[Senate Hearing 108-19]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-19
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 6, 2003
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, prepared statement 47
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 44
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Powell, Hon. Colin L., Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Responses to additional questions for the record from:
Senator Lugar.............................................. 62
Senator Biden.............................................. 81
Senator Voinovich.......................................... 94
Senator Dodd............................................... 100
Senator Feingold........................................... 103
Senator Boxer.............................................. 106
Senator Bill Nelson........................................ 107
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, prepared
statement...................................................... 53
(iii)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUDGET
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback,
Voinovich, Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Dodd, Kerry,
Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and Corzine.
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Mr. Secretary, we welcome you. The purpose of the hearing
this morning is to exchange views on the State Department
budget for the coming year, and we want to hear from you about
the needs of the State Department in this era when it occupies
the front lines in the war against terrorism.
I want to compliment you, as I know all members will, on
your efforts to expand funding for the State Department and for
foreign assistance programs. You have brought a very important
strategic understanding to budgetary questions involving the
Department. This committee could not ask for a better partner
in explaining why your work and the work of all those at the
Department is so critical in protecting American citizens from
future acts of terrorism.
The progress you have made in the last 2 years has begun to
reverse the damaging slide in diplomatic capabilities that
occurred through much of the 1990s. In the years following the
fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States slashed the
resources available to diplomatic activities and to foreign
assistance. In 2001, the share of the United States budget
devoted to the international affairs account stood at a paltry
1.18 percent, barely above its post-World War II low, and only
about half of its share in the mid-1980s. This slide occurred
even as the State Department was incurring the heavy added cost
of establishing new missions in the 15 States of the Former
Soviet Union.
Even after a healthy increase in the last fiscal year, the
U.S. foreign assistance in constant dollars has declined about
44 percent since Ronald Reagan's Presidency in 1985, and about
18 percent since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The
United States devotes about one-tenth of 1 percent of our gross
national product to economic assistance, ranking in this
category last among the 21 major providers of aid in the
developing world.
The September 11 attacks jarred our country out of its
complacency toward foreign threats, and your efforts have
translated this renewed awareness into more resources. What is
still missing from American political discourse is support for
the painstaking work of foreign policy, and the indisputable
role that diplomacy plays in our strategic efforts to win the
war on terrorism.
Mr. Secretary, even as we convene here to discuss
diplomatic budgeting and capabilities, there is not a soul in
the room who is not aware that you are joining us on this day
after a very important mission to the United Nations. A few of
our questions today will surely stray from the intricacies of
the 150 budget account, but even as we bring up Iraq, North
Korea, the war against terrorism, I hope that members will keep
in mind the connection between the immediate crises that we
will be talking about and the broader questions of our foreign
policy capabilities.
The ability of our military to defeat Iraq has never been
in question. What has been in doubt are factors related to our
diplomatic strength and our standing in the world. Can we get a
positive vote in the Security Council? Can we secure the
necessary basing and overflight rights? Can we limit anti-
American reaction to the war in the Arab world or elsewhere?
Can we secure allied participants in the work of reconstructing
Iraq in the event that war is necessary? Successful answers to
these questions depend largely on diplomatic work done by your
Department between crises, and they depend on the work funded
by the very budget that we discuss today.
Mr. Secretary, recently I outlined the five foreign policy
campaigns that I believe must be undertaken to win the war on
terrorism, and I use ``win'' in this case very deliberately.
Our soldiers can fight the war against terrorism, and they are
doing so in Afghanistan bravely, selflessly, and successfully,
but we will not win this war through attrition.
To win the war against terrorism, the United States must
assign United States economic and diplomatic capabilities the
same strategic priority we assign to military capabilities, and
the first of these five campaigns necessary to win the war is
expending our investments in diplomats, embassy security,
foreign assistance, and other tools of foreign policy. If a
greater commitment of resources can prevent the bombing of one
of our embassies, secure alliance participation in expensive
peacekeeping efforts, or improve detection of terrorists
seeking visas, the investment will have yielded dividends far
beyond its cost.
Second, we need to expand and globalize the Nunn-Lugar
cooperative threat reduction programs to assure to the maximum
extent possible that weapons of mass destruction are not
transferred to terrorists.
And third, we must promote trade, which is essential in
building the prosperity that can dampen terrorist recruitment
and political resentment.
Fourth, we must strengthen alliances so that we have
partners who will share financial burdens and support our
efforts against terrorism.
And fifth, we must reinvigorate our commitment to
democracy, expanding global energy supplies, protecting the
international environment, and accelerating development.
How will we know when we are winning? First, when every
other nation also rallies against al-Qaeda. Second, when
foreign law enforcement officials are willing and able to track
down and arrest al-Qaeda cells operating in their territory.
Third, when al-Qaeda's message no longer strikes a responsive
chord in the Muslim world. Fourth, when whole sections of
Islamic society have been lifted from conditions of abject
poverty, and fifth, when failed States can no longer harbor al-
Qaeda.
No military force, no matter how big, can achieve those
goals. They can only be achieved diplomatically and with a
strong and effective foreign policy. We are spending less than
8 cents on foreign policy of every dollar that goes to defense.
Your job here today, Mr. Secretary, is to convince us and,
through us, our colleagues, that we have the will, the
capacity, and the resources to win the war on terrorism.
[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar
Mr. Secretary, the purpose of this hearing is to exchange views on
the State Department budget for the coming year. We want to hear from
you about the needs of your Department in this era when it occupies the
front lines in the war on terrorism. I want to compliment you on your
efforts to expand funding for the State Department and foreign
assistance programs. You have brought a very important strategic
understanding to budgetary questions involving the Department. This
Committee could not ask for a better partner in explaining why your
work and the work of all those at the Department is so crucial in
protecting American citizens from future acts of terrorism.
The progress you have made in the last two years has begun to
reverse the damaging slide in diplomatic capabilities that occurred
during the 1990s. In the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall,
the United States slashed the resources available to diplomatic
activities and foreign assistance.
In 2001, the share of the U.S. budget devoted to the international
affairs account stood at a paltry 1.18 percent--barely above its post-
World War II low and only about half of its share in the mid-1980s.
This slide occurred even as the State Department was incurring the
heavy added costs of establishing new missions in the 15 States of the
Former Soviet Union.
Even after a healthy increase in the last fiscal year, U.S. foreign
assistance in constant dollars has declined about 44 percent since its
Reagan presidency peak in 1985 and about 18 percent since the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991. The United States devotes about one-tenth
of one percent of our GNP to economic assistance--ranking us last in
this category among the 21 major providers of aid to the developing
world.
The September 11 attacks jarred our country out of its complacency
toward foreign threats, and your efforts have translated this renewed
awareness into more resources. What is still missing from American
political discourse is support for the painstaking work of foreign
policy and the indispensable role that diplomacy plays in our strategic
effort to win the war on terrorism.
Mr. Secretary, even as we convene here to discuss diplomatic
budgeting and capabilities, there is not a soul in this room who is not
aware that you are joining us the day after a very important mission at
the United Nations. A few of our questions today will stray from the
intricacies of the 150 Budget Account. But even as we bring up Iraq,
North Korea, and the war against terrorism, I hope that members will
keep in mind the connection between the immediate crises and the
broader question of our foreign policy capabilities.
The ability of our military to defeat Iraq has not been in
question. What has been in doubt are factors related to our diplomatic
strength and our standing in the world. Can we get a positive vote in
the Security Council? Can we secure the necessary basing and overflight
rights? Can we limit anti-American reactions to war in the Arab world?
Can we secure allied participation in the work of reconstructing Iraq
after a war? Successful answers to these questions depend largely on
the diplomatic work done by your Department between crises. They depend
on the work funded by the very budget that we discuss today.
Mr. Secretary, recently I outlined five foreign policy campaigns
that must be undertaken to win the war on terrorism. I use the word WIN
in this case very deliberately. Our soldiers can FIGHT the war against
terrorism and they are doing that in Afghanistan--bravely, selflessly,
and successfully. But we will not win this war through attrition. To
win the war against terrorism, the United States must assign U.S.
economic and diplomatic capabilities the same strategic priority that
we assign to military capabilities.
The first of these five campaigns necessary to win the war is
expanding our investments in diplomats, embassy security, foreign
assistance and other tools of foreign policy. If a greater commitment
of resources can prevent the bombing of one of our embassies, secure
alliance participation in expensive peacekeeping efforts, or improve
detection of terrorists seeking visas, the investment will have yielded
dividends far beyond its cost.
Second, we will need to expand and globalize Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Programs, to ensure to the maximum extent possible
that weapons of mass destruction are not transferred to terrorists.
Third, we must promote trade, which is essential to building the
prosperity that can dampen terrorist recruitment and political
resentment.
Fourth, we must strengthen alliances so that we have partners who
will share financial burdens and support our efforts against terrorism.
And fifth, we must reinvigorate our commitment to democracy,
expanding global energy supplies, protecting the international
environment, and accelerating development.
How will we know when we are winning?
1. When every other nation also rallies against the al-Qaeda
threat.
2. When foreign law enforcement officials are willing and
able to track down and arrest every al-Qaeda cell operating in
their territory.
3. When al-Qaeda's message no longer strikes a responsive
chord in the Muslim world.
4. When whole sections of Islamic society have been lifted
from conditions of abject poverty.
5. When failed states that can harbor al-Qaeda no longer
exist.
No military force, no matter how valiant, can achieve these goals.
They can only be achieved diplomatically with a strong and effective
foreign policy. Yet we are spending less than 8 cents on foreign policy
for every dollar that goes to defense. Your job here today, Mr.
Secretary, is to convince us that we have the will, the capacity, and
the resources to win the war on terrorism.
The Chairman. It is my privilege now to turn to the
distinguished ranking member of our committee, Senator Biden,
for his opening statement.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr.
Secretary. As a matter of fact, I was waiting in the other room
to welcome you. I went to the wrong room. I went over to our
committee meeting room. Let me say at the outset, I am proud to
be associated with you. I think you did better than anyone
could have because of your standing, your reputation, and your
integrity, as it is understood by our European friends as well
as others around the world. No Democrat or Republican, I think,
could have presented the case better than you did yesterday. I
do not want to embarrass you, but I think a large part of the
success was the way--the way, the manner, the language, the
verbiage you used in presenting a case that you and I and
everyone on this committee knew existed, but it took you to do
it, and I want to tell you I am proud to be associated with
you.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, sir.
Senator Biden. This hearing, although scheduled some weeks
ago, in keeping with a very important practice is, one of the
first orders of business for this committee--to determine what
the new Congress is likely to do relative to the authorization
of funding for what I think my chairman has accurately pointed
out, and that is, these are new forms of conflict that,
although we need a powerful military, a powerful military will
not solve them. A powerful military and lack of the will to use
it will put us in a much more damaging and vulnerable position,
but no matter how powerful, no matter how incredible the
technology and the bravery of our warriors, it will not solve
the new conflicts that we face that do not lend themselves to
the neat categories that we are accustomed to.
So I think your budget and your leadership in the State
Department takes on a whole new dimension. I would suggest that
the tools available to Statecraft are the most likely tools to
be able to render this country more secure, even--even more
than our military, because we have noted that, and everyone has
noted, but notwithstanding our incredible efforts thus far, al-
Qaeda is still alive, not as well, but well. There is a whole
province in northwestern Pakistan which I am of the view is
essentially owned and operated by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and
tribal sympathies to extremist groups.
I am not suggesting that it lends itself to an easy
military solution, but the desperation, the poverty, the
despair that exists in large parts of the world, coupled with
the sense, unfairly in many cases, the sense that we are only
concerned about our immediate interests, and I know we are not,
I think puts us in a very different position and ups the ante
for an imaginative and creative and 21st century form of
diplomacy that I do not think any of us 4, 6, 8 years ago would
have anticipated, so I think this is a new deal in a big way,
and I think you are just the guy to be there to try to craft
it.
The fact is that we are going to discuss the
administration's proposed budget, and this is not meant to be a
political pun, we cannot proceed without first focusing on the
elephants that are in the room, North Korea and Iraq, so let me
say a very brief few words about those at the outset.
Mr. Secretary, along with millions of Americans and
millions of people around the world, you made, we all watched
you make a powerful case, and once again I want to commend you
for making that case, but suggest I think something you will
not disagree with. It is now--the question for Saddam is war or
peace. It is in his hands, but the question for the Security
Council is relevance or irrelevance, and I hope they are seized
of that understanding, and I, for one--I do not want to raise
the bar on you. I guess I have.
I believe--although it is a Herculean task, I believe that
it is possible to bring most nations along and leave others in
a position where they are not objecting, because I think that
is important. We are at a very critical moment, as you know,
and I think you have a very delicate balancing act, and I am
not going to be second-guessing it, but I do want to state what
I think it is, and that is that, to the degree to which our
friends around the world and those who are maybe not
traditionally viewed as our friends ask for more time to deal
with Iraq, I personally think that should be balanced against
whether or not they are likely to come along with us if, in
fact, a reasonable amount of time is given, and that balanced
against what the downside of giving time is.
If the Lord Almighty came down and sat in the middle of
this table and said, Joe, I know if you all give 6 more weeks,
even though that puts us in a militarily more difficult
position, that you will get a uniform view at the United
Nations that there is a deadline set and war is the option, war
will follow if he does not act, I would say take the chance. I
know that is a hard call. That is your business. You know those
people better than we do, and I am confident of your advice to
the President, but I do think that the Security Council has to
decide whether it is going to be relevant or not.
The other important task for the President is, in my view,
the first task has been accomplished: What is the threat? You
did that, and you did that very well. But the second part of
it, and you and I have talked about this often, and I presumed
to talk about it with the President, and that is, foreign
policy, no matter how well-conceived, cannot be sustained with
out the informed consent of the American people. I know of no
warrior who believes that more than you, having been through
Vietnam, and having led our troops in the field, as well as
having been the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This is not a criticism of the administration, because
maybe it is not the appropriate time yet, but I do think it is
important that we begin to tell the American people what may be
expected of them in terms of the days and the weeks, and Lord
knows how long after. I believe, from my exposure to my
constituency at home, which is every day, that notwithstanding
the growing support, based on the additional evidence put
forward, for the use of force if need be, there is an
overwhelming expectation that this will be a repeat of what
happened in the early 1990s, and that is that we will be
swiftly successful--and I, for one, think that is a probability
that is the most likely outcome, although you have to plan for
the worst, but that Johnny is going to come marching home very,
very rapidly. In my view Johnny and Jane are not going to come
home immediately. It may be 8 months, it may be 16 months, it
may be 3 years, but it is going to be some period of time that
they are going to be there.
I do not think the American people understand that yet, and
when I had the opportunity and the privilege to meet with our
forces under General Franks' command in Qatar about a month
ago, Senator Hagel and I were asked whether we would address
several hundred generals--I never saw so many stars in one
room. We were asked whether we would say a few words and take a
few questions, and the one thing on the minds of these warriors
was not whether they would win, if sent, but whether or not we
would be there a year and a year-and-a-half and 2 years and 3
years down the road, when we had to make hard choices between
another $18 to $20 billion, which is the estimate we got on
this committee to maintain forces in the region, or in Iraq, or
whether we would be using that money for a tax cut, or whether
we would be using that money for health care, we would be using
that money for something else.
And so I think we not only owe it to the American people, I
think every one of us who say we support this effort ought to
understand, if asked, we are prepared. The single most
important, first requirement that we will have will be to fund
that effort above every other thing that we are concerned
about, and we have deep concerns about a number of these
issues, and so I think it is a second reason why we should be
now discussing--and I will not press you today on this--what
are the plans, how detailed are the plans that exist for the
day, the week, the month, the years after.
I also think that North Korea is an equally urgent a
problem as Saddam Hussein at the moment, notwithstanding the
fact that we propositioned tens of thousands of forces, and we
are on--unless he chooses otherwise--the brink of war.
This morning, North Korea announced they have reopened
their small nuclear power plant. There is no doubt that
everyone involved with the U.S. Government understands that
they have the capacity to very quickly produce plutonium, which
is very quickly available, within 1 month maybe one bomb,
within 6 or 8 months or a year, somewhere between 6 and 8
additional nuclear weapons, and quite frankly, in light of the
comments, the concluding comments made by the chairman, that
worries me less than the fact that they have become a small
plutonium factory with a history of miscalculating what the
rest of the world thinks, with a history of proliferation, with
a history of supporting terror, with a history that worries me
that 3 years from now, we may find that plutonium in a suitcase
in a homemade nuclear weapon in some city in the United States
of America.
So I would like you to be able to discuss with us very
briefly at some point the degree to which you think we have
some time. I understand the administration's proposal of a
multilateral umbrella. It makes sense. I think that is the best
way, but as the President said in his State of the Union
Message, and I am paraphrasing, he is interested in results,
not in form. I hope we do not let form trump substance here,
notwithstanding the fact that we are in somewhat of a difficult
position.
So Mr. Secretary, let me stop there. I do have specific
questions about the budget, but it is inescapable, in light of
the news of the day and your brilliant performance yesterday,
for us not to discuss at some point North Korea and Iraq. I
think your budget is positive an increase, but if you take out
the Millennium Challenge Account [MCA] as part of the request,
we are basically a flat budget compared to the fiscal year just
completed, and you had $27.2 billion for fiscal year 2002. That
is how much we spent in that year, counting supplemental
funding. You take the Millennium Challenge Account out of this,
we are essentially back to where it was in 2002. You have
always been candid with us. I would like to know if you really
think that can get this new job done.
Again, thank you. Congratulations, and Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate the time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Let me just announce quickly that one of the concerns of
the distinguished Senator from Delaware, namely, the future
governance of Iraq, will be the subject of our hearing next
Tuesday, and that will have, I think, a great deal of interest
for members of the committee as well as the country, and on
Wednesday, we will be talking about the future governance of
Afghanistan, our role there, and what we may be able to do
through American diplomacy to assist the valiant people of
Afghanistan.
Mr. Secretary, I want to announce to the committee that,
due to the understandable commitments you have here and
elsewhere in the world, that we will try to conclude your
testimony at noon or before, and therefore, with the
concurrence of the ranking member, we will have a 5-minute
questioning period so all members can be accommodated, and we
will try to get to each member's questions.
I thank you very much for coming, sir. Please proceed with
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Powell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for your kind remarks, and Senator Biden, thank you for
your kind remarks. It is a great pleasure to come before the
committee for the third year in a row to defend the State
Department's needs for a world that is in transformation, a
world with new requirements that we must meet, and a world
especially that does require, as you said, sir, the very best
we can put on the front line of diplomacy.
Mr. Chairman, I do have a statement for the record which I
would like to submit, and then I have a short oral statement I
would like to present.
The Chairman. It will be printed in full in the record.
Secretary Powell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin first by thanking the committee for the strong
support that you have provided to the Department over the past
2 years. It has been a source of great personal inspiration to
me, but beyond that, it has been a source of inspiration to the
men and women of the Department of State to know that their
Congress, and especially this committee, is firmly behind them,
and firmly behind what they are doing on this front line of
diplomacy.
At one time, when I first came into the Department, I would
say, ``we are the front line, we are the defense of our
national interest.'' And my staff corrected this old soldier by
saying ``no, we are on the offense.'' Our diplomacy should be
offensive in nature; taking the message, and taking our value
system and taking what we believe out to the rest of the world.
And that is the attitude we have tried to convey throughout the
Department.
We also take our casualties. Last year, I lost three
members of my State Department family, two dependents killed in
a bomb attack in Pakistan, and a member of our AID family in an
assassination in Amman, Jordan. So as we sit here today, as we
worry about the military conflict that may or may not be ahead
of us, diplomats of the United States of America, AID
employees, Peace Corps employees, and all sorts of individuals
who are out in our diplomatic force are at risk every single
day from terrorism and from those who would try to destroy our
way of life--those who believe that by attacking our diplomats
they are attacking the United States directly--and I just am
pleased that this committee understands the sacrifice that they
make--them and their families--and you support us so strongly.
I was struck by one statistic you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
and that was, since the days of Ronald Reagan, the overall
budget for this kind of assistance, our foreign assistance, has
dropped 44 percent. The other thing that is significant about
that statistic is that it also suggests that the filter through
which we used to look at foreign affairs funding has changed.
It used to be through the filter of the cold war. How do we
influence different parties on different sides of the cold war
border?
Now, it is a lot different. Now, we have to worry about
poverty, we have to worry about HIV/AIDS, we have to worry
about nations that are no longer behind an iron curtain or a
bamboo curtain, and are trying to find their way forward to
democracy and the free enterprise system. And I think what we
are trying to do reflects that changed world, and that is why I
believe that the budget I am defending today on behalf of the
President is deserving of your full support. And obviously, I
am here to defend the President's budget. But I know that there
will be adjustments that will be made and different members of
the committee, different Members of the Congress will have
different ideas as to priorities and as to amounts that should
go to the various priorities. And we look forward to working
with you on that prioritization as we go forward.
The statistics as to whether it is an increase, or how much
of an increase, will also be a factor that has to be considered
later, after we see what we get in 2003. And so I once again
encourage all support possible for bringing to a closure the
2003 process in a way that supports the efforts of the
Department of State.
To my opening statement, then, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
say that I am pleased to appear before you in support of the
President's international affairs budget for fiscal year 2004.
Funding requested for 2004 for the Department of State, USAID,
and other foreign affairs agencies is $28.5 billion. The
President's budget will allow the United States to target
security and economic assistance to sustain key countries
supporting us in the war on terrorism, and helping us to stem
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
It will also help us launch the Millennium Challenge
Account: a new partnership generating support to countries that
rule justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic
freedom; to help us strengthen the U.S. and global commitment
to fighting HIV/AIDS and alleviating humanitarian hardships;
combat illegal drugs in the Andean region of South America, as
well as bolster democracy in one of that region's most
important countries, a country that is under siege, Colombia.
The budget request will also reinforce America's world-class
diplomatic force, focusing on the people, places, and tools
needed to promote our foreign policies around the world.
I am particularly proud of that last goal, Mr. Chairman,
because for the past 2 years, I have concentrated on each of my
jobs, first as primary foreign policy advisor to the President,
but also, and in my judgment just as important, Chief Executive
Officer of the State Department. Under my CEO hat, we are
asking for about $8.5 billion, and let me give you some
highlights of what these funds are for.
First, we have been reinforcing our diplomatic force for 2
years, and will continue to do so in fiscal year 2004. We will
hire 399 more professionals to help the President carry out the
Nation's foreign policy. This hiring will bring us to the
1,100-plus new Foreign and Civil Service officers we set out to
hire over the first 3 years of my tenure to bring the
Department's personnel back in line with the diplomatic
workload.
Mr. Chairman, I am so proud of the young men and women who
want to be a part of the Diplomatic Service and the Civil
Service that supports the State Department. In the 2 years that
I have been Secretary, and I really want to blow the
Department's horn on this, 80,000 Americans--80,000 Americans--
have turned up to take the Foreign Service exam to be a part of
this diplomatic force, to be part of our outreach into the
community. This is a significant increase over any other period
you may wish to look at in past years. It did not happen just
because it happened. It happened because we made an effort to
take our case to the American people and encouraged young
people to come into the force.
When I first arrived at the State Department, I was
distressed to find that for a number of years in the 1990s, we
did not hire any Foreign Service officers. Some years, we did
not even give the Foreign Service examination. That was
outrageous. You know, if you want a battalion commander 15
years from now, you have got to hire a second lieutenant now.
If you want an ambassador, career ambassador fully qualified,
speaking four languages, knowing all that he or she should know
15 years from now, you have got to bring in a junior Foreign
Service officer now, and we had not done that for years.
It would be a tragedy, after encouraging 80,000 young
people to get interested in the Foreign Service, to discover
that we cannot even hire 399 in any one year. So please, I
implore the members of this committee to give me what I need to
support our Diplomatic Readiness Initiative--bringing young
people who really want to be a part of this Department, who
really want to be a part of our diplomatic force--to bring them
into the Department so that they can come to the Department, to
learn what it is to be a young Foreign Service officer. And I
invite you to come down to one of our swearing-ins, when either
Rich Armitage or I talk to these youngsters, they raise their
right hand, and you have never seen such enthusiasm on the face
of youngsters to go out and serve their Nation. So please
support that initiative.
Second, I promised members of the Department I would bring
state-of-the-art telecommunications and computers and Internet
capability to the Department, because people who cannot
communicate rapidly and effectively in today's inter-connected
world cannot carry out our foreign policy. And we are
approaching our goal in that regard as well: Internet
capability on every desk, everywhere in the State Department,
at every embassy, at every mission, at every far-flung post.
Yesterday, after I spoke at the U.N, within minutes, it was
all being translated, it was all being put on CD-ROM, it was
all being fired over the Internet to every U.S. Embassy in
order to get the word out. It goes to one of the goals you
touched on earlier, Mr. Chairman: getting the word out,
touching the world, letting people know what we think, what we
believe. And this morning, my staff is proudly showing me all
of the Web site products that they have produced overnight and
everything else they have done to get the word out.
I was musing with my staff this morning that increasingly
we live in a world of pictures, and a world of television. My
presentation yesterday went out around the world, and people
saw it, and there was a picture in one of our newspapers this
morning of a group of young marines sitting in an aircraft
carrier watching the presentation live. They are not waiting
for it to be written up. They are not waiting for somebody to
comment on it. They are not waiting for a talking head to tell
them what they saw. They were seeing it, 10,000 miles away, in
real time, and making their own judgment.
We have to make sure that we get all of our diplomats in
every embassy the same kind of real-time capability to know
what is going on and to convey that message to all of the
audiences that we have to deal with around the world in both
unclassified and classified communications capability,
including desktop access to the Internet. Every man and woman
in the State Department must be connected, and this budget will
put us there, at least move us well along in that direction.
Finally, with respect to my CEO role, I really wanted to
sweep the slate clean and completely revamp the way we
construct our embassies and other overseas buildings, as well
as improve the way we secure our men and women who occupy them,
men and women who are in danger. That task is a long-term one,
an almost never-ending one, particularly in this time of
heightened terrorist activities. But we are well on the way to
implementing both the construction and the security tasks in a
better way, in a less expensive way, in a way that subsequent
CEO's of the State Department can continue and improve on. And
I want to brag about our overseas building operation under the
leadership of retired General Chuck Williams, and what a great
job they are doing in bringing the costs down of our embassy
facilities around the world, and doing it in a way that makes
maximum use of modern technology, modern construction
techniques, and modern construction management techniques,
standardization of our products, but at the same time, doing it
in a way that is sensitive to the culture of each country in
which our facilities are located.
Mr. Chairman, as the principal foreign policy advisor to
President Bush, I have priorities as well. Let me highlight our
key foreign policy priorities before I stop and take your
questions, and while I am talking about foreign policy, I want
to thank this committee for the 19 to 0 vote yesterday for the
Moscow treaty. I hope this committee will continue to give its
full support to this important treaty, as the full Senate
considers its ratification.
I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that it would be possible to
have this treaty ratified by the end of this month, if at all
possible. Yesterday, I spoke to my Russian Federation
colleague, Igor Ivanov, Foreign Minister Ivanov, and they are
prepared to move it through the Duma as well. And I hope that
before this spring, or perhaps maybe before the fall is out, we
will be in a position to exchange the instruments of
ratification between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation.
Mr. Chairman, the 2004 budget proposes several initiatives
to advance U.S. national security interests and preserve
American leadership. The 2004 foreign operations budget that
funds programs for the Department of State, USAID, and other
agencies is $18.8 billion. Today, our No. 1 priority is to
fight and win the global war on terrorism. The budget furthers
this goal by providing economic, military, and democracy
assistance to key foreign partners and allies, including $4.7
billion to countries that have joined us in the war on
terrorism.
Of this amount, the President's budget provides $657
million for Afghanistan, $460 million for Jordan, $395 million
for Pakistan, $255 million for Turkey, $136 million for
Indonesia, and $87 million for the Philippines. In Afghanistan,
this funding will be used to fulfill our commitment to rebuild
Afghanistan's road network. It is not just a road, it is
something that will connect this country, connect its
commercial centers, connect it politically, and start to bring
this nation into a sense of unity, and not just different
regions that are off pursuing their own destiny.
In addition, it will establish security through a national
military and national police force, it will establish
broadbased and accountable governance to democratic
institutions in an active civil society. It will ensure a peace
dividend for the Afghan people through economic reconstruction,
and provide humanitarian assistance to sustain returning
refugees and displaced persons.
United States assistance will continue to be coordinated
with the Afghan Government, the United Nations, and other
international donors.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to emphasize our efforts to
decrease the threats posed by terrorist groups, rogue states,
and other non-state actors with regard to weapons of mass
destruction and related technology. To achieve this goal, we
must strengthen partnerships with countries that share our
views in dealing with the threat of terrorism and in resolving
regional conflicts. The 2004 budget requests $35 million for
the nonproliferation and disarmament fund, more than double the
2003 request, increases funding for overseas export controls
and border security to $40 million, and supports additional
funding for science centers and bio-chem redirection programs.
The funding increases requested for these programs will
help us prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into
the hands of terrorist groups or States by preventing their
movement across borders and by destroying or safeguarding known
quantities of weapons or source materials. The science centers
and bio-chem redirection programs support the same goals by
engaging former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers,
engaging them in peaceful scientific activities, providing them
with an alternative to marketing their skills to States or
groups of concern.
The budget also promotes international peace and prosperity
by launching the most innovative approach to U.S. foreign
assistance in more than 40 years. The new Millennium Challenge
Account, an independent government corporation funded at $1.3
billion, will redefine development aid. As President Bush told
African leaders meeting in Mauritius recently, this aid will go
to nations that encourage economic freedom, root out
corruption, and respect the rights of the people. This, I
think, is one of our most significant initiatives. I am so
proud of it, and the President really is showing enormous
leadership by instituting this Millennium Challenge Account.
As opposed to looking at foreign aid through who was on the
right or wrong side of the cold war, now we want to know who is
on the right or wrong side of democracy, economic democracy,
the individual rights of men and women, transparency in
government, and the end of corruption. We want to know who is
on the right and wrong side of those values as we move into
this new century. And those nations that are on the right side,
and are developing, will find the United States is there to
help them through the Millennium Challenge Account.
Moreover, this budget offers hope and a helping hand to
countries that are facing health catastrophes, poverty and
despair, and humanitarian disasters. The budget includes more
than $1 billion to meet the needs of refugees and internally
displaced peoples.
The budget also provides more than $1.3 billion to combat
the global HIV/AIDS epidemic. The President's total budget for
HIV/AIDS is $2 billion, which includes the first year's funding
for the new emergency plan for HIV/AIDS relief announced by the
President in his State of the Union Address. These funds will
target 14 of the hardest-hit countries in Africa and the
Caribbean.
This budget also includes almost a half a billion dollars
for Colombia. The funding will support Colombian President
Uribe's unified campaign against terrorists and the drug trade
that fuels their activities. The aim is to secure democracy,
extend security, and restore economic prosperity to Colombia,
and prevent the narcoterrorists from spreading instability
through the broader Andean region.
To accomplish this goal requires more than simply funding
for Colombia. Therefore, our total Andean Counterdrug
Initiative is $731 million. Critical components of this effort
include resumption of the Air Bridge Denial program to stop
internal and cross-border aerial trafficking in illegal drugs,
stepped-up eradication and alternative development efforts, as
well as technical assistance to strengthen Colombia's police
and judicial institutions.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, to advance
America's interests around the world, we need the dollars in
the President's budget for fiscal year 2004. We need the
dollars under both of my hats, CEO and principal foreign policy
advisor. The times we live in are troubled, to be sure, but I
believe there is every bit as much opportunity in the days
ahead as there is danger. American leadership is essential with
regard to both the danger and the opportunity. With regard to
the Department of State, the President's 2004 budget is crucial
to the exercise of that leadership.
I have given you far more detail on the President's budget
in my written statement and, without objection, of course, you
have accepted that statement. I think I will stop at this
point, Mr. Chairman, and answer your questions, and I know in
the course of your questioning, we will deal with the specific
questions that you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, raise with
respect to Iraq and North Korea and other topical issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Powell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear
before you to testify in support of the President's International
Affairs Budget for Fiscal Year 2004. Funding requested for FY 2004 for
the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign affairs agencies is
$28.5 billion.
The President's Budget will allow the United States to:
Target security and economic assistance to sustain key
countries supporting us in the war on terrorism and helping us
to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
Launch the Millennium Challenge Account--a new partnership
generating support to countries that rule justly, invest in
their people, and encourage economic freedom;
Strengthen the U.S. and global commitment to fighting HIV/
AIDS and alleviating humanitarian hardships;
Combat illegal drugs in the Andean Region of South America,
as well as bolster democracy in one of that region's most
important countries, Colombia; and
Reinforce America's world-class diplomatic force, focusing
on the people, places, and tools needed to promote our foreign
policies around the world.
I am particularly proud of the last bullet, Mr. Chairman, because
for the past two years I have concentrated on each of my jobs--primary
foreign policy advisor to the President and Chief Executive Officer of
the State Department.
Under my CEO hat, we have been reinforcing our diplomatic force for
two years and we will continue in FY 2004. We will hire 399 more
professionals to help the President carry out the nation's foreign
policy. This hiring will bring us to the 1,100-plus new foreign and
civil service officers we set out to hire over the first three years to
bring the Department's personnel back in line with its diplomatic
workload. Moreover, completion of these hires will allow us the
flexibility to train and educate all of our officers as they should be
trained and educated. So I am proud of that accomplishment and want to
thank you for helping me bring it about.
In addition, I promised to bring state-of-the-art communications
capability to the Department--because people who can't communicate
rapidly and effectively in today's globalizing world can't carry out
our foreign policy. We are approaching our goal in that regard as well.
In both unclassified and classified communications capability,
including desk-top access to the Internet for every man and woman at
State, we will be there by the end of 2003. The budget before you will
sustain these gains and continue our information technology
modernization effort.
Finally, with respect to my CEO role, I wanted to sweep the slate
clean and completely revamp the way we construct our embassies and
other overseas buildings, as well as improve the way we secure our men
and women who occupy them. As you well know, that last task is a long-
term, almost never-ending one, particularly in this time of heightened
terrorist activities. But we are well on the way to implementing both
the construction and the security tasks in a better way, in a less
expensive way, and in a way that subsequent CEOs can continue and
improve on.
Mr. Chairman, let me give you key details with respect to these
three main CEO priorities, as well as tell you about other initiatives
under my CEO hat:
the ceo responsibilities: state department and related activities
The President's FY 2004 discretionary request for the Department of
State and Related Agencies is $8.497 billion. The requested funding
will allow us to:
Continue initiatives to recruit, hire, train, and deploy the
right work force. The budget request includes $97 million to
complete the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative by hiring 399
additional foreign affairs professionals. Foreign policy is
carried out through our people, and rebuilding America's
diplomatic readiness in staffing will ensure that the
Department can respond to crises and emerging foreign policy
priorities. This is the third year of funding for this
initiative, which will provide a total of 1,158 new staff for
the Department of State.
Continue to put information technology in the service of
diplomacy. The budget request includes $157 million to sustain
the investments made over the last two years to provide
classified connectivity to every post that requires it and to
expand desktop access to the Internet for State Department
employees. Combined with $114 million in estimated Expedited
Passport Fees, a total of $271 million will be available for
information technology investments, including beginning a major
initiative--SMART--that will overhaul the outdated systems for
cables, messaging, information sharing, and document archiving.
Continue to upgrade and enhance our security worldwide. The
budget request includes $646.7 million for programs to enhance
the security of our diplomatic facilities and personnel serving
abroad and for hiring 85 additional security and support
professionals to sustain the Department's Worldwide Security
Upgrades program.
Continue to upgrade the security of our overseas facilities.
The budget request includes $1.514 billion to fund major
security-related construction projects and address the major
physical security and rehabilitation needs of embassies and
consulates around the world. The request includes $761.4
million for construction of secure embassy compounds in seven
countries and $128.3 million for construction of a new embassy
building in Germany.
The budget also supports management improvements to the
overseas buildings program and the Overseas Building Operations
(OBO) long-range plan. The budget proposes a Capital Security
Cost Sharing Program that allocates the capital costs of new
overseas facilities to all U.S. Government agencies on the
basis of the number of their authorized overseas positions.
This program will serve two vital purposes: (1) to accelerate
construction of new embassy compounds and (2) to encourage
Federal agencies to evaluate their overseas positions more
carefully. In doing so, it will further the President's
Management Agenda initiative to rightsize the official American
presence abroad. The modest surcharge to the cost of stationing
an American employee overseas will not undermine vital overseas
work, but it will encourage more efficient management of
personnel and taxpayer funds.
Continue to enhance the Border Security Program. The budget
request includes $736 million in Machine Readable Visa (MRV)
fee revenues for continuous improvements in consular systems,
processes, and programs in order to protect U.S. borders
against the illegal entry of individuals who would do us harm.
Meet our obligations to international organizations.
Fulfilling U.S. commitments is vital to building coalitions and
gaining support for U.S. interests and policies in the war
against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. The budget request includes $1 billion to fund
U.S. assessments to 44 international organizations, including
$71.4 million to support renewed U.S. membership in the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO).
Support obligations to international peacekeeping
activities. The budget request includes $550.2 million to pay
projected UN peacekeeping assessments. These peacekeeping
activities ensure continued American leadership in shaping the
international community's response to developments that
threaten international peace and stability.
Continue to eliminate support for terrorists and thus deny them
safe haven through our ongoing public diplomacy activities, our
educational and cultural exchange programs, and international
broadcasting. The budget request includes $296.9 million for public
diplomacy, including information and cultural programs carried out by
overseas missions and supported by public diplomacy personnel in our
regional and functional bureaus. These resources are used to engage,
inform, and influence foreign publics and broaden dialogue between
American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.
The budget request also includes $345.3 million for educational and
cultural exchange programs that build mutual understanding and develop
friendly relations between America and the peoples of the world. These
activities establish the trust, confidence, and international
cooperation with other countries that sustain and advance the full
range of American national interests.
The budget request includes $100 million for education and cultural
exchanges for States of the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern
Europe, which were previously funded under the FREEDOM Support Act and
Support for East European Democracy (SEED) accounts.
As a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, I want to take
this opportunity to highlight to you the BBG's pending budget request
for $563.5 million. Funding will advance international broadcasting
efforts to support the war on terrorism, including initiation of the
Middle East Television Network.
Mr. Chairman, I know that your committee staff will go over
this statement with a fine-tooth comb and I know too that they
prefer an account-by-account laydown. So here it is:
Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP):
The FY 2004 request for D&CP, the State Department's chief
operating account, totals $4.164 billion.
D&CP supports the diplomatic activities and programs that
constitute the first line of offense against threats to the
security and prosperity of the American people. Together with
Machine Readable Visa and other fees, the account funds the
operating expenses and infrastructure necessary for carrying
out U.S. foreign policy in more than 260 locations around the
world.
The FY 2004 D&CP request provides $3.517 billion for ongoing
operations--a net increase of $132.7 million over the FY 2003
level. Increased funding will enable the State Department to
advance national interests effectively through improved
diplomatic readiness, particularly in human resources.
The request completes the Secretary's three-year Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative to put the right people with the right
skills in the right place at the right time. New D&CP funding
in FY 2004 of $97 million will allow the addition of 399
professionals, providing a total of 1,158 new staff from FY
2002 through FY 2004.
The FY 2004 D&CP request also provides $646.7 million for
Worldwide Security Upgrades--an increase of $93.7 million over
last year. This total includes $504.6 million to continue
worldwide security programs for guard protection, physical
security equipment and technical support, information and
system security, and security personnel and training. It also
includes $43.4 million to expand the perimeter security
enhancement program for 232 posts and $98.7 million for
improvements in domestic and overseas protection programs,
including 85 additional agents and other security
professionals.
Capital Investment Fund (CIF):
The FY 2004 request provides $157 million for the CIF to
assure that the investments made in FY 2002 and FY 2003 keep
pace with increased demand from users for functionality and
speed.
Requested funding includes $15 million for the State
Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART). The SMART
initiative will replace outdated systems for cables and
messages with a unified system that adds information sharing
and document archiving.
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM):
The FY 2004 request for ESCM is $1.514 billion. This total--
an increase of $209.4 million over the FY 2003 level--reflects
the Administration's continuing commitment to protect U.S.
Government personnel serving abroad, improve the security
posture of facilities overseas, and address serious
deficiencies in the State Department's overseas infrastructure.
For the ongoing ESCM budget, the Administration is
requesting $524.7 million. This budget includes maintenance and
repairs at overseas posts, facility rehabilitation projects,
construction security, renovation of the Harry S Truman
Building, all activities associated with leasing overseas
properties, and management of the overseas buildings program.
For Worldwide Security Construction, the Administration is
requesting $761.4 million for the next tranche of security-
driven construction projects to replace high-risk facilities.
Funding will support the construction of secure embassies in
seven countries--Algeria, Burma, Ghana, Indonesia, Panama,
Serbia, and Togo. In addition, the requested funding will
provide new on-compound buildings for USAID in Ghana, Jamaica,
and Nigeria.
The ESCM request includes $100 million to strengthen
compound security at vulnerable posts.
The request also includes $128.3 million to construct the
new U.S. embassy building in Berlin.
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE):
The FY 2004 request of $345.3 million for ECE maintains
funding for exchanges at the FY 2003 request level of $245
million and adds $100 million for projects for Eastern Europe
and the States of the Former Soviet Union previously funded
from Foreign Operations appropriations.
Authorized by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange
Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act), as amended, exchanges are
strategic activities that build mutual understanding and
develop friendly relations between the United States and other
countries. They establish the trust, confidence, and
international cooperation necessary to sustain and advance the
full range of U.S. national interests.
The request provides $141 million for Academic Programs.
These include the J. William Fulbright Educational Exchange
Program for exchange of students, scholars, and teachers and
the Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship Program for academic study
and internships in the United States for mid-career
professionals from developing countries.
The request also provides $73 million for Professional and
Cultural Exchanges. These include the International Visitor
Program, which supports travel to the United States by current
and emerging leaders to obtain firsthand knowledge of American
politics and values, and the Citizen Exchange Program, which
partners with U.S. non-profit organizations to support
professional, cultural, and grassroots community exchanges.
This request provides $100 million for exchanges funded in
the past from the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) and Support for
East European Democracy (SEED) accounts.
This request also provides $31 million for exchanges
support. This funding is needed for built-in requirements to
maintain current services.
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO):
The FY 2004 request for CIO of $1.010 billion provides
funding for U.S. assessed contributions, consistent with U.S.
statutory restrictions, to 44 international organizations to
further U.S. economic, political, social, and cultural
interests.
The request recognizes U.S. international obligations and
reflects the President's commitment to maintain the financial
stability of the United Nations and other international
organizations that include the World Health Organization, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development.
The budget request provides $71.4 million to support renewed
U.S. membership in the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UNESCO contributes to peace
and security in the world by promoting collaboration among
nations through education, science, culture and communication
and by furthering intercultural understanding and universal
respect for justice, rule of law, human rights, and fundamental
freedoms, notably a free press.
Membership in international organizations benefits the
United States by building coalitions and pursuing multilateral
programs that advance U.S. interests. These include promoting
economic growth through market economies; settling disputes
peacefully; encouraging non-proliferation, nuclear safeguards,
arms control, and disarmament; adopting international standards
to facilitate international trade, telecommunications,
transportation, environmental protection, and scientific
exchange; and strengthening international cooperation in
agriculture and health.
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA):
The administration is requesting $550.2 million for CIPA in
FY 2004. This funding level will allow the United States to pay
its share of assessed UN peacekeeping budgets, fulfilling U.S.
commitments and avoiding increased UN arrears.
The UN peacekeeping appropriation serves U.S. interests in
Europe, Africa and the Middle East, where UN peacekeeping
missions assist in ending conflicts, restoring peace and
strengthening regional stability.
UN peacekeeping missions leverage U.S. political, military
and financial assets through the authority of the UN Security
Council and the participation of other states that provide
funds and peacekeepers for conflicts around the world.
Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG):
The FY 2004 budget request for the BBG totals $563.5
million.
The overall request provides $525.2 million for U.S.
Government non-military international broadcasting operations
through the International Broadcasting Operations (IBO)
account. This account funds operations of the Voice of America
(VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free
Asia (RFA), and all related program delivery and support
activities.
The IBO request includes funding to advance broadcasting
efforts related to the war on terrorism. The request includes
$30 million to initiate the Middle East Television Network--a
new Arabic-language satellite TV network that, once
operational, will have the potential to reach vast audiences in
the Middle East. The request also includes funding to double
VOA Indonesian radio programming, significantly increase
television programming in Indonesia, and expand BBG audience
development efforts.
The IBO request reflects the shifting of priorities away
from the predominantly Cold War focus on Central and Eastern
Europe to broadcasting in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Funds are being redirected to programs in these regions through
the elimination of broadcasting to countries in the former
Eastern Bloc that have demonstrated significant advances in
democracy and press freedoms and are new or soon-to-be NATO and
European Union Members.
The IBO request also reflects anticipated efficiencies that
achieve a five-percent reduction in funding for administration
and management in FY 2004.
The FY 2004 request also provides $26.9 million through
Broadcasting to Cuba (OCB) for continuing Radio Marti and TV
Marti operations, including salary and inflation increases, to
support current schedules.
The FY 2004 request further provides $11.4 million for
Broadcasting Capital Improvements to maintain the BBG's
worldwide transmission network. The request includes $2.9
million to maintain and improve security of U.S. broadcasting
transmission facilities overseas.
That finishes the State and Related Activities part of the
President's Budget. Now let me turn to the Foreign Affairs part.
THE FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES: FUNDING AMERICA'S
DIPLOMACY AROUND THE WORLD
The FY 2004 budget proposes several initiatives to advance U.S.
national security interests and preserve American leadership. The FY
2004 Foreign Operations budget that funds programs for the Department
State, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies is $18.8 billion.
Today, our number one priority is to fight and win the global war
on terrorism. The budget furthers this goal by providing economic,
military, and democracy assistance to key foreign partners and allies,
including $4.7 billion to countries that have joined us in the war on
terrorism.
The budget also promotes international peace and prosperity by
launching the most innovative approach to U.S. foreign assistance in
more than forty years. The new Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), an
independent government corporation funded at $1.3 billion will redefine
``aid''. As President Bush told African leaders meeting in Mauritius
recently, this aid will go to ``nations that encourage economic
freedom, root out corruption, and respect the rights of their people.''
Moreover, this budget offers hope and a helping hand to countries
facing health catastrophes, poverty and despair, and humanitarian
disasters. It provides $1.345 billion to combat the global HIV/AIDS
epidemic, more than $1 billion to meet the needs of refugees and
internally displaced peoples, $200 million in emergency food assistance
to support dire famine needs, and $100 million for an emerging crises
fund to allow swift responses to complex foreign crises. Mr. Chairman,
let me give you some details.
The U.S. is successfully prosecuting the global war on terrorism on
a number of fronts. We are providing extensive assistance to states on
the front lines of the anti-terror struggle. Working with our
international partners bilaterally and through multilateral
organizations, we have frozen more than $110 million in terrorist
assets, launched new initiatives to secure global networks of commerce
and communication, and significantly increased the cooperation of our
law enforcement and intelligence communities. Afghanistan is no longer
a haven for al-Qaeda. We are now working with the Afghan Authority,
other governments, international organizations, and NGOs to rebuild
Afghanistan. Around the world we are combating the unholy alliance of
drug traffickers and terrorists who threaten the internal stability of
countries. We are leading the international effort to prevent weapons
of mass destruction from falling into the hands of those who would do
harm to us and others. At the same time, we are rejuvenating and
expanding our public diplomacy efforts worldwide.
Assistance to Frontline States
The FY 2004 International Affairs budget provides approximately
$4.7 billion in assistance to the Frontline States, which have joined
with us in the war on terrorism. This funding will provide crucial
assistance to enable these countries to strengthen their economies,
internal counter-terrorism capabilities and border controls.
Of this amount, the President's Budget provides $657 million for
Afghanistan, $460 million for Jordan, $395 million for Pakistan, $255
million for Turkey, $136 million for Indonesia, and $87 million for the
Philippines. In Afghanistan, the funding will be used to fulfill our
commitment to rebuild Afghanistan's road network; establish security
through a national military and national police force, including
counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics components; establish
broadbased and accountable governance through democratic institutions
and an active civil society; ensure a peace dividend for the Afghan
people through economic reconstruction; and provide humanitarian
assistance to sustain returning refugees and displaced persons. United
States assistance will continue to be coordinated with the Afghan
government, the United Nations, and other international donors.
The State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program will
continue to provide frontline states a full complement of training
courses, such as a course on how to conduct a post-terrorist attack
investigation or how to respond to a WMD event. The budget will also
fund additional equipment grants to sustain the skills and capabilities
acquired in the ATA courses. It will support as well in-country
training programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia.
Central Asia and Freedom Support Act Nations
In FY 2004, over $157 million in Freedom Support Act (FSA) funding
will go to assistance programs in the Central Asian states. The FY 2004
budget continues to focus FSA funds to programs in Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, recognizing that Central Asia is of
strategic importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The FY 2004
assistance level for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is 30
percent above 2003. Assistance to these countries has almost doubled
from pre-September 11 levels. These funds will support civil society
development, small business promotion, conflict reduction, and economic
reform in the region. These efforts are designed to promote economic
development and strengthen the rule of law in order to reduce the
appeal of extremist movements and stem the flow of illegal drugs that
finance terrorist activities.
Funding levels and country distributions for the FSA nations
reflect shifting priorities in the region. For example, after more than
10 years of high levels of assistance, it is time to begin the process
of graduating countries in this region from economic assistance, as we
have done with countries in Eastern Europe that have made sufficient
progress in the transition to market-based democracies. U.S. economic
assistance to Russia and Ukraine will begin phasing down in FY 2004, a
decrease of 32 percent from 2003, moving these countries towards
graduation.
Combating Illegal Drugs and Stemming Narco-terrorism
The President's request for $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative includes $463 million for Colombia. An additional $110
million in military assistance to Colombia will support Colombian
President Uribe's unified campaign against terrorists and the drug
trade that fuels their activities. The aim is to secure democracy,
extend security, and restore economic prosperity to Colombia and
prevent the narco-terrorists from spreading instability to the broader
Andean region. Critical components of this effort include resumption of
the Airbridge Denial program to stop internal and cross-border aerial
trafficking in illicit drugs, stepped up eradication and alternative
development efforts, and technical assistance to strengthen Colombia's
police and judicial institutions.
Halting Access of Rogue States and Terrorists to Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Decreasing the threats posed by terrorist groups, rogue states, and
other non-state actors requires halting the spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and related technology. To achieve this goal, we must
strengthen partnerships with countries that share our views in dealing
with the threat of terrorism and resolving regional conflicts.
The FY 2004 budget requests $35 million for the Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund (NDF), more than double the FY 2003 request,
increases funding for overseas Export Controls and Border Security
(EXBS) to $40 million, and supports additional funding for Science
Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Programs.
Funding increases requested for the NDF and EXBS programs seek to
prevent weapons of mass destruction from falling into the hands of
terrorist groups or states by preventing their movement across borders
and destroying or safeguarding known quantities of weapons or source
material. The Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection programs support
the same goals by engaging former Soviet weapons scientists and
engineers in peaceful scientific activities, providing them an
alternative to marketing their skills to states or groups of concern.
Millennium Challenge Account
The FY 2004 Budget request of $1.3 billion for the new Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) as a government corporation fulfills the
President's March 2002 pledge to create a new bilateral assistance
program, markedly different from existing models. This budget is a huge
step towards the President's commitment of $5 billion in annual funding
for the MCA by 2006, a 50% increase in core development assistance.
The MCA supplement U.S. commitments to humanitarian assistance and
existing development aid programs funded and implemented by USAID. It
will assist developing countries that make sound policy decisions and
demonstrate solid performance on economic growth and reducing poverty.
MCA funds will go only to selected developing countries that
demonstrate a commitment to sound policies--based on clear,
concrete and objective criteria. To become eligible for MCA
resources, countries must demonstrate their commitment to
economic opportunity, investing in people, and good governance.
Resources will be available through agreements with
recipient countries that specify a limited number of clear
measurable goals, activities, and benchmarks, and financial
accountability standards.
The MCA will be administered by a new government corporation
designed to support innovative strategies and to ensure accountability
for measurable results. The corporation will be supervised by a Board
of Directors composed of Cabinet level officials and chaired by the
Secretary of State. Personnel will be drawn from a variety of
government agencies and nongovernment institutions and serve limited-
term appointments.
In FY 2004, countries eligible to borrow from the International
Development Association (IDA), and which have per capita incomes below
$1,435, (the historical IDA cutoff) will be considered. In 2005, all
countries with incomes below $1,435 will be considered. In 2006, all
countries with incomes up to $2,975 (the current World Bank cutoff for
lower middle income countries) will be eligible.
The selection process will use 16 indicators to assess national
performance--these indicators being relative to governing justly,
investing in people, and encouraging economic freedom. These indicators
were chosen because of the quality and objectivity of their data,
country coverage, public availability, and correlation with growth and
poverty reduction. The results of a review of the indicators will be
used by the MCA Board of Directors to make a final recommendation to
the President on a list of MCA countries.
Africa Education Initiative
With $200 million, the United States is doubling its five-year
financial commitment to the African Education Initiative it launched
last year. The initiative focuses on increasing access to quality
education in Africa. Over its 5-year life the African Education
Initiative will achieve: 160,000 new teachers trained; 4.5 million
textbooks developed and distributed; an increase in the number of girls
attending school through providing more than a quarter million
scholarships and mentoring; and an increase African Education
Ministries' capacity to address the impact of HIV/AIDS.
Increases in Funding for Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
The FY 2004 budget provides $1.55 billion for the MDBs, an increase
of $110 million over the FY 2003 request of $1.44 billion. This
includes $1.36 billion for scheduled payments to the MDBs and $195.9
million to clear existing arrears. The request provides $950 million
for the International Development Association (IDA) for the second year
of the IDA-13 replenishment, $100 million of which is contingent on the
IDA meeting specific benchmarks in the establishment of a results
measurement system. By spring 2003, the IDA is to have completed an
outline of approach to results measurement, presented baseline data,
and identified outcome indicators and expected progress targets. By
that same time, the IDA is also to have completed specific numbers of
reviews and assessments in the areas of financial accountability,
procurement, public expenditure, investment climate, and poverty.
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD)
The WSSD engaged more than 100 countries and representatives of
business and NGOs. Sustainable development begins at home and is
supported by effective domestic policies and international partnerships
that include the private sector. Self-governing people prepared to
participate in an open world marketplace are the foundation of
sustainable development. These fundamental principals guide the U.S.
approach to Summit initiatives. At the 2002 Summit the U.S. committed
to developing and implementing realistic results-focused partnerships
in the areas of: Water for the Poor; Clean Energy; Initiative to Cut
Hunger in Africa; Preventing Famine in Southern Africa; and the Congo
Basin Partnership. At the end of the Summit new relationships and
partnerships were forged and a new global commitment to improve
sanitation was reached. The FY 2004 Budget supports these partnerships
with $337 million in assistance funding.
The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative
The President's Budget includes $145 million for the Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). This initiative gives us a framework and
funding for working with the Arab world to expand educational and
economic opportunities, empower women, and strengthen civil society and
the rule of law. The peoples and governments of the Middle East face
daunting human challenges. Their economies are stagnant and unable to
provide jobs for millions of young people entering the workplace each
year. Too many of their governments appear closed and unresponsive to
the needs of their citizens. And their schools are not equipping
students to succeed in today's globalizing world. With the programs of
the MEPI, we will work with Arab governments, groups, and individuals
to bridge the jobs gap with economic reform, business investment, and
private sector development; close the freedom gap with projects to
strengthen civil society, expand political participation, and lift the
voices of women; and bridge the knowledge gap with better schools and
more opportunities for higher education. The U.S.-Middle East
Partnership Initiative is an investment in a more stable, peaceful,
prosperous, and democratic Arab world.
Forgiving Debt--Helping Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
The Administration request provides an additional $75 million for
the Trust Fund for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). These funds
will go towards fulfilling the President's commitment at the G-8 Summit
in Kananaskis, Canada to contribute America's share to filling the
projected HIPC Trust Fund financing gap. The HIPC Trust Fund helps to
finance debt forgiveness by the International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) to heavily indebted poor countries that have committed to
economic reforms and pledged to increase domestic funding of health and
education programs. In addition, the President's request provides $300
million to fund bilateral debt reduction for the Democratic Republic of
the Congo under the HIPC Initiative, as well as $20 million for debt
reduction under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA).
The Administration believes that offering new sovereign loans or
loan guarantees to indebted poor countries while providing debt
forgiveness to those same countries risks their return to unsustainable
levels of indebtedness--a situation debt forgiveness seeks to resolve.
In order to address this situation, the Administration recently
invoked a one-year moratorium on new lending to countries that receive
multilateral debt reduction. U.S. lending agencies have agreed not to
make new loans or loan guarantees to countries that receive debt
reduction for one year. The measure will not be punitive. Should
countries demonstrate serious economic gains before the end of the
moratorium, lending agencies may, with interagency clearance, resume
new lending. The Administration hopes that this policy will bring to an
end the historically cyclical nature of indebtedness of poor countries.
American Leadership in Fighting AIDS and Alleviating Humanitarian
Hardships
This budget reaffirms America's role as the leading donor nation
supporting programs that combat the greatest challenges faced by many
developing countries today. The FY 2004 budget proposes a number of
foreign assistance initiatives managed by USAID and other federal
agencies to provide crucial resources that prevent and ameliorate human
suffering worldwide.
Fighting the Global AIDS Pandemic
The FY 2004 budget continues the Administration's commitment to
combat HIV/AIDS and to help bring care and treatment to infected people
overseas. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has killed 23 million of the 63 million
people it has infected to date, and left 14 million orphans worldwide.
President Bush has made fighting this pandemic a priority of U.S.
foreign policy.
The President believes the global community can--and must--do more
to halt the advance of the pandemic, and that the United States should
lead by example. Thus, the President's FY 2004 budget request signals a
further, massive increase in resources to combat the HIV/AIDs pandemic.
As described in the State of the Union, the President is committing to
provide a total of $15 billion over the next five years to turn the
tide in the war on HIV/AIDs, beginning with $2 billion in the FY 2004
budget request and rising thereafter. These funds will be targeted on
the hardest hit countries, especially Africa and the Caribbean with the
objective of achieving dramatic on-the-ground results. This new
dramatic commitment is reflected in the Administration's $2 billion FY
2004 budget request, which includes:
State Department--$450 million;
USAID--$895 million, including $100 million for the Global
Fund and $150 million for the International Mother & Child HIV
Prevention; and
HHS/CDC/NIH--$690 million, including $100 million for the
Global Fund and $150 million for the International Mother &
Child HIV Prevention.
In order to ensure accountability for results, the President has
asked me to establish at State a new Special Coordinator for
International HIV/AIDS Assistance. The Special Coordinator will work
for me and be responsible for coordinating all international HIV/AIDS
programs and efforts of the agencies that implement them.
Hunger, Famine, and Other Emergencies
Food Aid--Historically the United States has been the largest donor
of assistance for victims of protracted and emergency food crises. In
2003, discretionary funding for food aid increased from $864 million to
$1.19 billion. That level will be enhanced significantly in 2004 with
two new initiatives: a Famine Fund and an emerging crises fund to
address complex emergencies.
Famine Fund--The FY 2004 budget includes a new $200 million
fund with flexible authorities to provide emergency food,
grants or support to meet dire needs on a case-by-case basis.
This commitment reflects more than a 15 percent increase in
U.S. food assistance.
Emerging Crises Fund--The budget also requests $100 million
for a new account that will allow the Administration to respond
swiftly and effectively to prevent or resolve unforeseen
complex foreign crises. This account will provide a mechanism
for the President to support actions to advance American
interests, including to prevent or respond to foreign
territorial disputes, armed ethnic and civil conflicts that
pose threats to regional and international peace and acts of
ethnic cleansing, mass killing and genocide.
SUMMARY
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, to advance America's
interests around the world we need the dollars in the President's
Budget for FY 2004. We need the dollars under both of my hats--CEO and
principal foreign policy advisor. The times we live in are troubled to
be sure, but I believe there is every bit as much opportunity in the
days ahead as there is danger. American leadership is essential to
dealing with both the danger and the opportunity. With regard to the
Department of State, the President's FY 2004 budget is crucial to the
exercise of that leadership.
Thank you and I will be pleased to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I want to
use my 5 minutes to make comments, and maybe to ask a question
if we have an opportunity.
First of all, thank you for recognizing the work of our
committee in forwarding the Moscow treaty to the floor of the
Senate by unanimous vote. I would just say that the committee
met on an urgent basis after an e-mail from Senator Biden and
myself to be there at 10 so we could finish by 10:30 in order
to hear you at the U.N.
Secretary Powell. Any time that serves your purpose again,
Mr. Chairman, I will go back to the U.N.
Senator Biden. We may ask you to make a couple more major
speeches to get a quorum.
The Chairman. I thank all members of the committee. The 13
here arrived quickly. A quorum was present. We had good really
comments from a number of members, and action, and I hope we
can get floor activity on the Moscow treaty. We alert all
Members that we anticipate floor activity, and we hope we can
do that during February.
Let me also mention that I appreciate your budget item for
nonproliferation. That, of course, will be matched and maybe
exceeded by moneys in the Defense budget and the Department of
Energy budget. Many Members will have committee
responsibilities on this committee and elsewhere, but I would
like the support of the Department as we consider how Nunn-
Lugar cooperative threat reduction efforts might relate to
other countries. I do not want to extrapolate well beyond where
our diplomacy may go, but there may come a time when, in
working with North Korea, for example, we suggest that we might
be helpful in securing weapons or materials of mass
destruction, or helping in their destruction. It is not, I
think, a far-fetched idea any more than it was with regard to
the former Soviet Union at an earlier time.
Likewise, we may be able to work with other friendly
countries, India and Pakistan and others, who have developed
these weapons. We find real responsibilities in securing all of
the materials against those who would venture into their
provinces, so I ask for your help to enlarge the scope of
American diplomacy and the administration's understanding of
the nonproliferation area.
I compliment you on specifically mentioning 80,000 young
people who have come to the Department to take the Foreign
Service exam, and I will point out, and you witnessed this, Mr.
Secretary, as you came into this caucus room today, there are
tens, maybe hundreds of young people here in this hearing, or
down the hallway trying to get into this hearing. That is
great.
The problem that I foresee here, however, is the one that
you pointed out. For several years, we had no Foreign Service
exam. There were no lieutenants or anybody else coming into the
ranks, so that reports now have identified hardship posts at
many of our diplomatic stations that are sometimes filled by
officers that do not really have all of the normal
requirements. That is one of the legacies of failing to
recruit, of failing to ensure that the brightest come to the
Department.
Now, we have turned that around. What I hope, maybe, in
more detail for the record than you may be able to offer now,
is information on how we are meeting this hardship post
situation, literally how, even given the problems that you
have, you are filling in the toughest areas where many of these
young people are going to be recruited to go, because that is
of the essence in terms of our diplomacy.
Likewise for the record, you have mentioned the
communications situation which is so critical. You pointed out,
correctly, that your address to the United Nations was sent out
promptly to all of the embassies. You mentioned that even in
your conversation with Foreign Minister Ivanov of Russia, you
were able to talk about the Moscow treaty, and about action we
were taking back here, even as you were about to take action at
the U.N. That is tremendously important.
But what I hope you can offer is more detail about how the
money in this budget really brings our embassies all over the
world up-to-speed, which during my visits were not up to speed
in many ways. Commercial establishments of American businesses
overseas move at much greater speed than does our Diplomatic
Corps, and we really have to be on top of it.
I would compliment you specifically, because in our visit
this morning, you have mentioned, in addition to your speech to
the United Nations, that you attended a luncheon with all the
Security Council members and then visited one-on-one with 13 of
them. Now, that is very important for the American people to
understand. No amount of communication around the world will
achieve this, but to augment your personal advocacy and
leadership, this kind of message-carrying is just of the
essence, so please detail for us so that we can be better
advocates in this budget for those specific needs.
Finally, just let me say, I hope you can help us in getting
a plan for Afghanistan. Now, I appreciate, as is always the
case, that a certain amount of ad hoc strategy-making and
planning has to occur, but now we are in a situation, it seems
to me, of the intermediate or the long run, in which there has
to be some confidence that this country knows where it is
going, and that other countries know where we are going.
I think it is there somewhere, but I have not seen it, and
so I hope that you will flesh out, with the Secretary of
Defense or with others, an administration plan for Afghanistan,
similar to how Senator Biden has talked about a plan for Iraq.
We will be concentrating on Iraq Tuesday, and on Afghanistan,
as I mentioned, on Wednesday.
I have consumed my time, and therefore, I will not really
ask you to use your time except if you want to make a short
response.
Secretary Powell. I will make a very short response, if I
may, Mr. Chairman.
With respect to hardship posts, we are working very hard on
that. I hope you may have noticed an article in the newspaper
not too long ago where the State Department is the No. 1
Department in government in using forgiveness of student loans,
or setting aside student loan obligations, for those who are
willing to go to our hardship posts, and we are also once again
communicating throughout the Department the culture of the
Department. We go where we are sent. We are servicepersons. We
are men and women who serve where service is needed, and we
will take care of these hardship posts. But it is a lot easier
when we are given the resources that we need in order to hire
the people who are willing to take on these difficult jobs.
People hear ``hardship post'' and they do not always
understand what that means. It means you are asking a Foreign
Service officer who might have a family, children, to go to a
place where there are no schools, where there is no hospital in
case your child becomes ill, and where the living
accommodations are not near any standard you would like. We are
asking people to go do that for their country, and the
wonderful thing is, we do have people who do that, and will do
that.
I would like to just brag about one more thing. The last
Foreign Service exam we gave, among those who passed the exam,
38 percent were minority candidates. So we are working very
hard to make our Foreign Service look like our country. The
beautiful diversity that is the strength of this country should
be reflected in the Foreign Service.
As for information technology, we can go into that at
another time in exquisite detail. It is a subject that I love
very much. And with respect to our plan for Afghanistan, we are
willing to spend much more time with the committee on it and,
of course, you have the hearing next week. I think we should be
very proud of what we have accomplished in Afghanistan in just
a little over a year. There is a functioning government. They
are slowly reaching out throughout the country. It is still a
dangerous place, but not as dangerous as it used to be. It is
not as out-of-control as people suggest. The glass is more than
half-full, in my judgment, and with each passing day
Afghanistan is becoming less and less of a crystal glass, and
more of a beer mug that will withstand some of the pressures
that we place upon it.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I just have to
pause to underline this remarkable statistic that you just
shared with us. In this rigorous merit-based test for the
Foreign Service, 38 percent who passed were minorities. That is
an important point, and I appreciate your making that point.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I would like to move the nomination of
Secretary of State Powell for President of the United States.
The Chairman. Easy there, Joe.
Senator Biden. Boss, I like your style, and I think that is
a very important statistic, a very important figure.
Now, let me, since time is short, get right to it. There
are so many questions to ask, we are going to submit a lot of
these in writing. I know your staff is always available to us.
Let me speak--and if you could give me a quick answer, I
will try to make the first two questions very quick. Iraq. Are
you looking that you are likely to have to submit a
supplemental budget to us if we end up going to war? Because
there is not anything in here.
Secretary Powell. I am quite sure that, if the diplomatic
effort for a peaceful solution is not attainable, and conflict
is necessary, there will be a need for supplemental funds not
only for the State Department, but for many other Departments
as well.
Senator Biden. Good. Well, I am sure of that as well. You
are one of the Departments that I know is trying very hard to
anticipate, although there is no way to know what the
parameters of the needs may be if all peaceful means are
exhausted and we go to war. I hope you will keep us informed
through Deputy Secretary Armitage of what those general
parameters are. I know you are not waiting just to think, well,
let us see what happens. You are gaming this out, just as the
military is gaming out what they may need to do if they have to
go, and it would be useful for us, I believe, as a committee,
even if all members do not want to be bothered with that, to
let us know as you think this through so we can be prepared to
be helpful if we get there.
Secretary Powell. We are thinking it through now, Senator.
Senator Biden. The second point, I am disappointed that
although the moneys, the export control and border assistance,
the science and bio programs that are within the NADR account,
they are about what they were in 2003, but they are below what
was appropriated in 2002. I think that should be, in my view--I
would just warn you, I think, but I will follow the lead of the
chairman. I think that should be increased, but I just wanted
to give you a heads-up on that.
Let me go to something you said yesterday in your speech.
It does not directly relate to the budget. You devoted a
section of your presentation to the ties between Iraq and al-
Qaeda, and you identified a ``poison and explosive training
center camp,'' I think that was the quote, in northeastern
Iraq.
When the good Senator from Nebraska and I sat in a car for,
all told, 11 hours, 7 of which was in the mountains of Iraq,
northern Iraq just a couple of months ago, or a month ago, we
met with the Barzani and Talibani clans. We met with a whole
lot of people, and they were telling us about their concern
about what was going on on the Iranian-Iraqi border, which you
spoke to yesterday, and last August, there were news reports
that suggested U.S. officials were aware of a plant in the
region that produced deadly toxin, or ricin, yet the same
report said that the United States called off a strike against
that Ansar al-Islam facility.
In addition, officials of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
whom we met, whose territory borders the Ansar pocket, say that
they informed U.S. officials of an al-Qaeda presence in
September 2001, and I would ask my friend from Nebraska to
correct me if my recollection is wrong about what we were being
told when we addressed the so-called Kurdish parliament.
Today's New York Times carries a story based upon an interview
yesterday in Norway with Mullah Krekar, the purported leader of
the Ansar group.
And so my question is, if you know, how long has the
administration been aware of this presence in northeastern
Iraq, and if Ansar is so dangerous, and a key part of the link
between al-Qaeda and Saddam, why had we not taken direct
military action--it is in the ``no-fly zone''--against that
group, or, alternately, urged and supported the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan to eliminate Ansar? Can you give us an answer to
that?
Secretary Powell. I cannot specifically comment on the
information you were given about September 2001 and what was
reported to us at that time, and there are other agencies
involved.
Senator Biden. We were not told--let me make clear, I was
not told by the Kurds with whom we met for 24 or more hours
that they told the State Department, or the Defense Department
in 2001, but at the time we were there, which was at the end of
this past year, in December, we were told about that
connection, so I am not making the case that they told us in
2001.
Secretary Powell. We have been monitoring that location,
and been closely monitoring who has been going in and out of
that place. It has been occupied and unoccupied since last
summer. We have had conversations about it. I would rather not,
in this setting, go into what contingency plans we have looked
at, or what we might or might not have done. But I can assure
you that it is a place that has been very much in our minds,
and something we have been studying very carefully. And we have
been tracing individuals who have gone in there and come out of
there, and that is why I was able to make the presentation that
I made yesterday.
But with respect to specific military contingency plans we
might have had, which might still exist, I would rather not go
into any detail in this setting.
Senator Biden. Well, I hope either yourself, or you would
provide someone from your Department who is able to do that for
us on a classified basis.
Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by asking one ancillary
point. If Ansar is such a threat, why is its purported leader
walking around free in Norway, giving interviews, and the
reason I asked the question is, it is the only thing out there
that sort of undercuts our sense of urgency.
You made a very compelling case yesterday, and I remember
sitting watching it with my staff, and one of my staff members
turned and said, ``look, we have got reconnaissance photo
there. It is in the `no-fly zone.' We could take that out in a
heartbeat. Why have we not taken it out?''
My staff did not question what it was, but I am confident
that there are people around the country and the world going,
if this was so bad, if this is as bad as we are purporting it
to be, why is the head of this outfit giving interviews in the
Norwegian press, walking around Norway, as well as why have we
let it sit there if it is such a dangerous plant, producing
these toxins? It would be useful to have, on the record or off
the record, an answer to that.
Secretary Powell. I think in a classified setting we can go
into greater detail on that issue, sir.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and again, Mr.
Secretary, welcome. We all add to the recognition that has been
appropriately given to you today, and your team, for your
presentation yesterday.
What struck me as much as anything yesterday about what you
said and how you said it was that I believe the world saw a
very wise, thoughtful, and cautious America, and if we are to
continue to enhance our relationships around the world, work
with our allies and through our coalitions of common interest
to focus on this great curse of mankind, terrorism, that it is
going to require the kind of relationships and presentations
that you showed very completely yesterday to the world, so I
compliment you and your team, Mr. Secretary, for what you did
for our future, as well as our present.
You said something in your statement, as did the President
in his State of the Union Message the other night--in fact, if
I recall, he ended with something like, these great
opportunities abound today in the world. Probably never in the
history of man have we seen such possibilities as we see today
for good. Now, we understand the uncertainties and great
dangers and complications of the kind of world we live in
today, and my question is this. Iraq is a problem. It is a
concern. It is a threat. It is a challenge that has never been,
I do not believe, the question, or you have never had to make
that point.
There are other urgent threats to our security around the
world. North Korea. I would list the Middle East. I am
concerned about what is not happening in Israel, with the peace
plan. We have allowed that to drift. We have deferred that. We
have got problems south of our border, big problems. You have
mentioned some of these. We have great challenges still in
Afghanistan. The India-Pakistan issue is, I think, of great
urgency.
You did not make these problems, but you and the President
and your team must deal with them, and I would appreciate, Mr.
Secretary, you assuring this committee that if we go to war in
Iraq, then the leadership and resource capacity of this
country, and the focus, will not be turned completely on just
Iraq, and we allow North Korea, the Israeli-Palestinian problem
and all these other urgent issues that will not get better to
drift until we get back to them, and I would be interested in
your thoughts about that.
You have surely thought that through. The President has
surely thought this through, has talked to his senior advisors
like you, again going back to, at least in my opinion, a common
denominator, why our allies are so critical, because we cannot
do it all alone.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator Hagel. We do not have
the luxury of only dealing with one issue at a time. We deal
with all of the issues that you mentioned, and none are being
ignored. In my bilateral meetings over the last 36 hours, or 48
hours in New York, a lot of time was spent on North Korea. The
night before last, when I probably should have been spending
more time getting ready for my presentation, I had an hour-long
meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, my colleague,
Foreign Minister Tang, and most of that meeting was devoted to
North Korea.
China has a unique relationship with North Korea, and we
spoke about how to find a way forward to work for a solution to
this problem. And yesterday, in a conversation, after my
speech, with Foreign Minister Ivanov, most of that time was
spent on North Korea. So we are not ignoring these issues. We
are deeply engaged in these issues. We are in touch with the
North Koreans through a variety of channels, and while we note
what the North Koreans have said about the reactor start, it is
not clear whether it has. But I expect they will start it if
they have not started it by now.
We also note that traffic began moving yesterday between
North and South Korea through one of the openings through the
DMZ that we have been working to achieve, and to get worked out
between the two sides, so there are a lot of things that are
going on, and not each one of these issues requires the same
set of tools or the same set of solutions.
And you talked about the Middle East. A good part of
yesterday was also spent on the Middle East, talking to my
various colleagues, the Russian Foreign Minister as well as,
for example, the Foreign Minister of Chile, who is very
interested in the Middle East, surprisingly to some, perhaps,
because of the large Palestinian and Jewish populations that
live in Chile. And so I once again reaffirmed our commitment to
the ``road map.'' I took note of the fact that the President
supports the ``road map,'' and now that the Israeli election is
over, I expect in the near future we will be moving forward on
a ``road map.'' I know the President intends to take a more
active role in finding a way forward with the Middle East peace
process.
I spent a great deal of time over the last several days on
the India-Pakistan issue, met again for the second time in 5
days with the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to discuss these
issues and talk about the fact that we managed to calm things
down last year. We do not want to see spring come and tensions
escalate again across the line of control, and that has been a
subject of considerable discussion.
You mentioned our own hemisphere. In December, I traveled
to Mexico, I traveled to Colombia just for that reason, to let
them know that we have not forgotten them, and that we are
working with President Uribe. I spent time with President Uribe
in Bogota to go over his programs and to go over his plan and
to tell him that the United States will be there to support
him.
So it is a very complex, difficult world, but I think that
we are able to deal with these issues, and no one issue can be
allowed to block out consideration or the use of our leadership
and our political and economic and military forces to think
about and deal with other issues in other parts of the world.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr.
Secretary, welcome, and let me join with the chairman and the
ranking member and commend you for a splendid performance
yesterday before the United Nations. You just did a first-rate
job and made all of us proud. Tremendous work you did. I
certainly, like many here, never doubted whether Iraq possessed
weapons of mass destruction at all, and I think the evidence
you presented yesterday was very effective in a systematic way.
The next task you have in a sense, since this has fallen
largely on your shoulders, although I think others ought to
share with it, is obviously laying out very clearly to the
American public and to the international community to seek
support for Resolution 1441, and to lay out what the
enforcement is going to entail, how much it is going to cost,
what the dangers are involved in all of this. I think you are
in a unique position to do that. I think others could help you
do it, but it really needs to be done so that people understand
all that will be involved in this if that is the course of
action we are going to take.
Let me sort of pick up, if I can, on the point that Senator
Hagel has raised, and Senator Biden did as well. We had a very,
very good hearing the other day. Secretary Armitage was there
and did a fine job. We then heard from three of your colleagues
that you have known over the years, Ambassador Bosworth, Don
Gregg, and Ash Carter, who just did a first-rate job before the
committee in talking about North Korea.
Their testimony was excellent, and I know you have had a
lot of things to do in the last few days, so you probably have
not had a chance to look at that testimony, but to the extent
on one of these trips in the next few days you get a chance to
read some stuff, or even a synopsis of it, I think you would
find it tremendously worthwhile.
I do not want to put words in their mouths, but their
concern was, in a sense, the question obviously raised, we have
reached the conclusion that there is an imminent threat, at
least, that is, the appearance of an imminent threat in Iraq,
necessitating a real possibility of a military response rather
soon.
The question that they raised is, when you consider the
events in North Korea--and I do not need to lay them out, all
the--lack of inspections; the million-man army; the obvious
movement we are now painfully aware of fissile materials; the
real danger of getting plutonium is a matter of deep, deep
concern, even some information yesterday, which even adds more
alarm to all of this--the question is not relative, why does
one issue seem to be more important, but the issue of when and
how soon could we get to some bilateral talks here, not that
that necessarily is the answer, and I have listened to your
response in the past. You do not want to be blackmailed into
talks, obviously.
But clearly, there is a mounting sense of danger here on
the Korean Peninsula that really does demand, it would appear
to many of us, a more serious response to this than we seem to
be giving, and I just listened to you talk about meetings you
had yesterday in addition to your presentation before the
Security Council with other Foreign Ministers, a lot of it
spent on North Korea, as I listened to you explain it, but I
think it might be helpful to us, having listened to these three
individuals who really are concerned about what appears to be a
lack of direct talks here to see if we cannot diffuse this
situation, and I think those feelings are held by a lot of us
as well, and I wonder if you might respond to that.
And then, when we come around--I do not know if we are
going to have a second round, Mr. Chairman, but I really do
want to pick up on this hemisphere a bit. You know my strong
interest in it, and I appreciate some of the things that are
being done with Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, Brazil. There
is a long list of major, pressing issues that need to be
addressed.
Well, I am not going to get both in. Let me stick with the
first one, and I will find some time to come back to the second
one.
Secretary Powell. I have the greatest respect for the three
individuals you mentioned, and I fully appreciate and
understand the anxiety that exists in town and elsewhere around
the world about this situation. And we have indicated to the
North Koreans that we are willing to talk to them.
Frankly, when I started the discussions with the North
Koreans last summer in Brunei, I made it clear to the Foreign
Minister, who I met with at that time, that the United States
wanted to engage in a discussion, but we had to deal with these
basic issues. Now, the response from the North Koreans to date
has been, we will only talk to you. No one else has any
interest, and you have to talk to us, and we do not care what
anyone else thinks. And until you talk to us, we are just going
to keep moving in this direction.
Well, I understand that position, but it does involve other
nations. North Korea is a more direct threat to South Korea,
and to China, and to Russia, than anyone else. Now, those
nations are also encouraging us, ``quick, quick, talk to the
North Koreans.'' But I have to lean back and reflect on how we
got where we are.
We talked to the North Koreans back in 1993 and 1994, and
we came up with the Agreed Framework between the United States
and the DPRK, a bilateral agreement. And that bilateral
agreement served, for a period of 8 years, to keep any more
plutonium or weapons from being developed at that particular
compound, or complex. And I have given credit publicly to the
previous administration for their success in that regard.
But what we discovered is that, while we were celebrating
that success and thinking we had bottled something up--put the
genie back in the bottle and put the cork back on the bottle--
unbeknownst to the previous administration and unbeknownst to
us for the first year or so of this administration, is that the
North Koreans were off somewhere else busily building another
bottle with another genie. And there was no cork in it, when
they started doing work on enriched uranium. So they had lost
none of their desire and none of the motivation that they still
had to develop a nuclear weapon.
And then when we discovered it and faced them with this
evidence, they admitted it, they acknowledged it. Even though
they are claiming now they did not, they did. They acknowledged
it. And in response to our saying, ``you have got to do
something about this or we cannot move forward,'' they said,
``well, we will show you how the game is played.'' They pulled
the cork out of the other bottle and let the genie out.
We are prepared to engage with the North Koreans, and we
are prepared to talk to them. But what we cannot find ourselves
in a position of doing is essentially panicking at their
activities and their demands that you ``have to discuss this
with us in only the way that we say you should discuss it with
us.'' We believe that this time, when we get the corks back
into the bottles, the bottles have to be removed as well. And
this is going to be a long and difficult process to accomplish
this. And it is going to take the entire international
community working together.
The IAEA condemned North Korea's actions a few weeks ago;
35 nations and the Board of Governors condemned those actions.
It is appropriate for that condemnation to now be brought
forward to the Security Council. And we do not believe it is an
unreasonable position on our part to say to the North Koreans,
``we want to talk to you, we are willing to talk to you, we
have no intention of attacking or invading you.'' The last
thing we want is to see that kind of conflict start on the
Korean Peninsula. We are very sensitive to the concerns of our
South Korean friends, and Japanese friends, and Russian and
Chinese friends. But we all have to work together to find a way
forward.
And it has only been a few months since this diplomatic
problem has been on our agenda. And we have been working the
issue, and I still think it is possible to achieve a diplomatic
solution. We have tried to lower the rhetoric. We have tried to
understand what they want. But they need to understand clearly
what they have to do in order to resolve this problem. So while
I am sensitive to the charge that, ``you have got to start
talking to them right away or else they will do something that
will be more troubling and destabilizing,'' I think it is
essential that we do it in a way that keeps all of our allies
together and let our allies know, and our friends know, and our
partners in the region know that they have a responsibility as
well to persuade the North Koreans that they have to behave
correctly.
It is the Chinese President who said, ``Chinese policy is
not to accept the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.'' If
that is the Chinese position, and it is, then they have
something of a responsibility and obligation to play a role in
finding a way forward, and not simply saying, the United States
has to solve this by talking directly.
We will talk directly. We do have communications with them,
and those communications are regular, and we are still looking
for the right formula to move forward, give them the security
guarantees that they say they would like to have, and say they
must have. But at the same time, we are not going to just say,
``you have got these guarantees,'' and then hope they will
satisfy our concerns and the world's concerns about what they
have been doing with respect to plutonium activities and
uranium enrichment.
Senator Dodd. In fairness--and my time is obviously up--but
in fairness to the three of them, I do not think that was quite
their position, but nonetheless I would urge you to take a look
at what they stated, nor has anyone suggested that somehow
North Korea is not culpable here at all, obviously.
But just one quick point I would raise with you just
quickly, and that is whether or not in retrospect in your mind,
I mean, obviously, looking back at some of the things that we
have done and said over the last couple of years, in your view,
in retrospect, looking back, could we have done this a little
differently? Have we in some way maybe provoked some of this
situation we are finding ourselves in today? In retrospect,
looking back, we might have done things a little differently,
and I will not ask what differently, but just in your view, is
that a fair criticism?
Secretary Powell. Yes. In retrospect, they started this
enrichment activity to find ways to enrich uranium and violate
the understandings of the North-South nuclear agreement, the
Agreed Framework. All of this began long before this
administration came in and said a single word about it.
If anything, the very fact that this administration came in
with a rather skeptical point of view with respect to North
Korea's activities and the verifiability of what they were
saying, in retrospect, seems to have been an appropriately
skeptical attitude. And we studied it. We took a look at it for
over a year, and then the President made it clear that he
wanted a bold approach with the North Koreans. But that bold
approach could only be followed up on if we made it clear to
the North Koreans that we knew what they were doing, and it had
to stop. And they had to come back into compliance with the
obligations that they had entered into during the period of the
Agreed Framework, the North-South agreement of the early 1990s.
And only then could we talk about economic assistance. Only
then could the Japanese do what they wanted to do with respect
to normalization. Only then could the South Koreans really
engage the North Koreans to help the North Korean people.
The President has made it clear time and time again, we
want to help the North Korean people, who are starving, who are
in economic distress. But we have to find a way to do it that
does not suggest to the North Koreans that we are doing it
because they have this tool, this weapon that they use, of
nuclearization of the peninsula as a way to get us to do it
because we are threatened by them. We have to do it on the
basis of, ``you get rid of this type of program, you stop
moving in this direction, you stop the proliferation, you stop
selling weapons of mass destruction and missile parts to other
nations around the world, and you do something about this
million-man army that is bankrupting you, and hanging over the
38th parallel, and you will find a world that is waiting to
assist you with the basic, fundamental, economic problems that
you have inside that country.''
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
just suggest at some point we might want to have a longer
conversation on this. There are some disagreements about the
background of this. This is not the time or place, obviously we
have other issues, but I would hope soon, Mr. Chairman, we
might find a forum even in a closed-door setting with the
Secretary to go over some of this. This is a troublesome,
troublesome setting for many of us here.
Thank you.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I have 20 seconds to
correct the record? When I was talking about Ansar, my staff
pointed out I said it was in the area of ``the `no-fly zone.'
'' It is in the area controlled by the PUK. It is just due east
of Kirkuk, in the zone controlled by the Kurds, but it is below
the ``no-fly zone.'' I wanted to correct the record.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dodd and Senator Biden,
and I would just assure the Senator we will be discussing North
Korea, both probably in front of the cameras and behind the
cameras, because it is an ongoing pursuit along with our
consideration of Iraq and Afghanistan and nonproliferation.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Secretary, very much. I cannot imagine what your days are like,
so thank you for appearing here this morning, and forgive us
for deviating a little bit from the budget, but I would like to
followup on your answer to Senator Hagel and what is happening
in the Middle East, and where we are going with a ``road map,''
and how you might comment on Prime Minister Sharon's
dismissiveness of the ``road map.''
I think he went so far as to say ``no, that does not mean
anything, we have another plan.'' What is happening in Israel?
Secretary Powell. I do not know what other plan has been
referred to by various officials and figures. What we are
working on is a road map that we have developed working with
the United Nations, working with the Russian Federation, and
working with the European Union.
A solution to the problems in the Middle East will take the
entire international community working together. That is why we
formed the quartet, and why we believe the quartet has been
doing valuable work. We have shared earlier drafts of a road
map with both sides.
Both sides have things they agree with, and things they
totally disagree with within the ``road map.'' That should not
surprise anybody. And the President made the correct decision
several weeks ago, after we met with the quartet again, that in
light of the Israeli election and the uncertainty associated
with the election, we should finish our work or come close to
finishing our work--it is still in draft--on the ``road map.''
And then after the Israeli election, and at a time in the very
near future to be determined by the President, we should make
the road map available to both parties and the world for debate
and consideration, and for the kind of discussions that will be
necessary to move forward.
But the President's policy remains the same. He is
committed to the vision he outlined to the world on 24 June
last year which also picked up the important initiative of
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. And that vision remains
the same: to find a way to reach the creation of a Palestinian
State living side-by-side in peace with Israel--the Republic of
Israel, a Jewish State, and to also find a way to get to that
vision initially by ending the violence, ending the terror,
bringing that under control, getting that stopped,
transformation of the Palestinian Authority, and bringing
forward new leaders on the Palestinian side who have committed
to peace and committed to ending violence, and that still
remains the President's vision. And his instructions to me have
not changed since 24 June, when he gave his speech.
Senator Chafee. How do you think the other interested,
legitimate parties in the Middle East are reacting to our
seemingly hands-off approach? The elections are now over, and
we are still waiting for the specifics of the ``road map.'' It
seems, from what we hear, or what I hear, that there is a deep
concern about our lack of involvement.
Secretary Powell. We are staying in very close touch with
our friends in the Middle East. We have had a number of
delegations here recently. I have been in contact with all of
my colleagues in the quartet. There is a sense of anticipation,
and there is hope that this will come forward soon, the road
map and the President's solid support behind that road map in a
public way. And I think it is going to happen in the not-too-
distant future.
The Israeli election is now over. Prime Minister Sharon is
in the process of forming a government. And I hope that we will
see movement in the very near future. I have not yet had a
chance to discuss with the President how we will move forward
with the ``road map,'' but I expect to do that in the next few
days.
Senator Chafee. One last followup on Prime Minister
Sharon's reaction, or his comments. Where do we go if there is
such obstruction to the President's initiative from Prime
Minister Sharon?
Secretary Powell. We will see what level of debate,
disagreement and agreement is with the road map once it is
finally out there. One listens to statements from both sides
from day to day, and I take them in stride. I listen to them
carefully and take them under advisement. We will see where we
go once the President is ready to put forward the road map in a
formal way, and the quartet is ready to put it forward. And we
will see what both sides are--how they both respond at that
time.
Senator Chafee. In the last few seconds, when he said, ``we
have another plan,'' does that have anything to do with what we
are doing in Iraq?
Prime Minister Sharon was dismissive of the road map, and
he said, ``we have another plan.''
Secretary Powell. I am not familiar with his other plan.
Senator Chafee. Very good.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, I join my colleagues in thanking you for
your presentation yesterday, for its quality and its content. I
think that we are all gratified that the administration finally
came to the United Nations and made its case to the world, and
many of us have said that the hard diplomatic work, and the
work of educating America have been too long in the coming.
I think the road would have been much easier for you to
this moment, and I think the road would be easier in the days
ahead had the administration listened to you. I know your
position has always been to try to maximize that international
effort, and I think this is a vindication of your position and
of the many of us here in the Congress who long pushed for
something less unilateral and more of the hard work of
diplomacy.
I do not want to go into--I think the case you made
yesterday speaks for itself, and those who look for a smoking
gun, there is really a kind of a smoking gun. I mean, it does
not have to be the gun itself that is smoking. It can be
evidence which makes clear the effort to move the gun around
before it is actually smoking, and I think you made a very
powerful case with respect to that, and that is important here,
and people need to look at it dispassionately, nonpartisanly,
and with the security interests of our country in mind.
I am concerned about the work ahead to maximize the
international effort here, and I know you are, too, and I know
you are going to be engaged in that.
I also would say, and I think it is important for all of us
to say this, that there is an enormous burden on the United
Nations at this point to live up to its responsibilities, and I
think those of us who care about multilateral institutions
cannot just talk about them in the abstract. They have to
perform. They have to step up to their moment, and I think this
is one of those moments.
If Saddam Hussein cannot convince the world, and I think it
would be very difficult, maybe he can, and I would like you to
share with us if you think there are specific ways that he
could, in fact, live up to the standard that you have set,
given the difficulties of inspections. That is sort of question
number 1, if I may.
But I want to ask--because time runs so rapidly here, I
really want to ask you about this question that has been raised
by colleagues on North Korea. There has been a little bit of
revisionism here, if I may say so, Mr. Secretary, politely,
because there has been a history of the review process of the
administration, and indeed, I think in 2001 there were some
changes made in the approach, not to mention the increased
heightening of rhetoric, the sort of axis of evil, and pygmy
dictator, and other such things.
None of this precludes responsibility from North Korea for
breaking the agreement, I understand that, but in late 2000,
the heavy procurement efforts for material linked to the highly
enriched uranium program became known. In November of 2001,
Lawrence Livermore's secret report on the highly enriched
program was part of the ongoing intelligence assessment, and in
June of 2002 the pieces came together, and top officials
concluded they were cheating.
Here we are now, in 2003, and basically, the administration
has taken all of its options off the table, the option of
military, the option of sanctions, the option of talking for a
long time. Now we are talking, but what is really dangerous,
what makes this more dangerous than 1994, is that the
reprocessing of plutonium is the critical measurement. That is
the demarcation line here, and that is the decisive step before
the development of weapons. Once the plutonium is reprocessed,
the genie is out of the bottle.
Now, there is enough plutonium from existing fuel rods that
have been under international control since 1994 to make 5 to 6
nuclear weapons within 6 months, and six more the next year. If
the North Koreans resume and complete work on two other
reactors that were shut down in 1994, a 50-megawatt reactor and
a 200-megawatt reactor, they could be making enough plutonium
for dozens of nuclear weapons each year, a literal plutonium
assembly line.
Now, why do I stress that? Well, Mr. Secretary, this sort
of takes you back to cold war potential. This goes beyond the
capacity to have a suicide mission, where they lob a couple, or
engage in a couple. It gives them the capacity to have a
second-strike capacity, which puts you in a very different
structure.
Second, it has a profound impact on the cascading effect of
nuclear proliferation in the region in northeast Asia. Japan,
South Korea, China, India, Pakistan, all are impacted by the
lack of resolve of this, and it is more dangerous because we
know that this material can be sold. Even the weapons
themselves, to al-Qaeda and other efforts. Unlike Iraq, and I
emphasize this, North Korea has an established record of
selling weapons technology widely and indiscriminately,
obviously.
And many South Koreans have now come to interpret this
struggle as not a struggle between them and North Korea, but a
struggle between North Korea and the United States, and that
is, in fact, something that North Korea is exploiting, so I
think the administration has sort of left this fuzzy. I mean,
they are saying we do not want nuclear weapons, but it is not
the nuclear weapons, it is the reprocessing, and for a long
period of time we were exchanging oil for the knowledge that
they were not reprocessing.
I think every American would buy the exchange of oil for
non-nuclearization of the region. That is what we had. The
lifting of the cameras and the lifting of the inspectors has
deprived us of that, and yet there is no sense of sort of the
demarcation line on the processing, and no clarity from the
administration about what option is, in fact, on the table and
how we will proceed.
Former Ambassador Galluci and Sandy Berger have made one
proposal of a bargain. Others have made another proposal, I
believe Michael O'Hanlon at the Brookings.
So could you share with us, is the line worth drawing on
reprocessing? If it is, how does the administration intend to
do that, and why are we not moving more aggressively with
respect to that threat, where it is more real in terms of the
long-term threat of nuclearization than the current threat in
Iraq, which I agree is a threat, and is one we have to deal
with, but it is a different kind of threat.
Secretary Powell. No options have been taken off the table,
the option of sanctions, the option of additional political
moves, and no military option has been taken off the table,
although we have no intention of attacking North Korea, the
President said that, or invading North Korea. But the President
has retained all of his options.
And yes, we are concerned about the step of reprocessing.
In fact, that was the subject of the bulk of my discussions
yesterday with my Russian, and the night before, with my
Chinese colleagues, because I recognize the importance of that
step. But at the same time we have to take note of the simple
fact that even if you had plutonium facilities still bottled up
with cameras and seals and everything else, the reality is that
long before we came into office, they had already decided to
try to find another way to develop the very materials that are
of concern to us, in this case through the enrichment of
uranium. And so they had not abandoned, even though we were
keeping our eye on Yongbyon, they had not abandoned their basic
intention to develop fissile material that could be used in
nuclear weapons.
And as we solve this problem, and it is not just a problem
of Yongbyon, it has to be solved in a way that we see to the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. And the very fact
that Yongbyon was left in a manner that the seals could be
removed and it could be restarted, because the Agreed Framework
did not provide for the elimination and removal of all of the
cells until long after the light water reactors were up and
running and, you know, it was a future arrangement, left this
danger there all along. And so I still think it is possible to
find a diplomatic solution, working with our friends.
The South Koreans, the ones I have spoken to, and my
assessment of the new President-elect, and my conversations
with one of his principal advisors the day before yesterday
suggest that they realize it is not just a problem between the
United States and North Korea. They want us to do more, as he
said, publicly, and we are prepared to do more. But at the same
time, we have to find a complete solution to this problem that
involves Yongbyon, and enriched uranium, and not leaving in
place those elements that could be right back into operation
and presenting us a problem 3, 4, 5 years from now.
And what we are communicating to the North Koreans in every
way that we can, through all manner of channels, both public
and private channels and direct conversations, is that ``we
want to find a political solution, we want to talk to you, but
we believe that the best way to talk is in a multilateral forum
so that the other parties who have an interest in this can be
involved.'' And the other parties, frankly, have expressed an
interest in participating in a multilateral arrangement that
would lead to bilateral discussions.
Senator Kerry. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think there----
The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. I know my time is up. Can I just have an
answer to the first part of my question about what,
specifically, in your mind, Saddam Hussein might or might not
be able to do?
Secretary Powell. If Saddam Hussein really was interested
in avoiding the serious consequences contemplated by 1441, and
if he truly had abandoned his goal of having these weapons of
mass destruction, and was really committed to changing the
nature of his regime and his policies, he would be pushing out
scientists and experts and engineers and everyone else who knew
anything about these programs they have had over the last 12
years and saying, here they are, take them anywhere you want,
sit down, talk to them, they are the ones with the knowledge of
what we have been doing, here they are, talk to them. He would
not be giving them classes in how to keep secrets.
If he was really serious about it, he would be telling us
what happened to the anthrax, what happened to the bombs, what
is going on at this facility, what did you cover up, turn it
all over, turn over all of your cards, and let us get this
resolved. That is not what he has done, and the United Nations
and international community must not ignore its responsibility.
Yes, I have been in the forefront of diplomatic efforts
because I do not like war, nobody likes war. The President does
not like war, and does not want a war, but this is a problem we
cannot walk away from. And when we fought for 7 weeks to get
the U.N. Resolution 1441--and I might point out, Senator, that
the President decided in early August of last year to go down
the U.N. route.
Notwithstanding all of the speculation as to what he did or
did not do, it was in early August that we all spoke about
this, and the President decided to go the U.N. route. And that
decision was agreed to by all his principal advisors at one
morning meeting we had in person and by video. And when we
structured 1441 to make sure it was not like all other
resolutions, it said, you are guilty, you are in material
breach now, by the way, you can get out of material breach, but
only if you come clean, and by the way, we are going to empower
the inspection team to do a better job than they have ever done
in the past, and oh, by the way, if you flunk it this time, you
cannot just walk away from the serious consequences involved in
your further misbehavior.
Everyone who voted for that resolution--and I made this
point yesterday--knew exactly what we were talking about,
because the day the President spoke, that very afternoon,
September 12, I sat down with a number of my Security Council
colleagues, many of whom were pushing for an opportunity to
have a second resolution, and I said, ``OK, it may come to
that.'' And the President said the other day he ``welcomes a
second resolution.'' But I said to them at that time, ``do not
vote for this first resolution, 1441, if you are also saying at
this time you will not vote for a second resolution when
serious consequences are called for. Do not play that double
game.''
So everybody knew what we were getting into with 1441, and
we all hoped it would work. We all hoped Saddam Hussein and the
Iraqi regime or other leaders within Iraq would recognize that
this is the time, stop this kind of behavior and these kinds of
programs, live in peace with its neighbors, and let the
inspectors come in and verify the destruction of this material
and find out the truth.
So far, the Iraqi regime, led by Saddam Hussein, has chosen
not to do that. We will see what happens when the inspectors
visit this weekend, and we will all be looking with great
interest at what the inspectors report next Friday.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, and
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry. Let me
just say, the colloquy between Senator Kerry and the Secretary
was very important, and the chair did not want to interrupt
either.
Now, both the Secretary and Senator Kerry took seven-and-a-
half minutes, which amounted to 15 minutes, and in fairness to
other members, the chair is going to maintain a liberal time
policy here, but at the same time, I hope members will observe
the clocks that are in front of them, and if not, I will try to
prompt them, but I do not want to criticize the Senator or the
Secretary. It was a very important dialog, but we are just
going to try to keep everybody in line.
Senator Kerry. You have a better chance now. Republicans
are more disciplined.
Secretary Powell. I will not try to leave before every
Senator has had a chance.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary. I will try to keep within 5 minutes.
I want to observe the new world that we live in, discuss
something positive, and then focus on Iraq, and since I
probably will not have enough time, I want to commend you on
the technology, the Internet improvements in communications you
are trying to make. I want to work with you and your staff to
make sure that the consulates in particular are using
technology to better process visas and have access to
information to make better decisions.
Now, as far as something positive, Senator Nelson was there
at the National Prayer Breakfast today, dozens of countries
represented there. I was at a table with Secretary Martinez.
There were people from several nations, including three from
Russia. The CIA Director, George Tenet, was brought forward to
read from the Scriptures, and the Russians clapped.
I remarked to them, this is a positive sign, the Russians
are clapping for a CIA Director, and one of the gentlemen, in
fact, said he was once in the Secretary Advisor's Office which
had the responsibilities of counterintelligence. It brought a
tear to my eye that, while we may have some differences in the
world, even with our Russian friends, it is nowhere near as bad
as it was at one time, so--to bring a bright light to today's
hearing.
Now, so far as Iraq, I first and foremost want to commend
you on your tremendous, steady, calm, rational leadership
throughout this issue of disarmament with Iraq, your diplomacy,
your caution, your respect for the sovereignty and views of
other nations while presenting such a clear and convincing case
of evidence. It was very compelling yesterday and throughout
this entire effort to disarm Saddam and Iraq of the chemical,
the biological weapons as well as the means of delivering them,
whether through terrorists or through missiles or other
matters.
My question is, how do you see this all now playing out? If
this were a jury, it would be beyond a reasonable doubt. I
think you would get close to a unanimous decision. But how do
you see the disarmament playing out? It is a question, if not
now, when, how soon, if they say we need to put in more
inspectors, fine, you put in three times as many inspectors, a
thousand inspectors, what if they do find a cache of chemical
agents, or biological agents, or a missile that exceeds the
150-kilometer, then what, send in another few thousand?
When will a decision actually be made to make sure that
Saddam and Iraq is disarmed, which has generally been
stipulated, many of your facts were already stipulated facts.
There was evidence from others.
Of course, you did present some new evidence, as well, to
bolster the case, as well as the obvious communications of
Iraqi weapons shifting around.
In response to Senator Kerry's question, you mentioned a
second trigger, a second resolution possibly required from the
United Nations Security Council. Could you share with us the
views of the administration, if you feel it is appropriate? I
know a lot of this is diplomacy and negotiations, and you do
not always want to say how you are going to handle a
negotiation in something as delicate as this, but could you
share with us, when do you see a resolution? Do you think there
will be another one? What would be the specifics, and when, in
a general timeframe, would we need to go to the United Nations
Security Council to get a specific authorization of force to
disarm Iraq?
Secretary Powell. As the President has said, he would
welcome a second resolution, and many members of the Council
would not only welcome it, but some of them would say, we
require one for participation in whatever might come, or to
provide authority. We believe there is more than enough
authority for military action if that is decided upon in 1441
and previous resolutions. But we understand the attraction of
having a second resolution, and we would welcome it, and we
would work toward one if that is what comes to pass.
I think it will start to come to a head when Dr. Blix and
Dr. ElBaradei return from Baghdad and we see whether or not
there is any chance of serious progress. And not just progress
on process, but as a serious change of attitude and a
commitment to comply that one can believe can come about. And
so I would say within weeks, as the President has said, we will
know enough to bring this to a conclusion one way or the other.
I cannot tell you today when such a resolution might be
appropriate to be offered by one member of the Council or
another, or when there might be a vote on such a resolution.
But I think we are reaching an endgame in a matter of weeks,
not a matter of months. Twice as many inspectors, three times
as many inspectors, as was suggested by my French colleague and
seconded by my German colleague yesterday, might be useful if
there is a change in attitude. If there is no change in
attitude, we do not need to hire more detectives. That is not
the purpose of it. And so I think this is a matter of weeks.
I might also add that most of the individuals who spoke
after me yesterday, members of the Council, already had their
presentations ready long before I had arrived in New York. They
had already had them printed up. They were handing out printed
copies. When you saw them going around, they were handing out
printed copies of what they were about to say.
They never hand out a printed copy of what I am going to
say, because I never know what I am going to say until I say
it. But later in the day, when I spoke to each and every one of
them, and they had heard what I said, there was some shift in
attitude, a shift in attitude that suggested, I think, more and
more nations are realizing that this cannot continue like this
indefinitely. And so I think there might be, perhaps, more
support for a second resolution than some might think.
What that resolution would actually look like, and the
actual wording of the resolution, as you indicated, Senator
Allen, that is something I have to keep rather close to my
chest right now.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Powell. Mr. Chairman, can I violate your rule of
a moment ago and say one more word?
The Chairman. Of course.
Secretary Powell. You mentioned consulates. It is very
important they be a part of this information technology
revolution that we are trying to put forward in the State
Department. I am proud of what we have been able to do in
recent months after 9/11 to integrate our data bases and
integrate the intelligence law enforcement data bases. We are
trying to reduce the backlogs. We are trying to make sure that
we can approve visas more quickly, but safely. We are going to
put a new initiative into play, secure our borders, but keep
our doors open. Open our doors but secure our borders.
We do not want this to become a closed nation where we are
afraid to let people in. We are a nation that thrives on people
coming to our borders, and we are trying to convey that
attitude throughout our Consular Corps and work closely with
Governor Ridge and the Department of Homeland Security to that
end.
Senator Allen. If I may followup, will the consulates have
the information that the FBI and the CIA has?
Secretary Powell. My goal, and we are working toward this,
is that when a person comes to one of our consulates and
applies for a visa, electronically that request will come back
and be bounced against every data base that needs to have it
bounced against, and the answer will go back to the consular
officer electronically as fast as possible. We are not there
yet, but we are going to get there.
Senator Allen. I look forward to working with you on that
specifically. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask my
full statement and some questions for the record be included in
the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, those will be included in
full.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, welcome. Whatever a person's reaction to the
specifics of what you said yesterday, and whatever flows from
it, I certainly want to join in the praise and my feeling that
there is virtual unanimity in this country that we are very
proud of your performance before the United Nations, and I was
struck by your remark in answer to Senator Hagel that as a
country we do not have the luxury at this time to do just one
thing.
I think that perhaps is more true now than at any time in
the history of this country, but I would also suggest that in
terms of the history of this country, this may be one of the
times when it is most true that doing one thing will have a
tremendous impact on other things, and that, I think, is the
heart of the matter here with regard to whether we should take
unilateral action, particularly in the case of Iraq.
If the administration decides to go to war with Iraq
without a Security Council resolution explicitly calling for
such enforcement action, what do you think the impact of that
decision will be on the international coalition against
terrorism? Is it not going to get harder for some of the key
governments who will be seen as cooperating with us in the Iraq
situation to be able to cooperate with us as well with regard
to the effort against terrorism?
Secretary Powell. I think we can keep the Global War
Against Terrorism Coalition intact because I think more and
more nations that are in that coalition with us understand that
they are at risk. The British, the French, the Spanish, all of
them have seen this terror networks and these networks
interacting with each other in their own country.
Clearly, it is better if we can do this under U.N. auspices
with a new resolution, but if that is not the case, we believe
there is sufficient authority in existing U.N. resolutions or,
for that matter, in the inherent authority of the President of
the United States to defend our Nation, that we can make a
convincing case, and we will have a coalition of the willing
that will consist of many nations, even in the absence of a new
U.N. resolution.
Senator Feingold. Let me press you on that for a moment
with respect to the Muslim world. Is it not possible that
domestic dissatisfaction mobilized around opposition to U.S.
policy in Iraq could help destabilize some of our key allies in
the Muslim world? And let us face it, these governments, just
like any government, only have so much political capital. We
are using up our chits to get them to help us on this Iraq
situation and they are using up, frankly, their chits with
their own people.
I find it hard to believe, based upon what I have heard in
many conversations with diplomats from these countries, that
there is not a danger and a price to be paid in terms of their
ability to help us in the war against terrorism if we go
forward with this Iraq action unilaterally, and I would like
you to address that specifically.
Secretary Powell. There is no question that many of our
friends and those who said they would be part of a coalition of
the willing have difficult domestic circumstances that they
have to work their way through. The popular opinion is against
such a conflict, and it makes it harder for them to be a part
of that coalition.
What is striking is that they are still willing to be a
part of that coalition. They are taking enormous political
risk, especially among our European friends. But they think it
is the right thing to do, and so far, they have certainly
indicated they are willing to take that risk. And if conflict
comes, we cannot avoid it, we do not find a peaceful solution,
and if we are successful, and if, in that success, we put in
place an Iraq that is governed in a responsible way; that it is
not investing in weapons of mass destruction; that is living in
peace with its neighbors; and that has put in place a
representative form of government, with our assistance, that
protects the rights of all Iraqi citizens, I think that kind of
success will very rapidly rebound to the advantage of those
leaders that are willing to take the risk now.
Senator Feingold. I hope you are right. I am skeptical. I
believe this is going to create some real problems in the war
against terrorism, but obviously respect your views and will
follow it through.
Let me switch to a different part of the world. You have so
much on your plate, including the fight against terrorism. It
is a global problem, but it also presents global opportunities,
and I know that you and I share strong feelings that this
relates to Africa as well, and I have felt this more and more
as this fight against terrorism has gone on, so let me ask you
a question in this regard.
The fiscal year 2004 requests for development assistance
[DA] programs in Africa represent a $42.7 million decrease from
fiscal year 2003. Despite this, Sudan is slated for a 27.5
increase, which is wonderful, and I hope that it, of course,
facilitates a just and lasting peace in that very troubled
country, but other countries are slated for serious cuts,
including Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Somalia, and
Tanzania.
Anticorruption DA funds are requested at a $6 million
level, which is a decrease from the $7.5 million fiscal year
2003 request. I do not understand the priorities that are
reflected by this request, and I would ask you, if you could,
to explain the justification for these decreases.
Secretary Powell. Senator, I cannot give you a detailed
answer on each one of these countries. All I can say is that
within the total amount that we have in the budget, we had to
make choices, and we had to make investments in some places,
such as Sudan, and since I do not have all the money I would
like to have, we are constrained by what the President is able
to put in to the national budget, and what Congress may or may
not appropriate for our programs. Choices have to be made, and
this was the manner in which we prioritized the various
accounts, not only with Africa, but throughout the world.
I would like each and every one of these to be at a much
higher level than they were last year, but that is not the
luxury I have as we go through with our bureaus and with our
desk officers and with our embassies around the world to find
out how best to use the money that is going to be available to
us.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Secretary, my time is up, but I hope
you will take another look at these. It is my opinion that
these cuts to these countries do not reflect in particular the
challenges relating to terrorism that may exist with regard to
some of the African countries, not to mention many other
priorities, so I thank you and----
Secretary Powell. The only other point I would make,
Senator, is that even though it may be that the decreases you
mentioned overall are in Africa, there is an increase of 4.1
percent when you add in the Millennium Challenge Account and
the HIV/AIDS funding the President has requested.
Senator Feingold. I respect that and, of course, I respect
the HIV/AIDS initiative, but I think we have come to a time
here when we have to focus specifically on which countries are
countries that we have to have a very aggressive and
appropriate relationship with regard to many issues, including
the terrorism issue, and I do not think these particular
choices reflect that, even if the overall number may well be
higher, but we will----
Secretary Powell. I hope we can pursue that in the months
ahead.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I want to thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for getting this
committee off to such an excellent start. This important annual
opportunity to discuss the foreign affairs budget request is coming on
the heels of some very serious and enlightening hearings about some of
the most pressing issues before this country. This is an excellent time
for a discussion of foreign policy priorities for 2004.
It is always a pleasure to have Secretary Powell before the
committee. I share the strong sense of confidence in the Secretary's
judgment and competence that is expressed by my constituents back home
in Wisconsin.
The Secretary made a compelling presentation before the Security
Council. I believe that it largely confirmed what we already knew--Iraq
continues to pursue WMD, and Iraq is not in compliance with the UN
Security Council's resolution. I have consistently agreed that Iraq's
pursuit of WMD is a very serious issue that must be addressed by the
international community. Pointing out Iraq's dismal failure to comply
with U.N. resolutions using evidence and detail rather than rhetoric
was a very valuable step in that direction.
But the most difficult question before us is how to best address
this threat. We must determine what action should be taken that will
enhance rather than diminish U.S. security, what action will achieve
the necessary objective of containing Iraq and dismantling its WMD
programs without incurring grave, unnecessary costs.
And even as the situation in Iraq unfolds and the crisis festers in
North Korea, the U.S. cannot afford to lose sight of the global
campaign against terrorism, which must be this country's very first
priority. This effort is multi-faceted. It must be multilateral to
succeed, and it must be conducted with both a sense of urgency and with
foresight and a focus on long-term stability.
This means that we cannot afford to ignore the global project of
assisting the forces of progress and justice in resisting the forces of
chaos and destruction. Terrorism has a global reach. We cannot afford
to ignore whole swathes of the world.
As a 10-year member of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I want
to take this opportunity to reinforce this point with regard to sub-
Saharan Africa. Last year the subcommittee held a series of hearings
throughout 2002 focusing on weak states in Africa and U.S. policy
options. My purpose in convening the series was to draw attention to
some of the manifestations of states' weakness in various parts of
Africa--both in terms of humanitarian and economic collapse and in
terms of such phenomenon as piracy, illicit air transport networks, and
trafficking in arms, gemstones, and people. I wanted to call attention
to these issues, and to explore long-term policy options for changing
the context in these states--and addressing the relationship between
criminal activity, corruption, and humanitarian crisis--to help make
these states less appealing to criminal opportunists. By examining the
cases of Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and
Angola in these hearings, and by initiating a series of regular, off-
the-record roundtable meetings with members of the African diplomatic
corps in Washington to discuss their perspective on the campaign
against terrorism and U.S. foreign policy, the subcommittee was able to
respond to the events of September 11 with a focus on building
partnerships over the long term.
Not surprisingly, the most obvious point that we drew from the
hearing transcripts and roundtable meetings was that the task before
the U.S. is a complex one, and that getting our policy response right
is going to be difficult.
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, the President was right
to make plain that the U.S. will not distinguish between the terrorists
behind the attacks and those who harbor them, and he was right to
propose a far more robust, less complacent policy in these cases. But
state sponsors are only part of the problem.
The absence of a functioning state is another. The U.S. was short-
sighted when we disengaged from Afghanistan and Pakistan once we no
longer had cold war-related interests in those countries. America left
a vacuum in its wake, and some of the forces that moved to fill that
vacuum came to threaten our security in ways we could not have
imagined.
The only way to address these diffuse threats is through a long
term commitment to re-engagement. Short-term fixes--military strikes or
freezing the assets of diamond dealers involved in laundering terrorist
assets--may address some immediate threats, but they do nothing to
ensure that our children will not face the same problems in the years
to come. We must develop policies to help bring lasting stability to
these terribly unstable places, to build solid relationships and gain
access to solid information.
And our policies must reflect that fact that subordinating basic
human rights to accommodate larger strategic goals is a tactic that
often comes back to haunt us. In Somalia, in Liberia, and in the Congo,
the U.S. backed dictatorships utterly destroyed the institutions of the
state and society, leaving civilians few tools for building a better
future, and warlords ample opportunity to continue looting these
countries' wealth. Regimes that thrive on corruption and injustice
eventually create weak and broken states, yet it could not be more
clear that our long-term national interests are on the side of
accountability and respect for basic human rights.
I would also point out that no American public diplomacy effort can
succeed unless principled, engaged policy is backing it up. This means
supporting independent governments interested in the fate of their own
people and it means supporting vibrant civil societies that can balance
the power of government abroad. It means investing in health care and
education so that people around the world have a reason to believe in
the possibility of progress, and so that societies have a strong and
healthy core on which to build. It also means vigorously fighting the
HIV/AIDS pandemic--by redoubling efforts to prevent transmission,
meaningfully increasing access to treatment, and working not simply to
take care of orphans, but to prevent future generations from being
orphaned in the first place. I commend the President for the commitment
to this issue that he articulated in the State of the Union Address.
And so we all have a tall order before us. We must ensure that we
do not fail to keep our eye on the big picture even as we try to deal
as wisely as possible with the immediate crises before us. And our
budget priorities must reflect this balance.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Secretary, first of all, let me say,
Mr. Secretary, I think you are doing a fabulous job on a lot of
tough issues you have got spinning in the air. It seems Kim
Jong Il in North Korea is bound and determined to make us deal
with him at the same time that we are confronting the situation
in Iraq. That is the way I read this. He is just saying, look,
I am not going to let you deal sequentially with things in the
world, I am just going to jam this right up against you, and I
hope we do not play his game on his timeframe.
I guess I was noting in today's papers, London Guardian,
``North Korea Threatens U.S. with First Strike'' in the London
Guardian they are quoted there, and then this is in the
Washington Post, that the Japanese Government is considering
sending two destroyers equipped with GS air defense systems to
watch for North Korean missile launches, that they may try to
up the pressure even more on us to make some sort of deal or
agreement, and I applaud your standing firm against that, and I
hope you can continue to do that, even though it seems as if
they are bent and determined to use every tool they can to
build pressure on you and on us to make some sort of early
deal, early agreement that may well not serve our best
interests, or the world's best interests, or, even more
importantly than all of that, the people of North Korea's best
interests, who have suffered so much under this tyrant.
One thing I would like to--I want to bounce around a couple
of topics, and time is short, but on the road map in the Middle
East, if I could, I am concerned about a point on the road map
that it not follow a prescribed timetable, but, rather, it
follow performance, as the President laid out, not any sort of
artificial deadlines.
I am troubled also at the enhanced role that the other
parties in the quartet set for themselves in monitoring and
enforcing the terms of the road map, of what the other parties
are saying, what their role is going to be in enforcing and
monitoring the terms.
Ultimately, as you have said many times, the Israelis and
the Palestinians must make peace for themselves, and that it
cannot be imposed from the outside, and I wonder if--you have
commented some on this already, but what you see as the record
so far for Palestinian reforms that were outlined clearly by
the President in the road map, and the role you see for the
quartet versus the United States in monitoring and enforcing
the road map that has been laid out.
Secretary Powell. On the first point, the road map is both
performance-driven and has a schedule. The President's vision
was to see if we could get to a Palestinian State in a very
short period of time, relatively, 3 years or so. But you are
not going to get there in 100 years unless there is a different
kind of performance on the Palestinian side with respect to
ending the terror.
No nation is going to put itself in that kind of vulnerable
position of continuing terror and create a State from which the
terrorists operate, so performance is required. But at the same
time, there has to be some sense of timing, some sense of when
we could get to a Palestinian State. Because in the absence of
that kind of horizon clearly in mind, and the United States and
the other members of the quartet committed to that horizon,
then you remove some of the incentive for emerging Palestinian
leaders to put the hammer down with respect to terrorism.
With respect to the participation of the other members of
the quartet, there is going to be enough for all to do. We need
the European Union to bring resources of the kind they brought
over the years to rebuild the infrastructure of the Palestinian
community, we need the United Nations to be ready to play a
role, and Russia has always played an important role in terms
of following the situation and participating in the peace
process in the Middle East. I still, however, believe that
first and foremost, it will be the United States and the United
States' leadership that will be required to see something
happen.
People suggesting that, well, we have abdicated our role to
the quartet, nobody in the quartet would say that. It is the
United States' leadership that created the quartet, that is
driving the road map. It is my staff working on the road map;
working with other members of the quartet to bring together
something that we can all align behind.
What the quartet has served to do is to have all of us
speaking with one voice in one forum, as opposed to each member
of the quartet out doing their own thing. And that, I think,
has been very, very helpful. But it will be U.S. leadership
that makes it happen. And if we get to the point where monitors
go in, for example, they are initially going to be U.S.
monitors. But we do not want to have the whole burden for this,
and I think as confidence is developed as we start down this
road, there may well be a role for other nations to contribute
to that process, but it is going to be U.S. leadership and U.S.
presence that gets the process started.
Senator Brownback. If I could, and I appreciate that, and I
appreciate the need for the timetable to create the pressure
for the performance, but if the performance does not come, I
hope it is the United States that takes the grade and says, OK,
performance is not here, and not other members of the quartet
that say, well, we think maybe it is enough to be able to get
things accomplished.
My time has concluded, but on Iraq, and dealing with the
opposition, which I know you have done a lot of work in your
office, if Saddam is no longer there, or we are working with a
group hopefully with the Iraqi opposition, I hope we can keep
working closely with them, get the Liberty TV going, moving
forward.
I think it is just very important that we work closely with
them as much as possible as we move, it seems like further and
further forward here with Saddam not participating with the
United Nations, not complying with the agreement, that there
may well likely be actions and, if there are, that we have
groups that are there working with us in the possibility of a
post-Saddam Iraq that can be civil society, a democratic
society, a free society that we all hope and pray for in the
future.
I know there are a lot of groups that are pulling together
to try to see that taking place, and they are working with the
State Department, and they need the support and funding from
the State Department to do that.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator. We are working with
them, and let me just back up and touch on one aspect of your
first question. Reform in the Palestinian Authority has not
been adequate. We have seen some bright spots in the Finance
Ministry, but we need to see a lot more.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Sam Brownback
This is a watershed moment for those who have been claiming all
along that Saddam needs to be disarmed, but advocated that diplomacy
was the path to take. It is clear that Saddam has rejected this path.
If France and Germany, among others, will now make excuses as to why it
is acceptable for Saddam to have these weapons--as preliminary reports
indicate they are doing, then it is painfully clear that these
countries do not share our interest and should not have veto authority
over America's right to self-defense.
I think one of the most striking points Powell made so clearly
yesterday, is that our evidence shows that Saddam's regime are digging
holes, moving equipment or burying things at inspection sites shortly
before inspectors arrived. This indicates that the Iraqis are aware of
where inspectors are going--and therefore, these inspections are not
random, and allow Iraqis to avoid detection.
As Powell stated so clearly, Iraq is in defiant breach of
Resolution 1441. The only question left to be decided is whether the
world community will stand by what it said and enforce its will. If it
fails this test, nothing else it says will have sway over future
tyrants--for it will be painfully clear that even in the most obvious
cases of violating international law, there will not be a consequence
because of prevailing politics.
This resolution, which Saddam has clearly violated, came on top of
an entire decade of second chances. There comes a time when we must
face reality, even if some of our friends refuse to--and the difficult
reality is that Saddam Hussein has a demonstrated pattern of lying,
developing and using weapons of mass destruction. It is not surprising
that he has failed yet again to take advantage of the last chance
offered by the most recent U.N. resolution.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback. Let
me pay tribute to Senator Boxer. She was here at 9:30 and has
lasted through the whole hearing just as the Secretary has, so
let me give you your opportunity, Senator.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, let me start off by thanking you, because I
have never seen such an active chairman, and you are keeping
this committee so informed, and I just thank you for that, and
Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the people of California, and we
have got 35 million, we want to thank you for your service and
dedication to your country, to our country, and I know that you
are bearing the burdens of that, but you are doing it with
grace.
I want to first associate myself with the remarks of many
of my colleagues, Republican and Democratic here, when they
talk about the many challenges that we face. I have written a
letter to Senator Lugar outlining my concerns about the foreign
policy direction of the United States, and let me just lay it
out, it is a brief comment, and then I have two questions, one
on Iraq and one on Korea.
I fear that our foreign policy is becoming quite reactive
except for Iraq, where we are driving things, and some of my
colleagues have mentioned North Korea and the Middle East,
Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico, which is so close to
California. That is just to name a few. Senator Feingold
mentioned Africa. I am hopeful that we are going to look at
this foreign policy in the big picture when we have a chance,
and if our chairman will decide to take a look at this, because
I see a doctrine that appears to me to be one of designed
neglect. As a matter of fact, I heard one of your deputies on
the radio, a wonderful gentleman with--I thought he was
terrific.
He just said, we have to be ready for whatever comes at us,
and I felt that that said something that to me was--he did not
mean anything by it, except we have to be ready for things,
except I think we have to be more proactive, so perhaps there
is a disagreement on that point, you do not see it that way,
but just from my point of view, that is how I see it.
Now, there is little disagreement in my state that Iraq
must disarm. I have certainly felt that way for months. The
question is, how do you bring that about in a way that achieves
our goal with the least possible loss of life and the least
possible chance that these chemical and biological weapons will
be released?
We have a report from the CIA, now declassified, that says
if his back is against the wall, Saddam is apt to use these
weapons. I know everyone is aware of this, and that is why the
people in my state are anxious. They come to me every weekend I
go home, Mr. Secretary. Whether it is in the supermarket or
taking a walk down the bike path where I live, people are
coming up to me from all political persuasions. They do not
necessarily have the answer, but they are anxious about this.
They know, because it has been stated over and over again
by this Senator as well as by our chairman, Senator Lugar and
others, that there were more weapons of mass destruction
destroyed in the 1990s by the inspections, by robust
inspections, than they were by the bombs.
They understand that, and they also know that during the
1991 Persian Gulf war, we had many people with us both on the
field of combat and paying the bills afterwards. And right now,
I have asked the question of Secretary Rumsfeld many times,
tell me who is sending how many troops. I have yet to have a
written response. I am hoping to get that--and who is going to
pay the bills. And these things are concerning to my people.
I am a little confused about something. I want to ask you
this question on Iraq. I have here a Washington Post story in
which you are quoted, just about a month ago, saying the
following: ``The inspections are really now starting to gain
momentum.'' Then, just about 2 weeks after that you said,
``inspections will not work,'' so my question on Iraq is this.
Will you turn over the information you so intelligently made
public yesterday to the inspectors, and have you given up on
inspections? That is the first question, and my second question
has to do with Korea.
When Secretary Armitage was here, and he is kind of a
favorite of the committee because he is so direct, and I
personally think it is great, and I asked him the question, did
you and Secretary Powell, or did one of you, or someone from
the Department, talk to the President before he put North Korea
into the ``axis of evil,'' before he used that expression? The
answer was yes, and you both agreed that they are in the ``axis
of evil.''
I said, did you talk about what response it might evoke? He
said ``no, we did not,'' and I was rather taken aback, and I
thought about that for a few days. Did you contact South Korea
to find out what type of response they thought North Korea
might have to this, or our friend Japan? Because in diplomacy
we all know, for everything you say, everyone is listening, and
we have to be aware of the ramifications, and when Senator Dodd
asked you the question about, would you do things differently,
you talked about the Clinton and other administrations.
I am very concerned that we did not really think about the
ramifications of that remark, so could you tell me if you
talked to our allies in the region before the President made
that speech, and could you tell me, have you given up hope on
inspections?
Secretary Powell. Let me begin by going back to your first
point. I simply cannot sit here and not respond to a suggestion
that we have no foreign policy or it is a foreign policy of
benign neglect.
Senator Boxer. Designed neglect. I did not say benign
neglect.
Secretary Powell. Designed neglect? Designed neglect. Well,
I do not like that characterization, either.
Senator Boxer. Yes, I understand.
Secretary Powell. Over the last 2 years, we have put our
relationship with the two most important countries that we have
to deal with Russia and China on a solid basis. Yesterday, you
voted out the Treaty of Moscow, which got rid of the ABM
treaty, which was a source of irritation, which now has the
Russians cooperating with us in developing missile defense.
One of the things I talked to Igor Ivanov about yesterday
was how can we move forward in missile defense. We have
President Putin solidly aligned with us in the global war
against terrorism. We have got the Russians working with us in
Central Asia in ways that would have been unimaginable just 3
or 4 years ago.
With respect to the other large account that I worry about,
China, we started off with a terrible incident having to do
with a collision between two planes, and now, 2 years later, we
are working with China on a variety of issues. We have got
China into the World Trade Organization.
We have doubled--well, not quite doubled. We have had a 50
percent increase with the Millennium Challenge Account in
foreign assistance that we are going to be presenting to those
nations that have put themselves on a path to democracy in the
free enterprise system.
We have created a community of democracy here in the
Western Hemisphere.
We are working on free trade agreements with nations all
around the world. We are working on a Free Trade Agreement of
the Americas.
We have committed ourselves more than any other group of
nations with respect to HIV/AIDS, and wiping out this most
serious of problems we have on the face of the earth, so I
think we have an active foreign policy that is geared to the
kinds of challenges we are facing in the 21st century.
And above all of that, I mean, on top of all of that is the
way in which this President, this administration, and this
Nation is leading the global war against terrorism. Terrorism,
the new threat that replaced the ideological threats that we
used to have with communism and fascism. So I think we do have
an aggressive foreign policy that is moving us in the right
direction and moving us forward.
That is not to say that we do not have problems, North
Korea, the Middle East peace process, where we have not seen as
much progress as I would have liked, and of course, with
respect to Iraq.
With respect to inspections, my two statements are not
inconsistent. The momentum of inspections was picking up, but
with each passing day and week, we saw that the Iraqis were not
cooperating. It is not a question of will inspections work or
not work. Will Iraq comply or not comply so that the inspectors
can do their job? The burden of coming clean is not on the
inspectors to make them come clean, but for Iraq to come clean
so the inspectors can verify. So I did not think there was
anything inconsistent in the statement.
With respect to North Korea, the ``axis of evil'' remark I
saw in the State of the Union before the President said it, as
did Deputy Secretary Armitage. We were not surprised by it. And
it was an accurate description of the activities of those three
countries.
The North Koreans responded in an expected fashion. They
did not think they should be included in such an ``axis of
evil,'' and they attacked the United States. It was all vocal.
There was no other mobilization of North Korean forces that
took place, and no start of a nuclear weapons program as a
result of that remark. They did not open Yongbyon as a result
of that remark, and they also already had underway, which was
the point I was making, efforts to produce nuclear weapons
through enriched uranium technology. And that was not caused by
the ``axis of evil'' speech or anything else the United States
has done over the past 2 years.
It was a judgment made by North Korea that they wanted to
continue to pursue nuclear weapons development, and it was a
judgment that was made back in the late 1990s, and it was not
something that was known to my predecessors or was known to us
during the first year of this administration. It came to my
attention for the first time seriously in the summer of last
year, and we acted on that information.
And no, we did not discuss the ``axis of evil'' line with
our other friends in the region. We tend not to share the State
of the Union Address before the fact. But I do not think that
that was the precipitating cause for the problem we now have
with North Korea.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, can I just for the answer to
the question, have you turned over the information that you
gave us to the inspectors?
Secretary Powell. Yes. We are turning over to the
inspectors all of the information that they can use. Now, there
are some things we have that are not related to an inspection
of a site, but with respect to sites, we have turned over
dozens of them now. I think I can say in this setting we have
turned over, our best information is close to 60 different sets
of data that are actionable by the inspectors. And we stay in
close touch with Drs. Blix and ElBaradei, Assistant Secretary
Wolf of my staff, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, is
in constant touch with Dr. Blix, and he is linked into the
intelligence community to provide whatever assistance Dr. Blix
requires.
But what we have been trying to give Dr. Blix is
information he can use, and not just information. The same
thing with Dr. ElBaradei.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ducked out of
the hearing, Mr. Secretary, because I welcomed the new
Ambassador from Serbia and Montenegro to the United States, and
also the President of their parliament, and I do not have to
remind you, but maybe the members of this committee, that
things are still not stable in that part of the world, that we
have troops stationed in Bosnia, we have them in Kosovo, and
that we need to continue to make sure that we do not lose the
momentum that we have achieved there thus far.
I would like to congratulate you on the wonderful job you
did yesterday of presenting the case before the United Nations,
regarding the fact that Iraq has materially breached U.N.
Resolution 1441. I would like to congratulate you on your
aggressive diplomacy. I think we take for granted that you were
able to get a resolution out of the Security Council 15-zip. I
do not think there is anybody at this table that thought you
were going to be able to do it, maybe few people in the world.
Yet it was accomplished.
I think it is important that you underscore what you said
in response to Senator Kerry, when you indicated that when you
asked them to sign Resolution 1441 that, you told them that it
meant that if Iraq did not do what it was supposed to do, then
you expected members of the Security Council to follow through
and make sure that the resolution was enforced. I think that is
really important for people to understand that part of the
equation.
I have a question in regard to that, and then I want to
skip over to your CEO responsibilities. We know Saddam Hussein
has violated the U.N. Security Council resolutions, but as we
assess the dangers posed by him right now, there are those who
argue that the potential destabilization of the Middle East,
and the potential of unleashing terrorism around the world,
pose a greater threat than Iraq's continued violation of U.N.
Resolution 1441.
In other words, in your opinion, what poses the greater
threat to the American people and to the rest of the world? Is
it more dangerous to go to war with Iraq, or to allow Saddam
Hussein to remain in material breach of 1441 without real
consequences? That is a question I would like to just throw
out.
I want to move to the CEO aspect of your job. The CEO part
of this, I am excited about what you are doing. I said over and
over again when Jim Schlesinger testified before my committee 2
years ago--I had the oversight of government management, and
now the Federal work force. He said that unless we fix the
personnel problem, we will be unable to repair everything else
that is wrong with the U.S. security edifice, and I believe the
fact that you are hiring the people, that you are improving the
technology, that you are fixing up these embassies, I think is
very, very important in terms of our future.
I would like to know, do you believe that you have the
flexibilities now to get the job done in terms of moving
forward with your human capital challenges, and are you in the
position to solve a very big problem in the State Department
today, and that is compression in the Senior Executive Service,
where 75 percent of the people get the same pay? I have talked
to one ambassador after another. Of 15 people they have
working, five are terrific, five are OK, five are not doing the
job. They all get paid the same amount of money, and I would
like you to comment on that, as to whether or not you think you
are in a position to really get this work force going, keep
them on board, and attract new people.
Secretary Powell. On your first point, Senator, I think we
have to deal with Iraq. I do not think we can simply turn away
because we are afraid that if military action is required, it
would cause some other problems with respect to terrorism. That
certainly is a possibility. We are talking to all of our
friends in the region who might be subject to that kind of
disturbance within their countries, making sure that they
understand the threat and the consequences, and are they in a
position to manage it. And I think that is a manageable,
controllable problem.
I also think it may be well a transient problem, because I
think we look at the terrible consequences that can come from
conflict without often looking at what will happen when success
is achieved, when we win this and when the Iraqi people are
liberated, and when it is no longer necessary to have that many
U.S. forces staged in the region, and we do not have to worry
about weapons of mass destruction floating out of Iraq, and
when we have a different kind of Iraq, and when the wealth of
Iraq, the oil of Iraq is being used for constructive purposes
and not for destructive purposes.
So even though there may be some difficulties in the days
of a conflict, or even in the months after a conflict, I think
there is also the possibility that success could fundamentally
reshape that region in a powerful, positive way that will
enhance U.S. interests, especially if, in the aftermath of such
conflict, we are also able to achieve progress on the Middle
East peace, so that is my answer for that one. We cannot say we
are not going to do anything because it will cause us some
other problems in the region. This is a problem. It is not just
1441 as a resolution. It is Saddam Hussein as a threat to the
region.
With respect to your question on personnel, thank you for
your support, Senator, for what we are trying to do. Yes,
compression is a problem. I saw the same problem when I was in
the military, and the President has proposed some new programs
in the budget to deal with how we provide incentive pay for
those individuals who are really doing the job, and I look
forward to working with OMB and the President and other members
of the staff as we determine how best to solve this problem.
We need a strong flow of young people coming up in the
Foreign Service, and that is what the personnel action that I
am taking, and the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is all
about. And yes, I probably can use new authorities with respect
to how long people stay within the service, either Civil or
Foreign Service, before a judgment being made that they have
served nobly and well, but now it is time to retire.
We do not have the up-and-out situation for all the
employees in the State Department that I saw at work in the
military, and I am a great believer that you have to let the
top leave at some point in order to allow the ``young Turks''
to come on up, and that is the way we did it in the military.
They put me out--yes, they did--at about age 56.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Senator Voinovich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator George V. Voinovich
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I would like to join my colleagues in thanking you
for taking the time to appear before the committee this morning. This
is without a doubt a challenging time for our country, as we continue
our efforts to confront the threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his
relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in tandem with the
ongoing campaign to address the dangers of international terrorism.
Your active engagement with our friends and allies abroad, most
recently demonstrated in your remarks before the U.N. Security Council
yesterday in New York, is a crucial component of our nation's foreign
policy, and we remain grateful to you for your continued service to our
President and to the American people.
As we had the opportunity to discuss in Prague last November, I
remain very interested in a number of issues affecting our national
security agenda. These include not only developments in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but the issue of NATO enlargement, the state of affairs in
the countries of southeast Europe, and the problems of organized crime
and corruption abroad. I am also deeply troubled with the rise in anti-
Semitic violence in Europe and the Middle East, and I am hopeful to
work with you during the coming months to address this growing problem.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to submit a number
of questions for the record and request that they be answered in
written form at a later time.
Again, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for sharing your time with us
today. I look forward to your testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary,
there is the political will in the Congress to do something
about the African famine relief. We passed a couple of weeks
ago $500 million extra to do that, and it is an item, as we
speak, in conference committee. I would encourage you to speak
to those in the budgetary realm not to oppose it in conference.
If they do not, we will get it passed in conference.
Secretary Powell. Senator, I assure you I will take that
very powerful message back to those in the budget world.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Secretary Powell. This gives me a chance to talk about
another crisis. HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases is one, but
hunger and starvation is another one, and it is extremely
serious in parts of Africa, southern Africa and the Horn of
Africa, and other parts of the world. Not enough nations are
contributing money.
The United States is still the biggest contributor. Other
nations are not, frankly, doing as much as they could, and the
need is greater than ever, and the supply of food, the stocks
of food worldwide are not as great as they have been in the
past. The surpluses are not there, so all of these elements
come together to create a crisis. And it is a crisis that then
flows into HIV/AIDS for people that do not have the stamina,
the strength to resist these infectious diseases.
Senator Nelson. Thank you for those comments.
Every time I have seen you, I sound like a broken record,
and I will not break my past record. Scott Speicher. As we go
into this, we have got to keep him in mind. We tried to get the
Kuwaitis to raise the issue of Commander Speicher in their
bilateral talks with the Iraqis on POWs. They demurred, because
they wanted that to be in the overall committee instead of a
subcommittee, so I raise that prospect of our American flyer
over there possibly alive.
Secretary Powell. Scott Speicher is never out of my
thoughts. He was lost in a conflict that I supervised as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is a personal matter
as well as a professional one.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, in what was referred earlier in
this London Guardian article today in which North Korea's
Foreign Ministry is quoted as saying, ``preemptive attacks are
not the exclusive right of the U.S.,'' and they are actually
quoted in here, a Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry,
saying that they ``would consider a preemptive attack.''
Can you clarify for our committee what is the
administration's policy on preemption? There was quite a debate
on this earlier in the summer. I wish you would clarify that
for us.
Secretary Powell. In the President's National Security
Strategy, he spent a great deal of time in that document
talking about alliances, talking about economic development,
talking about the spread of democracy, and all sorts of issues
that cover the gamut of our foreign policy activity, our
defense policy, our national security policy.
There were two pieces in that document that got more
attention than anything else. One was the subject of
preemption. It was about a paragraph-and-a-half in one of the
chapters that said, preemption is an option. Preemption is
always an option. It is always a tool, a tactic, something one
could do to preempt something that was coming your way, that
you could see clearly coming your way.
In the post 9/11 environment, it seemed appropriate to
highlight that and to perhaps elevate it in priority with
respect to options available to you now that we saw terrorists
coming at us, so why would one not preempt a terrorist coming
our way, and raise for the consideration of policymakers, and
for the rest of the world to take a look at, our willingness to
go after somebody who was coming at us?
Preemption in my judgment, and we could get into a think
tank setting and argue this all day long, but preemption in my
judgment is not a strategy, it is one of the tools available to
a President as part of a toolbox full of tools.
The other thing that got all of the attention in the
President's National Security Strategy document was something
that was in--I think it was in the last chapter dealing with
the military and it said, it is the policy of the United States
to always make sure that we are stronger than anybody else.
Many people read into that something imperialistic or
unfortunate, but it seems to me it makes good, common sense.
I think we have always tried to be stronger than anyone
else who might threaten us for two reasons: first, to make sure
that if it ever came to conflict, we would be stronger, and
second to persuade anyone coming along that you really cannot
match us, and therefore do not try.
The Soviet Union tried for 40 years, until they went broke.
We can afford it, you cannot, and you cannot get an advantage
on us, so you really should not try. We do not have any hostile
intent with anyone who wants to be our friend, and so, what you
really ought to do is engage us in a partnership that will
benefit both of us, and do not try to challenge us militarily,
because you will come in second.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is kind of fascinating as I sit here and listen to your
testimony, Mr. Secretary, you talk about the U.S. leadership in
dealing with the quartet, and U.S. leadership in getting the
United Nations to uphold and then to enforce its many, many
resolutions regarding Iraq, the U.S. leadership on AIDS, the
U.S. leadership in dealing with world hunger, clearly the
responsibility of representing the greatest Nation in the
world, and I just want you to know you do a tremendous job
representing this country and our President.
Three comments, one question. First, I join my colleagues
in applauding your very compelling presentation before the
United Nations, and am very appreciative of the effort to build
a broad, multilateral international effort. It seems to me that
there is very little dispute amongst us Saddam Hussein is a
threat, he is in material breach, he needs to be dealt with,
and clearly, building this support effort is something that we
all support.
Second, in regard to North Korea--I am not the Secretary of
State. I can say this--North Korea reminds me of a spoiled
brat. They have knocked their food and their plate off the high
chair, and they are looking for undivided attention, and I do
hope, as we talk about multilateral approaches, and you said it
today you fully support it, there are others in that region who
have a real stake in making sure that that child, that spoiled
brat--I do not have one myself, by the way, but I have seen
others--that they are dealt with with them at the table,
Russia, South Korea, Japan, China, and so I support those
efforts.
A third comment, thank you, and I thank the President for
his bold move in dealing with the AIDS issue, very, very, very
important, very supportive, I think $1 billion increase this
year and $10 billion over 5 years.
Also, you made mention of the Millennium Challenge Account.
I believe that this President is seeking for the first time to
fund that account, important, and I think it adds to in
addition to the other dollars that we are providing, we should
not discount the impact that that effort is having.
A fourth issue, and actually the question, shifting focus a
little bit, drugs. In this country, we are seeing, I think, its
ugly head being raised again. For a while, I think we had a
sense that we were making headway, and that we were putting
this grave threat to our kids and to our national security,
that we were kind of putting a cap on it, and I sense, as a
former prosecutor and former mayor, that it is kind of raising
its ugly head again.
I know there is a substantial commitment, I believe $731
million for the Andean counterdrug initiatives, including $463
million to Colombia. My question is this. As we look at the
issue of dealing with Colombia, my fear is it is kind of like
squeezing a balloon, that if you squeeze it in one place, it
pops out in another place.
Can you talk to me a little bit of the regional
perspective, of how do we deal with this threat of drugs coming
from this area, and understanding, by the way, we have an
obligation at home to deal with the demand side. I understand
that, but can you talk to me a little bit about, are we
focusing perhaps in one area and not giving as much attention
to the others, or do we have a broad regional approach to what
is a growing threat to this country?
Secretary Powell. I think it is a broad regional approach.
We recognize the balloon phenomenon that you mentioned, and
therefore we are working on all sides of that balloon, or all
parts of that balloon, hopefully and ultimately to bust the
balloon, puncture it. So we are working with Colombia, where we
think the major problem is right now.
There has been an increase in crop eradication, and we are
glad to see that that is now getting into high gear. I hope in
the very near future the aerial denial program will be back in
operation. We have seen some statistics recently reported by
the office responsible for this, in drug control and
prevention, that some of these statistics with respect to the
use of drugs on the part of our young people is starting to go
in the right direction. Kids are starting to get smart, and as
you know, Senator, that is where we have to solve the problem.
And so I think it is a broad approach, not just Colombia
but the other nations as well, and that is why we shifted it
from being just Colombia to the Andean Drug Initiative.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coleman.
Senator Corzine.
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As the last
Senator in the gauntlet here, let me, like everyone on the
committee and across America, thank you for your leadership and
also for the professionals in the Department that carry out
this effort with regard to diplomacy day in and day out. It was
a compelling presentation yesterday to those of us who had some
skepticism.
There is a behavioral breach that I think is clearly
presented, but I think it is equally true that not only the
presentation was compelling, the advocate was compelling
because there has been a commitment to diplomacy, there has
been a commitment to prudence, and a commitment to multilateral
approaches that preceded that, which I think is essential in
our foreign policy efforts, so I congratulate you and all of
those who are committed to that approach.
You know, we have heard Inspector Blix say we are at 5
minutes to midnight. I guess my question is, is there a
practical nonviolent solution still possible? We hear talk
about exile or--but I guess I would like to explore what are
the consequences of the admission of a smoking gun, an
admission? Is there a way to move if that were an action taken
by the Iraqi regime now that seems to be in conflict in a lot
of people's minds if one were to admit that would bring on the
severe consequences potentially as well?
The second question, and this one is based on certainly my
own frustration, but I hear it among my colleagues as well.
Often, when we are considering these incredible issues of
putting men and women into harm's way, we are making decisions
without full information. Sometimes it feels like selective
information. I will give you a particular case in point. This
whole North Korean issue was in the system before we took a
vote here in the Congress. It is troubling to me that we make
decisions without full disclosure of important and relevant
information.
My question, are there other risks of weapons of mass
destruction being produced potentially in the hands of those
who would distribute them in the world? Are we thinking about
this in as comprehensive an approach as we should be?
And third, this is actually less important than the others,
although I think it is very important to address, what are the
risks of some of the conversation we see in the press that we
talk with regard to tactical and boutique nuclear weapons being
used with respect to incenting other bad actors in the world to
be protective of maybe bad interests, but accelerating those
interests as we go forward?
Secretary Powell. I just cannot put a likelihood or
handicap on whether he would go into exile or not.
Senator Corzine. Excuse me?
Secretary Powell. Exile. You touched on exile for Saddam
Hussein. I just cannot say what the likelihood is of that or
not. It is bandied about, but I have seen nothing to suggest
that he has started to pack his bags.
Second, with respect to where would we be if he admitted,
and he showed us all the smoking guns, that would certainly be
a major change, and something we would have to take a look at
and see if it is serious, and see whether it reflected just a
tactical move on his part or was a fundamental change in the
nature of that regime and the nature of its strategy. I think
the President, as well as the other heads of state and
government and the Security Council would then have to consult
as to whether or not this was a solution, or whether it was
just another diversion. But I would not bet on that happening
either in the next week or so.
With respect to North Korea, I have heard the suggestion
that perhaps the administration was withholding information
about what we knew until after the vote on the joint
resolution. I can just assure you, Senator, that was not the
case. We got the information. I kept pressing to make sure the
information was accurate.
I knew the seriousness of the information, and throughout
the late summer, we kept pulsing the intelligence community to
make sure we had it right. Then we started to conduct briefings
of our friends and allies, and then we slowly started to spread
the information out. Even then, we were trying not to
precipitate a crisis in the region, and we wanted to approach
the North Koreans in a way that said to them, ``look, we have
begun a dialog again,''--my dialog with the Foreign Minister in
Brunei, and then we sent Assistant Secretary Kelly to North
Korea in October.
And Kelly was prepared to give them a bold approach with
respect to cooperation in economic development and other
matters; how we could help them support what the Japanese
wanted to do with normalization, to support even more the
sunshine policy of the South Koreans. But we could not do that
unless they were ready to stop their proliferating activity and
their nuclear weapons development activity which we knew at
that time had shifted over to uranium enrichment, and to our
surprise, rather than deny it and say, ``let us talk more,''
they said, ``we did it, what are you going to do about it?''
Senator Corzine. I thought that happened 10 days----
Secretary Powell. It happened about 10 days before it
became public knowledge, and we were still reflecting on the
implications of what they said to us and what we should do
about it. And it was not being hidden for the purposes of
influencing a vote. And I am not sure it would have been
relevant to influence the vote in any event. But there was
never a conversation that said, ``let us hold this until the
vote is over.''
The conversations were, how do we deal with this
information, how do we deal with this new situation, and how do
we present it to the Congress in a way that makes sense and is
consistent with our other concerns about our friends in the
region. But it was not held. And when it finally became public
before we had finished all of our deliberations, I can just
assure you there was no consideration of it being held, or not
being made public, or to trying to keep it from being leaked
until after the vote on the joint resolution.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.
Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I think as we speak here, there is a press
conference taking place in Baghdad, where the government
spokesman is commenting on your presentation. Now, I am
obviously not listening to it, but my guess is the presentation
will suggest that the evidence you presented yesterday,
photographs, intercepts, satellite surveillance, videotape, was
not really evidence, and that they welcome back Mr. Blix with
open arms and with a renewed sense of cooperation.
My question is, are you looking for a particular verbal
response, or set of commitments from Iraq right now, or does it
just come down to actions?
Secretary Powell. Actions, really. They dismissed my
presentation before I gave it. The day before yesterday they
said, ``we know what Powell will come up with. It will be phony
satellite pictures and doctored transcripts and all sorts of
other things.'' So they dismissed it before they saw it. It is
predictable. It is what they always do. It is their pattern of
behavior.
And even after my presentation yesterday and, frankly,
while I was giving it, I could look out of the corner of my
right eye and see the Iraqi delegation scribbling away to
modify the remarks that their Permanent Representative would
use. And of course, he instantly attacked every single element
of the presentation, and it was all fabrication, it was all
lies. And I think at one point he said, ``and even third-rate
intelligence agencies can doctor transcripts to make it sound
like what has been put up on the screen.''
Well, guess what, we are not a third-rate intelligence
agency. We did not have to doctor anything. There was nothing
doctored in those tapes, or in anything else we presented
yesterday. They will try to distract attention. They will try
to deceive. They will try to trap us in rhetoric. They will try
to pretend that there is nothing going on, and that it is all
phony when what they ought to do is when Drs. Blix and
ElBaradei, Hans and Mohammad show up there on the weekend, they
ought to come clean.
Senator Sununu. The Iraqi response aside, could you talk a
little bit more about the response after your presentation with
the other Security Council members? I know you suggested it was
a positive reaction, that you think there was even some
movement. How many of the other members of the Security Council
or the government representatives were you able to speak with,
at least in an informal way, and any other specifics about
those discussions that would be helpful, that you might share
with the committee?
Secretary Powell. I had one-to-one conversations, or
delegation-to-delegation conversations with 13 of the 15
members. The United Kingdom had to leave right way, and I did
not need a conversation with Jack Straw, and I did not need a
conversation with myself, but all of the other 13 I spoke to
directly.
I have to leave it to them, if I may, Senator, to comment
on their position, and I have to give them the opportunity to
go back to their capitals and talk to their head of state or
government and have their own deliberations before I
prematurely say what I think they might do in the future.
Senator Sununu. I have a number of other topics I want to
touch on briefly, and I will try to be very short in my
questions.
First, in the conversation about the Mideast peace process,
earlier, you talked about the need for more in the way of
advancement and reforms from the Palestinian Authority. You
talked about optimism in response to what was happening in the
Finance Ministry, I believe. Are there one or two other
specific priorities you would like to see in addition, or what
issues would you highlight most?
Secretary Powell. The one I would highlight is security. We
need to see a lot more on security, and that has been the
weakest link, and until we can put in place a security
apparatus that is competent, that is professional, and that the
Israelis find competent and professional and have enough
confidence that they can work with them, then we really will
not see the kind of transformation that I think is necessary.
The other thing that I would highlight is political
transformation. We made it clear we need new leaders to emerge.
And I would frankly like to see a Prime Minister emerge who has
some independent authority of his own.
Senator Sununu. I want to touch on the issue of security
more broadly now with regard to embassies, embassy
construction. I was able to have a discussion with some of your
team looking at the embassy and security construction needs
around the world late last year. I do not want to dwell on the
negative. I think there has been a lot of positive, so forgive
me for phrasing the question this way, but what setbacks have
there been? Have there been any unexpected problems or setbacks
with construction, and is there anything that the committee can
do to try to alleviate those logjams?
Secretary Powell. I am not aware of any particular setback,
or particular embassy that is having a problem. But I will
check with General Williams to see if there is anything that I
should bring to your attention. I am very pleased at the
progress we have made, and we are trying to use the $1.5
billion a year you give us in the most efficient manner
possible.
I am sure that there may be one facility or another that is
having a little difficulty, but we have been able to bang
through all of the problems that we had encountered over the
last 2 years, but I will check with General Williams if there
is anything I should be highlighting.
Senator Sununu. I would appreciate that. I think it is an
important program. I know you value the program, but it is
also, I think, a fair statement that Congress does not like
surprises, so any problems or setbacks that are occurring, the
earlier those problems can be raised, the better.
My last question deals with assistance to the former Soviet
Republics. They are cooperating to a large degree in the war on
terrorism. I had the chance to visit Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,
and I know there is some additional assistance, I think a 50
percent increase in assistance to those countries.
I know it is not easy, it is a subjective decision, but I
would like you to talk a little bit about how you tradeoff the
assistance, perhaps, in response to their cooperation in the
war on terrorism with concerns that I think everyone on the
committee shares about the lack of progress in a number of
those former Soviet Republics on political reforms and economic
reforms and human rights.
Secretary Powell. We do not tradeoff. I meet with them on a
regular basis, their Prime Ministers and Presidents and Foreign
Ministers who come here, and during my visits there, and I
welcome their support in the global war against terrorism, but
in the very same breath, or the next breath, I make it clear to
them that we are still expecting to see political reform,
transparency in their system, the end of corruption,
representative government, free media.
All of the same standards are in place, and frankly,
because they are working with us in the global war against
terrorism, and we have created a new relationships with them,
it gives us, I believe, more leverage to press them on these
issues.
We do not set aside human rights. We do not set aside any
of the other items you talked about.
Senator Sununu. Will the incentives of the Millennium
Challenge Account be used to encourage reform in any of these
countries, or is the account really reserved to developing
nations in Africa or other parts of the world?
Secretary Powell. We think the first priority with respect
to the MCA will be in Africa and parts of our own hemisphere.
That does not mean that they are not possible candidates, but
they have got to have the basic requirements in place that we
have spoken about: a commitment to democracy; transparency; the
end of corruption; a rule of law; and all of the things that
the President intends for the Millennium Challenge Account.
There are other forms of foreign assistance and military
assistance that we can use with those countries. Even then, we
think some basic standards have to be met. It is not like the
days of the cold war, when, because of superpower conflict and
the need for a particular country to be on our side and not the
Soviet side. We were willing to overlook things that, frankly,
we should not have overlooked.
Senator Sununu. Have any of the proposed MCA funds been
allocated, $1.3 billion? Have any of them been allocated in
other countries spoken about by Senator Feingold, Mozambique,
Kenya, Somalia? Are they eligible for the funds through MCA, if
there are appropriate reforms?
Secretary Powell. Good question. We are still putting in
place the criteria for MCA grants, or funding, and no country
has yet been selected.
Senator Sununu. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu.
Mr. Secretary, yesterday you mentioned seeing 13 members of
the Security Council one-on-one. Today, you have met 15
Senators one-on-one, and you have been complete in your
responses.
Secretary Powell. Do not ask me which was easier, please.
The Chairman Let me ask that the record remain open until
the close of business Friday for additional questions, and I
would request of you, Secretary Powell, that you respond to
those questions that might be asked by members who could not
attend, or those who have thought of other questions even in
the course of this dialog. We thank you very much.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, can I just, before he leaves,
we should note, by the way, the presence of your staff behind
you, by the way. You do a great job. You are wonderful people,
and we have worked with many of these people over the years,
and I would not want the hearing to end without expressing our
gratitude for the people who do not testify here, but work
every single day to communicate with those of us up here. We
are very grateful.
Secretary Powell. Thank you. I am very proud of them. Thank
you, Senator Dodd.
The Chairman. Thank you. The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
OVERALL SPENDING
Question 1. We are now spending for diplomacy less than 8 cents for
every dollar we are spending on defense. Mr. Secretary, you have been a
soldier and a diplomat. Would you say that ratio is about right?
Answer. I don't think it's appropriate to compare international
affairs funding with defense funding, or international affairs with
Social Security or any other function. I know it can stand on its own
merit.
Question 2. Do you think the foreign affairs budget adequately
reflects the times? The embassy bombings in August 1998, the September
11 attacks, and the war on terrorism all have budget implications for
the Department. The security of Americans working in all our embassies
must be a top priority. Also, every embassy, especially those in
frontline states, now has a new mission to fulfill in the war on
terrorism. We also have growing anti-Americanism abroad, especially in
the Islamic communities across the world. But the overall budget hasn't
changed much, especially if you subtract the MCA funding. What are we
shortchanging in order to perform the important new missions of this
century?
Answer. Only about one percent of our federal budget is allocated
to international affairs. I would like to see us allocate a lot more,
because the needs around the world are great.
I'm pleased that President Bush has been able to increase
international affairs funding every year that he has submitted a
budget. He has taken a dramatic step with the Millennium Challenge
Account, which represents a 50 percent increase in our development
assistance. His HIV/AIDS Global Initiative is another significant
increase.
Yet I recognize that the President has to shape his budget in
accordance with a large number of priorities and with the resources
available, and the Congress has to do the same. I support the
President's request and hope that you will fully fund it.
Question 3. Will you be seeking additional funds in a supplemental
in FY 2003?
Answer. Yes. If a peaceful solution through diplomatic efforts is
not attainable and conflict is necessary, there will be a need for
supplemental funds--not only for the State Department, but for many
other departments as well.
WAR ON TERRORISM
Question 1. It has been 17 months since September 11th and the
Department has had a great deal of experience now as the coordinator of
our civilian counterterrorism effort overseas. Can you tell us how the
effort is proceeding? What obstacles have you run up against? How have
those obstacles been overcome?
Answer. Since September 11, our civilian counterterrorism effort
continues to build and sustain coalition commitment, cooperation and
capacity to support the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, the terrorism
threat continues at a high level, reflected in attacks from Bali to
Tunisia to Mombassa, and oil tankers off the coast of Yemen.
Notwithstanding, our extensive counterterrorism efforts in all regions
are producing encouraging results.
Al-Qaida has been expelled from Afghanistan and its terrorist
training infrastructure there destroyed. More than one-third of al-
Qaida's top leadership has been killed or captured, including some who
conspired in the 9/11 attacks, the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, and the
1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in East Africa.
The remnants of Al-Qaida and its allies however remain a threat.
Other terrorist organizations, such as the FARC, ETA, the real IRA and
many Palestinian rejectionist groups, also threaten our citizens, our
interests, and our allies around the world. As terrorist cells become
more diffuse, often operating independently and with tight secrecy, we
still face major challenges in obtaining timely intelligence. Libya,
Sudan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba and Syria are still state sponsors
of terrorism. Some countries have been slow to direct their resources
to detecting and preventing terrorist attacks. And many countries that
have the will to counter terrorism do not have the necessary resources
and capacity. Our diplomacy and programs aim to change these
conditions.
Our diplomacy and programs put a major focus on countering
terrorism finances. An important tool is our designation of Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTO's) Currently, 36 groups are designated.
FTO designation carries several legal consequences including criminal
penalties for American persons who knowingly provide material support
or resources to designated FTO's. Meanwhile, more than 250 terrorist
individuals and entities already have been designated under Executive
Order 13324 on terrorist financing. We work closely with The Financial
Action Task Force (FATF)--a 31-nation group promoting policies to
combat money laundering--to deny terrorists access to the world
financial system. And we provide training assistance to individual
countries to help them strengthen their ability to curb terrorist money
flows.
We also are trying to overcome resource shortages and other
obstacles within the U.S. government. Steps are being taken to better
share intelligence information with the FBI, CIA and other agencies.
State is playing a role in the creation of the Terrorist Threat
Intelligence Center (TTIC). At the same time, there also are budget and
resource issues. Delays in enacting the appropriations bills have
complicated implementation of some of our counterterrorism programs.
Quickly responding to unexpected developments, such as the requirement
to provide protective details for the President of Afghanistan,
requires moving funds from other security-related needs. Cuts in the
Department's budgets over the years have pinched not only programs but
the efforts to adequately staff embassies and bureaus to counter the
terrorism threat. We want to work closely with Congress to alleviate
these types of difficulties.
Question 2. In Pakistan, after September 11, some 3,000 U.S.
officials on temporary duty (TDY) descended on the embassy to help
track down Al-Qaeda terrorists. They included State's own diplomatic
security personnel, FBI officers, special forces and intelligence
agents. Embassy staff was reportedly stretched thin with only 4
political officers and 2 economic officers to support the influx. What
is the Department's current ability to provide ``surge capacity'' in
times of need? Would it be useful for the Department to develop mobile
sections in such areas as communications, consular activities and
administrative and political support?
Answer. Our Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) was designed to
provide us adequate personnel to respond to crises and emerging
priorities. We do currently maintain ``surge'' teams for security,
consular, administrative/management, and terrorism response assistance.
Typically, we provide additional capacity to the Embassy's political or
other sections by pulling experienced people from other places and
applying them to that priority situation. Because we had underhired
compared with our expanding mission in the 1990s, those responding to a
crisis usually left important work unattended. With full implementation
of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative in FY2004, we will have built a
stronger capacity to respond to these events and will be on our way to
planning for crises rather than just responding to them.
Question 3. What other kinds of strains has the enhanced counter
terrorism mission placed on embassy resources and personnel? Do you
believe that the embassies have been provided resources adequate to the
task? What would be necessary to do a better job?
Answer. The counter terrorism mission of the Department is growing
and is another example of the increasingly complex and challenging
international environment in which we operate. As our mission grows we
will continue to assess what is needed to meet it and will request
resources needed to meet them. Because the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative (DRI) was conceived of in 2001, we have found it necessary
to revise our implementation plans in the wake of September 11 so that
we can meet new priorities. For example, we have experienced falling
revenues from Machine Readable Visa fees and therefore had to provide
for the increased consular workload requirement out of our DRI funded
positions. We have also had to staff Embassy Kabul.
Question 4. Have you been able to develop an institutional sense of
``lessons learned?'' In other words, have there been successes in, for
example, the law enforcement to law enforcement area in one country
that can be replicated using similar techniques in another country?
Answer. We have been promoting the sharing of experiences and
``lessons learned'' through a variety of fora. For example, working
with other countries in the G-8, we helped develop a compilation of
best practices in dealing with counter terrorism issues. These included
both general and specific recommendations, including a discussion of
successful practices for dealing with hostage taking and weapons of
mass destruction. We shared the final document, An Inventory of G8
Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime Best Practices, December
2002, with the United Nations Counterterrorism Committee, the lead
institution for helping countries implement UNSCR 1373.
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) has
hosted regional conferences in which countries shared their experiences
fighting terrorism. For example, last year we brought together Pacific
Basin countries in Honolulu and Central Asian countries in Ankara.
In the Western Hemisphere, as the U.S. Chair of the OAS Inter-
American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), S/CT worked with the U.S.
Mission to the OAS and other USG agencies to launch this organization
as the Hemispheric focal point for promoting and coordinating CT
information sharing, capacity building and technical assistance,
especially in the areas of border security and anti-terrorist finance
regimes. The CICTE 2003 work plan calls for regular dissemination of
``lessons learned'' to all member states. The organization will be
featured as a model for other regional organizations to consider at a
Special Meeting on March 6 of the U.N. Committee on Counterterrorism
(CTC).
We have held seminars for 36 countries, organized on a regional
basis, to help other countries strengthen their counterterrorism
legislation. The seminars included not only discussions of CT law, but
also case studies of key investigations with the intention of sharing
law enforcement techniques. Participating countries and outside
speakers from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany also
shared useful experiences from their legal and law enforcement
perspectives.
On a bilateral level, we annually hold a series of meetings with
individual countries, including India and Russia as well as other
partners such as the U.K. and Canada in which we share CT experiences.
We also provide training through interagency teams to share techniques
for countering terrorism financing. Our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
programs share our experiences and knowledge with law enforcement
officials of other countries.
Question 5. Are there unique characteristics to working on
counterterrorism issues in Islamic countries? How do we get our law
enforcement and financial experts trained so that they can be effective
in an Islamic culture?
Answer. Like all foreign cultures, Islamic countries present unique
and varied operational challenges to American officials. In all foreign
countries, not solely in the Islamic world, we must continue to provide
our diplomats and overseas law enforcement and financial officials with
necessary language and cross-cultural skills to effectively navigate in
these foreign environments. Further, we must continue to develop the
skills particular to area experts who understand the governmental,
financial and security systems of Islamic counties.
The National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATCE) plays a major
role in Counterterrorism training, and the Bureaus of Near Eastern
Affairs (NEA), Consular Affairs (CA), Diplomatic Security (DS) and the
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) are all
contributing to its efforts.
Question 6. Who is providing the translation for this effort
[counter terrorism] when it is necessary? Is it the Foreign Service
officers or do we hire local translators? Do you think that more local
language proficiency among Foreign Service officers would help our
anti-terrorism effort overseas? What is being done to enhance
recruitment of language-capable officers?
Answer. The Department strives to ensure that employees have the
language skills needed to do their jobs. We consider language a
critical skill and assess overseas positions yearly to determine which
should require language skills. Employees who are assigned to those
positions must have or be able to acquire that language skill level
before going to post. While some waivers are given, in FY2002 in 88
percent of the language designated positions which were filled, we were
able to assign a language qualified person.
Strong language skills are an important element in enabling our
diplomats to deal effectively with important issue such as counter-
terrorism. While we do not require language skills for employment, we
have an active foreign language recruitment program to identify and
recruit Americans with existing foreign language skills. We rely on
training employees in languages as they are needed in order to be able
to flexibly respond to changing needs. The new hiring due to the
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is ensuring that all new employees
receive more language training before they assume their first overseas
assignments.
Question 7. Each embassy is in a unique situation in its role on
terrorism. How would you react to a request to the GAO for a report on
ten countries on the frontline. We would ask that the report outline
the tools they have available to them, including economic and
development assistance, and their effort in coordinating
counterterrorism and facility security. We would want to know whether
the ambassador feels he/she has the resources necessary to do the right
job.
Answer. I recognize the useful role that the GAO can play for
Congress and have no objections to such a study. We would hope, of
course, that the teams do not divert too much time from each embassy's
ongoing activities. We would like to coordinate in advance to ensure
that whichever countries are selected can indeed host the GAO team,
based on their current security posture and position. One way for GAO
to streamline the study might be through the use of a questionnaire
provided to selected posts.
NONPROLIFERATION AND ANTI-TERRORISM (NADR) FUNDING
Question 1. Is the 14% increase in funding for the International
Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection sufficient? If you had gotten
an extra $30 or $40 million, rather than only $7 million, could that
money have been used on valuable projects?
Answer. In the context of overall budget priorities, the Department
of State's FY 2004 request for $59 million for the Science Centers in
Moscow and Kiev and the Bio-Chem Redirection program is adequate.
Moreover, these programs are part of a broad, coordinated interagency
effort to prevent proliferation of WMD expertise, including the
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)/BW
Proliferation Prevention program and the Department of Energy Russian
Transition Initiatives. This year, and in the future, the Science
Centers and Bio/Chem Redirection Program will increase its emphasis on
moving more scientists into self-supporting civilian commercial
endeavors by creating more opportunities for them to develop and
compete for other sources of public and private funding. But this
increased emphasis on redirection, while at the same time continuing
our outreach to former weapon scientists and institutes, will require
sustained financial support of the Science Centers and Bio-Chem
Redirection programs in the near term.
Question 2. Has State developed a strategy to guide scientists into
commercially viable pursuits so that some can ``graduate,'' freeing up
funding for others?
Answer. The Department of State is currently in the second phase of
a strategy designed to permanently redirect former WMD scientists into
sustainable civilian pursuits.
Under the first phase, the objective was to identify and engage
former WMD scientists and engineers through the International Science
and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, the Science and Technology
Center in Ukraine (STCU), and the Bio Redirection programs carried out
by the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, and
the Environmental Protection Agency. This first phase successfully
engaged tens of thousands of scientists and engineers in civilian
projects. The Bio/Chem Redirection Program was developed to focus time-
urgent engagement and redirection efforts through the Science Centers
on former BW scientists and institutes that have been of particularly
high proliferation concern, as well as an expanded focus former
chemical weapon scientists and institutes.
The second phase, which began in 2002, aims at accelerating the
transition of former WMD scientists and institutes to peaceful
endeavors, including civilian research and commercially viable private
sector enterprises. Several steps are being taken to meet this goal,
including reorganizing and refocusing the ISTC and STCU to improve
their programmatic ability to redirect scientists and institutes, and
assisting biological and chemical weapon scientists to develop feasible
avenues toward self-sustainability plans through the Bio-Chem
Redirection program and the BioIndustry Initiative. The BioIndustry
Initiative, started in FY 2002 at the direction of Congress with a one-
time $30 million transfer from the Department of Defense/Cooperative
Threat Reduction appropriations, has been developing models for
graduating selected BW scientists and bioproduction facilities into
more economically viable and self-supporting entities, such as
accelerated drug and vaccine production. These initiatives will
leverage work being done by other USG nonproliferation/threat reduction
programs, as well as with other bilateral and multilateral economic and
technical assistance efforts.
Question 3. This request zeroes out funding for KEDO, including
administrative funding. If there were to be an agreement with North
Korea, however, isn't it likely that the KEDO mechanism would be used
again? Why is there not at least the administrative funding for KEDO in
this budget, as there is in the omnibus FY 2003 appropriation? Are
there any funds in the FY 2004 budget to cover the costs that might
accrue in some ``better than the Agreed Framework'' settlement with
North Korea?
Answer. Congress appropriated up to $5 million for KEDO in FY03,
provided the President determine that such a contribution is vital to
the national security interests of the U.S. Preserving our ability to
contribute to KEDO provides us flexibility to work with our allies to
achieve our shared non-proliferation goals. The U.S. is consulting with
the other members of KEDO's Executive Board (South Korea, Japan, and
the EU) about the future of the organization, including the future of
the light water reactor project. We are not prejudging any decisions in
this regard. We will keep in close touch with Congress as we proceed.
We do not know now what role, if any, KEDO will play next year, so
the Administration did not request FY04 funding for KEDO. If we find it
is in our interest to fund KEDO's administrative or other costs, we
will request as necessary. We are working closely with our KEDO
partners and continuing to consult on KEDO's future activities and
financial commitments.
Question 4. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) seems to be on a
funding roller coaster. Actual FY 2002 expenditures were $158 million;
the FY 2003 request was only $64 million; and the FY 2004 request is
for $106 million. Is there an explanation for the fluctuations? What
spending level are you aiming for over time, and when will we get
there?
Answer. The ATA program's FY 2003 request for $64 million was
submitted prior to September 11, 2001. The $158 million received in FY
2002 included the baseline FY 2002 budget and two supplemental
allocations provided after September 11. The State Department, knowing
the FY 2002 and FY 2003 baseline budgets would not cover post-9/11
needs, included requests in both supplementals to meet expected ATA
growth through FY 2003.
The FY 2004 request is the Department's best estimate of what ATA
will need to sustain its expanded activities and meet its capacity-
building mandate. Assuming no significant counterterrorism crises, and
without an increase in human and other capital resources for ATA, the
Department anticipates ATA will operate in the $100-150 million range
per annum over the next few years.
Question. 5. There is a lot of talk about doing more to guard
against radiological terrorism, and the IAEA will play a major role in
that effort. The Security Assistance Act enacted last year calls for an
effort to increase the regular IAEA budget, in part for this purpose,
and the Administration supported that provision. But the U.S. voluntary
contribution to the IAEA in the NADR account holds steady at $50
million, and the request for our regular budget contribution actually
goes down from $57 million this year to $54 million in FY 2004. Is the
United States failing to put its money where our mouth is? Do we expect
the value of the dollar to rise sharply, thus decreasing the cost or
our budget assessments? Is significant extra IAEA funding contained in
the Department of Energy budget?
Answer. Recent events highlight the critical role the IAEA plays in
international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Director General ElBaradei has proposed, and the United States
supports, an i increase in the IAEA's regular budget for safeguards--
inspections and related activities. The IAEA's treaty-driven safeguards
mandates have grown in every respect, from the expanding number of
countries and nuclear facilities subject to inspections to the new
safeguards measures developed in the 1990s to strengthen its ability to
detect undeclared nuclear activities.
The United States gives high priority to the IAEA budget and pays
its assessed share in full. We expect the assessed budget to increase
in 2004 and to pay our full assessment. The drop in our request from FY
2003 to FY 2004 is based solely on the changing assumptions about
currency exchange rates. At present the value of the Euro is at
historically high levels, and the FY 2004 request is based on the level
which was in effect last April, when the budget was originally
formulated.
U.S. voluntary contributions help meet urgent near-term needs and
provide specialized expertise. However, in recent years the IAFA relied
increasingly on voluntary contributions, mostly from our NADR account,
to carry out its core safeguards responsibilities. An increase in the
regular budget should reduce this reliance and enable us to use
available NADR funds to support other important priorities, for example
in nuclear safety and security.
The Department of Energy does not contribute to the regular budget
of the IAEA, but has provided extrabudgetary support to the IAEA,
including its efforts to combat radiological terrorism. I will leave it
to Secretary Abraham to provide any further detail you may need.
PERSONNEL
Question 1. Should the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative now be
expanded?
Answer. The DRI is a good start. If fully implemented, the 1158 new
employees will fill our most critical gaps in our workforce. Because
the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) was conceived of in 2001, we
have found it necessary to revise our implementation plans in the wake
of September 11 so that we can meet new priorities. For example, we
have experienced falling revenues from Machine Readable Visa fees and
therefore had to provide for the increased consular workload
requirement out of our DRI funded positions. We have also had to staff
Embassy Kabul. This may require additional resources as we review our
situation.
We believe that diplomatic readiness must be maintained by
continually assessing our requirements. Our workforce planning tools
are being updated and additional tools applied to assess our needs more
effectively. As our frontline mission in counter terrorism and other
areas expands and changes we will work to meet those missions and will
request needed resources.
But the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is not only about hiring.
We must also ensure that our people are taken care of. This means
providing better buildings, information technology, schools, and
medical care. It means having family-friendly policies and programs to
enable spousal employment. It means providing incentives for hardship
service and working to solve the problem of a 12 percent and growing
pay gap between domestic and overseas positions due to locality pay.
And it means providing training especially for managers. We will need
support to provide for these so that our employees are better able to
do their jobs.
Question 2. Is the Department successful in achieving its diversity
goals?
Answer. The Department is making huge strides in reaching out to
minorities interested in serving their country on the State Department
team. For example, the total number of minority registrants for the
three foreign service written exams offered since the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative was launched in 2001 is greater than the
corresponding total for 10 exams preceding its launch (1988-2000). As a
result, the number of minorities hired as FSOs in 2002 was more than
double the number for 2001.
However, given the lead time required to recruit, clear, and hire a
new foreign service officer, it would be premature to say that the DRI
has been fully successful in achieving our diversity goals. Therefore,
the Department is continuing its intensive effort--begun as part of the
overall Diplomatic Readiness Initiative--to encourage minority interest
in State Department careers. We are hopeful that these efforts will
soon translate into further increases in minority employment at the
State Department.
Question 3. A 2002 GAO report found that significant staffing
shortfalls plague diplomatic posts that are considered hardship
locations. China, Saudi Arabia and Ukraine, all visited by the GAO,
were found to have staffing gaps. In addition, in these countries, many
employees including new or untenured junior officers were either
working well above their grade levels or did not meet the minimum
language requirements. What can be done to get these posts fully
staffed as soon as possible?
Answer. The most critical need is to have adequate overall staffing
in the Department so that we have enough employees to staff all
positions as well as enough of a ``personnel complement'' to allow some
employees to be released for appropriate training while not leaving
jobs unfilled. Fully implementing the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
is a priority.
Staffing hardship posts is a high priority for Department
management. In addition, we have begun to implement many initiatives
and policy changes resulting from a series of hardship staffing working
groups. Our aim is to make hardship service less ``hard'' and to
provide incentives for service in such posts. Many initiatives we can
implement now while some may require legislative changes or additional
funding.
Question 4. Foreign Service generalists are the diplomats who
negotiate with foreign governments, make the contacts necessary for our
antiterrorism experts to succeed, and work face-to-face with officials
and the public. What would be your reaction to a provision in our
legislation that authorizes you to bring the number of Foreign Service
generalists to 10,000 over a certain period of time? (There are now
5,703 Foreign Service generalists. If USIA employees who joined the
Department in October 1999 when USIA merged into State are subtracted,
the total is 4,880. Even with the diplomatic readiness initiative, that
is only a modest increase over the 1986 figure of 4,630.)
Answer. We appreciate the interest in ensuring diplomatic
readiness. We need to attain full funding for the FY 2004 final tranche
of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. We may indeed require further
increases in personnel to meet our mission and we are continually
assessing those needs as we implement our Domestic Staffing Model,
continue to refine our Overseas Staffing Model and make great strides
in the Department's strategic planning and budgeting process.
VISAS
Backgound: Two recent reports, one from the GAO and the other from
the State Department's Inspector General, highlighted staffing
inadequacies that are clearly affecting our ability to make good
decisions quickly in the visa issuance process. Increased language and
other training for consular officers issuing non-immigrant visas (NIV),
better access to intelligence, and improved technology are crucial to
the Department's future effectiveness in this area. Protecting the
country from those who wish to do us harm must be at the top of the
Department's agenda. Providing the kind of access that our own citizens
expect to enjoy abroad to the tens of thousands of well-meaning foreign
businessmen, students, and tourists is also a high priority.
Question 1. Can you describe the changes that have been made in the
consular area since September 11, 2001, that are intended to heighten
the caution with which we grant entry to the United States?
Answer. I testified last July before the House of Representatives
on the Homeland Security bill, stating that our first line of defense
in protecting ourselves from those who would come to our shores are our
diplomats at our consulates and other locations around the world, where
we issue visas to people to come to America. The Department has no
greater responsibility than that of securing our nation's borders
through vigilance in the visa function and there is no area to which we
have devoted greater attention, thought, and resources. The Department
of Homeland Security is now a reality, and, since passage of the bill
marking its creation, the Department of State has been focused on
integrating the visa work done abroad by State consular officers with
DHS' statutory authority over visa policy and regulations. We have made
substantial progress in forging this relationship, one that is critical
to our effort to ensure that no one who means harm to the United States
is able to use the visa process to hurt us.
For its part, the Department of State has made sweeping changes to
the visa and passport processes and entry screening requirements during
the months since September 11, 2001. The steps outlined below are just
some of our efforts to improve the security of U.S. borders, which also
include our ongoing participation in interagency efforts to implement
the provisions of the USA Patriot Act and Enhanced Border Security Act,
the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS), and the
formation of the new Department of Homeland Security.
Improvements Made in Visa and Passport Processing
Document Integrity
In March, 2002, pilot tested the new, tamper-resistant
Lincoln visa with worldwide deployment to be completed by May,
2003.
Converted all domestic passport agencies to issue the new,
more secure photo-digitized and tamper-resistant U.S. passport.
Shifted production of all ``non-emergency'' overseas
passports from posts abroad to the U.S. to take advantage of
photo-digitization technology. Began testing electronic
transfer of passport data between posts and a domestic passport
center. This new process will eliminate the need to send paper
applications to a domestic passport center for passport book
production. The pilot is progressing satisfactorily. We expect
to implement this new process at all posts by the end of 2003.
Implemented the Passport Lookout Tracking System (PLOTS),
containing roughly 150,000 fraud files, which can be reviewed
system-wide to prevent issuance of fraudulent U.S. passports.
Developed and deployed a unique, secure ink for canceling
machine-readable visas to deter ``visa washing,'' the practice
of treating an issued visa with chemical solvents in order to
removed the toner and thus use the visa foil for fraudulent
purposes. The new ink fully permeates the visa to prevent
fraudulent use.
Deployed the Consular Lost and Stolen Passport (CLASP)
lookout system to all overseas posts, serving as the central
repository for information regarding lost or stolen U.S.
passports. Data entered into CLASP is also automatically
forwarded to the U.S. Customs Service's Treasury Enforcement
Communication System (TECS) to assist in the apprehension of
imposters using lost and stolen passports at the ports of
entry.
Created a network connection for electronic access to
digital images of passport records to all passport agencies,
consular posts, and authorized CA Headquarters personnel. The
information contained in the system is used to provide
information needed for verifying passport issuance in cases of
lost/stolen passport replacement, avoiding questionable
passport issuance and verifying citizenship verification.
Application Processing
Added more security checks for certain groups of visa
applicants from certain countries.
Provided access to the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD)
for all consular officers worldwide as well as to INS
inspectors at port of entry, U.S. Customs personnel and other
entities.
Expanded intranet resources for consular adjudicators and
Diplomatic Security investigators to assist them in reading and
verifying entry/exit cachets in Arabic or Persian script.
Namechecks
Incorporated approximately 8 million records from the FBI's
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) into our Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS) namecheck database. This
more than doubles the records on file.
Received into CLASS a significant increase in namecheck
records from the intelligence community (through TIPOFF--the
State Department's clearinghouse for sensitive intelligence and
watch-list entries). (TIPOFF has processed approximately 31,000
new entries since October 2001 bringing the total to over
78,000 terrorist lookouts).
Started automated cross checking of new derogatory
information concerning terrorists or suspected terrorists
(including TIPOFF entries) against CCD records of previously
issued visas. When there is a match, the visa is revoked and
INS notified.
Placed the U.S. Marshals database (WIN) of 20,000
individuals not entitled to passports because they are subject
to outstanding federal warrants of arrest into the passport
side of CLASS in November 2002.
In January 2003, began pilot test in Mexico of the new
Hispanic algorithm which we believe will greatly increase the
accuracy of namecheck returns for Hispanic names.
Completed East Asian algorithm linguistic study as the first
step in the process of developing language- and culture-
specific algorithms to better support namechecks in CLASS for
East Asian names.
Prepared Backup Namecheck System (BNC) using Real-Time
Update (RTU) for deployment beginning early 2003. This is a
backup namecheck system designed to support visa operations in
the increasingly rare event of telecommunications failures.
With the combination of BNC and RTU, the CLASS visa database is
replicated on a near-realtime basis to PC-based backup systems
at each consular post worldwide.
Upgraded the Travel Document Issuance System--Photodig
(TDIS-PD) to include the Consular Lost and Stolen Passport
(CLASP) database and a new Social Security matrix. The CLASP
database includes all reported lost and stolen U.S. passports,
while the Social Security matrix determines the State and
issuance date for a Social Security number which is then
compared to the State and date of birth provided by an
applicant, helping passport personnel to flag questionable
cases for further analysis.
Enhanced Data Collection
Included 25 additional data elements in the automated NIV
processing system (NIV 4.01) to be in worldwide use in early
2003. Most of these data elements were added at the request of
the law enforcement and intelligence communities and will
greatly enhance our ability to share meaningful case
information electronically.
Created new forms--the DS-157 (November 2001) and DS-158
(July, 2002)--to expand data requested of targeted cases and
revised DS-156 to expand data collection, again to increase the
amount of information available to the larger border security
community.
Provided all posts with software and scanners to support
scanning of supporting evidence for serious refusals. By adding
images of these documents to the consular database, refusal
details will be more widely available to inspectors at ports of
entry and others in the border security community.
Electronically capture photos for all refused NIV
applicants, expanding the database of photos as a resource for
anti-fraud and border security work.
Revised photo standards for NIV applicants to improve
quality of data for facial recognition and other purposes. As
these higher quality photos are added to the consular database
for every visa applicant (whether issued or refused), the USG
steadily gains photos for identification to aid with visa
adjudication and national security tasks.
Expanded Information Sharing
Expanded Consolidated Consular Database (CCD) access to all
U.S. ports of entry and other U.S. government agencies.
Piloted data-share with the Social Security Administration
to facilitate the issuance of Social Security number cards to
new legal immigrants.
Serious visa refusal files for posts in high intelligence
threat regions or those with space problems are stored at the
Kentucky Consular Center (KCC). These are refusals dealing with
``Category 1'' grounds of ineligibility, having to do with
terrorism, criminal, national security and other serious
grounds of visa refusal under U.S. law. KCC has begun back-
scanning, in order to make these files available to all users
of the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD).
Expanded distribution of the Department of State's
electronic Intelligence Alerts on lost/stolen blank documents,
making them available to more than 700 addresses in federal,
state, and local agencies and to foreign governments.
Began automatically forwarding data from the Consular Lost
and Stolen Passport (CLASP) system to the U.S. Customs
Service's Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) for
use at ports of entry.
Began back-scanning previously issued U.S. passport
applications which will make the data available back to 1994.
Approximately 8 million records have been scanned. Once this
project is completed, passport records including photographs
will be available for all currently valid passports.
Internal Controls
Restricted Foreign Service National (FSN) employee access to
namechecks.
Removed FSN ability to request namechecks outside of an
actual visa application. This change was made worldwide through
the deployment of a new tool for use in conducting ad hoc
namecheck queries by American personnel only.
As a pilot, removed FSN access to all namecheck information
in the NIV system at six pilot posts in August, 2002.
Worldwide restrictions to begin in March 2003.
Announced changes to the role of Consular Associates,
cleared American citizens used in consular work overseas. This
involves a fundamental realignment of American consular
resources overseas so that visa adjudication is restricted to
commissioned Foreign Service officers while other sensitive
consular activities are given to cleared American personnel in
lieu of Foreign Service Nationals.
Visa Referral system reviewed and post/consular managers
reminded of controls needed. Form revised and made mandatory.
New management tools to monitor user accounts on consular
automated systems.
Mandated a special worldwide review of management controls.
Implemented Consular Management Assistance Teams, which
visit posts to review management controls and procedures, and
expanded the management assessment review program at passport
agencies.
Began the process of formalizing and disseminating Standard
Operating Procedures for visa processing.
Are establishing with Diplomatic Security a vulnerability
assessment unit within CA to examine fraud trends and identify
issues for further investigation.
Fraud Prevention Efforts
Establishing anti-fraud units at the National Visa Center in
Portsmouth, New Hampshire (NVC) and the Kentucky Consular
Center (KCC). First goal is data validation/fraud screening for
employment-based cases using automated search tools to query a
wide variety of commercial and government databases concerning
company backgrounds. Recruitment of Fraud Program Manager
position for NVC is underway. After experience gained program
will be expanded to KCC.
Based on success in identifying imposters and duplicate
entries with the Diversity Visa lottery (DV) program, anti-
fraud efforts using Facial Recognition are being expanded to 13
other NIV applicant pools on a pilot basis. These countries
were chosen due to a combination of security and fraud
management concerns.
Commenced pilot program with Virginia DMV to share
information on fraudulent foreign documents submitted in
support of drivers license applications.
Implemented program with SSA to train SSA investigators on
the detection fraudulent foreign documents, and to increase
information sharing between SSA investigators and passport
agencies.
Initiated work with a contract consultant to design
approaches for mining data in the Consular Consolidated
Database to provide additional anti-fraud and management
oversight information.
Guidance/Training
As part of the effort noted above to prepare and disseminate
standard operating procedures for consular work, working to
revise all training materials to incorporate this guidance.
Initiated an Advanced Namechecking course at the Foreign
Service Institute.
Made changes to the basic consular training course to add
additional material on fraud, ethics and terrorism in addition
to new material on interviewing techniques.
Security Improvements
Participated in the drafting of an Entry-Exit Project
Charter (National Security Entry Exit Registration System,
NSEERS), working jointly with INS, Customs, and DOT, which sets
the parameters for an automated system to record the arrivals,
departures, and stay activities of individuals coming to and
leaving the U.S.
Have proposed the elimination of crew list visas (proposed
regulation has been published for public comment). This is
important because travelers on crew list visas do not require
individual passports and visas, so the elimination of this visa
class will provide for more thoroughly documented and reviewed
travelers.
Are now requiring visas for landed immigrants (from non-Visa
Waiver Program countries) in Canada and Bermuda. This change
was made in order to ensure that all travelers to the U.S. are
subject to appropriate levels of scrutiny in the visa process
independent of their current country of residence.
Have amended regulations to prevent automatic revalidation
of visas for NIV applicants with expired visas and a valid I-94
who apply in Canada or Mexico and for all nationals of ``state
sponsors of terrorism'' regardless of whether they apply for a
visa.
Have reiterated standing guidance on interview requirements
for applicants subject to security advisory opinion
requirements.
Are working closely with INS field and service center
operations to support their increased use of DOS lookout data
available in the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS)
for benefits processing.
Question 2. Can you share with the committee how your budget
request addresses the needs outlined by GAO and the OIG for the
Consular Affairs bureau?
Answer. The Department's FY 2004 budget includes $616.82l million
to fund the Border Security Program. This program funds virtually all
consular operations worldwide. The program addresses many of the issues
raised in the reports from the General Accounting Office and the State
Department's Inspector General. For example, consular staffing needs
are addressed through the funding of the salaries of approximately
2,400 full time domestic and overseas consular personnel and support
staff. The program provides all consular staff with modernized consular
systems. Hardware and software is replaced on a routine basis, while
systems training of new consular hires and refresher training for
existing personnel follows an 18 month training schedule. The Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which is a database of over 15
million names, allows consular officers immediate access to information
needed for visa and passport adjudication. This information is also
shared with other government agencies involved in homeland security.
The Border Security program also provides specialized consular training
on all aspects of consular work through the Department's Foreign
Service Institute.
Question 3. Could you describe the role that you expect the
Department of Homeland Security to play in our embassies overseas?
Answer. Discussions are still underway between the Department of
State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concerning the role
of DHS personnel in our embassies overseas. From January 16-24, a DHS
assessment team accompanied by a DOS officer traveled to Saudi Arabia
to address specifically the requirement of section 428(I) of the
Homeland Security Act regarding the mandatory DHS review of visa
applications in Saudi Arabia. The team's report is under review within
DHS. The Department of State stands ready to help DHS personnel take up
overseas duties that would enhance our ability to ensure that visas are
not issued to terrorists or others who would harm us.
Question 4. How successful are consular officers in gaining access
to the intelligence information they need to make decisions? Do they
have the benefit of both CIA and FBI input? What would be your reaction
if the Committee wrote into the bill language stating that consular
officers should have immediate access to U.S. government information on
individuals and groups who wish harm to U.S. citizens in order to
better inform their decisions on visa adjudication?
Answer. Significant progress has been made in the past year to
increase the amount of information available to visa officers overseas
and, conversely, to INS and other law enforcement and intelligence
agencies in the United States. The State Department's Consular Lookout
and Support System (CLASS), a comprehensive database which integrates
information from State, FBI, INS, DEA and intelligence sources, is a
principal example of this progress. The Department has been able to
leverage the provisions of the Enhanced Border Security Act and USA
Patriot Act to make CLASS an ever-stronger tool in our efforts to
protect our national security. CLASS uses sophisticated search
algorithms to match lookout information to individual visa applicants.
Every single visa applicant is run through CLASS, and, in fact, our
automated processing systems will not print a visa until the consular
officer has checked and resolved ``hits'' of the applicant's biodata
against the lookout system data. CLASS is only as good, however, as the
data that it contains. Since 9/11 this situation has improved
dramatically.
CLASS records have doubled since September 11. Per USA Patriot Act
mandate, approximately eight million names of persons with FBI records
were added to the CLASS database by August 2002, augmenting 5.8 million
name records from State, INS, DEA, and intelligence sources. These NCIC
records include the FBI's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File,
a particularly valuable resource. When a visa applicant ``hits''
against NCIC records in CLASS, consular sections can obtain
fingerprints to pass to the FBI for purposes of obtaining a full
criminal record if necessary. The fingerprints also help guard against
any identification problems.
20,000 Customs serious violator name records have been added to
CLASS since September 11, 2001. CLASS now has over 78,000 name records
of suspected terrorists, up 40% in the past year. Most of this
information has entered CLASS through TIPOFF, a program run through the
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research that acts as a
clearinghouse for sensitive intelligence information provided by other
agencies throughout the U.S. government. The TIPOFF staff is able to
review and evaluate information concerning suspected terrorists and
pass sanitized index information to CLASS. Since September 11, 2001,
approximately 31,000 new terrorist lookouts have been entered in the
TIPOFF database.
As should be clear from the preceding discussion, consular officers
in the field need immediate, comprehensive access to the index or
watchlist information concerning persons of concern to the United
States. We strongly believe that a robust and comprehensive
watchlisting system such as that represented by the TIPOFF and CLASS
databases is the key to effective screening of visa applicants. It
would not be helpful to push more detailed intelligence into the hands
of consular officers in the field, who are operating largely in an
unclassified environment under conditions that do not allow detailed
analysis. Rather, analysis and review should be completed in
Washington, with watchlist details provided to TIPOFF and, through that
mechanism, to CLASS.
Question 5. What is the current backlog in visa applications (both
immigrant and non-immigrant) and what is the principal cause of that
backlog?
Answer. Processing times for visas vary considerably among our
embassies and consulates. For nonimmigrant visas, applicants at most
posts are able to obtain appointments for interviews within two weeks
from the date of the request. Once a nonimmigrant visa application is
submitted at the interview, processing for most cases is completed
within 48 hours. At a few posts, the number of applicants seeking
interviews is such that applicants must wait considerably longer to
obtain an appointment.
The main reasons for a wait for an interview are staffing
shortages, staffing gaps, or drawdowns of staff for security reasons.
In some cases, an unanticipated increase in the number of applications
may produce a backlog of applicants seeking interviews. In some
countries, such as Colombia, dramatic increases in the number of
persons seeking to apply for visas has been caused by changes in the
local political and economic situation that increase out-migration
pressure. Cutbacks in the hiring of Foreign Service officers in recent
years have had a severe impact on our ability to keep nonimmigrant visa
sections fully staffed. In recent months, we have significantly
increased hiring of Foreign Service officers; an additional 90 junior
officers have been hired in the past year to fill much needed consular
officer positions worldwide. This increase in officer staffing will
greatly assist in eliminating any current visa processing backlogs.
For immigrant visas, the goal of our embassies and consulates is to
schedule appointments for immediate relative cases within 30 days of
applicants' informing the consular section that they have all the
required documents and are ready for interview. The consular section
must also have received the case from the National Visa Center and have
completed all required clearances. Preference category immigrant cases
are generally scheduled within 60 days once applicants notify post that
they are ready for interview and the post has obtained the required
visa number from the Department and completed any necessary clearances.
ADDITIONAL FUNDING NEEDS
Question 1. Which regions might you anticipate a need for funding
that are not in the current budget request?
Answer. We are closely following developments in conflicts around
the world. Based on current assessments, our budget request includes
the funding needs we anticipate for FY 2004.
Question 2. Are there emergency UN peacekeeping missions that might
be in the offing? What do you see as the likelihood that we will need
increased funding for the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in FY 2004, particularly given logistical
difficulties in the region, continuing instability, and dissent over
the recent peace accord? What about Cote d'Ivoire? Are the French
likely to want to turn over responsibilities to the UN if the peace
holds?
Answer. We are closely following developments in conflicts in
Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan for the possibility of a new UN
mission.
Both the Government of Burundi and the African Union (which just
deployed an initial 36 observers to Burundi) have expressed desire for
the UN to take over from the tri-nation (South Africa, Ethiopia,
Mozambique) Mission which is to be sent under AU sponsorship. Since
there is no comprehensive cease-fire or disarmament, neither we nor the
UN believe that conditions are right for a UN peacekeeping mission. If
those conditions are fulfilled, and if the parties were to show full
commitment to a viable political process, the African parties would
expect the Security Council to establish a UN Peacekeeping Mission.
Burundi remains at risk for a resurgence of genocidal violence, and we
need to work with our partners in Africa, Europe and the UN to avoid
this.
The current ECOWAS mission in Cote d'Ivoire, supported by French
troops, has UN Security Council support. There is no proposal on the
table for a UN peacekeeping operation in Cote d'Ivoire, and we do not
believe that one is necessary now. If, at some time in the future,
there is a comprehensive ceasefire and a viable peace process in place,
we would consider the establishment of a UN observer mission for Cote
d'Ivoire. We expect the French will propose a UN Peacekeeping Mission
for Cote d'Ivoire at some point in the future.
We are seeing mixed progress on peace in the Sudan. If and when
there is a firm peace agreement, there may be a role for the UN, but it
is too soon to speculate what that role might be.
The UN is in the process of implementing the expansion of MONUC
authorized in December. We have requested sufficient funds in FY 2004
for MONUC's current mandate and size.
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT (MCA)
Question 1. Critics of the proposed MCA have suggested that this
will be simply another new bureaucracy, rife with some of the same
problems we have faced in our existing foreign assistance programs. Why
should we create a separate agency?
Answer. The MCA represents the President's vision of an innovative
way for the United States to spur lasting development. The MCA is a
truly new approach.
First, the MCA is selective, targeting those countries that ``rule
justly, invest in the health and education of their people, and
encourage economic freedom.'' By selecting only those countries that
have adopted policies that encourage growth, MCA assistance will more
likely result in successful sustainable economic development. It will
also create a powerful incentive for countries wishing to qualify to
adopt growth-enabling policies.
Second, the MCA establishes a true partnership in which the
developing country, with full participation of its citizens, proposes
its own priorities and plans.
Finally, the MCA will place a clear focus on results. Funds will go
only to those countries with well-implemented programs that have clear
objectives and benchmarks.
A new institution is the best hope to implement this targeted
initiative, and to provide visible evidence of U.S. leadership and
high-level engagement. USAID and other agencies will need to continue
to deliver the important humanitarian and regional assistance of
interest to the United States, to address complex emergencies, and to
work both with countries that are MCA ``near misses'' as well as with
failed and failing states. The MCA is designed to complement existing
assistance by focusing on growth and demonstrating a new way of working
with countries that have reached a high level of development-readiness.
The MCA needs flexibility and focus to carry out its innovative
mandate and should start with a clean slate to give it the best chance
to succeed and show that this approach works. If it is to respond to
developing country priorities, the MCA cannot be restricted to specific
areas of funding. If it is to operate with a lean staff and draw from
the best and brightest in the public, private and nonprofit sectors,
the MCA must have special personnel authority. If it is to be
effective, it must also have the ability to contract and procure
broadly. If it is to succeed in its mission, the MCA must be open to a
new way of operating.
That is why the Administration has proposed the establishment of a
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) headed by a Chief Executive
Officer nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. He or
she would report to a cabinet board, chaired by the Secretary of State,
which would provide policy and operational oversight as well as
facilitate coordination among all foreign assistance programs.
Our goal is a new, flexible, effective and visible organization
that complements other assistance activities but operates in, a new way
to achieve lasting economic growth in countries most ready for active
partnership.
Question 2. In its deliberations to authorize and fund the MCA, the
Committee will want to consider how it can be organized to ensure
success. Making sure that the organization chooses recipient countries
and makes funding grants that are in the foreign policy interest of the
United States while, at the same time, giving the organization
independence and flexibility are both important goals. The
administration's draft legislation is expected to make the Secretary of
State the chairman of the MCA board. How important is it to you to hold
that position? Is it compatible with the constraints on your time? Are
there other ways that we can be assured that MCA decisions will be in
the foreign policy interests of the United States?
Answer. The Secretary of State should chair the MCA Board for
several reasons. First, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides
that the Secretary of State shall supervise and coordinate U.S.
economic assistance.\1\ The Secretary takes this responsibility
seriously. Second, the MCA is a high priority for the President and
this Administration, and placing the Secretary of State in a role that
will provide overall policy guidance reflects this high-level
commitment. Third, it is from this position that the Secretary can best
ensure that the programs and policies of the MCA work to promote the
foreign policy interests of the United States. Finally, the President
and the Congress rightly insist on strict accountability for the MCA.
Secretary Powell sees his role as Chairman of the MCA Board as
essential to ensuring there is strong Cabinet-level accountability for
the MCA.
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\1\ Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as
amended) provides that ``the Secretary of State shall be responsible
for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic
assistance to the end that such programs are effectively integrated
both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is
best served thereby.'')
Question 3. We obviously have learned some valuable lessons over
our many years in the economic development business. One of those
lessons is that U.S. assistance must be coordinated in the field with
other bilateral programs, multilateral programs and with other donor
nations. How can we ensure that the MCA and the U.S. Agency for
International Development do not compete, overlap, or duplicate one
another either in Washington or in the field? How will NCA programs be
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coordinated with multilateral programs or third country donors?
Answer. The Administration completely agrees that coordination with
other U.S. programs as well as international efforts is key to
successful development funding. The MCA will have a precise mandate to
spur long-term economic growth, operating in a limited number of
countries, as opposed to USAID, which has many mandates in many
countries. In the field, MCA staff will be under chief of mission
authority, as are AID staff, which will facilitate in-country
coordination. The MCA will have a lean field staff, and will therefore
rely on the Ambassador and Aid Director and their staffs to assist in
monitoring and implementing the MCA. The Secretary of State, as
Chairman of the Board, will provide the necessary policy oversight in
Washington and the field to avoid duplication, ensure coordination, and
make effective use of greater resources.
Because MCA funds represent a major increase in a country's
development assistance, USAID would likely undertake a strategic review
of its programs in those countries. Some USAID programs may well be
continued, such as regional programs or those fighting HIV/AIDs or
trafficking in persons, while others logically would be phased out or
incorporated in the MCC program. Some USAID assistance might also be
redirected from new MCA countries to countries that barely miss the
list of better performers to improve their chances in future
competitions.
The MCA will be able to coordinate with multilateral agencies and
other donors providing assistance and financing in MCA countries. This
coordination will primarily happen through the country's own MCA
contract, which will reflect the country's priority development needs.
Encouraging and supporting greater responsibility by the recipient
country to coordinate among its donors is an important aspect of making
aid more effective. Therefore, attention to this coordination will be a
key part of the Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC'S) approval of
MCA proposals.
Question 4. What do you see as the optimal relationship between
USAID and the MCA? Does the relationship need to be made clear in the
legislation authorizing the MCA?
Answer. From a policy perspective, the work of the MCA and USAID
should complement each other in Washington, D.C. and in the field.
USAID will, for example, help poor countries to make the reforms and
policy changes necessary to qualify for MCA funds. USAID can also fund
critical regional initiatives, humanitarian needs and support for
strategic partners and failed or failing states, which the MCA is not
designed to address. The MCA will remain targeted on increasing
economic growth in a select number of countries, and embody a new
approach to development, which could also influence USAID's approach to
its own programs.
In view of the need for flexibility and effectiveness in
implementing a new concept in assistance, it could be disadvantageous
to legislate the details of how USAID and the MCA interact. The
Secretary of State, in his capacity as Chairman of the MCC's Board and
as supervisor of the Administrator of USAID, will ensure establishment
of an organizational structure and relationship that promote
complementarity and cooperation between the MCA and USAID.
Question 5. If the MCA is successful, do you see it serving as the
model for our other international foreign assistance programs?
Answer. The MCA will have a major impact on the way the United
States delivers its foreign assistance. It helps clarify our
development objectives and create an integrated strategy for achieving
them. Its focus on building business-like partnerships with developing
countries while encouraging countries to create the policy environment
for economic growth is a major new step in lifting poor countries out
of poverty.
Even those countries that do not yet have the required policies in
place can benefit from the model the MCA presents, and USAID can help
those countries develop the capacity and commitment to enact these
policies. Our other assistance will also remain critical to address a
host of essential foreign assistance needs, such as humanitarian
tragedies, assisting in post-conflict situations, fighting the spread
of disease, and improving conditions in countries not qualifying for
the MCA. Ultimately, the MCA could be an important tool for promoting
results-based assistance, thereby enhancing the efficacy of all
development assistance.
Question 6. The emphasis of the MCA will be on developing the
potential for growth and development in countries where good government
and economic freedom provide the best chance for progress. To what
extent do you think the MCA will create incentive to make the changes
needed to qualify as an MCA designated country?
Answer. The challenge to create the right policy environment for
economic growth is the heart of the MCA. We established transparent,
rigorous indicators so each country can see where it stands and target
its efforts to meet the qualification criteria. We believe that the
potential to harness the substantial amount of funding available
through the MCA will serve as a strong incentive for countries to
develop these policies. The success of MCA countries should also have a
strong demonstrative effect. In this way the MCA will leverage its
actual funding to assist even those countries not yet in the program.
Indeed, we are already seeing this happen. We have already received
requests from countries to discuss their eligibility for the program
and where they might need to improve in order to increase their chances
of participating in the MCA.
Question 7. Is our understanding correct that USAID's budget would
not be cut to pay for the MCA and, further, that other development
funding such as World Bank contributions would not be reduced?
Answer. The MCA does not reduce the need for other assistance and
the President has made clear that the MCA is in addition to current
assistance. We are committed to global development. We have recently
seen this commitment deepen through the newly pledged $10 billion
dollar increase in HIV/AIDS funding, the additional $200 million
pledged for famine relief, the $100 million requested to address
complex emergencies, and the 7.3 percent increase in overall
development assistance funding in the 2004 budget sent to the Hill last
week. We have also increased our pledges to the Multilateral
Development Banks--18% increase for IDA, 18% for the AfDF, and 16% for
GEF. We are asking for $1.3 billion new dollars to fund the MCA, and we
urge Congress to authorize that amount.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE EXPANSION
Question 1. Could you describe the Department's role in these
negotiations? What is the division of labor between the Department and
the U.S. Special Trade Representative?
Answer. State and USTR and other interested U.S. agencies share a
strong common objective of demonstrating continued U.S. leadership in
the WTO's Doha Development Agenda negotiations and other international
trade negotiations, while at the same time vigorously promoting U.S.
economic interest abroad. State and other agencies actively support
USTR, which takes the lead in developing interagency consensus on most
trade policy issues and in conducting most trade negotiations.
Moreover, the Department has the added responsibility of ensuring
that U.S. trade policy decisions are consistent with our wider foreign
policy objectives.
State, with its extensive global network of economic, commercial,
political and public diplomacy officers who have expertise in both
local affairs as well as U.S. negotiating objectives, is uniquely
placed to advise interagency policy deliberations. Officers, up to and
including our ambassadors, at our embassies and constituent posts work
on the front lines on a daily basis to explain and build support for
U.S. trade policies. They also are the U.S. Government's eyes and ears
around the world, keeping Washington informed about the trade policies
of host governments and advising Washington on ways to influence key
players in host governments to advance U.S. interests and to find
solutions to trade and commercial problems.
Question 2. Does the Department have adequate resources to support
these current and future negotiating efforts or do you foresee the need
for additional funding and personnel for this purpose in future years?
Answer. The passage of the Trade Act of 2002 authorizing Trade
Promotion Authority has led to a surge of trade related activities. The
Department, like the U.S. Trade Representative's office, is working
hard to take full advantage to secure the international economic
opportunities created by that legislation.
To support the demands of the various trade negotiations, the
Department has asked for additional economic officers overseas and in
Washington in our budget requests for FY-2002, FY-2003 and FY-2004. In
addition, we will continue to evaluate whether reallocation of existing
current resources or a request for additional resources will be
necessary.
Question 3. Can you discuss efforts to link trade and aid so that
they are mutually reinforcing in their economic development impact?
This is now apparently being tried in the Morocco negotiations.
Answer. The Doha, Monterrey and Johannesburg Conferences, as well
as development goals in the Millennium Declaration, have changed the
dialogue on development. The global community now has an
internationally agreed agenda on the steps to take in the trading
system and in international development finance cooperation to create
the requisite conditions for sustained and rapid growth. Though aid
surely plays a role in alleviation of poverty and economic growth, an
even bigger impact will come from sound market-oriented economic
policies (including trade liberalization) and creation of a welcoming
environment for investment. Statistics repeatedly show that private
sector resources far outstrip the amounts and effects of official
development assistance. For example, the World Bank estimates that
removing all barriers to trade in goods would expand the global economy
by $832 billion by 2015, a 2.5% increase or $136 for every man, woman
and child on earth each year. Of this $539 billion would accrue to
developing countries. In furtherance of this goal, many U.S. agencies,
most importantly USAID, have significant programs designed to enhance
the capacity of developing countries to reap the benefits of the rules-
based global trading system. This will include aid designed to help not
only Morocco, but also southern African countries and Central American
countries participate with greater confidence in the ongoing FTA
negotiations. More broadly, our trade-related technical assistance
programs will help all our trade partners build capacity through such
programs as the World Trade Organization's Global Fund for Technical
Assistance.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
Question 1. To what extent are we shifting resources in our public
diplomacy effort to the Arab world?
Answer. After 9/11, public diplomacy resources shifted to support
the war on terrorism worldwide, with a significant emphasis on foreign
Arab and Muslim audiences. This resulted in increases of funds of 34%
in FY 2002 and 13% in FY 2003 for the South Asian geographic bureau and
increases of 15% in FY 2002 and 19% in FY 2003 for the Near Eastern
geographic bureau. [FY 2003 figures are drawn from the President's
request.]
These bureau increases reflect the priority attention given to the
Afghanistan war and the war on terrorism in both these important
regions of the world. They also demonstrate the large adjustments that
we made immediately following 9/11 and are continuing in FY 2003 to
reflect public diplomacy priorities in those regions. As there is no
program increase for public diplomacy requested for FY 2004, our shifts
for FY 2004 reflect a more modest increase of 3% for the Near Eastern
bureau and 5% for the South Asian bureau.
An additional $35 million in supplemental funding for public
diplomacy initiatives has also been directed to foreign Arab and Muslim
audiences. These activities included broadcasts, speakers, and foreign
journalist tours on values and religious tolerance; English language
programs, English teaching, and educational reform projects; American
studies programs in universities; and programs on Iran and Iraq. They
also included exchanges involving youth, women, the Fulbright program,
media training, English language instruction, and American studies.
In addition, a number of programs and activities were initiated at
Headquarters and provided to field posts in those regions. For example,
we have initiated publication of a magazine meant for young Arabic
speakers. This pilot project entails four initial print versions, the
first due out in April. We have expanded translations of our print and
electronic publications into Arabic and other languages, including
``Network of Terrorism'' and ``Muslim Life in America.'' We initiated a
Farsi Web site and have increased foreign journalist tours and
briefings and television co-operative productions with broadcasters
from countries with significant Muslim populations. These are just a
few of the products reflecting our shift of resources to the Arab and
Muslim world.
As for exchanges, in FY 2002 the Bureau of Educational and Cultural
Affairs redirected 5% of its base exchange resources ($12 million) to
engagement with the Muslim world and the war on terrorism. The FY 2003
exchanges plan maintains this emphasis, increasing the Middle East's
share of worldwide exchange resources to 15%, compared to 11% in FY
2002 and 10% in FY 2001. The bureau's Partnerships for Learning
exchanges funded by the supplemental funds target specific world
regions, focusing 50% on the Middle East, 20% on South Asia, and
approximately 10% each on East Asia, Africa, and Eurasia.
Question 2. The President's budget requests $30 million to build on
the Middle East Radio Network established in 2002 to establish an
Arabic language TV network in 2004. Do you have any evidence that our
programming is well received? Do you think we can compete with Al-
Jazeera?
Answer. The weekly and monthly research returns and focus groups
indicate that where Sawa has a strong AM and FM presence it has had a
positive impact. Sawa results indicate listenership and audience
demographics have exceeded initial projections. I am working with my
colleagues on the BBG to expand Sawa's network of AM and PM
transmitters. Where Sawa does not have a strong signal, it does not
have the same impact. Placement of State and BBG TV products on Arab
and non-Arab satellite and terrestrial systems indicates that our
current programming is very well received.
Al-Jazeera is influential but we have to remember there are more
than thirty satellite systems in the region and many terrestrial
broadcasters as well. Television is different from radio. The situation
with regard to satellite and terrestrial TV systems in the Middle East
is very fluid right now. A number of major commercial and national
investors are eager to build networks that will challenge Al-Jazeera. I
think that if we have the capacity to purchase products that reflect
the best of American culture and society and to commission compelling
programs that focus on our foreign policy goals, objectives, and
achievements, we can compete with any broadcaster. This could be either
through the Middle East Television Network or through placement on Arab
and non-Arab networks throughout the world.
Question 3. Are we giving financial support to responsible media
outlets to try to counter the influence of Al-Jazeera?
Answer. We do not financially support private or government-owned
Arabic television stations. Rather, we work closely with them, as well
as with journalists throughout the region, to ensure that U.S.
government policy is effectively represented and explained on Arab
media. Access to the Arab media is not a problem. They actively seek
our views and senior officials to articulate them.
State Department officials appear on pan-Arab TV or grant
interviews to the pan-Arab newspapers several times a week. The
Secretary has granted eight interviews to Arab media since August 2002,
all of which have been front-paged or aired in prime time. Others,
including Deputy Secretary Armitage, Under Secretary Grossman,
Assistant Secretary Burns, Ambassador Richard Haass, and Ambassador
Christopher Ross, have actively engaged Arab TV, radio and print media.
Our embassies in the region also engage the local or regional print
and electronic media on a sustained basis. These efforts include
interviews by Ambassadors and other appropriate speakers. Moreover, our
embassies, working with ECA and lIP, have been engaged in a number of
long-term efforts such as programs that are designed to increase the
professional skills of Arab journalists and to promote the freedoms as
well as responsibilities of the press.
Al-Jazeera's influence has been particularly strong because, up
until now, it was the only all-news Arabic media outlet and the first
to introduce controversial talk shows. As of February 20, 2003, that
changed with the emergence of MBC's new all-news station, Al-Arabiyya.
This Saudi-funded station, which has a much more moderate tone than Al-
Jazeera, may well make inroads into Al-Jazeera's market. Secretary
Powell granted this station a highly publicized interview that aired on
its second day on the air. The State Department will continue to work
with Al-Arabiyya and other Arab media outlets to ensure that our
policies are communicated directly and without distortion.
Question 4. What are we doing to make certain that our foreign
service personnel are adequately trained both in language and cultural
skills not only to explain U.S. policy to government officials in
various Foreign Ministries but also to get out of their embassies and
listen carefully to the concerns of others, particularly in countries
where extensive segments of the population are of the Muslim faith?
Answer. At the Department of State we believe that in order for
foreign affairs personnel to carry out their mission, they must have an
understanding of the values and beliefs that exist in their region of
assignment. As well, they must have a level of language competence in
the countries in which they are serving. Training programs conducted by
the Foreign Service Institute reflect this philosophy.
Foreign language proficiency remains one of the key tools to enable
communication and understanding, and the Department's Foreign Service
Institute (FSI) provides language programs in some 60 plus languages
including ``superhard'' ones such as Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and
Korean, and what we term ``enduring freedom'' languages such as Arabic,
Persian/Farsi, Dan, Pashtu, Tajiki, Urdu and Uzbek. In FY02, PSI
provided 1,229,575 hours of language training to 2,764 students (an
enrollment increase of 28%), with a success rate (those who reach their
designated target proficiency level when enrolled for the recommended
period of training) of 75%.
To enable officers to better communicate America's story overseas
we have included public diplomacy modules in foreign language classes
at all levels with a special emphasis on Arabic and other Middle
Eastern languages. Language and Culture Instructors receive public
diplomacy training to help them better understand the importance of
this function. Increased funding for post language programs supports
this effort as well. PSI has launched a curriculum development effort
specifically targeting listening skills for more sophisticated levels
of understanding to help foreign affairs professionals grasp the
nuances in conversations with foreign diplomats and host country
nationals. FSI is also exploring partnerships with regional educational
institutions in the Middle East to provide further
opportunities.opportunities for officers to be immersed in the culture
while acquiring more advanced language skills. All long term language
programs at FSI also include an integrated area studies component.
Presentations on Islam have long been core components of Area
Studies courses, and since 9/11, we have added an Afghan
Familiarization Course and sessions on Islam to the European Area
Studies Program. Students hear from academic specialists on Islam and
Muslim speakers discussing their beliefs; the curriculum is
consistently updated to reflect emerging issues.
FSI Public Diplomacy training has included content on Understanding
Islam and the role of public diplomacy in the successful implementation
of U.S. foreign policy, but a significant effort is being made
Department wide to strengthen PD awareness. This fall, we will
introduce an expanded series of training courses aimed at employees who
will serve in PD positions overseas (two new eight-week courses in
addition to the revamped three-week PD tradecraft basics course),
designed to help ensure that the U.S. government is able to effectively
communicate its foreign policy message and build long term mutual
understanding with foreign audiences. The courses will cover media
relations and community outreach as well as the management of the
Department's exchange, education and cultural programs.
UNITED NATIONS OVERSIGHT AND FUNDING
Question 1. As you are aware, the United States pays its yearly
dues to the United Nations at least ten months late each year--in
October rather than January--due to a change in timing of the payment
made in the Reagan administration. Officials in the Administration, in
particular Assistant Secretary Holmes, have expressed support for the
language in FY 2003 State Department Authorization Act that ``the U.S.
should initiate a process to synchronize payment of U.S. assessments
over a multi-year period.'' Does the President's budget request contain
funding to begin the process of synchronization? How do you propose to
rectify the issue of the U.S. paying late?
Answer. No, the request contains no such funding. The State
Department has considered options to move off the practice of making
deferred payments to the United Nations and other major organizations.
It would be helpful to the U.N. and other major international
organizations if funds could be provided early in their January-to-
December fiscal year, so that it is no longer necessary for them to
borrow from other internal accounts to cover the part of their
assessments that come from the United States. Deferral is a practice
that engenders some frustration from these organizations and the other
Member States without appreciably adding to U.S. leverage to influence
the course of their financial and management practices.
However, we estimate that such synchronization would require some
$700 million in one-time additional funding. As a way to lessen the
funding burden, we have examined plans to resynchronize payments on an
incremental basis. However, even spread over four or five years, the
level of additional annual funding would be quite significant. We
continue to look into this issue, but given competing demands for
resources, there is no assurance that funding for this purpose can be
accommodated in upcoming budget requests.
Question 2. Do we now consider UN management improved? What has
changed and what further improvements can we expect?
Answer. The UN has recently made significant management
improvements advocated by the U.S. These improvements include the
establishment of the Office of Internal Oversight Services,
implementation of results based budgeting, adoption of a code of
conduct for UN personnel, and reform of the scales of assessment.
In December 2002, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
giving the Secretary General (SYG) the go ahead to pursue his newest
set of management reforms. These include a major review of the
Department of Public Information, as well as the creation of regional
information hub centers that will improve the flow of information and
save money (e.g., by consolidating some offices) . The SYG has also
committed to implementing better evaluations of programs, establishing
a more efficient budget process, and instituting management
improvements in several key departments/offices.
We will continue to work with the SYG and press for these and other
new management improvements such as a reduction in travel costs,
elimination of obsolete activities and outputs, and modernization of
the Department of Public Information.
Question 3. How can we ensure that the UN continues to be an asset
and ally towards winning the war on terror?
Answer. The UN is fully engaged in the War on Terrorism, most
notably through the Security Council's Counterterrorism Committee (CTC)
and other specialized UN agencies. In a global response to terrorism,
most Member States are cooperating to some extent with the CTC in
undertaking a wide range of counterterrorism activities mandated by
UNSCR 1373, including suppressing terrorism financing and prohibiting
any other form of material support for terrorists. Moreover, all the
various regional groupings have developed programs for fighting
terrorism and are beginning to coordinate their efforts with other such
organizations.
The U.S. is taking a leading role in encouraging other countries
and the regional and international organizations to redouble their
efforts. The U.S. can best ensure the success of these international
efforts by assisting and encouraging regional and functional
organizations to continue their efforts, and by working to coordinate
its bilateral assistance programs with other donors. Working through
the UN and other regional organizations will ensure continued
commitment to our common goal, spurring other countries to increase
their contributions and at the same time more efficiently coordinating
operations, targeting assistance, and avoiding duplication of efforts.
Question 4. Ambassador Soderberg, in a recent Washington Times Op-
Ed column, and a report sponsored by Freedom House and the Council on
Foreign Relations recommend creating a ``democracy caucus'' of UN
member organizations to cooperate on issues of human rights, advancing
democracy and fighting global terrorism. Do you believe this is a good
idea? Has any groundwork been laid in this regard?
Answer. The United States firmly believes in the strength of
democracies and is active in the creation of a coalition of democratic
countries. We have spoken with countries in numerous international
contexts about the importance of like-minded countries working closely
together to advance principles enshrined in international documents,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Democracies, which
are committed to these rights, are well positioned to work together to
protect these principles.
At the Second Ministerial Conference of the Community of
Democracies held in Seoul last November, the U.S., along with all other
countries participating in this important event, endorsed a Plan of
Action that included increased cooperation among democracies. The Plan
renewed the Community's commitment to the promotion of democracy
regionally and globally, recognizing the universality of democratic
values, and the protection that democracy affords to human rights and
fundamental freedoms. In addition, the countries agreed to cooperate to
coordinate diplomatic or other efforts, particularly within
international fora.
We have discussed this with allies in Africa, Latin America, and
other regions. There is broad support and recognition of the important
benefit that can be gained from increased coordination among
democracies.
We are examining whether trying to create a formal democracy caucus
is feasible. We are also considering alternative mechanisms to achieve
the desired result.
Question 5. Has any progress been made in increasing the number of
U.S. citizens employed by UN agencies and organizations overseas?
Answer. The Department is beefing up its efforts to attain
equitable representation of Americans in UN agencies and other
international organizations (IOs) . We have instructed our Missions to
increase the pressure on IOs under their purview to appoint Americans.
To enhance our Missions' efforts, over the past two years we sent a
recruitment expert from Washington to urge agencies in Rome and Geneva
to increase their employment of Americans. In addition, we are taking
steps to work more closely with other U.S. Government agencies to
leverage their resources to better identify and promote potential
candidates for 10 employment.
We expect that these and other efforts underway will result in
increased American employment in international organizations.
Question 6. What is your vision of our UNESCO re-entry? How can we
make the most out of our joining this organization after twenty years?
What is your view on the adequacy of UNESCO's budget? What is the State
Department's diplomatic strategy to make certain that the U.S. wins a
seat on UNESCO's Executive Board, once it has become eligible to run?
Does the Administration plan to have a separate new Ambassador to
represent our interests at UNESCO?
Answer. President Bush announced U.S. re-entry into UNESCO ``as a
symbol of our commitment to human dignity'', and he promised that
America will participate fully in UNESCO's mission to advance human
rights, tolerance, and learning. His announcement has been greeted with
enormous enthusiasm by UNESCO and by UNESCO Member States. We will work
to strengthen the management and budgetary reforms set in place by
UNESCO Director General Matsuura and to influence the programs UNESCO
will pursue in the future.
After 19 years outside the organization, we plan to make the most
out of our rejoining by promoting the hiring of qualified Americans, by
ensuring that a broad range of American expertise is brought to bear in
the programs and other activities of UNESCO, and by helping UNESCO
address priority areas like ``Education For All'' in as efficient and
effective manner possible.
UNESCO has operated under a flat nominal budget for the past six
years. The UNESCO secretariat has proposed expanding specific programs
to be funded through an increase in the assessed budget. We are
evaluating these proposals with an eye to U.S. substantive priorities
in rejoining UNESCO and consulting other member states consistent with
a U.S. commitment to prudent fiscal discipline in UN bodies. Our
ultimate position will be consistent both with U.S. substantive
priorities and with the U.S. commitment to budget discipline in
international organizations, including UNESCO.
The United States is seeking a seat on the UNESCO Executive Board
during the election tentatively scheduled for October 10 during the
UNESCO General Conference. Our primary goal is to work with Group I
countries (Europe plus Canada and Israel) to agree on a consensus slate
of five candidates, including the U.S. Alternatively, we will need to
win support from the 188 Member States of UNESCO in an election by
secret ballot. As a first stage, we have notified the UNESCO Members
States of our candidacy and have begun a worldwide diplomatic effort to
secure support.
The Administration is currently looking intensively at the question
of how to structure the new U.S. Mission to UNESCO when the U.S.
rejoins in October 2003.
______
Responses of Hon. Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
BUDGET-RELATED QUESTIONS
Question 1. In the FY 2004 budget request, there is no funding
requested for the U.S. contribution to Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO), requiring the Administration to return
to the Congress with a supplemental request if the United States and
its allies reach a future agreement with North Korea. At the same time,
the Nonproliferation and International Security account in the
Department of Energy budget request ``has been significantly increased
over FY 2003 levels for restructuring of the program to take account
for recent events in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and take
steps to bring a `toolkit' of verification technologies to bear on the
clear and present danger of the DPRK nuclear program.''
a. In ruling out future funding for KEDO, what message is the
Administration sending out to our South Korean and Japanese allies who
have always shouldered the lion's share of the financial burden of the
Agreed Framework?
b. What is the nature of the funding increase and ``restructuring''
in the Nonproliferation and International Security account in the
Department of Energy budget request as related to North Korea? Please
explain how these changes promotes our nonproliferation goals and
whether they lay the groundwork for adequate verification of any
possible future agreement with North Korea on its nuclear programs.
Answer a. Congress appropriated up to $5 million for KEDO in FY03,
provided the President determine that such a contribution is vital to
the national security interests of the U.S. Preserving our ability to
contribute to KEDO provides us flexibility to work with our allies to
achieve our shared non-proliferation goals. The U.S. is consulting with
the other members of KEDO's Executive Board (South Korea, Japan, and
the EU) about the future of the organization, including the future of
the light water reactor project. We are not prejudging any decisions in
this regard. We will keep in close touch with Congress as we proceed.
We do not know now what role, if any, KEDO will play next year, so
the Administration did not request FY04 funding for KEDO. If we find it
is in our interest to fund KEDO's administrative or other costs, we
will request as necessary. We are working closely with our KEDO
partners and continuing to consult on KEDO's future activities and
financial commitments.
Answer b. The re-establishment of safeguards in the DPRK and the
eventual verification of North Korea's nuclear materials declaration
would have to be immediately undertaken by the international community
if the DPRK were to refreeze its nuclear program and/or decide to
remain party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The already
difficult IAEA verification task in North Korea has been further
complicated by the following recent events:
1. Removal of IAEA inspectors from North Korea, which has
resulted in the loss of monitoring and surveillance of the DPRK
frozen facilities at Yongbyon.
2. Unfreezing the plutonium production facilities at
Yongbyon. The 5 MW (e) reactor, which was restarted on February
26, will produce additional spent fuel. If North Korea proceeds
to reprocess existing canned spent fuel, now no longer under
safeguards, it would provide significant quantities of
undeclared plutonium along with production of large quantities
of reprocessing waste.
3. Knowledge of a clandestine uranium enrichment program.
Reestablishing safeguards will require significant effort. The
United States provides a wide range of technical support for
IAEA safeguards worldwide. We have already delivered a
specialized spent-fuel measurement instrument requested by the
IAEA for use in the DPRK. We anticipate a need for further
high-priority technical support for any renewal effort in the
DPRK. The Nonproliferation and International Security account
in the DOE budget request, therefore, has been increased over
FY03 levels to provide needed support.
Question 2. I understand that Secretary General Annan asked
President Bush and you to make a firm commitment to provide financing
for the UN Capital Master Plan for renovating its headquarters. I also
understand that there has been some discussion of the United States
providing a $1 billion interest-free loan to the UN for construction,
as was done when the current facilities were built fifty years ago.
a. Has the United States taken a position with regard to the
Capital Master Plan?
b. What is your view on the prospect of the United States giving
the UN a $1 billion interest-free loan?
c. What other options are under consideration for financing the
renovation plan? What are the relative merits and demerits of each?
Answer. The Administration supports the concept of the UN Capital
Master Plan (CMP) for renovation of the UN headquarters complex in New
York. The complex is aging, does not meet current building codes and
fire and safety standards, is not energy efficient, and is in need of
significant security upgrades. In its initial review of the CMP in
2001, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) indicated that the UN
complex ``clearly needs to be renovated'' and the UN's initial plans
for the renovation were ``reasonable.'' The GAO is currently conducting
a follow-up review of the CMP, which, we understand, should be
available this spring.
No decision has been made regarding an interest-free loan to the
UN. It is estimated that a $1 billion interest-free loan would cost the
U.S. government approximately $550-600 million at current interest
rates. This cost clearly presents a major hurdle.
The UN General Assembly has not yet considered the issue of
financing the CMP, including the potential options. Other UN members
have indicated in various venues their expectation of significant host-
country support by the U.S., including provision for an interest-free
loan. We expect the issue of U.S. support and CMP financing options, in
general, to be major discussion topics in future sessions of the
General Assembly.
Question 3. When were the exchange rate calculations for the
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account made? Please
provide an updated calculation of the request for the CIO account
reflecting current exchange rates.
Answer. The exchange rate calculations reflected in the FY 2004
request for the CIO account were based on rates in effect at the end of
April 2002, when the request was initially formulated. Since that time,
the value of the dollar has declined about 20 percent against major
foreign currencies (i.e., the Euro and Swiss franc) that are used for
the assessments billed by a number of organizations.
Based on updated exchange rates and other adjustments related to
the recent enactment of the FY 2003 CIO appropriation, the CIO request
would now total $1,070.2 million, up about $60 million from the
President's request.
Question 4. There is a discrepancy in the request for the UN
regular budget set forth in the appendix of the President's budget (at
page 691 of the appendix), which calls for $322 million, and the Budget
in Brief, which requests $340.7 million.
--What is the correct amount of the request?
--What are the reasons for the significant increase in the request
for the UN regular budget as compared to the FY 2003 request.
Answer. The Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) FY
2004 request for the UN regular budget is $340.7 million. This reflects
the full amount of the U.S. assessed requirements for calendar year
2003.
The lower figure shown in the appendix ($322 million) relates to a
technical adjustment in the presentation of the account. It is based on
the full requirement level of $340.7 million, as adjusted for a ``buy-
down'' of $18.7 million to take account of actual or potential funding
gains in the overall contributions to International Organizations (CIO)
account. The same adjustment figure also appears in the Budget in
Brief, but is shown at the end of the dollar tally for the full CIO
request (page 99). At present, the amount of the potential ``buy-down''
is in doubt. The level of the recently enacted FY 2003 appropriation,
in the face of exchange rate losses, has likely eroded by $11.7 million
our ability to reduce (or ``buy-down'') our funding requirements for FY
2004.
The increase in the CIO FY 2004 request for the UN regular budget
is attributable to the increase in the revised level of the overall
2002-03 UN budget. The overall UN budget increase, $266 million,
relates to several initiatives that the U.S. strongly supports. These
include enhancement of security measures of UN facilities following the
events of September 11th, the establishment of a new UN operation in
Afghanistan, additional costs relating to special political missions
approved by the Security Council, and the work of the UN's new Counter-
terrorism Committee. The budget increase also reflects the impact of
``uncontrollables'' such as higher inflation and exchange rate costs
and the approved salary adjustment for UN staff.
Following nearly a decade of no-growth budgets in the UN, we view
last year's increase of $266 million to be a necessary aberration to
respond to a host of unforeseen events, including September 11th. Our
position remains to ensure strict budget discipline in the UN.
Question 5. The FY 2004 budget requests $97 million for the D&CP
account for 399 positions, the third phase of the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative. This is $3 million less in nominal terms than the FY 2003
request for the same number of positions.
a. What accounts for this reduction?
b. Specifically, in what areas will savings be accrued?
Answer. The D&CP estimate for the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
is less in the FY 2004 request than in the FY 2003 request due to
refinements--based on more recent actual costs and experience--in
calculating and allocating the costs of first assignments. These costs
include initial assignment travel and outfitting expenses, such as
furniture, equipment, lease, and support costs.
Question 6. The FY 2004 Budget in Brief for the State Department
(at page 31) asserts that there is $35.6 million in decreases in the
D&CP account which represents funding for ``one-time hiring plan costs
for 399 new hires under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.'' The FY
2003 Budget in Brief (at page 29) asserts a similar decrease--a
reduction of $33.3 million in funding for ``one-time hiring plan costs
for 360 new hires under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.''
a. Are these ``one-time'' costs referenced in the FY 2003 budget
request the same ``one-time'' costs referenced in the FY 2004 budget
request?
b. Please provide specific details on the ``one-time'' costs
incurred in each of FY 2002 and FY 2003 which will not recur under the
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.
Answer a. Yes, the one-time costs referenced are the same types of
costs.
Answer b. The one-time hiring costs include security clearances and
medical exams for new officers and their families and office and
residential furniture, fixtures, and equipment. This expense also
consists of costs defined as ``make ready move in costs.'' This
includes improvements to new housing stock to cover increased security
needs and generators that are required in less-developed countries.
Question 7a. The budget request for the Millennium Challenge
Account anticipates $25 million in administrative expenses for a
separate corporation to administer the program.
--Why is a separate corporation necessary to administer this
program?
Answer. The MCA represents the President's vision of an innovative
way for the United States to spur lasting development. The MCA is a
truly new approach.
First, the MCA is selective, targeting those countries that ``rule
justly, invest in the health and education of their people, and
encourage economic freedom.'' By selecting only those countries that
have adopted policies that encourage growth, MCA assistance will more
likely result in successful sustainable economic development. It will
also create a powerful incentive for countries wishing to qualify to
adopt growth-enabling policies.
Second, the MCA establishes a true partnership in which the
developing country, with full participation of its citizens, proposes
its own priorities and plans.
Finally, the MCA will place a clear focus on results. Funds will go
only to those countries with well-implemented programs that have clear
objectives and benchmarks.
A new institution is the best hope to implement this targeted
initiative, and to provide visible evidence of U.S. leadership and
high-level engagement. USAID and other agencies will need to continue
to deliver the important humanitarian and regional assistance of
interest to the United States, to address complex emergencies, and to
work both with countries that are MCA ``near misses'' as well as with
failed and failing states. The NCA is designed to complement existing
assistance by focusing on growth and demonstrating a new way of working
with countries that have reached a high level of development-readiness.
The MCA needs flexibility and focus to carry out its innovative
mandate and should start with a clean slate to give it the best chance
to succeed and show that this approach works. If it is to respond to
developing country priorities, the MCA cannot be restricted to specific
areas of funding. If it is to operate with a lean staff and draw from
the best and brightest in the public, private and nonprofit sectors,
the MCA must have special personnel authority. If it is to be
effective, it must also have the ability to contract and procure
broadly. If it is to succeed in its mission, the MCA must be open to a
new way of operating.
That is why the Administration has proposed the establishment of a
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) headed by a Chief Executive
Officer nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. He or
she would report to a cabinet board, chaired by the Secretary of State,
which would provide policy and operational oversight as well as
facilitate coordination among all foreign assistance programs.
Our goal is a new, flexible, effective and visible organization
that complements other assistance activities but operates in a new way
to achieve lasting economic growth in countries most ready for active
partnership.
Question 7b. The budget request seeks $12 million--nearly half the
administrative budget--for ``other services'' (Budget appendix, page
903). What are these services? Please provide detailed information.
Answer. Estimates for the administrative expenses of the Millennium
Challenge Corporation are highly notional. They are based on
organizations (such as OPIC and USTR) that have similar administrative
costs in terms of travel and personnel. The $12 million in ``Other
Services'' would cover expenses such as the transportation of items, IT
contracts, legal services, and other services associated with the
start-up of the MCC. The Millennium Challenge Corporation envisions a
lean staffing model. We envision tapping current government resources
where appropriate and contracting out a good portion of its
administrative support. Any funds not used for administrative expenses
will be used for assistance.
Question 7c. The legislative proposals submitted by the President
do not include the eligibility criteria in the draft statutory
language. Should not the criteria be put in statute? If not, why not?
Answer. The proposed legislation defines the policy criteria, which
must be used to determine MCA eligibility, in Section 102(2)A, B and C.
The legislation is clear that the MCA should select only those
countries that have a ``demonstrated commitment to ruling justly,
investing in the health and education of their citizens and encouraging
economic freedom.'' The proposed legislation does not specify the
methodology or indicators to be used, although they are described in
the accompanying sectional analysis. We chose not to put the
methodology or indicators in legislation, since neither is set in
stone, nor should they be. No indicator or methodology is perfect and
the MCC will regularly review the system to ensure it is selecting
countries with the policies that will enable development results. As
the program proceeds, as necessary, certain indicators may be dropped
in favor of better data, or other indicators may be added if it is
determined they will help the Board of the MCC choose the most
qualified countries. The process will continue to be dynamic,
transparent, and rigorous.
Question 7d. What is the estimate of obligations of $800 million in
FY 2004 based on?
Answer. This is an estimate of the proportion of the $1.3 billion
budget request, which we expect would actually be obligated in FY 2004,
based on the careful selection system we will set up. The MCA will rely
on contracts developed in large part by the MCA country itself and then
negotiated with the Millennium Challenge Corporation. This is an
innovative approach with no precedent to guide us. We anticipate that
it may take some time to develop the first proposals and then hone them
into acceptably detailed and accountable contracts. We thus did not
believe it likely that all MCA money appropriated in FY 2004 would be
obligated in the fiscal year. We would anticipate that any remaining
funding would be obligated in FY 2005 for programs in countries
selected in FY 2004.
MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE: ESF REQUEST
Question. The proposed legislative language for the Economic
Support Fund (ESF) account would provide authority to establish
enterprise funds in the ``Middle East region.'' In which countries does
the Administration anticipate establishing such funds? Please define
what constitutes the ``Middle East region'' under this provision. What
is the estimated cost for establishing such funds?
Answer. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), working with
capital market experts in the Department, USAID and the White House, is
developing recommendations for an enterprise fund in the region.
Several options are under consideration for designation of the funds.
One option would establish country-specified funds, each with a
different board. Another option would be to set up an umbrella
enterprise fund for all Middle East and North Africa countries with a
single board that has the authority to set-up country-specific sub-
funds, each managed independently by in-country experts with relevant
professional experience.
In December, NEA sent out an interagency assessment team to
undertake the first of several country-specific due diligence reviews
of the region's receptivity to an enterprise fund type vehicle. The
team met with financial service professionals, entrepreneurs, business
leaders and other investors to assess capital needs, areas of business
opportunity, as well as the regulatory and legal climate. We are
incorporating the team's findings into our design of potential funds
for the region.
All Middle East and North African countries are eligible, with the
exception of Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria because of legal
restrictions.
The Department and relevant USG agencies are still reviewing
individual country needs in the region. The success of these funds will
depend upon having a capital base adequate to induce regional
governments to undertake the institutional changes needed to facilitate
fund investment. For this very reason, we are likely to apply the
entire FY04 request of $30 million to set up a fund in Morocco. In
Egypt, we are considering a fund of at least $100 million, financed
over several years from existing ESF sources to be reprogrammed.
EMERGENCY FUND FOR COMPLEX FOREIGN CRISES
Question. The budget requests authority for $100 million in FY 2004
for a new ``Emergency Fund for Complex Foreign Crises.''
a. Why is current authority under Sections 451 and 614 of the
Foreign Assistance Act insufficient to meet crises?
b. Would the use of funds be subject to any conditions or legal
restrictions, such as restrictions baring aid to state sponsors of
terrorism?
Answer. Sections 451 and 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act permit
the waiving of restrictions but do not authorize new funds, and hence
require the drawdown of existing resources. This is not the concept
behind the establishment of this new emergency account. Similarly, both
Sections 451 and 614 have yearly caps and in the case of Section 614,
country caps, that would hamper our ability to respond.
We have drafted the provision for the ``Emergency Fund for Complex
Foreign Crises'' so that it would enable us to provide assistance
``notwithstanding any other provision of law'', much like authorities
to provide disaster assistance and other forms of assistance with
respect to which there is general recognition that assistance is needed
without regard to usual limitations that under normal circumstances
would operate to prevent assistance.
BUDGET-RELATED
Question 1. Please provide information on the current Diplomatic
(DS) Special Agents, including--
--the number of DS special agents expected to retire in the next
three years;
--the number of DS special agents hired in the last three years;
--the number of FTEs for DS special agents and the number of
positions unfilled (with a breakdown between domestic and overseas
positions).
Answer. Over the course of the next three years (2003-2005), a
total of 173 DS special agents will become eligible for Retirement. Of
those, 25 will face mandatory retirement. In 2003, 100 special agents
will be eligible to retire with an additional 9 special agents reaching
the mandatory retirement age. In 2004, 26 special agents will become
eligible to retire and 9 special agents will achieve the mandatory
retirement requirements. In 2005, 22 special agents will be eligible to
retire and 7 additional special agents will face mandatory retirement.
In the last three fiscal years, 452 special agents have been hired:
52 in FY-2000, 82 in FY-2001, and 318 in FY-2002. Of the 452, 87 were
for attrition and 365 were new authorizations.
At present, there are a total of 1,229 DS special agents, of whom
786 are assigned domestically and 443 are overseas. Of the 121 special
agent positions that are not filled, 62 are domestic and 59 are
overseas.
Question 2. The Budget of Worldwide Security Upgrades (in the D&CP
account) requests $36.7 million to upgrade security at Embassy Kabul
and Embassy Dushanbe.
a. What is the estimate of the number of contractor guards at
embassy Kabul based on? Is there a comparable number of Marines
providing security now?
b. Is the cost estimate based on a similar contract for American
guards now in place in Afghanistan (i.e. the protection detail of
President Karzai)? If not, what is it based on?
Answer. From July 25 to 27, 2002, a Diplomatic Security program
officer visited post to determine the contract guard requirements to
replace the assigned U.S. Marine Company. A survey of the Embassy
compound, Embassy Annex, review of the U.S. Marines resources and
capabilities and consultations with the DCN, TDY RSOs, and Marine
Company commander was conducted. The information obtained from the
consultations, surveys and analyzing the current U.S. Marine
capabilities and resources was used to determine the estimated
resources, within the parameters of a contract guard force
capabilities, to adequately replace the U.S. Marine Company and provide
security. The estimated number of contractor guards was also based on
providing coverage to the entire Embassy compound and allowing for
increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic as the Embassy assumes
normalized operations. It provides contract guards for the mobile
patrols, off site offices, and the Ambassador's residential security
that are not currently provided by the Marine Company.
To adequately replace the U.S. Marine Company with a contract guard
force employing American citizens, Diplomatic Security has estimated
that 273,640 guard hours per year would be required at an annual cost
of $6,204,000 in FY-04.
Currently, a reinforced company of U.S. Marines, approximately 80
personnel, is providing security for the American Embassy in Kabul.
More contract personnel will be required. The U.S. Marines are better
equipped with weapons capabilities and resources, which provide them
with the ability to react to threats with a smaller contingent of
personnel than can be provided under a commercial guard contract. Also,
an increase in contract guards is required to account for mission
operations and other security services that are not currently being
provided by the U.S. Marines.
The cost estimate for the guard service is based on a similar
contract for the protection of President Karzai in Afghanistan. The
proposal is to use American guard personnel hired through a commercial
guard contract.
Question 3. With regard to the request for Athens Olympics
Security, will the United States Olympic Committee or the host
committee provide any reimbursement of the projected costs to the
United States government for providing security to the U.S. Olympic
Team? Is there a precedent for providing special agents to protect the
Olympic Team at an Olympics held outside the United States? From where
would the 150 special agents be assigned to temporary duty be drawn?
What would be the consequent effect on security at the U.S. missions or
domestic offices from which the special agents would be drawn?
Answer. Neither the Athens Olympic Organizing Committee nor the
U.S. Olympic Committee will provide reimbursement for the costs
associated with providing security for the U.S. Olympic Team. The
Organizing Committees do not fund security for each nation's Olympic
team but will provide basic security for all participants.
Special Agents from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) have
provided protective security support for the U.S. Olympic team for the
1988 Seoul, 1992 Barcelona, and the 2000 Sydney Games. DS has also
provided coverage for U.S. Athletes at the World Cup and other
international sporting events.
We expect to draw some of the 150 Special Agents from Washington
DC, various DS field offices throughout the United States and from
volunteers at overseas posts where their temporary travel will not
adversely affect mission security. We will also ask other U.S. Federal
Law Enforcement agencies to provide their Special Agents in support of
this operation. This is done at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) every
year. U.S. Marshals, ATF Agents and other Federal law enforcement
personnel work with DS to protect foreign dignitaries attending the
UNGA.
The 150 Special Agents assigned to provide security for the U.S.
Olympic Team will be in Greece no longer that four weeks: most for only
two to three weeks. We believe this will not produce long term adverse
affects on the operations of our domestic offices. No DS agent from an
overseas mission will be used if that mission's security will be
adversely affected by the agent's absence.
Question 4. What are the number of ETEs devoted to INR-TIPOFF/
Terrorism program? Are these positions all filled? Does the request for
FY 2004 provide for additional positions? If not, why not?
Answer. There are currently five positions devoted to INR's TIPOFF
program. All of these positions are filled. These positions are
supplemented by contract support as required.
The Department's FY 2004 request includes an additional 399
positions to complete the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI). These
positions, as well as contractor resources, will be prioritized to help
close existing staffing gaps and meet the dynamic staffing requirements
for the Department, including those that are identified for the TIPOFF
program.
Question 5. Why are the Fulbright Exchanges and Professional
Exchanges being reduced in the FY 2004 request? How many fewer exchange
participants will receive funding as a result?
Answer. The President's FY 2004 request for Educational and
Cultural Exchanges is $345 million. The Department can do more in
exchanges. However, the overall federal budget constraints did not
allow funding above the levels we are requesting.
The FY 04 request consists of:
$245 million for exchanges, which is straight-lined from the FY 03
level and $7 million below the current services level of funding. We
estimate that this will result in 2,450 fewer exchanges in FY 04. Given
that, ECA will pursue prioritization of effort and achievement of
efficiencies to maximize the utilization of our funds.
The request also includes $100 million for the merger of FSA/SEED
exchanges from the Foreign Assistance appropriation into the
Educational & Cultural Exchanges (ECE) appropriation. In the past, the
Department has used Foreign Assistance transfers from USAID to support
these key education, international visitor, and citizen exchange
activities in the NIS and southeastern Europe.
We need ways to reach the youth of the world, to quell hostility
towards us, and to engage in constructive dialogue that increases
mutual respect, and change antiAmerican attitudes. Exchanges are
central to that longterm effort.
Question 6. What is the unobligated balance in the K Fund as of
February 1, 2003? What are the projected obligations in FY 2003?
Answer. As of February 1, 2003, the unobligated balance in the
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service account (K Fund) was
$43.3 million.
Projected FY 2003 obligations for the K Fund are estimated to total
$30 million.
As a contingency account, the K Fund is utilized to meet unforeseen
emergencies in State Department operations. Given the war on terrorism
and campaign against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, it is
highly likely that we will need to draw down the balance of this
account in FY 2003 to meet requirements for rewards and evacuations.
INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE
Question. The request for International Disaster Assistance is $50
million below the request for FY 2003 and $186 million below the actual
spending in FY 2002. Why is the request reduced so significantly?
Answer. The basic funding level for the International Disaster
Assistance (IDA) account has not been reduced from traditional levels.
The FY 2003 request included a budget amendment of $53 million for
humanitarian, refugee, and reconstruction assistance specifically for
the West Bank and Gaza.
The FY 2002 actual level included a total of $186 million from the
Emergency Response Fund (P.L. 107-38) and the FY 2002 Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-206) to address specific post September 11
requirements.
As Secretary Powell indicated in his hearing, additional funding,
including IDA, will likely be needed in FY 2003 to address additional
unfunded needs.
BUDGET-RELATED
Question 1. What were the number of passports issued in FY 2001, FY
2002, and the first quarter of FY 2003?
Answer. The Department issued 7,119,506 million passports in FY
2001; 7,143,345 million in FY 2002; and 1,463,770 in the first quarter
of FY 2003.
Question 2. What were the number of NIV applications in FY 2001, KY
2002, and the first quarter of FY 2003?
Answer.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oct.-Dec. FY
FY 2001 FY 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issued....................................................... 7,588,778 5,769,638 1,204,822
Refused...................................................... 2,870,799 2,587,230 603,461
--------------------------------------------------
Total.................................................... 10,459,577 8,356,868 \1\ 1,808,283
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This figure represents a 2.76% increase over the same period during FY 2002.
Question 3. The Budget-in-Brief for the State Department (page 21)
projects that 6 million persons will apply for non-immigrant visas and
will generate an MRV fee in FY 2003, which will also apply in FY 2004.
The projected fee collections (set forth in the appendix), however,
differ by $200 million (projected $582 million in FY 2003 and $782
million in FY 2004).
--Please explain the difference in the projected MRV fee
collections.
Answer. The FY 2004 budget assumes a visa workload of 7 million
non-immigrant visa applicants, of whom approximately 6 million are
required to pay the $100 Machine Readable Visa Fee. Certain categories
of visa applicants, such as those seeking diplomatic visas, are not
subject to the MRV fee. Against this MRV demand base of 6 million
applicants, we have FY 2004 budgetary requirements that total $736
million. Enhanced visa processes and the requirements under the
Enhanced Border Security Act and the PATRIOT Act largely drive these
requirements. Among the program that we must continue and/or initiate
during KY 2004 is the collection of biometric data from all applicants.
We are also conducting longer and more extensive interviews of all visa
applicants.
In order to fund these activities, the FY 2004 budget assumes that
we will increase the MRV fee beyond $100. The Department has embarked
on a comprehensive cost of service study to determine what this new fee
would be. From a budgetary standpoint, we estimate that the new fee
would be $130 to $140 per applicant, thereby generating net revenues of
approximately $782 million.
Question 4. The Budget-in-Brief for the State Department (at page
35) indicates that the Department will establish 68 new positions in KY
2004 by shifting responsibility for visa adjudication currently held by
Consular Associates to Foreign Service Officers. The next paragraph
indicates that ``in addition, the Department of State will establish
additional positions as part of the Border Security Program funded by
MRV fees.''
--How many such positions will be established? At what cost?
Answer. In FY 2004, the Department will establish 193 new positions
to support the delivery of consular services. include:
68 positions funded as part of the Department's D&CP
program. These positions will allow the Department to continue
to meet its commitment to shift visa adjudication
responsibilities from consular associates to commissioned
Foreign Service Officers. The total costs of these positions is
$22.572 million.
125 new positions funded through the Department's Border
Security Program. This includes 80 overseas positions and 45
domestic positions. The overseas positions will deal with both
workload requirements and the need to begin collecting
biometrics from foreign visa applicants. The domestic positions
will address staffing needs associated with the domestic
passport function and the overall management of the Bureau of
Consular Affairs. The total cost of these 125 new positions is
estimated at $26,400 million.
Question 5. What would be the cost of ending the charge imposed on
passport applications for telephone inquiries to the National Passport
Center? Please provide an estimate which assumes retaining the services
of the contractor operating the Center.
Answer. The Department of State depends upon the National Passport
Information Center (NPIC) to answer inquiries from American citizens
seeking information about the U.S. passport application process. The
NPIC is currently operated by a private sector firm at no-cost to the
Department of State; the NPIC charges callers a fee that recovers the
cost of its service.
The Department of State, consistent with our commitment to continue
to improve service to our passport customers, is currently reviewing
proposals from vendors interested in taking over the NPIC function and
operating it as a service that would be largely funded by the
Department of State. The actual cost of this contract will be
determined through both the procurement process and based on actual
usage of this service by passport applicants. The Department's FY-03
and FY-04 Border Security Program budget includes $5 million for Public
Information Support to fund a consular information program that will
answer telephone inquiries about visas, passports and American citizen
services. The new contract will be funded from this budget source.
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
WOMEN (CEDAW)
Question. On July 8, 2002, you wrote me indicating that the
Administration was conducting a review of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and
that the review was proceeding as ``expeditiously as possible.'' Over
seven months have now passed.
a. What is the current status of that review?
b. When does the Administration expect to complete it?
Answer. The Administration is firmly committed to the advancement
of women, in the United States and abroad. However, we continue to
review unresolved questions related to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). We
have at this point no timetable for the conclusion of the review, and
therefore are not prepared to commit to concluding our work under a
particular time frame. As the review proceeds, we will continue to
advocate for women and children using a wide range of diplomatic tools
including foreign assistance, bilateral negotiations, and at
multilateral fora.
ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE BY USG PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH WAR ON
TERRORISM
Question. On December 26, 2002, the Washington Post reported on
treatment of terrorists suspects detained overseas by U.S. officials.
The article alleges that such suspects are ``subject to what are known
as `stress and duress' techniques,'' and further alleges that suspects
who do not cooperate are rendered to foreign intelligence services
whose ``practice of torture has been documented by the U.S. government
and human rights organizations.''
a. Please comment on these allegations as presented by the
Washington Post article.
b. What is U.S. policy and practice with regard to interrogation
and treatment of such suspects?
Answer. The United States, does not permit, tolerate, or condone
torture. Torture is a violation of U.S. law. Allegations of torture are
thoroughly investigated. Enemy combatants detained in U.S. control are
treated consistent with applicable United States law and international
law against torture, without regard to the conduct of our attackers. A
number of these detainees are Senior al-Qaida operatives or others
committed to killing Americans and others. They have been, and will
continue to be, questioned aggressively in order to protect the lives
of Americans and others. However, U.S. Government personnel are not
permitted to torture detainees or participate in torture by others.
They must conduct themselves in a manner that complies with applicable
law. In any cases where the United States transfers detainees to other
countries for detention, we seek and receive assurances that detainees
will not be tortured.
POLICY OR LEGISLATIVE QUESTIONS
Question 1. What instructions, if any, have been provided to posts
with regard to implementation of Section 505 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY 2003 (P.L. 107-228) (related to travel by Voice
of America correspondents)?
Answer. The Department of State and our Ambassadors overseas
recognize the vital role VOA correspondents play in bringing objective
coverage of critical stories to the world. However, VOA correspondents,
as all IRE, BBG and VOA employees, are federal employees subject to the
same constraints, privileges, and responsibilities as are all federal
employees overseas. Therefore, VOA correspondents are subject to Chief
of Mission authority and must request country clearances when traveling
abroad. They are also subject to Ambassadorial instructions in times of
crisis.
The Department and Administration feel there cannot be two separate
systems of accountability--one for the employees of all overseas USC
agencies and one specifically tailored to VOA correspondents. Uniform
treatment of all public servants is crucial to the discipline and
security of all our personnel, as was made clear in the President's
signing statement of September 30, 2002.
When other global media representatives are present, VOA
correspondents have been allowed to remain in-country even in cases of
an ordered departure. Ambassadors do not count VOA correspondents
towards the mandated personnel levels during an authorized or ordered
departure. In addition, in cases of mandatory evacuation, the
Department of State follows the Department of Justice's direction that
correspondents must evacuate with all other USC personnel, but the
journalists should be the last employee to depart before the
ambassador.
These precepts have served well and maintain the correspondents'
ability to cover a story, the President's authority and requirement to
have a uniform overseas public service, and the Ambassador's
responsibilities as Chief of Mission and Presidential representative.
Question 2. In August 2002, in West Papua, Indonesia, two Americans
were killed and eight others injured in an ambush while driving on a
mountain road. There is evidence that senior members of the Indonesian
military may have been behind this attack, which occurred less than
half a mile from an Indonesian military post. The senior Indonesian
police official in charge of the investigation said last December that
there is evidence that soldiers from the army's strategic reserve force
(KOSTRAD) were involved in the shooting. This same police official also
reported last November that a witness to the ambush reported seeing
members of the Indonesian army's special forces (KOPASSUS)
participating in the attack. The Indonesian police report on the
murders concludes, quote: ``there is a strong possibility that the case
was perpetrated by members of the Indonesian National Army Force,
however, it still needs to be investigated further.'' The Indonesian
police authorities who conducted the first investigation into the
murders have been transferred, removed from all authority over the
case.
In January 30, the New York Times reported that ``senior Bush
administration officials'' have determined that Indonesian soldiers
carried out the deadly ambush.
Question a. Has the United States government reached any
conclusions about who is responsible for the murders in West Papua? Has
the Indonesian government? If so, what are the conclusions?
Answer. The United States Government has not yet reached
conclusions about the identity of individuals who are responsible for
the murders in Papua, pending completion of the investigation into this
incident. We believe that the same holds true for the Government of
Indonesia.
Question b. Is the Indonesian government providing the FBI with
full, unobstructed access to potential suspects and witnesses to the
killings? Specifically, has the FBI been permitted to interview General
Raziman and Assistant Senior Police Commissioner Sumarjiyo, the police
authorities who first investigated the murders?
Answer. While we cannot speak for the FBI, we understand that the
cooperation provided to Indonesian Government officials did not meet
the full expectations of the FBI investigators who recently returned to
Papua for further investigation of this case. Indonesian military
authorities allowed the FBI agents to interview military personnel, but
only in the presence of an Indonesian Army Brigadier General who had an
intimidating effect on the soldiers. While the Indonesian Government
authorities initially promised to allow the FBI to take evidence to the
United States for testing, they later conditioned such an action on FBI
funding of GOI personnel to accompany the evidence to the United
States. Subsequently, during a February 19 meeting with FBI Director
Mueller, Indonesian Police General Pastika stated that the FBI would
have to send investigators and testing equipment to Indonesia in order
to run tests on the evidence. The FBI investigators did not request to
meet with Brigadier Raziman during their most recent trip to Papua. The
FBI worked closely with Assistant Senior Police Commissioner Sumarjiyo
during a previous visit and asked to meet with him upon their return to
Papua but were told that Sumarjiyo had been removed from the case.
Question c. On January 22, the State Department expressed the
Administration's opposition to an amendment to the FY 2003 omnibus
appropriations bill that would have conditioned some IMET assistance to
Indonesia. The Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs
asserted, ``The President has directed that we emphasize to the
Government of Indonesia that there must be a credible investigation and
process of justice to avoid damage to our entire bilateral
relationship.'' Assistant Secretary Kelly, described, however,
``repeated demarches'' from Washington which led the Indonesian
Government to permit the FBI to participate in a new investigation of
the West Papua killings.
Would you describe the Indonesian Army's investigation into its own
role in the West Papua murders as ``credible?'' Why does it take
repeated demarches in order for the FBI to be permitted to investigate
a crime in which 10 of the victims were American?
Answer. The Indonesian government's summary of the various
investigations, including those conducted by the Indonesian Army, was
provided to the FBI. We understand that the FBI review of this summary
found information pointing to possible involvement of individuals
associated with the Indonesian military, however, the FBI also noted
that the Indonesian government has not yet followed up on this
information in a credible manner. Senior officials of the Indonesian
Government quickly grasped the importance of this case; that we
presented ``repeated demarches'' was due to the fact that we raised
this issue in each and every encounter between senior U.S. and
Indonesian Government officials.
Question d. If the Indonesian military is found to have
orchestrated the attack or had prior knowledge of it, what will be the
consequences with regard to the U.S.-Indonesian relationship?
Answer. Anything short of a full accounting and punishment for
those responsible for this crime would be unacceptable and would have a
negative impact on the bilateral relationship. At this time we are not
prepared to speculate on the specific consequences of such a failure.
Question 3. Please provide information on implementation of Section
606(a)(1)(A) and (4) of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001
(related to Emergency Action Plans at U.S. missions and crisis
management training for Department personnel) since enactment. How is
oversight exercised of post compliance with regard to the requirements
for training or drills of measures under the Emergency Action Plans?
What is the compliance record of posts in this regard?
Answer. Foreign Affairs Handbooks (FAH) are the Department's
regulatory authority and all posts are expected to be in compliance.
The Emergency Planning Handbook, requires every post to conduct the
following drills each year: Fire, Bomb, Emergency Destruction, Internal
Defense, Duck and Cover, and Warden System Exercise for Notification of
both Official Personnel and Non-Official U.S. citizens. Posts listed as
high or critical on the Security Environment Threat List must conduct
these drills twice a year. The Handbook specifically states that Posts
will report the dates and results of the drills as they are conducted
via cable to the Department. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office
of International Programs tracks the status of Drills through Quarterly
Status Reports.
Since 1999, the Department has provided instruction in crisis
management to personnel at U.S. diplomatic posts by conducting Crisis
Management Exercises (CMEs) at a minimum of 100 posts per fiscal year.
On average, each post will participate in a CME once every 30 months.
All posts had completed at least one CME by March 2001. The number of
CMEs conducted through FY02 is as follows: FY 2000: 103; FY 2002: 105;
FY 2002: 110.
Question 4. How many overseas facilities, in percentage terms,
currently do not meet security standards for setback?
Answer. We currently have 248 overseas posts with facilities
located in stand-alone buildings or compounds and 86.6% of the posts do
not fully meet security standards for setback.
Department long-range plans call for the replacement of fifty-four
of our current overseas office facilities with new buildings through FY
2007. Should these plans be achieved, the percentage of our overseas
office facilities not meeting setback standards would be reduced from
86.6% to 65%. Relocating more of our smaller facilities into commercial
space in multi-tenant office buildings, as 9.5% of our office
facilities are currently located, will improve our security as well.
While offices in commercial space generally do not meet setback
standards, this alternate execution strategy for small posts provides a
reasonable level of security at an affordable price.
Question 5. Section 606(a)(7) of the Admiral James N. Nance and Meg
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001
requires the Secretary of State to enter into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the Secretary of Defense on rapid response
procedures for mobilization of personnel and equipment in times of
emergency with respect to U.S. diplomatic facilities. Has this MOU been
concluded?
Answer. The MOU has not yet been concluded. However, the Executive
Secretariat (S/ES) has begun internal preparations for negotiations
with the Department of Defense on rapid response procedures. According
to the January, 2001, Security and Intelligence Oversight Report,
stakeholder bureaus in State met and reviewed existing documents
defining responsibilities for crisis response.
Although the MOU process was initiated in early 2001, an MOU has
not yet been completed. Summer 2001 personnel turnover and the events
of September 11, 2001, delayed progress. Since 2001, S/ES has
experienced a complete changeover in staff. A November 20, 2002, memo
from the OIG to the S/ES executive office, requesting a status report
on the MOU, brought the matter to the attention of the new Executive
Secretary and S/ES staff, who were previously unaware of the
requirement.
To advance progress on the MOU, the Executive Secretary has
designated the Office of Crisis Management Support (S/ES-O/CMS) as the
action office for negotiating and drafting the MOU. The Director of CMS
has reestablished dialogue with the Department of Defense to that end.
S/ES will advise the Committee when the MOU with the Department of
Defense is finalized.
Question 6. Please provide information on attrition by grade, in
the Foreign Service in Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002. Please provide
information both in the aggregate and as a percentage of each grade.
Does the Department conduct exit interviews of officers who resign or
retire voluntarily? If so, what are the common reasons for departure
from the Service?
Answer. We are continually gratified by the fact that attrition in
the Foreign Service remains very low. We do collect information and
whenever possible conduct exit interviews with Foreign Service
employees who resign. In these interviews, the reasons most often cited
are related to incompatibility with the Foreign Service lifestyle due
to employee or family medical issues, children's educational needs, or
difficulty in finding employment for a spouse.
In addition, in our employee survey last year, employees most often
cited those same reasons as the ones that might prompt them to consider
leaving the Department. We have a variety of programs and initiatives
to address these concerns so that employees and families can remain
with the Department. This includes our spousal employment assistance
program and our efforts to manage ``tandem'' couples where both are
employees of the Department.
Question 7. As of January 1, 2003, what is the current average
caseload of officers in the Office of Children's Issues?
Answer. As of January 1, 2003, the average caseload in the
Abduction Unit of the Office of Children's Issues is currently fifty-
four active cases per officer.
Question 8. What is the status of consolidating all public
diplomacy personnel at Main State? How long will State continue to use
SA44?
Answer. Under the State-USIA Reorganization, the office of the
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was established
at Main State. In addition, the public diplomacy staffs from the
regional bureaus moved to Main State from SA-44. In addition to ECA and
lIP personnel, the legal public diplomacy staff remain at SA-44 pending
on-going major renovations that will result in the consolidation of the
Bureau of Legal Affairs at Main State.
The lease for SA-44 was renewed on January 3, 2003 for ten years,
through January 2, 2013. We are planning to consolidate most/all of the
ECA and lIP personnel to the Foggy Bottom area when the American
Pharmaceutical Association completes a proposed building addition
across the street from Main State. Due to site transfer and building
height limitations, we expect this addition will not be completed until
2007/2008. We can give GSA notice and vacate all or a portion of SA-44
when we are able to move staff to the new site.
Question 9. The backlog of pending Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) or Privacy Act requests continues to increase, according to the
most recently available reports from the Department. At the end of FY
2000, there were 5,782 requests pending. At the end of FY 2001, there
were 6,214 requests pending. The Congressional Presentation Document
for the Department for FY 2003 indicates ``23 additional FTEs were
provided to the Bureau of Administration in the third quarter of FY
2001 to eliminate the backlog during FY 2002 and FY 2003.''
a. What is the current backlog of FOIA and Privacy Act requests, as
of January 1, 2003?
b. Are those 23 additional FTEs still filled?
c. What are the reasons the backlog continues to increase?
Answers:
a. As of January 1, 2003, there was a backlog of 4420 FOIA and
Privacy Act cases.
b. Nineteen of the 23 additional FTEs have been filled; the
remaining four positions will be filled as soon as background
investigations are completed for the TOP SECRET security clearances
required for the positions. These 23 FTP will remain filled as part of
the permanent FOIA program infrastructure that has been established to
reduce the current backlog and prevent its build up in the future.
c. The backlog is no longer increasing, but decreasing as evidenced
by the fact that as of March 1, 2003, we had 3,762 FOIA and Privacy Act
cases in the backlog.
BUDGET-RELATED QUESTIONS
Question. The Congressional Presentation Document for the
Department for FY 2003 indicates that the ``Department has embraced the
use of alternative fuel and natural gas vehicles for the domestic motor
pool . . . (w)e have exceeded our goal for energy efficient vehicles,
in that they now comprise 84 percent of the applicable inventory.''
a. What is the goal for ``energy efficient vehicles?'' What is the
Department's definition of such a vehicle?
b. What efforts are being made or have been made to procure such
vehicles overseas?
Answer a. The Department of State's goals for energy efficient
vehicles are set forth in the Agency Fleet Energy Strategy Plan.
Although the Department has not established a ``percentage'' for energy
efficient vehicles, the Department's strategy includes: the use of
biodiesel (B-20) instead of conventional diesel powered vehicles;
continued acquisition of alternative-fuel vehicles (AFVs) and use of
alternative fuels in AFVs; acquisition of light-duty vehicles with
higher fuel economy; and improvements in the efficiency with which DOS
vehicles are operated.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) requires that 75 percent of
all covered light-duty vehicles (where the fleets have 20 or more
vehicles, are capable of being centrally fueled, and are operated in a
metropolitan statistical area with a population of more than 250,000
based on the 1980 census) acquired for Federal fleets must be
Alternative Fueled Vehicles (AFVs). In FY 2002 the Department acquired
43 AFVs (6 CNG bi-fuel, 4 CNG dedicated buses, and 33 E-85 flex-fuel)
for a total of 51 AFV credits. This resulted in an AFV-acquisition
percentage of 340% for FY 2002 (based on the Department's acquisition
of 15 light-duty non-exempt or ``covered'' vehicles).
The Department's definition of ``energy efficient vehicles'' is
defined as any vehicle that meets, or exceeds, the fuel economy values
for a specific make and model of motor vehicle as established by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). When acquiring vehicles, the
Department strives to purchase fuel efficient vehicles as published in
EPA's ``Fuel Economy Guide''.
Answer b. Currently, there are no energy efficient alternative fuel
vehicles in the overseas fleet, primarily because most countries do not
have alternative fuels available. We have purchased 50 American-
manufactured model year 2003 sedans and 30 model year 2003 station
wagons that can use either ethanol or gasoline fuel which will be used
to replace gasoline only powered vehicles where practical.
______
Responses of Hon. Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator George V. Voinovich
STRATEGIC HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
Question 1. Secretary Powell, the U.S. GAO, the Nation Commission
of Public Service, the U.S. Commission on National Security 21st
Century, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
and numerous other organizations have observed that the federal
government is experiencing a pervasive set of strategic human capital
management challenges. What is the Department of State doing to address
these issues especially in the case of its Civil Service workforce?
Answer. The Department of State has already embarked on its most
ambitious management reform ever in the area of human capital. We have
made people a top priority in the Department for both resources and
attention.
The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI)--begun in FY2002--is our
plan for ensuring the Department has enough staff to respond to crises
and emerging priorities, fill critical overseas staffing gaps, and
allow for training, especially in language and leadership and
management, without leaving us understaffed. We have successfully
completed the first year and are well on our way to completing year
two. With continued Congressional support we will be able to complete
the DRI in FY2004.
As part of the DRI, we have reformed our recruitment and hiring,
making significant gains in attracting talented applicants to the
Department. We increased all of our outreach and targeted the skills we
needed as well as minorities. With additional resources, we have
successfully streamlined the Foreign Service hiring process and have
turned our attention to the Civil Service hiring process. While much of
that process is governed by statute and managed by the Office of
Personnel Management, we want to ensure that what is within our control
is effective, efficient, and encourages talent to join the Department.
In addition to recruitment and hiring, we have also concentrated on
better methods of workforce planning, developing a Domestic Staffing
Model as a complement to our Overseas Staffing Model. As we use the
results from our initial assessments and begin to refine that model, we
will be able to better project skill needs within our domestic
operations. We are also working with the Department of the Army to
revise their civilian succession planning model for our use.
One of the goals of the DRI is to ensure we have an adequate
``personnel complement'' that can allow us to send people to the needed
training while not leaving day-to-day responsibilities understaffed.
The Army budgets a significant percentage of its workforce for
transfers and training and we want to be in a position to plan for
dealing with the unexpected rather than always taking it out of hide.
As part of the emphasis on training, we have instituted a plan to
train all Foreign and Civil Service mid-level employees over four years
in critical leadership and management skills. This is mandatory. We
also increased the emphasis on those skills in our Junior Officer
training and established a new training requirement for employees
entering the Senior Executive Service or the Senior Foreign Service.
Question 2. Please describe the State Department's rate of use of
the following title 5 authorities, which are designed to recruit and
retain a high-quality Civil Service workforce: (1) recruitment,
retention and relocation allowances; and (2) student loan repayments.
Answer. (1) The Department of State has implemented a structured
program of financial incentives to facilitate recruitment and retention
of individuals who possess critical Information Technology skills. A
panel of subject matter experts from throughout the Department
established the professional training and certification criteria, based
upon the skills needed to meet mission requirements. The program
provides one-time recruitment bonuses of up to 25% of base pay and on-
going retention allowances of up to 15% of base pay, depending upon the
level of the individual's credentials. To date, approximately 50% of
the current IT workforce have attained the necessary credentials to
receive some level of retention allowance. And 250 employees have been
approved for a recruitment bonus. Incentives have also been paid to
recruit and retain Civil Service employees in positions which require
skill in such difficult to staff languages as Japanese and Arabic.
Although the Department does not utilize the relocation bonus
incentive, we do pay permanent change of station allowances in
accordance with the Federal Travel Regulations to all Civil Service
employees who are relocated either from another Federal agency or
within the Department. We have also implemented written policies and
procedures which allow individual bureaus to pay certain travel
expenses for new hires who are relocating to accept employment with the
Department.
(2) The Department's Student Loan Repayment program has been
recognized as one of the most advanced and ambitious in the Federal
Government. In Fiscal Year 2002, 137 Civil Service employees in
positions in 26 occupational series were offered Student Loan Repayment
incentives. Of the 26 occupational series, 17 were identified as
chronically difficult to fill with or retain high-quality employees.
The employees in the remaining nine occupational series have unique
skills, knowledge, or abilities the Department has determined it is
essential to retain.
Two hundred and seventy Foreign Service employees in positions in
90 overseas locations were also offered Student Loan Repayment
incentives.
Question 3. Please comment on the State Department's use of the
Presidential Management Intern (PMI) Program in recent years.
Specifically, please respond to the following questions:
How does the PMI Program fit into the Department's short-
and long-term recruitment and hiring goals? Will the Program be
included in the management and/or human capital portion(s) the
Department's strategic and/or performance plans, which are now
required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA)?
What role does the PMI Program play in helping the
Department prepare for the imminent dynamic increase in federal
workforce vacancies that will be created by ``Baby Boomer''
retirements over the next decade?
What is the retention rate of PMIs who convert to the
competitive service after completing their two-year
internships? How long do such former PMIs remain with the
Department?
Answer. The PMI Program plays a significant role in both our short-
and long-term recruitment goals. Since 1997 we have been averaging over
50 PMI hires per year for a total of 307 to date. OPM has recognized
the Department as being among the top three Federal employers for PMI's
over the past several years.
While the PMI program is considered a part of our succession plan
and its use is encouraged at the highest levels, it is primarily a tool
for Bureaus to use to meet their skill needs. The yearly process of
determining what PMI positions to authorize is part of the regular
budgeting and planning process that allocates human resources.
Having a vibrant PMI program helps us to have significant numbers
of trained and experienced mid and senior level managers ready to
assume the responsibilities of our departing Baby Boomers. To this end,
we have instituted a centrally managed and structured program agenda
that:
Brings the PMIs on board as a group in September
Provides a dedicated week-long orientation at FSI
Requires mandatory periodic submissions of Individual
Development Plans that are monitored by the central PMI program
manager
Identifies specific management courses to be taken at FSI
Provides opportunities for two 4-month rotations which can
include serving at an embassy or consulate abroad.
Since 1997, we have converted 148 PMIs into Federal Service. Of
this number, 123 (83%) are still working at the Department, with 17
having entered the Foreign Service. Of the 25 who left after their
conversion, 5 transferred to other federal agencies. We currently have
over 150 PMIs progressing through their two-year internship.
Question 3. The Foreign Service Institute has an excellent
reputation for training the National's diplomats in foreign languages
and offering many beneficial courses to civilians as well. Is language
training available for those civilians who wish to gain such skills?
Answer. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) provides language
training primarily to U.S. foreign affairs professionals in preparation
for assignment abroad. It does not have the authority to provide
language training to civilians in general. FSI can provide training to
individuals under a Personal Services Contract (PSC) with the
Department of State when there is a job-related need connected to an
overseas assignment.
FSI, like the Defense Language Institute, does make some of its
language training materials (such as language tapes and texts and
multimedia CD-ROM tools) available, at a reasonable cost, to the public
through the National Technical Information Service which is under the
Department of Commerce.
Question 4. What new legislative authorities, if any, would be
useful to the improved management of the State Department's Foreign
Service, Foreign Service National and Civil Service workforces?
Answer. It is important that the issue of the dislocation of the
locality pay system be addressed especially as it relates to overseas
pay where employees receive the base pay scale and not even the ``rest
of the U.S.'' locality pay rate. For employees required to spend large
portions of their careers overseas, this is a major inequity and
disincentive with cumulative effects over a career. It has eroded the
value of hardship differentials and retirement contributions. The
longer this situation persists the more it affects morale as we ask
employees to do challenging work in ever more difficult situations
overseas.
SITUATION IN KOSOVO
Question 1. What is your assessment of the situation of ethnic
minorities in Kosovo? What constructive steps can the United States
take to end ethnic violence and encourage respect for all people in
Kosovo, including Serbs, Roma, Egyptians, Bosniaks, Croats, Turks and
other minorities?
Answer. The status of ethnic minorities in Kosovo varies widely by
municipality and even from village to village. The situation generally
is improving, but needs further progress.
Overall, violent acts against ethnic minorities have decreased but
ethnic minorities continue to face less visible forms of aggression as
well as serious restrictions on their freedom of movement. Some areas
have opened up for Serbs, but they still face pressure to sell
property, encounter difficulty traveling outside Serb-populated areas,
and are sometimes subject to arbitrary violence and intimidation. Roma,
Ashkali, Egyptians, Bosniaks and Gorani have freedom of movement in
parts of Kosovo. Turks are generally well integrated and face few
problems. A number of municipal leaders are actively working to improve
the situation for minorities in their communities, but indifference and
hostility toward ethnic minorities remains a significant problem. Lack
of economic opportunity is a serious problem for both Albanian and
minority communities.
The U.S. continues to push the leaders of Kosovo's ethnic
communities to end ethnic violence and intimidation, as well as make
clear that Kosovo must become a multiethnic society in which all of
Kosovo's citizens, including Serbs, can live safely. Positive
statements in support of returns and multi-ethnicity, such as those of
February 28 by President Rugova, Prime Minister Rexhepi, and Kosovo
Assembly President Daci, are helpful.
In addition to its substantial funding to support returns and the
work of the Housing and Property Directorate in 2003, the U.S. will
leverage funds for municipalities, setting local officials' public
support for tolerance and minority returns in their communities as a
precondition for obtaining U.S. assistance.
The U.S. Office in Pristina also coordinates closely with the UN
Interim Administration Mission's (UNMIK) Office of Communities and
Returns, and promotes an activist agenda on returns and multi-ethnicity
through its contacts with Kosovo leaders and through an active public
diplomacy program.
Question 2. During my visit to Kosovo last May, I was impressed
with the ``benchmark goals'' outlined by Head of UNMIK Michael Steiner,
which call for progress in key areas, including respect for the rule of
law, strengthening democratic institutions, and building a civil
society. The benchmark goals also emphasize the need to address respect
for minority rights and refugee return. What progress has been made in
the areas outlined by UNMIK? What is the United States doing to further
the implementation of these goals? I am particularly interested in the
level of our involvement in efforts to facilitate refugee return in
Kosovo.
Answer. We share your support for UN Special Representative Michael
Steiner's eight basic standards of a functioning democratic society.
These standards, which are linked to tangible benchmarks, are designed
to guide the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government toward
democratization. Recently Mr. Steiner has pushed Kosovar leaders to
engage more proactively on the benchmark process rather than focus on
final status. While we support this approach of ``standards before
status,'' Special Representative Steiner also needs to set out clear
indices of compliance for the Kosovar authorities. To that end, we
welcome Mr. Steiner's recent elaboration of actions local entities need
to take to meet the benchmarks and his intention to engage municipal
officials as well as the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government on
their implementation.
For your review, I have listed below the eight standards with a
brief update on each.
Functioning Democratic Institutions: Since 1999, Kosovo has
conducted three successful elections under the guidance of the
international community. As a result, there are functioning,
representative institutions at both the central and municipal
levels. The provisional government and Assembly have worked
together with UNMIK to produce legislation on education, the
environment and economic development.
Rule of Law: Kosovo's multi-ethnic police service, the
Kosovo Police Service, while still a new force, is a success
story. Since its inception in 1999, the United States has
committed $54.9 million to train and equip this organization.
Additionally, the U.S. provides 555 U.S. police officers to the
UN police mission in Kosovo, who are both performing law
enforcement functions, and helping to develop the institution.
The rate of serious crimes in Kosovo declined sharply in 2002,
and the recent arrests of three former Kosovo Liberation Army
members in Kosovo indicted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague
transpired without violence. However, ethnic violence and
organized crime continue to plague Kosovo. To help establish
the rule of law, the U.S. has contributed $2.5 million to
counter organized crime, including help establishing a Criminal
Intelligence Unit and Kosovo Organized Crime Bureau within
UNMIK police.
Freedom of Movement: In a few tense regions such as
Mitrovica and Pec/Peje, the freedom of movement for minorities
is limited; but, overall, there was a marked increase in
freedom of movement in some areas for Serbs and other minority
communities in 2002.
Returns and Reintegration: In the past year, we have seen
progress on the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons to Kosovo, but we are insisting on further, and faster,
progress. In 2002, nearly 2,700 minority individuals returned
to Kosovo, and minority returns exceeded departures for the
first time since the end of the conflict in June 1999. Nearly
6,000 refugees and displaced minorities have returned since
1999. In 2003, we anticipate returns on a larger scale as the
security situation improves and returns coordination between
UNMIK, international donors and Kosovo officials improves. The
difficult general economic situation in Kosovo and particularly
for minority communities remains a considerable obstacle to
sustainable returns.
Ensuring people have the right to return to their homes is an
important priority of the USG. In 2002, the State Department
contributed $13 million to support the work of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees in Serbia and Kosovo and funded $5.5 million
in NGO programs for returns to Kosovo. In 2003, there will be an
increase in funding for State Department's Bureau of Population and
Migration and USAID managed returns programs. The U.S. will also
leverage funds for municipalities, setting local officials' public
support for tolerance and minority returns in their communities as a
precondition for obtaining U.S. assistance. We have also urged the
Europeans to extend financial support long enough to encourage current
positive trends to continue, and to work together with UNHCR to ensure
a smooth handover of returns responsibilities to local authorities. We
will continue to work closely with UNMIK, the international community,
and the Kosovar leadership to ensure that everyone who wishes to return
has the opportunity to do so.
Economy: Through significant U.S. support, Kosovo has
developed a sound macroeconomic and structural policy for
economic recovery. We are working closely with UNMIK and the
provisional Kosovo authorities to establish a market-friendly
legal framework to attract outside investment and spur job
growth. Privatization has now begun. We are actively seeking
ways to allow IFI support to Kosovo, and to enmesh Kosovo into
the larger regional economy in a way that does not prejudice
the outcome of its final status.
Property Rights: Unresolved property disputes continue to
hinder returns, but recent administrative changes in UNMIK's
Housing and Property Directorate have allowed this organization
to operate more efficiently and help clear away hurdles to
sustainable returns. The U.S. will continue to support property
rights in 2003.
Dialogue with Belgrade: The U.S., along with UNMIK,
continues to encourage a direct dialogue between Pristina and
Belgrade on practical issues such as energy, trade and freedom
of movement. Establishing direct talks remains a politically
sensitive issue for both parties at this time. We note with
approval Special Representative Steiner's invitation to
Belgrade and Kosovo leaders February 28 to participate in
technical talks.
Kosovo Protection Corps: From the outset, the United States
has funded training for the Kosovo Protection Corps to build
its capabilities in disaster relief and civil protection tasks,
improve discipline and bring about better compliance with its
mandate. Unfortunately, the Kosovo Protection Corps still lacks
significant minority participation.
REFUGEE RETURNS IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE
Question. My interest in the issue of refugee return in southeast
Europe traces back to my visit to the Stankovic refugee camp in
Macedonia during the war in 1999. At that time, I was very concerned
with the plight of Kosovar Albanian refugees, and I was glad that many
of them were able to return to their homes. I have also been very
concerned with human rights and refugee return throughout the region,
whether in Bosnia, Croatia, or Kosovo. I believe continued progress on
this issue is crucial to efforts to enhance security and stability in
the region. What is the United States doing to promote refugee return
in southeast Europe? Where has progress been made, and where do we need
to raise our level of involvement in the region?
Answer. The U.S. supports the return of displaced people in the
Balkans in several ways. We provide substantial funding to
organizations that promote returns; in 2002 the State Department
contributed sixteen million dollars to non-governmental organizations
and nearly twenty-four million dollars to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees to support their activities in the region.
The United States Agency for International Development contributes
substantial development resources in support of returns as well. We
also use our diplomatic leverage with authorities in the region to push
for progress on the issue of returns.
Our efforts are yielding results. In Bosnia and Kosovo, we saw
encouraging progress in 2002. More than 100,000 people returned to
areas of Bosnia in which they will be part of the ethnic minority. This
brings the total number of minority returns in Bosnia to nearly
400,000, out of one million total returns, since the Dayton peace
agreement. We expect similar numbers in the coming year. In Kosovo,
minority returns have begun to exceed minority departures, and, while
more needs to be done, this is a sign of progress. This past year saw
nearly 2,700 such returns, for a total of nearly 6,000 since the end of
the conflict in 1999. Non-Serb minorities such as Roma and Bosniaks
still make up the bulk of these returns; however, we expect to see
Kosovar Serbs returning in increasing numbers in the coming year.
Progress has been slower in Croatia. Although more than 250,000
Croatian Serb refugees remain displaced throughout the region, only
17,000 returned to their homes in 2002. This number is unacceptably low
and we, together with our European partners, continue to push the
Croatian government to live up to its commitments to assist the return
of these individuals.
Given the success in Bosnia and the fact that the obstacles in
Croatia are mostly political and do not require outside financial
assistance, we will shift our funding priorities towards Kosovo in the
coming year. We will also continue to press the region's governments to
live up to their commitments to support returns.
ANTI-SEMITISM IN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Question. As we have discussed, I remain deeply concerned with the
rise in anti-Semitic violence that has been seen in Europe and the
Middle East. I believe it is crucial that the United States develop a
strategic plan to raise the awareness of this growing problem. What is
our national strategy to highlight the issue of anti-Semitism? What are
we doing bilaterally on this matter, and how are we working with
various international organizations such as the United Nations and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)? What steps
has the United States taken to encourage the OSCE to schedule a
separate, human dimension implementation meeting on the subject of
anti-Semitism this year?
Answer. The Department of State also views with concern the rise of
anti-Semitic violence in Europe and the Middle East. We have raised the
point bilaterally with high-level officials of governments of affected
countries, both here and abroad.
Our strategy is to focus on measures that will encourage our
European Allies to adopt programs to prevent anti-Semitism. One effort
that has been particularly successful is the International Task Force
on Holocaust Education, a group of 17 countries that is designing
programs to prevent anti-Semitism and encourage tolerance.
Bilaterally, we have been active in raising our concerns with host
governments. We have underlined that anti-Semitism can not be dismissed
as the action of hooligans, but must be seen as a challenge to
democratic civil society. These demarches have often resulted in public
statements issued by the Presidents of the countries involved, such as
that of President Putin in 2002.
We have also pressed the issue of anti-Semitism in the OSCE. Last
year, the United States won agreement at the OSCE Ministerial in Porto,
Portugal, to hold an OSCE meeting on anti-Semitism in 2003. We expect
the meeting to be held in early summer. The United States will assemble
a robust delegation of public and government members who will address
the U.S. experience in dealing with anti-Semitism and share our best
practices in dealing with this problem with other OSCE participating
states.
The UN addresses the general subject of religious intolerance,
rather than anti-Semitism per se. An independent special rapporteur on
religious intolerance with a mandate from the Commission on Human
Rights submits periodic reports to the General Assembly and UN
Commission on Human Rights, and decides which current problems (such as
anti-Semitism) UN organizations and agencies will focus upon. We
support those efforts.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION
Question. What is the United States doing to combat organized crime
and corruption in southeast Europe? How is the U.S. government working
with various non-governmental organizations and other members of the
international community, such as the Southeast Europe Cooperative
Initiative (SECI), the Stability Pact, the OSCE, and the European
Union, among others? How, if at all, are the various initiatives of
these groups being coordinated?
Answer. Organized crime and corruption pose a serious threat to the
Balkans, and by extension, to Western Europe and the U.S. Criminal and
terrorist organizations are often connected and exploit the weakness of
states in the region, in particular through trafficking in persons,
small arms, drugs, cigarettes, and illegal financial flows. Together
with the international community, the U.S. is working with these
countries to improve their capacity to deal with organized criminal
elements, which take advantage of a weak rule-of-law structure and a
decade of conflict. We place a high priority on development of the rule
of law in this region, and have provided significant assistance focused
on bilateral law enforcement, judicial reform, and border control.
The U.S. also supports regional initiatives and organizations such
as the Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Stability
Pact and the OSCE, which help to foster cooperation among states on
these issues, and we work closely with these organizations, and our
European partners, to coordinate efforts and maximize the benefit of
our assistance. The Stability Pact has recently co-located the
Secretariat for its Organized Crime initiative (SPOC) at the Regional
Anti-Crime Center in Bucharest. These organizations work together with
EUROPOL and other European structures to ensure their activities are
coordinated. Several EU countries have sent observers to the Bucharest
Center and some are also providing financial support to the SPOC. The
SPOC and the Bucharest Center are also working to follow up on the
conclusions of the November 25 EU Conference on Organized Crime that
was held in London. The OSCE's emphasis on combating illegal
trafficking also serves as a vehicle for developing further measures on
organized crime and corruption.
NATO
Question. As we begin to discuss the issue of NATO enlargement
during this session of Congress, there is continued dialogue regarding
the role that the NATO Alliance will play during the next fifty years.
How does the question of NATO enlargement fit into this debate? From
your perspective, what is the role of NATO as we prepare to confront
new challenges to global security post-September 11th? What
contributions can aspirant countries make to enhance the overall
security of the Alliance?
Answer. The role of NATO for the next fifty years will be what it
has been for the Alliance's first fifty years: to safeguard the freedom
and security of all of its members by political and military means in
accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the
United Nations Charter. NATO will remain the key Transatlantic tie and
the indispensable Euro-Atlantic security institution.
However, the threats that are facing the Alliance in the 21st
Century have changed dramatically since the Cold War years. The
principal threats of today--terrorism and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction--are transnational and global in nature, stemming
in many instances from non-state actors and from regions outside of
NATO's traditional area of operations.
To address these threats, NATO has embarked on a revolutionary
transformation of its military capabilities. This transformation, which
was the focus of the Alliance's highly successful summit last November
in Prague, will provide NATO with the means to rapidly deploy and
sustain highly capable forces to wherever they are needed. This
transformation is being led by the United States with the support and
full participation of our Allies, seven new invitees to NATO and our
partners.
At Prague, our European Allies agreed to improve their military
capabilities, through pooling resources and specialization, enabling
NATO to undertake collective action against the new threats that we
face around the globe. For their part, the seven invitees are already
working to develop such specialized niche capabilities. At Prague, the
Allies also endorsed a U.S. proposal to establish a NATO Response Force
(NRF). The NRF will harness NATO's new capabilities into a cutting edge
land, air and sea force that will be able to deploy at short notice to
anywhere in the world and sustain itself in the field.
NATO's decision at Prague to invite seven new members to join the
Alliance will also transform the Alliance, extending our zone of
security from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Committed Atlanticists, each
of the seven new invitees is already functioning like a de facto Ally.
Each has contributed in some capacity to Operation Enduring Freedom,
and peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. And all seven have also
supported publicly our call for Saddam to disarm or face the
consequences.
At Prague, the Alliance also rededicated itself to improved
relations with its neighbors, especially to the east and south. This is
particularly important given that many of the threats facing NATO today
originate from these areas.
Closer relations between NATO and neighbors such as Russia and
Ukraine will enhance the political and economic stability, of these
countries, and Alliance security, by encouraging military reform, good
governance, rule of law, human rights, and economic development.
______
Responses of Hon. Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Christopher Dodd
VENEZUELA
Question. It would appear that the Government prefers Carter's
referendum proposal as provided for in the Venezuelan Constitution
while the opposition favors Carter's Constitutional amendment route and
early elections. Where do we go from here?
Answer. The dialogue process led by OAS SYG Gaviria aims to help
the Venezuelan Government and opposition bridge the gap between the two
viable electoral proposals tabled by former President Carter on January
21. We strongly encourage both parties to avail themselves of this
forum to break the current political impasse. The Venezuelan Government
and the opposition need to reach agreement, at the dialogue facilitated
by OAS SYG Gaviria, upon which electoral option--either the recall
referendum or a constitutional amendment--to pursue to resolve
Venezuela's crisis.
The United States fully supports this dialogue effort and, along
with the other members of the Group of Friends, is committed to monitor
and verify the implementation of any agreement brokered by the OAS. In
an effort to help this process, the United States will join the other
members of the Friends group for a meeting on March 10 to explore
concrete steps that can be taken to advance a ``constitutional,
democratic, peaceful, and electoral'' solution in Venezuela.
MEXICO: RECENT DECISION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ON BEHALF
OF MEXICO
Question. Earlier this week the ICJ called upon the United States
to stay the execution of three Mexican nationals on death row while it
adjudicates the charge brought by the Mexican Government against the
United States that the U.S. violated its obligations under a Vienna
Consular Convention to give these individuals access to Mexican
consular officials prior to their trials. 11What will be the U.S.
response to the ICJ order?
Answer. Mexico's case on the merits seeks broad remedies in
criminal cases in which a Mexican national allegedly was not advised
without delay, as required by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, that he could request that his consular officials
be notified of his arrest and detention. (There are no allegations that
Mexican nationals have been denied access to Mexican consular officials
when requested either by the detained national or a consular official.)
All of the 54 Mexican nationals identified by Mexico application to the
ICJ were sentenced to death, but three have recently had their
sentences commuted to life imprisonment. The ICJ has set a schedule
requiring that Mexico file its Memorial on June 6, 2003, and that the
United States file its Counter Memorial on October 6, 2003.
The ICJ provisional measures order of February 5, 2003, provides
that the United States shall not execute three specific Mexican
nationals who Mexico believes are closest to having an execution date
set. None of the three in fact yet has an execution date. The
Department of State is reviewing the order in consultation with the
Department of Justice.
IMMIGRATION
Question. What concrete progress has taken place since the November
meeting? Realistically, what are the prospects for reaching an
immigration accord with Mexico this year or next? What implications
will this have on the Mexican Congressional elections scheduled for
later this year? What further personal role do you plan to take in
these negotiations?
Answer. While ensuring our security concerns are addressed, the
Administration remains committed to finding ways to advance the
bilateral migration agenda with Mexico. During my discussions at the
Binational Commission meeting in November in Mexico City, I conveyed
this message to the Government of Mexico.
As part of our examination of ways to improve and expedite the H2b
visa application process, the Departments of State, Labor and Justice
continue evaluating regulatory changes that would facilitate the
matching of willing workers in Mexico with willing employers in the
United States. The Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs has
initiated a feasibility study on integrating data systems from agencies
that have a role in the H2b application process.
In addition, our bilateral migration agenda is closely linked to
our efforts to enhance homeland security through our U.S.-Mexico Border
Partnership agreement (signed March 2002). As part of this ``smart
border'' initiative with Mexico, we are cooperating on such issues as
sharing data on travelers to our countries and seeking greater
harmonization of visa regimes.
It is difficult to predict when a migration accord with Mexico
might be reached, as there are many variables and a variety of complex
legal and regulatory issues that must be carefully explored. However,
it is an important issue that remains high on the bilateral agenda.
Given the foregoing, I would prefer to avoid speculation on the
implications of a migration accord, or the lack thereof, on the
legislative elections in July.
I am regularly updated on developments pertaining to Mexico and
migration and intend to continue my direct involvement in this issue.
Affairs has initiated a feasibility study on integrating data
systems from agencies that have a role in the H2b application process.
In addition, our bilateral migration agenda is closely linked to
our efforts to enhance homeland security through our U.S.-Mexico Border
Partnership agreement (signed March 2002). As part of this ``smart
border'' initiative with Mexico, we are cooperating on such issues as
sharing data on travelers to our countries and seeking greater
harmonization of visa regimes.
It is difficult to predict when a migration accord with Mexico
might be reached, as there are many variables and a variety of complex
legal and regulatory issues that must be carefully explored. However,
it is an important issue that remains high on the bilateral agenda.
Given the foregoing, I would prefer to avoid speculation on the
implications of a migration accord, or the lack thereof, on the
legislative elections in July.
I am regularly updated on developments pertaining to Mexico and
migration and intend to continue my direct involvement in this issue.
HAITI: AID EMBARGO
Question 1. [OAS] Resolution 822 was passed in September 2002, and
among other things, it called on Haiti to establish a neutral electoral
council and for the normalization of relations between Haiti and the
international financial institutions. At that time the U.S. pledged to
provide $1 million to the OAS mission so that security could be
improved in Haiti a precondition for the opposition participating in
the electoral process. The OAS mission has seen none of that money and
not surprisingly security remains a problem in Haiti. Is the U.S. going
to support the efforts of the OAS or not?
Answer. The U.S. has provided $1.6 million of the $3.2 million
contributed to the OAS Special Mission to date. The EU has contributed
600,000 Euros (US$641,160) with another 150,000 Euros (US$159,000)
pledged; Canada $511,139, with an additional $2 million Canadian
(US$1.3 million) pledged. The Mission has requested additional funding
of $11-13 million based on its current mandates. The cost for elections
security and observation could be as high as $35 million.
The Special Mission's Work Program has five components--security,
justice, human rights, governance and assistance for the 2003
elections. While funding constraints have prevented us from providing
for the full needs of the Special Mission, we have been actively
looking for additional funds from both U.S. and foreign resources. We
have been working with the Special Mission and UNDP on support of OAS
Special Mission activities and projects in Haiti, especially in the
areas of security and electoral assistance. We have also contacted
other donors to encourage them to fund the same activities.
The U.S. took the lead in creating the OAS Special Mission for
Strengthening Democracy in Haiti in January 2002 via OAS Resolution 806
and in expanding its mandate via OAS Resolution 822. We believe the OAS
Special Mission offers the best opportunity for long-term
democratization in Haiti.
Question 2. Why, four months after the decision by the OAS to
``normalize'' Haiti's relations with the IDB, have we seen little or no
movement on these funds?
Answer. OAS Resolution 822 supported normalization of economic
cooperation between the Government of Haiti and the international
financial institutions and urged those parties to resolve the technical
and financial obstacles that preclude such normalization.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have each held discussions with the
Government of Haiti since last September. However, before loan
disbursements can begin from the IDB, Haiti needs to pay its IDB
arrears, slightly over $20 million as of year-end 2002. The same holds
for the World Bank. For IMF programs, Haiti needs to negotiate and
implement an agreement with the IMF on basic economic reforms. An
appropriate IMF agreement could also facilitate additional loans from
the IDB and World Bank.
To date the Government of Haiti has neither paid its arrears to the
IDB or World Bank, nor reached an agreement with the IMF. All three
institutions continue their talks with the government. We have
encouraged the Government of Haiti to take the steps needed so that
lending from these institutions can resume. We have also encouraged the
institutions to work actively toward this goal.
BRAZIL
Question. On October 27, 2002, presidential elections were held in
Brazil. These elections were noted as being free and fair, and resulted
in the victory by a landslide of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva--known as
Lula--the leader of the left-wing Workers' Party. During the elections,
Lula promised a set of pension, tax, and other reforms that he is now
attempting to implement. However, due to his lack of political
experience and his earlier radical positions, the elections campaign
and results were marked by a panic in the financial markets. Recently,
Lula presented an outline of his first major policy initiative, through
which he hopes to ensure that in a country where 44 million people live
on or below the poverty line, everybody has enough food to eat.
However, some Brazilian officials and analysts have criticized this
initiative for overstating the problem of hunger in Brazil, confusion
over which regions will be helped, ill-preparedness, and lack of
funding.
How much weight do you give to these criticisms? Should the United
States provide aid to the Brazilian government for the funding of this
program? In your opinion, have the recent elections affected U.S.-
Brazil relations?
Answer. Brazilian President Lula launched his centerpiece ``Zero
Hunger'' program on January 30. We understand that the program is not
yet in effect nationwide and that some elements of the program are
still being designed. President Lula's goal of eliminating hunger in
Brazil is a worthy humanitarian objective that deserves our praise and,
where appropriate, support. The United States is examining how it might
be able to provide technical support to the Government of Brazil in
this initiative.
Brazil is a friend of the United States and a key hemispheric
partner. We consult regularly on regional and global issues. President
Bush met with then President-elect Lula on December 10 in Washington.
At that meeting, they agreed to hold a bilateral summit in 2003. The
summit, which is yet to be scheduled, will be an opportunity for the
United States to build upon and expand the already excellent bonds we
share with Brazil.
ARGENTINA
Question. What is the status of this funding? Besides supporting
the IMF loan, what measures has the United States taken to prevent
total economic collapse in Argentina? Are there additional measures
that the U.S. should take to aid Argentina?
Answer. With the strong backing of this Administration the
Government of Argentina reached an interim agreement with the
International Monetary Fund in late January. The January-through-August
2003 agreement gives Argentina the opportunity to build a more stable
foundation in the period before a new government can undertake more
far-reaching reforms.
Argentina has endured four years of recession. The economy declined
sharply in the first quarter of 2002 and then began to bottom out in
the second quarter of 2002, pointing the way to a possible modest
recovery in 2003. Social suffering is widespread and intense with
almost 60% of Argentines living in poverty.
Argentina's crisis was caused in large part by poor domestic fiscal
policy inconsistent with its rigid exchange rate regime. A key aim of
the agreed IMF program is to help underpin macroeconomic stability and
build a foundation for economic growth in Argentina. It is important
that the Government of Argentina fully implement all of its commitments
for the program to be successful and the IMF has just indicated that
the program is on track and that quantitative performance targets are
being met with comfortable margins.
Over the longer term, we will support Argentina's efforts to
develop a more comprehensive program to strengthen stability, the rule
of law, the investment climate, and growth. In addition, we will
encourage Argentina to engage cooperatively with creditors to resolve
the country's defaulted debt.
As you mentioned, the Administration has been a strong supporter of
the interim IMF agreement concluded in January. In addition, the
Administration has been a strong advocate of the World Bank's support
for the Government of Argentina's Heads of Household program, a
workfare program that pays 150 pesos per month (about $45) to the
unemployed in exchange for community service or training. At the end of
2002, 1.85 million Argentines had benefited from this program. We have
also supported programs funded by the Inter-American Development Bank.
Most recently, we supported a $1.5 billion emergency loan for a Program
for Social Protection and Mitigation of the Impact of the Crisis on the
Poor.
At the request of the Government of Argentina, the U.S. Treasury
has been providing short-term technical assistance missions in the
areas of monetary policy and banking sector reform to help build the
basis for future growth and prevent future financial crises. Treasury
will consider providing further longer-term technical assistance in
these areas.
In the areas of trade, we have been seeking ways that are
consistent with our trade laws to assist Argentine exporters. We meet
regularly in the U.S.-Argentine Bilateral Council on Trade and
Investment (BCTI). We are currently close to concluding an accelerated
review of petitions for Argentine products under the Generalized System
of Preferences. We also recognize that Argentina has been free of hoof
and mouth disease for one year, paving the way for the USDA to conduct
an assessment, which may allow renewed Argentine beef exports to the
U.S. The Department of Commerce has accepted Argentina's request to
conduct an administrative review of anti-dumping/countervailing duty
margins, and will consider Argentina's severe currency devaluation and
the drastic increase in U.S. domestic prices for honey as part of its
normal review process.
______
Responses of Hon. Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question. Is it your view that the Indonesian military has made
significant progress in its reform efforts over the past two years? On
what do you base your assessment? Will the Department link military
assistance to our demand for cooperation and accountability in the
investigation of the murder of American citizens in West Papua?
Answer. Military reform in Indonesia is a mixed record. The
military has accepted more changes in its status and role in the
national life over the past four years than at any other time in its
history. It did not intervene in the 1999 elections, and it resisted
political pressure to violate constitutional norms during the turbulent
period of President Wahid's impeachment and the succession to President
Megawati. The military has formally relinquished its special, parallel
function in government, and accepted a sharp reduction in appointed
parliamentary seats and the end of appointed representation in
legislative bodies by 2009. The five-year conviction on March 12, 2003
of an Army General officer for East Timor human rights abuses
represents a tangible step on the path to accountability.
Fundamental problems remain, however. Progress on accountability
has been slow; the military has grudgingly gone along with trials for a
small number of officers for human rights abuses. Civilian control only
exists in name only and discipline remains a problem. The military
deals with inadequate central government funding through running
unofficial businesses and foundations, and engaging in illegal
activities. There are many other reasons for this lack of progress,
including lack of political will, institutional resistance, budgetary
constraints, and the fact that the decade-long absence of IMET-trained
military officers constrains our interactions with key players in
regards to both counter terrorism cooperation and comprehensive
military reform. We continue to press the Indonesians for thoroughgoing
reforms.
We have conveyed in the strongest possible terms to the Government
of Indonesia that we expect them to identify and punish all those
responsible for the August 2002 murder of Americans in Papua. Anything
short of a full accounting and punishment for those responsible for
this crime would be unacceptable and would have a negative impact on
the bilateral relationship. Indonesian Government actions in this case
would be an important factor in our evaluation of future military
assistance programs for Indonesia, along with other factors such as
U.S. national security interests, respect for human rights, civil-
military relations, political developments in Indonesia, and the
regional strategic environment.
Question. Should the recent execution, following a secret trial, of
an ethnic Tibetan accused of terrorist bombings in Sichuan, together
with the closed-door prosecution in Shenzhen of a U.S. resident on
apparently trumped up terrorism charges, cause us to be concerned that
repressive governments whose support we are soliciting to combat global
terrorism are themselves using the ``war on terrorism'' as an excuse to
crack down on legitimate, peaceful dissent and persecute restive
minority groups?
Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to ensuring that adherence
to international human rights norms is not sacrificed in the pursuit to
advance the global war on terrorism. We have made it clear to the
Government of China on many occasions that the United States strongly
opposes any attempt to use the war on terrorism as an excuse to crack
down on those who are peacefully expressing their political or
religious views. We have expressed deep concern about the execution of
Lobsang Dhondup without adequate due process and the recent detentions
of dissidents on terrorism charges.
We reiterated our views to the Government of China at the time of
the Executive Order designation last September of the Uighur group
ETIM. We continue to emphasize to all countries in which Foreign
Terrorist Organization and Executive Order 13224 designees exist that
human rights must be respected.
In December, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor Lorne W. Craner traveled to Xinjiang as part of the China Human
Rights dialogue to deliver directly to Chinese officials the
President's message that the war on terrorism cannot be used to
crackdown on minorities. The message was reinforced during the recent
visit to China by Ambassador Cofer Black, the State Department's
Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He publicly stated that any response
to terrorism must be carried out within the context of protecting the
rights of all citizens under the rule of law.
Question. What, based on your preliminary intelligence, do you
expect the annual coca cultivation survey to show in terms of results
of the 2002 fumigation campaign, and if it's not positive, what other
alternatives will you begin to look at?
Answer. The annual U.S. official estimate on Colombian coca
cultivation for 2002 was released on February 27. The estimate showed a
15 percent reduction in Colombian coca fields compared to 2001--the
first decline in cultivation in a decade. The report also noted a 50
percent reduction in coca fields for the Departments of Putumayo and
Caqueta, the focus of our most aggressive coca eradication campaign.
This estimate reflects the contribution that the aerial eradication
program is making to our efforts to fight cocaine at its source.
Question. Please provide an update on the status of targeted
sanctions on officials in Zimbabwe. Is the asset freeze effective at
this time?
Answer. Travel restrictions remain in effect for those Zimbabwean
government officials and others, including business figures, who
continue to undermine Zimbabwe's democratic institutions. The IEEPA
(International Emergency Economic Powers Act) Executive Order blocking
the assets of key Zimbabwean government officials has been forwarded
for the President's signature. If signed, the Order would block the
assets in the United States or held by U.S. persons of key Zimbabwe
government officials, and would complement similar action taken by the
European Union.
Question. Can you assure me that the United States will continue to
support the Special Court for Sierra Leone?
Answer. The United States was a leading supporter of UN Security
Council Resolution 1315. The resolution called upon the Secretary
General to establish with the government of Sierra Leone an independent
Special Court, and was successfully passed in August 2000.
The United States continues to be a strong supporter of the Special
Court. We contributed $5 million in FY01 and $5 million in FY02 for the
Court's operations and expect to make a similar contribution in FY03.
The United States is fully prepared to support the Court in
successfully completing its mandate, and to provide diplomatic support
as needed.
Question. I notice that the U.S. anticipates spending less on the
peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in FY04. I
certainly hope that a just and lasting peace can be found in the DRC,
and I am very concerned about the extremely expensive nature of the
MONUC mission. At the same time, I fear that the millions of taxpayer
dollars already spent on MONUC will be money wasted if the U.S. rushes
to paper over the gaping holes in the incomplete peace and allows Congo
to sink back into chaos. I would also point out that credible reports
continue to indicate that the scale and scope of grave human rights
abuses rises to a level that demands an international response.
What steps will the Administration take in the year ahead to ensure
that we do not simply see more of the same appalling developments in
the DRC?
Answer. We share your concern and continue to stress to all parties
to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) how
important it is to cease hostilities and implement a transitional
government so that a just and lasting peace can be established in the
DRC.
We support full implementation of the 1999 Lusaka Cease-Fire
Agreement and subsequent agreements in the peace process. We have been
actively supporting implementation of these agreements as a means to
securing a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the DRC. To this end,
we have provided $800,000 to the South African/United Nations (UN)
Third Party Verification Mission (TPVM) to oversee implementation of
the July 30 Pretoria Agreement governing the withdrawal of Rwandan
troops from the DRC and the disarmament, demobilization, and
repatriation (DDR) of armed Hutu rebels. We have actively supported
implementation of the December 17 agreement among Congolese parties to
a transitional framework. We have encouraged DRC President Kabila to
take steps to begin implementing this agreement. We are in the process
of consulting with the UN and interested countries on ways to organize
the international committee called for in the December 17 agreement.
The United States has actively encouraged the other United Nations
Security Council members, plus Belgium and South Africa (P5 + 2) to
promote the Congolese peace process. Our collective efforts and those
of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC)
succeeded in getting the Congolese parties fighting in northeastern
Congo in late 2002 to sign a December 30 cease-fire agreement. We are
strongly encouraging Uganda and the DRC, signatories to the September 6
Luanda Agreement, to form the Ituri Pacification Committee called for
in that agreement as a means to providing political and military
stability in the Ituri region in order to prevent a further
deterioration in the humanitarian situation there. We have also
repeatedly condemned the violations of international human rights and
humanitarian norms, both through the UN Security Council and through
bilateral channels. We continue to impress upon other countries,
particularly Rwanda and Uganda, the need to cease any and all military
involvement in the DRC and any support for armed Congolese groups in
the DRC.
At the same time, we continue to provide humanitarian assistance to
the DRC, to assist persons displaced and disadvantaged by the on-going
conflict. Overall FY 2002 humanitarian assistance to the DRC is nearly
$42 million, in addition to nearly $26 million in development
assistance. This includes funds for child survival, maternal health,
HIV/AIDS, infectious diseases, and emergency food assistance.
Question. Why is the Administration hesitant to provide greater
support to the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria? Why would the
U.S. decline to take an opportunity to leverage taxpayer dollars at the
fund and take advantage of multilateral infrastructure rather than
spending money on the bureaucratic demands of an almost entirely
bilateral program? Are there specific criteria that the Fund could meet
to address the Administration's concerns?
Answer. U.S. political and financial support for the Global Fund is
unrivaled. The U.S. has never been hesitant in its support for the
Global Fund. The President made the first pledge by any government to
the Fund, before it was formally established, and Congress funded that
commitment when no structure yet existed. The President's recent
promise of an additional one billion dollars is a continuation of that
support, and means that the U.S. represents almost fifty percent of all
pledges. The U.S. is the only government or donor to have announced a
third pledge; indeed, only one other government has even made a second
pledge. Secretary Thompson's position as Chair of the Fund's Board
underscores our strong commitment and dedication to the Fund. We urge
other potential donors to join us to make the Fund a success.
The President, in his recent initiative, has in fact taken an
historic opportunity to try to leverage taxpayer's dollars by giving
generously to the Global Fund. As the Global Fund remains a very new
mechanism, our generosity must be tempered by some prudence.
We are optimistic about the Fund's prospects and committed to its
success. At the same time, we believe that it must establish a track
record. We also believe that our own bilateral programmatic and funding
efforts, including the President's Emergency Plan, have a tremendous
potential to complement these multilateral efforts.
Because the Fund is a financing mechanism and not an implementing
agency, it must rely on others with programmatic and technical skills
to support the grants made. Our bilateral programs have provided
technical assistance to Country Coordination Mechanisms in preparing
proposals and will support implementation efforts. In many cases, it is
successful bilateral programs that have provided the information and
start-ups that have led to successful proposals to the Global Fund.
The Global Fund and bilateral programs should be complementary. The
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and our continuing bilateral
programs contribute to the global efforts against AIDS by:
Assuring potential investors and recipients with a minimum,
stable five-year commitment to the Global Fund.
Helping countries prepare Global Fund proposals and to
implement projects through our bilateral programs.
Increasing the total resources available and thus making it
possible for the Global Fund to work with more countries more
effectively.
Our criteria for judging the Global Fund remain as they have been
from the time of our first commitment. The Fund has started well but
has only just disbursed the first money to approved proposals The
Secretariat has taken seriously the need for financial and programmatic
accountability but it will take time to verify that the innovative
structures will work as planned and to ensure that approved proposals
will make a measurable difference. By contrast, U.S. bilateral programs
have a record of success already.
The Fund must remain true to the basic principles outlined by
President Bush. While the U.S. has ensured those principles are part of
the Fund's basic architecture, we face constant pressures from others,
including recipient nations, to return to the old ways of doing
business, including giving funds to governments directly, with little
or no involvement of other stakeholders, and with little or no
accountability.
The President's principles remain:
The need for partnerships across borders and between the
public and private sectors. While representatives of the
private sector, including business, NGOs, and foundations, sit
on the Fund's Board, recipient countries have been slow to
include these important stakeholders in their proposals and
planning.
An integrated approach that emphasizes a blend of care,
treatment and prevention.
Concentrating efforts on programs that work to actually
benefit patients, based on proven best practices.
Review of proposals by medical and public health experts to
ensure effectiveness and technical soundness.
Respect for intellectual property rights, as an incentive
for vital research and development.
Put into place a strong and independent programmatic
monitoring and evaluation structure.
Demonstrate the ability to actually leverage U.S.
contributions by garnering more support contributions from
investors in the Fund.
______
Response of Hon. Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to an Additional
Question for the Record Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer
Question. Can you assure the Committee that the Administration will
not impose any restriction similar to those imposed on international
family planning programs pursuant to the President's Memorandum of
March 28, 2001 (``Restoration of Mexico City Policy'') on any program
funding HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment?
Answer. To be effective, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
relief will have to involve coordination among many parties. As we work
with Congress to develop this plan and as we implement it, we will
ensure that any organization that wishes to participate in the core of
the Emergency Plan for AIDS relief--the prevention, care, and treatment
of HIV/AIDS--will be eligible to receive U.S. funds targeted for that
purpose, provided that the assistance is not used to promote or perform
abortions.
______
Responses of Hon. Colin Powell, Secretary of state. to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
HAITI
Question 1. I was recently in Haiti, and witnessed the abject
poverty and inhuman conditions in which Haitians are living. In your
view, what is President Aristide's level of compliance with OAS
Resolution 822? What about the opposition?
Answer. We share your concern about the plight of the Haitian
people. A return to stability through settlement of the political
crisis will help to improve the Haitian economy, and thus the lives of
ordinary Haitians.
We are deeply dissatisfied with the Government of Haiti's level of
compliance with Resolution 822, which was adopted by unanimous
consensus, including Haiti, in the OAS Permanent Council and which
President Aristide has publicly committed to implement.
While there has been progress on payment of reparations to
political parties for damage suffered in the violence of December 17,
2001, and the OAS Special Mission has been able to negotiate
satisfactory terms for its activities with the government, on almost
all other accounts there has been little or no substantive progress.
This is particularly disappointing and worrisome in regard to the
deteriorating security environment. A climate of security conducive to
elections does not now exist. Armed gangs, many associated with the
ruling party, continue to perpetrate acts of violence and intimidation
against journalists, human rights activists, some businesses, and
students. Some investigations are proceeding, but the murders of
journalists Jean Dominique in April 2000 and Erignol Lindor in December
2001 are unsolved. Disarmament, a key element in creating a climate of
security, has consisted mainly of ineffective public gestures.
If elections are to be held in 2003 as called for in Resolution
822, it is vital that the Government of Haiti take immediate steps to
meet its commitments under the Resolution. By meeting its commitments,
the government can give the opposition the confidence to participate
fully and meaningfully in the electoral process. The opposition and
civil society must play more responsible roles. They must be prepared
to participate in an electoral council once the government creates a
more secure environment:
Question 2. Has the Aristide government provided compensation to
the victims of violence following the coup attempt of December 17,
2001? What is the status of the appointments to the Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP) and subsequent elections later this year?
Answer. The Haitian government and the victims signed an agreement
in July 2002 establishing procedures for the assessment and payment of
claims. Prompted by OAS Resolutions 806 and 822, which called for
timely payment of reparations, the government has paid reparations to
some of the victims.
It is, however, disappointing that the issue of reparations has not
been finally resolved. Negotiations with one opposition party are still
going on. Moreover, the government does not appear to be making any
effort to address reparations claims of individuals named by the OAS
Advisory Council on Reparations.
Resolution 822 called for a new Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)
to be formed by November 4, 2002, using procedures previously agreed to
by the opposition and government, designed to create the kind of
independent CEP that could oversee elections in a fair and impartial
way.
The CEP has not been formed. The government's hack of progress in
improving security caused opposition parties and civil society to
refrain from participation in the CEP. From November 2002 through
January 2003, a series of anti-government protest strikes and attacks
by government-supported gangs on opposition demonstrations have driven
the two sides further apart.
The ruling party and opposition agreed that the CEP would consist
of nine members nominated by them, the churches, and civil society
organizations. President Aristide on February 7 issued a presidential
decree naming seven of the nine members, saying at the time he was
leaving the other two positions open for opposition political parties
to fill as originally agreed to. The seven names that Aristide put
forward were already known to the public, having been previously
nominated by the churches and civil society organizations. Opposition
parties did not name any nominees in response to Aristide's decree, so
there still is no CEP.
It is disappointing that no CEP has been formed, but as noted in
Resolution 822 the integrity of the CEP formation is essential. It
would be a mistake for Aristide to act on his own in forming the CEP.
No single party or organization should be able to block formation of
the CEP, but it is essential to maintain the formula agreed to by all
parties in order to have free and fair elections. The U.S. cannot
support elections in Haiti unless they are free, fair, and reflect the
will of the Haitian people. The joint high-level delegation of the OAS
and CARICOM traveling to Haiti March 18-21 hopes to convince the
government to meet its obligations under Resolution 822 and the
opposition and civil society to participate in formation of a neutral,
credible, and independent CEP.
Question 3. Can you explain what steps the Administration is taking
to bring the opposition parties to the table? I understand the OAS is
involved, but what is the U.S. doing to encourage a resolution to bring
relief to the Haitian people? Is the OAS mission adequately funded and
supported by the U.S.?
Answer. Before returning to a dialogue with the Haitian government,
the opposition and civil society are deeply concerned about restoring a
secure environment. Key to understanding this concern is the violent
nature of Haiti's political history.
We are urging the Government of Haiti to create the minimum levels
of confidence required by the opposition and civil society by meeting
the security commitments it made in Resolution 822, and by supporting
the efforts of the OAS Special Mission to help the government do so. At
the same time, we have repeatedly reminded the opposition of its
responsibility to react positively and constructively when the
government begins to meet its commitments.
Special Presidential Envoy for Western Hemisphere Initiatives Otto
Reich will represent the U.S. in a joint OAS-CARICOM delegation
visiting Haiti March 18-21. The delegation will present a strong
message to all actors in Haiti--government, opposition, civil society--
that now is the time for effective action in meeting security concerns
and forming a credible CEP.
Although the Special Mission has received pledges of approximately
$5.5 million, it has serious cash flow problems. Actual contributions
to date total slightly more that $3.2 million, consisting mainly of
$1.6 million from the U.S. and $510,000 from Canada. Canada announced
an additional contribution of approximately $1.3 million in January,
which has yet to be received. The EU has contributed $640,000 with
another $159,000 to follow. The Mission has requested an additional
$11-13 million from the international community to fund its current
mandates. Beyond that, the cost for elections security and observation
could be as high as $35 million.
Question 4. As U.S. and international assistance still cannot be
directed to Haiti, the Haitian people are suffering. What is the U.S.
doing to see that OAS Resolution 822 is complied with and that
normalization of relations will take place between Haiti and
international financial institutions and multilateral banks?
Answer. In Resolution 822, the OAS supported normalization of
economic cooperation between the Government of Haiti and the
international financial institutions and urged those parties to resolve
the technical and financial obstacles that preclude such normalization.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) have each held discussions with the
Government of Haiti since last September. However, before loan
disbursements can begin from the IDB, Haiti needs to pay its IDB
arrears, slightly over $20 million as of year-end 2002. The same holds
for the World Bank. For IMF programs, Haiti must negotiate and
implement an agreement with the IMF on basic economic reforms. An
appropriate IMF agreement could also facilitate additional loans from
the IDB and World Bank.
To date the Government of Haiti has neither paid its arrears to the
IDB or World Bank, nor reached an agreement with the IMF. All three
institutions continue their talks with the government. We have
repeatedly encouraged the Government of Haiti to take the steps needed
so that lending from these institutions can resume. We have also
encouraged the institutions to work actively toward this goal.
The U.S. continues to provide assistance to Haiti through non-
governmental organizations addressing the urgent humanitarian needs in
Haiti and promoting prosperity and democratic institutions. The U.S.
has been and remains Haiti's largest donor. In the past two years, we
have disbursed over $120 million in humanitarian assistance to Haiti.
Question 5. In the President's budget for FY 2004, what kind of
assistance do you expect to provide to Haiti through USAID and
nongovernmental organizations?
Answer. USAID's objective in Haiti is to alleviate poverty while
building foundations for a prosperous, democratic society. Assistance
is channeled through U.S. contractors and grantees to local and other
U.S. non-governmental organizations. Principal USAID programs budgeted
for FY 2004 include:
Health ($21.8 million): USAID uses a network of over 30
local organizations to provide services to some 2.5 million
Haitians, close to a third of the population. Child
immunization rates in USAID-assisted areas are nearly double
the national average, as high as 85 percent in some parts of
the country. Child malnutrition rates in USAID assisted areas
fell from 32 percent to 22 percent in 1995-2000. The percentage
of women nationwide seeking prenatal consultation has increased
from 68 percent to 79 percent.
The national contraceptive use rate has gone from 9 percent to over
15 percent, with even stronger gains--to 22 percent--among rural,
illiterate women. This is part of our expanded AIDS prevention program.
Haiti is also a beneficiary of the Global Fund against AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
Food Security ($23.8 million): P.L. 480 Title II (food
assistance) improves the nutritional well-being and food
security of Haiti's poorest populations, especially children
under five and nursing mothers. An early warning system
developed to anticipate and prepare for food emergencies in the
Northwest region is now being replicated in other parts of the
country.
Democracy ($2.9 million): Democracy programs focus on
increasing the professionalism of political parties,
strengthening independent media and civil society organizations
and promoting judicial reform and human rights. Training and
other support is also provided for independent election
observation groups.
Education ($2.5 million): Programs increase pass rates for
third and fourth grade students through improved in-service
training for 4,000 teachers and school directors, radio
education in math and Creole, and the provision of books,
teaching aids, and curriculum guides.
Economic Growth ($1.75 million): Programs are aimed at
sustainable increases in income for the poor. They expand
availability of small business loans to urban micro-
entrepreneurs; provide assistance to small farmers in marketing
valuable export crops such as coffee, cacao, and mangos; and
help Haitian artisans find niche export markets. Beneficiaries
include small entrepreneurs (80% of whom are female),
approximately 250,000 hillside farmers, and 2,000 artisans.
Through these programs, we aim to alleviate poverty, illiteracy,
and malnutrition and to promote respect for human rights and the rule
of law. Effectiveness of U.S. assistance has been shown in the
improvement of social indicators in the areas of intervention, despite
a deteriorating economy overall.
USAID BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO HAITI (INCLUDES P.L. 480 FOOD)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004
BUDGET Disbursed Disbursed Estimated Budgeted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL IN MILLIONS........................... $72 $54 $47 $53
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The above figures do not include programs funded by the U.S.
Departments of State and Defense for training/equipping units of the
Haitian National Police with counter-narcotics responsibilities, Peace
Corps, or U.S. contributions to Haiti through international
organizations, such as the OAS, UNDP, and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM).