, and fire support
    architecture will allow rapid engagement of targets by any Army or
    joint asset.
        For over 227 years, soldiers have remained the centerpiece of our
    formations. The Land Warrior program--another key S&T initiative--
    responds to this legacy and enhances our soldiers combat power
    generation capability. The Land Warrior program will develop a
    lightweight, low observable, enhanced-armor protection, fighting
    ensemble for the individual Objective Force soldier. Through networked
    connectivity to the FCS-equipped, maneuver Unit of Action, Land Warrior
    soldiers will enable revolutionary lethality, mobility, survivability,
    and sustainability for the individual warfighter while reducing
    logistics demands.
        Future Combat Systems are networked in the joint C\4\ISR
    architecture--including networked communications, networked options,
    sensors, battle command systems, training, and both manned and unmanned
    reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. These networked systems
    will dramatically enhance situational awareness and understanding and
    operational level synchronization well beyond today's standards.
    Improved C\4\ISR capabilities will enable network-centric Objective
    Force operations. The results of the investments will allow leaders to
    capitalize on sensor and processing technology to see, understand, and
    shape the battlespace before the enemy can react--increasing combat
    force effectiveness and survivability. The S&T program will develop and
    demonstrate real-time, continuous situational understanding by
    integrating data from manned and unmanned air- and ground-based
    sensors.
        S&T investments in military logistics are an important enabler for
    the Objective Force. We are placing our emphasis on sustainment's big
    drivers--fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and water--to dramatically
    reduce our logistics footprint and lift requirements in these areas.
    Key technologies include on-board water generation, real-time logistics
    command and control processes and distribution management, enhanced
    multi-purpose munitions and packaging, efficient propulsion and power
    technologies, real-time diagnostics and prognostics, and Micro-Electro
    Mechanical Systems (MEMS).

                            TRANSFORMATIONAL SYSTEMS

        Several transformational systems were under development prior to
    announcement of the Army vision in October 1999. The Army has completed
    an extensive analysis to identify those systems that complement FCS and
    the Objective Force system of systems.
        The Comanche Helicopter is the centerpiece of the Aviation
    Modernization Plan (AMP) and represents the first new system to reach
    Initial Operational Capability (IOC) within the Army's Objective Force.
    Comanche is our armed reconnaissance platform with attack capabilities.
    It will leverage the situational awareness and situational curiosity of
    a scout augmented with revolutionary, state-of-the-art ISR
    technologies. Comanche supports vertical and horizontal maneuver as an
    integral part of network-centric operations and extends human eyes and
    decisionmaking beyond the ground maneuver force. Utilizing stealth
    technologies, it will network with all joint C\4\ISR and joint weapons
    systems. Comanche will leverage maximum effect of future standoff
    precision weapon systems such as the Common Missile and allow us to
    maneuver ground formations based upon full knowledge of the situation.
    Augmented with armed or unarmed UAVs, Comanche will fill ground
    maneuver's most critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial
    reconnaissance--with a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft.
    The Comanche program is already well on its way to giving the Army a
    capability pivotal to transforming the way we will fight.
        Several other transformational systems will empower the Objective
    Force with the knowledge dominance and battle command to provide
    decision superiority across the spectrum of operations. The Warfighter
    Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) System, Medium Extended Air
    Defense System (MEADS), the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and the
    Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S) will enable Objective
    Force joint C\4\ISR capabilities. These programs will provide the
    tactical enterprise level networks that will ensure seamless, secure,
    digital connectivity between the Objective, Interim, and today's
    forces. The Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A)
    architecture provides Army network-centric ISR connectivity from
    national agencies to joint systems to Objective Force Units of Action
    as part of the integrated Department of Defense DCGS architecture.
    DCGS-A will enable interoperable tasking, processing, and exploitation
    capabilities. The Aerial Common Sensor brings improved signal
    intelligence collection and precision geolocation capabilities, as well
    as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signals (MASINT)
    sensor packages. Another system, Prophet, uses communications
    intelligence to depict the battlespace and further enhance situational
    awareness. These C\4\ISR systems greatly enhance the Objective Force's
    ability to gain actionable information superiority and decision
    dominance over all adversaries and expand the range of options for the
    Joint Force combatant commanders.
        Transformational systems will provide the Objective Force with
    strategic and tactical maneuver capabilities. The Theater Support
    Vessel will support rapid intra-theater lift requirements, provide the
    capability to conduct operational maneuver and repositioning, and
    enable units to conduct enroute mission planning and rehearsal. The
    Future Tactical Truck System will have commonality with FCS and will
    support the Objective Force by enabling command, control, and
    transportation of cargo, equipment, and personnel. The Tactical
    Electric Power (TEP) generators will provide power to Objective Force
    units where fixed power grids are not available.
        Transformational systems provide the Objective Force with other
    important capabilities, as well. CBRNE effects systems support the
    Objective Force across the spectrum of military operations and improve
    capabilities to conduct homeland security activities. Engineer, civil
    affairs, and psychological operations vehicles will enable mobility and
    enhance civil affairs and PSYOPs capabilities. The Up-Armored High
    Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) will improve Objective
    Force soldier survivability and lethality. The Multi-Mission Radar will
    provide the capability to detect and track aircraft, artillery, and
    other projectiles, then queue appropriate weapons systems and airspace
    synchronization systems. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
    (HIMARS) is a lighter weight, more deployable multiple rocket launcher
    capability that will integrate into the joint fires network.
    Bridging the Capabilities Gap--Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
        Announcing our intent to field an Interim Force in October 1999,
    the Army responded to a capabilities gap between its lethal,
    survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its rapidly deployable
    light forces that lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility
    that we seek. Just 2\1/2\ years later in 2002, the Army began fielding
    the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to bridge that gap. In 2003--less
    than 4 years after the announcement--we are on track to achieve IOC
    with the first SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. Stryker Brigades will
    provide the combatant commander vastly increased operational and
    tactical flexibility to execute fast-paced, distributed, non-contiguous
    operations.
        Stryker Brigade Combat Teams respond to combatant commander
    requirements across the spectrum of military operations. Optimized for
    combat in complex and urban terrain, the Stryker Brigades will be
    decisive in other major combat operations, as well. The SBCT
    Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron
    provides both organic human intelligence capabilities and UAVs embedded
    at the brigade level. Its military intelligence and signal companies--
    working through a digitally enabled battle command bridge--leverage
    theater and national assets to create an information-enabled force.
    SBCTs will use this enhanced joint C\4\ISR capability to revolutionize
    combat paradigms from ``make contact, develop the situation, maneuver
    the forces'' to ``understand the situation, maneuver the forces, make
    contact at the time and place of your own choosing, and finish
    decisively.''
        Moreover, leveraging platform commonality, enhancing logistics
    practices and enablers, and reorganizing logistics formations, the SBCT
    is vastly more deployable and sustainable than our heavy forces, while
    significantly increasing combat power generating capabilities.
    Augmented for sustained operations, the SBCT requires 37 percent fewer
    CSS personnel than a digitized heavy brigade. While capitalizing on
    these advantages, developing and available technologies allow us to
    mass effects--rather than massing formations--and create a robust,
    reliable capability to conduct operational maneuver over strategic
    distances.
        Finally, SBCTs provide an invaluable means of spearheading
    transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned
    officers--tomorrow's commanders and command sergeants major--in the
    tactics, techniques, and procedures that will inform employment of the
    Objective Force.
        The Army has resourced six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams to
    contribute to fulfilling the 1-4-2-1 defense construct and national
    security requirements; however, at this time, the Secretary of Defense
    has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades. The
    Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with a plan for Stryker
    Brigades 5 and 6.
        Fielding of the SBCTs affects the entire Army: active and Reserve
    components; heavy and light forces; CONUS and OCONUS. Current fielding
    timelines will enhance the Nation's ability to fight and win the GWOT
    and conduct major combat operations. The transformation of four active
    component brigades to SBCTs provides a rotational base with three of
    the SBCTs focused on the Pacific theater. One of the two SBCTs fielded
    at Fort Lewis will be forward-based in Europe not later than 2007. The
    Stryker Cavalry Regiment will support the XVIII Airborne Corps'
    critical need for robust, armed reconnaissance. The conversion of a
    Reserve component brigade to an SBCT will enhance our strategic Reserve
    and support the GWOT, smaller scale contingencies, and homeland defense
    missions. Additionally, SBCT stationing provides rapid, strategic
    responsiveness through power projection platforms capable of supporting
    four critical regions described in the 1-4-2-1 defense construct. The
    first SBCT will attain Initial Operational Capability in the summer of
    2003.
    Preserving the Army's Legacy
        Today's force guarantees the Army's near-term warfighting readiness
    to fight and win our Nation's wars, decisively. Because the Army
    bypassed a procurement generation, the Army's Combat Support and Combat
    Service Support systems now exceed their 20-year expected life cycle,
    and 75 percent of our critical combat systems exceed their expected
    half-life cycle. To maintain operational readiness while preserving
    resources for transformation, the Army is recapitalizing and
    selectively modernizing a portion of the current force. The
    modernization program addresses the critical issue of AC and RC
    interoperability and serves as a bridge to mesh these two components
    seamlessly. In general, the Army increased funding for programs that
    are clearly transformational and support the Defense transformation
    goals, sustained funding for high priority systems that will transition
    to the Objective Force, and reduced funding for systems not essential
    to Army transformation. The Army remains committed to its 17-system
    recapitalization program, but we have reduced the prioritized
    recapitalization program from three-and-one-third divisions to two
    divisions.
        Army Special Operations Forces are an indispensable part of the
    Army and will continue to provide unique capabilities to the Joint
    Force and Land Component Commanders. In response to the increasing
    requirement for Special Operations Forces in support of joint campaign
    plans, the Army has validated and resourced growth in its SOF
    structure. The recent initiatives will transfer 1,788 manpower spaces
    to Major Force Program-11 beginning in fiscal year 2003. Since the
    commencement of Army Special Operations Forces operations in support of
    the GWOT, the U.S. Army has provided over $1.4 billion in new equipment
    to enhance Special Operations Forces firepower, communications, and
    ground and air mobility.
        The Army will remain the largest user of space-based capabilities
    among the Services. Army space assets are providing tangible support to
    the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom--they ensure Army
    and Joint Force Commanders optimize communications, satellite
    intelligence, global positioning system, imagery, weather, missile
    warning, and other space-based capabilities in every aspect of planning
    and operations. We are working diligently with the joint and
    interagency space community to ensure that Army and joint space systems
    continue to provide their essential capabilities now and for the
    Objective Force.

                   AVIATION TRANSFORMATION AND RESTRUCTURING

        Aviation transformation further demonstrates the Army's hard
    choices in balancing risk to resource transformation. Our interim
    plan--now in progress--lowers operating and sustainment costs while
    posturing aviation for arrival of the Objective Force by 2010. Apache
    modernization is an integral part of the Army Aviation Transformation
    Plan. The AH-64D Longbow heavy attack team will enhance domination of
    the maneuver battlespace and provide the ground commander with a
    versatile, long-range weapon system against a range of fixed and moving
    targets. The UH-60 Blackhawk continues to be the assault workhorse of
    Army Aviation, executing over 40 percent of the Army's annual flying
    hours. We are extending the life of the UH-60 while providing it with
    capabilities required of the future battlespace. Similarly, the Army is
    fully committed to the CH-47F Chinook program. Its heavy-lift
    capability is invaluable to transforming the Army. As we restructure
    and standardize attack and lift formations across the force, we will
    also adjust the stationing and alignment of Reserve component aviation
    units to mitigate the near-term risk.
        Army National Guard Aviation comprises almost 50 percent of the
    Army's aviation force and is one of the Nation's most valuable assets
    both for wartime and for peacetime missions. Essential for successful
    execution of the Nation's military strategy, the ARNG currently has
    aviation units deployed in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bosnia, Europe, and
    Saudi Arabia, as well as Central and South America.

             ARMY NATIONAL GUARD RESTRUCTURING INITIATIVE (ARNGRI)

        ARNGRI seeks to transform a sizeable portion of ARNG combat
    structure into more deployable, flexible fighting forces to support
    Army requirements at home and abroad. ARNGRI will introduce two new
    organizations into the force structure: Mobile Light Brigades and
    Multi-Functional Divisions. These organizations will provide full
    spectrum capabilities in support of combatant commanders. The Mobile
    Light Brigades will operate as a subordinate unit to the multi-
    functional divisions, which will also contain two combat support/combat
    service support brigades and be capable of supporting either major
    combat or homeland security operations.

                    ARMY RESERVE TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVES

        By providing responsive force generating capability and technically
    trained individuals, the USAR facilitates our capability to conduct
    extended campaigns in multiple theaters and to sustain joint
    operations. Army Reserve initiatives ensure the USAR is missioned,
    organized, and equipped to provide interoperability across the full
    spectrum of military operations. Transformational organizations include
    experimentation forces and information operations, joint augmentation,
    network security, and interagency units.
        The Readiness Command Restructuring initiative and Federal Reserve
    Restructuring Initiative will help the USAR fulfill these new mission
    requirements. These initiatives lend greater flexibility to efforts
    that enhance responsiveness to America's foreign and domestic
    protection needs. Regional Readiness Commands will focus on individual
    and unit readiness, leader development, training, and growth which will
    demand a new personnel system that achieves holistic life-cycle
    management for Army Reserve soldiers.

            INSTITUTIONAL ARMY--TRANSFORMING THE WAY WE DO BUSINESS

        We have made great strides in revolutionizing our business
    management practices by starting at the very top. Last year, we
    realigned our headquarters by reorganizing and realigning
    responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Army Staff--streamlining
    coordination, tasking, and decisionmaking--resulting in a more
    responsive and efficient organization. This initiative allowed us to
    eliminate unnecessary functions and redistribute 585 manpower spaces to
    accomplish core competencies.
        As previously discussed, the Army has addressed the management of
    its installations, personnel systems, and contracting in its
    Transformation of Installation Management (TIM). We are aggressively
    pursuing efforts to outsource non-core functions. The Army will reap
    substantial dividends in efficiency and effectiveness through these
    strategic realignments of human and physical capital.

                            PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION

        The Secretary of the Army's key management initiative is personnel
    transformation. Its goal is to modernize and integrate human resource
    programs, policies, processes, and systems into a multi-component force
    that includes civilians and contractors. We will evaluate our processes
    and implement the most efficient program, policies, and organizations
    to support the Objective Force.
        The centerpiece of personnel transformation is a comprehensive
    effort focused on a potential Army-wide implementation of unit manning
    and unit rotation. We are aggressively examining the feasibility of a
    unit manning and rotation system that would better support the new
    national defense strategy, improve cohesion and combat readiness within
    the operational Army, provide highly cohesive well-trained units to
    combatant commanders, and improve well-being for families by providing
    greater stability and predictability in assignments. The Army currently
    uses unit rotations in support of operational missions in the Balkans,
    Sinai, and Afghanistan. The Army is studying the use of unit rotations
    for other locations and in the war on terrorism. Units would know of
    these rotations well in advance, providing families with greater
    predictability and enabling focused preparation, both of which
    contribute to increased combat readiness of the unit.
        Unit manning seeks to synchronize the life cycle of a unit with the
    life cycle of the soldier within that unit. All soldiers and leaders
    would be stabilized, resulting in a significant increase in cohesion
    and combat readiness over our present individual replacement system.
    Such a system has significant second and third order effects across the
    force--training and leader development, recruiting and retention, unit
    readiness levels, and total Army end strength, among others. All of
    these are being studied intensively, and we anticipate senior Army
    leadership decisions on unit manning and unit rotation in July 2003.

                                   THIRD WAVE

        Because we operate in an environment in which there are increasing
    demands for military capabilities--the Secretary of the Army's Third
    Wave initiative seeks to ensure that we are achieving the best value
    possible for our taxpayers' dollars.
        There are three phases to the Third Wave process. First, we
    determined what activities were core or non-core to the Army's mission.
    In the second phase, we are validating the breakout between core and
    non-core functions by determining if any non-core functions should be
    exempted. This phase has an anticipated completion date of mid- to
    late-February 2003. Upon completion, the Army leadership will notify
    Congress of the results of this phase. In the third phase, key Army
    leaders will assess appropriate plans to execute non-core functions,
    select the best means to proceed, and develop implementation plans. At
    this time, we do not know how many of the 214,000 jobs identified as
    potentially non-core functions in Phase I will be included in
    implementation plans. Although implementation plans will target
    execution in fiscal years 2005-2009, some implementation plans may be
    delayed beyond that period.
        The implementation of competitive sourcing of non-core functions
    will adhere to OMB Circular A-76 and related statutory provisions.
    Exceptions to the requirement for public-private competition are
    limited, such as where 10 or fewer civilian employees perform the
    function or where legal restrictions against using the A-76 process
    apply to the function. To lower costs for taxpayers and improve program
    performance to citizens, OMB has undertaken major revisions to the
    processes and practices in OMB Circular A-76 to improve the public-
    private competition process.

                           ACQUISITION TRANSFORMATION

        The Army is leading the way in acquisition reform within DOD's
    broad transformation of defense acquisition policies and procedures.
    The Army's FCS program may prove to be the largest DOD acquisition
    effort that fully embraces the concepts of evolutionary acquisition and
    spiral development--leveraging the potential of rapid advancement
    within individual technologies by allowing for changes within programs
    as technologies mature.
        The FCS program is evolutionary in its design and incorporates
    periodic blocked improvements within its 19 systems--the Objective
    Force soldier and 18 manned and unmanned systems. Within these 19
    systems are 540 spirally developing technologies. The Army's use of a
    Lead System Integrator (LSI) enables a ``best of the best'' approach to
    selection from competing industry efforts. Our unprecedented
    partnership with DARPA ensures the FCS effort leverages that agency's
    DOD-wide perspective and resources to produce the best capability and
    value for the Joint Force.
        The Army continues to revise its acquisition policies and
    applicable regulatory guidance. On October 3, 2001, the Army approved
    an acquisition reorganization that transferred control of all
    acquisition program management to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)
    and eliminated duplication of effort in two major Army commands.
    Effective October 2002, 12 Program Executive Officers (PEO) report to
    the AAE, and their subordinate PEOs assumed management of all Army
    acquisition programs, regardless of acquisition category. The plan
    ensures that there is only one chain of authority for acquisition
    programs within the Army. In addition, the plan clearly holds program
    managers responsible and accountable for the life cycle management of
    their assigned programs.
        We have also transformed the way we conduct business through the
    organization of the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) that realigns our
    previously decentralized installation and information technology
    contracting processes into one organization. Responsible for all
    contracts over $500,000 and tasked to eliminate redundant contracts,
    ACA leverages Army-wide requirements to achieve economies of scale. ACA
    supports Army transformation efforts by aligning all base support
    contracting into a single organization that best supports installation
    management transformation. All of these initiatives use information
    technology to leverage enterprise-wide buying capabilities.
    Additionally, ACA will act as the single coordinating element and form
    the base from which to deploy contingency-contracting, operational
    support to the warfighting commands. The ACA and other contracting
    activities will continue to support small business awards in the
    outstanding manner it did in fiscal year 2002.

                            LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

        We cannot transform the Army without a transformation in logistics.
    We must incorporate the logistician's view into the design of our
    systems even before we begin to build platforms. Collaboration between
    the acquisition and logistics communities will give the Objective Force
    the rapid deployability and sustainability we demand--by design--
    without compromising warfighting capability.
        Designing the right logistics architecture--systems, business
    processes, enterprise, for example--is fundamental to success. The
    Army's logistics transformation will focus on creating an overarching
    corporate logistics enterprise that employs industries' best business
    practices. Within this enterprise, the Army established three principal
    goals for logistics transformation: enhance strategic mobility and
    deployability; optimize the logistics footprint; and reduce the cost of
    logistics support without reducing readiness or warfighting capability.
        The Army's mobility and deployability goals for the Objective Force
    are to deploy a combat brigade within 96 hours after lift off, a
    division on the ground in 120 hours, and a five-division corps in
    theater in 30 days. To achieve this strategic responsiveness, the Army
    Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) serves as a catalyst to bring about
    force projection changes both in the Army's and in our sister Services'
    lift programs.
        Platforms like the Intra-Theater Support Vessel (TSV) and Inter-
    Theater Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS) provide
    transformational capabilities for operational and strategic maneuver
    and sustainment of Army formations.
        Because strategic air and sealift cannot meet deployment
    requirements, Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) ashore and afloat
    continue to be a critical component of Army power projection. The Army
    is currently participating in a joint-led Worldwide Prepositioning
    Study to determine if location, mix, and capabilities in existing
    stocks of combat, combat support, and combat service support require
    adjustments to meet the defense strategy more effectively.
        The Objective Force requires the Army to optimize its logistics
    footprint to produce a smaller, more agile, responsive, and flexible
    sustainment organization. To achieve this goal, we will leverage
    technology and innovative sustainment concepts. The Army is already
    developing and integrating key enablers to provide a transformed,
    corporate logistics enterprise. Some of these enablers include embedded
    diagnostics and prognostics, tactical logistics data digitization
    (TLDD), serial number tracking, and the Global Combat Service Support-
    Army (GCSS-A) system that utilizes a commercial Enterprise Resource
    Planning (ERP) solution. The ERP approach changes the Army's logistics
    automation systems strategy from one of custom code development for
    unique Army requirements to adoption of a commercial off-the-shelf
    (COTS) product.
        The selective use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
    (LOGCAP) to augment military logistics force structure provides
    commanders with the flexibility to reallocate manpower, resources, and
    materiel by adding contractors to the equation of logistics support. In
    addition to providing services and some supply support, these
    contractors can quickly deploy to establish base camps, receive and
    process soldiers as they begin arriving in theater, and reverse the
    process when soldiers go home.
        Current initiatives that help reduce costs without reducing
    readiness or warfighting capability include the National Maintenance
    Program and the Single Stock Fund (SSF). As previously discussed,
    programs provide two basic building blocks for a revolutionary change
    in logistics business practices.

                          ADVANCED MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY

        Congress designated the Army as the lead agent for DOD vaccine,
    drug, and development programs for medical countermeasures to
    battlefield threats. This includes vaccines against naturally occurring
    infectious diseases of military significance, combat casualty care,
    military operational medicine, and telemedicine research. The program
    also funds Food and Drug Administration requirements for technology
    transition to advanced development.
        The medical force provides the requisite medical intervention and
    care for the Joint Force deployed around the globe. With its Medical
    Reengineering Initiative (MRI), the Army Medical Department has
    transformed 28 percent of its Corps, and echelon above Corps, force
    structure to an organizational structure that promotes scalability
    through easily tailored, capabilities-based packages. These packages
    result in improved tactical mobility, reduced footprint, and increased
    modularity for flexible task organization. MRI supports both the
    current forces and the Stryker Brigades, and is the bridge to the
    Objective Medical Force. We have implemented innovative strategies to
    make the most efficient use of our budget. Medical modernization, which
    includes the acquisition of current medical equipment and technology,
    is partially funded within MRI units.

                          BUSINESS INITIATIVES COUNCIL

        In June 2001, the Secretary of Defense established the Department
    of Defense Business Initiatives Council (DOD BIC). The DOD BIC's goal
    is to improve business operations and processes by identifying and
    implementing initiatives that expand capabilities, improve efficiency
    and effectiveness, and create resource savings in time, money, or
    manpower.
        The Army has aggressively explored ways to improve its internal
    business practices, and has established the Army BIC, under the
    leadership of the Secretary and the G-8. Effective November 13, 2002,
    the Secretary of the Army has approved a total of 35 initiatives under
    the Army BIC. Subsequently, the Army submitted a number of the
    initiatives through the formal DOD BIC process for implementation
    across the Services and other DOD activities. The BIC process has
    helped to create a culture of innovation and inter-service cooperation.
    The superb level of cooperation across the military departments, the
    Joint Staff, and OSD has made this possible.

                           A COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE

        With the continued strong support of the administration, Congress,
    our soldiers, and our Department of the Army civilians, and the
    greatest industrial base and science and technology communities in the
    world, the Army will field the Objective Force--this decade.
        By 2010, we will have fielded the first operationally capable
    Objective Force unit equipped with the Future Combat Systems. Our
    Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will be providing to combatant commanders
    capabilities not currently available--enhanced strategic responsiveness
    and the ability to operate in a distributed, non-linear battlespace.
    Through selective recapitalization and modernization of systems that
    enable our soldiers to preserve our legacy today, we will have
    sustained a decisive-win capability at a high state of readiness as an
    integral part of the Joint Force. We will have significantly improved
    the well-being of our people and sustainment of Army infrastructure.
        We remain committed to our legacy--preserving America's freedoms.
    In peace and in war, the Army's soldiers serve the Nation with
    unmatched courage, indomitable will, pride, and plain grit--as they
    have for over 227 years. Soldiers will continue to fight and win the
    Nation's wars, decisively--it is our sacred duty and our non-negotiable
    contract with the American people.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
        Admiral.

        STATEMENT OF ADM. VERNON E. CLARK, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Admiral Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
    members of the committee: Good morning and thank you for the
    opportunity to be with you here this morning to talk about our
    Navy and the challenges that we are facing today in the world.
        Mr. Chairman, I submitted a statement and if we could make
    that full statement a part of the record.
        Chairman Warner. The full statements of all witnesses will
    be included in the record.
        Admiral Clark. We are facing a period of great challenge
    and a period of great accomplishment. I am proud of what our
    people are doing on the point. I could not in fact be prouder
    of what our sailors are doing today in the world, involved in
    the global war on terrorism. It is hard work. We have great
    young men and women who are working the challenge and the task.
    They are innovators. They have great ideas. They are making our
    Navy better every day, and that is their task.
        I also want to make sure that I express my appreciation to
    this committee and to Congress at large for the help that you
    have played in your support in making our Navy stronger. I am
    grateful for the support of this body in the progress that we
    have made in improving our Navy. I will tell you that we are
    enjoying the best retention that we have ever experienced in my
    entire career, and frankly, in our Navy's history. The pay, the
    allowances, housing, the readiness that Congress has provided
    for our force is making a real difference.
        I want to also thank my partners here at the table, my
    Service Chief partners. These guys are committed to jointness
    and I will tell you, it is a pleasure to serve with them. In my
    estimation, our military is more joint than it has ever been
    before and I say without hesitation that all of the Services
    are needed equally to accomplish the task and the mission that
    is before us, and this group of people is working effectively
    together to get the job done.
        Last year when I appeared before this committee, I talked
    about current readiness and manpower as my highest priorities.
    I believe those decisions were right. I believe it postured us
    for the global war on terrorism. Our recommendations and the
    President's submission of the budget and the congressional
    affirmation has made a great difference in the readiness of
    your Navy.
        We have reduced near-term operational risks, we have
    deepened the growth and the development of our sailors, and we
    are seeing the results in our deployments and in our people
    today. Those investments have made today possible. This
    morning, 51 percent of my ships are deployed overseas. Of my
    306 ships, 195 of them are under way this morning, 6 of the 12
    carrier battle groups and two-thirds of the amphibious force
    carrying the marines.
        They are under way in support of the Nation's interests,
    leading the defense of the United States of America away from
    our shores, sending, I like to say, the sovereignty of the
    United States of America anywhere we have to take it--capable,
    persistent, joint, ready forces. They are demonstrating on an
    hourly basis the return on investment that this body has made
    in our Navy.
        I am proud of the budget submission this year. It is not
    without debate, to be sure, and I look forward to the
    discussion today. This year we seek to sustain the advances
    made in current readiness and in manpower and to focus on
    future readiness and transformation.
        Seapower 21, which is our vision for the future and
    detailed in my full statement, is about a dispersed, network-
    centric, joint, sea-based force, a force capable of projecting
    offensive power, a force capable of projecting defensive
    power--I call that Sea Strike and Sea Shield. I talk about that
    in terms of being a sea-based force, exploiting our operational
    advantage, the largest maneuver space on the planet, the
    world's oceans.
        In our investment strategy this year, we have assessed the
    risks between current readiness and future readiness, and I
    believe that it is appropriately balanced. We invest today to
    support the global war on terrorism and win today's fight, and
    we must invest in the capabilities to win tomorrow's fight as
    well. That involves tough decisions, to be sure, and I am
    looking forward to talking about them today.
        The threat assessment is straightforward. I think we all
    understand it. But in my judgment this has allowed us to take
    some steps to better prepare for the future. You all know that
    my focus in the previous 2 years has been on making sure that
    we won the battle for people, making sure that our current
    force was really ready to go. I think we have made great
    progress in those areas, and I do believe it is time to shine
    the spotlight on the future.
        The proposals before Congress allow us to divest of older,
    less capable equipment and to move toward that future.
    Certainly numbers are important and I have talked about them in
    my previous 2 years coming before this body to testify. Numbers
    have a quality all of their own. We have to buy capability and
    lethality into the systems that we field and put to sea.
        So, as I understand it, we are going to have a closed
    session today. I look forward to discussing the future threat
    and our readiness to deal with the future threat.
        Last year, our challenge was to find the money to
    recapitalize our Navy. I believe that we are on the way and the
    budget that is sent before you today increases the number of
    ships that we are buying and the number of aircraft that we are
    procuring for the future. We are bringing very important
    capability into the force like: the heart of our family of
    ships for the future, CVN-21, the first new carrier design in
    over 40 years; the Littoral Combat Ship, a revolutionary part
    of the family of ships, built with plug and play technology, a
    ship that will enable us to move rapidly into the 21st century,
    conceived with unmanned vehicles in mind.
        This budget will continue F/A-18E/Fs, which are deployed
    now, Mr. Chairman, for the first time. This budget introduces a
    new airplane, the EA-18G, to replace the jammer of old.
        LPD-17 is maturing, with multiple ships under construction.
    Joint Strike Fighter is in the budget. New helicopters, new
    support ships, and major investments in the new Hawkeye will
    provide the eyes and ears of the fleet.
        With the President's commitment to missile defense, this
    budget moves us towards sea-based missile defense in the year
    2004. Unmanned vehicles are on the horizon in partnership with
    my friend, General John Jumper, sitting at the end of the
    table.
        In short, this budget continues the commitment to build the
    culture of readiness in our Navy. It focuses on people, our
    capital asset. It sustains our commitment to the growth and
    development of our sailors. It moves us to the future built
    upon the principles of Seapower 21, our vision for the future,
    with a new focus on future readiness.
        This morning, 151 of my 306 ships are deployed. There are
    another 170 ships under way as part of the Military Sealift
    Command supporting the rest of the military structure: the
    Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. This force is ready
    and it is the most ready it has been in my entire military
    life. I am proud of the accomplishments and the gains that we
    have made.
        We add to all of that and we look at the challenges that
    are ahead of us. Mr. Chairman, I believe that this budget
    proposes the right balance as we move to the future engaging in
    the global war on terrorism, and I look forward to your
    questions as we move forward in the hearing.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Clark follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Adm. Vernon E. Clark, USN

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the
    opportunity to appear today. The investment you've made in America's
    Navy has been vital to the Nation's security and your Navy's ability to
    project more power, more protection, and more freedom to the far
    corners of the Earth. I speak for the entire fleet in thanking you for
    your exceptional and continuous support.

         I: YOUR NAVY TODAY--ENHANCED CAPABILITIES FOR THE JOINT FORCE

        This is a time of tremendous challenge and accomplishment for our
    Navy. Our men and women operating in the air, on and under the sea, and
    on the ground are at the leading edge of the global war on terrorism.
        Today, there are 151 ships on deployment, fully half of the Navy;
    this includes 6 of 12 aircraft carriers, and 8 of our 12 big deck
    amphibious ships (LHA/LHD). They are deployed in support of the
    Nation's interests in the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Indian
    Ocean, and the Western Pacific. Still others are preparing for
    deployment or continuing operations like strategic deterrent and
    counter-drug patrols in support of other national imperatives.

        The Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) is also actively engaged
    in supporting the war on terrorism; today, almost 75 percent of MSC's
    total force is carrying combat equipment for land-based forces and
    logistics support for Navy carrier battle group and amphibious ready
    groups. Nineteen of our 20 large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships
    (LMSRs), all 8 fast sealift ships, and half of our 72 ship Ready
    Reserve Fleet are actively supporting the Joint Force.
        These forces are operating with purpose, leading the defense of the
    United States away from our own shores and our own homes. After all,
    this new century is fraught with profound dangers: rogue nations in
    possession of weapons of mass destruction, potential conflict between
    regional competitors, widely dispersed and well-funded terrorist
    organizations, and failed states that deliver only tyranny and despair
    to their people.
        We frequently talk about the asymmetric challenges such enemies
    might present, assuming these advantages belong only to potential
    adversaries. Your Navy possesses asymmetric strengths all its own: its
    persistence, precision, independence, and agility are but a few.
        More importantly, our naval strengths are critical to our joint
    combat effectiveness. Our forward deployed, combat ready naval forces--
    sustained by naval and civilian shipmates around the world--are proving
    every day the unique and lasting value of sovereign, lethal forces
    projecting offensive and defensive power from the sea.
        There are numerous recent examples of the enhanced capability our
    Navy brings to the Joint Force.

             In Operation Enduring Freedom, Navy aircraft carrier-
            based tactical aircraft and long range, land-based Air Force
            tankers and bombers combined with Navy SEALs on the ground and
            Army Special Forces on horseback to deliver devastating strikes
            on Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan. Since then, our
            newest combat aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, has been
            flying combat sorties from the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln in
            Operation Southern Watch, demonstrating its increased range and
            payload capability. In combination with Tomahawk missiles from
            widely dispersed ships and submarines, this joint power
            projection force gives the Nation the ability to reach across
            the globe with precise, persistent striking power.
             The Peleliu and Bataan Amphibious Ready Groups,
            operating in the Arabian Sea, launched and sustained marines
            from the 15th and 26th Marine Expeditionary Units more than 450
            miles inland at ``Camp Rhino,'' to support the initial forward
            operating base in Afghanistan. This was the longest-range
            expeditionary airfield seizure operation ever launched from
            amphibious ships at sea. During the same timeframe, the carrier
            Kitty Hawk also provided an agile, sovereign Afloat Forward
            Staging Base (AFSB) for joint Special Operations Forces and
            their lift, attack, and command and control assets. Permanently
            installed command, control, communications, computers,
            intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C\4\ISR) suites
            and information technologies on all these ships enhanced the
            entire joint team's knowledge superiority picture and connected
            these Joint Forces with other forces and commands in the
            theater and around the world, all from the security our ships
            enjoy in the maritime domain.
             The Aegis cruiser U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG 70) completed
            three medium range ballistic missile defense tests last year,
            successfully acquiring, tracking, and hitting target ballistic
            missiles in the mid-course or ascent phases with a Standard
            Missile 3 (SM-3) in all three tests. Lake Erie and the Aegis
            destroyer U.S.S. John Paul Jones also supported three
            successive Missile Defense Agency intercontinental class
            ballistic missile tests; the Aegis system performed exactly as
            predicted in each of these tests, acquiring the targets
            immediately and passing high fidelity digital track data to
            national nodes ashore. These cruisers' and destroyers' organic
            Aegis Weapons System and their SPY-1 multi-function, phased
            array radars, demonstrate the capability and capacity to
            conduct a sea-based missile defense against those ballistic
            missiles that can target our homeland, allies, forward
            operating bases, and Joint Forces ashore. They could also
            provide important surveillance and cueing of intercontinental
            class weapons directed at our homeland.
             The Navy's Military Sealift Command is actively
            providing combat logistics support to U.S. Navy ships, is
            prepositioning joint military supplies and equipment at sea,
            and is providing sealift and ocean transportation of defense
            cargo. MSC's high quality shipping, augmented by charters,
            continues its sealift of the Army's 3rd and 4th Infantry
            Divisions, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, and V Corps.
            Fifteen of our deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)
            provide the majority of combat supplies and equipment for our
            Marine force, and 11 of these have already offloaded equipment
            in support of contingency operations. MSC is also delivering
            fuel and aviation support equipment and supplies to deployed
            Air Forces. In short, 95 percent of all equipment and supplies
            needed by U.S. forces in time of crisis moves by sea on MSC-
            controlled ships.
             The U.S.S. Florida (SSBN-728), an Ohio-class fleet
            ballistic missile submarine, successfully launched two Tomahawk
            missiles, confirming the ability to launch a Tomahawk from a
            configuration similar to the tightly packed cluster of Tomahawk
            All-Up-Rounds (AUR) we will use in the SSGN. This experiment
            was conducted in support of the SSGN program's Sea Trial
            experiment, Giant Shadow, which also explored how a network of
            forces, including special warfare forces, and various unmanned
            aerial, underwater, and ground vehicles and sensors could be
            used to provide surveillance, collect real-time intelligence,
            and develop and launch a time critical strike in support of the
            Joint Force Commander. This included the first vertical launch
            of a UUV, testing of nuclear-biological-chemical sensors, and
            the insertion of SEALs from one of the submarines we will
            convert to an SSGN.

        These examples represent the return on investment the American
    people have made in our Navy: an agile, connected fleet that enhances
    deterrence, sustains our access, conducts precision strikes, exercises
    joint command and control, enhances knowledge superiority, responds to
    crisis, projects, sustains and operates with the Joint Force ashore,
    and leverages the priceless advantage of our command of the seas. It is
    why we are a critical component of the Nation's joint defenses in
    peace, in crisis, and in conflict.
        None of the foregoing would be possible without the energy,
    expertise, and enthusiasm of our active and Reserve sailors, and our
    marine and civilian shipmates in the Department of the Navy. After all,
    it is people that put capability to practice, and it is their dedicated
    service that makes these capabilities ready--around the world and
    around the clock.

           II: A CULTURE OF READINESS--A COMMITMENT TO TRANSFORMATION

        This century's dangerous and uncertain strategic environment places
    a premium on credible combat forces that possess speed of response,
    immediate employability, and the flexible force packaging that brings
    the right capability to bear at the right time. It demands forces that
    can pair this capability with readiness, both today and in the future.
        Readiness is the Navy's watchword. Readiness is the catalyst that
    brings combat power, speed of response, and the ability to disrupt an
    enemy's intentions in both crisis and conflict. Readiness brings
    capability to bear wherever and whenever it is needed. We are making
    readiness a key element of our Navy's culture.
        The forces we've placed forward today--the 6 carrier battle
    groups--the 3 Amphibious Ready Groups, the Amphibious Task Forces
    comprised of 14 additional amphibious ships, and the 11 offloaded
    Maritime Preposition Ships all supporting a Marine Expeditionary Force
    of 50,000 marines--our multi-mission surface ships and submarines--the
    dozens of Military Sealift Command ships transporting the rest of the
    Joint Force--are the most ready force in our history, properly manned,
    superbly trained, and well provisioned with ordnance, repair parts, and
    supplies so they can provide both rotational deployment and surge
    capability. Our operational forces are ready earlier and are deploying
    at a higher state of readiness than ever before.
        A greater percentage of our ships are underway today than at any
    time in the last dozen years. Our ability to do so is the direct result
    of two things: the investment of the American people and the
    extraordinary commitment and accomplishment of our men and women in the
    Navy this past year. We made a concerted effort in last year's budget
    request to improve our current readiness and reduce our immediate
    operational risk and I am proud to report to you today that this force
    is ready to fight and win!
        At the same time, it is apparent that the 21st century sets the
    stage for tremendous increases in precision, reach, and connectivity,
    ushering in a new era of joint operational effectiveness. We clearly
    will be able to integrate sea, land, air, and space through enhanced
    network technology to a greater extent than ever before. In this new,
    unified battlespace, the sea will provide the vast maneuver area from
    which to project direct and decisive power.
        To navigate the challenges ahead and realize the opportunities, we
    developed this past year a clear, concise vision--Sea Power 21--for
    projecting decisive joint capabilities from the sea. It is a vision
    that stresses our asymmetric strengths of information dominance,
    advanced technology, and highly skilled and motivated professionals.
        Sea Power 21 advances American naval power to a broadened strategy
    in which naval forces are fully integrated into global joint operations
    across this unified battlespace and against both regional and
    transnational aggressors. It provides the transformational framework
    for how we will organize, align, integrate, and transform our Navy to
    meet the challenges that lie ahead.
        It also includes the transformed organizational processes that will
    accelerate operational concepts and technologies to the fleet; shape
    and educate the workforce needed to operate tomorrow's fleet; and
    harvest the efficiencies needed to invest in the Navy of the future.
        The capabilities needed to fulfill this broadened strategy are
    grouped into three core operational concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield,
    and Sea Basing, which are enabled by FORCEnet. The triad of transformed
    organizational processes that supports these concepts is: Sea Warrior,
    Sea Trial, and Sea Enterprise.

        Together, these concepts will provide increased power, protection,
    and freedom for America.

             Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent
            offensive power. Sea Strike operations are how the 21st century
            Navy will exert direct, decisive, and sustained influence in
            joint campaigns. Sea Strike capabilities will provide the Joint
            Force Commander with a potent mix of weapons, ranging from
            long-range precision strike, to clandestine land-attack in
            anti-access environments, to the swift insertion of ground
            forces.
             Sea Shield is the projection of layered, global
            defensive assurance. It is about extending our defenses beyond
            naval forces, to the Joint Force and allies and providing a
            defensive umbrella deep inland. Sea Shield takes us beyond
            unit, fleet, and task force defense to provide the Nation with
            sea-based theater and strategic defense.
             Sea Basing is the projection of operational
            independence. Sea Basing will use the fleet's extended reach of
            modern, networked weapons and sensors to maximize the vast
            maneuver space of the world's oceans. It is about extending
            traditional naval advantages to the Joint Force with more
            security, connectivity, and mobility from netted forces at sea.
             FORCEnet is the enabler of our knowledge supremacy and
            hence, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. It is the total
            systems approach and architectural framework that will
            integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and control,
            weapons, and platforms into a networked, distributed force and
            provide greater situational awareness, accelerated speed of
            decision, and greatly distributed combat power.

        Our transformed organizational processes are:

             Sea Warrior is our commitment to the growth and
            development of our sailors. It serves as the foundation of
            warfighting effectiveness by ensuring the right skills are in
            the right place at the right time.
             Sea Trial is a continual process of rapid concept and
            technology development that will deliver enhanced capabilities
            to our sailors as swiftly as possible. The Commander, U.S.
            Fleet Forces Command is leading this effort and developing new
            concepts and technologies, such as the Joint Fires Network and
            High Speed Vessels.
             Sea Enterprise is our process to improve
            organizational alignment, refine requirements, and reinvest the
            savings to buy the platforms and systems needed to transform
            our Navy. It is the means by which we will capture efficiencies
            and prioritize investments.

        Sea Power 21 is dedicated to a process of continual innovation and
    is committed to total jointness. It extends American naval superiority
    from the high seas, throughout the littorals, and beyond the sea. It
    both enhances and leverages persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance capabilities and precision weaponry to amplify the
    Nation's striking power, elevate our capability to project both defense
    and offense, and open the door to the afloat positioning of additional
    joint capabilities, assets, and forces.
        Sea Power 21 will extend the advantages of naval forces--speed of
    response, agility, immediate employability, and security--to the
    unified, joint warfighting team. It will increase our deterrence,
    crisis control, and warfighting power. It will ensure our naval forces
    are fully integrated into global joint operations to bring more power,
    more protection, and more freedom to America.
        We will put our Sea Power 21 vision into practice through a new
    Global Concept of Operations (CONOPs) to distribute our combat striking
    power to a dispersed, networked fleet. This will optimize our flexible
    force structure and create additional, scaleable, independent operating
    groups capable of responding simultaneously around the world. This
    distribution of assets will take us from 19 strike capable groups to 37
    strike capable groups with the full implementation of the Global
    CONOPs.

             Carrier Strike Groups will remain the core of our
            Navy's warfighting strength. No other force package matches
            their sustained power projection ability, extended situational
            awareness, and survivability.
             Expeditionary Strike Groups will augment our
            traditional Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit
            team with strike-capable surface combatants and submarines to
            prosecute Sea Strike missions in lesser-threat environments.
            When combined with a Carrier Strike Group, the resulting
            Expeditionary Strike Force will possess the full range of our
            netted, offensive, and defensive power. We will deploy at least
            one pilot ESG this year.
             Missile Defense Surface Action Groups will increase
            international stability by providing security to allies and
            Joint Forces ashore from short- and medium-range ballistic
            missile threats.
             Our future SSGN forces--specially modified Trident
            submarines--will provide large volume clandestine strike with
            cruise missiles and the capability to support and insert
            Special Operations Forces.
             An enhanced-capability Combat Logistics Force and
            Maritime Prepositioned Force will sustain a more widely
            dispersed and capable Navy/Marine Corps team.

        It is our intention to continue to nurture this culture of
    readiness and invest in this vision in the years ahead.

                    III. OUR FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

        This past year, the Navy improved its current readiness by properly
    funding our current readiness accounts, deepening the growth and
    development of our people, and developing innovative operational
    concepts and capabilities.
        This year, we intend to:

             Sustain our current readiness gains to support the war
            on terror;
             Deepen the growth and development of our people into
            the 21st century, high-technology personnel force that is our
            future; and
             Invest in our bold new Navy vision--Sea Power 21--to
            recapitalize and transform our force and improve its ability to
            operate as an agile, lethal, and effective member of our joint,
            networked warfighting team.

        At the same time, we will continue to actively harvest the
    efficiencies needed to fund and support these priorities in both fiscal
    year 2004 and beyond. Our Navy budget request for fiscal year 2004
    supports this intent and includes:

             Seven new construction ships, 2 more SSBN-to-SSGN
            conversions, 1 cruiser conversion, and 100 new aircraft;
             Investment in accelerated transformational
            capabilities, including the next-generation aircraft carrier
            (CVN-21), the transformational destroyer (DD(X)), and Littoral
            Combat Ship (LCS), the Joint Strike Fighter, the Advanced
            Hawkeye (E-2C RMP) Upgrade Program, and the EA-18G Electronic
            Attack aircraft;
             A 4.1 percent average pay increase in targeted and
            basic pay raises, and a reduction in average out-of-pocket
            housing costs from 7.5 percent to 3.5 percent;
             Investment in housing and Public Private Venture that
            will help eliminate inadequate family housing by fiscal year
            2007 and enable us to house shipboard sailors ashore when their
            vessel is in homeport by fiscal year 2008;
             Continued investment in key operational readiness
            accounts that includes an increase in aviation depot
            maintenance funding; improvement in our annual deferred
            maintenance backlog for our ships, submarines, and aircraft
            carriers; and sustained funding for our ordnance, ship
            operations, and flying hours accounts;
             Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Integration, a
            process that will maximize our forward-deployed combat power,
            optimize the core capability of naval aviation forces,
            introduce 200 modern aircraft across the fiscal year 2004 to
            fiscal year 2009 program and save billions of dollars;
             Divestiture of aging, legacy ships, systems and
            aircraft, producing nearly $1.9 billion in fiscal year 2004 for
            reinvestment in recapitalization;
             Improvements in the quality of our operational
            training through a Training Resource Strategy; and
             Investment in transformational unmanned underwater
            vehicles (UUV), unmanned aviation vehicles (UAV), experimental
            hull forms, and other technologies.
    A. Sustaining our Current Readiness
        Your investment last year produced the most ready force in our
    history! Training, maintenance, spare parts, ordnance, and fuel
    accounts enabled our fleet to be ready earlier, deploy at a higher
    state of readiness, and as we are witnessing today, build a more
    responsive surge capability. These investments were vital to sustaining
    the war on terrorism, assuring friends and allies and leading the
    Nation's global response to crisis.

             Ship operations and flying hours requests funds for
            ship operations OPTEMPO of 54.0 days per quarter for our
            deployed forces and 28 days per quarter for our non-deployed
            forces. The flying hours request receives an additional $137
            million this year to sustain the investment level we
            established in support of last year's budget. This level of
            steaming and flying hours will enable our ships and airwings to
            achieve required readiness 6 months prior to deployment,
            sustain readiness during deployment, and increase our ability
            to surge in crisis. However, sustained OPTEMPO at levels above
            this force-wide target, as is beginning to occur during fiscal
            year 2003's time of accelerated and extended deployments, will
            cause our current year execution to run both ahead and in
            excess of the existing plan.
             Ship and Aviation Maintenance. Last year, we reduced
            our major ship depot maintenance backlog by 27 percent and
            aircraft depot level repair back orders by 17 percent; provided
            32 additional ships with depot availabilities; ramped up
            ordnance and spare parts production; maintained a steady
            ``mission capable'' rate in deployed aircraft; and fully funded
            aviation initial outfitting. Our request for fiscal year 2004
            aviation maintenance funding adds over $210 million to fiscal
            year 2003's investment and will increase the number of engine
            spares, improve the availability of non-deployed aircraft, and
            meet our 100 percent deployed airframe goals.
              Our ship maintenance request continues to `buy-down' the
            annual deferred maintenance backlog and sustains our overall
            ship maintenance requirement. The aggregate level of funding
            for ship maintenance actually declines from fiscal year 2003 to
            fiscal year 2004, due in part to the positive effects of the
            additional maintenance funding provided in supplemental
            appropriations in the previous year, in part to the accelerated
            retirement of the oldest and most maintenance-intensive surface
            ships, and as a result of scheduling and timing.
             Shore Installations. The fiscal year 2004 request
            provides 93 percent of the modeled sustainment cost for
            facilities, an increase from fiscal year 2003's 84 percent.
            Although the overall investment in facility recapitalization
            has reduced from last year, slowing the replacement rate of
            facilities, our increased investment in sustainment will better
            maintain existing facilities as we continue to pursue
            innovations to improve our base infrastructure. Our Base
            Operations Support funding request is based on sustaining the
            current level of common installation and important community
            and personnel support functions; we have factored in management
            and business efficiencies to reduce the cost of providing these
            services. We continue to support a Base Realignment and Closure
            effort in fiscal year 2005 to focus our future investment and
            improve our recapitalization rate in the years ahead.
             Precision-guided munitions receive continued
            investment in our fiscal year 2004 request with emphasis on
            increasing inventory levels for the Joint Stand-Off Weapon
            (JSOW), optimizing the Navy's Joint Direct Attack Munition
            (JDAM) production rate and commencing full rate production
            under multi-year procurement for the Tactical Tomahawk
            (TACTOM). Our partnership with the Air Force in several of our
            munitions programs will continue to help us optimize both our
            inventories and our research and development investment.
             Training readiness. The Training Resource Strategy
            (TRS) has been developed to provide for more complex threat
            scenarios, improve the training of our deploying ships,
            aircraft, sailors, and marines, and support the range and
            training technology improvements necessary to ensure the long-
            term combat readiness of deploying naval forces. The TRS has
            identified the training facilities necessary to provide this
            superior level of training as well. Their dispersed character
            is more like the battlefield environment our forces will face
            today and tomorrow and will better challenge our deploying
            forces--before they are challenged in combat. Our fiscal year
            2004 request includes $61 million to support the TRS.
              At the same time, encroachment and environmental issues
            continue to impact our ability to maintain an acceptable level
            of access to our valuable testing and training ranges and
            operating areas. As a result, we are looking for a balanced
            approach that would protect our environmental obligations and
            our ability to both train in realistic scenarios and develop
            transformational systems for our future. Our approach would be
            limited to only the most critical issues, such as the
            designation of critical habitat on military lands designated
            for military training, and the scientific measurements that
            achieve an appropriate balance between our environmental
            concerns and our obligation to ensure our sailors are properly
            trained and our transformational systems are properly tested.
            We will focus the use of our ranges for these purposes while
            continuing to be an excellent steward of these environmental
            resources. We look forward to working with Congress and the
            American people on this important and urgent issue impacting
            our sailors and marines.
    B. Deepening the Growth and Development of our People
        We are winning the battle for people. Thanks to superb leadership
    in the fleet and the full support of the American people and Congress,
    we are making solid progress in addressing long-standing manpower and
    quality of service issues vital to having what it takes to win the
    competition for talent today and tomorrow.
        We are enjoying now the best manning I have witnessed in my career.
    With few exceptions, we achieved C-2 manning status for all deploying
    battle group units at least 6 months prior to deployment. These
    accomplishments enabled our Navy to develop a more responsive force,
    one that surged forward with the right people, at the right time, to
    fulfill our national security requirements.

        Retention is at record levels and recruiting has never been better.
    We achieved a 58.7 percent Zone A (<6 years of service (YOS))
    reenlistment rate, 74.5 percent Zone B reenlistment rate (6-10 YOS),
    and a Zone C (10-14 YOS) reenlistment rate of 87.4 percent in 2002.
    While we are also off to a great start in fiscal year 2003, we are
    instituting measures to ensure our annualized reenlistment rate meets
    our established goals (Zone A--56 percent, B--73 percent, C--86
    percent).
        Additionally, attrition for first term sailors was reduced by 23
    percent from fiscal year 2001 levels. Ninety two percent of our
    recruits are high school graduates and 6 percent of them have some
    college education.

        These tremendous accomplishments allowed us to reduce at-sea
    manning shortfalls last year and reduce our recruiting goals. We were
    also able to increase the overall number of E-4 to E-9s in the Navy by
    1.3 percent to 71.5 percent working toward a goal of 75.5 percent by
    fiscal year 2007. This healthy trend allows us to retain more of our
    experienced leaders to manage and operate the increasingly technical
    21st century Navy.
        Targeted pay raises, reenlistment bonuses, improved allowances,
    enhanced educational benefits, retirement reforms, support for improved
    family services, and better medical benefits are making a difference
    and can be directly attributed to congressional support and the
    outstanding work of our Navy leaders in our ships, squadrons, bases,
    and stations.
        Our fiscal year 2004 request capitalizes on last year's
    accomplishments and provides the opportunity to align our manpower and
    skills mix to balance our end strength and shape our 21st century
    workforce. As part of Sea Power 21's transformed organizational process
    improvements we will begin our Sea Warrior process.
        Our goal is to create a Navy in which all sailors are optimally
    assessed, trained, and assigned so that they can contribute their
    fullest to mission accomplishment. It is important that we sustain our
    manpower progress by furthering our supporting initiatives to include:

             Perform to serve will align our Navy personnel
            inventory and skill sets through a centrally managed
            reenlistment program. This initiative makes Commander, Navy
            Personnel Command the final authority for first term
            reenlistments and extensions and will steer sailors in over-
            manned ratings into skill areas where they are most needed. It
            provides the training necessary to ensure these sailors will
            succeed in their new rating. Most importantly, it will help us
            manage our skills profile.
             Navy Knowledge Online introduces our integrated web-
            based lifelong learning initiative for personnel development
            and learning management. It connects sailors to the right
            information in a collaborative learning environment, tracks
            their individual skills and training requirements, and provides
            lifelong support between our rating, leadership, and personal
            development learning centers and our sailors.
             Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through our Commitment to
            Education and Learning) is transforming the way we train and
            educate our people. A more responsive organizational structure
            has been established to include the Navy Chief Learning
            Officer, Naval Personnel Development Command, and Human
            Performance Center. We also partnered with fleet, industry, and
            academia to improve individual training and education as well
            as with colleges, through the Commissioned Navy College
            Program, to provide rating-related Associate and Bachelor
            degrees.
             Project SAIL (Sailor Advocacy through Interactive
            Leadership) will web-base and revolutionize the personnel
            assignment process by putting more choice in the process for
            both gaining commands and sailors. It will empower our people
            to make more informed career decisions and for the first time,
            create a more competitive, market-oriented process.

        Our Sea Swap initiative is underway now, with the first crew-change
    on U.S.S. Fletcher taking place in the Western Australia port of
    Fremantle last month. We will continue this pilot with another crew
    change this summer and we intend to continue to examine pilot programs
    in optimal manning, rotational crewing, assignment incentive pay,
    rating identification tools, and rate training.
        Your support of our fiscal year 2004 request for a targeted pay
    raise that recognizes and reaffirms the value of our career force and
    acts as an incentive to junior personnel to stay Navy is critical to
    staying the course. So, too, is continuing the reduction of average
    out-of-pocket housing expenses and the extension and enhancement of
    essential special pay and bonus authorities. All these efforts enable
    our Navy to sustain our forces in the war on terrorism, continue the
    increase in our Top 6 (E4 to E9), and develop the 21st century, high-
    technology personnel force that is our future.
    C. Investing in Sea Power 21
        Our 21st century Navy will be a joint, netted, dispersed power
    projection force and Sea Power 21 is the framework for how our Navy
    will organize, integrate, and transform. It prescribes a strategy-to-
    concepts-to-capabilities continuum by which current and future naval
    forces will exploit the opportunity that information dominance and
    rapid, highly accurate power projection and defensive protection
    capabilities bring to us.
        Together, these concepts will compress our speed of response and
    provide the Nation with immediately employable, secure and sovereign
    forward ``capability sets'' from which to project firepower, forces,
    command and control, and logistics ashore.
        The following describes the core capabilities, and our initial
    investments in our highest priority programs that support this vision.
        Sea Strike is the projection of precise and persistent offensive
    power. The core capabilities include: Time Sensitive Strike;
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Ship to Objective
    Maneuver; and Electronic Warfare and Information Operations. We are
    already investing in impressive programs that will provide the
    capabilities necessary to support Sea Strike; these include the
    following fiscal year 2004 priorities:

             F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The F/A-18E/F is in full rate
            production and when combined with this year's request for the
            EA-18G, will be the backbone of Navy sea-based precision and
            time-critical strike, electronic attack and airborne tactical
            reconnaissance. It is in the fifth of a 5-year multi-year
            procurement (MYP) contract (fiscal years 2000-2004) that will
            yield $700 million in total savings. The second multi-year
            contract for 210 aircraft will yield approximately $1 billion
            in savings as compared to the single-year price. The Super
            Hornet employs new knowledge dominance technologies, such as
            the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advanced Tactical
            Forward Looking Infrared System, Shared Reconnaissance System,
            and Multi-Informational Display System data link. It provides a
            40-percent increase in combat radius, a 50-percent increase in
            endurance, 25 percent greater weapons payload, 3 times the
            ordnance bring back, and is more survivable than our older
            Hornets; most importantly, it has the growth capacity to remain
            a mainstay of our tactical aviation for years to come. Three of
            these squadrons are already deployed today at one-third the
            operational cost of our legacy F-14 aircraft. Fiscal year 2004
            budgets for 42 E/F aircraft; this program maximizes the return
            on our procurement dollars through a multi-year procurement
            contract and a minimum economic order quantity buy.
             EA-18G. The EA-18G will replace the aging EA-6B
            Prowler for Joint Force electronic attack. Using the
            demonstrated growth capacity of the F/A-18E/F, the EA-18G
            Growler will quickly recapitalize our electronic attack
            capability at lower procurement cost with significant savings
            in operating and support costs and 3 years earlier than
            previously planned, all while providing the growth potential
            for future electronic warfare (EW) system improvements. It will
            use the Improved Capability Three (ICAP III) receiver suite and
            provide selective reactive jamming capability to the
            warfighter. This will both improve the lethality of the air
            wing and enhance the commonality of aircraft on the carrier
            deck. It will dramatically accelerate the replacement of our
            aging Airborne Electronic Attack capability. Engineering and
            developmental efforts commence with our fiscal year 2004 budget
            request.
             JSF. The Joint Strike Fighter will enhance our Navy
            precision with unprecedented stealth and range as part of the
            family of tri-service, next-generation strike aircraft. It will
            maximize commonality and technological superiority while
            minimizing life cycle cost. The fiscal year 2004 budget
            requests $2.2 billion in accelerated development funds; initial
            production is planned for fiscal year 2006.
             MV-22. The Joint Service MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor,
            Vertical/Short Take-Off or Landing (V/STOL) aircraft represents
            a revolutionary change in aircraft capability. It will project
            marines and equipment ashore from our amphibious shipping,
            operationalizing Ship to Objective Maneuver from the Sea Base
            and improving our expeditionary mobility and force entry needs
            for the 21st century. The MV-22 program has been restructured,
            redesigned, rebuilt, and is undergoing testing to deliver an
            operationally deployable aircraft on the restructured schedule.
            The MV-22 will replace the Vietnam-era CH-46E and CH-53D
            helicopters, delivering improved readiness, upgraded
            capability, and significantly enhanced survivability. It is
            overwhelmingly superior to our legacy CH-46E providing twice
            the speed, five times the range, and three times the payload
            capacity.
             Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV). We increased our
            commitment to a focused array of unmanned air vehicles that
            will support and enhance both Sea Shield and Sea Strike
            missions with persistent, distributed, netted sensors. We are
            initiating the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV this
            year to develop a persistent, multi-mission platform capable of
            both Sea Shield and Sea Strike surveillance and reconnaissance
            of maritime and land targets, communications relay, and some
            intelligence collection. We have provided funding for testing,
            experimentation, and/or demonstration of the Fire Scout
            Demonstration Systems, Global Hawk Maritime demonstration and
            the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle-Navy (UCAV-N) demonstration
            vehicle as well.

        Sea Shield is the projection of layered, global defensive power. It
    will soon enhance deterrence and warfighting power by way of real-time
    integration with joint and coalition forces, high speed littoral attack
    platforms setting and exploiting widely distributed sensors, and the
    direct projection of defensive powers in the littoral and deep inland.
    It will enhance homeland defense, assure, and eventually sustain our
    access in the littorals and across the globe. Sea Shield capabilities
    include Homeland Defense, Sea and Littoral Control, and Theater Air and
    Missile Defense.

        Our highest priority Sea Shield programs this year include:

             Missile Defense. Our Navy is poised to contribute
            significantly in fielding initial sea-based missile defense
            capabilities to meet the near-term ballistic missile threat to
            our homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies
            and we are working closely with the Missile Defense Agency
            (MDA) to that end. As partners, U.S.S. Lake Erie will be
            transferred to MDA to facilitate a more robust testing program
            for missile defense. In turn, MDA is requesting funds to
            upgrade three Aegis guided missile destroyers (DDG) for ICBM
            surveillance and tracking duties and procurement of up to 20
            standard missile interceptors to help us provide a limited at
            sea capability to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic
            missiles in the boost and ascent phases of flight. Our sea-
            based missile defense programs experienced tremendous success
            on the test range during 2002, and we look forward to building
            on these successes and developing a vital capability for our
            Nation.
             CG Conversion. The first Cruiser Conversion begins in
            fiscal year 2004. The Cruiser Conversion Program is a mid-life
            upgrade for our existing Aegis cruisers that will ensure
            modern, relevant combat capability well into this century and
            against evolving threats. These warships will provide enhanced
            land attack and area air defense to the Joint Force Commander.
            Core to these conversions is installation of the Cooperative
            Engagement Capability, which enhances and leverages the air
            defense capability of these ships, and the 5/62 caliber Gun
            System with Extended Range Guided Munitions to be used in
            support of the Marine Corps Ship-to-Objective-Maneuver
            doctrine. These converted cruisers could also be available for
            integration into ballistic missile defense missions when that
            capability matures.
             Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). We will continue
            development of UUVs for minefield reconnaissance in the
            littoral and other surveillance missions, including funding
            that will result in initial operating capability for the Long-
            term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) in fiscal year 2005.

        Sea Basing is the projection of operational independence. Our
    future investments will exploit the largest maneuver areas on the face
    of the Earth: the sea. Sea Basing serves as the foundation from which
    offensive and defensive fires are projected--making Sea Strike and Sea
    Shield a reality. Sea Basing capabilities include: Joint Command and
    Control, Afloat Power Projection, and Integrated Joint Logistics. Our
    intent is to minimize as much as possible, our reliance on shore-based
    support nodes.

        Our highest priority investments include:

             Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Our most transformational
            effort and number one budget priority, the Littoral Combat Ship
            will be the first Navy ship to separate capability from hull
            form and provide a robust, affordable, focused-mission ship to
            enhance our ability to establish sea superiority not just for
            our Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups, but
            for future joint logistics, command and control, and pre-
            positioned ships moving to support forces ashore. They will be
            dispersed and netted, both leveraging and enhancing the
            knowledge superiority and defense of the theater Joint Force.
            We will separate capability from hull form by developing
            `tailorable' mission modules that we can use to ``forward fit
            and fight'' these small, minimally manned, persistent, high-
            speed vessels across the globe. They will counter anti-access
            threats, namely small, fast surface craft carrying anti-ship
            missiles, torpedo-armed ultra-quiet diesel submarines, and
            large numbers of inexpensive mines. They will be the backbone
            of our carrier and expeditionary strike group organic mine
            warfare capability. By employing networked sensors, modular
            mission payloads, a variety of manned and unmanned vehicles,
            and an innovative hull design, they will have the inherent
            capacity for further transformation by developing future
            modules for other missions. We will capitalize on DOD
            initiatives, spiral development, and new acquisition methods to
            streamline the acquisition process, and begin construction of
            the first LCS by 2005. The fiscal year 2004 budget accelerates
            development and construction of nine LCS in the FYDP, key to
            ramping surface force structure to Global CONOPs levels outside
            the FYDP.
             DD(X). The DD(X) advanced multi-mission destroyer will
            bring revolutionary improvements to precision strike and joint
            fires. Transformational and leap ahead technologies include: an
            integrated power system and electric drive; the Advanced Gun
            System with high rate of fire and magazine capability; the new
            Multi-Function Radar/Volume Search Radar suite; optimal manning
            through advanced system automation, stealth through reduced
            acoustic, magnetic, IR, and radar cross-section signature; and
            enhanced survivability through automated damage control and
            fire protection systems. Armed with an array of land attack
            weapons it will provide persistent, distributed offensive fires
            in support of Joint Forces ashore. The capacity in both hull
            form and integrated electric power system will allow us to
            spiral its development to CG(X) and other transformational
            systems, like the electro-magnetic rail gun, in the years
            ahead.
             CVN-21. We have accelerated transformational
            technologies from the CVNX development plan into CVN-21 while
            sustaining the CVNX-1 development schedule submitted last year.
            This is the first new carrier design since 1967. The fiscal
            year 2004 budget request provides $1.5 billion in RDT&E and
            advanced procurement for the first CVN-21 and programs for
            split-funded construction beginning in fiscal year 2007. The
            transformational technologies include a new electrical
            generation and distribution system, improved flight deck design
            with Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching System, improved sortie
            generation, enhanced survivability, reduced manning, and
            incorporation of a flexible infrastructure that will allow the
            insertion of new capabilities as they evolve. CVN-21 will be
            the centerpiece of our Carrier Strike Groups in the future and
            will replace U.S.S. Enterprise in fiscal year 2014.
             Virginia-class submarine (SSN-774). The first four
            ships of this class are under construction: Virginia will
            commission in 2004; the keel was laid for Texas (SSN-775) in
            July 2002; Hawaii (SSN-776) was begun in 2001; and North
            Carolina (SSN-777) in 2002. This class will replace Los
            Angeles-class (SSN-688) attack submarines and will incorporate
            new capabilities, including an array of unmanned vehicles, and
            the ability to support Special Warfare forces. It will be an
            integral part of the joint, networked, dispersed fleet of the
            21st century.
             SSGN Conversions. We have requested two additional
            conversions in fiscal year 2004; these ships will be configured
            to carry more than 150 Tomahawk missiles, enabling covert,
            large-volume strike. The SSGN will also have the capability to
            support Special Operations Forces for an extended period,
            providing clandestine insertion and retrieval by lockout
            chamber, dry deck shelters or the Advanced Seal Delivery
            System, and they will be arrayed with a variety of unmanned
            systems to enhance the Joint Force Commander's knowledge of the
            battlespace. We will leverage the existing Trident submarine
            infrastructure to optimize their on-station time. The first two
            ships, the U.S.S. Ohio and U.S.S. Florida, enter the shipyard
            in fiscal year 2003 to begin their refueling and conversion.
            U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Georgia will begin their conversion
            in fiscal year 2004. We expect this capability to be
            operational for the first SSGN in fiscal year 2007.
             Maritime Prepositioning Force Future (MPF(F)). MPF(F)
            ships will serve a broader operational function than current
            prepositioned ships, creating greatly expanded operational
            flexibility and effectiveness. We envision a force of ships
            that will enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by the
            at-sea assembly of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade that arrives
            by high-speed airlift or sealift from the United States or
            forward operating locations or bases. These ships will off-load
            forces, weapons, and supplies selectively while remaining far
            over the horizon, and they will reconstitute ground maneuver
            forces aboard ship after completing assaults deep inland. They
            will sustain in-theater logistics, communications, and medical
            capabilities for the Joint Force for extended periods as well.

        Other advances in sea basing could enable the flow of Marine and
    Army forces at multiple and probably austere points of entry as a
    coherent, integrated combined arms team capable of concentrating lethal
    combat power rapidly and engaging an adversary upon arrival. The
    ability of the Naval Services to promote the successful transformation
    of deployment practices of the other Services will dramatically improve
    the overall ability of the Joint Force to counter our adversaries'
    strategies of area-denial and/or anti-access. We are programming RDTE
    funds to develop the future MPF and examine alternative sea-basing
    concepts in fiscal year 2008.
        FORCEnet is the enabler of the foregoing capabilities, and the
    operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in
    the joint, information age. It will allow systems, functions, and
    missions to be aligned to transform situational awareness, accelerate
    speed of decisions, and allow naval forces to greatly distribute its
    combat power in the unified, joint battlespace. It puts the theory of
    network-centric warfare into practice. We are just beginning this
    effort and we have requested $15 million in funds to administer the
    development of FORCEnet, the cornerstone of our future C\4\I
    architecture that will integrate sensors, networks, decision aids,
    warriors, and weapons. Programs that will enable the future force to be
    more networked, highly adaptive, human-centric, integrated, and enhance
    speed of command include:

             E-2C Advanced Hawkeye Radar Modernization Program. E-2
            Advanced Hawkeye (AHE) program will modernize the E-2 weapons
            system by replacing the current radar and other aircraft system
            components to improve nearly every facet of tactical air
            operations. The modernized weapons system will be designed to
            maintain open ocean capability while adding transformational
            surveillance and Theater Air and Missile Defense capabilities
            against emerging air threats in the high clutter and jamming
            environment. The advanced Hawkeye will be a critical
            contributor to Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air, and
            to Sea Strike and Shield. The fiscal year 2004 budgets over
            $350 million for continued development with first production
            planned for fiscal year 2008.
             Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). NMCI continues
            to bring together Navy personnel, government civilians, and
            contractors into a single computing environment. This program
            is fostering fundamental changes in the way we support critical
            warfighting functions, conduct Navy business, and train and
            advance sailors. Fiscal year 2004 funding of $1.6 billion
            continues user seat rollout and cutover to the NMCI
            architecture, progressing toward a target end-state of 365,000
            seats. Although NMCI seat cutover was slowed initially by the
            need to resolve the challenges of numerous, disparate legacy
            applications, the transition to NMCI has succeeded in
            eliminating more than 70,000 legacy IT applications and we are
            on track for the future.

        Sea Trial. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) is now in
    charge of our Navy's revitalized process of experimentation, and is
    rapidly developing emergent concepts and experimenting with new
    technologies to speed delivery of innovation to the fleet. CFFC will
    reach throughout the military and beyond to coordinate concept and
    technology development in support of future warfighting effectiveness.
    Embracing spiral development, the right technologies and concepts will
    then be matured through targeted investment and rapid prototyping.
        CFFC is working in concert with the U.S. Joint Forces Command to
    refine the Sea Trial process and integrate select wargames,
    experimentation, and exercises. We are already testing new operational
    concepts and technologies like the Collaborative Information
    Environment, Joint Fires Initiative, and the Navy Joint Semi-Automated
    Force Simulation in operations and exercises. We will continue to
    pursue evaluation of multiple platforms and systems, including
    experimental hull forms and electromagnetic rail guns, among others.
        The Systems Commands and Program Executive Offices will be integral
    partners in this effort, bringing concepts to reality through
    technology innovation and application of sound business practices.

                 IV. HARVESTING EFFICIENCIES FOR TRANSFORMATION

        We are working hard to identify and harvest the efficiencies needed
    to balance competing priorities and invest in our Sea Power 21 vision.
    Called Sea Enterprise, this process is intended to ensure our
    warfighting capability both now and in the future. It will help
    identify and produce those initiatives that both optimize our
    warfighting capability and streamline our organization and processes;
    to make it operate more efficiently, to reduce our overhead and to
    produce the savings needed for investment in recapitalization and our
    future. We have already identified several initiatives that have
    produced over $40 billion in savings and cost avoidance across the
    defense program--and many more billions outside the FYDP--to help fund
    our future. A few of the highlights include:

             USN-USMC Tactical Aviation (TACAIR) Integration plan
            shows the promise of cross-service partnerships. It will
            maximize forward deployed combat power, enhance our
            interoperability, more fully integrate our services, and save
            $975 million across the FYDP. This aggressive effort introduces
            200 modern aircraft in the next 6 years while retiring legacy
            F-14, F/A-18A/B, S-3, and EA-6B airframes, and it reduces our
            F/A-18E/F and JSF total buy requirements by 497 aircraft while
            enhancing our warfighting capability. There is more than $30
            billion in projected cost avoidance outside the FYDP as well.

             Partnerships. We are pursuing other promising
            partnerships to include new munitions with the U.S. Air Force,
            common communications and weapons systems with the U.S. Coast
            Guard's Deepwater Integrated Systems program, and joint
            experiments with high-speed vessels with the U.S. Army. We will
            continue to leverage the gains made in programs like joint
            weapons development (JDAM, JSOW, AMRAAM) as well.
             Identifying savings within the force for
            recapitalization. Last year, we promised we would sharpen our
            focus on our force structure in the years ahead--to buy the
            ships, aircraft, and the capabilities needed for tomorrow's
            Navy. At the same time, we cannot overlook the important gains
            our focus on current readiness made these last few years; it
            produced the more responsive force on deployment today. As a
            result, we are obligated to look hard at the ways we could
            balance these priorities and our discretionary investments to
            both satisfy the near term operational risks and prepare for
            the long-term risks of an uncertain future. This year, we made
            some hard choices across the fleet to do more to address our
            future risk, sustain our current readiness gains, and strike
            this balance. We identified several aging, legacy systems with
            limited growth potential and high operating and support costs,
            and ultimately, we accelerated the retirement of 11 ships and
            70 aircraft, divested more than 50 systems, and eliminated
            70,000 legacy IT applications. We are using the savings to
            recapitalize, modernize other legacy platforms, and invest in
            Sea Power 21. These initiatives result in an acceptable
            operational risk in the near term because of our emphasis on
            sustaining our current readiness gains. Equally important,
            these difficult decisions yielded $1.9 billion for reinvestment
            and will do much to help reduce our future risk.
             Improved business operations and processes. We are
            improving both the way we run the fleet and our ability to
            control costs. The LPD-DDG swap produced savings sufficient to
            purchase a third guided missile destroyer in fiscal year 2004.
            We are using multi-year procurement contacts and focusing where
            possible on economic order quantity purchase practices to
            optimize our investments. We conducted the Workload Validation
            Review, and made Performance Based Logistics improvements.
            Other initiatives like piloting mission funding for two of our
            public shipyards, Enterprise Resource Planning, strategic
            sourcing, NMCI, and eBusiness are helping us find the funds
            necessary to emerge with the optimal force structure, a healthy
            industrial base and an efficient and appropriately sized
            infrastructure.
             Installation Claimant Consolidation. In October 2003
            we will establish a single shore installation organization,
            Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC), to globally
            manage all shore installations, promote ``best practices''
            development in the regions, and provide economies of scale,
            increased efficiency, standardization of policies where
            practicable and improved budgeting and funding execution. This
            initiative has the potential to save approximately $1.6 billion
            in the next 6 years.

        We will continue to pursue the efficiencies that improve our
    warfighting capability. We are committed to producing the level
    investment stream that will help implement our bold new Navy vision and
    produce the number of future ships, aircraft, and systems we need to
    counter the 21st century threat. Harvesting savings for reinvestment is
    an important part of that effort, and we will continue to examine the
    potential efficiencies while weighing the operational risks, both now
    and in the future.

                                 V. CONCLUSION

        We are affecting positive change in our Navy. We will continue our
    culture of readiness and our commitment to transformation while
    pursuing those efficiencies that both make us good stewards of the
    public's funds, and improve our warfighting capability. I have made it
    plain to our men and women in the Navy that mission accomplishment
    means both warfighting effectiveness and resourcefulness.
        At the same time, our people remain at the heart of all we do; they
    are the real capital assets in our Navy. We have invested heavily to do
    what is right for the people who are investing themselves in our Navy.
    ``Growth and development'' is our byline. As we look to the future, we
    will build on the impressive progress we have made in recruiting,
    assigning, and retaining our military and civilian professionals.
    Active leadership is making it happen today and will do so in the years
    to come.
        There are still more challenges and opportunities in the year
    ahead. We will continue prosecuting the global war on terrorism. This
    entails being ready to respond--to surge and sustain warfighting
    capabilities--in support of the war, as well as preparing our force for
    the battles of tomorrow.
        But by implementing our bold new Navy vision, harvesting
    efficiencies for reinvestment, adding potent new platforms to the
    fleet, and launching an integrated Navy-wide experimentation plan, we
    are creating the future capabilities and force structure required to
    counter these 21st century threats.
        I thank the committee for your continued strong support of our
    Navy, our sailors, and our civilian shipmates. Working together, I am
    confident we will make our great Navy even better and provide our
    Nation with more power, more protection, and more freedom in the years
    ahead.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        General Hagee.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL W. HAGEE, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Hagee. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, ladies and
    gentlemen of the committee: It is an honor for me to be here
    this morning. Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, on behalf of
    those marines over in the Gulf, I would like to thank you very
    much for you and your delegation's recent visit over there. It
    meant a great deal to them to see you there and I thank you for
    that.
        Chairman Warner. We thank you.
        General Hagee. Sir, along with our sister services, the
    Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a key role in the
    global war on terrorism and in the establishment of stability
    and security in many of the world's trouble spots. Marines,
    both active and Reserve, are operating side by side with
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, NGOs, diplomats, and many others in
    diverse locations around the globe from Afghanistan to the
    Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Turkey, the Georgian
    Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines.
        Today marines are flying from Bagram Air Base in
    Afghanistan, from Navy carriers at sea, and from bases around
    the Arabian Gulf. In fact, 63 percent of the Marine Corps
    operating forces are currently deployed and almost 90 percent
    are either deployed, forward stationed, or forward based.
        Marine Corps operations throughout the past year have
    highlighted the versatility and utility of our expeditionary
    forces. Although we have had one of our busiest years in terms
    of operational deployments, participation in realistic
    worldwide exercises remain critical to supporting the theater
    security cooperation plans and ensuring that we maintained a
    ready and capable force.
        Sir, your marines are ready. Along with the Navy, we are
    moving out with new organizational concepts, as mentioned by
    the CNO, including TACAIR integration and carrier and
    expeditionary strike groups that will make us more responsive
    and more flexible.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget continues our effort to
    modernize and transform the force. Support that you in Congress
    have provided over the last 2 years has helped us make real
    progress in our modernization, transformation, personnel, and
    readiness accounts. Marines and their families have benefited
    from targeted pay raises and improved family housing and
    barracks. Increases in the basic allowance for housing have
    significantly reduced out-of-pocket cost of living expenses for
    our marines.
        Regarding modernization and transformation, our top ten
    Marine Corps ground programs are adequately founded over the
    near-term. Among these are the Advanced Amphibious Assault
    Vehicle, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the
    Lightweight 155-Howitzer. On the aviation side, we are on track
    for funding for the V-22, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the
    Four-Bladed Cobra and Huey upgrades. Finally, we continue to
    make needed progress in readiness.
        Having recently come from the operating forces, I can tell
    you there is a marked positive improvement in the way we have
    funded for readiness now compared to just a few years ago.
        My main concern today echoes one of the concerns of the
    Secretary of Defense, in that without supplemental funding, we
    are spending tomorrow's dollars today. We are very grateful for
    the additional funding provided last week in the fiscal year
    2003 omnibus appropriations bill. This funding provides a
    measure of relief to those programs that were bearing the costs
    of the global war on terrorism. Thank you for your timely
    action.
        That said, our contingency requirements are significant and
    they greatly exceed the funding provided. We ask for your
    support and timely passage of the administration's upcoming
    supplemental request.
        That concern notwithstanding, we are currently doing what
    we are trained to do. We are ready to support the Nation
    through whatever challenges may lie ahead. We are on solid
    ground regarding our mission and our direction. We will remain
    your only sea-based, rotational, truly expeditionary combined
    arms force ready to answer the call as part of an integrated
    Joint Force.
        Sir, I would like to thank this committee on behalf of all
    the marines for your continued support, and I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Hagee follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Gen. Michael W. Hagee, USMC

        Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the
    committee; it is my honor to report to you on the state of your United
    States Marine Corps. First, on behalf of all marines, I want to thank
    the committee for your continued support. Your sustained commitment to
    improving the warfighting capabilities of our Nation's Armed Forces and
    to improving the quality of life of our Service men and women and their
    families is vital to the security of our Nation, especially now, at
    this time of impending crisis.

                                I. INTRODUCTION

        The Navy-Marine Corps team continues to play a key role in the
    global war on terrorism and in the establishment of stability and
    security in many of the world's trouble spots. Marines, both active and
    Reserve, are operating side-by-side in diverse locations, from
    Afghanistan, to the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, Turkey, the
    Georgian Republic, Colombia, Guantanamo Bay, and the Philippines. At
    the same time, the Corps maintains a host of other commitments around
    the world that support U.S. national security, military, and foreign
    cooperation and security strategies. The powerful capability that the
    naval services bring to our Joint Forces is a central element of our
    Nation's military power.
        Marine Corps' operations throughout the past year have highlighted
    the versatility and expeditionary nature of our forces. Missions in
    support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle marked the most
    visible accomplishments of our forward-deployed forces. Marine Air
    Control Squadrons continue to provide air control, surveillance, and
    air traffic control support to Operation Enduring Freedom during their
    deployments to the Central Command area of responsibility. Elsewhere,
    the Marine Corps continues to support Operation Joint Forge in the
    Balkans by sending civil affairs teams to Bosnia.
        Even as the Marine Corps saw one of our busiest years in terms of
    operational deployments, participation in realistic, worldwide
    exercises remained critical to supporting the Combatant Commander's
    Theater Security Cooperation Plans and ensuring that we maintained a
    ready and capable force. Over the last year, marines participated in
    more than 200 service, joint, and combined exercises. These included
    live-fire, field training, command post, and computer-assisted
    exercises. Participants varied in size from small units to Marine
    Expeditionary Forces. Overseas, Marine Expeditionary Units (Special
    Operations Capable) conducted exercises in Jordan, Italy, Croatia,
    Tunisia, the Philippines, Australia, Thailand, and Kuwait.
        At home, Marine Reserve units were designated as ``on call'' forces
    to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency's role in homeland
    security. In addition, the Marine Corps also conducted numerous
    training operations and internal exercises. This important training
    helps develop individual and unit proficiency and competency. It also
    allows the Marine Corps to examine unit operational skills and ensures
    that each unit has the capabilities required to execute our full range
    of missions.
        The Marine Corps continues to contribute to the Nation's
    counterdrug effort, participating in numerous counterdrug operations in
    support of Joint Task Force Six, Joint Interagency Task Force-East, and
    Joint Interagency Task Force-West. These missions are conducted in the
    Andean region of South America, along the U.S. Southwest border, and in
    several domestic ``hot spots'' that have been designated as High
    Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Individual marines and task-organized
    units are assigned to these missions in order to provide support for
    domestic drug-law enforcement throughout the United States, and to
    provide conventional training to military forces in South America that
    execute counternarcotics missions. Marine operational and intelligence
    teams also support Colombian military efforts to combat narco-
    terrorism. Marines of our Reserve Forces have executed the majority of
    these missions.
        Our successes in these global operations and exercises have not
    been achieved alone. We have worked closely alongside the Navy, our
    sister Services, and Federal agencies to realize the true potential of
    joint, interoperable forces in the new environment of 21st century
    warfare. The superior operational and personnel readiness levels we
    have been able to maintain directly reflect the strong, sustained
    support of Congress in last year's National Defense Authorization and
    Appropriations Acts. In fiscal year 2004, we seek your continued
    support for the President's budget so we can consolidate the gains made
    to date, improve those areas where shortfalls remain, and continue
    transforming the way the Navy-Marine Corps team will fight in the 21st
    century.

                            II. BUILDING ON SUCCESS

        The President's fiscal year 2004 budget, together with your
    support, will provide a strong foundation on which we can continue
    building on our successes. Our focus is on improving our ability to
    operate as an agile, lethal, ready, and effective member of a broader
    Joint Force that takes the complementary capabilities provided by each
    Service, and blends them into an integrated and effective force for
    meeting future challenges.
        Increases in our Military Personnel accounts have a positive effect
    on the retention of our most valued assets--our marines. Given the
    increasing pressure to modernize and transform the force, the Marine
    Corps is constantly working to identify and assess program tradeoffs to
    enable the most effectively balanced approach between competing demands
    and programs. These tradeoffs occur within a larger context of the
    Department's overall program tradeoff decisions, which is driving the
    Navy and Marine Corps to work more closely than ever before in our
    planning, budgeting, and decisionmaking. An additional concern that
    complicates this process is the sizeable unfunded cost of the ongoing
    global war on terrorism.
        Challenges also arise from the changing realities of our national
    security environment. The Marine Corps is committed to the idea that we
    will fight as an integral part of a joint team. We continue to place
    high priority on interoperability, shared concept development, and
    participation in joint exercises with our sister Services.
    Additionally, the security environment now demands that we pay more
    attention to our role in homeland defense, our critical infrastructure,
    and force protection--even as we deploy more forces overseas. These
    challenges demand that we balance competing priorities while remaining
    focused on maintaining excellence in warfighting.
    Adapting to a Changing, Dynamic World
        While we adapt the advantages of technology to meet the changing
    face of warfare, we draw strength from the unique culture and core
    values that make us `marines.' We look for innovation in four broad
    areas to address future challenges:

             Transformational technology
             New operational concepts
             Refined organizations
             Better business practices

        Innovative approaches culled from these efforts should provide
    insight into new capabilities that we can adapt for future warfighting.
    In this regard, we are currently engaged in an immediate and critical
    tasking to define how we, along with our partners in the Navy, intend
    to project naval power ashore in the 2015-2025 timeframe. This effort
    requires the intellectual rigor and participation of all the elements
    of our Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and is influencing the entire
    Marine Corps--from our structure and training to the way we will fight
    on future battlefields as an integral component of a Joint Force.
    Technology and Experimentation
        The plan for realizing future joint concepts consists of three
    closely related processes: (1) Joint Concept Development, (2) Joint
    Experimentation and Assessment, and (3) Joint Integration &
    Implementation. The overall process is more commonly known as Joint
    Concept Development and Experimentation. In order to ensure support and
    engagement throughout this process, the Marine Corps reorganized to
    establish three Joint Concept Development and Experimentation divisions
    under the cognizance of the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat
    Development Command. These three organizations are key elements of
    Marine Corps transformation and enable full Marine Corps involvement in
    joint experimentation and transformation as well as the Navy's Sea
    Trial process for naval experimentation and transformation.
        The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory maintains cognizance over
    Marine Corps-specific experimentation--with a focus on the tactical
    level--to develop enhanced warfighting capabilities for the future.
    Technologies and procedures are field tested in experiments conducted
    with the operating forces. In addition, the lab coordinates closely
    with the Office of Naval Research to identify promising technologies
    that support the next generation of warfighting capabilities.
    New Concepts and Organizations
        The Marine Corps is streamlining force development from concept to
    acquisition under the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development. Our
    Expeditionary Force Development System is a single system of dynamic
    functions integrated into a process that produces and sustains
    capabilities to meet the needs of the Marine Corps and the combatant
    commanders. The Marine Corps advocates for ground combat, aviation
    combat, command and control, and combat service support, as well as the
    Marine Requirements Oversight Council, are key participants in the
    process. The Expeditionary Force Development System continuously
    examines and evaluates current and emerging concepts and capabilities
    to improve and sustain a modern Marine Corps. The system is compatible
    with and supports naval and joint transformation efforts and integrates
    transformational, modernization, and legacy capabilities and processes.
    This integrated, concept-based driver for transformation is currently
    working on several ideas that will influence the future Marine Corps.
        Expeditionary Strike Groups. The Marine Corps and Navy are engaged
    in a series of experiments that will explore the Expeditionary Strike
    Group concept. This concept will combine the capabilities of surface
    action groups, submarines, and maritime patrol aircraft with those of
    Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units (Special
    Operations Capable), to provide greater combat capabilities to regional
    combatant commanders. In the near future, the Navy-Marine Corps team
    will conduct a pilot deployment on the west coast to test the
    Expeditionary Strike Group concept. Navy combatants have already been
    incorporated within the existing training and deployment cycle of the
    Amphibious Ready Group. This experiment will also allow us to test
    command-and-control arrangements for the Expeditionary Strike Group. It
    will provide critical information to support the future implementation
    of the concept and highlight any needed changes in service doctrine,
    organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
    and facilities.
        Tactical Aviation Integration. The Navy and Marine Corps team has
    embarked on a Tactical Aircraft (Strike-fighter) Integration plan that
    will enhance core combat capabilities and provide a more potent,
    cohesive, and affordable fighting force. This integration is the
    culmination of a long-term effort to generate greater combat capability
    from naval fixed-wing strike and fighter aircraft, and represents a
    shared commitment to employ the Department of the Navy's resources as
    judiciously as possible. This integration has been ongoing for several
    years, with four Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet squadrons operating as part
    of embarked carrier air wings. This Navy-Marine Corps effort will
    guarantee that naval aviation will be integrated as never before, and
    will effectively support the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and the joint
    warfighter. Specifically, the integration plan:

             Reinforces our expeditionary ethos
             Provides a smaller, more capable, more affordable
            force for the Department of the Navy
             Integrates Marine strike fighters in 10 Navy Carrier
            Air Wings
             Integrates three Navy strike fighter squadrons into
            the Marine Unit Deployment Program
             Includes the global sourcing of all DON strike fighter
            assets and ensures their support to Marine Air-Ground Task
            Forces and regional combatant commanders
             Provides increased combat capability forward
             Complements the enhanced seabasing concept

        A cornerstone of this plan is Department of the Navy funding and
    maintenance of legacy aircraft at the highest levels of readiness until
    the Joint Strike Fighter and F/A-18E/F replace them. This requires an
    unwavering commitment to level funding of strike fighter readiness
    across the Department of the Navy. These integration-driven readiness
    levels will allow the Navy-Marine Corps team to surge more aircraft
    than what is possible today.
        Enhanced Networked Seabasing. Fully networked, forward-deployed
    naval forces and platforms that are integrated into our seabasing
    capability will provide naval power projection for Joint Force
    Commanders. These forces will use the sea as a means of maneuver,
    enabling a broad range of joint campaign operations. Sea-based
    operations incorporate, integrate, protect, and sustain all aspects of
    naval power projection, from space to the ocean floor, from blue water
    to the littorals and inland--without dependence on land bases within
    the Joint Operating Area. Seabasing will provide enhanced capabilities
    to the naval force, such as rapid force closure, phased arrival and
    assembly at sea, selective offload of equipment tailored for individual
    missions, and force reconstitution for follow-on employment. The
    traditional naval qualities of persistence and sustainment--enhanced by
    advanced force-wide networks--underpin the staying power and
    flexibility of the sea base. Naval platforms can stay on-station, where
    they are needed, for extended periods of time. The at-sea
    maneuverability of the seabase, coupled with advanced underway
    replenishment technologies and techniques, will ensure force readiness
    over time.
        Integrated Logistics Capabilities. The Integrated Logistics
    Capabilities effort began as a unique collection of military, industry,
    and academic organizations collaborating to develop a future vision of
    Marine Corps logistics processes. The product is a set of
    transformational initiatives that will provide better support to the
    warfighter. The purpose of the Integrated Logistics Capabilities
    concept and process is to implement a transformation strategy, based on
    best practices, that provides the framework for the execution of agile,
    effective logistics support to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force, with
    the focus of streamlining the logistics chain.
        Capabilities are being conceptually refined and incrementally
    validated in the operating forces as they are identified and
    recommended. An assessment of the Proof-of-Concept, published in
    November 2002 by the Center for Naval Analysis, reflected improved
    supply response time (68 percent reduction in time) and overall repair
    cycle time (33 percent reduction).
        Over both the mid- and long-term, improved combat effectiveness and
    efficiencies in the logistics chain are expected. However, efficiencies
    cannot be fully realized until the people, process, and technology
    changes are applied across the entire operating force. The logistics
    transformation and process modernization, together with the cutting
    edge suite of technologies provided by the Global Combat Support
    System, will greatly enhance the combat capabilities of Marine forces.
        Reestablishment of Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies. We have
    validated the requirement to reestablish our Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison
    Companies (ANGLICO). These companies will provide our commanders a
    liaison capability with foreign area expertise to plan, coordinate, and
    employ terminal control of fires in support of joint, allied, and
    coalition forces. ANGLICO will be reestablished with a company on each
    coast and a separate brigade platoon in Okinawa. Each company will have
    a habitual relationship with the Reserves. Full operational capability
    is expected by late summer 2004.
        Marine Corps-U.S. Special Operations Command Initiatives. Today,
    105 marines are filling Special Forces billets around the world. In
    addition to providing the current Chief of Staff to U.S. Special
    Operations Command (USSOCOM), the Marine Corps provides support to and
    ensures interoperability with Special Forces through the actions of the
    SOCOM-Marine Corps Board. That board met twice in 2002 and developed
    initiatives in the areas of Operations, Training and Education,
    Communications/C\4\, Information Operations, Psychological Operations,
    Civil Affairs, Intelligence, Aviation, Future Concepts, and Equipment
    and Technology. One of the initiatives, pursued in coordination with
    the Naval Special Warfare Command, is the Marine Corps' first sizeable
    contribution of forces to the Special Operations Command. Consisting of
    81 marines and 5 sailors, a detachment has been organized, trained, and
    equipped to conduct special reconnaissance, direct action, coalition
    support, foreign internal defense, and other special operations
    missions, and will begin training at Camp Pendleton, California, in
    June 2003. They will subsequently transfer to the operational control
    of USSOCOM during October 2003 and deploy in April 2004 as augmentation
    to a Naval Special Warfare Squadron supporting both U.S. Pacific
    Command and U.S. Central Command.
    Better Business Practices
        We continue to seek out and use better business practices to
    achieve greater cost-effectiveness, improve performance, and sharpen
    our focus on our warfighting core competencies. In line with the
    competitive sourcing initiatives in the President's Management Agenda,
    we are increasing emphasis across our supporting establishment on
    competing our commercial activities with the private sector. We are
    complementing this initiative with continued development of an
    effective activity-based costing and management initiative across our
    installations. This allows us to focus on the true cost of various
    functions and services and to develop benchmarks that enable us to
    improve performance and to focus analyses on cost-saving initiatives.
    This will occur both in commercial areas that we compete, and in non-
    commercial areas that cannot be competed. Competitions completed to
    date have resulted in saving millions of dollars annually and returning
    almost 900 marines to the operating forces. We will continue to seek
    additional competition candidates. Activity-Based Costing and
    Management initiatives provided our installation commanders with cost
    and performance information that enabled them to save over $37 million
    last year. As we refine our databases, we expect continuing increases
    both in performance and cost effectiveness.
        Through all of the efforts outlined above, the Marine Corps is
    building on today's success. As we build on our current capabilities,
    embrace innovation, and transform to meet the daunting conventional and
    asymmetric threats to U.S. security in the 21st century, we will
    continue to be the Nation's Total Force in Readiness, fielding warriors
    whose unique seabased expeditionary and combined-arms capabilities will
    be critical to success in crisis and conflict. In the process of
    balancing our programs to meet these goals, we will focus on two
    primary objectives: (1) our main effort--maintaining excellence in
    warfighting, and (2) taking care of our marines and families.

                          III. TAKING CARE OF OUR OWN

        Providing for the needs of our marines, their families, and our
    civilian marines remain among our top priorities. The most advanced
    aircraft, ship, or weapons system is of no value without highly-
    motivated and well-trained people. People and leadership remain the
    real foundations of the Corps' capabilities. It is important to note
    that the Marine Corps operates as a Total Force, including elements of
    both active and Reserve components. We continue to strengthen the
    exceptional bonds within our Total Force by further integrating the
    Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing operations and training.
    Human Resources
        End Strength. The congressionally-authorized increase in Marine
    Corps end strength to 175,000 in response to the global war on
    terrorism is very much appreciated. This increase of 2,400 marines
    allows us to sustain the increased missions associated with the
    activation of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (antiterrorism),
    enabling us to replace marines in the active units that we ``borrowed''
    in standing up the brigade, and continue to provide the Nation with a
    robust, scalable force option specifically dedicated to antiterrorism.
        Recruiting. Sustaining our ranks with the highest quality young men
    and women is the mission of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command.
    Recruiting Command has consistently accomplished this mission for more
    than the past 7 years for enlisted recruiting and 12 years for officer
    recruiting. These achievements provide the momentum fueling the
    continuous pursuit to improve the recruiting process and enhance the
    quality of life for our recruiters. To continue to attract America's
    finest youth, Recruiting Command has provided recruiters with the best
    tools available to accomplish their mission. The Marine Corps supports
    the National Call to Service Act and continues to work closely with DOD
    in developing an implementation policy. We expect to commence enlisting
    individuals under this program commencing October 1, 2003. The Marine
    Corps Reserve achieved its fiscal year 2002 recruiting goals,
    accessioning 5,904 non-prior service marines and 4,213 prior service
    marines. With regard to our Reserve component, our most challenging
    recruiting and retention issue is the ability to fill out our Selected
    Marine Corps Reserve units with qualified officers. The Marine Corps
    recruits Reserve officers almost exclusively from the ranks of those
    who have first served a tour as an active duty Marine officer.
        While this practice ensures our Selected Marine Corps Reserve unit
    officers have the proven experience, knowledge, and leadership
    abilities when we need it the most--during mobilization--it limits the
    recruiting pool that we can draw from to staff our units. As a result,
    the Selected Reserve currently has a shortage of company grade (second
    lieutenant to captain) officers. We are exploring methods to increase
    the Reserve participation of company grade officers through increased
    recruiting efforts, increased command focus on emphasizing Reserve
    participation upon leaving active duty, and Reserve officer programs
    for qualified enlisted marines. We are also pursuing the legislative
    authority to provide an affiliation bonus to Reserve officers as an
    additional incentive for participation in the Selected Marine Corps
    Reserve.
        Retention. Retaining the best and the brightest marines has always
    been a major goal of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is by design a
    youthful service, however, it is of paramount importance to retain the
    highest quality marines to lead our young force. History has proven
    that leadership in the Staff Noncommissioned Officer ranks has been the
    major contributor to the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. The
    Marine Corps has two retention standards. Our First Term Alignment Plan
    has consistently achieved its reenlistment requirements over the past 8
    years. With one-third of the current fiscal year completed, we have
    achieved 87 percent of our first-term retention goal. A look at our
    Subsequent Term Alignment Plan (second tour and beyond) demonstrates
    that we have already retained 51 percent of our goal for this fiscal
    year. Both of these trends indicate healthy continuation rates in our
    career force.
        Current officer retention is at an 18-year high, continuing the
    strong performance of the last 2 years. Despite this positive trend, we
    cannot become complacent. As a Corps, we will continue to target
    specific qualifications and skills through continuation pay. Military
    compensation that is competitive with the private sector provides the
    flexibility required to meet the challenge of maintaining stability in
    manpower planning.
        Marine Corps Reserve--Partners in the Total Force. It is important
    to note that the Marine Corps operates as a Total Force, including
    elements of both active and Reserve components. We continue to
    strengthen the exceptional bonds within our Total Force by further
    integrating the Marine Corps Reserve into ongoing training and
    operations. Concurrent with the various initiatives underway to improve
    integration and update capabilities, the Marine Corps Reserve continues
    to support its primary mission of augmentation and reinforcement.
    Reserve units and marines provided over 1.8 million man-days in fiscal
    year 2002. Reserves provided support at all levels within the Marine
    Corps and at combatant commands and high-level staffs.
        As we enter the 21st century, the overall structure of Marine
    Forces Reserve will retain the current basic structure. However, Marine
    Forces Reserve is currently working to create new capabilities
    identified as part of its comprehensive review. Both as a structural
    and an operational change, Marine Forces Reserve is increasing its
    operational ties with the Warfighting Commanders by improving lines of
    communication with our operating forces. These increased operational
    ties will improve interoperability, increase training opportunities,
    and enhance the warfighting capabilities of the Total Force.
        Mobilization. Since the events of September 11, the Marine Corps
    judiciously activated Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) marines in
    response to both internal and joint operational requirements. The
    Marine Corps has maximized the use of individual volunteers to meet
    these requirements primarily in the areas of staff augmentation and
    force protection. In addition, Selected Marine Corps Units (SMCR) were
    activated for force protection requirements in support of homeland
    security. Because of emerging requirements associated with war on
    terrorism, we began involuntary recall of some of our IRRs on January
    17, 2003.
        Stop Loss. On January 15, 2003, the Marine Corps instituted Stop
    Loss across the Marine Corps to meet the emerging requirements
    associated with the expanding war on terrorism. Stop Loss was initiated
    to provide unit stability/cohesion, maintain unit readiness, meet
    expanded force protection requirements, and to reduce the requirement
    to active IRR personnel. We will continue to make judicious use of this
    authority and continue to discharge marines for humanitarian, physical
    disability, administrative, and disciplinary reasons. We have
    instructed our general officers to continue to use a common sense
    approach and have authorized them to release marines from active duty
    if it is in the best interest of the Marine Corps and the marine.
    Education
        Our leaders--especially our noncommissioned officers--throughout
    the entire chain of command have kept the Corps successful and
    victorious. Their sense of responsibility is the cornerstone of our
    hard-earned successes. We will continue to develop leaders who can
    think on their feet, act independently, and succeed. In the future, as
    today, leaders will continue to instill stamina and toughness in each
    individual while simultaneously reinforcing character that values
    honor, integrity, and taking care of our fellow marines--including
    treating each other with dignity and respect. Aggressive and informed
    leadership demands education, training, and mentoring. The importance
    of these key elements cannot be over-emphasized, and we must attend to
    each at every opportunity.
        Marine Corps University has responsibility and authority for the
    planning, coordinating, and overseeing all education for our marines.
    The university is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges
    and Schools to confer Masters degrees and currently offers a Masters of
    Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, and a Masters of
    Military Studies at the Command and Staff College. The Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff currently accredits the War College, Command and
    Staff College, and the College of Continuing Education for Phase I
    Joint Education. The President of the University also exercises command
    authority over the Expeditionary Warfare School and the Staff
    Noncommissioned Officer Academies worldwide. Notable accomplishments
    include Department of Education approval of a Masters of Operational
    Studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting, which is the first step
    toward our third Master's degree program.
        Plans for the future include providing coordination and continuity
    through a coherent education plan for all marines. Our goal is to
    develop better warfighting leaders at all levels through an increased
    emphasis on relevant, structured education--at the graduate and
    undergraduate level--through both resident programs and distance
    education. Our intent is to greatly expand beyond the current emphasis
    on field-grade officers to support leadership development throughout
    the training and education continuum from marine private through
    general officer and to specifically bring senior noncommissioned
    officers further along the education continuum.
        Our lifelong learning mission is to establish an integrated
    approach to learning; providing marines with one destination for
    enrollment in a college program, access to research tools such as
    books, periodicals, and the Internet, basic skills enhancement, and
    nonresident courses. In the face of a requirement to increase tuition
    assistance from 75 percent to 100 percent of tuition costs, and the
    rate from $187.50 per semester hour to $250 per semester hour, the
    Marine Corps added the necessary funds to expand the tuition assistance
    program in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which provides sustainment until
    fiscal year 2009.
    Quality of Life/Quality of Service
        Congressional support for increases in the Basic Allowance for
    Housing, as well as the aggressive Marine Corps use of the Public
    Private Venture (PPV) authority provided by Congress 5 years ago, are
    resulting in dramatic improvements to the housing of our marines and
    their families. Your continued support of our budget to help us achieve
    zero out-of-pocket expenses by fiscal year 2005 is greatly appreciated.
    The condition of other infrastructure, such as our barracks,
    workspaces, and training ranges, are also key factors in overall
    quality of life. While our infrastructure budgets reflect only the
    minimal essential military construction and re-capitalization
    necessary, they will allow us to achieve a re-capitalization rate of 67
    years within the FYDP (down from 100 years in fiscal year 1999) and an
    improvement of our facilities readiness by fiscal year 2013.
        We have been aggressively working to reduce the number of marines
    and civilian marines in non-core business areas, reapplying the marines
    to other operational requirements, and looking to optimize the use of
    civil service/contractor support where appropriate. Our track record is
    good. By example, we have reapplied marines in the garrison food
    service and mobile equipment areas back to the operating forces and
    competed a significant number of civilian positions. We will continue
    this process in line with the President's Management Agenda to review
    50 percent of our positions by fiscal year 2008. By ensuring that
    quality of service remains high, we will help maintain our successful
    record of recruitment and retention.
    Families
        The Marine Corps is an expeditionary force prepared to deploy on
    short notice to accomplish assigned missions. While we may recruit
    marines, we almost always retain families--it becomes a family decision
    for a marine to stay for an entire career. Because of our expeditionary
    culture, deployment support is provided to marines and their families
    as part of our normal operations, largely through the efforts of Marine
    Corps Community Services. In addition to concerted efforts to improve
    housing and family services, security and support is offered during
    pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment phases of our
    operations. The Marine Corps also offers numerous programs focused on
    new parent support and the prevention of domestic violence, as well as
    services and programs for infants, toddlers, children, and teens. The
    Exceptional Family Member Program focuses on assistance to service
    personnel who have a family member with special needs before, during,
    and after Permanent Change of Station Orders.
    Safety
        Ensuring a safe command climate and working environment remains a
    critical concern for the Marine Corps. Often, the settings and the work
    our marines do are dangerous, but effective command climates
    continually mitigate those dangers through planning and leadership. Our
    safety programs are integral to force protection and operational
    readiness. Leadership and programming in safety awareness and standards
    are vital to providing marines and their families with a meaningful
    quality of life and service. On the heels of a very successful year
    prior, fiscal year 2002 was a disappointing year for safety in the
    Corps, as we lost more marines to mishaps in fiscal year 2002 than we
    had in any single year for the preceding decade. Our aviation mishap
    rate increased as well (from 1.40 to 3.9 class A mishaps per 100,000
    flight hours).
        These results do not indicate a lack of desire to safeguard
    marines. Rather, several factors were involved that made it
    particularly difficult to prevent mishaps through normal operational
    risk management efforts. Demographically, the Marine Corps is a younger
    force than the other Services (by an average 6 to 8 years), with
    maturity being a contributing factor in many mishaps; however, none of
    these factors are excuses for any failure to avoid preventable mishaps.
    Our leadership at all levels is deeply concerned about the negative
    trend and we are actively involved in multiple efforts to improve
    readiness and save our most precious marines and valuable equipment.

                 IV. OUR MAIN EFFORT--EXCELLENCE IN WARFIGHTING

        Marines have a vision for the future, and we are moving forward
    with the modernization and transformation efforts needed to make this
    vision a reality. We fully understand that our vision cannot be
    achieved independent of our sister Services. Each of the Services has
    its own critical role to play in providing for our Nation's collective
    security; however, it is important that each of our contributions be,
    simultaneously, both unique and complementary. In particular, the Corps
    stresses the importance of our key partnership with the Navy. The Navy-
    Marine Corps team has never been stronger, or more necessary for our
    Nation.
        We have stated that our first concern is with the care and
    stewardship of our people. This philosophy extends to the rest of our
    programming in that we focus on procuring the programs and equipment
    that will maximize the abilities of our marines to perform effectively
    in combat. With the foundation of requirements drawn from our emerging
    concepts, the Marine Corps is transforming its warfighting systems and
    assets throughout the elements of our Marine forces. The following
    examples reflect but a few of our transformation and modernization
    efforts. A more comprehensive description of the Marine Corps' entire
    acquisition program can be found in the publication entitled Marine
    Corps Concepts & Programs 2003.
    Training
        We believe the enduring wisdom, ``you train the way you fight.''
    Because of this, our training exercises are becoming ever more joint
    and combined to provide our marines with the experience they will need
    when called upon to respond to crises--because there is no doubt that
    we will work alongside our sister Services and coalition partners from
    other nations in such circumstances. The Marine Corps Combat Training
    Center at Twentynine Palms, California, focuses on integrated live fire
    and maneuver, as well as combined arms training, and will continue to
    play a central role as our foremost training and testing site for
    Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Ongoing initiatives will expand the
    role of the Combat Training Center and transform it into a ``Center of
    Excellence'' that will focus the training efforts across our operating
    forces. The Combat Training Center facilitates and supports the
    development of new concepts and capabilities, thereby reinforcing our
    combat effectiveness, enhancing joint interoperability, and supporting
    Dodd transformation efforts.
        The future role of the Combat Training Center will grow beyond its
    current emphasis on battalion-level integrated live fire, combined arms
    training to support expanded training opportunities for all elements
    (ground, air, combat service support, and command) of Marine Air-Ground
    Task Forces up to and including a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This
    will include enabling multi-site, distributed training evolutions that
    tie together units from various bases; and investing in technology that
    simultaneously links live, virtual, and constructive training.
    Additionally, improvements to the existing Expeditionary Air Field and
    construction of a large-scale urban training facility are being studied
    as possible ways to enhance training opportunities at Twentynine Palms.
    All of these efforts have the potential to increase the capability of
    our training center to support evolving training requirements, enabling
    the Corps to maintain its focus on uniquely marine training skills,
    while providing a vehicle to further integrate Marine Corps
    capabilities into those of the Joint Force.
    Infrastructure
        Marine Corps infrastructure consists of 15 major bases and stations
    and 185 Reserve facilities in the United States and Japan. In keeping
    with the Corps' expeditionary nature, these installations are
    strategically located near air and seaports of embarkation, and are
    serviced by major truck routes and railheads to allow for the rapid and
    efficient movement of marines and materiel. Recognized as the ``fifth
    element'' of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force because of the close link
    to the operating forces and their operational readiness, the condition
    of the Corps' bases and stations is of vital importance. With the
    ability to train as an integrated force being a fundamental requirement
    of the Corps, infrastructure development planning is designed to
    provide the facilities, training areas, and ranges (both air and
    ground) to accomplish this requirement while minimizing excess and
    redundant capacities. With increasing encroachment pressures and
    constrained fiscal resources, the Marine Corps face significant
    challenges to provide and maintain a lean and efficient infrastructure
    that fully meets changing mission demands.
        Blount Island Acquisition. We are committed to undertake the wisest
    possible course to conserve our real property and, when necessary, to
    acquire any additional property that is mission critical. The Blount
    Island facility in Jacksonville, Florida, is a national asset that must
    be acquired to ensure its availability for long-term use. Blount
    Island's peacetime mission of supporting the Maritime Pre-positioning
    Force is vitally important, while its wartime capability of supporting
    large-scale logistics sustainment from the continental United States
    gives it strategic significance. The facility will play a vital role in
    the national military strategy as the site for maintenance operations
    of the Maritime Pre-positioning Force for years to come. The Marine
    Corps plans to acquire the Blount Island facility in two phases. Phase
    1, funded in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001, is currently in
    progress and will acquire interests in approximately 311 acres of land
    for the primary purpose of ensuring public safety on parcels adjacent
    to the leased central management operational area. Phase 2, planned for
    fiscal year 2004, involves acquisition of the central maintenance
    operational area, consisting of over 1,000 acres.
        Training at Eglin Air Force Base. With cessation of training at
    Vieques, Puerto Rico, the established training ranges, quality of
    training support, and proximity to the ocean available at Eglin Air
    Force Base, Florida, can provide Naval Expeditionary Forces with an
    alternative training capability. Eglin's capabilities, location, and
    tenant commands provide the opportunity to facilitate joint training
    between Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Special Operations
    Forces. Development of an expeditionary force training capability at
    Eglin can support the Secretary of Defense's vision and direction for
    training transformation and the development of a Joint National
    Training Capability. This type of training will be critical to naval
    expeditionary combat-readiness.
        The Marine Corps proposes to execute two 10-day training exercises
    with a Marine Expeditionary Unit at Eglin each year. These exercises
    include a variety of scenarios such as amphibious landings, raids,
    mechanized operations, helicopter operations, and live fire and
    maneuver exercises. No final decision on training activities will be
    made until an environmental assessment currently underway is completed.
    The Navy and Marine Corps are actively working to develop and sustain
    cooperative relationships with the local community and the State of
    Florida.
        Encroachment and Environmental Issues. Encroachment--defined as any
    deliberative action that can cause the loss of, or restrict, the use of
    land, airspace, frequency, or sea maneuver areas--is a serious threat
    to the operational readiness of the Corps. Urban and residential areas
    now surround many Marine installations that were originally remotely
    situated. This growth is often accompanied by pressure for access to
    Marine Corps resources, or demands to curtail Marine Corps operations
    to make them more compatible with surrounding land uses. The Corps'
    training lands often provide excellent habitat for threatened and
    endangered species, serving as islands of biodiversity amid the crush
    of densely populated urban areas that surround many of our
    installations. The Marine Corps is proactively engaged with Federal,
    State, and local agencies and governments, as well as nongovernmental
    organizations, to provide win-win solutions to these encroachment
    pressures, and ensure compatible land usage and environmental security
    without degrading training and mission readiness. Unimpeded access to
    our installations and ranges is critical to the Marine Corps remaining
    America's ``Force in Readiness.''
        Our Nation has crafted a strong environmental code of conduct
    structured on a wide range of Federal, State, and local laws and
    regulations. Vague or inflexible environmental requirements, however,
    can present significant challenges for marines performing their primary
    mission. We support ongoing efforts to seek clarity and limited
    flexibility in certain environmental laws, so that we may more
    effectively balance our training requirements with our long-term
    environmental stewardship responsibilities. Our ultimate goal is to
    ``train the way we fight,'' while preserving the natural environment.
    Today, marines at all levels perform their jobs with an increased
    awareness of potential environmental impacts. All of our bases and
    stations, for example, have implemented Integrated Natural Resource
    Management Plans and aggressive pollution prevention programs. The hard
    work does not end with these initiatives. The impact of encroachment on
    the Corps' ability to fully utilize its installations are varied and
    require constant vigilance and attention to ensure that operational
    readiness is not diminished.
    Command and Control
        Interoperability is the key to improving naval expeditionary
    command and control effectiveness, especially as we begin to integrate
    battlespace sensors residing in our manned and unmanned aerial, space,
    and ground vehicles. This is particularly true as the Marine Corps
    continues to work routinely with a range of government, non-government,
    and international agencies. The command, control, communication, and
    computer (C\4\) end-to-end interoperability of the Global Information
    Grid will serve to enhance our ability to conduct joint, multi-
    department, and multi-agency operations through the use of technology,
    standards, architectures, and tools.
        The Marine Corps works closely with the Joint Staff, combatant
    commanders, operating forces, and other Services to ensure that, where
    possible, joint concepts of operations are developed for common
    capabilities. An example of this process is occurring with the
    development of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which combines numerous
    single function programs of current inventories into a single,
    interoperable, joint radio program that will provide secure digital
    communications while enhancing wideband tactical networking.
    Intelligence
        Our fiscal year 1996-2003 enhancements to Marine Intelligence
    Support are paying off during Operation Enduring Freedom and the global
    war on terrorism. Intelligence Support organic to Marine Forces
    combined with capabilities from our Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
    in Quantico, Virginia, to provide federated production (reachback)
    support has been validated through current operations. Marine
    Expeditionary Unit's forward deployed with organic all-source
    intelligence collection and production capabilities provide current
    intelligence support to Marine and Special Operations units. Our
    deployed signals intelligence, human intelligence, ground sensor, and
    reconnaissance teams provide the commander current situational
    awareness. All-source intelligence marines have the systems and
    training to integrate organic collection, network with the Joint Force
    on the ground, and effectively reach back to the Marine Corps
    Intelligence Activity and joint centers at secure locations.
    Mobility
        While the global war on terrorism has demonstrated the current
    capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team, our continuous
    transformation and modernization efforts hold even greater potential
    for increasing naval power projection capabilities in the future. Many
    of these efforts focus on increased speed, range, payload, and
    flexibility of maneuver units--mobility. This concept includes a vision
    of an all-vertical lift Air Combat Element, with the introduction of
    tiltrotor and short-take-off/vertical-landing (STOVL) aircraft. The
    following initiatives are some of the keys to the achievement of Marine
    Corps operational mobility objectives:
        MV-22 Osprey. The MV-22 remains the Marine Corps' number one
    aviation acquisition priority. While fulfilling the critical Marine
    Corps medium lift requirement, the MV-22's increased capabilities of
    range, speed, payload, and survivability will generate truly
    transformational tactical and operational opportunities. With the
    Osprey, Marine forces operating from the sea base will be able to take
    the best of long-range maneuver and strategic surprise, and join it
    with the best of the sustainable forcible-entry capability. Ospreys
    will replace our aging fleets of CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea
    Stallion helicopters.
        KC-130J. The KC-130J will bring increased capability and mission
    flexibility to the planning table with its satellite communications
    system, survivability, and enhancements in aircraft systems, night
    systems, and rapid ground refueling. The KC-130J is procured as a
    commercial off-the-shelf aircraft that is currently in production. We
    are pursuing a multi-year program for purchase with the U.S. Air Force.
        Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. The Advanced Amphibious
    Assault Vehicle (AAAV) is the Marine Corps' only Acquisition Category
    1D program and will be one of the principal enablers of the
    Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare concept. AAAV will provide never before
    realized high-speed land and water maneuver, a highly lethal day/night
    fighting ability, and advanced armor and nuclear-biological-chemical
    protection. This--coupled with a systematic integration into emerging
    service and Joint Command and Control networked information,
    communications, and intelligence architectures--will provide the Marine
    Corps with increased operational tempo, survivability, and lethality
    across the spectrum of operations.
        Maritime Pre-positioning Force. The Maritime Pre-positioning Force
    (Future) will be the true enabler of primarily sea-based operations.
    When it becomes operational, the future Maritime Pre-positioning Force
    role will expand beyond that of today, and will provide a true
    seabasing capability. In this regard, it will serve four functions that
    the current capability cannot: (1) Phased at-sea arrival and assembly
    of units; (2) Selective offload of equipment and cargo; (3) Long-term,
    sea-based sustainment of the landing force; and (4) At-sea
    reconstitution and redeployment of the force. The naval services are
    exploring several new technology areas during the development of
    Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future). Currently, the Maritime Pre-
    positioning Force (Future) program is conducting an analysis of
    alternatives to inform an acquisition decision by the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense.
        High-Speed Vessel (HSV). High-speed vessels will enhance the Marine
    Corps' capability to perform a wide range of missions, from providing
    support to a theater security cooperation plan to sustaining long-term
    operations ashore. High-speed vessels can enhance our ability to
    conduct sea-based operations and use the sea as maneuver space. HSVs do
    not have the loitering and forcible entry capabilities of amphibious
    ships or the pre-positioning capacity of our Maritime Prepositioned
    Force Squadrons. However, their shallow draft, high speed,
    maneuverability, and open architecture make them a valuable link in a
    seamless logistics system that extends from source of supply to the sea
    base and the Joint Force, enabling a faster, more responsive, and
    capable deployment of a range of force modules from forward-based
    ``hubs'' such as Okinawa, or from the United States. The Marine Corps
    is currently testing and validating these concepts by employing a high-
    speed vessel in the Pacific theater as a form of strategic lift.
        Power Projection Platforms. Combined with embarked marines, naval
    expeditionary warships provide the Nation with forward-presence and
    flexible crisis response forces. They also provide a truly unparalleled
    expeditionary forcible-entry capability. As part of a joint effort, the
    Marine Corps will remain capable of getting to the fight rapidly in
    order to decisively deter or defeat adversaries who try to impose their
    will on our country or its allies. A fiscally constrained programmatic
    goal of 12 Amphibious Ready Groups--one that deliberately accepts
    increased operational risk by attempting to balance force structure
    with available resources--does not change the warfighting requirement
    to lift the Assault Echelons of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades via
    future platforms for amphibious shipping. The Marine Corps supports the
    LPD-17 and a modified LHD-8 (``Plug Plus'') ship design in fiscal year
    2007 and will evaluate the adequacy of the R&D and SCN funding for the
    development of future LHA(R) ships for the remainder of the class.
        Mine Countermeasure Capabilities. Naval expeditionary forces
    require an effective countermine warfare capability to open and
    maintain sea lines of communication and to operate within the littoral
    battle space. This is probably our greatest concern when it comes to
    projecting power in an anti-access environment. With respect to mine
    countermeasures, we require a family of capabilities that encompasses
    mine detection, location, neutralization, marking, and data
    dissemination. Designed to provide an organic mine countermeasures
    capability within operationally acceptable timelines and with
    acceptable levels of operational risk, this next generation of systems
    includes the Advanced Mine Detector, the Assault Breacher Vehicle, the
    Remote Minehunting System, and the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance
    System. Our most critical mine countermeasures deficiencies exist in
    the area near the shoreline through the high water mark and beyond,
    where detection and neutralization capabilities are extremely limited.
    Given the broad proliferation of known and unknown mined areas
    throughout the world, we must improve our ability to operate in this
    exceptionally lethal environment. Our intent is to leverage America's
    strength in technology to dramatically improve our ability to locate
    and avoid or neutralize mines and obstacles as necessary, and
    eventually remove the man from the minefield.
    Fires and Effects
        With the increased range and speed of expeditionary mobility
    assets, the landward area of influence of naval forces has increased by
    an order of magnitude. Consequently, the Nation requires weapon systems
    with correspondingly greater range, lethality, flexibility, and
    tactical mobility. A range of lethal and non-lethal fire-support
    programs is moving the Corps in that direction. The development and
    acquisition of non-lethal weapons systems will expand the number of
    options available to commanders confronted with situations in which the
    use of deadly force is inappropriate. The Marine Corps is developing a
    robust non-lethal capability that will address the non-lethal core
    requirements of clearing facilities, crowd control, and area denial.
    Additionally, we are enhancing the capabilities with which we can
    affect our adversaries that defy the traditional concept of weapons and
    fire-support means. Technical advances in directed-energy weapons hold
    much promise for future capabilities in this area.
        Joint Strike Fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter is the next-
    generation strikefighter for the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy and
    will replace the Marine Corps' AV-8B and F/A-18A/C/Ds. The JSF family
    of aircraft will include a STOVL variant, a conventional take-off and
    landing (CTOL) variant, and an aircraft carrier-capable variant.
    Commonality between the variants will reduce both development and life-
    cycle costs and will result in significant savings when compared to the
    development of three separate aircraft. The Marine Corps requires that
    its STOVL variant be able to operate from large-deck amphibious ships,
    austere sites, and forward operating bases. The STOVL Joint Strike
    Fighter version can use from three to five times more airfields around
    the world than our existing conventional take-off and landing aircraft.
    Moreover, because the STOVL variant can operate from both conventional
    carriers and amphibious assault ship decks, it thereby effectively
    doubles the number of platforms available for seabased operations. The
    advantages of a stealthy STOVL strike fighter--capable of taking off
    from an expeditionary base on land or at sea, flying at supersonic
    cruise, accomplishing its mission with advanced sensors and weapons,
    and then returning to its expeditionary site--are dramatic. The STOVL
    Joint Strike Fighter will provide the reliability, survivability, and
    lethality that marines will need in the years ahead, and transform the
    very foundations of naval tactical air power for the 21st century.
        Naval Surface Fire Support. Our ability to provide fires in support
    of expeditionary forces operations beyond the beach has not kept pace
    with the dramatic increases in mobility. Critical deficiencies
    currently exist in the capability of the Navy to provide all-weather,
    accurate, lethal, and responsive fire support throughout the depth of
    the littoral in support of expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps
    supports the Navy's near-term efforts to develop an enhanced naval
    surface fire support capability with the fielding of the 5-inch/62-
    caliber naval gun and the development of extended-range munitions. In
    the far-term, the Marine Corps supports the development and fielding of
    the Advanced Destroyer [DD(X)], armed with 155 mm Advanced Gun Systems
    and Land Attack Missiles, to fully meet our naval surface fire support
    requirements. Our Nation's expeditionary forces ashore will remain at
    considerable risk for want of suitable sea-based fire support until
    DD(X) joins the fleet in significant numbers.
        Indirect Fire-Support. A triad of indirect fire-support programs
    will provide needed firepower enhancements for marines in the near- to
    mid-term. The first element of the triad is the Lightweight-155 mm (LW-
    155) towed howitzer needed to replace our current M-198 howitzer, which
    is at the end of its service life. The LW-155 is a joint Marine Corps-
    Army effort that will meet or exceed all the requirements of the
    current system while significantly reducing its weight.
        The second element, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
    (HIMARS), will deliver very high volumes of rocket artillery in support
    of the ground scheme of maneuver. The HIMARS will provide accurate,
    responsive general support and general support reinforcing indirect
    fires at long range, under all weather conditions, and throughout all
    phases of combat operations ashore. It will fire both precision and
    area munitions to a maximum range of 36 miles.
        The Expeditionary Fire Support System, the third system of the
    land-based fire support triad, will accompany marines in any
    expeditionary mode of operation. It will be the primary indirect fire-
    support system for the vertical assault element of the ship-to-
    objective maneuver force. The Expeditionary Fire Support System, as a
    system, will be internally transportable by helicopter or tiltrotor
    aircraft to allow the greatest range and flexibility of employment for
    our future operations.
        Information Operations. Defense planners are engaged in studies
    exploring Information Operations as a core military competency, fully
    integrated into both deliberate and crisis action planning. The Marine
    Corps intends to enhance our operational capability in both offensive
    and defensive Information Operations. Marine Corps doctrine and
    warfighting publications are being reviewed and revised to acknowledge
    Information Operations as a core warfighting capability fundamental to
    all operations spanning the spectrum of conflict with equal
    significance during non-combatant and humanitarian operations. We
    recognize a requirement to develop and train an Information Operations
    career force of trained professionals from the ground up in support of
    joint and interagency efforts.
        New Weapons Technologies. The Corps is particularly interested in
    adapting truly transformational weapon technologies. We have forged
    partnerships throughout the Department of Defense, other agencies, and
    with industry over the past several years in an effort to develop and
    adapt the most hopeful areas of science and technology. Several notable
    programs with promising technologies include: (1) advanced tactical
    lasers, (2) high-power microwave, non-lethal active denial systems, (3)
    free electron lasers, (4) electromagnetic guns (rail guns), and (5)
    common modular missiles for aircraft.
    Logistics and Combat Service Support
        The Marine Corps logistics' vision is to significantly enhance the
    expeditionary and joint warfighting capabilities of our operating
    forces. Key warfighting capabilities encompassed in our future
    concepts--Enhanced Networked Seabasing and Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver--
    will be defined by our logistic capabilities and limitations. Hence, we
    are committed to exploring and implementing actions to increase combat
    power, operational versatility, and deployability. The concept of
    focused logistics in Joint Vision 2020 is guiding the Marine Corps as
    we strive to increase the sustained forward-deployed capability of our
    forces. Future force combat service support--and the Marine Corps
    logistics that enables it--will be changing as we shift more of our
    operations to the sea base. At the forefront of this effort is the
    Marine Corps Logistics Campaign Plan that outlines essential objectives
    and tasks based upon overarching Marine Corps, naval, joint, and DOD
    concepts and guidance. Our strategy encompasses four pillars:
        Logistics Information Fusion and C2. A key to current and emerging
    warfighting capabilities is a robust and responsive logistics
    information technology capability--one that is integrated with our
    command-and-control architecture and interoperable with naval and joint
    systems. The Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) and
    shared data environment, along with the Common Logistics Command and
    Control System, provide logisticians across the Marine Corps with a set
    of common logistics assessment, planning, and execution tools that are
    interoperable with the common operating picture.
        Seamless Distribution. The single capability that defines Marine
    forces in a joint environment is its ability to sustain itself over an
    extended period of time. The principal goal is to move from defining
    sustainment in terms of deployable ``days of supply'' to a continuous
    uninterrupted sustainment capability for the force. A key element in
    achieving this is integrating current distribution processes and
    systems into broader naval and joint distribution processes. Achieving
    this capability will not only greatly enhance naval operations, but
    will be transferable to the task of sustaining Joint Forces and
    operations.
        Enhanced Equipment Readiness. The bulk of our logistics effort and
    associated ``footprint'' is driven by its equipment-support activities.
    The Marine Corps seeks to reduce the required level of support for
    equipment by greatly improving the reliability, availability, and
    maintainability of ground tactical equipment.
        Enterprise Integration. Achieving the emerging warfighting
    capabilities envisioned by future concepts require dynamic shifts in
    our logistics processes and organizations. Leading this effort toward
    logistics modernization is true enterprise integration consisting of
    GCSS-MC, process reengineering, and organizational reform.

                                 V. CONCLUSION

        The major challenges confronting the Marine Corps today center on
    organizing, training, and equipping our force to better support Joint
    Force Commanders, now and in the future. The modernization programs and
    the transformational systems that we are pursuing are key to our
    ability to meet the Nation's wartime, crisis, and peacetime
    requirements. We have put into place well-conceived programs addressing
    the needs of our marines and their families, the requirement to enhance
    the current readiness of legacy systems, the critical role
    infrastructure plays in present and future readiness, and the balance
    between modernization and transformation.
        Our capabilities, combined with those of our sister Services and
    Special Operations Forces, form the integrated array of military
    capabilities America needs to confront an increasingly varied and
    threatening national security landscape. You can remain justifiably
    proud of what your Marine Corps contributes as America's forward
    engagement and expeditionary combined-arms force. We are grateful for
    the unwavering support you provide in this vitally important work.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        General Jumper.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. JUMPER, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED
                            STATES AIR FORCE

        General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished
    members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you here today. I am proud to represent the
    airmen of our United States Air Force who serve proudly beside
    the soldiers, sailors, and marines represented at the table
    here today.
        I would like to echo my support and my thanks for what this
    committee has done to improve the readiness of our forces
    around the world. There is nothing that contributes more to
    retention than to give that crew chief on the flight line the
    part he needs to fix his airplane. I share Vern Clark's
    sentiment; it has never been better in our United States Air
    Force, but it is due to the support that is felt from this
    committee, and we thank you for that.
        This year we celebrate 100 years of powered flight. Many of
    those celebrations will go on in Senator Dole's State and
    around the United States. We have come a long way since those
    days. We find ourselves in a much different world than we
    expected as we face a variety of threats from the linear
    battlefields of Iraq to the cave environments of Afghanistan.
        But these challenges have been and will continue to be met
    through a force of dedicated airmen from the active duty, the
    Guard, and the Reserve. We have all had a busy year and our
    tempo continues unchecked. Over the skies of our own United
    States, we have flown more than 25,000 fighter sorties. Today,
    the 390th Fighter Squadron from Mountain Home, Idaho, is
    overhead the Capitol even as we sit here today. They have been
    joined by tanker, airlift, and surveillance sorties 75 percent
    of which have been flown by our National Guard and Reserve over
    the United States.
        We have 14,000 airmen in and around Afghanistan today and
    have contributed to the joint effort nearly 70,000 sorties,
    including 8,000 tanker sorties, which are the heart and soul of
    our global strike effort.
        All of these things are joined by efforts in Operations
    Northern and Southern Watch, where we have had 9,000 airmen
    deployed, have flown over 14,000 sorties in this past year, and
    along with our Marine and Navy colleagues have gotten shot at
    from the ground in Iraq virtually every day of the year.
        We have also been engaged in significant humanitarian
    efforts around the world. We are all familiar with the
    disasters in Guam and, closer to home, the firefighting efforts
    that we have all been a part of.
        All this to say that our tempo is high and our people have
    been sprinting for a long time, but they never fail to answer
    the call, as you saw during your visit to overseas, Mr.
    Chairman.
        To deal with the tempo problems that have emerged since the
    demise of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Cold War, we
    have organized ourselves into air expeditionary forces,
    borrowing a chapter from the book of the Navy and the Marine
    Corps, trying to get ourselves into a deployable rotational
    scheme that puts predictability into the lives of our people.
    Again, this is a total force effort and includes our National
    Guard and Reserve.
        This scheme has served to graphically point out many of our
    shortages in our personnel, manning, and critical skills. We
    are having to pull 23,000 of our airmen forward from future
    rotation force packages to deal with the current situation as
    we get ready for what the President might ask us to do in
    Southwest Asia. These shortages in combat engineers, medical,
    combat communications, and security forces are but a few
    examples of what we are trying to deal with.
        Another point of stress is our aging aircraft. Along with
    our colleagues in the Navy, our average aircraft age is now
    about 23 years of age. It is the oldest we have ever had to
    deal with, and corrosion and fatigue problems that we have
    never seen before are emerging. We are looking at costs of
    repairing these aircraft rising at more than 10 percent a year.
        Engines are another problem. We have had to add inspections
    that have increased our manhours by about 200,000 manhours just
    to inspect engines in the field to catch problems before they
    happen.
        Our space systems are little different. We have done a
    great job, with the help of this committee, to replace our
    aging launch fleet with the Atlas IV with the Atlas V and the
    Delta IV rockets as well as the EELV launch systems that are
    coming into service. It is hard to believe that our defense
    satellite program is now 32 years old and our Minuteman III
    systems are 30 years old, but it is true.
        What are we doing to deal with these issues? You have seen
    the people. We have all seen the people. They will not quit.
    They will do whatever we ask them to do. Like Vern, our
    recruiting and our retention is better than it has ever been.
        One of the things that we have been asked to do by our
    Secretary of Defense as a part of his personnel transformation
    initiative is to make sure that we are making the best use of
    our people. One of the initiatives we have had at Robins Air
    Force Base in Georgia is to blend a wing of National Guard and
    active and bring them together under the leadership of a
    National Guard wing commander to make best use of the great
    experience in that Guard unit and the ready response of our
    active personnel.
        This, along with other initiatives, has been approved by
    our Secretary of Defense, and this includes educational
    opportunities. Our Secretary of the Air Force has gone with the
    Secretary of the Navy and blended the postgraduate education of
    the Naval Postgraduate School with the Air Force Institute of
    Technology so that we are not double-teaching and we share the
    same professors and the same curricula. We have even opened
    some postgraduate education opportunities to our enlisted
    force. Today at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base at the Air
    Force Institute of Technology, you will find seven Marine Corps
    enlisted along with eight U.S. Air Force enlisted enrolled
    getting master's degrees.
        All these people, Mr. Chairman, are marvelous. I had the
    opportunity this year to go give Air Force crosses to the
    widows of two of our airmen who died in Afghanistan, Senior
    Airman Jason Cunningham and Tech Sergeant John Chapman. We have
    another of those heroes with us here today. I would like to
    introduce Staff Sergeant Allen Yoshida, who is seated behind me
    here tonight. Allen was badly wounded in Afghanistan and we
    have asked him as he recovers to be a part of our effort,
    another one of the Secretary of Defense's efforts, to
    streamline our acquisition process.
        It is Sergeant Yoshida, with his direct operational
    experience, who is working directly with our acquisition
    community to get the pieces of equipment rapidly fielded that
    will make the job of the combat controller on the ground that
    much easier. We salute his service, Mr. Chairman.
        All of these acquisition initiatives are not just with what
    we do on the ground, but we have seen similar acquisition
    initiatives streamlines into our remotely piloted aircraft as
    well. As Vern Clark pointed out, we have efforts with the
    United States Navy to put ourselves together where we can in
    the remotely piloted vehicle and the conventionally armed
    unmanned vehicle programs as well.
        We have continued our development of the F/A-22. This
    airplane will give us 24-hour stealth capability for the first
    time. It has already got the qualities of the best air-to-air
    fighter in the world, but its main focus will be on what it can
    do air-to-ground, and as it moves into the future, to add the
    ability to hit moving targets in and under the weather with the
    F-22.
        Blending with the United States Army's concept of
    operations, which calls for brigade combat teams behind enemy
    lines, the F/A-22 will be able to reach the sergeants on the
    ground and put ordnance on the ground in support of them in a
    rapid way.
        We are also working toward the notion of integrating, as
    Vern Clark said, and networking along with the other Services,
    and we have asked for the Multi-Sensor Command and Control
    Aircraft to be a part of this transformation. It will
    horizontally integrate at the machine level manned, unmanned,
    and space platforms. It will allow us to coordinate our defense
    to things like cruise missiles, to which we think we are very
    vulnerable today, and it will be able to join in quickly with
    naval and land forces to do rapid targeting.
        Vern Clark likes to say that his favorite word for the
    decade is ``persistence,'' and I could not agree with him more.
    As we do remotely piloted aircraft into the future, such as
    Predator and Global Hawk, and we bring the Predator B on line
    with its six weapon stations and the ability to loiter for more
    than 30 hours, we will see great leverage come to those on the
    battlefield.
        Sir, I can tell you that one of the great improvements we
    have seen is in readiness and one of the great worries that I
    have is to make sure that we keep our training ranges available
    for all of our air, land, and sea forces. We have seen much
    about encroachment issues. Another one of Secretary Rumsfeld's
    initiatives is to maintain the edge we have in our training
    with his range readiness and preservation initiatives, which we
    ask for our support, Mr. Chairman.
        Sir, there are many other initiatives under way, not only
    in the Air Force but in the Department of Defense, that have to
    do with streamlining processes and unloading administrative
    burdens. I think we are going to see great improvements in all
    these in the future.
        Once again, let me thank all of the members of the
    committee for their support. Sir, your Air Force has never been
    more ready, and we are ready to do anything the President asks.
        Thank you very much, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Jumper follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Gen. John P. Jumper, USAF

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Air Force has an
    unlimited horizon for air and space capabilities. Our Service was borne
    of innovation, and we remain focused on identifying and developing the
    concepts of operations, advanced technologies, and integrated
    operations required to provide the Joint Force with unprecedented
    capabilities and to remain the world's dominant air and space force.
        The Wright brothers' historic flight in 1903 ushered in the dawn of
    a dramatic era of scientific, cultural, and technological advances. As
    the Air Force celebrates this centennial of powered flight, we do so
    with the recognition that, despite the daunting challenges of a more
    dynamic security environment, the next hundred years will witness
    equally fantastic achievements. The 2003 Air Force Posture Statement
    reflects this optimism. In this report, we relate some of our
    accomplishments of 2002 as well as our vision of an innovative and
    adaptive force capable of guaranteeing American air and space dominance
    for the decades to come. Our successes are America's successes; they
    are the direct result of the selfless and unconditional service by men
    and women of the total Air Force and their families.
        During the past year, and in the midst of combat and a variety of
    contingency operations, we evaluated, implemented, and validated a host
    of technological advances, organizational changes, and concepts of
    operation. These enabled us to deliver desired effects faster and with
    greater precision than at any time in the history of warfare. Such
    adaptation is characteristic of our Service, as airmen continually
    strive to push innovation ever forward en route to unprecedented air
    and space capabilities for combatant commanders, the Joint Force, and
    our Nation. In the year ahead, we will move our expeditionary Air Force
    closer to realizing the transformational imperatives of this new era,
    machine-to-machine digital integration of manned, unmanned and space
    assets, and joint command and control. Our concepts of operations
    leverage this integration, and expand our asymmetric advantages in air
    and space--advantages that are fundamental to defending America's
    interests, assuring our allies and coalition partners, and winning the
    Nation's wars.
        We recognize the responsibility for America's security is not one
    we shoulder alone. We work tirelessly toward developing and training
    professional airmen, transitioning new technologies into warfighting,
    and integrating the capabilities of our sister Services, other
    government agencies, and those of our friends abroad to act in the most
    efficient and effective manner across all operations--from humanitarian
    to combat missions. At the same time, we pay special attention to the
    consolidating aerospace industry, our acquisition processes, and our
    critical modernization challenges, to ensure we will be able to draw
    upon our core competencies for decades to come.
        Blessed with full endorsement from the American people, Congress,
    and the President, we will remain the world's dominant Air Force. We
    are honored to serve with America's airmen, and we sincerely appreciate
    the confidence in our commitment and capability to provide our great
    Nation with superiority in air and space.

                                  INTRODUCTION

        As America approaches the 100th anniversary of powered flight, the
    Air Force realizes that the Nation is only in the adolescence of air
    and space capabilities. Yet we envision a future that will manifest
    dramatic advances in propulsion, operational employment, weapons
    systems, information technology, education, and training for our air
    and space forces. It is a future of unprecedented, seamless integration
    of air and space capabilities with joint command and control at the
    operational level of war, and machine-to-machine integration at the
    tactical level. We are pursuing these changes--some elementary, others
    revolutionary--which will dramatically escalate the capabilities
    available to the Joint Forces of the United States, perpetuate American
    air and space dominance, and redefine the nature of warfare.
        If there was any ambiguity about the nature of the security
    environment in this new century, the attacks of September 11, 2001
    crystallized the setting. Just as the turmoil of the previous decade
    eluded prediction, the dynamic setting of the decades ahead poses even
    greater predictive challenges as centers of power and sources of
    conflict migrate from traditional origins. No longer will it suffice to
    prepare for real and perceived threats from nation-states. Instead,
    America must apply the sum of our operational experiences and
    experimentation to develop dynamic, flexible, and adaptable forces,
    capable of dissuading, deterring, and defeating a much wider range of
    potential adversaries, while still assuring our friends and allies.
        This fluid setting underscores the need for doctrinal agility, and
    expeditious and responsive acquisition, planning, and execution across
    the spectrum of capabilities in support of homeland security--from the
    most difficult anti-access scenario to humanitarian relief. As new
    generations of technology proliferate among potential adversaries, we
    also are reminded of the need to keep pushing technology forward. In
    less than 100 years, we elevated from a Kitty Hawk biplane flying 100
    feet on a 12-second flight, to a host of sophisticated, stealthy aerial
    vehicles capable of reaching any place in the world, and an array of
    satellites that circle the globe continuously. We do not rest on these
    achievements, but instead engage a new generation of innovation.
    Therefore, our mission is to make calculated research, development, and
    procurement decisions with the resolve to integrate all of our combat,
    information, and support systems into an enterprise architecture that
    contributes joint air and space capabilities to help win the Nation's
    wars.
        Meeting these requirements also warrants our continued
    transformation into an expeditionary force with the culture,
    composition, and capabilities to fulfill our evolving operational
    tasks. As the scope of global contingencies requiring American
    involvement has multiplied, we have witnessed the substantial value of
    agility, rapid response, and integration. Thus, we are becoming ever
    more responsive in time, technology, and training, and in the process,
    we are elevating Air Force contributions to joint capabilities, while
    developing our airmen as joint warfighters.
        A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld laid out a number of key priorities
    for the Department of Defense (DOD). All of these--from pursuing the
    global war on terrorism and strengthening joint warfighting
    capabilities, to streamlining the DOD processes and improving
    interagency integration--demand across-the-board changes in the way the
    Defense Department operates. The Air Force has taken advantage of this
    opportunity to evaluate and strengthen our capabilities, and to
    fundamentally drive our investment strategy.
        As we contemplate more than a decade of unprecedented success using
    air and space power, we recognize that we never fight alone. The
    emerging interdependence of joint, coalition, and alliance partnerships
    throughout a decade of contingency warfare has been a profound lesson
    learned. Through cooperative planning, we will realize the full
    potential of our Service--bringing to bear fully integrated air and
    space capabilities.
        It is our imperative to approach this planning and integration with
    innovation and vision, fundamentally focused on capabilities. All of
    the Armed Forces are focusing on meeting the Quadrennial Defense
    Review's ``1-4-2-1'' force-shaping construct, by defining the
    fundamental capabilities required to meet the challenges of a changing
    world. These are: to defend the United States through homeland
    security; to deter aggression and coercion in the four critical regions
    of Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Asian littorals; to
    swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while being
    capable of decisive victory in one of those conflicts; and to conduct a
    number of smaller scale contingencies. A revitalized, capabilities-
    focused approach to operational military requirements will allow us to
    meet these missions.
        Our focus on capabilities for an uncertain future has inspired us
    to adapt anew the way we organize, train, and equip our forces. We have
    begun by developing Task Force Concepts of Operations (TF CONOPs),
    which will define how we will fight and integrate our air and space
    capabilities with joint, coalition, and alliance forces. The
    requirements that emerge from these operational concepts will guide a
    reformed acquisition process that will include more active, continuous
    partnerships among requirement, development, operational, test, and
    industry communities working side-by-side at the program level.
        This process can only be successful with the help of a vibrant
    defense industry. Yet today the aerospace industry is consolidating to
    a point that threatens to diminish the advantages of competition. This,
    in turn, can lead to loss of innovation, diminished technical skill
    base, lower cost efficiencies, and other challenges. We must foster
    increased competition to ensure the long-term health of an industrial
    sector critical to our national security. While the Air Force will
    continue to advance the vision and associated capabilities for air and
    space, we also must challenge industry in order for it to stay on the
    cutting edge of technology and efficient management practices.
        Finally, transforming our force will not be possible without a
    process to educate, train, and offer experience to the right mix of
    Active Duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and civilian airmen
    who understand the nature of our changing security environment. To
    achieve this, we will evolve what we have traditionally called the
    ``personnel'' function in new ways so as to blend Professional Military
    Education, advanced academic degrees, and assignment policies under the
    auspices of ``Force Development.''
        This is the United States Air Force in 2003--inherently innovative,
    tirelessly dedicated, and comprised of the very best airmen and
    capabilities in the world to ensure American security and defend her
    interests. This is what our Nation expects, and we will continually
    meet that expectation.

                                   WHAT WE DO

        The United States Armed Forces exist to fight and win our Nation's
    wars, which no service can accomplish alone. The Air Force's pivotal
    role is to deliver fully capable and integrated air and space power to
    the Joint Force Commander (JFC). By dominating the media of elevation,
    the Air Force offers unique warfighting capabilities that leverage the
    strengths of surface forces and expand the range of potential effects.
        Air and space are realms with unlimited horizons for discovery and
    development. While the Air Force has made tremendous strides in
    realizing the visions of early airmen and exploiting the operational
    potential in each medium, we know there is an array of capabilities as
    yet undiscovered. As the Air Force strives to realize these
    possibilities, we deliver a multitude of air and space achievements for
    joint warfighting.
        Although relatively short, Air Force history reveals fundamental
    competencies that are core to developing and delivering air and space
    power--those unique institutional qualities that set the Air Force
    apart from the other Services and any other military force in the
    world. By identifying and keeping these competencies foremost in our
    vision, we are able to more effectively advance the unique
    capabilities, as well as the ultimate effects, the Air Force provides
    to the Joint Force and the Nation.
        The Air Force continually develops areas of expertise that make us
    the preeminent air and space force in the world. Previously, we
    distilled these into six distinctive capabilities which we referred to
    as our ``core competencies''--Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack,
    Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority,
    and Agile Combat Support. However, just as our concepts of operations
    and capabilities continuously evolve, so also does the way in which we
    articulate Air Force competencies. With deeper refinement, we learned
    there are more fundamental elements to what we are as an Air Force and
    how we develop our capabilities for joint warfighting. These are our
    underlying institutional air and space core competencies, those that,
    in fact, make the six distinctive capabilities possible: Developing
    Airmen, Technology-to-Warfighting, and Integrating Operations. These
    three air and space core competencies form the basis through which we
    organize, train, and equip and from which we derive our strengths as a
    service.

        (1) Developing Airmen: The heart of combat capability

        The ultimate source of air and space combat capability resides in
    the men and women of the Air Force. The potential of technology,
    organization, and strategy are diminished without professional airmen
    to leverage their value. Our Total Force of active duty, Guard,
    Reserve, and civilian personnel are our largest investment and most
    critical asset. They are airmen, steeped in our expeditionary Service
    ethos. Therefore, from the moment they step into the Air Force through
    their last day of service, we are dedicated to ensuring they receive
    the precise education, training, and professional development necessary
    to provide a quality edge second to none. The full spectrum
    capabilities of our Air Force stem from the collective abilities of our
    personnel; and the abilities of our people stem from career-long
    development of professional airmen.

        (2) Technology-to-Warfighting: The tools of combat capability

        The vision of airmen in employing air and space power fundamentally
    altered how we address conflict. As the leader in military application
    of air and space technology, the Air Force is committed to innovation
    and possesses a vision to guide research, development, and fielding of
    unsurpassed capabilities. Just as the advent of aircraft revolutionized
    joint warfighting, recent advances in low observable technologies,
    space-based systems, manipulation of information, precision, and small,
    smart weapons offer no less dramatic advantages for combatant
    commanders. The Air Force nurtures and promotes its ability to
    translate vision into operational capability in order to produce
    desired effects. Our innovative operational concepts illuminate the
    capabilities we need, allowing us to develop unsurpassed capabilities
    to prevail in conflict and avert technological surprise.
        The F/A-22 is demonstrative of this ability to adapt technology to
    warfighting capabilities. Originally envisioned as an air superiority
    fighter, it has been transformed into a multi-role system. The F/A-22
    not only brings to bear warfighting capabilities without equal for
    decades to come, but also includes those we did not foresee at its
    inception. Collectively, the platform's supercruise, stealth,
    maneuverability, and novel avionics will deliver the ability to create
    crucial battlefield effects to the hands of the warfighter, and allow
    access to revolutionary concepts of operations.

        (3) Integrating Operations: Maximizing combat capabilities

        Effectively integrating the diverse capabilities found in all four
    Services remains pivotal to successful joint warfighting. The Air Force
    contributes to this enduring objective as each element of air and space
    power brings unique and essential capabilities to the Joint Force. Our
    inherent ability to envision, experiment, and ultimately execute the
    union of a myriad of platforms and people into a greater synergistic
    whole is the key to maximizing these capabilities. In so doing, we are
    able to focus acquisition and force planning on systems that enable
    specific, effects-based capabilities, rather than on individual
    platforms.
        Embedded in our exploration of innovative operational concepts is
    the efficient integration of all military systems--air, land, maritime,
    space, and information--to ensure maximum flexibility in the joint
    delivery of desired effects across the spectrum of conflict, from war
    to operations short of war. However, effective integration involves
    more than smart technology investment--it also requires investigation
    of efficient joint and service organization and innovative operational
    thinking. Thus, investments in our people to foster intellectual
    flexibility and critical analysis are equally as important as our
    technology investments.
        Collectively, our air and space core competencies reflect the
    visions of the earliest airmen and serve to realize the potential of
    air and space forces. We foster ingenuity and adventure in the
    development of the world's most professional airmen. We seek to
    translate new technologies into practical systems while we encourage
    intellectual innovation at every level of war. We drive relentlessly
    toward integration in order to realize the potential and maturation of
    air and space capabilities.
        Our proficiency in the three institutional air and space core
    competencies underpins our ability to deliver the Air Force's six
    distinctive capabilities in joint warfighting. In turn, our
    capabilities enable desired effects across the spectrum of joint
    operations through our task forces drawn from our air and space
    expeditionary forces. The results of this relationship between core
    competencies, distinctive capabilities, and operational effects are
    manifest in the array of successful missions the Air Force accomplished
    in the past year and those we continue to execute.
    Expeditionary Construct
        Our core competencies reflect a legacy of innovation and adaptation
    to accomplish our mission. This point is underscored by the fact that,
    in spite of over a 30-percent reduction in manpower in the past 12
    years, we have faced an exponential increase in worldwide taskings.
    Intensifying operations tempo (OPTEMPO) requires significant changes in
    the way our force trains, organizes, and deploys to support JFC
    requirements. We are a truly expeditionary force--the nature off our
    ``business'' is deployed operations.
        The Air Force meets JFC requirements by presenting forces and
    capabilities through our Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF)
    construct. This divides our combat forces into 10 equivalent AEFs, each
    possessing air and space warfighting and associated mobility and
    support capabilities. A key element of our ability to deliver these
    tailored and ready expeditionary forces is our development of Task
    Force Concepts of Operations. Our TF CONOPs describe how we fight and
    how we integrate with out sister services and outside agencies. They
    are the fundamental blueprints for how we go to war. Combined with our
    AEF construct--the principal tool we use to present expeditionary
    wings, groups, and squadrons--TF CONOPs will guide our decisions in
    operational planning, enable us to provide scalable, quick-reacting,
    tasked-organized units from the 10 standing AEFs, and sustain our
    ability to ensure trained and ready forces are available to satisfy
    operational plans and contingency requirements.
        The AEF construct incorporates a 15-month cycle during which two
    AEFs are designated as lead for a 90-day ``eligibility'' period. During
    this period, the two are either deployed or on alert for daily,
    worldwide expeditionary taskings, for which they are tailored and
    presented to the JFC as expeditionary squadrons, groups, and wings
    (depending on the specific requirement). Meanwhile, the remaining eight
    AEFs are in various stages of reconstituting, training, or preparatory
    spin-up. It is during this preparatory time (approximately 2 months)
    that we integrate the training-to-task of AEF squadrons immediately
    prior to their on-call window.
        Yet, it is important to note that while our combat forces cycle
    through deployment vulnerability periods, they sustain wartime
    readiness throughout the 15-month training and preparation cycle--a
    critical drive of our 90-day eligibility window. Our AEF cycle thus
    precludes the need for ``tiered'' readiness by allowing our combat
    forces to remain current and capable for any contingency or operational
    plan.
        While ensuring necessary capabilities for the JFC, AEF cycles allow
    us to provide our airmen with a more stable and predictable environment
    in which to train, re-fit, and equip. In addition, AEF scheduling makes
    it easier and more practicable for the Air Reserve Component (ARC)
    forces--Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG)--
    to bring their essential contributions to bear by allowing them to plan
    definitive absences from their civilian employment. This is a critical
    advantage of the AEF construct, as ARC forces comprise nearly half of
    the forces assigned to AEFs and contribute the majority of forces for
    some mission areas.
    Operations in 2002
        Confident in our air and space capabilities, and committed to
    meeting any mission tasked, the Air Force completed an unprecedented
    array of operations and exercises in 2002. From the mountain ranges in
    Afghanistan and the jungles of the Philippines to the deserts of the
    Middle East, and across every continent and body of water, the Air
    Force joined with land and naval forces to secure America's national
    objectives. With each mission, the Joint Force grows more capable as it
    applies vision, experimentation, and integration to every undertaking.
    We do not act as individual services, but in concert as joint
    warfighters, as we prevail in the war on terrorism and in all
    undertakings.
        Assuring our Nation's citizens, the Air Force conducts a range of
    alert postures involving more than 200 military aircraft at over 20
    airbases for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). In conjunction with
    unprecedented NATO airborne warning support and other U.S. assets, we
    have provided continuous combat air patrols over sensitive/high risk
    areas, and random patrols over other metropolitan areas and key
    infrastructure. Last year, we flew over 25,000 ONE fighter, tanker,
    airlift, and airborne warning sorties, made possible only through the
    mobilization of over 30,000 Reserve component airmen. In fact, the ANG
    and AFRC have effected over 75 percent of the total ONE missions. We
    will continue this critical mission, as we execute our most fundamental
    responsibility--homeland defense.
        Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the USAF has
    maintained a continuous, steady-force presence in Afghanistan and the
    rest of the area of responsibility with more than 14,000 airmen. Air
    Force assets provide crucial intelligence and situation awareness,
    combat power, and support capabilities for the combatant commander. A
    key reason for American military success in the region is the
    performance of Air Force special operations airmen. Working in teams
    with other special forces, ground units, and coalition elements, airmen
    special operators heroically bring to bear the full weight of air and
    space capabilities--from the ground. They introduce our adversaries to
    the full lethality of our airmen, fully integrated on the ground, in
    the air, and from space.
        Fully engaged in all aspects of the war on terrorism, from mobility
    to close air support, our aircraft and crews flew more than 40,000 OEF
    sorties in 2002--over 70 percent of all coalition sorties. Over 8,000
    refueling missions marked the linchpin capability for the joint fight--
    the tanker force--while the magnificent achievements of airlift assets
    rounded out overwhelming mobility efforts. Simply put, Air Force
    mobility forces made operations in a distant, land-locked nation
    possible.
        Beyond air operations, we operated and maintained several
    constellations of earth-orbiting satellites. In 2002, we launched 18
    missions with a 100-percent success rate--including the first space
    launches using Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. These activities
    bolstered America's assured access to space and ensured vigorous,
    global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), missile
    warning, precision navigation and timing, communications, and weather
    systems. In addition, manned, unmanned, and space ISR assets not only
    delivered unprecedented battlefield awareness, but with the Predator
    unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), also introduced transformational combat
    capabilities.
        ONE and OEF levied particularly heavy demands on our security
    forces. In CONUS and forward locations, increased alert postures
    warranted significant increases in security personnel who constitute a
    critical element of our force protection capabilities. These demands
    have raised our force protection posture worldwide and have forced us
    to adjust to a new ``steady state'' condition. Security forces bear the
    brunt of the adjustment effort despite a resultant baseline shortfall
    of approximately 8,000 personnel to meet the alert postures. In the
    near term, we involuntarily extended for a second year nearly 9,500 ARC
    security forces. However, in order to relieve these ARC forces, we
    concluded a 2-year agreement with the Army for short-term support, and
    initiated several ongoing efforts to combine technology, new processes,
    and some manpower shifts to achieve a long-term adjustment to this new
    era.
        As we adjust, we continue to deliver force protection through the
    integrated application of counter and antiterrorism operations, and
    preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
    explosive (CBRNE) incidents. We employ a tailored selection and
    application of multi-layered active and passive, offensive and
    defensive measures. Intelligence and counterintelligence programs
    support this integrated effort and remain critical to our success. In
    this regard, we continued to develop and employ all-source intelligence
    systems, cross-functional intelligence analysis procedures, and an
    operational planning process to implement force protection operations
    that deter, detect, deny, and destroy threats. Our goal is to see
    first, understand first, and act first.
        Though engaged in these security enhancements and the global war on
    terrorism, our combat operations were not limited to OEF in 2002. Iraqi
    forces fired on coalition aircraft over 400 times during 14,000 sorties
    supporting Operations Northern Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW).
    The Air Force maintained a continuous, regional presence of more than
    9,000 airmen, while air and space assets provided vital intelligence,
    situation awareness, and indications and warning to monitor Iraq's
    compliance with United Nations' directives.
        Whether on the ground or in the skies, our airmen also conducted a
    host of other missions above-and-beyond standing security requirements
    around the globe. Even though the war on terrorism is our national
    military focus, airmen joined soldiers, sailors, and marines in the
    Balkans, South America, Europe, Asia, and around the world to assure
    our friends and allies, while deterring and dissuading our adversaries.
        Worldwide humanitarian and non-combat evacuation operations
    missions remain other key tasks for Air Force personnel. In 2002, for
    example, airlift crews exceeded 2.4 million airdropped daily ration
    deliveries in Afghanistan, evacuated allied personnel at threatened
    locations around the world, and flew typhoon relief missions to Guam,
    while our explosive ordnance specialists removed unexploded munitions
    in Africa. Yet, while conducting unprecedented food, medical, civil
    engineering, and evacuation relief efforts in warring regions, we were
    also on call to perform critical, quick-response missions during
    natural or man-made crises at home. Through explosive ordnance
    disposal, firefighting, law enforcement support, and rapid medical
    response expertise, we conducted daily operations in support of local,
    State, and Federal agencies. During the wildfire season, ANG and AFRC
    C-130s equipped with modular airborne fire fighting systems flew nearly
    200 sorties while assisting U.S. Forest Service firefighting efforts in
    numerous States. In addition, when Hurricane Lili endangered Louisiana,
    Air Force aeromedical and critical care forces rolled in with C-9
    aircraft to transport and safeguard 40 patients from threatened
    hospitals.
    Training Transformation
        Training is a unique American military strength. As potential
    adversaries work to overcome our technological superiority, it is
    imperative we enhance this strength through improved proficiency at the
    tactical level and integration at the joint level. Training is integral
    to our core competencies and the critical enabler for military
    capabilities, so we are engaged with the other services, unified
    commands, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in
    developing and implementing a training transformation plan. Our
    objective is to train as we will fight and increase the joint context
    of our exercises through live, virtual, distributed, and constructive
    environments. It is the realism of this training that gives us the edge
    in combat. This involves not only modernizing the integration of space
    and information operations on our ranges, but also planning for their
    sustainment to meet future test and training missions while
    implementing environmentally sound use and management to ensure long-
    term availability. Additionally, to expand range support for current
    and emerging missions, we are embarking on a new effort to identify and
    procure environmental, airspace, and spectrum resources at home and
    abroad. Balancing competing economic and environmental needs for these
    resources is a growing challenge we face with our regulatory and
    community partners. To support this effort, DOD developed the Range and
    Readiness Preservation Initiative. This legislation recommends
    clarification to environmental laws that, as currently written and
    interpreted, can adversely affect resources available to support
    training activities at ranges.
    Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Exercises, Interoperability Training, and
            Experimentation
        We advanced joint and combined interoperability skills with our
    sister services and those of 104 nations throughout 111 JCS exercises
    and Joint Task Force (JTF) experimentation, conducted in 40 foreign
    countries. Exercises ranged from large field training such as Bright
    Star, to command post exercises like Positive Response, to smaller, but
    equally valuable, humanitarian exercises, as in the school
    construction, well drilling, and medical clinic visits of New Horizons-
    Jamaica. These activities provided realistic training and enhanced the
    effectiveness of all participating nations' forces.
    Task Force Enduring Look
        Success in future operations hinges upon our ability to learn from
    previous operations and exercises. To ensure we learn from ongoing
    operations and adapt accordingly, we established Task Force Enduring
    Look (TFEL). TFEL is responsible for Air Force-wide data collection,
    exploitation, documentation, and reporting for our efforts in ONE/OEF.
    The objective for TFEL is clear--provide superior support to the
    warfighter and properly recognize and apply lessons learned during
    rather than only at the conclusion of these operations.
        Through extensive investigation and analysis, TFEL examines joint
    warfighting effectiveness, determines implications, and shapes future
    Air Force transformation of expeditionary air and space power. The task
    force documents lessons learned in a variety of products that cover
    every conceivable subject matter. As derivative campaigns unfold, TFEL
    will broaden its assessments in follow-on reports. Applying the lessons
    in these reports and adapting from our past experiences will help
    ensure we prevail in future operations.
        We are able to accomplish the full spectrum of air and space
    missions and improve our capabilities through lessons learned, by
    focusing on the best way to organize, train, and equip. Creativity,
    ingenuity, and innovation are the hallmarks of all that we do, all of
    which begins with our people.
                                   who we are
            ``No arsenal and no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so
            formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women.
            It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It
            is a weapon that we as Americans do have.'' President Ronald
            Reagan, 20 January 1981

        America is blessed with vast resources, and chief among these is
    her people. In the same way, the Air Force relies on the officers,
    enlisted, civilians, and contractors that comprise our Total Force--
    active duty, Guard, and Reserve--for cultural strength and unbridled
    skill. Air Force strength will never reside in systems alone, but in
    the airmen operating them. Nor will our capabilities improve solely
    through technology, but instead through the adaptive insight of our
    creative and selfless professionals.
        Therefore, we recruit and retain a remarkably diverse group to
    ensure we reach the fullest potential of air and space forces. Their
    backgrounds reflect the cross-section of American culture--all races,
    religions, economic and educational backgrounds, skill and management
    levels, men and women--and make this Air Force the tremendous
    organization it is today. Just as diverse individual citizens find
    unity in the term American, our personnel embrace an identity and
    fundamental perspective as airmen.
        The underlying qualities found in all airmen emanate from our core
    values--integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all
    that we do. Embedded in these core values are the inherent
    characteristics of our confident, capable airmen--courage, tenacity,
    professionalism, vision, pride, and, when faced with seemingly
    insurmountable obstacles, heroism. Indeed, today's airmen carry on the
    traditions and visions of the earliest generation of airmen while
    preparing for the challenges of the future.
        The diversity of our airmen energizes the advancement of America's
    air and space power. Airmen embrace transformational ideas and seek to
    apply them to every aspect of the Air Force, from organizational
    constructs to concepts of operations and employment. They are able
    stewards of the Nation's space programs, advancing ideas and
    technologies for national security, as well as for the environmental
    and economic benefit of our Nation and the world. Yet, ultimately our
    standout advantage is our warrior airmen themselves, who demonstrate
    skills and dedication in combat unsurpassed by any in history. Whether
    maintaining safe skies across the United Nations' sanctioned no-fly one
    in Iraq, hunting down terrorists in the jungles of the Philippines, or
    paying the ultimate price while rescuing fellow Americans in a battle
    on an Afghan ridge, our airmen are proven combat veterans. Their
    selflessness resonates the very best of our Service.
        Airmen are expeditionary--our natural state of operations is not
    ``home station,'' but rather, deployed. After two successful cycles,
    our AEF construct has been validated as an effective means of meeting
    our Nation's expeditionary requirements. Yet we continue to enhance the
    construct by initiating significant organizational change to ensure
    nearly every airman belongs to 1 of the 10 AEFs. The effect has been a
    change to our airmen's mindset and culture, where an individual's AEF
    association cultivates an expeditionary perspective and a clearer
    appreciation for joint warfighting requirements and capabilities.
    Force Development--A New Leadership Development Paradigm
        In the past, we addressed aspects of career development, education,
    and assignments individually, but not necessarily in a coordinated,
    connected approach. Recognizing this, and to prepare for the future
    more ably, we introduced a systemic, deliberate force development
    construct that evolves professional airmen into Joint Force warriors.
    This construct coordinates doctrine and policies, concentrated to
    provide the right level, timing, and focus of education, training, and
    experience for all airmen, while encompassing personal, team, and
    institutional leadership skills across tactical, operational, and
    strategic levels.
        In the 21st century, we need air and space warriors with mastery of
    their primary skills and others who possess competency beyond their own
    specialty. However, this diversity must be deliberate to ensure the
    correct skills are paired according to institutional requirements.
    Force development encourages many to obtain a deep perspective in their
    functional area, but at the same time offers the broader perspective we
    need to complement our leadership team. We begin this transformation
    with the active duty officer corps and will eventually encompass the
    civilian, enlisted, and Reserve component to better meet the expanding
    challenges of tomorrow.
    Education and Technical Training--Emphasis on Joint Leadership/Warfare
        As opportunities resident in advancing technologies unfold, it is
    imperative that the Air Force be able to draw upon a vibrant collection
    of educated, technically skilled, and technologically savvy airmen--
    both uniformed and civilian alike. We are answering this fundamental
    need in fiscal year 2003 with aggressive and innovative initiatives to
    enhance the abilities and breadth of our force. Agile, flexible
    training is an essential investment in human capital, and our
    initiatives will ensure our investment delivers the right training to
    the right people at the right time.
        In August 2002, we began our groundbreaking Enlisted-to-Air Force
    Institute of Technology (AFIT) program. An initial cadre of senior NCOs
    began receiving world-class, graduate education to optimize them for
    greater responsibilities and challenging follow-on assignments. We will
    also provide a major influx of officers into AFIT, Naval Postgraduate
    School (NPS), and civilian institutions. In addition, because more than
    42 percent of our civilian force will be eligible for retirement in the
    next 5 years, we are committing significant resources to pay for
    advanced education as well as cross-functional career broadening.
        Future military missions and contingencies will require greater
    sophistication and understanding of the security environment, and our
    expeditionary force requires airmen with international insight, foreign
    language proficiency, and cultural understanding. We are working
    diligently to expand the cadre of professionals with such skill sets
    and experiences. Our education initiatives will contribute to a major
    corporate culture shift that fosters appropriate development throughout
    our airmen's careers to meet evolving force requirements.
    Diversity
        Foremost among our efforts to enhance the capabilities of our
    airmen is a passionate drive for diversity. Diversity is a warfighting
    issue; it is a readiness issue. We must attract people from all
    segments of American society and tap into the limitless talents and
    advantages resident in our diverse population if we hope to reach our
    fullest potential as a fighting force. Nurturing rich representation
    from all demographics opens the door to creativity and ingenuity,
    offering an unparalleled competitive edge for air and space
    development. Today's multi-threat world also mandates that we
    invigorate in our airmen the ability to effectively think across
    cultural boundaries and functional paradigms (or stovepipes). We will
    thus recruit, train, and retain airmen without intellectual boundaries,
    uniquely capable of integrating people, weapons, ideas, and systems to
    achieve air and space dominance.
    Recruiting
        It takes tremendous effort to identify and develop such airmen, yet
    the return for the Nation is immeasurable. Increased advertising, an
    expanded recruiting force with broader access to secondary school
    students, and competitive compensation prepare us to meet recruiting
    goals. Despite the challenge of mustering such a diverse and skilled
    collection of Americans, we exceeded our fiscal year 2002 enlisted
    recruiting goals and expect to surpass fiscal year 2003 objectives. We
    will adapt our goals to meet new force objectives; however, the
    capacity limitations of Basic Military Training and Technical Training
    School quotas will continue to challenge Total Force recruiting
    efforts.
        Officer recruitment presents similar challenges, yet we continue to
    attract America's best and brightest. However, we are particularly
    concerned with military and civilian scientists and engineers. We fell
    short of our accession goal for this group and have begun all-out
    recruitment and retention efforts for these critical specialties. For
    example, in fiscal year 2003 we plan to begin a college sponsorship
    program to attract scientists and engineers from universities lacking
    Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs. In addition, we
    continue to find recruiting health care professionals especially
    difficult, so we are making adjustments to ensure improvement.
        We will also closely monitor ARC recruitment. Historically, the ANG
    and AFRC access close to 25 percent of eligible, separating active duty
    Air Force members (i.e. no break in service.) Continued high OPTEMPO
    may negatively impact our efforts in attracting Air National guardsmen,
    as well as drawing separating active duty airmen to the Air Force
    Reserve. As a result, recruiting will have to ``make up'' a substantial
    portion of accessions from that market by developing alternatives.
    Retention
        The Air Force is a retention-based force. The critical skill sets
    we develop in our airmen are not easily replaced, so we expend every
    effort to retain our people--the impetus for our ``re-recruiting''
    efforts. Overall retention plans include robust compensation packages
    that reward service, provide for a suitable standard of living, ensure
    a high quality of life, and retain the caliber of professionals we need
    to decisively win America's wars.
        For fiscal year 2002, it was difficult to calculate accurate
    retention results due to Air Force implementation of Stop Loss.
    Nonetheless, we continue to reap the benefits of an aggressive
    retention program, aided by bonuses, targeted pay raises, and quality
    of life improvements. Introducing the Critical Skills Retention Bonus
    for select office; specialties reinforces our commitment to target
    specific skill suffering significant retention challenges. However,
    many airmen retained under Stop Loss will separate throughout fiscal
    year 2003--a fact of particular concern for our rated force.
        Bonuses and special pay programs continue to be effective tools in
    retaining our members. The ANG has placed particular emphasis on
    aircraft maintenance fields, security forces, and communication and
    intelligence specialists, among others, by offering enlistment and
    reenlistment bonuses, Student Loan Repayment program, and the
    Montgomery GI Bill Kicker program. Another example is the flexible
    Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program--an important part of our
    multi-faceted plan to retain pilots. In conjunction with our rated
    recall program, our fiscal year 2002 plan resulted in a substantial
    increase in committed personnel. We have a similarly designed ACP
    program in fiscal year 2003, and developed extensions to include
    navigators and air battle managers.
    Summary
        Regardless of AEF deployment or home station missions, our airmen
    accomplish their duties with firm commitment and resolute action. It's
    what we do. It's who we are: a practical, technically sound, ingenious
    force of uniformed and civilian airmen derived from this richly diverse
    nation to create the world's premier air and space power.

                               WHERE WE'RE GOING

        The first hundred years of powered flight witnessed tremendous and
    enduring innovation. We commemorate this centennial during 2003 with
    the theme, Born of Dreams, Inspired by Freedom, which recognizes the
    remarkable accomplishments of generations of airmen. Today's airmen are
    equally impassioned to bring dreams to reality as we pursue our vision
    of tomorrow's Air Force, Unlimited Horizon. Through this vision, we
    build a bridge from today's existing capabilities to those required to
    win tomorrow's wars.
        Ultimately, our success will be measured by our ability to provide
    our forces with assured freedom to attack and freedom from attack.
    Achieving such victory in tomorrow's battlespace will demand our full
    integration with fellow services, allies, and coalition partners--an
    essential part of the expeditionary construct. Through our security
    cooperation efforts, we build these international defense relationships
    and allied capabilities to ensure we have the access, interoperability,
    and international support for our worldwide commitments. Toward this
    requirement, we are working with our sister services to develop truly
    joint concepts of operations that integrate the full spectrum of land,
    sea, air, space, and information warfighting capabilities. When America
    places its men and women in uniform into harm's way, we owe them
    preeminent resources, planning, and organization to achieve victory
    over any adversary.
    Capabilities-Based CONOPs
        While adapting to the new strategic environment, our principal
    focus has been transitioning from a platform-based garrison force to a
    capabilities-based expeditionary force. No longer platform-centric, we
    are committed to making warfighting effects, and the capabilities we
    need to achieve them, the driving force behind our ongoing
    transformation. From this point forward, all of our operational,
    programming, and budget decisions will be supported by a predefined
    capability.
        Our emerging TF CONOPs will help make this essential shift by
    providing solutions to a variety of problems warfighters can expect to
    encounter in the future. Whether detailing our plans for operating in
    an anti-access environment or identifying how to deliver humanitarian
    rations to refugees, TF CONOPs lend focus on the essential elements
    required to accomplish the mission. They cover the complete spectrum of
    warfighting capabilities (deep strike, information, urban,
    psychological operations, etc.) and enable us to tailor forces
    (expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons) from existing AEFs to meet
    JFC's requirements. Responsibility for CONOPs development falls to the
    major commands, with a senior officer on the HQ USAF air staff assigned
    to each CONOPs to serve as their ``Champion,'' facilitating the
    process.
        TF CONOPs directly support Secretary Rumsfeld's efforts to free
    scarce resources trapped in bureaucracy and push them to the
    warfighter. They will also be the focal point for a capabilities-based
    Program Objective Memorandum (POM). In support of this effort, our
    Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment analyzes and assesses
    shortfalls, health, risks, and opportunities, while prioritizing
    required future capabilities. This helps CONOPs developers articulate
    any disconnects between required capabilities and developing programs,
    while providing senior Air Force leadership an operational,
    capabilities-based focus for acquisition program decisionmaking. TF
    CONOPs include:

             Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) employs joint power-
            projection capabilities to engage anti-access and high-value
            targets, gain access to denied battlespace, and maintain
            battlespace access for all required joint/coalition follow-on
            operations.
             Global Response Task Force (GRTF) combines
            intelligence and strike systems to attack fleeting or emergent,
            high-value, or high-risk targets by surgically applying air and
            space power in a narrow window of opportunity, anywhere on the
            globe, within hours.
             Homeland Security Task Force (HLSTF) leverages Air
            Force capabilities with joint and interagency efforts to
            prevent, protect, and respond to threats against our homeland--
            whether within or beyond U.S. territories.
             Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
            Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (Space & C\4\ISR)
            Task Force harnesses horizontal integration of manned,
            unmanned, and space systems to provide persistent situation
            awareness and executable decision-quality information to the
            JFC.
             Global Mobility Task Force (GMTF) provides regional
            combatant commanders with the planning, command and control
            (C\2\), and operations capabilities to enable rapid, timely,
            and effective projection, employment, and sustainment of U.S.
            power in support of U.S. global interests--precision delivery
            for operational effects.
             Nuclear Response Task Force (NRTF) provides the
            deterrent ``umbrella'' under which conventional forces operate,
            and, if deterrence fails, avails a rapid scalable response.
             Air and Space Expeditionary CONOPs is the overarching
            context, which identifies and sequences distinctive
            capabilities and broad-based functions that air and space power
            provide the JFC to generate desired effects for national
            military objectives.

        The Air Force is transforming around these Task Force Concepts of
    Operations. In addition to serving as a roadmap for operators, the TF
    construct will form the basis for resource allocation, future system
    acquisitions, and POM submissions in order to find capabilities-based
    solutions to warfighter problems.
    Science and Technology (S&T)--Wellspring of Air and Space Capabilities
        Reaching these warfighter solutions rests in large measure with
    research and development. Through robust investment and deliberate
    focus in science and technology, the Air Force invigorates our core
    competency of technology-to-warfighting. Combined with innovative
    vision, S&T opens the direct route towards transforming air and space
    capabilities. Therefore, we continue long-term, stable investment in
    S&T to ensure we realize future capabilities, as well as those that may
    immediately affect existing systems.
        We are improving our S&T planning and collaboration with other
    services and agencies to ensure; we: 1) encourage an operational pull
    that conveys to the S&T community a clear vision of the capabilities we
    need for the future; 2) address the full spectrum of future needs in a
    balanced and well-thought out manner; and 3) enhance our ability to
    demonstrate and integrate promising technologies. Some of these new
    technologies--UAV systems, laser-based communications, space-based
    radar, and others--show clear promise for near-term, joint warfighting
    applications. Others present opportunities we can only begin to
    imagine. We are exploring each of these technologies, and our
    investment will deliver the required capabilities of our CONOPs.
    Executive Agent for Space
        Embedded in all of our TF ONOPs, and indeed within most military
    operations, is an extensive reliance on systems resident in space. The
    Air Force proudly fulfills the role of the Department of Defense
    Executive Agent for Space with confidence and enthusiasm. Our ability
    to execute this tremendous responsibility stems from a natural outflow
    of our core competencies and distinctive capabilities. Accordingly, and
    in conjunction with the other Services and agencies, we are shaping a
    new and comprehensive approach to national security space management
    and organization.
        Our capstone objective is to realize the enormous potential in the
    high ground of space, and to employ the full spectrum of space-based
    capabilities to enable joint warfighting and to protect our national
    security. The key to achieving this end is wholesale integration:
    through air, land, space, and sea; across legacy and future systems;
    among existing and evolving concepts of operations; and between
    organizations across all sectors of government. We will continue to
    deliver unity of vision, effort, and execution to fulfill our mission
    of delivering the most advanced space capabilities for America.
    Drawing Effects from Space
        Our horizon is truly unlimited, extending beyond the atmospheric
    environs of airpower to the reaches of outer space. Our proud Air Force
    tradition of airpower is joined by an equally proud and continually
    developing tradition of space power.
        In the early days of the space age, only those at the strategic
    level received and exploited the benefits of space capabilities. The
    current state of affairs, however, is decidedly different. The former
    distinctions between classified and unclassified programs among
    military, civil, and commercial applications are growing increasingly
    blurred--in some cases, they are virtually seamless. In short, space
    capabilities now are woven deeply into the fabric of modern society,
    and they have altered forever the way we fight wars, defend our
    homeland, and live our lives.
        It is in this context and this understanding of the widespread and
    increasing importance of space systems that we strive to meet present
    and future national security challenges by providing dominant space
    capabilities that will:

             Exploit Space for Joint Warfighting. Space
            capabilities are integral to modern warfighting forces,
            providing critical surveillance and reconnaissance information,
            especially over areas of high risk or denied access for
            airborne platforms. They provide weather and other earth-
            observation data, global communications, precision navigation,
            and guidance to troops on the ground, ships at sea, aircraft in
            flight, and weapons en route to targets. All of these
            capabilities, and more, make possible the tremendous success
            our joint warfighters achieve during combat operations.
              We will enhance these existing capabilities and, where it
            makes sense, pursue new ones such as the Transformational
            Communications System (TCS), which will strive to dramatically
            increase bandwidth and access for warfighters, and Space Based
            Radar, which will complement the airborne Joint Surveillance
            Target and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) while migrating Ground
            Moving Target Indicators (GMTI) into space. We will also
            develop methods and technologies to enhance our Nation's
            ability to conduct rapid and accurate global strike operations
            anywhere in pursuit of U.S. interests.
             Pursue Assured Access to Space. We cannot effectively
            exploit space for joint warfighting if we do not have
            responsive, reliable, and assured access to space. In August
            2002, the new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle got off to a
            strong start with the successful launch of Lockheed Martin's
            Atlas V booster. Boeing's Delta IV program added to the
            Nation's quiver of modern launch vehicles with liftoff in
            November 2002. We will also pursue advanced and highly
            versatile reusable launchers and small expendables with
            extremely short response times to achieve long-term assured
            access, while taking the necessary steps to maintain and
            improve our space launch infrastructure.
             Preserve our Freedom to Act in Space. We must be able
            to act freely in space, or risk losing those capabilities
            essential to joint warfighting. We initiated efforts to
            increase our space situation awareness, beginning with the new
            Space Situation Awareness Integration Office at Air Force Space
            Command, and a similar program at the Space and Missile Systems
            Center. Future efforts are planned to develop strategy,
            doctrine, and programs to improve the protection of our own
            space capabilities while denying the benefits of joint space
            capabilities to our adversaries.

        As it is with all Air Force capabilities, the most important
    resource for national space capabilities is neither technological nor
    fiscal--it is human. Our Space Professional Strategy fulfills a Space
    Commission recommendation to develop space professionals and nurture a
    cadre to lead our national security space endeavors at all levels in
    the decades ahead. These space-expert airmen will be the core stewards
    of space operations, and shoulder the responsibility for aggressively
    advancing joint warfighting capabilities into the high ground frontier.
    Horizontal Integration of Manned, Unmanned, and Space Assets
        The essence of transformation is found in leveraging the Nation's
    technological dominance to create maximum asymmetrical advantage.
    Airmen seek unrestricted boundaries when looking at war planning from a
    theater-wide perspective, or talking about national elements of power.
    Simply stated, it is in the way we think--we must take advantage of it.
        Our foremost objective is to develop the capability to conduct
    rapid and precise operations to achieve desired effects and shape the
    battlespace for the Joint Force. This requires interfacing numerous DOD
    and national assets--the seamless, horizontal integration of manned,
    unmanned, and space-based systems. An essential element is designing
    systems that use digital-level, machine-to-machine conversations to
    expedite data flow and ensure the JFC receives timely, decision-quality
    information. Such integration will dramatically shorten the find, fix,
    track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) cycle. In the end, we know
    that neither JFC's guiding operations, nor special operators putting
    iron on targets, care what source provides the target data. It is an
    effect they seek, and what we will provide.
        Key to the warfighter's success is Predictive Battlespace Awareness
    (PBA). PBA requires in-depth study of an adversary well before
    hostilities begin. Ultimately, we want to be able to anticipate his
    actions to the maximum extent possible. PBA-derived insights allow us
    to utilize critical ISR assets for confirmation rather than pure
    discovery once hostilities begin. We are then able to analyze
    information to assess current conditions, exploit emerging
    opportunities, anticipate future actions, and act with a degree of
    speed and certainty unmatched by our adversaries.
        Along this path, we are transitioning from collecting data through
    a myriad of independent systems (Rivet Joint, AWACS, JSTARS, space-
    based assets, etc) to a Multi-sensor Command and Control Constellation
    (MC2C) capable of providing the JFC with real-time, enhanced
    battlespace awareness. Today, this transition is restricted by the
    necessity to rely on low density/high demand (LD/HD) C\4\ISR assets.
    The limitation inherent in LD/HD platforms forces us to shift their
    exploitation capabilities between theaters to cover emerging global
    threats and events. This suboptimizes overall battlespace awareness and
    limits our efforts at predictive analysis. In the interim, responsive
    space-based ISR assets will help mitigate our over-stressed LD/HD
    systems. Yet ultimately, we need a synergistic combination of military
    and commercial assets, advanced data processing capabilities, and
    assured reachback to achieve true battlespace awareness.
        In the future, a single widebody platform employing tunable
    antennas and sensors--Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft
    (MC2A)--will replace many of the C\4\ISR functions of today's
    specialized, but independent assets. Air, ground, and space assets will
    comprise the MC2C, which will elevate Joint Forces Air Component
    Commanders' ability to command and control air assets. Additionally,
    every platform will be a sensor on the integrated network. Regardless
    of mission function (C2, ISR, shooters, tankers, etc), any data
    collected by a sensor will be passed to all network recipients. This
    requires networking all air, space, ground, and sea-based ISR systems,
    command and control (C2) nodes, and strike platforms to achieve shared
    battlespace awareness and a synergy to maximize our ability to achieve
    the JFC's desired effects.
        Uniting joint and coalition information presents the most difficult
    challenge in providing one common operational picture for key
    decisionmakers. We are working closely with our sister services to
    eliminate the seams between existing systems and taking the necessary
    steps to ensure all future acquisitions are planned and funded to meet
    the interoperability requirements of future joint CONOPs.
        A critical element of successful information merging is
    communications, as bandwidth is finite and requires careful management.
    Long-range or penetrating systems must communicate beyond the horizon
    despite adversaries' attempts to exploit or interrupt these links. To
    counter disruption, all systems must be reliable, secure, and
    bandwidth-efficient. The PBA construct facilitates this objective by
    eliminating constrictive, stove-piped communications systems while
    emphasizing networked operations.
        We will realize the vision of horizontal integration in our TF
    CONOPs. GSTF, for example, will deliver the right-sized mix of assets
    with appropriate sensors capable of penetrating into enemy airspace.
    Such sensors may be low observable and/or expendable, mounted on either
    ISR platforms or imbedded into strike platforms. Sensors may consist of
    Special Operations Forces, inserted before the commencement of
    hostilities, who communicate with attack platforms during combat via
    secure electronic writing tablets, annotating targets, and threats on
    the imagery display with a stylus. As technology progresses, and where
    it makes sense, a significant portion of ISR functionality will likely
    migrate to space, affording 24/7 persistence and penetration. Likewise,
    advanced defensive counterspace capabilities will afford these systems
    protection from enemy actions.
        Combining manned, unmanned, and space-based assets with dynamic C2
    and PBA transforms disparate collection and analysis activities into a
    coherent process, allowing the warfighter to make timely, confident,
    and capable combat decisions. This is what the Air Force brings to the
    joint fight. It is what air and space warriors are all about. We unlock
    the intellectual potential of airmen who think across the dimensions of
    mediums and systems capabilities for the joint warfighter.
    Addressing the Recapitalization Challenges
        Despite new CONOPs and visions for future capabilities, we cannot
    rely on intellectual flexibility to eradicate the challenge of old
    systems and technologies. Though creativity may temporarily reduce the
    negative impacts of aging systems on our operational options,
    ultimately there are impassable limits created by air and space system
    hardware issues.
        We have made tremendous strides in modernizing and improving
    maintenance plans for our aircraft; however, the tyranny of age has
    introduced new problems for old aircraft. Reality dictates that if we
    completely enhance the avionics and add new engines to 40-year-old
    tankers and bombers, they are still 40-year-old aircraft, and subject
    to fleet-threatening problems such as corrosion and structural failure.
        This is equally true for our tighter aircraft, where once cutting-
    edge F-117s now average over 15 years of age, and mainstay air-
    dominance F-15Cs are averaging nearly 20 years of service. With double-
    digit surface-to-air missile systems, next-generation aircraft, and
    advanced cruise missile threats proliferating, merely maintaining our
    aging fighter and attack aircraft will be insufficient. In fact, the
    dramatic advances offered in many of our TF CONOPs cannot be realized
    without the addition of the unique capabilities incorporated in the F/
    A-22. Simply stated, our legacy systems cannot ensure air dominance in
    future engagements--the fundamental element for Joint Force access and
    operations. We will thus continue executive oversight of F/A-22
    acquisition in order to ensure program success. While keeping our
    funding promises, we will procure the only system in this decide that
    puts munitions on targets, and which is unequally capable of detecting
    and intercepting aircraft and cruise missiles.
        Although ultimately solving these recapitalization challenges
    requires acquisition of new systems, we will continue to find
    innovative means to keep current systems operationally effective in the
    near term. We know that just as new problems develop with old systems,
    so too do new opportunities for employment, such as our employment of
    B-1s and B-52s in a close air support role during OEF. We will also
    pursue new options for these long-range strike assets in a standoff
    attack role for future operations.
        Unlike with the aforementioned air-breathing assets, we cannot make
    service life extensions or other modifications to our orbiting space
    systems. Satellites must be replaced regularly to account for hardware
    failures, upgrade their capabilities, and avoid significant coverage
    gaps. Additionally, we must improve outmoded ground control stations,
    enhance protective measures, continue to address new space launch
    avenues, and address bandwidth limitations in order to continue
    leveraging space capabilities for the joint warfighter. We are
    exploring alternatives for assuring access to space, and a key aspect
    of this effort will be invigorating the space industrial base.
        Finally, it is imperative that we address the growing deficiencies
    in our infrastructure. Any improvements we may secure for our air and
    space systems will be limited without a commensurate address of
    essential support systems. Deteriorated roofs, waterlines, electrical
    networks, and airfields are just some of the infrastructure elements
    warranting immediate attention. Our ability to generate air and space
    capabilities preeminently rests with the ingenuity of visionary ideas,
    yet intellectual versatility must be supported by viable systems and
    structures to realize our Service potential.
    Organizational Adaptations
        Commensurate with our drive to enhance air and space capabilities
    is our identification and development of organizational structures to
    aid these advances. In 2002, we initiated numerous adaptations to more
    efficiently and effectively exploit Air Force advantages for the joint
    warfighter.
    Warfighting Integration Deputate
        Comprehensive integration of the Air Force's extensive C\4\ISR
    systems is paramount for our future capabilities. This requires an
    enterprise approach of total information-cycle activities including
    people, processes, and technology. To achieve this, we created a new
    Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration (AF/XI), which brings
    together the operational experience and the technical expertise of
    diverse elements (C\4\ISR, systems integration, modeling and
    simulation, and enterprise architecture specialties.)
        This new directorate will close the seams in the F2T2EA kill chain
    by guiding the integration of manned, unmanned, and space C\4\ISR
    systems. AF/XI's leadership, policy, and resource prioritization will
    capitalize on the technologies, concepts of operations, and
    organizational changes necessary to achieve horizontal integration and
    interoperability.
        Success has been immediate. AF/XI worked with the Deputy Chief of
    Staff for Air and Space Operations to champion increased Air Operations
    Center weapon system funding in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which
    accelerated the stabilization and standardization of the weapon system.
    Subsequently, the base-lined weapon system now has a modernization
    plan, which is both viable and affordable. AF/XI also led analysis that
    highlighted imbalances among collection and exploitation capabilities.
    As a result, we plan to accelerate ground processing and exploitation
    capabilities within the future years defense program to close the gap.
    Major contributions in management of the complex information
    environment will continue, as AF/XI makes better use of scarce
    resources, allowing the Air Force to provide the joint warfighter the
    capabilities to dominate the battlespace.
    Chief Information Officer (AF/CIO)
        Partnered with AF/XI, the AF/CIO shares responsibility to spearhead
    the transformation to an information-driven, network-centric Air Force.
    These two organizations orchestrate the integration within our
    information enterprise, and establish processes and standards to
    accelerate funding and ensure priorities match our integrated
    information vision.
        The AF/CIO's specific mission is to promote the most effective and
    efficient application, acquisition, and management of information
    technology resources under an enterprise architecture. The goal is to
    provide the roadmap for innovation and to function as a blueprint for
    the overall leverage of valuable information technology. Enterprise
    architecture will use models and processes to capture the complex
    interrelationships between the Air Force's systems and platforms. A
    resultant example is basing Information Technology (IT) investment
    decisions on sound business cases, approved Air Force standards, and,
    ultimately, how a particular technology contributes to specific
    capabilities. Additionally, we are institutionalizing enterprise
    architecting as a key construct in defining mission information
    requirements and promoting interoperability.
        Currently, the wide variety of IT standards limits C2 processes and
    information and decision support to our warfighters. The AF/CIO-AF/XI
    team is tackling this and all other integration challenges as they
    develop an enterprise architecture that spans the entire Air Force,
    while also staying in harmony with other services' efforts.
    Blended Wing
        We do nothing in today's Air Force without Guard, Reserve, and
    civilian personnel working alongside active duty airmen. A fundamental
    initiative of Air Force transformation is formalizing this integration
    under the Future Total Force (FTF). As part of the FTF, we are pursuing
    innovative organizational constructs and personnel policies to meld the
    components into a single, more homogenous force. FTF integration will
    create efficiencies, cut costs, ensure stability, retain invaluable
    human capital, and, above all, increase our combat capabilities.
        A key effort is to ``blend,'' where sensible, units from two or
    more components into a single wing with a single commander. This level
    of integration is unprecedented in any of the Services, where active
    duty, Guard, and Reserve personnel share the same facilities and
    equipment, and together, execute the same mission. In essence, blending
    provides two resource pools within a single wing--one, a highly
    experienced, semi-permanent Reserve component workforce, offering
    stability and continuity; the other, a force of primarily active duty
    personnel able to rotate to other locations as needs dictate.
        The first blended wing opportunity arose with the consolidation of
    the B1-B fleet. The move left behind an experienced but underutilized
    pool of Guard personnel at Robins AFB, GA. Meanwhile, the collocated
    93rd Air Control Wing (ACW) (active duty E-8 Joint STARS), suffered
    from high tempo and low retention. Hence, Secretary Roche directed that
    the two units merge, and on 1 October 2002, the blended wing concept
    became a reality with the activation of the 116th ACW.
        The 116th ACW tackled many pioneering challenges: from legal
    questions surrounding the command of combined active-Reserve component
    units, to programmatic issues with funding the program from two
    separate accounts, to integrating different personnel systems used by
    each component. Airmen from both components are working through these
    issues successfully, making the 116th an example for future FTF
    blending. Yet, some additional Title 10 and Title 32 provisions still
    need to be changed to make the FTF a reality. Meanwhile, parallel
    efforts, such as placing Reserve pilots and maintenance personnel
    directly into active duty flying organizations under the Fighter
    Associate Program, add to this leveraging of highly experienced
    reservists to promote a more stable, experienced workforce.
        As organizational constructs, blending and associate programs lay
    an important foundation for a capabilities-based, expeditionary air and
    space force, which are inherently flexible and ideal to meet rotational
    AEF requirements. In a resource-constrained environment, blending
    promotes efficiencies and synergies by leveraging each component's
    comparative strengths, freeing funds for modernization while sustaining
    combat effectiveness, and effecting warfighting capabilities greater
    than the sum of its parts.
    Combat Wing
        The comprehensive evaluations in our ongoing transformation include
    examining our wing structure. Given all of the lessons gleaned from
    expeditionary operations over the past decades, we asked, ``Could we
    derive advantages in revised wing organization for both force
    development and combat capability'' The answer was ``Yes,'' and we
    enacted changes to create the Combat Wing Organization (CWO).
        The central aspect of the CWO is the new Mission Support Group.
    This will merge former support and logistics readiness groups, and
    contracting and aerial port squadrons, as applicable. Within this
    group, we will hone expeditionary skills from crisis action planning,
    personnel readiness, and working with the joint system for load
    planning and deployment, to communications, contingency bed down, and
    force protection. Currently, all of these aspects exist in skill sets
    that none of our officers have in total. But the new expeditionary
    support discipline will address this and provide our officers the
    expertise in all aspects of commanding expeditionary operations. With
    this reorganization, each wing will now have one individual responsible
    for the full range of deployment and employment tasks--the Mission
    Support Group Commander.
        The restructuring will retain the operations group; however, group
    commanders will become more active in the operational level of war.
    Squadron commanders will be role models for operators in the wings,
    ready to lead the first exercise and combat missions. Similarly, we
    will establish a maintenance group responsible for base-level weapons
    system maintenance and sortie production rates. Like their operator
    counterparts, maintenance squadron and group commanders will be role
    models for all wing maintainers. Meanwhile, medical groups will retain
    their current organization, although we are working changes to home and
    deployed medical operations for future implementation.
        Flying and fixing our weapons systems, as well as mission support,
    are essential skill sets. Each requires the highest expertise,
    proficiency, and leadership. The new wing organization allows
    commanders to fully develop within specific functional areas to plan
    and execute air and space power as part of expeditionary units, while
    also giving maintenance and support personnel focused career
    progression. This re-organization does not fix something that is
    broken--it makes a great structure exceptional.
    Acquisition and Business Transformation
        To achieve our vision of an agile, flexible, responsive, and
    capabilities-based air and space force, we must transform the processes
    that provide combatant commanders with air and space capabilities. An
    example of this in action is the Air Force's efforts to carry out the
    responsibilities of DOD Space Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). The
    Secretary of the Air Force delegated those responsibilities to the
    Under Secretary of the Air Force, under whose leadership immediate
    benefit was realized. Adapting an effective process already in use at
    the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Under Secretary
    instituted a new streamlined space acquisition program review and
    milestone decisionmaking process. This new process was used for the
    first time in August 2002 in developing a contract for the National
    Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. This effort
    creates an opportunity for the Air Force to apply performance and cost
    accountability to defense industrial firms through their chief
    financial officers and board of directors by linking executive
    compensation to contract performance.
        In addition to the major process changes for DOD space, the Air
    Force's Business Transformation Task Force directs and integrates
    further process improvement and adaptation. Core business and
    operations support processes--such as acquisition, logistics,
    maintenance, training, medical and dental, among others--are crucial,
    as they ultimately determine our overall enterprise effectiveness and
    directly sustain combat capabilities. An additional category of
    processes called ``enablers'' completes the Air Force enterprise.
    Examples of ``enablers'' include management of human resources,
    finances, contracts, property plant and equipment, and information. The
    enablers are important as they facilitate our core capabilities and
    determine the overall efficiency of our enterprise.
        The Air Force will enact business transformation from an integrated
    enterprise perspective, examining every process and associated link.
    Accordingly, we will employ industry best practices and identify
    management metrics to improve process efficiency without degrading our
    enterprise effectiveness, expand our customer's self-service management
    capability and free up needed resources for the operational
    communities, and provide real-time, accurate financial data for better
    decisionmaking. Already, acquisition reform has effected notable
    improvements, including:

        (1) Streamlined our acquisition and contracting regulations,
    replacing lengthy prescriptive sets of rules with brief documents that
    emphasize speed, innovation, sensible risk management, and elimination
    of time-consuming process steps that have little value. As previously
    mentioned, our new National Security Space acquisition process is an
    example of progress in this area.
        (2) Created a Program Executive Office for Services to bring new
    efficiency to the growing area of services contracts. This key area,
    which accounts for nearly half of our procurement budget, had no prior
    centralized coordination and oversight.
        (3) Developed and initiated System Metric and Reporting Tool
    (SMART), putting real-time program status information on everyone's
    desktop. This web-based application pulls data from dozens of legacy
    reporting systems to give everyone from program managers up to senior
    leadership direct visibility into the ``health'' of hundreds of
    acquisition and modernization programs. When fully deployed in fiscal
    year 2003, it will automate the tedious and laborious process of
    creating Monthly Acquisition Reports and possibly Defense Acquisition
    Executive Summary reporting to OSD.
        (4) Empowered ``high powered teams'' of requirements and
    acquisition professionals to create spiral development plans to deliver
    initial capability to warfighters more quickly, and add capability
    increments in future spirals.
        (5) Designed a Reformed Supply Support Program to improve the
    spares acquisition process by integrating the support contractor into
    the government supply system. Contractors now have the same capability
    as government inventory control points to manage parts, respond to base
    level requisitions, track spares levels, and monitor asset movement.
        (6) Continued, with OSD support, expansion of the Reduction in
    Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) program, to identify critical cost
    drivers, fund investments to address them, and generate cost savings
    and cost avoidance. We also created standard processes and a business
    case analysis model to use for initiatives within R-TOC. In fiscal year
    2003, OSD allocated $24.9 million no-offset investments to R-TOC that
    will return $53.2 million through fiscal year 2008. A planned $37.1
    million investment across the FYDP will save a projected $331 million
    in operations and maintenance through fiscal year 2009.

        These initiatives are only the beginning of a comprehensive and
    aggressive approach to reforming business practices. Our efforts today
    will have a direct effect on efficient and effective air and space
    capability acquisition, both immediately and in the future.
    Ensuring Readiness
        Integrating systems and expanding business practices will not only
    have dramatic effects on air and space capabilities, but also reduce
    readiness challenges. However, we still face daunting, but
    surmountable, obstacles. We must overcome a multitude of installations
    and logistical issues to secure flexible and timely execution of
    expeditionary requirements for joint warfighting.
        Reconstituting and reconfiguring our expeditionary basing systems
    and wartime stocks is a critical element of our force projection
    planning. While we made significant strides in funding, we require
    additional investments in bare base systems, vehicles, spares,
    munitions, and prepositioning assets. Our infrastructure investment
    strategy focuses on three simultaneous steps. First, we must dispose of
    excess facilities. Second, we must fully sustain our facilities and
    systems so they remain combat effective throughout their expected life.
    Third, we must establish a steady investment program to restore and
    modernize our facilities and systems, while advancing our ability to
    protect our people and resources from the growing threat of terrorism
    at current, planned, and future operating locations--at home or abroad.
        We are making progress. Improved vehicle fleet funding allowed us
    to replace some aging vehicles with more reliable assets, including
    alternative fuel versions to help meet Federal fuel reduction mandates.
    Targeted efficiencies in spares management and new fuels mobility
    support equipment will improve supply readiness. In addition, our
    spares campaign restructured Readiness Spares Packages and repositioned
    assets to contingency sites. Moreover, to increase munitions readiness,
    we expanded our Afloat Prepositioning Fleet capabilities, and continue
    acquiring a broad mix of effects-based munitions in line with the
    requirements of all TF CONOPs.
        Finally, our ``Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan'' calls
    for major transformation in financial and infrastructure capitalization
    to ensure Air Force hardware is safe and ready to operate across the
    threat spectrum. To support this plan, we increased funding in fiscal
    year 2004 for depot facilities and equipment modernization. We also
    began a significant push to require weapon systems managers to
    establish their product support and depot maintenance programs early in
    the acquisition cycle and to plan and program the necessary investment
    dollars required for capacity and capability. Additionally, we are
    partnering with private industry to adopt technologies to meet
    capability requirements. The results from these efforts will be
    enhanced, more agile warfighter support through the critical enabler of
    infrastructure.
    Expanding AEF Personnel
        The attacks of September 11 significantly increased workload and
    stress in a number of mission areas for our expeditionary forces.
    Manning for these operations is drawn from our existing AEF packages.
    In order to accommodate increased contingency requirements, we are
    exploring options to augment the existing AF construct. Recent and
    ongoing efforts to maximize the identification of deployable forces and
    align them with AEF cycle, assisted in meeting immediate critical
    warfighting requirements. However, some career fields remain seriously
    stressed by the war on terrorism. Accordingly, our efforts focus on
    changing processes that drive requirements not tuned to our AEF rhythm.
    We developed formulas to measure, and gathered quantitative data to
    evaluate, the relative stress amongst career fields to redirect
    resources to the most critical areas. We also began a critical review
    of blue-suit utilization, to ensure uniform airmen are used only where
    absolutely necessary, and maximize the use of the civilian and contract
    workforce for best service contribution and military essentiality.
        We are refocusing uniformed manpower allocation on our distinctive
    capabilities to reduce the stress on our active force. Additionally, we
    are carefully considering technologies to relieve the increased
    workload. These efforts exist within our longer-term work to
    reengineer, transform, and streamline Air Force operations and
    organizations, and have allowed us already to realign some new recruits
    into our most stressed career fields.
    Summary
        As the two mediums with the most undeveloped potential, air and
    space represent the largest growth areas for national security and the
    greatest frontiers for joint warfighting. As such, air and space
    operations will play an ever-increasing role in the security of America
    and her allies. The Air Force will exploit technology, innovative
    concepts of operations, organizational change, and our ability to
    embrace creative ideas and new ways of thinking. We will bring to bear
    the full suite of air and space capabilities for tomorrow's Joint Force
    Commander--drawing from every resource, integrating closely with all
    Services, and overcoming any obstacle to succeed.

                                  NEXT HORIZON

        The events of the last year have emphasized the dynamics of a new
    international security era. The decade of new states following the Cold
    War has been followed by the rise of non-state actors, many following a
    path of aggression and destruction. Yet, just as America adapted to new
    global dynamics in the past, we will again confront emerging challenges
    with confidence and faith in our ability to meet the demands of
    assuring freedom.
        The Air Force remains dedicated to drawing on its innovation,
    ingenuity, and resolve to develop far-reaching capabilities. The
    ability to deliver effects across the spectrum of national security
    requirements is the cornerstone of the vision and strategy of Air Force
    planning and programming. In conjunction, and increasingly in
    integration with ground, naval, marine, and other national agency
    systems, the Air Force will play a central role in elevating joint
    operations. We recognize the greatest potential for dominant American
    military capabilities lies in the integration of our air and space
    systems with those of other services and agencies, and our success in
    this objective will be evident in every mission to deter, dissuade, or
    decisively defeat any adversary.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
        Those were excellent statements. Now we will proceed to
    questions. Let us start off with the question of the readiness
    of our troops. It seems to me there are two areas of readiness.
    The overall readiness I think you have addressed, but three of
    us on this committee who went overseas observed the readiness
    of those forward-deployed troops in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
    the Gulf region.
        There were areas which concerned us, like the Joint Special
    Operations Center (JSOC), Special Operations SEAL teams, and
    things like that. Some of those individuals have been on a
    rotation cycle to where they were back again many times. I
    wonder if you all could just touch on that readiness situation.
    Since you brought fortunately the sergeant, why do we not start
    with the Air Force on that question.
        Are you concerned about the ability to maintain that
    OPTEMPO of those critical skills I mentioned as well as others?
        General Jumper. Yes, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld and I are
    concerned. Secretary Rumsfeld has rightfully asked us to go
    forward and to make sure that everything that we are doing with
    our people in uniform are things that need to be done by people
    in uniform, and to take those things that do not need to be
    done by people in uniform and shift those slots back over to
    uniformed slots so that we can relieve the tension on our
    deployed forces.
        In the Air Force alone, we found 12,000 people doing what
    we think does not have to be done by people in uniform. That
    would go a long way to relieving some of the pressure that we
    feel on those slots. So it is not just a matter of adding end
    strength. It is a matter of making efficiencies out of what you
    have and making sure you police up the battlefield, sir, and go
    out and find where bodies have migrated off to and make sure
    they get them back to military business. That is part of the
    solution that we are working on.
        Chairman Warner. My question was more narrowly directed to
    those members of the Air Force who are participating on combat
    teams in those regions right now.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir. Especially in the Special
    Operations Forces, they have not been sized for long-term
    sustained operations.
        Chairman Warner. Do you see a window which is a matter of
    constraint?
        General Jumper. Not a particular window, Mr. Chairman. I do
    see a need to bolster up, especially in our combat search and
    rescue forces, which is the Air Force portion of this, and our
    combat controllers, of which Sergeant Yoshida is a part. We
    need to take a look at bolstering up those career fields to be
    able to sustain, especially in this war against terrorism, and
    that kind of activity.
        Chairman Warner. General Shinseki, we will shift to you
    because you have the majority of those people.
        General Shinseki. I do, Mr. Chairman. They are stressed and
    we are using them on multiple missions that a few years ago
    were not anticipated. The first step has been for Special
    Operations Command, and then my Army commander who is part of
    that, to look hard at the missions they are performing today.
    The ones that can be returned to conventional forces, we are
    taking that under our decisions now, so that we husband our
    Special Operating Forces for the key missions that they need to
    focus on.
        Many more missions today than back in 1996, 1997, when we
    saw these requirements expanding. Another thing, the Secretary
    of Defense has asked the commander of Special Operations
    Command to look at his capabilities and see what additional
    requirements he might have. That analysis has been provided and
    is being staffed.
        In advance of that, the Army has in next year's budget
    already added something of the order of 1,800 or 1,900
    additional Special Operations authorizations and about a
    billion dollars to give Special Operations Command added
    capabilities.
        Chairman Warner. Do you see any constraints on the time in
    those regions that we visited, the ability to maintain that
    high OPTEMPO of those particular skills, say in the next 60 to
    90 days?
        General Shinseki. There is stress today and, as I say, the
    decision to pull some of our very best special operators off
    missions that they can be relieved of will give us a bigger
    inventory to deal with that rotation cycle.
        Chairman Warner. Admiral Clark.
        Admiral Clark. Mr. Chairman, it is well documented, and I
    talked about the number of ships that I had deployed, 51
    percent of my great Navy. I talked about 170 additional ships.
    That is the Military Sealift Command. That is pressed forward.
    A lot of those are civilian manned.
        But I look back over the course of time since September 11
    and the start of this process, we have had 9 of our 12 carrier
    battle groups deployed. We are watching the tempo very
    carefully. I feel good about our readiness. But that does not
    mean that there are not areas where you have real challenges,
    and the Special Forces teams are one of those areas that you
    have identified.
        So today I have six carriers over there. Am I concerned
    over the next 60 to 90 days? No, I am very confident. But you
    will recall that the previous two times I have come before you
    I have said that at the top of my list was the current
    readiness challenge, and we have invested significantly in
    that. There are always areas where there will be pockets that
    we have to manage and watch carefully, and we are doing it.
        Chairman Warner. General Hagee.
        General Hagee. Sir, as I mentioned in my opening statement,
    we have 63 percent of the Marine Corps forward deployed. I
    would associate myself with what the Chief of Naval Operations
    said. For the near term, we can maintain that. We will continue
    to watch that to see if we need to do any rotation.
        We do not have any Special Operating Forces per se, but we
    are working with Special Operations Command to see if there are
    some of the capabilities that we have currently in theater that
    can help relieve some of their pressure.
        Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, as we visited with the troops
    there is no question about their having been well trained and
    their commitment and their morale is high. But there is not a
    one of us that did not look into their faces and share with
    them the thoughts that they shared with us about, if force is
    required to remove Saddam Hussein and to dismantle the weapons
    of mass destruction, we could be confronted with in the early
    stages of that combat weapons of mass destruction inflicted
    upon our own forces.
        I think each of you this morning should touch on the
    training and your level of confidence in that training and our
    ability of the troops to carry out their missions. General
    Shinseki, we will start with you.
        General Shinseki. This is the toughest part of our training
    requirement. It is the part of the operation that has the
    greatest risk and also the greatest constraints on physical
    performance applied to it. Being inside of our overgarments,
    masks, and gloves we restrict our senses, and it is the part
    that deserves a considerable amount of training effort.
        That training does go on, whether it is at home station in
    the middle of winter at Fort Stewart, Georgia, or out at the
    National Training Center in California in August. You can
    expect in your training cycle to be put into full mission
    oriented protective posture (MOPP-4) protective environment and
    be required to operate.
        So in terms of discipline, in terms of stamina, in terms of
    the confidence that our equipment is functional at the
    individual level, all of that is there. I think our commanders
    have good visibility along with the responsibility to make sure
    that that piece of their training is addressed in concert with
    all the other training they have to go and get accomplished to
    maintain the highest readiness standards.
        But training in our nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC)
    equipment is part of that, individually and as well as units.
    Units that operate in that environment, if they're
    contaminated, can be expected to operate for an extended period
    in the environment. Units that have an opportunity to
    decontaminate their own equipment and themselves individually
    rehearse this as part of their responsibilities.
        The training level is there. I say again, this is the
    toughest part of our operation, but the requirement to meet the
    training standard is there and commanders execute this.
        Chairman Warner. But in your personal judgment, do you have
    a high degree of confidence in their ability to endure and
    carry out the mission?
        General Shinseki. I do.
        Chairman Warner. Admiral.
        Admiral Clark. I second that completely. My conviction is
    that we have made great investments in the current readiness
    part of our budget. In previous testimony before this
    committee, I have talked about that as a priority issue. I will
    tell you that my manning is better in my battle group and
    amphibious forces than it has ever been since I have been in
    the Navy. It is that way because we have invested in it. We
    have invested in the training cycle and are constantly
    improving it so that we know we have it right.
        Now, does that mean that there is no reason for concern? Of
    course that would be a foolish thing to say when you talk about
    potential conflict. But Mr. Chairman, I am very confident in
    the readiness of our force.
        Chairman Warner. The ability to cope with that contingency?
        Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        General.
        General Hagee. Senator, I am absolutely confident in our
    ability to operate in that environment. As the chairman knows,
    just a few months ago I was in command of the unit that is over
    in Kuwait right now. In the 2 years I was in command, there was
    nothing more important than the NBC readiness. To give you some
    statistics, we have enough Saratoga suits to give three to each
    individual. We have filters for the gas masks, enough for three
    for each individual. We have 14 so-called Fox vehicles. These
    are specially equipped vehicles to detect chemicals in the
    atmosphere or in the ground. We have seven biological detection
    units from the Army with the marines that are there,
    specifically put together to detect biological agents.
        Right now, 94 percent of our marines have had their
    smallpox vaccination. If you include the ones that we exempted,
    they are at 99 percent. We have 85 percent of the marines who
    have had three or more anthrax vaccinations. If you look at the
    ones that have had one or more, we are in the low 90 percent.
        Sir, we are ready and we can operate in that environment.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
        General Jumper.
        General Jumper. Mr. Chairman, we train, as the other
    Services do, every day in this environment. I have every
    confidence that we can sustain operations in this environment.
    We are under way fully with our anthrax and smallpox
    vaccination program. We have the detectors around the
    perimeters of our air bases and we practice in this environment
    as part of our normal readiness training. Sir, we are ready.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 10:28 a.m., the hearing was recessed, the
    committee proceeded to other business, and the hearing was
    reconvened at 10:29 a.m.]
        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you very much.
        General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the
    Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a
    successful completion of the war?
        General Shinseki. In specific numbers, I would have to rely
    on combatant commanders' exact requirements.
        Senator Levin. How about a range?
        General Shinseki. I would say that what has been mobilized
    to this point, something on the order of several hundred
    thousand soldiers, is probably a figure that would be required.
    We are talking about post-hostilities control over a piece of
    geography that is fairly significant with the ethnic tensions
    that could lead to other problems. It takes a significant
    ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment
    to make sure that people are fed, that water is distributed--
    all the normal responsibilities that go along with
    administering a situation like this.
        Senator Levin. What effect would that type of an occupation
    to that extent have on two things: one is our OPTEMPO, which
    you have talked about, already stressed; two is the ability of
    the Army to fulfill the other missions that we have?
        General Shinseki. Well, if it were an extended requirement
    for presence of U.S.-only Army forces, it would have
    significant long-term effect and, therefore, the assistance
    from friends and allies would be helpful.
        Senator Levin. Some of the service personnel with whom we
    chatted on our trip indicated a belief that there may be some
    equipment that they needed but did not have, equipment which
    might be, they thought was, in the hands of non-deployed units.
    I'm just wondering whether any of you are aware of any such
    equipment and whether you would just double-check it. We were
    given one example particularly, something called a Laser Viper.
    But are any of you aware of that situation, where we have the
    most advanced equipment not in the hands of the deployed
    forces, but in the hands of nondeployed forces?
        General Shinseki. I am not aware of any specifics, but I
    would not doubt that there is possibly an opportunity to
    discover something.
        Senator Levin. If you would just all check that issue out,
    because that is obviously something relevant.
        General Shinseki. I will find that information, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I am not aware of any specific instance of the above situation in
    today's deployed forces. Given the cycle in which Navy ships and
    aircraft deploy (known as the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC)),
    and the program manager methodology utilized by NAVSEA, NAVAIR, and
    SPAWAR to introduce new technology into the operating fleet, the most
    modern equipment approved for in-service use would have been installed
    during the unit's last extended maintenance availability prior to the
    commencement of training operations.
        However, the situation of the ``most advanced equipment, not
    (being) in the hands of the deployed forces'' is indeed possible, given
    that, (a) many ships are currently deployed outside of their scheduled
    deployment in support of overseas operations and hence may have missed
    some equipment modernization opportunities and, (b) the ease of
    installation and ready availability of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
    equipment allows for these systems to be directly procured and
    installed by non-deployed ships crews, outside of the above IDTC and
    program management scenarios (in the past, this has typically been in
    the areas of shipboard navigation aids, computer peripherals, and
    similar technology).

        Senator Levin. On the end strength issue, last year our
    Services indicated they needed additional end strength. Only
    the Marines have received additional end strength in this
    budget request. Admiral Clark, your number one unfunded
    priority was for 4,400 additional active duty personnel. That
    was unfunded last year. Your budget proposal for this year has
    an end strength reduction of 1,900 active duty personnel, along
    with a reduction of 2,000 Reserve component personnel. The Navy
    is busier than it was last year. How do you square that?
        Admiral Clark. Well, I square it like this. My proposal
    also reduces the total number of ships that we will have in the
    Navy as we seek to move toward a modernized and redesigned
    Navy. My recommendation to the Secretary and him to the
    President was that there were ships that we needed to
    decommission and move on, and that is why the numbers are
    smaller.
        I will say this, Congress has given us authority to be in
    an over-end strength posture. So in terms of the number of
    people, I have shortfalls in the existing execution year in
    people.
        One of the reasons is that we have had the success that we
    are realizing tremendous success in the battle for people.
    Young people today want to serve, but I do have shortfalls
    there that need to be addressed with supplemental
    appropriations.
        Senator Levin. General Jumper, your predecessor said the
    Air Force needed an increase in end strength of 10,000 airmen.
    The pace of operations has picked up considerably since then
    and yet the Air Force did not get an increase in authorized end
    strength last year and it did not, apparently, ask for an
    increase this year.
        Do you have the personnel you need and how do you square
    those facts?
        General Jumper. Sir, we are in fact stressed, as I stated
    before. One of the things the Secretary of Defense has asked us
    to do, and we are doing, is finding those airmen out there that
    are not doing things that uniformed people need to be doing and
    to police those up and move those slots into slots that do
    require uniformed people.
        We have another issue in that we have previous year
    commitments of almost 4,500 slots that were taken as a result
    of privatization actions that were actually not taken off the
    books. We are having to reduce those as well as part of this
    budget activity.
        So we continue to look for these efficiencies. We will
    continue to apply them where we can. If they do not do the job,
    I will be the first to go back to the Secretary of Defense and
    ask for the relief that we need to get that job done.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        I would ask all of you this. I have a copy of the draft
    legislative proposal which has been circulating inside the
    Department of Defense. Under that draft, the Joint Staff would
    report to the Secretary instead of to the Chairman. The
    Secretary would have to approve all appointments to the Joint
    Staff. The draft amendment would strike the statutory
    requirement that the Joint Staff be ``independently organized
    and operated.'' We also have a copy of a memorandum signed by
    David Chu requesting a legislative proposal that would reduce
    the terms served by the service chiefs from 4 years to 2-year
    renewable terms.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I think these proposals, taken together or separately,
    would undermine the ability of the uniformed military to
    provide independent military advice to the civilian leadership,
    to the executive branch, and to Congress. That is my view.
        More importantly, would you tell us quickly whether you
    support those proposals, General Shinseki?
        General Shinseki. Senator Levin, I have not seen the exact
    language here, but I have heard that there have been
    discussions. This is a chief at the end of a 4-year service and
    I think that the 4-year term, at least for me, has been helpful
    in continuity. I am looking at the fact that, 4 years here, I
    am about to field the first Stryker Brigade. At the end of 4
    years here, the Army is about to have its first major
    acquisition milestone decision in May of this year for the
    Future Combat System. It has taken considerable effort, 4
    years, to put these programs together.
        I think it is helpful to have a long-term perspective. I
    know there are others who have responsibility in this area,
    whether it is here in Congress or over in Defense, combatant
    commanders and service chiefs. All of us have responsibilities.
    But for a service chief a longer term perspective is helpful.
        I think that some of the early inertia that the Army had to
    overcome in order to get its transformation legs moving and
    develop some momentum would have been different had it been
    just a 2-year term of service. I believe that the Joint Staff
    as it exists today serves both the Chairman and the Joint
    Chiefs. I look to them as part of keeping my role as a member
    of the Joint Chiefs, keeping me abreast of those issues. I look
    for them to continue to do that.
        Senator Levin. To maintain that independence?
        General Shinseki. That is correct, for the Joint Chiefs.
        Senator Levin. Do you want to give us quick answers? My
    time is up. Do you agree with these proposals?
        Admiral Clark. First of all, I had not heard of the first
    part of your proposal. This is the first I have heard of it.
        Senator Levin. What was the first you heard of?
        Admiral Clark. The proposal for the Joint Staff, the chain
    of command and the way you lashed it up; I had not heard that.
        Senator Levin. Okay. We will send you all a copy, by the
    way. We would not want you to be in the dark about what is
    floating around the Pentagon.
        Admiral Clark. My sense is that I serve at the pleasure of
    the President, and it seems to me that the experience you glean
    in 2-year assignments is not the best way to go. Again, I am
    not sure the status of that proposal and I have not been asked
    to comment on it.
        I know that there is a tenure issue here, and how long it
    takes and the nature of your contribution. For me, it is a
    pleasure to serve in a position like this, and if the President
    makes a judgment that there are going to be 2-year tours
    instead of 4-year tours, obviously that is the way we are going
    to go.
        The experience related to it is, I find myself now at a
    point where there is a great learning curve in these
    assignments. I would also say that 4 years that we currently
    have is a considerable period to serve. What I believe is
    required is that we need a construct that serves the President
    and serves the Service and provides for independent assessment
    by the Chiefs.
        Senator Levin. General?
        General Hagee. Sir, I had not seen the proposal either and,
    in the interest of time, I would agree with Admiral Clark.
        General Jumper. Sir, we have not been briefed on the
    details of such a proposal nor have we had a chance to discuss
    this with the Secretary of Defense. I will say that I would
    think the Secretary would want his service chiefs in position
    long enough to be able to make a difference and to establish a
    rapport with one another, to be able to deal with the joint
    issues that we deal with every day.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I will address this first question to you, General
    Shinseki, because Admiral Clark and General Jumper have already
    responded to the end strength question that Senator Levin had
    posed.
        Since the early 1990s, the Army has been cut by more than
    34 percent and undergoing a 300-percent increase in mission
    rates. The average frequency of Army contingency deployments
    has increased from 1 every 4 years to 1 every 14 weeks. During
    the same period of time, the Army lost a third of its force
    structure, 21 percent of its infrastructure and 37 percent of
    its budget authority.
        Now, all of this is before September 11 and then the
    potential problems that we are gearing up for right now. To put
    it in perspective, in fiscal year 1989, the Operation Desert
    Storm-size deployment of 261,000 active troops would require 53
    percent of the Army's deployable end strength and only a sixth
    of its forward-staging troops. Today that same deployment would
    require 86 percent of deployable end strength.
        Now, that gets into the problem that we are having, of
    course, with our Reserve component. They are doing a great job,
    but we all know that we are having problems with certain
    critical MOSs and there is not a person at this table up here
    that does not have a lot of deployments in his or her State. I
    know you all answer the question, yes, we are ready and all
    that, but how long can you sustain this? Then specifically on
    end strength, General Shinseki, where are you? What are your
    feelings?
        General Shinseki. Senator, I think the last 3 years that I
    have appeared before this committee, I have indicated that the
    mission profile that the Army has been asked to address is
    bigger than the size of the active component formations that we
    had and that end strength was an issue.
        But if you recall 3 years ago, recruiting was a challenge
    and we had to go take care of that. In the last 3 years,
    recruiting and retention is no longer the issue. So we are able
    to fill our ranks. Prior to this mobilization expansion for a
    potential Southwest Asia scenario, I think you would have found
    something on the order of 25,000 to 30,000 Reserve component
    soldiers mobilized each and every day routinely for the Sinai,
    Bosnia, and Kosovo. I think this is an indication that our
    reliance on the Reserves. Their response has been fantastic,
    but the fact that we are relying on them so heavily for those
    routine day-to-day missions suggests that there is an end
    strength issue here.
        Those numbers are constantly reviewed. We have made the
    case that end strength is an issue for the Army, and we will
    continue to do that.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
        Now, for all of you, I want to first thank you because you
    have each had someone come into my office. We have had
    briefings on this next issue that concern me. It concerns me,
    not just because it has been of concern to this committee for a
    long time, but I also chair the Environment and Public Works
    Committee.
        That is, environmental encroachment. We have had briefings
    from each one of the four Services. General Hagee, we know what
    is happening out at Camp Pendleton. We know that we will be
    able to use about 30 percent of the land area there. General
    Shinseki, we have the same problem at Fort Bragg and other
    places. Of course, we know what has happened by losing the
    Vieques Range. That puts more burdens on the ranges that we
    have here in CONUS.
        So I would like to have each one of you just very briefly
    talk about how serious of a problem this is. Then for the
    record, I would like to have you inform this committee as to
    the monetary costs, as near as you can determine them, of
    complying with these environmental regulations.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                           ENVIRONMENTAL ENCROACHMENT

        General Shinseki. Encroachment on training and testing ranges is a
    significant issue for the Army. Our soldiers must train as they intend
    to fight because they will surely fight as they have been trained.
    Environmentally based restrictions on training add artificiality into
    training. Compliance with environmental laws can also restrict access
    to land needed for maneuver and live-fire and restrict the available
    times and durations of training activities.
        The Army has spent more than $74 million over the past 5 years for
    compliance with the Endangered Species Act. Given the significantly
    increasing requirements brought about by pending critical habitat
    designations, we anticipate significant increases in cost both to
    maintain compliance and find training alternatives.
        In addition, there are indirect costs associated with deploying
    units to alternative training sites when their home station does not
    support all necessary training requirements. For example, the 25th
    Infantry Division (Light) in Hawaii cannot conduct all of the 18
    required combined arms live-fire exercises at their home station range,
    Makua Military Range, due to a NEPA-based lawsuit settlement. Rather,
    they must conduct a number of these exercises while deployed to the
    continental U.S. or overseas. In addition, other units in Hawaii
    (National Guard and Marines) that would also train at Makua are unable
    to do so and must deploy or develop alternatives (suboptimal training
    methods) for their displaced live-fire training.
        At Fort Richardson, Alaska, the Army is currently engaged in a
    lawsuit where the plaintiffs allege that live-fire training violates
    the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). They
    are seeking to shut down training at the Eagle River Flats (ERF) range.
    The RCRA allegation argues that munitions fired into or onto ERF fall
    within the definition of RCRA statutory solid waste. If munitions used
    for their intended purpose are considered to be statutory solid waste,
    the Army could be forced to perform corrective action or remediation of
    ERF. Live-fire training during the remediation would be impossible and
    the only mortar and artillery impact area at Fort Richardson would be
    lost for training. The CERCLA allegations are that the act of firing
    munitions onto an operational range constitutes a release of hazardous
    substances requiring reporting, characterization, and remediation. If
    the court agrees with the plaintiff, then live-fire training and
    testing operation at every Army range could be subject to CERCLA
    response requirements. These findings would not only dramatically
    impact the readiness of the 172nd Infantry Brigade in Alaska, the
    largest infantry brigade in the Army, but the entire Department of
    Defense (DOD).
        Further lawsuits could compel the Environmental Protection Agency
    and State regulators in all U.S. regions to enforce the same standards
    on other military ranges. Live-fire training would be severely
    constrained and military readiness would decrease dramatically. The
    requirement to conduct RCRA corrective action or CERCLA response
    actions on operational ranges would constitute a huge financial burden.
    The Army estimates that the cost to conduct RCRA or CERCLA-type clean
    up on Army operational ranges would range from $14 billion to $140
    billion. This does not include money that would be required to move
    displaced training to another location during the cleanup. Moreover, if
    these standards are applied across the DOD, it is unlikely that
    alternative live-fire training sites would even be available.
        Admiral Clark. While the fiscal year 2003 Department of the Navy
    (DON) environmental compliance budget is approximately $1 billion, no
    specific lines are tied directly or exclusively to encroachment
    mitigation. DON budgets the funding required to comply with existing
    environmental laws applicable to installations, ships, and aircraft.
    These laws and regulations in turn have encroachment impacts if they
    alter training time or space available while we maintain the property
    the taxpayers have entrusted in us.
        The effects of encroachment go beyond the environmental programs
    due to the fact that when encroachment occurs there are potential costs
    associated with delays, cancellations, modifications, and movement of
    training to different locations. Operational costs may increase in the
    form of more steaming days and/or flying hours required to complete an
    exercise, and personnel costs may rise from paying travel per diem over
    a longer time period.
        The final cost has no fiscal figure but carries the most weight and
    burden of encroachment on our troops. Should an exercise move to an
    alternate location because of encroachment concerns, it means the
    sailor could incur a longer time away from home due to transit time to
    the training site. During this higher state of operational tempo as we
    prosecute the global war on terror, all possible options are used to
    ensure the sailor maximum time with family while home. It is also why
    Navy strives to accomplish most unit level training near the home base,
    but unfortunately there are times when this goal cannot be achieved due
    to encroachment.
        General Hagee. For fiscal year 2004, the Marine Corps has budgeted
    the following to meet environmental compliance, pollution prevention,
    and conservation requirements:
                                                           [In thousands
                                                             of dollars]

        Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps                 121,975
        Military Construction                                     31,200
        Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve           9,245
        Defense Working Capital Fund                               2,966

        General Jumper did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in committee files.

        General Shinseki. I would tell you the Army must train.
    Otherwise, our presence on a piece of ground is not useful to
    us. So we have made the importance of meeting our training
    requirements a high priority, and where we have forces located
    we have had to work with folks responsible for the environment
    and find ways to continue to train. I think we have done that
    by demonstrating we are good stewards.
        But this is an issue that we continue to work, whether it
    is in the National Training Center where you have the Desert
    Tortoise or Fort Bragg, Fort Polk, Fort Benning, where the Red-
    Cockaded Woodpecker exists.
        Senator Inhofe. General, I know you have been good
    stewards, all of you have, and that is the problem. You are
    such good stewards, you are getting more and more of the
    critters coming in and more and more of the problems. For
    example, look at Fort Bragg. Camp Lejeune is a good example,
    General Hagee, where I have been down there at 2-year intervals
    and I see more and more of these areas where they are not able
    to train.
        So I am concerned about this, and again for the sake of
    time I will just go ahead and ask you for the record if you
    would submit that.
        General Shinseki, one other question for you is. First of
    all, I thank you for all the effort that you made in coming up
    with an NLOS cannon compromise that gets into our Future Combat
    System. I think it is good. I would ask you, does the budget
    adequately fund that program to meet the congressionally-
    mandated time line, that is fielding this by 2008?
        General Shinseki. It does, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay, good.
        General Jumper, I know one of the big controversial things
    in the costs would be, what are you going to use for tankers?
    There are several proposals out there. The KC-135 Es and Rs--I
    think now four-fifths of them are converted to Romeos--but also
    the proposal for the leasing of 100 767s, which I think people
    have to understand is the first step. If that were to happen, I
    would assume we would end up with 400 or 500 of these things.
        My concern is this. You are going to have to come to this
    committee for ratification of that lease agreement, is that
    correct?
        General Jumper. That is correct.
        Senator Inhofe. When you do come to this committee for
    ratification, will you come in with an established training,
    basing, and maintenance plan for that equipment?
        General Jumper. Sir, the plan that we have for training is
    not established yet. What the initial plan would be, to start
    off, as we did with the C-17, and that would be that as a few
    airplanes become available then that training would probably be
    done on a contract.
        As you reach a certain level of aircraft--in the C-17
    example it was 20 aircraft--then you make a decision on
    centralizing the training. So at that time, we would come
    forward with a plan on how and when that would be done sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Yes, I remember the C-17. We went through
    that for a number of years.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. It is a successful program. However, it is
    a little bit different than this because you are talking about
    a leasing operation where you are going to have these
    conversions and then a major training effort. I would just say
    this: if you are not in a position to come before this
    committee with the training and the basing and maintenance, I
    am probably going to oppose the lease altogether, because there
    are some alternatives out there and I think we really need to
    see how this overall program is going to work before we get
    into something as far-reaching as this program you are
    contemplating right now.
        General Jumper. I understand, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        First let me begin by thanking and commending General
    Shinseki for his great service to the Army and the Nation, and
    also Patty Shinseki, who has served with equal distinction at
    least. Thank you.
        There is a recurrent theme in today's questioning about
    manpower and end strength and I think that emanates from the
    common sense view that it is very difficult to interject
    military forces into a region and it is sometimes more
    difficult to get them out. So I think we all are anticipating
    not only successful military operations, but long-term
    operations.
        I know you have responded, but could you particularly
    respond to the issue of Reserve and National Guard, because
    what I have seen, as Senator Inhofe has suggested, in my home
    State we have mobilized practically all the Guard and Reserve
    Forces we have for 1 year. A more specific question is, what do
    we have to do now to ensure that we do not run into a wall a
    year from now and there are not any willing able National
    Guard, Reserves, to fulfil critical missions, many of which
    might be particularly germane to the Reserves and the Guards
    since civil affairs, distribution of water, distribution of
    food, as General Shinseki suggested there is a lot more of
    those qualified individuals in the Reserves than the Active
    Forces.
        Could you comment, and I will ask all of you gentlemen to
    do so.
        General Shinseki. Certainly, Senator. I think this is part
    of that larger discussion about right-sizing the force, the end
    strength issue that I addressed earlier. Then once that issue
    is addressed, then it is the appropriate mix between active and
    Reserve components.
        Day to day, we should be able to handle that out of the
    available inventory of our active component formations, and
    then have on those unusual circumstances when you have to surge
    for a large operation a requirement to go to our Reserve
    components. That is not what is happening right now. So it is a
    right-sizing of the force and a decision on how to best achieve
    the right mix and balance here.
        Having said that, our Reserve component soldiers have been
    absolutely fantastic in their response to these call-ups, many
    of them, on very short notice. They have done what we have
    asked them to do in days when we would have normally wanted to
    give them weeks to respond.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, from your perspective?
        Admiral Clark. I do not have the same circumstances the
    General does, but I do have the issue for us and where we are
    in the manning circumstances about force protection. We have
    used a number of these individuals in the force protection
    role. I have about 5,000 people called up today, so my numbers
    are dramatically different than the other Services.
        We will be able to sustain this where we are. The challenge
    is: how do you get the right mix so that you are not constantly
    calling on the Reserve structure to now handle what is in
    effect from where I sit a new requirement for security? We are
    moving and will in this budget this year bring more active duty
    people into the structure to take care of basic force
    protection challenges that we face.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        General Hagee.
        General Hagee. Yes, sir. The Marine Reserve is pretty much
    a mirror image of our Active-Duty Force, except for certain
    functions like PSYOPS and civil affairs. We have approximately
    14,000 Reserves on active duty right now and that is a result
    of our prep for what action we might have to take in Southwest
    Asia. We can maintain that in the near term.
        Senator Reed. General Jumper.
        General Jumper. Sir, I think one of the challenges we all
    have is to try to determine the new background level baseline
    activity that is going to be required of all of our Services as
    we go through the dynamics that we are going through now.
    Certainly with the addition of Afghanistan, the aftermath of
    Kosovo, all of us have had to rise to a new, higher level of
    basic activity in all of our Services.
        This also dictates how the mix has to go between the active
    and the Reserve. We have done some minor adjustments in the Air
    Force with combat search and rescue forces, substituting one
    capability in the Reserve Forces for active duty combat search
    and rescue.
        So I think this is going to be an iterative process. I do
    not think we are going to be able to answer the question of the
    right mix or even the right tempo of activity for some time
    until we see how we baseline out again.
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Admiral Clark, I noticed that the budget proposal cuts over
    $400 million in submarine research and development, but my
    hunch is that a lot of our research and development funds, not
    just within the Navy but throughout the Services, are being
    cut. What is the impact in terms of future technology from
    these cuts in research and development?
        Admiral Clark. I do not know exactly which budget line you
    are referring to, but obviously research and development is the
    lifeblood for future development. So we have a strong R&D
    budget in this submit. But obviously, your question, what is
    the role, is the lifeblood, so it has to be right.
        I would be happy to address the specific if you have it. In
    terms of the total macro numbers by community, I really do not
    do it that way.
        Senator Reed. We will specifically get you some
    information, then.
        My time has expired. Thank you.
        Senator McCain [presiding]. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Jumper, we have the Air Force Academy in the State
    of Colorado. We have a number of allegations that are surfacing
    now about women who have been raped at the Academy. There was a
    problem in the early 1990s with some sexual harassment cases,
    and I know that the Academy tried to deal with the problem by
    putting in place some procedures to allow women to go ahead and
    report a rape case or sexual harassment. Then, there was a GAO
    report in 1994 that had some recommendations on what could be
    done as far as the procedures concerned.
        Since the investigative reporters have brought up this
    situation and consequently we have had a number of women who
    have contacted my office. I think we are up to about 16 now.
    There is one common thread. I mean, there is a number of common
    threads that run through with these cases, but there is one
    common thread and that is that they are working under an honor
    system in the Academy. They are encouraged to step forward and
    they are given an amnesty opportunity. Then, they are brought
    in and the case is investigated. They are put in a position
    where if they want to stay in, continue to be in the Air Force
    as a career, they have to lie.
        So this really puts them in a box, and I hope you will take
    a close look at what is happening at the Academy. I was hoping
    maybe you might have a comment or two.
        General Jumper. Senator, I could take up the rest of your
    day with my comments on this subject. First of all, let me
    assure you and other members of the committee that there is no
    place in the United States Air Force for any potential officer
    who would treat any other potential officer in the way that has
    been alleged.
        Secretary of the Air Force Jim Roche and I are the personal
    action officers on this particular issue. Before this came to
    light in the press, we had other indications that some of the
    processes by which these infractions are reported were not as
    they should be. There have also been suggestions that women who
    surface these are encouraged not to press charges because the
    circumstances they found themselves in leading up to the crime
    may have compromised their situation.
        Let there be no doubt that assault and rape are crimes of
    violence, and crimes of violence will be treated separately
    from the circumstances that one might find themselves in
    leading up to that crime of violence.
        We have a team out there right now looking at the very
    processes you mentioned, Senator, to make sure that anyone at
    the Academy has a clear channel to report these criminal
    activities and that we have the means to deal with them
    appropriately.
        Senator Allard. I appreciate your comments, General Jumper.
    I think there are two problems there. Number one, maybe some of
    these cases in the past need to be reviewed a little closer.
    Number two, I think most of the women that are contacting my
    office are concerned about the future. I see that you are too
    in the comments that you just made before this committee. It is
    important to make sure this process is corrected so that we
    have a team--we do not have a victim within the team that
    somehow or other gets themselves in an untenable situation.
        I appreciate your comment.
        General Jumper. Senator, if I could just add one comment. I
    have two daughters in the Air Force, and I have a third one who
    will start ROTC next year. So you are looking at a dad who has
    little tolerance for this stuff.
        Senator Allard. General, I understand. Very good. Thank you
    for your comments.
        I would like to move on to another issue within my 6 minute
    period here, and that is missile defense. I am very interested
    developing and getting our missile defense system deployed out
    there. I think it is a high priority for the President also.
        The Missile Defense Agency is developing these systems, but
    I think ultimately you are going to be the users of that
    system. So my question is, are you all prepared to make the
    ballistic missile system a core mission for each of your
    branches of the Services? I am talking Navy, Air Force, and
    Army. I am assuming it may already be becoming a part of your
    core mission.
        So I would like to have each one of you comment on that if
    you would, please. We will start with General Shinseki and we
    will just move on down the table, Admiral Clark and then
    General Jumper if you would, please.
        General Shinseki. Senator, the Army has had a long
    tradition of association with missiles and, yes, we are part of
    this National Missile Defense Program. Our contributions
    currently have to do with, even as the National Missile Defense
    Program is being stood up, our capabilities are in the terminal
    attack business with our Patriots and our THAAD missiles. Right
    now they represent about the only point to point attack,
    missile to missile attack capability. Even as other
    capabilities are being stood up, we are already part of this
    effort.
        Senator Allard. As a part of your core mission now; is that
    where we are?
        General Shinseki. We have been part of missile defense as
    part of this.
        Senator Allard. Core mission?
        General Shinseki. Yes.
        Senator Allard. Admiral Clark.
        Admiral Clark. We have had an incredibly successful testing
    year the last 12 months, six for six and three direct hits.
    Three were tracking exercises. We absolutely are prepared to
    move into the future on this.
        Now, as to whether it is core or not, missile defense has
    been a core, but different kinds, near as opposed to ballistic
    missile, long-range capabilities. The proposal put forward
    would have us moving to an interim capability in 2004. We
    anxiously are pursuing that. In fact, the Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency was coming forward with a proposal to
    build a test platform and I came forward with a counterproposal
    that I commit a ship now to that program so we do not lose time
    in that effort. We are on board and moving forward.
        Senator Allard. I think a big part of that is this concept
    of the spiral development.
        Admiral Clark. Correct.
        Senator Allard. I think you can play a key role in getting
    it started there.
        Admiral Clark. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        General Jumper.
        General Jumper. Sir, we will certainly consider it core to
    the Air Force, whatever our role emerges in the future. We know
    that we have a significant program with the Airborne Laser
    already under way. It will blend in with this program, and we
    will be working with STRATCOM and Northern Command as their
    roles work out, and our components will then be a part of the
    implementation, however it is designated.
        Senator Allard. Thank you all.
        My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator McCain. Senator Dayton.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Shinseki, I want to thank you also for your
    distinguished service and recall that when I attended this
    hearing 2 years ago and each of you--and this was my first
    time--expressed your own views directly to this committee,
    regardless of other considerations and pressures as others did
    as well. I certainly in subsequent years, especially last year,
    had the chance to see how vital that is and how courageous at
    times it requires someone to be. I want to thank you
    specifically for that.
        I want to follow up on Senator Inhofe's question a little
    more regarding the NLOS cannon system. What specifically is in
    the fiscal year 2004 request for that, what components of that
    development? Are those locked into fiscal year 2004? Then are
    we set up now step by step? You said fiscal year 2008 is the
    expected deployment.
        General Shinseki. Well Senator, we took the moneys that
    were available coming out of the Crusader program, focused it
    into the Non-Line of Sight Cannon. This Congress added
    additional moneys to ensure that the development would be
    visible and continue, and that is all on track.
        This year in the fiscal year 2004 budget, we have taken
    that Non-Line of Sight Cannon program element, which was a
    separate element, put it together with Future Combat System
    overall, those vehicles, because it is thought that this Non-
    Line of Sight Cannon will provide us the common chassis on
    which all the other systems would ride. We watch that very
    closely, and that is addressed in the budget.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you.
        One question I will ask each of you, and again I will start
    with General Shinseki again. On the budget proposal for the 5
    out years, it is basically in the DOD component for this coming
    fiscal year $379.9 billion and then for the next 5 years it is
    approximately $20 billion. Actually, it is a 5-percent increase
    initially, but 4 percent at the end. So my thought was, if you
    spend that increment of funding over the course of the plan you
    have laid out here, what in fiscal year 2009 will be the major
    developments or improvements or next steps forward,
    irrespective of service areas? Does that progression reflect
    your own priorities, your own view of what we most importantly
    need to do to be ready to fight whatever we have to fight in
    2009?
        General Shinseki. If you look out, the Army is extending
    from the fiscal year 2004 budget, but from fiscal year 2004 to
    fiscal year 2009 you will see that on the moneys generated,
    Future Combat System, that new capability that we are looking
    at in 2010, that we will begin to field that in 2008 in small
    increments, and the first brigade-sized element in 2010. So the
    Future Combat System, precision munitions, sensors and
    communications, what lashes this together is the C\4\ISR, if
    you will, the ability to link all these capabilities.
    Additionally, missile defense technology, a significant
    investment of about a billion dollars; about a billion dollars
    in science and technology as well. So these are the major
    categories that we will see accomplished in 2010.
        Senator Dayton. Admiral?
        Admiral Clark. Senator, the major issues are the
    recapitalization of the existing force and then moving forward
    with transformation. I have testified before this committee in
    previous years over the challenges that I face in that
    recapitalization issue and that I need $12 billion a year in my
    SCN account, for example, and have not had it.
        As I move toward the out years and will we be doing
    everything we need to do, the out years, we are doing
    everything we can to turn dollars into investment in the future
    for recapitalization, modernization, and transformation. I am
    encouraged by the out years. It is easy to see the improvement
    in the out years, but we have moved the budget in a way that
    puts the resources in the ship construction account, that puts
    the resources into the transformation we need in the aviation
    side of the house.
        For example, General Jumper and I are working--this will be
    reflected in future budgets--on how we can team to make the
    unmanned combat air vehicles and how we can get there quicker.
    I absolutely see the kind of transformational things that we
    need in the future as well as the number of ships that we need
    to build so that we can recapitalize for the first half of the
    20th century.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you.
        General?
        General Hagee. Some of those transformation items that we
    have talked about as far as the Marine Corps would be the
    Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle. In fiscal year 2009 we are
    going to start seeing, I believe, the Joint Strike Fighter
    coming off; tiltrotor technology, which right now is doing very
    well in the testing, will be available. We will be in the
    middle of our upgrade of our Huey and Cobra to a four-rotor
    blade on each one of those helicopters.
        We will have a replacement for the LHA. We will also have a
    way ahead for the replacement for our Maritime Prepositioned
    Force.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you.
        General Jumper. Sir, I think we will begin to see some of
    Secretary Rumsfeld's initiatives in transformation starting to
    come to fruition, where we streamline processes; we get the
    operational community, and the acquisition community, the
    scientific community together during the development of
    programs, and we start to get things out much quicker to the
    field.
        As far as the Air Force is concerned, I think we are going
    to see an increase in our ability to talk directly between
    space, air, land, and sea platforms, so that we can get the
    machine-to-machine interfaces that right now go through travel
    communities and analog eyeballs in order to interpret results.
        I think we will see a great uptick in our ability to
    network. I call it the cursor over the target. The sum of the
    wisdom of all of our systems talking to one another equals a
    cursor over the target that we can act on immediately. I think
    that we will see great improvements in our ability to deal with
    future threats such as cruise missiles, which is a big worry of
    mine, and mobile targets in and under the weather, in and under
    the camouflage, being able to work with General Shinseki's
    concept of operations to help our folks on the ground, all
    these things.
        The next generation of strike technology, whether it is a
    bomber, whether it is in orbit, from orbit, or through orbit,
    are going to be questions we are going to be asking in the
    coming months to prepare for future threats.
        Senator Dayton. Thank you.
        Although my time has expired, you say you have the
    resources you need, so I would say that anything that is not in
    this, especially in these out years, that you think is either
    not in that should be or that you think is underfunded, I would
    appreciate having that in writing in the next month or so. But
    I thank you all.
        Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
        Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank each of you for the tremendous service you have
    rendered. You have led in changing our military establishment
    and transforming it to a more lethal and mobile force that we
    respect, that leaves us with the capability of affecting world
    events in a positive way. We really appreciate that, all of
    you.
        I know there are things that remain to be done. There will
    be challenges you need to face, and whenever you make a change
    someone is not going to be happy. But I think the change is
    going in the right direction and I salute you for that.
        I know that some may want to continue to discuss and debate
    the niceties of the situation in Iraq, but I would just recall
    that we have voted 77 Senators and overwhelmingly in the House
    to authorize the President to take the action he believes is
    necessary without a UN vote, without a NATO vote, and I expect
    that the President will do that. It strikes me as really
    ludicrous or really worse, pernicious that France and Germany
    would suggest that we need to give at least 4 more months to
    the inspectors when Saddam Hussein could, within a few hours,
    disclose his weapons of mass destruction and the matter would
    be settled and we would not have a problem.
        So we need to give him more time to do something he could
    do in one day is beyond me. So I hope the President will
    continue to press on the United Nations the need for them to be
    responsible, be relevant, and to honor the resolutions that
    they have previously issued.
        Gentlemen, on the Guard and Reserve, there is some concern
    about whether we have them configured properly and whether or
    not we are able to call them up in a timely fashion and we have
    the right forces to call up. They are prepared to serve.
    Alabama has the highest per capita National Guard service in
    activation of any State in the country, and we are proud of
    that and willing to serve on that.
        I visited Opelika and Brundage and my old Army Reserve unit
    that I spent 10 years in has been activated for the second
    time. They are in Kuwait. They were there 11 years ago.
        I would just ask, are you satisfied where we are with the
    Reserves in terms of training? First, I would like to say the
    training and their capability and their equipment are maybe not
    perfect, but is so far superior to what it used to be. It is so
    close to active duty in most instances.
        But are you satisfied we are configured correctly and that
    we are using them as wisely as we can? General Shinseki, I
    guess you have the most. Maybe you can give your thoughts.
        General Shinseki. Senator, as I said, we have used them a
    lot more than I would have expected. I have watched this now
    for a number of years and I have talked about the end strength
    of the Army and the fact that we have gone to the Reserve
    component for many of those routine missions. I mean, they are
    in the Sinai today, they are in Bosnia, they are about to go to
    Kosovo; this suggests that for these ongoing operations that we
    are going to them far more frequently than I think any of us
    expected.
        I do know that there is stress on them. For these missions,
    we have the time to bring them up to the mission standard and
    they deploy and do a fantastic job. For a large-scale expansion
    on short notice, which is really what the members of the Guard
    and the Reserve have their focus on, this adds to the
    challenge. When they are being used for those routine day-to-
    day missions, it adds to the stress.
        Are they able to do it? Yes. Are they better today than
    they were 5 or 10 years ago today? Much, much better. A lot of
    effort on their part and ours to get them resources and
    training to the standard. But there is stress on their
    formations and following this set of mobilizations we are going
    to have to take a good hard look at right-sizing the force and
    getting to the right mix. Those studies are under way.
        Senator Sessions. So those studies are under way?
        General Shinseki. Yes.
        Senator Sessions. Any of you want to comment further on
    that? [No response.]
        One of the things that we need to continue to strive for in
    our transformation are new methods of warfare: Special Forces,
    which I hear you say are most stressed; precision-guided
    munitions that we need enough of; and unmanned aerial vehicles
    and maybe unmanned ground vehicles. Those are transformational
    matters of great importance and it seems that we are somewhat
    stressed in each one of those areas and we could perhaps be
    further along in each one of those areas than we are today.
        It strikes me that in any likely conflict in the next
    decade these fores are going to be key to our success.
        I will start with General Shinseki again. Do you have any
    comments or are we where we need to be with regard to these
    type forces and should we strive to do more?
        General Shinseki. Special Operations Forces?
        Senator Sessions. The Special Operations Forces, the
    unmanned aerial vehicles, the precision-guided munitions, and
    things of that nature that represent modern warfare.
        General Shinseki. Special Operations Forces, you have
    already begun to see some adjustments on the part of the Army.
    Even before this latest expanded call-up or requirement for
    Special Operations Forces, in this next budget we have added
    something on the order of 1,800, perhaps 1,900, additional
    people that come from the Army, and it takes us a certain
    amount of time to grow that capability and then transition them
    to the Special Operations Forces.
        We are even recruiting directly off the street for
    youngsters with particular skills and capabilities that may go
    directly into that kind of unit. So we are looking at that. We
    have added to their budget in fiscal year 2004. So those things
    are under way.
        As I indicated earlier, we are investing in precision
    munitions. In some ways if you look at the efforts of the Army
    to digitize in the 1990s, it was the term that was used to
    describe what we were doing to create better situational
    awareness for our units and our formations so we could more
    precisely target those things we wanted to bring our fires
    against. Much of that investment is being realized today.
        For the ground combat formations, it is distinguishing
    between ourselves, our friends, and those adversaries who we
    want to target. Much of that is going on, a complement of now
    precision fires being able to link into that. Those investments
    are being made.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral, a comment?
        Admiral Clark. If I could. We have made a lot of progress
    in the PGM world. I feel real good about where we are. We are
    on a curve. We have not flattened out. This is a good news
    story. General Jumper and I are working together to make sure
    that we have the right mix of weapons and we have a great
    partnering relationship going on with the Air Force.
        I am really excited about what is happening in unmanned
    vehicles. I absolutely believe this is one of the most
    important technologies for us to pursue. We had a successful
    flight of one of the unmanned prototypes this last week, a
    combat vehicle, and this is all headed in the right direction.
    Again, this is an area where the Air Force and the Navy are
    working hand in glove, seeking to chart a path together so that
    we can optimize and get the most bang for the buck for the
    taxpayers' resources.
        The area where I am a little more concerned is the SOF
    question you raise. We have to look at this carefully. By the
    way, with the command relationship that exists, some of these
    forces work directly for Special Operations Command and not for
    the Navy per se. But we know that they are turning this force
    tightly.
        The demand on this resource is significant and I would
    expect that we are going to see a requirement to increase this
    force structure.
        Senator Sessions. General Hagee?
        General Hagee. Sir, I would strongly agree about the use of
    unmanned aerial vehicles.
        Senator Sessions. Could I just interrupt. I notice that the
    Navy sent out a memo, according to The Washington Times
    article, that a capability gap exists and that a sense of
    urgency needs to be placed on unmanned aerial vehicles. Would
    you agree with that, Admiral Clark?
        Admiral Clark. I do agree with it and that is why I am so
    excited to report to you that we had a very successful flight
    last week. We have unmanned vehicles. Now, I am talking about
    the next generation. General Jumper and I are working on
    unmanned combat vehicles that will be carrier-capable. If you
    look at the nature of our operations cyclic off the carrier
    or--we need more dwell time.
        My favorite new word in the last year is ``persistence''--
    persistent combat capability. We need that capability, and I
    believe that the unmanned regime is going to give us great
    capability. It is coming. There are investments for it in this
    budget and there will be, and we are working on additional
    things now for the future.
        General Hagee. Sir, we are also working with the Navy and
    the Air Force in the unmanned aerial vehicle area, both with
    sensors and the combat unmanned aerial vehicles. We are also
    working on the ground unmanned vehicles, too, mostly in the
    sensor area.
        As I mentioned before, we are working with Special
    Operations Command. In fact this afternoon, I am meeting with
    General Holland trying to identify those areas where Marine
    forces that are already forward deployed might be able to
    relieve some of the stress on his forces.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Jumper. Sir, I am very proud of how we are getting
    this stuff out in the field in efforts like we described with
    Sergeant Yoshida, who is working directly with commercial
    industry, with our acquisition community, to take off-the-shelf
    technology, get them into the hands of our combat controllers,
    and do it now. I think that is a good model for the future.
        On things like the unmanned air vehicle, we are making the
    Predator UAV as quickly as we can. We are making two a month.
    One of the problems that we have is we have to balance the
    things we are trying to do with that vehicle with our ability
    to have a stable production line, because since 1999, we have
    added the laser designation capability to the Predator, we have
    added the Hellfire missile to the Predator, and other special
    capabilities that we keep going back then and trying to refit
    into the ones that are being manufactured now.
        We have a Predator B on the way that is going to have six
    weapons stations on it and it will improve that capability
    significantly.
        Then with the precision-guided munitions, if you recall,
    Senator, back as recent as the Kosovo war we did not have the
    Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The JDAM, which is GPS-
    guided, is on everybody's tongue now. We did not even have it
    in Kosovo. We were dropping prototypes out of the B-2.
        Since then we have tens of thousands of these things that
    Admiral Clark and I are out procuring at a rate of about 2,500
    a month by July of this year, as quickly as we can make them.
    So I think the emphasis is there. I could go on and on, but I
    think the emphasis is there and we have a deep appreciation for
    what you are talking about, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Well, we do not want to run short.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I join with all the members of the committee in commending
    all of you for the job that you have done preparing our Armed
    Forces to deal with the eventualities that we are going to be
    facing, appear to be facing very soon in terms of Iraq. At the
    time when these servicemen are called to perform, all of us are
    going to be strongly behind them.
        I am glad we talked earlier, in response to questions,
    about the preparedness of the servicemen and women. I do not
    believe that this conflict in Iraq is going to last a very long
    time. I myself am most concerned about Osama bin Laden and al
    Qaeda, the security issues that are presented by them still,
    and those issues that are presented by them in terms of terror
    here at home and around the world.
        I am very concerned about North Korea and the dangers that
    they have in terms of production of nuclear weapons grade
    plutonium.
        I am glad that General Shinseki and others talked about the
    training of our troops to deal with chemical and biological
    weapons. I am sure that the real challenge that we are going to
    face, I think, eventually is whether as a result of this
    conflict, with the inspections if they fail and they are not
    followed through or cannot be completed, is the danger of a
    recruiting ground for al Qaeda in Iraq and among the Arab
    world.
        General Shinseki, we talked about feeding the people in
    Iraq, 24 million Iraqis, 60 percent of them being fed and
    probably food being stored in barns. It is not difficult to
    assume that those barns are going to be burned down. So you end
    up with individuals that after 3 days may not be looking at
    American servicemen and women as liberators.
        Setting up the local police, when you have these
    bloodletting feuds that have lasted over a lifetime, a judicial
    system in a country that has never known a judicial system. How
    is that going to be developed? What is going to happen in terms
    of American servicemen if the Kurds start going over and
    reclaiming their old lands? Are we going to become involved and
    embroiled in that? What are going to be the orders to our
    servicemen?
        We read in this morning's papers we are 2 to 3 weeks away
    from moving, so there must be some instructions. What is going
    to happen when the Shi'a move into the southern part of Iran to
    reclaim their religious cities? Where are American servicemen
    going to be over there?
        So these are some of the concerns. At the same time, we are
    seeing the North Koreans moving ahead in terms of their
    production of weapons-grade plutonium. It appears to me that we
    have developed and sustained a two-war military to only have it
    run by an administration with a one-war attention span. Will we
    resolve the crisis before or after in terms of, in Iraq, before
    or after the North Koreans produce a few more bombs?
        What is your thinking today in looking at the danger that
    that poses to the security in the Pacific, the dangers of an
    arms race there, of real conflict? What are your plans in terms
    of telling this committee how we ought to be considering the
    issues of using whatever is going to be necessary in terms of
    force in order to protect our interests there?
        What is the timing going to be? What should we know, given
    those realities today and given the challenges that are
    presented?
        I do not think anyone is doubting that these men and women
    are going to be able to get into Baghdad. That is, at least for
    some of us, just going to be the beginning. I want to bring up
    the whole questions about the Reserve and the Guard. In my
    State, Massachusetts, we are proud of the ones that have served
    well, the highest activation since World War II, with all the
    implications that has in terms of primary responders that you
    have talked about.
        At a time that we see additional troops going to the
    Philippines, additional troops going to Colombia. Primarily my
    focus of the question is on North Korea, your statement of
    whether we are going to have enough time in North Korea, and
    then I am going to run out of time.
        But I want to hear from General Shinseki about the
    administration's cut on Impact Aid for schools, $130 million,
    cutting back on school budgets in districts where servicemen
    are going over to Iraq and these Impact Aid funds are 30, 40,
    or 50 percent of school budgets. It is beyond belief to me on
    this matter.
        If someone could make a comment, just if they would on that
    and the other issue about how they see this unfolding
    responsibility on the military and how that fits into the
    timing for our security interests in North Korea, with its
    imminency of developing the weapons-grade plutonium.
        General Shinseki. Senator, I think you have described quite
    well this challenging and complex environment we find ourselves
    in today. Had we sat back 3 years ago and described it, it
    would not have been exactly as we see it. Maybe it is a good
    caution to us that in this business of trying to anticipate it
    is not precise and sometimes you have to have a little of added
    capability to be able to adjust to these unanticipated
    surprises.
        I think in our discussions of two major combat operations,
    one a decisive defeat and the other a significant, swiftly
    defeat the efforts, you can add a third major contingency here
    and that is the global war on terrorism. Several years ago that
    was not seen as a requirement. So the stress on the
    requirements has certainly spread, at least in the case of the
    Army, our ground forces cover more missions than we would have
    anticipated.
        We are concerned about what appears to be happening in
    North Korea, but we also know that there are actions under way
    to deal with that. For the present, we look at our people on
    the ground there and look at what requirements we may be asked
    to provide to the combatant commander should tensions go any
    higher. We are in the process of doing that and, as I indicated
    earlier, to meet his requirements it would probably involve
    additional mobilization of our Reserve components.
        But I think your questions are appropriate. I would say
    that in the aftermath of this series of crises, as we think
    about where we position U.S. military presence for the future,
    these are issues that ought to impact the strategy that
    outlines where those capabilities ought to be positioned.
        Senator Kennedy. If any of the others want to add to that?
        General Jumper. Sir, could I comment on the Impact Aid?
        Senator Kennedy. Sure.
        General Jumper. I just learned about this yesterday, as a
    matter of fact. I am not sure exactly what happened, but it is
    certainly of concern to the Air Force and, as the father of a
    child who goes to a school that benefits from this sort of aid,
    it is something that we will go back and look into. It was not
    something that was recommended by my service, I can tell you.
        Senator Kennedy. It is a $115 million cutback. Thank you.
        I know my time is up. The policy decisions are not made by
    you. They are made by the administration and obviously to the
    extent Congress does. So everyone has a high regard for all of
    you, and I think it is almost because of the extraordinary high
    regard that we have for all of you we want to make sure that
    you have what you need to do the job and not being asked to do
    things which put you at undue risk.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Shinseki, I want to join my colleagues in thanking
    you for your extraordinary service.
        I also want to pursue the issue of the readiness of our
    troops to face a biological or chemical attack. Last July, the
    Army Audit Agency submitted a report that was critical of the
    Army's preparedness to deal with such an attack, and the
    results of the audit were very troubling. Of 25 units reviewed
    at Fort Hood and Fort Lewis, 18 of them were found not to be
    proficient in operating chemical and biological defensive
    equipment. Inspectors also found that many units were not
    performing adequate maintenance on their chem-bio equipment.
        There have been other reports, recently by ``60 Minutes''
    and others, that have also raised very troubling questions
    about whether our troops would be adequately prepared and
    protected if they face chemical or biological weapons.
        First, could you tell me how the Army has responded to
    these audits and reports? Second, are you personally confident
    that our troops are adequately trained, equipped, and prepared
    to face a chemical or biological attack?
        General Shinseki. Senator, just a point of clarification.
    Was that report a year ago or 2 years ago that you are
    referring to?
        Senator Collins. I believe it was last July, just this past
    year.
        General Shinseki. Last July. Okay, there have been several
    of these surveys. In some cases, we have asked these agencies
    to go out and take a look because of things we have heard. The
    one I am most familiar with was several years ago. I would have
    to go back and take a look at this report.
        I will tell you when we looked several years ago, when we
    talk about a battalion sized unit, 2 years ago our problem
    areas were with the two soldiers who were on the battalion
    level staff that had responsibilities for certain select pieces
    of equipment. So in a 500 to 800 person organization, the focus
    of that investigation was we found some shortcomings in
    training and maintenance at that level, and we have gone to
    work and corrected those things.
        I will have to look and see specifically what this last
    July report was about. But whenever we discover there is some
    concern, we go back out there and ensure that the commanders
    are doing, and are resourced to do, what it is we expect of
    them. The training that goes along with operating in this
    environment is part of our mission set that we train to.
        As I say, whether you are at garrison at Fort Stewart in
    the wintertime or August in the National Training Center, you
    can expect that these tasks are part of that set of skills that
    individuals have to train to.
        The answer to your question: I am confident we are training
    and that standards are significant. This is the toughest part
    of our training mission. For those units that are currently on
    the ground in the forward areas, I can tell you they are
    dealing with this requirement on a daily basis.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Admiral Clark, I am pleased that the budget this year turns
    the corner on shipbuilding and provides for funding for 12
    ships. But nevertheless, the Navy is still dealing with a
    legacy of underfunding year after year and the result of that
    with the planned retirement of the Spruance class destroyers is
    that the fleet is projected to fall under 300 ships in coming
    years, bottoming out at, I think, 291 ships in the year 2006.
        You have testified in the past that ideally to meet mission
    requirements you would need a fleet of approximately 375 ships.
    Is that still your judgment, that a fleet ideally would be
    about that size?
        Admiral Clark. Yes, Senator, it is.
        Senator Collins. I would like to talk to you about how we
    can recapitalize our fleet, not only through new construction
    but also modernization of the Arleigh Burke class of
    destroyers. It seems to me that one way that we can reduce
    total life-cycle costs is by reducing the crew size on our DDGs
    using the technological breakthroughs and designs that we have
    learned in designing the DD(X).
        What are your thoughts on modernization of the DDGs to make
    sure we are maximizing their useful life and also reducing
    overall costs by reducing the size of the crew?
        Admiral Clark. I think that is absolutely the right
    direction to go. We have been doing some experimenting with
    Smartship for the last several years. We see a lot of that
    manifested in the design of DD(X). While we do not know exactly
    how many people DD(X) is going to have on it, we know it is
    going to be dramatically less than what we have on our main
    line ships of the line today.
        When DDG comes up for its midlife--and we must begin to
    project toward that midlife upgrade--we are going to need to
    apply the improvements that technology will allow us to bring
    to bear.
        Senator, when we talk about the total number of ships and
    we talk about capability like DDG, the Burke class is a great
    ship. It is a terrific ship. Still building them. But one of
    the things that I do not believe that we have always done as
    well as we should have done in our Navy is start thinking right
    up front, where is the midlife improvement on this platform?
        Because if we do not do that, looking back over time, you
    lose the ship early. The taxpayer does not get the return on
    investment that it laid out when it invested in the platform.
    So we clearly, we are not there yet on DDG. We are still
    building them. But we have to be moving toward that with the
    things that we have discovered in some of our Smartship
    experimentation.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        General Jumper, my time has expired, but I just want to
    associate myself with the concerns expressed by Senator Allard
    on the allegations involving rape and other sexual assault at
    the Air Force Academy. One of my proudest responsibilities is
    to recommend young men and women to attend our Service
    academies, and the idea that I am recommending young women who
    then may be at risk of sexual assault is just appalling to me.
    I know that it is to you as well.
        I just want to let you know that in my capacity as chairman
    of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I, along with Senator
    Lieberman, have asked the Inspector General of the Department
    of Defense to investigate these allegations. I am pleased to
    hear your comments as well this morning.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Collins, I assure you that when I
    first learned of this problem several weeks ago, in
    consultation with our colleague the Senator from Colorado, we
    have taken those steps to posture this committee so that we can
    review the findings. We urged the appropriate Air Force
    officials, including our witness today, to initiate these
    steps.
        I thank the Senator for her concern because I likewise,
    along with every member of this committee, take such pride. As
    a matter of fact, my Academy Day is coming up soon, when some
    400 or 500 nominees or applicants and their families gather
    here at the Senate to review those options.
        I thank the Senator.
        Senator Pryor, would you indulge me? I just wish to make an
    announcement to the committee. Senator Levin and I have
    arranged for tomorrow morning a classified briefing for the
    entire committee on the efforts to date by the administration
    with regard to the planning for the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
    This is an interagency effort. We will have briefers from the
    various departments and agencies of the Federal Government
    initially tasked with this. I hope Senators can schedule their
    time to be available for this briefing.
        Thank you, Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I, too, want to concur with Senator Collins' statements a
    few moments ago about the academies, and I know that you are
    going to do everything in your power to do what we need to do
    to make that situation right.
        Also, I want to just thank you all for being here today,
    thank you for your service to this great country. I think the
    war on terrorism has touched every person in our Nation in
    various ways and certainly everyone in this room is touched by
    it in some way. I know that you cannot pick up the paper in
    Little Rock without reading about the Little Rock Air Force
    Base or the fact that many of our National Guard units have
    been called up, including our Air National Guard unit there in
    Fort Smith, and what is going on at the Army's Pine Bluff
    Arsenal as part of the war on terrorism.
        It has touched many lives, not just in my State, but all
    over this great country.
        Also, I must say on a personal note, Senator Warner, that
    when I was the Attorney General of Arkansas, my director of
    operations was a one-star general in the Arkansas National
    Guard, and he has been called up now for I think over 6 months
    now. Part of his responsibility is to assess readiness of
    various National Guard units around the country and to call
    them up as need be. He is now in Georgia doing that.
        I know that preparedness is something that you are very
    focused on. I appreciate your comments about preparedness today
    and the lessons learned in this environment we find ourselves
    in today. I can assure you, and I think I can speak for the
    committee, that we are going to do everything in our power to
    make sure that our men and women are the best-trained and best-
    equipped in the world. We are just going to do our part on this
    committee to continue to make sure that you can complete your
    mission and the mission of the United States of America.
        I really only have one question today, Mr. Chairman, and
    that is about retention. Some of you mentioned that in your
    opening statements. I know it is something in the last several
    years that has received a lot of publicity and attention, as it
    should. It is an important part of our military picture and an
    important part of our preparedness. I would like to hear from
    each one of you today, if possible, about how you feel we are
    doing and your particular branch is doing on the issue of
    retention and what we need to do to get you to the level where
    you are very satisfied with retention.
        General Shinseki. Senator, up until this point, retention
    has not been an issue for us. In fact, if there was a challenge
    it was recruiting 3 years ago. We fixed that. The last 3 years
    we have met our recruiting targets. But at the same time, our
    retention requirements we exceeded each year in each of our
    components.
        The stress on the force right now may affect decisions
    after this mobilization period is over about primarily Reserve
    component soldiers, whether they stay in their formations or
    not, and I think that is something we have to pay attention to.
    I think whatever we can do to work with employers of those
    soldiers is also important, and we do. We go out and through
    our contacts engage those employers, thank them for what they
    do, and explain how important this is.
        But there is stress out there. I think we are all aware of
    it.
        Admiral Clark. Senator, I always love this question because
    we are doing better than we ever have in our history. We are
    going through a period for the last 2 years we have had the
    highest retention we have ever had in the history of the
    institution. Part of this reason is because young men and women
    want to be part of the solution. Young Americans want to be
    there, and that is what we are seeing.
        With regard to recruiting, last year we took 7,500 out of
    the plan because we had more people than end strength would
    allow us to have. So I would just sum it up like this: our
    young people are responding to the challenge.
        Now, make no mistake. They are responding to a whole series
    of signals. One is the global war on terrorism. But they are
    responding to signals that they have received from the American
    people and from Congress as well. There have been major things
    done to help us win this battle for people.
        I would tell you that at this stage of the year I am
    running about 20 points over my annual targets. But I will tell
    you why this is; there are reenlistment incentives for people
    to stay. When those reenlistment incentives run out, well, we
    will see a change in the way that they respond.
        So very much what has become evident to me in my 2\1/2\
    years in this post is that they are looking for signals from
    the American people and they like the signals that they are
    getting from the American people and from Congress. Congress
    has helped us put together financial incentive packages and the
    things that they are responding to.
        But more than anything else, my summation of what is going
    on with our young people is they want to make a difference. I
    would ask you to continue to support us on the issues that
    allow us to create and shape the force the way we need to shape
    it for the 21st century. There are financial tools that are
    involved there and the help of Congress is critical.
        Thank you.
        General Hagee. Senator, I could not agree more with the
    Chief of Naval Operations. I would like to thank this committee
    and Congress for the support that you have given us and our
    young men and women in uniform. Quality of life makes a
    difference. Selective reenlistment bonus makes a difference.
    Those are some of the things that the Admiral was talking
    about. Obviously they want to serve.
        As far as the Marine Corps specifically is concerned, we
    have had the best year in retention in our officer corps this
    year over the last 18 years. This year on our retention of our
    first term enlistees, in January we had already retained 80
    percent of what we wanted to retain for the entire year. So
    like the Navy, we are doing very well in retention both on the
    enlisted and the officer side.
        General Jumper. Senator, in the Air Force we are
    experiencing similar results. Our recruiting for last year was
    finished by the end of April. Our retention numbers are higher
    than they have been in years, and we set very high retention
    standards because we spend so much money training many of our
    technical people. We have experienced up to 20 points better
    than the goals that we have set.
        I think I agree completely with Admiral Clark. Once you
    expose the youngsters out there today, who many think do not
    have the capacity to be dedicated, patriotic, or committed,
    once you expose them to success in military life, then they
    cannot turn back. They are proud of what they do. They are
    proud to serve.
        The incentives that have been supported by this committee
    have been a great help. As a result, we are experiencing the
    highest pilot retention we have had in quite a few years.
        So we thank the committee, Mr. Chairman and Senators, for
    all you have done, and we need to continue to do this to keep
    the quality of our force as high as it is.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        An important aspect of overall readiness is certainly
    family readiness, and I would like to pursue a couple of
    questions in this area. Having just been at Fort Bragg this
    past week as well as Marine Air Station Cherry Point and
    Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, as I talked with commanders,
    with enlisted personnel, with the spouses--many of the spouses,
    their partners had been deployed; others were about to be
    deployed. An issue that came up time and again was one that
    Senator Kennedy brought up on Impact Aid and the fact that the
    children of these men and women who are being repeatedly
    deployed deserve to have a quality education in a well-funded
    school.
        General Jumper, I appreciate your responding to the
    question, but I would like to ask the rest of the panel if you
    would also speak to Impact Aid and how you see this in terms of
    the importance to your people and your families. I am concerned
    about this issue, and I would like to hear each of you respond
    to that issue as well.
        General Shinseki. Senator, the Army has been interested in
    working a wide range of education issues because they have been
    important to our service members, the education of their family
    members. Impact Aid is a piece of that and it is important to
    our service members, seeing the education of their children.
        Admiral Clark. I align myself with the General's comments.
    We have a saying, we recruit individuals, we retain families.
        Senator Dole. Yes.
        Admiral Clark. We believe that. Clearly one of the major
    issues for a service member is making sure that their children,
    that they have the kind of opportunity that they dream of for
    them. So every one of these programs are critical.
        I would say that one of the challenges for us--and this is
    an issue for the committee and as we look at what it takes to
    compete in the marketplace--is what kind of tools do the
    Services need and what kind of issues are the service members
    looking at when they make decisions about whether they are
    going to serve or not.
        We know that, first and foremost, it has to be an
    attractive, appealing lifestyle. But I will tell you, Senator,
    one of the things that has been real clear to me. The men and
    women who are serving today, they are not missing the signal
    that is coming from the citizens of the United States of
    America, and that citizenry is saying to our people today: we
    appreciate your service. Everything we can do to send that
    signal will benefit our institutions greatly.
        General Hagee. Senator, I would also like to associate
    myself with General Shinseki and Admiral Clark's comments. When
    the marine out in the field knows that his family is taken care
    of, he can better focus on his or her job than if he is worried
    about what is going on back on the home front. Our young men
    and women today are highly educated and they want their
    families to be educated.
        Senator Dole. Let me raise another issue in this area. The
    budget includes a $4 billion request for family housing for
    fiscal year 2004 and about $346 million of that is for family
    housing privatization. I am very interested in this. It is a
    truly transformational program that seems to me to go directly
    to the issue of morale of our troops and also to the fact that
    if a young couple has attractive housing they are more likely
    to make a decision to stay in the military, to make it a
    career.
        I would like to have each of you comment on this, whether
    or not this privatization as a way to move in the future might
    be the most cost-effective and the quickest way to eliminate
    alot of this substandard housing which of course exists across
    all branches of the Services.
        I was particularly interested in the planned community
    concept at Fort Bragg. But if you could talk with me a bit,
    just respond briefly now and maybe more for the record, about
    how you see privatization, for example the quality of
    construction, how cost-efficient is it, and long-term plans for
    maintenance. I think this could be a great asset and I would be
    very interested in how each of you see privatization.
        General Shinseki. Senator, it is an important initiative.
    We started this about 2 years ago. Fort Bragg is in the second
    tranche of posts. We started with Fort Sill, Fort Lewis, and a
    number of others. For us, this was the only solution because to
    generate the kinds of resources to do this on our own was not
    possible. So this Residential Communities Initiative, in which
    we get assistance from outside, has been a significant
    momentum-builder in addressing our housing needs. It is
    important. We think it works and we are expanding the
    experiment to multiple locations.
        Senator Dole. Are we devoting enough resources for this
    family housing in this budget?
        General Shinseki. In terms of privatization, we are.
        Admiral Clark. We are moving forward and we got permission
    from Congress last year to start a privatization public-private
    venture in the area of bachelor quarters as opposed to the
    house itself. Frankly, Senator, that is the area where we are
    more behind.
        But here is what I have to say. I do not really want to
    build more military housing if I do not have to. When I talk to
    our people, I ask them: How many of you have your own place? I
    want them to have a stake in America. I want them to have their
    own place, not a military place, especially when we get to
    career people. That is what I tell them.
        What has happened over the course of the last 4 years as we
    have sought to buy down the out-of-pocket costs--we make
    another big step in it in this budget--is that we are seeing
    our service members get to a position that they can compete in
    the market.
        Now, in the area of bachelor quarters, that is a different
    story. We are very much, again, experimenting with solutions
    here and we want to move toward that as rapidly as possible. We
    will have our substandard housing off the record by the end of
    this FYDP. It will be gone. That has been the objective.
        But the most exciting thing for me is to see a young
    service member who owns their home for the first time. That is
    what I want for them. What is being done for them now is making
    that more of a possibility.
        General Hagee. Senator, we strongly support the public-
    private venture. We started several years ago in Hawaii. It has
    been a great success. In fact, just last year the residents
    threw a party for all the maintenance people. That is the
    response that they had to public-private venture. We opened up
    a series of houses in Camp Pendleton last year and without
    public-private venture we would not be able to reduce the
    number of inadequate houses that we have.
        We are joining with the Navy on the experiment on PPV in
    the BEQ area and I am quite excited about that.
        Senator Dole. Great. Thank you.
        General Jumper. Senator, we have quite a few bases that are
    in fairly remote locations and we have about 38 projects
    planned that will address about 40,000 family housing units. I
    believe we are the only Service that does not get finished by
    the Secretary of Defense's goal of 2007, but that mostly has to
    do with northern tier bases where we would have to displace
    people. We just cannot do the shell game fast enough to fulfill
    the requirement. But we are pushing full speed ahead as quickly
    as we can.
        Senator Dole. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has expired.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Bill Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Jumper, is the Air Force committed to extend both
    contractors on the EELV over the next 5 years?
        General Jumper. Sir, there is no reason that I know of to
    deviate from that path. I know there are some studies underway
    and we have not seen the results of those studies, but the
    current program is to stick with both the Atlas and the Delta
    programs.
        Senator Bill Nelson. According to that answer then, is
    there money in the fiscal year 2004 budget that will enable
    that to occur?
        General Jumper. As far as I know, we are adequately funded,
    sir. I will get back if there is any doubt, but nothing has
    been brought to my attention that would argue otherwise.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If there is any doubt, please get
    back.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Needless to say, it is important that
    we have assured access to space.
        Now, I just found this out and this alarms me, because 20
    years ago, as the Congressman representing Orlando, we started
    the simulation center there, for the Navy, and pretty soon all
    of the Services came together and that became a simulation
    center. For obvious reasons, this was cost effective on our
    training and so forth.
        I have just been told that that is being zeroed out in the
    fiscal year 2004 budget, which is hard for me to even imagine.
    I would like each of your comments?
        General Shinseki. Senator, I am not specifically sure what
    is being zeroed out. But the Army's simulations efforts are in
    Orlando, as you describe, and we continue to operate there.
    What you would have known as Simulation, Training, and
    Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) is there.
        Admiral Clark. I am unaware of any move to zero out
    Orlando. Orlando has been a key part in helping us put forth a
    transformational approach to training. In fact, key members of
    that organization have been on my task force who work toward
    the revolution in training in the Navy.
        I will look into it, Senator, and see if there is anything.
    If there are any cuts there, I am unaware.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Navy contribution to the Joint Simulation Center in Orlando,
    Florida is the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division
    (NAWCTSD). There are no cuts of any kind scheduled for NAWCTSD in
    fiscal year 2004 or the Future Years Defense Program.

        Senator Bill Nelson. General Hagee.
        General Hagee. Sir, I am also unaware of any cuts there.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper.
        General Jumper. Sir, we have our modeling and simulation
    center there and I am unaware of this. We do a lot of work down
    there.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Well, if you would check,
    because there is a DOD program decision memorandum, PDM,
    directing the cancellation of the joint simulation system
    program in the fiscal year 2004 budget, and that just seems to
    me about as contrary as we can be as to what we need to be
    doing.
        General Shinseki.
        General Shinseki. Senator, that is a project and an effort
    all of us participated in. It is one that was not delivering
    and I believe that is correct, that joint simulation system was
    having difficulty meeting its contract. I believe that is the
    reason it was scrutinized and decided to be lined through.
        I will provide more information for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]
                  Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) Termination
        The JSIMS program was terminated in the Program Decision Memorandum
    1 (PDM 1) decrement. While it did not cite a specific rationale for the
    termination, the program has been under close scrutiny the past year
    because of significant delays in achieving critical milestones,
    increasing costs, and little to show for the large investment. However,
    the PDM directed completion of JSIMS Block 1 by June 2003, which should
    provide the Joint Warfighting Training Center a Joint Task Force
    component-level training capability. The PDM also directed completion
    of an analysis of alternatives to identify a cost-effective method of
    meeting future Joint and Service training requirements. In subsequent
    guidance to the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense also
    recognized the Army's significant investment in the Warfighter
    Simulation program and provided guidance to continue that effort. With
    the requisite resources, we can meet our Title X training and have the
    capability to link with any future joint training solution.

        Senator Bill Nelson. I think we all ought to be aware,
    because your colleagues do not seem to be aware of that. I
    would like a justification as to how that is in the best
    interests of the defense of the country as we train our troops
    and try to be cost effective with simulators.
        Let me ask you again, General. There are rumors that we are
    going to have some amassing of opponents, the enemy, in the
    area of northeast Afghanistan for some kind of spring
    offensive. It could be in Afghanistan, it could be right across
    the line in very forbidding territory where there is a bunch of
    tribals.
        I would like your comment on how we are going to meet that
    kind of resistance, that kind of attempt to blunt some of the
    success that we have had in Afghanistan from a military
    standpoint.
        General Shinseki. I am not specifically sure on exactly
    this tip, but all along that border between Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, there are operations ongoing and we do from time to
    time see a buildup of capabilities. The combatant commander
    there, Lieutenant General Dan McNeil, working for General Tom
    Franks, focuses on those day-to-day operations. We provide him
    the capabilities to conduct those day-to-day operations.
        This specific buildup for a springtime offensive, all of us
    anticipate when the weather gets better activity goes up. But
    the specific area you are referring to I probably want to take
    a look at and give you a better answer.

        [The information referred to follows:]

                           Operation Enduring Freedom

        The Central Command Combatant Commander is better prepared to
    answer operational questions such as this. As a force provider for this
    operation, the Army's responsibility is to provide trained and ready
    forces to the combatant commander. The Army has provided all forces
    that the combatant commander has requested and is prepared to provide
    additional forces if required.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Does your commander have sufficient
    forces to repel such an offensive?
        General Shinseki. I believe he does. I will be certain to
    ask that very question just because you have asked it.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I ask it for obvious reasons, because
    we are going to have our attention diverted to another part of
    the world and we sure do not want to be losing ground. I mean,
    it is irritating enough that there seems to be a lessening
    cooperation from President Musharraf in Pakistan. But sooner or
    later, if that is where the al Qaeda leadership is, we are
    going to have to go in there and root them out, and not the
    least of which we are going to have to be prepared in case
    there is a counteroffensive from them on us.
        So in whatever kind of setting you want to discuss this or
    your designee, I would be most appreciative.
        General Shinseki. Senator, I would be happy to do that.
    There is coordination that goes on between our people and folks
    on the other side to ensure coordinated activities.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, General.
        Mr. Chairman, as I conclude, I would like at an appropriate
    setting, perhaps a closed setting, for us also to talk about
    the new military role that is apparently occurring in the
    Philippines, which I do not necessarily disagree with, but I
    would like to know how we think that that is going to be able
    to help us stamp out the terrorist activity in that part of the
    world.
        It is going to be there. It is going to be in other
    countries, and as a member of your committee, I want to have
    some assurance that we are doing what we should. Is the new
    role symbolized by the more combat-capable, combat-ready,
    combat-insertive position that we are talking about in the
    Philippines?
        Chairman Warner. Senator, the question of the Philippines
    will be a part of our briefing tomorrow morning, and I wish to
    say to the committee that we have a closed session scheduled
    immediately at the conclusion of this round of questions, at
    which time the Senator may pose that question. So there is the
    first opportunity you would have to raise that question with
    regard to the Philippines.
        Like you, I would like to know exactly the circumstances
    under which this decision was made and what the expectations
    are with regard to those deployments.
        I thank the Senator.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, let me just say that this Senator has a great
    appreciation for the job each of you do, for your great
    leadership you are providing, and for those men and women that
    serve under you, and to each of you, I say thank you for that.
        I also have a great appreciation for the job that the
    administration is doing and the leadership that this
    administration is providing with respect to winning the war on
    terrorism, and thank goodness we have people who are willing to
    make a tough and hard decision, knowing that they have under
    them leadership like you and the men and women that serve under
    you to carry out the jobs assigned to each of them that will
    ensure that my children and my grandchildren are going to live
    in the same safe, free, and open America that my generation has
    enjoyed.
        So for that I say thank you, and I hope you will express
    that to each of the men and women that serve under you at every
    opportunity.
        General Jumper, you know my fondness for Robins Air Force
    Base and the great job that the men and women, civilian and
    military, do there, and I appreciate your comments regarding
    the 116th. That decision was just a great vision on the part of
    Secretary Roche, you, and the folks like Paul Weaver over on
    the Guard side, any number of folks who participated in that.
    It is going to be a model for where the future of the armed
    services are going to go, irrespective of what branch we are
    looking at.
        I am very proud of those folks.
        General Jumper. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Chambliss. I have had the opportunity to visit
    Robins Air Force Base many times, particularly recently.
    General Shinseki, I will tell you that recently I was at Fort
    McPherson, Fort Gillem, and Fort Stewart, and you all are
    correct that the quality of the force out there today is second
    to none. It is well-prepared, well-trained, and the men and
    women that are being called on to defend freedom are in my
    opinion the best-trained, best-service organization that the
    world has ever seen. That is thanks in large part to your
    leadership.
        General Jumper, four weapons systems that I have a keen
    interest in are C-17, C-130, F-22, and Joint Surveillance and
    Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). From a budgetary
    standpoint, I think the C-17 is moving forward in a very good
    manner. The decision on the multi-year several years ago, I
    think, was one of the best business decisions that any branch
    has ever made, particularly the Air Force.
        I would like for you to give us just a quick budget update
    on the other three weapons systems, if you will, as it is
    reflected in this current budget.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir. Well, starting with the F/A-22,
    we have the production cap of $43 billion. We are sticking
    within that cap. We are on track to begin our operational tests
    later in this year as we finish up our developmental testing.
    The airplane is achieving astonishing results when you talk to
    the people that fly it.
        We continue to have some problems with software stability
    that we are working very hard, and, of course, we are at the
    critical part of the airplane's development now where it
    continues to go from the development phase into the production
    phase and the ensuing production problems that you get when you
    start up production.
        So we are working our way through those, but we have not
    come back to ask for any more money, nor do we intend to. We
    intend to live within that cap.
        The JSTARS, of course, is a magnificent sensing device that
    we join with the ground forces to give them targets, moving
    target indications on the ground. The mission of the 116th is
    to train their people up to speed and get the backenders up to
    speed. We had a few slowdowns in the training for the
    backenders that we are working our way through as we get that
    first surge of people who have transitioned from other systems
    in the National Guard through that training. We are working our
    way through that now.
        Then the C-130, I believe is the other one you mentioned.
    All of the problems we had with the C-130J I think have been
    reconciled and that is going forward now for OMB consideration.
    So I think everything is on track, not without challenges, but
    working our way through all of it.
        Senator Chambliss. Are we going to be able to provide the
    service to the customer out there with respect to JSTARS by
    stopping at 17 instead of going to the full complement of 19
    and moving on to the 767, where we are going to have that gap?
    Are you comfortable with that?
        General Jumper. Sir, we are working hard to make sure that
    we do not have any more of a gap than we can stand. We are
    proposing a transition into the Boeing 767 with the next
    generation of JSTARS improvements and this will be the baseline
    aircraft for our multi-sensor command and control aircraft that
    will do the sort of integration with space, unmanned, and
    manned platforms that we think will take us into the future--
    talking directly to satellites, controlling UAVs, being able to
    join with the other Services to provide command and control
    depending on who is first on the scene, being able to
    distribute signals around the battle space, and being able to
    deal with things like cruise missiles.
        We use the next generation of the JSTARS platform in a
    Boeing 767 as our baseline for that activity. We took some
    decreases in funding, but we think we can work our way through
    that and we look forward to keeping this program vital and
    pressing on with it. I think it is going to be very vital for
    all the Services.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you. All of you, thanks again.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I listened
    carefully to Senator Nelson's questions about the Philippines.
    Will there also be additional information available about
    current involvement in Colombia that the committee could be
    advised of?
        Chairman Warner. I will advise the Senator that there is no
    reason why that question could not be asked if you are able
    schedule-wise to join us at the closed session.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to start by thanking General Shinseki for his
    incredible work. General Shinseki has done a tremendous job on
    behalf of the Army, and I am very grateful to his lifetime of
    service and look forward to your continuing service in whatever
    form that takes.
        Admiral Clark, in late January, the Pentagon announced that
    it was sending eight Coast Guard cutters and several port
    security units to the Persian Gulf. As I understand it, this is
    the first deployment of Coast Guard patrol boats overseas since
    the Vietnam War. Is that correct as far as you know?
        Admiral Clark. Actually, Senator, the cutters have been
    deploying with us periodically and working up with us. Part of
    our agreement is that in time of crisis they will come work for
    us. The only way to make that work is to periodically do it. So
    they periodically are deploying with our carrier battle groups.
        Senator Clinton. What are the numbers that are currently
    deployed? Do you have that?
        Admiral Clark. I am sorry, I do not. We would be happy to
    get that for you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The number of Coast Guard cutters deploying to the Persian Gulf
    are:

        378-foot high endurance cutters

            USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)--homeport: Alameda, CA
            USCGC Dallas (WHEC 716)--homeport: North Charleston, SC

        225-foot seagoing buoy tender

            USCGC Walnut (WLB 205)--homeport: Honolulu, HI

        110-foot patrol boats

            USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)--homeport: South Portland, ME
            USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)--homeport: Sandy Hook, NJ
            USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)--homeport: Atlantic Beach, NC
            USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)--homeport: Miami, FL
            USCGC Grand Isle (WPB 1338)--homeport: Gloucester, MA
            USCGC Bainbridge Island (WPB 1343)--homeport: Sandy Hook, NJ
            USCGC Pea Island (WPB 1347)--homeport: St. Petersburg, FL
            USCGC Knight Island (WPB 1348)--homeport: St. Petersburg, FL

        Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Admiral. Because in
    New York, as well as many other coastal States and cities, we
    count on the Coast Guard to guard our ports against terrorist
    threats and other emergencies like the one we just had the
    other day with the explosion at Staten Island. The Coast Guard
    was the first responder. We could not have responded without
    their lead and assistance.
        So I would like some additional information that I will
    submit to you in writing, so that I have a better idea of the
    criteria that are used to deploy the cutters, how long they are
    expected to be deployed, what are the missions that they
    perform, and how we anticipate replacing those functions that
    are going to be left behind as they deploy with you.
        I want to ask each of the chiefs a question that has been a
    concern of mine for many years, ever since President Clinton
    asked me to look into the Gulf War, the Gulf War Syndrome, and
    I went out to Bethesda to Walter Reed and met with a number of
    veterans who returned from the gulf suffering from unknown
    symptoms.
        I became convinced in my own mind and based on the research
    that we were doing that this was real, this was something that
    had to be addressed. The President appointed a commission to do
    so.
        Now, with U.S. troops being deployed again to the Persian
    Gulf, I know that you are spending a lot of time and attention
    trying to make sure that we do not send young men and women to
    war where they are out of harm's way in a conventional and
    traditional sense, but they return home debilitated and have to
    be separated from the Service and have ongoing chronic health
    conditions.
        So I would appreciate each of the Services giving me a
    brief overview and then I would like to arrange a briefing that
    my staff is currently working on to get more indepth
    information, because clearly the February 2002 GAO report
    before the House Veterans Affairs Committee seemed to conclude
    that, while military medical surveillance policies had been
    established, still a lot needed to be done to implement the
    system. I think we want to do everything possible to protect
    our troops this time around.
        If I could just have a brief overview comment from each of
    the Service Chiefs about that and then, as I say, I look
    forward to a more indepth briefing. General Shinseki.
        General Shinseki. Senator, I would say, first of all, we
    all share the concern coming out of the last gulf operation,
    and the conclusions were less conclusive than we would like.
    There was a variety of issues that continue today to be
    studied.
        I think since that last operation, however, we have
    expanded our detection and sensing capabilities in some rather
    significant ways, not just in chemical, but also biological
    threats. I think we are concerned. We have gone back to look at
    what the conditions might have been then. We pay attention to
    it, better detection, better training. But still there are a
    host of unknowns here, exactly what the causes were of that
    gulf illness.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Admiral Clark?
        Admiral Clark. My problem is a little different than
    General Shinseki's. Our issue is providing fundamentally
    protective gear for attack at sea, and we have some built-in
    systems to protect our people inside the ships. I would just
    tell you that we have made significant investments. In an open
    forum I would put it this way: we have made significant
    investments and we are ready.
        Senator Clinton. General Hagee?
        General Hagee. We share your concern, Senator. As General
    Shinseki mentioned, we have vehicles, platforms out there that
    did not exist 10 years ago during Operation Desert Storm,
    platforms that can identify and detect chemical and biological
    agents that are in the air and in the ground. We have also
    collected information on every single one of our marines so
    that we have good medical data baseline to try to, if anything
    happens, to try to determine what change has occurred.
        Senator Clinton. I really applaud you for that and I hope
    that every Service can move toward that. We have found post-
    September 11 in New York the fire department had baseline
    screenings, the police department did not. It is much more
    difficult to figure out what the exposures led to when you do
    not know what the starting point was. So I very much appreciate
    what the Marine Corps has done on that.
        General Jumper. Senator, I agree with General Hagee. I
    think the baselining activity plus the steps that have been set
    up to gather data around the locations is much more
    sophisticated than we saw last time, and hopefully the root
    causes of these things can be determined in time to be of help.
        Senator Clinton. I thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I think this has not only implications for
    our men and women in uniform, but rather significant civilian
    ramifications as well. I greatly appreciate the chiefs taking
    this on as an issue and I look forward to following with great
    concern what we learn and how we respond.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I know firsthand of your deep
    concern about the veterans who have returned from Afghanistan
    and other far-flung parts of the globe as to their health, and
    I commend you for those initiatives that you have undertaken.
        Senator Roberts.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you.
        Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and what has been
    referred to doubtless all at the table as your favorite word,
    for persevering in your command and, quite frankly, here at the
    hearing.
        General Shinseki, well done, sir.
        General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Roberts. You have provided outstanding leadership
    and I think your legacy is going to be better transformation of
    the legacy weaponry, and so you have achieved a great deal and
    we thank you for that.
        General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you for working with our former
    Commandant, General Jim Jones, who is the SACEUR. I think
    before a hearing some time ago, I said we did not need two tips
    and two spears; we needed one tip and one spear. We have done
    that in regards to working with the Marine Corps and the Marine
    Corps working with you, sir. So we thank you for your
    innovative leadership.
        General Shinseki. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Roberts. As a survivor along with Senator Levin of
    Senator Warner's forced march, which was disguised as a CODEL,
    to possible war zone countries where we are fighting and in my
    opinion winning the war on terrorism, I want to say that we
    have an obligation to meet with a number of men and women in
    uniform on the front lines. As chairman of the Intelligence
    Committee, I want to go out and check the intelligence to our
    warfighters. We went to Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Qatar as well
    as other locations, and we survived. I think we did, Carl. I am
    not quite sure.
        But at any rate, I can report that the cooperation between
    our intelligence and our military personnel is as close as it
    has ever been. We now have in place information systems that
    will allow rapid access to current intelligence from the
    commander all the way down to the marine or soldier in the
    field.
        It is my judgment that we are really learning the lessons
    of Operation Desert Storm and September 11.
        Mr. Chairman, I hope we would not spend too much time
    arguing about who constitutes the greatest threat to us right
    this second. Is it Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong Il, Supreme Leader
    Ali Khamani in Iran, or Osama bin Laden? They are all major
    threats, all challenges to U.S. security here at home. They get
    worse with time if not acted upon. They all represent very
    unique geopolitical circumstances. They demand very tailored
    situations or solutions, and they all demand action now, but
    different kinds of action.
        I have more or less a speech on this and I would ask
    permission that my full statement be inserted in the record at
    this point.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts

        Thank you Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership. I
    want to thank Admiral Clark and General Jumper for their perseverance
    not only in service to our Nation but also in communicating with this
    committee. General Shinseki, well done, sir. Thank you for your
    leadership as Chief of Staff of the Army. Your legacy will be
    transformation, the shift from the systems of the past to the platforms
    and capabilities of the future.
        Last week, along with Senator Levin, I survived Senator Warner's
    forced march to possible war zone countries in which we are fighting
    and, in my opinion, winning the war on terrorism. I had the pleasure of
    visiting our men and women in uniform on the front lines.
        As chairmen and ranking members of the Intelligence Committee and
    Armed Services Committee, we were able to talk directly to the folks
    getting the job done for America's security from their stations in
    Kuwait, Afghanistan, Qatar, and other locations.
        I can report that the cooperation between our intelligence and
    military personnel is as close as it has ever been. We now have in
    place information systems that will allow rapid access to current
    intelligence from the combatant commander all the way down to the
    marine or soldier in the field.
        I also observed a keen appreciation for the need to fully share
    intelligence information. It is my judgment that we are learning the
    lessons of Operation Desert Storm and September 11 well.

                                    THREATS

        I hope we do not spend too much time today arguing about who
    constitutes the greatest threat to us right this second. Is it Saddam
    Hussein, Kim Jong Il, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, or Osama bin
    Laden? They are all major threats, challenges to U.S. security here at
    home that get worse with time if not acted upon.
        They all represent unique geopolitical circumstances demanding
    tailored solutions. Indeed, they all demand action now but different
    kinds of action. Just because the military instrument of power is the
    choice for responding to Osama bin Laden and may become the choice for
    responding to Iraq, it by no means suggests force is appropriate right
    now for North Korea or ever in the case of Iran.
        It's not that simple and we ought not to mistake complexities in
    the threat picture for contradictions in policy. For example, North
    Korea, as dangerous and unstable as it is, has not invaded its neighbor
    to the south since 1953.
        We cannot say the same for Saddam Hussein who invaded Kuwait in
    1990 with what looked at the time like intentions for Saudi Arabia as
    well. Not to mention the fact that, to my knowledge, North Korea is not
    currently harboring senior members of a terror network led by a close
    associate of Osama bin Laden, Mr. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

                                      IRAQ

        But this is really beside the point. In passing H.J. Res 114,
    Congress specifically authorized the President to ``use the Armed
    Forces of the United States in order to: (1) defend the national
    security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
    Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council
    resolutions regarding Iraq.'' Colleagues, that resolution passed the
    Senate 77 to 23 on October 11, 2002.
        This action was, of course, in addition to the Iraq Liberation Act,
    which Congress passed and President Clinton signed in to law October
    31, 1998. That act clearly states the U.S. should foster regime change
    in Iraq.
        Lastly, on November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council passed
    Resolution 1441 which gave Iraq one last opportunity to comply with its
    disarmament obligations.
        Now, months later, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has
    told us unequivocally that ``Iraq has in place an active effort to
    deceive the U.N. inspectors and deny them access. This effort is
    directed by the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given
    clear directions to its operational forces to hide banned materials in
    their possession.''
        Further, the DCI stated ``Iraq's biological weapons program
    includes mobile research and production facilities that will be
    difficult, if not impossible, for the inspectors to find. Baghdad began
    this program in the mid-1990s--during a time when inspectors were in
    the country.''
        Even the latest U.N. assessments directed by Dr. Blix indicate
    Saddam Hussein is still not complying. Colleagues, let us be candid. No
    amount of U-2 surveillance flights nor increase in the number of
    inspectors will solve this problem, at the very least with respect to
    biological weapons. Let's be honest. The U.S. Government has bent over
    backwards to manage the threat from Saddam Hussein without further
    military action.
        I thank the chair.

        Senator Roberts. I want to go first of all to the
    commandant and ask him a question in regards to SOCOM, and I
    know that they have a lot of operations. Everybody has
    operation stress. But I understand we have 81 marines, 5
    sailors organized, trained, and equipped for special
    reconnaissance and direct action and other special operations
    missions, who will be under the SOCOM operational control by
    October of this year. I understand the answer is yes; is that
    correct?
        General Hagee. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Roberts. All right. I hope we can continue that
    partnership.
        I am going to get down to your warfighting lab in Quantico,
    VA, as soon as I can. I apologize for not coming sooner. One of
    the questions I had as we were out to Camp Commando and Camp
    Coyote out there in Kuwait; I was so proud of our marines, who
    are operating basically in a sand trap and still performing and
    training their mission, and I am not surprised. You already
    answered this question in splendid fashion about our WMD
    capability and I thank you for that answer.
        I have a question for General Jumper. Do you remember the
    old baseball combination--you and I are not too far off in age
    difference--of Tinkers to Evers to Chance?
        General Jumper. I am afraid not, sir.
        Senator Roberts. You do not? Well, anybody else? Somebody
    say they remember that. Will you, please?
        Senator Clinton. Over here, Pat. I remember.
        Senator Roberts. Admiral Clark?
        Okay, thank you. I thank Senator Clinton.
        Well, Senator Inhofe talked about Tinkers to Evers to
    Chance when he mentioned the KC-135s and the lease agreement
    that we are now working with under the national security
    requirements. So General Jumper, I am not opposed to Tinker,
    but I do not want to take a chance.
        General Jumper. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. So consequently I would like to ask, if
    the lease proposal under review is not approved, how will
    procurement of replacement tankers be accelerated? I do not see
    any plans down the road to do that other than to retire the 68,
    who really should be retired. I do not think we have any other
    alternative than to go to the lease agreement. Now, that is a
    tough thing. I do not want to get you in between Jim and
    myself, but that is where you are.
        General Jumper. Sir, it is a tough decision we have to
    make. As a matter of fact, the plan to accelerate the
    procurement plan which we already had on the books was the
    lease, and we put this lease agreement on the table for
    everyone to take a look at. It has been thoroughly scrutinized
    and the Secretary of Defense is looking at it now along with
    his lease committee there in the building and we are awaiting
    the decision.
        Senator Roberts. I hope the decision comes soon, and I
    would point out that the distinguished chairman and ranking
    member are on record as supporting this. I do not have to say
    that; they will, but I thought I would anyway.
        General Shinseki, recent reports indicate the Secretary of
    Defense is considering realignment of our force structure in
    Europe. I know that our new SACEUR thinks the same way. As part
    of this review, let me ask you, is the Army considering
    bringing any force structure from Europe back to the United
    States?
        General Shinseki. Senator, we await the analysis that
    General Jones is undertaking at this point. What we have always
    said is a clear strategy is the best route to that long-term
    stationing set of decisions, and we think General Jones's
    insights will be helpful here. If the answer is to bring forces
    home, we will do that. If it is to keep what we have there,
    albeit in different configurations and locations, we are
    prepared to support that as well.
        Senator Roberts. I thank you very much.
        My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, could I just have 10 seconds
    for the record there. Just so that I do not mislead anybody, my
    statement has been consistently that whether or not I would
    support that lease will depend upon the numbers and the facts
    as provided to us. I have been one that is more than willing to
    look at that as an option, but I just do not want to mislead my
    good friend from Kansas by my silence.
        Senator Roberts. If the Senator would yield, I will be
    happy to be a blocking back for him any time on this decision,
    and we will just let you carry the ball, sir.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Members of the committee, it is now the
    completion of the first round. We have had an excellent hearing
    this morning and the attendance has been at an all-time high,
    showing the concern of our members.
        It is the intention of the chair, in consultation with my
    ranking member, to go into a closed session now. But the
    ranking member does have a prior commitment which requires his
    asking one or two questions now before the closed session, and
    I am happy to accommodate him.
        Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to just ask General Shinseki about his reference to
    the missile defense system. I believe Senator Allard raised
    this issue. On January 2, Secretary Rumsfeld established some
    new procedures for the development and oversight of missile
    defense programs. This is what the memo said, ``The Secretary
    of Defense will decide whether to use test assets for emergency
    or contingency deployment based on an assessment of military
    utility, progress in development, and recommendation by the
    Director of MDA and military Services.''
        The President has now decided to deploy a national missile
    defense system in 2004 and the Department of Defense has asked
    to waive the legal requirement for independent operational
    testing of this system prior to deployment. I understand,
    General Shinseki, that the Army is going to be asked to operate
    this national missile defense system starting in 2004.
        Here is my question: have you provided an assessment of the
    military utility of the national missile defense system to be
    deployed in 2004?
        General Shinseki. I do not recall providing personally a
    specific recommendation of that sort.
        Senator Levin. All right. Will you check your records and
    if there has been such an assessment, would you share that with
    this committee?
        General Shinseki. I will do that, Senator.
        Senator Levin. Prior to the decision to deploy, did
    Secretary Rumsfeld ask you for advice regarding the military
    utility of the national missile defense system as it would
    exist in 2004?
        General Shinseki. I am not aware of that request.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. That concludes your questions?
        Senator Levin. May I just have one question of General
    Jumper? It has to get to this issue of the Predators. We were
    out there. We have seen the value of the Predators just in so
    many places now, most recently where we visited in the last
    week. Is there any way of increasing the production from over
    three a month?
        The demand on these assets is huge. Their value is extreme.
    They can make a huge difference. Everybody wants them, but we
    need them in that theater I guess as much as anyplace. What
    efforts have been made to increase, get a new production line
    going somewhere else, get a license agreement going out?
        General Jumper. Sir, there are several mitigating features
    of the Predator. First, it was an advanced concept technology
    demonstration (ACTD), that is, that was handed to the Service.
    In that technology demonstration it took one ground station to
    fly one Predator. One of the things we are trying to do in the
    development is figure out how to fly several airplanes from one
    ground station. Until we get that problem solved, there is
    really no use in upping the numbers of productions because we
    are ground station-limited in the number of airplanes that we
    can put up at any one time.
        We are working hard to solve this problem and once we do
    and once we get the Predator B model under contract, then we
    are going to have to decide if we want to shift all to B models
    or have a mix of As and Bs. We have decided already we are
    going to buy 128 of these things, if that is the force
    structure that we need, and I think the program we are in right
    now will answer a bunch of very important questions before we
    make a decision about whether to open another production line
    or not.
        But we will keep you close to that, Senator, because it is
    a concern of ours as well.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. I join my colleague's view about that. We
    went to certain sites on our trip. I think we are going to have
    to revisit your current objectives and perhaps have Congress
    inject itself in that decisionmaking, because the dependence on
    this system, not only by the military--you know of other
    segments of our Government that are drawing down those assets,
    and the remarkable performance to date and the versatility of
    this system, it just extrapolates into saving lives of the men
    and women of the Armed Forces and others involved in this
    system. So shall we conclude saying that the attention of
    Congress is at full span on this.
        General Jumper. Absolutely, sir.
        Chairman Warner. We are there to support you.
        General Jumper. I understand and I appreciate that very
    much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Yes, go ahead.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, you very kindly have requested
    certain information from the CIA at our last meeting relative
    to suspect site numbers. There was a very strong disagreement
    here between myself and Mr. Tenet relative to what had been
    supplied to the U.N. and the chairman was very much involved in
    a number of conversations in this regard, as were Senator
    Roberts and others.
        The record is clear that this is a significant issue about
    which some of the statements made by the CIA in letters to me
    were in my judgment significantly different from some of the
    statements that Director Tenet made before this committee and
    the Intelligence Committee. In an effort to amplify or clarify
    that issue, I believe that the chairman had indicated that he
    had requested the CIA for a letter at our last meeting, which I
    believe was the 13th of February.
        But I just wanted for the record to determine whether or
    not such a letter has been received?
        Chairman Warner. I wish to advise my colleague and other
    members of the committee that that letter has not been
    received. But in the context of my requesting in an open
    hearing of the Director of the CIA for such letter, I indicated
    my own judgment, having reviewed I think almost all the facts
    that you had before you with the exception of your important
    visit to meet with Hans Blix. It was my judgment that the
    administration had in good faith provided on a real-time basis
    as much information as it possessed that was relevant to the
    inspections.
        But you are correct, the letter which I requested has not
    yet been received.
        Senator Levin. I had set forth on the record the
    discrepancies, not in numbers but in terms of overall rank of
    percentage that was very significantly different in terms of
    what the classified information was supplied to me and the
    representations of the Director at the Intelligence Committee
    and before this committee.
        It is a very important issue. I think it is very important
    that the CIA carry out not just its commitment to the chairman
    that they supply a letter in this regard, but, frankly, a
    number of commitments that it has made to me that it has not
    carried out in terms of written updates, and a letter to Mr.
    Tenet will be going from me relative to those commitments this
    afternoon.
        But I want to thank the chair for this bringing us up-to-
    date on that letter, which was not yet forthcoming from the CIA
    to him. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. At this time the open portion of this
    hearing is concluded. But again, I wish to commend our four
    distinguished witnesses for an excellent hearing, and I thank
    my colleagues who turned out in strong numbers to receive this
    important testimony today and ask questions.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

                       SHIPBUILDING FUNDING ALTERNATIVES

        1. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, in reviewing the budget request,
    it appears that the first ship for two classes of ships, the Littoral
    Combat Ship (LCS) and the DD(X) destroyer, will be funded with
    research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds. However the
    first aircraft carrier of a new class, the CVN-21, is to be funded from
    the shipbuilding account, split over fiscal years 2007 and 2008. Why is
    it that the first ships of two classes were funded with RDT&E funds,
    but the CVN-21 was not?
        Admiral Clark. In the case of LCS and DD(X), both new hull designs
    with multiple transformational technologies, the use of RDT&E for the
    lead ships will aid in stabilizing these new construction programs
    through better management of the inherently higher risks. Furthermore,
    yearly review of RDT&E budgets will improve the fidelity in the
    execution year budget requirement and allow flexibility to adjust out
    year budgets if critical technologies are delayed or require additional
    maturation. While CVN-21 will also incorporate transformational
    technologies, the hull form will be similar to current proven carrier
    designs, thus incurring less risk in ship construction than LCS and
    DD(X). As such, funding CVN-21 in SCN is appropriate.

                              LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

        2. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, last month the Naval Warfare
    Development Command published the Concept of Operations for the LCS, in
    which it stated: the LCS will contribute to Sea Shield through its
    unique capability to respond quickly, to operate in the littoral
    environment, and to conduct focused missions with a variety of
    networked off board systems. The budget request calls for the first of
    these ships to be purchased with RDT&E funds in fiscal year 2005, even
    though it appears the requirement has not yet been finalized. What is
    your vision for the LCS? How will it contribute to the overall
    effectiveness of the fleet?
        Admiral Clark. My vision for the LCS is a networked, fast,
    stealthy, shallow draft vessel designed to gain and sustain our access
    to the littoral to enable the flow of Joint Forces ashore. LCS will use
    a system of systems approach, employing networked sensors, modular
    mission payloads, and a variety of unmanned vehicles. It will have
    robust self-defense capability at its core and an open computing
    architecture that will enable the modularity we seek.
        Key to LCS's capability will be the use of mission modules which
    will allow LCS to perform a specific mission such as anti-submarine
    warfare, mine warfare, or anti-surface warfare. Furthermore, these
    modules will be forward staged and capable of being rapidly installed,
    enabling LCS to be quickly modified to change missions as operational
    priority dictates.
        LCS will assure the Joint Forces access to contested littorals, and
    will defeat the anti-access strategies any potential adversary may
    employ. Equally important, the mission-tailored LCS permits our large,
    multi-mission combatant ships to conduct those missions for which they
    were optimally designed, such as ballistic missile defense, area air
    defense, and naval surface fire support to our marines and other Joint
    Forces ashore.

        3. Senator Warner. Admiral Clark, how much additional funding would
    be required in fiscal year 2004 to accelerate the development of this
    ship?
        Admiral Clark. An additional $35 million in fiscal year 2004 would
    reduce risk in development of anti-submarine, anti-surface, and mine
    hunting mission modules for Flight 0 of the LCS.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain

                               RESERVE COMPONENT

        4. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, I continue to be impressed with the greater role
    that our Reserve component service members play in our National
    Military Strategy. For example, General Shinseki's statement that
    ``today, more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve
    component.'' General Jumper's statement that ``Air Reserve Component
    Forces comprise nearly half of the forces assigned to the Air and Space
    Expeditionary Force squadrons, groups, wings, and contribute the
    majority of forces for some mission areas.'' Even the Navy, which
    traditionally has a much smaller Reserve Force, is making history.
    According to press accounts, ``A group of naval reservists from Texas
    and Arizona are making history on the deck of the U.S.S. Theodore
    Roosevelt (CVN-71). For the first time since the Korean War, an entire
    Naval Air Reserve Squadron has been deployed aboard an aircraft
    carrier, Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 201 flying F/A-18s.'' Admiral
    Clark, I am sure you are receiving the same reports I am. VFA-201 has
    the best sortie completion rate--100 percent, best carrier landing
    boarding rate, day/night landing grades and readiness, and during
    COMPUTEX scored 100 percent on missile and bomb drops.
        Please explain how the fiscal year 2004 Defense budget provides
    adequate training and modernization funds for Reserves so you can
    continue to rely on them over a sustained period of time, in modern
    equipment like VFA-201 has?
        General Shinseki. The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget provides
    adequate training dollars; however, the Army lacks adequate
    modernization/equipment funding for the Reserve components. With
    support from Congress, we have made great strides in improving the
    training dollars for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve.
        Admiral Clark. Navy formally reviews Naval Reserve modernization
    requirements as a part of its resource allocation process. As a result
    of that assessment, the validity and priority of those requirements are
    judged in the context of all other Navy and Naval Reserve modernization
    requirements.
        I am pleased to report that the fiscal year 2004 Defense budget
    funded Naval Reserve modernization accounts at a higher level than
    Defense budgets of the past 3 years (fiscal year 2004 is approximately
    $32 million higher than fiscal year 2003). The fiscal year 2004 budget
    continues modernization of the Naval Reserve Air Fleet by providing
    funds to procure an additional C-40A ``Clipper'' aircraft. The C-40 is
    a derivative of the Boeing 727 and is replacing the aging fleet of C-9
    logistics aircraft. Additionally, the Flying Hour Program is funded to
    meet 100 percent of the notional training requirement for Reserve
    pilots. The increased operating and modernization funds have been
    targeted to sustain a level of Reserve participation in Navy operations
    that are essential for us to continue to project influence throughout
    the globe.
        As always, there have been some reductions and some increases in
    the individual procurement accounts that reflect the changing
    priorities of a transforming Navy undergoing recapitalization. A good
    example of this is the integration of Navy and Marine Corps tactical
    aviation forces that tailors future force structure in recognition of
    increased capability of the airframes and munitions. One outgrowth of
    this restructuring was the disestablishment of a Naval Reserve and a
    Marine Corps Reserve Fighter/Attack squadron in the fiscal year 2004
    Defense budget request.
        The decisions reflected in the budget demonstrate Navy's intent to
    invest in those priorities, to the extent it is affordable.
    Unfortunately, there are also always high-priority requirements that
    could not be funded. Within constrained top-lines, lower priority
    requirements--both active and Reserve--will not be funded. Those that
    cannot be funded are considered for inclusion in Navy's list of high-
    priority unfunded programs, a copy of which is made available to
    Congress. Historically, Congress has aided Reserve Modernization
    through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA).
    Dramatic decreases in NGREA have had an impact on Reserve
    modernization.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps has built an efficient and
    effective Total Force. Maintaining our expeditionary readiness depends
    upon high-quality Marine reservists as a key part of our Total Force.
    Their training, leadership, quality of life, and equipment
    modernization will continue to be of the utmost importance.
        The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget request provides funding in the
    Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve (O&MMCR) and Reserve
    Personnel Marine Corps (RPMC) appropriations that will adequately
    support the training requirements of Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES)
    units and personnel. In fiscal year 2004, MARFORRES units are scheduled
    to conduct live-fire exercises and participate in amphibious, desert,
    jungle, mountain, and cold weather training. Fiscal year 2004 funding
    will support individual and unit participation in Total Force exercises
    such as: Combined Arms Exercise and Desert Scimitar in Twentynine
    Palms, CA; Weapons and Tactics Instructor course in Yuma, AZ; Ulchi
    Focus Lens in Korea; Cobra Gold in Thailand; Kernal Blitz in CA;
    Rolling Thunder in Fort Bragg, NC; and UNITAS in South American
    countries. These exercises provide operational tempo (OPTEMPO) relief
    to the active component and provide increased opportunities for
    reservists to support the Total Force effort throughout the world.
    However, the execution of these exercises, rely heavily on robust OMMCR
    appropriations and RPMC Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) budgets.
        One of the Marine Corps pillars of readiness focuses on ongoing
    modernization initiatives. The Marine Corps makes every effort to
    resource the Reserve component at levels similar to the active
    component. This effort gives the Reserve Forces the ability to fully
    integrate into the Total Force, especially during periods of
    mobilization when augmenting and reinforcing the active component in
    sustained combat operations. The fiscal year 2004 Defense budget
    provides funding for a series of incremental and affordable
    modernization efforts for our legacy systems including: upgrades to
    aviation systems (CH-46E, CH-53E, C-130T, and F/A-18A) and ground
    systems such as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle Product. Improvement
    Program; and new procurements of ground systems (Thermal Weapons Site,
    the Lightweight 155 Towed Howitzer, and the High Mobility Artillery
    Rocket System (HIMARS)).
        General Jumper. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2004
    and the out years provide the resources for the Air Force Reserve
    Command to undertake one of the biggest aircraft modernizations in the
    past 2 decades, after the procurement hiatus in the 1990s. Force
    structure associated with the C-141 will be realigned to support newly
    built C-17 Globemaster IIIs, C-5As, and KC-135s. C-5 B-models will be
    added to the AFRC fleet. The upgraded KC-135R air refueling tanker will
    replace the last of AFRC's KC-135 E-models. The oldest C-130Es in the
    fleet will be replaced by newer more capable H-model C-130s and newly
    built C-130J aircraft. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget provides
    a much needed jumpstart to the Air Force Reserve equipment
    modernization program, ensuring that the Air Force Reserve remains a
    robust and capable partner in the Total Force team.
        Additionally, the budget covers the cost of training Air Force
    Reserve personnel that have been called on in great numbers to
    participate in Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Noble Eagle, and
    Operation Iraqi Freedom. Participation levels have risen sharply since
    September 11, 2001, further increasing pressure on  available training
    dollars. The Air Force Reserve continues to make great strides in
    efficient resource management by outsourcing support jobs and
    partnering with the active component to maximize long-term combat
    capability through the rebalancing of the Active/Reserve Force mix.

        5. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, what antiquated Reserve policies still exist in
    statute that you would like us to change that negatively affect the way
    you do business today? By incorporating Reserves in an even greater
    effort into the Total Force?
        General Shinseki. There are several ongoing studies by the General
    Accounting Office, the Wexford Group, the Army Staff, and others that
    are looking into issues like active component/Reserve component
    program, compensation reform, duty statuses, etc. The Army and the
    Department of Defense will be studying the recommendations with great
    interest and will alert Congress to any recommended policy changes that
    require legislative action.
        Admiral Clark. It would be premature to request a statutory change
    prior to completion of the Department's studies on Total Force
    integration and the mobilization/force deployment process.
        That said, we have made modifications to our internal policies and
    coordinated changes to Department of Defense policies to improve
    Reserve integration. These changes include the minimization of second-
    year involuntary recalls, implementation of a narrowly focused active
    and Reserve stop-loss policy (in effect for 5 weeks, affecting fewer
    than 100 sailors), and implementation of the Navy-Marine Corps
    Mobilization Processing System (NMCMPS), which provides web-based
    requirements, sourcing, and processing.
        General Hagee. First, the Marine Corps Reserve is an integral part
    of the Marine Corps Total Force concept. Our Selective Marine Corps
    Reserve Units are a mirror image of our active component units allowing
    them to quickly integrate into our active component fulfilling their
    traditional roles of augmenting and reinforcing Marine Expeditionary
    Forces. Second, there are currently no statutory restrictions that
    negatively impact the Marine Corps Reserve's ability to support the
    total force. However, legislative assistance in the following areas
    will allow the Marine Corps to provide a greater level of continuous
    support to the Total Force.

             Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB-SR)--Selected Reserve
            Benefits Obligation Period Reduction. This would modify the
            eligibility criteria to ``not less than 4 years'' in order to
            allow the Services the option of offering MGIB-SR benefits to
            recruits incurring a 4x4 contractual obligation in addition to
            the obligation period of ``not less than 6 years'' required for
            MGIB-SR benefits. This would increase the potential pool of
            SMCR recruits.
             Consistency in Reserve Strength Accounting and
            Management. This proposal would revise Title 10, U.S.C. Section
            115 exempting Reserve personnel serving on active duty for 180
            days or more from counting against active duty end strength.
            Approval of this change would ensure that a Reserve member who
            is exempt from counting against active duty end strength would
            also be exempt from counting against active duty grade strength
            and would be exempt from inclusion on the active duty list.
            This revision would likely remove barriers to Reserve component
            participation and greatly enhance our flexibility in employing
            reservists in support of operational requirements.
             Limitation of Initial Payment of Enlistment and
            Reenlistment Bonuses for the Selected Reserve. Currently, Title
            37 limits the initial payment of these bonuses to one-half of
            the total value. By increasing the initial payment amounts, the
            recruiting and retention value of these bonuses would be
            greatly enhanced and increase SMCR recruiting and retention
            efforts.

        General Jumper. A number of proposals have been included in the DOD
    Omnibus submission to Congress, or are being submitted through the
    fiscal year 2005 Unified Legislation and Budgeting cycle, to align
    Reserve policies with the new steady state. We have always worked as a
    team in the Air Force and will continue to set the standards for Total
    Force commitment through discussion of these current initiatives and
    those that may arise at a future date, to include the following:

             Extending Hostile Fire and Imminent Danger Pay to
            Reserve component Members on Inactive Duty
             Position Vacancy (Below the Zone) Promotion
            Consideration in Time of War or National Emergency
             Military Leave for Mobilized Federal Civilian
            Employees
             Streamline the process to continue Officers on the
            Reserve Active Status List

                                      PAY

        6. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, I am looking at the pay tables here. In 2000, the
    law prescribed military pay raises to be ECI plus 0.5 percent.
    According to the tables, E-1s to E-3s will receive a 2-percent pay
    raise. Is that enough?
        General Shinseki. Since fiscal year 2000, military pay has improved
    substantially relative to the 70th percentile benchmarks recommended by
    the 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation for junior officers
    and junior enlisted personnel. Only the most junior enlisted personnel
    and officers would receive less than 3.7 percent or Employment Cost
    Index (ECI) plus 0.5 percent. E-1s would receive 2 percent while E-2s
    would receive 3.2 percent. It should be noted, however, that these pay
    grades are transitional-members are in them for a short time. Their pay
    is now close to the 90th percentile while pay for mid-grade and senior
    noncommissioned officers is still below our target. We continue to
    support military pay raises of ECI +0.5 percent; however, we believe it
    is appropriate to redistribute the pay raise--putting more pay where it
    is needed while being assured that entry-level pay is very competitive.
        Admiral Clark. I believe that it is enough for E-1s. We have
    proposed a 3.2-percent raise for E-2s and E-3s. That said, when we
    request targeted pay raises, we do so with one principal objective in
    mind: provide incentive in a competitive work force. We expect our E-1
    to E-3 personnel to move quickly through those pay grades and on to
    positions of leadership at the petty officer level. I remain convinced
    that targeted pay raises in these leadership pay grades are a valuable
    motivator of performance in our most junior personnel.
        General Hagee. The 2 percent pay raise is focused on E-1s only. E-
    1s are automatically promoted to E-2 after 6 months of service, which
    is normally about the time they complete their MOS training and go to
    their first duty station. E-2s are scheduled for a 3.2-percent raise
    and E-3s are scheduled for a 3.7-percent raise. Congress instituted the
    ECI +0.5 percent to close the gap between military and comparable
    private sector pay and currently E-1s are at or near the 90th
    percentile.
        General Jumper. The proposed pay raise, if approved, will increase
    E-1 pay by 2 percent. This is approximate to the increase in inflation.
    Personnel in grades of E-2 will receive a pay raise equal to the ECI
    (3.2 percent) and E-3s will receive a 3.7-percent raise.
        Our junior enlisted personnel entering the Service in the grades of
    E-1/E-2 are in the transition phase of their career. An E-1 will
    advance to the grade of E-2 once they reach 6 months time-in-grade
    (TIG). An E-2 will advance to E-3 when reaching 10 months TIG. Upon
    completion of basic training and tech school, most airmen will already
    have advanced to the grade of E-3.
        The proposed raise continues our efforts of previous years to
    reduce the disparity between military pay and private sector, which
    contributes to quality force retention. Additional targeting will also
    result from a redistribution of the pay raises. Our most junior
    members' compensation is now close to the 90th percentile of comparable
    civilians while pay for Senior NCOs is still below the 70th percentile
    target. We believe it is appropriate to redistribute the pay raise--
    putting more pay where it is needed while ensuring the entry-level pay
    remains very competitive.

        7. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, what is the projected pay raise for general and
    flag officers?
        General Shinseki. The projected pay raise for general officers for
    2004 is 3.7 percent, ECI plus 0.5 percent; however, general officer pay
    is capped at Executive Schedule Level III, which is currently $142,500.
        Admiral Clark. The projected 2004 pay raise for flag officers in
    the pay grades of O-7 through O-9 is 3.7 percent, which equates to the
    by law increase of ECI plus 0.5 percent. The statutory requirement that
    caps flag officer pay at the equivalent rate for level III of the
    Executive Schedule is expected to result in no increase in basic pay
    for officers in the pay grade of O-10.
        General Hagee. The projected pay raise for O-7 through O-10 general
    and flag officers is 3.7 percent (ECI0 +0.5 percent).
        General Jumper. Their projected fiscal year 2004 pay raise is 3.7
    percent. Unless overt action is taken, the four-star pay will remain
    capped, which may create a situation in which there is virtually no
    difference in three- and four-star pay.
    Currently:
            - 3-star base pay: $11,319.60
            - 4-star base pay: $11,874.90 (capped)

    Projected:
            - 3-star base pay with 3.7 percent increase: $11,738.40
            - 4-star base pay: $11,874.90 (capped)

        8. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, if it is enough for E-1s, then is it enough for
    generals and admirals?
        General Shinseki. The projected pay raise for all our career
    noncommissioned officers and commissioned officers is 3.7 percent, ECI
    +0.5 percent, in recognition of their commitment to service and
    associated responsibilities commensurate with their grade. E-1 pay is
    now close to the 90th percentile relative to their civilian
    counterparts based on experience and education. Additionally, E-1s are
    only in this pay grade for a very short period of time.
        Admiral Clark. We are trying to retain the best people in the Navy,
    from E-1 to O-10. To do that, my folks need to have not only superior
    job content and quality of service, but they need a pay system that
    produces powerful incentives for promotion and retention.
        Right now, Navy flag officers are paid at or near the 70th
    percentile of comparably educated civilians, a level determined by the
    9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) as necessary to
    enable the military to recruit and retain the quantity and quality of
    personnel it requires. By contrast, personnel in pay grade E-1 are
    currently at the 90th percentile. Accordingly, I believe that the 3.7-
    percent pay raise (Employment Cost Index +0.5 percent), provided for in
    37 U.S.C. Sec. 1009, is appropriate to maintain flag and general
    officer pay at a level consistent with their responsibilities, while a
    2 percent raise for E-1s will help maintain their purchasing power,
    similar to or above that of their civilian counterparts.
        General Hagee. Congress instituted the ECI +0.5 pay raise to close
    the gap between military pay and comparable private sector pay. After
    considering the relative value of military compensation against the
    private sector wages by age, education level, and experience, DOD
    targeted the pay raise to more aggressively close the gap between NCOs/
    SNCOs and their private sector counterparts. All enlisted personnel E-3
    and above will receive a 3.7-percent pay raise or more, consistent with
    properly targeting the pay raise to bring them closer to the
    recommended 70th percentile of their civilian counterparts. Similarly,
    all officers, except second and first lieutenants with no prior
    enlisted service, to include general officers, will receive a 3.7-
    percent pay raise consistent with the 9th QRMC review. These officers
    will receive a 3.2-percent pay raise keeping them above the 70th
    percentile.
        General Jumper. In line with the 9th QRMC, DOD is targeting pay
    increases for our mid-level to senior enlisted personnel ranging from
    4.6 percent to 6.25 percent. Pay for E-1s will increase 2 percent,
    approximately equal to the increase in inflation. A 2-percent pay raise
    will maintain the purchasing power of E-1 pay and will maintain their
    compensation close to the 90th percentile of comparable civilians
    (recent high school/college graduates). E-2s and O-1/O-2s will receive
    a 3.2-percent pay raise, which is equal to the ECI. All others will
    receive 3.7 percent to include generals and admirals. A 3.7-percent
    increase for general officers will slightly improve their purchasing
    power and maintain their compensation close to that of CEOs leading
    small companies (revenue under $2 million/year).*
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * Source: Executive Compensation, June 2001

        9. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, what effect will this have on those E-1s on the
    lower end of the pay scale with respect to getting the last of our
    military personnel off of food stamps, or will we backslide and be
    putting personnel back on food stamps?
        General Shinseki. There has been a steady and noteworthy decline in
    the number of members on food stamps since the first survey of
    participants in 1991. In 1991, there were 19,400 members on food stamps
    among all Services. Today, the Department of Defense estimates that
    there are 2,000 members on food stamps--we estimate that 1,155 are
    soldiers. The decrease in food stamp participation is primarily due to
    increases in military base pay, basic allowance for housing and
    subsistence, and implementation of the Family Subsistence Supplemental
    Allowance (FSSA). Eligibility for FSSA is based on USDA criteria for
    food stamps, except income for FSSA purposes, includes the value of
    government quarters. The USDA does not count the value of government
    quarters in determining eligibility. We know the majority of soldiers
    on food stamps live on-base, approximately 60 percent. However, since
    the FSSA requires the soldiers to count their housing as income, these
    soldiers are not eligible for FSSA and continue to receive food stamps.
    The majority of FSSA participants for the Army range from E-3s to E-5s.
    The proposed pay raise provides a raise equivalent to the employment
    cost index to E-2s and the employment cost index plus 0.5 percent to E-
    3s and E-4s. We do not believe the proposed 2 percent pay raise for E-
    1s will impact food stamp usage.
        Admiral Clark. As of the end of fiscal year 2002, there were 23
    Navy E-1s on food stamps, or 0.03 percent of the Navy E-1 population.
    While that is still 23 too many, we expect that the proposed 2 percent
    basic pay raise for E-1s in 2004, as well as the increases in basic
    allowance for housing (BAH) associated with the continued buy down of
    out-of-pocket expenses, will continue to drive that number down.
        General Hagee. The food stamp program is administered by the States
    and, therefore, the USMC does not have access to this data. The NDAA 00
    established a family subsistence allowance to help military families.
    The maximum amount of FSSA is $500/month and is paid based on family
    size and household income based guidelines as determined by the
    Department of Agriculture. During 2002, we paid out $78,000 in FSSA to
    48 marines. Only one was an E-1, with the majority of the recipients
    being E-3 and above with large families. We believe that the continuing
    raises in basic pay and reduction of BAH out-of-pocket expenses will
    reduce the number of marines participating in FSSA.
        General Jumper. Military pay for our airmen in the grades of E-1/E-
    2 attending basic training and technical school is relatively high
    compared to their private sector counterparts so we do not consider the
    projected pay raise for E-1/E-2s to be a problem. In fact, airmen enter
    the Air Force earning basic pay already close to 90 percent of their
    civilian counterparts with the same education and experience
    background. Additionally, airmen, depending on their specialty skill,
    may be eligible for a variety of separate pays, allowances, and bonuses
    in addition to the tax advantages they receive for nontaxable income.
        Since the Services implemented the FSSA program in 2001, only 15 AF
    active duty personnel are currently certified to receive FSSA. To
    qualify for FSSA, an airmen's household income level must be less than
    the USDA Food Stamp Program (130th of poverty level). FSSA is a
    voluntary monthly tax-free cash allowance (up to $500/month) paid to a
    member and must be reported as income to all federally-funded income
    assistance programs (School Lunch Program; Women, Infant, and Children
    (WIC); and Food Stamps: Earned Income Tax Credit). In February each
    year, members must recertify for FSSA to show that their income is
    below the USDA Food Stamp Program eligibility level. In 2002, 27
    members qualified for FSSA. FSSA eligibility will fluctuate throughout
    the year as a result of changes in the member's income level
    (promotions, annual pay raises, special/incentive pays and bonuses, or
    other household income). While it is difficult to determine exactly how
    the number of personnel certified/qualified for FSSA will increase or
    decrease, the pay raises proposed will certainly be a step in the right
    direction toward reducing such numbers.
        Of the 15 families currently receiving FSSA, there are 7 E-3s with
    5-6 members in household, 2 E-4s with 6-7 members in household, and 6
    in the grades of E-5 and E-6 with 8-11 members in household. Average
    FSSA amount paid to eligible members is $308 per month. There are no
    members below the grade of E-3 currently receiving FSSA.

                                  END STRENGTH

        10. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, last year, I supported a legislative proposal with
    my friend Senator Max Cleland, which called for an increase in end
    strength based on your personnel requirements. The Army reported to the
    committee that they may need 42,000 to 43,000 additional soldiers, the
    Air Force 22,000 to 30,000 additional airmen, the Navy 10,000
    additional sailors, and the Marine Corps an additional 5,000 marines.
        You and your personnel chiefs were quite clear that the requirement
    was driven by the war on terrorism and operations after September 11.
    The first 100,000 Reserve and national guardsmen that you called up for
    Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom have just returned home. We
    are engaged all over the world. Our men and women in uniform may be
    asked to do more this year than last.
        How do you propose to manage an even lower military end strength
    with increased requirements for more personnel in even more places
    (i.e., homeland security, Afghanistan, Iraq, Korea, etc.)?
        General Shinseki. While the congressionally-mandated fiscal year
    2002 active Army end strength was 480,000, the Army exceeded this end
    strength target, as well as the budgeted average strength of 474,000
    man-years. The Army finished fiscal year 2002 with an end strength of
    486,543 (78,158 officers, 404,305 enlisted, and 4,080 cadets). The Army
    was allowed to exceed the end strength targets only because of the 2-
    percent flex authorized by Congress. The Army will continue to utilize
    this flex and continue to use Reserve component (RC) forces to meet
    current and emerging requirements for the global war on terrorism and
    the new strategic environment.
        This is a complex question that has no simple answer. Looking at
    our history since September 11, we have had a 480,000 Active-Duty Force
    and a sustained force of 30,000 mobilized RC soldiers on active duty
    status. The Army views these requirements as a new operational plateau
    and not as a spike. The recent increase in mobilization of the RC is a
    spike for the potential war against Iraq and increased threat levels.
    But even after the immediate spike subsides, we see the Army's
    operational requirements maintaining a new plateau. This coming June,
    both the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force
    (KFOR) will become RC operations to mitigate active component (AC)
    tempo. This will require the mobilization of portions of an RC division
    for SFOR and portions of another RC division for KFOR to sustain the
    operations. During this period of mobilization, RC soldiers will be in
    an active duty status. These requirements are additive to the support
    the RC is already providing to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
    Noble Eagle to support homeland defense and the global war on
    terrorism. Any increase in end strength will be tied to how long we
    expect the RC to maintain that operations tempo. The Army continues to
    look at whether or not the 480,000 Active-Duty Force is right and
    whether we have the right AC/RC mix in our combat, combat support, and
    combat service support formations, as well as addressing our current
    high demand/low density units.
        Admiral Clark. Embedded in our military end strength projections
    are various platform decommissionings offset by increases in
    Antiterrorism/Force Protection manning. Accelerating the retirement of
    our oldest, least capable, and most maintenance-intensive platforms was
    one of the most difficult decisions the Navy made this year. While
    aggregate warfighting capability is a better metric than the number of
    ships and aircraft in our inventory, we recognize that below a certain
    threshold numbers do matter. However, all of our analyses suggest that
    the near-term inactivations we are proposing do not compromise our
    ability to accomplish our mission, and that the fastest and most
    efficient way to recapitalize and transform the fleet is to pursue
    vertical cuts in our least capable type-model series, both in ships and
    in aircraft, and apply those savings toward procuring new ships and
    aircraft.
        In summary, Navy end strength is based on requirements that are
    largely force structure based. As older, more manpower intensive
    platforms are taken off line and replaced by more efficient ships and
    aircraft the requisite end strength decreases in concert.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps asked for and was granted an end
    strength increase of 2,400 marines for fiscal year 2003. This increase
    was greatly appreciated and came at the right time. The 2,400 marines
    were used to replenish units depleted by standing up the 4th MEB (MEB
    Hqtrs/ AT Battalion/Chemical Biological Incident Response Force/
    Security Force Company). Coinciding with the end strength increase to
    175,000, the USMC continues to look at ways to return marines to the
    operating forces. Military-civilian conversions, A-76, and outsourcing
    efforts have allowed us to return approximately 900 marines to the
    operating forces. We believe that 175,000 active component end strength
    is sufficient to meet our current mission requirements.
        General Jumper. We are examining opportunities to optimize use of
    the current end strength. We continue to look for those airmen doing
    things that uniformed people should not be doing, or those who are
    supporting agencies outside the Air Force that do not necessarily have
    to be military or Air Force resources. I would characterize this
    portion as a force and skills ``mix'' issue. Over the past year, we
    have been reviewing our core competencies--those things that we as an
    Air Force do better than anyone else, or things that we do that are
    very difficult for others to duplicate, as part of an ongoing effort to
    find areas where we can realign our military personnel from ``non-
    military'' jobs into those that must be military. These core
    competencies will be implemented in a program we call the Human Capital
    Task Force, which will ensure our military force structure is placed in
    those functional areas with the highest demand and appropriateness for
    uniformed airmen. The remaining areas we've determined to not be core
    competencies, although essential, but not necessarily required to be
    performed by military members--will be studied as to whether this work
    can best be accomplished by our outstanding Federal civilian workforce
    or by outside contractors through competitive sourcing studies or an
    alternative to competitive sourcing. In addition, part of our long-term
    strategy is to overhaul our entire requirements determination process
    to better focus on core competencies.
        Though we cannot definitively tell you we will not need additional
    end strength until we are confident we have our skills mix issue
    resolved, there is no doubt ``solving'' this issue will be very
    expensive. We are looking for creative ways to pay for the increase in
    contractor costs or an increase in civilian pay dollars to pay for the
    non-``blue-suit'' work that is currently being performed by the
    military we will reassign.

                         NATIONAL CALL TO SERVICE PLAN

        11. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, my staff was recently briefed on the implementation
    of the Call to Service Plan, which Senator Bayh and I were successful
    in including in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
    2003. I thank the Marine Corps in particular for embracing the program
    in the commandant's statement. While I am encouraged by the new
    enthusiasm shown by the Department of Defense, compared to last year, I
    would like you to discuss how you plan to maintain this new level of
    effort to ensure this program is fully utilized. How do you intend to
    implement the 18-18-18 enlistment option approved last year?
        General Shinseki. We are not participating in the 18-18-18 since it
    was replaced by the National Call to Service Enlistment Option.
    Participants in the National Service enlistment option, upon completion
    of initial entry training, will serve in the AC for a period of 15
    months. They may then stay in the AC or choose to serve 24 months in
    the Selected Reserve. Upon completion, they may continue in the
    Selected Reserve, serve in the Individual Ready Reserve, or serve in a
    National Service Program, or any combination of the above. The Army
    will offer the incentives specified for the National Service option
    which includes the choice of one of the following: (1) payment of a
    bonus in the amount of $5,000; (2) up to $18,000 repayment on
    qualifying student loans; (3) entitlement to an allowance for
    educational assistance at the monthly rate payable for basic
    educational assistance allowances for a total of 12 months (now at $900
    per month); or (4) entitlement to an allowance for educational
    assistance at 50 percent of the monthly rate payable for basic
    educational assistance allowances for a total of 36 months (now at $366
    per month). Twenty-four military occupation specialties have been
    identified for participation in this program.
        Admiral Clark. Navy, in coordination with DOD and the other
    Services, is in the process of developing an implementation plan, which
    will take effect 01 October 2003 (fiscal year 2004). The overarching
    theme for Navy's implementation of the National Call to Service (NCS)
    enlistment option is to utilize the program to bolster our Selected
    Reserve (SELRES) force readiness. NCS candidates will be afforded the
    full range of active duty training, given fleet experience and then, if
    they choose not to reenlist in the Active Force, they will be
    transferred to our Selective Reserve Force as a readiness multiplier.
    Our plan for fiscal year 2004 will goal NCS accessions at 1 percent of
    total non-prior service accessions ( cents450). Future annual accession
    goals, as well as the accession skill mix, will be directly tied to
    projected SELRES manning shortfalls.
        General Hagee. Marine Corps, in coordination with DOD and the other
    Services, is in the process of developing an implementation plan which
    will take effect 01 Oct 03 (fiscal year 2004). The overarching theme
    for USMC's implementation of the NCS enlistment option is to utilize
    the program to ultimately bolster our SELRES force readiness. NCS
    candidates will be afforded entry-level recruit and MOS training, given
    operating force experience and then, if they choose not to reenlist in
    the Active Force, they will be transferred to our Selective Reserve
    Force as a readiness multiplier. Our plans for fiscal year 2004 will
    set the goal for NCS accessions at approximately 0.5 percent of total
    non-prior service accessions (175) ramping up to 1 percent by fiscal
    year 2006.
        General Jumper. Senator we also have embraced this program. Our
    strategy is to use this program to reach out to the market that may
    find this type of enlistment more attractive than traditional
    enlistments. We plan to reach out to individuals currently in college
    or those completing it in the near future. Additionally, efforts are
    underway to ensure we maximize the output of this program to help
    improve the staffing in our Air Reserve components. Currently, we have
    identified at least 29 different skills across the Total Air Force that
    will be staffed with people that enter through the NCS program. These
    29 skills were selected in large part because they are also utilized in
    the Reserve component and will allow members to transfer easily. These
    include security force positions, flight line positions, medical
    positions, and numerous others.

        12. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, what percentage of your total force will be made up
    of personnel under this type of contract?
        General Shinseki. We will begin with an initial cap of 2 percent of
    the annual accession mission. The percentage of the total force will
    initially be significantly less than 1 percent.
        Admiral Clark. Due to the short-term nature of the NCS contract
    (average length of time on active duty projected to be 20 months), and
    the Navy's vision of setting accession goals based on SELRES manning
    shortfall requirements, it is anticipated that the first cut will
    produce a steady state average of NCS contracts in the total enlisted
    force will be approximately 1 percent (3,000-3,500 NCS contracts on
    active duty at any given time). We will evaluate progress in the
    future.
        General Hagee. Present plans call for USMC to access 0.5 percent
    (175) in fiscal year 2004 and ramp up to 1 percent (350) of our annual
    enlisted accessions by fiscal year 2006.
        General Jumper. Senator our current plan is to enlist 1 percent
    (approximately 370 people), of our total non-prior service accessions
    in fiscal year 2004. We have identified at least 29 different skills
    across the Total Air Force that will be staffed with people that enter
    through the National Call to Service Program. The 1 percent will be
    divided across the 29 skills.

        13. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, what role would the National Service Plan member
    fill in your Service? I would like to encourage you to come back to the
    committee and myself for further help in using this program to increase
    end strength.
        General Shinseki. Participants who enlist for the 15-month term of
    service will attend the same training as those who enlist for a longer
    term of service in the same specialty. Specialties with a total
    training time of less than 16 weeks and facilitate Reserve duty or
    National Service will be open to this option. This enlistment option
    will be open to 24 military occupation specialties including combat,
    combat support, and combat service support. After training,
    participants in this option are subject to both overseas assignments,
    except Germany and Hawaii, and stateside assignments.
        Admiral Clark. While on active duty, NCS recruits will be utilized
    in the Navy to fulfill the same functions as recruits coming in under
    longer-term contracts. All NCS recruits will attend boot camp, a Navy
    ``A'' school, and will be worldwide assignable to sea and shore
    billets. At the completion of their active duty contract, they will be
    afforded the opportunity to either reenlist in the Active Force or
    transfer to the SELRES. While attached to the SELRES, NCS members will
    fill manning gaps in targeted ratings. The skill mix for NCS accessions
    will be directly linked to projected SELRES manning shortfalls.
        General Hagee. The ultimate goal for our NCS marines is to support
    the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) in meeting manning shortfalls
    and support their emerging homeland security missions. A majority of
    the NCS marines would be tied to ATIFP missions and would be trained in
    infantry, NBC, and MP MOSs. Active duty would be spent serving with the
    4th MEB (AT), Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF),
    Marine Security Forces, and Base/Station MPs. Assignments in the SMCR
    would be tied to Security Battalions, CBIRF, and other units assigned
    to homeland security missions. We are also planning on offering a
    limited number of NCS marines extended training in critical skill areas
    in short MOSs (i.e. intelligence, linguists, aerial navigators, etc.)
    so that we can assign these NCS marines directly into these critically
    short billets within the SMCR.
        General Jumper. Senator, we have identified many different skills
    in which these members will be utilized. These skills stretch across
    the Air Force and can also be utilized in one of our Air Reserve
    components. Members enlisted under the National Service Plan are not in
    addition to, but will count against our current authorized end
    strength.

        14. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, if you were authorized the increase in end strength
    required to meet your commitments, how quickly would you be able to
    fill out the ranks of currently undermanned units?
        General Shinseki. Any increase in end strength will be tied to how
    long we expect the Reserve components to maintain their current
    operations tempo. The Army continues to look at whether or not the
    480,000 Active-Duty Force is right and whether we have the right active
    component/Reserve component mix in our combat, combat support, and
    combat service support formations, as well as addressing our current
    high-demand/low-density units. Additionally, the Army derives end
    strength requirements from the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, which
    currently is ongoing. The TAA and other efforts to move soldiers from
    supporting roles to units will affect the increase in end strength
    requirements.
        Given current recruiting and retention resources, and current
    retention rates, the Army has the ability to increase end strength by
    approximately 7,700 in fiscal year 2004. An increase in resources or
    efficiencies will have a commensurate increase in the ability to
    increase the Army's end strength.
        Admiral Clark. As a result of congressional authority to operate
    above strength controls, yet within the NDAA authorization of +2
    percent, Navy active-duty end strength levels are already sufficient.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps is very satisfied with the NDAA for
    fiscal year 2003 increase of 2,400 marines. The Marine Corps believes
    that 175,000 active marines are sufficient to meet our traditional
    mission requirements. We are currently not experiencing any problems in
    recruiting, training, and retaining marines to meet this increase.
        General Jumper. It is difficult to provide a definitive answer, as
    there are several issues involved including the recruiting and training
    pipelines. In the ideal environment, it takes between 12 and 18 months
    to recruit and train additional personnel.

        15. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, would you need to reactivate units and squadrons
    that were decommissioned during the down-sizing of the 1990s?
        General Shinseki. No. Soldiers who enter the Army under this plan
    would be integrated into existing units.
        Admiral Clark. I foresee no need to re-commission units at this
    time. We are using the National Call to Service Plan to complement our
    Reserve Force and to meet Reserve requirements for trained junior
    personnel.
        General Hagee. A. Marine Corps force structure is based on the
    minimum manpower and equipment needed to provide required combat
    capabilities. Since the end of the Cold War, our requirements have
    increased while end strength has decreased. Specifically, since a
    recent high of over 191,000 in 1991, we now stand at 175,000 active
    duty marines. This is at a time when we find ourselves engaged in a
    major theater war as well as numerous other vital missions.
        B. In recent years, with the help of a modest end strength
    increase, we have reactivated selective units in order to meet emergent
    threats and provide our regional combatant commanders with the
    capabilities they require. Our reactivation of the 4th Marine
    Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) and our active component Air
    Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (ANGLICO) are examples.
        C. Through a combination of specific force structure realignments
    and institutional process improvements, the Corps has enjoyed
    unprecedented efficiencies in manpower allocation. In spite of this, we
    currently are able to man our Active-Duty Forces at only 94 percent of
    their validated requirement. Given this shortage of manpower to meet
    our current requirements, and without presupposing another end strength
    increase, I do not believe it is prudent for us to seek reactivation of
    previously decommissioned units.
        General Jumper. At this time there are no plans to reactivate any
    units or squadrons inactivated during the downsizing of the 1990s. New
    squadrons would only be required if additional force structure or
    mission changes were directed. Additionally, end strength increases do
    not generate the need for additional squadrons. We are analyzing our
    force requirements to determine if there are opportunities to realign
    military manpower from non-military essential functions into high-
    stress, high-PERSTEMPO career fields within existing units. We would
    then backfill the losing functions with civilian manpower or contract
    support, depending on the availability of resources.

        16. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, what increases in procurement would be required to
    ensure that these service members are properly equipped?
        General Shinseki. None. Soldiers who enter the Army under this plan
    would be integrated into existing units, assigned to authorized unit
    positions, and utilize equipment authorized by the units. However,
    there may be some additional cost associated with the procurement of
    personal items such as initial uniform issue items that would be based
    upon the number of soldiers entering the Army under this program.
        Admiral Clark. Thus far, we have identified no additional
    procurement needs to facilitate implementation of Navy's NCS program,
    largely because the program will be operated within our existing
    strength authorization and NCS members will perform duties associated
    with existing requirements.
        If, however, at some point, Navy leadership deems it necessary to
    activate previously decommissioned activities (ships, squadrons, bases,
    etc.), part of the consideration of such a decision will involve a
    detailed evaluation of the mission and structure of commands identified
    for reactivation, in order to determine procurement needs associated
    with their activation/reestablishment.
        General Hagee. This question is a follow-on to QFR #15 which asked,
    ``Would you need to reactivate units and squadrons that were
    decommissioned during the down-sizing of the 1990s?'' The Marine Corps'
    response indicated that there was no need to reactivate any units or
    squadrons.
        In light of the Marine Corps' response to QFR #15, this question is
    not applicable.
        General Jumper. We plan to enlist 1 percent (approximately 370) of
    our total non-prior service accessions in fiscal year 2004 through the
    NCS plan. As there is currently no increase in end strength associated
    with the NCS plan, the cost to equip these members is included in the
    budget.

                               CONCURRENT RECEIPT

        17. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, I am on record as a strong supporter of concurrent
    receipt since 1991. I believe military retirement pay is pay for
    services rendered to a serviceman or woman after 20 years of dedicated
    military service. Disability pay is pay to a serviceman or woman
    because of physical or mental pain or suffering caused by their years
    of service in the military. The pays are different. The pays are
    separate. Military retirement pay should not be offset by disability
    pay. The Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act on
    ``Special Compensation for Combat-Related Disabled Uniformed Services
    Retirees'' addressed only a small portion of retired service members
    not being fairly compensated for their service to this country and
    disabilities acquired during that service. Senator Harry Reid and I
    have re-introduced legislation to ensure that all service members are
    fairly compensated. What are your views on this legislation and this
    issue?
        General Shinseki. Of course, the Army is most grateful to our
    veterans, especially those who have served long and faithful careers.
    We realize that there is no payment that can ever fully repay these
    brave soldiers for the sacrifices they have made. However, we must
    temper this emotionally charged issue with the position of the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense, which the Army supports. We cannot pay
    anyone twice--that is, both retired pay and disability pay--for the
    same service. Further, we must keep in mind our obligation to those who
    are serving now and may be putting their lives on the line in combat in
    the weeks and months ahead. Would we be able to support these troops
    after paying the $45 billion, 10-year cost for concurrent receipt that
    DOD estimates?
        The Army is grateful to the President for signing ``Combat Related
    Special Compensation'' into law. This new law will compensate military
    retirees who served 20 years and were wounded in combat or combat-
    related training. The Army is part of a DOD committee working together
    to develop guidelines for executing this compensation program by June.
        Admiral Clark. Like all Americans, I believe we owe our veterans a
    great debt of gratitude, particularly those serving long and faithful
    careers. We must always remember that our Nation has remained strong
    because of the brave men and women who were willing to fight and risk
    their lives to protect their fellow citizens. However, we must also
    recognize the significant obligation this bill will place on the
    Military Retirement Fund without identifying appropriations.
        I cannot support concurrent receipt of retired pay and disability
    compensation that goes into effect prior to appropriation of funds to
    cover the cost to the Military Retirement Fund and manpower and
    personnel accounts. To do otherwise would put other critical programs
    at risk.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps has always supported fair and
    equitable treatment of retired marines and acknowledges that the issue
    of concurrent receipt needs to be fully addressed. The NDAA fiscal year
    2003 provides special compensation for military retirees with combat-
    related disabilities (CRSC). Though this is not concurrent receipt, we
    believe that this is an important first step. The Marine Corps' major
    concern lies with the appropriation of additional funding to support
    any legislative change concerning concurrent receipt. Compelling the
    Services to pay the bill out of existing funds would result in serious
    cuts in modernization and readiness, as well as potential cuts in
    current programs to our active and Reserve marines.
        General Jumper. Senator McCain, the Department has traditionally
    opposed legislative attempts to repeal the ban on concurrent receipt of
    full retired pay and VA disability compensation. This opposition is
    based on 100+ years of historical precedent, and a longstanding
    administration belief against ``duplicate payments'' for same period of
    service. However, we recognize the importance of properly compensating
    veterans for service injuries, and that there are two competing
    viewpoints on whether concurrent receipt is justified.
        Proponents of retaining the ban argue that offsets are common to
    other Federal payments (for example, Dependency and Indemnity
    Compensation offsets the Survivor Benefit Plan annuity). Ending this
    offset would set an expensive precedent for reduction/elimination of
    similar offsets among Federal programs. OSD reports a rough cost
    estimate of $41 billion in increased direct spending for the first 10-
    year period if the ban on concurrent receipt were lifted ($3 billion in
    the first year alone, and $14 billion in increased accrual payments by
    DOD to the military retirement trust fund for the same 10-year period).
    Also, retired or ``retainer pay'' implies possible future service, and
    since a disabled retiree is not fit for recall, offset is appropriate.
        Proponents of repealing the ban argue the offset is unfair. Civil
    service retirees and prior service retirees typically are able to
    receive disability compensation from VA with no corresponding offset
    (though no other agency provides for disability and retirement pay from
    that agency). Another argument is that VA disability recipients are
    entitled to other Federal benefits, so why not military retired pay? As
    an alternative to ``full'' concurrent receipt, OSD estimates the ban
    could be lifted for 100 percent disabled retirees at a much-reduced
    cost of $50 million/year. The Air Force has not budgeted for this item
    in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget and cannot absorb or support
    the significant costs without additional funding. If additional funding
    were provided by Congress to cover the cost of lifting the ban, we
    would support such legislation.

                                  ENCROACHMENT

        18. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, the loss of Vieques, and the increasing impact of
    encroachment on operations and training at bases and ranges, concern me
    greatly. We passed legislation last year that will help to reduce some
    encroachment concerns at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) and to a smaller
    degree at Luke AFB, but there is much more to be done. Please discuss
    what actions your Services are taking to protect the viability of
    military ranges and bases, especially against encroachment.
        General Shinseki. The Army is working internally and with other
    agencies to mitigate the effects that encroachment has on our training
    and readiness. Our principal internal effort is the Sustainable Range
    Program (SRP). The objective of SRP is to maximize the capability,
    availability, and accessibility of ranges and training land to support
    doctrinal training and testing requirements. SRP is based on three
    tenets:

        (1) Scientifically Defensible Information. The Army is developing
    and maintaining complete data on all aspects of ranges--operational
    characteristics of training facilities, physical characteristics of
    real property, and data on the range as part of the natural and
    cultural environment.
        (2) Integrated Management. We are integrating the management of
    ranges across the four disciplines that directly affect them: range
    operations and modernization; facilities and installation management;
    munitions management and safety; and environmental management.
        (3) Outreach. The Army is working to inform political leadership,
    regulators, and communities to improve understanding of the Army's need
    for training and testing and the Army's more sophisticated range
    management approach.

        The Army is developing both an overarching Army regulation and
    detailed implementing guidance to the field on the SRP. Specific
    programs that will support sustainment of ranges and minimize the
    impacts of encroachment include: implementation of the Army Range and
    Training Land Strategy, quantification of encroachment impacts in the
    Army Installation Status Report, implementation of Army Compatible Use
    Buffers (utilizing authorities granted by Congress in Section 2811 in
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003), and the
    implementation of mission-focused environmental management systems on
    all Army installations.
        I would like to comment specifically on the Army's efforts to
    implement the authority Congress granted the military departments
    earlier this year to acquire buffer zones around our installations.
    Fort Bragg pioneered this type of agreement, and now, Fort Carson,
    Colorado, has moved out and implemented one of our first agreements
    under the new legislation. Under a cooperative agreement between The
    Nature Conservancy and Fort Carson, The Nature Conservancy has
    negotiated a renewable lease with a private landowner that establishes
    a conservation easement and precludes development on about 30,000 acres
    and 14 linear miles of perimeter on the Fort Carson's southern
    boundary. We are excited about the prospects this new authority
    presents and will be working hard to identify suitable properties and
    resources to implement the program fully.
        The Office of the Secretary of Defense is working with the Services
    to develop overarching Department policy for sustainment of ranges and
    operating areas. This policy will support the long-term planning and
    programming necessary to ensure our ranges and training areas meet
    mission needs now and in the future.
        Admiral Clark. Beginning on the east coast, Navy is implementing
    the Training Resource Strategy (TRS), which ties together multiple
    ranges for fleet training. This plan distributes our training across
    all ranges instead of relying on a single site as we did at Vieques and
    consequently lessens the impact of short-term or seasonal encroachment
    at anyone range on our overall training program. TRS also supports a
    more realistic training scenario for our forces by providing larger,
    multi-dimensional training areas that were not available at Vieques.
        Taking advantage of legislation passed last year, Navy is
    developing an ``Encroachment Partnering'' (EP) program. This program
    allows acquisition of real estate interests on lands in the vicinity of
    military properties to reduce incompatible land uses that impact
    mission capabilities. As described below, funded programs are in place
    to conduct long-term sustainable planning for Navy ranges, to include
    identifying locations where EP projects can reduce the impacts
    associated with urban encroachment. For example, EP projects may
    support preservation of off-base habitat for species as cities expand,
    reducing species reliance on military lands. EP projects can also be
    used to reduce commercial and residential development in areas subject
    to noise or other indirect effects from training or testing. EP extends
    the options available for installations to conduct compatible land use
    planning with States and local governments, and can support positive
    partnerships with conservation groups and local stakeholders.
        In fiscal year 2004, the Navy has budgeted approximately $800
    million for compliance, pollution prevention, and conservation to meet
    our environmental obligations and manage natural resources.
    Additionally, the President's budget for fiscal year 2004 provides
    approximately $98 million across the FYDP to support a range
    sustainment program that will include development of management plans
    for each of our training range complexes, based upon current and
    anticipated operational requirements, and including detailed
    environmental and land-use planning.
        An important component of the range sustainability program is
    ensuring an ongoing dialogue occurs with all stakeholders, including
    local citizens and community planning organizations, as well as
    national and State resource agencies. Since encroachment impacts are
    often manifested via inappropriate regulatory restrictions or citizen
    lawsuits, this coordinated planning and outreach effort is critical to
    controlling the adverse impacts of encroachment.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps is engaged in many ways to protect
    the viability of our military ranges and bases, especially against
    encroachment. The Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps (OMMC) budget
    for environmental compliance and protection has held steady over the
    last several years at approximately $120 million per year. Our budgets
    are requirements based and our steady funding is attributable to the
    fact that environmental legislation has remained consistent since 1996.
    Previous investments to improve environmental compliance have also
    resulted in associated cost decreases. Additionally, the conservation
    portion of our budget has increased from about $1 million OMMC in
    fiscal year 1992 to about $15 million in fiscal year 2003.
        Every Marine Corps base, station, or range with natural resource
    responsibilities has in place an Integrated Natural Resource Management
    Plan (INRMP) which provides for the conservation and rehabilitation of
    natural resources. These plans are prepared in cooperation with
    regulatory agencies. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) policy
    acknowledges that INRMPs can be acceptable substitutes for critical
    habitat designation. It is this policy we seek to have Congress codify.
        Critical habitat designation under the Endangered Species Act
    presents the single greatest encroachment concern for the Marine Corps.
    The standard under the Endangered Species Act is that critical habitat
    cannot be adversely modified. Currently, we do not train on lands
    subject to critical habitat designation to ensure no adverse
    modification. The Marine Corps' ultimate concern is that once land is
    designated as critical habitat, land management authority transfers
    from the commanding general of the installation to the regulatory
    agencies and, via the courts, special interest groups. The Marine Corps
    has worked with FWS to develop a scientifically and legally based
    policy that precludes the need to designate critical habitat. The
    Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative (RRPI) has within it a
    provision that would codify current FWS practice. Absent legislation,
    environmental litigation may still cause 57 percent of the 125,000 acre
    Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton, California and 65 percent of
    the 23,000 acre Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar, California to
    be designated critical habitat.
        The Marine Corps is pursuing Encroachment Partnering opportunities
    per the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (10 USC
    2684A, Sec 2811a) as another tool for addressing encroachment. This
    legislation allows entry into an agreement with an eligible entity such
    as a private conservation organization or State, to address the use or
    development of real property in the vicinity of a military
    installation. The purpose of Encroachment Partnering agreements are
    twofold: limit development or use of property that would be
    incompatible with the mission of the installation and/or preserve
    habitat on the property that would relieve current or anticipated
    environmental restrictions for the installation.
        MCB Camp Pendleton is participating in the South Coast Conservation
    Forum, a group whose goal is to acquire lands that will be set aside to
    protect as many of the 50 listed species in the local Southern
    California area as possible. MCB Camp Lejeune, North Carolina is a
    member of the Onslow Bight Forum, a group dedicated to sharing
    information and discussing potential buffer land partnering
    opportunities in coastal North Carolina.
        The Marine Corps recognized that evidence of negative encroachment
    impacts, though persuasive, were largely anecdotal. Consequently, the
    Marine Corps set out to establish quantitative data regarding this
    issue. Selecting MCB Camp Pendleton as the subject of the study, we
    examined encroachment impacts on the capability of the installation to
    support unit operational readiness requirements for a Marine Air Ground
    Task Force. Study results found that combat arms elements were able to
    accomplish only 69 percent of established standards for non-firing
    field training while conducting an amphibious operation at Camp
    Pendleton. A second phase of this study is on the verge of completion.
    A final report of some 760 tasks is due to the Commanding General, MCB
    Camp Pendleton this month. Initial results from the final report's
    findings are consistent with those of the preliminary assessment. On
    average, the units evaluated were able to complete their required tasks
    to just below 70 percent of the established standard, while conducting
    an amphibious operation at Camp Pendleton. Endangered species were the
    largest contributing encroachment factor in this study. These findings
    reinforce that for the Marine Corps, endangered species issues are at
    the forefront of the Service encroachment debate.
        As a necessary follow-on effort to the Camp Pendleton study, a
    Headquarters Marine Corps Range Management System (RMS) has been
    funded, including monies programmed through fiscal year 2004, to build
    a Corps-wide ability to relate training standards to ranges. Intent is
    to have the RMS in place within the next 18 months. RMS will have broad
    utilization from the unit through institutional level. This system is
    envisioned to be able to plan and develop training, schedule ranges and
    training areas, perform training cost/benefit analysis, and very
    importantly, measure the effects of encroachment on our installations
    ability to support unit operational readiness requirements.
        To conclude, the Marine Corps needs solutions as outlined in the
    RRPI, embedded in law, that requires consideration, accommodation, and
    protection of lands used for military training and operations. RRPI
    passage, including the provision that addresses critical habitat
    designation, has direct national security implications, and is a Marine
    Corps priority.
        General Jumper. The Air Force is also greatly concerned with the
    increasing impact encroachment is having on our operations and
    training. The Air Force has made it a priority to define and quantify
    the resources needed to support our mission requirements and to measure
    and communicate the impacts of encroachment on mission readiness. The
    Air Force has a four-prong strategy to address encroachment issues:

        (1) Identify and quantify the resource base needed to perform the
    AF mission, and quantify the readiness impairments resulting from
    resource denial (encroachment). To accomplish this, the Air Force is
    developing the Resource Capability Model (RCM) that will more precisely
    identify natural, physical, and statutorily controlled resources needed
    to conduct readiness activities to better inform decisionmakers both
    within the Air Force and among our community and regulatory partners.
        (2) Continue to institute dialogue with other Federal resource
    management agencies (such as the Department of the Interior,
    Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Commerce) to develop
    regulatory or administrative improvements that can relieve military
    resource encroachment.
        (3) Enhance outreach and communications with States, local
    governments, and interested organizations regarding how unintended
    consequences of resource management programs can impair military
    readiness.
        (4) Explore the possible need for statutory modifications to
    prevent unintended impacts to military readiness from resource denial
    or degradation. One such effort to obtain statutory modifications is to
    support the RRPI. It is a legislative proposal that will provide the
    needed clarification to specific environmental statutes in order to
    protect access to our training resources while continuing to protect
    the environment. Those specific statutes include the Endangered Species
    Act, the Clean Air Act, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, the
    Comprehensive Environmental Response, the Compensation and Liability
    Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
        More specifically, the Air Force is conducting mitigation measures
    to address encroachment issues that impact our operations. For example,
    at the Barry M. Goldwater Range, the Air Force routinely monitors
    target areas for Sonoran Pronghorn movements and will divert or cancel
    live missions projected near Pronghorn areas. At Eglin AFB, we
    electronically tag and track endangered Gulf Sturgeon to ensure they
    are not impacted by our operations. At Nellis AFB, the Air Force is
    acquiring 417 acres on the north departure zone due to urban
    encroachment off of the southern departure zone.
        Through the application of mitigation measures, together with our
    strategic four-prong approach which includes the provisions of the
    RRPI, the Air Force will continue to fulfill its dual mission of
    protecting the lives and well-being of our citizens and to protect the
    environment.

                                 TRANSFORMATION

        19. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, when transformation was first discussed, we talked
    about a revolution in military affairs, and ``skipping a generation of
    technology.'' We talked about taking advantage of emerging technology
    to decrease the size of our military forces while increasing their
    mobility and lethality. Kenneth J. Krieg, Special Assistant to the
    Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, recently came over to brief
    our staffs on the current status of transformation. His briefing had
    little to do with warfighting. I would characterize his briefing as
    more of a major reform of DOD bureaucracy. When Dov Zakheim, Under
    Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) came to the Hill and briefed this
    year's budget, he talked at length about what a transformational budget
    this is. Yet it is very telling that in your R&D budget, while there is
    $870 million for the development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
    there is $5.5 billion for continued development for three short range
    fighter programs, all three of which were considered to be candidates
    for the chopping block 2 years ago to provide money for
    transformational programs and technologies. What has happened to
    transformation?
        General Shinseki. The Army is firmly committed to its
    transformation efforts. In this President's budget and its associated
    Future Year Defense Plan, the Army has generated approximately $22
    billion of savings by terminating 24 systems ($13.9 billion) and
    reducing or restructuring an additional 24 ($8.6 billion) in order to
    fund transformation and other higher priority programs. The Army
    reinvested these savings into: Future Combat System ($13.5 billion),
    Precision Munitions ($3.2 billion), Sensor and Communications ($2.3
    billion), Science & Technology ($1.1 billion), Missile and Air Defense
    ($1.1 billion), and other smaller high priority systems.
        Admiral Clark. Transformation remains embedded in everything we do,
    and the Navy is committed to what we see as joint transformation at the
    Service level. To this end, transformation is about more than investing
    in new technologies, although that is certainly an important part of
    it. It is also about developing new operational concepts such as the
    Global Concepts of Operations; new processes such as Sea Warrior, Sea
    Trial and Sea Enterprise; and new organizations such as Navy-Marine
    Corp Tactical Aviation Integration, all of which I described in my
    testimony. These initiatives are in important ways about maximizing the
    effectiveness of the capital assets in which we have already invested.
        Transformation is also about investing in programs that will result
    in major increases in warfighting effectiveness, including the next-
    generation aircraft carrier (CVN-21), the transformational destroyer
    (DD(X)) and LCS, the SSGN, the Joint Strike Fighter, and the Advanced
    Hawkeye (E-2C RMP) Upgrade Program. At the same time, not all of our
    investments are for new things. Service life extensions, product
    improvements, and modifications to current equipment may offer
    significant future returns on investment, such as the cruiser
    conversion plan. Other modernization programs are not transformational
    by themselves, but are necessary to provide the supporting structure to
    deliver new transformational initiatives.
        General Hagee. Transformation is not merely about ``skipping a
    generation of technology'' or developing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
    other future technologies. Transformation is also about developing new
    operational concepts, organizational constructs, and business reforms
    that will enable us to realize our vision of future warfighting. While
    future technologies play some part in achieving these transformational
    capabilities, many of the currently existing or planned programs and
    technologies also support the transformation of the Marine Corps.
    Indeed, if we can achieve a transformational capability through changes
    in our organizations or operating concepts, then we may be able to
    reallocate some of those savings to develop capabilities that can only
    be realized through future technologies. Many of the existing or
    planned programs are not, of themselves, transformational. But,
    enhancements in their reliability, availability, and maintainability
    over previous systems will allow us to pursue that next generation of
    technology without sacrificing the warfighting capabilities of today.
    Regardless, transformation should only be judged by the improvements in
    the overall capabilities of the Nation's warfighters.
        General Jumper. Senator, transformation is alive and well in the
    Air Force. We are investing more than $95 billion over the FYDP in
    transformational capabilities. These capabilities are provided by a
    variety of programs and initiatives, including the F/A-22 Raptor and F-
    35 Joint Strike Fighter programs you referred to, but not limited to
    them. Transformation as we see it is not just about new programs, but
    about exploiting new approaches to the operational concepts and
    organizational structures we develop for the employment of both new and
    existing technologies. Further, the AF is not transforming in a
    vacuum--the unique air and space capabilities we provide are just one
    part of an integrated joint, interagency, and coalition team. Ensuring
    that the entire team is equipped with complementary and synergistic
    capabilities and platforms is important as we transform the Air Force.
        It is easy to fall into the trap of focusing on a particular system
    when discussing transformation. Truth is that the transformed Joint
    Forces will be composed of a ``system of systems'' connected through
    operating concepts and organizational constructs. Those forces will be
    more network-centric, less platform-centric, and able to better conduct
    effects-based operations by increasing information sharing.
        They will have C\4\ISR capabilities that provide a joint common
    relevant operational situational awareness of the battlespace, rapid
    and robust sensor-to-shooter  targeting, reachback and other necessary
    prerequisites for network-centric warfare. They will do it with
    integrated Air Force capabilities and systems we are developing and
    investing in now--including the Space Based Radar, the Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency satellite constellation, laser-based
    communications, the Distributed Common Ground System, and Global
    Positioning System Blocks IIF & III. They will do it by bringing
    together these capabilities, along with the F/A-22 and F-35, to provide
    an overwhelming ability to see, reach out, and touch any possible
    adversary with the right tool to achieve the intended effect.
        To more directly address your comments about the short-range
    fighter programs we're pursuing, I'd like to expand on some of the
    transformational capabilities the F/A-22 will bring to the United
    States. The Raptor combines air dominance, SEAD/DEAD (suppression/
    destruction of enemy air defenses), and precision attack capabilities
    in one platform. Its stealth, supercruise, maneuverability, and
    integrated avionics will allow us to overcome night-operating
    limitations in heavily defended areas, and bring persistent stealth to
    the battlespace. Our warfighting commanders will have a greatly
    enhanced ability to overcome anti-access environments, to ``kick down
    the door'' to clear the way for follow-on forces and missions.
        Complementing the F/A-22's superior air dominance and ground attack
    ``kick down the door'' capability, the F-35 provides persistent,
    follow-on ground attack. It will give our joint and allied air forces a
    greatly improved stealth platform with enhanced strike capabilities at
    a lower cost by capitalizing on joint investments by the Air Force,
    Navy, Marine Corps, and allies. In addition to reduced procurement
    costs, the F-35 will also be cheaper to maintain and operate. The F-35
    Joint Strike Fighter is the ideal weapons platform to replace our aging
    strike fighters.
        Finally, the Air Force is fully committed to capitalizing on the
    warfighting capabilities inherent with UAVs. From a historical
    perspective, we are in a ``Billy Mitchell era'' with regard to UAV
    development. The recently completed Defense Science Board study of UAVs
    noted that the loss rates of existing UAVs are over 50 times higher
    than for existing manned platforms. They also reported that these UAVs
    can cost over $40 million each. Our R&D investment of $870 million for
    UAVs is thus sizeable given the maturity of their development. They,
    therefore, require a more substantial investment to successfully
    transition these programs to production and deployment. The differences
    you see in our R&D investment is more a factor of the development
    maturity of the programs than any lack of commitment for UAVs. As the
    development of UAVs matures, our investment will increase accordingly.

        20. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, why are we now allowing evolutionary, traditional
    platforms to be labeled transformational?
        General Shinseki. Army transformation consists of three primary
    vectors--the current Legacy Force, the Stryker Brigades, and the
    Objective Force. Over the last 3 years, the Army has undertaken
    transforming itself into a force that is more strategically responsive
    and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations.
    While Army transformation encompasses these three vectors, the Army has
    worked in concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense as to
    which systems are considered transformational. The Army has 19 systems
    recognized by the Department as transformational, and they include the
    Future Combat Systems, the Warfighter Information Network Tactical,
    Comanche, and the Joint Tactical Radio System. Current Army platforms
    such as the Apache, Abrams, and Bradley while crucial to the Army's
    transformation efforts, have not been classified as transformational.
        Admiral Clark. The President's stated goal is to `skip a
    generation' of technology and accelerate transformational technologies.
    For example, aircraft carriers are indeed a `traditional platform,'
    however, in CVN-21 we have leapt from the CVN(X) development plan into
    CVN-21 within about the same timeline. The transformational
    technologies include a new electrical generation and distribution
    system, improved flight deck design with Electromagnetic Aircraft
    Launching System, Advanced Arresting Gear, improved sortie generation,
    enhanced survivability, reduced manning, and incorporation of a
    flexible infrastructure that will allow the insertion of new
    capabilities as they evolve.
        General Hagee. Platforms themselves should not be viewed as
    traditional or transformational. Instead, the innovative and relevant
    capabilities that these platforms help support better demonstrate the
    transformation of our force. The new operational concepts we develop
    first describe our vision of future warfighting, and indicate the
    capabilities that will be required to achieve this vision. Some of
    these capabilities can then be achieved only through the employment of
    leap-ahead technologies and with the development of new platforms, such
    as the V-22 Osprey. Often, however, these capabilities will rely
    equally on platforms already on hand--for mobility, fire support,
    combat service, or communications, for example. In fact, we
    intentionally leverage these investments, in both dollars and training,
    whenever possible to achieve new capabilities as efficiently as
    possible. I think it is more useful to evaluate our transformation
    based on the new or dramatically improved capabilities we provide to
    joint warfighters, rather than upon an appraisal of any individual
    platform.
        General Jumper. We primarily judge the transformational qualities
    of our platforms based on whether the platform provides a significant
    improvement to our joint warfighting capabilities that enable new
    concepts for military operations. For instances that allow the
    measurement of warfighting capability, ``significant improvement'' is
    usually interpreted to mean a near order of magnitude improvement in
    our warfighting capability. Another factor that contributes to our
    assessment is the contribution of our platforms to Secretary Rumsfeld's
    ``Critical Operational Goals of Transformation.'' If our platforms
    provide a substantial contribution towards the satisfaction of these
    goals, it may be labeled transformational.
        Not all of our platforms contribute to our transformation through
    the implementation of new technologies. Some platforms become
    transformational through use of existing technologies in new innovative
    ways to significantly improve our warfighting capabilities. There is no
    time element associated with our criteria. We judge our platforms based
    on their contribution to our warfighting capabilities. Consequently, it
    is entirely consistent with our viewpoint to have platforms that
    preceded ``transformation'' as a DOD initiative to be labeled
    transformational.

        21. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, what time line are we looking at for OSD's desired
    bureaucratic reforms to actually have an impact on the battlefield for
    our warfighters?
        General Shinseki. On the DOD level, it is my understanding that
    many of the proposed bureaucratic reforms require congressional action
    and assistance in order to begin implementation, and will be forwarded
    to Congress as part of a comprehensive transformation package.
        Speaking from the Army's perspective, we have ongoing and emerging
    efforts to identify and institute changes to our internal business
    processes. The primary focus of our business process reforms has been
    two-fold: free up resources available for higher priority programs, and
    streamline processes and procedures to use our soldiers' and civilians'
    time more efficiently. A few of these reforms will have near-term
    impacts (within 1 year) in terms of freeing up personnel resources for
    other activities or streamlining processes, but the majority take a
    longer time to implement.
        The Army's current internal business reform process, known as the
    Army Business Initiative Council (Army BIC), has focused the majority
    of its efforts on identifying and implementing mid-level improvements
    intended to produce near-term savings and efficiencies. To date,
    Secretary White, as part of the Army BIC process, has approved 53
    initiatives. Some of those initiatives can be implemented simply by
    changing old and outdated regulations and policies. Others require the
    assistance of Congress to change statutory law.
        One example of an initiative that has been approved by the BIC for
    action, and championed by the Army, was recently forwarded to this
    committee as part of the proposed National Defense Authorization Act
    for Fiscal Year 2004. The initiative will allow the Army and the other
    Services to get out of the business of purchasing, administering, and
    paying for government cellular phones and is intended to save funding
    and free up manpower for other, more important tasks. Instead, for
    those with a validated government need for cellular phone use, we would
    instead use the authority being sought from your committee to provide
    them with a flat-rate stipend to use their personal phone for
    government business.
        Another initiative approved for implementation within the Army is
    to update the Common Tables of Allowance, which will help ensure
    equipment authorizations for our combat units and more accurately
    reflect their current requirements, and thus make them better prepared
    to carry out their combat mission when called upon to do so.
        The above initiative is more representative of the type of
    initiatives approved by the Army BIC; less than 20 percent of all
    approved Army BIC initiatives require congressional action for
    implementation. However, we do look forward to working with your
    committee on those Army BIC initiatives which require congressional
    assistance in the near future.
        Admiral Clark. Secretary Rumsfeld is pursuing a number of
    initiatives. I believe some of them will have immediate impact and some
    will take longer to mature, but in the end we will be a more
    streamlined, agile Department.
        General Hagee. The Secretary of Defense's Transformation Planning
    Guidance provides a strategy and timeline for the development and
    fielding of new capabilities for our joint warfighters. Within the next
    2-3 years, we can expect to see transformational changes to the
    interoperability of our forces, especially in terms of joint planning
    and communications, by taking into account lessons learned from joint
    training and ongoing operations, as well as the results from advanced
    technology demonstrations and experimentation. During the next decade,
    our ongoing efforts to develop new joint operational concepts will
    begin to promote the true integration of the various capabilities the
    Services provide as we work to meet the six operational goals
    established in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Finally, the
    Chairman's Joint Vision articulates our far-term view of future
    operations and describes the capabilities that will reach the field in
    15 to 20 years. I believe that this consistent emphasis on developing
    capabilities that are ``born-joint'' for the near-, mid-, and far-term
    will fundamentally change our acquisition, training, and planning
    processes, and truly transform the way the way we operate on tomorrow's
    battlefield.
        General Jumper. Our new mind set for capabilities development,
    which we call ``Agile Acquisition,'' is beginning to take hold and pay
    dividends. Over the past 18 months we have proven to ourselves that we
    can, in fact, reform our processes and deliver new capabilities to the
    warfighter faster. For wartime specific requirements we use the Rapid
    Response Process (RRP). RRP delivers approval to proceed with material
    solutions submitted by MAJCOM combatant commanders to CSAF within 19
    days. Success to date--the acquisition and fielding of 33 urgent Combat
    Mission Need Statements valued in excess of $308 million across 12
    platforms. Outside of wartime specific requirements, we have also
    accelerated some warfighter acquisition initiatives from 3 years to
    less than 1 year for contract award. One such example is the Joint
    Warning and Reporting Network for detecting, analyzing, and warning of
    potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
    hazards.
        The challenge now is to take these successes and institutionalize
    them so that they become the way we do business. The AF is working with
    OSD to ensure that all policies (both OSD and AF) foster collaboration,
    initiative, trust, and partnering. All of this is fixed on the twin
    goals of Agile Acquisition: reduced cycle time and increased
    credibility. Additionally, we are aggressively developing training
    programs to not only teach people new processes, but also to change the
    work culture to one that accepts the urgency of Agile Acquisition.

                                  ``GO PILLS''

        22. Senator McCain. General Jumper, there have been reports in the
    press regarding an Air Force policy which authorizes Air Force pilots
    to take amphetamines called ``go pills'' as a ``fatigue-management
    tool''. The reports I saw described that Air Force tactical aviation
    pilots, not just bomber crews, use the ``go pills'' during combat air
    patrol (CAP) missions.
        Can you describe to me why does the Air Force finds it necessary to
    use amphetamines as a fatigue-management tool and Navy and Marine Corps
    pilots do not use it, but are subjected to similar combat air patrol
    missions? I believe some of our citizens may find it disconcerting to
    learn that Air Force combat air patrols over cities since September 11
    were flown by Air Force pilots using amphetamines.
        General Jumper. I can't speak for the Navy or Marine Corps, but
    I'll be happy to answer your concerns about the Air Force's policy for
    use of ``go pills'' as a fatigue-management tool. It is part of a
    comprehensive program that includes strict usage control and prefers
    fatigue management over pharmacological use. The policy grew out of a
    need to be able to sustain operations on long-duration missions, often
    at night. From 1972 to 1995 the Air Force sustained 96 serious mishaps
    in which fatigue was cited as a factor; there were no mishaps in which
    the use of stimulants was a factor.
        The Air Force conducted a comprehensive 18-month review on the
    effects of the medication and concluded that the pills provide an extra
    margin of safety by helping aircrews counter fatigue. Use of the pills
    is completely voluntary at the discretion of the aircrew, and use is
    approved in each case in writing by commanders, normally for missions
    over 8 hours for fighter aircraft or 12 hours for bombers. Individuals
    are informed that ``go pills should only be used in conjunction with
    fatigue-management tools or after all fatigue-management tools have
    been exhausted.''

                               RESERVE COMPONENT

        23. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, in your statement you talk
    about the importance of the Reserve component in supporting defense
    requirements. The significant number of Reserve personnel activated
    since September 11 clearly validates your comments. As you stated,
    today more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve component
    (RC). The Secretary of Defense has commented that there are functions
    and capabilities now residing only in the RC that need to exist in our
    Active-Duty Forces. I see this as another indication of the need to
    increase your end strength. Please explain how you intend to migrate
    capabilities back in to the active component (AC) under current end
    strength limitations.
        General Shinseki. While the congressionally-mandated fiscal year
    2002 active Army end strength was 480,000, the Army exceeded this end
    strength target, as well as the budgeted average strength of 474,000
    man-years. The Army finished fiscal year 2002 with an end strength of
    486,543 (78,158 officers, 404,305 enlisted, and 4,080 cadets). The Army
    was allowed to exceed the end strength targets only because of the 2
    percent flex authorized by Congress. The Army will continue to utilize
    this flex and continue to use RC forces to meet current and emerging
    requirements for the global war on terrorism and the new strategic
    environment.
        The Army's AC and RC force mix is the result of deliberate actions
    to balance risks and priorities in light of operational requirements as
    well as resource constraints. The Army continues to adjust its force
    structure based on the ``1-4-2-1'' force-sizing construct. The Army's
    force mix is designed to support the geographic combatant commander's
    requirements and is determined using the Total Army Analysis (TAA)
    process. To stay within constant end strength levels, adding
    capabilities to the Active Force will require the transfer of some
    mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve Force. A number of
    options exist to reduce risk including the conversion of lower demand
    structure inside the Active Force; converting key capabilities held in
    the RC, but needed intermittently; and changes in Reserve personnel
    management to increase access by enhancing volunteerism and diminishing
    involuntary mobilization.
        Additionally, for the Program Objective Memorandum 2004-2009, over
    19,500 spaces were programmed for change within the Active, Guard, and
    Reserve Force structure. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has activated
    or has programmed to activate through fiscal year 2009, a total of 68
    active, 102 National Guard, and 85 Reserve units that fall into these
    high-demand categories: aviation, chemical, civil affairs/psychological
    operations, and military police. The enhanced force capabilities
    address the most urgent needs.
        Currently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction
    with the Joint Staff has undertaken a study to improve operational
    availability of all military forces. As part of this study, the AC/RC
    mix is being studied in the context of short-notice, short-duration
    major combat operations. This study is incomplete and will be continued
    as part of Defense planning for fiscal year 2005 to determine any
    recommended force structure changes.

        24. Senator McCain. General Shinseki, I noted that the Army intends
    to invest nearly $700 million over the next 6 years to modernize key
    training ranges, such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,
    the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack
    Center near Gila Bend. What improvements will these funds be directed
    towards?
        General Shinseki. The Combat Training Center (CTC) modernization
    program modernizes the maneuver CTCs, the National Training Center
    (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Combat Maneuver
    Training Center, and establishes the Deep Attack Center of Excellence.
    This allows the CTC program to develop its leaders, keep pace with Army
    transformation, provide high-quality, full-spectrum training
    operations, and realistic joint and combined arms training. During the
    next 6 years, the Army will invest nearly $700 million to modernize and
    establish these training centers. The $700 million provides for
    opposing forces surrogate vehicles, surrogate tank vehicles, common
    training instrumentation architecture, objective instrumentation
    systems, and NTC military operations on urbanized terrain.
        The Deep Attack Center of Excellence is designed for corps level
    attack aviation training with Air Force integration. It will provide a
    rigorous, integrated, live CTC-type collective training experience for
    corps and divisional attack battalions, other service attack systems,
    and respective enabling command, control, and intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance elements along with other combined
    arms systems in a joint environment.

                                SHIP RETIREMENTS

        25. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, the President's budget includes
    the retirement of the Spruance-class destroyers. I have two concerns
    here. First, today's Navy routinely operates in littoral waters
    increasingly populated by a very capable diesel submarine threat, yet
    we are doing away with a class of ships designed to counter that
    threat. Second, these destroyers have been equipped, at significant
    cost, to be able to carry Tomahawk missiles. What is the Navy doing to
    manage the loss of both a key antisubmarine warfare (ASW) asset and a
    capable strike platform?
        Admiral Clark. The Spruance-class was designed to counter the
    Soviet Navy's blue water nuclear submarine threat, which we no longer
    face. Current Navy warfighting analysis indicates decommissioning this
    class of ship does not affect our ability to prosecute diesel
    submarines in the littoral. Our development of LCS and its capabilities
    inherent in the antisubmarine warfare mission module will provide us a
    new and better capability to prosecute diesel submarines at a lower
    cost.
        A key issue for littoral ASW is the ability to operate a
    helicopter. The number of available helo spots exceeds the inventory of
    helicopters available in the fleet, even with the accelerated
    decommissioning of the Spruance-class.
        Available verticle launch system (VLS) cells lost by the
    decommissioning of the Spruance-class are gained back by the
    commissionings of DDG-51 Flight IIA destroyers. These ships will
    provide substantially more combat capability in every warfare area and
    96 VLS cells compared to the 61 on Spruance-class ships. The number of
    VLS cells in the fleet by fiscal year 2004 is greater than in fiscal
    year 2003 even with the decommissionings, and rises steadily
    thereafter.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Fiscal Year
             Weapon Systems         --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total VLS Cells................    6,869    7,131    6,870    6,949    6,993    7,316  \1\ 7,8    8,316    8,508
                                                                                                16
    Total Helo Spots \2\...........      164      166      152      153      152      158      166      170     174
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ SSGN IOC
    \2\ Helo Spots exceed LAMPS inventory

        26. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, you state that we currently have
    151 ships deployed. How can you maintain that OPTEMPO, and stay within
    PERSTEMPO while retiring these ships? Would it not make more sense to
    hold off retiring these ships until after world wide requirements have
    dropped off? Perhaps sometime after the Iraq situation has been
    resolved?
        Admiral Clark. Our Navy is at the highest state of readiness that
    I've ever witnessed in my career. This is duel in no small part, to the
    tradeoffs we have made between quantity and capability--including the
    accelerated retirement of some of our ships. Last year, I promised we
    would sharpen our focus on our force structure in the years ahead--to
    buy the ships, aircraft, and the capabilities needed for tomorrow's
    Navy while at the same time, maintaining our ability to meet
    operational requirements. As a result, we took a hard look at the ways
    we could balance these priorities and our discretionary investments to
    both satisfy the near-term operational risks and prepare for the long-
    term risks of an uncertain future. We identified several aging, legacy
    systems with limited growth potential and high operating and support
    costs, and ultimately, accelerated the retirement of 11 ships and 70
    aircraft, divested more than 50 systems and eliminated thousands of
    legacy IT applications. These initiatives result in an acceptable
    operational risk in the near term because of our emphasis on sustaining
    our current readiness gains. Equally important these difficult
    decisions yielded $1.9 billion for reinvestment and will do much to
    help reduce our future risk.

                                  ENVIRONMENT

        27. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, I am aware of a number of
    environmental issues that are in the works on the Commerce Committee
    that have military implications. Would you elaborate on some of the
    specific issues surrounding the Marine Mammal Protection Act and how
    they are impacting naval readiness?
        Admiral Clark. The definition of the term ``harassment'' of marine
    mammals in the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) is a source of
    confusion because the definition is tied to vague and ambiguous terms
    such as ``annoyance'' and ``potential to disturb.'' These terms apply
    to even the slightest changes in marine mammal behavior and are ripe
    for litigation that leads to increased restrictions on training and
    testing.
        In November 2002, a Federal District Court judge in San Francisco
    presiding over a case brought by special interest groups alleging
    violation of the MMPA, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and
    the Endangered Species Act (ESA) issued a court order that strictly
    limits employment of the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low
    Frequency Active (SURTASS LFA) sonar system. This advanced system is
    designed to detect and track the growing number of quiet diesel
    submarines possessed by nations which could threaten our vital national
    security. After highlighting what the court viewed as flaws in
    regulatory agency implementation of the MMPA and ESA, and despite the
    Navy's unprecedented efforts to comply with NEPA, the court issued a
    preliminary injunction restricting Navy's deployment of SURTASS LFA to
    only a small area in the Western Pacific. As a result of the inherent
    structural flaws in the laws themselves as applied to worldwide
    military readiness activities, the Navy now finds the deployment and
    operation of one of our most important national security assets
    constrained by a Federal Court as a result of litigation brought by
    special interest groups that is specifically designed to deny the Navy
    use of the system. Future testing and employment of SURTASS LFA (and
    potentially other Navy training and testing programs) are in jeopardy
    because of flaws in the MMPA, which was originally enacted to protect
    whales from commercial exploitation and to prevent dolphins and other
    marine mammals from accidental death or injury during commercial
    fishing operations.
        The submarine threat today is real and in some ways has become more
    challenging than during the Cold War. Many nations are capable of
    employing quiet-diesel submarines to deny access or significantly delay
    execution of joint and coalition operations in support of our vital
    interests. Of the approximately 500 non-U.S. submarines in the world,
    almost half that number are operated by non-allied nations. Of greatest
    concern are the new ultra-quiet diesel-electric submarines armed with
    deadly torpedoes and cruise missiles being produced or acquired by the
    People's Republic of China, Iran, and North Korea. These diesel
    submarines are very difficult to detect outside the range at which they
    can launch attacks against U.S. and allied ships using passive sonar
    systems. Active systems like SURTASS LFA, when used in conjunction with
    other antisubmarine sensor and weapons systems, are necessary to
    detect, locate, and destroy or avoid hostile submarines before they
    close within range of our forces.
        While recognizing the national security need for SURTASS LFA,
    nevertheless, the Federal District Court judge deciding the LFA lawsuit
    was constrained by the broad language of the MMPA, which was not
    drafted with application to military readiness activities in mind.
    Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' failure to produce scientific evidence
    contradicting the independent scientific research sponsored by the Navy
    in coordination with numerous outside experts that the system could be
    operated with negligible harm to marine mammals, the court opined that
    Navy training must be restricted. In reaching this conclusion, the
    court noted that under the definition of harassment, the phrase
    ``potential to disturb'' hinged on the word ``potential'' and extended
    to individual animals. Quoting from the opinion, the judge said, ``In
    fact, by focusing on potential harassment, the statute appears to
    consider all the animals in a population to be harassed if there is the
    potential for the act to disturb the behavior patterns of the most
    sensitive individual in the group.'' (Emphasis added.) Interpreting the
    law this broadly would require authorization (permits) for harassment
    of potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of marine mammals based on
    the benign behavioral responses of one or two of the most sensitive
    animals.
        Highlighting how difficult it would be to apply the MMPA to
    worldwide military readiness activities under such a broad
    interpretation of harassment, the court also pointed out that a
    separate structural flaw in the MMPA limits permits for harassment to
    no more than a ``small number'' of marine mammals. Overturning the
    regulatory agency's decades-old interpretation of the MMPA, the court
    also said that the ``small number'' of animals affected cannot be
    defined in terms of whether there would be negligible impact on the
    species, but rather is an absolute number that must be determined to be
    ``small.'' The court's far-reaching opinion underscores shortcomings in
    the MMPA, which apply to any worldwide military readiness activity, or
    any grouping of military training activities that might be submitted
    for an overall review of impact on the environment.
        Other examples of how the MMPA affects testing and training follow:

            Navy Research: During the last 6 years of Navy research on how
            to counter mines and detect submarines in shallow water, over
            78 percent of the tests have been delayed, scaled back, or
            cancelled due to the impact of environmental regulations.
            Shallow Water Training Range: Lack of clarity in the definition
            of ``harassment'' is delaying the establishment of shallow
            water training ranges to prepare sailors for the Navy's most
            difficult battlefield--shallow water antisubmarine warfare.

                     Navy's fleet exercises face severe limitations
                    to avoid potential ``harassment'' of marine mammals.
                     Exercises to protect ships from submarines and
                    mines in narrow, shallow straits, such as the Strait of
                    Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, have been moved to less
                    realistic conditions in deep water.
                     Some exercises forced to adopt aerial and
                    other visual surveys for sea turtles and marine mammals
                    can only be done in daylight. The mitigation denies the
                    ability to train at night.

        To address these issues, I ask for your consideration of the
    narrowly focused amendments to the MMPA proposed by DOD in the National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, which has now been
    transmitted by the President to Congress. Our proposal to clarify the
    definition of ``harassment'' and allow authorization of activities
    under the MMPA that would have a ``negligible'' impact on a stock or
    species, and follow recommendations made in a report to Congress by the
    National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences in
    2000. According to the NRC, if the current definition of Level B
    harassment (detectable changes in behavior) were applied to commercial
    shipping and recreational boating as strenuously as it is applied to
    scientific and naval activities, the result would be crippling
    regulation of nearly every motorized vessel operating in U.S. waters.
        The DOD proposed amendment to the MMPA will ensure protection of
    marine mammals while allowing sufficient flexibility to conduct
    training and other operations essential to national security. Left
    unchanged, the MMPA will continue to be the subject of litigation
    brought by special interest groups and could lead to restrictions on
    other sonar systems in use by the fleet for over 30 years.

                                AVIATION SAFETY

        28. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark, an article in the November 4,
    2002 Defense News delineated a key and expanding roll for rotary wind
    aircraft in battle group operations as you invest in MH-60R and MH-60S
    helicopters. I was surprised to learn that the Navy has elected not to
    include the Cockpit Air Bag System (CABS) crash-activated, inflatable
    protection system in these new airframes.  Analysis of crash date shows
    that airbags will save one aviator of every three that is killed in
    what are considered survivable crash sequences. The Army is currently
    equipping its rotary fleet with CABS, why has the Navy elected to
    forego this readily available means of protecting the aircraft's most
    valuable asset?
        Admiral Clark. The U.S. Navy, through Naval Air Systems Command
    engineering processes, has a hazard analysis and risk management
    program, which it applies to all type/model/series of Navy and Marine
    Corps aircraft. The Navy recognizes the benefits of CABS and has
    included it in both the MH-60S and MH-60R Operational Requirements
    Documents (ORD) as elements of the block upgrade program. Through the
    evolutionary acquisition process, these block upgrades will improve
    aircrew survivability and protect our most valuable assets.

                    LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) PROCUREMENT

        29. Senator McCain. Admiral Clark and General Jumper, last year the
    Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was not in the fiscal year 2003 proposed
    budget. I am impressed that you have been able to accelerate
    development and construction of Littoral Combat Ships in this year's
    budget, and your 6-year funding plan, including beginning construction
    next year. How have you been able to do this without leasing? As I
    understand it, the basis for why the Air Force needs to lease KC-767
    tankers is because our acquisition process is too slow and laborious.
    General Jumper, perhaps your acquisition people need to speak with
    Admiral Clark's. Please comment.
        Admiral Clark. LCS brings a new approach to ship development. The
    LCS acquisition, a streamlined derivative of the traditional approach,
    focuses principally on developing a ship to accommodate modular combat
    systems. These combat systems modules will be developed separately from
    ship construction. In line with recent DOD initiatives to streamline
    and tailor the acquisition process, the Navy has planned for LCS to
    begin construction no later than fiscal year 2005. LCS program
    initiation in fiscal year 2003 affords an opportunity to employ
    innovative spiral development and acquisition methods from the keel up.
    Lessons learned from Navy experimentation with small high-speed ships
    and innovative hull forms such as Hybrid Deep Vee Demonstrator (HDV(D)-
    100), High Speed Vessel (HSV), Coastal Waters Interdiction Platform
    (CWIP), TRITON, and SLICE has proven invaluable in reducing program
    risk. Collaboration between the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater
    program and with allied nations facilitates cost effective development
    and procurement of the LCS and its associated mission capability
    modules.
        Early LCS flights will heavily leverage existing technologies and
    ship designs, thereby accelerating the timeline for requirements
    development and acquisition, which will keep delivery times for LCS
    significantly shorter than traditional ship programs.
        General Jumper. Sir, the Littoral Combat Ship will be a great asset
    to the Navy once it has been designed, built, tested, then inserted
    into the fleet. With this year's proposed budget, the Navy has funded
    their program earlier in the FYDP just as the USAF has accelerated our
    KC-135 Replacement Tanker Program into the FYDP. Both programs should
    deliver their first new systems to the warfighter toward the end of the
    FYDP. Both programs rely upon industry to design and provide suitable
    platforms for the missions. So, in essence, both the Air Force and the
    Navy used similar methods to accelerate both programs a similar amount
    of time.
        However, while the Navy must wait on industry to design and develop
    their new Littoral Combat Ship, the Air Force can immediately leverage
    the commercial 767 Tanker Transport design and development work
    performed by Boeing for the Italian and Japanese Air Forces. Just as
    the Navy has leased ships in the past to deploy combat support quickly,
    the USAF believes that leasing air-refueling tankers is a good approach
    to quickly replace our 43-plus-year-old KC-135E aircraft.
        The KC-767 leasing proposal, if approved by DOD and Congress, will
    have lower upfront costs than a traditional procurement and will field
    67 new KC-767 tankers within the FYDP, compared to one aircraft via
    traditional procurement. In addition, the leased KC-767 program could
    provide the taxpayers with the benefits of immediate high rate
    production, at a lower cost than achievable through a traditional
    approach. These innovations in the acquisition process support our
    Nation's security needs significantly faster, while providing
    responsible stewardship of our taxpayers' dollars.

                          BOEING AND DELTA IV ROCKETS

        30. Senator McCain. General Jumper, an article in the Wall Street
    Journal on February 12, 2003 reported the Air Force will pay the Boeing
    Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation $538 million to keep both
    companies in the rocket-launch business because of the continuing
    downturn in the commercial-satellite market. Is this a Department of
    Defense policy or is Secretary Roche proposing this policy on his own?
        General Jumper. The Air Force and DOD together are committed to
    providing the capability to launch our Nation's national security
    payloads required by today's warfighters. The fiscal year 2004
    President's budget provides funding for assured access initiatives to
    provide that capability.

        31. Senator McCain. General Jumper, attempts in the past to
    artificially keep two defense companies in a particular sector of the
    defense market for the sake of competition has not produced competition
    at all. In fact, there have been many independent reports that no
    efficiencies were ever realized. Does it make sense to try and keep two
    defense companies in the rocket-launch business when there may only be
    enough business for one corporation?
        General Jumper. Although competition is one of the benefits of this
    approach, the overarching need is to assure access to space for
    national security, and to do that we need to have two launch providers
    that can back each other up. When compared to heritage launch systems,
    Air Force estimates show that the EELV program still meets and exceeds
    the 25-percent cost saving goal even after the assured access
    initiatives are considered.

        32. Senator McCain. General Jumper, what other options are you
    examining with regard to this rather questionable policy on the Air
    Force's rocket-launch program?
        General Jumper. We have examined several options for providing
    assured access to space, such as foreign launch providers and greater
    utilization of the space shuttle, and have determined that maintaining
    two competing contractors to provide assured access is the best
    approach to meet the growing warfighter demands of our space assets now
    and in the future.

                               F-15 CLS CONTRACT

        33. Senator McCain. General Jumper, it has recently been brought to
    our attention that the contract for F-15 Contractor Logistic Support
    was awarded to a company whose bid was nearly 50 percent higher than
    the company that currently holds the contract. Rather than stay with
    the L-3 Corporation that has been performing this task in a fully
    satisfactory manner for $68.8 million, the Air Force chose to go with a
    bid by Boeing of $100.2 million. In fact, a recent decision to move the
    facility to St. Louis vice Seymour Johnson AFB will make the price
    difference between the two contract bids greater than $32 million due
    to much higher work rates. Are you aware of this issue? If not, will
    you please look into it and get back to this committee.
        General Jumper. This refers to a contract award that includes the
    acquisition of new F-15 training devices as well as upgrades and
    contractor logistics support for some older devices. The requirement
    under the solicitation was not the same as the previous contract. The
    request for proposal (RFP) was not asking for business as usual;
    therefore, minimally addressing the requirements would likely increase
    perceived risk for implementation of future aircraft modifications and
    upgrades. The RFP clearly stated that award would be made on a best
    value basis, with the combination of evaluation factors other than
    price (technical/management and past performance) being significantly
    more important than cost or price. Boeing's technical proposal received
    high ratings, while the technical proposal of L-3 Communications was
    marginal and had several significant weaknesses. It was the
    determination of the Order Award Authority that the technical
    advantages of Boeing's proposal outweighed the increased cost. This
    decision is consistent with Section M, of the RFP which states that the
    best value decision, ``. . . may result in an award to a higher-rated,
    higher-priced offeror, where the decision is consistent with the
    evaluation factors and the Order Award Authority reasonably determines
    that the technical superiority and/or overall business approach of the
    higher priced offeror outweighs the cost difference.''
        Location of the training system support center (TSSC) at the Boeing
    facility in St. Louis did not increase cost differences between the L-3
    and Boeing offers. The Boeing order includes fixed prices for operation
    of the TSSC.

                          BOEING KC-767 AERIAL TANKER

        34. Senator McCain. General Jumper, I continue to be troubled by
    your Service's push to lease 100 KC-767 tankers under terms that are
    clearly a disservice to the taxpayers of this country. In the context
    of your Service's desire for this lease at any cost, the retirement of
    KC-135s with relatively few flight hours concerns me.
        Just last April at a press briefing with Secretary of Defense
    Rumsfeld, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Myers, stated the
    following about the Air Force KC-135 aerial tanker fleet: ``the fleet
    is relatively healthy. These are older aircraft, but have lots of
    flying hours left on them. They've been re-engined. We are putting new
    avionics in the cockpit. There's been a lot of work done on those
    particular aircraft to keep them modern. . .''
        Let me review some of the highlights of the information that has
    been provided to Congress by independent export, the Office of
    Management and Budget, the General Accounting Office, the Department of
    Defense Inspector General, and the Congressional Budget Office. These
    are not my facts, these are facts reported by these agencies.

        GAO (2002):

             ``The current fleet of KC-135s have between 12,000 to
            14,000 flying hours on them--only 33 percent of the lifetime
            flying hour limit and no KC-135s will meet the limit until
            2040.''
             ``While the KC-135 is an average of 41 years old, its
            airframe hours and cycles are relatively low. With proper
            maintenance and upgrades, we believe the aircraft may be
            sustainable for another 41 years.''
             ``The Boeing Company, manufacturer of the KC-135,
            projected that the aircraft could fly for many years beyond the
            turn of the century, based on average hours flown, and a
            projected utilization of about 300 hours a year per aircraft.''
             ``In fact, when I inquired about the average hours per
            year for KC-135s, GAO said the Air Force reported, ``the KC-135
            fleet is averaging about 300 hours per year,'' including
            Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle data.
             ``The Air Force Mobility Command has higher priorities
            like replacing the C-5A, there is no requirement to begin
            replacing KC-135s before fiscal year 2013.''

        OMB (2002):
             Director Mitch Daniels: ``The current fleet of KC-135s
            is in good condition; there are higher priorities in terms of
            modernization for the Department of Defense''.

        Air Force (2002):
             In the February 2003 issue of Military Magazine, you
            reported that the mission capable rate for KC-135 tankers
            improved 3.7 percent, up to 79.5 percent last year the second
            highest in the Air Force inventory. The B-2 bomber mission
            capable rate by comparison is only 42.1 percent, and that is up
            10.6 percent over the previous year.
             According to the Air Force ``Tanker Requirement Study
            05'', replacing the KC-135 fleet with leased Boeing 767 tankers
            would not solve, and could exacerbate, the shortfalls
            identified in the TRS-05.

        I believe the above information clearly shows that we are
    prematurely retiring flight hour young KC-135s. The fact is there are
    aircraft in the DOD inventory as old as the KC-135s with as much as
    five times the number of flight hours that are still in service and
    will be for some time.
        I would like you to explain why you believe that the KC-135s need
    to be replaced 10 years earlier than the Air Force's most recent study,
    in spite of several independent assessments that we do not need to
    begin replacing the aircraft until 2013, and in fact, the airframes
    will not reach their flight hour limits until after 2040.
        General Jumper. The Air Force has an obligation to spend the
    taxpayer's money wisely, while providing a robust, reliable, and
    flexible air refueling force. Studies, such as the one referenced, are
    intended to provide planning information to senior leaders to allow
    them to make informed decisions rather than dictate a specific way
    ahead. Competing priorities and limited budget demand our leaders make
    choices based on risk. Today, our most pressing tanker risk is a delay
    in the recapitalization process. With over 90 percent of our air
    refueling capability resting on our venerable KC-135 fleet, replacement
    needs to begin as soon as possible. The Air Force simply cannot accept
    the risk of unknown systemic failures that could ground the fleet and
    cripple the global reach of U.S. and coalition forces.
        Every weapons system is unique and comparisons to the KC-135 should
    be taken in proper context. The KC-135 is the oldest combat weapon
    system in the Air Force inventory and particularly susceptible to
    corrosion due to its design and basing history. An abundance of hidden
    joints and layered body skins on the KC-135 provide ample opportunity
    for moisture to accumulate, which has only been exacerbated by extended
    operation in damp and coastal climates.
        Subsequent to April 2002, more about the effects of corrosion were
    learned. We  have also gained an appreciation for how much the
    projected operations and support (O&S) costs for the KC-135 fleet have
    grown since the completion of the Economic Service Life Study (ESLS).
    Originally, the ESLS estimated annual cost would escalate from $2.1
    billion per year to $3.0 billion by 2040. However, 18 months after the
    ESLS completion, we determined the average annual O&S cost estimate
    increased by $250 million over study projections. This equates to an
    11.9 percent annum increase in O&S, the equivalent of the operations
    and maintenance requirements for 62 KC-135s. The updated ESLS data now
    reflects that the annual cost would escalate from $2.2 billion to $3.4
    billion by 2040. While it is true that KC-135s are young in hours
    compared to structural design life, this fact does nothing to protect
    the airframes from the corrosive effects of years of exposure to the
    elements.
        With an average of about 17,000 flight hours versus a design limit
    of about 36,000 hours, you would not expect to see stress-induced metal
    fatigue on KC-135s. In general, that is the case. Instead, we are
    seeing age induced corrosion similar to rust, and cracked hoses and
    wiring, just as you would on a low mileage, 43-year old automobile.
    Repairing and preventing this type of corrosion is both difficult and
    expensive. The Air Force is now in the process of incrementally
    replacing the entire aircraft structure over the next 40 years.
        The combined effects of aging, the surge in demand due to the
    global war on terrorism, and the heightened steady-state stress of a
    post-September 11 world have compelled the Air Force to accelerate
    plans to replace the KC-135. Increasing costs and decreasing
    reliability and maintainability, in light of our future expectations,
    have reached the point where it no longer makes sense to continue
    investing limited resources to keep our oldest and least capable
    tankers flying.
        In summary, the Air Force simply cannot accept the risk of unknown
    systemic failures that could ground the fleet and cripple the global
    reach of U.S. and coalition forces. Today, our most pressing tanker
    risk is a delay in the recapitalization process.

        35. Senator McCain. General Jumper, what programs do you intend to
    shift funds from to enable you to pay for a lease of Boeing 767s in the
    near-term and in the long-term?
        General Jumper. The Air Force is working to identify sources to pay
    for a potential lease. If DOD approves the lease, we will submit the
    sources with reprogramming actions, budget submissions, and budget
    amendments as required.

                           NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

        36. Senator McCain. General Hagee, the retirement of 19 Spruance-
    class destroyers reduces the number of 5-inch guns available for fire
    support missions by 38. This is an area where the Navy has had a
    chronic shortfall in capability since the battleships were retired in
    the early 1990s. What impact on the Marine Corps' ability to conduct
    amphibious operations will this additional reduction in naval guns
    have?
        General Hagee. The Navy's current Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)
    capability lacks sufficient range and lethality to adequately support
    the Marine Corps' concept of Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). Also,
    the fire support system on the Spruance-class destroyers is not capable
    of receiving calls-for-fire via data transmission from the Advanced
    Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). While the Marine Corps
    is at significant risk today in terms of NSFS support for expeditionary
    operations, the retirement of these ships, to be completed by fiscal
    year 2006, will not significantly increase this risk.
        The Navy has already started fielding the 5-inch/62-caliber naval
    gun on newly built Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The Navy is
    scheduled to field the Naval Fires Control System (NFCS) in fiscal year
    2004 to provide the capability to receive and process digital data
    calls for fire, and the 5-inch Extended Range Guided Munition (ERGM)
    will be fielded in fiscal year 2006. The introduction of these systems
    will provide an enhanced capability to provide NSFS support to
    expeditionary forces that does not reside in the current fleet of
    surface combatants.
        The Navy plans to fully meet the Marine Corps' NSFS requirements in
    the far term with the fielding of DD(X). The Marine Corps requires that
    each DD(X) be fielded with two 155-mm Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) and a
    total magazine capacity of at least 900 extended-range munitions. This
    configuration for DD(X) will be sufficient to meet minimum Marine Corps
    NSFS requirements for gun-launched munitions, assuming a total of 24
    DD(X) will be built.

                                    AIRCRAFT

        37. Senator McCain. General Hagee, the V-22 is rapidly approaching
    what is theoretically a final key decision point. The Marine Corps
    demonstrated unprecedented flexibility last year in moving off of ships
    in the Indian Ocean to a base of operations hundreds of miles inland in
    Afghanistan. A force deployment of this type was thought to be beyond
    your current air fleet. Does the success of your operations in
    Afghanistan mitigate the requirement for the V-22?
        General Hagee. The MV-22 remains our number one aviation
    acquisition priority.
        We remain proud of the Marine Corps' contributions in Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF) and our current operations today. These
    successes highlight the Marine Corps' role in national security as a
    truly expeditionary force in readiness.
        These successes were not without risk and limitations. Issues of
    force protection, establishment, and maintaining intermediate support
    bases, limitation in total number of personnel allowed in country,
    fuel, and range limitations, long range MEDEV AC, and our ability to
    conduct ``Be Prepared To'' (BPT) missions highlighted the need to field
    improved systems like the MV-22 to our Fleet Marine Forces.
        The V-22's speed, range, payload, survivability, and self-
    deployability attributes have implications on the strategic,
    operational, and tactical levels. Its use in OEF would have given the
    Joint Task Force commander an increased operational flexibility that
    would have spanned across all warfighting functions. Specifically in
    OEF the MV-22 would have:

            - Minimized risk
            - Increased operational flexibility
            - Provided a responsive sustainment capability
            - Decreased survivability concerns
            - Increased mission success for BPT

        38. Senator McCain. General Hagee, why does the Marine Corps
    continue to invest in its aging Huey fleet instead of upgrading to an
    H-60 variant that would align the Marine Corps with the future Navy
    rotary wing force? This would dramatically streamline training and
    logistical support, and provide commonality of parts support between
    Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps has chosen to remanufacture both
    legacy H-1, the AH-1W, and UH-1N airframes with a focus on commonality
    as a way of reducing the logistical and manpower demands. This decision
    was controversial at Milestone II and remains a point of discussion
    because some feel that a combination of AH-64D Apaches and a variant of
    the H-60 Blackhawk (MH-60S Seahawk Combat Search and Rescue variant)
    with over 1,500 operated by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and
    several other nations, would save money for the government through
    economies of scale in procurement, and shared maintenance and support
    burdens.
        However, repeated independent analysis has revealed that intra-
    service commonality between the Huey and Cobra would yield greater
    benefits in areas of personnel manning requirements and logistics. Most
    recently, an analysis of alternatives for the H-1 upgrades program was
    reviewed and updated by OSD. The conclusion, once again, was that the
    AH-1Z/UH-1Y combination is the most cost effective option that meets
    the Marine Corps recapitalization and warfighting requirements. The
    commonality of 84 percent between the AH-1Z and UH-1Y results in
    significant cost savings, logistics and deployability advantages for
    the Y/Z fleet over the life cycle. All other alternatives considered
    for our attack and utility requirements would adversely impact our
    current manpower force structure and would be cost prohibited in
    procurement and life-cycle support. In order to meet USMC Utility
    Helicopter ORD Thresholds, the MH-60S would require the many additions
    and modifications to include: Digital moving map system, Helmet mounted
    display system, Aircraft Survivability suite (radar and laser
    detection, IR/RF countermeasures), crew served gun system, forward
    firing ordnance (2.75,, rocket) system with pilot sight, UHF DAMA
    SATCOM, FLIR with LDRS, Modifications for ballistic tolerances
    (OBIGGS), cockpit software, and ergonomic fixes.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn

                                      B-1

        39. Senator Cornyn. General Jumper, there is little doubt that the
    B-1 has played an important role in Operation Enduring Freedom. I would
    like to get your thoughts on how the B-1 has performed and how you
    envision the B-1s role in the future?
        General Jumper. The B-1 performed magnificently during Operation
    Enduring Freedom, delivering 39 percent of all total tonnage and 67
    percent of all JDAM dropped in Afghanistan while flying only 35 percent
    of bomber strike sorties and 12 percent of all Air Force sorties.
    Moreover, the B-1 maintained a 78-percent Mission Capable rate while
    deployed. The B-1 will continue to function as the backbone of the
    bomber fleet in direct attack operations conducted in permissive and
    semi-permissive threat environments. A non-permissive threat
    environment will necessitate the use of standoff munitions to ensure
    survivability. Armed with a full complement of 24 long-range,
    precision, stealthy JASSM-ERs, the B-1 provides critical capabilities
    to the Global Strike (GS) CONOPs while providing enhanced key
    capabilities to the Global Response (GR) CONOPs.

                                      V-22

        40. Senator Cornyn. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, I understand that Under Secretary of Defense Pete
    Aldridge was ``encouraged'' after being briefed recently on the V-22
    flight test program and that he believes he should have enough
    information by May whether to continue the V-22's production schedule.
    From an operational perspective, how would an aircraft with
    capabilities such as the V-22s help you in the global war on terrorism?
        General Shinseki. The Army does not have an operational requirement
    for an aircraft with the capabilities such as the V-22.
        Admiral Clark. The V-22 will save American lives in all military
    operations, including the global war on terrorism. With twice the speed
    of CH-46, the V-22 will deliver combat forces to the objective area
    sooner, with less exposure time spent en route. The range of the V-22,
    five times that of the CH-46, will increase our reach from forward
    bases and amphibious shipping, allowing us to influence much more of
    the battlespace simultaneously. The payload capacity of the V-22, three
    times that of the CH-46, will enable the swift delivery and rapid re-
    supply of combat forces deep within enemy territory, vastly
    complicating the enemy's attempts to attack us. With aerial refueling
    support, the V-22 is capable of self-deploying worldwide. The self-
    deploying capability combined with the increased speed of the V-22 will
    allow an initial response to threats much more rapidly than with our
    current helicopters. The V-22 gives our Marines and Special Forces the
    capability to strike the terrorists at any time, in any place, with
    devastating effect and with reduced risk. The V-22 will be a force
    multiplier that translates into shorter conflicts and reduced friendly
    casualties.
        General Hagee. The speed, range, payload, survivability, and self-
    deployment attributes of the V-22 will provide the Joint Force
    commander with unprecedented operational reach, expanded area of
    influence, and the ability to leverage netted forces to deter or defeat
    adversaries. The MV-22 will help meet the requirements for increased
    flexibility and adaptiveness while overcoming the physical and
    political challenges of access denial.

             Global self-deployability will enable combatant
            commanders to reduce their strategic airlift requirements while
            expediting warfighting capabilities from inside or outside
            their theater.
             The unparallel survivability of the MV-22 is a salient
            feature that ensures that the MV-22 not only gets to the fight
            first but returns.
             The increased operational reach, provided by the MV-
            22, will allow the Joint Force Commander to conduct operations
            from deep in the sea-based to deep in the landmass. The
            combinations of a forward presence force with the capability to
            be augmented by global self-deployable MV-22s will enhance at-
            sea-arrival and assembly operations or expeditionary land-based
            operations. Eliminating the breakdown and build up period
            associated with rotorcraft, the MV-22 will be able to support
            operations on arrival in theater. The increases in speed and
            range will allow the Joint Force Commander to leverage off of
            the MV-22's sortie cycle efficiency to increase the tempo of
            operations. The increases in sortie cycle efficiency will
            permit expeditious movement of troops and supplies while always
            retaining the ability to mass forces from a distributed and
            dispersed environment.
             The combinations of the V-22's attributes
            exponentially increase the Joint Force commander's possibility
            of options in the planning and execution phases. The
            sanctuaries of time, space, and the tyranny of distance that
            protects terrorist operations and cells will be reduced. The
            MV-22 will reduce the execution timelines and increase the
            amount of intelligence that we can act on.
             The introduction of the V-22 will help shape the
            operational environment and underwrite general deterrence
            thereby assuring allies and dissuading aggression among other
            things. Fielding the MV-22 will contribute to general
            deterrence by conveying the impression that U.S. forces are not
            only the most powerful forces in the world today, but are
            likely to stay that way.

        General Jumper. The CV-22 would give the USAF a transformational
    leap forward in our ability to infiltrate and resupply Special
    Operations Forces. This platform will meet the long-standing
    requirement for long-range, night/adverse weather clandestine
    penetration of politically and/or militarily denied areas, in order to
    support special operations missions, most within one period of
    darkness. Additionally, the CV-22 has twice the combat radius of the
    MH-53, can fly 1.9 times as fast, and can carry 10,000 lbs. more
    payload.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                         SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING

        41. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, for the second consecutive year,
    the Navy is requesting a real decrease in its S&T budget. After
    removing ``pass through'' and ``devolved'' programs that are managed by
    Navy for Joint Forces Command and OSD, the Navy S&T fiscal year 2004
    request is down 3.6 percent from fiscal year 2003 requested levels in
    constant dollars.
        How are declining S&T budgets that are projected out through the
    years of the FYDP consistent with efforts of transformation? Is this a
    reflection that the value of your S&T activities in the past have had
    in supporting your warfighters?
        Admiral Clark. The Navy's fiscal year 2004 President's budget
    request for science and technology shows an increase from the fiscal
    year 2003 budget request as shown in the table below.

                                NAVAL S&T BUDGET
                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             President's Budget Request
              Budget Activity          -------------------------------------
                                         Fiscal Year 2003   Fiscal Year 2004
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Basic Research (6.1)..............                410                457
    Applied Research (6.2)............                580                536
    Advanced Technology Development                   617                721
     (6.3)............................
                                       -------------------------------------
      Total Naval Science & Technology              1,607              1,714
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pass-through
        The Department of Defense appointed U.S. Joint Forces Command
    (JFCOM) as the ``transformation laboratory'' of the United States
    military. JFCOM develops future concepts for joint warfighting. All of
    the Services help fund the unified commands. The U.S. Joint Forces
    Command is one of the nine unified commands and is budgeted in the 6.3
    portion of the naval science technology request.
        Given the expanded mission of JFCOM, it may be more appropriate to
    place JFCOM funding in a defense wide budget activity. Pending a
    defense wide line, it may be appropriate to move the funding (which is
    for prototypes, demonstrations, and concept development) up to the
    higher Navy R&D budget activities (i.e. 6.4-6.7).
        The JFCOM programs elements are listed below.

                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Fiscal year 2004
                 PE Title                   PE Number         President's
                                                             Budget Request
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Navy Technical Information                  0603727N                 151
     Presentation System.............
    Joint Warfare Experiments........           0603757N                13.7
                                                          ------------------
      JFCOM Total....................                                  164.7
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Devolvement
        Although several programs devolved from OSD to Navy, the largest
    devolved program, the University Research Initiative (URI) program,
    will now be managed by Navy in support of naval needs and technologies.
    $71 million is being requested for URI in fiscal year 2004. Navy will
    now be in charge of URI funding, topics, and the programs executed
    therein. In the past, Navy competed through OSD for these funds
    annually and could not incorporate these efforts into our long-term S&T
    planning. This provides an opportunity to enhance Navy's world class
    basic research program, which is the cornerstone for future
    transformational opportunities. Factoring in the URI program, Navy
    actually has real growth of 1.0 percent over the fiscal year 2003
    President's budget request. Beyond fiscal year 2004, there is real
    growth in fiscal year 2005 as well.
        While Basic Research (6.1) has benefited from the devolvement of
    the URI program to Navy, there remain difficult choices in 6.2 and 6.3
    funding to maintain the best possible portfolio in the face of the
    significantly constrained budgetary environment. This environment has
    necessitated significant cuts in the Future Naval Capabilities--
    designed to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter--in order to
    focus only on the highest priority projects within the 6.2 and 6.3
    portfolio.
    Transformation
        As for transformation, Navy S&T programs directly support and
    enable transformation. The fiscal year 2004 budget request contains
    several transformational initiatives, reflecting OSD and Navy
    leadership priorities. Examples of new initiatives and ongoing programs
    include the following:

            - Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle-Navy (UCAV-N)
            - Electric Power Technologies such as the Free Electron Laser
            and High Temperature Superconducting Motor
            - Advanced Multi-function RF System (AMRFS)
            - Wideband Gap Power Devices
            - Functional Materials-Hypersonic Weapons
            - Virtual At-Sea Training (VAST)

        Recent experience in Operation Enduring Freedom, where thermobaric
    weapons and a knowledge web system were among several programs that
    transitioned directly from S&T to the fleet, demonstrates the current
    value Navy places in its S&T programs. The investment transformation
    described above will provide continued support to the warfighter.

        42. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, are we sacrificing the next wave
    of transformation (15-20 years out) that will be driven by today's
    scientific advances by underinvesting in S&T? What programs were cut in
    order to achieve the 3.6 percent savings?
        Admiral Clark. The next wave of naval transformation (15-20 years
    out) requires a robust and strategically balanced investment in Navy's
    basic research (6.1) account which funds the Department's science
    requirements. The fiscal year 2004 6.1 budget request ($456.6 million)
    shows significant growth compared to the fiscal year 2003 request
    ($409.9 million), due to the devolvement of the URI program. This is a
    real increase to the Navy 6.1 program and increases the core funding
    available for Navy discovery and invention, the bedrock of future naval
    transformation.
        While the overall portfolio for S&T increased, there have been both
    increases and decreases to specific programs, mostly in response to
    Navy and OSD leadership priorities focused on naval transformation. For
    example, increases can be found in the UCAV-N program, the Supersonic
    Cruise Missile program, and the High Altitude Auroral Research Program
    (HAARP).
        Though Core National Naval Responsibilities initiatives were
    protected from reductions, there remain difficult choices in 6.2 and
    6.3 funding to maintain the best possible portfolio in the face of a
    significantly constrained budgetary environment. This environment has
    necessitated significant cuts in the Future Naval Capabilities--
    designed to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter--in order to
    focus only on the highest priority projects within the 6.2 and 6.3
    portfolio.

                           NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY

        43. Senator Reed. Admiral Clark, a recent article in Defense
    Horizons titled ``The Silence of the Labs'' described the ongoing
    deterioration of the Navy's S&T capability, especially at the Naval
    Research Laboratory (NRL). What role does NRL play in achieving the
    vision of Sea Power 21? What steps are being taken to ensure that this
    organization's important capabilities are not degraded as we seek to
    transform the Navy?
        Admiral Clark. The Naval Transformational Roadmap supports
    transformation through the components which comprise Sea Power 21: Sea
    Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and ForceNet. Each of these components
    is enabled by naval science. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has
    aligned its science and technology (S&T) investment with Naval Strategy
    with the strategic goal of naval science being to provide the
    foundation for overwhelming and enduring technological superiority for
    American naval forces. The NRL is the Navy's corporate laboratory. As
    such, it is responsible for execution of much of ONR's S&T investment
    in support of Sea Power 21.
        The role of supporting transformation is not a new one for NRL.
    Since 1923, the lab has been the source of numerous technological
    innovations that have made significant contributions to transforming
    the fleet and creating modern naval warfare. A few of these include:
    developing the first U.S. radar; inventing the key concepts leading to
    the Global Positioning System (GPS); and developing, in partnership
    with industry, GPS's four prototypes and first operational satellite.
    More recent achievements include an electronic warfare decoy, the ALE-
    50, which protected combat aircraft over Kosovo, a decoy so effective
    it earned the nickname ``Little Buddy'' from U.S. pilots. Another
    innovation seeing action in Kosovo was Specific Emitter Identification
    technology, which identifies any radar by its unique characteristics
    with such accuracy as to ``fingerprint'' it. In fact, it can
    distinguish between identical models produced off the same assembly
    line. Selected by the National Security Agency as the national
    standard, Coast Guard vessels, naval warships, and aircraft use it to
    support drug interdiction, enforce treaties, and monitor the movement
    of materials used in weapons of mass destruction.
        NRL's capabilities are, therefore, very important to achieving the
    vision of Sea Power 21, which seeks to leverage innovative
    organizations, concepts, and technologies with the stated aim of
    achieving order of magnitude increases in warfighting effectiveness.
    For example, among other things, the vision calls for the use of
    unmanned platforms and an improved intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance capability. NRL has world-class expertise in both these
    areas, and in numerous others of importance.
        The problems discussed in ``The Silence of the Labs'' are not new
    and, in fact, were validated in a recently-released tri-Service lab
    study conducted under the auspices of the Naval Research Advisory
    Committee (NRAC). The study, chartered by the Director, Defense
    Research and Engineering, produced a report called ``Science and
    Technology Community in Crisis,'' which argued that the future
    viability of the Defense Department's S&T capability is threatened by
    increasing losses of key technical personnel, insufficient levels of
    funding for facility and equipment modernization, and bureaucratic
    impediments that often produce counter-productive results in the
    research environment.
        The NRAC panel emphasized, in particular, the serious demographic
    challenge the labs face over the next several years, when retirements
    are expected to claim much of their experienced scientific and
    engineering talent. Because replacing that talent is a top priority, we
    are already taking steps to improve the labs' ability to recruit, hire,
    and retain the best technical personnel. For example, we are supporting
    lab efforts to utilize, to the fullest extent, the personnel
    demonstration pilots established at a number of labs including the NRL.
    These pilots, which Congress authorized in Section 342 of the Fiscal
    Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act, encourage participating
    labs to experiment with a variety of innovative personnel practices,
    each adapted to the many unique lab environments found within and
    across the Services. While they do not completely solve the personnel
    problems, these demonstrations have improved our ability to recruit and
    retain some of the best and brightest technical talent on the market.
    Another example is an initiative by the Chief of Naval Research
    specifically aimed at revitalizing the S&T workforce in our labs and
    centers. This collaborative effort, which also includes academic
    partners, has a number of components. For example, it provides
    scholarships at participating universities in return for obligated
    service in our labs. It also envisions retraining retired military
    technology officers and bringing them back into the labs where their
    valuable experience as warfighters can be infused into our research
    efforts. We are also supporting other congressionally authorized lab
    reform efforts including utilization of the experimental authority to
    hire scientific and  technical personnel which you authorized in
    Section 1113 of the Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization
    Act.

                 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNFUNDED PRIORITY LIST

        44. Senator Reed. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, please provide a detailed list of high priority
    science and technology (S&T) projects which are supportive of your
    efforts to transform your Services that you were not able to adequately
    invest in with the fiscal year 2004 budget request.
        General Shinseki. The Army's unfunded priorities provided to
    Congress included two S&T efforts that we were unable to fully fund in
    the fiscal year 2004 budget: $28 million for Future Combat Systems
    manufacturing technology (Man Tech) and $12 million for the Future
    Tactical Truck System (FTTS). The Man Tech funding would provide
    technology solutions to avoid costs in developing munitions and sensors
    critical to FCS. These include micro electro-mechanical systems for
    safe and arm functionality, reducing the size and increasing
    performance of inertial measurement units in munitions, and uncooled
    infrared sensors for target detection and identification. The FTTS S&T
    program is a new effort pursuing technologies for next generation
    medium and heavy tactical cargo vehicles. The primary goals of the FTTS
    program are to determine the tactical efficiencies of a hybrid-electric
    vehicle to reduce logistics demands and increase mobility and
    survivability by adding technologies such as enhanced situational
    awareness and add-on armors. The FTTS funding would provide embedded
    prognostics and intelligent load handling, a vehicle/load alignment
    system, and a smart load conforming tie-down system.
        Admiral Clark.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Fiscal
                    Title                    Year           Comments
                                             2004
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Electric Based Weapons...............    61.00  Accelerated research and
                                                     development of the
                                                     electrical components,
                                                     electrical control
                                                     systems, and material
                                                     technologies needed to
                                                     support electric
                                                     weapons deployment is a
                                                     very high risk,
                                                     extremely high payoff
                                                     investment area.
                                                     However, significant
                                                     investments in these
                                                     areas will provide a
                                                     revolution in Naval
                                                     Fires, Time Critical
                                                     Strike, and Platform
                                                     Self-Defense while
                                                     significantly reducing
                                                     the logistics'
                                                     footprint required to
                                                     support this mission
                                                     area. Products include
                                                     Electromagnetic Gun
                                                     Naval Fires, advanced
                                                     directed energy self-
                                                     defense weapons, and
                                                     Free Electron Laser
                                                     100KW demonstration.
    CVN-21/Advanced Capability Ship......    49.00  Accelerated research and
                                                     development of the
                                                     electrical components,
                                                     electrical control
                                                     systems, and material
                                                     technologies needed to
                                                     support significant
                                                     expansion of electric
                                                     power systems and
                                                     reduction of high
                                                     maintenance fluid
                                                     systems is a complex
                                                     high risk, high payoff
                                                     investment area.
                                                     However, significant
                                                     investments in these
                                                     areas will ``unlock''
                                                     the significant amount
                                                     of propulsion power for
                                                     enhanced warfighting
                                                     capability, such as
                                                     higher sortie rates,
                                                     increased striking
                                                     capability, and
                                                     improved self-defense
                                                     while significantly
                                                     reducing system
                                                     maintenance and
                                                     logistics footprint
                                                     required to support
                                                     these platforms.
    FORCENET.............................    45.00  Develop and demonstrate
                                                     a shipboard ADM of an
                                                     Advanced Multifunction
                                                     RF System (AMRF-C) that
                                                     will encompass current,
                                                     planned, and future-
                                                     growth comms, EW, and
                                                     LPI radar functions in
                                                     C, X, and Ku Bands for
                                                     LCS, DD(X) subs, and
                                                     CVN-21. Demonstrate
                                                     wide- and narrow-band
                                                     anti-jam (AJ)
                                                     waveforms, a wideband
                                                     AJ high altitude UAV
                                                     comms and network
                                                     package, and a
                                                     narrowband AJ/LPI/LPD
                                                     comms and network
                                                     package (JTRS)
                                                     necessary for planned
                                                     and future FORCENET
                                                     use. Develop
                                                     technologies and
                                                     architectures to
                                                     support high data rate,
                                                     uninterruptible network
                                                     to deployed sea base
                                                     and forces projected
                                                     ashore.
    Space S&T............................    17.10  Provide the next
                                                     generation of
                                                     technologies to enhance
                                                     and transform both
                                                     naval and joint
                                                     warfighting
                                                     capabilities. The
                                                     enhancement of space-
                                                     based communications,
                                                     navigation, ISR, METOC,
                                                     and space control all
                                                     hinge on the
                                                     development of
                                                     spacecraft, payloads,
                                                     and components which
                                                     are more robust,
                                                     responsive, covert, and
                                                     economical. Examples of
                                                     target technologies are
                                                     micro-satellites, MEMS,
                                                     high bandwidth encoding
                                                     techniques, autonomous
                                                     operations, etc.
    Precision Strike/Solutions to GPS        60.10  Provide jam-resistant
     Jamming.                                        missile guidance by
                                                     ultra-tightly-coupled
                                                     GPS/INS system  when
                                                     stand alone GPS
                                                     receiver is jammed,
                                                     thereby, circumventing
                                                     jammer threats. The
                                                     ultra-tightly-coupled
                                                     GPS/INS will increase
                                                     precision flight time
                                                     of weapon to target and
                                                     hands off to inertial
                                                     navigation to guide the
                                                     weapon when jammed for
                                                     the last few minutes of
                                                     flight. Precision
                                                     navigation, guidance,
                                                     and control in a GPS
                                                     denied environment; Nav
                                                     by imagery, low cost
                                                     MEMS and laser IMUs and
                                                     weapon integrated
                                                     precision timekeeping.
                                                     Precision target
                                                     location sensors across
                                                     EM/optical spectrum and
                                                     signal/image track
                                                     processors both on and
                                                     off-board surface, air,
                                                     and gun launched
                                                     weapons. Network,
                                                     computational, and
                                                     mission planning
                                                     technology for
                                                     precision targeting.
                                                     Aircraft and weapon
                                                     airframe and propulsion
                                                     technologies to counter
                                                     emerging threat
                                                     spectrum.
    Littoral ASW (LASW)..................    50.00  Significantly increase
                                                     ASW applied research to
                                                     provide technology to
                                                     meet the 2015 threat.
                                                     Develop components of
                                                     advanced off-board
                                                     distributed systems.
                                                     Develop technology for
                                                     cross platform sensor
                                                     level fusion and
                                                     estimating performance
                                                     of advanced sensors.
                                                     Demonstrate airborne
                                                     electromagnetic
                                                     detection system for
                                                     Multi-Mode Aircraft and
                                                     Unmanned Air Vehicles
                                                     (UAVs). Demonstrate
                                                     wide area cueing using
                                                     advanced electro-optic/
                                                     infrared systems and
                                                     high altitude long
                                                     endurance UAVs.
                                                     Demonstrate components
                                                     for transition to light
                                                     weight torpedo plan
                                                     product improvement
                                                     program.
    MANTECH..............................     5.50  Although Navy previously
                                                     committed to Congress
                                                     to funding the program
                                                     at $60 million per
                                                     year, PB04 (fiscal year
                                                     2004) request is only
                                                     $54.5 million.
    Academic Research Fleet Renewal--        80.00  There is a pressing need
     UNOLS.                                          to modernize the
                                                     country's aging
                                                     Academic Oceanographic
                                                     Research Fleet through
                                                     an orderly, phased
                                                     renewal plan with
                                                     construction of 4 new
                                                     Ocean Class ships and 3
                                                     new Regional Class
                                                     ships over the next 10
                                                     years.
    Seabasing/STOM.......................    24.00  Logistics planning and
                                                     execution from CONUS to
                                                     Seabase and Objective.
                                                     Develop capabilities to
                                                     support command and
                                                     control on the move
                                                     from the Seabase to the
                                                     Objective. Naval
                                                     Surface Fire Support
                                                     improvements in range,
                                                     projectiles/fusing,
                                                     precision, and volume
                                                     of fire. Ammunition
                                                     resupply of surface
                                                     combatants.
    Organic MCM..........................     6.00  Protective Mining--
                                                     Protect sea basing.
                                                     Integrated joint
                                                     command and control for
                                                     multiple, cooperating
                                                     unmanned systems.
    Mine Countermeasures Reconnaissance..    30.00  Develop clandestine
                                                     approaches to
                                                     countermeasures
                                                     networked minehunting
                                                     using fully
                                                     reconnaissance
                                                     autonomous, cooperative
                                                     vehicles with
                                                     classification sensors
                                                     reporting tactical
                                                     control ID indicators.
                                                     Develop and demonstrate
                                                     mission capability
                                                     package for LCS using
                                                     coordinated swarms of
                                                     autonomous,
                                                     interactive, underwater
                                                     vehicles engaged in
                                                     networked minehunting.
      Total..............................   427.70
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        General Hagee. The Marine Corps looks for innovation in four broad
    areas to address future challenges, e.g., transformational
    technologies. Our commitment to S&T, rooted in the axiom that forward
    thinking now equates to tangible transformation today, manifests as
    programmed growth in fiscal year 2004. Promising projects such as the
    Expeditionary Tactical Communications System, the Joint High Speed
    Vessel, and the Target Handoff System (experimental) support, on the
    move command and control, Sea-Basing and Sea Strike respectively. We
    are also transforming the way we do business through proactive joint
    experimentation. To support this effort, three Joint Concept
    Development and Experimentation (JCDE) divisions were established and
    have already leveraged concepts amongst the Services. While JCDE is
    adequately funded, have noted the benefits to be achieved by increasing
    the funding for this effort and the Center for Emerging Threats and
    Opportunities.
        Attached you will find a detailed listing of unfunded fiscal year
    2004 Department of the Navy S&T programs. (See Admiral Clark's response
    to same question.) These programs support our transformational efforts.
        General Jumper. One of the most important efforts currently ongoing
    within our S&T program is the work we're doing to enhance the
    Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) kit equipment carried by the Air Force
    Special Tactics Controllers who perform operations deep in enemy
    territory to help identify who the terrorists are, where their weapons
    are located, and who the innocent civilians are. Using very rapid
    spirals to speed development, prototyping, testing, production, and
    fielding, the Air Force is working to realize significant enhancements
    to these kits, while reducing weight and size. The following list is a
    representative summary of high priority S&T efforts, including
    enhancements to the BAO kit, for which the Air Force could use
    additional funding in fiscal year 2004. A more detailed, comprehensive
    list will be provided to the Senate Armed Services Professional Staff
    as requested.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     [In
                               Effort                            millions of
                                                                   dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    BAO Kit Enhancements.......................................       13.000
    Basic Research for Nanosatellites, Space Control, Command          8.000
     and Control, and Super Energetic Propellants..............
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (lSR)              11.800
     Automation for Time-Critical Targeting....................
    Joint Battlespace Infosphere...............................       13.900
    Electronically Steerable Array and Space-Based Radar On-          10.000
     Board Processing..........................................
    Advanced Payload--Hard and Deeply Buried Targets...........        3.000
    Commanders' Decision Aids for Predictive Battlespace               3.500
     Awareness.................................................
    Laser Infrared Flyout Experiment Advanced Technology               7.400
     Demonstration.............................................
    Denied Area Surveillance...................................        1.000
    Airborne Active Denial System Integrated Concept...........       35.860
    Force Protection...........................................        3.000
    Human Systems Countermeasures to Future Laser Threats......        3.100
    Targets Under Trees........................................        3.800
    Effects-Based Operations...................................        4.000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                                OVERSEAS BASING

        45. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, what level of involvement have each of you had with
    the series of Overseas Basing Studies currently being conducted
    regarding our overseas presence?
        General Shinseki. The Secretary of the Army has directed the Army
    staff to conduct an extensive review of Army Strategic Posture looking
    out over the next 10 years. The intent is to ensure that the Army is
    able to meet all the requirements of the combatant commanders and is
    well positioned to seamlessly transform to the Objective Force.
    Concurrently, the Secretary of Defense has directed that his staff, the
    Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders review future posture and
    overseas basing. The Army is working in coordination with these efforts
    to ensure the synchronization necessary to meet the Army's
    responsibilities for flexible power projection and sustained land
    dominance as part of the joint force. The Army will continue to work
    closely with the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense to ensure we have the appropriate posture
    and force structure to meet both the current strategic requirements and
    the many future challenges to our national security.
        Admiral Clark. I have been briefed on these studies throughout
    their development. In the specific instance of the SECDEF Overseas
    Basing Requirements Study completed in December 2002, the Navy assisted
    in shaping the effort through a Flag/General Officer Steering Committee
    and through a staff-level working group.
        I have also been briefed on the findings of the Integrated Global
    Presence and Basing study initiated in March 2003 by the Secretary of
    Defense. I expect the results of this study to be published in October
    2003.
        General Hagee. The Secretary of Defense has requested the
    examination of global positioning of forces, capabilities, and
    supporting infrastructure be accelerated. He has tasked the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, and the combatant commanders with developing, by July 1, 2003, a
    comprehensive and integrated presence and basing strategy looking out
    10 years.
        The United States Marine corps is participating in this
    examination, providing input at both the Service level to the Joint
    staff and at the component level to the combatant commanders. This work
    is being coordinated with other ongoing efforts within the Department
    of defense including the directed study on Oversees Basing Requirements
    (OBRS, 2002), the ongoing JROC directed Overseas Presence Study (OPS,)
    the ongoing Joint Staff Operational Availability Study (OA), and the
    ongoing Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Policy) analysis of
    overseas presence requirements.
        General Jumper. We have been engaged with OSD, the Joint Staff, the
    Combatant Commands, and other Services over the past 1\1/2\ years with
    these basing studies. We will continue to stay engaged as basing
    options are further developed and will work with the Combatant Commands
    to implement the options the Secretary of Defense decides upon.

        46. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, in evaluating our overseas force structure in both
    Europe and Asia, what options are being considered if we should choose
    to change our current structure? What would each of these options
    require from a facilities and infrastructure standpoint?
        General Shinseki. The Army and its regional Army Service Component
    Commanders are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Joint Staff, and each of the geographic combatant commanders and staffs
    to determine the global posture of engagement which best supports our
    national security strategy. The Army will work to determine the cost or
    need for additional facilities in the continental United States once
    these discussions yield greater fidelity for the potential courses of
    action. We do know that the United States and the Republic of Korea
    have agreed to a number of changes under the March 25, 2002, Land
    Partnership Program (LPP). This plan reduces the number of major
    installations from 41 to 23, but does not change the number of Army
    forces based on the peninsula. However, this action could facilitate
    the reduction of forces on the peninsula as the LPP takes effect
    between now and 2011.
        Admiral Clark. In August 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed
    all combatant commanders to review overseas basing requirements and to
    examine opportunities for joint use of facilities and land by the
    Services, consolidate infrastructure, and enhance training. The
    Department of Defense continues to examine these opportunities within
    the context of a global strategy. This will include an assessment of
    facilities and infrastructure needs, and should be completed by October
    2003.
        General Hagee. We are not planning any significant force structure
    changes in Europe or Asia. Our intent is, and always has been, to
    continue to support the regional combatant commanders in accordance
    with our Title 10 responsibilities.
        General Jumper. We have infrastructure--enduring in value and
    strategically located--that we would like to maintain in both Europe
    and Asia. We are pursuing a network of Main Operating Bases (MOB),
    Forward Operating Bases (FOB), and Forward Operating Locations (FOL) to
    support our expeditionary air force. This architecture will enhance our
    access to areas adversaries seek to deny, distribute our forward
    presence, and increase airbase availability by using bases in receptive
    host nations.
        In a few cases we may move some of our forces to new MOB; this will
    likely require extensive infrastructure improvements. In contrast to
    our MOBs, we plan to develop more FOBs, bases with a few, but adequate
    number of permanently stationed personnel to keep them ``warm.''
    Accordingly, we will improve or develop only a limited amount of
    infrastructure at such bases. Using a rotational force, we would then
    periodically deploy to these FOBs, using such opportunities to
    familiarize our forces with the FOBs and exercise with our friends and
    allies. Complementing our MOBs and FOBs, we will have designated FOLs
    with minimal infrastructure and no permanently stationed active duty
    personnel. These FOLs are designed for contingency use. As such,
    incoming units will bring their own support equipment.

        47. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, could each of you please discuss the increasing
    strategic role that both Hawaii and Guam play in maintaining our
    forward presence in the Pacific? What additional requirements might we
    see for Hawaii and Guam in support of future operations?
        General Shinseki. East Asia will continue to be a region of
    strategic importance. Given the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean and
    the great distances between the continental United States (CONUS) and
    East Asia, stationing Army forces forward is absolutely critical to
    reducing response time for potential contingency operations in the
    region and conducting operations in support of Pacific Command's
    (PACOM) theater security cooperation plans. Hawaii remains critical to
    supporting potential operations in Korea and Southeast Asia.
    Maintaining combat ready forces in Hawaii, such as the 25th Infantry
    Division, reduces the deployment time to each of these regions by more
    than 20 percent compared to CONUS-based forces. Additionally, the
    shorter deployment legs help us conduct sustained operations throughout
    the Pacific.
        There are approximately 28,000 soldiers stationed in Hawaii, about
    one-third of whom are Reserve component personnel. Headquarters, U.S.
    Army Pacific, co-located with Headquarters, PACOM, provides Title X
    support to PACOM and manages Army operations throughout the Pacific
    region outside of Korea. The 25th Infantry Division runs a Division
    Ready Brigade cycle to provide PACOM with a ground force ready and
    deployable for any contingency. The 25th Infantry Division participates
    in numerous training activities throughout the region to enhance
    military cooperation with important allies such as Japan, Australia,
    the Philippines, and Thailand. The 45th Corps Support Group provides
    continuous support for units and personnel performing critical
    missions, whether they are major operations such as Operation Enduring
    Freedom-Philippines, exercises such as Cobra Gold (Thailand), or small
    unit deployments.
        In the future, Hawaii will continue to play a critical role in
    support of U.S. military objectives in the Pacific. As proposed for
    congressional funding in the fiscal year 2004 Army budget submission,
    we plan to transform one brigade of the 25th Infantry Division into a
    Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) beginning in fiscal year 2005. This
    transformed SBCT will provide PACOM with a more lethal and survivable
    force, deployable from a forward base.
        Guam's location provides the Army with a key support base for
    operations in the East Asian littoral. While there are no active Army
    combat forces stationed on Guam, the Guam Army National Guard supports
    PACOM's missions by providing critical enabler units for deployments
    throughout his area of responsibility. Guam also provides important
    logistical and maintenance support for the Army vessels that make up
    the Army prepositioned stocks afloat fleet.
        In the future, we anticipate that Guam will continue to play a key
    role in support of Army forces deployed throughout the Western Pacific.
    With its airfield, seaport, and strategic location, Guam can serve as
    an intermediate staging base to support contingencies in the East Asian
    littoral, as well as in Northeast Asia.
        As a State and territory of the United States, Hawaii and Guam,
    respectively, provide secure locations to support Army forces operating
    in the Western Pacific. Together with the other armed services, the
    Army continues to provide critical land component capabilities for use
    in PACOM's Joint Mission Force concept.
        Admiral Clark. The Navy has long recognized the strategic value
    played by both Guam and Hawaii in support of the joint force. Both are
    essential to maintaining the U.S. forward naval presence within the
    Asia Pacific Rim and significantly improve the operational flexibility
    and efficiency of naval forces.
        Together with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Marine
    Corps, we are studying various options for both Guam and Hawaii as we
    move forward with the Navy's new Global Concept of Operations (CONOPs).
    Under the Global CONOPs, today's carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and
    amphibious ready groups (ARGs) will be re-configured into carrier
    strike groups (CSGs) and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs). In
    addition, the CONOPs also envisions surface action groups (SAGs)
    devoted to theater ballistic missile defense. I can assure you that
    both Guam and Hawaii are being reviewed in various contexts to
    ascertain the best way of maximizing the forward deterrent value of
    these forces.
        The Navy has already taken steps to improve its forward deployed
    posture by implementing a plan to homeport three fast attack submarines
    (SSNs) in Guam. Submarine Squadron 15 was established in Guam in fiscal
    year 2002, the U.S.S. City of Corpus Christi arrived in October 2002,
    the U.S.S. San Francisco arrived in December 2002, and the U.S.S.
    Houston is to arrive in 2004. Forward basing SSNs in Guam reduces
    transit time to/from station, equating to greater time ``in theater''
    and additional mission days to fulfill national and fleet requirements.
    Guam is 2,100 nautical miles (7 full steaming days) closer to the
    Arabian Gulf than is Norfolk and Pearl Harbor, as such, it is uniquely
    positioned to support continued naval forward presence in the Pacific
    in the future. Additionally, its status as a U.S. territory allows
    storage and loading of prepositioned war munitions without the consent
    of a foreign government. Moreover, Guam can be used as an intermediate
    staging base and safe haven for potential non-combatant evacuation
    operations within the Pacific theater.
        Finally, both Guam and Hawaii do not have any political-military or
    diplomatic issues to address. Guam, as a U.S. territory, is the only
    guaranteed failsafe against the loss of basing rights in East Asia.
        Hawaii is home to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Submarine
    Force, three submarine squadrons and their 25 submarines assigned to
    Pearl Harbor. COMNAVMIDPAC headquarters and numerous surface warships
    are homeported in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The Pacific Fleet's Maritime
    Surveillance and Reconnaissance Commander's headquarters (with four VP
    and VPU (P-3) squadrons) are located at MCB Kaneohe Bay. These forces
    are approximately 1 week closer to the Asia Pacific region than are
    West Coast forces, and thus, add flexibility/quicker response times to
    mission essential tasking. Pearl Harbor is the largest U.S. naval base
    outside of the continental United States. Consideration is being given
    to a proposal to relocate additional warships from the West Coast to
    Pearl Harbor to take advantage of Hawaii's proximity to the WESTPAC
    theater of operations. However, considerable infrastructure would be
    required to make such a move. Lastly, NCTAMS PAC is the main hub for
    Pacific Command (Joint) communications and is slated to be a teleport.
        General Hagee. The threat to peace and security within the Pacific
    region has fundamentally changed. While we still must deal with the
    traditional forces of potentially aggressive nations, we now must also
    deal with terrorism, rogue states employing asymmetric tactics, and
    weapons of mass destruction. We must be capable of dealing with all of
    these dangers. We must be able to assure our allies and friends;
    dissuade military competition; deter threats against U.S. interests and
    the interests of our friends; and decisively defeat any adversary who
    is not or cannot be deterred.
        To be more adaptable and responsive to these emerging threats and
    challenges, our Pacific Marine forces are now working with the
    Commander of the Pacific Command in examining new ways of organizing,
    employing, and supporting our forces. While this project is still in
    its initial stages, there are several key emergent Marine Corps
    concepts that highlight the importance of Hawaii and Guam within our
    future Pacific security structure.
        Our forward-deployed Marine forces will be truly expeditionary.
    They will be potent, agile, and mobile forces that can gain and
    maintain strategic access, rely on advanced sea basing, and conduct
    effective Theater Security Cooperation. These forces will require a few
    major bases, or hubs, to support their forward presence. Extending from
    these hubs, we envision smaller forward operating bases to support our
    amphibious forces with a rotational force presence. Ideally, extending
    even further throughout the region would be minimally manned training
    areas capable of providing up to battalion-sized combined training. To
    support these forward-based and forward-deployed naval forces, we will
    require in-theater logistics distribution centers. Lastly, we will
    continue to require sites for the Pacific-based future Maritime Pre-
    positioned Force (MPF(F)) squadron. It is also clearly evident that
    this basing concept will require adequate strategic airlift and sealift
    to deploy and sustain our forces, and adequate intratheater mobility
    assets to move forces and supplies within theater.
        Even in this early stage of concept development, it is clear that
    both Hawaii and Guam, strategically positioned and having vital
    infrastructure, will play key roles potentially augmenting our existing
    facilities in Japan in supporting the basing, sustaining, and training
    of our forces deployed across the Pacific.
        General Jumper. We continue to value Hawaii's strategic roll in the
    Pacific. There is approximately $60 million in the fiscal year 2004
    President's budget for new military construction to support the eight
    C-17s that we will station at Hickam AFB in fiscal year 2006.
        Guam's strategic importance is becoming evident as we increase our
    focus on the global war on terrorism and other instability in the East
    Asian Littoral \1\ (EAL). We expect to develop it into the power
    projection and logistics hub for the region with permanently based and
    rotational forces.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ East Asian Littoral is defined as the region stretching from
    south of Japan though Australia and into the Bay of Bengal.

        48. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, could each of you please detail the support the
    U.S. receives through the host nation funded construction programs such
    as the Japanese Facilities Improvement Project program in Japan and the
    Funded Construction Program and Land Partnership Plan in Korea? What is
    the status of each of these programs and how do we currently benefit
    from these partnerships?
        General Shinseki. The Host Nation Funded Construction Program
    (HNFCP) consists of the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) in Japan,
    the Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program in Germany, the Combined Defense
    Improvement Program (CDIP) in Korea, and the Republic of Korea Funded
    Construction (ROKFC) program in Korea.
        The primary HNFCP is the FIP, which has provided about $700 million
    of construction per year. The program was implemented in 1979 and over
    the past 20 years, the Government of Japan has built $19 billion of new
    quality of life and operational facilities for our U.S. service
    members.
        The PIK program awarded $202 million in construction projects from
    fiscal year 1994 through 2001. There is an additional $33 million
    planned for award in fiscal year 2003 and 2004.
        In Korea, the CDIP was initiated in 1982 by the Republic of Korea
    (ROK) to share the financial burden of maintaining U.S. forces in
    Korea. The CDIP funds projects that support only warfighting and
    operational facilities and total about $50+ million of construction per
    year.
        The ROKFC program was established in 1991 it provides well-being
    facilities, infrastructure, as well as warfighting projects. The ROKFC
    program funds about $135+ million of construction per year. In 2002,
    the U.S. forces Korea (USFK) and the Republic of Korea Minister of
    National Defense signed an agreement for a Land Partnership Plan (LPP).
    The LPP is a comprehensive plan for more efficient and effective
    stationing of U.S. forces in Korea. The LPP increases readiness and
    force protection; gains efficiencies; improves quality of life for U.S.
    forces in Korea; resolves civil petitions; facilitates regional
    development; and strengthens the ROK-U.S. alliance. The LPP will cost
    approximately $2.4 billion over the next 10 years. It allows USFK to
    close and consolidate some major installations by the end of 2011. The
    ROK will fund an estimated $1.3 billion to construct replacement
    facilities; purchase more than 1,200 acres for new grants; expand ROK
    military training area for U.S. use; and purchase safety easements with
    USFK exclusive grants. The U.S. will return 33,000 acres of land to the
    ROK government and is expected to fund about $1.1 billion to build
    replacement facilities for the installations it plans to relocate or
    close. The LPP allows the U.S. forces to train more efficiently
    alongside ROK forces. It will optimize land use in one of the world's
    most densely populated and congested countries and station U.S. forces
    where they can best accomplish their assigned mission.
        Admiral Clark. The Navy receives Host Nation Funded Construction
    (Burden Sharing) support from both Japan and Korea. The Japanese
    Facilities Improvement Program is funded by the Japanese Defense Agency
    and currently supports four categories of projects: force structure or
    mission increases, family housing and community support, Japanese
    initiatives including environmental and safety issues, and service
    initiatives. In Korea, two cost sharing programs are in use including
    the Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDIP) and the ROKCF. The CDIP
    supports construction of facilities related to improved combat
    operations, war reserves, and combined U.S./Korea operations. The ROKFC
    supports quality of life and sole U.S. use projects.
        All of these programs are active and help share the financial
    burden of a forward deployed posture. In fiscal year 2002 we received
    $199 million in support from the JFIP program to include $80 million
    for improvements to the Yokosuka Carrier Pier, and $4.5 million from
    ROKCF to include a $3.8 million medical clinic in Chinhae.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps portion of the 2003 Japanese FIP is
    $142.1 million. Generally, the FIP provides housing, community support,
    environmental and safety deficiency abatement, and other non-
    warfighting (i.e., other than weapons, ammunition and fuel storage)
    facilities. FIP has been very successful in supporting improved quality
    of life/quality of workplace infrastructure since the program's
    inception in 1979.
        General Jumper. The Air Force receives support, in the form of
    host-nation funded construction, from NATO, Japan, and Korea. In recent
    years, that support has averaged roughly $300 million per year. The
    funds provided by these countries are used to construct facilities that
    directly support Air Force missions, as well as facilities that support
    quality of life for Service members and their families stationed
    overseas.
        For example, the NATO contribution helps offset construction
    supporting the Air Force's roles in the NATO mission. The Japan
    Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) supports ``defensive''
    warfighting capabilities, such as aircraft shelters, and may be used to
    replace ``offensive'' capability facilities that predate 1979. The
    Korean CDIP funds combined Republic of Korea-United States warfighting
    requirements; while the ROKCF program funds mission support and
    quality-of-life requirements.
        In addition, under the Rhein Main transfer program, Germany is
    helping to pay for facility construction at Ramstein and Spangdahlem
    Air Bases necessary to relocate the missions currently at Rhein Main
    Air Base. In total, Germany is investing nearly $400 million to help
    pay for construction associated with this relocation. The majority of
    this construction will occur in 2004 and 2005.
        Korea's LPP is an initiative supporting the consolidation of U.S.
    installations in the Republic of Korea. USFK will vacate land no longer
    needed, due to force realignment on the Korean peninsula. At the same
    time, the Korean government will give USFK additional land around
    military installations receiving realigned forces. The U.S. Army is the
    major player in LPP. However, the Air Force is benefiting from LPP at
    Osan Air Base, where we are adding acreage to the installation to
    support housing construction.

        49. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General Hagee,
    and General Jumper, please provide cost estimates for the additional
    resources that would be required, on a continuing basis, to construct
    and maintain facilities in the continental United States that would be
    lost if we eliminated a permanent force structure in Europe and Japan.
        General Shinseki. The Army and its regional Army Service Component
    Commanders are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Joint Staff, and each of the geographic combatant commanders and staffs
    to determine the global posture of engagement which best supports our
    national security strategy. The Army will work to determine the cost or
    need for additional facilities in the continental United States once
    these discussions yield greater fidelity for the potential courses of
    action.
        Admiral Clark. The Department of Defense is developing a
    comprehensive basing strategy, including an assessment of the
    implications for facilities and infrastructure needs, that should be
    completed by October 2003. Until the results of this study are known,
    it would be premature to speculate on which commands or individual
    units, if any, should be relocated to the continental United States,
    where they might be based, or what the associated costs would be.
        General Hagee. The plant replacement value of Marine Corps
    facilities in Japan in fiscal year 2001 is $8.7 billion. In the absence
    of a force reduction and since the Marine Corps has limited
    underutilized space in the United States we expect an initial
    investment of $8.7 billion would be required to replace the plant
    provided by the Japanese in the United States. In addition, we would
    also need to increase our sustainment by at least $40 million each year
    to replace the labor provided by the Japanese government in order to
    maintain the new facilities in the United States. The Marine Corps has
    no permanent force structure in Europe.
        General Jumper. We feel that maintaining our presence in Europe and
    Japan is crucial to the United States' national security and stability
    in both regions, therefore, we have not considered completely
    withdrawing U.S. Air Forces from these regions nor studied how much it
    would cost to do so.

                       BASE OPERATIONS FUNDING SHORTFALL

        50. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, and General
    Hagee, I am concerned about the reductions in base operations funds in
    each of your Service's budgets. Can you please comment on what you feel
    the impact of these reductions will be from a broader readiness and a
    morale perspective?
        General Shinseki. Base operations support funding for fiscal year
    2004 is $5.8 billion and represents only 65 percent of our
    requirements. The Army took some risk by funding higher priorities in
    force protection and replenishing depleted peacetime spares inventories
    to eliminate a significant readiness issue. We will continue to provide
    quality services to our soldiers and their families but in some
    instances the quantity of services will be reduced.
        Admiral Clark. I expect no impact on shore installation readiness,
    nor do I anticipate any impact on morale. The fiscal year 2004 budget
    is aligned with previous years in terms of producing a constant level
    of capability. In our effort to find efficiencies, we are making
    organizational and process changes in the management and delivery of
    installation support. Key to this effort is the establishment of a
    single consolidated organization, Commander, Navy Installations (CNI),
    whose core mission is management and operation of shore installations.
    Our fiscal year 2004 budget reflects those anticipated efficiencies.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps strives to preserve program
    stability while balancing competing requirements of modernization,
    investment, and infrastructure. Given these competing requirements in a
    fiscally constrained environment, our base operations account has been
    funded to the optimum level without any near-term degradation to
    readiness or morale.

                          STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

        51. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, could you outline the current
    plans for the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) planned for
    Hawaii?
        General Shinseki. The Army intends to field an SBCT in Hawaii. We
    have resourced all six SBCTs to contribute to fulfilling the ``1-4-2-
    1'' defense construct and national security requirements; however, at
    this time, the Secretary of Defense has only authorized the procurement
    of the first four brigades. As directed by the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, the Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with an
    analysis of potential enhancements for Stryker Brigades five and six.
        Pending Secretary of Defense approval, fielding for the 2nd
    Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, in Hawaii begins in October 2005 with
    the unit achieving initial operational capability in the summer of
    2007.

        52. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, what are the military
    construction requirements needed to support the expected fiscal year
    2005 implementation of the SBCT?
        General Shinseki. Based on current planning, the Hawaii SBCT
    reaches initial operational capability in fiscal year 2007. Currently
    known fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009 Army Military Construction
    requirements that support the Hawaii transformation and combat systems
    total about $517 million. Additionally, the Army's fiscal year 2004
    budget includes $71 million for military construction in Hawaii that is
    required to support both Legacy Force requirements that are currently
    not being met and transformation.

                           NAVY INSTALLATION COMMAND

        53. Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, in your written testimony you
    discuss the stand up of the Navy Installation Command planned for
    October 2003 with an estimated cost savings to the Navy of $1.6 billion
    over the next 6 years. Can you detail how these savings are expected to
    be achieved?
        Admiral Clark. We anticipate savings in personnel, facilities, and
    base-operational costs due to:

             Streamlining of shore installation management
            procedures and policies.
             Elimination of redundant HQ management functions and
            cost.
             Greater competition for contract work from aggregating
            functions.
             Simplification of the budgeting and funding process.
             Increased consistency in standards and levels of
            performance for base operations across Navy installations.
             More focused support from contractors and support
            organizations.
             Expansion of regional management concept in providing
            installation support.
             Greater use of Information Technology tools to
            increase efficiency.

        54. Senator Akaka. Admiral Clark, as you are aware, the Army
    undertook a similar initiative, the Installation Management Agency
    (IMA), which stood up in October 2002. What lessons have you drawn from
    and do you expect to draw from the Army's experiences with the IMA?
    What similarities and differences are there across the two Services
    that might point either to similar practices or the need for different
    approaches?
        Admiral Clark. We have been in regular dialogue with Army over the
    past year including four face-to-face meetings with senior IMA
    leadership, and have drawn the following lessons:
        First, it is essential to separate installation funding from
    mission funding. This eliminates the problem of installation funding
    migrating to mission requirements for contingency or other emergent
    actions, and thereby, adversely impacting installation support services
    to the fleet.
        Second, reducing the number of major commanders involved in running
    shore installations can generate efficiencies.
        Third, a single installation commander affords Navy the opportunity
    to consolidate the best in installation management expertise.
        Fourth, a single installation command allows major commanders to
    focus on primary missions rather than the means.
        We have several similarities between our Services in this area as
    installations in both Services generally perform similar functions. In
    the past, we both had multiple major commanders doing installation
    management functions while mission and BOS funding were programmed,
    budgeted, and allocated as a single operating budget.
        Our differences will not affect our approach. Navy moved toward
    claimant consolidation and regionalization in 1997/1998 by reducing the
    number of installation claimants from 18 to 8. Army has an additional
    layer (for policy and resourcing) between the IMA (for execution) and
    Army Chief of Staff. Navy CNI combines policy, resourcing, and
    execution and will report directly to the CNO. Navy has identified 28
    installation management functions while the Army has 95.
        Based upon these considerations, we have adopted a similar approach
    to installation management by standing up CNI on 1 October 2003.

      READINESS IMPACT OF ACCEPTING SHORT-TERM RISKS TO FUND MODERNIZATION

        55. Senator Akaka. General Shinseki, as both Secretary of Defense
    Rumsfeld and you have acknowledged, the fiscal year 2004 budget accepts
    short-term risks in order to more fully fund modernization efforts. In
    your view, what are the immediate readiness impacts of this strategy,
    especially with the high tempo our military forces are currently
    experiencing?
        General Shinseki. The Army continues to make difficult choices and
    implement changes in its investment plans and resourcing efforts.
    During the fiscal year 2004-2009 program/budget process, the Army
    modified its overall transformation plan by further reducing near-term
    efforts to support achievement of longer-term goals. These reductions
    are made in the context of a careful and prudent balance between
    immediate operational needs, e.g., the demands of homeland security and
    the global war on terrorism and the imperatives of Army transformation.
    In general, funding is increased for programs that are ``clearly
    transformational'' and support Defense transformation goals. The Army
    has chosen to manage risk in the modernization of its current force and
    the associated mid-term warfighting readiness. This risk takes the form
    of more selective modernization and recapitalization efforts for the
    current force, while still retaining sufficient efforts to ensure
    essential readiness requirements.
        The immediate readiness impacts of this strategy are minimal.
    Another metric for current readiness is the amount of funding provided
    to ground and air operational tempo (OPTEMPO). For fiscal year 2004,
    ground and air OPTEMPO are funded to provide the resources to sustain
    Army readiness for peacetime operations. The potential war in Iraq and
    the ongoing global war on terrorism have created additional
    requirements that will require passage of a 2004 supplemental to ensure
    the continued readiness of our forces.

                               COMBAT AIR PATROLS

        56. Senator Akaka. General Jumper, The Washington Post has been
    reporting that the U.S. Customs Service has begun to assist the Air
    Force in conducting combat air patrol, or CAP missions. I understand,
    however, that this support is fairly limited. Can you give us a broad
    sense of the percentage of forces engaged on an ongoing basis in
    conducting CAP missions, and how much that might increase if we were to
    go to war in Iraq?
        General Jumper. The Air Force and the U.S. Customs Service have a
    long history of working closely together, but there are important
    distinctions between our respective missions and capabilities. We
    expect Custom's role will evolve as part of their transition into the
    Department of Homeland Security, but we expect their focus will remain
    primarily law enforcement. They are well equipped to respond to general
    aviation aircraft that violate temporary flight restrictions without
    additional indications of hostile intentions. However, they have no
    capability to defend against a commandeered airliner like we
    experienced on September 11. Air defense forces, in contrast, are there
    to provide a last-ditch defensive capability against any type of
    airborne threat, but are neither equipped nor authorized to enforce
    laws. Today, both Customs and the Air Force have personnel sitting
    side-by-side 24 hours a day in the National Capitol Region Coordination
    Center, sharing data and coordinating their combined response.
        Prior to operations beginning in Iraq, approximately 0.7 percent of
    our active duty USAF personnel (2,810) were required to support air
    defense operations, including the CAP. Today that number has grown to
    just over 0.8 percent (3,000) with the addition of four alert sites.
    Should conditions indicate, the number could rapidly grow to over 1.5
    percent (6,000) to support the maximum planned defensive posture.

        57. Senator Akaka. General Jumper, is the Air Force exploring other
    options, such as expanding our cooperation with Customs, to help reduce
    the burden over the long term?
        General Jumper. The Air Force is working directly with Customs, the
    Secret Service, the Transportation Security Administration, Federal
    Agency Administration, and others in establishing the Interagency
    Homeland Air Security Coordination Center. As better aviation security
    procedures are implemented and intelligence information shared and
    fused between agencies, we expect the requirements for CAP will be
    reduced. However, we also believe it unlikely that the threat of an
    asymmetric air attack will be eliminated in the immediate future. In
    light of that, we are working to put the Noble Eagle Level 5 forces
    into a sustainable posture that will eliminate the need for continued
    mobilization of the Reserve component.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

               END STRENGTH AND MOBILIZATION OF GUARD AND RESERVE

        58. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
    Hagee, and General Jumper, each of the armed services is feeling
    significant pressure from the pace of current operations and the
    ongoing requirements of forward presence, peace operations, and
    training requirements. The Services do not have the numbers of
    personnel they need in the skills required to sustain the force for
    worldwide commitments--and I expect commitments to increase as the war
    on terror expands. This is a high-risk strategy--pushing end strength
    problems onto the back of the Guard and Reserve could unhinge the
    entire ``reserve system.'' Does the Nation have the Active Forces
    necessary for what we are doing now and what we are expected to do over
    the next 10 to 20 years to secure the Nation?
        General Shinseki. This question addresses a particularly vexing
    challenge for the Army, requiring a multi-faceted analysis. As I have
    previously testified, we have an Army that is too small for its mission
    profile. Emerging requirements in support of the global war on
    terrorism, uncertainties regarding long-term operational requirements,
    and the requirement to sustain existing ongoing small-scale
    contingencies while simultaneously transforming the Army certainly
    warrant a review of our entire force structure. The Army is
    particularly sensitive to the tremendous demands currently being placed
    on our Reserve component soldiers in their selfless service to the
    Nation.
        The post-September 11 environment has seen a tremendous increase in
    the number of Reserve component soldiers mobilized in support of
    ongoing operations--current steady state is approximately 30,000. As
    part of Total Army Analysis 2011 (TAA-11), the Army is reviewing its
    existing force structure, specifically focused toward facilitating
    transformation to an Objective Force capability. A critical charter of
    TAA-11 is to review the existing force structure, both active and
    Reserve, to determine the correct allocation of forces in support of
    the National Security Strategy and Defense and Transformation guidance.
    Paramount to this review will be studies focused on determining the
    correct balance of Active and Reserve Forces to ensure the Army is
    capable of meeting its responsibility to the Nation.
        Admiral Clark. The Navy has sufficient Active-Duty Forces. In fact,
    we are seeking to reduce the number of Active-Duty Forces in the coming
    years. That said, we have always relied upon Reserves to complement the
    Active Force in times of conflict, and the global war on terror is no
    exception. Reserves have filled--and are continuing to fill--positions
    requiring specific skill sets that may not reside in the Active Force.
    We will continue to take the steps needed to ensure we have the right
    balance of skill sets in both the active and Reserve components to
    complete all missions.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps asked for and was granted an end
    strength increase of 2,400 marines for fiscal year 2003. This increase
    was greatly appreciated and came at the right time. The 2,400 marines
    were used to replenish units depleted by standing up the 4th MEB (MEB
    Hqtrs/ AT Battalion/Chemical Biological Incident Response Force/
    Security Force Company). Coinciding with the end strength increase to
    175,000, the USMC continues to look at ways to return marines to the
    operating forces. Military-civilian conversions, A-76, and outsourcing
    efforts have allowed us to return approximately 900 marines to the
    operating forces. We believe that 175,000 active component end strength
    is sufficient to meet our mission requirements.
        General Jumper. This is specifically one of the questions we are
    trying to answer with a study led by our Air Force Plans and Programs,
    Directorate of Strategic Planning, Strategy and Defense Integration
    Division (AF/XPXS) called Operational Assessment. It looks at the
    suitability of the current active duty and Reserve component mix to
    meet future operations. The results of the initial study will be
    briefed to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on 31 March 03.
        The Air Force's active duty and Reserve component mix is
    fundamentally sound, both for current and future operations. The Air
    Force Reserve component (ARC) is different than the other services.
    Several points illustrate this contention. On any given day, 35 percent
    of our Reserve component, or over 66,000 airmen, are on active duty.
    Our tanker and airlift professionals are now predominately from the
    Reserve component with approximately 61 percent of our airlift crews
    and 51 percent of our tanker personnel from the ARC. To meet Combatant
    Command requirements, our Air Expeditionary Forces use significant ARC
    forces -25 percent of our aircrews and about 14 percent of
    expeditionary combat support are from the ARC. Volunteerism is
    exceptionally high for the initial part of any contingency. For most
    operations we can meet all requirements with volunteers given
    sufficient mandays and a clear utilization plan. Additionally, our
    Reserve component maintains high readiness and ramps up quickly,
    normally within 72 hours and frequently sooner.
        The Operational Availability study validates that the Air Force has
    very few issues with ARC contribution, even when their capability is
    required with minimal warning. We clearly have some areas that require
    further examination to see if adjustments are required. However, the
    current defense strategy does not invalidate our active duty and
    Reserve mix. As long as the strategy does not change substantially, we
    are confident the Air Force will meet its requirements. A fully
    stressed defense strategy necessitates acceptance of risk in some areas
    but the Air Force's active duty and Reserve mix is not a primary
    factor.

        59. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, current and future
    operations in the global war on terrorism are increasingly requiring
    mobilization of large numbers of Reserve component forces. Mobilization
    of these patriotic citizen-soldiers is, of course, a burden on
    thousands of families and communities nationwide. The Guard and Reserve
    system is a volunteer system. Looking into the future, what do you
    think the long-term impact of extended and frequent reserve
    mobilizations will be on the strength and vitality of the Reserve
    Forces?
        General Shinseki. The Army Reserve has been in a continuous state
    of mobilization since December 1995. Rotations in Bosnia, Kosovo,
    Kuwait, and mobilizations and deployments are part of Operation Noble
    Eagle and the war on terrorism have all become part of what it means to
    serve in the Reserve components today. These recurring deployments have
    given our units a great deal of experience in being able to mobilize
    quickly and effectively.
        We are sensitive to the stresses of frequent mobilizations and the
    impacts on retention and recruiting of quality soldiers. Soldiers are
    committed to their duty and we do not anticipate any long-term impacts
    on the readiness of the force resultant from the ongoing mobilizations.
    The concerns of most soldiers, families, and employers are that the
    mobilizations are as predictable as possible and the duty is directly
    related to the defense mission of the Nation.
        Additionally, the Army Reserve is executing a Federal Reserve
    Restructuring Initiative that will, among other things, mitigate
    potential negative effects caused by increased small-scale contingency
    mobilizations and establish a goal to limit the total time mobilized
    for individual Army Reserve soldiers to 270 days over any 5-year
    period.

        60. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, what are the risks to
    the Guard and Reserve ``system'' posed by the current pace and scope of
    mobilizations--what happens if members vote with their feet and leave
    the Reserves upon release from active duty?
        General Shinseki. There is a risk of losing highly trained and
    qualified Reserve component soldiers due to these numerous mobilization
    requirements. Currently, there are over 65,000 Selected Reserve and
    94,000 Army National Guard soldiers mobilized in support of Operation
    Noble Eagle and the global war on terrorism. This represents close to
    one-third of our current Selected Reserve strength and 27 percent of
    Army National Guard strength. If upon demobilization, these individuals
    decided to leave the Reserve components, it would take several years
    for the Reserve components to reach its mandated end strength
    objective, and duty military occupational specialty qualification
    objectives. However, based on past studies, we are estimating that the
    Reserve components will lose between 20 and 30 percent of these
    soldiers. In recognition of this, the Army Reserve is executing a
    Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative that will, among other things,
    establish human resources life-cycle management practices aimed at
    providing trained and ready units and individuals while mitigating the
    affects of multiple mobilizations.

        61. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, what about employer
    backlash?
        General Shinseki. To date, there is no data or trend to demonstrate
    that employer backlash will come as a result of the present
    mobilization. In many discussions with employers concerning employee
    mobilizations, the employers generally agree that Guard and Reserve
    employees are loyal to their companies and will be returned to their
    previous positions without difficulty. Of note is that employers want
    planning time both mobilize and demobilize. Also, there is no trend to
    indicate that multiple mobilizations have a negative impact on
    employment.

        62. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki and General Jumper, the
    National Guard opposes any relegation of its structure to less than
    high-end combat capability consistent with Active Forces and essential
    to a globally relevant strategic Reserve. How will the Army and Air
    Force preserve and promote this capability within the National Guard?
        General Shinseki. The Army's transformation process includes the
    Army National Guard (ARNG). Changes to the ARNG began in 1996 with the
    ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS), a four-phased plan that converts
    up to 12 ARNG combat brigades-worth of structure into required combat
    support and combat service support structure. Phase 1 and 2 (fiscal
    year 1999 to 2007) conversions are ongoing or currently programmed to
    convert. Phase 3 and 4 requirements will be determined at the
    conclusion of Total Army Analysis 2011.
        In January 2002, the Army began developing a new plan, the Army
    National Guard Restructuring Initiative (AGRI), in anticipation of
    publication of the new Defense Strategy. In concert with ADRS, AGRI
    continues to reshape the ARNG; however, the AGRI concept focuses on
    converting heavy combat structure to lighter, mobile combat structure
    that is more relevant to the new defense strategy. AGRI restructures
    the Army National Guard to meet emerging requirements from homeland
    security to small-scale contingencies and major combat operations.
        AGRI reshapes selected ARNG divisions from a heavy configuration to
    a more versatile design called the Multi-Functional Division (MFD).
    Embedded within the MFD is the Mobile Light Brigade (MLB), an infantry-
    centric organization enhanced with systems that provide commanders with
    more versatile capabilities over present ARNG divisional brigades. We
    envision using MLBs in a variety of mission sets to include homeland
    security, small-scale contingencies, and generating force operations.
    Additionally, we will begin funding AGRI in this Program Objective
    Memorandum.
        Through the MFD and MLB, AGRI is the Army National Guard's
    organizational bridge to the Objective Force. With initiatives like
    this, the ARNG will continue to improve its readiness and maintain a
    relevant combat force to meet the Nation's requirements.
        General Jumper. The National Guard's quest for continued relevance
    in the Expeditionary Air Force and in the arena of homeland security is
    well founded and supported by both the Secretary and myself. The Air
    National Guard specifically, as a Total Force Partner, continues to
    provide large portions of the Air Force's combat, combat support, and
    humanitarian capacity. Their aircraft, aviators, and support teams are
    second to none and we intend to continue to lean on them as we have in
    the past. The Air National Guard will remain in the forefront as the
    Department's capability-based planning construct evolves. Rest assured,
    that as we organize, train, and equip the Total Air Force for the
    future, the Air National Guard will be involved in every step of the
    process.

                           OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

        63. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, U.S. forces in
    Afghanistan continue to conduct dangerous combat operations. In recent
    weeks, U.S. forces completed the largest ground battle with al Qaeda
    and Taliban elements since Operation Anaconda. Are U.S. operations
    being hampered by the ``safe haven'' in the ungoverned areas of western
    Pakistan that al Qaeda and Taliban forces are using?
        General Shinseki. I believe an operational question such as this is
    best answered by the Central Command Combatant Commander. As the Chief
    of Staff of the Army, my responsibility is to provide trained and ready
    forces to the combatant commander. Afghanistan is still a dangerous
    place. The Army staff here in the Pentagon carefully monitor the
    situation there, and maintain good communications with Central Command
    so we remain ready to provide any support General Franks requests.

        64. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, how do you see U.S.
    combat operations in Afghanistan evolving over the next year and do you
    feel the combatant commander has sufficient forces to accomplish the
    missions laid out by the President?
        General Shinseki. I believe operational questions such as these are
    best answered by the Central Command Combatant Commander. The Army has
    provided all forces that the combatant commander has requested and is
    prepared to provide additional forces if required.
        The Army currently has 11,600 soldiers conducting operations in
    Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Over the next year the Army's
    numbers are expected to increase as we send in a team of soldiers to
    assist in training the Afghanistan National Army. Our goal is to have
    an Afghanistan National Army capable of providing security and able to
    defeat any threats to the legitimate government anywhere within the
    borders of Afghanistan. We will also work with the Afghanistan Minister
    of Defense and General Staff, which will control Afghanistan National
    Army operations and activities according to the directives and policies
    of the Central Government's civilian authorities. We anticipate this
    training to last 36 months.

                                SPACE CAPABILITY

        65. Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper, space superiority ranks
    with air superiority as a top priority. The ability to exploit and
    assure U.S. access to space assets while denying the same to our
    adversaries is of great importance. As the ultimate high ground, space
    provides America with military advantages that cannot be duplicated.
    With determined exploration and exploitation of space capabilities, we
    will widen our advantages and set the bar beyond reach of any
    adversary. How important is assured access to space to our current and
    future military capability?
        General Jumper. Assured access to space and the space control
    mission are high priorities as they are critical to success in modern
    warfare. We must maintain the capability to support the current needs
    of our warfighters and be in a position to provide for future
    requirements as our Nation's dependency on space-based assets continues
    to increase. Not only do our forces need unhampered access to space-
    based services, but they must be protected from the space-based
    capabilities of future adversaries. Thus, we must be prepared to
    deprive an adversary of the benefits of space capabilities when
    American interests and lives are at stake.

                              BOMBER FLYING HOURS

        66. Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper, the Air Force has been
    putting many more flying hours on bombers particularly the B-2 and B-52
    than had been contemplated in the bomber study, that study anticipated
    the B-52 would be available through 2040. Do you see the bomber study
    conclusions as still being valid?
        General Jumper. The bomber study conclusion is still valid:
    aggressive modernization of the existing bomber force will provide an
    equivalent capability to that of a B-2C force at a significantly lower
    cost.

        67. Senator Bill Nelson. General Jumper, do you see a need to look
    at the possibility of a replacement bomber program that would be in
    place before 2040?
        General Jumper. No, not at this time, the Air Force does not see
    the need to accelerate the bomber replacement program. The Long Range
    Strike Platform (LRSP) study is progressing well and will be completed
    in early 2004. The objective of the study is to identify the most
    promising concepts and the required technology investments needed to
    support a 2012-2015 start of an acquisition program.

                            JOINT SIMULATION SYSTEM

        68. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
    Hagee, and General Jumper, I have been made aware of a Department of
    Defense (DOD) Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) directing the
    cancellation of the Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) program in fiscal
    year 2004 and through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The PDM
    also directed the cancellation of your related Service simulations,
    although I understand now that some funding may have been restored in
    the actual fiscal year 2004 budget request that has arrived in
    Congress.
        I and other members on the Armed Services Committee who care deeply
    about the pace and scope of efforts to increase joint experimentation,
    joint training, creation of a standing joint operational headquarters,
    and joint requirements and acquisition validation, are troubled by this
    development. The program is intended to provide a joint simulation
    capability to ``integrate'' Service simulations allowing for joint
    training and experimentation at strategic, operational, and tactical
    levels. This kind of tool is essential to any effort to move the
    Military Establishment to greater joint training, doctrine and
    experimentation. What is your position on the cancellation of this
    program and the impact on your related Service simulation programs?
        General Shinseki. I do not believe the cancellation of the program
    will have an impact on joint training. The fiscal year 2003 funding was
    retained so the program manager could deliver the Block 1 software to
    the Joint Warfighting Training Center (JWFC) for their use to conduct
    Joint Task Force (JTF) component level training. This will enable the
    JWFC to continue further development to support joint training,
    doctrine, and experimentation. Moreover, the PDM directed an analysis
    of alternatives (AoA) to identify a cost-effective method of meeting
    future joint and service training requirements. The impact on the Army
    simulation is greater, however, because the Block 1 software provides
    little utility for service use. To this end, I believe it is better for
    the Army to pursue its own Title X solution with a capability to link
    with a joint simulation when it has matured.
        Admiral Clark. Navy supports the decision to cancel the Joint
    Simulation System (JSIMS) for Service use. JSIMS was over budget ($12
    million in fiscal year 2003), behind schedule (over 1 year for Block 1
    and estimates as much as 5 years for Block 2), and delivering a product
    that does not meet all of the requirements in the Operational
    Requirements Document. The impact to the Navy is that funding to
    support wargaming development has been zeroed. However, unlike the
    other Services, Navy training requirements for wargaming are directed
    at a small audience (Battle Group/Amphibious Ready Group Staff only)
    and therefore do not require the extensive hardware and manpower to run
    a JSIMS scenario. Navy will reprogram existing funds to upgrade the
    Enhanced Naval Wargaming System (ENWGS) to meet emerging training
    requirements. Because the reprogramming is minimal, Navy chose not to
    reclama the JSIMS portion of the PDM to DOD.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps continues to support the
    requirement for an effective joint simulation capability. We concur
    with the PDM guidance to perform a near-term joint service validation
    and test of the JSIMS system and support the decision to concurrently
    perform a formal AOA to the current JSIMS program. However, we are
    concerned with the adverse impact that the PDM guidance will have on
    our ability to support, and ultimately replace, our service-specific
    legacy simulation programs. The version of JSIMS that will be delivered
    this summer will not meet the Marine Corps Title X training
    requirements. The elimination of all subsequent JSIMS funding precludes
    our ability to upgrade the JSIMS to meet these Title X mandated service
    training requirements. Therefore, we will have to continue to rely upon
    our aging legacy simulation systems. Since JSIMS was intended to
    replace our legacy systems the USMC JSIMS funding line had displaced
    the funding for those legacy systems. The elimination of the Marine
    Corps JSIMS funding line by the PDM did not include a concomitant
    provision to provide the funding required to effectively maintain and
    upgrade our existing training simulation systems and associated
    infrastructure.
        General Jumper. The Air Force accepts the fiscal trade-offs that
    led to the OSD PDM decision on the JSIMS program. Impacts to related
    Air Force simulation programs will require funding adjustments to
    maintain and improve legacy systems in current use for service and
    joint training, doctrine and experimentation.

        69. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
    Hagee, and General Jumper, are you satisfied that DOD directed the
    cancellation with a clear understanding of the risks and costs
    associated with closing the existing program, delaying establishment of
    a replacement program, and the potential loss of time and skilled
    modeling and simulation development personnel?
        General Shinseki. I can only assume that DOD had a clear
    understanding of the risks and cost for terminating this program. The
    Army worked very closely with them while they were drafting the PDM. We
    recommended completing Block 1, assessing the software, and then
    complete an AoA before deciding on termination. We also strongly
    recommended the service program funding be retained regardless of the
    JSIMS decision so that the Services could progress on their own toward
    their own Title X capability with the intent to link to JSIMS at a
    later date.
        Admiral Clark. I am satisfied that DOD made a good faith decision
    on the JSIMS based on management structure, overhead, and nature of the
    separate development environments. JSIMS has not adhered to basic
    acquisition principles and shows no potential to deliver a usable
    product for service use within the Acquisition Program Baseline
    timeframe. However, the PDM does allow for completion of Block I to
    address near-term joint training requirements. The PDM-directed AOA
    should recommend a follow-on program that has the ability to ``learn''
    from JSIMS mistakes and possibly deliver a better product in less time
    than JSIMS had projected for Block 2.
        General Hagee. We are concerned with the unintended adverse impacts
    of the guidance embodied by the PDM. As I mentioned earlier, the PDM
    did not address the funding resources required to sustain our legacy
    systems in the absence of a near-term replacement joint simulation
    system that meets the Marine Corps Title X training requirements. The
    PDM zeroed out the funding that was designated to support the
    replacement of our legacy systems and the upgrade of the associated
    infrastructure. We currently have no future year funding available to
    support our legacy system sustainment and upgrade requirements.
        We are also concerned with the adverse impact on the JSIMS
    workforce as significant numbers of well-trained and experienced
    personnel abruptly depart the program. The departure of these
    critically skilled personnel is negatively impacting the Orlando-based
    modeling and simulation industry and will delay our ability to
    reestablish the cohesive joint program team required to assume
    management of a follow-on joint simulation training system acquisition
    effort.
        General Jumper. We are satisfied that OSD principals understood the
    risks and costs implied and that the final decision reflects the
    difficult fiscal trade-off's often required among competing OSD
    priorities and the mandate to remain within DOD total obligation
    authority.

        70. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
    Hagee, and General Jumper, are you satisfied that cancellation of the
    JSIMS program is necessary to accelerate establishment of a Joint
    National Training Capability or does it complicate achieving such an
    objective?
        General Shinseki. Cancellation of the JSIMS program should not
    complicate achieving a Joint National Training Center (JNTC)
    capability. Constructive simulations are only a small piece to JNTC
    effort and current simulations should support near term JNTC
    requirements until JSIMS is built to meet that requirement.
        Admiral Clark. The cancellation of JSIMS will help accelerate the
    establishment of a viable joint simulation training capability in the
    long-term. The program was over budget, overdue, and did not meet the
    requirements as set forth in the Operational Requirements Document.
        General Hagee. The Marine Corps continues to support the
    requirement for an effective Joint Simulation Capability as well as the
    requirement for a Joint National Training Capability. The respective
    programmatic funding decisions should take into account the
    complementary nature of these respective capabilities and should not be
    viewed as an either/or resolution. These capabilities should be
    developed concurrently while ensuring the maximum effective amount of
    interoperability.
        General Jumper. The OSD Program Decision Memorandum in question
    covered a range of resource decisions, including the cancellation of
    JSIMS and the establishment of JNTC. I would defer to OSD to comment on
    whether the two decisions were related.
        The JSIMS decisions does include provisions for an AOA to determine
    a way ahead for joint simulation, so it is clear that joint simulation
    remains a departmental goal.

        71. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
    Hagee, and General Jumper, what are your views on the importance of
    quality modeling and simulation to joint experimentation, joint
    training, joint doctrine, joint requirements development, and joint
    acquisition?
        General Shinseki. Modeling and simulations are absolutely essential
    to support joint and service training, experimentation, doctrine,
    requirements development, and acquisition. The Army transformation
    effort depends on the use of models and simulations to develop emerging
    systems, assess advance concepts and test doctrine, and provide a
    greater capability to train commanders and staffs in their warfighting
    task through constructive simulations.
        Admiral Clark. We must be more efficient in the manner in which we
    organize, train, and equip our forces. Modeling and simulation will
    help us to do that by providing a virtual venue for the types of joint
    training and experimentation required to develop joint requirements and
    sound doctrine.
        That said, JSIMS was not moving effectively toward a solution. It
    was over budget ($12 million in fiscal year 2003), behind schedule
    (more than 1 year for Block 1 and as much as 5 years for Block 2), and
    it would have delivered a product that fails to meet the requirements
    set forth in the Operational Requirements Document.
        General Hagee. Quality modeling and simulation provide critical
    enabling capabilities required to effectively achieve the desired goals
    of joint experimentation, joint training, joint doctrine development,
    joint requirements development, and joint acquisition. Modeling and
    simulation tools have proven their efficacy across a variety of
    applications and functions.
        These powerful tools alleviate the limitations associated with
    physical processes and entities. Simulation-based systems have been
    proven to reduce costs, increase safety, improve the effectiveness, and
    accelerate the timeframes required to perform joint training and
    experimentation. These tools have been used to facilitate doctrine
    development and identify weaknesses on which to focus the requirements
    development process. Joint acquisition programs have repeatedly
    leveraged the benefits of simulation to achieve reduced procurement
    costs, reduced live testing requirements, and reduced design cycle
    times.
        Modeling and simulation are core capabilities that will increase in
    scope and utility in support of our ongoing national training
    transformation initiatives.
        General Jumper. Quality modeling and simulation continues to be
    critical to achieving the Revolution in Military Affairs currently in
    progress and is therefore essential to joint experimentation, training,
    doctrine development, requirements definition, and acquisition.

        72. Senator Bill Nelson. General Shinseki, Admiral Clark, General
    Hagee, and General Jumper, in your view, what DOD agency should be
    responsible for the definition of requirements, research, development,
    testing, evaluation, and procurement of a joint simulation system?
        General Shinseki. The Joint Forces Command is responsible for the
    definition of requirements for a joint simulation system. Those
    requirements are then vetted through the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Committee for validation.
        Admiral Clark. In my view, operationally focused systems,
    supporting training, and experimentation activities should be the
    responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the
    Commander, Joint Forces Command. They should meet the needs of the
    Services and the functional and geographic combatant commanders to the
    maximum extent possible. Systems supporting acquisition, test and
    evaluation, and research and development should be the responsibility
    of the applicable DOD office.
        General Hagee. We have learned from our JSIMS experience that the
    degree of success of a joint acquisition program is dependent upon the
    authority provided to the central joint program management office over
    the personnel, material, and funding resources designated in support of
    that program.
        The Joint Forces Command is well positioned to lead a coordinated
    joint service effort to complete the definition of requirements,
    research, development, testing, evaluation, and procurement of a joint
    simulation system. Their personnel resources could be augmented with
    the requisite level of functional experts and acquisition professionals
    from the respective services and agencies, to include technical support
    from the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office.
        General Jumper. Joint Forces Command should be, and is, responsible
    for compiling and defining the operational requirements of all
    Warfighting Commands and their Component/Supporting Commands that will
    use any joint simulation system. The RDT&E and procurement of any
    potential joint simulation system should be under the direction of
    OSD(AT&L) and assigned service acquisition executives, or as assigned
    by OSD to the authority of an established Joint Program Office.

        [Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 6, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                              SERVICE SECRETARIES

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
    room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
    Warner (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
    Roberts, Allard, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Dole,
    Levin, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, and
    Clinton.
        Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director; Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk.
        Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
    professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
    staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff member;
    Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
    professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
    staff member; Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member;
    Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Joseph T.
    Sixeas, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general
    counsel; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
    staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Creighton
    Greene, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, professional
    staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; and Peter K.
    Levine, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew Kent,
    and Sara R. Mareno.
        Committee members' assistants present: Dan Twining,
    assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
    Senator Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts;
    Douglas Flanders and Jayson Roehl, assistants to Senator
    Allard; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James
    P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier,
    assistant to Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to
    Senator Talent; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator Graham;
    Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J.
    Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Barry Gene (B.G.)
    Wright, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to
    Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator
    Akaka; William K. Sutey and Peter A. Contostavlos, assistants
    to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
    Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton;
    Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze,
    assistant to Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. Good morning. The committee meets today to
    receive testimony of the Secretaries on the respective posture
    of the military Services and President Bush's budget request
    for fiscal year 2004 and the future years defense program. I
    was thinking of the gravity of the times that we face today and
    how Senator Levin and I will have our 25th annual hearing with
    Service Secretaries this morning. I cannot recall in years past
    when there has been a more important time to have each of you
    address the readiness of your forces as they are poised to
    respond to such orders as the Commander in Chief may direct.
        Secretary White, Secretary Roche, we welcome you back
    before the committee. Secretary Johnson, congratulations on
    your recognition to become the Acting Secretary of the Navy. We
    have a great respect for Secretary England for his service to
    the Department of Defense and, in particular, to the Department
    of the Navy. We miss him, but he will do well in his
    challenging assignment of homeland defense.
        We look forward to this annual hearing, your personal and
    professional views on how the budget sets forth the
    requirements of your respective Services to accomplish their
    current missions, as well as the requirements to modernize and
    recapitalize for future missions of this committee's oversight
    responsibilities and decision-making functions. Indeed, you all
    deserve a tremendous amount of credit for the service you have
    provided to our Nation, and most particularly to our men and
    women in uniform and their families.
        Two weeks ago, Senators Levin, Roberts, Rockefeller, and I
    had the pleasure of visiting our U.S. military personnel in the
    Persian Gulf region, as well as in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I
    can assure you that we found our forces ready, focused, well-
    equipped, and committed to respond to any orders that they may
    receive. Our forces are poised in support of our diplomatic
    efforts, and I wish to stress that over and over again, to the
    extent diplomacy may work. I think all of us still have a
    glimmer of hope that it could succeed, brought about simply by
    the forces under your respective departments, together with
    those of Great Britain and other nations of the coalition of
    the willing.
        That is the backbone of the diplomacy. As we prepare for a
    possible confrontation with Iraq, if diplomacy fails, our
    forces continue to fight the global war on terrorism elsewhere.
    The capture in Pakistan this week of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the
    mastermind of the September 11 attack, is another significant
    blow to the al Qaeda leadership and a reminder that we have not
    been distracted by events in Iraq and, indeed, our President
    and the Department of Defense have kept up the high tempo
    worldwide on terrorism.
        North Korea poses a problem, and we note with interest the
    response that our President has directed there in his efforts
    again to have a multilateral resolution of that problem between
    Russia, China, South Korea, and the United States. As we focus
    on these important threats, we must not forget our deployed
    forces in Europe or Asia, as well as those operations deployed
    in the Balkans, Philippines, Colombia, and elsewhere, but that
    our military personnel are able to successfully conduct such
    wide-ranging missions is a tribute to their ability, their
    training, their dedication, and the support they receive from
    their families. They truly are the best, most capable military
    force in modern history, so I urge you to sustain and approve
    that action.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We join in
    welcoming our Service Secretaries. Congratulations, Secretary
    Johnson, on your appointment. You have been here before, but in
    a different capacity. Secretary Roche, Secretary White, it is
    always good to have you two in front of us.
        At this momentous time, first and foremost on our mind is
    whether our forces have everything they need to succeed in
    their missions, should they be called upon to go to war. That
    is obviously something which every member of this committee,
    every Member of Congress, every American, wants to be assured
    about. As the Chairman mentioned, Senator Rockefeller, Senator
    Roberts, the Chairman, and I paid a visit to those troops and
    found them to be of high morale, well-motivated, and well-
    trained. They feel that they are ready.
        We know that the debate about whether to go to war and if
    so, whether we should go with or without authorization of the
    United Nations, is part of a debate in a democratic society.
    They are there to protect a democratic society. All of the
    debate and discussions are part of that society, I have found
    them not to be dismayed by the kind of discussion, debate, on
    the demonstrations that have occurred. They are focused on
    their duty and their mission, and that they are aware of the
    fact that should they be called upon to go to war, that they
    will have the 100 percent support of the American people.
    Regardless of what the positions are that Americans take and
    under what conditions we should initiate an attack, there is
    going to be total unity in this country. Our troops feel it
    relative to the support for them, should, in fact, they be
    called upon.
        We also meet at a time when we have a budget which we must
    deal with. This year again, we have authorized significant
    increases in our defense budget over the last 5 years, where
    there have been sustained budget increases for the Department
    of Defense. They have been appropriate. We have been able to
    protect our readiness and our modernization at the same time we
    have provided for significant pay increases and benefit
    improvements for our forces. The men and women of the military
    deserve no less.
        What is left out of this budget, however, are the estimated
    costs of going to war, war itself, the post-Saddam period, as
    well as the additional costs of maintaining waging a war on
    terrorism. The estimates, even with ranges, have not been
    provided to us, despite many requests, and these costs are
    real. They are going to be significant, but they are not
    included in the budget request.
        Some of us feel as a matter of fact that it is
    irresponsible for us to adopt a budget resolution without
    knowing what these ranges are. The best case and worst case
    scenario estimates that will make such a big difference to the
    budgets this year and in the future are not available to us. At
    the same time, a budget request is before us which has
    significant tax cuts, for instance, which will cause a
    reduction in revenues to the Government at the same time we are
    on the verge of going to war and having extensive costs in a
    postwar period.
        There will be more on that in the next few days as to
    whether or not it is wise to proceed with adoption of a budget
    resolution in the absence of those estimates. At least as
    important is how much money we spend on national defense and
    the question of how those dollars should be spent; and that, of
    course, is the annual quest of this committee. We have to go
    through the budget request to determine what is the best way to
    spend the resources which are allocated and dedicated to the
    defense of this Nation.
        Each of our military departments has been undergoing a
    change since the end of the Cold War. The efforts of the
    Services to reshape themselves, to respond to the emerging
    security environment, will succeed if we have strong
    leadership, and the leadership of the witnesses that we have
    before us today.
        The task of charting a vision and getting the men and women
    of the Services to accept that vision will strongly depend upon
    the efforts of the three witnesses before us. I applaud them
    for their efforts to date and encourage them, as all of us
    would, to continue to exert that strong leadership to make
    these reformation efforts a reality.
        So, Mr. Chairman, we have some tough choices. There's an
    increase to the size of the budget. We nonetheless have some
    major decisions that we must make, and we look forward to
    hearing from our witnesses today to help us with that process.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. The full
    statement of each witness will be placed into the record. To
    the extent you wish in your opening remarks, if you would
    abbreviate, thank you very much. We will start with the senior
    Service, the United States Army, and Secretary of the Army
    White.

        STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS E. WHITE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

        Secretary White. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
    distinguished members of the committee, I am grateful for this
    opportunity to speak with you today about the Army. Our
    priorities remain the same: win the global war on terrorism and
    transformation.
        First and foremost, I wish to thank this committee for your
    continued support of the Army. The fiscal year 2003 budget has
    allowed us to make significant improvements in many key areas.
    We have structured our budget request for fiscal year 2004 in
    the same fashion as fiscal year 2003 based on our top
    priorities of people, readiness, and transformation.
        Thanks to your support, we are making significant strides
    in the personnel area: the fully funded pay raise for all
    soldiers, targeted pay raises in selective grades,
    significantly reducing soldier out-of-pocket expenses for
    housing, and an accelerated Residential Communities Initiative
    to improve on-post quarters for our families, to name just a
    few initiatives to support our soldiers.
        To shift away from our individual replacement system, we
    are examining options for unit-manning initiatives that will
    enhance the cohesion of combat readiness of our formations
    while improving the predictability of assignment patterns for
    Army families.
        We have had since September 11 over 30,000 National Guard
    and Reserve soldiers on active duty consistently for the past
    18 months. As of today, we have activated over 128,000 of these
    reservists for current potential future operations. These
    Reserve component soldiers are performing magnificently, and we
    appreciate the tremendous support that they have received from
    their employers, as well as the American public. We recognize
    the unique sacrifices made by these citizen soldiers as they
    step up to do their duty as citizens and patriots.
        From a readiness perspective, the Army is ready for any
    additional operations we are ordered to perform in the future,
    and our great soldiers are successfully meeting our many
    current obligations around the world. With your help in fiscal
    year 2003 and again in our fiscal year 2004 budget request, we
    fully funded training requirements for the force, significantly
    improved our spare parts availability, and accelerated fielding
    of soldier support items and unit communications equipment to
    make our unit as ready as possible.
        Having said that, our operations tempo (OPTEMPO) has never
    been higher in my nearly 40 years of experience with the Army.
    While we have fully funded normal OPTEMPO and training,
    including the full complement of pre-September 11 missions such
    as Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sinai, and Korea, we have many other
    obligations as we pursue the global war on terrorism as part of
    the joint force. Post-September 11 missions of the past 18
    months include Operation Noble Eagle, here at home, Operation
    Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, as well as operations in the
    Philippines and elsewhere. Finally, we have a significant flow
    of Army forces into the Persian Gulf in support of the
    diplomatic efforts to ensure the disarmament of Iraq. Given
    this level of activity, it should come as no surprise that
    supplemental funding will be required in 2003.
        We are working hard to balance our readiness imperative
    with realistic training with our obligations as good stewards
    of the environment with our range preservation initiative that
    you are considering. It is essential for us to restore the
    balance between the use of military lands for their uniquely
    military purposes and the need for environmental protection and
    species preservation. The readiness of our soldiers going into
    harm's way depends upon that, so we ask for your help with this
    important initiative.
        From a transformation perspective, we are transforming our
    Army even while we execute combat operations and prepare for
    future contingencies, which is an absolute necessity. There
    will be no operational problems. We are transforming the
    business side of the Army as well as the operational forces,
    and we are transforming within the joint context, not
    necessarily in a service-centered manner. We have held steady
    on the azimuth established by our Chief of Staff, General Eric
    Shinseki, in 1999, almost 4 years ago. In fiscal year 2004 we
    fund a fourth of our six Stryker brigades in the field at Fort
    Polk, Louisiana, with the Second Armed Cavalry regiment.
        We remain focused on the Objective Force for the
    restructured Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter program.
    We are postured to successfully meet acquisition Milestone B in
    May for the Future Combat System (FCS). FCS includes the Non-
    Line-of-Sight (NLOS) variant and the initial fielding
    increment, which will meet the cannon requirement previously
    addressed by the Crusader program. We remain on a glide path to
    field the first Objective Force unit in 2008 with an initial
    operational capability some 2 years later.
        On the business side of the Army, we fully solicit your
    support for the Department of Defense (DOD) transformation
    package which will greatly streamline our operations and give
    us flexibility to manage the Department in the most efficient
    manner. In the same vein, our business transformation
    initiatives are designed to achieve greater value for the
    taxpayer dollar. Our Residential Communities Initiative (RCI)
    to privatize family housing continues to be an enormous
    success, and we deeply appreciate your support. Every set of
    family quarters in the United States Army will be up to
    standard by 2007, and I can't think of any better initiative to
    support families in an Army that is a married Army than RCI.
    Furthermore, we continue to privatize on-base utilities,
    centralize Army-wide contracting, and consolidate installation
    management activities into a new agency.
        Finally, we are conducting what we call our ``Third Wave
    Initiative,'' which seeks to eliminate all non-core functions
    currently consuming Army people and dollars and find some other
    way to accomplish those tasks. Rest assured, we will pursue
    these business initiatives in full consultation with Congress.
        From a risk perspective, balancing the risk associated with
    near-term modernization and mid-term transformation has
    required us to make some very tough choices. We have had to
    terminate or restructure numerous modernization programs for
    the current force to generate the capital to fund the
    transformation. In a nutshell, our 2004 budget supplement funds
    people, readiness, and transformation at the expense of some of
    our infrastructure accounts and current force modernization. We
    made these judgments only after a careful balancing of
    operational risk, and the risk of not transforming, to provide
    the capabilities the Army needs to meet the obligations of mid-
    and long-term joint operational concepts.
        In conclusion, I wish to return to those who I mentioned
    first in my remarks and those that are most important in the
    Army, our soldiers. Their performance in Afghanistan speaks
    volumes. In the dead of winter in a landlocked country in the
    toughest terrain imaginable, they collapsed the Taliban regime
    and put al Qaeda on the run. It's been my privilege as it has
    been your privilege to visit them in Afghanistan, Kuwait,
    Bosnia, Kosovo, and all around this country.
        You could not meet a finer group of young Americans. They
    are, flat-out in my 40 years experience, the best soldiers I
    have ever seen, and we all ought to be very proud of them. Let
    me assure you they are ready for whatever contingencies and
    operations the President sees fit to order. Thank you for this
    opportunity to discuss the 2004 budget submission of the Army.
    I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary White follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas E. White
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you
    for this opportunity to report to you today on the posture of the
    United States Army.
        America's Armed Forces are the most powerful in the world.
    America's Army remains the most respected landpower to our friends and
    allies and the most feared ground force to those who would threaten the
    interests of the United States.
        Since before the birth of the Nation, American soldiers have
    instilled hope in a noble dream of liberty. They have remained on point
    for the Nation through nine wars, and the intervals of peace in the
    years between--defending the Constitution and preserving freedom.
    Magnificent in their selfless service, long in their sense of duty, and
    deep in their commitment to honor, soldiers have kept the United States
    the land of the free and the home of the brave. This is our legacy. Our
    soldiers who serve today preserve it.
        In October 1999, we unveiled our vision for the future--``Soldiers,
    on point for the Nation, transforming this, the most respected army in
    the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant
    across the full spectrum of operations.'' The attacks against our
    Nation on September 11, 2001, and the ensuing war on terrorism validate
    the Army's vision--people, readiness, transformation--and our efforts
    to change quickly into a more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile,
    lethal, survivable, and sustainable force.
        While helping to fight the global war on terrorism, the Army is in
    the midst of a profound transformation. Readiness remains our constant
    imperative--today, tomorrow, and the day after. Transformation,
    therefore, advances on three broad axes: perpetuating the Army's legacy
    by maintaining today's readiness and dominance; bridging the
    operational gap with an Interim Force of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams;
    and fielding the Objective Force to fight and win conflicts in the
    years beyond this decade.
        As they have throughout the Army's 227-year history, soldiers
    remain the centerpiece of our formations. Versatile and decisive across
    the full spectrum of joint missions, land forces have demonstrated time
    and again the quality of their precision in joint operations. Our
    responsibility is to provide soldiers with the critical capabilities
    needed for the tough missions we send them on.
        After 3\1/2\ years of undiminished support from the administration
    and Congress, and the incredible dedication of soldiers and Department
    of the Army civilians, we have begun to deliver the Army Vision. With
    continued strong support, we will win the war against global terrorism,
    meet our obligations to our friends and allies, remain ready to prevail
    over the unpredictable, and transform ourselves for decisive victories
    on future battlefields.
        We have achieved sustainable momentum in Army transformation; the
    framework is in place to see the Objective Force fielded this decade.

                       THE ARMY--AT WAR AND TRANSFORMING

        The United States is at war, and the Army serves the Nation by
    defending the Constitution and our way of life. It is our nonnegotiable
    contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
    decisively.
        In the weeks immediately following the attacks of September 11,
    2001, Special Operations Forces (SOF) infiltrated Afghanistan,
    penetrated al Qaeda and Taliban strongholds, and leveraged all
    available long-range, joint fires, enabling the Northern Alliance to
    begin dismantling the Taliban. By January 2002, U.S. and Allied
    conventional force reinforcements began to set the stage for Operation
    Anaconda, where soldiers, demonstrating courage and determination under
    the most challenging conditions, defeated al Qaeda at altitude on the
    escarpments overlooking the Shah-e-kot Valley.
        Today, more than 198,000 soldiers remain deployed and forward
    stationed in 120 countries around the globe, conducting operations and
    training with our friends and allies. Decisively engaged in the joint
    and combined fight against global terrorism, soldiers are serving with
    distinction--at home and abroad. Soldiers from both the active and the
    Reserve component have remained ``on point'' for the Nation in the
    Balkans for 7 years, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for 12 years, in the
    Sinai for 21 years, and in Korea and Europe for over 50 years. At the
    publication of the Army Posture Statement, there were more than 110,000
    Reserve component soldiers mobilized for active Federal service in
    support of Operation Noble Eagle and Operation Enduring Freedom. Even
    as we transform, soldiers will remain ready to answer the calls of the
    Nation to defeat well-trained, determined, and dangerous adversaries
    who miscalculate in taking on the best led, the best-equipped, and the
    best-trained army in the world.
        At war and transforming, the Army is accelerating change to harness
    the power of new technologies, different organizations, and revitalized
    leader development initiatives to remain at the head of the line. To
    accomplish this, Army transformation advances along three major axes
    towards attainment of the Objective Force. We selectively recapitalize
    and modernize today's capabilities to extend our overmatch in staying
    ready to defend our homeland, keep the peace in areas important to the
    Nation, and win the war against global terrorism. Stryker Brigade
    Combat Teams--our Interim Force--will bridge the current operational
    gap between our rapidly-deployable light forces and our later-arriving
    heavy forces, paving the way for the arrival of the Objective Force. By
    2010, the Army's Objective Force--organized, equipped, and trained for
    ground dominance, cyber-warfare, and space exploitation--will provide
    the Nation the capabilities it must have to remain the global leader,
    the strongest economy in the world, and the most respected and feared
    military force, by our friends and allies and our enemies,
    respectively.
        The surprise attacks against our Nation and Operation Enduring
    Freedom, in response to those attacks, validated the Army Vision and
    provided momentum to our efforts to transform ourselves into an
    instrument of national power that provides full spectrum operational
    capabilities that are strategically responsive and capable of decisive
    victory. In a little over 3 years, we have begun to realize the Army
    Vision--People, Readiness, and Transformation.
        The transforming Army is enriching as a profession and nurturing to
    families whose sacrifice has borne the readiness of the force for the
    past 10 years. Our well-being initiatives are our commitment to reverse
    this trend by giving our people the opportunity to become self-reliant,
    setting them up for personal growth and success, aggressively investing
    in family housing, and revitalizing single-soldier living space in our
    barracks. Our manning initiatives have filled our line divisions and
    other early deploying units to dampen the internal turbulence of
    partially filled formations and help put a measure of predictability
    back into the lives of our families.
        The Army has carefully balanced the risk between remaining ready
    for today's challenges and preparing for future crises. With unwavering
    support from the administration, Congress, our soldiers, and Department
    of the Army civilians, the Army has made unprecedented progress in its
    efforts to transform.
        We will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the first
    Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) this summer and demonstrate the
    increased responsiveness, deployability, agility, verastility,
    lethality, survivability, and sustainability that SBCTs provide to
    combatant commanders. In a little over 3 years from initial concept to
    fielded capability, the SBCTs will allow us to glimpse the potential
    for acquisition reform in paving the way for delivery of the Objective
    Force.
        We have constructed the framework for achieving the Objective Force
    this decade: a Transformation Campaign Plan with Roadmap, the Objective
    Force White Paper, the Operational and Organizational plans for the
    Objective Force Unit of Action, and the Operational Requirements
    Document for the Future Combat System of Systems.
        Additionally, the Army is poised to fill ground maneuver's most
    critical battlefield deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with
    Comanche, a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft that is a
    cornerstone of the Objective Force.
        All along the way, we have tested our concepts in wargames and
    experiments, checked and rechecked our azimuth to the Objective Force
    weekly and monthly, and look forward to a successful Future Combat
    System Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board decision in May of this
    year.
        However, we cannot accelerate Army Transformation without
    transforming the way the Army does business--from transformation of
    logistics and acquisition to personnel and installation transformation.
    Revolutionizing Army business management practices achieves the best
    value for taxpayers' dollars; conserves limited resources for
    investment in people, readiness, and transformation; enhances
    management of personnel systems, installations and contracting; and
    augments our potential to accelerate arrival of the Objective Force.
    Changing the Army is first about changing the way we think, and better
    business practices represent practical application of common sense
    initiatives that best serve the Army and our Nation.
        We are proud of our progress. We are grateful for the strong
    congressional support that has helped put the Army on its approach
    march to the Objective Force. The Army 2003 Posture Statement describes
    our tremendous progress in transformation--an orchestrated campaign,
    synchronized with OSD and joint transformation, to achieve the
    Objective Force and keep America's Army the dominant landpower in the
    world.

            THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT--THE REQUIREMENT TO TRANSFORM

        During the last two decades of the 20th century, information-age
    technologies dramatically changed the political, economic, and military
    landscapes. Operation Desert Shield, Operation Desert Storm, and
    operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, and Kosovo illustrated the requirement
    for transforming our forces to meet the evolving, strategic
    requirements of our Nation. Survivable and extremely lethal, our heavy
    forces effectively met the requirements for which they were designed;
    yet, they were slow to deploy and difficult to sustain. Conversely, our
    light forces were rapidly deployable, but they lacked the protection,
    lethality, and tactical mobility that we seek across the spectrum of
    military operations. We were successful in winning the Cold War and, as
    a result, smaller than we had been in 40 years. The Army no longer had
    the luxury of specialized forces built to confront a single and
    narrowly defined threat like the Warsaw Pact countries.
        Today's challenges are more complex; threats are elusive and
    unpredictable. The fight against international terrorism has
    overshadowed, but not eliminated, other potential crises. Tension
    between India and Pakistan persists; stability between China and Taiwan
    is tenuous; and concern over North Korea escalates. Threats of
    transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD)--often financed by organized crime, illicit drug
    transactions, trafficking in women and children, and the sale of arms--
    further complicate the security environment. Geopolitical trends such
    as scarce resources, youth population-spike in underdeveloped
    countries, aging populations in developed countries, and the growth of
    mega-cities, among others, presage a future strategic environment of
    diverse and widely distributed threats.
        Fully appreciating the internal and external difficulties that
    profound change engenders, we assessed the operational challenges of
    the new century against the capabilities of our Cold War Army,
    recognized the opportunity to leverage the inherent combat power of the
    technological revolution, and set a clear path ahead--the Army Vision.
        The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) reaffirms our military's
    highest priority--defending the United States. To do this effectively,
    we assure our allies and friends; dissuade future military competition;
    deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and
    decisively defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails. The NSS directs
    the military to transform to a capabilities-based force ready to
    respond to unpredictable adversaries and security crises. The Objective
    Force meets these NSS requirements, and Army transformation will
    enhance our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations, achieve
    decisive results at the time and place of our choosing, and safeguard
    the Nation's ability to exercise our right of self-defense through
    preemption, when required.
        The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a capabilities-based
    approach to defense planning that provides broader military options
    across the operational spectrum, from pre- to post-conflict operations.
    The force-sizing construct--1-4-2-1--takes into account the number,
    scope, and simultaneity of tasks assigned the military: it sizes the
    force for defense of the U.S. homeland (1), forward deterrence in four
    critical regions (4), the conduct of simultaneous warfighting missions
    in two regions (2)--while preserving the President's option to call for
    decisive victory in one of those conflicts (1)--and participation in
    multiple, smaller contingency operations.

        THE ARMY--SERVING TODAY, BALANCING RISK, MANAGING TRANSFORMATION

        Soldiers are the most precise and responsive means to strike and
    then control enemy centers of gravity on the ground--where people live,
    work, and govern. American soldiers are disciplined, professional, and
    trained for success in diverse missions; they are the foundation of a
    flexible force that accomplishes its missions in the non-linear
    battlespace by integrating new, innovative technologies and techniques
    with current systems and doctrine. Our people adapt under the harshest
    conditions, whether in the deserts of Kuwait and the Sinai, the
    mountains and rice paddies of Korea, or the tropics of the Democratic
    Republic of Timor-Leste.
        These demanding commitments mean we must nurture a balance between
    current and near-term readiness and our transformation to meet future
    challenges. The Army has accepted reasonable operational risk in the
    mid-term in order to fund our transformation to the Objective Force. To
    avoid unacceptable risk, we are monitoring closely the current
    operational situation as we support the combatant commanders in the war
    against terror, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute the long-term
    effort to defeat transnational threats. We have designed and
    implemented the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) to provide a
    precision, predictive tool with which to monitor the Army and make
    appropriate adjustments to preserve current readiness. Our surge
    capacity in the industrial base further reduces current risk by keeping
    production lines warm and responsive. Our first Stryker Brigade Combat
    Team will provide the combatant commanders with a new capability to
    further mitigate operational risk--even as we transform to the
    Objective Force.

        REALIZING THE ARMY VISION--PEOPLE, READINESS, AND TRANSFORMATION

        In 1999, the Army announced its vision to transform into a more
    strategically responsive force, dominant across the full spectrum of
    military operations. The Army vision addresses three essential
    components: people, readiness, and transformation. Soldiers are the
    heart of the Army, the centerpiece of our formations, and the
    foundation of our combat power. Readiness remains our overarching
    imperative; it is the means by which we execute our nonnegotiable
    contract with the American people--to fight and win our Nation's wars,
    decisively. To preserve readiness while rapidly changing,
    transformation advances on three major axes: preserving our Army legacy
    by maintaining readiness and dominance today; bridging the operational
    gap with Stryker Brigades--the Interim Force; and fielding the
    Objective Force this decade to keep the Army dominant in the years
    beyond this decade.
        Realizing the Army vision requires the concerted effort of the
    entire Army, across all components--from warfighting to institutional
    support organizations. The Army published its Transformation Campaign
    Plan in April 2001 to synchronize and guide this complex undertaking.
    The November 2001 Objective Force White Paper describes the advanced
    capabilities and core technologies needed to build the Objective Force.
    The Army's June 2002 Army transformation Roadmap defines transformation
    as a continuous process--with specific waypoints--that increases our
    contributions to the joint force while achieving the six DOD critical
    operational goals. The result will be a more strategically responsive
    and full spectrum dominant force capable of prompt and sustained land
    combat operations as a member of the joint force.
        In support of the emerging joint operational concepts and
    architectures, the Army--as the major landpower component--continues to
    develop ground concepts for a full spectrum, and multidimensional
    force. These concepts are producing a joint force that presents
    potential enemies with multiple dilemmas across the operational
    dimensions--complicating their plans, dividing their focus, and
    increasing their chances of miscalculation.
        In future joint operations, Objective Force units will be capable
    of directing major operations and decisive land campaigns with Army
    headquarters. Objective Force headquarters at all levels will provide
    the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with seamless, joint battle command and
    decision superiority. The modularity and scalability of our Objective
    Force formations will provide an unprecedented degree of flexibility
    and adaptability to the combatant commander--providing the right force
    at the right time for decisive outcomes.

                       PEOPLE--OUR MOST VALUABLE RESOURCE

        The Army Vision begins and ends talking about people. People are
    central to everything else we do in the Army. Platforms and
    organizations do not defend this Nation; people do. Units do not train,
    stay ready, grow and develop leadership--they do not sacrifice and take
    risks on behalf of the Nation. People do. Institutions do not
    transform; people do. People remain the engine behind all of our
    magnificent moments as an Army, and the well-being of our people--the
    human dimension of our transformation--is inextricably linked to Army
    readiness.
        In our vision, we recommitted ourselves to doing two things well
    each and every day--training soldiers and civilians and growing them
    into competent, confident, disciplined, and adaptive leaders who
    succeed in situations of great uncertainty. We are dedicated to
    preparing our soldiers to lead joint formations, to enabling our
    headquarters to command and control joint forces, and to providing to
    those joint formations the capabilities only the Army can bring to the
    fight: the ability to control terrain and populations.

                               MANNING THE FORCE

        The objective of our manning strategy is to ensure we have the
    right people in the right places to fully capitalize on their
    warfighting expertise--this is the Army's commitment to the Nation,
    Army leaders, soldiers, and our families. Correctly manning our units
    is vital to assuring that we fulfill our missions as a strategic
    element of national policy; it enhances predictability for our people;
    and it ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform their
    assigned tasks. In fiscal year 2000, we implemented a strategy to man
    our forces to 100 percent of authorized strength, starting with
    divisional combat units. The program expanded in fiscal year 2001 and
    fiscal year 2002 to include early deploying units. In fiscal year 2002,
    we maintained our manning goals and continued to fill our Divisions,
    Armored Cavalry Regiments, and selected Early Deploying Units to 100
    percent in the aggregate, with a 93 to 95 percent skill and grade-band
    match. We remain on target to accomplish our long-term goal of filling
    all Army units to 100 percent of authorized strength.

                       RECRUITING AND RETAINING THE FORCE

        In 1999, the Army missed its recruiting goals for the active
    component (AC) by about 6,300 inductees, and for the Reserve component
    by some 10,000. Our recruiting situation was simply unacceptable, and
    we committed ourselves to decisive steps and reversed that trend.
        In fiscal year 2002, the active component achieved 100 percent of
    its goal in recruiting and retention--for the third consecutive year.
    The Army exceeded its AC 79,500 enlisted accession target in fiscal
    year 2002 and exceeded our aggregate fiscal year 2002 retention
    objective of 56,800 soldiers in all three categories by 1,437. We are
    poised to make the fiscal year 2003 accession target of 73,800, and we
    expect to meet our active component fiscal year 2003 retention target
    of 57,000. The fiscal year 2004 accession target is set at 71,500.
        The Army Reserve has met mission for the last 2 years, and its
    recruiting force is well structured to meet fiscal year 2004
    challenges. The Army Reserve continues to maintain a strong Selected
    Reserve strength posture at 205,484 as of January 17, 2003,--over 100.2
    percent of the fiscal year 2003 end strength objective. Overcoming many
    recruiting and retention challenges in fiscal year 2002, the Army
    National Guard (ARNG) exceeded end strength mission, accessions were
    104.5 percent of goal, and we exceeded reenlistment objectives.
        To ensure that we continue to recruit and retain sufficient
    numbers, we are monitoring the current environment--the global war on
    terrorism (GWOT) and frequent deployments--to determine impact on
    morale, unit cohesiveness, combat effectiveness, and support of well-
    being programs that draw quality people to the Army. We continue to
    examine innovative recruiting and retention initiatives. The challenges
    we face in fiscal year 2003 and 2004 are two-fold: increase recruiter
    productivity and recruiting resources necessary to maintain recruiting
    momentum when the economy becomes more robust. Resourcing recruiting
    pays dividends well beyond accessions in the year of execution. For
    example, Army advertising in fiscal year 2002 influenced not only
    fiscal year 2002 accessions, but also potential recruits who will be
    faced with enlistment decisions in fiscal year 2003 and beyond.

                   RESERVE COMPONENT FULL-TIME SUPPORT (FTS)

        Today, more than 50 percent of our soldiers are in the Reserve
    component (RC). The GWOT and homeland defense are significant
    undertakings that demand a high level of resourcing. The RC has been
    key to our success in these operations. To ensure the Army's RC
    continues to meet ever-increasing demands with trained and ready units,
    the Army plans to increase full-time support authorizations 2 percent
    each year through fiscal year 2012, increasing the FTS from the current
    level of 69,915 to a level of 83,046. The Army recognizes additional
    full-time support authorizations as the number one priority of the Army
    National Guard and Army Reserve leadership.

                               CIVILIAN COMPONENT

        As a comprehensive effort to consolidate, streamline, and more
    effectively manage the force, the Army has begun an initiative to
    transform our civilian personnel system. High quality, well-trained
    civilians are absolutely essential to the readiness of our force and
    our ability to sustain operations today and in the future. Recruiting,
    training, and retaining a highly skilled, dedicated civilian workforce
    is critical in meeting our obligations to the combatant commanders and
    the Nation. Aggressive transformation of our civilian force--in which
    projections through fiscal year 2005 indicate a 16 percent annual
    turnover due to retirements and other losses--will ensure we continue
    to meet those obligations.
        As of fiscal year 2002, the Army employed 277,786 civilian
    personnel. To forecast future civilian workforce needs with precision,
    we developed the Civilian Forecasting System, a sophisticated
    projection model that predicts future civilian personnel requirements
    under various scenarios. The Army is working closely with the Office of
    the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and other Federal agencies to
    demonstrate the power of this system so they can fully leverage its
    capabilities, as well.
        The Civilian Personnel Management System XXI (CPMS XXI) has
    identified the reforms necessary to hire, train, and grow a civilian
    component that supports the transforming Army. To achieve this, we have
    redefined the way civilians are hired, retained, and managed. Mandatory
    experiential assignments will become the vehicle by which we develop
    future leaders. CPMS XXI fully responds to current mandates in the
    President's Management Agenda and incorporates the results of the Army
    Training and Leader Development Panels. For example, two initiatives
    for recruiting well-trained civilians are:

             The Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development
            System--a centrally managed program that accesses and trains
            civilian interns and grows a resource pool of personnel who can
            accede to senior professional positions.
             The DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002 and
            Fiscal Year 2003 provided direct hire authority for critical,
            hard-to-fill medical health care occupations and enabled the
            reduction in average fill-time for these positions to 29 days.

                                ARMY WELL-BEING

        The readiness of the Army is inextricably linked to the well-being
    of our people, and Army well-being is the human dimension of our
    transformation. Well-being responds to the physical, material, mental,
    and spiritual needs of all Army people--soldiers, civilians, retirees,
    veterans, and their families. We recognize the fundamental relationship
    between well-being programs and institutional outcomes such as
    readiness, retention, and recruiting. To support mission preparedness
    as well as individual aspirations, well-being integrates policies,
    programs, and human resource issues into a holistic, systematic
    framework that provides a path to personal growth and success and gives
    our people the opportunity to become self-reliant. We recruit soldiers,
    but we retain families--well-being programs help make the Army the
    right place to raise a family. When our families are cared for,
    soldiers can better focus on their mission--training, fighting, and
    winning our Nation's wars, decisively.
        Soldiers appreciate the Nation's devotion to them, and they are
    grateful for the country's recognition of their service and sacrifices.
    Recent improvements to the Montgomery GI Bill, Tricare for Life,
    Tricare Reform, Retired Pay Reform, the 4.1 percent general pay
    increase, and additional pay increases in 2003, are all important to
    soldiers and their families. These initiatives have helped the Army
    respond to the well-being needs of our people. Army voluntary education
    programs improve our combat readiness by expanding soldier skills,
    knowledge, and aptitudes to produce confident, competent leaders. Other
    well-being initiatives include:

             Spouse Employment Summit. The Army is developing
            partnerships with the private sector to enhance employment
            opportunities for Army spouses and provide improved job
            portability for them.
             Spouse Orientation and Leader Development (SOLD). SOLD
            connects Army spouses and enhances their opportunity to serve
            as valued leaders who contribute to the readiness and future of
            the Army and our Nation.
             Army University Access Online. eArmyU offers soldiers
            access to a variety of online, post-secondary programs and
            related educational services. www.eArmyU.com is a comprehensive
            web-portal widely accessible to soldiers, including those in
            Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kuwait.
             In-State Tuition. To level the playing field for
            access to education opportunities, the Army is working to
            encourage States to grant in-State status for military
            personnel and families at public colleges and universities in
            their soldier's State of legal residence and State of
            assignment.
             High School Senior Stabilization. This policy enhances
            predictability by allowing families to request stabilization at
            their sponsor's current duty location if they have a child who
            will graduate from high school during that year.
             Secondary Education Transition Study (SETS) Memorandum
            of Agreement (MOA). Facilitated by the Army, this agreement
            among participating school superintendents is their commitment
            to partner and improve high school transitions for DOD
            children. Currently, over 110 school superintendents have
            signed the SETS MOA.

       LEADER DEVELOPMENT--TRAINING SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS, AND GROWING
                                    LEADERS

        The Army is a profession--the Profession of Arms. Conducting
    decisive ground combat operations in defense of the United States and
    its interests is a core competency of this profession. The development
    of each member of the Army is the foundation of lifelong devotion to
    duty--while in uniform and upon returning to the civilian sector.
        By its nature, our profession is extraordinarily complex and
    dangerous. The American people entrust the Army with the sacred
    responsibility to apply lethal force in defense of U.S interests. As
    such, the Profession of Arms must remain firmly grounded in
    constitutional values and must constantly change and grow to preserve
    its competitive advantage in an evolving strategic environment. At all
    levels, our leaders--military and civilian--must apply their
    professional knowledge in increasingly varied and unique situations
    that are characteristic of today's strategic environment. Ultimately,
    we must grow professional Army leaders who provide wise and discerning
    military judgments founded on long experience and proven professional
    expertise. This capacity is developed only through a lifetime of
    education and dedicated service--in peace and in war.
        Soldiers serve the Nation with the full realization that their duty
    may require them to make the supreme sacrifice for others among their
    ranks. Soldiers fighting the war on terrorism today, those who will
    fight our future wars, and those who have fought in our past wars are
    professional warfighters and a precious national asset. To ensure we
    remain the greatest landpower in the world defending the greatest
    country in the world, the Army and the Nation rely upon their unique
    and hard-earned experiences and skills. To develop the operational
    skills required to defend the Nation, training must remain our number
    one priority.
        The evolving strategic environment, the gravity of our
    responsibilities, and the broad range of tasks the Army performs
    require us to review and periodically update the way we educate, train,
    and grow professional warfighters. The Army's strategic
    responsibilities to the Nation and combatant commanders now embrace a
    wider range of missions. Those missions present our leaders with even
    greater challenges than previously experienced. Therefore, leader
    development is the lifeblood of the profession. It is the deliberate,
    progressive, and continuous process that trains and grows soldiers and
    civilians into competent, confident, self-aware, and decisive leaders
    prepared for the challenges of the 21st century in combined arms,
    joint, multinational, and interagency operations.
        In June 2000, we convened the Army Training and Leader Development
    Panel (ATLDP). The ATLDP's purpose is to identify skill sets required
    of Objective Force soldier and civilian leaders. Further, ATLDP
    assesses the ability of current training and leader development systems
    and policies to enhance these required skills. In May 2001, the Army
    Training and Leader Development Panel Phase I (Officer Study)
    identified 7 strategic imperatives and generated 89 recommendations.
    With those, we validated the requirement to transform our Officer
    Education System (OES)--from the Officer Basic Course through the
    Command and General Staff Officer Course. Additionally, the panel
    reconfirmed the value of Joint Professional Military Education II (JPME
    II) in preparing our leaders for joint assignments. The most
    significant product of the officer ATLDP is our OES transformation.
        ATLDP Phase I (Officer Study) identified three high-payoff
    institutional training and education initiatives for lieutenants,
    captains, and majors. The first of these is the Basic Officer Leader
    Course (BOLC). BOLC will provide a tough, standardized, graduate-level,
    small-unit leadership experience for newly commissioned officers. The
    second of these initiatives is the Combined Arms Staff Course for staff
    officers, and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course for company
    commanders. Both courses will capitalize on advanced distributed
    learning and intensive resident training methods. The third initiative,
    Intermediate Level Education (ILE), will provide all majors with the
    same common core of operational instruction, and it will provide
    additional educational opportunities that are tailored to the officer's
    specific career field, branch, or functional area. Beyond ILE, Army
    officers continue to attend Joint or Senior Service Colleges to develop
    leader skills and knowledge appropriate to the operational and
    strategic levels of the profession.
        Completed in May 2002, the ATLDP Phase II (NCO Study) resulted in
    78 findings and recommendations extending across 6 imperatives--Army
    culture, NCO Education Systems (NCOES), training, systems approach to
    training, training and leader development model, and lifelong learning.
    Among others, the ATLDP Phase II recommended building new training and
    leader development tools for NCOs to replace current methods, as
    required. The ATLDP Phase III (Warrant Officer Study) culminated with
    63 recommendations extending across 4 crucial imperatives.
    Recommendations included clarifying the warrant officer's unique role
    in the Army and improving the Warrant Officer Education System to
    ensure timely training and promotion. The Civilian Training and Leader
    Development Panel (Phase IV) study results are complete, and we are
    forming the Implementation Process Action Team (I-PAT). I-PAT will
    identify actions the Army must take to increase the professional
    development of our civilian workforce. At the senior leader level, the
    Army initiated the Army Strategic Leadership Course (ASLC). The program
    is aimed at teaching principles of strategic leadership, with emphasis
    on visioning, campaign planning, leading change, and transformation. To
    date, we have completed 12 of the foundation courses and 3 alumni
    courses, training the majority of the Army's general officers.

                      READINESS--WINNING OUR NATION'S WARS

    Homeland Security (HLS)
        Defending our Nation--abroad and at home--against foreign and
    domestic threats is fundamental to the Army's legacy, and our
    warfighting focus provides capabilities relevant to HLS requirements.
    HLS missions range from traditional warfighting competencies that
    defeat external threats to the non-combat tasks associated with
    supporting civil authorities in domestic contingencies. Operation Noble
    Eagle mobilized over 16,000 Army National Guard soldiers to protect
    critical infrastructure. These soldiers assisted the Department of
    Transportation in securing our Nation's airports while also playing a
    vital role in securing our Nation's borders. The Army is moving forward
    to provide one Civil Support Team to each State, as required by the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. The Civil
    Support Teams support incident commanders and identify chemical,
    biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) agents and
    substances, assess current and projected consequences, advise on
    response measures, and assist with appropriate requests for additional
    support. To date, OSD has certified 30 of 32 teams, and the Army is
    working to establish additional teams. Collectively, the certified
    teams have performed 890 operational missions since September 11, 2001.
    The Army remains committed to HLS, dedicating AC and RC staffs to focus
    on training, doctrine, planning, and execution of DOD missions in
    support of civil authorities.
    Missile Defense
        Robust missile defense is a vital warfighting requirement that
    protects both our homeland and our deployed forces. Missile defense
    includes far more than a reactive capability to shoot down missiles in
    their reentry phase. Missile defense requires a coherent system of
    sensors; battle command; weapons systems; and active, passive,
    proactive, and reactive operational concepts, all aimed at destroying
    enemy missiles--not only during their reentry phases. Missile defense
    must also be able to destroy enemy missiles on the ground, before they
    launch or during their boost phase once launched. Missile defense is
    inherently a joint capability to which the Army is a major contributor.
        The Army is deploying and employing ground mobile defense assets to
    contribute to this warfighting capability, accelerating the fielding of
    the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC 3) system, and developing
    directed energy weapons that will bring new defense measures to the
    Army and the Nation. We are postured to assume control of the Medium
    Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program in fiscal year 2003 and
    intend to begin fielding by fiscal year 2012.
        MEADS is a transformational program of Objective Force quality and
    a significant improvement on Patriot's capabilities. It will be more
    mobile and more deployable (C-130 capable) than Patriot and cover a
    360-degree radius to Patriot's 120 degrees. It will be effective
    against low radar, cross section cruise missile targets, and require
    only 30 percent of Patriot's manpower. MEADS will be more accurate and
    more sustainable than Patriot.
    Chemical Demilitarization
        In Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145, Congress directed the DOD to
    destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. In turn, the
    Secretary of Defense delegated management of all chemical munitions
    disposal to the Department of the Army. On November 29, 2000, the
    Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, using incineration-based
    technology, completely destroyed the last stockpiles stored at the
    Atoll, and closure operations began in January 2001. The Tooele
    Chemical Agent Disposal Facility has incinerated 44 percent of the
    chemical agents and 81 percent of the munitions stored there. Disposal
    operations at these two sites destroyed 30 percent of the total U.S.
    chemical weapons stockpiles. Construction of incineration facilities at
    Anniston, Alabama; Umatilla, Oregon; and Pine Bluff, Arkansas, is
    complete. Systemization activities are on-going at Aberdeen, Anniston,
    Umatilla, and Pine Bluff. The plan to accelerate the disposal of bulk
    agents using a neutralization process at Aberdeen, Maryland, and
    Newport, Indiana, has been approved. Anniston and Aberdeen are
    scheduled to start destruction in second quarter fiscal year 2003, and
    Newport is scheduled to begin in first quarter fiscal year 2004.
        To comply with treaty agreements and the congressional mandate, we
    must complete the destruction of these weapons by 2007. The treaty
    allows for a one time, 5-year extension to this deadline. With
    continued funding and minimal schedule changes, we will safely destroy
    the U.S. stockpile of lethal chemical agents and munitions at eight
    existing CONUS sites.
    Training the Force
        In October 2002, the Army released Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training
    the Force. Synchronized with other field manuals and publications being
    updated to respond to changes in Army, joint, multinational, and
    interagency operations, FM 7-0 is the capstone doctrinal manual for
    Army training and leader development. It provides the developmental
    methodology for training and growing competent, confident soldiers, and
    it addresses both current and future Objective Force training
    requirements.
        We are transforming the way we fight future wars, and the Army is
    participating fully in a DOD-sponsored program to transform how forces
    train to fight. This effort involves four major initiatives: building
    upon existing service interoperability training; linking component and
    joint command staff planning and execution; enhancing existing joint
    training exercises to address joint interoperability; and studying the
    requirement for dedicated joint training environments for functional
    warfighting and complex joint tasks. The Army is scheduled to host the
    first joint National Training Center (NTC) event at Fort Irwin,
    California, in May 2003. During June 2003, the U.S. Army Forces Command
    will execute the second joint NTC event--JCS exercise Roving Sands.
        During the late 1990s, funding for the recapitalization and
    modernization of the Army's Combat Training Centers was reduced,
    eroding their capability to support their critical missions.
    Additionally, the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment
    and current force instrumentation systems have become difficult to
    maintain. The Army's Combat Training Center modernization program will
    ensure that our premier training areas (NTC at Fort Irwin, Combat
    Maneuver Training Center in Germany, the Joint Readiness Training
    Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, and the Deep Attack Center of Excellence
    near Gila Bend, Arizona) are modernized to provide high quality,
    realistic, full-spectrum joint training. To address these problems, the
    Army will invest nearly $700 million over the next 6 years to modernize
    these training centers.
    OPTEMPO
        In accordance with congressional directives, the Army developed a
    new methodology to prepare budget requests that accurately reflect
    operations and maintenance requirements. In the report submitted in
    July 2002, the Army outlined updated processes that ensure consistency
    in reporting of tank miles and reflect requirements and execution with
    more precision. Management controls initiated in fiscal year 2001 to
    prevent migration of OPTEMPO funds to other areas were highly
    successful and remain in effect.
        The Army's combined arms training strategy determines the
    resourcing requirements to maintain the combat readiness of our forces.
    For the active component, the Army requires 800 ground OPTEMPO miles
    per year for the M1 Abrams tank and corresponding training support; the
    active component flying hour program requires an average of 14.5 live
    flying hours per aircrew each month. Both Army National Guard and the
    Army Reserve aircrew training strategies require 9.0 hours per crew
    each month. The ARNG ground OPTEMPO requirement is a composite average
    of 174 miles in fiscal year 2004, and the Army Reserve (USAR) ground
    OPTEMPO requirement is 200 tank-equivalent miles in fiscal year 2004.
        While this describes the Army's training strategy, actual execution
    levels from unit to unit have varied depending upon factors such as on-
    going operations, safety of flight messages, and adequate manning of
    combat formations. To this end, the Army has fully funded its AC ground
    OPTEMPO requirement, while its AC flying program is funded to its
    historical execution level of 13.1 flying hours. The RC air and ground
    OPTEMPO are similarly funded to their execution levels, rather than
    their requirement. Although the Army has not always been able to
    execute the training strategy, we have taken steps to have all units
    execute the prescribed training strategy in fiscal year 2003, fiscal
    year 2004, and beyond.
    Force Protection and Antiterrorism
        Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate
    hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel and includes
    family members, resources, facilities, and critical information. In the
    war on terrorism, the area of operations extends from Afghanistan to
    the East Coast and across the United States. Naturally, force
    protection and antiterrorism measures have increased across Army
    installations in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.
        Findings from the Cole Commission, the Downing Report on the Khobar
    Towers bombing, and Army directives to restrict access to installations
    have all led to thorough assessments by the Department of the Army
    Inspector General, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and
    commanders. Our efforts focus on improved force protection policy and
    doctrine; more rigorous training and exercises; improved threat
    reporting and coordination with national intelligence and law
    enforcement agencies; enhanced detection and deterrence capabilities
    for CBRNE threats; increased capabilities and protection for access
    control; and expanded assessments of Major Commands (MACOM) and
    installation force protection programs. Both operational and
    installation environments rely upon secure, networked information
    infrastructure to execute daily enterprise-wide processes and decision-
    making, so the parameters of force protection include contemporary and
    evolving cyber threats, as well.
        The Army's Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) secures the
    Army's portion of the Global Information Grid, secures the digitized
    force, and supports information superiority and network security
    defense-in-depth initiatives. ISSP provides the capability to detect
    system intrusions and alterations and react to information warfare
    attacks in a measured and coordinated manner. To the greatest extent
    possible, it protects warfighters' secure communications--from the
    sustaining base to the foxhole.
        Soldiers, active and Reserve, are heavily engaged in force
    protection and antiterrorism missions. Soldiers guard military
    installations, nuclear power plants, dams and power generation
    facilities; tunnels, bridges, and rail stations; and emergency
    operations centers. During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City,
    Utah, nearly 1,500 ARNG soldiers provided security, and soldiers
    guarded key infrastructure sites during Super Bowl XXXVII in January
    2003. Over 12,500 Reserve component soldiers are currently mobilized
    for Operation Noble Eagle to fulfill force protection requirements, and
    in February 2003, over 8,000 Army National Guard soldiers will support
    Air Force security requirements--a requirement that could reach 9,500
    soldiers. Security of detention facilities and detainees at Guantanamo
    Bay Detention--a long-term detainee mission--requires approximately
    1,500 Army personnel, 50 percent of whom are military police. Army
    Reserve Internment and Resettlement battalions on 6-month rotations
    impact military police availability to CONUS force protection
    requirements.
    Sustainment
        The Army is revolutionizing its logistics process. One initiative,
    the Single Stock Fund (SSF), redirected more than $540 million worth of
    secondary items from stocks to satisfy customer demands between May
    2000--SSF inception--and November 2002. During that same period, we
    redistributed more than $218 million worth of secondary items from the
    authorized stockage levels to meet higher priority readiness
    requirements. By extending national visibility of stockage locations
    and capitalizing inventories into the Army Working Capital Fund, we
    reduced customer wait time by an average of 18.5 percent. The SSF will
    continue to reduce inventory requirements and generate even more
    savings for the Army by creating greater flexibility for the management
    of inventories.
        Another initiative, the National Maintenance Program (NMP),
    enhances weapon system readiness, reliability, and availability rates
    by bringing Army Class IX repair parts to a single national standard.
    Ultimately, increased reliability will reduce overall weapon system
    operating and support cost. Additionally, the NMP centralizes the
    management and control of Army maintenance activities for components
    and end items. NMP will produce appropriately sized Army maintenance
    capacity that still meets total maintenance requirements.
    Strategic Readiness Reporting
        The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999
    requires the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive
    readiness reporting system that objectively measures readiness to
    support the NSS. The Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS) responds
    to and provides a baseline in achieving this critical initiative.
        SRS is a precision readiness measurement tool that provides Army
    leadership with accurate, objective, predictive, and actionable
    readiness information to dramatically enhance resource management
    toward one end--strategic readiness to defend the United States. The
    Army Scorecard--a product of SRS--will integrate readiness data from
    the business arena and the operating, generating, and sustaining forces
    of both the active and Reserve component. Army Scorecard methodology
    focuses on four critical areas: People--investing in soldiers and their
    families; Readiness--maintaining the support capability to the
    combatant commanders' operational requirements; transformation--
    transforming the Army into the Objective Force; and application of
    sound business practices.
        SRS markedly improves how we measure readiness. It gathers timely
    information with precision and expands the scope of the data
    considered. We are further developing this system to leverage leading
    indicators and predict trends--solving problems that affect readiness
    before they become problems, from well-being to weapons platforms. SRS
    will help enable the Army preserve readiness to support combatant
    commanders, invest in soldiers and their families, identify and adopt
    sound business practices, and transform the Army to the Objective
    Force.
    Installations
        Army installations are our Nation's power projection platforms, and
    they provide critical training support to the Army and other members of
    the joint team. Additionally, soldiers, families, and civilians live
    and work on Army installations. The quality of our infrastructure
    directly affects the readiness of the Army and the well-being of our
    soldiers, families, and civilians.
        The Army has traditionally accepted substantial risk in
    infrastructure to maintain its current warfighting readiness. However,
    a decade of chronic under funding has led to a condition in which over
    50 percent of our facilities and infrastructure are in such poor
    condition that commanders rated them as ``adversely affecting mission
    requirements.'' Our facilities maintenance must improve. Over the past
    2 years, with the help of the administration and Congress, the Army has
    begun to rectify this situation with significant increases in funding
    and innovative business practices. These efforts have been dramatically
    successful as we continue to correct a problem that was 10 years in the
    making. Thus, in an effort to prevent future degradation of our
    facilities, the Army has increased its funding for facilities
    sustainment to 93 percent of requirement beginning in fiscal year 2004.

                TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (TIM)

        Recognizing the requirement to enhance support to commanders, the
    Secretary of the Army directed the reorganization of the Army's
    management structure. On October 1, 2002, the Army placed the
    management of Army installations under the Installation Management
    Agency (IMA). IMA is a new field-operating agency of the Assistant
    Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM). Its mission is to
    provide equitable, efficient, and effective management of Army
    installations worldwide to support readiness; enable the well-being of
    soldiers, civilians, and family members; improve infrastructure; and
    preserve the environment. This new management approach eliminates the
    migration of base operations funds to other operational accounts below
    the HQDA level. It also enables the development of multi-functional
    installations to support evolving force structure and Army
    transformation needs. The Army is poised to capitalize on opportunities
    TIM gives us to provide excellence in installations.
        Two programs that significantly increase the well-being of our
    soldiers and their families are the Barracks and the Family Housing
    programs. The Army established the Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP) in
    the late 1990s to improve single soldiers' housing conditions. Through
    2002, we have upgraded or funded-for-upgrade 70 percent of our
    permanent party barracks to soldier suites that consist of two single
    bedrooms with a shared bath and common area. The Army will continue the
    BUP until all permanent party barracks achieve this standard.
        With the strong support of Congress, the Army established the
    Residential Communities Initiative (RCI) for our families. This program
    capitalizes on commercial expertise and private capital to perform a
    non-core function for the Army family housing management. The program
    provides greater value to the Army by eliminating the housing deficit
    at our first 11 sites, while leveraging a $209 million Army investment
    into $4.1 billion of initial private development. The Army's
    privatization program began with 4 pilot projects and will expand to 18
    active projects by the end of fiscal year 2003. Pending OSD and
    congressional approval, 28 projects are planned through 2006 that will
    impact over 72,000 housing units or 80 percent of Army family housing
    in the United States. By the end of 2007, we will have the programs and
    projects in place to meet the OSD goal of eliminating inadequate family
    housing. We will accomplish this goal through RCI and increased Army
    investment in family housing military construction (MILCON) at non-
    privatized installations. The Reserve component (RC) enhances RCI
    through real property exchange authority that is only available to the
    RC. This legislative authority allows the exchange of RC owned property
    with public or private entities and has a tremendous potential to
    improve future Reserve component infrastructure at no governmental
    cost.
        The Army has also aggressively reduced its financial burden and
    physical footprint by disposing of 34 percent of its facilities from a
    1990 high of 116 billion square feet. The Army anticipates that the
    congressional fiscal year 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
    authority will permit additional appropriate reductions. BRAC will
    enable the Army to dispose of excess infrastructure and realign the
    remaining facilities with the requirements of the transforming Army and
    the Objective Force. BRAC will also allow the Army to re-allocate
    resources from closed or realigned installations to other high priority
    requirements.
        The Army continues to improve its utilities infrastructure by
    divesting itself of non-core utility systems' operation and maintenance
    through privatization. As of December 2002, we had privatized 64 of the
    351 systems in the program, and we have an additional 104 presently
    under negotiation.
        As part of our Army Knowledge Management (AKM)--described later in
    more detail--we are modernizing our Installation Information
    Infrastructure--infostructure--to support a network-centric, knowledge-
    based Army. The Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization
    Program (I\3\MP) executes a multi-year, $3.2 billion program for
    upgrades to optical fiber and copper cable, installation of advanced
    digital equipment, and upgrades to Defense Global Information Grid
    gateways. This program will ensure worldwide, high-speed data
    connectivity at Army installations. To date, we have completed 22 of 95
    CONUS installations and initiated upgrades at 4 installations outside
    of the continental United States (OCONUS). We plan to complete I\3\MP
    in 2009.

                   TRANSFORMATION--CHANGING THE WAY WE FIGHT

        The Army is fundamentally changing the way we fight and creating a
    force more responsive to the strategic requirements of the Nation. We
    are building a joint precision maneuver capability that can enter a
    theater at the time and place of our choosing, maneuver at will to gain
    positional advantage, deliver precise joint fires and, if necessary,
    close with and destroy the enemy.
        The Objective Force is an army designed from the bottom up around a
    single, networked, integrated C\4\ISR architecture that will link us to
    joint, interagency, and multi-national forces. It will be a rapidly
    deployable, mounted formation, seamlessly integrated into the joint
    force and capable of delivering decisive victory across the spectrum of
    military operations. Consolidated, streamlined branches and military
    operational specialties comprised of professional warfighters will be
    poised to transition rapidly from disaster relief to high-end
    warfighting operations.
        The Objective Force and its Future Combat System of Systems will
    leverage and deliver with precision the combat power of joint and
    strategic assets. It is a capabilities-based force that rapidly
    responds to the requirements of the strategic environment in which our
    soldiers will be the most strategically relevant and decisively capable
    landpower--no matter the mission, no matter the threats, no matter the
    risks.
        In the final analysis, the Army's combat power does not wear tracks
    or wheels--it wears boots. No platform or weapon system can match a
    soldier's situational curiosity and awareness. It is the soldiers'
    ability to discern and to think, their ingenuity and resourcefulness,
    their endurance and perseverance, and their plain grit that make them
    the most reliable precision weapon in our inventory. Soldiers remain
    the centerpiece of our formations.
        To help guide our transformation efforts, the Army leverages
    lessons-learned from extensive experimentation and wargaming. We are
    working to harness the power of knowledge, the benefits of science and
    technology, and innovative business solutions to transform both the
    operational and institutional Army into the Objective Force. The Army's
    annual Title 10 Wargames provide critical insights for developing the
    Objective Force. Likewise, results from joint experiments--Millennium
    Challenge 2002 and other Service Title 10 Wargames like Global
    Engagement, Navy Global, and Expeditionary Warrior, to name a few--also
    inform these efforts.
        The Army is fully committed to joint experimentation as a means to
    examine and assess Objective Force contributions to the strategic,
    operational, and tactical levels of joint warfare. The Army has
    established a joint/Army Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E)
    Task Force to ensure that Army CD&E efforts are synchronized with joint
    CD&E. This task force makes certain that joint experiment lessons-
    learned inform the design and development of the Objective Force. This
    year, the Army's Title 10 Wargame--co-hosted by Commander, Joint Forces
    Command--will focus on the joint force that will fight the next battle.
    Linked to Joint Forces Command's Pinnacle Impact 03 experiment, it will
    be conducted within the context of a future 1-4-2-1 global scenario and
    the emerging Joint Operations Concept. The Army is committed to these
    efforts, and in this budget we have nearly doubled last year's funding
    of these exercises.
        Joint, interagency, multinational, and Army warfighting experiments
    provide invaluable opportunities for the Army to experiment with
    innovative approaches to warfighting and to test new tactics,
    techniques, procedures, organizations, processes, and technology. In
    Millennium Challenge 2002, the largest joint experiment in U.S.
    history, the Army demonstrated four vital capabilities it brings to the
    joint fight:

             the ability to attain and maintain information
            superiority (knowledge);
             the ability to conduct decisive maneuver to enable
            dominant joint maneuver;
             the ability to defeat the opposition in an anti-access
            environment through rapid entry and employment capabilities;
            and
             the ability to support and sustain rapid combat power
            efficiently by reducing the operational and tactical logistics
            footprint.

        To evaluate the effectiveness of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
    (SBCT) concepts for battalion and company operations in a joint force,
    the Army employed a SBCT unit during Millennium Challenge. Less than 4
    weeks after Stryker vehicles were delivered to the first unit at Fort
    Lewis, the unit demonstrated rapid air and sealift deployability and
    integrated into the exercise well. Additionally, when given a mission
    on short notice to support a Marine Corps unit in ground operations,
    the SBCT unit demonstrated its agility and versatility.
    Balancing Risk as We Manage Change
        Balancing risk is integral to Army transformation. To maintain
    current readiness while we transform, we are managing operational risk:
    risk in current readiness for near-term conflicts with future risk--the
    ability to develop new capabilities and operational concepts that will
    dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges. The Army has
    accepted risk in selective modernization and recapitalization, and we
    continue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, the
    well-being of our people, transformation, the war on terrorism, and new
    operational commitments. Since 1999, the Army has terminated 29
    programs and restructured 20 others for a total savings of $12.8
    billion. These funds were reallocated to resource the Stryker Brigades
    and essential Objective Force research and development.
        In Program Budget 2004 and its associated Five-Year Defense Plan
    (FYDP), the Army has generated an additional $22 billion of savings by
    terminating 24 additional systems and reducing or restructuring 24
    other systems. To accelerate achieving the Objective Force capabilities
    and mitigating operational risk, the Army reinvested these savings in
    the development of transformational capabilities in these and other
    programs:

             Future Combat System--$13.5 billion
             Precision Munitions--$3.2 billion
             Sensors and Communications--$2.3 billion
             Science and Technology--$1.1 billion
             Missile and Air Defense--$1.1 billion

        The operational risk associated with the decreased funding for
    certain current programs is acceptable as long as we field Stryker
    Brigades on schedule and accelerate the fielding of the Objective Force
    for arrival this decade. We will continue to reassess the risk
    associated with system reductions and related organizational changes
    against operational requirements and the strategic environment.
    An Information Enabled Army
        Achieving the full spectrum dominance of the Objective Force
    requires changing the way we fight. Changing the way we fight requires
    a holistic transformation of logistics, personnel, installation
    management, acquisition, aviation, business practices--every aspect of
    the Army must transform. The Objective Force requires innovative
    changes and out-of-the-box ingenuity in the way we take care of our
    people and manage the information and material that enhances their
    readiness and answers their needs--both personal and professional, at
    home and in the short sword warfight at foxhole level. Simply put, we
    cannot achieve the Objective Force capabilities without leveraging the
    full potential of the technological advances that our Nation's
    industrial base and science and technology (S&T) communities are
    developing. The Army has consolidated management of information
    technologies (IT) into a single effort--Army Knowledge Management
    (AKM). AKM capitalizes on IT resources unique to our Nation and
    harnesses them for transformation, for the Army, and for the combatant
    commanders.
        Information management is critical to achieving the Army Vision,
    and Army Knowledge Management supports transformation through the
    development and implementation of a network-centric, knowledge-based
    Army architecture interoperable with the joint system. AKM will
    accelerate the detect-decide-deliver planning processes and enable
    warfighters to see the adversary first--before our forces are detected;
    understand the common relevant operating picture first; act against
    adversaries first; and finish the warfight with decisive victories--see
    first, understand first, act first, finish decisively. AKM will provide
    knowledge at the point of decision for all leaders--from the factory to
    the foxhole.
        Enabling collaborative mission planning and execution among widely
    dispersed locations around the globe, AKM will provide a rapid and
    seamless flow and exchange of actionable information and knowledge. The
    network-centric operations that AKM enables will decrease our logistic
    footprint and enhance sustainability of the Objective Force through
    multi-nodal distribution networks--reaching forward to the theater and
    back to installations. Advanced information technologies will
    dramatically enhance battle command. Command, control, communications,
    and computer (C\4\) decision tools seamlessly linked to intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets produce a radically
    improved common relevant operating picture (CROP) and enable battle
    command.
        AKM will dramatically enhance the warfighter's ability to
    distribute, process, fuse, and correlate unprecedented amounts of
    actionable data into information--securely, reliably, and quickly
    enough to enable leaders to synchronize and mass effects for decisive
    results. Network-centric operations enable information awareness,
    information access, and information delivery.
        The Army Knowledge Enterprise (AKE) construct describes the Army's
    process to enable improved strategic and tactical information
    distribution and collaboration. In short, AKE leverages the ingenuity
    and resourcefulness of our people in shaping the environment to achieve
    dominance and helps leaders achieve decision superiority and mission
    efficiencies.
        Integration and refinement of existing Army networks is the first
    step in achieving a network-centric, information-enabled force that
    creates efficiencies and provides secure, reliable, actionable
    information communications. To this end, the Army activated the Network
    Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM). NETCOM is the Army's single
    authority assigned to operate, manage, and defend the Army's
    information infrastructure. NETCOM has assumed technical control of all
    Army networks--active, Guard, and Reserve. This new policy allows
    NETCOM to evaluate any system, application, or piece of equipment that
    touches the Army networks. NETCOM will improve the capacity,
    performance, and security of our networks at every level.
        Among others, one tangible product of NETCOM is the consolidation
    and removal of redundant servers across the Army. This example of
    better business practice will harvest significant savings in
    resources--both dollars and managers--while increasing the
    effectiveness of the network. Since the first quarter fiscal year 2002,
    we have reduced the number of servers Army-wide by 16 percent--311 in
    the National Capital Region alone.
        Army Knowledge Online (AKO) begins to allow the Army to
    decentralize the management of information. AKO is the Army's secure,
    web-based, internet service that leverages the Army's intellectual
    capital to better organize, train, equip, and maintain our force. It
    gives our people a means to collaborate, to improve their situational
    awareness, and to access their personnel data. Already, hard-copy
    processes that formerly took days and weeks can now be accomplished
    almost instantly--from pay to personnel actions to assignments, to name
    a few. AKO is just an early glimpse of the potential capabilities of a
    network-centric, knowledge based organization that harnesses the
    potential of the global infostructure.

                                OPERATIONAL ARMY

    The Objective Force
        The Army is actively engaged in global operations supporting
    combatant commanders today, but it is our obligation to prepare for the
    future, as well. The Objective Force is the Army's future full-spectrum
    force that will be organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more
    strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal,
    survivable, and sustainable than we are today--across the full spectrum
    of military operations as an integral member of a cohesive joint team.
        The Nation will continue to face adaptive, asymmetric threats that
    capitalize on the power of information. To dominate and maintain
    superiority over these emerging challenges, the Army is changing the
    way we fight--a paradigm shift more significant than the 20th century's
    introduction of the tank and the helicopter. The Army is changing from
    sequential and linear operations to distributed and simultaneous
    operations. The Objective Force--characterized by networks of people
    enabled with systems that provide actionable information and decision
    superiority--will dissuade, deter, or decisively defeat our adversaries
    anytime, anyplace, and anywhere.
        The Objective Force will consist of command structures scaled to
    meet Joint Force Commander requirements and modular combined-arms units
    tailored according to each situation. Objective Force integrated,
    mobile, air-ground teams will conduct mounted and dismounted operations
    and employ both manned and unmanned platforms to achieve decisive
    victories. Capable of forcible entry and operations in austere
    environments to address the spectrum of military operations--from
    humanitarian assistance to warfighting--the Objective Force will
    conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations and master
    transitions between phases of operations. It will be an offensively
    oriented, multi-dimensional force enabled by advanced information
    technologies that give soldiers real-time intelligence and actionable
    information.
        The Objective Force will arrive in theater combat-capable;
    deployment will be synonymous with employment. The Objective Force will
    be strategically responsive and rapidly deployable on the U.S Air Force
    family of inter-theater and intra-theater aircraft. An Objective Force
    Unit of Action (UA) will deploy on approximately one-third the number
    of aircraft required to deploy a heavy brigade combat team today. It
    will be operationally deployable and capable of operational maneuver
    over strategic distances by air, land, or sea. Soldiers will overcome
    anti-access and area denial strategies and environments through
    precision maneuver and decision superiority.
        Equipped with new systems designed to meet the needs of the Army's
    future fighting formations, the Objective Force will be a networked
    system-of-systems. This system-of-systems includes soldiers equipped
    with the Land Warrior system; a family of 18 integrated, synchronized,
    manned and unmanned FCS; and critical complementary systems such as the
    Comanche and the Future Tactical Truck System. The components of the
    FCS are being synchronously developed and fielded as a complete family
    to achieve the warfighting capabilities the Nation requires to defeat
    adaptive, asymmetric conventional and unconventional adversaries.
        Soldiers are the centerpiece of the Army's formation--not
    equipment. Soldiers of the Objective Force will leverage dominant
    knowledge to gain decision superiority over any adversary. They will
    seamlessly integrate Objective Force capabilities with the capabilities
    of joint forces, Special Operations Forces, other Federal agencies, and
    multinational forces. The Objective Force soldiers will enable the
    United States to achieve its national security goals in a crisis,
    rather than simply inflict punitive strikes on an adversary. Employing
    FCS capabilities in formations called Units of Action (UA) and Units of
    Employment (UE), Objective Force soldiers will provide campaign quality
    staying power--that means precision fire and maneuver to control
    terrain, people, and resources, without having to resort to
    indiscriminate collateral damage. The Land Warrior system will
    integrate individual soldiers in the network while providing them
    increased protection and lethality. FCS will give soldiers the
    capability to destroy any adversary in any weather and environment with
    smaller calibers, greater precision, more devastating target effects,
    and at longer-ranges than available today.
        Joint C\4\ISR--a network-centric information architecture nested
    within the Global Information Grid--will connect the Objective Force's
    system-of-systems. Capitalizing on the synergistic power of the
    information network enterprise, every Objective Force soldier and
    platform will be capable of sensing and engaging the enemy while
    maintaining situational awareness of friendly forces. Advanced
    information technologies and C\4\ISR decision tools and assets will
    enhance the Common Relevant Operating Picture (CROP). The Objective
    Force will identify, locate, and engage critical targets with lethal or
    non-lethal affects and assess battle damage on those targets. The joint
    C\4\ISR linkages will enable the attack of targets with whatever joint
    or Army assets are available for immediate employment, whether the
    force is in contact or out of contact. Similarly, enhanced situational
    awareness will facilitate multi-layered active and passive defense
    measures--including both offensive and defensive counter air against
    air and non-air breathing, manned and unmanned aerial vehicles.
        The CROP and network-centric operations will enhance sustainability
    of the Objective Force through multi-nodal distribution networks that
    reach forward to the area of operations or reach back to the Home
    Station Operations Center. Increased reliability through equipment
    design and commonality among the FCS family of systems will enhance
    sustainability while reducing logistics demands. Advanced technologies
    will enable robust Objective Force operations while shrinking the
    logistics footprint and lift requirements of deployed forces.
        The FCS is a transformational approach to meeting this Nation's
    requirements for the Objective Force. We designed and will field the
    FCS family in a carefully balanced manner to avoid optimizing a
    component at the expense of sub-optimizing the overarching capabilities
    of Objective and Joint Forces. The acquisition and requirements
    development processes are being updated to accommodate the DOD's
    direction to field a networked system of systems rapidly through spiral
    development and an open architecture that allows maturing technological
    insertions as they occur.
        The Army embraces the ongoing DOD and Joint Staff capabilities and
    acquisition processes reform efforts to achieve revolutionary
    capabilities in the fielding of a new generation of equipment. This
    collaborative DOD and JCS effort enables the Army to design new
    information-age capable organizations holistically, use evolutionary
    acquisition strategies to equip those organizations, and see the
    Objective Force fielded before the end of this decade.
    Science and Technology (S&T)--Moving Toward the Transformed Army
        Preempting our adversaries' technological surprises over the past 3
    years, Army S&T investments are already providing America's Army with
    sustained overmatch in all materiel systems. The Army has increased and
    focused its S&T investments. We are demonstrating the enabling joint
    interoperable technologies essential for Objective Force capabilities
    and accelerating their arrival. Our S&T program is pursuing a wide
    spectrum of technologies for unmanned air and ground systems that will
    expand the range of joint warfighting capabilities, reduce risk to
    soldiers, and reduce the logistics footprint of the force. Realizing
    the full potential of unmanned systems requires technological
    development in sensors that improve navigation and mission performance,
    in intelligent systems for semi-autonomous or autonomous operation, in
    networked communications for manned-unmanned teaming, and in human-
    robotic interfaces, among many others.
        The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Army
    partnership contracted for a Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) to
    accelerate the transition of FCS to the System Development and
    Demonstration (SDD) Phase, with a Milestone B decision in May 2003. The
    Army is on track to achieve first unit equipped in 2008 and an initial
    operating capability of one Objective Force Unit of Action (UA) in
    2010. To accelerate development and in partnership DARPA, the focus on
    key transformation technologies for the FCS has been narrowed to the
    systems with the most promise. Our highest priority S&T efforts remain
    technological advances for the FCS.
        The Army will field FCS as a family of systems built on information
    age technologies embedded in manned and unmanned air and ground
    platforms. Integral to joint fires, the family of systems will
    integrate long-range air- and ground-based sensors with long-range
    cannon and missile precision munitions. The family of systems will also
    provide increased joint capabilities to conduct battle command,
    reconnaissance, mounted combat operations, dismounted combat
    operations, medical treatment and evacuation, and maintenance and
    recovery. To provide decisive lethality, FCS will employ networked,
    precision and loitering attack munitions fired from modular, easily
    transportable containers. Finally, FCS will leverage embedded, real-
    time interactive, virtual, distributed, collaborative, joint
    simulations for training and mission rehearsal.
    Enabling the Objective Force Soldier
        Eighteen systems, both manned and unmanned; the Objective Force
    soldier; and C\4\ISR, together, comprise the Future Combat System.
    Manned and unmanned reconnaissance capabilities are part of the FCS
    Family of Systems' interdependent networked air- and ground-based
    maneuver, maneuver support, and sustainment systems.
        There are 10 unmanned systems: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
    Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4; Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)--the
    Multifunction Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE), the Armed Robotic
    Vehicle (ARV), and the Small (manpackable) Unmanned Ground Vehicle
    (MUGV); Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS); and Unattended Munitions--the
    Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) Launch System (LS) and Intelligent Munitions
    Systems (IMS).
        There are eight manned systems: the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV);
    Command and Control Vehicle (C\2\V); Reconnaissance and Surveillance
    Vehicle (RSV); Line-of-Sight, Beyond-Line-of-Sight Mounted Combat
    System (LOS/BLOS MCS); NLOS-Mortar; Medical Vehicle (MV); the FCS
    Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV); and the Non-Line-of-Sight
    (NLOS) Cannon.
        Decisive warfighting is about fires and maneuver: fires enable
    maneuver, and maneuver enables fires. Joint and organic close,
    supporting, indirect fires destroy the enemy, suppress the enemy's
    capabilities, protect our forces and enable ground units to maneuver.
    The ICV, the Unattended Munitions NLOS-LS, IMS, C\2\V, MCS, NLOS-
    Mortar, and NLOS Cannon are important elements of the FCS that will
    enable the Objective Force to conduct distributed and simultaneous
    joint combat operations. With joint fires, the NLOS cannon is critical
    to support and protect our land forces in hostile environments. NLOS-LS
    NetFires is a platform-independent family of missiles with precision
    attack and loitering capability. Both Precision-Guided Mortar Munitions
    and Excalibur precision cannon munitions will enhance organic maneuver
    fires. A new, joint fire support, battle command and fire support
    architecture will allow rapid engagement of targets by any Army or
    joint asset.
        For over 227 years, soldiers have remained the centerpiece of our
    formations. The Land Warrior program--another key S&T initiative--
    responds to this legacy and enhances our soldiers combat power
    generation capability. The Land Warrior program will develop a
    lightweight, low observable, enhanced-armor protection, fighting
    ensemble for the individual Objective Force soldier. Through networked
    connectivity to the FCS-equipped, maneuver Unit of Action, Land Warrior
    soldiers will enable revolutionary lethality, mobility, survivability,
    and sustainability for the individual warfighter while reducing
    logistics demands.
        Future Combat Systems are networked in the joint C\4\ISR
    architecture--including networked communications, networked options,
    sensors, battle command systems, training, and both manned and unmanned
    reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. These networked systems
    will dramatically enhance situational awareness and understanding and
    operational level synchronization well beyond today's standards.
    Improved C\4\ISR capabilities will enable network-centric Objective
    Force operations. The results of the investments will allow leaders to
    capitalize on sensor and processing technology to see, understand, and
    shape the battlespace before the enemy can react--increasing combat
    force effectiveness and survivability. The S&T program will develop and
    demonstrate real-time, continuous situational understanding by
    integrating data from manned and unmanned air- and ground-based
    sensors.
        S&T investments in military logistics are an important enabler for
    the Objective Force. We are placing our emphasis on sustainment's big
    drivers--fuel, ammunition, maintenance, and water--to dramatically
    reduce our logistics footprint and lift requirements in these areas.
    Key technologies include on-board water generation, real-time logistics
    command and control processes and distribution management, enhanced
    multi-purpose munitions and packaging, efficient propulsion and power
    technologies, real-time diagnostics and prognostics, and Micro-Electro
    Mechanical Systems (MEMS).

                            TRANSFORMATIONAL SYSTEMS

        Several transformational systems were under development prior to
    announcement of the Army Vision in October 1999. The Army has completed
    an extensive analysis to identify those systems that complement FCS and
    the Objective Force system of systems.
        The Comanche helicopter is the centerpiece of the Aviation
    Modernization Plan (AMP) and represents the first new system to reach
    Initial Operational Capability (IOC) within the Army's Objective Force.
    Comanche is our armed reconnaissance platform with attack capabilities.
    It will leverage the situational awareness and situational curiosity of
    a scout augmented with revolutionary, state-of-the-art intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies. Comanche supports
    vertical and horizontal maneuver as an integral part of network-centric
    operations and extends human eyes and decisionmaking beyond the ground
    maneuver force. Utilizing stealth technologies, it will network with
    all joint C\4\ISR and joint weapons systems. Comanche will leverage
    maximum effect of future standoff precision weapon systems such as the
    Common Missile and allow us to maneuver ground formations based upon
    full knowledge of the situation. Augmented with armed or unarmed UAVs,
    Comanche will fill ground maneuver's most critical battlefield
    deficiency--armed aerial reconnaissance--with a capable, survivable,
    and sustainable aircraft. The Comanche program is already well on its
    way to giving the Army a capability pivotal to transforming the way we
    will fight.
        Several other transformational systems will empower the Objective
    Force with the knowledge dominance and battle command to provide
    decision superiority across the spectrum of operations. The Warfighter
    Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) System, Medium Extended Air
    Defense System (MEADS), the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and the
    Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S) will enable Objective
    Force joint C\4\ISR capabilities. These programs will provide the
    tactical enterprise-level networks that will ensure seamless, secure,
    digital connectivity between the Objective, Interim, and today's
    forces. The Distributed Common Ground System--Army (DCGS-A)
    architecture provides Army network-centric ISR connectivity from
    national agencies to joint systems to Objective Force Units of Action
    as part of the integrated Department of Defense DCGS architecture.
    DCGS-A will enable interoperable tasking, processing, and exploitation
    capabilities. The Aerial Common Sensor brings improved signal
    intelligence collection and precision geolocation capabilities, as well
    as imagery intelligence (IMINT) and measurement and signals (MASINT)
    sensor packages. Another system, Prophet, uses communications
    intelligence to depict the battlespace and further enhance situational
    awareness. These C\4\ISR systems greatly enhance the Objective Force's
    ability to gain actionable information superiority and decision
    dominance over all adversaries and expand the range of options for the
    joint force combatant commanders.
        Transformational systems will provide the Objective Force with
    strategic and tactical maneuver capabilities. The Theater Support
    Vessel will support rapid intra-theater lift requirements, provide the
    capability to conduct operational maneuver and repositioning, and
    enable units to conduct enroute mission planning and rehearsal. The
    Future Tactical Truck System will have commonality with FCS and will
    support the Objective Force by enabling command, control, and
    transportation of cargo, equipment, and personnel. The Tactical
    Electric Power (TEP) generators will provide power to Objective Force
    units where fixed power grids are not available.
        Transformational systems provide the Objective Force with other
    important capabilities, as well. Chemical, biological, radiological,
    nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) effects systems support the Objective
    Force across the spectrum of military operations and improve
    capabilities to conduct homeland security activities. Engineer, civil
    affairs, and psychological operations vehicles will enable mobility and
    enhance civil affairs and PSYOPs capabilities. The Up-Armored High
    Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) will improve Objective
    Force soldier survivability and lethality. The Multi-Mission Radar will
    provide the capability to detect and track aircraft, artillery, and
    other projectiles, then queue appropriate weapons systems and airspace
    synchronization systems. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
    (HIMARS) is a lighter weight, more deployable multiple rocket launcher
    capability that will integrate into the joint fires network.
    Bridging the Capabilities Gap--Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
        Announcing our intent to field an Interim Force in October 1999,
    the Army responded to a capabilities gap between its lethal,
    survivable, but slow-to-deploy heavy forces and its rapidly deployable
    light forces that lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility
    that we seek. Just 2\1/2\ years later in 2002, the Army began fielding
    the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to bridge that gap. In 2003--less
    than 4 years after the announcement--we are on track to achieve IOC
    with the first SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. Stryker Brigades will
    provide the combatant commander vastly increased operational and
    tactical flexibility to execute fast-paced, distributed, non-contiguous
    operations.
        Stryker Brigade Combat Teams respond to combatant commander
    requirements across the spectrum of military operations. Optimized for
    combat in complex and urban terrain, the Stryker Brigades will be
    decisive in other major combat operations, as well. The SBCT
    Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron
    provides both organic human intelligence capabilities and UAVs embedded
    at the brigade level. Its military intelligence and signal companies--
    working through a digitally enabled battle command bridge--leverage
    theater and national assets to create an information-enabled force.
    SBCTs will use this enhanced joint C\4\ISR capability to revolutionize
    combat paradigms from ``make contact, develop the situation, maneuver
    the forces'' to ``understand the situation, maneuver the forces, make
    contact at the time and place of your own choosing, and finish
    decisively.''
        Moreover, leveraging platform commonality, enhancing logistics
    practices and enablers, and reorganizing logistics formations, the SBCT
    is vastly more deployable and sustainable than our heavy forces, while
    significantly increasing combat power generating capabilities.
    Augmented for sustained operations, the SBCT requires 37 percent fewer
    CSS personnel than a digitized heavy brigade. While capitalizing on
    these advantages, developing and available technologies allow us to
    mass effects--rather than massing formations--and create a robust,
    reliable capability to conduct operational maneuver over strategic
    distances.
        Finally, SBCTs provide an invaluable means of spearheading
    transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned
    officers--tomorrow's commanders and command sergeants major--in the
    tactics, techniques, and procedures that will inform employment of the
    Objective Force.
        The Army has resourced six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams to
    contribute to fulfilling the 1-4-2-1 defense construct and national
    security requirements; however, at this time, the Secretary of Defense
    has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades. The
    Army will provide the Secretary of Defense with a plan for Stryker
    Brigades 5 and 6.
        Fielding of the SBCTs affects the entire Army: active and Reserve
    components; heavy and light forces; CONUS and OCONUS. Current fielding
    timelines will enhance the Nation's ability to fight and win the GWOT
    and conduct major combat operations. The transformation of four active
    component brigades to SBCTs provides a rotational base with three of
    the SBCTs focused on the Pacific theater. One of the two SBCTs fielded
    at Fort Lewis will be forward-based in Europe not later than 2007. The
    Stryker Cavalry Regiment will support the XVIII Airborne Corps'
    critical need for robust, armed reconnaissance. The conversion of a
    Reserve component brigade to an SBCT will enhance our strategic Reserve
    and support the GWOT, smaller scale contingencies, and homeland defense
    missions. Additionally, SBCT stationing provides rapid, strategic
    responsiveness through power projection platforms capable of supporting
    four critical regions described in the 1-4-2-1 defense construct. The
    first SBCT will attain Initial Operational Capability in the summer of
    2003.
    Preserving the Army's Legacy
        Today's force guarantees the Army's near-term warfighting readiness
    to fight and win our Nation's wars decisively. Because the Army
    bypassed a procurement generation, the Army's Combat Support and Combat
    Service Support systems now exceed their 20-year expected life cycle,
    and 75 percent of our critical combat systems exceed their expected
    half-life cycle. To maintain operational readiness while preserving
    resources for transformation, the Army is recapitalizing and
    selectively modernizing a portion of the current force. The
    modernization program addresses the critical issue of AC and RC
    interoperability and serves as a bridge to mesh these two components
    seamlessly. In general, the Army increased funding for programs that
    are clearly transformational and support the defense transformation
    goals, sustained funding for high priority systems that will transition
    to the Objective Force, and reduced funding for systems not essential
    to Army transformation. The Army remains committed to its 17-system
    recapitalization program, but we have reduced the prioritized
    recapitalization program from three-and-one-third divisions to two
    divisions.
        Army Special Operations Forces are an indispensable part of the
    Army and will continue to provide unique capabilities to the Joint
    Force and Land Component Commanders. In response to the increasing
    requirement for Special Operations Forces in support of joint campaign
    plans, the Army has validated and resourced growth in its SOF
    structure. The recent initiatives will transfer 1,788 manpower spaces
    to Major Force Program-11 beginning in fiscal year 2003. Since the
    commencement of Army Special Operations Forces operations in support of
    the GWOT, the U.S. Army has provided over $1.4 billion in new equipment
    to enhance Special Operations Forces firepower, communications, and
    ground and air mobility.
        The Army will remain the largest user of space-based capabilities
    among the Services. Army space assets are providing tangible support to
    the war on terrorism and Operation Enduring Freedom--they ensure Army
    and Joint Force Commanders optimize communications, satellite
    intelligence, global positioning system, imagery, weather, missile
    warning, and other space-based capabilities in every aspect of planning
    and operations. We are working diligently with the joint and
    interagency space community to ensure that Army and joint space systems
    continue to provide their essential capabilities now and for the
    Objective Force.
    Aviation Transformation and Restructuring
        Aviation transformation further demonstrates the Army's hard
    choices in balancing risk to resource transformation. Our interim
    plan--now in progress--lowers operating and sustainment costs while
    posturing aviation for arrival of the Objective Force by 2010. Apache
    modernization is an integral part of the Army Aviation Transformation
    Plan. The AH-64D Longbow heavy attack team will enhance domination of
    the maneuver battlespace and provide the ground commander with a
    versatile, long-range weapon system against a range of fixed and moving
    targets. The UH-60 Blackhawk continues to be the assault workhorse of
    Army aviation, executing over 40 percent of the Army's annual flying
    hours. We are extending the life of the UH-60 while providing it with
    capabilities required of the future battlespace. Similarly, the Army is
    fully committed to the CH-47F Chinook program. Its heavy-lift
    capability is invaluable to transforming the Army. As we restructure
    and standardize attack and lift formations across the force, we will
    also adjust the stationing and alignment of Reserve component aviation
    units to mitigate the near-term risk.
        Army National Guard Aviation comprises almost 50 percent of the
    Army's aviation force and is one of the Nation's most valuable assets
    both for wartime and for peacetime missions. Essential for successful
    execution of the Nation's military strategy, the ARNG currently has
    aviation units deployed in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bosnia, Europe, and
    Saudi Arabia, as well as Central and South America.
    Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (ARNGRI)
        ARNGRI seeks to transform a sizeable portion of ARNG combat
    structure into more deployable, flexible fighting forces to support
    Army requirements at home and abroad. ARNGRI will introduce two new
    organizations into the force structure: Mobile Light Brigades and
    Multi-Functional Divisions. These organizations will provide full
    spectrum capabilities in support of combatant commanders. The Mobile
    Light Brigades will operate as a subordinate unit to the Multi-
    Functional Divisions, which will also contain two combat support/combat
    service support brigades and be capable of supporting either major
    combat or homeland security operations.
    Army Reserve Transformation Initiatives
        By providing responsive force generating capability and technically
    trained individuals, the USAR facilitates our capability to conduct
    extended campaigns in multiple theaters and to sustain joint
    operations. Army Reserve initiatives ensure the USAR is missioned,
    organized, and equipped to provide interoperability across the full
    spectrum of military operations. Transformational organizations include
    experimentation forces and information operations, joint augmentation,
    network security, and interagency units.
        The Readiness Command Restructuring Initiative and Federal Reserve
    Restructuring Initiative will help the USAR fulfill these new mission
    requirements. These initiatives lend greater flexibility to efforts
    that enhance responsiveness to America's foreign and domestic
    protection needs. Regional Readiness Commands will focus on individual
    and unit readiness, leader development, training and growth which will
    demand a new personnel system that achieves holistic life-cycle
    management for Army Reserve soldiers.

                               INSTITUTIONAL ARMY

    Transforming the Way we do Business
        We have made great strides in revolutionizing our business
    management practices by starting at the very top. Last year, we
    realigned our headquarters by reorganizing and realigning
    responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Army Staff--streamlining
    coordination, tasking, and decision-making--resulting in a more
    responsive and efficient organization. This initiative allowed us to
    eliminate unnecessary functions and redistribute 585 manpower spaces to
    accomplish core competencies.
        As previously discussed, the Army has addressed the management of
    its installations, personnel systems, and contracting in its
    Transformation of Installation Management (TIM). We are aggressively
    pursuing efforts to outsource non-core functions. The Army will reap
    substantial dividends in efficiency and effectiveness through these
    strategic realignments of human and physical capital.

                            PERSONNEL TRANSFORMATION

        The Secretary of the Army's key management initiative is personnel
    transformation. Its goal is to modernize and integrate human resource
    programs, policies, processes, and systems into a multi-component force
    that includes civilians and contractors. We will evaluate our processes
    and implement the most efficient program, policies, and organizations
    to support the Objective Force.
        The centerpiece of personnel transformation is a comprehensive
    effort focused on a potential Army-wide implementation of unit manning
    and unit rotation. We are aggressively examining the feasibility of a
    unit manning and rotation system that would better support the new
    national defense strategy, improve cohesion and combat readiness within
    the operational Army, provide highly cohesive well-trained units to
    combatant commanders, and improve well-being for families by providing
    greater stability and predictability in assignments. The Army currently
    uses unit rotations in support of operational missions in the Balkans,
    Sinai, and Afghanistan. The Army is studying the use of unit rotations
    for other locations and in the war on terrorism. Units would know of
    these rotations well in advance, providing families with greater
    predictability and enabling focused preparation, both of which
    contribute to increased combat readiness of the unit.
        Unit manning seeks to synchronize the life cycle of a unit with the
    life cycle of the soldier within that unit. All soldiers and leaders
    would be stabilized, resulting in a significant increase in cohesion
    and combat readiness over our present individual replacement system.
    Such a system has significant second and third order effects across the
    force--training and leader development, recruiting and retention, unit
    readiness levels, and total Army end strength among others. All of
    these are being studied intensively, and we anticipate senior Army
    leadership decisions on unit manning and unit rotation in July 2003.
    Third Wave
        Because we operate in an environment in which there are increasing
    demands for military capabilities--the Secretary of the Army's Third
    Wave initiative seeks to ensure that we are achieving the best value
    possible for our taxpayers' dollars.
        There are three phases to the Third Wave process. First, we
    determined what activities were core or non-core to the Army's mission.
    In the second phase, we are validating the breakout between core and
    non-core functions by determining if any non-core functions should be
    exempted. This phase has an anticipated completion date of mid- to
    late-February 2003. Upon completion, the Army leadership will notify
    Congress of the results of this phase. In the third phase, key Army
    leaders will assess appropriate plans to execute non-core functions,
    select the best means to proceed, and develop implementation plans. At
    this time, we do not know how many of the 214,000 jobs identified as
    potentially non-core functions in Phase I will be included in
    implementation plans. Although implementation plans will target
    execution in fiscal years 2005-2009, some implementation plans may be
    delayed beyond that period.
        The implementation of competitive sourcing of non-core functions
    will adhere to OMB Circular A-76 and related statutory provisions.
    Exceptions to the requirement for public-private competition are
    limited, such as where 10 or fewer civilian employees perform the
    function or where legal restrictions against using the A-76 process
    apply to the function. To lower costs for taxpayers and improve program
    performance to citizens, OMB has undertaken major revisions to the
    processes and practices in OMB Circular A-76 to improve the public-
    private competition process.
    Acquisition Transformation
        The Army is leading the way in acquisition reform within DOD's
    broad transformation of defense acquisition policies and procedures.
    The Army's FCS program may prove to be the largest DOD acquisition
    effort that fully embraces the concepts of evolutionary acquisition and
    spiral development--leveraging the potential of rapid advancement
    within individual technologies by allowing for changes within programs
    as technologies mature.
        The FCS program is evolutionary in its design and incorporates
    periodic blocked improvements within its 19 systems--the Objective
    Force soldier and 18 manned and unmanned systems. Within these 19
    systems are 540 spirally developing technologies. The Army's use of a
    Lead System Integrator (LSI) enables a ``best of the best'' approach to
    selection from competing industry efforts. Our unprecedented
    partnership with DARPA ensures the FCS effort leverages that agency's
    DOD-wide perspective and resources to produce the best capability and
    value for the joint force.
        The Army continues to revise its acquisition policies and
    applicable regulatory guidance. On October 3, 2001, the Army approved
    an acquisition reorganization that transferred control of all
    acquisition program management to the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)
    and eliminated duplication of effort in two major Army commands.
    Effective October 2002, 12 Program Executive Officers (PEO) report to
    the AAE, and their subordinate PEOs assumed management of all Army
    acquisition programs, regardless of acquisition category. The plan
    ensures that there is only one chain of authority for acquisition
    programs within the Army. In addition, the plan clearly holds Program
    Managers responsible and accountable for the life cycle management of
    their assigned programs.
        We have also transformed the way we conduct business through the
    organization of the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) that realigns our
    previously decentralized installation and information technology
    contracting processes into one organization. Responsible for all
    contracts over $500,000 and tasked to eliminate redundant contracts,
    ACA leverages Army-wide requirements to achieve economies of scale. ACA
    supports Army transformation efforts by aligning all base support
    contracting into a single organization that best supports installation
    management transformation. All of these initiatives use information
    technology to leverage enterprise-wide buying capabilities.
    Additionally, ACA will act as the single coordinating element and form
    the base from which to deploy contingency-contracting, operational
    support to the warfighting commands. The Army Contracting Agency and
    other contracting activities will continue to support small business
    awards in the outstanding manner it did in fiscal year 2002.
    Logistics Transformation
        We cannot transform the Army without a transformation in logistics.
    We must incorporate the logistician's view into the design of our
    systems even before we begin to build platforms. Collaboration between
    the acquisition and logistics communities will give the Objective Force
    the rapid deployability and sustainability we demand--by design--
    without compromising warfighting capability.
        Designing the right logistics architecture--systems, business
    processes, enterprise, for example--is fundamental to success. The
    Army's logistics transformation will focus on creating an overarching
    corporate logistics enterprise that employs industries' best business
    practices. Within this enterprise, the Army established three principal
    goals for logistics transformation: enhance strategic mobility and
    deployability, optimize the logistics footprint, and reduce the cost of
    logistics support without reducing readiness or warfighting capability.
        The Army's mobility and deployability goals for the Objective Force
    are to deploy a combat brigade within 96 hours after lift off, a
    division on the ground in 120 hours, and a five-division corps in
    theater in 30 days. To achieve this strategic responsiveness, the Army
    Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) serves as a catalyst to bring about
    force projection changes both in the Army's and in our sister Services'
    lift programs.
        Platforms like the Intra-Theater Support Vessel (TSV) and Inter-
    Theater Shallow Draft High Speed Sealift (SDHSS) provide
    transformational capabilities for operational and strategic maneuver
    and sustainment of Army formations.
        Because strategic air and sealift cannot meet deployment
    requirements, Army prepositioned stocks (APS) ashore and afloat
    continue to be a critical component of Army power projection. The Army
    is currently participating in a joint-led worldwide prepositioning
    study to determine if location, mix, and capabilities in existing
    stocks of combat, combat support, and combat service support require
    adjustments to meet the defense strategy more effectively.
        The Objective Force requires the Army to optimize its logistics
    footprint to produce a smaller, more agile, responsive, and flexible
    sustainment organization. To achieve this goal, we will leverage
    technology and innovative sustainment concepts. The Army is already
    developing and integrating key enablers to provide a transformed,
    corporate logistics enterprise. Some of these enablers include embedded
    diagnostics and prognostics, tactical logistics data digitization
    (TLDD), serial number tracking, and the Global Combat Service Support--
    Army (GCSS-A) system that utilizes a commercial Enterprise Resource
    Planning (ERP) solution. The ERP approach changes the Army's logistics
    automation systems strategy from one of custom code development for
    unique Army requirements to adoption of a commercial off-the-shelf
    (COTS) product.
        The selective use of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
    (LOGCAP) to augment military logistics force structure provides
    commanders with the flexibility to reallocate manpower, resources, and
    materiel by adding contractors to the equation of logistics support. In
    addition to providing services and some supply support, these
    contractors can quickly deploy to establish base camps, receive and
    process soldiers as they begin arriving in theater, and reverse the
    process when soldiers go home.
        Current initiatives that help reduce costs without reducing
    readiness or warfighting capability include the National Maintenance
    Program and the Single Stock Fund (SSF). As previously discussed,
    programs provide two basic building blocks for a revolutionary change
    in logistics business practices.
    Advanced Medical Technology
        Congress designated the Army as the lead agent for DOD vaccine,
    drug, and development programs for medical countermeasures to
    battlefield threats. This includes vaccines against naturally occurring
    infectious diseases of military significance, combat casualty care,
    military operational medicine, and telemedicine research. The program
    also funds Food and Drug Administration requirements for technology
    transition to advanced development.
        The medical force provides the requisite medical intervention and
    care for the joint force deployed around the globe. With its Medical
    Reengineering Initiative (MRI), the Army Medical Department has
    transformed 28 percent of its Corps, and echelon above Corps, force
    structure to an organizational structure that promotes scalability
    through easily tailored, capabilities-based packages. These packages
    result in improved tactical mobility, reduced footprint, and increased
    modularity for flexible task organization. MRI supports both the
    current forces and the Stryker Brigades, and is the bridge to the
    Objective Medical Force. We have implemented innovative strategies that
    make the most efficient use of our budget. Medical modernization, which
    includes the acquisition of current medical equipment and technology,
    is partially funded within MRI units.
    Business Initiatives Council
        In June 2001, the Secretary of Defense established the Department
    of Defense Business Initiatives Council (DOD BIC). The DOD BIC's goal
    is to improve business operations and processes by identifying and
    implementing initiatives that expand capabilities, improve efficiency
    and effectiveness, and create resource savings in time, money, or
    manpower.
        The Army has aggressively explored ways to improve its internal
    business practices, and has established the Army BIC, under the
    leadership of the Secretary and the G-8. Effective November 13, 2002,
    the Secretary of the Army has approved a total of 35 initiatives under
    the Army BIC. Subsequently, the Army submitted a number of the
    initiatives through the formal DOD BIC process for implementation
    across the Services and other DOD activities. The BIC process has
    helped to create a culture of innovation and inter-Service cooperation.
    The superb level of cooperation across the military departments, the
    Joint Staff, and OSD has made this possible.

                           A COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE

        With the continued strong support of the administration, Congress,
    our soldiers, our Department of the Army civilians, and the greatest
    industrial base and S&T communities in the world, the Army will field
    the Objective Force--this decade.
        By 2010, we will have fielded the first operationally capable
    Objective Force unit equipped with the Future Combat Systems. Our
    Stryker Brigade Combat Teams will be providing to combatant commanders
    capabilities not currently available--enhanced strategic responsiveness
    and the ability to operate in a distributed, non-linear battlespace.
    Through selective recapitalization and modernization of systems that
    enable our soldiers to preserve our legacy today, we will have
    sustained a decisive-win capability at a high state of readiness as an
    integral part of the Joint Force. We will have significantly improved
    the well-being of our people and sustainment of Army infrastructure.
        We remain committed to our legacy--preserving America's freedoms.
    In peace and in war, the Army's soldiers serve the Nation with
    unmatched courage, indomitable will, pride, and plain grit--as they
    have for over 227 years. Soldiers will continue to fight and win the
    Nation's wars, decisively--it is our sacred duty and our non-negotiable
    contract with the American people.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Secretary White. For
    the Department of the Navy, Secretary Johnson.

    STATEMENT OF HON. HANSFORD T. JOHNSON, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE
                                  NAVY

        Secretary Johnson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
    distinguished members of this committee, it is an honor to
    appear before you today and talk about the Department of the
    Navy and also the fiscal year 2004 budget. Our Nation is served
    by the most professional and capable naval force in the world.
    The Navy-Marine Corps forces alongside the Army, Air Force, and
    Coast Guard partners are on station in every part of the world
    that you saw in your trip, taking the fight on global terrorism
    to our enemies, deterring aggression against our Nation and our
    allies, and as you so eloquently mentioned, representing U.S.
    interests, diplomatic and military, around the world.
        Today, more than 60 percent of our ships are underway,
    including seven deployed carrier battle groups, and 63 percent
    of our Marine operating forces are deployed. The Navy-Marine
    Corps team successes are reflective of the strong and sustained
    support of this committee and Congress and the Department of
    Defense, as well as, as you mentioned, our dedicated civilian
    and contractor employees and most importantly, the great
    American moms, dads, wives, husbands, and children who support
    these forward-deployed defenders of freedom.
        Our people remain our most precious resource. The fiscal
    year 2004 budget sustains the tremendous progress we made in
    readiness accounts by requesting targeted pay raises and
    further reduction of the out-of-pocket expenses for housing.
    Our recruiting goals are being met. Our retention remains very
    strong. With respect to personnel management transformation,
    the 21st century security environment demands flexibility. We
    are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to
    explore ways to provide greater flexibility and modernize our
    personnel systems.
        We must now turn to the challenges, as you mentioned, of
    recapitalization and modernization. Two-thirds of our top-line
    increases for fiscal year 2004 are dedicated to increased
    procurement. $11.4 billion is dedicated to shipbuilding
    providing for the construction of seven new ships, two SSBN
    conversions to the SSGN, and the first ship in the cruiser
    conversion program. This represents a significant increase, and
    is a step in the right direction.
        I am also pleased to report that the budget funds 100 new
    aircraft, sustains the MV-22 Osprey program, continues
    development of the Joint Strike Fighter, and continues the
    procurement of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle.
        Moreover, we are pressing ahead with innovative ways to
    ensure that we are not locked into purchasing platforms whose
    electronics, sensors, and systems are obsolete upon delivery.
    We are moving forward on procuring ships not as a total
    package, but in a phased approach to acquire the systems in the
    right way, insert them at the right time, in a structured
    process.
        As you are well aware, the acquisition process sometimes
    forces us to act in ways that no business would ever consider.
    Under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense, we are
    exploring opportunities to transform the process, increase
    flexibility and efficiency, foster creativity and innovation,
    streamline processes, and create savings.
        We look forward to working with you on these proposals as
    they mature. The budget reflects a careful balancing of
    competing demands and risks. Most evident is our decision to
    accelerate the retirement of our older, most maintenance-
    intensive ships. We are convinced that selected near-term
    divestment of platforms that are least relevant to our future
    is the best and the most efficient way to recapitalize,
    modernize, and transform without compromising our ability to
    accomplish our mission.
        In total, the retirement of legacy systems and application
    of transformational business practices will result in a savings
    of $1.9 billion. More importantly, the budget builds on the
    concept of transformation into our recapitalization and
    modernization efforts. This commitment to transformational
    platforms includes the next generation aircraft carrier, the
    CVN-21, which makes tremendous steps in aircraft carrier
    design, the DD(X), which is the centerpiece of the Navy's
    future family of ships, and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS),
    which will be designed from the outset as a focused mission
    ship that will use reconfigurable mission modules to counter
    the most challenging threats in the littorals.
        In aviation, we continue to move forward with the Joint
    Strike Fighter, the advanced Hawkeye upgrade program, and this
    year, we introduce EA-18G, which will replace the EA-6B
    Prowler, our most maintenance-intensive aircraft in the
    Department of Navy.
        FORCEnet is the architecture that will enable network-
    centric warfare to begin now. We made difficult choices in the
    fiscal year 2004 budget request, but we have been careful to
    craft it to sustain the advances made in personnel, quality of
    service, and readiness to balance risk while divesting legacy
    systems and concepts, and to invest in shipbuilding, aircraft
    procurement, transformational technologies, all to achieve the
    combined joint total force that the future demands.
        I must also tell you, Secretary White mentioned that the
    cost of operations in support of the global war on terrorism
    and preparation for any contingencies in Iraq are not reflected
    in the budget request. A supplemental request will be
    necessary. I look forward to working with you and all the
    members of the committee in your continued strong support for
    our entire Armed Forces. Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Johnson follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Hon. Hansford T. Johnson

       NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM: NATIONAL SEAPOWER . . . AROUND THE WORLD,
                                AROUND THE CLOCK

                                I. INTRODUCTION

        The Navy--Marine Corps Team continues to provide extraordinary
    service and value to our Nation. Throughout the past year our Naval
    Forces have distinguished themselves around the globe, and our sailors
    and marines operating in the air, on and under the sea, and on the
    ground--including our space cadre--remain at the leading edge of the
    global war on terrorism. They have demonstrated the full effect of
    their lethal power, from the blue water to the littorals and well
    beyond, engaging and destroying the enemy in areas that previously
    would have been considered sanctuaries from sea-based forces. At a time
    of great consequence for our Nation, our Navy and Marine Corps not only
    have ``answered the call,'' but have done so while improving our combat
    readiness and retaining our sailors and marines at historic rates.
        Our successes in the global war on terrorism, while significant,
    have not been achieved in isolation. We have worked alongside, in
    partnership, with our sister Services to realize the true potential of
    joint, interoperable forces in the new environment of 21st century
    warfare. The superior operational and personnel readiness levels we
    have been able to sustain are directly reflective of the strong,
    sustained support of Congress. In fiscal year 2004, we seek your
    support for the President's budget request to sustain the gains made to
    date, improve those areas where shortfalls remain, and continue
    transforming the Navy and Marine Corps for the 21st century.
        In the balance of this statement we will describe the significant
    accomplishments the Navy and Marine Corps have realized during the past
    year, the improvements in our warfighting readiness and capabilities
    that are supported by the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request,
    and some details of our plans to transform and prepare for the
    challenges of the future. In assessing our request, it is important to
    note that our focus is on improving our ability to operate as an agile,
    lethal and effective member of a broader, networked joint warfighting
    force. To that end, we have given priority to the following overarching
    goals:

             Successfully prosecuting the global war on terrorism
            while sustaining our current readiness;
             Recapitalizing, modernizing, and transforming our Navy
            and Marine Corps to meet the challenges of the future;
             Fully networking our forces at sea and ashore to
            operate seamlessly in a joint and coalition environment;
             Continuing to invest in our sailors and marines; and
             Sustaining the quality of our operational training.

        In pursuing these principal objectives, we had to make some
    difficult tradeoffs within our proposed program. However, our fiscal
    year 2004 budget request is the best balance possible among important,
    but often competing priorities.

     II. CONTEXT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST: SUCCEEDING IN A
                           TIME OF GREAT CONSEQUENCE

        Last year, our Navy and Marine Corps forces built on the historic
    response of our sailors and marines following the September 11, 2001
    attacks on our Nation. Today, our forces continue leading the way on
    the front lines of the global war on terrorism. More than half of our
    Navy operating forces and over 60 percent of the Marine Corps operating
    forces are currently deployed around the globe. Since the beginning of
    Operation Enduring Freedom more than 90,000 sailors and marines and 100
    Navy ships have deployed in support of ongoing operations. Nine of our
    12 aircraft carriers and half of our 12 Amphibious Ready Groups have
    seen action in this worldwide conflict. Additionally, over 5,000
    members of the Naval Reserve and 15,000 members of the Marine Corps
    Reserve have been activated in support of these operations.
        Even after the effective defeat of the Taliban and the liberation
    of Afghanistan, our Naval Forces, whether sea-based or on the ground,
    continue their missions. For example, marines from the 4th Marine
    Expeditionary Brigade (Antiterrorism) provide support and security for
    the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, while others
    serve in Tactical Air Operations Detachments in support of air and
    Naval Special Warfare operations in Afghanistan.
        While the global war on terrorism remains our principal focus, the
    Navy-Marine Corps team still operates extensively, as in the past,
    representing U.S. interests throughout the world. In Southwest Asia, we
    maintained continuous carrier presence, conducting combat operations
    over Iraq in support of Operation Southern Watch. At the same time,
    naval task forces continued Maritime and Leadership Interdiction
    Operations supporting United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq
    for the eleventh straight year. In addition to these operational
    commitments, over 2,000 marines participated in Eager Mace 2002, an
    amphibious assault exercise in Kuwait in late September 2002.
        During May through August 2002, over 1,400 sailors, marines, and
    coast guardsmen participated in the eighth annual Cooperation Afloat
    Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with countries including the
    Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei.
    Marines from the Third Marine Expeditionary Force participated with all
    CARAT nations in landing force operations as well as providing a Marine
    Security Element to advise and assist the armed forces of the
    Philippines in their efforts against global terrorism.
        In the Mediterranean, Navy ships, including surface combatants,
    submarines, and patrol craft, operated with friends and allies in over
    60 exercises with NATO and Western European nations to enforce United
    Nations sanctions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Marines from
    the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
    demonstrated their capability to offload and move inland to reinforce
    Kosovo Forces' security requirements.
        Our ability to sustain the preceding breadth of capabilities, from
    combat operations to peacetime coalition-building exercises, came as a
    result of difficult choices we made--choices that have proven wise by
    the manner in which history unfolded last year. As you recall, in last
    year's budget we placed great emphasis on fixing some of the chronic
    problems that had been threatening our long-term ability to man,
    operate, and sustain the fleet we have today. We made a conscious
    decision to give the highest priority to our personnel and current
    readiness accounts. Within our critical procurement accounts we
    undertook a major effort to make the foundations for our shipbuilding
    programs healthy, even at the expense of being able to procure only
    five new ships in fiscal year 2003. While congressional support for
    supplemental appropriations did much to decrease our maintenance
    backlog and fill our spare parts bins, we fully recognize our fiscal
    year 2003 plan devoted fewer resources toward recapitalization than
    either the Department or Congress would have wished. Having made that
    difficult prioritization we committed to translating a healthy
    procurement base in fiscal year 2003 into earnest recapitalization in
    fiscal year 2004. We have kept that promise.

       III. THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET: BUILDING FROM A SOLID FOUNDATION

        The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects an
    increase of $3.5 billion above the amount provided in the Fiscal Year
    2003 Defense Appropriations Act. It also reflects the Department's
    commitment to get the most out of every dollar provided by the American
    taxpayers. We do not come to Congress with ``hat in hand,'' but rather
    with a responsible request, optimally balanced across an entire
    department of competing priorities. In this budget request we have
    proposed an additional $1.9 billion for our priority programs with
    funds identified through our own rigorous cost savings and divestiture
    initiatives.
        Together, these sources of additional funds have enabled us to
    ``turn the corner'' in our most pressing recapitalization efforts. Two
    thirds of our top line increase is dedicated toward increased
    procurement. This budget request reflects two more new construction
    ships and five more aircraft than appropriated by Congress last year.
    It increases our funding for transformational research and development
    (R&D) initiatives by a half billion dollars while consolidating the
    critical gains in personnel and current readiness achieved in last
    year's budget. The following represents the priority funding in fiscal
    year 2004 for the Department of the Navy:

             We propose 7 new construction ships and 100 new
            aircraft;
             We propose significant transformational capabilities,
            including the next-generation aircraft carrier (CVN-21), the
            next-generation destroyer (DD(X)), the LCS, two more SSBN-to-
            SSGN conversions, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the V-22
            Osprey, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), and the
            Advanced Hawkeye (E-2C) Program;
             The administration proposes a range of military pay
            increases from 2.0 percent up to 6.25 percent, targeted by rank
            and years of service, and additional reductions in out-of-
            pocket housing costs from 7.5 percent to 3.5 percent;
             We propose sustained funding for our key operational
            readiness accounts, including an increase by over $200 million
            for aviation depot maintenance;
             We implement Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Aviation
            Integration, a process that will maximize our combat power,
            optimize the core capability of naval aviation forces, and
            introduce 200 modern aircraft across the fiscal year 2004-
            fiscal year 2009 program; and
             We improve the quality of our operational training
            through our Training Resource Strategy, and provide $61 million
            in fiscal year 2004 toward this end.

        Highlights of our fiscal year 2004 budget request are provided in
    the sections below.
    A. Current Readiness
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request builds upon the best successive
    2 years in readiness budgets in more than a decade. It funds an OPTEMPO
    of 54.0 days per quarter for our deployed forces. This level supports
    the Global Naval Forces Presence Policy in terms of Carrier Battle
    Group (CVBG) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) availability as required
    by national security policy. However, accelerated deployment timelines
    and increased OPTEMPO will cause current year execution to run ahead of
    the existing plan.
        Funding for ship maintenance will achieve more than 96 percent of
    the fiscal year 2004 notional goal. This reflects a virtually identical
    posture as compared to last year, both in terms of percent
    accomplishment and quantity of backlog remaining. The aggregate level
    of funding for ship maintenance declines from fiscal year 2003 to
    fiscal year 2004, due in part to the positive effects of the additional
    maintenance funding provided in supplemental appropriations in the
    previous year, and in part to the accelerated retirement of our oldest,
    least capable, and most maintenance-intensive ships.
        Accelerating the retirement of these ships was one of the most
    difficult decisions we made in building this year's budget. While
    aggregate warfighting capability is a better metric than the number of
    ships in our inventory, we recognize that below a certain threshold
    numbers do matter. However, our analyses indicate that the near-term
    inactivations we are proposing provide an acceptable level of risk
    without compromising our ability to accomplish our mission, and that
    the fastest and most efficient way to recapitalize and transform the
    Fleet is to pursue vertical cuts in our least capable type-model
    series, both in ships and in aircraft, and apply those savings toward
    procuring new ships and aircraft.
        The growing sophistication of potential threats, increasing
    complexity of modern warfare, advances in training technology, and the
    development of new weapons and tactics require more capable training
    facilities and methodologies. Under the leadership of Fleet Forces
    Command, the Department has produced the Training Resource Strategy
    (TRS), a multi-year plan to improve inter-deployment training for
    CVBGs, ARGs, and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). The Department is
    committed to implementing and fully funding these improvements.
        The training technology, range, and facility improvements
    programmed via the TRS will ensure the long-term combat readiness and
    effectiveness of our deploying forces and produce a training capability
    superior to that existing today. The fiscal year 2004 budget will
    ensure deploying forces are fully prepared for the challenges of armed
    conflict in the 21st century.
        Military lands and training ranges--including land, sea, and air
    training and operating areas (OPAREAs)--are necessary to ensure that
    realistic training opportunities exist to prepare our sailors and
    marines. Population growth, economic development, expansion of
    conservation and recreational areas, and urban and suburban sprawl,
    along with State and Federal environmental laws and regulations, have
    significantly restricted the military's access to and use of military
    lands, training ranges, and at-sea OPAREAs. This ``encroachment'' has
    markedly restricted our ability to train realistically and, unless
    checked, promises to produce further restrictions.
        Our goal is not to roll back environmental protection, but to
    ensure that our sailors and marines are properly trained. We owe these
    young people realistic, quality training before we send them in harm's
    way. We are not looking for an exemption for everything the military
    does, but rather for a scientific approach that achieves an appropriate
    balance between environmental concerns and unique military readiness
    needs. We remain committed to our long tradition of excellent
    environmental stewardship, and our fiscal year 2004 budget will ensure
    our deploying forces are fully prepared for every challenge they may
    encounter.
    B. Personnel Readiness
        Our ships, submarines, and aircraft have no ``asset value'' to the
    Nation until manned by trained, educated, and motivated people. Sailors
    and marines--along with our civilian workforce--remain the strong and
    steady foundation of our naval capabilities. The families of our
    service members also are vital to our readiness. It is a fact that we
    recruit sailors and marines, but we retain families, and we recognize
    that the effectiveness of our forces is dependent in large measure on
    the support they receive from their loved ones.
        Over the past 2 years we realized significant gains in the manpower
    arena that translated directly into increased personnel readiness. In
    the process of maintaining an increased readiness posture while
    transforming antiterrorism/force protection positions, Navy operated
    just below the congressionally-allowed maximum end strength flexibility
    in fiscal year 2002. Doing so permitted us to sustain CVBG and ARG
    manning readiness near 100 percent. Our ability to surge deploy forces
    around the globe in response to recent events is testimony to the
    success of our personnel readiness posture. Over the course of fiscal
    years 2003 and 2004, we anticipate end strength will decrease slightly
    to reflect force structure changes.
        Active Duty
        The Navy and Marine Corps met recruiting and accession goals in
    2002, and continue to attract America's finest young men and women to
    national service. The Marine Corps notched its seventh year of meeting
    monthly and annual recruiting goals. Navy achieved its recruiting goals
    for a fourth consecutive year. Both Services are well-positioned for
    success in meeting 2003 officer accession requirements. The sailors and
    marines entering active duty truly represent our country's best and
    brightest. In 2002, 92 percent of Navy's enlisted accessions were high
    school graduates (up from 90 percent in 2001), while the Marine Corps
    accessions of high school graduates rose 1.3 percent to 97.5 percent.
        Retention rates in 2002 remained at record levels, with 58 percent
    of eligible first-term sailors deciding to ``stay Navy.'' The Marine
    Corps met retention goals in 2002 in record time, achieving its highest
    occupational specialty match to date while also experiencing its
    highest officer retention rate in 18 years. Sailors and marines have a
    sense of purpose and the desire to serve during this critical juncture
    in our Nation's history. We provide them unique opportunities to grow
    professionally and personally, to achieve and be recognized, and to
    lead. They see improvements to their quality of service, and they
    appreciate the outstanding compensation and benefits provided to them
    and to their families. Our recruiting and retention success is
    reflected in the fully manned and operationally capable CVBGs and ARGs
    currently on station around the globe.
        We are fully committed to providing the finest education and
    training for these bright young minds, as befits their place as future
    leaders of the Navy and Marine Corps. Graduation from ``Battle
    Stations'' or the ``Crucible'' is but the first step toward achieving
    the technologically advanced force required to conduct naval warfare in
    the 21st century. Our ``Revolution in Training'' is establishing a
    career-long learning continuum, ensuring the continuous personal and
    professional development of every service member.
        Successful as we are in attracting and retaining the best, we must
    not lose focus on people programs. Our immediate goals include:

             Increase Navy recruit high school graduation rates
            from 92 percent to 94 percent. Marine Corps recruit high school
            graduation rates are currently between 97 percent and 98
            percent;
             Increase the percentage of enlisted Navy recruits with
            previous college experience or technical/vocational training;
             Continue the Training Transformation started by Navy
            Task Force EXCEL (Excellence through Commitment to Education
            and Learning), and Marine Corps training continuum
            synchronization, including partnering with industry and
            academia to impart individual training and education;
             Continue to develop a live, virtual, and constructive
            training environment both within the Department and for use in
            conjunction with the Joint National Training Capability; and
             Explore innovative manning initiatives such as the
            Optimum Manning program, which relies on new technologies and
            creative leadership to reduce ship manning.

        Congressional support for a targeted pay raise in fiscal year 2004,
    which recognizes and reaffirms the value of our career force, is
    critical to staying the course. So, too, is continuing the reduction of
    out-of-pocket housing expenses and the extension and enhancement of
    essential special pay and bonus authorities. The Selective Reenlistment
    Bonus remains an important tool for retaining our critical skill
    personnel.
        Reserves
        Our Reserve community remains an integral part of our Navy and
    Marine Corps team, with 88,000 naval reservists and 40,000 Selected
    Marine Corps reservists serving today. The seamless integration of the
    Reserve and active components as a total force in the global war on
    terrorism has been a resounding success. The dedicated service,
    invaluable resources, and selfless sacrifices to duty each of these
    ``citizen sailors and marines'' provides on a daily basis are integral
    to operational success. We have recalled over 15,000 Navy and Marine
    Corps reservists as of mid-January 2003. These patriots have provided
    force protection, staff augmentation, intelligence, and warfighting
    skills to the Nation's war efforts.
        The Naval Reserve constitutes 19 percent of the Navy's total force,
    with an additional 69,000 sailors serving as Individual Ready
    Reservists (IRRs). In 2002 the Naval Reserve met both its officer and
    enlisted recruiting goals, the result of significant recruiting program
    efforts. These Reserve Forces provide our inter-theater airlift, harbor
    defense, naval embarked advisory teams, and Naval Coastal Warfare
    capabilities. In addition, a large portion of the Navy's port cargo
    handling support, Mobile Construction Battalions, intelligence, and
    medical capabilities are resident in the Reserves.
        The Selected Marine Corps Reserve comprises nearly 25 percent of
    the Marine Corps' warfighting capability, with an additional 58,000
    marines serving as Individual Ready Reservists (IRRs). The Marine Corps
    Reserve's contribution to the global war on terrorism continues with
    individuals and units mobilized to provide a wide variety of support.
    The additional mobilization of hundreds of Individual Mobilizations
    Augmentees and IRRs provided a critical surge of ready expertise and
    staff augmentation to warfighting commands, both Joint and Marine.
        Civilian Personnel
        The civilian workforce, currently totaling approximately 186,000,
    forms an essential role as part of our total force. Hard-working and
    dedicated civilian employees can be found in every major command,
    working alongside our sailors and marines, performing the vital work of
    the Department. We continually refine and shape this vital work force
    for current and future missions. Twenty-one civilian occupational
    groups are targeted specifically for intensive active management. These
    include science and engineering, logistics, contracting, human
    resources, and financial management. Just as it is essential to recruit
    and retain the very best sailors and marines, it also is essential to
    recruit and retain the best and brightest civilians. We are in a
    competition for talent, and your support for a flexible set of civilian
    human resource management tools will enhance our efforts to hire,
    develop, and retain this quality work force.
    C. Shipbuilding
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides funding for seven new
    construction ships, the final two of four planned SSBN-to-SSGN
    conversions, and the first ship in our Cruiser Conversion program. In
    all, our shipbuilding program includes $11.4 billion, a significant
    increase above last year. Additionally, we invest more than $1.5
    billion for R&D in transformational shipbuilding programs such as CVN-
    21, DD(X), LCS, and SSGN (discussed later in this statement). The seven
    new ships include:

             Three Arleigh Burke class (DDG-51) destroyers. These
            ships are being procured as part of a multi-year procurement
            (MYP) of 10 DDG-51 ships over the period fiscal year 2002
            through fiscal year 2005. In addition to the cost savings from
            this MYP, the Navy and its two principal DDG builders
            successfully negotiated a workload swap arrangement in June
            2002 in which General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works will transfer
            LPD-17 ship construction work to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems
            in exchange for additional DDG-51 work. This arrangement will
            optimize production efficiencies and stabilize workload at all
            shipyards building DDG-51 and LPD-17 class ships.
             One Virginia class (SSN-774) fast attack submarine.
            The fiscal year 2004 ship marks the initial year of a seven-
            ship, 5-year MYP that will achieve significant savings while
            increasing submarine procurement to two per year starting in
            fiscal year 2007. The first Virginia class submarine (SSN-774)
            will deliver in June 2004.
             One San Antonio class (LPD-17) amphibious transport
            dock. The fiscal year 2004 budget provides full funding to
            procure the sixth ship of this class. The program is on track,
            and represents an urgently needed contribution to the Marine
            Corps' amphibious lift requirements.
             Two Lewis and Clark class (T-AKE) auxiliary cargo and
            ammunition ships. Fiscal year 2004 funding procures the fifth
            and sixth ships of this class to continue recapitalization of
            our support fleet. Delivery of the lead ship is expected in
            fiscal year 2005.

        Beginning in fiscal year 2004, the Cruiser Conversion Program will
    provide selected Ticonderoga class Aegis-equipped cruisers with
    essential land attack, force protection, and Area Air Defense Commander
    capabilities, extending their mission-relevant service life to 35-plus
    years.
        Beyond the new construction ships and conversions, the fiscal year
    2004 budget request provides additional incremental funding for LHD-8,
    service life extension for three Landing Craft Air Cushioned, and
    initial R&D efforts on the LHA Replacement (LHA(R)), scheduled for
    procurement in fiscal year 2007. In LHA(R) the Department is pursuing a
    far more capable replacement for aging amphibious ships such as the
    LHA. While the initial stages of design move forward, LHA(R) will offer
    many improvements over the LHA it will replace, and will set the stage
    for further development toward a new design that could offer
    capabilities such as concurrent flight operations of helicopters and
    fixed wing aircraft.
    D. Aircraft
        The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget maximizes the return on
    aviation investment, primarily through the use of MYP arrangements for
    the F/A-18E/F (both airframe and engine), the E-2C, and the MH-60S. We
    also have agreed to enter a joint MYP contract with the Air Force to
    procure KC-130Js to replace the Marine Corps' fleet of KC-130F/Rs. In
    all, the fiscal year 2004 budget procures 100 new aircraft, including:

             53 tactical, fixed wing aircraft (42 F/A-18E/F, 2 E-2C
            and 9 MV-22);
             28 helicopters (13 MH-60S, 6 MH-60R and 9 UH-1Y/AH-
            1Z);
             16 trainer aircraft (15 T-45 and 1 T-39); and
             3 support aircraft (2 UC-35 and 1 C-40A)

        The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is the Navy's principal tactical
    aviation recapitalization program until we get to the JSF. The fiscal
    year 2004 budget includes $3.0 billion for 42 planes, which constitutes
    the final installment of a fiscal year 2000--fiscal year 2004 MYP
    contract. Deliveries remain ahead of schedule, and the first squadron
    of F/A-18E/F recently conducted combat operations aboard U.S.S. Abraham
    Lincoln (CVN-72). Of note, a variant of the F/A-18 airframe, the EA-18G
    Growler, has been selected as the Navy platform to replace the aging
    EA-6B Prowler. By using a common airframe, the EA-6B follow-on will
    deliver at lower cost while providing growth potential for improved
    future electronic warfare systems. The Marine Corps expects to fly the
    EA-6B (ICAP III) until approximately 2014 to 2015 before transitioning
    to a new Electronic Attack aircraft.
        Based on successful flight testing results, the Department felt
    confident to continue the minimum sustaining rate for the V-22 Osprey
    program and has requested nine MV-22s along with two CV-22s requested
    by the Air Force. Additionally, fiscal year 2004 funding supports key
    elements of the Department's helicopter master plan. We have requested
    procurement of 13 MH-60S platforms (organic mine countermeasures,
    combat search and rescue, special operations and logistics missions)
    and 6 MH-60R platforms (tactical support missions for surface
    combatants and aircraft carriers). Together, these will continue
    replacing the Department's aging fleet of H-46, SH-3, SH-60B, and SH-
    60F helicopters. Fiscal year 2004 will mark the first year of
    procurement in the AH-1Z/UH-1Y program. These aircraft improve many
    capabilities for the Marine Corps, including increased payload, range
    and time on station, improved sensors and lethality, and 85 percent
    component commonality.
    E. Weapons
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request supports the Department's
    objective to develop, upgrade, and replace weapons and weapon systems
    to ensure we maintain our warfighting edge.
        Our precision-guided munitions inventory will continue to improve
    in fiscal year 2004 as the Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) system ramps up
    to full rate production. TACTOM will accelerate the transition of our
    land attack missile inventory from the older Tomahawk Land Attack
    Missile to the newer, more capable, less costly TACTOM. The budget
    request sustains the maximum Department of the Navy production rate for
    the Joint Direct Attack Munition of 1,000 units per month while
    procuring over 5,000 Laser Guided Bomb kits. Production of the Joint
    Standoff Weapon (JSOW) baseline variant (dispenser) increases in fiscal
    year 2004, and the JSOW unitary variant (penetrator) enters full rate
    production.
        Several land attack R&D efforts central to future littoral warfare
    continue in fiscal year 2004. Advanced naval gun technologies will
    enhance fire support to marines operating ashore. Evolving toward a
    fiscal year 2005 ``shoot-off,'' either the Extended Range Guided
    Munition or the Autonomous Naval Support Round will enhance the range
    and accuracy of Navy 5-inch guns. The Advanced Gun System will provide
    the next generation of surface combatants with a modular, large caliber
    gun system including an automated magazine handling system.
    F. Key Warfighting ``Core Competencies''
        While the fiscal year 2004 budget request devotes a significant
    amount of resources toward recapitalizing and transforming to meet
    future requirements, it also provides solid support for our
    longstanding naval ``core competencies'' of Anti-Submarine Warfare
    (ASW), Mine Warfare (MIW), Ship Self Defense (SSD), and Air Defense
    (AD).
        ASW
        ASW remains a challenging mission area, particularly in the shallow
    water littoral regions populated by modern, quiet submarines. The
    fiscal year 2004 budget request supports numerous improvements in ASW.
    The Improved Extended Echo-Ranging is incorporated into the USQ-78B
    Acoustic Processor, which will improve large area acoustic search
    capability on our Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Further enhancements to our
    capability for large area search will be provided by acquiring the
    Automatic Periscope Detection and Discrimination system. Additionally,
    the capability for our surface combatants to survive attacks from
    threat torpedoes will be enhanced through the Surface Ship Torpedo
    Defense effort. The success of the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (A-
    RCI) program in providing significant improvement in ASW sensor
    processing for our submarine force has spawned similar efforts in
    submarine combat control, communications, and upgrades to the surface
    fleet's SQQ-89 combat suite. These programs validate the Navy's
    decision to use commercially available technology to deliver superior
    performance at less cost.
        MIW
        The Navy continues to make advances in MIW capabilities, and our
    emphasis on organic capabilities to counter the growing mine threat is
    enhancing our ability to ``get to the fight.'' The fiscal year 2004
    budget continues the development and acquisition of the Long-Term Mine
    Reconnaissance System (LMRS), which is on track for a fiscal year 2005
    IOC on Los Angeles class submarines. LMRS will provide a clandestine
    reconnaissance capability for mines and mine-like objects. The fiscal
    year 2004 budget also includes funding for the development and
    acquisition of the Remote Mine-hunting System (RMS), a surface ship--
    launched and recovered semi-submersible vehicle. RMS has a fiscal year
    2005 IOC with near-term fielding planned for DDGs 91-96. RMS also is a
    strong candidate for future deployment on the LCS. To meet the
    Department's goal of an organic mine warfare capability by fiscal year
    2005, the fiscal year 2004 budget continues the development and
    integration of five Organic Mine Subsystems into the MH-60S platform.
        SSD
        We continue to invest in upgrading our Ship Self Defense programs.
    Fiscal year 2004 funding covers the spectrum from electronic
    countermeasures to missiles to guns. The Surface Electronic Warfare
    Improvement Program (SEWIP) is a spiral development effort initiated to
    provide a robust, full spectrum electronic warfare system following
    cancellation of the Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System in
    fiscal year 2002. SEWIP will build on the legacy SLQ-32 system to field
    capabilities against next-generation threats. The current budget
    expands procurement of the Close-in Weapons System, Block 1B. The
    internationally-procured Rolling Air Frame Missile will provide ship
    self-defense against missiles as part of a layered defense.
    Additionally, we are pursuing installation of minor caliber guns on our
    deploying ships to improve our ability to counteract a small boat
    threat in the 0 to 8,000 yards range. We soon will install stabilized
    minor caliber guns on two DDGs.
        AD
        The fiscal year 2004 budget requests funds to develop the Extended
    Range Active Missile (ERAM). ERAM will enable over-the-horizon
    engagements against the most advanced anti-ship and land attack cruise
    missiles, and represents an important step in projecting area defense
    landward from the sea.
    G. Maneuver Warfare
        The fiscal year 2004 budget supports the continued development and
    fielding of all equipment used by the Marine Corps' maneuver forces.
    This year, we identify approximately $340 million for R&D and
    procurement of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV). Last
    year we procured the first AAAV, which will serve as a full-up system,
    live-fire test vehicle. We will procure 186 systems over the remainder
    of the fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2009 program. Scheduled for IOC in
    fiscal year 2008, the AAAV will provide a unique combination of
    offensive firepower, nuclear-chemical-biological protection, and high
    speed mobility on land and on sea.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget will fund the next 60 Lightweight 155-
    mm (LW155) Howitzers. These units will provide significant improvements
    in Marine Corps fire support over the current M198 system. Compatible
    with all U.S. and NATO 155mm rounds, the smaller footprint of the LW155
    will reduce strategic sealift requirements while providing improved
    accuracy and greater lethality.
    H. C\4\I, Space and Network Initiatives
        The Department's Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and
    Intelligence (C\4\I) and Space programs are an integral part of
    network-centric operations, enhancing the combat capability of our
    Naval Forces and serving as critical enablers of a transforming Navy
    and Marine Corps. Our concept of Information Technology for the 21st
    century (IT-21) is providing a common backbone for C\4\I systems to be
    linked afloat, ashore, and to the Internet. IT-21 combines satellite
    and line-of-sight communication paths with commercial IT hardware and
    software to establish secure and unclassified Internet Protocol network
    connectivity for ashore and mobile Naval Forces. This is a critical
    first step toward transformational network-centric operations.
        Our next major objective is to integrate the successes of IT-21 and
    incorporate them across the full spectrum of naval operations to
    achieve significant improvement in knowledge management and operational
    performance. This full dimensional approach, called FORCEnet, will
    provide the operational construct and architectural framework for naval
    warfare in the information age. We will address FORCEnet in greater
    detail later in this statement.
        Support from space is essential to many Navy and Marine Corps
    operations today, and grows increasingly important as the force becomes
    more network-centric. The fiscal year 2004 budget supports the
    Department's expanding efforts in space, including assured, high data
    rate satellite communications, precision navigation and targeting,
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems and environmental
    support.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget continues critical enhancements that
    will provide our forces with a common tactical picture. Cooperative
    Engagement Capability (CEC) will provide real time exchange of fire
    control quality data between battle force units and will permit a
    single, identical tactical picture. The Block 2 version will reduce
    cost, size, and weight, with procurement beginning in fiscal year 2006.
    The Naval Fires Control System and Joint Fires Network will use
    existing fire control infrastructure to serve as the nerve center for
    surface land attack by automating shipboard land attack battle
    management duties, incorporating improved land attack weapons systems,
    and utilizing battlefield digitization.
        The Navy/Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) serves as the principal
    element of the IT-21 effort ashore and is a key enabler of IT
    transformation. Business Case Analyses conducted over the last 2 years
    have demonstrated that the NMCI strategy, characterized by having a
    single private sector entity provide IT services under a long-term
    commercial seat management contract is, in fact, a sound business
    decision compared to the way IT requirements previously were satisfied.
    Last year, Congress approved a 2-year extension to the base performance
    period of the original NMCI contract, extending coverage through fiscal
    year 2007. Fiscal year 2004 funding of $1.6 billion continues user seat
    roll-out and cutover to the NMCI architecture, progressing toward a
    target end-state of 365,700 seats.
    I. Missile Defense Initiatives
        The Department of the Navy is poised to contribute significantly in
    fielding initial sea-based missile defense capabilities to meet the
    near-term ballistic missile threat to our homeland, our deployed
    forces, and our friends and allies. We are working closely with the
    Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to upgrade six DDGs in calendar year 2004
    and another six in calendar year 2005 for ICBM surveillance and
    tracking duties. We also are supporting MDA's procurement of up to 20
    Standard Missile interceptors to provide a limited at-sea capability to
    intercept ballistic missiles in the ascent and mid-course phases of
    flight. Finally, U.S.S. Lake Erie (CG-70) will be assigned to MDA to
    facilitate a more robust testing program for missile defense. Our sea-
    based missile defense programs experienced tremendous success on the
    test range during 2002, and we look forward to building on these
    successes to accelerate development of this vital capability for our
    Nation.
    J. Shore Infrastructure
        The Department remains dedicated to maintaining and improving the
    quality of our support to sailors and marines. Maintaining and
    improving an aging infrastructure, while recapitalizing our operating
    forces, requires disciplined choices and innovative approaches.
        The fiscal year 2004 housing program continues the Department's
    course toward the goal of eliminating inadequate family housing by
    2007. The Navy's three-pronged strategy of improving allowances to
    service members, privatizing, and continuing traditional military
    construction is proving very successful. Increased Basic Allowance for
    Housing (BAH) is spurring local communities to provide necessary
    housing on the open market. Recent analysis shows we have reduced the
    total requirement for Government-furnished housing by over 9,500 units.
        Public/private housing ventures are allowing us to achieve more
    with less commitment of resources. In fiscal year 2003, we will
    privatize over 10,400 homes in five locations; in fiscal year 2004, we
    are increasing this by another 7,000 units. Where BAH and privatizing
    do not apply we are renovating or replacing our inventory.
        We are building on our successes in family housing to help achieve
    our Homeport Ashore Program. Three bachelor housing Public-Private
    Venture (PPV) projects are being developed that could triple the number
    of spaces we would have been able to provide in San Diego, Norfolk, and
    Camp Pendleton under traditional military construction.
        The fiscal year 2004 Military Construction and Sustainment program
    reflects difficult but necessary trade-offs between shore
    infrastructure and fleet recapitalization. The Department remains
    committed to achieving a 67-year recapitalization rate by fiscal year
    2008. In pursuing that goal, we will explore innovative solutions to
    provide safe, efficient installations for our service members,
    including design-build improvements, more efficient facilities, and
    BRAC land sales via the GSA Internet.
    K. Business Practices
        We have embarked on a mission to improve the business practices of
    the Department. Every dollar saved by working smarter or by ending
    outdated methods of operations is another dollar that can be used for
    our sailors and marines to equip, train, or fight.
        Information is key to improving the way we do business. Better
    information makes for better decisionmaking, both on the battlefield
    and at the budget table. We have four pilot programs in place utilizing
    enterprise resource planning (ERP), which aim to improve the quality of
    information available to our decisionmakers. These pilot projects will
    eliminate dozens of incompatible computer databases and the business
    processes that once supported those databases. Even more importantly,
    ERP should produce financial and managerial information that is more
    complete, more accurate, and more timely. Our focus now is on
    converging these pilots to achieve even greater synergy of management
    information across a broader spectrum of the Department, and working
    with the Department of Defense Comptroller to ensure these efforts are
    advancing the uniform business management architecture under
    development.
        In addition to better information, we need flexible and innovative
    tools to help manage the Department. Some of these tools, like
    strategic sourcing, are being used already. Competition helps achieve
    the best quality support to the sailor and marine at the lowest
    possible cost by introducing the discipline of the marketplace. The
    acquisition process still needs considerable reform. We owe it to every
    sailor and marine to ensure that today's technology arrives in their
    hands today, not tomorrow. It still takes too long from lab to live
    fire. Finally, the Navy and Marine Corps need better tools to recruit
    and manage the civilians who support our warfighter.
       iv. naval power 21: a transformational vision for the 21st century
        Fundamentally, our Navy and Marine Corps exist to control the seas,
    assure access, and project power beyond the sea. Our vision, Naval
    Power 21, is built upon three pillars:

             We assure access. We assure sea-based access worldwide
            for military operations, diplomatic interaction, and
            humanitarian relief efforts.
             We fight and win. We project power to influence events
            at sea and ashore both at home and overseas.
             We are transforming continually to improve. We are
            transforming concepts, organizations, doctrine, technology,
            networks, sensors, platforms, weapon systems, training,
            education, and our approach to people.

        Although the Navy and Marine Corps team remains the greatest
    maritime force in the world, the emerging challenges of the 21st
    century demand a joint, netted, power projection force that offers
    modern and ever-evolving combat capability. Together, under the
    supporting service visions of Seapower 21 and Marine Corps Strategy 21,
    we will provide funding for a full array of transformational
    initiatives in our R&D, investment, and operational programs. Evidence
    of the scope and magnitude of these changes is highlighted by our
    transformation:

             from a single new class of destroyer to a family of
            surface combatants tailored for the full range of 21st century
            missions;
             from a Cold War force of 18 SSBNs to a 21st century
            force of 14 SSBNs and 4 SSGNs;
             from evolutionary aircraft carrier improvements to the
            revolutionary promise of CVN-21;
             from no ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability to
            limited sea-based BMD capability; and
             from competing Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation
            to an integrated naval tactical aviation.
    A. Transformational Capabilities to Assure Access and Project Power
        The Navy and Marine Corps continue to meet the imperative of
    transformation. Our ``way ahead'' for the future capitalizes on
    transformational ideas that facilitate our recapitalization goals. The
    fiscal year 2004 budget request includes funding for initiatives in
    shipbuilding, aviation, and C\4\I that promise dramatic improvements in
    assuring access and projecting power.
        In shipbuilding, we are fulfilling the President's stated goal to
    ``skip a generation'' of technology by restructuring our previous two-
    step (CVNX-1 and CVNX-2) evolutionary acquisition approach into a
    single transformational ship design that accommodates continuous
    evolution through the life of the class. The new design, named CVN-21,
    sustains the original development and construction schedule from CVNX-
    1, but accelerates many critical technologies previously planned for
    the second step ship, CVNX-2. CVN-21 will feature a new propulsion
    plant, a greatly expanded electrical generation and distribution
    system, a new/enlarged flight deck, an improved sortie rate generation
    over CVNX-1, an electro-magnetic aircraft launching system (EMALS), a
    new advanced arresting gear, improved weapons and material handling
    systems, and improved survivability features--all with 800 fewer crew
    members. In support of this technology acceleration we have added
    significant funding across the fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009
    program while providing $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2004 alone.
        The centerpiece warship of our future surface combatant ``family of
    ships,'' the DD(X), is on track to move to an initial construction
    contract award in fiscal year 2005. Fiscal year 2004 funding of $1.05
    billion will enable further development of key electric drive, power
    grid, and combat system components. Through a spiral development
    acquisition process, DD(X) will be the principal technology engine that
    will feed the entire family of ships.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget requests approximately $160 million in
    R&D to begin moving out with the next member of our future surface
    combatant ``family of ships,'' the LCS. A networked, lethal, small,
    fast, stealthy, and highly maneuverable ship, LCS will be designed from
    the keel up as a focused mission ship capable of employing manned and
    unmanned mission modules to counter some of the most challenging anti-
    access threats our Naval Forces may encounter close to shore--mines,
    quiet diesel submarines, and swarming small boats. Last year, we
    continued experimenting with a range of innovative hull forms, and
    Congress supported us so we could get the program moving this year,
    avoiding a critical 1-year delay. The fiscal year 2004 effort will be
    aimed at defining requirements, improving our knowledge base for
    selecting an LCS design, and beginning mission module development.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request contains nearly $1.2 billion
    for SSBN-to-SSGN conversion. This effort will provide a near-term
    transformational capability to the Nation by removing four Ohio class
    submarines from their strategic mission, refueling their reactors to
    permit an additional 20 years of operation, and converting them into
    conventional strike platforms capable of carrying more than 150
    Tomahawk missiles and deploying over 60 Special Operations Forces.
    Funding to commence the first two conversions was provided in fiscal
    year 2003; this year's request supports beginning the final two
    conversions.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget provides $2.2 billion to continue
    development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a stealthy, multi-role
    fighter aircraft designed to be an enabler for Naval Power 21. JSF
    replaces the Navy's F-18A/C Hornet variants and the Marine Corps' AV-8B
    Harrier and F/A-18C/D Hornet while complementing the Navy's F/A-18E/F
    Super Hornet. JSF offers dramatic improvements in affordability and
    supportability. It has completed all major milestones to date on time,
    and remains on track to IOC for the Marine Corps in 2010 and for the
    Navy in fiscal year 2012.
        A critical enabler of transformational intelligence, surveillance,
    and reconnaissance, the E-2C Advanced Hawkeye Program will provide a
    robust overland capability against current and future cruise missile-
    type targets. The fiscal year 2004 budget invests over $350 million for
    continued development. IOC is planned for fiscal year 2008 with a total
    procurement of 66 systems.
        As the global war on terrorism has demonstrated, unmanned
    technology will play an ever-increasing role in the battleground of the
    21st century. The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget invests more
    than $300 million across a series of UAV programs, including Tactical
    UAVs, Maritime Surveillance UAVs, and an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
    (UCAV) initiative, developed in partnership with the U.S. Air Force.
    Beneath the sea, we will invest more than $80 million in Unmanned
    Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) that are being developed to enhance
    capabilities in minefield reconnaissance and other submarine missions.
    B. Transformational Organizations and Operational Concepts
        Beyond pure technology, transformation also includes revolutionary
    methods for achieving dramatically greater utility out of our existing
    assets. The Department's initiative to integrate its tactical aviation
    capabilities is one such transformational story. Navy and Marine Corps
    tactical air integration will maximize forward deployed combat power
    and optimize the core capability of naval aviation forces. Its positive
    impact will be felt across the Department's entire tactical aviation
    enterprise, from leaner, more capable fighting formations to
    streamlined procurement requirements (tactical and training) to
    manpower savings. In total, this innovative program promises to save
    $975 million over the fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009 program and
    provide approximately $19 billion in cost avoidance from fiscal year
    2007 to fiscal year 2012.
        To support the ability of forward-based Naval Forces to respond to
    a host of scenarios, the Navy and Marine Corps are exploring more
    robust strike capabilities for the ARG/MEU team. The Expeditionary
    Strike Group pairs the traditional ARG with surface combatants and an
    SSN so the force has greater capability to conduct independent
    operations in the ``deter'' and ``swiftly defeat'' scenarios outlined
    in our defense strategy.
        FORCEnet is the Department of the Navy's catalyst for operational
    transformation. In the realm of network-centric warfare and operations,
    it will enable orders of magnitude increases in combat power to ensure
    decisive influence and warfighting success across the full spectrum of
    military operations in the information age. FORCEnet is not a system.
    It is the architecture by which we will integrate our sensors,
    networks, decision aids, weapons, and warfighters into a networked,
    distributed combat system, scalable across the entire range of conflict
    from seabed to space and sea to land. Leveraging powerful network
    infrastructure ashore, including NMCI and the various constituents of
    IT-21, with legacy and developing tactical networks at sea, including
    those as diverse as CEC, Joint Fires Network and the E-2C Advanced
    Hawkeye Program, FORCEnet will bring a dramatically expanded
    ``toolbox'' of capabilities to the joint warfare commander. Through
    FORCEnet the Navy and Marine Corps will transform to a joint, netted,
    distributed, and forward stationed force.
    C. Transformational Initiatives for our People
        Sea Warrior is the process of developing 21st century sailors.
    Curriculum Mapping is the Marine Corps equivalent. These initiatives
    identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed for mission
    accomplishment; apply a career-long training and education continuum;
    and employ a responsive, interactive career management system to ensure
    the right skills are in the right place at the right time.
        Modern Naval Forces are manned by streamlined teams of sailors and
    marines who fight and manage some of the most complex systems in the
    world. We need sailors and marines who are highly educated and expertly
    trained. They must be creative thinkers and life-long learners, and it
    is for them that we undertook the Revolution in Training. They also
    deserve a human resource management and detailing system that provides
    information and choice, both to the sailor and gaining commands, so
    that informed career decisions can be made. To this end, we are moving
    toward an interactive and incentivized distribution system that
    includes team detailing, web job listings, an information call center,
    and comprehensive and extensive engagement of our detailers with
    individual sailors to help shape their careers.
        At sea, we are exploring two initiatives that promise a revolution
    in the way we man our ships. First, we have begun an ``Optimal Manning
    Experiment'' on board U.S.S. Milius (DDG-69) and U.S.S. Mobile Bay (CG-
    53) to develop a more efficient model for the shipboard manning
    requirements of the 21st century. Also, we have begun a crewing
    experiment titled ``Sea Swap,'' in which we will deploy two destroyers
    for 18 months consecutively, rotating the entire crews at 6-month
    intervals. This initiative will realize significant operational savings
    by avoiding multiple 6-week transits to and from the deployed operating
    areas.
    D. Transformational Initiatives for Doing Business
        Our ability to recapitalize and transform stems in large measure
    from a vigorous divestiture program that forced us to make hard choices
    across every facet of the Department's operations. We looked hard at
    older systems with their limited capabilities and high infrastructure
    costs (maintenance, parts, training, etc.) and ultimately decided to
    accelerate retirement of 11 ships and 70 aircraft. We reorganized and
    then reduced the Secretary of the Navy Headquarters Staff by 25
    percent. We divested ourselves from more than 50 systems and eliminated
    70,000 legacy IT applications from an original baseline of 103,000. In
    the aggregate, these difficult decisions yielded $1.9 billion for
    reinvestment in higher priorities.
        In addition to divestiture initiatives, we are transforming the way
    we manage the entire Department's internal affairs. Perhaps nowhere is
    this more evident than in our shipbuilding programs. Instead of locking
    ourselves into ``pre-ordained obsolescence'' through rigid designs for
    hull, combat, and information systems that take years to execute, we
    are capitalizing on computer-aided, design-build strategies in which we
    harvest commercial, ``state-of-the-art'' technologies and insert them
    at the optimum time as the construction process moves from hull to
    combat system suite to information systems. We have undertaken some
    remarkable initiatives within our acquisition community that have
    stabilized key industrial bases, expanded our ability to capitalize on
    the best commercial practices, and laid a strong foundation for
    controlling the costs of our major acquisition programs.
        We are working with industry as partners across the full breadth of
    our shipbuilding programs. The tri-partite agreement between Navy,
    General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman stabilized both our DDG-51 and
    LPD-17 programs, avoided a ``second lead ship'' challenge for the LPD
    program, and produced savings sufficient to purchase a third DDG in
    fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005. We are working with the software
    industry to open all Navy architectures. These efforts are intended to
    lead to the development of a truly open architecture that can be shared
    between all of our current and future combatant ships. Finally, we have
    imposed a discipline on ourselves that severely limits change during
    the critical phases of our major shipbuilding programs. This discipline
    also has been implemented in the JSF program through a configuration
    steering board. By controlling the scope and timing of change, we hope
    to implement necessary changes in our programs in a planned fashion
    where we know what it will cost and how we will install it in the most
    economical manner.
        Through these transformational business initiatives and others, our
    Department will emerge with an optimal force structure; a healthy
    industrial base and an efficient and appropriately sized
    infrastructure.

        V. THE WAY AHEAD: POSITIONING TODAY'S NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FOR
                             TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES

        Although the global war on terrorism is closer to the beginning
    than the end, our Navy and Marine Corps, as members our Nation's joint
    battle force, have disrupted terrorist networks and freed the people of
    Afghanistan. Our Nation can take pride that, in 2002, the Navy-Marine
    Corps Team continued its record of combat excellence, improved
    operational readiness, and retained our magnificent people at historic
    rates.
        Much has been accomplished, but much remains to be done. The
    Department's fiscal year 2004 budget request positions today's Navy and
    Marine Corps to support tomorrow's joint warfighting environment by
    sustaining hard-fought advances in personnel and operational readiness,
    investing in critical shipbuilding and aircraft programs, fueling
    transformational capabilities, and building a global, agile, and fully
    networked force. As our Navy and Marine Corps Team confronts a future
    with challenges already visible on the horizon, we thank you for your
    terrific support of our Naval Forces, and urge your continued support
    for the course upon which we have embarked to fight and win our
    Nation's wars while preparing to meet the demands of an uncertain
    tomorrow.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. For the
    Department of the Air Force, Secretary Roche.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES G. ROCHE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

        Secretary Roche. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
    members of the committee. It is my great honor to join my
    fellow Service Secretaries today and to represent some hundred
    thousand active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen who are
    engaged in defending our Nation and serving our interests
    around the globe. I am very proud of their achievements this
    year, from combat operation to homeland defense, to their daily
    efforts that guarantee the readiness, health, security, and
    morale of our forces.
        It has also been my distinct pleasure to serve for another
    year with a wonderful general officer named John Jumper. I
    enjoyed working with him; I enjoyed his background. We note in
    our travels around the Air Force, we have been impressed and
    humbled by the creativity, commitment, and professionalism of
    our airmen.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, if the President decides that
    we should go into conflict, I want you to know we are ready. We
    have looked at all of the aspects. As some of you know, I carry
    each day the current list of preferred precision munitions and
    where we are in production. We review all that will be asked of
    us. We are ready; we want you to know this.
        As we prepare for the future, we fully support the
    Department's continuing efforts to balance near-term readiness
    and operational requirements with long-term transformation of
    the Armed Forces. Our challenge is to fight the global war on
    terrorism while simultaneously transforming. We must do both.
    Although we face near-term budget pressures, we nevertheless
    must invest in the future. Otherwise, we may be forced to pay
    more later in dollars and perhaps even lives.
        A year of challenging operations, readiness improvements,
    and investments in our people provide us with many good news
    stories. In defense of the homeland, we flew over 25,000
    Operation Noble Eagle fighter, tanker, and airborne warning
    sorties, made possible only through the mobilization of over
    30,000 airmen from the Air Force Reserves and Air National
    Guard. They have conducted over 75 percent of all Operation
    Noble Eagle missions.
        In Operation Enduring Freedom, we flew more than 40,000
    sorties in 2002, over 70 percent of all coalition sorties. We
    did over 8,000 refueling missions, 55 percent of which were for
    Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, which really made this a joint
    operation in a distant landlocked nation that we never thought
    possible that we would have to fight a long time ago.
        In Afghanistan, our special operation teams developed new
    ways to bring air and space power to bear in a variety of
    engagements. Notably, our combat controllers integrated new
    technologies and precision weapons into close air support from
    39,000 feet using the B-2 bomber; and Curtis Lemay probably is
    turning in his grave. We are now developing better processes to
    target and engage time-critical and moving targets, and the
    same combat controllers are working on the next generation of
    systems.
        We have sustained a forward presence around the globe
    protecting our Nation's interests and assuring our allies. We
    now have over 35,000 deployed airmen serving in some 50
    expeditionary bases in over 35 countries plus over 50,000
    airmen permanently assigned overseas, not including Hawaii and
    Alaska.
        In space, we continued the operation of a variety of
    satellite constellations that provided essential capabilities
    to warfighters and civil consumers. Last year, we launched 18
    missions with a 100 percent success rate, including the first
    space launch using an expendable launch vehicle. But we are now
    facing some interesting challenges. For instance, we now note
    with undeniable reality that other nations are investing in
    American advanced military technologies, and fielding the best
    our aerospace industry has to offer in their air forces. This
    is unique in our history.
        While investment of our good friends and allies is a great
    value for our alliance's industrial base, superior capabilities
    are now sure to be present in American-produced airplanes that
    do not fly the American flag. While other nations are
    modernizing, we continue to employ aging systems that are
    becoming more difficult to operate and more expensive to
    maintain. The average age of the operational Air Force fleet is
    22 years old this day. Even with our planned aircraft
    procurements, the total average age is expected to increase to
    27 years by the year 2020.
        While our 2004 budget addresses a number of these
    challenges and supports the Department's priorities, it
    accelerates our modernization of joint capabilities, and
    maintains the gains of readiness and people programming
    achieved last year. Most important it gets money into our
    procurement programs and funds essential capabilities our
    warfighters need. I strongly request that you support stability
    in all of these programs.
        Mr. Chairman, we are also working with Secretary Rumsfeld
    and our colleagues to assess, advocate, and implement a range
    of sensible management practices that we believe will help
    minimize bureaucratic obstacles in the path that affect the
    future administration of the Department. In particular, we are
    looking at measures to transform our personnel, acquisition,
    administrative, and range management practices and we have
    asked for your help.
        In order to be brief, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude there
    and thank you and your colleagues for investments you have made
    in our future and for the trust you have placed in our
    concerted effort to provide America with air and space
    dominance.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Roche follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. James G. Roche

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Air Force has an
    unlimited horizon for air and space capabilities. Our Service was borne
    of innovation, and we remain focused on identifying and developing the
    concepts of operations, advanced technologies, and integrated
    operations required to provide the joint force with unprecedented
    capabilities and to remain the world's dominant air and space force.
        The Wright brothers' historic flight in 1903 ushered in the dawn of
    a dramatic era of scientific, cultural, and technological advances. As
    the Air Force celebrates this centennial of powered flight, we do so
    with the recognition that, despite the daunting challenges of a more
    dynamic security environment, the next hundred years will witness
    equally fantastic achievements. The 2003 Air Force Posture Statement
    reflects this optimism. In this report, we relate some of our
    accomplishments of 2002 as well as our vision of an innovative and
    adaptive force capable of guaranteeing American air and space dominance
    for the decades to come. Our successes are America's successes; they
    are the direct result of the selfless and unconditional service by men
    and women of the Total Air Force and their families.
        During the past year, and in the midst of combat and a variety of
    contingency operations, we evaluated, implemented, and validated a host
    of technological advances, organizational changes, and concepts of
    operation. These enabled us to deliver desired effects faster and with
    greater precision than at any time in the history of warfare. Such
    adaptation is characteristic of our Service, as airmen continually
    strive to push innovation ever forward en route to unprecedented air
    and space capabilities for combatant commanders, the joint force, and
    our Nation. In the year ahead, we will move our expeditionary Air Force
    closer to realizing the transformational imperatives of this new era,
    machine-to-machine digital integration of manned, unmanned, and space
    assets, and joint command and control. Our concepts of operation
    leverage this integration, and expand our asymmetric advantages in air
    and space--advantages that are fundamental to defending America's
    interests, assuring our allies and coalition partners, and winning the
    Nation's wars.
        We recognize the responsibility for America's security is not one
    we shoulder alone. We work tirelessly toward developing and training
    professional airmen, transitioning new technologies into warfighting,
    and integrating the capabilities of our sister Services, other
    government agencies, and those of our friends abroad to act in the most
    efficient and effective manner across all operations--from humanitarian
    to combat missions. At the same time, we pay special attention to the
    consolidating aerospace industry, our acquisition processes, and our
    critical modernization challenges, to ensure we will be able to draw
    upon our core competencies for decades to come.
        Blessed with full endorsement from the American people, Congress,
    and the President, we will remain the world's dominant Air Force. We
    are honored to serve with America's airmen, and we sincerely appreciate
    the confidence in our commitment and capability to provide our great
    Nation with superiority in air and space.

                                  INTRODUCTION

        As America approaches the 100th anniversary of powered flight, the
    Air Force realizes that the Nation is only in the adolescence of air
    and space capabilities. Yet we envision a future that will manifest
    dramatic advances in propulsion, operational employment, weapon
    systems, information technology, education, and training for our air
    and space forces. It is a future of unprecedented, seamless integration
    of air and space capabilities with joint command and control at the
    operational level of war, and machine-to-machine integration at the
    tactical level. We are pursuing these changes--some elementary, others
    revolutionary--which will dramatically escalate the capabilities
    available to the joint forces of the United States; perpetuate American
    air and space dominance; and redefine the nature of warfare.
        If there was any ambiguity about the nature of the security
    environment in this new century, the attacks of September 11, 2001,
    crystallized the setting. Just as the turmoil of the previous decade
    eluded prediction, the dynamic setting of the decades ahead poses even
    greater predictive challenges as centers of power and sources of
    conflict migrate from traditional origins. No longer will it suffice to
    prepare for real and perceived threats from nation-states. Instead, we
    must apply the sum of our operational experiences and experimentation
    to develop dynamic, flexible, and adaptable forces, capable of
    dissuading, deterring, and defeating a much wider range of potential
    adversaries, while still assuring her friends and allies.
        This fluid setting underscores the need for doctrinal agility, and
    expeditious and responsive acquisition, planning, and execution across
    the spectrum of capabilities in support of homeland security--from the
    most difficult anti-access scenario to humanitarian relief. As new
    generations of technology proliferate among potential adversaries, we
    also are reminded of the need to keep pushing technology forward. In
    less than 100 years, we elevated from a Kitty Hawk biplane flying 100
    feet on a 12-second flight, to a host of sophisticated, stealthy aerial
    vehicles capable of reaching any place in the world, and an array of
    satellites that circle the globe continuously. We do not rest on these
    achievements, but instead engage a new generation of innovation.
    Therefore, our mission is to make calculated research, development, and
    procurement decisions with the resolve to integrate all of our combat,
    information, and support systems into an enterprise architecture that
    contributes joint air and space capabilities to help win the Nation's
    wars.
        Meeting these requirements also warrants our continued
    transformation into an expeditionary force with the culture,
    composition, and capabilities to fulfill our evolving operational
    tasks. As the scope of global contingencies requiring American
    involvement has multiplied, we have witnessed the substantial value of
    agility, rapid response, and integration. Thus, we are becoming ever
    more responsive in time, technology, and training, and in the process,
    we are elevating Air Force contributions to joint capabilities, while
    developing our airmen as joint warfighters.
        A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld laid out a number of key priorities
    for the DOD. All of these--from pursuing the global war on terrorism
    and strengthening joint warfighting capabilities, to streamlining the
    DOD processes and improving interagency integration--demand across-the-
    board changes in the way the Defense Department operates. The Air Force
    has taken advantage of this opportunity to evaluate and strengthen our
    capabilities, and to fundamentally drive our investment strategy.
        As we contemplate more than a decade of unprecedented success using
    air and space power, we recognize that we never fight alone. The
    emerging interdependence of joint, coalition, and alliance partnerships
    throughout a decade of contingency warfare has been a profound lesson
    learned. Through cooperative planning, we will realize the full
    potential of our Service--bringing to bear fully integrated air and
    space capabilities.
        It is our imperative to approach this planning and integration with
    innovation and vision, fundamentally focused on capabilities. All of
    the Armed Forces are focusing on meeting the Quadrennial Defense
    Review's ``1-4-2-1'' force-shaping construct, by defining the
    fundamental capabilities required to meet the challenges of a changing
    world. These are: to defend the United States through homeland
    security; to deter aggression and coercion in the four critical regions
    of Europe, Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Asian littorals; to
    swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while being
    capable of decisive victory in one of those conflicts; and to conduct a
    number of smaller scale contingencies. A revitalized, capabilities-
    focused approach to operational military requirements will allow us to
    meet these missions.
        Our focus on capabilities for an uncertain future has inspired us
    to adapt anew the way we organize, train, and equip our forces. We have
    begun by developing Task Force Concepts of Operation (TF CONOPS), which
    will define how we will fight and integrate our air and space
    capabilities with joint, coalition, and alliance forces. The
    requirements that emerge from these operational concepts will guide a
    reformed acquisition process that will include more active, continuous
    partnerships among requirement, development, operational, test, and
    industry communities working side-by-side at the program level.
        This process can only be successful with the help of a vibrant
    defense industry. Yet today the aerospace industry is consolidating to
    a point that threatens to diminish the advantages of competition. This,
    in turn, can lead to loss of innovation, diminished technical skill
    base, lower cost efficiencies, and other challenges. We must foster
    increased competition to ensure the long-term health of an industrial
    sector critical to our national security. While the Air Force will
    continue to advance the vision and associated capabilities for air and
    space, we also must challenge industry in order for it to stay on the
    cutting edge of technology and efficient management practices.
        Finally, transforming our force will not be possible without a
    process to educate, train, and offer experience to the right mix of
    active duty, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and civilian airmen
    who understand the nature of our changing security environment. To
    achieve this, we will evolve what we have traditionally called the
    ``personnel'' function in new ways so as to blend professional military
    education, advanced academic degrees, and assignment policies under the
    auspices of ``Force Development.''
        This is the United States Air Force in 2003--inherently innovative,
    tirelessly dedicated, and comprised of the very best airmen and
    capabilities in the world to ensure American security and defend her
    interests. This is what our Nation expects, and we will continually
    meet that expectation.

                                   WHAT WE DO

        The United States Armed Forces exist to fight and win our Nation's
    wars, which no Service can accomplish alone. The Air Force's pivotal
    role is to deliver fully capable and integrated air and space power to
    the Joint Force Commander (JFC). By dominating the media of elevation,
    the Air Force offers unique warfighting capabilities that leverage the
    strengths of surface forces and expand the range of potential effects.
        Air and space are realms with unlimited horizons for discovery and
    development. While the Air Force has made tremendous strides in
    realizing the visions of early airmen and exploiting the operational
    potential in each medium, we know there is an array of capabilities as
    yet undiscovered. As the Air Force strives to realize these
    possibilities, we deliver a multitude of air and space achievements for
    joint warfighting.
        Although relatively short, Air Force history reveals fundamental
    competencies that are core to developing and delivering air and space
    power--those unique institutional qualities that set the Air Force
    apart from the other Services and any other military force in the
    world. By identifying and keeping these competencies foremost in our
    vision, we are able to more effectively advance the unique
    capabilities, as well as the ultimate effects, the Air Force provides
    to the joint force and the Nation.
        The Air Force continually develops areas of expertise that make us
    the preeminent air and space force in the world. Previously, we
    distilled these into six distinctive capabilities which we referred to
    as our ``core competencies''--Air and Space Superiority, Global Attack,
    Rapid Global Mobility, Precision Engagement, Information Superiority,
    and Agile Combat Support. However, just as our concepts of operations
    and capabilities continuously evolve, so also does the way in which we
    articulate Air Force competencies. With deeper refinement, we learned
    there are more fundamental elements to what we are as an Air Force and
    how we develop our capabilities for joint warfighting. These are our
    underlying institutional air and space core competencies--those that,
    in fact, make the six distinctive capabilities possible: Developing
    Airmen, Technology-to-Warfighting, and Integrating Operations. These
    three air and space core competencies form the basis through which we
    organize, train, and equip and from which we derive our strengths as a
    Service.

        (1) Developing Airmen: The heart of combat capability

        The ultimate source of air and space combat capability resides in
    the men and women of the Air Force. The value of technology,
    organization, and strategy are diminished without professional airmen
    to leverage their value. Our total force of active, Guard, Reserve, and
    civilian personnel are our largest investment and most critical asset.
    They are airmen: steeped in our expeditionary Service ethos. Therefore,
    from the moment they step into the Air Force through to their last day
    in service, we are dedicated to ensuring they receive the precise
    education, training, and professional development necessary to provide
    a quality edge second to none. The full spectrum capabilities of our
    Air Force stem from the collective abilities of our personnel, and the
    abilities of our people stem from career-long development of
    professional airmen.

        (2) Technology-to-warfighting: The tools of combat capability

        The vision of airmen in employing air and space power fundamentally
    altered how we address conflict. As the leader in military application
    of air and space technology, the Air Force is committed to innovation
    and possesses a vision to guide research, development, and fielding of
    unsurpassed capabilities. Just as the advent of aircraft revolutionized
    joint warfighting, recent advances in low observable technologies,
    space-based systems, manipulation of information, precision, and small,
    smart weapons offer no less dramatic advantages for combatant
    commanders. The Air Force nurtures and promotes its ability to
    translate vision into operational capability in order to produce
    desired effects. Our innovative operational concepts illuminate the
    capabilities we need, allowing us to develop unsurpassed capabilities
    to prevail in conflict and avert technological surprise.
        The F/A-22 is demonstrative of this ability to adapt technology to
    warfighting capabilities. Originally envisioned as an air superiority
    fighter, it has been transformed into a multi-role system. The F/A-22
    not only brings to bear warfighting capabilities without equal for
    decades to come, but also includes those we did not foresee at its
    inception. Collectively, the platform's supercruise, stealth,
    maneuverability, and novel avionics will deliver the ability to create
    crucial battlefield effects to the hands of the warfighter, and allow
    access to revolutionary concepts of operation.

        (3) Integrating Operations: Maximizing combat capabilities

        Effectively integrating the diverse capabilities found in all four
    Services remains pivotal to successful joint warfighting. The Air Force
    contributes to this enduring objective as each element of air and space
    power brings unique and essential capabilities to the joint force. Our
    inherent ability to envision, experiment, and ultimately execute the
    union of a myriad of platforms and people into a greater, synergistic
    whole is the key to maximizing these capabilities. In so doing, we are
    able to focus acquisition and force planning on systems that enable
    specific, effects-based capabilities, rather than on individual
    platforms.
        Embedded in our exploration of innovative operational concepts is
    the efficient integration of all military systems--air, land, maritime,
    space, and information--to ensure maximum flexibility in the joint
    delivery of desired effects across the spectrum of conflict, from war
    to operations short of war. However, effective integration involves
    more than smart technology investment--it also requires investigation
    of efficient joint and Service organization and innovative operational
    thinking. Thus, investments in our people to foster intellectual
    flexibility and critical analysis are equally as important as our
    technology investments.
        Collectively, our air and space core competencies reflect the
    visions of the earliest airmen and serve to realize the potential of
    air and space forces. We foster ingenuity and adventure in the
    development of the world's most professional airmen. We seek to
    translate new technologies into practical systems while we encourage
    intellectual innovation at every level of war. We drive relentlessly
    toward integration in order to realize the potential and maturation of
    air and space capabilities.
        Our proficiency in the three institutional air and space core
    competencies underpins our ability to deliver the Air Force's six
    distinctive capabilities in joint warfighting. In turn, our
    capabilities enable desired effects across the spectrum of joint
    operations through our task forces drawn from our air and space
    expeditionary forces. The results of this relationship between core
    competencies, distinctive capabilities, and operational effects are
    manifest in the array of successful missions the Air Force accomplished
    in the past year and those we continue to execute.
    Expeditionary Construct
        Our core competencies reflect a legacy of innovation and adaptation
    to accomplish our mission. This point is underscored by the fact that,
    in spite of over a 30-percent reduction in manpower in the past 12
    years, we have faced an exponential increase in worldwide taskings.
    Intensifying operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) requires significant changes
    in the way our force trains, organizes, and deploys to support JFC
    requirements. We are a truly expeditionary force--the nature of our
    ``business'' is deployed operations.
        The Air Force meets JFC requirements by presenting forces and
    capabilities through our Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF)
    construct. This divides our combat forces into 10 equivalent AEFs, each
    possessing air and space warfighting and associated mobility and
    support capabilities. A key element of our ability to deliver these
    tailored and ready expeditionary forces is our development of Task
    Force Concepts of Operation. Our TF CONOPS describe how we fight and
    how we integrate with our sister Services and outside agencies. They
    are the fundamental blueprints for how we go to war. Combined with our
    AEF construct--the principle tool we use to present expeditionary
    wings, groups, and squadrons--TF CONOPS will guide our decisions in
    operational planning, enable us to provide scaleable, quick-reacting,
    tasked-organized units from the 10 standing AEFs, and sustain our
    ability to ensure trained and ready forces are available to satisfy
    operational plans and contingency requirements.
        The AEF construct incorporates a 15-month cycle during which two
    AEFs are designated as lead for a 90-day ``eligibility'' period. During
    this period, the two are either deployed or on alert for daily,
    worldwide expeditionary taskings, for which they are tailored and
    presented to the JFC as expeditionary squadrons, groups, and wings
    (depending on the specific requirement). Meanwhile, the remaining eight
    AEFs are in various stages of reconstituting, training, or preparatory
    spin-up for their lead period over the course of 12 months. It is
    during this preparatory time (approximately 2 months) that we integrate
    the training-to-task of AEF squadrons immediately prior to their on-
    call window.
        Yet, it is important to note that while our combat forces cycle
    through deployment vulnerability periods, they sustain wartime
    readiness throughout the 15-month training and preparation cycle--a
    critical driver of our 90-day eligibility window. Our AEF cycle thus
    precludes the need for ``tiered'' readiness by allowing our combat
    forces to remain current and capable for any contingency or operational
    plan.
        While ensuring necessary capabilities for the JFC, AEF cycles allow
    us to provide our airmen with a more stable and predictable environment
    in which to train, re-fit, and equip. In addition, AEF scheduling makes
    it easier and more practicable for the Air Reserve Component (ARC)
    forces--Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG)--
    to bring their essential contributions to bear by allowing them to plan
    definitive absences from their civilian employment. This is a critical
    advantage of the AEF construct, as ARC forces comprise nearly half of
    the forces assigned to AEFs and contribute the majority of forces for
    some mission areas.
    Operations in 2002
        Confident in our air and space capabilities, and committed to
    meeting any mission tasked, the Air Force completed an unprecedented
    array of operations and exercises in 2002. From the mountain ranges in
    Afghanistan and the jungles of the Philippines to the deserts of the
    Middle East, and across every continent and body of water, the Air
    Force joined with land and Naval Forces to secure America's national
    objectives. With each mission, the joint force grows more capable as it
    applies vision, experimentation, and integration to every undertaking.
    We do not act as individual Services, but in concert as joint
    warfighters, as we prevail in the war on terrorism and in all
    undertakings.
        Assuring our Nation's citizens, the Air Force conducts a range of
    alert postures involving more than 200 military aircraft at over 20
    airbases for Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). In conjunction with
    unprecedented NATO airborne warning support and other U.S. Services'
    assets, we have provided continuous combat air patrols over sensitive/
    high risk areas, and random patrols over other metropolitan areas and
    key infrastructure. Last year, we flew over 25,000 ONE fighter, tanker,
    airlift, and airborne warning sorties, made possible only through the
    mobilization of over 30,000 Reserve component airmen. In fact, the ANG
    and AFRC have effected over 75 percent of the total ONE missions. We
    will continue this critical mission, as we execute our most fundamental
    responsibility--homeland defense.
        Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the USAF has
    maintained a continuous, steady-force presence in Afghanistan and the
    rest of the area of responsibility of more than 14,000 airmen. Air
    Force assets provide crucial intelligence and situation awareness,
    combat power and support capabilities for the combatant commander. A
    key reason for American military success in the region is the
    performance of Air Force special operations airmen. Working in teams
    with other special forces, ground units, and coalition elements, airmen
    special operators heroically bring to bear the full weight of air and
    space capabilities--from the ground. They introduce our adversaries to
    the full lethality of our airmen, fully integrated on the ground, in
    the air, and from space.
        Fully engaged in all aspects of the war on terrorism, from mobility
    to close air support, our aircraft and crews flew more than 40,000 OEF
    sorties in 2002--over 70 percent of all coalition sorties. Over 8,000
    refueling missions marked the linchpin capability for the joint fight--
    the tanker force--while the magnificent achievements of airlift assets
    rounded out overwhelming mobility efforts. Simply put, Air Force
    mobility forces made operations in a distant, land-locked nation
    possible.
        Beyond air operations, we operated and maintained several
    constellations of earth-orbiting satellites, and in 2002 we launched 18
    missions with a 100-percent success rate--including the first space
    launches using Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles. These activities
    bolstered America's assured access to space and ensured vigorous,
    global ISR, missile warning, precision navigation and timing,
    communications, and weather systems. In addition, manned, unmanned, and
    space intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, not
    only delivered unprecedented battlefield awareness, but with the
    Predator UAV, also introduced transformational combat capabilities.
        ONE and OEF levied particularly heavy demands on our security
    forces. In CONUS and forward locations, increased alert postures
    warranted significant increases in security personnel who constitute a
    critical element of our force protection capabilities. These demands
    have raised our force protection posture worldwide and have forced us
    to adjust to a new ``steady state'' condition. Security forces bear the
    brunt of the adjustment effort despite a resultant baseline shortfall
    of approximately 8,000 personnel to meet the alert postures. In the
    near term, we involuntarily extended for a second year nearly 9,500 ARC
    security forces. However, in order to relieve these ARC forces, we
    concluded a 2-year agreement with the Army for short-term support, and
    initiated several ongoing efforts to combine technology, new processes,
    and some manpower shifts to achieve a long-term adjustment to this new
    era.
        As we adjust, we continue to deliver force protection through the
    integrated application of counter and antiterrorism operations, and
    preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
    explosive (CBRNE) incidents. We employ a tailored selection and
    application of multi-layered active and passive, offensive and
    defensive measures. Intelligence and counterintelligence programs
    support this integrated effort and remain critical to our success. In
    this regard, we continued to develop and employ all-source intelligence
    systems; cross-functional intelligence analysis procedures; and an
    operational planning process to implement force protection operations
    that deter, detect, deny, and destroy threats. Our goal is to see
    first, understand first, and act first.
        Though engaged in these security enhancements and the GWOT, our
    combat operations were not limited to OEF in 2002. Iraqi forces fired
    on coalition aircraft over 400 times during 14,000 sorties supporting
    Operations Northern Watch (ONW) and Southern Watch (OSW). The Air Force
    maintained a continuous, regional presence of more than 9,000 airmen,
    while air and space assets provided vital intelligence, situation
    awareness, and indications and warning to monitor Iraq's compliance
    with United Nations' directives.
        Whether on the ground or in the skies, our airmen also conducted a
    host of other missions above-and-beyond standing security requirements
    around the globe. Even though the war on terrorism is our national
    military focus, airmen joined soldiers, sailors, and marines in the
    Balkans, South America, Europe, Asia, and around the world to assure
    our friends and allies, while deterring and dissuading our adversaries.
        Worldwide humanitarian and non-combat evacuation operations
    missions remain other key tasks for Air Force personnel. In 2002, for
    example, airlift crews exceeded 2.4 million airdropped daily ration
    deliveries in Afghanistan, evacuated allied personnel at threatened
    locations around the world, and flew typhoon relief missions to Guam,
    while our explosive ordnance specialists removed unexploded munitions
    in Africa. Yet, while conducting unprecedented food, medical, and civil
    engineering and evacuation relief efforts in warring regions, we were
    also on call to perform critical, quick-response missions during
    natural or man-made crises at home. Through explosive ordnance
    disposal, fire fighting, law enforcement support, and rapid medical
    response expertise, we conducted daily operations in support of local,
    State, and Federal agencies. During the wildfire season, ANG and AFRC
    C-130s equipped with modular airborne fire fighting systems flew nearly
    200 sorties while assisting U.S. Forest Service firefighting efforts in
    numerous States. In addition, when Hurricane Lili endangered Louisiana,
    Air Force aeromedical and critical care forces rolled in with C-9
    aircraft to transport and safeguard 40 patients from threatened
    hospitals.
    Training Transformation
        Training is a uniquely American military strength. As potential
    adversaries work to overcome our technological superiority, it is
    imperative we enhance this strength through improved proficiency at the
    tactical level and integration at the joint level. Training is integral
    to our core competencies and the critical enabler for military
    capabilities, so we are engaged with the other Services, unified
    commands, and OSD in developing and implementing a training
    transformation plan. Our objective is to train as we will fight and
    increase the joint context of our exercises through live, virtual,
    distributed, and constructive environments. It is the realism of this
    training that gives us the edge in combat. This involves not only
    modernizing the integration of space and information operations on our
    ranges, but also planning for their sustainment to meet future test and
    training missions while implementing environmentally sound use and
    management to ensure long-term availability. Additionally, to expand
    range support for current and emerging missions, we are embarking on a
    new effort to identify and procure environmental, airspace, and
    spectrum resources at home and abroad.
    Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Exercises, Interoperability Training, and
            Experimentation
        We advanced joint and combined interoperability skills with our
    sister Services and those of 104 nations throughout 111 JCS exercises
    and Joint Task Force (JTF) experimentation, conducted in 40 foreign
    countries. Exercises ranged from large field training such as Bright
    Star, to command post exercises like Positive Response, to smaller, but
    equally valuable humanitarian exercises, as in the school construction,
    well drilling, and medical clinic visits of New Horizons-Jamaica. These
    activities provided realistic training and enhanced the effectiveness
    of all participating nations' forces.
    Task Force Enduring Look
        Success in future operations hinges upon our ability to learn from
    previous operations and exercises. To ensure we learn from ongoing
    operations and adapt accordingly, we established Task Force Enduring
    Look (TFEL). TFEL is responsible for Air Force-wide data collection,
    exploitation, documentation, and reporting for our efforts in ONE/OEF.
    The objective for TFEL is clear--provide superior support to the
    warfighter, and properly recognize and apply lessons learned during
    rather than only at the conclusion of these operations.
        Through extensive investigation and analysis, TFEL examines joint
    warfighting effectiveness, determines implications, and shapes future
    Air Force transformation of expeditionary air and space power. The task
    force documents lessons learned in a variety of products that cover
    every conceivable subject matter. As derivative campaigns unfold, TFEL
    will broaden its assessments in follow-on reports. Applying the lessons
    in these reports and adapting from our past experiences will help
    ensure we prevail in future operations.
        We are able to accomplish the full spectrum of air and space
    missions, and improve our capabilities through lessons learned, by
    focusing on the best way to organize, train, and equip. Creativity,
    ingenuity, and innovation are the hallmarks of all that we do, all of
    which begins with our people.

                                   WHO WE ARE

            ``No arsenal and no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so
            formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women.
            It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It
            is a weapon that we as Americans do have. President Ronald
            Reagan, 20 January 1981

        America is blessed with vast resources, and chief among these is
    her people. In the same way, the Air Force relies on the officers,
    enlisted, civilians, and contractors that comprise our total force--
    active, Guard, and Reserve--for cultural strength and unbridled skill.
    Air Force strength will never reside in systems alone, but in the
    airmen operating them. Nor will our capabilities improve solely through
    technology, but instead through the adaptive insight of our creative
    and selfless professionals.
        Therefore, we recruit and retain a remarkably diverse group to
    ensure we reach the fullest potential of air and space forces. Their
    backgrounds reflect the cross-section of American culture--all races,
    religions, economic and educational backgrounds, skill and management
    levels, men and women--and make this Air Force the tremendous
    organization it is today. Just as diverse individual citizens find
    unity in the term American, our personnel embrace an identity and
    fundamental perspective as Airmen.
        The underlying qualities found in all airmen emanate from our core
    values--integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all
    that we do. Embedded in these core values are the inherent
    characteristics of our confident, capable airmen--courage, tenacity,
    professionalism, vision, pride, and, when faced with seemingly
    insurmountable obstacles, heroism. Indeed, today's airmen carry on the
    traditions and visions of the earliest generation of airmen while
    preparing for the challenges of the future.
        The diversity of our airmen energizes the advancement of America's
    air and space power. Airmen embrace transformational ideas and seek to
    apply them to every aspect of the Air Force, from organizational
    constructs to concepts of operation and employment. They are able
    stewards of the Nation's space programs, advancing ideas and
    technologies for national security, as well as for the environmental
    and economic benefit of our Nation and the world. Yet, ultimately our
    standout advantage is our warrior airmen themselves, who demonstrate
    skills and dedication in combat unsurpassed by any in history. Whether
    maintaining safe skies across the United Nations' sanctioned no-fly
    zone in Iraq, hunting down terrorists in the jungles of the
    Philippines, or paying the ultimate price while rescuing fellow
    Americans in a battle on an Afghan ridge, our airmen are proven combat
    veterans. Their selflessness resonates the very best of our Service.
        Airmen are expeditionary--our natural state of operations is not
    ``home station,'' but rather, deployed. After two successful cycles,
    our AEF construct has been validated as an effective means of meeting
    our Nation's expeditionary requirements. Yet we continue to enhance the
    construct, by initiating significant organizational change to ensure
    nearly every airman belongs to one of the 10 AEFs. The effect has been
    a change to our airmen's mindset and culture, where an individual's AEF
    association cultivates an expeditionary perspective and a clearer
    appreciation for joint warfighting requirements and capabilities.
    Force Development--A New Leadership Development Paradigm
        In the past, we addressed aspects of career development, education,
    and assignments individually, but not necessarily in a coordinated,
    connected approach. Recognizing this, and to prepare for the future
    more ably, we introduced a systemic, deliberate force development
    construct that evolves professional airmen into joint force warriors.
    This construct coordinates doctrine and policies, concentrated to
    provide the right level, timing, and focus of education, training, and
    experience for all airmen, while encompassing personal, team, and
    institutional leadership skills across tactical, operational, and
    strategic levels.
        In the 21st century, we need air and space warriors with mastery of
    their primary skills and others who possess competency beyond their own
    specialty. However, this diversity must be deliberate to ensure the
    correct skills are paired according to institutional requirements.
    Force development encourages many to obtain a deep perspective in their
    functional area, but at the same time offers the broader perspective we
    need to complement our leadership team. We begin this transformation
    with the active officer corps and will eventually encompass the
    civilian, enlisted, and Reserve components to better meet the expanding
    challenges of tomorrow.
    Education and Technical Training--Emphasis on Joint Leadership/Warfare
        As opportunities resident in advancing technologies unfold, it is
    imperative that the Air Force be able to draw upon a vibrant collection
    of educated, technically skilled, and technologically savvy airmen--
    both uniformed and civilian alike. We are answering this fundamental
    need in fiscal year 2003 with aggressive and innovative initiatives to
    enhance the abilities and breadth of our force. Agile, flexible
    training is an essential investment in human capital, and our
    initiatives will ensure our investment delivers the right training to
    the right people at the right time.
        In August 2002, we began our groundbreaking Enlisted-to-Air Force
    Institute of Technology (AFIT) Program. An initial cadre of senior NCOs
    began receiving world-class, graduate education to optimize them for
    greater responsibilities and challenging follow-on assignments. We will
    also provide a major influx of officers into AFIT, Naval Postgraduate
    School (NPS), and civilian institutions. In addition, because more than
    42 percent of our civilian force will be eligible for retirement in the
    next 5 years, we are committing significant resources to pay for
    advanced education as well as cross-functional career broadening.
        Future military missions and contingencies will require greater
    sophistication and understanding of the security environment, and our
    expeditionary force requires airmen with international insight, foreign
    language proficiency, and cultural understanding. We are working
    diligently to expand the cadre of professionals with such skill sets
    and experiences. Our education initiatives will contribute to a major
    corporate culture shift that fosters appropriate development throughout
    our airmen's careers to meet evolving force requirements.
    Diversity
        Foremost among our efforts to enhance the capabilities of our
    airmen is a passionate drive for diversity. Diversity is a warfighting
    issue; it is a readiness issue. We must attract people from all
    segments of American society and tap into the limitless talents and
    advantages resident in our diverse population if we hope to reach our
    fullest potential as a fighting force. Nurturing rich representation
    from all demographics opens the door to creativity and ingenuity,
    offering an unparalleled competitive edge for air and space
    development. Today's multi-threat world also mandates that we
    invigorate in our airmen the ability to effectively think across
    cultural boundaries and functional paradigms (or stovepipes). We will
    thus recruit, train, and retain airmen without intellectual boundaries,
    uniquely capable of integrating people, weapons, ideas, and systems to
    achieve air and space dominance.
    Recruiting
        It takes tremendous effort to identify and develop such airmen, yet
    the return for the Nation is immeasurable. Increased advertising, an
    expanded recruiting force with broader access to secondary school
    students, and competitive compensation prepare us to meet recruiting
    goals. Despite the challenge of mustering such a diverse and skilled
    collection of Americans, we exceeded our fiscal year 2002 enlisted
    recruiting goals and expect to surpass fiscal year 2003 objectives. We
    will adapt our goals to meet new force objectives, however the capacity
    limitations of basic military training and technical training school
    quotas will continue to challenge total force recruiting efforts.
        Officer recruitment presents similar challenges, yet we continue to
    attract America's best and brightest. However, we are particularly
    concerned with military and civilian scientists and engineers. We fell
    short of our accession goal for this group and have begun all-out
    recruitment and retention efforts for these critical specialties. For
    example, in fiscal year 2003 we plan to begin a college sponsorship
    program to attract scientists and engineers from universities lacking
    ROTC programs. In addition, we continue to find recruiting health care
    professionals especially difficult, so we are making adjustments to
    ensure improvement.
        We will also closely monitor ARC recruitment. Historically, the ANG
    and AFRC access close to 25 percent of eligible, separating active Air
    Force members (i.e. no break in service). Continued high OPTEMPO may
    negatively impact our efforts in attracting Air National Guardsmen, as
    well as drawing separating active airmen to the Air Force Reserve. As a
    result, recruiting will have to ``make up'' a substantial portion of
    accessions from that market by developing alternatives.
    Retention
        The Air Force is a retention-based force. The critical skill sets
    we develop in our airmen are not easily replaced, so we expend every
    effort to retain our people--the impetus for our ``re-recruiting''
    efforts. Overall retention plans include robust compensation packages
    that reward service, provide for a suitable standard of living, ensure
    a high quality-of-life, and retain the caliber of professionals we need
    to decisively win America's wars.
        For fiscal year 2002, it was difficult to calculate accurate
    retention results due to Air Force implementation of Stop Loss.
    Nonetheless, we continue to reap the benefits of an aggressive
    retention program, aided by bonuses, targeted pay raises, and quality-
    of-life improvements. Introducing the Critical Skills Retention Bonus
    for select officer specialties reinforces our commitment to target
    specific skills suffering significant retention challenges. However,
    many airmen retained under Stop Loss will separate throughout fiscal
    year 2003--a fact of particular concern for our rated force.
        Bonuses and special pay programs continue to be effective tools in
    retaining our members. The ANG has placed particular emphasis on
    aircraft maintenance fields, security forces, and communication and
    intelligence specialists, among others, by offering enlistment and
    reenlistment bonuses, Student Loan Repayment Program, and the
    Montgomery GI Bill Kicker Program. Another example is the flexible
    Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program--an important part of our
    multi-faceted plan to retain pilots. In conjunction with our rated
    recall program, our fiscal year 2002 plan resulted in a substantial
    increase in committed personnel. We have a similarly designed ACP
    program in fiscal year 2003, and plan future extensions to include
    navigators and air battle managers.
    Summary
        Regardless of AEF deployment or home station missions, our airmen
    accomplish their duties with firm commitment and resolute action. It's
    what we do. It's who we are: a practical, technically sound, ingenious
    force of uniformed and civilian airmen derived from this richly diverse
    Nation to create the world's premier air and space power.

                               WHERE WE'RE GOING

        The first hundred years of powered flight witnessed tremendous and
    enduring innovation. We commemorate this centennial during 2003 with
    the theme, Born of Dreams, Inspired by Freedom, which recognizes the
    remarkable accomplishments of generations of airmen. Today's airmen are
    equally impassioned to bring dreams to reality as we pursue our vision
    of tomorrow's Air Force, Unlimited Horizon. Through this vision, we
    build a bridge from today's existing capabilities to those required to
    win tomorrow's wars.
        Ultimately our success will be measured by our ability to provide
    our forces with assured freedom to attack and freedom from attack.
    Achieving such victory in tomorrow's battlespace will demand our full
    integration with fellow Services, allies, and coalition partners--an
    essential part of the expeditionary construct. Through our security
    cooperation efforts, we build these foreign defense relationships and
    allied capabilities to ensure we have the access, interoperability, and
    international support for our worldwide commitments. Toward this
    requirement, we are working with our sister Services to develop truly
    joint concepts of operation that integrate the full spectrum of land,
    sea, air, space, and information warfighting capabilities. When America
    places its men and women in uniform into harms way, we owe them
    preeminent resources, planning, and organization to achieve victory
    over any adversary.
    Capabilities-Based CONOPS
        While adapting to the new strategic environment, our principal
    focus has been transitioning from a platform-based garrison force to a
    capabilities-based expeditionary force. No longer platform-centric, we
    are committed to making warfighting effects, and the capabilities we
    need to achieve them, the driving force behind our ongoing
    transformation. From this point forward, all of our operational,
    programming, and budget decisions will be supported by a predefined
    capability.
        Our emerging TF CONOPS will help make this essential shift by
    providing solutions to a variety of problems warfighters can expect to
    encounter in the future. Whether detailing our plans for operating in
    an anti-access environment or identifying how to deliver humanitarian
    rations to refugees, TF CONOPS lend focus on the essential elements
    required to accomplish the mission. They cover the complete spectrum of
    warfighting capabilities (deep strike, information, urban, and
    psychological operations, etc.) and enable us to tailor forces
    (expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons) from existing AEFs to meet
    JFC's requirements. Responsibility for CONOPS development falls to the
    Major Commands, with a senior officer on the HQ/USAF Air Staff assigned
    to each CONOP to serve as their ``Champion,'' facilitating the process.
        TF CONOPS directly support Secretary Rumsfeld's efforts to free
    scarce resources trapped in bureaucracy and push them to the
    warfighter. They will also be the focal point for a capabilities-based
    Program Objective Memorandum (POM). In support of this effort, our
    Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment analyzes and assesses
    shortfalls, health, risks, and opportunities, while prioritizing
    required future capabilities. This helps CONOPS developers articulate
    any disconnects between required capabilities and developing programs,
    while providing senior Air Force leadership an operational,
    capabilities-based focus for acquisition program decision-making. TF
    CONOPS include the following:

             Global Strike Task Force (GSTF) employs joint power-
            projection capabilities to engage anti-access and high-value
            targets, gain access to denied battlespace, and maintain
            battlespace access for all required joint/coalition follow-on
            operations.
             Global Response Task Force (GRTF) combines
            intelligence and strike systems to attack fleeting or emergent,
            high-value or high-risk targets by surgically applying air and
            space power in a narrow window of opportunity, anywhere on the
            globe, within hours.
             Homeland Security Task Force (HLSTF) leverages Air
            Force capabilities with joint and interagency efforts to
            prevent, protect, and respond to threats against our homeland--
            whether within or beyond U.S. territories.
             Space and Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
            Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (Space and
            C\4\ISR) Task Force harnesses horizontal integration of manned,
            unmanned, and space systems to provide persistent situation
            awareness and executable decision-quality information to the
            JFC.
             Global Mobility Task Force (GMTF) provides regional
            combatant commanders with the planning, C\2\, and operations
            capabilities to enable rapid, timely, and effective projection,
            employment, and sustainment of U.S. power in support of U.S.
            global interests--precision delivery for operational effects.
             Nuclear Response Task Force (NRTF) provides the
            deterrent ``umbrella'' under which conventional forces operate,
            and, if deterrence fails, it avails a rapid scalable response.

        Air and Space Expeditionary CONOPS is the overarching context,
    which identifies and sequences distinctive capabilities and broad-based
    functions that air and space power provide the JFC to generate desired
    effects for national military objectives.
        The Air Force is transforming around these Task Force Concepts of
    Operation. In addition to serving as a roadmap for operators, the TF
    construct will form the basis for resource allocation, future system
    acquisitions, and POM submissions in order to find capabilities-based
    solutions to warfighter problems.
    Science and Technology (S&T)--Wellspring of Air and Space Capabilities
        Reaching these warfighter solutions rests in large measure with
    R&D. Through robust investment and deliberate focus in S&T, the Air
    Force invigorates our core competency of technology-to-warfighting.
    Combined with innovative vision, S&T opens the direct route towards
    transforming air and space capabilities. Therefore, we continue long-
    term, stable investment in S&T to ensure we realize future
    capabilities, as well as those that may immediately affect existing
    systems.
        We are improving our S&T planning and collaboration with other
    Services and agencies to ensure we: (1) encourage an operational pull
    that conveys to the S&T community a clear vision of the capabilities we
    need for the future; (2) address the full spectrum of future needs in a
    balanced and well-thought out manner; and (3) enhance our ability to
    demonstrate and integrate promising technologies. Some of these new
    technologies--UAV systems, laser-based communications, space-based
    radar, and others--show clear promise for near-term, joint warfighting
    applications. Others present opportunities we can only begin to
    imagine. We are exploring each of these technologies, and our
    investment will deliver the required capabilities of our CONOPS.
    Executive Agent for Space
        Embedded in all of our TF CONOPS, and indeed within most military
    operations, is an extensive reliance on systems resident in space. The
    Air Force proudly fulfills the role of Department of Defense Executive
    Agent for Space with confidence and enthusiasm. Our ability to execute
    this tremendous responsibility stems from a natural outflow of our core
    competencies and distinctive capabilities. Accordingly, and in
    conjunction with the other Services and agencies, we are shaping a new
    and comprehensive approach to national security space management and
    organization.
        Our capstone objective is to realize the enormous potential in the
    high ground of space, and to employ the full spectrum of space-based
    capabilities to enable joint warfighting and to protect our national
    security. The key to achieving this end is wholesale integration:
    through air, land, space, and sea; across legacy and future systems;
    among existing and evolving concepts of operation; and between
    organizations across all sectors of government. We will continue to
    deliver unity of vision, effort, and execution to fulfill our mission
    of delivering the most advanced space capabilities for America.
    Drawing Effects from Space
        Our horizon is truly unlimited, extending beyond the atmospheric
    environs of airpower to the reaches of outer space. Our proud Air Force
    tradition of airpower is joined by an equally proud and continually
    developing tradition of space power.
        In the early days of the space age, only those at the strategic
    level received and exploited the benefits of space capabilities. The
    current state of affairs, however, is decidedly different. The former
    distinctions between ``black'' programs, ``white'' space, military,
    civil, and commercial applications are growing increasingly blurred--in
    some cases, they are virtually seamless. In short, space capabilities
    now are woven deeply into the fabric of modern society, and they have
    altered forever the way we fight wars, defend our homeland, and live
    our lives.
        It is in this context, and this understanding of the widespread and
    increasing importance of space systems, that we strive to meet present
    and future national security challenges by providing dominant space
    capabilities that will:

             Exploit Space for Joint Warfighting: Space
            capabilities are integral to modern warfighting forces,
            providing critical surveillance and reconnaissance information,
            especially over areas of high risk or denied access for
            airborne platforms. They provide weather and other earth-
            observation data, global communications, precision navigation
            and guidance to troops on the ground, ships at sea, aircraft in
            flight, and weapons enroute to targets. All of these
            capabilities, and more, make possible the tremendous success
            our joint warfighters achieve during combat operations.
              We will enhance these existing capabilities and, where it
            makes sense, pursue new ones such as the Transformational
            Communications System (TCS), which will strive to dramatically
            increase bandwidth and access for warfighters; and Space Based
            Radar, which will complement the airborne Joint Surveillance
            Target and Attack Radar System (JSTARS) while migrating Ground
            Moving Target Indicators (GMTI) into space. We will also
            develop methods and technologies to enhance our Nation's
            ability to conduct rapid and accurate global strike operations
            anywhere in pursuit of U.S. interests.
             Pursue Assured Access to Space: We cannot effectively
            exploit space for joint warfighting if we do not have
            responsive, reliable, and assured access to space. In August
            2002, the new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle got off to a
            strong start with the successful launch of Lockheed Martin's
            Atlas V booster. Boeing's Delta IV program added to the
            Nation's quiver of modern launch vehicles with liftoff in
            November. We will also pursue advanced and highly versatile
            reusable launchers and small expendables with extremely short
            response times to achieve long-term assured access, while
            taking the necessary steps to maintain and improve our space
            launch infrastructure.
             Preserve our Freedom to Act in Space: We must be able
            to act freely in space, or risk losing those capabilities
            essential to joint warfighting. We initiated efforts to
            increase our space situation awareness, beginning with the new
            Space Situation Awareness Integration Office at Air Force Space
            Command, and a similar program at the Space and Missile Systems
            Center. Future efforts are planned to develop strategy,
            doctrine, and programs to improve the protection of our own
            space capabilities while denying the benefits of joint space
            capabilities to our adversaries.

        As it is with all Air Force capabilities, the most important
    resource for national space capabilities is neither technological nor
    fiscal--it is human. Our Space Professional Strategy fulfills a Space
    Commission recommendation to develop space professionals and nurture a
    cadre to lead our national security space endeavors at all levels in
    the decades ahead. These space-expert airmen will be the core stewards
    of space operations, and shoulder the responsibility for aggressively
    advancing joint warfighting capabilities into the high ground frontier.
    Horizontal Integration of Manned, Unmanned, and Space Assets
        The essence of transformation is found in leveraging the Nation's
    technological dominance to create maximum asymmetrical advantage.
    Airmen seek unrestricted boundaries when looking at war planning from a
    theater-wide perspective, or talking about national elements of power.
    Simply stated, it is in the way we think--we must take advantage of it.
        Our foremost objective is to develop the capability to conduct
    rapid and precise operations to achieve desired effects and shape the
    battlespace for the joint force. This requires interfacing numerous DOD
    and national assets--the seamless, horizontal integration of manned,
    unmanned, and space-based systems. An essential element is designing
    systems that use digital-level, machine-to-machine conversations to
    expedite data flow and ensure the JFC receives timely, decision-quality
    information. Such integration will dramatically shorten the find, fix,
    track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) cycle. In the end, we know
    that neither JFCs guiding operations, nor special operators putting
    lead on targets care what source provides data. It is an effect they
    seek, and what we will provide.
        Key to the warfighter's success is Predictive Battlespace Awareness
    (PBA). PBA requires in-depth study of an adversary well before
    hostilities begin. Ultimately, we want to be able to anticipate his
    actions to the maximum extent possible. PBA-derived insights allow us
    to utilize critical ISR assets for confirmation rather than pure
    discovery once hostilities begin. We are then able to analyze
    information to assess current conditions, exploit emerging
    opportunities, anticipate future actions, and act with a degree of
    speed and certainty unmatched by our adversaries.
        Along this path, we are transitioning from collecting data through
    a myriad of independent systems (Rivet Joint, AWACS, JSTARS, space-
    based assets, etc.) to a Multi-sensor Command and Control Constellation
    (MC\2\C) capable of providing the JFC with real-time, enhanced
    battlespace awareness. Today, this transition is restricted by the
    necessity to rely on Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) C\4\ISR assets.
    The limitation inherent in LD/HD platforms, forces us to shift their
    exploitation capabilities between theaters to cover emerging global
    threats and events. This sub-optimizes overall battlespace awareness
    and limits our efforts at predictive analysis. In the interim,
    responsive space-based ISR assets will help mitigate our over-stressed
    LD/HD systems. Yet ultimately, we need a synergistic combination of
    military and commercial assets, advanced data processing capabilities,
    and assured reachback to achieve true battlespace awareness.
        In the future, a single wide-body platform employing tunable
    antennas and sensors--Multi-sensor Command and Control Aircraft
    (MC\2\A)--will replace many of the C\4\ISR functions of many of today's
    specialized, but independent assets. Air, ground, and space assets will
    comprise the MC\2\C, which will elevate Joint Forces Air Component
    Commanders' ability to command and control air assets. Additionally,
    every platform will be a sensor on the integrated network. Regardless
    of mission function (C\2\, ISR, shooters, tankers, etc.), any data
    collected by a sensor will be passed to all network recipients. This
    requires networking all air, space, ground, and sea-based ISR systems,
    command and control (C\2\) nodes, and strike platforms, to achieve
    shared battlespace awareness and a synergy to maximize our ability to
    achieve the JFC's desired effects.
        Uniting joint and coalition information presents the most difficult
    challenge in providing one common operational picture for key
    decisionmakers. We are working closely with our sister Services to
    eliminate the seams between existing systems and taking the necessary
    steps to ensure all future acquisitions are planned and funded to meet
    the interoperability requirements of future joint CONOPS.
        A critical element of successful information merging is
    communications, as bandwidth is finite and requires careful management.
    Long-range or penetrating systems must communicate beyond the horizon
    despite adversaries' attempts to exploit or interrupt these links. To
    counter disruption, all systems must be reliable, secure, and
    bandwidth-efficient. The PBA construct facilitates this objective by
    eliminating constrictive, stove-piped communications systems while
    emphasizing networked operations.
        We will realize the vision of horizontal integration in our TF
    CONOPS. GSTF, for example, will deliver the right-sized mix of assets
    with appropriate sensors capable of penetrating into enemy airspace.
    Such sensors may be low observable and/or expendable, mounted on either
    ISR platforms or imbedded into strike platforms. Sensors may consist of
    Special Operations Forces, inserted before the commencement of
    hostilities, who communicate with attack platforms during combat via
    secure electronic writing tablets, annotating targets and threats on
    the imagery display with a stylus. As technology progresses, and where
    it makes sense, a significant portion of ISR functionality will likely
    migrate to space, affording 24/7 persistence and penetration. Likewise,
    advanced defensive counterspace capabilities will afford these systems
    protection from enemy actions.
        Combining manned, unmanned, and space-based assets with dynamic
    C\2\ and PBA transforms disparate collection and analysis activities
    into a coherent process, allowing the warfighter to make timely,
    confident, and capable combat decisions. This is what the Air Force
    brings to the joint fight. It is what air and space warriors are all
    about. We unlock the intellectual potential of airmen who think across
    the dimensions of mediums and systems capabilities, for the joint
    warfighter.
    Addressing the Recapitalization Challenges
        Despite new CONOPS and visions for future capabilities, we cannot
    rely on intellectual flexibility to eradicate the challenge of old
    systems and technologies. Though creativity may temporarily reduce the
    negative impacts of aging systems on our operational options,
    ultimately there are impassable limits created by air and space system
    hardware issues.
        We have made tremendous strides in modernizing and improving
    maintenance plans for our aircraft, however the tyranny of age has
    introduced new problems for old aircraft. Reality dictates that if we
    completely enhance the avionics and add new engines to 40-year-old
    tankers and bombers, they are still 40-year-old aircraft, and subject
    to fleet-threatening problems such as corrosion and structural failure.
        This is equally true for our fighter aircraft, where once cutting-
    edge F-117s average over 15 years old, and mainstay air dominance F-
    15Cs are approaching 20 years old. With double-digit surface-to-air
    missile system, next-generation aircraft, and advanced cruise missile
    threats proliferating, merely maintaining our aging fighter and attack
    aircraft will be insufficient. In fact, the dramatic advances offered
    in many of our TF CONOPs cannot be realized without the addition of the
    unique capabilities incorporated in the F/A-22. Simply stated, our
    legacy systems cannot ensure air dominance in future engagements--the
    fundamental element for joint force access and operations. We will thus
    continue executive oversight of F/A-22 acquisition in order to ensure
    program success. While keeping our funding promises, we will procure
    the only system in this decade that puts munitions on targets, and
    which is unequally capable of detecting and intercepting aircraft and
    cruise missiles.
        Although ultimately solving these recapitalization challenges
    requires acquisition of new systems, we will continue to find
    innovative means to keep current systems operationally effective in the
    near term. We know that just as new problems develop with old systems,
    so too do new opportunities for employment, such as our employment of
    B-1s and B-52s in a close air support role during OEF. We will also
    pursue new options for these long-range strike assets in a standoff
    attack role for future operations.
        Unlike with the aforementioned air-breathing assets, we cannot make
    service life extensions or other modifications to our orbiting space
    systems. Satellites must be replaced regularly to account for hardware
    failures, upgrade their capabilities, and avoid significant coverage
    gaps. Additionally, we must improve outmoded ground control stations,
    enhance protective measures, continue to address new space launch
    avenues, and address bandwidth limitations in order to continue
    leveraging space capabilities for the joint warfighter. We are
    exploring alternatives for assuring access to space, and a key aspect
    of this effort will be invigorating the space industrial base.
        Finally, it is imperative that we address the growing deficiencies
    in our infrastructure. Any improvements we may secure for our air and
    space systems will be limited without a commensurate address of
    essential support systems. Deteriorated roofs, waterlines, electrical
    networks, and airfields are just some of the infrastructure elements
    warranting immediate attention. Our ability to generate air and space
    capabilities preeminently rests with the ingenuity of visionary ideas,
    yet intellectual versatility must be supported by viable systems and
    structures to realize our Service potential.
    Organizational Adaptations
        Commensurate with our drive to enhance air and space capabilities
    is our identification and development of organizational structures to
    aid these advances. In 2002, we initiated numerous adaptations to more
    efficiently and effectively exploit Air Force advantages for the joint
    warfighter.
    Warfighting Integration Deputy Chief of Staff
        Comprehensive integration of the Air Force's extensive C\4\ISR
    systems is paramount for our future capabilities. This requires an
    enterprise approach of total information-cycle activities including
    people, processes, and technology. To achieve this, we created a new
    Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration (AF/XI), which brings
    together the operational experience and the technical expertise of
    diverse elements (C\4\ISR, systems integration, modeling and
    simulation, and enterprise architecture specialties).
        This new directorate will close the seams in the F2T2EA kill chain
    by guiding the integration of manned, unmanned, and space C\4\ISR
    systems. AF/XI's leadership, policy, and resource prioritization will
    capitalize on the technologies, concepts of operations, and
    organizational changes necessary to achieve horizontal integration and
    interoperability.
        Success has been immediate. AF/XI worked with the Deputy Chief of
    Staff for Operations to champion increased Air Operations Center
    funding in the fiscal year 2004 POM, which accelerated the
    stabilization and standardization of the weapon system. Subsequently,
    the base-lined weapon system now has a modernization plan, which is
    both viable and affordable. AF/XI also led analysis that highlighted
    imbalances among collection and exploitation capabilities. As a result,
    we plan to accelerate ground processing and exploitation capabilities
    within the Future Years Defense Program to close the gap. Major
    contributions in management of the complex information environment will
    continue, as AF/XI makes better use of scarce resources, allowing the
    Air Force to provide the joint warfighter the capabilities to dominate
    the battlespace.
    Chief Information Officer (AF/CIO)
        Partnered with AF/XI, the AF/CIO shares responsibility to spearhead
    the transformation to an information-driven, network-centric Air Force.
    These two organizations orchestrate the integration within our
    information enterprise, and establish processes and standards to
    accelerate funding and ensure priorities match our integrated
    information vision.
        The AF/CIO's specific mission is to promote the most effective and
    efficient application, acquisition, and management of information
    technology resources under an enterprise architecture. The goal is to
    provide the roadmap for innovation and to function as a blueprint for
    the overall leverage of valuable information technology. Enterprise
    architecture will use models and processes to capture the complex
    interrelationships between the Air Force's systems and platforms. A
    resultant example is basing information technology (IT) investment
    decisions on sound business cases, approved Air Force standards, and,
    ultimately, how a particular technology contributes to specific
    capabilities. Additionally, we are institutionalizing enterprise
    architecting as a key construct in defining mission information
    requirements and promoting interoperability.
        Currently, the wide variety of IT standards limits C\2\ processes
    and information and decision support to our warfighters. The AF/CIO-AF/
    XI team is tackling this and all other integration challenges as they
    develop an enterprise architecture that spans the entire Air Force,
    while also staying in harmony with other Services' efforts.
    Blended Wing
        We do nothing in today's Air Force without Guard, Reserve, and
    civilian personnel working alongside active airmen. A fundamental
    initiative of Air Force transformation is formalizing this integration
    under the Future Total Force (FTF). As part of FTF, we are pursuing
    innovative organizational constructs and personnel policies to meld the
    components into a single, more homogenous force. FTF integration will
    create efficiencies, cut costs, ensure stability, retain invaluable
    human capital, and, above all, increase our combat capabilities.
        A key effort is to ``blend,'' where sensible, units from two or
    more components into a single wing with a single commander. This level
    of integration is unprecedented in any of the Services, where active,
    Guard, and Reserve personnel share the same facilities and equipment,
    and together, execute the same mission. In essence, blending provides
    two resource pools within a single wing--one, a highly experienced,
    semi-permanent Reserve component workforce, offering stability and
    continuity; the other, a force of primarily active personnel able to
    rotate to other locations as needs dictate.
        The first blended wing opportunity arose with the consolidation of
    the B1-B fleet. The move left behind an experienced but underutilized
    pool of Guard personnel at Robins AFB, GA. Meanwhile, the collocated
    93rd Air Control Wing (ACW) (active E-8 Joint STARS), suffered from
    high tempo and low retention. Hence, Secretary Roche directed that the
    two units merge, and on 1 October 2002, the blended wing concept became
    a reality with the activation of the 116th ACW.
        Over the course of calendar year 2002, the 116th ACW tackled many
    pioneering challenges: from legal questions surrounding the command of
    combined active-Reserve component units, to programmatic issues with
    funding the program from two separate accounts, to integrating
    different personnel systems used by each component. Airmen from both
    components are working through these issues successfully, making the
    116th an example for future FTF blending. Yet, some additional Title 10
    and Title 32 provisions still need to be changed to make the FTF a
    reality. Meanwhile, parallel efforts, such as placing Reserve pilots
    and maintenance personnel directly into active duty flying
    organizations under the Fighter Associate Program, add to this
    leveraging of highly experienced reservists to promote a more stable,
    experienced workforce.
        As organizational constructs, blending and associate programs lay
    an important foundation for a capabilities-based, expeditionary air and
    space force, which are inherently flexible and ideal to meet rotational
    AEF requirements. In a resource-constrained environment, blending
    promotes efficiencies and synergies by leveraging each component's
    comparative strengths, freeing funds for modernization while sustaining
    combat effectiveness, and effecting warfighting capabilities greater
    than the sum of its parts.
    Combat Wing
        The comprehensive evaluations in our ongoing transformation include
    examining our wing structure. Given all of the lessons gleaned from
    expeditionary operations over the past decades, we asked, ``Could we
    derive advantages in revised wing organization for both force
    development and combat capability?'' The answer was ``Yes,'' and we
    enacted changes to create the Combat Wing Organization (CWO).
        The central aspect of the CWO is the new Mission Support Group.
    This will merge former support and logistics readiness groups,
    contracting, and aerial port squadrons, as applicable. Within this
    group, we will hone expeditionary skills from crisis action planning,
    personnel readiness, and working with the joint system for load
    planning and deployment, to communications, contingency bed down, and
    force protection. Currently, all of these aspects exist in skill sets
    that none of our officers have in total. But the new expeditionary
    support discipline will address this, and provide our officers the
    expertise in all aspects of commanding a forward base system. With this
    reorganization, each wing will now have one individual responsible for
    the full range of deployment and employment tasks--the Mission Support
    Group Commander.
        The restructuring will retain the Operations Group; however, group
    commanders will become more active in the operational level of war.
    Group and squadron commanders will be role models for operators in the
    wings, ready to lead the first exercise and combat missions. Similarly,
    we will establish a maintenance group responsible for base-level
    weapons system maintenance and sortie production rates. Like their
    operator counterparts, maintenance squadron and group commanders will
    be role models for all wing maintainers. Meanwhile, medical groups will
    retain their current organization, although we are working changes to
    home and deployed medical operations for future implementation.
        Flying and fixing our weapons systems, as well as mission support,
    are essential skill sets. Each requires the highest expertise,
    proficiency, and leadership. The new wing organization allows
    commanders to fully develop within specific functional areas to plan
    and execute air and space power as part of expeditionary units, while
    also giving maintenance and support personnel focused career
    progression. This reorganization does not fix something that is
    broken--it makes a great structure exceptional.
    Acquisition and Business Transformation
        To achieve our vision of an agile, flexible, responsive, and
    capabilities-based air and space force, we must transform the processes
    that provide combatant commanders with air and space capabilities. An
    example of this in action is the Air Force's effort to carry out the
    responsibilities of DOD Space Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). The
    Secretary of the Air Force delegated those responsibilities to the
    Under Secretary of the Air Force, under whose leadership immediate
    benefit was realized. Adapting an effective process already in use at
    the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Under Secretary
    instituted a new streamlined space acquisition program review and
    milestone decision-making process. This new process was used for the
    first time in August 2002 in developing a contract for the National
    Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System. This effort
    creates an opportunity for the Air Force to apply performance and cost
    pressure on defense industrial firms through their chief financial
    officers and board of directors by linking executive compensation to
    contract performance.
        In addition to the major process changes for DOD space, the Air
    Force's Business Transformation Task Force directs and integrates
    further process improvement and adaptation. Core business and
    operations support processes--such as acquisition, logistics,
    maintenance, training, medical, and dental, among others--are crucial,
    as they ultimately determine our overall enterprise effectiveness and
    directly sustain combat capabilities. An additional category of
    processes called ``enablers'' completes the Air Force enterprise.
    Examples of ``enablers'' include: management of human resources,
    finances, contracts, property plant and equipment, and information. The
    enablers are important as they facilitate our core capabilities and
    determine the overall efficiency of our enterprise.
        The Air Force will enact business transformation from an integrated
    enterprise perspective, examining every process and process link.
    Accordingly, we will employ industry best practices and identify
    management metrics to improve process efficiency without degrading our
    enterprise effectiveness; expand our customer's self-service management
    capability and free up needed resources for the operational
    communities; and provide real-time, accurate financial data for better
    decisionmaking. Already, acquisition reform has effected notable
    improvements, including:

        (1) Streamlined our acquisition and contracting regulations,
    replacing lengthy prescriptive sets of rules with brief documents that
    emphasize speed, innovation, sensible risk management, and elimination
    of time-consuming process steps that have little value. As previously
    mentioned, our new National Security Space acquisition process is an
    example of progress in this area.
        (2) Created a Program Executive Office for services to bring new
    efficiency to the growing area of services contracts. This key area,
    which accounts for nearly half of our procurement budget, had no prior
    centralized coordination and oversight.
        (3) Developed and initiated System Metric and Reporting Tool
    (SMART), putting real-time program status information on everyone's
    desktop. This web-based application pulls data from dozens of legacy
    reporting systems to give everyone from program managers up to senior
    leadership direct visibility into the ``health'' of hundreds of
    acquisition and modernization programs. When fully deployed in fiscal
    year 2003, it will automate the tedious and laborious process of
    creating Monthly Acquisition Reports and possibly Defense Acquisition
    Executive Summary reporting to OSD.
        (4) Empowered ``High Powered Teams'' of requirements and
    acquisition professionals to create spiral development plans to deliver
    initial capability to warfighters more quickly, and add capability
    increments in future spirals.
        (5) Designed a Reformed Supply Support Program to improve the
    spares acquisition process by integrating the support contractor into
    the government supply system. Contractors now have the same capability
    as government inventory control points to manage parts, respond to base
    level requisitions, track spares levels, and monitor asset movement.
        (6) Continued, with OSD support, expansion of the Reduction in
    Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) program, to identify critical cost
    drivers, fund investments to address them, and generate cost saving and
    cost avoidance. We also created standard processes and a business case
    analysis model to use for initiatives within R-TOC. In fiscal year
    2003, OSD allocated $24.9 million no-offset investments to R-TOC that
    will return $53.2 million through fiscal year 2008. A planned $37.1
    million investment across the FYDP will save a projected $331 million
    in operations and maintenance through fiscal year 2009.

        These initiatives are only the beginning of a comprehensive and
    aggressive approach to reforming business practices. Our efforts today
    will have a direct effect on efficient and effective air and space
    capability acquisition both immediately and in the future.
    Ensuring Readiness
        Integrating systems and expanding business practices will not only
    have dramatic effects on air and space capabilities, but also reduce
    readiness challenges. However, we still face daunting, but
    surmountable, obstacles. We must overcome a multitude of installations
    and logistical issues to secure flexible and timely execution of
    expeditionary requirements for joint warfighting.
        Reconstituting and reconfiguring our expeditionary basing systems
    and wartime stocks is a critical element of our force projection
    planning. While we made significant strides in funding, we require
    additional investments in bare base systems, vehicles, spares,
    munitions, and pre-positioning assets. Our infrastructure investment
    strategy focuses on three simultaneous steps. First, we must dispose of
    excess facilities. Second, we must fully sustain our facilities and
    systems so they remain combat effective throughout their expected life.
    Third, we must establish a steady investment program to restore and
    modernize our facilities and systems, while advancing our ability to
    protect our people and resources from the growing threat of terrorism
    at current, planned, and future operating locations--at home or abroad.
        We are making progress. Improved vehicle fleet funding allowed us
    to replace some aging vehicles with more reliable assets, including
    alternative fuel versions to help meet Federal fuel reduction mandates.
    Targeted efficiencies in spares management and new fuels mobility
    support equipment will improve supply readiness. In addition, our
    spares campaign restructured Readiness Spares Packages and repositioned
    assets to contingency sites. Moreover, to increase munitions readiness,
    we expanded our Afloat Prepositioning Fleet capabilities, and continue
    acquiring a broad mix of effects-based munitions in line with the
    requirements of all TF CONOPS.
        Finally, our ``Depot Maintenance Strategy and Master Plan'' calls
    for major transformation in financial and infrastructure capitalization
    to ensure Air Force hardware is safe and ready to operate across the
    threat spectrum. To support this plan, we increased funding in fiscal
    year 2004 for depot facilities and equipment modernization. We also
    began a significant push to require weapon systems managers to
    establish their product support and depot maintenance programs early in
    the acquisition cycle, and to plan and program the necessary investment
    dollars required for capacity and capability. Additionally, we also are
    partnering with private industry to adopt technologies to meet
    capability requirements. The results from these efforts will be
    enhanced, more agile warfighter support through the critical enabler of
    infrastructure.
    Expanding AEF Personnel
        The attacks of September 11 significantly increased workload and
    stress in a number of mission areas for our expeditionary forces. Since
    our day-to-day operation is absolutely set to the rhythm of the
    deploying AEF packages, we must make appropriate adjustments. Recent
    and ongoing efforts to maximize the identification of deployable forces
    and align them with AEF cycles, assisted in meeting immediate critical
    warfighting requirements. However, some career fields remain seriously
    stressed by the war on terrorism. Accordingly, our efforts focus on
    changing processes that drive requirements not tuned to our AEF rhythm.
    We developed formulas to measure, and gathered quantitative data to
    evaluate, the relative stress amongst career fields to redirect
    resources to the most critical areas. We also began a critical review
    of blue-suit utilization to ensure airmen are used only where
    absolutely necessary and maximize the use of the civilian and contract
    workforce for best service contribution and military essentiality.
        We are refocusing uniformed manpower allocation on our distinctive
    capabilities to reduce stress on our active force. Additionally, we are
    carefully considering technologies to relieve the increased workload.
    These efforts exist within our longer-term work to reengineer,
    transform, and streamline Air Force operations and organizations, and
    have allowed us already to realign some new recruits into our most
    stressed career fields.
    Summary
        As the two mediums with the most undeveloped potential, air and
    space represent the largest growth areas for national security and the
    greatest frontiers for joint warfighting. As such, air and space
    operations will play an ever-increasing role in the security of America
    and her allies. The Air Force will exploit technology, innovative
    concepts of operations, organizational change, and our ability to
    embrace creative ideas and new ways of thinking. We will bring to bear
    the full suite of air and space capabilities for tomorrow's Joint Force
    Commander--drawing from every resource, developing closely with all
    Services, and overcoming any obstacle to succeed.

                                  NEXT HORIZON

        The events of the last year have emphasized the dynamics of a new
    international security era. The decade of new states following the Cold
    War has been followed by the rise of non-state actors, many following a
    path of aggression and destruction. Yet, just as America adapted to new
    global dynamics in the past, we will again confront emerging challenges
    with confidence and faith in our ability to meet the demands of
    assuring freedom.
        The Air Force remains dedicated to drawing on its innovation,
    ingenuity, and resolve to develop far-reaching capabilities. The
    ability to deliver effects across the spectrum of national security
    requirements is the cornerstone of the vision and strategy of Air Force
    planning and programming. In conjunction, and increasingly in
    integration with ground, naval, marine, and other national agency
    systems, the Air Force will play a central role in elevating joint
    operations. We recognize the greatest potential for dominant American
    military capabilities lies in the integration of our air and space
    systems with those of other Services and agencies, and our success in
    this objective will be evident in every mission to deter, dissuade, or
    decisively defeat any adversary.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We will
    now proceed to a round of questions with 6 minutes each.
        First, an administrative announcement to the committee. The
    committee has presently before it a number of military and
    civilian nominations, including those for the Under Secretary
    of Defense for Intelligence, Assistant Secretary of the Army
    for Civil Works, and Administrator of the National Security
    Administration. These nominations have been before the
    committee for the requisite 7 days. It is the hope of myself
    and my colleague, Senator Levin, that we be able to convene our
    committee at some point today, possibly following a vote on the
    floor, for the purpose of voting on these nominations with the
    exception of one, and that is we will defer to the request of
    one of our members who desires to have a personal meeting with
    that individual. He has not been able as yet to schedule, so we
    will defer with regard to the Assistant Secretary of the Army
    for Civil Works until our colleague on the committee has had a
    chance to be here.
        Now, the questions each of us have. These are very somber
    moments, not just for those of us who have the responsibility
    to the men and women of the military and their families, but
    indeed for every American. We recognize that, as I said
    earlier, it is the presence of our troops with other troops
    throughout the world that is providing the measure of diplomacy
    that grinds on day after day, hour after hour. I commend all of
    those engaged in the diplomatic efforts, especially Secretary
    Powell, who has been exemplary in his performance, as well as
    the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and, indeed, our President
    have shown a measure of courage and judgment without parallel
    in contemporary history in trying to deal with this situation,
    which I personally characterize as the most complicated thing I
    have ever seen in my years of having the privilege of being
    here.
        But the question of the chem/bio is the great unknown.
    There is the potential for the use of these weapons, that
    category of weapons in this conflict should force be needed,
    and it would be the first time in the annals of U.S. military
    history since 1918. My father served as an Army doctor in the
    trenches during that period and I have read through his
    letters, a short biography he wrote of his experiences, and it
    was the most difficult situation to deal with, not only from
    the standpoint of his responsibilities of medical treatment,
    but for command and control.
        From my own assessment of the status of the military, I
    think the departments have done the best they can with the
    state-of-the-art technology. Also, this committee in the years
    that I have been on it made the tough decision, along with the
    whole Congress, that our military would not use these weapons.
    Such remaining weapons as we have in the possession of the
    United States are all carefully housed in places for
    demilitarization, so there are none in our inventory.
        For years, it was thought as a part of military doctrine
    that the best way to preclude the use of these weapons was to
    have an equal or greater capability to declare an end to them.
    That proved to be the case successfully during World War II,
    but I think it is important that each of you address the
    efforts of your departments to train and equip our forces, and
    then your own personal assessment of the level of that training
    and equipment to meet any possible use of those weapons in such
    force that may be ordered by the President and other heads of
    state and governments for the coalition for weapons. Mr.
    Secretary, what is your assessment of the caliber and quantity
    of the chembio defense equipment currently deployed with the
    Army forces in that region?
        Secretary White. In my view, Senator, the soldiers we have
    in CENTCOM area are well-equipped from a nuclear, biological,
    and chemical (NBC) perspective. The equipment that they have is
    significantly better in many cases than what we had in the
    Operation Desert Storm experience. NBC training is an integral
    part of all Army training activities--the donning of chemical
    suits, masks, and so forth.
        We have checked masks and individual sets of equipment
    before deployment to make sure they fit properly. We have
    adequate stocks in the theater of chemical suits, gloves,
    boots, and headgear for two complete sets for every soldier
    that is in the Gulf and contingency stocks. Naturally, when you
    talk to soldiers, there is an apprehension about the chemical
    environment because we are talking obviously about live agents.
    We practice against chemical agents, but I believe there is a
    confidence because of the training and because of the equipment
    that they will deal satisfactorily with the situation. I am
    confident they will.
        Chairman Warner. Secretary Johnson.
        Secretary Johnson. I agree with Secretary White. We have
    the very best equipment, and as Senator Levin, you, and I saw
    the marines in the desert donning this gear, they are very
    serious about it even when it is very hot and difficult to
    wear, but they understand the threat. The thing that concerns
    me most is the obvious anxiety that goes through their minds
    about what they know about, and even worse, what they do not
    know about, we are doing all we can, but this is of great
    concern to us.
        Chairman Warner. Secretary Roche.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, the airmen also wear these
    suits. It is not fun to fly an F-16 in your chemical suit, but
    the aircraft tends to go low. We train them to fly in them.
    They are very uncomfortable, but they understand the reason and
    we are properly equipped for all of our deployed forces.
        Chairman Warner. The question of if force is utilized, and
    following the judgment of our military command of this
    situation at some point in time will be secure in terms of the
    cessation of combat activities, what level of forces do you
    anticipate each of your departments projecting that will have
    to remain in that area of responsibility (AOR) and for what
    period of time?
        I raise that question because General Shinseki appeared
    before this committee. He gave his views. Those views were
    subsequently commented upon by the Secretary of Defense, and I
    understand Secretary White this morning, you are prepared to
    give the statement on behalf of the Department of the Army.
        Secretary White. Senator, what General Shinseki said was in
    response to that question was, first, that it is up to the
    combatant commander to determine what the force level is and
    the duration of it, and, second, the combatant commander hasn't
    made that decision. General Shinseki has some experience in
    this, having run the stabilization force in Bosnia, and he is a
    very experienced officer and he expressed his own personal
    opinion that it could be several hundred thousand I believe is
    what he said.
        At the same time with the vagaries of this and the
    variables that are involved in it and the difficulty of
    predicting an exact number, there are others that would suggest
    maybe it is going to be significantly lower, and I think we
    will just have to wait and see as, if the President so orders
    the campaign, and if we become involved in the stability
    operation after that, we will have to wait and see how those
    variables work out, what the specifics are. You have two views
    on this right now and many theories in support of each view.
        Chairman Warner. Secretary Johnson.
        Secretary Johnson. Sir, I agree, and the great unknown is
    the participation of many people, other nations. I was in
    Bahrain just about the time that you were there to visit with
    the coalition representatives, and they had people from all
    over the world. They want to help us in every way possible, and
    I personally was impressed to see the Japanese, who had three
    warships in the area. They have an oiler that refuels our
    ships, 75,000 gallons of oil. But all of those people are eager
    to participate in any activity after the conflict is over, and
    I think you'll see a great coalition effort.
        Chairman Warner. Secretary Roche.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, we could not have predicted
    how many aircraft we needed to keep behind for Afghanistan. It
    is a very uncertain thing as to how it would end. We had 7,500
    airmen in the region. Operation Southern Watch is now up to
    35,000, but a lot of what we do by air depends on what we are
    doing by truck or by ship. Certainly bomber aircraft we only
    use two of the three in Afghanistan, fighter bombers, we have
    used 117s. It is a combination of how fast it goes, to what
    degree can support come in by truck and ship, and to what
    degree it has to be funneled.
        Chairman Warner. I'd like to make a personal observation
    here and defer this question to another colleague. When I was
    privileged to be in the department many years ago during the
    war in Vietnam, we had a most unexpected and tragic series of
    scandals at the various academies. The Secretary of Defense
    constituted the three Service Secretaries as a committee to
    examine this and to determine how best we would address the
    problem. We did that.
        But I remember in the course of that responsibility of
    assessing the problem, how we correct it, listening to many
    very senior and retired officers and their reverence for the
    academy system and how it is to always represent a model
    institution of learning, discipline, and all the other
    attributes that we try to create in our educational system.
        Also, Members of Congress are intimately involved with
    these because we are privileged under the law to make
    nominations, and I don't think there is one of us in our
    travels that are not deeply moved when a young person comes up
    and says with great pride ``Senator, I attended the Academy
    because of your nomination.'' It is a very special feeling.
        So we were as a group on this committee very deeply moved
    when the allegations arose with respect to the most serious
    types of disciplinary breakdown and fracture in the Air Force
    Academy. I commend you, Mr. Secretary, for the swiftness with
    which you addressed this and I commend my colleague, the
    Senator from Colorado, Mr. Allard, who promptly in consultation
    with me and others proceeded to have this committee fully
    involved. But I think it is important, and Senator Allard and I
    incorporated this in our letter to the Department of Defense,
    that each of you look at your own institutions to make certain
    whether or not allegations are present of the kind involved in
    the Department of the Air Force.
        It has come to my attention that there are letters coming
    in with regard to a second inclusion. I will wait for the
    Department of Defense to address those. I brought those to the
    attention of the Department. Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
    likewise has worked on this, so I will defer the question to my
    colleague from Colorado when it comes his turn.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For reasons that
    you have indicated the potential future costs of our actions in
    southwest Asia are difficult to assess, but I do understand
    that each of your departments has produced some cost estimates
    for supplemental funds that we would be required to spend
    through the end of the fiscal year under a number of different
    assumptions. One, that the current presence in the CENTCOM area
    is maintained without actually fighting a war; the other
    assumption is that we do fight a war and then engage in post
    conflict stability operations.
        Have your departments, in fact, generated cost estimates,
    Secretary White?
        Secretary White. Yes, we have. We have had detailed
    discussions with the Comptroller of the Department, Mr.
    Zakheim, and no final decisions have been made about how much
    of a supplemental fee will be requested or what the timing of
    it will be.
        Senator Levin. How many cost estimates have you submitted?
        Secretary White. We have been through a number of
    iterations to make sure that our cost estimates for the
    operations and maintenance, the estimates, how much money it
    will cost to reconstitute a force given that the President does
    direct an operation, all these types of details we have
    scrubbed through with the comptroller's office.
        Senator Levin. This would be the supplemental funds for
    this fiscal year?
        Secretary White. 2003.
        Senator Levin. What is the range, highest and lowest?
        Secretary White. Currently if you break this up into the
    piece that is required to support the non-Iraq buildup
    activities, the Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble
    Eagle part of this, where we were on the 1st of October steady
    state since September 11, those cost about $6 billion
    additional from, assuming that we stay in Afghanistan and other
    places at about the same OPTEMPO that we have held there for
    the past year or so.
        Senator Levin. What about the post-conflict stability
    operations in Iraq? What is the range for that?
        Secretary White. We have not gotten into the details of
    that, in as much detail as we have buildup and the
    mobilization.
        Senator Levin. To the extent you have gotten into it, what
    is the range?
        Secretary White. I think looking at it from the Army's
    perspective, looking at the operation as it is currently set
    up, the Army's bill could be roughly somewhere between $20
    billion and $30 billion.
        Senator Levin. That is for the range of the cost of the
    post-conflict stability in 2003?
        Secretary White. That is the cost to mobilize the force
    above what we have for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring
    Freedom to do the preparation tasks, to properly prepare that
    force for a potential operation, to transport it and get it in
    position, and then to bring it back at some point.
        Senator Levin. Does that include the cost of maintaining
    the force in Iraq after Saddam Hussein?
        Secretary White. Through the end of the year.
        Senator Levin. Through the end of the year. So that is the
    extra cost of the war?
        Secretary White. No. Because the details of how long the
    war would last and how it would play out, there are so many
    variables associated with that, I'd prefer not to get terribly
    specific.
        Senator Levin. That doesn't include the cost of the war?
        Secretary White. The cost of the war would be in addition
    to the base cost of $20 million.
        Senator Levin. Mr. Secretary, do you have that? The cost of
    maintaining the force?
        Secretary Johnson. I do not, sir. We are a fully deployed
    Navy and Marine Corps. That is a blessing and a curse. We will
    run out of the first area operations and maintenance funds by
    midsummer. Depending on how Secretary White has talked, the
    assumptions, the numbers vary widely. We are in discussions
    with the Secretary of Defense's office continually, and the
    assumptions in dollars change and I am not prepared to give a
    number.
        Senator Levin. You are not prepared to tell us what the
    range is, the high and low, for post-conflict stability
    operations?
        Secretary Johnson. Our ranges are for just what we are
    doing now in the $3 billion to $4 billion. If you go into
    higher ones, we are near what Secretary White talked about, but
    I do not have anything more specific.
        Senator Levin. What about the Air Force?
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force has a movable range
    depending on what you are talking about. It depends on the
    level of Operation Noble Eagle, which can go from $250 million
    in a peaceful state up to a billion a year if we have to
    maintain fighters over the U.S. We are able to do OEF because
    we are in a specific state in Afghanistan.
        We are more fungible in that we have done no work on the
    post. We tend to fly stuff back, and we have the mobility
    forces going, but we have a PACOM that is emerging. We have
    been ordered to put that aircraft in Guam. Guam is just coming
    through a typhoon, so there will be work done there in order to
    base more in Guam. That is uncertain. Put it all together, the
    part that is, has downward variance is OEF and Operation Noble
    Eagle is $7.5 billion, Iraq could be as much as $7 billion, but
    if it is earlier we will pull staff back and then PACOM is just
    emerging. We are not sure what that is.
        Senator Levin. My time has expired.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary White, I
    have taken a lot of interest in the ultimate solution of what I
    consider to be a real crisis in our capability. I don't think
    there has ever been a time the Service has been more
    cooperative in working together to a solution, the NLOS
    solution that will be compatible with our Future Combat System.
    But at the same time, I look at that as being one that would be
    a part of the FCS. It is something that is needed in addition
    to that, and that is to get us out of this old antiquated
    equipment that we are using right now. You would probably be
    surprised to find out there are four countries making an
    artillery piece that is better in range, accuracy, and rapid
    fire than ours, including South Africa.
        Now, my concern has been to get that online as quickly as
    possible. Our target date for rapid deployment would be 2008.
    My question would be in the event something happens that would
    delay the FCS, can we continue to keep that date an accurate
    deployment date?
        Secretary White. I think we can. The progress since we
    talked about this last year has been excellent. The use of
    funds to transfer the technology from the Crusader program, we
    put those funds to good use. It will be the future milestone
    coming up in May, and my view right now is not only will we
    hold the schedule and NLOS cannon, but there will be an
    implementation of FCS that will hit the 2008, 2010 time frame.
    I think it is possible.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. Closely related, there
    has been a lot of discussion about the fifth and the sixth
    Stryker Brigades. I have had an experience when we were
    mandating the competition and I conducted competition to M-113
    and Stryker. I came back without any question in my mind that
    it was necessary to do that. I see the Stryker Brigade as a
    bridge to FCS. I'd like to have you tell us a little bit about
    yours, an update as to the need for the fifth and the sixth
    Stryker Brigades and where we are right now.
        Secretary White. Certainly. The fifth brigade will go to
    Hawaii with the 25th Division and it will be in the 2005
    budget. The sixth brigade will go to the Pennsylvania Army
    National Guard, and that is in the 2006 program. We have had
    extensive discussions with the Secretary of Defense, with the
    staff of the Secretary of Defense about the composition of
    brigades 5 and 6. There are other things we can add to the
    brigades to make them more robust, make them more of a stepping
    stone to the Objective Force, as you said.
        We owe the Secretary a study on precisely how we should
    configure brigades 5 and 6. We will have that to him in the
    near future, and the money remains in the program for the
    fielding of those. From an Army's perspective, I think it is
    critical that we field brigades 5 and 6 on schedule. Brigade 1,
    by the way, that you saw at Fort Lewis will hit its initial
    operational capability (IOC) on time this summer.
        Senator Inhofe. How many are delivered right now?
        Secretary White. We are producing about 45 a month and the
    acquisition of it has been a very good story from an
    efficiency-of-acquisition perspective.
        Senator Inhofe. Secretary Roche, let me tell you how much I
    personally appreciate the time that you were confirmed. I think
    you and I took a trip, your first trip after confirmation, but
    we had a chance to talk about the dilemma we are facing right
    now with our depots, and the fact that it has been a long
    history in looking at this that it's answering actually a
    national security problem that we would have should we become
    dependent upon someone from the outside for core capability.
    You made it very clear on that trip--I remember a statement--
    that the Air Force is not going to get in the real estate
    business, and everyone interpreting it is wrong. But right
    after that, we passed the largest bond issue by a 72 percent
    margin that's ever been passed in that part of my State of
    Oklahoma. Your initiatives are working when for the first time
    we are getting something in there where we can be competitive,
    where we can deal with something, with equipment that's newer
    than World War II technology. I appreciate that very much and
    your workforce-shaping initiatives that are working, now that
    we can turn out a KC-135 in 200 days.
        I ask you, first of all, about that. Second, is there any
    legislation that's needed to have you continue on this path
    that is in my opinion very successful?
        Secretary Roche. Thank you, Senator. One of the things that
    I would like to mention that the metrics Tinker displayed were
    for both Boeing and place in Alabama, the other ALCs, those
    people said none of those people are better than we are, and
    they got better. The place is dramatically cleaner. I think
    that you have noticed that our ability to get airplanes through
    the place is much faster. Our models are coming through faster.
    The E models are old. The partnering initiative that Tinker was
    one of the leaders on has really paid off, and we have now gone
    to all the companies who are producing or will produce aircraft
    for us in the future and said this model really works.
        I was personally involved with one. It's beneficial to the
    country and industry. Tinker has the lead on some of that, and
    in fact, we are asking that some of the larger companies
    producing aircraft start to work with the ALCs early on. So far
    it's not so much legislation that we need as to continue to try
    to get the change both in terms of the original manufacturers
    and at the ALCs, but it's been a tremendous progress in
    something like 20 months, tremendous progress.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, my time
    has expired. Can I just ask a question of Secretary White?
    Secretary White, when we had the chiefs, we had the same
    question about the downsizing that has taken place. I'd like to
    have you give us an analysis not here, but for the record,
    where we are in end strength in the Army, including the Reserve
    components.
        Secretary White. I will do that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The congressionally-mandated fiscal year 2003 active Army end
    strength is 480,000; the Army National Guard is 350,000; and the Army
    Reserve is 205,000. The Army expects to exceed this end strength
    target, as well as the appropriated average strength of 480,000
    manyears.
        The active Army finished fiscal year 2002 with an end strength of
    486,543; the Army National Guard finished fiscal year 2002 with an end
    strength of 351,078; and the Army Reserve finished fiscal year 2002
    with an end strength of 206,682.
        The active Army's fiscal year 2002 average strength was 482,733,
    which was approximately 8,700 more than the budgeted level. The current
    projection for fiscal year 2003 active Army end strength is 490,300,
    which includes an estimated military occupational specialty stop-loss
    strength of 2,585. This estimate could increase by as much as 10,000 to
    15,000 with the implementation of unit stop-loss for units involved in
    operations in Iraq.
        The Army National Guard average strength for fiscal year 2002 was
    350,785. Current projection of National Guard end strength for fiscal
    year 2003 is 350,000. The Army National Guard expects to meet or exceed
    that goal.
        The Army Reserve fiscal year 2002 average strength was 207,396,
    which was approximately 4,731 more than the budgeted level. The current
    projection for fiscal year 2003 Army Reserve end strength is 211,817,
    which includes an estimated 70,000 mobilized Army Reserve soldiers.
    These soldiers are expected to remain mobilized into fiscal year 2004
    and are not subject to normal attrition. This will result in the Army
    Reserve exceeding its fiscal year 2003 end strength by 6,000 to 8,000.

        Chairman Warner. Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    for your testimony and your service. There was an article in
    the Kansas City Star, where the first line is troops heading to
    the Iraqi theater are not getting health screening, especially
    blood sampling mandated by a law enacted by Congress in 1987.
    Is the Army not screening?
        Secretary White. My information is that we are screening. I
    think it's imperative that we screen. We have DNA samples,
    blood samples from every soldier that deploys. I will check
    that information.
        Senator Reed. I understand that, and I am not the expert,
    but that the DNA samples are different than the blood screening
    mandated by this congressional act, but I am not certain of
    that.
        Secretary White. I will get you information for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        DOD Directive 5154.24, dated October 3, 2001, requires the Armed
    Forces Institute of Pathology to maintain a repository of DNA samples
    from members of the Armed Forces. The DNA sample is a specimen
    collected by swabbing the inside of the service member's mouth, and is
    not a blood sample. The Army is currently at nearly 100 percent
    compliance for active component troops, and at nearly 90 percent
    compliance for Reserve components, and is currently working to correct
    the quality and technical errors in the collection process in order to
    reach the goal of 100 percent.
        Section 1074f of title 10, United States Code, enacted on November
    18, 1997, directs that the pre- and post-deployment screening of all
    service members include the drawing of blood samples. The Army is
    currently in compliance with the guidelines. The blood sample is drawn
    as an HIV test, with the remaining blood being stored. All soldiers
    will have current HIV tests and associated blood samples before
    deployment.

        Senator Reed. Secretary Johnson, is the Navy following this
    as well?
        Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. We have had no challenges so
    far.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Roche?
        Secretary Roche. I have gone through the line to make sure
    we do it correctly. We do a baseline on someone, including
    blood, DNA, etc. We monitor conditions in a particular area.
    When they come back off the rotation, we do another medical
    review to compare it to the baseline and anything we may have
    learned overseas. I think we have this reasonably under
    control, sir.
        Senator Reed. Secretary White, many of the questions this
    morning focused on the forces that will be needed to not only
    decisively engage in defeat of Iraq if so ordered, but longer
    term occupational forces. That puts a particular burden on the
    Army, Navy, Air Force, expeditionary forces. Do they have the
    flexibility of reconstituting and falling back very quickly? If
    there is extended occupation, the Army will bear the brunt of
    it. I wonder at this point what percentage of our Army has been
    committed to the Iraqi theater operations roughly?
        Secretary White. Active component (AC) plus Reserve
    component (RC) probably a third. You are talking about Central
    Command (CENTCOM) in general, but all the deployments around
    CENTCOM, and it's working on AC and RC and those that have been
    alerted to deploy, maybe 30 percent.
        Senator Reed. What additional percentage has been allotted
    for possible deployments?
        Secretary White. That would be the top end figure.
        Senator Reed. Of course with this deployment forward, you
    have to have a rotational force upon it. Essentially, the
    deployed force together with their rotational force could be 60
    percent of the Army?
        Secretary White. If you look at Afghanistan, we have
    rotated three different divisions into Afghanistan to date--
    82nd Airborne to 10th Mountain to 101st Airborne.
        Senator Reed. One of the reasons I am concerned about it is
    that, generally, these things usually take longer and more
    people than you expect even in your most realistic estimate. I
    recall last October when plans for the operation talked about a
    force of 75,000 Army ground personnel with air power. There are
    300,000 troops in the theater right now. I think we would be
    wise to assume the worst case which would drive numbers up, I
    know your discussion with Senator Levin suggested that you have
    a range, but my guess would be it would be the top end, not the
    bottom end?
        Secretary White. Our experience, we are in our eighth year.
    Kosovo, we are in our fifth year, I do believe although at much
    lower levels than we initially would suggest it's a one-term
    effort. The Secretary of Defense made the point that the hope
    would be that very soon it would be an international effort,
    and the others would contribute, which would lower the burden
    on us, as has been the case to a certain extent in Afghanistan.
        Senator Reed. Let me raise the pressure that we are seeing
    back home with the National Guard and Reserve. This falls most
    particularly in the Army National Guard and Reserve units, with
    the Air Force also. My troops have basically all been mobilized
    for a year. My suspicion, though, because of the expertise of
    these soldiers, military police officers, civil affairs people,
    information specialists, that those are precisely the people
    that you need not this year, but the following year. Where are
    you going to get them, because I can tell you the imposition,
    the disruption, these are patriots but they have to come back.
    You are going to have to replace them is my point.
        Secretary White. I think the long-term concern is if we
    stay at current levels of mobilization, eventually it's going
    to impact on Reserve component retention and recruiting as
    well. Now, in the first 18 months of the global war on
    terrorism, we have been very fortunate we have not seen that.
    But a year or 2 years from now, depending upon what level of
    mobilization of that, we are certainly concerned about that.
        Senator Reed. Again, this I think applies, but with most
    impact on the Army, Air Force, illustrative of the Navy, I
    would assume you are preparing plans right now to meet this
    very likely contingency and the sooner these plans are
    presented to us, the more opportunity we will have to look at
    your proposals, which I think would involve increasing end
    strength, incentivizing additional retention or Reserve or
    National Guard or resizing the force between Reserve component
    and active component, and all of these issues if they are
    delayed further will slow down I think your ability to respond.
        Secretary White. Senator, you know that's all under
    consideration. I think the Secretary talked about that while he
    was here. It is a matter of urgency for us.
        Senator Reed. I did not mean to pick on you, Mr. Secretary.
    But the Army is the lead, I think, in the forces that will
    occupy the country. Mr. Secretary, thank you. Thank you all.
        Chairman Warner. Ladies and gentlemen of the committee,
    there is now a vote. What I would suggest we do is that the
    next allocation of time be equally divided between Senator
    Dole, Senator Ensign, and we will take you and then we will
    adjourn for the vote until Senator Allard returns. I will see
    that the vote is held. Senator Dole?
        Senator Dole. Upon recent visits to military bases in North
    Carolina, they have given me initial insight into what our
    military personnel and families are facing as they go through
    repeated deployments. I would like to have each of you discuss
    family readiness and family morale. First, as you have had an
    opportunity to reflect on the tragedies that occurred at Fort
    Bragg, are there lessons that all of the Services have learned,
    and what are you doing to ensure that both military personnel
    and their families have appropriate counselling both
    predeployment and post deployment? This is of great interest
    and concern to me.
        As head of the Red Cross for many years, I put in place a
    program on mental health counseling for victims of disasters
    and for families. We streamlined our Armed Forces Emergency
    Services, which includes counseling, but I wonder if it's not
    the case that in some instances there is a reluctance to seek
    counseling because it might be viewed as hurting one's career.
        What do you do to anticipate problems where there may be
    special family stress where supervisors have reported this sort
    of situation? Also as I have toured our bases, I was very
    impressed with the support network that is there. I visited, in
    each instance with the military spouses, and they had an
    excellent support network. Are we ensuring that this sort of
    support network is available on all our bases and that it has
    strong command support?
        Secretary White. First of all, family issues are readiness
    issues. We spend an enormous amount of time on that. You raised
    a key point. We found when we examined the Fort Bragg situation
    in great detail that the tragic situation that occurred last
    summer, though not in all cases, we need to have ways for
    people on a confidential basis to deal with these problems and
    seek help and counseling and so forth without it becoming a
    chain of command issue, which of course stifles that. We have
    put in place changes to our family advocacy program to see to
    it that those avenues are open. We spent a great deal of time
    both pre- and post-deployment with spouses when they return and
    we consider the matter of utmost importance.
        Secretary Johnson. We have long had this challenge, of
    course, and we have a program we call return and reunion and we
    actually have an ops plan, if you will, to prepare the families
    and also the members when they return for reunion. We work with
    key volunteers--key spouses--and we have done well, but we
    always are trying to improve and we learn a lot from the Army
    difficulties. We are trying to move forward in a very positive
    way. I also visit with the families, and families are very
    important. I happen to have a son who is a reservist activated
    in Kuwait. I know from a personal standpoint about the
    importance of the families.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, we have had an expeditionary Air
    Force operation now for about 3 or 4 years, and in the process
    of that, we have had to go through this in the past with people
    deploying all of the time. Of our 360,000 active duty airmen,
    we have over 100,000 in this rotation; now it's up to 260,000,
    so from the very early days, we have had to worry about
    particular bases supporting those who were deployed. Because we
    flew people from so many bases, each base has a program to be
    available to the families, worry about them, making sure they
    don't have other issues, getting to the schools, make sure
    schools know deployments are happening. So this is not
    necessarily new.
        Senator Dole. I see my time has expired, but I would like
    to submit some questions for the record that you should answer
    with regard to impact aid and a couple of other questions,
    please.
        Senator Ensign [presiding]. Let us assume the President
    decided he was going to do as some had suggested and give the
    inspectors whatever period of time, whatever period that time
    was, you are building up in case we have to go to war. The
    costs that he was talking about, would there be any difference
    in those costs through 2003 if we just continued with the
    weapons inspectors and we built up because we have to be
    prepared for war? Is there any difference in the costs than
    what he was talking about?
        Secretary White. Senator, the costs I was talking about,
    most of them are already sunk.
        Senator Ensign. That was the point I was trying to make. If
    we go with just weapons inspectors, the costs that you all are
    talking about are pretty much there. The costs that you did not
    include would be the costs of ammunition, of operations within
    the war itself. Isn't that correct?
        Secretary White. That's right. Because we have paid to
    mobilize a force and a significant amount of Reserves. We paid
    to transport it.
        Senator Ensign. For the Army and Navy, that would be yes?
    The Air Force would be different?
        Secretary Roche. If we are at war, we will probably take
    Operation Noble Eagle and go up to a large aircraft going
    overhead which will have our costs go up somewhat
    exponentially. In terms of having the costs of having people
    deployed, we sacrificed some things like training, school
    housing. Flight training is not being done the way they want it
    to be. Those costs will start to accumulate. Our presumption is
    that we will be there as long as we have to be, but there is a
    price.
        Senator Ensign. The point is if you would just have the
    military there, those costs were being incurred?
        Secretary Roche. The cost of having that many of our people
    deployed, the incremental cost is high. So we pay a cost just
    to be deployed, which is something over and above what we
    normally would be paying.
        Senator Ensign. Just briefly, I do not know if you want to
    comment on this, that's the future we are looking at with bases
    in Europe. We are looking at another round of Base Realignment
    and Closure (BRAC) here, but there is also with General Jones
    what he has talked about as far as shifting the bases. Did any
    of you want to comment as far as what you see as the future of
    those bases and your general impressions of that?
        Secretary White. As the Secretary of Defense talked about
    in the hearing, the combatant commanders are taking a look at
    repositioning and the strategic requirements going forward. We
    actively support those reviews. General Jones, for example,
    combatant commander in Europe, is part and parcel with him and
    working with how we should be stationed and positioned in
    support of our naval applications. Korea was mentioned. We
    actively support them because it's enormously important to us,
    so we are studying where the force is going to be positioned
    and whether we rotate units in or whether they be permanently
    stationed there. There is a tremendous amount of work going on,
    and we are right in the middle of it.
        Senator Ensign. One other quick question, and then turn it
    over to Senator Allard, since the other senators have left. You
    can continue to chair and go on since the rest of the senators
    will be coming back.
        There was an article in yesterday's Early Bird that
    discussed what is called the Pentagon's private Army. The Army
    they described is comprised of individuals hired by private
    military companies to handle mostly noncombat jobs so our
    military forces can focus on their core mission. The article
    stated during the Gulf War, there was one contractor for every
    50 to 100 soldiers; that ratio is now one for every 10.
        First of all, are those figures correct? Do you see us
    continuing in that direction? What other types of functions
    currently performed by the military are we looking to contract
    out? Also in light of the recent incident in Colombia involving
    contractor civilians, what are the rules that apply to these
    individuals who happen to find themselves in harm's way? Can
    they carry weapons, are they considered prisoners of war if
    captured?
        Secretary White. For the Army's part, we extensively employ
    contractors for a wide variety of things. We are continuing to
    do that with this Third Wave initiative, as I mentioned, at the
    start and the numbers are bigger. I think the trend has been to
    do more and more of this because you can get a better value
    proposition than tying up uniformed people with these types of
    activities. I think it's a positive thing that we ought to be
    doing. I am not an expert on rules of engagement. I will
    provide that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Employees of civilian contractors serving with U.S. Army units in
    contingency operations are in noncombat positions. Normally, employees
    of civilian contractors are not issued weapons, but instead rely upon
    soldiers responsible for rear area security. If circumstances warrant,
    a commander may issue a personal weapon, a pistol or rifle, to an
    employee of a civilian contractor, provided the employee has received
    firearms training and is determined to be competent in handling the
    weapon safely. The employee may use the weapon for personal self
    defense only.
        An employee of a civilian contractor is an individual accompanying
    the Armed Forces and, as such, is entitled to prisoner of war status if
    captured by the enemy.

        Senator Ensign. Any of you wish to comment on that?
        Secretary Johnson. We use contract labor when our ships go
    into port. When I was in Kuwait, I saw more and more contract
    activity moving things. I remember in Operation Desert Storm
    that most of the ground movement was done by contractors. We
    use them when we need them. We do not have as quite a
    regimented a program as the Air Force and Army do.
        Secretary Roche. The nature of air power, we do have
    contract labor. We probably have a ratio that's even higher.
    They are further back. They are not in an area where they are
    in combat. I know of no occasions where we actually have
    aircraft in harm's way, but certainly it would be involved in
    maintenance for software work, software support, and they
    perform functions well done by them and allow us to take
    uniform airmen and use uniform airmen.
        Senator Ensign. Thank you. I will turn it over to Senator
    Allard.
        Senator Allard [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Ensign.
    First of all, as Chairman, I am going to ask unanimous consent
    that I make my opening statement part of the record. Also I
    would like to enter into the record as well a letter to
    Secretary Roche of the Air Force concerning rapes and sexual
    assaults. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Allard and the
    information referred to follow:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the willingness of the
    Service Secretaries to appear before us today. Our forces continue to
    fight in Afghanistan, assist forces in Yemen, Djibouti, and Georgia,
    and defend our homeland. Now, they are poised to take on a new mission:
    the invasion of Iraq. The mobilization of thousands of men and women in
    the Reserves and National Guard are indicative of the size and scope of
    our current military operations. Despite many hardships, our soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardmen have stepped forward and
    embraced their country's call to arms. We thank them for their service.
    We thank each of you for providing them with the leadership they need
    to defend our Nation.
        I would like to take a few moments to address a very serious
    concern of mine. Four months ago, a former cadet at the U.S. Air Force
    Academy approached me about her recent experiences at the Academy. She
    said that she was sexually assaulted, but was punished by the Academy
    for drinking and having sex in the dormitories. Since then, more than
    25 current and former cadets who were allegedly sexually assaulted or
    raped have approached me and my staff.
        Three weeks ago, I wrote a letter to Secretary of the Air Force
    James Roche requesting a full and complete investigation into these
    allegations. The Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator John
    Warner, and I sent a second letter last week requesting that the
    Department of Defense Inspector General review the Air Force's
    investigation. I also gave Secretary Roche a letter following my
    meeting with him on February 25, which asked him to answer several
    important questions. I have yet to receive a response from the Air
    Force.
        The Air Force did send an investigative team to Colorado Springs.
    The team spent 10 days at the Academy and, from my understanding, was
    able to get an understanding for the school's current system for
    addressing sexual assault and rape cases. However, I also understand
    the investigative team did not interview any current or former cadets
    who have reported being sexually assaulted or raped.
        The Air Force tells me that the investigation is not over and that
    the investigative team may return to the Academy to meet with the
    victims. My office has been attempting to facilitate this process. I
    have also been told that the Air Force will be setting up a hot-line at
    the Department of Defense that will be available for cadets to call. I
    think these actions are a good start, but it is not enough.
        I am concerned that the Air Force has not offered confidentiality
    to the cadets. How can the Air Force expect cadets to come forward and
    not be given confidentiality, particularly after watching the Academy
    punish and ruin the careers of several of their classmates who made the
    mistake of reporting a sexual assault or rape? I am also waiting to see
    if the Air Force will work with the local rape counseling service in
    Colorado Springs, which reportedly assisted 28 cadets who were raped.
        Over the last couple of days, I have been asked several times if I
    thought this current crisis at the Air Force Academy resembled the 1991
    Navy Tailhook scandal. In many ways, I think this scandal is worse. It
    seems clear to me that the problems at the Air Force Academy go much
    deeper than those that became apparent during the Tailhook scandal. The
    entire support and legal system at the Academy appears to have failed.
    The Academy can't even tell us how many cadets reported a sexual
    assault or rape.
        These failures begin with leadership, but they do not end there.
    The system is broken and must be fixed if we are to ensure the safety
    of the cadets.
        Many of my colleagues here today have urged and in fact nominated
    high school students to attend the Air Force Academy. We stressed the
    honor and integrity of the institution. I still believe in the Air
    Force Academy, and I am interested in working with the Air Force to
    correct many of the problems at the school. But first, we need to have
    a full and complete investigation and that begins by working with the
    victims. So, I urge you, Secretary Roche, to consider all options that
    will encourage victims to come forward. I also encourage you to
    cooperate with the Defense Department's Inspector General when he
    begins his investigation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address this
    important issue. I look forward to discussing it in more depth during
    the question and answer period.

        Senator Allard. I want to say a few things about the Air
    Force situation and ask Secretary Roche a few questions.
    Several reporters over the last week have asked if I consider
    the current situation at the Academy to be worse than the
    Navy's 1991 Tailhook scandal. I told them that I think it's
    worse and here's why.
        We have a system breakdown at the Academy. Over 25 current
    and former cadets sexually assaulted or raped have contacted my
    office. Each one of these cadets provided information on how
    the Academy failed to adequately support them after the
    reported sexual assault or rape. Perception by some of these
    cadets was that they were actually punished for reporting.
    Clearly, Academy support and the legal system failed to assist
    these cadets.
        This problem begins as leadership, but it doesn't end
    there. I appreciate the comments by both Secretary Roche and
    General Jumper that this cannot be tolerated. Secretary Roche,
    I appreciate your personal involvement. I was pleased when you
    ordered an investigation into this matter. However, I believe
    more needs to be done. The victims need to feel good about the
    process. They need genuine action that seeks to solve the
    problem. Having just made this brief comment before the
    question, let me proceed on to the questions.
        The investigation, Secretary Roche, that you ordered has
    been proceeding now for over 2 weeks. Can you give this
    committee an update on the progress of the Air Force
    investigation?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. We want everyone to know the
    degree to which you and I have worked closely on this matter
    and make sure we have a baseline on the record for the United
    States Air Force, and I speak for General Jumper as well as
    myself. This is a problem and that cadets are having. In fact,
    we have cadets who have misused power who have done things that
    we cannot tolerate, and we will not tolerate any cadet who
    sexually assaults another. We will not tolerate a cadet who
    harbors one who had or cadet who was present and allowed
    something like that to go on, and especially we will not
    tolerate cadets who harass or who shun that cadet who has the
    courage to come forward. That's a cadet problem.
        It's a climate problem. You are absolutely right. We have
    to deal with a climate that has allowed this to emerge 10 years
    ago. This is the second time the therapy actions taken 10 years
    ago were thought to be effective, but in fact we found that
    they are not. We are on a two-track path here.
        First track is to worry about the fact that come June,
    Senators, as you well know, we will have 714 American women at
    our Air Force Academy. 218 of those 714 will be brand-new
    arrivals. We have to ensure that their parents believe that
    those cadets are safe. We also have roughly 3,400 male cadets.
    We have to make sure their parents understand that an
    accusation is not a conviction.
        We will always retain due process. First thing we are doing
    is to get a larger sense of what is happening at the Academy.
    To this degree, we have talked to counselors there, we talked
    to professors, and we put out blanket calls for cadets to speak
    with us as well as any victim past or current, or past and not
    reported, to come. We have talked to victims.
        We are obligated to adhere to privacy standards just as
    your office is, so when you tell us about a cadet, you
    recognize we have to ask you, could you ask that cadet if she
    would speak to us, because we cannot violate the policy. We are
    learning enough to realize that the change must occur, change
    in the climate, how we manage the place, how we lead the place
    has to change. That's the first rule of business.
        The second is we have now reviewed on a cursory or in-depth
    level 54 cases. Of those 54 cases, we are trying to identify
    which of those that our inspector general will go into in-
    depth, so some of the parties to a particular allegation will
    be contacted. The IG will start shortly. We will give them the
    initial list, give them the whole group, but say these 11 or 12
    that you see right now, or maybe more, may emerge. We want to
    make sure you go into it because they reflect situations where
    the person who placed the accusation felt that the system let
    her down.
        We want to have specific review of due process in those
    cases. There are other cases where the victim chooses not to
    deal with this again. The part that is the saddest thing--and
    this is comparable to what is occurring throughout universities
    in the United States--is that while we have seen whatever we
    see--whatever the number is, 25, 50--there are probably another
    100 more that we do not see. That's a smaller number than the
    national statistics say occur on universities. But this is not
    a university.
        Any woman going into the Air Force Academy should feel
    better protected than going to any other university. Therefore,
    what frightens me most is the climate is affecting so many
    others who have not come forward. In fact, I was introduced to
    one and all I could say was I am sorry. We have to get at that.
    So we will both make changes which will come out by the end of
    March.
        You are the Senator from Colorado. You have long-term
    interest as a member of the Academy advisory board and also
    because there are particular cadets who have approached you.
        I also would like you and everyone to know that the reason
    that General Jumper and I are so adamant about this is we
    cannot bear the thought of criminals being commissioned. We
    cannot bear the thought of a criminal flying around with a
    couple thousand pounds of bombs under his wings using his
    judgment instead of rules of engagement or deciding when he can
    do something, when he cannot do something, or possibly preying
    on other of our airmen.
        We cannot have that and, therefore, we need for the male
    cadets to take initiative. We will do whatever we have to do
    with regard to administration of the Academy. We also, and this
    is tough, need to ask for courage, ask for a number of the
    female cadets to come forward. We cannot have them know that
    there is a criminal who is making it through that place,
    because when she goes on we want her to worry about the Air
    Force, not that fear. I'm proud to say with cooperation of
    Secretary Johnson and Vernon Clark, I have just had an open
    door at the Naval Academy. Spent last night there benchmarking
    how we do things, how they do things--best practices.
        It's my intent to share everything that we come upon with
    both Secretary White and Secretary Johnson just in case there
    is a chance to stop something. The Naval Academy was open with
    all of the difficulties they are facing, with things that they
    deal with. The fact that we have this ability to quickly speak
    among ourselves I think is very important.
        I would expect by the end of March that we will have a
    number of initiatives that General Jumper and I will sign out,
    and they will affect the climate of that school. Meanwhile, the
    inspector general for the Department is participating more in
    an over-our-shoulders watching how we are doing the business,
    which is fine. As long as we are transparent, we should be
    fine. We will make the first moves by the end of March.
    Senator, we are between 60 and 90 days for 217 new recruits to
    show up.
        Senator Allard. I do appreciate your further elaborating on
    the progress of the investigation. You and the investigating
    team were there about 10 days?
        Secretary Roche. They were there Friday, and I started a
    week ago tomorrow. They begged to see their families and get
    clean laundry. They have certain approaches working with the
    downtown clinic, TESSA, where they have very strict privacy
    rules as well. We are trying to ask them and we need time for
    them to turn, with some of them go back 15 years, and ask those
    patients if they would be willing to come forward. That would
    be tough.
        We have some telephone appointments with some parents. We
    have male cadets who have come forward who want to contribute.
    We have faculty members, female, and others. We have had some
    of the victims come forward already. We keep trying to create
    an environment that says it's okay, but we cannot force any of
    them. Even in your case, you notice the same thing. Your office
    has been supportive. Some of the women do not want to go
    through it again, but they want someone to know that something
    has happened.
        When we get the inspector general tasks, they will go by
    the cases case-by-case to see whether or not there were any
    holes in due process, but we are discovering larger things,
    Senator. We are discovering different definitions of sexual
    assault used that the Academy has compared to at a typical Air
    Force base.
        Benchmark that with the Navy. Secretary of the Navy doesn't
    have that problem. It's exactly the same definition one place
    as the other. So uniform military justice can be applied
    properly and systematically. Because of budget reasons in the
    past and because of shortage of pilots, we have dropped the
    preparation programs that we had for naval company officers we
    called AOCs, commissioned officers who are with the squadrons,
    but that's a terrible thing to have done but the pressures 5, 6
    years ago caused that to happen.
        The Navy did not succumb to that. They maintained standards
    of training prior to becoming an officer. We failed. We failed
    to empower our senior enlisted at the Academy. The kind of
    resources that exist are not existent in the Air Force Academy,
    but they will be.
        Senator Allard. How many victims have you met with so far?
        Secretary Roche. We have met with at least six and there
    are two new cases that have come along.
        Senator Allard. You have another team?
        Secretary Roche. TESSA downtown. They have had a chance to
    contact people. It's starting to converge, climate, power
    imbalances, putting young women in difficult positions that we
    ought not to be doing. Come back to the fact that these are
    adults, they have to deal with these problems themselves. We
    have to help them, but we cannot have them preying on high
    school students that will be young officers come June. They
    must be protected.
        Senator Allard. We all struggle with this issue of
    confidentiality. I cannot even give you the names unless they
    agree to allow me to give them the names. The crisis center has
    the same problem. We need to get the victim to understand that
    we are going to treat their concerns seriously. As this
    confidential issue comes up, and I think there needs to be a
    frank discussion with the victim as to what is most important,
    the confidentiality aspect or whether this goes to court, a
    case, or somewhere or another that it may jeopardize that case
    somehow or another and sometimes they have to make that
    decision. But I guess the question I'm going to ask you is that
    many of the victims that have approached my office have refused
    to talk to your investigative team because they fear reprisals
    and do not want to jeopardize their careers. There are those
    that say that they would like to have their confidentiality
    protected. Are you willing to grant confidentiality to victims
    that might be willing to come forward?
        Secretary Roche. It's a legal term. It depends what
    confidentiality is. If a victim comes forward and says I would
    like my name not to be used, that we can absolutely do. We can
    be sure that publicly we can be led to that victim. If she
    reports a crime, we are obligated to go after that criminal and
    to that degree we have to tell her that if there is a crime
    involved, if in fact there is an assault, we have to
    investigate because there is a potential criminal who could be
    flying one of our aircraft.
        This is where confidentiality is the problem. First of all,
    I'm not empowered to give confidentiality. If I ask a question,
    the answer has to be something that can be used for official
    purposes only so we can protect someone's privacy rights. But
    if there is a crime, we are obligated to go after that
    criminal.
        Senator Allard. Many of the assailants have gotten off
    lightly. How many cadets have been court martialed for sexual
    assault or rape and can you share with this committee how many
    cadets have been court martialed at the Air Force Academy for
    sexual assault and rape for the last 10 years?
        Secretary Roche. I'm going to give you a preliminary
    number. It changed over the weekend. Recordkeeping is not all
    we had wanted it to be. There has been one formal court martial
    where the assailant was acquitted. However, there was another
    court martial where alleged assailant pled guilty and went off
    to jail for 7 months, so far I know of two. In many of the
    other cases, there has not been sufficient evidence to fit the
    element of the crime under the uniform code, but because we are
    finding out enough administrative wrongdoing by the individual,
    we have thrown the person out. That's different from being able
    to take them to trial. One of the things we know is that in the
    future if a young person has been assaulted, we can educate her
    on what is the difference between harassment and assault so she
    understands that. Then we want to put with her very quickly
    someone who can explain the law, explain the process, so she
    understands what is going to happen and that there are defense
    counsel, understand that the process of the crime has elements
    of the crime that must be approved.
        However, there are administrative things. When we have not
    been able to take someone to court martial, oftentimes we have
    been able to throw them out. We get to a point of a ``He said,
    She said'' situation which is difficult to take to court. The
    other Academies have that same problem.
        Senator Allard. I think we really need to instill
    confidence in the system so victims, when they report a rape,
    know that the rape itself won't put their military careers at
    risk. This is the problem that we are willing to take on.
        Secretary Roche. We are at a point now when we go to look
    for senior officer, for instance, the superintendent will be
    retiring this summer and we are looking for replacement, it's
    sad we have to go back to make sure no one ever accused the
    general officer of something even if it was unsubstantiated
    because it's such a delicate matter. We cannot start a
    discussion by saying, ``But in your past. . .'' So we are
    taking this very seriously, and we do not want a situation
    where a victim suffers through her career because of something
    that was not her fault in any way, shape, or form. There is
    nothing in the breaking of regs that justifies a sexual assault
    against any of these women. Nothing.
        Senator Allard. Just to wrap it up, Mr. Chairman, if I
    might. On February 25, you and I met in my office to discuss
    this issue. During that meeting, I gave you a detailed letter
    asking a number of questions pertaining to the investigation. I
    just ask that you put in the record your responses, what is the
    status of your response to that particular letter.
        Secretary Roche. We have a draft, but it's changing. I do
    not want to give you the draft, rather at least wait until the
    end of March and say, as of the end of March, here are the
    answers based on what we have found, but I have been given one
    draft already. Too much is changing. We want to go back and see
    if the folks at TESSA have some insights that are different
    than we obtained. We are going to fold those in. There is one
    in the GAO report that I want to spend more time on. They are
    all quite useful.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Allard. As was mentioned by the Chairman, who is
    now with the committee, and you know we all have something at
    stake here. Members of Congress do make nominations to the Air
    Force Academy, and we frequently promote the Academies in
    general as a good education and a wonderful opportunity for
    young people who measure up. It's vitally important we have a
    system in place where they are comfortable, and there will be
    some justice if there is a situation where a victim experiences
    rape or incest.
        The integrity of the system is at stake and I think this is
    a really important time in the life of the Academies,
    particularly the Air Force Academy. Thank you for your
    interest, and we will be continuing to be watching over these
    as you move forward in your investigation.
        Secretary Roche. Absolutely. We are totally transparent to
    you. I think you know General Jumper is en route flying out
    there now. He will be speaking to the cadets. He will also be
    speaking to some of our enlisted there. We have had one polling
    of the senior enlisted. We are trying to touch as many of those
    bases as we possibly can. A thing that's scary is that we are
    talking about young people who come 2 months from now, will
    graduate and some of them may face war within 12 months. I
    don't want them growing up in a war, Senator. I want them grown
    up when they go out of the Academy and I don't want them to
    think that they can get away with this, so there is something
    else they can get away with later on.
        These are aspiring officers in whom we all place special
    trust and confidence. Once upon a time, their commissioning
    certificates referred to them as officers and gentlemen. They
    have special obligations. They cannot escape now and all of a
    sudden become responsible in the future.
        Senator Allard. There is this loyalty to the squadron. The
    loyalty needs to start with the perpetrator of the act, and if
    he is going to be a loyal member of that squadron, he should
    not have done what he did and shouldn't come back later on in
    the squadron where he says you are the one that is the problem.
        Secretary Roche. These young people need to know their peer
    group is the men and women of the Armed Services. Right now
    some of them are shaming the Air Force, but they are also
    shaming any member of the Armed Forces.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you for an excellent
    line of questions, and again I commend you for your work on
    this issue. Also, another member of our committee who has been
    very active and that is our next questioner, Senator Nelson. I
    wonder if you would indulge the chair for one question as I
    have been involved in this. I think we better employ language
    that is clearly understandable by a generation, an age younger
    than we or maybe in my case a generation, but zero tolerance is
    understood. I think that the importance of each of the Service
    Secretaries indicate that in their analysis and factions that
    they take with respect to their Academies the policy of zero
    tolerance would be very much a part of the understanding. Is
    that correct?
        Secretary Roche. Senator, I dread ever to disagree with
    you. Zero tolerance to me I don't think captures the specifics
    that these young men especially need to know. Zero tolerance
    says you cannot perform, and we will not condone, a sexual
    assault on a victim, another cadet. We want to go further,
    Senator, and I think you agree.
        Not only is that not tolerated, if they know of one of
    their own in their group, they have an obligation to go after
    that person. They have an obligation to stop these things from
    happening, and especially they have an obligation never to
    harass or shun a cadet who had the courage to come forward.
        Chairman Warner. It can be broadened to that. But I think
    we have to employ standards that are understood by this
    generation. I think the zero tolerance does send some message.
    Secretary Johnson, your view?
        Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. I certainly agree. The code
    says we will not tolerate them among us. That's certainly what
    we are talking about.
        Secretary White. We agree as well. We start the education
    process and understanding of that policy the day they come to
    the Academy.
        Chairman Warner. In the letter we specifically asked our
    former colleague on the committee who is now in charge of
    personnel in the Department of Defense that each of the
    Academies should review this situation, and the Air Force can
    ascertain to the extent that there is any presence of
    allegation within those Academies. I will close out on that and
    now turn to my colleague, who has raised that with the
    committee of the other Academies.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That's exactly right. I have had
    complaints from the Air Force Academy. One woman, who was raped
    at the Air Force Academy while she was a freshman, learned that
    another woman had been raped by the same man, a fellow cadet 2
    weeks earlier. They reported the crimes to the office of
    special investigations, but the male cadet was never charged.
    One woman left the Academy. The other is still a cadet.
        In another complaint, a Floridian, a woman at West Point
    assaulted in her dorm room by another cadet, was urged not to
    make an issue out of the attack and eventually, separated from
    the Academy. Now, given these complaints, and I certainly hope
    Secretary Johnson that this doesn't get to your Academy, but
    given these complaints and a number of others that have been
    reported in the media, I want to know how many complaints of
    sexual assault or rape have you received in the past 5 years
    and how many times have you pursued criminal charges against
    the alleged rapists?
        Secretary Roche. We are assembling those data for the Air
    Force at this time. We had a hotline that picked up 98 calls.
    We have had 54 major investigations. We have only had one,
    possibly two formal court martials. We have had a number of
    dismissals because while you cannot prove the elements of their
    defense, you have enough to say there is violation of the
    Academy regulations, and therefore dismissing the individual. I
    would encourage you Senator, if you could, if they would have
    the courage to contact us or contact your office and allow your
    office to tell us their names so we can contact them. The
    privacy rights are such that we cannot ask any of them unless
    they come forward to us.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If after investigation of the facts if
    you determine that a crime had been committed, would you turn
    that over to the appropriate criminal authorities?
        Secretary Roche. Absolutely. One of the things that the
    inspector general's work will do that Senator Warner was
    referring to is to look at these cases to see whether due
    process was followed. If not, or if it warranted reopening,
    then that was something we could do with uniform code. We
    would, just as we are now having some young women come forward
    who had previously not come forward. We will put that into the
    chain of command into the office of special investigations and
    follow through with it.
        We have done things for instance that I know won't surprise
    you. We have had an incident of a cadet in a community do
    something rather heinous. The district attorney decided that it
    wasn't a big enough deal to him, refused to prosecute it. We
    prosecuted it and he is in the slammer now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White.
        Secretary White. We have prosecuted and taken cases to
    court martial in the past. We will provide details for the 5-
    year period that you requested. It is a critical issue for us.
    It has been for a long time. Women have been at West Point
    since 1976. I think, as Secretary Roche has talked about here,
    the point is to establish a climate that makes people safe
    about reporting these things, and then take action appropriate
    with the offense. We will provide you that detail. We consider
    it very important. We are looking very closely at the situation
    at the Air Force Academy.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The United States Military Academy (USMA) has had five allegations
    of rape: one in 1998; one in 1999; one in 2000; one in 2001; and one in
    2002. Charges were preferred in two of these cases. In the 1998 case,
    the investigation determined that the sex was consensual and both
    cadets graduated. In both the 1999 and 2000 cases, the accused cadets
    resigned in lieu of court-martial and received other than honorable
    discharges. In both cases, the victims recommended acceptance of the
    resignation in lieu of court-martial.
        It is important to note that the Department of the Army provides
    oversight for this. In the 2001 case, there was insufficient evidence
    to support the allegation to go to court-martial. However, the cadet
    was found to have violated other USMA regulations and resigned. In the
    2002 case, DNA evidence did not substantiate the allegation and both
    cadets graduated.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Of the victims who left, will you
    provide them with an opportunity to serve in the military?
        Secretary Roche. Depends on the circumstances, sir. I would
    not want to make a blanket statement there. I know that some of
    them, for instance, loved the Air Force enough, and I'm
    surprised at this level of courage that they left the Academy,
    gone to university, and joined the ROTC program. We have known
    that, and we have welcomed them.
        Secretary White. I would, too, on a case-by-case basis,
    certainly.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You have spoken earlier of a cadet
    problem. Is this an officer leadership problem?
        Secretary Roche. As I noted, it's always both. These are
    adults, and it is easy for those adults to try and put
    responsibility for their actions someplace else. They are the
    ones who committed it. There is a leadership problem. I believe
    we the corporate Air Force have failed the Academy. This is not
    an issue at the Academy. When we allowed budget reasons and
    shortages of officer reasons to not, for instance, at the Air
    Force Academy there are very few pilots for these squadron
    officers, battle managers, because they are so desperately
    needed in the field. We have to think was that really smart? We
    gave up 1 year of advanced education for counseling. That
    clearly was not smart.
        We did not make good use of our superlative noncommissioned
    officers and put them in the chain of command so that they
    could have helped this problem. That was not smart. That's not
    the fault of the people there. It's my predecessor and his
    predecessor as well as General Jumper's predecessor and his
    predecessor. It's a corporate responsibility for that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. At the end of the day, we want to make
    sure that both your investigations hold someone responsible and
    accountable, which is the appropriate way in the military. I
    have been burned a little bit recently on this. Senator Pat
    Roberts and I have been involved in the Scott Speicher case and
    we have seen how everything has been so mushy over the last 12
    years with mistakes being made and no one being held
    accountable. Now we have every reason. I personally think he is
    likely to be alive, that we have left a downed pilot for 12
    years, and that no one has had to step forward with
    accountability. I do not want to see that in this case as well.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, if I may, sir, where
    accountability is warranted, it will be there. I have had no
    problem removing general officers from jobs. I have had no
    problem holding people accountable, but when you really get
    into this particular case, the accountability goes broad. If it
    has to be somewhere, it's with General Jumper and me.
        Secretary White. The chain of command is responsible for
    this, and I as the Secretary am responsible for the department.
    West Point is a national treasure. We intend to keep it that
    way.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    your willingness to jump into this with all fours.
        Chairman Warner. I also wish to commend you for your work
    on Commander Speicher. I know that you had offered and wanted
    to accompany Senator Levin and I on our recent trip. That was
    not possible given the size of the aircraft. I know your desire
    to pursue that case. I think Senator Roberts at each stop was
    able to invoke not only your intense feelings on that case, but
    his. I thank you for bringing it up. I hope you continue to
    bring it up until we have some resolution of that tragic saga.
    We had excellent patience exercised by Senator Ben Nelson.
    Senator?
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Over the last
    several weeks, there have been a number of news articles about
    the hardships that military personnel both active and Reserve
    are facing because of deployments to support several
    contingency operations and some of these hardships include
    possible bankruptcy, but also parenting issues when both
    parents or single parents are deployed, effects in income for
    reservists ordered to active duty where they are paid far less
    than they are paid and compensated in their civilian jobs,
    first responders ordered to active duty leaving their cities
    and neighborhoods without their services in the event of a
    terrorist attack on the homeland.
        As I ask each of you, I would like to have each of you
    respond. Does your Service have policies in place to prevent
    wherever possible, for example, both parents from being sent to
    a combat zone at the same time?
        Secretary White. I don't think we have a specific policy
    against that particular issue. We require single parents or
    families where both parents are in the military to provide a
    family care plan that's reviewed by the chain of command to
    make sure when they deploy that the children are adequately
    provided for. But I will have to get back to you for the record
    about the specifics of dual soldier families, and if there are
    any limitations on it or comments on it.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        There are no specific DOD policies that preclude the assignment or
    deployment of multiple family members to designated hostile-fire/
    imminent-danger areas or combat zones at the same time. This includes
    both a single parent and members of a dual-military couple with family
    members. However, DOD policy does exist which speaks to the concurrent
    assignment of multiple family members to the same unit or ship. The
    policy provides for reassignment of all but one member to a different
    unit or ship. Approval of such requests will be based on military
    requirements. The Army defines a unit for this purpose as a battalion,
    squadron, or element with less than 500 authorized Army personnel. Army
    implements DOD policy without change.
        Understanding that plans must be made to ensure family members are
    properly and adequately cared for when the soldier is deployed or
    otherwise not available, current Army policy requires that dual-
    military couples with family members have an approved Family Care Plan
    (FCP) on file. Soldiers unable or unwilling to provide an adequate FCP
    are ineligible for deployment. Soldiers without approved plans may be
    considered for separation.
        As a matter of policy, all similarly qualified service members must
    share assignments or deployments in hostile-fire/imminent-danger or
    combat zones equitably. However, provisions exist for consideration of
    combat deferment or exemption for service members or families
    experiencing severe humanitarian or compassionate problems. Our
    soldiers voluntarily entered the profession of arms with the
    understanding they would be subject to worldwide assignments to include
    being placed in harms way. On balance, they accept these policies and
    do not wish to be restricted from performing their duties along with
    their fellow soldiers.

        Secretary Johnson. We also have no policy that specifically
    prohibits it, but we do require, as Secretary White talked
    about, for them to have a plan.
        Senator Ben Nelson. In the event that they are both
    deployed?
        Secretary Johnson. That they are both deployed.
        Senator Ben Nelson. That works for deployment. But I think
    we are worried about losing the same parents in the same combat
    zone.
        Secretary Johnson. We understand that. Most often their
    larger family takes care of the children. On the other hand, it
    would be incorrect to say that an officer couldn't serve. We
    have to be careful to allow them to serve their country while
    serving their family also.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I understand. We are trying to narrow
    it down to a combat zone, as opposed to service.
        Secretary Roche. Again, I would have to support the
    Secretary of the Navy. We would not want to say that a
    condition of officership or enlistmentship is affected by
    result of your majority. Support groups are maintained. I do
    not know of any cases where we would have a married couple
    where we would have a same flight over a same combat zone at
    the same time.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Do you have any screening system that
    would identify firefighters, police officers, medical
    personnel, and other first responders to determine whether they
    may be needed more in their local community because of the
    interest in hometown security and the homeland security effort?
        Secretary Roche. I love this one, sir. We, in fact, look
    for those specific specialties because we are in such short
    demand of them, and we are in such short demand because we are
    protecting so many bases here plus new bases overseas that,
    thanks to my colleague, Secretary White, we are renting close
    to 8,000 Army guardsmen to protect Air Force bases because we
    do not have the force. We have exhausted the Reserve Force to
    be able to have the force protection at the bases here and
    overseas at the same time.
        The specialties you brought up we are very much in need of
    and, yes, every now and then it's a shock to realize how many
    members of police departments and fire departments of small
    American towns are now on active duty, but they have been part
    of our Reserve and we sure needed it.
        Secretary White. I would agree and say the same thing. If
    you look at Military Police (MP) units, most of them are in law
    enforcement in their private communities and we have activated
    just about every MP unit in the stretcher right now: both Guard
    and Reserve. The Reserve side of this is that in States where
    units have been activated that have specific capabilities that
    the State would like to use under State control for emergency
    purposes, the Adjutants General (AG) of the States have contact
    with the surrounding States and they swap out capabilities to
    cover when a unit is mobilized, but that doesn't get exactly
    what you asked.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Over the years, they have had
    relationships with employment groups. They work closely with
    employers and we have a good partnership. Local units look at
    the things we are talking about, but yet as the other two
    Secretaries have mentioned, we go after some of the people that
    are also needed in our great Nation at home.
        That's reminiscent changing the words to the song ``Over
    There.'' So I would hope that you might take a look at that. I
    understand the importance of having the reservists and the
    Guard serve and be available and be deployed. Also, I think we
    all are aware of the importance of what effect it has over here
    when they go over there.
        My final question is: what systems do you have in place to
    make sure that your mobilization is fair? For example, that
    some individuals are not ordered to active duty for a second
    time unless absolutely necessary or kept on active duty longer
    than they have been led to believe they would be on active
    duty, while others are not activated? I understand that there
    are different skills or different service requirements and
    therefore that will mitigate, but is there a system in place to
    apply fairness where possible?
        Secretary White. We work this very carefully. In
    conjunction, on the Guard side with the State adjutant general
    obviously, there have been cases, and we have not had to
    mobilize anyone for more than a 1-year period. That's one of
    the reasons we are helping out the Air Force on-base security
    is they would have had to go into a second year of
    mobilization. But even having said that, 18 months into the
    global war on terrorism, we are so short of MPs that we have
    had to remobilize a small group of people who in fact were
    mobilized September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2002. After the
    current situation we have remobilized, but we worked very hard
    in the Guard and Reserve oversight process to make sure it's
    fair and the burden is kept as reasonable as we can.
        Secretary Johnson. We work on the burden, but you would be
    proud of the number of volunteers who come forward and want to
    serve. I would be hard pressed to give a percent, but I suspect
    it's a majority.
        Senator Ben Nelson. I wouldn't in any way want to suggest
    that you wouldn't have the loyalty of these men and women. It's
    a matter of certain hardships and/or equity that plays a role
    and you never want to under sell the importance of those who
    volunteer because their particular circumstances may permit
    them to do that.
        Secretary Roche. Same thing. As of today, we have over
    1,700 volunteers. Easier for us depending on how the airlines
    are going. We mobilize by experiences, and I think quite
    frankly we mobilize for our needs in combat and expect that the
    Air National Guard and Reserves will try to handle this
    particular need of the individual. The Air National Guard has
    been in this business for a long time. They have been in
    Operation Northern Watch, Operation Southern Watch, and
    Operation Enduring Freedom. They have been part and parcel. You
    cannot tell that this is a guard craft or active craft unless
    you look at the tail number. They have a personnel system that
    gets what we need on the spot. We do not try to figure it out.
    It just works.
        Senator Ben Nelson. My time is up. Thank you very much. I
    appreciate it.
        Senator Warner. Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    you and Senator Allard for raising the issues of discipline and
    behavior at the Academies. I appreciate the addressing of this
    very crucial issue that concerns many of us, not only those of
    us here on the dais, but people around the country.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, you have spoken to me on several
    occasions about your concerns on this case.
        Senator Clinton. I know in the great scheme of things where
    we have 200,000 of our men and women on the knife's edge going
    into harm's way, some may wonder why we are raising this, but
    indeed I think it demonstrates the strength of our system and
    the commitment to our overriding values. I am very proud that
    it has been raised and followed through in such a professional
    manner.
        I also want to express my appreciation to the Secretaries
    for their response to the question that the chairman asked
    toward the beginning of the hearing concerning General
    Shinseki's testimony before us a week or so ago. I understand
    completely that we are talking unpredictable, in the words of
    Secretary Rumsfeld, unknowable factors perhaps. But I think
    that the manner in which you responded to that question and
    referred to General Shinseki's personal service with a
    comparable set of circumstances was very welcomed. I, for one,
    appreciate it and I think that the range that we are attempting
    to understand Senator Levin has consistently questioned every
    witness about is an important one for us to continue to probe.
    I thank you for the way you have responded to that inquiry.
        I have a series of questions. I will submit them to the
    record. With respect to a question, Secretary Johnson, about
    Coast Guard deployments, I will be submitting to the record,
    committing to the record a letter that I'm sending to you with
    respect to more information about the call up of Coast Guard
    ships.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Last week, Admiral Clark informed me that the Coast Guard
    cutters have been periodically deployed with Navy carrier
    groups to ensure their readiness to work with Navy ships in
    times of crisis. However, according to a Coast Guard spokesman,
    this is the first time that Coast Guard combatant ships have
    been deployed in support of a national contingency in 30 years.
        Indeed, one news report indicates that the Coast Guard has
    sent one fourth of its fleet to the Gulf. We, in New York and
    other coastal states, particularly along the east coast, count
    on the Coast Guard to be part of our homeland security to guard
    our ports against potential terrorist threats, as well as to
    provide assistance and leadership in responding to emergencies
    such as the recent barge explosion on Staten Island, where the
    Coast Guard was the first responder on the scene and helped to
    contain that accident. So I will be asking for additional
    information for how many additional Coast Guard cutters,
    including patrol boats, are currently deployed, the criteria
    that are used to determine deployment, how long we expect to
    see them deployed overseas, the missions that they are
    currently performing, and any provisions or planning with
    respect to replacing their necessary functions into the future.
    Obviously as we are looking at the multiple challenges that we
    are confronting, it's imperative that we think ahead, and I do
    not know that deploying Coast Guard cutters in times of
    heightened alert will always be a very good idea. It may be
    necessary now, but we may have to look for alternatives, so I
    will look forward to receiving those answers to those
    questions.
        Secretary Roche, I'm deeply interested in the work that is
    done at the Air Force research lab in Rome. Have you had a
    chance to visit the lab? I would love to, however, be there
    with you when and if you do?
        Secretary Roche. I'd be delighted. That's the sort of stuff
    if you know my past that turns me on. [Laughter.]
        Senator Clinton. I wasn't inviting you to be turned on. I'm
    only kidding. I couldn't resist. [Laughter.]
        Secretary Roche. I'm an electronics and research man.
        Senator Clinton. I know. Just kidding.
        Secretary Roche. It's a very interesting place, and it does
    great work.
        Senator Clinton. It would be a great pleasure. Obviously,
    the work being done to develop cyber security technologies are
    one of the most important investments we need to be making with
    respect to our cyber infrastructure and the protective
    technology that is required, so I hope that we will have a
    chance to do that sooner instead of later.
        Finally, I would just echo the questions and concerns of my
    colleague, Senator Ben Nelson, about first responders. This is
    another one of those issues that has to be taken into account
    as we plan for the future. I know Secretary Rumsfeld has
    apparently expressed concern about having reliance that our
    forces have on reservists and guardsmen for the kind of
    deployment that we are now experiencing. Of course in many
    communities in our country, we are deeply dependent upon them,
    our firehouses, police stations, and emergency rooms. So I
    think we are going to have to consider how to better deal with
    demands on both ends of our security spectrum, both here at
    home and overseas, when we look at the Reserve components.
        Mr. Chairman, the Secretaries have been very helpful in
    responding to concerns many of us have about the questions that
    Senator Nelson raised, possibly married couples with children
    both serving in the same combat area. If there is any kind of
    formal statement or policy that has been adopted on this, we
    might want to get that just so that we all know if there are
    individual service policies, we need them; but if there is
    something that is being developed across the board, it would be
    very useful because many of us are receiving a lot of questions
    from not only constituents but from mayors, county executives,
    and others who have been facing these tremendous fiscal crises
    that they are currently undergoing and have to pay their
    reservists costs. We are trying to get our arms around this. I
    would look forward to receiving that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary Johnson. Spouse collocation is a key distribution goal.
    To the greatest extent possible, we assign one member to a shore
    billet, or otherwise non-deployable activity, while the spouse is
    fulfilling a sea-going or operational tour.
        Navy makes every effort to avoid concurrent assignment of dual Navy
    couples to deployable units. We also strive to avoid these operational
    assignment concerns for personnel married to other Service personnel or
    Reserve component members. However, given the expeditionary nature of
    naval service, there remains the potential for both members of a dual
    military couple to be simultaneously deployed.
        Dual Navy couples, and Navy members married to members of the other
    Services, are required to establish formal contingency arrangements to
    provide for the needs of children (and other dependent family members)
    in the event of conflicting operational demands. Commanding officers
    are responsible for ensuring compliance with program requirements and
    maintaining documentation of these plans at the local command.
        Requests to be excused from deployment are submitted to a member's
    immediate commander and forwarded for disposition through the
    operational chain of command. If requests cannot be resolved at the
    local level, the commander may, if deemed appropriate, refer the
    request to headquarters level as part of an administrative separation
    package.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you Senator. That will be done.
        Secretary Johnson. We will provide all the information you
    asked for. The partnership between the Navy and the Coast Guard
    has always been strong. It's even stronger now. There are some
    things that military people cannot do where Coast Guard members
    have that authority. We will provide information on the ships
    that go forward, but that partnership is tremendous forward and
    in the homeland. We are supporting the Coast Guard here very
    much and we will provide the information to you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The number of Coast Guard Cutters deploying to the Persian Gulf
    are:

             378-foot high endurance cutters

                     USCGC Boutwell (WHEC 719)--homeport: Alameda,
                    CA
                     USCGC Dallas (WHEC 716)--homeport: North
                    Charleston, SC

             225-foot seagoing buoy tender

                     USCGC Walnut (WLB 205)--homeport: Honolulu, HI

             110-foot patrol boats

                     USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332)--home port: South
                    Portland, ME
                     USCGC Adak (WPB 1333)--homeport: Sandy Hook,
                    NJ
                     USCGC Aquidneck (WPB 1309)--home port:
                    Atlantic Beach, NC
                     USCGC Baranof (WPB 1318)--homeport: Miami, FL
                     USCGC Grand Isle (WPB 1338)--homeport:
                    Gloucester, MA
                     USCGC Bainbridge Island (WPB 1343)--home port:
                    Sandy Hook, NJ
                     USCGC Pea Island (WPB1347)--home port: St.
                    Petersburg, FL
                     USCGC Knight Island (WPB 1348)--homeport: St.
                    Petersburg, FL

        Chairman Warner. Secretary Johnson, you raised a very
    important point about the statutory provisions in laws that
    enable the Coast Guard to do certain actions in reference to
    boarding that is not available to our forces. Maybe it ties
    into the review the Secretary is undertaking. But I think in
    these times when we are stretched so thinly and if it impacts
    on the Coast Guard to cover so many areas, that you might
    revisit that legislation to determine whether or not some
    authority, albeit maybe temporary, would enable the forces to
    maintain this task.
        Secretary Johnson. In hostile situations, we do not have a
    problem. But in nonhostile situations, we do. But we will look
    at that.
        Chairman Warner. I do not want to have the Coast Guard
    impacted in the ability to carry out so many of its functions
    because of the necessity to have Coast Guard personnel or a
    ship, as the case may be, present. Thank you very much.
        The chair is going to remain here for a number of wrap-up
    questions, but Senator Levin has commitments. I will yield to
    him and Senator Allard, then do the wrap-up.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, as always, for your
    courtesy. First on the end strength issue. You commented on
    this before, but when I asked the question in a little
    different way. Given the fact that our forces are so widely-
    deployed in such great numbers, given the fact that we have
    such huge demand and stress on our Guard and Reserve Forces, do
    you believe it is likely that you will be asking for an
    increase in the end strength of your Army and your Navy? Is it
    likely you'll be asking for an increase?
        Secretary White. Senator, we have discussed this before.
    The Army has had an active duty end strength Guard plus Reserve
    of 510,000 for 18 months. While there are certainly
    efficiencies that we can make within the 480,000 end strength
    cap to get military people doing military jobs and freeing up
    those spaces, if the operational tempo stays where it is in
    Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom going forward, we
    are over strength right now. We have Stop-Lossed 3,000 people.
    Our retention numbers are better than we had expected so we are
    at about 489,000 as it is. I think it's going to be a prime
    topic of discussion.
        Senator Levin. Is it likely you, Secretary Johnson, will be
    asking for increase in end strength?
        Secretary Johnson. Not likely. We are 2 percent over
    strength now and Marine Corps has a Stop Loss which puts them
    over also.
        Secretary Roche. We are in a situation where we are over
    the 2 percent right now. We have found 2,000 airmen not working
    for the Air Force. We are trying to bring 6,000 of them back
    in. I agree with Secretary Rumsfeld. 600 some communicators in
    the Pentagon easily handled by a contract out, which we are
    doing. When we finish with that, we will come back. It's
    distorted now, Senator Levin, because pilot retention is way
    up. Recruiting--we have recruited this year--finished early. We
    see that happening and re-enlistments are happening as well.
    It's what's distorted. As of right now, we do not see asking
    for end strength increase.
        Senator Levin. Secretary White, are you aware of proposals
    to merge the staffs at the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and the JCS?
        Secretary White. It was brought up in this hearing when you
    had the chiefs here. I had not seen the paper. I have heard
    because it has been discussed here in committee and discussed a
    little bit over in the department.
        Senator Levin. Have you been briefed on any such proposal?
        Secretary White. No.
        Secretary Johnson. I have read about it. I have not been
    briefed.
        Secretary Roche. No, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, such an important question. Do
    you have any basis, in fact, to say there is any official
    circulation of a document and it leads to the question whether
    or not the Secretaries, who in my judgment are an integral part
    of any formal policy should be involved? I do not know of an
    official document and I do not know if the Secretary has
    omitted the process.
        Senator Levin. The question is whether there is a draft
    floating around which our Secretaries have been briefed about,
    or at least the idea has been briefed to them. The answer is
    no.
        Secretary Roche. I know of no draft and have not been
    briefed.
        Senator Levin. We have all kinds of reasons to believe
    there are proposals floating around for both areas of the
    length of service of the chiefs and in terms of merger of the
    staffs. I believe those proposals are floating around the
    building, but my question is whether they have been briefed on
    it. Their answer was no.
        Secretary Roche. Sir, you raised a new one, length of
    service of the chief. We have had a dialogue with our boss and
    he has listened to our views.
        Senator Levin. There has been dialogue?
        Secretary Roche. Length of service of chief, combatant
    commanders, Chairman and Joint Chairman.
        Secretary Johnson. Absolutely sir.
        Secretary White. Yes.
        Senator Levin. I did not mean to throw that curve ball. I
    appreciate your catching that. Two different subjects we are
    interested in. One of them you said there have been
    discussions, one of them there have not been, and that's
    acceptable to me.
        Secretary Roche, on the tanker issue, has the decision been
    made about tanker leasing?
        Secretary Roche. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. Is there anything in this budget, any item
    that presumes the outcome of such a decision?
        Secretary Roche. I'm keeping the word that I gave you last
    year. In the budget is plan A, which is that the lease will not
    occur and we have to continue to buy tankers later in the
    decade. So therefore we could not ask Secretary Rumsfeld to
    approve our budget if in fact that made conditions for him
    approving the lease.
        It assumes a negative outcome that says we will buy later
    in the decade because we could not ask him to make a decision
    on the budget without having made a decision on resources. The
    office of the Secretary of Defense has been working on this for
    some time. We are hoping it will happen shortly. I can't tell
    you, Senator. I know Secretary Rumsfeld is getting frustrated
    that gestation period for this is growing. We are about
    elephant size now.
        Senator Levin. He doesn't get easily frustrated so
    something must be going on. Thank you all.
        Chairman Warner. The chair observes the Senator from
    Georgia has arrived, if you would like to be recognized.
        Senator Chambliss. Sorry I'm running behind, gentlemen.
    It's one of those days full of hearings. I appreciate your
    conversation yesterday, Secretary Roche. We look forward to
    continuing to work on that issue and as Chairman of the
    Personnel Subcommittee, I look forward to working closely with
    you to make sure all of our men and women are well. I know
    that's your intention.
        Secretary Johnson, I have a question for you with respect
    to the C-130J multiyear program. We worked awfully hard last
    year to include the language in last year's Defense
    Authorization bill for multiyear procurement of the C-130J,
    both the Air Force and the Marine Corps. I know that work is
    being done to get the planes on contract, and most of the
    information is with the Comptroller's office. However, I
    understand the Navy has not provided all the paperwork that is
    needed and this is holding up the contract. Can you tell me
    when the Navy will finish submitting the paperwork so we can
    move that contract forward?
        Secretary Johnson. We are participating with the Air Force
    on the C-130J.
        Senator Chambliss. It's my understanding that paperwork has
    been there for sometime and hasn't come out of the Navy. It's
    been sitting there for several weeks. If you can follow up on
    that, I'd appreciate it.
        Secretary Johnson. I will follow up.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Navy completed the required paperwork for the C-130J Multi-Year
    Program and the contract was signed on March 14, 2003.

        Senator Chambliss. Thank you. That's all I have, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased with
    the way the missile defense program is moving along, and the
    question I have of the Secretaries is this. What are you doing
    to assure that missile defense is going to be a core competency
    in your Service?
        Secretary White. Senator, from the Army's perspective, it
    always has been and we will get back from the Missile Defense
    Agency control of the PAC-3 program which is critical to
    terminal phase defense. Our component command of STRATCOM is
    reestablishing Fort Greeley, where the test site will be, and
    of course, we also run the test range so we are very heavily
    involved in this. It's always been a core competency of the
    Army and I think will be an integral part of the defense.
        Secretary Johnson. We have given use of the U.S.S. Lake
    Erie to the Missile Defense Agency to do their work on
    experimentation and so forth. We have identified five other
    ships and missile defense systems on board. We are working with
    the Missile Defense Agency to develop better missiles. We have
    the capability on the launch end, and we would like to have
    longer capability to get in the mid range. We are leaning
    toward a good partnership from our perspective.
        Senator Allard. Secretary Johnson, I think in the test
    phase we have allocated money to the land-based and then also
    some to the Navy, too. I was thinking the number that we
    allocated to the Navy was more than what you just mentioned.
        Secretary Johnson. 20 missiles. But five ships we are
    talking about here. One has a tracking capability. The others
    have vertical launch system capability and we have the 20
    missiles allocated. We plan to develop better missiles.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, the United States Air Force is
    heavily involved in this defense, but certainly from space and
    things like high and low, those problems. We work closely with
    the Missile Defense Agency on the airborne laser, very delicate
    project at Edwards Air Force base. It would be infrastructure
    for missile defense.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Secretary, when I first came on to this
    committee, I had the opportunity to serve as Chairman of the
    Personnel Subcommittee. At that particular point in time, we
    were struggling with how it is we were going to retain our
    specialty areas. My question is right now how are we doing at
    retaining individuals in these specialty areas? We put some
    provisions in that legislation so that there could be salary
    adjustments for people in the private sector. I'd like to hear
    from all three of the Secretaries on how they view our ability
    to retain and recruit individuals into various specialty areas
    that we were having difficulty a number of years back.
        Secretary White. As it stands right now, retention across
    the board and paid incentives that support specialty areas are
    in good shape. The question is will we be able to sustain that
    going forward.
        Secretary Johnson. We in the Navy and Marine Corps are in
    outstanding shape. Marine Corps has always been able to retain
    as many as they wanted to. Now I have to worry about if there
    is a slot in the particular specialty the person wants to stay
    in. But we are able to do 90 percent of the ones who want to
    stay. We have to move a few to a different specialty.
        In the Navy, we have been focusing on a more mature, older
    force. We have some 71 percent that are past the initial part
    in the Navy; we expect to drive that to 75. With that, of
    course, comes a difference in cost because they are more
    senior, but when you look at the requirement to train new
    people and the cycle, the additional cost to keep the more
    senior, more capable people is well worth it.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, the help that Congress has given
    us is really a godsend. It's helped us to deal with navigators,
    battle managers, scientists, engineers that we are looking at
    so it has been really a help to us to be able to focus. There
    are still some specialties in demand. We are still behind in
    the pilots, but at least we are filling up the school.
        Some of our specialties are clearly things like security
    forces, which there is an unexpected demand for. Some unique
    ones, like specialties who know hot to handle fuels become very
    critical folks. Rehooks, civil engineers are in great demand
    elsewhere. Another thing we try is to make education part of
    why you want to be in the Armed Forces, not just things like
    the college.
        For the first time, we have had enlisted members at the Air
    Force Institute of Technology Air Force degrees, we have eight
    airmen and six marines. We have tailored the officer program
    much more with very good degrees that will help us and help
    them in later life, which gives them a reason to be part of us
    for a longer period of time.
        Senator Allard. Secretary Roche, I have a question on our
    access to space which is essential to our military operations.
    The EELV program has been critical for assuring that we do have
    that access. Is the Air Force willing to commit to in the long
    term to having two service providers for EELV programs? There
    are some programs where we did not have duplication of effort
    and we have gotten into trouble. I'm concerned that if we end
    up with sole source here that if we discover a problem with one
    of these vehicles, we do not have back-up. This is survival.
    I'd like to hear your comments on this.
        Secretary Roche. Sir, I had the pleasure of being on the
    staff of the Intelligence Committee. At the time, it was the
    sense of Congress that we should make sure we had a back-up.
    I'm very mindful of that. We are convinced we need two
    different launch vehicles. Right now that's two launch
    providers.
        Every now and then we think is there a sensible way we
    should reduce costs given that commercial demands do not
    appear. If you maintain two design teams and combine overhead
    functions, we are not there yet. It's clear we need two
    separate designs in case there is a class problem so we do not
    get caught.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I have one more question.
    This has to do with what is the Air Force doing to protect our
    space assets? Perhaps this is a question that cannot be
    answered. There may be some things that you can answer in this
    setting and in relation to that I'm concerned about our
    security as far as cyberspace is concerned as well. During
    these times of conflicts, I know there is an unprecedented
    amount of hits coming in to the Pentagon and various computer
    systems. So I'm interested in how you are addressing this
    issue. If you could deal with the space aspect and maybe all of
    you would be willing to respond to the cyberspace issue, I
    would appreciate it.
        Secretary Roche. Senator, it would be very hard in open
    session to talk to you about the subject. I can say the
    following. I have been telling everyone that the space field is
    going to be something exciting in the future. People are going
    to start to play games. The game is going to be an interesting
    game, and they are going to start developing doctrine not
    unlike naval doctrine and air doctrine and the GPS jammer which
    we developed on our own, to see the fact that the jammer is on
    the market is really the first overt move for war and space.
        It's intended to deny us of the use of space. This kind of
    a game is going to go on. Understanding what we might be able
    to do in other circumstances is clearly something I would be
    delighted to talk to you about in an appropriate setting.
        Cyber is in many cases the same. We have been hit. Our tri-
    defense industry cycle company by company and tries to overload
    that company and put it out. That continues. Making sure
    firewalls work must go on, but it's something that's also been
    looked at as it should.
        Secretary Johnson. We are working the second problem, all
    of us together.
        Secretary White. I would agree with that.
        Senator Allard. Not only the companies, but Congress here.
    We had a day this month where we were completely overloaded,
    and it was an intention to try and make it difficult for our
    offices.
        Secretary Roche. They smoked a server and put a server on
    fire when I got hit.
        Senator Allard. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, especially for your
    help with the Armed Services and the Academies.
        Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, with regard to the proposals
    forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to Congress earlier this
    week, and the article in The Washington Post today, those
    proposals in large measure track the ones that were brought up
    to Congress late in the session last year. We simply were not
    given time, I think, to adequately review them, and to secure
    the measure of relief that is necessary. But this engagement
    with the environmental community is something which frankly I
    regret.
        I think all of us, whether we are environmentalists or
    otherwise, are concerned about the readiness of the men and
    women of the Armed Forces and their ability to carry out their
    assigned missions and that directly relates to the training
    that they receive. So it seems to me it's an all America
    question to strike a balance here.
        I will read one quote of Michael Jansy, a senior policy
    analyst for the National Defense Council, charged that ``this
    bill is a rollback of almost every major environmental law on
    the books.'' I have been around now a very long time, and I can
    see what is going on here. But I'm going to continue to work on
    this issue as I have in the years past to see whether we cannot
    get a realistic balance between what is needed by the military
    and no damage to the framework and environmental laws which
    recognize a struggle in Congress over many years.
        My dearly departed friend, John Chafee, who I served with
    on the Environmental and Public Works Committee, who, as a
    matter of fact, recruited me to serve on that committee, and
    now I find myself as the senior Republican on that committee,
    with Senator Inhofe the current chairman of that committee. He
    is very active on that issue. Our distinguished colleague,
    Senator McCain, Chairman of the Commerce Committee, will have
    part of it, so the three committees that work together are
    trying to achieve a careful balance.
        It's very important, however, that this hearing today
    reflect the positions of the three military departments on the
    whole with reference to what hierarchy will you assign to this
    issue, and the need for Congress to provide some remedies that
    you are able to continue that level of training that you think
    is essential. So we will start with you, Secretary White.
        Secretary White. Mr. Chairman, I think it's imperative that
    we have the ability to balance environmental protection of the
    lands that we occupy and train on with the requirements to
    train and sustain a ready force. We have traditionally been
    very good stewards of the environment, and I think our track
    record is excellent. It's not an issue as you would suggest as
    the article suggested that we want to roll back this
    legislation.
        What we are seeking is the flexibility to be able to
    balance these requirements on a single piece of ground, and
    what we find is we are becoming more and more limited because
    the way the laws are interpreted in being able to strike that
    balance. So for us, it's tremendously important that this
    legislation be fast and that we have the opportunity to make
    that balance.
        Chairman Warner. The anecdotal story in this area, I
    remember 10 or 15 years ago that we had an issue before this
    committee that the Red-Cockaded Woodpecker was a magnificent
    bird and it was on an Army base. It was in the environmental
    community being challenged, and when we got into it we found
    that indeed the operation of the tanks and the artillery did
    take its toll on some of the birds, churned up the ground but
    finally, that case was resolved on the following: we found that
    the number of woodpeckers had tripled because that operation
    with the equipment and the training increased the food supply.
        Just a little quick note. I have a constant battle within
    my own family. I have three wonderful children who really spent
    a lot of time in a serious way on this subject, so I have
    accountability myself. I want to probe this fully and get some
    relief. Secretary Johnson.
        Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir. We work very hard in outreach.
    Last year, we brought the proposals to Congress at the last
    moment. This year, we have been able to continue the dialogue
    with the various committees and people who have answers. We
    have been able to work with the other agencies within
    government to gain support for the things we want to do and in
    some cases we want to do it for defense.
        They would like to do it for the entire Nation, but there
    are different issues with economic exploitation from the
    defense. We feel very strongly about the Marine Mammal
    Protection Act, and have agreement with NOAA on that and of
    course the Endangered Species Act, we would like to do the
    integrated natural resource management plans, and those are two
    big ones.
        Last year, you gave us the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that
    wasn't quite what we asked for, but we are going to try to work
    it in the context that you gave it to us working with the
    Department of the Interior before we come back and ask for help
    on that one.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, this is very important. If
    you are an endangered species, come to one of our ranges and
    bring all your critter relatives with you. We care about the
    environment. They flourish very nicely. The major issue is as
    Secretary White stated, Mr. Chairman; there are interpretations
    going on that could be a problem. Much of this legislation
    before you is to ask that Congress resolve these so we do not
    wind up in court with every single one of our ranges tied up in
    court cases.
        We can get some resolution for those early. No one really
    wants to have any of our airplanes have to get a license for
    bird strikes, so many kills per day. That's sort of silly, but
    yet some could think of interpreting things that way. We do not
    mind when for instance one of our ranges has a certain type of
    antelope that's grazing. We just do not fly that day. We can
    live with the environment quite comfortably.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you. There is a quotation in The
    Washington Post article today attributed to the EPA, and it
    states as follows: ``I do not believe that there is a training
    mission anywhere in the country that is being held up or not
    taking place because of environmental protection regulations.''
    I would appreciate if each of you would provide for the record
    such instances where it is the judgment of the military
    departments that there have been clearly documented areas where
    the training has been impaired as a consequence of these
    interpretations that the Secretary alluded to and, in your own
    professional judgment, how that degrades readiness.
        Secretary White. Be happy to.
        Secretary Roche. Delighted, sir.
        Secretary Johnson. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Secretary White. I believe Governor Whitman's comments were
    intended to address the Federal statutes under the Environmental
    Protection Agency's (EPA) purview, so I will focus my comments on those
    laws. Nonetheless, I would like to point out that many of the
    environmentally based constraints on Army training stem from
    requirements of laws outside of EPA's purview, i.e., the Endangered
    Species Act (ESA) and mitigation measures imposed as a result of the
    National Environmental Policy Act process.
        The Army's primary concern with statutes within the purview of the
    EPA are those of the expanding application of pollution control laws to
    live-fire training activities. The Army is currently litigating
    allegations that firing activities at Fort Richardson, Alaska, violate
    the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); the Comprehensive
    Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); and
    the Clean Water Act. Plaintiffs are seeking to halt live-fire training
    and require remediation of the Eagle River Flats impact area. This
    would dramatically impact the training of the 172nd Infantry Brigade,
    the largest infantry brigade in the Army. If the suit is successful, it
    would set a precedent that could subject live-fire training and testing
    at more than 400 Army operational ranges to permitting and remediation
    actions under these laws.
        It is interesting to note that the expanded application of
    environmental laws to military ranges is not coming from regulatory
    agencies, but from citizens' suits seeking novel interpretations of
    these laws. The DOD has worked closely with the EPA to develop tailored
    and narrowly drafted legislative proposals that will clarify the
    applicability of both RCRA and CERCLA to our operational ranges. These
    proposals seek to codify the long-standing EPA policy, established by
    the Clinton administration, that firing ammunition on an operational
    range is not a trigger for cleanup requirements.
        The EPA issued a series of administrative orders under the Safe
    Drinking Water Act that shut down artillery and mortar firing and
    pyrotechnics use at the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR). These
    actions significantly curtailed National Guard training at that
    installation. As a result, the Army has had to permanently displace
    this training to alternate locations. Units from the Massachusetts
    National Guard must travel over 400 miles to train at Fort Drum, New
    York. We continue to conduct some limited training at MMR under
    restrictions designed to protect the aquifer that underlies the
    installation. It is important to note that the legislative
    clarifications DOD is seeking would not have affected the outcome of
    this case or the authority of the EPA to take such an action under the
    Safe Drinking Water Act.
        Secretary Johnson. The following are examples of where
    environmental protection regulations are impacting readiness:

             Due to the complexity of applying environmental laws
            to military activities, the Navy's premiere sonar system for
            detecting diesel submarines, operated by countries like North
            Korea, Iran, and China, currently operates under the
            restrictions of a court order limiting where and when the
            system can be used. This summer, the court will rule on future
            use of the system.
             During the last 6 years of Navy research on how to
            counter mines and detect submarines in shallow water, over 78
            percent of the tests have been delayed, scaled back, or
            canceled due to the impact of environmental regulations.
             Lack of clarity in the definition of ``harassment'' in
            the Marine Mammal Protection Act is delaying the establishment
            of shallow water training ranges to prepare sailors to fight
            and win in the littorals, the Navy's most difficult
            battlefield.
             Navy's fleet exercises face severe limitations to
            avoid potential ``harassment'' of marine mammals.

                     Exercises to protect ships from submarines and
                    mines in narrow, shallow straits, such as the Strait of
                    Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, have been moved to less
                    realistic conditions in deep water.
                     Some exercises forced to adopt aerial and
                    other visual surveys for sea turtles and marine mammals
                    can only be done in daylight. The mitigation denies the
                    ability to train at night.
                     Environmental factors--including application
                    of the vague definition of harassment--often conflict
                    with the operational need for the training and increase
                    the time away from home for sailors.

             There are 17 miles of beach at Camp Pendleton,
            California, but due to environmental restrictions and urban
            encroachment, only 1,500 meters is available to practice
            amphibious landings and movement from the beach using all
            Marine Corps combat vehicles. Even within this 1,500-meter
            beach, all military vehicles must stay on designated roads.
             Due to EPA-based restrictions in the Mariana Islands,
            this year's multi-national exercise Tandem Thrust will not
            include amphibious landings using air cushion landing craft--
            the best heavy-lift capability we have.
             Proposed critical habitat designation on military
            lands in Guam--for species not currently present, but which the
            Fish and Wildlife Service would like to introduce as a solution
            to special interest lawsuits--threaten to shift the core
            mission of these Government-owned lands from military readiness
            to one of environmental protection.
        Secretary Roche. In terms of the affects to our readiness,
    realistic training is important to all Services and joint operations is
    and will continue to be a decisive advantage in future conflicts.
    Ensuring that the other Services have the resources necessary to train
    realistically is just as important to the Air Force as our own
    training.
        The Air Force and John Peter Suarez, Assistant Administrator,
    Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency, are in agreement that in its history, there is only
    a single instance when the EPA took an enforcement action that halted
    live-fire training at a range. The installation that was affected was
    the Massachusetts Military Reservation (MMR) on Cape Cod,
    Massachusetts. Live-fire training had to be shifted to another facility
    but some training was able to be continued such as small arms training,
    as well as other training without using explosives, propellants, and
    pyrotechnics.
        Environmental plaintiffs have filed suit at Fort Richardson,
    Alaska, alleging violations of Comprehensive Environmental Response,
    Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Alaska antipollution law
    applicable under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). If
    successful, they could potentially force remediation of the Eagle River
    Flats impact area and preclude live-fire training at the only mortar
    and artillery impact area at Fort Richardson thereby dramatically
    degrading readiness of the 172nd Infantry Brigade, the largest infantry
    brigade in the Army. It could also set a precedent fundamentally
    affecting military training and testing at virtually every test and
    training range.
        The proposed Range Readiness Program Initiative (RRPI) legislation
    would codify and confirm the longstanding regulatory policy of EPA and
    every State concerning  regulation of munitions use on operational
    ranges under RCRA and CERCLA. It would confirm that military munitions
    are subject to EPA's 1997 Military Munitions Rule while on range, and
    that cleanup of operational ranges is not required so long as material
    stays on the range. If such material moves off-range, it still must be
    addressed promptly under existing environmental laws. Moreover, if
    munitions constituents cause an imminent and substantial endangerment
    on range, EPA will retain its current authority to address it on-range
    under CERCLA section 106 (our legislation explicitly reaffirms EPA's
    section 106 authority).
        The legislation similarly does not modify the overlapping
    protections of the Safe Drinking Water Act, NEPA, and the ESA against
    environmentally harmful activities at operational military bases. The
    legislation has no effect whatsoever on DOD's cleanup obligations under
    RCRA or CERCLA at Formerly Used Defense Sites, closed ranges, ranges
    that close in the future, or waste management practices involving
    munitions even on operational ranges (such as so-called Open Burning
    and Open Detonation (OB/OD) activities).
        The Endangered Species Act provision would confirm the prior
    Administration's decision that an Integrated Natural Resources
    Management Plan (INRMP) may in appropriate circumstances obviate the
    need to designate critical habitat on military installations. The prior
    administration's decision that INRMPs may adequately provide for
    appropriate endangered species habitat management is being challenged
    in court by environmental groups, who cite Ninth Circuit case law
    suggesting that other habitat management programs provided an
    insufficient basis for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to avoid
    designating critical habitat. These groups claim that no INRMP,
    regardless of how protective, can ever substitute for critical habitat
    designation. This legislation would confirm and insulate the U.S. Fish
    and Wildlife Service's policy from such challenges.
        The Defense Department's proposal has vital implications for
    readiness. Absent this policy, courts, based on complaints filed by
    environmental litigants, compelled the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
    to re-evaluate ``not prudent'' findings for many critical habitat
    determinations, and as a result U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service proposed
    to designate over 50 percent of the 12,000-acre Marine Corps Air
    Station (MCAS) Miramar and over 56 percent of the 125,000-acre Marine
    Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton as critical habitat. Without the
    legislation, the Air Force may face restrictions at Beale AFB, Travis
    AFB, and Andersen AFB as a result of proposals to designate critical
    habitat currently being evaluated. Unlike Sikes Act INRMPs, critical
    habitat designation can impose rigid limitations on military use of
    bases, denying commanders the flexibility to manage their lands for the
    benefit of both readiness and endangered species.
        The Clean Air Act's ``general conformity'' requirement, applicable
    only to Federal agencies, has repeatedly threatened deployment of new
    weapons systems and base closure/realignment despite the fact that
    relatively minor levels of emissions were involved.

             The planned realignment of F-14s from NAS Miramar to
            NAS Lemoore in California would only have been possible because
            of the fortuity that neighboring Castle Air Force Base in the
            same airshed had closed, thereby creating offsets.
             The same fortuity enabled the homebasing of new F/A-18
            E/Fs at NAS Lemoore.
             The realignment of F/A-18 C/Ds from Cecil Field,
            Florida, to NAS Oceana in Virginia was made possible only by
            the fortuity that Virginia was in the midst of revising its
            Implementation Plan and was able to accommodate the new
            emissions. The Hampton Roads area in which Oceana is located
            will likely impose more stringent limits on ozone in the
            future, thus reducing the State's flexibility.

        As these near misses demonstrate, under the existing requirement,
    there is limited flexibility to accommodate readiness needs, and DOD is
    barred from even beginning to take readiness actions until the
    requirement is satisfied.

        Chairman Warner. Now, homeland defense. When I visited with
    our troops in the Gulf region here recently with my
    distinguished good friends and colleagues, Senators Levin,
    Roberts, and Rockefeller, everywhere we went, we talked about
    homeland defense and I explained to them that the military's
    mission for homeland defense begins right where they are in the
    far-flung outposts across the world where these individuals in
    many cases are taking a lot of risks to perform their missions
    because to the extent we can intercept, curtail, reduce,
    capture, crush, or otherwise stop individuals and
    organizations' participation in worldwide terrorism, this
    lessening of the chance that it will be brought to the shores
    of the United States.
        So I look at defense of homeland of the military as not
    just embracing our security here in the continental United
    States, but in every outpost throughout the world. I think it's
    important that this record reflect what each of your
    departments is doing in this area and the coordination efforts
    that are underway with the newly created Department of Homeland
    Defense. Start with you.
        Secretary White. Mr. Chairman, first of all, the homeland
    defense mission is always foremost for us. A lot of changes in
    the department, the standing up of a combatant commander,
    General Eberhart with NORTHCOM, we have headquarters in the
    Army that work directly with him as we do other combatant
    commanders around the world to ensure that we have force,
    responsive forces should the need arise to take care of that.
        Second, we have invested a lot of money in antiterrorism
    force protection initiatives to better protect our
    installations to protect our people.
        Third, we have done a lot of coordination with the National
    Guard so that if we take units that would be used in a first
    response and federalize them and deploy them someplace, the
    States have compacts in place with the surrounding States that
    can fill in those holes so that the local capability is not
    lost. So there are a whole series of initiatives ongoing within
    the overall envelope of homeland security. We are in much
    stronger position now than we were 18 months ago.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Johnson.
        Secretary Johnson. My predecessor, Gordon England, put it
    very well when he talked about homeland defense. We want it to
    be an away game, as you were explaining, to the troops
    overseas. We want to take the actual battles to the source and
    we support Northern Command as well as Secretary White has
    described.
        We have a Marine and Navy component. The Marines stood up
    focused on these sort of activities, so we take it very
    seriously, our strong partnership not only with Northern
    Command, but homeland security and others associated.
        Secretary Roche. Mr. Chairman, this is a big thing for us.
    With NORTHCOM and NORAD associated, we have netted all the
    radars inside the United States as compared to the case where
    we only worried about the periphery, so if we have a track of
    interest, we need to put fighters on it.
        Depending on the threat level and where the President of
    the United States is, you know we have special things in place.
    We have AWACS, tankers, accounts for 20 bases, over 200
    aircraft every day are tied up in this, and prepositioned C-
    130s to be able to move Marine and Army units. This is big to
    us. It's costly to us. It's wearing our planes out faster, but
    we have a very close relationship with NORTHCOM, and General
    Eberhard knows the demands he places on us.
        Chairman Warner. Secretary Roche, I have a very detailed
    and technical question regarding a program and I'm going to put
    it in the record.
        Secretary Roche. I'd be delighted to, sir.
        Chairman Warner. We monitor that program with care. Do we
    have concerns over these cost overruns and consequences of
    financial diminution and size of the force?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. The subject of the Montgomery GI Bill
    benefits from taking these trips and getting down to these
    troops in the field. They are concerned about their families
    and different things but a number of them asked me and my
    colleagues about this program.
        Congress--I was very active in this--gave you authority
    with regard to transferability of benefits. For those who may
    be following and are not familiar with this, the service
    person, male or female, whatever the case may be, earns the GI
    Bill, and in some instances, they complete much of their
    education or they feel as a parent that they should give that
    very important asset that they earn through their service to
    their spouse or their children. Each of the departments has
    treated this in a different manner. Let us just start with the
    Secretary of the Air Force first.
        Secretary Roche. I'm not up on how we deal with it. I know
    I have talked with some of our senior-enlisted. They agree this
    is something that would be useful if it was given to the
    senior-enlisted because they made decisions to stay in the
    Service, as opposed to going outside. They are probably not
    going to go to college, and, therefore, they feel they are
    losing something. They would like to see a transfer, but with
    regard to exactly how we are handling it, I will have to get
    back to you.
        Chairman Warner. This is on the minds of these young
    people, I tell you, very much so. I'm hopeful that you will
    avail yourself of the authority. I have very modest, relatively
    insignificant, tours of duty in the Navy and Marines, but I'm
    here as a United States Senator solely because of the GI Bill.
        I received very generous treatment from two modest tours of
    active service, and I just feel that I want to participate with
    my colleagues on this committee and other members of the Senate
    in providing for the current generation of people in the
    service in a manner that's so generously given to me, to use
    it. If not, we will make it mandatory.
        Secretary Johnson. As I talk, as you do, to these people,
    this subject comes up. Our approach is to try to use it as a
    retention tool for senior NCOs. In particular, to have it more
    focused as opposed to having a situation where a person can
    come in to gain that benefit.
        Secretary White. I would agree with both of my colleagues.
    That would be the final approach. We need to get on with it and
    make some decisions.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you for that commitment because
    there is one thing we all know from our service time in
    uniform. Boy, the word goes through the ranks fast. The big
    boys at the top are going to make it work. I understand your
    retention is at an all-time high and that's magnificent.
        Your recruiting is at an all-time high, but I have been
    here long enough to see this drop off and have serious
    problems. I hope we do not see those stressful periods again.
    So let us strengthen everything we can for these people.
        Unmanned systems has been a favorite subject of mine in
    this committee for a long time. I'm very proud of the strides
    that this committee made when I was privileged to be chairman
    some years ago and Senator Levin has continued to join me in
    periods of his chairmanship. In fiscal year 2001, this
    committee set the ambiguous goal of getting the technologies
    that would lead to the development of the fielding of unmanned
    operational combat systems.
        This budget continues to build on that goal by increasing
    funding for unmanned systems by more than 25 percent over last
    year's funding. I commend the administration's commitment to
    this transformation. Could each of you tell us your view of the
    role of unmanned systems in ongoing and future operations and
    what technology in unmanned systems requires more
    investigation? Start with Secretary Roche because he knows
    about the Predator. I was astonished we could do two a month.
        Secretary Roche. It's up to three now, sir.
        Chairman Warner. It was magnificent, very small company
    that has the patents, and it's not easy to go to a second
    source. Also, the highly technical part of that, down in the
    guts of it, hard to mass produce it.
        Secretary Roche. It turns out we looked seriously at
    whether we should have more. I took the planes one and a half a
    month to three a month making each of them a common fire wing.
    It's not the limiting feature of the sensor systems that you
    could put on these. Three a month if everybody will steady out
    in time will give us a very good output on a continuing basis.
        One of the things that's been interesting since your
    original legislation is we have had a lot of learning. We may
    be able to use things in the Afghan war. General Franks was
    really terrific to General Jumper and me and allowed us to take
    systems that weren't ready for prime time and deploy them
    knowing full well we are going to have failures and a bunch of
    other things. We have learned so much of that that our views of
    unmanned aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft, and unattended
    aircraft have changed and we are getting quite excited, to the
    point where we are attempting to replicate what occurred in the
    Army Air Corps in the late 1930s where different types of
    systems were developed, airmen got together and used them from
    that developed doctrine.
        There is a point where Congress passed a law on the limit
    of the length that a bomber could fly, that we gave the planes
    to the Navy. Series of things that we have done and that were
    dramatic in World War II. Right now, we know certain systems
    require pilot in the loop.
        It's the instinct of that young officer who takes the plane
    and turns it in such a way that for most radars--it's called a
    zero doppler notch--there is not enough doppler. Therefore, the
    fighter plane cannot see it. We have been shot down once, but
    these tactics that they have learned as pilots become very
    handy.
        Also, since these things can be attack systems, we want the
    same officer responsibility that we have in all of our other
    systems. That can be done by keeping the pilot in the loop,
    remotely pilot the aircraft. Then there is Global Hawk. Where
    Global Hawk has long-term persistence, very high altitude and
    Global Hawk can give you a U-2 complement.
        We are thinking of taking things from space and linking
    down. For instance, we could in fact have reinforced GPS
    signals from Global Hawk orbits or provide a local area
    communication system without having to use all the bandwidths
    on a particular region. Working these through, we have tried to
    provide self defense on some of our drones.
        We have other families. Predator will go higher and faster.
    We consider it a hunter killer. The electronics and avionics
    are appropriate for a remotely unattended aircraft, just having
    a pilot, it's going to dance on its hind legs. But now that
    it's dancing, what do you do for it? If we can tailor it, they
    can make a contribution to war. Hunter killer would be designed
    to do automatic cueing.
        We are borrowing things we have learned from the Navy. This
    thing can hunt, hunt, hunt. Let us know when it all of a sudden
    sees a match; then we can put the pilot back into the loop and
    act like a typical attack officer who will take responsibility
    for the attack he conducted. We find this to be a very exciting
    thing. There are some that have been in the classified world.
    We will have multiple families and figure out where the
    comparative advantages are.
        We know some place where there is no comparative advantage.
    When it comes to judgment, you cannot beat the mind of a man or
    woman flying the plane. We take areas where there is
    comparative advantage and assign those increasingly to these
    unattended or remotely piloted aircraft.
        Chairman Warner. Do you feel that the program is at about
    the right pace?
        Secretary Roche. Yes, sir. We have debates with some of our
    colleagues as to design and comparative advantage. What we
    really notice is persistence is terribly important. Long stay.
    What we call digital acuity, which means that a digital system
    does not tire the way an operator tires.
        As any of the three of us know, if you put someone on a
    radar scope, there is only so much time. You do that in digital
    domain, that thing will be as good at 23 hours as it was at 2
    hours. We find it to be a very exciting area, and no fighter
    pilots are complaining because they understand this is a good
    contribution to war, and they do not want to just bore holes in
    the sky searching.
        They have been able to work with these systems beautifully.
    With Predators, pilots have done laser bombing from our own
    drones, and when they talk to the little thing, it answers
    right back.
        Chairman Warner. Good. That's quite encouraging. Do you see
    other nations moving along at any pace near what the United
    States would achieve?
        Secretary Roche. No. But we are starting to see other
    interests. Some of the exports of the Israelis may come back
    and haunt us some day. But other countries are starting to
    recognize that there is something here. Even some country in
    the Middle East that you would otherwise not expect recognize
    the great advantage of using these vehicles.
        Secretary Johnson. Admiral Clark is working very closely
    with General Jumper on our joint unmanned vehicle development.
    We in the Navy have additional activities in the Marine Corps.
    One we would like to do more in the maritime arena.
        Ultimately, we are interested in having unmanned vehicles
    to do undersea activity to destroy mines and operate them from
    on board ships. There is a lot of science that has to be done,
    but we have great cooperation with all the Services, and we all
    have the same interest in moving forward. The Marines would
    like to have an expendable and see what is there.
        Secretary Roche. Something that's very exciting we have
    been doing is that there are some of these that are only this
    big but if you are trying to do base security overseas whether
    we are trying to do it for our bases or working with the Army,
    the Army has the intellectual lead here, and they have
    developed some of these that are just fabulous. John and I
    united in the desert up in the mountains to watch how they
    could effectively use these very small systems with very light
    cameras and do a terrific job at surveillance. So the whole
    field is exploding in some very interesting ways.
        Secretary White. In the current time frame, as Secretary
    Roche just said, we have been using the small robotic vehicles
    in Afghanistan to clear caves and do things that would be
    potentially hazardous. We are also fielding right now shorter
    range UAVs that Jim is talking about for our brigade commanders
    who are buying eight Shadows this year which the brigade level
    went. We are buying 800 UAVs for corps commanders and fielding
    those right now. In the Objective Force in the Future Combat
    System, there is a family of unmanned ground vehicles and a new
    family of unmanned aerial vehicles to support the force. So we
    are investing heavily in this and we appreciate your support.
        Chairman Warner. I have taken an interest, of course, in
    the civilian applications, but I'm also finishing up here very
    shortly communication to the administration urging that this be
    studied very carefully because of the potential to invade
    privacy. As the private sector takes much of the technology
    which the military departments have done on this in R&D and
    otherwise, and puts it into the private sector, that's
    something our country has to monitor carefully.
        Pay equity for soldiers stationed in Korea. Last month, I
    met with the general commander of the U.S. Army forces in
    Korea. We discussed hardship assignment to Korea with living
    and working conditions, family separation, and pay disparity
    comparative to those serving in Japan. I understand that
    soldiers are continuing to turn in resignations for officers
    rather than facing another tour.
        This is a tough question, Mr. Secretary. I know you are
    doing your very best. If you could just bring us up-to-date
    because I'm going to continue to monitor this. I spent some
    time over there, a short tour. The weather was challenging, to
    say the least.
        Secretary White. It's a difficult place to serve. We have
    people in several locations. We are examining the whole posture
    there as Secretary Rumsfeld talked about, but there are
    financial disadvantages to serving in Korea as opposed to other
    parts of the world. Consequently, we have a very high turn-down
    rate of soldiers put on assignment there.
        We have talked about it with the previous commander there,
    General Schwartz brought this up. We have had extensive
    discussions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense but we
    have not resolved anything at this point, and I'm going to
    continue to push.
        Chairman Warner. I have to say, Mr. Secretary, that every
    problem has a solution. In the course of this current bill that
    is to be written by this committee, I want to include
    provisions in it that will correct this. I have great respect
    for Secretary Rumsfeld and his team, but I guess there are
    times when Congress has to step out. No criticisms of the other
    co-equal branch of the government, the administration, but we
    are going to solve this. We are going to make some progress in
    this legislation this year.
        Secretary White. Good, sir. Soldiers will be better off for
    it.
        Chairman Warner. I have a personal interest, and now, of
    course, the Korean peninsula poses a very serious threat
    situation which I think is being commendably addressed by our
    President and others in a diplomatic manner.
        Gentlemen, I thank you for an excellent hearing today, very
    thorough, and I wish you well. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Warner

                        PREDATOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE

        1. Senator Warner. Secretary Roche, the Predator Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicle has proven to have tremendous operational capability. How many
    of these vehicles are currently in service? What is the current
    Predator production rate? What, if any, are the limiting factors to the
    production rate?
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force has 46 Predator Unmanned Aerial
    Vehicles in service with an additional 42 that are funded through this
    year. In October 2001, I directed acceleration in production to two
    Predator aircraft per month. This acceleration will continue with
    deliveries through 2004. The primary limiting factor to increasing
    production is our current production facility capacity. Within our
    current facilities, up to four Predator aircraft can be produced per
    month. This will, however, require additional production line
    employees, and an investment in additional production tooling.

                             F/A-22 RAPTOR AIRCRAFT

        2. Senator Warner. Secretary Roche, this past year, the Air Force
    changed the designation of the F-22 Raptor to the F/A-22. I want to
    commend the Air Force for recognizing the importance of capitalizing on
    this aircraft by expanding its mission to include a ground attack role.
    I also understand, though, that delays in the development program have
    caused cost growth in excess of $800 million, which has to be made up
    out of available production funds for the aircraft. What is your
    assessment of the causes for the delay and the cost growth in the F/A-
    22 program?
        Secretary Roche. As a result of resolving several development-
    related issues--such as fin buffet, canopy howl, and avionics
    stability--we extended the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
    (EMD) schedule to allow proper completion of envelope expansion flight
    testing, and avionics development and avionics flight testing. This
    extension reflects the fact that the program is event-driven, not
    schedule driven. We will complete all EMD content required to deliver
    an ORD-compliant aircraft to the warfighter. The resultant impact of
    the schedule extension is an $876 million increase to the EMD estimate-
    at-completion (EAC). Of note, this amount includes a risk factor to
    increase confidence in the estimate. We sourced this EMD EAC increase
    from within the F/A-22 program. It is important to also note that this
    EMD schedule extension, and corresponding EAC increase, does not
    indicate a concern regarding aircraft performance, nor does it
    represent an increased risk of production retrofit.

                      PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPON INVENTORIES

        3. Senator Warner. Secretary Johnson and Secretary Roche, while
    only 10 percent of the air-launched weapons used in Operation Desert
    Storm were precision-guided, a much higher percentage of precision
    weapons have been used in more recent conflicts, such as Operations
    Allied Force and Enduring Freedom. Do you believe that the current
    inventories of these weapons are sufficient to carry out possible
    conflict with Iraq?
        Secretary Johnson. Yes, I believe that the current inventories of
    precision-guided weapons are sufficient.
        Secretary Roche. CENTCOM's munitions requirements for operations
    are being met. As a result of supplemental funding, the Joint Direct
    Attack Munition (JDAM) procurement program has been energized to reach
    a production rate of 2,800 units per month by July 2003. We are
    currently at a rate of over 2,400 units per month, and have in excess
    of 18,000 JDAM in the Air Force inventory. Overall, procurement of JDAM
    for the Air Force will exceed 150,000.
        Supplemental funding and increased emphasis on collateral damage,
    the Air Force has committed to procuring additional Laser Guided Bombs
    (LGBs), specifically the GBU-12 which has a 500-pound blast/
    fragmentation warhead. The Air Force qualified a second vendor,
    Lockheed Martin, in the summer of 2002. As a result, the Air Force is
    procuring over 40,000 GBU-12s through the Future years Defense Plan
    (FYDP). Current production rate is 1,650 LGBs per month (accelerating
    to 2,000 by summer 2003), and we have in excess of 11,000 GBU-12s in
    the Air Force inventory.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions

                                 ARMY EDUCATION

        4. Senator Sessions. Secretary White, the Army has enjoyed a great
    reputation with their eArmyU program. You currently have roughly 35,000
    soldiers enrolled with many more on waiting lists. What do you see as
    the future for eArmyU and is the Army committed to funding this program
    so our soldiers can continue to gain educational benefits?
        Secretary White. The Army is committed to funding eArmyU as it
    expands from its current 14 sites to Army-wide status in 2005, at which
    time enrollment will reach 80,000. eArmyU is successfully reaching a
    new generation of soldier-students and helping them to achieve their
    academic goals. The program offers unprecedented academic access,
    choice, and flexibility and continues to set the standard in today's
    online learning environment.
        Today, eArmyU enrolls over 33,400 students. This number is expected
    to reach 40,500 by September 2003. eArmyU soldiers have access to 115
    degree and certificate programs through 23 colleges and universities by
    logging in to the eArmyU.com portal. We are currently in the process of
    adding 12 new institutions this year, which will soon bring our total
    to more than 30. What's even more exciting for us is the scope of our
    program. eArmyU is fulfilling the promise of ``anytime-anywhere''
    learning. Soldiers located in 50 countries, four U.S. territories, and
    49 States are taking classes through the eArmyU portal. More than 135
    soldier-students have graduated as of February 27, 2003.
        The Army's purpose in creating eArmyU was to enhance traditional
    learning programs and services by providing an anytime, anywhere
    distance learning program that ensures eligible enlisted soldiers have
    full access and scholastic support to achieve their educational goals.
    We know that continued support to the program benefits not only the
    soldier, but the Army as a whole.
        As a testament that eArmyU is a long-term investment for the Army,
    I am pleased to report that the program is being transitioned into
    standard Army operations. Efforts are underway to incorporate eArmyU
    into the Army Knowledge Management structure. Additionally, we are
    developing concepts such as an education shared data warehouse, in
    which eArmyU's data management capabilities will be the cornerstone
    that allows us to leverage all current and legacy Army education data.
        Online education continues to reach a new generation of learners.
    e-Learning will become a dominant approach to educating a broad cross-
    section of the American population in coming years. Finding ways to
    build enhanced and specialized academic support for online learners
    will continue to play an important role in this revolution. eArmyU will
    lead the way in providing the most effective e-Learning tools in the
    most cost-efficient e-Learning environment.

                     NATIONAL GUARD FAMILY ACTIVITY CENTER

        5. Senator Sessions. Secretary White, during Operation Desert
    Shield and Operation Desert Storm, once the number of mobilized
    National Guard troops reached a certain level, the National Guard
    received Temporary Tour on Active Duty (TTAD) funds to staff Family
    Activities Centers (FAC) in each State with retired military personnel.
    These centers supported the families of deployed National Guard
    soldiers. I have been told that, to date, no funds have been received
    to support any FACs. With the numbers of deployed guardsmen approaching
    the number activated during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, there is a
    pressing need to ensure that we are taking care of the families of our
    guardsmen. Can you provide an update on the status of plans, to include
    funds expended or planned for expenditure, that address the obligation
    that we have to provide support for these family members?
        Secretary White. We did not receive any funding for this critical
    requirement. The National Guard Bureau provided a baseline requirement
    of $60 million to support this mission. This unfunded requirement was
    submitted to us for the global war on terrorism supplement. The Army
    National Guard borrowed $13 million from other accounts to support
    initial manpower requirements to ensure immediate family assistance and
    services were accomplished.
        During large activations and deployments, the Army National Guard
    sets up and operates Family Assistance Centers throughout the Nation to
    serve families. These centers are usually staffed with between one to
    three paid personnel and are expected to provide 24/7 on-call contact
    availability. Based on increased mobilizations, we estimate an eventual
    requirement for approximately 400 FACs across America. Of these 400
    centers, approximately 275 are currently operational. We have a
    statutory and regulatory obligation, as well as a moral imperative, to
    assist and support our military families. Full funding of this
    requirement is critical to the success of the Reserve component's
    mission accomplishment.

                  AIR FORCE TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOL SUPPORT

        6. Senator Sessions. Secretary Roche, I understand that training
    slots for many different technical specialty schools are in short
    supply, and that the technical training schools are having difficulty
    meeting the demands of the Reserve customer. In the past, most
    reservists were prior active duty members, and joined the Reserve
    component already trained. However, today the majority of the people
    joining the Reserve are non-prior service. This change has led to an
    increase in the Reserve's training needs. Further complicating the
    issue of training and scheduling school dates is the reality that
    reservists must attempt to schedule their training around the needs of
    their civilian employers. Therefore, the reservist often cannot fill
    training school vacancies on short notice.
        Today, my Reserve unit reports that 57 Air Force technical training
    schools are already closed for fiscal year 2003. As a result, a new
    recruit joining the Air Force/Air Force Reserve today will have to wait
    a significant amount of time before being inducted because of this
    shortage of school slots.
        Do you see a need for increased capacity in Air Force technical
    training schools, and does the Service have any plans or initiatives
    underway to increase the number of training slots to meet the increased
    and changing nature of the demand?
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force is in the process of reshaping the
    force in response to the current security environment. Some Air Force
    Specialty Code technical schools met past capacity requirements, but
    are now feeling stressed because of meeting new or expanded mission
    demands. As we work through this force reshaping, schoolhouse
    requirements will be adjusted. Active and Reserve component
    requirements will be re-evaluated and enough seats made available to
    meet new steady state current and future requirements.
        In the interim, the timing of course dates may not be as
    convenient; however, sufficient seats will be available to accomplish
    Total Force mission requirements. Our focus is on making force-shaping
    adjustments while maintaining the most effective and efficient Total
    Force training pipeline possible. We expect to sustain adequate
    capacity given the size of the force we have today.

                       ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION CONCERNS

        7. Senator Sessions. Secretary Johnson, in testimony before this
    committee, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations
    have said that environmental concerns are weighing heavily on your
    ability to train. This negative impact, in turn, has negatively
    affected readiness. So that the record on this subject is clear, could
    you offer some examples, some evidence of this problem, and how you
    believe legislative relief will re-strike the correct balance between
    training and readiness and environmental stewardship.
        Secretary Johnson. With regards to the Marine Mammal Protection Act
    and the Endangered Species Act, the following examples and requested
    relief are provided.
    Examples of Impacts from the Marine Mammal Protection Act
        1. Operational training and deployment of the Navy's Surface Towed
    Array Sonar System Low Frequency Active (SURTASS LFA) sonar system has
    been delayed for 6 years, even after the Navy invested $10 million on
    independent scientific research that showed the system could be used
    with negligible impact on marine mammals.
        2. During the last 6 years of research on how to counter mines and
    detect submarines in shallow water, over 78 percent of the tests
    planned by the Navy's Office of Naval Research (ONR) have been delayed,
    scaled-back, or cancelled due to environmental regulations having to do
    with marine mammals under the Marine Mammal Protection and Endangered
    Species Acts.
        3. Navy's efforts to establish permanent at-sea shallow-water
    training ranges for both the East and West Coast are being delayed by
    environmental regulations and the potential for litigation,
    particularly over how to apply the definition of ``harassment'' in the
    Marine Mammal Protection Act to Navy training.
    How Congress Can Help By Passing DOD's Proposed Legislation for MMPA
        Clarifying the definition of harassment could reduce special
    interest group lawsuits that challenge regulatory agency
    interpretations of ``harassment.'' Special interest groups can
    overstate the impact of Navy activities with arguments based on vague
    terms such as ``annoyance'' and ``potential to disturb.'' A clearer,
    science-based definition based on biologically significant behavior
    could show that Navy activities actually impact only a minimal number
    of marine mammals. Clarifying the definition could also reduce
    unnecessary modification (dumbing down), delays or cancellation of
    valuable Navy training and testing.
    Examples of Impacts from the Endangered Species Act and Critical
            Habitat Designation
        1. In 1996, when 40 percent of the Chocolate Mountain Aerial
    Gunnery Range was designated as ``critical habitat'' pursuant to the
    Endangered Species Act, Navy sea/air/land (SEAL) training was
    negatively impacted. Before the designation, Navy SEALs conducted
    realistic training with multiple avenues of approach. Navy SEALs using
    this important range are now restricted to firing their weapons in a
    narrow field of fire to avoid firing toward the critical habitat.
        2. Environmental-based restrictions on training at Southern
    California ranges normally used by SEALs, including Endangered Species
    Act restrictions for birds at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, have
    caused the SEALs to relocate much of their training. Utilization of
    military lands to protect species without recognizing the comprehensive
    impacts to the military is a constant concern.
        3. Environmental restrictions for the protection of birds and
    lizards at San Clemente Island, another important SEAL training range,
    significantly impact the use of live ammunition. As a result, the SEALs
    resorted to using blanks, paint balls, laser tag, and other simulated
    ammunition.
        4. Due to similar ESA-based restrictions in the Marianas Islands
    intended to protect sea turtles, the Tinian Monarch (a bird), the
    Micronesian Megapod (a ground bird), and the Marianas Fruit Bat, as
    well as providing protection for near-shore coral reefs, the amphibious
    landing portion of this year's exercise Tandem Thrust will not include
    landings on the beach by air cushion landing craft. Tandem Thrust is a
    multi-national exercise involving the U.S. and other allied nations
    (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and others) supporting Commander, U.S.
    Pacific Command's warfighting readiness.
        5. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service recently proposed designating
    critical habitat on two Navy installations on Guam and Hawaii where the
    relevant endangered species are not currently present on Navy lands.
    Both these installations have Integrated Natural Resource Management
    Plans (INRMPs) for managing the natural resources that currently exist
    within their boundaries. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's goal is
    to introduce these species on Navy land now dedicated to training.
    How Congress Can Help By Passing DOD's Proposed Legislation for ESA
        Changing the ESA so that an approved INRMP removes the need for a
    critical habitat designation will protect endangered species under the
    overall management plan for all natural resources.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins

                      LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) AND DD(X)

        8. Senator Collins. Secretary Johnson, in its fiscal year 2004
    budget submission, the Navy includes $160 million for the LCS. Admiral
    Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, has indicated that this is a top
    priority of the Navy in this year's budget. Last week, the Navy issued
    a request for proposals to build the first LCS. This vessel is aimed at
    providing the Navy with better capability to operate closer to shore.
    However, these kinds of ships cannot serve as a substitute for major
    surface combatant vessels. The Navy's budget submission also includes
    $1.1 billion for development of the DD(X) destroyer. I would like to
    hear your insights into the different capabilities that the LCS and
    DD(X) destroyer will provide. Is the development of DD(X), along with
    the LCS, a top priority for the Navy?
        Secretary Johnson. Development of both our next generation
    destroyer, DD(X), and the LCS is critical to the future Navy. Future
    surface combatants are optimized to perform key functions: LCS to
    assure access to littoral regions in the face of asymmetric threats
    such as mines and submarines; DD(X) for delivery of precision strike
    and volume fires in support of forces ashore; and the next generation
    cruiser, CG(X), to create and maintain air superiority over joint
    forces at sea and on land, as well as defend the homeland against
    ballistic missile threats. As such, DD(X) and LCS will provide
    complementary capabilities, described below, to the Fleet.
        Armed with an array of land-attack weapons, such as Tactical
    Tomahawk and the Advanced Gun System (AGS), DD(X) will provide
    persistent, distributed, long-range, precision attack needed in support
    of our joint forces operating deep inland. It will combine this
    firepower with 21st century technologies such as stealth, integrated
    power systems, and electric drive propulsion. The added electrical
    power will allow DD(X) to spiral develop to hyper-velocity and laser
    weapons.
        LCS will capitalize on emerging unmanned vehicle technologies and
    perform the focused Sea Shield missions of MIW, Surface Warfare (SUW),
    and ASW. It will provide the fast, affordable, focused-mission
    capability that will sustain access and enhance the Navy's ability to
    establish sea superiority not just for our Carrier Strike Groups and
    Expeditionary Strike Groups, but for all the joint logistics, command
    and control, and prepositioned ships that must transit the critical
    littoral threat area to move and support forces ashore.

        9. Senator Collins. Secretary Johnson, it is critical that the Navy
    build on the momentum of the fiscal year 2004 budget submission in the
    coming years. According to documentation submitted by the Department of
    Defense, the Navy has budgeted $12 billion for shipbuilding in fiscal
    year 2005, including an additional three DDG-51 destroyers. However, as
    it currently stands, there is no funding for DDG-51s after fiscal year
    2005. The DD(X) destroyer program is scheduled to begin production at
    that time, but there only appears to be funding for one DD(X) in fiscal
    year 2006, and one in fiscal year 2007. The possibility of only two
    major surface combatant ship constructions in fiscal year 2006 and
    fiscal year 2007 would substantially damage the industrial base. Is the
    Navy committed to addressing this problem?
        Secretary Johnson. In order to transform to meet future threats,
    the Navy must move toward DD(X). The current plan is to complete
    procurement of 62 ships in the DDG-51 class in fiscal year 2005. A
    single DD(X) in fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 creates pressure
    on the surface combatant industrial base, but is mitigated by the 10
    ship DDG multi-year procurement and the workload swap between Bath Iron
    Works and Northrop Grumman that will optimize production efficiencies
    and stabilize workload at both shipyards. The Navy is committed to
    maintaining a robust and competitive shipbuilding industrial base.
    Industrial base concerns will be taken into consideration in the
    formulation of future budgets.

        10. Senator Collins. Secretary Johnson, DD(X) will allow the Navy
    to field a fleet of highly capable and affordable warships. It will
    accomplish this by leveraging R&D costs, resultant technologies, and
    efficient processes and benefits across multiple platforms. DD(X) is
    also central to improving quality-of-life for our sailors--even more
    important as we ask our Armed Forces to do more in the new security
    environment. Would you discuss the value that you believe DD(X) and its
    family of ships will provide the Navy team, and further could you speak
    to the $1.1 billion investment proposed in the fiscal year 2004 budget
    for this family-of-ships?
        Secretary Johnson. DD(X) will be armed with an array of land attack
    weapons, such as Tactical Tomahawk and the AGS to provide persistent,
    distributed, long-range, precision attack needed in support of our
    joint forces operating deep inland. Tactical Tomahawk will reach up to
    1,000 miles inland as a responsive call-for-fire weapon. AGS will
    provide fires to 100 miles, a seven-fold improvement on current
    capability.
        DD(X) will take advantage of advanced stealth technologies to be
    less detectable and more survivable to enemy attacks than the ships it
    will replace. An open architecture, distributed combat system will
    support a ``plug and play'' environment in which to operate AGS, an
    advanced vertical launching system and a Multi-Function Radar/Volume
    Search Radar suite. Other features on DD(X) will include an advanced
    hull form, integrated electric drive propulsion, optimized manning, and
    extensive automation.
        The DD(X) research and development effort will enable the Navy to
    keep pace with today's rapid technological advances, spiraling
    promising technologies to both CG(X) and LCS. It will also enable the
    Navy to upgrade in-service Aegis cruisers and destroyers with selected
    leading edge technologies to maintain operational effectiveness of the
    legacy, multi-mission fleet. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget
    requests $1.058 billion for DD(X) to fund continuation of the DD(X)
    design effort and continued design, development, and test of the 10
    DD(X) Engineering Development Models (EDMs) listed below:

            Advanced Gun System (AGS) and Munitions
            Integrated Power System (IPS) *
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        * EDM will be tested at-sea.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Volume Search Radar (VSR)/Multi-Function Radar (MFR)
            Radar Suite *
            Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) *
            Peripheral Vertical Launch System (PVLS)
            Integrated Deckhouse and Apertures
            Autonomic Fire Suppression System (AFSS) *
            Infrared Mock-ups
            Hull Form Scale Model
            Integrated Undersea Warfare System (IUSW)

        The DD(X) lead ship contract award is scheduled for fiscal year
    2005.
        The LCS will use emerging unmanned vehicle technologies and deliver
    the focused Sea Shield missions of MIW, SUW, and ASW. It will provide
    the fast, affordable, focused-mission capability that will sustain
    access and enhance the ability to establish sea superiority not just
    for our Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Strike Groups, but for
    all the joint logistics, command and control, and prepositioned ships
    that must transit the critical littoral threat area to move and support
    forces ashore.
        The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $158 million for
    LCS to support hull form development, mission module development and
    integration, and requirements analysis. The LCS Integrated Requirements
    Document has been completed and construction of the first LCS is
    expected to commence in 2005.

                               AIR FORCE ACADEMY

        11. Senator Collins. Secretary Roche, as I expressed last week to
    General Jumper, I am appalled by the allegations of sexual assaults at
    the Air Force Academy. Along with Senator Lieberman, I have asked the
    Department of Defense Inspector General to investigate this very
    disturbing situation. Your cooperation in looking into this matter has
    been appreciated. The perpetrators of these crimes are a discredit to
    the Academy, and a discredit to the Air Force. Since these crimes have
    come to light, what actions have you taken to ensure that the young
    women at the Academy receive the protection and attention that they
    require?
        Secretary Roche. We are conducting a comprehensive review of Air
    Force Academy programs and practices to deter and respond to sexual
    assaults. In connection with that review, we are looking closely at
    factors affecting both reporting and handling of alleged incidents of
    sexual assaults, including the cadet hierarchy and the relationships
    between the upper and freshman classes. We are also evaluating how the
    Academy administers cadet discipline in order to ensure there are no
    obstacles to the reporting of crimes. We are evaluating how we select,
    train, and organize the professional staff to ensure we provide the
    best available supervision and mentoring. We are also reviewing the
    process of investigating allegations of sexual assaults, as well as the
    awareness training, medical care, counseling services, legal
    consultation, victim advocacy, and spiritual support we provide to
    victims to ensure they receive the support that they need, and fair
    treatment throughout the investigative and judicial process. We are
    also clarifying the definition of sexual assault used at the Academy to
    include only conduct that constitutes a crime.
        While our review is continuing, General Jumper and I have made
    changes in Academy leadership in order to implement some significant
    changes to reinforce our goals to train and equip tomorrow's leaders at
    the Academy. We intend to ensure the safety and security of every cadet
    and to enhance the trust and confidence of the American people in the
    Air Force Academy. On March 26, 2003, we announced our Agenda for
    Change, which directs a variety of changes including among others those
    regarding cadet life, Academy leadership, officer and NCO selection and
    training, security for cadets, and the social climate at the Academy.
    The full Agenda for Change has been made available to the committee.
    These changes, which are to be implemented in time for the arrival of
    the entering Class of 2007 this fall, are intended to reinforce the
    values of character, leadership, integrity, and  honor that we must
    instill in every cadet and future Air Force officer.
        This job is not finished, but we think we've made a good start. Our
    bottom line is this: sexual assaults will not be tolerated at the Air
    Force Academy, and all who commit sexual assaults will be brought to
    justice. In addition, those who knowingly protect perpetrators, and
    those who would shun or harass anyone with the courage to come forward
    and report these crimes, will be held accountable.

                   CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

        12. Senator Collins. Secretary White, during last week's hearing
    with the Service Chiefs, I asked General Shinseki about a July 2002
    Army Audit Agency report dealing with the Army's preparedness to deal
    with a chemical or biological attack. The results of this audit were
    very troubling. Of the 25 units reviewed at Fort Hood and Fort Lewis,
    18 of them were not judged to be proficient in operating chemical and
    biological defensive equipment. Also, inspectors found that many units
    were not performing adequate preventative maintenance on their chem-bio
    defense equipment. Given the possibility of war against Iraq, I am very
    concerned about these findings. ``60 Minutes'' recently did a story
    based in part on this audit. Can you assure not only me, but also the
    troops who are even as we speak being deployed to the Persian Gulf,
    that they have adequate training and equipment to deal with a chemical
    or biological attack?
        Secretary White. U.S. forces serving in Iraq and throughout the
    Gulf region are trained and prepared to operate in a contaminated
    environment. The threats and challenges presented by operating in a
    contaminated environment may increase the degree of difficulty, but are
    not insurmountable. Our forces are trained, and they have the equipment
    they need to survive and sustain operations in a nuclear, biological,
    and chemical environment.
        Army individual and collective training doctrine places great
    emphasis on sustaining a ``band of excellence'' across a range of tasks
    that specifically focus on the unit's mission essential tasks. In the
    last several months, these training programs received significantly
    greater attention and focus. Military commanders recognized the
    immediacy of the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and
    initiated training to improve their chemical-biological defense
    equipment readiness. Each unit mobilizing or deploying in support of
    current operations will conduct individual skill training validation
    before and after deployment to ensure they are fully capable of
    operating equipment in a chemical-biological environment.

                        MEDICAL CONDITIONS CAUSED BY WAR

        13. Senator Collins. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, a sad part of modern warfare is the illnesses that
    have cropped up after our Nation's last two major conventional
    conflicts. Many of the men and women who served during the Vietnam War
    were afflicted with Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome. As we saw over the
    years, Agent Orange has had devastating long-term impacts on some
    veterans of that conflict. Following our last war against Iraq, some
    veterans suffered as a result of what we now call Gulf War Syndrome.
    There is still debate about its causes. As we stand potentially on the
    brink of another conflict in the Middle East, what steps are your
    Services taking to adequately track the health of those serving in the
    Persian Gulf? If there is a conflict, will we have an adequate
    foundation of data to ensure that if another illness should appear,
    like Gulf War Syndrome, that we will be able to adequately diagnose its
    causes?
        Secretary White. Numerous steps have been taken to track the health
    of soldiers serving in the Persian Gulf. These steps include measures
    that occur before, during, and after the deployment period. Before
    departure, all soldiers complete a pre-deployment health assessment to
    determine if individuals have pre-existing medical conditions that
    might affect their health while deployed. Evaluations by medical
    specialists are completed, when necessary, to assure that deploying
    personnel are fit for service in a combat zone. Copies of data from the
    health assessment are archived and reviewed periodically to assess the
    health of deployed service members. During deployment, a standardized
    health surveillance system is implemented to detect and mitigate any
    outbreaks of illness. Data from this system is captured electronically
    and can be monitored from any place in the world through secure
    Internet access. In addition, all soldiers deploy with a recently
    implemented deployment health record to assure that all medical
    encounters are recorded and archived for future review.
        In addition to these measures, an active environmental surveillance
    program is conducted by the combatant command to proactively identify
    and assess any potential threats that are recognized. A systematic
    information system assures that evaluations are completed on a timely
    basis, that results are communicated to appropriate authorities for
    action, and that all evaluations are permanently archived for later
    review.
        At the time of redeployment, numerous processes are in place to
    assess and assure the health of soldiers who are coming home. These
    include a medical debrief on the threats encountered while deployed and
    information on what to do if health problems occur at a later time.
    During the redeployment process, soldiers undergo an expanded health
    assessment to identify any physical or mental health issues that may
    have developed during the deployment. Any health issues identified
    during the post-deployment health assessment are referred to
    specialists for further evaluation using the Deployment Health Clinical
    Practice Guideline developed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. This
    guideline requires that all deployment-related health visits be
    recorded using a special diagnostic code, so that such visits can be
    monitored electronically.
        In summary, an intense effort has been made to safeguard and
    monitor the health of soldiers deployed during Operation Enduring
    Freedom and to Iraq. Numerous data systems are in place to track health
    outcomes on an individual level, monitor environmental exposures in
    theater, record clinic visits occurring during or after deployment, and
    assure that appropriate health care is provided. These new efforts
    enhance abilities to rapidly detect any emerging health problems that
    occur as a result of the deployment, focus on groups of service members
    that may be affected, and identify potential exposures that may have
    been the cause of specific clusters of illness.
        Secretary Johnson. The Department of Defense is enhancing the post-
    deployment health assessment process. The improvements include a more
    comprehensive health assessment and a blood sample taken within 30 days
    of leaving the theater. The more comprehensive assessment will provide
    individual information about events that occurred during a deployment
    and enable the DOD health care providers to more effectively assess
    health status as they interact with each service member. The blood
    samples will be forwarded to the DOD Serum Repository for archival
    purposes. These enhancements are just one piece of the total force
    health protection program that also includes increased environmental
    surveillance, electronic medical recordkeeping, and improved unit
    location data. Commanders are responsible for complete redeployment
    processing of their personnel and helping each individual to make a
    smooth, post-deployment transition, according to DOD guidelines.
    Because deployment health concerns often evolve over time, commanders
    also encourage their returning service members to re-visit with health
    care providers to address all deployment related health concerns. The
    complete force health protection program, including regular blood
    tests, regular physical examinations, annual dental examinations,
    annual medical record reviews and pre- and post-deployment health
    assessments, assists DOD in providing a world-class continuum of care
    from accession to separation. The health and safety of our people is
    our top concern. DOD will continue to improve the force health
    protection program based on medical lessons learned from deployments.
    DOD is committed to providing service members and the public access to
    accurate, consistent, and comprehensive information about post-
    deployment force health protection policies and to instilling and
    maintaining public confidence in DOD's concern for the health of its
    personnel, its health care system, and its ability to respond to any
    health concern that may arise from a deployment.
        Secretary Roche. The men and women of the United States Air Force
    deserve our every effort to protect their health both at war and in
    peace. The pillars of force health protection are recruiting and
    maintaining a fit force, preventing disease and injury, and caring for
    those who are injured or become ill. The Air Force is committed to
    force health protection through the life cycle of their service. The
    cornerstone of our effort is rooted in the Deployment Health
    Surveillance program. Mandated by public law and implemented by
    Department of Defense Instructions, this program combines elements of
    preventive and supportive medicine to protect the health of our airmen.
        The program includes pre-deployment health assessments. These
    assessments provide baseline data--the ``foundation of data'' that you
    speak of--that can be used to compare against post-deployment
    assessments to determine the deployment's impact, if any, on the
    member's health. Our Deployment Health Surveillance program also
    includes immunizations, serum sampling, patient record maintenance, and
    centralized data storage for ongoing and future analysis.
        None of these individual tools will yield the total picture, but
    taken together they ensure we will have the information we need to
    monitor, investigate, improve, and protect our members' health.
        Our primary goal is the prevention of the conditions you rightfully
    address in your statement. Environmental surveillance at deployment
    sites initially includes sampling air, water, and soil, and continues
    with routine monitoring of food, water, and endemic disease vectors.
    Since the Gulf War, we have established many programs for deployment
    health surveillance. While these programs have greatly increased our
    ability to detect health hazards, reduce risks, and survey for health
    problems in personnel who have deployed, we are continuing to improve
    in a number of areas. Here are some of the concrete efforts and
    initiatives we are currently working:

             Automation of the deployment health assessments, in
            cooperation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
            Affairs
             Enhancement of the health assessments returning airmen
            receive before leaving theater and within 30 days of returning
            to home station
             Automation of deployed health records and records of
            medications taken while deployed
             Electronic recording of environmental data
             Mental health assessments and critical incident stress
            support both in theater and at home
             Agile medical support in theater to prevent casualties
            and illness
             Archiving of unit locations throughout a deployment
            for possible future use

        We are continuing to enhance the care we provide when service
    members develop conditions possibly related to deployments. To this end
    we have implemented a program to screen personnel for deployment
    related health concerns and to use a clinical practice guideline,
    developed in cooperation with the Veterans Administration, to address
    those illnesses and conditions that could be associated with combat
    service. We have linked such care to our automated record of clinic
    visits to ensure we can track these patients and the care they receive.
        We maintain deployment related medical and environmental data in a
    variety of repositories. The main Department of Defense repository for
    health assessments and serum samples is the Army Medical Surveillance
    Activity. We have Air Force service specific repositories for
    environmental health data,  theater surveillance data, and patient
    records. The Air Force has physicians and epidemiologists to monitor
    deployment related illnesses and injuries, and to study the data for
    potential causes to any conditions that may arise. The men and women of
    the United States Air Force deserve nothing less.

                            RECRUITING AND RETENTION

        14. Senator Collins. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, waging the war against terrorism has required
    significant resources. The recent build-up in the Persian Gulf has also
    placed a strain on funding. It is my understanding that later this
    year, the Department of Defense will be submitting a supplemental
    appropriations request to cover some of these costs. However, I am
    becoming increasingly concerned about the toll being taken on the men
    and women serving today. Admiral Clark has indicated that half of our
    fleet is currently deployed, a significant jump from normal operations.
    I am sure that the other Services are in a similar situation. How long
    can we operate at this high rate before we start seeing negative
    impacts on our recruiting and retention? How are each of you managing
    military personnel to deal with this issue?
        Secretary White. Currently, the Army is having no problem meeting
    its annual accessions requirements and quality goals and anticipates no
    problems in the future, despite the current operational tempo and
    deployments. If we see a drop in enlistment, we will reassess our
    recruiting strategy and make appropriate adjustments.
        It is difficult for us to determine retention trends at this time;
    however, studies by RAND and the Army Research Institute show that
    first deployments have a positive impact on the soldier's desire to
    stay in the Army, but subsequent and repetitive deployments have a
    negative impact on the soldier's desire to stay in the Army. A fall
    2002 survey of military personnel shows that ``amount of time away from
    my family'' was one of the leading reasons given by soldiers who leave
    the Army.
        We are managing critical military personnel skills through our
    stop-loss and stop-move programs. We have implemented these programs
    through precision management and executed them incrementally based on
    the changing operational environment since September 11, 2001.
        Secretary Johnson. Despite long deployments and the extremely
    arduous duty required of sailors over this past year, we have not yet
    observed a negative effect on retention, and the retention successes we
    are enjoying have permitted us to continue reducing our accession
    goals. Should it become necessary for us to continue extending
    deployments, and should longer deployments become routine, we would
    expect this to have a negative effect on recruiting and retention.
        Studies following Operation Desert Storm suggested that deployments
    exceeding eight months resulted in significantly lower reenlistment
    rates, particularly for married sailors and those in relatively sea-
    intensive occupations (2 percentage point drop for sailors overall, 7
    percent for married sailors, and 3.4 percent for those in sea-intensive
    occupations).
        However, those studies also showed that if long deployments were
    not routine, but were associated with ``morale boosting crises,'' such
    as the present situation we are facing, ``these challenging and
    exceptional deployments are likely to yield higher retention than
    routine long deployments.'' Recent statistics support this finding.
    However, it is difficult to predict for how much longer we can extend
    deployments without the practice being perceived as ``routine,''
    thereby adversely impacting retention.
        Navy recognizes that to continue extending deployments for
    sustained periods of time, will likely begin to adversely impact the
    current recruiting and retention successes we are enjoying. While our
    active strength level, with selective-augmentation by naval reservists,
    is sufficient to support mission requirements and force structure, we
    continue to monitor the situation closely to evaluate the recruiting
    and retention impacts of the current operational tempo. As situations
    evolve both in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, we
    anticipate that extended deployments will remain the exception, vice
    the rule; thereby limiting the potential adverse impacts on our
    recruiting and retention efforts.
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force shares your concern about the
    current high tempo and the toll it is taking on our airmen. Our
    involvement in the numerous hot spots around the world has truly
    stretched our troops to the limit. We have tried to minimize that
    impact by employing our people in the most efficient manner possible
    for these contingencies. One of our greatest strengths continues to be
    the quality and dedication of our Air National Guard and Air Force
    Reserves troops. When combined with our active duty and civilian force,
    these troops help spread our commitments throughout the ``Total''
    force. Our Expeditionary Air Force concept has also served us well
    during these times of high tempo. That is not to say that it has
    resolved the problems associated with our high tempo, but it has
    provided the foundation from which to build a model to minimize the
    impacts.
        Your question concerning how long will we be able to operate at
    this rate before we begin to feel an impact on recruiting and retention
    is a good one. While we cannot say definitively how long we can sustain
    this rate without an impact, current data indicates positive trends in
    both recruiting and retention. Exit surveys show that deployments alone
    do not play a major role in a member's decision to separate when
    compared to other factors such as compensation and the availability of
    civilian jobs. We have worked very hard with your support to ensure our
    airmen are duly compensated for the work they do for our great Nation.
    Our hope is that these trends continue and that we will be able to keep
    the best and brightest members of our Air Force in uniform. Recruiting
    efforts have also responded well to your committee's continued support.
    Our recent increases in recruiter strength and marketing efforts have
    had a significant impact. We continue to attract the finest of
    America's youth from all walks of life.
        While we are currently doing well in these areas, we do not want to
    build a false sense of security. Our assumption is that if these high
    tempo rates were to continue for an extended period of time, it would
    ultimately begin to have a negative impact on our troops and a
    detrimental impact on our ability to recruit and retain the forces
    needed to meet the many demands placed on our Air Force.

                                  ``GO-PILLS''

        15. Senator Collins. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, I have some concerns about the usage of amphetamines
    by our military. As part of the proceedings regarding last year's
    friendly fire bombing of Canadian troops in Afghanistan, the use of
    these so-called ``go-pills'' has been spotlighted. It is my
    understanding that these drugs are administered directly by military
    physicians, and that pilots are monitored very closely during their
    use. Given the intense supervision given to pilots and their flying
    hours, I can understand how the Air Force can manage the use of these
    drugs. However, for military personnel operating on land or at sea,
    supervision becomes more of an issue. Are these drugs distributed to
    non-pilots? If so, what controls are in place to ensure that they are
    not abused? Are there adequate studies regarding their effects on
    performance?
        Secretary White. Dexedrine, commonly referred to as ``go-pills,''
    is not used by anyone in the Army other than aviators. It has been a
    long-standing Army policy to maximize the use of non-pharmacological
    countermeasures to fatigue such as sleep/wake cycles in operational
    plans. A query of the Pharmacy Data Transaction Service database for
    prescriptions to active duty Army soldiers revealed an average of two
    Dexedrine prescriptions a month over the last 18-month period. Further
    investigation revealed that personnel at Fort Rucker used these
    prescriptions for flight training purposes.
        Army aviators will use pharmacological countermeasures only in
    extreme circumstances. The Army has long studied various stimulants and
    is most comfortable with the benefits and side-effect profile of
    Dexedrine for Army aviators. After other countermeasures have been
    exhausted, and the commander has decided conditions warrant its use,
    the flight surgeon may use 2.5, 5, or 10 milligrams of Dexedrine up to
    a maximum of 30 milligrams in a 24-hour period.
        The decision to use stimulants is the commander's, but is made in
    concert with appropriate medical and safety counsel. For example,
    within the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a policy letter
    signed by the commander directs that ``the utilization of drugs such as
    amphetamines, or the application of medical procedures, such as `blood
    doping,' to enhance or extend performance is strictly forbidden without
    the approval of the Commander, USSOCOM.'' To date only the 160th
    Special Operations Aviation Regiment has applied and received approval
    for a performance-enhancing drug protocol for pilots. In this protocol,
    the use of Dexedrine requires approval from the first general officer
    in the operational chain of command after a request from the battalion
    or air mission commander and the flight surgeon.
        Secretary Johnson. There is no authorized use of ``go pills'' for
    any non-pilots.
        Secretary Roche. While I cannot comment on Navy and Army policies,
    Air Force policies currently only permit the use of ``go-pills'' by one
    or two-seat fighter/bomber aircrew members and by U2 reconnaissance
    pilots. The policies would include a small group of F-15E Weapons
    Systems Officers, who are covered under the same controls as pilots.
    There are no USAF policies that permit the distribution of ``go-pills''
    in ground personnel. In fact, the Air Force Special Operations Command
    restricts ``go-pill'' use outside of the policies I've previously
    mentioned. With respect to the use of Dexedrine by Air Force pilots,
    there is a considerable body of scientific literature over the last 60
    years, dating back to World War II, which supports the safety,
    efficacy, and performance benefits to be gained from the use of small
    doses of dextroamphetamine in extended duration air operations. I am
    confident that our fatigue management system, which includes such
    pharmaceuticals, is scientifically sound, voluntary, and very well
    controlled.
                                     ______

                  Question Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole

                               CUTS IN IMPACT AID

        16. Senator Dole. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and Secretary
    Roche, during my visits recently to several North Carolina bases I
    listened to commanders, enlisted personnel, and military spouses. In
    addition to concerns about pay and quality housing, one of the themes I
    heard repeated had to do with making sure that the children of the men
    and women who are dealing with repeated deployments are getting a
    quality education in adequately funded schools. That brought the
    subject around to Impact Aid and the cuts that have been made in the
    fiscal year 2004 budget. If we ask the men and women of our armed
    services to go into harms way, they need to know that we are doing
    everything to make sure that we are taking care of their families. How
    can we possibly justify the cuts that have been made in Impact Aid
    funding?
        Secretary White. Impact Aid funds are an important source of
    Federal income for school districts that educate federally-connected
    children and help to ensure military children are provided quality
    education. The Impact Aid program is a U.S. Department of Education
    (DoED) function and responsibility. The Army supports the DOD position
    that Impact Aid funding and management is correctly positioned within
    DoED. The Army was not consulted by either DoED or the Office of
    Management and Budget in the formulation of this portion of the
    President's budget for fiscal year 2004. The Army strategy is to
    continue to work closely with DoED and DOD to find solutions to Impact
    Aid's persistent underfunding. Through our School Liaison Services
    program, we are keeping commanders and parents informed about the
    importance of completing the required Federal forms so school districts
    receive the Impact Aid allocation for each military-affiliated student.
        Secretary Johnson. Education issues for the children of our active
    duty personnel are important to the Navy and I recognize the
    significance of Impact Aid funds. They are an important source of
    Federal income for school districts that educate federally connected
    children and help to ensure military children are provided quality
    education. The Impact Aid program, however, is a DoED function and
    responsibility. The Navy plays no role in the development or
    determination of Impact Aid and was not consulted by either DoED or the
    Office of Management and Budget in the formulation of this portion of
    the President's budget for fiscal year 2004.
        Secretary Roche. We view adequate funding for schools as one of the
    most important quality-of-life issues for our families with school age
    children. We are very gratified that Congress has supported requested
    funding levels for the operation of our DOD dependent schools overseas
    and within the United States. Impact Aid is certainly an important
    ingredient in guaranteeing education quality for our children who
    attend schools within the United States. The Air Force has not
    recommended any changes to the Impact Aid program.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                                SHIP RETIREMENTS

        17. Senator Levin. Secretary Johnson, this budget includes cutting
    the Navy fleet size below 300 ships in fiscal year 2004. At a time when
    we are deploying the fleet more and asking our people to spend greater
    periods of time away from home, this would appear to be moving in the
    wrong direction. Will the Navy be able to sustain its normal peacetime
    deployments at these lower fleet sizes without breaking the operating
    tempo goals that establish how frequently, and for how long, sailors
    will be expected to be absent from their families?
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy will be able to sustain its normal
    peacetime deployments without breaking operating tempo goals. The CNO
    is committed to his personnel tempo guidelines, and the Navy has
    sufficient ships to meet its commitments within these guidelines. The
    Navy has commenced a comprehensive review of our forward deployment
    responsibilities, and operational and personnel tempo guidelines are
    major factors in this review. Additionally, Navy initiatives such as
    Sea Swap and the Fleet Response Concept are projected to provide
    forward, ready, and employable forces where and when needed--both
    designed with personnel tempo goals in mind.

                              ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

        18. Senator Levin. Secretary White, a recent press article quoted
    General Pace as saying that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council is
    reviewing a recommendation that would reshape the Army's force
    structure from 10 more specialized divisions to 10 identical divisions
    that could be deployed to contingencies on a rotating basis. What is
    your view of that concept?
        Secretary White. I do not think the Army will ever have 10
    identical divisions. There will always be a need to maintain some level
    of specialization that will not be required across the total force.
    However, the Army intends to field interchangeable, general-purpose
    forces with common core capabilities through the Objective Force,
    beginning with initial operating capability of the first brigade-sized
    unit of action by 2010. In the near- to mid-term, the Army will meet
    overseas presence and rotation requirements through tailoring current
    forces in accordance with combatant commander requirements.
        Today's Army comprises a robust mix of specialized divisions:
    airborne, air assault, light infantry, infantry, and armored/
    mechanized. Each type of division is optimized to provide a unique
    combination of capabilities, but is also specifically designed for
    rapid reorganization to accomplish a specific task or mission referred
    to as ``task organizing.'' Task organization ensures the force contains
    the appropriate mix and quantity of combined arms to accomplish
    assigned overseas presence and rotational missions in accordance with
    the combatant commander's intent and concept of the operation.
        Reducing or eliminating the distinctions between heavy and light
    forces is a fundamental objective of Army transformation. Objective
    Force units are being designed to be strategically responsive and
    dominant at every point across the full spectrum of operations. In the
    future, the Objective Force will possess an organic capability to
    conduct vertical envelopment (airborne) and air assault in both
    independent actions or as complementary maneuver in support of
    committed forces. The Army continues to assess and adjust the
    configuration of the unit of action and unit of employment to best
    support the emerging needs of the combatant commanders. The first unit
    of action begins fielding in 2008 and will achieve its initial
    operating capability this decade.

        19. Senator Levin. Secretary White, is there no longer a role for
    specialized divisions such as the airborne and air assault divisions?
        Secretary White. Airborne and air assault operations are a relevant
    and necessary part of the mix of capabilities the Army provides to the
    geographic combatant commanders. Operations in Afghanistan and
    potential operations in Iraq require the unique skills and flexibility
    inherent in the airborne and air assault divisions. The capabilities
    necessary to conduct horizontal and vertical envelopment missions are
    valid requirements that support the full spectrum of joint military
    operations.
        Executed rapidly, airborne and air assault operations provide
    positional advantage, achieve surprise, overcome difficult terrain,
    expose enemy capabilities to destruction throughout the joint
    operational area, and block, isolate, or otherwise dislocate enemy
    forces.

                          ACTIVE/RESERVE COMPONENT MIX

        20. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, it is clear that many of our Reserve and National
    Guard units and individuals are being taxed by the current level of
    commitments. It may well be that the Department should adjust the roles
    and functions assigned to each component appropriate for this new
    strategic environment. Do you all believe that DOD should adjust the
    roles and functions assigned to each of the active, Reserve, and
    National Guard components? If so, what changes, if any, do you believe
    are necessary? What are your plans for dealing with this issue?
        Secretary White. The Army is aware that many of our soldiers, from
    both the active and Reserve components, are being taxed by our current
    level of commitments as we pursue our assigned missions in support of
    the defense strategy, which includes the war on terrorism and homeland
    defense. The current size, mix, and roles of the Army's components were
    established under a different set of conditions than what the force is
    now operating under and what we expected to operate under in the
    future. Our participation this past year in defense planning on
    operational availability has helped identify potential changes in the
    mix and role of our Reserve components. Our participation in the
    upcoming DOD study on active and Reserve component mix will assist the
    Army in the implementation of the changes necessary to meet the Army's
    requirements in the defense strategy while also reducing burden on all
    of our soldiers.
        Additionally, for the Program Objective Memorandum 2004-2009, over
    19,500 spaces were programmed for change within the Active, Guard, and
    Reserve Force structure. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has activated
    or has programmed to activate through fiscal year 2009, a total of 68
    active, 102 National Guard, and 85 Reserve units that fall into these
    high demand categories: aviation, chemical, civil affairs/psychological
    operations, and military police. The enhanced force capabilities
    address the most urgent needs.
        Secretary Johnson. While the current level of commitment is
    certainly taxing both active and Reserve personnel of all Services, the
    Naval Reserve has not been overused.
        The roles and functions mismatches that burden some of the other
    Service Reserve components are not as prevalent in the Navy/Naval
    Reserve mix. The Navy has worked hard to integrate reservists into the
    daily business routine of the overall Navy and we need not activate
    large numbers of reservists to go to war.
        Lessons learned post-September 11 have suggested a need to adjust
    Navy force mix in the Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) mission area. NCW is
    a mission that is currently resident only in the Naval Reserve. The
    commencement of the GWOT led us to the conclusion that we need to
    increase the size of our NCW forces. We have made a conscious effort to
    buy active duty NCW capabilities to meet the increased operational
    demand. These forces will not replace, but will reinforce the
    capability we already have in the Naval Reserve.
        In June 2002, ASN(M&RA) and VCNO chartered an effort to develop a
    21st century vision for a fully integrated Active and Reserve Naval
    Force. This effort is exploring Active/Reserve Force mix alternatives
    and is ongoing under the tutelage of Navy's Total Force Flag Steering
    Group. Active duty and Reserve officers are fully engaged in
    appropriately shaping the Navy of tomorrow and will continue working to
    bring this effort to completion.
        Secretary Roche. The entire Department of Defense is currently
    looking at all the emerging requirements of the new National Military
    Strategy which have been given such great impetus by the events of
    September 11. In the Air Force, we have made and will continue to make
    changes to our force mix (the ratio of a mission in the active and
    Reserve components) and force structure (how those forces are based and
    organized) as new needs emerge to support that strategy. The Air
    Reserve Component (ARC), both Reserve and Guard, have made huge
    contributions to our successes in Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble
    Eagle. They have stepped up to the challenges just as our active
    component has. Though the active and Reserve components have both been
    stressed in these endeavors, our risk management has spread that stress
    fairly equitably.
        We do have several mission areas in which we are making adjustments
    to mitigate some of those stresses to the Reserve component. For
    example, the Air Force Reserve is transferring 15 combat search and
    rescue aircraft, a low-density/high-demand asset, to the active
    component. In turn the Reserve unit will convert to KC-135 R-model
    tankers, a mission that has proven very successful in the Reserve
    component. The ARC will also be transferring 14 C-130 R-models to our
    Air Force Special Operations Command to meet the post September 11
    requirements. These adjustments will allow the active and Reserve
    components to maintain the steady-state requirements without overusing
    our invaluable Reserve component.

                               ARMY MODERNIZATION

        21. Senator Levin. Secretary White, in this year's budget request
    the Army has made a clear statement as to acquisition priorities,
    shifting $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2004 and $22 billion across the
    fiscal year 2004-2009 FYDP from the procurement of existing legacy
    weapon systems to the R&D and procurement of Objective Force systems.
    This was done by canceling 24 programs and restructuring another 24
    more. This is on the heels of numerous such cancellations in prior
    years. While moving forward with transformation, until this year the
    Army had intended to balance the risks in the transformation plan by
    recapitalizing and selectively modernizing the three heavy Army
    divisions and the Armored Cavalry Regiment of the counter-attack
    corps--forces which will continue to be needed for the next two
    decades. Now only two divisions of that corps will be modernized. How
    should we assess the risks in that strategy?
        Secretary White. The Army has conducted continuous reassessment of
    the risk associated with transforming the force in anticipation of its
    Future Combat Systems. At this time, given current transformation
    timelines, the Army believes that the risk it has taken is prudent. The
    continuous assessment of risk includes all Quadrennial Defense Review-
    defined risks, particularly the near-term operational, the future
    challenges, and the force management effects of programmatic offsets.
    We will continue to reevaluate these reductions each year and will
    readdress our risk as the situation warrants.

        22. Senator Levin. Secretary White, I note that news reports
    indicate that the Army plans to deploy four heavy divisions and a
    cavalry regiment for a possible war with Iraq. Does modernizing only
    two of those over the next 20 years make sense?
        Secretary White. The Army made a conscious decision to decrease the
    modernization of the Counterattack Corps from 3\1/3\ divisions to 2
    divisions. It was clearly the toughest decision in this budget. We were
    forced to terminate and curtail some modernization programs including
    the digitization of the Counterattack Corps in order to generate
    capital for Army transformation. The Army has accepted prudent
    operational risk in the mid-term to fund our transformation to the
    Objective Force. The Army has several means to mitigate the risk
    associated with this decision. We are on schedule to gain the initial
    operational capability of the first Stryker Brigade this year. The six
    Stryker Brigades, which we have planned, act as both a strategic hedge
    to allow transformation of our current forces and as a learning
    environment to train leaders and soldiers for our Objective Force
    formations. We have also accelerated the fielding of transformational
    technologies to enhance the warfighting capabilities of our deployed
    forces. We will be transforming units from our divisions into Objective
    Force formations by the end of this decade.
        We made the judgment to curtail the modernization of the
    Counterattack Corps at two divisions after a careful balancing of
    operational risk, and the risk of not transforming, to provide the
    capabilities that the Army needs to meet the obligations of mid-term
    and long-term joint operations concepts. We are closely monitoring the
    current operational situation as we support the combatant commanders in
    the global war on terrorism, conduct homeland defense, and prosecute
    the long-term effort to defeat transnational threats to ensure the risk
    remains prudent. As current operations unfold, we will reexamine our
    risk assessment each year.

        23. Senator Levin. Secretary White, how confident are you of
    meeting the 2010 initial operational capability date for the Future
    Combat Systems? Do you believe that the technologies will be mature
    enough to make a decision to go forward with system development and
    demonstration this spring?
        Secretary White. I am highly confident that we will meet the Future
    Combat System's initial operational capability in 2010. In the context
    of emerging changes to acquisition policy, we are working with DOD to
    develop an acquisition approach that supports our intent to provide an
    operationally effective initial capability to the Nation in 2010. To
    meet our timelines, we are adopting an approach that will enable the
    Army to adapt processes available in the commercial sector to
    accelerate maturation of technology and integration of systems. The use
    of the Lead Systems Integrator to assist the Army in the management and
    execution of this program has allowed us to leverage commercial
    practices to retain competition and integrate a broad range of
    solutions for the system of systems concept.
        The Army is finalizing its evaluation of the technology within FCS
    as required by the Defense Acquisition Executive. The chief scientist
    of the Army chartered reviews of the technology by both government and
    independent experts. These assessments have been reconciled and Army
    leadership is reviewing the consolidated product. Upon approval, the
    technology maturity assessment will be forwarded to the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense for final endorsement. The Army foresees no issue
    that would preclude an affirmative technology maturity assessment at
    the systems development and demonstration decision point in May 2003.

        24. Senator Levin. Secretary White, if you expect to begin fielding
    the Future Combat Systems in 2008 as planned, why do you believe it is
    so important to field the fifth and sixth interim Stryker Brigade
    Combat Teams in 2006 and 2007? Would you consider spending the $3
    billion intended for those brigades for modernizing the remainder of
    the heavy counter-attack corps instead?
        Secretary White. The Army has established the correct balance
    through continuous reassessment of the approximate mix of Legacy,
    Interim, and Objective Forces needed to accomplish various mission
    sets. In order to sustain the ability to support forward deployed
    rotations and meet multiple requirements of the defense strategy, the
    Army has developed the appropriate number of highly mobile forces.
        As the Army transitions to support the ``1-4-2-1'' defense
    construct, the Stryker Brigade is a force that fills critical gaps that
    enable combatant commanders to accomplish the defense strategy. Present
    Stryker Brigade fielding timelines will enhance the Nation's ability to
    fight and win the war on terrorism while deterring hostile nations with
    weapons of mass destruction and transforming. The transformation of
    four active component brigades to Stryker Brigades provides a
    rotational base with three of the brigades focused on the Pacific
    theater and one forward-based in Europe. The Stryker Cavalry Regiment
    will support the XVIII Airborne Corps' critical need for robust armed
    reconnaissance. The conversion of a Reserve component brigade to a
    Stryker Brigade is critical because it enhances the capabilities of the
    strategic Reserve, and homeland defense missions are better met. This
    will allow the Army to embed digital technology into the Reserve
    components that will facilitate future active and Reserve
    interoperability as part of the joint force.
        Additionally, the conversion to six brigades focuses on every part
    of the Army: active and Reserve components, heavy and light forces, and
    U.S. and overseas based. Then, the ability to rotate the Reserve
    component Stryker Brigade into small-scale contingencies or enduring
    support and stability operation deployments in support of the global
    war on terrorism, Balkans, etc., allows a manageable operational tempo
    and deployment tempo for these capable units.

        25. Senator Levin. Secretary White, do you intend to include any of
    the 48 canceled or restructured programs on any unfunded priorities
    list the Army would submit for congressional consideration this year?
        Secretary White. The fiscal year 2004 budget submission included 24
    systems that were terminated. Based on lessons learned from the global
    war on terrorism, the Army reviewed ongoing operations and revalidated
    limited numbers for four systems that had been terminated during the
    preparation of the budget submission: Tactical Exploitation System
    (TES), M919 25 millimeter ammunition, Stinger Missile, and the Joint
    Tactical Terminal. As part of the budget submission, the Army also
    generated a list of critical unfunded priorities. Three of the
    revalidated systems were placed on this list--TES, M919, and Stinger.
    In all cases, the unfunded priorities procure systems to meet an
    identified Army shortfall in the global war on terrorism.
        The budget submission also included 24 programs that were
    restructured. Of these 24 restructured programs, four programs include
    elements that appear on the unfunded priorities list (Family of Medium
    Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), Javelin missile, second generation forward-
    looking infrared radar (FLIR), and Soldier Modernization Systems). The
    FMTV request would procure light medium tactical vehicles and medium
    tactical vehicles, the Javelin request would procure 720 command launch
    units for the Army National Guard, the second generation FLIR request
    would provide funds required to maintain the industrial base, while the
    Soldier Modernization Systems request would provide various soldier
    equipment to support the Army's Rapid Fielding Initiative for the
    global war on terrorism.
        The Army may propose further changes to fiscal year 2004
    investments pending lessons learned from current operations.

                         SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING

        26. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, the fiscal year 2004 budget request reduces
    investments in critical S&T programs by more than $1 billion from
    fiscal year 2003 appropriated levels. It falls well short of the goal
    of investing 3 percent of the defense budget in S&T to support military
    transformation, despite the fact that the goal has been endorsed by the
    Defense Science Board, National Academy of Sciences, Quadrennial
    Defense Review, Congress, and even yourselves. In fact, by fiscal year
    2009 it is programmed to fall to 2.4 percent of DOD's topline, not even
    including supplemental appropriations. How is this limited investment
    supportive of your goal to transform our military capabilities?
        Secretary White. To accelerate Army transformation, the Army has
    grown the S&T budget request every year since the Army Vision was
    announced in 1999. This represents a total of 38 percent growth in Army
    S&T since the fiscal year 2001 budget request. We have done this
    because we recognize the key role of Army S&T in accelerating Future
    Combat Systems and other Objective Force capabilities. Over 98 percent
    of fiscal year 2004 S&T investments are focused on maturing and
    developing critical technologies to achieve Objective Force
    capabilities. S&T investments through fiscal year 2009 continue to
    increase, focused on transitioning technology to the warfighter faster.
        Secretary Johnson. The overall Navy S&T portfolio is closely
    monitored to ensure consistency with, and support for, the Navy's
    Transformation Roadmap Sea Power 21 pillars, including Sea Strike, Sea
    Shield, Sea Base, and FORCEnet. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget
    request contains several transformational initiatives, reflecting OSD
    and Navy leadership priorities. Examples of such transformational
    programs which are included in the Navy S&T budget request include:

             Joint Forces Command's experimentation program
             Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle
             Electric Power Technologies including 100 kilowatt
            free electron laser, and 36 megawatt superconducting motor
             Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle S&T requirements
            (Marine Corps)
             Advanced Multi-function Radio Frequency System
             Wide bandgap power devices
             Functional materials
             Hypersonic weapons
             Virtual at-sea training
             Project Morgan
             DC homopolar motor
             X-Craft
             Lightweight electrical energy sources (Marine Corps)
             Secure mobile wireless networking technology (Marine
            Corps)
             USMC Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV)
             USMC Electric Technologies for Advanced Ground
            Vehicles
             Marine Corps Warfighting Lab experimentation

        Navy understands the importance of identifying appropriate S&T
    projects and quickly delivering those new technologies to the
    warfighters. During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi
    Freedom, several S&T projects (thermobaric weapons, affordable weapons,
    and a knowledge web system) transitioned directly from S&T to the
    Fleet/Force, thereby demonstrating the current value of S&T programs.
        Secretary Roche. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requested
    amount of $2.2 billion is actually higher than the fiscal year 2003
    appropriated amount of $1.8 billion for the Air Force S&T program and
    provides for the technology development essential for the Air Force
    vision of an Expeditionary Air and Space Force. We have taken the
    effects and capabilities required by the Air Force's Concepts of
    Operations and mapped them to the long-term challenges and short-term
    objectives identified in the congressionally-directed S&T Planning
    Review completed in February 2002. Our goal is to make the warfighting
    effects and the capabilities we need to achieve them the drivers for
    everything we do and this is especially true in our S&T program.

        27. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, what areas of research are you cutting back on?
        Secretary White. The Army regularly reviews S&T investments to
    ensure we maintain a balanced portfolio of basic and applied research
    and advanced technology development programs. We are not cutting back
    on research; we are increasing investments in those areas that will get
    us to the Future Combat Systems and the Objective Force sooner.
    Specifically, in basic research we have increased funding 18 percent
    compared with the fiscal year 2001 budget request for paradigm-shifting
    technologies such as nanoscience and biotechnology.
        Secretary Johnson. While Basic Research (6.1) has benefited from
    the devolvement of a portion of the University Research Initiative
    program to Navy, there remain difficult choices in Applied Research
    (6.2) and Advanced Technology Development (6.3) funding to maintain the
    best possible portfolio.
        In the face of the constrained budgetary environment, we made
    difficult choices in Applied Research (6.2) and Advanced Technology
    Development (6.3) funding to maintain a viable portfolio to fund
    transformational S&T at a rate we can afford.
        We reduced funding for the Future Naval Capabilities (FNC)--
    designed to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter--in order to
    focus only on the highest priority projects within the 6.2 and 6.3
    portfolio.
        The following shows some of the primary FNC products that were
    reduced or not pursued in the fiscal year 2004 President's budget
    request:

             Low observable integrated deckhouse,
             Advanced estimate of sensor performance,
             Mission responsive ordnance,
             Limits of passive sonar, and
             Underwater surveillance data link network.

        Secretary Roche. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requested
    amount of $2.2 billion for the Air Force S&T program is actually higher
    than the fiscal year 2003 appropriated amount of $1.8 billion. This
    increase comes primarily as a result of In-House Laboratory Independent
    Research, High Energy Laser, and High Performance Computing
    Modernization programs that were devolved to the Air Force by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense. We have worked hard to maintain a
    balanced S&T portfolio and, if you discount these programs and compare
    only traditional S&T funding, our fiscal year 2004 President's budget
    request sustains a level S&T investment from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal
    year 2004.

                                   WORKFORCE

        28. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, it is clear that government labs, especially defense
    labs, are finding it difficult to attract and retain the finest
    scientific and engineering technical talent. Congress has attempted to
    provide the directors of your laboratories with the ability to
    establish demonstration programs to address workforce issues, and to
    ``directly hire'' needed technical talent (avoiding standard civil
    service red tape) to be more competitive with the private sector, but
    these have not been aggressively utilized by the Services. How are you
    planning to address your science and engineering workforce crisis?
        Secretary White. The service laboratories are now facing other
    challenges from within the Department. A Federal Register announcement
    has been published which may have consequences for the laboratories,
    possibly compromising progress on the previous lab demonstrations and
    requiring the labs to adopt, with union concurrence, so-called ``best
    practices.'' These ``best practices'' were personnel rules adopted from
    all of the current personnel demonstrations, but which may not be
    tailored to the specific needs of the various labs. In addition, the
    Department is attempting to develop a ``one size fits all'' new
    personnel system based on these ``best practices,'' which will apply to
    all of its employees, but which may not address the specific needs of
    the labs. Until these OSD initiatives sort themselves out, it remains
    unclear how we will address the personnel requirements of the labs.
        Secretary Johnson. Civilian workforce issues are of great concern
    to the Department of the Navy, and have been the subject of several
    recent studies:

             the August 2000 Civilian Workforce 2020: Strategies
            for Modernizing Human Resources Management in the Department of
            the Navy;
             the July 2001 Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO)
            Task Force report on Civilian Manpower & Personnel Management;
            and
             the May 2002 tri-Service study carried out under the
            auspices of the Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) study
            called Science and Technology Community in Crisis.

        All three of these produced recommendations for improving the
    Department of the Navy's civilian workforce, some of which have already
    been implemented.
        Your concerns about the crisis in our science and engineering task
    force were validated in the NRAC study which was chartered by the
    Director, Defense Research and Engineering. Its report emphasized that
    the viability of the Defense Department's S&T capability is threatened
    by increasing losses of key technical personnel, insufficient levels of
    funding for facility and equipment modernization, and bureaucratic
    impediments that often produce counter-productive results in the
    research environment.
        The NRAC report emphasized, in particular, the serious demographic
    challenge the labs face over the next several years, when retirements
    are expected to claim much of their experienced science and engineering
    talent. Replacing that talent is a top priority, we are already taking
    steps to improve the labs' ability to recruit, hire, and retain the
    best science and engineering personnel. The Navy has been working with
    the DOD in analyzing all human resources practices in the laboratory
    demonstration projects under DOD's Best Practices Initiative and we are
    working together to provide the results of this analysis as best
    practices across the entire laboratory community rather than just one
    lab experiencing independent success.
        Congressionally-authorized personnel demonstration projects have
    improved our ability to recruit and retain some of the best and
    brightest technical talent in the market, but they do not completely
    solve our lab personnel problems. For example, the pilot projects do
    not provide all the hiring flexibilities we need because we still
    cannot get the most innovative programs through each local union which
    we are required to do under the demonstration project authority.
        Building on the success of these congressionally-authorized
    personnel demonstration projects, the Administration recommended
    legislation for a DOD National Security Personnel System (NSPS) this
    year. We strongly support this legislation which the House-passed
    version in H.R. 1588 largely reflects. This legislation takes the labs
    out of a demonstration project status and allows permanent use of best
    practices flexibilities in the labs as well as the rest of the
    Department by providing among other things, the basis for a fair and
    flexible system of civilian personnel management with critical
    flexibilities in hiring, assignment, advancement, and reduction in
    force. In addition, it provides the opportunity for a new labor-
    management relationship that is critical to implementing NSPS in a
    timely manner and a streamlined appellate system that is fundamental to
    implementing a workable pay for performance system. The legislation
    would also permit the temporary hiring of older Americans and remove
    the pay penalty for hiring annuitants that would allow us to retain the
    mentoring capability and institutional knowledge of our best talent.
        Another example is an initiative by the Office of Naval Research
    specifically aimed at revitalizing the S&T workforce in our labs and
    centers. This collaborative effort, which also includes academic
    partners, has a number of components. For example, it provides
    scholarships at participating universities in return for obligated
    service in our labs. It also envisions retraining retired military
    technology officers and bringing them back into the labs where their
    valuable experience as warfighters can be infused into our research
    efforts.
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has
    implemented a successful personnel demonstration project, which is in
    its sixth year. It addresses many workforce issues, such as pay
    inequalities and workforce refreshment. As a direct result, we have
    seen great improvement in the laboratory workforce morale and
    retainment.
        With respect to Section 342 of the National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 1995 and Section 1114 of the NDAA for Fiscal
    Year 2001, additional initiatives have been implemented, while others,
    such as direct hire authority for college graduates, are still being
    evaluated by the Department of Defense. In the interim, AFRL and the
    Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel worked together to allow
    AFRL to utilize the Federal Career Intern Program.
        To fully address the S&E workforce crisis, the Air Force has
    established the first-ever Scientist and Engineer Functional Manager
    within the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
    (Science, Technology, and Engineering) to oversee the health and
    development of the workforce. In addition, we have established several
    military and civilian recruitment, retention, and bonus programs to
    address critical career field needs. An example of one recent success
    story is that a large percentage of military scientists and engineers
    have accepted the Critical Skills Retention Bonus.
        In March 2002, the transformation of the entire DOD civilian
    personnel community was initiated as the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Personnel and Readiness) directed the establishment of the DOD Human
    Resources Best Practices Task Force. The Task Force, consisting of
    representatives from both the human resources community and the
    functional community, including Air Force and defense laboratory
    representatives, reviewed initiatives that had been subject to testing
    and evaluation in our personnel demonstration projects. After careful
    consideration of the ``best practices,'' they developed a personnel
    system to best meet the needs of the Department, the National Security
    Personnel System.

        29. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, what new authorities, if any, do your lab directors
    need to face this crisis?
        Secretary White. The labs continue to require authorities to hire
    top talent at market rates, in some cases well above current Senior
    Executive Service pay scales. In addition, they also should have
    authorities to more easily remove employees at the bottom of the
    performance scale, allowing the labs to raise the ``quality bar.''
    These two authorities are the most critical for improving the quality
    of the workforce.
        Secretary Johnson. Enactment of the House-passed version of the
    National Security Personnel System in H.R. 1588 is critical to
    obtaining the widest possible flexibilities to enable the labs and
    centers to recruit and retain the best and brightest.
        Secretary Roche. For the Air Force to move forward in the coming
    century, we need the ability to use all the flexibilities proposed in
    the Best Practices demonstration project, not only for the laboratory
    workforce, but across all Air Force functions. In addition, The Air
    Force Research Laboratory Commander needs the authority to implement
    the flexibilities contained within Best Practices to meet mission and
    workforce demands and to adequately address the Air Force scientist and
    engineer workforce crisis.

                   STANDOFF CONVENTIONAL EXPLOSIVE DETECTION

        30. Senator Levin. Secretary Johnson, the attack on the U.S.S. Cole
    demonstrated a significant force protection vulnerability. Since the
    October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole, what technological advances
    have been made to help prevent a repeat of this tragic event?
        Secretary Johnson. The Office of Naval Research has developed
    several technologies to help provide force protection to U.S. ships
    including:

             Flare launcher on a .50 Caliber machine gun mount to
            send warning shots at small boats;
             Running Gear Entanglement System to provide a 100m
            perimeter around a ship at anchor;
             Rapidly developed empirically validated models
            demonstrate new solutions for ship survivability. Model shows
            that use of stainless steel for hull material helps to reduce
            blast penetration;
             360 degree periscope and related software;
             Microwave powered warning system which deters
            intruders by heating their skin; and
             Nuclear Quadrapole Resonance System for the detection
            of bulk explosives (RDX, PETN) in packages, mail pouches, or on
            personnel (manual scanning).

        31. Senator Levin. Secretary Johnson, specifically, what
    investments has the Navy made to improve our ability to detect
    conventional explosives (not WMD) from standoff ranges?
        Secretary Johnson. This is a challenging problem for which no good
    technical solution has yet been identified. ONR hosted a conference on
    standoff detection of conventional explosives that concluded that no
    stand-off (defined as >1Km) off-the-shelf detection technologies could
    be exploited within the next 18 months.
        Planning for technology investment in this area is underway. ONR is
    collaborating with Air Force, Army, Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal,
    and NAVSEA Indian Head experts (both government and contractor) to
    identify and exploit emerging technologies that may potentially be
    stand-off quality detectors. Additional proposals are being continually
    received and reviewed for merit. Much work is underway in detectors
    suitable for shorter range, including joint Navy/DARPA work in the
    nuclear quadruple resonance technology especially in combination with
    other standard techniques.

              army research, development, and engineering command
        32. Senator Levin. Secretary White, the Army has begun to standup a
    Research, Development, and Engineering Command that will absorb the
    existing labs and research organizations (such as TARDEC) that
    currently are aligned with Army Major Commands (such as TACOM). How
    will this reorganization affect the reporting chains, mission, and
    funding levels at these organizations?
        Secretary White. Overall funding levels will not be affected by the
    reorganization. The Research, Development, and Engineering Command
    Center Directors will report to the Commander, Research, Development,
    and Engineering Command. The commanders of the Tank and Automotive
    Command, Communications and Electronics Command, and Aviation and
    Missile Command continue to report to the Commander, Army Materiel
    Command.

        33. Senator Levin. Secretary White, will there be any net loss of
    personnel from the affected organizations?
        Secretary White. The realignments within the affected organizations
    will be done without any net loss of personnel.

        34. Senator Levin. Secretary White, why is this reorganization a
    positive step, when it would seem to create a wider gulf between the
    technology developers and the organizations that typically make use of
    their innovations and products?
        Secretary White. Research, Development, and Engineering Command
    will establish synergy across the laboratories to speed technology
    transition to the developing and buying organizations--program
    executive offices. Each program executive office will have a senior
    official responsible to ensure the technologies developed in the labs
    are satisfying essential warfighting needs. The Research, Development,
    and Engineering Command Agile Development Center's scientists and
    engineers will work directly with the combatant commands to establish a
    ``reach-back link'' to Army Materiel Command laboratory capabilities.

                           HIGH ENERGY LASER PROGRAMS

        35. Senator Levin. Secretary Roche, the OSD has proposed devolving
    all high energy laser S&T programs to the Air Force. This program was
    established by statute as a joint program, with OSD management. There
    is great concern that the joint program that has been established will
    be subsumed by Air Force interests in high energy lasers. Will the Air
    Force be requesting a change in statute to support and legalize the
    devolvement?
        Secretary Roche. The devolvement of programs to the Air Force was
    initiated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Air Force has
    no plans at this time to request a change in statute, but we are
    working to ensure that the programs transferred to the Air Force
    continue to advocate the broader multiple military objectives inherent
    in these programs. We are currently developing a Memorandum of
    Agreement between the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and
    Technology) (DUSD (S&T)) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air
    Force (Science, Technology, and Engineering) on management of the High
    Energy Laser Joint Technology Office. We plan to have DUSD (S&T)
    continue to function as the Senior Civilian Official and as Chair of
    the Technology Council in accordance with the current statute.

        36. Senator Levin. Secretary Roche, how will the Air Force retain
    the joint nature of the program as intended by Congress?
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force does not plan to make any changes to
    the High Energy Laser Joint Technology Office (JTO) process beyond that
    required by changes in the funding source. Representatives from the
    other Services and defense agencies will still participate in the JTO.
    Proposals will continue to be solicited from them, as well as from
    industry and academia as before, and these proposals will continue to
    be evaluated by the same joint structure. The Air Force will not
    increase its participation in the JTO or in the various working groups
    that support the JTO. The Technology Council, chaired by the Deputy
    Under Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology) and comprised of
    the Service and Defense Agency Science and Technology Executives, will
    continue to be the principal oversight body. The JTO will not be a part
    of the Directed Energy Directorate of the Air Force Research
    Laboratory, but will continue as a separate organization. The JTO
    Director will report to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
    (Science, Technology, and Engineering).

        37. Senator Levin. Secretary Roche, how will the Air Force ensure
    that the programs continue to be funded at a sufficient level in future
    years given growing budget constraints?
        Secretary Roche. The three High Energy Laser JTO program elements
    were devolved to the Air Force along with out-year funding. These
    programs will be protected as much as possible from future budget
    reductions. It is our plan at this time to use the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology) Technology Council to
    address appropriate funding levels for this program.

        38. Senator Levin. Secretary Roche, is there any OSD guidance on
    the appropriate level of funding for these programs?
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force has not received any guidance from
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the appropriate
    level of funding for these programs.

                                  DEVOLVEMENT

        39. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, a number of S&T programs have been devolved to the
    Services from the OSD. There has been guidance from OSD regarding
    funding levels for these programs (including the JTO High Energy
    Lasers, High Performance Computing Modernization Program, and others)
    during the FYDP. There is concern that, if the Services are faced with
    resource shortfalls due to current operations or other expenses, these
    programs may become targets for reprogramming and could be used as
    sources of funding for other Service priorities. Is there any guidance
    from OSD on protecting devolved programs from reprogramming actions?
        Secretary White. The devolved OSD programs have been assigned new
    program elements, which allow OSD and Congress to track the funding
    levels of these efforts.
        Secretary Johnson. There is no such guidance. For the devolved
    programs, OSD guidance did note that consistent with oversight
    responsibilities, appropriate OSD staff will review execution plans and
    metrics prior to the start of each fiscal year, and at mid-year to
    determine future allocations.
        The following funded requirements were devolved from OSD to Navy
    S&T during the fiscal year 2004 budget development cycle:

                                                                [In millions
                                                                 of dollars]

      University Research Initiatives                                   70.7
      In-House Laboratory Independent Research                           2.1

        Although special protection has not been assigned to these
    programs, Navy will execute these programs in accordance with R-2
    budget justification exhibits which support the fiscal year 2004
    President's budget request. These programs did receive proportionate
    reductions (approximately -2.0 percent) without prejudice during the
    Navy fiscal year 2004 budget development cycle; these cuts are
    reflected in the President's budget request.
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force has not received any guidance from
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense with respect to protecting
    devolved programs from reprogramming actions.

        40. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, will you ensure that these programs are protected to
    preserve OSD and congressional intent with regards to the investment
    levels in these critical research and technology areas?
        Secretary White. Yes. We have no plans to change either the intent
    or investment levels in these programs.
        Secretary Johnson. The following funded requirements were devolved
    from OSD to Navy S&T during the fiscal year 2004 budget development
    cycle:

                                                               [[In millions
                                                                 of dollars]

    University Research Initiatives                                     70.7
    In-House Laboratory Independent Research                             2.1

        Although special protection has not been assigned to these
    programs, Navy will execute these programs in accordance with R-2
    budget justification exhibits, which support the fiscal year 2004
    President's budget request. These programs did receive proportionate
    reductions (approximately -2.0 percent) without prejudice during the
    Navy fiscal year 2004 budget development cycle; these cuts are
    reflected in the President's budget request.
        It is noted that OSD continues to maintain joint oversight for
    these programs, before and after the fiscal year 2004 devolvement.
        Secretary Roche. The In-House Laboratory Independent Research, High
    Energy Laser, and High Performance Computing Modernization programs
    devolved to the Air Force by the OSD were devolved along with out-year
    funding. These programs will be protected as much as possible from
    future budget reductions. It is our plan at this time to work with OSD
    to address appropriate funding levels for these programs.

                            COORDINATION WITH DARPA

        41. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, the DARPA now executes over 25 percent of the total
    DOD S&T budget. How do you work with DARPA to ensure that they support
    your mission areas and complement your S&T programs?
        Secretary White. The Army looks to DARPA to invest in high-risk,
    high-payoff technologies that might give us significant increases in
    future warfighting capabilities. Through the years, there have been
    many instances of the Army transitioning technologies, components, and
    systems from DARPA that support Army mission areas. Frequently,
    however, these transitions were not smooth.
        The FCS program was conceived with a number of important goals. One
    was to use DARPA's innovative thinking and procurement strategies to
    help the Army transform on a very rapid timeline. Another was to lay a
    foundation for achieving smoother, faster transitions of technologies
    from DARPA to the Army. We believe that the key to achieving both of
    these goals was establishing a partnership early in the research and
    development cycle.
        The Army/DARPA FCS memorandum of agreement (MOA) established a
    partnership that has served us well over the past 3 years. We have
    achieved the key program objectives in support of the FCS Milestone B
    decision and the products of this partnership will be seen in FCS
    Increment I. We are now in the process of negotiating a new FCS MOA
    with DARPA for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006, focusing on
    selected enabling technologies that will continue to increase the
    capabilities of FCS and the Objective Force through the spiral
    development process.
        The Army continues to cultivate its relationship with DARPA and
    partner with them to achieve unprecedented leaps in areas beyond ground
    combat. We are pursuing breakthroughs in unmanned aviation through an
    established partnership on the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft program
    and a proposed partnership on the A-160 Hummingbird. Based on our
    successes with FCS, I am confident we will continue using this approach
    for future programs that require risk-taking, innovative approaches.
        Secretary Johnson. Our investment portfolios are not built in
    isolation. The defense reliance process integrates the Services' S&T
    programs while preserving the healthy diversity of vision and approach
    that has given us the technical agility we enjoy today. Our relations
    with DARPA are excellent and productive. Much of the Office of Naval
    Research's basic and applied research investment is designed with a
    view to handing scientific advances over to DARPA for further
    development and exploitation. The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle program
    is an excellent example of this kind of collaboration. We are working
    closely with DARPA on wide band gap semiconductors to support the
    radar, communications, and electronic warfare systems of the future,
    including the advanced multifunction radio frequency concept.
        Secretary Roche. The relationship between the Air Force and DARPA
    continues to be strong with the Air Force acting as agents for a number
    of DARPA technology programs. This relationship helps focus both the
    Air Force and DARPA on technologies that provide future capabilities
    that are relevant to the warfighter. In addition to executing DARPA
    technology programs, the Air Force participates in the defense reliance
    process to coordinate those programs that are of mutual interest, but
    not ones that we are executing for DARPA. DARPA technology investments
    are important to the Air Force and we strive to maintain cognizance of
    their research programs to harmonize efforts and eliminate duplication.

        42. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, are there specific technology development goals
    supporting mission areas in your Service in which DARPA could play a
    larger role?
        Secretary White. The new FCS MOA for future Army/DARPA
    collaboration will be finalized after the FCS Milestone B decision in
    May 2003. At that time, the Army and DARPA will assess capability gaps
    between FCS Increment I and objective capabilities where new
    technologies can offer a solution. From that set, we will determine the
    best mix of technology investments in which the Army should lead and
    those in which a partnership with DARPA makes the most business sense.
        In laying the groundwork for the new MOA, we already have
    identified three key areas where we believe DARPA can help the Army.
    They are (1) find the enemy, (2) autonomy with intent, and (3)
    affordable survivability.
        ``Find the Enemy'' seeks to provide technologies to defeat
    camouflage, concealment, and deception and to exploit situational
    awareness through improved sensors, assured communications, intelligent
    decision aids, and data fusion.
        ``Autonomy with Intent'' focuses on improving the ability of
    unmanned systems to function while minimizing soldier workload and
    required attention/interaction.
        ``Affordable Combat Identification'' aims to increase force
    survivability by improving identification of battlefield entities for
    intermingled forces in high OPTEMPO operations in complex terrains
    using cost-effective approaches.
        Each of these areas presents real technical challenges that will
    require extremely innovative thinking and the ability to invest
    significant resources to demonstrate viable solutions. All are
    important today and will be even more important in the future Objective
    Force.
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy has been working closely with DARPA to
    coordinate S&T efforts. There are numerous areas where S&T Program
    Officers wear both ONR and DARPA hats thus leading to highly leveraged
    cooperative efforts. Wide band gap semiconductor developments that
    enable the advanced multi-function radio frequency system for Navy
    ships is a good example.
        DARPA and ONR work together to identify DARPA programs and projects
    that have high applicability to naval requirements and utilize ONR's
    Future Naval Capabilities program to enable transition. Besides
    identifying DARPA programs with Navy interest, ONR technologies
    addressing DARPA development needs, such as small atomic clocks, make
    DARPA's efforts more likely to succeed. Recently, DARPA has initiated a
    Service Day activity, inviting S&T, requirements, and acquisition
    members of the Services to briefings on their programs in order to get
    better exposure of their efforts. The first Navy-DARPA Service Day will
    be conducted in early May 2003 in the areas of electronic warfare,
    communications, and information assurance.
        Secretary Roche. The most important area in which DARPA could
    increase their technology development efforts is in space access and
    other space-related efforts. We have seen indications that they are
    already planning for a larger space technology investment and we
    certainly encourage this. Another area of particular interest to the
    Air Force is information technology. DARPA already has a robust
    investment in this area, which the Air Force would like to see
    continued and, perhaps, even increased.

               FOREIGN STUDENT INVOLVEMENT IN DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH

        43. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, what policies and directives currently control the
    participation of foreign students in Service-funded research programs?
        Secretary White. The Army requires contractors performing basic
    research to abide by Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324a, which
    makes it unlawful to employ unauthorized aliens and sets forth the
    requirements for documenting and attesting that aliens are not
    unauthorized, as well as 8 Code of Federal Regulations 274a(2), which
    sets forth the process for the verification of employment eligibility
    of aliens. As long as the contractor or university complies with the
    United States Code and Code of Federal Regulations alien employment
    requirements, and the foreign student is eligible for employment, there
    are no restrictions on their working on unclassified basic research.
        Additionally, we comply with the Department of Defense grants and
    agreements regulations. All Army basic research is unclassified and is
    generally published in peer reviewed, open literature.
        Secretary Johnson. Generally, student participation in a Service-
    funded research program occurs at an institution of higher education
    (IHE); the IHE receives an award from the Service to conduct research
    (typically a grant) and then chooses which students participate in the
    research. Student participation is generally not limited by citizenship
    unless a security clearance is required for the uncommon instance of a
    classified research program at an IHE.
        Some students participate in research at Service laboratories via
    various intern/summer programs. Security clearance requirements
    generally limit participation in these programs to citizens or, in some
    cases, permanent residents.
        Small Business Administration policy governs acceptance and
    prohibition on issues such as these. If the individual has a ``green
    card'' or is a legal resident, he/she is permitted to work on an Small
    Business Innovation Research project.
        Secretary Roche. The baseline document that the Air Force uses to
    provide policy and direction for foreign students in funded research
    programs is the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-189,
    entitled ``National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and
    Engineering Information.'' This directive establishes national policy
    for controlling the flow of science, technology, and engineering
    information produced in conjunction with federally-funded fundamental
    research at colleges, universities, and laboratories. Basically, the
    NSDD-189 policy, to the maximum extent possible, is that the products
    of fundamental research remain unrestricted. If it is determined prior
    to conducting the research that there will likely be national security
    issues involved, the mechanism to control information will be by
    classification. Fundamentally, no restrictions may be placed upon the
    conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has
    not received national security classification, except as provided in
    applicable U.S. statutes. It is important to point out that NSDD-189
    applies to all students, including foreign students, involved in
    federally-funded fundamental research.

        44. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, how do you work to ensure that these programs are
    consistently applied across your Service?
        Secretary White. There are no restrictions on foreign students
    working on unclassified basic research sponsored at universities.
        Secretary Johnson. Each Institution of Higher Education (IHE) that
    performs Service funded research is responsible for choosing the
    students that participate in said research under the award (i.e.
    grant), as long as the IHE meets all provisions of the award
    requirements. In most cases, student participation is not limited by
    citizenship, unless a security clearance is required; however, it is
    uncommon for an IHE to perform on a classified research program.
        Students also participate in research at Service laboratories via
    various intern/summer programs; however, security clearance
    requirements generally limit participation in these programs to
    citizens or, in some cases, permanent residents.
        In the case of work performed at IHEs, laboratories, etc., it is
    generally considered to be the purview of the performing organization
    to assure that its policies and practices comply with applicable laws
    and regulations (including those regarding intellectual property and
    export control).
        Secretary Roche. To ensure our foreign student involvement programs
    are consistent across our laboratory, the Air Force relies on our
    Scientific and Technical Information Program and on our classification
    program managers to determine if federally-funded work is sensitive and
    should be appropriately controlled by national security guidelines. If
    foreign students are involved in research programs, the baseline for
    determining if fundamental research needs to be controlled for national
    security reasons is the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-
    189, entitled ``National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific,
    Technical and Engineering Information.'' This directive establishes
    national policy for controlling the flow of science, technology, and
    engineering information produced in conjunction with federally-funded
    fundamental research at colleges, universities, and laboratories.

             PUBLICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF DOD-FUNDED RESEARCH

        45. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, what policies and directives currently control the
    classification, publication in literature, and presentation in
    scientific conferences of Service-funded research programs?
        Secretary White. National Security Decision Directive 189 defines
    policy for publication of federally-funded research results. Under this
    policy, no restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of
    federally-funded fundamental research that has been determined to be
    unclassified. The challenge is in maintaining a process that identifies
    when and if unclassified information becomes classified.
        National security statutes require periodic reviews throughout the
    research process to reaffirm the classification of ongoing research.
    The mechanism for safeguarding this information is through
    classification. Army Regulation 380-5 (Information Security) provides
    policies, procedures, and criteria for the security classification of
    Army information. Additionally, Army Regulation 380-381 (Special Access
    Programs) provides policies, procedures, and criteria for safeguarding
    and protecting Army Special Access Programs. Army Regulation 360-1 (The
    Army Public Affairs Program) provides similar policies, procedures, and
    criteria for the release of unclassified Army information to the
    public.
        Secretary Johnson. Executive Order (EO) 12958, April 17, 1995,
    Classified National Security, prescribes a uniform system for
    classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security
    information.

             One of the classification categories is ``scientific,
            technological, or economic matters relating to the national
            security (SEC 1.5).
             Basic scientific research information not clearly
            related to the national security may not be classified (SEC
            1.8b).

        National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, September 21,
    1985, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and
    Engineering Information with Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/
    Research and Engineering (OUSD/R&E) Memo, October 1, 1984, Publication
    of the Results of DOD Sponsored Fundamental Research.

             This directive establishes national policy for
            controlling the flow of science, technology, and engineering
            information produced in federally-funded fundamental research
            at colleges, universities, and laboratories. Fundamental
            research is defined as follows:

            ``Fundamental research'' means basic and applied research in
            science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are
            published and shared broadly within the scientific community,
            as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial
            development, design, production, and product utilization, the
            results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or
            national security reasons.

             To the maximum extent possible, the products of
            fundamental research remain unrestricted. It is also the policy
            of this administration that, where the national security
            requires control, the mechanism for control of information
            generated during federally-funded fundamental research in
            science, technology, and engineering at colleges, universities,
            and laboratories is classification. Each Federal Government
            agency is responsible for: (a) determining whether
            classification is appropriate prior to the award of a research
            grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if so,
            controlling the research results through standard
            classification procedures; and (b) periodically reviewing all
            research grants, contracts, or cooperative agreements for
            potential classification. No restriction may be placed upon the
            conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundament research
            that has not received national security classification, except
            as provided in applicable U.S. statutes.

    Other Directives
        DOD 5200.1-R, Jan 1997, Information Security Program Regulation
        SECNAVINST 5510.36, 17 Mar 1999, Department of the Navy (DON)
    Information Security Program (ISP) Regulation
        DOD Instruction 5230.29, 6 May 1996, Security and Policy Review of
    DOD Information for Public Release
        DOD Instruction 3200.14, 13 May 1997, Principles and Operational
    Parameters of the DOD Scientific and Technical Information Program
        DOD Directive 3200.12, 15 Feb 1983, DOD Scientific and Technical
    Information Program
        SECNAVINST 3900.43A, 20 Jul 1994, Navy Scientific and Technical
    Information Program (STIP)
        DOD Directive 5230.24, 18 Mar 1987, Distribution Statements on
    Technical Documents
        ONRINST 5570.1, 1 Dec 1986, Distribution Statements on Technical
    Documents
        DOD Directive 5230.25, 6 Nov 1984, Withholding of Unclassified
    Technical Data From Public Disclosure [applies to all unclassified
    technical data with military or space applications which may not be
    exported limited to critical technology with military or space
    applications]
        OPNAVINST 5510.161, 29 Jul 1985, Withholding of Unclassified
    Technical Data from Public Disclosure
        ONRINST 5570.2, 1 Dec 1986, Processing of Unclassified Technical
    Information
        DOD Instruction 5230.27, 6 Oct 1987, Presentation of DOD-Related
    Scientific and Technical Papers at Meetings
        Militarily Critical Technologies List, June 1996, with updates
        EO 12829, 6 Jan 1993, National Industrial Security Program (NISP)
        Additional DOD/DON directives exist that contain restrictions on
    release of information relating to specific programs, such as Sensitive
    Compartmented Information and others, but these are usually classified
    programs not considered fundamental research.
        Other directives deal with specific procedures to accomplish
    review, if needed.
        Secretary Roche. I can only speak for Air Force research programs.
    Fundamental Executive Branch policy is documented in National Security
    Decision Directive 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific,
    Technical, and Engineering Information, approved by President Reagan.
    This Directive states that, ``to the maximum extent possible, the
    products of fundamental research [are to] remain unrestricted.''
        Classification of all Air Force information is governed by
    Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, as
    amended. This order specifies that information may only be classified
    if an original classification authority determines that its
    unauthorized disclosure would cause damage to the national security
    that the classification authority can identify or describe. Information
    properly classified may only be presented in forums where personnel
    present have a security clearance and a need-to-know. In addition, some
    scientific and technical information may be unclassified, but
    sensitive, and require controls under the Arms Export Control Act, the
    Export Administration Act, or other statutes. This information could
    not be presented in open forums, but could be presented in forums where
    personnel present have a need-to-know, but not necessarily a security
    clearance. Any scientific and technical information proposed for
    presentation in any open forum is required to undergo a security review
    in accordance with Air Force Instruction 35-101, Public Affairs
    Policies and Procedures.

        46. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, do these provide standard exceptions for fundamental
    research?
        Secretary White. Army activities, including the Army Research
    Laboratory, have incorporated clauses in the terms and conditions of
    research contracts when the area of research either may have potential
    defense applications or contain sensitive material. In these cases, the
    clause calls for review of the research results and papers prior to
    publication in the open literature. However, some universities have
    rejected contracts with prepublication review clauses.
        Secretary Johnson. Yes. Executive Order (EO) 12958 states that
    ``Basic scientific research information not clearly related to the
    national security may not be classified.''
        National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189 establishes policy
    that products of fundamental research remain unrestricted, except where
    classification is warranted.
        DOD Instruction 5230.27 reiterates the policy in EO 12958 and NSDD
    189 and is carried down to various DON directives.
        Secretary Roche. Yes, basic research is normally conducted,
    presented, and published in the public domain. As research is focused
    on military or scientific applications, it increases in sensitivity and
    access becomes more restricted. The only situations where basic
    research might be restricted or classified are if they involved a
    scientific breakthrough that had national security implications.

        47. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, how do you work to ensure that these programs are
    consistently applied across your Service?
        Secretary White. By following the adequate and comprehensive
    National Security, DOD, and Army policies and procedures described
    above.
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy follows Department of Defense and
    Department of the Navy directives. At the Office of Naval Research,
    program officers and program managers are responsible for determining
    that classified access is not required and that all information can be
    released to the public before awarding a grant as fundamental research.
        Secretary Roche. We have established formal review procedures
    through our Office of Public Affairs to review any data for release
    into the public domain. We also have formally designated those
    individuals having Original Classification Authority within the Air
    Force and require them to receive training prior to assuming those
    duties. We have formal mechanisms such as mandatory declassification
    reviews and annual security reviews to monitor our information security
    program to ensure information is properly classified and adequately
    protected. The Air Force Inspector General's office can review programs
    as needed.
        It is both prudent and cost effective to share data on basic
    research with the scientific community to globally conserve resources
    and cooperate in determining which approaches have promise and which
    have already proved worthless. There is no logic to restrict basic
    research. However, in transitioning from basic research to applied
    research, we must determine which basic research efforts have promising
    military applications that should be exploited. We rely on our
    technical directors in our laboratories to monitor their research
    programs and make informed judgments on when it is appropriate to begin
    to restrict access to information for national security reasons.

                    PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING FOR TRANSITION

        48. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, a major concern of DOD and Congress is the rapid and
    efficient transition of technologies from the S&T community to the
    warfighter. A common problem in this process is the reluctance of
    acquisition programs to commit out-year funding to transition or accept
    the anticipated products of current S&T programs, for fear of ``losing
    the money'' if the relatively high-risk S&T programs fail for technical
    reasons. This fear limits program managers' ability to take on risk in
    their program. How are you working to encourage program managers to
    take on more risk in their programs in order to accelerate Service
    transformation?
        Secretary White. The new DOD 5000 Defense Acquisition Framework
    provides Army program managers with a flexible process that encourages
    the insertion of new technologies at any point along the acquisition
    process to maintain technological superiority to the warfighter, while
    keeping program risk at an acceptable level. Key to this framework is
    the concept of evolutionary acquisition where capabilities are improved
    through time-phased requirements. The focus is on maturing and
    demonstrating technologies in a relevant environment before inserting
    the technology into actual systems to reduce life cycle cost and cycle
    time, while keeping overall risk to programs at a manageable level.
        The primary tool for communicating technology maturity to the
    program managers is through Technology Readiness Assessments (TRAs).
    TRAs are periodically conducted to measure the maturity of developing
    technologies to ensure they are sufficiently mature before being
    integrated into systems being developed by program managers. One of the
    end results of a TRA is the assignment of a Technology Readiness Level
    (TRL 1 through 9) for the technology being assessed. In general, the
    Army's position is that technologies are mature enough to transition
    once they have achieved TRL 6, or where systems have been demonstrated
    in a relevant environment. If a technology is rated less than a TRL 6,
    further development and risk reduction work is encouraged with a plan
    to include the new capability during the next increment or block
    upgrade of a weapons system.
        This new framework encourages the program managers to accept a
    manageable level of risk while attempting to transition ``high-risk''
    S&T programs into weapon systems. The framework allows for technology
    insertion by a program manager at any point along a program's life
    cycle to take advantage of rapidly maturing technologies and ensures
    technological superiority to the warfighter is maintained.
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy research and development community is
    working together to speed the transition of science and technology into
    the acquisition community. There are two major initiatives underway to
    reduce the risk of technology transition: the FNC process and the
    Commercial Technology Transition Office (CTTO).
    Future Naval Capabilities (FNC)
        FNCs are programs to shape the next Navy and Marine Corps.
    Developed and managed by integrated product teams with members of the
    acquisition, requirements, S&T, resource, and warfighter requirements
    communities, the FNC fill the gap that all too often opens between the
    S&T community and the acquisition commands.
        The FNC process delivers maturing technology to acquisition program
    managers for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and
    process improvements. With a total investment of $578 million in fiscal
    year 2002, over $640 million in fiscal year 2003 and $500 million
    planned for fiscal year 2004, FNCs support the Secretary of the Navy's
    goals to: (1) increase combat capability, (2) enhance personnel
    performance, (3) introduce advanced technology, and (4) improve
    business practices.
        The FNC process is already delivering products to the acquisition
    community. The Autonomous Operations FNC program is pursuing a dramatic
    increase in the performance and affordability of naval air, surface,
    ground, and underwater autonomous vehicles-unmanned systems able to
    operate with a minimum of human intervention and oversight. The
    Autonomous Operations FNC gives us a great potential to operate
    effectively in what would otherwise be denied areas and supports Sea
    Shield and Sea Strike.
        In fiscal year 2004, for example, we will transition the Gladiator
    Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle to the Marine Corps. Gladiator is
    intended to support dismounted infantry across the spectrum of conflict
    and throughout the range of military operations. It will enhance the
    tactical commanders' ability to detect, identify, locate, or neutralize
    a broad range of threats.
        A great deal of our transformational effort is lodged in the FNCs.
    The key to successful transformation is the strong business partnership
    among scientists, industry, requirements, acquisition, and warfighters.
    Commercial Technology Transition Office (CTTO)
        To help enable the transition of technology into naval acquisition
    programs, the CTTO is staffed with personnel with business skills as
    well as technical expertise, who are able to communicate effectively
    with acquisition professionals and empowered to negotiate with them.
    For the Department of the Navy, this role will be filled by the
    Commercial Technology Transition Office at the Office of Naval
    Research, which is explicitly dedicated to transitioning technologies
    into acquisition programs, works under the aegis of the Assistant
    Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition)
    (ASN(RD&A)) and coordinates closely with the newly-created Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, Technology and
    Engineering) (DASN(RDT&E)). By carefully matching mature technologies
    to specific needs, the CTTO has already concluded 20 technology
    insertion agreements with senior acquisition managers and has earned
    their trust.
        Beginning in fiscal year 2004, the new Rapid Technology Transition
    Program Element, PE 0203761N, has been requested to fund the activities
    of the CTTO. This program element will provide the seed funding needed
    to get a fast start on technology insertion projects, including a
    number of candidates already in the pipeline. The CTTO plans to follow
    through on leads generated in the dialogue with venture capitalists to
    add to the pipeline of candidate insertion agreements.
        Secretary Roche. One way of rapidly transitioning technology to the
    warfighter and accelerating transformation is through the Air Force
    Applied Technology Councils (ATCs) and the Advanced Technology
    Demonstrations (ATDs). The councils are composed of two- and three-star
    generals from the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), our logistic
    centers, our acquisition product centers, and our major user commands
    who formally prioritize ATD programs. We hold an ATC meeting with each
    Major Command twice a year and have commissioned 34 ATDs that have
    transition funding. The ATC process is extremely important in linking
    the S&T program to the system developers, the logisticians, and the
    operational users. This process facilitates technology transition to
    operational use and secures user commitment for resources to do systems
    design and development and fielding of the technology.

        49. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, how can you protect the funding of programs that are
    attempting to plan and program assuming the success of current S&T
    programs in the event of technical delays?
        Secretary White. Programs that are dependent on success of S&T
    programs ``protect'' their funding by minimizing the risk of the S&T
    program to their overall program. Risk is minimized a couple of
    different ways. Program managers utilize evolutionary or spiral
    development to allow open architecture within their hardware design so
    that if the S&T program is not successful, they can replace that
    component with proven technology. This still allows the program manager
    to integrate the new technology when it becomes mature.
        In addition, the TRAs are designed to minimize program risk of
    incorporating new technology, and the evolutionary/spiral development
    open architecture design process allows for programs to continue
    forward using proven technology in lieu of new technology that may have
    been delayed due to unsuccessful S&T efforts. Combined, these practices
    are designed to help protect funding of programs planning on the
    success of S&T programs.
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy S&T community is actively and
    cooperatively working with the acquisition community to speed and
    ensure the efficient transition of S&T products into the fleet. In
    order to reduce the inherent risks of any technology transition of S&T
    products to the acquisition community, the ONR, in 1999, implemented a
    new initiative called the FNC process.
        The FNC process delivers maturing technology to acquisition program
    managers for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, and
    process improvements. With a total investment of $578 million in fiscal
    year 2002, over $640 million in fiscal year 2003 and $500 million
    planned for fiscal year 2004, FNCs support the Navy's goals to: (1)
    increase combat capability, (2) enhance personnel performance, (3)
    introduce advanced technology, and (4) improve business practices.
        The 12 FNCs concentrate scientific, technologic, and funding
    resources to deliver specific programs and products to the acquisition
    commands on mutually agreed upon schedules. Developed and managed by
    Integrated Product Teams (IPT), consisting of members of the
    acquisition, requirements, S&T, resource, and above all, warfighter
    communities, the FNCs bridge the technological gap that often develops
    between the S&T community and the acquisition commands. Through a
    consensus- based approach, the IPT provides critical transition-focused
    management oversight of all S&T products. Each S&T product is required
    to have a Technology Transition Agreement (TTA). The TTA serves as the
    contract between the S&T and acquisition communities and provides all
    product and transition-relevant information. This includes a
    description of the product to be delivered, the identification of exit
    criteria (key technical/performance parameters), target acquisition
    platform/program, requirements, resource, and demonstration information
    as well as an assessment of the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of the
    product at the time of transition. The TTA are signed by the S&T,
    acquisition and resource/requirements sponsors, thus eliminating any
    potential ambiguity.
        Additionally, S&T managers sponsor product-specific ``industry
    days'' to solicit input from potential industrial performers regarding
    technological development strategies and associated manufacturing
    issues. This systematic approach of integrating key stakeholder
    opinions and perspectives serves to reduce the overall risk associated
    with the successful technological development and subsequent
    integration of an S&T product into an acquisition program.
        A key component of the IPT-led FNC process is the formal commitment
    of the acquisition community to accept the technologically-ready FNC
    products and commit funds to transition them. For example, the Organic
    Mine Countermeasures (OMCM) FNC is working to provide our forces with
    an organic--that is to say, an inherentability to detect, characterize,
    and neutralize mines, wherever they may be encountered. Closely aligned
    with the tenets of Sea Shield, the OMCM FNC has recently transitioned
    several important products. One of them, the REMUS autonomous
    underwater vehicle, is currently supporting our operating forces as
    they search for mines in Operation Iraqi Freedom. REMUS was also used
    in the weeks immediately following September 11 to help secure our
    domestic ports. REMUS has emerged from a basic oceanographic research
    program and successfully transitioned to our Special Operations Forces.
        The overall FNC process is managed through ONR and the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of the Navy for RDT&E and is overseen by the
    Department of the Navy S&T Corporate Board, a four-star level group
    consisting of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant
    Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
    for Research Development and Acquisition. As the FNC approval
    authority, the Corporate Board serves to provide the macro-level
    investment balance of the Navy's S&T portfolio.
        Secretary Roche. Our ATC process facilitates technology transition
    to operational use and secures user commitment for resources to do
    systems design and development and fielding of the technology. In this
    way, we ``protect'' funding for our ATDs. In addition, we review these
    ATDs several times during their existence to ensure the technology is
    maturing as expected. If delays are encountered, all appropriate
    leadership is informed at that time during the ATC.

                   UNFUNDED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES

        50. Senator Levin. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, please provide a prioritized list of unfunded S&T
    projects that the committee can utilize in its consideration of the
    fiscal year 2004 budget request.
        Secretary White. The Army's unfunded priorities provided to
    Congress included two S&T efforts that we were unable to fully fund in
    the fiscal year 2004 budget: $28 million for FCS Manufacturing
    Technology (ManTech) and $12 million for the Future Tactical Truck
    System (FTTS). The ManTech funding would provide technology solutions
    to avoid costs in developing munitions and sensors critical to FCS.
    These include micro electro-mechanical systems for safe and arm
    functionality, reducing the size and increasing performance of inertial
    measurement units in munitions, and uncooled infrared sensors for
    target detection and identification.
        The FTTS S&T program is a new effort pursuing technologies for next
    generation medium and heavy tactical cargo vehicles. The primary goals
    of the FTTS program are to determine the tactical efficiencies of a
    hybrid-electric vehicle to reduce logistics demands and increase
    mobility and survivability by adding technologies such as enhanced
    situational awareness and add-on armors. The FTTS funding would provide
    embedded prognostics and intelligent load handling, a vehicle/load
    alignment system, and a smart load conforming tie-down system.
        Secretary Johnson. In building the fiscal year 2004 President's
    budget request, the Department had many competing priorities. I feel
    that the request reflects the best balance of resources to accomplish
    the mission of the Department. While the list of efforts below would
    expand the scope of our S&T request, they need to be considered in the
    overall context of Navy and Marine Corps unfunded priorities. Unfunded
    priorities have been provided to various committees by way of a joint
    CNO/CMC letter.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Fiscal
                    Title                    Year           Comments
                                            2004 $
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Electric Based Weapons...............    61.00  Accelerated research and
                                                     development of the
                                                     electrical components,
                                                     electrical control
                                                     systems and material
                                                     technologies needed to
                                                     support electric
                                                     weapons deployment is a
                                                     very high risk,
                                                     extremely high payoff
                                                     investment area.
                                                     However, significant
                                                     investments in these
                                                     areas will provide a
                                                     revolution in Naval
                                                     Fires, Time Critical
                                                     Strike, and Platform
                                                     Self-Defense while
                                                     significantly reducing
                                                     the logistics footprint
                                                     required to support
                                                     this mission area.
                                                     Products include
                                                     Electromagnetic Gun
                                                     Naval Fires, advanced
                                                     directed energy self-
                                                     defense weapons, and
                                                     Free Electron Laser
                                                     100KW demonstration.
    CVN-21/Advanced                          49.00  Accelerated research and
    Capability Ship......................            development of the
                                                     electrical components,
                                                     electrical control
                                                     systems and material
                                                     technologies needed to
                                                     support significant
                                                     expansion of electric
                                                     power systems and
                                                     reduction of high
                                                     maintenance fluid
                                                     systems is a complex
                                                     high risk, high payoff
                                                     investment area.
                                                     However, significant
                                                     investments in these
                                                     areas will ``unlock''
                                                     the significant amount
                                                     of propulsion power for
                                                     enhanced warfighting
                                                     capability, such as
                                                     higher sortie rates,
                                                     increased striking
                                                     capability, and
                                                     improved self-defense
                                                     while significantly
                                                     reducing system
                                                     maintenance and
                                                     logistics footprint
                                                     required to support
                                                     these platforms.
    FORCENET.............................    45.00  Develop and demonstrate
                                                     a shipboard ADM of an
                                                     Advanced Multifunction
                                                     RF System (AMRF-C) that
                                                     will encompass current,
                                                     planned, and future-
                                                     growth comms, EW, and
                                                     LPI radar functions in
                                                     C, X, and Ku Bands for
                                                     LCS, DDX subs, and
                                                     CVN21. Demonstrate wide-
                                                      and narrow-band anti-
                                                     jam (AJ) waveforms, a
                                                     wideband AJ high
                                                     altitude UAV comms and
                                                     network package, and a
                                                     narrowband AJ/LPI/LPD
                                                     comms and network
                                                     package (JTRS)
                                                     necessary for planned
                                                     and future FORCENET
                                                     use. Develop
                                                     technologies and
                                                     architectures to
                                                     support high data rate,
                                                     uninterruptible network
                                                     to deployed sea base
                                                     and forces projected
                                                     ashore.
    Space S&T............................    17.10  Provide the next
                                                     generation of
                                                     technologies to enhance
                                                     and transform both
                                                     naval and joint
                                                     warfighting
                                                     capabilities. The
                                                     enhancement of space-
                                                     based communications,
                                                     navigation, ISR, METOC,
                                                     and space control all
                                                     hinge on the
                                                     development of
                                                     spacecraft, payloads,
                                                     and components which
                                                     are more robust,
                                                     responsive, covert, and
                                                     economical. Examples of
                                                     target technologies are
                                                     micro-satellites, MEMS,
                                                     high bandwidth encoding
                                                     techniques, autonomous
                                                     operations, etc.
    Precision Strike/Solutions               60.10  Provide jam-resistant
    to GPS Jamming.......................            missile guidance by
                                                     ultra-tightly-coupled
                                                     GPS/INS system when
                                                     stand-alone GPS
                                                     receiver is jammed,
                                                     thereby circumventing
                                                     jammer threats. The
                                                     ultra-tightly-coupled
                                                     GPS/INS will increase
                                                     precision flight time
                                                     of weapon to target and
                                                     hands off to inertial
                                                     navigation to guide the
                                                     weapon when jammed for
                                                     the last few minutes of
                                                     flight. Precision
                                                     navigation, guidance,
                                                     and control in a GPS
                                                     denied environment; Nav
                                                     by imagery, low cost
                                                     MEMS and laser IMUs and
                                                     weapon integrated
                                                     precision timekeeping.
                                                     Precision target
                                                     location sensors across
                                                     EM/optical spectrum and
                                                     signal/image track
                                                     processors both on and
                                                     off-board surface, air,
                                                     and gun launched
                                                     weapons. Network,
                                                     computational, and
                                                     mission planning
                                                     technology for
                                                     precision targeting.
                                                     Aircraft and weapon
                                                     airframe and propulsion
                                                     technologies to counter
                                                     emerging threat
                                                     spectrum.
    Littoral ASW (LASW)..................    50.00  Significantly increase
                                                     ASW applied research to
                                                     provide technology to
                                                     meet the 2015 threat.
                                                     Develop components of
                                                     advanced off-board
                                                     distributed systems.
                                                     Develop technology for
                                                     cross platform sensor
                                                     level fusion and
                                                     estimating performance
                                                     of advanced sensors.
                                                     Demonstrate airborne
                                                     electromagnetic
                                                     detection system for
                                                     Multi-Mode Aircraft and
                                                     UAVs. Demonstrate wide
                                                     area cueing using
                                                     advanced electro-optic/
                                                     infra-red systems and
                                                     high altitude long
                                                     endurance UAVs.
                                                     Demonstrate components
                                                     for transition to light
                                                     weight torpedo plan
                                                     product improvement
                                                     program.
    MANTECH..............................     5.50  Although Navy previously
                                                     committed to Congress
                                                     to funding the program
                                                     at $60 million per
                                                     year, PB04 (fiscal year
                                                     2004) request is only
                                                     $54.5 million.
    Academic Research Fleet                  80.00  There is a pressing need
    Renewal-UNOLS........................            to modernize the
                                                     country's aging
                                                     Academic Oceanographic
                                                     Research Fleet through
                                                     an orderly, phased
                                                     renewal plan with
                                                     construction of four
                                                     new Ocean Class ships
                                                     and three new Regional
                                                     Class ships over the
                                                     next 10 years.
    Seabasing/STOM.......................    24.00  Logistics planning and
                                                     execution from CONUS to
                                                     Seabase and Objective.
                                                     Develop capabilities to
                                                     support Command and
                                                     Control on the move
                                                     from the Seabase to the
                                                     Objective. Naval
                                                     Surface Fire Support
                                                     improvements in range,
                                                     projectiles/fusing,
                                                     precision, and volume
                                                     of fire. Ammunition
                                                     resupply of surface
                                                     combatants.
    Organic MCM..........................     6.00  Protective Mining--
                                                     Protect sea basing.
                                                     Integrated joint
                                                     command and control for
                                                     multiple, cooperating
                                                     unmanned systems.
                                                     Provides residual for
                                                     LCS.
    Mine Countermeasures                     30.00  Develop clandestine
    Reconnaissance.......................            approaches to networked
                                                     minehunting using fully
                                                     autonomous, cooperative
                                                     vehicles with
                                                     classification sensors
                                                     reporting tactical
                                                     control ID indicators.
                                                     Develop and demonstrate
                                                     mission capability
                                                     package for LCS using
                                                     coordinated swarms of
                                                     autonomous,
                                                     interactive, underwater
                                                     vehicles engaged in
                                                     networked minehunting.
      TOTAL                                 427.70
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Secretary Roche. One of the most important efforts currently
    ongoing within our S&T program is the work we're doing to enhance the
    Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) kit equipment carried by the Air Force
    Special Tactics Controllers who perform operations deep in enemy
    territory to help identify who the terrorists are, where their weapons
    are located, and who the innocent civilians are. Using very rapid
    spirals to speed development, prototyping, testing, production, and
    fielding, the Air Force is working to realize significant enhancements
    to these kits, while reducing weight and size. The following list is a
    representative summary of high priority S&T efforts, including
    enhancements to the BAO kit, for which the Air Force could use
    additional funding in fiscal year 2004. A more detailed, comprehensive
    list has been provided to the Senate Armed Services Professional Staff
    as requested.

                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Effort                               Amount
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    BAO Kit Enhancements........................................      13.000
    Basic Research for Nanosatellites, Space Control, Command          8.000
     and Control, and Super Energetic Propellants...............
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)              11.800
     Automation for Time-Critical Targeting.....................
    Joint Battlespace Infosphere................................      13.900
    Electronically Steerable Array and Space-Based Radar On-          10.000
     Board Processing...........................................
    Advanced Payload--Hard and Deeply Buried Targets............       3.000
    Commanders' Decision Aids for Predictive Battlespace               3.500
     Awareness..................................................
    Laser Infrared Flyout Experiment Advanced Technology               7.400
     Demonstration..............................................
    Denied Area Surveillance....................................       1.000
    Airborne Active Denial System Integrated Concept............      35.860
    Force Protection............................................       3.000
    Human Systems Countermeasures to Future Laser Threats.......       3.100
    Targets Under Trees.........................................       3.800
    Effects-Based Operation.....................................       4.000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

                               DEPOT MAINTENANCE

        51. Senator Akaka. Secretary Roche, the Air Force's fiscal year
    2004 budget request for depot maintenance is at its lowest level in a
    decade. At the same time, the operational tempo of its aircraft is very
    high and it appears that it is likely to remain at high levels, if not
    grow higher, for the foreseeable future. Why did the Air Force choose
    to reduce maintenance funding under the current circumstance?
        Secretary Roche. We increased our funding by $226 million from
    fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004 in the fiscal year 2004
    President's budget for depot maintenance. However, our requirements
    grew by $486 million for that same period. The increase in funding
    applied by the Air Force was quickly absorbed by aging aircraft issues
    that are increasing both material consumption and direct labor hours.
    For example, the depot work package for KC-135E aircraft has doubled in
    the last 10 years, primarily due to aging aircraft issues. One factor
    is the corrosion on the engine struts, the point at which the engines
    attach to the wing. This corrosion must be repaired now or it will
    continue to worsen, become more expensive to repair over time, and
    could impact the safety of flight/airworthiness of our KC-135E fleet.
    There are numerous examples like this across all our fleets. We faced
    tremendous pressure in this budget and took some risk within depot
    maintenance, knowing that we will have challenges to work in fiscal
    year 2004. We are committed to working those challenges.

        52. Senator Akaka. Secretary Roche, do you believe these reductions
    are consistent with maintaining ready forces in the near- and mid-term?
        Secretary Roche. Right now, the Air Force is experiencing its best
    readiness posture in years: Aircraft down for spare parts is less than
    11 percent--the best it has been since fiscal year 1996.
    Cannibalization rates have decreased 26 percent since fiscal year 1997.
    Engine readiness is at its highest level since fiscal year 1998. We
    have been able to do that with your help and with some help from the
    OSD. We know we have challenges in fiscal year 2004 as we try to
    maintain our forward progress in improving our readiness posture.
    Obviously, we have to look at trade-offs and make tough decisions, but
    the impact to readiness will be one of the first questions asked as we
    work through those decision sets. We are committed to working through
    those challenges and addressing any backlogs in fiscal year 2005.

                             BASE OPERATING SUPPORT

        53. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, the fiscal year 2004 budget request for each of your
    Services includes reductions in base operating support. These accounts
    fund critical aspects of keeping our military installations running
    safely and efficiently. In addition, they frequently serve as
    ``flexible'' accounts from which money is drawn in the short-term for
    ongoing operational demands. Many times, these funds are not fully
    replaced by future supplemental allocations. Are you comfortable with
    these reductions?
        Secretary White. The Army took some risk by funding higher
    priorities in force protection and replenishing depleted peacetime
    spares inventories to eliminate a significant readiness issue. We will
    continue to provide quality services to our soldiers and their families
    but in some instances, the quantity of services will be reduced.
        Secretary Johnson. From a broad readiness perspective, I expect no
    negative impact on shore installation readiness as a result of the
    fiscal year 2004 budget request for base operating support. The fiscal
    year 2004 budget is aligned with previous years in terms of producing a
    constant level of capability. In our effort to reduce support costs, we
    are making organizational and process changes in the management and
    delivery of installation support. Key to this effort is the
    establishment of a single consolidated organization, Commander, Navy
    Installations (CNI), whose core mission is management and operation of
    shore installations. The fiscal year 2004 budget reflects anticipated
    efficiencies, which allow us to produce the same capability at a lower
    cost.
        Secretary Roche. The reduction in our fiscal year 2004 Base
    Operating Support account results from three factors:
        (1) A reduction in the Defense Finance and Accounting Service
    annual payment. This reduction is based on historical levels paid to
    the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for financial services.
        (2) Rate reductions from the Transportation Working Capital Fund.
    Because the Transportation Working Capital Fund posted higher earnings
    in fiscal year 2002 during Operation Enduring Freedom, the carryover
    results in reduced rates in fiscal year 2004.
        (3) Fiscal constraints and the realignment of funding to other Air
    Force priorities. While not completely comfortable with these
    reductions, the Air Force must balance funding across its full spectrum
    of requirements. We have included a $160 million request for base
    operating support on the fiscal year 2004 Unfunded Priority List.

        54. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, what are both the short- and long-term implications of
    these decreases, both for morale and for future funding requirements?
        Secretary White. The short-term implication will be reduced
    services. In the long-term, the Army will need to increase base
    operations support to ensure we meet soldiers' needs. Affordability
    limits the amount of funding that can be devoted to base operations
    support.
        Secretary Johnson. I anticipate no long- or short-term implications
    for these decreases. While projections of shore installation
    requirements show the submitted budget less than 3\1/2\ percent short
    of the requirement to sustain current levels of service through fiscal
    year 2004, these calculations include assumed efficiency savings which
    I believe to be conservative. However, as you know, one of my key
    issues is concern for the quality of service for our service men and
    women. Therefore, you will see included on CNO's Unfunded Programs
    List, an item for an additional $98 million for base operations, to
    reduce the risk of not maintaining a constant level of service in
    fiscal year 2004, which in turn may affect the quality of service
    experienced by our sailors.
        Secretary Roche. In the short-term, the fiscal year 2004 base
    operating support program decrease will lower the level of services
    provided at our installations. Commanders are aware of base operating
    support service level reductions and typically take measures to
    mitigate morale impacts by allocating available end-of-year funding for
    quality-of-life items.
        In the long-term, the Air Force will continue to strive to balance
    adequate base operating support funding with the need to fund other Air
    Force requirements.

                                EXECUTIVE AGENCY

        55. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) recently
    stated that his office is conducting a review of whether the Services
    should continue to have ``executive agent'' responsibilities for
    various DOD functions. What are your views on this subject? What
    alternatives to executive agency should be considered?
        Secretary White. While I have not seen the Under Secretary of
    Defense (Comptroller) review you mention, I believe the Services should
    continue to have executive agent responsibilities because this
    minimizes duplication of Service efforts and resources. I do, however,
    have several concerns about executive agent responsibilities. These
    responsibilities must be reviewed frequently by the OSD to ensure they
    are still appropriately assigned and the Services should be resourced
    to accomplish their assigned responsibilities.
        DOD is addressing these issues with DOD Directive 5100.88 (DOD
    Executive Agent) published on September 3, 2002. While this directive
    is still in the process of being fully implemented, it establishes
    procedures to address the Army's concern that Services are assigned
    executive agent responsibilities, yet not provided the resources to
    meet those responsibilities. DOD Directive 5100.88 specifies procedures
    to identify funding methods and resource requirements and include them
    in the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. In the
    future, Services will not have to take funds from Service specific
    programs to fund their executive agent responsibilities. DOD Directive
    5100.88 also instructs the OSD Director of Administration and
    Management to maintain, monitor, and revise the list of DOD Executive
    Agent designations and make it available to all DOD components.
        The Army is not aware of any better alternatives to executive agent
    responsibilities and believe that our efforts should focus on fully
    implementing Directive 5100.88 to identify executive agent
    responsibilities and ensure they are properly resourced.
        Secretary Johnson. Navy has Executive Agency of Joint Forces
    Command (JFCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM). In light of the ongoing
    study underway by Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    (Comptroller) and Joint Staff, the Navy is in a position to evaluate
    the alternatives as they are finalized. The current system affords the
    opportunity for the Navy and the Combatant Commands to actively engage
    in discussion and evaluation of issues in order to gain a general
    understanding of the requirements.
        Secretary Roche. A fiscal year 2004 Program Decision Memorandum
    gave the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in concert with the
    Under Secretary of Defense (Programs, Analysis, and Evaluations), and
    the Joint Staff, the responsibility for identifying alternatives to
    Executive Agency to the Senior Level Review Group (SLRG). The Air Force
    has been told the alternatives will range from keeping the current
    system to totally replacing it. The Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and Joint Staff internal review process is ongoing; the task force is
    preparing a briefing for the SLRG but the meeting has not yet been
    scheduled.

                               TRANSITION FUNDING

        56. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, as DOD places increasing emphasis on joint
    experimentation, some have suggested that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
    should be provided with its own funding in order to purchase promising
    items quickly and get them directly into the hands of the regional
    combatant commanders. In your view, does JFCOM need such an account?
        Secretary White. In meeting its responsibilities as the lead Joint
    Force Integrator and DOD's executive agent for Joint Warfighting
    Experimentation, JFCOM already performs a significant and valuable
    function. In this capacity, JFCOM develops future joint warfighting
    concepts and validates those with the most promise through joint
    experimentation. If the analysis indicates changes in doctrine,
    organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
    and facilities are warranted to enhance joint, multi-national, or
    interagency interoperability, JFCOM forwards these through the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Services for implementation.
        We have received and acted upon a number of recommendations since
    this process began last year, but JFCOM does not have the procurement
    processes or the expertise necessary to implement a rapid acquisition
    program that would flow from funding as you describe. The Army believes
    the Joint community is best served by JFCOM continuing to serve as the
    focal point for concept development and experimentation and providing
    specific change recommendations to the CJCS and Services through the
    JROC. The military departments and Defense agencies already have the
    acquisition mechanisms and expertise, with oversight provided by the
    JROC and OSD, to rapidly procure and distribute items to the regional
    forces assigned to combatant commanders. In addition to the normal
    acquisition process, which is currently undergoing significant
    improvements and streamlining, we have dramatically improved our rapid
    acquisition programs to quickly provide promising and ``off-the-shelf''
    products and capabilities to Army forces and combatant commanders.
        Secretary Johnson. Draft Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Year
    2005 proposes the establishment of a Joint Rapid Acquisition Program
    (RAP) by USD(AT&L) in coordination with JFCOM to rapidly acquire joint
    capabilities for fielding. It further states that Joint RAP ``will
    accelerate acquisition by starting development in the fiscal year with
    bridge funds that tie the joint acquisition initiatives to the
    Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process.'' The
    program is intended to allow the rapid testing and evaluation of
    emerging technologies to facilitate transformational initiatives. Since
    the existing PPBS processes do not support rapid test, evaluation, and
    acquisition, some mechanism will need to be established, and Navy
    supports the development of Joint RAP.
        Secretary Roche. Joint Forces Command funding authority for rapid
    acquisitions carries risk. Experimentation results alone do not provide
    the total evaluation required to ensure future interoperability and
    sustainability. Title X provides the Secretary of the Air Force with
    the responsibility for equipping Air Forces for the combatant
    commanders. In close partnership with JFCOM, we can apply Service
    acquisition processes to rapidly deliver those capabilities to the
    regional combatant commanders and ensure corresponding programming
    strategies for sustainment and upgrades.

        57. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, what would the impact be on your Service and its
    support to the regional commanders?
        Secretary White. The most significant impact would be on the
    oversight provided by the JROC. This body oversees the development and
    implementation of warfighting solutions to ensure joint coherency.
    Elimination of JROC oversight will increase the challenges associated
    with program integration and synchronization of the capabilities
    provided to regional combatant commanders. As mission executers,
    combatant commanders rely on the military departments and Defense
    agencies to provide effective and interoperable forces and capabilities
    through their respective Service component commands, particularly
    important as forces are shifted between theaters for operational
    missions. Mature processes and procedures to accomplish this are in
    place and working. Providing JFCOM funding and acquisition authority
    would unnecessarily complicate the challenge of providing synchronized
    and integrated capabilities to combatant commanders.
        Secretary Johnson. Draft Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Year
    2005 states that start-up funding for the Joint Rapid Acquisition
    Program will be provided in fiscal year 2005 and out. The source of
    these resources has not been identified. Assuming that these resources
    are provided to the Navy, any long-term financial impact will be
    related to the technologies tested. Assuming positive testing and
    evaluation, the bridge funding proposed in the language will allow some
    transition period for the Services to identify appropriate funding
    alternatives.
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force believes we are currently on the
    right approach in teaming with JFCOM to identify transformation needs
    and capabilities and then applying Service acquisition processes to
    deliver these capabilities to the regional commanders. The addition of
    acquisition authority to JFCOM would only serve to complicate a teaming
    arrangement that we believe is working. There is no process to
    synchronize the timing between JFCOM rapidly purchasing a capability
    and the ability of the Service to program for training, fielding, and
    sustainment. Ultimately, the lack of a coherent implementation plan
    will impact support to the regional commander.

                              HOUSING INITIATIVES

        58. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, in your written testimony you
    state that the Navy relies first on the local community to provide
    housing for our sailors, marines, and their families. Given today's
    threat environment how does the Navy propose to address force
    protection concerns for those sailors and marines living off base on
    the local economy?
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy's force protection plans for families
    living in the private sector are much the same as for civilians.
    Currently, about three out of every four Navy families live in the
    private sector, side by side with their civilian counterparts. Security
    and protection for these families are provided through the existing
    network of Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities
    currently protecting all of our citizens. The dispersal of military
    personnel into the private sector reduces the exposure of military
    personnel to force protection threats. Additionally, the regular
    training and awareness provided to active duty members on the issue of
    antiterrorism and force protection contribute to the safety of military
    families regardless of where they live.

                ANTI-TERRORIST/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) FUNDING

        59. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, according to the administration, homeland defense
    funding drops in the fiscal year 2004 request due to one-time force
    protection investments in 2003. Out of the approximate $2 billion
    decrease for the Department, homeland defense funding for MILCON, which
    represents AT/FP funding, drops from $733 million to $82 million. What
    progress have you made in the buy-out of AT/FP requirements for our
    installations? Are we almost finished fulfilling the requirements, or
    should we expect additional requirements in fiscal year 2005, fiscal
    year 2006, fiscal year 2007, and the future?
        Secretary White. The Army has significant requirements in MILCON,
    operations and maintenance, and procurement in fiscal year 2005 to
    fiscal year 2009.
        The Army has made significant progress in buying AT/FP requirements
    for our installations. In fiscal year 2003, approximately $211 million
    will be spent on AT/FP MILCON projects related to installation access
    control. Additionally, approximately $302.4 million of Other
    Procurement, Army will be spent on physical security equipment
    controlling access on installations.
        Secretary Johnson. Through Joint Service and Navy Integrated
    Vulnerability Assessments, critical facilities at each installation are
    regularly assessed. These assessments compare existing critical
    facilities against prevailing construction criteria. The Vulnerability
    Assessments are performed on a 3-year cycle for CONUS installations,
    and every 2 years for OCONUS installations. In addition, installations
    are required to perform self-vulnerability assessments annually. Based
    on the results of these assessments, the Navy continually looks at its
    Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) requirements for our
    installations, and programs the most needed projects. As such, there
    could be additional requirements for AT/FP projects for fiscal year
    2005 and beyond as these assessments are completed. The fiscal year
    2004 President's budget future years defense program indicates that the
    total resource requirement to address the Navy's force protection needs
    with military construction is $542.3 million. It should be noted that
    each military construction project is designed to incorporate
    antiterrorism/force protection construction standards.
        Secretary Roche. With the fiscal year 2003 enacted budget, the Air
    Force is investing more than $450 million in antiterrorism/force
    protection facility requirements. Of this amount, more than $200
    million is being invested through our military construction program.
        For fiscal year 2004, we have requested nearly $20 million for
    antiterrorism/force protection-specific projects (e.g., perimeter
    fencing, entry access gates) and antiterrorism/force protection design
    requirements embedded into other construction projects. In addition to
    this investment, we still have antiterrorism/force protection
    requirements programmed in our future years defense plan. Specifically,
    the Air Force has identified approximately $100 million in requirements
    for fiscal years 2004-2009. These projects either enhance existing
    antiterrorism and force protection measures or eliminate inefficiencies
    caused by existing workarounds. They include, for example, fencing,
    entrance gates, and vehicle inspection stations.

                                OVERSEAS BASING

        60. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, could each of you please discuss the support you
    currently receive through host nation construction programs such as the
    Japanese Facilities Improvement Project in Japan and the Funded
    Construction Program in Korea as well as support in Europe?
        Secretary White. The host nation funded construction programs
    consist of the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP) in Japan, the
    Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDIP), and the Republic of Korea
    Funded Construction (RoKFC) program in Korea. In Europe, we also have a
    Payment-In-Kind (PIK) program in Germany under which we use residual
    value to build facilities.
        The primary host nation funded construction program is the FIP,
    which has provided about $700 million of construction per year. The
    program was implemented in 1979 and over the past 20 years, the
    Government of Japan has built $19 billion of new quality of life and
    operational facilities for our U.S. service members.
        In Korea, the CDIP was initiated in 1982 by the Republic of Korea
    to share the financial burden of maintaining U.S. Forces in Korea. The
    CDIP funds projects that support only warfighting and operational
    facilities, and total about $50+ million of construction per year.
    Residual value is a method for Germany to provide compensation for the
    Army's improvements to facilities on installations we return to
    Germany. PIK is residual value that comes in the form of construction
    credits. The PIK program awarded $244 million in construction projects
    through fiscal year 2002.
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy receives host nation funded
    construction (burden sharing) support from both Japan and Korea. The
    Japanese Facilities Improvement Program is funded by the Japanese
    Defense Agency and currently supports four categories of projects:
    force structure or mission increases, family housing (provision of
    housing only) and community support, Japanese initiatives including
    environmental and safety issues, and service initiatives. In Korea, two
    cost sharing programs are in use including the Combined Defense
    Improvement Fund (CDIP) and the Republic of Korea Construction Fund
    (ROKCF). The CDIP supports construction of facilities related to
    improved combat operations, war reserves, and combined U.S./Korea
    operations. The ROKFC supports quality-of-life and sole U.S. use
    projects. In Europe, we use every available funding source, including
    the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) for those eligible
    projects, residual value, and payment-in-kind in partnership with the
    host nations.
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force receives support, in the form of
    host-nation funded construction, from NATO, Japan, and Korea. In recent
    years, that support has averaged roughly $300 million per year. The
    funds provided by these countries are used to construct facilities that
    directly support Air Force missions, as well as facilities that support
    quality of life for service members and their families stationed
    overseas. For example, the NATO contribution helps offset construction
    supporting the Air Force's roles in the NATO mission. The Japan
    Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) supports ``defensive''
    warfighting capabilities, such as aircraft shelters, and may be used to
    replace ``offensive'' capability facilities that predate 1979. The
    Korean Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDlP) funds combined
    Republic of Korea-United States warfighting requirements; while the
    Republic of Korea Funded Construction (ROKFC) Program funds mission
    support and quality-of-life requirements.
        In addition, under the Rhein Main transfer program, Germany is
    helping to pay for facility construction at Ramstein and Spangdahlem
    Air Bases necessary to relocate the missions currently at Rhein Main
    Air Base. In total, Germany is investing nearly $400 million to help
    pay for construction associated with this relocation. The majority of
    this construction will occur in 2004 and 2005.

        61. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, what is the status of each of these programs and how
    do we currently benefit from these partnerships?
        Secretary White. The various host nation funded construction
    programs continue to be an active and important program for our forces
    overseas by providing quality-of-life and operational facilities at
    little or no cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
        Secretary Johnson. All of these programs are active and help share
    the financial burden of a forward deployed posture. In fiscal year
    2002, we received $199 million in support from the Japanese Facilities
    Improvement Program (JFIP) to include $80 million for improvements to
    the Yokosuka carrier pier, and $4.5 million from the Republic of Korea
    Construction Fund (ROKCF) to include a $3.8 million medical clinic in
    Chinhae. In Europe, we use every available funding source, including
    the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) for those eligible
    projects, residual value and payment-in-kind in partnership with the
    host nations.
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force receives support, in the form of
    host-nation funded construction, from NATO, Japan, and Korea. In recent
    years, that support has averaged roughly $300 million per year. The
    funds provided by these countries are used to construct facilities that
    directly support Air Force missions, as well as facilities that support
    quality-of-life for service members and their families stationed
    overseas.
        For example, the NATO contribution helps offset construction
    supporting the Air Force's roles in the NATO mission. The Japan
    Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) supports ``defensive''
    warfighting capabilities, such as aircraft shelters, and may be used to
    replace ``offensive'' capability facilities that predate 1979. The
    Korean Combined Defense Improvement Program (CDIP) funds combined
    Republic of Korea-United States warfighting requirements, while the
    Republic of Korea Funded Construction (ROKFC) Program funds mission
    support and quality-of-life requirements.
        In addition, under the Rhein Main transfer program, Germany is
    helping to pay for facility construction at Ramstein and Spangdahlem
    Air Bases necessary to relocate the missions currently at Rhein Main
    Air Base. In total, Germany is investing nearly $400 million to help
    pay for construction associated with this relocation. The majority of
    this construction will occur in 2004 and 2005.

        62. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, could each of you please describe your Services'
    efforts to consolidate forces overseas with programs such as the Land
    Partnership Plan in Korea and Efficient Basing East in Germany?
        Secretary White. Efficient Basing-East will consolidate the
    activities of 13 installations in Germany onto one, allowing the
    majority of those installations to be closed. Efficient Basing-East
    will enhance unit readiness and effectiveness by improving command and
    control, enhancing force protection, and improving training. Soldier
    quality-of-life will also be improved because new housing and renovated
    or new mission facilities will be provided.
        Land Partnership Plan in Korea will consolidate 41 U.S. Forces,
    Korea (USFK) installations onto 23 enduring installations. Of these 41
    installations, 32 are Army installations which will be consolidated
    onto 14 enduring installations. The plan returns approximately 32,000
    acres to the Republic of Korea (RoK). USFK will receive new facilities
    to replace currently occupied poor facilities with more joint use of
    RoK ranges and training areas to improve training and combat readiness.
    Command and control, force protection, and soldier quality-of-life will
    also improve.
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy has successfully consolidated our
    presence overseas in a number of core locations. In Naples, Italy,
    where we operate multiple sites, we are nearly complete with a major
    effort to consolidate facilities at two sites. A major recapitalization
    at Sigonella, Sicily is underway and a consolidation of facilities at
    La Maddalena will soon begin.
        Secretary Roche. Air Force overseas force structure is inherently
    consolidated since our operations primarily revolve around an airfield.
    For this reason, the Land Partnership Plan and Efficient Basing East
    models are difficult to apply directly to Air Force overseas basing,
    basing that has changed significantly since 1990.
        For example, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) had 805
    aircraft and 72,000 personnel at 51 locations in 1990. Today USAFE has
    220 aircraft and 32,000 personnel at 28 locations--a 45-percent
    reduction in operating locations. This consolidation of locations
    overseas was based in part in the transformation of the Air Force from
    an overseas garrison force to a predominately stateside expeditionary
    force.

                                QUALITY-OF-LIFE

        63. Senator Akaka. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, funding for a number of budget areas that directly
    affect quality-of-life for our service men and women has seriously
    decreased in this year's request. Some examples include a $1.5 billion
    drop in overall MILCON funding, a $200 million cut to family housing,
    and a reduction that brings Army restoration and modernization, or R&M,
    down to a level that is 10 percent of the fiscal year 2002 level. What
    impact will these types of reductions have on the quality-of-life of
    our service men and women and their families?
        Secretary White. Quality-of-life continues to be an Army priority,
    and available funding is focused on restoring or building new
    facilities that improve the living and working conditions for soldiers
    and their families. For example, our budget request supports the
    elimination of inadequate family housing by 2007, compared with 2010 2
    years ago. For single soldiers, we have budgeted over $700 million for
    new and renovated barracks in this year's budget request. While budgets
    fluctuate from year to year, the Army's commitment to barracks and
    family housing improvements has not wavered.
        Secretary Johnson. The Department of the Navy's fiscal year 2004
    budget request represents a balance between funds needed to operate,
    recapitalize and transform our fleet assets with funds needed to do the
    same for our shore installations. We believe our quality-of-life
    programs will continue to provide the kinds and levels of support
    needed by Navy and Marine Corps families.
        We do not anticipate an adverse impact on quality-of-life as a
    result of reductions to MILCON funds for housing. The Department of the
    Navy will eliminate its inadequate military family housing by fiscal
    year 2007. This is possible through increased reliance on the use of
    military housing privatization authorities. These authorities allow us
    to leverage Government resources with private sector capital to
    renovate or replace our inadequate housing and construct additional
    housing as needed. More importantly, the continuing commitment to buy-
    down out-of-pocket housing expenses, through increases to the Basic
    Allowance for Housing, will allow our sailors and marines to be better
    able to find suitable, affordable housing in the private sector.
        Secretary Roche. With the fiscal year 2004 budget request, the Air
    Force is continuing to focus on quality-of-life for our people. The
    quality of our facilities, infrastructure, and communities sends a
    direct signal to our men and women regarding the value we place on
    their service.
        Our military construction request is up $150 million from last
    year's request--a 20 percent increase. Included in that request is more
    than $250 million to construct new dormitories, fitness centers, and
    family support/child development facilities.
        Our housing request is up slightly from last year's request and up
    nearly 30 percent from the fiscal year 2002 request. This year we will
    construct or renovate more than 3,600 houses, and with the exception of
    4 northern-tier locations, we will eliminate our inadequate housing
    units in the United States by 2007.
        Finally, our facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization
    (O&M) request is as high as it has been in a decade--nearly $2 billion.
    This level of funding allows us to properly invest in facility
    sustainment (to keep our good facilities good) and invest some O&M
    funding in much-needed restoration and modernization.
        Recent surveys indicate that members perceive no significant
    problems with Air Force quality-of-life. In our newest survey, 90
    percent of respondents agreed that the Air Force is a good place to
    work. Housing ranked fifth and sixth in order of importance of quality-
    of-life issues while pay and compensation ranked as the top two. As you
    can see from the preceding paragraphs, we have a get-well plan for
    MILCON. With the help of Congress in these few appropriation cycles, we
    have made significant progress in the area of pay and compensation. We
    have seen dramatic changes in the number of individuals who feel that
    total compensation is fair. We thank you for that much needed support
    and appreciate your question concerning the overall quality-of-life for
     our members and their families.

                                ORDNANCE CLEANUP

        64. Senator Akaka. Secretary Johnson, you indicated that the Navy
    was planning on treating the island of Kaho'olawe as a formally used
    defense site (FUDS). Given the fact that the FUDS program is severely
    underfunded and that priority is given to unexploded ordnance (UXO)
    clearance in areas with civilian populations, I am concerned about this
    revelation. Please provide me with more detail about the Navy's
    intentions regarding this issue including, but not limited to, how this
    would affect the Navy's responsibilities regarding the clearance of
    newly discovered previously undetected ordnance on Kaho'olawe after
    November 11, 2003.
        Secretary Johnson. The Navy does not plan on treating Kaho'olawe as
    a FUDS after control of the island is returned to Hawaii in November
    2003. The Navy executed a quitclaim deed in 1994 that transferred title
    to Kaho'olawe to the State. DOD policy makes cleanup/clearance of any
    property transferred from DOD control after October 17, 1986 ineligible
    for FUDS funding.
        With respect to the discovery of previously undetected ordnance on
    Kaho'olawe Island after November 11, 2003, the Navy and the State of
    Hawaii have been working on a Memorandum of Agreement concerning the
    means for regular interval clean-ups and removal of newly discovered
    previously undetected ordnance by the Navy, as required by Section
    1002(a)(2) of PL 103139. Representatives from the Navy and the State
    continue to discuss the framework for the agreement. The Navy is
    planning on reserving funds in the Kaho'olawe Island Trust Fund for
    clearance associated with the above discoveries.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                                    MANPOWER

        65. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, last week all four
    Service Chiefs testified that their forces were under significant
    ``strain'' due to the high operational tempo required by the global war
    on terrorism, peace support operations (Bosnia/Kosovo), and forward
    presence missions (South Korea). In particular, the Army is feeling
    significant strains to its 480,000-soldier force, which is the same
    size as was authorized in the late 1990s despite a substantial increase
    in deployments and combat operations since September 11. A potential
    peace support operation in Iraq requiring thousands of Army troops will
    add to this burden. The Bush administration continues to insist that
    more troops are not required. Instead, they claim that the existing
    force must be used more efficiently. Is the active duty Army big enough
    to accomplish the tasks it has been given?
        Secretary White. Nothing has changed since my last testimony--the
    Army is too small for its mission profile. The reality is that our
    operations tempo (OPTEMPO), already challenging before September 11,
    has increased dramatically in the post September 11 environment. Over
    the past 18 months, mobilizations have maintained a steady state of
    approximately 30,000 Reserve component soldiers, effectively increasing
    our active duty strength to approximately 510,000. We recognize the
    necessity to ensure we look internally to obtain all possible
    efficiencies before making any determinations on potential end strength
    increases.
        A study is currently underway to review Army non-core
    competencies--the Third Wave--with the expectation that some personnel
    savings will be generated for use in mitigating ``force stress.''
    Additionally, we are fully cognizant of the stress that this steady
    state mobilization is placing on our Reserve components. Studies are
    underway to determine the correct balance of Active and Reserve Forces,
    including an analysis exploring options for mitigating the current
    stress to the Reserve components by ensuring that the correct type
    units are resourced within the active component. The results of these
    studies, coupled with corresponding supportability analyses, are
    expected to provide valuable insight into the end strength question.

        66. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, is it possible to realign
    the existing active force of 480,000 troops to relieve this pressure
    without ``breaking'' the force in terms of training and logistics
    support needs?
        Secretary White. Efforts are currently underway to examine the
    existing active and Reserve component mix. This analysis will include a
    review of those high-demand/low-density organizations, primarily
    located in the Reserve component, that are experiencing extended or
    repeat mobilizations in support of operations worldwide. Any attempt to
    assess impacts to training and logistics support needs would be
    premature until all analysis is complete.

                                  SHIPBUILDING

        67. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Johnson, the size of the Navy's
    fleet is expected to decline to as few as 292 ships in the coming
    years, yet Admiral Clark has repeatedly testified that he needs a
    minimum of 375 ships to accomplish all the missions he has at a
    reasonable operational pace. Why is there such a large difference
    between what the Navy says it needs and the fleet supported by the
    President's budget?
        Secretary Johnson. To build a force of about 375 ships needed to
    meet the requirements of the new defense strategy will require a major
    commitment of resources over an extended period of time. The fiscal
    year 2004 President's budget includes a significant funding increase
    from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004 for Navy shipbuilding
    programs. Funding for Navy shipbuilding programs is projected to
    increase across the Future Years Defense Program. In the near term,
    some older, less capable ships will be decommissioned. The operational
    cost savings from retiring these higher manning, maintenance intensive
    ships will be used to help finance the transition to a larger, more
    capable force. This will result in a smaller force in the near term,
    but savings generated by those retirements will facilitate the
    transition to the numbers, type, and mix of ships required to execute
    the range of missions anticipated in the 21st century.

        68. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Johnson, can you estimate the
    additional cost involved to bring the size of the fleet anywhere near
    the Chief of Naval Operation's target size?
        Secretary Johnson. To achieve approximately 375 ships in the first
    quarter of this century requires an average of $14 billion per year in
    new construction (TY03 dollars) and procurement of an average of .12
    ships per year. This requires a long-term commitment to fund
    construction at significantly higher levels than recent years.
    Additionally, to sustain this force will require an average of $2
    billion per year (TY03 dollars) for nuclear refueling overhauls,
    conversions, landing craft, and service craft replacement.

                               MANPOWER REDUCTION

        69. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Johnson, how do you justify the
    10,000-sailor reduction in the President's budget when the future shape
    and size of the Navy has yet to be determined?
        Secretary Johnson. In conjunction with the execution of our overall
    investment strategy, we continue to conduct extensive reviews focused
    on balancing current and future force operational requirements and
    capabilities, while operating within established fiscal constraints. In
    proposing the budget submission for fiscal year 2004, we determined
    that reducing the number of less capable, manpower intensive platforms
    would free valuable resources essential to future plans for enhancing
    transformational capabilities. The manpower associated with these force
    structure changes results in a smaller requirement.
        Additionally, Navy has various efforts underway that are helping
    improve manpower efficiency and reduce future manpower requirements:

             Task Force Excel is exploring innovative techniques to
            improve how we train sailors.
             Sea Swap and Optimal Manning are finding ways to keep
            battle forces at sea longer while exploring potential areas to
            restructure crew manning.
             FORCENET is aimed at improving manpower efficiency by
            integrating warriors, sensors, networks, command and control,
            platforms, and weapons into a networked distributed combat
            system.
             Sea Enterprise maintains core capabilities, optimizes
            investments, and applies selected business reforms to our
            organizations and processes.
             Sea Warrior is the enhanced assessment, assignment,
            training, and education of personnel.

        We believe these initiatives, when completed, will yield increased
    capabilities, while permitting us to man our forces in the most
    efficient and economical manner possible.

                                RESERVE MOVEMENT

        70. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, current and future operations in the global war on
    terrorism are increasingly requiring mobilization of large numbers of
    Reserve component forces. Mobilization of these patriotic citizen-
    soldiers is, of course, a burden on thousands of families and
    communities nationwide. Looking into the future, what do you think the
    long-term impact of extended and frequent Reserve mobilizations will be
    on the strength and vitality of the Reserve Forces?
        Secretary White. Soldiers from the Army National Guard and Reserve
    have been in a continuous state of mobilization since December 1995.
    Rotations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, and mobilizations and deployments
    as part of Operation Noble Eagle and the global war on terrorism have
    all become part of what it means to serve in the Army National Guard
    and Reserve today. These recurring deployments have given our units a
    great deal of experience in being able to mobilize quickly and
    effectively.
        We are sensitive to the stresses of frequent mobilizations and the
    impacts on retention and recruiting of quality soldiers. Soldiers are
    committed to their duty, and we do not anticipate any long-term impacts
    on the readiness of the force resulting from the ongoing mobilizations.
    The concerns of most soldiers, families, and employers are that the
    mobilizations are as predictable as possible and the duty is directly
    related to the defense mission of the Nation. We anticipate a higher
    attrition rate after the stop-loss policy is lifted. However, a part of
    this attrition will be a result of impeding normal loss over time.
    Additionally, we are looking at building a rotational base in the force
    that is applicable to the Reserve component (RC). This concept is based
    on a plan for a 180-day unit rotation, which falls within the 270-day
    Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up authority, no more than once
    every 5 years. Among other things, it will provide these units with
    operational experience, provide OPTEMPO relief for the active Army,
    impart a sense of predictability for the RC soldiers, and distribute
    the workload across the force. Consequently, we expect that this
    concept will mitigate any potential negative effects caused by
    increased small-scale contingency mobilizations.
        Secretary Johnson. It is difficult to accurately predict the long-
    term impact of extended and frequent Reserve mobilizations on the
    Reserve Forces. While there has been considerable discussion about
    mobilizing large numbers of reservists and involuntarily extending some
    for 2 years, the Naval Reserve has called up approximately 25 percent
    of its force since September 11. Preliminary trends do not show an
    increased attrition rate from the Naval Reserve as a response to a
    concern about being mobilized. In fact, since June of last year we have
    seen the Naval Reserve's focused enlisted attrition rate rise only
    slightly greater than 2 percent to a rate of 19.1 percent. Our Naval
    Reserve Career Decision Survey results show that financial and medical
    compensation are the key reasons for mobilized reservists to stay in
    the Naval Reserve. On the other hand, the effects of mobilization on
    our reservists' spouses and children are the main reasons some of them
    choose to leave.
        One often-overlooked impact that mobilization has on the Naval
    Reserve is within recruiting. In the last few years the Naval Reserve
    has seen a downward trend in the number of NAVETS entering the Naval
    Reserve. Although this may be a factor of higher retention rates in the
    active component, it may also reflect a propensity of NAVETS not to
    join the Naval Reserve upon release from active duty for fear that they
    may be mobilized after joining the Naval Reserve.
        The net impact the global war on terrorism will have on the Naval
    Reserve is still uncertain. However, the key to maintaining a strong
    Naval Reserve Force during periods of mobilization is to maintain
    training opportunities, mobilize SELRES to fill meaningful requirements
    (i.e., those for which they were trained), and ensure personnel
    policies (such as duration of mobilization and healthcare for the
    member's family) are consistent, fair, and seamlessly accessible.
        Secretary Roche. The long-term effect of extended deployments for
    our reservists is in the data-gathering process. Presently, there is no
    correlation, but this number and length of deployments is
    unprecedented. Reserve components continue to face many challenges, to
    include recruiting and retention. Since 1992 when the number of active
    duty separations was 50,000, to the current 13,000, they have relied
    more and more upon Non-Prior Service (NPS) accessions and accessions
    from other Services to fill that recruiting pool gap. Recruiting more
    NPS also means more time and money, and a higher attrition rate than
    with prior service recruits.
        In addition to considerations of a smaller pool of potential prior
    service personnel, recruiting from active duty becomes more difficult
    during high operations tempo periods because those leaving active duty,
    when faced with transitioning to a civilian job, will choose not to
    participate in the Reserve or National Guard. This is particularly
    prevalent in the high-stress, high-demand, low-density career fields.
    Likewise, this becomes true for those who participate and are faced
    with whether to continue to do so at the risk of their civilian job or
    their families.
        Anticipating these difficult decisions, and evaluating what effect
    the high operations tempo has had and will have on members of the
    Reserve components, we have worked hard through the recent past to
    provide adequate pay and benefits and increase bonuses for these high
    stress career fields.
        Our citizen airmen are highly trained and motivated and will
    continue to be a vital force if we manage several factors: continue to
    provide adequate pay and benefits, communicate openly and often with
    their families, civilian employers, and civic leaders, assign PERSTEMPO
    across the force as evenly as possible, and provide predictability to
    the extent possible in the number and length of mobilizations and
    deployments.

        71. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, in addition, is the current mobilization causing you
    to rethink both the size and structure of the Reserve Forces?
        Secretary White. Much of the force found in the RC today is a
    result of decisions made to support the Total Force Policy and previous
    defense strategy. With the draw-down during the 1990s, the Army could
    not maintain all of its warfighting capability in the Active Force and
    decided to place many highly specialized capabilities in the RC. The
    Reserve components were configured and resourced to provide many
    specialized capabilities anticipated to be needed only in a protracted
    major theater war. Given the requirements of the new defense strategy
    and the high level of RC use, these force structure decisions are under
    review to determine the proper Active and Reserve Force mix.
        We are also aware that the mobilization process is in need of
    overhaul to get ready units to the fight, with less notice, in less
    time, with reduced sacrifice and stress on the part of the mobilizing
    soldiers and their families. We are analyzing this process in order to
    institute these improvements. Additionally, we are further exploring
    the impact of active component (AC) and Reserve component
    transformation initiatives on mobilization and readiness before we make
    a final determination as to the proper AC/RC force mix.
        Among the RC transformation initiatives is an endeavor to eliminate
    unready units by bringing structure levels down to better match end
    strength. This will dramatically increase readiness by focusing
    resources on high-demand, high-OPTEMPO forces and creating rotational
    depth in capabilities such as civil affairs, psychological operations,
    biological detection, military intelligence, and military police units.
        Secretary Johnson. With the exception of NCW mentioned previously,
    I think in fiscal year 2004, the size and structure of the Naval
    Reserve Forces is just about right. In the case of NCW, we are working
    to provide an active duty capability that will compliment the
    capabilities we already have in the Naval Reserve.
        Secretary Roche. The Air Reserve component (ARC), both Reserve and
    Guard, have performed magnificently in our ongoing successes in
    Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle. It is no secret that we
    rely heavily on the capabilities that reside in the ARC. They have
    stepped up to the challenges just as our active component has. Though
    the Active and Reserve components have both been stressed in these
    endeavors, our risk management has spread those stresses fairly
    equitably. However, the entire Department of Defense is currently
    looking at all the emerging requirements of the new National Military
    Strategy which have been given such great impetus by the events of
    September 11. In the Air Force, we have made and will continue to make
    changes to our force mix (the ratio of a mission in the active and
    Reserve components) and force structure (how those forces are based and
    organized) as new needs are emerging to support that strategy.
        We do have some mission areas in which we are making adjustments to
    mitigate some of those stresses and meet those emerging requirements.
    For example, the Air Force Reserve is transferring 15 combat search and
    rescue aircraft, a low-density-high-demand asset, to the active
    component. In turn, the Reserve unit will convert to KC-135 R-model
    tankers, a mission that has proven very successful in the Reserve
    component. The ARC will also be transferring 14 C-130 H2-models to our
    Air Force Special Operations Command to meet the post September 11
    requirements. These adjustments will allow the active and Reserve
    components to maintain the new steady-state requirements without
    overusing our invaluable Reserve component. In short, we will
    continually rethink the entire air and space force as we lead our
    Defense's transformation efforts to meet the challenges of the 21st
    century.

        72. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, are the kinds of units that are in the various Reserve
    components the right ones? (For example, the USAF has ``borrowed''
    thousands of Reserve Army troops to provide protection for air bases
    and other Air Force facilities due to the insufficient size of USAF
    security personnel units.)
        Secretary White. The Army's active and Reserve component force mix
    is the result of deliberate actions to balance risks and priorities in
    light of operational requirements as well as resource constraints. The
    Army continues to adjust its force structure based on the ``1-4-2-1''
    force-sizing construct. The Army's force mix is designed to support the
    geographic combatant commander's requirements and is determined using
    the Total Army Analysis process. To stay within constant end strength
    levels, adding capabilities to the active force will require the
    transfer of some mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve
    Force. A number of options exist to reduce risk including the
    conversion of lower demand structure inside the active force;
    converting key capabilities held in the Reserve components, but needed
    intermittently; and changes in Reserve personnel management to increase
    access by enhancing volunteerism and diminishing involuntary
    mobilization.
        Additionally, for the Program Objective Memorandum 2004-2009, over
    19,500 spaces were programmed for change within the Active, Guard, and
    Reserve Force structure. Since fiscal year 2001, the Army has activated
    or has programmed to activate through fiscal year 2009, a total of 68
    active, 102 National Guard, and 85 Reserve units that fall into these
    high-demand categories: aviation, chemical, civil affairs/psychological
    operations, and military police. The enhanced force capabilities
    address the most urgent needs.
        Currently, the Office of the Secretary of Defense in conjunction
    with the Joint Staff have undertaken a study to improve operational
    availability of all military forces. As part of this study, the AC/RC
    mix is being studied in the context of short-notice, short-duration
    major combat operations. This study is incomplete, but will be
    continued as part of defense planning for fiscal year 2005 to determine
    any recommended force structure changes.
        Secretary Johnson. Neither the Navy nor the Naval Reserve have been
    required to borrow units from the other Services to complete Navy
    missions. Therefore, the Naval Reserve does not require force structure
    adjustments in fiscal year 2004.
        Secretary Roche. The events of September 11 and the subsequent
    global war on terrorism have changed the scope of many requirements.
    One of the most dramatic changes is the requirement for force
    protection particularly within the borders of the United States. The
    use of the Army National Guard to provide installation force protection
    is a short term fix while the Air Force pursues a number of initiatives
    to both increase the number of security forces personnel as well as
    invest in transformational technologies to meet the new increased
    requirements. We must remember that U.S. soil has now become a new area
    of responsibility for the new combatant commander of NORTHCOM and the
    permanent adjustments to support homeland defense including our active,
    Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard facilities are in the works.
        In more general terms of the mission mix of active and Reserve
    components in the Air Force, we have made and will continue to make
    changes to our force mix (the ratio of a mission in the active and
    Reserve components) and force structure (how those forces are based and
    organized) as the new needs emerge to support the National Military
    Strategy that puts homeland security at the pinnacle of
    responsibilities. The Air Reserve component, both Reserve and Guard,
    have made huge contributions to our successes in Operations Enduring
    Freedom and Noble Eagle. They have stepped up to the challenges just as
    has our active component. Though the active and Reserve components have
    both been stressed in these endeavors, our risk management has spread
    that stress fairly equitably. We think we have the mix just about right
    although, in a few areas like force protection, we are currently making
    significant changes to the entire force--active, Reserve, and Guard.

                               AIR FORCE ACADEMY

        73. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, one woman who was raped
    at the Air Force Academy while she was a freshman there has contacted
    me. She learned the same man--a fellow cadet--had raped another woman 2
    weeks earlier. They reported the crimes to the Office of Special
    Investigations, but he was never charged. One of the women left the
    Academy--the other still is a cadet. I also received a complaint from a
    woman at West Point who was assaulted in her dorm room by another
    cadet. She was urged not to make an issue of the attack, and eventually
    she was separated from the Academy. If, after a thorough investigation
    of the facts and you determine that crimes were committed, will you now
    pursue criminal charges against the perpetrators?
        Secretary Roche. I have from the beginning made it clear that
    sexual assault is a crime and that those who commit sexual assaults are
    criminals who will be punished to the fullest extent of the law and for
    whom there is no place at the Academy or in the Air Force. It would be
    improper, though, for me to prejudge the disposition of any specific
    case. In general, our comprehensive review of sexual assault issues at
    the Air Force Academy includes examination of the investigation and
    disposition of sexual assault allegations. While our review is not
    complete, the information available so far indicates that with very few
    exceptions--perhaps no more than one--allegations reported to the Air
    Force Office of Special Investigations were properly investigated.
    However, if facts are developed in any case that were not appropriately
    considered in the original disposition decision, and if the Air Force
    still has jurisdiction over the alleged offender, prosecution under the
    UCMJ would be one of the options available to the cognizant chain of
    command.

        74. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, will you also provide the
    victims who left school before graduation an opportunity to again serve
    in the military?
        Secretary Roche. Cadets who reported sexual assaults have
    subsequently left the Academy for a wide variety of reasons; in some
    cases those reasons were not related to the alleged sexual assault. I
    therefore cannot provide a ``one size fits all'' answer to this
    question. The Academy, and other Air Force accession sources, will
    consider requests for reentry on a case-by-case basis.

        75. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Roche, who is responsible for
    allowing the allegations of rape to go unanswered and for failing to
    provide the women cadets the care and attention they needed after such
    a traumatic event?
        Secretary Roche. With several reviews and investigations of the
    Academy situation incomplete, we cannot yet be sure we know all the
    facts, and we must not rush to judgment as to the personal
    responsibility of any individual. I intend to take another look at this
    issue when all the relevant information is in. As you are aware, I have
    replaced the leadership team at the Academy. I did so because I believe
    new leadership can most effectively implement the changes General
    Jumper and I have directed at the Academy in our Agenda for Change,
    announced on March 26, 2003, and any future changes we may find
    appropriate after receiving the reports of the Working Group, the Air
    Force and DOD Inspectors General, and the review group recently
    mandated by Congress. My focus has been, and remains, on fixing the
    problem.

                    CANCELLATION OF JOINT SIMULATION SYSTEM

        76. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, I have been made aware of a DOD Program Decision
    Memorandum (PDM) directing the cancellation of the Joint Simulation
    System (JSIMS) program in fiscal year 2004 and through the FYDP. I and
    other members on the Armed Services Committee who care deeply about the
    pace and scope of efforts to increase joint experimentation, joint
    training, creation of a standing joint operational headquarters, and
    joint requirements and acquisition validation, are troubled by this
    development. The program is intended to provide a joint simulation
    capability to ``integrate'' Service simulations allowing for joint
    training and experimentation at strategic, operational, and tactical
    levels. This kind of tool is essential to any effort to move the
    military establishment to greater joint training, doctrine, and
    experimentation. What is your position on the cancellation of this
    program and your related Service simulation programs?
        Secretary White. I do not believe the cancellation of the program
    will have an impact on joint training. The fiscal year 2003 funding was
    retained so that the program manager could deliver the Block I software
    to the Joint Warfighting Training Center (JWFC) for their use to
    conduct Joint Task Force component level training. The Army also
    reprogrammed $9.9 million this year to support the Block I effort. The
    Block I software should enable the JWFC to maintain the software to
    support joint training, doctrine, and experimentation. Moreover, the
    PDM directed an analysis of alternatives to identify a cost-effective
    method of meeting future joint and service training requirements. That
    will either be JSIMS Block II and III, or a different model. The impact
    on the Army simulation is greater, however, because the Block I
    software provides little utility for service use. To this end, we
    believe it is better for the Army to pursue its own Title X solution
    with the clear intent of linking to the future joint simulation once
    that simulation has been determined and matured.
        Secretary Johnson. Navy supports the decision to cancel the JSIMS
    for service use. While an excellent concept, JSIMS experienced cost
    overruns and delays, it would not meet all of the requirements in the
    Operational Requirements Document, nor would it provide for joint
    experimentation.
        In order to continue support of wargaming requirements at the
    Battle Group and Amphibious Ready Group staff level, Navy will
    reprogram existing funds to upgrade the existing Enhanced Naval
    Wargaming System (ENWGS), which creates a track database in Global
    Command and Control System-Navy.
        Navy has also demonstrated the ability to link Joint Semi-Automated
    Forces (JSAF) to the Battle Force Tactical Trainer (BFTT) system and
    stimulate ship's combat systems in a Battle Group sized modeling and
    simulation (M&S) training event. Navy will build on this positive
    experience in an effort to standardize and improve in-port and underway
    virtual exercises as JSAF allows federation with M&S training and
    experimentation systems of the other Services.
        Secretary Roche. The Air Force accepts the fiscal trade-offs that
    led to the Office of the Secretary of Defense PDM decision on the JSIMS
    program. Impacts to related Air Force simulation programs will require
    funding adjustments to maintain and improve legacy systems in current
    use for service and joint training, doctrine, and experimentation.

        77. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, are you satisfied that cancellation of the JSIMS
    program is necessary to accelerate establishment of a Joint National
    Training Capability or does it complicate achieving such an objective?
        Secretary White. Cancellation of the JSIMS program should not
    complicate achieving a Joint National Training Center capability.
    Constructive simulations are only one piece of the Joint National
    Training Center (JNTC) effort and current simulations will support
    near-term JNTC requirements until a joint solution is built to meet
    that requirement.
        Secretary Johnson. No. A JNTC does not require the JSIMS.
    Alternatively funded programs exist, and they have the capability JSIMS
    intended to provide a JNTC. Also, the maritime capability of the
    initial version of JSIMS does not equal the capability of the program
    it is intended to replace, thus forcing the continued funding of the
    legacy program.
        Secretary Roche. The OSD Program Decision Memorandum in question
    covered a range of resource decisions, including the cancellation of
    JSIMS and the establishment of JNTC. I would defer to OSD to comment on
    whether the two decisions were related.
        The JSIMS decisions does include provisions for an Analysis of
    Alternatives to determine a way ahead for joint simulation, so it is
    clear that joint simulation remains a departmental goal.

        78. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary White, Secretary Johnson, and
    Secretary Roche, from your perspective, what are the priority
    requirements for a true joint national training capability and the
    simulation systems necessary to make it possible?
        Secretary White. Joint training must be capabilities-based and
    responsive to the mission requirements of the combatant commanders. It
    must be adaptable to meet both joint and service mission planning and
    rehearsals requirements across the full spectrum of military,
    multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental operations. To this
    end, it should have live, virtual, and constructive components that can
    be integrated to optimize the training for all audiences.
        Secretary Johnson. The following elements are required to provide
    true joint training:

             Access to joint command and control training
            environments for commanders and their staffs at all levels;
             The ability to train joint tactical interoperability
            during the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) accomplished
            via participation by other Service personnel and units in
            exercises;
             Modeling and simulation assets operated in accordance
            with Service specific or joint tactics, techniques, and
            procedures; and
             Investment in connectivity infrastructure and software
            interfaces between service systems in order to replicate the
            joint environment in live, modeling, and simulation
            environments. Services must agree on architectures and
            databases.
        Secretary Roche. We envision Joint National Training Capability
    (JNTC) requirements to focus on the three following areas: First,
    development of a network of high-fidelity simulators and training
    devices connected across a long-haul network, that enable warfighters
    to train together as they would fight even though separated
    geographically by great distances. Second, JNTC must enhance existing
    service interoperability training by synchronizing events at major
    training centers (e.g. Red Flag, Virtual Flag, Air Warrior, Blue Flag),
    with an end-state of fully integrated and standardized joint
    interoperability training. Third, JNTC must develop mechanisms to
    measure joint training effectiveness. These mechanisms include range
    instrumentation, certifiable joint standards, ``ground truth'' through
    data availability, and after action review incorporated into air Force
    and joint lessons learned. Ultimately, the intent is to train ``the way
    we intend to fight'' with JNTC enhancing execution of air power in
    support of the Joint Force Commander.
        Live, virtual, and constructive simulations, at the tactical and
    operational levels of war integrated within distributed systems
    architecture, will be the integral elements of the JNTC. The Air Force
    continues to work closely with the other Services, unified commands,
    and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to identify requirements and
    cost-effective solutions to implement this initiative.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh

                             EXPLOSIVE SAFETY ARCS

        79. Senator Bayh. Secretary Johnson, many of our military
    installations' missions are being encumbered by community encroachment.
    This has been highlighted by flight restrictions at certain military
    installations and, in the extreme, by the controversy of the Navy
    training at Vieques. Encroachment at ordnance facilities can take a
    less visible, but extremely dangerous form. Those installations that
    store large quantities of ordnance items may have explosive safety arcs
    that extend past their boundaries into the surrounding community. In
    this era of heightened security, total containment of explosive arcs
    within military installation boundaries is even more critical.
        When all of the explosive storage magazines are fully loaded at our
    ordnance facilities, do the explosive safety arcs extend beyond the
    installation's boundaries?
        Secretary Johnson. The encumbrance of off-installation properties
    by naval ordnance storage facilities is not permitted, except under
    strictly controlled circumstances in support of operational missions,
    and only in accordance with the explosives safety criteria detailed in
    Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards (DOD
    6055.9-STD) and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) OP 5, ``Ammunition
    and Explosives Safety Ashore Regulations for Handling, Storing,
    Production, Renovation, and Shipping''. An example of those
    circumstances is unsuitable terrain for development (i.e., wetlands,
    topography, etc.) or restricted access such as Government-owned land
    that is not open to the public.

        80. Senator Bayh. Secretary Johnson, as communities have built up
    closer to our ordnance activities, have they entered the explosive
    safety arc areas?
        Secretary Johnson. As a general rule, off-installation areas are
    not permitted to be encumbered by Explosive Safety Quantity Distance
    (ESQD) arcs from naval ordnance storage facilities. Under the
    Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards (DOD
    6055.9-STD) the Navy can present a case for a waiver wherein explosive
    arcs can extend beyond station boundaries if a risk analysis
    demonstrates low risk to those exposed. If a waiver is granted there is
    a requirement that the risk be closely monitored and explosive arcs
    reduced if the risk increases. Occasionally, temporary event waivers
    are granted for specific evolutions, but these are closely monitored
    and duration is limited to the absolute minimum.

        81. Senator Bayh. Secretary Johnson, have the ordnance activities
    had to download from full capacity to bring in the explosive safety
    arcs?
        Secretary Johnson. There have been cases in the past where changes
    external to the naval ordnance storage facility have caused an
    encumbrance of off-installation areas. Examples include off-
    installation zoning changes or where updates to explosives safety
    criteria (outlined in Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives
    Safety Standards (DOD 6055.9-STD) and Naval Sea Systems Command
    (NAVSEA) OP 5, ``Ammunition and Explosives Safety Ashore Regulations
    for Handling, Storing, Production, Renovation, and Shipping'') caused
    an encumbrance of off-installation areas. In these cases MILCON
    projects have reapportioned the explosives storage capability on
    station or explosives limits for ordnance facilities were reduced so
    that Explosive Safety Quantity Distance (ESQD) arcs would no longer
    encumber off-installation areas.

        82. Senator Bayh. Secretary Johnson, is this ``ordnance
    encroachment'' going to be a factor in the BRAC criteria?
        Secretary Johnson. The BRAC 2005 selection criteria are currently
    in development. The BRAC 2005 law requires that the Secretary of
    Defense must publish for comment, and transmit to Congress, the
    proposed criteria no later than December 31, 2003. The final criteria
    must be published and transmitted to Congress no later than February
    16, 2004.

        [Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        UNIFIED AND REGIONAL COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY STRATEGY AND
                            OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in
    room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe,
    Roberts, Collins, Levin, Reed, Akaka, Ben Nelson, Dayton, Bayh,
    and Pryor.
        Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; Brian R. Green, professional staff
    member; William C. Greenwalt, professional staff member; Mary
    Alice Hayward, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley,
    professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional
    staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member;
    Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Joseph T. Sixeas,
    professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel;
    and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
    professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional
    staff member; and Christina D. Still, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Leah C. Brewer, Andrew W.
    Florell, and Nicholas W. West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Cord Sterling,
    assistant to Senator Warner; James Beauchamp, assistant to
    Senator Roberts; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator
    Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Mieke Y.
    Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King and Neil D. Campbell,
    assistants to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler, assistant to
    Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey and Douglas Bush, assistants to
    Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben
    Nelson; William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton;
    Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro,
    assistant to Senator Clinton; and Andy York, assistant to
    Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. Good morning. The committee will come to
    order. We tender our apologies to our distinguished panel of
    witnesses and others who have gathered here this morning for
    this very important hearing. It was a historic moment in the
    Senate chamber this morning when our very much beloved and
    distinguished chaplain since 1995 retired such that he could go
    back to his home and care for his family, and that was followed
    by two votes. Of course we get paid by the vote, and therefore
    we have a way of being there for those votes.
        The committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral
    Thomas Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; General Leon
    LaPorte, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; and General James Hill,
    Commander, U.S. Southern Command, with regard to their area of
    responsibilities (AOR) and particularly their military strategy
    and operational requirements. Also, whether Congress, in their
    judgment, has fulfilled our obligation to give them the support
    that they require. This is the first in a series of hearings
    that this committee conducts annually to receive the testimony
    from our Nation's combatant commanders.
        Gentlemen, you are our warfighters. With great distinction
    and humility, you have carried out your missions thus far and
    will continue to do so. We welcome your insight on developments
    in your areas of responsibility as well as your assessment of
    the fiscal year 2004 defense budget requests.
        Each of our witnesses has assumed his current assignment
    within the past year. We welcome you on your first posture
    hearing before this committee. Each of you has a long and
    distinguished record of service to our country and I thank you
    and I thank your families on behalf of Congress. We ask you to
    convey to the fine men and women under your commands the
    gratitude of the committee and indeed the entire Nation for
    their professionalism and dedication to service.
        Gentlemen, the committee values your unique contributions
    and perspectives on the important issues we are addressing this
    morning. Your insight provides us with the important
    information we need to make the decisions regarding policies
    and programs that affect each of your areas of responsibility.
    This is of particular significance this year due to the ongoing
    global war on terrorism, a potential all-out war with Iraq, and
    this Nation's other global responsibilities, of course the
    Korean Peninsula being foremost, General LaPorte, among the
    priorities.
        I will put the balance of my statement in the record to
    achieve some efficiency of time. I thank you.
        Senator Levin.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

        The committee meets today to receive testimony from Admiral Thomas
    Fargo, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command; General Leon LaPorte,
    Commander of U.S. Forces Korea; and General James Hill, Commander of
    U.S. Southern Command, on their military strategy and operational
    requirements.
        This is the first in a series of hearings this committee will
    conduct over the next few weeks to receive testimony from our Nation's
    combatant commanders. Gentlemen, you are our warfighters. We welcome
    your insight on developments in your areas of responsibility (AOR), as
    well as your assessment of the fiscal year 2004 defense budget request.
        Each of our witnesses has assumed his current assignment within the
    past year. We welcome you on your first posture hearing before this
    committee. Each of you has a long and distinguished record of service
    to our country. I want to thank you on behalf of the committee and the
    Nation for your leadership, dedication, and service.
        We ask you to convey to the fine men and women under your commands
    the gratitude of the committee and our entire Nation for their
    professionalism, their dedication, their service and the sacrifices
    that they and their families are making on behalf of the American
    people.
        Gentlemen, the committee values your unique contributions and
    perspectives on the important issues we are addressing this morning.
    Your insight provides us with important information we need to make
    decisions regarding policies and programs that affect each of your
    areas of responsibility. This is of particular significance this year
    due to the ongoing global war on terrorism, a potential all-out war
    with Iraq, and this Nation's other global responsibilities in which
    each of you play a critical role.
        In a development of utmost concern to all of us, tensions have
    risen on the Korean peninsula over the past few months, following the
    admission by North Korea in October 2002 that it is operating a secret
    nuclear program based on uranium enrichment, and its subsequent
    decision to withdraw from the Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
        North Korea has now restarted its reactor at Yongbyon and could
    soon begin reprocessing operations to extract weapons-grade plutonium.
    Resumption of North Korea's nuclear weapons program poses a grave
    threat to regional and international stability. Some have accused the
    administration of being ``resigned'' to a nuclear North Korea. I
    respectfully disagree. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated just last
    week: ``The position of the United States is we don't want to see
    nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula. It is also the position of
    China. It is also the position of Japan and South Korea.'' The United
    States, in conjunction with its friends and allies in the region, is
    working responsibly to resolve this situation through diplomatic means.
        I look forward to hearing Admiral Fargo's and General LaPorte's
    assessment of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. I am particularly
    interested in any changes in North Korea's military posture, as well as
    your assessment of North Korea's nuclear program, ballistic missile and
    proliferation activities, and the readiness of our forces to respond to
    any possible developments on the peninsula both now or in the future.
        In the Asia-Pacific region, the global war on terrorism is being
    waged in the Philippines, with U.S. troops deployed to that nation to
    help the Philippine Government in its fight against terrorist groups.
    Recently, our two governments have been discussing a new mission in the
    Philippines that would increase the role of U.S. forces, to include a
    possible combat role. I look forward to hearing an update on the status
    of discussions with the Philippine Government regarding this potential
    new mission.
        Last, but certainly not least, we look forward to General Hill's
    assessment of the state of affairs in Latin America. Of particular
    concern is the situation in Colombia, where the U.S. is providing
    substantial amounts of aid to helping that nation eradicate illicit
    drug cultivation. Our military is involved in this effort. We look
    forward to General Hill's assessment of the mission.
        We welcome our witnesses this morning and look forward to their
    testimony.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I will do the same thing. I
    will just join you in welcoming our witnesses and, thank them
    for their tremendous service to our Nation. The
    responsibilities are awesome and growing in each of their
    areas. We have new challenges and I think growing challenges.
        I would just ask that my statement be made part of the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

        We meet today to discuss military strategy and operational
    requirements in two critical parts of the world--Asia and Latin
    America. In Asia, we are faced with a full-blown political-military
    crisis on the Korean peninsula. The North Koreans admitted that they
    have a secret uranium-based nuclear program, in contravention of four
    existing agreements to keep a nuclear-weapons-free Korean peninsula. In
    an attempt to force the United States to meet with them, the North
    Koreans have taken a series of escalatory steps, bringing us to a
    stalemate fraught with the danger of miscalculation.
        The North Koreans expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA) inspectors who were monitoring the plutonium-based program that
    had been successfully frozen by the Agreed Framework. They removed the
    seals and monitoring cameras from the plutonium facilities, announced
    their withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty, and a few weeks ago
    they restarted the nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon complex. We remain
    highly concerned that their next step might be starting up their
    plutonium reprocessing facilities, which could yield five to six
    nuclear weapons in a matter of months.
        The administration continues to refuse to speak directly with the
    North Koreans, thereby denying us the benefit of communicating to the
    North Korean government what actions are unacceptable, and of
    obtaining, at least, some more information about their objectives. I
    believe that we ought to talk to them. Talking is not appeasement. It
    is the only feasible avenue right now for preventing them from
    developing more nuclear weapons and possibly exporting them to the
    highest bidder. If we are serious about working with our allies on this
    matter, we would do so, because our allies are urging us to talk to
    North Korea.
        Also related to Korea, the Washington Post carried a story on page
    1 of its March 4th edition concerning the incident in which four North
    Korean jets intercepted a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in international
    airspace over the Sea of Japan on Sunday, March 2. According to the
    story, defense officials stated that ``At least one of the North Korean
    planes directed its radar to identify the U.S. aircraft as a target and
    may have `locked on,' a step short of shooting a missile.''
    Additionally, on March 8, the New York Times carried a page 1 story
    that said the North Korean jets ``were trying to force the (U.S.)
    aircraft to land in North Korea and seize its crew'' according to a
    senior defense official. I hope that our witnesses can clarify the
    following: 1) Did the North Korean aircraft ``lock on'' to the U.S.
    planes; 2) Did the North Koreans attempt to force down the U.S.
    aircraft; and 3) Did the North Koreans take any action that could be
    construed as preparatory to shooting down the U.S. aircraft?
        At the same time that we are faced with the threat from North
    Korea, the administration's response to it has greatly stressed our
    already evolving relationship with South Korea. So, I look forward to
    hearing from General LaPorte about our latest efforts with the South
    Koreans to examine the military alliance and to address the respective
    roles and missions of our militaries, as well as U.S. force structure
    and basing in South Korea.
        I am also interested in hearing about our work to help train the
    Philippine army to more effectively fight terrorists and insurgents.
    How successful have we been in achieving a key objective--helping them
    develop an ability to eliminate the kidnap-for-ransom Abu Sayyaf Group?
        Were we were planning to change our role in the Philippines--as has
    been reported--in a manner that would have contravened the Philippine
    constitution? If so, Congress should have been consulted, as Secretary
    Wolfowitz said we would, in advance of any change in our mission. I
    certainly expect that we will be consulted if there are any changes in
    the future.
        Last month fighting broke out again between the Philippine
    government and one of the other groups operating in the southern
    Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In the past this
    25,000-strong group has indicated that they would take military action
    if U.S. troops encroached on their territory. I am concerned about the
    possibility that our activities in the Philippines might put our troops
    at risk from other groups like the MILF.
        So, I look forward to hearing about our future training plans from
    Admiral Fargo.
        In Latin America, one of the greatest political-military challenges
    we face is the effort to fight drug production and trafficking.
    Colombian President Uribe says he is committed to confronting the
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia--the FARC--as well as the
    National Liberation Army--the ELN--and the paramilitaries, head-on. He
    has taken some important steps toward developing the strategy and
    resources to wage an enduring campaign against the FARC, ELN, and
    paramilitaries. I look forward to hearing from General Hill how our
    training efforts are complementing and leveraging his strategy, and if
    the existing personnel and other limitations on U.S. participation
    should be maintained. I am also interested to hear about what we are
    doing throughout the Andean region to address the potential of
    spillover of coca and heroin production and trafficking to neighboring
    countries.
        I look forward to testimony from our witnesses on these issues and
    other topics of concern to them.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. Both
    of our statements in their entirety will go in the record, and
    each of the written statements submitted to the committee by
    the witnesses in their entirety will go into the record. We
    will just proceed to Admiral Fargo. Why don't you lead off.

      STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS B. FARGO, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
                     UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

        Admiral Fargo. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
    and members of the committee. It is great to be with you again.
        The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are
    providing superior service to the Nation in the Asian Pacific
    region and around the world, and the high readiness of our
    forces today can be directly attributed to the generous support
    of this esteemed body and of the American people as a whole.
        Dramatic events of the past year have brought into focus
    new national security demands for the 21st century, and we have
    outlined five near-term priorities for the Pacific Command to
    meet those demands. I would like to briefly highlight these
    priorities for you.
        The first is the global war on terrorism and we are
    building momentum in the war on terrorism in the Pacific
    theater. In addition to providing forces to the Central Command
    for Operation Enduring Freedom, we are focused on two primary
    terror threats related to al Qaeda, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
    in the Philippines, and the Jemaah Islamiyah, an al Qaeda
    surrogate spread throughout Southeast Asia.
        Last year we responded to the request of the Philippines to
    provide training, advice, and assistance to the Armed Forces of
    the Philippines in southern Mindanao, including Basilan Island,
    then an Abu Sayyaf stronghold. This 6-month effort provided a
    template to help the Republic of the Philippines develop a
    lasting counterterrorist capability. As a result, we have seen
    the beginning of stability on Basilan, the terrorists have been
    separated from the people, and normal activity, like children
    going back to school, has returned.
        There is clearly more to be done. The ASG is
    reconstituting, have been active in bombing campaigns, and are
    looking for outside support, and we have an active exercise and
    a security assistance program in place to contribute to build
    the counterterrorist capability that the Armed Forces of the
    Philippines needs.
        The Jemaah Islamiyah, or JI, has had cells in Singapore,
    Malaysia, and Indonesia, has attacked American and other
    interests throughout the region. This group was also
    responsible for the tragic Bali bombing which killed some 200
    people, many of them Australian. We are focused on the JI and
    are pleased with the cooperation of our friends in the region,
    including the investigations by the Government of Indonesia to
    apprehend and bring these terrorists to justice. Over 130 JI
    members have been arrested or detained to date.
        Our Service components are enjoying the highest readiness
    that I can recall in my 32 years of service. For example, in
    January, all six Pacific Command aircraft carriers were
    underway simultaneously, five with full air wings embarked. I
    can provide similar examples for all the Services in the
    Pacific componency.
        Our warfighting readiness will benefit from future
    developments of missile defenses, increased stocks of
    precision-guided munitions, improved anti-submarine warfare
    capabilities, increased intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance assets, and improved air and sealift to speed
    our forces to future conflicts.
        Our quality-of-service concept in the Pacific includes the
    traditional quality-of-life initiatives plus the facilities,
    the spare parts, and the information technology necessary for
    satisfaction and efficiency on the job. You should know that I
    am a big fan of this new and present generation. They are
    smart, engaging, and unafraid of hard work, and they well
    represent our Nation and its values around the globe.
        Morale and retention are high and we appreciate your
    support of the defense budget, including the improved readiness
    funding and the pay raises that demonstrate part of your
    continuing commitment to our people.
        Our longstanding bilateral alliances in the Pacific, our
    solid friendships, and the presence of our forward-deployed
    combat forces are the constants that ensure the region's peace
    and stability. Northeast Asia is a center of gravity for our
    Asian Pacific security and our alliance with Japan is
    fundamental to that security. Japan has been aggressive and a
    strong partner in the global war on terrorism. In my judgment
    our relationship with Japan has never been stronger.
        Our alliance with South Korea is also solid. It has been
    the basis for peace and prosperity in South Korea for 50 years
    and will continue to serve our mutual security interests even
    after the lessening of tensions on the Peninsula. North Korea's
    provocative actions over the past 6 months have not changed
    that fundamental truth.
        Australia is our special partner and friend in the Pacific.
    The Australians have demonstrated courage and leadership in
    regional efforts from Afghanistan to Bali to East Timor and we
    continue to work to eliminate barriers to interoperability
    between our forces.
        Our relationships with Thailand and the Philippines, as I
    have already described, also demonstrate cooperation and
    partnership in regional and global security initiatives. The
    contributions by good friends in the region are really
    numerous. Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, and more recently
    India have all participated in the global war on terrorism,
    with contributions ranging from intelligence sharing to over-
    flight access to combat forces.
        Our final priority is to promote change and improve our
    Asian-Pacific defense posture for the future. Pacific Command
    is synchronizing transformational efforts to produce rule
    improvements in six key areas, which include: first, updating
    our plans to meet current and emerging threats within our new
    force planning construct.
        Second is strengthening command and control relationships,
    including maturing the standing joint force headquarters
    concept.
        Third is improving our force posture and our footprint in
    ways that improve our ability to respond to threats more
    rapidly while minimizing adverse impact on our allies and
    friends.
        Fourth, we need to increase capabilities for immediate
    employment, and here I am talking about once again missile
    defense, global strike capabilities, the nuclear-powered cruise
    missile attack submarine (SSGN), and improvements in
    intelligence assets to increase our warning of potential
    threats.
        Fifth, we need to harness those capabilities in new
    operating patterns and concepts, such as the Navy's
    expeditionary strike group, the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat
    Team, and high-speed vessels.
        Finally, increasing opportunities for diversified access
    and in or out logistics to reassure allies, build reliable
    options for contingency planning, and improve training
    alternatives to relieve the pressure on overstressed locations.
        These six areas encompass the primary focus of our
    transformational efforts in the Pacific. On behalf of the men
    and women of the Pacific Command, let me offer my sincere
    appreciation for your support and for the opportunity to report
    on the posture of the United States Pacific Command. I
    certainly look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Fargo follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Adm. Thomas B. Fargo, USN

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: On behalf of the men and
    women of the United States Pacific Command, I thank you for this
    opportunity to testify on security in the Asia-Pacific region.
        Having served as Commander, United States Pacific Command
    (CDRUSPACOM) over the past year, and previously serving as Commander,
    United States Pacific Fleet for 30 months, has fortified my belief that
    a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region is of paramount
    importance to our country and the world. In contrast, an Asia that is
    uncertain presents grave dangers to our Nation and the security of our
    friends and allies in the region.
        We have a number of security concerns, and they are addressed
    clearly in our National military strategy and supporting guidance:

             Conflict on the Korean Peninsula
             Miscalculation over the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir
             Transnational threats like terrorism, the
            proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and illegal
            drug trade
             Instability associated with a failing nation-state or
            humanitarian crisis, and
             Ensuring the readiness of our forward deployed forces
            in the region.

        We are not facing these concerns alone. Since the terrorist attacks
    of 11 September and over the past year, we have had unprecedented
    cooperation in combating and supporting the global war on terrorism and
    backing from concerned neighbors to stop the proliferation of weapons
    of mass destruction. We have continued to build on the longstanding
    bilateral alliances and friendships necessary to deter regional
    aggression and coercion, dissuade military competition, and assure our
    allies and friends of our commitment to them and the region. We've
    accomplished this by our forward presence in the theater and by the
    actions of our forces as they execute tasks and operations in support
    of our Nation's security. In short, we have begun a journey to
    ``operationalize'' the strategic guidance we have received. Our
    destination is a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.
        Last year during my confirmation hearing, I provided five broad
    priorities for Pacific Command. Since then, I've used the priorities as
    a roadmap for focusing the command, directing operational initiatives
    and assessing progress. Today, my intent is to provide you an update on
    these priorities as they pertain to the defense posture of the U.S.
    Pacific Command (USPACOM).
    Sustaining and Supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
        Our highest USPACOM priority is sustaining and supporting the GWOT.
    This includes not only operations in the Pacific, but also as a force
    provider to Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A), or wherever
    international terrorism might threaten our interests worldwide.
    Although we don't have any Government-supported sanctuaries for
    terrorists in the Pacific, terrorist cells and organizations that
    operate in the region provide unique challenges to USPACOM and to the
    countries in which they proliferate.
        GWOT Update. Regional and local terrorist groups with ties to al
    Qaeda pose the most dangerous threat to U.S., allied, and friendly
    interests in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). Bolstered by
    financial and technical support from al Qaeda, the Jemaah Islamiyah
    (JI) network and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines
    have demonstrated their capability to attack U.S. and Western
    interests. Our task, in coordination with other agencies, is to ensure
    these terrorists do not destabilize established governments in the
    region or threaten Americans or our friends. Regional alliances and
    partnerships are critical to achieving both our short-term goal of
    eradicating regional terrorist groups and our long-term goal of
    establishing a security environment throughout the Asia-Pacific region
    that rejects terrorism and addresses the factors that breed terrorists.
        Southeast Asia witnessed a number of terrorist acts in 2002,
    including the bombings of tourist nightclubs on the Indonesian island
    of Bali on 12 October that killed nearly 200 civilians, including seven
    Americans, and a series of bombings across the Philippines also in
    October. We believe the ASG was responsible for the attacks in the
    Philippines that killed at least 22 people--including a U.S.
    serviceman--and wounded over 200 others. Coincident investigations and
    arrests in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines,
    and Australia have revealed an extensive, sophisticated network,
    centered on the Jemaah Islamiyah, that continues to plan attacks
    against U.S. and Western diplomatic interests and less defensible
    commercial or tourist venues across the region. We have credible
    information that al Qaeda has long sought to expand its movement in
    Southeast Asia. By leveraging its connections with sympathetic groups
    and individuals, some previously trained in Afghanistan, al Qaeda seeks
    to expand its network and obtain the support of local proponents in
    establishing a regional pan-Islamic state supportive of radical Islamic
    ideology.
        To meet this challenge, USPACOM and regional governments have
    strengthened counterterrorism cooperation over the past year. Regional
    governments have made progress achieving counterterrorism goals through
    legislation that combats terrorism and its resource methods, by
    capturing and detaining terrorists, and through interagency
    coordination and intelligence sharing. To date, over 100 terrorist
    suspects have been arrested or detained, primarily in Malaysia,
    Singapore, Philippines, and Indonesia. The U.S. Government has
    designated JI, the ASG, and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
    People's Army as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This action enables
    us to identify and freeze the financial assets of these groups and sets
    the conditions for their isolation. Governments in the region are also
    increasing their cooperation with regional counterparts--forming
    bilateral and multilateral alliances to combat terrorist activity.
    ASEAN's plan to establish a regional Counterterrorism Center in Kuala
    Lumpur, Malaysia is a noteworthy example. USPACOM continues to support
    the efforts of these nations to strengthen the rule of law, improve the
    effectiveness of regional armed forces, and promote democratic ideals
    of pluralism and religious tolerance. Our long-term effort is to use
    international, regional, and local relationships to defeat terrorism
    through coordinated diplomacy, education, information operations, and
    the use of force when necessary. This is our challenge--and we will
    meet it.
        We've learned a great deal about terrorism in Southeast Asia over
    the past year: how these entities organize, how they operate, and what
    they seek to achieve. We realize we have much more to learn and to
    accomplish. I am convinced that our best approach is to disrupt
    terrorist activities where we can while helping build our regional
    partners' capabilities to do the same. It is a team effort.
        To better synchronize our efforts in combating terrorism in the
    Pacific, we have assumed the offensive while putting in place an
    ``active defense.'' Offensively, we established a full time Joint
    Interagency Coordination Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG-CT) at
    USPACOM Headquarters. Defensively, we designated our Army component,
    U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), as our Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC)
    for Hawaii; Commander, Pacific Representative--Guam (COMPAC- REPGUAM)
    as our JRAC for Guam; and Commander, Alaska Command (ALCOM) as Joint
    Task Force--Alaska. These command and control constructs are
    successfully prosecuting the war on terror while protecting our forces
    and critical infrastructure.
        JIACG-CT. We have established a Joint Interagency Coordination
    Group for Counter Terrorism (JIACG/CT) to coordinate DOD and other
    Government agency (OGA) activities in USPACOM AOR, develop targets for
    future military or OGA operations, plan USPACOM regional and country
    counterterrorism (CT) campaigns, and enhance U.S. and partner nation CT
    capabilities in support of national objectives in the GWOT. It is an
    all-encompassing and focused effort, where we are now integrating our
    Theater Country Teams to assess host-nation concerns and necessary
    conditions to proceed with our CT campaign. This team endeavor has been
    extremely successful as demonstrated by the actions of regional
    countries that are supporting U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan and
    regional operations, like those in the Philippines, while conducting CT
    operations in their own countries--all in the past year.
        Forward and Deployed Forces. Within the last year, the U.S.S. Kitty
    Hawk, John C. Stennis, Carl Vinson, Constellation, and Abraham Lincoln
    battlegroups; maritime patrol aircraft; U.S.S. Peleliu, Bonhomme-
    Richard, Belleau Wood, and Tarawa Amphibious Ready Groups with the
    11th, 13th and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units; 5th, 11th, and 13th Air
    Forces; and the 509th Bomber and 40th Air Expeditionary Wings have
    deployed in support of major roles in OEF-A and operations in the
    Persian Gulf. Further, many USPACOM countries continue to provide
    tangible support to OEF-A within their means. Australia, India, Japan,
    Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have
    all contributed support ranging from overflight, access and basing to
    escort, logistics, and troops on the ground. We appreciate their many
    contributions and valuable cooperation.
        Regional Counterterrorism. Information sharing between countries in
    the Pacific has provided unprecedented insights into the Jemaah
    Islamiyah (JI) and al Qaeda networks in the Asia-Pacific region. As a
    result, Singapore and Malaysia have arrested dozens of members of JI,
    the primary transnational terrorist organization in the Pacific with
    links to al Qaeda. Indonesia has arrested suspected terrorist leaders
    and bombing suspects since the October bombings in Bali. However,
    Indonesia has a difficult problem and has factions that do not want to
    aggressively investigate groups within Indonesia sympathetic to al
    Qaeda. We need to cooperate more effectively at all levels with
    Indonesia on terrorism. An International Military Education and
    Training (IMET) program for Indonesia is key to our engagement effort.
        The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) continues
    to attack terrorist infrastructure and capabilities in the Philippines
    and throughout the region. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is firmly
    on our side in the GWOT--strongly supporting the effort. Our advice and
    assistance, including our maintenance and training packages provided
    under security assistance authorities, are improving the Armed Forces
    of the Philippines (AFP) CT capabilities. Operation Enduring Freedom-
    Philippines (OEF-P) serves as the ideal vehicle for U.S. forces to
    advise and assist the AFP in the development of skills necessary to
    fight terrorists. Additionally, the infrastructure improvements to
    roads, hospitals, and schools and the construction of water wells on
    Basilan Island under DOD's humanitarian and civic assistance program
    provide positive impacts on local communities--highlighting America's
    positive role while assisting the Philippines in dealing with the
    socio-economic causes that entice disenfranchised Filipinos to support
    terrorist activities. As a result of this well integrated operation,
    the ASG is on the run on Basilan and its influence with the local
    populace there has been dampened.
        USPACOM's Antiterrorism Program is proactive and dynamic in its
    approach to protect our people and resources throughout the Pacific. It
    is an ``active defense'' because it has offensive qualities. Since 11
    September, we have come a long way in better protecting DOD personnel
    and critical infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region.
        Joint Rear Area Coordinators (JRACs) in Alaska, Guam, Hawaii,
    Japan, and Korea are the focal points for force protection,
    coordinating security measures and intelligence fusion among the
    different services in their AORs. JRACs provide the command and control
    construct to synchronize our DOD anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/
    FP) efforts for military installations and property with Federal,
    State, and local agencies and with the host nations in the cases of
    Japan and Korea. USPACOM's JRACs are models for interagency
    coordination, combined scenario-based training events, and
    unprecedented cooperation and information sharing. We are working
    continuously with U.S. Northern Command to standardize and synchronize
    our efforts and procedures.
        USPACOM has an aggressive vulnerability assessment program that
    covers DOD bases, ports, airfields, and training areas in the AOR that
    are not under U.S. control. We use assessment teams from the Defense
    Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the services, and our components to
    ensure our facilities have current assessments and proactive
    antiterrorism plans. USPACOM personnel work closely with their
    Department of State counterparts to ensure host-nation support is
    adequate to protect our deployed forces and that all are employing the
    latest AT/FP procedures.
        Force protection is ``operationalized'' in USPACOM. Our staff
    continually monitors threat information and the environment in which
    our forces are based. Theater and country specific Force Protection
    Conditions (FPCONs) are continually reviewed and upgraded as necessary.
    Random Antiterrorism Measures are employed to complicate terrorist
    planning. USPACOM also has a travel restriction program, providing a
    tool to declare entire countries or portions thereof ``off-limits'' to
    DOD members, thus keeping them out of harm's way. In addition, Force
    protection plans are required for all travel in our AOR, from major
    unit deployments to individuals on leave. The resource drain from
    increased FPCONs is a formidable challenge to both manpower limitations
    and Force Protection Technology initiatives. Your continued support is
    necessary to sustain the progress we are making in this area.
        Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program and Homeland
    Security. Currently, we support Homeland Security and Forward Base
    security efforts primarily through Information Analysis,
    Infrastructure/Personnel Protection, and Quick Reaction Forces. The
    Critical Infrastructure Program is our operational initiative to
    improve security in the AOR. The program is on track in developing
    processes and methodologies. The first CIP Appendix to one of our
    theater Operational Plans (OPLAN) will go to the Joint Staff on 30
    April 2003. Additionally, a comprehensive USPACOM CIP Operation Order
    (OPORD), our Theater Infrastructure Assurance Plan, is in final
    staffing. Notably, the program has resulted in a partnership with the
    Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures to develop
    and field a prototype Combatant Command CIP Database in May 2003.
        Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HLD/CS). With the recent
    direction to consolidate the security, defense, and support for the
    homeland, we are working to integrate existing functions as well as
    expanded mission requirements to enhance our protection of the USPACOM
    Homeland AOR that includes the State of Hawaii, the Territories of Guam
    and American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
    Islands. Programs such as the JRAC, CIP, Homeland Air Security (HAS),
    Consequence Management for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear,
    and high yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Domestic Support Operations are
    but a few of those being combined into one plan to maximize our
    capabilities and still refine the use of our resources. USPACOM's HAS
    mission deters, prevents or interdicts aerial threats and aggression
    directed toward Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and U.S. territories within
    USPACOM's AOR. The HAS air threat spectrum ranges from ballistic
    missiles and aircraft to future low-altitude cruise missiles and radio
    controlled sub-scale aircraft. The potential for a terrorist to gain
    this capability is rising. USPACOM has addressed this challenge with
    close integration, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among
    international, Federal, State, local agencies, and governments. This
    fusion of individual agency capabilities, including our military, into
    an integrated, multi-layered response is key to our collective success.
        USPACOM also supports other non-Homeland Security functions. Civil
    Support operations will be an enhancement of our existing Domestic
    Support Operations to the Homeland. Although not directly related to
    securing the homeland against terrorism, this support affects the
    impact of terrorist action. With Secretary of Defense direction, we
    quickly support the Department of Homeland in mitigation and recovery
    efforts relating to natural disasters. Typhoon Pongsona in Guam is a
    good example. The USPACOM HLD/CS program has taken on a renewed effort
    with great scope and responsibilities. Our Contingency Plan (CONPLAN)
    will build on our processes for intelligence sharing, AT/FP, CIP,
    CBRNE, and natural disasters as well as other requested support to the
    civilian sector, providing a comprehensive program for Hawaii, Guam,
    and all our territories in the AOR.
        Information fusion. USPACOM's Counterintelligence Program remains
    the key link between DOD and Law Enforcement Agency efforts in the
    Pacific Theater. We are committed to furthering the integration efforts
    of the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group--Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-
    CT) and counterintelligence missions with the FBI's Joint Terrorism
    Task Forces and with allied international agencies. Along these lines,
    we are pioneering efforts to promulgate all-source intelligence fusion
    to connect local, state, national, and DOD intelligence,
    counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies. These efforts,
    coupled with a joint international training regimen encompassing
    asymmetric warfare and analysis from multiple perspectives, hold great
    promise in developing an ``actionable intelligence'' capability.
        Manpower Requirements. Legislation mandates reductions in Higher
    Headquarters (HHQ) staffs by 15 percent. USPACOM and our sub-unified
    commands are executing these reductions in ways that will minimize the
    impact on our missions. The need for intelligence gathering, analysis,
    production, coordination, dissemination, campaign planning, and
    capabilities testing in exercises and coalition building is greater
    than ever. Adequate manpower resources are essential to mission
    planning to counter emerging asymmetric threats. Achieving synergy of
    forces launched from around the globe during conflicts while providing
    effective reach-back for those forces creates high mission demand on
    our combatant headquarters (HQ) staff.
        The GWOT has created additional manpower requirements. Increased
    security patrols, both shore-based and waterside, in response to
    enhanced FPCONs; non-U.S. controlled port and airfield assessment
    teams; 24/7 coverage for JRACs and Crisis Action Teams; and the already
    expanding Homeland Defense, Civil Support and CT missions are a few
    examples of manpower generating tasks. Additional AT/FP billets are
    needed to address the full range of force protection, antiterrorism,
    and CT missions throughout USPACOM. As we continue to develop the
    Homeland Defense and Civil Support plan, we already see the need for
    enhanced information analysis capabilities and consequence management
    resources for CBRNE events.
        Integrating reservists. Throughout the 1990s, we increasingly
    relied on our Reserve and Guard members to help accomplish our mission.
    These outstanding service members/citizens contributed not only hard
    work, but also unique talents and perspectives. It is not an
    understatement to say that they have helped in every facet of the
    USPACOM mission. After 11 September, with the sharply increasing
    demands of the GWOT, we needed their support. Throughout USPACOM, we
    only mobilized about 5,000 reservists--about 10 percent of the
    immediate 11 September mobilized force capability. They helped with
    force protection, logistics flow, and increased shifts in a myriad of
    areas. As we continue to tap into our reservists and National Guardsmen
    to support operations, we need to ensure they receive benefits
    comparable to our active duty service members. America can be proud of
    how our Reserve and Guard Forces have responded.
        Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF). USPACOM
    received $3.98 million in CbT RIF funding in fiscal year 2002. The
    fiscal year 2003 worldwide allocation stands at $47 million. This
    initiative provides the Geographic and Functional Commanders additional
    avenues for resourcing against emergent and emergency terrorist
    threats. USPACOM received $4.14 million (10 projects) of the $32.4
    million available in the first allocation of fiscal year 2003 funding,
    not including $2.56 million (14 projects) for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).
    USPACOM funded CbT RIF projects include emergency Explosive Ordnance
    Disposal responder gear for USARPAC; a perimeter wall for the new
    USPACOM Headquarters; vehicle gates and barriers for Tripler Army
    Hospital; mass notification system for Misawa Air Base (AB), Japan;
    closed circuit television for Fort Buckner; gates for Yokota AB, Japan
    flight line; barrier gates for Fort Shafter; crash barriers for Camp
    Zama, Japan; and a standoff initiative with HQs security upgrades for
    Yokota AB.
        Special Operation Forces (SOF). USPACOM, through Special Operations
    Command, Pacific and JTF-510, maintains the ability to deploy SOF under
    the command of a general officer to any location to combat terrorism.
    We have used this capability in Operation Enduring Freedom--Philippines
    and continue to refine it to support the GWOT. This capability,
    however, depends on building and maintaining relations with supporting
    allies and friendly nations. We build and maintain these relationships
    through our Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and other Theater
    Security Cooperation (TSC) programs. We look forward to working with
    the Congress to ensure these activities continue to receive future
    resource consideration.
    Improving Readiness and Joint Warfighting Capability
        Improving the readiness and joint warfighting capability of USPACOM
    Forces is critical to assuring our friends and allies, dissuading
    future military competition, deterring threats and coercion against
    U.S. interests, and defeating an adversary if deterrence fails. It
    includes the force levels, spares, operating dollars, and training
    needed to maintain ready forces. It also means innovating,
    transforming, and improving our capabilities and developing operating
    concepts and technologies needed to keep our forces ready for a wide
    range of alternative futures.
        Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The GWOT and
    traditional regional military threats demand ever-increasing agility
    and innovation in military intelligence. In the Asia-Pacific region,
    Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) remains our best means to provide timely
    information on threat developments and intentions. It is key to
    tracking terrorist activities in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well
    as maintaining warning indicators and situational awareness on areas
    such as Korea, tensions between India and Pakistan, and China's
    continuing military modernization and relations with Taiwan.
        The ability to integrate National Security Agency (NSA) and service
    SIGINT is vital in peacetime and in crisis. Rapid advances in
    telecommunications technologies, and their use by adversaries, present
    a daunting SIGINT challenge. I strongly support NSA's transformation
    efforts to defeat any perspective gains the digital technology
    revolution may present to our enemies.
        I strongly advocate the accelerated development and fielding of
    joint, interoperable, modular, rapidly reconfigurable tactical SIGINT
    equipment for land, sea, and air platforms. These improvements should
    be balanced by collaborative intelligence processing systems at
    national, theater, and tactical levels to make the best use of the
    increased data obtained.
        Without concurrent improvements in NSA's capabilities and in
    service cryptologic systems it will be increasingly difficult to
    predict, find, and target the most serious threats in our region.
        Substantial improvements are needed to enhance Human Intelligence
    (HUMINT) collection capability against key USPACOM Indications and
    Warning requirements, to include hard and deeply buried underground
    facilities supporting the adversary's command, control, and
    communications and WMD infrastructure. Focused and coordinated source
    development is critical. Sustained resources for both CIA and DOD
    (Defense HUMINT Services) will yield the progress we need. Our military
    commands must have insight into enemy plans and intentions that only
    good HUMINT can provide.
        Cryptolinguists remain a long-standing shortfall with Operation
    Enduring Freedom proving the value of personnel fluent in languages and
    dialects. We are partially meeting the current challenges by training
    cryptolinguists to become familiar with low-density dialects and using
    speakers fluent in these dialects to augment our force. Ensuring the
    Defense Manpower Data Center's Automated Language Finder database
    tracks all USPACOM languages and dialects would significantly improve
    our ability to find speakers of languages/dialects required for future
    operations. Additionally, it is essential the Defense Language
    Institute develop tests for languages/dialects that accurately assess
    language skills of service personnel.
        To support future contingencies, crises or OPLANs, we require a
    full-up and exercised joint ISR architecture with adequate ISR assets.
    One positive development sponsored by the U.S. Air Force is the multi-
    intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination
    (TPED) environment with the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) at
    Hickam Air Force Base (AFB). This system will distribute data from
    theater, commercial, and tactical ISR sensors to multiple users--
    national, joint, and combined--involved in a crisis. To fully benefit
    from the DCGS, additional funding is needed to ensure USPACOM service
    components have a sustained airborne ISR infrastructure, to include
    unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and extended tether U-2 high-altitude
    surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.
        Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\). Over the
    past 3 years, improving the C\4\ posture in the Pacific has been a top
    USPACOM priority and still is one of the most critical challenges we
    face today. The C\4\ infrastructure must be continually sustained and
    protected. We've invested heavily in command and control systems and
    equipment, communication devices, and computers across the command. We
    do this because our current and future requirements demand that we do.
    For example, the Air Force recently declared initial operating
    capability for a new Air Operations Center at Hickam AFB in Hawaii.
    This function can deploy in part or as a whole to operate through the
    full spectrum of contingency operations, reaching back for support from
    the rest of the Air Operations Center at Hickam. Every planning action,
    training event, operation, and weapon system in existence today relies
    heavily on the ability to communicate. Providing our fighting men and
    women with the weapons they need comes with a large price tag, but it's
    worth it. To do otherwise would be tantamount to denying them
    ammunition in the heat of battle.
        C-4 Challenges. The GWOT demands effective communication systems
    and equipment to link national authorities and local first responders
    with real-time information. We have made great strides in improving C4
    capabilities in the Pacific Theater, but we must continue improvements
    at a rapid pace to keep up with expanding requirements for
    connectivity, capacity and security. C4 ties all technology together
    and is the underpinning for Transformation, both directly and
    indirectly. We must enhance our information infrastructure to be more
    robust, able to rapidly capitalize on improving technology, and more
    cost efficient.
        To achieve information superiority we need to move large volumes of
    information to and from the warfighter to maintain vivid and complete
    situational awareness and achieve understanding at a glance. Many folks
    envision large volumes of information as pages and pages of text
    messages, which can overwhelm users and result in ``information
    overload.'' Instead, we are talking about maximum use of multi-media
    such as video, shared applications through collaboration software, and
    high-resolution imagery. Through these types of tools, our operators
    can digest more information and we can collectively move towards a more
    knowledge-based environment.
        This type of capability requires large network capacity. Our
    warfighting requirements for remote and austere locations require that
    this network capacity be robust and resilient. Enhanced satellite
    capability is one of USPACOM's most critical needs. Today we do not
    have enough bandwidth in any of the military satellite bands, Ultra,
    Super, or Extra High Frequency, to fully support our operational plans.
    Commercial SATCOM capacity can support much of this shortfall, however,
    commercial SATCOM availability is subject to market pressures and is
    not fully dependable. For example, an important commercial SATCOM
    service to the Navy was preempted by media coverage of the 2000
    Olympics in Sydney, Australia.
        Additionally, USPACOM principally relies on geo-stationary weather
    satellites to track destructive typhoons over the vast expanse of
    USPACOM's ocean areas. Our current geo-stationary satellite weather
    information comes from foreign-owned and operated satellites that are
    reaching their designed service lives.
        Consequently, it is absolutely crucial to fully fund and keep on
    track satellite upgrades, launches of new communications and weather
    satellites, and new satellite programs. The Transformational
    Communication System (TCS) system being proposed by the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for C3I looks promising for meeting our SATCOM
    needs.
        Our terrestrial communication infrastructure also needs attention.
    Most of our bases, posts, camps and stations are supported by mid 20th
    century cable and wire technology. The Global Information Grid (GIG)
    Bandwidth Expansion Project promises to replace this legacy
    infrastructure with the fiber optic connectivity needed for our in-
    garrison forces, command centers and training facilities.
        Radio communications that connect us with Federal, state and local
    government agencies are also important for force protection, homeland
    security and disaster response. We appreciate the congressional support
    for the Pacific Mobile Emergency Radio System (PACMERS), which will
    help us meet National Telecommunications and Information Administration
    (NTIA) mandate for frequency consolidation and allow for excellent
    interoperability with non-military partners.
        Information Assurance and Information Sharing. Communication
    connectivity and capacity are only part of the solution for network
    centric warfare. Communication and information security must be
    maintained while simultaneously sharing information and collaborating
    with bilateral and multilateral coalitions. Our ability to share
    information with coalition partners is inhibited by our need to
    restrict information within enclaves that are not accessible to
    coalition partners. To be network centric, we need the network to be
    agile and allow for the dynamic interconnection of nodes that support
    several communities of interest. Typically, we can have several
    simultaneous operations involving different coalition partners
    occurring in the Pacific at any given time. Being able to support these
    concurrently, with sufficient network capacity, is an information
    technology challenge.
        Our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN) initiative is
    helping us achieve this goal by developing an information system that
    is interoperable with U.S. and coalition forces and is agile enough to
    allow us to selectively collaborate in multiple joint/multi-national
    environments simultaneously. We have formed a strong partnership with
    CENTCOM to roll our COWAN solution into the Combined Enterprise
    Information Exchange System, CENTRIXS, which may become the single
    network environment for all joint forces to support coalition
    operations and intelligence networking requirements. This single,
    highly meshed environment would be much more responsive and financially
    efficient than the multiple networks required today to support each
    individual coalition community.
        Communication and information security measures are both part of
    our comprehensive Information Assurance strategy. As the Internet
    expands and becomes more pervasive, our adversaries are continuously
    finding ways of using computer vulnerabilities and network weaknesses
    to deny access to our information resources or exploit our information
    content. There are many programs focused on information assurance
    involving encryption, intrusion detection and network emergency
    response. Coordination of these programs and computer network defense
    activities requires a highly trained team of network professionals
    working around the clock with and a strong relationship with the Joint
    Task Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF CNO). I cannot cite any
    single program that is more important than any other in the Information
    Assurance area; however, emphasis in this area is a must if we expect
    to rely on network centric operations.
        With regard to information sharing, we have made great strides in
    gathering and taking advantage of ``open source'' information and
    providing it to our coalition and inter-agency partners to build trust
    and improve understanding. The vast amount of this information
    necessitates focused collection and analytical efforts to identify
    accurate and relevant information to enhance security cooperation. Open
    source products provided by the Virtual Information Center (VIC) and
    the regional information exchanges conducted via the Asia-Pacific Area
    Network (APAN) have increased our situational awareness of events and
    developments in the Asia-Pacific region that affect all of our
    operations. More importantly, these web-based activities have enabled
    us to expand our information base and share the results instantly with
    our foreign counterparts and potential coalition partners.
        Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The Pacific undersea warfare
    challenge is growing at a significant rate. In recent years, the
    USPACOM AOR has seen the greatest increase in submarine order of battle
    in the world. A robust and integrated ASW architecture and more capable
    force structure are essential to counter the growing submarine threat.
    The premier ASW asset remains submarines. To ensure sufficient
    submarines are available to track and kill enemy forces, we must
    continue to support the refueling of 688-class submarines and follow
    through in reaching a Virginia-class submarine build rate at two per
    year in fiscal year 2007. I also strongly support the rapid transition
    to acquiring Automatic Periscope Detection technology for surface ships
    and Navy Maritime Patrol Aircraft employed in littoral regions.
    Congressional efforts last year resulted in funding for a welcomed and
    much needed 688-class submarine refueling overhaul program and funding
    that enabled the transition from a science and technology program to an
    acquisition program for airborne Automatic Periscope Detection
    technology. I appreciate your support as we make necessary improvements
    in our ASW war fighting capabilities.
        Missile Defense (MD). Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
    pose the most pervasive and challenging missile threat for USPACOM MD.
    Effectively defending against this threat requires a layered,
    complementary mix of sea and ground based lower tier and upper tier
    terminal phase defense systems. Until a robust upper tier system is
    fielded, lower tier systems remain paramount to successful execution of
    theater OPLANs. A mix of forward deployed ground systems and sea-based
    lower tier systems offers the lowest risk and earliest deployment
    options. Accordingly, I support delivery of a sea-based terminal system
    as soon as technologically feasible and a moderate increase in Patriot
    PAC-3/GEM+ missile production/conversion to meet current OPLAN and
    contingency plan (CONPLAN) warfighting requirements. From a homeland
    defense perspective, continued development and fielding of a Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) capable of intercepting missiles in all
    phases of flight (i.e. boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all
    known threats remains a top priority. Key capabilities that support
    these requirements, now and in the future (Missile Defense Agency's
    Block 2004-2006 BMDS capabilities), for USPACOM include PATRIOT PAC-3,
    Sea Based Midcourse Defense Segment, Theater High Altitude Air Defense,
    and Airborne Laser \1/2\ power. Congressional support of the BMDS
    programs remains vigilant, and I applaud your continued support of
    Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives.
        Mobility and Operations. During 2002, we made great strides
    partnering with U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to modernize
    our strategic air and sealift infrastructure to meet potential
    operational needs ranging from disaster relief to the GWOT and all the
    way to a major war. The USPACOM En Route Infrastructure Steering
    Committee has identified, validated, and championed over $500 million
    in hydrant, ramp, and runway projects throughout the AOR to support the
    National Military Strategy as mandated by the Defense Planning Guidance
    and by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005. Our current en route
    airlift system includes Elmendorf AFB Alaska, Hickam AFB Hawaii,
    Andersen AFB Guam, and Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Kadena AB,
    Misawa AB, and Yokota AB Japan. Additionally, we have developed an AOR-
    wide prioritized list of air and seaports to visit and assess their
    capability as potential en route locations.
        The heavy use of Naval Supply Facility in Diego Garcia, a British
    Island in the Indian Ocean, in support of OEF, has led to its near-term
    consideration as an en route port supporting both USPACOM and USCENTCOM
    operations. We have identified over $38.7 million in infrastructure
    improvement projects to expand the facility's current operational
    throughput capability. Projects nearing completion include improvements
    in temporary containerized munitions handling pads and storage areas,
    wharf lightning protection, and transient berthing projects. Similarly
    at Wake Island, we have identified significant infrastructure
    improvement projects to ensure continued access to this critical
    location supporting our Pacific Tanker Air Bridge. The fiscal year 2002
    MILCON $9.7 million Repair Island Access Facilities is currently
    restoring the wharf and marine bulkhead in preparation for major
    airfield pavement replacement starting with the fiscal year 2003 MILCON
    $24.9 million, which replaces the entire deteriorated runway pavement.
    Following that, four more phases in fiscal year 2004 and beyond will
    complete replacement of the airfield taxiways and aprons and upgrade of
    the water supply, electrical power and sanitary sewage systems, for an
    additional $74 million. These investments and others like them
    throughout the Pacific will ensure we have the necessary infrastructure
    readiness when we need them.
        As early deployers, air-refueling tankers are critical to executing
    theater war plans for establishing the Pacific Tanker Air Bridge.
    Ongoing OEF and Noble Eagle have demonstrated the operational impact
    that air-refueling capability has in support of the GWOT. The KC-135
    aircraft comprises 90 percent of the tanker fleet and their usage
    increased 45 percent over what was programmed following 11 September
    2001.
        The High Speed Vessel (HSV) provides a flexible alternative for
    intra-theater movement in USPACOM, including its use to augment
    airlift. Since October 2001, III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has
    been testing and evaluating deployments using a leased HSV with great
    success and cost savings for exercise deployments and redeployments, as
    well as operational employment. Joint Venture HSV X1, the Joint Army/
    Navy HSV that participated in Millennium Challenge 2002 and other
    exercises, was scheduled to support U.S. Army training in the USPACOM
    Theater from March to April 2003, but was diverted to support U.S.
    Central Command (CENTCOM). USPACOM fully supports the pursuit of high
    speed sealift technology as an Advanced Concept Technology
    Demonstration (ACTD) and a future force projection transportation
    platform.
        USPACOM supports USAF and USTRANSCOM efforts to procure C-17
    aircraft to meet strategic airlift needs in our AOR. Our number one
    strategic lift shortfall is airlift due largely to the retirement of
    aging C-141 and C-130 airframes and substandard C-5 aircraft
    performance. Additionally, to better meet operational response in the
    AOR, we fully support the initiative to forward base eight C-17s each
    at Hickam AFB, and Elmendorf AFB starting in fiscal year 2006 and
    fiscal year 2007 respectively. To have facilities available on arrival
    of these aircraft, Hickam's C-17 beddown military construction (MILCON)
    will start in fiscal year 2004 with six projects totaling $64 million.
    Elmendorf's C-17 beddown MILCON will start in fiscal year 2005 and the
    MILCON funding stream for these facilities will total about $105
    million each over the fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009 MILCON FYDP
    to provide the needed facilities for these assets to have full mission
    capability. These strategic mobility aircraft will bring a much-needed
    aerial delivery capacity to the Pacific Theater and prevent any lapse
    in capability during the reduction of C-130s in the AOR. We also
    support USAF efforts to procure F/A-22 Raptors. The F/A-22 will provide
    a unique, rapid response to swiftly defeat enemy threats in the USPACOM
    AOR.
        A V-22 Osprey tiltrotor capability is truly transformational--
    exhibiting leap-ahead technology. If the current test program proves
    successful, this capability will extend our operational reach and
    access in the AOR. The Osprey's projected design, performance, and
    reduced vulnerability and susceptibility will provide USPACOM with a
    highly survivable and flexible capability. The aircraft's enhanced lift
    abilities provide significant migration for the medium-lift
    requirement.
        The Pacific region needs three of the six planned Stryker Brigade
    Combat Teams (SBCTs) to fully support theater warfighting capabilities
    and region transformation efforts. The primary military force of our
    friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region is their Army. SBCT
    participation in regional events reinforces our commitment to support
    allied transformation efforts and coalition building by continuing
    Army-to-Army high technology training and exercise events.
    Additionally, the SBCTs show great promise in providing joint
    commanders the means to better integrate Army force capabilities as
    part of a joint or coalition task force.
        Training Areas. We are tasked to perform an increasing number of
    missions, from peace operations to strikes and raids to noncombatant
    evacuation to humanitarian assistance. Each mission requires
    preparation. The only way to prepare and ensure readiness is through
    tough, oriented, and realistic training. Dropping dummy bombs and
    firing inert ordnance cannot replace ``live-fire'' practice. The first
    exposure to ``live fire'' our forces face must be in a controlled
    training environment where they learn from their experience at less
    risk than in hostile combat.
        However, we routinely receive encroachment pressure on our training
    ranges throughout the AOR. Restrictions on space, hours, ordnance, and
    radio frequencies impact our ability to exercise our equipment and
    train to standard. Last spring, a suit pertaining to the Migratory Bird
    Treaty Act (MBTA) temporarily closed our primary aircraft live-fire
    range, Farrallon de Medinilla, near Guam, until the D.C. Circuit Court
    of Appeals granted an emergency stay. Fortunately, timely congressional
    action amended the MBTA to exempt DOD military readiness activities,
    and a subsequent appellate court order dismissed the case as moot.
    Likewise, Makua Range on Oahu is in use but severe limits in the number
    and type of ground force training cycles have forced us to accomplish
    most small unit training in Hawaii through expensive deployments to the
    Pohakuloa range on the Big Island. Range and training limitations in
    Japan and Korea cause units to deploy away from their home station for
    routine training. Moreover, although aircraft, artillery, and pistols
    are noisy instruments of war, they are basic parts of our business.
    Developments now demand noise restrictions that force important low-
    altitude maneuvers to unrealistically high altitudes and limit the use
    of ranges.
        We are good stewards of our environment. Success stories are
    numerous, but often the stories aren't well known. We have set aside
    space for protected species, altered or deferred some units' training
    to avoid interference in nesting areas, and developed specific programs
    to increase the populations of protected or endangered species.
        The military's answer to encroachment challenges has been to work
    around the problems while seeking to minimize the impact on the quality
    and quantity of training. But, maneuver space is less, training lanes
    have become narrow and artificially tunneled, and our individual
    maneuvers have become too predictable or repetitive. The work-arounds
    may still accomplish the training, but usually require additional
    costs--in terms of money, time, and impact to the well-being of our
    service members. Readiness and training experiences decline; we cannot
    let this continue.
        Many of our environmental laws, while well intentioned, are vague.
    For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) prohibits
    harassment of protected species without prior authorization from the
    respective regulatory agency. The current definition of ``harassment''
    of marine mammals can be mere ``annoyance'' or ``potential to disturb''
    without biologically significant effects. Any Navy test or training
    activity that harasses a protected species must be approved by the
    applicable regulatory agencies--often after delays, or subject to
    restrictions, that degrade the quality of the training. Sometimes
    inflexibilities in the statue preclude our regulators from approving
    even activities that many believe have insignificant impacts.
    Additionally, litigants using the Endangered Species Act are seeking to
    force the Fish and Wildlife Service to lock up thousands of acres of
    military ranges as ``critical habitat'', even though our own
    congressionally-mandated Installation Natural Resource Management Plans
    afford habitat protection. In fact, litigants are seeking to force the
    U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate such critical habitat on
    significant areas of DOD training ranges for endangered species that
    are not even present on such lands. As these examples show, such loose
    language and broad definitions can and do impede essential air, land,
    and sea activities near marine mammals or endangered species locations.
    Clear definitions and consideration of national security requirements
    should be important points in all environmental legislation.
        In April 2002, the administration sent a legislative package to
    Congress recommending clarifications to certain environmental statutes
    as part of the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative (RRPI). The
    proposed package was prepared to help DOD maintain its ability to train
    forces and continue to protect the environment in which we train. Last
    year, Congress enacted three elements of our proposal but did not act
    on the remaining five. This year, the President has resubmitted the
    remaining RRPI proposals, with some modifications based on both
    discussion with Congress and other environmental stakeholders and a
    significant decision last year concerning the MMPA in the SurTASS
    lawsuit. We thank Congress for support of the RRPI and ask for your
    support on future encroachment issues that impact our readiness.
        Logistics. An aging aircraft inventory and some parts shortages
    continue to drive reduced Mission Capable and reduced fill rates for
    our ``go to war'' Readiness Spares Packages and high cannibalization
    rates. The result is lower than expected readiness at increased costs.
    Although funding for spare parts has improved over the last 2 years,
    some shortages continue. For example, only three of eight Pacific Air
    Force (PACAF) A-10, F-15, and F-16 wings maintained minimum Mission
    Capable standards during fourth quarter fiscal year 2002. PACAF
    requires excess cannibalization to meet wartime mission planning sortie
    generation rates. PACAF cannibalization rates are higher than 8 percent
    for the F-16, F-15C/D, F-15E, and A-10. Likewise, the U.S, Army uses
    controlled substitution to achieve peacetime mission-capable Aviation
    Fleet goals. Delays in stock availability due to 12-18 month spares
    delivery lead-times are a root cause of controlled substitution and
    create difficulty in matching funding lines with projected
    capabilities. Increased spares at the Army wholesale level are required
    to meet the increased flying hours necessary to surge to wartime
    Operational Tempo.
        We have made progress but need your continued support in fully
    funding materiel and personnel requirements for organizational,
    intermediate, and depot maintenance levels. Additionally, we need
    support for each Service's Life Cycle Support program to extend the
    life of our aging aircraft fleets.
        Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield
    Explosive (CBRNE) defense is a significant concern in the Pacific
    theater, and a potential showstopper for U.S. military operations,
    causing significant operational risk to Major War OPLAN execution.
    CBRNE is a critical operating condition and potentially the greatest
    theater threat I face, affecting everyone, everywhere, including our
    allies and the homeland. Aircraft exposure on the Korean Peninsula or
    an attack on a few strategic choke points, including Guam and key
    Japanese air and seaports, could stop U.S. force flows and other
    critical support operations. Significant differences exist between what
    we would like to achieve against CBRNE threats and our actual
    capabilities. Specific shortages include Individual Protective
    Equipment, Chemical/Biological Point and Standoff detection, inadequate
    decontamination standards, and significant shortcomings in detailed and
    actionable intelligence on adversary WMD processes and facilities.
        We are active in the Joint Service Installation Protection Program
    and with other ongoing studies and demonstrations. For example, we are
    sponsoring a Restoration Operations (RESTOPS) Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to examine the actions necessary to
    protect against and immediately react to the consequences of a chemical
    or biological attack at a fixed site. Through this venue, we are
    investigating new tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as
    exploring new detection, decontamination, early warning networks, and
    medical technologies. The RESTOPS ACTD will have its final
    demonstration at Osan Air Base, Korea, in February 2003. Another effort
    we are sponsoring is a DOD-wide biological warfare (BW) seminar. The
    DOD WMD community collectively assessed the shortfalls within DOD for
    responding to enemy BW and gave us a way-ahead to resolve these issues.
    We are working to integrate procedures and technologies that allow us
    to mitigate the impact of such an attack. We cannot do this alone.
    USPACOM needs support from the entire joint community to improve our
    abilities to protect our forces and to operate in this difficult
    environment should the need arise. Your continued support is critical
    to CBRNE defense readiness.
    Quality of Service for our Men and Women
        While winning the war on terrorism and transforming our forces to
    ensure a qualitative military edge, we must improve on the Quality of
    Service (QOS) for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. QOS means
    providing the high quality operating facilities, the tools, and the
    information technology necessary for our service men and women to
    achieve their goals and execute their missions with efficiency and a
    minimum of frustration. My travels throughout the Asia-Pacific region--
    first as Commander, Pacific Fleet, and now as Commander, Pacific
    Command--confirm my belief you have done a great service to our
    military members and their families in the area of personnel
    entitlements.
        The QOS initiatives included in the Fiscal Year 2003 National
    Defense Authorization Act show service members that military and
    congressional leaders are taking actions to meet the needs of our
    service men and women and their families. Thank you for your support on
    recent initiatives, including the 4.1 percent pay raise, assignment
    incentive pay, and the ability to grant emergency leave of absence.
    These QOS initiatives will assist in retaining highly skilled troops
    and their families. Many USPACOM personnel will benefit from the
    ability to defer their Consecutive Overseas Tours travel entitlement,
    from recent increases in Basic Housing Allowance, and from the
    additional Basic Allowance for Subsistence provisions in areas with
    inadequate messing facilities. Deployed personnel will be more at ease
    knowing that additional family assistance has been provided in the form
    of childcare, education, and youth services for our men and women who
    are in harm's way, supporting contingency operations and the GWOT.
        Military Family Housing remains a top priority. All services have
    devised plans to eliminate inadequate housing by 2007 with a
    combination of traditional military construction (MILCON) and
    privatization (Public Private Venture or Residential Communities
    Initiative). Congressional support has provided immediate benefits to
    our men and women who serve. Continued funding is essential, however,
    to enable further progress in reducing the number of inadequate
    quarters and in limiting out of pocket expenses to our service members
    and their families while maintaining a high standard of construction
    and quality. While we have made progress, we still have considerable
    work remaining. We appreciate your continued attention on this
    important issue.
        Dorms and Barracks for our single service members is another area
    where we have seen significant improvement. Our service components are
    now pursuing well thought out plans to meet the fiscal year 2008 goal
    of eliminating open bay berthing and central latrine-style barracks. We
    must retain our current operational funding stream, however, to
    maintain existing facilities as renovation proceeds. Again,
    congressional support has had a direct and beneficial impact on our
    young service members.
        Our base infrastructure is still below standards. Sustainment,
    Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) of facilities and infrastructure
    throughout the USPACOM AOR continues to be an important concern. Fiscal
    Year 2001 Installations Readiness Report rated about 80 percent of
    USPACOM facilities at C-3 (having serious deficiencies) or C-4 (not
    supporting mission requirements). In many areas, USPACOM facilities are
    1940s vintage and not mission conducive. For example, modern weapons no
    longer fit into WWII vintage magazines and require improved piers for
    safe, proper handling. The DOD goal directs components to achieve a 67-
    year recapitalization rate by fiscal year 2007 and restore readiness of
    existing facilities to C-2 (minimum acceptable performance) status on
    average, by the end of fiscal year 2010. Current funding puts achieving
    this directive at risk. In addition to maintaining our facilities, we
    have equally important infrastructure requirements above SRM needs that
    require attention. These include new mission bed-downs and essential
    environmental requirements. Our facilities and infrastructure provide a
    foundation for optimum readiness and quality of service critical to
    mission success. We appreciate Congress' past funding efforts and call
    upon your continued assistance to ensure adequate facilities and proper
    maintenance for the long term.
        By far the most important weapons systems in our inventory are our
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. These individuals require life-
    cycle support and maintenance just like other systems. Force Health
    Protection is that maintenance program. Ensuring the health of our
    forces directly relates to our ability to implement effective disease
    countermeasures that include vaccines, antibiotic stockpiles, and
    automated disease surveillance systems. I ask you to continue your
    support for ongoing research and development efforts that will improve
    our disease detection capabilities.
        The upkeep and replacement of military medical facilities remains
    one of our top QOS priorities. We are working to replace or renovate
    our substandard facilities, particularly for Naval Hospital, Guam,
    further degraded by Typhoon Pongsona in December. We must continue to
    ensure our military medical infrastructure is safe, modern, and secure.
        We appreciate the MILCON appropriations to the USPACOM AOR. These
    funds are vital to maintain our ability to work and fight together with
    our allies and to help transform and modernize our forces. In fiscal
    year 2003, $1.1 billion was allotted toward mission and mission support
    requirements and $300 million toward family housing needs. In fiscal
    year 2004, we need continued MILCON support for vital readiness and QOS
    issues. For example, we require MILCON for new mission bed-downs, such
    as the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and the C-17 aircraft. Our backlog
    of major infrastructure repairs is reflected in the need for complete
    or major repair of airfield pavements at all U.S. Pacific Air Force
    bases, as well as the major repairs needed on critical infrastructure
    at bases and long-range radar detection in defense of the homeland. In
    the wake of destruction from Typhoon Pongsona in November 2002, it is
    clear we require supplemental MILCON support for a ``typhoon-proof''
    concrete aircraft hangar as well as several other projects at Andersen
    Air Force Base, Guam. The hangar will provide reliable support for
    critically important current and future Air Expeditionary Force and
    OPLAN requirements. Also, we require MILCON for consistent
    environmental stewardship and essential dorm and family housing
    deficits and renovations. I thank Congress for using MILCON where
    enhanced force protection is necessary.
        The New USPACOM Headquarters is under construction and designed to
    provide advanced information management, decision support and
    visualization technologies for our people to efficiently accomplish
    their mission.
        Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) MILCON for two
    schools on Guam is my top family QOS priority. One is an elementary
    school that is currently not in the DODEA MILCON program due to lack of
    funds. The second is a replacement high school programmed in the
    DODEA's fiscal year 2006 MILCON program. Current facilities are 1997
    building conversions in poor, substandard condition that received
    significant damage from two typhoons in 2002. Further, numerous seismic
    events over the past few years have significantly weakened the
    elementary/middle school. Our military family dependents need safe,
    soundly built schools conducive to a good learning environment. We need
    your near-term support for these two DODEA school MILCON projects in
    Guam especially in light of our increased force posture on the island.
        Pacific Warfighting Center (PWC). Increasing operational and
    exercise activity, training complexities, and C\4\I modernization have
    rendered obsolete USPACOM's exercise simulation infrastructure and
    support capabilities. This deficiency significantly reduces the ability
    to train USPACOM and Joint Task Force commanders in crisis action
    readiness procedures; limits their ability to rehearse key operational
    orders; degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability with
    friends in the region; and contributes to increased OPTEMPO, training
    time, and associated costs for USPACOM forces before responding to
    contingencies. The current facility does not support future
    technologies or meet force protection requirements. The planned, state-
    of-the-art operations and simulation center will improve total force
    readiness and achieve OSD's goal for transforming training by
    exploiting emerging technologies to create a robust, networked, live,
    virtual, and constructive training and mission rehearsal environment
    for joint and combined force commanders and their staffs.
        PWC will be a key node on the Joint National Training Center's
    global grid of operational warfighting centers. Specifically, it will
    fully integrate with, and extend the capability of, the Joint Forces
    Command's Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center and U.S.
    European Command's Warrior Preparation Center. Accordingly, the PWC
    will provide an effective venue for decision support, OPLAN mission
    rehearsal, and combat analysis for headquarters and deploying forces.
    The planned simulation center will transform USPACOM through the use of
    emerging information technologies to support advanced warfighting
    concepts and joint experimentation. The PWC promises to save exercise
    funds and enhance regional security cooperation using Internet-based
    information exchange opportunities via the Asia-Pacific Area Network.
    This MILCON project will provide a secure facility in Hawaii for
    assembling military, civil-military and interagency representatives
    from throughout the Asia-Pacific region for interoperability exercises,
    collaborative research, and seminars. The facility will also support
    component conference requirements in a secure and protected setting.
        Again, much has been accomplished in QOS improvements, but we still
    have more to do. Thank you again for the support you have provided and
    I thank you in advance for your continued future support.
    Reinforcing the ``Constants'' in the Pacific Region
        Our long-standing bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region,
    our friendships and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces
    continue to be the foundation of the region's peace and stability. One
    of my goals is to build on these relationships while nurturing
    multinational efforts that support the region's mutual interests. Our
    forward posture is fundamental and our combat capability essential to
    deter regional threats. We look for initiatives that help shape our
    overseas posture.
        Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). Dramatic events of the past 2
    years have brought into focus new and challenging national security
    demands for the 21st century. A mix of traditional and non-traditional
    threats jeopardizes the unprecedented levels of Asia-Pacific security
    and prosperity of the last 50 years. These threats are reminders that
    evolving challenges require more prompt and effective responses to
    ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. At USPACOM, we
    ``operationalize,'' national and defense security strategy with
    regional emphasis. Attaining national security and defense objectives
    in the Asia-Pacific region requires a broad understanding of threat
    capabilities, a frank assessment of political-military realities, and a
    well-charted course supported by meaningful and mutually beneficial
    security cooperation.
        Our acute theater security concerns include conflict on the Korean
    Peninsula (where the stakes are high); miscalculation between regional
    strategic rivals (such as China-Taiwan or India-Pakistan); and
    transnational threats such as terrorism, proliferation, drug-associated
    violence, and instability from failed nation-states. Although we
    anticipate peaceful resolution of longstanding security concerns in
    places like the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and Kashmir, the
    strategic situation in these potential flashpoints and elsewhere
    mandates vigilance and preparedness. We are strengthening our current
    security relationships and military capabilities while developing new
    relationships and capabilities to deter conflict and dissuade would-be
    regional competitors.
        The USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) Plan supports the
    overall mission by enhancing U.S. influence, expanding U.S. operational
    access to train (and deploy) forward-deployed and forward-based combat
    forces, and increasing interoperability with our coalition partners to
    support potential efforts across the spectrum of military operations.
    Every TSC activity we undertake enhances our joint/combined
    capabilities and communicates our intent to assure friends, or
    dissuade, deter, or defeat potential enemies. Security Cooperation is
    an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training and
    Experimentation Plans and our operational focus, solidifies the link
    between national strategy and focused, enduring regional security.
        The dividends of a relevant, adaptive TSC plan are clear--our
    treaty allies and friends have provided incomparable support to OEF and
    the GWOT. Every day, our TSC planners, exercise planners, security
    assistance personnel, and forward-deployed forces coordinate, plan, and
    execute meaningful security cooperation activities that strengthen
    military-to-military cooperation and prepare U.S. forces and their
    prospective Coalition partners for the next challenge.
        Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger. From the
    outstanding rapport at the highest levels of our governments to the
    action officers, our two countries are moving forward in strengthening
    ties and resolving problems. Nearly 38,000 U.S. armed forces personnel
    are stationed in Japan, which also serves as a forward-deployed site
    for about 14,000 U.S. naval personnel. Japan provides over $4.5 billion
    in host-nation support, the most generous of any U.S. ally. Without
    these forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces, it would be much
    more difficult for the U.S. to meet commitments and defend American
    interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance
    is fundamental to security and peaceful development in the region.
        Since becoming Prime Minister (PM) nearly 2 years ago, PM Koizumi
    has stressed the importance of the alliance and has sought to move
    Japan's security policies forward. He exerted exceptional leadership in
    response to the 11 September terrorist attacks, pushing support for the
    GWOT. After 11 September, the Government of Japan (GOJ) rapidly passed
    legislation and obtained Cabinet approval of a Basic Plan that provides
    the framework for significant Japan Self-Defense Force contributions to
    the war on terrorism. The speed with which Japan reacted is
    unprecedented in the 50-year history of the Japan-U.S. security
    relationship. GOJ contributions to the GWOT include the provision of
    over 70 million gallons of fuel oil to coalition ships by the Japan
    Maritime Self-Defense Force. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force has
    provided over 1,700 flight hours moving tons of important cargo and
    passengers throughout the theater. We take every opportunity to express
    our appreciation to the GOJ for its support following 11 September.
        The significant progress in building national support against
    terrorism does not eliminate concerns, however, about U.S. military
    activities in Japan. Although Japanese public support for the alliance
    remains high, about 70 percent, a majority of Japanese citizens would
    like to see a reduction in the burden of our presence. The normal range
    of base-related issues, including constraints on training and concerns
    about crime and the environment require continued careful management.
        Efforts continue to implement the Special Action Committee on
    Okinawa (SACO) Final Report. While 15 of 27 SACO initiatives have been
    completed, 12 (2 of 5 noise reduction and 10 of 11 land release
    initiatives) are still in progress. The cornerstone of the Japan-U.S.
    SACO Final Report is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). GOJ
    approval of a Basic Plan for the off-shore portion of the FRF
    highlights the progress in the SACO process. However, we continue to
    emphasize to the GOJ that our requirements have not changed, and a
    complete replacement facility is required before returning Futenma.
        The U.S.-Japan alliance requires our proper attention. At the same
    time, significant growth opportunities exist for advancing U.S.
    interests. U.S. forces' presence here, from the country team
    perspective, is secure, and careful management of the issues will
    ensure it remains so. My hope for the coming year is that our security
    dialogue with Japan will advance beyond the discussion of current
    issues related to bases and training to address our longer-term
    interests in sustaining our vital alliance. We also look to expand and
    improve U.S.-Japan coordination with other countries within the region
    to address regional security issues.
        Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK remains one of our strongest
    allies. The new Korean Government is committed to the alliance.
    Unfortunate incidents marred the relationship this past year--the most
    tragic was the death of two young Korean girls in an accident involving
    a U.S. Forces Korea vehicle. In this regard, the U.S. has at every
    level offered our profound sympathy and apologies.
        The late fall protests indicate the depth of emotion the Korean
    people feel on issues related to perceived inequalities in the ROK-U.S.
    relationship. However, they are not indicative of the solution sought
    by most Koreans or the Korean Government. The Korean people in general
    recognize the great contributions made by the United States to their
    nation's security and believe the relationship is in their interest, as
    it is in ours. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and United States Forces Korea, we continue to review our force
    presence in the ROK and North East Asia.
        As a partner, the ROK has been steadily increasing its regional
    security role. USPACOM is working with the ROK Joint Staff to ensure
    our regional security cooperation efforts are in consonance with one
    another and integrated where appropriate. In particular, the ROK
    supports USPACOM exercises and seminars aimed at increasing regional
    cooperation and interoperability among U.S. friends and allies. Korea's
    contributions to regional peace and stability were clearly demonstrated
    this past year in Timor-Leste, where ROK Army troops participated in UN
    peacekeeping efforts to support the region's newest nation. This
    growing regional role for Korea contributes to the security of the
    region while not detracting from its peninsular defense
    responsibilities.
        The ROK continues steadfast support to anti-terrorism efforts. The
    Korean Armed Forces are with us in the GWOT, from Guam to Central Asia
    and on the ground in Afghanistan, supporting our efforts with
    transportation and medical support. In the USPACOM area, the ROK Air
    Force has flown over 2,000 hours moving tons of important cargo and
    passengers throughout the AOR. Similarly, the ROK Navy has provided
    important sealift to bolster our efforts in South Asia, moving 3,500
    tons of material. In the aftermath of Typhoon Cha'taan, the ROK landing
    ship tanks (LSTs) provided emergency sealift of over 350 tons of
    bottled water and other disaster relief supplies and materials to Guam.
    The ROK Army deployed a Mobile Surgical Hospital initially to Manas,
    Kyrgyzstan, and subsequently to Bagram, Afghanistan. A civil
    engineering battalion will soon join these forces to assist in
    rebuilding the infrastructure of that emerging nation. These
    contributions have been, and will continue to be, important to the
    success of OEF, and we thank the Korean people for their support.
        The events of 2002 remind us of the dangers posed by the Kim Jong
    Il regime and the threat our ROK-U.S. combined team faces on the
    peninsula. The conventional threat from the Democratic People's
    Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains unabated, illustrated by the
    unprovoked naval attack in July on an ROK Navy vessel that resulted in
    the loss of four young ROK sailors. The DPRK maintains more than 60
    percent of its forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone
    (DMZ), and the Kim regime persists in its ``military first'' policy,
    providing sufficient resources to keep its large force fed, equipped,
    and exercised, while its citizens face deprivation and starvation.
    While the DPRK has so far not broken its promise to suspend ballistic
    missile test flights, it continues development efforts including static
    engine tests. Additionally, the DPRK exports missiles and missile
    technology, posing a grave counter-proliferation concern. Finally, the
    Kim regime continues to engage in nuclear brinkmanship, with the
    disclosure of its Highly Enriched Uranium program and progressive steps
    to restart its plutonium production and reprocessing program. These
    actions are in violation of the Agreed Framework, DPRK pledges to the
    IAEA, and the 1992 North-South Basic Agreement calling for
    denuclearization of the Peninsula. The DPRK is not above precipitating
    a crisis to strengthen its bargaining position. Now more than ever it
    is critical our ROK-U.S. partnership stand firm.
        The ROK is a strong ally that is increasingly contributing to
    regional peace and stability. Together we face a common threat on the
    Peninsula. However, the Korean people are looking for ways to foster
    reconciliation with the DPRK. We recognize the importance of these
    efforts to the Korean people and their government. Moreover, we agree
    on the crucial role of the Armistice Agreement in maintaining peace on
    the Korean Peninsula, and we are committed to ensuring that efforts at
    reconciliation do not increase risk for the security of the ROK or the
    United States.
        In sum, through continuing support to the coalition to combat
    global terrorism and efforts to participate fully in regional security,
    the ROK plays a very positive role in the region. U.S. and ROK forces
    remain prepared, and we are looking for ways to strengthen the alliance
    to deal with current and future challenges.
        Australia. Our strong ally and partner, Australia has demonstrated
    steadfast commitment and bold leadership in the GWOT and in essentially
    every other security endeavor in the region. Its military contributions
    to the coalition against terror are substantial and include Combat Air
    Patrols (CAP), tankers, Special Air Service (SAS) troops, guided
    missile frigates and, most recently, support for Sea Swap, our USN
    initiative to exchange crews of select vessels forward in theater.
    Additionally, Australia has become a regional leader in pursuing
    multilateral counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia by signing
    counter-terrorism MOUs with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand while
    pursuing others. USPACOM remains focused on maintaining strong levels
    of interoperability with the Australian Defence Forces across the full
    spectrum of contingency operations including counter-terrorism.
    Australia continues to lead international support for the struggling
    nations of the Oceania region, providing humanitarian assistance and
    training. Australia is the southern anchor of our security architecture
    in the region, and we will maintain the vibrancy of this strategic
    relationship.
        Republic of the Philippines. Our relationship with the Government
    and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) developed and matured
    throughout 2002. Through comprehensive security assistance packages and
    focused security cooperation, the AFP has improved its ability to fight
    terrorism on its homeland as demonstrated by the AFP Southern Command's
    effective neutralizing of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) on Basilan Island
    and the continuing fight in Jolo. This has not come without cost. Both
    American citizens and service members have been wounded, or lost their
    lives to the terrorists in the Southern Philippines.
        Despite these losses, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-
    P) has produced tremendous successes. The Joint Task Force advised and
    assisted AFP forces in their mission to rid ASG terrorists from Basilan
    Island. As a result, the ASG threat declined significantly on Basilan
    Island. Although the road that circled Basilan was repaired to support
    AFP/U.S. tactical mobility, it will also help the people of Basilan in
    their economic livelihood as will the new water wells, repairs to
    school buildings, critical hospitals, and other medical treatment areas
    throughout the island. These humanitarian and civic assistance program
    successes acted as force multipliers for U.S. and AFP operations
    because the programs separated the citizens of Basilan from supporting
    the terrorist threat. To ensure the AFP can successfully respond to the
    terrorist threat, the U.S developed a Security Assistance (SA) Program
    that will provide the AFP with additional counter-terrorism training
    and equipment. This program is just starting and will consist of light
    infantry battalion, light reaction company, night-vision, intelligence
    fusion, Non-commissioned Officer, and Civil Military Operations
    training. The SA modules will occur at various locations in the
    Philippines to benefit the AFP beyond its Southern Command units.
    Additionally, USPACOM is implementing a Foreign Military Financing
    (FMF) Maintenance Assistance Plan that will sustain AFP critical
    tactical mobility platforms, including UH-1H helicopters, C-130
    transport aircraft, two-half ton trucks, and 78-foot patrol craft. We
    seek your assistance in ensuring funding for this program through the
    next 3 years. This will give the AFP an opportunity to address current
    equipment maintenance shortfalls.
        Action has not been limited to the southern Philippines. We have
    completed various large-scale exercises in Luzon and continue to plan
    for security cooperation events in 2003. On 21 November 2002, the AFP
    signed a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement with USPACOM--a positive
    sign of reciprocity and an improving relationship. We have already used
    the agreement by leasing body armor to the AFP. This small gesture will
    improve the AFP force protection posture and support Philippine efforts
    to combat terrorism.
        The Philippines plays a strategic role in the USPACOM AOR. As
    training areas for U.S. forces dwindle, excellent training facilities
    in the Philippines remain available, though repairs are required. Last
    year, the U.S. provided $25 million in fiscal year 2002 supplemental
    funding for the SA modules currently underway in the Philippines.
        We have accomplished a lot in the GWOT and in securing our
    strategic objectives with the unwavering support of the Philippine
    Government. The security situation in the Philippines needs continued
    improvement to attract investments and promote economic stability.
    Continued U.S. support through comprehensive, focused and timely SA
    funding is one way we can influence the situation in the Philippines.
    Supporting the GRP in their fight against the ASG is another way. A
    sustained GRP counterterrorism capability is the goal.
        Thailand. The Kingdom of Thailand is a treaty ally that continues
    to have an outstanding military-to-military relationship with the U.S.
    Exercise Cobra Gold (CG) is a centerpiece of this relationship. CG-2003
    will be our 22nd joint/combined bilateral exercise with Thailand, and
    the 4th of the expanded observer program--making it USPACOM's premier
    multilateral event. By adding this multinational exercise dimension in
    an environment that trains for transnational issues, Thailand is
    assuming an active role in promoting South East Asia security.
        Military-to-military policy with Thailand is managed through annual
    Thai-American Consultations. Benefits to Thailand include U.S.
    counterdrug/border security support, demining training, peace
    operations training and support, and an extensive security assistance
    program with a robust International Military Education and Training
    (IMET) component. Thailand's contributions as a regional leader include
    a peacekeeping troop presence in Timor-Leste, a commitment to providing
    engineering support in Afghanistan to support the GWOT, and an intent
    to contribute to the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia.
        As a result of our strong relationship with Thailand, we have
    received access to facilities, ports, and airfields, and the granting
    of overflight clearances in support of operational emergencies. Our
    ongoing security cooperation program, including exercises such as Cobra
    Gold, helps to address the security interests of both our countries and
    serves as a catalyst for enhancing our regional security posture.
        Singapore. Our relationship with Singapore is one of the strongest
    in the region. Following the 11 September terrorist attacks, Singapore
    provided access to airfields and naval facilities to U.S. forces,
    detained 31 suspected terrorists, froze terrorist financial assets,
    increased protection to shipping in the Strait of Malacca, and
    implemented the U.S. Container Security Initiative. Singapore's
    recently published White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists and
    announcement to launch a terrorist research center in 2003/2004
    testifies to its comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism in
    Southeast Asia. Our efforts with Singapore focus on reinforcing our
    already strong foundation through improved interoperability and
    cooperation.
        Malaysia. Some of the most aggressive action against terrorism in
    Southeast Asia has occurred in Malaysia. To date, Malaysian security
    forces have arrested more than 70 suspected terrorists and have taken
    the lead in several initiatives aimed at increasing cooperation in
    combating terrorism and other areas of mutual interest. The proposed
    Regional Counter Terrorism Training Center in Kuala Lumpur is one such
    initiative and represents an important opportunity to enhance regional
    efforts at combating terrorism. By providing expertise, information,
    and funding when appropriate, we can assist Malaysia and other nations
    of Southeast Asia in developing the skills necessary to defeat
    terrorism. As a moderate Muslim nation with a secular democratic
    government, Malaysia's influence extends beyond the region. Its January
    announcement to discontinue funding for private religious schools is an
    example of a government taking action against the root causes of
    terrorism by not supporting deviant extremist teachings that breed
    hatred. Currently, Malaysia holds the chairmanship of the Organization
    of Islamic Conference and remains influential in the Non-Aligned
    Movement. Together, we remain committed to cooperating in areas of
    mutual interest and improving our ability to operate in combined
    regional efforts.
        India. Based on the policy direction provided by the Indo-U.S.
    Defense Policy Group, USPACOM embarked on an aggressive security
    cooperation program with India over the past year. To date, our forces
    have conducted a number of successful exercises--ranging from airborne
    operations to surface warfare naval exercises--that have improved the
    combat effectiveness of U.S. forces. Over the past 10 months, USPACOM
    and its components have met with their Indian counterparts and
    established a long-range plan outlining mutually beneficial activities.
    These programs will increase our interoperability with, and access to,
    Indian forces. Our growing military cooperation supports the
    transformation of our relationship with India and serves to further
    this strategic partnership. This partnership was evident in India's
    strong support for the GWOT, most notably its naval escorts of U.S.
    ships transiting the Strait of Malacca last summer. As my recent trip
    to the troubled state of Kashmir confirmed, terrorists also menace
    India. Our improved relationships with India and Pakistan were
    invaluable as we helped these rivals step back last year from the brink
    of war.
        Indonesia. The government of Indonesia responded admirably to the
    terrorist bombings in Bali on 12 October 2002, arresting many key
    operatives and developing information on the domestic and regional
    terrorist threat. Globally, radical Islam continues to destabilize
    Muslim countries and threaten the interests of tolerant, democratic
    nations. Indonesia is a key battleground in the struggle against
    terrorism and radicalism. In the face of economic turmoil, separatist
    and communal violence, and political transition, the world's most
    populous Muslim nation is struggling to maintain its secular,
    democratic character, and to cooperate with the international community
    in eliminating transnational security threats. The Indonesian military
    (TNI) is also going through a difficult transition from protector of an
    autocratic regime to defender of a popularly elected government. This
    is a significant cultural and institutional transition that will not
    happen by itself.
        Accountability, essential to democratic civil-military relations,
    must improve. Critical to the success of this effort is Professional
    Military Education that exposes TNI officers to democratic norms and
    modern defense management techniques while building personal bonds of
    trust and goodwill. Particularly important is influencing the younger
    generation of officers to support the struggle against terrorism.
    International Military Education and Training (IMET) is another
    important tool as is FMF support for equipment, such as patrol boats
    for monitoring Indonesia's porous borders, to improve TNI's ability to
    counter transnational threats.
        East Timor. This past May, Timor-Leste became the world's newest
    democracy following 20 plus years of occupation and over 200,000
    deaths. Though the greatest credit for this achievement goes to the
    Timorese people, the U.S. military provided significant assistance in
    Timor-Leste's transition to a democratic state. Our U.S. Support Group
    East Timor (USGET) played a vital role in providing a stabilizing
    military presence during Timor-Leste's transition to independence. We
    conducted monthly ship visits, built schools and roads, repaired water
    and electrical systems, and provided medical and dental treatment for
    thousands of Timorese. We are proud of USGET and our military forces
    that contributed to Timor-Leste independence.
        Although USGET deactivated on 17 December 2002, USPACOM continues
    to play a positive role in Timor-Leste's development as a democratic
    state. Through IMET and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) we are funding
    English language training, helping develop the Timor-Leste Defense
    Force (ETDF) logistics system, purchasing basic equipment, and
    designing training programs to help develop Timor's Defense Secretariat
    and the ETDF. My key goals are to support the development of a civil/
    military defense establishment subordinate to civilian authority and
    the rule of law and help develop the ETDF as a credible self-defense
    force.
        China. We have a modest but constructive military-to-military
    relationship with China. Our relationship is guided by PL 106-65 (NDAA
    2000), which limits us to the areas of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
    Relief (HA/DR) and other non-warfighting venues. Our activities are
    part of ongoing DOD efforts to place such contacts with China on a new
    footing since the April 2001 aircraft collision incident. The U.S.S.
    Paul Foster port visit to Qingdao in November 2002 and my visit to
    China from 13-17 December 2002 were the first USPACOM bilateral
    military-to-military contacts with China since March 2001. One
    objective of these exchanges is to demonstrate the quality of our
    forces and our values by developing personnel exchanges between the
    younger generation of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and U.S.
    military personnel.
        Taiwan. For Taiwan, our actions are guided by the Taiwan Relations
    Act. We have worked this past year to support self defense improvements
    that can best meet Taiwan's identified defense needs. We want Taiwan to
    remain stable, democratic, and economically prosperous while it
    develops a professional, civilian-controlled defense establishment with
    a modernized, joint operations-oriented military.
        Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) brings together
    current and future military and civilian leaders to discuss regional
    security concerns. The Center provides a unique platform to discuss
    security issues while promoting USPACOM and OSD regional cooperation
    policies. Now more than ever, we realize each country must contribute
    to regional security to assure its continued political, economic, and
    social stability. Through executive courses and conferences, the APCSS
    gives Asia-Pacific leaders a regional forum to recognize security
    challenges, not only from a U.S. viewpoint but also from the
    perspective 45 participating nations, including Russia, Chile, Canada,
    and Pakistan.
        Center of Excellence (COE). COE's peace operations seminars have
    improved peace support capabilities in countries such as Thailand,
    Malaysia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. This improvement is
    evident in Thai and Filipino participation in peace stability
    operations in Aceh, Indonesia. These and other COE activities
    demonstrate our long-term commitment to relationships across the civil-
    military spectrum in the Asia-Pacific region. The Center's
    contributions complement other efforts to eliminate immediate terrorist
    threats. COE continues to prepare our forces to perform effectively in
    more complex environments with new actors and less predictable
    behaviors toward civilian victims of conflict. The Center's unique
    position as a civil-military humanitarian organization allows it to
    engage authorities from diverse countries in non-intrusive ways that
    help USPACOM reach out to new and otherwise reluctant partners. Your
    support for the COE in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
    provides valuable assistance in executing USPACOM priorities.
        Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference. One of our premier theater
    security activities, USPACOM annually hosts this regional conference,
    bringing together Asia-Pacific CHODs (CJCS equivalents) for a series of
    discussions on regional defense issues. The November 2002 conference,
    which was held in Singapore and was co-hosted by the Singapore Armed
    Forces and Chief of Defense Lieutenant General Lim Chuan Poh, gathered
    senior military leaders from 21 nations, including the Vice Chairman of
    the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace. The conference's theme,
    ``Meeting Security Challenges in the 21st Century,'' provided a forum
    for candid dialogue among senior leaders. The October 2002 Bali
    bombings heavily influenced discussions and underscored the ability of
    terrorists to cut across borders and present a common regional and
    global threat. The CHOD's conference continues to provide an excellent
    opportunity to foster understanding, build confidence among
    participants, strengthen relationships, and promote stability.
        Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides vital support to
    developing countries involved in the GWOT. Funds provided in the
    Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act,
    2002 and the emergency FMF Supplemental directly supported Security
    Cooperation priorities in the East Asian Littoral and other regions in
    USPACOM. FMF delivers the military articles, services, and training
    required to support the efforts of our friends and allies that promote
    U.S. security interests. We appreciate your support of SA programs and
    our efforts to improve their effectiveness and responsiveness.
        International Military Education and Training (IMET) is an
    effective, low-cost component of the SA effort. The program provides
    U.S. access to foreign governments and influences those governments far
    out of proportion to its modest cost. Furthermore, it exposes future
    leaders to U.S. values and commitment to the rule of law and the role
    of a professional military in a democratic society, and it promotes
    military professionalism. Recent restoration of full IMET to Indonesia
    is a welcome development. Having a core group of well-trained,
    professional leaders with first hand knowledge of our values and
    democratic institutions will make a difference in achieving our
    strategic security goals in Indonesia and throughout the theater.
        Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) or Mutual Logistic
    Support Agreements (MLSA) have enhanced interoperability and readiness
    and provided a cost effective mechanism for mutual logistics support
    for U.S. and Allied Forces. USPACOM forces that participated in the
    fiscal year 2002 multinational exercise Cobra Gold greatly reduced
    their logistics footprint by using an ACSA. Three countries within
    USPACOM's AOR have deployed forces outside our AOR under ACSA
    provisions in support of the GWOT--Australia, New Zealand, and the
    Republic of Korea. Thus far, these countries have benefited from
    approximately $350,000 worth of logistics support, supplies, and
    services via reimbursable ACSA transactions. Primary logistics support
    provided includes food, medical services, dental support, force
    protection, transportation/material handling equipment, billeting,
    vehicle/equipment maintenance, and fuel. Thailand is preparing to
    deploy forces to the USCENTCOM AOR soon in support of the GWOT, and the
    ACSA has been instrumental in providing Thai forces with cold weather
    and NBC gear on a reimbursable basis. USPACOM has 10 ACSAs in place
    (Philippines, Australia, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand,
    New Zealand, Fiji, and Tonga) with eight other countries within our AOR
    in DOD's ACSA--Eligible status (India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal,
    Brunei, Maldives, Madagascar, and Sri Lanka). We will continue to
    negotiate with ACSA-Eligible countries to expand the options we have to
    integrate coalition capabilities.
        Forward stationed or deployed military presence provides the
    leading edge of U.S. combat power and forms the cornerstone of
    deterrence. Within the Asia-Pacific region this equates to roughly
    100,000 forward-deployed personnel located primarily in the Republic of
    Korea and Japan. These forces deter conflict, dissuade competition,
    respond to crisis, man the infrastructure to receive follow-on forces,
    and fight if necessary. USPACOM is committed to developing the most
    effective regional command and control constructs to maximize the
    employment of our forward-deployed forces. In conjunction with ongoing
    DOD restructuring initiatives, we are reviewing these command and
    control structures and our force posture to ensure they are consistent
    with today's operational requirements and geo-political realities. The
    goal is to consolidate and transform our headquarters in Japan, the
    Republic of Korea, and throughout the region to provide an immediately
    employable force capable of decisive operational effects. Of course,
    these improvements will be undertaken in close consultation with our
    allies. Prototype command and control constructs such as the Joint
    Mission Force or Standing Joint Force Headquarters leverage both
    enhanced joint warfighting equities and transformation dividends. Along
    with our efforts to improve our command structure, we will continue to
    develop diversified access throughout the region. We foresee ongoing
    requirements to consolidate and improve our facilities in Korea, Japan,
    and other locations in the region. We also expect to enhance our access
    to facilities in Southeast Asia (SEA) and the South Asia Indian Ocean
    (SAIO) area to meet regional and global requirements and support the
    GWOT and other operational or contingency demands.
    Promoting ``Change'' and Improving the Asia-Pacific Defense Posture
        Our country is undergoing the most fundamental transformation of
    its defense strategy and Armed Forces since the Second World War.
    Guidance for this transformation is clear and starts with the National
    Security Strategy. At USPACOM, we are putting that guidance into
    action, operationalizing it with Asia-Pacific emphasis. Our efforts
    include strengthening command and control constructs, updating plans,
    improving force posture, diversifying access and enroute logistics,
    improving capabilities for immediate employment, and developing new
    operating patterns and concepts.
        Our progress toward successful transformation of our force is the
    result of a deliberate, iterative process of innovation and
    experimentation. This process necessitates that we collaborate and stay
    in close touch with service initiatives--ensuring they are synchronized
    into the joint team. Likewise, we continue to build a collaborative
    bridge between our experimental efforts and the experimentation
    underway in USJFCOM, the lead command for joint experimentation.
        Consistent with Secretary Rumsfeld's Transformation Planning
    Guidance, USPACOM has a multifaceted program covering a broad range of
    technological, organizational, and conceptual initiatives. It is a
    focused effort to explore and integrate innovative concepts and mature
    technologies to address our toughest challenges to effective joint
    operations.
        Our transformation and experimentation efforts are necessary steps
    in advancing improvements to the speed of action and effectiveness of
    joint operations across strategic, operational, and tactical force
    levels. To date, our new standing operating procedures and enhancements
    to collaboration have yielded as much as 2 weeks' reduction in time to
    stand up and deploy a Joint Task Force (JTF) in response to a
    contingency. By experimenting with and fielding mature technologies and
    prototype decision tools--placing them in the hands of operators well
    within the traditional acquisition cycle time--we have established
    information superiority and enhanced efficiency for theater command and
    control. With continued support, we can zero-in on even greater
    improvements to JTF effectiveness, such as integration and
    synchronization of operational fire and maneuver, surpassing
    information superiority with decision superiority, and expediting the
    fielding of mature technologies and concept prototypes to forward-
    deployed JTF Commanders.
        Within USPACOM, our Joint Mission Force (JMF) initiative provides
    the coherent framework for experimentation and transformation to
    enhance JTF operations across the spectrum of missions from forcible
    entry through humanitarian assistance. This mature initiative has
    allowed us to focus our transformational efforts toward a specific end-
    objective: seamless joint operations. The JMF concept will serve as
    USPACOM's segue to implementing the Standing Joint Force Headquarters
    as directed in the Defense Planning Guidance.
        Each year during exercises such as Cobra Gold, our multilateral
    exercise co-hosted with Thailand, and Tandem Thrust, our theater-wide
    biennial joint exercise with Australia, we experiment with JMF
    initiatives that address our ``Top Ten Challenges'' to enhancing JTF
    speed of action and effectiveness. By experimenting while we exercise,
    we can accurately assess the military utility of new technologies and
    procedures. As a direct result of success during exercises, JMF has
    fielded several key technologies within USPACOM's designated JTFs. Over
    the past year, Bandwidth Monitoring and Control devices have given our
    JTFs dynamic control of limited bandwidth for critical communications.
    The Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) now provides
    USPACOM Headquarters Joint Operations Center and our JTFs an
    interoperable tool for sharing a common operational picture for dynamic
    tracking and targeting and for conducting personnel recovery
    operations. JMF has provided our designated JTFs with a suite of
    collaborative tools and the training required for planning, executing,
    and assessing joint operations. Our design and implementation of a
    standard JMF web tool provides an internet ``one-stop shop'' for JTF
    real-time information sharing, planning, and execution.
        Additionally, JMF has operationalized other important command-wide
    capabilities such as our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN)
    for secure operations with our coalition partners, the Asia-Pacific
    Area Network (APAN) for civil-military and non-government organization
    operations with coalition forces, telemedicine for joint medical
    operations (JMO-T), and language translation capability such as DARPA's
    ``Phraselators.''
        To bridge the gap between our major joint exercises, hone
    readiness, and provide periodic spiral development opportunities,
    USPACOM conducts routine command and control exercises (C2X). These
    short duration, vignette-driven exercises not only test our JTF command
    and control procedures, they also provide an important venue for spiral
    technology and procedural development and fielding. This JMF initiative
    has proven effective in USPACOM as a readiness-enhancer.
        Over the next 2 years, with your support, USPACOM's Joint Mission
    Force will integrate emerging technologies into information operations
    and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance management. Our
    transformation and experimentation initiatives include our coalition
    partners.
        In Korea, we have worked Integrated Total Asset Visibility and
    language translators during exercise Ulchi Focus Lens. USFK has the
    lead for the Theater Precision Strike Operations ACTD and this year is
    sponsoring the Theater Effects-Based Operations ACTD.
        We have installed our JMF Web tool on the Japan Self-Defense Force
    bilateral secure wide-area network. We also have an information sharing
    agreement with Japan, and Japan has used Coalition Rear Area Security
    Command and Control in exercises such as Keen Edge and Yama Sakura.
        As Cobra Gold 2002 participants, Singapore Armed Forces and Royal
    Supreme Thai Command members were directly involved with our
    initiatives for collaboration tools, virtual Civil Military Operations
    Center, and Cowan. Additionally, Singapore is participating in the
    Spartan ACTD and is pursuing involvement in other ACTDs, such as
    RESTOPS and JTF WARNET (Wide Area Relay Network).
        The JTF WARNET initiative approved by the Joint Requirements
    Oversight Council (JROC) on 25 April 2002 provides organic, wireless
    secure Internet Protocol-based connectivity among tactical components
    of a JTF. WARNET applications, interfaces, and procedures enhance JTF
    command and control by sharing tactical situational awareness data
    among service command and control systems, enabling joint fires and
    collaborative planning and execution. JTF WARNET provided tactical-
    level force integration during Millennium Challenge 2002. We will
    conduct WARNET regional tests and a pre-deployment exercise in Hawaii
    and Japan in fiscal year 2003 before WARNET becomes a JTF operational
    capability in fiscal year 2004, culminating in Cobra Gold 2004.
        USPACOM served as the host Combatant Command for the Joint Warrior
    Interoperability Demonstration (JWID) 2002 and will host JWID 2003. For
    the first time, Japan, Korea, and Singapore have been invited to sit on
    the Coalition Task Force (CTF) staff. Their inclusion in the
    traditional mix of U.S., NATO, U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
    participants is pushing the envelope on coalition interoperability as
    it demonstrates the true nature of our interoperability challenges.
        The Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program
    complements the IMET program. DOD funding has sent foreign military
    officers to U.S. military institutions and selected regional centers
    for non-lethal education. This program has provided regional combatant
    commands with additional flexibility in executing our security
    cooperation strategies and has had an immediate and positive impact in
    encouraging reform, professionalism, and regional cooperation in
    addressing counter-terrorism and other transnational threats.
        The fellowship focus for USPACOM has been toward educational
    programs that encourage these advancements among Asia-Pacific nations
    addressing transnational threats with a focus on counter-terrorism.
    Specific courses have assisted in minimizing terrorist threats in the
    Asia-Pacific region, severing links between indigenous terrorist groups
    and global terrorist networks, allowing the establishment of a more
    professional military, developing stronger mutual security
    partnerships, and enhancing theater security cooperation. We are using
    the program to provide non-lethal training to Indonesian, Malaysian,
    and Philippine military officers at U.S. military educational
    institutions. U.S. military courses provide the basics for success in
    any military operation. A secondary benefit is the exposure students
    receive to the higher standards of ethics and behavior associated with
    a professional military that is under competent civilian control. Your
    continued support in providing this flexible funding alternative is
    appreciated.
        C2 for Coalitions. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
    (MPAT) Program involves a group of military planners from the U.S. and
    many nations in USPACOM's Area of Interest. The purpose of MPAT is to
    increase operational interoperability among participating countries'
    interoperable planners who can rapidly augment a multinational force
    headquarters in response to a regional crisis. Using multinational, but
    standardized skills and procedures, MPAT planners would plan and
    execute coalition operations to support a multinational and interagency
    response to a small-scale contingency. Through a series of workshops
    and information exchange events, including four major crisis action
    planning exercises, MPAT members have developed a knowledge base of the
    various national crisis action planning procedures in the Asia-Pacific
    region. They have also developed a strong working relationship with
    each other. Military planners from over 25 countries and
    representatives from the UN and various non-governmental and
    international organizations have attended these workshops.
        As part of the MPAT initiative, we and other nations in the region
    are developing a multinational force Standing Operating Procedures (MNF
    SOP) that any nation leading a coalition crisis response relief effort
    can use. This MNF SOP has coalition/combined task force activation,
    forming, and planning procedures focused on military operations other
    than war (MOOTW), from humanitarian assistance through peace
    operations, and includes counter-terrorism aspects. Planners from 30
    nations practice and validate the MNF SOP during MPAT and other
    multinational exercises each year.
        Since the Asia-Pacific region does not have a regional NATO-like
    organization, the MPAT and MNF SOP efforts represent the major regional
    program aimed at developing multinational procedures and maintaining a
    cadre of multinational military planners using common planning and
    operating procedures for coalition operations. USPACOM's Internet-based
    Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN) enables the working-level
    communications required to develop these procedures. APAN's easily
    accessible collaborative capability enables us to extend regional
    dialogues begun in functional forums such as CHOD conferences into
    exercises and operations that improve our regional response to the
    growing range of military missions we face today. The ability to place
    instructional material on APAN for mutual benefit of the U.S. and Asia-
    Pacific partners would enhance the USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation
    program and U.S. national security interests. The provision of
    internet-based training and education should include such programs as
    Advanced Distributed Learning and similar internet tools. USPACOM could
    thereby more effectively use focused military education programs to
    develop regional skills required to accomplish cooperative security
    missions, improve civil-military relations, increase respect for human
    rights, and strengthen democratic principles.
        I would like to express our appreciation for past congressional
    support of the Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) appropriations--
    support that has ensured a robust beginning for these programs. As we
    continue with the MPAT and MNF SOP development, we will improve the
    capabilities and interoperability of countries in the region to support
    operations that we may lead while enhancing the ability of other
    countries to lead coalition operations as well.
        Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA). Achieving the fullest
    possible accounting of Americans is a high USPACOM priority, and we
    will continue to devote the necessary personnel and resources to obtain
    the answers the POW/MIA families so richly deserve. During fiscal year
    2002, JTF-FA conducted 10 joint field activities (JFAs)--4 in Vietnam,
    5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia. The JTF-FA field teams investigated 211
    cases and excavated 50 sites. In total, they recovered and repatriated
    remains believed to be those of Americans unaccounted-for from the war
    in Southeast Asia from 27 sites (9 in Vietnam, 12 in Laos, and 6 in
    Cambodia). Furthermore, 31 individuals from recovery operations were
    identified and returned to their loved ones during this period. JTF-FA
    will maintain its pace of operations in fiscal year 2003, with 10 JFAs
    scheduled--4 in Vietnam, 5 in Laos, and 1 in Cambodia. JTF-FA will also
    conduct an underwater survey in China.
        Following Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's direction to determine the
    feasibility of merging JTF-FA and the Army's Central Identification
    Laboratories, Hawaii, we have put in place a comprehensive plan of
    action and milestones to ensure a smooth merger and standup date of 1
    October 2003. Merging of the two units under a single command is
    operationally sound and will clearly demonstrate our government's
    commitment to our unaccounted for citizens. Three critical items
    remain. First, realignment of the Department of the Army's Central
    Identification Laboratory Hawaii (CILHI) funding to the Department of
    the Navy as Executive Agent for USPACOM and the merged organization.
    Second, transfer of Department of the Army civilian positions and
    functions to the Department of the Navy. Third, determining the
    permanent location of this new organization with the attended
    adjustment and advancement to the CILHI approved FY-08 MILCON
    headquarters building project.
        Land Partnership Plan (LPP). The Commander of U.S. Forces Korea
    (USFK) has reached agreement with the ROK Government on an LPP that
    will consolidate U.S. force presence. The plan will reduce the number
    of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 23 while significantly
    enhancing training and combined warfighting capability--better
    supporting our long-term regional strategy. The LPP will also have a
    significant positive affect on the quality of life of our servicemen
    and women and their families assigned to our forces on the peninsula.
    Our partner is committed--the LPP has received the full backing of the
    Korean Government and its National Assembly, and will be a model for
    future discussions.
        Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). USPACOM
    continues to lead in innovating tactics, techniques, procedures, and
    concepts of operations that make the Nation's investment in science and
    technology productive for our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen in
    the field. We do so through a continual cycle of experimentation,
    demonstration, and special projects aimed at our early understanding of
    emerging technologies and their impact on military operations in the
    Asia-Pacific region.
        Transformation depends heavily on ACTDs. Today we are involved in
    19 ACTD projects, more than any other regional command. We have
    distributed the Transformation workload across the whole theater--
    almost all service component and Sub-Unified Commanders and most of my
    Staff Directors have responsibility for executing one or more ACTD.
        Our new fiscal year 2003 ACTD will provide us with new tactical
    capabilities. The Overwatch ACTD will give us a capability to detect
    and pinpoint sniper fire in an urban environment, enhancing security
    and situational awareness for our troops in the field. In addition to
    our new ACTDs, we have pioneered co-development of technology with
    Singapore with the SPARTAN Unmanned Surface Vessel ACTD. This ACTD
    provides technological developments to improve capabilities for multi-
    mission packages in Mine Warfare, force protection, precision strike,
    and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Additionally, it
    will enhance battlespace awareness and increase force protection for
    surface and subsurface operations through the unmanned surface vessel
    with modular sensor packages.
        The ACTD program is clear proof that when system developers and
    operators come together we can get useful military products into the
    hands of the user faster than with standard acquisition. However, this
    is only true if the technology successfully transitions into a program
    of record. I am proud to report that we will successfully transition
    all five of our ACTDs completed this year. Soon all combatant
    commanders will reap benefits in the areas of Joint Fire Control,
    personnel recovery, small unit logistics, telemedicine, and decision-
    support tools from our completed projects.
        Our Joint Experimentation program focuses on Joint Task Force (JTF)
    operations. It is fully coordinated with the U.S. Joint Forces
    Command's Joint Experimentation Program and includes technology
    insertion experiments during our regular exercises to advance our state
    of practice of JTF operations, both in the U.S. only venue and in
    coalition venues. This year, we executed the first two major
    experiments. The first occurred as part of our C2X exercise series
    where we train to establish command and control of a deployed JTF. The
    experiment augmented our normal C\4\I surveillance and reconnaissance
    equipment suites with new capabilities to manage and control
    information flow on the JTF networks and provide enhanced fires
    management capabilities across the joint force. Our second experiment
    occurred in a coalition environment during the Cobra Gold exercise with
    Thailand, Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia. We also added new
    technology from Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to
    improve network security and the commander's understanding of the war
    plan. We are finding that by experimenting as we exercise, we can
    provide a continuous series of warfighting improvements that are field
    tested in joint and combined operations before we make key procurement
    decisions.
        I've highlighted just a few of the experimentation and
    modernization initiatives in USPACOM. Our initiatives, like those of
    other Regional Combatant Commanders and the Services, in concert with
    USJFCOM, promise to modernize the force and enhance mission capability.
    We are working hard with USJFCOM to synchronize and bring coherence,
    prioritization, and continuity to the transformation of our forces.

                               SUMMARY STATEMENT

        America's Armed Forces in the Pacific continue to promote security,
    peace, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Through the
    professional efforts of our dedicated men and women, we continue to
    assure our allies, dissuade our adversaries and deter aggression. We
    are relentlessly pursuing terrorists, improving our force protection
    posture and maintaining our readiness so that if called upon, we will
    decisively defeat any adversary. U.S. Pacific Command's priorities for
    the near term remain unchanged: sustaining and supporting the global
    war on terrorism; improving our Readiness and Joint Warfighting
    Capability; improving the Quality of Service for our soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines; reinforcing the Constants in the Pacific Region;
    and promoting change and improving our Asia-Pacific Defense Posture for
    the Future.
        The men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command welcome this
    opportunity to tell their story. The support of Congress and the
    American people is greatly appreciated. Thank you.

        Chairman Warner. General.

      STATEMENT OF GEN. LEON J. LaPORTE, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
      UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, U.S. FORCES KOREA, COMBINED FORCES
                             COMMAND KOREA

        General LaPorte. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and
    distinguished committee members, I am honored to appear before
    the committee to update you on the current situation in the
    Republic of Korea (ROK). First, I want to extend the thanks of
    all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and the
    Department of Defense civilians that serve in Korea. Your
    consistent support enables us to maintain readiness and for us
    to be able to accomplish our mission on the Korean Peninsula.
        The past year was extraordinary for those who served in
    Korea. We have deterred North Korean aggression while
    maintaining a high state of readiness. In May when I took
    command, I established five priorities: first was to ensure
    peace and stability on the Peninsula and in the northeast
    region. Second was to ensure that our forces were trained and
    ready for their deterrence mission and, if needed, to conduct
    combat. Third was to strengthen the very strong Republic of
    Korea-United States Alliance. Fourth was to transform the
    command into a 21st century capability. Finally, it was to make
    Korea an assignment of choice for all U.S. service members.
        2002 marked the fourth democratic transfer of power in the
    Republic of Korea, renewed South Korean efforts toward inter-
    Korean reconciliation and the first World Cup hosted in Asia.
    In contrast, there were some discouraging incidents as well:
    North Korea's unprovoked attack, which resulted in the sinking
    of a Republic of Korea naval patrol boat in the West Sea and
    increased regional tensions; and the revelation, too, of the
    North Korean nuclear weapons development program; and also a
    cyclic rise in anti-United States Forces Korea sentiment.
        The Republic of Korea-United States Alliance weathered the
    challenges of 2002 and continues to be the foundation of peace
    and security throughout Northeast Asia. In 2002, the United
    Nations Command has made significant contributions to inter-
    Korean initiatives by the South Korean Government while
    maintaining the effectiveness of the armistice agreement, most
    notably to reduce tensions following the 20 June North Korean
    attack on the Republic of Korea naval ship, and also in the
    development and operation of the transportation corridors.
        Combined Forces Command, the backbone of the ROK-U.S.
    Alliance, continued to modernize capabilities and work together
    to deter the North Korean threat. United States Forces Korea
    established the groundwork for its transformation to a
    capabilities-based force for the 21st century. This
    transformation, as determined by the ROK-U.S. Future of the
    Alliance policy initiative, will ultimately result in a better
    and more capable disposition of forces throughout the region.
        Our alliance, forged in blood of 415,000 South Koreans and
    33,000 Americans who gave their lives during the Korean War,
    remains strong and committed to the tenets of the mutual
    defense treaty. The challenges of 2002 have firmly reinforced
    three points.
        First, the events in Korea affect the entire world, North
    Korea remains a serious threat to regional and global
    stability; continued United States presence in northeast Asia
    is critical to regional stability; and the Republic of Korea-
    United States Alliance is essential to continue regional
    security.
        2003 will be a pivotal year for the Republic of Korea. As
    the international community works to resolve the North Korean
    nuclear weapons issue, security and stability will remain a
    common denominator of our alliance. As the first 50 years of
    our mutual defense and security relationship comes to a close,
    we will achieve closely to the principles of the 1953 mutual
    defense treaty as we prepare for the next 50 years.
        I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
    committee and look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General LaPorte follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, USA

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am
    honored to appear before you as Commander, United Nations Command;
    Commander, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; and
    Commander, United States Forces Korea. On behalf of the more than
    37,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 5,700 civilians serving
    in Korea, I thank you for your unwavering support which enables us to
    maintain readiness and accomplish our deterrence mission on the Korean
    peninsula. I appreciate this opportunity to present an assessment of
    the command's status.
        This has been an extraordinary year in Korea. 2002 marked the 4th
    democratic transfer of power in the Republic of Korea, renewed South
    Korean efforts toward inter-Korean reconciliation, and the first World
    Cup hosted in Asia. In contrast, there were some discouraging incidents
    as well: North Korea's calculated armistice violation in the West Sea,
    exposure of the North Korean nuclear weapons programs, a tragic
    training accident in June, and cyclic rise of anti-United States Forces
    Korea sentiment. With consistency and determination, North Korea
    attempts to split the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance by
    exploiting these events. Our Alliance weathered these incidents and
    continues to be the foundation of peace and security throughout the
    Northeast Asia region. These incidents have firmly reinforced three
    points: the consequences of events in Korea affect the entire world;
    continued United States presence in Northeast Asia is critical to
    regional stability; and the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance is
    essential to regional security.
        Today, I will address current and future requirements by looking
    at: the Northeast Asia security environment; the North Korean challenge
    to regional and global security; the Republic of Korea-United States
    Alliance; and my command priorities--Ensure peace and stability on the
    Korean peninsula, Readiness and Training, Strengthen the Republic of
    Korea-United States Alliance, Transform the Command, and Make Korea an
    Assignment of Choice.

                    THE NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

        Northeast Asia is a nexus of economic might, competing interests,
    converging threats, cultures, and historical animosities. Over 17
    percent of the world's trade value is with countries in Northeast Asia,
    and United States trade with the region is second only to our trade
    with the North American Free Trade Association.\1\ Many of the nations
    in the region--China, Japan, Russia, and the Republic of Korea--are
    contending for economic and political influence. Enduring cultural and
    historical animosities remain a dynamic political force. This region
    marks the convergence of five of the world's six largest militaries,
    and three of the five declared nuclear powers. Today, the current
    military demarcation line between North and South Korea is the most
    heavily armed in the world and remains an arena for confrontation.
    North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of missile
    technology threatens regional and global stability. United States
    presence in Korea demonstrates our firm commitment to defend democratic
    values and prevent our enemies from threatening us--and our partners--
    including with weapons of mass destruction. Our forces in Korea send
    the clear message that we will stand with our allies and friends to
    provide the stability that promotes prosperity and democratic values.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Derived from U.S. Census data. For the first 11 months of 2002,
    total trade with Northeast Asia ($U.S. billion) are: Japan $172.92,
    China $148.13, Republic of Korea $58.13, Taiwan $50.60. Trade with
    NAFTA during the same period was $557.39 (Canada $342.55 and Mexico
    $214.73), (http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/top/dst/2002/11/
    balance.html) accessed 19 February 2003.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Republic of Korea Today
        The Republic of Korea is fast becoming a global economic
    competitor. In 2002 the Republic of Korea's economy grew 6 percent
    while boasting the world's 11th largest Gross Domestic Product and
    third largest cash reserves.\2\ The South Korean people are justifiably
    proud of these achievements and the Republic of Korea's increasing
    international prominence. The Republic of Korea's vision of the future
    is to diversify its economy by becoming the ``transportation,
    financial, and information technology hub of Northeast Asia.'' \3\ This
    vision seeks to route Northeast Asia, Europe, and the Americas trade
    through the Republic of Korea using an inter-Korean transportation
    system. To achieve this goal the Republic of Korea must significantly
    increase cooperation with North Korea. Inter-Korean initiatives begun
    by former President Kim Dae-Jung and continued by President Roh Moo-
    Hyun pursue reconciliation for cultural, economic, and humanitarian
    reasons. The Republic of Korea's engagement policies toward North Korea
    profoundly affect how South Koreans view their relations with the
    United States and North Korea.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ United States Department of State, Country Commercial Guide
    Korea, Fiscal Year 2003.
        \3\ President Roh, Moo-hyun announced his intent to position the
    Republic of Korea as the ``economic powerhouse of Northeast Asia''. In
    public appearances, he amplified this vision stating that he sought to
    make South Korea the transportation, financial, and information
    technology hub of Northeast Asia. For President Roh's national
    priorities, see Korea Herald articles at http://kn.koreaherald.co.kr/
    SITE/data/html--dir/2003/01/11/200301110003.asp, http://kn.korea-
    herald.co.kr/SITE/data/html--dir/2002/12/28/200212280010.asp.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Many South Koreans under age 45, a generation that has lived in an
    era of peace and prosperity, have little or no understanding of the
    North Korean threat. These South Koreans perceive North Korea not as a
    threat but rather as a Korean neighbor, potential trading partner and a
    country that provides access to expanded Eurasian markets. This
    perception of North Korea contrasts with America's view that North
    Korea is a threat to regional and global stability. This divergent view
    of North Korea, coupled with strong national pride, has been a cause of
    periodic tension in the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance.
        There have always been groups in the Republic of Korea that are
    critical of United States policy and claim that the United States
    hinders inter-Korean reconciliation. Demonstrations against American
    policy and military presence increased sharply during this year's
    Republic of Korea presidential election. Political interest groups made
    claims of inequity in the Republic of Korea-United States alliance a
    central issue during the presidential campaign. Opposition groups
    exploited a United States military court's acquittal of two American
    soldiers charged with negligent homicide in the tragic training
    accident that claimed the lives of two South Korean schoolgirls last
    June. Non-governmental organizations asserted that the Status of Forces
    Agreement (SOFA) was unjust and that the acquitted soldiers should have
    been tried in a Republic of Korea court rather than by a United States
    military court. During the presidential election campaign, these groups
    used biased and inaccurate media reporting to inflame anti-United
    States Forces Korea sentiments and mobilize demonstrations, a
    traditional tool of political protest in the Republic of Korea.
    Regrettably, several of these protests turned violent.
        Since the December 2002 Republic of Korea presidential election,
    anti-United States Forces Korea demonstrations have virtually
    disappeared, due in large part to positive steps taken by United States
    Forces Korea, the United States Embassy, and the Republic of Korea
    government. Through our Republic of Korea-United States Status of
    Forces Joint Committee process, we identified ways to improve
    implementation of the 2001 Status of Forces Agreement. Convening a
    Republic of Korea-United States Status of Forces Agreement Special
    Joint Task Force, we incorporated recommendations in vehicular safety,
    convoy operations, and joint investigation procedures. This Special
    Joint Task Force assisted United States Forces Korea and the Republic
    of Korea's government in explaining the provisions of the Status of
    Forces Agreement to the Korean people.
        The prompt and comprehensive actions of the Status of Forces
    Agreement Joint Committee addressed the concerns of many South Koreans.
    Shortly after his election, President Roh, Moo Hyun voiced support for
    a strong Republic of Korea-United States alliance and continued United
    States military presence in Korea even after reconciliation.
    Acknowledging the rationale for the Alliance, he expressed a desire to
    re-examine the relationship based on the principles of equal
    partnership and greater emphasis on shared interests. Since the
    presidential election, pro-American groups, some as large as 100,000
    people, in the Republic of Korea have conducted demonstrations
    supporting the continued stationing of United States Forces in the
    Republic of Korea. In this the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, we
    have an opportunity to revitalize the Alliance in constructive ways
    that enhance this mutually beneficial partnership while ensuring
    peninsula and regional security.
        We can improve the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance by
    closely examining the roles, missions, capabilities, force structure,
    and stationing of our respective forces. This includes the Republic of
    Korea assuming the predominant role in its defense and increasing both
    Republic of Korea and United States involvement in regional security
    cooperation. These efforts will enhance our partnership while fully
    acknowledging the Republic of Korea's contributions to burdensharing,
    support to the war on terror, and their modernization program for
    defense of the Republic of Korea.
        Republic of Korea Defense Burdensharing
        Defense burdensharing is an important part of maintaining the
    readiness of United States Forces Korea. The Republic of Korea
    burdensharing contribution in 2002 was $490 million, 41 percent of
    total United States Forces Korea non-personnel stationing costs, behind
    Japan and Germany in Allied burdensharing. In 2003, the Republic of
    Korea's contributions will increase to $539.5 million. The Republic of
    Korea's annual burdensharing contributions have increased significantly
    since the Asian financial crisis, rising over $206 million (62 percent)
    since 1997.
        The Republic of Korea's support for the war on terror
        The Republic of Korea has continued its steadfast support to the
    global war on terror. The Republic of Korea's National Assembly
    extended its mandate through 2003 and increased its commitment of
    support forces to Operation Enduring Freedom. Today Republic of Korea
    liaison officers are planning and coordinating with their United States
    counterparts at both Central Command and Pacific Command headquarters.
    The Republic of Korea's military is supporting the war on terror from
    Tampa, Florida, throughout the Pacific, and in Kyrgyztan and
    Afghanistan. The Republic of Korea has provided several contingents of
    support troops to include a navy transport ship moving essential
    airfield material to Diego Garcia, four C-130 cargo aircraft to support
    the United States Pacific Command's operations, and a hospital unit in
    Bagram. In February 2003, a Republic of Korea engineering unit began
    deployment to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. In addition, the government
    of the Republic of Korea has provided $12 million of their $45 million
    pledge to fund humanitarian and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan.
        Republic of Korea's military modernization
        The Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense has made a
    long-term commitment to acquire the necessary capabilities to secure
    the Republic of Korea against current and emerging threats. The
    Republic of Korea's military modernization program involves significant
    purchases of United States equipment to improve interoperability. Over
    the last decade, 82 percent of the Republic of Korea's equipment
    purchases have been United States equipment. Last year direct Foreign
    Military Sales of United States military equipment to the Republic of
    Korea exceeded $1.8 billion and commercial agreements were reached to
    deliver over $4 billion of additional military equipment over the next
    few years. Boeing was awarded the contract to deliver 40 F-15K aircraft
    between 2005 and 2008. This year, the Republic of Korea is taking
    delivery of 20 additional KF-16 aircraft, procuring its second
    battalion of Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, and extended range
    munitions. The Republic of Korea's Navy is building three new
    destroyers, equipped with the AEGIS system.
        The Republic of Korea's military has made strides in improving its
    capabilities; however, its small budget, as a fraction of Gross
    Domestic Product, restrains modernization efforts. In 2003, the
    Republic of Korea's defense budget increased 6.5 percent to $14.2
    billion but fell from 2.8 percent to 2.7 percent of Gross Domestic
    Product. This has left some key programs unfunded or delayed,
    continuing a 10 year trend. The Republic of Korea has delayed purchase
    of critical equipment in the required quantities--theater air and
    missile defense systems, early warning and control aircraft, and
    upgraded equipment for their Special Operations units. Acquiring these
    systems provides critical capabilities to ensure the Republic of
    Korea's security against threats posed by North Korea.
            north korean challenges to regional and global security
        North Korea is a dangerous dictatorship that continues to threaten
    peace, security, and stability in Northeast Asia. The Kim Jong Il
    Regime uses illicit activities to fund the extravagant lifestyles of
    the inner circle and is using its military capabilities to extort
    resources from the international community. North Korea poses several
    threats to global stability: an economy on the brink of collapse; an
    active nuclear weapons development program; growing proliferation of
    missiles, chemical, and biological weapons technologies; and large
    conventional forces and special operations forces that directly
    threaten our allies. North Korean brinksmanship ensures that the Korean
    Peninsula remains a place of palpable danger, illustrated by North
    Korea's unprovoked attack on a Republic of Korea patrol boat in the
    West Sea on 29 June 2002 and North Korean efforts to develop highly
    enriched uranium nuclear weapons. North Korea continues to flagrantly
    violate its international agreements resulting in increased regional
    tensions. The Republic of Korea and United States Forces continue to
    face the possibility of a high intensity war involving large
    conventional forces and significant weapons of mass destruction.
    North Korean Political Environment
        Kim Jong Il is firmly in control. He is the ultimate decision maker
    who controls the state security apparatus and occupies all key party,
    military, and government leadership positions. Kim relies on a core
    group of elites to maintain power. This inner circle, not the formal
    hierarchy of the party and government, run all the major North Korean
    institutions. Kim provides the ruling elite with a relatively luxurious
    lifestyle, while the masses live in poverty. Kim's overriding goal is
    regime survival. His intent remains to dominate the Republic of Korea
    and to reunify the peninsula under North Korean leadership.
    North Korean Economic Environment
        The most pressing problem facing North Korea is its failing
    economy. Economic output has shrunk by nearly one-half since 1993. The
    country suffers from obsolete production facilities and severe
    shortages of capital, energy and raw materials. Industrial facilities,
    other than those devoted to defense industries, are nearly beyond
    repair as a result of more than a decade of under-investment and
    critical spare parts shortages. Most factories operate at less than 25
    percent capacity.
        Despite severe economic problems and acute deprivation among the
    general populace, the Kim Regime chooses to maintain a large, capable,
    and forward deployed conventional military force. North Korea's
    ``Military First'' policy ensures the military receives top priority in
    all resources, at the expense of the North Korean people. The military
    consumes about one third of the North Korean budget. The military
    operates a parallel economy producing conventional weapons, missiles,
    and illegal drugs for sale on the open market as well as large-scale
    smuggling and currency counterfeiting. Most of the profits from these
    activities accrue directly to the military, with the remainder going to
    Kim and the elite. Kim Jong Il continues to buy the loyalty of his
    elite by providing luxury cars, housing, food, and special medical
    care.
        To prop up the progressively deteriorating North Korean economy,
    Kim Jong Il has implemented a number of initiatives. He has invigorated
    ideological campaigns that demand loyalty and perseverance--encouraging
    the North Korean people to endure hardships for the good of the nation.
    To complement the ideological campaign, the Kim Regime has tightened
    security and increasingly militarized North Korean society to preclude
    broad internal dissent. North Korea has turned to foreign aid,
    primarily from the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and
    China to meet its food and fuel needs. The Kim Regime has implemented
    limited economic reforms, including unprecedented wage and price
    increases, designed to jump-start the economy; however these efforts
    have not revitalized the North Korean economy. Unless North Korea
    embraces a more open market economy--a prospect that Kim Jong Il fears
    will threaten his control--we expect no significant economic
    improvement in the foreseeable future.
    North Korean Nuclear Issues
        North Korea's nuclear weapons program poses a very serious threat
    to the United States and our allies, risks regional stability, and
    challenges the international non-proliferation regime. During a meeting
    with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in early October 2002,
    North Korea acknowledged its pursuit of a covert program to enrich
    uranium for nuclear weapons. In a 16 October statement, North Korea
    admitted a series of actions that violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement,
    the 1992 Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
    Korean Peninsula and the 1994 Agreed Framework. We assess that the Kim
    Regime believes possession of nuclear weapons will guarantee survival.
        The North Koreans have again resorted to brinksmanship using the
    nuclear issue in an effort to gain economic and political concessions
    through negotiations. On 10 January 2003, they expressed their
    intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    Restarting the Yongbyon nuclear reactor near Pyongyang has prompted
    fears that it intends to produce nuclear weapons in the near future. If
    North Korea begins reprocessing existing fuel rods at the Yongbyon
    facility, it could produce enough material for five to eight nuclear
    weapons within a year. North Korea's history of selling missiles and
    missile-related technologies to any state or group with hard currency
    raises serious concerns about the potential for nuclear weapons
    technology or scientific know-how to find their way from North Korea to
    the hands of terrorists.
    North Korean Ballistic Missile Sales
        North Korea's ballistic missiles, capable of delivering weapons of
    mass destruction, are a threat to the region and a destabilizing
    influence in the world. North Korea remains one of the few countries
    willing to sell to anyone with cash complete missile systems,
    production facilities, and technological assistance. These sales in
    turn contribute to instability in regions such as the Middle East and
    South Asia. Although Kim Jong Il told President Putin and Prime
    Minister Koizumi last year that the current ballistic missile flight-
    testing moratorium will remain in place beyond 2003, North Korea has
    repeatedly threatened to restart missile test launches.
    Role of the North Korean Military
        The Korean People's Army ensures regime survival by controlling the
    internal situation and deterring external threats. It is the one
    instrument of national power that enables North Korea to extract aid
    from its neighbors in the region. The military also plays a major role
    in the economy. Although a decade of resource shortages has left the
    North Korean military ill-prepared to fight and win a war to reunify
    the Peninsula, there are no indications that the Kim Regime has
    abandoned the forced reunification option.
        Conventional Forces: With 1.17 million personnel, the Korean
    People's Army is the fifth largest active duty military force in the
    world. The North Korean air force has over 1,700 aircraft and the navy
    has more than 800 ships, including a large submarine fleet. The ground
    force is the world's third largest, with almost one million soldiers,
    and an estimated 6 million Reserves. About 70 percent of the North
    Korean Army is deployed south of Pyongyang, where they are capable of
    attacking with very little tactical warning. The preponderance of the
    North Korean long-range artillery force can strike Seoul from its
    current locations.
        Asymmetric Threat: The North's asymmetric forces are dangerous,
    well trained, and well funded by the North Korean military budget. They
    continue to make methodical improvements in weapons of mass
    destruction, ballistic missiles, and special operations forces.
        North Korea is openly pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Their
    program to develop both plutonium and uranium based nuclear weapons has
    been well documented. North Korea maintains a substantial chemical
    weapons stockpile and production capability that threatens both our
    military forces and the civilian population centers in the Republic of
    Korea and Japan. Additionally, North Korea has the capability to
    develop, produce, and potentially weaponize biological warfare agents.
    The principal risk attendant to the North Korean weapons of mass
    destruction is proliferation--the sale of fissile materials, completed
    nuclear weapons, and the technology to produce chemical or biological
    agents to other nations or terrorist organizations.
        Their ballistic missile inventory includes over 500 SCUD missile
    variants that can threaten the entire peninsula. They continue to
    produce and deploy medium-range No Dong missiles capable of striking
    cities and United States bases in Japan. According to estimates by the
    Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, North
    Korea has an untested ballistic missile capable of delivering a payload
    the size of a nuclear weapon to parts of the continental United States.
    Continued research on a three-stage variant of these missiles will
    provide North Korea the capability to target all of North America. As
    with weapons of mass destruction, North Korean missile proliferation
    poses a threat far beyond the Korean peninsula.
        North Korea's 122,000-man special operations forces are the world's
    largest and pose a significant asymmetric threat. We consider them a
    tough, dedicated, and profoundly loyal force. They undergo year-round
    training to develop and maintain their skills. During wartime, these
    forces would attack to disrupt command facilities of the Republic of
    Korea-United States Combined Forces Command and seek to destroy our
    force generation capability. The North will concentrate their special
    operations forces against our critical war fighting nodes while seeking
    to deny reinforcement from the continental United States.
        Force Improvements: The North Korean military is adaptive. They
    have studied our military actions, most recently in the Balkans and
    Afghanistan, and adapted their tactics to offset our technological
    advantages. They concentrate their efforts against the combined
    surveillance, precision attack, and force generation capability of the
    Republic of Korea and the United States. North Korea continues to
    improve their command, control, communications, and intelligence
    systems, harden and bury their facilities, improve lines of
    communication, disperse forces, and improve camouflage, concealment,
    and deception measures. These efforts increase the survivability of
    North Korean combat power, and complicate our attack warning
    capability.
        Assessment: North Korea poses a dangerous and complex threat to
    peace and security on the peninsula and throughout the region. Their
    growing missile and weapons of mass destruction programs, including a
    re-vitalized nuclear weapons program, constitute a substantial threat
    to the world. Moreover, they have shown willingness to sell anything to
    anybody for hard currency. They will continue to support the military
    at the expense of the general population and extort aid to prop up
    their failing economy. We see no indications that the Kim Regime will
    change the policies of military first, brinkmanship, and missile
    proliferation throughout the world.

      UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, AND UNITED STATES
                                  FORCES KOREA

        Since I took command in May 2002, I have had several opportunities
    to assess the capabilities and readiness of United Nations Command,
    Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. Key events
    included response to the West Sea Armistice Violation by North Korea,
    security for development of the inter-Korean transportation corridors
    through the Demilitarized Zone, and security support for the 2002 World
    Cup and Asian Games.
    United Nations Command
        Under the mandate of Security Council Resolutions 82, 83, and 84,
    the United Nations Command in Seoul provides a standing coalition with
    15 member nations to address trans-national interests in regional
    stability. United Nations Command led the international response to the
    29 June 2002 West Sea Armistice violation by the North Koreans. This
    egregious, unprovoked North Korean attack in the West Sea sank the
    Republic of Korea patrol boat SOSAN; killing 6 and wounding 19 Republic
    of Korea sailors. The United Nations Command member nations promptly
    issued strong statements denouncing the North Korean aggression. Facing
    this international censure, North Korea reluctantly expressed regret
    over the incident and agreed to the first United Nations Command--
    Korean Peoples Army General Officer talks in almost 2 years. At the
    General Officer talks, North Korea guaranteed not to interfere with a
    United Nations Command-led salvage operation. Under the United Nations
    flag, the Republic of Korea's navy successfully salvaged the sunken
    boat. United Nations Command observers ensured neutrality and
    transparency of the salvage operation. The strength of the Republic of
    Korea-United States Alliance, backed by the United Nations Command
    member nations, led to a successful West Sea recovery operation and
    reinforced the legitimate authority of United Nations Command to
    enforce the Armistice. United Nations Command again provided a
    stabilizing force and prevented a dangerous situation from escalating
    into open hostilities.
        Following the West Sea salvage operation, the Republic of Korea and
    North Korea held the Seventh Inter-Korean Ministerial talks, during
    which they re-invigorated efforts to establish inter-Korean
    transportation corridors. These corridors allow reconnection of rail
    lines and roadways through two designated points in the Demilitarized
    Zone to facilitate inter-Korean humanitarian visits and commerce. To
    support this Republic of Korea reconciliation initiative, United
    Nations Command worked closely with the Republic of Korea's Ministry of
    National Defense to establish special coordination measures between the
    Republic of Korea's Ministry of National Defense and the North Korean
    People's Army to speed construction and operation of the transportation
    corridors while ensuring compliance with the Armistice Agreement and
    security of the Demilitarized Zone. The first group of passengers
    crossed the Military Demarcation Line through the eastern corridor on
    14 February 2003. This was the first time in 50 years that citizens of
    the Republic of Korea crossed directly into North Korea and is a clear
    demonstration of successful cooperation between the Republic of Korea
    and United Nations Command. The figure below illustrates the location
    of the east and west inter-Korean transportation corridors through the
    Demilitarized Zone.

    Combined Forces Command
        Combined Forces Command ensures the security of the people of the
    Republic of Korea. Combined Forces Command provides the military force
    that deters external aggression and stands ready to defeat any external
    provocation against the Republic of Korea. Combined Forces Command,
    composed of air, ground, naval, marine, and special operations
    components, conducts combined training exercises and readiness
    inspections to maintain the warfighting readiness that is essential to
    deterrence. Combined Forces Command headquarters is a fully integrated
    staff, manned by Republic of Korea and United States military officers.
    This thoroughly integrated headquarters coordinates the operations that
    deter external aggression. In 2002, Combined Forces Command assisted
    with the successful United Nations Command salvage operation in the
    West Sea and with military security support to the World Cup and Asian
    Games.
        Leveraging Combined Forces Command wartime operational procedures,
    United States Forces Korea and Republic of Korea forces shared
    information and conducted combined exercises to deter terrorist
    infiltrators seeking to disrupt the games. Combined Forces Command
    operated a Crisis Action Response Team to quickly respond to any type
    of incident. United States Forces Korea provided unique biological and
    radiological defense assets to augment the Republic of Korea's military
    capabilities. Our close cooperation ensured a secure 2002 World Cup and
    demonstrated the agility of Combined Forces Command to conduct a wide
    range of operations.
    United States Forces Korea
        United States Forces in Korea are the tangible demonstration of
    United States commitment to peace and stability in Korea and throughout
    Northeast Asia. United States Forces Korea brings the robust
    technological superiority, information dominance, and warfighting
    prowess that complement and buttress the Republic of Korea's military
    capabilities. Our forward presence deters North Korean aggression and
    convinces North Korea not to start a devastating war that would only
    have tragic consequences throughout the region. To maintain the
    dominance that ensures deterrence, we must maintain state-of-the-art
    capabilities in Korea. My top priorities for force modernization are:
    increasing C\4\ISR functionality and interoperability, increasing the
    pre-positioned stocks of preferred munitions, improving counter fire
    capabilities, missile defense, force protection, and logistics. These
    capabilities support peninsular defense and regional security
    operations.
        C\4\ISR functionality and interoperability
        United States Forces Korea continues to work hard to achieve the
    decision superiority needed to execute effects-based operations. We
    have made significant improvements in the combined Command, Control,
    Computers, Communications, and Intelligence architecture in Korea. Over
    the last year we have created a combined Common Operational Picture
    that integrates Republic of Korea Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Tactical
    Data Links from both Republic of Korea and United States air and naval
    vessels and live video feeds from throughout the theater. We seek to
    expand these capabilities by adding logistics and engineering Common
    Operational Picture currently under development at Joint Forces
    Command. We thank you for your support, which has allowed us to
    progress this far. However, this common operational picture is built on
    an aging communications infrastructure that is increasingly expensive
    to maintain. We need to continue improving Command, Control, Computers,
    Communications, and Intelligence functionality and interoperability.
        The strategy for improving our Command, Control, Computers,
    Communications, and Intelligence requires improved secure digital
    networks, collaborative planning tools, and enhanced interoperability.
    Our secure digital networks need significant technology upgrades to
    improve the efficiency of information exchange. High-speed internet
    encryption will enable us to prioritize and rapidly transmit secure
    data throughout the theater. We also need to increase our secure long-
    haul communications networks to effectively collaborate with United
    States Pacific Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Improving these
    networks provides the infrastructure required to upgrade our
    collaborative planning tools and interactive displays to provide real-
    time decision support.
        Improving interoperability of Republic of Korea and United States
    Forces Korea communications systems is paramount. The Program Budget
    Decision 725 has helped us to address our Command, Control, Computers,
    Communications, and Intelligence shortfalls. Some examples of key
    interoperability programs that need your continued support are
    integration of Republic of Korea Command Post Automation System and
    United States Global Command and Control System-Korea; integrating
    tactical Mobile Subscriber Equipment; and expanding Automated Deep
    Operations Coordination System. I urge your continued endorsement of
    Program Budget Decision 725 to maintain this funding across the Future
    Years Defense Plan.
        Preferred Munitions
        The complexity of Korean terrain and weather require the all
    weather capability provided by precision munitions. Our operational
    planning leverages ``preferred munitions'' to conduct precision strike
    against essential military targets. While we can conduct a successful
    campaign without precision munitions, it would be longer and more
    costly in terms of infrastructure damage and human suffering. Korea's
    weather often impacts our munitions choices, but Global Positioning
    Satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition and inertial-guided Wind
    Corrected Munitions Dispenser give us the capability to sustain our
    operations when the weather precludes the use of other munitions. Some
    key requirements for this theater are: Joint Direct Attack Munition,
    Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser, Conventional Air Launched Cruise
    Missile upgrades, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets, Javelin
    and Hellfire anti-tank weapons. We must maintain adequate stocks of
    these munitions on the peninsula. Critically important are early
    development and fielding of munitions to defeat the hard and deeply
    buried targets prevalent throughout North Korea. Toward that end,
    United States Forces Korea is sponsoring two promising Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstrations--thermobaric weapons and tactical missile
    system penetrator munitions, which will carry the fight to the enemy
    wherever they seek to hide. I ask that you continue to support
    development and production of the advanced precision munitions required
    to support all contingency plans.
    Counter-fire Capabilities
        In the event of a conflict, the ability to rapidly destroy North
    Korean long-range artillery is essential to deterrence. An aggressive
    counter-fire battle achieves early destruction of one of North Korea's
    essential military capabilities, while minimizing casualties and
    protecting Seoul--the Republic of Korea's seat of government and hub of
    economic power. My vision for the counter-fire fight is two-fold: a
    proactive capability to destroy North Korean artillery systems before
    they fire; and an overwhelming response to any North Korean fires into
    the Republic of Korea. A fully resourced and integrated ground, sea,
    and air counter-fire capability is essential to achieving this decisive
    overmatch. Key components of the theater counter-fire system are:
    state-of-the-art counter-battery radars, precision munitions,
    operational-level and strategic-level Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and
    state-of-the-art Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
    capabilities. Your support of these programs provides the capabilities
    needed to destroy the North Korean artillery at the time and place of
    our choosing while simultaneously protecting Seoul.
        Missile Defense
        North Korea's theater ballistic missiles can range deeply into the
    Republic of Korea, and deliver both conventional and chemical weapons
    on the civilian population and military targets. To defeat the North
    Korean missile threat, I need to increase the number of advanced
    PATRIOT missiles in the Republic of Korea. Increasing the density of
    these advanced air defense weapons on the peninsula ensures the needed
    protection for critical nodes.
        Force Protection
        Protecting the force remains essential to operational readiness--I
    will not compromise the safety of our service members and their
    families. We remain vigilant and have taken critical steps to improve
    our security posture--most notably increasing perimeter security
    forces, installation of closed circuit television monitors at key
    access points, fielding Portal Shield chemical and biological detection
    systems, and conducting intensive anti-terrorism and force protection
    training exercises.
        Although we continue to assess the terrorist threat as low, we have
    implemented additional force protection measures and increased our
    physical security presence to ensure the safety of our people. In
    addition to our normal security forces, the Korean National Police are
    integrated into our installation security plans. Their sustained
    presence adds depth and effectiveness to the security of our key
    facilities. We have worked closely with the Republic of Korea Ministry
    of National Defense to increase military security cooperation during
    times of heightened force protection posture. These prudent measures
    ensure the Republic of Korea--United States Alliance is prepared to
    meet any terrorist threat to our installations.
        Over the past year, we completed a detailed vulnerability
    assessment of our installations. This assessment identified over 130
    major tasks required to comply with anti-terrorism and force protection
    requirements, many of which require changes to our infrastructure. Key
    requirements to improve force protection focus on establishing adequate
    standoff protection around our key facilities and installations and
    upgrading structural integrity on mission essential and vulnerable
    buildings. We have taken prudent measures to mitigate these shortfalls
    with the available resources. I encourage you to support all force
    protection related projects.
        Logistics and Sustainment
        Adequate logistical sustainment is essential to our campaign plans.
    In Korea, our operations are sustained by a combination of pre-
    positioned equipment stocks and replenishment from the continental
    United States. In addition to the precision munitions requirements I've
    presented, I need your support to correct shortfalls in Army Pre-
    positioned Set-4 equipment, supplies, and maintenance facilities. These
    war reserve sustainment stocks are essential to execute operational
    plans. To ensure timely arrival of additional forces and sustainment
    supplies, I fully support initiatives to field robust strategic
    transportation systems like the High Speed Vessel and C-17. Equally
    important to the Korean Theater is the continued improvement of Joint
    Logistics Over The Shore equipment, which provides the flexibility to
    sustain the force against an enemy's anti-access strategies. Improved
    strategic mobility and robust pre-positioned equipment and supplies
    ensure sustainment of forward deployed forces and rapid reinforcement
    from the continental United States.

                               COMMAND PRIORITIES

        As the commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces
    Command, and United States Forces Korea, my command priorities are:
    Ensure Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula, Readiness and
    Training, Strengthen the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance,
    Transformation of the Command, and Make Korea an Assignment of Choice.
    I want to elaborate on each of these, identify the key programs and the
    resources needed to make them a reality.
    Ensure Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula
        Maintaining the Armistice and deterring aggression are the most
    important missions I have as Commander, United Nations Command,
    Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea. Readiness to
    fight and win decisively is critical to these missions. We must also
    foster broader regional security cooperation to enhance solidarity
    among our allies and friends. It is essential that the two key elements
    that deter conflict on the peninsula, the United Nations Command member
    nations and the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance, continue
    cooperation to actively promote peace and stability. Our common
    purpose, steadfast resolve and advanced capabilities are essential to
    continued stability in Korea.
    Readiness and Training
        Readiness is my number one priority. Readiness is our ability to
    deter, and if required, defeat aggression on the Korean peninsula. The
    proximity of the threat, the complexity of combat in this theater, and
    high personnel turnover demand intensive, combined training at all
    levels. Our year-round combined exercise program, which leverages the
    results of Joint Forces Command experimentation, provides a great venue
    to maintain our warfighting proficiency and implement new operational
    concepts that support transformation.
        Combined Forces Command uses the combined exercise program to
    maintain readiness that is essential to defeat a limited warning attack
    by North Korea. Our robust annual training program consists of three
    major exercises: Ulchi-Focus Lens; Reception, Staging, Onward Movement
    and Integration; and Foal Eagle. Collectively, these exercises train
    over 400,000 personnel and ensure that the Combined Forces Command Team
    of active and Reserve component units remains proficient in all
    warfighting tasks. In Ulchi-Focus Lens 2002, our capstone training
    exercise, we improved our Common Operational Picture with interactive
    command and control displays. We used the Common Operational Picture at
    all command levels to achieve common situational awareness. We also
    implemented a new collaborative planning and execution system to
    coordinate theater-level operations. Ulchi-Focus Lens 2002 provided an
    opportunity to test Integrated Total Asset Visibility and automated
    language translators.
        Our 2003 exercise program focuses on implementing effects based
    operations. To enhance the exercise program, we are continuing the
    development of the emerging Northeast Asia Regional Simulation Center
    to provide simulation support to joint, combined, and bi-lateral
    exercises. This effort is becoming the preferred venue to resolve
    difficult coalition integration and doctrinal issues. As this center
    moves toward its objective state in 2008, it has the potential to
    support multilateral exercises and simulation with other regional
    partners and allies. Our 2003 exercise program is essential to
    maintaining warfighting proficiency and implementing new doctrinal
    concepts that improve operational effectiveness.
        Training Area Encroachment
        In addition to simulation training, we must conduct regular live
    force-on-force training to practice combat tasks and maintain maneuver
    proficiency. Korea's increasing urbanization encroaches on training
    areas, restricting our ability to train in Korea. For example, armored
    and mechanized units cannot maneuver outside of small and discrete
    pockets of land located in a corridor North of Seoul. Artillery live
    fire training is limited to two small training areas, which prohibit
    effective integration of fire and maneuver techniques. We have the same
    problem with our Air-to-Ground ranges and must continually work to
    ensure we have the proper separation for adequate aircrew training
    while maintaining safety for the people who live near the ranges. The
    Land Partnership Plan provides the mechanism for us to improve our
    training areas and reduce the effects of encroachment. By 2008 we
    expect to have the land necessary to create a consolidated Korean
    Maneuver Training Center. I ask you to fully support this initiative.
    Strengthen the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance
        For 50 years the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance has been
    a standard by which all others are judged. To strengthen the Alliance,
    we need to improve public understanding of United States contributions.
    It is also essential that we review and re-affirm the military
    relationship of the Republic of Korea and United States Forces Korea.
    These complementary efforts will ensure that the Alliance endures well
    into the future.
        To improve the public understanding and appreciation of United
    Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces
    Korea, I have implemented a ``Good Neighbor'' program that encourages
    closer interaction between our units and the people of the Republic of
    Korea. This program uses local unit outreach programs such as tutoring
    English language students in area schools, Arbor Day activities, and
    sponsoring charitable contributions for orphanages. One of our largest
    volunteer efforts occurred in the aftermath of Typhoon Rusa in
    September 2002. United States Forces Korea volunteers assisted with
    clean-up operations and delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies.
    These efforts reduced suffering and sped recovery in the affected
    communities. Community outreach programs develop personal relationships
    that increase understanding and appreciation for United States Forces
    Korea.
        In addition to these one-on-one programs, I've established new
    channels of communication with South Korean community leaders,
    nongovernmental organizations, media representatives and concerned
    citizens. The Commander's Korea Advisory Council provides a venue for
    military and community leaders to help with our efforts to positively
    influence the Alliance. Unit commanders have established hot lines to
    receive and address issues of concern to the South Korean people. We
    are also educating local civic leaders about provisions of Status of
    Forces Agreement, improved safety programs, and Land Partnership Plan
    implementation. We are now developing a Korean language web site to
    provide command information to the South Korean public.
        Because of our high annual personnel turnover, Eighth United States
    Army has instituted a cultural awareness program called ``New Horizons
    Day.'' New Horizons Day teaches our service members and civilian
    employees about Korean culture, safety, risk mitigation, and command
    policies on appropriate off-duty behavior. New Horizons Day reinforces
    our efforts to improve understanding of the close ties that are the
    foundation of the Alliance.
        We have begun the process of re-defining the Republic of Korea-
    United States Alliance. In December 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
    and Minister of Defense Lee, Joon agreed to conduct a Future of the
    Alliance Policy Initiative to guide Alliance transformation. The Future
    of the Alliance Policy Initiative--jointly led by the United States
    Office of the Secretary of Defense and Republic of Korea's Ministry of
    National Defense--will focus on future roles, missions, functions,
    structure, and stationing in the Alliance; combined transformation and
    modernization; and the role for the Alliance after reconciliation.
    These policy discussions will ensure the Alliance has the right balance
    for the future.
        The defense ministers also directed the Republic of Korea-United
    States Military Committee develop new operational concepts for combined
    operations. These operational concepts take advantage of new military
    technologies and lessons from other theaters to implement an effects-
    based warfighting structure. Using the lessons of Millennium Challenge
    02 we will implement the systems needed to make these concepts a
    reality. We are rapidly revising our contingency plans to achieve rapid
    decisive maneuver and simultaneous engagement throughout the
    battlespace. These initiatives increase our ability to defeat the North
    Korean threat and to transform the command.
    Transformation of the Command
        We must prepare today to shape the uncertain future in Northeast
    Asia. My transformation vision is the core of an enhanced Alliance and
    ensures our ability to provide security throughout the region. As we
    conduct the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative with the United
    States Office of the Secretary of Defense and Republic of Korea's
    Ministry of National Defense, we will closely examine how to make the
    command structure more efficient, modernize our capabilities, and
    develop a future regionally capable combined force that can protect
    Korea and conduct regional security missions. This vision is achievable
    in the near to mid-term and we're on the right path to making it
    reality.
        The Land Partnership Program, ratified by the Republic of Korea's
    National Assembly in November 2002, is a great foundation for
    transformation. LPP is a plan that returns 50 percent of United States
    Forces Korea installations to the Republic of Korea government and
    consolidates United States Forces Korea into 23 centralized
    installations. What's most important about Land Partnership Plan is its
    flexibility to accommodate future changes in force structure, command
    arrangements, and basing. In addition to the Land Partnership Program,
    we are conducting a combined Republic of Korea-United States Initial
    Master Plan to reduce United States presence in Seoul. This study will
    identify the needed facilities and a less intrusive location for our
    units currently stationed in Seoul.
    Make Korea ``The Assignment of Choice''
        Today, Korea remains the least desirable assignment for all
    services, largely because of family separation, poor living and working
    conditions, and financial hardship. Improving housing conditions, re-
    capitalizing the infrastructure, and correcting the pay disparity will
    create an ``irreversible momentum'' in making Korea an assignment of
    choice.
        To reduce family separation in Korea, I want to provide command-
    sponsored housing for at least 25 percent of our married military
    members and their families by 2010. We currently provide government
    owned and leased housing for less than 10 percent of our married
    service members, far less than the 70 percent in Europe and Japan. I
    plan to station the vast majority of our families south of the greater
    Seoul metropolitan area. To accomplish these goals, we must increase
    our housing and support leasing authorities to 15 years. This will make
    the programs attractive to South Korean construction companies and
    create a ``build-to-lease'' market in the Republic of Korea. With
    stable Military Construction funding levels, increased leasing
    authority, and Host Nation Funded Construction under the Land
    Partnership Program, we can afford this initiative to improve living
    and working conditions in the Republic of Korea.
        With your support, we are continuing to improve accompanied housing
    with phased renovation of family housing units. In fiscal year 2004, we
    will start the second phase of a three-phased housing project that will
    add housing for 111 more families at Osan air base. We began these
    efforts 2 years ago and we continue to make progress on this important
    initiative.
        Even with your great support to housing last year ($185.3 million),
    over 40 percent of our unaccompanied service members live in inadequate
    quarters; many in buildings erected shortly after the end of the Korean
    War. Because of overcrowding and sub-standard facilities, many
    unaccompanied personnel must live in dense urban areas outside our
    installations, creating force protection concerns and requiring our
    service men and women to pay high out-of-pocket living expenses. We
    have a plan to provide unaccompanied enlisted service members with
    quality housing by 2008, as mandated by the Department of Defense. The
    Air Force Dormitory Master Plan and Army Barracks Upgrade and Buyout
    Plan allow us to use funds where they are most needed for renovation
    and new construction. The Fiscal Year 2004 Military Construction
    program requests three Army dormitory complexes and another Air Force
    dormitory that will significantly reduce housing deficiencies. Your
    continued commitment to stable Military Construction will have a major
    impact on correcting the housing shortage our service men and women
    endure in Korea.
        Deteriorating work facilities impair readiness, reduce the
    efficiency of uniformed and civilian workers, and lower retention rates
    of highly qualified and otherwise motivated people. Our facilities and
    infrastructure are old--over one third of all buildings in the command
    are between 25 and 50 years old, and one third are classified as
    temporary buildings. We are working hard to maintain existing permanent
    facilities through an aggressive Sustainment, Restoration, and
    Maintenance program funded with Operations and Maintenance accounts.
        Environmental stewardship is important to me personally and to the
    command. Our most immediate environmental concern is the command's
    aging fuel tanks. We are continuing to work through challenges with
    environmental protection and mitigation programs. Although there have
    been improvements in the last 2 years, more needs to be done with
    environmental project funding in 2004. Environmental requirements have
    been integrated into military construction and Sustainment,
    Restoration, and Maintenance funding. These resources will be wisely
    invested in our enduring installations under the Land Partnership Plan.
        The final element of making Korea an assignment of choice lies in
    correcting the pay disparity between serving in Korea and equally harsh
    shorter tours in southwest Asia and the Balkans. Our service members
    are motivated by more than money; however, financial hardship and low
    morale are clearly linked. An Army Sergeant serving a 6-month tour in
    Bosnia receives $500 more per month than one of his or her peers
    serving a 12-month unaccompanied tour in Korea. Additionally, our men
    and women pay significant out of pocket costs to maintain a second
    household in Korea, where cost of living expenses exceed those in San
    Francisco and Frankfurt, without the benefit of a cost of living
    allowance. We are participating in a Department of Defense study to
    explore possible solutions such as separate rations, additional
    hardship duty pay, a cost of living allowance, and distributed
    incentive pay. We are also exploring other initiatives to reduce
    financial inequities, such as expanding the Overseas Tour Extension
    Incentive Plan, implementing Assignment Pay Initiative, and
    implementing partial Basic Allowance for Housing to compensate for sub
    standard housing, but we need your support to make these initiatives a
    reality for our service men and women.
    In conclusion, I'd like to leave you with these thoughts:
        Northeast Asia is a key region for the United States and our
    partners. We must maintain our presence in the region to demonstrate
    our commitment to ensure peace and security in the region.
    Congressional support is vital to our future in Korea and Northeast
    Asia. We thank you for all that you've done.
        Events in Korea affect the entire world. North Korea's aggressive
    posture and continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction pose
    serious danger to the peace, security, and prosperity of the peninsula
    and the region. It has substantial military capability and is selling
    high technology missiles to the highest bidder. North Korea continues
    to violate its agreements and extort aid from the international
    community. North Korea's renewed efforts to develop nuclear weapons
    pose a formidable threat to the world. North Korea is a threat to
    Northeast Asia and all peace-loving nations. It is a threat that
    requires a strong Republic of Korea Alliance, a robust forward United
    States military presence, and an active international domestic effort.
        The Republic of Korea-United States Alliance has weathered
    challenges for over 50 years, and this partnership will continue to
    endure. Now is the time to transform this alliance to meet the changing
    conditions in the region. We need your support to implement our
    transformation vision.
        You can be justifiably proud of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
    marines, and civilians in Korea that serve the American people. Their
    daily dedication and performance reflect the trust and support that
    you've placed in them.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
        General Hill.

       STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. HILL, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
                     UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

        General Hill. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished
    members of the committee: I am honored for this opportunity to
    appear before you today. I greatly appreciate the support of
    the committee for the United States Southern Command and the
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, and
    civilian personnel who I am so privileged to command.
        These men and women are performing in an absolutely
    outstanding manner. I have seen Special Forces trainers in the
    remote regions of Colombia, Reserve medics exercising their
    skills by bringing medical attention for the first time to
    villages in Belize, airmen conducting detection and monitoring
    missions over the source zone in the Andean region, and sailors
    and coast guardsmen conducting interdiction operations in the
    Caribbean.
        I am grateful and continually inspired by their selfless
    dedication and unwavering pride in serving our great country. I
    have also been inspired by the dedication of Colombian soldiers
    in their daily fight to defend Colombian democracy against
    vicious narcoterrorists and in their efforts to rescue three
    American citizens. The Colombian military has sustained deaths
    in their continued attempt to rescue these Americans.
        Since taking command 7 months ago, I have traveled
    extensively throughout the region, to include nine visits to
    Colombia. These visits have provided me important insights to
    the region, its leaders, the challenges, and, equally
    important, opportunities that lie before us in Latin America
    and the Caribbean.
        The expectations derived from democratic and free market
    reforms, seemingly so available at the close of the last
    century, are not being realized at the dawn of this one. This,
    along with economic stagnation and endemic corruption, are
    significantly challenging many of the hemisphere's fledgling
    democracies.
        Latin America and the Caribbean is an increasingly
    important region to the United States. We have strong and
    growing economic, strategic, security, and cultural ties to the
    region. On the negative side, nearly all of the cocaine and
    much of the heroin consumed in our country comes from this
    region, significantly contributing to the 19,000 deaths caused
    by drugs last year.
        The threats to security and to stability in the region do
    not come from warring or antagonistic countries or neighbors.
    Overall, the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
    generally have friendly relations. In fact, it is the least
    militarized region of the world. The threats instead come from
    destabilizing and corrupting influences of international
    terrorism, narcoterrorism, illegal drugs, arms trafficking, and
    rampant crime.
        Although nowhere are these transnational threats more
    graphically and brutally active than in Colombia, they have
    pervasively and corrosively spread throughout all regions of
    Latin America and the Caribbean. We therefore cannot focus our
    efforts exclusively on Colombia, and we in Southern Command are
    not. Fortunately, there is a growing recognition among the
    region's leaders that the problems emanating from, but not
    restricted to, Colombia are regional and require a regional
    solution.
        In fact, just yesterday the Andean Ridge countries' foreign
    ministers and ministers of defense, meeting in Colombia, signed
    an understanding to increase regional cooperation and
    information-sharing to coordinate their efforts along their
    borders to combat narcoterrorists and the flow of drugs. This
    move toward regional cooperation is a very important one and
    one that we have been pursuing vigorously.
        As I mentioned in my written statement for the record, I am
    proud to say that the men and women of the United States
    Southern Command do a great deal to further our Nation's
    interests in this hemisphere with very few resources and a
    modest presence. We are, however, at a critical point where the
    progress in eliminating conflict, reducing tension, and
    establishing democracy throughout the region could be at risk
    if we are not steadfast in our efforts. The continued progress
    as a region of democracy and prosperity is of paramount
    importance, I believe, to our national security.
        I thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Hill follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Gen. James T. Hill, USA

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, it is a
    pleasure to appear before you today to present the United States
    Southern Command's current posture statement. I am honored to have the
    opportunity to highlight the important contributions the men and women
    of our command are making to the war on terrorism. These soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, members of the Coast Guard, and our civilians
    are working in virtually every nation in the region to promote U.S.
    national security interests. Their work has done much to preserve
    stability and strengthen relationships with our allies.
        Since taking command 7 months ago, I have traveled extensively
    throughout the region and have witnessed the mounting challenges facing
    regional leaders and their people. The expectations derived from
    popular elections and free market reforms, seemingly so achievable at
    the close of the last century, are not being realized at the dawn of
    this one. Economic stagnation, endemic corruption, and unprecedented
    challenges to sovereignty by international terrorists, narcoterrorists,
    and drugs, arms, and human trafficking organizations threaten many of
    the hemisphere's fledgling democracies. Without sustained international
    support, some of these democracies could collapse, signaling the return
    of authoritarian regimes that respect neither human rights nor
    democratic principles. Today, I will outline the United States Southern
    Command's priorities in the hemisphere and the impact of what we do, or
    fail to do, on our own national security. The strategic importance of
    the hemisphere, the war on terrorism, and our interests in Colombia
    remain central.

                            IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION

        The nations of our hemisphere are largely at peace with each other
    and have foresworn the development of weapons of mass destruction.
    Indeed, the regional nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of Tlatlelolco,
    is one of the most successful in history. Military spending on a per
    capita basis is lower in Latin America than anywhere else in the world.
    There are many cultural, economic, and political reasons to suggest
    that U.S.-Latin relationships should be increasingly important, yet
    world events keep U.S. security policy focused appropriately in other
    directions.
        The region is the number one source of new Americans as more than
    34 million residents in the U.S. are of Latin origin. Latin Americans
    are the largest and fastest growing minority group in the country and
    by 2050 are projected to comprise one quarter of the U.S. population.
    Their growing numbers are having a profound influence on our society
    and culture.
        Our economic and strategic ties to Latin America and the Caribbean
    have never been stronger. The region provides over 31 percent of our
    imported oil, more than all Middle Eastern countries combined. The
    volatility of the Middle East makes the availability of oil supplies
    from Latin America and the Caribbean all the more critical. The U.S.
    conducts more than $360 billion of annual trade with Latin America and
    the Caribbean, nearly as much as with the entire European Community. By
    the year 2010, trade with Latin America is expected to exceed that with
    the European Economic Community and Japan combined. This exchange
    translates into millions of American jobs and businesses linked to this
    region. As our recently negotiated Free Trade Agreement with Chile
    shows, these links will only grow as we progress toward the president's
    vision of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas. Latin America is also
    critical to the global environment as the Amazon Basin produces 20
    percent of the world's freshwater runoff and 25 percent of the world's
    oxygen. Also, 25 percent of United States pharmaceuticals are derived
    from sources in this same area.
        During the past 25 years, Latin American and Caribbean nations have
    emerged from limited democracies and dictatorial regimes to democracies
    governed by elected civilian leaders that have increased respect human
    rights and control their military forces. This transformation is in no
    small measure a result of Southern Command's ongoing engagement and
    security cooperation activities. Such activities now include military
    operations in support of the war on terrorism; counterdrug operations;
    military training and exercises; and professionalization of the
    region's militaries emphasizing the role of the military in a
    democratic society, respect for human rights, and the protection of
    civil liberties.
        The true test of a nation's democracy and military professionalism,
    however, is how well that nation endures crisis. Many Latin American
    and Caribbean nations are currently experiencing political, economic,
    and social crises, and never before have their militaries demonstrated
    such restraint and support for their elected civilian leadership.
        While much is going right in the region, there still is much that
    is discouraging. Millions of Latin Americans remain mired in poverty,
    living in urban slums or neglected rural areas with crumbling
    infrastructure, inadequate sanitation, little access to proper health
    care, and perhaps most tragically, minimal educational opportunities
    for their children. Some telling statistics illustrate the magnitude of
    the economic crisis now facing the region. According to the United
    Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC), 214
    million people in the region, 44 percent of the population, live below
    the poverty level. Seven million people were added to the ranks of the
    poor in 2002, and 20 percent of the region's population is unable to
    provide for even their most basic food needs. Developmental assistance
    and international investment are inhibited by the lack of security in
    the region. These figures illustrate in very real terms the enormous
    challenges faced by our democratic allies in the region.
        In recent years, economic desperation and volatile social
    environments in the hemisphere have set the conditions for the
    proliferation of international terrorism, narcoterrorism, illegal
    drugs, and arms trafficking. This is the crux of my concern and my
    responsibility. Unless and until Latin American and Caribbean
    governments can provide both security and stability and a reasonable
    opportunity for positive change in the lives of their citizens, these
    activities will continue to fester and grow and the foundations of
    democracy could crumble under the weight of these transnational
    threats.

                                    THREATS

    Terrorism in the Region
        The war on terrorism is our number one priority. The events of
    September 11, 2001, provided a cruel and graphic illustration of the
    evils of terrorists and their ability to attack at a time and place of
    their choosing. The recent El Nogal nightclub bombing in Bogota,
    Colombia, in which at least 35 people were killed and 173 wounded is
    just one example of the incessant terrorist attacks in that country.
    Last year's bombing outside the U.S. Embassy in Peru by the Shining
    Path is an indication that terrorist groups in the region are
    deliberately targeting U.S. citizens and interests. Economic
    deprivation, political instability, rampant corruption, drug
    trafficking, and paralyzed judicial systems are breeding grounds for
    terrorists and coupled with Latin America's proximity to the U.S.,
    increase our vulnerability to attack from the southern approaches to
    our homeland.
        To complement Homeland Security efforts and seal the seams through
    which terrorists infiltrate, we must take comprehensive measures in our
    region to combat international terrorism. To effectively prosecute the
    war on terrorism, we must have the authority to use our assets and
    subordinate commands to assist partner nations interdict those illicit
    activities that support terrorists throughout our area of
    responsibility. To strengthen capabilities, build coalitions, and
    ensure our allies can effectively defeat terrorist activities within
    their borders, we must continue to provide partner nation security
    forces with equipment and continue to train with them in bilateral and
    multilateral exercises. Promoting security and effective border defense
    in every nation of our area of responsibility denies terrorists
    operating locations, support structures, freedom of movement, and the
    financial underpinnings from drug trafficking for their destructive
    activities.
        International terrorists and narcoterrorists, fueled by drug and
    arms traffickers, menace our region. While the primary front in the war
    on terrorism currently lies elsewhere, Southern Command plays an
    important supporting role. Radical Islamic groups operating out of the
    region use the profits from drug, human, and arms trafficking, false
    documentation, and other illicit activities in our hemisphere to fund
    their worldwide operations. The narcoterrorist organizations operating
    primarily out of Colombia are spreading their reach throughout the
    region, wreaking havoc, and destabilizing legitimate governments. It is
    these organizational networks that remain our focus.
        Middle Eastern based terrorist groups to include Hamas, Hizballah
    and Islamiyya al Gammat have networks and support structures throughout
    the region. These cells, extending from South America through Central
    America and the Caribbean, consist not only of logistics and support
    personnel, but also of terrorists who have participated in attacks in
    the Middle East. Radical Islamic supporters have long gathered in areas
    such as the Tri-border region between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina,
    known for its deep links to a full range of transnational criminal
    activities. Similarly, we continue to be concerned by possible
    activities of radical Islamic groups on Margarita Island in Venezuela
    and Maicao, Colombia. Precise estimates of the amount of money diverted
    from the region to radical Islamic groups are difficult to determine
    due to the illicit nature of the activity, however, the figures are
    likely in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
        In the Tri-border area, a raid in the fall of 2001, on the business
    of a local Hizballah leader revealed terrorist training videos and
    audiotapes extolling the virtues of Jihad. He admitted having ties to
    businesses in Miami, New York, Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay--leaving
    open the question of his involvement in terrorist efforts to penetrate
    the United States or pass money to terrorist groups.
        Last year, Paraguay arrested and tried several important Islamic
    radicals. Hizballah financial chief, Sohbi Fayad, was convicted on
    charges of tax evasion and local extremist, Ali Dahrough, is awaiting
    trial. Paraguay awaits the extradition of Hizballah Tri-border chief,
    Assad Barakat, from Brazil to face similar charges. These actions
    against convicted and alleged terrorists, and those who support them,
    produce important disruptions of terrorists' networks.
        Similar efforts are needed throughout the region to neutralize the
    Islamic radical structure while upholding the rights of law-abiding
    Muslims. Building coalitions, training, equipping forces, and improving
    capabilities will enable allies to significantly reduce their
    ungoverned spaces and gain greater control of their borders. These
    efforts produce skills, which are tested in U.S. sponsored multilateral
    exercises that promote security, improve effective border control, deny
    terrorists safe havens, and restrict their ability to operate.
        Narcoterrorism is most pervasive in Colombia where citizens suffer
    daily from murder, bombings, kidnappings, and lawlessness. However,
    narcoterrorism is spreading increasingly throughout the region.
    Narcoterrorist groups are involved in kidnappings in Panama, Venezuela,
    Ecuador and Paraguay. They smuggle weapons and drugs in Brazil,
    Suriname, Guyana, Mexico, and Peru, are making inroads in Bolivia, and
    use the same routes and infrastructure for drugs, arms, illegal aliens
    and other illicit activities. The narcoterrorists are very well
    financed by their involvement in every aspect of drug cultivation and
    production, kidnapping, and extortion. These drug-fueled terrorist
    groups with their ideologically appealing names--the Revolutionary
    Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC, the National Liberation Army or ELN,
    and the United Defense Forces or AUC--directly attack the legitimate
    authority of the Colombian government. Ideology is no longer the moving
    force it once was for these organizations. Today, they are motivated by
    money, and power, and protecting, and sustaining themselves through
    drug trafficking and terror. The arrest last year in Houston, Texas of
    an AUC operative arranging an exchange of $25 million worth of drugs
    for arms is a clear indication of the symbiotic relationship among
    terrorists, drugs, and arms traffickers. The re-emergence of the
    Shining Path in Peru is being fueled by their involvement in the drug
    trade.
        Narcoterrorism also negatively impacts the environment. Over 4
    million hectares of rain forest have been destroyed in order to plant
    coca. Forty eight thousand metric tons of precursor chemicals used in
    coca production per year, are dumped into the environment. Terrorist
    pipeline attacks have spilled 3 million gallons of oil, the equivalent
    of 12 Exxon Valdez's.
    Drug Trafficking
        Underlying all of this is the illegal drug industry--a scourge that
    constantly threatens the sovereignty, stability, and rule of law in
    Latin America and the Caribbean. Drug traffickers generate violence,
    foster crime, fuel gangs, and corrupt public institutions. The Drug
    Enforcement Administration believes that a substantial number of
    foreign terrorist organizations are trafficking in large amounts of
    narcotics--six of these organizations are operating in this hemisphere.
    In addition to all three of the Colombian terrorist groups, the Shining
    Path, Jama'at Al Musilmeen, and Hizballah generate revenues through the
    drug trafficking business.
        According to the Office of the National Drug Control Policy
    (ONDCP), over 19,000 Americans die annually from drug-induced causes.
    This constitutes, in my mind, a weapon of mass destruction. If we
    define national security as the safety and well being of our citizenry,
    illegal drugs must be considered a major national security concern.
        Narcotrafficking not only threatens the security of the United
    States, but also the survival of democratic allies in the region
    through unabated violence, terror, and corruption, while forcing these
    countries to devote precious resources to address these problems.
    Additionally, as traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in
    the transit countries, transit nations become drug consumers as well.
    Brazil provides an illustration of how such an evolution can occur; it
    is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world behind the
    United States. While partner nations are willing to work with us to
    develop regional approaches to counter the production and trafficking
    of illegal drugs, effective and sustainable counterdrug operations
    severely test the capabilities of their thinly stretched security
    forces.
    Arms Trafficking
        A nearly unchecked flow of illegal arms throughout the region poses
    another serious threat to the security of several nations and
    exacerbates terrorist violence throughout the region. Many of these
    arms are leftover from the region's civil wars, while others are from
    former Soviet bloc countries or even purchased legally in the United
    States. They are then shipped through the region's porous borders
    destined to the terrorist organizations in Colombia or gangs elsewhere,
    often in exchange for drugs. Arms traffickers use a variety of land,
    maritime, and air routes that often mirror drug and human trafficking
    routes.

                              REGIONAL ASSESSMENTS

    Andean Region
        Colombians suffer daily from a level of violence and terror
    practically unimaginable to us. In this war-torn country, a decades-old
    conflict waged by narcoterrorists and fueled by illicit drug money
    continues unabated, claiming thousands of lives. More than 1.5 million
    Colombians have been displaced from their homes by war, terror, and
    violence. Last year there were more terrorist attacks in Colombia--an
    average of four per day--than in all other nations of the world
    combined. Colombia has the highest homicide rate in the world. Last
    year more than 28,000 Colombians were murdered--13 times the U.S.
    rate--making homicide the most likely cause of death. More than 2,900
    Colombians were kidnapped, also the highest rate in the world. Violence
    has become so endemic that a Colombian company now specializes in
    bulletproof vests for children.
        Many familiar with Colombia's conflict romantically describe the
    illegal groups as ``revolutionaries,'' ``guerrillas,'' or ``rebels.''
    These terms are inaccurate and out of date. The FARC, ELN, and AUC,
    directly challenge the legitimate authority of the Colombian
    Government, yet offer no alternative form of government. Simply put,
    these are narcoterrorists who profit at the expense of Colombia and its
    people.
        All three of these groups target elected government officials and
    the civilian population with their brutal attacks. International human
    rights groups have publicly denounced the massacres, assassinations,
    political kidnappings, forced displacements, and forced recruitment of
    minors by all three groups. Human rights groups have also denounced the
    FARC's use of illegal weapons to attack protected sites and civilian
    institutions such as the May 2002 battle between the FARC and AUC, in
    which a FARC mortar fell attack on a church in Bojaya, killing more
    than 100 people, many of them children. The FARC's latest innovation of
    forcing kidnapped individuals to drive bomb-laden cars on suicide
    missions represents yet another step in the downward spiral toward the
    terrorists' total disregard for the sanctity of human life. Attempting
    to protect Colombians from this lawlessness is a paralyzed judicial
    system in which 97 percent of crimes go unpunished and three million
    cases remain backlogged.
        In the face of these enormous challenges, President Alvaro Uribe is
    vigorously proceeding with changes to reform the nation's political and
    legal systems, promote socio-economic development, protect human
    rights, provide help to displaced persons, enlarge and professionalize
    the security forces, and combat narcoterrorism. I have traveled to
    Colombia nine times and am impressed by President Uribe and his strong
    and principled team's determination to defeat the forces that are
    ripping his country apart.
        President Uribe's initiatives are solidly supported by internal
    control and legislative measures designed to hold military members
    responsible for their own actions. Education and training initiatives,
    including human rights training implemented by the Colombian Ministry
    of Defense, have produced some of the best-trained and most
    professional military personnel in Colombia's history. Allegations of
    human rights violations by the military have dropped to less than 2
    percent of all allegations, and today the Colombian military is one of
    the most respected organizations in the nation.
        Colombia remains the world's leading producer of cocaine and
    accounts for 90 percent of the U.S. supply. Furthermore, we are seeing
    a surge in poppy cultivation and heroin production in Colombia. While
    Colombia's heroin production is a modest eight metric tons per year,
    virtually all of it is smuggled into the U.S.
        Although it has the political will to fight drug traffickers,
    Ecuador remains a significant transshipment country for illicit drugs
    and is the country most vulnerable to spillover from Colombia. Economic
    limitations and security concerns hamper Ecuador's ability to
    strengthen border control operations. Ecuador is host to one of the
    Southern Command's Forward Operating Locations (FOL) in Manta. The FOL
    has proven to be an effective launch site and critical element in our
    source zone counterdrug operations. This FOL provides coverage in the
    eastern Pacific where we have seen the greatest increase in drug
    smuggling activity. Runway improvement, construction of living
    quarters, and maintenance facility projects were completed in 2002.
    Continued infrastructure improvement will ensure the airfield meets
    U.S. operations and safety standards. Manta's substantial contributions
    to counterdrug efforts will become even more valuable with the
    resumption of the Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia. The
    effectiveness of the Air Bridge Denial Program is unquestionable. The
    incorporation of additional safety measures will facilitate the
    resumption of this program, which will improve our ability to assist
    Colombia in its efforts to interdict the flow of illegal drugs.
        Venezuela continues to deteriorate with its declining per capita
    income, financial crisis, increased instability, violence, and crime.
    Despite this political and societal crisis, the U.S.-Venezuelan
    military contacts continue with Venezuelan military students attending
    U.S. schools. We have a longstanding institutional relationship with
    the Venezuelan military and will continue to pursue common security
    concerns, as long as the military remains within its constitutional
    authority.
    Caribbean
        In the Caribbean the primary challenge comes from narcotrafficking
    and the corruption that accompanies it. With the exception of Haiti,
    democratic institutions remain relatively stable but the police and
    security forces are often overwhelmed or outgunned by the resources of
    drug traffickers and others engaging in illicit activity. The
    significant economic slowdown in the Caribbean provides a fertile
    environment for the corruption of government and security personnel as
    well as the proliferation of drug trafficking and other illicit
    activities. To meet these challenges regional governments are
    attempting to focus on cooperative efforts such as the Regional
    Security System (RSS) and CARICOM. There is a growing understanding
    among Caribbean leaders that leveraging each other's limited resources
    is the only way to deal with the threats they face. Our efforts are
    focused on supporting these cooperative approaches.
        Haiti stands out in the area of responsibility for its total
    political and economic paralysis. The government has refused to
    implement both the economic and political reforms essential for
    garnering vital support from the international community. Without
    fundamental changes in both the political and economic sphere, Haiti
    will continue to stagnate.
        A key element of our efforts in the Caribbean is the uniquely
    focused Tradewinds exercise. Conducted annually, Tradewinds exercise
    objectives focus on combating transnational threats, counter drug
    operations, and disaster preparedness. This year's exercise will
    consist of two phases hosted respectively by Jamaica and Barbados.
    Central America
        We are at a unique point in time in Central America, with most of
    the region's political and military leaders dedicated to overcoming
    historical border differences and tensions in order to pursue regional
    economic and military integration. Southern Command has a long history
    of providing security cooperation to Central American nations with a
    regional focus on disaster response, humanitarian and civic assistance,
    demining, peacekeeping, and counterdrug operations. Arms trafficking,
    originating with arms left over from the civil wars of the 1980s not
    only threaten this region but flow southward to Colombia. This region
    is also a primary avenue for illegal migrants and drugs entering the
    United States. Especially troublesome is the situation in Guatemala.
    The administration has proven to be an unreliable partner in countering
    drug trafficking and according to the Inter-American Commission on
    Human Rights, there were more than 100 attacks against human rights
    workers in Guatemala last year.
        Central America is therefore key to our counterdrug and counter
    terrorist efforts, which include regional operations to strengthen
    capabilities and foster cooperation within nations of the region. We
    are working more closely with the Organization of Central American
    Armed Forces (CFAC) to promote military integration and cooperation in
    maintaining regional security. El Salvador provides Southern Command
    the use of Comalapa Airport as a Forward Operating Location for
    counterdrug coverage throughout Central America, the eastern Pacific,
    and the western Caribbean. Joint Task Force Bravo in Honduras continues
    to provide a logistical support base to the critical humanitarian
    missions of the region, as well as counterdrug operations through
    support of Central Skies exercises.
    Southern Cone
        Military-to-military engagement in the Southern Cone remains
    strong. Argentina remains in the grip of economic crisis. Recent
    estimates indicate that 19 million, or 53 percent of Argentines are
    living below the poverty line. In the midst of this crisis, the
    Argentine military remains a strong partner for the U.S. in the region
    and has carved out a useful role in U.N. peacekeeping operations and
    support for the war on terrorism. Argentine military leaders strongly
    support democracy and the constitution and serve as a voice of
    restraint and respect for the democratic process. Southern Command
    continues its military-to-military contact program with the Argentinean
    Armed Forces and expects this sustained cooperation will continue in
    the future.
        Crime in Brazil, especially urban gang violence, remains a serious
    problem, and President ``Lula'' da Silva faces challenges from illicit
    drug and arms traffickers. Thus far, cooperation with the new Brazilian
    administration and the Brazilian military continues seamlessly.
        Despite regional economic difficulties, Chile's economy remains on
    firm footing and offers appreciated stability in the Southern Cone.
    Transparency International rates Chile as one of the least corrupt
    nations in the world. The United States has recognized this by
    concluding a Free Trade Agreement with Chile, the first nation in the
    region after Mexico. We look forward to a growing and cooperative
    relationship with Chile and its armed forces.

                                WAR ON TERRORISM

        As mentioned earlier, terrorists throughout the region bomb,
    murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, and smuggle arms among other illicit
    activities. Southern Command trains, equips and builds allied nation
    capabilities to confront terrorists, control borders, deny safe havens,
    and prevent terrorists from operating with impunity. Interagency
    cooperation, improving Colombian military capabilities, conducting
    detention operations, the use of expanded authority, and security
    cooperation are among the tools we employ. With the inextricable link
    between terrorists, drugs, and arms trafficking, counterdrug and arms
    interdiction operations are critical to our efforts. Joint Interagency
    Task Force-East (JIATF-E) is integral to our operations.
    Inter Agency Cooperation
        JIATF-East began as an interagency coordinator of maritime
    counterdrug operations in the transit zone. Today, after merging with
    JIATF-S, collocating in Key West, Florida, assuming responsibility for
    the source zone, and adding international members to their staff,
    JIATF-East provides planning assistance for counterdrug operations in
    response to U.S. country teams throughout the region. Transit zone
    operations may or may not involve U.S. forces, but our forces do
    participate in planning operations supported by the U.S.
        Responding to Secretary Rumsfeld's guidance to participate in a
    Joint Interagency Coordination Group, Southern Command meets monthly to
    focus on the war on terrorism with representatives from the Department
    of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of State, Department
    of Homeland Security, and Department of Defense. The Joint Interagency
    Coordination Group is also a venue for sharing intelligence and
    effectively coordinating our regional counterterrorism efforts.
    Andean Counterdrug Initiative
        The Andean Counterdrug Initiative, a complement to Plan Colombia,
    concentrates on the region rather than on Colombia alone. Success in
    Colombia could produce a spillover into neighboring countries that may
    not be prepared to deal with the consequences. These countries remain
    transshipment points for arms, drugs, and precursor chemicals entering
    and exiting Colombia. While success in Colombia is essential, we cannot
    risk winning the battle in Colombia and losing the war in the region.
    The Andean Counterdrug Initiative is intended to contain the effects of
    spillover and, to a lesser degree, sustain the success of Plan
    Colombia.
    Improving Colombia's Military Capabilities
        Southern Command assistance programs are intended to help Colombia
    develop the capabilities to solve their security problems and diminish
    the U.S. in-theatre role. Military training of Colombian units that are
    vetted for human rights abuses is key to realizing success on the
    battlefield. The training of the Counter Narcotics Brigade and the
    establishment and training of a Commando Battalion to pursue enemy
    leadership have already produced results.
        U.S. Special Forces have also been training Colombian Armed Forces
    in Arauca as part of an infrastructure security strategy to protect a
    portion of the 772-kilometer pipeline and other critical infrastructure
    points, that have been frequent targets of terrorist attacks. This
    training will enable Colombia to protect remote narcoterrorist
    influenced areas of the countryside where the pipeline is located. The
    oil carried by the pipeline represents annual revenues of about $500
    million for the Colombian Government. The loss of this revenue
    seriously undermines Colombia's fiscal health and the attacks create
    considerable environmental and ecological damage.
    Detention Operations
        In addition to its work in Central and South America, Southern
    Command has directly and actively supported the war on terrorism by
    establishing a terrorist detention and intelligence operations facility
    at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in January 2002. Intelligence operations at
    Guantanamo have provided critical information regarding terrorist
    organizations' leadership, planned attacks, potential attacks, and
    other specific information that has already thwarted terrorist
    activities. As Guantanamo operations continue, we will improve
    intelligence exploitation, collection and dissemination, and establish
    more permanent facilities to provide servicemembers a better quality of
    life.
        We combined Joint Task Force 160 and 170 to form Joint Task Force
    Guantanamo, achieving unity of command and ensuring improved
    coordination between the intelligence collection mission and camp
    operations. Detainees continue to receive medical care, three meals
    daily that meet Muslim dietary laws, clothing, permanent shelter,
    showers, and humane treatment consistent with the provisions of the
    Geneva Convention.
    Expanded Authority
        The Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2002 and the Fiscal Year
    2003 Defense Appropriations Act included provisions to use counterdrug
    assets for non-counterdrug missions within these respective years. The
    granting of expanded authority for operations was an important
    recognition that it is impossible to separate the drug threat from the
    threat to security and stability raised by terrorist organizations such
    as the FARC, ELN, and AUC. Operations are more efficient and effective
    because the same assets are used to confront terrorists as well as drug
    traffickers. We can now share more intelligence with Colombia, and they
    can use counterdrug-funded assets in the combined campaign against
    terrorists and drug production and trafficking. A great example of
    success as a result of expanded authority is the killing of the FARC's
    15th Front Commander by the Colombian military utilizing U.S. provided
    UH-1 helicopters flown by Colombian pilots.
    Security Cooperation
        Southern Command's security cooperation activities expand United
    States influence, assure friends, and dissuade potential adversaries.
    The overarching goals are to promote regional security and stability
    through training, equipping, and developing allied security force
    capabilities that improve competence and professionalism while
    underscoring respect for human rights.
        Command programs are also intended to strengthen respect for the
    rule of law, civilian control of the military, and support for
    democratic ideals. We do this not only because it is in tune with the
    highest values of the American people, but also because it is a
    strategic, operational, and tactical necessity. Security forces must
    enjoy the trust and confidence of their people before they can be
    effective. Only by respecting the law and the dignity of all the
    citizens they are sworn to defend, can security forces hope to gain the
    respect of those they protect.
        We annually coordinate and direct more than 30 legal engagement
    activities among military counterparts, regional governments, and non-
    government organizations. Specific accomplishments include the creation
    of a legal corps, reform of military justice codes and procedures,
    human rights and law of war education, and the inclusion of military
    lawyers in the planning and execution of military operations. Nowhere
    are the positive results of these efforts more apparent than in
    Colombia where the people now hold their military in high esteem.
        Complementing this training are disaster relief programs that teach
    militaries how to respond to their civilian authorities when disasters
    occur. Fuerzas Aliadas is the cornerstone of this program and will be
    hosted by Nicaragua this year. More than 20 nations will participate,
    including our regional partners, Canada, the United Kingdom, the
    Netherlands, and France.
        Beyond disaster relief, New Horizons exercises provide unique and
    rigorous training opportunities to engineer, medical, and civil affairs
    units. These activities hone U.S. forces' engineering and medical
    skills in a challenging environment, under conditions nearly impossible
    to replicate in the U.S.
        Last year the New Horizon exercises completed 33 engineer projects
    consisting of schools, medical clinics, wells, and rudimentary road
    construction and repair. The 59 humanitarian medical deployments
    treated more than 680,000 patients. During these deployments, our
    veterinary teams treated approximately 67,000 animals in varying
    livestock categories, which contributed significantly to sustaining
    local economic health. Bolivia, Panama, Belize, Dominican Republic,
    Grenada, and St. Kitts will host New Horizons exercises this year.
        The annual naval exercise, UNITAS, is conducted throughout the
    region with significant participation by several countries. This year,
    Ecuador will host the UNITAS Pacific Phase. Argentina is scheduled to
    host UNITAS Cruise 2004 Atlantic Phase in October. An amphibious
    bilateral exercise between the U.S. and Argentina is scheduled for
    September. Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru will each conduct a bi-lateral
    amphibious exercise with participating U.S. forces.
        This year the Central American nations will host several exercises
    to include Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) North that will focus on
    enhancing the peacekeeping skills and capabilities of the 22
    participating nations. All the Central American countries and the
    majority of Caribbean nations will participate. We will also conduct
    PKO SOUTH and Cabanas to strengthen the peacekeeping skills,
    cooperation, and capabilities of the rest of the region's military
    forces.

                                  REQUIREMENTS

        As the war on terrorism progresses we will increasingly pursue
    operations of mutual interest with goals that increase interoperability
    with our allies. We will pool our resources to the extent possible, but
    we foresee additional threats to U.S. security interests that may
    require additional resources or the reprioritization of programmed
    funds, if circumstances warrant. We anticipate Guantanamo's operating
    tempo to increase, additional stress on our theater communications
    architecture, an escalation of detection and monitoring activities, and
    a greater need for interoperability of allied nations that will require
    Foreign Military Financing programs and a renewal of the expanded
    authorities.
    Joint Task Force--Guantanamo
        Long-term operational requirements for JTF-Guantanamo detainee
    operations are necessary to enhance our effectiveness in the war on
    terrorism, but as we continue to improve our mission capabilities there
    will be a cost associated with the progress. Since January 2002,
    Guantanamo has provided, and continues to provide, critical
    intelligence information on worldwide terrorist organizations'
    leadership, planned attacks, potential targets, and other critical
    information that can thwart subversive activities. We anticipate the
    arrival of additional detainees to be secured, screened, held, managed,
    and interrogated for both counterterrorist planning and law enforcement
    purposes. Manpower requirements will also increase to ensure a safe and
    secure facility.
    Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\)
        My next priority deals with enhancing our C\4\ architecture for
    fixed and mobile operations throughout the region as outlined in
    previous testimonies. The current C\4\ infrastructure lacks the
    flexibility to execute the assigned mission due to over reliance on
    inadequate commercial communications systems, limited communications
    bandwidth, and fragmented operations and maintenance support.
    Consequently, Southern Command is unable to effectively and efficiently
    support a counterdrug mission simultaneously with another contingency
    operation such as anti-terrorism, noncombatant evacuation, migrant
    operations, disaster relief, or defense of the Panama Canal.
        Since existing military systems alone are insufficient, it is my
    intention to transform, expand, and maintain a cost-effective,
    efficient, centrally managed, and robust infrastructure that supports
    the Theater Security Cooperation Strategy. This strategy includes
    counter-terrorism operations, regional engagement, crisis response, and
    counterdrug missions. We are partnering with the Defense Information
    Systems Agency and the Department of State's Diplomatic
    Telecommunications Service Program Office to explore commercial
    alternatives such as fiber optic communication links. This effort shows
    promise for improving C\4\ effectiveness throughout the region.
    Detection and Monitoring
        We conduct varied and diverse detection and monitoring (D&M)
    operations that require a high state of readiness and a joint effort to
    link multi-intelligence collectors targeted against strategic,
    operational, and tactical requirements. This melding of organic and
    national collection resources will improve operations and fulfill the
    Quarterly Defense Review Transformation requirement for continuous and
    persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
        Southern Command's role in Operation Enduring Freedom includes the
    employment of national, airborne, ground, and maritime ISR assets that
    are targeted against regional terrorist groups and transnational
    support cells. Their combined products create a common operating
    picture of regional activity that can be shared with our allies as
    appropriate. Successful D&M operations contribute to allied nations'
    defenses against terrorism and promote regional security cooperation.
        Detection and monitoring has eight major programs that are vital to
    our counterdrug campaign plan. These programs include Relocatable Over
    the Horizon Radar (ROTHR), Fleet Support Operations, Maritime Patrol
    Aircraft (MPA), FOLs, JIATF-East, Joint Surveillance and Reconnaissance
    Operations Center (JSSROC), Hemispheric Radar System (HRS), and South
    Air Force Support. These programs, when sufficiently funded, will
    provide a formidable capability to detect and monitor illicit
    trafficking of arms, drugs and other illegal activities that fuel
    terrorist groups. Overall, this capability further provides critical
    information used by the U.S. and host nations to effectively counter
    the expansion of narcoterrorism.
    Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
        Foreign Military Financing fosters cooperative security
    arrangements, and regional initiatives rely on partner nation
    participation. Many nations rely, in turn, on FMF to sustain the kind
    of readiness that effective partnering requires. Latin American and
    Caribbean militaries still have legitimate defense sustainment and
    modernization requirements. As we request more partner nation
    assistance in fighting terrorism and transnational threats, FMF will be
    an important source of their equipping and training efforts. Regional
    militaries require force modernization to be interoperable. Without FMF
    support and adequate national funding, training, and maintenance,
    equipment in Latin American forces continues to deteriorate, which
    degrades allied military readiness, increases the cost of U.S.
    participation, reduces the capability of our hemispheric partners in
    the war on terrorism, and makes military responses to natural disasters
    and humanitarian relief more difficult.
    Expanded Authority
        As previously mentioned, operations today are more efficient and
    effective because the same assets are used to confront both drug
    traffickers and terrorists, thanks to the expanded authority. The
    authority also permits greater intelligence sharing and allows allied
    nations to use U.S. counterdrug funded equipment for non-counterdrug
    missions. Expanded authority is essential to the command's ability to
    deal with both narcotraffickers and terrorists. The authorities granted
    in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 were 1-year programs confined
    to Colombia. Because of the successes we have experienced in both
    intelligence sharing and improving operations, we are requesting
    expanded authority for the entire area of responsibility in fiscal year
    2004.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Without question, democracy has gained a foothold in Latin America.
    The question is how long will it prevail? Until ordinary citizens
    benefit from free market reforms and reduced corruption and until
    terrorists can no longer operate with relative impunity, that question
    will linger. For most nations in our area of responsibility, the
    threats come from within. It will be up to those nations to demonstrate
    their ability to govern; to provide law and order, implement judicial
    reform, and develop a profound respect for human rights. These
    fundamentals provide the stable and secure environment necessary for
    economic growth--growth that will improve the quality of life for
    ordinary citizens. Southern Command will play a crucial role in
    developing the kinds of security forces that help provide the ability
    to govern throughout the region, and particularly in Colombia.
        We are at a critical time in Colombia's history. The elected
    government of President Uribe enjoys unparalleled approval ratings of
    about 70 percent. Under his leadership, the Army is helping to regain
    control of urban neighborhoods long since held by narcoterrorists.
    Colombia's citizens are taking a more active role in their nation's
    defense, providing actionable intelligence to the Colombian Armed
    Forces. President Uribe has raised taxes to provide greater resources
    to his nation's security forces. There is a renewed sense of momentum,
    commitment, and hope as the Colombian people struggle to save their
    country, but there is also a small window of opportunity beyond which
    public opinion and support will wane without significant progress.
        I would like to close by leaving the committee with this thought. I
    am proud to say we do a great deal to further our Nation's interests in
    this hemisphere with very few resources and a modest presence. Beyond
    Colombia, we are at a critical point where the progress in eliminating
    conflict, reducing tension, and establishing democracy throughout the
    region could be at risk if we are not steadfast in our efforts. While
    our attention is drawn to another region of the world, we must keep in
    mind that we live in this hemisphere, and its continued progress as a
    region of democracy and prosperity is of paramount importance to our
    national security.
        I would like to thank the Chairman and the members of the committee
    for this great opportunity and for the tremendous support you have
    provided this command. I can assure you that the men and women of the
    United States Southern Command appreciate all that you do for them as
    they perform their noble work for our great country.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        The committee will proceed with a 6-minute round of
    questions. I will lead off, followed by Senator Levin.
        The press reports this morning that the United States has
    announced spy flights over North Korea will resume amid
    warnings that Pyongyang's nuclear program is much more advanced
    than previously thought. Assistant Secretary of State James
    Kelly said North Korea could have enough weapons-grade material
    within months, not years, to produce nuclear weapons.
        Let us talk about that, and I think that responsibility is
    shared by two of our distinguished witnesses this morning. Let
    us first address the resumption of the flights, and also it is
    my understanding they will not be accompanied by such
    protective aircraft initially as could be available. Admiral
    Fargo, that would be in your jurisdiction, shared with General
    LaPorte. Why don't you lead off, Admiral.
        Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, that is in my
    jurisdiction and those press accounts this morning were
    accurate. I cannot go into the exact form and substance of
    those flights, but of course we retain our right to fly these
    unarmed surveillance and reconnaissance flights in
    international air space, as we do throughout the world.
        So those flights have recommenced. I do not think I can add
    much more to that without getting into classified material on
    the tactics of that.
        Chairman Warner. We can understand that. But I presume the
    most prudent and reasonable precautions are on hand to protect
    that plane if necessary; is that correct?
        Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, obviously we took a very close
    look at this and did a full assessment and a complete analysis,
    and we have put in place what I consider to be the prudent
    measures to ensure that these planes are properly----
        Chairman Warner. That is all we need to know for the
    moment.
        Now, your own professional assessment with regard to the
    nuclear program that has been initiated once again by North
    Korea and the dangers it poses to this country?
        Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir. I think this nuclear program has
    dangers on any number of levels. Obviously we are very
    concerned and all of our regional allies are very concerned
    about nuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Certainly there are a
    couple ways they can do that, through the highly enriched
    uranium program or through reprocessing spent fuel rods. The
    concerns are both in the neighborhood of the ability of North
    Korea to have an arsenal of nuclear weapons and an equal, maybe
    even a greater, concern is that they could take this weapons-
    grade material and proliferate it and proliferate it to----
        Chairman Warner. Ship it to other areas of the world.
        Admiral Fargo. Ship it to other areas of the world and to
    terrorist organizations, and of course that is a very serious
    situation that is international in its context.
        Chairman Warner. Well, given the seriousness of that, I am
    going to pick up on your phrase, of concern to the regional
    allies. That would be Russia, China, Japan, South Korea. Thus
    far, our efforts diplomatically--and I commend the President
    and others for conducting this diplomacy--to try and bring
    about a resolution of this problem. But thus far our allies
    have not expressed the willingness that I feel measures up to
    your observation that they are concerned, to participate in
    multilateral talks prior to any bilaterals that may eventually
    be decided upon between the United States and North Korea. Your
    views on that?
        Admiral Fargo. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, on a military-
    to-military level, which is really my lane here, we are
    conducting very close cooperation with the Japanese and the
    Republic of Korea on this issue. I have had exchanges, very
    candid discussions with Admiral Ishikawa in Japan. I am sure
    General LaPorte has had similar discussions with his
    counterpart, and we are working very closely on this issue
    together.
        Chairman Warner. Well, let us hope it works out
    diplomatically, and I think the President is quite right to try
    and approach this from a multilateral standpoint, because
    Russia, Japan, China, and South Korea all have very severe
    interests in this thing being resolved so that that is not a
    nuclear peninsula.
        General LaPorte, your professional views on this?
        General LaPorte. In terms of the reconnaissance flights, I
    support Admiral Fargo in providing him some assets to enable
    him to accomplish that mission. So we are fully in agreement on
    the execution of these missions and the manner in which he has
    designed them.
        In terms of the nuclear issue, Mr. Chairman, I want to
    underscore the significant threat North Korea presents in terms
    of proliferation. North Korea's economy is a failed economy and
    they gain hard currency in order to keep their regime in power
    by engaging in activities such as proliferation of military
    hardware, and missiles that we all know about.
        They are also very much involved in the narcotics business,
    methamphetamines especially. In Japan alone, it is estimated
    that it is a $9 billion-a-year business. They are also involved
    in counterfeiting and also dealing in endangered species. So
    that should underscore the fact that if they had weapons-grade
    plutonium they would be willing to sell that also for the right
    price. That is very important.
        In terms of my contact in Korea, I will tell you that the
    military is very concerned about the nuclear issue. I meet
    periodically with the Republic of Korea Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, General Lee, and he joins us in our concern
    and our desires.
        Chairman Warner. Let me ask specifically, are each of our
    commanders before us this morning satisfied that you have the
    forces you need to support the range of contingencies that
    could arise in connection with this developing situation?
    Primarily those forces are there for deterrence, but should
    some measure of engagement be required, Admiral, do you have
    sufficient forces?
        Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, I am better postured today in
    the western Pacific than I was a year ago. We are fortunate at
    this point in time that we have an annual exercise that takes
    place on the Korean Peninsula, Foal Eagle, or Reception,
    Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSO&I), that brings
    additional troops and aircraft to the Peninsula. This has been
    on the books for a year. We do it every year, so it is not
    provocative.
        Chairman Warner. Your answer is yes and, even though our
    country is heavily engaged, as it should be, in supporting
    diplomacy in the Iraq situation and that diplomacy is supported
    directly as a consequence of the forces that we forward-deploy
    in that region, you are confident that there has been no
    deterioration in your deterrent capability and reaction
    capability?
        Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir, I am confident.
        Chairman Warner. General?
        General LaPorte. Senator, I am also confident that I have
    the ability to deter and have contingencies if required. We
    have increased our intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance capabilities so that we have good indications of
    warning of any North Korean activity.
        Chairman Warner. That capability extends to chemical and
    biological protection for our troops? I ask both commanders,
    you have adequate protection should that weapon be utilized?
        General LaPorte. Yes, sir, we do.
        Chairman Warner. Admiral?
        Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you.
        My time is up. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, back to this
    reconnaissance plane incident. The Washington Post carried a
    story on it in its March 4 edition, which said that ``Defense
    officials stated that `at least one of the North Korean planes
    directed its radars to identify the U.S. aircraft as a target
    and may have locked on, a step short of shooting a missile.' ''
        That is the quote that I want to ask you about from the
    Post. There is a quote from the New York Times on March 8 that
    said that North Korean jets `` `were trying to force the U.S.
    aircraft to land in North Korea and seize its crew,' according
    to a senior Defense official.''
        Admiral, would you first comment on those two quotes?
        Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir. Senator, as you would imagine, we
    have gone back and done a pretty thorough analysis of the
    intercept, including the tapes and debriefing the pilots. It is
    clear that the North Korean acquisition radar has a couple of
    different modes. I would not characterize this as lock-on. The
    radar was in its acquisition mode, but had not shifted to its
    fire control mode. So I think that is the answer to the first
    question.
        The second question: We do not know exactly what the North
    Koreans were trying to do. I have looked at the videotapes
    myself. They may very well have been signaling for the plane to
    go down.
        Chairman Warner. Excuse me. Those were hand signals vice
    electronic?
        Admiral Fargo. Those were hand signals, and there were no
    voice coms with the plane.
        Chairman Warner. I think that should be made clear.
        Admiral Fargo. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin. In your judgment did the North Korean jet or
    jets try to force the aircraft to land in North Korea?
        Admiral Fargo. In my judgment, this was a provocation on
    their part. I cannot come to a conclusion that they were trying
    to force the aircraft down. They may have been trying to
    indicate to them to leave their air space or they could have
    been trying to signal the aircraft to follow and go down. But I
    do not think you can make a judgment based on what I have seen.
        Senator Levin. Now, the word that was used apparently
    yesterday in terms of resumption of our flights, which I very
    much support, is that they would be ``resumed with
    circumspection.'' Can you give us a little more detail about
    that? Or would you want to just leave it where you have
    testified this morning?
        Admiral Fargo. I think the comments that I made to the
    chairman's question about taking prudent measures here is
    consistent with the term ``circumspection.''
        Senator Levin. ``Prudent measures,'' does that imply to
    protect our plane if necessary?
        Admiral Fargo. That implies the full range of things that
    we can do in terms of making sure we have the right
    intelligence, situational awareness, warning, and procedures in
    place to ensure that the plane can fly this mission safely.
        Senator Levin. There has been some discussion about how we
    proceed with North Korea in terms of whether there should be
    direct discussions at a high level between us and the North
    Koreans. What has been stated frequently is that we prefer to
    proceed multilaterally with the other nations in the region,
    which obviously makes sense. We want to consult with them and
    to work with them in terms of how to respond to what is
    obviously a crisis. Now, some people do not want to describe
    this as a crisis, but, listening to your testimony and an awful
    lot of testimony and reports prior to your testimony, it is
    obvious we have a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
        But putting that aside just for a minute, this is my
    question. What the regional nations are telling us, every one,
    after we consult with them multilaterally, is that we ought to
    have direct talks with North Korea. That is one of the things
    that they are advising us to do, talk to North Korea directly.
    Is there any military reason that we should not have direct
    talks with North Korea? First, Admiral?
        Admiral Fargo. Well, I think that the clear views that I
    get from talking to our regional partners here is they want to
    be part of any process with respect to North Korea. Certainly
    that is true of the Japanese and the Republic of Korea, and
    they want to be consulted and involved and their voice needs to
    be heard in this because they have huge equity here.
        So I think that is the way that we have to proceed.
        Senator Levin. Is there any military reason from our
    perspective, if our friends and other nations in the area are
    urging us to have these direct talks, is there any military
    reason from our perspective that we should not do so?
        Admiral Fargo. Senator, I do not know how to answer that
    question.
        Senator Levin. Have you been consulted on this question?
        Admiral Fargo. I have been. What I am trying to do, with
    respect to my responsibilities, is to do the kinds of things
    with the Japanese and Koreans that build their confidence in a
    solution to the problem, to make sure that we have the right
    deterrent posture in place and the right warning for any future
    event. That is fundamentally my responsibility here in this
    issue.
        Senator Levin. Do you want to add anything, General?
        General LaPorte. Senator, I would just reinforce what
    Admiral Fargo said. This is an issue that has international
    implications, international concerns, violations of an
    international treaty. I could not best advise on the best way
    of going about these negotiations. I think I would have to
    leave it to the experts, leave it to the Secretary of State to
    make those determinations.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. If the committee would indulge the chair,
    this incident brings us to the question of the historic
    problems that we as a Nation have encountered, 25, 30 years ago
    with the Soviet Union. We had very close calls in the air and
    on the sea, and we entered into the Incidents at Sea Executive
    Agreement.
        Senator Levin. Which, if I can interrupt our chairman, our
    chairman was the person who represented our Nation at the
    signing of that treaty.
        Chairman Warner. I thank my colleague, yes. It has worked,
    if I may say with a sense of humility. It has worked very well.
        So it comes to mind that, while we may not want to try a
    framework with North Korea at this time, at least we ought to
    try and take the precaution to establish, either directly or
    through intermediaries, a system of communication between
    aircraft such as to avoid an unintended consequence. So I leave
    it at that.
        My understanding, there is a channel that that North Korean
    plane could have come up on to communicate with our aircraft;
    is that correct?
        Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, I will have to take that for
    the record and get back to you, because I do not have it. I do
    not know the answer to that question.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        There is no installed capability that enables direct communication
    with the DPRK aircraft other than UHF/UHF Guard. Electronic voice
    communications were not established between aircraft.

        Chairman Warner. Well, I would suggest that we look into
    that, because relations between these two nations are very
    strained at the moment and a precipitate act by a military
    officer, intentionally or unintended, could exacerbate these
    situations. Thank you for the indulgence.
        Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The plane that made the intercept was a MiG-29, is that
    correct?
        Admiral Fargo. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. The MiG-29 is a very advanced aircraft, in
    some ways better than our aging F-15s and F-16s. I know that
    you folks are not Air Force, but I also know that is in your
    command.
        I was very proud, about 5 years ago in the previous
    administration, when General Jumper in a different position
    made the statement of his concern over such aircraft as the
    MiG-29, the Su-27, the Su-30, some of the Russian vehicles,
    that are better than our aircraft in some ways. There is no
    sense in getting into which ways they are, but they are.
        We all know that our pilots are better, our troops are
    better, but we do have these deficiencies. As far as that is
    concerned, I would just like to hear a comment on the
    capabilities of the North Korean Air Force and our assets, how
    they compare with each other, not the pilots but the equipment.
        General LaPorte. Senator, I could give you a very detailed
    answer in a closed session.
        Senator Inhofe. Okay.
        Chairman Warner. It is the intention of the chair to
    provide a closed session following this open session.
        Senator Inhofe. Well, that is fine. Something that does not
    require a closed session is a recognition of some of those
    problems. The Army, as you well know, also has some
    deficiencies. One of the problems we had in Operation Anaconda
    is we did not have the capability of really having a
    sophisticated artillery response. Close air support is good for
    the ground troops when it is working and when you do not have
    weather problems or you are able to get up there.
        I have been concerned for quite some time that in the case
    of artillery there are some four countries, including South
    Africa, that make a better artillery unit than we have.
        Admiral Fargo, I have not heard of anything that would be
    comparable to that in the Navy. Is there a deficiency in the
    Navy where our modernization programs have not really kept up
    with some of the potential adversaries that we have?
        Admiral Fargo. Well, as I mentioned in my opening
    statement, I think the thing I am most concerned about in my
    area of responsibility is missile defense. I am concerned about
    the proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles and medium-
    range ballistic missiles and our ability to deal with that
    right now. We have programs that are coming along, but we have
    not fielded those yet and they are certainly key in my judgment
    to being able to protect our military forces both ashore and at
    sea.
        Senator Inhofe. I only bring this up because I just think
    in all these hearings we need to recognize that we do have
    deficiencies. We need to get on with the F-22, we need to get
    on with a non-line-of-sight (NLOS) cannon that can be fielded
    and can be competitive with potential adversaries.
        General LaPorte, today in the New York Times you said that
    there are no signs that North Korea was preparing for war, but
    you also said, ``They have studied our military actions most
    recently in the Balkans and Afghanistan and have adapted their
    tactics to offset our technological advances.''
        Could you elaborate a little bit on that comment?
        General LaPorte. I am not certain I made that quote, but I
    will answer your question.
        Senator Inhofe. Oh, then you were misquoted. I am not
    saying this critically, by the way. I was very much concerned
    when I saw that.
        General LaPorte. North Korea has for the past 10-12 years
    adapted based on what they perceive as the strengths of the
    United States military. They have adapted in several ways.
    First, in terms of communications, they have developed an
    indigenous frequency-hopping radio that allows them to
    communicate in a secure mode. They have gone to a great deal of
    fiber optics in terms of their communications between fixed
    facilities.
        In an attempt to protect their forces from our surveillance
    and air capabilities, they have gone to a tremendous number of
    underground facilities throughout North Korea to protect
    leadership and critical forces. Those are examples of the way
    North Korea is adapting to what they perceive as the
    capabilities of the United States.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much.
        Finally, let me ask Admiral Fargo this question. There was
    a severe case of righteous indignation that set into the North
    Korean press when the U.S.S. Carl Vinson was holding its
    exercise. They were talking about, that the exercise at its
    height made the situation so tense that a nuclear war may break
    out at any moment.
        Isn't this exercise that they refer to by the U.S.S. Carl
    Vinson the same exercise that we do on a regular basis
    virtually every year?
        Admiral Fargo. Yes, Senator, that is exactly right. We do
    an annual exercise on the Peninsula and in the surrounding
    waters and we try to commit a carrier battle group to that
    exercise every year.
        General LaPorte. I would add to that, Senator Warner, this
    exercise had been planned for over 5 years. We plan them 5
    years in advance. It was planned for this time. It is a
    nonprovocative exercise. It is focused on the reception of
    forces into the Peninsula and integrating them in. So I think
    their claims are really not accurate.
        Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that. My time has expired, but
    I think we needed to say that, because a lot of people read
    that and think that this is a provocative act, which it is not.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to welcome our panel this morning and commend you
    and all of our troops. I want to tell you that we are very
    proud of what you are doing.
        General LaPorte, your statement discusses periodic tension
    in the Republic of Korea and the United States alliance. You
    refer to the generation of South Koreans who have lived in an
    era of peace and prosperity, who have little or no
    understanding of the North Korean threat. From your vantage
    point, do you believe there has been a diminishment of support
    for American troops in the South?
        General LaPorte. Senator, I have been asked quite often
    recently, do we have a crisis in South Korea? My response has
    been adamantly no, we do not. We would have a crisis if South
    Korea was unable to hold democratic elections like they just
    did. We would have a crisis if the civilian authorities did not
    control the military. We would have a crisis if people were not
    allowed to gather and to speak their mind. We would have a
    crisis if people were unable to worship freely.
        That is not the case in South Korea. We have a maturing
    democracy and what we have is a democracy that is dealing with
    the challenges of a democratic society.
        I will tell you that most of the Korean people truly
    support the United States Forces Korea. Last weekend there was
    a rally. Over 70,000 Koreans came out waving American flags.
    They unfurled a massive flag, a massive Korean flag, a massive
    United Nations flag.
        Senator Inhofe. Where was that, General?
        General LaPorte. In South Korea, in the capital, in Seoul.
    They were demonstrating their support.
        But the fact still remains, due to the combined efforts of
    the Republic of Korea military and the United States military,
    we have been very successful in our deterrent mission for 50
    years and we have provided a peaceful environment that has
    allowed great prosperity. So many of the younger generation, 45
    years and younger, have lived in that prosperity in the era of
    peace. So they do not have a true, full appreciation of the
    threat that the North Korean military presents. We need to work
    on that and we will.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you for that response.
        General, Senator Warner mentioned Assistant Secretary of
    State James Kelly's testimony before the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee yesterday that North Korea could produce
    significant plutonium within 6 months, but that the HEU, highly
    enriched uranium, alternate capability is not so far behind.
    Mr. Kelly also followed up saying that the HEU program,
    ``contrary to conventional wisdom, is not a problem for down
    the road, but a real threat in a matter of months.''
        I would like to have a clarifying assessment of this.
        General LaPorte. Well, I agree with Secretary Kelly in
    terms of the plutonium. If the North Koreans were to open the
    reprocessing plant in Yongbyon and start reprocessing the spent
    fuel rods, it would be a short period of time in which they
    would be able to leach out the weapons-grade plutonium and have
    enough to produce nuclear weapons.
        In terms of the highly enriched uranium source, I would
    like to address that in a closed session for you.
        Senator Akaka. General, according to an unclassified
    summary released in November 2002 by the CIA, the CIA said,
    ``We recently learned that the North is constructing a plant
    that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more
    nuclear weapons per year when fully operational, which could be
    as soon as mid-decade.''
        Do you see the HEU program becoming in a matter of months a
    serious threat?
        General LaPorte. I think the HEU program is a serious
    threat. In terms of the timing and when they would be to a
    point where they could process the uranium, it is still in
    question. We know for certain that they have been involved in
    gathering the technologies and the equipment necessary to use
    this method of producing highly enriched uranium, and we can
    talk in a closed session in terms of the timing of it.
        Senator Akaka. Admiral Fargo, I have been very concerned,
    and we have spoken about this, about the homeland security of
    the State of Hawaii and the territories of the Pacific. I have
    continuously asked about the coordination not only between the
    Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security,
    but also between Northern Command and Pacific Command. What
    kind of coordination is occurring to ensure that Hawaii's
    homeland security needs are not forgotten as Federal policies
    develop involving the other 49 States?
        Admiral Fargo. Senator, I think the coordination between
    Northern Command and Pacific Command is excellent. In fact,
    General Eberhart was at my headquarters within the last 7 days.
    We have talked through these issues with his command. We are
    also proceeding on planning that is very closely aligned. In
    Hawaii and the other areas within the Pacific we built the
    Joint Rear Area Coordination Group that was designed
    specifically to provide the kind of intelligence and crisis
    response and help to first responders that was necessary to
    ensure that we had a strong partnership with the State and the
    local government.
        We are going to transition that to what I will call Joint
    Task Force (JTF) Pacific, which will provide once again a
    capability to ensure that the coordination is absolutely
    strong. This is essentially the same procedure that is being
    done in NORTHCOM. But our relationships with organizations like
    the Joint Terrorist Task Force in Hawaii are very strong. Our
    relationships with the Governor and the Mayor's offices to make
    sure that they have this information readily are also solid.
        So I am very comfortable that we have the procedures in
    place now and have a good plan for the future to support our
    homeland defense responsibilities and our homeland security
    responsibilities.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Roberts.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a prepared
    statement I would like to insert in the record at this point.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts
        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I am glad to have Pacific Command, Southern
    Command, and U.S. Forces Korea represented here today. Gentlemen, I
    commend you and the men and women who serve under your command.
        Undoubtably, this hearing will touch on various aspects of the
    current worldwide threat situation and the appropriate U.S. response.
    Along those lines, I want to express for the record what I see as
    President Bush's national security strategy and where the current
    government of Saddam Hussein fits in.
        I realize Central Command is not appearing today but we keep going
    around and around on this subject here in Congress, sometimes losing
    sight of what we do here in Washington is all about.
    President's Strategy
        The President's national security strategy is simple: prevent a
    nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon from ever being detonated in
    the United States. That's it. It's not about oil, old scores, or even
    fostering political revolution as certain "intellectuals" believe. It's
    about preventing hundreds of thousands of Americans from dying in an
    instant.
        Toward that end, this administration has, quite logically, sought
    to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    capability--be it large scale passenger-carrying aircraft, nerve
    agents, anthrax, highly enriched uranium, etc.--by the new apocalyptic
    terror groups we all saw in action on the morning of September 11,
    2001.
        We know in such groups ``the will'' is there so it's largely a
    question, at least in the short term, of preventing the means, ``the
    way,'' for suicide terrorists to destroy our cities and kill our
    people. A good start, naturally, is to take a hard look at regimes
    that, for whatever reason, support terrorism in general, hate the
    United States, and possess--or seek to possess--WMD.
        That's what the axis of evil is all about: Iran, Iraq, and, yes,
    North Korea. In particular, we have no choice but to deal right now
    with those axis of evil regimes with links to the new apocalyptic
    terror groups.
        Which government fits the bill at this moment? The government of
    Saddam Hussein. With which terror groups is he associated? Those lead
    by Mr. Poison Center himself, Abu Masab al-Zarqawi.
        This is not debatable. Understanding this situation is not a matter
    of political persuasion. It's established fact and since no member of
    the United Nations, except perhaps Great Britain, faces the specific
    threat the U.S. faces, we should not be surprised the Security Council
    does not support the destruction of Saddam's regime. Why should they?
        None of their cities and landmarks are on the top of al Qaeda's hit
    list. They didn't lose 3,100 people and their two tallest buildings in
    90 minutes. They do not face the same threat. They do not experience
    the same fear. Of course, invite them along, but, if they refuse to
    join the effort, then move on for goodness sake. In this day and age,
    on these issues, with the emerging nexus between suicide terror groups
    and weapons of mass destruction, it is the height of irresponsibility
    to make fundamental policy decisions based on what Paris, Bonn, Moscow,
    or Brussels thinks.
        That is taking multilateralism to an absurd extreme. It is leaving
    the safety of our people to governments who have no responsibility nor
    incentive for protecting them.
    Prioritizing Threats
        I hope we do not spend too much time today arguing again about who
    constitutes the greatest threat to us right this second. Is it Saddam
    Hussein, Kim Jong Il, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, or Osama bin
    Laden? They are all major threats, challenges to U.S. security here at
    home that get worse with time if not acted upon.
        They all represent unique geopolitical circumstances demanding
    tailored solutions. Indeed, they all demand action now but different
    kinds of action. Just because the military instrument of power is the
    choice for responding to bin Laden and may become the choice for
    responding to Iraq, it by no means suggests force is appropriate right
    now for North Korea or ever in the case of Iran.
        It's not that simple and we ought not to mistake complexities in
    the threat picture for contradictions in policy. For example, North
    Korea, as dangerous and unstable as it is, has not invaded its neighbor
    to the south since 1953.
        We cannot say the same for Saddam who invaded Kuwait in 1990 with
    what looked at the time like intentions for Saudi Arabia as well. Not
    to mention the fact that, as I noted earlier, to my knowledge North
    Korea is not currently harboring senior members of a terror network
    lead by a close associate of Osama bin Laden.
    Iraq's Last Chance
        But this is really beside the point. In passing H.J. Res. 114,
    Congress specifically authorized the President to ``use the Armed
    Forces of the United States in order to--(1) defend the national
    security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by
    Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council
    resolutions regarding Iraq.'' Colleagues, that resolution passed the
    Senate 77 to 23 on October 11, 2002.
        This action was, of course, in addition to the Iraq Liberation Act,
    which Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law October 31,
    1998. That Act clearly states the U.S. should foster regime change in
    Iraq.
        Lastly, on November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council passed
    Resolution 1441 which gave Iraq one last opportunity to comply with its
    disarmament obligations.
        Now, months later, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has
    told us unequivocally that ``Iraq has in place an active effort to
    deceive the U.N. inspectors and deny them access. This effort is
    directed by the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Baghdad has given
    clear directions to its operational forces to hide banned materials in
    their possession.''
        Further, the DCI stated ``Iraq's biological weapons program
    includes mobile research and production facilities that will be
    difficult, it not impossible, for the inspectors to find. Baghdad began
    this program in the mid-1990s--during a time when inspectors were in
    the country.''
        Even the latest U.N. assessments directed by Dr. Blix indicate
    Saddam Hussein is still not complying. Colleagues, let us be candid. No
    amount of U-2 surveillance flights nor increase in the number of
    inspectors will solve this problem, at the very least with respect to
    biological weapons. Let's be honest. The U.S. Government has bent over
    backwards to manage the threat from Saddam Hussein without further
    military action.

        Senator Roberts. I want to go back to the suggestion that
    some have made in regards to direct negotiations with North
    Korea and Kim Jong Il. It is my understanding--in the
    Intelligence Committee we have had numerous briefings.
    Basically, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has
    indicated that Kim Jong Il's attempts this past year, ``to
    parlay the North's nuclear weapons program into a political
    leverage suggests he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally
    different relationship with Washington, one that implicitly
    tolerates the nuclear weapons program.''
        I guess my question is, why take the bait? It seems to me
    that they have stated their basic purpose of any direct
    negotiations would be a nonaggression pact. To enter into those
    negotiations at this point without our neighbors in that same
    neighborhood seems to me to be pointless. They continue to
    provoke and proliferate. I think the estimate in 5 years is
    that they could have numbers in double digits in regards to
    missiles and warheads that they would sell, maybe worth a
    billion and a half or 2 billion dollars, they would have to
    proliferate to receive any income; and that country is a basket
    case.
        Their behavior in regards to what General LaPorte has
    already indicated in regards to crime, drugs, and kidnappings,
    etc., is deplorable. They are a theocracy. I have been to
    Pyongyang. I was part of the first official delegation allowed
    in, not really to negotiate, but at least to have some
    dialogue. That was 4 years ago. So we tried some direct
    dialogue, not negotiations, and we were trying to arrange a
    third-party grain sale to address the famine, which was even
    more severe say 4 or 5 years ago. What we got back was rhetoric
    and a very surreal experience.
        Let me give you a plausible intelligence scenario, both for
    Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, in regards to Kim Jong Il
    and what he has in his mind in terms of the future. I think my
    suggestion would be or my surmising of the intelligence that is
    provided is that he views the countries of the world in two
    categories, (1) those that have capability in regards to
    nuclear weaponry, and (2) those that do not; and then he
    separates again where the United States and the international
    community will permit that, i.e., India, Pakistan, and other
    countries, and he wants to be the Musharraf, if I could use
    that as a very poor I guess analogy, and to basically have the
    U.S. accept his position in regards to being a producer of
    nuclear weaponry. That basically is his goal and he is going to
    continue the production and he is going to continue testing and
    he is going to continue launching until he gets into that
    category. It seems to me that is what his goal is.
        If that is the case, why on earth would we want to take the
    bait and go into direct negotiations when in fact this is a big
    international challenge? Would you have any comment other than
    to say yes, you agree with me?
        General LaPorte. Senator, there is no question in my mind
    that Kim Jong Il is in charge and he is making the decisions,
    and his main goal is regime survival. His most pressing concern
    is his failed economy. North Korean provocations and nuclear
    brinkmanship are aimed at gaining security guarantees and
    economic assistance to ensure that that regime remains in
    place.
        Senator Roberts. Admiral Fargo?
        Admiral Fargo. Senator, the only thing I would add to that
    is it is pretty clear that he is not complying with his current
    agreements.
        Senator Roberts. Let me ask something that occurred to me
    when I was there again on a second Congressional Delegation
    (CODEL). 116,000 Americans in regards to South Korea, 37,000
    members of the Warrior Division, 20 minutes from what I would
    describe as possible Armageddon with the capability that North
    Korea has. Why keep our families there with the current
    situation? I have never understood why that has to be? I know
    the quality of life means a great deal, but 37,000 of the
    Warrior Division have certain circumstances, others who are
    stationed there, and a great many more Americans. I do not
    think we want to signal that we want to withdraw by any means
    in terms of weakness or send any signals like that down the
    road in regard to our resolve. But it has always bothered me
    from that standpoint.
        Would you address that, General LaPorte?
        General LaPorte. Yes, Senator, I will. We have
    approximately 5,000 family members on the Peninsula. We have
    37,000 service members on the Peninsula. Let me address it from
    the standpoint of desires to serve in Korea from a service
    member's perspective. There are three aspects of service in
    Korea that we work very hard. First is and foremost is the
    family separation. 67 percent of U.S. service members are
    married, and they are put under a lot of stress and strain in
    terms of family separation. Right now if you serve in overseas
    positions you are not guaranteed you are going to remain there.
    You may be deployed so you are away from home many times.
        Only 7 percent of my 37,000 have family members
    accompanying them. It is an important aspect of having an
    accompanied tour in Korea. Up north where the Second Infantry
    Division is, there are almost no family members. There are
    some, but very few.
        We need to look at a balanced approach in terms of our
    positioning of the U.S. forces in Korea and having a reasonable
    rate of accompanied families associated with it. We have
    procedures in terms of notification of what we call
    noncombatants and we have procedures if the need arises to move
    them and evacuate them. But that is a big issue for service
    members in terms of being with their families, something that
    is a very difficult challenge where there is a real threat.
        We had a similar threat in Europe for a period of time, and
    I think we have to put some thoughtful work into it.
        Senator Roberts. If he pulls the trigger you have about 20
    minutes. I do not know what evacuation plan is going to be
    successful under those circumstances. I am not trying to pick
    an argument with you. It is just something that I have been
    concerned about for several years and I know you are as well.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Roberts.
        I think at this point in the record you ought to expand on
    this important inquiry by our colleague, because in the private
    consultations that you and I have had you alluded to your
    thinking something should be done, but you are doing it right
    now, together with the Secretary of Defense, looking at the
    entire force structure, the disposition of that force structure
    on the Peninsula, and the numbers involved. Am I correct in
    that?
        General LaPorte. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. In December
    we had a security consultative meeting in Washington. The
    Minister of National Defense from Korea and the Secretary of
    Defense agreed to conducting a Future of the Alliance study
    initiative with the new South Korean administration once it
    came into office.
        On the 26th of February, Department of Defense policy
    personnel came and we initiated discussions with the South
    Korean Government associated with roles, missions, force
    structure, and basing of forces. We think this is a very
    healthy process to do. October is the 50th anniversary, so why
    not reexamine and reaffirm our commitment to the alliance, but
    it may not have to look exactly as it has looked like for 50
    years.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, General. Thank you, Senator
    Roberts, for raising it.
        Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, let me begin by thanking you for your service to
    our country. We are all very grateful to you. I hope you will
    express that gratitude to the men and women who serve under
    your commands.
        General Hill, I am going to try to get to you eventually,
    but I do have a couple of questions about Korea first. I do not
    want you to be insulted feeling like you have been left out of
    everything today.
        General Hill. That is all right, sir.
        Senator Bayh. I am interested in a couple of the issues
    that you deal with.
        But first a couple of things about Korea. To Admiral Fargo
    and General LaPorte. This situation, the nuclear tensions in
    the Korean Peninsula, may not be resolvable through a dialogue,
    but they are certainly not resolvable peacefully if we do not
    try under some set of circumstances. Having said that, I think
    we need to keep all the options on the table in case whatever
    dialogue develops fails, either because the North Koreans have
    made a strategic decision they are just going to go down the
    road of increasing their nuclear capabilities or because there
    is nothing that we can offer them that will convince them to
    desist in that path or, even if there is something we can offer
    them, perhaps we conclude that we cannot verify that they will
    abide by any agreement we might reach.
        For whatever set of circumstances might exist, the
    President needs to have all the options available to him, as do
    we. If we chose to try and remove the reprocessing facility and
    the small reactor that they have, the launch sites for the
    longer missiles that they have developed, do we have the
    capability of doing that?
        Admiral Fargo. Senator, we have a wide range of
    capabilities and great capability in terms of precision-guided
    munitions. I am not going to go into the specifics of any
    particular potential targets or the hypothetical. I am
    obviously very confident with the capability that we have at
    hand today.
        Senator Bayh. I appreciate the need for some vagueness in
    your answer, Admiral. I will not press you further on that.
        The reason I ask the question is if you do not have that
    capability then obviously that takes one option off the table
    and forces you in a different direction, even if you do not
    have great confidence at the end of the day it is going to
    achieve the security of the country that you are trying to
    achieve.
        If we were to pursue such an option, what do you
    anticipate? Obviously, we have to try and game these things
    out. What is the likely response that the North Koreans would
    present us with?
        Admiral Fargo. Senator, these are things that we have given
    a lot of thought to and I would really like to deal with these
    in a classified session if we could, please.
        Senator Bayh. I will respect that, Admiral. Perhaps you
    will feel the same way about my next question. It is along the
    same lines. The North Koreans obviously have missiles that are
    capable of hitting Japan. We suspect that they may have one or
    two nuclear warheads. Do we know that they can fit those
    warheads to those missiles? Would Japan be at risk of a nuclear
    strike if hostilities were to break out?
        Admiral Fargo. Senator, I am not trying to duck these, but
    these all have great intelligence-related components to the
    answers. So if I could, we could deal with it in another
    session.
        Senator Bayh. My curiosity unfortunately leads me into
    areas that we cannot discuss in this forum.
        Maybe a couple of things we can discuss. I would like to
    follow up on Senator Roberts' questions and the chairman's
    questions. I do hope that we are giving serious thought to
    repositioning our forces on the demilitarized zone (DMZ). It
    seems to me one of their likely responses--if they are
    interested in continuing to drive a wedge between us and our
    South Korean allies, they would launch a large barrage on
    Seoul. That would perhaps backfire in terms of public
    relations. They are more likely to try and attack our troops
    along the DMZ. It seems to me that the troops are really
    sitting ducks there. I hope we give some serious consideration
    to at least repositioning them somewhere out of artillery
    range. I will just make that comment. I think the General
    already indicated that we are giving serious thought to that.
        Maybe you can answer this on the record. If the North
    Koreans were to declare themselves a nuclear power or at some
    point in the next year or so were actually to test a nuclear
    device, what do you think the reaction of the South Korean
    military authorities would be to that? You have discussed, both
    of you, the change in public opinion in the South. What effect
    would that have on public opinion in the South, if any? Or if
    you cannot discuss public opinion, at least the South Korean
    military authorities?
        General LaPorte. I am confident, working with the South
    Korean military on a day-to-day basis, that the South Korean
    military would follow explicitly the guidance given to them by
    the civilian leaders.
        Senator Bayh. They seem to be--I do not want to say denial,
    but they are certainly downplaying the potential threat from
    the North. I was wondering if this might convince them to take
    the threat a little more seriously at this point.
        General, let me ask about Colombia, hopefully with a little
    more luck here.
        General Hill. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bayh. The violence seems to be escalating. The
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has obviously
    gotten some assistance from others in urban warfare techniques
    and so forth. I am told by at least some informed individuals
    that there really are not demands that the FARC has put on the
    table today that might give one much hope in terms of a
    negotiated settlement of this conflict any time soon.
        In your opinion is there a military solution to this
    problem?
        General Hill. Senator, I believe that I look at Colombia
    pre- and post-7 August, which is when the Uribe Government took
    over. They have energized both militarily and in all the other
    facets of governance--judicial, economic, and political
    reform--they have energized the Colombians to levels they have
    never reached before. I believe that they have in fact on the
    military side gained the momentum on the FARC and the National
    Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of
    Colombia (AUC). I believe that they can maintain that momentum
    if they continue to see it through and I believe they will, and
    that we continue to support them in that effort.
        They will never in my opinion totally eradicate those
    organizations. They will not eradicate them because they have
    morphed from purely ideological entities into narcoterrorists
    and they are now in the business of making drugs and in the
    drug trade. They will not want to give up their businesses.
        In my opinion, as they continue movement in all areas, not
    only military but the other areas of governance, the Government
    of Colombia can reclaim portions of Colombia that they have not
    been in in years, and they are in the process of doing that.
    They can stop the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC from operating
    with impunity throughout the countryside, and then they can
    maintain and restore the greater part of their democracy.
        Senator Bayh. Mr. Chairman, could I make two brief
    comments? My time has expired. They are very brief.
        Chairman Warner. I tell you what. We are going to have
    another round in which you can participate.
        Senator Bayh. General, I appreciate it. I take your answer
    to be that they are making progress, therefore making our
    support worthwhile, even though there is no final resolution to
    this process through military means only.
        General Hill. There will never be a pure military solution
    to the problem that is Colombia. They recognize that and we
    recognize that. But I remain cautiously optimistic.
        Chairman Warner. That is an important line of questions
    that you have proposed and I intend to do a follow-up.
        Now we have Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        My first question relates to Korea. As I understand it, we
    have somewhere between 30,000 and 40,000 troops stationed there
    right now. The South Korean military is maybe around a million
    or so. Those are round figures, I know. This is more of a
    philosophical question, and that is, in your estimation, what
    is the deterrence consideration that we provide in South Korea?
        It seems to me that we would be quite a deterrent to any
    aggression by North Korea and that it is important that we
    maintain a presence there, if nothing else, just for the
    deterrence factor there. Could I hear a response on that?
        General LaPorte. Senator, I think you are exactly right. We
    have been a tremendous deterrent for the past 50 years, but it
    has been a result of a combined forces deterrence, not a U.S.
    unilateral deterrence.
        I would just like to highlight, the South Korean military
    is a very capable military, over 640,000 strong on active duty.
    They are well-equipped, they are well-trained, and they are
    extremely well-led. They are motivated. They are good
    warfighters. We train with them on a daily basis. They have a
    very good army that has modern equipment. They have an air
    force with very talented and very well-trained pilots and good
    equipment. They are purchasing the F-15. Their navy is a very
    good navy and getting stronger every day. They have one of the
    finest marine corps in the world.
        So I have great confidence in the South Korean military and
    they play a predominant role and it will be an increasing,
    significantly more viable role in their national security
    posture.
        Senator Pryor. This is a follow-up to Senator Roberts'
    question a moment ago. I know that he was not implying this or
    would not even ever say this because he does not believe this,
    but I have heard some say that we should just withdraw from the
    South Korean Peninsula altogether and always be ready to
    respond, but not have any presence there. I personally think
    that is a mistake, and I would like to hear your thoughts on
    that.
        General LaPorte. I began in my conversation saying that
    what happens in Korea has an impact throughout the world and I
    truly believe that. Thirty percent of the gross domestic
    product of the world is produced in the Northeast Asia region.
    You have four of the largest six militaries in the world there.
    For the reasons of stability and peace, I think it is very
    important that the United States has presence on the Peninsula
    and that that presence is linked with forces in other regional
    neighbors and allies throughout the Pacific.
        Senator Pryor. If I can change gears and go to Colombia
    here for just a few moments. I will be glad to sit down and
    meet with you in private about this. I do not want to say I
    have a concern, but I want to make sure that you and your
    forces are receiving the right kind of training, right kind of
    equipment, and the right kind of people there to fulfill your
    mission.
        I know it is very difficult, under very difficult
    circumstances. It is a different kind of mission. It is a very
    unique mission in a lot of ways. I just want you to know that I
    would be glad to sit down any time and talk about what you
    think your special needs may be to accomplish the goal there.
        General Hill. I appreciate that, Senator, and I will set up
    a time to come in and do that.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        General Hill. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Pryor. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        General Hill, I would like to follow on that line of
    questions by our colleague. We now have caps on the number of
    persons and so forth. I presume you are in consultation with
    the Secretary of Defense and others on that issue. Do you have
    a view, your professional view, that you would like to share
    with the committee regarding those caps and your ability to
    carry out the mission to which you have been assigned?
        General Hill. Yes, sir. I believe at the present time,
    given the mission that we are doing, we can operate within that
    cap. I would not say that down the road you might want to
    relook that issue, but at the present time I stay within the
    cap and we can accomplish our mission within the cap.
        As you are aware, we have gone slightly over the 400 number
    in personnel during the last 30 days in our search for the
    Americans. But the law allowed for that and we made the proper
    notifications.
        Chairman Warner. I would hope that the adversaries would
    not misinterpret the intention of this country to be supportive
    to stamp that out by virtue of this cap situation. Do you find
    that they can utilize that cap to their advantage by telling
    those who support them, you see that the United States is not
    serious about this?
        General Hill. No, sir. I think that they understand that
    the United States is serious about this.
        Chairman Warner. All right, you have answered the question.
        General Hill. May I add one other point to that?
        Chairman Warner. Sure.
        General Hill. Going back to Senator Bayh's earlier
    question, as you look at the escalating violence--his term--I
    believe that what is going on in the last couple of months in
    Colombia is an indicator that the Colombian efforts supported
    by the United States is working, is a successful program, and
    that is why you are seeing this change in the way that
    especially the FARC are operating.
        Chairman Warner. Well, let us just go right from that
    observation, which is a very important one you have made. Do
    those perpetrators of harm and deceit and production of drugs
    and dissemination of same now figure that the intensity of our
    effort in Colombia requires them to go to other countries and
    begin to establish a stronger base of operation there? What
    should we do to address that?
        General Hill. Yes, sir. The FARC and the ELN, all three of
    the narcoterrorist groups that operate in Colombia, operate in
    varying degrees on the other side of the borders of the
    neighboring countries, in all of them. As I have traveled
    through the region and from the very beginning of my first
    trip, I have talked to both the political and the military
    leadership and said: ``As we continue to win the battle in
    Colombia, you are going to have to work your side of the
    border, and you need to, with greater coordination with the
    Colombians, do that.'' I have offered up SOUTHCOM facilitating
    apparatuses to assist them.
        I believe that this is coming to fruition. Just yesterday
    the Colombians held a meeting in Bogota with government
    representatives from Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and
    Peru. They met for a day and all agreed that they needed to
    establish greater cooperation along those borders. This is an
    important step and one we should not overlook.
        Chairman Warner. I think it is important that our record
    reflect that the committee is concerned about Venezuela and
    also your status report on Panama and particularly the
    functioning of the canal to serve the interests of the world.
        General Hill. Yes, sir. First on Panama, I was in Panama 2
    weeks ago. I toured the canal and I met with President Moscoso,
    the chief of the Panamanian police, the commissioner of the
    canal, and other important people inside Panama. We have worked
    with them and are continuing to work with them over the
    security of the canal. I believe the Panamanians are capable of
    defending the canal and supporting their role in it, and that
    the canal is operating very efficiently. I have heard of this
    both professionally and anecdotally from many people.
        Chairman Warner. Let us shift to Venezuela.
        General Hill. Yes, sir. Venezuela--during the first part of
    the major strike, I believe that what you saw in Venezuela was,
    for lack of a better term, democracy in action: people in the
    street with opposing views to the elected president. Following
    the strike, it seems to me that his actions might portend a
    move toward greater authoritarianism. In my mind that bears
    watching very carefully. I have directed my people to do that.
    I have not been in Venezuela. I have not been in contact with
    any senior level military of Venezuela, although we continue to
    have military-to-military relationships with Venezuela.
        I think it is also important to note that the work we have
    done, not only in Venezuela but throughout the region, has paid
    off in the professionalization of the militaries. The
    Venezuelan military did not go out into the street and kill its
    citizens, nor did they conduct a coup. I think that is an
    important aspect of what is going on there. But we are watching
    Venezuela carefully, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Admiral Fargo, I think it is very important that you bring
    the committee up to date with respect to China and particularly
    our military-to-military relationships. They appear to be
    strengthening. Am I correct in that?
        Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, I would agree. I just visited
    China in December, visited five cities in 5 days in three of
    the military regions, and had a very, I would term it,
    constructive and useful dialogue with primarily the military
    leadership, but to some degree some of the political leadership
    also.
        We have also started an exchange of port calls. Admiral
    Gaffney, who heads our National Defense University, is
    conducting educational exchanges with China. Of course they are
    a regular participant at the Asian Pacific Center for Security
    Studies.
        Chairman Warner. This is on a positive trend?
        Admiral Fargo. I think it is a positive vector, is the way
    I like to put it.
        Chairman Warner. I would like to shift to Taiwan, a very
    valuable relationship between our nations, that is the United
    States and the current government there. Bring us up to date on
    that. The tensions appear to be somewhat lessened at the
    moment.
        Admiral Fargo. I think that is a fair characterization.
    Certainly our relationship with Taiwan is governed very clearly
    by the Taiwan Relations Act. There is a great deal of economic
    connectivity right now between Taiwan and the People's Republic
    of China (PRC), and certainly I would term the level of tension
    right now in the Strait is relatively low.
        Chairman Warner. We have a government-to-government
    relationship and I think it is important. Thank you very much.
        Let us conclude my questions on India. India is in our AOR,
    but of course we would have to address the relationships with
    Pakistan, which is in CENTCOM. But you can address that status
    there.
        Admiral Fargo. Mr. Chairman, I certainly can. I used to
    command our naval forces in the Central Command and so I am
    very familiar with Pakistan. I have been there a number of
    times.
        Right now we are building a relationship with both India
    and Pakistan. We recognize this is not a zero sum game. We
    ought to be able to have a productive and constructive
    relationship with both countries. India, specifically, is
    helping in the global war on terrorism. They contributed a ship
    to conduct the Straits of Malacca patrol as part of the global
    war on terrorism. I have also been there recently and talked to
    their leadership. We think India is a natural partner, the
    largest democratic country in the world, and we are improving
    our relationship and expanding our military-to-military
    cooperation with India.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you.
        Senator Levin, I see two colleagues have joined us. Senator
    Ben Nelson, to then be followed by Senator Reed.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize
    for being in and out. It is difficult to do several things at
    once around here, but sometimes you are required to do that.
        First of all, I want to thank all of you for being here.
    General Hill, it is good to have you back and this time
    testifying for Southern Command. I appreciate that very much.
    My first trip as a Senator was with two of my colleagues here
    to visit Colombia. I have followed as closely as possible what
    has been going on in the Andean region. I hope you will forgive
    me if I focus most of my time on Admiral Fargo and General
    LaPorte.
        Both of you lead commands that the entire world is watching
    right now and, although Iraq tends to garner greater attention
    at the moment, I truly believe that in many respects North
    Korea presents the more immediate and maybe in some respects
    the greater threat at the moment. Our military buildup in Iraq
    is required to keep that nation from becoming the next North
    Korea.
        But in our effort to deal with that one threat, it seems to
    me that we are missing an opportunity to address the other. I
    am speaking, of course, of the decision to engage North Korea
    only in multilateral talks. Unfortunately, our allies in the
    region do not seem to share that same enthusiasm for
    multilateral talks. China and Russia have also suggested that
    this is an issue for the United States. North Korea states that
    they will only meet us on a one-on-one basis.
        I would prefer multilateral talks, but I do not think we
    can wait for partners who do not seem to be coming to join us
    at the moment and who do not seem to be welcome at the table
    with respect to the North Korean position. I understand the
    argument that the administration has made that they do not want
    to reward bad behavior. Neither do I. But waiting to talk until
    North Korea has a larger nuclear--or has a nuclear arsenal and
    continues to be the greatest proliferator and the one-stop shop
    for rogue nations as well as potentially for every possible
    terrorist is not a very attractive alternative.
        I think we can act as though we have options, but I think
    our options are really basically two: We negotiate or we wait
    until there is a nuclear arsenal and then we are worried more
    about what is the military reaction to this if we are even able
    to have a diplomacy opportunity.
        I believe the best course of action--and I have offered
    this as a construct for negotiation--is to use what I have
    referred to as the simultaneous model of engagement, in which
    North Korea would agree to freeze its nuclear program in both
    cases and allow inspectors to confirm those actions, while the
    United States agrees to hold off any military action, not
    necessarily a nonaggression pact, but an agreement to withhold
    any military actions before and during negotiations, talks, and
    not to impose any kind of economic sanctions in that process as
    well.
        I appreciate so much a little over 2 weeks ago the fact
    that General LaPorte and other colleagues there, including the
    ambassador, gave us a fairly substantial briefing on the nature
    of the challenges that are there on the Peninsula. I do believe
    that a simultaneous model of negotiation can work, but it
    requires that we will agree to do it on a bilateral basis.
        I have followed the first steps toward bilateral
    discussions or at least that suggestion. Secretary Powell then
    said that his statement about that was the equivalent of
    leaning too far forward on his skis; apparently he was perhaps
    just a little bit ahead of himself. Secretary Armitage also had
    some reference to bilateral talks. I can understand that there
    can be differences of opinion in the administration.
        But my concern is, if we do not address the threat soon I
    fear we are going to come to regret it. In 50 years it will not
    be about whether we had bilateral or multilateral talks, but
    about whether we were able to work together to stop the nuclear
    threat at this point in our history.
        Admiral Fargo, the administration has really made it clear
    that they want multilateral talks. Obviously, North Korea said,
    no, they want it one-on-one. Fifty years from now, what do you
    believe will matter most, whether we have bilateral talks or
    that we were able to work together, hopefully, to resolve the
    nuclear issue?
        Admiral Fargo. Well, Senator, fundamentally I believe this
    is a multilateral issue. It is certainly a regional issue and
    all of our partners in the region have said that a nuclear-
    capable North Korea is unacceptable to them. It is not only a
    regional issue; it is an international issue, and that is
    certainly why the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
    taken this to the UN and the Security Council. That is my
    belief and I think that is the proper way to approach it.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Well, I understand. Now, the President
    in his news conference said it was regional. He did not say it
    was global. I am not going to suggest to you, in baseball
    parlance, that saying it is regional and global is trying to
    steal second and keep your foot on first. I am not going to
    suggest that.
        It is difficult to distinguish or to draw a line on what
    the distinction is. To go ahead and say it is regional, I do
    understand that. But it does have these global implications and
    I can understand the interest that some have in saying, let us
    get together with the North Koreans and let us start the talks.
    If we can expand them into multilateral discussions and
    multilateral solutions, we will deal with the regional issue
    very effectively. But we also will begin to deal with the
    global aspect of it because of the missile capacity of North
    Korea to potentially reach the west coast of the United States
    and other locations of a considerable distance.
        Maybe it sets you up for a question that is very difficult
    to answer, but it does seem to me that we have to pursue this
    aggressively now.
        My time is expired. I appreciate it. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I understand we are prepared to
    go into closed session now?
        Chairman Warner. My colleague has his second round
    opportunity. If you would like to take a brief one, we have
    time for yours and Senator Levin, then go to closed.
        Senator Roberts. Mr. Chairman----
        Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts also.
        Senator Roberts. I wanted to ask General Hill some
    questions.
        Chairman Warner. I think we will proceed then to complete
    our second round.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, at this time let me just say
    publicly how much respect and esteem I have for the gentlemen
    here and the job they are doing for the country, and then
    reserve my questions for the closed round.
        Chairman Warner. Well, you are a running mate of most of
    these generals, are you not, out of West Point?
        Senator Reed. Well, General LaPorte is from Rhode Island
    and I do not want to suggest that everyone from Rhode Island is
    5\1/2\ feet tall, but we are very proud of his contribution to
    the national defense.
        General LaPorte. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo apparently made a critical
    mistake in his youth and went to Annapolis, and General Hill is
    just a general. You have been a great general. So I have a
    great deal of respect and affection for----
        Chairman Warner. Your time has expired. [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Roberts.
        Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In view of the Senator from Arkansas' remarks in regards to
    my position on a possible withdrawal from Korea, nothing could
    be farther from the truth. I would point out that in terms of
    war planning, on the first day of war we have one division, the
    Warrior Division, the South Koreans would have 28. The fourth
    day of war their Reserves would come on and they would have 44
    divisions, as I understand it.
        We also provide 50 percent of the air force capability, 80
    percent of the naval capability, and 100 percent of the command
    and control, and it is an integrated force. So there is no way
    that we should be even thinking about any kind of withdrawal
    for these combatants.
        Ten thousand members of the 37,000 who are combatants, of
    the Second Infantry Division, 10,000 in regards to the Air
    Force personnel, 15,000 in terms of headquarters and support,
    mostly in Seoul. But it is the 116,000 noncombatants that I am
    concerned about. I am concerned about combatants as well. Five
    thousand military dependents, and that was the key that I was
    really referring to; 5,000 to 10,000 other U.S. Government
    agencies and dependents; 100,000 businessmen, contractors,
    etc., mostly non-defense-related.
        Obviously, there is a long-range studying effort that you
    are going to do on this particular problem, but I wanted to
    make it very clear that I am not suggesting in any way any kind
    of withdrawal.
        General Hill, I was a fan of General Wilhelm when he was
    the Southern Command CINC and he pointed out to me at that
    particular time we had 31 nations involved with your command,
    30 of them were democracies. We have made so much progress
    since 1980, 360 million people, average age 14. In terms of the
    following issues: one, immigration, big-time issue for the
    United States; two, drugs; three, energy, more especially with
    Venezuela and the strike--we get 17 percent of our energy
    supply from Venezuela; where my wife is complaining that we are
    paying $2 a gallon in regards to gasoline--terrorism and
    trade--these issues affect our daily lives and pocketbooks.
        Yet, during the Balkans crisis we took away a lot of
    infrastructure from you, not from you personally but from the
    command, and have not put it back. Now we have the surge in
    regards to Iraq. My question to you is: Do you have the
    necessary funding and the infrastructure to do the job, with
    the thousands and thousands and thousands of miles in an area
    which we tend to ignore--not ignore; maybe benign, maybe not so
    benign, neglect. I am concerned about this because of the
    issues that I raise that directly affect the daily lives and
    pocketbooks of the American people.
        General Hill. Your points are well taken in terms of the
    importance of the region to the United States and I completely
    concur with that. If I needed one thing, I need greater
    intelligence support. But if I go back to the Joint Staff, all
    of us need greater intelligence support. That comes forward in
    my integrated priority list to the Department, and I understand
    priorities. They are sitting to my right at this point.
        Senator Roberts. Well, General, let me interrupt you, and I
    apologize for doing that. But I can introduce you to the
    chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I can promise you that
    you can get a full hearing from him, and if you want to come
    and visit the chairman of the Intelligence Committee we will be
    happy to take a hard look at that in your behalf, in
    conjunction, of course, with the chairman of the Armed Services
    Committee, who also serves on the Intelligence Committee.
        General Hill. Sir, it really comes down to a matter of
    prioritization. I have enough assets within my theater to do
    the missions that I have been allocated to do. I could always
    use more, as General LaPorte could use more and Admiral Fargo.
        Senator Roberts. I understand. I understand that.
        General Hill. That is the point I was making.
        Senator Roberts. Let me ask you a question in regards to
    Comandante Castro. Senator Akaka is no longer here, but he was
    with me in a trip to Cuba about, oh, a year and a half ago. The
    Comandante is 77 years old. I am concerned about post-Castro
    Cuba and I am concerned about trying to establish some tie of
    entrepreneurship, some tie so that democracy--I am not trying
    to get into the Cuban-American situation at all.
        It worries me that, with tourism down there and the growing
    drug problem there, that we could possibly make some progress
    if we entered into some kind of a joint understanding on
    narcotics control. That has been proposed before. It gets into
    the State Department and some ideological questions. I know it
    is controversial. Do you have any feeling about this?
        General Hill. Sir, Cuba along with many other countries in
    this region play in the drug trade. There is no doubt about
    that. If we could work out something where we could begin to
    get a handle on their part of the drug trade, it would be very
    useful.
        Senator Roberts. Let me point out, not that I do not have
    any illusions about Castro, but what his number one concern
    was, as I determined it to be during those meetings, those
    infamous 12- to 14-hour meetings where you do a lot more
    listening than talking, that he really was very much interested
    in that, because he is worried about his country and a drug
    cartel having undue influence in a post-Castro period.
        I would like to visit with you about that and perhaps we
    can bring that up in the closed session.
        General Hill. Yes, sir.
        Senator Roberts. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, General LaPorte, there have been a lot of press
    reports that North Korea has restarted its Yongbyon reactor. I
    do not know that anybody has officially told us that. Is that
    in fact correct?
        General LaPorte. The reactor to the best of my knowledge
    has been restarted. As far as the reprocessing plant, we do not
    have any indication that that has been restarted.
        Senator Levin. As far as moving the fuel rods from the
    storage facility to the reprocessing facility, has that been
    confirmed?
        General LaPorte. Could I address that in a closed session
    with you?
        Senator Levin. Sure.
        But you just indicated that as far as we know they have not
    yet resumed operation of the reprocessing facility?
        General LaPorte. Correct.
        Senator Levin. You've been asked about the testimony of the
    Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, yesterday about the
    enriched uranium program of North Korea not being far behind
    the plutonium program. I think both Admiral Fargo and General
    LaPorte were asked about this. General LaPorte, you indicated
    you preferred to comment on that in closed session. The problem
    with that is that Assistant Secretary Kelly talked in open
    session. It is difficult, it seems to me, to argue that that is
    still a classified issue when the Assistant Secretary of State
    has made a statement on the record publicly about that issue.
        I do not know quite how to go about that, Mr. Chairman.
    This would be your call on this. It is troubling to me that we
    do not get your testimony on that subject at a public hearing.
    Maybe you are being more circumspect, which is totally
    appropriate if he talked about classified information. But how
    is it still classified if the Assistant Secretary of State has
    commented publicly on the issue?
        Chairman Warner. Would you not think, Senator, that he
    could share his views in closed session and then you and I
    jointly could undertake to get such declassification as we felt
    appropriate?
        Senator Levin. All right. If that is more comfortable for
    you, that is fine with me. But I do think we have to resolve
    that disconnect there. That would be fine, Mr. Chairman.
        Now, Admiral Fargo, have we proposed allowing U.S. troops
    in the Philippines to participate in patrols?
        Admiral Fargo. In patrols?
        Senator Levin. Have we proposed to the Philippines that we
    participate in patrols with their army?
        Admiral Fargo. We are talking to the Government of the
    Philippines right now about what kind of additional help we can
    provide. Last year we conducted Balikatan 02-1, which was an
    exercise that allowed us to train, advise, and assist.
    Certainly any exercise that we conduct would have to be in a
    non-hostile environment. So to answer your question
    specifically, we have not worked out an arrangement past the
    current effort that is underway, which is the security
    assistance we are providing to train these five modules, the
    light reaction companies, the battalions, provide night vision
    capability, and infuse intelligence and planning into their
    system, plus the other exercises, the large array of exercises
    that we have.
        Senator Levin. So are you saying that if we make a proposal
    along this line it would be for patrols in a non-hostile
    environment? Is that what you are saying?
        Admiral Fargo. If it is an exercise, and that is what we
    agree with the Government of the Philippines that we would like
    to go forward with, then an exercise would have to be in a non-
    hostile environment.
        Chairman Warner. That is a training exercise.
        Admiral Fargo. A training exercise.
        Chairman Warner. For training.
        Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, in your written testimony you
    indicated that al Qaeda has given financial aid to a number of
    terrorist groups in the southern Philippines. Could you
    elaborate on any recent financial or technical support from al
    Qaeda to the Abu Sayyaf Group or to any other terrorist group
    in the Philippines?
        Admiral Fargo. We believe that al Qaeda has had both a
    training and a financial relationship with the Abu Sayyaf
    Group.
        Senator Levin. Would that be within the last few years?
        Admiral Fargo. Within the last few years, yes, sir. I can
    give you more specifics in closed session.
        Senator Levin. That would be fine.
        Are we getting cooperation, Admiral, from Indonesia in
    terms of the war on terrorism and in terms of the investigation
    of the killing of two Americans last August?
        Admiral Fargo. Senator, we are certainly getting
    cooperation on the war on terrorism. The cooperation with the
    Bali investigation has been excellent. It has led to the arrest
    of a number of Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, including the number
    three leader Samudra, and has certainly painted a much clearer
    picture for us of the operations of this group in Southeast
    Asia.
        We are not happy with the cooperation we have received on
    the Papua investigation, the Freeport Mining investigation, and
    we are continuing to talk to the Indonesian Government about
    how they can improve that investigation.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        General Hill, just one question for you--my time, should I
    just finish with one question?
        Chairman Warner. Sure, go right ahead.
        Senator Levin. At the time Hutchison Whampoa was the low
    bidder on a contract on port operation at the Panama Canal,
    there was a lot of concerns raised here by some members of the
    Senate about their connection with the Chinese Government. Has
    there been any threat to our security, any problem with
    Hutchison Whampoa operating those facilities?
        General Hill. No, sir, there has not.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Reed, any follow-up that you might have?
        Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Fine. Thank you. The committee will now
    commence its work in closed session in Hart 219. Thank you very
    much.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                       INDONESIAN MILITARY INVESTIGATION

        1. Senator Allard. Admiral Fargo, on August 31, 2001, a number of
    American teachers in Papua, Indonesia, were attacked as they were
    returning from a picnic outing. Two Americans died, and several others
    were wounded. The attack occurred during the middle of the day, less
    than a half mile away from an Indonesian military position, and lasted
    for approximately 45 minutes. The Indonesian police immediately
    launched an investigation into the attack and later issued a report
    concluding that there was a strong possibility that the attack had been
    carried out by members of the Indonesian military (TNI).
        After substantial U.S. diplomatic pressure, Indonesia's government
    ordered a new joint police/military investigation and agreed to allow
    the participation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI
    investigators recently returned to the United States from Indonesia and
    reported that they had received marginal cooperation from the
    Indonesian government. For example, the team was only allowed to
    interview military personnel from the region in the presence of a
    senior Indonesian military officer and was not given complete access to
    the evidence from the attack.
        I remain concerned about the lack of progress in the Indonesian
    investigation into this attack. The Government of Indonesia proved in
    the Bali investigation that it is capable of developing information on
    suspects and conducting a thorough investigation. However, in the
    August 31 attack on innocent Americans, it seems that the Indonesian
    government is not doing what it can to bring those responsible to
    justice. What is your assessment of the Indonesian government's
    determination to investigate this case and bring those responsible to
    justice?
        Admiral Fargo. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to comment
    on this extremely important matter.
        In short, I feel that the Government of Indonesia simply has not
    yet done enough to develop the evidence in this case, and to follow it
    wherever it leads.
        In my meeting with Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States,
    Ambassador Soemadi, on 26 November 2002, I made clear the seriousness
    with which the United States Government regards this case. I informed
    him that it could affect our entire relationship. The initial evidence
    suggesting possible TNI involvement was especially disturbing. Since
    then I have continued to be fully supportive of the embassy's efforts
    with the Government of Indonesia to pursue justice in this case.
        Unfortunately, Indonesia's government is still undergoing a very
    challenging transition to democracy after 32 years of authoritarian
    rule under former President Suharto. This transition has been made even
    more difficult by the lingering economic crisis, various incidents of
    regional violence, and more recently, challenges to the nascent
    democratic government from terrorism and extremist Islamic groups. I am
    hopeful from the recent prosecution and conviction of the TNI members
    who murdered Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay (even though the
    severity of the sentences was disappointing) that the government will
    continue to investigate this case and punish those found guilty.
        I can assure you that we will not abandon our efforts to pursue
    accountability for this tragedy; we feel that the further development
    of democratic government and the safety of United States and other
    foreign citizens in Indonesia are inextricably tied to bringing this
    incident to a satisfactory resolution.

        2. Senator Allard. Admiral Fargo, are you satisfied with the
    Indonesian military's cooperation with and participation in this
    investigation?
        Admiral Fargo. No, Senator, I am not. Our constant position has
    been that the Indonesian military must fully support the government's
    efforts to investigate this case, and to follow the evidence wherever
    it leads. This includes sharing of evidence with investigators and
    providing uninhibited access to witnesses. We will continue to insist
    upon these and any other necessary conditions until the case is
    satisfactorily resolved.

        3. Senator Allard. Admiral Fargo, in your prepared testimony, you
    expressed support for the International Military Education Training
    (IMET) funding provided by Congress last year for Indonesia. I agree
    that the IMET program is an important tool exposing Tentara Nasional
    Indonesia (TNI--Indonesia National Military) officers to democratic
    values and civilian leadership. Yet, I am troubled by allegations that
    personnel from the TNI were involved in the August 31 attack. Wouldn't
    you agree that the United States should withhold IMET funding until the
    Indonesian investigation has been completed and the TNI has been
    exonerated?
        Admiral Fargo. Thank you, Senator, for your positive opinion of the
    ability of the IMET program to favorably influence the development of
    democratic values within TNI. Respectfully, however, I feel that
    withholding IMET is not only unlikely to result in a satisfactory
    conclusion to this investigation, but that it will also hinder
    Indonesia's democratic development as well.
        Although TNI has already instituted significant reforms since the
    end of the New Order in May 1998 (reduction in the number of seats in
    the Legislature, divestment of the National Police, successive civilian
    Defense Ministers, a non-Army Supreme Commander, repudiation of their
    socio-political doctrine of ``Dwifungsi'' and the practice of inserting
    active duty officers in civilian government positions, and consistent
    support of the civilian government during three transitions of
    Presidential power), it still retains enough influence and access to
    resources to maintain its institutional integrity indefinitely,
    regardless of whether IMET is offered or withheld.
        I believe that IMET should be considered an enabler, rather than a
    reward, that will give TNI the tools and relationships to develop their
    organization into a modern, professionally managed force that is
    capable of working with their civilian leaders and other nations in
    addressing some of the serious problems that confront our community of
    democracies today, such as terrorism, sectarian violence, international
    peacekeeping requirements, piracy and other transnational issues. It is
    important that Indonesia develop the capacity to play this role because
    of the potential influence it can wield as the largest country in the
    Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the most populous
    Muslim-majority (and democratic) nation in the world. Because of this
    potential benefit, I believe it is as much in our interest to provide
    IMET as it is in Indonesia's to benefit from it. My experience has been
    that withholding educational opportunities from developing countries
    tends to perpetuate many of the dysfunctional, debilitating patterns of
    behavior that prevent them from advancing.
        I agree that it is important to send a clear message that in spite
    of significant reform, there is still a need for improvements in TNI's
    accountability and contribution to Indonesia's developing democracy.
    Besides personally discussing key issues with senior TNI officers at
    bilateral and regional meetings, and offering capacity-building
    activities through Pacific Command's Theater Security Cooperation
    Program (TSCP), we also endorse such restrictive measures as: 1)
    vetting candidates for U.S. education and training for a history of
    human rights violations or other illegal activities, 2) forgoing
    combat-related training activities, and instead focusing on reform,
    humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping, and 3)
    withholding full FMS (with exceptions only for areas supporting U.S.
    interests, such as counter-terrorism).
        In summary, I feel that the best approach to achieving
    accountability, furthering democratic reform, and supporting U.S.
    interests with TNI is a ``Balanced Approach'' that both enables
    advancement and discourages recidivism.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                   NORTH KOREA--URANIUM-BASED NUCLEAR PROGRAM

        4. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo and General LaPorte, on March 12,
    2003, Assistant Secretary James Kelly testified before the Senate
    Foreign Relations Committee that, ``the enriched uranium issue, which
    some have assumed is somewhere off in the fog of the distant future, is
    not.'' He added, ``It is only probably a matter of months, not years
    behind the plutonium program.'' Do you agree with this assessment?
        Admiral Fargo. [Deleted.]
        General LaPorte. [Deleted.]

                  PHILIPPINES--AL QAIDA-ABU SAYYAF GROUP LINK

        5. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, in your written testimony you
    state, ``bolstered by financial and technical support from al Qaeda,
    the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the
    southern Philippines have demonstrated their capability to attack U.S.
    and Western interests.'' Can you elaborate on recent financial and
    technical support from al Qaeda to the ASG?
        Admiral Fargo. [Deleted.]

        6. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, do we have fresh intelligence
    linking the ASG to al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah?
        Admiral Fargo. [Deleted.]

                      COLOMBIA--WORLDWIDE TERRORIST GROUPS

        7. Senator Levin. General Hill, the Department has requested
    authority to support use of counterdrug funding in Colombia and
    throughout the region to support a unified campaign against illicit
    narcotics-trafficking, to support a unified campaign against activities
    by organizations in the Americas hemisphere actively engaged in, or
    designated as, terrorist organizations.
        In your written statement you assert, to complement homeland
    security efforts and seal the seams through which terrorists
    infiltrate, we must take comprehensive measures in our region to combat
    international terrorism. You also state that Middle Eastern terrorist
    groups to include Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamiyya al Gammat have
    networks and support structures throughout the region. If you were
    granted this authority, would you use the counterdrug funding to fight
    the Middle Eastern groups you listed?
        General Hill. Terrorist organizations and drug trafficking
    organizations are frequently one and the same. Because it is difficult
    to meaningfully separate their activities it makes sense to deal with
    them holistically, using all available resources without the necessity
    for case-by-case analysis of a group's specific activities. National
    Security Policy Directive-18 and the statutory authorities in the
    Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Appropriations Bill allow us, in Colombia, to
    use counterdrug funds to support the Colombian Government's efforts
    against U.S.-designated terrorist organizations. These same authorities
    outside of Colombia against the activities of other U.S.-designated
    terrorist organizations would be beneficial.

        8. Senator Levin. General Hill, what other international terrorist
    groups fall under the definition of ``actively engaged in . . .
    terrorist organizations''--the Irish Republican Army, the Basque
    separatists?
        General Hill. [Deleted.]

        9. Senator Levin. General Hill, do you believe that the priority
    for using counterdrug assets should be fighting the narcoterrorists
    indigenous to Colombia and the other countries we are assisting?
        General Hill. I believe the priority of use for counterdrug
    resources should be counterdrug missions. However, we recognize that
    the activities of terrorist organizations cannot be meaningfully
    separated from the activities of narco-trafficking organizations.
    Therefore, if the organizations are one and the same, there are
    efficiencies to be gained by conducting both counterdrug and
    counterterrorism missions with the same resources.

        10. Senator Levin. General Hill, if so, how would you ensure that
    counterdrug funding was used primarily to fight drugs, and the
    insurgents who have the greatest role in producing and exporting those
    drugs?
        General Hill. Counterdrug authorities 1004 and 1033 mandate end-use
    monitoring and reporting. Under these counterdrug authorities, we track
    the DOD funding and the intended use of equipment, training, and other
    USG activities that support Colombian and other participating nation
    counternarcotics units responsible for fighting narco-terrorism.
    USSOUTHCOM employs rigid monitoring and reporting to ensure counterdrug
    funding is applied properly and against those insurgents who produce,
    export, and traffic drugs.

                             COLOMBIA--ERADICATION

        11. Senator Levin. General Hill, the White House reported 2 weeks
    ago that coca cultivation in Colombia has decreased by 15 percent, the
    first time since we began the current eradication program 3 years ago.
    A February 28 Washington Post account states that the drop in
    cultivation occurred in southern Colombia where most of the herbicide
    spraying is focused and that cultivation has increased in the east. In
    addition, cultivation has increased slightly in Peru and Bolivia. In
    Bolivia, President Sanchez de Lozada is under pressure to allow an
    increase in legal coca cultivation. Do you agree with the White House
    and Washington Post assessments?
        General Hill. Yes. According to the Interagency Assessment of
    Cocaine Movement eradication in four of Colombia's key coca growing
    areas reduced the coca crop 15 percent at the end of 2002, the first
    decline observed in Colombia's crop in a decade. The Government of
    Colombia with support from the Department of State's Narcotics Affairs
    Section (NAS) reportedly sprayed over 38 percent more area in 2002 than
    in 2001, resulting in reductions in coca production in the Putumayo,
    Narino, Norte de Santander, and Caqueta growing areas. The crops
    shifted back toward Guaviare to include Meta and Vichada with
    substantial new cultivation. Reportedly, 54 percent of the Colombian
    coca crop is being cultivated in this region; up from 33 percent in
    2001. In 2002, Peru had its first increase since 1995 with 4,100
    hectares of new cultivation. Bolivia's eradication teams were also
    unable to keep pace with new plantings in the Chapare resulting in a
    cultivation rise of 23 percent in 2002. The pressure on Bolivian
    President Sanchez de Lozada to increase the legal coca cultivation
    limit is coming from the Leftist Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party
    being led by Evo Morales, who is supported by the cocaleros. An
    agreement to increase legal cultivation (presently restricted to the
    Central Chapare region) for each small farmer is under debate.

        12. Senator Levin. General Hill, what are we doing to prevent
    cultivation from popping up in places where we are not eradicating?
        General Hill. From a military perspective, we have encouraged the
    Colombian military to mass their military operations, sequentially and
    within their capability, to secure ungoverned areas. This will allow
    the Colombian government to establish governance, enforce the rule of
    law, foster alternative development and bring other institutions and
    services to those areas. We are also training the Colombian military to
    create civil affairs and information operations capabilities that can
    persuade and assist the applicable Colombian population not to
    participate in coca cultivation, processing, and trafficking
    activities.

        13. Senator Levin. General Hill, will we be able to maintain
    success in southern Colombia over the long term?
        General Hill. Long-term success will require an improved,
    coordinated, and enduring interagency and regional effort sufficient to
    overcome 40 years of violence, criminal activities, and social
    inequities. Additionally, increased personal security for inhabitants,
    a functioning judiciary, visible government presence, and viable legal
    economic opportunities will help to ensure success in southern
    Colombia.

        14. Senator Levin. General Hill, how are we addressing possible
    displacement to Bolivia and other neighboring countries?
        General Hill. To support the reduction of illicit activities,
    SOUTHCOM has a permanent Military Information Support Team (MIST)
    assigned to Bolivia. The MIST team supports the objectives of the
    Bolivian U.S. country team and SOUTHCOM to prevent illicit trafficking.
    To improve Bolivia's capabilities to counter illicit trafficking, there
    have been six Special Operation Force deployments in the past 12 months
    and five Security Assistance Teams in the past 7 months to Bolivia.
    USSOUTHCOM works closely with the Andean Ridge countries to support
    their drug reduction efforts to contain the problem. To assist in
    containment, USSOUTHCOM supports the regional alternative development
    efforts of the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics
    and Law Enforcement Affairs and the U.S. Agency for International
    Development.

                            COUNTERNARCOTICS BRIGADE

        15. Senator Levin. General Hill, in your written testimony you
    state that the training of the Counter-Narcotics Brigade and the
    establishment and training of a Commando Battalion to pursue enemy
    leadership have already produced results. You are also conducting
    training in the Arauca Province to help the Colombian military protect
    valuable infrastructure, including the Cano Limon oil pipeline. What
    concrete results have the Colombians achieved to date as a result of
    this training, and what are the measures of effectiveness that you are
    using to determine military success?
        General Hill. The immediate results of the mission may be observed
    in recent operations conducted by the Colombian military. Since the
    initiation of expanded authorities for Colombia in October 2002, the
    Colombian military has completed the following significant military
    operations:
        [Deleted.]
        All of these actions reflect progress in several of the training
    objectives for USSOUTHCOM's mission in Colombia. In addition, training
    of the Commando Battalion continues on track, with an expected
    operational capability in April 2003.
        As for the overall measurements of effectiveness, in the initial
    phases of the expanded mission in Colombia (commenced in January 2003),
    measuring success will be based on the completion of USSOUTHCOM-
    sponsored training, equipping, and support of specified Colombian
    military units, combined with measuring the demonstrated capabilities
    of these supported units.

                          SPECIAL OPERATIONS TRAINING

        16. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, in your written testimony you
    state that through the Special Operations Command Pacific and Joint
    Task Force-510, your command has the ability to deploy special
    operators anywhere to combat terrorism. You add that ``This capability,
    however, depends on building and maintaining relations with supporting
    allies and friendly nations. We build and maintain these relations
    through our Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and other Theater
    Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP).'' How important are the SOF
    training missions in the various countries within your area of
    operations in terms of: 1) maintaining readiness; 2) deploying troops
    into familiar and unhostile environments; and 3) gaining participation
    of other countries in operations or exercises that are important to
    you?
        Admiral Fargo. SOF training deployments foster combat-ready forces,
    regional knowledge, cross-cultural understanding, and national
    alliances.
        To support theater contingency and operation plans, U.S. SOF must
    be capable of conducting sustained combat operations in rugged
    environments, diverse terrain, and dense urban areas. Maintaining
    requisite skills is a never-ending challenge, requiring U.S. SOF to
    refine theater-specific tactics, techniques, and procedures during in-
    theater deployments.
        Unlike training in the Continental United States, in-theater
    deployments offer first-hand knowledge of theater-specific operational
    conditions. During these deployments, SOF work hand-in-hand with
    foreign nation counterparts, building interoperability, sharpening
    language skills, and exchanging solutions to operational challenges.
    They accomplish these mission-essential activities ``in-country,''
    demonstrating America's moral character, military power, democratic
    principles, and economic might.
        In addition to enhancing combat skills, in-theater deployments hone
    SOF command and control functions, support relationships, and
    collateral mission activities. SOF planners, logisticians, intelligence
    analysts, civil affairs and psychological operations specialists,
    communicators, and medical personnel routinely participate in SOF
    deployments. While doing so, SOF subject matter experts work with host
    nation counterparts and civilians, enhancing regional expertise. Such
    interaction is invaluable when coordinating forward staging bases or
    executing short-notice deployments.
        Regional access and alliances are two additional SOF deployment by-
    products. SOF events have created inroads with previous belligerents,
    strengthened relationships with burgeoning friends, and nurtured
    historic partners. SOF deploy to Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, training
    local agencies to disarm land mines and interdict drug smugglers. SOF
    are training in India, generating relationships with future allies.
    Pending appropriate authorization, U.S. SOF are poised to re-initiate
    training with select Indonesian and Burmese military units. Given
    rising international terrorism and pressing requirements to obtain
    counter-terrorism intelligence, SOF training deployments and related
    host nation interactions will soon become even more valuable.

                               LANGUAGE TRAINING

        17. Senator Levin. Admiral Fargo, in your written testimony on
    intelligence assets you state, ``it is essential that the Defense
    Language Institute develop tests for languages/dialects that accurately
    assess language skills of service personnel.'' Have you encountered
    problems with assessing language skills, identifying who has them, and
    retaining personnel and proficiencies?
        Admiral Fargo. Yes, we continue to have problems assessing language
    skills and also have problems identifying speakers of Operation
    Enduring Freedom (OEF) languages and dialects. The Defense Manpower
    Data Center's (DMDC) Automated Language Finder (ALF) database currently
    does not track speakers of six languages and dialects required for OEF
    namely: Cebuano, Chavacanno, Maranoan, Maguindanoan, Tausug and Yakan.
    Further, no language proficiency tests currently exist for 18 PACOM OEF
    languages/dialects: Achenese, Balinese, Bengali, Cebuano, Chavacanno,
    Ilocano, Javanese, Malay, Maranoan, Maguindanoan, Pushtu, Punjabi,
    Singhala, Sudanese, Tamil, Tausug, Urdu and Yakan. It is not cost-
    effective to maintain cryptolinguist communities for all languages and
    dialects required for OEF. However, it is essential that speakers of
    OEF languages and dialects be identified and tested so that short
    notice requirements can be filled by speakers with known proficiencies.
    Retention of linguists is directly related to use of their language
    skills. Retention of linguists who use their language skills in support
    of operations and planning equals or exceeds the retention of non-
    linguists. Turnover and loss of linguists who do not use their language
    skills is significant.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                   ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS

        18. Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, and General Hill,
    the Department of Defense has established a set of programs called ACTD
    which are designed to help accelerate the adoption of new technologies
    by operators. This largely successful program brings together
    developers and warfighters and has successfully transitioned some
    systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), into current
    operations. How are you working with the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program to test and
    evaluate new technologies and the new operational concepts that they
    enable?
        Admiral Fargo. The United States Pacific Command continues to lead
    the way among regional combatant commanders using Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstrations to operationalize science and technology for
    the warfighter. Today we are involved in 18 active ACTD projects, more
    than any other theater command. We have distributed the transformation
    workload across the whole theater--almost every Service Component,
    Joint Task Force and Sub-Unified Commander, as well as each of my Staff
    Directors, is responsible for executing one or more ACTD.
        Investing our time in ACTDs provides an ideal way for my forward-
    deployed forces to confront emerging technologies early and influence
    the way they will be introduced into the joint force. ACTDs are
    organized as projects, and so benefit from having crisp objectives,
    schedules, budgets and deliverables. They demand partnerships between
    technical project managers, transition managers, and my operational
    project managers, each with a clear role in the project's ultimate
    successful demonstration and transition. These projects encourage my
    joint force to create new tactics, techniques, procedures and concepts
    of operations, a useful military product with value often exceeding
    that of the new technology. By applying project management discipline
    to ACTDs my forces are able to assess the military utility of these
    technologies and concepts within a fixed time.
        In addition, U.S. Pacific Command integrates its Joint
    Experimentation and Transformation initiatives with the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense's Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
    program. Adhering to the philosophy of ``experiment while we
    exercise'', Pacific Command actively engages in experimentation during
    all its joint training exercises, such as Cobra Gold and Tandem Thrust
    with our coalition partners, and Terminal Fury with our own joint
    forces. In conjunction with our special focus Command and Control
    Exercises (C2Xs) Pacific Command's joint exercise program provides the
    operational venue for hosting and applying advanced concept technology
    demonstrations, other technology initiatives, and advanced procedures
    to quickly add new capabilities to our joint forces. Pacific Command
    also hosts the Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration for its
    second year, providing another international opportunity to apply
    Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations to an operational scenario
    for experimentation and test. Timing of all our exercises allows
    experimentation and spiral development, characterized by hands-on
    feedback from the operators and valuable leave-behinds for the joint
    warfighters after assessment. This rapid spiral transformation over the
    past 3 years, currently, and in the coming years, puts capability in
    user's hands years ahead of traditional acquisition timelines.
        Through funding support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    for Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrations, Pacific Command has
    integrated a joint fires capability into the headquarters and each of
    its primary Joint Task Forces for addressing time-sensitive and time-
    critical targets with an initiative called the Automated Deep
    Operations Coordination System. We've extended hospital diagnosis,
    treatment, and surgery to the front lines with an initiative called
    Joint Medical Operations-Telemedicine. We're simplifying logistics
    tracking and host nation support with a multinational equipment and
    supplies tracker called Coalition Theater Logistics.
        Joint Task Force Wide Area Relay Network (JTF WARNET) is a
    Transformation Initiative of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) Advanced Systems and Concepts (AS&C) and Commander U.S. Pacific
    Command (USPACOM) resulting from the Extending the Littoral Battlespace
    (ELB) ACTD. The ELB ACTD demonstration phase completed in fiscal year
    2001 with its major system demonstration exercise Kernel Blitz
    (Experimentation) (KBX). As a result of the advanced warfighting
    concepts and capabilities demonstrated, PACOM and OSD AS&C restructured
    the ELB ACTD fiscal year 2002 and 2003 transition phase as the JTF
    WARNET initiative to enable joint tactical level digital connectivity
    and command and control interoperability. In April 2002 the Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council approved JTF WARNET to build, test, and
    develop Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) and Tactics, Techniques and
    Procedures (TTPs) to deploy the first prototype to PACOM operational
    forces. All services, Special Operational Command, OSD, PACOM and Joint
    Forces Command are partnered in the JTF WARNET initiative.
        In fiscal year 2002 and 2003, PACOM Component forces have assisted
    in setting requirements and developing CONOPs and TTPs for employing
    the JTF WARNET prototype. In June through September of 2003 PACOM
    Component forces will assist in testing and evaluating JTF WARNET in a
    series of field exercises. In fiscal year 2004 JTF WARNET capabilities
    will be deployed in Western Pacific and will participate in exercise
    Cobra Gold 04.
        The Joint Tactical Radio System Joint Program Office has been named
    as the JTF WARNET Transition Manager for fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
    PACOM has been instrumental in developing the JTF WARNET Transition
    Plan that is completing final staffing for approval. JTF WARNET
    products will transition into 23 programs of record. The JTF WARNET
    fielding and transition efforts are fully funded.
        Additionally, we're taking control of the limited frequency
    bandwidth available for joint operations and dynamically controlling
    which applications and operational priorities are allocated that
    bandwidth. This initiative is expected to become the Information Flow
    Analysis and Control Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
    beginning in fiscal year 2004, as a result of its experimental
    application and force enhancement throughout Pacific Command units. To
    help Pacific Command achieve more accurate planning with specific
    desired results, we're working closely to bring Theater Effects Based
    Operations and Joint Networked Fires and Effects to the range of
    Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrations that have modernized our
    force capabilities so rapidly within the past 3 years.
        The U.S. Pacific Command continues to work closely with the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense for Advanced Concepts Technology
    Demonstrations to provide a true operational environment--not a battle
    lab--for mature and promising technologies and procedures. That
    office's support of Pacific Command initiatives is a sound investment
    in rapid spiral transformation of our joint and combined operational
    forces.
        General LaPorte. Since the inception of the ACTD and to this day
    USFK works directly with the Principal Assistant to the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts (DUSD-AS&C), Dr.
    Charles Perkins. Dr. Perkins and USFK communicate directly and
    regularly via email and telephone. These communications are
    supplemented with frequent face-to-face meetings in Korea.
        General Hill. We are working very closely with the Deputy Under
    Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts in the planning
    and execution of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration programs. At
    this time, we are the operational sponsor for three major technology
    demonstrations in our geographical area of responsibility. One program
    is developing the capability to find targets of interest such as narco-
    terrorist camps, supporting infrastructure, and associated lines of
    communications hidden under the dense foliage of the Andean Ridge. This
    technology will enable key operational capability in the Command's most
    critical region and other similar operational environments in the
    world. Another technology demonstration is designed to rapidly collect
    high-resolution terrain mapping from unmanned aerial vehicles. This
    program will allow us to explore high-definition elevation data to
    improve the effectiveness and survivability of forces entering
    unfamiliar or hostile environments. Also, we are teaming with the U.S.
    European Command to undertake a technological demonstration that will
    provide protection of key infrastructure and personnel against human-
    carried bombs. This teaming arrangement will ensure a broad set of
    fixed and mobile requirements applicable to military and civilian
    agencies. In the future, we expect to continue our support of these
    Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations. The Deputy Under Secretary
    of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts provides tremendous
    support through technology demonstrations to meet my near, mid and long
    term operational needs. Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations are
    absolutely necessary to develop operational capability in a methodical,
    cost-effective and expeditious manner.

                              SCIENTIFIC ADVISORS

        19. Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, and General Hill,
    you are constantly being faced with new technological threats (such as
    cyberattack, adaptation of cheap commercial technologies for military
    purpose, chemical and biological attack, etc.) as well as opportunities
    to apply new revolutionary technologies to address operational
    requirements. How are you provided with scientific and technical advice
    to support your missions and operations?
        Admiral Fargo. We receive advice about both threats and
    opportunities arising from emerging science and technology from many
    sources. At the first level, I have my staff of senior professional
    military officers who represent all the services, and branches of the
    services. These men and women are subject matter experts in the various
    areas of modern warfare, and as professionals they maintain their
    connections and currency in the fields where they are subject matter
    experts. Embedded in my staff at PACOM I have representatives from the
    Office of Naval Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central
    Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense
    Information Systems Agency, and others. I also have a Chief Information
    Officer to keep me apprised of the latest threats and opportunities in
    Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C\4\I).
    I have an office of Defense Cooperation in Armaments to monitor science
    and technology in the Asian-Pacific region. Finally, I have a Science
    and Technology Advisor (STA) whose purpose is to exchange information,
    and to coordinate projects and policy with the national, international,
    and Department of Defense science and technology community.
        The STA maintains close working contact with each of the offices
    listed above, and with the science advisors for each of my service
    components and sub-unified commands within the region. This close
    relationship encourages a free flow of scientific and technical
    information between and among the commands, and in particular
    encourages the development of limited objective experiments and
    demonstration projects that can quickly assess the military utility of
    emerging technologies. By confronting new technologies early in a
    forward military setting, we are able to take the lessons away rapidly
    in terms we can use, namely improved concepts of operations, tactics,
    techniques, and procedures. When these lessons help influence
    acquisition, so much the better.
        My STA stays current in many of the issues concerning Department of
    Defense science and technology issues, coordinating with the OSD, and
    the Service science and technology organizations and laboratories. He
    also acts as conduit for international cooperation for various ongoing
    and planned projects. For instance, the STA brokered the first
    international agreement for cooperative development of an ACTD with
    Singapore on the SPARTAN unmanned surface vehicle. This improves our
    theater security by providing unmanned vessels interoperable by either
    navy to support escort of our vessels in the straits of Malacca. The
    Science and Technology Advisor, along with my Logistics Directorate,
    also developed an international cooperative development arrangement
    with Australia for the Coalition Theater Logistics ACTD. Since then we
    have begun to explore developing similar cooperative projects with
    Japan, Korea, India, and Malaysia.
        PACOM is also taking the initiative to develop responses to
    chemical and biological attacks. In addition to the ongoing Restoration
    of Operations ACTD, my Plans Directorate has developed a roadmap and is
    pursuing technology and projects that can reduce the effects of
    chemical/biological warfare attacks.
        PACOM's focus on operationalizing science and technology has given
    me the ability to build an incomparable team of advisors from all the
    services to address science and technology challenges in the region.
        General LaPorte. USFK receives scientific and technical advice
    through a number of sources: The Army Materiel Command provides a
    Science Advisor through Army Materiel Command-Field Assistance in
    Science and Technology (AMC-FAST); the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    (DTRA) has an Liaison Officer (LNO) within the command; the Defense
    Information Systems Agency (DISA) has an office in theater; and the
    Program Executive Office for Command Control and Computers Tactical
    (PEOC3T) also maintains a presence in Korea. USFK also receives
    assistance from the USPACOM Science and Technology Advisor (STA). In
    the area of modeling and simulations, USFK receives effective technical
    support from throughout the DOD. The Defense Modeling and Simulation
    Office (DMSO) maintains a full time liaison officer at the Korea Battle
    Simulation Center (KBSC). Additionally USJFCOM, USSTRATCOM, and the
    modeling and simulation agencies of all four services provide the
    latest in simulations and associated links to joint and service C\4\ISR
    systems.
        General Hill. I receive scientific and technical advice to meet my
    missions and operations through the Office of the Command's Science and
    Technology Advisor. My pool of science and technology personnel
    provides me with extensive Air Force, Army, Navy, and industrial
    experience. In fact, the U.S. Army Materiel Command--Field Assistance
    in Science and Technology, the U.S. Navy Office of Naval Research, and
    the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts
    assist with scientific and developmental engineering manpower to the
    Command. The advisors identify, analyze, consolidate and coordinate
    technical solutions to operational requirements. In addition, they
    actively seek new technologies to improve our operational capability.
    Their goal is to achieve a balance between the aggressive pull of
    operational requirements and the push of technical innovations to
    include transformational activities. My advisors maintain close
    liaisons with the scientific and technical community at large from the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, national agencies, Services,
    industry, academia and our participating nations. Examples of support
    include the application of an innovative foliage penetrating radar to
    current operations; initiatives to improve wide area maritime
    surveillance, detection and monitoring for tactical riverine
    operations, and bio-terrorism; and, the development of a red team
    program in U.S. Southern Command.

        20. Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, and General Hill,
    how are you connected to the various Service technology development
    organizations in order to address quick response technology needs and
    questions?
        Admiral Fargo. Pacific Command is connected with the various
    Service technology development organizations, and other organizations
    that collectively make up the national research enterprise, through
    many layers of staff interaction. My staff, which is organized by
    operational discipline, is made up of professional military officers
    who have deep experience within both their Services and their military
    specialties. They often maintain contact with Service science and
    technology organizations and laboratories to develop quick-response
    solutions to current needs. My staff is augmented with liaison officers
    from many Service and Department of Defense agencies who assure that
    their products and expertise is known to Pacific Command, and that
    Pacific Command's emerging challenges are known to their home
    laboratories. My staff includes a Chief Information Officer (CIO) who
    is a national leader in the current discussions about the future
    architecture of world-wide command information infrastructure. Finally,
    my staff also includes an office of the Science and Technology Advisor
    who coordinates a broad program of technology projects, and maintains a
    network of connections to address quick response technology needs and
    questions.
        Each of my theater Service components has a Science and Technology
    Advisor (STA) who maintains close ties with their Service technology
    development centers. The STA's and CIO's offices maintain close working
    relationships with the theater Service component STAs as well as
    maintaining their own ties within the Navy and Air Force technology
    communities. This group collaborates on theater projects employing new
    technology from various Service laboratories or technology centers.
    Three such recent projects have explored the use of written and spoken
    language machine translators for operational use, developing and
    testing a system that manages the limited bandwidth available to our
    Joint Task Forces at sea, and developing a counter-sniper weapons
    system. It is important to emphasize that technology employed without a
    developed concept of operations (CONOPs) or tactics, techniques and
    procedures (TTPs) provide nothing the operator in the field can use.
    These Limited Objective Experiments provide the operators the
    opportunity to develop the CONOPs and TTPs while determining the
    military utility of the technology. They then can provide improvement
    feedback for the project. In the case of the language translation
    devices, and the bandwidth management, the real world operations
    resulted in significant upgrades to improve the system. If the project
    is successful then these experiments will lead to the formulation of an
    ACTD.
        In addition to the ties to the Service technology developers, the
    STA staffs are tied into the national technology agencies, such as the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense Information Systems
    Agency, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as well as
    the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Science and
    Technology and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
    Communications, and Intelligence.
        General LaPorte. Army Materiel Command-Field Assistance in Science
    and Technology (AMC-FAST) has a formal staff of ``Quick Reaction
    Specialists'' that receive requests from the field and respond back
    with solutions. United States Forces Korea (USFK) is intimately tied in
    with this staff and is currently receiving support through two separate
    programs within AMC-FAST. USFK also maintains close liaison with Air
    Force Operational Test and Experimentation Command, the Air Armaments
    Center, and the National Assessment Group. USFK and USJFCOM have also
    established a strong program of interaction on developing projects.
        General Hill. I am connected to the various Service technology
    development organizations through the working interfaces between my
    science advisors and agencies within the U.S. Army Research Laboratory
    and U.S. Army Communications-Electronic Command. My advisors also
    interact with the U.S. Navy technology development offices such as the
    Office of Naval Research and Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition,
    the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts
    provides U.S. Southern Command with links to other technology
    organizations such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and
    the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. This connectivity provides forums
    to address my operational shortfalls through special joint initiatives,
    Service programs, and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.

        21. Senator Reed. Admiral Fargo, General LaPorte, and General Hill,
    how can that connectivity be improved?
        Admiral Fargo. The Nation's research enterprise is a vast and
    dynamic endeavor that involves universities, industry, national and
    service laboratories, and Department of Defense funding and policy
    agencies. This enterprise represents a tremendous reservoir of talent
    that can reasonably be applied to the issues we face in U.S. Pacific
    Command, when we are effective at attracting and focusing their
    attention. We do a good job of this by using multiple channels to
    communicate with OSD. We make our needs known through my Integrated
    Priority List and through persistent contact with the national research
    enterprise at all levels.
        Overall, I am satisfied and our process is working well. Improved
    connectivity with the Nation's research enterprise would mean more
    effective joint technologies for U.S. Pacific Command. This effort
    would aid in bridging the technological gap between the Services and
    between us and our coalition partners. We continually strive to broaden
    our scope of involvement with the national research enterprise. This
    year alone we have hosted the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for
    Science and Technology, and leadership from the Defense Advanced
    Research Projects Agency and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. U.S.
    Pacific Command maintains a partnership with both of these agencies
    including experimentation in unmanned vehicles, and a new U.S. Pacific
    Command focal role addressing chemical and biological weapon
    mitigation.
        General LaPorte. The Army Materiel Command-Field Assistance in
    Science and Technology (AMC-FAST) Science Advisor position in Korea has
    been vacant since October 2002. Filling this position would be a
    significant improvement. Also, AMC-FAST is an Army organization;
    providing USFK a Navy and Air Force equivalent would be of significant
    value to take advantage of synergistic efforts within all of Department
    of Defense.
        General Hill. I am satisfied we are on-track in the way we work
    with developmental commands within the Department of Defense, with
    Services and, with the other Regional Combatant Commands (RCC) to
    address operational and technology challenges. I have directed my
    science and technology staff to routinely coordinate with, and leverage
    the technical accomplishments of other commands and agencies. In order
    to improve connectivity, we are increasing information exchanges and
    interaction at every level of DOD, Service, RCC and non-defense
    agencies to ensure USSOUTHCOM's unique mission needs are considered
    during planning, resource allocation and execution phases. I have also
    directed that the staff be more proactive in identifying both potential
    and mature technical solutions to solving the command's requirements.
    Through active interface, in an increasingly collaborative environment,
    we are seeking to leverage the success other RCCs are having in any
    given area. Finally, I have recently been able to increase my science
    and technology staff, having them report directly to a general officer
    whose responsibilities include seeking new and transformational methods
    wherever they exist for routine and operational missions.

        [Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                           BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
    room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John
    Warner (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, Allard,
    Sessions, Levin, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson,
    Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor.
        Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: Brian R. Green,
    professional staff member; William C. Greenwalt, professional
    staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; and
    Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Kenneth M. Crosswait, professional
    staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member;
    and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
    Florell, and Jennifer Key.
        Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell,
    assistant to Senator Inhofe; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator
    Allard; Arch Galloway, II, assistant to Senator Sessions; James
    P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; Elizabeth King,
    assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani Kalipi and Richard
    Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
    Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to
    Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and
    Terri Glaze and Andy York, assistants to Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. Given the historic moment, I think that
    each Senator should consider using a minute or two for an
    opening statement, if he or she so desires, before we get to
    the particulars of this very important hearing.
        I would like to say I was very privileged last night to be
    in attendance with my colleague, Senator Levin, and other
    leadership from the Senate and House as the President spoke
    with us in the Oval Office--that is, the Cabinet room, prior to
    his addressing the Nation at 8 o'clock. I have unhesitatingly
    given my support to this courageous President throughout this
    controversy for many months.
        His address to the Nation last night was very clear, to the
    point, and entirely consistent with his views as Commander in
    Chief and the responsibility he has under our Constitution. It
    is my judgment that he is acting consistent with a series of
    U.N. resolutions, most particularly 1441. He has put together a
    coalition of nations. While not as large as that in 1991, in my
    judgment, it is equally significant.
        There were statements to the effect that we are going
    without the support of Muslim nations. That is incorrect. A
    number of those nations are providing us with port facilities,
    air bases, overflight rights. It is clear that the
    preponderance of the nations in that region of the world are in
    support of the actions that we, Great Britain, and Australia,
    with our troops, are undertaking to eliminate the weapons of
    mass destruction.
        I find certainly in my State and across the Nation a
    growing support among our people for the actions taken by the
    President. That is as it should be. It is my hope and
    expectation that those of us here on Capitol Hill, who have
    expressed a diversity of opinions, will now close ranks behind
    the men and women of the Armed Forces, and indeed the Commander
    in Chief, as he undertakes to carry forward this mission in the
    cause of freedom.
        Senator Levin, do you care to say a few words?
        Senator Levin. I was not planning on doing so, Mr.
    Chairman, but since you have invited us to do so, let me just
    add a word perhaps similar to what I expressed yesterday on the
    floor of the Senate at great length.
        The President has now decided to end the diplomatic effort.
    Those of us who have questioned the administration's approach,
    including this Senator, will now be rallying behind the men and
    women of our Armed Forces to give them the full support that
    they deserve, because it seems certain that we will soon be at
    war.
        The question of the approach was based on a number of
    factors, including the fact that we have invoked the
    resolutions of the Security Council, including 1441, as the
    basis for proceeding, and yet now ignore the apparent
    unwillingness of the Security Council to support military
    action at this time. It is obvious that nine members of the
    Security Council were not able to be aligned by the
    administration to support a second resolution, even though the
    President said there would be a vote just a few days ago.
        But that is water over the dam. Last October, a majority of
    both houses of Congress voted to authorize the President to use
    military force with or without the express authority of the
    United Nations. I disagreed with that decision. I offered an
    alternative. But the overriding fact is that this democracy
    functions through debate and through decision. The decision to
    give the President wide authority was democratically arrived
    at.
        So now we have courageous men and women in harm's way, who
    are not just carrying out an order of the Commander in Chief
    with bravery and the highest form of professionalism, they are
    also implementing the outcome of that democratic debate in
    Congress. This Nation honors and protects democratic debate and
    the resolution of that debate.
        So I am sure that all of us feel, regardless of what
    position we took on whether or not to go with or without the
    express authority of the United Nations, as the President said
    he would request, those men and women should and, I believe, do
    know--that they have the full support and the fervent prayers
    of all the American people as they carry out their missions.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        We will just go back and forth.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, thank you. First of all, I
    would join you in your comments. I do appreciate Senator
    Levin's comments that now we join together after we have had a
    fervent debate on the need to and how we deal with the Iraqis
    and Saddam Hussein. We have historically, in this country, had
    our debate and then joined together to support the men and
    women overseas who are putting their lives on the line for
    freedom and the security of America.
        Many of us in policy decisionmaking really do appreciate
    their commitment. I have a lot of confidence in their
    leadership and a lot of confidence in their equipment and
    getting them supplied and prepared over there to meet the
    coming challenges, I think, in the next few days.
        As chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Mr.
    Chairman, I plan to closely follow the development of our vital
    defenses. I think they are important to the future mission of
    all branches of the military. I have been saying for years that
    the missile threat to this Nation is here and we must be
    prepared. I think this was confirmed by the Director of Central
    Intelligence, George Tenet, during our hearing on September 12.
    He was asked if North Korea had a missile capable of hitting
    the West Coast of the United States. Director Tenet stated,
    very unambiguously at the time, that the declassified answer is
    yes, they can do that.
        North Korea is not the only country of concern that is
    developing long-range ballistic missiles. This threat is
    growing and we remain extremely vulnerable to the missile
    attack. That is why the December announcement by the President
    to deploy a missile defense system is so important. The
    national security of this Nation is at risk and we must be
    ready.
        I also want to thank all the witnesses for being here. I
    know you have a lot on your plate at this time and I thank you
    for taking the time to share with us your thoughts on this
    important issue.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, I thank you for suggesting, as
    did Senator Levin, that we have a full committee hearing. In
    due course, I will turn the chair over to you as the
    subcommittee chairman.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Are there other colleagues who would like
    to make a brief opening statement relative to the matter other
    than what is before the committee?
        Yes. Go ahead, Senator Reed.
        Senator Reed. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.
        Like of all of us, we are expecting the commitment of
    military forces. I have every confidence that they will
    prevail. That confidence is borne out by having associated with
    many of the commanders as classmates and friends for 30 years.
    They are extraordinary Americans and they will do a great job
    for our country.
        Their job is to carry out the orders of the Commander in
    Chief. Our job is to continue to probe and ask questions, so
    that the policy is the right policy for the country. That is
    the process of debate and deliberation in our system of
    government, a system that we would like to see in Iraq.
        When it comes to the issues before this committee, we
    continue to raise serious questions, because these are
    complicated and serious issues. That is why I think this
    hearing is very important.
        Over the last few years, particularly the last two, as I
    chaired the Strategic Subcommittee, we have tried to focus on
    deploying equipment after it has been thoroughly tested, not
    without testing. We wanted to fund activities that could be
    executed, not simply to provide funds that would not lead to
    executable programs. Third, to avoid excessive funding for just
    nonspecific activities. Those questions still remain and we
    will keep raising those questions, because that is our
    responsibility and our job. We are committed to do it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. We all recognize your
    deep interest in the command structure for this particular
    conflict since a number of them were class mates,
    contemporaneous at West Point with you and in your own
    distinguished military career.
        If you wish to have a leave of absence to join them, the
    Chair so grants it. [Laughter.]
        Senator Reed. I do not know what I could add, other than
    enthusiasm.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Chairman, the die has been cast. I want
    our troops to know that we are proud of them. The reports we
    have of them is that their training is at the optimum, and they
    are ready for anything. I want our troops to know that we are
    proud they are out there, and we want them to know that we are
    here in Congress to support them in every way. I want to be one
    of those here as a Senator to do that. Of course, we want to
    wish them well in everything that they do.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator. You were a trooper
    yourself at one time in an early period of our history.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I enjoyed watching you
    and Senator Levin last night.
        Chairman Warner. I enjoyed watching you earlier this
    morning. [Laughter.]
        Senator Levin. I enjoyed watching Senator Warner last
    night. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Warner. That is part of our responsibilities.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I have the privilege of being the
    ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. I am
    looking forward to getting into the specifics. I have a lot of
    questions. I do not know all of you personally, but I do know
    Secretary Aldridge personally, and he is one of the best
    appointments in this administration. I have lots of questions
    for you, Pete. So I am looking forward to it.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We live and
    work in an environment where debate and differences of opinion
    are crucial to the democracy and the freedoms that we enjoy and
    we protect. But there are times when we need to recognize the
    debate may be over, decisions have been made, and it is time to
    put the differences behind us, to join together. This is one of
    those times where we need now to support the men and women in
    uniform and support their efforts throughout the world.
        We hope and pray for their safety and their speedy return.
    We hope that things will turn out as they are planned.
        It is important that we join together as a Nation today and
    in the days ahead, because there will be differences of
    opinion. But it is important that we put those aside for the
    common good of our men and women in uniform and come together
    and support their efforts.
        I thank you very much for the opportunity.
        Chairman Warner. I thank the Senator.
        Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just
    reiterate the feelings of my colleagues in terms of rallying
    around the troops at this time, regardless of the differences
    of opinion that may have existed previously. We all keep them
    in our thoughts and our prayers at this important hour.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Senator, the record reflects that you are
    one of the original drafters of the resolution that passed the
    Senate by 77 votes. I was privileged to be associated with you
    as one of the four drafters myself.
        Senator Bayh. The privilege is mine, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have
    anything to add other than it is a very serious moment in
    American history and for all Americans, and really for all the
    world. It is just a time, I think, that calls for prayer. We
    need to pray for the leadership of this country, including the
    President and our military leaders and planners, and certainly
    the troops out there on the ground. I just appreciate the
    opportunity you have given us this morning.
        Chairman Warner. I thank the Senator.
        Senator Levin and I now will give our opening statements
    relative to the matter at hand.
        The definition of homeland defense is ever-expanding. But
    before us today is a panel of individuals who are entrusted
    with one of the most critical chapters of homeland defense, a
    chapter that many of us, including this Senator, have advocated
    for years and years, since I have been in this United States
    Senate.
        You, as the Four Horsemen, are bringing into fruition the
    hopes and dreams that so many of us have had, beginning with
    our former president, Ronald Reagan, when he initiated the
    boldest steps in this direction, followed then by George
    Herbert Walker Bush.
        I thank Senator Levin and Senator Allard for suggesting we
    have this at a full committee hearing this morning.
        I welcome the witnesses. We have the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Acquisition, Mr. Aldridge; the Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation, Mr. Christie; the Director of
    the Missile Defense Agency, General Kadish; and Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for International Security, Dr. J.D.
    Crouch.
        Thank you all, gentlemen.
        Events in the world today underscore the importance of this
    hearing. As our troops prepare for possible conflict with Iraq,
    U.S. missile defense assets are now at this moment being
    deployed throughout the Middle East in the Persian Gulf region.
    Turkey, Israel, and a number of nations in the Gulf are, today,
    defended by U.S. Patriot batteries against the missile threats
    posed by Iraq.
        In addition, with U.S. assistance, Israel has developed and
    deployed its own national defense system centered around the
    important Arrow Program. Our Nation was a major contributor in
    many ways to the development of that program. These deployments
    are a key component of President Bush's vision of a layered
    missile defense system capable of defending the United States,
    its allies, friends, and deployed military forces against the
    increasing threat posed by ballistic missiles and weapons of
    mass destruction.
        This is not a future hypothetical threat we are discussing.
    It is here and now, as Senator Allard pointed out. According to
    the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, in his
    testimony before this committee, and I quote him, ``The United
    States faces a near-term ICBM threat from North Korea. Over the
    next several years, we could face a similar threat from Iran
    and possibly Iraq.''
        September 11 was a vivid reminder that the United States is
    vulnerable to attack in ways we never imagined. It is our duty
    to protect the American people against the full range of
    threats as we can best envision them. President Bush has given
    that leadership from the moment he took office. He has been
    committed to developing and fielding missile defenses to
    protect the United States, our troops deployed overseas, our
    allies, and friends from a limited missile attack.
        The President has substantially increased funding for
    missile defense and has focused our efforts on deploying an
    effective missile defense system. For fiscal year 2004, the
    President has requested $9.1 billion for missile defense, an
    18-percent real increase over the 2003 level. He has removed
    the constraints imposed by the ABM Treaty. With this budget
    before us, he has taken an important first step in actually
    fielding a missile defense capability.
        On December 17, 2002, President Bush announced his decision
    to field an initial missile defense capability, consisting
    primarily of ground- and sea-based interceptors to protect the
    United States, our friends, and our allies: ``These initial
    capabilities emerge from our research and development program
    and build on the test bed that we have been constructing. While
    modest, these capabilities will add to America's security and
    serve as a starting point for improved and expanded
    capabilities later, as further progress is made in researching
    and developing missile technologies.''
        A clear statement by the President and recognition of the
    fact that the program under optimum circumstances would have
    remained intact. But I think the President is exactly right in
    using the limited capabilities that we have thus far put in
    place. I strongly support this President's decision. It is a
    prudent, responsible step. It will ensure the United States
    has, at least, a modest capability.
        Today we will receive your individual assessments as to the
    degree it helps. But he points out, it is a modest capability
    for the near future to protect our people against a limited--
    not a massive--but a limited attack.
        It is important to point out the use of a development
    system by our military forces for operational purposes is not
    unique. There are many examples from the recent past, driven by
    an urgent need and the fact that the developmental system could
    provide at least limited operational capability of such systems
    for our military forces.
        Some of these examples are well known. Two Joint
    Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System aircraft, or
    JSTARS, flew hundreds of hours of combat missions during the
    1991 Persian Gulf War and provided warning to our forces on the
    ground when the Iraqi army was on the move. What was the status
    of the JSTARS aircraft at that time? A question. They were pre-
    production aircraft that had not even started operational test
    and evaluation.
        Indeed, in the wake of the outstanding performance of
    JSTARS during the 1991 conflict, our committee increased the
    administration's request for JSTARS aircraft long prior to
    completion of operational test and evaluation. More recently,
    the Predator and Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles have
    proven to be valuable assets to our forces during the global
    war on terrorism. Our military put these assets in the field in
    Afghanistan, even though the Predator failed its operational
    evaluation, and Global Hawk has yet to start its operational
    evaluation.
        The witnesses today will testify as to how successful these
    systems have been in contributing to our military effort. The
    record is clear, when faced with an imminent threat and an
    urgent need for a military capability, we have often fielded
    systems that have not fully completed their operational
    testing. This does not mean that we are fielding systems with
    no military value.
        To the contrary, this practice has enabled us to provide
    our military with critical capabilities during times of crisis
    and conflict. Clearly the testing of the BMD system is not
    complete. The Secretary of Defense has already testified, and I
    expect our witnesses today will confirm, that testing on the
    BMD system will continue unabated, will be vigorous, will grow
    more complex and difficult, and that the system capabilities
    will hopefully improve over time.
        The capability that this initial fielding will provide is,
    by the Department of Defense's own assessment, limited. The
    alternative is to leave the Nation with no defenses at all
    against long-range missile attack. I repeat, we have absolutely
    nothing in place in this Nation to interdict the rogue state
    from firing at us, terrorists firing at us, or other means of a
    limited attack. That is unacceptable. I think the steps taken
    by our President, and supported by the witnesses before us, are
    very prudent and the correct steps.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    calling this very important hearing today.
        This committee has historically been committed to ensure
    that the men and women of our military service receive the best
    equipment, the best training, and the best support that we can
    provide. That is why 20 years ago, this Congress passed one of
    the most important laws to ensure the quality of the military's
    equipment.
        The law established the Director of Operational Test and
    Evaluation (DOT&E). It was passed in 1983. It states that no
    weapons system may be deployed without undergoing rigorous
    realistic operational testing, or a plan for that testing at a
    minimum, and approved by the director.
        To keep the director as independent as possible, he is
    appointed by the President, not by the Secretary of Defense. He
    is confirmed by the Senate. We are pleased to have the current
    director, Tom Christie, with us today. Mr. Christie and his
    predecessors have been able to maintain an independent,
    unbiased watch over the development of the Pentagon's weapon
    systems.
        Unlike the military services that developed the systems,
    the director has no stake in the systems that he tests, except
    to see that they perform as they should under realistic combat-
    like conditions. If they do not, his job is to inform the
    Secretary of Defense and Congress. This powerful system of
    checks and balances has served the military well. It has been a
    long time since we deployed a system that does not work, or at
    least that we deployed a system that does not have a plan for
    operational testing to make sure that it does work.
        Prior to the existence of the 1983 law that established the
    Operational Test and Evaluation Director, such multi-billion
    dollar mistakes were all too common. The Bradley Fighting
    Vehicle, the B-1 bomber, and the Sergeant York gun, were all
    part of a major defense build-up of the early 1980s. There were
    examples of systems that were rushed to deployment without
    realistic testing or a plan for realistic testing. The first
    two systems had such serious problems that they would have
    posed life-threatening dangers to their own crews, had they
    ever been used in combat. The taxpayer was forced to pay tens
    of billions of dollars in extra costs to retrofit fixes for the
    most egregious problems. The Sergeant York gun was actually
    canceled outright after taxpayers spent $2 billion to develop
    and purchase more than 100 of the faulty guns.
        So we enacted a law in 1983 to establish the Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation, require that all major weapon
    systems have independent operational testing either before they
    are deployed or to have a plan for such operational testing in
    the field, and that they not be exempt from operational
    testing. The Patriot PAC-3 missile system is one of such
    systems and is being deployed now, following a rigorous set of
    operational tests.
        The decision to develop and deploy a national missile
    defense against strategic missiles has been made. That is not
    the issue anymore. There was debate over that decision, as to
    whether it was wise to do that, and what it would precipitate
    in terms of other countries' responses, but that debate is
    over. The decision to deploy a national missile defense is
    over.
        The question now is whether or not we are going to deploy a
    system, which we take steps to assure will work. That is the
    issue, and that is where operational testing comes in. I want
    to first off agree with my chairman relative to the history of
    JSTARS and Predator.
        JSTARS and Predator were fielded before operational testing
    was completed and should have been. They were tested in the
    field. We learned a lot about JSTARS and Predator in the field.
    What we did not do relative to JSTARS and Predator, and what we
    should not do here, is exempt them from operational testing at
    some point.
        There was no language relative to JSTARS and to the
    Predator such as is in this year's budget request, which
    provides that a system which is being fielded is going to be
    considered a system which is in development and demonstration.
    Because the effect of saying, as this budget request does, that
    the 2004 system, which is going to be deployed or fielded in
    Alaska, is going to be considered, in the words of the budget
    request, a system development and demonstration for purposes of
    any law governing the development and production of a major
    defense acquisition program. That language effectively exempts
    this system from operational development. That is the problem
    that I see.
        I have problems with fielding a system before it is
    operationally tested, because part of the system can never be
    operationally tested. The radar that is going to be deployed
    cannot be operationally tested for 2 years. I have problems
    with that. That is one problem. We can agree or we can disagree
    over that one.
        But it seems to me, doubling the problem is this exemption
    from operational testing for the parts of the system that can
    be tested after they are fielded. Parts of the system can be
    tested. I would hope we could unite on that issue. We never
    adopted language such has been requested here for JSTARS and
    for Predator. There is no reason to adopt that language. It
    sets a horrible precedent for us to exempt a system from
    operational testing at some point, even after it is fielded.
        Predator and JSTARS prove my point, that you do not need
    language like is being proposed in order to field a system. So
    we can debate whether or not this system should be fielded at
    this point. We can debate that issue; it is a debate and people
    will differ on that one. But it is obviously going to be
    fielded. I do not think we should have any debate over whether
    or not we ought to include language which exempts a system that
    has been fielded without operational testing from being
    operationally tested, to the extent it can be, after it is
    fielded. That is what seems to me to be an issue where we ought
    to be able to rally around. We are rallying our troops, and
    rightly so, even though there was difference over the issue as
    to whether or not the decision to move to war without the full
    support of the United Nations with a resolution, which the
    President said he would seek a vote on. We debated that and
    that debate is over. Now we are rallying around our troops.
        We debated the deployment of a system, a national missile
    defense system. That debate is over. The decision to develop
    and deploy it has been made. But now, it seems to me that we
    ought to rally around operationally testing that system to the
    extent we can. That is a safety mechanism for our troops and
    for our people. That 1983 law should not be waived. We should
    not exempt systems from being operationally tested at some
    point, either before they are fielded, hopefully.
        In most cases, they can be. But in exceptional cases, and
    the chairman has mentioned those cases, Predator, JSTARS, they
    had a useful purpose to be served after they were fielded. By
    fielding them, there was a useful purpose. They gave us some
    capability we otherwise did not have. It was not the full
    capability. But we sure learned a lot after they were fielded
    by testing them in the field.
        Again, I emphasize we did not adopt this kind of language
    that is being proposed here by the administration; that no one
    seems to know how it got in the budget, by the way. We did not
    adopt this kind of language for JSTARS and Predator, as far as
    I know, at least.
        So that is my opening statement, Mr. Chairman. Again, I
    thank you for calling the hearing.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. I guess we agree,
    then, on the question of fielding it. It is the old doctrine,
    use it or we could lose it. We could suffer an attack, which
    would substantially damage life and limb and property here in
    this country. To think that we would not put everything
    possible against that potential attack is not a wise decision.
        Now as to the laws, that specific question that you framed
    is before the secretary and this panel this morning. So, Mr.
    Secretary, we will admit all statements in their entirety for
    the record. You gentleman may proceed, as you wish.
        Secretary Aldridge.

       STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD C. ``PETE'' ALDRIDGE, JR., UNDER
     SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS

        Secretary Aldridge. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Levin,
    and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you today to discuss the fiscal year 2004
    Department of Defense missile defense program and budget
    submission. I am pleased to provide you this update on the
    progress of the missile defense development program.
        In the year that has transpired since I last addressed the
    committee, we have made some good progress in missile defense.
    The new management structure, established by Secretary Rumsfeld
    in his memorandum of January 2, has been stood up. An effective
    and vigorous oversight structure, aided by the Missile Defense
    Support Group, is in place and providing valuable advice to me
    and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency for the conduct
    of the program. Processes within the Department have been
    modified to support the accelerated development and fielding of
    these new revolutionary capabilities.
        A national team of the best and brightest of government and
    industry has been formed and is tackling the complex technical
    challenges of ballistic missile defense. We have achieved a
    number of successes in the missile defense test program, which
    have added momentum to the development effort and bolstered our
    confidence that we will be able to meet the challenges that lie
    ahead.
        In addition, our overtures to allies and friends have
    generated an expanded desire for international participation in
    the ballistic missile defense program. The focus of my
    testimony in March of last year was the management and
    oversight of the missile defense program. The committee was
    rightly concerned that the new management structure should
    provide for the proper oversight of the program by the
    Department and that Congress would have full insight into
    program activities.
        I informed you of the formation of a Missile Defense
    Support Group, consisting of key officials plus two advisors
    from 13 selected offices within the Department, including the
    military services, for a total of 39 individuals who support
    the decisionmaking by the Senior Executive Council and to
    advise me and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency on the
    full range of issues associated with the missile defense
    program, including policy, operations, acquisition, and
    resources.
        In the span of one year, we have had 25 meetings of the
    Missile Defense Support Group, an average of two meetings each
    month of a group of some of the most knowledgeable and
    experienced individuals in the Department. No program in the
    Department receives more scrutiny, either in level of rigor or
    frequency of study, than the missile defense program.
        The Missile Defense Support Group has provided me and
    General Kadish strong support in numerous key areas of the
    missile defense program. The Missile Defense Support Group has
    helped develop the strategies for the deployment of an initial
    capability, and the follow-on deployment of expanded
    capabilities, in block configurations. It has also been
    valuable for the transition of developed capabilities to the
    Services for fielding and operation.
        In October of last year, I decided that the time was right
    to transfer the Patriot PAC-3 system to the Army. The advice of
    the Missile Defense Support Group for making the hand-over to
    the Army supported the Defense Acquisition Board process and
    aided my decision to make the transfer.
        The Missile Defense Support Group has also helped the
    missile defense development program by speeding a number of
    routine Department processes, including review of the annual
    budget and continuing evaluation of each part of the missile
    defense program against its cost and schedule goals. I can
    confidently assure Congress that oversight has actually
    improved under the new management structure with the continual
    engagement of this support group.
        As you are aware, in December 2002, President Bush made a
    decision to deploy limited missile defense capability beginning
    in 2004. The nature of the expanding ballistic missile defense
    threat, and the declared hostile intent of our adversaries,
    compels us to put capabilities in the hands of our fighting men
    and women as soon as they become available, even if the state
    of development is less than we would ultimately hope to
    deliver.
        Putting an effective capability into the hands of our
    fighting force is a dramatically safer move for our troops, our
    Nation, our lives, and our friends, than delaying their
    fielding for 5 years or more as we strive for the final
    objective level of performance. This is the strategy directed
    by Secretary Rumsfeld in his January 2, 2002, memorandum on the
    missile defense program and the philosophy by which our efforts
    are being guided.
        Concerns have been raised by some that this might result in
    the fielding of systems that are unproven and unsuitable for
    battlefield conditions, or that the Department is seeking a
    waiver of statutory requirements governing operational testing.
    No such waiver of testing requirements has been requested; and
    I will repeat that. No such waiver of testing requirements has
    been requested.
        Quite the contrary, the revolutionary nature of missile
    defense and the threat posed by ballistic missiles have
    prompted us to take steps to ensure that deployed systems meet
    effectiveness and suitable goals through rigorous testing
    throughout the development. The Department involves the
    operational test community well in advance of a deployment
    decision, so that we can gain a better understanding of these
    issues as capabilities are being developed. The Director of
    Operational Test and Evaluation is directly involved in the
    review and assessment of all missile defense testing
    activities. He will provide his operational assessment report
    to Congress each year and provide the Department an operational
    assessment of the suitability and effectiveness of the
    ballistic missile defense system at each block decision point.
        DOT&E also participates as a member of the Missile Defense
    Support Group, which has examined the development test program
    on several occasions during its first year of work. The
    Department is committed to ensuring that fielded missile
    defense capabilities are sufficient for defending against the
    threat. I am confident that the level of oversight being
    provided to test activities will accomplish this goal.
        An important element of our missile defense program is the
    planned ability to extend ballistic missile defenses to include
    our friends and allies. Recent revelations about North Korea's
    ability to reach the United States, compounded by that nation's
    recent behavior, have validated the concerns of Japan and other
    Western Pacific nations regarding the threat of ballistic
    missile attack.
        These concerns are rightly shared by Europe, as well. The
    ongoing proliferation of weapons and missile technology to
    nations such as Iran pose an immediate threat to the European
    continent and to North America. This has sparked a growing
    desire among several of our allies to participate in the
    missile defense program. We have recently conducted discussions
    with the United Kingdom, Japan, and Denmark toward expanded
    missile defense participation, with some positive outcomes
    already agreed to.
        We are also continuing dialogue with other allies. The
    effectiveness of any global ballistic missile defense system
    will be enhanced by international participation.
        Since this is my first opportunity to testify before the
    Senate Armed Services Committee since the passage of the
    National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, I
    would like to take this opportunity to thank its members for
    their invaluable contribution to such elements of this
    legislation as Buy-to-Budget. This provision will help us
    optimize the use of taxpayer funds as we seek to provide the
    best possible equipment and weaponry to the warfighter. We are
    also grateful for the removal of certain superfluous and
    resource-consuming reporting requirements.
        The continued cooperation between the Department of Defense
    and Congress will only grow in importance as we execute our
    mission to provide for the national security of the United
    States. I look forward to continuing that cooperation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Secretary Aldridge.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Aldridge follows:]

          Prepared Statement by Hon. Edward C. ``Pete'' Aldridge, Jr.

        Good morning, Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and members of the
    committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
    discuss the fiscal year 2004 Department of Defense missile defense
    program and budget submission. I am pleased to provide you this update
    on the progress of the missile defense development program.
        In the year that has transpired since I last addressed the
    committee, we have made good progress in missile defense. The new
    management structure established by Secretary Rumsfeld in his
    memorandum of January 2, 2002, has been stood up. An effective and
    rigorous oversight structure, aided by the Missile Defense Support
    Group, is in place and providing valuable advice to me and to the
    Director of the Missile Defense Agency for the conduct of the program.
    Processes within the Department have been modified to support the
    accelerated development and fielding of these new revolutionary
    capabilities. A national team of the best and brightest of the
    government and industry has been formed and is tackling the complex
    technical challenges of ballistic missile defense. We have achieved a
    number of successes in the missile defense test program, which have
    added momentum to the development effort and bolstered our confidence
    that we will be able to meet the challenges that lie ahead. In
    addition, our overtures to allies and friends have generated an
    expanded desire for international participation in the Ballistic
    Missile Defense Program.
        The focus of my testimony in March of last year was the management
    and oversight of the missile defense program. The committee was rightly
    concerned that the new management structure should provide for the
    proper oversight of the program by the Department and that Congress
    should have full insight into program activities. I informed you of the
    formation of a Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG) consisting of key
    officials plus 2 advisors from 13 selected offices within the
    Department (including the military services) for a total of 39
    individuals who support decisionmaking by the Senior Executive Council
    (SEC) and to advise me and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency
    on the full range of issues associated with the missile defense program
    including policy, operations, acquisition, and resources. In the span
    of 1 year we have had 25 meetings of the MDSG, an average of 2 meetings
    each month of a group of some of the most knowledgeable and experienced
    individuals in the Department. No program in the Department receives
    more scrutiny--either in level of rigor or frequency of study--than the
    missile defense program. The MDSG has provided me and General Kadish
    strong support in numerous key areas of the missile defense program.
    The MDSG has helped develop the strategies for the deployment of an
    initial emergency capability and the follow-on deployment of expanded
    capabilities in block configurations. It has also been valuable for the
    transition of developed capabilities to the Services for fielding and
    operation. In October of last year I decided that the time was right to
    transfer the Patriot (PAC-3) system to the Army. The advice of the MDSG
    for making the handover to the Army supported the Defense Acquisition
    Board process and aided my decision to make the transfer. The MDSG has
    also helped the missile defense development program by speeding a
    number of routine Department processes including review of the annual
    budget and the continuing evaluation of each part of the missile
    defense program against its cost and schedule goals. I can confidently
    assure Congress that oversight has actually improved under the new
    management structure with the continual engagement by the MDSG.
        As you are aware, on December 19, 2002, President Bush made the
    decision to deploy a limited missile defense capability beginning in
    2004. The nature of the expanding ballistic missile threat and the
    declared hostile intent of our adversaries compel us to put
    capabilities in the hands of our fighting men and women as soon as they
    become available, even if the state of development is less than what we
    ultimately hope to deliver. Putting an effective capability into the
    hands of our fighting force is a dramatically safer move for our
    troops, our Nation, our allies, and our friends than delaying their
    fielding for 5 years or more as we strive for a final, objective level
    of performance. This is the strategy directed by Secretary Rumsfeld in
    his January 2, 2002 memorandum on the missile defense program and the
    philosophy by which our efforts are being guided. Concerns have been
    raised by some that this might result in the fielding of systems that
    are unproven and unsuitable for battlefield conditions or that the
    Department is seeking a waiver of statutory requirements governing
    operational testing. No such waiver of testing requirements has been
    requested. Quite the contrary, the revolutionary nature of missile
    defense and the threat posed by ballistic missiles have prompted us to
    take steps to ensure that deployed systems meet effectiveness and
    suitability goals through rigorous testing throughout development. The
    Department involves the operational test community well in advance of a
    deployment decision so that we can gain a better understanding of these
    issues as capabilities are being developed. The Director of Operational
    Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) is directly involved in the review and
    assessment of all missile defense testing activities. He will provide
    his operational assessment report to Congress each year and provide the
    Department an operational assessment of the suitability and
    effectiveness of the ballistic missile defense system at each block
    decision point. DOT&E also participates as a member of the Missile
    Defense Support Group, which has examined the developmental test
    program on several occasions during its first year of work. The
    Department is committed to ensuring that fielded missile defense
    capabilities are sufficient for defending against the threat. I am
    confident that the level of oversight being provided to test activities
    will accomplish this goal.
        An important element of our missile defense program is the planned
    ability to extend ballistic missile defenses to include our friends and
    allies. Recent revelations about North Korea's ability to reach the
    United States, compounded by that nation's recent behavior, have
    validated the concerns of Japan and other Western Pacific nations
    regarding the threat of ballistic missile attack. These concerns are
    rightly shared by Europe, as well. The ongoing proliferation of weapons
    and missile technology to nations such as Iran poses a more immediate
    threat to the European continent than to North America. This has
    sparked a growing desire among several of our allies to participate in
    the missile defense program. We have recently conducted discussions
    with the United Kingdom, Japan, and Denmark toward expanded missile
    defense participation, with some positive outcomes already agreed to.
    We are also in continuing dialogue with other allies. The effectiveness
    of any global ballistic missile defense system will be enhanced by
    international participation.
        Since this is my first opportunity to testify before the Senate
    Armed Services Committee since the passage of the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, I would like to take this
    opportunity to thank its members for their invaluable contributions to
    such elements of this legislation as ``Buy-to-Budget.'' This provision
    will help us optimize the use of taxpayer funds as we seek to provide
    the best possible equipment and weaponry to the warfighter. We are also
    grateful for the removal of certain superfluous and resource-consuming
    reporting requirements. The continued cooperation between the
    Department of Defense and Congress will only grow in importance as we
    execute our mission to provide for the national security of the United
    States. I look forward to continuing that cooperation.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before the
    committee. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

        Chairman Warner. Mr. Christie, in your opening statement
    here, I hope you would address Senator Levin's important
    observation and express your concurrence, I presume, with the
    very clear statement about waiver given by Secretary Aldridge.

     STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. CHRISTIE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL
               TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Christie. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and
    distinguished members of the committee, I also appreciate this
    opportunity to appear and discuss operational test issues
    involved with building this missile defense test bed that may
    also have some inherent defense capability. Let me emphasize up
    front that I strongly support building this test bed as a means
    of conducting more realistic ballistic missile defense testing.
        It will provide us with an excellent capability to test the
    integrated ballistic missile defense system against more
    challenging targets and under more realistic flight conditions.
    Designed to accomplish this testing mission, this test bed may
    have some capability to defend against an actual threat and a
    real attack. It depends, of course, on certain assumptions
    about intelligence of an imminent attack and the positioning of
    sensors to acquire, track, and target the threat.
        Regardless of what this initial collection of equipment,
    communications, and personnel is called, the fact remains that
    we must build this test capability and put it in the field
    before we can test the system. It is also prudent to develop
    operational concepts and to train personnel in concert with
    test bed development, so that whatever inherent capability
    exists in this testing infrastructure could be employed to
    defend the United States in an event of a ballistic missile
    attack.
        I understand and share the concerns raised by some members
    of Congress, with the precedent of fielding operational systems
    without adequate operational testing. Some had suggested that
    the Department is requesting a waiver from operational testing
    for the ballistic missile defense system. Mr. Aldridge has said
    that the Department has not requested such a waiver.
        Now, let me take just a moment here to discuss my overall
    assessment of the situation. The Missile Defense Agency is
    proceeding with the design and development strategy that is
    very proactive when it comes to testing. General Kadish has
    adopted a mission assurance philosophy that treats test
    instrumentation as mission-critical equipment. My staff and I
    are involved on a daily basis with the Missile Defense Agency
    and the program managers for the ballistic missile defense
    elements. We review test plans, participate in planning
    meetings, witness tests, and provide coordinated advice to the
    director and respond in written reports to Congress on the
    adequacy of the testing programs.
        I have access to all the information I need to fulfill
    these responsibilities. I have completed my assessment of the
    PAC-3 initial operational test and evaluation, which is
    documented in a classified beyond low-rate initial production
    report that was provided to Congress last November.
        I have also completed, and submitted to the appropriate
    committees of Congress, my annual assessment of the MDA testing
    programs, as required by House Report 107-333. In that report I
    conclude that the ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element
    of the BMDS, in essence, has not yet demonstrated operational
    capability.
        This conclusion, which I believe General Kadish agrees
    with, is based on the fact that many essential components of
    GMD have yet to be built. We can't test the system without
    these critical components. We cannot test the GMD system
    realistically without this test bed.
        This was illustrated recently when the exo-atmospheric kill
    vehicle failed to separate from the booster in integrated
    flight test ten. MDA subsequently restructured the flight test
    program, eliminating further testing with this old booster
    system. This decision considered the poor performance of the
    surrogate booster system and the risks of diverting booster
    developers from the objective booster design effort, compared
    with the advantages of gathering additional data from those
    flight tests.
        Beginning later this fiscal year and continuing to the 2004
    decision, testing will resume with a test flight for each of
    the candidate booster motors and a risk-reduction flight for a
    target launch from Kodiak. Intercept testing will continue in
    IFTs-14 and -15, flown with the new boosters. This is followed
    by integrated ground testing of the test bed and a system test
    readiness review just prior to the 2004 deployment decision.
        Current plans also call for three more intercept flights
    for the Aegis ballistic missile defense prior to the end of
    fiscal year 2004. Additional flight testing beyond this point
    is still being planned. The purpose of the test bed is to
    establish a baseline capability, to realistically integrate and
    test the components of the BMDS, and to enhance capability
    incrementally through block development.
        The real challenge here is to develop an operational
    concept for using the test bed that will integrate components
    of the BMDS as they become available, in order to evaluate the
    operational capability of the system and defend against a
    ballistic missile attack, if so needed. If we do not develop an
    operational concept and an attack does come, then we will have
    failed in a most serious way.
        On the other hand, if an effort to refine an operational
    concept for an interim system significantly distracts us from
    building the objective system in expeditious fashion, then we
    risk similar failure. Defense from the test bed is a serious
    matter that will demand the focus and attention of the
    developers, the testers, and the users. We will need to work
    together with a common understanding of what we are building to
    achieve this goal.
        While the test bed is a research and development system,
    this does preclude us from addressing operational test and
    evaluation issues with it. In fact, it is common for systems in
    development to combine developmental and operational test
    objectives. The test bed, including missiles, will provide an
    early opportunity to acquire valuable ground test data on
    intra- and inter-operability between the command and control
    center and the silo/missile complex; on the system and missile
    health, or built-in testing capability; and on system safety,
    reliability, maintainability, and logistics.
        It will also permit us to get an early start on collecting
    data on the aging effects on the missile. Availability of this
    data will permit lessons learned from the test bed to be
    considered in improving the objective ground-based mid-course
    defense system.
        Every major GMD ground and flight test, both prior to and
    after the 2004 test bed is available, formally addresses both
    development testing and operational testing, objectives
    consistent with the maturity level of the system. The Service
    operational test agencies have approximately 35 personnel at
    this point, dedicated to planning the details of the
    operational test portions of the ground and flight tests and
    for analyzing and reporting relevant operational test data.
        My staff is working with the operational test agencies to
    define independent evaluation plans for those operational test
    activities. I will review and approve these operational test
    and evaluation plans and their associated data requirements. I
    will review and comment on plans for development tests,
    exercises, simulations, and experiments that will produce the
    data to feed the evaluation process. I will use both
    developmental and operational test data as the basis for my
    operational assessments, for advising General Kadish and the
    Secretary, and as the basis for my annual assessment, which
    will be provided to Congress.
        Let me wrap up my remarks by briefly covering the Patriot
    PAC-3 system, which was talked about earlier. This is the first
    BMDS element to go through a procurement milestone under the
    new capability-based acquisition philosophy. I concluded in my
    beyond-low-rate production report, submitted last November to
    Congress, that the PAC-3 missile shows significantly improved
    performance against some tactical ballistic missile threats.
        The Defense Acquisition Board approved a limited purchase
    of PAC-3 missiles consistent with programmatic objectives, such
    as developing production capacity, unit cost considerations,
    and urgent military needs. This puts an improved, proven
    capability in the field, well ahead of when a completely
    demonstrated objective capability will be available.
        The Missile Defense Agency originally planned for future
    blocks of the PAC-3 system to stay in research and development,
    transitioning to the Army only after each block went through
    further developmental and operational testing. However, MDA
    took advice from me and other Missile Defense Support Group
    members, as Mr. Aldridge has discussed earlier, to keep the
    development and testing activities in a combined DT/OT mode.
    The entire PAC-3 program is being transitioned to the Army.
    This decision avoids conflicting development objectives between
    missile defense and air defense mission needs. The program
    office has developed a robust follow-on test program to address
    other ballistic missile targets, counter-measures, and other
    air defense targets.
        Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my staff has worked and
    will continue to work diligently with General Kadish's staff to
    build what I feel is a very effective relationship. I will
    continue to work closely with General Kadish to ensure that the
    mission of the test bed, as a test bed, is kept in perspective.
    He and I have discussed taking advantage of the data gathering
    opportunities that this test bed will provide.
        I am working with the Service operational test agencies to
    identify data requirements for an operational test evaluation
    plan that I will review and approve. I will continue to monitor
    planning and testing activities to ensure that we test as
    realistically and as thoroughly as we can, advise the Director
    of MDA of operational testing concerns, and report my
    assessments of progress to both the Secretary and to you.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Christie.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Christie follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. Christie

        Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the
    opportunity to appear before you today and discuss the operational
    testing issues involved with building a missile defense test bed that
    may also have some inherent defensive capability. I strongly support
    building this test bed as a means of conducting more realistic
    ballistic missile defense testing. It will provide us with an excellent
    capability to test the integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System
    against more challenging targets under more realistic flight
    conditions. Designed to accomplish this testing mission, this test bed
    may have some capability to defend against an actual threat in a real
    attack, depending, of course on certain assumptions about intelligence
    of an imminent attack and the positioning of sensors to acquire, track
    and target the threat. Regardless of what this initial collection of
    equipment, communications, and personnel is called, the fact remains
    that we must build the test capability and put it in the field before
    we can test the system. It is also prudent to develop operational
    concepts, and train personnel in concert with the test bed's
    development, so that whatever inherent capability exists in the testing
    infrastructure could be employed to defend the United States in the
    event of a ballistic missile attack.
        I understand and share the concerns raised by Members of Congress
    with the precedent of fielding operational systems without adequate
    operational testing. Some have suggested that the department is
    requesting a waiver from operational testing for the BMDS system. Let
    me take a moment here to discuss my assessment of this situation.
        The Missile Defense Agency is proceeding with a design and
    development strategy that is very proactive when it comes to testing.
    General Kadish has adopted a mission assurance philosophy that treats
    test instrumentation as mission critical equipment. My staff and I are
    involved on a daily basis with the Missile Defense Agency and the
    program managers for the Ballistic Missile Defense System elements,
    reviewing test plans, participating in planning meetings, witnessing
    tests, providing coordinated advice to the director, and responding in
    written reports to Congress on the adequacy of the testing programs. I
    have access to all the information I need to fulfill these
    responsibilities.
        I have completed my assessment of the PAC-3 Initial Operational
    Test and Evaluation test results, which is documented in a classified
    Beyond Low Rate Initial Production report, provided last November to
    Congress. I have also completed and submitted to the appropriate
    committees of Congress, my annual assessment of the MDA testing
    programs, required by House report 107-333. In that report, I conclude
    that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element of the BMDS has
    essentially not yet demonstrated operational capability. This
    conclusion, which I believe MDA agrees with, is based on the fact that
    many essential components of GMD have not yet been built. We cannot
    test the system without these critical components, and we cannot test
    it realistically without the test bed.
        This was illustrated recently, when the exoatmospheric kill vehicle
    failed to separate from the booster in IFT-10. MDA subsequently
    restructured the flight test program, eliminating further testing with
    the old booster system. This decision considered the poor performance
    of the legacy booster system and the risks of diverting booster
    developers from the objective booster design effort, compared with the
    advantages of gathering additional data from those flight tests.
        Beginning later this fiscal year and prior to the 2004 decision,
    testing will resume with a test flight for each of the candidate
    boosters and a risk reduction flight for a target launched from Kodiak.
    Intercept testing will continue in IFTs-14 and 15, flown with the new
    boosters. MDA is currently considering plans to optimize the sequence
    of these tests, and to include additional risk reduction flights. This
    is followed by integration ground testing of the test bed and a system
    test readiness review. Current plans also call for three more intercept
    flights for the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense prior to the end of
    fiscal year 2004, with the last flight conducted against a separating
    threat. Additional flight testing beyond this point is still being
    planned. The purpose of the test bed is to establish a baseline
    capability, to realistically integrate and test the components of the
    BMDS, and to enhance capability incrementally, through block
    development.
        The real challenge is to develop an operational concept for using
    the test bed that integrates components of the BMDS as they become
    available, in order to evaluate the operational capability of the
    system and defend against a ballistic missile attack in an emergency.
    If we don't develop an operational concept and an attack does come,
    then we will have failed in a most serious way. On the other hand, if
    an effort to refine an operational concept for an interim system
    significantly distracts us from building the objective system in an
    expeditious fashion, then we risk similar failure against more
    sophisticated threats down the road. Defense from the test bed is a
    serious matter that will demand the focused attention of the
    developers, the testers and the users. We will need to work together
    with a common understanding of what we are building to achieve this
    goal.
        While the test bed is a research and development system, this does
    not preclude us from addressing operational test and evaluation issues.
    In fact, it is common for systems in development to combine
    developmental and operational test objectives. The test bed, including
    missiles, will provide an early opportunity to acquire valuable ground
    test data on intra- and interoperability between the command and
    control center and the silo/missile complex; on the system and missile
    health and status or built in testing capability; and on system safety,
    reliability, maintainability and logistics supportability. It will also
    permit us to get an early start on collecting data on aging effects on
    the missile. Availability of this data will permit lessons learned from
    the test bed to be considered in improving the objective Ground-based
    Mid-course Defense system.
        Every major GMD ground and flight test, both prior to and after the
    2004 test bed availability, formally addresses both DT and OT
    objectives consistent with the maturity level of the system. This
    includes testing planned both prior to 2004 test bed capability and
    after. The Service Operational Test Agencies have approximately 35
    personnel dedicated to planning the details of the operational test
    portion of the ground and flight tests, and for analyzing and reporting
    relevant operational test data. My staff is working with the
    Operational Test Agencies to define independent evaluation plans for
    the operational test activities. I will review and approve these
    Operational Test and Evaluation plans and their associated data
    requirements. I will review and comment on plans for developmental
    tests, exercises, simulations, and experiments that will produce the
    data to feed the evaluation process. I will use both developmental and
    operational test data as the basis for my operational assessment, for
    advising General Kadish, and as the basis for my annual assessment.
        Let me wrap up my remarks with an update on the PAC-3 program. This
    is the first BMDS element to go through a procurement milestone under
    the new capability based acquisition philosophy. I concluded in my
    Beyond Low Rate Production report submitted last October that the
    missile shows significantly improved performance against some tactical
    ballistic missile threats. The Defense Acquisition Board approved a
    limited purchase of PAC-3 missiles, consistent with programmatic
    objectives, such as developing production capacity and unit cost
    considerations, and urgent military needs. This puts an improved,
    proven capability in the field well ahead of when a completely
    demonstrated objective capability will be available. MDA originally
    planned for future blocks of the PAC-3 system to stay in research and
    development, transitioning to the Army only after each block went
    through further developmental and operational testing. However, MDA
    took the advice of myself and other missile defense support group
    members, to keep the development and testing activities in a combined
    DT/OT mode. The entire PAC-3 program is being transitioned to the Army.
    This decision avoids conflicting development objectives between missile
    defense and air defense mission needs. The program office has developed
    a comprehensive follow-on test program to address maneuvering ballistic
    missile targets, countermeasures, and air defense targets.
        Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my staff has worked diligently
    with General Kadish's staff to build what I feel is a very effective
    relationship. I will continue to work closely with General Kadish to
    make sure that the mission of the test bed, as a test bed, is kept in
    perspective. General Kadish and I have discussed taking advantage of
    the data gathering opportunities that the test bed will provide. I am
    working with the Service operational test agencies to identify data
    requirements for an operational evaluation plan that I will review and
    approve. I will continue to monitor planning and testing activities to
    ensure that we test as realistically and thoroughly as we can, advise
    the Director, MDA of operational testing concerns, and report my
    assessments of progress to the Secretary and to you.
        This concludes my opening remarks and I welcome your questions.

        Chairman Warner. Secretary Crouch.

    STATEMENT OF J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
                     INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

        Secretary Crouch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
    members of the committee. It is an honor to come before your
    committee today to provide details about the missile defense
    policy and direction of our missile defense program in light of
    the President's recent decision to begin initial fielding of
    missile defense capabilities in 2004. This committee has played
    a crucial role in bringing our missile defense program to this
    point.
        Mr. Chairman, we and our allies face serious and
    unpredictable threats to our homeland and military forces from
    the proliferation of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of
    mass destruction. Ballistic missiles have proliferated on a
    global basis and are in the hands of over two dozen states,
    many of which have either chemical, biological, or nuclear
    weapons programs under way.
        North Korea, for example, has had an active ballistic
    missile program for years and has developed a wide range of
    offensive missiles. It has deployed and exported missiles that
    can threaten our allies, friends, and forces abroad. North
    Korea also has the Taepo Dong II long-range missile, which is
    capable of reaching parts of the United States and could be
    flight tested at any time.
        Iran and other countries are also working on space launch
    vehicles and intercontinental range ballistic missiles that
    could be ready for testing in the next few years.
        We are moving forward with missile defense to help protect
    American territory and forces abroad, our allies, and friends
    against the use of missiles and weapons of mass destruction by
    unpredictable and, in some cases, irresponsible states.
        In addition, some countries seek missiles and weapons of
    mass destruction to coerce us simply by threatening their use.
    Missile defenses can help to reduce our potential vulnerability
    to such coercive threats.
        Finally, missile defense can help to reduce the
    proliferation of offensive missiles by reducing their value,
    thereby reducing the demand for them. In this way, we see
    defenses as a way to provide a useful complement to our non-
    proliferation efforts. In light of this new security
    environment and the considerable progress made to date in
    missile defense technology, the President directed the
    Department of Defense to proceed with initial fielding of
    modest missile defense capabilities in 2004 and 2005.
        As the President has noted, because ballistic missile
    threats also endanger our friends and allies around the world,
    it is essential that we work together cooperatively to defend
    against them. To do so, the Department of Defense is developing
    and deploying missile defenses capable of protecting not only
    the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends
    and allies. We have structured our missile defense program in a
    manner that encourages participation by other nations.
        The Department has been pursuing a broad-based research
    development and testing program to examine the full range of
    capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges and
    in all phases of flight. As we field the missile defenses
    called for by the President, our development and testing
    program will continue to improve our defensive systems over
    time.
        Under this evolutionary approach, we do not envision a
    final or fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, the
    composition of missile defenses, including the type, number,
    and location of components, will change over time to meet the
    changing threat and take advantage of technological
    developments. This approach facilitates the timely delivery of
    an initially modest, but still useful, defensive capability
    that can then be improved with the benefit of technical
    advancement and operational experience.
        The capabilities called for by the President for 2004/2005
    include 20 ground-based interceptors against an
    intercontinental range ballistic missile threat, 16 located at
    Fort Greeley, Alaska, and four located at Vandenberg Air Force
    Base in California. The GBIs, or ground-based interceptors,
    will be available on a continuous basis to intercept long-range
    missiles during their mid-course phase of flight.
        The ballistic missile defense system supporting the GBIs
    will include an initial set of integrated sensors, based on
    land and at sea, and cued by early warning sensors in space. We
    have also made requests to the United Kingdom and the Kingdom
    of Denmark to upgrade early warning radars on their territory
    to track ballistic missile threats that might emanate from the
    Middle East. The United Kingdom has already granted the United
    States permission. We look forward to hearing from Denmark
    sometime later this year.
        To address the medium-range threat, we plan to equip three
    existing Aegis-class naval ships with up to 20 standard missile
    SM-3 interceptors. This will provide a highly mobile missile
    defense capability to help protect U.S. forces and allies and
    provide, again, some modest limited protection for the U.S.
    homeland against shorter range missiles that might be launched
    from ships off of our coast.
        Finally, with respect to the short-range threat, we will
    continue to field additional air transportable and mobile
    Patriot PAC-3 units with up to 346 PAC-3 missiles and 42 PAC-3
    radars. These initial capabilities may be improved later in the
    decade through additional measures that will ultimately lead,
    we hope, to a multilayered missile defense capability.
        Fielding a layered missile defense system poses new
    operational command and control challenges. A key presidential
    document used to organize U.S. forces, the Unified Command Plan
    UCP 2002, assigns the U.S. Strategic Command responsibility for
    planning, integrating, coordinating, and developing the desired
    characteristics for sea-, land-, air-, and space-based missile
    defense operations.
        UCP 2002 addresses the missile defense command and control
    issue through the use of centralized planning with
    decentralized execution. Therefore, while STRATCOM will be
    given responsibility for planning, integrating, and
    coordinating global missile defense operations, NORTHCOM and
    other regional combatant commands retain responsibility for
    defending their geographic areas of responsibility. It also
    includes command and control over systems providing defense
    against ballistic missile attacks.
        Mr. Chairman, as the President has stated, it is essential
    that we work together with allies and friends to defend against
    ballistic missile threats. Accordingly, the Department of
    Defense is developing and deploying missile defenses capable of
    protecting our friends and allies, as well. There are a number
    of examples of U.S. missile defense in cooperation with allies
    around the world. The United States, as this committee well
    knows, has been working with Israel since the late 1980s to
    develop the Arrow Missile Defense System.
        We are also working cooperatively with the United Kingdom,
    Japan, Italy, and Germany, and have an ongoing dialogue with
    India on missile defense issues. The United States continues
    actively to engage the Russian Federation in the area of
    missile defense cooperation. The joint declaration, signed by
    Presidents Bush and Putin last May, called for missile defense
    cooperation and reflects the new relationship between our
    countries.
        To fulfill our commitment to strengthen confidence,
    increase transparency, and study areas for missile defense
    cooperation, a U.S./Russian missile defense working group has
    been established under the auspices of a ministerial-level
    group on strategic security. In this venue, the United States
    has proposed to begin voluntary and reciprocal information
    exchanges and visits, has made proposals for potential areas of
    new cooperation, and has also encouraged the Russian
    interaction with U.S. companies working on missile defense.
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, missile defenses are an
    essential element of our overall national security policy to
    transfer U.S. defense capabilities to meet the requirements of
    a dynamic international security environment. As we move
    forward to field the missile defenses called for by the
    President, we will do so in cooperation with our friends and
    allies.
        Our initial missile capabilities will be modest but the
    evolutionary approach we are pursuing will support continued
    research, development, and testing to improve our capabilities,
    as budgets and technologies allow and as developments of the
    threat necessitate.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Secretary Crouch.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Crouch follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. J.D. Crouch II

        Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to come before your committee to
    provide details about our missile defense policy and the direction of
    our missile defense program, especially in light of the President's
    recent decision to begin initial fielding missile defense capabilities
    in 2004.
        I would like first to identify the basic reasons for moving forward
    with the fielding of missile defense. We and our allies face serious
    and unpredictable threats to our homelands, populations, and interests,
    particularly including the proliferation of ballistic missiles armed
    with weapons of mass destruction. One of the reasons potential
    adversaries seek ballistic missiles is because we have no defenses
    against long-range missiles, and limited defenses against shorter-range
    missiles. Potential adversaries see these weapons as a means for
    exploiting an obvious U.S. and allied vulnerability.
        Ballistic missiles have proliferated on a global basis and are in
    the hands of over two dozen states, many of which have chemical,
    biological, or nuclear weapons programs underway.
        North Korea, for example, has had an active ballistic missile
    program for years, and has developed a wide-range of offensive
    missiles. It has deployed and exported missiles that can threaten our
    allies, friends, and forces abroad.
        North Korea caught us by surprise when it launched its three-stage
    Taepo-Dong I space-launch vehicle/ballistic missile in August 1998. We
    knew North Korea was developing longer-range missiles, but we were
    surprised at the presence of a third stage on the missile. We have been
    surprised many times in the past by foreign ballistic missile
    developments. We likely will be surprised again in the future. The
    existing and emerging missile threats of which we are aware are
    significant; those we can see now only in part almost certainly will be
    more severe.
        For example, North Korea has the Taepo Dong II long-range missile
    capable of reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-
    sized payload, and it could be flight-tested at any time. According to
    the National Air Intelligence Center, the Taepo Dong II missile may be
    exported to other countries in the future. Iran and other countries
    also are working on space-launch vehicles and intercontinental-range
    ballistic missiles that could be ready for testing in the next few
    years.
        We are moving forward with missile defense to help protect American
    territory and forces abroad, and our allies and friends against the use
    of missiles and weapons of mass destruction by unpredictable, and in
    some cases, irresponsible states.
        In addition, some countries seek missiles and weapons of mass
    destruction to coerce us simply by threatening their use. Missile
    defenses will help to reduce our potential vulnerability to such
    coercive threats.
        Finally, by reducing the value of ballistic missiles for coercion
    or use, our missile defense capability will help to dissuade countries
    from investing in ballistic missiles at the outset. Missile defense can
    help to reduce the proliferation of offensive missiles by reducing
    their value, and thereby reducing the demand for them. In this way
    defenses will provide a useful complement to our other non-
    proliferation efforts.
        In light of this new security environment and the considerable
    progress made to date in missile defense technology, the President
    directed the Department of Defense to proceed with fielding initial
    missile defense capabilities in 2004 and 2005. We will build on the
    missile defense test range (known as the ``test bed'') that we have
    been constructing. As a result of our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty,
    the fielding of these initial capabilities no longer is prohibited. The
    initial missile defenses called for by the President will serve as a
    starting point for improving our defensive capabilities as budgets and
    technological progress allow, and as developments in the threat
    necessitate.
        Finally, as the President has noted, because ballistic missile
    threats also endanger our friends and allies around the world, it is
    essential that we work together cooperatively to defend against them.
    To do so, the Department of Defense is developing and deploying missile
    defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and our
    deployed forces, but also our friends and allies; and we have
    structured our missile defense program in a manner that encourages
    participation by other nations.
        With these general points in mind, allow me to elaborate on our
    approach to missile defense development and deployment, and how we are
    pursuing cooperative efforts with allies and friends.

               U.S. DEFENSE GOALS AND CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING

        From the start of this administration, our approach to developing
    and fielding missile defenses has been consistent with the Department's
    goal of transforming U.S. military forces and adopting a capabilities-
    based approach to planning. We begin with the recognition that we face
    a security environment where threats and potential adversaries are less
    predictable and more diverse than during the Cold War. Therefore,
    rather than organizing our defense planning around a fixed and largely
    static set of enemies, we now focus on how potential adversaries might
    fight and with what means.
        The Nuclear Posture Review concluded that a mix of capabilities--
    offensive and defensive--is required to address the emerging missile
    threat, and to help meet the four broad defense goals outlined in the
    Nuclear Posture Review: to assure, dissuade, deter, and if necessary,
    defend and defeat. Missile defenses will help to:
        Assure allies and friends that ballistic missiles threats will not
    coerce the U.S. from fulfilling its security commitments, or allow
    aggressors the means to undermine the cohesiveness and political
    stability of a coalition or alliance;
        Dissuade potential adversaries from investing in or developing
    ballistic missiles and their associated nuclear, chemical, and
    biological warheads by reducing the value of such weapons;
        Deter ballistic missile attacks and threats by reducing an
    adversary's confidence in the possible success of its missile attack,
    and by denying the political-coercive or military benefits associated
    with threatening an attack;
        Defeat missile attacks and defend the population of the United
    States, its forces, allies, and friends should deterrence fail.

             THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO FIELDING MISSILE DEFENSES

        In applying capabilities-based planning to missile defense, we
    concluded that an evolutionary approach to acquiring and fielding
    missile defense was the best way to address ballistic missile threats
    in a dynamic and unpredictable security environment.
        The Department has been pursuing a broad-based research,
    development, and testing program to examine the full range of
    capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all
    phases of flight. On December 17, 2002, the President announced his
    decision to field in 2004 and 2005 initial defensive capabilities
    against long-range missiles, and additional capabilities against
    shorter-range missiles. As we field these capabilities, our development
    and testing program will continue to improve our defensive systems over
    time.
        Under this evolutionary approach, we do not envisage a final or
    fixed missile defense architecture. Rather, the composition of missile
    defenses, including the number, type, and location of components, will
    change over time to meet the changing threat and take advantage of
    technological developments. The evolutionary approach to the
    acquisition and fielding of missile defenses is the best means for
    providing advanced capabilities to the warfighter, while continuously
    pursuing follow-on improvements in capability. This approach
    facilitates the timely delivery of a modest, but still useful defensive
    capability that can then be improved with the benefit of technical
    advancements and operational experience.
        The severity of existing and emerging missile threats, and the
    potential for surprises, call for this approach to acquisition that
    permits the fielding of appropriate defensive capabilities as soon as
    technically practicable.
        Fielding modest capabilities in the near-term will provide not only
    timely defensive coverage, it also will allow operational input from
    combatant commanders. This is especially important for the missile
    defense mission wherein there is little previous operational experience
    to serve as a guide.
        Two good examples where we have taken a similar approach to the
    timely fielding of limited capabilities still in development are the
    Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and the Joint Surveillance and
    Target Attack System (JSTARS). Predator was begun as an Advanced
    Concept Technology Demonstration project in 1994, conducted its first
    flight test in 1995 and was first deployed in Bosnia in 1996. Since
    then, commanders in the field have provided valuable inputs on ways to
    improve the system and have continued to request this capability in
    other operational scenarios, including Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
        JSTARS aircraft were deployed in 1991 to participate in Operation
    Desert Storm even though they were still in development. The
    developmental aircraft flew on 49 combat sorties and accurately tracked
    mobile Iraqi forces. JSTARS developmental aircraft also flew 95
    operational sorties in support of NATO peacekeeping mission Operation
    Joint Endeavor in December 1995, monitoring ground movements to confirm
    compliance with the Dayton Agreements.
        In each case, the timely and limited deployment of a system still
    in development provided useful capabilities, and facilitated subsequent
    improvements in the systems.
        Our evolutionary approach to missile defense similarly points to
    the initial fielding, in limited numbers, of those missile defense
    capabilities that have been demonstrated to work, and the subsequent
    improvement of these capabilities through incremental improvements, for
    example, by inserting new technologies when available.
        We are moving forward with missile defense on the basis of a highly
    successful test program over the past 2 years. For example, since the
    beginning of 2001, we have had four successful tests out of five for
    the long-range, ground-based interceptor, three successful tests out of
    three for the short- to medium-range sea-based interceptor, and five
    successful tests out of seven for the short-range, ground-based
    interceptor. Where tests have failed, we understand what went wrong and
    have taken measures to correct the problem. In the next 2 years, we
    plan to conduct over 120 flight and ground tests.
        Some test failures are to be expected with advanced technology
    development programs. Indeed many of our most successful programs have
    had significant test failures. For example, the Corona satellite
    program, which produced the first overhead reconnaissance satellites,
    suffered 11 straight test failures. The Vanguard program failed 11 of
    its first 14 tries. The Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile failed
    in 66 out of 123 flights.
        Nevertheless, in each case, these programs continued in
    development, were successfully deployed, and made significant
    contributions to our national security. We have learned from our
    missile defense test successes and failures, and look forward to
    additional successful tests as we deploy the initial missile defense
    capabilities and work continuously to improve those capabilities.

                        INITIAL CAPABILITIES (2004-2005)

        In December 2002 the President directed the Department of Defense
    to build on the missile defense test bed and begin deployment of
    missile defense capabilities in 2004 and 2005. These capabilities will
    serve as the starting point for the evolutionary improvement of our
    missile defense capabilities.
        The capabilities planned for 2004-2005 include 20 ground-based
    interceptors (GBIs) against the intercontinental-range ballistic
    missile threat; 16 located at Fort Greely, Alaska and 4 GBIs at
    Vandenberg Air Force Base. The GBIs will be available on a continuous
    basis to intercept long-range missiles during their midcourse phase of
    flight, while the incoming enemy warheads are outside the atmosphere.
        The Ballistic Missile Defense System supporting the GBIs will
    include an initial set of integrated sensors based on land and at sea,
    and cued by early warning sensors in space. We also have made requests
    to the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Denmark to upgrade early
    warning radars on their territory to track ballistic missile threats
    from the Middle East. The UK has granted permission and we look forward
    to hearing from Denmark by this summer.
        To address the medium-range threat, we plan to equip 3 existing
    Aegis-class ships with up to 20 Standard-Missile (SM-3) interceptors.
    This will provide a highly mobile missile defense capability to help
    protect U.S. forces and allies and provide some limited protection for
    the U.S. homeland against shorter-range missiles launched from ships
    off our coasts. We also plan to modify other sensors on 15 existing
    Aegis ships to support the overall ballistic missile defense system.
        Finally, with respect to the short-range threat, we will continue
    to field additional air-transportable and mobile Patriot PAC-3 units
    with up to 346 PAC-3 missiles and 42 PAC-3 radars. The PAC-3 missile is
    the first upgrade of the Patriot system to feature a hit-to-kill
    missile that can help defeat chemical and biological threats, and is
    designed to protect U.S. and coalition forces in the field as well as
    limited geographic areas.
        These initial capabilities may be improved later in the decade
    through additional measures that will lead, ultimately, to a multi-
    layered missile defense system. These include additional ground- and
    sea-based interceptors and PAC-3 units; introduction of the Theater
    High Altitude Area Defense system to intercept medium-range missiles at
    high altitude and the Airborne Laser that will use directed energy to
    destroy a ballistic missile in the boost phase; enhanced radars and
    other sensor capabilities; development of a common booster for boost
    and midcourse defense; and initial development and testing of space-
    based hit-to-kill interceptors.
        The budget request for the Missile Defense Agency for fiscal year
    2004 and fiscal year 2005 is $7.7 billion and $8.7 billion
    respectively. Included in this funding request is an additional $1.5
    billion total for fiscal year 2004 and 2005 to provide those initial
    capabilities directed by the President for 2004 and 2005. Funding
    requests for our missile defense programs will remain relatively
    constant at roughly $8+ billion per year from fiscal year 2004 to
    fiscal year 2009. This represents less than 3 percent of the total
    defense budget over these years.

                               OPERATIONAL ISSUES

        Fielding a layered missile defense system poses new operational
    command and control challenges. A key Presidential document used to
    organize U.S. forces, Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2002, assigns the U.S.
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM) responsibility for planning, integrating,
    coordinating, and developing the desired characteristics for sea, land,
    air, and space-based global missile defense operations. UCP 2002
    addresses the missile defense command and control issue through the use
    of centralized planning with decentralized execution. Therefore, while
    STRATCOM will be given responsibility for planning, integrating, and
    coordinating global missile defense operations, NORTHCOM and other
    regional combatant commands will retain responsibility for defending
    their geographic areas of responsibility--including command and control
    over systems providing defense against ballistic missile attacks.

                      COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS

        As the President stated, it is essential that we work together with
    allies and friends to defend against ballistic missile threats.
    Accordingly, the Department of Defense is developing and deploying
    missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States and
    our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies. For example, two
    of the capabilities we plan to operate in 2004 and 2005--sea-based
    missile defense and Patriot PAC-3--could provide some protection for
    allies against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, depending on
    where they are located.
        The United States also will structure its missile defense program
    in a manner that encourages industrial participation by other nations,
    consistent with U.S. national security. Countries will be encouraged to
    participate at whatever level they deem appropriate up to and including
    co-development and production of various systems. They might also
    provide in-kind contributions such as territory and facilities upon
    which to build components of our missile defense system.
        There are a number of examples of U.S. missile defense cooperation
    with allies and friends around the world. For example, the U.S. has
    been working with Israel since the late 1980s to design and develop
    missile defense systems. U.S. and Israeli cooperative programs, such as
    the Arrow defense system, along with the sharing of U.S. missile launch
    warning information, will continue to assist Israel in the development
    of a ballistic missile defense capability to deter and, if necessary,
    defend against current and emerging ballistic threats. We are also
    helping Israel to address the threat via a co-production arrangement of
    Arrow components in the U.S.
        Turning to Asia, the U.S. and Japan have engaged in missile defense
    research cooperation since the 1990s. These efforts have focused on
    sea-based missile defense efforts (Japan has acquired several AEGIS
    ship platforms), including components developed by Japan that could
    become part of an evolutionary development upgrade to the U.S. Navy's
    Standard Missile III (SM-3). The U.S. and Japan are scheduled to
    conduct joint flight tests of the SM-3 in fiscal year 2005/2006. We are
    exploring additional avenues to enhance missile defense cooperation
    with Japan.
        Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific area, we are working closely with
    South Korea as they proceed with their new air defense frigate
    development with the aim of including missile defense capabilities. We
    have an ongoing dialogue with India on missile defense issues and
    recently this dialogue expanded to include discussion of India's
    efforts to determine its own specific missile defense requirements.
    Likewise, we have met with officials from Taiwan in an effort to answer
    their questions regarding missile defense.
        Turning to Europe, there is consensus in NATO on the need to
    develop and deploy missile defenses capable of protecting deployed
    forces against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles. The Alliance
    is undertaking a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility study to
    examine options for protecting allied forces from ballistic missile
    threats of up to 3,000-km.
        Because Europe increasingly is threatened by missiles of all
    ranges, we have encouraged the Alliance to expand its consensus on
    missile defense to include missile defenses capable of protecting all
    Alliance territory against the full range of missile threats. As a
    first step, the Alliance agreed at the November 2002 Prague Summit to
    initiate a new missile defense feasibility study to examine options for
    protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centers against
    the full range of missile threats.
        The United States has had a long relationship with the United
    Kingdom in the area of missile defense research. Recently, British
    Secretary of State for Defense Geoffrey Hoon stated that ``developing
    the capacity to defend against the threat of ballistic missile attack
    is in the interest of the UK and its people.'' We are in the process of
    deepening this relationship between our two nations to facilitate
    greater missile defense cooperation. The United States has requested
    and received permission by the United Kingdom to upgrade the early
    warning radar located at Fylingdales.
        The governments of Germany, Italy, and the United States have been
    pursuing a multilateral research and development program to field a new
    mobile air and missile defense system capable of providing protection
    for forces on the move, the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS).
    MEADS is expected to replace the U.S. Army's Patriot system in the next
    decade and has the potential to become the core short-range missile
    defense capability for the Alliance. Both Germany and Italy support
    MEADS and have programmed funding for the next phase of activities.
        The United States continues to engage the Russian Federation
    actively in the area of missile defense cooperation. The Joint
    Declaration signed by Presidents Bush and Putin last May called for
    missile defense cooperation and reflects the new relationship between
    our countries. Our relationship no longer is focused on managing
    hostility, but instead, on building cooperation.
        To fulfill our commitment to strengthen confidence, increase
    transparency and study areas for missile defense cooperation, a U.S.-
    Russian Missile Defense Working Group has been established under the
    auspices of the Ministerial-level Consultative Group on Strategic
    Security. In this venue the U.S. has proposed to begin voluntary and
    reciprocal information exchanges and visits, made proposals for
    potential new cooperation and also encouraged Russian interaction with
    U.S. corporations working on missile defense.
        We already have some ongoing programs of missile defense
    cooperation. For example, we have conducted three successful Theater
    Missile Defense Exercises with the Russian Federation. A fourth
    exercise is planned in Moscow in the spring of 2005. These
    unclassified, computer-based exercises are designed to establish
    procedures for independent but coordinated operations in the event that
    our forces are deployed together against a common adversary.
        We also are seeking to resolve issues that impede implementation of
    agreed cooperation programs. Negotiations continue on the Russian-
    American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program. We also continue to
    discuss the Joint Data Exchange Center, which is held up by a
    disagreement over tax and liability provisions.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Missile defenses are an essential element of our overall national
    security policy to transform U.S. defense capabilities to meet the
    requirements of a dynamic international security environment. As we
    move forward in 2004 and 2005 to field the missile defenses called for
    by the President, we will do so in cooperation with our allies and
    friends. Our initial missile defense capabilities will be modest; but
    the evolutionary approach we are pursuing will support continued
    research, development, and testing to improve our capabilities as
    budgets and technology allow, and as developments in the threat
    necessitate.

        Chairman Warner. General Kadish.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. RONALD T. KADISH, USAF, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
                             DEFENSE AGENCY

        General Kadish. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of
    the committee. I would like to take just a few minutes to
    highlight for you some key points about the missile defense
    program and underscore the progress we have made.
        In early 2001, we started structuring the missile defense
    program to develop capabilities to defend the United States,
    our allies, our friends, and deployed forces against all ranges
    of missiles in all phases of flight. With the support of
    Congress, and in particular this committee, we have made
    considerable progress in demonstrating key missile defense
    technologies and system integration.
        Our testing and analysis gives us confidence that the
    ``hit-to-kill'' technology works and that we can take the
    initial steps we are proposing to provide modest initial
    defensive capability where none exists today. Altogether we
    have made great progress in our missile defense program. Our
    testing has been aggressive and productive.
        Over the past 2 years, we have achieved four for five
    successful ground-based intercepts against long-range targets.
    We are three-for-three in our sea-based intercepts against
    medium-range targets. We were five-for-seven with the Patriot
    Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3, against short-range targets.
    We are making steady progress with the airborne laser to
    develop the revolutionary speed-of-light technologies involved.
        We have had failures and in all probability we will
    continue to have some failures. But this score card has
    increased our confidence in our basic technical approach. Last
    December, the President directed the Department of Defense to
    field an initial set of missile defense capabilities because of
    our technical progress and our total lack of missile defenses
    against intermediate and long-range missiles. Given our
    fielding approach, using the test bed we have been working on,
    and given our testing successes to date, and our analysis of
    them, I believe we are ready for this.
        With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-
    term architecture for a limited system to address a range of
    missile threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed long-
    term architecture. We will evolve and improve the capability of
    the Block 2004 system over time, so that when we propose to
    field initially in 2004 and 2005, it may evolve to look very
    different a decade later.
        The number and type of missile defense assets and their
    locations and basing arrangements may be expected to change to
    make the system more integrated and even more capable. This is
    consistent with the approach I have described in previous
    hearings. We are building and fielding limited militarily
    useful capabilities as soon as they can be made available. We
    have said all along that when we do field, we will not field a
    system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will
    have limitations and gaps. Let there be no illusions there.
        The system we will be fielding initially will be limited
    operationally. But we went down this road knowing that there
    would be limitations. We have a process that specifically is
    designed to make up for those limitations as soon as
    practicable. With an evolutionary capability acquisition
    approach, we put capability in the field, we test it, we use
    it, we get comfortable with it, we learn what works well and
    what does not work well, and we improve it as soon as we can.
        Before the President's decision, the fiscal year 2004
    President's budget would have reflected the development of a
    set of test bed capabilities that could have been made
    operational. Today we are asking Congress to authorize funds
    that would allow us to add to this test bed capability and make
    it operational in the 2004 and 2005 time frame. In other words,
    instead of building a test bed that might be used
    operationally, we are fielding an initial defensive capability
    we will continue to test.
        Because of this relationship between initial defense
    capability and testing, we are asking that all funding
    associated with both efforts be under the defense-wide
    appropriation RDT&E.
        Now with respect to the issue of operational testing before
    deployment, I would argue that what we are faced with today is
    a timing issue. This is a unique, unprecedented technology in
    its early stages of maturity. We have to strike a balance
    between our desire for perfection in missile defense as we
    deploy and our desire to have, as soon as possible, a defensive
    capability where none exists today; or can we do both? Can we
    continue to test the elements of the components of the system
    we might also use to defend ourselves? I believe we can.
        Now, why do I believe that? Because we have shown the nuts
    and bolts of the missile defense capabilities we are planning
    to field and Block 2004 can work. Over the past 2 years, we
    have conducted a total of 55 flight tests and 60 ground tests;
    17 of these tests were intercept tests. Each test builds our
    confidence. Now we know ``hit-to-kill'' works. We have had a
    significant degree of repeatability represented in the tests
    conducted to date. We are well along in our goal of
    demonstrating reliability.
        Mr. Christie has clearly stated the relationship we are
    building and our objectives concerning operational tests. We
    will continue to work with Mr. Christie and his people to make
    the best decisions we can about missile defense.
        Regardless of the names we apply to our testing, we must
    have assets and infrastructure in the field if we are going to
    begin to test the system under operationally realistic
    conditions. If we do not have the weapons and sensors fielded
    at operationally useful locations, we cannot really do a good
    job of hooking it all up to make sure it works. This program
    and this budget proposes to do just that.
        Our intentions are to test the complete system as soon as
    possible. Over the next 2 years, we are planning another 68
    flight tests, 58 ground tests, and about the same number of
    intercept tests as before. We have done the testing to have
    confidence to proceed. We want to continue to strike the right
    balance. The elements of the test bed will also have some
    inherent defense capability. We can do operational testing
    while having the system on alert. We should take advantage of
    that.
        I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take the next
    step in missile defense for another reason. Our test bed
    evolutionary approach to initial defensive capability is
    rational from a cost standpoint as well. We do not now have an
    adequate understanding to submit a budget for many tens of
    billions of dollars for a huge, fixed, long-term architecture.
    We do not need to.
        We are able, however, to purchase some field capabilities
    in small numbers. This approach will allow us to control costs.
    With an increase of $1.5 billion over 2 years, we could provide
    this country with a modest missile defense capability where
    none exists today.
        Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on
    track. The Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told
    Congress it would do. Your support has been important to the
    progress we have made. We have listened to your concerns and
    have sought to address them in a responsible manner. Our tests
    and our analysis gives us confidence that we can take the first
    step toward initial defensive operations, while we continue to
    prove our new technologies and demonstrate missile defense
    combat utility through realistic testing.
        I believe there is a tremendous benefit in putting this
    unprecedented technology into the field in manageable
    increments to provide some defense, to learn more about it,
    gain experience with it, and improve it over time.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of General Kadish follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, USAF

        Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is an
    honor to appear before you to present the Department of Defense's
    Fiscal Year 2004 missile defense program and budget.
        In early 2001 we restructured the missile defense program to
    develop the capability to defend the United States, our allies and
    friends, and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles in all
    phases of flight. With the support of Congress, we have made
    considerable progress in demonstrating key ballistic missile defense
    (BMD) technologies and system integration. Our testing and analysis
    give us confidence that hit-to-kill technology works and that we can
    take the initial steps we are proposing to bolster defenses against
    short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and introduce a modest
    defensive capability to defeat a limited long-range threat. Today I
    will review our progress, discuss why we are confident in our approach,
    and outline our plans and challenges ahead.
        Over the past 2 years we have conducted several successful
    intercept tests. We achieved four for five successful long-range,
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) intercept flight tests,
    demonstrating the hit-to-kill technologies of the Exo-atmospheric Kill
    Vehicle, critical sensor technologies, and the integration of many
    geographically dispersed missile defense assets. The failure of the
    most recent such test (Integrated Flight Test-10) last December
    resulted from the non-separation of the interceptor and the surrogate
    booster rocket. This was not a failure of new missile defense
    technology, but a failure of our quality control processes. We are
    increasing our already focused quality control efforts. We are taking
    steps to ensure this separation problem is not repeated. Furthermore,
    future GMD tests will no longer use the surrogate booster and instead
    will use one or both of the boosters currently under development.
        We are three for three in our ship-based exo-atmospheric intercept
    tests. Last year Aegis BMD successfully completed its Aegis Lightweight
    Exo-Atmospheric Projectile (LEAP) Intercept (ALI) project. Based on
    these results we accelerated the insertion of the follow-on Aegis BMD
    capability into the test bed. Our third intercept in November 2002 was
    the first ever intercept of a ballistic missile in the ascent phase of
    flight.
        Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) has made significant strides.
    Since January 2001, we have had five for seven successful intercepts of
    ballistic missile targets and have begun fielding the first PAC-3
    missiles. We also executed more than a dozen successful test flights of
    the Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft, completed significant aircraft
    modifications, and accomplished successful subsystem testing and full-
    up ground-tests of the first laser module. While we are in the
    difficult phase of integrating the components into the ABL, our
    progress to date has increased our confidence that ABL can eventually
    be integrated into the BMD system (BMDS).
        Mr. Chairman, America's missile defense program is on track. The
    Missile Defense Agency is doing what we told Congress it would do. We
    listened to your concerns and have sought to address them in a
    responsible manner. We have faced significant technical and management
    challenges, but through aggressive testing we have proven that hit-to-
    kill technology works. We have demonstrated system integration through
    complex system testing. These tests, combined with analysis of
    simulations and exercises, give us confidence that the system can take
    the first steps toward initial defensive operations while performing as
    a test bed for further realistic testing and continued spiral
    development.
        The President's fiscal year 2004 budget will allow us to continue
    this significant progress and is structured to incorporate the
    recommendations of the Defense Science Board summer study of 2002.

                    EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE

        The BMD system involves many sensors and interceptors that are
    integrated and layered to enable engagements against hostile missiles
    in the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. Layered
    defenses can allow multiple shot opportunities across all of the
    engagement segments and potentially within each one of those segments,
    greatly enhancing our ability to handle countermeasures and destroy in-
    flight missiles and their payloads.
        As I have explained in past hearings, we are building the missile
    defense system using an evolutionary acquisition approach, so that the
    system's capability can be enhanced over time. Our plan continues to be
    one of incrementally providing the decision makers the ability to field
    militarily useful capabilities based on their technological readiness,
    suitability for operational use and threat developments.
        Last December the President directed the Department to field an
    initial set of missile defense capabilities in order to reduce the
    vulnerabilities of the United States, our troops, and our allies and
    friends. Given our fielding approach, and given the successful testing
    we have accomplished to date, I believe we are ready for this. The
    proposed budget for fiscal year 2004 and across the 2004-2009 Future
    Years Defense Program (FYDP) supports Research, Development, Test, and
    Evaluation (RDT&E) activities to accomplish that goal. We plan to begin
    operating modest land and sea defense capabilities in 2004 to provide
    limited protection of our country as well as our troops and critical
    assets overseas.
        In missile defense, we deal routinely with revolutionary
    technologies and unprecedented engineering requirements. The program we
    are currently executing recognizes the unique challenges we face and
    sets out a disciplined course to develop the BMD system in an
    evolutionary way. Having spent the last couple of years looking at
    different missile defense options, we are now narrowing our program
    activities and focusing on development and fielding of the most
    promising elements.
        Consistent with the approach I have described in previous hearings,
    we are building and fielding limited, militarily useful capabilities as
    soon as they can be made available. This approach takes into account
    known and projected threats and the present state of technology. With a
    capability-based acquisition approach we put capability into the field,
    test it, use it, get comfortable with it, and learn what works well and
    what does not. We have structured test bed fielding opportunities to
    occur in ``blocks'' every 2 years to improve what we have fielded as
    needed. Block 2004 (initial defense capabilities) represents 2004-2005,
    Block 2006 represents 2006-2007, and so on. These blocks will deliver
    elements and components that are ready for continued rigorous testing
    and full integration into the system.
        With the President's decision, we now have a basic near-term
    architecture for a limited system to address a range of missile
    threats. I want to stress that we have no fixed, long-term
    architecture. We will evolve and improve the capability of the Block
    2004 system over time, so that what we propose to field initially in
    2004 and 2005 may evolve to look very different a decade later. The
    number and type of missile defense assets and their locations and
    basing arrangements may be expected to change to make the system more
    integrated and capable.
        We have adopted this evolutionary approach because a single
    acquisition cycle is not responsive to rapid changes in threat and
    technology and is not structured to deal with surprise. We want to
    avoid prematurely constraining system design by using the traditional
    requirements process and waiting up to 20 years or more for a defensive
    capability that would result from using traditional acquisition rules.
    In a world marked by increasing ballistic missile activity, our Nation,
    forces, and allies cannot afford to wait that long.
        In using this evolutionary approach, we still have the ability to
    incorporate the discipline and intent of the traditional acquisition
    process. For example, the warfighting community has been heavily
    involved from the beginning in the development of system elements and
    components. We are successfully using a spiral development process to
    put new technologies into play more quickly than if we were to use the
    traditional approach. Spiral development requires regular dialogue and
    active participation between user and developer for delivering a
    militarily useful set of capabilities. Once we field the initial
    capability, uniformed personnel will operate the system.
        Despite the many uncertainties we face, this approach allows us to
    be good stewards of the taxpayers' money. The President's recent
    announcement stands as a good example of this. We are not making an
    early commitment to large-volume serial production and very large-scale
    investments. Our fielding commitment will be scaled over time and rise
    with our confidence that we are on the right development path for this
    complex, multifaceted system.

             AGGRESSIVE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND TEST ACTIVITIES

        As we prepare to implement the President's directive, we plan to
    continue the program's intensive testing activities up to and beyond
    the 2004-2005 timeframe. We have a single, robust RDT&E program
    dedicated to the development and demonstration of missile defense
    technologies and integration concepts. In fact, consistent with our
    investments over the past 2 years, the lion's share of the fiscal year
    2004 budget request of $7.7 billion for the Missile Defense Agency,
    roughly $6 billion, will support RDT&E activities that are not directly
    tied to system fielding. Significant development efforts in fiscal year
    2004 include continued work on Theater High Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD), ABL, and kinetic energy boost-phase interceptors in the post-
    Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty environment.
        These aggressive RDT&E activities are the basis for proceeding as
    the President has directed and for continuing development work to build
    a multi-layered BMD system. We will continue our practice of assessing
    these activities on a regular basis to see if they can be accelerated
    or whether they must be truncated or modified in some manner. RDT&E
    activities occurring in fiscal year 2004 will contribute to Blocks
    2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010.
        We are still evaluating the impact of our withdrawal from the ABM
    Treaty. The treaty successfully did what it was intended to do. It
    severely restricted missile defense development and fielding options.
    The President's action has made it possible to begin to develop and
    test aggressively the full range of missile defense technologies and
    pursue capabilities that make the most sense from the standpoints of
    technology, operations, and cost.
        For example, as a result of the treaty withdrawal, Aegis BMD, the
    sea-based defense element, began its successful participation in GMD
    integrated flight tests conducted last October and December. While
    initially only collecting boost and ascent phase radar data, Aegis BMD
    has begun engineering efforts to become a full participant in future
    tests and will eventually provide fire control data to the BMD system.
        Our intercept tests against long-range ballistic missiles are very
    complex, yet since October 1999 we were forced to restrict ourselves to
    the same intercept flight geometries because of artificial constraints
    in our current test bed and our obligation to remain compliant with the
    ABM Treaty. Today, in order to test our GMD interceptors, we must
    launch targets from Vandenberg, AFB in California and interceptors from
    Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. We are changing that. The test
    bed we are building will introduce flexibility into our test approach
    and help overcome some basic geographic and geometric limitations by
    allowing us to test weapons and sensors against ballistic missiles of
    all ranges along different azimuths and using different trajectories.
    For test purposes we will introduce variable target launch and impact
    points and engagement areas.
        Robust, realistic testing is absolutely critical to developing an
    effective missile defense system. Over the past 2 years we conducted a
    total of 55 flight tests and 60 ground tests. Seventeen of these tests
    were flight-intercept tests. Each test builds our confidence in the BMD
    system. From our flight-testing, we know that the hit-to-kill approach
    works. We know our sensors can successfully detect and track the target
    and that our software algorithms can discriminate between reentry
    vehicles and basic decoys and debris. We know our battle management
    system can generate orders that put a kill vehicle in a position to
    achieve intercept. We will continue to refine and improve the system's
    performance in all areas. Our test program continues to add to our
    confidence that the basic technologies are sound and that they will
    work together to provide the Nation an effective BMD system.
        Our program and budget will continue to maintain a high tempo of
    increasingly complex ground- and flight-testing. Over the next 2 years
    we are planning another 68 flight tests, 58 ground tests, and
    maintaining the same pace of intercept tests as before. We do system
    testing to give us confidence that we have the ability to integrate
    geographically dispersed missile defense elements and components into
    an effective system. This does not include the many experiments we
    conduct routinely, the modeling and simulation activity, and the
    wargame exercises. Our computer predictions are very valuable in this
    process and give us a great deal of confidence that we are on the right
    paths.
        We remain committed to our aggressive testing approach, where we
    mature midcourse, boost, and terminal missile defense components and
    elements through rigorous testing under increasingly realistic and
    challenging conditions. When we have adequately demonstrated
    technologies, decisions can then be made concerning their integration
    into blocks for fielding. Testing activities remain central to what we
    do and are well supported within our funding request.

                          INITIAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

        Congress has already funded plans to put five midcourse
    interceptors into the test bed in silos at Fort Greely in Alaska,
    develop Aegis BMD, and test the SM-3 interceptor at the Pacific Missile
    Range Facility in Hawaii. Other activities are currently underway to
    improve the missile defense test bed by upgrading or developing launch
    sites (including Vandenberg, AFB), radar sensors, battle management and
    command and control components, communications terminals and networks,
    and associated test infrastructure in the United States and the
    Marshall Islands (including airborne, sea-based, and ground-based data
    collection assets).
        Today we are asking Congress to authorize funds that will allow us
    to add to this test bed and make it operational by 2004. These initial
    defense capabilities, fielded over a 2-year period, will include
    ground-based interceptors to counter long-range threats, sea-based
    interceptors to defeat short- and medium-range threats, additional PAC-
    3 units, and early warning and tracking sensors based on land, at sea,
    in the air, and in space.
        Before the President's decision, the fiscal year 2004 President's
    budget would have reflected the development of a set of test bed
    capabilities that could have been made operational. Instead of building
    a test bed that might be used operationally, we are fielding an initial
    defensive capability that we will continue to test. All RDT&E
    activities will support the initial defense capability, and the system
    elements and components we field will continue to support RDT&E.
    Because of the relationship between initial defense capabilities and
    testing, we are asking that all funding associated with both efforts be
    under Defense-wide appropriations RDT&E. With the December announcement
    we have quickened the pace at which we are moving forward, but we have
    not changed the direction in which we are moving.
        We are proposing to do in fiscal year 2004 what we said we were
    going to do in previous hearings, that is, field tested missile
    defenses a little at a time using a step approach. The missile defense
    operations we are proposing are unprecedented, and there still is much
    to learn. I believe there is tremendous benefit in putting this
    unprecedented technology into the field, in manageable increments, to
    provide some defense, to learn more about it, gain experience with it,
    and improve it over time.
        The Israeli Arrow program stands out as an example of how fielding
    militarily useful capability in block increments and in a timely manner
    can work and how successful it can be. With only four successful
    intercept flight tests, Israeli officials declared their first Arrow
    battery operational on October 17, 2000 and fielded that country's
    first capability to defeat incoming ballistic missiles launched from
    nearby states. The Israeli system has been operational for more than 2
    years now, and during that time it has conducted additional intercept
    and flight tests to enhance the system's performance. Plans are moving
    forward to augment it even further. Surrounded by states having an
    active interest in ballistic missiles, Israel found a way to field a
    limited defensive capability on an accelerated timeline and at a time
    when it could not afford to wait for system testing to be completed.
        We in the United States, of course, are not strangers to fielding
    an unprecedented military capability on an accelerated schedule. Our
    leadership struggled in the early stages of deploying the first
    reconnaissance satellites and land- and sea-based ballistic missiles.
    Urgent national security requirements pressed us to deploy capability
    soon, and through trial and error we did. Despite test failures, the
    country persevered and made militarily useful capabilities operational.
    Since that time, we have dramatically improved the capabilities of
    those first-generation systems. The parallels between these pioneering
    programs and the missile defense program are clear.
        I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are ready to take this next step
    in missile defense. Our fielding approach will not only help
    rationalize the force structure we deploy from the technological and
    threat standpoints, but also from the standpoint of cost. We do not now
    have adequate understanding to submit a bill of many tens of billions
    of dollars for a huge, long-term fixed architecture. We are able,
    however, to purchase, produce, and field capabilities in small numbers.
    This approach will allow us to control costs. With a modest investment
    and increase by the Department of a total of $1.5 billion spread over
    the fiscal year 2004 and 2005 budgets, we will provide this country
    with militarily useful capabilities where none exists today.
        In short, this $1.5 billion primarily will add a small number of
    ground-based interceptors as well as more SM-3 interceptors to the test
    bed capability we are already building. Future fielding decisions, as
    we have said all along, will be made in the outlying years based on the
    progress of technology and the evolution of the threat, subject to the
    annual congressional appropriations process.

                   CONFIDENCE IN INITIAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

        In assessing our level of confidence with the planned initial
    missile defense capabilities, we have to strike a balance between our
    desire for perfection in the missile defenses we deploy and our desire
    to have as soon as possible a defensive capability where none exists
    today.
        Adequate testing is the key to achieving that balance. While this
    testing may not fit the mold of classical operational testing that
    would traditionally take place prior to full-rate production, we do
    follow a testing discipline that I believe can give us the confidence
    to say that what we deploy will work as we have said it would under
    threat circumstances that we believe we might have to face.
        I believe that to strike the right balance we must go through an
    intense period of testing to demonstrate that the technologies on which
    we are relying can work consistently under conditions that are
    increasingly stressful and realistic. We have spent the past 2 years
    demonstrating the technologies we propose to employ in the Block 2004
    Test Bed. We have said all along that when we do field we will not
    field a system that will fully meet our missile defense needs. We will
    face limitations and have gaps, let there be no illusions there. The
    system we are initially fielding will be limited operationally. But we
    went down this road knowing that there would be gaps and with a process
    that is specifically designed to fill those gaps and make up for
    performance limitations as soon as practicable.
        Among the limitations that should be included here is that of
    operational experience. We need to build operational experience over
    time with the system that will be guarding our Nation and our troops.
    There is no better way to do that than to put basic elements out into
    the field and to begin working with those assets to develop the
    doctrine and concepts of operation we will need and to train the
    military personnel who will operate it.
        We have spent significant amounts of money on testing the GMD and
    Aegis BMD elements of system. All of the tests to date have been what
    we have called ``developmental tests.'' Regardless of the names we
    apply to our testing, we must have assets and infrastructure in the
    field if we are going to begin to test that system under operationally
    realistic conditions. If we do not have the weapons and sensors fielded
    at operationally useful locations, we cannot really do a good job of
    hooking it all up to make sure it works.
        The President's decision allows us to put this materiel out in the
    field for testing, in locations that make sense from an operational
    point of view. Given the recent events in the international security
    environment, the President's decision reflects an urgent need to make
    that test bed as operational as we possibly can. That decision also
    recognizes that we will not be fielding the perfect system at the
    outset.
        What we are faced with today is a timing issue. Must we do what has
    been traditionally called ``operational testing'' before we can say
    that we have a capability we can use in an extreme security situation,
    or can we do both? Can we continue to test the elements and components
    of a system we also could use to defend ourselves if needed? I believe
    we can.
        Why do I believe that? Because we have shown that the nuts and
    bolts of the missile defense capabilities we are planning to field in
    Block 2004 can work. We have had a significant degree of repeatability
    represented in the tests we have conducted to date, and we are well
    along in our goal of conducting these tests reliably. We are now to the
    point where we need to assemble selected missile defense elements into
    a test bed that will permit operationally realistic testing using
    different azimuths and trajectories, different launch and target
    points, and different arrangements in our sensors and weapons. That
    test bed will allow us to test in different ways so that we can refine
    our all-too-important battle management and command and control
    infrastructure. The elements of the test bed also will have some
    inherent defense capability. We can do operational development testing
    while having the system on alert. We should take advantage of that.
        Our intentions are to test the complete system and to be ready to
    respond to ballistic missile threats against the United States, our
    deployed forces, and our friends and allies. We have conducted the
    rigorous testing needed to give us the confidence that we are far
    enough along to do operationally realistic testing in an integrated
    way. Testing will always be an important part of this system--always.
    We will always be improving what we have in the field. The budget we
    have submitted will support the testing required to ensure that the
    elements of the Block 2004 system we would like to field will
    adequately serve the defense needs of this Nation.
        Our RDT&E activities are extensive and are important part of our
    acquisition approach. Below are three areas of special interest.
    BMD System Radar Activity
        The MDA's Family of Radar concept is continuous and flexible global
    detection, tracking, discrimination, and hit assessment. Ideally, we
    want to be able to watch missile payloads deploy and accomplish prompt
    and early battle assessment. We are currently pursuing multiple sensor
    technologies and identifying and developing sensors to give the BMD
    system the ``eyes'' it will need. In order to identify the most
    promising technologies and reduce risk, we are investigating, in
    parallel, sensor alternatives on land-, sea-, air- and space-based
    platforms to add robustness to the BMD system and improve opportunities
    to collect multiple phenomenology on the threat missile or target
    complex. Evaluations of different sensor and weapon combinations and
    alternatives will help us assess their overall benefit to an
    integrated, layered BMD system. An important element in this effort is
    the mobile Sea-Based X-Band radar (SBX), which we plan to build by
    September 2005 to greatly improve both testing and our initial defense
    capability.
        The BMDS Radar project, a new activity, is funded in the fiscal
    year 2004 budget to expand the engagement battle space and assess
    missile defense concepts of operation that we were not allowed to
    consider under the ABM Treaty. We will validate the concept of forward-
    basing and sensor layering and evaluate advanced algorithms using both
    MDA- and non-MDA-owned sensors. Current plans call for the BMDS radar
    to be available for integration into the test bed in late 2006. We will
    support continuous sensor research to improve capabilities and develop
    advanced algorithms for Block 2008 and beyond.
    BMD System Infrared Sensor Activities
        The Department restructured the Space Based Infrared System-Low
    (SBIRS-Low) element in fiscal year 2002, renaming it the Space Tracking
    and Surveillance System (STSS). We will explore new technologies to
    enhance missile detection, improve reporting on ballistic missile
    launches regardless of range, azimuth, or launch point, and provide
    critical midcourse tracking and discrimination data.
        The Russian-American Observation Satellites (RAMOS) project is a
    cooperative effort between the United States and the Russian Federation
    to improve early warning technologies. RAMOS represents an innovative
    space-based sensor R&D initiative. We are proceeding towards a joint
    Preliminary Design Review this summer and expect to conclude the design
    and development phase in early fiscal year 2005. The United States is
    actively striving to reach a bi-lateral agreement to conduct activities
    beyond the design and development phase. If we are able to move forward
    with this project, we would launch two satellites in late fiscal year
    2008.
    BMD System Interceptor Activity
        Our longer-term goal is to develop low-cost enhanced interceptors
    for integration with different platforms to defend against missiles in
    the boost, midcourse, and exo-atmospheric terminal phases of flight. We
    are consolidating all next-generation kinetic energy interceptor
    (booster and kill vehicle) development efforts and placing them under
    our BMDS Interceptor activity. Relying heavily on existing hardware and
    proven technology, we will develop a hit-to-kill boost phase capability
    by Block 2008 and deliver capability enhancements for Block 2010 and
    beyond.
        In fiscal year 2004 we will begin developing a space-based kinetic
    energy interceptor test bed to explore the technological feasibility
    and operational advantages of engagements from space. This plan is
    consistent with the Defense Science Board's recommendation, released
    last August, to establish a comprehensive development program for a
    space-based kinetic system. Following up on last year's successful
    experiments to understand key sensor technologies, we will conduct in
    2004 a Near Field Infra-Red Experiment to observe from space a boosting
    rocket. This data will assist in the selection of seeker and sensor
    technologies for a ground-based boost interceptor and development of
    interceptor guidance and homing algorithms.

                          BLOCK ACTIVITIES AND BUDGET

        We are working within the MDA and with the Department's operational
    community to meet the President's objective to establish an initial
    defense capability in 2004, which begins with Block 2004. The following
    describes by block our planned fielding opportunities across the FYDP.
    Block 2004
        This block continues development and integration of elements,
    components, and facilities in the test bed. Block 2004 RDT&E funding
    will deliver capabilities directed by the President for operational use
    in fiscal year 2004-2005. We plan to add different capabilities to
    point-defense capabilities already provided by PAC-3 units. This
    initial fielding will grow the RDT&E program and expand the physical
    infrastructure of the test bed.
        Funds in this block will enable us to conduct major target and
    countermeasure development and capability demonstrations, integration
    tests, and experiments. We are investing in a substantive system test
    program to test system command, control, and battle management (C\2\BM)
    and communications across the elements. The Block 2004 Master Test Plan
    lays out the strategy for conducting a comprehensive set of integrated
    and distributed ground- and flight-tests to verify performance and
    characterize the capability of the system. This test program will form
    the basis of operational and military utility assessments of the Block
    2004 initial defense capability.
        We will have three major system integration flight tests, the first
    of which is a large-scale integration event that tests C\2\BM and
    communications during multiple element intercept tests. We plan to
    demonstrate C\2\ capabilities and communications among C\2\ and battle
    management nodes, weapons, and sensors and to continue work with the
    Services, Combatant Commands, and the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense to ensure BMD system interoperability with legacy and planned
    Department systems and standards.
        We are requesting $3.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
    for fielding Block 2004. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2004
    activities across the FYDP is $6.2 billion (see Table 1).

                                                        TABLE 1: BLOCK 2004 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
                                                                       ($M Then-Year) \1\
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  Fiscal Year                              FYDP      Totals
                                                                       ----------------------------------------------------------------   Fiscal     Fiscal
                                  Project                                                                                               Year 2004- Year 2002-
                                                                         2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009      2009       2009
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    C\2\BMC Block 2004................................................      21      80     114      79       0       0       0       0        194        295
    Hercules Block 2004...............................................       0       0      18      27       0       0       0       0         46         46
    Joint Warfighter Support Block 2004...............................       0       0      24      13       0       0       0       0         37         37
    Test & Evaluation Block 2004......................................      47      57      37      33       0       0       0       0         70        174
    Targets & CM Block 2004...........................................      75     104     197     170       0       0       0       0        367        547
    THAAD Block 2004..................................................     808     888     622     635      65       0       0       0      1,322      3,018
    GMD Test Bed Block 2004...........................................     636     452   1,205     868       0       0       0       0      2,073      3,161
    Aegis BMD Test Bed Block 2004.....................................     413     440     648     894      98       0       0       0      1,640      2,492
    ABL Block 2004....................................................     454     348     345     150       0       0       0       0        494      1,296
                                                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Totals..........................................................   2,454   2,369   3,212   2,868     163       0       0       0      6,242    11,065
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

        Boost Elements. We are developing directed energy and kinetic
    energy boost phase intercept capabilities to create a defense layer
    near the hostile missile's launch point. We require quick reaction
    times, high confidence decision-making, and redundant engagement
    capabilities to counter ballistic missiles in this phase.
        ABL is currently under development to acquire, track, and kill
    ballistic missiles in boost phase using speed-of-light technology. ABL
    integrates three major subsystems (Laser; Beam Control; and Battle
    Management, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
    Intelligence (BM/C\4\I)) into a modified commercial Boeing 747-400F
    aircraft. We will continue major subsystem integration and testing
    activities. Block 2004 activities involve completion of ground-testing,
    to include first light on the test bed aircraft, first flight of the
    complete weapons system, and the successful track and high-energy laser
    engagement of a missile-shaped target board dropped from high-altitude.
    In fiscal year 2005, we will deliver one aircraft for BMD system
    integration and testing and demonstrate a missile shoot-down against a
    boosting threat-representative target.
        Midcourse Elements. Midcourse defense elements engage ballistic
    missiles in space after booster burnout and before the warhead re-
    enters the atmosphere. The GMD element defends against long-range
    ballistic missile attacks, and Aegis BMD will counter from the sea
    medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.
        The Department's plans are to add by the end of fiscal year 2004 1
    more Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) at Fort Greely in Alaska for a
    total of 6 GBIs at that site, and 4 interceptors at Vandenberg, Air
    Force Base, for a total of up to 10 interceptors at both sites. The
    decision to develop two interceptor sites is consistent with our
    layered approach and operational concept and will allow us to work
    through critical integration, battle management, and command and
    control issues early on.
        There are a number of other activities we need to undertake in
    fiscal year 2005. We are asking for appropriations to produce up to 10
    additional GBIs for fielding at the Fort Greely site, for a total of 16
    interceptors in Alaska and 4 in California. We also plan to produce by
    the end of 2005 between 10 and 20 SM-3 missiles for deployment on 3
    Aegis ships converted to the missile defense mission. Because we are
    starting from a base of zero, each interceptor we field between now and
    2005, up to the full complement of 20 ground-based and 20 sea-based
    interceptors, will increase significantly our overall capability to
    defend this country, our troops, and friendly countries against long-
    and medium-range threats.
        Included in the test bed and as part of the initial missile defense
    architecture are plans for integrating Early Warning Radars (EWR) at
    Eareckson AS (the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska) and Beale AFB
    (Upgraded EWR). We will add to this infrastructure multiple fire
    control nodes and improved lines of communications connecting sites in
    Alaska and the continental United States using fiber optics and
    satellites. The administration is working to secure allied approval to
    upgrade and integrate into the BMD system early warning radars
    currently located in the United Kingdom and Thule, Greenland to view
    threat missiles launched out of the Middle East. The United Kingdom
    already has approved the use of the Fylingdales radar. We also plan to
    build by September 30, 2005 a Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) to improve
    the testing regime and enhance initial missile defense system
    performance.
        We have made dramatic progress in recent months with the GMD
    element, including in the areas of silo construction, development of a
    nationwide communications network, and integrated flight-testing. We
    have excavated six silos at Fort Greely, 7 weeks ahead of schedule, and
    we are in the process of constructing and establishing appropriate
    security for multiple test bed facilities at Fort Greely and Eareckson.
        By the end of 2005, we will upgrade SPY-1 radars on 15 Aegis
    warships for enhanced surveillance and track capability. Three
    prototype surveillance and track Aegis destroyers will be available
    starting in 2003; we will modernize additional destroyers for
    surveillance and track and BMD engagement capability. Two Aegis
    cruisers in addition to the U.S.S. Lake Erie, our test cruiser, will
    receive BMD engagement modifications.
        The next SM-3 flight test, scheduled for later this year, will use
    a reengineered Monolithic Divert and Attitude Control System (MDACS)
    for the first time in the interceptor's kinetic warhead. MDACS has
    proved to be more reliable than the previous model, faster to build,
    and less expensive. Five at-sea flight tests and numerous tracking
    exercises, including participation in GMD integrated flight-tests, are
    planned through 2005. Our cooperative research with Japan will continue
    to enhance the capabilities of the SM-3 interceptor. The focus of that
    research is on four components: sensor, advanced kinetic warhead,
    second stage propulsion, and lightweight nosecone.
        Terminal Elements. THAAD is designed to be rapidly deployable and
    protect forward-deployed U.S. and friendly troops, broadly dispersed
    assets, population centers, and sites in the United States by engaging
    short- to medium-range ballistic missiles or their payloads at endo-
    and exo-atmospheric altitudes. THAAD could have more than one intercept
    opportunity against a target, a layering potential that makes it more
    difficult for an adversary to employ countermeasures effectively. This
    terminal defense capability will help mitigate the effects of a WMD
    payload.
        This year we will complete missile and launcher designs, initiate
    manufacturing of missile and launcher ground test units, and begin
    testing the first completed radar antenna. We will continue fabrication
    of the second radar and building the battle manager and launcher test
    beds. A total of four exo-atmospheric flight tests at the White Sands
    Missile Range, New Mexico are planned for fiscal year 2004-2005.
        PAC-3 provides terminal missile defense capability against short-
    and medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-radiation missiles, and
    aircraft with a low radar cross-section employing advanced
    countermeasures. PAC-3 successfully completed initial operational
    testing last year, intercepting ballistic missiles, aircraft, and
    cruise missiles. The tests uncovered problems that we have since
    corrected in collaboration with the Army. We have completed development
    of the PAC-3 missile and made C\2\BM modifications to enable PAC-3's
    integration into the BMD system. We will continue to conduct PAC-3
    tests this year. Later in Block 2004 we will demonstrate PAC-3's
    integration with other BMD system elements.
        With the support of Congress, the Department already has
    accelerated PAC-3 missile production and currently has a plan to
    increase that production rate to 20 missiles per month in 2005. Given
    current production plans, by the end of 2005 the PAC-3 inventory will
    stand at 332 missiles.
        The Department is transferring this month PAC-3 procurement and
    RDT&E funding to the Army, which is reflected in the Army's fiscal year
    2004 budget request. The MDA will retain responsibility for defining
    and testing BMD system interoperability and continue to work with the
    Army on PAC-3 engineering, development, and testing. The Department is
    currently preparing to transfer later this year RDT&E funding for the
    Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) from the MDA to the Army.
        The Arrow Weapon System, developed jointly by the United States and
    Israel to counter short- to medium-range ballistic missiles, is
    operational at two sites in Israel and interoperable with U.S. missile
    defense elements. We worked with Israel to deploy its first two Arrow
    batteries, and are currently assisting that country to procure a third
    battery.
        The Arrow System Improvement Program, a spiral development upgrade
    of the current operational system, includes technical cooperation to
    improve the performance of the Arrow system and test it at a U.S. test
    range. The first flight test was conducted successfully on January 5,
    2003. We continue to support additional Arrow flight-testing to assess
    technology developments and overall system performance and to collect
    data and conduct annual hardware-in-the-loop exercises with Israel to
    enhance interoperability.
    Block 2006
        Block 2006 work continues to improve existing capabilities and
    provide new sensors and interceptors for integration with fielded
    elements. Our focus will be on evolving and integrating the capability
    to achieve a more synergistic and layered BMD system. We will continue
    rigorous system and element flight-test demonstration and validation
    efforts and use wargames to help develop concepts of operation and
    operational procedures.
        We are requesting $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
    for Block 2006. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2006 activities
    across the FYDP is $11.3 billion (see Table 2).

                                                        TABLE 2: BLOCK 2006 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
                                                                       ($M Then-Year) \1\
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  Fiscal Year                              FYDP      Totals
                                                                       ----------------------------------------------------------------   Fiscal     Fiscal
                                  Project                                                                                               Year 2004- Year 2002-
                                                                         2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009      2009       2009
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    C\2\BMC Block 2006................................................       4      27      53     104     116       0       0       0        273        304
    Hercules Block 2006...............................................       0       0      19      18      45      45       0       0        127        127
    Joint Warfighter Support Block 2006...............................       0       0       0      12      24      12       0       0         48         48
    Test & Evaluation Block 2006......................................       1       1       2       9      41      39       0       0         92         93
    Targets & CM Block 2006...........................................       1       4      32     110     213     172       0       0        526        530
    THAAD Block 2006..................................................       0       0     109     208     598     498     113       0      1,525      1,525
    GMD Block 2006....................................................   2,460   2,109   1,605   1,774   1,354   1,235       0       0      5,969     10,538
    Aegis BMD Block 2006..............................................       0       0      24      73     377     299       0       0        773        773
    ABL Block 2006....................................................       0       0      10      86     150      79      81      55        461        461
    BMDS Radars Block 2006............................................       0       0     101     145     134       0       0       0        380        380
    STSS Block 2006...................................................      55     232     276     285     285     204      75      35      1,160      1,447
                                                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total...........................................................   2,520   2,372   2,232   2,823   3,335   2,583     270      90     11,333    16,225
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

        Boost Elements. We will enhance and test the integration of the ABL
    aircraft into the BMD system. Candidate enhancements include
    improvements in BMC\4\I, interoperability, pointing and tracking, and
    target engagement. We will continue evaluation of the ABL test aircraft
    capability against a range of threats. This aircraft will be available
    to provide an emergency operational capability except for a maximum of
    6 months during fiscal year 2007 when it may undergo modifications and
    enhancements.
        Midcourse Elements. We plan to enhance defensive capability and
    further develop the test bed by maturing hardware and software of all
    GMD interceptor, sensor, and C\2\BM components. We will continue our
    ground- and flight-testing to demonstrate improved weapon and
    discrimination performance and critical interfaces with external
    sensors. We also plan to complete the upgrade of the Thule EWR should
    we get approval from Denmark.
        Aegis BMD flight missions will incorporate remote engagements of
    targets as well as demonstrations against intermediate-range ballistic
    missile (IRBM) targets. We will continue development of Aegis BMD
    sensor discrimination capability. Prototype BMD signal processors will
    be tested aboard Aegis ships with SPY-1 radar modifications. SM-3
    missile deliveries will begin in 2004. Our plans are to build an
    inventory of up to 35 SM-3 interceptors by the end of 2006. Also, if
    directed, we would prepare to field up to 20 additional SM-3
    interceptors in 2007. We will proceed with our cooperative BMD research
    with Japan to enhance the SM-3. We have two joint flight tests of the
    advanced nosecone planned in the fiscal year 2005-2006 timeframe, and
    we will continue to look at possibilities for co-development.
        Terminal Elements. The THAAD interceptor begins in the third
    quarter fiscal year 2006 a series of five flight tests that are
    scheduled to conclude in first quarter fiscal year 2008. We will
    improve THAAD's exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric endgame
    discrimination capability against increasingly complex targets.
        Sensors. Current plans call for a new forward-based radar in late
    2006 for positioning close to the threat at sea or on land. Enhanced
    forward-based sensor capabilities and improved sensor netting will
    enable the BMD system to handle threats posing a more difficult
    discrimination challenge and provide a launch-on-remote capability. A
    midcourse radar will be added as part of our layered approach.
    Additional radar configurations will be procured as necessary to
    satisfy Block 2006 objectives.
        Current plans are to launch two low-earth orbit satellites in
    fiscal year 2007 to validate space-based sensor concepts for target
    acquisition, tracking, and discrimination and to provide a space node
    for the test bed. STSS will improve in subsequent blocks to provide
    data fusion, radar/sensor cueing over-the-horizon, and interceptor
    handover and fire control. Production alternatives will be evaluated at
    least annually based upon element performance and integrated BMD system
    performance.
    Block 2008
        Block 2008 represents a major step in BMD system evolution. We plan
    to complete multiple layers of weapons and sensors, based on fixed and
    mobile platforms, to counter a range of ballistic missiles. This block
    will include C\2\BM components that enable integrated control of all
    system assets throughout the battlespace. Primary development projects
    include adding boost phase weapons to the test bed, integrating space
    sensor platforms, and fusing multi-sensor discrimination products. We
    will integrate capability-based targets and payload suites (to include
    new and more complex countermeasures) into our system testing to
    demonstrate effectiveness against evolving threats.
        We are requesting $572 million in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
    for Block 2008. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2008 activities
    across the FYDP is $16.3 billion (see Table 3).

                                                        TABLE 3: BLOCK 2008 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
                                                                       ($M Then-Year) \1\
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  Fiscal Year                              FYDP      Totals
                                                                       ----------------------------------------------------------------   Fiscal     Fiscal
                                  Project                                                                                               Year 2004- Year 2002-
                                                                         2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009      2009       2009
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    C\2\BMC Block 2008................................................       0       0       1      12      27     144     145     147        476        476
    Hercules Block 2008...............................................       0       0      19      17      17      17      62      60        192        192
    Joint Warfighter Support Block 2008...............................       0       0       0       0       0      12      29      31         71         71
    Test & Evaluation Block 2008......................................       0       0       1       1       4      13      85      87        190        190
    Targets & CM Block 2008...........................................       0       0       0      57      77      68     239     253        694        694
    THAAD Block 2008..................................................       0       0       0       0     237     227     369     300      1,134      1,134
    GMD Block 2008....................................................       0       0       0       0       0       0     878     877      1,756      1,756
    AEGIS BMD Block 2008..............................................       0       0       0     116     186     322     470     386      1,481      1,481
    ABL Block 2008....................................................      11     237     256     402     582     561     366     267      2,435      2,683
    BMDS Radars Block 2008............................................       0       0       0       0       0     136     102      22        261        261
    STSS Block 2008...................................................       0       0       0       0       0      82     177      89        348        348
    BMDS Interceptor Block 2008.......................................      54     100     296     529   1,013   1,562   1,939   1,890      7,229      7,383
                                                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total...........................................................      65     337     572   1,134   2,145   3,146   4,862   4,409     16,268    16,669
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

        Boost Elements. ABL will integrate new technologies to improve
    performance and lethality and enhance operational suitability. We will
    continue development of promising technologies for insertion into Block
    2008 and beyond and design and develop a system-level ground-test
    facility for ABL. We plan to test a second ABL aircraft in the test bed
    during Block 2008.
        Plans also are to develop and integrate a mobile ground-based boost
    phase hit-to-kill capability into the test bed for flight-test
    demonstration. We will initiate a space-based test bed development to
    determine the feasibility of intercepting missiles from space. Initial
    on-orbit testing would commence with three to five satellites in Block
    2008.
        Midcourse Elements. We will conduct up to three GMD flight-tests
    annually to demonstrate advanced engineering and pre-planned equipment
    improvements for the boosters, interceptors, early warning and fire
    control radars, and C\2\BM and communications software builds. We plan
    to enhance the Aegis Weapons System AN/SPY-1 radar to improve
    discrimination for engaging both unitary and separating targets. We
    will assess GMD integration with the BMDS Interceptor and also test the
    interceptor on board an Aegis warship.
        Terminal Elements. We will complete the development and testing of
    the THAAD weapon system. We are planning up to eight developmental and
    operational-type flight tests to stress interceptor, radar, and C\2\BM
    performance in realistic scenarios that include advanced
    countermeasures.
        Sensors. Our work will build on the initial BMDS Radar
    configuration and conduct sensor research to improve capabilities and
    develop advanced algorithms. We will improve Family of Radar coverage,
    performance, and flexibility and address vulnerability within the
    context of the overall BMD system global sensor network. STSS
    operations will continue to be integrated with other BMD elements in
    the test bed and support enhanced C\2\BM development initiatives. STSS
    will demonstrate the ability to acquire, track, and discriminate
    midcourse objects with space-based infrared sensors.
    Block 2010
        Work in this block will continue spiral development projects for
    weapon and sensor improvements and platform integration. C\2\BM and
    communications improvements will enable highly resolved sensor data to
    be exchanged with all BMD system elements.
        We are requesting $24 million in fiscal year 2004 to support RDT&E
    for Block 2010. Our estimated expenditure for Block 2010 activities
    across the FYDP is $4.7 billion (see Table 4).

                                                        TABLE 4: BLOCK 2010 FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
                                                                       ($M Then-Year) \1\
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  Fiscal Year                              FYDP      Totals
                                                                       ----------------------------------------------------------------   Fiscal     Fiscal
                                  Project                                                                                               Year 2004- Year 2002-
                                                                         2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009      2009       2009
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AEGIS BMD Block 2010..............................................       0       0       0       0       0       8     104     145        257        257
    STSS Block 2010/2012..............................................     179      55      24      44     232     565     750   1,065      2,680      2,914
    BMDS Interceptor Block 2010.......................................       0       0       0       0      97     146     585     974      1,803      1,803
                                                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total...........................................................     179      55      24      44     329     719   1,439   2,184      4,740     4,974
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

        Boost Elements. Block 2010 activities will improve exo-atmospheric
    BMDS Interceptor performance and enable greater basing mode
    flexibility, to include possible adaptation to sea-based platforms. We
    will develop and test an advanced space-based test bed to augment or
    replace the Block 2008 space-based test bed.
        Midcourse Elements. We will continue flight-testing improved weapon
    and sensor components and work toward the integration of an advanced
    BMDS Interceptor. Aegis BMD will incorporate prior block developments
    into the Navy-developed next-generation, open architecture Combat
    System.
        Terminal Elements. THAAD will integrate proven technologies to
    enhance its capability against longer range and faster ballistic
    missiles without sacrificing existing mobility and performance.
    Fielding and survivability upgrades also are planned to demonstrate a
    capability against both IRBM and ICBM threats.
        Sensors. New technologies will be inserted into subsequent STSS
    blocks to provide precise threat tracking and improved discrimination.
    We will develop and launch a satellite with improved sensors integrated
    into the first common satellite bus, and develop and integrate advanced
    ground station equipment and software. The Block 2010 STSS will deliver
    a space-based capability to acquire, track and discriminate ballistic
    missiles based on larger aperture track sensors, increased vehicle
    lifetime, and increased, near-real-time on-board data processing. The
    funding also includes launch services for Block 2010 satellites. C\2\BM
    funding focuses on integrating STSS data into the sensor net.

                            MISSION AREA INVESTMENTS

        Our Mission Area Investments are investments common to the entire
    BMD system that enable us to implement over time our block fielding
    approach. Mission Area Investments maintain core development and
    testing infrastructure and facilitate the integration of future block
    capabilities. The President's budget requests $1.69 billion in fiscal
    year 2004 for these investments. This program activity accounts for
    about $11.3 billion, or just over 20 percent of the total funding
    estimate across the FYDP. Table 5 provides a detailed breakdown of
    funding for each investment activity.

                                                 TABLE 5: MISSION AREA INVESTMENTS FUNDING FISCAL YEAR 2002-2009
                                                                       ($M Then-year) \1\
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  Fiscal Year                              FYDP      Totals
                                                                       ----------------------------------------------------------------   Fiscal     Fiscal
                            Investment Activity                                                                                         Year 2004- Year 2002-
                                                                         2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009      2009       2009
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    System Engineering................................................     236     397     436     474     501     510     580     578      3,079      3,713
    C\2\, BM & Communications.........................................      16      16     119     125     178     201     204     218      1,045      1,076
    Test & Targets....................................................     359     332     338     332     328     352     316     333      1,998      2,688
    International Programs............................................     211     205     148     215     129     100      89      89        769      1,185
    Advanced Concepts.................................................     347     176     388     418     363     437     524     534      2,664      3,187
    Program Operations................................................     232     170     264     252     283     306     317     333      1,754      2,156
                                                                       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Total...........................................................   1,400   1,296   1,692   1,817   1,783   1,904   2,029   2,083     11,309    14,005
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.

        The significant Mission Area Investments are as follows:
    System Engineering
        The System Engineering activity defines, manages, and integrates
    the layered BMD system. Capability-based acquisition requires continual
    assessment of technical and operational alternatives at the component,
    element, and system levels. Our system engineering process assesses and
    determines system design and element contributions and the impact of
    introducing new technologies and operational concepts to ensure
    properly synthesized system blocks. These activities provide the
    technical expertise, tools, and facilities to develop the BMD system
    and maintain an intelligence and research capability to ensure that the
    system evolves in a way that is responsive to known and anticipated
    threats.
        We are increasing our focus on risks related to producibility,
    manufacturing, quality, cost, and schedule of the BMD system elements.
    We dedicate resources to examine the applicability of technology to
    system needs and transition readiness. Industrial and manufacturing
    investment strategies for achieving system affordability and
    facilitating insertion of successive new capabilities are increasingly
    vital to the program.
    Command and Control, Battle Management & Communications (C\2\BMC)
        Our activities related to C\2\BMC create interoperability among a
    wide variety of legacy systems and emerging elements over joint and
    coalition networks. The C\2\BMC activity will continue development and
    integration of the C\2\BM and communications functions for the BMD
    system. By fielding software development spirals that improve system
    synergism, integration capability, and interoperability with external
    systems, this activity expands the inherent C\2\BM capabilities of
    fielded terminal, midcourse, and boost defenses. Communications funding
    will develop and improve BMD system-wide communication links and sensor
    netting functions to enable enhanced early warning and quicker
    interceptor response times. The Joint National Integration Center
    (JNIC) provides a common environment for the BMD elements to conduct
    experiments, demonstrations, and exercises and is a key-operating
    C\2\BM component of the test bed.
    BMD Tests & Targets
        The missile defense program includes significant test and
    evaluation infrastructure, test execution capabilities, and analytical
    tools for program-wide use. The Agency conducts risk reduction,
    developmental, and operational element and component testing as well as
    tests to collect critical measurements, such as plume signatures. We
    also have a rigorous measurements test program to collect data in
    support of design, development, and engineering activities.
    Measurements from dedicated test events and targets of opportunity
    enable us to design components, characterize potential countermeasures,
    test algorithms, undertake lethality and kill assessment, and validate
    our critical models and simulations.
        Investments providing ballistic missile targets, countermeasures,
    and other payloads support our test objectives. Presentation of the
    targets and payloads for flight test events involves designing,
    prototyping, developing, procuring, certifying, and qualifying for
    testing. In fiscal year 2003 we will establish a single prime
    contractor to further enhance system level management of targets and
    countermeasures activities.
        In fiscal year 2004 we will continue to resource critical test
    facilities, launch capabilities, instrumentation, telemetry,
    communications, and safety systems underpinning our testing regime.
    With the enhanced realism of the test bed, the increasing complexity of
    our tests, and the escalating tempo of test activity, our investments
    in this area will emphasize flexibility, standardization, and mobility.
    International Programs
        The President has underscored the importance of working with other
    countries to develop missile defenses and provide protection against
    ballistic missile threats. We are building defensive layers that could
    potentially involve a variety of locations around the globe and
    probably involve many other countries. Last summer interagency teams
    briefed key allies on the international participation framework. Today
    we are well along in our discussions with several governments regarding
    their possible participation in the missile defense program and
    improvements in our industrial relationships.
    Advanced Concepts
        We have several science and technology (S&T) initiatives to
    increase BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the
    engagement battle space of terminal elements. In fiscal year 2004, we
    will continue to focus on the miniature kill vehicle project, which
    could lead to a flight-test in fiscal year 2005. Fiscal year 2004
    funding will support investigating early detection and tracking
    technology, Laser/LADAR technologies for improved tracking, weapon
    guidance, and imaging, and technologies for a space-based, high-power
    laser. While our S&T activities are not on a critical path for
    insertion into the BMD system, each one of them is being considered for
    their block enhancement value.
    Program Operations
        Our Program Operations expenses are primarily for government
    personnel performing management support activities, contractors that
    assist in performing these activities, and O&M-like costs associated
    with operations and maintenance at numerous facilities around the
    country, supplies and equipment, communications and printing, travel
    and training, and information technology management.

                            MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT

        The missile defense program uses an acquisition approach tailored
    to the unprecedented nature of the technology involved in missile
    defense. We will continue to work very hard to ensure that the program
    has adequate management and congressional oversight. There is an
    improved process in place within the Department that preserves
    management, technical, and financial oversight by cognizant authorities
    on the Senior Executive Council and the Missile Defense Support Group.
    Senior warfighters, including the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,
    have reviewed missile defense objectives and will continue to do so
    several times a year. Internally we have in place configuration
    management procedures, and we produce on a regular basis the necessary
    threat, system, and configuration control documentation to ensure that
    our activities continue to support our development and fielding
    objectives. As directed in the 2002 and 2003 Defense Authorization
    Acts, we have identified cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals
    and developmental baselines in the President's fiscal year 2004 budget
    justification materials and shown clear linkages between the Agency's
    budget and key performance measures.

                                    CLOSING

        Mr. Chairman, we are on track with our missile defense program. We
    know that the technology fundamental to the current generation of
    missile defenses works. We have demonstrated many times over the past 2
    years that we can collide with a warhead and destroy it. We have the
    confidence to proceed with plans for an initial defense capability. A
    few years ago, I could not have said this to the American people. Today
    I can. We will build confidence in the system over time as we invest in
    the program.
        We also recognize that we have much more work to do to improve the
    BMD system. The architecture we have in 2004 and 2005 will probably be
    very different a decade later, depending on how our RDT&E efforts
    proceed. Our objective continues to be one of improving missile defense
    capability over time. We have made considerable progress in missile
    defense over the past 3 years. With the President's direction, and with
    your approval of our budget request, we will take another important
    step on that long road before us.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Warner. Before we proceed to a 6-minute round of
    questions, the distinguished Senator from New York has joined
    us now. Each of us have had an opportunity, given the unusual
    events of the day and particularly the last 24 hours, to
    address the committee and others.
        Senator Clinton.
        Senator Clinton. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just
    add my words to those of my colleagues, that certainly last
    evening was a solemn occasion for every American, when the
    President addressed our Nation about the possibility of
    military action, giving Saddam Hussein one last chance to avoid
    war. Obviously we all hope, although it is a hope against
    evidence, that Saddam Hussein will finally hear this ultimatum
    and understand the severity of those words and the
    consequences.
        While I, along with many others, wish there were more
    international support for this effort to disarm Saddam Hussein,
    at this critical juncture it is important for all of us to come
    together in support of our troops and pray that, if war does
    occur, this mission is accomplished swiftly and decisively with
    minimum loss of life and civilian casualties.
        On Friday, Mr. Chairman, I was at Fort Drum, where we held
    a memorial service for 11 young soldiers who died in a training
    accident on a Black Hawk mission. I met with the wives of those
    young men, two of whom were pregnant, their mothers, their
    fathers, their grandparents, their sisters, their brothers,
    their cousins. I looked into the eyes of each person and told
    them how sorry I was and how I hoped that they shared our pride
    in the extraordinary courage of these young men, as they were
    training to defend us.
        Clearly, all of us hope that this mission will be
    accomplished with minimum loss of life. We know that our
    military, thanks in large measure to the people who serve on
    this committee, are the best trained, equipped, and motivated
    in the world. We support them fully and we are very grateful
    for their service in these difficult times. I know that all of
    us will be praying for them and sending our strongest, most
    heartfelt best wishes; not only to the men and women who are
    poised on the edge of combat, but to their families, who in a
    very real sense in today's world are also serving our country.
        Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator. Throughout your
    service on this committee, you have emphasized your personal
    concern for the family structure that is such a vital part of
    the overall infrastructure to support our men and women in the
    Armed Forces. I thank you.
        I will open with questions. Then I will pass the gavel to
    the subcommittee chairman, Senator Allard, to conclude the
    question period in the hearing.
        Secretary Aldridge, let us go back to the very important
    issue raised by my colleague, Senator Levin, and fully explore
    the issues that he raises. It would be helpful. Let us cut
    through some of the legal situation here and just get down to
    it. What was the intent of the administration asking for this
    provision? What is it that you feel the provision, if adopted
    by Congress, enabled you to do that you can't do now?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I wish I had a
    record of how the language got added to this bill. We do not
    know exactly other than perhaps protecting some interests of
    the Department. I think the bottom line, however, is that it
    was never our intent to try to get a waiver for operational
    testing. As a matter of fact, the reason we have the test bed
    and we are developing the test bed is to enable operational
    testing.
        I think we can work with the committee and the staff to
    find language that clearly, unambiguously states where the
    Department is. That is, we do not request a waiver. I think we
    can find language that will ensure that Senator Levin's
    concerns are being addressed. I believe we can do that.
        Chairman Warner. That is helpful but I think it is a frank
    admission that, at this juncture, you are not certain as to how
    it originated. To the extent you can determine that, well and
    good. Because I judge from your remarks now that this committee
    and Congress can anticipate a revision forthcoming in the
    course of our deliberations before any bill is drawn up. Am I
    correct in that?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. That will be very helpful.
        Now, General Kadish, I listened very carefully to your
    excellent statement. You used the word ``limited'' in several
    different contexts. I want to clarify for the record the
    obvious, but some people following this hearing, I think, might
    not fully appreciate that the ultimate objective is for us to
    devise a system to protect us against a limited number of
    missiles, were they to be directed at the continental limits of
    the United States and/or our allies and so forth.
        Am I not correct in that?
        General Kadish. Yes, Senator. Eventually, evolutionary
    improvements to the system may go beyond that. Certainly in the
    2004 time.
        Chairman Warner. Do not say beyond that. It enables the
    system, then, to interdict a greater number.
        General Kadish. Greater number, correct.
        Chairman Warner. All right. That is the use of the word
    ``limited'' which I think you want to go back and look at your
    testimony. Then you referred to ``limited'' in the context that
    if we proceed as now anticipated, we will get a limited benefit
    from the system.
        General Kadish. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. In other words, limited in its capability
    just to knock down one missile, much less a dozen or so.
        General Kadish. Right.
        Chairman Warner. Do you follow me on the use of the word
    ``limited''?
        General Kadish. I think so.
        Chairman Warner. If you go back and look over your
    statement, you might wish to clarify that.
        General Kadish. I will look at it again.
        Chairman Warner. But let me go directly to a broader issue
    here. Some are concerned that the President's decision to field
    missile defense capabilities during 2004 and 2005 means that we
    are deploying a capability that has not been tested. In
    addition, there is some concern that making the missile defense
    test bed an operational asset will somehow reduce or truncate
    tests or will disrupt the testing you already have planned.
        Let us clarify those. Give us your assessment, based on
    test results of the maturity of the ground-based mid-course
    system and the Navy missile defense system, which the President
    opted to field.
        General Kadish. Senator, our tests to date, I guess I would
    characterize as that we have proven the basic functionality of
    each of the elements and to some degree their ability to
    integrate to perform their mission. That certainly has given us
    a lot of confidence in proceeding.
        Now what we have to do, specifically in the ground-based
    missile defense case, is to actually put them in the locations
    that they could be realistically tested. Let me just give you
    an example. Right now today, as complex as our testing is from
    Vandenberg to Kwajalein, we have a radar that is out of place
    in terms of its operationally realistic configuration. The X-
    Band radar is at Kwajalein itself. It should be farther
    forward. The early warning radar is in California, and it
    should also be farther forward in looking at the trajectory.
        When we build a test bed, we hope to fix that and to
    provide us with more capability to operationally, realistically
    look at different azimuths of intercept, different
    trajectories, and provide a much more robust look at the data
    gathering that supports our models and simulations. That, in
    turn, would give us greater confidence that we could handle
    unusual situations.
        In regard to the concern of whether or not we would reduce
    our testing because we have the test bed in an operational
    configuration, I think there is a risk that we may not be able
    to time it exactly right. Basically we are working very hard
    today and, in fact, have started a battery of meetings with the
    using community starting with Strategic Command and NORTHCOM,
    to look at different approaches to how we would actually keep
    operationally alert status on the system or part of the system
    while we are doing other types of tests. That is going to
    require us a little bit more time to define in detail the
    meaning of every test we want to do.
        But what I see today is basically the capability of doing
    both tasks in concert with the using community to make sure we
    can accomplish both our objectives. I am confident we will be
    able to work that out.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Secretary Crouch, the President made his decision last
    December to proceed with the limited fielding of ground-based
    mid-course capabilities and the Navy mid-course system. Can you
    elaborate on the background which prompted this very important
    decision? Was the decision promulgated by any specific threat
    development? Or was it more directed at the general trend
    toward widespread deployment and the need to do so for missile
    defense?
        Secretary Crouch. Senator, you know that we have taken, in
    the Department as a whole, a capabilities-based approach to
    dealing with emerging and extant threats. We see missile
    defense capabilities as being one of the essential tools in the
    tool kit that the Department will need in the future to defend
    the United States, to defend our allies, and to defend deployed
    forces abroad.
        Clearly, we think from just looking at existing threats and
    the development of things, for example, in North Korea our
    concerns about long-range systems coming out of the Middle East
    and the like, we think that threat was an important part of
    this decision. But I would also underscore the fact that we
    have been surprised in the past by things. We have been
    surprised by new systems, by new capabilities. So I would not
    want to say that it was keyed specifically to an individual
    threat, but more broadly to the need for a capability for the
    United States that we do not have.
        Against that back drop is also the point that we do not
    have any capability today in this area. It is not as though we
    are building on an existing system, like aircraft carriers,
    where we have a particular system deployed, and we are now
    arguing about the next version or the next modification to that
    system.
        We thought it was important to get some capability out
    there. We think that that will not only give us that limited,
    very modest capability, but also will improve our operational
    testing and give the warfighter some experience in using these
    systems. We also think it has an impact in the way it might be
    able to dissuade others from investing in long-range ballistic
    missile capabilities.
        So, it was really for all those reasons that I think the
    President made the decision he did.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Christie, the planned 2004 national missile defense
    deployment is going to use an old 1970s vintage long-range
    radar that was never designed for missile defense. This radar
    is called the Cobra Dane radar, as I understand it. First, in
    your recent report on missile defense, which was released in
    February, you said that ``the absence of a long-range target
    that will be able to exercise the Cobra Dane radar will
    preclude a system-level flight test of the 2004 national
    missile defense system.''
        Is that correct?
        Mr. Christie. Yes, the Cobra Dane radar will not be able to
    track a test target because of the way it is pointed, except in
    a simulated operational exercise. We will not be able to use it
    in testing.
        Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, could the witness speak up?
    We cannot hear.
        Mr. Christie. Okay. I am sorry.
        Senator Clinton. Thank you.
        Mr. Christie. We will not be able to use the Cobra Dane
    radar in testing because we would have to launch the target
    from west of the radar into its envelope.
        Senator Levin. So, there is not a long-range target
    suitable to be used for that test; is that correct?
        Mr. Christie. Yes. We would have to use an air launch
    target which we do not have at the present time for testing.
        Senator Levin. Right. So there is no plan to test that
    radar against a long-range target?
        Mr. Christie. That radar will be tested and exercised at
    some length with the command and control system that will be
    set up at Fort Greeley. But it will not be tested against an
    actual target.
        Senator Levin. All right. So therefore, the 2004 system
    can't be tested as a complete system with a realistic long-
    range target. Is that correct?
        Mr. Christie. We will test the entire system in simulated
    operational exercises.
        Senator Levin. Do we have a long-range target, a realistic
    one, to test it against?
        Mr. Christie. We will not be able to launch a target from
    Japan so it would fly into that radar's field of view.
        Senator Levin. Right. That is all I am saying.
        Mr. Christie. Okay.
        Senator Levin. All right. So in that sense, we are not
    going to be able to test the 2004 system that is being fielded
    as a complete system with a realistic, actual long-range
    target. Is that correct? I am just trying to summarize.
        Mr. Christie. No. We are not going to be able to test with
    a realistic launch from that direction.
        Senator Levin. Okay. That is fine.
        Mr. Christie. From that specific direction, no.
        Senator Levin. We are not going to be able to do that.
    Would you like to be able to do that?
        Mr. Christie. If we had an air launch target that we could
    launch to test that particular radar, we would be able to do
    that.
        Senator Levin. Let me get to this language that apparently
    Secretary Aldridge does not know how it got into the
    legislative proposal. I am glad to hear that it did not come
    from you, Secretary Aldridge. Do you know how this language got
    here that effectively waives operational testing by designating
    the 2004 system as a development system? That is, what is the
    effect of designating, as a development system does, to
    effectively exempt it from operational testing, since it is a
    development system under this language.
        Mr. Christie, do you know how that language got into this
    legislative proposal that came from the administration?
        Mr. Christie. No, I do not. But I would also add that just
    because it is a development system does not mean that some
    operational testing cannot take place.
        Senator Levin. Of course. That is our point. We did that
    with other systems.
        Mr. Christie. Operational testing will take place.
        Senator Levin. It will take place and should take place.
        Mr. Christie. It will.
        Senator Levin. So then, you do not know what the point,
    then, is of designating----
        Mr. Christie. No, I cannot speak to that.
        Senator Levin. You were not consulted?
        Mr. Christie. No, I was not.
        Senator Levin. Were you consulted, Secretary Aldridge,
    before this language was put into this proposal of the
    administration?
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir, I was not. But I am not
    consulted on thousands of other pages of language. I think, in
    reading the language, if the intent was never to ask for the
    waiver, you read the language in a very innocent way; because
    that was not our intent to interpret that language in a way
    that would request a waiver.
        Senator Levin. But you did not have an intent. As I
    understand.
        Secretary Aldridge. Oh, it is not an intent.
        Senator Levin. You do not know where this language came
    from?
        Secretary Aldridge. I was not participating in adding the
    language to the bill.
        Senator Levin. Do you know what its intent is? Have you
    asked the people who put the language in here what its intent
    is?
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir, I have not.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Secretary Crouch, were you involved in getting this
    language here?
        Secretary Crouch. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. Do you know what its intent is?
        Secretary Crouch. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. General Kadish were you involved in getting
    this language in here?
        General Kadish. Senator, I was involved in trying to get
    the intent of the language into the budget documentation. The
    basic intent of that paragraph in the budget documentation is a
    very detailed description, was to get the authority that was
    granted this year and previous years to use the RDT&E money
    exclusively for all our efforts, as opposed to dividing up the
    restrictions between military construction-type money and
    procurement money. That was the intent at the budget-
    documentation level.
        Senator Levin. That is the intent of this language?
        General Kadish. As I understand it, yes.
        Senator Levin. Were you consulted or did you draft this
    language?
        General Kadish. I did not draft the language but I saw the
    language, as we were putting our budget language together.
        Senator Levin. All right. Do any of you have any objection
    to this language being revised so that it makes it clear that
    this system is subject to operational testing? Do you have any
    problem with that?
        General Kadish. There was never an intent to exempt us in
    that language. It could be read that way; obviously, you have.
    So I have no problem changing it. But the intent was a funding
    issue, not a testing issue.
        Senator Levin. All right. I am glad to hear that.
        Will you all answer my question this way: Do you have any
    problem with that language being changed?
        Secretary Aldridge. We have no problem with changing that
    language.
        Senator Levin. So that it is not limited to development
    testing, so that operational testing will take place on this
    2004 system? Do you have any problem with that, Secretary
    Aldridge?
        Secretary Aldridge. No, sir, I do not. I just want to
    hesitate and say one thing: But so long as we get the other
    reason for the language, to include the RDT&E funding to permit
    the deployment.
        Senator Levin. Do you have any problem, Mr. Christie?
        Mr. Christie. No, sir.
        Senator Levin. Do you have any problem, Secretary Crouch?
        Secretary Crouch. Absolutely not.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        My time is up. Thank you.
        Senator Allard. It is my time to ask some questions.
    General Kadish, you were trying to respond to some questioning
    to Mr. Christie or Senator Levin. Do you have a comment that
    you want to elaborate on, on that question?
        General Kadish. I would just point out, in regard to the
    Cobra Dane radar, that this is another example of how difficult
    it is to put a system together that depends on geography for
    its function. The Cobra Dane radar is in a very good position
    to do a lot of what we need to do for an early warning radar.
        In regard to testing it operationally, there are two
    methods that we will probably offer. They are not worked out in
    detail yet. One is we have a long-range target air launched
    under development that we will put into the program when we can
    get it ready. It will not be ready in the 2004 time frame or
    possibly in the early 2005 timeframe. But the schedules are
    such that as soon as we can, we will be testing it
    operationally using that type of a target, if it works out.
        Senator Allard. So, your goal is to get a complete analysis
    of the system?
        General Kadish. Right. Now, there are other data elements
    tracking different types of items that look like ballistic
    missiles that would also help us in our evaluation of that
    system.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        General Kadish. I would point out that the Cobra Dane radar
    is certainly 1970s-type of technology. But what we intend to do
    is upgrade it with the very latest computer processing
    capabilities, as well as software, to make sure it can do its
    intended function.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Mr. Christie, in your most recent report to Congress, you
    stated that the BMDS elements have made progress this year in
    one or more of four areas: flight test, system ground test,
    component ground test, and system definition. Again to quote,
    ``MDA's program represents a sound engineering approach for
    maturing both the system design and test infrastructure.''
        Would you tell us what factors provide you with confidence
    that progress is being made and that the MDA's approach is a
    sound one?
        Mr. Christie. The R&D program that is laid out for the
    various elements is done in a very systematic way, with robust
    testing for each of the elements. We have, I think, as General
    Kadish earlier discussed, demonstrated the hit-to-kill
    capability, which was a big question mark. We are now ready to
    move on to ``missionizing'' that capability. We are now ready
    to move on to a ground-based interceptor that will be using the
    new booster motors, because the old booster motors have been a
    problem.
        For the test bed that is being planned, it will eventually
    remove the dependence on the radar in Hawaii that provides mid-
    course tracking when the sea-based X-band radar is operational.
    So when I look at the total program, I think it is moving in
    the right direction. The right tests are planned, both in terms
    of individual elements, as well as the total system.
        Does that answer your question, Senator?
        Senator Allard. I think that is what we are wanting. Thank
    you. But let me follow up with it just a little bit. Your
    report also notes that the recent successful Aegis test flights
    took place from functional, fully-manned, operational ships.
    Consequently, the system could be employed in an emergency with
    limited expectation of success.
        Now, the Aegis tests were clearly not operational tests.
    But an operational asset conducted them and led to a decision
    to field that initial capability. Would you assess, in a
    general way, the utility of conducting tests with system under
    development with operational assets?
        Mr. Christie. In the Aegis case, we actually fired off
    operational ships using operational crews. We had three
    intercepts that proved the capability of the missile system
    that is in development. That testing supports buying a limited
    number of missiles, up to 20, that will give us some limited
    capability against medium-range threats.
        I support the concept of doing operational testing or
    getting an operational evaluation out of a development program,
    and particularly when we are using operational troops or
    operators on an actual operational ship, which is what the case
    was here.
        Senator Allard. A follow-up question I have in response to
    your answer, since it was positive in nature: would your
    confidence in the operational utility of the ground-based, mid-
    course system be enhanced if one or more of these flight tests
    took place using an operational asset and the soldiers who man
    it on a regular basis?
        Mr. Christie. Obviously it would be. But I do not think, at
    this point in time in the development program, that we are
    going to be able to turn over the ground-based system to
    operators. We will be training operators once we get the test
    bed fielded, but I am not sure that the testing will use
    military operators. I would have to refer to General Kadish. I
    do not remember.
        Senator Allard. Do you want to elaborate on that?
        Mr. Christie. It would give me more confidence if we were
    using actual soldiers in an operational system. But I do not
    think we are planning to use soldier operators for some time.
        Senator Allard. General Kadish.
        General Kadish. Senator, if I could answer that question a
    little bit more in detail. The current testing, certainly on
    the ground-based side, is not done with soldiers at the
    consoles, although we simulate the types of decisions they
    would make. Our intent, although the plans are not finalized
    right now and they are just beginning to become part of our
    discussions with the using community, is to--as we approach the
    2004 fielding, is to actually put the user/soldiers at the
    consoles for flight test, if at all possible, to replicate what
    we have done with Aegis.
        Now, we are not there yet. These are plans that need to be
    put together and make sure we have all the safety and the
    training up and operating. But that would be clearly our
    intent, because as Mr. Christie pointed out, the best test we
    could get is when real soldiers, sailors, and airmen operate
    the equipment. That is the best test that we could use.
        However, they would not be given the design of the GMD
    system, the quantity of people involved is not very large at
    all, because of the nature of that system.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Senator Reed, my time has expired. You are next.
        Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Christie, I think one of the critical points in your
    testimony, which was very good testimony, is this phrase with
    respect to the mid-course, ground-based program. This
    conclusion, which I believe MDA agrees with, is based on the
    fact that many essential components of GMD have not yet been
    built. We cannot test the system without these critical
    components. We cannot test it realistically without the test
    bed.
        Will all of these critical systems be built prior to 2004?
        Mr. Christie. They will be built as part of the Block 2004
    test bed. I do not think they will all be in place by September
    2004. The sea-based X-band radar is a necessary component. We
    will have new boosters. We will be testing the new boosters
    with a ground-based interceptor.
        Those are two components that are not there now.
        Senator Reed. So based on your testimony and your response,
    this is a question of not just deploying a system without
    testing, this is deploying a system that has not yet been fully
    built; is that accurate?
        Mr. Christie. No, we have not built the sea-based X-band
    radar yet that is needed for mid-course guidance.
        Senator Reed. But we are deploying a system that has not
    yet been built, the whole system?
        Mr. Christie. We have to build it to put it in the field to
    support testing.
        Senator Reed. My point is, I understand we have to build
    it. But maybe I am missing something, but usually we deploy
    systems that are at least built, not fully tested, but at least
    built. This seems to be a departure from the--my assumption
    that we will build a system and then we will test it. Again, I
    think your comments suggest that we are doing something that is
    somewhat unusual in deploying a system that has not yet been
    fully been built.
        Mr. Christie. We will not deploy it until we have built it.
        Senator Reed. We are deploying it in 2004; is that correct?
    Am I wrong?
        Mr. Christie. Yes.
        Senator Reed. You have just indicated that we will not have
    a significant part of the system even built by 2004?
        Mr. Christie. We may not have it deployed in 2004. It may
    not be built and in place in 2004.
        It will be built as part of the 2004 test bed.
        Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, I assume that the
    President of the United States has declared that this system
    will be deployed in September 2004; is that correct?
        Secretary Aldridge. He set a goal to have it deployed and
    we have used the term 2004 to 2005. We are constructing the
    components that will make that happen, some of which already
    exist, some of which do not.
        Senator Reed. So there is a possibility that in September
    2004, this system will not be deployed?
        Secretary Aldridge. I do not--the terminology ``deployed''
    bothers me. That is the reason I am hesitating.
        Senator Reed. It bothers me, too. That is why I am trying
    to figure out what you intend to do.
        Secretary Aldridge. We are talking about the construction
    of a test bed, the construction of a test bed, which will be
    augmented with some limited operational capability. The word
    ``deployed'' has a connotation that goes far beyond the
    construction of a test bed.
        Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, I could not agree with you
    more. But that is the choice, the term, the President of the
    United States used. He did not get up and make a speech about a
    test bed and limited capabilities, which I think is very
    accurate, which suggests to me that, from the test planning
    standpoint, what you are saying makes a great deal of sense.
    But there is a political connotation to ``deployment,'' which I
    think has gotten in, perhaps.
        Let me turn to General Kadish. First, let me say that you
    have a very difficult job, technically demanding and also
    rhetorically demanding at times.
        General Kadish. I will not disagree with that, Senator.
        Senator Reed. I know. We agree. So far, all of the tests
    that you have conducted, and some have been successes and some
    recognizably have not succeeded, require that you input into
    your kill vehicle your booster target data; is that correct?
        General Kadish. That is correct.
        Senator Reed. At what point will you not be putting target
    data into your test shots? At what time frame?
        General Kadish. Let me try to be a little bit more precise,
    because the implication of the question is that there is target
    data that should not be there.
        Senator Reed. No, no, no. At what point will you fire a
    missile without target data?
        General Kadish. We do not ever expect to fire a missile
    without target data. The way the missile defense systems
    operate, by their very nature, is that you have to have a
    sensor in the right place at the right time to detect the
    missile launch. Once that missile launch is detected, the whole
    system starts tracking it, deciding when to shoot at it, how
    many times to shoot at it, whether we kill it or not, whether
    we want to shoot at it again. In a layered missile defense
    system, we will always be injecting target data into the
    system.
        Senator Reed. At this point, you inject the days before the
    event the pre-loaded data.
        General Kadish. These tests are very scripted today.
        Senator Reed. When will you stop doing very scripted tests?
    What year?
        General Kadish. We will get less and less scripted the more
    we get the test bed into the operational mode.
        Senator Reed. By September 2004, will you be firing
    missiles that have limited or no data pre-loaded?
        General Kadish. No. But the operational system will also
    have pre-loaded data.
        Senator Reed. That is true. But by 2004, essentially you
    will be firing a missile, the kill vehicle and its booster,
    which has significantly been loaded days before with target
    data?
        General Kadish. But that is the way the operational system
    will work. What we will not do is predict the time of launch of
    a threatening missile. The system, if we do it right, and this
    is part of the testing that we have to do, is to make sure that
    it is always up and operating; so when those sensors detect a
    launch, we can shoot at it.
        It will have intelligence data loaded up. It will have the
    time of day loaded up, because that is the way the system
    operates. So it will have that type of data. But the
    operational system will use data of that nature.
        Senator Reed. My time has expired. Thank you, General.
        Senator Allard. Before I call on Senator Sessions, I have
    just a comment. Obviously, the Aegis or the X-band radar has
    been already tested and deployed. With this system, you have
    confidence in it?
        General Kadish. The sea-based X-band radar?
        Senator Allard. Have we built, tested, and operated X-band
    radars in the past?
        General Kadish. I think so, Senator, yes. Oh, yes.
        Senator Allard. All right. It seems like we are getting
    into sort of a terminology issue here about ``operational'' and
    ``fielded.'' I wonder if perhaps maybe a ``fielded''
    terminology would not be a little more accurate and actually
    what is going on, because I think ``operational'' tends to
    signify that certain events are going to occur. When we have
    spiral development, it seems to me like we have a little
    different terminology that has to be developed, as far as
    missile defense systems are concerned.
        Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to express my appreciation to the entire Department
    of Defense for the superb way you have responded to the threat
    of Iraq. You are placed in a position to be successful; Lord
    willing, we will be successful, if that war does occur.
        I think what you have done in transforming the military, in
    applying the highest and best science, the best technology, and
    then training our troops to utilize that technology, breaking
    down old barriers so that Air Force and sergeants and airplanes
    can communicate in a way that places incredible stress on the
    enemy in the event of a conflict, is just an extraordinary
    achievement. I am just exceedingly proud of that.
        It allows our President, and the United States of America,
    and the people of this country to stand strong for our values,
    to be courageous, and know that if we do not knuckle under to
    evil forces around the world, we can in fact make this a better
    world and improve our own personal security. We can do it with,
    hopefully, a minimal loss of life, even to our enemies. So it
    is an extraordinary time. I really want to salute you for that.
        There has been some debate and concern since I have been in
    the Senate about national missile defense. There are those who
    said the window that the commission found, setting forth the
    date that we needed to be able to deploy, was not accurate,
    that we did not need a missile defense program, that we ought
    not to develop one, and we ought to slow down the development
    programs that we had.
        We have had a considerable number of debates since 1997,
    when I came here, on that issue. Each time that we have debated
    it, those who have felt that we need to move forward with a
    missile defense have prevailed in the debate. We still have a
    good, tough questioning, which I think can only be constructive
    to our program. Some, I know, have not supported the program to
    begin with. But there is nothing wrong in this democracy. We
    are having to be challenged and be able to face those
    challenges.
        But with the emergence of evidence that Saddam Hussein has
    missiles that could extend their range, that Iran is desiring
    to enhance its missile capability, and with the testimony we
    have had from CIA Director Tenet that North Korea may even able
    to reach the United States with a missile today, I believe that
    this has validated the commitment this country has made toward
    that.
        General Kadish, I know you have handled that for so many
    years. You have testified many times. The program has had some
    progress. I am sure there is a lot of difficulties and
    challenges that you have faced. But we have continued to move
    along. If I am not asking you to repeat it too much, would you
    tell us where you think we are in terms of your personal view
    of how much progress we have made and how close we are to our
    goal of making this country safe against a missile attack?
        General Kadish. Senator, as you will find in my formal
    testimony, I believe we are ready to take the next steps. Two
    years ago or more, I could not have told you with confidence
    that the hit-to-kill technology would be workable enough to put
    into an operational system. We believed it to be so, but we had
    a lot of testing to prove it. We have accomplished that
    testing. We are confident now that the basic technologies and
    the approach we are using is a sound one.
        We have many other efforts to improve on that in our RDT&E
    program. Based on the fact that our current analysis and
    testing provides us confidence in the hit-to-kill technology, I
    think we are ready to take the next step, in actually making it
    operational, use it, get comfortable with it, improve it as
    best we can, and then make the decisions in the future of what
    best to add to that system to make it even better than it is at
    any given time.
        So right now, I believe we have made a lot of progress. We
    have a lot of work to do. We have a lot of challenges to face,
    some of which are more management than technical. But I think
    we are up to it. We are going to work hard to make it work.
        Senator Sessions. I do not have any doubt that Kim Jong Il
    would like to have the American leadership and the American
    people think that he has the capability of hitting this country
    with a missile. Once he has that capability, he may think that
    he can blackmail, or push the United States around. He thinks
    he can deter us from doing things that are in our national
    interest and the interest of the world.
        So, I think having that capability as soon as we can is
    important. I believe events have validated the steady program
    of progress toward this goal that we have invested in.
        General Kadish and Secretary Aldridge, this year MDA will
    transfer to the Army the PAC-3 and MEADS program. Procurement
    and transition criteria seem to be in place. Please tell me
    what R&D support the Missile Defense Agency will provide to
    these programs in the out-years. Also, is there any sort of
    strategy in place or being discussed which combines the various
    programs into a seamless strategy? What is that strategy?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. Let me start off. We did take
    a look at the PAC-3 program and MEADS. I had three criteria
    that I established for myself to determine when such a program
    should transition. That has been part of the missile defense
    plan altogether. When we make a decision to take a system that
    we believe is now ready for operational deployment, we would
    remove it out of the Missile Defense Agency, focus the Missile
    Defense Agency exclusively on the research and development, and
    then give the operational system to the appropriate Service.
    That is what we did with PAC-3.
        We had technical maturity, we had--with the availability of
    production facilities. We had the full support of the Secretary
    of the Army to do so. Those were the basic criteria that I used
    to make that decision to transfer.
        The Army will have the exclusive responsibility for the
    development and the operational deployment of PAC-3. However,
    the integration of the PAC-3 into the ballistic missile defense
    activities will continue to reside within the Missile Defense
    Agency, because those activities have to be integrated. But
    essentially the full deployment and the future development,
    which would be primarily air defense capabilities, will exist
    within the Army to do that.
        Senator Sessions. General Kadish, do you want to further
    comment?
        General Kadish. I fully support that approach. Its linkage
    with missile defense, as well as air defense, is properly
    placed in the Army at this point in its cycle; and we will
    continue involvement.
        Senator Sessions. It is important that we make sure that
    funding is maintained adequately. The Army is picking up now
    something they had not had before. We need to make sure that
    the funding follows it, else they will not be able to deploy.
        Comment on that, Secretary Aldridge.
        Secretary Aldridge. Absolutely. That was the third
    criteria, that the Secretary of the Army fully supports this
    and will properly fund it. He assured me that was going to
    happen.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Aldridge, the President has
    once again presented a robust missile defense budget. In the
    aftermath of this treaty, are you satisfied that we have
    sufficient funding to look at all phases of the architecture,
    boost, mid-course, and terminal? Are you satisfied generally
    with the budget?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. I have gone through the
    program in detail. We have activities dealing with boost phase,
    mid-course, and terminal phase. We have capabilities dealing
    with short-range, medium-range, and long-range rockets. We have
    a robust technology program in place, some of which may work
    and some of which may not. So we have a program that, I
    believe, will get us where we want to go in this evolutionary
    spiral development approach. We will make decisions as we go.
    As some things turn out to prove themselves to be effective and
    some things prove themselves not to be effective, we will stop
    some things, which we have already done in one case.
        The Navy Area Program was getting in deep financial trouble
    and we decided to terminate that program and use our funds for
    other things. Yes, I am very confident that we have a well
    laid-out program that will get us where we need to go.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. I do believe that is the
    correct approach. I believe you should be free to make changes.
    We should not straight-jacket you now with a program that we
    are not absolutely certain is going to be the way it will end
    up. I do salute the President for understanding early on that
    the ABM treaty was not a basis of a relationship between us and
    Russia, that it was complicating our ability to rationally
    develop a missile defense system. You are now free of that. We
    are able to develop a system that makes sense.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator Sessions. The Senator's
    time has expired.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I have heard a lot of discussion today about the PAC-3
    missile. I wonder if you could just tell me in general terms--
    and this is really for anybody who is best qualified to
    answer--what the PAC-3's capabilities are?
        Secretary Aldridge. I think General Kadish can probably do
    it better than any of us.
        General Kadish. The Patriot-3, I can describe the
    capabilities with a few characteristics. It is what we call a
    point-defense system, where it protects a certain radius area
    rather than a large region. It has a characteristic of being a
    terminal system. So it intercepts after the warhead reenters
    the atmosphere. It protects against short-range missiles and
    medium-range missiles. So it has those kinds of characteristics
    in terms of capability.
        So when you look at it, it protects a point defense in the
    terminal phase against short- and medium-range missiles.
        Senator Pryor. How mobile is it?
        General Kadish. It is what I would call transportable in
    that it could be placed in a place where it needs to defend and
    then can be moved. But it does not--if the term ``mobile''
    includes, ``Can it shoot while it is moving?'' The answer is
    no. It is transportable. In fact, the latest deployments prove
    that out. We are able to move it, transport it, set it up. Then
    if we need to move it again, move it again.
        Senator Pryor. I understand if you cannot answer this next
    question, but do we have PAC-3s in the Iraqi theater right now?
    Again, we are not in a closed session. So if you cannot answer,
    I understand.
        General Kadish. We have every missile defense capability
    that will contribute to this problem in play.
        Senator Pryor. How many PAC-3s do we currently have in our
    arsenal, if you can answer that?
        General Kadish. I think it changes from day to day. Because
    every time we get a delivery off the production line, we send
    it into its intended use. I think the number is somewhere in
    the mid-50s.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. You have more requested in the
    upcoming fiscal years that is included in the budget?
        General Kadish. Yes. If I recall exactly, and I would have
    checked these numbers, is that this program requests, and we
    would have up to 332 by the end of 2005.
        Senator Pryor. That was a question, too, I had. Are we
    trying to get to a level and stay there, that we should always
    have a set amount in our arsenal?
        General Kadish. The inventory, what we call the inventory
    objective, for Patriot-3 right now is not necessarily a
    relevant factor, because we have so few of them. We are trying
    to build as many as we can, as quick as we can.
        Senator Pryor. Right.
        General Kadish. The ultimate number will be subject to the
    best judgment of the Army, and the Department, and the money
    available.
        Secretary Aldridge. The fiscal year 2003 omnibus bill just
    provided $104 million for us to accelerate the production rate
    to get up to a level rate, which I would prefer not to answer
    in an open hearing.
        Senator Pryor. I understand.
        I do not want to put words in your mouth, but it sounds as
    if you all are pretty satisfied with the PAC-3. Is that fair?
        General Kadish. From my perspective, I am never satisfied
    with where we are with these systems. I would like to do more
    with every dollar we can afford to spend.
        Senator Pryor. Right.
        General Kadish. But it has a very good capability for what
    it is used for.
        Senator Pryor. I understand there are more upgrades and
    additional capabilities that are being worked on right now?
        General Kadish. That is correct. In fact, if you look back
    in history, Patriot-2, which we have also in the inventory, was
    an upgrade to Patriot basic, and now this is Patriot-3.
        Senator Pryor. Right.
        Secretary Aldridge. The follow-on program is a program
    called MEADS, Medium Extended Air Defense System, which is an
    international program with the U.S., Italy, and Germany. That
    is a program that is being developed now that would make it far
    more mobile in the sense of being air transportable on a C-141,
    as opposed to C-17s, and would give it a much improved
    capability for cruise missile, as well as tactical missile
    defense.
        Senator Pryor. Okay. If possible, and I know you do not
    have these facts and figures before you, but I would like you
    to get me what you anticipate may be required in funding the
    upgrades and extending the capability of the PAC-3 system, if
    that is possible.
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        I have directed the Army to combine management, development, and
    fielding of the Patriot and MEADS programs. The Army plans to spend
    $1.051 billion in fiscal year 2005, $986 million in fiscal year 2006,
    $994 million in fiscal year 2007, $1.197 billion in fiscal year 2008,
    and $1.209 billion in fiscal year 2009 on the Patriot/MEADS program. Of
    these, $360.4 million are RDT&E in fiscal year 2005, $306.7 in fiscal
    year 2006, $315.7 in fiscal year 2007, $345 million in fiscal year
    2008, and $312.3 million in fiscal year 2009. The total budget will
    fund the continued development of Patriot/MEADS, the procurement of
    PAC-3 missiles and related ground support equipment, the upgrade of
    additional Patriot units to PAC-3 capability and the continued support
    of Patriot units deployed worldwide. Specifically, the Army will do an
    incremental insertion of MEADS capability into the existing Patriot
    forces starting in fiscal year 2009-2010, develop and field the MEADS
    objective missile (PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhanced) by fiscal year 2011,
    and develop and field Operation Iraqi Freedom fixes to the PAC-3 system
    starting in fiscal year 2004.

        Senator Pryor. The last question I have, and I just want to
    make sure I am very clear on this, this is really a follow-up
    to Senator Levin's earlier questions, is, as I understand it,
    the PAC-3 system did go through operational testing before
    being deployed. Am I correct in that?
        Mr. Christie. That is correct.
        Senator Pryor. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Allard. Next we have Senator Akaka.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman.
        General Kadish, I understand you plan to use radars of
    Aegis ships floating off the coast of North Korea to augment
    the 2004 national missile defense deployment. I also understand
    those ships are required to defend Hawaii from a North Korean
    missile attack. A senior Missile Defense Agency official was
    recently quoted as saying, and I quote, ``These ships will
    carry two computer programs, both of which will use Aegis radar
    data. The programs will not run concurrently. Operators will
    have to choose to operate the standard air defense program or
    the ballistic missile defense program. While the ballistic
    missile defense program is installed, it will not also, at the
    same time, have a program that can do the other full air
    defense missions.''
        Does this mean that a crew of a ship off the coast of North
    Korea will have the choice between defending themselves for the
    type of anti-ship cruise missile launched by the North Koreans
    last month or defending Hawaii from a missile attack? If so, is
    this not a terrible choice they have to make?
        General Kadish. Let me take that. The answer is no. Now let
    me explain why I said no, that they would not have to make a
    choice. It gets a little bit complicated. We still have some
    things to work out with what the United States Navy will
    actually have, as a concept of ops, for those ships and what
    they are going to do. Let me start by saying that the Aegis
    ships in this configuration have two functions.
        One is to act as a surveillance platform for protecting
    Hawaii, as well as giving cues for the whole United States. The
    second function they would have would be to actually defend
    against shorter range missiles. To the best of my knowledge,
    the surveillance function can occur while the ship is actually
    engaged in the full operation of its defensive capability.
        When we move to the missile defense against shorter range
    missiles, because those ships may have dual tasks defending
    against shorter range missiles, as well as surveillance for
    Hawaii and other purposes, they would have the choice between
    the full fleet defense missile air defense capability and
    operating the only missile defense, standard missile three
    capability.
        That is the choice they would have to make. They have full
    self-defense capability on the ship for their own purposes. But
    they would not have the fleet-air-and-missile defense that is
    inherent in the Aegis platform. We are working through some of
    the operational concepts that make sure that our sailors are
    protected to the maximum extent possible during this mission.
    That is underway by the Navy senior leadership right now.
        So the choices are very compatible and commensurate with
    the risks that we are running, is the best way I could put it.
    If it is there to help us protect Hawaii and give cues to other
    radar systems, then that is what it will do.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you for your response.
        The national missile defense architecture envisioned by
    President Clinton included a large permanent X-band radar,
    located on the Island Shemya at the end of the Aleutian chain.
    As I understand it, this radar was required to enable the
    discrimination of the target warhead from a variety of other
    potential objects and was located to be able to defend all 50
    States from a missile attack from North Korea.
        General Kadish, you have previously testified that this
    radar was, and I quote, ``the long pole in the tent for a
    national missile defense.'' The current plans for the 2004
    missile defense deployment do not include any permanent X-band
    radar for operational use. Although a floating sea-based X-band
    radar is eventually planned for testing purposes, it will not
    always be in a position to defend against a real threat
    missile.
        Furthermore, a recent report from the Missile Defense
    Agency stresses that the sea-based radar is not a substitute
    for the Shemya X-band radar. Rather, it is a test asset. The
    sea-based radar may be operable in port, where it would
    probably spend much of its time, because of interference issues
    with aircraft, cars, and other devices.
        General Kadish, why do you not plan to build a permanent
    operational X-band radar to support the deployment of a
    national missile defense against a North Korean threat?
        General Kadish. I would not say we do not plan to build
    those types of sensors. I think we have more evaluation to do.
    As we evolve the program, I would expect those decisions to be
    up for consideration.
        If I might, let me take you back to the X-band radar at
    Shemya and give you a chronology of why the decisions have been
    made the way they have been made in regard to the X-band.
        When the national missile defense program that required the
    X-band at Shemya was put together, that radar was put there for
    basically a couple of reasons. One is that we had no sensor
    that we could really, at the time, do everything that we wanted
    to do, and it was not in the Shemya arrangement. Cobra Dane was
    evaluated. But we would like to have had more capability than
    that, under the requirements-based approach that we were under
    at the time, because it had a very high-performance standard.
        So we decided that we needed a radar there. An X-band was a
    good one. We wanted to put it at Shemya because it met a lot of
    the criteria for that system. Once we looked at not having a
    treaty in effect and looked at the basic capability of the
    system we had, we could delay that radar and look at other
    opportunities. That is where we came up with this sea-based
    platform, to serve two purposes.
        One is to move this very large radar around the Pacific so
    it could have different viewing angles and not be tied to one
    ground-based location. The second thing is that we could move
    it into an operational capability to add to our overall
    defensive posture when it became available and was not needed
    for testing. That is on track to be done.
        I guess the final reason, and the reason why it was a long
    pole in the tent at the time we were talking about the Shemya
    radar, was that it takes a long time to build anything in
    Shemya in Alaska. It is at the end of the Aleutian chain, and
    construction seasons are very short, and the weather to get the
    material there is generally very bad.
        So that is why we had to start so early. It became the
    focal point of that debate. Now we are freer to look at other
    locations. We will do that.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, General, for your
    response.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Senator Bayh.
        Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, gentleman, for your testimony today.
        Secretary Crouch, I would like to start with you, if I
    might. Then, Secretary Aldridge, I would like to turn to you.
        I would like to focus first on the North Korea threat,
    specifically how imminent and how serious it is. You have
    testified, I believe, Secretary Crouch, that the North Koreans
    have a missile capable of hitting the United States but it has
    not been tested yet; is that correct?
        Secretary Crouch. That is correct.
        Senator Bayh. So they have deployed a system without
    testing. I think it is interesting we are proposing to follow
    the North Korean model, perhaps the only area in which we would
    mimic the North Koreans. Can a warhead be fitted to that
    missile? Do we know that they have the capability of doing that
    and still hitting the continental United States? We know they
    have a missile that we believe is capable of hitting the
    continental United States, although not tested.
        Secretary Crouch. I would say that we have seen two things.
    One, we have seen an earlier test, a flight test, of a missile
    that had three stages, that we think was attempting to put a
    payload in orbit, which would have demonstrated some inherent
    intercontinental capability. So we did see a flight test of
    that.
        The specific missile I was referring to that we have not
    yet seen a flight test of, but which I believe we assess they
    could flight test at any time, is something we call the Taepo
    Dong II.
        Senator Bayh. Right.
        Secretary Crouch. We believe that that missile is capable
    of carrying a reentry vehicle-sized payload to intercontinental
    range.
        Senator Bayh. I am going to digress for one second. You
    mentioned Iran testing missiles. The missiles that they
    currently are developing, they are not capable of hitting the
    continental United States; is that correct?
        Secretary Crouch. We see a flight test program going on
    there. They have moved from short-range to now looking at
    medium-range type systems.
        Senator Bayh. Can those systems hit the United States?
        Secretary Crouch. No. Those particular systems could not
    hit the United States. They would be capable of threatening a
    number of our allies and potentially deployed U.S. forces
    overseas.
        Senator Bayh. Correct.
        Secretary Crouch. But our assessment is that by mid-decade
    or around mid-decade they could flight-test a capability, based
    upon the advancements of their program, that could strike the
    United States.
        Senator Bayh. They could.
        Mr. Aldridge, I would like to turn to you.
        The point I wanted to make, Secretary Crouch, at least for
    the next few years, it seems to be largely a North Korea-
    related problem. Is that a fair analysis?
        Secretary Aldridge. That is to you.
        Secretary Crouch. Oh, I am sorry. I thought----
        Senator Bayh. Largely a North Korea-related problem.
        Secretary Crouch. I thought he was directing Mr. Aldridge.
        Secretary Aldridge. No.
        Secretary Crouch. I would say----
        Senator Bayh. Let me withdraw the question and move on. I
    think you see where I was heading.
        Let me ask you, Secretary Aldridge, about the effectiveness
    of the system that is to be deployed in 2004 and 2005 in
    protecting against this developing North Korean threat. The 10
    land-based missiles proposed for the end of fiscal year 2004,
    how effective would they be against the North Korean missile,
    if it were in fact launched against our country?
        Secretary Aldridge. We think it would be effective. We
    probably should not go into a lot of details.
        Senator Bayh. How do you define effective? 90 percent
    success rate? 75? 50?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir. The way you could achieve
    these rates is you do not have to fire just one interceptor per
    target. You could fire two, as we do in PAC-3.
        Senator Bayh. Of course.
        Secretary Aldridge. The effectiveness is in the 90-percent
    range. Of course, we want the effectiveness to be high enough
    that we never have to use these things. I mean, that is the
    ultimate effectiveness, that they never be used.
        Senator Bayh. There are 10 going on line in 2004, 10 in
    2005?
        Secretary Aldridge. Right.
        Senator Bayh. The radar is not going to be available. When
    will that go into place, 2006?
        Secretary Aldridge. Let me see. General Kadish probably has
    the specific dates for all of those.
        General Kadish. We will have radars on line to handle the
    early warning and usefulness of the system in 2004, when we put
    the missiles on alert, if everything works out all right. We
    will add the sea-based X-band, if it proves out, the following
    year. It is currently scheduled by September 2005.
        Senator Bayh. So, Secretary Aldridge, your testimony is
    that with the 10 interceptors going in at the end of fiscal
    year 2004 and the radar that will be on line at that time, we
    would have a 90 percent effectiveness in shooting down the
    Taepo Dong II?
        Secretary Aldridge. A lot depends on the continuation of
    the test and the effectiveness, its precise effectiveness,
    numbers. But I would put, as of today, the projected
    effectiveness in the 90-percent range.
        Senator Bayh. The reason I ask this is, there is a great
    deal of tension between our country and North Korea today. The
    effectiveness of this system is going to affect our diplomacy,
    other possible military actions, and so forth. If you are
    advising Congress or the President of the United States about
    possible North Korean reactions to our different actions, it is
    going to have a pretty profound impact.
        You perhaps take one course of action, if you think there
    is a minimal chance of them hitting one of our cities with a
    missile, and you take a different course of action if you think
    it is somewhat more significant.
        Secretary Aldridge. Exactly. Of course, that is the
    rationale that went into the decision by the President to
    proceed. I think he clearly has many more options available, if
    he has a limited operational defense, is the way he described
    it. The activities that exist, the thought processes that
    exist, in North Korea or anywhere else, goes through a
    different----
        Senator Bayh. Just so I understand, and this will end my
    questioning here, I would be interested in Senator Levin's
    reaction to this, if he has a moment to think about it. If you
    are advising the President of the United States that there is
    the possibility of the North Koreans hitting Los Angeles or San
    Francisco with a nuclear warhead, you are advising him that we
    would have a 90-percent chance of taking that down before it
    could get there as early as the end of the fiscal year of 2004.
    I mean, if millions of lives depend on it, that is your answer?
        Secretary Aldridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Allard. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Could I intervene here?
        Senator Allard. I assume Senator Bayh is yielding his time.
        Senator Bayh. I would gladly yield my time. My time has
    expired. But my reaction to this is I am pleased to hear, I
    will say I am pleased but more than a little surprised to hear
    your answer. I would be interested in the Senator's thoughts on
    that.
        Senator Allard. We are getting close to wrapping up. I
    think you only have 3 minutes anyhow. But let us go ahead and
    we will proceed here.
        Senator Levin. Number one, I am surprised that you even
    answered this in an unclassified setting. But number two, I am
    surprised at your answer, because I know the classified number.
    I will leave it at that.
        Secretary Aldridge. Well, I am projecting----
        Senator Levin. I just think you had better go back and
    check the classified numbers to the probability of success of
    this 2004 system. I think you will want to correct the record
    after you read the classified numbers. But I think I had better
    leave it at that, because it is a classified number. But I was
    surprised, number one, that you did answer it.
        Secretary Aldridge. I am surprised there is a classified
    number existing, because we do not know yet until we get into
    the testing process.
        Senator Levin. There is a range.
        Secretary Aldridge. The range probably depends on whether
    it is one missile or two missiles or a lot of other
    assumptions.
        Senator Levin. I am just going to leave it at that. I think
    I have to leave it at that. I have no choice.
        Senator Allard. Okay. We will move on ahead then.
        Thank you, Senator Bayh.
        I just have been conferring here with my colleague, Senator
    Levin. He says that he has about 3 minutes that he wants to use
    on follow-up questions. I have one question I would like to
    follow up on. Unless Senator Bayh has any other questions or
    anything, we will probably draw the hearing to a close at that
    particular point.
        My question is this: Secretary Aldridge, capabilities-based
    spiral development means to me that we will put something in
    the field when we believe it has military utility. Then we will
    improve upon it over time. That, in turn, means to me that the
    system meets a recognized threat and that it has sufficient
    maturity that we think it has a good chance of working. Even
    after it is in the field, we will continue to work on it and
    improve it.
        What concerns me is that some of my colleagues and some
    people in the Pentagon continue to focus on deployment as a key
    event in spiral programs. No doubt that it will be true for
    some of the programs. But it seems to me that we almost need a
    new vocabulary to help us better describe how we test and how
    we put these capabilities-based spiral-development programs in
    the field.
        Would you care to comment on that, please?
        Secretary Aldridge. I agree with you. The terminology is
    very ambiguous. I think the whole concept of spiral development
    has to go along with the spiral requirements process, as well
    as the spiral testing process. I think the terminology is,
    again, somewhat ambiguous. It could probably use some more
    rigor in exactly how we define it.
        But the concept itself is very strong. I think it clearly
    gives the direction of putting systems into the field as
    quickly as possible so the cycle times of this acquisition
    process could be shortened. The risk can be reduced because we
    are going with more mature technology earlier. We can get rid
    of older equipment sooner, because it goes to the field. But
    the spiral development capability must also have a technology
    program that clearly can enter new technologies as it matures
    into the program to create the blocks of improvement. So that
    is a very key part of it.
        Let me just make one other point of all this. Spiral
    development also goes with a thing which I call properly
    pricing the programs. Because even though you have a spiral
    development, if the program manager runs out of resources at
    the end of the year, the first thing he does, he slips the
    program, and you have just defeated the purpose of spiral
    development.
        So you will hear a lot of talk within the Department about
    spiral development and properly pricing the programs up front.
    Those are two key elements that must go hand in hand.
        Senator Allard. Then Senator Kadish.
        Senator Levin. You just demoted him. [Laughter.]
        Senator Allard. I am sorry. General Kadish.
        General Kadish. That is an honor, Senator. [Laughter.]
        Senator Allard. General Kadish, would you just review for
    some of us the management tools you have in place now, such as
    your integrated master plan, integrated master schedule, and
    earned value management system, and the progress you have made
    in implementing these tools. Then maybe elaborate a little bit
    on have they been effective in providing you with the
    information you need to manage your programs in a disciplined
    way?
        General Kadish. We have been working very hard to put
    management discipline in all phases of our activities. This has
    been a goal of mine for several years, to be as efficient at
    this as we possibly can. We have come up with the concepts. We
    looked at GAO recommendations, internal recommendations,
    consulted recommendations. We have come up with a system of
    management tools that we are, in fact, working on, as we speak,
    to manage this very complex program. It includes integrated
    master schedules and plans. It includes earned value
    management. It even includes weekly, and even daily,
    interaction with our executing program managers.
        I guess if I were to give us a report card right now on how
    well we are implementing that, we have the right vision. I
    would give us an A-plus on that.
        The implementation has been difficult, as you would expect,
    for something like this. I expect by the end of the year this
    will be full up and operating to my full expectations. But
    right now, we are probably halfway there on implementing some
    of these things.
        We get pretty good cost visibility out of the earned value
    system. That is one of my major concerns, to make sure we know
    where we are from a cost and schedule standpoint.
        So the tools we are putting in place, I think, are going to
    be effective. They already have been, to a large degree. They
    are absolutely necessary for a complex program like this.
        Senator Allard. Thank you.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Kadish, do you happen to have Section 8061, which
    is the section that was written by somebody, relative to
    exempting this test bed from operational testing?
        General Kadish. No, I do not.
        Senator Levin. Let me get you a copy of it here. I want to
    go through this with you. ``Section 8061, the funds available
    to the Department of Defense under the heading Research,
    Development, Test and Evaluation Defense-wide may be used to
    develop and field an initial set of missile defense
    capabilities.'' That is defined in the next sentence.
        So far, if you stop right there, that accomplishes what you
    were interested in accomplishing in terms of the budget. Would
    you say that is correct?
        General Kadish. After the word ``capabilities''?
        Senator Levin. Yes.
        General Kadish. I believe so, yes, Senator.
        Senator Levin. If it stopped right there, that would
    achieve what you were trying to achieve when you said that you
    would like the R&D funds to be used for this 2003 and 2004 test
    bed?
        General Kadish. I am not a lawyer, Senator. So I would
    have----
        Senator Levin. Well, but is that----
        General Kadish. That is the intent. I mean, that is clearly
    the intent.
        Senator Levin. That is the intent of that language. I
    understand. That is the intent of that language?
        General Kadish. Right.
        Senator Levin. If you had put a period right there, that is
    what you intended to accomplish; is that correct?
        General Kadish. Right.
        Senator Levin. Now, it is the second half of that sentence
    which is the mystery that nobody seems to know how it got into
    the application here or in the proposal that came from the
    administration. It is this language that I want to read to you:
    ``Such fielding shall be considered to be system development
    and demonstration for purposes of any law governing the
    development and production of a major defense acquisition
    program.''
        That is the language which I am talking about here this
    morning. You did not suggest that part of that sentence; did
    you?
        General Kadish. I do not recall doing that. But in the
    development of these types of paragraphs, I think you can
    appreciate the fact that when the staff agencies and the legal
    community look at this, they may not have every law covered
    that may affect the funding issues. So my opinion would be that
    these types of clauses are in general used to make sure that we
    did not miss something in the process.
        Senator Levin. These types of clauses, as far as we know,
    have never been used for any fielded system in history. Do any
    of you know of any fielded system that has been designated by
    law as a developmental system? Do you know of any, anybody here
    at this panel? [No response.]
        We have searched. We can't find--you say this is the sort
    of language which is used. General, do you know of any fielded
    system that has been designated by law as a developmental
    system?
        General Kadish. I do not. I have not thought about it,
    Senator, but I do not think so.
        Senator Levin. Okay. Does anybody on the panel know of any?
        Mr. Christie, do you know of any?
        Mr. Christie. No, I do not.
        Senator Levin. Secretary Aldridge? Secretary Crouch?
        Secretary Crouch. Outside my----
        Senator Levin. Okay. Well, we do not either. So since your
    goal would have been accomplished, as you just testified, by
    putting a period after the word ``defense capability,'' since
    that is what you wanted to do, use R&D money to develop and
    field this initial set of missile defense capabilities, and you
    do not know, no one knows, where this second half of the
    sentence came from, we are going to find out.
        Secretary Aldridge. I am going to go search. But I think
    the point is, I think we agree that it is not our intent to
    waive operational testing.
        Senator Levin. Yes. Well, I am glad----
        Secretary Aldridge. We can come to agreement on what the
    words say to make that happen.
        Senator Levin. That is good. That is very reassuring, and I
    hope our chairman and our full committee chairman will help us
    to accomplish that, strip out that language. We have to find
    out where that language came from, because the effect of that
    language. It keeps something in development which is now
    fielded, the effect of it is to exempt that system from
    operational testing of a development system.
        Secretary Aldridge. That was not the intent. I think the
    intent was, as General Kadish has said, a system that is in
    SDD, system development and demonstration phase, is an R&D
    program and uses R&D research. Maybe it was just an expansion
    of the first phrase for clarification. But whatever it is, I
    think we are in full agreement as to how to proceed. We can
    find acceptable language to make it work.
        Senator Levin. Now, if you would help us find out how it
    happened, because it is troubling to me. It is obvious that the
    administration is trying to put a label of a deployed national
    missile defense system on what is really a test bed. That is
    troubling to many of us. That is exaggerating what is being
    fielded here for many of us. I think Senator Reed went through
    that with you.
        But if at the same time there is an effort somewhere,
    somehow, by somebody unknown to the four of you who run these
    programs, language gets into a request to us that would exempt,
    effectively, this system from operational testing, should
    somebody try to exempt it, that is doubly troubling. I am glad
    to hear that none of you are trying to exempt it from
    operational testing.
        Somebody here put that language in there for some purpose.
    It is troubling enough and a puzzlement enough to many of us
    but I am not speaking here for more than myself. I think some
    others who have expressed themselves on this are troubled by
    the exaggerated description of this as a deployed national
    missile defense system with your exaggerated capability as to
    the likelihood of success, Mr. Secretary, when it is really a
    test bed. If in fact, the motivation of this language is to
    immunize this from operational testing at the same time, it is
    doubly troublesome.
        I will leave the ifs there, because you are going to clear
    up the mystery, Secretary.
        Senator Allard. Senator Nelson, you are up, if you have
    questions.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I have plenty of
    questions. But I just looked at the clock. Is that a vote in
    progress?
        Senator Allard. I think we are scheduled for a vote right
    at 12:00. Senator Levin had 3 minutes. He has wrapped up. I am
    wrapped up. If you would like to run a question or two then you
    can submit the rest in writing, if you would like.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I am going to try to ask them all.
    Have they called the vote yet?
        Senator Allard. No, not that I am aware of.
        Senator Levin. If that is one light, they have called the
    vote.
        Could someone check, please, as to whether a vote is on?
        Mr. Chairman, we received a letter from Phil Coyle, who is
    the former occupant of the office that Mr. Christie now holds.
    I would ask that this letter on operational testing history be
    made part of the record.
        Senator Allard. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Senator Allard. I will find out how much time is left.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
        Mr. Christie, in your February assessment of the ground-
    based national missile defense program, you stated that ``only
    a very limited range of engagement parameters have been
    explored so far,'' that ``overall only limited potential
    functionality has been demonstrated in testing.''
        Can you explain?
        Mr. Christie. Up to the point that we wrote that report
    last fall, the hit-to-kill capability had been demonstrated. We
    had discovered problems with the booster. The last flight test
    was a problem because of a failure of the kill vehicle to
    separate from the booster. We had non-operationally realistic
    geometries out of necessity, launching the targets from
    Vandenberg to Kwajalein. We had a simulated mid-course tracking
    system located on Hawaii that would not be applicable in an
    operational sense.
        So we had demonstrated quite a bit. But we had also found
    that there are things that we should be doing in the very near
    future to make testing more operationally realistic. That is
    exactly what the test bed is designed to do, to correct many of
    those shortfalls in realistic operational testing capability.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, since your statement in February,
    there has been such sufficient confidence in the system and the
    testing that you feel like that it is not going to affect the
    effectiveness in order to deploy this in 2004?
        Mr. Christie. I was reporting at that point in time on the
    testing that had been done up to that point and my assessment
    of the plans that are on the table. I do not believe I made
    those kind of statements about the test plans that are
    presently on the table, and particularly with respect to the
    test bed that we have been discussing.
        Senator Allard. Senator, just for your information, we have
    about 10 minutes left.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        You stated, in your recent operational assessment, that the
    current national missile defense system had no current
    operational capability?
        Mr. Christie. That is correct.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Yet you have had some interceptor
    successes?
        Mr. Christie. That is right.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Why, then, is there no current
    capability against a real threat?
        Mr. Christie. A real threat, as we have talked about
    earlier today, comes from North Korea. We have not tested that
    geometry. We do not have a capability at this time to defend
    against that kind of a threat. So at this time, we do not have
    an operational capability.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right.
        General Kadish, your budget documents show that you are
    going down parallel paths to acquire the ground-based boost
    phase and a space-based phase. Now, it is my understanding that
    the space-based test bed that you plan will not actually be
    used to shoot down a test missile, whereas the ground-based
    will be used.
        So is it true, the assumption that I am making, that you do
    not plan to actually shoot down a test missile with a space-
    based? If not, why not?
        General Kadish. We do have the parallel paths, as you point
    out. The nearer path is the terrestrial-based, whether it is
    ground or sea eventually, we intend to move out very
    aggressively on, and hopefully reduce the risk, to space-basing
    those types of interceptors.
        At the same time, we have a path that we are pursuing a
    little bit later in time to put the space test bed up, as you
    suggest. It is our intent, as far as at least my internal
    discussions, that test bed that we would space-base would serve
    two functions. One is to demonstrate intercepts from
    interceptors that would be on orbit, so to actually do an
    intercept, and to work out all the difficulties involved with
    having a constellation of that size potentially on orbit.
        But it would be a test bed. It would actually try to do
    those types of things that I described, but only in a test
    mode.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, what is our pleasure? I
    came here at 9:30. I have a bunch of questions. We are going to
    have to go vote. I would like to go vote and come back and
    continue my questions.
        Senator Allard. Everybody here on the committee has had one
    round of questions. Then we had a shortened second round,
    Senator Levin and myself. We are in the second round with you.
    If you have some questions, you may want to submit those in
    written form. If the member wants to come back and ask some
    more questions, I will be glad to come back and chair the
    committee for you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I think you need my vote on this
    particular vote.
        Senator Allard. We are voting on Estrada. So that is the
    vote up on the floor.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is why you need my vote.
        Senator Allard. Okay. Then let us go ahead and I will
    recess the committee, and we will go ahead and vote, and we
    will be back. If my information is correct, we have about 6
    minutes or so, the vote will end. So that will give us time to
    get down there. We will get back probably about 25 after, I
    would guess, and we will give you an opportunity to ask some
    more questions.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If we are going to completely throw
    off the schedule of these folks, I do not want to do that.
        Senator Allard. That is a good point. What are your
    schedules? Do your schedules permit you to be here for a while
    longer? Does anybody have a problem? [No response.]
        Okay. Let us go ahead, and we will come back.
        [Recess.]
        Senator Allard. We will go ahead and call the committee
    back to order. We will go ahead and ask Senator Nelson to
    resume his questioning.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        All right. General, we were right in the middle of a
    questioning about the parallel tracks on the space-based and
    the ground-based. You had just started your answer.
        General Kadish. Let me repeat and then try to answer the
    question completely. We do have parallel paths for boost phase.
    The reason why we do have them is because it is a very risky
    proposition with the time lines and the phenomenology involved.
    So we set up this parallel path approach that has terrestrial,
    which includes sea-based and land-based approach, as well as a
    space-test-bed approach that comes later in time.
        Our primary path is the terrestrial approach, in order to
    prove out the concepts, get the phenomenology and to provide
    potentially as early a capability as we can, given the
    constraints of geography surrounding the boost phase. We intend
    to pursue a space interceptor test bed, as is described in our
    budget documents. That test bed will have two fundamental
    purposes being space-based. One is to see and test intercepts
    from space in very limited test bed context, as well as to
    prove out the difficulties and work out the difficulties of
    having a constellation of that nature on orbit, very limited
    number of potential satellites.
        That is the concept. We have a lot of work to do on both
    those efforts. But we have a primary path and a later path,
    using the space-based test bed.
        Senator Bill Nelson. When would you estimate that you would
    do a test of the space-based?
        General Kadish. We have--of the space-based test bed, it
    could be--we are working out some of the details of that
    strategy right now. My best guess, at this point in time, would
    be sometime in the--well, I will give you a wide range--Block
    2008 to 2012.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You would consider that you would have
    to have a test of that to determine if it was going to be
    effective; would you not?
        General Kadish. Yes, sir. I mean, that is the fundamental
    pillar of all our activities under missile defenses, to test
    them as best we know how, given their complex nature, to see
    that they work properly.
        Senator Bill Nelson. 2008 to 2012, is that right?
        General Kadish. Right.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are you still going to be around?
        General Kadish. Senator, I hope not. [Laughter.]
        I intend to be around, but maybe not in this position.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask a policy question to the
    secretary over there. That would be the first time that we
    would be weaponizing space. There has been a policy up to this
    point that we are not going to weaponize space. Tell me about
    your thinking with regard to the change of that policy.
        Secretary Aldridge. I should quickly kick this ball to J.D.
    Crouch, who is the policy guy. But let me just respond in the
    sense that we are heading down the path for missile defense
    that is looking at all elements: boost phase, mid-course, and
    terminal. It is a logical step for an effective missile defense
    system to have a very effective boost phase intercept system,
    because you avoid a lot of problems. You basically can cover
    the world. You can avoid any issue of discrimination.
        Now once you have accomplished that, then you look at
    various ways to do boost phase. We are looking at airborne
    lasers. We are looking at ground-based interceptors. We are
    looking at space-based. Any one of those might work and many of
    them may not work.
        So from the point of view of laying out a program plan of
    development, we are looking at all those parallel phases. Now,
    whether or not we actually go and do one of these to build a
    test and do an intercept will depend on obviously getting the
    money in the budget and getting congressional approval to spend
    the money in that direction. So I think the policy issue will
    have to be addressed. But right now, we are laying a plan that
    has that as one of the options in it.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you not have a lot of promise on
    your boost phase right now with the Aegis system?
        Secretary Aldridge. That is correct. I would say probably
    the most effective boost phase would be the airborne laser. It
    is the one that probably has more effectiveness because of its
    essentially worldwide coverage and zero time of flight system.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How far along are we in the testing of
    the airborne laser?
        Secretary Aldridge. General Kadish can probably address
    that specifically.
        General Kadish. Yes, sir. If I may, Senator. We are at what
    I call the hardware phase of the airborne laser. We are
    probably within 18 months to 2 years of demonstrating that this
    laser system could actually shoot down a missile. That is quite
    remarkable.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Within how long?
        General Kadish. Eighteen months to 2 years, depending on
    how successful we are building it all on the airplane over the
    next couple years. It is very risky, I would assess. But the
    technology appears to be there.
        So where we stand today is we have an airplane, a 747, that
    is configured to accept the laser as its cargo to carry around.
    We got that integrated. It is flown. We have gotten the test
    program under way of that part of the program. We are
    assembling, as we speak, at Edwards Air Force Base, the laser
    component on the ground in a 747 carcass to make sure it fits.
    This summer we plan to have first light out of that laser setup
    in the carcass of the 747. If all goes well over the next 18
    months to 2 years, we will integrate that in the airplane and
    fly it to attempt to shoot down a boosting missile.
        So we have made remarkable progress; not without its
    problems and difficulties, but that is heading in the right
    direction at this point in time.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is pretty dramatic.
        General Kadish. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you can shoot down a rocket in its
    boost phase with a laser from a big airplane, you can shoot
    down anything.
        General Kadish. I would not go that far, Senator, but we
    can do a lot of damage.
        Senator Allard. Senator, I have always advocated and I have
    always liked the concept of going after the boost phase,
    because you drop the warhead or weapon of mass destruction
    right back into the lap of those who started it. I think that
    works better than any peace treaty out there, frankly.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Although presumably the warhead would
    not be armed. Unless they do not have the arming techniques.
        Senator Allard. You would hope not anyway.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is something. So, you are that
    optimistic on the testing on the laser?
        General Kadish. I am cautiously optimistic. In fact, I
    would invite members of the committee to go out there and see
    the hardware, if you have a chance, at Edwards Air Force Base.
    But when you go out there and you see the hardware, talk to the
    people working on this. They are worried about their next
    crisis in front of them to meet schedule and cost effort. But I
    think there is a very quiet confidence they will be able to do
    this. It is a matter of when and what problems will come up.
        There are a lot of skeptics on this. I think that is a
    healthy attitude to take right now. But as Secretary Aldridge
    points out, some things will work, some things will not. But
    this is on track right now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you perfect the technology on laser
    from a platform of a sub-sonic airplane, can you use that
    technology? There is no reason why you could not use that on a
    space-based platform, is there?
        General Kadish. There are different challenges in space.
    The size of the mirrors require the optics, which in and of
    itself is a major accomplishment of ABL, to be put on orbit and
    then having, basically, a chemical plant that you have in the
    back of that airplane on orbit, are significant challenges. The
    fundamentals are the same. It would give us a lot better
    confidence, I think, of going to space. Of course, space solves
    your geography problem, in a sense, because you can use those
    weapons more effectively from the high ground of space.
        But there will be very difficult challenges to move that to
    space. I would not characterize it as a trivial matter at all.
        Secretary Aldridge. Plus the fact that we do not have a
    launch vehicle to do it, because it takes several hundreds of
    thousands of pounds for a space-based laser. There is just no
    way to get it there at this point.
        Senator Bill Nelson. With some of the rockets that we are
    going to go to Mars with, we can do it with that. [Laughter.]
        Secretary Aldridge. We hope.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let us talk about decoys.
    Let me ask you, Mr. Christie, do you have a high confidence
    that we will have the capability to discriminate from the
    decoys when we deploy this thing in 2004?
        Mr. Christie. High confidence with certain decoys, yes. We
    have tested with some decoys already and demonstrated a
    discrimination capability. We will be carrying out even more
    difficult tests of counter-measures. But without getting into
    classified information, I cannot speak to what we will
    demonstrate with specific decoys between now and then. We can
    provide that answer to you for the record.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. I would like to follow up on
    that.
        Senator Allard. Go ahead.
        Senator Bill Nelson. No, no. I mean in an appropriate
    setting, in a classified setting at some point.
        Senator Allard. Like many of the gentlemen on the
    committee, for example, if you want a classified briefing on
    either subject, usually just contact them. They can set aside a
    room there. It is in S-407, I believe it is. That classified
    briefing can be provided for you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Aldridge, what are we doing
    to ensure that, as we try to orbit a constellation of space-
    based radar satellites, and they are not being designed for
    missile defense, but might be able to provide a global missile
    defense tracking capability as a side benefit. What do you
    think about the potential side benefit of this kind of system?
        Secretary Aldridge. That is very difficult. The space-based
    radar that is being considered by the Department is a radar
    that looks to the ground. It is a radar that is trying to
    detect targets moving and to provide some imaging capability.
    So it is not designed to be tracking missiles in space. It is
    really looking downward. The concept is in a fairly low earth
    orbit. Yet we are looking at other concepts that could be--
    maybe you would put it at a higher orbit.
        I believe, really, the direction that we would like to move
    was what used to be called the SBIRS-Low program, now called
    Space Tracking and Surveillance System. It is a space-based
    system designed exactly to do what you would like to do. Only
    now it looks up into the orbits that would be for missiles,
    rather than looking down on the ground. That program has been
    restructured. As you may recall, there were some difficulties
    with that, that we had last year. We restructured the program.
    We are going to launch two satellites in the 2006/2007 period
    that will be prototypes that would lead on to other systems
    later on.
        That is carried as part of the missile defense program. It
    is carried under General Kadish's activity. It is fully
    integrated with the work we have underway for missile defense.
    That is perhaps the right way to go, as opposed to trying to
    make a third mission of a space-based radar.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, with regard to the boost
    phase systems, the boost phase interceptor has to be very fast
    or it has to get very close in order to be effective. So what
    are the general design goals of the boost phase system? What
    are the regions that you might want to have covered by such a
    system? Where would that system have to be placed, other than
    what you have already told us about in Alaska and down at
    Vandenberg?
        General Kadish. The general characteristic of a boost phase
    defensive system is such that you have to be closer to your
    intended target than you would in the mid-course phase or in
    the terminal phase, obviously. It is rather up close and
    personal for terrestrial-type of activities. But if you look at
    the geometries, if you have a boosting missile and you have the
    kinetic fly out of another missile to catch up to it, you want
    to be in the general vicinity of that boosting missile,
    measured in hundreds of kilometers.
        Space-basing gives you a bigger advantage because you could
    be closer to any point on the ground from space than you could
    be if you were deployed specifically on the ground. So one of
    the major constraints to a boost-phase activity is that you
    have to be close to the borders of the offending country that
    you are trying to defend against.
        There are a lot of advantages if you could make that work.
    That is why we have the parallel paths of having boosters with
    the proper velocities. When you have boosters doing kinetic
    energy, you have time-line problems because the time lines are
    very short. When you have the speed of light of a laser, you
    have the speed of light, so you do not have the fly-out times
    of a kinetic booster. That is why we are proceeding on all
    those parallel paths.
        So I guess the primary constraint, if you want to call it a
    constraint, or characteristic of boost-phase defensive systems
    is that they have to be close to the boosting missile to defend
    against it, relatively speaking, in regard to the mid-course or
    terminal phases.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you went to a space-based system,
    how many satellites would you have to have giving you tracking
    coverage in order to get 24-hour coverage of your potential
    enemy launch regions?
        General Kadish. That is a difficult question to answer. But
    let me give you some ranges. It is difficult because you have
    to decide what type of capability you want. In a layered,
    multifaceted system that we are building, a space-based
    interceptor boost phase system would not be the only system we
    would depend on. So you would have a different constellation,
    if it was the only system, than you would if you have other
    layers in the process.
        On the most likely side, we have done calculations, and I
    have seen analyses that say we can do it with as little as
    potentially 60 or 70 interceptors to as many as 300 or more. It
    goes geometrical from there, depending on how robust we wanted
    to be in the things we are talking about.
        So I think affordability here, if we ever go down that
    route, is a major issue. The complexity of those constellations
    is one of the major technical risks associated with it. But it
    is very attractive, as I pointed out, from a geography
    standpoint.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you get to the time period of 2008
    to 2012 that you talked about and start to deploy space-based
    assets, if we were to ever have a policy decision that you
    wanted to have them removed from space so that space would not
    be weaponized, is that being put into your thought process?
        General Kadish. Senator, I am not the right person to
    address the policy issues of this. We will certainly comply
    with the policy of the Department and Congress through the
    appropriate process. I think that is better left to Secretary
    Crouch.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Aldridge, Mr. Christie,
    Secretary Crouch?
        Secretary Crouch. Sure. I think your question was, ``Would
    the system be capable of being extracted?'' Again, I think we
    are in the very early stages here. So, whether or not it would
    have that kind of a capability obviously for something on
    orbit, you would have the options of trying to physically take
    it out of space, which I think would probably be very difficult
    and very expensive. You might also have the options of de-
    orbiting the system.
        But I think that those would be technical capabilities that
    you would have to build in to the system, if you wanted to have
    the option of being able to do that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. That is correct. But the technical
    capability has to follow a policy decision. That is why I
    raised the issue for you to start thinking about.
        Secretary Aldridge. I think it is probably a chicken-or-egg
    issue, because if it does not make any technical sense, then
    why do we ask for the policy change? We do have to understand
    what is the technical difficulty of making this happen and the
    cost. It may be just prohibitive. But I think in terms of what
    we are doing now is we are just studying this issue and trying
    to get some technical assessment of does this make any sense
    long before we ask for--even address the policy.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Back on January 31, a senior
    defense official was quoted as saying, ``It is not clear how
    the national missile defense system to be deployed by 2004 will
    be manned 24 hours a day.'' That was the quote. Then a
    spokesperson for the Missile Defense Agency was quoted as
    saying, ``The Missile Defense Agency is an R&D agency that has
    no operational control over the system it develops.'' The quote
    continued, ``The systems are turned over to the military
    services for operational use.'' That is the end of the quote.
        So, how can your agency continue to improve and test if the
    system is going to be turned over to something like the Army
    for operational use?
        General Kadish. Senator, I think I alluded to this earlier
    in our discussions with the members. But let me put it in this
    context: We have a unified command plan change now that puts
    STRATCOM as a primary interface with missile defense. Then we
    have to deal with NORTHCOM as well. In the process of putting
    this system together and putting it, what I would call, on
    alert, we are actively discussing now just that very question
    of how do you do both at the same time.
        I am very confident that we will be able to work out an
    arrangement that does such a thing. It would be a very
    practical approach to the problem. We have some experience with
    that, even today in our strategic systems of how you test and
    operate at the same time.
        Those details, however, have not been worked out. We are
    working on those issues as we speak. I would expect that over
    the coming months, and over the next year especially, those
    issues will be addressed. In fact, I think without having the
    test bed and the imperative to make it operational, we would
    have a very hard time of getting any operational concepts put
    together to operate such a system in the short run.
        So I think that is a major benefit. As difficult as that
    will be to work out, it will be a major benefit of us going
    down this path, to get the warfighting using communities on all
    our systems more familiar with how we ought to operate them,
    and then we can respond to what they think ought to be done in
    the future.
        Senator Bill Nelson. If you are going to have 16 more
    tests, and this thing is operational in 2004, you are really
    going to have a challenge of how do you pull it off of
    operational to get all those tests done.
        General Kadish. I think it will be a challenge but a
    welcome one.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Since the President's decision to
    deploy the ground-based mid-course missile defense by 2004, the
    flight test schedule does not seem to have kept up. Three
    intercept flight tests have been canceled. Now, why did you not
    request enough funding to complete the flight test program with
    the current interceptor design on schedule, while also
    developing the new boosters? When will the objectives of the
    three canceled flight tests be completed?
        General Kadish. I think that, after the last flight test,
    the best way I can answer that is we took a look at what we had
    to do and what we have already done and tried to be good
    stewards of the taxpayers' money and said: If we did the flight
    test program that we had planned to do, using surrogate
    booster, while at the same time putting new boosters into play,
    two things would happen.
        One, is we would repeat basically what we already knew in
    the flight tests that we would do using the surrogate booster.
    We would not be able to change the configuration. So we would
    be doing tests confirming what we already knew about the
    system. But we would probably have increased our confidence on
    the reliability.
        Traded with that would be the second thing, and that is
    that there is only a finite amount of people involved in this
    program at this point. We wanted to focus their attention on
    what really needed to be done.
        So the conclusion we collectively came to, and I think is
    validated by Mr. Christie, is that it was prudent to focus our
    attention on booster flight tests. We want to start up the
    intercept tests in the proper configuration that we really want
    to test, and suspend the other types of tests. The marginal
    confidence and increase in knowledge would not necessarily be
    worth the expense of those tests.
        So we balanced the program. That is the effort we are
    trying to execute right now. I think it is a prudent and wise
    decision at this point.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You want that system in Alaska by the
    end of 2004. You have that X-band radar. It is not going to be
    ready by then. So Mr. Secretary Crouch, will the President's
    planned deployment of the national missile defense system in
    Alaska still go ahead by the end of 2004, regardless of the
    readiness of the radar?
        Secretary Crouch. Yes, sir. My understanding is that the
    modest capabilities that are planned for that system do not
    require the sea-based X-band radar that you are speaking of.
    But obviously, that sea-based X-band radar will, when it does
    come on line beyond 2004, will provide some additional
    capability to that system. But its primary purpose will be to
    engage in testing for the system.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Where is Shemya?
        Secretary Crouch. Shemya is at the end of the Aleutian
    chain in Alaska.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So, that is a little island, you
    have it there or the floating platform. Your answer would be
    applicable to both?
        Secretary Crouch. At this point, there is nothing in the
    budget that would put the X-band radar in Shemya. That was part
    of the old national missile defense system.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, you have had five successes
    in 4 years. You have had, tell me if this is right, eight
    flight interceptor tests and three of those have failed. Do you
    have the confidence now that you are getting your hands around
    the problems as you have developed, so that we are not going to
    have that kind of success rate in the future, on your future
    tests?
        General Kadish. I am very confident in the approach we are
    taking to the testing program. It is not only flight tests; it
    is ground tests, it is simulations, it is a whole series of
    different things that build our confidence.
        In regard to the intercept tests, you are correct. There
    were five successes in 4 years. But four of those successes
    occurred in, I think, about a 13-month or 14-month time period;
    and three out of the eight failed. Of the three failures that
    we have had, one of my main frustrations is that they occurred
    because we made a mistake in building the system, effectively a
    quality control mistake. When you are dealing with prototype
    hardware of this nature, unfortunately this occurs all too
    frequently.
        So one of the main focuses that I had in the program for
    almost a couple years now, and it is coming to fruition with a
    vengeance right now, is something called mission assurance. I
    think you might be familiar with it. That has become the number
    one criteria, even in our source selections, to make sure that
    even our prototype hardware, our first hardware that we built,
    now that we know the fundamental technology works, needs to be
    built properly. These are very complex systems. We are going to
    pay a lot of attention to that effort.
        So my confidence stems from the fact that we have a basic
    knowledge of the technology now. We know how to integrate it.
    We will get experienced with it, with this test bed that we
    will make operational. With the proper focus on mission
    assurance and quality control, we could build it the way we
    need to build it.
        Senator Allard. Senator, we need to wrap it up. This panel
    has been here for 3\1/2\ to 4 hours.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So have I, Mr. Chairman; and I have
    just completed my questions.
        Senator Allard. Okay. Thank you.
        Again, I would like to thank the panel for their time and
    willingness to answer the questions from the members of this
    panel. I want to thank you very much for your dedication and
    your good work. Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                       BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        1. Senator Levin. Secretary Aldridge, many of the ballistic missile
    defense programs currently being funded have no established performance
    goals, architectures, or cost estimates. When will such goals be
    established, how much money do you plan to spend on these programs
    prior to establishing such goals, and which other major defense
    programs do you plan to develop with no concrete performance and cost
    goals or overall architectures?
        Secretary Aldridge. The Secretary of Defense was definite about
    goals and priorities for missile defense in his memorandum of January
    2, 2002, which established ballistic missile defense as a single
    program of work. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) immediately
    established technical objectives and goals for a single program to
    develop layered, integrated, ballistic missile defenses in depth for
    our homeland, deployed forces, and friends and allies. The current
    Statement of Goals provides even more detailed goals as they relate to
    development for Block 04 of the Ballistic Missile Defense System
    (BMDS). In keeping with these goals, MDA developed cost estimates and
    technical proposals to provide missile defenses as soon as practical.
    This work created the budgets for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year
    2004. As development and fielding progresses, MDA will adjust goals and
    plan for technical development to keep pace with the ballistic missile
    threat while providing affordable missile defenses. Consequently, while
    there is a Block 04 architecture and cost estimate for limited fielded
    defense, new technical capabilities responsive to emerging threats
    drive an evolving architecture that may change significantly as the
    BMDS becomes more effective in future blocks.

                       TESTING PAC-3 AGAINST SCUD TARGETS

        2. Senator Levin. General Kadish, when do you plan to test the PAC-
    3 system against actual SCUD targets and what is preventing you from
    doing so now?
        General Kadish. Testing of the PAC-3 missile became an Army
    responsibility upon transfer of the program to the Army on March 31,
    2003. MDA is still responsible as a ballistic missile target provider,
    however, and stands ready to support the future PAC-3 test program. As
    a part of the development and initial operational testing of the PAC-3,
    we did not have actual SCUD targets available in appropriate quantities
    and sufficient lead time to incorporate them into our test program.
    There are a number of risks associated with the SCUD missile, such as
    its accuracy, that make it impractical at many test ranges. The
    resulting restrictions, including reliability, safety, environmental
    and repeatability concerns, made SCUD-representative targets more
    appropriate for early testing. Additionally, our testing philosophy is
    to test against targets that represent a variety of threat solutions so
    that we have a robust system capable of defending against a wide,
    variable range of threats. This approach has reaped benefits in the
    current conflict in Iraq.

                   DEPLOYING NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

        3. Senator Levin. Mr. Christie, did you advise the President or
    anyone else to deploy a national missile defense system in 2004?
        Mr. Christie. I did not. However, I fully support building the test
    bed to support more realistic testing and developing a concept of
    operation. Also, the test bed may have some inherent capability that
    could be employed in the event of a ballistic missile attack on the
    United States.

                   APPROVING BLOCK 04 MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

        4. Senator Levin. Mr. Christie, are you going to approve and
    implement operational test plans for the Block 04 missile defense
    systems prior to September 2004, so that we will know what the
    demonstrated capabilities of the fielded systems are by the time they
    are fielded?
        Mr. Christie. I will review and approve the operational test plans
    for the Block 2004 test bed. Each ground and flight test event will
    address both developmental and operational test objectives. I will
    review and comment on the developmental plans and approve the
    operational plans. This process applies both prior to and after the
    2004 deployment.

                OPERATIONAL TESTING FOR MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

        5. Senator Levin. General Kadish, when will operational testing in
    accordance with current law for the ground-based national missile
    defense and the sea-based missile defense systems be conducted?
        General Kadish. Current testing of the Ground-Based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) element developmental prototype is structured as combined
    Developmental Testing/Operational Testing (DT/OT), occurring in a
    Consolidated Test Force (CTF) environment. A CTF environment brings
    together developmental and operational testers from both the prime
    contractor team and the government in a common forum to plan and
    execute all testing in accordance with combined DT and OT objectives to
    the maximum extent practicable. Because GMD is an evolutionary
    development, at designated intervals this process culminates in BMD
    elements characterization, performed by the Operational Test Agencies
    (OTAs), i.e., Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), Air Force
    Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), and Joint Test
    Interoperability Command (JTIC). At the time of each ``production off-
    ramp,'' i.e., the transition of the developmental configuration into
    production at some plateau in its evolution, an assessment of the OT
    shortfall for that specific system configuration will be made. Based
    upon this assessment, OT of the specific configuration will be
    conducted, as required, to eliminate the shortfall.
        The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Program has a Memorandum of
    Agreement with the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force
    (COMOPTEVFOR), the Navy's OTA, to participate in the planning and
    observe all Aegis BMD Block 2004 testing. Within 60 days following the
    conclusion of each test, COMOPTEVFOR provides a ``Letter of
    Observation'' which provides formal OTA feedback regarding system
    performance to the Program Director, Aegis BMD. COMOPTEVFOR's
    recommendations are then considered and, if possible, implemented in
    subsequent testing. Flight Mission 9, which is currently the last test
    of the Aegis BMD Block 2004 activity, is currently being planned as a
    combined DT/OT. COMOPTEVFOR will conduct a formal Operational
    Assessment of this system element.

                                  AEGIS SHIPS

        6. Senator Levin. General Kadish, the 2004 national missile defense
    system to be deployed in 2004 relies on Aegis ships off the coast of
    North Korea to protect Hawaii from missile attack. How many ships are
    required to provide protection for Hawaii on a 24-hour, 7-day a week
    basis (as well as to provide adequate self-protection for the ships)
    and does the Navy have ``extra'' ships that it has agreed to provide
    for this role? Has the Navy agreed to provide these ships on a 24/7
    basis?
        General Kadish. This issue is being actively worked directly with
    the Chief of Naval Operations and his staff. This joint effort includes
    a coordinated analysis of operational task force, and is considering
    stationing one or two ships in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan to
    provide Surveillance and Track Data to the BMD system. The Navy will
    then determine how best to protect the ship(s).

        7. Senator Levin. General Kadish, do the Aegis ships to be deployed
    off the coast of North Korea as part of the Block 2004 system have the
    demonstrated capability to track an ICBM targeting Hawaii from North
    Korea with enough accuracy to prosecute an intercept using a ground-
    based missile defense (GMD) interceptor? If so, how was this capability
    demonstrated? Please provide a detailed answer at the classified level,
    including the expected and demonstrated Aegis track accuracies as a
    function of time compared to the handover requirements of the GMD
    interceptor.
        General Kadish. In the brief time since the withdrawal from the
    Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, we have demonstrated the
    capability of Aegis ships to track ICBMs with its Spy-1 radar in
    Integrated Flight Tests 9 and 10. We cannot as yet say we can provide
    data accurate enough to prosecute an intercept using a GMD interceptor.
    However, our results are encouraging and support further analysis,
    system modification, and testing of the extent of the capability to
    provide not only cueing, but also, on certain trajectories, direct
    support to the interceptor.

        8. Senator Levin. General Kadish, can the Aegis ships planned to be
    deployed off the coast of North Korea as part of the Block 2004 GMD
    system defend themselves from anti-ship cruise missiles while
    simultaneously tracking an ICBM which has targeted Hawaii, and will the
    ICBM track from the ship have sufficient accuracy to prosecute an
    intercept using a GMD interceptor?
        General Kadish. Although the Aegis ship will not be able to conduct
    other missions using the SPY-1 radar while conducting the BMD mission,
    the ship still retains some self-defense capability through use of its
    Close-In-Weapons-Systems (CIWS). Defense may also be provided by
    another ship. The Navy is addressing how it will defend the
    Surveillance and Track BMD ships. Continued improvements through Block
    2004 will restore much of the self-defense capability of the Aegis BMD
    ships. With regard to track inaccuracy, we cannot as yet say we can
    provide data accurate enough to prosecute an intercept using a GMD
    interceptor. However, our results are encouraging and support further
    analysis, system modification, and testing of the capability to
    determine whether it can provide cueing and, on certain trajectories,
    direct support to the interceptor.

                      EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCK 04 GMD SYSTEM

        9. Senator Levin. Secretary Aldridge, you stated at the hearing
    that the Block 04 GMD system would have effectiveness ``in the 90
    percent range.'' What is the basis for this estimate, and why does it
    differ substantially from the classified probability of engagement
    success values provided to the General Accounting Office by the Missile
    Defense Agency earlier this year in the document titled, ``BMDS
    Statement of Goals; Block 04 System Architecture''?
        Secretary Aldridge. The BMDS Statement of Goals for the Block 04
    System Architecture established system effectiveness values against a
    range of targets and multiple trajectories. Higher effectiveness values
    can be expected when multiple defense resources engage a single
    adversary reentry. Actual effectiveness probabilities of engagement
    success depend on various environmental factors, the number and types
    of incoming missiles, defense capabilities available and deployable,
    and ballistic missile command and control capabilities.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Jack Reed

                            ANOMALY PROBLEM WITH EKV

        10. Senator Reed. General Kadish, you discovered the track gate
    anomaly problem with the EKV during IFT-6 in July 2001. Why is it not
    yet fixed, and when do you plan to fix it?
        General Kadish. We first saw the track gate anomaly during IFT-6
    and it recurred in all subsequent flight tests. We were able to
    duplicate the anomaly during ground testing and found that it is likely
    caused by introduction of electromagnetic interference (EMI) into the
    EKV through some flight test-unique cabling. These cables are not part
    of the EKV's operational hardware. Once we determined the probable
    cause, the offending cables were eliminated and additional shielding
    added to mitigate the EMI. We were unable to validate the fix on IFT-10
    however, because of an unrelated hardware failure involving separation
    of the EKV from the booster. Our next opportunity will be during IFT-14
    in 1Q fiscal year 2004.
        We have designed and built a very robust and capable system. It is
    important to note that we had four consecutive successful intercepts in
    which the EKV struck and killed the target vehicle despite experiencing
    track gate anomalies. We have a high confidence that we solved the
    track gate anomaly problem and look forward to demonstrating the fix on
    IFT-14.

                       BUILDING A PERMANENT X-BAND RADAR

        11. Senator Reed. General Kadish, when do you plan to build a
    permanent, operational X-band radar to support the deployment of a
    national missile defense against a North Korean threat?
        General Kadish. Because the overall ballistic missile threat is
    greater than North Korea alone, the BMDS is better served by the
    positional flexibility afforded by a Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX).
    Additionally, the SBX can support both operational needs and integrated
    flight tests. For example, while both radars can provide operational
    coverage of a specific region, the SBX also will support nearly all of
    the remaining planned flight tests, while a fixed radar could support
    only one. For these reasons, there currently are no plans to construct
    a permanent operational XBR.

                     ICBM ATTACK AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

        12. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, in your February assessment of
    missile defense programs, you stated that the 2004 national missile
    defense deployment ``may have some intrinsic capability to acquire,
    track, and intercept an inbound ICBM, under the right circumstances.''
    Could you tell me whether you believe an actual ICBM attack against the
    United States is likely to conform to the ``right circumstances'' you
    allude to, and provide a general description of what the ``right
    circumstances'' are?
        Mr. Christie. The test bed elements are being built using
    technology specifically designed to conduct ballistic missile defense
    missions. It is being integrated by government organizations and
    industry teams familiar with the mission and the technical challenges.
    However, it will not be possible to demonstrate defensive capability
    through testing that fully replicates the threat by the time the
    fielding decision is made. The test bed will have some intrinsic, yet
    unknown capabilities to defend against a limited attack. The right
    circumstances that I refer to in my report are those situations where
    we would expect the test bed capabilities to be most effective. While
    the specific circumstances are classified, they generally relate to
    timing, intelligence data, direction of attack, and the threat missile
    and associated countermeasures.

                                 FIXING THE GMD

        13. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, your most recent report to Congress
    stated that ``the GMD [national missile defense] element has yet to
    demonstrate significant operational capability'' because ``the GMD test
    program in fiscal year 2002 has suffered from . . . test infrastructure
    limitations'' such as ``lack of a realistically placed mid-course
    sensor'' and a ``fixed intercept point.'' Which of these problems will
    be fixed by September 2004, which is the deployment date the
    administration has set for national missile defense? Is it safe to say
    that until those problems are fixed, it will be impossible to
    demonstrate ``significant operational capability?''
        Mr. Christie. If the test bed construction proceeds as scheduled,
    the constraint of a fixed intercept point will be corrected by
    September 2004. A realistically placed mid-course sensor for testing
    will require the completion of the sea-based X-band radar, currently
    scheduled for the end of calendar year 2005. It should be noted that
    the Cobra Dane radar at Shemya is a realistically placed mid-course
    sensor for a defensive mission, but is not easily included in testing
    due to its fixed orientation. We will not have performed sophisticated
    discrimination testing, so EKV and radar discrimination capability will
    be unknown. The only way to test the full system in a variety of
    operationally realistic configurations is to build the test bed. Until
    the test bed is complete, operational capability will have to be
    assessed based on the performance of the system and its elements in
    more constrained encounters.

                   COST ESTIMATE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        14. Senator Reed. Secretary Aldridge, the Fiscal Year 2002 National
    Defense Authorization Act required any missile defense program in the
    ``engineering and manufacturing development'' phase to provide the
    estimated costs for the life of the program. This law defined
    ``engineering and manufacturing development'' as that phase which:

      1. Translates the most promising design approach into a producible
            design;
      2. Validates the manufacturing process; and
      3. Demonstrates system capabilities through testing.

        The administration has decided to deploy ground-based national
    missile defense and sea-based theater missile defense systems just 18
    months from now. This surely places these systems well beyond the
    ``engineering and manufacturing development'' phase right now. When do
    you intend to provide Congress with life cycle cost estimates for these
    programs?
        Secretary Aldridge. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is not
    a program in engineering and manufacturing development. The President's
    decision to field an initial capability in 2004 has not changed the
    status of BMDS. The BMDS capabilities planned for Block 04 will use
    developmental test articles designed to work together for an initial
    layered missile defense capability.

                EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

        15. Senator Reed. Mr. Christie, do you believe the missile defense
    systems the administration has decided to field in 2004 have been
    proven to be operationally suitable, effective, reliable, and
    supportable in the field?
        Mr. Christie. The two systems that may be fielded in 2004 are the
    Aegis BMD system and the Block 2004 test bed, which consists of
    elements of the GMD system. Both the Aegis and GMD program have
    demonstrated some limited capability consistent with the mission of
    defending against a limited ballistic missile attack. Operational
    suitability and effectiveness are typically assessed based on a systems
    performance in operational testing. Prior to September 2004 neither
    system will have undergone sufficient testing to determine their
    suitability and effectiveness. As I testified, the test bed will
    provide the opportunity to acquire significant information on battle
    management, command, control, communications, safety, reliability,
    maintainability, and logistics supportability of the missile/silo/
    command center complex. It can also be used for operator training and
    for developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing the
    test bed. Once the test bed is deployed, it will be used to execute the
    flight tests.

                                  GMD TESTING

        16. Senator Reed. General Kadish, when do you plan to test the GMD
    system against simple, realistic decoys that mimic the RV? When will
    the system be tested against tumbling RVs together with simple,
    tumbling RV-shaped balloons (please provide a classified answer, if
    required)?
        General Kadish. [Deleted.]
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                               OPERATIONAL SYSTEM

        17. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, the Missile Defense Agency
    plans some 16 more major flight tests of the GMD system, and many more
    major ground tests. Once the system is fielded in 2004, do you plan to
    take the operational system off-line for this testing?
        General Kadish. It will be possible to test the system while it is
    on alert providing an initial defensive operations capability. It will
    be critical to correctly time the testing, and MDA has already begun
    discussions with STRATCOM and NORTHCOM in order to address this issue.

                       MID-COURSE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, since the President's
    decision to deploy the ground-based mid-course missile defense system
    in Alaska by the end of fiscal year 2004, three intercept flight tests
    have been canceled. During the hearing, you stated that one reason why
    they were canceled is that the tests would ``repeat basically what we
    already knew.'' Does this mean that the three flight tests would have
    been no more complex than the previous four flight tests, all of which
    have been very similar?
        General Kadish. MDA will continuously re-evaluate its test program
    and adjust to meet evolving verifications needs. The decision to remove
    1FT-11, -12, and -16 from the flight test plan was made prior to the
    President's announcement to proceed with fielding initial defensive
    operations (IDO) capabilities. Its important to note that since that
    time, MDA renamed Radar Characterization Flight (RCF)-2 to IFT-16A.
        MDA has long said that it will adjust its programs and schedules
    based on successes and failures. It would be fiscally irresponsible--
    while adding little to the current pool of data--to conduct another
    flight test with similar testing configuration and component versions
    that have been utilized and tested in five consecutive GMD flight tests
    (during which we conducted four successful targets engagements).
    Therefore, MDA decided to reprioritize the tests and concentrate on the
    most immature component of the GMD element--the booster--and conduct
    five critical booster test flights in fiscal year 2003, while
    continuing to develop and construct the initial GMD parts of the BMDS
    test bed and achieve initial operations capability by 2004.
        With regard to IFT-16A: RCF-2 has been redesignated as IFT-16A and
    rescoped as a system-level test involving a simulated intercept. IFT-
    16A will specifically exercise the GMD element, especially the newly
    upgraded Beale Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR). IFT-16A, currently
    scheduled for 4Q fiscal year 2004, is accelerated to support GMD system
    assessment prior to fielding initial defensive capabilities.

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, when do you plan to
    increase test complexity to include targets with signatures,
    countermeasures, and flight dynamics more closely matching the threat?
        General Kadish. GMD flight test complexity continuously increases
    as additional functionalities are added. Target signatures,
    countermeasures, and flight dynamics are in concert with the current
    threat estimates and the Adversary Capability Document.

                                     IFT-10

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, under the previous
    administration's plan for NMD, IFT-10 would have included a relatively
    realistic target suite. Could you please compare the original plan for
    flight tests with the current plan, and explain the reason for any
    differences?
        General Kadish. IFT-10 was originally planned under a different set
    of assumptions than the current BMDS program. The original purpose of
    IFT-10 was to assess the capability of the NMD system against a
    relatively realistic re-entry vehicle (RV) and target suite. There are
    two primary differences between the planned and the completed IFT-10
    mission: (1) Two additional objects were added to the target suite, and
    (2) the mission was conducted at night. The two additional objects were
    added to the target suite to increase the complexity of the intercept.
    The mission was conducted at night to assess the systems performance in
    a new flight test environment.

                            GMD INTERCEPTOR TESTING

        21. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, the GMD interceptor is
    supposed to get in-flight targeting update messages to steer it towards
    the target. I understand that you have not yet conducted a test where
    in-flight target updates were actually used to change the course of the
    interceptor. When is this type of test planned?
        General Kadish. In IFT-15 we plan to commit the interceptor using
    sensor track data external to GMD. This will require an In-Flight
    Target Update (IFTU) based on GMD sensor data to further refine the
    intercept point.

        22. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, should we proceed with
    deployment of the GMD system if we have not yet completed a successful
    test that includes aiming the interceptor with in-flight target
    updates?
        General Kadish. We have exercised the IFTU process during previous
    successful IFTs, and plan to stress this process even more so during
    IFT-15.

                                BLOCK 04 SYSTEM

        23. Senator Bill Nelson. General Kadish, during the hearing, you
    stated that the operational, fielded GMD system would require targeting
    data to be loaded into the interceptor in advance of the intercept,
    just as in the previously completed flight tests. For the Block 04
    operational system, how long before launch does such target data need
    to be loaded and what information needs to be included in the data load
    (please provide technical details). Can we expect we will have that
    information in real time in the event of a hostile missile launch
    against the United States?
        General Kadish. Targeting data can be loaded into the interceptor
    immediately prior to launching the interceptor.
        The interceptor requires the following targeting data to be loaded:

             The predicted time and location in space where the
            intercept will occur.
             The range at which the interceptor can expect to `see'
            the target.
             Infrared and visual characteristics of the target that
            will enable the interceptor to discriminate the target from
            other nearby objects, e.g., decoys.

        In addition to the above targeting data, the interceptor also loads
    before launch:

             Celestial coordinates of the stars that the
            interceptor will use for navigation.
             The times that communications events are scheduled to
            occur to/from the ground.

        The Block 2004 operational system will have hostile missile launch
    early warning and cueing from space-based infrared satellites. The
    predicted time and location in space where the intercept will occur is
    calculated in real-time from data provided by tracking radars (i.e.,
    Cobra Dane, Upgraded Early Warning Radars, the Navy's Aegis cruisers
    and destroyers, and the Sea-Based X-band radar). Based on this real-
    time information, targeting data is selected from a database and
    uploaded to the interceptor prior to launch.

            deployment of national missile defense system in alaska
        24. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Crouch, will the President's
    planned deployment of the national missile defense system in Alaska go
    ahead by the end of fiscal year 2004 regardless of the actual readiness
    of the system or could that time line be adjusted to accommodate
    additional necessary tests and preparations to achieve a working
    system?
        Secretary Crouch. In December 2002 the President directed the
    Department of Defense to build on the missile defense test bed and
    begin deployment of an initial set of missile defense capabilities in
    2004 and 2005. These capabilities will serve as the starting point for
    the evolutionary improvement of our missile defense capabilities, which
    will evolve as technology and the threat develop. Additionally, over
    the last 2 years we have conducted a successful flight testing program
    which has given DOD the confidence to proceed with the deployment of
    this initial set of capabilities. These capabilities will of course
    continue to evolve and improve over time based on technical progress
    and our continued testing program.

                              SPACE-BASED WEAPONS

        25. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Crouch, if the administration
    launches space-based weapons such as the space-based boost phase
    interceptor test satellites, is it administration policy that such
    satellites should be capable of being removed from space after they are
    launched?
        Secretary Crouch. The U.S. has made no decision to deploy space-
    based weapons. Therefore, statements on operational issues associated
    with deployment of such weapons would be premature at this time.

                               RADARS IN THE U.K.

        26. Senator Bill Nelson. Secretary Crouch, when does the U.S. plan
    to upgrade the radars in the U.K. and Greenland for missile defense,
    and how much funding will be required to protect the upgraded radars
    and the local inhabitants from potential terrorist strikes on those
    radars?
        Secretary Crouch. The United Kingdom gave the U.S. permission to
    proceed with the upgrade of the Fylingdales radar in February 2003. The
    upgrade is currently scheduled to be completed by late-2005. Denmark is
    willing to provide us permission to upgrade the Thule radar but also
    wants to update the 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement at the same
    time. If we are eventually allowed to upgrade the radar, the plan is to
    have the upgrade completed by mid-2006. We don't anticipate any
    additional funding will be required to augment force protection
    capabilities to protect these radars.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

                                LAYERED DEFENSE

        27. Senator Clinton. General Kadish, as I understand it, the
    missile defense program is designed to develop a ``layered defense''
    capable of engaging all classes and ranges of ballistic missile
    threats. It is designed to attack missiles in all phases of flight
    including the boost phase (the part of the missile's flight from launch
    until it stops accelerating under its own power), the mid-course phase
    (where the missile has stopped thrusting but is gliding under its own
    power), and the terminal phase (where the missile falls back into the
    atmosphere). As you have noted, the initial deployment of a ballistic
    defense system is slated to take place in 2004 in Fort Greeley, Alaska.
    In your prepared testimony, you state that the President's decision to
    deploy the system ``recognizes that we will not be fielding the perfect
    system at the outset.'' Will the system put in place by 2004 be able to
    target missiles in each phase of launch?
        General Kadish. The system in place by 2004 will be able to target
    missiles in certain midcourse and terminal phases. Capabilities to
    target missiles in the boost phase will be developed in Block 2006 with
    kinetic intercept of boost phase included in the 2008 development
    block. Boost phase fielding decisions have not yet been made.

                    MISSILE TESTING AGAINST COUNTERMEASURES

        28. Senator Clinton. General Kadish and Mr. Christie, Missile
    Defense Agency documents acknowledge that during the mid-course phase,
    there is a greater opportunity to deploy countermeasures against a
    defensive system. These countermeasures include readily available
    technology such as separating reentry vehicles, radar absorbing
    material, booster fragmentation, low power jammers, chaff, and even
    simple balloon decoys. Has there been any testing of the ability of the
    missile defense system to respond to these countermeasures? What has
    been the result?
        General Kadish. Countermeasures exercised to date in the GMD
    program have consisted of balloon decoys. Incremental changes in
    complexity have been achieved by varying the type and number. In all
    tests to date, the system has been able to identify and intercept the
    reentry vehicle (RV) in the presence of countermeasures. In the near
    term, future tests will be characterized by a transition to more
    complex penetration aids (penaids) later in the test program. The
    details of these future penaids and tests are classified.
        Aegis BMD program has collected data while participating in flight
    tests where countermeasures were present.
        Mr. Christie. Yes, there has been both ground and flight testing
    against countermeasures. MDA has a classified program that is
    investigating the feasibility and effectiveness of various types of
    countermeasures in laboratory environments and using modeling and
    simulation. The data from these activities are used to predict expected
    GMD system performance. System performance against some of the
    postulated countermeasures can be adequately evaluated using hardware-
    in-the-loop simulation; others will require flight-testing. To date,
    flight-testing has included balloon decoys. As the test bed matures,
    flight tests plans are to include more sophisticated countermeasures.

             MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND NORTH KOREA'S CAPABILITIES

        29. Senator Clinton. General Kadish and Mr. Christie, ostensibly,
    the decision to deploy a missile defense system by 2004 is to defend
    the U.S. against a possible missile attack by North Korea. Will the
    system in place by 2004 be able to defend against North Korean missiles
    if they are equipped with countermeasures?
        General Kadish. [Deleted.]
        Mr. Christie. The test bed may have some inherent capability
    against ballistic missiles, even with simple countermeasures, but it
    will not be demonstrated in 2004. The test bed elements are being built
    using technology specifically designed to conduct ballistic missile
    defense missions. It is being integrated by government organizations
    and industry teams familiar with the mission and the technical
    challenges. However, it will not be possible to demonstrate defensive
    capability through testing that fully replicates the threat by the time
    the fielding decision is made.

        30. Senator Clinton. General Kadish and Mr. Christie, do we know if
    the North Koreans are researching countermeasures technology for their
    missile program?
        General Kadish. As an acquisition agency, MDA depends upon DOD
    intelligence agencies to assess specific adversary current and future
    capabilities and research efforts. However, MDA's research and
    capability based development approach allows for exploration of the
    full range of known countermeasures and counter-countermeasures without
    requiring precise intelligence information related to each adversary.
        Mr. Christie. I think it is safe to assume that North Korea does
    have some type of a countermeasures research program. We do not know
    what North Korea is doing with countermeasures, but it is possible that
    the Missile Defense Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency could
    provide some insight into North Korea's countermeasure research
    activities.

                              BOOST PHASE MISSILE

        31. Senator Clinton. General Kadish and Secretary Crouch, the boost
    phase missile defense approach is the one that seems the least affected
    by possible countermeasures. Given that the location of North Korea and
    Iran--the most likely threats of a ballistic missile threat--are such
    that a boost-phase intercept system is technically feasible, how are
    boost phase interceptors incorporated into your missile defense plan?
        General Kadish. The boost-phase interceptors are incorporated into
    the layered BMDS by first providing a terrestrial kinetic energy
    interceptor capability against boost/ascent targets with a ground
    mobile launcher in Block 2008. In Block 2010 plans are to sea-base this
    capability to provide additional geographic flexibility. We plan
    further evolution of this capability in Block 2012 by expanding the
    interceptor capability to counter targets in mid-course. MDA also plans
    to initiate a parallel space-based boost interceptor development
    activity starting in fiscal year 2004.
        Secretary Crouch. Development and testing of boost-phase
    interceptors is an important element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
    System. We are developing directed energy and kinetic energy boost
    phase intercept capabilities to create a defense layer near the hostile
    missile's launch point. We require quick reaction times, high
    confidence decisionmaking, and redundant engagement capabilities to
    counter ballistic missiles in this phase. The most mature of the boost
    phase systems is the Airborne Laser (ABL). The ABL is currently under
    development and is being designed to acquire, track, and kill ballistic
    missiles in the boost phase using speed-of-light technology. The first
    shoot down test of ABL is scheduled for fiscal year 2005. We are also
    developing a terrestrial kinetic energy boost interceptor, and have
    requested from Congress funds for a test program to determine the
    feasibility of intercepting missiles during the boost and ascent phase
    from space.

        [Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

          ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in
    room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
    (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
    Allard, Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Levin, Akaka, and
    Pryor.
        Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: L. David Cherington,
    counsel; Brian R. Green, professional staff member; Mary Alice
    A. Hayward, professional staff member; and Ambrose R. Hock,
    professional staff member.
        Minority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
    minority counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
    member.
        Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell, Jennifer Key,
    and Sara R. Mareno.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
    assistant to Senator McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to
    Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard;
    Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; D'Arcy
    Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
    assistant to Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to
    Senator Graham; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
    Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
    Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Davelyn Noelani
    Kalipi and Richard Kessler, assistants to Senator Akaka;
    William K. Sutey and Peter A. Contostavlos, assistants to
    Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
    Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. The committee meets this morning to
    receive testimony from Secretary of Energy Abraham, a very dear
    and valued colleague of this institution. He will present the
    posture of the defense-related activities of the Department of
    Energy, as well as the President's defense budget request for
    fiscal year 2004 and the future years defense program. We
    welcome our witness this morning.
        This is an important annual posture hearing for this
    committee. This committee has jurisdiction over approximately
    two-thirds of the Department of Energy's budget, the parts of
    the budget related to defense or former defense missions.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the defense related
    missions of the Department of Energy (DOE) is $16.6 billion, a
    4-percent real increase over the 2003 appropriated level.
        The budget request also contains a number of initiatives
    which focus on the future of our nuclear deterrent, including
    the repeal of the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons research, a
    transition to an 18-month underground nuclear test readiness
    posture, and a new initiative to reconstitute an advanced
    concept program which would promote concept and feasibility
    studies at the national nuclear weapons laboratories.
        I will waive further reading so we can proceed with this.
    All of us have a full agenda, as does the Secretary.
        I would like to submit the rest of my statement for the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator John Warner

        The committee meets this morning to receive testimony from
    Secretary of Energy Abraham, on the posture of the defense-related
    activities of the Department of Energy, as well as on the President's
    defense budget request for fiscal year 2004 and the future years
    defense program. I welcome our distinguished witness and former
    colleague back before the committee.
        This is an important, annual posture hearing for this committee.
    This committee has jurisdiction over approximately two-thirds of the
    Department of Energy's budget--the parts of the budget related to
    defense or former defense missions.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the defense-related
    missions of DOE is $16.6 billion, a 4-percent real increase over the
    fiscal year 2003 appropriated level. The budget request also contains a
    number of initiatives which focus on the future of our nuclear
    deterrent, including a repeal of the ban on low-yield nuclear weapons
    research, a transition to an 18-month underground nuclear test
    readiness posture, and a new initiative to reconstitute an ``advance
    concepts'' program, which would promote concept and feasibility studies
    at the national nuclear weapons laboratories where upon scientific
    discovery can thrive.
        The U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile was designed and manufactured to
    deter and defeat targets in the former Soviet Union. As such, it worked
    very effectively as a deterrent for over 50 years. While the United
    States needs to continue to maintain its deterrent capability, we must
    also address the new threats posed by rogue nations and transnational
    groups intent on acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction.
        The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in December 2001,
    established a new defense strategy--a strategy which included a plan to
    reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. The NPR provided the vision for
    realigning our Nation's strategic defenses within a new triad, which
    includes offensive strike systems, both nuclear and non-nuclear;
    defenses, both active and passive; and a revitalized defense
    infrastructure to provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet
    emerging threats. The ``advanced concepts'' initiative is part of this
    triad.
        Ensuring that our scientists and engineers are challenged and are
    free to think, research, discover, innovate, and create is imperative.
    That was the type of environment in which the nuclear weapons program
    was born with the Manhattan Project. We must make sure such freedom to
    research and develop is present in our national weapons laboratories if
    we are to deter and, if necessary, counter 21st century threats.
        I have long been concerned about the congressionally-mandated
    prohibition on research on precision low-yield nuclear weapons. The
    budget request specifically requests a repeal of this ban on low-yield
    nuclear weapons research. In their budget request, the administration
    found the ``legislation has negatively affected U.S. Government efforts
    to support the national strategy to counter WMD and undercuts efforts
    that could strengthen our ability to deter, or respond to, new or
    emerging threats.''
        While there may not be a current military requirement for a low-
    yield nuclear weapon, that does not mean the research is not important
    or valid, or that there will not be a future military requirement for
    such a weapon. In fact, the research could greatly benefit our
    scientists and their understanding of nuclear weapons, to include a
    better understanding of what our potential adversaries may be able to
    produce. Additionally, such research would provide valuable experience
    for new scientists and engineers, especially as test-experienced
    scientists continue to reach retirement age.
        I have also been concerned in recent years with our test readiness
    posture. The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program is focused on
    maintaining the existing nuclear weapons stockpile in such a manner
    that it can be certified as safe, secure, and reliable, without the
    need for underground nuclear testing. This is quite a challenge,
    particularly as the average age of weapons in the stockpile has grown
    beyond 20 years.
        While the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program seems to have
    been successful thus far in enabling DOE to annually certify the
    safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile, if the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program reveals a problem across a weapon-type in the
    stockpile, actual underground nuclear testing may be the only way to
    resolve the problem. Today, if such a problem were discovered, it would
    take 3 years for DOE to be ready to conduct an actual test to help
    resolve the problem. This timeline must be changed. Ensuring that we
    have an enhanced test readiness posture is vital. The 18-month
    readiness posture proposed by the administration does not mean that we
    will conduct a test, but instead that we will be ready to do so should
    circumstances arise which require testing.
        The President of the United States should have the broadest range
    of capabilities available to respond to adversaries who threaten the
    safety and security of the United States. We should not place
    artificial limits on the intellectual capabilities of our gifted
    scientists. As threats emerge which cannot be deterred or destroyed
    with conventional weapons, our President must have other options
    available to protect the citizens of the United States, our interests
    and our allies. This has been the policy of the United States for
    almost 60 years. The President should not be limited by our 20th
    century nuclear weapons which were designed to deter or defeat 20th
    century threats. The President should have a wide array of conventional
    and nuclear weapons to deter or, if necessary, defeat 21st century
    targets which continue to emerge.
        Secretary Abraham, thank you for your service to our Nation. We
    look forward to your testimony.

        Senator Levin?
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I will also
    follow that course of action, given the events that take up so
    much of everybody's time here and simply put my statement in
    the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Senator Carl Levin

        Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I join Senator Warner in welcoming you
    to the committee this morning to discuss the Department of Energy's
    budget request for fiscal year 2004.
        The Department of Energy's total budget request for fiscal year
    2004 is $23.4 billion, of which $16.6 billion, or about two-thirds of
    the overall DOE budget, is for defense-funded activities and, thus,
    under the jurisdiction of this committee. These defense-funded
    activities include the environmental cleanup program, the nuclear
    nonproliferation programs, the nuclear weapons activities, and the
    naval reactors development program. The National Nuclear Security
    Administration is responsible for the nonproliferation programs, the
    nuclear weapons program, and the naval reactors program.

                           NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

        Earlier this month, the Department of Energy, Russia, and the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) co-sponsored an international
    conference on the protection of radiological devices and other nuclear
    and radiological materials that could possibly be used in a
    radiological dispersal device--a so-called ``dirty bomb.'' I understand
    that this conference was well attended and successfully highlighted the
    need to provide greater security for much of this material. Secretary
    Abraham, I am interested in your views on this subject and what
    additional actions the DOE and other U.S. Government agencies are
    taking to provide the necessary additional security for these and other
    materials.
        After several years of delays the DOE nonproliferation programs
    appear to be back on track. While DOE, the Department of Defense, and
    the State Department have improved the security of significant
    quantities of weapons grade fissile materials and nuclear weapons, in
    the 10 years of the Nunn-Lugar program, much remains to be done. About
    37 percent of the short-term upgrades are in place, but only about 17
    percent of the comprehensive security-measures are in place.
        Earlier this month, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the John F.
    Kennedy School of Government released a new report, ``Controlling
    Nuclear Warheads and Materials, A Report Card and Action Plan.'' In a
    forward to this report, Senator Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn
    wrote: ``Preventing terrorism with weapons of mass destruction must
    become the central organizing security principle of the 21st century.
    It is the only threat whose danger is dire and diffuse enough to unify
    all nations, and it will take the unity of all nations to meet that
    threat.'' They remain concerned that one of ``the biggest obstacles to
    action is overcoming the denial that such an attack could occur and the
    paralysis that comes from believing the job is too massive and too
    overwhelming to be done. . . We must finally face the truth about the
    scale of the threat and build a partnership of nations with the methods
    and means to respond.''
        The report itself makes several key findings with respect to the
    threat and the actions that need to be taken to address the threat.
    Significant emphasis is placed on the importance of securing materials
    at the source. ``The most effective approach to reducing the risk is a
    multi-layered defense to block each step on the terrorist pathway to
    the bomb. But securing nuclear weapons and materials at their source is
    the single most critical layer of this defense, where actions that can
    be taken now will do the most to reduce the risk of terrorists
    acquiring nuclear weapons and material, at the least cost.'' While we
    have put in place short-term upgrades for 37 percent of the material,
    that means that 63 percent of the material has had no security
    upgrades. Secretary Abraham, I know that you share the concerns about
    the security of the materials, and I look forward to working with you
    to address promptly this threat.

                                NUCLEAR WEAPONS

        Protecting and securing nuclear weapons and materials is just one
    aspect of a successful nonproliferation program. Coordinating nuclear
    weapons policy and nonproliferation policy is also essential.
        Over the course of the past 2 years, the administration has taken
    several actions that would indicate more emphasis and importance is
    being placed on nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation and the nuclear
    weapons policies and actions of the United States are inextricably
    connected, and we must be conscious of that interaction. I look forward
    to discussing this issue with you as well.

                             ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP

        The Department has been making good progress on the cleanup of the
    nuclear weapons complex. As I understand it, you are moving to
    accelerate the cleanup effort even more. Further acceleration will
    require close cooperation with the communities, the States and the
    Environmental Protection Agency, as well as some additional funding.
    This is certainly a significant challenge. I look forward to hearing
    your plans for accelerated cleanup and how Congress could be of help.
    It is a pleasure to have you back before the committee.
        Thank you, Senator Warner.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator McCain, do you have any opening comment?
        Senator McCain. No, thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Fine. I would also like to submit for the
    record the statement of Senator Roberts.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Roberts follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Pat Roberts

        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to offer my welcome to our
    distinguished witness today.
        First, I want to commend you, Secretary Abraham, and the
    administration, for presenting Congress with a fiscal year 2004 budget
    request for the DOE nonproliferation programs that is the highest ever
    in the history of these programs. This shows the importance the
    President has placed on these nonproliferation programs. Moreover, this
    budget is 30 percent more than what was requested last year. This
    increase alone is unprecedented.
        As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
    Capabilities with oversight responsibilities for both the DOE and DOD
    nonproliferation programs, I am pleased that these programs are
    receiving Presidential level support and cooperation.
        The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is getting worse,
    not better. Despite years of nonproliferation treaties and regimes
    designed to curb and control such proliferation, today's reality is
    that more nations and non-state actors have these capabilities, despite
    these multilateral efforts. We must recognize this fact and protect
    against it to the best of our abilities. The emerging threats that this
    committee identified in past years are the threats of today.
        For this reason, it is incumbent upon Congress to ensure that these
    nonproliferation programs succeed. We must be certain that these
    programs' goals are being met by ensuring that Congress has a way of
    measuring program progress and achievements. By providing the resources
    and the necessary oversight, Congress must remain vigilant and deliver
    what is promised to the American people.
        I applaud your diligent efforts in moving these nonproliferation
    programs forward to meet the threats posed by proliferating weapons of
    mass destruction around the world. Thank you for your remarks today and
    for your contributions to U.S. national security.

        Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary?

         STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, SECRETARY OF ENERGY

        Secretary Abraham. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I thank the
    ranking member and my former colleague from Michigan, Senator
    McCain, and others on the committee. Obviously, we meet as many
    international events are taking place in the world today that
    bring us here under unique circumstances, ones I know we all
    join in our support of the combat teams in the field.
        Our Department obviously plays a part in the support of our
    national security. Literally all of the Department's
    activities, from our defense programs to the many programs we
    have to promote energy security and scientific leadership,
    address national security concerns, but today I just will make
    a brief opening statement and submit for the record a longer
    statement that outlines our Department's budget.
        Just a few top-line points. Of our $23.4 billion request
    for the fiscal year 2004 budget, 70 percent, or $16.6 billion,
    is for national security programs. Of that amount, $8.8 billion
    will support the activities of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA), and $7.2 billion will fund our
    environmental cleanup programs, with the remaining $600 million
    devoted to other defense activities.
        NNSA has a huge responsibility for maintaining our Nation's
    nuclear stockpile, rebuilding the capabilities of our defense
    complex, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and
    materials, and continuing our strong naval reactors program.
        Because of our successful efforts in these areas over the
    past 2 years, the Department has been entrusted with added
    responsibilities and the means to execute them more
    effectively. Our 2004 budget submission of $8.8 billion for
    defense programs and NNSA includes a $925 million increase over
    last year to carry out the defense program responsibilities and
    our nonproliferation programs.
        Our nuclear capability continues to be a key strategic
    component of our Nation's security posture, and certifying to
    the President the safety and the reliability of our stockpile
    is among the highest, if not the highest, responsibilities I
    have as the Secretary of Energy.
        Our challenge today is large. It is complex. We must
    maintain the safety, security, and reliability, as well as the
    effectiveness of our aging nuclear weapons stockpile without
    resort to underground testing. Our budget proposes $6.4 billion
    in spending for stockpile stewardship and the rebuilding of our
    defense complex, a $532 million increase over the fiscal year
    2003 budget proposal.
        We will use our increased funding to continue advancing the
    scientific and the manufacturing capabilities we need over the
    long term. Last fall we awarded a contract to build the two
    largest supercomputers in the world to help us ensure our long-
    term ability to certify the safety, reliability, and the
    effectiveness of the weapons in our stockpile.
        The Department will also continue to refurbish aging
    weapons under our stockpile life extension program to ensure
    that they remain safe and effective. We will continue to
    dismantle warheads and bombs which are retired from the
    stockpile, and we will continue to make progress toward
    restoring the capability to manufacture and certify war-reserve
    plutonium pits for the stockpile.
        Finally, in order to carry out all these activities, the
    budget funds programs that will allow our Department to
    continue to restore, rebuild, and revitalize the physical
    infrastructure of the weapons complex. While we work to keep
    our stockpile ready, safe, and secure, we must at the same time
    expand our already productive efforts to prevent the spread of
    nuclear weapons and materials. During the past 2 years, our
    Department has significantly improved control of Russian
    nuclear materials. We put the plutonium disposition program on
    a sound footing, revitalized the program to shut down Russian
    plutonium-producing reactors, and accelerated the program to
    protect Russian nuclear materials and Russian Navy nuclear
    weapons. We have enhanced our ability to detect weapons of mass
    destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological
    systems and other terrorist threats, and we have reduced the
    risks of accidents in nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide.
        As a result of the unprecedented levels of cooperation
    reached by President Bush and President Putin to control the
    proliferation of nuclear materials, Russia and the United
    States have agreed to complete the work of protecting some 600
    tons of Russian fissile material by 2008, a full 2 years
    earlier than expected.
        In addition, the United States, Russia, and the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) this year will
    intensify international cooperation to keep radioactive
    materials, the kind that could be used in the construction of
    so-called dirty bombs, out of the hands of terrorists. That
    work took a large step forward in Vienna last week when we co-
    chaired an international conference on ways nations can work
    individually and collectively to account for and secure
    radioactive sources. Representatives from over 120 countries
    attended the conference, which we co-chaired with Russia and
    the IAEA.
        To carry out our complex nonproliferation work, we have
    increased our total nonproliferation budget to more than $1.3
    billion, a 30-percent increase over last year. That budget will
    make it possible for the Department to increase our
    international monitoring visits to sensitive nuclear sites by
    one-third, to boost our contributions to international
    safeguards work carried out through the IAEA and other
    cooperative programs by 17 percent over 2003 funding.
        We will also continue to move ahead with work related to
    plutonium disposition facilities in both the United States and
    Russia to eliminate excess weapons plutonium and accelerate our
    program for the elimination of Russian highly enriched uranium.
        Our longstanding naval reactors program is responsible for
    the safe operation of the reactor plants that power 40 percent
    of our Navy's combatant ships, as well as for new nuclear
    propulsion plants. Our budget request of $768 million for naval
    reactors, an increase over the fiscal year 2003 appropriation,
    will allow for the development and deployment later in this
    decade of a new design reactor core to meet the requirements of
    longer, harder ship deployments.
        As we carry out our national defense duties, our
    responsibilities also extend to cleaning up the legacy of a
    half of a century of nuclear defense work here at home. Our
    budget submission of $7.2 billion for environmental management
    is the highest amount ever requested for these programs. These
    funds will allow us to continue with our reformed accelerated
    cleanup effort which will increase or accelerate completion of
    environmental cleanup programs by 35 years, reduce risk to the
    public and the environment, and save taxpayers more than $50
    billion in program costs.
        Mr. Chairman, I could obviously go on at great length, but
    in the interest of the events of today and the committee's
    desire, I know, to complete its work swiftly today, I will
    submit the rest of my statement for the record and obviously
    look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you
    for having me.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Abraham follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Hon. Spencer Abraham

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is a
    pleasure to be here today to discuss the President's fiscal year 2004
    budget request for the Department of Energy (DOE). In doing so, I want
    to stress the ways this budget is going to help us accomplish our
    various missions related to defense and the environment.
        The President's fiscal year 2004 budget of $23.4 billion for the
    DOE continues the administration's commitment to ensure national
    defense and safeguard the Nation's energy security through advances in
    science and technology, as well as fulfill our obligation as
    environmental stewards to surrounding communities. While DOE's national
    policy objectives have not changed, this budget reflects a new approach
    toward conducting business at the Department of Energy. Reengineering
    efforts that we began in fiscal year 2002 have taken shape:
    programmatic activities are better focused to achieve primary mission
    objectives; budget priorities are set with improved measurable
    performance criteria; and corporate management initiatives reflect
    aggressive implementation of the President's Management Agenda.
        Of the total fiscal year 2004 budget request of $23.4 billion,
    approximately 71 percent of the total Department of Energy budget, or
    $16.6 billion, is for the Department's defense programs within the
    jurisdiction of this committee. Within the $16.6 billion budget, $8.8
    billion is to support activities in the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, $6.8 billion to fund the environmental cleanup
    activities, $430 million to fund the Defense Nuclear Waste Fund, and
    $522.7 million to fund Other Defense Activities.
        This budget request reflects and addresses the critical challenges
    we face today and will continue to face in the coming decades. I have
    charted a course for the Department that emphasizes DOE's critical
    contributions to our Nation's national security and provides forward-
    reaching solutions to America's energy problems. These priorities as
    they relate to this committee's jurisdiction are to:

             meet our responsibilities to maintain the nuclear
            stockpile;
             expand and make more comprehensive our non-
            proliferation activities;
             accelerate the environmental cleanup program; and
             build and maintain a stable and effective national
            defense program to respond to the guidance in the Nuclear
            Posture Review with special emphasis on revitalizing laboratory
            and production plant infrastructure.

        The fiscal year 2004 budget is focused to deliver on these
    priorities.
        As part of the Department's Strategic Planning process these
    priorities translate into six overlapping departmental goals that form
    our core mission of national security. All of the Department's planning
    and budgeting for fiscal year 2004 drives toward these six goals:

             maintain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear
            deterrent;
             control nuclear proliferation;
             reduce dependence on energy imports;
             achieve a cleaner, healthier environment;
             improve our energy infrastructure to ensure the
            reliable delivery of energy; and
             maintain a world class scientific research capability.

        Formulation of this year's budget reflects significant management
    changes occurring within the Department. Guided by the President's
    Management Agenda and the management reforms I started in fiscal year
    2001, and incorporated more fully into the budgeting process in 2002,
    this budget implements integrated, long-term program planning and
    performance accountability. The Department is implementing a 5-year
    programmatic and planning framework to provide an unprecedented
    opportunity to consider future impacts in determining current year
    funding priorities. This budget was formulated to deliver measurable
    results to reach the Department's strategic goals. This achievement is
    a significant step toward reaching our key goal to focus DOE activities
    to adhere to the primary mission of national security. By streamlining
    program activities and management structures, the Department of Energy
    will more effectively and efficiently manage and produce the results
    expected by American taxpayers.

                         PRESIDENT'S MANAGEMENT AGENDA

        Rising to the challenge of the President's Management Agenda, the
    Department is beginning to improve how it manages, budgets, and plans
    for all programs, projects and activities. By improving management,
    performance, and accountability, the Department is striving for a level
    of performance that keeps DOE programs safe, on track, and on budget. A
    system of scorecards is being used to evaluate the effectiveness of
    various programs and allocate resources to achieve this end.
    Performance measures are improving to ensure that they are specific,
    quantifiable, concise, comprehensive, and relevant to the American
    taxpayer. Also, in accordance with the President's commitment to an
    expanded and effective electronic government, DOE is centrally managing
    information technology investments and other capital assets to reduce
    waste, increase productivity and provide increased services at lower
    cost.
    Research and Development Investment Criteria
        The President's Management Agenda calls for consistent and
    sufficient evaluation of future research and development (R&D)
    investments and past performance. In response, the Department developed
    internal guidance for programs to score their R&D activities against
    the administration's applied R&D investment criteria. This approach
    focuses R&D dollars on long-term, potentially high-payoff activities
    that require Federal involvement to be both successful and achieve
    public benefit. The Department will continue to work to develop
    consistent scoring and benefits estimation methods, to permit
    comparison of applied R&D programs across the Department. The applied
    R&D scorecard process is an important way the Department is integrating
    performance into the budget. The scorecard process is in its second
    year of development. The goal is to develop high analytical
    justifications for applied research portfolios in future budgets. This
    will require the development and application of a uniform cost and
    benefit evaluation methodology across programs to allow meaningful
    program comparisons.
    Program Assessment Rating Tool
        In addition to the use of R&D investment criteria, the Department
    implemented a new tool to evaluate the management effectiveness of
    selected programs. The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) was
    developed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide a
    standardized way to assess the effectiveness of the Federal
    Government's portfolio of programs. While OMB's objective for fiscal
    year 2004 was to evaluate 20 percent of each government agency, the
    Department of Energy reviewed nearly 60 percent of its activities
    through the PART process. The departmental elements that participated
    were: Environmental Management; Science; Fossil Energy; Nuclear Energy;
    Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy; the Power Marketing
    Administrations; and the National Nuclear Security Administration.The
    structured framework of the PART provides a means through which
    programs can assess their activities differently than through
    traditional reviews. While some of the programs received less than
    favorable scores, the information exchange between the Department and
    OMB proved quite valuable. The current focus is to establish outcome-
    and output-oriented goals, the successful completion of which will lead
    to benefits to the public, such as increased national security and
    energy security, and improved environmental conditions. The Department
    will incorporate feedback from OMB into the fiscal year 2005 budget and
    planning process, and will take the necessary steps to continue to
    improve performance. The results of the reviews are reflected in the
    Department's fiscal year 2004 budget.

                    NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        The Department of Energy, through the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, preserves U.S. national security by ensuring the
    safety, security, and reliability of our Nation's nuclear deterrent,
    working to reduce the global danger from the proliferation of nuclear
    materials and other weapons of mass destruction, and providing
    technical expertise in advancing Homeland Security. The fiscal year
    2004 budget request for NNSA is $8.8 billion, a $925 million increase
    above the fiscal year 2003 budget request, and includes:

             Weapons Activities ($6.4 billion)
             Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation ($1.3 billion)
             Naval Reactors ($768 million)
             Office of the NNSA Administrator ($348 million)

        The administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) set the current
    national nuclear weapons policy reflected in the Department's fiscal
    year 2004 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA). The NPR calls for the NNSA to maintain the
    viability of the Nation's nuclear weapons capability without the use of
    underground testing; develop a stockpile surveillance and engineering
    base; refurbish and extend the lives of selected warheads; and maintain
    a science and technology base, including responsive facilities and
    infrastructure, needed to ensure the safety and reliability of the
    Nation's nuclear weapon stockpile.
        The Department's NNSA has recently implemented a major
    reorganization that follows the principles of the President's
    Management Agenda, to improve government through performance and
    results. The new organizational structure eliminates a layer of
    management, consolidates offices and administrative functions, and sets
    NNSA on a course to achieve an almost 20-percent reduction in Federal
    personnel by the end of fiscal year 2004.
    Weapons Activities
        One of my most important responsibility as Secretary of Energy is
    to certify to the President the safety and reliability of our nuclear
    stockpile. Our nuclear weapons capability protected the Nation and
    helped us to win the 50-year Cold War. Today it continues to be a key
    strategic component of our Nation's security posture. Our challenge
    today is large and complex: we must maintain the safety; security;
    reliability; and effectiveness of our aging nuclear weapons stockpile
    without resort to underground testing. We must also provide a
    manufacturing base for the production of a replacement weapon if the
    need should arise.
        Our fiscal year 2004 budget proposes $6.4 billion for the Weapons
    Activities program, which also includes funding for safeguards and
    security for NNSA sites and for rebuilding our national security
    infrastructure. For the last 7 years, the Stockpile Stewardship Program
    has allowed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to certify to the
    President that (1) the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is safe,
    secure and reliable and (2) that there is no need to resume underground
    testing.
        To ensure that the existing stockpile continues to meet its
    military requirements, the NNSA also has a comprehensive refurbishment
    program known as stockpile life extension. It is presently working on
    four warhead types in the enduring stockpile--the W87, W76, B61, and
    the W80. This program designs, builds, tests, and installs new
    subsystems and components thereby extending the operational service
    life for these warheads for some 30 years.
        NNSA is also restoring the full suite of manufacturing capabilities
    needed to respond to any stockpile contingency.
        NNSA is installing an interim pit production capability at Los
    Alamos. Later this year Los Alamos will deliver a W88 pit that will
    meet all quality manufacturing requirements for use in the stockpile.
    This will be the first pit made by the United States since the shutdown
    of Rocky Flats in 1989. NNSA has begun work on design and siting for a
    modern pit facility that will be capable of manufacturing all pit types
    for the current stockpile and any new requirements, should they arise.
    To complete the materials supply story, NNSA will begin producing new
    tritium for the stockpile by irradiation of tritium producing rods in a
    TVA reactor this fall.
        We are also investing in the leading edge scientific and
    engineering tools required to support the stockpile now and into the
    future. Three areas deserve special mention. First, with the advanced
    scientific computing initiative (ASCI), NNSA is working with U.S
    computer manufacturers to acquire the world's fastest and most capable
    computers to address nuclear weapons performance issues that several
    years ago were impossible to solve. Second, the Dual Axis Radiographic
    Hydrotest Facility at Los Alamos is providing ``cat-scan-like'' images
    of weapons implosion processes. This test bed provides critical data to
    validate the ASCI codes. Third, later this year, the world's most
    powerful laser, the National Ignition Facility, will begin to carry out
    experiments at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in support of
    the nuclear weapons stockpile.
        As the Nuclear Posture Review highlighted, the threats we face
    today are dramatically different from those we faced a few years ago.
    To ensure that future American Presidents have deterrence options to
    deal with these threats, we have a modest Advanced Concepts program
    ($21 million) underway. The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) will
    be allocated $15 million. This program will examine whether or not two
    existing warheads in the stockpile--the B61 and the B83--can be
    sufficiently hardened through case modifications and other work to
    allow the weapons to survive penetration into various geologies, with
    high reliability, before detonating. The remaining funds will be
    divided between the weapons laboratories for studies of other advanced
    concepts work.
        DOE supports about $1 billion annually for ongoing operation of
    NNSA facilities at the government-owned, contractor-operated, national
    laboratories, production plants, and test site. In addition, $273
    million is requested in fiscal year 2004 for 8 new construction starts
    and 12 ongoing construction projects. The Facilities and Infrastructure
    Recapitalization Program ($265 million) is responsive to the Nuclear
    Posture Review infrastructure guidance, and is in its third year to
    restore, rebuild and revitalize the physical infrastructure of the
    nuclear weapons complex that has deteriorated and is in immediate need
    of attention. This program is tightly structured to address highest
    priority needs, to eliminate deferred maintenance requirements, and
    eliminate excess space in all nuclear weapons complex facilities. Our
    responsibilities also encompass security for the nuclear weapons
    complex. In the past year, we have placed the highest priority on
    addressing urgent, emergent concerns about the safeguards and security
    posture of our Nation-wide complex of facilities and transportation
    systems following the events of September 11, 2001. In addition to
    increasing our protective forces, enhancing training, and upgrading
    equipment, we will begin a modest R&D effort to try to improve the
    effectiveness of technologies for physical and cyber security. We also
    upgraded our emergency response assets, which are available to be
    deployed in emergencies around the world.
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
        America's safety must be our paramount concern. Presidents Bush and
    Putin have agreed to an unprecedented level of bilateral cooperation to
    control the proliferation of nuclear materials. The President's fiscal
    year 2004 budget request of $1.3 billion for Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation reflects the administration's full commitment to
    reducing the global nuclear danger and participating in the Global
    Partnership to sustain nuclear nonproliferation initiatives in the
    former Soviet Union. This request supports departmental programs to:
    (1) enhance U.S. capability to detect nuclear weapons proliferation,
    (2) prevent and reverse proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD), (3) protect or eliminate weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
    material and/or infrastructure, and redirect excess foreign weapons
    expertise to civilian enterprises, and (4) reduce the risk of accidents
    in nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide.
        The fiscal year 2004 funding level for Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation reflects a 30-percent increase over the fiscal year
    2003 request of $1 billion. The increase provides for the start of
    construction of a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility in the
    U.S. and U.S. efforts to assist Russia with the start of construction
    of an industrial scale MOX fuel fabrication facility. In addition to
    MOX construction activities, the request of $657 million for Fissile
    Material Disposition supports completion of design activities for the
    pit disassembly and conversion facility and continuation of the U.S.
    ``off-spec'' HEU blend-down project.
        Additionally, the request includes $30 million to implement a new
    program to accelerate nuclear materials disposition efforts in support
    of the 2002 G8 Summit initiatives to purchase Russian highly enriched
    uranium (HEU) above the amounts in the 1993 U.S./Russia HEU Purchase
    Agreement. The United States is currently in the process of drafting
    agreements with Russia for the purchase of highly enriched uranium from
    Russia to supply selected U.S. research and test reactors and for the
    purchase of downblended Russian HEU for a low-enriched uranium (LEU)
    stockpile in Russia.
        The fiscal year 2004 request also provides $40 million for the
    Russian Transition Initiative (RTI) to reduce the migration risk of
    nuclear and WMD expertise in the former Soviet Union. The RTI partners
    former Soviet weapons scientists with U.S. industry partners on
    projects selected for their commercial potential, while also assisting
    the Russians in downsizing their nuclear weapons complex and opening
    the closed nuclear cities to commercial ventures. RTI has garnered over
    $125 million in matching resources from U.S. industry partners, which
    amounts to $3 in private sector funds for every $2 in U.S. Government
    funding. In addition, private investment funding has contributed over
    $90 million to further augment its technology commercialization
    efforts.
        The fiscal year 2004 request also includes $50 million to assist
    the Russian Federation to cease its production of weapons-grade
    plutonium by providing replacement power production capacity. In fiscal
    year 2003, responsibility for the program was transferred from the
    Department of Defense to the Department of Energy. Agreements were
    recently signed with the Russian Federation, allowing work to be
    initialized on this program.
        The request includes $204 million to support the research,
    development, testing, and evaluation of nuclear proliferation detection
    technologies for agencies responsible for monitoring proliferation and
    combating terrorism.
        A request of $226 million for the International Nuclear Materials
    Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program will continue to
    improve the security of weapons-usable nuclear material and weapons in
    Russia, and secure materials that could be used in radiological
    dispersion devices (dirty bombs). Specifically, the Department is
    working to secure approximately 600 metric tons of fissile materials
    and thousands of warheads. The program provides for security of trucks
    and railcars transporting nuclear weapons-usable materials and
    consolidates nuclear material at fewer locations in order to reduce
    vulnerability from theft and sabotage. In fiscal year 2004, cooperation
    will expand to include Russian strategic rocket forces.
        Additionally, the MPC&A request supports efforts to install
    radiation detection equipment at borders of Russia and the former
    Soviet Union in order to prevent nuclear smuggling and illicit
    trafficking.
        The Nonproliferation and International Security request of $102
    million supports U.S. efforts to control exports of items and
    technology that aid in the development of WMD, implement international
    safeguards in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency,
    and explore and implement innovative approaches to improve regional
    security.
        In addition, the fiscal year 2004 request includes an increase for
    development and delivery of tools to meet requirements to detect,
    understand, and verify dismantlement of clandestine nuclear programs.
    Naval Reactors
        The Naval Reactors program is responsible for the safe operation of
    reactor plants in operating nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
    carriers constituting 40 percent of the Navy's combatants. It also
    fulfills the Navy's requirements for new nuclear propulsion plants that
    meet current and future national defense requirements. The program is
    beginning development and will deploy, later this decade, a new design
    reactor core to meet the demands of longer, harder ship deployments.
    The fiscal year 2004 budget request totals $768 million, an increase of
    $612 million over the fiscal year 2003 appropriations, and allows Naval
    Reactors to fund this transitional technology.

                    ACHIEVE A CLEANER, HEALTHIER ENVIRONMENT

        Protecting the environment is compatible with increasing the supply
    of dependable, domestically produced energy. As President Bush has
    said, ``Sustained economic growth is the solution, not the problem,
    because a nation that grows its economy is a nation that can afford
    investments and new technologies.'' By harnessing the power of American
    science and technology, we can achieve both energy independence and a
    cleaner, healthier environment. The fiscal year 2004 budget embodies a
    commitment to current and future generations of Americans to accelerate
    risk reduction and cleanup of environmental damage resulting from Cold
    War nuclear programs, reduce the polluting effects of energy sources,
    and develop secure energy technology options for the future.
    Environmental Management
        The total fiscal year 2004 budget request for Environmental
    Management (EM) activities totals $7.2 billion, approximately 5 percent
    above the comparable fiscal year 2003 request, to accelerate risk
    reduction and closure. This is the highest amount ever requested for
    the EM program. Within this committee's oversight, the Department is
    requesting $6.8 billion for the EM program, of which $5.8 million is
    for Defense Site Acceleration Completion and $995 million is for
    Defense Environmental Services.
        The Environmental Management program was created in 1989 to safely
    manage the cleanup of the environmental legacy from 50 years of nuclear
    weapons production and nuclear energy research at 114 sites around the
    country. The scope of the program includes stabilization and
    disposition of some of the most hazardous materials known. In February
    2002, the EM program released a Top-to-Bottom Review, which revealed
    that process rather than cleanup results had been the basis for
    performance and cleanup approaches.
        Following this review, the EM program committed to devote the next
    18 months to developing and implementing several key management reforms
    that would drive accelerated risk reduction and project completion. We
    are ahead of schedule. In one year, we have begun developing and
    implementing four management reforms, which serve as the basis for the
    EM program's accelerated risk reduction cleanup initiatives. These
    reforms are:
        Acquisition Strategy. We are implementing a strategy that will both
    increase competition by enlarging the pool of potential contractors
    competing for our work and increasing the accountability of our
    contractors to deliver real, meaningful cleanup.
        Configuration Control. EM has begun implementing a strict
    configuration management system that baselines a number of key,
    critical program elements, such as Performance Management Plans, EM
    corporate performance measures, and life-cycle costs. Strict
    configuration control and monitoring of these key elements will
    facilitate a high confidence level that the goals and direction of the
    accelerated cleanup initiatives are being met.
        Human Capital. This reform strongly supports the President's
    Management Agenda. EM is building a more robust organizational and
    performance accountability system that holds each manager and employee
    accountable for actions and results. Individual performance management
    is being fully integrated into EM organizational goals. We have
    completed two phases of senior executive reassignments between both the
    Field and Headquarters.
        New Budget Structure. We have developed and begun implementing a
    new budget structure, which complements other management reform
    initiatives by focusing on completion and endpoints, and communicating
    EM's goals and objectives. The new budget structure clearly identifies
    scope and resources that directly support the accelerated cleanup and
    risk reduction mission.
        Since the release of the Top-to-Bottom Review, significant progress
    has been made with respect to these management reforms. In addition, EM
    has made efforts to identify and implement changes in 10 areas
    emphasized in the Top-to-Bottom Review that are critical to the success
    of the program. EM has focused these activities into special projects,
    each with a complex-wide perspective. Successful execution of these
    projects is crucial to improving the performance of the program and
    eliminating many of the barriers that have hindered previous
    initiatives to accelerate cleanup and reduce life-cycle cost.
        In fiscal year 2004, the EM program will continue making progress
    in implementing management reforms and making changes in the areas
    emphasized in the Top-to-Bottom Review. The EM fiscal year 2004 budget
    request has been tailored to meet our mission of accelerated risk
    reduction and completion. The most impressive aspect of this budget is
    that it fully reflects each site's new accelerated risk reduction and
    cleanup strategies. The strategic groundwork has been laid and the EM
    program is moving forward. Through the implementation of accelerated
    cleanup strategies, the EM program anticipates that cleanup will be
    completed no later than 2035, at least 35 years earlier than originally
    anticipated and life-cycle savings of greater than $50 billion will be
    achieved.
        Fiscal year 2004 will be a banner year, where significant risk
    reduction will be achieved. During fiscal year 2004, the EM program
    will:

             Eliminate 1.3 million gallons of radioactive waste
            from underground tanks, and permanently close nine underground
            radioactive waste tanks (two at Savannah River, one at INEEL,
            and six at Richland).
             Complete stabilization of all remaining plutonium
            metals, oxides, and residues in EM inventory (at Richland and
            Savannah River).
             Package 633 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel for safe
            storage and disposal (cumulative 88 percent of EM's inventory
            packaged).
             Accelerate transuranic waste shipments to the Waste
            Isolation Pilot Plant. EM will ship more than 12,000 m\3\ of
            transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
             Complete remediation of 180 formerly contaminated
            sites (surpassing 50 percent of these sites in the EM
            inventory).

        The fiscal year 2004 budget will allow the EM program to remain
    focused on the core mission of accelerated risk reduction and project
    completion.
    Legacy Management
        The fiscal year 2004 budget realigns program activities that will
    better support the Department's long-term mission by creating the
    Office of Legacy Management to manage post-cleanup activities. The
    Department is requesting $47.5 million in fiscal year 2004 for the
    Office of Legacy Management to monitor and maintain the integrity of
    cleanup remedies and administer the Department's post-closure
    obligations at closed sites. Legacy Management will be the steward of
    sites cleaned up and closed by DOE and the Army Corps of Engineers,
    administer activities for post-retirement benefits for former
    contractor employees and manage long-term contractor liabilities. This
    restructuring supports the Department's efforts to focus the
    Environmental Management program, which used to carry these
    responsibilities, to achieve more cleanup and risk reduction for the
    American taxpayer. I cannot stress strongly enough that even with the
    completed remediation and closure of EM sites, the Department will
    never abandon its responsibilities to the communities. Establishing an
    Office of Legacy Management will ensure that those concerns and
    responsibilities are represented by a dedicated office, measured only
    by their success in meeting the defined needs of those communities and
    their constituents.
    Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
        The President's February 2002 recommendation and Congress' July
    2002 approval of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the Nation's high level
    nuclear waste repository was a seminal step in advancing the
    Department's goal to ensure the safe and secure disposition of
    dangerous nuclear materials away from the hands of terrorists. The
    budget requests $591 million for the Department's repository program.
    This request coupled with the fiscal year 2003 requested amount would
    support the completion of work needed for the submission of a license
    application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2004 and the
    development of transportation capabilities needed to initiate
    repository operations by 2010. However, the $131 million reduction from
    the President's fiscal year 2003 budget request together with the 4
    month-long continuing resolution, has introduced a high risk in our
    ability to meet a December 2004 license application date, but we are
    making every effort to meet this objective.

                               HOMELAND SECURITY

    Safeguards and Security
        Safeguarding and securing DOE's nuclear facilities, materials and
    information, and protection of our employees remains one of the
    administration's top priorities. As such, the Department's total
    safeguards and security funding in the fiscal year 2004 request is $1.2
    billion, an increase of $179 million over the fiscal year 2003 request.
    Within the amount requested, $586 million will support activities to
    safeguard DOE's NNSA nuclear weapon facilities, $357 million will
    support activities that protect the Cold War nuclear waste material
    being cleaned up at our environmental cleanup sites, $238 million will
    fund the security of the Department complex-wide, and $48.1 million
    will support the continued safeguards and security activities at our
    scientific laboratories and facilities. A portion of these expenses
    will be recovered through charges to non-DOE customers performing work
    at DOE laboratories. I will continue to work closely with the President
    to ensure our homeland security and fulfill our obligation to protect
    the American people. With the administration's strong will and
    commitment to national security, the funding request for safeguards and
    security will translate into measurable results.
    Counterintelligence
        The Department's world leadership position in nuclear weapons
    knowledge as well as its extraordinary research and development of many
    leading edge technologies makes it a priority target of foreign
    intelligence collection. To offset this threat, the Department is
    requesting $46 million to support counterintelligence activities across
    the entire complex. These activities are focused on protecting our
    nuclear weapons secrets, but also emphasize a high priority on
    protecting our other sensitive scientific endeavors, and on combining
    with other departmental elements in our efforts to defeat terrorism.
    Independent Oversight
        I rely upon my independent oversight organization to provide me
    with a current and accurate assessment of the Department, including the
    NNSA, in the areas of safeguards and security, cyber security,
    emergency management, and environment, safety and health. This office
    conducts comprehensive evaluations to verify that the Department's
    critical assets are protected, that the Department can effectively
    respond to any emergency, and that site workers, the public, and the
    environment are protected from hazardous operations and materials.
    Independent oversight activities are conducted with a focus on
    independence and objectivity, using a systematic oversight process,
    with an extensive emphasis on performance and performance testing. For
    fiscal year 2004, our budget proposes $22.6 million for an independent
    oversight program that promotes excellence and continuous improvement
    for the protection of departmental critical assets.
    Energy Assurance
        Failure to meet increasing energy demand with increased energy
    supplies and vulnerability to disruptions from natural or malevolent
    causes could threaten our Nation's economic prosperity, alter the way
    we live our lives, and threaten our national security.
        DOE will continue to assist in meeting this homeland security
    challenge. To that end, the fiscal year 2004 budget proposal maintains
    an analytical capability to support the Department's energy security
    responsibilities. Included in the budget is $4.3 million for Energy
    Assurance activities to continue to conduct energy security activities
    in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security. This is a key
    concern underlying the President's NEP recommendations.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman and members of this committee that concludes my
    prepared statement. I will be glad to answer any questions you may have
    at this time.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We are both
    quite familiar with the subjects at hand, and we commend you
    for your stewardship to date. You have some challenges for the
    future.
        I will defer to Senator McCain. He has another engagement,
    and then I will resume after Senator Levin.
        Senator McCain. Secretary Abraham, thank you for being here
    and thank you for your excellent stewardship of this very
    important branch of Government.
        Mr. Secretary, I would just like to ask you about a very
    important issue that has arisen this morning. It is very
    important in the State of Arizona and the country, and I do not
    know if you had a chance to see the piece that was carried in
    The Washington Times article by Bill Gertz and Jerry Seper. It
    is titled ``Nation's Biggest Nuclear Power Plant a Terrorist
    Target.'' ``Terrorists have targeted the United States' largest
    nuclear power plant near Phoenix, and security officials are
    looking for Iraqi government `sleeper cells' that might carry
    out the attack, The Washington Times has learned.
        ``The threat to the Palo Verde nuclear plant, located in
    the Sonora desert 50 miles west of Phoenix, prompted the
    deployment of National Guard troops to the facility. . . .
        `` `We understand the sensitivity.' ''
        Then it goes on to say, ``One official said the report on
    the Palo Verde threat was contained in classified intelligence
    reports distributed to law-enforcement and security officials.
        ``A second U.S. official confirmed the report and said it
    was `uncorroborated threat information' that was sent to
    appropriate U.S. security authorities.''
        [The information referred to follows:]
            NATION'S BIGGEST NUCLEAR POWER PLANT A TERRORIST TARGET

             [By Bill Gertz and Jerry Seper--The Washington Times]

    March 20, 2003
        Terrorists have targeted the United States' largest nuclear power
    plant near Phoenix, and security officials are looking for Iraqi
    government ``sleeper cells'' that might carry out the attack, The
    Washington Times has learned.
        The threat to the Palo Verde nuclear plant, located in the Sonora
    desert 50 miles west of Phoenix, prompted the deployment of National
    Guard troops to the facility, according to U.S. officials.
        ``We understand the sensitivity of this time, and we are very, very
    committed to protecting the safe operation of Palo Verde,'' Jim
    McDonald, a spokesman for the Arizona Public Service Co., which owns
    the reactor complex, said in an interview.
        Mr. McDonald declined to comment on specific intelligence
    indicating a threat to Palo Verde but noted that the troops were added
    Tuesday by order of Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano.
        One official said the report on the Palo Verde threat was contained
    in classified intelligence reports distributed to law-enforcement and
    security officials.
        A second U.S. official confirmed the report and said it was
    ``uncorroborated threat information'' that was sent to appropriate U.S.
    security authorities.
        Palo Verde is the largest nuclear power facility in the United
    States with three reactors that produced 30 billion kilowatt hours of
    electricity last year, Mr. McDonald said.
        The threat to attack the facility came from sensitive information
    indicating that the plant was targeted by Middle Eastern terrorists who
    were not further identified.
        The threat to Palo Verde comes as other intelligence reports
    indicate that Iraq has set up clandestine cells of operatives inside
    the United States or abroad that could be called on to conduct attacks
    or sabotage on behalf of Baghdad.
        For example, recent intelligence reports indicated that Iraqi
    diplomats in Cairo had conducted surveillance of the U.S. Embassy
    there, U.S. officials said.
        Officials did not say how many Iraqi cells are in the country.
    Baghdad has nearly 250 officials posted to the United States, most of
    them at its U.N. mission in New York.
        A Bush administration official said the State Department has
    decided to expel the three Iraqi diplomats posted to Baghdad's interest
    section in Washington. The expulsion order is expected as early as
    today.
        Only Iraqi officials engaged in improper intelligence or terrorism-
    related activity can be expelled from the U.N. mission.
        Meanwhile, the FBI warned law-enforcement officials yesterday to
    watch for suspicious activity by people driving Iraqi diplomatic
    license plates.
        ``Suspicious activity involving vehicles bearing Iraqi diplomatic
    license plates should be reported immediately to the nearest Joint
    Terrorism Task Force,'' the FBI stated in a weekly intelligence
    bulletin.
        Codes used by cars driven by Iraqi diplomats in Washington bear the
    ``TF,'' and Iraqi U.N. diplomatic vehicles in New York have the ``TS''
    code.
        Intelligence officials said the administration has urged
    governments around the world to expel Iraqi diplomats, and several have
    complied.
        Iraqi diplomats have been expelled in recent days from Czech
    Republic, Hungary, Romania, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Thailand, and
    Australia.
        Two Iraqis also were expelled from the United States on March 5
    after they were identified as intelligence officers, U.S. officials
    said.
        Justice Department officials yesterday confirmed that the  FBI is
    looking to interview as many as 50,000 Iraqis now in the United States
    for information that could help U.S. forces. They said a war with Iraq
    is expected to dramatically increase the chances of terrorist attacks
    against U.S. targets in this country and abroad.
        One senior department official said that while most Iraqis in this
    country are not believed to be terrorists or associated with terrorist
    organizations, Muslim extremists within the Iraqi community who are
    affiliated with al Qaeda could use a war as the reason for an attack.
        Among the Iraqis being sought for questioning are 3,000 illegal
    immigrants said to be missing, amid U.S. concerns that some could be
    connected with groups or agents of the Iraqi regime.
        Earlier this week, Mexican authorities detained six Iraqi citizens
    as they sought to cross into the United States from Tijuana. The six,
    including one woman, claimed to be German citizens on their arrival at
    the Tijuana airport Tuesday night on a flight from Mexico City. They
    have been returned to Mexico City for questioning.
        It could not be learned if the detained Iraqis were connected to
    the plot to attack Palo Verde.
        Border Patrol authorities also confirmed that a diary written in
    Arabic was found last week in a backpack discovered on a southern
    Arizona trail frequently used by illegal aliens. The diary, according
    to the sources, contained names and telephone numbers of at least two
    persons in Canada and Iran.
        The FBI has since taken custody of the diary, but refused comment
    on it yesterday.

        Palo Verde is the largest nuclear power facility in
    America, and I wonder if you could shed any more light on these
    reports. As you can imagine, it has caused significant concern
    back in the State of Arizona, as well as around the country.
        Secretary Abraham. Senator, obviously, I will not comment
    on the specific intelligence reports that are referenced in the
    article. I would just say that I am aware of the issue and I
    know that actions are being taken on a broad basis to both
    explore any of the intelligence information that has come to
    light, as well as to take adequate security procedures to make
    certain that any threat that might be posed can be effectively
    dealt with. I think that all actions that can be taken are and
    will be taken by the appropriate authorities to try to minimize
    any possible risks involved.
        Senator McCain. You are working with other agencies to make
    sure that the threat of this attack or a possible attack is
    minimized?
        Secretary Abraham. Well, we are playing the role that our
    Department has. Obviously, nuclear reactors, private
    facilities, are under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission who has the lead responsibility here. We
    provide support services, as do other Federal agencies to that
    oversight. I am informed that actions are being taken by all
    the appropriate agencies, at the direction of NRC and others,
    to address the concerns that have been raised.
        Senator McCain. I thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much.
        Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        One element of the Department of Energy's nonproliferation
    program is the effort to ensure that Russian nuclear scientists
    are not tempted to work for proliferants. The Initiatives for
    Proliferation Prevention, or IPP, program provides work for
    scientists in conjunction with U.S. business interests, as you
    well know, and it seems to be working well.
        Another program, however, is not working so well, and that
    is the effort to redevelop some of the Russian nuclear cities
    and facilities. Apparently the Russians are trying to address
    that issue. I am wondering whether or not the DOE is rethinking
    the approach to the whole Russian nuclear cities issue.
        Secretary Abraham. I would not say that we are rethinking
    the whole approach. I think we are trying to find ways to make
    all of these programs as effective as possible. I think there
    has been definitely some progress forward in terms of engaging
    more U.S. businesses to partner and engage in activities that
    will employ technicians and scientists. I know that our
    Ambassador to Russia, Ambassador Vershbow, recently visited one
    of these cities with my counterpart, the head of the Ministry
    of Atomic Energy, to explore other new promising opportunities.
        But there has been, I think, some particularly positive
    progress in terms of the engagement of, at least initially,
    American companies, and now I understand also Russian companies
    in not only engaging in more activities both in the nuclear
    cities themselves, but also employing Russian scientists and
    technicians.
        We are pleased about that progress. We hope we can see it
    continue to expand. But in terms of changing the program, that
    is not under contemplation at this point.
        Senator Levin. Would you take a look at the Senate bill 6,
    which was introduced by Senator Daschle and others at the
    beginning of Congress? There are some ideas in that bill on how
    to revitalize this Russian nuclear cities program. If you and
    your staff could take a look at it and get back to us with your
    comments on the nuclear cities provisions in that bill, it
    would be appreciated.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Department of Energy has been quite successful in its efforts
    to reduce the threat of WMD without the significant changes proposed in
    S.6. The National Security Council has reviewed our programs, and we
    are meeting and adhering to their guidelines. We closely coordinate
    with the Department of State and the rest of the interagency on our
    nonproliferation programs through the National Security Council's
    Policy Coordination Committees (PCC).
        First, S.6 would introduce what we feel are unnecessary
    coordination processes and procedures that would divert key resources
    from the implementation of on-the-ground activities. For example, we
    believe that there is little need to create a joint U.S.-Russian
    commission to advise on the shutdown of Russian nuclear weapons
    assembly and disassembly facilities (Section 9006(c)). We already
    cooperate closely with the Russians in this area to determine relevant
    areas of work. We believe that such an effort would generate more
    reporting and other requirements. Furthermore, we have multiple
    checkpoints within the U.S. interagency for approval of projects.
    Creating a commission would lead to duplication of activities and
    efforts.
        Section 9006(e) calls for Russia to bear only 15 percent of the
    cost of downsizing, and this could be construed as committing the U.S.
    to pay the remaining 85 percent. Russia should continue to bear the
    largest financial burden of downsizing its own nuclear weapons complex.
    Therefore, we recommend that the lowest fixed participation, at 15
    percent in this bill, be stricken.
        In Section 9008 (a) and (b), the proposed $25 million authorization
    for IPP is problematic whether it is mandatory or additional
    (discretionary) funds. If the funds are discretionary, they should be
    appropriated to the integrated Russian Transition Initiatives (RTI)
    program [which includes both IPP and the Nuclear Cities Initiative
    (NCI)], and not specifically to IPP, since downsizing is not IPP's
    mission. If the funds are mandatory, it will force IPP to spend more
    than its entire budget to work at a few facilities designated for
    shutdown in a limited number of closed cities in Russia. In fact, IPP
    is presently working at dozens of locations in Russia and other former
    Soviet states where nuclear, biological and chemical weapons scientists
    are being engaged on non-weapons enterprises. This work would be
    eliminated and many targeted scientists with very sensitive expertise
    would be vulnerable for recruitment by government and terrorist groups.
    If the efforts at downsizing are a priority for acceleration, then it
    is advisable to increase funding to RTI, which is already working on
    downsizing efforts.
        We appreciate the continued congressional attention to threats
    posed by weapons, materials, and expertise. We in the administration
    are always willing to work with Congress to address and overcome
    threats to U.S. national security.

        Senator Levin. The DOE budget request for fiscal year 2003
    included $15.5 million for a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.
    The fiscal year 2004 budget request includes $15 million for
    that penetrator, $6 million for advanced nuclear weapons
    concepts, and $17 million for enhanced test readiness to reduce
    the time needed to conduct a nuclear test.
        In addition, the Defense Department has sought a repeal of
    the 1993 prohibition on research and development that could
    lead to the production of a low-yield nuclear weapon. Is the
    Department of Energy working on new nuclear weapons designs?
        Secretary Abraham. Not on a new weapon design, no. I think
    that at this point, as I understand the provisions of the
    legislation, the work which relates to the Robust Nuclear Earth
    Penetrator only can take place after the Department of Defense
    submits a report to Congress, and then 30 days after that. I do
    not believe that report has been submitted as of yet, and so
    the funds, the $15 million for that effort, are not yet
    available to us to work on. But once they are, then we would
    initiate conceptual work. But that is not directed toward a new
    weapon.
        I think what we have been given as an assignment, as part
    of a broader study of the need for this capability, is the
    responsibility to look at whether or not that capability can be
    in some way provided by a modification of an existing weapon.
        Senator Levin. The Defense Department, as I indicated,
    sought the repeal of the 1993 prohibition on that research and
    development effort that could lead to the production of a low-
    yield nuclear weapon. Were you involved in the decision to seek
    the repeal of that language? Or did you--and I am referring
    either to you or the DOE as an agency--request the Department
    of Defense to seek the repeal of the 1993 language?
        Secretary Abraham. I would have to check to determine the
    exact role that people from our agency played in the
    development of the policy, and I would be glad to submit that
    for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Both the Departments of Energy and Defense support a repeal of
    section 3136 of the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization
    Act. We must recognize that the national security challenges that
    confront the Nation today are dramatically different than when the law
    was passed almost a decade ago. We believe it is only prudent to allow
    the laboratories to undertake research into technical options that
    could strengthen our ability to deter, dissuade, and respond to the
    national security challenges of the 21st century.
        Its also important to understand that the Department of Energy has
    no requirements from the Department of Defense for any new nuclear
    weapons nor does repeal of section 3136 usurp Congress' right to
    authorize and appropriate the considerable sums that would be required
    to build or deploy new or modified nuclear weapons consistent with
    section 3143 of the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization
    Act.

        But I would just say to the committee, as you indicated,
    when you read the definition, the restriction does not simply
    prohibit research on new low-yield warheads but also prohibits
    any activities which could potentially lead to the production
    by the United States of such a warhead.
        What we believe is that such a broad restriction has a real
    impact, a chilling effect of sorts, on the work scientists and
    engineers are doing and it really impedes efforts to explore
    technical options to respond to threats. So we support the
    position because we think that it has had a chilling impact on
    the work that can be done because it is such a broad
    definition. Any activities which could potentially lead to
    production encompasses a lot of the work that could conceivably
    be done in our weapons labs.
        Senator Levin. The number one threat that we all face is
    the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
    destruction. We are trying to persuade other countries to not
    put greater emphasis on nuclear weapons, not to test. We are
    highly critical of India and Pakistan for testing. We are
    highly critical, appropriately so, of North Korea when they
    pull out of the Nonproliferation Treaty.
        If you want to talk about chilling effect on our
    scientists, the chilling effect on our whole position and point
    of view in the world is that we have to reduce the number of
    nuclear weapons in this world and the reliance on nuclear
    weapons in this world. If we start to move down the road of we
    want modifications to improve capabilities, we want an earth
    penetrator, we want millions of dollars to get readier to
    resume testing, that sends the opposite message to the world
    that we are saying, on the one hand, do not pull out of the
    Nonproliferation Treaty, do not test weapons, do not rely on
    nukes. Then when these budget requests come out to us showing
    greater reliance, greater capability, greater willingness to
    consider resumption of testing, it undermines or chills the
    argument that we are making to the rest of the world. So I hope
    when you look at the chilling reference and the chilling
    language, that you also look at what the chilling effect is in
    terms of our argument on the other side of this equation, which
    is the nonproliferation side of the equation.
        Secretary Abraham. Obviously, because our Department has
    the responsibilities both, on one hand, for the work we do in
    our complex and for much of the nonproliferation work we do,
    that is something that we are always mindful of. I would say
    that at a time when we have not been testing, when we have
    terminated the plutonium pit production capabilities of the
    country, when we have not been developing new weapons, when we
    have passed the plywood restrictions, and so on, we have,
    nonetheless, seen the message. That message has not, it seems
    to me, resulted in others refraining from the development of or
    the seeking of these weapons.
        What we are trying to do here is maintain capabilities that
    allow us to respond to threats of the new century, as outlined
    in the Nuclear Posture Review or as might come forward in the
    future. We will try to always take both of those considerations
    into account.
        But our work at least in the Department is not at this
    stage that of developing new weapons but maintaining the
    capacity, the capability, and the skills even of some of the
    people so that we are at least able, when called upon, to
    perform the job we are asked to do, which is the sort of
    engineering work, as well as the responsibility to be able to
    certify to you and the country and the President, obviously,
    the capability of our stockpile, its readiness, as well as its
    reliability.
        Senator Levin. Thank you. My time is up.
        Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, I would say in rebuttal to
    my distinguished colleague's observation that there are some
    very important collateral advantages to repeal of the ban on
    low-yield nuclear weapons research. You pointed out the
    importance of the maintaining of a cadre of individuals trained
    should this administration or a future administration feel that
    it is essential for our own security interests and primarily
    for deterrent interests to move in the direction of a low-yield
    nuclear weapon.
        But are there not many collateral benefits derivative from
    lifting the ban to the science-based Stockpile Stewardship
    Program if the scientists are allowed to conduct some low-yield
    weapon research?
        Secretary Abraham. As I indicated, I think we view this
    whole area as one in terms of maintaining capabilities. We are
    concerned about the fact that an effective Stockpile
    Stewardship Program requires not only tremendous investment,
    which this committee has supported in new technologies from the
    National Ignition Facility to the computer programs, but also
    the human skills and technical expertise that has to be
    maintained not only in retaining talent but also in recruiting
    talent and keeping skills well developed. We see it in the area
    of test readiness, for instance, where we find ourselves with a
    work force not necessarily prepared to, if called upon, conduct
    tests.
        We think that both in the area of advance concept research
    and in terms of just the general sort of technical research
    that might be conducted in the labs, that if every time
    scientists seek to engage in some type of research, they feel
    they have to go to the general counsel to determine whether or
    not the standard, which is a pretty broad definition standard,
    is in jeopardy of being violated, we feel that that has had an
    impact on the work force and on the kind of work that they can
    do. So, yes, it does have collateral impact on the
    effectiveness of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
        Chairman Warner. That is the key acknowledgement that I was
    hoping to elicit from you. This Senator has followed this
    Stockpile Stewardship Program since its inception. I think it
    is important that you give us a little update on this program
    because originally, in 1993 and 1995, it was thought that we
    would take about 10 years to set up a comprehensive science-
    based Stockpile Stewardship Program, which would begin to
    validate the safety, security, and reliability of the aging
    nuclear weapons stockpile. We are now reaching the end of that
    decade, and I would like to have your views as to what is the
    progress we are making.
        For those following this hearing who might not recall this
    history, when the decision made was to stop actual testing, we
    then determined the reliability and safety. I underline safety
    because many of our American citizens have volunteered to care
    for this inventory and, indeed, the areas in which they live.
    It is important that that safety be without any doubt or
    question.
        Now, what is the status of the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program in view of the original estimates of a decade from the
    1993-1995 time frame to have it full up operational?
        Secretary Abraham. Many of the programs, many of the tools
    are in the process of either being developed or will be
    developed in the next few years. I am certainly not capable of
    telling the committee today that all of them will be on line
    and fully operational in the time frame of 2003 to 2005. They
    simply will not be. We are still in the process of building the
    National Ignition Facility. It is now largely completed, but
    there is obviously considerable more work to do there.
        I mentioned already that our new advanced supercomputing
    initiative is launching the effort to build the two literally
    largest computers in the world, but that is going to take
    several years to complete. When they are finished, they will
    form part of the capability.
        The DARHT program is on track.
        We are not, however, in a position where, within the next
    year or 2, we will have a fully operational alternative and
    effective alternative to use as an alternative for testing the
    reliability of the stockpile. We believe these tools ultimately
    will be able to help us make those determinations, but we are
    not in the position of saying----
        Chairman Warner. So let us face facts. You inherited a
    program, and I am not suggesting your predecessors in any way
    were other than doing their very best to put it together within
    the original time frame of, as you said, 2003-2005. You
    acknowledge it is not going to make it. What is your best
    estimate of when this system will be full up?
        Secretary Abraham. I do not feel today that I can give you
    that estimate, Senator, because I think that each of these
    tools interacts with one another in the process of trying to
    replicate or trying to assess the capability of a weapon. At
    least in my appearances here, I do not think I have ever
    indicated that we know with absolute certainty. We believe that
    the combination of these tools will serve to allow us to
    determine the reliability of the stockpile, but they are not
    operational yet. At that point, we will hopefully be successful
    as we intend to be.
        Chairman Warner. Now, the program, though, does in its
    current status yield a considerable amount of data that
    contributes to your annual certification. Am I not correct?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes, that is right.
        Chairman Warner. Even though it is not full up. I do not
    know if you can say where on the curve between zero and full up
    it is at the moment, but it is providing very valuable
    information which contributes to your annual certification. Am
    I correct on that?
        Secretary Abraham. That is right.
        Chairman Warner. Fine. My time has expired.
        I see Senator Akaka has joined us.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to add my welcome to Secretary Abraham. It is always
    good to see you on the Hill.
        Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my statement be included in
    the record.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I welcome the
    opportunity to have Secretary Abraham testify before us today. The
    issue I want to focus on is the administration's approach to nuclear
    non-proliferation.
        Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons has been an American
    national security goal since the end of World War II. In 1946, at the
    inaugural session of the newly created U.N. Atomic Energy Commission,
    the U.S. Representative Bernard Baruch declared, ``We are here to make
    a choice between the quick and the dead.'' He underscored the necessity
    of limiting nuclear weapons to avoid a nuclear disaster and to meet the
    world's demands for peace and security.
        Out of these early efforts grew the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    Treaty, which was completed in 1968 with over 180 countries as
    signatories today. It is the cornerstone of the international nuclear
    non-proliferation regime. The treaty contains a special bargain: the
    so-called non-nuclear states would forswear acquiring nuclear weapons,
    and, in exchange, the nuclear states--the United States, Russia,
    France, England and China--have committed to achieving their own
    nuclear disarmament. This commitment is contained in Article 6 of the
    treaty.
        The U.S. remains committed to strengthening the Non-Proliferation
    Treaty. Secretary of State Powell said so in his testimony in support
    of the recently approved Moscow strategic nuclear arms treaty. Yet, the
    administration's current policies make me wonder if this is truly the
    case.
        Rather than fulfilling our commitments to reduce the number and
    limit the role of our nuclear weapons, we seem to be holding their
    numbers steady and expanding their missions.
        For example, the Moscow Treaty has a worthwhile goal, the further
    reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals. Yet, in practice, the U.S.
    nuclear stockpile may not be much smaller in 2012, when the treaty is
    over, than it is today. As many have noted, the Moscow Treaty does not
    call for the dismantlement of any nuclear warheads or launchers under
    any timetable whatsoever. The majority of U.S. or Russian nuclear
    weapons could be removed from launchers and placed into storage. From
    storage, they could easily be returned to active duty.
        I hope Secretary Abraham today can provide more details about the
    administration's announced plans to dismantle some of the weapons
    removed from launchers. I would like to know how many are involved, or,
    at least, what percentage will be dismantled. But more importantly, I
    would like to know why all of the warheads removed cannot be
    dismantled. Russia would eliminate more nuclear weapons if the U.S. did
    the same. What is the justification for keeping such a large number of
    warheads?
        The administration also wants to embark on at least two new nuclear
    weapons programs. The administration said that a robust earth
    penetrating nuclear weapon (RNEP), or bunker buster, is needed to
    destroy a growing number of hard and deeply buried targets. It may have
    a yield in the range of 100s of kilotons. In contrast, the bombs
    dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had yields of less than 20 kilotons.
        In addition, the administration is seeking to repeal the
    congressional prohibition on so-called low-yield nuclear weapons, those
    with less than five kilotons of explosive power. Low-yield, or mini-
    nukes, are often described by the administration as potentially useful
    in destroying buried weapon caches or weapons of mass destruction
    facilities in urban areas because of the view--I call it a myth--that
    these weapons would minimize civilian losses.
        I do not think these new nuclear weapons are necessary. In the
    1990s, we deployed the B6-11 bomb that has a large yield and is for
    attacking buried targets. We also have several nuclear warheads types
    that have small yields. Finally, we have an array of conventional
    weapons that can accomplish difficult missions.
        Moreover, seeking to develop new nuclear weapons and expand their
    role to attacking other than the nuclear forces of other nations is a
    dangerous development. It sends the wrong signal to the rest of the
    world about the U.S. commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    Treaty. We should be thinking how we, along with the rest of the
    countries possessing nuclear arsenals, can reduce our reliance on
    nuclear weapons and reduce our nuclear stockpiles.
        Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other concerns about the
    administration's nuclear policies. The administration's effort to
    increase the readiness of our nuclear weapons test site is quite
    worrisome. Again it sends the wrong signal to the rest of the world
    about our commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. We must
    keep the weapons we have safe and secure, but we can accomplish this
    without a new round of nuclear tests.
        I hope the administration will clarify these questions in today's
    hearing. Our limited defense dollars will be constrained by the growing
    Federal deficit and a war on Iraq. The burden of proof is on the
    administration to show why we need to maintain such a large nuclear
    arsenal and continue to develop unneeded costly new nuclear weapons
    systems, when we have many other pressing defense and domestic
    priorities.

        Senator Akaka. Mr. Secretary, many are concerned about the
    Moscow Treaty. The treaty does not have a timetable for
    reductions or an agreement for the dismantlement of any nuclear
    warheads. Could you please provide us with more details now or
    for the record about the administration's plans to dismantle
    warheads and also, in round numbers, how many or what
    percentage of the warheads removed will be dismantled?
        Secretary Abraham. Let me provide, if I could, a more
    detailed response to that for the record. Let me, though, just
    put a little bit of context in your evaluation.
        When we talk about the capabilities for dismantlement, it
    is important to always remember that the same facilities and,
    to some extent, the same personnel who would work on
    dismantlement are also responsible for weapons refurbishment
    and our life extension program for weapons. We really have, in
    terms of the process, to balance the need to keep the existing
    stockpile in a state of effective readiness, and the life
    extension programs are very extensive. We do dismantlement even
    on an ongoing basis. Part of it would be included in the budget
    we have requested. But we fit that work in as we also conduct
    other work in our Pantex facility as opportunity provides
    itself.
        If we wish to do more dismantlement in relationship to the
    Moscow Treaty or any other decisions that were made, it either
    means we have to expand the complex to be able to do that or,
    literally, reduce work that is done on the maintaining of the
    reliability of existing weapons or the life extension program.
        Those are the factors, and I would be happy to provide for
    the record a more specific answer as to the sort of timetable
    envisioned.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The following is the current plan for warhead dismantlements:

        While the Moscow Treaty does not specifically call for
    dismantlement of warheads, the Department of Energy is working with the
    Department of Defense to identify warheads that are excess to
    requirements and plan for their dismantlement. With implementation of
    the Nuclear Posture Review, DOE is expecting additional retirements and
    is currently examining the possibility of new dismantlements in the
    fiscal year 2004-2007 timeframe. [Deleted.] A moderate amount of
    increased dismantlements could be accommodated within the current and
    planned nuclear weapons complex capacity before the three Life
    Extension Programs get fully underway and utilize most of the available
    capacity later this decade.

        Senator Akaka. Thank you for your response.
        Mr. Secretary, Senator Levin raised the issue of the
    administration's plans to develop a robust earth penetrating
    nuclear weapon. He also mentioned the administration's desire
    to repeal the congressional prohibition on low-yield nuclear
    weapons, those with less than 5 kilotons of explosive power.
    Low-yield and many nukes are often described by the
    administration as potentially useful in destroying buried
    weapons of mass destruction facilities in urban areas.
    Theoretically these weapons would minimize civilian losses.
        Yet, in the 1990s we deployed the B6-11 bomb that has a
    large yield and is for attacking buried targets. We also have
    several nuclear warhead types that have small yields. Finally,
    we have an array of conventional weapons that can accomplish
    difficult missions.
        My question to you is, do you think it will be possible to
    use an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon in an urban area
    without causing collateral damage?
        Secretary Abraham. I think that one of the reasons the
    project which we are being asked to study is going on is
    because of the concern, among other things, that, first of all,
    hardened and deeply buried targets provide a serious challenge
    as a matter of current and projected future military and
    national security challenges, that we needed a capability to
    deal with that, that existing capabilities for a variety of
    reasons, part of which I think included the belief that they
    might be more destructive than necessary. I am not sure if that
    would be only in an urban setting, but just in a broader sense.
    I think the conclusion that was reached, as a result of the
    Nuclear Posture Review, was that we needed to explore a wide
    array of possible responses to deal with that threat.
        Only one of those is in our area. That is the idea of the
    so-called RNEP, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, research--
    to determine whether or not we might be able to modify an
    existing nuclear capability to be able to address this. But it
    is also my understanding that non-nuclear studies are also
    being conducted by the Defense Department to see if there are
    other ways that might be more effective. I think part of that
    decision making would, obviously, deal with the question of
    collateral damage and what is the most efficient and effective
    way of addressing this threat.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for your responses.
        Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
        Senator Allard [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
        Without objection, I would like to make my opening
    statement a part of the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

        Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin, thank you very much for holding
    this very important hearing on the Department of Energy's national
    security programs. As always, it is good to see Secretary Abraham.
        The Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which I have the privilege of
    being the Chairman, is responsible for authorizing over two-thirds of
    the Department of Energy's budget. A large share of the programs we
    oversee are in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
    These programs are vital to our Nation and our allies.
        The ability to ensure that our nuclear stockpile is safe, secure,
    and reliable, is the most important job at DOE and is THE mission of
    NNSA. However, I believe DOE can enhance this mission. For the last 10
    years, this mission has been focused on the past--meaning life
    extensions on our aging, Cold War nuclear stockpile. However, while
    this is their most critical mission, I believe that we have to begin to
    look to the future and at what our next threat or threats will look
    like. This means that DOE and NNSA scientists must be given the freedom
    to think and explore. They must be allowed to be scientists. I realize
    this is controversial, but unless we recognize that the world is
    different and that we must adept to this changing threat structure, we
    could find ourselves with the wrong deterrent for the future threats.
        A matter of tremendous importance and a priority for me with
    defense nuclear sites is our Environmental Management program. The
    problems of the last half century will take a coherent policy of
    innovation, integration, and funding to overcome. Luckily for you and
    the Nation there are good and dedicated people in these programs. The
    scientists at our national labs are the best in the world and the
    engineers and craftsmen at our cleanup and Naval Reactors sites
    continue to meet the ever-increasing demands we place on them.
        I would like to end with a statement that I have said many times:
    No site is an island. That is why is it so important for all States
    with DOE sites, whether they have an ongoing mission or are slated for
    closure, must keep the national objectives and needs at the forefront.
    We all care deeply about our individual sites and situations, but we
    must work together to make the DOE complex work for all of us.
        Again, thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to
    hearing Secretary Abraham's testimony.

        Senator Allard. Senator Abraham, I would like to welcome
    you personally.
        I feel that we should not put science at a standstill. I do
    hope and would encourage you to move forward with this idea of
    nuclear concepts. I think that there is some advantage to
    continuing to think from even a scientific basis all the
    parameters of nuclear.
        Before we get into a lot of that discussion any further, I
    would just like to thank you and compliment you on your
    commitment to cleaning up nuclear sites here in this country.
    You have worked hard at it. You have visited a number of those
    sites, I know.
        In 1996, when I was first elected to the United States
    Senate, the project I first got involved in was out at Rocky
    Flats. At that point in time, about 1997, they were talking
    about a cleanup date of 2060 to 2065. It was determined at that
    time that if we put more money into the program, we could
    advance cleanup and meet a deadline of 2006. It appears as
    though we are going to meet that 2006. If you have any doubts
    in that regard, I might ask you to mention that because that is
    very important. I think, if nothing else, we have set a
    standard for other cleanup of other sites. I am real proud from
    that perspective.
        Other sites were cooperative. There were three of them
    originally. We talked about Rocky Flats, Mound, and then
    Fernald. It seems as though some of the other sites that were
    agreeing to this advance appropriations to clean up Rocky Flats
    and the other two agreed with the understanding that there
    would be money available once Rocky Flats got cleared up to
    help advance their cleanup.
        My question to you is, once the first three closure sites
    are cleaned up and closed, does DOE plan to use the annual
    savings realized from the completion of the 2006 closure sites
    to accelerate the cleanup and closure of the remaining
    environmental management sites?
        Secretary Abraham. I think there has been somewhat of an
    adjustment across the entire complex in the way we look at
    cleanup, and I think, frankly, the Rocky Flats experience was
    the model that has helped us to move to a new approach. Our
    Under Secretary of the Department for Energy, Science, and
    Environment, Secretary Card, was the CEO of the operation at
    Rocky Flats, and our Assistant Secretary for Environmental
    Management, Jessie Roberson, was the Department site official
    that helped bring about the expedited cleanup.
        When they came into their jobs, I asked them to conduct a
    Top-to-Bottom Review of the entire complex to see what we could
    do to accelerate cleanup complex-wide. That is what we have
    done. We thought that the approach taken at Rocky, at Fernald,
    and at Mound was not appropriate for everybody. We thought that
    you should not have to just live at one of those sites to be
    able to see your site cleaned up in a short time frame. What we
    were confronted with in the other sites, much as was the case
    at Rocky Flats, was a 70-year game plan for cleanup.
        At each site in the last year-and-a-half, we have developed
    an accelerated program. In virtually every case, the site
    letters of intent with the State and, slowly but surely, with
    the regulators, whether that is the local regulators or the
    EPA, are being developed to expedite all the sites.
        Consequently, instead of having a budget in which scarce
    resources are going to be fought for by all the sites with
    inadequate amounts of money available to expedite all the
    cleanup, the budget we are submitting this year is consistent
    with moving all the sites ahead at an accelerated rate.
    Obviously, when we passed the point where Rocky Flats is
    finished in 2007, we would have a very substantial fall-off in
    terms of expenses for that site. Whether we will need all of
    that money to keep the other sites on their fast cleanup
    remains to be seen.
        But our goal is to front-end funding for cleanup across the
    spectrum of the complex. That is why we are asking for the
    largest Environmental Management budget the Department has ever
    requested. The budget we have asked for is consistent with this
    very accelerated program. We believe we can clean up the entire
    set of facilities that were in the Environmental Management
    mission not in 2070, but at least as early as 2035 and perhaps
    sooner. We do not even want to wait, I guess I am saying, until
    Rocky Flats is finished to start injecting more funds into the
    other sites.
        Senator Allard. I appreciate your commitment to
    environmental cleanup.
        What is the Department of Energy's policy with regards to
    facilities which are managed by Environmental Management but
    still have a long-term national security or science mission?
        Secretary Abraham. We recognize that we have sites where
    there are ongoing activities but where there is also a
    substantial cleanup responsibility. One of the challenges that
    we have is determining whether the ongoing missions are ones
    that should place the site really under the leadership of the
    part of our Department that will be taking the responsibility
    for that future mission.
        That is one of the things we have done up at the site in
    Idaho where we have concluded that the long-term mission of
    Idaho is a mission it has had for some time, but now is a
    mission with, I think, a more focused effort, which is in the
    area of nuclear energy research. Our Nuclear Energy Division
    now has principal oversight for the site. That does not mean
    the Environmental Management programs will be slowed down. In
    fact, they will be sped up. That is now being looked at not as
    primarily an EM program, but rather as a nuclear energy
    program.
        Senator Allard. You are saying that the landlord then would
    assume that main responsibility at that site.
        Secretary Abraham. Right. We are moving, in that case, to a
    different division. Essentially our two under secretaries,
    Under Secretary Card and the Acting Administrator for our NNSA
    division, Ambassador Brooks, are right now in the process of
    looking down the road to figuring out where responsibilities in
    the future ought to be allocated. Part of that discussion also
    goes to where legacy responsibilities down the road should be
    allocated as to whether they will remain simply in an
    Environmental Management division or whether the new landlord,
    as you put it, the new lead agency or lead part of our
    Department, should now take on that responsibility. We are
    still working on what makes the most sense for the future.
        Senator Allard. Again, thank you for your effort on
    environmental management and cleanup.
        I still have some time left, so I want to follow up on
    NNSA. If they receive a new military requirement for a low-
    yield weapon, what steps need to take place to allow the
    national weapons labs and plants to begin production of a new
    weapon?
        Secretary Abraham. That is a fairly complicated series of
    steps. I think I may have somewhere in my materials here the
    multiple step process of weapons production, but I guess I
    cannot find it right now, Senator. Maybe I could provide that
    process, that legal process, to you.
        At this stage, though, I just would reiterate. We are not
    proceeding ahead even with the research on the RNEP because we
    still await the Defense Department's submission of its report
    to Congress.
        Senator Allard. Just one brief question. This is probably
    the most important question in this regard. Can NNSA begin
    manufacturing new low-yield nuclear weapons without getting a
    new approval from Congress?
        Secretary Abraham. If the question you are asking is
    whether or not we can proceed on the study that we are engaging
    in to modify an existing warhead, that would be a different
    status than the development of a new weapon because that
    distinction is fairly significant. But I am not sure on the
    precise legal status.
        Senator Allard. If you could get a response back to us, I
    think the committee would appreciate that.
        Secretary Abraham. Yes. We would be happy to do that.
        Senator Allard. If we get a written response back, it would
    be fine.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        No, the Department of Energy cannot begin the research and
    development, let alone the manufacture of new, low yield nuclear
    weapons without obtaining relief from Section 3136 of P.L. 103-160, the
    Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. This provision
    prohibits the department ``. . . from conducting the research and
    development that could lead to the production by the United States of a
    low yield nuclear weapon which, as of the date of enactment of this
    Act, has not entered production.'' The law also defines low yield as a
    ``nuclear weapon that has a yield of less than 5 kilotons.''
        Section 3143 of Public Law 107-314, the Fiscal Year 2003 National
    Defense Authorization Act, requires the Department of Energy to request
    funds in the President's  budget  for  the  development  or  production
     of  a  new  nuclear  weapon. The budget entry is specified as a single
    dedicated line item for each such activity that is in phase 3 or higher
    for new nuclear weapons, or phase 6.3 or higher for weapons
    refurbishment. The Department currently has no requirement from the
    Department of Defense for the development or production of any new
    nuclear weapons.

        My time is expired.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Levin. Senator Pryor, would you yield for 30
    seconds?
        Senator Pryor. Absolutely.
        Senator Levin. I would appreciate it. I must leave.
        Secretary Abraham, you have now sent us a letter, relative
    to the documents that we have asked for relative to the
    Strategic Petroleum Reserve, stating that you are not going to
    be furnishing us certain documents. You are asserting a
    deliberative process privilege, which means then we would have
    to seek a subpoena in order to determine if there is going to
    be an executive privilege asserted over those documents.
        I am not going to ask a question. I do not want to do that.
    But would you take a look at the other part of our request,
    which is that you tell us how many documents are you asserting
    a privilege over and just the subject of the documents, but at
    a minimum, how many documents are you asserting a privilege
    over. If you could let us know in a supplementary letter to
    that so that we can decide with, obviously, Senator Coleman,
    who is the chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on
    Investigations, whether or not a subpoena would then be issued
    for those documents, which then sets up the executive
    privilege.
        Secretary Abraham. I would be happy to do that. I do not
    know the answer, so I will be glad to.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        By letter dated December 9, 2002, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
    on Investigations requested that DOE supply certain documents related
    to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. On January 10, 2003, by letter from
    Mike Smith, DOE's Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, we provided to
    the subcommittee a number of documents in response to its request. On
    March 19, 2003, and again by letter from Assistant Secretary Smith, we
    provided additional documents that were still under review when the
    January 10 letter was sent. In both of the letters, DOE noted that many
    of the documents being provided to the subcommittee were subject to the
    deliberative process privilege or contained information that may be
    protected from public disclosure by the Trade Secrets Act.
        The March 19 letter stated that certain documents were not being
    provided to the subcommittee because they constitute or reflect
    confidential White House communications, and that for the same reason,
    the documents would not be provided in response to your own March 4,
    2003, letter. After receiving that response, your staff reiterated the
    request in your March 4 letter that DOE provide a list of documents not
    being provided to the subcommittee, the subject of each, and the
    reasons for withholding it. In response, on March 25 our Office of
    Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs explained that the March 19
    letter already had set forth why DOE has withheld certain documents--
    they constitute or reflect confidential White House communications. We
    also explained that the request for a list of those documents
    originated with the March 4 letter, and, therefore, is a request by you
    in your capacity as an individual Senator, rather than one from the
    subcommittee. DOE does not have a list of the type you requested, and
    creation of logs of withheld documents is not required in
    administration by agencies of the Freedom of Information Act.
    Therefore, and again as DOE already has explained to your staff, DOE is
    not in a position to prepare and submit to you a list of the sort
    requested in your March 4 letter. For all of these same reasons, we are
    not in a position to supply to you the information you requested at the
    March 20, 2003, hearing.

        Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor.
        Senator Allard. Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Abraham, I am looking at a press release from the
    NNSA from late last year that talks about the reorganization
    that is going on there. As I understand it, you are in the
    process of, mostly through attrition, reducing the staff there
    by about 20 percent. Is that right?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes.
        Senator Pryor. About 20 percent according to the press
    release.
        I have a general concern about that. By the way, I am not
    opposed to that concept of streamlining and becoming more
    efficient. I am always for that. But I have a general question
    in the context of the heightened security we live in right now
    considering this war on terrorism and all of the possible,
    potential threats against which you all manage and maintain.
    How is that going right now, and are you seeing any adverse
    effects in terms of morale or any gaps or transitional issues
    that are causing you problems?
        Secretary Abraham. Senator, not at this point. I am not
    saying there are not people who will always be unhappy with
    changes in the status quo. What we have tried to do in this
    proposal, I know, is to be very careful about how we would make
    this transition occur. I can assure you and the committee that
    no actions will be taken in a hasty fashion or in a fashion
    inconsistent with the actual security of either the complex or
    the capabilities of the complex.
        One of the challenges which basically confronted me when I
    became Secretary was the fact that shortly before my arrival,
    in fact, based on actions I had voted for when I was in the
    Senate, we had developed the NNSA as a quasi-independent part
    of the Department. One of its first responsibilities--and that
    is primarily one for the administrator and now the acting
    administrator--to develop was a game plan for trying to set
    this new agency, if you would, or quasi-independent agency, up
    in a way that minimized the duplication of functions.
        One of the frustrations Congress had that led in part to
    the development of NNSA I think was that there was a sense
    there were too many layers of decision making, too many
    management layers. What Ambassador Brooks and before him
    General Gordon have tried to do is to wrestle with that issue.
    I can tell you that most of the hearings I had initially were
    hearings in which people were arguing or asking really for us
    to do this work quickly because it has been expected by the
    appropriators as one of the first responsibilities in this
    area.
        We have tried in this reorganization to address it. We have
    certainly heard from many Members who have had one particular
    concern or another because of some of the rearrangements. I
    know there are certainly going to be people in the system who
    may prefer the old approaches that we had. But we think this
    represents what Congress asked us to do, which was to do a good
    faith evaluation of the bureaucracy and try to recommend ways
    to make it more efficient and streamlined.
        Senator Pryor. Again, I agree completely with those goals.
    I am 100 percent on board with that. The committee, I think,
    would like to hear just an assurance that while we are doing
    this and going through this transition, we are taking care of
    our business, we are taking care of our mission, and there are
    no gaps or missed steps that could cause a security problem.
        Secretary Abraham. I think we will be able to do the
    mission better. Our goal really was to try to eliminate some of
    the bureaucracy that was, in fact, perceived by upper
    management of NNSA to be hard to work through, too many layers
    in the chain of command. One of the frustrations that I have
    and anybody who has served, I think, because I know most of the
    previous Energy Secretaries, is that there sometimes are
    problems within the complex, and people say why did that
    happen. Part of it is because it took such a long time for
    decisions to move up and down the chain.
        But I can assure you, and look forward to working with the
    committee as we effectuate these changes, that we are not going
    to do anything that undermines the quality or the timeliness of
    the work of the Defense Programs or Nonproliferation. I think
    we are pleased with the progress, in almost every respect, that
    we have been making on some of the priority items, but it will
    not be lost on us that, as we make these changes, there is
    always a threat that we could lose effectiveness. We will do
    our best and keep you well informed of how we are addressing
    those.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cornyn.
        Senator Cornyn. Secretary Abraham, good to see you this
    morning. I want to thank you for appearing before the committee
    today and tell you that I look forward to working with you to
    ensure that our nuclear weapons facilities receive the proper
    funding and resources they need in order to carry out their
    important mission.
        I am especially glad to see that we are moving forward with
    the modern pit facility. I think most Americans would be
    surprised, as I was when I learned, that we currently do not
    have a certified capability to produce such an important part
    of our nuclear arsenal. Indeed, it is supremely ironic that at
    a time when we are justifiably concerned about the ability of
    North Korea to produce nuclear weapons, that America cannot.
        On that point, the point of the modern pit facility, I want
    to ask you about the length of time it takes to complete that
    facility. I am informed that the best estimate is 15 to 17
    years. I wanted to ask you why does it take so long and is
    there anything that we in Congress can do to speed up the
    process.
        Secretary Abraham. Senator, you raise an important point.
    The duration of time between this point and when we feel we can
    have a fully operational modern pit facility is a long one
    because obviously there are inordinate numbers of both safety
    standards, environmental standards, and others that have to be
    met along that pathway.
        I should, however, note that we believe that this year we
    will be actually able to produce a pit which can be certified
    at the work that is being done at Los Alamos. It is a small
    operation by comparison to what we would envision a modern pit
    facility to be. We are not going to be without any capability
    because we will have that, but that is obviously a very small
    production capability.
        As to the specific impediments, I would have to, if I
    could, respond for the record on that.
        Senator Cornyn. That would be very helpful.
        Secretary Abraham. I will give you maybe some of the
    technical explanations that I do not have with me here today.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Based on current planning, construction of a Modern Pit
    Facility (MPF) will start in 2011 and be completed in 2017.
    Initial production in 2018 will enable the manufacture of
    plutonium pits for the nuclear weapon stockpile by 2020. This
    schedule will ensure that the NNSA is able to develop essential
    pit manufacturing capabilities that are both technologically
    ``modern'' and capable of meeting long-term needs of the
    Nation's nuclear stockpile.
        It is also essential that the MPF comply with all
    environmental standards and evolving security requirements.
    With an expected cost of some $2 billion to design and
    construct a MPF, the DOE must provide high confidence that a
    MPF can meet production goals and also meet all safety,
    security, and environmental compliance requirements.
        The current MPF schedule exercises prudent risk management
    based on current understanding of pit lifetimes, future
    stockpile requirements, and other priorities within NNSA. The
    current schedule for design and construction could be shortened
    by several years if the MPF project were provided additional
    resources; however, NNSA will live within its FYNSP and feels
    that the current schedule is reasonable.
        While many regulatory and administrative actions will be
    required to develop and operate a MPF, there are no specific
    issues that Congress must address at present to speed up the
    process.

        The other issue here is that there has been some concern
    about whether or not we should move ahead on some of these
    projects. The time frame that you have just outlined is a good
    example of some of the challenges we have in terms of
    maintaining capability, which has been our priority of trying
    to establish the capability to do the work that we may or may
    not in the future be called on to undertake.
        Senator Cornyn. Certainly I think we all understand if
    there are safety or scientific reasons for such a huge length
    of time. If there are, however, bureaucratic rules or other
    things that do not make sense that we can address here in
    Congress, I hope you will let me and the committee know.
        Will the modern pit facility that we are talking about have
    the flexibility such that it will be able to produce a range of
    pits, possibly even for weapons that currently are not in
    America's nuclear inventory?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes. It is, I think, the objective to
    have a facility that will have flexibility. We are always in
    the process of not only thinking about being capable of doing
    things today but being able to address challenges of the
    future. I think the concept behind the facility is to have a
    design that allows for that flexibility.
        Senator Cornyn. Let me jump to another subject in my
    remaining time--maintenance backlogs at our Nuclear Weapons
    Complex. Of course, I guess we would all agree that it is
    critical that we maintain upkeep of our facilities. The
    Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP)
    appears to have been successful in halting the growth of the
    approximately $1 billion maintenance backlog at our nuclear
    weapons facilities. Unfortunately, the backlog will remain the
    same or grow if the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
    (RTBF) program, which continues current and future maintenance,
    continues to decline. In fact, the nuclear weapons may be in
    the same poor shape in the future when the FIRP ends.
        Do you believe maintenance activities are adequately funded
    at the plants and laboratories in order to eliminate
    maintenance backlogs in the next 8 years when FIRP ends?
        Secretary Abraham. We definitely place a high priority on
    eliminating that backlog. Two of the challenges which we have
    tried to address in the more robust budgets, which this
    administration has been submitting, are the deterioration in
    the infrastructure generally and the maintenance backlogs that
    Congress has also identified as a problem. We believe that the
    funding that we are providing puts us right on the course
    towards addressing that backlog. It is going to take some time.
    We recognize that.
        It may be at the end of that, as we move down that road,
    that we conclude that not only do we have to have an ongoing
    maintenance program that is effective, but that we also find
    additional challenges that fall into a category of perhaps
    being defined as backlog by that point.
        I would just say that the FIRP does enjoy very substantial
    amount of support in this budget, and we certainly intend to
    apply that effectively to the infrastructure problems we have
    encountered.
        Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        Secretary Abraham, delighted to have you back in the
    Senate, if not as a Member, at least as a witness. We
    appreciate your leadership at the Department of Energy.
        To follow up on Senator Cornyn's good line of questioning,
    let me just drive home that point. Since we closed Rocky Flats
    in 1989, the United States has not had production capability
    for the primaries or the pits that are essential for making
    weapons. I know we will be doing something in Los Alamos for
    the W88 warhead, but that will only be dealing with a small
    number of the warhead types.
        Let me ask you a few brief questions. Does Russia have the
    capability to produce these right now? Do they have a
    production capability in Russia?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes. The answer is that they do.
        Senator Sessions. What about China?
        Secretary Abraham. I believe they do, yes.
        Senator Sessions. North Korea?
        Secretary Abraham. We believe that they may have that
    capability.
        Senator Sessions. As I understand it, we are the only
    nuclear power in the world at this point that does not have
    production capability.
        Secretary Abraham. Senator, that is the reason why we
    strongly support the investments in the development of this
    facility. We do not do it, however, because of a desire to
    restart an arms race. I think your point is an important one.
    Also, however, we just view our current capabilities as being
    inadequate to meet any future national security challenges we
    might have, and we feel that restoring capability is the first
    challenge that we have to undertake. That is why we have worked
    on the infrastructure programs that were mentioned, and that is
    why we support the development of pit manufacturing capability.
        Senator Sessions. It would be hard to say, would it not,
    Mr. Secretary, that we are somehow destabilizing the world if
    we are moving up, simply reestablishing the level that every
    other nuclear power in the world has?
        Secretary Abraham. The point I made earlier, which I would
    just repeat, is that even as we have placed a moratorium on
    testing, even as we closed Rocky Flats and have not had the
    capability of developing a pit, and even as we have placed
    restrictions on the sort of research that can be conducted, it
    has not dissuaded others from acting.
        Obviously, we always take into account the implications of
    investments we make or the development of capabilities that we
    might undertake. We take into account its impact on others, but
    it seems that others are acting in their own best interests and
    we feel that there is at least a need for us to now really
    focus on the restoration of our capabilities here.
        Senator Sessions. What you are then basically saying is we
    have not been doing that. We have not had that capability, but
    it has not deterred others from achieving that capability and
    going forward. In fact, it has no impact whatsoever, if you
    really think about it. I do not know why it would.
        As a matter of fact, it might be an encouragement. It
    strikes me that if we develop a nuclear policy that freezes our
    capabilities against any future change or improvement, we have
    simply set a floor, a goal that any nation that wants to be a
    peer competitor to the United States should seek and try to
    achieve, and, at that point, they would have parity with the
    United States. Psychologically, I do not think we need to do
    that.
        Would you comment on that?
        Secretary Abraham. I would just say this: With the end of
    the Cold War, decisions about reducing the investments in these
    kinds of capabilities were made and carried forward. I think
    there is no tangible evidence that those decisions have led
    others to necessarily follow that model, which I think is your
    point. But notwithstanding that, what others might do is a
    consideration.
        But I think the first consideration we have is what is in
    the interest of our national security. That is the first
    consideration, and the first answer is we believe it is in our
    interest, as a matter of national security, to restore these
    capabilities. We see no behavior that suggests that doing that
    would have an impact on the rest of the world that was so
    undesirable as to offset whatever national security advantages
    are gained from us moving ahead here.
        But in the first instance, all of these decisions begin
    with the question of what does the United States need in the
    future to be able to maintain its capability, and we think that
    has to be addressed in the fashion we are talking about.
        Senator Sessions. I agree. We want to reduce nuclear
    weapons. That should be our goal. But I do not think in the
    long run the world will be safer and other nations will reduce
    their power if we reduce our power substantially and freeze
    ourselves at that level. I think it is a dangerous policy, and
    I support your view.
        Secretary Abraham. The Treaty of Moscow attempts to reduce
    the number of nuclear weapons. What we recognize is that the
    challenges of the Cold War of the latter half of the 20th
    century may not be the challenges of the 21st century. We have
    already seen evidence of that, and our belief is that there is
    a pathway forward here that is important to proceed on. It is
    not a pathway of immediately developing new weapons or
    enhancing every weapon, nor is it the pathway of essentially a
    nuclear freeze. It is a pathway of developing capability to
    address challenges as they might emerge, and having no
    capability, at least in our judgment, is not the proper
    approach. Obviously, the pit facility is an important part of
    that capability being reestablished.
        Senator Sessions. I notice my time is up, Mr. Chairman.
    Will we have a chance to have a short second round?
        Senator Allard. Yes, I believe so. We have to be sure to
    get the Secretary out of here by 11:30, but I believe we will
    have an opportunity to allow you to ask a question or two more.
        Senator Graham, you are next. I just want to welcome you
    here personally to the committee. I know our States have worked
    closely on issues of environmental management and other issues,
    and I look forward to continuing to work with you.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I will continue some of the things
    that Senator Sessions was talking about.
        First, though, I want to congratulate you and thank you for
    appointing Jeff Allison as the site manager at Savannah River.
    I think we are all going to be very pleased with that, and I
    appreciate that. Jeff has done a good job and will continue to.
        I will change the subject just a little bit. We will get
    back to pits in a moment. The MOX program is a big deal to the
    country and certainly to the Savannah River Site, and I
    appreciate the budget allocation this year.
        One of the concerns that I have is the Russian program. Can
    you give us a little update about exactly where the Russians
    are with their MOX facility and what is the outlook there?
        Secretary Abraham. We feel very positive about recent
    developments on the Russian side of the plutonium disposition
    agreement. We have reached an agreement. The Russians have
    reached a positive decision with respect to the design of their
    facility. That had been one of the impediments, if you would,
    or one of the project lines that had not been moving quickly.
    That has now been achieved.
        The success the President had last year with the
    development of the Global Partnership initiative to recruit and
    encourage other members of the G8 to join a partnership to
    provide $20 billion over the next decade for nonproliferation
    programs in Russia has changed some of the funding dynamics in
    a favorable way so that the funding for the Russian program, I
    think, is on the right track, and we are confident it will be
    achieved.
        Senator Graham. So you feel confident.
        Secretary Abraham. Yes. Obviously, a reflection of our
    confidence is in the budget submission we have made where we
    have now made a major commitment in this proposal for the
    beginning of construction in Savannah River.
        Senator Graham. You think the Russians are going to keep
    pace with us, generally speaking.
        Secretary Abraham. I believe the Russian program is on its
    track now in a much more confident direction. It will not be
    exactly parallel to ours, but now it is moving ahead in a way
    that is, I think, much improved over where we were a year ago.
        Senator Graham. Along the lines of the questions by Senator
    Sessions, what I am trying to say and I think what we are all
    trying to say here is that a new pit production facility makes
    sense to us. I applaud you for going down this road. The
    sooner, the better for, I think, most of us.
        Even though we are trying to appropriately reduce the
    amount of nuclear weapons available to the former Soviet Union
    and ourselves in a responsible way, lessening the dangers, I
    think there is a feeling here among most of us--and I believe
    the administration too--that you always have to maintain
    currency and viability. So a pit production facility that can
    make sure that we have the state-of-the-art, new generation
    technology to marry up with delivery systems would be something
    most of us would be supportive of.
        I do not think they are contrary goals at all. Trying to
    modernize your ability to produce and maintain a viable nuclear
    deterrent force in the future is not contrary to trying to
    lessen the danger. I applaud you for what you have done and
    encourage you to continue and hope you bring it to the Savannah
    River Site. [Laughter.]
        Now, Senator Chambliss, my colleague from Georgia, has been
    very supportive of the site. One thing I think we have had
    going for us at the Savannah River Site is South Carolina and
    North Carolina delegations and, recently, good leadership of
    the Governor's office. I think that now you will have somebody
    you can work with in Governor Sanford.
        I know he is very concerned about hydrogen research and
    Savannah River has a very rich tradition of hydrogen research.
    We developed a hydrogen bus several years ago in the Savannah
    River Technology Center.
        Do you have any plans for that center in terms of hydrogen
    research, and could you give us a little overview of where we
    are going with hydrogen from the Department's point of view?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes. Let me say that we are definitely,
    as you well know, expanding our hydrogen fuel cell programs. We
    have not made decisions as to where and when research will be
    conducted, but the President has committed a $1.7 billion
    program over the next 5 years. The design of that program will
    be focusing on research on hydrogen production, hydrogen
    storage, and on our capability of effectively reducing the cost
    of hydrogen fuel cell generation. A variety of programs will
    now be launched.
        The goal is to really, in these next 5 years, jump start
    the high risk research that needs to be conducted in order for
    us to really make this transition that we envision to a
    hydrogen economy, one that would see motor vehicles powered by
    the fuel cells. We have not made decisions yet as to where all
    that research will be conducted, but it will obviously be a
    very robust program.
        Senator Graham. I think Savannah River could help you
    there, and we are definitely interested.
        The last thing is the Savannah River Technology Center. We
    would like to see that expanded. There is a real user-friendly
    environment in South Carolina and Georgia for such projects,
    and we are definitely working on a next generation nuclear
    reactor. That is one area of our energy economy that I think
    has been neglected. I applaud you for having a friendlier
    attitude toward nuclear power. It is a non-emitting, safe form
    of energy, and I think our country has been neglectful in the
    past to let the technology become stagnant. I would certainly
    encourage you to look at a research site, Savannah River being
    one of them, obviously, for the next generation nuclear
    reactors.
        With that, I will appreciate what you are doing for our
    country.
        Secretary Abraham. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Allard. Senator Chambliss. I would also like to
    welcome you to the committee and look forward to working with
    you too.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and likewise.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to associate myself with the remarks
    of my colleague from South Carolina, Mr. Graham. We have worked
    very closely together on any number of issues at the Savannah
    River Site, a keen interest. I have expressed it to members of
    your staff over the last couple of years.
        The primary concern that I have about SRS is from a
    security standpoint. I know we read the threats that exist out
    there with respect to potential attacks of terrorism occurring
    at our nuclear power plants. We have two in our State, Plant
    Vogel and Plant Hatch. Plant Hatch is in my old congressional
    district, and I have spent an awful lot of time there. I have
    also spent time at Plant Vogel.
        Very honestly, while we are always vulnerable at any site
    in America, I think that Southern Company and the other owners
    of those two nuclear power plants have done a good job with
    respect to securing the facility. With the guidelines coming
    from Washington regarding construction of those plants, I feel
    very good about the security of the plant in the event the
    perimeter lines were breached.
        But, from a nuclear waste storage standpoint, I am
    concerned about security at facilities such as the Savannah
    River Site. I would like for you to comment to us about what
    you have done there, what is in this budget, and what do we
    expect to need to do at sites like the Savannah River Site
    regarding nuclear storage.
        Secretary Abraham. Our cross-cutting, if you would,
    security proposal in the budget calls for about a $1.2 billion
    complex-wide security allocation. To use Savannah River as an
    example, among the sorts of things which we have done to try to
    enhance security, particularly in the wake of September 11, is
    to increase access controls, to create an inner-site perimeter,
    to add armed guards, to extend the buffer zone at the site, and
    to initiate patrols along the river and guards at the tank
    farm. Similar kinds of things are going on at other parts of
    the complex.
        As I always tried to make clear when we have these
    hearings, we have tried to also increase our monitoring and our
    flexibility to make changes where they are called for. We
    really believe that the security posture has to be reviewed on
    a very frequent basis. Our security teams are doing that. We
    are in the process of basically reexamining our design basis
    threat on an ongoing basis to make adjustments where called
    for. If we feel that there is a change that is needed,
    obviously, we will place that kind of funding priority at the
    top of any requests we make to Congress, or, if we have to,
    within the site itself, we will make those adjustments to
    reprogram money to make sure that any newly emerging concerns
    can be quickly dealt with.
        Senator Chambliss. I appreciate that very much, and folks
    in our area will be glad to hear that too.
        I want to echo also what Lindsey said with respect to Jeff
    Allison. Bringing him on as site manager has been a good fit,
    and we look forward to continuing to work with you to bring all
    the assets we can to the Savannah River Site. Thank you, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Secretary Abraham. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Allard. Let us see. Now I am trying to figure out
    just where we stand as far as committee questions are
    concerned. I have one question I want to cover. Senator Pryor,
    do you have any questions?
        Senator Pryor. No.
        Senator Allard. I know that Senator Sessions has a couple
    of questions, and then we will wrap it up.
        I got cut short on time here, Mr. Secretary, and I want to
    clarify my question to you.
        Secretary Abraham. Please.
        Senator Allard. I want to give you an opportunity to
    respond to this question, and then I will explain why I think
    this is an important question.
        Just to clarify the record, does NNSA need an authorization
    from Congress to proceed with the production of a new nuclear
    weapon?
        Secretary Abraham. A new weapon. I believe I answered in
    the context of the research on the Robust Nuclear Earth
    Penetrator, but if it were a new weapon, yes, congressional
    approval to proceed with production or design of a new nuclear
    weapon would be required.
        Senator Allard. I am glad you clarified that because I
    think that is important for those who have concerns about
    whether we are moving ahead with concepts on what we do with
    nuclear weapons. It is an idea of looking at the scientific
    aspects of a nuclear weapon. When you get right down to it,
    Congress is going to have to approve production of a new
    weapon. I think that is an important thing for people who may
    have concerns about just the idea of concept, further
    scientific investigation of a nuclear weapon, to keep that in
    mind.
        Let me go ahead and move to Senator Sessions. Did you have
    any more, Senator Chambliss?
        Senator Chambliss. No.
        Senator Allard. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary Abraham, since I have been in
    the Senate, through various different events, I have had
    insights into the Department of Energy laboratories--Los
    Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia. I have been shocked and
    disturbed by the security breaches, by the mismanagement, and
    by the problems that have existed there. Some of them have been
    made quite public. There has been a pattern of misconduct that
    I think is quite significant over a very long period of time.
        I know you have taken it as your responsibility to clean
    that up, and there are some good steps that have been taken.
    Frankly, I have serious doubts about whether we ought to
    maintain these contracts, whether other universities or other
    entities ought to be given a chance to participate in this $2
    billion a year that we routinely give out to Los Alamos
    Laboratory, for example.
        This is a published report. I have this Associated Press
    article from CNN.com. The headline says this, ``Former Los
    Alamos Official Says Lab Does Not Have `Criminal Culture'.''
    Well, that is good to have the person say that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        He said that the investigators, Glenn Walp and Steve Doran,
    were fired because they had provided incomplete and inaccurate
    information. These two investigators had pressed investigations
    into suspected mismanagement of lab money, prompting the House
    Energy Committee to hold hearings on it.
        Salgado, who has now been removed or quit, acknowledged a
    lab culture where money was at times treated as ``monopoly
    money.'' This is a head man, the deputy director or principal
    deputy director of the lab, who said they were treating money
    as monopoly money. He said, ``It is not a criminal culture, but
    it is a culture that has to be addressed.'' I would agree.
        Seventeen employees have now been fired or removed from
    management positions by the University of California which
    manages this. Salgado himself, who was making those statements,
    was fired in January. Top officials that hindered several
    investigations into the misuse of hundreds of thousands of
    dollars in lab funds were identified.
        The investigator Walp said lab managers knew fraud at the
    lab had been ``greening the valley'' around Los Alamos for
    years but looked the other way.
        They just listed a lot of different problems of individual
    fraud by employees, and financial mismanagement and problems
    involving espionage have been known for some time there.
        Frankly, it strikes me that the University of California
    cannot get it through its head that it is not some sort of
    ordained entity here. Their security situation is difficult for
    any university, but it particularly appears to me that the
    University of California has difficulty understanding the
    security requirements.
        Are you looking at that? Will the Department of Energy
    consider giving the opportunity to other universities who will
    commit to run the program with integrity and with proper
    security procedures? Why should some other university not be
    given the chance?
        Secretary Abraham. First of all, when some of the
    revelations of late were brought to my attention, frankly in
    the period right before or approximately the same time they
    became part of the media, we began a very intense series of
    discussions and meetings with the leadership, the president of
    the university and others in his leadership team, to try to
    convey, once and for all, our belief that when we hire somebody
    as a contractor to run these labs, that they actually have all
    of the responsibility that goes with that title. We made it
    very clear to the university that they had to take action
    quickly to address not just the specific issues that had
    emerged, but the broader issues, the broader undercurrent, that
    made it possible for these advantages to be taken and for this
    conduct to occur.
        They have done a number of things beginning, as I think we
    made it clear to them, with some changes in personnel. You
    alluded to that. That had not taken place when, just 2 years
    before, another set of events took place at Los Alamos. There
    had not been a change or changes in the security division and
    other key leadership positions, even though there had been
    quite obviously problems.
        We also have tried, in studying the Los Alamos issues, to
    share what we are learning about the problems there with all of
    our labs because a lessons-learned approach, in my judgment,
    has to be taken from this so that we do not have repetition of
    these problems in the future elsewhere.
        We have also made it clear to the university that unless
    they meet what I consider to be the responsibilities that they
    have been paid for, then we will find someone else to do it. To
    that end, I have asked the Deputy Secretary of our Department,
    Kyle McSlarrow, and the acting head of the NNSA, Linton Brooks,
    to complete and provide for me by April 30 an evaluation of the
    University of California's performance in the wake of our
    directives, as well as any further recommendations as to the
    ongoing or future role that the university should have, and I
    look forward to getting the report.
        I think also one of the issues you have touched on is an
    important one, and that is the question of the nature by which
    these sorts of contracts are provided. Ours is the only
    Department, I think, which has Federal research facility
    contracts that are ever made available for competition. I do
    not think that happens with other Departments. We do have the
    flexibility for that competition. Even as we are examining the
    specific case of Los Alamos, I have appointed a blue ribbon
    team of outside experts to provide us with a better
    understanding of and some criteria for future competition,
    which I think will inevitably be beneficial to the complex.
        Senator Sessions. I would thank you for that. I would say
    that from my experience, both at secure briefings and public
    briefings, that serious security breaches have occurred that
    have adversely impacted the United States. It is quite clear
    that we should not be paying to green the valley with Federal
    taxpayers' dollars, and frankly I see no reason whatsoever that
    you ought not to give other universities who may be prepared to
    carry on this program effectively with security and efficiency
    a chance to bid on this. They do not have a right to have this
    program forever. I think their behavior has been very poor, and
    I hope that you will not just talk about it. I hope you will
    take bids from other universities and see what kinds of
    proposals they would make before you decide to continue this
    one.
        Secretary Abraham. The other point I would also make is
    this, that as we examine the situation, we do not intend to
    have the taxpayers responsible for mismanagement problems. We
    believe that if there has been mismanagement, that the cost of
    that has to be borne where appropriate by the contractor as
    well.
        Senator Sessions. It is just part of the university
    culture, Mr. Chairman. They do not like restrictions. They do
    not like security. These universities just do not think that
    way, and if there is not very strong leadership, it tends to be
    operated like a college campus rather than a highly secure and
    important defense laboratory.
        Senator Allard. I think you made some very good comments.
    Senator Sessions, thank you for your questions.
        We have run out of members and questions, Mr. Secretary. I
    just want to say that I considered it an honor and pleasure to
    serve with you in the Senate, and I feel like you do a good job
    here with the Department of Energy. You have had a lot of huge
    challenges. You have done a great job with them, and I wish you
    well.
        After we adjourn here, I would just like to speak with you
    a moment, if we might.
        Secretary Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. I agree, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard. I declare the committee adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts

      PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES AND DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION
                                   ASSISTANCE

        1. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, with certain countries
    moving towards indigenous nuclear programs and possessing weapons of
    mass destruction expertise and technologies, do you believe the
    Department of Energy (DOE) may require additional authority to permit
    DOE nonproliferation programs and assistance to be spent in countries
    beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU)?
        Secretary Abraham. NNSA's nonproliferation activities are central
    to the Bush administration's December 2002 National Strategy to Combat
    Weapons of Mass Destruction, which lists ``Strengthened
    Nonproliferation'' as a pillar of its approach to reducing
    proliferation threats. The Department is fully committed to this
    critical mission; this is reflected in the diversity of our programs to
    address nonproliferation concerns in Russia, other states of the FSU,
    and, increasingly, throughout the world.
        NNSA's nonproliferation mission and responsibilities set forth in
    the National Nuclear Security Administration Act are broad enough to
    encompass our conduct of nuclear nonproliferation activities outside of
    Russia and the FSU. However, we are seeking in the National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 to clarify that NNSA has the
    requisite authority to conduct its international Materials Protection,
    Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program not only in the FSU but in
    other countries where the risks of nonproliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction, materials and technology also threaten the security of the
    United States.

        2. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, specifically, what other
    countries do you believe would be interested in DOE cooperative
    nonproliferation programs, and, in particular, which programs do you
    see participating and why?
        Secretary Abraham.

             We are currently pursuing a dialogue on MPC&A
            cooperation with countries we believe are of particular
            concern, but we feel it is premature to discuss specifics in
            detail.
             Many countries outside the FSU are interested in our
            border detection and Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)
            programs--and we hope to expand these programs to those
            countries where significant proliferation risks exist. Eastern
            and Central Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa are regions
            where we may initiate work. We will target resources to
            countries where nuclear and radiological material security is
            most vulnerable, including areas associated with terrorist
            organizations or activities.
             In addition, DOE/NNSA's export control assistance
            program has grown from 3 partner countries--Russia, Ukraine,
            and Kazakhstan--to nearly 20--including the Baltics, the
            Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Cyprus, India,
            Pakistan, Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt,
            Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, China and Hong Kong. Cooperation is
            in its infancy in many of these countries. DOE/NNSA's broader
            geographical focus is consistent with the U.S. Government's
            interest in strengthening international export controls and
            securing key transshipment routes that proliferators are known
            to take advantage of in acquiring the items and technologies
            needed for their WMD programs.

            FISCAL YEAR 2004 NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM BUDGET REQUEST

        3. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, the budget request for the
    DOE nonproliferation programs represents a 30-percent increase above
    last year's request. This is the first time in the history of these
    programs that the increase has been so substantial. This increase will
    primarily be spent on constructing a mixed-oxide facility (MOX) in
    South Carolina to dispose of U.S. plutonium under the U.S.-Russia
    Disposition Agreement and the President's new initiative to accelerate
    nuclear materials disposition in Russia. Would you please tell me why
    the DOE decided to focus the increase on these two programs this year
    and what impact these programs will have on U.S. national security?
        Secretary Abraham. The MOX facility is an important element of a
    long-term agreement with Russia under which each country will dispose
    of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium by 2025. The increase in
    funding in fiscal year 2004 is needed to complete the detailed design
    and begin construction of the MOX facility, contingent on parallel
    progress in the Russian program. In addition, the President's new
    initiative to accelerate nuclear materials disposition in Russia will
    permanently eliminate 1.5 MT per year of highly enriched uranium (HEU).
    Both of these programs help to prevent the threat of theft or diversion
    by terrorists or rogue nations of surplus plutonium/HEU in Russia and
    strongly support the administration's nonproliferation objectives.

             We did not increase our budget request for the
            International MPC&A Program (which protects materials) because
            we took that step 2 years ago. The pace of the program is now
            governed by Russia's ability to absorb assistance, not by U.S.
            funding. Within the $226 million for MPC&A we have new
            initiatives to secure radiological materials and to provide
            security of Russian Strategic Rocket Force warhead sites.
             The Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production
            Program, recently transferred from the Department of Defense,
            needs no increase now because $74 million in prior year funds
            are being transferred to us.
             The Russian Transition Initiatives Program has
            sufficient funds at the $40 million level to work to redirect
            Russian nuclear weapons expertise to peaceful civilian
            activities. Increases are not required because we have a number
            of pending projects.
             Our bottom line: We are proud of what we have done.
            Our budget request makes clear the administration's strong
            support for nonproliferation.

            RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES AND THE TERRORIST THREAT

        4. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, there has been a great deal
    of discussion about the threats posed by a ``dirty bomb'' or RDD and
    the need to secure and account for radiological sources both at home
    and worldwide. Would you tell me what the DOE position is regarding the
    threat posed by an RDD versus a device using weapons-grade nuclear
    materials, e.g. highly-enriched uranium or plutonium?
        Secretary Abraham. DOE's priority, in program focus and budget, is
    on securing weapons grade nuclear materials, which could be used in a
    nuclear explosion. These materials pose the highest risk to U.S.
    national security. Still, the threat posed by an RDD is a major concern
    and increasing resources have been dedicated to reducing this threat as
    well.
        An RDD is often termed a weapon of mass ``disruption'' rather than
    a weapon of mass destruction. An RDD attack can produce general panic,
    health consequences including immediate fatalities, and long-term
    increases in cancer incidence, long-term denial of property use, and
    massive economic impact arising from property and facility
    decontamination needs, disruption of services, and other associated
    factors. Recent reports have estimated that it would cost almost $20
    billion, not including decontamination and other cleanup costs, to
    recover from an RDD attack in a densely populated urban setting with a
    strontium-90 source commonly used in Soviet-fabricated radioisotope
    thermoelectric generators--Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators
    (RTGs). In comparison, the economic costs of natural disasters such as
    the 1993 floods and Hurricane Andrew range from $5.5 billion to $20.5
    billion, respectively.
        In contrast, an attack using fissile material in an actual nuclear
    device could result in damage that is many orders of magnitude greater
    than that posed by an RDD attack, both in terms of loss of life,
    infrastructure devastation, and recovery costs.
        DOE/NNSA programs aim to address the broad spectrum of threats to
    United States national security. This includes the priority mission of
    securing fissile material and reducing the threat from high-risk
    radioactive sources that could be used in an RDD.

        5. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, since there are so many
    radiological sources being used by industry, the medical community, and
    others, how is DOE prioritizing the threat posed by these sources from
    an RDD perspective?
        Secretary Abraham. Many different organizations are involved in
    determining what high-risk sources are. DOE and the U.S. national labs,
    the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others have all contributed to
    the body of work on this topic. We are working with our national
    laboratories and the NRC to categorize priority sources and to evaluate
    actions to protect sources of greatest concern. There are many
    variables to consider, but there is general convergence on which
    sources present the greatest potential threat, should they be used for
    malicious purposes.

        6. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, what sources do you believe
    should be secured and accounted first and what is DOE doing to address
    this threat?
        Secretary Abraham. DOE will focus efforts on areas where the
    greatest risk reduction can be achieved at the least cost.

             This past March, at the International Conference on
            the Security of Radioactive Sources, I announced a $3 million
            contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
            to assist developing countries in securing their radioactive
            sources. DOE can provide critical support in the form of
            technical and financial assistance to enable countries of
            interest to properly account for radiological material.
             Our initial focus is on seven major isotopes of
            concern: cobalt-60, cesium-137, radium-226, americium-241,
            plutonium-238, iridium-192, and strontium-90. Although we are
            initially focusing our efforts on these seven isotopes, we will
            retain flexibility to include other isotopes on a case-by-case
            basis.
             Another aspect of the DOE's approach will focus
            efforts on countries that are most at risk of having their
            radiological materials stolen due to social/economic
            conditions, lax regulatory infrastructure, and/or lack of
            technical and financial means to correct problems on their own.
            Working with the Department of State, DOE will continue to
            analyze risks within the radioisotope lifecycle (production,
            distribution, use, and disposition), risks within countries,
            and potential smuggling/transit routes.

                     RUSSIAN TRANSITION INITIATIVE PROGRAM

        7. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, the Russian Transition
    Initiative (RTI) program is designed to address the ``brain drain''
    concern in the FSU by providing commercial partnerships between FSU
    scientists and U.S. industry and by assisting Russia with the
    downsizing of its nuclear weapons complex.
        I was pleased to learn in your testimony that RTI has obtained over
    $125 million in matching resources from U.S. industry for
    commercialization endeavors, or $3 in private sector funds for every $2
    in U.S. Government seed funding. Can you explain how and why RTI has
    been able to attract this kind of private sector investment and how RTI
    could attract even more private sector dollars?
        Secretary Abraham. First, credit for progress in this area should
    go to the new leadership of the Russian Transition Initiative as well
    as to the leadership of the U.S. Industry Coalition (USIC).

             Specifically, under this leadership RTI has been able
            to attract significant resources through its requirement that
            USG funding be matched at least dollar-for-dollar with cash or
            in-kind contributions by companies.
             Once invested, many partners are anxious to see their
            initial effort succeed, so they actually invest more than
            required in time, capital or equipment. This translates into
            greater leveraging.
             Recently RTI attracted $96 million in outside funds
            through five industry partners.
             The support of RTI's investment in upgrades to
            business and physical infrastructure encourages private
            commercial support in the form of contracting, distributorships
            and joint ventures between U.S. and Russian firms, especially
            in the Russian closed cities. These successes encourage other
            industry partners to invest. Recently, Russian companies have
            begun to invest in businesses in the closed cities.
             RTI plans to continue to expand its outreach to U.S.
            industry partners and is already cooperating with other USG
            organizations such as the Overseas Private Investment
            Corporation (OPIC) to help attract private investment.
             Recently a Russian counterpart to the private USIC,
            the National Industry Coalition, has been formed and will work
            to expand Russian investment in these cooperative commercial
            efforts.

        8. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, how many FSU scientists are
    involved full time with RTI commercial projects?
        Secretary Abraham. Currently, 7,200 scientists, engineers, and
    technicians in Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan are at work.
        Background: Russian Transition Initiatives includes Initiatives for
    Proliferation Prevention (IPP), which draws its numbers from work in
    Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) only
    works in Russia. IPP employs about 6,700 scientists and NCI employs 500
    scientists and technicians in commercial work, which totals 7,200.

          NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION/DOE SUPPORT IN IRAQ

        9. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, in December 2002, the NNSA
    redirected $6 million of fiscal year 2003 DOE funds to provide
    technical support to the IAEA and the United Nations Monitoring,
    Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) for weapons of mass
    destruction (WMD) inspections in Iraq. To date how much of the $6
    million has been spent and what kind of assistance have these funds
    provided?
        Secretary Abraham. In December 2002, $6 million was redirected by
    NNSA to support WMD inspections being conducted by the IAEA's Iraq
    Nuclear Verification Office (INVO) and the UNMOVIC, as mandated under
    U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.
        As of March 1, 2003, approximately $780,000 had been expended to
    support inspections. These funds have been used to cover costs for
    technical, proliferation assessments by our national laboratories and
    for specialized equipment, software, and related technology for use by
    INVO and UNMOVIC. At this time, it is undetermined what the funding
    requirements will be in a post-war Iraq.

        10. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, with the war in Iraq
    underway and the inspections suspended, what role do you anticipate
    NNSA will play now or in post-conflict Iraq?
        Secretary Abraham. It is well known that the Department of Energy
    is resident to hundreds of nuclear and other WMD specialists. We fully
    anticipate that the Department of Defense will call on our experts to
    assist with the identification and elimination of Iraq's WMD
    capabilities. Looking further down the road, we anticipate supporting
    any U.S. Government activities to provide long-term monitoring of Iraqi
    dual-use facilities and imports and exports. At this time, it is
    undetermined what the actual role will be in a post-war Iraq.

                            IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

        11. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, there has been a lot of
    attention recently on the status of the Iranian nuclear program, which
    appears to be permitted under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In
    your opinion, based on what you know of the Iranian program, how much
    of a threat does this program pose compared to other nuclear programs
    in ``axis of evil'' countries?
        Secretary Abraham. Iran is actively developing a nuclear program
    and related facilities for, we believe, nuclear weapons purposes. These
    facilities were undeclared until recently and were declared only under
    intense international pressure. This program raises very serious
    questions about Iran's compliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
    Treaty obligations. It poses serious dangers, and we will work with our
    partners in the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran
    remains free of nuclear weapons.
        By comparison, it is a long-standing intelligence community
    assessment that North Korea has already produced one, possibly two,
    nuclear weapons. If it were to reprocess the currently stored spent
    fuel, North Korea could have enough plutonium for several more nuclear
    weapons. A North Korea with nuclear weapons is equally alarming
    especially since North Korea's program is further along in its
    development. North Korea has acknowledged having nuclear weapons and
    has threatened their export. The intent of the U.S. Government is to
    pursue a multilateral process that leads to the complete, verifiable
    and irreversible elimination of North Korean nuclear weapons
    capabilities.
        With regard to Iraq, we do not believe that Saddam Hussein ever
    abandoned his nuclear weapons ambitions. On the contrary, we believe
    that there are strong indications that right up to the end of the
    regime, Saddam remained determined to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact,
    DOE joined most agencies of the Intelligence Community in the 2002
    National Intelligence Estimate in the assessment that Iraq had
    reconstituted its nuclear weapons program.

             DOE NONPROLIFERATION BUDGET AND NON-MONETARY OBSTACLES

        12. Senator Roberts. Secretary Abraham, during my time on the
    Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, I have noted that
    U.S. nonproliferation programs require greater cooperation from Russia
    and other FSU partners to accelerate program goals. With this fiscal
    year 2004 budget, I believe the real challenge ahead will be non-
    monetary obstacles, such as access and greater cooperation.
        This perspective is echoed in the March 2003 report, Controlling
    Nuclear Warheads and Materials, A Report Card and Action Plan, just
    completed by Harvard and the Nuclear Threat Initiative:

            the available budgets are now large enough, and the non-
            monetary obstacles substantial enough, that simply adding money
            to existing programs, while making no other changes, would in
            most cases do little to strengthen or accelerate these efforts.

        What is your view of this assessment, and how is the DOE addressing
    the challenges posed by ``non-monetary obstacles'' for the
    nonproliferation programs within DOE?
        Secretary Abraham. I agree with the assessment that non-monetary
    obstacles such as access and cooperation now limit our nonproliferation
    activities. Still, despite these obstacles, we continue to make solid
    progress in a number of areas.
        DOE's senior management meets frequently with Russian counterparts
    in the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) to review progress
    in overcoming obstacles. We have developed a ``scorecard'' for
    maintaining the visibility of all NNSA/MinAtom cooperation to ensure
    that it stays on track. The senior management of both agencies reviews
    it periodically. Also, as Secretary of Energy, I periodically have
    direct discussions with Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev to
    resolve issues such as access that thwart progress of nonproliferation
    programs.
        For example, in the area of MPC&A, we have made significant
    progress with MinAtom on access issues, especially at ``civilian''
    facilities with less stringent access restrictions imposed by MinAtom.
    In fact, we are finishing work at the first large MinAtom fuel
    processing facility, the Luch facility, this spring. Luch was the site
    of the attempted theft of highly enriched uranium by a facility insider
    several years ago. We expect to complete at least two additional large
    MinAtom facilities next year (Novisibirsk and IPPE in Obninsk).
    Consequently, this part of our program is in the process of
    transitioning to the sustainability phase as upgrades are completed.
        Another area in our work that periodically confronts access
    difficulties is the Russian Transition Initiatives program. Since
    September 2002, the Nuclear Cities Initiative has enjoyed access to all
    three of the closed cities with which it works, without any problems.
    Under the Implementing Arrangements on Access, negotiated in 2002, work
    continues to proceed and access is being granted. One trip to Sarov
    took place recently, and trips appear to be approved as requested. That
    said, access is not unlimited. NCI and MinAtom do negotiate specific
    numbers of visits to the cities per year, and NCI agrees to operate
    under that ceiling. Requests for amending the number of visits to a
    city can be made by an exchange of letters every 6 months.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Wayne Allard

                          CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION

        13. Senator Allard. Secretary Abraham, to help clarify the record,
    is further congressional authorization required before the DOE-NNSA can
    begin design or production of a new nuclear weapon?
        Secretary Abraham. Neither full scale development nor production of
    new nuclear weapons could proceed unless Congress authorizes and
    appropriates the necessary funds. Further, section 3143 of Public Law
    107-314, the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization Act, requires the
    Department of Energy to request funds in the President's budget for the
    development or production of a new nuclear weapon. The budget entry is
    specified as a single dedicated line item for each such activity that
    is in phase 3 or higher for new nuclear weapons, or phase 6.3 or higher
    for weapons refurbishment. These phases correspond to final design work
    phases and onward.

        14. Senator Allard. Secretary Abraham, is further congressional
    authorization required before DOE-NNSA can begin design or production
    of a precision low yield nuclear weapon?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes. Congress would have to repeal the
    prohibition against research and development of new low yield weapons,
    Section 3136 of Public Law 103-160, as the administration has
    requested. Additionally, design or production of a precision low yield
    nuclear weapon would be subject to the requirements of Section 3143 of
    Public Law 107-314, that apply to development and production of new
    nuclear weapons and to weapon modifications, if such modifications are
    in order to meet new military requirements.

        15. Senator Allard. Secretary Abraham, is further congressional
    authorization required before DOE-NNSA can begin production of the
    Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator?
        Secretary Abraham. Neither full scale development nor production of
    the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator could begin unless Congress
    authorizes and appropriates the necessary funding.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin

                   STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE FILL SCHEDULE

        16. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, in the spring of 2002, the
    DOE determined to no longer permit deferrals of scheduled deliveries of
    oil to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). This decision, which was
    publicly announced by the Secretary of Energy on April 9, 2002, was a
    reversal of the practice employed during 2000 and 2001, which allowed
    deferrals of SPR deliveries when oil prices were rising or oil supplies
    were tightening, in exchange for deliveries of additional amounts of
    oil at a later time.
        On March 5, 2003, I released a report prepared by my staff on the
    Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) of the U.S. Senate
    Committee on Governmental Affairs, showing how this new policy to fill
    the SPR, regardless of the price of oil, helped to increase oil prices
    without increasing overall U.S. oil supplies.
        Documents provided by DOE indicate that, during the spring and
    summer of 2002, DOE's SPR office repeatedly urged the Department to
    return to the previous fill policy. For example, in a document dated
    June 11, 2002, the SPR office advocated restoring the previous policy
    of allowing deferrals of SPR deliveries as follows:

            Since the prior business model for oil acquisition is
            financially superior to the current model, works counter to
            economic cycles, is familiar to contractors, is favored for
            logistics reasons, is in tune with legislative mandates, and
            allows the government to take positive action when consumers
            are distressed by oil prices, the SPR office recommends
            reconsideration of the decision not to renegotiate delivery
            dates of SPR oil.

        The document also states: ``Champions of the current policy are
    unknown and there is no known record laying out arguments in support of
    a rigid fill schedule.''
        Please identify the ``champions'' who advocated adoption of the new
    SPR fill policy.
        Secretary Abraham. It is my responsibility to determine SPR oil
    acquisition policy and approve implementation strategies. I seek the
    advice of DOE staff and other members of the administration as
    circumstances dictate.

        17. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, please provide the arguments
    made in the spring of 2002 in support of a ``rigid fill schedule.''
        Secretary Abraham. In the spring of 2002, I determined to take
    deliveries as contractually scheduled in order to fill the SPR at a
    reasonable rate for the purpose of increasing our energy security. Our
    policy towards SPR fill is not rigid. Had circumstances been different,
    we had and have the flexibility to defer or otherwise modify fill
    schedules.

        18. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, please explain why the
    identity of the proponents of the new SPR fill policy and the arguments
    they used to advocate this new policy were not disclosed to the career
    staff of DOE's SPR office.
        Secretary Abraham. In large organizations, decisionmakers are
    supported by numerous experts and advisors. Ideally, information flows
    in both directions during the course of resolving issues. As a
    practical matter, given time pressures and other factors, this does not
    always occur.

        19. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, please confirm whether you
    were the individual who made the final decision, publicly announced on
    April 9, 2002, not to permit any more deferrals of deliveries of oil
    into the SPR.
        Secretary Abraham. I did make the decision to take deliveries as
    contractually scheduled, as I announced on April 9, 2002.

                          SPR OIL DEPOSITS/OIL PRICES

        20. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, in response to the PSI
    minority staff report, the Deputy Secretary of Energy issued a
    statement noting that the average daily deposit of oil into the SPR in
    2002 represented only 0.14 percent global daily supply, and a DOE
    spokesman was quoted as saying the amount of oil put into the SPR is
    ``a drop in the bucket.''
        In contrast, however, career staff in DOE's SPR office have written
    that the SPR daily fill rate can have a significant impact upon the
    price of oil. One memorandum prepared by the SPR office in the spring
    of 2002, for example, explicitly refutes claims that SPR deposits
    involve ``inconsequential volumes'' of oil:

            [I]f the SPR inventory grows and OPEC does not accommodate that
            growth by exporting more oil, the increase comes at the expense
            of commercial inventories. Most analysts agree that oil prices
            are directly correlated with inventories, and a drop of 20
            million barrels over a 6-month period can substantially
            increase prices. (Memorandum titled, ``Options for Filling the
            Strategic Petroleum Reserve,'' reprinted in PSI minority staff
            report, Appendix 3, page 246.)

        What are your views regarding whether the SPR oil deposits in 2002
    and 2003 affected U.S. oil prices?
        Secretary Abraham. It is administration policy to use the SPR only
    in emergency supply situations or for national security reasons, not to
    influence market prices. However, price is determined by the interplay
    of supply and demand. On the demand side, the acquisition of oil for
    the SPR is one of many demand variables. The SPR acquisition rates
    during all of 2002 were modest, especially when compared to marginal
    demand associated with weather extremes or the decline of demand from
    the airline industry in the wake of the September 11, 2001, disaster.
        Demand fluctuations overall during 2002, however, were small
    compared with volatility of supply. Delays in renewing the Iraqi oil-
    for-food program would periodically reduce supply by 2 million barrels
    per day. Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico caused production platforms
    to be evacuated in the fall of 2002, and a strike in Venezuela starting
    on December 1, 2002, stopped over 3 million barrels per day of
    production. Most importantly, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
    Countries (OPEC) maintained excess production capacity of 4-5 million
    barrels per day through most of 2002. To the extent prices were
    volatile during 2002, that characteristic of the market was driven by
    fluctuations in supply and adherence to production quotas by member
    countries of OPEC, not by SPR oil acquisition.
        High prices during the first quarter of 2003 were associated with
    the Venezuelan strike and concern for war in Iraq. However, the
    decision by OPEC to increase its quota in 2002 and the fulfilled
    promise of extra production by Saudi Arabia in 2003 reduced prices
    substantially. SPR oil acquisition in 2002 has been minimal and has had
    no influence on prices.

        21. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, if SPR oil deposits are too
    inconsequential to affect oil prices, please explain why DOE decided to
    defer scheduled deliveries of oil to the SPR for the past several
    months.
        Secretary Abraham. Starting on December 1, 2003, Venezuelan oil
    production was curtailed due to a general strike. Venezuela is one of
    the largest sources of U.S. petroleum imports, and due to its location
    the shipping time for Venezuelan oil to reach the United States is only
    a few days. Virtually all of the world's excess production capacity is
    in the Persian Gulf, replacement oil for the lost Venezuelan oil was 40
    days away from the United States. Once it became apparent that the
    Venezuelan strike would be prolonged, more oil was produced and shipped
    from the Persian Gulf region for the U.S. Gulf Coast. Nevertheless, due
    to the lengthy transit time, it was prudent to temporarily reduce SPR
    demand for oil in the Gulf Coast in order not to aggravate what was a
    transient regional problem.

                     SPR FILL RATE AND THE U.S. OIL SUPPLY

        22. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, the attached chart shows,
    using DOE/Electronics Industry Association (EIA) data, that U.S. crude
    oil supply and demand are closely balanced. It shows that, since 1986,
    the average daily change in U.S. commercial inventories has been only
    about 50,000 barrels per day, and the largest daily change occurred in
    1999, when U.S. commercial inventories lost an average of 110,000
    barrels per day over the course of the year.

        In light of these 17 years of data, what are your views regarding
    the extent to which an SPR daily fill rate, which, over the course of
    2002, took an average of 135,000 barrels per day of crude oil out of
    the U.S. commercial marketplace, affected available commercial oil
    supplies and U.S. commercial oil inventory levels?
        Secretary Abraham. In general, it is in the interest of the world's
    exporting countries with excess production capacity to match production
    to demand in a price range that allows sustained economic growth.
    Exporting countries are indifferent to the sources of demand, whether
    for industry, transportation or strategic stockpiling. Consequently, as
    long as SPR fill is moderate and consistent it probably has no more
    than transient impacts on commercial inventories.

        23. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, would you agree that an SPR
    fill rate that may be insignificant if it lasts for a short period of
    time, such as a few days, may become significant if continued over a
    longer period of time, such as an entire year, if overall oil supplies
    do not increase during that period?
        Secretary Abraham. If supply were inflexible and other sources of
    demand for oil were inflexible, then by definition any marginal demand
    increase must come out of inventory. Whether a change in commercial
    inventory is significant or not will depend upon whether industry can
    meet commercial demand. During 2002-2003, despite SPR fill, the
    Venezuelan strike, an extremely long winter, the disruption of Nigerian
    exports, and the war in Iraq, industry has been able to satisfy all
    demand for refined products.

                     IMPACT OF AN OIL RELEASE FROM THE SPR

        24. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, in an interview broadcast on
    National Public Radio on March 7, 2003, Dr. Philip Verleger, a leading
    oil economist, was asked why U.S. oil supplies were so low. Dr.
    Verleger replied:

            Venezuela is one reason, but as a U.S. Senate Committee pointed
            out Wednesday, the U.S. Government was filling the Strategic
            Petroleum Reserve last year as prices were rising. By my
            estimate, had the U.S. Government not filled the U.S. Strategic
            Petroleum Reserve or returned the 20 million barrels they'd put
            in back to the market, prices right now would be around $28 a
            barrel instead of $38 a barrel and gasoline prices might be 25
            to 35 cents lower.

        Dr. Verleger has just released an analysis with similar findings.
    This analysis, which is attached, finds that modest releases of oil
    from the SPR last December and January to compensate for the loss of
    oil from Venezuela would have increased U.S. commercial inventories
    enough to have kept crude oil prices as much as $9 per barrel lower,
    and gasoline and heating oil prices almost 30 cents lower. What is
    DOE's reaction to Dr. Verleger's analysis?

        Secretary Abraham. There is no question that there is enough
    inventory in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve that the Government could
    influence short-term oil prices dramatically if it chose to do so.
    However, in the long run, allowing regular Government market
    interventions would have a detrimental impact on market discipline;
    marginal production would fail to materialize; consumers would not
    constrain their energy use; and Government competition would discourage
    private sector inventory accumulation. It is the policy of this
    administration that a free market best allocates resources, and that
    the SPR will only be used in the event of a severe energy supply
    interruption of an emergency nature.

                              SPR DEFERRAL POLICY

        25. Senator Levin. Secretary Abraham, in light of its decisions
    over the past few months to defer scheduled deliveries of oil to the
    SPR, please describe DOE's current SPR deferral policy, including
    whether it has abandoned the no-deferral policy announced in the spring
    of 2002; whether it has restored the prior policy of allowing SPR
    deferrals when oil prices are rising or oil supplies are tightening, in
    exchange for deliveries of additional oil at a later time; or whether
    it has developed new criteria to determine when to grant a request to
    defer a scheduled SPR delivery.
        Secretary Abraham. The policy of the administration is to fill the
    SPR deliberately and cost-effectively, principally through royalty-in-
    kind transfers, to its capacity of 700 million barrels by the end of
    2005. The Department of Energy will consider all of the objectives
    contained in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act for consideration
    during the acquisition process. Specifically, the Department will seek
    to minimize cost, minimize the Nation's vulnerability to a severe
    energy supply interruption, minimize impacts on supply levels and
    market forces, and encourage competition in the petroleum industry. It
    will be our policy to transfer approximately 130,000 barrels of crude
    oil per day from the Department of the Interior to the Department of
    Energy until Reserve capacity is filled. If continuing SPR fill
    impinges on these statutory objectives, we will consider deferring
    deliveries.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy

       BERYLLIUM-EXPOSED WORKERS EMPLOYED BY DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY VENDORS

        26. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Abraham, the Fiscal Year 2003
    Consolidated Appropriations Act required the Department of Energy to
    start an outreach and medical screening program for beryllium-exposed
    workers employed by Department of Energy vendors in the Worcester,
    Massachusetts, area through an existing medical screening program. When
    do you plan to commence this screening and outreach program?
        Secretary Abraham. Planning has started for the new beryllium
    screening and outreach project for beryllium vendor employees in the
    Worchester, Massachusetts, area. The project will be implemented
    through one of DOE's existing Former Worker Program project teams
    located in Boston. Existing facility records at DOE Headquarters have
    been located and provided to the project team to assist it in preparing
    a proposed plan and budget. It is anticipated that outreach will
    commence this summer and medical screening for beryllium exposures will
    be initiated before the end of the fiscal year.

        27. Senator Kennedy. Secretary Abraham, will you use an existing
    former worker medical screening program in order to expedite the
    implementation of this program?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes, an existing Former Worker Program project
    team led by Boston University will implement the new beryllium outreach
    and medical screening program.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka

       NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW, U.S. STOCKPILE, AND WARHEAD DISMANTLEMENT

        28. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, you indicated during your
    testimony that you would provide additional information regarding the
    administration's plans to dismantle warheads. Please also provide, in
    round numbers, what percentage or how many of the warheads will be
    dismantled that will be removed from strategic launchers by virtue of
    the Moscow Treaty or the decision of the administration to have only
    3,800 ``operationally deployed'' strategic warheads by 2008.
        Secretary Abraham. Some warheads are likely to be retired and
    dismantled as a result of the administration's plans to reduce the
    number of operationally deployed strategic warheads to no more that
    3,800 by the end of 2007 and between 1,700 and 2,200 by the end of
    2012, but that determination has not yet been made beyond reaffirming
    the earlier decision to retire the W62 warhead by 2009. [Deleted]. The
    Department of Energy will work with the Department of Defense to set
    appropriate dismantlement rates once warheads excess to national
    security requirements are identified.

        29. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, you indicated during your
    testimony that there is a trade-off between the work involved for
    dismantling weapons and the work involved in maintaining or
    refurbishing weapons. The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget includes
    a $12.9 million increase over the fiscal year 2003 budget for
    dismantlement work. Could you please list the nuclear weapons
    disassembly history from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2002 at the
    Pantex Plant. Please include for each fiscal year: a) the total number
    of weapons disassembled for disposal; b) total weapons disassembled for
    evaluation and then disposed of; c) the total number of weapons
    disassembled and then reassembled; and d) the total number
    disassembled.
        Secretary Abraham.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               Fiscal Year
                                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      1996     1997     1998     1999     2000      2001      2002
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Disassembled for disposal.....................      992      445    1,003      165  Deleted   Deleted   Deleted
    Disassembled for evaluation and then disposed        72       53       59       42  Deleted   Deleted   Deleted
     of...........................................
    Disassembled and then reassembled \1\.........       86      114       84       23  Deleted   Deleted   Deleted
    Total disassembled............................    1,150      612    1,146      230  Deleted   Deleted   Deleted
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Some warheads are disassembled in 1 year and then reassembled in a future year. ``Disassembled and then
      reassembled'' numbers are those reported as ``rebuild'' for the appropriate year.

        30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, please list all projected
    disposal efforts by weapons program and projected start and end dates.
        Secretary Abraham.

             W-79 (Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile)
              Disassembly began in fiscal year 1998 and was completed in
            January 2003.
             W56 (Minuteman II warhead)
              Disassembly began in fiscal year 2000 and will be complete in
            fiscal year 2005.
             B61-3/4 (Non-strategic bomb)
              Disassembly of a small number of excess units planned for
            fiscal year 2004-2005.
             B53 (Strategic bomb)
              Disassembly planned for fiscal year 2006-2007.

        Additional warheads are likely to be retired and dismantled as a
    result of the Nuclear Posture Review, but that determination has not
    yet been made beyond reaffirming the earlier decision to retire the W62
    warhead by 2009. The Department of Energy will work with the Department
    of Defense to set appropriate dismantlement rates once warheads excess
    to national security requirements are identified.

        31. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, please list projected
    refurbishments by warhead type and projected start and end dates.
        Secretary Abraham. The DOE is presently working on four major Life
    Extension Programs (LEPs)--the B61, W76, W80, and W87. This will
    design, build, test, and install new subsystems and components, thereby
    extending the operational service for these warheads for some 30 years.

            W87 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Warhead: The LEP is
            enhancing structural integrity of the warhead. To date more
            than 3/4 of the warheads have gone through the process.
            Start: First Production Unit in second quarter fiscal year 1999
            End: fourth quarter fiscal year 2004

            B61-7/11 Strategic Bomb: The LEP is refurbishing the canned
            subassembly.
            Start: Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) authorized first
            quarter fiscal year 2003
            End: First Production Unit in third quarter fiscal year 2006 (4
            year production program that is currently scheduled to end
            fourth quarter fiscal year 2010)

            W76 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead: The LEP is a
            comprehensive overhaul of the warhead.
            Start: Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) authorized second
            quarter fiscal year 2000
            End: First Production Unit in fourth quarter fiscal year 2007
            (production of a Block 1 quantity to be completed by fourth
            quarter fiscal year 2012)

            W80 Air Launched Cruise Missile and Advanced Cruise Missile
            Warhead: The LEP will replace various warhead components and
            incorporate surety upgrades.
            Start: Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering) in first quarter
            fiscal year 2001
            End: Program being rebaselined from a second quarter fiscal
            year 2006 First Production Unit to a new start date that could
            occur as early as third quarter fiscal year 2007 for the W80-3
            warhead (the production of a Block 1 quantity of warheads would
            continue for 5 years)

        In addition to these major efforts, DOE is carrying out a number of
    smaller-scale alterations to the B61, B83, W78, and W87 warheads.

        32. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, in 1991 Presidents Bush and
    Gorbachev announced they would take unilateral but reciprocal steps to
    consolidate and eliminate, in some cases, their tactical nuclear
    weapons. In the administration briefings on President Bush's decisions,
    officials stated that 850 Lance missile and 1,300 nuclear artillery
    warheads would be eliminated. In addition, 900 B-57 depth bombs would
    be eliminated. Please provide an unclassified list of the warhead types
    covered by President Bush's 1991 pledge, the date dismantlement began
    for each warhead type, the date dismantlement was or will be completed,
    and the number of warheads dismantled.
        Secretary Abraham. President George H.W. Bush, in his September 27,
    1991, Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet
    Nuclear Weapons, stated: ``I am therefore directing that the United
    States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched
    short-range, that is, theater nuclear weapons. We will bring home and
    destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic
    missile warheads.''
        Warhead types covered by President Bush's pledge:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Dismantlement
                    Warhead Type                    Dates (FY)     Quantity
                                                       1992
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    W33 (Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile).....            1992         554
    W48 (Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile).....       1992-1996         737
    W70 (Lance Missile Warhead).................       1992-1997       1,138
    W79 (Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile).....       1998-2003        \1\
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Dismantlements in fiscal year 2000 and beyond are classified
      Confidential Formerly Restricted Data. The W79 data will be provided
      separately.

        While not explicitly pledged to be destroyed as part of President
    Bush's 1991 announcement, the Department of Energy dismantled in excess
    of 900 B57 bombs (all were able to be configured as depth bombs) in
    fiscal year 1992-1996.

        33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, please provide a list of
    warhead concepts currently being worked on at DOE and the national
    labs.
        Secretary Abraham. RNEP is the only warhead concept currently
    planned for work at the national labs in fiscal year 2003-2004.

             ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR AND LOW-YIELD WEAPONS

        34. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, what kinds of assurance can
    you provide that either a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) or
    low-yield weapon could be used in an urban area to attack a buried
    hardened target without causing substantial collateral damage?
        Secretary Abraham. The use of nuclear weapons is a Department of
    Defense matter. It would be inappropriate for me to comment on this
    issue.

        35. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, low-yield nuclear warheads
    are commonly defined as those warheads with an explosive power of less
    than five kilotons. Does the U.S. currently have operational nuclear
    weapons that can have yields of five kilotons or less?
        Secretary Abraham. The U.S. has two existing nuclear weapons that
    have certified yields of less than five kilotons.

        36. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, will either a RNEP weapon,
    new low-yield weapon, or a modified low-yield nuclear weapon require
    nuclear testing?
        Secretary Abraham. As currently conceived, RNEP will not require
    any nuclear testing. We are confident that with simulation and use of
    our past test data, we could design and certify a variety of new or
    modified low yield weapons without requiring nuclear testing.

        37. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, Dr. Everet Beckner of the
    NNSA testified last year that the RNEP concept resulted from a Joint
    Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated requirement. Please
    list all JROC validated requirements post 1996 for advanced concepts
    involving nuclear weapons by date with a brief description.
        Secretary Abraham. The JROC is a Department of Defense
    organization. We receive such requirements through the Nuclear Weapons
    Council. The only such requirement since 1996 has been RNEP.

        38. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, on a related note, are there
    any validated requirements from the Nuclear Weapons Council for a new
    or modified weapon that would produce a yield of five kilotons or less?
        Secretary Abraham. There are currently no validated requirements
    for a new or modified nuclear warhead with a yield of five kilotons or
    less, and the 1994 prohibition on research and development of low yield
    warheads prevents DOD from developing requirements for low yield
    nuclear warheads.

                      U.S. AND FOREIGN PRODUCTION CAPACITY

        39. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, can the Los Alamos facility
    be adapted to fabricate all the pit types for the current stockpile?
        Secretary Abraham. An upgraded facility could be adapted to
    manufacture most, but not all, pit types in the current stockpile.
    However, an upgraded LANL facility would not have the production
    capacity required or agility to simultaneously manufacture multiple pit
    types. Both capacity and agility in pit manufacturing are required to
    meet long-term national security needs.

        40. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, what is the validated
    military requirement for annual pit production?
        Secretary Abraham. The DOD does not establish a validated military
    requirement for annual pit production, but does determine the number/
    types of stockpiled nuclear weapons required. Based on these DOD
    requirements, the DOE then determines the annual pit production
    necessary to ensure that stockpiled nuclear weapons meet national
    security needs. Today, there is a need for additional pits for W88 to
    replace those used for destructive surveillance.

        41. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, you testified today that
    several countries have the ability to produce plutonium pits for a
    nuclear warhead, a capability the U.S. has lacked since 1989. Which
    other countries have this capability, and, if so, are they utilizing
    it?
        Secretary Abraham. Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea
    have the capability to produce plutonium [deleted] nuclear warheads.
    All are assessed to be utilizing or [deleted] their plutonium pit
    production capabilities.

             Russia is likely remanufacturing pits today for its
            existing nuclear weapons stockpile using previously produced
            plutonium.
             Likewise, China is likely producing pits from
            previously produced plutonium in its development of next-
            generation nuclear weapons.
             Although [deleted] compared with Russia's and China's,
            India and Pakistan [deleted] plutonium for their nuclear
            weapons and [deleted].
             [Deleted], North Korea is likely preparing to recover
            existing plutonium [deleted] and, once in hand, [deleted]
            manufacture pits for [deleted] nuclear weapons.

        42. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, you answered in the
    affirmative today to a question about whether North Korea has an
    ability to produce plutonium primaries. Is it the position of the DOE
    that North Korea has a facility for the serial production of plutonium
    primaries? Does the CIA agree with the DOE position?
        Secretary Abraham. Since this question pertains to intelligence
    sources and methods, I am unable to answer it in an unclassified
    context.

        43. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, is it the position of the DOE
    that North Korea has produced one or more plutonium primaries? Does the
    CIA agree with the DOE position?
        Secretary Abraham. Since this question pertains to intelligence
    sources and methods, I am unable to answer it in an unclassified
    context.

                                     RUSSIA

        44. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, some people have proposed
    importing spent nuclear fuel from around the world into Russia. They
    have argued that the proceeds from this would allow Russia to pay for
    needed security and environmental improvements. Before this project can
    be implemented, however, the U.S. needs to sign an agreement on the
    Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy with Russia. Please tell us about the
    status of negotiations with Russia on signing such an agreement.
        Secretary Abraham. According to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the
    United States must enter into an agreement for cooperation before it
    may engage in significant nuclear cooperation with another nation. The
    transfer of U.S. obligated spent fuel to Russia constitutes significant
    nuclear cooperation and would thus require an agreement for cooperation
    between the United States and Russian Federation. The Department of
    State negotiates such agreements with the technical assistance and
    concurrence of the Department of Energy. However, there are no ongoing
    negotiations between the United States and Russian Federation to
    conclude an agreement for cooperation. The administration has made
    clear that we will not negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement with
    Russia under the Atomic Energy Act until our concerns about Russian WMD
    and missile proliferation are resolved.

        45. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, at the Non-Proliferation
    Treaty Preparatory Committee (NPT PrepCom) in 2002, Russian officials
    said the implementation of the Russian commitments under the 1991 Bush-
    Gorbachev Presidential Nuclear Initiatives could be completed soon if
    there were adequate funding. If so, this would be significant as it
    would mean that Russia would dismantle all of its ground forces
    weapons--smaller nuclear artillery shells, nuclear mines, and short-
    range missile warheads--which are the types of nuclear weapons of the
    highest concern from a security standpoint. Since the NPT PrepCom, has
    the administration had formal or informal discussions with Russian
    officials about how much funding would be needed to assist Russia with
    finishing the implementation of its 1991 pledges? If so, what level of
    funding would be needed?
        Secretary Abraham. I share your concern about fully implementing
    the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Using Nunn-Lugar
    funding and other funding, the National Nuclear Security Administration
    is extensively involved in cooperation with Russia to enhance the
    security of Russian nuclear warheads, however the funding is not used
    to enhance the operational capabilities of Russian nuclear forces.
        At the May 2002 Moscow Summit, Presidents Bush and Putin
    established the Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) in
    addition to signing the Moscow Treaty. The CGSS is chaired by the
    Foreign and Defense Ministers of the United States and Russia, as the
    principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen mutual
    confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans and
    discuss a broad range of strategic issues of mutual interest. The
    initial meeting of the CGSS took place in September 2002, and resulted
    in the creation of three working groups: Working Group One on Offensive
    Nuclear Transparency, Working Group Two on Missile Defense Cooperation,
    and Working Group Three on Nonproliferation.
        Working Group One has met twice this year in Geneva. The U.S. focus
    has been to build confidence in a spirit of cooperation by presenting a
    positive long-term vision and emphasizing near-term transparency. As
    Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld mentioned during their testimony on the
    Moscow Treaty and to their Russian counterparts in the CGSS, the United
    States has a strong interest in transparency related to tactical
    nuclear weapons, and in reducing uncertainties about their safety and
    security and implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.
    The issue of transparency of tactical nuclear weapons has been under
    discussion during the Working Group One meetings this year.

        46. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, a significant non-
    proliferation problem is to guarantee Russian nuclear scientists remain
    safely employed in Russia. One avenue to do this is to involve them in
    commercial projects. Do you believe, however, there is non-commercial
    work these scientists could be involved in, such as energy and
    environmental research?
        Secretary Abraham. We believe that finding employment for Russian
    weapons scientists in Russia benefits from multiple approaches.
    Although supporting commercial projects is an important component of
    our effort, there are non-commercial opportunities as well. For
    example, DOE's Russian Transition Initiatives is participating in a
    multilateral effort coordinated by the International Science and
    Technology Center in Moscow to engage Russian nuclear scientists in
    fuel cell research, an important component of the administration's
    energy agenda. In addition to energy and environmental projects, there
    are non-commercial opportunities in nonproliferation research and in
    securing and eliminating weapons grade materials.

        47. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, do you believe the Nuclear
    Cities Initiative (NCI) component of the Russian Transition Initiatives
    (RTI) program should move beyond the three Russian nuclear cities where
    it is currently focused?
        Secretary Abraham. Yes. The Nuclear Cities Initiative should build
    on its success in closing the weapons assembly facility at Avangard and
    begin assisting the Russian Government in shutting down a second
    weapons assembly facility in Zarechny (Penza-19). NCI should also
    expand its efforts to Seversk (Tomsk-7) to complement the efforts of
    the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production project. Finding
    alternative civilian employment for the downsized workforce has been
    identified as a critical factor in that project's ultimate success. I
    believe that with additional funding, NCI can achieve accelerated
    results in both these cities because it can readily adapt the
    successful models developed in Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk.

        48. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, do you think NCI and the
    Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) should devote more
    attention and resources to downsizing and scientist/worker re-direction
    at the closed cities of Zarechny (Penza-19; especially the warhead
    assembly/disassembly plant) and Ozersk (Mayak)?
        Secretary Abraham. Zarechnyy is the second weapons assembly
    facility the Russians have indicated a desire to close, although we
    have not yet reached agreement with them on NCI work in that city. I
    believe that it is important for NCI, which is the downsizing component
    of our Russian Transition Initiative, to devote attention and resources
    to Zarechnyy, now that Avangard is no longer doing nuclear weapons
    work. With the closure of Zarechnyy, the Russians will have only two
    weapons assembly plants, a more appropriate level for the post-Cold War
    environment and one which reduces the surge capacity of the Russian
    nuclear complex. Because considerable U.S. funding is being provided to
    Ozersk by other nonproliferation programs, that city is not a priority
    for either NCI or IPP.

        49. Senator Akaka. Secretary Abraham, do you support a global
    ``clean-out'' of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) stocks at facilities
    that pose security risks--in particular, do you support creating a
    single, focused program at the Department of Energy consolidating the
    U.S. Government's resources, authority, and expertise to remove HEU
    from the world's most vulnerable sites as rapidly as possible?
        Secretary Abraham. The Harvard-NTI Report recommended a new
    initiative along these lines to secure HEU worldwide as rapidly as
    possible. We have carefully considered this recommendation and
    concluded such an initiative is not necessary.
        Under the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement with Russia, we have already
    eliminated over 170 metric tons (MT) of the 500 MT expected to be
    eliminated under this program. Other programs, such as the Accelerated
    Materials Disposition (AMD) and the Reduced Enrichment Research Test
    Reactor and Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program, will secure
    more HEU in the years ahead. We are working with the IAEA and Russia to
    secure HEU supplied to Russian and Soviet-supplied reactors. We have
    made special efforts, such as that directed at the Vinca reactor in
    Yugoslavia, to remove the HEU of greatest concern.
        In our view, the administration's current plans to prioritize
    reducing and eliminating stockpiles based on where they pose the
    greatest threat is the most cost-effective and efficient approach to
    lowering the threat of weapons of mass destruction to the United
    States.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

                          PROTECTION OF SEALED SOURCES

        50. Senator Clinton. Secretary Abraham, unfortunately, radioactive
    materials that can be used to make a ``dirty bomb''--known as ``sealed
    sources''--are currently also used in a wide array of beneficial
    applications in the U.S., including in hospitals, research
    laboratories, food irradiation plants, oil drilling facilities, and
    airport runway lighting.
        In the heightened state of alert that we now find ourselves, we
    need to ensure that these sealed sources are adequately protected
    against theft and nefarious activity. Senator Gregg and I have
    introduced the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act, legislation that would help
    provide such protections and do more to track sealed sources, recover
    any sources that are lost, and ensure that sealed sources are handled
    in a safe and secure manner so that they do not fall into the wrong
    hands--either at home or overseas.
        I know the U.S. recently co-sponsored and you participated in an
    IAEA Conference on the Security of Radioactive Sources. At the
    conference, you stated, ``It is our critically important job to deny
    terrorists the radioactive sources they need to construct such weapons.
    . . . Radioactive sources can be found all over the world, and
    terrorists are seeking to acquire them. The threat they represent to
    people of every nation is very real.'' Do you agree that the Federal
    Government should be doing more domestically to ensure that these types
    of radioactive material--these sealed sources--are adequately protected
    against theft and possible nefarious activity?
        Secretary Abraham. While terrorist use of radioactive materials or
    sealed sources does not threaten the massive destruction of a nuclear
    explosion, it does pose a potentially serious threat to public health
    and safety. I believe that the U.S. should pursue a vigorous effort to
    protect radioactive materials and sealed sources against theft or
    misuse. In fact, both the Department and the NRC have been using our
    existing authority to pursue such an effort.
        Shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, the Chairman of the
    Nuclear Regulatory Commission and I formed an interagency working group
    to address this issue. The Department and the Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission released a comprehensive report on Radiological Dispersal
    Devices on May 14, 2003. That report identified several areas where we
    can accelerate our efforts, including:

             Identification of the radiological sources of greatest
            concern and the development of a national threat policy to
            guide government actions to prevent terrorist use of
            radioactive materials.
             Consideration of a national tracking system for sealed
            sources, with more extensive use of existing databases as an
            interim measure.
             An integrated approach to the recovery and disposition
            of unneeded sealed sources.

        The NRC oversees the disposal of the majority of sealed sources
    used domestically, most of which can be safely disposed at commercial
    sites. The Department of Energy is responsible for the disposal of a
    relatively small amount of radioactive material, which exceeds the
    upper limit for commercial disposal. The Department is working closely
    with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to aggressively recover and
    store unneeded sources from licensees where commercial disposal is not
    available.

        51. Senator Clinton. Secretary Abraham, there are institutions in
    New York State--and throughout the country--that are waiting for the
    DOE to accept these used, sealed sources for appropriate storage under
    the Department's Off-Site Source Recovery Program. In response to an
    inquiry, your Department sent me a letter in August 2001 stating,
    ``Limited safeguards and security issues continue to impact our ability
    to accept Plutonium 239 sources. There are several hundred such sources
    around the county that could be stored under the Off-Site Source
    Recovery Program. We expect to be able to resolve these remaining
    issues and accept the sources . . . prior to September 2002.'' Yet as
    of February of this year, facilities in New York are still waiting for
    a ship date for these sources. Can you please tell me when DOE will be
    able to accept these Plutonium 239 sources for storage under the
    Department's Off-Site Source Recovery Program?
        Secretary Abraham. The Off-Site Source Recovery Program has
    recovered approximately 7,000 sealed sources since 1997. The program
    was provided $10 million in fiscal year 2002 emergency supplemental
    appropriations with a goal of recovering 5,000 sources in 18 months.
    The program has recovered over 2,500 sources under this appropriation
    so far, and DOE expects to exceed the goal of 5,000 sources by April
    2004, which is the end of the 18-month period.
        The Department also has been working to initiate the recovery of
    plutonium-239 sources. Due to the enhanced safeguards and security
    requirements which are required when working with large numbers of
    these sources, this process has been more difficult than with other
    types of sources. The Department has identified a storage location and
    is finalizing the safety and operating procedures at this time. The
    Off-Site Source Recovery Program expects to begin receiving plutonium-
    239 sources before the end of fiscal year 2003. Currently, source
    program staff are visiting a limited number of high priority sites that
    have plutonium-239 sources and packaging those sources for shipment.
    When the storage facility is ready to begin receiving shipments, there
    will be a number of sites already packaged and ready to ship. The Off-
    Site Source Recovery Program is contacting licensees who have excess
    plutonium-239 sources and making plans and arrangements to recover all
    of these sources in an efficient, cost effective manner. It will take
    approximately 1 year to recover all of the known, excess plutonium-239
    sources.

                                  WEST VALLEY

        52. Senator Clinton. Secretary Abraham, I am concerned that
    negotiations between New York State and the Department of Energy
    regarding the West Valley demonstration project in Western New York are
    at an impasse. West Valley has been engaged in the cleanup of nuclear
    waste, but New York State and DOE are at an impasse over who should
    have stewardship of the site. As the cleanup of West Valley proceeds
    each day, it is imperative that we reach an agreement on the long-term
    stewardship of the site. Do you have an update on the status of the
    negotiations? If not, can you have a member of your staff follow up
    with my staff?
        Secretary Abraham. On January 29, 2003, the New York State Energy
    Research and Development Authority issued a press release announcing
    that the negotiations are at an impasse. No formal negotiations have
    taken place since that time.
        We would be pleased, as well, to follow up with your staff.

        [Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2004

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                                HOMELAND DEFENSE

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:17 a.m. in
    room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
    Warner (chairman) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
    Allard, Collins, Chambliss, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, Kennedy, Reed,
    E. Benjamin Nelson, and Pryor.
        Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff
    director.
        Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup,
    professional staff member; Carolyn M. Hanna, professional staff
    member; Patricia L. Lewis, professional staff member; Ann M.
    Mittermeyer, counsel; Paula J. Philbin, professional staff
    member; and Scott W. Stucky, general counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
    Democratic staff director; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority
    counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; and
    Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew W.
    Florell, and Nicholas W. West.
        Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
    assistant to Senator McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to
    Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard;
    James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy
    Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
    assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to
    Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator
    Cornyn; Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy;
    Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; William K. Sutey,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to
    Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
    Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze and Andy York, assistants to
    Senator Pryor.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to receive
    testimony on the Department of Defense's role in the defense of
    our homeland. I am pleased to welcome today's witnesses: the
    Honorable Paul McHale, the first Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for Homeland Defense; General Ralph Eberhart, the first
    Commander of the United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM); and
    Admiral James Ellis, the first Commander of the restructured
    United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Thank you all and
    your assistants for traveling long distances in some instances
    to get here.
        I emphasize the fact that you gentlemen are the first for
    an important reason. You are part of a transformation of our
    military that is broader and deeper than just an examination of
    weapons systems or military hardware. This transformation, a
    refocusing of organizations and missions, was accelerated by
    the tragic events of September 11.
        As we begin our hearing this morning, our thoughts and
    prayers are with our brave men and women in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, as well as other parts of the world. We must be
    ever mindful of the fact that they and their families, their
    efforts are our first line of defense in the overall security
    of our homeland. Homeland defense begins on these outposts of
    the world. For every terrorist stopped on a distant
    battlefield, that is one less who will bring danger to our
    shores.
        As we saw on September 11 and also in recent natural
    disasters, the Department of Defense (DOD) has unique
    capabilities to contribute to the overall security of our
    homeland. You gentlemen represent the leadership that will
    bring these capabilities to bear. Through your testimony, we
    hope to more clearly learn the Department's role in homeland
    security and how each of you envision the interaction between
    your respective organizations to achieve an integrated
    Department of Defense effort and, in tradition with this
    committee, your personal views on what additions should be
    made.
        With the establishment of the new Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), we are reminded that homeland security is an
    enormously complex task that must be carefully coordinated
    throughout the government. It is essential that we understand
    how you will coordinate your efforts with this new department
    and what additional capabilities, resources, and authorities
    you will require to ensure the success of this challenging
    effort that is so vital to our national security.
        The Armed Forces of the United States must in every way
    legally possible support our Nation's homeland security effort.
    This fundamental imperative is one that President Bush
    identified to the American people while he was still Candidate
    Bush. In a speech at The Citadel in September 1999, then-
    Governor Bush stated that, ``The protection of America itself
    will assume a high priority in a new century. Once a strategic
    afterthought, homeland defense has now become an urgent duty.''
    We are indeed fortunate that our President had the foresight to
    begin to prepare our Nation for the challenges we are
    confronting today.
        Gentlemen, you truly are a part of transformational change
    occurring within our Armed Forces. As a part of that, let me
    once again raise a controversial issue, the issue of posse
    comitatus. I have recommended to the administration ever since
    September 11 the reevaluation of the contribution that DOD can
    make to homeland defense and do it within the parameters of
    that tried and effective statute, put on the books for good
    intentions way back when, but I think it needs to be re-
    examined today and I believe the Department is undertaking to
    do that.
        Simply put, this law prohibits members of the Armed Forces
    from engaging in law enforcement activities, a very sensible
    and rational and time-tested, proven doctrine. But things have
    changed and emergencies occur, and in that instance we should
    re-examine whether or not the current law and its regulations
    and interpretations need to be changed in any way and what role
    Congress might have or not have.
        This law was adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War, and
    the rest of the history you know.
        Thank you very much for this opportunity to have all three
    of you here today, as a matter of fact.
        Senator Levin.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to join
    you in welcoming our three witnesses this morning to discuss
    the very important subject of homeland defense.
        As the chairman said, you are part of a first and making
    history. It is appropriate that this hearing this morning is
    taking place in the Senate Caucus Room, which has been a part
    of so much history.
        Admiral Ellis, I guess you made a little history this
    morning, or at least your daughter-in-law did. I understand you
    are a new grandfather. I do not know if that is for the first
    time, but I know you have a new grandson this morning.
    Congratulations on behalf of all of us. I know your son, who is
    the father of your new grandson, is in Afghanistan. We wish the
    new baby, his mother, and his father the best of all wishes
    possible.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you very much, Senator. We are very
    proud.
        Senator Levin. It is typical of your family that the father
    is in Afghanistan. You will be seeing the new boy before the
    father will. But that is the way he chose to dedicate his life,
    and we are very proud of him and you.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you for your kind words.
        Senator Levin. I do not know if either of the other
    witnesses has family either in Iraq or in the area or in
    Afghanistan. If you do, I do not mean to leave you out in any
    way.
        Each of you has a new role to fulfill in meeting the
    challenge of defending the United States, and in General
    Eberhart's case North America. As part of the Unified Command
    Plan Change 2, which was effective last October, the Strategic
    Command and the Northern Command have new missions. The
    Northern Command mission is to provide command and control of
    Defense Department homeland defense efforts and to coordinate
    support to civil authorities. Strategic Command assumes the
    missions of U.S. Space Command as well as four new missions,
    including oversight of command, control, communications,
    computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in
    support of global and strategic operations and global missile
    defense integration.
        The North American Air Defense Command retains its previous
    mission, but now aligns with Northern Command rather than Space
    Command. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Security, also recently established, will provide the
    policy guidance to support the homeland defense mission, as
    well as coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and
    other Federal agencies involved in homeland defense.
        In the short time that each of you has been in your new
    position, you have made considerable progress, including
    establishing a binational U.S.-Canadian commission, working
    with the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Pacific Command
    (PACOM) to develop recommendations regarding future roles and
    organization of the joint inter-agency task forces, drafting a
    plan for establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil
    Support Team (WMD-CST) in every American State and territory,
    and working to develop the right mix of forces that would be
    assigned to the Northern Command under the Joint Task Force-
    Civil Support (JTF-CS) to help civilian authorities when
    directed by the Secretary of Defense.
        Much remains to be done, including the establishment of
    operational requirements for missile defense and implementing
    the computer network defense and attack missions. In addition,
    there remain many challenges, including coordinating between
    Northern Command and Pacific Command to work out the modalities
    of protecting Alaska and Hawaii, coordinating intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance missions for the DOD, and,
    perhaps most importantly, for ensuring usable intelligence is
    provided to all commands in a timely fashion.
        So we thank each of you for your work and your service and
    for launching this new effort. We look forward to hearing from
    each of our witnesses.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
        Senator McCain.
        Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being here today and I
    apologize for not being able to remain during the entire
    hearing. However, I do want to raise one subject with the
    Secretary, General Eberhart, and Admiral Ellis. There is a
    dirty little secret about homeland security that I believe
    needs to be examined and remedied as soon as possible, and that
    is the fact that our borders are not secure.
        We have an increasing flow of illegal immigrants, drugs,
    and possibly--I emphasize, possibly--terrorists through our
    southern border and perhaps our northern border. I am not as
    familiar with the northern border as I am with the southern
    border. We have had park rangers killed. We have had gunfights.
    We have had organizations paint vehicles exactly like Border
    Patrol vehicles and come across our border. We have intercepted
    individuals from Middle Eastern countries. We have found a
    backpack with documents printed in Arabic.
        We have no control over our southern border. 30,000 illegal
    immigrants are coming across the Arizona border every month. I
    think it argues for a high priority. It argues for complying
    with a fundamental of the United States of America's security,
    and that is if our borders are porous and people can move back
    and forth across our borders at will and with impunity, it
    poses a threat. I do not know how we can assure the security of
    our homeland when we have insecure borders.
        In my home State of Arizona, we now have vigilante groups
    who are forming and because of their frustration with the lack
    of enforcement of our border, are now taking the law into their
    own hands. That has some very dangerous consequences, but their
    frustration is somewhat understandable. When you meet ranchers
    who have had 11 times in one week sport utility vehicles
    bursting through the seven-strand barbed wire fence that is the
    barrier between our two countries, invading their land, it is
    serious. When you have the National Park Service personnel who
    are in charge of the wildlife refuges on the border saying the
    wildlife refuges are being destroyed, we have a very serious
    problem.
        It is going to take, among other things, the use of some
    high technology. I do not see how you can put individuals all
    the way across our border between the United States and Mexico.
    I would urge you to look at the use of the Predator, and other
    high tech equipment which we have developed and could easily
    use along our border.
        This issue is serious. It has human consequences. Last
    year, 134 people died in the desert trying to cross over from
    Mexico into the United States of America. It has security
    consequences and it has economic consequences for our health
    care organizations and other providers of assistance to our
    citizens and now are providing it to illegal immigrants.
        So I hope that in your testimony or in the question and
    answer session you will discuss this issue, because again I do
    not see how you can possibly tell Americans that their homeland
    is secure if their border is not secure, and the degree of
    insecurity of those borders I think is not appreciated by most
    Americans today.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for being
    here and I thank them for the outstanding work that they are
    doing.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain. That is a very
    important dimension to our oversight responsibilities. It is
    probably shared by other committees, but we have jurisdiction
    over a portion of that.
        Senator Levin. Before Senator McCain leaves, if I could
    just ask Senator Kennedy to yield for a minute. I want to
    concur in what he said about our borders. The northern border
    which he made reference to is indeed a huge risk for us in
    terms of our security. We have gone into this at great length,
    but the point that he made about our southern border is indeed
    too true for our northern border as well. I want to thank him
    for raising the issue this morning.
        Senator McCain. Could I mention--Mr. Chairman, I do not
    want to take the time of the committee.
        Chairman Warner. Go right ahead.
        Senator McCain. We do not want the military on the border.
    That is not appropriate. It is not constitutional. They are not
    trained for it. There are too many strings on it. I believe
    that a lot of the equipment that the military has can have
    great application to border security, and that is where I hope
    that the members of this panel can be involved and helpful to
    us.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you again.
        Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Kennedy. Just very briefly, welcome, gentlemen. I
    had an opportunity over the weekend to go down to Otis Air
    Force Base, home of the 102nd National Guard Fighter Wing. You
    have elements of it over in Iraq. The 101st, which is one of
    the wings, has been awarded as the top Air National Guard Wing,
    and it obviously has--they take great sense of pride in meeting
    their responsibilities in terms of air security over the
    Northeast. They are very, as you well know, highly skilled,
    highly dedicated and committed, and it is always reassuring.
        Second, on the issues of immigration as well, we passed a
    Border Security Act a little over a year ago and it is
    gradually being implemented. That has implications on both the
    southern border as well as the issues on all the borders
    surrounding us.
        One of the important things that had not been happening is
    the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had not been cooperating
    with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and
    therefore the INS had one hand behind its back. For instance,
    two of the hijackers that came from Saudi Arabia were on the
    watch list and the CIA had not notified them, and they were
    able to get visas to come on in here. So this cooperation is
    something that is beginning to take place, but it is something
    that is going to be enormously important in terms of helping.
        Just a final point. I want to commend the Defense
    Department for its immunization of smallpox. They have done a
    very effective job, immunizing I think 230,000 troops; I do not
    know for sure. They have done it extremely effectively. They
    have had small numbers of adverse reactions. They have taken
    good care of the people with those and I believe, at least what
    I had heard previously, virtually all of them had returned to
    duty.
        But it has been a very good screening program with follow-
    up programs, and it really is the way to do it. As we are
    moving on into these issues on smallpox, the DOD has really
    given a wonderful example of how to do it. Constantly we have
    these other issues and there was a hearing on Severe Accute
    Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) yesterday. There is no reason to
    believe that it is a bioterrorist weapon, but it could have
    been. The way the World Health Organization (WHO) responded on
    that along with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the
    National Institutes of Health (NIH) is enormously reassuring in
    terms of almost a test case on this.
        I bring that to your attention as one of the things that
    appears to be working. Several things that I have mentioned
    here are working very well.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.
        Senator Inhofe, any other members wish to make an opening
    statement, please signify.
        Senator Inhofe. I will just make it very brief, Mr.
    Chairman. My concern is with operation tempo (OPTEMPO) right
    now. I know that, Secretary McHale, you are very interested in
    this and we talked about this before. In fact, all of us have.
    I do not think there has been a time in our history that we
    have had to call up so much of the Reserve component, and it is
    becoming a real hardship and we are losing some critical
    Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). The fact is
    exacerbated by the fact that you also have a lot of your first
    responders in the Guard and in the Reserves. You are going to
    have to be handling that.
        So my major concern is the capacity. What are we going to
    be able to do? How much can you spare from the military side
    for homeland security, because from where I sit in Oklahoma and
    I watch those that are being called up, I do not see that we
    have the capacity to give anything there. So it is a critical
    thing that I know you are having a difficult time dealing with,
    but we certainly have to be answering this in our own minds as
    we develop future budgets because, as the chairman said in his
    opening remarks, things have changed in our relationship with
    the use of the Guard and Reserves.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Are there others? Senator Reed, do you
    wish to make a statement?
        Senator Reed. No, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Fine, thank you.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, I would briefly welcome the
    panel. I think this is the first time we have had a hearing
    since about this time last year when we discussed the
    reorganization, and I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman,
    on a timely hearing. I think it is important. They have been
    stood up since around early this fall--I think it was the 1st
    of October--and then it has been a year now and I am looking
    forward to hearing their comments.
        We did some unique things. We set up Northern Command. We
    also combined U.S. Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command. I
    want to know how that is progressing along.
        On immigration, when I listen to the comments here of my
    colleagues and on the floor, I agree, here on the table, that
    we do have a problem with the borders, but we cannot do it
    alone. It seems to me we have to solicit help from our
    neighbors, Canada and Mexico. We have to get them, and I hope
    that some effort is being done diplomaticly to bring them in.
    They need to be partners in dealing with this. I do not know
    exactly how we do it, but I think that is vital to our success
    on the borders.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a full statement I would
    like to make a part of the record.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Allard follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Wayne Allard

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, at this time, the Department of
    Defense announced several changes in the unified command plan. This is
    really the first time that this committee has had the opportunity to
    examine these changes. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
    hearing. It is important that we remain engaged on these issues.
        Never before has homeland defense and homeland security received so
    much attention. The administration responded to September 11 with a
    number of proposals, including the creation of the Department of
    Homeland Security and the development of a homeland security strategy.
    To better respond to threats to the homeland, the Department of Defense
    recommended several changes to its command structure, which the
    President approved, that greatly improved the Department's ability to
    defend the homeland and support lead civilian crisis and consequence
    management agencies.
        The creation of U.S. Northern Command was one of these changes.
    This new organization will be responsible for protecting our homeland
    from external threats and for supporting Federal, State, and local
    agencies inside the homeland. I look forward to hearing from General
    Eberhart about the progress his command has made over the last year.
        The changes in the unified command plan also included the folding
    of U.S. Space Command into U.S. Strategic Command. I understand that
    Admiral Ellis and U.S. Strategic Command has done a great job in
    supporting our troops in Iraq and in the global war against terrorism.
    But, while I recognize the importance of this effort, I want to make
    sure that other areas, such as Space, also remain a top priority for
    Strategic Command.
        I thank the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense for
    being here today. I understand this is his first appearance before this
    committee since his nomination hearing. I look forward to your
    testimony about the Department's efforts to better protect our
    homeland.
        Our country remains vulnerable to attack; but the administration
    and the Department of Defense recognize these vulnerabilities and are
    taking measures to secure our homeland. This is a long-term process and
    we should not expect quick results. We must be deliberate and certain
    that the measures we take better secure our homeland and protect us
    from potential attacks.
        I appreciate the willingness of our witnesses to testify before
    this committee during this difficult time and look forward to their
    testimony.
        This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Warner. Without objection, it is so admitted.
        Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, I want to welcome you all. There are so many
    concerns today about homeland security, but I have boiled it
    down to hometown security. If you do not feel secure in your
    hometown, it is pretty hard to feel secure in your homeland.
        In the process of calling up reservists and guardsmen, as
    we always have, we are today faced with trading off what we
    have to support us on the front lines versus what we have on
    the home front. So many of our reservists and guardsmen are
    also first responders, firefighters, police officers, and
    emergency workers, that it makes it very difficult. I hope that
    we are able to find a way to protect ourselves and secure the
    people here at home as well as to try to take care of our
    interests abroad.
        So I thank you very much and look forward to your comments.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Collins, as Chairman of the Governmental Affairs
    Committee, you have jurisdiction over some of the aspects of
    homeland defense.
        Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As
    Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, which has
    jurisdiction over the new Department of Homeland Security, I am
    particularly interested in hearing from our witnesses today
    about the extent of cooperation between DOD and the new
    Department of Homeland Security. This is an issue that I
    discussed with Secretary McHale when we met and I look forward
    to hearing the comments of our witnesses in this regard.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Does anyone else have
    an opening statement?
        Senator Cornyn. I will withhold any comments until
    questions.
        Chairman Warner. We will hear from our first witness,
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul
    McHale, a former member of the United States House of
    Representatives and a marine with considerable experience and
    some personal knowledge on what it is like to be called up from
    the Reserves. Welcome.

     STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL McHALE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                          FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE

        Secretary McHale. Good morning, sir. Senator Warner,
    Senator Levin, members of the committee: Good morning.
        I will be submitting a formal statement for the record. It
    is currently under review by the Office of Management and
    Budget (OMB). But, Mr. Chairman, with your consent I would like
    to provide a few brief remarks at the opening of the hearing.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection.
        Secretary McHale. Mr. Chairman, President Bush has said
    that, ``The world changed on September 11, 2001. We learned
    that a threat that gathers on the other side of the Earth can
    strike our own cities and kill our own citizens. It is an
    important lesson, one we must never forget. Oceans no longer
    protect America from the dangers of this world. We are
    protected by daily vigilance at home and we will be protected
    by resolute and decisive action against threats abroad.''
        At the outset, Mr. Chairman, we should recognize that
    America's first line of domestic defense really begins overseas
    and results from the capabilities of our forward deployed
    forces, many of whom are engaged in combat as we meet this
    morning. In that sense, Secretary Rumsfeld has correctly noted
    that the annual homeland defense budget of the Department of
    Defense is $380 billion.
        Recognizing, however, in the wake of the attacks on
    September 11, that it was now essential to establish a new
    combatant command with specific geographic responsibility for
    the United States, NORTHCOM was created. On 1 October, NORTHCOM
    assumed initial operational capability (IOC). The mission of
    NORTHCOM, as paraphrased by Senator Levin a few minutes ago, is
    as follows: ``United States Northern Command conducts
    operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression
    aimed at the United States, its territories and interests,
    within assigned areas of responsibility, as directed by the
    President or the Secretary of Defense provides military
    assistance to civil authorities, including consequence
    management operations.''
        NORTHCOM's responsibilities fall essentially into two
    categories: the warfighting defense of the area of
    responsibility (AOR) and civil support to civil authorities
    under circumstances where we in the Department may have a
    unique capability not possessed by the civilian community or,
    as was the case after September 11, under those circumstances
    where it is determined that civilian authorities are
    overwhelmed by the immediate challenge at hand.
        NORTHCOM's force structure is unusual when compared to
    other geographic combatant commands. There are very few forces
    which are permanently assigned, although appropriate units have
    been identified for possible assignment as needed. NORTHCOM's
    commander is my friend Ed Eberhart, a superb general who joins
    me this morning. His headquarters is located at Peterson Air
    Force Base and, as I noted a few moments ago, his command
    assumed initial operational capability just a few months ago.
        I was nominated by the President to become the first
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense in January.
    That was to fill a new position created by the National Defense
    Authorization Act of 2003. You were kind enough to confirm me
    to that position approximately 2 months ago.
        During the past 2 months since I appeared before you during
    my confirmation hearing, we have been busy. I have visited
    virtually every major homeland defense command in the United
    States. In the case of Hawaii--a distant responsibility--
    pursuant to the commitment that I gave to Senator Akaka,
    although I could not physically visit Hawaii during that period
    of time, I had a secure videoteleconference with the operations
    officer for PACOM and discussed with him the same kinds of
    issues that I had covered in person with all of the other
    commands.
        Chairman Warner. There are a number of those commands and
    would you provide for the record a listing.
        Secretary McHale. The ones that I visited, sir?
        Chairman Warner. I want to know all of them. Whether you
    visited them or not, we would like to have the entire structure
    as a part of the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [Deleted.]

        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir, we will happily submit that.
        Just to give you a brief summary, NORTHCOM and North
    American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), are collocated out
    of Peterson Air Force Base. Beneath NORTHCOM in terms of
    command and control we have Joint Task Force-Civil Support,
    which is located in Norfolk; Joint Forces Headquarters,
    Homeland Security, also in Norfolk. We have a series of six
    Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs), rapid reaction forces at the
    battalion level, that are geographically dispersed throughout
    the United States. We have JTF-6, which is located in El Paso.
        I have visited nearly all of those. There are two QRFs that
    I have not yet been able to visit, one at Fort Drum and one in
    Alaska, but hopefully those visits will be scheduled in the
    very near term.
        That gives you essentially an overview of the wire diagram
    that falls under the command of General Eberhart. If I have
    missed any major components, he can certainly add to the list
    that I presented to you during his testimony. We will give you
    a formal list of all of those units for the record, sir.
        Chairman Warner. If you have a wiring diagram, that would
    be helpful also.
        Secretary McHale. We do, sir. As you look at that----
        Chairman Warner. Does anyone have a copy of it with him?
        Secretary McHale. Pardon me, sir?
        Chairman Warner. Does any witness have a copy of that
    wiring----
        General Eberhart. Let me check, sir. I may.
        Chairman Warner. If so, I would like to have the diagram
    duplicated and distributed to the members in attendance.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        Senator Collins a couple of moments ago emphasized her
    interest in the relationship between the Office of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and the new
    Cabinet agency for which her committee has primary oversight
    responsibility, the Department of Homeland Security. Senator,
    let me assure you that in the interim since we last spoke we in
    the Department of Defense have worked very hard to establish a
    close working partnership with the Department of Homeland
    Security.
        We have a full-time Department of Defense representative in
    their operation center. We are in daily communication with the
    Department of Homeland Security. We have complete sharing of
    intelligence information between the two departments. Routinely
    each day we provide to them intelligence that we in the
    Department of Defense believe may be helpful to them in the
    execution of their mission, and they similarly do not hesitate
    to contact us on matters that are of mutual concern.
        In addition, Pete Verga, who has now been appointed my
    principal deputy and is seated behind me, has as one of his
    major responsibilities the day-to-day management of that
    relationship between the Department of Homeland Security and
    the Department of Defense.
        Mr. Chairman, I had a number of other comments, but in the
    interest of time I will bring my opening statement to a close.
    I certainly would welcome any questions that you might have and
    I will do my very best to answer them. I would simply say in
    conclusion that I can assure you today, as always, America's
    men and women in uniform stand ready to defend our Nation
    against any threat at home or abroad. I welcome your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary McHale follows:]

                     Prepared Statement by Hon. Paul McHale

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and members of the committee: I
    appreciate the opportunity to meet with you on the critical subject of
    our Nation's security.
        As stated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the highest
    priority for the U.S. military is the defense of the U.S. homeland. At
    home and abroad, the Department of Defense is a significant contributor
    in this national effort to secure our Nation and its people.
        The President understands that terrorists can attack at any time,
    in any location, using every conceivable technique. He also understands
    that it is physically not possible to defend against every conceivable
    threat, in every place, at every time. To successfully defend against
    terrorism, and other 21st century threats, requires that we take the
    war to the enemy. Our task is to put pressure on the terrorists
    wherever they are, in Afghanistan and across the globe, to ensure that
    they have no safe haven, no sanctuary, anywhere in the world.
        That is why the President has marshalled all of the Nation's
    capabilities--political, economic, financial, law enforcement, military
    and intelligence--to deter, attack, and destroy terrorist
    organizations, and those who harbor them. These organizations typically
    threaten the United States, our interests, or our allies from terrorist
    locations overseas.
        That is why defense of the homeland actually starts abroad, where
    our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are putting their lives on
    the line every day to make it more difficult for terrorists to plan or
    execute their attacks before they ever near our borders.

                     HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY

        As described by the President in the National Strategy for Homeland
    Security, homeland security is defined as a concerted national effort
    to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the
    vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the
    damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks.
        In addition, the Defense Department defines homeland defense as the
    military protection of United States territory, domestic population,
    and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and
    aggression. It also includes routine, steady state activities designed
    to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for action if
    deterrence fails.
        With respect to homeland security, the Defense Department will
    usually operate in support of a lead Federal agency. While in homeland
    defense activities, the Defense Department will take the lead and be
    supported by other Federal agencies. In fact, Section 876 of Public Law
    107-296, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, recognizes the Department
    of Defense's lead role in the conduct of traditional military missions
    by providing that ``[n]othing in this act shall confer upon the
    Secretary [of Homeland Security] any authority to engage in
    warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other
    military activities, nor shall anything in this act limit the existing
    authority of the Department of Defense or the Armed Forces to engage in
    warfighting, the military defense of the United States, or other
    military activities.'' This section clearly delineates the difference
    between homeland defense activities and homeland security activities.

         THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF THE NATION

        In his testimony before Congress in May of last year, the Secretary
    of Defense described three distinct circumstances in which the
    Department of Defense would be involved in activities within the United
    States:
        The first case was extraordinary circumstances, which require the
    Department to execute its traditional military missions. For example,
    combat air patrols and maritime defense operations. In these cases the
    Department plays the lead role and is supported by other Federal
    agencies. For instance, combat air patrols where the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) provides data to assist the efforts of Air Force
    fighter pilots in identifying and, if necessary, intercepting
    suspicious or hostile aircraft. Also included in the category of
    extraordinary circumstances are cases in which the President,
    exercising his Constitutional authority as Commander in Chief,
    authorizes military action.
        The second case was emergency circumstances of a catastrophic
    nature--for example: responding to an attack or assisting in response
    to forest fires, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and so forth, during
    which the Department may be asked to act quickly to provide
    capabilities that other civilian agencies do not have.
        Finally, the Secretary noted temporary circumstances, where the
    Department is given missions or assignments that are limited in
    duration or scope and other agencies have the lead from the outset. An
    example of this would be security at a special event like the Olympics.
    Another example is assisting other Federal agencies in developing
    capabilities to detect chemical/biological threats.
        Subsequent to the Secretary's testimony, three significant changes
    to the Department of Defense have fostered an evolving perspective of
    our role at home in the security of our Nation.
        First, the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the
    President, changed the Unified Command Plan and stood up, on October 1,
    2002, the U.S. Northern Command. U.S. Northern Command's mission is to:

             Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat
            threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its
            territories, and interests within the assigned area of
            responsibility; and
             As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense,
            provide military assistance to civil authorities including
            incident management operations.

        General Ed Eberhart, Commander of U.S. Northern Command, also
    commands the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is
    collocated with U.S. Northern Command at Peterson Air Force Base,
    Colorado Springs, Colorado. U.S. Northern Command is a U.S. only
    command and NORAD is a U.S.-Canada bilateral command. NORAD is
    responsible for the aerospace defense of North America. U.S. Northern
    Command is responsible for the land, maritime and U.S.-only air
    capabilities of homeland defense. The two commands work closely
    together on a daily basis to provide aerospace defense to the Nation.
    The U.S. Northern Command and NORAD staffs are integrated with the
    dual-hatting of many staff officers.
        U.S. Northern Command's area of responsibility includes air, land
    and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States,
    Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately
    500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico
    and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The defense of Hawaii and our territories
    and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility of U.S.
    Pacific Command. U.S. Northern Command will additionally be responsible
    for security cooperation and coordination with Canada and Mexico.
        In addition to defending the Nation, U.S. Northern Command will
    provide military assistance to civil authorities in accordance with
    U.S. laws and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.
    Military assistance is almost always in support of a lead Federal
    agency, such as the Department of Homeland Security.
        Military civil support includes domestic disaster relief operations
    that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Support
    also includes counter-drug operations and consequence management
    assistance, such as would occur after a terrorist event employing a
    weapon of mass destruction.
        Second, the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act
    directed the establishment of an ``Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Defense.'' I am honored to serve as the first Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
        In accordance with Section 902 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump
    National Defense Authorization Act of 2003, my principal duty is ``the
    overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the
    Department of Defense'' to be exercised subject to the Secretary's
    authority, direction and control (10 U.S.C. 113(b)) and without
    interfering with the chain of command over the Armed Forces (10 U.S.C.
    162(b)). My charge, as given to me by law, by the Secretary of Defense,
    and by the President is to lead and focus the Department's activities
    in homeland defense and homeland security, ensure internal coordination
    of DOD policy direction, provide guidance consistent with the law to
    Northern Command for its homeland defense mission and its military
    activities in support of homeland security, to include support to civil
    authorities, and to coordinate with the Homeland Security Council
    (HSC), the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), and other government agencies. In other words, I am
    responsible for recommending to the Secretary the roadmap for the
    Defense Department's role in securing our Nation at home.
        Third, the Fiscal Year 2003 National Defense Authorization Act also
    directed the establishment of an ``Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence.''
        The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will have the
    primary responsibilities to assure that the senior leadership of the
    Department and Combatant Commanders receive the warning, actionable
    intelligence and counter-intelligence support needed to pursue the
    objectives of our new defense strategy.
        The Under Secretary will also enhance Defense Department
    intelligence-related activities, provide a single point of contact for
    coordination of national and military intelligence activities with the
    Community Management Staff and strengthen the relationship between the
    Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. So, in
    terms of this forum, the new Under Secretary will define and provide
    oversight for the Defense Department's participation in national
    Indications and Warning.

                        DOD ACTIONS TO DEFEND THE NATION

        As the President said, on the eve of the standup of the new
    Department of Homeland Security, ``We're tracking down terrorists who
    hate America, one by one. We're on the hunt. We [have] them on the run.
    It's a matter of time before they learn the meaning of American
    justice. We're opposing terror regimes that are arming with weapons of
    mass destruction to threaten the peace and freedom of this world. We're
    taking unprecedented measures to defend the homeland with the largest
    reorganization of our government in more than a half a century.''
        On October 7, 2001, we took the fight to the enemy when we, along
    with our allies, launched attacks against al Qaeda and the Taliban in
    Afghanistan. This operation, Operation Enduring Freedom, successfully
    liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban, destroyed al Qaeda training
    bases, disrupted al Qaeda communications and impaired al Qaeda
    organizational efforts.
        The Department continues to prosecute the war on terrorism abroad.
    Today, the brave men and women waging the war against terrorism around
    the world are America's first and most important line of defense
    against homeland attack. By going directly to the source and rooting
    out terrorists and their networks, they deter and defeat terrorist
    attacks before they occur.
        Protecting our Nation requires an unprecedented level of
    cooperation throughout all levels of government, with private industry
    and institutions, and with the American people. The Federal Government
    has the crucial task of fostering a collaborative environment, and
    enabling all of these entities to work together to provide the security
    our Nation requires. The new Department of Homeland Security is tasked
    with the responsibility of leading this national effort to protect our
    Nation against terrorist attacks. The Secretary of Defense has made a
    public commitment to work closely with the new Department of Homeland
    Security in order to coordinate our respective responsibilities.
        The U.S. military actually took its first step in response to
    September 11, 2001 when two F-15 Eagle jets arrived at the World Trade
    Center, just minutes after United Airlines Flight 175 sliced into the
    second tower. While they were unable to alter the course of history on
    that morning, they stood guard with renewed vigilance. They were the
    first, but they were not the last.
        The direct defense of the American homeland, Operation Noble Eagle,
    commenced immediately after the September 11 attacks and includes
    combat air patrols over key domestic locations, expanded air
    operations, and command and control of active component forces,
    including U.S. Navy ships with anti-aircraft systems to enhance the
    security of U.S. domestic airspace. Since September 11, 2001, DOD has
    been flying daily combat air patrols over U.S. cities. Since that date,
    DOD has flown over 28,000 sorties and responded to more than 1,000
    requests from the FAA to intercept potential air threats. Operation
    Noble Eagle also entails Coast Guard inspections of cargo vessels and
    patrols--supported by Navy Patrol Coastals--in defense of major
    seaports.
        The Department of Defense is supporting the Department of Homeland
    Security as the lead Federal agency for homeland security. Military
    planners assisted the Department of Homeland Security in the
    development of the Liberty Shield plan. DOD's continuing homeland
    security commitments as part of Operation Noble Eagle complement
    Liberty Shield's national effort to protect our citizens and
    infrastructure.

            THE NATIONAL GUARD'S ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF THE NATION

        One of the critical elements in DOD's contribution to the security
    of our Nation is the National Guard. Since the terrorist attacks of
    September 11, the Defense Department has depended daily upon the
    personnel and resources of the National Guard. In fact, the two F-15
    Eagle jets that responded to the attacks on the World Trade Center on
    September 11, 2001, were from the 102nd Fighter Wing, Massachusetts Air
    National Guard at Otis Air National Guard Base (ANGB).
        When we were attacked on September 11, more than 100,000 reservists
    and National Guard members sprang into action--Army, Navy, Air Force,
    Marines, Coast Guard. Since then, they have helped defend our homeland,
    drive the Taliban from power, shut down the terrorist training camps in
    Afghanistan, and liberate the Afghan people.
        These contributions have been vital to our success thus far in the
    global war on terrorism.
        The National Guard is particularly well-suited to perform selected
    homeland defense missions, such as the Air National Guard's important
    role in continental air defense. However, the National Guard is combat
    ready to conduct overseas military operations and is relied upon by
    combatant commanders as part of our Nation's strategic Reserve.
        In the past, the National Guard was dual-tasked. In wartime, the
    Nation has expected the Guard to fulfill its mission overseas; in
    peacetime, the Nation has expected the Guard to be available for
    domestic emergencies. The terrorist attacks of September 11 have now
    taught us that the National Guard may be called upon to do both at the
    same time, not by accident but because our Nation's enemies may attack
    us in both places at once.
        Consequently, as DOD reviews how best to deal with the challenge of
    the new security environment, it is mindful of the need to properly
    balance the application of the total force to: defend the homeland,
    contribute to the global war on terrorism, meet military commitments
    abroad, and, if necessary, participate in a major theater war.
        The National Guard can support homeland security in several ways.
    First, the Guard can operate in State service under the direction of
    the governors. For example, on September 11, the National Guard of New
    York, New Jersey and Connecticut responded to the attacks on the World
    Trade Center.
        Second, in State service but performing duties of Federal interest,
    in Title 32 status. This status involves State command and control, but
    Federal payment of costs.
        Third, in Federal Title 10 status, when the National Guard is
    mobilized to serve under the direction of the President or the
    Secretary of Defense. Significantly, the Commander of Northern Command
    will have command authority over the Guard only when it is serving in
    Title 10 status. In all other cases, command authority over the Guard's
    activities remains with State governors.
        These arrangements have worked well in the past. The challenge
    today is to translate them into our new security environment. There are
    many proposals for doing so, and we'll work with the NSC, HSC, DHS,
    Congress, and the governors to make certain that we have an approach
    that meets the Nation's needs.

     THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE-DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

        March the 1st marked an historic day for the Federal Government.
    Over 170,000 employees from more than 20 different agencies officially
    became part of the Department of Homeland Security, creating a more
    effective, organized and united defense of our homeland. The Department
    of Homeland Security is a vital and important step in reorganizing our
    government to meet the threats of a new era as we continue the work of
    securing our Nation.
        As noted earlier, the Secretary of Defense has made a public
    commitment to work closely with the new Department of Homeland Security
    in order to coordinate the respective responsibilities. DOD and DHS
    have complementary missions and capabilities. In general, the
    Department of Defense is responsible for homeland defense missions--to
    defend the land, maritime, and aerospace approaches from external
    threats--while the Department of Homeland Security will be responsible
    for major elements of domestic security and civil preparedness. DOD
    will also provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities in
    accordance with U.S. law, as directed by the President and the
    Secretary of Defense. For example, such assistance could include
    support for incidence management operations led by the Department of
    Homeland Security when authorized by the President or the Secretary of
    Defense. There will be an ongoing requirement for U.S. Northern Command
    to coordinate plans, exercises, and training with the operating
    components of DHS.
        As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, I will
    supervise all DOD homeland defense activities, including combatant
    command capabilities, consistent with the Secretary's direction and
    without interfering with the chain of command, and will coordinate all
    requests for assistance and cooperative ventures between the Department
    of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.

                 THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FIRST RESPONDERS

        DOD is eager to continue a long tradition of providing specialized
    capabilities, technology, and training to first responders. In
    addition, in situations where civilian authority capabilities to deal
    with emergencies is overwhelmed, DOD can provide unique assistance
    support of first responders. Some of these capabilities include those
    provided by the U.S. Northern Command's Joint Task Force Civil Support,
    the National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams
    (WMD-CST), the Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the
    Chemical/Biological-Rapid Response Team (CBRRT), explosives detection,
    technical escort, and medical services.
        DOD participates in many interagency efforts to transfer applicable
    technologies to first responders. For example, DOD invests around $100
    million annually in the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). The
    TSWG is a broad, interagency group that brings together nearly 20
    Federal agencies to develop, test, and field technology that would
    protect U.S. forces from terrorist attacks. These technologies also
    typically are applicable to first responders and other homeland
    security missions.
        DOD, through the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical
    and Biological Defense, funds and participates in the InterAgency Board
    for Equipment Interoperability and Standardization (IAB). The IAB is a
    user-working group supported by voluntary participation from various
    local, State emergency responders, Federal Government, and private
    organizations. It is designed to help achieve standardization,
    interoperability, and responder safety and to better prepare emergency
    responders to respond to, mitigate, and recover from any incident by
    identifying and advocating requirements for Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, Nuclear or Explosives (CBRNE) incident response
    equipment. The IAB publishes annually the Standardized Equipment List
    (SEL) that is utilized by National Institute of Justice in their grant
    process to guide State and locals on procurement of equipment for WMD
    preparedness.
        Section 1401 of the Fiscal Year 2003 Bob Stump National Defense
    Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense to appoint a senior
    individual to ensure transfer of technology and equipment to emergency
    responders and the civilian sector.
        DOD also provides first responder training at a variety of
    installations around the country. These programs--at facilities like
    the Chemical School, Maneuver Support Center, and the Chemical Defense
    Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the Defense
    Nuclear Weapons School operated by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico--train DOD, State, and local
    responders to recognize and react to weapons of mass destruction and
    disaster situations.
        From local to national level, the Defense Department is an active
    participant in military/civilian training exercises. In fact, this
    year, elements of the Defense Department are scheduled to participate
    in exercises with Federal entities such as the Department of Homeland
    Security, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, States such as Iowa, Utah, and Texas, and in
    cities such as Colorado Springs, Colorado, Seattle, Washington, and
    Winterburg, Arizona. Whether we are talking about a TOPOFF tabletop
    exercise in Washington, D.C. to examine the national response to a
    weapon of mass destruction attack or a Regional Readiness Workshop in
    Anchorage, Alaska to examine how the Federal, State, and local
    authorities cooperate to deal with the aftermath of an earthquake, such
    exercises forge realistic expectations, foster a firm understanding of
    roles and responsibilities, identify best practices, and highlight
    shortfalls that must be overcome.
        Some in Congress have expressed concerns that many first responders
    are also members of the military's Reserve component and that they may
    be called from their important local roles to fulfill their military
    missions. The Defense Department shares this concern. This is why,
    since 1979, the Defense Department has managed a screening program to
    ensure that civilian employers can identify critical positions that
    cannot be filled with personnel who are subject to mobilization. This
    program is intended to minimize conflicts between employees' military
    service obligations and their civilian employment requirements during
    times of war or national emergency.
        Due to the unique nature of the current emergency, which requires
    not only mobilization of the Ready Reserve but also the careful
    protection of public health and safety, the Defense Department has
    established a special process to accommodate individual requests from
    Federal and non-Federal agencies to submit mobilization exemption or
    delay for their employees who are Ready reservists, based on the
    critical nature of their civilian employment. DOD considers these
    requests on a case-by-case basis. Ready reservists who are granted
    exemption from mobilization are transferred to the Standby Ready
    Reserve or the Retired Reserve, or discharged, as appropriate.
        DOD is also in the process of establishing a mandatory Civilian
    Employment Information program. This new program will require the
    collection of both employee and employer related information. The
    Department's intent is to permit the military to fulfill mobilization
    requirements, while avoiding the dilemma outlined by some Members of
    Congress.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In conclusion, the department and agencies--Federal, State, and
    local--charged with protecting American people and property share a
    common goal: to assure the security of American citizens, territory,
    and sovereignty. The Defense Department plays a proud role in the
    security of our Nation and will continue to work closely with others
    that share this responsibility. America's men and women in uniform
    stand ready to defend the Nation both at home and abroad.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        General Eberhart.

     STATEMENT OF GEN. RALPH E. EBERHART, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES NORTHERN COMMAND

        General Eberhart. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
    distinguished members of the committee: I thank you for this
    opportunity to appear before you once again. I also thank you
    for your continued support of and commitment to a strong
    national defense, and especially the way you support those men
    and women who serve this great Nation and their families,
    especially those in harm's way.
        Chairman Warner. Would you bring the microphone up closer.
        General Eberhart. I am sorry, sir.
        Chairman Warner. You are not carrying your voice well.
        General Eberhart. Is this better?
        Chairman Warner. It is better.
        General Eberhart. Excuse me.
        It is also a pleasure to serve with the two gentlemen with
    me today. As Secretary McHale has said, we are not only
    professional colleagues, but we are also close personal
    friends. I can tell you in the 2 months that he has been on
    board he has certainly made a difference in focusing the
    Department on homeland defense and homeland security.
        To my left, Admiral Jim Ellis. As has been said, we have
    worked hard over the last year to establish our two new unified
    commands. There is a very special relationship between
    Strategic Command and NORAD and Northern Command when you look
    at aerospace warning, aerospace control, and in the future as
    you look toward missile defense.
        Although I have been asked this morning to appear as
    Commander of Northern Command, I would like to speak briefly
    about NORAD, a very special binational relationship that has
    served Canada and the United States exceedingly well since
    1958. The professional actions of those men and women in the
    aftermath of September 11 mentioned by Senator Kennedy, those
    at Otis among them, I am convinced have served to protect our
    population centers and our key infrastructure from air attack
    to this day. They have flown over 29,000 sorties collectively
    without an incident or an accident, which attests to their
    skill and expertise.
        Now let us turn to Northern Command. Northern Command is
    first and foremost a U.S. unified command, a construct that we
    adopted with the National Security Act of 1947. In fact,
    December of that year European Command, Pacific Command, and
    Southern Command were established. We decided at that time,
    because we were protected by two wide oceans and two friendly
    nations, that we did not need that command structure in North
    America.
        Then in 1958, because of the threat of Soviet long-range
    aviation and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), we
    established NORAD, but their responsibility was for air and
    space, not for land and sea.
        In the aftermath of September 11, it became apparent to the
    Secretary of Defense and the President that we were violating a
    principle of military command and control, that we did not have
    centralized command and control, decentralized execution. The
    President and the Secretary had to go to several different
    commanders that day to craft our reaction to those tragic
    events of September 11.
        So they decided and, with your support, they established
    Northern Command in October of this last year. Again, this is
    first and foremost a U.S. unified command; job number one,
    national security, homeland defense, defense against foreign
    aggression. However, this command is in fact different, as
    Secretary McHale has alluded to, in that our homeland is in our
    area of responsibility. So we have the secondary mission, which
    will be our prominent mission in the near future in my view,
    and that is providing support to civil authority, one-stop
    shopping, if you will, for Federal forces to be used however
    the President and the Secretary of Defense decide is the right
    way to use it to protect the men and women of this great
    Nation.
        I believe that, as you look at where we were a year ago or
    6 months ago or 3 months ago, we have come a long way. Mr.
    Chairman, you and I discussed during the confirmation hearing
    initial operational capability and full operational capability
    (FOC), and you cautioned me not to wait, to press ahead as fast
    as we possibly can, and we have done just that. In fact, I
    believe that we are farther along than I would have dreamed
    possible last year at this time or even 1 October, right around
    the time that we discussed it.
        But we still have a long way to go. In fact, I would offer
    to you that we should never be satisfied with our status in
    terms of homeland defense and homeland security. We need to
    continue to advance the ball. We need to continue to get
    better, because I guarantee you the bad guy out there, those
    who wish us harm, are figuring out ways as we speak today to
    attack us and what is near and dear to us.
        As the Secretary of Defense has said, this is important
    business. This is mission number one, to protect the men and
    women of this great Nation where they live and work.
        I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Eberhart follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, USAF

        Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and members of the committee:
        It is an honor to appear before this committee again, and to
    represent the outstanding men and women of North American Aerospace
    Defense Command and United States Northern Command. The soldiers,
    sailors, airmen, marines, coast guardsmen, national guardsmen,
    reservists, and civilians serving in our Commands are truly the ``best
    of the best,'' and give our two great nations--the United States and
    Canada--every reason to be proud.
                                     norad
        Our number one priority is to strengthen aerospace warning and
    control of United States and Canadian airspace. Prior to 11 September
    2001, we focused on threats originating from outside North America. As
    a result of these terrorist attacks, we now also look for threats from
    within our borders.
        Thanks in large part to the timely passage of the Fiscal Year 2002
    Defense Emergency Response Fund, today we have connectivity with 70 FAA
    long-range interior en route radars, better ground-to-air
    communications, and a robust coordination capability to provide
    comprehensive coverage of our airspace.
        Throughout this integration effort, the FAA has been very
    responsive to our requests for technical assistance. This strong
    partnership of dedicated people is committed to further improving our
    ability to protect the Nation's airspace.
        Operation Noble Eagle. NORAD defends North America from domestic
    air threats through Operation Noble Eagle. Across the United States and
    Canada, armed fighters are on alert and flying irregular combat air
    patrols to identify and intercept suspect aircraft. Since 11 September
    2001, we have flown over 28,000 sorties to deter, prevent and defend
    against potential terrorist attacks, without a single mishap. This
    tremendous accomplishment is a tribute to the professionalism and
    perseverance of the men and women executing these missions.
        In addition, we are supporting homeland defense operations with a
    layered air defense of the National Capital Region. We have developed
    new relationships across the DOD and with interagency partners to
    establish a comprehensive shield to guard our Nation's capital.
        To maintain our warfighting edge, we routinely exercise and
    evaluate our ability to defend against the full spectrum of air
    threats. United States' and Canadian civil agencies continue to make
    air travel safer through increased airport and aircraft security
    measures. However, if called, we stand ready as the last line of
    defense against threats within our airspace.
        North American Air Surveillance Plan. In our efforts to provide the
    best possible coverage of North America, we have teamed with the FAA
    and North American Air Surveillance Council to further enhance our
    wide-area surveillance capabilities. There has been an outstanding
    level of interagency cooperation to develop a comprehensive North
    American Air Surveillance Plan that addresses our requirements to
    detect, identify and classify all aircraft within North American
    airspace. We look forward to fielding expanded capabilities that track
    even smaller, low-altitude threats.

                             NORAD'S RELATIONSHIPS

        USNORTHCOM. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are two separate commands. Neither
    command is subordinate to the other or a part of the other, but we work
    very closely together. Members of the two commands work side-by-side
    within the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center and, in many cases,
    United States military members are dual-hatted in positions on both
    staffs.
        Bi-National Planning Group. The Departments of Defense and State
    have been working with their counterparts in Canada to develop
    additional areas of cooperation to better protect our citizens. One
    promising outcome of this collaboration is an agreement to establish a
    Bi-National Planning Group for a 2-year term.
        This group will identify additional ways to protect our citizens
    and strengthen air, land and maritime defense of North America, while
    respecting the national interests and sovereignty of each nation.
    Members have already begun arriving and will be appended to NORAD.

                                   USNORTHCOM

        On 1 October 2002, the President established USNORTHCOM as a
    regional combatant command to provide ``unity of command'' for United
    States military actions that counter threats to our homeland from the
    air, land, or sea domain. We are just like the other regional combatant
    commands, with one important difference--the United States homeland is
    in our area of responsibility.
        We conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and
    aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests.
    We also provide military assistance to civil authorities, when directed
    by the President or the Secretary of Defense. When we work with civil
    authorities, we will most likely be in a support role to a lead Federal
    agency, providing ``one-stop shopping'' for Federal military
    assistance. The President's decision to establish USNORTHCOM has
    enhanced the DOD's ability to provide quick, responsive support, when
    and where needed.
        Organization. USNORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces.
    Whenever mission requirements dictate, we will request additional
    forces from the Secretary of Defense, and if approved, receive them
    from our force provider, United States Joint Forces Command. Our day-
    to-day operations are conducted by three subordinate commands:

             The Joint Force Headquarters--Homeland Security
            supports land and maritime defense planning for the continental
            United States, and provides military assistance to civil
            authorities.
             The Joint Task Force--Civil Support provides command
            and control of consequence management forces that respond to
            chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield
            explosive events.
             The Joint Task Force--6 provides support to Federal,
            State, and local counterdrug law enforcement agencies.

        Exercises. Over the past several months, we have trained and
    exercised with 55 Federal, State, and local agencies across a broad
    spectrum of scenarios. During Unified Defense 02-2 in September 2002,
    we validated our initial capability to command and control forces in
    response to future attacks. Most recently, in February 2003, we
    completed a second major exercise, Unified Defense 03-01, to strengthen
    the trusted relationships we need with interagency partners to defend
    our Nation's homeland.
        Current Operations. We have demonstrated our ability to conduct
    operations in a number of emergency situations. During the Washington,
    DC, sniper attacks, we coordinated aerial surveillance for the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) efforts. Most recently, we supported
    military operations in the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia
    tragedy. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, we established a
    response task force to provide command and control for DOD resources
    and units, in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (FEMA).
        We have also been called upon to conduct operations in support of
    pre-planned events. In October 2002, using forces provided by United
    States Pacific Command, we supported the President's attendance at the
    Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Los Cabos, Mexico. In
    January 2003, we provided command and control of all military support
    to the State of the Union Address, to include security, emergency
    medical, and chemical and biological response forces.
        Emergency Preparedness and Response. We have the capability to
    assist local responders and lead Federal agencies in their response to
    a bioterrorism incident. Although biohazard investigative expertise
    exists in most local and State health departments and in the Federal
    Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, these resources may become
    overwhelmed in emergency circumstances. When directed by the President
    or Secretary of Defense, we will provide bioterrorism experts to a lead
    Federal agency to help prevent or contain a situation. Likewise, we are
    ready to provide field medical units, as well as logistics,
    transportation and security capabilities to assist Federal, State, and
    local agencies, as required.

                            USNORTHCOM'S CHALLENGES

        Intelligence. Homeland defense relies on the sharing of actionable
    intelligence among the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies.
    Our Combined Intelligence and Fusion Center collates and analyzes data
    from the United States Intelligence Community and nearly 50 different
    government agencies. One of our greatest challenges lies in sifting
    through the volumes of intelligence and operational data from these
    sources. Our goal is to help connect the dots to create a clear threat
    picture, playing our appropriate military role as part of the
    interagency team. Another shared challenge is to overcome cultural and
    procedural differences among the DOD and other departments for
    information that is collected, categorized, classified, analyzed and
    disseminated.
        Homeland Command, Control, and Communications. We need to be able
    to command and control forces and to coordinate planning and operations
    with agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels. Interoperable
    communication architectures and trusted information exchange
    environments provide the framework for coordinated operations. We have
    ongoing efforts with our homeland defense and civil support partners to
    upgrade existing architectures and to better integrate our information
    collection and exchange capabilities.
        Ballistic Missile Defense. We are working with the Missile Defense
    Agency, United States Strategic Command and other combatant commands to
    develop the Concept of Operations that will ensure the United States
    has an effective missile defense capability by the fall of 2004.
        Posse Comitatus. We will remain vigilant in ensuring that
    USNORTHCOM is used in accordance with the laws of our great Nation--
    respecting the rights and liberties of every American. We understand
    the Posse Comitatus Act and related laws and the clear limits placed on
    military support to civil law enforcement. We believe the act, as
    amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no
    modification is needed at this time.

                           USNORTHCOM'S RELATIONSHIPS

        Our command is built upon a total force and total national team
    concept that includes members from all five Services, the National
    Guard, the Reserves, DOD civilians and numerous Federal, State, and
    local agencies. We believe we are redefining ``jointness'' by forming
    new partnerships within the DOD and with numerous civilian agencies, as
    well as strengthening existing ones. Developing these strong
    relationships is key to our success.
        Department of Homeland Security. The Secretary of Defense will
    coordinate with the Secretary of Homeland Security on policy and
    resource issues. In accordance with decisions by the Secretary of
    Defense, we will work with various sectors of the Department of
    Homeland Security on operational planning, training and execution.
        Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)). We
    have frequent interaction with Paul McHale on a broad range of issues.
    As ASD(HD), his principal duty is the overall supervision of the
    homeland defense activities of the DOD.
        Other Combatant Commands. We have established a conceptual
    framework with Admiral Jim Ellis, Commander, United States Strategic
    Command; Admiral Ed Giambastiani, Commander, United States Joint Forces
    Command; and General Charlie Holland, Commander, United States Special
    Operations Command to secure the homeland. We are also working closely
    with the regional combatant commanders to eliminate threats to our
    homeland from afar. Our focus is to address gaps in coverage and any
    overlapping responsibilities to ensure that we provide an integrated
    defense for our citizens at home and abroad.
        National Guard. We have a close relationship with the National
    Guard Bureau, which is enhanced even more by having Major General Steve
    Blum, an Army National Guardsman, as our Chief of Staff. We believe
    that no force is better suited to help deter, prevent, and defeat many
    of the threats we face than today's National Guard. Through the
    National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM coordinates with State headquarters
    for planning purposes and maintains situational awareness of National
    Guard actions and commitments.
        To support our missions of homeland defense and military assistance
    to civil authorities, we are looking at the feasibility of evolving the
    current mobilization process into something closer to the current air
    defense model used by the Air National Guard in support of NORAD's
    mission. Specifically, Air National Guard fighter units of 1st Air
    Force have been successfully employing instantaneous Title 10 USC
    orders for several years. These orders allow an individual to
    volunteer, with consent of the Governor, to be federalized for specific
    missions prior to execution. We believe we can achieve a higher level
    of readiness if we apply the air defense mobilization model to the
    existing National Guard response forces, when needed in a Federal
    capacity.
        Coast Guard Maritime defense missions involve traditional military
    activities such as combat air patrols and naval operations within our
    area of responsibility. In these cases, we would take the lead and the
    Coast Guard would likely be called upon for support. It is important to
    note that the Coast Guard does not report to USNORTHCOM, although we do
    have several Coast Guardsmen on our staff, including Rear Admiral Jim
    Van Sice, who serves as our Deputy Director of Operations. The Coast
    Guard is in the Department of Homeland Security, and any requests for
    Coast Guard assistance to DOD would come from the Secretary of Defense
    to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
        By contrast, the Coast Guard would be the lead Federal agency for
    maritime homeland security. When directed, we would support Coast Guard
    homeland security missions through our naval component commander. This
    support might include maritime air surveillance, the use of naval
    surface combatants with Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments
    onboard, or the use of specialized DOD capabilities.
        Interagency. We are leveraging the unique capabilities and
    expertise of Federal, State, and local agencies to protect our
    homeland. Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group is working to help
    synchronize interagency plans, exercises and operations. In addition,
    we have a growing number of liaison officers in our headquarters staff
    at Peterson Air Force Base, to include the FBI, Central Intelligence
    Agency, FEMA, and the National Imagery and Mapping Administration.
      potential future capabilities and missions for norad and usnorthcom
        We continue to address critical command and control challenges
    highlighted by the terrorist attacks on our homeland. We are committed
    to improving our situational awareness by developing a common operating
    picture for the air, land and maritime domains.
        Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command and Control System. We are
    pursuing ways to leverage the Combatant Commanders' Integrated Command
    and Control System to modernize our aging 60's era air and missile
    warning systems and infrastructure. This will allow us to migrate to
    our next-generation Battle Control System and provide the foundation
    for a fully integrated NORAD-USNORTHCOM command and control capability.
        Battle Control System. The upgraded Battle Control System will
    provide connectivity with a wide array of radars and sensors across
    North America, thereby giving our homeland a more integrated air
    defense capability. As future increments are fielded, we will be able
    to process air defense data faster, as well as improve our battlespace
    awareness.
        High Altitude Airship (HAA) Advanced Concept Technology
    Demonstration. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Missile
    Defense Agency, the United States Army and NORAD are spearheading the
    effort to demonstrate the technical feasibility of an unmanned,
    untethered, long-duration HAA. The prototype airship will stay airborne
    for 1 month and carry a 4,000-pound payload. We expect the objective
    HAA to have the capability to stay airborne for up to a year and carry
    a payload greater than 4,000 pounds. A robust HAA capability would give
    warfighters persistent wide-area surveillance of the battlespace
    against a full spectrum of air, land and sea threats.
        Homeland Security Command and Control Advanced Concept Technology
    Demonstration. USNORTHCOM is sponsoring this Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstration to provide the DOD homeland security community
    with operationally relevant command and control capabilities. This
    initiative will help us rapidly insert mission-enhancing technologies
    and promote information sharing, collaboration and decision-making in a
    trusted information exchange environment.

                                   CONCLUSION

        We are grateful for everything the members of this committee have
    done to ensure our ability to defend our homeland. The National Defense
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 reflects your commitment to our
    mission, as well as to our servicemen and women, and we appreciate your
    continued support. With your help, our Nation will be safer tomorrow
    than it is today. I am honored to appear before you, and look forward
    to your questions.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
        Admiral Ellis.

     STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES O. ELLIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
    distinguished members of the committee. I, too, have a prepared
    statement that I would like to submit for the record.
        Chairman Warner. Without objection, all statements in their
    entirety will be made a part of the record.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, sir.
        It is an honor to appear before you all once again
    representing, as always, the outstanding members of the United
    States STRATCOM, men, women, military, civilian, Active and
    Reserve alike. I am pleased again to share the panel with
    Secretary McHale and General Ed Eberhart. As Ed noted, during
    the last several months he and I have worked closely together
    through the creation of our two new unified commands, and the
    United States Strategic Command looks forward to developing a
    similarly productive relationship with Secretary McHale and his
    staff in the months ahead.
        As you have already noted, Mr. Chairman, ours is a new
    United States Strategic Command. It is a reflection of the new
    international security environment we must all work to
    effectively address together. It is a reflection of the
    recommendations of the Space Commission, the Quadrennial
    Defense Review (QDR), and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
    Finally, it is a reflection of the clear guidance the President
    gave to the Department to challenge the status quo and envision
    a new architecture of American defense.
        The new United States Strategic Command was created first
    and foremost to provide responsive, integrated, and
    synchronized combat capability and support across geographic
    boundaries. As has already been noted, in a global sense, every
    combatant command is employed in defending our homeland and
    this Nation's interests. The United States Strategic Command is
    responsible for the integration of intelligence, information
    operations, and the national strategic arsenal in their
    support.
        I am convinced that the alignment of responsibility for our
    Nation's on-orbit capabilities under the same unified command
    that now has global responsibilities in four previously
    unassigned mission areas has created new opportunities to shape
    our future. I am committed to working with our strong and
    growing team of partners to address each one of these new
    capabilities. We are crafting not just a vision, but a clear
    and detailed course of action in every mission area.
        Since the United States Strategic Command was established
    last fall on the 1st of October, we have provided significant
    support to the Nation and the regional combatant commanders.
    Examples include: deploying intelligence, planning, space, and
    information operations experts to theaters of interest around
    the globe, including United States Central Command (CENTCOM);
    optimizing communications, bandwidth, and global positioning
    system performance for ongoing combat operations; and providing
    24 hours a day, 7 days a week missile warning to our forces in
    the field and to General Ed Eberhart for his AOR, our homeland.
        We have led the intelligence community effort to find and
    characterize underground facilities in Afghanistan and other
    countries. We have used our on-orbit systems for battle damage
    assessments, targeting, as well as for providing data to the
    ongoing analysis being conducted by Admiral Gehman and the
    Space Shuttle Columbia mishap investigation team.
        We remain committed to the Nation's deterrent capability
    resident in our stockpile and the delivery systems and to
    retaining and advancing the United States' position as the
    preeminent space-faring nation.
        One of our new missions, integrating missile defense across
    all areas of responsibilities, will be very important to
    enhanced homeland security. Strategic Command's role in missile
    defense is to develop a global concept of operations for a
    multi-capability system with an integrated command and control
    architecture to work seamlessly across all of the regional
    combatant commands, a demanding task.
        Response time to defend against an enemy missile attack
    will be short. Therefore, streamlined organizational structures
    and precise guidance must be drafted and wargamed in advance of
    the initial defensive operations goal of fiscal year 2004.
        This is a very exciting time for the professionals at
    United States Strategic Command. We have tremendous
    opportunities ahead of us and are engaged in charting the
    course for meeting our future warfighting needs. To pursue
    these needs, we will advocate for advanced conventional
    capabilities, support the sustainment and modernization of our
    nuclear deterrent force, sustain and further operationalize the
    tremendous capability our on-orbit assets bring to the Nation,
    and develop and maintain a cadre of highly trained strategic,
    space, and information operations professionals.
        Never before has such a broad array of missions been
    combined under one combatant command. We are aggressively
    building the right teams, the right structure, and the right
    plans to move confidently from concept of operation to tangible
    combat capability. We are leveraging our historic strategic
    planning expertise and our space and information operations and
    regional support heritage to become a more globally focused
    operational headquarters, one that is better equipped to
    provide the combat capabilities required by our national
    leaders and support the warfighters in the defense of this
    great Nation.
        Thank you and I look forward to your questions, Mr.
    Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Ellis follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by Adm. James O. Ellis, USN

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Nelson, and distinguished members of the
    committee, it is an honor to again appear before you, representing the
    outstanding men and women of United States Strategic Command, to
    address the strategic issues that remain so vital to the Nation. As you
    recall, during our last hearing we discussed space operations, allowing
    us to focus today on strategic deterrence and the actions underway to
    shape a dramatically different strategic future.
        U.S. Strategic Command, our components, and our task forces are
    crafting an entirely new command, instrumental in fighting the war on
    terrorism, deterring a wider array of potential adversaries, and
    focused on recasting the Nation's global military capabilities for the
    demands of the 21st century.
        We are drawing on the best elements of both U.S. Space Command and
    U.S. Strategic Command in order to eliminate seams, broaden oversight
    and streamline responsibilities. Significant reductions in the level of
    operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons have begun in
    compliance with Presidential direction, the NPR and the Moscow Treaty
    while continuing to meet our obligations under the Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (START). Associated deactivation or modification of
    strategic delivery platforms is also well underway.
        STRATCOM continues to deploy or provide intelligence, planning,
    targeting, space, and information operations expertise to operations in
    U.S. Central Command and around the world. We have reshaped and
    streamlined the command's component and organizational structure to
    enable an integrated and trans-regional approach to matching global
    capabilities to global challenges. Importantly, we also completed a
    comprehensive update to our deterrent force plans to reflect the needs
    of the new international security environment.
        While these efforts are critical, they represent only the first
    steps toward a much broader vision of our strategic future. On January
    10, 2003, the President signed Change Two to the Unified Command Plan
    (UCP) and tasked us specifically with four previously unassigned
    responsibilities. These are: global strike, missile defense
    integration, Department of Defense information operations, and command,
    control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (C\4\ISR). This unique combination of roles,
    capabilities, and authorities under a single unified command will bring
    new opportunities in the strategic arena, in addition to further
    refining the global opportunities to support the regional combatant
    commanders.
        We are quickly integrating the efforts of our strong and growing
    team of service, agency, national laboratory, and intelligence
    community partners to define specific goals, identify milestones and
    quantify the progress of our collective efforts. Today, the new U.S.
    Strategic Command is improving our Nation's joint combat effectiveness
    by modernizing systems, streamlining processes, and providing a broader
    range of fully integrated mission capabilities to the warfighter and to
    our Nation's leaders.

                   THE FUTURE OF OUR NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE

        I am proud to again report that our Nation's nuclear deterrent
    forces remain fully ready. They are manned by a cadre of true
    professionals who, around the world and around the clock, effectively
    support the nuclear pillar of our national security strategy. For more
    than 56 years, Strategic Air Command and the former U.S. Strategic
    Command stood at the ready, supporting deterrence through rigorous and
    disciplined planning, effective training, and robust command and
    control of our Nation's strategic nuclear forces. The professionals of
    the new U.S. Strategic Command still willingly shoulder that enormous
    responsibility. We remain fully confident that STRATCOM's readiness,
    and that of our service components, is the most effective guarantee
    that the use of these weapons will never be required. As we reshape our
    organization and assume broader responsibilities, we remain committed
    to rigorously ensuring the continued safety and surety of our nuclear
    arsenal and delivery systems. Zero defects remain our standard.
        We are making prudent and measurable progress in achieving the
    President's goal, codified in the Moscow Treaty, of between 1,700 to
    2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the year
    2012. Air Force Space Command, our Air Force component, began
    deactivation of Peacekeeper ICBMs on 1 October 2002. This effort
    remains on schedule and will be complete by 2005. The Navy removed two
    Trident submarines, U.S.S. Ohio and U.S.S. Florida, from strategic
    service in fiscal year 2003, to be followed in fiscal year 2004 by
    U.S.S. Michigan and U.S.S. Georgia. All four of these capable vessels
    will be modified into Tomahawk cruise missile carriers, designated
    SSGN, by the end of 2007. They will also provide a tremendous increase
    in the size and sustainability of support to our special operations
    forces. With the 1996 re-role of the B-1 to a non-nuclear role, we are
    moving to retire several hundred gravity weapons in fiscal year 2003,
    and are finalizing plans to remove many of the oldest ICBM warheads
    from the Nation's active nuclear stockpile.

                         SUSTAINMENT AND MODERNIZATION

        With no new nuclear systems under development, the important task
    of sustaining and modernizing our Nation's aging weapons and delivery
    platforms must be carefully managed and appropriately resourced. These
    forces must remain a ready, reliable, and credible element of our
    Nation's security posture. Other than the Navy's submarine launched D-5
    missile, still in low-rate production, we are no longer building any of
    the weapons or platforms that comprise our strategic forces. We
    appreciate your continued strong support, through service and agency
    programs, of our key weapon, delivery platform, and communications life
    extension and upgrade programs. These include:

             Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program (GRP),
            replaces aging electronic components and updates software to
            preserve reliability, maintain accuracy, and ensure
            supportability through 2020. The GRP is the foundation of MMIII
            modernization and is being completed at the rate of 80 per
            year, with 140 deployed to date.
             Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP),
            corrects age-related degrades by repouring the propellant in
            stages I and II, and remanufactures stage III. PRP requires GRP
            software for fielding, and must be sequenced appropriately. It
            is programmed at the rate of 96 per year, with 49 boosters
            deployed to date.
             B-52 Avionics Mid-life Improvement, one of STRATCOM's
            highest priorities, and AEHF upgrade, to ensure mission
            capability and assured connectivity as this aircraft continues
            to establish new benchmarks in service longevity.
             D5 SLBM Life Extension and Backfit Programs, will
            provide a standardized fleet of 14 SSBNs for the full hull life
            of the Trident II. Two of four SSBNs have completed backfit
            with the remaining two scheduled for completion in fiscal year
            2006 and fiscal year 2007. D5 life extension requires
            replacement of guidance and missile electronics on fielded D5
            missiles, and procurement of 115 additional missiles to meet
            reliability testing needs over the 14-year life extension of
            the hull. The D5 Life Extension Program is adequately funded
            and on schedule for initial operational capability in fiscal
            year 2013.
             B-2 communications upgrade, which may require
            acceleration in future years to ensure secure and survivable
            connectivity as AEHF replaces MILSTAR.
             Strategic War Planning System (SWPS), which recently
            completed an initial upgrade and is now entering a new phase.
            This new modernization effort will incorporate the flexibility
            and responsiveness envisioned by the Nuclear Posture Review and
            broadened to support our newly assigned non-nuclear strategic
            and regional support missions.
             Combatant Commanders Integrated Command and Control
            System (C2IC2S), which will replace aging and unsustainable
            NORAD/U.S. Strategic Command mission-unique battle management
            systems with a single, open architecture. C2IC2S is on track to
            incrementally deliver warfighting C2 capability for NORAD in
            late fiscal year 2004, strategic missile warning in early
            fiscal year 2006, with space surveillance and control
            capabilities being delivered from fiscal year 2003 through
            fiscal year 2008.

        In addition to our vital life extension and modernization programs,
    we are working closely with our partners in the Departments of Defense
    and Energy, and Congress to ensure our nuclear stockpile remains safe,
    reliable, and credible. As the Nation's nuclear stockpile continues to
    age, we must carefully monitor its condition. Through the National
    Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) science-based Stockpile
    Stewardship Program, we continue to improve our surveillance, modeling,
    simulation tools and processes in order to provide the critical data on
    aging effects, component reliability and physics phenomena we require
    in the absence of nuclear weapon testing. Past drawdowns in nuclear
    weapon infrastructure require that the essential warhead life extension
    programs be carefully sequenced with scheduled warhead dismantlement so
    as to provide just-in-time delivery to meet operational deterrent force
    requirements. We are working closely with the NNSA, the national labs
    and plants to shape their support to our future stockpile. With the
    production complex operating near its peak capacity, we will need to
    optimize the balance between essential life extension programs and
    dismantlement work.
        Annually, at the direction of the President, I provide a nuclear
    weapon stockpile assessment to the Secretary of Defense. In my last
    assessment, based on the information provided by my staff and
    independent advice from our expert Strategic Advisory Group, I outlined
    my confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This is
    the first time since the program began in 1996 that a STRATCOM
    assessment did not indicate a decline in confidence in the reliability
    of the stockpile. I attribute this directly to the continued
    improvements in and funding for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, to
    the steps taken by NNSA and the Services to diligently address
    previously reported technical issues, and to the progress of the
    ongoing life extension programs. I agree with the rigorous technical
    analysis conducted, and confirmed to the Secretary there is currently
    no need to consider resumption of nuclear testing. I appreciate your
    strong support for funding of the NNSA, enabling continuation of their
    important work.
        As we continue to sustain and modernize our forces, we are also
    working closely with the Services and the Department of Energy to
    address the critical anti-terrorism and force protection requirements
    associated with safeguarding the Nation's nuclear systems. The ongoing
    Mighty Guardian exercise series and the Nuclear Command and Control
    System Federal Advisory Committee End-to-End Review have helped the
    Services and the Department of Energy better focus their security
    efforts. While the changing character of the postulated threats
    requires continuous evaluation, I believe the Services are making
    concrete improvements in physical security, though much remains to be
    done. We will continue to encourage this effort through the STRATCOM
    Integrated Priority List and will remain an active participant in the
    creation of implementation guidance that will flow from completed
    Office of the Secretary of Defense policy studies such as the NPR and
    the End-to-End Review.

                          FUTURE ENHANCED CAPABILITIES

        It is well known that much of our current military capability was
    designed or procured for a dramatically different international
    security environment. This is especially true of our Nation's deterrent
    forces. Though sustainment and modernization of these systems remains
    essential, equally important is the examination of future concepts and
    the contribution they could make to our deterrent posture. A
    fundamental assumption of the Nuclear Posture Review is that a mix of
    advanced capabilities, some yet to be designed, that include
    conventional, non-kinetic, special operations and nuclear, is needed in
    order to offer the broadest range of options to our Nation's leaders.
    Such a spectrum of capabilities will both enable the planned NPR draw
    down in operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and form part
    of a New Triad of deterrence in support of the President's goal of
    reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. While there are certainly
    significant policy issues associated with this transformational effort,
    it is also true that much laboratory research and development, detailed
    analytical study and advanced simulation efforts are an essential
    underpinning to such a fact-based dialogue. A number of organizations,
    including the Department of Defense and the Defense Science Board have
    nascent reviews underway. As the Secretary of Defense has noted, these
    studies are intended to consider and weigh alternatives and in no way
    pre-suppose decisions as to detailed design, production or deployment.
    Advanced Conventional Capabilities and Global Strike
        U.S. Strategic Command's newly assigned global strike mission
    extends our long-standing and globally focused deterrent capabilities
    to the broader spectrum of conflict. We will incorporate conventional,
    non-kinetic, and special operations capabilities into a full-spectrum
    contingency arsenal and into the Nation's strategic war plan to further
    reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. This innovative approach will
    enable the command to deliberately and adaptively plan and rapidly
    deliver limited-duration, non-nuclear combat power anywhere in the
    world. Our intent is to provide a wide range of advanced options to the
    President in responding to time-critical, high-threat, global
    challenges and, thereby, raise even higher the nuclear threshold.
        As envisioned, global strike could be decisively conducted at the
    direction of our most senior civilian leaders. It also represents a
    powerful tool in support of the regional combatant commander,
    essentially increasing the forces and options he has available to deter
    and engage an adversary. In either case, global strike will provide the
    Nation the ability to engage priority targets by moving rapidly from
    actionable intelligence, through adaptive planning, to senior-level
    decision-making and the delivery of kinetic or non-kinetic effects
    across thousands of miles. It can provide what may be the most critical
    element early in the fight--time. As a regional combatant commander
    assembles and moves forces into position or needs to strike into
    temporarily denied areas, U.S. Strategic Command can provide early
    planning and tangible, long-range combat capability. We are initially
    building this capability around the bomber force, and are bringing the
    B-1 back into our force structure in its purely conventional role. This
    committee's continued support of advanced conventional weapons
    initiatives such as the SSGN will assist in our immediate efforts to
    improve joint warfighting effectiveness. We continue to study concepts
    such as conventional ballistic missiles, Common Aerospace Vehicles,
    hypersonic aircraft, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles that could
    play a significant role in improving our global strike capabilities in
    the mid- to long-term.
    Information Operations (IO)
        Delivering on the promise of information operations is one of U.S.
    Strategic Command's top priorities. Incorporating computer network
    attack and defense, electronic warfare, psychological operations,
    strategic deception and operational security, this nascent mission area
    promises to dramatically improve our offensive and defensive
    capabilities, and may play a large role in shaping the size and
    character of future force structures. Quite simply, I believe that
    integrated IO comprise the next revolution in warfighting, and our new
    role as the integrator of DOD information operations will bring a joint
    perspective to improvements in capabilities, ensure ready access to IO
    planning, reduce stovepipes, test and validate new capabilities, and
    provide a responsive command and control system to the Nation's
    civilian leaders and combatant commanders.
        Our current vision has U.S. Strategic Command serving as the
    central IO armory. While we need not own service and agency IO
    programs, or execute all IO missions, we must have full insight and
    access to all DOD IO capabilities as well as execution capability for
    strategic efforts. We will capitalize on our proven expertise in
    detailed intelligence collection, rigorous nuclear planning and
    consequence analysis to bring a fully integrated, deliberate planning
    process to the IO realm. We envision providing weapons or capabilities
    with documented system reliability and analytically based estimates of
    consequences and effectiveness, just as we have done for decades with
    the Nation's nuclear forces. We will support an expeditious national-
    level approval process for conducting IO, and we will work to ensure
    national leaders and warfighters have what they need at their disposal,
    not only during crisis but also during the critical planning, training,
    exercise, and deployment phases. In this vein, we have conducted a
    number of advanced information operations exercises, spanning the
    entire planning, approval, execution, and battle damage assessment
    phases, and have identified valuable lessons for inclusion in our
    future planning and development processes.
    Missile Defense
        The danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
    systems is clearly one of our Nation's top concerns. As we discussed
    during my last appearance, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is actively
    developing an array of land, air, and sea-based missile defense systems
    to provide an additional level of protection for our homeland, our
    allies, and our forces in the field. Although still in the early stages
    of development, global missile defense will become an important third
    leg of the Nation's New Triad beginning next year.
        While the MDA develops and acquires our missile defense systems,
    U.S. Strategic Command is charged with efficiently integrating and
    operationalizing global missile defense, enabling an initial defensive
    operations capability in less than 18 months from today. As General
    Myers noted recently before this committee, missile defense is
    inherently a multi-command and multi-regional task, and we are
    developing the global concept of operations and command and control
    architecture to provide the full support needed by the regional
    combatant commanders to defend their theaters, including the ballistic
    missile defense of the continental United States by U.S. Northern
    Command. With the unique combination of missions now assigned to our
    command, we are also working to integrate the emerging defensive
    capabilities with our full-spectrum of offensive capabilities, to
    support rapid and fully informed decision-making at the appropriate
    tactical level. This effort will be aided by the long-existing
    relationships we have crafted as the historic provider of ballistic
    missile integrated threat warning.
    Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C\4\)
        In the fast-paced and complex national security environment of the
    21st century, U.S. decision-makers and warfighters must have seamless
    access to superior information to conduct decisive operations. Under
    the Unified Command Plan, STRATCOM now is assigned the role of tasking
    and coordinating C\4\ in support of strategic force employment. Our
    objective is to provide a more capable and flexible means to integrate,
    synchronize, coordinate, and convey information at any level from the
    President to the front-line combatant. We will partner closely with
    U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Defense Information Systems Agency in
    this critical effort.
        The events of September 11, 2001, illustrate the need to improve
    our national command and control architecture, and we are working with
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, and
    Communications (ASD/C\3\) and a host of others to craft a new national-
    level C\4\ system. This system must allow increased access to a broader
    array of Federal agencies, provide improved information flow, enable
    rapid decision-making, and support the requirements of our network-
    centric forces in the Information Age. While this is important for the
    Nation and all of the Department's missions, it is imperative for the
    strategic deterrent, integrated missile defense, and global strike
    missions, where data collection, analysis, decision-making, and
    execution must occur within dramatically compressed timelines. We will
    leverage our experience with nuclear command and control to create a
    robust, hardened component to the national C\4\ system to preserve and
    strengthen the deterrent effect that assured communications, rapid
    decision-making and certain action provide. We appreciate your
    continuing support of the innovative communications initiatives such as
    the Transformational Communications Architecture and the important
    delivery platform connectivity upgrades vital to robust command and
    control.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
        U.S. Strategic Command is also tasked under the Unified Command
    Plan to plan, coordinate, and integrate ISR for the Department of
    Defense in support of global and strategic operations. While ISR has
    always provided intelligence insight and targeting data, recent world
    events have demonstrated the critical role comprehensive ISR operations
    can play in senior-level decision-making, tactical planning and even
    deterrence.
        We will work closely with Department of Defense and Intelligence
    Community partners to develop and institutionalize the processes and
    systems necessary to maximize the capabilities of existing systems and
    assess intelligence collection priorities. New concepts such as
    intrusive ISR, incorporating space-based, air-breathing, terrestrial
    and maritime elements, could take us beyond passive collection
    benefits, especially when integrated with critical human intelligence
    and technical data. Our objective is to not only better provide
    persistent, actionable, predictive intelligence, but also to deter the
    threatening actions that a robust, global, persistent ISR capability
    could bring into full view. Systems such as the Space Based Infrared
    System (SBIRS), Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and Space Based Radar
    (SBR) represent the high end of a spectrum that must also bring
    advanced air-breathing, terrestrial and maritime elements into a global
    architecture. Our ISR needs and regional focus in time of crisis are
    well known. In the future, global challenges will require an ISR
    capability that is broad and deep enough to simultaneously meet all
    national and regional needs across the continuum of peace, crisis, and
    conflict.

                          OPTIMIZING THE ORGANIZATION

        As you recall from my previous statements, U.S. Strategic Command
    is realigning our overall headquarters organizational structure in
    order to effectively and efficiently address a wider range of
    responsibilities. We will organize along functional and operational
    lines, rather than administrative in an effort to focus on our primary
    mission areas. As we move to our new organizational alignment this
    month, we will expand the use of enhanced planning and analysis tools
    into our newly assigned mission areas. While we will draw heavily on
    their tools and skills, we will retain the core nuclear planning staff
    as a distinct element in our headquarters, organizationally aligned and
    consolidated to ensure focused and dedicated nuclear planning and
    expertise continues in the future as it has for more than half a
    century.
        As we design concepts of operations for the new command, we are
    pursuing innovative new service relationships that will enable the
    command to efficiently tap into the unique skills and expertise
    resident in an array of other organizations, without requiring full-
    time STRATCOM ownership of their forces. We are strengthening our
    partnerships with the national agencies in order to collaboratively
    approach our new mission areas, particularly in the highly technical
    and focused realm of intelligence, information operations, and
    communications. We have forged new relationships with the National
    Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Defense
    Information Systems Agency. Each has incredibly talented professionals
    and dedicated systems, processes, and procedures that are important to
    our shared success but which need not be duplicated in our
    headquarters. We are also excited about the opportunity to leverage our
    strong relationships with the national laboratories as we expand and
    develop new capabilities applicable to our recently assigned missions.
        As we discussed previously, success in any of our missions depends
    on our number one asset--our people. Creating a culture of excellence
    in a broader and deeper range of missions while sustaining the
    standards still reflected in our nuclear and space communities will
    depend on recruiting, training, and retaining the best and the
    brightest, in our military, in public service, in industry, and at the
    national labs. We will fully support and participate in efforts to
    create and sustain cadres of space, nuclear, and information operations
    professionals in both the Department of Defense and the Department of
    Energy. They are absolutely essential to our future.

                          CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

        As we work to achieve the goals, carry out the responsibilities and
    deliver the capabilities needed for the global challenges of the 21st
    century, we will encounter many difficulties and find many more
    opportunities. It will not be quick or easy; few truly important
    efforts are. We will need to keep in mind our broader objectives, even
    as we wrestle with the daily technical, operational or policy details.
    Though the list will doubtless change over time, our specific strategic
    goals are:

             Fully implement the guidance of the Nuclear Posture
            Review, to include advocating the development of advanced
            offensive and integration of defensive capabilities in order to
            meet the President's goal of reducing our reliance on
            operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
             Delivering on the promise of information operations to
            the warfighter.
             Integrating global missile defenses across regional
            boundaries, combining land, air, and sea-based systems with
            capable offensive forces to better protect the Nation and our
            forces in the field.
              Providing adequate bandwidth and a robust
            communications architecture for rapid decision-making and
            global combat operations at the strategic and operational
            level.
             Supporting technical and process enhancements in
            intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance so as to provide
            comprehensive, persistent, predictive, and actionable strategic
            capabilities.
             Redefining the STRATCOM organizational structure and
            crafting new relationships with the Services and national
            agencies to effectively and efficiently support our broadened
            responsibilities.
             Supporting the Services' and the Department of
            Energy's efforts to enhance anti-terrorism and force protection
            measures for our critical space and nuclear facilities.
             Addressing concepts of deterrence and the associated
            force structure appropriate for the new international security
            environment of this decade and beyond.

        Each of these challenges will require a team effort, inside and
    outside the command. As we move forward, we look forward to working
    with you and the many others who are privileged to share the humbling
    responsibilities for our Nation's defense.

                                   CONCLUSION

        It is a time of great enthusiasm, excitement, and opportunity at
    U.S. Strategic Command. While 2002 was a year of new concepts, 2003 and
    2004 must clearly be years of execution. Driven by new tasking and new
    responsibilities, in a real sense we at STRATCOM have reclaimed the
    classic definition of strategic, as articulated by Sun Tzu, Clauswitz,
    Washington, or Webster. We no longer live in a world where strategic is
    synonymous with nuclear, and we are integrating and interlinking the
    command's broad portfolio of missions to better and more flexibly meet
    the deterrent needs of the Nation. We have taken the first important
    steps in the evolution of our full-spectrum ``new'' strategic
    capabilities, even as we have taken the historic first steps in drawing
    down our Nation's deployed nuclear arsenal.
        I appreciate your continued support of the men and women of
    STRATCOM and the unique and essential contributions they continue to
    make to our Nation's security. I look forward to reporting our
    continuing progress to you in the future, as we take the next important
    steps in building the new United States Strategic Command.
        Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

        Chairman Warner. Thank you, Admiral.
        We will have our usual 6-minute round. Our colleagues,
    Senators McCain and Levin, have very carefully laid out
    important questions with regard to the borders. I would like to
    raise a similar question related to the coastlines bordered by
    our oceans. How serious is the threat there? What role do each
    of you play in protecting any possible incursions across our
    coastline, the most probable being a terrorist missile attack
    of some type from some type of vessel? Who budgets for
    technologies and programs that might address this threat?
        Yesterday, General Eberhart, you and I had an opportunity
    to visit privately and you said that your area of
    responsibility as designated extends 500 miles to sea. I was
    quite reassured by the command and control you have over
    vessels coming in and surveillance. Then, Secretary McHale, I
    expect you are more or less coordinating all the efforts on
    this. Admiral, I am not sure what portion you have.
        But let us start with General Eberhart.
        General Eberhart. Sir, as we look at maritime threats we
    focus initially on what we would consider threats that the
    Department of Defense would have the lead on. The example that
    you used, a cruise missile, whether it was from a foreign
    nation's navy or a terrorist cruise missile, we would certainly
    have the lead for that type of activity.
        Ideally, as we talked earlier and you alluded to during
    your statement, we want to stop that missile, that crew, before
    it reaches the 500-mile limit of our area of responsibility.
        Chairman Warner. Board the vessel if necessary?
        General Eberhart. Board the vessel, and if that does not
    work then do whatever is appropriate in terms of international
    law and law of the sea to make sure that that does not pose a
    threat to this Nation. Ideally, we like to work with the flag
    carrier, whatever nation whose flag that ship is flying, and we
    have found that they are very cooperative. If they believe that
    they have a flagged vessel that in fact is carrying contraband
    or doing something that poses a threat to us, we would like for
    one of our allies to take care of this problem before it poses
    a threat to us.
        You could argue that we are the supported command for this
    exercise, kind of a moot point. But in fact, if European
    Command (EUCOM) or Pacific Command can take down that threat,
    that is great. Let us defend as far forward as possible.
        Then if it is necessary and we do not detect it, we are not
    aware of it until it is inside our area of responsibility.
    Every day we look at where all of the ships are in the Atlantic
    and in the Pacific. We work with both the Navy and the Coast
    Guard to ensure we know what ships are closest to this threat,
    what ships would have the capability to deal with the threat,
    whatever the threat might be, and then we respond.
        Now, what we do not have right now and what we need in the
    future is wide area surveillance.
        Chairman Warner. What is the last word?
        General Eberhart. Wide area surveillance, sir. We get some
    surveillance, obviously, from our overhead, but that is
    cyclical, if you will. It is not 100 percent of the time. If we
    know the general area to look in we can send out aircraft for
    surveillance. Sometimes we can do it with other ships' radar,
    et cetera. But over time we are going to have to harness the
    technology so that we have a picture on the sea much like we
    have a picture in the air today, so that we can sort the good
    guys from the bad.
        Chairman Warner. How soon do you anticipate that that will
    be a part of your----
        General Eberhart. Sir, right now we are doing what we call
    an advanced concept technology demonstration, which is
    supported by the Department of Defense. It is supported by
    Congress and is funded. This is essentially a high altitude
    unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that will be up 60,000 to 70,000
    feet. We think one day it will have the capability to be up for
    a year or more and provide us this wide area surveillance.
        Chairman Warner. What about the UAVs we currently have in
    inventory and coming on line with further production?
        General Eberhart. We can use those, too, sir. But obviously
    they are somewhat limited in terms of duration time and in
    terms of legs and in terms of their capacity to carry sensors.
    But all of those things we have to harness.
        Chairman Warner. Please include in the record such
    additional information you may have.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Lessons learned from employment of UAV systems such as the Predator
    and Global Hawk have provided valuable insight into the potential for
    unmanned systems to support homeland defense. Prospective UAV
    applications include emergency response communications capability,
    long-endurance surveillance and detection for border and maritime
    security, and sensors to support law enforcement and civil response
    agencies. In addition, ground and maritime unmanned vehicles are
    promising technologies that could provide homeland defense
    capabilities.

        Chairman Warner. Now I want to get in a question for
    Secretary McHale related to port security. It is one thing to
    interdict the vessel beyond our shores, but there are instances
    where that vessel will be portside, and also the ports
    facilities could well be a target of those that have not come
    by sea but come by land, that is the terrorists.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, one of the things
    that I have tried to do during the brief period of time that I
    have been in office has been a conscious focus on pushing
    outward the boundaries of our defense. A great deal of emphasis
    has been appropriately applied to port security and I certainly
    do not denigrate that. But I come out of a Marine Corps
    background and I believe in locating and defeating the enemy as
    far from my position as possible.
        So I want to reach out well into the blue water to defeat
    the enemy threat, particularly if it is a weapon of mass
    destruction. I also want to locate that threat if it comes into
    port, but that is frankly when the enemy has made it into the
    wire and that is a late stage in the process.
        It was noted earlier that the NORTHCOM area of
    responsibility includes approximately 500 nautical miles of
    blue water. While that is true, it is somewhat of a
    generalization. It is basically 500 nautical miles on the west
    coast, but if you look at the Unified Command Plan and see how
    the lines are actually drawn it is probably three times that
    distance, approximately 1,500 nautical miles, along the east
    coast because of the way the line is drawn in a straight line
    and our coast is curved.
        We have a substantial amount of blue water on either side
    of the Nation in which to detect, interdict, and destroy an
    enemy attack.
        Chairman Warner. That includes the States of Alaska and
    Hawaii, I presume?
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir, it does. We have the
    responsibility for all of the homeland defense activities,
    whether they are in General Eberhart's AOR or, as is the case
    for instance of Hawaii, within the PACOM AOR. So our charter is
    a little bit broader, significantly broader in the sense of
    protecting American citizens and property and freedoms beyond
    the AOR that have been assigned to General Eberhart.
        We have a very large amount of blue water. We need to take
    advantage of that entire space for an integrated maritime
    defense of our coastline. That begins with better intelligence,
    intelligence that in terms of area of interest is worldwide for
    General Eberhart. We need to bring to that intelligence a
    homeland defense perspective that has not always been the case
    in the past.
        Chairman Warner. How long is it going to take you to
    achieve that? You are saying that in the future we are going to
    do this. I want to know what that time line is, and are there
    sufficient assets in the pipeline, perhaps in this most recent
    supplemental, perhaps in the President's budget, to implement
    what you foresee now as being the needed requirements for
    equipment, training, personnel to carry out that mission.
        Secretary McHale. Mr. Chairman, we have gotten a lot better
    in the last few months in terms of bringing a homeland defense
    perspective to raw intelligence. That intelligence has
    historically been oriented toward the forward edge of the
    overseas battlefield and relatively few analysts have looked at
    that information in order to make a connection to a domestic
    threat.
        We have gotten better. My hope and expectation is that the
    President's proposal for the Terrorist Threat Integration
    Center (TTIC) that he announced in his State of the Union
    address will allow us to fuse overseas intelligence collection
    capabilities for analysis and review by those who in the United
    States look at that information, to determine its relevance to
    a threat that might materialize here, so that we connect the
    dots before an event occurs.
        Mr. Chairman, I also think that we can in the future take
    advantage of our GPS tracking system in order to have real-time
    location information with regard to a naval platform that may
    ultimately pose a threat to the United States, and that that
    tracking can go on for an extended period of time so long as we
    believe that that ship is still on the seas and that it might
    at some point be a threat to our Nation.
        Chairman Warner. My time is expiring. Admiral Ellis, do you
    have a contribution to this question?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, our
    job is to provide to General Eberhart and all the regional
    combatant commanders everything we have and to act as the
    spokesman on behalf of the combatant commanders for the very
    real capabilities that we need to develop. That includes robust
    communications architecture, the persistent intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance that Ed was speaking to, the
    fused multi-system ballistic missile defense capability, and a
    viable information operations capability.
        So we are being asked to centralize that, to assess what we
    have, and to look, more importantly, at what the architecture
    and requirements need to be for the future across the full
    spectrum of the threats that confront the Nation.
        Chairman Warner. I thank the witnesses.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to pick up with Secretary McHale and with
    General Eberhart, particularly on the intelligence questions
    which you just discussed. Secretary McHale, what is your
    connection and what is the new command's connection to the
    Counterterrorist Center (CTC) at the CIA? How are you linked to
    that center, which analyzes the information relative to foreign
    terrorists which threaten our interests here in the United
    States?
        Secretary McHale. Senator, I think Ed will probably want to
    comment on this as well. But there are a number of ways in
    which we are linked. I have daily communication with the CIA in
    order to have access to the information generated by the CIA
    related to domestic threats. I begin each day with a DIA brief
    and then follow that by attending the briefing that is received
    by the Secretary of Defense on these very issues.
        Senator Levin. Let me interrupt you there. Are you
    represented at the CTC the way the FBI is and the way the
    Department of Homeland Security is?
        Secretary McHale. Our office is not, but I do believe that
    the DIA is represented, and we have daily contact with the DIA.
    In addition, we have recently created, pursuant to the
    statutory authority provided by Congress, the Under Secretary's
    position for Intelligence, and I know he intends to work very
    closely with both that agency and the Terrorist Threat
    Integration Center.
        Senator Levin. So that your connection to that place which
    produces the analyses which you need, presumably, and General
    Eberhart needs, is through the DIA?
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir. In addition, General Eberhart
    has on his staff full-time a representative of the CIA. That
    person is located with General Eberhart out in Colorado
    Springs. That person serves along with a DIA representative as
    a conduit back to the CIA in terms of their counterterrorism
    analysis and information.
        Senator Levin. General, that person, however, does not sit
    at the CTC and is not part of the analysis process; is that
    correct?
        General Eberhart. That is correct, sir. That person is not.
        Senator Levin. So it is a one-way conduit from you to the
    CTC, but not from the CTC to you; is that fair or is that too
    simplistic?
        General Eberhart. Sir, I really think that does not
    appropriately capture it, because there are about five
    different conduits from the CTC to me. There are regular
    reports that they send out that we get copies of, and we get
    those directly. In some cases we get them from other
    organizations, but in some cases we get them directly.
        Senator Levin. You get all the analyses of the CTC that
    affect homeland security?
        General Eberhart. Sir, I am convinced that we do. Again, we
    have some checks and balances here. We have the head of the
    DIA, and if he sees a report he picks up the phone and calls
    our J-2, our intelligence, and says: ``Have you seen this
    report?'' I am happy to report to this day we have.
        We have this DIA liaison officer right there in the CTC who
    is checking and doublechecking to make sure we get the
    information we need. Then we have this flag level CIA
    representative, so that if we have a question about a report we
    can go back verbally and get an answer very quickly, as opposed
    to going back through a bureaucracy, if you will.
        Senator Levin. The lack of coordination of intelligence
    information between the various agencies was a huge failure
    prior to September 11. There are a number of efforts being made
    by this committee and the Governmental Affairs Committee, by a
    lot of committees, to make sure that that does not happen
    again. You state in your testimony, General Eberhart, that one
    of the greatest challenges lies in sifting through the volumes
    of intelligence and operational data, and that another shared
    challenge is to overcome cultural and procedural differences
    among the DOD and other departments for information that is
    collected, categorized, classified, analyzed, and disseminated.
        I happen to agree, by the way, that those challenges exist.
    But would you expand on that? If those challenges exist, it
    suggests that they have not yet been overcome. Give us a little
    more detail about those challenges.
        General Eberhart. Sir, my view is that the challenges
    exist. Sadly, they will probably always exist to some degree.
    However, we have come a long way since September 11 in being
    able to overcome those challenges and to make them manageable,
    if you will. There is, to a large degree, an approach now that
    we have termed ``need to share'' as opposed to ``need to
    know.'' I think we are seeing that type of attitude out there,
    whether it is a law enforcement organization, whether it is the
    intelligence community, or if it is information from open
    sources that we think we need to put together to integrate, to
    ideally fuse, as the Secretary has said, so we can connect the
    dots and have something that is actionable.
        As we do these scenarios--as we do this real-time sharing
    of information day in and day out--those cultural barriers come
    down. I am seeing better cooperation than I have ever seen
    before, much like during the 1990s when we brought down a lot
    of those cultural barriers in the intelligence community to
    share information, and Jim Ellis and others were part of that
    effort.
        We have done things like what we call a tear line, where we
    might have very sensitive information that talks about the
    source and a lot of other things, but the source and those
    kinds of things are not important out at the tactical level. So
    we take that, we sanitize it to the point where the tactical
    user gets the information he or she needs and it is not as
    highly classified as it was before, where we said we cannot
    share this information.
        So we have taken, I believe, some significant steps. That
    does not mean we have this right yet. We have to continue to
    work it.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        One of the issues that I have been very concerned about is
    the ability to detect explosives from a distance. Ever since
    the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, that has been very high up on
    our radar as a technological challenge. Are we making any
    progress, Secretary McHale, on the ability to develop standoff
    detection capability for explosives, as well as for chemical,
    biological, and nuclear weapons material?
        Secretary McHale. Senator, I think we are. I was encouraged
    by the briefings that I received when I came on board to find
    out that our remote sensing capabilities are more advanced than
    I would have anticipated. That for me was very encouraging
    information.
        A couple weeks ago I was with Senator Reed at a homeland
    defense symposium in Newport, Rhode Island. Congressman Kennedy
    attended that as well, and I had an opportunity to speak to a
    number of significant contractors in the private sector who are
    bringing advanced and robust technology to this area.
        With regard to explosives, the challenge is significant.
    With regard to weapons of mass destruction, it is even greater.
    Just to give you a quick example, a few years ago Tom Clancy
    wrote a novel that focused on the transport of an improvised
    nuclear device across the Atlantic Ocean into one of our
    unprotected ports. That novel's plot went on to describe the
    consequences following the detonation of that improvised
    nuclear device.
        It is my belief that if an enemy is to acquire weapons of
    mass destruction, that will likely take place overseas, and it
    is likely that the material for that weapon would be brought
    into our country by a maritime platform. There are sensors now
    in use. They are in the early stages of development, but there
    are sensors that I think hold out great promise for creating
    what I have called WMD choke points, engagement areas, where we
    would have the opportunity to screen passing vessels, to
    determine whether or not a weapon of mass destruction was
    aboard the ship. The science to support that effort is not too
    far down the road in terms of its understanding and operational
    employment.
        So one of the most encouraging areas of information that I
    have had brought to my attention since taking this office is
    the very real prospect that in the not too distant future we
    will be able to operationally employ in an effective way remote
    sensing capabilities for explosives and particularly for high-
    end weapons of mass destruction.
        Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you.
        Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Levin.
        Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. General Eberhart, we have talked a lot in
    general terms about local, State, and Federal cooperation. I am
    curious to know what kind of mechanisms perhaps you are putting
    in place now to encourage that cooperation to occur. I think in
    my own mind of things like war games, for example. I mean,
    there might be an opportunity there to create some kind of
    scenario where you could have local--or what are you doing, for
    example, to maybe have an input on training programs for law
    enforcement? I wondered if you would share with us some of your
    thoughts.
        General Eberhart. Senator Allard, I think the best way to
    answer this is to say there are both formal programs and
    informal programs. First to the formal programs. I think the
    best example of that is the civil support teams that Congress
    has authorized. These soon will be in all 54 States and
    territories. My view is that these teams are a wonderful bridge
    from those first responders to the State militia and then to
    Federal forces if and when those Federal forces are required.
        Because those teams are federally-funded and equipped, we
    have been able to ensure standardization among those teams.
    They have the same equipage, they have the same training, they
    use the same terminology. They are certified by the United
    States Army to conduct this mission, and then the Secretary of
    Defense is the final certification official.
        So therefore we have this standardization and soon we will
    have this standardization in all of our States and territories
    that I think will help us standardize all the way from the
    first responders of the fire departments and the police
    departments again to State agencies to Federal agencies. That
    is a formal program, if you will, and I think those types of
    programs pay big dividends.
        The informal programs are what you alluded to. Those are
    voluntary in nature, but we certainly do not have trouble
    getting people to volunteer. These are where we do war games
    scenarios. In most cases they are in Colorado Springs when we
    do these, or when we participate in other places, there will be
    upward of 50 different government agencies, to include State
    and local responders and State agencies, sitting at the table
    working our way through a scenario, whether that is a weapon of
    mass destruction, whether that is some sort of epidemic, or
    whatever the case may be, crisis management or consequence
    management.
        I think these interactions are very important in terms of
    standardization, in terms of interoperability, in terms of
    building friendship and confidence that will really be the key
    to our success.
        Then finally, back to the formal programs, we have formal
    exercises. This summer, TOPOFF 2 has been chartered by Congress
    for us to conduct. TOPOFF 2 will include three or four
    different States in this exercise program where we will reach
    down all the way to the first responders and we will exercise
    the entire system from first responders to Federal forces when
    and where needed.
        So I think we are making good progress there. It takes
    time. Sometimes it is slower than we would like. We cannot
    mandate this, but I think everybody realizes this is the right
    way to go.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, General.
        Admiral Ellis, I am curious to know what you are doing in
    your newly created command to make sure that space remains a
    core mission.
        Admiral Ellis. Senator, as you and I have discussed many
    times, space is the fundamental underpinning of everything we
    do in today's military, not just with the new missions that
    have been assigned to us at the United States Strategic
    Command. Clearly that takes on a number of levels. First off,
    we need to assess candidly the requirements and the programs
    that are being put in place by each of the Services. From a
    joint warfighter perspective that is our role, to assess the
    level of funding, the priorities, and the like from each of the
    Services--Army, Navy, and Air Force--that contribute to that
    through robust componency relationships with me.
        I have also taken it upon myself to make sure that I visit
    all of the facilities that are so important to our space
    effort. That is, the launch complexes on both coasts,
    obviously, and the major industry contributors to the assured
    access and the tremendous on-orbit capabilities that we have
    enjoyed and absolutely must preserve and enhance in the years
    ahead.
        Finally, we are very much a part of the gaming and the
    simulation capabilities that are an important part of
    reemphasizing for each of our warfighters the importance of the
    role that space plays in their ability to execute their
    missions. We just completed, as you are undoubtedly aware,
    Schriever II, which was the second of our national war games,
    if you will, in space. That involved representatives from all
    agencies, all Services, as well as the private sector, so that
    we take the lessons that we learn from a vision of what
    challenges will confront us in the future as a Nation to better
    optimize the progress that we want to continue towards
    enhancing our use of space.
        Senator Allard. Secretary McHale, the National Guard
    continues to be a critical part of our military mission. At the
    same time, it is essential for homeland defense. Has the
    Department of Defense determined how to best utilize the Guard
    in your view?
        Secretary McHale. I think we have a direction, but not an
    end state that has been defined. While maintaining the Guard as
    a balanced force that will continue to serve as an important
    part of our Nation's Strategic Reserve, with overseas
    warfighting requirements and training, we anticipate that the
    National Guard will play a more active and focused role, a more
    robust role, in homeland defense.
        We have eight National Guard divisions that are oriented
    now primarily toward the overseas war fight, at least in terms
    of their Title 10 mission requirement. I anticipate, as General
    Eberhart described a bit earlier, that the Guard will play an
    even more significant role in terms of future CSTs. The
    National Defense Authorization Act has now required that we
    establish 55 such teams. We currently have 32 that are
    certified. So clearly the National Guard is going to play a
    bigger role in that area.
        The National Guard plays an important role in terms of
    individuals and units that have been assigned to JTF-Civil
    Support for consequence management, including consequence
    management following a successful enemy attack involving a
    weapon of mass destruction. So in the future what I anticipate
    is that, while the Guard will remain committed to the training
    and equipment for an overseas war fight, substantial portions
    of the National Guard will, in addition to overseas warfighting
    missions, be assigned new homeland defense requirements.
        Senator Allard. A lot of these individuals are part-time.
    They have jobs other than the Guard. If we put on too much
    responsibility, then it no longer becomes a part-time position.
    Are we able to maintain our personnel in the National Guard?
    Are they pretty happy with the current situation?
        Secretary McHale. I think they are.
        Senator Allard. Even with the increased demands?
        Secretary McHale. Even with the increased demand. The Guard
    is now playing an important role with regard to our overseas
    war fight, particularly in combat support and combat service
    support capabilities that the Guard brings to our overall
    military capability. To the best of my knowledge, there are no
    ground combat units, no maneuver elements from the Guard that
    are currently engaged in Iraq.
        We have a significant number of Guard personnel who can,
    either in Federal status, Title 10 status, or more likely in
    State status, play a significant role in terms of the
    protection of domestic critical infrastructure. We have Guard
    personnel deployed right now at various locations around the
    country protecting in State status critical facilities that the
    governor of the individual State believes needs to be protected
    under circumstances where civilian law enforcement may not be
    prepared to take on that challenge.
        So in the years ahead--and I would emphasize this--I think
    there will be a much more important role for the Guard, but not
    just in Title 10 Federal status. I think, as was the case with
    Operation Liberty Shield when Secretary Ridge announced that we
    were going to a heightened state of alert during the period of
    conflict in Iraq, at his suggestion a number of governors in
    State status took their Guard forces, put them on alert,
    brought them to active duty and, again in State status,
    deployed them to protect critical sites.
        That mission of critical infrastructure protection I think
    is one that with increasing likelihood will be assigned to the
    Guard.
        Senator Allard. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Allard.
        Senator Pryor.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Eberhart, I have a few questions for you. During
    the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy, how did NORTHCOM, NORAD,
    and STRATCOM respond and how did they work together?
        General Eberhart. Sir, as soon as we knew that in fact it
    looked as if we had lost the Space Shuttle Columbia, there was
    a problem with Space Shuttle Columbia, we initiated with the
    National Military Command Center what we call a domestic event
    conference. That domestic event conference is something that
    grew out of the tragedy of September 11, where we get all the
    players, if you will, on a teleconference so that we know what
    the problem is and what type of solution sets might be
    available and to try to sort out those very important questions
    such as who will be in the lead, who will have the lead for
    this effort. It has proved to be a wonderful vehicle that has
    served us well as we have worked our way through many different
    problem sets.
        On that day, representatives from STRATCOM, NORAD, and
    NORTHCOM were all up. I was personally up, and through that
    conference and through then subsequent conversations offline it
    was established that initially the National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration (NASA) was the lead Federal agency.
        Then we switched the lead Federal agency from NASA to the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) because it was
    obvious that it was now a consequence management problem, but
    that NASA would still be supported, because we had to in fact
    secure this wreckage and make sure it did not constitute a
    threat to the citizens of this great Nation, and also so we
    could try to put together the accident investigation.
        So, in fact, what you had was Strategic Command in the lead
    for the accident investigation, supporting the accident
    investigation, and Northern Command in the lead in supporting
    FEMA in terms of recovering the debris and safeguarding our
    citizens. That is the way it has progressed to this day,
    obviously with policy guidance from the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, specifically the Office of the Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Homeland Defense. We had teleconferences every
    day for about a week there as we sorted our way through these
    problems.
        So I think that the mechanism of the domestic event
    conference, the close friendship and working relationship
    between commands and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    served us well in the aftermath of that tragedy.
        Senator Pryor. It sounds like you work pretty well
    together. Are there lessons learned? In other words, can we do
    it better next time? Did we learn some lessons this time?
        General Eberhart. Sir, I am a believer that if you win 70
    to nothing tomorrow, you can still do something better the next
    time you get on the field, because whoever you are playing is
    going to be better. So there is no doubt in my mind that there
    are things that we can do better, and we in fact have an after-
    action report that we are working our way through now. It is
    the initial after-action report. It is very detailed.
        But I think in terms of how we provide capabilities to
    these agencies there is a long list of things that we in fact
    can do better and we are working to do those better in the
    future.
        Senator Pryor. Let me ask a follow-up to Senator Allard's
    questions a minute ago about the National Guard, and maybe you
    answered this. But what role do you see the National Guard
    having in homeland security and, more specifically, in
    NORTHCOM?
        General Eberhart. Sir, I would like to say that there are
    two great teachers, if you will, in terms of homeland defense
    and homeland security. One goes back to the 1630s and that is
    our militia, that is our National Guard. The second is our
    Coast Guard, dating back to 1790. They have been doing this
    since their inception and we have a lot to learn from both of
    these great institutions.
        So when I think of homeland defense and homeland security,
    first and foremost I default to those organizations because I
    know they know how to do it. Of course, the dilemma is, as the
    Secretary has said, do you take the National Guard and relegate
    it--probably not the right verb--to only homeland defense and
    homeland security missions or do you keep a broader view, but
    look for ways to focus them better. I do not mean better in
    terms of they are not doing it well enough, but so that we can
    in fact leverage them better for homeland security and homeland
    defense. I think the latter is what we should do, as the
    Assistant Secretary has mentioned.
        I believe that we have a construct right now in that our
    air defense missions, as you well know, are predominantly,
    almost exclusively conducted by our National Guard. I think
    that construct can serve us well for sure on the land, too, as
    we look at our quick reaction forces and our rapid reaction
    forces in the future. Obviously, if we do that we have to have
    them so that they are able to react quickly and promptly. 96
    hours or a week does not get it. They have to be ready to go in
    12 or 24 hours.
        I think we can make those kinds of things work, but I am
    open to any and all ideas here. I am convinced we can do it
    better.
        Senator Pryor. I would love to visit with you some time
    about what resources you think the National Guard needs to
    augment and to assist in the mission and be able to achieve the
    mission that it is intended to do.
        Secretary McHale, we talked a little bit here about
    NORTHCOM and working very closely with Canada. What about
    Mexico? Is there a reason why Mexico is not in this? Does that
    mean that we do not perceive any threats coming from the south?
        Secretary McHale. Senator, if I may, could I comment
    briefly on the previous question and move to Mexico very
    expeditiously?
        Senator Pryor. Sure.
        Secretary McHale. Among the lessons learned with regard to
    the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy was initially some
    uncertainty as to the lead Federal agency. Immediately
    following the tragedy there was an expectation that the
    Department of Defense might be the lead Federal agency. Quickly
    there was a recognition that that is not the way to approach
    these issues. Under the Federal response plan, FEMA assumed
    very effectively its lead. We provided support to FEMA. But
    there was uncertainty in the first few hours.
        The military response during Space Shuttle Columbia
    reflected the fact that Title 10 involvement is likely to be
    modest in terms of domestic engagement. Most of the military
    support for the recovery effort was led by the National Guard
    in State status. About 1,000 guardsmen were deployed from the
    various States that were affected and they did a superb job,
    but they were under State command and control, at State
    expense. We in fact used about a half dozen CSTs in Title 32
    status as part of the cleanup.
        Now, forgive me, I will move very quickly to your question.
        Senator Pryor. That is okay.
        Secretary McHale. We are pursuing a close cooperative
    relationship with the Mexican military where that effort is
    governed by profound respect for Mexican sensitivities with
    regard to their national sovereignty. NORAD has provided a
    bilateral relationship with Canada that goes back many decades.
    It is a mature military relationship and the comfort level of
    that relationship reflects the friendship and professional
    military cooperation that has existed throughout NORAD's
    existence.
        We hope to achieve an even closer relationship than the one
    we have had with Mexico in the past, but the pace of pursuing
    that relationship must be dependent upon the sensitivities on
    both sides of the relationship. There are appropriate
    sensitivities in Mexico with regard to the protection of
    Mexican sovereignty. We are pursuing cooperative military
    efforts with Mexico, but only at a pace that meets the
    requirements Mexico brings to the table.
        So it is our hope that, with regard to the NORTHCOM AOR, in
    the years ahead we will have a close cooperation between
    neighbors both on our northern and southern borders, and we are
    in fact pursuing that, but with a sensitivity toward the
    historic concerns that are manifested by the Mexican government
    and the Mexican people.
        Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Allard [presiding]. Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary McHale, let me begin by commending you for the
    work that you have already undertaken to ensure a strong
    relationship between your office and the new Department of
    Homeland Security. I was very pleased to hear the update that
    you provided in your opening statement. I want to follow up on
    concerns that have been raised by my colleagues about the
    National Guard.
        As of April 2, I believe that there are nearly 220,000
    members of the National Guard and Reserves now on active duty.
    In Maine many of the members of the National Guard's regular
    jobs are in our police and fire departments. They tend to be
    the backbone of the first responders in many Maine communities.
    Similarly, we had a situation in Maine where a Coast Guard
    cutter which was working hard on port security in southern
    Maine has now been deployed to the Gulf.
        Is there a concern that as we rely more on the Guard in a
    conflict such as the one in Iraq and as we deploy and redeploy
    Coast Guard assets, there is a danger that we could end up
    actually weakening our homeland security? When you look at the
    members of the Guard who are first responders in communities
    all across this Nation, and the first responders are the
    backbone of homeland security in many ways, and if you look at
    the Coast Guard, which has been so involved in port security,
    if we are starting to redeploy those assets are we risking our
    homeland security in times of war?
        Secretary McHale. Senator, we obviously have to approach
    those kinds of issues very carefully. The first thing we need
    to do is get the facts. When I had my confirmation hearing,
    Senator Clinton asked me about this issue and I indicated to
    her that we would provide information related to the number of
    first responders who were also reservists in various
    capacities.
        I discovered when I got back to the Pentagon--we have since
    communicated this to Senator Clinton--that we do not know that
    information, because when I gave the answer it was my belief
    that we could locate those individuals within the Reserve and
    the Guard who are also first responders. I discovered that,
    since the majority of our first responders in the United States
    are in fact volunteers, although we have data at the Department
    of Defense with regard to employment of our reservists, we do
    not have data with regard to their volunteer activities that
    might relate to first responder requirements.
        In fact, I think there are something like a million,
    perhaps slightly more than that firefighters in the United
    States. Three-quarters of them are volunteers.
        So as a direct result of the question before this
    committee, the Department of Defense has now undertaken a
    comprehensive survey in order to determine not only the
    occupations of those who serve in the Reserves, but also their
    volunteer activities insofar as they relate to first responder
    status.
        In addition, the Department of Defense does have a program
    for delaying the activation of individuals if in fact an
    exemption is appropriate based on the public safety
    requirements of an individual community. That request can be
    made. Some requests have been made in the past, and we have
    attempted to the very best of our ability within a reasonably
    brief time frame to accommodate mobilization issues so that
    communities are not left without their first responder support.
        Lastly, with regard to the Coast Guard, that involves
    coordination between an entity that in peacetime is under the
    Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense
    that may require Coast Guard capabilities in an overseas
    warfighting role. I can assure you that very careful attention
    is paid to a balancing of overseas requirements and domestic
    needs whenever those kinds of capabilities are deployed to an
    overseas war fight.
        That is not a decision that is lightly made, and included
    in the analysis is a careful focus on what the domestic
    implications are arising out of an overseas deployment of a
    Coast Guard unit. We in the Department of Defense do not seek
    that support from the Coast Guard unless it can be determined
    that the risk is reasonable and prudent in terms of the
    deployment, and frequently what it means is an identification
    of other Coast Guard units that are capable of taking on that
    mission should the first unit be deployed.
        Senator Collins. Thank you for that response and I look
    forward to seeing the results of the surveys that you are
    undertaking. I am also pleased to know about the exemption
    process, because in some small towns in Maine when the Guard
    member is called up and he or she is the only support for the
    police chief it has been an issue.
        I want to turn to the issue of port security and learn more
    about the Department's role in that regard, and I would like
    all three of you to comment. I held a hearing recently in the
    Governmental Affairs Committee to evaluate the security of our
    ports, looking particularly at containers. We have literally
    millions of individual containers coming into the United States
    each and every year. We used to look at container ships as
    marvels of international trade. Now we look at them and we
    worry that they may harbor terrorists or the makings of a dirty
    bomb or biological or chemical weapon.
        Indeed, the testimony at the hearing was chilling in that
    regard. The experts who testified before us felt that our ports
    were our single greatest vulnerability. They also told us that
    for years containers have been used to smuggle in illegal
    aliens, drugs, other contraband. So there already is an
    infrastructure, if you will, that could be used by a terrorist
    group.
        There is also an al Qaeda manual that advises the
    recruitment of smuggling rings as possible members of terrorist
    units. So the combination of an infrastructure that has been
    used illegally for many years and the relative ease with which
    it could be penetrated by a terrorist group was cause for great
    concern among the committee members.
        The Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    are obviously the lead on this. They are doing a lot of
    screening and working with ports in other nations to station
    customs officials. They have developed new technology that is
    going to be of use. But it seems to me that the Department of
    Defense has an intelligence role to play in perhaps identifying
    cargo ships at particular risk, because the whole idea is we
    have to stop them before they get to our shores.
        So starting with Admiral Ellis, I would like each of you to
    comment on the Department's role in port security.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Senator Collins. That is a great
    question. Clearly it highlights the long-acknowledged
    relationship between criminal smuggling elements and
    terrorists, both in terms of the processes you describe, as
    well as the funding streams that support terrorism in many
    ways.
        My role in the United States Strategic Command is to
    oversee, as I mentioned, one of the elements of our DOD
    capabilities, and that is C\4\ISR, a very awkward acronym, but
    it really does talk to some of the issues you are addressing,
    specifically in the intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance piece.
        As we look to requirements to better optimize the use of
    current systems and to design capabilities for the future,
    clearly the technology transfer opportunities that you address
    into other agencies that are charged with the surveillance that
    is essential in preventing that flow of terrorist capabilities
    to our Nation has to be a strong piece of that, and it will be.
        We have had some success in the past. As you know well, the
    United States Customs and Border Protection, for example, flies
    P-3 aircraft with Navy E-2 surveillance radars on them. So
    there is some history of finding systems that have great
    military applications and transferring them to areas that have
    application more broadly in ensuring the Nation's security. The
    same thing is also true of the technology that the Secretary
    was alluding to earlier in the ability to detect chemical,
    biological, and nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction,
    if you will.
        So from our standpoint as we articulate the requirements
    for the military, I think it is also important that we
    understand the applicability that these capabilities may have
    in other areas, and we are committed to that.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        General?
        General Eberhart. First of all, I would like to applaud
    some of the procedures that have been initiated by Customs and
    Border Protection and the Coast Guard to work this problem. The
    96-hour notice, the manifest, working with customs agents there
    at the ports of departure, I think are starting to really pay
    dividends. They have put teeth in this and it is not unusual
    for the captain of the port, if someone tries to approach the
    port and has not given this 96-hour notice, to make them mark
    time out there before they will let them into the port to make
    sure that we follow these procedures.
        Second, this relationship between the United States Navy in
    particular and the Coast Guard goes way back, and it is a
    relationship that has matured over time, that there is no doubt
    when you talk to our leadership off of all of our coasts how
    they work together. In fact, we put what we call law
    enforcement detachments, which are Coast Guard men and women,
    on Navy ships to work this problem. So at the tactical level
    they are working this day in and day out.
        But the final resolution in my view will be through
    technology. We cannot inspect every container. If we can
    require people to file these manifests 96 hours ahead of time,
    we can have limited surveillance. But until we have wide area
    surveillance and until we have the remote sensing capability to
    know that there is something on that ship that could pose a
    hazard to our citizens, we are never really going to be able to
    solve this problem like we would like to solve it.
        So we have to harness technology for both surveillance and
    sensing and then, as we come back to the front end of the
    problem, share intelligence. So if we think there is something
    suspicious happening, that we share that with all the people
    who need to know this so that we can protect this Nation.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired.
    Could Secretary McHale just respond very quickly?
        Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Secretary McHale. Senator, in my judgment, we need to
    develop a maritime defensive strategy in depth for the 21st
    century. The purpose of that strategy should be the decisive
    defeat of terrorists in possession of weapons of mass
    destruction. The Navy needs to maintain its blue water
    capability to protect our country against hostile nation
    states, but we need to take the current capabilities of the
    Navy, supplement them with evolving technological capabilities,
    and find an equally effective defense against terrorism and
    weapons of mass destruction.
        We need to bring a homeland defense perspective to
    worldwide intelligence so that we understand how that
    intelligence affects a potential domestic threat. We need to
    track hostile vessels real-time so that we know where they are
    all the time in terms of the implications for domestic
    security. We need to advance remote sensing capabilities for
    weapons of mass destruction, so that when a hostile vessel
    approaches our shores we know it and we can screen it to
    guarantee that a weapon of mass destruction will not be brought
    into an American port.
        Then lastly, we in the Department of Defense need to
    strongly support the efforts of the lead Federal agencies in
    this regard, the Coast Guard and law enforcement agencies,
    including Customs and Border Protection and the FBI. We will
    support them with emerging technologies that are being
    developed within the Department of Defense and we will support
    them, when appropriate, with unique capabilities, for instance
    when the Navy may have a capability that is not possessed by
    the Coast Guard but which would be of advantage to the Coast
    Guard in carrying out its mission of port security.
        We receive those kinds of requests from the Coast Guard and
    we routinely cooperate with the Coast Guard in providing that
    support.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Dole.
        Senator Dole. General Eberhart, you have stated that over
    29,000 sorties have been flown since September 11, and in
    addition to that NORAD has supported a continuous layered air
    defense of the National Capital Region. The professionalism of
    all of the men and women who have accomplished these missions
    without a single mishap is truly exceptional.
        Now, in carrying out your responsibilities for contingency
    planning, how are you addressing the various readiness issues
    that surface for some of the high density, low demand forces
    that have been through repeated deployments? Do you foresee any
    future morale issues, morale problems with regard to these
    forces and their families?
        General Eberhart. Senator, as you well know, we are
    concerned about operations tempo and personnel tempo. We are
    concerned about the wear and tear on our equipment, but more so
    on our people, whether they are guardsmen or reservists or
    active duty.
        Right now, as we work our way around the low density, high
    demand capabilities for NORAD and NORTHCOM, we are careful to
    ask for capabilities and not platforms. For example, if we need
    air surveillance, we do not specifically ask for an Airborne
    Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplane. What we will ask
    for is the capability. In some cases, as Admiral Ellis has
    said, we will get that capability from Customs or the Coast
    Guard or from the United States Navy, as opposed to the E-3s
    that are stationed at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma.
        But that really does not work the problem in the longer
    term. The Secretary of Defense has alluded that low density,
    high demand is a nomenclature we put on things that we have not
    bought enough of. Over time, we need to buy more of those kinds
    of things so that they are no longer low density, high demand
    and we have the force structure we need in those areas to work
    our problem.
        Second, as the Secretary of Defense has said, in the longer
    term we have to look at how we use Guard and Reserve and
    Active-Duty Forces. Do we have the right mix of those forces?
    If we are continually having to use the Guard and Reserve,
    maybe we have the wrong force structure in terms of our Guard
    and Reserve Force structure and our Active-Duty Force
    structure.
        So that is how we work the problem in the longer term. In
    the near-term, we look for work-arounds in terms of these low
    density, high demand forces.
        Senator Dole. Secretary McHale, you supervise all homeland
    defense activities, including combatant command capabilities.
    How do you envision that the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
    and its component units might be used in a homeland defense
    role?
        Secretary McHale. There are a number of ways in which they
    could be utilized. The most likely employment of Special
    Operations Forces would be upon assignment to a combatant
    commander who requested those forces in order to execute a
    homeland defense mission where that combatant commander thought
    that the use of those forces would enable him to achieve the
    mission.
        That is another way of saying that homeland defense
    missions would be treated the same as all other missions with
    regard to the transfer of forces to the combatant commander for
    the execution of the mission. Now, in a purely domestic setting
    the distinction between the responsibilities of the Office of
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
    Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) in the Department of Defense and
    the new Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Defense would be a boundary drawn generally at the
    U.S. border. Counterterrorism activities, including Special
    Operations Forces, external to the United States would remain a
    SOCOM-SOLIC function. The use of Special Operations Forces
    within the United States would be the responsibility of the
    combatant commander in whose AOR they would be operating. That
    would be General Eberhart and the command would be Northern
    Command.
        Once counterterrorism activity begins to take place
    internal to the United States, that counterterrorism activity
    would be conducted in support of a lead Federal law enforcement
    agency. At the low end of that DOD support, we would typically
    be talking about the use of DOD equipment by civilian law
    enforcement agencies. We would temporarily loan to a law
    enforcement agency equipment that we possessed that they might
    want to use.
        As you move up the scale of response, it is conceivable
    that at the high end of WMD capabilities and our ability to
    defeat an enemy threat that under appropriate circumstances,
    particularly in the chem-bio arena, that Special Operations
    Forces could, based on the mission, be employed by General
    Eberhart as the supported commander.
        At the very high end, we get into a classified area of
    response capability that we would have to discuss in a closed
    session, where Special Operations Forces have had traditional,
    but again, highly classified missions.
        Senator Dole. The Special Operations community has been
    able to transition technology into capability at a much faster
    rate than other DOD agencies, primarily due to their unique
    acquisitions process. General Eberhart, you mentioned the high
    altitude airship advance concept technology demonstration
    (ACTD). Beyond the ACTD, what else is being done to accelerate
    the transition of a promising technology into a homeland
    defense capability?
        General Eberhart. There are several other projects we have.
    We have one in terms of information-sharing and command and
    control. It is another advanced concept technology
    demonstration for homeland defense. We also have been supported
    by the Department of Defense from several others that, as
    Secretary McHale has said, may not be uniquely demonstrated for
    homeland defense and homeland security, but have applications
    in terms of our security and our defense of the homeland.
        So therefore, we believe right now that we are making good
    progress in terms of harnessing technology. I say that a little
    bit tongue in cheek because we are never satisfied with how
    fast we are going, because again this is an important mission,
    this is important business. I would like to put the throttle
    all the way to the stops here.
        I think we are making good progress. There are promising
    technologies out there. There are technologies that will be
    appropriate for homeland defense that will also have
    application in terms of homeland security. In fact, we have
    entered into a strategic relationship with the Sandia
    Laboratory and also with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    (DTRA) in terms of sorting our way through technologies that
    exist today and how those can be applied to homeland defense
    and homeland security.
        Senator Dole. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Warner. In your direct testimony you talk about
    this system. For those following this hearing, I think that
    this system is envisioned to be not unlike the old blimp, which
    is a part of my generation. But this one presumably will be
    unmanned, is that correct?
        General Eberhart. That is correct, sir.
        Chairman Warner. It would have the duration of perhaps up
    to a year without servicing and the like?
        General Eberhart. It would be theoretically above the
    weather, Senator, 60,000 to 70,000 feet. So we do not have to
    deal with thunderstorms and those types of phenomena.
        Chairman Warner. What is that altitude again?
        General Eberhart. 60,000 to 70,000 feet, sir.
        Chairman Warner. That is up there.
        I am glad you asked that question, Senator Dole, and we are
    looking into it. It is in our markup right now and perhaps the
    Senator would want to follow it in the markup, because it may
    well be that we have to augment your funding profile to make
    certain that the estimated dates can be met. So thank you,
    Senator, very much.
        Senator Chambliss.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That blimp
    generation was a pretty good generation. You all did all right.
    [Laughter.]
        Chairman Warner. There are a few of us still surviving. I
    remember, if I can say as an aside, when I was Secretary of the
    Navy there was a move afoot out in California to tear down the
    old blimp--what did we call them, Admiral? They were hangars.
        Admiral Ellis. Hangars, blimp hangars.
        General Eberhart. Dirigibles, too. We called them
    dirigibles.
        Chairman Warner. Dirigibles. But they were magnificently
    constructed, wooden. I said, no way we are going to tear them
    down; there might be a future use for them. So there they are.
    They are still there, are they not, Admiral?
        General Eberhart. Yes, sir, at Navy Moffett.
        Senator Chambliss. Gentlemen, all three of you have a great
    challenge in your respective newly created positions and I
    commend you on getting off the ground and getting going like
    each of you have.
        General Eberhart, you and I, because of my close ties to
    the Air Force, have had many opportunities to work together
    over the last 8\1/2\ years. I have always been impressed with
    your dedication, your hard work, and your capability. I could
    not have been more pleased when I saw who the President's
    choice for the newly created NORTHCOM commander was. So I again
    congratulate you and commend you for the good job you are
    doing.
        Mr. Secretary, again you and I go back to our days on the
    House Armed Services Committee and we have both come a long way
    since then. Our mutual friends say you have taken a step up and
    I have taken a step down. I do not know what my House buddies
    mean by that. [Laughter.]
        An issue that has been very important to me over the last
    couple of years, particularly since September 11, has been the
    issue of information-sharing between all of our intelligence-
    gathering agencies, as well as all of our law enforcement
    agencies at the Federal level all the way down to the State and
    local level. Each of you have your own respective intelligence
    piece, but I think most significantly information coming to you
    from our intelligence gatherers is critically important to
    winning this battle of protecting our homeland and winning the
    war on terrorism.
        I would just like to hear from each of you as to how that
    integration and cooperation and dialogue between our
    intelligence gatherers is working as far as coming to you and
    as far as information that you gather going back to them with
    respect to not just the war on terrorism, but any other issues
    that may be important to us.
        Admiral Ellis, if you would start off, please.
        Admiral Ellis. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the
    opportunity. You rightly point out the critical element that
    intelligence provides to whatever we do, whatever our shared
    responsibilities are in defense of the Nation. It is not enough
    just to talk sensors. It is not enough to talk about the
    technology we have and what we need to collect. But it is very
    important how we process it, how we evaluate it, and how we
    distribute and disseminate it to the people that need to have
    it.
        So those processes are under stringent review. We have
    identified new organizational elements that can fuse
    intelligence more quickly. Some of those have already been
    mentioned in the course of this hearing. We are exploring other
    concepts to bring agency representatives more into active
    participation rather than just liaison officer roles within our
    organizations. For the first time, I think, we are beginning to
    look at the entire intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance issue as a process, not just as a sensor or, as
    Ed noted, a platform issue.
        So I am pleased that we have made great progress. We are
    going to try it out. We are making quick changes if we see
    better ways to do it, and I promise you that it is getting
    better everyday. It is not yet as good as the Nation must have
    for the future, but we are working at it.
        General Eberhart. Sir, from our perspective we work this
    problem in several different ways. First of all, hopefully when
    you visit our command you will see that when we have an
    intelligence briefing or when we have a staff meeting we are
    redefining ``joint,'' we are redefining the intelligence
    community, if you will, because not only will there be military
    intelligence experts there, but there are experts there
    representing the entire intelligence community: NSA, CIA,
    obviously representatives from DIA.
        Also, there is an FBI representative there. There are Coast
    Guard representatives. There are other representatives there,
    so that we can, in fact, ensure that we are receiving the
    intelligence and information those agencies have and then, it
    is a two-way street, make sure that we get back to them any
    information we have that might be of interest to them.
        A perfect example is when we thought we perceived a threat
    in the State of Arizona recently, our FBI representative was
    the one who brought that to the intelligence community, and
    then we immediately, through that FBI representative, ensured
    that that information was getting played back into the State of
    Arizona, that their FBI representative there knew, that the
    local authorities, the State authorities who needed to know,
    had that information.
        So in many cases we find ourselves as the facilitator to
    make sure that this information is in fact flowing to the right
    people, knowing that we do not have the lead at this time.
    Someone else by our Constitution has the lead, but that does
    not mean that we do not work hard to make sure they have the
    information that they in fact need.
        As we talk about the word ``transformation,'' we also try
    to think of those types of things we have that we normally
    think of in terms of a homeland defense, fighting our Nation's
    war type of perspective, and how we could possibly harness the
    types of capabilities that Jim Ellis has in terms of
    reconnaissance, imagery, communications, et cetera, for the
    homeland security mission, obviously in accordance with the
    laws of the land. There are ways to use those capabilities
    whether we are fighting fires, whether we are in the aftermath
    of the tragic Space Shuttle Columbia accident, or whatever it
    might be. There are ways to harness those capabilities that we
    normally think of in other terms to work homeland security
    problems.
        Secretary McHale. Senator, I think it was clear in the
    immediate aftermath of September 11 that there was an immediate
    need for the sharing of information across parochial boundaries
    among those that had a genuine need to know. I can tell you
    from first-hand observation that the sharing of that
    information today does indeed take place. It took a very
    painful experience to teach us that lesson, but the information
    is now being passed without resistance across boundaries that
    in the past were major impediments to the passing of
    information.
        As a result of that, what I have observed is that the need
    now is to bring a sense of analysis and prioritization to huge
    volumes of information in order to identify within that mass of
    information what is truly relevant and important with regard to
    homeland defense. Most of the information in the intelligence
    world that I see relates to the historic commitment to be
    prepared to prosecute, if necessary, an overseas war fight.
    That information is not routinely analyzed in order to bring a
    homeland defense perspective to the work product.
        Now, in order to achieve that result Congress created the
    new position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
    Secretary Cambone was recently confirmed for that position. We
    do have robust ties through DIA and through the Joint
    Intelligence Task Force--Combatting Terrorism (JITF-CT) with
    other agencies, such as the CIA and the FBI. In fact, I can
    tell you the sharing of information between the Department of
    Defense and the Department of Homeland Security is robust and
    conducted on a daily basis. We in fact send to their operations
    center those daily updates that are relevant to the mission
    they have to accomplish.
        Now what we have to do is change not only the process of
    sharing information, but modify the culture related to its
    analysis. We need to create an unprecedented capability to
    analyze and understand the homeland defense implications that
    arise out of huge quantities of data and information that have
    been compiled for purposes other than homeland defense. We are
    bringing a sense of urgency to that new homeland defense
    prioritization.
        Senator Chambliss. I agree with you, the analytical part of
    it is just as critical.
        Now, you say that you are sharing with them. Are you
    getting that same information they gather back?
        Secretary McHale. Yes. We tap into many of the same sources
    in terms of collection capabilities, but we have a very robust
    daily flow of information back and forth. As I mentioned
    earlier, we have a permanent representative in the operations
    center. I have been on the phone in the last couple of weeks
    with Secretary Ridge on a number of occasions where he had a
    matter that he wanted to bring to our attention in the
    Department of Defense.
        I, Pete Verga, who is seated behind me, and others have
    routinely--and by that I mean daily--communicated with folks
    within the Department of Homeland Security with regard to those
    matters that we need to bring to their attention.
        The real challenge now is bringing comprehension and
    meaningful analysis to enormous quantities of threat-based
    information where separating the wheat from the chaff is really
    the difficulty. We have an enormous amount of information.
    Determining what is significant is much more difficult.
        Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. That is an important question you raise,
    Senator. I would just probe it a little bit.
        We have this new concept that the President has established
    to synthesize in some person. Could not that be the area in
    which you can get some distillation? I am concerned that if
    every government agency has this enormous overhead and
    infrastructure necessary to do their own evaluation, synthesis,
    distillation, whatever it is--we all recognize the ever-
    increasing massive amounts of this information--that we have a
    wide range of redundancy across the government.
        Are you familiar with this new setup?
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir, I am. I am not directly
    involved in it, but I certainly have a strong interest as a
    potential customer in terms of the work product that they will
    generate. It is the Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
        Chairman Warner. Yes.
        Secretary McHale. The President proposed it in his State of
    the Union Address. Secretary Cambone, who was, as I said, just
    recently confirmed by the Senate, will take over, has taken
    over, as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He
    and I have spoken at some length on this issue and he will be
    the representative of the Department of Defense with regard to
    our integration, our participation in the Terrorist Threat
    Integration Center, and he understands in some detail the
    interest that I have in obtaining through him----
        Chairman Warner. I have pointed this out.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. I have urged that you all take a look at
    it.
        Secretary McHale. The potential benefit is enormous in
    terms of bringing together into a single stream diverse sources
    of information.
        Chairman Warner. Now, this committee will be addressing its
    annual authorization bill. We are midway at doing that now. I
    recognize that, with the best of intentions, the administration
    put in place legislation under which you are now operating. But
    I urge you to bring to the attention of the next level echelon
    the need you feel for any additional legislation, because now
    is the time to incorporate it in our bill, assuming it is in
    the oversight range of this committee.
        So that is an open invitation to discuss that with your
    Secretary of Defense. It would cover all three of you. So take
    a look at that.
        Next is the assets that you have within your respective
    responsibilities: Are those assets sufficient? As you well
    know, this committee looks at the President's budget, does its
    own work, and then we take into consideration late entries by
    the administration. It is referred to in some vernacular as a
    wish list.
        But that often is the case because the President's budget
    is formulated almost a year ahead of time and here we are about
    a year later. We try and do as much real-time adjustment as
    necessary. So in terms of assets, if there is something that
    would meet, in the vernacular, the wish list, I would hope you
    would bring it to the attention of the committee.
        Now, the question of posse comitatus has been of great
    interest to a number of us here on the committee. I know my
    colleagues, Senator Levin, and I have discussed this. Is there
    some ongoing examination, Secretary McHale, of that statute
    framework to determine whether or not any amendment is
    necessary?
        Secretary McHale. Senator, I think the analysis, at least
    from the Department of Defense's perspective, has been largely
    completed. I am hesitant to say that it is entirely complete,
    because I cannot be sure that there is not a lawyer somewhere
    taking a look at it. But let me tell you where we stand.
        First of all, the Department is aware of your concern with
    regard to the issue and we obviously are aware that you have
    considered in the past and may still be considering hearings
    into a possible revision of the posse comitatus statute. Should
    you choose to move forward with those hearings, you will have
    the complete cooperation of the Department of Defense in that
    effort.
        Chairman Warner. It is not necessary to have hearings if
    the Secretary of Defense has made a decision that he does not
    think any changes are necessary.
        Secretary McHale. Sir, I think he has made that decision.
        Chairman Warner. If that is the case, for the record I wish
    you would give me a supplemental communication on the status of
    that so that we can take it into consideration of the hearing.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Secretary of Defense stated last year that the current act
    strikes a proper balance regarding use of the military for law
    enforcement purposes within the United States. However, he also
    indicated that he remained open to further review of the issue. Late in
    2002, he directed a departmental working group to look into this issue.
    That working group included representation from U.S. Northern Command.
    The working group concluded that the President has sufficient authority
    to order the military to provide military support to civilian law
    enforcement authorities, when necessary, including in the aftermath of
    a catastrophic weapons of mass destruction incident, and that no change
    to the act is required.
        A number of significant exceptions to the act have been enacted
    over the years to allow for the appropriate use of U.S. military forces
    to assist in enforcing the laws of the U.S. at the request of civil
    authorities. These exceptions are reflected in current DOD policy.
    Examples include:

             Insurrection/rebellion (chapter 15 of title 10, United
            States Code)
             Chemical/biological weapon of mass destruction
            incident (section 382 of title 10, United States Code)
             Nuclear material incident (section 831 of title 18,
            United States Code)
             Terrorist incident (Public Law 107-40)

        Regarding the potential need for rapid DOD response in domestic
    emergencies, the Department recognizes that imminently serious
    conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require
    immediate action by military commanders, or by other responsible
    officials of DOD agencies, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or
    mitigate great property damage. Under such exigencies, when time does
    not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military
    commanders and other responsible DOD officials are authorized to take
    necessary action to respond to the immediate requests of civil
    authorities. Should a larger response be required, U.S. Northern
    Command would be prepared to react, as directed by the President and
    the Secretary of Defense.
        DOD is prepared to respond to catastrophic events, as directed. We
    do not believe that the act would in any way impede the nature or
    timeliness of that response.

        Chairman Warner. My concern is that if another catastrophe
    of the magnitude we experienced on September 11 took place, say
    in another part of the United States which is somewhat remote
    from the assets that were available to the New York scene, we
    would have to call upon everybody to pitch in and help, and it
    could well be that, from the standpoint of local security and
    the like, the military could step up.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Now, we just do not want, if that
    misfortune struck the United States, everybody running around
    on the telephone with the military commander saying, ``I would
    like to help, but I have posse comitatus.''
        Secretary McHale. Sir, let me give you a reassurance on
    that. We do plan in some detail for those kinds of
    contingencies and we do have forces prepared to respond in the
    event that we were to experience that kind of attack and the
    Department of Defense would be directed by the President or the
    Secretary of Defense to respond.
        However, with regard to posse comitatus, we do not believe
    that the statute in its current form would in any way impede
    that response. There are a number of significant exceptions to
    posse comitatus that have been adopted statutorily over the
    years, and in terms of our ability to respond, for instance, to
    a weapon of mass destruction attack, there is an entire command
    subordinate to General Eberhart that is prepared to launch such
    a response and we do not believe in the Department that an
    emergency response involving military capabilities would be
    impeded in any way by posse comitatus.
        Chairman Warner. Fine. That is your understanding, General
    Eberhart?
        General Eberhart. Yes, sir, it is.
        Chairman Warner. You are satisfied with this. General
    Ellis, you are satisfied to the extent that somehow you might
    be affected?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Well then, it may well be that this issue
    is cared for, but I would appreciate a letter which should
    contain just the testimony that you have just given as a
    conclusion on it.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Chairman Warner. Now, on the unmanned systems, as I think I
    shared with you yesterday, General, not to get too personal
    about this, but when I was a young man in the late 1930s and
    1940s all of my generation was consumed in making model
    airplanes. I am sure that there is a successive generation just
    as active as my generation was many years ago, a half century
    ago.
        But that presents a platform that can deliver some
    meaningful harm to communities if it fell into the wrong hands.
    Now, as long as people are aware of that potential--I hope it
    is being addressed and steps being taken to monitor certain
    aspects of it to try and follow what is taking place in the
    open marketplace and by telephone order or catalogue order or
    whatever the case may be.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. I assume that issue has been addressed and
    people are looking into it. Is that correct, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary McHale. People are looking at it, sir, that is
    correct.
        Chairman Warner. General?
        General Eberhart. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. That is all we need for the record, that
    it is being examined.
        Secretary McHale. Sir, I would point out, because of your
    comment I can guarantee you as soon as we get back I will make
    sure that even more attention is paid to that issue.
        Chairman Warner. That is just good common sense.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Computer network defense. Admiral Ellis,
    could you give us an assessment of the threats to our defense
    information infrastructure and measures you are implementing to
    protect it?
        Admiral Ellis. I would be delighted, Senator. I have an
    element under my command, initially established by General Ed
    Eberhart when it was under the United States Space Command,
    called the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations
    (JTF-CNO). My responsibility is specific to the task of
    ensuring Department of Defense network security and it is in
    that context that I would like to couch my comments.
        The JTF-CNO is headquartered here in Washington. It is
    embedded with the Defense Information Systems Agency because of
    their role in overseeing the Department's entire communications
    networks. It has a phenomenal record of success in tracking
    network intrusions and responding appropriately. They are
    empowered to establish protective policies, to actually unplug
    elements of the network should they be placed at risk by
    attacks, and their entire focus is to ensure the rigor and the
    integrity of the networks on which the Department is
    increasingly reliant.
        It is also fair to say that we are a part of the growing
    concern on the Federal Government and national side with regard
    to the vulnerabilities that are potentially resident in massive
    computer network attacks, and indeed as a Nation we have become
    much more reliant on them. A number of initiatives that have
    begun under this administration, under the former leadership of
    Richard Clark, specifically, have brought together inter-agency
    and interdepartmental efforts to oversee this, including the
    cyber warning information network and agencies and mechanisms
    to rapidly disseminate the awareness and understanding and
    sensitivity of what is going on with regard to the health of
    the network are well under way, and the JTF-CNO commander, a
    two-star general, is our representative to those agencies.
        So we do believe and continue to assess the importance of
    networks to our future. We are committed to establishing
    firewalls that prevent intrusion. We also acknowledge that
    intrusion, even on a small scale, can be particularly
    devastating and we are pursuing aggressively capabilities to
    deliver to respond appropriately to intrusions when they occur.
    So it is not enough to have a perfect defense. One would argue,
    and I think persuasively, that it is never going to be perfect.
    The issue is how do you deal with it when it occurs, and we are
    pursuing those options aggressively, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        The role of unmanned missions. We have a number of off-the-
    shelf, it could well be in due course. What policy and
    operational concerns do you have about the use of unmanned
    systems in homeland security? General?
        General Eberhart. Sir, as we discussed yesterday, I am
    concerned about those technologies should they in fact be used
    against us by terrorists. That is one issue you have already
    addressed that concerns me greatly.
        Second, I believe that those UAVs can be used very
    effectively for surveillance, whether it is maritime
    surveillance, whether it is border surveillance, just as we
    have used them in downtown Baghdad and other places in
    surveillance to ensure that in fact we can defeat the bad guy,
    those who wish us ill.
        Obviously, the concerns always are in terms of the safety
    of those vehicles, in terms of deconflicting those vehicles
    with other traffic, to make sure that they are properly
    certified, properly operated, that they do not in fact--that
    the unintended consequences are not that they present more of a
    risk than they do an advantage to us as we work our way through
    those, the use of that technology.
        I believe all those things can in fact be overcome and that
    we will see that these UAVs will become more and more prevalent
    in the future. But we have to do this correctly and I know that
    is your concern.
        Chairman Warner. Yesterday I wrote a letter on this subject
    to the President, since I and other members of this committee
    are quite interested in it, pointing out the rights of privacy
    of individuals. We have to be cautious about that issue. I will
    make that letter a part of the record here. It is a public
    document.
        [The information referred to follows:]

    President George W. Bush,
    The White House,
    Washington, DC.
        Dear Mr. President: I have long supported the expanded use of
    unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) by the United States military, and have
    been heartened by reports from soldiers in the field of the usefulness
    of UAVs as ``eyes in the skies'' in the global war on terrorism,
    particularly in Afghanistan. As you may recall, under my leadership,
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 contained
    legislation (Section 217) and additional funding ($200 million) to
    accelerate the use of UAVs by our military. I believe that the
    potential applications for this technology in the area of homeland
    defense are quite compelling.
        I am writing to request that you explore the option of using UAVs
    for the critical homeland defense mission.
        First, I believe that UAVs could prove most valuable in helping to
    monitor remote stretches of our northern and southern borders. These
    areas are historically difficult to police, given the great distances
    involved, and frequently are patrolled just once in a 24-hour period.
    Given the fact that al Qaeda operatives, among others, have made it
    clear that they will seek to gain entry to our country by any means, we
    cannot afford to leave any route unmanned.
        Second, long-endurance, land-based UAVs could support Coast Guard
    vessels, enabling one ship to monitor longer distances. This could be
    of great advantage to the Coast Guard, as it seeks to provide homeland
    security coverage for our 95,000 miles of waterways while not
    neglecting its traditional maritime responsibilities. In addition, it
    would be another weapon in their arsenal as they seek to interdict drug
    smugglers.
        Third, UAVs could be used to monitor the safety and integrity of
    our Nation's major oil and gas pipelines, and critical infrastructures
    such as dams, hydroelectric power plants, drinking water conduits and
    long-distance power transmission lines. They could also be used to
    monitor the transportation of hazardous cargo, especially industrial
    chemicals that could be used as a weapon against us.
        As with the introduction of any new technology, UAVs have not been
    problem free. I am aware that, to date, military UAVs have suffered
    higher than desirable accident rates that will require that their
    systems be engineered with greater redundancy for use by civilian
    agencies. In addition, they do not have the ability to detect, and
    automatically avoid, nearby aircraft. These are important safety issues
    that would have to be addressed before employing UAVs over populated
    areas, and in flight paths utilized by both commercial and private
    aircraft, including helicopters.
        Additionally, it is essential that any examination of this concept
    address the real concerns we all share about the possible loss of
    privacy. I know that you are as committed as I to ensuring that we meet
    our national security needs without unduly sacrificing the privacy
    rights of our citizens. There may be many detractors to the idea of
    using UAVs for other than military purposes based solely on the
    concerns regarding privacy.
        Lastly, I confess that, as a young man in the late 1930s and early
    1940s--before I began my military service in the Navy--I was fascinated
    with aviation, and built many a model airplane. I draw your attention
    to all the work being done within your administration to recognize that
    someone desiring to bring harm to our Nation could utilize this
    wonderful hobby by utilizing model airplanes to spread chemical and
    biological agents. The administration might find it necessary to have
    some congressional recognition of this important and rapidly expanding
    technology to further insulate and protect our people from possible
    harm.
        There is broad agreement in this country that we must be proactive
    in ensuring that terrorists never again strike our shores. You have
    championed the idea of transforming our military services from being a
    force designed to fight the former Soviet Union to one tailored to 21st
    century adversaries, especially those utilizing terrorism as a weapon.
    I believe that considering the use of UAV technology in homeland
    defense echoes that spirit of transformation.
        Mr. President, I hope that you will receive this idea in the
    constructive spirit in which it is offered.
        With kind regards, I am
                                                        John W. Warner.

        Chairman Warner. Do you have anything further to add about
    the UAVs, Secretary McHale?
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir, I do. My personal experience
    with them goes back to the Gulf War. We used them in the Gulf
    when I was there the last time around as a marine, so I am
    familiar not only with the policy issues, but the actual
    operational employment of UAVs.
        The use falls into two categories. I think there is a
    tremendous potential benefit from the effective offshore use of
    UAVs as part of an integrated surveillance plan that in turn
    might be coordinated with a sea-based array of WMD sensors. We
    establish various platforms in the air to observe threats as
    they approach our shores and then array a maritime sensor
    system that might well detect a weapon of mass destruction
    while still out in the blue water. So I think whether you are
    talking about an airship or a UAV, we have to push out as far
    as we can the surveillance and other capabilities of a maritime
    defense in depth.
        Second, coming ashore, we can make certain capabilities
    available to lead Federal law enforcement agencies for their
    primary use with regard to domestic activity. We would make
    equipment available at the direction of the President and the
    Secretary of Defense and subject to whatever privacy
    constraints Congress might want to impose upon that lead
    Federal law enforcement agency.
        So I think UAVs play a significant potential role both in
    traditional defensive missions, where we would take the lead,
    and in law enforcement missions, where we would simply provide
    support to a properly constrained domestic law enforcement
    agency.
        Chairman Warner. If these vehicles become somewhat more
    prolific in the private sector--I mean, some of these companies
    might well offer them to the private sector--then you have an
    air space situation that has to be hopefully monitored within
    the structure that you are in.
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Warner. Admiral Ellis, any point you would like to
    make on UAVs?
        Admiral Ellis. Sir, I think you have teed it up very well.
    This is yet another issue that builds on several others that,
    as we look at the tremendously changed national security
    environment, we have to balance appropriately between the need
    for that intelligence essential to our defense and the rights
    to privacy and personal security that are an important part of
    being an American.
        This is the same challenge we face in the computer network
    operations area, in the intelligence issues that you are well
    familiar with, sir, as we look to better fuse that together.
    This adds to that and just highlights the direction in which we
    are going as we, as a Nation, address those trades between
    needing more actionable information, and the rights of the
    individual citizens that have to be held in appropriate regard.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you.
        Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Admiral, you made reference to the computer
    network defense mission in response to the chairman's question
    and then made an allusion as to the offensive possibilities of
    computer network operations. In that regard, have you had a
    chance to study the various legal implications of an offensive
    mission?
        Admiral Ellis. Yes, sir. The issues that you describe
    within computer network operations writ large, including both
    defense and attack, are an important part of any policy
    consideration as we look to the future. The Department of
    Justice and others have undertaken reviews and it is an
    important part of what we do as we look for policy guidance on
    the way ahead, even as we examine technological alternatives.
        The computer network operations piece is particularly
    challenging because it is possible to employ the global
    information grid in manners that disguise, if not hide, the
    origin of certain elements. So there is an increasing challenge
    in knowing where the potential threats to our own systems
    originate. They can be laundered, if you will, through various
    routes and mechanisms, and so there are legalities associated
    with that as we address the issues that I was discussing with
    the chairman: how do we deal with the rights of American
    citizens and still deal with the security element.
        The obverse of that, of course, is on the computer network
    attack side as we examine potential capabilities for the
    future.
        Senator Levin. What are some of the legal issues that you
    are grappling with in that area in terms of attack?
        Admiral Ellis. I would be happy to provide a more detailed
    discussion for the record.
        Senator Levin. Would you do that, thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The legal issues related to computer network attack are generally
    the same as employment of any class of weapon in time of conflict.
    First, a test-bed needs to be developed so we can accurately predict
    the effects of network attack. The results of the tests will allow a
    fact-based evaluation of the discrimination and proportionality
    judgments that form the basis of all Law of Armed Conflict. In other
    words, we must strive to accomplish military objectives without causing
    unnecessary damage to civilian infrastructure, and determine the best
    methods to achieve dominance over an adversary using the least amount
    of force.
        Additionally, in all military actions we seek to limit the negative
    effects of operations on those who are not combatants. On the attack
    side of network operations, we must consider the effects a potential
    course of action will have, not only on the physical well-being of non-
    combatants, but also their personal privacy along with other human
    rights concerns. We are committed to decreasing the humanitarian cost
    of conflict wherever possible.

        Senator Levin. Secretary McHale, I want to go back to the
    intelligence coordination issue, which is something that I have
    been deeply concerned about for a long time. We went through a
    number of hearings on this subject and the conclusion of the
    new Department of Homeland Security, and I think everybody
    else, was that the CTC is the primary location to analyze
    foreign intelligence. The new TTIC would then take those
    analyses, supplement it in any way they wanted, refer it back
    to the CIA and CTC for additional analyses, and then integrate
    those analyses on foreign intelligence, intelligence about
    foreign terrorist threats, integrate that with any domestic
    threats----
        Secretary McHale. Yes, sir.
        Senator Levin.--and then link all of that to infrastructure
    vulnerabilities. But that is all done between the CTC and the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        How does the Department of Defense link up to the TTIC?
    Could you go through that again with us?
        Secretary McHale. It will be on two levels. On the tactical
    level, DIA has a JITF-CT and the JITF-CT is the principal
    portal between tactical intelligence external to the Department
    of Defense and the internal needs of the Department of Defense
    to be aware of that information.
        On a policy level, the new Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence will take the lead in terms of coordination with
    the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. So as a practical
    matter, on a daily basis I would anticipate that the JITF-CT
    would remain the principal day-to-day contact with the
    international and domestic intelligence community, subject to
    the supervision of the newly created position of the Under
    Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
        As a practical matter, what that means is every day I start
    with a DIA briefing. Most of the information they bring to my
    attention has been given to them from their JITF-CT and so I
    have daily and I think open access to that information which is
    deemed to be of domestic significance, whether it is gathered
    internationally or domestically.
        Senator, it is also significant that, as I said, I start
    the day with that DIA briefing, but minutes later, at the
    direction of the Secretary of Defense, I attend with him each
    day his briefing on these issues, at least during a wartime
    environment. So I first get the briefing from the DIA and then
    I am able to attend and hear the same information covering
    those and perhaps some additional topics that might be
    presented to the Secretary of Defense.
        I think that really highlights the importance the Secretary
    has placed, not on me, but on the office that I am privileged
    to hold.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        General Eberhart, your prepared statement mentions that the
    JTF-CS provides command and control of consequence management
    forces that would be responding to a chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive event. How would
    that JTF-CS and these forces be coordinated with efforts of the
    Department of Homeland Security, as well as with State and
    local emergency response forces?
        General Eberhart. Sir, there is a variety of ways that this
    would happen. First of all, an incident occurs and a
    determination is made at that time that in fact the local
    responders or the State agencies or other Federal agencies do
    not have the wherewithal to deal with this problem. At that
    time a lead Federal agency would in fact be established and
    they would request what they thought was appropriate military
    support.
        If in fact we thought the military support was best
    provided by the JTF-CS, that is where we would go for those
    capabilities.
        I do not want to lead you to believe that we are just
    sitting there waiting, doing nothing, in case somebody might
    call. Hopefully, we would have some intelligence up front that
    this might happen. Second, as soon as it occurs we will know
    that it has occurred. So that, in football terminology, we are
    dressing out for the game. We are getting ready, so if they
    call us we can shorten the amount of time it takes us to
    respond with qualified people to help alleviate the situation.
        Then we will in fact respond to this area, initially with a
    planning force, then with follow-on forces to help. We have
    everything from transportation to ambulance capabilities to
    medical capabilities to abilities to help establish a cordon or
    whatever we think is appropriate.
        In almost every case, Senator, we would be in support of
    another lead Federal agency, probably FEMA. It could be someone
    else if they had established that another agency is best suited
    to be the lead Federal agency. We take our instructions from
    that agency, but we would in fact command and control those
    forces.
        Most likely that commander would report directly to me.
    Depending on the situation, we may have him report to another
    one of our subordinate commanders if we thought that was
    appropriate. But those people work daily and they study
    response plans from various counties, our large cities. The
    counterterrorist organization from the city of New York will
    soon visit down there.
        So we are trying to in fact oil this mechanism so that
    people know each other, we share plans, and we are prepared to
    respond if and when needed.
        Senator Levin. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Warner. Gentlemen, we have had an excellent
    hearing, well-attended by a large number of this committee. It
    is going to be extremely helpful to us as a committee and
    indeed the Senate as a whole to recognize with the detail you
    have given us the very significant participation by the
    Department of Defense in the overall responsibility for
    homeland defense.
        We shall continue to follow this as one of the highest
    priorities of this committee. We thank you and I once again
    encourage you to access this committee for such assistance as
    you need with regard to legislation and to such priority of
    asset flow as authorized and eventually appropriated here in
    Congress. So we are off to a good start.
        Thank you for traveling long distances, Admiral Ellis and
    General Eberhart, and it is always a pleasure to have a former
    member of the United States Congress facing us. We know full
    well that you are prepared for all of our questions.
        Secretary McHale. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Levin. Particularly one who wears glasses just as
    wonderful as your's. [Laughter.]
        Secretary McHale. I think we bought them at the same
    drugstore. [Laughter.]
        Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening the
    hearing. Thanks to our witnesses for very useful testimony.
        Chairman Warner. Thank you. We are adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                   Questions Submitted by Senator John Cornyn
      transfer of intelligence information to state and local authorities
        1. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHale, it is important that State and
    local law enforcement officials have the most accurate information as
    possible about any potential threats to our communities. At the same
    time, we need to safeguard sources and methods when it comes to
    intelligence reporting. However, we must strike the appropriate balance
    between protecting sources and methods and getting this information to
    the people who need it. Could you explain how you will work within the
    Department of Defense (DOD) and with the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) to ensure that the appropriate intelligence information
    gets to the right people at the State and local level so we can better
    protect our communities?
        Secretary McHale. Within the DOD, as the principal staff assistant
    and advisor on all homeland defense matters, I will work closely with
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Stephen Cambone,
    who serves as the Secretary of Defense's Principal Staff Assistant and
    advisor on all intelligence, counterintelligence and security, and
    intelligence-related matters, to ensure that DOD provides appropriate
    intelligence information to the DHS. The DHS then, in accordance with
    Public Law 107-296 (the Homeland Security Act of 2002) Sections 102 and
    201, is responsible for ``distributing or, as appropriate, coordinating
    the distribution of, warnings and information to State and local
    government personnel, agencies, and authorities and to the public.''

                   FORCE PROTECTION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

        2. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHale, I am privileged to have 17
    major military installations in my State. As such, I am particularly
    concerned that DOD has adequate and standardized force protection
    measures in place at our military bases not only in Texas but across
    the country. Last year, Congress directed DOD to develop a
    comprehensive plan for improving the preparedness of military
    installations for preventing and responding to a terrorist attack.
    Could you provide me an update on the plan's progress and discuss your
    role in ensuring that we have the proper force protection measures in
    place at our Nation's bases?
        Secretary McHale. Section 1402 of the Fiscal Year 2003 National
    Defense Authorization Act directs DOD to develop a comprehensive plan
    for improving the preparedness of military installations for preventing
    and responding to terrorist attacks, including attacks involving the
    use or threat of weapons of mass destruction. DOD is presently staffing
    the plan and will submit it to Congress later this year. The report
    defines elements of installation preparedness to include prevention,
    detection, protection, and emergency response functions. The plan also
    addresses a variety of initiatives the DOD is presently undertaking to
    determine those ``best practices'' needed to enhance installation
    preparedness through an integration of technology and human capital. In
    my role as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, my
    office is responsible for a variety of issues, including force
    protection concerns as related to installation preparedness. As base
    force protection conditions change due to the evolving threat,
    corresponding flexible protective measures are activated. Flexible
    employment of such measures allows a timely, focused response.

        INTELLIGENCE SHARING BETWEEN NORTHCOM AND THE TERRORIST THREAT
                               INTEGRATION CENTER

        3. Senator Cornyn. General Eberhart, in your opening statement you
    note that ``homeland defense relies on the sharing of actionable
    intelligence among the appropriate Federal, State, and local
    agencies,'' and that NORTHCOM's ``Combined Intelligence and Fusion
    Center collates and analyzes data from the United States Intelligence
    Community and nearly 50 different government agencies.'' Could you
    elaborate on the relationship between NORTHCOM's Combined Intelligence
    and Fusion Center (CIFC) and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
    (TTIC)?
        General Eberhart. We are laying the groundwork for partnerships
    with the TTIC and other key intelligence organizations. We plan to
    embed command intelligence officers in the TTIC to ensure continual
    collaboration and information exchange.

         TRANSFER OF DOD TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
                              GOVERNMENT ENTITIES

        4. Senator Cornyn. Secretary McHale, last year's Defense
    Authorization Bill directed the Secretary of Defense to designate a
    senior official to facilitate the transfer of DOD technology to State
    and local first responders and other Federal entities. Could you tell
    me your views on what DOD technologies you believe have the greatest
    potential homeland security application, particularly in the area of
    border surveillance, and how you plan to facilitate the transfer of
    such technologies to other government entities?
        Secretary McHale. DOD participates in many interagency efforts to
    transfer applicable technologies to first responders. For example, DOD
    invests around $100 million annually in the Technical Support Working
    Group (TSWG), the U.S. national forum that brings together over 85
    Federal agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate interagency
    and international research and development (R&D) requirements for
    combating terrorism. The TSWG rapidly develops technologies and
    equipment to meet the high-priority needs of the combating terrorism
    community, and addresses joint international operational requirements
    through cooperative R&D with major allies.
        Most, if not all, of the technologies considered by TSWG have
    homeland security applications--especially in the areas of prevention
    and response. Examples of technologies that may be of interest in the
    area of border surveillance include: technologies to detect explosives,
    weapons, chemical and radiological material, and other contraband on or
    in personnel, vehicles, vessels, cargo, and mail; advanced technologies
    for invisibly marking moving or stationary targets that may be imaged
    remotely, day or night; improved body armor and standards to provide
    greater effectiveness against current and emerging threats; and
    advanced optical systems to provide improved imaging in night and
    obscured viewing environments.
        Section 1401 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump National Defense
    Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, directed that ``the Secretary of
    Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report
    on the actions taken to carry out this section,'' to include ``[a]
    summary of the actions taken or planned to be taken to implement'' the
    responsibilities of the designated senior official and ``an initial
    list of technology items and equipment identified'' pursuant to the
    execution of these responsibilities. In coordination with the Office of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, my office is developing the report that will outline the
    process we will utilize to match DOD technology and equipment with
    first responder requirements.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy

             SYSTEMS FOR FORCE PROTECTION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

        5. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, I would like to ask you a few
    questions about the protection of U.S. forces and installations, and
    how well the Department of Defense utilizes commercially available
    technology to achieve these missions. As homeland defense encompasses
    the protection of critical defense infrastructure against external
    threats, this issue appears to fall squarely within your purview.
        It is my understanding that whereas every U.S. embassy and every
    airport is protected with explosive trace detection systems, metal
    detectors, and x-ray scanners, there are very few of these systems
    deployed at military installations around the Nation and abroad. I
    played a role after the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in supporting the
    Navy in its effort to outfit all ships in the fleet with explosive
    trace detectors, to help prevent a recurrence of such a horrible event.
    But I fear that the Defense Department has not adopted widespread use
    of these systems and is failing to provide adequate force protection as
    a result.
        What is the current level of use of these types of detection
    systems at Defense Department facilities?
        Secretary McHale. Explosive trace detection systems, metal
    detectors, and x-ray scanners are presently employed at numerous DOD
    facilities worldwide. However, these capabilities are not universal.
    Concerted efforts are underway in each of the Services to increase the
    availability of equipment and systems to protect our installations and
    facilities. For example, the Army is executing a program to provide
    equipment packages to security forces at Army installations worldwide.
    The package includes large mobile vehicle inspection systems, explosive
    trace detection systems, x-ray inspection systems for cargo containers,
    portable and fixed barriers, closed circuit television cameras,
    portable light sets, and under-vehicle inspection capability. The Air
    Force, Navy, and Army have employed large vehicle imaging systems at
    some locations. The Navy is working to procure metal detectors and
    baggage scanning equipment (x-ray imaging) for larger ships. The Air
    Force has purchased baggage-scanning equipment (x-ray imaging) for
    their passenger terminals and mailrooms. Additionally, the Marine Corps
    has plans to purchase trace detectors in support of their Explosive
    Ordnance Detection (EOD) mission and the Navy has employed these
    systems in their shipboard operations. Furthermore, DOD is investing in
    a research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) effort to field a
    neutron electric generator-based scanning system to automate threat
    recognition for large vehicles/containers.

        6. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, who in the Department sets
    requirements for the acquisition and deployment of such systems?
        Secretary McHale. The individual Services set requirements for
    acquisition and deployment.

        7. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, which office sets standards
    for the testing and evaluation of these systems?
        Secretary McHale. Within the Physical Security Equipment Advisory
    Group (PSEAG) and in accordance with DOD Directive 3224.3, the Navy
    oversees the RDT&E of explosive detection equipment (EDE). A CAPSTONE
    Requirements Document for EDE has been drafted and forwarded to the
    Joint Requirements Working Group of the PSEAG. Specific key performance
    parameters were included in this overarching document. The Naval
    Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, Indian Head, MD has
    been assigned as the Navy's Technical Development Agent (TDA) for EDE.

        8. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, my understanding is that
    other agencies in the Federal Government have conducted extensive tests
    on these types of detection systems, such as the DHS--including the
    Transportation Security Administration, the Customs and Border
    Protection, and the Coast Guard--the Department of State, and the
    Department of Transportation. Does the Department of Defense plan to
    reinvent the wheel in evaluating these systems for its own use, or will
    it cooperate with these other agencies and take advantage of the
    analyses already conducted?
        Secretary McHale. To ensure the timely acquisition of the most
    effective force protection capability available, the Department
    continually evaluates test data from all sources of force protection
    technology. As an example, the test and evaluation efforts of the FAA
    in the area of trace detection have been leveraged extensively. DOD
    also uses State Department and U.S. Customs test data when deciding
    which commercial barrier systems and x-ray systems best meet the needs
    of the Services. Additional test and evaluation may be conducted when
    the efforts of other agencies do not fully address our requirements. As
    an example, additional evaluations may be conducted when the leveraged
    results have not considered unique safety or climatic conditions. The
    explosive detection equipment RDT&E program conducted on behalf of the
    DOD PSEAG has coordinated much of their work with other government
    agencies, academia, and the private sector. Over the past 3 years, the
    Navy has conducted comparative studies of trace explosive detectors,
    mailroom screening systems, and large vehicle imaging systems. Test
    results are shared with these agencies and all branches of the
    military.

        9. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, I understand that this may be
    out of your direct purview, but it certainly relates to your
    responsibilities for protecting facilities and people. Do you know
    whether these types of systems are being planned for deployment in Iraq
    to protect our troops and the personnel helping to rebuild Iraq from
    terrorist bombs?
        Secretary McHale. This is not a matter in my direct purview;
    however, I am given to understand that forward operating bases in Iraq
    are protected by guarded perimeters with controlled access points
    patrolled by personnel with specialized equipment capable of detecting
    explosives and weapons.

                                FIRST RESPONDERS

        10. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, I understand that part of
    the mission for your office is to assist the State and local public
    safety agencies to utilize DOD dual-use technology to enhance their
    response to acts of terrorism and other critical incidents. What
    process do you anticipate using to match the needs and requirements of
    first responders?
        Secretary McHale. Section 1401 of Public Law 107-314, the Bob Stump
    National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003, directed that
    ``[t]he Secretary of Defense shall designate a senior official of the
    Department of Defense to coordinate all Department of Defense efforts
    to identify, evaluate, deploy, and transfer to Federal, State, and
    local first responders technology items and equipment in support of
    homeland security.'' I anticipate that I will be designated this senior
    official.
        Section 1401 also directed that ``the Secretary of Defense shall
    submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the actions
    taken to carry out this section,'' to include ``[a] summary of the
    actions taken or planned to be taken to implement'' the
    responsibilities of the designated senior official and ``an initial
    list of technology items and equipment identified'' pursuant to the
    execution of these responsibilities. In coordination with the Office of
    the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
    Logistics, my office is developing the report that will outline the
    process we will utilize to match DOD technology and equipment with
    first responder requirements.

        11. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, how can DOD create a
    permanent interface with this community?
        Secretary McHale. While the report on technology and equipment
    transfer to civil responders required by Section 1401 of Public Law
    107-314 (the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal
    Year 2003) and, therefore, a more complete answer to your question,
    remains in development, two stratagems for maintaining a permanent
    interface are:
        First, we can continue to leverage existing forums that have
    successfully engaged with first responder needs, such as the TSWG and
    the InterAgency Board on Standardization and Equipment. These two
    groups have had considerable success in properly interfacing with the
    first responder community.
        Second, we can work with the DHS; and more specifically, the Office
    of State and Local Coordination. Working cooperatively with DHS allows
    both DOD and the first responder community to have a single Federal
    clearinghouse rather than multiple, potentially confusing and competing
    Federal clearinghouses.

        12. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, what benefits do you
    anticipate from this connection for both DOD and the first responder
    communities?
        Secretary McHale. I anticipate mutual benefits for DOD and the
    first responder community. As demonstrated by DOD's successful
    participation in such interagency efforts as the InterAgency Board on
    Standardization and Equipment and the TSWG, DOD can be a valuable
    source of useful technologies to first responders.
        DOD benefits materially and procedurally. For example, when the
    first responder community purchases a technology also used by DOD, the
    cost-per-unit may decrease as the number of units purchased increases.
    Additionally, the first responder community can be a rich source of
    lessons learned on the use of these technologies in urban and
    humanitarian operations.

                                CIVIL LIBERTIES

        13. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, the military's ability to
    act on U.S. soil is limited by the Posse Comitatus Act and other
    legislative provisions, which prevent the military from traditional law
    enforcement activities, such as engaging in search and seizures. How do
    we balance these limitations against the increased role of the military
    in homeland security?
        Secretary McHale. Under the Constitution, the President, as
    Commander-in-Chief, may order the military to perform specific domestic
    missions under extraordinary circumstances. In addition to the
    President's constitutional authority, Congress has specifically vested
    the President with certain statutory authority to employ members of the
    Armed Forces. The insurrection statutes at 10 U.S.C. Sec. 331, et.
    seq., and Public Law 107-40, which grants the President authority to
    respond to terrorist incidents, are two examples of this type of legal
    authority. Other statutes authorize use of the Armed Forces and its
    unique capabilities in providing support to other agencies during
    domestic missions, operations, and activities. These include the
    Stafford Act, the Economy Act, and Chapter 18 of Title 10, United
    States Code, regarding military support to civilian law enforcement
    agencies.
        Immediate emergency response authority permits commanders to take
    prompt action to respond to requests from civil authorities to save
    lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great damage to property as
    a result of civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities seriously
    endangering life and property. Immediate emergency response is
    authorized only when time does not permit local commanders to seek and
    receive appropriate approval from the chain of command.
        The potential applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act is evaluated
    and resolved before military personnel undertake any mission,
    operation, or activity on U.S. territory, especially when providing
    support to civil law enforcement authorities. Since the President has
    constitutional and statutory authority to use the military to provide
    support to civil authorities, the Department does not believe that the
    act would impede the nature or timeliness of DOD support when directed
    to provide support by the President.

        14. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, given the increased role of
    the National Guard in homeland security, those individuals are blurring
    the line between law enforcement and military operations. The Fourth
    Amendment is a very complex body of law. Are National Guardsmen
    receiving training in Fourth Amendment search and seizure law?
        Secretary McHale. While in State Active Duty (State-controlled/
    State-funded) or Title 32 status (State-controlled/Federally-funded),
    National Guard Forces are not under the command and control authority
    of the Secretary of Defense or the President. Also, while in State
    Active Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard Forces are not subject
    to the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act.
        The only training of a Fourth Amendment nature is MACDIS (Military
    Assistance for Civil Disturbances) training. National Guard units of
    select States are required to conduct annual sustainment training in
    this area. This training covers apprehension and detention operations,
    which includes searches of an individual in order to protect the safety
    of an apprehending soldier. In practice, apprehensions in a MACDIS
    situation are generally done by civil law enforcement officers or by
    guardsmen under their supervision. Further, National Guard Forces in
    State Active Duty or Title 32 status normally operate under State laws
    and each State grants their National Guard Forces different levels of
    law enforcement powers.

        15. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, are they aware of the
    applicable doctrines and exceptions?
        Secretary McHale. While in State Active Duty or Title 32 status,
    National Guard Forces are not under the command and control authority
    of the Secretary of Defense or the President. Also, while in State
    Active Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard Forces are not subject
    to the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act.
        While in State Active Duty or Title 32 status, National Guard
    Forces operate under State laws and each State grants their National
    Guard Forces different law enforcement powers. Some of the States'
    Rules for the Use of Force (RUF), employed by National Guard Forces
    when operating in their State, include minimal authority for searches
    and seizures, primarily used to apprehend and to protect the National
    Guard member from individuals being apprehended. In other States, RUF
    status allows somewhat broader search and seizure authority, such as
    searches of private vehicles for weapons. Examples of these States are
    Vermont, Texas, Illinois, and Nevada.
        Federalizing National Guard Forces to perform domestic law
    enforcement functions is the least effective and efficient method of
    employing our National Guard and the DOD method of last resort. The
    most appropriate status for them to perform such functions is in State
    Active Duty status. In the extremely rare occasion that National Guard
    Forces are federalized to perform law enforcement functions, members
    will receive appropriate training in Fourth Amendment search and
    seizure law.

        16. Senator Kennedy. Secretary McHale, have they received training
    in ethnic and racial profiling?
        Secretary McHale. While in State Active Duty or Title 32 status,
    National Guard Forces are not under the command and control authority
    of the Secretary of Defense or the President.
        Each State's judicial authorities establish the applicable legal
    authorities under which their respective National Guard members will
    operate when under State control. Since National Guard members are not
    granted full State law enforcement powers, ethnic and racial profiling
    is not seen as applicable to the National Guard.
        Federalizing National Guard Forces to perform domestic law
    enforcement functions is the least effective and efficient method of
    employing our National Guard and the DOD method of last resort. The
    most appropriate status for them to perform such functions is in State
    Active Duty status.

        [Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee adjourned.]