    [Senate Hearing 108-206]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 108-206

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                    before a

                              SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

                          ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       on

                                   H.R. 2555

     AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
     FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2004, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                        Department of Homeland Security
                       Science and Technology Directorate
                                U.S. Coast Guard
                              U.S. Secret Service
                           Nondepartmental witnesses

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

     Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
                                     senate

                                     ______

                           U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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                          COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                         TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
    THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi            ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
    PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
    CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri        PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
    MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky            TOM HARKIN, Iowa
    CONRAD BURNS, Montana                BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
    RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           HARRY REID, Nevada
    JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire            HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
    ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              PATTY MURRAY, Washington
    BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado    BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
    LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas          RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
    MIKE DeWINE, Ohio                    TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
    SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
                        James W. Morhard, Staff Director
                     Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
                  Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

              Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security

                      THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
    TED STEVENS, Alaska                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
    PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
    MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky            PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
    RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           TOM HARKIN, Iowa
    JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire            BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
    BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado    HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
    LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   PATTY MURRAY, Washington

                               Professional Staff
                                 Rebecca Davies
                                   Les Spivey
                               Rachelle Schroeder
                                  James Hayes
                                  Carol Cribbs
                           Charles Kieffer (Minority)
                            Chip Walgren (Minority)
                            Alexa Sewell (Minority)
                             Scott Nance (Minority)

                             Administrative Support

                                 Joshua Manley

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                             Tuesday, April 8, 2003

                                                                       Page
    Department of Homeland Security..................................     1

                            Tuesday, April 10, 2003

    Department of Homeland Security: Science and Technology
      Directorate....................................................    45

                            Tuesday, April 30, 2003

    Department of Homeland Security..................................    83

                             Thursday, May 1, 2003

    Department of Homeland Security:
        U.S. Coast Guard.............................................   185
        U.S. Secret Service..........................................   185

                              Tuesday, May 6, 2003

    Department of Homeland Security..................................   263

                             Tuesday, May 13, 2003

    Department of Homeland Security..................................   331
    Nondepartmental Witnesses........................................   439

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 2:15 p.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Cochran, Gregg, Craig, Byrd, Harkin,
    Kohl, and Murray.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BROWN, UNDER SECRETARY,
                EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
                DIRECTORATE

                   opening statement of senator thad cochran

        Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
        The subject of today's hearing is the fiscal year 2004
    budget request for the Emergency Preparedness and Response
    Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.
        We appreciate the attendance of Under Secretary Michael
    Brown. We thank you for your attendance today and welcome you
    and those who have accompanied you to this hearing.
        The President's budget request for Emergency Preparedness
    and Response totals $5.96 billion. We have a copy of the
    statement you have prepared for the committee, which we will
    make a part of the record in full. And we will invite you to
    make any explanation of the budget request which you think
    would be helpful to the committee as we review this request for
    appropriations.
        But before proceeding, I want to recognize my good friend,
    the distinguished Senator from West Virginia and the ranking
    Democrat on the committee, for any opening statement that he
    would wish to make.
        Senator Byrd.

                      statement of senator robert c. byrd

        Senator Byrd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is the
    first witness to testify before the recently established
    Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
    Committee, the subcommittee that is tasked with making careful
    choices about how best to take care of our Nation. Is this
    working?
        We have been able to send a person to the moon and bring
    him back safely again, but we have never been able to perfect a
    good public address system.
        So this subcommittee has to find the proper balance. How do
    we make America safe without fundamentally changing the quality
    of a free society? How do we protect ourselves from a threat
    within our borders, while protecting our privacy rights, and
    our freedom to move about this great country? How do we invest
    the resources and organize our efforts to catch terrorists
    without throwing out The Constitution? How do we make sure that
    the agencies that have been merged into the new Department of
    Homeland Security and that have specific missions unrelated to
    homeland security, such as preventing and responding to natural
    disasters, have the resources to effectively accomplish those
    missions?
        Over the last 10 years, the Federal Emergency Management
    Agency has earned the reputation as the Federal agency that
    extends help to Americans in their darkest hour. Time and
    again, when Americans have been struck by hurricanes, when West
    Virginians have been struck by floods, and when Americans have
    been struck by earthquakes, FEMA has been the Federal agency
    that was the firm shoulder that disaster victims could lean on.
        That is not to say that FEMA's response has always been
    without problems, but in recent years, FEMA has been organized
    as, and has been very adept at, helping the victims of national
    emergencies. I know a good many families and communities in
    West Virginia who look at FEMA and wonder where they would be,
    how they might have survived, without the aid of FEMA.
        In your testimony today, please explain to the subcommittee
    what you expect the impact will be of the merger of FEMA into
    the Department of Homeland Security. Under the umbrella of the
    new Department of Homeland Security, with so much emphasis on
    homeland security, can the recently created Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate continue to provide the
    victims of natural disasters with the same kind of rapid and
    organized assistance?
        FEMA was formed in 1979 by merging into one agency five
    agencies from existing Federal departments. And it took 15
    years for FEMA to work through organizational glitches and
    internal bickering at times. I have been on this committee
    since FEMA was created, and I do not want to see this very
    important agency go through more growing pains.
        While learning to prepare for and to respond to all
    hazards, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
    must not lose its capacity to respond effectively to natural
    disasters.
        Now, the Homeland Security Act places new responsibilities
    on your agency, including program transfers from the FBI--it is
    that broccoli I had for lunch. Gives you trouble. Does it give
    you trouble?
        Mr. Brown. Not too often, Senator.
        Senator Byrd. The Homeland Security Act places new
    responsibilities on your agency, including program transfers
    from the FBI, health and human services, and the commerce
    department. It is this subcommittee's job to ensure that you
    have adequate resources to maintain your past level of activity
    and to take on these new responsibilities.
        I hope that in your testimony today, you will address
    whether the President's budget provides the resources to
    address these new responsibilities without undermining your
    missions related to responding and preventing natural
    disasters. I will look forward to your testimony.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
    Gregg.
        Senator Gregg. Mr. Chairman, I will look forward to hearing
    the witness.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

                           statement of michael brown

        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Senator. Good afternoon, Mr.
    Chairman, Senator Byrd, Senator Gregg. It is certainly my
    pleasure to be here.
        I am Michael Brown, the Under Secretary for the Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate (EP&R) of the Department
    of Homeland Security. On March 1 of this year, the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) became part of the
    Department of Homeland Security. We at FEMA are honored and
    excited to be a part of this DHS mission to prepare and protect
    our Nation.
        However, I want to assure the members of this subcommittee
    that FEMA will not lose sight of its responsibility to help
    people and communities affected by natural disasters. During my
    tenure at FEMA, I have developed an acute appreciation for its
    all-hazards mission.
        To underscore that point, it is useful to examine our
    mission statement. The mission statement of the Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate is to lead the Nation to
    prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover
    from major domestic disasters, both natural and manmade,
    including incidents of terrorism. It still contains the core
    responsibilities that guided FEMA as an independent agency.
        Since March 1 and the standing up of the Department of
    Homeland Security, we have responded to disasters caused by
    snowstorms, ice storms, flooding and the Columbia Space Shuttle
    disaster.
        We have not changed how we respond. The core competencies
    of my dedicated staff have not changed, nor have the experience
    and expertise that they bring to the table.
        We embrace our new homeland security responsibilities.
    Those responsibilities will be folded into our long-standing,
    well-tested organization and will not replace it.
        As we moved into the Department of Homeland Security, I
    ordered an internal reorganization of the directorate. We look
    forward to submitting those changes to you once we have
    completed our realignment.
        FEMA will be divided into four disciplines: preparedness,
    mitigation, response and recovery. This reorganization reflects
    the traditional areas of emergency management. It also
    resembles the organizational flow used by many States who must
    continue to be our partners in incident management.
        The changes that FEMA has undergone, both external and
    internal, have not changed its focus. And as part of DHS, we
    will continue FEMA's tradition to be there whenever disaster
    strikes, whatever its nature.
        The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate faces
    serious challenges in achieving this mission. Chief among those
    challenges is increased risk. America's metropolitan areas
    continue to grow in size and density, with many of the largest
    situated in coastal regions, along earthquake faults, or in
    other high-risk areas. Commercial and residential development
    have progressed at a rapid pace across the Nation, expanding
    into previously unsettled or sparsely populated areas, and
    exposing growing communities to new risks, especially wildfire,
    flooding, and erosion.
        To address these growing risks, EP&R will act accordingly.
    We are working to consolidate the multiple Federal response
    plans into a single national response plan governing our
    emergency activities across all levels of Government.
        We are augmenting and maintaining the Nation's
    pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpiles and strengthening their
    future capacity to ensure adequate supplies in the event of a
    national emergency.
        We are committing ourselves to recruiting, training and
    retaining a top-notch workforce and developing a staff with the
    talent, skills, competencies and dedication necessary to meet
    the demands of the future.
        We are working to further develop State, local and
    volunteer readiness strategies through planning, mitigation,
    preparedness, response and recovery activities.
        Finally, we are providing critical information to the
    public, the media and the emergency management community by
    maintaining public information programs and by building
    partnerships with and among Government entities, other
    responder organizations and the private sector.
        Toward these goals, the President's Budget for Fiscal Year
    2004 requests resources to address these areas. Approximately
    $900 million is proposed for Project BioShield for a new
    permanent authority that would allow the Government to secure
    medical countermeasures to strengthen the Nation's preparedness
    against bioterror attacks.
        There is $400 million to be spent to augment and maintain
    the Strategic National Stockpile of drugs and vaccines in order
    to expand and strengthen America's capability to respond to a
    bioterrorism threat.
        $300 million is proposed to continue the pre-disaster
    hazard mitigation program, ensuring that the most worthwhile
    and cost-effective mitigation programs are funded.
        $200 million is proposed to correct, update and digitally
    distribute the Nation's flood insurance rate maps, identifying
    areas at risk. These maps will guide future development and
    flood mitigation efforts.
        Finally, $1.9 billion will provide disaster relief under
    those primary assistance programs that provide a significant
    portion of the total Federal response to victims in
    presidentially declared major disasters and emergencies.
        These programs reflect FEMA's commitment to performing its
    mission of leading America to prepare for, mitigate the effects
    of, respond to and recover from disasters, both natural and
    manmade, including those acts of terrorism. Successfully
    implementing these missions is key to our Nation's well-being.
        Finally, one of the strategies the Department of Homeland
    Security will employ to implement its broad agenda is the
    consolidation of the Department's grant processes within a
    single directorate to allow its State and local partners one-
    stop shopping for all homeland security needs.
        The President's Budget consolidates grants for first
    responders in the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within
    the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. The
    assistance to firefighters, State and local all-hazards
    emergency operations planning, interoperable communications
    equipment and Emergency Management Performance Grants all move
    from FEMA to ODP.
        Because of the proposed transfer of these grant programs,
    those resources are now shown in the Border and Transportation
    Security/ODP budget instead of the FEMA budget.
        In closing, I would like to thank the members of this
    subcommittee for the opportunity to speak about some of our
    successes over the last year, and our challenges ahead in the
    fiscal year 2004 budget.

                               prepared statement

        FEMA joins DHS with great faith that we now have an entire
    department helping us secure the Nation against all hazards,
    whether natural or manmade. We will do our part by responding
    to disasters wherever they strike and whatever causes them. And
    with that, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to answer any questions.
        [The statement follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Michael Brown

                                  introduction
        Good afternoon, Chairman Cochran and Members of the Subcommittee. I
    am Michael Brown, Under Secretary for the Emergency Preparedness and
    Response Directorate (EP&R) of the Department of Homeland Security.
        On March 1 of this year, the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
    FEMA, became part of the Emergency Preparedness and Response
    Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). We are proud
    to join the new Department and are determined to do our part to help
    Secretary Ridge and the Department succeed. I want to assure the
    Members of this Subcommittee that EP&R will not lose sight of its
    responsibility to help people and communities affected by disasters. I
    served as the General Counsel of FEMA when I first arrived in
    Washington, D.C. and, at the time of the creation of DHS, as the Deputy
    Director. Given that experience, I have an acute appreciation for
    EP&R's mission and its important role in the Department. To underscore
    that point, it is useful to examine our mission statement. The mission
    statement of EP&R,

        To lead the Nation to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond
    to, and recover from major domestic disasters, both natural and
    manmade, including incidents of terrorism still contains the same core
    responsibilities that guided FEMA as an independent agency. Since March
    1, DHS/EP&R has responded to disasters caused by snowstorms, ice storms
    and flooding. We have not changed how we respond.

        As we moved into DHS, I ordered an internal reorganization of EP&R.
    We look forward to submitting those changes to you once we have
    completed our realignment. EP&R will be divided into four disciplines--
    preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. This reorganization
    reflects the traditional areas of emergency management. It also
    resembles the organizational flow used by many States, who continue to
    be our partners in emergency management.
        The changes FEMA has undergone--both external and internal--have
    not changed our focus. As part of DHS, EP&R will continue FEMA's
    tradition to be there whenever disasters strike.
                        fiscal year 2002 accomplishments
        During fiscal year 2002, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (FEMA) expended nearly $3.9 billion in disaster funds to aid people and
    communities overwhelmed by disasters, which included earthquakes,
    floods, ice and winter storms, fires, hurricanes, tornadoes, and
    tropical storms. FEMA responded to 42 major disasters involving 28
    States and 4 U.S. Territories.
        FEMA also provided assistance for a near-record 83 fire events that
    affected 18 States, with the western part of the Nation experiencing
    one of the worst fire seasons in U.S. history. In fiscal year 2002,
    FEMA received $360 million in Assistance to Firefighter Grants for
    equipment, safety and prevention programs and vehicles. We received
    $745 million for that purpose in fiscal year 2003. Late in fiscal year
    2002, FEMA was appropriated $225 million to distribute to States in
    fiscal year 2003 to modernize their emergency operations centers,
    update their emergency response plans, and improve their emergency
    preparedness.
        In addition to the numerous disasters that struck in fiscal year
    2002, FEMA continued its full support to the City and State of New York
    in their recovery efforts from the terrorist attacks of September 11,
    2001. This includes distributing the $9 billion allotted by President
    Bush and Congress.
                                   challenges
        The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate faces serious
    challenges in achieving its mission. Chief among those challenges is
    increased risk. America's metropolitan areas continue to grow in size
    and density, with many of the largest situated in coastal regions,
    along earthquake faults, or in other high-risk areas. Commercial and
    residential development have progressed at a rapid pace across the
    Nation, expanding into previously unsettled or sparsely settled areas,
    and exposing growing communities to new risks, especially wildfire,
    flooding and erosion. To address these growing risks, EP&R will
    continue to emphasize pre-disaster mitigation and insurance.
        The risks associated with acts of terrorism also pose a significant
    challenge for EP&R. FEMA's rapid and decisive response to the events of
    September 11 demonstrated the Agency's role in consequence management.
    As a result, the Nation is looking to the emergency management
    community--and EP&R in particular--to meet this challenge. Creating a
    single, all-incident management plan from the multiple Federal response
    plans currently operating is an important step in ensuring EP&R meets
    the challenge. Maintaining the Nation's pharmaceutical and vaccine
    stockpiles, and strengthening their future capacity to ensure adequate
    supplies in the event of a national emergency are additional activities
    we will undertake.
        EP&R also faces serious challenges in maintaining and developing
    its workforce. Within the next 5 years, 48 percent of the EP&R
    workforce is projected to become eligible for retirement. Given this,
    EP&R has committed itself to recruiting, training, and retaining a top-
    notch workforce and developing a staff with the talent, skills,
    competencies, and dedication necessary to meet the demands of the
    future.
        Meeting multiple demands with limited resources, a problem familiar
    to all Federal agencies, is another obstacle EP&R will have to overcome
    to achieve its mission of protecting the lives and property of the
    American people.
                                   activities
        Specific mission activities include:
      --Improving the Nation's disaster response capabilities and those of
            State and local governments by developing and maintaining an
            integrated, nationwide operational capability to respond to and
            recover from disasters and emergencies, regardless of their
            cause, in partnership with other Federal agencies, State and
            local governments, volunteer organizations, and the private
            sector.
      --Assisting all levels of government, first responders, volunteer
            groups, and the public in meeting the responsibilities of
            domestic emergencies and challenges, especially incidents that
            are fire-related or chemical/biological in nature through
            planning, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery
            activities.
      --Using risk management strategies to reduce and eliminate the long-
            term risk to life and property from natural and technological
            hazards such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and dam
            failures.
      --Ensuring the adequacy of the Nation's pharmaceutical and vaccine
            stockpiles and other medical supplies that can be delivered to
            emergency sites in 12 hours.
      --Providing critical information to the public, the media, and the
            emergency management community by maintaining public
            information programs and by building partnerships with and
            among government entities, other responder organizations, and
            the private sector.
                                2004 highlights
        The President's Budget for 2004 includes several areas of emphasis:
      --$890 million is proposed for a new, permanent authority that would
            allow the Government to secure medical countermeasures to
            strengthen the Nation's preparedness against bioterror attacks.
      --$400 million would be spent to maintain the Strategic National
            Stockpile of drugs and vaccines in order to expand and
            strengthen America's capability to respond to a bioterrorism
            threat.
      --$300 million is proposed to continue the pre-disaster hazard
            mitigation program to ensure that the most worthwhile and cost-
            effective mitigation programs are funded.
      --$200 million is proposed to correct, update, and digitally
            distribute the Nation's flood insurance rate maps, to
            identifying areas at risk. The maps will guide future
            development and flood mitigation efforts.
      --$1.9 billion will provide disaster relief under the primary
            assistance programs that provide a significant portion of the
            total Federal response to victims in presidentially declared
            major disasters and emergencies.
        EP&R's 2004 programs reflect its commitment to performing its
    mission of leading America to prepare for, mitigate the effects of,
    respond to, and recover from disasters, both natural and manmade,
    including incidents of terrorism. Successfully implementing the EP&R
    missions is key to our Nation's well being.
                                  preparedness
        The mission and overriding objective of the Preparedness Division
    is to help the Nation better prepare to respond to emergencies and
    disasters of all kinds, including those resulting from acts of
    terrorism and involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Preparedness Division
    is contained in our $1.652 billion operating expense account.
    Preparedness priorities include:
      --Strengthening the ability of State and local emergency managers and
            responders to prepare for and respond to all hazards, including
            terrorist attacks;
      --Building and sustaining a national preparedness and response
            capability.
        The Preparedness Division is responsible for Federal, State, local,
    and community preparedness programs; assessments and exercises; the
    Radiological Emergency Preparedness program and the Chemical Stockpile
    Emergency Preparedness Program; and emergency management and first
    responder grants administration.
        The Preparedness Division also includes the U.S. Fire
    Administration, whose mission is to reduce life and economic losses due
    to fire and related emergencies. Fire death rates in the United States
    are among the highest in the industrialized world, but many of these
    deaths are preventable. The U.S. Fire Administration works to prevent
    these deaths and the damage to property through leadership, advocacy,
    coordination and support. The training programs offered at the National
    Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute to promote the
    professional development of command level firefighters, emergency
    managers and emergency responders are an important aspect of the U.S.
    Fire Administration's duties.
        Another training program in the Preparedness Division is the Noble
    Training Center located at Ft. McClellan, Alabama. Noble Training
    Center is the only hospital facility in the U.S. devoted entirely to
    medical training for WMD. The Noble Training Center trains medical
    personnel for State and local hospitals, emergency medical services,
    the National Disaster Medical System and the Metropolitan Medical
    Response System.
        The Preparedness Division will provide the expertise to develop the
    National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response
    Plan (NRP). The objective of both of these tasks is to ensure that all
    levels of government across the Nation work efficiently and effectively
    together, using a national approach to domestic incident management.
        NIMS will provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal,
    State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently
    together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all domestic
    incidents. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among
    Federal, State, and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core
    set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the
    incident command system; multi-agency coordination systems; unified
    command; training; identification and management of resources
    (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications
    and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of
    incident information and incident resources.
        The Preparedness Division will continue to provide the States with
    technical assistance in their all hazards planning. As part of our
    effort to prepare our citizens for all disasters, the Division will
    oversee the Community Emergency Response Teams, or CERT. This program,
    begun as a civilian training program by the Los Angeles Fire
    Department, has become a nationwide effort to train citizens in first
    aid and basic firefighting and emergency response techniques. CERT
    trained citizens are able to provide those basic emergency services
    that would otherwise occupy the first responders. EP&R provides train-
    the-trainer programs to allow as many citizens as possible to receive
    this training across the country. Currently, over 200,000 citizens have
    received CERT training; our goal is to train 400,000 citizens by the
    end of 2003.
        Preparedness is also responsible for the Metropolitan Medical
    Response System (MMRS). The MMRS consists of 120 teams of medical
    responders located in major metropolitan areas. The primary focus of
    the MMRS program is to develop or enhance existing emergency
    preparedness systems to effectively respond to a public health crisis,
    especially a WMD event. Through preparation and coordination, the local
    law enforcement, fire, hazmat, EMS, hospital, public health, and other
    ``first response'' personnel are better able to effectively respond in
    the first 48 hours of a public health crisis.
                                   mitigation
        Our mitigation efforts are an essential cornerstone of the
    Department of Homeland Security's resolve to protect the lives and
    property of Americans from the ravages of disasters. Mitigation
    programs provide us the opportunity not only to develop plans to reduce
    risks, but to actually implement those plans before a disaster occurs.
        In fiscal year 2003, Congress supported the President's efforts to
    promote disaster mitigation by creating and funding two initiatives:
    pre-disaster mitigation grants and flood map modernization. We are
    moving quickly to implement both of these important initiatives.
        The Pre-Disaster Mitigation program supports the goals of disaster
    mitigation partnerships. The competitive nature of this funding source
    encourages communities to assess their risks, evaluate their
    vulnerabilities and incorporate an action plan into the ongoing
    planning processes.
        As an annual grant program, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation program
    gives States and communities the opportunity to develop plans to reduce
    risks. States will no longer need a presidentially declared disaster
    before they can receive mitigation funding to reduce their most
    significant risks. Mitigation of the most hazardous risks should be a
    regular investment priority, and not contingent upon a disaster
    declaration.
        This competitive program will help ensure that the most worthwhile
    and most cost-effective projects are funded. The goal is to fund
    activities that will reduce the risks of future damage in hazard-prone
    areas, thereby reducing the need for future disaster assistance.
        The States play an essential role in the implementation of all of
    our mitigation programs, and they will be prominent in the pre-disaster
    mitigation program.
        With respect to the pre-disaster mitigation grants, we have already
    announced the availability of funds for pre-disaster mitigation
    planning grants based on the fiscal year 2003 appropriation. The
    application deadline for these grants is April 30, 2003, and we will
    award these grants to the approved States and territories soon
    thereafter.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget proposal includes $300 million: an
    appropriation request of $280 million for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation
    program coupled with $20 million transferred from the National Flood
    Insurance Fund for flood mitigation grants.
        The fiscal year 2004 request also includes $200 million for the
    Flood Map Modernization Program which is also well underway. Flood maps
    have been produced for over 19,000 communities. Communities, lenders,
    insurance agents and others use the maps and the flood data
    approximately 20 million times a year to make critical decisions on
    land development, community redevelopment, insurance coverage, and
    insurance premiums.
        Now, however, more than two-thirds of the maps are more than 10
    years old. Many do not accurately reflect the change in flood risk due
    to increased development over the years. Nearly all of the maps have
    out-dated streets that make it difficult to precisely determine if a
    property is located in a floodplain. Of additional concern is that the
    vast majority of the existing maps are not compatible with today's
    Geographic Information System (GIS) technology. This further
    complicates communities' efforts to implement mitigation strategies
    through building code and planning and zoning enforcement.
        We will continue implementing a two-pronged approach, begun in
    fiscal year 2003, for updating the Nation's flood hazard data. With
    buy-in from our State and local partners, we are focusing first on
    high-risk areas. This will best serve our mission to reduce losses of
    life and property. In addition, to take advantage of economies of scale
    in these areas, we are emphasizing basin wide studies, where they are
    feasible and cost effective. Secondly, we plan to capitalize on areas
    that have existing data that can be quickly and efficiently converted
    to up-to-date flood studies supporting the National Flood Insurance
    Program (NFIP). This approach provides a framework for prioritizing
    projects and is scalable to accommodate available funding in fiscal
    year 2004 and subsequent years.
        One reason the NFIP flood hazard data is out of date is the lack of
    ownership at the State and local levels. Our strategy for map
    modernization seeks to change this pattern. We will engage in
    partnerships and establish a process that enables State, regional, and
    local entities to manage their flood hazard data. Many local
    governments already implement the floodplain management standards of
    the NFIP. So, where the interest and capability exist, hazard
    identification activities should also be accomplished locally. We will
    provide flood hazard identification training and technical assistance
    to those interested in flood hazard identification. This training will
    increase the capability of States, regional planning commissions, flood
    control districts, and local governments to produce and maintain flood
    hazard studies. The end result will be a decentralized system for
    producing data by those most affected by the flood hazard.
        A key component of the flood map modernization initiative is
    improving e-Government processes for flood hazard data creation and
    distribution. Through the Flood Map Modernization Program, we will
    enable easy access and exchange of flood hazard data through the
    Internet. This system will provide tools allowing the effective use of
    information for making decisions that reduce vulnerability to flood
    risk.
        It is critical that the new flood maps be maintained. We will work
    closely with the States and local communities to do so. By moving to a
    web-based distribution system and using technology to adjust the maps,
    we will provide timely, accurate flood risk information to communities
    that wish to make development and redevelopment decisions without the
    risk of increasing flood damages.
        So far, in fiscal year 2003, we have implemented a performance-
    based acquisition strategy for modernizing the Nation's flood maps. Our
    ``results oriented'' approach leverages the industry's innovations and
    ``best business practices'' to deliver new flood maps in the most cost
    effective and timely manner possible. In addition, we are implementing
    an integrated acquisition strategy that will leverage expertise and
    resources with other Federal agencies and our State and local partners.
        Mr. Chairman, I am also happy to report that the National Flood
    Insurance Program, the largest single-line property insurance writer in
    the country, is once again debt-free and stands on solid financial
    ground as we begin a new era in emergency management.
        In June of 2001, Tropical Storm Allison battered the Gulf Coast and
    East Coast States. After the final losses were tallied, Allison had the
    dubious distinction of becoming our first billion-dollar tropical
    storm, and we borrowed $660 million from the U.S. Treasury to pay for
    losses that exceeded our reserves. We have repaid that debt, with
    interest, as of October 2002.
        Approximately 30,000 families, business, and other victims of
    flooding from Allison received payments from the National Flood
    Insurance Program rather than relying on disaster relief. This example
    proves again the value of the flood insurance program, which helps
    America recover from the devastating effects of flood, while minimizing
    the burden on the taxpayer.
                                    response
        The Response Division coordinates and implements the Federal
    response to presidentially declared disasters. The budget for the
    Response Division is contained in the Operating Expenses account and in
    the Disaster Relief Fund.
        We will continue to improve our disaster response capabilities--and
    those of State and local governments--through the efficient and
    effective delivery of disaster assistance to victims, while also
    reducing costs and ensuring accountability of response assets and
    equipment. The Response Division is charged with developing and
    maintaining an integrated, nationwide operational capability to respond
    to and recover from disasters and emergencies, regardless of their
    cause, in partnership with other Federal agencies, State and local
    governments, volunteer organizations, and the private sector.
        As one of its new initiatives, the Response Division will
    streamline capabilities by merging the Federal interagency response
    plans into one national response plan. The National Response Plan will
    encompass the Federal Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan, the
    Federal Radiological Response Plan and the Interagency Concept of
    Operations Plan.
        We also recognize that disasters, such as an earthquake on the New
    Madrid fault, have the potential of affecting tens of thousands of
    people. While the emergency management community is well-trained to
    handle day-to-day disasters, we are not adequately prepared to handle a
    truly catastrophic event. In order to respond to such events, the
    Response Division will pursue comprehensive, all hazards catastrophic
    planning. The goal is to ensure an integrated Federal, State, local and
    private sector response and an efficient mobilization of resources in
    the event of a catastrophic disaster. The first area of concentration
    will be catastrophic housing.
        As part of the EP&R budget, $400 million is requested to maintain
    the Strategic National Stockpile. The Strategic National Stockpile is
    made up of pharmaceuticals, vaccines and medical supplies housed in
    various areas around the country in case of emergencies. By dispersing
    the assets, we are able to get the necessary supplies to a disaster
    site in 12 hours.
        The Administration is requesting $890 million is requested for a
    new authority to allow the Federal government to purchase vaccines and
    medication for biodefense. EP&R is beginning its work in this arena by
    developing a bio-terrorism response plan, Bio-Watch; participating in
    Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Bio-terrorism Task
    force; and participating in major bio-terrorism response exercises such
    as TOPOFF 2 and Exercise Silent Night.
        The Response Division will take operational control over three
    separate teams of specialists that can be rapidly mobilized in times of
    disaster: the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) from the Federal
    Bureau of Investigations (FBI); the National Disaster Medical System
    (NDMS) from the Department of Health and Human Services; and the
    Nuclear Incident Response Teams (NIRT) from the Department of Energy.
        DEST provides expert advice, guidance and support to the FBI On-
    Scene Commander (OSC) during a WMD incident or credible threat. It is a
    specialized interagency U.S. Government team comprised of crisis and
    consequence management components. The DEST augments the FBI's Joint
    Operations Center (JOC) with tailored expertise, assessment and
    analysis capabilities.
        NDMS is a nationwide medical response system to supplement State
    and local medical resources during disasters and emergencies and to
    provide backup medical support to the Departments of Defense and
    Veterans Affairs medical care systems during an overseas conflict.
        The final new team, the NIRT, was established to provide a
    versatile nuclear and radiological emergency response and management
    capability.
                                    recovery
        The disaster relief activities of EP&R are financed primarily from
    the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) with funding for permanent staff in the
    Operating Expenses appropriation. The 2004 budget request for the DRF
    includes $1.934 billion which will help insure that we meet outstanding
    obligations from previous disasters, and have the funds needed to
    handle events in fiscal year 2004.
        The Recovery Division administers the programs that help States,
    local governments, communities and individuals recover after the
    President has determined supplemental Federal assistance is needed. The
    Individual and Public Assistance programs will remain our primary
    commitment to communities, individuals, and families affected by
    disasters. To provide assistance as quickly as possible, we coordinate
    closely with our regional offices, disaster field offices, other
    Federal agencies, our State partners and voluntary organizations.
        The Individual Assistance Program provides individuals and families
    affected by disasters with a full range of available programs in a
    timely manner. This assistance varies from tangible help such as
    providing funds to repair homes, to the more intangible programs
    providing emotional support through State crisis counseling programs.
    When disaster strikes, individuals and families need immediate
    information and help. Once the President declares a disaster,
    applications for individual assistance are taken and centrally
    processed to get money into the hands of the victims as soon as
    possible, generally within 7 to 10 days. Through timely home
    inspections and nationwide call centers, disaster victims are able to
    obtain the information and assistance needed to recover.
        The Public Assistance Program is the primary means for community
    recovery. This program provides cost-shared grants to States and local
    governments and to certain private non-profit organizations for debris
    removal, emergency protective measures, and repair or replacement of
    damaged facilities, such as roads, buildings, and utility systems. A
    recent example with which you may be familiar was the removal of
    approximately1.8 million tons of debris from the World Trade Center
    attack. This enormous effort was completed both ahead of schedule and
    under budget. Also, we were better able to address the complex transit
    issues in New York City following 9/11 by collaborating with other
    Federal agencies. Specifically, integrating FEMA's programs with those
    of the Federal Transit Administration improved the means in which
    financial assistance was provided to the City.
        In order to promote a more efficient use of Federal and State
    resources, we work with State and local applicants to evaluate damage
    to facilities and estimate the cost to repair them. In addition, we
    encourage communities to include mitigation measures in repairs to
    reduce future damages to facilities. Finally, EP&R encourages States
    with adequate resources to assume a larger role in managing the Public
    Assistance program in their States.
        The Fire Management Assistance Program is another key resource for
    States and local governments to mitigate, manage, and control forest or
    grassland fires to prevent damages that result in a major disaster
    declaration. This past year's drought spawned many fires, and the
    financial assistance we provided through more than 80 fire declarations
    saved millions of dollars in damages to private properties and public
    facilities.
        We take our mission to help communities and citizens recover very
    seriously. We continuously survey our customers and evaluate the
    effectiveness of our Recovery Programs to help communities and disaster
    victims and, at the same time, ensure the proper stewardship of Federal
    taxpayer dollars.
                                   conclusion
        In closing, I would like to thank the Members of the Subcommittee
    for the opportunity to speak about some of our successes over the last
    year, our challenges ahead and the fiscal year 2004 budget for the
    Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of the Department of
    Homeland Security. We join DHS with great faith that we now have an
    entire department helping us secure the Nation against all hazards,
    both natural and man made. We will do our part by preparing for,
    mitigating against, responding to and recovering from disasters. I
    would now be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

                              DISASTER RELIEF FUND

        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for
    summarizing your statement and explaining the highlights of the
    President's budget request for 2004.
        As you know, we just completed action here in the Senate on
    a supplemental appropriations bill. I wonder if you have any
    comments about the sufficiency of the funds that have been
    included in the Senate supplemental appropriations bill in
    helping meet the needs of this directorate for the balance of
    this fiscal year?
        Mr. Brown. Senator, I think that the supplemental goes a
    long way to meeting some of our unmet needs. As you know, when
    the threat advisory level changes and we go to different
    colors, and right now we are in Code Orange, it causes agencies
    like FEMA to go through a checklist of different actions that
    we think are appropriate to take both within the National
    Capital Region and out among our regional directorates across
    the country.
        We do not just summarily go through and implement
    everything that is on that checklist, but only those which we
    think are appropriate. So consequently, our operational budget
    increases dramatically. And I think the increase in the War
    Supplemental from $15 million to $45 million is a very
    significant help to us.
        I will tell you, however, we are still short in the
    Disaster Relief Fund. We would appreciate any help you could
    give us in that area.
        Senator Cochran. Well, in that connection, I recall the
    other day when you came by my office, which I appreciated very
    much that we talked about how it is hard to predict how much
    money is going to be needed for disaster relief because none of
    us knows what the nature of the disaster situation is going to
    be from 1 month to the next, or 1 year to the next. And we can
    pick out a number, the administration can or the committee can,
    and put it in a bill, hoping that will take care of the needs.
    What happens, though, if we get to the point where obviously we
    are today--and your answer suggests we may be about to run out
    of money in the disaster relief account--what happens when you
    do run out of money and Congress has not put sufficient funds
    in a supplemental or provided them to your office?
        Mr. Brown. Historically, Mr. Chairman, yearly
    appropriations average approximately $3 billion for the
    Disaster Relief Fund, the DRF. That normally gets us through a
    typical year of covering ongoing disasters. For example, right
    now we have, approximately 50 open disasters on which we are
    expending funds, either in individual assistance or public
    assistance.
        That assistance may include things like payments to
    individuals for repairs to homes, payments to State and local
    governments for repair of buildings, roads and bridges and so
    forth.
        What normally happens is that the Office of Management and
    Budget (OMB) will keep the Disaster Relief Fund at about a
    half-billion-dollar level. A couple of days ago, it was down to
    about $28 million, the lowest in the history of the agency, I
    believe. It is now back up today, I think, to about $44
    million.
        If OMB does not release the funds soon to the DRF, EP&R
    will probably have to delay the start of some projects or
    postpone the completion of other projects until we do receive
    the needed funds.
        Senator Cochran. Am I correct in assuming that many of
    these projects you are talking about are projects that are
    really under the purview of local governments, counties or
    States, where they are rebuilding a bridge or repairing
    infrastructure of one kind or another?
        Mr. Brown. Yes. Either assistance to individuals as a
    result of a disaster or public assistance to State and local
    governments. We provide funds through the State governments and
    they pass it to the entities in the declared disaster area. But
    primarily we are talking about public assistance projects,
    which would be the buildings and that type of thing that would
    have been damaged in a disaster.
        Senator Cochran. Yes. So if those local Governments are
    deprived of funds, particularly over a long period of time, we
    are going to run the risk of creating some more problems and
    hazards for the people who live in those communities, or
    States, is that correct?
        Mr. Brown. That is correct. We will reach some go point
    where I will have to have my financial people and others
    through to see what projects have been obligated and which ones
    we need to pare back until we either get a release of funds
    from OMB or additional funding in the DRF.

                        ASSISTANCE TO FIREFIGHTER GRANTS

        Senator Cochran. I want to ask one other question. Then I
    am going to yield to other members of the committee for any
    questions that they have. Can you tell us why the budget
    request shifts the assistance to firefighter grants from
    Emergency Preparedness and Response to the Office for Domestic
    Preparedness?
        Mr. Brown. The President's original proposal recommended
    that the entire first responder grantmaking process in the
    Department of Homeland Security be moved to FEMA, the Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate. Congress chose not to do
    that, and instead chose to split the first responder grants
    between FEMA and ODP. As we move through the transition, all of
    the normal first responder grantmaking processes that FEMA
    performs will go into ODP within the Border and Transportation
    Security Directorate to create a one-stop shop for first
    responders.
        Senator Cochran. Do you have any concerns regarding the
    shift in the administration of this important grant program--if
    so, what are they?
        Mr. Brown. I think the record would show that, as Senator
    Byrd has commented, FEMA had some glitches in the beginning. I
    also think the record would show that over the past 10 to 12
    years, FEMA has done an exceptional job of processing those
    grants in a very timely and organized fashion.
        I am committed to making certain that if the grants do move
    to ODP, that we will provide whatever resources we need to
    provide to ODP to allow them that same culture and that same
    ability.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Byrd.

                              DISASTER RELIEF FUND

        Senator Byrd. You have said that your current balance is
    about $44 million?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. And, what is the amount that can be made
    available on a contingent basis? Have you made a request to
    OMB?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, Senator, we have asked OMB to release the
    funds to get us back up to at least the $500 million level.
        We started that process in early February.
        Senator Byrd. Given the fact that in an average month FEMA
    pays out $250 million from the Disaster Relief Fund, $544
    million does not seem like enough to get you through the end of
    fiscal year 2003. Will the President send up a supplemental
    funding request?
        Mr. Brown. I do not know, sir. You will have to ask him.
        Senator Byrd. Well, why would I have to ask him?
        Mr. Brown. I do not know if the Administration plans on
    submitting another supplemental request.
        Senator Byrd. Well, do not give me a flippant response like
    that.
        Mr. Brown. I am not, Senator. I am just saying I really do
    not know whether or not they are going to request another
    supplemental.
        Senator Byrd. Okay. You do not have to say to me, ``You
    will have to ask him.'' I know how to ask the President a
    question.
        Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. And I know how to ask agency heads questions.
    What will happen if you run out of money?
        Mr. Brown. We will have to start delaying projects.

                        ASSISTANCE TO FIREFIGHTER GRANTS

        Senator Byrd. Recently, the U.S. Fire Administration
    released a report that concluded that only 13 percent of the
    fire departments are trained and equipped to deal with
    biological, chemical or radiological weapons. With this
    striking weakness in the ability of our first responders to
    respond to a known threat, I am disappointed to see that the
    President's fiscal year 2004 budget proposes to cut grants to
    fire departments from $745 million to $500 million.
        I am disappointed by the fact that the administration has
    continued to represent its $3.5 billion proposal for first
    responders as an adequate level, when it in fact provides no
    more resources than that enacted in fiscal year 2003 for
    similar programs.
        Given that your agency identified the weakness in
    firefighting programs, do you believe that the President's
    request is adequate?
        Mr. Brown. What we are trying to do, Senator, is to make
    certain that through the Assistance to Firefighters Grant
    Program, we get the money to where it is most needed, where
    there is the greatest risk.
        One of the things I have talked about is that we need to
    take the funds we get from Congress and the Administration for
    the fire program, and make sure that they are used as wisely as
    possible.
        One way I am trying to do that is to get the different fire
    departments to stop competing against one another, particularly
    when they are located close to one another or when there is
    some way that they can cooperate on a regional basis to better
    utilize taxpayer dollars.
        I often use my home State of Colorado as an example. There
    is no reason why Denver, Boulder and Fort Collins, all located
    right together on the front range, should each be applying for
    the same equipment. What they should do is get together and
    figure out what their vulnerabilities are, then apply for
    funding based on cooperative resolution of those
    vulnerabilities.
        I think that is a better way for the fire departments that
    are inadequately prepared to get the equipment that they need.
        The $3.5 billion funds the grant programs that award monies
    for training and equipment to combat terrorism. The purpose for
    which the funds are requested to be used is one of the factors
    considered in the peer review process to decide who should or
    should not be getting a grant.
        Senator Byrd. So I take it that you do not believe that the
    President's request is adequate?
        Mr. Brown. There will always be more requests than
    available funds. For example, Senator, with the current $750
    million appropriation for the firefighter grants, we have well
    over 20,000 applications in the pipeline representing almost $2
    billion worth of requests.
        Senator Byrd. Do I have any more time? Are you----
        Senator Cochran. Can we move to these others, and come back
    to you?
        Senator Byrd. Yes. Let us do that. Thank you.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Craig.
        Senator Craig. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    will be brief. I do not have any detailed questions, but, Mr.
    Secretary, I thank you for being before this committee. I am
    telling you as a member of the Senate, I am one who--while I
    supported and will support Homeland Security as an agency and
    worked with everyone here to get it stood up and operating
    from, at least, a legal and structural point of view and a
    policy point of view, I was one of those that was concerned
    that FEMA get buried and not be as effective as I believe it
    has been over the last good number of years.
        It is one of those agencies that I think did have the
    credibility in the turn-around time and did not get caught up,
    it seemed, in so many ways that other agencies seem to as it
    related to getting to its mission at hand and executing it.
        I hope that does remain the case. We will continue to work
    closely with you on it in serving on this new committee. I am
    anxious to work with the chairman to make sure all of that
    happens, at least from the funding side that which is
    appropriate.
        I also do not believe in backing so much money up you
    cannot get it out the door. I also recognize that sometimes it
    is important, even in critical times, that folks stand in line
    and wait just a little bit. It makes them a bit more efficient
    in the current operations and--but I will tell you that the
    fire money that comes to our departments across rural Idaho and
    across Idaho itself has been very, very effective, and I think
    put to use wisely and appropriately. And it has made those
    departments more responsive under the new responsibilities we
    are giving them. They are obviously going to need some help in
    developing the expertise necessary, so these grants are
    important. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Brown. We thank you for those compliments, Senator. I
    appreciate that.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Craig.
        Senator Kohl.

                       HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM

        Senator Kohl. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran.
        Mr. Brown, the current terror alert system, as it is
    intended to do, is causing people to be considerably alarmed
    and to come to attention, as well as causing considerable
    expense inevitably across many parts of our country. At a time
    when budgets are squeezed, a higher alert status has, in many
    cases, resulted in an increased overtime and anxiety.
        Many areas of our 50 States are beginning to not take the
    system seriously enough, because they believe that the threat
    does not apply to them. This alert system could easily turn
    into the boy who cried wolf in that people will not take it
    seriously enough until it is too late.
        What changes to the system is the Department considering
    and can we, in fact, expect changes in the future?
        Mr. Brown. I think Secretary Ridge has addressed that by
    trying to emphasize that the color-coded system is really
    geared toward the law enforcement and professional communities
    to give them an idea of where they need to be in their states
    of readiness. And I would use FEMA, again, as an example of
    what to do. We are trying to get States and locals to adopt a
    similar type of program.
        We have in our operations manual the different steps we
    would take at the different threat levels. Rather than
    implement every single one of those steps, we implement what is
    important based on the particular threat. We do this so that we
    do not have just these huge operational expenses for
    everything, but only for what we specifically need based on the
    threat.
        What we would like to do is educate the State and locals to
    do the same thing, that whether they ratchet up completely or
    not is something that they can certainly do on their own. But
    they should consider ratcheting up only as it applies to the
    particular threat and to what is needed in their particular
    community.
        As Secretary Ridge continues to push down the idea that the
    alert system is for the professionals, I think we will avoid
    your concern about crying wolf.
        Senator Kohl. Well, what I was referring to is any code.
    Let us take the second highest, which I believe is--is that
    code orange?
        Mr. Brown. Yes.
        Senator Kohl. Yes. Well, when we issue a code orange alert,
    are we intending that every community in every State across the
    entire 50 States are at the same level of risk and should
    respond?
        Mr. Brown. When the Secretary and the Attorney General make
    the decision to change the threat level, they are doing that
    based on specific intelligence that they receive----
        Senator Kohl. Yes.
        Mr. Brown [continuing]. About the threat. And I would say,
    Senator, that based on the intelligence that the Secretary and
    that the Under Secretaries have received that caused the threat
    level to go up to orange, there is a very credible threat out
    there. I think it is incumbent upon us to convey that to the
    State and local governments as succinctly and as appropriately
    as we can.
        Senator Kohl. What we are asking them to do is go, all--
    asking then all parts in all 50 States to go on an alert, and
    to do those things and spend that kind of money, which is
    consistent with the code orange----
        Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
        Senator Kohl [continuing]. Are we suggesting that Rawlings,
    Wyoming is at the same level of risk as Washington, D.C. and
    New York City?
        Mr. Brown. No. But I think where I am miscommunicating is
    what Rawlings, Wyoming, should do. Let us say there are 40
    items that you can do at Code Orange. Rock Springs or Rawlings
    or some place in Wyoming instead ought to decide that they are
    going to do only 2 or 3 of those things, because they do not
    need to do all 40 of them. So they can hold down their costs by
    implementing that kind of system.
        Senator Kohl. And so then you are suggesting that every
    community should make a decision?
        Mr. Brown. Absolutely.
        Senator Kohl. Well, then would Los Angeles make a decision
    or can--are they in a position to make a decision any less than
    Washington, D.C. or New York?
        Mr. Brown. If I----
        Senator Kohl. Because--in other words, what I am suggesting
    to you--and it is okay because you are just starting, or we are
    just starting as a country and we need refinement. It seems to
    me that there needs to be considerable thought, as I presume
    and hope will be given, and some specific direction and
    guidance so that all States and communities within all States
    can be helped to make particular and specific decisions on what
    these alert systems really mean and how they should be applied
    and how they do not apply in many cases. In fact, you know,
    most parts of America are very unlikely to be hit in time of
    terrorism.
        And I have not yet heard from the Department an
    understanding and a recognition of that as some kind of an
    alert system that will account for the fact that most parts of
    our country are really at low risk even at times of high risk.
        Mr. Brown. Your point is very well taken, and I think it is
    incumbent upon FEMA, which is now part of the Department, to
    take its protocols and the way we decide what we should be
    doing or should not be doing and help the State and locals do
    the same thing, by giving them the tools they need to prepare
    based on the risk that they may face in their unique community.
    As you say, there may be a community that looks around and
    says, ``Our risk really is a dam that might be blown up. So
    when we change threat levels we need to focus our energy on
    that particular vulnerability.'' They might not need to do
    everything that FEMA suggests should be done when we go from
    one level to another.

                                TRAINING GRANTS

        Senator Kohl. Thank you. Last question: As you know, State
    and local governments are struggling with budget cuts. Many are
    also working with reduced staffs because of call-ups of the
    Guard or Reserve; and add to this the seemingly constant
    elevated security alert level at times, and the Governments are
    struggling with skyrocketing overages, overtime costs, local
    and State Governments, associated with our new security threat.
        As a result, many fire departments and emergency managers
    are not sending their people to training, because those extra
    hours mean even more overtime and overtime that they are not in
    a position to account for.
        So my question is, will the Department allow the use of
    training grants to reimburse for overtime?
        Mr. Brown. Senator, I think I will be corrected or somebody
    will kick me in the chair if I say this incorrectly, but I am
    pretty certain that we are restricted from using the grant
    money for overtime. I think what we want to do instead is to
    try to get as much of that grant money out to the localities as
    possible for ``train the trainer'' programs. By doing so, we
    can push the training down to the State and local levels and
    not require them to go some place else for the training. I
    think that would help alleviate part of that problem.
        Senator Kohl. Well, I think what you are saying is true,
    and that is what I am referring to. I am suggesting that
    because those training grants cannot be used for overtime----
        Mr. Brown. Right.
        Senator Kohl [continuing]. And because overtime is being
    expended, so I am asking--and they do not have the money to
    compensate for that overtime----
        Mr. Brown. That is correct.
        Senator Kohl [continuing]. So that they do not send their
    people in many cases to these training programs, which you
    definitely want them to do.
        Mr. Brown. That is right.
        Senator Kohl. They cannot pay for it.
        Mr. Brown. That is right.
        Senator Kohl. So aside from, you know, throwing up your
    hands and saying, ``Well, you will just have to make do the
    best you can with these increased emergency problems and
    training problems,'' which is not something we want to do, how
    else are they going to pay for this overtime----
        Mr. Brown. Well----
        Senator Kohl [continuing]. Use some of this training money.
    You know, maybe you would suggest, well, you can use 20 percent
    of it or 10 percent or 5 percent, not all of it, but something
    that would give the States and the local governments access to
    some additional funding to pay for the training that is being
    required.
        Mr. Brown. Right. I mean, you are absolutely correct. And
    absent that statutory ability to do that, then what we do is
    try to push the training down to them to minimize and mitigate
    the cost of that overtime.
        Senator Kohl. Say that again.
        Mr. Brown. To the extent that we have some statutory
    relief, which would allow us to do that----
        Senator Kohl. Yes.
        Mr. Brown [continuing]. What we do in the alternative is to
    push the training down to the State and local levels, take it
    as close to that recipient as possible to minimize the amount
    of overtime that they have to incur in order to receive the
    training.
        I mean, we could consider that in the 2004 grants, but we
    cannot do it in the 2003 grants.
        Senator Kohl. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Kohl.
        Senator Murray.

                         NATIONAL STRATEGY ON TRAINING

        Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And Mr. Brown, thank you for being here today. I think the
    training we do for first responders is extremely important. I
    think we need to do everything we can to better prepare our
    communities for natural disasters or terrorist acts or
    whatever, you know, is out there. And I know that several
    directors within the Department are working on the training
    issue. I have talked to Secretary Ridge about this as well.
        Last year, there was a lot of talk about the importance of
    developing a national strategy on training, and I am curious
    what happened to that national strategy, if you can give us an
    update on that.
        Mr. Brown. That is still in the works. That is one of the
    things that EP&R is taking on within the Department to develop.
    Just like we are trying to develop and put together the
    national response plan, we are also trying to put together a
    national training program at the same time.
        Senator Murray. But we have not developed a national
    strategy on training as of yet?
        Mr. Brown. Not yet.
        Senator Murray. How can----
        Mr. Brown. We still have the training programs within FEMA
    that will be transferring; and we are now trying to develop
    those kinds of strategies across all directorates.
        Senator Murray. Well, how do we know what an appropriate
    level of funding is unless we know what the national strategy
    is on that?
        Mr. Brown. I am not sure I am equipped to answer that for
    you, Senator.
        Senator Murray. Well, we will be having to make a decision
    on this committee on how much to put into training. And unless
    we know what the national strategy is it is----
        Mr. Brown. Right.
        Senator Murray [continuing]. Going to be difficult to do.
        Mr. Brown. I will be happy to take that back and formulate
    an answer for you.

                      HAMMER TRAINING AND EDUCATION CENTER

        Senator Murray. Okay. Last year, Mike Byne visited my home
    State of Washington to see the HAMMER Training and Educational
    Facility that is located in Richland, Washington. That is a
    training facility that is used by FEMA already. It is used by
    the Department of State, the Marine Corps, Army National Guard,
    Department of Energy, local law enforcement. It is an excellent
    facility. Can you give me an update on what the
    administration's consideration of HAMMER is for training
    purposes?
        Mr. Brown. We want to take all of the assets that we have
    in Homeland Security and expand those. We have not only
    Emmitsburg, we have the Noble Training Center. We have your
    facility in Washington. We want to take all of those and
    enhance them as much as possible, because I believe, and I
    think departmentwide we all agree, that whatever facilities we
    currently have we must expand and make them as efficient as
    possible and utilize them as best as possible.
        Senator Murray. Do you have a timeline for when you will be
    making those decisions; and, again, I ask because we are going
    to have to be making some decisions about funding and
    management that we need to move forward on. So do you have a
    timeline on when you would?
        Mr. Brown. Okay. I am told that the timeline is now out to
    the States for them to look at to see what kind of timeline
    they need. There is apparently some money in ODP now, for them
    to develop what they want to do with the facility.
        Senator Murray. So are the States going to be responsible
    for the training, or is your agency?
        Mr. Brown. We would be responsible for providing the money.
    But the training is actually done at the State and local
    levels.
        Senator Murray. Well, the HAMMER Facility is a national
    facility. It is not just Washington State. It is for training
    for nationally.
        Mr. Brown. We have to confess we are not familiar with that
    one and all the programs in it, but we will look into it.
        Senator Murray. Well, if you could, and if you could talk
    to Mike Byrne, because he had been out--but we cannot just say
    Washington State, you are going to do HAMMER.
        Mr. Brown. Right.
        Senator Murray. It is a national training facility. It is
    going to take Federal funds. And we need direction on that.
        Mr. Brown. Yes, we will find out.

                       COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMS

        Senator Murray. Okay. In your testimony you talked about
    Community Emergency Response Teams, the CERT, which I was happy
    to hear you reference, because I know that that is a very
    valuable program for training.
        I recently spoke with some of the emergency management
    facilities--officials actually from my State about CERT, and I
    got to tell you the answer I got from the ones in my State
    reinforces to me that the Federal Government is not doing
    enough in this area to prevent another attack on our country. I
    was told that Washington State got $70,000 for CERT training
    from FEMA in 2002, and amazingly the State only recently got
    approval from the Department to spend the fiscal year 2002
    money on training.
        You--we are here today to talk about the 2004 budget. Can
    you explain to me why the 2002 money is just now going out the
    door?
        Mr. Brown. That money, Senator, was from the supplemental
    in August, so that is maybe why it is just now hitting the
    streets.
        Senator Murray. Well, actually, my State was supposed to
    get $70,000 from the 2002 budget, FEMA 2002 budget----
        Mr. Brown. Yes.
        Senator Murray [continuing]. For CERT training. They just
    got approval from the Department right now to spend that 2002
    money. So I am just wondering what--you know, why it is taking
    so long. This is from 2 years ago. It was not from the
    supplemental.
        And my next question was going to be what about the 2003
    money. Are you getting that out the door? I heard Senator Kohl
    talk about training and using some of that money for overtime;
    and I would just caution us that if the money is not getting
    out there for training, it is not that it is not needed for
    training. It is just for some reason there has been some
    bureaucratic hang-ups in getting it out there.
        Mr. Brown. Well, I am determined to go back and find out
    why, because we have an excellent reputation of getting the
    money out the door. I want to find out specifically why this
    money has taken longer than normal to distribute.
        Senator Murray. I would----
        Mr. Brown. I will find out and get that answer back to you.
        Senator Murray. Because I think those training dollars are
    extremely important, right?
        Mr. Brown. I could not agree more.
        Senator Murray. Okay. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                          INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Murray.
        When we were considering the supplemental appropriations
    bill, Mr. Secretary, in the Senate, money was added for the
    Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate's disaster
    relief account for interoperable communications. I wonder if
    you could tell us if in the conference report we do make these
    funds available, whether they can be spent in this fiscal year.
        Mr. Brown. Senator, I have discussed that with the staff,
    and they assure me that we can get the interoperability funds
    out by the end of this calendar year. The firefighter grants
    will be out by the end of the fiscal year 2004.
        Senator Cochran. How does the agency plan to deal with the
    fact that the budget request for 2004 does not include any
    funding for interoperable communications equipment within your
    directorate's account? But it includes it within the Office for
    Domestic Preparedness. How is this going to be resolved?
        Mr. Brown. We will provide ODP with program support or
    whatever it takes to help them, one, get the money out the
    door; and, two, to use it effectively.
        Senator Cochran. Yes. Well, I assume then that other
    agencies within the Department can obtain the use of funds that
    are appropriated to the Office for Domestic Preparedness for
    this purpose. Is that your understanding?
        Mr. Brown. That is my understanding.

               OPERATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND SUPPORT TEAMS

        Senator Cochran. In the response division, you talk about
    gaining operational control--your directorate having
    operational control over three teams, the Domestic Emergency
    Support Team from the FBI, the National Disaster Medical System
    from the Department of Health and Human Services, and the
    Nuclear Incident Response Teams from the Department of Energy.
    How is this going to work? Will these teams essentially remain
    under the jurisdiction of their departments as they now exist,
    but simply receive funds that are allocated to them through the
    Department of Homeland Security?
        Mr. Brown. Well, it is a mishmash. Generally, the
    operational control of those different teams falls under
    Emergency Preparedness and Response. So, for example, the
    Nuclear Incident Response Teams, we will deploy those as
    needed. But the training and the money to fund and manage those
    will actually come from the Department of Energy.
        Then you take the Domestic Emergency Support Team from the
    FBI. Again, we deploy it, but there is no money that comes over
    with it from the FBI. We have not yet quite figured out how we
    would actually deploy it and find the money to manage that
    deployment.
        Regarding the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), we
    have entered into a memorandum of agreement with HHS to have
    operational control of it, but to rely upon HHS again for the
    management and--what is the word I am looking for--to manage
    and----
        Oh, right. Okay. I am being corrected. I am talking about
    the Strategic National Stockpile. In terms of the Stockpile, we
    do have the operational control of it, and we do have an
    agreement with HHS.
        Back to the NDMS, we would deploy the Disaster Medical
    Assistance Teams in it but they do not come with any sort of
    money to manage or train or do anything in particular with
    them. We would have to enter into an MOA or MOU with HHS to do
    that.
        Senator Cochran. And the NDMS is the National Disaster
    Medical System, right?
        Mr. Brown. That is correct. Those are the DMATS and the
    DMORTS.

                        PROJECTS BIOSHIELD AND BIOWATCH

        Senator Cochran. Well, this fits in with what we have
    become familiar with as project BioShield. You referred to
    BioWatch in your statement. Is this the same thing, or are
    these two different things?
        Mr. Brown. Two different things.
        BioShield is the President's $900 million proposal for the
    creation of the experimental or the new vaccines, and BioWatch
    is the program by which we are trying in several selected
    places to implement new monitoring and detection systems.
        Senator Cochran. What will the role of your directorate be
    with respect to BioShield if it is enacted?
        Mr. Brown. We will simply act as the middle man and at some
    point NIH and CDC would come to us and say we think we have a
    product here.
        On the other side, we would say we have identified a
    specific threat, a specific biothreat that needs to be
    addressed, and we would marry those two up. We would actually
    simply act as the middle man, the contract and the funnel for
    the money.

                          STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE

        Senator Cochran. Well, in terms of your relationship with
    the Department of HHS, will Homeland Security have the final
    decision-making authority over what goes into the National
    Pharmaceutical Stockpile?
        Mr. Brown. This is the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile,
    which is now called the Strategic National Stockpile. And we
    will rely on HHS's expertise to tell us what needs to go in
    there.
        Senator Cochran. Well, will they decide what comes out or
    how you get access to----
        Mr. Brown. No. We will do that.
        Senator Cochran. You will decide that.
        Mr. Brown. We will control the operations and deployment of
    the stockpile.
        Senator Cochran. Yes. Well, does your directorate have the
    expertise to make these decisions, do you think?
        Mr. Brown. I think we do, in terms of the deployment and
    the response, because we have the National Disaster Medical
    System on our team now, thus we have already had meetings with
    the Surgeon General about creating within Emergency
    Preparedness and Response a medical advisory team for that very
    specific purpose.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. I am going to yield
    to others on the committee now for any other questions they may
    have and I may have a few in conclusion.
        Senator Byrd.

                            FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION

        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        West Virginia has suffered immeasurably from flooding and
    other natural disasters. My home State is under a disaster
    declaration right now due to flooding. The West Virginia Flood
    Prevention Task Force, which I convened, has identified
    strengthening the floodplain management program as the most
    effective way to stop the vicious cycle of repetitive flooding
    in West Virginia.
        One of the most important tools to floodplain management is
    to have accurate, up-to-date flood maps. Last year, Congress
    appropriated $150 million to the Flood Mapping Program at FEMA.
    This was the largest appropriation to the Flood Mapping Program
    in its history.
        But by your own estimates, it will cost $950 million to
    modernize all flood maps in the country, so it is important
    that these funds be targeted to the communities that are most
    at risk. I believe that flood map modernization funds should be
    targeted to the most flood-prone communities. And in the past,
    FEMA has administered the flood map modernization program by a
    population-based formula. Can you tell the subcommittee how you
    plan to administer the fiscal year 2003 and 2004 funds?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, Senator, I can. I would say that I think
    the task force and the effort that your State is making is
    commendable. We wish we could get all States to recognize that
    if they could get together and start doing that kind of
    planning, it would help us do our job even better.
        We are currently doing a modernization on a strategy that
    was developed by a stakeholders meeting on February 5 and 6 of
    this year. It is based on high-population density, high-growth
    areas, high-risk areas; but most importantly, history of
    repetitive loss claims and what the policy base is, plus the
    ability to leverage and cost-share with the State and locals.
        So while population density is important, we are trying at
    the same time to weigh that against the high-risk and high-
    prone areas.
        Senator Byrd. Are you saying that you will be moving from a
    population-based formula for funding this program? You will be
    moving away from that?
        Mr. Brown. No. Population is just one criterion now.
        Senator Byrd. Yes. The West Virginia Flood Prevention Task
    Force concluded that 18 full-time staff would be needed to
    properly implement flood plain management activities. But, the
    State can only afford to pay for one full-time staff. How would
    you ensure that you do not penalize States that desperately
    need flood-mapping resources, but whose financial straits
    hinder their sophistication?
        Mr. Brown. Because we want to look, Senator, at where the
    flood maps need to be done first based on that--those different
    criteria. We are not going to penalize a State simply because
    they may not be, for example, like North Carolina, which has a
    very robust program, versus a State that cannot afford to do a
    whole lot. We want to do it where it is going to have the most
    effect in terms of getting the maps out the door.
        Senator Byrd. Given West Virginia's history of flooding and
    how outdated its flood maps are, this is a very important
    program to the State. The West Virginia Senate and the West
    Virginia House passed resolutions in January of 2003 calling on
    FEMA to expedite the process of updating West Virginia's flood
    insurance rate maps.
        In the past, FEMA has used the population-based formula to
    distribute the flood-mapping funds. That approach does not take
    risk into account. This hurts States like West Virginia that
    are small in population, but they are at disproportionate risk
    of flood damage.
        I understand that you intend to change the way the program
    is administered and take risk into account, is that correct?
        Mr. Brown. That is correct. We also increased the State
    funding for State flood plain management to $1 million in
    fiscal years 2002 and 2003. So there should be additional
    resources coming for that purpose.
        Senator Byrd. Very well. So, you do intend to take risk
    into account?
        Mr. Brown. That is correct.
        Senator Byrd. All right. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
        Senator Harkin, we welcome you as a member of our
    subcommittee.
        Senator Harkin. Thank you.
        Senator Cochran. You may proceed with any questions or
    statements you might have.

                                  FOOD SAFETY

        Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no
    statement, Mr. Chairman, just two little points that I would
    like to be able to get a response on, Mr. Brown.
        And one is food security. We have talked about this. I have
    talked about it with Secretary Ridge. And from my--my
    standpoint on the Agriculture Committee and just looking, I do
    not see a lot really being done there. I do not know what kind
    of plans are being made. Maybe they are. I just--I just do not
    know about them. But, you know, we have so many entry points
    for contamination of our food supply in this country.
        And I know that if it were caught, it might--you know, if
    something--if somebody worked to invade the food supply at one
    of these entry points, they probably--because of the system we
    have set up--it probably could be contained fairly rapidly.
        However, it is the psychological impact that happens when
    something gets in the food supply like that, and God forbid
    some people die of that, what happens to the rest of this
    country? Because as you know, some food--let us say a meat or a
    meat product could enter at some point--just a couple three
    points, and it could be all over the United States in the next
    24 hours the way the delivery system is right now.
        And yet we still continue with the same basic system that
    we have had for a long time. And I just want your response as
    to whether you think this is being due--given due consideration
    at the--at your department.
        Mr. Brown. I think that it is. I mean, I do not know that
    much about it, simply because it is something that is not in my
    area.
        Senator Harkin. Yes.
        Mr. Brown. But I do know that APHIS falls now under Border
    and Transportation Security and that Under Secretary Hutchinson
    is taking it very, very seriously.
        But I would like to comment on a point that you made about
    the terror aspect. I think the mitigation factor is one
    important thing that FEMA brings to the table in the Department
    of Homeland Security. When terrorists do something, they are
    looking for two effects. They are looking for the immediate
    effect their act has, such as blowing up something or killing
    people.
        Senator Harkin. Yes.
        Mr. Brown. But beyond that, they are looking for the terror
    that act imposed, and the disruption in the economy, or society
    that it causes.
        FEMA, I think, is well placed to mitigate those effects. If
    you take a natural disaster or a manmade disaster, whether it
    be the chemical truck that spills over accidentally or spills
    over on purpose because of a terrorist incident, to the extent
    that we can train firefighters and other first responders to
    minimize the effect of that chemical truck spilling over, we
    have taken away one of the tools of the terrorists.
        Senator Harkin. All right.
        Mr. Brown. We have mitigated against that.
        Senator Harkin. Correct.
        Mr. Brown. I want to emphasize that is the same attitude
    that I know Under Secretary Hutchinson takes when he is
    addressing the bioterror aspects of food and other agricultural
    products.

                            FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION

        Senator Harkin. The second part is probably maybe a little
    bit more in your area, but I wanted to get that in about the
    food supply. I will every time we have a hearing on this.
        And I do not know if Senator Byrd asked--I heard him talk
    about flooding in West Virginia, but in the--did you mention in
    the 2003 appropriations bill, we had put in $150 million in
    additional funds for flood plain mapping. And the need for
    updated maps has been a long-term need across the country, and
    when will those funds be released? Was that the question that
    was asked? I do not know if that was asked. If it was not, I
    would like--if it was----
        Mr. Brown. Yes. Right. The Senator referred to the
    additional $150 million.
        Senator Harkin. Well, when will the funds be released?
        Mr. Brown. We now have a process in place. I have learned a
    lot just in the past couple of weeks about panels and how we
    are putting different panels together around the country----
        Senator Harkin. Yes.
        Mr. Brown [continuing]. And then implementing this strategy
    of defining the population, the risk areas, where the
    repetitive losses are occurring, prioritizing those and
    starting to get the funds out.
        The funds are going out in two different mechanisms. They
    are either going directly to the States which already have
    their own programs, or to private companies which have their
    own programs, so I think the funding has already started in
    terms of modernizing those maps.
        Senator Harkin. Well, I was not aware of that.
        Mr. Brown. I am also told that those particular funds have
    not been released from OMB yet. We have the strategy in place,
    but the funds have not been released.
        Senator Harkin. Okay. Well--and no time when, huh? And also
    will the funds be allocated nationally so that each region can
    meets its highest needs? What kind of--do you know anything
    about the allocation of those funds?
        Mr. Brown. Yes. It is going to be.
        Senator Harkin. Okay.
        Mr. Brown [continuing]. When I outlined the strategy to
    Senator Byrd earlier, that was done with the stakeholders'
    input and they have outlined on a national basis how we start
    this. We jump start it all over the country.
        Senator Harkin. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Byrd, do you have any additional questions?

                       EMERGENCY FOOD AND SHELTER PROGRAM

        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to ask a question about the Emergency Food and
    Shelter Program. It has been well run, well managed by FEMA.
    Now that FEMA has moved to the new department, the President
    has proposed to move the program to the Department of Housing
    and Urban Development.
        Could you state what the rationale for moving a program
    that had been effectively administered by FEMA to HUD may be?
        Mr. Brown. The administration's position was that the
    Emergency Food and Shelter Program was really not quite in sync
    with the traditional role of FEMA, and more appropriately
    belonged in Housing and Urban Development.
        Senator Byrd. And Congress specifically chose to keep the
    program in FEMA in the fiscal year 2003 omnibus appropriations
    bill and rejected the President's proposal to move the program
    to HUD. Are you committed to implementing the program in fiscal
    year 2003?
        Mr. Brown. Absolutely, Senator. If it stays with FEMA, we
    will continue to implement it. If it moves, we will do
    everything in our power to assist HUD in keeping that same
    high-level standard of operation.
        Senator Byrd. Well, I hope that the program does not fall
    through the cracks at the Department. It is a popular program
    in our communities. And it helps to address the growing crisis
    of homelessness.

                          INTEGRATION OF FEMA INTO DHS

        I have one more comment, then one more question, Mr.
    Chairman.
        In the past, the vast majority of FEMA's activities have
    been in preparation for and in response to natural disasters.
    FEMA is an all-hazards agency. But like many other Federal
    agencies since September 11, FEMA has provided increased
    resources to responding to terrorist threats.
        What steps are you taking within the new Department to make
    sure that your new agency's ability to respond to natural
    disasters is not affected by its integration into the
    Department of Homeland Security?
        Mr. Brown. A couple of things, Senator. First of all, I
    want to just state for the record that I am absolutely
    personally committed to making certain that we do not lose that
    capability and that approach.
        But to specifically give you some examples of how we are
    doing that, first and foremost, in the realignment that I am
    taking FEMA through right now, we are realigning it along the
    traditional lines of emergency management--preparation,
    response, recovery, and mitigation. Those will be the four main
    functions of this particular directorate.
        I think it is important, secondly, that you understand that
    I am going to do everything in my power to maintain our
    relationship with State and local governments. I think you have
    heard Director Albaugh say this, and I think Secretary Ridge
    has said it. I want to repeat it, that when there is an
    emergency, they do not dial 202, they dial 911.
        The people who respond are the State and local governments.
    We must continue to keep them in the loop and recognize that
    they are the first responders. Those are the ones that we have
    to make certain are prepared and know how to respond.
        I cannot resist giving the example of the barge that
    started burning in New York Harbor a few months ago and there
    was a feeling that we ought to go do something, when, in fact,
    it was a simple barge fire. I mean, not to minimize the effect
    of a barge fire, but it was a barge fire in New York Harbor,
    and it is something that the State and locals are trained to
    respond to and which they did quite well.
        We must maintain that focus. FEMA's focus must be on
    responding when something is beyond the State and local
    capability.
        Senator Byrd. Well, there has been a great deal of concern
    that State and local preparedness for natural disasters could
    be impacted adversely by the integration of FEMA into the new
    Homeland Security Department. In my own case, I am very
    conscious of the natural disasters that occur so often, coming
    from a mountainous country as I do, and having experienced so
    many times over these past 50 years, Mr. Chairman, responding
    to communities that have been stricken in those flood-prone
    valleys; and having responded by seeking appropriations for
    water resources projects, reservoirs, and so on. My
    constituents and I are very concerned about this.
        The Homeland Security Act instructs FEMA to maintain its
    all-hazards focus. But, the threat of terrorism and the
    Department's emphasis on it could overshadow the emphasis on
    natural disasters. I have been comforted by the responses given
    by Mr. Brown to my questions.

                      EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND SUPPORT TEAMS

        You have not requested funding for the National Domestic
    Preparedness Office, the Domestic Emergency Support Teams, or
    for the Metropolitan Medical Response System; but your
    directorate is responsible for administering these programs.
    How will you pay for them?
        Mr. Brown. We are currently going through a process of
    analyzing what is actually in the budgets of those particular
    programs in the other departments, and seeing what we can get
    out of those departments to help fund those.

                       PRE- AND POST-DISASTER MITIGATION

        Senator Byrd. Will pre-disaster mitigation and disaster
    relief activities suffer in your judgment?
        Mr. Brown. No, sir. They will not.
        Senator Byrd. What makes you think that?
        Mr. Brown. Because I think that the State and locals
    recognize that pre-disaster and post-disaster mitigation are
    both viable programs, and that in either direction we go, pre-
    disaster or post-disaster, we can minimize the effects of
    disasters. If we do it pre-disaster, we can do it based on our
    longstanding understanding of where the risks are, of
    encouraging the States to come in with plans, with the best
    mitigation programs for their States and for their risks.
        If we do it post-disaster, we will continue to do the same
    thing we have done in the past, to go into a place where it has
    been hit hard, where there is the motivation to do mitigation
    programs. Either way, we can make it work.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I want to help you
    when I can.
        And I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having a good
    initial hearing. I think it has been a good one. You have been
    most fair. I appreciate the time you have allotted me to ask
    questions.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd. We appreciate
    your being here today and contributing to the hearing in the
    way that you have, as well.

                       SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME

        Mr. Secretary, earlier today, I attended a hearing of the
    subcommittee that appropriates money for the Department of
    Labor, Health and Human Services, and we had before the
    committee the heads of the National Institutes of Health and
    the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Dr. Gerberding,
    who is the head of CDC, answered some questions, a few of which
    I asked, about this Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
    virus that is scaring everybody from China to Mississippi and
    West Virginia. People are concerned about it, and they are
    fearful about what the consequences could be and how widespread
    it is going to be and who all is going to be affected and what
    we can do about it.
        And the medical community, of course, is talking about
    precautions that ought to be taken, and she responded to some
    questions on that subject. My question is what is the
    interaction that you expect to occur between the Centers for
    Disease Control and your directorate in the investigation of
    sudden disease outbreaks such as this?
        Mr. Brown. I think we have already established a very good
    precedent. When SARS initially broke out three or four weeks
    ago, we had conference calls--I believe it was a Saturday or a
    Sunday--where we started immediate interaction with them. Do we
    need to deploy anything from the stockpile? What do we need to
    do in terms of responding at all?
        I think we have already established those great lines of
    communication.
        Senator Cochran. Does this relationship relate to both
    terrorist activity, bioterrorism, as well as naturally
    occurring virus outbreaks such as SARS? Is this handled in any
    different way between you and the Centers for Disease Control?
        Mr. Brown. No. I think SARS is a good example of the
    biomedical programs and material that are coming into FEMA. It
    shows that we are able to respond and communicate regardless of
    what the source of the disease or the outbreak is; and that we
    are willing to open those lines of communications and discuss
    what is appropriate for the response.
        Should FEMA and EP&R be doing something? Should the CDC or
    NIH be doing something? I think it is just a good precedent we
    started with the SARS outbreak.

                    EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS

        Senator Cochran. Yes. Let me ask you about another subject,
    the Emergency Management Performance Grants. This is a program
    that was funded in fiscal year 2003 in the amount of $165
    million, which was $49 million over what was requested by the
    President. But in this budget request, there is no money being
    proposed, as I understand it. Are we missing something? Is it
    somewhere else in the budget and we just cannot find it, or is
    there no request for the Emergency Management Performance Grant
    program? Do you know?
        Mr. Brown. I have not found it, Senator, and I think that
    we need to recognize that the Emergency Management Performance
    Grants are something that is vital to State and local
    governments for them to operate and maintain their emergency
    operation centers and their staffs. I just think it is a very
    important program. We very much appreciate the additional money
    you gave us.
        Sixty percent of the $165 million is already out the door.
        Senator Cochran. Yes. Well, it seems to me that this
    program could contribute significantly to the challenge of
    securing our homeland, because these funds are used by local
    governments, as I understand it, to improve the capacity of
    State and local emergency management systems to function in
    times of emergency and in first responder situations.
        Do you share my views of the importance of the program and
    that it could be very useful in helping to secure our homeland?
        Mr. Brown. I think it is very good for State and local
    governments, yes.

                              DISASTER RELIEF FUND

        Senator Cochran. My last concern is that you mentioned
    earlier there was a shortfall in funding of the Disaster Relief
    Fund. That is a little troubling to me; because this last
    weekend, when I was in Mississippi on my way back to
    Washington, there were a lot of thunderstorms throughout our
    State, the mid-part of Mississippi. It was under thunderstorm
    warnings for the better part of the afternoon, and a tornado
    hit Meridian, Mississippi. And I was headed north to fly out of
    the northern part of the State.
        But my question is, if funds are needed for assisting local
    governments like that and you say there is a shortage of
    funding for the Disaster Relief Fund, I am worried that if we
    do not put something in the supplemental, we are going to be
    neglecting our responsibilities to these local governments.
        You pointed out how there were funds in the pipeline. There
    were needs out there and that OMB might be called upon to
    reallocate or do something to make up the shortfall. My
    question is, are supplemental appropriations required at this
    time for the Disaster Relief Fund? There is no request for the
    funds. What is the supplemental appropriation requirement?
        Mr. Brown. Senator, if you wanted to go back to the
    historical traditional funding of the Disaster Relief Fund, it
    would probably be somewhere in the ballpark of, I think, $1.4
    billion.
        It would be $1.4 billion to get us back up to where we
    were.
        Senator Cochran. That is in addition to what has already
    been spent in this fiscal year?
        Mr. Brown. Correct. That is correct.
        Senator Cochran. Well, I thank you very much. I think your
    responses and your enthusiasm for the challenges of this job
    are reassuring, certainly to me, and I think we are in good
    hands with you serving as Under Secretary of this Department's
    Emergency Prepardness and Response Directorate, as it is now
    called.
        I remember when James Lee Witt came before the Governmental
    Affairs Committee. He came up for confirmation, and he had been
    a local office holder in Arkansas. President Clinton had named
    him as his first administrator of FEMA. And he came by to make
    a courtesy call to talk about what he could expect and what
    would be asked of him, and what he needed to prepare to do at
    his confirmation hearing. And he was really kind of nervous
    about the whole prospect.
        He had seen things on TV that had scared him about what
    could happen to you in hearings like that. But I could tell
    right away he had the kind of disposition and commitment that
    was probably going to equip him to be an excellent
    administrator.
        And as it turned out, well, he handled himself very well at
    that hearing. I just said, ``Be yourself. Do not worry about
    it. Just try to be as direct and candid with your responses as
    you can. Nobody is going to be out to embarrass you. They all
    understand that you have never been at a hearing like this.''
    And he did perform well.
        And he performed well as an administrator, because he
    really sincerely cared about the people that needed help from
    that Federal agency. And I think we have been blessed over time
    with a lot of people like him. Joe Albaugh was like that. He
    really wanted to make sure that when people needed help from
    the Federal Government, from his agency, they were going to get
    the help they needed.
        And he was personally out there seeing that they got it.
    And I think you are that same kind of person too. And I am
    pleased to see you serving in this position, and I wish you
    well. And you can be assured that our committee is going to
    support you and try to help you do your job and to do it well.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Secretary feels
    the $1.4 billion that he said is needed to bring it up is
    necessary. Does he feel it is needed? Does he feel that the
    supplemental should carry that?

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        Senator Cochran. I do not want to answer his question again
    for him, but he said yes.
        Senator Byrd. He did?
        Senator Cochran. Yes.
        Senator Byrd. I did not hear him say yes.
        Senator Cochran. Well, he did.
        Senator Byrd. Did he?
        Senator Cochran. Is that what you said?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Okay. I do not have any hearing aid.
        Okay. I--did you say yes?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Okay.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                              all-hazards approach
        Question. Please explain the steps you are taking to ensure those
    non-homeland security functions within the Emergency Preparedness and
    Response directorate are being preserved.
        Answer. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate was
    created to ensure that the Department maintains its ability to respond
    to emergencies and disasters of all types. The Directorate is composed
    of the primary disaster response, recovery, mitigation, and
    preparedness programs formerly provided by the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency.
        While terrorism requires immediate and direct attention in the
    present environment, our core mission is to provide leadership and
    support to reduce the loss of life and property, and to protect our
    Nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a
    comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards approach. The Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate continues to take an all-hazards
    approach to preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery, and we
    continue to work with State and local governments, as well as the first
    responder community, to this end. This consolidation of national
    response assets allows the Federal Government not only to provide the
    services that the American people have become accustomed to during
    emergencies and disasters and which existed prior to the establishment
    of the Department, but also enhances our ability to maximize Federal
    resources, streamline delivery processes, and focus programs and assets
    on State and local needs.
        However, we are not resting on our past achievements. We will be
    working with the Congress, other Federal partners, State and local
    leaders, and other affected stakeholders to continue to enhance our
    ability to respond effectively to all types of disasters.
        The focus of the disaster programs formerly within FEMA was one of
    an all-hazards approach. The all-hazards approach remains the focus and
    benefits from the more global perspective of the Department and its
    related components.
        Question. How has Operation Liberty Shield and the increased needs
    associated with elevating the terrorist threat level to orange affected
    the non-homeland security functions of Emergency Preparedness and
    Response?
        Answer. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate's
    Response Division maintains the ability to monitor, analyze, and
    respond to situations resulting from any type of incident. Our response
    programs are designed in an all-hazard manner to allow for timely and
    effective response to emergencies and disasters. With the realignment
    of Federal response assets into one centralized operational component,
    this capability is enhanced.
        With Operation Liberty Shield, we have experienced increased costs
    associated with the protection of our facilities, as well as with
    enhanced operational readiness. At the same time, we have also
    maintained a more robust monitoring and assessment operation in support
    of the Department's overall activities.
                            internal reorganization
        Question. Where are you in the process of internal reorganization?
    When can we expect to receive notice of the changes you are making?
        Answer. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate has
    been assertively pursuing internal reorganization as an effective means
    of supporting the DHS mission and commitment to the American public as
    well as the President's Management Agenda. Under Secretary Brown has
    met individually with senior leadership/management of the Directorate
    to discuss internal strategic goals, related priorities, and proposed
    restructuring designed to enhance capabilities and effectiveness linked
    directly to the overall DHS mission.
        The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate is finalizing
    its realignment plan, which integrates the Federal disaster response,
    recovery, mitigation and preparedness assets. Our main focus during
    this process has centered on taking a careful look at the effectiveness
    of existing programs, the processes necessary to fully integrate
    disaster response programs from other Federal agencies, and meeting the
    President's direction to establish a National Incident Management
    System while maintaining full mission readiness to respond to
    emergencies and disasters regardless of origin.
        We expect to initiate this realignment in the near future, but
    achievement of the full realignment may not realized until later this
    year in order to ensure that we maintain our capabilities during the
    upcoming hurricane season. Pending the official realignment of
    operations within the Directorate, we will be working to affect the
    immediate aligning of personnel to meet mission critical requirements
    and maintain our response readiness capabilities.
        Question. Will the Department seek to change the account structure
    for Emergency Preparedness and Response to reflect this reorganization?
    Would it be beneficial to restructure the accounts?
        Answer. We have no plans to change the appropriation account
    structure beyond what has already been proposed in the fiscal year 2004
    Budget. However, as we realign our organization, we may change the
    budget activity breakdown that is shown within an account for the
    fiscal year 2005 budget request.
                        assistance to firefighter grants
        Question. Can you explain why the fiscal year 2004 budget request
    shifts the Assistance to Firefighter Grants program from FEMA to the
    Office for Domestic Preparedness?
        Answer. Financial assistance to States for State and local first
    responder terrorism preparedness is being consolidated through the
    Office for Domestic Preparedness. For years, States and localities have
    asked for a one-stop shop for grants. The proposal to shift grants for
    first responders, including those for firefighters, to ODP will
    accomplish this goal. This shift will also allow these grants to be
    more focused on terrorism preparedness and better integrated with other
    State and local funding priorities. However, key aspects of the current
    program, peer review of competitive funding proposals and direct grants
    to fire departments, will be retained in ODP. The move to ODP will
    enhance program coordination with DHS' first responder programs, which
    is the key goal of the move.
        Question. What concerns do you have regarding this shift in the
    administration of such an important grant program?
        Answer. We believe that ODP will ensure that the program maintains
    its high level of efficiency and cost effectiveness. EP&R looks forward
    to working closely with ODP to make sure that this program will succeed
    in enhancing the terrorism preparedness of our Nation's firefighters.
        Question. What has been the demand for these grants?
        Answer. In its first year (when departments were allowed to submit
    two applications) the program received grant requests from about 18,980
    departments totaling approximately $3 billion. In fiscal year 2002
    (when only one application per department was allowed), the program
    received requests from approximately 19,550 departments totaling $1.9
    billion in Federal dollars. This year, the program received more than
    19,950 requests totaling approximately $2.1 billion. However, it should
    be noted that most major Federal grant programs receive more funding
    requests than they can fund.
                          interoperable communications
        Question. When can we expect to receive a plan for how the $25
    million for interoperable communications equipment will be allocated?
    Please give us an update on your progress.
        Answer. The implementation of the fiscal year 2003 interoperable
    communications equipment grant program will be coordinated between the
    Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, Office
    of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS); both departments
    received funding in fiscal year 2003 for interoperable communications
    equipment grants, with the direction to coordinate their efforts. In
    the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Omnibus Appropriation, EP&R received
    $25 million for this purpose, and COPS received $20 million (out of
    this, $5 million will go to the National Institute of Standards and
    Technology (NIST) and $3 million to the National Institute for
    Justice's AGILE Program).
        We are aware that Congress has expressed interest in providing
    additional funds for interoperability communications as part of the
    Wartime Supplemental. If additional funding is provided, we believe it
    would be advisable to run a single application process for all 2003
    funds. We will work with COPS to provide an allocation plan as soon as
    possible.
        Question. Have you obligated any of the $25 million that was
    appropriated for fiscal year 2003?
        Answer. No. All COPS and EP&R funding for interoperability will be
    awarded through a coordinated process which includes peer review. Grant
    awards will be made in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. EP&R and
    COPS anticipate that awards will range from $50,000 to $2 million per
    proposal, and expect the funds to be distributed in September.
        Question. How does the agency plan to address this issue in fiscal
    year 2004, since no funding was requested in the Emergency Preparedness
    and Response budget?
        Answer. The funding that will be awarded in fiscal year 2003
    through the coordinated COPS/EP&R effort will provide funding to
    jurisdictions across the Nation for demonstration projects that will
    explore uses of equipment and technologies to increase interoperability
    among the fire service, law enforcement, and emergency medical service
    communities. These demonstration projects will illustrate and encourage
    the acceptance of new technologies and operating methods to assist
    communities in achieving interoperability.
        Once technology is proven and accepted, standards will result that
    will serve as the basis for future communication equipment purchases.
    We anticipate that in future years, all equipment that would be
    purchased by the first responder community would meet the requirements
    of the standard. Funding for this equipment may be provided through the
    $3.247 billion in first responder grants in the Office for Domestic
    Preparedness. Over the last few years, approximately 17 percent of ODP
    grant funds has been used for communications equipment. If this average
    holds true in fiscal year 2004, the result will be a nearly four-fold
    increase in the interoperability funding.
        Question. How will FEMA continue the implementation and operation
    of the systems put in place with the funding provided in fiscal year
    2003 if no funding is provided in fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. While there is a maintenance financial obligation
    associated with all equipment purchases, the Administration believes
    Federal grant funding should be focused on enhancing and improving
    communications, not maintaining current investments. The funding
    available in fiscal year 2003 will be used to demonstrate the
    technologies and operating methods that will best assist communities in
    achieving interoperability. Office for Domestic Preparedness grant
    funds can support additional enhancements, but maintenance of these
    systems is largely a State and local responsibility.
        Question. Does the Department of Homeland Security anticipate
    developing a system that allows other agencies from within the
    Department to access funding for interoperable communications through
    the Office for Domestic Preparedness?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security does not anticipate
    developing a system that allows other agencies from within the
    Department to access funding for interoperable communications. The
    purpose of this funding is to allow local governments and first
    responders to demonstrate interoperable communication equipment to help
    DHS benchmark an acceptable standard. Federal agencies'
    interoperability needs should be addressed as part of their ongoing
    equipment acquisition process.
                              mitigation division
        Question. Please give us an update on the implementation of the two
    pre-disaster mitigation grants and flood map modernization.
        Answer. The fiscal year 2003 Omnibus appropriations bill provided
    $149 million to the National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund to initiate a
    competitive grant program for pre-disaster mitigation planning and
    projects for State, Tribal, and local governments. Such hazard
    mitigation plans and projects will reduce overall risks to the
    population and structures and, in the long term, will reduce reliance
    on funding from disasters declared by the President.
        As part of the fiscal year 2003 appropriations, EP&R was directed
    to provide grants of $250,000 to each of the 50 States and five other
    recognized entities for hazard mitigation planning, for a total
    allocation of $13.75 million. The Notice of Availability of Funds for
    the planning grants was published on March 3, 2003. Applications are
    due to EP&R by April 30, 2003.
        EP&R currently is putting in final form the fiscal year 2003
    guidance for the competitive Pre-disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant
    Program, with an emphasis on factors such as cost-effectiveness,
    States' priority ranking, technical feasibility, and consistency with
    other Federal programs.
        EP&R is also finalizing the guidance for the Flood Mitigation
    Assistance (FMA) Program for fiscal year 2003. As in prior years, EP&R
    will award planning, technical assistance, and flood mitigation project
    grants under the FMA program. For fiscal year 2003, we have established
    (as a national priority) mitigating repetitive flood loss properties,
    insured under the National Flood Insurance Program, through the PDM and
    FMA programs.
        EP&R's fiscal year 2003 appropriations included $149 million for
    Flood Map Modernization. In March, program staff met with key
    stakeholders to finalize the approach for the inaugural-year
    implementation. In April, the synopsis for a performance-based
    management contract was published. The implementation strategy for this
    initiative includes an emphasis on partnering with Federal, State, and
    local organizations to accomplish three things: 1. Leverage Federal and
    other public funds; 2. Increase local capability to produce and
    maintain flood and other hazard data; and 3. Facilitate data management
    by those who will benefit most from the information.
        The National Flood Map Modernization strategy will be implemented
    through two approaches. The first approach focuses on highest-risk
    areas, as identified by our State and local partners, immediately
    supporting our goal to reduce losses of life and property. Highest risk
    areas are those with high growth, high population, and a history of
    significant flood losses. We are investigating the feasibility of
    basin-wide studies to take advantage of economies of scale in these
    areas. The second approach involves capitalizing on areas that have
    data that can be quickly and efficiently leveraged into usable flood
    hazard data.
        Question. What has been the response to date for pre-disaster
    mitigation grant applications?
        Answer. The Notice of Availability of Funds (NOFA) for the planning
    grants was published on March 3, 2003. Applications are due to EP&R by
    April 30, 2003.
        EP&R is currently finalizing guidance for the competitive Pre-
    disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program and the Flood Mitigation
    Assistance (FMA) Program. Applications for the competitive PDM will be
    due 90 days after the publication of the NOFA, and we expect to begin
    awarding PDM grants in September 2003.
        Since the FMA funding is 2-year funding, applications will be
    accepted from the date of publication of the fiscal year 2003 guidance
    until March 2004. We expect to award FMA grants beginning in July 2003.
        While none of the application periods for the various grants has
    closed, we have received numerous inquiries and expect States to
    actively pursue grants through these programs.
        Question. What are the funding needs to continue these initiatives
    in fiscal year 2004? Is the President's budget request sufficient to
    meet these needs?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2003, Congress provided $20 million for the
    Flood Mitigation Assistance Program (FMA), $149 million for the Pre-
    disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program, and reduced the standard
    formula for the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) from 15 percent
    to 7.5 percent. The increase in the PDM program for fiscal year 2003
    offsets the reduction in the HMGP, based on average annual HMGP funding
    levels.
        For fiscal year 2004, the President's budget proposes a level of
    funding similar to that provided in fiscal year 2003, with a total of
    $300 million proposed for the FMA and PDM programs combined. The FMA
    and PDM programs provide a significant opportunity to raise awareness
    of risks, and reduce the Nation's disaster losses through risk
    assessment and mitigation planning. These programs will permit the
    implementation of pre-identified, cost-effective mitigation measures
    before disasters occur. Examples of these measures include establishing
    disaster-resistant building codes, and retrofitting structures to
    protect against wind, seismic, or flood hazards.
        The Administration is requesting $200 million in Flood Map
    Modernization funding for fiscal year 2004. Multi-year funding is
    needed to update the entire national flood map inventory to digital
    format.
                               response division
        Question. Which functions (budgets, personnel, daily operations,
    etc.) of the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the National Disaster
    Medical System and the Nuclear Incident Response Teams transferred from
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Health and Human
    Services and the Department of Energy to the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS)? What is meant by operational control?
        Answer. The National Disaster Medical System's (NDMS) operations,
    budgets, and authorities have been transferred into the DHS. DHS and
    the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have entered into a
    memorandum of understanding that provides the basis for HHS continued
    administrative support for personnel, procurement, finance, and other
    administrative systems until these functions can be moved to DHS or
    beginning in fiscal year 2004, whichever is sooner. HHS continues to
    support the personnel system used for the activation of approximately
    8,000 civilian volunteers. Although the personnel system continues to
    reside within HHS, this has not adversely affected the readiness of the
    NDMS. The NDMS legislative authorities (Public Law 107-188) transferred
    to DHS, and the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response
    became the head of NDMS. For NDMS, operational control means managing
    the System on a day-to-day basis, including authority to activate and
    deploy, and to direct and manage response teams when they are deployed
    to an incident. DHS is also responsible for the strategic development
    of the response teams.
        The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) is a multi-agency
    response element. The operational control of the DEST transferred from
    the FBI to DHS on March 1st. While each agency supplies their own
    personnel and equipment to the DEST, DHS has assumed the administrative
    and logistical responsibilities for the team.
        All program management responsibilities for the Nuclear Incident
    Response Teams, including budgeting, staffing, training, equipping,
    strategic planning, and maintenance, remain with the Department of
    Energy. The responsibility for establishing standards, certifying
    accomplishment of those standards, conducting joint and other exercises
    and training, evaluating performance, and providing funding for
    homeland security planning, exercises and training, and equipment is
    now the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security.
        The emergency response assets of the Department of Energy's
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will deploy at the
    direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Under
    Secretary for EP&R, with the exception of the regional Radiological
    Assistance Program (RAP) teams, which retain the authority to self-
    deploy. While deployed, the emergency response assets fall under the
    operational control of the Secretary of Homeland Security for the
    length of the deployment. Operational control is the authoritative
    direction over all aspects of nuclear/radiological operations and
    provides the authority to perform those functions of command and
    control over the response assets involving planning, deploying,
    assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
    direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control
    provides full authority to organize the deployed assets as the
    Secretary of Homeland Security, through the Under Secretary for EP&R,
    or his designee, considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.
    It does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for
    logistics or matters of administration, discipline or internal
    organization. All operational functions will be coordinated through the
    Under Secretary for EP&R or his designee, and will be consistent with
    current Presidential Decision Directives, Executive Orders, and
    interagency contingency plans. All deployed assets will support the
    designated Lead Federal Agency and the On-Scene Commander.
        Question. Will the three teams essentially remain at their current
    departments but receive funding through the Department of Homeland
    Security?
        Answer. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate is
    undertaking the integration of these programs within the overall
    Federal response structure to ensure that these programs are mission
    capable to operate within the National Incident Management System. As
    such, the Department will fund these programs to mission capability
    standards. We will also be looking for ways to achieve cost savings
    during this process. The integration of these teams, as well as the
    capabilities of the Urban Search and Rescue Teams, offers the Federal
    Government the overall capability to meet emergency and disaster
    requirements in a more efficient and effective manner.
        Question. Do you foresee any obstacles in this arrangement to the
    successful operation of these vital systems?
        Answer. The integration of operations, personnel and assets will
    present challenges, but it will also create opportunities for
    enhancement of programs and processes to better meet the needs of our
    clients.
        Question. What will the Emergency Preparedness and Response role be
    with respect to BioShield if enacted into law?
        Answer. The DHS role with respect to BioShield, if enacted, will be
    to: assess current and emerging threats of use of chemical, biological,
    radiological or nuclear agents; to determine which of such agents
    present a material risk of use against the population; and to act as a
    prudent manager of any funds made available through the BioShield
    authority. The Emergency Preparedness and Response role would be to
    ensure the timely inclusion of items procured through Project BioShield
    into the Strategic National Stockpile, and in cooperation with HHS, to
    ensure that Federal and State partners are well equipped to receive and
    distribute allotments of these new countermeasures, as necessary.
        The SNS will be able to maintain and deploy the innovative/new
    medications and vaccines that become available under Project BioShield.
    NDMS medical response teams will be able to utilize any new or
    innovative vaccines and medications in their response to the event.
        Question. Does the Department of Homeland Security have final
    decision making authority over what products go into the stockpile, and
    what products will be dispensed from the stockpile?
        Answer. No. Under the law, the Department of Health and Human
    Services (HHS) is responsible for determining the content and quantity
    of items that go into the SNS. DHS, however, is responsible for working
    with HHS to provide the intelligence assessments of the risks of
    specific threats that the content of the SNS must address. DHS is also
    responsible for funding the SNS, which gives it the fiduciary
    responsibility to ensure that funds spent on additions to the SNS are
    used appropriately. DHS does have final decision making authority over
    the products that the SNS releases.
        The Director of the NDMS will participate in workgroups that
    provide assistance in the development of the formulary for our response
    teams to have the necessary information about the medications and
    vaccines in the SNS in order to provide the most effective response.
        Question. If the Department has the authority, does it have the
    medical expertise to make these decisions?
        Answer. The Department's Strategic National Stockpile, housed in
    the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), identifies
    treatment protocols for specific threats and works closely with public
    and private subject matter experts in medicine, emergency response,
    public health and other disciplines to define the most efficacious and
    cost effective items for protecting the American public.
        Subject matter experts within HHS, DHS, DOD and other Federal
    agencies provide expertise in formulary development and oversight. The
    SNS also includes nationally recognized law enforcement, scientific,
    and medical experts from the non-Federal civilian sector to assist with
    the review of the SNS formulary.
        Question. Based on the development maturity and production
    readiness of the needed vaccines and medications in the next 18 months,
    can the Department effectively and efficiently spend such a large
    amount of funds in one fiscal year?
        Answer. If the vaccines and medications are available, we will be
    able to purchase appropriate pharmaceuticals including vaccines,
    antitoxins, and antibody enhancing drugs. However, production
    constraints may result in the delivery of these items over a multi-year
    period.
        Question. How many different vaccines and medications actually will
    be ready for Department of Homeland Security purchase in the next 18
    months, and what is the cost estimate for each?
        Answer. There will be continued procurement of currently produced
    smallpox vaccine (Acambis) and anthrax vaccine (BioPort), as well as
    heptavalent and pentavalent botulinum antitoxin that will be produced
    in the next 6-18 months (Cangene). In addition, two new vaccines are
    expected to be ready for procurement through project BioShield within
    the next 18 months. These include a new-generation anthrax vaccine, as
    well as a new smallpox vaccine. The costs of the new-generation
    vaccines are not yet available, but a working group is meeting
    regularly, and determining costs is one of their top priorities.
        Question. Please provide for the record a detailed statement
    demonstrating for each vaccine and medication its development maturity
    and production readiness and how that status supports obligation of
    specific funding amounts in fiscal year 2004.
        Answer. Initiatives to support the intermediate-scale advanced
    development of rPA and MVA vaccines are planned for late fiscal year
    2003 and early fiscal year 2004 respectively. These initiatives may
    include collection of preclinical and clinical data, such as:
    production and release of consistency lots; formulation, vialing and
    labeling of vaccine; development of animal models in at least two
    species to support the FDA animal rule; process, assay and facility
    validation; and clinical evaluation in initial phase II trials.
        For next-generation recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) anthrax
    vaccine, two candidate products are in early product development.
    Preclinical data for this vaccine are expected to be submitted between
    July 2003 and September 2004, and clinical data are expected to be
    submitted by March 2004. The estimated date for completion of this
    phase of the rPA vaccine project is June 2004. For next-generation
    Modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA) smallpox vaccine, two candidate products
    are in early product development. Preclinical data for this vaccine are
    expected to be submitted between July 2003 and September 2004, and
    clinical data are expected to be submitted by June 2004. The estimated
    date for completion of this phase of the MVA vaccine project is
    September 2004.
        Question. Mandatory spending can reduce Congress's oversight and
    visibility into a program and its ability to determine appropriate
    funding levels. Why did the Department seek these funds through
    mandatory spending instead of through annual appropriations?
        Answer. As demonstrated by the support shown by Congress in passing
    the Bioterrorism bill last year, Members have demonstrated their
    support for expediting the progress in acquiring drugs and vaccines to
    protect our citizens from bioattack. The Administration proposes this
    permanent, indefinite authority to allow the government to purchase a
    vaccine or medication as soon as experts agree it is a safe and
    effective means of protecting the American people against a serious
    threat from bioterrorism. This authority will also serve to assure
    potential manufacturers that if they can create a safe and effective
    product needed to counter bioterrorism threats, the government can
    purchase it. The Administration recognizes that this is an
    extraordinary request designed to meet an extraordinary threat, and
    will continue to work with Members and the relevant Committees to
    demonstrate the checks and oversight embedded in this proposal. The
    Administration's intent is to accelerate the production of urgently
    needed countermeasures, not to circumvent Congressional oversight.
        Question. What information can the Department of Homeland Security
    provide the Subcommittee to demonstrate that mandatory spending and not
    annual appropriations is required to effectively accomplish this
    program?
        Answer. It is clear that the pharmaceutical and biologics industry
    need incentives to engage in R&D, testing, and manufacture of
    countermeasures to biological and chemical threat agents. The President
    announced Project BioShield--a comprehensive effort to develop and make
    available modern, effective drugs and vaccines to protect against
    attack by biological and chemical weapons or other dangerous pathogens.
    Specifically related to the question, the proposed legislation for
    Project BioShield will ensure that resources are available to pay for
    ``next-generation'' medical countermeasures. The proposed legislation
    creates a permanent indefinite funding authority to spur development of
    medical countermeasures. This authority will enable the government to
    purchase vaccines and other therapies as soon as experts believe that
    they can be made safe and effective, ensuring that the pharmaceutical
    and biologics private sector devotes efforts to developing the
    countermeasures. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary
    of Health and Human Services will collaborate in identifying critical
    medical countermeasures by evaluating likely threats, new opportunities
    in biomedical research and development, and public health
    considerations. Project BioShield will allow the government to buy
    improved vaccines or drugs for smallpox, anthrax, and botulinum toxin.
        Use of the proposed BioShield authority is currently estimated to
    be $5.6 billion over 10 years. However, under the proposed authority,
    funds would also be available to buy countermeasures to protect against
    other dangerous pathogens, such as Ebola and plague, as soon as
    scientists verify the safety and effectiveness of these products.
        Question. What is the interaction between the Centers for Disease
    Control and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate in the
    investigation of a sudden disease outbreak, such as Severe Acute
    Respiratory Syndrome?
        Answer. EP&R monitors the status that CDC provides as it
    investigates sudden disease outbreaks such as Severe Acute Respiratory
    Syndrome. Should the outbreak threaten to overwhelm the ability of
    State/local government's ability to deal with it, EP&R will deploy the
    SNS and/or rapidly mobilize the support of multiple Federal agencies
    under the Federal Response Plan. EP&R may also activate the National
    Disaster Medical System (NDMS). CDC and EP&R are seeking an even closer
    working relationship to enhance coordination with the SNS via an MOU.
        EP&R personnel participated in a number of teleconferences with CDC
    and HHS during the early stages of the investigation. Involvement from
    the SNS occurs on a daily basis. Additionally, medical personnel from
    the EP&R NDMS section review the daily CDC updates on SARS, and
    interact with personnel from HHS on a regular basis.
        Question. Does this relationship change based upon the
    determination of the origin of a sudden disease outbreak (i.e.
    naturally occurring or terrorist related)?
        Answer. No, the relationship would not change. Generally, HHS is
    the lead Federal department in health emergencies, irrespective of
    whether those emergencies are caused by terrorist attacks, natural
    disasters, outbreaks, or technological accidents. HHS responds through
    its public health agencies and resources, including CDC, the Health
    Resources and Services Administration, and the Food and Drug
    Administration. EP&R would also respond to both naturally occurring and
    terrorist health-related emergencies with the SNS and NDMS. If the
    President were to declare a major disaster or an emergency under the
    Stafford Act, EP&R, as the lead consequence management agency would
    assume overall responsibility for coordinating the Federal response.
    HHS, however, is the Federal lead under the Emergency Support Function
    for health (ESF 8).
                    emergency management performance grants
        Question. Please explain why funding for Emergency Management
    Performance Grants was not included in the President's fiscal year 2004
    budget request.
        Answer. The Emergency Management Performance Grants are
    consolidated into the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for
    first responder grants in the Office for Domestic Preparedness. This
    reflects the Administration's belief that State emergency management
    and homeland security planning should be integrated with State-level
    homeland security efforts. Within the $3.6 billion request for ODP,
    approximately $150 million will be allocated to non-personnel costs
    previously covered by EMPG, including State and local strategic
    planning and development of all-hazard operations plans. Personnel
    integral to the administration and planning necessary to build
    sufficient Federal plans and capacity are consistent with meeting
    Federal responsibilities and will be supported. Personnel directly
    meeting the important daily requirements of a State or local government
    are expected to be supported at that level of government.
        Question. Is consolidation of the Emergency Management Performance
    Grants into ODP an indication that this administration is choosing to
    focus more on the homeland security aspects of the new department and
    less on the non-homeland security responsibilities. What is your view
    regarding the Emergency Management Performance Grants?
        Answer. The Emergency Management Performance Grants are being
    consolidated with other grants within Department of Homeland Security
    to provide ``one-stop'' shopping for first responders. While the
    emergency management offices within the States have relied heavily on
    the EMPG grants for years for all hazards capabilities, the fiscal year
    2004 Budget emphasizes that these funds should be focused on enhancing
    current capabilities, not supplanting State personnel costs.
                                     ______

                   Question Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens

                             use of organized labor
        Question. Are efforts being taken by the Department of Homeland
    Security to include organized labor in the planning of emergency
    preparedness and response efforts?
        Answer. The Emergency Response Directorate of the Department of
    Homeland Security is always looking for opportunities to improve
    planning for emergency preparedness and response efforts. EP&R has
    worked closely with various organizations in our emergency preparedness
    and response activities and plans to continue these relationships as
    part of the Department of Homeland Security.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                              disaster relief fund
        Question. Please provide the most recent accounting of balances in
    the disaster relief fund.
        Answer. As of May 23, the unobligated balance in the Disaster
    Relief Fund for non-terrorist related events was $445 million.
    Unallocated funds totaled $281 million. Both of these amounts reflect
    the fact that the President released $250 million in emergency
    contingency funds on May 22, 2003.
        Question. According to the Emergency Preparedness and Response
    budget justifications, there was $3.9 billion in outlays from the
    disaster relief account in 2002, which is, on average, $325 million per
    month. Should OMB make the remaining balance in the contingent
    emergency fund available this year, how much more will the Department
    need to get through fiscal year 2003, assuming an average weather year?
        Answer. Supplemental funds for the Disaster Relief Fund will be
    required. The Administration is reviewing estimates of requirements and
    will notify Congress formally once the requirements are known.
                             september 11 response
        Question. Congress appropriated $8.798 billion to FEMA for response
    to the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City. Have all of these
    funds been obligated? Please provide an accounting of expenditures.
        Answer. No, $6.4 billion has been obligated as of May 21. Another
    $1 billion for Debris Removal Insurance is pending enabling legislation
    by the New York State legislature to allow the City of New York to
    create a captive insurance company or other appropriate insurance
    mechanism to allow for claims arising from debris removal. In addition,
    $90 million for Ground Zero Health Responders Health Monitoring is
    pending completion of an Interagency Agreement with the Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention. The remaining $1.3 billion is reserved
    for ongoing Human Services, Hazard Mitigation, and Public Assistance
    Programs. In accordance with the Consolidated Appropriations
    Resolution, 2003, remaining funds may be used for non-Stafford Act
    costs by New York City and New York State ``associated with'' the 9/11
    attacks. At this time, it appears that between $750 million and $1
    billion of the $1.3 billion not yet obligated or earmarked will be
    available for this purpose.
        Question. There is currently $1,024,785 left in EP&R's September 11
    response account. How will these funds be spent? Are these the funds
    that can be used for non-Stafford Act funding? If not, describe the
    estimates and plans for use of non-Stafford Act funds.
        Answer. Currently, EP&R estimates that there will be between $750
    million and $1 billion available for non-Stafford Act projects
    ``associated with'' the 9/11 event. The final amount will not be known
    until EP&R, New York State, and New York City complete the expedited
    close-out process by the end of June 2003. Both New York City and New
    York State have submitted lists of non-Stafford Act projects for
    funding consideration, and EP&R is drafting Project Worksheets for all
    of the projects requested, with the understanding that actual grant
    awards will only be made up to the amount of funding available.
        Question. Within the $8.798 billion appropriated to FEMA, $2.75 was
    for repair to transportation systems. How many funds total are
    available for transportation system repair in New York, i.e. Department
    of Transportation, Metropolitan Transit Association, PATH? Of the EP&R
    amount, how much has been expended? Please detail past expenditures and
    any known plans for remaining funds. What is the current estimate for
    projects that New York is pursuing for transportation infrastructure
    damaged on September 11?
        Answer. The primary funding amounts available for transportation
    system restoration in Lower Manhattan include: EP&R ($2.75 billion),
    Federal Transit Administration (FTA) ($1.8 billion), Metropolitan
    Transportation Authority (MTA) (up to $1.5 billion--insurance), Port
    Authority (up to $1.5 billion--insurance). In addition, there are
    indications that the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation may commit
    a portion of the remaining  $1 billion of the Department of Housing
    and Development's (HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds
    for transportation system improvements. None of the EP&R funds has been
    expended to date. EP&R has transferred its $2.75 billion to FTA through
    an Interagency Agreement, and FTA is currently working with the MTA and
    Port Authority to develop grant agreements for the initial projects.
    There is no single definitive estimate for New York transportation
    improvements for damaged infrastructure related to 9/11. The core
    projects, i.e., PATH station, new MTA terminal, Pedestrian Concourse,
    Highway 9A, South Ferry Station, and Port Authority Bus Terminal, are
    estimated to cost nearly $5 billion. Additional projects being
    contemplated to provide a direct rail connection between Lower
    Manhattan and the Long Island Railroad, JFK International Airport, and
    Newark Liberty International Airport may cost several billion dollars
    more depending upon the final alternative's selected.
        Question. Of the $8.798 billion appropriated for post September 11
    FEMA activities in New York, $100 million was made available for the
    individual assistance program for new air filtration systems. Please
    provide the committee with a status report in light of reports that the
    program was being used fraudulently by some individuals. What steps has
    EP&R taken to ensure that the program is being used properly? How many
    people have dropped out of the program? How many funds have been
    returned? How will EP&R administer remaining funds?
        Answer. To date, nearly $100 million of Federal funding has been
    obligated to fund the New York State-administered Individual and Family
    Grant program with grants going to more than 110,000 families. Although
    program implementation is the responsibility of New York State, EP&R
    has instituted an aggressive media outreach and home inspection program
    to reduce fraud. As a result, approximately 101,000 applicants (45
    percent) have withdrawn from the program. The amount of funds returned
    to date is approximately $1.5 million; however, this figure includes
    returns due to incorrect addresses and postal errors, which cannot be
    easily separated out from funds returned by applicants. In addition,
    this amount represents only voluntary returns to date. New York State
    and EP&R are just beginning a comprehensive recoupment process to
    recapture funds not expended in accordance with programmatic
    guidelines. The $100 million is a program estimate, and it appears that
    all of the funds will be expended by the time that New York State
    completes grant processing; however, if there are funds remaining at
    the end of the program, the balance will be reallocated to be used for
    other eligible purposes.
                           biodefense countermeasures
        Question. The Department requests $890 million for permanent
    indefinite authority for biodefense countermeasures. EP&R budget
    justifications indicate that the government will be able to ``pre-
    purchase critically needed vaccines or medication for biodefense as
    soon as experts agree the vaccines and mediations are safe and
    effective enough to place in the SNS.'' Who are these ``experts''? And
    what is the process by which drugs will be tested for safety and
    effectiveness prior to being placed in the SNS? How will EP&R
    coordinate its activities with the Center for Disease Control?
        Answer. The experts referenced in the budget justification include
    researchers, scientists and doctors at the National Institutes of
    Health (NIH), who would have the flexibility to seek outside expertise,
    make special purchases, and face other management challenges that can
    be barriers to quick progress in converting basic scientific
    discoveries into usable products.
        Furthermore, the Department's Strategic National Stockpile Program,
    operated in coordination with the Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention (CDC), utilizes clinically accepted treatment protocols for
    specific threats and works closely with public and private subject
    matter experts in medicine, emergency response, public health, and
    other disciplines to define the most efficacious and cost effective
    items for protecting the American public.
        Subject matter experts within the Departments of Health and Human
    Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), and Defense (DOD), as well as
    in other Federal agencies, are routinely requested to provide expertise
    in formulary development and modifications to a variety of threat
    agents. The SNS Program also utilizes scientific and medical subject
    matter experts from the non-Federal civilian sector to assist with the
    review of the SNS formulary.
        HHS is responsible for determining the content and quantity of
    items that go into the SNS. DHS is responsible for working with HHS to
    provide the intelligence assessments of the risks of specific threats
    that the content of the SNS must address. DHS is also responsible for
    funding the SNS and making final decisions over the products that the
    SNS releases.
        Use of a drug prior to licensure--a so-called Investigational New
    Drug--has many safeguards built into it, including informed consent and
    extensive follow-up monitoring. These are important provisions, but in
    a crisis, they could prevent the drug from being made available in a
    timely fashion to all the citizens who need it.
        The emergency use authority is very narrowly focused and targeted:
    only drugs under the direct control of the U.S. government could be
    used, and only after certain certifications had been made. All use
    would be voluntary. This emergency authority provides:
      --The Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
            Diseases with the increased authority and flexibility to award
            contracts and grants for research and development of medical
            countermeasures. Funding awards would remain subject to
            rigorous scientific peer review, but expedited peer review
            procedures could be used when appropriate.
      --A finding by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, based on
            expert analysis by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), that
            the treatment in question was expected to have benefits in the
            emergency situation that outweighed its expected risks.
      --Greater flexibility in the FDA review process to meet the
            circumstances of specific terrorist threats. Unlike typical
            medical product approvals, the authority may be limited to
            particular types of medical providers, patients and conditions
            of use.
      --A limited time period. It would remain in effect no more than 1
            year, unless the specific terrorist threat justifies extension
            of the authorization, and the available evidence indicates that
            the countermeasure is providing important expected benefits.
                                  cerro grande
        Question. Please provide obligations and expenditures to date for
    Cerro Grande fires. How many claims have been received to date? How
    much has been requested in those claims? What are your best cost
    estimates of future need?
        Answer. To date, EP&R has approved $437,150,000 in response to
    claims from the Cerro Grande fires and has expended $437,000,000.
    21,512 claims for assistance have been received, 4,561 of which are
    subrogation claims that have been filed by insurance companies and
    those represent approximately $105,000,000. From the funds previously
    made available by Congress, EP&R also paid eligible mitigation claims
    to deter and prevent any future fire damage to property in the Los
    Alamos area. According to FEMA's fiscal year 2002 financial statements,
    audited by the Office of the Inspector General, the unfunded claim
    liability for Cerro Grande totaled approximately $127,000,000.
    Subsequent to the end of fiscal year 2002, the fiscal year 2003
    Consolidated Appropriations Resolution provided an additional
    $89,415,000, leaving a shortfall of approximately $36,000,000.
                           emergency food and shelter
        Question. How many staff administer the Emergency Food and Shelter
    program? From when an appropriation bill is signed into law, how long,
    on average, has it taken FEMA to get Emergency Food and Shelter program
    funds to the National Board?
        Answer. The appropriation for the Emergency Food and Shelter
    Program does not provide for FTE. Staff administers the program as
    collateral duties. The law requires that once appropriated funds have
    been received by EP&R, they must be distributed to the National Board
    within 30 days. On average, EP&R has provided the funds to the National
    Board within 20 days of receipt of funding. HUD can meet the same
    programmatic requirements, so the transfer of EFS to HUD will not
    disrupt those operations.
                               u.s. fire service
        Question. What steps is the Department taking to respond to
    findings in the National Fire Protection Association and FEMA's report
    ``A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service?''
        Answer. The findings of the December 2002 report, A Needs
    Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, are used to help guide United
    States Fire Administration (USFA) program planning and funding
    decision-making. However, these findings are regarded as advisory, and
    not as formal Administration policy.
        The following recent USFA initiatives specifically address issues
    identified in the assessment:
      --The Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program has distributed funds
            targeted to firefighter operations, safety initiatives, new
            vehicle purchases, EMS training and equipment, and fire
            prevention programs.
      --A Memorandum of Understanding has been signed to create Incident
            Management Teams in large metropolitan areas for large-scale
            emergencies and to ensure that highly qualified personnel are
            available for response throughout the Nation.
      --Training at the National Emergency Training Center for fire and
            emergency management personnel has been expanded to address new
            developments and challenges in planning, response, and recovery
            from emergencies of all types and scope.
                            pre-disaster mitigation
        Question. In fiscal year 2003 Congress appropriated $149,025,000 to
    the Nation Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund. Congress directed that each of
    the 50 States received grants of $250,000 for planning pre-disaster
    mitigation projects. The fiscal year 2004 budget proposed that these
    grants be made competitively. Why does the Administration request this
    change?
        Answer. For fiscal year 2004, the President's budget proposed a
    level of funding similar to that provided in fiscal year 2003, with a
    total of $300 million proposed for the Flood Mitigation Assistance
    (FMA) and Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program combined.
        Awarding grants on a competitive basis will ensure that the most
    worthwhile, cost-beneficial projects receive funding, such as, but not
    limited to, those containing properties insured under the National
    Flood Insurance Program that have suffered repeated losses and for
    which multiple claims have been paid. With the significant source of
    pre-disaster mitigation funding now available, we have an opportunity
    to implement a sustained pre-disaster mitigation program to reduce
    overall risks to the population and structures, while reducing reliance
    on funding from actual disaster declarations. Furthermore, the analysis
    required for a competitive process will raise awareness of risks and
    reduce the Nation's disaster losses through risk assessment and
    mitigation planning, and the implementation of planned, pre-identified,
    cost-effective mitigation measures that are designed to reduce
    injuries, loss of life, and damage and destruction of property from all
    hazards, including damage to critical services and facilities.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget reflects a total shift to pre-disaster
    preparation and mitigation, with funds that are dedicated to pre-
    disaster mitigation, operating independently of the Disaster Relief
    programs, assuring that funding remains stable from year to year and,
    therefore, not subject to reliance on funding from actual disaster
    declarations.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

                        office for domestic preparedness
        Question. How was it decided that the Office of Domestic
    Preparedness (ODP) would be placed in the Borders and Transportation
    Directorate and not in Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate?
    Does this move create a split between preparedness for terrorism events
    and other types of disasters and emergencies?
        Answer. The President's plan for the creation of the Department of
    Homeland Security placed the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
    with the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate. However,
    prior to passing the Department of Homeland Security Act, Congress
    changed the location of ODP to the Borders and Transportation Security
    Directorate.
        Question. How will the transfer of FEMA's Office of National
    Preparedness to ODP affect FEMA's preparedness mission and programs?
        Answer. The staff and terrorism-related functions of the Office of
    National Preparedness (ONP) have been consolidated into the Office for
    Domestic Preparedness, consistent with the intent of the Homeland
    Security Act. Consistent with a reorganization proposed by the Under
    Secretary, those ``all-hazards'' activities formerly associated with
    ONP will be transferred to a newly created Preparedness Division within
    EP&R.
                               2004 funding level
        Question. FEMA funding for fiscal year 2004 appears on the surface
    to be greatly increased in this budget, but a closer look shows that
    most of that funding goes to Bioshield and a few specific programs.
    Given that fact, how will FEMA cope with its new responsibilities when
    it will only be receiving level funding for traditional programs?
        Answer. Funding was transferred to EP&R for its new
    responsibilities. In addition, some of FEMA's functions and resources
    related to first responders were transferred to other organizations
    with the Department of Homeland Security.
                           assistance to firefighters
        Question. In the fiscal year 2004 budget request the President
    proposes that the Assistance to Firefighters grant program be
    transferred to ODP and away from the U.S. Fire Administration, which
    has managed it to date. What was the policy reason behind this
    proposal?
        Answer. Financial assistance for State and local first responder
    terrorism preparedness is being consolidated through the Office for
    Domestic Preparedness. For years, States and localities have asked for
    a one-stop shop for grants. The proposal to shift grants for first
    responders, including those for firefighters, to ODP will accomplish
    this goal. This shift will also allow these grants to be more focused
    on terrorism preparedness and better integrated with other State and
    local funding priorities. However, key aspects of the current program,
    peer review of competitive funding proposals and direct grants to fire
    departments, will be retained. The move to ODP will enhance program
    coordination with DHS' first responder programs, which is the key goal
    of the move.

                              SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

        Senator Cochran. Well, Mr. Brown, thank you very much. You
    have been an excellent and cooperative witness. We appreciate
    it very much. We wish you well as you carry out your duties as
    Under Secretary of this directorate.
        Our next hearing is going to be on Thursday at 2 o'clock in
    room 192 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Our witness at
    that time will be the Department of Homeland Security's Under
    Secretary for Science and Technology, Dr. Charles McQueary.
        Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 3:29 p.m., Tuesday, April 8, the
    subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. Thursday,
    April 10.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 2:35 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Cochran, Domenici, Byrd, and Inouye.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                       Science and Technology Directorate

    STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES McQUEARY, UNDER SECRETARY
        Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
        Today we continue our review of the fiscal year 2004 budget
    request for the Department of Homeland Security. We will
    consider at this hearing the programs and activities under the
    Department's Science and Technology Directorate.
        I am pleased to welcome the Under Secretary for Science and
    Technology, Dr. Charles E. McQueary.
        The Science and Technology Directorate is one of four
    directorates that makeup the Department of Homeland Security.
    The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred certain research
    and development functions of the Department of Defense, the
    Department of Energy, and the Department of Agriculture to the
    Department of Homeland Security. These functions and activities
    that have been transferred are now under the jurisdiction of
    the Science and Technology Directorate.
        For fiscal year 2004, the President's budget requests $803
    million for activities of this directorate.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for submitting a
    prepared statement to the committee which we will print in full
    in the committee's hearing record. We invite you to make any
    statement and explanation of the budget request which you think
    would be helpful to the committee as we review the request for
    appropriations.
        I am pleased now to yield to my friend from West Virginia,
    the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd for any
    statement he might have.
        Senator Byrd. I do not have any opening statement. I will
    just reserve my time for questions. Thank you.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Inouye.
        Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just
    wanted to come by and congratulate and welcome our new under
    secretary. May I request that questions be submitted?
        Senator Cochran. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        They will be submitted. Mr. Secretary, we hope you will be
    able to respond to those questions within a reasonable time.
        Senator Inouye. May I be permitted to leave? I have got
    some conference matters.

                               prepared statement

        Senator Cochran. Of course, best wishes to you. I also ask
    that a statement submitted by Senator Craig be submitted in the
    record.
        [The statement follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Senator Larry Craig

        I appreciated meeting with Dr. McQueary prior to his confirmation,
    to discuss use of Department of Energy national laboratories to
    implement the research agenda of the Department of Homeland Security.
    Prior to the creation of the Homeland Security Department, the national
    laboratories of the Department of Energy were already investigating
    many of these security challenges related to critical infrastructure
    protection, detection of dirty bombs, cybersecurity and sensors to
    detect chemical and nuclear materials. In my view, the Department of
    Homeland Security, through its Directorate for Science and Technology,
    should continue and expand this important work but it should not re-
    invent the wheel. In addition to saving money, using the Department of
    Energy national labs for this research will also serve the purpose of
    deploying these technologies into the field, and enabling them to
    protect us, sooner rather than later.

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

                       STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES MCQUEARY

        Mr. McQueary. Thank you, sir.
        Good afternoon Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and Senator
    Inouye also, even though he has had to leave.
        It is a pleasure for me to be here with you today to
    discuss the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the
    Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
    Directorate. Secretary Ridge has already testified and provided
    the Department's overall fiscal year 2004 budget request and
    the role expected of Science and Technology to make the Nation
    safer.
        It is a great honor and a great responsibility to lead the
    science and technology efforts of this Directorate and the
    Department to meet the challenges of protecting our homeland
    and our way of life.
        The most important mission for the Science and Technology
    Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting edge technologies
    and new capabilities so that the dedicated men and women who
    serve to secure our homeland can perform their jobs more
    effectively and efficiently and indeed, those men and women are
    my customers.

                      FISCAL YEAR 2004 PLANS AND MISSIONS

        Our plans for fiscal year 2004 reflect this relationship
    and our desire to provide capability to the field as rapidly as
    possible.
        Our mission is to conduct, stimulate, and enable research
    and development, test and evaluation, and timely transition of
    homeland security capabilities to Federal, State and local
    operational end users.
        The Information and Analysis Infrastructure Protection
    Directorate is supported by Science and Technology through our
    Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment and Critical
    Infrastructure Portfolios. In addition, the Science and
    Technology Directorate will support the mission needs of the
    Border and Transportation Security Directorate, the United
    States Coast Guard, the United States Secret Service, and the
    Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate through
    coordinated and focused research and development programs.
        Throughout the initial planning process for the Science and
    Technology Directorate we were guided by current and future
    threat assessments, our current capability to respond to that
    threat, and by the priorities spelled out in the President's
    National Strategy for Homeland Security.

                    SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE GOALS

        Our goals are several and they are: develop and deploy
    state-of-the-art high-performance, low operating cost systems
    to prevent the illicit traffic of radiological and nuclear
    materials and weapons into the United States; provide state-of-
    the-art high-performance, low operating cost systems to rapidly
    detect and mitigate the consequences of the release of
    biological and chemical agents; provide state-of-the-art high-
    performance, low operating cost systems to detect and prevent
    illicit high explosives transit into and within the United
    States; enhance missions of the Department's operational units
    through targeted research, development, test and evaluation and
    systems engineering and development; develop and provide
    capabilities for protecting cyber and other critical
    infrastructures; develop capabilities to prevent technology
    surprise by anticipating emerging threats; and finally,
    develop, coordinate, and implement technical standards for
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
    countermeasures.
        The threats to our homeland are many. We must constantly
    test and assess our threats and vulnerabilities, develop new or
    improved capabilities to counter these threats, and mitigate
    their effects should an attack occur. Our program must also
    enhance the missions of the Department to protect and provide
    assistance to civilians in response to natural disasters, law-
    enforcement needs, and other activities. We will develop close
    partnerships with private industry, academia and government
    agencies to focus a national research and development effort
    aimed at protecting the homeland. We are requesting $803
    million in fiscal year 2004 to conduct our mission. We will
    implement our activities through focused portfolios that
    support our mission. These portfolios are Biological
    Countermeasures; Chemical and High Explosives Countermeasures;
    Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; Critical
    Infrastructure Protection; Threat and Vulnerability Testing and
    Assessment; and the standards State and local program.

              HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

        Through the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
    Agency, our program will explore cutting-edge approaches to
    assessing current and emerging threats. It is our estimate that
    at least $350 million of the overall request will be carried
    out by HSARPA in fiscal year 2004. Our strategy includes
    evaluation, prototyping and rapid deployment of available
    technologies to the field. To do this, we will establish a
    technology clearinghouse in partnership with the Technical
    Support Working Group which has performed a similar mission for
    the past several years with great success for the Departments
    of State and Defense. Through this partnership we will
    encourage and support innovative solutions to enhance homeland
    security and will engage the private sector in rapid
    prototyping of homeland security technologies.

                              EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

        A knowledgeable workforce focused on homeland security is
    essential to our ability to address advancements in science and
    technology. Declining enrollments in specific academic fields
    such as radiochemistry is leading to a lack of workers in areas
    of science and technology which is important to America's
    effort to protect the homeland. Thus, we will establish
    fellowship programs at the graduate and post-graduate levels to
    encourage research activities in these areas and thus develop
    the foundation America needs to sustain our technical advantage
    in the war against terrorism. We will also establish University
    Centers of Excellence to provide an enduring and focused
    resource to the Nation in this effort.

                               prepared statement

        Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for the opportunity to
    appear before the Subcommittee. This concludes my prepared
    statement and I do thank you for including my more lengthy
    remarks in the record.
        [The statement follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Charles McQueary

    Introduction
        Good afternoon. Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be with you today to
    discuss the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the
    Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
    Secretary Ridge has already testified and provided the Department's
    overall fiscal year 2004 budget request and the role expected of
    science and technology to make the nation safer. It is a great honor
    and a great responsibility to lead the science and technology efforts
    of this Directorate and the Department to meet the challenges of
    protecting our homeland and our way of life.
        The most important mission for the Science and Technology
    Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting edge technologies and new
    capabilities, so that the dedicated men and women who serve to secure
    our homeland can perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently--
    they are my customers. Our plans for fiscal year 2004 reflect this
    relationship, and our desire to provide capability to the field as
    rapidly as is possible.
        The threats to our homeland are many. We must constantly monitor
    these threats and assess our vulnerabilities to them; develop new or
    improved capabilities to counter chemical, biological, radiological,
    nuclear, explosive, and cyber threats; and mitigate the effects of
    terrorists attacks should they occur. The Science and Technology
    Directorate's program must also enhance the conventional missions of
    the Department to protect and provide assistance to civilians in
    response to natural disasters, law enforcement needs, and other
    activities.
        Throughout the initial planning process for the S&T Directorate we
    have been guided by current threat assessments, our understanding of
    capabilities that exist today or that can be expected to appear in the
    near term, and, importantly, by the priorities spelled out in the
    President's National Strategy for Homeland Security.
        Thus, our key specific areas of emphasis are to:
      --Develop and deploy state-of-the art, high-performance, low-
            operating-cost systems to prevent the illicit traffic of
            radiological/nuclear materials and weapons into and within the
            United States.
      --Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low-operating-cost
            systems to rapidly detect and mitigate the consequences of the
            release of biological and chemical agents.
      --Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low-operating-cost
            systems to detect and prevent illicit high explosives transit
            into and within the United States.
      --Enhance missions of all Department operational units through
            targeted research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E),
            and systems engineering and development.
      --Develop and provide capabilities for protecting cyber and other
            critical infrastructures.
      --Develop capabilities to prevent technology surprise by anticipating
            emerging threats.
      --Develop, coordinate and implement technical standards for chemical,
            biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) countermeasures.
    Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Portfolio
        We are requesting $803 million in fiscal year 2004 to provide
    applied research, development, demonstrations, and testing of products
    and systems that address these key areas of emphasis. The Science and
    Technology Directorate will implement its activities through focused
    portfolios that address biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear,
    and cyber threats; support the research and development needs of the
    operational units of the Department; and receive innovative input from
    private industry and academia as well as national and Federal
    laboratories. In particular, the Homeland Security Advanced Research
    Projects Agency (HSARPA) will have an essential role in meeting the
    goals and objectives of the Department and the Directorate across the
    range of the portfolios. These portfolios and activities are described
    as follows:
        Biological Countermeasures.--Biological threats come in many forms.
    They can be toxins, viruses, or bacteria, distributed by airborne
    aerosols, or in food or water supplies, or in the case of contagious
    diseases, spread among infected people or animals. Some biological
    threats require considerable technical sophistication on the part of
    the adversary and others do not. Timely detection and early initiation
    of prophylaxis and decontamination is the key to mitigating the
    consequences of any biological attack, should it occur. We are
    requesting $365 million in fiscal year 2004 to:
        Develop and deploy a Biological Warning and Incident
    Characterization System (BWIC). BWIC will consist of two major
    elements: a nationwide biosurveillance system that looks for early
    indicators of the exposure of people, animals and plants to biological
    agents; and environmental monitoring networks in selected cities that
    can detect the agent directly. This activity will be available as a
    pilot in fiscal year 2004.
        Continue the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
    Center (NBACC), initiated in fiscal year 2003, as a key component in
    implementing the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security.
    The NBACC will leverage the expertise of America's cutting-edge medical
    and biotechnical infrastructure to focus on the biological agent
    threat, including performing risk assessments and determining which
    countermeasures require priority research and development. It is an
    essential, new approach to integrating national resources for homeland
    security, supporting public health, law enforcement, and national
    security. The analytical capabilities of the NBACC will be functional
    in fiscal year 2004.
        Protect our agricultural infrastructure by providing the most rapid
    means of detecting infected animals before they exhibit signs of the
    disease to contain the original introduction, providing vaccines and/or
    therapeutics and a vaccination/therapy program to deter the spread of
    the disease, and providing genetic data that can be quickly used to
    identify the source, virulence and potential for spread of an
    introduced foreign disease.
        Chemical Countermeasures.--According to the National Research
    Council's Report Making the Nation Safer, ``chemicals continue to be
    the weapon of choice for terrorist attacks. They are readily available
    and have the potential to inflict significant casualties.'' In fact,
    terrorist attacks on civilian populations with chemical warfare agents
    have already occurred. In the Aum Shrinrikyo attack on the Tokyo
    subway, casualties were limited only because the attackers did not use
    an effective agent dispersal method. Similarly, accidental releases of
    toxic industrial chemicals have demonstrated that materials relatively
    widely available in modern industrial societies can result in large
    number of casualties.
        Significant work on chemical defense in military situations has
    been conducted, focused on battlefield attacks using chemical warfare
    agents. However, major gaps exist regarding civilian defense, most
    notably in strategies for dealing with the broader spectrum of threats
    (e.g. toxic industrial materials); detection systems capable of
    continuous monitoring with very low false positive rates; deployed
    chemical defense systems; and a robust forensic capability. The
    Chemical Countermeasures portfolio is requesting $55 million to address
    these shortcomings through a balanced mix of activities: (1) systems
    studies will be used to prioritize efforts amongst the many possible
    chemical threats and targets; (2) new detection and forensic
    technologies will be developed and demonstrated; (3) protective systems
    that integrate physical security, ultra-sensitive detection,
    information management, and consequence management strategies will be
    developed and piloted in selected high value facilities such as
    airports and subways; and (4) the Science and Technology Directorate
    will work with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    Directorate to characterize and reduce the vulnerability posed by the
    large volumes of toxic industrial materials in use, storage or
    transport within this Nation.
        High Explosives.--Detection of high explosives and mitigation of
    their use has been a prime focus, historically of the Federal Aviation
    Administration, and now the Transportation Security Administration
    (TSA). The current terrorist threat extends beyond air transport to all
    other modes of transportation and to fixed facilities. The Department
    of Homeland Security will build on TSA's R&D in this area to develop
    and deploy more effective explosives detectors that can address the
    broader threats. Development of reliable stand-off detection capability
    of large quantities of explosives, especially in vehicles, is
    particularly needed. For this purpose $10 million in fiscal year 2004
    is requested.
        Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures.--Countering the threat of
    radiological or nuclear attack is one of the top priorities of the
    Department of Homeland Security and the Science and Technology
    Directorate. The Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures portfolio is
    requesting $137 million to address this threat through a comprehensive
    systems approach that emphasizes early detection; effective
    intervention capabilities at the Federal, State and local levels;
    development of mitigation technologies and science-based consequence
    management programs for use should an attack occur; and effective
    training at all levels of response. Concurrent efforts focused on
    deployment, evaluation and improvements to currently available
    technologies; a research and development program for advanced
    technologies and their continuous insertion into operational use; and
    the provision for an enduring science and technology base to address
    long-term challenges such as the detection of highly-enriched uranium
    and heavily shielded radioactive sources is used to address both
    today's threats and those of the future.
        Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment.--The purpose of
    the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment (TVTA) program is
    to create advanced modeling, information and analysis capabilities that
    can be used by the organizations in the Department to fulfill their
    missions and objectives. One thrust of this program is to develop
    advanced computing, information, and assessment capabilities in support
    of threat and vulnerability analysis, detection, prevention and
    response. This portfolio also conducts extensive research and
    development activities in the area of cybersecurity, addressing areas
    not currently addressed elsewhere in the Federal Government. An example
    of this is developing tools and techniques for assessing and detecting
    the insider threat. The TVTA program uses a strategy of multi-year
    investments that infuse new capabilities into the DHS mission
    directorates on a regular basis based on strategic 5 year road maps. A
    spiral development process ensures early use and feedback by intended
    users and operators of all technologies developed within the program.
    Successively more complete and refined prototypes lead to operational
    pilots and fully operational systems for the Department organizations.
    $90 million is requested in fiscal year 2004 to support this activity.
        Critical Infrastructure Protection.--Our national infrastructure
    provides the continual flow of goods and services that are essential to
    the defense and economic security of the United States. Many of these
    functions are so vital that major disruptions would cause severe
    consequences to the behavior and activities of our citizens. Our free
    society and the high quality of life that we value depend upon the
    reliable operation of the infrastructure. In addition, we must protect
    the lives of our citizens (especially whenever they gather in large
    numbers) and key assets including many national monuments and icons.
        The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) portfolio has three
    primary goals: (1) develop, implement, and evolve a rational approach
    for prioritizing CIP strategies and resource allocations using
    modeling, simulation, and analyses to assess vulnerabilities,
    consequences, and risks; (2) propose and evaluate protection,
    mitigation, response, and recovery strategies and options; and (3)
    provide real-time support to decision makers during crises and
    emergencies. $5 million is requested in fiscal year 2004 for this
    activity, which also leverages work being done elsewhere in the Federal
    Government and the Department of Homeland Security.
        Standards/State and Local Program.--Standards should be applied to
    all elements of the homeland security infrastructure to ensure a robust
    capability to defend against and to respond to any crisis situation--
    whether it is the result of terrorism, natural causes, or a
    catastrophic accident. Organizing and integrating the efforts of the
    government and the private sector will enable the Department of
    Homeland Security to develop standards for equipment used for detection
    of materials that could be used in a terrorist attack. This will reduce
    the probability of a successful terrorist attack on the United States
    and facilitate development of a vital and enduring ability to respond
    to national emergencies.
        The Standards/State & Local Program will provide consistent and
    verifiable measures of effectiveness of homeland security related
    equipment and systems in terms of basic functionality, appropriateness
    and adequacy for the task, interoperability, efficiency, and
    sustainability. The Science and Technology Directorate will facilitate
    the development of guidelines in conjunction with both users and
    developers. The guidelines will encompass user needs and operating
    conditions, as well as the capabilities and the limitations of the
    technologies. The Standards/State and Local Program will develop, in
    collaboration with operational end-users, performance measures, testing
    protocols, certification methods, and a reassessment process
    appropriate to each threat countermeasure and for the integrated
    system. The Standards/State and Local Program will address all elements
    of the homeland security mission including equipment, information,
    analyses, personnel, and systems. Special emphasis will be placed on
    soliciting input from the actual users in the State and local response
    communities, and on providing effective methods for communicating
    information back to these agencies.
        Major program objectives include working with the private sector to
    establish a network of homeland security certification laboratories.
    This will provide a consistent level of assurance in the effectiveness
    of detection and other operational equipment. Consistent standards for
    training and certification of personnel will also be developed. The
    program will continue to broaden the suite of technical standards for
    various forms of equipment and systems and will provide protocols and
    standard data collection formats for test and evaluation projects
    undertaken by the Science and Technology Directorate. $25 million is
    requested in fiscal year 2004 to support this important effort.
        Support to Department of Homeland Security Components.--The Science
    and Technology Directorate has the responsibility to provide Federal,
    State and local operational end-users with the technology and
    capabilities to protect the United States homeland from catastrophic
    terrorist attacks and enhance their capabilities for conducting their
    conventional missions. An essential component of this responsibility is
    to coordinate and collaborate with the other components of the
    Department to assist and enhance their technical capabilities through
    integrated research and development activities. The integration of the
    Science and Technology Directorate research and development efforts
    with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
    is specifically described in the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and
    Assessment, and the Critical Infrastructure Protection portfolios. In
    addition, the Science and Technology Directorate will support the
    mission needs of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate,
    the United States Coast Guard, the United States Secret Service and the
    Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate through coordinated and
    focused research and development programs. Research and development in
    potentially high payoff technologies will be emphasized. $55 million is
    requested in fiscal year 2004 for this purpose.
        Rapid Prototyping Program.--Significant capabilities exist in
    private industry for the rapid development and prototyping of
    technologies in support of the homeland security mission. A mechanism
    to quickly and easily access the capabilities of private industry will
    allow the Department of Homeland Security to more effectively fulfill
    its mission requirements.
        The Science and Technology Directorate will establish a partnership
    with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to provide the
    Department with a technology clearinghouse to encourage and support
    innovative solutions to enhance homeland security and to engage the
    private sector in rapid prototyping of homeland security technologies.
    $30 million is requested in fiscal year 2004 to solicit from the
    private sector near-term capability that can be rapidly prototyped and
    fielded.
        Homeland Security Fellowship Programs/University Programs.--
    Advancements in science and technology have the potential to change or
    increase the threats to our security; these advancements also improve
    our ability to thwart these emerging threats. A knowledgeable workforce
    focused on homeland security is essential to our ability to address
    advancements in science and technology.
        The vast scope of the science and technology needed to address
    homeland security coupled with declining enrollments in specific areas
    such as nuclear science and technology, and radiochemistry are leading
    to a lack of qualified applicants for relevant research and
    development. This program requests $10 million to support strategic
    partnerships with the academic community to provide support for
    qualified students and faculty.
        Emerging Threats.--Advancements in science and technology have the
    potential to change or increase the threats to our security. These
    advancements also improve our ability to thwart these emerging threats.
        The Emerging Threats program will support the exploration of
    innovative, cross-cutting, out-of-the box approaches for anticipating
    and responding to new and emerging threats. It will also establish and
    support studies and analyses to be conducted by the new Homeland
    Security Institute. $22 million is requested in fiscal year 2004 for
    this purpose.
        The scope of the work to be conducted by this budget is broad but
    focused on the areas that improve our capabilities to thwart terrorist
    attacks by early detection and identification of the threat, effective
    protection and intervention technologies, mitigation of potential
    consequences should an attack occur, and a robust forensics and
    attribution capability. Our strategy includes early deployment of off-
    the-shelf technologies to provide initial defensive capability and
    near-term utilization of emerging technologies to counter today's
    terrorist threats and the development of new capabilities to thwart
    future and emerging threats. A key part of our efforts will be
    conducted through the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
    Agency to engage industry, academia, government, and other sectors in
    innovative research and development to meet operational needs. Although
    I have described the budget request along product lines, such as
    biological and chemical countermeasures, it is our estimate that at
    least $350 million of the overall request will be carried out by HSARPA
    in fiscal year 2004.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
    prepared statement. I would be pleased to address any questions.

                   COOPERATION WITH DHS AND NON-DHS ENTITIES

        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        While there were certain specific functions transferred to
    the Department of Homeland Security over which you now have
    jurisdiction or responsibility, there were some that were left
    out that are under the overall Department's responsibility,
    such as the Coast Guard, the Secret Service and others.
        Does that present any kind of challenge administratively
    for you, or do you share in the responsibility for working on
    science and technology issues with those other parts of the
    Department of Homeland Security, even though they are not
    directly under your jurisdiction?
        Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir, we do share in that responsibility.
    In fact, as a part of our organization with in Science and
    Technology, we have individuals who have transferred into the
    S&T organization from all of those agencies that you mentioned,
    to be in our spaces, if you will, to help influence the Science
    and Technology portfolio direction that we will take.
        So while the organizations that you mentioned do not report
    directly to me, we do have oversight responsibility for the
    science and technology work done in those organizations. We
    have also already established a partnership with the laboratory
    directors from all of those agencies that you mentioned so that
    we can begin working closely with them. And so far I have been
    very pleased to see the great enthusiasm with which the leaders
    of the scientific organizations have come together, recognizing
    that there is more power in a larger scientific community than
    there is in what I would call smaller groups.
        Senator Cochran. There are other Federal agencies, too, and
    activities of the Federal Government not within the Department
    of Homeland Security that have responsibilities for helping to
    protect our homeland against terrorist attacks. I think
    immediately of the Postal Service and the challenge that they
    have in trying to help ensure that we are able to detect any
    efforts to transmit through the mail anthrax and other harmful
    agents.
        To what extent will your office be involved in providing
    information, in terms of science and technology, to those other
    independent agencies or other departments of Government such as
    the U.S. Postal Service?
        Mr. McQueary. First of all, it is very important that one
    of the first things that we do is understand exactly what is
    going on not only within the government but also in private
    industry and universities in the areas that relate to homeland
    security.
        In the specific instance of the Post Office, the Office of
    Science and Technology Policy has been working with the Post
    Office since we had the anthrax issue right after 9/11. I have
    already established a very close relationship with Dr. John
    Marberger, who heads up the OSTP organization. So we will have
    very close coordination with the work that is being done there.
    If we need to have working groups with the Post Office, I would
    see no reason why there should be an impediment to doing so.

                 ROLE OF THE PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER

        Senator Cochran. If a terrorist decided to target American
    farms and ranches with some effort to carry out a bioterrorism
    act, we are limited in what we know about how diseases can be
    transmitted and spread. But we are trying, through the
    activities of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center which is
    now part of the Department of Homeland Security, to understand
    how to better fight efforts that would target America's farms
    and ranches.
        To what extent is your Directorate going to be involved in
    helping to map a strategy to effectively quarantine animals or
    to prevent the spread of diseases in this kind of situation?
        Mr. McQueary. Certainly. As you correctly point out, Plum
    Island does transfer into the Department of Homeland Security.
    That occurs on the first of June.
        We had interactions as the planning process was going
    through. I have not personally been to Plum Island yet,
    although that is high on my list of things to be done within
    the next several days, to get more familiar with Plum Island
    and the details thereof.
        As I see it, though, they play a very important function,
    particularly in helping to protect our country from animal
    diseases that could come in inadvertently. And therefore by
    doing this, they also put us in a better position to understand
    how to protect against those diseases.

                  CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING CENTERS EXCELLENCE

        Senator Cochran. I know that there are probably going to be
    a lot of requests from around the country from colleges and
    universities to ask you to designate them as ``Centers of
    Excellence'' in research in this area. How are you going to
    approach that challenge? How are you going to pick and choose
    among all the colleges and universities as to who gets to be a
    center?
        Mr. McQueary. Well, first of all, I am pleased with the
    legislation as it came out in giving us the latitude to be able
    to work that issue. There are a number of criteria that are
    called out in the legislation establishing the Department of
    Homeland Security, and certainly that will be an important part
    of what we need to examine as we decide what to do.
        My opinion, if I might render a professional opinion at
    this point, is that it would be very difficult to find a single
    university that has the breadth and expertise so that they
    could call themselves the very best there is in the country in
    all of the expected areas. So my personal preference is to do
    an early assessment of where the best work is being done in the
    areas of counterterrorism interest, and then choose centers of
    excellence based upon that judgment.
        And I would certainly expect that we will call upon the
    scientific community to help us render that judgment. That will
    not be strictly a Department of Homeland Security S&T call by
    itself.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.

               ADEQUACY OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES AND CAPABILITIES

        Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, the Homeland Security Act
    gives you the responsibility to develop a national policy and
    strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals, objectives,
    and policies for and coordinating the Federal Government
    civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to
    chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and other emerging
    terrorist threats.
        In recent testimony, FBI Director Robert Mueller said his
    greatest concern is that our enemies are trying to acquire
    dangerous new capabilities with which to harm Americans.
    Terrorists worldwide have ready access to information on
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons via the
    Internet.
        Mr. Secretary, our agencies have identified new and
    existing technological capabilities that can be used today to
    help prevent terrorism, but they have not received the budgets
    to obtain them. Do you think that our agencies are adequately
    equipped and prepared with existing technologies and
    capabilities?
        Mr. McQueary. Sir, I believe the reason the Science and
    Technology Directorate was created as a part of the Department
    of Homeland Security was to help improve the overall situation
    at our borders and provide added protection. So I think the
    answer has to be that the country has decided we are not
    adequately protected and we still have work to be done. And I
    believe that we are chartered with the responsibility of
    leading that effort in concert with the other units that make
    up the Homeland Security Department, deciding what needs to be
    done and doing it.
        I do believe that it is very important that we understand
    quickly what kinds of capabilities exist in the country today,
    so that we can implement those things that will make a
    difference as quickly as we can because speed is important in
    the business that we are in.

                 IDENTIFICATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NEEDS

        Senator Byrd. Last year Congress appropriated additional
    funds to purchase technology and equipment critical to homeland
    security but the Administration rejected the funding. This
    year, as we continue to operate under a heightened state of
    alert, the Administration did not request specific funding for
    this technology in the supplemental spending bill.
        I speak with respect to technology that has been identified
    by the agencies, such as radiation portable monitors and non-
    intrusive inspection equipment for the Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection and radiation pagers and isotope identifiers
    for Coast Guard officers who board suspect vessels. There were
    attempts to add funding to the emergency supplemental a few
    days ago that would have provided Homeland Security agencies
    with additional technologies and capabilities.
        Secretary Ridge and the Attorney General have said that
    there was a high-risk of a terrorist attack right now. Are you
    working with the various Homeland Security agencies to identify
    existing technologies and capabilities that could immediately
    be deployed to the men and women securing our homeland?
        Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir, that is a significant
    responsibility that we have. And indeed, the role that we play
    in the Department of Homeland Security is to be the supplier of
    technologies to the other agencies and units that make up the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        I have described this as a customer/supplier model, if you
    will, having come from the industrial side of things, in which
    they are the customers, as are the people working on the front
    lines. And we are to be the suppliers of the technologies that
    are needed. And our job is to help evaluate, determine what
    should be done and help implement the rapid deployment of those
    things that are needed.
        Senator Byrd. Could you provide the subcommittee with some
    examples?
        Mr. McQueary. Examples of things that we are doing?
        Senator Byrd. Are you working with the various Homeland
    Security agencies to identify existing technologies and
    capabilities that could immediately be deployed to the men and
    women securing our homeland?
        Mr. McQueary. If I may, we have been in existence just
    since the first of March. We have a relatively small staff at
    this particular point. I take that fully as a responsibility
    that we have.
        I cannot tell you today specific examples other than there
    are radiological detectors at our borders even today and there
    are upgrades that are underway in many of those locations. But
    has Science and Technology affected those in any great way to
    date? The answer would be no, simply because we have not been
    in existence nor have we had people.
        If you would recall when Homeland Security was formed,
    there were no people that transferred into Science and
    Technology. So we are building our organization a person at a
    time today in order to be able to do the work and accomplish
    the responsibilities that the Congress has given us in the
    construction of the bill.
        Senator Byrd. Since the threat of terrorism is imminent,
    should you be focusing on both longer-term development of
    technologies and technologies that are currently available so
    that the Homeland Security personnel can work more efficiently
    and effectively?
        Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir. I believe that is very important
    that we have a multi-layered strategy in what we do. And in
    fact, that indeed is a part of our planning and strategic plan
    that we are working on, and that we expect to publish in the
    near future. Very important.
        If I may, the Homeland Security issue is a very large
    systems engineering problem if I may describe it coming from
    the background which I do, in which we have large numbers of
    inputs and outputs. And the important thing is to understand
    how this system needs to work to provide the protection.
        From that understanding will come the ability to be able to
    determine what we must do in terms of long-range developments,
    as well as to be able to use those things that we know already
    exist. And there are many companies that have things out there
    today, as certainly you alluded to, that maybe, that probably
    will be, very beneficial to us as we make this country safer
    than what it is today.

                                MANPAD STRATEGY

        Senator Byrd. There has been much talk about the need to
    secure our commercial airliners from the threat of shoulder-
    fired surface-to-air missiles. Last November it was reported
    that Al Qaeda operators fired two shoulder-fired missiles at an
    Israeli passenger plane. The cost to purchase these weapons is
    roughly $5,000 to $30,000, and over 500,000 are available
    worldwide on the black market.
        Secretary Ridge announced on Tuesday that the Government
    should pay for research and technology to protect commercial
    airliners from this type of attack. Has the Secretary discussed
    this with you? And if he has, what steps are you taking to
    pursue this?
        Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir, he has discussed it with us a few
    weeks ago. We are aware of the MANPAD strategy you describe. It
    is a very serious issue and one in which we have already begun
    to participate in a systems engineering analysis to determine
    what would be an equitable approach for our private airline
    industry.
        There has been work. It has gone on in the Department of
    Defense, and certainly we would build upon that work. But there
    is not a system, as I understand it, that exists today that one
    could simply apply onto a commercial airliner with no
    additional development work.
        Senator Byrd. I want to yield shortly to the Chairman, who
    will in turn then call upon Senator Domenici, but let me get
    this further question, if I may.
        Your budget justification does not include anything
    specifically on this issue. TSA has requested $75 million in
    research and development to improve current security
    technology. Industry estimates that the cost to design and
    certify effective countermeasures for different aircraft types
    will cost close to $55 million. So can you tell me where the
    funding will come from to do this?
        Mr. McQueary. Sir, I cannot today. I can tell you that we
    have included within the budget the study work that would be
    necessary for Science and Technology to provide its technical
    judgment on how to approach this problem and that is not a
    large expense. In fact, I would estimate that is a $1 million
    to $2 million maximum kind of effort for us.
        Of course, the major cost would be in the procurement of
    such systems and I have not been engaged in the discussion
    about how that would be paid for.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator
    Domenici.
        Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, I have to chair another
    subcommittee, as I think you are aware, but I very much
    appreciate the opportunity to ask one question.

                    COLLABORATION WITH NATIONAL LABORATORIES

        First, Dr. McQueary, it is good to see you. You have a very
    big job and we look forward to working with you.
        As you know, in my State, we have two great national
    laboratories. And one of my subcommittees is the subcommittee
    that funds all of the national laboratories for the Department
    of Energy, some 18 laboratories from Argonne to ones in New
    York and up and down the line.
        Obviously, I am correct in saying you intend to work with
    those laboratories as they have either know-how or technology
    that would be helpful to you in implementing your role; is that
    correct?
        Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir, that is absolutely correct. They
    have great talent in those laboratories.

              HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

        Senator Domenici. Homeland Security Advanced Research
    Projects Agency is known as, I guess, HSARPA.
        Mr. McQueary. HSARPA, some call it. I wish I had been here
    sooner to name it something else, but I was not.
        Senator Domenici. We will try our best.
        As we understand it, the purpose for that is to use it as a
    tool to move ideas from the drafting board to the front lines
    as quickly as possible. And in so doing, to use your funds so
    that you can bring to bear all of the resources of the United
    States, including private industry, universities, and the
    national laboratories, on an issue or a need in this particular
    field; is that correct?
        Mr. McQueary. That is absolutely correct, sir.
        Senator Domenici. When do you think that that agency is
    going to be up and running?
        Mr. McQueary. I believe it will be up and running soon. We
    have done a lot of planning for it. It will actually be up and
    operational around the first of October simply because of the
    way the budgets are done.
        Senator Domenici. Who do you think will head it up?
        Mr. McQueary. I have interviewed many people and I am still
    looking for people to do that. I think it is essential that we
    get the right kind of technical talent to lead that. And
    therefore, I am continuing to look.
        Senator Domenici. Do you have any idea how many employees
    would be working there and where they might be located, Doctor?
        Mr. McQueary. We have not reached that point because that
    is an organization whose size will be driven largely by the
    number of programs that we have implemented, and so we will
    need program managers to run programs, and so the size will be
    driven by that.
        Senator Domenici. Once again, it is very important that the
    way you set it up will permit it to interact with the national
    laboratories in the best possible way; is that not correct?
        Mr. McQueary. That is absolutely correct.
        Senator Domenici. Without that, you are losing a great deal
    of talent and capacity that already exists. You do not have to
    duplicate that.
        Mr. McQueary. And we will not, or we will make every effort
    not to duplicate it, I can assure you.
        Senator Domenici. I have some additional questions with
    reference to how you are going to go about doing that, but I
    just wanted to leave you with the further admonition that just
    because we have a new problem, we do not have to, in each
    instance invent a new agency or a new institution to solve it.
        You have a very big job. Part of it is to make things work
    and pull things together that are already out there and apply
    them to an existing problem. And I am hopeful that in the
    months to come, as we bring you here, you will be able to show
    us how you have arranged this so that the great strength of our
    private sector research and our laboratories is brought to bear
    on some of these terrorist issues.
        Are you going to give us assurance that that is the
    direction that you will be moving?
        Mr. McQueary. I can assure you, that is my intent, sir.
        Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.

                        COMPREHENSIVE ENTRY EXIT SYSTEM

        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
        Let me ask you another question on the subject of the
    Border and Transportation Security Directorate. There is a
    project that is being planned, as I understand it, which is
    called the Comprehensive Entry Exit System. There is a
    legislative requirement that the Entry Exit System be able to
    read biometrics, which is the system to use fingerprint
    technology, facial recognition technology, or maybe even iris
    scan technology, to verify the identity of people traveling
    into or even maybe out of the United States.
        There have been investments already by the Department of
    Justice in improving fingerprint technologies. Do we need to do
    the same sort of thing for facial recognition technology and
    iris scan technology, in your opinion?
        Mr. McQueary. I believe that those two latter areas that
    you mentioned are certainly behind fingerprint recognition
    systems, though a lot of good work has been done in the
    industry and I think that we can draw upon that to make the
    decision of what direction we should go in choosing one of the
    two latter ones you mentioned as being the added biometric to
    be used for the Border Entry Exit System.

                             BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES

        Senator Cochran. Do you plan to use funds that are
    appropriated to your Directorate to develop a new generation of
    biometric technologies?
        Mr. McQueary. Sir, I cannot remember at this point whether
    we have included that in this budget or not. If I may answer
    the question. The answer is yes. I apologize, I should have
    known but it has been a long day and I simply did not remember.

                            TECHNOLOGY CLEARINGHOUSE

        Senator Cochran. We are already beginning to get inquiries
    from people around the country who know about the new
    department. And those of us who serve on this funding
    subcommittee are being contacted and urged to be sure that
    their ideas and their suggestions get reviewed. How are you
    going to go about reviewing all those requests? You are going
    to have more suggestions and more ideas about how to improve
    the state of the world in so many different areas. Are you
    going to establish a clearinghouse of some kind to review these
    things?
        Mr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cochran. How are you going to deal with that?
        Mr. McQueary. As I mentioned in my opening statement, we
    have partnered already with the Technical Support Working
    Group, which has been in existence for several years. We expect
    to issue broad agency announcements indicating what areas of
    technology we are interested in in industry. We have a
    reprogramming action that has been proposed and if it gets
    approved as we proposed it, we then will issue the broad agency
    announcements, and industry will be able to see the areas that
    we are interested in.
        With that being said, what I am asking in people who come
    to see me is, do not ask me how can you use my thing in your
    solution. I am asking people to help me define what the
    solution needs to be. Because this, as I mentioned, is a very
    large systems problem. We are going to have some very talented
    people. But I can assure you we will not have the talent to be
    able to conceive of all the possibilities.
        So we need people who come in with ideas to help us think
    about how it can be used in a large system context because that
    is the problem that we face.
        Senator Cochran. Our job is to decide how much money you
    need.
        Mr. McQueary. Yes sir.

                            UNIVERSITY-BASED CENTERS

        Senator Cochran. Of course, we consider the request that is
    submitted by the President, but sometimes, and I am not
    suggesting this is true with this Administration, but sometimes
    Administration officials submit numbers knowing the Congress is
    going to have to increase the number. That just happens. No use
    to pretend that it does not.
        I wonder about the $15 million that is requested in this
    budget, for example, to establish university-based centers and
    support strategic partnerships with the academic community.
    That sounds like a pretty small amount of money to me.
        Mr. McQueary. I do not believe it is so small when you are
    just starting out. I think it is important that we have a good
    plan in place. I think it is important that we not take a lot
    of time to figure out what the plan is.
        But I would like to be able to come before you and present
    a plan that I know I have studied sufficiently to be able to
    say I believe this is the one that can and should be
    implemented to accomplish the things that the Congress has
    asked us to do in the legislation.
        So I am not personally uncomfortable with the amount of
    money in that area now, quite frankly.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, very much. Senator Byrd.

                   DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S BIOMETRICS INITIATIVE

        Senator Byrd. On biometrics, Dr. McQueary, are you aware of
    the Defense Department's biometrics initiative?
        Mr. McQueary. Sir, I am only aware in a very general sense.
    I have not had a scientific review of that, but it is certainly
    an important thing for me to do.
        Senator Byrd. Do you plan to work with the Defense
    Department and other agencies to build on the testing already
    done and the lessons already learned?
        Mr. McQueary. I would view that we have not done our job
    unless we do that. We certainly must do that, because that is
    the way we determine how much money really should be spent, by
    knowing that we are using what has already been done.
        Senator Byrd. The Defense Department has been quite active
    in this area, and I hope that you will pursue that opportunity
    to build on the testing there.
        Mr. McQueary. I assure you we will.

                                MANPAD STRATEGY

        Senator Byrd. If Secretary Ridge believes that there is a
    serious threat of a shoulder-launched missile being fired at a
    commercial airliner, why did the Administration oppose an
    amendment in the Senate a few days ago to provide $55 million
    to test existing technologies on commercial aircraft?
        Mr. McQueary. Sir, I do not know the answer to the
    question, but I can try to find out to respond back to you. But
    I do not know.
        Senator Byrd. Could you give us a timeline for coming
    forward with your recommendations?
        Mr. McQueary. I, first of all, have to determine in concert
    with Secretary Ridge whether it is appropriate that the Science
    and Technology group make that recommendation or whether it
    should come out of one of the operational directorates. I
    cannot answer the question today but certainly I should be able
    to answer it soon. And I can certainly discuss that with
    Secretary Ridge and get back to you.
        Senator Byrd. Would you supply to the subcommittee an
    answer to that question, after you have had that discussion?
        Mr. McQueary. Yes sir.

                              PERFORMANCE MEASURES

        Senator Byrd. You are responsible for developing a national
    policy and strategic plan for identifying priorities, goals,
    objectives, and policies for and coordinating the Federal
    Government's civilian efforts to identify and develop
    countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
    and other emerging terrorist threats, including annual
    measurable objectives and specific targets.
        On page 26 of your budget justification, you find these
    words: performance measures for the Science and Technology
    Directorate have not been established. And yet you are
    requesting an $803 million budget, including $242 million or a
    43 percent increase over last year.
        How is this subcommittee supposed to evaluate your request
    if we do not have any performance standards to go by?
        Mr. McQueary. I think you should ask us to provide those
    performance measures and I agree with that. The response that
    we have there is the one we have today but it is not
    satisfactory long-term. And we do need to have performance
    measures. I agree. I come out of an industry where if you
    cannot measure it, you cannot be sure it has been done.
        Senator Byrd. Exactly. I would suggest that you do your
    best then, Mr. Secretary, to provide the subcommittee with
    reliable performance measures during the fiscal year 2004
    budget process, so that we can evaluate your $803 million
    request.
        Mr. McQueary. Yes sir.
        Senator Byrd. Congress has appropriated billions of dollars
    since 9/11, much of which has gone to the development of
    technological capabilities to prevent terrorist attacks. This
    subcommittee is going to be working very hard to make sure that
    the investment is spent wisely. So please take steps, since you
    do not have anything on paper, please take steps to develop
    performance measures, as you have indicated you will, so we
    will know if the money is appropriately being spent
    effectively.
        Mr. McQueary. Yes sir.

              HOMELAND SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

        Senator Byrd. I have one other question.
        Public Law 107-296, the Homeland Security Act, created the
    Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency. The agency
    is modeled on the Advanced Research Projects Agency except that
    the goal of the agency is to develop technologies that would
    benefit homeland security.
        In your prepared testimony you estimate that $350 million
    of your overall request of $803 million would be carried out by
    this new Advanced Research Projects Agency. But the Homeland
    Security Agency Act authorizes only $500 million. Why is there
    a $150 million gap between your funding requests and the
    authorized amount?
        Mr. McQueary. Sir, my approach, having come out of the
    industrial side, is we are in the business of funding products
    and systems, and those products and systems in general will cut
    across not only the Homeland Security Advanced Research Project
    Agency, but the work that is done in the laboratories.
        And so my belief, and a strong belief, is that developing a
    budget based upon products and systems is a better way than
    doing an organizational budget which would be equivalent to
    saying how much are we going to spend in HSARPA? I assume the
    $500 million may have been an estimate that someone had and the
    $350 million that we have estimated is certainly that. It is an
    estimate, because the detailed programs have not been put
    together through competitive approaches or through work that is
    done in the laboratories.
        Senator Byrd. In 1959, Congress approved $485 million for
    what was then known as the Advanced Research Projects Agency,
    ARPA. This was the first year it received an annual
    appropriation.
        I do not know what is the matter with my throat today. I am
    not smoking any cigars, although I do like them.
        Mr. McQueary. Perhaps I could join you in a private moment
    then, with one of those.
        Senator Byrd. Let us try that. Do you have anything else on
    your hip?
        I think you would acknowledge that to date research and
    development activities in support of homeland security have
    been underfunded. In light of that, what do you think an
    appropriate funding level for this agency would be?
        Mr. McQueary. I missed which agency, sir. For the
    Department of Homeland Security?
        Senator Byrd. The next question is pertinent. Are you
    planning to request a higher level for HSARPA in future years?
        Mr. McQueary. Sir, it is premature to say yes or no to
    that, because I think it is important that we examine the needs
    of the directorates that make up the Department of Homeland
    Security, and from that determine what the program should be.
    Those needs will be looked at from the standpoint of ``do we
    need to be funding work ourselves or do we need to simply be
    buying what already exists out in America today?''
        And we have to answer that question, and you have every
    expectation that we should.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

                     FISCAL YEAR 2003 REPROGRAMMING REQUEST

        Mr. Secretary, yesterday we received a request from the
    Department of Homeland Security to reprogram fiscal year 2003
    appropriations for your Directorate.
        Mr. McQueary. Yes.
        Senator Cochran. This reprogramming could not have been
    anticipated when the budget request we are reviewing today was
    composed. Will the request for fiscal year 2004 be changed if
    this reprogramming request is approved? Specifically, do you
    believe that the balance of funds resulting from a
    reprogramming will be sufficient to carry out the biological
    research and defense activities for the Fort Detrick Biowarfare
    Center for the remainder of this fiscal year?
        Mr. McQueary. Yes, I do. In fact, the budget for Fort
    Detrick, we explicitly know that that is sufficient for this
    year because, as you know, we do not have a lot of the fiscal
    year left, and therefore it is not necessary to spend as much.
    And that is part of the thinking that went into that.

                    STANDARDS FOR FIRST RESPONDER EQUIPMENT

        Senator Cochran. The detection equipment used by first
    responders to alert the public of threats from chemical,
    biological, or radiological sources is an important line of
    defense for first responders to use to alert the public if a
    terrorist attack is taking place or has taken place. There
    currently are no standards for much of the equipment that is
    being used for the detection of these attacks. Once standards
    and technologies are developed, the Homeland Security Act
    authorizes the Secretary to create a system for transferring
    Homeland Security technologies to Federal, State and local
    Governments in the private sector.
        Can you tell us if there are standards and criteria being
    developed now by the Department for the equipment that will be
    used to respond or alert the public to a terrorist attack when
    it occurs?
        Mr. McQueary. We specifically have a group working on
    standards. That group is working in concert with NIST and the
    American National Standards Institute because we are not trying
    to create standards all by ourselves. We are relying upon work,
    very good work, that has been done within the Government
    previously.
        We have already issued a draft, I believe it is a draft,
    for radiation detectors for comment already. So that has been
    done and we are actively working on that.
        And you will see we have, in the fiscal year 2003
    reprogramming action, as well as in the proposed budget for
    fiscal year 2004, we have money in there to continue to work
    the standards issue. It is a very important issue to help the
    local responders be able to save money because now with no
    standards they are more or less subjected to whatever happens
    to be sold to them and rendering the judgments themselves.
        Senator Cochran. Do you intend to take into account the
    views and suggestions of the local end-users, such as the first
    responders themselves, who have had experience in these
    matters, the police, fire, the transit authorities, so that you
    can develop the most sophisticated detection devices possible?
        Mr. McQueary. Sir, those are the customers for what we do
    and the answer is emphatically yes, because that is where we
    need to be getting the requirements for what we do, is at the
    first responder level. We do have plans in place to be able to
    accomplish that, so that we do have their inputs.
        Senator Cochran. Will there be any effort by the Department
    to provide funding to those in the private sector who are
    working on these standards and technologies for devices?
        Mr. McQueary. I would view the standards work as being
    more--where the opportunity would be is when you have
    development of laboratories that would be testing--similar to
    Underwriters Laboratories. We certainly do not intend to build
    a government laboratory. So anything that we would do would go
    to the private sector or the Government, if labs are available
    to be able to do that.
        Senator Cochran. Or could some of this research be done at
    the university centers?
        Mr. McQueary. Absolutely. Yes sir.

       APPLICATION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES, EXPERIENCE AND
                EXPERTISE TO MEET HOMELAND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

        Senator Cochran. The U.S. military has methods of detecting
    chemical attacks, and certainly in the Operation Iraqi Freedom
    this is something that has been utilized. But there is a large
    difference between the military and the private sector and the
    civilian population.
        How do you intend to utilize the expertise and the
    experience of the Department of Defense in helping develop
    technologies for the civilian population and our civilian
    agencies that will be called upon to help protect our homeland?
        Mr. McQueary. We certainly intend to draw on the enormous
    amount of work the Department of Defense has done in this area.
    As I would see it, a crucial issue for us, however, is that we
    have to have a low false alarm rate. The military is in a
    slightly different position. If they have a false alarm and go
    to general quarters, they can stand down if they find there was
    nothing. Whereas in the civilian population, we cannot afford
    to constantly have our people being in an excited state because
    alarms were put forth and they turned out to have no merit.
        So I see the major effort that we have to accomplish is in
    that area of determining, from a technological standpoint, how
    we can keep the false alarm rate at a level the country can
    live with in the civilian population.
        Senator Cochran. I know our staff members have reviewed the
    statement that you submitted very carefully. We will probably
    be submitting some additional questions to you to fill out our
    hearing record to be sure we understand the request you have
    submitted, and to be assured that we know enough about it to
    make an intelligent decision about the amount of funding you
    need for the coming fiscal year.
        But we wish you well in this undertaking. This is a very
    important responsibility that you have assumed. We appreciate
    your service and the good work that the Department officials
    are doing to organize this new department, get it running, and
    get it off to a good start.
        We wish you well.
        Mr. McQueary. Thank you very much. I look forward to it and
    I look forward to working with this committee and to better
    educate you on what we are doing because I think the better off
    we all will be. So I look forward to that.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, any further comments or
    questions?
        Senator Byrd. I join with you in your good wishes and I
    thank the Secretary and wish him well.
        Mr. McQueary. Thank you, sir.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your
    cooperation with our committee. Other Senators may submit
    written question, as well, and we ask you to respond to them
    within a reasonable time.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                            development of standards
        Question. The detection equipment used by first responders to alert
    the public of chemical, biological, or radiological threats is the
    front-line of defense for first responders to alert the public if a
    terrorist attack took place. As you are aware, there are currently no
    standards for much of the equipment that is being used for the
    detection of these attacks. Once these standards and technologies are
    developed, the Homeland Security Act authorizes the Secretary to create
    a system for transferring homeland security technologies to Federal,
    State, local governments and the private sector. What standards and
    criteria are being developed by the Department of Homeland Security for
    the equipment that will detect and respond to any attack that may
    occur?
        Answer. The need for standards and criteria for equipment being
    developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was recognized
    during the initial stages of developing the Science and Technology
    (S&T) Directorate's long-range strategy. During the transition phase,
    the need for standards to address design, procurement, deployment, and
    use of the radiological and biological detectors was determined to be a
    key need. In collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and
    Technology (NIST), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
    the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the DHS
    S&T transition team began development of standards for four high-
    priority classes of radiation detection equipment. The four classes are
    personal dosimeters (``pagers''), alarming hand-held detectors, hand-
    held isotope identifiers, and radiation portals. These standards have
    been released in draft form and will soon go to ballot, in accordance
    with ANSI process requirements for national consensus standards. A
    contract to develop a standard test method for hand-held bulk anthrax
    immunoassay kits is being prepared.
        Work is also progressing in the areas of training standards and
    personnel certification. Additional standards needs for both detection
    and response are being identified as part of a systematic evaluation of
    capabilities versus needs for standards to support the homeland
    security mission related equipment, operators, models and analyses,
    data and information, and integrated systems.
        Question. How will the Department take into account the needs of
    the local end-user, such as the police or the mass transit authorities,
    to develop the most sophisticated detection devices? Does the
    Department intend on providing any pilot or seed money to involve the
    private sector in working on these sets of standards? What are the
    complexities in establishing such a system, and how would you
    characterize your progress so far in meeting this responsibility?
        Answer. The needs of the local end-user community are a key part of
    the DHS S&T standards development process. The very first step in our
    process includes input from users to help determine performance
    guidelines. The actual development of performance measures, facilitated
    by standards experts, represents a balance among three drivers. The
    user is engaged to provide guidance on operating conditions, procedures
    and functionality. Analysts who help define the threats provide
    information on the problem to be solved by detection devices. Finally,
    developers who understand governing scientific principles and the
    relative sophistication of the equipment provide information on the
    technical capabilities and limitations of the detectors. Reassessment
    of the standards based on lessons learned and equipment evolution is
    also an integral part of the planned process.
        The actual mechanism for engaging the user community--which
    includes State, local, and Federal Government end-users--varies. For
    the standards currently in development, the users have been engaged
    through established organizations that represent a wide range of users.
    One example is the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
    Interoperability (IAB). The State Homeland Security Advisors are also
    anticipated to be key resources for providing the right staff for input
    to the process. We expect that these groups and other technical
    organizations will provide a nucleus around which a capability will be
    built to obtain State and local responder participation in future
    standard development efforts and to provide information about how
    specific technologies conform with standards for procurement purposes.
    Organizations throughout the Department work with representatives of
    these entities and other key end users on a day-to-day basis, and we
    will leverage user input and feedback through these relationships.
        The private sector has already been involved in the process of
    developing voluntary consensus standards. Manufacturers, academics, and
    professional societies have been strongly represented in the groups
    that have already been activated. The traditional method for producing
    standards involves volunteers to lead and staff the writing groups.
    Some funding has been set aside to support the writing committee
    chairs. Funds have also been planned to help support the ANSI Homeland
    Security Standards Panel that will aid in cataloging and coordinating
    standards development with the professional societies that are the
    traditional source for United States' national voluntary consensus
    standards.
        In terms of the complexity in establishing a system that addresses
    standards relevant to DHS, the development of a suite of standards is a
    significant undertaking. The interrelated nature of the homeland
    security defensive system for emergency response--plus the need to
    ensure that the emergency system is interoperable and integrated with
    the existing infrastructure also adds to complexity. Incorporating the
    requirements of Federal, State, and local responders into a coherent
    and flexible system is essential but creates a very large-scale problem
    set. Finally, we are dealing with both a rapidly evolving threat and
    with constantly evolving technologies. Therefore, there is a crucial
    need to ensure flexibility in the standards that are developed or they
    will quickly become unusable, and an obstacle to the deployment of next
    generation technologies.
        We would characterize our progress to date as satisfactory. The
    process for developing standards traditionally takes a minimum of 18
    months and some standards have taken up to 15 or more years to develop.
    The proposed radiation detection standards have been developed in about
    6 months--and the rollout of the draft occurred less than a month after
    the Department became operational. Our future efforts will continue to
    use the ANSI existing standards development organizations and their
    memberships to expedite development and adoption of relevant standards.
    We also will provide funding to support what were heretofore strictly
    volunteer efforts, to expedite writing of critical standards for
    homeland security. We will champion the inclusion of users in all major
    stages of standards development--including the formulation of
    operational test protocols. We will also encourage the use of automated
    tools and web-based review and tracking to streamline the process. The
    assets provided by ANSI will be leveraged to build on existing
    standards and standard development expertise to fill the gaps and needs
    in our current system of standards.
                            concerns for rural areas
         Question. While there is concern about the Nation's largest urban
    areas being vulnerable to terrorist attacks there should also be equal
    concern about the Nation's rural areas. Much of the Nation's critical
    infrastructure such as bridges, highways, railroads, electric power
    lines, pipelines, and drinking water reservoirs and dams are located in
    rural America. Advances that have been made in information technology
    and the internet should make the task of securing the homeland easier
    and more cost effective by putting this technology to work in rural
    America to protect these critical infrastructures.
        (a) Does the threat and vulnerability, testing and assessment
    program include funding for technologies and systems which meet the
    threats that may arise in rural America?
        (b) Can you elaborate on the proposed formation and activation of
    the advanced research and development center that will include advanced
    technology support to the Department?
        Answer. (a) The Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Analysis
    (TVTA) program's planned activities address the needs of rural regions
    in several ways. We are developing advanced information systems, tools
    and sensors in order to better detect possible terrorist intentions,
    and to help analysts map threats to specific targets including rural
    reservoirs, power generation plants, and agriculture. Many of these
    tools will be designed to be usable by local officials to aid in
    regional efforts to combat terrorism. The cost of deploying new sensor
    technologies in remote areas has often been high due to communication
    infrastructure needs. To enable a lower cost, rapidly deployable
    alternative, we are planning a demonstration of new capabilities to
    link sensors to central monitoring stations using existing Federal and
    private communications infrastructures. New portable technologies to
    detect threats, such as improved radiation and biological agent
    detectors, are being developed by the S&T Directorate. Sensors alone
    cannot solve the problems associated with potential terrorist threats.
    Looking beyond sensor technology, we will develop models of the
    behavior and motivations of terrorist organizations to better
    understand the conditions that may lead to a rural attack.
        (b) It is the S&T Directorate's role to support the needs and
    requirements of the Department of Homeland Security. The Science and
    Technology Directorate carries the responsibility for ensuring that the
    necessary research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) activities
    are carried out to support the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
    Protection (IAIP) mission in cybersecurity. To satisfy this mission as
    it relates to cybersecurity, it is our intention to create a RDT&E
    center for the Department's cybersecurity needs.
        The DHS Cybersecurity Center will team through partnership and
    cooperation with NSF and NIST. This center will be available to us
    through the academic community--including partners from industry, the
    national labs and other government programs. We see this as critical--
    to combine all resources and efforts across the government R&D
    community to accelerate the technical solutions towards this issue.
        The Center will have five primary roles or functions, as follows:
      --Provide communication and coordination among various public and
            private organizations dealing with the many diverse aspects of
            cybersecurity. The Center will foster national and
            international cooperation in creating a robust and defensible
            cyber infrastructure.
      --Support the operational needs of the IAIP Directorate relative to
            vulnerability assessments and new tools and methods for
            enhancing cybersecurity. Through public-private interactions,
            this center will also facilitate the implementation of
            security-enhancing tools and methods by government and private
            agencies.
      --Direct Support to IAIP: in addition to responding to DHS RDT&E
            needs, the center may be asked to provide on-call technical
            expert capabilities in support of emergency response for rapid
            vulnerability mitigation in response to cyber threats.
      --The center will further identify and then implement RDT&E programs
            to address specific gaps in the R&D community. A unique feature
            of the DHS Center will be the utilization of existing or the
            development of test beds where new cybersecurity methods,
            tools, and approaches can be exercised in a controlled
            environment and evaluated against common, accepted standards.
            Developing the test beds and measurement-performance standards
            will be an element of the center's program.
      --In order to have the necessary human resources who possess the
            requisite knowledge and skills to advance and secure the
            nation's cyber infrastructure, the center will foster
            educational programs and curriculum development. This will be
            done in conjunction with participating universities who can
            serve as a nucleus for developing and disseminating new
            materials to have the broadest possible benefit to the nation
            and the upcoming stream of scientists and engineers.
              department of health and human services coordination
        Question. The Homeland Security Act authorizes Secretary Ridge to
    set research and development priorities for anti-terrorist
    countermeasures, but it also gives authority to the Secretary of Health
    and Human Services to set priorities in civilian human health-related
    terrorism countermeasures.
        Have you entered into discussions with the Department of Health and
    Human Services to establish priorities for basic and applied biodefense
    research?
        Answer. Yes. In compliance with Homeland Security Act of 2002,
    Public Law 107-296, Section 302(2), the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are working
    together on biodefense research priorities. During the transition
    period leading to establishment of the DHS, the HHS provided an
    individual to the Homeland Security Transition Planning Office.
    Subsequently, several steps were taken to formalize a continuing
    interaction. An interagency coordinating committee, co-chaired by The
    Executive Office of the President's National Science and Technology
    Council (NSTC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB), has been established as the vehicle for
    coordinating and prioritizing the national bio-defense research,
    development, test and evaluation agenda. A Memorandum of Understanding
    (MOU) between the Department of Health and Human Services and the
    Department of Homeland Security has been established to enable closer
    coordination on issues that are specific to DHS and HHS.
        Question. How do you propose to cooperate with the Department of
    Health and Human Services to set priorities and resolve conflicts?
        Answer. Two key steps are being taken to formalize our cooperation
    with the Department of Health and Human Services in setting priorities
    and resolving conflicts. First, an interagency coordinating committee,
    co-chaired by The Executive Office of the President's National Science
    and Technology Council (NSTC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and
    the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), has been established as the
    vehicle for coordinating and prioritizing the national bio-defense
    research, development, test and evaluation agenda. This Chemical,
    Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Research Coordinating Committee
    (CBRN-RCC) will be the primary vehicle for coordinating and
    prioritizing the multi-agency annual bio-countermeasures research
    agenda and portfolio and will be responsible for planning for specific
    R&D efforts in bio-countermeasures. Second, the Memorandum of
    Understanding (MOU) established between the Department of Health and
    Human Services and the Department of Homeland enables closer
    coordination on issues that are specific to DHS and HHS.
          homeland security advanced research projects agency (hsarpa)
        Question. The newly created Homeland Security Advanced Research
    Projects Agency (HSARPA) was patterned after the Department of
    Defense's (DoD) Advanced Research projects Agency and intends to speed
    up the development of technologies that would address homeland security
    vulnerabilities. There is concern whether the $350 million requested
    can be effectively and efficiently used and whether the Department of
    Defense's Advanced Research projects Agency is applicable for homeland
    security research and development.
        What is your schedule for creating this agency, do you intend to
    staff it with existing personnel or new personnel, and when do you
    expect it will begin operations?
        Answer. HSARPA will be operational no later than June 1, 2003. At
    that time it will have few dedicated staff, and will be operated by
    personnel from S&T headquarters in a ``dual-hatted'' mode. HSARPA will
    be staffed with new personnel.
        Question. What are the major tasks that must be accomplished to
    create this agency, and what do you consider to be the most difficult
    challenges you will face its creation?
        Answer. Key tasks are staffing, and developing the contracting
    processes needed to access the private sector. Staffing HSARPA with
    people of the highest quality, and with knowledge and skills at the
    cutting edge of technology, represents the most difficult challenge in
    setting up the Agency.
        Question. Of the $350 million requested for this new entity in how
    much of these funds include efforts funded elsewhere in the Department
    or by other agencies in fiscal year 2003 and prior years and how much
    represents funding for new activities?
        Answer. All of the efforts contemplated for HSARPA in fiscal year
    2004 are either new starts in fiscal year 2004, or continuations of
    activities started within DHS (S&T) in fiscal year 2003.
        Question. How much of the $803 million requested for the Science
    and Technology Directorate in fiscal year 2004 continues ongoing
    programs, and how much funds new research and development activities?
    How much of these funds goes for actual technology and systems
    development and how much for more generic basic and applied research?
        Answer. $400 million of the $803 million represents new activities.
    The remainder are continuations or enhancements to activities initiated
    in fiscal year 2003. How much of the funds will go for actual
    technology development versus basic and applied research is difficult
    to answer at this time; DHS does not break down its RDT&E efforts into
    6.1-6.4 categories like DOD. It is safe to say, however, that our
    initial focus will not be in basic research (6.1), but rather 6.2-6.3
    (to use DOD categories). There are exceptions, however. Some of the
    cyberforensics efforts will be 6.1 in nature, as will our efforts in
    the social sciences (such as behavioral or autonomic indicators of
    hostile intent, or efforts to develop an understanding to peoples'
    reactions to threat warnings).
        Question. The largest component of these funds is $365 million for
    Biological Countermeasures, much of which may be executed through the
    less than 1-year old National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
    Center that transferred from DOD. How much of these funds are for new
    activities, and how much for efforts less than 1 year old that have
    transferred from DOD?
        Answer. Of the $365 million in the fiscal year 2004 Biological
    Countermeasures budget, approximately $180 million is for the National
    Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC). Of that $180
    million, $90 million is for continuation of activities begun in fiscal
    year 2003 to address recognized deficiencies in the nation's
    preparation and response to bioterrorism. The remaining $90 million is
    for initiation of construction of the NBACC facility that is a
    continuation of the $5 million fiscal year 2003 investment in
    construction planning and design. These are activities over and above
    existing Department of Defense programs, the need for which was
    recognized by both the then Office of Homeland Security and the
    Department of Defense in their original request for NBACC. The Homeland
    Security Act of 2002 transferred these responsibilities to the new
    Department of Homeland Security.
        Question. How much of these funds are for continuing older
    activities at DOD?
        Answer. None of the requested NBACC funding is for continuing older
    activities at the DOD. The NBACC appropriations and programs were
    initiated in fiscal year 2003 to address recognized deficiencies in the
    nation's preparation and response to bioterrorism. These are activities
    over and above existing Department of Defense programs, the need for
    which was recognized by both the then Office of Homeland Security and
    the Department of Defense in their original request for NBACC.
        Question. Do you intend to alter any of the research priorities
    established by DOD for these programs?
        Answer. There is no intent to alter the vision or research
    priorities of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
    Center (NBACC) program identified by the Department of Defense (DOD).
    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supports the NBACC research
    priorities originally established by the DOD, and now supported by DHS.
    The NBACC program includes addressing the issues of characterization of
    these biological threats. Highest priority is given to this risk and
    vulnerability analysis, which identifies the nature of newly emerging
    threats and potential countermeasures to mitigate these threats. This
    information and data will comprise a net assessment and will be used to
    provide a scientific foundation to comply with the provisions of Public
    Law 107-296, Section 302(2). The NBACC will operate in a hub and spoke
    laboratory model, with the majority of the funds distributed to high
    value facilities in academia, industry and the national laboratory
    system. Four centers are being established in fiscal year 2003, each
    setting research priorities, and each partnered with a principal
    Federal agency. The Bioforensics Center, as an example, is partnered
    principally with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to develop
    an unimpeachable program for analysis and attribution studies of
    biological materials obtained from legal casework or foreign materials
    identified as potential bio-terrorist or biological warfare threats.
        Question. The submitted statement indicates that the $137 million
    sought for Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures will, in part, fund
    concurrent efforts to deploy, evaluate, and improve currently available
    technologies and R&D on advanced technologies.
        Concurrent efforts usually require a certain level of maturity in
    the underlying technologies before they can deployed successfully. What
    technologies in this area do you think will be mature enough to support
    this type of development in fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. Nuclear material portal monitors, hand-held search and
    isotope identification equipment, personal dosimetry devices, and
    imaging systems are commercially available. Immediate limited
    deployment in fiscal year 2004 of this equipment in varied operational
    and environmental contexts will meet three objectives: getting
    available nuclear detection equipment into the field at key locations,
    focusing research and development by more thorough elucidation of
    technical limitations and operational issues and constraints of
    existing commercially available equipment, and establishing field test-
    beds for rapid testing and evaluation of prototype equipment as it
    becomes available. This three-pronged approach is important for
    assuring that the right research and development projects are pursued
    and that the products can be quickly and effectively implemented into
    the countermeasure system that meet end-user needs.
        Question. Within the limits of unclassified information, what are
    the most promising advanced technologies that you will be developing in
    the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures area?
        Answer. The existing nuclear technology base was developed for
    applications including nuclear materials safeguards, environmental
    monitoring and clean-up, and nuclear facility decommissioning and
    demolition. This technology base is an important starting point for
    advanced technology research and development initiatives that address
    current and future nuclear and radiological threats. These initiatives
    include technologies for passive detection and discrimination of
    radiological and nuclear materials that will benefit multiple DHS
    missions. Specific passive detection thrust areas include room
    temperature detector technologies, imaging systems, low-cost detector
    concepts, and mobile detection systems. Active interrogation
    technologies will also be developed to address critical gaps in our
    current capabilities (e.g. detection of highly enriched uranium and
    shielded nuclear and radiological material). Concepts in this area
    include gamma-induced fission systems and neutron interrogation
    systems. New capabilities to search for and neutralize threats are
    needed and will be pursued; specific areas include broad area search
    and characterization, information analysis and assessment, and render
    safe technologies. Development efforts to provide rapid detection,
    triage and decontamination technologies will address identified
    consequence management and recovery technology gaps.
        Question. The submitted statement discusses plans for ``continuous
    insertion (of these advanced technologies) into operational use.'' A
    major challenge for research and development activities is the actual
    transition of technologies into fielded systems. Incomplete, delayed,
    or unsuccessful transition is not uncommon, at least in Defense
    Department advanced technology programs.
        What specific steps will you take to minimize the problems usually
    associated with transitioning advanced technologies into operational
    use?
        Answer. Technology transition is a key goal for the DHS S&T
    Directorate. We are taking a multilayered approach. First, we involve
    the user community at the outset of any project we undertake in order
    to develop program goals. As the program matures, the user community
    will also contribute to the development of system requirements and
    operational concepts. Second, we will engage in demonstrations
    periodically through the development process to generate feedback from
    the user and reduce technical risk. Finally, HSARPA will engage, where
    appropriate, in pilot deployments of the technology, where operators
    use the equipment in an operational setting while DHS S&T provides
    technical support and funds the operations and support costs. This
    pilot deployment concept reduces operational risks to the user,
    provides insight for product improvement, and allows the user to budget
    for system procurement and support costs at an appropriate level of
    maturity.
        Question. In providing support for other DHS components, such as
    the Coast Guard and Border and Transportation Security Directorate, you
    stated says ``research and development in potentially high payoff
    technologies will be emphasized.''
        What potentially high payoff technologies exist in this area, and
    how do they differ from those already being developed by R&D funds
    sought in separate R&D budget requests in some of these components,
    such as TSA and the Coast Guard?
        Answer. The purpose of DHS S&T is to ensure alignment with the
    National Strategy and implement an overall DHS/S&T strategy. The DHS
    S&T strategy includes coordinating and incorporating the strategies of
    individual components such as TSA and Coast Guard to ensure our efforts
    are leveraged to the maximum extent possible.
        From the Coast Guard's perspective, the greatest opportunities with
    S&T funding lie in developing technologies for the detection of threats
    in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) domain.
    The tools developed by S&T's investments will have significant
    applicability for the U.S. Coast Guard in the maritime environment. The
    Coast Guard is positioned in this effort to work with S&T to help
    integrate various types of sensors to improve overall capability,
    including portability, and to identify capability gaps in detection
    where technology offers opportunities. The support and collaboration
    DHS S&T provides will accelerate the development and deployment of
    these critical CBRN detection technologies and capabilities; clearly
    the CG enjoys a complimentary relationship with DHS S&T in this
    endeavor.
        Another high payoff technology example is Unmanned Aerial vehicles
    (UAVs) for both Border and Transportation Security as well as Coast
    Guard applications. DHS S&T is investigating whether implementing UAVs
    could strengthen security along the borders and ports as well as
    monitoring the safety and integrity of critical infrastructures.
    Additionally, as part of the Integrated Deepwater System, the Coast
    Guard plans to utilize UAVs.
        High payoff technologies to detect and counter biological,
    chemical, and radiological and nuclear threats and attacks will benefit
    multiple components of DHS.
        Question. DHS statements about its R&D activities frequently refer
    to rapid prototyping, and $30 million of the $803 million requested is
    ``to solicit from the private sector near-term capability that can be
    rapidly prototyped and fielded.''
        Is this $30 million the only funding for rapid prototyping efforts,
    and what are the key technologies and capabilities that you believe are
    ready for rapid prototyping?
        Answer. The $30 million is intended to solicit from industry near-
    term technologies that may be available for rapid prototyping in
    priority areas in homeland security. Our expectation is that this will
    be sufficient funding for that purpose. Areas of interest where we
    expect substantive responses include personal decontamination
    technologies; protective gear; remediation technologies; sensors;
    cybersecurity capabilities; public training and outreach tools; and
    forensics.
        Question. The private sector is naturally optimistic about the
    readiness of its technologies for rapid prototyping. What factors will
    you evaluate to assess whether rapid prototyping potential is real or
    overstated?
        Answer. We will rely heavily on evaluating the technology on its
    scientific and engineering merits; the maturity of same; operational
    suitability (in terms of false alarm and miss probabilities,
    throughput, training, reliability, and support costs); and
    manufacturability.
        Question. What are the principal components of the $803 million
    request that comprise the $350 million intended for the new Homeland
    Security Advanced Research Projects Agency?
        Answer. The research activities that we will conduct in HSARPA cut
    across the priorities for DHS S&T. Thus, the research activities
    planned include:
      --Biological Countermeasures.--This includes remediation
            technologies, and development of the next generation of
            environmental sensors.
      --Chemical Countermeasures.--This includes remediation technologies
            and development of facilities monitoring and response systems.
      --High Explosives Countermeasures.--Included here are activities
            designed to detect at range large quantities of high explosives
            (i.e. truck bombs).
      --Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures.--Included here are new
            concepts for actively probing for the presence of fissile
            material, and for taking advantage of long residence times in
            ship containers to passively detect fissile material.
      --Critical Infrastructure Protection.--Included here is reaching out
            to the academic community to develop and test methodologies for
            systematically revealing interdependencies among
            infrastructures.
      --Support to DHS Components.--Included here are activities supporting
            conventional missions of the Department, such as advanced
            biometrics, and advanced techniques for monitoring the border.
      --Rapid Prototyping Program.--Organizationally, the technology
            clearinghouse is managed under HSARPA. Thus, the TSWG BAA, and
            rapid prototyping activities occur here.
      --IT Infrastructure.--Included here is developing advanced scalable
            techniques for organizing extant disparate databases and
            conducting queries of same efficiently.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens

                                   SAFETY Act
        Question. The purpose of the SAFETY Act provisions (at Subtitle G--
    Sections 861-865) in the Homeland Security Act was to encourage
    immediate deployment of existing anti-terrorism technologies--
    especially for high risk potential targets. However, nothing has yet
    been done to implement the SAFETY Act. We understand that OMB has
    drafted implementing regulations that are awaiting review at the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        When will these regulations be issued?
        Answer. It is not possible at this time to identify a specific date
    on which these regulations will be issued. The regulations to implement
    the SAFETY Act are a high priority and are presently under review at
    DHS. DHS is working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
    finalize an initial set of SAFETY Act regulations. We expect to publish
    these regulations for comment very shortly. Following the public
    comment period, the regulations will be finalized and issued.
        Question. Will they be effective immediately?
        Answer. The point at which the regulations will become effective
    following their finalization is also under discussion.
        Question. How does DHS plan to staff implementation of the SAFETY
    Act so that technologies can be qualified quickly?
        Answer. DHS has researched using a combination of private and
    public sector certification efforts to help understand the likely
    needs--in terms of process, facilities, and staff. DHS will reach out
    to the private sector to staff and perform specific tasks in the
    process. DHS will also leverage current USG assets and processes to the
    extent possible to proceed quickly with SAFETY Act implementation.
        Question. In order to avoid the delay associated with a lengthy
    rulemaking and qualification process, will DHS consider an emergency
    qualification process that at least lets the top10 high risk sites get
    technology in place?
        Answer. There are plans for both an immediate implementation path,
    as well as for a longer-term ``ideal state'' process that would
    implement the SAFETY Act. The technologies that will be considered in
    both types of processes will focus on those technologies and systems
    that have been demonstrated to make the largest contribution to risk
    reduction for the homeland security defensive system--and that meet the
    criteria contained in Subtitle G. Each geographical site and type of
    facility will have different types of vulnerabilities. They will also
    have different probabilities for attack and different means of attack
    will have different consequences. Understanding the contribution of a
    specific technology on the total system must include consideration of
    the synergies and the respective degree of impact on overall risk.
        Question. What steps can DHS take right away to qualify key
    technologies for high priority sites?
        Answer. An expedited process for consideration of high profile,
    high-consequence technologies is being developed. The technologies must
    meet the criteria of Subtitle G. They must also be assessed to be
    effective with respect to significant reduction of overall system
    vulnerability and adequate information and data must be available to
    allow DHS to address the effectiveness and adequacy of the technology
    in the system context.
        Question. Is it correct that DHS has several pending applications
    for qualification?
        Answer. DHS does not have an application process in place. The
    process will be contingent upon issuance of regulations. Public
    notification of the application process and of the select categories of
    technologies that will be considered for certification will be made
    through the DHS website after regulations are issued.
        Question. Does DHS have a list of high priority sites and their
    needs?
        Answer. DHS has been considering overall system vulnerabilities and
    methods to assess gaps and needs. Many methods have been used to
    develop this understanding, and much of this knowledge has been derived
    from studies done by other USG agencies that had homeland security
    responsibilities prior to March 1, 2003. This process will become
    increasingly more rigorous as a more complete suite of tools is
    developed and implemented. Thus, we expect our assessment of high
    priority aspects of the system to evolve in response to both increased
    understanding and with changing conditions.
        Question. If not, what can be done to get that information rapidly
    before DHS?
        Answer. The question of specific sites versus system vulnerability
    is answered above.
        Question. What else can we do to reduce delay in making this
    technology available?
        Answer. It is critical that, both in the initial stages of SAFETY
    Act implementation as well as in the future when the process has
    reached its ideal state, that only the most important technologies, in
    terms providing major risk reduction, are considered for certification.
    The system will quickly become overloaded and extremely burdensome if
    every conceivable technology must be reviewed or evaluated.
        Question. Can you report back to us within a week as to how an
    emergency process might begin?
        Answer. Until DHS and OMB have completed their review and have
    issued guidance for the actual implementation of the SAFETY Act, it
    would be premature to discuss an emergency process. However, much
    thought and research is going into this topic so that the Department
    will be prepared to move out quickly after issuance of the guidance.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell

        Question. Would you please describe the process that the
    Department, or more specifically, the Science and Technology
    Directorate, will use in soliciting and evaluating research proposals
    so as to ensure that the highest quality proposals receive funding?
        Answer. In all cases the Department will rely on review by experts
    in the field. In addition, for directed (e.g. applied) research,
    selection criteria will also include responsiveness to the programs
    needs, schedule and cost realism, and key personnel.
        Question. Would you please describe what proportion of the Science
    and Technology efforts of DHS will focus on basic research and what
    proportion will focus on application of new technology?
        Answer. This question is difficult to answer at this time; DHS does
    not break down its RDT&E efforts into 6.1-6.4 categories like DOD. It
    is safe to say, however, that our initial focus will not be in basic
    research (6.1), but rather 6.2-6.3 (to use DOD categories). There are
    exceptions, however. Some of the cyberforensics efforts will be 6.1 in
    nature, as will our efforts in the social sciences (such as behavioral
    or autonomic indicators of hostile intent, or efforts to develop an
    understanding to peoples' reactions to threat warnings).
        Question. Presumably, universities and private sector industries
    will conduct much of this research. What proportion of total research
    funding will be provided to universities and what proportion will be
    provided to the private sector?
        Answer. At this time, no requests for proposals for the work have
    been issued or proposals received. We will award funds based on
    technical merits, responsiveness to program needs, schedule and cost
    realism, and other metrics as appropriate. However, some funds will be
    applied to university centers of excellence, and to graduate and
    postdoctoral research efforts in support of homeland security. The
    President's budget request includes $10 million for these latter
    activities.
        Question. In your testimony you mentioned that you are requesting
    ``$10 million to support strategic partnerships with the academic
    community to provide support for qualified students and faculty.'' I
    believe other Federal agencies that fund research also fund graduate
    fellowship or traineeship programs. Will the Department, or more
    specifically, the Science and Technology Directorate, fund graduate
    fellowships or traineeships? If so, would you please describe in
    general terms how that funding program will operate?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate is committed to building a cadre of
    dedicated scientists and engineers who will pursue careers in homeland
    security related disciplines and who will, in turn, encourage the next
    generation of experts to follow in their footsteps. To that end, we are
    working with national organizations such as the American Association of
    Universities, American Association for the Advancement of Science, the
    National Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation to
    develop mechanisms that maximize our ability to tap the wealth of
    talent at the nation's universities and colleges to pursue disciplines
    related to the diverse portfolio of homeland security programs. A key
    element of this effort will be the establishment of the Homeland
    Security Scholarship and Fellowship Program. Our goal is to make this a
    premier program--on par with those of NIH, NRC, NASA and others--that
    encourages outstanding students and faculty to work in homeland
    security related fields. The key to making this program a success will
    be the engagement of university and college faculty and administration
    throughout the process. In fiscal year 2004 we will model the execution
    of this program on the fellowship/scholarship programs sponsored by the
    National Science Foundation.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Shelby

        Question. What is the Directorate doing to develop a national
    structure for science and technology analysis and development?
        Answer. Section 302(2) of the Homeland Security Act requires the
    development of a national strategy and policy for homeland security
    research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E). In fiscal year
    2003, DHS S&T is committing $10 million to develop this strategy, which
    includes efforts to catalog Federal efforts in this area, and, working
    with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    Directorate, conducting threat analysis and vulnerability assessments
    to assist in prioritizing the national effort.
        Question. Alabama, and specifically the Huntsville metropolitan
    area, offer a unique opportunity for the Department of Homeland
    Security's Science and Technology Directorate. The Huntsville area
    maintains one of the highest, if not the highest, number of PhD's per
    capita in the nation. These individuals' immeasurable expertise in
    areas unique to the Homeland Security and Defense industries is too
    great a resource to leave untapped by the Department. I would encourage
    you to consider the Huntsville area when you continue to discuss the
    framework of the Science and Technology Directorate. To that end, what
    is the Directorate doing to take advantage of this great source of
    information, analysis, and invention?
        Answer. DHS S&T is well aware of the technical and scientific
    capabilities resident in the Huntsville area, which includes many
    significant Federal systems engineering and scientific facilities such
    as NASA, SMDC, MICOM, as well as a significant and highly capable
    contractor base. DHS S&T will avail itself of the entire National RDT&E
    enterprise, including as appropriate the significant capabilities
    resident in Huntsville, Alabama. Dr. McQueary visits the Huntsville
    area on May 12, 2003, as a result of their invitation.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Larry Craig

                       critical infrastructure protection
        Question. I have worked with the Department of Energy for some
    time, on programs to secure the nation's critical infrastructure from
    attack. I have worked to provide funding in Energy and Water for the
    establishment of a Critical Infrastructure Protection Test Range at the
    Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. I think it is
    essential to actually put these systems under mock attack and see if
    the protection technologies work. Much effort is being expended to
    develop extensive models of our critical infrastructures and their
    interdependencies. There is no question that protection of our critical
    infrastructures is a vital priority for our nation. However, I have
    concerns that huge sums are being invested in computer models without
    having adequate data to support them. Idaho's lab provides a unique
    capability to do this, because it is a remote, 900 square mile Federal
    installation with its own electrical, communications and water systems.
    Almost like a virtual city, it has everything from its own traffic
    lights to its own nuclear reactors. Given my work on this issue,
    however, I would suggest to you that your requested budget for critical
    infrastructure protection--$5 million out of a budget of $803 million--
    is inadequate. This isn't sufficient to develop technologies, much less
    test them. I will be looking closely at your plans in this area.
        Please explain the requested level of your budget given our
    security needs in this area.
        Answer The S&T Directorate has actually budgeted a total of $15
    million for Critical Infrastructure Protection for fiscal year 2004. In
    addition, there will be several technology programs in the Critical
    Infrastructure Protection area supported by the Information Analysis
    and Infrastructure Protection Directorate which is DHS' lead component
    for critical infrastructure protection, and with which S&T's activities
    are coordinated. There is a need for data for model validation and
    experimental verification of all computer models, simulations, and
    analyses. We have met with the staff of the Idaho National Engineering
    and Environmental Laboratory and they are working with us to develop
    Critical Infrastructure Protection R&D programs.
                              radiological attack
        Question. Much of the work of countering the threat of radiological
    attack resides in detecting these materials before they are brought
    into an area and detonated. Department of Energy national laboratories
    have been doing work on this issue for years. Through their work on
    nuclear fuel cycles, DOE labs such as Argonne, have a lot of expertise
    in detecting and measuring radiological events. I would not want to see
    this work duplicated elsewhere.
        Could you provide for the record any plans you have for conducting
    research on detection and intervention capabilities along these lines
    at the national laboratories?
        Answer. Detecting materials that might be used in a radiological
    attack requires understanding the potential threats and how specific
    technologies and systems of multiple technologies can impact these
    threats. Research and development in systems integration and systems
    analysis will provide an effective, integrated system architecture and
    the capability for regularly assessing and rapidly optimizing the
    nuclear countermeasure system. Development of needed detection
    technologies and countermeasure systems will build on the previous
    efforts of the national laboratories. Detecting radiological and
    nuclear threats before they become dangerous requires new capabilities
    for new operational deployment strategies. These new technologies and
    systems will augment the currently available capabilities (commercially
    or from government and academic laboratories) that can be employed
    today in the nuclear countermeasure system.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                   under secretary for science and technology
        Question. For each portfolio and activity described in the
    congressional budget justification, please provide a detailed
    description of the programs and initiatives being funded in your base
    budget as well as the request for fiscal year 2004, including the cost
    associated with each.
        Answer. See table below. For the fiscal year 2003 base, which
    reflects activities transferred to the Department in Public Law 107-
    296, a reprogramming letter has been submitted to the House and Senate
    Appropriations Committees.

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Question. Provide the number of FTE associated with each portfolio
    and activity described in your fiscal year 2004 budget justification.
        Answer. See table below:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Fiscal Year
                                                  Request           FTE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Biodefense..............................            $365              63
    Nuc/Rad.................................             137              22
    Chemical Countermeasures................              55              10
    High Explosives.........................              10               2
    Threat and Vulnerability Testing and                  90              16
     Assessment.............................
    Standards/State & Local Programs........              25               4
    Rapid Prototyping.......................              30               5
    Emerging Threats........................              22               4
    Critical Infrastructure Protection......               5               2
    Support to DHS Components...............              55              10
    HS Fellowship Programs/Univ Programs....              10               2
                                             -------------------------------
          TOTALS............................             804         \1\ 140
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Excludes 40 FTE's associated with the Directorate's management and
      61 FTE's for the Environmental Measurements Laboratory.
    Note: Numbers rounded to nearest thousand.

        Question. For each office on the ``S&T Organizational Chart''
    provided to the Subcommittee provide a budget estimate and associated
    FTE's for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004.
        Answer. The Directorate will have 79 FTEs associated with the
    Office of the Under Secretary; the Office of Plans, Programs and
    Budget; the Office of Research and Development; and HSARPA. The
    estimated salary cost of fiscal year 2003 FTE's is approximately $8.5
    million. The S&T Directorate plans to have a staffing level for fiscal
    year 2004 of approximately 180 FTEs plus 61 FTE for the Environmental
    Measurements Laboratory (EML). The estimated salary cost of these FTEs
    is approximately $22 million to $27 million.
        Question. On page 25 of your budget justification, no funding is
    provided for ``Adjustments Necessary to Maintain Current Levels.'' Does
    the fiscal year 2004 budget account for the President's proposal for
    pay or any other economic assumptions? Provide an explanation of why
    ``Adjustments to Maintain Current Levels'' are not included in your
    fiscal year 2004 budget estimates.
        Answer. Yes, the budget accounts for the President's pay and
    economic assumptions. These amounts are included in the budget numbers
    in fiscal year 2004 but not specifically broken out in Adjustments to
    Maintain Current Levels. Because most of the Science and Technology
    fiscal year 2004 activities are new or significantly increased, the
    portfolio-by-portfolio estimates were developed assuming that increases
    for pay and other economic assumptions would be accounted for within
    the overall portfolio growth.
        Question. Pursuant to Public Law 107-296, provide a detailed list
    of the functions transferred from other agencies to the Science &
    Technology Directorate, including personnel (FTE) transferred, physical
    infrastructure (if any), and associated funding with each function
    transferred.
        Answer. The Environmental Measurements Laboratory, Department of
    Energy, with an authorized 61 FTE's and 53 existing personnel
    transferred to the S&T Directorate. Six FTE's as well as the six
    incumbents of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
    Department of Energy, also transferred to the Directorate.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Transferred From                        Program Description         FTEs   Personnel    Funding
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Energy........................................  Chemical Biological National           4          4  $48,005,527
                                                     Program.
                                                    Nuclear Smuggling...............  ......  .........  ...........
                                                    Nuclear Assessment Program......       2          2    5,584,000
                                                    Biological and Environmental      ......  .........   20,000,000
                                                     Research.
                                                    Advanced Scientific Computing R   ......  .........    3,068,000
                                                     & D.
                                                    Environmental Measurements            61         53    3,048,287
                                                     Laboratory.
    Agriculture...................................  Plum Island Animal Disease        ......  .........      ( \1\ )
                                                     Center.
    Defense.......................................  Biological Research and Defense   ......  .........  420,000,000
                                                     programmatic activities.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Determination Order has not been finalized, since Plum Island Animal Disease Center transfers 6/03 to DHS.

        Question. What is your current on-board staffing level? What is
    your estimated staffing level for the end of fiscal year 2003? To
    better understand the makeup of the Science and Technology
    Directorate's workforce, provide a list of all positions by grade and
    job title or job classification.
        Answer. As of April 22, 2003, the entire S&T Directorate has 92
    personnel working. Thirty-seven are in the immediate Office of the
    Under Secretary; the Office of Plans, Programs, and Budget; and the
    Office of Research and Development. Two are in HSARPA. Fifty-three are
    at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) in NYC. The 92
    personnel consist of permanently assigned employees, employees detailed
    from within and outside DHS, Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA)
    assignments, and contractor support from the National Laboratories. The
    Directorate anticipates filling its 79 authorized FTE's, not including
    the 61 authorized the EML, by the end of fiscal year 2003. The
    Directorate may not be able to fill the 8 vacant FTE's at EML until the
    funding issue is resolved. Funding was transferred from DOE to cover
    only the 53 filled positions.
        The Directorate is currently writing position descriptions and
    having them classified. At this point, we are unable to provide a list
    by title, series and grade. Most of the positions will be classified as
    GS-13, 14, 15, ST, and SES and will be in the engineering (800) and
    sciences (400, 600, and 1300) series. Supporting positions will be
    primarily administrative, analytical, and program management at the GS-
    7 through 15 in the 301, 340, 343, and 1515 series.
        Question. Provide the number of employees detailed from other
    agencies that are currently working for the Science and Technology
    Directorate.
        Answer. As of April 22, 2003, the Directorate had a total of seven
    personnel on detail from outside the Department
        Question. Provide a list (if any) of contracts entered into with
    federally funded research and development centers in fiscal year 2003,
    including the name of the research center and the amount of the
    contract.
        Answer. No contract has been entered into at this time in fiscal
    year 2003 with any FFRDC. DHS (S&T) is planning on contracting in the
    near term with the MITRE Corp to provide studies and analyses in
    support of our system engineering mission, for a sum of $1.2 million.
        Question. When will the Homeland Security Advanced Research
    Projects Agency (HSARPA) be established? How many employees will be
    employed at the HSARPA?
        Answer. HSARPA was established by Public Law 107-206, November
    2002, and will be operational no later than June 1, 2003. At that time
    it will have few dedicated staff, and will be operated by personnel
    from S&T headquarters in a ``dual-hatted'' mode. HSARPA will be staffed
    with new personnel. Currently planned FTE count is 56 at the end of
    fiscal year 2004. This number may change as program requirements and
    workload are analyzed in more detail.
        Question. Provide a list of all ongoing R&D activities, by agency
    and funding amounts, within the Department of Homeland Security.
        Answer. Outside of the S&T directorate, the following R&D
    activities are underway in the Department of Homeland Security:
      --The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) request includes
            $75.2 million for research through TSA's Technology Center.
      --The Coast Guard request includes $22 million in fiscal year 2004
            for research and development projects in areas such as
            contraband detection, vessel stopping, Command Center Concept
            Exploration, and Intelligent Waterways Research.
      --The Information Analysis and Information Protection (IAIP)
            Directorate request includes $5 million in fiscal year 2004 for
            cybersecurity research projects conducted by the National
            Communications System.
        Question. Describe efforts underway to coordinate and integrate all
    research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation
    activities of the Department of Homeland Security.
        Answer. The S&T Directorate is working very closely with the other
    operational directorates in DHS to coordinate and integrate the RDT&E
    portfolio of the Department. To that end, all the S&T Portfolio
    managers also serve as liaisons to one of the operational organizations
    (e.g., BTS, IAIP, EP&R, USCG, USSS) with many of these staff being
    matrixed from their home organizations. The S&T budget directly
    reflects requirements identified by these end-users. In addition, the
    S&T Directorate has assumed government oversight for the Federal
    laboratories that transferred into the Department in fiscal year 2003.
    The S&T Directorate has an Office of Federal Laboratories that is
    responsible for ensuring that these facilities and programs are
    integrated into the overall RDT&E enduring capability of the
    Department.
        Question. Provide a list of Research & Development contracts the
    Science & Technology Directorate has entered into in fiscal year 2003
    and those planned for fiscal year 2004. For fiscal year 2003, the list
    should include the amount for each contract and the entity receiving
    the contract.
        Answer. The S&T Directorate has not yet entered into any new R&D
    contracts in fiscal year 2003. The S&T Directorate has assumed
    responsibility for direction and guidance for those programs
    transferred from other agencies to the S&T Directorate, including their
    existing R&D contracts. We will provide additional information on the
    scope and nature of those transferred programs upon request.
        The S&T Directorate has not yet determined the R&D contracts needed
    for fiscal year 2004 as these will be based on the final fiscal year
    2004 program plans and user requirements to meet the DHS mission.
        Question. For the Homeland Security Institute and the Homeland
    Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee, provide a timeline
    for the establishment of each organization, including progress to date
    and associated costs.
        Answer. The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory
    Committee will be established before the end of fiscal year 2003. The
    Homeland Security Institute will also be established before the end of
    fiscal year 2003. For the latter, a draft Request for Proposal (RFP)
    has been created, in consultation with Department of Defense FFRDC
    management.
        Question. Provide a summary of the Homeland Security Institute and
    the Homeland Advisory Committee's roles and responsibilities in
    furthering the development of homeland security science and technology.
        Answer. The Homeland S&T Advisory Committee will operate as a board
    of directors for the Directorate, in terms of providing strategic
    advice, management advice, and undertaking focused studies and projects
    as needed. The Homeland Security Institute will provide analytic
    support of unquestioned objectivity in such areas as threat and
    vulnerability assessments, technical assessments, cost analyses,
    systems analyses, test and evaluation criteria, and actuarial analyses.
        Question. Provide a list of cities where the Biological Warning and
    Incident Characterization System (BWIC) has been deployed, including
    plans for future deployment.
        Answer. The first phase of BWIC is known as BioWatch. The BioWatch
    deployment is more extensive than originally planned because of the war
    in Iraq and the associated heightened alert status. As a result,
    BioWatch is currently collecting data in 26 of the most populated
    cities. These cities are: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston,
    Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Francisco, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Boston,
    Detroit, Atlanta, Miami, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Cleveland, San Diego,
    St. Louis, Denver, Tampa, Washington D.C., Baltimore, San Antonio,
    Austin, Columbus, and Milwaukee. Please treat this list as For Official
    Use Only since revelation as to which cities do or do not have BioWatch
    might influence subsequent terrorist activity.
        If the current decreased alert status continues, it is our intent
    to scale back at the end of fiscal year 2003 the number of BioWatch
    cities to a subset of those highest on the threat list and to work with
    the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for Disease
    Control and Prevention (CDC) to seek transition funding for these. In
    fiscal year 2004, we will field a pilot of the next generation wide
    area detection system in one of these cities. That system will support
    50 samples per day at the same operational cost as the existing
    BioWatch system which handles 10-12 samples per day. Local public
    health officials have identified this increased sampling as a critical
    step toward improved consequence management. Concurrently, we will be
    conducting R&D on advanced detectors which should enable us to upgrade
    BioWatch by replacing the air filters, which are currently collected
    manually and then brought to a central analysis lab, with distributed
    detectors that do the analysis at the point of collection and within an
    hour--thereby greatly reducing the warning time without increasing the
    operational costs.
        Question. Your fiscal year 2003 reprogramming request, received on
    April 9, 2003, makes reference to the Biowatch program. What is the
    difference between the BWIC and Biowatch programs?
        Answer. BioWatch is the first phase of an enhanced capability
    within the BioWarning and Incident Characterization System (BWIC).
    Deployed in response to the heighten tensions surrounding the Iraq
    conflict, BioWatch provides for early detection of possible aerosolized
    release of key agents in many of our cities and metropolitan areas. It
    does so by deploying aerosol collectors at existing EPA sites in and
    around these cities, then collecting the filters from these collectors
    every 24 hours and taking them to the nearest CDC Laboratory Response
    Network (LRN) lab for analysis. As noted in the answer to S&T-S52
    above, the plan is to upgrade this capability in the future to provide
    increased spatial and temporal sampling while maintaining or reducing
    the operational costs associated with the current BioWatch pilot.
        This upgraded environmental portion is one of three critical arms
    of BWIC. The second key arm of BWIC is an integrated biosurveillance
    system. Integrated biosurveillance will augment traditional clinical
    surveillance with less traditional surveillance techniques such as
    syndromic surveillance, advice nurse calls, over the counter drug sales
    and veterinary reports in the desire to provide a still earlier
    indication of potential exposure to a pathogen. We are currently
    working with CDC to define the key elements of such an integrated
    surveillance system. The third key arm of BWIC is to integrate the
    information from both the environmental monitoring (BioWatch) and
    biosurveillance systems with appropriate consequence managements tools
    (e.g. plume hazard prediction models and epidemiological models) to
    provide the incident commanders with the best possible estimate of the
    extent of the event so as to better guide the response. The integrated
    combination of these three elements--environmental monitoring,
    biosurveillance, and their integration into consequence management
    tools--comprises the BWIC system.
        Question. For the $91 million included in the Lands and Structures
    Object Classification line, please provide a detailed description of
    the project or projects planned with this funding, the amount for the
    project or projects previously appropriated, and the total amount
    necessary to complete the project or projects, the total amount
    currently authorized (if any), and whether additional authorization is
    required for the project or projects planned with this funding.
        Answer. The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
    Centers (NBACC) is to be established on a hub and spoke model with the
    NBACC hub--high security, biocontainment facilities--located at Fort
    Detrick, Maryland. The NBACC spoke facilities are partnering Federal
    laboratories as well as contract public and private sector specialty
    labs. Existing national biocontainment laboratory infrastructure,
    especially with the capability for safe, effective and controlled
    generation of biothreat agent aerosols within biocontainment
    laboratories, is insufficient to meet NBACC program needs. This was
    demonstrated by conducting a publicly advertised, sources sought,
    market survey in April 2002, and by examination of others' construction
    plans. The NBACC is comprised of four centers: (1) Bioforensics
    Analysis Center for unassailable analysis to support attribution of the
    use of biothreat agents (BTA) by criminals, state and non-state actors;
    (2) Bio-Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Center for validated
    countermeasure testing against BTA aerosol lab challenge; (3)
    Biodefense Knowledge Center to provide relevant training, data
    integration, analysis, and information dissemination while exploiting
    artificial intelligence technologies; and (4) Biothreat Assessment
    Support Center for laboratory studies of potential BTA and
    countermeasure efficacy to provide the essential scientific basis for a
    BTA net assessment and prioritization. The fiscal year 2003
    appropriation supporting the NBACC contained $5 million for facility
    planning analysis and design; these studies are presently incomplete.
    Additionally, the NBACC is being planned and coordinated as a component
    of the biocontainment laboratory infrastructure on the Fort Detrick
    BioDefense Campus. Participants include the Department of Defense and
    other Federal departments having operations at Fort Detrick. Since
    plans are presently incomplete, the full scope of NBACC facility
    requirements-individually and as shared infrastructure-and the detailed
    costs and schedules to complete these construction projects is not yet
    available. Existing authorization for these efforts is sufficient.
        Question. Will there be a National headquarters laboratory within
    the Science & Technology Directorate? If so, where?
        Answer. In accordance with the Homeland Security Act, the S&T
    Directorate has established an Office of National Laboratories. This
    office has the ability to access the expertise of all of the existing
    national laboratories through a Memorandum of Agreement signed by the
    Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Energy in February
    2003. DHS does not intend to establish a headquarters laboratory, but
    rather, it will sponsor homeland security programs at a variety of
    sites that leverage the vast talent of the national laboratory complex.
    The national laboratories are crucial elements of the enduring
    scientific and technical capability that DHS needs to execute its
    mission in the long term.
        Question. Describe the role the Science & Technology Directorate
    has played (if any) in responding to the Sudden Acute Respiratory
    Syndrome (SARS).
        Answer. S&T is monitoring the SARS outbreak closely with other
    Federal and State public health officials. The S&T Directorate has not
    funded any activities associated with SARS that normally fall under the
    jurisdiction of HHS, CDC and the Public Health Service.
        Question. Your budget shows a $30 million increase in equipment
    costs in fiscal year 2003 and then a decrease of $30 million in fiscal
    year 2004. Why was there such a large increase for equipment costs in
    fiscal year 2003?
        Answer. The $30 million is for equipment associated with the Bio-
    Watch system that will be purchased and deployed in the fiscal year
    2003.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye

                   under secretary for science and technology
        Question. In your written testimony you state, a key part of our
    efforts will be conducted through the Homeland Security Advanced
    Research Projects Agency. It is my understanding that this agency will
    be modeled after DARPA, a program I have seen first-hand meet with
    great success. Your fiscal year 2004 budget request assumes that
    approximately $350 million will be used for this purpose. Could you
    please provide us with an update on the creation of that Agency and an
    estimated timetable for solicitation of the first round of grants?
        Answer. HSARPA will be operational no later than June 1, 2003. At
    that time it will have few dedicated staff, and will be operated by
    personnel from S&T headquarters in a ``dual-hatted'' mode. However, it
    is anticipated that several Broad Agency Announcements that cut across
    the portfolios within the Directorate will be issued soon afterwards.
        Question. I support the Directorate's Homeland Security Fellowship
    Program as an effort to support university-level study of science and
    technology. It is anticipated that this will help meet our country's
    need for qualified applicants for security related research and
    development positions. However, enrollment of U.S. citizens in graduate
    science and engineering programs has not kept pace with that of foreign
    students. I understand that this program would provide support to
    students and faculty, but I believe we need to work to encourage
    students to enter these fields, not only support those who choose these
    fields. How would the fellowship program work to entice U.S. citizens
    to enter into these fields?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate is committed to building a cadre of
    dedicated scientists and engineers in the United States who will pursue
    careers in homeland security related disciplines and who will, in turn,
    encourage the next generation of experts to follow in their footsteps.
    A key element of this effort is the establishment of the Homeland
    Security Scholarship and Fellowship Program. Our goal is to make this a
    premier program--on par with those of NIH, NRC, NASA and others--that
    encourages outstanding students and faculty who are U.S. citizens to
    work in homeland security related fields. The key to making this
    program a success will be the engagement of university and college
    faculty and administration throughout the process.
        Question. Your Directorate will develop standards for State and
    local homeland security infrastructure equipment. Do you anticipate
    that these standards will be guidelines and suggestions, or do you
    anticipate that our State and local entities will be required to
    purchase equipment and implement training programs in compliance with
    the standards your Directorate develops? If these standards will be
    mandatory, what financial assistance will the Department provide for
    the purchase of compliant equipment?
        Answer. In accordance with OMB Circular-119, the standards
    developed and used by DHS for homeland security equipment will
    primarily be voluntary consensus standards. As such, these equipment
    standards will function as guidelines that set minimum performance
    specifications to ensure that the equipment will have basic
    functionality, will be adequate for the task for which it is intended,
    and demonstrates a basic level of efficiency, interoperability, and
    sustainability. In general, specific equipment purchases will not be
    mandated by DHS. However, we anticipate that the existing grant
    programs will tie allowable purchases to equipment that has been shown
    to meet an accepted DHS standard. In addition, if equipment standards
    are established or mandated as part of a National Incident Management
    System, then failure to adopt those standards will, per Homeland
    Security Presidential Directive #5, render a jurisdiction ineligible
    for any preparedness-related grant or contract funding, not just
    equipment-related grants. Our plan is to ensure that training programs
    providing proficiency on equipment that meets standards will also be
    covered to some extent by the existing USG funding programs. There is
    great interest from the State and local emergency response community in
    having the standards needed to make intelligent and potentially life
    saving decisions when it comes to equipment purchase. Therefore,
    providing these standards is a very important component of our mission.
        HR5005 invests the Secretary with regulatory authority. There may
    be some very specialized cases where issues of human health and safety
    dictate promulgation of regulations. Those special cases where specific
    types of equipment are made mandatory will likely be considered
    separately in terms of government funding that would be made available
    for deployment.

                              SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

        Senator Cochran. This concludes our hearing today.
        We will continue to review the fiscal year 2004 budget
    request for the Department of Homeland Security on Wednesday,
    April 30, at 10 a.m. in room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office
    Building. Our witness at that time will be the Secretary of
    Homeland Security, Tom Ridge.
        The subcommittee stands in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., Thursday, April 10, the
    subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
    April 30.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 10:04 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Specter, Domenici,
    McConnell, Shelby, Gregg, Campbell, Craig, Byrd, Inouye,
    Hollings, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Kohl, and Murray.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    STATEMENT OF HON. TOM RIDGE, SECRETARY
        Senator Cochran. The committee will please come to order.
        Today, as the subcommittee continues its hearings on the
    fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Department of Homeland
    Security, we are faced with historic challenges. For the first
    time in at least 40 years, Americans are facing direct threats
    to our country and to our personal safety at our workplaces and
    in our homes. The new Department of Homeland Security is a key
    component in the effort to combat terrorism and we are very
    pleased to have with us today the head of that new Department,
    Secretary Tom Ridge.
        Mr. Secretary, I think you and the President have made
    impressive progress in the effort to make America safer and
    more secure. You have worked with the Congress to obtain
    passage of the Homeland Security Act, to create the Department
    of Homeland Security and bring together 22 Federal
    organizations and some 180,000 employees to achieve this higher
    level of safety and security.
        But, we all know that more needs to be done. The
    President's budget request for this Department for fiscal year
    2004 is $36.2 billion. We look forward to your testimony, Mr.
    Secretary, in support of this budget request.
        I also have had an opportunity this morning to read a copy
    of the remarks that you made on the occasion of the first 100
    days of the existence of the Department of Homeland Security
    that you delivered at the National Press Club here in
    Washington yesterday. I thought it was informative. You have
    also prepared a statement for the committee and we will make
    that a part of our hearing record in full.
        We want to be sure as we review this request that we
    provide a level of funding that is consistent with the threats
    we face and that we can reasonably expect to be used to achieve
    our goal of a safe and secure homeland.
        Before proceeding to hear your testimony, I want to
    recognize Senator Byrd, the ranking Democrat member of the
    committee, for any opening statement he may have, and then we
    will recognize other Senators in the order in which they
    appeared at the hearing. Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. How are you, Mr.
    Secretary?
        Our country is a great and powerful Nation and we have been
    able to put a man on the moon and bring him back to earth
    again. Man has long looked at that moon and longed for
    centuries to put his foot on that moon. But we haven't been
    able to perfect a good public address system.
        This one may work. Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have
    a good chairman who is a stickler for getting started on time
    and I am glad to see that. A few days ago, I said to him, if I
    am not there on time, go ahead, so we have that understanding,
    and I thank the other members of the subcommittee for their
    presence and their interest and their attention.
        Ours is a society built on freedom. We have designed our
    society to make our people and our institutions accessible,
    with freedom of movement and access to information. You have
    said, Mr. Secretary, that we are a Nation at war and that
    another terrorist attack here in America is inevitable. You
    have said that the attacks such as the attacks of September 11
    are long-term threats that will not go away. I do not disagree
    with that assessment.
        Your Department has the responsibility to make careful
    choices about how to reconcile these goals, openness and the
    need for security operations which cannot always be open. A
    proper balance must be found. How do we make America safer
    without fundamentally changing the quality of a free society?
    How do we protect ourselves from a threat within our borders
    while protecting our privacy rights and our freedom to move
    about this great country? How do we invest the resources and
    organize our efforts to catch, to apprehend terrorists without
    trampling on the Constitution?
        How do we make sure that the agencies that have been merged
    into the new Department of Homeland Security but also have
    specific missions unrelated to homeland security, such as
    preventing and responding to natural disasters, have the
    resources to effectively accomplish those dual missions?
        Recently, in an interview with Fox News, you said, and I
    think I am quoting you correctly, ``We have to prepare for the
    inevitability of suicide bombings in the United States.'' You
    went on to say, ``We will never be immune from those kinds of
    attacks,'' and I think you are right. I agree with that.
        But I find it very difficult to reconcile that statement
    with positions that you and others in the administration have
    taken since November of 2001, positions that have consistently
    opposed efforts by the Congress to provide critical resources
    for homeland security, funding for first responders, funding
    for security on our porous borders, funding for security at our
    nuclear power facilities, funding for security at our ports
    through which 7 million containers annually travel with an
    inspection rate of only 2 percent, for security at our
    airports, and for the security of our critical infrastructure
    such as our clean drinking water systems?
        In November of 2001, just 2 months after the attacks of 9/
    11, you, Mr. Secretary, wrote to the Congress in your capacity
    as the Director of the Office of Homeland Security and this is
    what you said. ``No additional resources to protect the
    homeland beyond what the President has already requested are
    needed at this time.'' You see, you were writing to me and to
    Ted Stevens and others. Your message was, basically, let us
    wait until 2002.
        Well, 2002 came and in August of 2002, the President chose
    to terminate $2.5 billion of funding that Congress had approved
    as an emergency for a homeland security program, including $423
    million of funding for first responders, as well as funding for
    nuclear security, airport security, and port security. The
    President, in refusing to designate those $2.5 billion as an
    emergency, in essence blocked funding for the Coast Guard, the
    Secret Service, and for the Customs Service for the container
    security initiative. These are all agencies now under your
    control. The President's message, basically, was let us wait
    until 2003.
        In January of this year, 2003, I offered an amendment to
    add $5 billion of homeland security funding to the omnibus
    appropriations bill for 2003. Once again, the administration
    opposed the amendment, opposed this amendment, asserting that,
    and I quote, ``it was new, extraneous spending.'' Well, my
    amendment was defeated when, once again, the administration
    argued that homeland security funding could wait, this time
    until 2004.
        In March of this year, with the Nation at war, the
    President finally requested a $4 billion supplemental for
    homeland security. Congress approved $5 billion for many of the
    same homeland security programs contained in the amendment that
    I offered 4 months ago. Not only has President Bush failed to
    lead the Nation in addressing these vulnerabilities, he has, in
    fact, actively opposed efforts to provide the resources
    necessary to address these significant weaknesses. I find this
    behavior more than puzzling.
        Since 9/11, the President with great fanfare signed
    legislation to authorize improvements in security at our
    airports, security at our ports, and security on our borders.
    The President signed legislation to protect our drinking water.
    The President announced a plan for State and local governments
    to vaccinate 10 million first responders for a potential
    smallpox attack, and yet the President has consistently opposed
    efforts to provide the essential resources to fund these new
    priorities, these new authorities.
        In November of 2002, when President Bush signed the
    Department of Homeland Security bill, he announced, ``Our
    government will take every possible measure to safeguard our
    country and our people.'' Well, how does one explain this
    disparity, these divergences?
        Well, Mr. Secretary, last Thursday, President Bush was in
    Canton, Ohio, looking for support for his $1.6 trillion tax cut
    proposal. In his remarks, he said, according to the newspaper
    that I read, ``Now, you hear talk about deficits.'' This is
    President Bush. Allow me just for a moment to pretend that this
    is President Bush reading it. ``Now, you hear talk about
    deficits, and I am concerned about deficits, but this Nation
    has got a deficit because we have been through a war.''
        Well, I read that statement twice just to make sure that my
    eyes were still fairly good. Mr. Chairman, this statement
    troubles me. In the budget that the President transmitted to
    the Congress on February 4, he did not include one thin dime,
    not one thin penny, for the costs of the war. And yet his
    budget proposed deficits of $304 billion in fiscal year 2003,
    $307 billion in fiscal year 2004, and deficits of $1.4 trillion
    from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2008. His budget
    included no funding for war in Iraq and no money for
    reconstruction of Iraq, and his budget assumed levels of
    economic growth that exceed current expectations.
        So I have to say that based on the record, the deficits did
    not come from the war, but they are going to come plenty. We
    just made our first payment, or down payment.
        When Americans are being threatened here at home, it is
    very important that the President be straight with the American
    people. Mr. Secretary, you have been candid, as candid as you
    could be, with the Congress and the American people about the
    nature and duration of the risk that we face. However, we
    cannot respond to that threat simply by reorganizing. That is a
    hollow promise to hand to the American people. When we are
    talking about the physical safety of our people and the future
    of our economy, we surely have to say more and do more than
    offer up the tired old bureaucratic bromide of reorganization.
        If there is one lesson that we should learn from 9/11, it
    is that terrorist attacks on our Nation can no longer be viewed
    as distant threats across the ocean. The enemy may attack our
    troops or citizens overseas or civilians here at home. We must
    provide all of the necessary resources to support our troops
    overseas, and this committee has done that. This committee has
    been unanimous in pursuing that course.
        But we must also provide significant homeland security
    resources now to meet the real needs that have been authorized
    by the Congress and signed into law by the President for port
    security, airport security, border security, and nuclear
    security, and again, this committee has done that and it has
    acted unanimously in doing so.
        I wouldn't want to be in your shoes if some catastrophe
    happens next week at a port or at a chemical plant or at a
    nuclear facility. I hope that you will be a strong and loud
    proponent of replacing some of this rhetoric with real
    resources before it is too late.
        Mr. Secretary, I am pleased to be here with you today,
    pleased that you will be testifying before this subcommittee,
    and I look forward to working with you in the common cause of
    making America safe and keeping it free. I thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Gregg, if you have an opening
    statement, you may proceed.
        Senator Gregg. I would hope we could hear from the witness
    and I will reserve my opening statements, although I certainly
    appreciate the opening statement of the chairman and the
    ranking member.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Hollings, would you
    like to make an opening statement?
        Senator Hollings. Mr. Chairman, I want to hear from the
    witness, also, but I want the distinguished Secretary to
    understand the frustration behind my questions when I get my
    chance. Osama bin Laden, according to Lloyd's of London, has
    outright ownership of ten vessels and control of ten more. It
    was his ship that went into the port of Mubasa in Kenya. The
    terrorists jumped off, blew up Nairobi, went down and blew up
    Dar Salaam down in Tanzania, and got back on ship and escaped.
        There is no question, since we know every plane that comes
    to the coast and approaches the United States by transponder,
    we track them all, in the dark of night a ship could come into
    the Delaware River. We wouldn't know it. It could go up and
    easily blow up a tank farm there in Philadelphia in your own
    back yard. Now, what are we going to do about it?
        Well, you will find that the ports themselves are not
    particularly interested in doing anything about it because they
    know under law the Coast Guard, the Captain of the Coast Guard,
    he is responsible, and as far as they are concerned, the port
    authority, the local authorities, I can tell you from Customs,
    Immigration, or anybody else, they could care less. All they
    want to do is move cargo. That is the competition. That is the
    name of the game.
        And the result, we passed unanimously--this is bipartisan,
    totally bipartisan--100 to nothing a port security bill and we
    had money. We got over to the House side and the White House
    and the House leadership played a game with us. They first
    delayed hearings and everything else. When they finally got to
    the bottom line, they said, well, wait a minute, this is a tax.
    We are not going to increase taxes. We argued and finally the
    House Parliamentarian ruled it was a fee and not a tax.
        Then they put us off by saying, well, wait a minute, this
    originated in the Senate, and under the Constitution, it
    originated in the House. I said, well, you all rewrite it and
    you offer it and let's send it back and we will adopt it. We
    couldn't get them to budge at all, and with that background, I
    am looking now at port security and I find zero under your
    budget for port security.
        They are supposed to do all the assessments. They are to
    correlate all of these entities, make assessments, what their
    plans are, give the security plan then to the Coast Guard. The
    Coast Guard has then got to sort of approve or alter the plan
    and then they implement it, and that is the background, Mr.
    Chairman, and that is the only reason I take this opportunity.
    Like you, I want to yield. I appreciate the opportunity.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Hollings.
        Senator Specter.
        Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a
    couple of comments because while this hearing is on, the
    Subcommittee on Labor, Health, and Human Services, which I
    chair, is having a hearing at the same time and I am going to
    have to attend there, and the Judiciary Committee is having a
    hearing, trying to move ahead with nominations. But I will do
    my very best to get back to propound some questions and have a
    discussion.
        At the outset, Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your service.
    You have taken on a very, very tough job. You left the
    governorship of Pennsylvania. You and I have worked together
    for the better part of three decades and I thank you for what
    you are doing.
        One subject that I want to comment about very briefly
    involves reports that have just been released. Two reports
    conclude that many Federal agencies are still failing to share
    critical information about terrorist suspects with other
    agencies because of both cultural and technological barriers,
    and the reports go on to say that goals set by the Bush
    administration and Congress last year to promote the sharing of
    terrorist information remain largely unmet and that the Federal
    agencies criticized have agreed with the general findings.
        I bring this subject up at the outset because, as you know,
    Mr. Secretary, this is a matter which you and I have discussed
    at great length, that I have discussed. Last year, I wanted to
    put an amendment on our homeland security bill, except that the
    House had gone out of session and it would have materially
    delayed the matter. You came to see me, and I later talked to
    both Vice President Cheney and President Bush about it.
        I think it may be helpful if there is legislation
    introduced which would give you, as Secretary of Homeland
    Security, that responsibility and have the matter in
    Governmental Affairs, which is the authorizing committee, and
    have a thorough airing of these subjects so we don't have these
    spasmodic reports without giving you or Director Tenet or
    others--it is now in the hands of the Central Intelligence
    Agency--an opportunity to respond.
        My initial judgment had been, and I talked to you about
    this, to make no legislative proposal, to give an opportunity
    to see how it would work out under the CIA, but it doesn't
    appear to be working too well. Perhaps there has not been an
    adequate time. A legislative proposal is not going to be acted
    on immediately, but it would stimulate the kind of debate, I
    think, that would be helpful.
        One other very brief comment. SARS poses an enormous threat
    to homeland security, and not of the terrorist nature, and I
    had talked to Dr. Gerberding--this is a matter which comes
    under the Centers for Disease Control, under the subcommittee
    which I chair on Health and Human Services, and it may be
    necessary to come to you, Mr. Secretary, for help, depending on
    what funding requirements there are and what funds are
    immediately available.
        Some $16 million was appropriated in the supplemental bill
    and this is something which we are reviewing with Dr.
    Gerberding in great detail. We may have a hearing in your old
    bailiwick, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, later this week. But
    depending upon the intensity of the problem and the nature of
    the response from the financing, it may be something that we
    will be coming to you for.
        As I say, I am going to excuse myself for a while but hope
    to come back. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Specter.
        Senator Mikulski, you may be recognized for an opening
    statement if you would like.
        Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, you face, indeed, a daunting job and we look
    forward to working and supporting you. I want to thank you for
    choosing Michael Burn to be the Homeland Security Coordinator
    for the Capital Region, outstanding. We have met with him. He
    is meeting with local officials. You should know he is getting
    kudos in the region, an excellent choice.
        As you know, all response is ultimately local, and I hope
    in your statement you deal with the issues that we continually
    hear about the need for local communities to be able to have
    access to homeland security funds, to be able to do the first
    responder incident reactions response that is so desperately
    needed. Every time we go on orange alert, the local city and
    county budgets go into the red. Often, the money goes to the
    States. It trickles down. It is late coming. It is not done in
    a necessarily organized and coordinated way.
        And I know you have heard from mayors. I know you have
    heard from the National Association of Counties. I know Mayor
    O'Malley has been particularly vocal, and I actually share his
    frustration, and take the community of Baltimore, the port, the
    financial capital of the State, the research center of the
    State, and Anne Arundel County, where it has the State
    functions, the Naval Academy and the airport, the National
    Security Agency, though we get a great job from the FBI, it is
    the locals that are doing it.
        So we look for also what is the most effective way to get
    the money particularly to high-risk areas that either have a
    nuclear power plant, chemical plant, you name it, military
    installations, stadiums. We are it and we are next door, so we
    welcome that.
        Second, when science and technology, good for all the work
    that is being done there, but I am hearing concerns that we are
    not having national standards being established, particularly
    for some of the first responder equipment, and, therefore,
    every company with a gadget, gizmo, google, goggle, is coming
    around and our local people want to make wise use of the funds
    that are coming through, like in the fire grant program.
        Also, I just want to also say we really do need help in the
    immigration backlog. The Vermont office has over a 400,000-
    person backload. It has a tremendous impact.
        And then on the Coast Guard, they need all the help they
    can get with both homeland activity as well as search and
    rescue and making sure those drugs don't come into our border.
    There is more than one kind of predator that threatens the
    American people.
        So those are kind of the basic things that I had on my mind
    and look forward to hearing your testimony, and as always, look
    forward to working with you.
        Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Murray.
        Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just
    welcome the Secretary here and know that your office is in
    charge of a lot of interests in my State.
        I share the concerns of Senator Hollings in terms of our
    ports and the safety and security there. I am deeply concerned
    that the money that we have given you for Operation Safe
    Commerce, both in 2002 and 2003, a total of $58 million, to
    date, not one penny of that has been spent, and we keep getting
    delays on that. We are going to have a disaster at our ports if
    we don't start implementing this, and I will be asking you
    about that.
        I also am very concerned about border crossings. As you
    know, the Northwest corner of my State is where we caught an al
    Qaeda operative several years ago and we know how important
    that is. But the economy is also extremely important and we
    want to make sure that border works efficiently and I am very
    interested in your, I think it is your Visit, is it Visit
    system that you are going to be establishing. I want to hear
    how that is going to work.
        I also am very interested in hearing about how we are going
    to train those first responders and whether we have a national
    strategy. So I will reserve my questions for our comment
    period, but thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for having this
    hearing.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
        Mr. Secretary, I notice in the remarks you made at the
    National Press Club yesterday, and I think there is a reference
    to this in your prepared statement as well, you talked about
    Operation Liberty Shield and the fact that that has been
    suspended or ended. In the supplemental appropriations bill, we
    provided funds for the conduct of that operation. I hope in
    your comments that you make to us now--we will put your total
    statement in the record--that you will touch on the status of
    Operation Liberty Shield and what the cost savings might be for
    the termination of that. In the supplemental, we appropriated
    funds based on estimates that were available back then and it
    would be good for us to know how that may have been changed by
    recent events.
        But, at this point, you may proceed with any comments that
    you would like to make on this or other subjects and then we
    will have an opportunity to ask you questions. You may proceed.

                        STATEMENT OF SECRETARY TOM RIDGE

        Secretary Ridge. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to
    the members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity
    to present the first budget for the Department of Homeland
    Security. So to you, Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, please know that it
    is a distinct pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
    the first annual budget request for the Department of Homeland
    Security.
        For practical purposes, you have already accepted the much
    longer statement and more detailed statement, but I would like
    to discuss this morning a few highlights with you prior to our
    conversation.
        I would add that we are a Department currently engaged in
    many firsts, with each of these new undertakings presenting
    both challenges and opportunities. I would like to thank the
    subcommittee, the committee that created you, and your staff
    for the exemplary approach they have demonstrated in taking on
    the challenge of advancing the cause of homeland security.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

        The President's budget request for fiscal year 2004 lays a
    critical and solid foundation block for the future of the
    Department. It is, as the chairman pointed out, a $36.2 billion
    commitment to advancing the safety and security of our American
    homeland and those who we exist to serve. This request
    represents a 7.4 percent increase in funding for DHS programs
    over fiscal year 2003. It also contains critical initiatives to
    advance the efficiency and the effectiveness of our Department,
    supports ongoing efforts and programs, and sustains vital non-
    security services and missions throughout the Department.
        The President's Budget contains $18.1 billion for the
    Border and Transportation Security Directorate. It reflects
    organizational improvements, funds personnel enhancements,
    training, and improves the technologies needed to support two
    of the Department's strategic goals: to improve border and
    transportation security, and simultaneously facilitate the
    unimpeded flow of legitimate commerce and people across our
    borders, and through our seaports and airports.
        The budget request also calls for $3.5 billion to
    strengthen the readiness capabilities of State and local
    governments that play a critical role in the Nation's ability
    to prepare for and respond to attacks of terrorism, and better
    consolidates grants for State and local response funding and
    training needs within the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
        Senator Mikulski, Senator Murray, actually just about
    everybody on the panel I think, has very appropriately raised
    the concerns that they have heard from their mayors and
    governors about not only the level of funding, but I must tell
    you it will be one of the tasks of the Department working in a
    bipartisan way, working with all of you on this subcommittee,
    to see to it that the dollars get to the areas of critical
    need, and the outcomes and benefits we receive from the
    expenditure of those dollars go to enhancing our security.
        We have a real challenge before us in 2004 because I am
    going to be working with you to take a look at the funding
    formula for 2004 and working with you to see if we can finally
    convince our friends the mayors, and the county commissioners,
    and the States to develop intra-state preparedness plans.
        I know you were very, very sensitive to the needs of local
    communities in the fiscal year 2003 supplemental. $1.3 billion
    of that which the Congress directed to the Department to
    distribute 20 percent to the States, 80 percent to local
    communities. That is probably a pretty decent balance or
    proportion as to where dollars are to go. We will continue to
    discuss the proportional sharing of those dollars but I think
    we would all feel more comfortable if when those dollars are
    expended we could match the purpose of the expenditure against
    the need that was reflected in a statewide plan that said,
    ``this is our homeland security plan.'' We need to work
    together to see that we all accomplish that because we all want
    to accomplish the same outcome: every dollar being spent most
    appropriately on enhancing the security and safety of our
    neighborhoods.
        Funding requested for the Emergency Preparedness and
    Response Directorate totals $5.9 billion. These funds will be
    used to enhance nation-wide readiness to manage and respond to
    disasters whether caused by the forces of nature or the forces
    of evil.
        In addition to fully funding traditional FEMA programs, the
    President's Budget includes needed investment in America's
    pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpiles. It also includes nearly
    $1 million for Project Bioshield, a critically-needed incentive
    for the development and deployment of new and better drugs and
    vaccines to protect Americans from the threat of bioterrorism.
        The request for the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
    Protection Directorate is $829 million. As you know, this is a
    new unit. This is a new directorate within the Department of
    Homeland Security. We pulled in pieces of other agencies,
    Energy, FBI, and Commerce, into this piece. But this is a
    significant security enhancement, I think, for this country
    that the Congress supported.
        The funds will support the Directorate's effort to analyze
    intelligence and other information, evaluate terrorist threats,
    assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructure, issue
    timely warnings to private sector industries, and work with
    Federal, State, local, and private stakeholders to take or
    effect appropriate protective action. The President's request
    provides the resources necessary for us to carry out these most
    important and unique Departmental responsibilities.
        Additionally, we are requesting $809 million for the
    Directorate of Science and Technology. This is a good place and
    an area for us to have that discussion with regard to standards
    and certification because this is precisely the unit within
    this Department that is going to address those challenges.
        In the quest to secure our homeland, we face fanatical and
    sinister enemies. Their willingness to contemplate the most
    evil of means to harm us, and the possibility that others might
    help them to acquire those means demands that we sustain a
    scientific and technological edge to stay ahead of our enemies.
    The funds requested for science and technology will support the
    essential research, development, testing, and evaluation needed
    to do just that through existing programs and institutions as
    well as new entities, like the Homeland Security Advanced
    Research Project Agency.
        The President requests $6.8 billion for the United States
    Coast Guard, a 10 percent increase over fiscal year 2003 for
    this vital component of the new Department of Homeland Security
    charged with pushing our maritime borders farther out to sea.
    This request will support continued and enhanced operations of
    the service across its broad portfolio of indispensable
    missions. It will enable the Coast Guard to grow to meet its
    ever-increasing security responsibilities while at the same
    time sustaining operational excellence in non-security
    functions. Bottom line: The request for vital recapitalization
    of the Coast Guard's offshore, near-shore, and communication
    assets are covered in this appropriation request.
        The proposed budget also contains $1.3 billion for the
    United States Secret Service so they may perform their dual
    missions of protection and criminal investigation. The funds
    will support the protection of the President, the Vice
    President and their families, heads of state, security for
    designated National Special Security Events, and the
    investigation and enforcement of laws relating to
    counterfeiting, fraud, and financial crimes. The fiscal year
    2004 appropriation will also help to defray the expense of
    additional security coverage during the Presidential campaign
    of 2004.
        Roughly $1.8 billion of the President's budget request will
    support the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services,
    including $100 million to reduce the backlog of applications
    and begin ensuring a 6-month process standard for all
    applications and benefits, regardless of their nature.
        In summary, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, this
    budget request for the Department of Homeland Security supports
    the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security. The
    strategy provides the framework to organize and mobilize the
    Nation, Federal, State, and local governments, the private
    sector, and the American people in the very complex mission to
    protect our homeland.
        We have begun the very first steps of our critical work and
    we are only at the beginning of what will be a long struggle to
    protect our Nation from terrorism. Though much has been
    accomplished, there is certainly much, much more work to do.
    This budget will provide the resources to enable the Department
    to manage its responsibilities and lead the effort to make our
    country safer and more secure.
        America's response to terrorism has been strong, measured,
    and it has been resolute. The Department of Homeland Security
    is committed to carrying this response forward by preventing
    terrorist attacks, working with Congress to reduce America's
    vulnerability, and effectively responding to attacks that might
    occur. Certainly, by doing so, we will build a better future
    and a safer future for ourselves and our children and our
    country. I look forward to working with the subcommittee and
    each of you individually in this challenging, critical, and I
    might add, I think, most noble of missions.

                               prepared statement

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this
    concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond
    to any questions you may have at this time. Thank you very
    much.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
    statement.
        [The statement follows:]

                        Prepared Statement of Tom Ridge

    Introduction
        Good morning, Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, distinguished members
    of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today to discuss
    the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS)--the first ever annual budget request for the
    new Department. I want to express my gratitude for the focus and
    support the Congress provided in creating the new Department, I am also
    grateful for this Committee's effort in passing the President's wartime
    supplemental from which the Department is receiving much needed
    resources for Operations Liberty Shield and Iraqi Freedom. I look
    forward to working with you to build a proper fiscal foundation for
    DHS, and positioning the Department to successfully carry out its
    critical mission.
        Two months ago, the major components of our Department came
    together, bringing with them approximately 179,000 employees from
    agencies across the Federal Government. These dedicated professionals
    are now working under one Department with the mission of protecting the
    American people. Together we are leading the largest Federal
    reorganization in more than 50 years, a tremendous task to meet a
    tremendous challenge.
        This Department's strategic objectives are clear: to prevent
    terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce America's
    vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and assist in
    recovery should a terrorist attack occur. To achieve these objectives,
    the Department has already taken steps to unify principal border and
    transportation security agencies, coordinate a cohesive network of
    disaster response capabilities, create a central point for the analysis
    and dissemination of intelligence and information pertaining to
    terrorist threats, and join research efforts to detect and counter
    potential terrorist attacks.
        In this mission, the Department of Homeland Security is not alone.
    As former governors, both the President and I understand that our
    partnership with State and local government is critical to building a
    national capacity to prevent terrorist attacks, to reduce our
    vulnerability and then to respond to an attack.
        Further, we are developing crucial partnerships with the private
    sector. As you all know, 85 percent of our Nation's critical
    infrastructure is owned or operated by private enterprise. This
    includes systems such as telecommunications, banking and finance,
    energy and transportation. The private sector also is a key source of
    new ideas and innovative technologies that will provide tools in the
    fight against terrorism.
        In laying the foundation for this Department, we also have a
    tremendous opportunity for implementing good government initiatives and
    carrying out the vision of the President's Management Agenda. Our
    mission is critical, and we must institute strong management principles
    and set solid performance measures.
        We are at the beginning of the effort to protect our Nation from
    terrorism. While much has been accomplished, there is much more work to
    be done. We must stay focused and engaged in this effort so that we can
    meet the challenges of this time in our Nation's history.
    Summary of Departmental Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2004
        To that end, the President has submitted a budget that clearly
    reflects the Administration's commitment to the priorities and mission
    of the Department of Homeland Security, and lays a critical and solid
    foundation block for the future of the Department. The $36.2 billion
    request marks a commitment to advancing the safety and security of our
    American homeland and those whom we serve. This request represents a
    7.4 percent increase in funding for DHS programs over the original
    fiscal year 2003 request and includes roughly 179,000 full-time
    equivalent (FTE) positions for fiscal year 2004. The discretionary
    authority requested in this budget is $26.7 billion. It contains
    critical initiatives to advance the efficiency and effectiveness of our
    Department, supports ongoing efforts and programs, and sustains vital,
    non-security services and missions throughout the Department. This
    request provides for border and transportation security, protects
    critical infrastructure and key assets, and ensures that we are
    prepared for and capable of responding to terrorist attacks.
        With this budget request, resources for the agencies moving into
    DHS will have grown by more than 60 percent between fiscal year 2002
    and fiscal year 2004. During the same period, nearly 61,000 staff,
    largely in TSA, will have been added to protect the homeland. The
    budget includes major initiatives to improve information analysis and
    infrastructure protection, as well as to advance and harness science
    and technology to make America safer. These are new initiatives unique
    to the Department of Homeland Security that go beyond the capabilities
    and operations of the component agencies.
        This budget will support the critical operations of each of the
    Department's organizations. These organizations are:
      --Border and Transportation Security
      --Emergency Preparedness and Response
      --Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
      --Science and Technology
      --United States Coast Guard
      --United States Secret Service
      --Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, and
      --Department-Wide Support
    Border and Transportation Security Budget Request
        The Border and Transportation Security directorate secures the
    border and transportation system of the United States at ports of entry
    and 7,500 miles of land border, across 95,000 miles of shoreline and
    navigable rivers, at the Nation's airports, and throughout the highway
    and rail system of the country. It is charged with preventing the
    illegal entry of people or goods, while at the same time facilitating
    the unimpeded flow of lawful commerce and people across our borders.
    Last year more than 400 million persons, 115 million motor vehicles,
    2.4 million railcars, and 7 million cargo containers were processed at
    the border. For fiscal year 2004, each of these categories is projected
    to have significant volume increases.
        To carry out this important mission, the President has requested a
    total of $18.1 billion. The funds will be used to create smart borders
    that are more secure; further consolidate border organizations to
    provide greater accountability for a seamless border service; increase
    the security of international shipping containers; continue
    implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001;
    and ensure that our Nation's first responders are trained and equipped
    to address the threat of terrorism. The following sections detail the
    budget requests for the Border and Transportation Security directorate
    components.
        The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) brings together
    approximately 42,000 employees including 19,000 inspectors from the
    Agriculture Plant Health and Inspection Service, Immigration and
    Naturalization Service, and the Customs Service, including canine
    enforcement officers, and 11,000 Border Patrol Officers. The Bureau
    focuses its operations on the movement of goods and people across our
    borders to prevent the illegal entry into the United States of people
    or goods at or between ports-of-entry while facilitating the movement
    of legitimate trade and international travel.
        The budget includes $6.7 billion for BCBP, an increase of $1.7
    billion (33 percent) above fiscal year 2002. This funding level will
    support expansion of programs such as the Container Security
    Initiative, which puts BCBP inspectors in key international ports to
    work with host governments in targeting and examining high-risk
    containers before they are placed on ships bound for the United States,
    and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program,
    which increases supply chain security and expedites the secure, lawful
    commerce of C-TPAT partners across our borders. This budget also
    supports continued implementation of the comprehensive Entry/Exit
    system to track visitors to the United States and funds the Automated
    Commercial Environment system (ACE) and the International Trade Data
    System (ITDS). Nearly $1.1 billion has been dedicated to these latter
    two capital projects since 2001.
        With these funds, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection will
    ensure compliance with customs, immigration and agricultural laws;
    determine the admissibility of persons coming to the United States;
    secure our borders from biological threats to our Nation's plant and
    animal resources; inspect over 139 million projected vehicles and more
    than 600 thousand projected aircraft; and prevent the admission of
    terrorists and other criminals. The Bureau will also focus on deterring
    illegal crossings, seizing illegal drugs, currency, and monetary
    instruments, processing $1.2 trillion in imports, and collecting $20
    billion in duties on the same.
        The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) brings
    together the enforcement and investigation arms of the Customs Service,
    Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Protective
    Service. The reorganization involves approximately 12,000 employees,
    including 5,500 criminal investigators, 4,000 employees for immigration
    investigations and deportation services, and nearly 1,500 Federal
    Protective Service personnel who focus on the mission of enforcing the
    full range of immigration and customs laws within the interior of the
    United States, in addition to protecting specified Federal buildings.
        To carry out its responsibilities, the fiscal year 2004 request for
    the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement includes $2.8
    billion, an increase of nearly $400 million (16 percent) above fiscal
    year 2002. About $1.1 billion will support investigative activities--
    including immigration, fraud, forced labor, trade agreement
    investigations, smuggling and illegal transshipment, and vehicle and
    cargo theft.
        The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues its
    mission of helping to protect and secure our Nation's transportation
    systems while ensuring the unencumbered movement of commerce and
    people, including the more than 600 million commercial passengers who
    fly into, out of, and within the United States each year. The
    Department requests $4.8 billion for TSA, approximately $2.4 billion of
    which will be financed by offsetting collections from aviation
    passenger security fees and airline security fees.
        Roughly $4.3 billion will fund direct aviation security activities,
    including a professional passenger and baggage screening workforce and
    supporting equipment to prevent weapons and other contraband onto
    aircraft. It also supports State and local law enforcement personnel to
    secure screening checkpoints; air marshals to provide in-flight
    security; and improvements in screening technologies. The request
    includes funding for new air cargo and armed pilot initiatives, as well
    as technologies to identify passengers who may pose a security risk.
    TSA will continue to work with the Department of Transportation and
    other Federal agencies to develop and implement security standards for
    non-aviation modes of transportation and work on the Transportation
    Worker Identification Credentialing initiative. Finally, TSA, through
    the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, will issue
    Letters of Intent to airports to provide assistance for the
    installation of explosive detection equipment.
        The Office for Domestic Preparedness will strengthen the readiness
    capabilities of State and local governments that play a critical role
    in the Nation's ability to prepare for and respond to acts of
    terrorism. The Department will manage the First Responder initiative
    through the Office for Domestic Preparedness, providing training to
    firefighters, emergency medical services, emergency management
    agencies, and law enforcement personnel. $3.5 billion is requested in
    the fiscal year 2004 President's budget for this initiative, plus
    funding for program administration and oversight for the Office for
    Domestic Preparedness.
        The budget also provides grants for preparedness equipment,
    technical assistance, and Federal, State, and local joint exercises.
    These grants will be awarded to the states to address the needs
    identified in their response plans. State plans must contain funding
    for firefighter preparedness, State and local law enforcement anti-
    terrorism initiatives, and Citizen Corps activities.
        The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) will continue
    its tradition as the Government's leading provider of high-quality law
    enforcement training to Federal, State and local law enforcement
    officers. $146 million is requested in the fiscal year 2004 President's
    budget for FLETC.
        With the assistance of the Congress, the Department of Homeland
    Security will produce a more robust enforcement and protection
    capability to secure our Nation. We need to integrate our capabilities
    and increase our protection. We cannot completely eliminate the
    possibility of terrorist attack, but we can reduce our vulnerabilities
    by enhancing our support for State and local emergency preparedness and
    response.
    Emergency Preparedness and Response Budget Request
        An effective response to a major terrorist incident--as well as a
    natural disaster--rests on being well prepared. Through the Emergency
    Preparedness and Response directorate, the Department will lead
    America' to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and
    recover from major domestic disasters, both natural and manmade,
    including incidents of terrorism. The directorate will contribute to a
    fully coordinated approach to disaster management within the United
    States, using Federal resources previously operating under multiple
    plans. Funding requested for Emergency Preparedness and Response totals
    $5.96 billion.
        The request for Emergency Preparedness and Response consolidates
    funding for programs formerly funded through the Federal Emergency
    Management Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, such
    as the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the National Disaster Medical
    System, and the Strategic National Stockpile.
        The President's request includes roughly $1.3 billion for America's
    pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpiles, including adding new drugs to
    the stockpile as they are developed. The Strategic National Stockpile
    contains drugs, vaccines, other medical supplies and equipment that can
    be delivered to any place in the country within 12 hours of a request
    for assistance. It now holds enough smallpox vaccine for every
    American, sufficient treatments for 20 million persons exposed to
    Anthrax, and treatments for injuries following a chemical attack or
    explosion. The Department of Homeland Security, in close coordination
    with the Department of Health and Human Services, will assure optimal
    medical preparedness and response capacity to meet threats to our
    Nation.
        As a critical aspect of this program, the Administration proposes
    new permanent, indefinite authority through project BioShield to
    overcome hurdles that impede our ability to stockpile adequate amounts
    of needed drugs and vaccines to protect Americans from bioterrorism.
    This authority will allow the government to purchase critically needed
    vaccines or medications for biodefense as soon as experts agree it is
    safe and effective enough to place in the Department's Strategic
    National Stockpile.
        With this budget request, the Department will also carry out the
    traditional functions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
    improving the Nation's disaster response capabilities and those of
    State and local governments. $1.9 billion is requested to provide
    disaster relief under the primary assistance programs that provide a
    significant portion of the total Federal response to victims in
    Presidentially-declared major disasters and emergencies. Further, the
    budget includes funds to modernize the Nation's flood insurance rate
    maps which will improve flood mitigation efforts, as well as funds for
    the pre-disaster hazard mitigation program that will ensure that the
    most worthwhile and cost-effective mitigation programs are funded.
        Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Budget Request
        The President's budget request calls for $829 million to fund the
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate, a new
    unit that will combine the capability to identify and assess the
    threats to our homeland, provide the basis from which to organize
    protective measures to secure the homeland, and stop terrorist attacks
    before they happen. IAIP is responsible for identifying and protecting
    America's critical infrastructure and key assets of national-level
    importance: food, water, agriculture, public health, emergency
    services, information and telecommunications, banking and finance,
    energy, transportation, chemical, defense industry, postal and
    shipping, and national monuments and icons.
        Working together with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other intelligence gathering
    agencies, the Department of Homeland Security will participate in
    setting intelligence requirements, including the prioritization of
    terrorism threats, weapons of mass destruction, and other relevant
    intelligence activities. The directorate will analyze and assess law
    enforcement information and intelligence, translating these assessments
    into improved security by taking actions to reduce America's
    vulnerability to terrorist attack. $32 million is requested for these
    activities.
        $384 million is requested for IAIP to work with Federal departments
    and agencies, State and local governments and private industry to
    identify critical infrastructures, conduct assessments of the highest
    priority infrastructures, and implement measures to protect them from
    actual threats. In addition, the Department will develop technical
    standards, guidelines, and best practices for states and industry as
    part of of its protective program.
        The Department is also in charge of issuing warnings, threat
    advisories, and recommended response measures to America's public
    safety agencies, elected officials, industry, and the public. In close
    coordination with the FBI, the Department will disseminate timely,
    actionable information to the public, private sector, and State and
    local officials related to specific threats and vulnerabilities, as
    well as what steps to take in response to a threat. The Department
    requests $70 million to provide 24 hours a day, seven days a week
    intelligence and warning capabilities, review and disseminate
    information to relevant public and private sector entities, and provide
    a mechanism to issue national advisories through the Homeland Security
    Advisory System.
        The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate
    will also work with stakeholders to develop and implement an integrated
    national plan for the physical and cyber protection of critical
    infrastructures and key assets.
    Science and Technology Budget Request
        The Science and Technology directorate will maintain and enhance
    the Nation's superiority in science and technology, a key to securing
    the homeland. New technologies for countering chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, and other emerging threats, mitigating their
    effects should they occur, and for information and analysis sharing
    will increase the security of our homeland and minimize the damage from
    future terrorist attacks.
        In fiscal year 2004, the budget request for the Department of
    Homeland Security includes $803 million for the Science and Technology
    directorate. These funds will support existing programs and
    institutions as well as new entities like the Homeland Security
    Advanced Research Projects Agency.
        The Homeland Security Act created the Homeland Security Advanced
    Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) to develop a crucial capability for
    the Nation. HSARPA will research, develop, test, and evaluate
    countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
    weapons and other terrorist threats. Initial funding will be used to
    address immediate gaps in high-priority operational requirements for
    chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear countermeasures,
    protecting our critical infrastructure, and conventional mission
    operations. We will engage the private sector and others in the
    development of innovative, high-payoff capabilities, as well as focus
    our efforts to evaluate and prototype commercially available
    technologies. The Department will invest in developing revolutionary
    new technologies to enhance our future capabilities and will evaluate
    and prototype technologies to enhance our near-term security.
        The Science and Technology directorate will provide new enabling
    capabilities to the other components of the Department, and enhance
    their ability to execute their various missions. Science and Technology
    will recruit and retain a workforce that is best in class, develop
    future generations of scientists, engineers, and technologists in
    fields required to ensure the vitality of the homeland security
    enterprise, and establish, maintain, and utilize state-of-the-art
    research and development facilities and infrastructure.
        The budget request will facilitate applied research, technology
    demonstrations, development, and testing of prototypes and full-scale
    pre-production hardware; enable procurement of products and systems
    necessary for the protection of our homeland from the effects of
    weapons of mass destruction and other terrorist weapons. The budget
    supports the development of a national policy and prioritized strategic
    plan for homeland security research, as well as development of
    standards for homeland security equipment for use by first responders.
    United States Coast Guard Budget Request
        The President requests $6.8 billion for the United States Coast
    Guard, a 10 percent increase over the fiscal year 2003 request for this
    vital component of the new Department of Homeland Security. This
    request will support continued and enhanced operations of the Service
    across its broad portfolio of indispensable missions. It enables the
    Coast Guard to grow to meet its ever-increasing security
    responsibilities, while at the same time sustaining operational
    excellence in non-security functions. The request provides for vital
    recapitalization of the Coast Guard's offshore, near shore, and
    communications assets.
        Recapitalization of Legacy Assets and Infrastructure.--The budget
    request will support funding for two major recapitalization
    initiatives--the Integrated Deepwater System and Rescue 21. The request
    for the Integrated Deepwater System is $500 million in fiscal year
    2004. These resources will fund conversion of five 110-foot patrol
    boats to more capable 123-foot patrol craft, seven short-range
    Prosecutor small boats, progress on the first National Security Cutter,
    slated for delivery in fiscal year 2006, and continued development of a
    Common Operating Picture, command and control system for prototype
    installation, at four shore-based command centers. Implementation of
    Rescue 21, the Coast Guard's primary communications system in the
    coastal zone area, will reach 35 percent completion in fiscal year 2004
    and is on track for full completion by the end of fiscal year 2006. In
    addition, the budget provides continued support for the Great Lakes
    Icebreaker Replacement.
        Increase Homeland Security Capabilities.--The Coast Guard's request
    increases funds for Maritime Domain Awareness, providing for leased
    satellite channels for cutters and network connectivity for smaller
    assets, Automatic Identification Systems, the Rescue 21 network, and a
    prototype Joint Harbor Operations Center to provide surveillance in
    Hampton Roads, Virginia. The request will also support new port
    security assets: 58 Sea Marshals, 6 deployable Maritime Safety and
    Security Teams equipped with six new small response boats, 43 small and
    eight medium response boats to increase presence in ports and
    waterways, two port security units, nine 87-foot Coastal Patrol Boats,
    and stand up of Stations Boston and Washington, D.C.
        Sustain Non-Homeland Security Missions.--For Search and Rescue
    (SAR) and safety efforts, the budget will provide 449 new personnel
    towards achievement of a 68-hour workweek at small-boat stations, a 12-
    hour watch standard at command centers, and will also provide training
    enhancements at the National Motor Lifeboat School, the Boatswain's
    Mate ``A'' school, and the National Search and Rescue School to
    increase the training throughput at both locations.
        With these funds, the Coast Guard will be able to enhance its
    presence at ports and waterways to mitigate the risk to mariners and to
    mitigate the Nation's security risk to terrorist and other illegal
    threats. The Coast Guard continues to work to reduce serious vessel
    collisions or groundings, reduce oil and garbage discharge into the
    water, and provide core competencies to the Department of Defense
    including maritime interdiction, port safety and security, aids to
    navigation, and military environmental response operations.
    United States Secret Service Budget Request
        The United States Secret Service protects the President and Vice
    President, their families, heads of state, and other designated
    individuals; investigates threats against these protectees; protects
    the White House, the Vice President's residence, foreign missions and
    other buildings within Washington, D.C.; and designs, plans, and
    implements security for designated National Security Special Events.
    The Secret Service also investigates violations of laws relating to:
    counterfeiting of obligations and securities of the United States;
    financial crimes that include, but are not limited to, access device
    fraud, financial institutions fraud, identity theft, computer fraud;
    and computer-based attacks on our Nation's financial, banking, and
    telecommunications infrastructure.
        The President's budget request for the United States Secret Service
    of $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2004 maintains current program
    operating levels and fully annualizes the cost of staffing authorized
    in fiscal year 2002. It provides approximately $40 million for security
    for the 2004 Presidential candidates and nominees and the Democratic
    and Republican National Conventions. In addition, the Service has
    requested funds to design and build the prototypical mail facility that
    can effectively screen for selected chemical, biological, radiological,
    nuclear, and explosives contaminants. This facility is necessary to
    ensure that mail destined for the White House Complex is thoroughly
    examined and determined to be safe.
    Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Request
        The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services seeks to greatly
    improve the administration of immigration benefits to the more than
    seven million annual applicants, by building and maintaining a services
    system that provides immigration information and benefits in a timely,
    accurate, consistent, courteous, and professional manner.
        To accomplish this goal, the fiscal year 2004 budget requests $1.8
    billion. Of that request, $100 million will fund the President's
    initiative to reduce the applications backlog and ensure a 6-month
    processing standard for all applications. To support this commitment,
    the Bureau will focus on three critical elements: achieving a high-
    level of performance by establishing clear, concrete performance
    milestones and actively monitoring progress towards these milestones;
    transforming business practices by implementing significant information
    technology improvements and identifying improvements to change the
    current way of doing business; and ensuring integrity by establishing
    comprehensive quality assurance measures.
        The Department will also ensure that our Nation's policies for
    issuing visas to visitors are consistent with security and foreign
    policy interests. The Department will have legal authority over the
    issuance and denial of visas, although the Secretary of State will
    manage the activities of consular officers and will retain the power to
    deny visas based on foreign policy interests.
    Department-Wide Support Budget Request
        The budget request includes $294 million for the operation of
    departmental headquarters. DHS headquarters focuses on national policy
    through centralized planning and is responsible for functions such as
    planning, policy, budgeting, strategy, interagency coordination,
    integrated research and development, public affairs, legislative
    affairs, information technology, departmental security, and legal
    affairs.
        In the area of information technology, the Department's request
    includes $206 million for capital investments to establish the
    priorities of information technology integration, modernize high
    priority business processes, and increase efficiency through
    technological improvements. It also includes a department-wide
    enterprise architecture that will guide our investment in, and use of
    information technology, and the conversion of wireless radio
    communications to narrowband operations as required by law.
        The Department will consolidate duplicative telecommunications
    systems and networks as well as business management systems. All new
    information technology investments are reviewed centrally in order to
    prevent redundant investments and misspent taxpayer dollars. DHS will
    seek to develop a modern information technology environment that
    supports homeland security missions, enhances productivity, facilitates
    information sharing while ensuring security and privacy, and generates
    savings.
        The request includes $40 Million for the Counterterrorism Fund. The
    Counterterrorism Fund covers unbudgeted critical costs associated with
    providing support to counter, investigate, or prosecute domestic or
    international terrorism, including payment of rewards in connection
    with these activities; and reestablishing the operational capacity of
    an office, facility or other property damaged or destroyed as a result
    of any domestic or international terrorist incident. The
    Counterterrorism Fund may also reimburse other Federal agencies for
    extraordinary costs related to their participation in particular
    terrorism prevention or response activities.
        In implementing the President's Management Agenda, we have an
    enormous task: reorganizing and integrating 22 agencies with their own
    work cultures, operating and management procedures, and operating
    missions into one Department. This challenge presents an opportunity
    for the Department to become the model of management excellence, to
    manage resources effectively and to deliver measurable results.
        New management flexibilities that were requested by the President
    in the areas of human resources, procurement, and budget and
    performance integration will be key to success in the Department. The
    use of these new flexibilities will be tracked as measurable goals. The
    Department will blend the personnel systems of the incoming agencies
    into a unified system that is consistent, coherent, and that rewards
    good performance. The Department must also work to unify the 19
    existing financial systems and ensure that a chosen system directly
    links performance with spending.
    Conclusion
        In summation, the President's budget request for the Department of
    Homeland Security supports his National Strategy for Homeland Security.
    This strategy provides the framework to mobilize and organize the
    Nation--Federal, State and local governments, the private sector, and
    the American people--in the complex mission to protect our homeland. We
    have begun the very first steps of our critical work, but we are only
    at the beginning of what will be a long struggle to protect our Nation
    from terrorism. While much has been accomplished, there is much more
    work to do. This budget will provide the Department the resources to
    manage its responsibilities and continue its work of securing the
    homeland for the American people.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
    prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
    have at this time.

        Senator Cochran. I hope that Senators will cooperate with
    the effort to limit our first round of questions to five
    minutes each and then we will have an opportunity to continue
    to discuss these issues of the budget request for the
    Department as long as needed to have a full understanding of
    the budget request.

                            OPERATION LIBERTY SHIELD

        Mr. Secretary, I mentioned the funding that we provided in
    the supplemental for Operation Liberty Shield which, as I
    understand it, was an effort nationwide, including local and
    State government officials and agencies, to protect against
    retaliation that might be visited upon our States and local
    governments and citizens of the United States in response to
    our efforts in Iraq.
        To what extent do you think this operation has been
    successful? I don't recall any specific retaliatory actions
    being taken. There may have been, and you may have frustrated
    some. Can you bring us up to date on your assessment of the
    success or failure of Operation Liberty Shield?
        Secretary Ridge. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I need to
    thank the Congress for the historic support for a first of its
    kind initiative in Liberty Shield, where for the first time,
    the Federal Government, working in partnership with the State
    and local governments and the private sector, provided an
    unprecedented level of security in anticipation of potential
    hostile terrorist action because of our military involvement in
    Iraq. It is the first time that the Federal Government planned
    for and worked with and through States and local governments
    and the private sector to literally add an overt security
    presence at critical places around the country.
        Pursuant to that effort, we asked you, the members of the
    Committee and Congress, to give us substantial resources to
    support Liberty Shield. If I recall correctly, you gave the
    Coast Guard about $580 million, $400 million of which was for
    the work that they were doing in the Gulf, $180 million to
    support their extraordinary efforts on port security. You gave
    itemized specific dollar amounts to Customs and Border
    Protection, to Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
        So what we will need to provide you at some later date,
    once we calculate the cost, is that you did specifically
    designate certain monies for certain activities based on
    anticipated cost. It is our responsibility to get back to you
    to tell you--to match what you appropriated to what we expended
    and tell you what we are going to do with the rest.
        The bottom line is that you gave enough money to do the
    job, to do the job very, very well. We ramped it up on March 17
    and took it down on April 17. Within minutes after I contacted
    the governors and the homeland security advisors, they moved
    into action. The plan involved using State resources to protect
    critical pieces of infrastructure. Some of the governors
    provided National Guard. Some of the governors provided State
    police. Others used other law enforcement members. You provided
    resources to reimburse them for those costs because they
    deployed them pursuant to a Federal request. So we have got to
    do a run-down and comparison and report back to you dollars
    expended, dollars remaining, and obviously as members of the
    Appropriations Committee, you are going to want to know what we
    spent. If there is a balance, you want to know where we spent
    it.
        Senator Cochran. Well, that is true, and we appreciate your
    understanding of that request and the importance of that
    information to the committee.

                         CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE GRANTS

        Another question within this area of concern and interest
    is how you would assess the sufficiency of the funding to
    reimburse State and local governments for the expenses incurred
    by them in complying with the Department's requests and
    directions. Do you think that the $200 million, for example, in
    the appropriations bill we provided for critical infrastructure
    grants will be sufficient to cover increased costs to State and
    local governments for the critical assets that they devoted
    resources to protect in communities and States across the
    Nation?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, it is a little too early to
    assess it, I think. We are pretty close to the dollars they
    needed, but frankly, because it is the first of its kind
    exercise--as we were trying to ramp up to give you, very
    appropriately, the kind of specific information you wanted as
    to why we needed X-number of dollars for Liberty Shield, we ran
    various scenarios. We took a look at different kinds of
    critical infrastructure and said, ``let us just apply a generic
    number to each piece of critical infrastructure, multiply it by
    the number of pieces of infrastructure, and give you a
    number.'' We said, ``well, that doesn't really work because
    what you may want to do at a bridge or a tunnel may be
    different than what you want to do at a nuclear power
    facility.''
        So we think from preliminary reports that we had sufficient
    dollars, but one of the lessons we will learn from this very
    successful exercise is basically the cost associated with
    providing certain kinds of protection to certain pieces of
    critical infrastructure that we can use in future years to
    compute very appropriately the levels of reimbursement that the
    States and locals should receive.
        I believe Congress was very generous. We got substantial
    dollars from you, literally billions of dollars. Some of it,
    you very specifically earmarked, and some you provided more
    flexibility to the Department of Homeland Security to
    distribute. But I will assure the members of the subcommittee,
    you will get as much specific information about each venue,
    each location, so we can in future years give you even more
    precise numbers if we return with a similar request.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
        Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your good
    statement. I don't envy your task. You are the man who we have
    the fingers pointing at and, in some cases, you are the man
    that will be made the goat if the goat can be made, and I
    sympathize with you. I don't know how you can possibly do this
    job if you are human, and I take it that you are, with all of
    these agencies and the enormous responsibilities that are upon
    you and these agencies. I want to help you whenever I can.
        Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.

                           FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

        Senator Byrd. The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in
    1966 to provide that any person has the right to request access
    to Federal agency records or information. All agencies of the
    U.S. Government are required to disclose records upon receiving
    a written request for them except for those records that are
    protected by exemptions or exclusions.
        When Congress last fall adopted legislation to create the
    new Department, it also adopted a broader exemption to FOIA,
    allowing private companies to hide health and safety
    information from the public as long as the companies
    voluntarily submit this information to the DHS. The exemption
    applies to information about facilities that could be targets
    of a terrorist attack.
        Increased security concerns call for prudent changes, but
    not for blanket exemptions in the information available to the
    public. If the government is allowed to operate in secrecy,
    without scrutiny, then the people's liberties can be easily
    lost. We ought to strengthen the Freedom of Information Act,
    not undercut it. The American people ought to have access to
    information that directly impacts upon their freedoms, as well
    as their safety, and I firmly believe that the Freedom of
    Information Act exemption that Congress exempted in the
    Homeland Security Act was too broad. It allows the new
    Department to cloak too many of its activities in secret.
        This month, the Department proposed new rules that would
    broaden this exemption even further, making an already bad law
    even worse. Under the new rules, there will be an enormous
    incentive for corporations and lobbyists and government
    contractors to carry a rubber stamp and mark the words
    ``critical infrastructure information'' on everything that they
    touch. There will be that incentive, so it can all be locked
    away in the darkest recesses of the Homeland Security
    Department.
        Not only can the private sector use this powerful new
    classification to shield itself from legal liabilities, but I
    am afraid that the government will also use it to shield the
    administration from public scrutiny of its activities. Now,
    there will be administrations after this administration and the
    same will apply to them. There will be that inclination, that
    tendency, that proclivity to hide things under this label.
        Where does it end? If there is information regarding
    threats to the safety of the people, to the security and so on,
    they ought to be told. They have the right to know.
        Mr. Secretary, experts in this area have concluded that
    these rules will allow lobbyists and government contractors to
    hide their relationships with the Homeland Security Department,
    including phone conversations and personal meetings with agency
    officials. How do we know that the Department is not just
    turning over the safety of the American people to the
    administration's friends in the private sector, like many
    believe has been done for the construction of Iraq?
        So I guess my question to you, Mr. Secretary, is what sort
    of ethical and sunshine standards are you, as the Secretary,
    going to insist upon?
        Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator. First of all, I think
    you and I agree that the role of the Freedom of Information Act
    historically is consistent with the public operation of the
    public's business. There is a transparency built into what we
    do in this country by the very nature of our political
    community, but the Freedom of Information Act has certainly
    worked in years gone by to assure access to the kinds of
    documents and information to which you have referred in your
    statement.
        I would assure the Senator that the regulations to which
    you refer do not in any way relieve any company from its
    responsibility to provide information that may otherwise be
    dictated by any other law or any other regulation in the
    Federal Register or on the books anywhere. They cannot avoid
    disclosure that may be required under a different statute by
    lumping whatever that information might be and turning it over
    to the Department of Homeland Security. It is our
    responsibility, if they try to do that and we see that the
    information that they have passed to us is in violation of the
    law, to see to it that they are prosecuted, and I would assure
    the Senator that is precisely what we will do.

                           FOIA RULES AND EXEMPTIONS

        The purpose of this exemption in the Freedom of Information
    Act was really to get the voluntary submission of information
    from companies that is otherwise not required as it relates to
    potential vulnerability of their facilities, whatever they
    might be, so that we could take a look at it, take a look at
    the threat, take a look at hopefully the modeling and the work
    we have done in our new Department and get back to them and
    say, that is a vulnerability that is of high interest and high
    risk and you need to take the following protective actions in
    order to deal with it.
        So I would say to the Senator, I would assure him that the
    purpose of this Freedom of Information Act exemption is not to
    provide a friendly forum for anyone out there to violate the
    laws and the requirements imposed on them by other statutes or
    other regulations.
        Senator Byrd. Your new rules expanded this exemption to
    include information that is voluntarily submitted to any agency
    in the Federal Government. Now, how can this departure from the
    language chosen by Congress be justified?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, they still will be required to
    file whatever reports or whatever papers necessary and
    consistent with laws as it relates to those agencies. The
    exemption is based solely on the need to get voluntary
    information, make it available to us so we could take a look at
    potential vulnerabilities in their infrastructure.
        But they are still required to file whatever other reports,
    whether it is the EPA, the Department of Energy, whatever it
    is. This does not immunize them from potential prosecution if
    they try to avoid that kind of disclosure by sending
    information to us that we may conclude, as we look at it, you
    are in violation of the preexisting statute. If you are
    violating the law, you are violating the law and whatever
    agency gets that information is required to turn it over to the
    appropriate authorities and see to it that you are prosecuted.
        Senator Byrd. As I indicated a private company can stamp
    anything as critical infrastructure information. That
    information would be automatically exempt from public
    disclosure unless the Department reviews the information and
    decides it should not be protected. Your rules designated one
    man, a single program manager, I take it, who will be
    responsible for reviewing this massive amount of information,
    voluntarily submitted information that will pour into the
    Homeland Security Department. How can we expect--how can this
    subcommittee be assured that one individual, I take it one
    individual, to have the resources and the time to determine
    whether companies are abusing these rules?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, that description obviously
    conjures up a no-win situation for the project manager because
    that individual, he or she couldn't possibly be able to deal
    with all that. I assure you, in the directorate dealing with
    information analysis and infrastructure protection, there will
    be a team available to make that assessment. There will be
    lawyers that will review it.
        And again, I underscore the notion, Senator, that this is
    not information that these companies have any responsibility
    under any law or any regulation, any statute, they don't have
    to share this information with us at all. There is nothing out
    there that compels them to do that. And what we are saying to
    them, as many companies have already begun the very important
    work of taking a look at their own security challenges, that
    when they are taking a look at their own infrastructure, in
    addition to information that they are compelled to submit, they
    voluntarily submit some of the information, perhaps even some
    of their own critical self-assessments to us that otherwise
    they wouldn't have to disclose under any statute.
        And based on that information, we then develop, hopefully,
    a plan of action so that they can reduce their vulnerability to
    a terrorist attack. But they would not be providing that
    information, Senator, under any other statute or any other
    regulation and it is voluntarily provided.
        Senator Byrd. My time is up and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am sure you have given me a very liberal five minutes. Thank
    you.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
        Senator Gregg.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
    the fact that you have taken on a huge and complex
    responsibility here, Governor. I suspect that you evaluate one
    of your priorities as being controlling our borders and making
    sure that the people who enter this country enter it for the
    purposes which are constructive, not purposes which are
    destructive.

                               ENTRY-EXIT SYSTEM

        As a core element of that is the issue of how the INS is
    functioning as it has been transferred over to your agency.
    Senator Hollings and I, who had responsibility for INS for a
    while before it moved over to this subcommittee, had extremely
    severe reservations about the exit-entry computer system which
    the INS was going to try to buy and put in place for the
    purposes of border crossing and identifying who was coming
    across the border. In fact, we felt it was intuitively obvious
    that this was an absurd system that could not function because
    INS didn't have the underlying capability to integrate it into
    the overall issue of the databases. And, furthermore, the idea
    that you would have 100 percent biologics identification of
    people coming across the border just was absurd on its face.
        And yet, INS charged forward. They wanted to spend billions
    on this, and the administration forced us to put $300 million
    into the bill that we just passed, the omnibus.
        I noticed in your statements, I think it was yesterday,
    that you are reorganizing this whole effort.
        Secretary Ridge. Yes.
        Senator Gregg. I would be interested if you came to the
    same conclusion that our committee came to about 2 years ago
    that this exit-entry system as originally proposed by INS could
    not possibly function effectively and that it has to be
    replaced by something that actually is realistic.
        Secretary Ridge. One of the first program reviews that I
    undertook as the Secretary was the entry-exit system, and it is
    still an ongoing review. There had been some work done for the
    previous year and a half, and candidly, it wasn't done quite
    with the clarity or the comprehensiveness or we just weren't
    satisfied with the work product to date, so Secretary
    Hutchinson and I went back and have refocused the effort to
    comply with the law and the mandate of Congress to come up with
    a system that registers people when they enter and exit.
        There are several challenges associated with it. The
    challenges have more to do with maintaining that kind of system
    at our land borders than it does with maintaining that kind of
    system at airports and seaports. If you have visited,
    particularly the Mexican border, at any one of those places--I
    was out there on Friday, out in Southern California, and there
    are 24 lines, 24 avenues of ingress from San Ysidro into
    Southern California. That is the entry system.
        And I took a look at that and said, well, this is the entry
    system. Let us assume we can get it done here. Where are the 24
    lines or at least the 12 lines of travel so you can monitor the
    exit? And I took a look at the 24 lines coming in and I said,
    this is a real challenge because there doesn't appear to be any
    room to build any more lines, any more roads so we can build
    that kind of an infrastructure. So I think there are some very
    unique challenges with regard to the system as it relates to
    entry-exit at our borders.
        Clearly, there are ways we can facilitate. We are starting
    some experimental programs with pedestrian traffic, with
    commercial trucking traffic, and with passenger vehicles based
    on the principle of risk management, in that we know who you
    are, we know you work on this side of the border, you live on
    this side of the border. Both governments basically confirm
    that you are a good worker and you are an honest, law-abiding
    citizen. We can put you in one lane and let you go back and
    forth.
        But I would say to the Senator that the real challenge will
    be maintaining that kind of system where you have literally
    hundreds of thousands of people going across the border daily,
    and the notion that we are going to stop everyone and pull
    everybody out of the buses and everybody out of the cars to
    make sure that they have a biometric identification card and we
    verify they are who they are, it does pose some significant
    challenges. Once, we complete our survey, it is a matter that I
    will be prepared to discuss with you and the Senator both
    publicly and privately, because there are some real challenges
    associated with it.

                             FUNDING FOR ENTRY-EXIT

        Senator Gregg. Well, you have got $360 million that was
    forced upon, in my opinion, forced into the account. I would
    just hope that it is not going to be spent on the program that
    was proposed.
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, we are going to move
    incrementally on this program. I think the Congress has given
    us a mandate to come up with that system, with a biometric
    identifier at our airports and seaports by the end of the year.
    I think that is doable, although there are enormous challenges
    associated with it, because it is clear in the legislative
    intent and we want to have a biometric standard or standards so
    that we can verify the individual who is coming across our
    borders, the one to whom they issued the visa. So we need
    fingerprints, probably need photos. Some of the countries are
    using iris scans.
        That is the kind of information we would secure in a
    consular's office or in an embassy elsewhere. So we have to
    make sure they have the technology to put it on the identifier,
    put it on the card. We have to have the database secured and
    the technology at the port of entry to confirm who they are. So
    there are enormous technological problems. I think there are
    systems that are out there that we can apply.
        We are going to push real hard to meet the deadline that
    Congress gave us for the airports and seaports, but I do think
    that we need to review between now and the end of next year
    that very specific requirement as it relates to border traffic
    across the land borders.
        Senator Gregg. Are you reviewing the underlying data
    capabilities of the INS that this whole system would depend on?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I am not going to draw any
    conclusions there until we are finished with our own internal
    review of that capability and----
        Senator Gregg. Are you reviewing it, though?
        Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Gregg. Totally independent of what you are being
    told by the agency which you absorbed?
        Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you.
        Secretary Ridge. Also, to your point, a RFP has not gone
    out yet. One of the advantages of having a science and
    technology unit in the new Department is before this part of
    the Department sends out an RFP, which we know has enormous--
    there is a huge technology infrastructure associated with it,
    we are going to have our science and technology people take a
    look at what is out there and help them design the RFP, some
    sort of consultation.
        Senator Gregg. May I suggest that you take a look at the
    model that we finally set up at the FBI, because they had so
    many failures in the area of major computer structures, which
    was to bring in an independent group which was essentially an
    analyst team of very capable private sector people.
        Secretary Ridge. I am familiar with it, Senator, and I will
    take you up on the suggestion.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Gregg.
        Senator Hollings.

                         PORT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

        Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        With respect to the ports, there are 361, 50 major ones.
    Some have moved along and are working very hard. But the
    majority sort of talk about an unfunded mandate. How much
    money, Mr. Secretary, do you provide for the States to provide
    for these vulnerability assessments that are required by law?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, first of all, as you pointed out,
    the Congress has provided substantial resources to do some of
    these vulnerability assessments, particularly at the 50, 55
    strategic ports the Coast Guard is doing, and I believe you
    included another $38 million in the fiscal year 2003
    supplemental because of the Congressional concern that this be
    accelerated and moved along.
        Also, Senator, you have given the Department the discretion
    of a piece of about $700 million to go out to critical areas
    based on threat and critical infrastructure, and one of the
    allowable costs for the applicants for those dollars will be
    the vulnerability assessments. So I think we have substantial
    money to deal with that--and we can get the job done at the 55
    ports, because as you pointed out, I think there are 360 ports
    nationwide. We will just have to see how far those dollars go.
        But also in this 2004 budget, Senator, there is a request
    for in excess of $800 million for the information analysis
    infrastructure protection piece and it is our intention to use
    some of these dollars for port vulnerability assessments, too.
        Senator Hollings. If you have got that money, that is fine
    business. The $38 million that we were barely able to get into
    that supplemental is not going to be enough, and so they need
    more. Specifically for example, now, we required the vessels
    themselves to put on those transponders and they will have to
    bear the cost, but we need $57 million for the Coast Guard to
    put up these towers. Do you have that $57 million?
        And don't give me that 10 percent for the Coast Guard. That
    10 percent, you give them 50 percent more work to do and
    responsibility and function and then you are trying to fit it
    all into that 10 percent, and Admiral Collins just in an
    article of a hearing again 2 weeks ago, he said he is
    stretched. We don't have the money. I would like to get that
    $57 million fixed. Can you give us that?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I would have to go back and take
    a look, but I believe that in conversation and reports I have
    had with the Admiral, and I don't want to misstate his intent
    to use the money, but this whole domain awareness and the new
    command and control center that they are building around the
    country, is it in this budget? It is my understanding that he
    can proceed with the funding of the towers and the
    communication system that he has been trying to set up. I mean,
    they have to phase it in over a period of years, but it is my
    understanding that the dollars available in fiscal year 2004
    will let him move that right along without interruption. But I
    will have to get back to you specifically on that because I am
    afraid I am not that versed.
        [The information follows:]

        As an element of their Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, the
    Coast Guard is evaluating a project to install a nationwide shore-based
    Universal Automatic Identification System (AIS) system to enhance
    Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). By design, the system would be capable
    of capturing essential MDA information (vessel identification,
    position, heading, ship length, beam, type, draft, and hazardous cargo
    information) from any AIS equipped vessel throughout the coastal zone
    and displaying the AIS data at command centers for use by operational
    commanders, as well as transmitting the data to other offices for
    analysis and monitoring. The costs to build this nationwide network are
    not yet fully developed. The Coast Guard is currently evaluating the
    engineering requirements and best approach to implementing this
    project, thus funding for this system is not included in the Coast
    Guard's fiscal year 2004 budget request. The Coast Guard intends to
    execute the combined $27,900,000 provided in the fiscal years 2002
    Supplemental and 2003 appropriations to install AIS capability in the
    VTS ports of New Orleans, Prince William Sound, Houston/Galveston, New
    York and Port Arthur.

                                 RAIL SECURITY

        Senator Hollings. That and those security plans, too, we
    need the extra money for that. But let me jump quickly to the
    real security. Now, for example, at tunnels at New York,
    Baltimore, come down to Washington, there is a tunnel right
    under the Supreme Court. I know some locals who were ready to
    use that tunnel a couple years ago.
        But where is the money now? We authorized $750 million for
    rail security on those tunnels alone, and I don't see any money
    in Homeland Security now for that.
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I believe that the Transportation
    Security Administration has resources. They have begun to work
    with the Federal Railway Administration to do vulnerability
    assessments at some critical pieces of railroad infrastructure.
    I know that in our internal assessment in preparation for
    Liberty Shield we identified several critical pieces of
    railroad infrastructure that we asked and secured either public
    or private sector support.
        So as we are building up this capacity within the new
    Department under that directorate, it will not only be the
    Transportation Security Administration working with the Federal
    Railroad Administration, but it will be our Department working
    with the railroads on vulnerability assessments. And again, the
    fiscal year 2004 budget gives us a rather substantial amount of
    money in order to do those vulnerability assessments.
        Senator Hollings. You talk generally of substantial amount,
    but it was $750 million there. It was $515 million authorized,
    of course, for, you say, the railroads, because as you know, we
    only own about 750 miles of the 22,000 miles of freight rails.
    They have bridges and vulnerabilities and everything else like
    that. They say it is an unfunded mandate. You see, that is what
    we are getting at the committee level.
        Secretary Ridge. Well, I will tell you, Senator, that in my
    discussions with the folks, private sector folks, publicly
    traded companies, they have a lot of equity interests, but I
    think that, by and large, the responsibility of securing
    critical assets of a privately owned, profit-generating company
    rests more with the privately owned, profit-making company than
    it does with the Federal Government and the taxpayer.
        Not everybody has an equity interest in every railroad in
    the country. Those that do, and I think there is a
    responsibility of the leadership and the Board of Directors to
    their employees, to the communities in which they operate it,
    and to their shareholders, they could at least begin some of
    these vulnerability assessments themselves to make a
    determination and work with us in order to get a handle on what
    they really need as we try to manage the risk.
        We will not be able to provide security to every bridge and
    to every tunnel and to every piece of infrastructure. I think
    we all understand that. But I think we need to engage this, and
    I say this in a very positive way, we have been able to engage
    some of these railroad companies to work with us to identify
    critical pieces of infrastructure and the debate as to who is
    paying for it may end up being a very public one, but I will
    tell you, from our point of view, our communication with the
    private sector that owns these assets is that, by and large, we
    want to help you identify the critical pieces of
    infrastructure. We want to help you do the assessment on what
    you need in order to secure the infrastructure. But at the end
    of the day, it is our view that it is much more private sector
    responsibility than it is a public sector one.
        Senator Hollings. Well, we debated that back and forth
    across the committee. The Congress has authorized $750 million.
        Secretary Ridge. Well, yes----
        Senator Cochran. Senator, your time has expired.
        Senator Hollings. I thank the distinguished chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Murray?

                               ENTRY-EXIT SYSTEM

        Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I first want
    to associate myself with the comments of Senator Gregg on the
    entry-exit system. We have some really serious concerns and I
    appreciate your response back to him and look forward to
    working with you on that. I think the INS has been eager to do
    this since the 1996 legislation and it is an area we need to be
    vigilant on and move forward carefully, so I appreciate your
    comments.
        Also, I want to----

                                 INS EMPLOYEES

        Secretary Ridge. Might I just, there, I think it would be
    important for the Senator, you have probably done this, but
    first of all, I do want to say something good about the men and
    women that work at the INS. They work hard. They haven't
    necessarily over the years been given the equipment or maybe
    provided other things that they needed in order to accomplish
    their task.
        But I think on a day-to-day basis, they go to work trying
    to do the right thing. Maybe they weren't given the right
    direction. Maybe they weren't given the right information.
    Maybe they weren't given the right technology. But they work
    pretty hard.
        I know we have a lot more work to do, Senator. Don't get me
    wrong. I am not trying to sugarcoat some of the problems that
    have been identified publicly and that we have identified
    internally. They are there. Our job is to fix them. But at the
    end of the day, I just want to relay to you that I was in Los
    Angeles on Friday talking about ports and airport security with
    the officials out there, but I stopped for an hour and a half
    at an immigration and naturalization ceremony, 4,200 new
    Americans from 135 different countries.
        The notion to be present when 4,200 people raise their
    hands and at the end of taking an oath, regardless of their
    country of origin, they suddenly became Americans and are now
    citizens, and the fact that people from 135 countries chose
    this country to live in, these men and women in INS, that is
    the job they do. They have a tough job. It is a welcoming job.
        We know we have some work to do and we also know that we
    have friends in Congress on both sides of the aisle that want
    to help us get it right, and that is what we need to do in the
    years ahead.

                            OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE

        Senator Murray. Thank you. I also want to follow up on
    Senator Hollings' concerns about ports and continued security
    is an issue. I have been very concerned about the Seattle-
    Tacoma port, third largest in the Nation. We have been working
    closely with them and other ports.
        In 2002, we gave you $28 million for Operation Safe
    Commerce and $30 million in 2003, and as I said in my opening
    comments, this is an initiative that will enable the security
    of 6 million containers that enter our ports every year to be
    monitored from the time they are loaded to the time they are
    unloaded. It is extremely important that we begin to understand
    what is coming into our ports, and this is a really important
    operation, but so far, none of that money has been spent,
    despite all of our pushing, and I wanted you to explain to the
    subcommittee why the Department has not moved forward on
    Operation Safe Commerce that has now been funded in two
    separate fiscal years and can you assure me that we are going
    to see some movement on this.
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I believe we are in the process,
    with regard to the 2003 package I am most familiar with, in
    coming up with some grants guidance to distribute those
    dollars. I believe that----
        Senator Murray. Well, Operation Safe Commerce is a pilot
    project targeted to the three top ports, and the ports,
    everybody is ready. They have submitted their grants. They are
    waiting to hear from all of you, and we were told that
    originally it was February. Now, it is June, could be pushed.
    These people are ready to go. They have projects in place. They
    know what they need to be doing. They are waiting for the
    money.
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, let me review it and get back to
    you on that.
        [The information follows:]

        The Ports of (1) Los Angeles and Long Beach; (2) Seattle and
    Tacoma; and (3) the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey have
    submitted proposals for funding consideration under this initiative.
    The application closing date for OSC proposals was March 20, 2003.
    Representatives from the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
    Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of Commerce
    and the Transportation Security Administration are currently evaluating
    the applications. Evaluation and selection estimates are expected to be
    completed by early May with award announcement following contract
    negotiations and congressional notification estimated for early July
    2003.

        Senator Murray. I would really appreciate it. We cannot
    allow 6 million containers a year to continue to come into our
    ports without monitoring. We are ready to go with a project
    that works and we just are waiting for your office----

                         CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE

        Secretary Ridge. If I might, Senator, I appreciate that
    very much, but we also need to understand that we have begun
    layering other defenses to review that cargo before it gets to
    any of the domestic ports. You have given us $60 or $70 million
    for the Container Security Initiative that is up and running
    and we are tying into more and more foreign ports. You have
    also given us substantial dollars to enhance the Coast Guard's
    capability to target high-risk cargo.
        The number goes around, and people use the number, well, we
    only board 2 or 3 percent of the cargo ships in the country.
    But I would say to you, we board 100 percent of the cargo ships
    that we think are high-risk cargo ships. So we have started----

                            OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE

        Senator Murray. The point of Operation Safe Commerce is to
    begin to know what is in those containers, and if you could
    take a look at it and get back to me----
        Secretary Ridge. Sure. I would be very pleased to and look
    forward to communicating----
        Senator Murray [continuing]. I think you will be pleased
    with what you see the ports doing. They are just waiting for
    the go-ahead from your agency, so if you could check that.

                               TRAINING STANDARDS

        I know my time is short. I just wanted to also really bring
    up the issue of a national strategy on training. We have a lot
    of people out there who want to do what they need to do in
    terms of homeland security but training is a real issue. I
    wondered if you could tell us what is the status of a national
    strategy on getting these folks trained and when we can expect
    some progress and seeing something from your office on that.
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, we are obliged and will provide
    standards and certification of training, of communications, of
    equipment. Again, with great respect, the Department has been
    up and operational for only about 60 days. FEMA has been
    working on it. We have been doing some work with the Department
    of Justice.
        Again, one of the very important roles of the new
    Department that you highlighted in your question is that
    somebody in the Federal Government has to start setting
    standards, standards for training, standards for equipment, the
    standards for interoperability, and that is one of our primary
    tasks.
        So again, I would assure you that the process of setting
    those training standards--as you know, we have four or five
    national training centers. I must tell you that hardly a day
    goes by that somebody else doesn't want to start another
    national training center somewhere else in this country----
        Senator Murray. That is exactly why I think we need a
    national strategy, so we all----
        Secretary Ridge. You are absolutely right. You are right on
    target. If we develop the national training standard and the
    national model and we set aside x-number of dollars for States
    or regions, there is no need to build more national training
    centers if we have a model to train with. The training can be
    done intra-state. But we have to set the standard.
        Senator Cochran. The Senator's time has expired.
        Senator Murray. I appreciate that, and I would just hope
    that you look at the National Guard in terms of providing that
    training. They do much of that already and I think we don't
    want to lose that.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Leahy?
        Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Governor,
    Secretary, thank you for being here. There are probably days
    when you feel as though you live up here on the Hill. I assume
    that is because you feel it is the safest place in the country
    to be.

                FORMULA FOR STATE AND LOCAL PREPAREDNESS GRANTS

        We have spoken many times, both in hearings and privately,
    on how to fairly allocate domestic terrorism preparedness plans
    to our States and local communities, and as you know, I have
    had some interest in that even in our little State of Vermont.
    I authored and added to the USA PATRIOT Act the provision
    creating an all-State minimum for the Office for Domestic
    Preparedness. Each State receives at least three-quarters of 1
    percent of the national allotment.
        Currently, 35 to 40 percent of ODP grants are distributed
    equally to the States. The rest are given out in various
    factors. For example, $2.6 billion allocated in fiscal year
    2003, at least $1.7 billion of that would go to those places
    deemed to be major terrorist targets.
        I now hear that officials from your Department plan to
    announce soon whether they will propose a change in the formula
    to be issued. I ask and I want you to know that when the
    supplemental appropriations went through, the managers
    specifically included reference to the all-State minimum,
    reaffirming Congress's support to the all-State minimum, at the
    same time, providing additional money for those obvious
    targets, like Washington, D.C. or New York City. So are we
    going to see a new proposal coming out?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, thank you for asking the
    question.
        Senator Leahy. I am sure it surprised you that I asked
    this.
        Secretary Ridge. You and I have had this discussion, and
    frankly, we need to have more, both public and private,
    discussions with you and your colleagues because this is one of
    the most important things we can do in the fiscal year 2004
    budget.
        As of today, the Department of Homeland Security will put
    the applications online for that $1.5 billion and we have got
    the Congress appropriated $1.3 billion 80/20, $200 million of
    50/50 State and local. You did give us with those dollars, the
    flexibility to depart from the basic traditional ODP funding
    formula. You also gave us $700 million for the high-threat,
    high-vulnerability areas.
        We have made an internal decision, Senator, to use the
    traditional formula for the $1.3 billion. We ran a variety of
    numbers back and forth----
        Senator Leahy. What do you mean by traditional formula?
        Secretary Ridge. It is the funding formula that says you
    start with three-quarters of 1 percent per State----
        Senator Leahy. Which is what I wrote into the PATRIOT Act--
    --
        Secretary Ridge [continuing]. Plus population, and we
    really appreciated being given the discretion, but I really
    thought the traditional formula would be more appropriate for
    that pool of dollars, because applying a threat vulnerability
    and critical infrastructure piece on top of that is going to
    take some work with the Congress of the United States in order
    to come up with that formula. So those dollars will be
    distributed according to the traditional formula.
        It is much easier for us to--it is very difficult on a
    Statewide basis, at least it was in the few days, in the
    several days we have had to work out a formula, to take a
    threat assessment and an assessment of critical infrastructure
    and apply it nationally. It is a lot easier to apply that kind
    of approach to a major municipal area or region. So----
        Senator Leahy. But we have given extra money for that.
        Secretary Ridge. And we are going to use the discretion. So
    in answer to your question, the largest pool of funds are going
    out to the traditional.
        Senator Leahy. Okay.
        Secretary Ridge. Vermont is going to get their money. Every
    other State is going to get their share of those dollars under
    the traditional formula until we can reach an agreement with
    Congress as to what the modifications might be for the new
    allocation, because I do think we need to change it, but----
        Senator Leahy. Is this traditional going to be part of the
    fiscal year 2004----
        Secretary Ridge. That is the conversation and the debate
    probably that you and I and others will have, Senator.
        Senator Leahy. Well, let us----
        Secretary Ridge. The answer ultimately----
        Senator Leahy [continuing]. I mean, look at that managers'
    statement when we have it, because there is still a lot of
    support for that.
        Secretary Ridge. And I believe that there should be a
    minimum going to every State.
        Senator Leahy. I mean, just to set up the office, put the
    phones, and have people in, whether you are a small State or a
    large State, there are certain basic costs that are going to be
    the same.
        Secretary Ridge. Right, and I agree. I do think, however,
    and it bears debate and hopefully some changes in how we
    distribute dollars in the future, that coming to some agreement
    with Congress with regard to what value you add to a threat
    over a year period if the presence of critical infrastructure
    in that area or in that State, that is a lot easier to take
    that information, Senator, and apply it to a municipal area or
    to a region----
        Senator Leahy. And also----
        Secretary Ridge [continuing]. It is a lot easier to do that
    than it is to a State.
        Senator Leahy. Also, the State might be--I mean, this isn't
    part of my State, but you might have a small State in
    population but they have got a port or whatever else it might
    be.
        Secretary Ridge. Right.
        Senator Leahy. I will submit some questions there, but I
    would like to sit down with you and talk to you about this.
        Secretary Ridge. I look forward to it, Senator. We need to.

                      TOWNHALL MEETINGS WITH INS EMPLOYEES

        Senator Leahy. Also, we talked about INS and I talked to
    Under Secretary Hutchinson about this. He mentioned the town
    hall meetings you have done with new DHS employees in Miami and
    elsewhere. We have 1,600, or more than that, but were INS
    employees who are now DHS employees in Vermont. They are those
    hard working, patriotic, conscientious people you have talked
    about.
        I would invite either you or Under Secretary Hutchinson to
    come to Vermont and talk with them. I think you would find it--
    the snow has gone away, but from Pennsylvania, you know--
    Senator Harkin says it is down to two feet deep, but you
    understand what weather is.
        But I think--the reason I mention this, even though it is a
    small State, this is actually one of your larger installations.
    I would urge you or Asa to come up. These people are not
    political. They are not partisan. They are concerned Americans.
    I think you would benefit by it and I know they would benefit
    by it, but I also think DHS overall would benefit by it. So I
    would urge you to do that. I think you would be welcomed by
    everybody from the governor on through on that. The governor
    and I are different parties, but I think we would join equally
    in your welcome.
        Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that
    invitation.
        Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Leahy, for your
    contributions to the hearing.
        Senator Harkin.

                      DHS COORDINATION WITH STATE OFFICES

        Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I just have basically three questions. One
    has to do with a coordination between DHS and State offices. In
    the last session we had, I asked you a question and you
    responded in writing regarding two sites in Iowa that were
    supposed to be protected. The letter I got from your office
    said, and I quote, ``Governors and State homeland security
    providers were provided with examples of facilities and systems
    within their States that met these criteria from a Federal
    perspective. These references are intended as examples only,''
    et cetera, et cetera.
        So I passed that back out to Iowa and they said that that
    was not right, that Iowa was told that the two specific bridges
    were the ones to be protected, and that seemed to be the view
    from several other State directors, as well. In fact, one sent
    an e-mail that they said that they were specifically told by
    FEMA that this answer that I got was not correct, that sites
    were specifically told to be protected.
        So again, I want to get this cleared up because there seems
    to be some concern, and I can say openly that the two sites in
    Iowa are two railroad bridges that go over the Mississippi.
    Well, we have got two rivers. We have got the Mississippi on
    one side and the Missouri on the other. Those railroads keep
    going on, so you protect two on one side but nothing on the
    other side.
        I am wondering about the coordination here. That is my
    question, just on coordination between the State offices and
    DHS. Iowans feel they were told they have got to do those two
    sites and nothing else, and what I am getting from your office
    is, no, those were just supposed to be examples but not
    specific. I am trying to get this kind of cleared up, is all.
        Secretary Ridge. First of all, Senator, I appreciate the
    inquiry. There were, and I can't assess right now he said, she
    said, what was said.
        Senator Harkin. I know that.
        Secretary Ridge. Clearly, we gave specific directions to
    some communities to deal with specific pieces of
    infrastructure, and I know that for a fact.
        Senator Harkin. I can believe that, yes.
        Secretary Ridge. Whether or not those were included in the
    communication to Iowa, I will go back and double-check. The
    point being, however, that as we ramped up Liberty Shield, in
    addition to providing Federal direction to secure certain
    pieces based on our analysis of risk management and the loss
    that would be incurred if something transpired at that
    particular site, we also said to governors, that is what we
    want you to do, but, I mean, at some point in time, we have to
    rely on the governors and others who may view other pieces of
    infrastructure that they want to support and defend and secure,
    as well.
        So I will get back to you on that. But the challenge we
    have, and we accept the challenge, is communicating in a timely
    and accurate way the kind of support we need with our friends
    at the State and local level, and I believe that there is no
    other agency in the history of the Federal Government that
    communicates more frequently with the States and locals.
        [The information follows:]

        At the onset of Operation Liberty Shield, the Iowa State Homeland
    Security Advisor was specifically asked by the Department of Homeland
    Security to do two things: protect specific sites, and identify other
    sites that should also receive protection, based on a set of criteria
    that the Department provided. Specifically, we requested that Iowa:
      --Ensure that appropriate, visible, protective measures were in place
            for the following two critical assets:
        --BNSF Iowa End Rail Bridge--Fort Madison, Iowa
        --Union Pacific Iowa End Rail Bridge Clinton, Iowa
      --Based on an additional set of 13 law enforcement sensitive criteria
            provided to every State and Territorial Homeland Security
            Advisor, identify any other assets in the State of Iowa that
            met these criteria, and consider putting protective measures in
            place at these sites, as well.
        The Department provided a report template and asked the states to
    report periodically on specific actions taken in response to Operation
    Liberty Shield. The Department also told the States, through their
    Homeland Security Advisors, that it would be requesting supplemental
    appropriations in order to try and help defer costs for actions taken
    by the States during Liberty Shield.

        Secretary Ridge. We think we have a good communications
    system now, Senator, but we know it has to be better because
    the relationship for us to be able to secure the country is
    going to have to be a lot stronger and the confusion that
    arises in your statement, we cannot afford to have that occur
    if we are to secure the country in times of need. There should
    be no hesitation if instructions are given, secure that place,
    and we all need to understand that.
        Senator Harkin. I appreciate that very much.

                     PARALLEL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT EFFORTS

        I was meeting with some of my fire fighters from Iowa
    recently this morning and it has been brought to my attention
    that there is a concern in my State that some of the new
    provisions for training is going almost on a parallel level
    with what is already existing with the existing Fire Marshal in
    Iowa. We have the Iowa Department of Emergency Management that
    does the DHS work, where your efforts flow through. They want
    to set up, for example, new training teams for bomb disposal.
    That already exists under the Fire Service Training Bureau in
    Iowa, the Fire Marshal. As they told me, first responders need
    to be trained in the basics like hazmat, basic fire fighting
    training. That already exists.
        But now, it seems that the Iowa Department of Emergency
    Management is going to set up other parallel types of systems
    when this is already existing, and so again, I am wondering if
    we are looking at existing structures within States that
    already do the kind of hazmat training, basic fire fighting
    training, things that are already in place, utilizing them
    rather than setting up some parallel kind of structure.
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, you tee it up for me. This is
    precisely why I believe that once our Department sets standards
    for this kind of training, each State should be required to
    submit a plan to tell us what agency within that State is going
    to provide the training. It makes no sense, to your question,
    to have two or three centers unless the capacity matches the
    need, but to be setting up two separate, independent training
    programs that may only be operating at 50 percent capacity,
    particularly when you already have an existing training
    program. I mean, that goes to the very rationale behind setting
    up State plans to deal with questions of training, equipment
    acquisition, distribution of funds, and the like. The question
    is germane as to what we are trying to avoid in the future.

                       COSTS OF PROTECTING INFRASTRUCTURE

        Senator Harkin. I appreciate that very much, Mr. Secretary.
    One last thing, or two last things.
        I looked at the cost supposedly for protecting these two
    bridges in Iowa and it comes out that the cumulative daily cost
    estimate to protect these two bridges is $11,000 a day, and I
    am wondering if I can get that contract.
        Eleven-thousand dollars a day. Now, this is not from you.
    This is coming out from underneath.
        Secretary Ridge. We have to beat a lot of other people to
    the head of the line, Senator.
        Senator Harkin. I think so. But I am hopeful--I say it
    because I am looking at the cost breakdown, and I am saying, if
    this is what is going on around the country, because we are
    spending a lot of money, I think, needlessly.
        So I guess my point is, I hope that you have a good
    Inspector General on board and to really start taking a look at
    some of these cost estimates that come in and what they are
    doing. I look at this, to protect two bridges, per day, $11,000
    a day. It just doesn't make sense.
        Secretary Ridge. One of our goals, Senator, now that we
    have stood down Liberty Shield, is to go back and review at
    different sites the costs that were allegedly incurred at each
    site, and I think after this, we debrief ourselves and scrub
    all those numbers and then compare them to what otherwise might
    have occurred, we will be able to report back to you and give
    you an answer, if that is the common occurring cost or if there
    is a cheaper and more efficient way of providing the security
    at those bridges.
        Senator Harkin. Well, I sure hope you look at this and I
    hope you have got good watchdogs down there to look at this----
        Secretary Ridge. We will.
        Senator Harkin [continuing]. Because this stuff is coming
    up, and I am not saying that the bridges aren't vital and
    needed, but the cost of this protection is just way out of
    line, just way out of line. Again, I am just concerned, if
    this, what happens when you multiply that by all the different
    sites around the country and what you are doing and how much
    money this is. So I hope you will really look at it.
        Secretary Ridge. It does, and it also gives to mind,
    Senator, if you will, the notion that we don't have enough
    money in the Federal Treasury, the State treasury, and the
    personal pocketbooks of every American citizen to harden every
    target, every site. We have to manage the risk, and determine
    what is the infrastructure that if it was destroyed would
    result in the greatest loss, catastrophic loss of life? What is
    the infrastructure, if destroyed, would have the greatest
    catastrophic economic impact?
        I know as a former governor in Pennsylvania, I had over
    100,000 bridges. There were some that I had to consider were
    far more important to safety, security, and economic matters
    than others, and I think that is the kind of assessment that we
    have to do nationally, and we have to have our friends at the
    State and local level help us with it.

                      COLLABORATION WITH CIVIL AIR PATROL

        Senator Harkin. One last thing. I know you met with the
    Civil Air Patrol.
        Secretary Ridge. Yes.
        Senator Harkin. I appreciate that very much, and I hope you
    are going to continue to work with the Civil Air Patrol.
        Secretary Ridge. We had a very good discussion with them.
    As you pointed out in our earlier conversation, they do provide
    considerable benefit as they work with some of the other units
    of the new Department and we are going to look for ways to take
    advantage of their patriotism, their equipment, and their
    professionalism and see if we can expand their mission in
    certain areas.
        Senator Harkin. And they are cost effective.
        Secretary Ridge. Oh, absolutely.
        Senator Harkin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

                   MANAGEMENT OF FIRST RESPONDER INITIATIVES

        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator, for your contribution
    to the hearing.
        Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2004 budget request proposes
    to manage the first responder initiative through the Office for
    Domestic Preparedness and the budget requests $3.5 billion in
    funding. You are earmarking $500 million for fire fighters'
    assistance and $500 million for law enforcement. My question
    is, how do you propose to allocate these funds to fire fighters
    and law enforcement agencies? Do you intend, for example, to
    retain the current grant programs now managed by the Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate which provide emergency
    management performance grants to States or grants directly to
    fire departments through the Assistance to Fire Fighters grant
    program?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, the $500 million that we have
    earmarked for the fire departments, though we do want to shift
    it from the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
    over to ODP, would be distributed according to past practice.
    Again, we would like the dollars distributed for equipment and
    training exercises consistent with a Statewide plan to build up
    their capacity to deal with emergencies. But they have a very
    thorough review process that they have put into place and I
    think everybody's interest would be best served if we just
    continued that practice.

                            HIGH THREAT URBAN AREAS

        Senator Cochran. There was $100 million in fiscal year 2003
    funds announced by the Department on April 8 to high-threat
    urban areas.
        Secretary Ridge. Correct.
        Senator Cochran. This included distributions to seven
    cities--New York City, Washington, D.C. and the National
    Capital Region, Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, San Francisco,
    and Houston. Do you intend to use the same formula? I presume
    there was a formula used for awarding these funds. Are you
    going to continue to use that for the additional $700 million
    provided in the fiscal year 2003 Wartime Supplemental
    Appropriations Act?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, that is our intention. As I
    mentioned to Senator Leahy, part of the discussion we need to
    have, and hopefully we can resolve it in the fiscal year 2004
    appropriations process, is the formula that you would direct
    the Department and this Secretary to use--that we need some
    more permanency, I think, with regard to the funding formula
    and maybe more specificity. But you have given us the
    discretion.
        We find that it is much easier to go to the FBI, go to the
    CIA, go to our own intelligence analysts and render an
    assessment with regard to threat and vulnerability around a
    locality rather than a State because of the nature of the
    information we receive. So we would take that assessment. We
    put a value on it. We take a look at the critical
    infrastructure in a region, and more often than not, you will
    find in a more densely-populated area, either a city or a
    county, you will find a lot of the critical infrastructure that
    you need to protect, for obvious reasons.
        And so the funding formula that we used before took in
    threat and vulnerability, critical infrastructure, both public
    and private, and then density of population. We assigned values
    to it and we are going to use basically the same system.
    Because we have seven times as much money, the distribution of
    those dollars will be much wider. We made the decision
    internally, Senator, that we could give a little to a bunch of
    places and they wouldn't be able to do significant things with
    it, and if it is about building up infrastructure and hardening
    targets, we decided that would limit it. But the generosity of
    the Congress, coupled with the same discretion, means that more
    cities will benefit, more regions will benefit.

                                  WATCH LISTS

        Senator Cochran. Thank you for that. I noticed in today's
    papers there was a discussion of a GAO report that is being
    made available today, and, as usual, the content of that report
    was leaked to the press through advance stories. It had to do
    with the so-called watch list----
        Secretary Ridge. Right.
        Senator Cochran [continuing]. And the way that is compiled.
    I don't know whether you have had an opportunity to review the
    report--I don't see how you could--but you may have some
    information about it and at least have some information about
    whether or not we are making progress, and that is the
    question, to centralize and to have a coherent way of
    determining who we should be on the lookout for as they are
    trying to come into our country or move around the country that
    pose a threat to our Nation's security.
        What about the watch list issue? Is there going to be, and
    when can we expect there to be a watch list that can be shared
    with local officials and others that need to know so they can
    participate in doing their jobs, helping contribute to the
    safety and security of our country in this way?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, we began working with the
    multiple agencies that generate watch lists many, many months
    ago to consolidate not only the database, but then to make sure
    that the right people had access to the entire database. That
    has been an ongoing initiative within the White House and now
    in the Department of Homeland Security. It will be facilitated
    enormously as a result of the creation of the President's
    Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which will be the venue
    that this kind of information is consolidated.
        So I can't give you a specific time frame. I think we are
    fairly close to finalizing the consolidation itself. The next
    piece of that is making sure that we have the technology to
    distribute the information to the points of interest and
    concern around the country and around the world so they can
    take advantage of it. Part of the time delay is just making
    sure that people with the same names or similar names on
    multiple databases are--confirming they are the same or
    different individuals. I mean, there is a technical piece to
    this that has been a little cumbersome.

                      TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER

        But under the President's Terrorist Threat Integration
    Center, you will see the consolidation and then the
    distribution of these, and the time table, I think, will be
    more easily identified in the next couple of weeks. I think we
    can give you a more specific answer on that.
        [The information follows:]

        The GAO is correct in its assessment that the government's approach
    to using watch lists is decentralized because the lists were developed
    in response to individual agencies' unique missions. Those historical
    missions include the duties of the law enforcement and intelligence
    communities, and now include the mission to defend the homeland. The
    effort to consolidate and establish the connectivity of information
    contained in historical databases, from which watch lists may be
    generated, requires close coordination among my Information Analysis
    and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, several other Departments,
    and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. Discussions among the
    interested parties to effect the sharing and consolidation of
    information are ongoing, and all parties are working to establish a
    timeframe for implementation.

        Senator Cochran. When we were considering the legislation
    in the Governmental Affairs Committee, we assumed that the
    Department of Homeland Security would actually do this and
    would be the lead agency in the Administration to do this, and
    then the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
    that you just talked about seems to either be supplanting or
    supplementing in some way the work of the Department. Are you
    still going to conduct your own intelligence analysis?
        Secretary Ridge. Oh, yes, absolutely.
        Senator Cochran. Are you going to get information from the
    intelligence agencies and compile that and analyze it and then
    give it to the White House, to this Terrorist Threat
    Integration Center? How is that going to work?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, first of all, we are going to
    continue to work and have been working with the CIA, the FBI,
    and the Department of Defense to set up the Terrorist Threat
    Integration Center. They are aware of our work to integrate the
    databases because we were working with those agencies. One of
    the advantages of having this much broader Threat Integration
    Center is that we will have a much more substantial capacity,
    not only to integrate names but actually start working on
    individuals and building up the kind of information base about
    these individuals and their potential conduct.
        Having said that, the Congress said very specifically that
    we are to have our own Information Analysis and Infrastructure
    Protection Directorate. We will be a full partner in the Threat
    Integration Center. We will take some of our analysts and have
    them working on the analytical and assessment products that are
    generated by the Threat Integration Center. But that will not
    be a substitute for our own analysts working in that
    directorate. It won't be a substitute for our own competitive
    analysis.
        The difference will be that the analyst in the Threat
    Integration Center, and here, this is where it adds enormous
    value to the new Department, those analysts as full partners
    have access to everything. We are a provider of information to
    the TTIC. We are also a consumer. The analysts that we have
    from our Department in that center are going to have access to
    all the raw data, all the reports, everything that everybody
    else has. The analysts in our Department won't have that access
    directly, but they will have it indirectly through their
    counterparts in the Threat Integration Center. So we view it as
    a full partnership. We view it as enormous value added to the
    unit that Congress authorized in the legislation creating the
    Department.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank
    you, Mr. Secretary.

                       FEDERAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER DHS

        One of the most contentious issues during last year's
    debate on the creation of your Department, Mr. Secretary,
    involved the administration's plan for its treatment of the
    thousands of Federal employees that were being pulled away from
    their various agencies with their differing pay and benefit
    structures and merged into this huge new entity. Many were and
    many still are concerned that their hard work and their years
    of service would amount to little more, or to nothing, perhaps,
    once the final personnel plan is formulated at the end of this
    year.
        Now, their fears are compounded, and so are mine, may I
    say, when they read the administration's proposal to undertake
    a massive overhaul of the Department of Defense's personnel
    system. I suppose we are talking about 660,000 persons there or
    some such number.
        I find it more than ironic to learn about these plans to
    contract out secret services. After the terrorist attacks on
    September 11, 2001, we found out, to date, about some of the
    inefficiencies that private security contractors brought to our
    Nation's airports. There were gaps in security. There were lax
    background checks. We heard about the failure rates in security
    screens. We heard that there were criminal aliens, even, who
    were being employed by these security agencies to check
    passengers, to check baggage and so on at the Nation's
    airports. I was astounded, and I am sure other people were,
    too, to learn that, that there were aliens and even criminal
    aliens--aliens who had criminal records, perhaps I had better
    put it that way--who were employed by these private security
    contractors.
        To address some of these problems, Congress created the
    Transportation Security Administration. We federalized the
    security system. Private contractors had failed, so we stepped
    in. One mission of this new agency was to do a better job than
    the private contractors.
        Now, believe it or not, we hear of plans to contract out
    security functions again. I am dumfounded. Have we not learned
    any lesson from September 11? Now, this is an enormous, an
    enormous opportunity for abuse, and it is coming.
        In this regard, what is your Department contemplating in
    the area of contracting out current Federal jobs, Mr.
    Secretary?

                            OUTSOURCING FEDERAL JOBS

        Secretary Ridge. Senator, you referred, first of all, to
    the work we have undertaken to harmonize dozens and dozens of
    pay and personnel systems that are part of the 22 departments
    and agencies that have become part of the Department of
    Homeland Security, and first, I want to assure you that the men
    and women represented in those agencies are very much involved
    in the process of developing that personnel system. We have
    begun. We had discussions with the representatives of both the
    organized workforce and the non-union workforce to set up the
    process. We have a fairly significant outreach effort where
    members of the team are going to visit, I think as many as six
    cities, where we are going to bring the employees from the
    different agencies in to talk about it.
        We also have assured them, and the Congress in this
    language creating the Department assured them, that the
    personnel system will be based on the principles of merit and
    fairness and that the historic protections afforded Federal
    employees will be provided in the new human personnel system.
    So that process has moved forward.
        I am aware of the concerns that you raised, the
    privatization of the security force with regard to airport
    security prior to TSA, and Senator, I can't tell you today that
    we have any plans to privatize any of this work out. But I also
    cannot tell you today that there may be occasions in the future
    where if we find it is appropriate to get additional support
    through the private sector, we will.
        But I have, as we speak today, engaged in these discussions
    with these men and women, 175,000 strong. We have no plans to
    privatize our support at the borders, our work at the national
    labs, privatizing what used to be the investigative or the
    inspective role of the Animal Plant Health and Inspection
    Service, the legacy Customs or INS.
        Frankly, Senator, the beautiful thing about the new
    Department, and for all those who say that it is such a tough
    job, is that we, unlike the TSA, do not have to go out and hire
    45,000 or 50,000 people and train them to do the job. Most of
    the men and women that are working in the new Department have
    been at their job for a long time and do it pretty well. We
    have to give them, I think, the kind of leadership, the kind of
    support, and the kind of technology so that they can do it even
    better. But right now, Senator, we don't have any plans of
    privatizing that critical work out to the private sector.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, are there proposals under
    consideration to contract out existing activities in specific
    agencies?
        Secretary Ridge. It is a big agency and I can't tell you
    that I see the contracts that my colleagues are signing on a
    day-to-day basis. Over a period of a year, there will be
    literally hundreds and hundreds. But I am not presently aware
    of any contracting out of existing responsibilities that the
    men and women are presently engaged in.
        Senator Byrd. So your answer is----
        Secretary Ridge. To my knowledge, the answer is no.
        Senator Byrd. So----
        Secretary Ridge. There may have been some contracts that
    were let for privatization before the Department was created.
    That could very well be the situation, and where they are, I
    don't know. I mean, I think it is possible. But in terms of new
    ones, I am not aware of any.
        Senator Byrd. Do you not feel that you should be made aware
    of such?
        Secretary Ridge. I think, given the sensitivity of where we
    are with the negotiations, with the employees, the concern that
    members of Congress would have without that course of action,
    that is why I feel pretty confident in telling you that I am
    not aware of any right now because I think I would be made
    aware if it was an intention. I would hopefully be made aware
    when it was an intention to do rather than a contract that was
    let.
        Senator Byrd. Well, Mr. Secretary, I would hope--this is a
    very--I would say this is a very serious issue. We are going to
    hear more about contracting out. William Wordsworth said, no
    matter how high you are in your department, you are responsible
    for what the lowliest clerk is doing. And so this, I dare say,
    will not be the last time that questions will be asked about
    contracting out, and I would adjure you to not just wait until
    you are made aware of such, but that you make it your business
    to become aware and let the subcommittee know what criteria
    would be used and what examples of activities that are being
    considered. Would you do that?
        Secretary Ridge. I will, Senator.
        Senator Byrd. Agencies are encouraged to submit management
    plans to the OMB which incorporate the competitive sourcing
    quotas outlined in the President's budget. Information from the
    OMB indicates that these plans, while submitted to the OMB for
    approval, can be released to the public at the discretion of
    the agency heads. If this subcommittee is to appropriate $36
    billion to employ 179,000 full-time equivalent positions, the
    subcommittee would expect you to provide Congress with a copy
    of any management plan or competitive sourcing proposal that
    the Department submits to the OMB. When do you expect to submit
    a management plan to the OMB and how soon could that plan be
    made available to this committee?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, if we understand your very
    appropriate question correctly, I think it would be submitted
    to them by the end of August.
        Senator Byrd. Would the Secretary----
        Secretary Ridge. The end of August is the timeframe. The
    end of August.
        Senator Byrd. The end of August?
        Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Very well. I hope, Mr. Secretary, you will
    take a long look at this matter of contracting out and make
    yourself aware of what is going on in this area. If there is
    something going on, I hope you will take a long look.
        The safety and the security of the Nation, that is what you
    are talking about. That is what we are talking about. That is
    what the American people expect. The safety and security of the
    Nation should not become a for-profit endeavor. Security of the
    people should be the driving motivation, and I believe in my
    heart that that is the way you see it. The security of the
    people should be the driving motivation, not a business bottom
    line.
        Very well, Mr. Chairman. Are we going to meet later? We are
    going to have a vote at noon, are we?
        Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, that is my understanding. A
    vote was supposed to occur at 12 o'clock noon, and it is 12
    o'clock. I hope we can recognize Senator Specter, who has come
    back and did not ask questions. He did make an opening
    statement. My intention would be to recognize Senator Specter,
    and then if we do have a vote, simply declare a recess. I have
    two or three more questions to ask the Secretary, and I think
    you do, too.
        Senator Byrd. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have an
    appointment at one o'clock. I wonder if the committee chairman
    and the Secretary could consider coming back at 1:30 or 2:00--
    --
        Senator Cochran. My hope is that we could be through by one
    o'clock, so that wouldn't interfere with your appointment.
        Senator Byrd. Oh, you don't----
        Senator Cochran. My hope would be that we would go vote at
    12 o'clock, or as soon thereafter as the signal is given for
    the vote, and we could return and complete our questions by one
    o'clock.
        Senator Byrd. I see. I see. So if a Senator has a stomach
    ulcer, he will just have to bear with it----
        Senator Cochran. And that don't might have one, or might
    get one. We can sympathize with that Senator more
    appropriately.
        Senator Byrd. I have several questions, if the----
        Senator Cochran. I hope we could complete action by one
    o'clock, Senator, if we can. I would like to try, anyway.
        Senator Byrd. Very well. I will try with you.
        Senator Cochran. That is great. Senator Specter.
        Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                                  WATCH LISTS

        Mr. Secretary, are you familiar with the issue of the watch
    list information which various Federal agencies have? That was
    a critical factor on September 11 when two of the hijackers
    from Kuala Lumpur were known by the CIA, and information about
    them was not transmitted to the Immigration and Naturalization
    Service. The reports of the General Accounting Office, which
    are released today, makes a rather pointed comment that some
    agencies do not even have policies for sharing watch list
    information, and my question is, to what extent is that true?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, we began the work several months
    ago when I served the President as the Assistant to the
    President for Homeland Security and we have continued that work
    in the new Department. I have not seen the GAO report, so I
    can't respond specifically, but to accelerate the creation of
    those essential memorandums so that there was not only a
    consolidation of the watch lists that are generated by multiple
    agencies in this government and a confirmation of the accuracy
    of the information and names on that list, but also a
    distribution mechanism so that the right people could get
    access to the consolidated list.
        That is something we have been working on for several
    months. It is something that I believe will be accelerated with
    the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center that
    the President has created by Executive Order, which is going to
    be directed by the CIA, the Deputy Directors from the FBI, and
    then the two Associate Directors will be from the Department of
    Homeland Security and from DOD.
        I haven't seen the report. I read the press accounts of the
    report. It is something that we began working on several months
    ago. We have accelerated the process. We ran into some
    complications along the way. We have overcome those, and I
    think with the TTIC creation, it will accelerate it and get it
    to the point where you and I believe that it needs to exist,
    one venue, consolidated database, but just as importantly of
    having all the information in one place, making sure that the
    right people have access to all the information.

                              INFORMATION SHARING

        Senator Specter. Mr. Secretary, the report goes into the
    issue of the cultural differences, which has long been a
    critical factor as to whether the CIA and FBI could really put
    aside decades of isolation, very deep-seated feelings of
    maintaining their own information. What is your evaluation, if
    there has been enough time to come to a conclusion, as to
    whether those cultural differences have been surmounted?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I believe that with the
    leadership of the two principals, that is precisely the
    direction that Director Tenet and Director Mueller are seeking
    to--they are not seeking, they are going in that direction. One
    of the big challenges I believe Director Mueller had, and you
    have alluded to it in both private conversation with me and, I
    presume with Director Mueller, but also in public comment, that
    the FBI prior to 9/11 had a lot of information even intra-
    agency that was not consolidated, that other folks in other
    parts of the agency that might have had a point of view or
    could have used that information didn't have access to it.
        With the support of Congress and several hundred million
    dollars and a team that the Director has brought in, the
    consolidation of that and the information sharing consistently
    gets better within the FBI. I see evidence of it every single
    day, and I believe that the placement of analysts from the
    Department of Homeland Security side-by-side with analysts from
    the CIA and analysts from the FBI and other agencies in the
    Threat Integration Center will virtually assure the kind of
    consolidation and integration that you are talking about. Time
    will tell, but I am very optimistic on the capabilities and the
    capacity of this new Integration Center.
        Senator Specter. Besides the General Accounting Office
    report, there was a report by local law enforcement and a
    comment by the Chief of Police in Raleigh, North Carolina,
    Chief Jane Hurlow, who was an author of the report, said that
    local police are, used the word ``frustrated'' by what they saw
    as the FBI's unwillingness to share its vast resources and
    expertise. Now, that may be outside of the scope of what you
    have seen directly, but what would your view of that be?
        Secretary Ridge. My sense is that it is probably not the
    distribution of the kind of information that the local law
    enforcement community seeks and, frankly, as a country, I
    believe we need, is not as even and is not as complete, that we
    need to develop a system of distribution, and again, I believe
    the presence of the Department of Homeland Security and the
    Threat Integration Center, the presence of our own analysts
    within the Department, as well as I consider to be probably one
    of the best working relationships with State and locals,
    including law enforcement, of any other agency in the Federal
    Government, I see we have an opportunity to redress probably
    the legitimate concern of some of the local law enforcement
    folks who don't think they are getting the kind of timely and
    accurate information they need.
        Those who are directly connected to the Joint Terrorism
    Task Forces around the country, they have a point of view,
    although there may be varying opinions, but in the smaller
    communities where they may not have quite the same connection,
    I suspect that there is some concern that they are not as fully
    informed as they need to be.
        To that end, Senator, one of the challenges that we have
    working with the FBI is making sure they get timely information
    down, but I have seen a need for us to also ensure there is a
    mechanism that these law enforcement professionals with whom
    you worked in Philadelphia, but who are working on the streets
    in L.A. and in New York City and in Washington, D.C., they are
    developing their own intelligence gathering capacities. Some
    have their own linguists. They are starting to connect up their
    own operations. L.A. is connecting with New York. New York is
    connecting with Chicago. I suspect that you will have this
    infrastructure at the local level. They will start seeing
    patterns. They may see surveillance trends. They may keep their
    eyes on specific individuals moving around the country. They
    will have information that they want to share with the Threat
    Integration Center as well.
        So again, they have made a lot of progress, Senator,
    dramatic improvement, still a way to go, but I think the Threat
    Integration Center enhances and accelerates the consolidation.
    We still have work to do to distribute in both directions in
    order to make it an effective use of all that information.
        Senator Specter. Mr. Secretary, I am going to submit some
    questions for the record because the chairman, understandably,
    wants to conclude the hearing by one o'clock and we have an
    intervening vote, and I am sure you want to conclude the
    hearing by one o'clock. I know how frequently you appear on
    Capitol Hill and I know you have got a lot of work to do.
        But what I would like to do, and I would like to mention
    these topics, when we had the votes during the budget, there
    was support for the President on not adding money on, and those
    were some very tough votes--port security, for example, where
    we have a big port, as you know, having been the Governor of
    Pennsylvania, in Philadelphia and many other votes, and Senator
    Byrd has made a suggestion which he has commented about on
    additional funding, and we really held the line to give you a
    chance to tell us what expenditures ought to be made.

                            PUBLIC HEALTH QUESTIONS

        But constitutionally, it is the Congress, as you well know
    because you were a member of the House of Representatives for
    12 years, but I would like to know what you have in mind on the
    issue of weapons of mass destruction, where you deal with
    chemical and biological and radiological weapons. What kind of
    funding there is necessary to have an appropriate response?
        And the issue of water safety and food safety is an
    enormous issue and the experts tell us that there has to be
    very expensive monitoring which has to be undertaken there.
        Then you have the issue of quarantining at points of
    international entry, which I am told will be enormously
    expensive. And then there is the question about an attack on
    the CDC itself, Centers for Disease Control. What kind of costs
    would be involved there?
        A final question I have, which I would like your comment
    about, if the CDC comes forward and gives us a list of expenses
    they have on SARS, would you think that is a matter which would
    appropriately come within your purview to have a coordinated
    response with CDC? With SARS, that is.
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I think given that the primary
    focus of the country relative to public health issues and the
    primary focus relative to bioterrorism issues and the like is
    within HHS and we have the extraordinary capacity of CDC and
    NIH, I think it would be more appropriately a matter for them.
    But having said that, it is a matter that rises to the level
    where we all have to take a look at our own budgets to figure
    out if we can come up with the additional dollars to support a
    national effort to deal with it. If it gets to the point where
    we have to do that, obviously, the Department of Homeland
    Security would want to be at the table to do whatever it could.
        But I do think, given the focus, the mission, and the
    experience, it is more appropriately with HHS.
        Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Specter, for your
    contribution to this hearing.

                             HEADQUARTERS BUILDING

        Mr. Secretary, I have a question about your housing
    situation. I know you are temporarily located in headquarters
    here in Washington, D.C., at the U.S. Naval Nebraska Avenue
    Complex. The budget request for fiscal year 2004 includes $30
    million to design a new headquarters building and acquire a
    site for it. The implication is that a decision has been made
    to construct a new building for the Department of Homeland
    Security.
        I am curious to know what your plans are. Has a decision
    been made? Have you explored other Federal space that might be
    available or thought about purchasing an existing facility
    rather than building a new building? What can you tell us about
    the need for these funds?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, first of all, there has been no
    final decision as to a permanent location. There is quite a bit
    of work that we are presently undertaking to find a location
    where we can house more of the Department of Homeland Security.
    I certainly invite you out to take a look at the facilities at
    Nebraska Avenue. We are limited because of substantial physical
    restraints, given the nature of that facility, so we are
    engaged in very aggressively looking at a larger temporary
    facility until a final decision is made.
        It is my understanding that the $30 million in the fiscal
    year 2004 budget is really for site selection and design if and
    when a final decision is made to build a Department of Homeland
    Security. Right now, our priority is to get a larger building
    where we can integrate more of our employees and our technology
    as we ramp up the new Department.
        We are running out of space at Nebraska Avenue. We have
    people in two or three other locations in the downtown area. In
    the virtual world, we are hooked up by the computer, but we
    think there would be enormous efficiencies and a lot better for
    all of us if we could find a larger venue to at least
    consolidate a significant portion of our operation. So it is a
    work in progress.
        Senator Cochran. We earlier approved transfer requests
    totaling $125 million for start-up costs, such as furniture,
    computers, communications equipment, and the like, and most of
    these funds, I am told, are unobligated. OMB has indicated that
    planning factors for these expenditures are being reviewed.
        I would hope, for the record, you could bring us up to date
    on the status of this need, the continued need, if any, for
    this funding, and if it is not needed, we would appreciate your
    suggestion as to how these funds could be further reprogrammed,
    if they could be more efficiently used for other purposes.
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, we are going to need them for the
    headquarters. We put some restraint on the use of those dollars
    until we can determine whether or not we are going to expand at
    Nebraska Avenue or if there is another facility available for
    us to move into.
        Candidly, we have spent about half of those dollars. We
    have been holding up on the other expenditures. We don't want
    to necessarily make an investment in an infrastructure or in a
    building or two that we are going to leave in the next 6 months
    or 18 months. So those dollars will be expended once we make a
    final decision as to where we are going to consolidate more of
    our operation, and that is the reason. We just didn't want to
    run right out there and spend them because we weren't 100
    percent sure that for the immediate future we were going to be
    located at Nebraska Avenue. The decision is pending and we
    should hopefully have a final decision on that in the next
    couple of weeks.

                               PROJECT BIOSHIELD

        Senator Cochran. We have heard from officials at NIH about
    the President's proposed new Project BioShield initiative, a
    program to acquire vaccines, treatments and products to combat
    bioterrorism. In the budget submission before us from your
    Department, we notice a request for $890 million in new funds
    for this initiative. It is a program, as I understand it, to
    accelerate research, development and procurement of vaccines
    and medications, devices, and other products to be used against
    bio-warfare agents, such as smallpox and anthrax. These
    vaccines would be stockpiled for emergency use if they are
    considered safe.
        But, my question is the need that we have been told exists
    for this to be mandatory spending and not subject to the annual
    appropriations process. The Administration requests these funds
    be authorized by Congress as permanent indefinite funding, not
    subject to the annual appropriations process. That is not going
    to sit very well, I will be honest with you, with this
    Committee. I notice on the calendar of legislation that this is
    a subject that is going to come before the Senate pretty soon.
    So I am asking, why would you want to avoid the annual
    appropriations process for this particular project when all the
    others under the jurisdiction of the Department are subject to
    annual appropriations by Congress?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I think the basic principle
    around the Administration's request is to create within the
    Executive Branch a financial capacity to respond immediately
    upon the certification of a bioterrorist threat by the
    Department of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services
    so that an immediate market would be available to the private
    sector to commit research and development dollars to develop
    diagnostics and vaccines in a hurry to respond to a crisis,
    bioterrorism crisis with which our intelligence community felt
    we were threatened by.
        Frankly, there are four vaccine companies left in the world
    and if we have a crisis that would require us to go to one or
    all of them and say, we need a diagnostic. One of the
    challenges right now with the SARS virus is that there is not a
    good diagnostic tool out there. Now, there may be a large
    enough marketplace, and apparently it is since it is worldwide,
    that perhaps the private sector will invest its own research
    and development dollars and in the next several weeks come up
    with a diagnostic test. It is obviously going to take them a
    little longer to come up with a vaccine if they think that it
    is necessary for domestic or international consumption.
        The bottom line is that having that capacity available to
    the President of the United States in the event of a threat of
    a bioterrorist incident gives us the ability to go into the
    private sector to assure them that a market will be there to
    purchase the diagnostic or vaccine.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for your explanation.
    We will review that very closely with you and continue to
    consult with you on possible disposition of that request.
        I have other questions connected to that issue and I will
    just submit those and ask you to respond for the record.
        Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.

             CONGRESSIONAL ABILITY TO REACT IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very interested
    in the question you just asked as well as other questions.
        I put a hold on this virus shield legislation before the
    recess. I don't mind stating when I put holds on matters. The
    specific issue that you have raised here, and I want to stress
    that I share your viewpoint and I hope that the administration
    will work with Congress to resolve this issue.
        Mr. Secretary, I can understand the kind of emergency that
    you probably contemplate, but remember, and I hope the
    administration will remember, that within three days following
    September 11, Congress, both Houses, passed a $40 billion--am I
    not correct? I am correct, I am told--$40 billion emergency
    package, just like that, the snap of my finger. Congress can
    act and will act when the emergency is there and when it is
    clear that it is an emergency that needs it.
        And I want to tell you one thing. We have to guard the
    constitutional prerogatives, responsibilities, and authorities
    and powers of Congress in any emergency, and I am not in favor
    of this administration or any other administration seeking more
    of the powers over the purse than the Constitution permits.
        So if there is an emergency, let us know. If it needs to be
    done in three days, let us know about it. Show us the
    justification. I am not just talking to you, and I hope you
    will understand that.
        Secretary Ridge. I understand, Senator.
        Senator Byrd. I don't say this in that spirit. But I am
    saying to the administration, and it needs to be said to this
    administration, if it never needed to be said to an
    administration, and this administration will be succeeded by
    other administrations, and I have always found that the
    executive branch and the judicial branch are very zealous in
    protecting their prerogatives, their powers, their authorities.
        The executive branch is out there at some point on the
    compass, at some place in the globe working every minute of
    every 24 hours while the Congress is sleeping or while the
    Congress is in recess or while the Congress is off on a break
    of some kind. The legislative branch is not always out there
    and the executive branch and the judicial branch are always
    ready to protect and to sound off and to stand up and to stand
    straight and tall when it comes to the protection of their
    authority. The one branch of the three that is not as zealous
    as it ought to be is the legislative branch.
        Now, I understand that cases can be made for quick action,
    but the record can be cited to show that the Congress, when the
    need is for quick action, that Congress can act and will act,
    and I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will continue to be zealous
    on this point and other points.
        When I came to Congress, I guess 85 percent of the monies
    came through the appropriations process, and today, only about
    a third or less come through the appropriations process. Now, I
    stand with you and will stand as long as I am a member of this
    Senate and live and can speak, I will be with you on this. I
    will respond to any emergency as quickly as will President
    Clinton or President Bush or President Reagan or President
    Nixon or President Truman. Truman is my favorite Democrat
    President in my time here, and I have been here longer than
    anybody else, 50 years.
        Did you know that out of 11,707 men and women who have
    served in Congress in these 215 years of our existence, out of
    11,707, only two have served longer than this Senator from West
    Virginia. I wasn't as zealous in protecting the constitutional
    power of the purse when I first came here to the Senate as I am
    today. But I have been on this committee now, I am in my 45th
    year, and this administration or any other administration--I
    don't care if it is a Democrat. It doesn't make any difference
    to me if it is a Democrat down there in the White House. I feel
    exactly the same way.
        I didn't go all the way with Mr. Clinton. When he asked me
    to bend to include the health reform in a reconsideration
    package so it would be severely limited debate time, I said,
    no, that is not the purpose of the Senate. We are here to
    debate. The American people need to know what is in that health
    package and we as members need to know what is in it. And so I
    did not bend and I will not bend for any President, with all
    due respect to every President.
        I am very concerned about this thing. Give them a little
    here and a little there and a little here, and the first thing
    you know, as Mr. Dirksen said about spending billions of
    dollars, the first thing you know, a little bit here and a
    little bit there and the power over the purse would be vested
    down there in the White House. And if you have studied the
    history of England like I have, you will be aware of the blood
    that has been shed by Englishmen to wrest the power of the
    purse away from tyrannical monarchs and to vest it in the House
    of Commons, the people's representatives.
        I say all this with due respect to you, but I am with you,
    Mr. Chairman, on this. Any time, anywhere, any hour of the 24
    hours, I will be with you.

                          TRACKING OF FOREIGN VISITORS

        Now, on to a couple of my questions. One crucial component
    of ensuring our homeland security is ensuring that we as a
    government know which foreigners are visiting our country, why
    they are here, and that they depart when they are required to
    do so. Our existing visa tracking systems are not doing the
    job. One of the major criticisms of the former Immigration and
    Naturalization Service was and remains its inability to
    adequately track the entry and subsequent exit of the non-U.S.
    citizens who come to the United States and for whatever reason
    overstay their visa.
        For instance, only recently, the Department of Justice's
    Inspector General released a report stating that there are
    significant deficiencies in the tracking of foreign students.
    The Acting Assistant Secretary of the new Bureau of Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement agreed with the IG's conclusion that
    they need more resources to properly manage one of the many
    tracking systems.
        What steps are you taking to ensure that this system is on
    track and can be deployed in a timely fashion? I believe the
    budget before us requests only $480 million for the new entry-
    exit visa tracking system. This is only a $100 million increase
    over last year's level. Many members of Congress and outside
    experts are concerned about the lack of progress in
    implementing this system. It is my understanding that the
    Department has not yet determined what technology will be used
    in developing the system. So what steps are you taking?

                               U.S. VISIT SYSTEM

        Secretary Ridge. Senator, the entry-exit system that we now
    like to call the U.S. VISIT System was one of the highest
    priorities for the new Department as we took a look at the work
    that we had inherited from the old INS. Candidly, we made an
    internal assessment that there was more work that needed to be
    done, better work needed to be done, and expedited work had to
    be done in order to meet the timetable in order to get a system
    up and operational at the airports and seaports by the end of
    this year, as mandated by the Congress of the United States.
        My colleague, Secretary Asa Hutchinson and I, now that we
    have reins and responsibility over that program, have refocused
    our internal work. We have combined the work that they had been
    doing with our science and technology unit so we could take a
    look at the technology applications that are out there in the
    world today. We know that it will be quite a challenge to get
    the system up and operational at airports and seaports by the
    end of this year, but that is what Congress mandated. We
    inherited it, and we are going to do everything we possibly can
    to get it up and operational in a way that is consistent with
    your intent and, frankly, consistent with the need of the
    country. We have a legitimate need to know who is coming in,
    when they are coming in. We have a legitimate need to know if
    they left.
        I will tell you, Senator, that there are real challenges to
    take that same approach and apply it to our land borders, and
    we will have to address them both publicly and privately, I am
    sure. But I would be prepared to come back with a couple of my
    colleagues to explain to the Congress the kinds of things we
    are doing in order to meet the deadline by the end of the year.
        Senator Byrd. But the----
        Secretary Ridge. I have not let any money out yet, Senator.
    We are not going to put out a request for proposal until we are
    satisfied internally that we have done the hard work that we
    needed to do and maybe should have been done before in order to
    get this thing prepared to let a contract in order to get it
    done.
        Senator Byrd. You are to be applauded. You are to be
    applauded for that.
        But let me ask this question. As I said earlier, the budget
    before us requests only $480 million for this new tracking
    system, only $100 million increase over last year's level. Do
    you feel that this is adequate? Do you think this is an
    adequate amount? Do you think the funding request is adequate?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I believe that it is. At least,
    that is the figure we requested based upon earlier
    calculations. We are doing our own internal calculations based
    on our technology team taking a look at our needs, and if it is
    not enough, you have given me some reprogram authority and I
    think your first admonition to me would be, if it is not enough
    and you need a few extra dollars, you ought to find it within
    your own operation before you come back to us. So that is
    exactly how we would go about trying to resolve and find any
    additional dollars.
        So again, we can report back to you, and you will require
    us to report back to you and we should report back to you in
    the near future as to the progress we have made on this
    initiative.
        Senator Byrd. And you would----
        Secretary Ridge. Congress started talking about this in
    1996 and has put substantial money in the budget starting, I
    think, last year, perhaps the year before. We know we have to
    accelerate things in order to make it happen and we are going
    to do everything we can to make it happen.

                             ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSES

        Senator Byrd. During floor debate on the Iraqi war
    supplemental appropriations bill, an amendment to add $30
    million for the study and deployment of anti-missile defense
    systems for commercial aircraft was narrowly defeated. A few
    days later, you publicly commented, Mr. Secretary, that
    deployment of this type of technology was merited and deserved
    to be looked into by the Department. Does the Department
    believe that the potential threat to commercial airliners from
    such an attack is sufficient threat to warrant the deployment
    of anti-missile defenses? If so, what funds would be used to do
    this and what level of funding and which agency within the
    Department should take the lead in the effort?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, we have not concluded for policy
    purposes that commercial aviation should be equipped with
    military-type anti-MANPAD devices, but we have concluded that
    the threat is significant enough to proceed on a couple of
    paths. Clearly, working with other agencies in the government,
    and it has been working quite some time, the proliferation of
    these devices around the world requires the attention of State,
    Defense, and other agencies and they are focusing on that.
        Clearly, given the fact that there have been futile uses of
    this equipment in other countries gives reason for us to work
    with local law enforcement and aviation security folks to
    develop protocols, security protocols with regard to the areas
    around the airport as well as other adjustments conceivably in
    flying the aircraft.
        And the third piece of this is for us to take a look at the
    existing technology and also perhaps the development of new
    technology that might have an application to commercial
    aviation. We have reprogrammed some money from the Department
    of Defense, and we are going to use some of those dollars to
    begin that technical inquiry to look at effectiveness,
    efficiency, cost, and the like. So we have begun that process
    with some of the dollars that you have given us the opportunity
    to reprogram.
        Senator Byrd. How much money have you used--has been
    reprogrammed for this purpose?
        Secretary Ridge. Basically, I think, Senator, Congress took
    a look at it and I think we have reprogrammed about $420
    million from DOD. It goes across a wide range of issues, and I
    can't tell you today the specific dollars that we are going to
    initially invest in taking a look at MANPAD technology, but I
    do know that in my conversation with our leader there, that
    some of these dollars are going to go to an initial effort
    there. Depending on that research, again, it is part of our
    responsibility to pick and choose among priorities with the
    dollars you have given us that we have now and in the 2004
    budget. We are asking for over $800 million in the science and
    technology piece, which I presume will mean that--I can only
    anticipate we are using some of those on this research, as
    well.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to impose on your
    time overlay, but would I have time for one or two more
    questions?
        Senator Cochran. Yes, sir, Senator, if the Secretary can
    oblige us. I hope he can. We are now advised that the vote that
    was to occur at 12 has been put off until 1:45, so that is not
    a problem, but he has been sitting there a pretty good while.
        Senator Byrd. He is a much younger man.
        Senator Cochran. He has cooperated very----
        Senator Byrd. He is a much younger man than I am. I know he
    is tired.
        I know you are tired.
        Secretary Ridge. Thank you, sir.

                        VULNERABILITY OF CHEMICAL PLANTS

        Senator Byrd. But I have two more questions. One deals with
    chemical plants. Last month, the General Accounting Office
    reported that chemical plants remain vulnerable to a terrorist
    attack. Using data from the Environmental Protection Agency,
    the GAO noted that 123 chemical facilities across the country,
    if attacked, could inflict serious damage and expose millions
    of people to toxic chemicals and gasses.
        Now, I remember when I was--earlier in my career, we had
    the largest, I suppose, about the largest chemical plants in
    the Kenora Valley anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. Perhaps
    we have lost some of them in recent years as we have lost a lot
    of our other industries. But the administration identified
    chemical plants as part of the critical infrastructure in its
    national strategy for the physical protection of critical
    infrastructure and key assets report.
        In your written response to my question at our March 27
    hearing, you identified as one of the several that you
    identified, you identified chemical facilities in close
    proximity to large populations as one of our most significant
    vulnerabilities. The CBO estimated that it will cost $80
    million over 5 years to conduct the vulnerability assessments
    associated with our chemical plants, and yet the administration
    has not requested any funding, as I understand it, for this
    purpose.
        Why have not the resources, the requested resources to
    enhance security at chemical plants, been requested and what
    plans do you have to improve security in the area, including
    the identification of appropriate resources to accomplish these
    goals?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I can't agree or disagree with
    the dollar figure associated with the cost of securing these
    sites, so I will pass on that estimate. I don't know enough
    about how they concluded that, so I will just leave it alone.
        First of all, a lot of the chemical companies have begun
    their own internal vulnerability assessments and defray that
    expense as a corporate expense.
        Also, I think you are aware that there is legislation
    pending or will be pending before the Senate of the United
    States so that we can address this very important issue as we
    go about securing those sites on a risk management basis that
    offer the greatest potential for catastrophic personal harm and
    consequences.
        I will tell you that this is one of the areas, Senator, if
    I might link this question with a question and an inquiry that
    we had before about the Freedom of Information Act. We will
    want the chemical companies, as we will want some other
    companies, to look real hard at potential vulnerabilities and
    be honest and critical in that assessment, and we will want
    them to share that with us. Now, that is not information that
    we necessarily want to put in the public domain. We don't want
    to provide a road map to terrorists by revealing publicly some
    of the vulnerabilities we have at these sites.
        So it is an interesting question because it raises who
    should do the vulnerability assessments, frankly, and who
    should pay for them. I think, clearly, I believe that the
    companies should pay for them. Should they share that
    information with us--can we find a way so that they share it so
    we can give them some direction to secure the venues and reduce
    the vulnerabilities? I want them to do that.
        Do we need some legislation? I believe we will be in a
    position to work with this committee and other committees to
    see that we get that legislation during this period of
    Congress. But again, I would tell you, Senator, I think most of
    these chemical companies are traded on the public stock
    exchange. There are a lot of legitimate expenses they deduct
    before they pay taxes, and it seems to me that one of the most
    legitimate expenses in the post-9/11 era is the cost of
    enhanced security to protect your employees, to protect the
    community in which you have the facility and protect the
    interests of the people that own the plant, so I look forward
    to those continuing discussions, Senator.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you. I have other questions which I
    will submit for the record. I do have one final question, Mr.
    Chairman, and you have been very, very liberal, as I said, with
    me, and I want to thank you and I want to thank the staffs on
    both sides. We have excellent staffs who have helped us to
    prepare.

            FUNDING FOR IDENTIFIED HOMELAND SECURITY VULNERABILITIES

        On March 27, Mr. Secretary, of this year, I asked you to
    provide the committee with your written assessment of the ten
    homeland security vulnerabilities that you are most concerned
    about, and I thank you for responding rapidly. It wasn't a
    request that was put aside and delayed and perhaps forgotten,
    but you responded quickly and your response was useful in
    making final decisions on the supplemental appropriations act
    that Congress approved.
        In your response, you noted that the threat environment is
    continually changing, but that you did have the guidance, you
    did have guidance that helped you to focus your priorities.
    This response, which is not classified, focused on potential
    attacks on chemical facilities, nuclear power plants, large
    dams, liquid natural gas storage facilities, electric and
    telecommunications systems, data storage systems,
    transportation systems such as rail and air transportation
    systems, water supplies that are vulnerable to contamination,
    food processing centers, and petroleum handling facilities such
    as pipelines, and ports. Excellent, excellent response.
        The President has signed authorization bills to expand
    Federal investments in many of these areas, such as port
    security and drinking water security, but the President has not
    requested funding for these new authorizations. In fact, if
    your vulnerability guidelines to the President's budget are
    compared, if you compare your vulnerability guidelines to the
    President's budget, there does not appear to be much, if any,
    correlation. Now, can you tell this subcommittee where in the
    budget are the resources to cope with each of these
    vulnerabilities?
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, the first resource is, I think,
    the most important first step that we take in this country, is
    looking at those sectors of our economy that we itemize and
    refer to in our letter to you, and then take a look at the
    vulnerabilities in that sector, take a look at the threat as it
    relates to that sector, then make some conclusions as to how
    much it would cost to protect whatever vulnerabilities we find,
    and then the next question is, who is to defray the cost?
        The President has requested a rather substantial sum of
    money for us in the fiscal year 2004 budget to conduct those
    vulnerability assessments, and again, some of it are dollars
    that very appropriately will be expended by us to do those
    assessments on our own. But part of the function of the new
    Department, and the Congress provided a private sector advocate
    and the private sector intersects with the Department in so
    many different places, in the Science and Technology
    Directorate, in the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
    Protection Directorate, and one of the challenges we have, and
    we welcome the task, is to engage the private sector, those
    that haven't begun their own vulnerability assessments, to do
    that and to work with us to identify on a risk management basis
    what should be hardened, and our job, frankly, is to convince
    them it is in their interest to harden it.
        Senator Byrd. But, Mr. Secretary, you haven't really
    answered my question. I have listened very carefully. Let me
    say this again. The President has signed authorization bills to
    expand Federal investments, so the decision has been made with
    respect to who is going to do some of this, these investments.
    The President has signed authorization bills to expand Federal
    investments in many of these areas, such as port security and
    drinking water security. But the President, the Chief
    Executive, has not requested funding for these new
    authorizations.
        Now, what I am saying is, if you compare your vulnerability
    guidelines, which were very, very good, as you compare them to
    the President's budget, there doesn't appear, at least to this
    Senator and to this Senator's staff, there doesn't appear to be
    any correlation.
        So my question was, and maybe you can't answer it, can you
    tell me where in the budget are the resources to cope with each
    of those vulnerabilities that you have set forth in response to
    my request earlier this year. You may want to----
        Secretary Ridge. Senator, I would be happy to go back over
    it. You ask a very appropriate question. I think there are
    dollars dealing with some of the transportation infrastructure.
    I think there are dollars dealing with food safety. I don't
    think they come up by any stretch of the imagination to the
    level that Congress authorized, and I would say to the Senator,
    I think when it comes to the identification of risks, I think
    we may have agreement, general agreement, but I also think when
    it comes to appropriating the money consistent with the
    authorizations that there is an opportunity for Congress, as
    well, to shift its priorities in terms of the national budget,
    having passed the authorization bills, to take a look at the
    appropriations process, match it against authorizations, and in
    the years ahead, work with us to meet some of those priorities
    that we have identified and you have identified in the
    authorization process and come up with additional dollars in
    the appropriations process.
        Senator Byrd. Well, may I just comment----
        Secretary Ridge. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd [continuing]. And this is all I have. We have
    done that repeatedly. Congress has done that repeatedly and
    appropriated monies and the President has turned the back of
    his hand, as he did on the $2.5 billion that was designated as
    emergency. So Congress has been out front. We have appropriated
    monies time and time and time again, only to see this
    administration turn its back on the appropriations.
        And so the rhetoric, the rhetoric has not matched, has not
    matched reality. So I say to you, yes, we want to work with you
    and we want to appropriate the monies, but I hope that this
    administration will take a look at its responsibilities and
    particularly its rhetoric in so many instances and not veto, or
    in effect veto, the funding that the Congress has appropriated.
        I thank you for your work----
        Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Byrd [continuing]. For your listening to our
    complaints, and hopefully, we can work together in ensuring the
    increased safety of our country in these matters.
        Secretary Ridge. Thank you, Senator. Yes, sir.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your
    cooperation with our committee and we appreciate your service
    to the country. Senators may submit written questions, and we
    would request you respond to them within a reasonable time.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                        preserving agency mission focus
        Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the Department
    of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that agency functions not directly
    related to homeland security are not diminished or neglected. However,
    there is concern that non-homeland security missions over time may not
    receive adequate funding, attention, visibility, and support within a
    department under tremendous pressure to succeed in its primary security
    mission. How will DHS ensure that proper attention is given to non-
    homeland security missions, such as providing assistance to victims of
    natural disasters?
        Answer. We recognize that many elements of the Department such as
    FEMA, the Secret Service and the Coast Guard have critical missions in
    addition to their specific homeland security responsibilities. As such,
    I meet frequently with all of my leaders to ensure that we are carrying
    out all of our missions.
        We understand that our responsibility to the Congress and the
    taxpayer includes ensuring that both our homeland security and non-
    homeland security missions are adequately resourced and carried out.
    Our fiscal year 2004 budget acknowledges our non-homeland security
    missions and requests that the Congress provide resources to ensure
    that those missions are fully discharged. Our Congressional
    justifications elaborate on these missions and responsibilities.
        The Department is currently setting up formal mechanisms and
    measures to monitor the performance of all of its activities, including
    non-homeland security activities. As required by the Government
    Performance and Results Act, the Department will publish performance
    measures for its activities in its first annual Performance Report in
    February 2004 and as part of its fiscal year 2005 Annual Performance
    Plan. The Department will use the results of the performance measures
    to help determine resource requirements.
                                risk management
        Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 calls for DHS to carry
    out comprehensive assessments of vulnerabilities of the key resources
    and critical infrastructure of the United States, including risk
    assessments to determine the risks posed by particular types of
    terrorist attacks. Using this information, DHS is to identify
    priorities for action by DHS, other Federal agencies, State and local
    governments and the private sector. What is the timetable for the
    comprehensive assessments and the subsequent setting of action
    priorities and milestones to protect key resources and critical
    infrastructure? What have DHS identified as the areas with the highest
    risks and how are these areas being specifically addressed?
        Answer. The Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
    Protection Directorate (IAIP) is addressing this issue on several
    tracks. The IAIP is implementing a plan to conduct standardized
    vulnerability assessments for all critical infrastructure sectors. This
    group of assets was identified during our work on Operation Liberty
    Shield. This project, named Project 180, will enhance security at key
    sites through strategic enhancements and eliminate the need to place
    National Guard and State police at times of heightened threats. On a
    more comprehensive level, the IAIP also has implemented a plan to
    conduct standardized vulnerability assessments for all critical
    infrastructure sectors. Vulnerability assessments will span all
    critical infrastructure sector and be conducted in concert with other
    Federal agencies, States, and industry in order to ensure that
    interdependencies are understood and protective measures are
    prioritized for implementation. The IAIP will also, on an as needed
    basis, issue specific warnings and guidance for infrastructure
    stakeholders necessitated by specific threats or conditions.
        Question. DHS is responsible for the Homeland Security Advisory
    System. DHS, in coordination with other Federal agencies, is to provide
    specific warning information, and advice about appropriate protective
    measures and countermeasures, to State and local government agencies
    and authorities, the private sector, and others. Concerns have been
    raised about warning capabilities, particularly the lack of specificity
    and guidance to officials below the national level under the current
    Homeland Security Threat Advisory System. Are changes being considered
    to the Homeland Security Threat Advisory System to give more specific
    guidance regarding national and specific threats? If so, when will the
    new system be in full operation?
        Answer. Changes to the Homeland Security Advisory System are not
    being considered at the present time. To the fullest extent possible,
    specificity of threat information is conveyed in Information Analysis
    and Infrastructure Protection Directorate warning products, while
    ensuring classified sources and methods are protected. We intend,
    whenever possible, to tailor specific protective measures commensurate
    with the level and type of threat identified and collaborated by a host
    of intelligence sources, including the Department of Justice and the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as non-governmental independent
    studies. The Department is always seeking to improve the precision and
    accuracy of threat warning. For example, we developed a set of more
    specific protective measures the first time we elevated the threat
    level to Orange this year. Subsequently, we developed state specific
    criteria and further fine-tuned recommended protective measures.
    Distribution was done through law enforcement channels via the FBI,
    Secret Service, as well as direct contact through the Office of State
    and Local Government Coordination to the State Homeland Security
    Advisors for further transmission within their States. The Department
    always communicates any specific, credible threat information directly
    to officials in affected jurisdiction.
                department start-up issues/investment decisions
        Question. Mr. Secretary, you face the enormous challenge of
    integrating the 22 organizations transferred to the new Department into
    a single, unified whole. How are you mitigating the impacts of this
    transition on the capabilities of each of the transferring agencies to
    continue to perform their missions?
        Answer. While the challenge of integrating the 22 organizations
    into the Department of Homeland Security is enormous, the day-to-day
    work of the vast majority of employees is unchanged--they continue to
    perform outstanding service in the protection of our homeland. I have
    worked with the senior leadership of the Department and the heads of
    those component agencies to mitigate the impacts of this transition by
    ensuring that we have open lines of communication not only here in
    Washington but also across the county. The challenge requires us to
    take several approaches including regular leadership meetings both with
    myself and the Deputy Secretary, and with the Under Secretary for
    Border and Transportation Security, establishing clear lines of
    authority as we have reorganized both the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
    communications with managers and front line employees through town hall
    meetings and weekly employee newsletters.
        Question. What specific steps are you taking to integrate the
    chains of command and the personnel of these organizations without
    interfering with their current capabilities to perform their missions?
        Answer. As we move to unite the component agencies, we are
    consciously working to ensure that we remove institutional barriers to
    integration. The appointment of Interim Port Directors and interim
    Directors of Field Operations with the creation of the Bureau of
    Customs and Border Protection is just one example of how we are
    addressing these issues. These interim leaders were appointed because
    there must be ``unity of command'' and clear reporting channels which
    ensures that front line officers and supervisors know where to report,
    how to report, and with whom they will be coordinating their efforts.
        Question. What steps are you taking to meld the different cultures
    of these organizations in a way that preserves any unique, positive
    aspects while creating an overall ``Department of Homeland Security''
    culture?
        Answer. We have developed a seal and a strategy for ensuring DHS
    identity to help the different cultures coming into the Department
    identify with DHS. We are working to integrate the legacy identities
    into the DHS identity.
        Question. Secretary Ridge, last July 16, you and OMB Director
    Daniels sent a memo to selected departments and agencies on ``DHS
    Transition Issues.'' This memo described how you would identify ``day
    one'' issues requiring resolution at the moment DHS is created and how
    short and longer term transition plans would be developed. What major
    ``day one'' issues were identified, and how specifically are you
    resolving them?
        Answer. We have already accomplished many of our initial goals for
    the Department. From an operational capability perspective, we stood up
    the Homeland Security Command Center on a 24-7 basis and implemented
    Operation Liberty Shield, the first comprehensive, national plan to
    increase protections of America's citizens and infrastructure. We
    successfully launched the Ready campaign to build a citizen
    preparedness movement by giving Americans the basic tools they need to
    better prepare themselves and their families. The Department has
    focused on getting the resources our State and local partners need to
    them in an expedited manner, distributing millions of dollars in grant
    monies already. From a management perspective, we initiated a
    comprehensive reorganization of the border agencies as well as
    commenced work on a single human resources management system.
        Question. Which of these issues do you consider resolved, which
    will require additional efforts, and what are those additional actions
    that need to be taken?
        Answer. Management tasks are extremely important to the efficient
    operation of the Department. To that end we are presently engaged in
    efforts to ensure that infrastructure and support functions are
    provided in the most cost effective and efficient manner, establishing
    lead and support elements for the Department's various functions,
    ensuring efficient communication with our partners in the States,
    localities, and private sector, and coordinating effectively with other
    Federal entities. For example, we are standing up an investment review
    board, implementing a multi-year program and budget planning/
    development process, launching a program management office to develop
    an integrated business/financial management system, developing the
    Department's IT enterprise architecture, establishing a strategy
    development process, and developing a comprehensive human resources
    system.
        Question. Secretary Ridge, you issued a Transition Memo with OMB
    Director Daniels on July 16 which stated the importance of identifying
    any pending actions or policy decisions within the existing agencies
    that might be decided differently in the context of the expected new
    Department. Agency heads were asked to identify major subject areas and
    pending actions that qualified for discussions within this context.
    What major investment and policy decisions were identified, which were
    put on hold, and why do they qualify for rethinking in view of the
    creation of DHS?
        Answer. Since the Department was created, several processes have
    been established to promote efficiency and effectiveness and to avoid
    duplication. For example, the Department established a comprehensive
    Investment Review Process to integrate capital planning and investment
    control, budgeting, acquisition, and management of investments (both
    information technology and non-information technology) to ensure public
    resources are wisely invested. Investments that meet a pre-determined
    dollar threshold or may have significant policy implications are
    subject to review to ensure that spending on investments directly
    supports the Department's mission and provides optimal benefits and
    capabilities to stakeholders and customers. The Department has also
    established a process to develop strong business cases for its
    information technology investments and is using the business cases to
    determine which projects are funded. In addition, the Department has
    also established a 5-year budget planning process that includes program
    reviews to make funding decisions.
        The establishment of the Department has also resulted in the
    consolidation of several functions including responsibility for
    coordinating research and development under the Office of Science and
    Technology and performing intelligence capabilities under the Office of
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The formation of
    each of these organizations has resulted in a rigorous review of these
    functions to ensure integration across the Department and avoid
    duplication.
        Question. What are the emerging outcomes of these reviews, and when
    can you inform the Subcommittee about specific decisions on each of
    these matters?
        Answer. The Department recently initiated its investment review,
    budget development and business case development processes. Results
    should be available within the next several months. The Department has
    briefed Appropriations Committee staff on its progress in implementing
    functions performed by Science and Technology and Information Analysis
    and Infrastructure Protection and will apprise the Committee of our
    further progress on a continuing basis.
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 DHS budget request only assumes $30
    million in savings from consolidating administrative and management
    systems. Does achieving this much smaller amount of savings mean that
    last July's estimates of $65 million to $200 million were overly
    optimistic? Can you give us updated and detailed estimates of such
    savings?
        Answer. $30 million is the estimate of achievable savings in fiscal
    year 2004. The Department intends to pursue further savings in the
    future.
        Question. You have predicted that, after the first year, there may
    be some worker dislocations and a good possibility of job losses as you
    try to reduce overlaps among the entities transferring to DHS. When
    will you have a number estimate of what those dislocations and job
    losses will be and when will you inform the workers affected and the
    Congress?
        Answer. As we proceed with plans to merge the component
    organizations and to consolidate administrative and management systems,
    we will be able to identify areas of overlap and duplication of effort.
    DHS plans to minimize outright job losses, and will communicate with
    employees, their representatives, and the Congress as it develops its
    plans for staff restructuring and realignment.
        Question. What specific criteria are you establishing to determine
    who will be dislocated and who will lose their jobs, and will you
    provide affected employees a fair process in which they can appeal
    these decisions and the application of these criteria?
        Answer. It is too early to identify the specific criteria for any
    possible dislocation. The Department is committed to applying fair
    criteria to any decision process. It should be noted that the
    application of reduction in force rules under title five remains a
    requirement in the Department.
        Question. During and after consideration of the Homeland Security
    Act, you made an impassioned case that the DHS personnel system should
    be more ``flexible'' than the current Civil Service system. You
    received such flexibility in the Homeland Security Act, at least for
    after the year-long transition period. At this point, what changes do
    you envision for your civilian employees in terms of performance
    evaluations, compensation, and collective bargaining arrangements?
        Answer. We have established a Human Resource Management System
    Design Team to develop options for the changes we are encouraged to
    make in creating a new personnel system for DHS. That Design Team has
    just begun its research work. The schedule for presentation of options
    is later this fall.
                             information technology
        Question. According to the Department of Homeland Security's
    organizational chart, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) reports to
    the Secretary via the Under Secretary for Management. In this
    organizational position, will the CIO have the responsibility and
    accountability to effectively work across the Department to deliver and
    maintain the information technology necessary to meet the Department's
    mission?
        Answer. The CIO will lead the IT Capital Investment process which
    will have the strength it needs to ensure coordinated planning, and
    execution of integrated technology efforts throughout the department.
    These are critical to the Department, endorsed by the leadership from
    the Secretary through all of the Under Secretaries and other senior
    leadership. Given the commitment of this senior leadership team, the
    CIO will have the clout that he needs to integrate and optimize
    Information Technology throughout this department.
        Question. One of the key challenges facing the Department of
    Homeland Security is how to manage and merge, where appropriate, the
    existing information technology (IT) resources of the 22 different
    component agencies that were subsumed in the department. What is the
    Department's approach for managing this?
        Answer. We are developing an Enterprise Architecture, which will
    both identify the opportunities for consolidation and integration
    across the IT portfolio of systems and assets, and well as guide the
    approach we will then execute. Please see Question 19 for further
    details.
        Question. Do you envision any opportunities for efficiencies via
    consolidation and if so, would there be any monetary savings associated
    with such consolidation?
        Answer. We do expect to find opportunities for integration and
    consolidation across our IT infrastructure and enterprise solutions. We
    have initiated IT integration teams, working in concert with their
    business counterparts (subject matter and program personnel), in the
    areas of targeting systems, identity credentialing systems, and alerts
    and warning systems, business management systems, back office systems
    (human capital and resources, financial management, acquisition and
    procurement), and in IT infrastructure. We do anticipate monetary
    savings from this work, to be realized over the next two fiscal years.
    We have set a working target of $280 million.
        Question. Over the next year, what are the Department's critical IT
    priorities and what are the milestones for accomplishing them? What are
    they over the next 5 years?
        Answer.
     near term information technology priorities & milestones (fiscal year
                                     2003)
    Infrastructure
      --Installing new wide-area network circuits; provides increased
            bandwidth, and more stable backbone--June 2003.
      --Deploying satellite capability at NAC; provides KU Band and HF--
            July 2003.
      --Consolidation of help desk support across DHS; analysis and
            recommendations--July 2003.
      --Consolidation of data centers across DHS; analysis and
            recommendations--June 2003.
      --IT Disaster Recovery Plan; recommendations--August 2003.
    Enterprise License Agreements
        Develop plan for consolidating enterprise licenses--May 2003.
    Information Security Program
                IT Security
      --Develop and implement department-wide IT security program--July
            2003.
      --Submit annual Federal Information Security Management Report to
            OMB--September 2003.
      --Submit program and system-level plans of action and milestones to
            OMB--October 2003.
      --Draft consolidated department-wide IT Security Program budget
            submission (Exhibit 300) for fiscal year 2005--June 2003.
      --DHS-wide IT Security Conference in Baltimore, MD--July 2003.
      --FISMA report due to OMB--Sept 2003.
      --IT Security Training and Awareness Program strategy and plan-of-
            action completed--Sept 2003.
      --Implement department-wide IT Security Training and Awareness
            Program--Oct 2003.
      --Enterprise IT security architecture (coupled to overall
            architecture efforts)--Oct 2003.
      --Refined Governance process--Jan 2004.
      --Improved Incident Handling capability--Mar 2004.
    Enterprise Solutions
                Capital Planning and Investment Control
      --Develop and implement department-wide information technology
            capital planning and investment control process--April 2003.
      --Develop DHS-wide e-government strategy with goals, objectives and
            milestones for each project--May 2003.
      --Develop proposals to integrate existing systems IT infrastructure
            and back-office systems and eliminate redundant investments and
            obsolete systems--September 2003.
      --Submit with the DHS fiscal year 2005 budget the Exhibit 53, Form
            300s for major IT projects (annual cost of $5 million or more
            and lifecycle cost of $25 million or more)--September 2003.
                Enterprise Architecture
      --Develop a detailed roadmap (migration strategy) for instituting a
            DHS enterprise architecture that builds upon the proposal to
            integrate existing systems.--October 2003.
        --Provide to OMB the ``as is'' architecture, including DHS
                directorates, identifying at least business application and
                technology layers (should reflect DHS' inventory review
                work underway)--June 15th.
        --Submit the modernization blueprint or ``to be'' architecture,
                identifying how they map to the Federal EA and business
                layer--August 15th.
      --Develop DHS wireless architecture and implementation plan--July
            2004.
                Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA)
      --Provide update on meeting GPEA requirements--July 03 and October
            2003.
                E-government Initiatives
      --Serve as managing partner of Disaster Management and Project
            Safecom and provide update--August 2003.
      --Participate in Geospatial Information One-Stop, Vital, e-grants, e-
            training, smartbuy, business compliance one-stop, and e-
            grants--fiscal year 2003 and 2004.
    longer term information technology priorities & milestones (fiscal year
                                   2004-2005)
                Infrastructure
      --Move to a consolidated DHS network (unclassified)--March 2005
      --Move to a consolidated email environment--December 2004
                Enterprise Solutions
      --Move to consolidated Financial Management environment--TBD fiscal
            year 2005
      --Move to consolidated web self service for HR--December 2005
        Additional priorities and milestones are still being determined as
    part of our enterprise architecture effort and as business unit
    strategies and priorities emerge.
        Question. Reviews of the practices of leading information
    technology organizations in the private and public sectors show that
    implementing adequate investment and risk management controls and
    capabilities is essential to effectively managing information
    technology (IT).
        The Clinger-Cohen Act and OMB guidance direct Federal departments
    and agencies to develop and implement enterprise architectures (EA) to
    guide and constrain their information technology investments. What
    steps has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) taken to develop an
    EA? What is the schedule for completing it?
        Answer. The Office of the CIO has been working on the development
    of the department's EA since ``day one.'' An integrated project team
    has been established, with an experienced government project manager
    versed in enterprise architecture management and development. This team
    has already reviewed existing work in each of the incoming agencies,
    and has been mapping current business processes and inventorying IT
    assets. This work will guide the identification of priority
    opportunities for consolidation by highlighting potential and real
    overlap or redundancy.
        We have also initiated a unique partnership in the development of
    our EA. We have established a working group, through the National
    Association of State CIOs (NASCIO), that represents State and local
    interests and requirements. We have held two working sessions with the
    NASCIO group, and more are planned to help us refine and improve our
    EA. This effort has also served to enhance the partnership among
    Federal, State, and local government.
        Once the current state process mapping and inventory are
    accomplished (end of June 2003), we will then continue the mapping of
    desired state processes. This desired state will serve to identify the
    business goals and objectives, with a focus on the next 1-3 years, set
    forth by the Secretary and Under Secretaries of each directorate. The
    gap that exists between where we are (current state) and where we want
    to be (desired state) allows us to then develop our Migration Strategy
    (Roadmap). We expect to have the first version of our Roadmap by the
    end of this fiscal year.
    Enterprise Architecture Components--Target Dates
      --Business Strategy (Department level)--June 2003
      --Business Processes current state (Directorate level)--June 2003
      --Business Processes desired state (Directorate level)--August 2003
      --Information Requirements current state (Directorate level)--July
            2003
      --Information Requirements desired state (Directorate level)--August
            2003
      --IT Migration Strategy and Roadmap (the plan to move us from current
            state to desired state)--September 2003
      --Investment Process for IT (Department level)--March 2003
            (Completed)
      --Portfolio Management Process--July 2003
      --Inventory of IT Assets (Current Applications)--June 2003
      --Inventory of IT Assets (Infrastructure)--May 2003

        Question. What DHS official is responsible and accountable for
    delivering the EA?
        Answer. The Chief Information Officer.
        Question. What are the major information technology and systems
    needs of the Department of Homeland Security?
        Answer. We have identified the following major needs and
    objectives:
      --Program reviews of the major initiatives to ensure alignment with
            business strategy and objectives--Ongoing through the end of
            the fiscal year
      --Refinement of Business Strategies from each Directorate--Ongoing
      --IT skills inventory--Due to begin in June with completion by August
            2003
      --Staffing of IT leadership positions--Ongoing
      --Establishment of department level IT compliance and reporting
            processes--Ongoing with completion by end of fiscal year
      --Development of Department EA and Roadmap--Ongoing with completion
            of first roadmap by end of September 2003
      --Development of Joint and Consolidated Exhibit 300s for fiscal year
            2005 budget cycle--Ongoing with completion as part of OMB
            budget cycle
      --Completion of President's Management Agenda goals and objectives
            related to eGovernment for fiscal year 2003--Ongoing
        Question. What office within the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) will be responsible for managing the Department's information
    technology (IT) human capital, including assessing whether DHS has the
    right mix of IT knowledge and skills to achieve its mission?
        Answer. The Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer and the
    Office of the Chief Information Officer share this responsibility for
    managing IT human capital.
                     changing agency regional headquarters
        Question. Secretary Ridge, you have stated that you are ``making
    good progress'' on a plan to redraw the differing regional structures
    and boundaries DHS inherited from the transferring agencies, but that
    the plan still is under development. What specific objectives have you
    established for creating a new regional structure, and what specific
    issues are being considered in developing this plan?
        Answer. The overarching objective is to fulfill the DHS mission in
    support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security to provide for
    unity of purpose among agencies. True integration of mission and
    department-wide effectiveness would be jeopardized with significantly
    different regional structures among DHS agencies
        Question. What is the likelihood that the plan will contain major
    changes to the current regional structures and boundaries of agencies
    transferred to the Department, and which agencies do you expect to be
    most affected by the regional restructuring plan?
        Answer. We are in the data gathering and baseline analysis process,
    and the regional structure has not been developed. Impacts to various
    Departmental components cannot be estimated at this time.
        Question. Which is a more important objective for the plan--to save
    money or to increase operational effectiveness? How do you intend to
    make trade-offs between operational effectiveness and cost savings?
        Answer. Increased operational effectiveness is not incompatible
    with cost effectiveness. It will be important for the Department to
    develop a regional concept that optimizes key factors including cost
    while maintaining the highest level of operational effectiveness.
        Question. What specific criteria are you using to evaluate the pros
    and cons of the changes being considered, and which of these criteria
    do you consider most important and less important?
        Answer. DHS is evaluating the best way in which to merge the field
    operations of twenty-two legacy agencies, represented by nine different
    regional alignments. To accomplish this, all DHS components are working
    to: (1) develop a baseline understanding of the current regional
    structures in the component organizations; (2) develop the options for
    a regional concept to ensure day-to-day operations and incident
    responses are well coordinated and planned.
        Question. Do you have any preliminary estimates of the costs to
    implement the changes you are contemplating, and of the savings that
    might be made? When can we expect the costs to occur and the savings to
    be realized?
        Answer. Increased operational effectiveness is not incompatible
    with cost effectiveness. It will be important for the Department to
    develop a regional concept that optimizes key factors including cost
    while maintaining the highest level of operational effectiveness.
        Question. What specific progress are you making in developing the
    plan, and what schedule has been established to complete the
    restructuring plan and to inform Congress and the affected employees
    about your recommended course of action? Are you ahead, behind, or on
    that schedule?
        Answer. All DHS components are working together to analyze various
    data and develop a baseline understanding of the relevant issues
    associated with the creation of a new Department-wide regional
    structure. An initial round of data collection has been completed and
    passed to DHS staff for analysis
        Question. How long would you expect it to take to fully implement
    the plan should Congress approve it?
        Answer. An implementation plan and schedule will follow completion
    of our baseline analysis, which is still underway.
        Question. Please provide for the record the statement of
    objectives, terms of reference, fiscal guidance, operational
    assumptions, and mandated schedule that have been issued to guide the
    development of this plan.
        Answer. These elements could be developed as part of an
    implementation plan, which would follow completion of the baseline
    analysis. To reiterate the overall concept objectives are presented and
    discussed in Q-32, the overarching objective is to fulfill the DHS
    mission in support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security to
    provide for unity of purpose among all DHS component organizations
                                dhs headquarters
        Question. How much has the cancellation of the first process to
    find a headquarters facility delayed DHS's schedule to move into such a
    longer-term location?
        Answer. During the initial search for a headquarters building a
    number of critically important factors were identified. Security of the
    facility, the infrastructure existing to support DHS operations,
    adequate size, availability of fixtures and fittings, and the distance
    to Washington, DC sites at which the Department conducts business were
    all important to this process along with the availability of such a
    location within a very short time frame. After surveying the market, it
    was determined that the available properties did not present an
    acceptable alternative when all was considered. Since that time DHS has
    been able to temporarily occupy existing government facilities at very
    reasonable rent rates that satisfy the need for placing people. By
    August 2003 DHS should have control of space that provides for seating
    approximately 1000 of DHS's projected permanent, detail, and contractor
    staff. The interim time has provided opportunities for reviews of
    various alternatives for housing DHS and to further develop and refine
    requirements needed for the headquarters building over the longer term.
        Question. Why has DHS included $30 million in its budget request
    for design and site acquisition for a new headquarters, as opposed to
    requesting funds for this project through the GSA Federal Buildings
    Fund?
        Answer. The budget request included language that joined DHS and
    GSA together in working through the design and site acquisition
    process. We believe that this partnership will work well in satisfying
    DHS needs while ensuring that GSA's proven acquisition expertise is
    utilized.
        Question. How much of the $30 million requested is for design costs
    and how much is for site acquisition? What is the basis of these
    estimates?
        Answer. Site acquisition costs are largely dependent upon the
    geographic area in which the site is located. Downtown urban sites have
    typically higher costs than suburban sites. Design costs run in the
    range of about 10 percent of the expected building construction costs.
    Construction of a building in the 400,000 square foot range could be
    expected to be $140 to $180 million therefore design would be $14 to
    $18 million. The $30 million could provide for site acquisition and an
    initial conceptual portion of the design. Since DHS is still in the
    process of surveying acceptable sites for a permanent headquarters,
    estimates for design and acquisition costs would be speculative.
        Question. What is the cost estimate DHS is now using as a planning
    factor for land and construction of a longer-term headquarters?
        Answer. DHS is still identifying its needs and requirements for a
    permanent headquarters. Once more specific requirements have been
    defined, comprehensive estimates for land acquisition and construction
    costs will be developed.
                            departmental operations
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $294
    million for ``Departmental Operations'', including $30 million for
    design and acquisition of a new headquarters. Would you please provide
    a detailed breakdown and justification of the request, including the
    amount of funding, full-time equivalent positions, and object class
    breakdown for each of the specific activities funded by this request,
    including, but not limited to: the Office of the Secretary and
    Executive Management; the Office of the Under Secretary for Management,
    the Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Office of the Chief
    Financial Officer, the Departmental Operations Center, and the Office
    of the General Counsel.
        Question. Please provide the fiscal year 2004 funding and full-time
    equivalent positions requested for the Office of the Under Secretary
    for Border and Transportation Security; the Office of the Under
    Secretary for Science and Technology; the office of the Under Secretary
    for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; the Office of
    the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response; the Office
    of State, Local, and Private Sector Coordination; all public affairs
    activities of the Department; and all Congressional affairs activities
    of the Department. Also, identify each account where the funding for
    each of these offices and activities is requested in the President's
    fiscal year 2004 budget, and provide an object classification table for
    each.
        Answer. See Attachment 1.

                                       DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY--DEPARTMENTAL OPERATIONS--FISCAL YEAR 2004 REQUEST
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                Salaries &
                  Organization                      FTE        Travel Total   Supplies Total  Benefits Total     Training     Other Expenses       Total
                                                                  Budget          Budget          Budget          Budget       Total Budget
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Immediate Office of the Secretary.......              12        $555,000         $60,000      $1,560,000          $9,000        $156,000      $2,340,000
    Immediate Office of the Dep. Secretary..               6        $240,000         $30,000        $780,000          $4,500        $153,000      $1,207,500
        Security............................              20         $90,000         $60,000      $2,600,000         $15,000     $17,260,000     $20,025,000
    Chief of Staff..........................              31        $310,000        $155,000      $4,030,000         $23,250        $765,500      $5,283,750
    Executive Secretary.....................              34        $340,000        $170,000      $4,250,000         $25,500      $1,317,000      $6,102,500
    Special Asst to the Secretary/Private                 30        $600,000         $90,000      $3,900,000         $22,500        $165,000      $4,777,500
     Sector.................................
    NCR Coordinator.........................               3         $30,000          $9,000        $390,000          $2,250        $151,500        $582,750
    State & Local Affairs...................              23        $460,000         $69,000      $2,990,000         $17,250        $161,500      $3,697,750
    International Affairs...................               8        $160,000         $24,000      $1,040,000          $6,000        $154,000      $1,384,000
    Public Affairs..........................              43        $860,000        $129,000      $5,590,000         $32,250      $3,021,500      $9,632,750
    Legislative Affairs.....................              49        $735,000        $147,000      $6,370,000         $36,750        $174,500      $7,463,250
    General Counsel.........................              66        $330,000        $198,000      $9,240,000         $49,500        $933,000     $10,750,500
    Civil Rights & Liberties................              20        $200,000         $60,000      $2,600,000         $15,000     $12,010,000     $14,885,000
    Immigration Ombudsman...................               8         $80,000         $24,000      $1,040,000          $6,000        $154,000      $1,304,000
    HS Advisory Committee...................               4         $80,000         $12,000        $520,000          $3,000        $152,000        $767,000
    Privacy.................................               4         $80,000         $12,000        $520,000          $3,000        $152,000        $767,000
    Under Secretary for Management..........               6         $57,000         $18,000        $780,000          $4,500        $611,300      $1,470,800
        Strategic Initiatives...............               5         $22,500         $15,000        $650,000          $3,750      $1,152,500      $1,843,750
        Chief Financial Officer.............              60        $270,000        $180,000      $7,500,000         $45,000      $4,180,000     $12,175,000
        Procurement.........................              41        $184,500        $123,000      $5,125,000         $30,750      $1,670,500      $7,133,750
        Human Resources.....................              49        $220,500        $147,000      $6,125,000        $236,750      $1,094,500      $7,823,750
        Chief Information Officer...........              63        $283,500        $189,000      $8,190,000         $47,250     $73,457,500     $82,167,250
        Administration......................              37        $166,500        $111,000      $4,625,000         $27,750     $53,878,500     $58,808,750
    Border & Transportation Security........              67        $837,500        $201,000      $8,710,000         $50,250        $333,500     $10,132,250
    Info. Analysis & Infrastructure                       37        $462,500        $111,000      $4,810,000         $27,750        $318,500      $5,729,750
     Protection.............................
        Command Center......................               8         $35,200         $24,000      $1,040,000          $6,000      $4,354,000      $5,459,200
    Emergency Preparedness and Response.....              26        $325,000         $78,000      $3,380,000         $19,500        $313,000      $4,115,500
    Science and Technology..................              40        $500,000        $120,000      $5,200,000         $30,000        $320,000      $6,170,000
                                             ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Total.............................             800      $8,514,700      $2,566,000    $103,555,000        $800,000    $178,564,300    $294,000,000
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              intelligence issues
        Question. Congress contemplated that DHS would have a leading role
    in analyzing terrorist threat intelligence data and distributing that
    information to Federal, State, and local government agencies. The
    proposed Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) seems to be
    chartered with the same responsibilities. Will the creation of TTIC in
    any way diminish DHS's role in analyzing and disseminating terrorism-
    related intelligence information?
        Answer. No. Within the DHS, the Information Analysis and
    Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) has robust, comprehensive
    and independent access, mandated by the President and in the law, to
    terrorist-threat information relevant to homeland security. It has the
    mission to obtain information and intelligence, including through other
    DHS components, analyze that data, and take action to protect the
    homeland against terrorist attacks. The IAIP's Information Analysis
    (IA) division will conduct its own, independent threat and other
    analysis, and leverage the resources of other entities, such as the
    FBI, CIA, and TTIC. IA analysts assigned to TTIC will ensure that
    information gathered by the TTIC will be known to and accessible by
    IAIP. Conversely, data gathered by DHS (from its own collectors as well
    as State and local government and the private sector) reaches TTIC and
    informs its work.
        Question. Does DHS still intend to conduct its own intelligence
    analysis, and, if so, how will its analytical work differ from TTIC's
    and how will it avoid duplicating the work done by TTIC, the CIA, and
    the FBI?
        Answer. IAIP's analytic mission is focused on threats to the
    homeland, whereas the TTIC will integrate and analyze terrorism-related
    information collected domestically and abroad to form the most
    comprehensive threat picture. Unlike other intelligence, law
    enforcement, and military entities (such as the CIA, FBI, TTIC and
    DOD), the DHS' mission is focused on the protection of the American
    homeland against terrorist attack. In addition to assessing terrorism
    threats IAIP will map these threats to vulnerabilities. IA will
    leverage and not duplicate TTIC by ensuring that TTIC's work directly
    supports IA's focus on the homeland.
        Question. A White House Fact Sheet states that TTIC will ``play a
    lead role in maintaining an up-to-date database of known and suspected
    terrorists.'' Does DHS still intend to maintain its own terrorist
    database, and, if so, how will that database differ from the TTIC
    database?
        Answer. DHS IAIP and other appropriate entities are in the process
    of discussing where such databases will reside.
        Question. How can you assure us that the existence of separate TTIC
    and DHS intelligence analysis, terrorist databases, and information
    dissemination channels will not create confusion and overlap within the
    Federal Government?
        Answer. To reduce confusion and overlap, IAIP's analysis will be
    tailored to support DHS headquarters and DHS operational components
    such as the Homeland Security Advisory System. In addition, IAIP will
    be responsible for disseminating information to the State/local/and
    private sector.
        Question. It has been stated that TTIC eventually ``will fully
    house a database of known and suspected terrorists that officials
    across the country will be able to access and act upon.'' Does this
    interfere with DHS's statutory role to disseminate terrorism
    information to State and Local officials? How will you prevent
    confusion among these officials about which Federal organization is the
    authoritative source for such information?
        Answer. If information obtained by or analyzed at the TTIC
    represents a threat to homeland security, and needs to be passed on to
    State and Local officials, the IA's presence at the TTIC will ensure
    that the information is passed by DHS in accordance with its specific
    responsibility for providing federally collected and analyzed homeland
    security information to first responders and other State and local
    officials, and key private sector contacts.
        Question. Will the existence of TTIC interfere in any way with DHS
    having unfettered access to all relevant intelligence data from raw
    reports to finished analytic assessments collected and conducted by
    other Federal agencies?
        Answer. No, as discussed above.
        Question. Will DHS still be able to work directly and independently
    with the FBI, CIA, and other members of the Federal intelligence
    community to obtain terrorist threat information, or will all DHS only
    be able to obtain such information from TTIC?
        Answer. Information from the TTIC will just be one of many sources
    of Federal, State and local, and private and critical infrastructure
    sector information available to the IAIP. The DHS will continue to work
    directly with the intelligence community as appropriate.
         u.s. visitor and immigrant status indication technology system
        Question. How is the new U.S. VISIT system different from the
    proposed Entry Exit system that received $380 million in funding in the
    fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, and for which
    you have requested $480 million in fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. The U.S.-VISIT Program incorporates the requirements of the
    entry exit system. At the air and sea ports of entry, the inspections
    process will be very similar as it is today. The U.S.-VISIT system will
    modify and integrate the existing systems such as the Interagency
    Border Inspection System (a biographical name lookout or watch list
    search), Advance Passenger Information System (electronic manifests),
    the Arrival and Departure Information System (which matches the
    electronic arrival and departure records submitted by the commercial
    carriers), Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (non-U.S.
    citizen student information) and the IDENT system.
        Question. It was announced that the new U.S. VISIT system will
    replace the current National Security Entry Exit Registration System
    (NSEERS), integrate the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
    (SEVIS), and fulfill congressional requirements. The original Entry
    Exit system that the Administration, including the Office of Homeland
    Security, had been working on for the last year did incorporate NSEERS
    as its pilot project, would be interacting with SEVIS, and would
    fulfill congressional mandates. What will the U.S. VISIT system be
    doing that is different from the original Entry Exit proposal?
        Answer. As the U.S.-VISIT Program is phased-in, NSEERS will be
    phased-out. The U.S.-VISIT system will have the capability to use
    biometrics at both entry and exit. This new process will not adversely
    affect the current inspections process. As stated above, the U.S.-VISIT
    program will modify and integrate existing systems. The DHS expects to
    meet the first scheduled requirement at the air and sea ports of entry
    by December 31, 2003.
        Question. What is the rational for a full integration of SEVIS with
    U.S. VISIT?
        Answer. U.S.-VISIT is intended to manage the entry and exit of
    certain U.S. visitors and people. The integration with SEVIS is an
    important component of the U.S.-VISIT program. It is important that
    schools are aware of the requirement that a student register with the
    school within 30 days of arrival into the United States.
        Question. Given that SEVIS has significant requirements outside of
    tracking the actual entry and exit of students, how will the needs and
    responsibilities of the SEVIS system be maintained within U.S. VISIT?
        Answer. The full functionality of SEVIS will be retained and
    maintained. The integration of SEVIS into the U.S. VISIT will allow for
    the seamless exchange of foreign student data.
        Question. The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations
    Resolution requires that an expenditure plan for the initial $380
    million appropriated for Entry Exit be submitted to this Committee.
    Additionally, specific information was requested about how the NSEERS
    program was developed. It has been several months--when will the plan
    be submitted?
        Answer. We anticipate that the expenditure plan will be submitted
    to Congress and the GAO in June 2003.
        Question. The information on the NSEERS program was due to the
    Appropriations Committees on March 20, 2003, from the Department of
    Justice. Have you been coordinating with them on this report and when
    do you expect it to be submitted?
        Answer. BICE or BCBP is working closely with DOJ to provide the
    information.
        Question. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate had
    responsibility for the Comprehensive Entry Exit project. Who will be
    responsible for the new U.S. VISIT project?
        Answer. The Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate
    will continue to have responsibility for and manage the U.S.-VISIT
    Program.
        Question. What is the total amount of funding that you expect will
    need to be invested in this system for full deployment? Are you on
    schedule for full deployment of the system by 2005?
        Answer. At this point in time we believe that the fiscal year 2003
    and fiscal year 2004 are the appropriate amounts. The U.S.-VISIT
    Program has three important phases culminating respectfully at the end
    of the calendar year 2003, 2004, 2005. However, U.S.-VISIT will be a
    system that will continually evolve in order to take advantage of
    emerging technologies and processes in order to support the ongoing
    needs. The schedules for each of the phases are extremely aggressive.
    While we believe Phase I is achievable, there is further analysis and
    planning required for Phases II and III, therefore, we are in the
    process of developing an expenditure plan for fiscal year 2004 and
    2005. In addition, we also expect to engage private industries to
    assist us in meeting these aggressive schedules.
        Question. It was announced that the first phase of U.S. VISIT will
    be operational at international air and sea ports by the end of 2003.
    In the absence of an approved expenditure plan, what funds are being
    used to continue the development of the U.S. VISIT system, such that
    you will be able make this deadline?
        Answer. The U.S.-VISIT Program has been approved to spend $5M to
    prepare an expenditure plan, which consists of an acquisition strategy,
    risk management, workforce breakdown schedule, security plan, and
    privacy assessment
        Question. Please provide the Committee with a project plan with
    detailed milestones for how you expect to achieve the end of year 2003
    deadline, and an explanation of the exact functionality that will be
    available to each of the organizations that must enter data into or get
    data out of the system.
        Answer. This information is included in the expenditure plan, which
    will be provided to Congress.
        Question. Will biometrics be incorporated into the system by the
    end of 2003? If so, what are the specific biometrics that the system
    will capture? Will the biometric be captured and verified at primary or
    at secondary inspection?
        Answer. The U.S.-VISIT system will have the capability to use
    biometrics at primary inspection at certain ports of entry by the end
    of 2003.
        Question. How will the exit of visitors to the United States be
    recorded into the U.S. VISIT system, and will this capability be
    available by the end of 2003? What is the current status of the
    Advanced Departure Information System (ADIS)?
        Answer. The exit is the most challenging piece of the U.S.-VISIT
    Program. We will have the capability to collect all of the biographic
    information (electronic arrival and departure manifests) on all
    passengers that travel through the air and sea ports of entry. Under
    the NSEERS, IDENT was deployed at exit locations to capture and verify
    the identity of NSEERS registrants.
        The Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) has been developed
    and is currently receiving the electronic arrival and departure
    manifests from the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) carriers. In the next few
    months we will complete an analysis of the matching of the arrival
    record with the departure record. We will compare these matching
    results with the Form I-94 information contained in the Non Immigrant
    Information System (NIIS).
        Question. Will the U.S. VISIT system have the capability to report
    on overstays to Congress by the end of 2003?
        Answer. Beginning on January 1, 2004, the U.S.-VISIT system will
    have some ability to report on overstays. For example, we will be able
    report overstay information on Visa Waiver travelers from the ADIS
    system.
        Question. How do you plan to make the identified overstays an
    investigative priority within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement?
        Answer. Under NSEERS, we were able to identify registrants who
    overstayed their period of admission, or did not register upon exit. We
    will build upon the lessons learned from this pilot to identify
    overstays in the U.S.-VISIT program. In addition, the Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) have developed policies and
    procedures to identify and locate these registrant overstays. The U.S.-
    VISIT Program is working closely with the Bureau on this issue.
        Question. It was announced that the U.S. VISIT system will allow
    the Department of Homeland Security to end the domestic registration
    that has been conducted under the National Security Entry Exit
    Registration System (NSEERS). Under the Department of Justice, the
    domestic registration of NSEERS had been scheduled to end in April of
    2003, what steps have you taken that are different from that previously
    planned end of domestic registration?
        Answer. Domestic registration for NSEERS registrants concluded on
    April 25, 2003. The required 30-day and annual re-registration is
    currently under review.
        Question. By ending the NSEERS program, are you suspending the
    special registration that selected individuals are subject to at entry?
        Answer. No, the port of entry registration will continue. There are
    no recommendations to expand the list of current countries, although,
    there will likely always be additional processing for certain aliens
    identified as being of special interest. To the extent required by 8
    CFR 264.1(f)(2)(i), the public will be notified, by publication of a
    notice in the Federal Register, of expansion of the nationalities
    subject to special registration at ports of entry. However, per 8 CFR
    264.1(f)(2)(iii), neither the Secretary of State (SOS) nor the
    Secretary of Homeland Security (SHS) are required to make public their
    criteria for registration. Therefore, either the SOS or the SHS can
    amend the criteria at any time without public notice.
        Question. By ending NSEERS, are you suspending that portion of the
    program that requires registrants who remain in this country for 1 year
    after their initial registration to re-register with the Department?
    Are you suspending that portion of the program that requires
    registrants who remain in the country 30 days after arrival to re-
    register with the Department? If yes, what is the rationale for this
    change?
        Answer. No suspension is currently planned for the required 30-day
    and annual re-registration.
               ``project bioshield'' vaccine acquisition program
        Question. DHS is seeking $890 million in mandatory spending for
    ``Project Bioshield'' to buy biowarfare vaccines and medications. The
    program is intended to encourage drug manufacturers to increase
    research and production of biowarfare defenses. Based on the
    development maturity and production readiness of the needed vaccines
    and medications in the next 18 months, can DHS effectively and
    efficiently spend such a large amount of funds in one fiscal year?
        Answer. The Administration estimates obligating $890 million for
    BioShield procurements in fiscal year 2004. Based on the current state
    of the science, and the expectation that the proposed authority will
    allow DHS and HHS to actively pursue industry partners in this effort,
    the Administration expects to make major investments in a next-
    generation anthrax vaccine, and the next-generation smallpox vaccine,
    and smaller but still important procurements for countermeasures for
    botulinum toxin. Production constraints may result in the delivery of
    countermeasures over a multi-year period, but barring a change in the
    science, we expect to be able to enter contracts for the entire
    estimated amount.
        Question. How many different vaccines and medications actually will
    be ready for DHS purchase in the next 18 months, and what is the cost
    estimate for each?
        Answer. There will be continued procurement of currently produced
    smallpox vaccine (Acambis) and anthrax vaccine (BioPort), as well as
    heptavalent and pentavalent botulinum antitoxin that will be produced
    in the next 6 to 18 months (Cangene). In addition, two new vaccines are
    expected to be ready through Project BioShield within the next 18
    months. These include a new generation anthrax vaccine, as well as a
    new smallpox vaccine. The costs of the new generation vaccines are not
    yet available, but a working group is meeting regularly, and
    determining costs is one of its top priorities.
        Question. Please provide for the record a detailed statement
    demonstrating for each vaccine and medication its development maturity
    and production readiness and how that status supports obligation of
    specific funding amounts in fiscal year 2004.
        Answer. Initiatives to support the intermediate-scale advanced
    development of rPA and MVA vaccines are planned for late fiscal year
    2003 and early fiscal year 2004 respectively. These initiatives may
    include collection of preclinical and clinical data, such as:
    production and release of consistency lots; formulation, vialing and
    labeling of vaccine; development of animal models in at least two
    species to support the FDA animal rule; process, assay and facility
    validation; and clinical evaluation in initial phase II trials. For
    next-generation recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) anthrax vaccine,
    two candidate products are in early product development. Preclinical
    data for this vaccine are expected to be submitted between July 2003
    and September 2004, and clinical data are expected to be submitted by
    March 2004. The estimated date for completion of this phase of the rPA
    vaccine project is June 2004. For next-generation Modified Vaccinia
    Ankara (MVA) smallpox vaccine, two candidate products are in early
    product development. Preclinical data for this vaccine are expected to
    be submitted between July 2003 and September 2004, and clinical data
    are expected to be submitted by June 2004. The estimated date for
    completion of this phase of the MVA vaccine project is September 2004.
                                  coast guard
        Question. What specific criteria would you apply if faced with a
    choice between carrying out a non-homeland security mission and a
    homeland security mission by the Coast Guard?
        Answer. As a military, maritime, multi-mission organization, the
    Coast Guard recognizes that its Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) and
    Non-Maritime Homeland Security (non-MHS) missions are not mutually
    exclusive. Resource allocation efforts, at the strategic and tactical
    level, are made by Operational Commanders utilizing their values,
    experience, training, judgment, and a keen eye toward balancing the
    risks involved in the situation at hand. This is truly one of the Coast
    Guard strengths.
        Consider the tactical resource allocation example of a Coast Guard
    cutter and embarked helicopter patrolling the waters off the south
    coast of Florida. The multi-mission capabilities of these assets and
    the people who crew them result in a resource mix that on any given day
    might:
      --Respond to a call from a sinking sailboat (non-MHS mission--Search
            & Rescue);
      --Conduct a boarding on a commercial fishing vessel (non-MHS
            missions--Marine Safety, Living Marine Resources, and Marine
            Environmental Protection);
      --Interdict a ``go-fast'' approaching U.S. shores (MHS missions--
            Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security; Drug Interdiction; Migrant
            Interdiction);
      --Escort a Naval ship during a military out load operation (MHS
            missions--Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security; Defense
            Readiness).
        Should a situation unfold in which a MAYDAY call and ``go fast''
    sighting occur simultaneously, the Coast Guard Operational Commander
    would utilize the assets available in crafting a response, keeping in
    the forefront of his or her mind the premise that human life takes
    precedence.
        A second example, this one in the realm of strategic resource
    attainment, pertains to the President's fiscal year 2004 budget
    request. The funds requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget are
    critical to overall mission balancing efforts and to the sustainment of
    the Coast Guard's high standards of operational excellence across all
    missions. It is important to note that every MHS dollar directed to the
    Coast Guard will contribute to a careful balance between its safety and
    security missions, both of which must be properly resourced for
    effective mission accomplishment. The fiscal year 2004 budget reflects
    steady progress in a multi-year resource effort to meet America's
    future maritime safety and security needs. This new funding will
    positively impact performance in all assigned missions.
        In performance-based organizations such as the Coast Guard,
    resource attainment and allocation decisions are made with the
    overarching mission outcome in mind. Coast Guard decision-making
    criteria is focused on successful mission performance, and led by our
    values, training, experience, judgment, sense of balance, and risk
    management skills.
        Question. Some Coast Guard supporters claim that Deepwater's 20-
    year duration should be cut in half. Such an action might increase
    costs by about $4 billion in fiscal years 2005-2010, although it might
    save about $4 billion in fiscal years 2010-2020. Can the Department of
    Homeland Security budget afford such increases in the near term?
        Answer. The Administration considers Integrated Deepwater System
    (IDS) funding in conjunction with all agency requests based upon
    national priorities. The President's fiscal year 2004 request of $500
    million for the IDS funds critical initiatives is consistent with the
    fiscal year 2004 funding level reflected in the March 7, 2003 Report to
    Congress on the Feasibility of Accelerating IDS to 10 years. The IDS
    contracting strategy provides the Coast Guard the flexibility to adjust
    the proposed implementation schedule depending on budget variances.
        Question. After September 11, 2001, the need for tamper-resistant
    identification cards became a priority for all agencies of the
    government issuing these types of cards. The fiscal year 2003
    supplemental appropriations Act provides $10 million to the Coast Guard
    for updating the Merchant Mariner Documents provided to certain
    qualified crew members. Please tell the subcommittee how you plan to
    use the supplemental appropriations provided.
        Answer. Fiscal year 2003 supplemental funding will be used to
    provide contractor support at the Regional Exam Centers (REC) to
    accommodate workload surges resulting from the enhanced security
    processes; install technological improvements such as electronic
    fingerprinting capabilities to reduce processing time and upgrades to
    the database for mariner documentation tracking and record keeping;
    provide more Investigating Officers in the field to adjudicate security
    issues discovered on mariner applicants; and, where possible,
    centralize those functions not requiring face-to-face contact with the
    applicant.

                 SPEND PLAN FOR $10 MILLION SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Planned
                Item Description                   Cost          Execution
                                                               (Fiscal Year)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additional personnel and equipment at         $5,000,000       2003/2004
     the RECs...............................
    Electronic Fingerprinting Equipment.....       1,000,000            2003
    Additional Investigating Officers.......         700,000       2003/2004
    Additional personnel for screening and         1,900,000       2003/2004
     evaluation support.....................
    Mariner credentials database upgrades...       1,000,000       2003/2004
    Additional program management and                400,000            2003
     project support........................
                                             -------------------------------
          Total.............................      10,000,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The upgrades for issuing credentials to mariners operating in the
    Marine Transportation System will ensure that credentials are never
    issued to those who pose a threat to national security or marine
    safety. This new system includes a more robust vetting process for
    mariners and more personal interaction between the mariner and the REC
    to verify the applicant's identity. In addition, a more tamper-
    resistant card is being issued to minimize the chance of misuse. The
    Coast Guard will continue to work with other agencies, especially the
    Transportation Security Administration, to achieve a ``good
    government'' solution that is fast, accurate, and consistent.
        Question. Are all of the agencies of the Department of Homeland
    Security that are in the process of developing more secure
    identification cards for employees, such as the Coast Guard,
    Transportation Security Administration, Citizenship and Immigration
    Services, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, working
    together in a consolidated approach to the research, development and
    implementation of new tamper-resistant identification cards? Wouldn't
    it be more cost-efficient to have a Department-wide system for tamper-
    resistant identification cards?
        Answer. Through the Department's investment review and IT
    consolidation processes, a consolidated approach is being taken to
    different programs such as credentialing.
        Question. The Coast Guard received $400 million in fiscal year 2003
    supplemental funding through the Department of Defense for defense-
    related activities in the War on Iraq. What responsibilities, if any,
    does the Coast Guard have in the aftermath of the war or in rebuilding
    Iraq? Will available funding cover the costs associated with these
    Coast Guard activities? If not, do you have estimates of the additional
    funding needed to cover the cost of these activities?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is awaiting information from the Combatant
    Commander on the exact needs for Coast Guard forces to assist in the
    rebuilding of Iraq. However, over half of the Coast Guard forces
    deployed have already been released by the Combatant Commanders; the
    CGC DALLAS, one Port Security Unit and four 110 foot patrol boats
    deployed to EUCOM and the CGC BOUTWELL and CGC WALNUT deployed to
    CENTCOM are all returning home shortly or have already arrived.
        Four 110 foot patrol boats, three Port Security Units and four Law
    Enforcement Detachments remain in the Arabian Gulf to support CENTCOM,
    and no timeline has been established for their return.
        The Department of Defense has been appropriated funds within the
    IRAQI FREEDOM Fund of the 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental
    Appropriations Act of which ``up to'' $400 million may be transferred
    to the Coast Guard to cover the costs for supporting Operation IRAQI
    FREEDOM. The Coast Guard is still working with the Department of
    Defense to transfer those funds, but the Coast Guard expects to receive
    sufficient funds to cover the reconstitution of all its deployed
    forces. Depending on the length of the post-war deployment, the Coast
    Guard will coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security and the
    Department of Defense to identify the proper resources to support and
    reconstitute the important multi-mission Coast Guard assets that remain
    in the Arabian Gulf.
        Question. The President's fiscal year 2004 budget proposes to
    consolidate several existing Coast Guard accounts: Operating Expenses,
    Environmental Compliance and Restoration, and Reserve Training into one
    Operating Expenses account; and Acquisition, Construction and
    Improvements and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation into one
    Capital Acquisitions account. Is this consolidation of accounts
    necessary? What is accomplished by combining these accounts?
        Answer. The intent of the consolidation is to ensure more
    consistency, simplicity, and flexibility across all DHS components.
        The Operating Expenses appropriation is comprised of the Coast
    Guards traditional Operating Expenses (OE), Environmental Compliance &
    Restoration (EC&R) and Reserve Training (RT) accounts. Environmental
    Compliance & Restoration is a natural fit as it's utilized for clean
    ups of hazardous sites, battery recovery operations or minor
    restorations of contaminated facilities which is a typical use of
    operating expense resources. Reserve Training is also a natural fit
    since it is used for military pay and benefits, training, operational
    equipment and travel expenses--normal uses of Operating Expenses.
        The Capital Acquisitions appropriation is comprised of the Coast
    Guards traditional Acquisition, Construction & Improvements (AC&I),
    Research Development Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E) and Alteration of
    Bridges (AB) accounts. RDT&E fits into the Capital Acquisitions
    structure since these resources, primarily, are the precursor to major
    and minor acquisitions, focused on forming the business and performance
    case for the follow-on procurements. Although we are not requesting
    resources for Alteration of Bridges in fiscal year 2004, recapitalizing
    highway and railroad bridges fits into the structure of a capital
    acquisition process.
                      emergency preparedness and response
        Question. Which functions (budgets, personnel, daily operations,
    etc.) of the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the National Disaster
    Medical System and the Nuclear Incident Response Teams transferred from
    the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Health and Human
    Services and the Department of Energy to the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS)?
        Answer. For the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS),
    operations, budgets and authorities have been transferred into DHS. DHS
    and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have entered into
    a memorandum of understanding that provides the basis for HHS-continued
    administrative support for personnel, procurement, finance, and other
    administrative systems until these functions can be moved to DHS or the
    beginning of fiscal year 2004, whichever is sooner. HHS continues to
    support the personnel system used for the activation of approximately
    8,000 civilian volunteers. The NDMS legislative authorities (Public Law
    107-188) transferred to DHS, and the Under Secretary for Emergency
    Preparedness and Response (EP&R) became the head of NDMS.
        The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) is a multi-agency
    response element. The operational control of the DEST transferred from
    the FBI to DHS on March 1st. While each agency supplies its own
    personnel and equipment to the DEST, DHS has assumed the administrative
    and logistical responsibilities for the team.
        All program management responsibilities for the Nuclear Incident
    Response Teams including budgeting, staffing, training, equipping,
    strategic planning, and maintenance remain with the Department of
    Energy (DOE). The responsibility for establishing standards; certifying
    accomplishment of those standards; conducting joint and other exercises
    and training; evaluating performance; and providing funding for
    homeland security planning, exercises, training, and equipment is now
    the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security.
        The emergency response assets of DOE/National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) will deploy at the direction of the Secretary of
    DHS through the Under Secretary for EP&R, with the exception of the
    regional Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams, which retain the
    authority to self-deploy. While deployed, the emergency response assets
    fall under the operational control of the Secretary of DHS for the
    length of the deployment. All operational functions will be coordinated
    through the Under Secretary for EP&R or his designee, and will be
    consistent with current Presidential Decision Directives, Executive
    Orders, and interagency contingency plans. All deployed assets will
    support the designated Lead Federal Agency and the On-Scene Commander.
        Question. It has been said that DHS will have operational control
    over the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the National Disaster Medical
    System and the Nuclear Incident Response Teams. What is meant by
    operational control? Will the three teams essentially remain at their
    current departments but receive funding through DHS? Do you foresee any
    obstacles in this arrangement to the successful operation of these
    vital systems?
        Answer. DHS and HHS have entered into a memorandum of understanding
    that provides the basis for HHS-continued administrative support for
    personnel, procurement, finance, and other administrative systems until
    these functions can be moved to DHS or the beginning of fiscal year
    2004, whichever is sooner. HHS continues to support the personnel
    system used for the activation of approximately 8,000 civilian
    volunteers. Having the personnel system continue within HHS has not
    adversely affected the readiness of the NDMS. Operational control for
    NDMS means managing the System on a day-to-day basis, including
    authority to activate and deploy, and to direct and manage response
    teams when they are deployed to an incident. DHS is also responsible
    for the strategic development of the response teams.
        The DEST is a multi-agency response element. The operational
    control of the DEST transferred from the FBI to DHS on March 1st. While
    each agency supplies its own personnel and equipment to the DEST, DHS
    has assumed the administrative and logistical responsibilities for the
    team.
        All program management responsibilities for the Nuclear Incident
    Response Teams remain with DOE. The responsibility for establishing
    standards; certifying accomplishment of those standards; conducting
    joint and other exercises and training; evaluating performance; and
    providing funding for homeland security planning, exercises, training,
    and equipment is now DHS' responsibility.
        The emergency response assets of DOE/NNSA will deploy at the
    direction of the Secretary of DHS through the Under Secretary for EP&R,
    with the exception of the regional RAP teams, which retain the
    authority to self-deploy. While deployed, the emergency response assets
    fall under the operational control of the Secretary of DHS for the
    length of the deployment. Operational control is the authoritative
    direction over all aspects of nuclear/radiological operations and
    provides the authority to perform those functions of command and
    control over the response assets involving planning, deploying,
    assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
    direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control
    provides full authority to organize the deployed assets as the DHS
    Secretary, through the Under Secretary for EP&R or his designee,
    considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not, in
    and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters
    of administration, discipline, or internal organization. All
    operational functions will be coordinated through the Under Secretary
    for EP&R or his designee, and will be consistent with current
    Presidential Decision Directives, Executive Orders, and interagency
    contingency plans. All deployed assets will support the designated Lead
    Federal Agency and the On-Scene Commander.
        Question. Is it true that DHS is considering changing the name of
    the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate to the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) because of its national name
    recognition? If so, how is this possible since EP&R was created by
    statute? Have you discussed this possible change with the House and
    Senate authorizing committees? What would be the benefits of changing
    the name from EP&R to FEMA, since EP&R now encompasses more than what
    was formerly known as FEMA?
        Answer. Such a proposal is under consideration by the
    Administration. DHS will provide notification to the appropriate
    committees if such a change is formally proposed.
        Question. On April 15, 2003, the President made available to DHS an
    additional $250 million in Disaster Relief funding through EP&R to
    assist with the recovery of the Columbia Shuttle disaster and other
    ongoing recovery efforts from previous disasters. Since this additional
    funding is provided to assist with disasters that EP&R has already
    responded to and been working on, is there sufficient funding in the
    Disaster Relief account to sustain operations throughout the remainder
    of the fiscal year?
        Answer. Supplemental funds for the Disaster Relief Fund will be
    required this fiscal year. However, the Administration is still
    reviewing estimates of projected requirements, and will notify Congress
    formally at the appropriate time.
                        office for domestic preparedness
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget proposes to manage the First
    Responder initiative through the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The
    budget requests $3.5 billion in funding and earmarks $500 million of
    this amount for assistance to firefighters and $500 million to law
    enforcement. How does the Administration propose to allocate the $500
    million requested for firefighters and the $500 million proposed for
    law enforcement? For example, do you intend to retain the current grant
    programs now being managed by the Emergency Preparedness and Response
    directorate (formerly FEMA) which provide emergency management
    performance grants to states or grants directly to fire departments
    through the Assistance to Firefighters Grant program?
        Answer. There are two separate allocations of $500 million in the
    fiscal year 2004 request. One $500 million allocation will be for
    direct terrorism preparedness assistance to fire departments, similar
    to the Fire Act program being transferred from FEMA. Since its
    inception, DHS's Office for Domestic Preparedness has enjoyed a strong
    relationship with the Nation's fire service. The fiscal year 2004
    Budget strengthens that relationship while integrating direct fire
    department grants into the broader planning process for terrorism
    preparedness.
        The other $500 million allocation request for State and local law
    enforcement for terrorism preparedness and prevention activities which
    include: training and equipment for WMD events, support for information
    sharing systems, training of intelligence analysts, development and
    support of terrorism early warning methods, target hardening and
    surveillance equipment, and opposition force exercises.
        Question. No additional funding is requested for fiscal year 2004
    for critical infrastructure protection grants (funded in the fiscal
    year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act) or for
    high-threat urban areas (funded in the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated
    Appropriations Act and the fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations Act). Do you foresee a need to continue
    funding for either of these grant programs in fiscal year 2004? How
    much is included in the fiscal year 2004 request for each of these
    programs?
        Answer. The $200 million appropriated in the 2003 Emergency Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations Act was for reimbursement of states for
    expenses incurred protecting critical infrastructure during Operation
    Liberty Shield.
        Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) was developed and implemented
    after the fiscal year 2004 budget request was developed. We believe the
    states will find this program an integral part of their strategic
    planning, and continue to fund it with grant funds ODP allocates to
    them on an annual basis. DHS will expect state plans and applications
    to make adequate provision for major population centers. Instituting a
    separate grant application process for their needs will lead to overlap
    and duplication.
        Question. First responders funding has been awarded to states with
    a pass-through to local governments on the basis that statewide plans
    are developed to deal with the issues of terrorism preparedness,
    vulnerability assessments and the like, and that the funds be spent by
    the States and local governments consistent with this plan. How
    important do you believe the statewide plans are in assuring the proper
    expenditure of this assistance at the State and local level?
        Answer. The State Homeland Security Strategy is designed to give
    each State and territory one comprehensive planning document that
    includes response requirements for a WMD terrorism incident,
    irrespective of the sources of funding. It is developed based on
    assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and capabilities at both the
    State and local jurisdiction levels. It should serve as a blueprint for
    the coordination and enhancement of efforts to respond to WMD
    incidents, using Federal, State, local, and private resources within
    the state. Because of the importance of this information, the grants
    are awarded based on the submission of this state plan to ensure the
    state uses the funds according to the needs identified in the strategy.
        There have been many concerns from the government as well as first
    responders in the field regarding the grant funding reaching local
    jurisdictions in a timely manner. Therefore, the fiscal year 2003 State
    Homeland Security Grant Program I (SHSGP I) and SHSGP II incorporate a
    strict timeline to facilitate the release and obligation of this
    funding.
        The SHSGP I application kit was posted online on March 7, 2003.
    States had to submit their applications to ODP within 45, by April 22,
    2003. Applications were reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
    Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the states within 21
    days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time grant is
    awarded. As mandated by Congress, 80 percent of the equipment funds
    must be provided to local units of government. The required bi-annual
    Categorical Assistance Progress Reports must reflect the progress made
    on providing funds to the local jurisdictions.
        The SHSGP II application kit was posted online on April 30, 2003.
    States must submit their applications to ODP within 30 days, by May 30,
    2003. Applications will be reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
    Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
    days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time that the
    grant is awarded. As mandated by Congress, 80 percent of the total
    amount of the grant to each State must be provided to local units of
    government. The required bi-annual Categorical Assistance Progress
    Reports must reflect the progress made on providing funds to the local
    jurisdictions.
        Question. In testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee
    on the fiscal year 2003 supplemental request, you indicated, Secretary
    Ridge, that there may be reason to rethink how we distribute future
    terrorism preparedness funding, whether the population-based
    distribution formula historically used by the Office for Domestic
    Preparedness is appropriate, or whether it should take into account
    such factors as threat, vulnerability, critical infrastructure needs,
    and the like. Does the Administration plan to submit to the Congress a
    proposal to change the formula for the program? What changes in the
    formula will be sought?
        Answer. The current formula for the allocation of ODP funds to the
    States for the fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program
    (SHSGP) I and SHSGP II was computed on a base, pursuant to the Patriot
    Act, plus a population formula. Starting in fiscal year 2004, the
    Department will seek to make changes in how it distributes funding to
    the States. Each State and territory will continue to receive a base
    amount, but the balance of funds will utilize a multi-faceted formula,
    taking into account factors including threat and risk assessments,
    critical infrastructure of national importance, and population density.
    The Administration would support legislation to lower the base amount
    so that more funds are available to allocation based on other factors.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

                                 border issues
        Question. It has been 17 years since the Federal Government
    launched a major effort to upgrade U.S. borders and that effort focused
    only on the Southwest border.
        I have just sponsored the Border Infrastructure and Technology
    Modernization Act (S-539). The new bill will focus on U.S. borders with
    Canada as well as Mexico. This bill has the dual goals of facilitating
    the efficient flow of trade while meeting the challenges of increased
    security requirements.
        This will include:
      --More funding for equipment at our land borders--Additional funding
            for personnel
      --Additional funding for training
      --And, additional funding for industry/business partnership programs
            along the Mexican and Canadian borders.
        It is important for the border enforcement agencies to work with
    the private sector on both sides of the border and reward those
    partners who adopt strong internal controls designed to defeat
    terrorist access to our country.
        What are your thoughts on the importance of trade partnership
    programs along the Southwest border?
        Answer. Industry Partnership Programs (IPP) allow the BCBP to
    expand our influence beyond the borders and into Mexico, Central
    America, South America and the Caribbean. Under the umbrella of the
    Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), these priority
    initiatives include the Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP),
    the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC) and the Americas Counter
    Smuggling Initiative Program (ACSI). Each IPP enables the Trade to
    tighten our borders through the enhancement of supply chain security
    standards that deter smugglers from using conveyances and cargo to
    smuggle terrorist devices and narcotics. These complementary programs
    benefit both BCBP and the private sector by securing the integrity of
    shipments destined for the United States while promoting the efficient
    flow of trade.
        We are currently working on additional security requirements that
    take into account the additional terrorist and drug threat on the
    Southwest border for conversion of the LBCIP carriers to C-TPAT. BASC
    chapters have been established throughout Ecuador, Colombia, Costa
    Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela and most recently in Jamaica,
    where a chapter was founded in March 2003. The ACSI Teams continue to
    support BASC through security site surveys, briefings on smuggling
    trends and techniques and security and drug awareness training.
        The primary purpose of LBCIP is to prevent smugglers of illegal
    drugs from utilizing commercial conveyances for their commodities.
    Carriers can effectively deter smugglers by enhancing security measures
    at their place of business and on the conveyances used to transport
    cargo. By signing agreements with the BCBP, land and rail carriers
    agree to enhance the security of their facilities and the conveyances
    they use and agree to cooperate closely with BCBP in identifying and
    reporting suspected smuggling attempts.
        BASC is a business-led, BCBP supported alliance created to combat
    narcotics smuggling via commercial trade that was formed in March 1996.
    BASC examines the entire process of manufacturing and shipping
    merchandise from foreign countries to the United States, emphasizing
    the creation of a more security-conscious environment at foreign
    manufacturing plants to eliminate, or at least reduce, product
    vulnerability to narcotics smuggling. BCBP supports BASC through ACSI,
    which are teams of BCBP officers that travel to the BASC countries to
    assist businesses and government in developing security programs and
    initiatives that safeguard legitimate shipments from being used to
    smuggle narcotics and implements of terrorism.
        Question. What plans do you have to increase cooperation with the
    Mexican government on border issues?
        Answer. The Border Patrol component of the Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection will continue to work closely with the Mexican
    government on border issues regarding the safety and security of all
    persons living on and or traveling in the vicinity of the U.S./Mexico
    border. The close cooperation with officials of the Mexican government,
    both at the national and local levels, has recently lead to joint
    border safety initiatives aimed at protecting the lives of those who
    are endangered by the smugglers that prey upon them. The joint safety
    initiatives include water safety and rescue training and public service
    announcements which are broadcast in Mexico to warn border crossers of
    the dangers involved in crossing rivers, deserts and mountainous areas.
    These successful joint ventures with the Mexican government will
    continue to increase as the benefits to the citizens of both countries
    are realized.
                federal law enforcement training center (fletc)
        Question. Congress created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center (FLETC) to be the consolidated training center for almost all
    law enforcement agencies. As the law enforcement training arm of the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) it seems logical that FLETC
    should develop and conduct standardized training for all Homeland
    Security law enforcement and inspection personnel.
        Such a training approach would ensure that all law enforcement
    personnel receive appropriate and consistent instruction. This is
    particularly important as you retrain and cross-train border agencies
    which have been merged under DHS (e.g. Customs, Immigration, and
    Agriculture Inspectors).
        Congress specifically created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Facility in Artesia, New Mexico to handle the advanced and special
    training of almost all Federal law enforcement personnel.
        In the past, Federal agencies have chosen not to use FLETC
    facilities for training and instead have contracted with non-Federal
    institutions. Over the past few years, Congress has provided over $30
    million for the FLETC Artesia facility, alone.
        When the need for Federal Air Marshal training arose after
    September 11, FLETC-Artesia answered the call to duty by developing and
    providing this training in a remarkably short period of time. By way of
    example, FLETC-Artesia brought in three 727 airplanes for use in
    training to go along with the 18 firing ranges and 3 shoot-houses.
        FLETC-Artesia boasts 683 beds, state-of-the-art classrooms, and a
    brand new cafeteria to accommodate approximately 700 students a day,
    yet it has been running at around 320 students during fiscal year 2003.
        FLETC-Artesia's close proximity to the Southwestern border,
    recently constructed facilities and optimal training conditions
    certainly suggest the center should be highly utilized by DHS.
        How do you intend to provide training for the newly hired DHS
    personnel as continued training for existing DHS personnel in light of
    the new security challenges facing our country?
        Answer. As we enter a new era in law enforcement operations in the
    United States, the FLETC is a good example of the new government
    approach intended by the legislation creating the DHS: a means to
    harmonize the work of many law enforcement agencies through common
    training, while at the same time maintaining quality and cost
    efficiency. In fiscal year 2003, 65 percent of the FLETC's projected
    training workload will come from nine law enforcement agencies
    transferred to the new Homeland Security department. In fiscal year
    2004, this workload will continue to be above 73 percent of our
    estimated total Federal training workload.
        Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary
    Hutchinson, FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of DHS.
    Placing FLETC within the DHS will help to support the ``unity of
    command'' and the coordination and efficiency themes sought in the
    public law that created DHS. FLETC has a long history of service to
    many of the DHS components--the U.S. Secret Service, the former Customs
    and Immigration and Naturalization Services including the U.S. Border
    Patrol (USBP), the Federal Protective Service and more recently, the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
        With the start-up of the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
    and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is ready to help
    facilitate, develop, and implement new training and cross training
    programs. We recognize that much of this effort and expertise will
    necessarily come from the agencies involved, but there likely will be
    significant adjustments made over time to all DHS-related training
    programs, basic and advanced. Already, an effort is underway to
    systematically review existing training for these new entities and to
    address whatever capabilities are needed to meld the duties of the
    participants. In the meantime, training will continue unabated to
    achieve all of the hiring expectations of our agencies.
        Question. How do you intend to use FLETC facilities for training
    DHS employees?
        Answer. The national ``war on terrorism'' precipitated by the
    events of September 11, 2000 placed new and increased demands on the
    Nation's Federal law enforcement agencies. Officers and agents
    immediately began to work extended hours and many have been reassigned
    geographically and/or to expanded duties. Nearly all Federal law
    enforcement agencies made plans to increase their cadre of qualified
    officers and agents, and submitted urgent requests to the FLETC for
    basic law enforcement training far in excess of the FLETC's normal
    capacity. These requests were for increased numbers of graduates and
    for their speedy deployment to buttress the hard-pressed Federal law
    enforcement effort.
        The events of September 11 also increased the need for certain
    advanced law enforcement training conducted at the FLETC, especially
    classes associated with such issues as counter-terrorism, weapons of
    mass destruction, money laundering, etc. Likewise, the need for
    instructor training classes increased, to strengthen the cadre of
    instructors qualified to handle the training surge--at the FLETC and
    within the agencies.
        In addressing the unprecedented increase in training requirements,
    FLETC has conducted capability analyses to determine the set of actions
    most likely to result in optimum throughput without compromising the
    qualifications of graduating officers and agents, and maximizing the
    use of each of its training facilities. With the consultation and
    concurrence of its partner organizations (POs), FLETC leadership
    directed that training be conducted on a six-day training schedule
    (Monday through Saturday), thus generating a 20 percent increase in
    throughput capability. More importantly, the 6-day training schedule
    drives a corresponding compression of the length of each training
    program, effectively delivering each class of new law enforcement
    officers to their agencies weeks sooner than under the conventional
    training schedule. Should the 6-day training schedule be insufficient
    to meet the demand, an extended work day will be considered.
        In addition to the 6-day training schedule, FLETC has expanded its
    staff with a supplemental cadre of re-employed annuitants (primarily
    retired Federal law enforcement officers) who are contributing their
    skills and experience as instructors to help sustain the surge in
    training operations. This is a 5-year authority provided by Congress in
    fiscal year 2002.
        Further, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
    tasked by BTS with establishing a Training Academy Committee to
    identify and assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS
    training academies. This study will be the basis for determining the
    schedule and priority for training elements of DHS in a coordinated
    manner.
        Question. How should DHS use FLETC Artesia's facilities and
    specialized training capabilities?
        Answer. FLETC intends to utilize its Artesia facility to its
    maximum potential. At the request of the Under Secretary, Border and
    Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate, Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
    tasked with establishing a Training Academy Committee to identify and
    assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS training academies.
    The Committee will use a two phased methodology to identify the
    training assets and to develop a plan for operating the facilities
    employed by each of the Directorate's bureaus, and will also include
    the Coast Guard, Secret Service, and the Bureau of Citizenship and
    Immigration Services. The operational plan will provide the framework
    for coordinating academy training in all BTS bureaus. The Committee
    will develop and submit a report at the conclusion of each phase
    according to the timelines established by its charter. Once the
    Committee has identified all of the BTS training capabilities, FLETC
    can develop a more definitive utilization plan of facility usage at
    Artesia and all other sites.
       the national infrastructure simulation and analysis center (nisac)
        Question. The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
    Center (NISAC), located at Kirtland Air Force base and run by Los
    Alamos and Sandia Labs is one of the best analytical tools, not only in
    the country, but probably in the world. NISAC should be used as a
    critical management tool across the board by all DHS executives.
        NISAC's mission is to improve the robustness of the Nation's
    critical infrastructure (e.g. oil and gas pipelines, electrical power
    grids, roadways, harbors, etc) by providing an advanced modeling and
    simulation capability that will enable an understanding of how the
    infrastructure operates; help identify vulnerabilities; determine the
    consequences of infrastructure outages; and optimize protection and
    mitigation strategies.
        How do you plan on using this facility to its fullest potential?
        Answer. We anticipate that the NISAC will provide a capability for
    complex analysis of infrastructures, infrastructure interdependencies
    and project cascading effects for both tactical and strategic decision
    making. While NISAC is still in early development and the actual
    capabilities have yet to be proven in an integrated manner the initial
    capabilities look promising.
        Question. Where do on plan on locating it in the new organization?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations requires the
    development of a NISAC in New Mexico. During the initial phases of
    development the NISAC Program Office will be in Washington, DC and we
    will begin building technical capacity in New Mexico. A specific
    location for a permanent facility has not yet been selected. The NISAC
    will be a DHS owned and operated facility with a DHS management team
    and a resident contractor technical staff from academia, support
    contractors and the national laboratories.
                         purchase of the town of playas
        Question. Approximately one week ago, I sent you a letter
    suggesting the Department of Homeland Security purchase the town of
    Playas for the training of State and local first responders.
        As you are aware, Playas is a deserted company town in Southern New
    Mexico that could be used as a real world anti-terrorism training
    center.
        Playas incorporates almost 260 homes, several apartment buildings,
    a community center, post office and airstrip, a medical clinic,
    churches and other typical small town structures.
        This town would cost the government $3.2 million--a bargain that
    should not be passed up. While Federal law enforcement has access to
    modern training facilities at FLETC, State and local first responders
    do not have access to the same quality of facilities. Playas can meet
    this vital need in a cost-effective manner.
        Currently, New Mexico Tech, a member of Homeland Security's
    National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, has put together a proposal
    for the Department of Homeland Security through their Office of
    Domestic Preparedness to purchase Playas.
        What role do you foresee Playas playing in the defense of our
    homeland?
        Answer. At this time, a decision as to the role of Playas is
    undetermined, although the site could have potential value in a
    national training architecture. Playas' usefulness as a location for
    homeland defense preparedness training must first be assessed through a
    feasibility study to determine if acquisition of the property will make
    a contribution to the national first responder training program.
        Question. Will you evaluate the feasibility of using Playas as a
    training site for State and local first responders before we lose this
    unique opportunity?
        Answer. A feasibility study to determine the potential use of
    Playas as a training center would be the first step in the decision-
    making process. If upon review of the completed feasibility study a
    decision is made to move forward with utilizing the property for a
    training facility, a detailed plan will be developed to determine the
    most advantageous manner in which to acquire the property. This would
    be a lengthy process given the many legal issues involved, particularly
    if the decision is for the Federal Government and ODP to purchase or
    lease the property.
        DHS is committed to using existing training sites to their fullest
    capacity and capabilities before acquiring any additional facilities.
    Facilities under the control of DHS components, such as the U.S. Secret
    Service, Office of Domestic Preparedness, Federal Law Enforcement
    Training Center and the U.S. Coast Guard, will first be considered in
    assessing site usage for first responder training. To the extent
    feasible and necessary, DHS also will review the capabilities of State
    and local law enforcement academy sites, which may provide more cost
    effective means for training partnerships. At this time, there does not
    appear to be a need for the acquisition of a ``town'' setting to
    conduct presently identified training needs. Should circumstances arise
    that may warrant such consideration, DHS will be pleased to evaluate
    the Playas, NM site.
                              national guard issue
        Question. I have been told that the Department of Defense has
    decided to terminate National Guard support to the Department of
    Homeland Security's border inspection operations. I believe that the
    National Guard has been an intricate partner with Customs for well over
    a decade, providing the extra hands necessary to help inspect cargo at
    our land borders, seaports, and mail facilities. I believe there are
    approximately 350 National Guardsmen working alongside Customs in this
    capacity, at any given time.
        This work is of particular importance to New Mexico on our border
    with Mexico. There are approximately 52 guardsmen along the New Mexican
    border supporting a total of 90 plus Customs, Immigration and
    Agriculture inspectors. It is my understanding that for every guardsman
    who works searching cargo or screening mail allows an extra Department
    of Homeland Security (DHS) inspector to be on the frontlines looking
    for terrorists.
        As I understand, the Defense Department would like to place these
    guardsmen in positions (along the U.S. border) that are more ``military
    unique'', such as intelligence collection.
        Is now the time for DOD to move these guardsmen from these critical
    positions?
        Answer. In September 2002, DOD officially informed the U.S. Customs
    Service, now Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), that they
    would discontinue funding National Guard counternarcotics support of
    BCBP's Cargo and Mail Inspection operations (the only BCBP operations
    supported by National Guard soldiers) effective September 30, 2003. DOD
    subsequently changed this date to September 30, 2004.
        As a result of the September 2002 notification, aggressive hiring
    strategies to offset any negative impact of losing National Guard
    support were implemented. Through regular appropriations, supplemental
    funding and an overall increase in our inspector corps as a result of
    the March 1, 2003 transition to BCBP, our agency is prepared to do
    without National Guard support beginning October 1, 2004.
        Question. Shouldn't we be increasing the number of guardsman at our
    borders?
        Answer. As a result of the significant increase in BCBP staffing,
    as outlined above, it is not necessary to retain National Guard support
    at our borders, nor is it necessary to increase the number of National
    Guard soldiers at the border locations. BCBP welcomes National Guard
    support beyond September 30, 2004, but the support is not critical for
    BCBP to accomplish its mission.
        Question. If DOD pulls the Guard from the border will DHS need more
    funding to replace personnel?
        Answer. No. Through regular appropriations, supplemental funding
    and an overall increase in our inspector corps as a result of the March
    1, 2003 transition to BCBP, our agency is prepared to do without
    National Guard support beginning October 1, 2004.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

        Question. I understand that the Denver International Airport has
    been working closely with the Transportation Security Administration to
    modify its baggage conveyor system so the TSA can permanently install
    explosive detection systems to screen checked baggage at an estimated
    cost of $90 million.
        Denver has plans ready and the construction contracts in place and
    could get started today. However, Denver is still waiting for the TSA
    to release the initial $30 million that the TSA has committed to
    providing to get the first phase underway.
        I would hope that the TSA would get this crucial funding disbursed
    so that this important work could get started as soon as possible.
        Can you tell me why this funding has to date been withheld?
        Answer. TSA has been in negotiations with Denver on the funding
    process. These negotiations are in the final stages, and I hope to have
    a completed agreement by early June.
        Question. When do you expect the TSA will release the $30 million
    to Denver?
        Answer. TSA will release the $30 million once an agreement has been
    reached and executed by both parties.
        Question. What is the schedule for providing the remaining $60
    million?
        Answer. TSA is completing LOI plan which will describe the Federal
    commitment for Denver and other airports under the LOI authority.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

        Question. Why has the Administration requested $30 million for
    funding of the new Department of Homeland Security headquarters
    facility in the Department's budget as opposed to in the General
    Services Administration budget--where most Federal construction
    projects are funded? Does the Department intend to assume over time the
    construction and repair and alteration requirements of other facilities
    (such as ports of entry) which are now part of the new Department?
        Answer. The budget request included language that joined DHS and
    GSA together in working through the design and site acquisition
    process. We believe that this partnership will work well in satisfying
    DHS needs for ensuring that the permanent DHS headquarters is
    established at the earliest possible time while ensuring that GSA's
    proven acquisition expertise is utilized. This partnership should also
    result in GSA eventually taking over and operating the DHS headquarters
    building under the Federal Buildings Fund system with allowances made
    for the extent of DHS's contribution to the project. With regard to
    assumption of construction, repair and alteration requirements of other
    facilities which are now part of DHS, we intend to examine the most
    cost effective and efficient ways of accomplishing these activities.
     legacy custom service and immigration and naturalization service fees
        Question. A significant portion of the budgets of the new Bureaus
    of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement are based on the assumed collection of fees from the legacy
    Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service. What
    happens if these fees do not materialize or materialize at levels lower
    than estimated? How do you intend to bridge that funding gap should one
    occur?
        Answer. If funding shortages occur because of smaller fee receipts,
    BCBP will adjust the level of inspection services accordingly in order
    to function within available resources.
                            expiration of cobra fees
        Question. The COBRA fees--which provide funding for nearly 1,100
    legacy Customs personnel as well as nearly all overtime for the legacy
    Customs inspectors--expire at the end of this fiscal year. What, if
    anything, are you doing to extend these fees? Have you submitted
    legislation to the appropriate authorizing committees and discussed
    with them the need for the extension of these fees? Also, what
    contingency plans, if any, do you have in place to cover the costs of
    the current COBRA-funded functions should the fees not be extended in
    time?
        Answer. We have briefed both the HouseWays and Means Committee and
    the Senate Finance Committee staffs on the need for an extension of the
    COBRA fees, and both Committees have developed proposals to extend the
    fees. The expiration of the COBRA fees will present numerous problems
    for BCBP as well as fee paying parties-in-interest. Other existing
    statutes require that airlines be billed for overtime services and pre-
    clearance (19 USC 267 and 31 USC 9701) and that foreign trade zones and
    bonded warehouses be billed for inspectional and supervision services
    (19 USC 81n and 19 USC 1555). Other charges, such as fees for
    reimbursement of compensation of boarding officers under 19 USC 261
    will also need to be reinstated. These statutes are held in abeyance
    while the COBRA fees are in effect (see 19 USC 58c(e)(6)). While the
    reimbursements from these other statutes would offset some of the
    losses from the expired COBRA fees, the amounts are not expected to be
    significant. If the COBRA fees expire, service to international
    passengers and the trade would need to be reduced to a level
    commensurate with available funding. It should also be noted that the
    failure to reauthorize the fees provided for under the COBRA statute
    (19 USC 58c) will result in an additional loss in collections of
    approximately $1 billion annually. This represents the Merchandise
    Processing Fees, which are deposited into the General Fund of the
    Treasury as an offset to the commercial operations portion of the BCBP
    budget
                          revised department pay plan
        Question. A report from the Office of Personnel Management was due
    February 24 on the plan to merge the various individual pay and
    benefits systems in the new Department. An outline on issues to be
    considered in developing such a plan was delivered a few weeks after
    the due date. What is the status of the pay and benefits plan? When
    will a final plan be proposed? Do you anticipate that further
    legislation will be needed to implement the plan? What Federal agencies
    and entities, as well as outside organizations, are participating in,
    or are you consulting with, on the development of the plan?
        Answer. The Design Team which we have established to develop
    options for a new Human Resource Management System for the Department
    has been asked to address issues of pay and benefits as an integral
    component of the larger system design. The Design Team is conducting
    basic research during the early summer months. The schedule for the
    Design Team calls for the presentation of options later this fall. The
    authorities granted to DHS and OPM in the Homeland Security Act will
    allow us to address some of the differences of basic compensation in
    regulation--any changes to benefits or premium pay would require
    legislation. The Design Team has reached out to many Executive Branch
    agencies in the conduct of its research. In addition, they have met
    with private and public sector entities from around the country, they
    have consulted with the General Accounting Office and the Merit Systems
    Protection Board. And they will be conducting town hall and focus group
    meetings around the country with DHS employees and their
    representatives during the month of June. The Team itself includes
    human resource professionals from both DHS and OPM, management and
    employee representatives from DHS, union professional staff and local
    union representatives of DHS bargaining units.
                  national capital region airspace protection
        Question. Is it true that there are no air assets--either rotary or
    fixed wing--permanently assigned to the National Capital Region and
    that the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement helicopters
    currently protecting our airspace are borrowed from other parts of the
    country? How many assets have been assigned to this region and from
    which parts of the country are they being borrowed? How long are they
    expected to be assigned to this region? What are the impacts on the on-
    going operations at the other regions from which these assets have been
    borrowed? Is there a long term ``fix'' in the planning stages for this
    problem?
        Answer. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE),
    Office of Air and Marine Interdiction (OAMI) is providing two Blackhawk
    helicopters and two Citation Tracker aircraft with associated aircrews
    and support personnel for National Capital Region (NCR) air security
    operations. Additionally, OAMI is providing Detection Systems
    Specialists (DSSs) and four operator consoles from the Air and Marine
    interdiction Coordination Center to establish and provide 724 law
    enforcement air surveillance to the NCR. These assets are drawn from
    throughout the OAMI program and are rotated on a regular basis to
    minimize the impact to any one sector. The impact on aircraft
    maintenance at the other regions is the loss of productive man-hours to
    support the remaining aircraft, thus limiting the maintenance
    contractor's flexibility to meet other surge demands. There is no
    expectation of this mission terminating.
                               letters of intent
        Question. The fiscal year 2003 Iraqi War Supplemental (Public Law
    108-11) included a provision allowing the Under Secretary for Border
    and Transportation Security to issue letters of intent to airports to
    provide assistance in the installation of explosive detection systems.
    What is the status of this issue? Is the Office of Management and
    Budget delaying the issuance of these letters?
        Answer. TSA has received OMB approval to begin using the letter of
    intent (LOI) process included in Public Law 108-11. Along with the LOI,
    TSA and the airport develop and enter into a Memorandum of Agreement
    (MOA) to outline the specific details of the work to be accomplished to
    complete an in-line explosive detection system (EDS) solution. TSA is
    working to complete and LOI plan which will outline the Federal
    Government's commitment to EDS integration.
                   private mail radiation detection equipment
        Question. The Department has provided its employees who inspect
    U.S. Postal Service mail with radiation detection equipment. Does it
    also provide similar equipment for employees who inspect United Parcel
    Service and FedEx mail? If not, why not? Is there a plan to provide
    this equipment in the future?
        Answer. The equipment used by employees inspecting DHS deliveries
    is used while screening deliveries from the U.S. Postal Service, United
    Parcel Service, and FedEx. Its use has proven effective to date and it
    is expected that it will continue to be used in the future.
                              operation greenquest
        Question. By all accounts, the on-going anti-terrorism initiative
    known as ``Operation Greenquest'' is working quite well. However, there
    have been rumblings that the FBI may be attempting to take control of
    the Operation from the Department's Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement. Is this true? If so, does the Department support shifting
    control of the program from legacy Customs to the FBI? For what reason?
        Answer. In an effort to unify the U.S. Government's war against
    terrorist financing, the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice
    entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on May 13, 2003. This MOA
    assigns lead investigative authority and jurisdiction regarding the
    investigation of terrorist finance to the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI).
        Those cases that are determined to be ``terrorist financing'' cases
    will be investigated only through participation by the Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) in the FBI Joint Terrorism
    Task Forces (JTTF). All appropriate BICE-developed financial leads will
    be reviewed by the FBI, and if a nexus to terrorism or terrorist
    financing is identified, the leads will be referred to the JTTF under
    the direction of the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section
    (TFOS). There are no provisions in the current agreement between DHS
    and DOJ that allow for delegation of authority of terrorist financing
    investigations.
        In accordance with BICE's independent authority and jurisdiction
    relative to other financial crimes and money laundering investigations,
    BICE will be the lead investigative agency for financial investigations
    that are not specified as ``terrorist financing'' cases. BICE will
    continue to vigorously and aggressively proceed with its DHS mission to
    target financial systems that are vulnerable to exploitation by
    criminal organizations, and to protect the integrity of U.S. financial
    infrastructures.
       justice department's recent decision regarding illegal immigrants
        Question. On April 24, Attorney General Ashcroft announced that his
    agency has determined that broad categories of foreigners who arrive in
    the United States illegally can be detained indefinitely without
    consideration of their individual circumstances if immigration
    officials say their release would endanger national security.
    Apparently, Homeland Security officials appealed that decision but
    their objections were overruled by the Attorney General. There are
    significant costs that are born by detaining illegal immigrants until
    their eventual deportation. For instance, it is estimated that the
    detention of Haitians in Florida over a 6 month period has cost the
    Department $12.5 million. Given that the Justice Department decision
    could have a significant impact on the Homeland Security Department's
    budget, how will the costs of these policy decisions be paid and by
    whom? Is the Department making further appeals of the Justice
    Department's ruling in this case?
        Answer. BICE is fully supportive of the decision by the Attorney
    General to allow national security implications to be considered as
    part of bond determinations. This decision was requested by BICE in the
    face of a recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision which had
    ruled that bond determinations could only be based on individual
    circumstances.
        However, there are other factors which have the potential to
    significantly impact already tight funding for bed space in BICE
    detention facilities. For example, the Supreme Court's recent decision
    in DeMore v. Kim, upholding the constitutionality of mandatory
    detention, while welcome, requires BICE to take approximately 4,000
    aliens into custody in the near future. Other factors include increase
    detention needs based on SEVIS, NSEERS, and the absconder initiative.
    These new factors, combined with reductions to the funding level for
    the fiscal year 2003 Detention and Removal budget may require BICE to
    submit a request for supplemental appropriations.
        There were two reductions to the funding level for the fiscal year
    2003 Detention And Removal budget. In the appropriated account, $615
    million identified for the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee was
    reduced by $22 million in the Conference Report. In the User Fee
    account, Detention and Removal funds were reduced by $5.6 million due
    to a decrease in expected User Fee revenue. As a result, without an
    appropriation supplemental, 1,081 beds would have to be reduced to
    cover the deficit. If a reduction in beds is necessary, the result will
    be 9,729 fewer aliens being detained. For aliens in detention,
    approximately 92 percent are removed, while approximately 13 percent of
    aliens on the non-detained docket are removed. Thus, the reduction in
    1,081 beds may result in 7,686 fewer removals.
                              port security grants
        Question. On November 25, 2002, the President signed the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act of 2002, which addresses our need to
    quickly reduce the vulnerability of our seaports.
        On that day, the President said the following and I quote: ``We
    will strengthen security at our Nation's 361 seaports, adding port
    security agents, requiring ships to provide more information about the
    cargo, crew and passengers they carry.''
        The Coast Guard has since estimated the cost of implementing this
    Act at $1.4 billion in the first year and $6 billion in the next 10
    years.
        Congress has worked diligently to establish a mechanism for direct
    Federal grants to assist the ports. All together, we have provided $348
    million to help ports establish new security measures. Unfortunately
    none of these funds were requested by the Administration. In the most
    recent competition, ports sent in over $1 billion in applications for
    $105 million in funding.
        Mr. Secretary. Just 2 months after signing the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act, the President sent to Congress a budget
    for fiscal year 2004 that included no funds for Port Security Grants.
    Yet, in the State of the Union, the President said, that we've
    intensified security at ports of entry. How do you reconcile these
    statements with the President's request?
        Answer. There are elements within the Coast Guard's fiscal year
    2003 and 2004 budgets that represent a significant Federal investment
    in the increased security of our ports. These budgets make substantial
    headway in implementing the Coast Guard's Maritime Strategy for
    Homeland Security.
        For example, the Coast Guard developed and promulgated a Notice of
    Arrival regulation, which requires vessels to provide advance vessel,
    people, and cargo information to the Coast Guard. This regulation
    expanded the pre-9/11 Notice of Arrival requirements to include: 96-
    hour advance notice vice 24 hours; passenger and crew information; and
    additional information on previous ports of call and hazardous cargoes
    carried on board each vessel.
        To centralize collection and processing of Notices of Arrival, the
    Coast Guard established the National Vessel Movement Center. This unit
    collects all of the Notice of Arrival information and enters it into a
    database that is accessible to Coast Guard units, as well as other
    agencies, including Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
    the Centers for Disease Control.
        In response to the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) the
    Coast Guard is developing regulations to improve the security of
    vessels, waterfront facilities, and ports. The Coast Guard plans to
    publish these interim rules by July 2003 and final rules by November
    2003.
        Aside from Coast Guard, the fiscal year 2004 budget provides $462
    million in the IAIP account for vulnerability assessments and
    mitigation, as well as $18 million for the Customs Trade Partnership
    Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and Free and Secure Trade (FAST) initiatives
    and $62 million for the Container Security Initiative in the Bureau of
    Customs and Border Protection..
        Question. Mr. Secretary, the Administration has provided
    significant Federal aid to our airports to cover much, if not all, of
    the security costs associated with passengers and baggage screening,
    and I agree with that funding, but I am left wondering why port
    security is such a low priority. In the fiscal year 2003 omnibus bill,
    Congress approved $150 million of unrequested funds for port security
    grants. Would you commit to the Subcommittee that these dollars will be
    used immediately to cover some of the $1 billion of pending
    applications?
        Answer. Port security is a high priority within the Department. We
    will continue to work with the Administration in developing budget
    execution plans for the spending of fiscal year 2003 appropriated funds
    for port security grants.
                     transportation security administration
        Question. One of the entities folded into the new Department of
    Homeland Security is entitled the Transportation Security
    Administration, not the Aviation Security Administration. Yet, within
    the $4.8 billion TSA budget, only $86 million is requested for maritime
    and land security activities while over $4.3 billion is requested for
    aviation security. In fact, the budget request for administrative costs
    associated with TSA headquarters and mission support centers ($218
    million) is 2.5 times greater than the request for maritime and land
    security.
        Mr. Secretary, why has more funding not been requested for other,
    equally important modes of transportation? Based on your analysis of
    the vulnerabilities of the various transportation modes, is the
    security of the airlines more important than the security of our ports,
    our busses and subways or AMTRAK?
        Answer. DHS has requested substantial resources across the
    Department for security needs outside of aviation, including resources
    in the Coast Guard for ports and maritime security; in BCBP for cargo
    security; in IAIP for vulnerability assessment, intelligence, and
    infrastructure protection for all sectors including transportation; and
    in EP&R for emergency response. ODP recently proposed spending $75
    million on port security and $65 million on mass transit security in
    fiscal year 2003. For its part, TSA continues key standards-setting
    efforts, and will work closely with modal administrations of the
    Department of Transportation to help leverage resources of that agency,
    where appropriate, to accomplish security goals. This type of
    cooperation has already occurred in many areas, for example hazardous
    materials transportation by truck.
                       code yellow terrorism alert level
        Question. Mr. Secretary, on April 16, 2003, the Department of
    Homeland Security reduced the terrorism alert level from code orange to
    code yellow. According to your statement at the time, the change in
    threat level was the result of the Department's review of intelligence
    and updated threat assessments from the intelligence community.
    However, there have been numerous media reports that the Department
    also considered the cost of heightened security as a determining factor
    in the decision to move from orange to yellow alert.
        As we have discussed before, heightened alert levels require States
    and local government to spend more on protecting its citizens. On the
    day that you last testified before this subcommittee, the U.S.
    Conference of Mayors released a study that showed cities were spending
    an additional $70 million per week in personnel costs alone, to keep up
    with the demands of increased domestic security. I know that you have
    heard similar complaints from private industry.
        Shouldn't the Department be providing the resources to pay for
    heightened security, rather than lowering threat levels to avoid
    providing these resources?
        Answer. While the supplemental provided limited assistance with
    Operation Liberty Shield, The Administration as a general rule is not
    planning to reimburse costs associated with changing the threat level.
    However, we are making resources available (ODP etc.) to enhance their
    permanent capabilities to respond to increased threat. The President's
    budget requested $462 million for vulnerability reduction efforts under
    the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection. Part of that
    mission will take into account the consequences of loss, vulnerability
    to terrorism, likelihood of success by terrorists, terrorist
    capabilities, and threat assessments to determine the relative risk to
    critical infrastructure and key assets. Specifically, DHS has begun
    implementation of a plan to reduce the vulnerabilities of high value/
    high probability of success terrorist targets within the United States.
                    fire grants and first responder funding
        Question. Mr. Secretary, FEMA--in conjunction with the National
    Fire Protection Association--released a study on January 22, 2002,
    entitled ``A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service'' which reported
    that only 13 percent of our Nation's fire departments are prepared
    handle a chemical or biological attack involving 10 or more injuries.
    Last year, FEMA awarded $334 million in fire grants but received over
    19,000 applications that requested over $2 billion.
        Given the critical unmet needs of our Nation's first responders, I
    simply do not understand the Administration's lack of commitment to
    this program. In fiscal year 2002, the President refused to spend $150
    million approved by the Congress for this program. For fiscal year
    2003, the President proposed to eliminate all funding for the program.
    For fiscal year 2004 you are proposing a 33 percent reduction to the
    fire grants program from the 2003 enacted amount of $745 million.
        Please explain to the subcommittee why the Administration does not
    view this program as a critical part of our strategy to secure the
    homeland.
        Answer. The responsibilities of the fire service have expanded
    since 9/11 to include planning for and responding to possible terrorist
    attacks. However, one of our most significant concerns is that the
    current Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program does not emphasize
    these critical terrorism preparedness needs, and the allocation of
    specific grants is not coordinated with other State and local
    preparedness funds and plans. Also, States and localities have long
    asked for a one-stop shop for first responders grants.
        This is why the fiscal year 2004 Budget consolidates fire grants in
    the Office for Domestic Preparedness, with no less than $500 million of
    the President's $3.5 billion First Responder Program allocated for fire
    services. In addition, State and local governments may also use their
    formula funds to address fire service needs. As a result, we believe
    fire services will actually receive higher funding under the proposed
    Budget. While key aspects of the current Assistance to Firefighters
    grant program--peer review of competitive funding proposals and direct
    grants to fire departments--will be retained, this shift will allow
    these grants to be more focused on terrorism preparedness and better
    integrated with other State and local funding priorities.
                      drinking water system vulnerability
        Question. On June 12, 2002, the President signed the Public Health
    Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. That
    Act amended the Safe Drinking Water Act to require each community water
    system serving a population of greater than 3,300 persons to: conduct
    an assessment of the vulnerability of its system to a terrorist attack
    or other intentional acts intended to substantially disrupt the ability
    of the system to provide safe and reliable drinking water and, where
    necessary, develop an emergency response plan that incorporates the
    results of the vulnerability assessments. It also authorized grants to
    pay for basic security enhancements identified in the vulnerability
    assessments, such as fences, locks, and security cameras. Industry
    estimates show that the vulnerability assessments alone will cost $450
    million. Security enhancements are estimated at $1.6 billion.
        Has the President requested funds to help State and local
    governments make sure that our citizens can trust that their drinking
    water is safe?
        Question. The President has not requested funds to pay for upgrades
    to water systems at risk of a terrorist attack such as intentional
    introduction of chemical, biological or radiological contaminants into
    community water systems. Why is this not a priority of the President?
        Answer to SEC-107 and 108. The Department is currently in the
    process of working with the States to help them to assess their ability
    to deal with chemical, biological and radiological attacks. The Office
    of Domestic Preparedness, as directed by Congress, has refined the
    State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Process (SHSAS) that
    was originally established in fiscal year 1999 to assess threats,
    vulnerabilities, capabilities, and needs regarding weapons of mass
    destruction terrorism incidents at both the State and local levels. The
    fiscal year 2003 SHSAS will allow State and local jurisdictions to
    update their assessment data to reflect post-September 11, 2001
    realities, to include potential risks to the water systems, as well as
    to identify progress on the priorities outlined in their initial
    strategies. The refined process will also serve as a planning tool for
    State and local jurisdictions, and will assist ODP and its partners in
    allocating Federal resources for homeland security.
                                 support teams
        Question. The National Guard has thirty-two Weapons of Mass
    Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams prepared to deploy rapidly to
    assist a locality in responding to a chemical, biological or nuclear
    attack. Each of these teams has been certified as fully ready to assist
    civil authorities respond to a domestic weapon of mass destruction
    incident, and possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to
    be proficient in all mission requirements.
        The 2002 Defense Authorization Act requires DOD to establish 23
    more teams, with at least one team in each State. I was surprised to
    learn that the President requested no funding in his fiscal year 2004
    budget to implement this requirement.
        The following States represented by Members of this Subcommittee do
    not have WMD Civil Support teams: Mississippi, New Hampshire, Maryland,
    Vermont, and Wisconsin.
        Mr. Secretary, can you explain why the President did not request
    any funds for equipping and training National Guard units to help our
    local first responders cope with a terrorist attack here in America?
    Were any of these units sent to the Persian Gulf?
        Answer. We did not participate in the National Guard's fiscal year
    2004 budget development process and am not aware of National Guard
    Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Teams that may have
    deployed to the Persian Gulf.
         computer assisted passenger pre-screening system ii (capps ii)
        Question. Included in the Transportation Security Administration's
    budget request is $35 million for a new passenger screening program
    known as the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System II (CAPPS
    II). This new system is designed to enhance airline passenger safety by
    mining commercial databases of personal information, and using
    ``pattern analysis'' to predict which passengers might engage in
    terrorist activities. The TSA will assign each passenger a risk level
    of green, yellow or red, and will use that determination to prevent
    certain passengers from boarding the plane.
        Congress built a number of safeguards into the Homeland Security
    Act to protect against privacy invasions. But to date, the Department
    has not made any information about development of the system available
    to the public, nor has it confirmed that it will publish guidelines for
    the program.
        Despite the fact that your agency has not yet published rules or
    guidelines for the development of the CAPPS II system, the Department
    has gone ahead and issued a preliminary contract for the development of
    CAPPS II. When will you issue the guidelines and procedures by which
    CAPPS II will operate?
        Answer. TSA has issued a proposed Privacy Act notice (January 15,
    2003), which contains guidelines and requirements for the records
    system that will support CAPPS II. This proposed notice is now being
    reviewed to address the many comments received from the public. A final
    notice will be published in the near future. This final notice will
    reflect the input we have received from members of the public, as well
    as privacy advocacy groups and stakeholders.
        TSA will establish guidelines for CAPPS II before it becomes fully
    operational. These guidelines will undergo thorough review at several
    levels within TSA and the Department before being finalized.
        Question. I was pleased to see that you filled the Privacy Officer
    position at the Department. It is important that the proper
    institutional oversight be in place before moving forward with systems
    such as CAPPS II. Will the Privacy Officer at the Department formally
    review the proposed CAPPS II guidelines before they are finalized? Will
    the appropriate Congressional committees be given an opportunity to
    review the proposed CAPPS II guidelines before they are finalized?
        Answer. TSA has issued a proposed Privacy Act notice (January 15,
    2003), which contains guidelines and requirements for the records
    system that will support CAPPS II. This proposed notice is now being
    reviewed to address the many comments received from the public. A final
    notice will be published in the near future. This final notice will
    reflect the input we have received from members of the public, as well
    as privacy advocacy groups and stakeholders.
        TSA will establish guidelines for CAPPS II before it becomes fully
    operational. These guidelines will undergo thorough review at several
    levels within TSA and the Department before being finalized. The Chief
    Privacy Officer of DHS has already begun her review of the system and
    will remain an active participant throughout the developmental and
    operational stages. Naturally, the proposed guidelines will be
    submitted to the appropriate Congressional committees for review and
    comment.
       border security--gaps in screening entrants into the united states
        Question. Last year the Senate Finance Committee tasked the General
    Accounting Office with sending agents out to try to enter the United
    States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica using false names and
    counterfeit identification documents. In short, in each instance, those
    GAO officials succeeded in using these fake documents to enter the
    United States. On at least one occasion they were not even stopped as
    they crossed over at one port-of-entry.
        The results of this exercise led the General Accounting Office to
    conclude that (1) people who enter the United States are not always
    asked to present identification, (2) security to prevent unauthorized
    persons from entering the United States from Canada from at least one
    location is inadequate and (3) inspectors from the former INS are not
    readily capable of detecting counterfeit identification documents.
        Mr. Secretary, do the results of this exercise trouble you? Will
    the modest increases you have proposed in the number of border
    enforcement and inspection personnel rectify these gaps or do you need
    to change your Department's procedures and training requirements?
        Answer. The results of the General Accounting Office (GAO) exercise
    have to be regarded in the appropriate context. Under law, U.S.
    citizens are not required to present any travel document or other
    identification when reentering the United States from anywhere in the
    Western Hemisphere other than Cuba. Similarly, citizens of Canada are
    not required under law to present any travel document or other
    identification when entering the United States from Canada. In each of
    these scenarios, a BCBP Inspector may accept a verbal declaration of
    citizenship and may admit the declarant to the United States if they
    are satisfied that he or she is indeed a United States or Canadian
    citizen. Especially at our land border Ports-of-Entry (POEs), Bureau of
    Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) Inspectors have very little time
    to determine whether or not to select a traveler for more intense
    scrutiny. In a matter of seconds they are required to examine the
    individuals, their documents, and their conveyances and determine
    whether their declaration of citizenship and their customs declaration
    appear accurate or require further examination.
        In the case of the GAO exercise, it was quickly determined that the
    Agents were indeed United States citizens. This was clear from their
    appearance, their demeanor and their language. Once satisfied that the
    person with whom they are dealing is a U.S. citizen and that there is
    no indication that they are smuggling goods or people, BCBP Inspectors
    are required to move them quickly through the POE. Standing immigration
    inspection instructions mandate close scrutiny of any documentary
    evidence of U.S. citizenship if the Inspector suspects that a false
    claim to citizenship is being made. Such was not the case in this
    instance. Indeed, it is questionable whether the Agents' or any other
    U.S. citizen's presentation of counterfeit evidence of citizenship is
    in any way legally actionable, since citizens cannot be excluded from
    the United States and no documentation is required for entry.
        Finally, the variety of identity documents available to United
    States and Canadian citizens, when one considers the number of Sates,
    territories and provinces and the various editions of drivers' licenses
    and birth certificates in circulation, is extremely large. I would be
    concerned that such focus on increased scrutiny of such a wide variety
    of documentation in the case of each and every citizen crossing the
    border would detract from, rather than enhance, BCBP's principal
    mission of identifying and interdicting terrorists and weapons of mass
    destruction.
        Question. What steps do you intend to have the Department take to
    address these gaps--such as better training or more intense document
    scrutiny--and what additional resources do you need to do so?
        Answer. I believe that this is more an issue of law and policy of
    national significance rather than an issue of training and resources
    for BCBP. While, this GAO exercise raises two principal points of
    focus, neither speak to the training or skills of BCBP Inspectors. The
    first is the issue of what documentation should be required of United
    States and Canadian citizens seeking to enter the United States.
    Citizens of these two countries, especially those residing in border
    areas, have enjoyed the privilege of crossing our border without a
    documentary requirement for centuries. While a decision to institute a
    documentary requirement might seem an obvious need in the current
    environment, it would end a practice seen as highly symbolic of the
    close nature of our relations with Canada.
        The second issue deals with the security, integrity, and variety of
    civil documentation issued by our states and territories. Wide
    varieties of eligibility criteria exist, such that, although this
    documentation generally serves as valid identity documentation, it does
    not serve in many cases as useful or conclusive evidence of
    citizenship. Even if the states and territories were to provide access
    to their civil documentation databases to permit BCBP Inspectors to
    positively identify license holders, this would still not serve as
    proof of citizenship, since drivers' licenses are regularly issued to
    non-citizens and the integrity of the identity data used to secure
    drivers' licenses is itself suspect. We believe that the use of a
    single federally issued document as proof of identity and citizenship
    would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of POE inspections in
    relation to both enforcement and facilitation of movement across our
    borders.
        We look forward to working with the Congress in analyzing and
    resolving these important issues.
               immigration's ``entry-exit'' visa tracking system
        Question. One crucial component of ensuring our homeland security
    is ensuring that we as a government know which foreigners are visiting
    our country, why they are here, and that they depart when they are
    required to do so. Our existing visa tracking systems are not doing the
    job.
        The budget before us requests $480 million for the new entry/exit
    visa tracking system. This is a $100 million increase over last year's
    level of funding. Many Members of Congress and outside experts are
    concerned about the lack of progress in implementing this system. It is
    my understanding that the Department has not yet determined what
    technology will be used in developing the system. Mr. Secretary, what
    steps are you taking to ensure that this system is on-track and can be
    deployed in a timely fashion? Please provide specific details as to how
    the newly announced U.S. VISIT program will differ from the currently
    planned ``entry-exit'' system. Also, do you plan on getting the
    appropriate congressional committees on board to support your proposed
    revisions?
        Answer. I have required that the U.S.-VISIT Program conduct a
    review of the program to ensure that it is aligned with the mission of
    the department and meets the Congressional requirements. As previously
    stated, the U.S.-VISIT program will incorporate the requirements of the
    entry exit system. To date many of our systems have already been
    integrated and we will continue to build upon this. We will phase-out
    the NSEERS program but will incorporate the tools and lessons learned.
        As you may be aware, the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations
    Act requires that none of the funds appropriated for the U.S.-VISIT
    Program may be obligated until DHS submits an Expenditure Plan that (1)
    meets the capital planning and investment control review requirements
    (2) complies with Federal acquisition rules (3) is reviewed by GAO, and
    (4) has been approved by the Committees on Appropriations. Therefore,
    the DHS is closely working very diligently with the GAO and appropriate
    congressional committees for final release of the funds.
                            treasury forfeiture fund
        Question. When the Department of Homeland Security Act was passed,
    it was determined that the Treasury Forfeiture Fund fit the criteria
    for being transferred to the new Department. However, it was the policy
    of the Office of Management and Budget that this did not occur as it
    had decided that the Funds assets would be transferred to a similar
    fund at the Department of Justice.
        Given that the major agencies transferred from the Treasury
    Department to Homeland Security--the former Customs Service chief among
    them--have contributed upwards of 70 percent of the assets in the Fund
    and that the Fund has been used to further law enforcement activities
    now to be conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, do you
    agree that the Treasury Fund should simply be transferred to the
    Justice Department? Doesn't this shortchange homeland security?
        Answer. The Administration has proposed to consolidate forfeiture
    funds under the Department of Justice. This proposal would streamline
    highly duplicative administrative operations in two agencies into a
    single, more efficient structure. We believe that the Departments of
    Justice and Homeland Security will work together to ensure that DHS
    receives an appropriate share of the consolidated fund's assets. DHS
    does not have to manage the fund on a day-to-day basis to guarantee
    that this is the case.
                       port of entry construction backlog
        Question. On May 14, 2002, the President signed the Enhanced Border
    Security Act of 2002, authorizing significant improvements in our
    efforts to secure our borders. However, a congressionally mandated June
    2000 study of our port of entry infrastructure (primarily focused on
    our land border ports of entry) indicated a list of 822 projects
    totaling $784 million. These projects ranged from overloaded electrical
    outlets at facilities built in the 1930s which are not equipped to
    accommodate 21st computers and other technical systems to a border
    station in Eastman, Maine that is literally a trailer. The tragic
    events of 9/11--and the subsequent increase in staffing along our
    borders--only compounded the problem and the need.
        Mr. Secretary, with the increased demands of both trade and
    homeland security at our Nation's borders, and the increases in
    staffing along our borders, why are there no funds requested in your
    budget for infrastructure construction at our ports of entry and along
    our borders?
        Answer. The majority of Ports of Entry (POEs) along the northern
    and southern borders are owned and operated by the General Services
    Administration (GSA). The GSA fiscal year 2004 budget request includes
    $186M for POE facility improvements. In addition, the U.S.-VISIT
    program plan includes funding renovations and modifications at POEs in
    order to support the implementation of the program system. Facility
    plans are currently being developed to support the program.
                          office of homeland security
        Question. Secretary Ridge, the President's budget devotes a
    considerable amount of attention to the new Homeland Security
    Department, but barely mentions its predecessor, the White House Office
    of Homeland Security. The only reference to the Homeland Security
    Office in the President's budget is to request that its appropriation
    be consolidated within a single White House appropriation, further
    isolating the Office's activities from the American public and the
    Congress. As Homeland Security Secretary, you must be in contact with
    the White House Homeland Security Office. The advisory alerts are
    raised and lowered in consultation with the Homeland Security Council,
    on which the Homeland Security advisor is a member. I understand that
    General John Gordon has been appointed by the President to be the new
    White House Homeland Security Director. This appointment will not
    require the confirmation of the Senate, and, if history is any guide,
    the White House will not permit General Gordon to testify before the
    Congress.
        Mr. Secretary, what we must avoid is a situation where this
    Administration's homeland security policies are directed from within
    the confines of the White House, insulated from the Congress and the
    American public. What are the President's plans with regard to the
    Office of Homeland Security, and how will that Office's activities
    differ from what it was doing prior to the creation of a Homeland
    Security Department? Why is this Office still necessary now that a new
    Department has been created?
        Answer. The Office of Homeland Security was created by the
    President on October 8, 2001, via Executive Order 13228 and serves as
    and is synonymous with the staff of the Homeland Security Council
    (HSC). Just as the National Security Council (NSC) was created by
    Congress in the same act which created the Department of Defense and
    the CIA, Congress established the HSC within the EOP by statute at the
    same time as it created the Department of Homeland Security. HSC
    provides advice to the President on homeland security matters, policy
    development and the interagency process regarding Administration policy
    on homeland security, including development and coordination of
    implementation of the national strategy to secure the United States
    from terrorist threats and attacks. As such, just as the NSC functions
    in a policy coordination and advisory role somewhat parallel to the
    missions of (e.g.) the Department of State, Defense and other agencies
    with national security missions, so the HSC functions in a policy
    coordination and advisory role somewhat parallel to the missions of
    (e.g.) the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies with
    homeland security missions.
                        most significant vulnerabilities
        Question. On March 27, 2003, I asked you to provide the Committee
    with your written assessment of the ten homeland security
    vulnerabilities that you are most concerned about. I thank you for
    responding rapidly. Your response was useful in making final decisions
    on the supplemental appropriations act that Congress just approved.
        In your response, you noted that the threat environment is
    continually changing, but that you did have guidance that helped you
    focus your priorities. This response, which is not classified, focused
    on potential attacks on chemical facilities, nuclear power plants,
    large dams, liquid natural gas storage facilities, electric and
    telecommunications systems, data storage systems, transportation
    systems such as rail, and air transportation systems, water supplies
    that are vulnerable to contamination, food processing centers and
    petroleum handling facilities such as pipelines and ports.
        The President has signed authorization bills to expand Federal
    investments in many of these areas such as port security and drinking
    water security but the President has not requested funding for those
    new authorizations. In fact, if you compare your vulnerability
    guidelines to the President's budget, there does not appear to be any
    correlation. Can you tell me where in the budget are the resources to
    cope with each of these vulnerabilities?
        Answer. The President's budget requested $462 million for
    vulnerability reduction efforts under the Assistant Secretary for
    Infrastructure Protection.
                       standard for rating the department
        Question. Secretary Ridge, your highest imperative as the head of
    the Homeland Security Department is to make sure a repeat of September
    11 never happens, or if it does, to respond effectively. So in that
    sense, it's hard to judge your accomplishments to date.
        You've listed a number of initiatives undertaken by the Homeland
    Security Department since its creation, but, in the end, the only way
    to really gauge whether the Department has been successful in its
    mission to protect the homeland is whether another major terrorist
    attack occurs in the United States. I don't want to wait to see another
    September 11 to determine if your Department has accomplished its
    mission.
        What criteria can you provide this Committee for us to measure your
    Department's actions in protecting this Nation from terrorists? How can
    the Congress measure your success?
        Answer. The Department is establishing, and will report as part of
    its fiscal year 2005 Budget request, program specific goals which will
    be tied to measurable performance outcomes. Also, the Department is
    setting up the office of Program Analysis and Evaluation within its
    Office of Management with a key responsibility of developing the
    Departments Strategic Plan and ensuring associated goal, strategies and
    performance measures are in place to effectively review the performance
    of all programs. Also, the Departments Future Years Homeland Security
    Program will provide proper evaluation of program priorities making
    sure goals and objectives are properly planned, programmed and
    budgeted. The fiscal year 2005 budget request will have measures for
    each area of responsibility. However, the ultimate measure of success
    will be the ability to identify, respond, and stop potential terrorist
    threats to our Nation.
                           customs import specialists
        Question. What steps is the Department taking to increase the
    number of Customs trade personnel (import specialists) in the BCBP?
    What steps has the Department taken to ensure that Customs trade
    missions are not being lost in the anti-terrorism focus of the DHS?
        Answer. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) is
    actively working to fully staff field Import Specialists and other
    trade personnel to the maximum level funded. BCBP is ensuring
    ``critical need'' ports are adequately staffed in order to carry out
    the Bureau's trade responsibilities.
        Although the priority mission of the BCBP is to detect and prevent
    terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, we
    have not abrogated our trade and narcotics interdiction
    responsibilities.
        BCBP trade personnel in Headquarters and field offices continue to
    ensure trade functions are carried out correctly and efficiently. The
    changes in BCBP's primary mission have not negatively affected our
    ability to collect and protect the revenue, enforce trade agreements,
    monitor import compliance, and enforce textile quotas. We use a risk
    management approach to ensure the efficient use of resources to move
    legitimate trade across our borders. We identify and interdict
    violators and merchandise in violation of importing laws, embargoes,
    and/or sanctions to stop predatory and unfair trade practices that
    threaten the United States economic stability, market competitiveness
    and public safety. An example of this is the President's Steel 201
    initiative that BCBP is aggressively enforcing.
                         remote video inspection system
        Question. Recently, a spokesman for the Department stated that DHS
    plans to add an additional 90 remote video inspection system (RVIS)
    cameras at ports of entry along the Northern border. Currently, there
    are 236 surveillance systems along both the Northern and Southern
    borders. A number of frontline Customs inspectional personnel have
    stated that on more than one occasion these RVIS systems are down or
    are unable to identify persons or automobiles crossing the border into
    the United States. Is it in the best interest of homeland security to
    replace people at these often remote locations and increase the use of
    video entry technology that, according to a January 2002 Treasury
    Department Inspector General report, often fails because of severe
    weather and software problems?
        Answer. It is not in the best interest of homeland security to
    replace people at these often-remote locations. That is one of the
    reasons that on October 31, 2002, Commissioner Bonner approved a
    recommendation by the Office of Field Operations to terminate the RVIS
    program and incorporate the existing RVIS equipment into the Northern
    Border Security Project. The North Atlantic CMC issued a notice to the
    public indicating that the RVIS ports would be closed as of March 15,
    2003.
                           pending senate legislation
        Question. At least two bipartisan bills (S. 6 and S. 539) calling
    for, among other things, an increase over time in BCBP staffing by
    1,000 have been introduced in the Senate. Is the Department aware of
    these bills? If so, what position has the Department taken on them--
    specifically in regard to the intended increase in staffing?
        Answer. Review of the port security assessments completed to date
    has yielded valuable preliminary information regarding security
    enhancement requirements. These assessments have identified a number of
    physical security enhancements that were either non-existent or needed
    improvement, such as fencing, lighting, and closed circuit television
    systems. Other common recommendations included: standards for
    transportation worker identifications systems, security plans,
    communications systems, and screening equipment standards for cargo and
    passengers.
                                  watch lists
        Question. What specific steps will the Department be taking--either
    individually or in conjunction with the Defense Department and the
    Central Intelligence Agency--to address the concerns highlighted in the
    recently released General Accounting Office report (03-322)?
        Answer. The GAO is correct in its assessment that the government's
    approach to using watch lists is decentralized because the lists were
    developed in response to individual agencies unique missions. Those
    historical missions include the duties of the law enforcement and
    intelligence communities, and now include the mission to defend the
    homeland. The effort to consolidate and establish the connectivity of
    information contained in historical databases, from which watch lists
    may be generated, requires close coordination among my Information
    Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, several other
    Departments, and the Terrorism Threat Integration Center. Discussions
    among the interested parties to effect the sharing and consolidation of
    information are ongoing, and all parties are working to establish a
    timeframe for implementation.
                                      foia
        Question. During the budget hearing before this Senate
    subcommittee, Secretary Ridge assured the members of the subcommittee
    that FOIA requests would not be processed only by the single ``Program
    Manager'' assigned to reviewing information marked as ``critical
    infrastructure information''. Rather, Secretary Ridge indicated that a
    team of personnel within the Department would share this
    responsibility. Please identify the line items within the 2004 budget
    request that support processing critical information submissions and
    the FTEs that will be assigned to this activity?
        Answer. To the extent that the question inquires about the funding
    levels and personnel that will be required to support the Critical
    Infrastructure Information Program contemplated by Subtitle B of Title
    II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (the Act), such information is
    not yet available. The Department of Homeland Security is presently
    developing the rules and procedures for the CII Program, to be
    administered by the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    Directorate, which will govern the receipt, care, and storage of
    voluntarily submitted CII protected under the Act. At the present time,
    specific staffing levels for the CII Program have not been established.
        However, to the extent that the question proceeds from an apparent
    understanding that the CII Program Officer will have primary
    responsibility to process requests submitted to the Department pursuant
    to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), it should be clarified that
    this will not be the case. Rather, FOIA requests submitted to DHS will
    be received and processed in the first instance by the Department's
    FOIA Office in the Management Directorate, which will direct the
    requests to the attention of the office(s) in the Department that may
    possess responsive materials. Thus, only in the event that a FOIA
    request seeks information or materials that may be in the possession of
    the CII Program, will the request be forwarded to the CII Program
    Officer.
        Thus, the FOIA Office and functions will be entirely distinct from
    the CII Program Office. With respect to the budget and staff needs
    anticipated for FOIA-related activities, the FOIA Office will be
    administered by a single director who will receive support at
    Headquarters from contractors. In addition, each DHS Directorate will
    have its own assistant FOIA Officer and FOIA specialist who will
    support the DHS FOIA Officer. This staffing plan will encompass
    approximately 24 FTEs.
                        office for domestic preparedness
        Question. Congress appropriated $1.5 billion to the Office of
    Domestic Preparedness for grants to States in the fiscal year 2003
    supplemental appropriations bill. These funds are subject to the small
    State minimum, as required in Section 1014 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
    Please explain how the remaining funds will be distributed to States?
        Answer. As authorized by Congress in the USA Patriot Act,
    allocations for the fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations bill
    were determined using a base amount of .75 percent of the total
    allocation for the states (including the District of Columbia and the
    Commonwealth of Puerto Rico) and .25 percent of the total allocation
    for the U.S. territories, with the balance of funds being distributed
    on a population-share basis.
                                first responders
        Question. On April 30, 2003, Secretary Ridge was quoted in USA
    Today as saying that if Congress approves the Administration's fiscal
    year 2004 request of $3.5 billion for first responders, nearly $9
    billion will have been made available to the States and locals since
    September 11, 2001. Please provide the Committee with an explanation of
    this statement by listing the various appropriations that sum to the $9
    billion the Secretary referred to.
        Answer This amount includes the following: $5.010 billion for
    terrorism and emergency preparedness grant programs within Emergency
    Preparedness & Response/FEMA ($710 million), the Office for Domestic
    Preparedness ($3.881 billion), and the Department of Justice ($419
    million not including COPS and block grant programs). $2.923 billion in
    public health preparedness funds through HHS and DHS $1.110 billion in
    Assistance to Firefighters Grants, which are not currently focused on
    terrorism preparedness.
                      funding for departmental management
        Question. According to budget documents presented by the
    Department, the fiscal year 2003 estimate for the Departmental
    Management account is $379 million, however using authority granted in
    section 3 of Public Law 107-294, the Congress has only approved the
    transfer of $125 million for this activity. Is the obligation of these
    additional funds for Departmental Management consistent with section
    1511(d)(1) of the law, which requires that funds transferred to the new
    Department be used only for the purposes for which they were originally
    made available?
        Answer. Public Law 107-294 gives DHS the authority, subject to
    Congressional notification, to transfer up to $140 million in
    unobligated balances from component agencies to fund needs associated
    with setting up the new department. Currently, DHS has transferred only
    $125 million of these unobligated balances, as cited above. To maintain
    3-year comparability in the President's budget, however, additional
    funds were shown in the Departmental Management Operating Expenses
    account to represent the consolidation of managerial activities at the
    headquarters level and the savings associated with centralizing these
    functions in the new Department. The reallocation was made for budget
    presentation purposes only, with no loss of funding actually occurring
    in fiscal year 2003. DHS does not plan to transfer more than the
    authorized $140 million in unobligated balances, and has not yet
    decided whether it will require the additional $15 million not yet
    transferred.
        Question. Has the Department required the various component
    agencies to transfer any funds to the Departmental Management account?
    Please identify each of the accounts and amounts transferred to
    Departmental Management and identify the authority for the transfer.
    Please identify any requirements in bill and report language for funds
    transferred to Departmental Management, other than those transferred
    pursuant to section 3 of Public Law 107-294.
        Answer.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Agency                 Authority        Trf. From        Trf. To       Dollar Amt
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Dept. of Justice.............  Public Law 107-       15 03 0129      70 03 0100      $1,188,938  Departmental
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    Dept. of Transportation......  Public Law 107-       69 03 0102      70 03 0100         251,493  Departmental
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    Dept. of Energy..............  Law 107-294.....      89 X 00228       70 X 0100       1,019,786  Departmental
                                                                                                      Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    EOP..........................  Public Law 107-        11 X 0038       70 X 0100       3,746,000  Departmental
                                    296 Section                                                       Management
                                    1516.                                                             Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    EOP..........................  Public Law 107-        11 X 0500       70 X 0100      78,394,217  Departmental
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    FEMA.........................  Public Law 107-       58 03 0100      70 03 0100      10,000,000  Departmental
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    FEMA.........................  Public Law 107-       58 03 0101      70 03 0100       2,000,000  Departmental
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    FEMA.........................  Public Law 107-        58 X 0104       70 X 0100      18,000,000  Departmental
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    GSA-FPS......................  Public Law 107-        47 X 4542       70 X 0100       1,396,500  Departmental
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    HHS..........................  Public Law 107-       75 03 0140      70 03 0100       1,584,000  Departmental
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    HHS..........................  Public Law 107-       75 03 0600      70 03 0100         583,000  Operating
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
    HHS..........................  Public Law 107-       75 03 0885      70 03 0100         583,000  Operating
                                    294.                                                              Management
                                                                                                      Operating
                                                                                                      Expenses
                                  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Subtotal, Operating      ................  ..............  ..............     118,746,934  ...............
           Management Operating
           Expenses.
    Dept. of Justice.............  Public Law 107-      15 0304 013    70 0304 0102      16,889,500  Dept-Wide Tech
                                    296 Section                                                       Invest
                                    1516.
    Dept. of Justice.............  Public Law 107-        15 X 4526       70 X 4640      68,000,000  WCF
                                    296 Section
                                    1516.
    Treas. Counterterrorism Fund.  Public Law 107-        20 X 0117       70 X 0101      72,654,803  Counterterroris
                                    296 Section                                                       m Fund
                                    1516.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Please describe the limitations under current laws and
    regulations for former employees of the Department of Homeland Security
    for lobbying the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of
    Homeland Security.
        Please describe the limitations under current laws and regulations
    for former employees of the Office of Homeland Security for lobbying
    the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of Homeland
    Security.
        Answer. Post-Government-service employment restrictions are
    established by statute. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207 establishes limitations on
    communications to the Government by former employees. The Director,
    U.S. Office of Government Ethics, recently published for comment
    definitive regulations that will implement this statute as it is
    applied to recent retirees. See 68 Fed. Reg. 15,385 (3/31/03).
        41 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d), a provision of the Procurement Integrity
    Act, bars certain officials who took certain actions or filled certain
    roles in relation to large procurements from accepting compensation
    from the contractor that was awarded the resulting contract for 1 year
    following taking the specified action regarding or leaving the
    enumerated position in the procurement. This statute does not bar a
    former employee's contacts with the U.S. Government. However, the
    procurement that underlies the prohibition would constitute a
    particular matter involving specific parties, and communications to the
    Government in connection with it would, most likely, violate 18 U.S.C.
    Sec. 207.
        18 U.S.C. Sec. 207 provides:
      --(a)(1) Communication restriction that applies to all former
            employees
        --Permanent bar for a former employee to serve as another's
                representative before the Executive Branch, Federal courts,
                or the District of Columbia in connection with a case,
                contract, application, proceeding, controversy or other
                ``particular matter'' involving specific parties in which
                he or she participated personally and substantially as a
                Government employee.
        --The representation restricted includes not only acting as
                another's agent or attorney, but also any kind of
                communication made with the intent to influence the United
                States. This includes promotional and procurement-related
                contacts.
      --(a)(2) Communication restriction that applies to former supervisors
        --Two-year bar for a former employee to serve as another's
                representative before the Executive Branch, Federal courts,
                or the District of Columbia in connection with a case,
                contract, application, proceeding, controversy or other
                ``particular matter'' involving specific parties that was
                actually pending under his or her official responsibility
                during the last 1 year of his or her Government service.
      --(b) Restriction that applies to all employees involved in trade or
            treaty negotiations
        --One-year bar for a former employee to aid, advise, or represent
                another on the basis of ``covered information'' concerning
                any ongoing trade or treaty negotiation in which he or she
                had participated personally and substantially during the
                last year of his or her Government service.
      --(c) Communication restriction that applies to former ``senior''
            employees
        --One-year bar for a former senior employee to knowingly make, with
                the intent to influence, any communication to or appearance
                before an employee of a department or agency in which he or
                she served in any capacity during the last 1 year of his or
                her Government service.
        --A ``senior employee'' for these purposes is, among others: one
                employed at a rate of pay specified in or fixed under the
                Executive Schedule (5 U.S.C. Part III, Subpart D, Chapter
                53, Subchapter II) (5 U.S.C. Sec. 5311-18); and one
                employed in a position not otherwise specified in the
                statute for which the basic rate of pay, exclusive of any
                locality-based pay adjustment, is equal to or greater than
                the rate of basic pay payable for level 5 of the Senior
                Executive Service.
      --(d) Communication restriction that applies to ``very senior''
            employees
        --One-year bar for a former very senior employee to knowingly make,
                with the intent to influence, any communication to or
                appearance before an officer or employee of a department or
                agency in which he or she served in a ``very senior''
                position within a period of 1 year prior to his or her
                termination of service and a person appointed to a position
                in the Executive Branch that is listed in 5 U.S.C.
                Sec. Sec. 5312-16 (Executive Schedule levels I through V).
        --A ``very senior'' employee for these purposes is, among others,
                one who is employed in a position in the Executive Branch
                at a rate of pay payable for level I of the Executive
                Schedule (5. U.S.C. Sec. 5312).
      --(e) Restriction that applies to ``senior'' and ``very senior''
            employees in relation to foreign entities
        --One-year bar for any ``senior'' or ``very senior'' employee to
                represent before any agency or department of the United
                States with the intent to influence the performance of duty
                of a Government official a foreign entity or to aid or
                advise a foreign entity with the intent to influence the
                performance of duty of a Government official.
      --(f) Special rules for detailees
        --A person detailed from one agency to another agency is deemed to
                be an employee of both agencies.
        There are a few limited exceptions to some of these restrictions,
    which may include representation of State or local governments,
    universities, hospitals, medical research, or international
    organizations; use of special knowledge or information or a scientific
    or technological nature; and testimony under oath. Former ``senior''
    and ``very senior'' political appointees are allowed to make
    representational contacts on behalf of a candidate for Federal or State
    office, or on behalf of national and campaign committees or a political
    party.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

                      flexibility of first responder funds
        Question. I have joined Senator Collins as a cosponsor of a bill to
    provide greater flexibility for states to use homeland security grants.
    This legislation would allow any State to request approval to
    reallocate funds received through the Office of Domestic Preparedness
    among the four categories of equipment, training, exercises, and
    planning.
        Do you support greater flexibility in the domestic preparedness
    program's guidelines for how ODP funds may be used by State and local
    emergency responder agencies so that they may meet the unique needs of
    each State to be prepared for a terrorist attack?
        Answer. ODP's State Homeland Security Strategy is designed to give
    each state and territory one comprehensive planning document that
    includes all needs for response to a WMD terrorism incident,
    irrespective of the sources of funding. It is developed based on
    assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and needs
    regarding weapons of mass destruction terrorism incidents at both the
    state and jurisdiction levels. It serves as a blueprint for the
    coordination and enhancement of efforts to counter WMD incidents as
    well as identify related Federal, State, local, and private resources
    within the state. The Department strongly believes the allocation of
    ODP grants should be consistent with these plans. However, the
    Administration concurs that ODP grants should not set arbitrary limits
    on the amounts available for equipment, training, and exercises. This
    current practice is based on Congressional guidance. The fiscal year
    2004 Budget proposes to give states and localities greater flexibility
    in this regard.
        In addition, through the Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of
    2003, ODP is providing state and local governments with additional
    funding to participate in the national effort to combat terrorism. The
    SHSGP II provides funding for First Responder Preparedness and Critical
    Infrastructure Protection. The funding available for the First
    Responder Preparedness may be used to supplement activities initiated
    with the state's SHSGP I funding, including: procurement of specialized
    emergency response and terrorism incident prevention equipment; design,
    development, conduct and evaluation of combating terrorism exercises;
    institutionalizing awareness and performance level training at the
    state and local level; and planning and administrative costs associated
    with updating and implementing the state's homeland security strategy.
    Under First Responder Preparedness, the state has the ability to choose
    how much funding should be applied to each of these four areas.
                 new grant program for ``terrorism activities''
        Question. I have heard from numerous officials at the Vermont
    Homeland Security Unit that the Department of Homeland Security's ODP
    office has been working hard since Congress passed and the President
    signed the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Law to get
    those funds to State and local first responders as soon as possible.
    They find ODP staff to be informative and responsive to all their
    questions and requests. In fact, I have been told that the turn-around
    period for decisions on grant applications is no more than 15 days. I
    commend and thank you and your ODP staff for those efforts.
        In its fiscal year 2004 request, the Homeland Security Department
    Office of Domestic Preparedness includes $500 million ``for grants to
    State and local law enforcement for terrorism prevention activities.''
    This appears to be brand new program that is being proposed by the
    Administration. Please tell us what this new proposed Office of
    Domestic Preparedness program would do and why it is needed. How do you
    propose to allocate funds under this new program for state and local
    law enforcement if Congress agrees to fund it?
        Answer. The $500 million appropriation to ODP for state and local
    law enforcement for terrorism preparedness and prevention activities
    will include: training and equipment for WMD events, support for
    information sharing systems, training of intelligence analysts,
    development and support of terrorism early warning methods, target
    hardening and surveillance equipment, and opposition force exercises.
    The precise allocation of these funds is being developed.
                            citizen corps initiative
        Question. The DHS budget summary states that of the $3.5 billion in
    assistance for the Office of Domestic Preparedness. This amount
    includes a $181 million request for funds to support the Citizen Corps
    Initiative.
        Now, it is my understanding that the Citizen Corps Initiative lies
    under the direction of the Homeland Security Department's Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate. Citizen Corps is a community-
    based initiative to involve U.S. citizens in homeland security through
    public education and outreach programs.
        I am puzzled as to why funds for this initiative would be drawn
    from the Office of Domestic Preparedness--an office that has strict
    guidelines for exactly how State and local public safety personnel may
    use ODP grants to acquire specialized training and equipment necessary
    to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass
    destruction. As an Emergency Preparedness Response Directorate program,
    funds for the Citizen Corps should be requested under that account so
    that Citizen Corps funding will not reduce funds that should be
    reserved for our Nation's police officers, EMS and firefighters. Don't
    you agree?
        Answer. ODP has a long-standing and close relationship with first
    responders across all disciplines. Pursuant to requests by state and
    local governments for a ``one-stop-shop'' for first responders, we are
    proposing such a shop in ODP. Therefore, the move of Citizen Corps
    activities to ODP is both a consolidation of Federal grant programs to
    first responders as well as an effective utilization of ODP's existing
    relationship with state and local responders.
                          emergency operations centers
        Question. State Emergency Operations Centers are essential to
    coordinate a local, state, and Federal response to such grave
    situations as a terrorist attack. These facilities, which tie together
    advanced communications and monitoring equipment, can be extremely
    expensive. As state dedicate more resources to increase security and
    pay for overtime and hiring, it has become increasingly difficult for
    states to allocate sufficient funds to build and upgrade center. Can
    you tell me what plans your department has developed to try to provide
    funds for states to construct new E.O.C.s?
        Answer. FEMA received $56 million for Emergency Operations Centers
    (EOCs) in supplemental fiscal year 2002 appropriations and is using a
    phased approach to implement this program. During Phase 1, all States
    were awarded $50,000 to conduct an assessment of existing EOCs. States
    were then invited to apply for up to $150,000 in Federal funding for
    physical modifications to State EOCs to accommodate secure
    communications equipment. The Federal funding requires a 25 percent
    match, for a total project cost of $200,000. In Phase 2, the remainder
    of the fiscal year 2002 supplemental funding will be awarded through a
    nationally competitive grant process to address the most immediate EOC
    deficiencies nationwide. States must submit applications for the
    competitive funding by May 17, 2003. Applications should reflect the
    deficiencies noted in the Phase 1 or other EOC assessments. A review
    panel will convene in June to review the EOC applications and to make
    award determinations. Eligible activities under the competitive grant
    program include new EOC construction and upgrades to existing EOCs.
        For fiscal year 2003, FEMA received an additional $25 million for
    EOC grants, which will be added to the amount available under the
    fiscal year 2002 Phase 2 competitive EOC grants. By combining the
    additional fiscal year funds, States will be able to submit one
    application and be considered for all of the available funding
    (approximately $74 million).
        However, this effort does not represent a permanent commitment, as
    state and local governments must take steps to ensure that maintenance
    and continued investment in these centers is adequately supported by
    state and local funds.
                             technology investment
        Question. Mr. Secretary, I cannot tell you how many firms from my
    home state of Vermont and across the country have told me about
    promising technologies that will help increase security. For example, a
    superb company in Bellows Falls, Vermont has come up with a promising
    device to scan underneath vehicles and difficult-to-reach places. Many
    companies have faced difficulty in learning about new Request for
    Proposals and competing for contracts. Can you tell me about the
    department's plans to consolidate technology investment into a single
    account, like DOD does with it's research and development budget?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's S&T Directorate will
    use the services of the Technical Support Working Group to seek
    industry participation in needed technology development efforts and
    also to inform interested parties of the Department's needs. Broad
    Agency Announcements will also be used to solicit ideas and
    participation. In addition, there will be specific calls for proposals.
    All of these mechanisms will be announced, with information and
    guidance posted on the web. In addition, the S&T Directorate maintains
    an e-mail address of science.technology@dhs.gov for interested
    individuals or firms to submit ideas for consideration; these
    submittals are reviewed and referred to the appropriate S&T staff for
    consideration. Thus, although there will not be a single process or
    account for the Department's S&T Directorate's efforts, there will be a
    wide distribution of information on the Department's science and
    technology needs and the process to participate.
                            operation liberty shield
        Question. I think that many of us are confused about the division
    of responsibility between you and the Attorney General when it comes to
    our immigration laws. With the INS having been transferred to DHS, it
    would seem that you have primary responsibility for immigration, and
    you have used that responsibility in Operation Liberty Shield, among
    other areas. Because the Executive Office of Immigration Review has
    been retained within the Department of Justice, however, the Attorney
    General continues to assert authority over the interpretation of our
    immigration laws, most recently by deciding--incorrectly in my view--to
    reverse the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision that an 18-year old
    Haitian man should be released on bond, on the grounds that the
    decision would ``encourage further surges of mass migration from
    Haiti.'' Did the Attorney General consult with you about his decision
    in the Haitian case?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security referred the Board of
    Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of D-J- to the Attorney General
    for review. On March 1, 2003, the authority of the Immigration and
    Naturalization Service to refer Board of Immigration Appeals decisions
    to the Attorney General was vested in the Secretary of Homeland
    Security, or in ``specific officials of the Department of Homeland
    Security designated by the Secretary with the concurrence of the
    Attorney General.'' 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(h)(iii). In this instance, the
    referring official was the Under Secretary for Border and
    Transportation Security.
        Question. Has the Attorney General consulted with you about his
    review of the Matter of R-A- case, involving whether a domestic
    violence victim should be denied asylum in the United States?
        Answer. The Attorney General has not yet consulted with DHS about
    this case, but I anticipate that the Attorney General will consider the
    views of my Department before issuing a decision
        Question. How is responsibility divided for issuing regulations in
    the area of immigration law? Who has the ultimate authority--you or the
    Attorney General? Are DHS and DOJ working together in the regulatory
    process?
        Answer. Both the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney
    General have important, and in certain areas, coextensive
    responsibility for issuing regulations in the area of immigration law.
    With the transfer of the former INS to the Department of Homeland
    Security, the Secretary of Homeland Security has the primary role in
    setting immigration policy within the Administration. However, the
    Homeland Security Act left the Executive Office for Immigration Review,
    housing the immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals, in
    the Department of Justice. In order to achieve prompt and effective
    implementation of regulations by both Departments to implement the
    common goals of this Administration, I assure you that the two
    Departments will work closely together when promulgating regulations in
    the future.
        Question. To provide a specific example, are you and the Attorney
    General working together on regulations to cover the conditions under
    which asylum can be granted to victims of domestic violence? If so,
    what is the current state of your work?
        Answer. The comments to the proposed regulation that was published
    on December 7, 2000 are currently being reviewed and considered by the
    Department of Homeland Security. We are working with the Department of
    Justice to coordinate a unified approach to this issue
        Question. Under Operation Liberty Shield, asylum seekers from 33
    Muslim countries who arrive in the United States are subject to
    automatic and unreviewable detention, with no individualized evaluation
    of the risk they may present. How many individuals have been detained
    thus far under Liberty Shield? What are the nationalities of the
    detained individuals?
        Answer. A total of 24 asylum seekers were detained under Liberty
    Shield including individuals from Iraq (15), Pakistan (3), Netherlands
    (1), Egypt (1), Lebanon (1), Turkey (1), Iran (1), Indonesia (1).
    Currently there are 15 in custody: Egypt (1), Indonesia (1), Iraq (9),
    Netherlands (1), Pakistan (3).
        [Note--the national from Netherlands was detained based on place of
    birth.]
        Question. With the cessation of active hostilities in Iraq, when do
    you plan to discontinue this automatic detention policy?
        Answer. The policy requiring mandatory detention of Expedited
    Removal cases in which credible fear has been established was
    disestablished contemporaneous with the Liberty Shield stand down.
    Detainees in custody were reviewed for appropriateness of continued
    detention based on standing guidance. No detainee was released until
    all appropriate indices checks were completed and found to be negative.
        Question. Did you consult with the Attorney General about the
    detention policy? What was the nature of the consultations?
        Answer. The Attorney General's staff helped to formulate, in a
    collaborative process, this and other elements of Liberty Shield.
       critical infrastructure information requirements of the homeland
                                  security act
        Question. Critical infrastructure information was given a broad
    exemption from the Freedom of Information Act in the Homeland Security
    Act of 2002. In accordance with that law, the Department of Homeland
    Security recently issued a proposed rule on the handling of critical
    infrastructure information.
        As written, the Homeland Security Act only covers information
    submitted to the Department of Homeland Security itself. The proposed
    rule, however, would require other Federal agencies that receive
    critical infrastructure information to pass it along to the Department,
    which would then exempt the information from public disclosure. In July
    2002, before the Homeland Security Act was passed, Rep. Tom Davis
    offered an amendment on the House floor to make all Federal agencies
    subject to the critical infrastructure provisions in the bill, not just
    the Department of Homeland Security. That amendment failed. Is the
    Department now attempting to achieve through rulemaking what the House
    of Representatives specifically rejected?
        Answer. Under the statute passed by Congress, DHS has the sole
    responsibility to designate voluntarily provided critical
    infrastructure information as protected CII. Accordingly, the proposed
    procedures address the handling of information which is voluntarily
    submitted by concerned citizens. This information may indeed arrive
    first at an agency other than DHS, however that agency lacks the
    statutory authority to designate this information as protected CII.
    Therefore, when the submitter expressly wishes protection under the CII
    Act of 2002, the voluntarily submitted information shall be forwarded
    on to DHS (29.5(b)(1)) for review and potential protection, pursuant to
    DHS designation.
        Question. The proposed rule states that ``the Department relies
    upon the discretion of the submitter as to whether the volunteered
    information meets the definition of critical infrastructure.'' This
    language creates a loophole by which a private entity could manipulate
    the law by voluntarily submitting incriminating or embarrassing data
    that is stamped ``critical infrastructure information,'' and thereby
    shielding the data from public view. If the proposed rule is
    promulgated as written, will the Department take any steps to prevent
    such a situation from occurring?
        Answer. The language in the preamble to the regulatory language
    emphasizes the voluntary nature of the submissions. The Department is
    keenly aware that reliance upon a submitter's discretion may lead to
    abuse of that discretion. And that such abuse could severely damage the
    integrity of the program. The Department is therefore taking all
    possible measures to prevent against abusing this protection. For that
    reason, proposed 29.6 provides that if the CII program manager
    determines the information is not submitted in good faith (in accord
    with the Act), the information will not be protected CII and,
    furthermore, the Program Manager need not even notify the submitter
    that the information does not qualify.
                                  agriculture
        Question. Secretary Ridge, you commented in a radio broadcast with
    Secretary Veneman on Monday that you believe that a livestock
    identification program would be ``a very good initiative to
    undertake''. I have long supported pilot projects, such as the one run
    by the Holstein Association in Brattleboro, Vermont, to test various
    methods of animal identification. Does the Department of Homeland
    Security, itself or in collaboration with USDA, have any plans to
    implement such a system? And if so, what efforts will your Department
    and USDA be making to help livestock producers transition to this new
    system? Specifically, will there be any financial assistance?
        Answer. At this time the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does
    not have any plans to immediately undertake a livestock identification
    program. With necessary studies and analyses, and should we decide to
    pursue such an initiative, then we would do so in close collaboration
    with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). It is too
    early to speculate on how the Departments of Homeland Security and
    Agriculture might help livestock producers transition to a livestock
    identification system. Some of that would depend on if it was a
    required or voluntary system, and many other variables. Financial
    assistance, if cost effective for this purpose, would be considered.
        Question. The Department of Homeland Security will be taking over
    the Plum Island Research Facility on June 1st. Plum Island is the only
    location America where highly infectious diseases that could wreak
    havoc on our agricultural system, such as foot-and-mouth disease, are
    studied. Will Plum Island continue to be exclusively an agriculture
    research facility or do you have any plans to study non-agricultural
    infectious diseases at this facility? Are there any plans to change the
    biosafety level of this facility?
        Answer. The Department, in partnership with USDA, intends to
    support research programs that focus on animal health research and
    diagnostics aimed at protecting our livestock against both natural and
    intentional release of foreign and exotic animal diseases. The
    Department has no plans to change the current research focus on foreign
    animal diseases, nor do we intend in the future to work on zoonotic
    agents at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). There are no
    plans to change the existing biosafety level of the Plum Island
    Facility.
        Question. There have also been some serious labor issues with the
    contracted security force at Plum Island. Will employees of the
    Department of Homeland Security be taking over the function of
    protecting the Plum Island facility? Regardless of employment, will
    additional measures be taken to increase security of this facility?
        The security force at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center will
    remain contracted. Across the country, the U.S. Government is taking
    measures to improve security at critical facilities. The USDA initiated
    security upgrades at Plum Island starting in December 2000. The USDA
    and Department of Homeland Security will continue to implement the
    security upgrades and review security policies and procedures.
                    northern border ports of energy staffing
        Question. I wrote you last month to ask about reports I have
    received that at two ports of entry in Vermont, and many other ports of
    entry along our border with Canada, there is now only one officer on
    duty on the overnight shift, instead of the two that have been on duty
    since the September 11 attacks. As I understand it, this change was
    implemented during the weekend after the Iraq war began and the
    terrorist threat level was elevated. Can you explain why this change
    was made generally, and why it was made at this time?
        Answer. In response to the tragedies of September 11, 2001, our
    agency immediately began staffing all Northern Border ports of entry
    with a minimum of two officers at all times. This included staffing
    non-24 hour ports during closed hours.
        Prior to 9/11, non-24 hour locations were unmanned during closed
    hours. We recently conducted a very thorough review and analysis of our
    operations at the non-24 hour Northern Border ports and have determined
    that one officer can safely and effectively monitor and report activity
    at many, but not all, of these locations during closed hours. Our
    review, which focused largely on officer safety, found that there were
    no significant events related to border intrusion and/or terrorism
    reported at the non-24 hour Northern Border ports during the past 19
    months. The review further indicated, however, that sufficient backup
    at some of the locations was not readily available. As a result of our
    review, the policy of 1-officer staffing during closed hours at the
    non-24 hour Northern Border ports was implemented on March 13, 2003,
    one week prior to the beginning of the war with Iraq. However, the
    policy was implemented only at the locations where it was determined
    safe to do so and sufficient backup is available.
        The policy of 1-officer staffing during closed hours remains an
    increase to pre-9/11 staffing numbers. Furthermore, 1-officer staffing
    during closed hours is commensurate to threat levels based on detailed
    research and analysis over a significant period of time.
                                  watch lists
        Question. The Washington Post reports this morning that the GAO
    will release a report today that criticizes the current state of the
    watch lists' that nine different agencies maintain to keep track of
    potential terrorists and other security threats and prevent them from
    entering or doing harm to the United States. I assume that your
    Department worked with the GAO as it compiled this report, and that you
    have some familiarity with its findings.
        Do you accept the responsibility for consolidating the numerous
    existing watch lists into a workable system? If so, what steps have you
    already taken and will you take to achieve that result?
        Answer. The GAO is correct in its assessment that the government's
    approach to using watch lists is decentralized because the lists were
    developed in response to individual agencies unique missions. Those
    historical missions include the duties of the law enforcement and
    intelligence communities, and now include the mission to defend the
    homeland. The effort to consolidate and establish the connectivity of
    information contained in historical databases, from which watch lists
    may be generated, requires close coordination among my Information
    Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, several other
    Departments, and the Terrorism Threat Integration Center. Discussions
    among the interested parties to effect the sharing and consolidation of
    information are ongoing, and all parties are working to establish a
    timeframe for implementation.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Harkin

                                  plum island
        Question. As you know, the President is proposing to transfer
    roughly half of the USDA's Plum Island's research budget to your
    agency. The justification given for the proposed transfer by your staff
    is that you want to take control of the funding for diagnostic testing
    that is done at Plum Island. While I have no problem with your
    department doing some testing development, I am very concerned about
    diverting critical funds that support USDA's mission as the lead agency
    for responding to agricultural health threats, whether they be natural
    or intentional.
        The only agricultural health functions transferred to DHS under the
    Homeland Security Act were those functions related to inspecting
    agricultural products coming in at ports-of-entry. There was no general
    transfer of authority for responding generally to agricultural health
    problems. Statutorily, USDA remains the lead agency when it comes to
    responding to agricultural health emergencies whether intentional or
    accidental, which makes sense, because USDA is where the expertise
    resides, and the agency that coordinates our domestic, agricultural
    first responder network. I think that strategy still makes sense. But,
    the Administration is now asking for a change in that strategy--a
    strategy, I might add, that you yourself supported in testimony before
    the Agriculture Committee last year. Why is the Administration
    proposing to reopen the Homeland Security Act and transfer USDA
    research programs that are critical to USDA's agricultural health
    mission in contravention of the clear language of the Homeland Security
    Act that any research conducted by DHS at Plum Island would not be
    taken from USDA research funds? What critical research needs does you
    agency have that cannot be met under the Homeland Security Act as
    currently written? If there are such needs why not just ask for the
    funds that you need rather than taking them from another agency?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of
    Agriculture have entered into a strategic partnership through which we
    can develop a focused research and development program to prevent,
    respond to, and recover from agroterrorism. We believe that the
    important work conducted by USDA scientists at PIADC must continue, and
    that strides in animal health research and diagnostics can serve both
    Departments' missions. We will work with USDA to balance research
    outcomes between economic security needs associated with agricultural
    trade and with homeland security needs associated with prevention of
    malicious acts against Americans and their institutions.
                   agriculture quarantine inspection program
        Question. Mr. Ridge, my staff has been trying for some time now to
    set up a briefing with your agency regarding implementation of the
    provisions of the Homeland Security Act affecting the Agriculture
    Quarantine Inspection program, could you please provide your assurance
    that this will be scheduled as soon as possible?
        Answer. BCBP Associate Commissioner, Agricultural Inspection Policy
    and Programs and her staff conducted a briefing scheduled on May 19,
    2003, with staff members of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn),
    Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD), Speaker of the House J.
    Dennis Hastert (R-IL), and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA).
    The BCBP Agricultural Inspection members are available to meet anytime
    to discuss the DHS Agricultural Quarantine Program.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted by Senator Herb Kohl

                           toxic substances--cyanide
        Question. Secretary Ridge, cyanide and other industrial chemicals
    are very lethal, readily available for purchase, and can be easily made
    into a terror weapon. The FBI has warned law enforcement agencies
    nationwide that terrorists may use cyanide in a future attack. We are
    working on a draft bill that will simply ensure that chemicals, like
    cyanide, do not fall into the wrong hands.
        Secretary Ridge, will you and your staff support my efforts to
    close this loophole quickly? We would appreciate your expertise and
    cooperation to get this done right and as soon as possible.
        Answer. Toxic industrial materials are recognized as being
    potential targets of terrorist attacks as well as potential terrorist
    weapons. The Administration believes that legislation with respect to
    chemical site security is necessary, and is working with members of
    Congress as they consider proposals in this area.
        Many industrial firms have conducted their own vulnerability
    assessments and have implemented enhanced security measures at their
    facilities to minimize the risk of terrorist attack and release of
    these toxic materials. It is important that we recognize enhanced
    protective measures may be needed, but additional measures should not
    unnecessarily impede the legitimate use and commerce of such materials.
                     crisis training for elected officials
        Question. Elected officials, especially at the local level, get
    little training, if any on how to handle a major crisis or disaster.
    There are many opportunities for police and fire fighters to learn how
    to deal with trouble, but mayors and county officials do not get any
    special training when they become the final authority on disaster
    response in their community. Many have to learn on the job. Small
    community leaders in my state are unclear how they should react or
    prepare for potential catastrophes.
        While FEMA has some exercises for top officials, will the
    Department of Homeland Security focus more attention on training
    elected officials to make the right decisions during a disaster? Will
    you develop a training program at the national level for mayors and
    county officials?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security offers a number of
    training alternatives for state and local officials to improve their
    management of a major disaster and/or terrorist attack. Both the
    Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate and the Office for
    Domestic Preparedness (ODP) contribute to this important role.
        EP&R through its Emergency Management Institute (EMI) in
    Emmitsburg, MD offers a number of courses to teach these individuals
    how to deal with terrorism, as well as the full range of disasters and
    emergencies.
        In addition, ODP supports direct training programs through the
    Domestic Preparedness Consortium, including the Center for Domestic
    Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama. A portion of ODP's State Homeland
    Security Grants may also be used by states and localities to fund
    rigorous training of their own choosing, provided it meets DHS-approved
    quality standards.
                       equipment standards and guidelines
        Question. Congress and the Administration are sending a lot of
    money out to our local communities to buy high tech equipment,
    including chemical and biological weapons detectors. First responders
    depend on these systems to make decisions and protect property and
    lives, but they have no help determining whether these machines will
    work in a crisis, just the word of the manufacturer.
        Will DHS set standards for how sensitive or reliable chemical and
    biological testing equipment should be? When will DHS provide
    guidelines to local communities so when they buy equipment they can
    feel confident these tools will work?
        Answer. Standards are an integral component of the mission of the
    S&T Directorate because they provide the objective measures of homeland
    security systems effectiveness. Standards are a fundamental component
    of the cradle to grave research, development, test, evaluation and
    transition to service product cycle. Thus, standards for homeland
    security applications must be constructed in parallel with the
    defensive systems to establish minimum criteria for effectiveness that
    encompass: basic functionality, adequacy for the task,
    interoperability, efficiency, and sustainability. Standards development
    requires a detailed knowledge of the technical attributes and
    capabilities of the system and a comprehensive understanding of the
    user requirements and operating conditions. A tight coupling must be
    maintained between the operational users, standards, and all the
    technologies that comprise the system at each step in the research,
    development, test and evaluation process.
        During the transition phase of the Department, the need for
    standards to address design, procurement, deployment, and use of the
    radiological and biological detectors was determined to be a key need.
    In collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and
    Technology (NIST), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and
    the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), the DHS
    S&T transition team began development of standards for four high-
    priority classes of radiation detection equipment. The four classes are
    personal dosimeters (``pagers''), alarming hand-held detectors, hand-
    held isotope identifiers, and radiation portals. These standards have
    been released in draft form and will soon go to ballot, in accordance
    with ANSI process requirements for national consensus standards. A
    contract to develop a standard test method for hand-held bulk anthrax
    immunoassay kits is being prepared.
        Work is also progressing in the areas of training standards and
    personnel certification. Additional standards needs for both detection
    and response are being identified as part of a systematic evaluation of
    capabilities versus needs for standards to support the homeland
    security mission related equipment, operators, models and analyses,
    data and information, and integrated systems.
        In addition, the S&T Directorate has been working with the Oklahoma
    City Memorial Institute for Preventing Terrorism (MIPT) to deploy a
    web-based tool that will communicate directly with user communities.
    The user community has had a broad representation in the development of
    the tool. ``Project Responder,'' with direct input from DHS, is
    evolving into a tool that can catalog technologies, provide links to
    manufacturer data, and indicate which standards apply and also the
    degree of compliance with DHS standards. It will also show links to
    appropriate training and with potential grant programs.
                             proper funding levels
        Question. We know there is a training and equipment gap between
    where we are now, and what we need to have to be truly ready. We know
    many fire departments do not have the training to respond to a serious
    hazardous materials event. We know many states do not have a
    communications system in place that allows top leadership to talk to
    all the first responders in the state. After these needs are met,
    however, how do we know we have spent enough?
        Answer. The Department is working with State and local authorities
    throughout the Nation to identify shortfalls and develop a plan for
    meeting security response standards. The Departments Future Years
    Homeland Security Program currently under development will help ensure
    that out year requirements are properly aligned and funded to maintain
    needed capability.
        Question. Is DHS working on a system to measure the costs and
    benefits of additional spending? Is there a way to prove that
    additional spending will improve security?
        Answer. The Department is evaluating all programs to ensure proper
    levels of funding. The Department also is setting up the office of
    Program Analysis and Evaluation within the Office of Management which
    will review, analyze, and evaluate programs, actions, or taskings to
    ensure adherence to DHS policies, standards and homeland security
    objectives, and ensure programs are designed to accommodate operational
    requirements and the readiness and efficiency of the DHS. One of its
    key jobs will also be developing the Department's Strategic Plan and
    ensuring associated goal, strategies and performance measures are in
    place to effectively review the performance of all programs. The fiscal
    year 2005 budget request will have measures for each area of
    responsibility. Also, the Departments Future Years Homeland Security
    Program will provide proper evaluation of program priorities making
    sure goals and objectives are properly planned, programmed and
    budgeted. Again, the ultimate measure of success will be the ability to
    identify, respond, and stop potential terrorist threats to our Nation.

                              SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

        Senator Cochran. We will continue to review the fiscal year
    2004 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security
    tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock in this same room. Our witnesses
    at that time will be the Director of the United States Secret
    Service, W. Ralph Basham, and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast
    Guard, Admiral Thomas H. Collins.
        Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., Wednesday, April 30, the
    subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday
    May 1.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 1, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Byrd, and Murray.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                              U.S. Secret Service

    STATEMENT OF W. RALPH BASHAM, DIRECTOR

                                U.S. Coast Guard

    STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS, COMMANDANT

                    OPENING REMARKS OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

        Senator Cochran. The Subcommittee will please come to
    order.
        Today the Subcommittee on Homeland Security of the Senate
    Appropriations Committee continues its hearings on the
    President's budget request for fiscal year 2004 for funding the
    Department of Homeland Security activities.
        This morning we will hear from two agencies that have been
    transferred to the new Department, the United States Secret
    Service and the United States Coast Guard.
        We are pleased to have as our witnesses this morning the
    Director of the U.S. Secret Service, W. Ralph Basham, and the
    Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Admiral Thomas H.
    Collins.
        We will begin with the Secret Service. The Secret Service
    was established, as we know, in 1865 with very few officers and
    the responsibility for preventing the circulation of
    counterfeit currency.
        Today the Secret Service continues to curtail
    counterfeiting while protecting our Nation's leaders and
    securing America's financial infrastructure from cyber crime.
        We have a copy of your written testimony, Director Basham,
    which we appreciate very much. It will be made a part of the
    record in full, and we would encourage you to summarize it or
    discuss the high points and make any additional comments that
    you think would be helpful to the Committee's understanding of
    the budget request for the Secret Service.
        I thought we would go ahead with an opening statement and
    then recess the hearing because we have a vote that is
    scheduled on the Senate floor at 10:15. One way we could do
    this is to have the Commandant of the Coast Guard make an
    opening statement as well, if that is all right with the
    Admiral.
        So let us proceed now with the Secret Service. You may
    proceed, Mr. Director.

                      OPENING STATEMENT OF W. RALPH BASHAM

        Mr. Basham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is a privilege for me to be here today to represent the
    men and women of the United States Secret Service and our
    fiscal year 2004 budget request.
        Our agency looks forward to forming a strong and lasting
    relationship with this new Subcommittee, and I deeply
    appreciate your willingness to allow us to be here to testify
    today.
        We have entered a truly momentous period for the Secret
    Service. On March 1, 2003, as you stated, our agency was
    transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the
    Department of Homeland Security. I would like to share with
    this Subcommittee our vision for the future of the Secret
    Service and in particular the role that this agency will seek
    to carry out in the new Department.

                         MISSIONS OF THE SECRET SERVICE

        The bedrock principle of the Secret Service's dual
    protective and investigative missions is our focus on
    prevention. This core philosophy is ingrained in our culture
    and is truly what makes the Secret Service unique among all law
    enforcement agencies.
        Our focus on prevention began with our original mandate to
    suppress counterfeiting when the Secret Service adopted the
    goal of preventing the production of counterfeit currency
    before it was circulated. Today our agents are trained to
    detect incidents before they occur, through meticulous advance
    work and counter-surveillance tactics.
        Threat assessments developed by our Intelligence Division
    identify existing dangers to officials that we protect. Our
    Electronic Crime Task Forces provide training to hundreds of
    our local law enforcement and private sector partners, aiding
    them in efforts to shield critical systems and networks from
    cyber criminals and terrorists.
        We believe that our prevention-based philosophy mirrors
    that of the new Department. Our common goal is to anticipate
    and prepare, to take the necessary precautions to minimize
    opportunities for our adversaries, and to prevent any loss of
    life or the disruption of the institutions upon which we
    depend.
        The Secret Service has already identified resources,
    assets, and personnel within our agency that could enhance the
    efforts of the new Department to achieve its homeland security
    objectives.
        Foremost is our century-old protective mission and mandate
    to protect the President, the Vice President, visiting world
    leaders, and other key Government officials, and to coordinate
    security operations for events of national significance.
        An equally important component of homeland security is
    economic security, including the protection of our currency and
    financial payment systems, particularly as fraudulent credit
    and debit cards and counterfeit checks have become prevalent in
    the marketplace.
        We must also address the vulnerabilities in other critical
    infrastructures. A serious compromise of these assets ranging
    from telecommunication networks to energy plants to water
    treatment facilities could wreak havoc on our economy, law
    enforcement, health care providers, transportation systems, and
    emergency services.
        The need to secure our critical infrastructure typifies an
    area where our agency's unique competencies and experience can
    contribute to the efforts of the new Department. Today, the
    Secret Service is already discussing with Departmental
    officials how our expertise can be applied to safeguarding and
    ensuring the continuity and reliability of physical and
    technology-based assets throughout our economy and our
    communities.

                    ELECTRONIC CRIMES SPECIAL AGENT PROGRAM

        Let me introduce one of our special agents who is on the
    front lines of that effort. Special Agent Cornelius Tate is a
    graduate of the University of Mississippi with a degree in
    computer science. He is a 17-year veteran of the Secret
    Service. He has served in numerous protective and investigative
    assignments including the Presidential Protective Division.
    Today, Special Agent Tate is one of 180 members of our unique
    Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program. Our ECSAP program
    provides specialized training in the forensic preservation and
    examination of computer evidence. These ECSAP agents are truly
    unique, both because of their ability to provide timely,
    mobile, and onsite examinations, and because they can combine
    their technical expertise with their investigative skills and
    experience.
        Until recently, Special Agent Tate served as a Secret
    Service liaison to the Computer Emergency Response Team at
    Carnegie Mellon University. Today he is providing critical
    support to the DHS initiatives to coordinate Federal and State
    efforts to safeguard key assets throughout the Nation such as
    nuclear facilities and water treatment plants from both
    physical and electronic terrorist attacks.

                            SECRET SERVICE PERSONNEL

        Mr. Chairman, it has been more than three decades since I
    began my own Secret Service training, and as you can imagine, a
    lot has changed over that time. The technology revolution has
    forever transformed our economy, our culture, and the
    challenges we face in law enforcement. Our protective
    methodologies have become vastly more sophisticated,
    incorporating elements such as electronic surveillance,
    biometrics, and air space surveillance systems. And of course,
    we have the ominous and immediate threat posed by global
    terrorists.
        But if there has been a common thread throughout the 138
    years of the Secret Service's history, it is truly the unique
    caliber of individuals who are drawn to our agency. We have
    always managed to attract individuals with special backgrounds
    and extraordinary credentials. They join the Secret Service and
    they remain with our agency because the position offers
    something that the private sector cannot--an opportunity to
    serve their country.
        I would like to introduce to you one of our employees who
    truly embodies that spirit. Sergeant Joseph Wright is an 8-year
    veteran of the Secret Service Uniformed Division. He is a
    native of Fort Knox, Kentucky and completed his high school and
    college in West Virginia. He joined the United States Army as a
    reservist in 1987 and the Secret Service as a uniformed officer
    in 1995. Last year, Sergeant Wright temporarily left our agency
    to serve a year-long deployment with the U.S. Army Special
    Operations forces in Afghanistan. He was awarded the Bronze
    Star for his service, of which I know his three children are
    enormously proud.
        Special Agent Tate and Sergeant Wright are members of the
    United States Secret Service family. Every special agent,
    uniformed officer, technical specialist, forensic examiner, and
    administrative staff member contributes to our protective and
    investigative missions. Our employees represent a diversity of
    backgrounds, experiences, and expertise, yet they share many of
    the same ideas and aspirations.
        The character and spirit of our people is the undeniable
    strength of the Secret Service and defines both the history and
    the future of our agency.
        Mr. Chairman, the men and women of the United States Secret
    Service stand ready to continue to protect our leaders, our
    infrastructure, and the American people. Our people have the
    skills, the experience, the training and, most important, the
    character to rise to any occasion. They have dedicated their
    careers and their lives to making America safer.

                               prepared statement

        Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
    and this Subcommittee, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my
    statement, and I am prepared to answer any questions.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Director.
        [The statement follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of W. Ralph Basham

        Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished members of this
    subcommittee, it is a privilege to be here today to testify on the
    fiscal year 2004 budget. Our agency looks forward to forming a strong
    and lasting relationship with this new subcommittee, and I deeply
    appreciate the opportunity to represent the 6,100 dedicated men and
    women of the Secret Service.
        Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to the Members and staff of
    the former Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government. For years,
    this subcommittee was responsible for the oversight of the Secret
    Service, and we were tremendously fortunate to have a long line of
    exceptional chairmen, Senators and staff--many of whom are here today--
    that provided unwavering support to our agency, our mission and our
    personnel. The contribution of these individuals to the strength and
    versatility of the Secret Service today cannot be overstated, and we
    are grateful for their efforts and leadership.
        With me today, Mr. Chairman, are C. Danny Spriggs, Deputy Director;
    Barbara Riggs, Chief of Staff; Paul D. Irving, Assistant Director for
    Homeland Security; Stephen T. Colo, Assistant Director for
    Administration; Keith L. Prewitt, Assistant Director for Government and
    Public Affairs; Patrick C. Miller, Assistant Director for Human
    Resources and Training; Brian K. Nagel, Assistant Director for
    Inspection; George D. Rogers, Assistant Director for Investigations;
    Donald A. Flynn, Assistant Director for Protective Operations; Carl J.
    Truscott, Assistant Director for Protective Research; and John J.
    Kelleher, Chief Counsel.
        We come before you today during what is truly a momentous period
    for the Secret Service. For the first time in the 138 years of our
    existence, the Secret Service is no longer a part of the Department of
    the Treasury. On March 1, 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act
    of 2002, our agency, and all of its functions and assets, were
    transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security. I would like to
    share with the subcommittee our vision for the future of the Secret
    Service, and in particular, the role our agency will seek to carry out
    in the new department, under the leadership of Secretary Ridge. This is
    a time of great transition and change for the Secret Service. But we
    recognize the magnitude of the challenge before us, and the men and
    women of the Secret Service stand ready to continue their extraordinary
    service to our country.
        The bedrock principle of the Secret Service's dual protective and
    investigative missions is our focus on prevention. This core philosophy
    is prevalent throughout our agency's history. The theme of prevention
    is ingrained in our culture and pierces every facet of the Secret
    Service. It is the undercurrent of our daily investigative and
    protective work, and is truly what makes the Secret Service unique
    among all law enforcement entities.
        Our focus on prevention began with our original mandate to suppress
    counterfeiting, when the Secret Service adopted the goal of preventing
    the production of counterfeit currency before it was circulated. One
    hundred thirty-eight years later, our field personnel continue to work
    closely with paper and ink manufacturers and suppliers to determine if
    there is any inordinate demand for the materials used to produce
    quality counterfeit currency.
        Prevention has also become an integral part of our efforts today to
    work with local law enforcement, other Federal agencies, and the
    private sector to protect our country's critical infrastructure and
    financial payment systems from intrusion and compromise.
        Our agents are trained to detect incidents before they occur
    through meticulous advance work and countersurveillance tactics. Threat
    assessments developed by our Intelligence Division identify existing
    dangers to the officials we are protecting. Our Technical Security
    Division analyzes and addresses any vulnerabilities in a physical
    security plan. Our Electronic Crime Task Forces provide training to
    hundreds of our local law enforcement and private sector partners,
    aiding them in efforts to shield critical systems and networks from
    cyber criminals and terrorists.
        We believe that our prevention-based core philosophy mirrors that
    of the new department. Like our agency, the DHS must be prepared to
    respond to incidents and infiltration. Our common goal is to anticipate
    and prepare, to take the necessary steps and precautions to minimize
    opportunities for our adversaries, and to prevent any loss of life or
    the destruction or disruption of the institutions we depend on.
        Following enactment of this historic reorganization legislation,
    the Secret Service began the process of identifying resources, assets
    and personnel that could enhance the efforts of the new department to
    achieve its homeland security objectives.
        Foremost is our century-old protective mission and mandate to
    protect the President, the Vice President, their families, former
    Presidents and other key government officials, including visiting world
    leaders and heads of state. The Secret Service is also responsible for
    coordinating security at National Special Security Events, such as the
    2002 Winter Olympics and the national political conventions. An equally
    important component of homeland security is economic security,
    including the protection of our currency, critical assets and financial
    payment systems. Since our inception 138 years ago, the goal of the
    Secret Service's investigative efforts has been to safeguard our
    financial infrastructure. Financial crimes have increasingly targeted
    both American industry and American consumers, as fraudulent credit and
    debit cards and counterfeit checks have become more prevalent in the
    marketplace. Even more troubling, stolen identities, false
    identification documents, and fraudulent credit cards have become the
    tools of the 21st century terrorist.
        Our currency and financial payment systems are primary targets for
    terrorists and other criminal enterprises, yet our critical
    infrastructure is equally vulnerable. A serious compromise of these
    assets, ranging from telecommunications networks to energy plants to
    water treatment facilities, could wreak havoc on our economy, law
    enforcement, military, health care providers, transportation systems,
    and emergency services. Accordingly, Secretary Ridge has made critical
    infrastructure protection one of the highest priorities of the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        The need to secure our critical infrastructure typifies an area
    where our agency's unique competencies and experience can enhance the
    efforts of the new department. Today, the Secret Service is already
    discussing with DHS officials how our expertise can be applied to
    safeguarding and ensuring the continuity and reliability of physical
    and technology-based assets throughout our economy and our communities.
        Reflective of the evolving nature of our mission, critical
    infrastructure protection has become a vital component of our
    protective methodology in recent years. Advances in technology and the
    world's reliance on interdependent network systems have demonstrated
    that we can no longer rely solely on human resources and physical
    barriers in designing a security plan; we must also address the role
    and inherent vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures upon which
    security plans are built. That is why the Secret Service has
    specialists, stationed in our field offices across the country, who
    have the experience and expertise to secure critical infrastructures
    that encompass information technology, telecommunications, emergency
    services, and other essential networks.
        Over time, these skilled personnel in our field offices have built
    partnerships with the municipalities, private companies, and local law
    enforcement agencies in the cities and regions we serve. On subjects
    ranging from physical security to threat assessment to forensic
    analysis, the Secret Service endeavors to share with our local law
    enforcement and private industry partners the prevention-based
    expertise we have developed during the course of our protective and
    investigative missions. This is clearly evident in the area of critical
    infrastructure protection and our efforts to aid local governments and
    private companies in assessing the vulnerabilities of their networks to
    prevent disruption and compromise. It is also reflected in our
    affiliation with Carnegie Mellon's Computer Emergency Response Team
    Coordination Center which focuses on insiders who attack critical
    information systems.
        Within the Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service is
    currently assisting the Directorate of Information Analysis and
    Infrastructure Protection with its mandate to complete vulnerability
    assessments of identified assets and to develop a comprehensive plan
    for securing key resources and critical infrastructure, including power
    production and distribution systems, electronic and financial
    transmission systems, emergency communications systems, and physical
    and technical networks that support such systems. We continue to work
    closely with the Department and are discussing options for further
    expanding the role of the Secret Service in safeguarding these critical
    assets.
        Mr. Chairman, it has been more than three decades since I began my
    own Secret Service training. As you can imagine, much has changed for
    the Secret Service during that time. The technology revolution has
    forever transformed our economy, our culture, and the challenges we
    face in law enforcement. Our protective methodologies have become
    vastly more sophisticated, incorporating elements such as electronic
    surveillance, biometrics, airspace surveillance systems, and chemical/
    biological/hazardous material detectors. And, of course, we have the
    ominous and immediate threat posed by global terrorists, who have
    demonstrated their zeal to destroy our most cherished symbols and
    institutions and to harm an infinite number of Americans.
        During my initial weeks as Director, I have spent considerable time
    introducing myself to our employees, both here in Washington and in our
    field offices. And as I have had the opportunity to reacquaint myself
    with the men and women of this agency and learn more about their
    backgrounds, their training, and their experience, I am reminded of the
    adage that the more things change, the more they stay the same.
        If there has been a common thread throughout the 138 years of the
    Secret Service's history, it is the truly unique caliber of individuals
    who are drawn to our agency. We have always managed to attract
    individuals with special backgrounds and extraordinary credentials.
        They join the Secret Service, and remain with our agency, because
    their position offers something that the private sector cannot--an
    opportunity to serve their country. An opportunity to protect their
    nation's highest elected leaders. An opportunity to protect their
    families, their friends, and their communities.
        For these men and women, it is more than an opportunity. It is a
    calling.
        The Secret Service is a family. Every special agent, uniformed
    officer, technical specialist, forensic examiner and administrative
    staff member contributes to our protective and investigative missions.
    Our employees represent a diversity of backgrounds, experiences and
    expertise, yet they share many ideals and aspirations. The character
    and spirit of our people is the undeniable strength of the Secret
    Service, and defines both the history and the future of our agency.
                     fiscal year 2004 appropriation request
        The Service's fiscal year 2004 funding request totals
    $1,123,951,000 and 6,066 full-time equivalents (FTE), and includes
    funding for two accounts: the Operating Expenses account, and the
    Capital Acquisitions account.
                               operating expenses
        The Secret Service's Operating Expenses appropriation request for
    fiscal year 2004 totals $1,120,372,000 and 6,066 FTE, a decrease of 45
    FTE from this fiscal year's staffing level. The funding increases
    proposed in this budget include: $54,056,000 needed to maintain current
    program performance levels, and cover base pay and benefits
    annualization costs; an additional $31,881,000 for the protective
    effort surrounding the 2004 presidential campaign, and $33,000,000 for
    processing of mail going to the White House. These increases are offset
    by a $9,000,000 reduction in the base budget reflective of our
    reorganization into the Department of Homeland Security, and
    anticipated consolidation savings from integration with Department-wide
    processes and operations.
                              capital acquisitions
        The Secret Service's fiscal year 2004 request for its Capital
    Acquisitions account totals $3,579,000, an increase of $83,000 over the
    level appropriated for this fiscal year. This increase is needed to
    maintain current program performance levels. There are no programmatic
    changes or initiatives proposed for this account.
                             investigative program
        Since 1865, the Secret Service has been safeguarding our currency
    and financial infrastructure, pre-dating our mission to protect the
    President by nearly four decades. Securing our financial and critical
    infrastructures and ensuring the strength and stability of our economy,
    are central tenets of homeland security. Our investigative mission is
    accomplished through our vast network of field offices, including 134
    throughout the United States and 20 additional offices overseas. Our
    field offices have developed strong, information-sharing partnerships
    with the multitude of local police organizations and private companies
    they work with on a daily basis. These field offices are leading
    criminal investigations and task force initiatives, but they are also
    resources for the communities they are serving.
                                 computer crime
        For the last twenty years, the Secret Service has been a leader of
    Federal law enforcement efforts to investigate electronic crimes--an
    authority that was reaffirmed by Congress in the USA Patriot Act of
    2001. As with our protective mission, we continue to focus on
    preventative measures to shield the American people and our essential
    networks from terrorists, cyber criminals, and other attackers. We have
    committed ourselves as an agency to developing new tools to combat the
    growth of cyber terrorism, financial crime and computer fraud.
        The Secret Service's highly-regarded Electronic Crimes Special
    Agent Program (ECSAP) provides specialized training to select agents in
    all areas of electronic crimes, and qualifies these personnel as
    experts in the forensic examination and preservation of electronic
    evidence and in the protection of critical infrastructure. ECSAP agents
    are also trained to examine the variety of devices used in many
    criminal enterprises, including credit card generators, electronic
    organizers, scanners, computer hard drives, and devices manufactured or
    reconfigured to intercept or duplicate telecommunications services.
        The ECSAP program consists of 180 agents stationed today throughout
    the country. They have become invaluable specialists, both for our own
    investigations as well as for our local and Federal law enforcement
    partners. From June 1, 2001 through June 1, 2002, ECSAP agents
    completed over 1,400 forensic examinations on computer and
    telecommunications equipment. The nationwide demand among our local law
    enforcement and private sector partners for investigative or
    prevention-based assistance from our ECSAP agents is overwhelming, and
    we are striving to expand this program and training within our agency's
    existing resource levels.
        Another important component of our strategy to secure our financial
    and critical infrastructure is the development of the Secret Service's
    electronic crime task forces. Several years ago, the Secret Service
    recognized the need for law enforcement, private industry and academia
    to pool their resources and expertise as part of a collaborative effort
    to investigate and prevent electronic crimes and protect our nation's
    critical infrastructure. In New York alone, our task force is comprised
    of over 300 individual members, including 50 different Federal, state,
    and local law enforcement agencies, 250 private companies and 18
    universities. This task force has made 961 state and locally-prosecuted
    arrests and investigated an estimated $960 million in actual and
    potential losses due to fraud.
        The USA Patriot Act of 2001 authorized our agency to extend these
    task forces to cities and regions across the country. Last year, we
    launched the initial phase of this expansion, developing task forces in
    locations with significant or specialized interests in the financial,
    banking or critical information sectors, including Los Angeles, San
    Francisco, Las Vegas, Chicago, Charlotte, Miami, Boston, and
    Washington, D.C. We have received strong and enthusiastic support for
    this program from the scores of local law enforcement agencies we work
    with, as well as our private sector partners, who are all excited about
    the potential of this exciting new endeavor. These task forces
    represent a potential means of extending the preventative mission so
    imperative to homeland security to communities across the country.
        Based on our experience, the first line of defense in combating
    cyber crime is often an agent or officer who is trained in methods of
    preserving and securing evidence at electronic crime scenes. In
    recognition of the time sensitivities associated with computer crime,
    the importance of properly seizing computer-related evidence, and the
    increasing complexity of cyber-related crime, we continue to see the
    value in promoting partnerships and training. In the course of
    investigating electronic crime and developing strategies in search of
    the best formula, we have found prevention, collaboration, information
    sharing and timely response to be essential factors in the equation.
        Consequently, the Secret Service, in cooperation with the
    International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), recently
    introduced the Forward Edge training package. Forward Edge utilizes
    state-of-the-art computer training designed for all law enforcement and
    provides instruction with regard to securing electronic crime scenes
    and safely seizing computer-related evidence. Forward Edge includes an
    8-hour CD-ROM, utilizing a three-dimensional, interactive training
    format, to provide the officer or agent with different scenarios
    involving identity theft, financial crimes, network intrusion, credit
    card fraud, counterfeiting, data theft and other computer-related
    crimes. The CD-ROM also provides a field guide that contains practical
    information, such as an inventory of local computer crime statutes for
    every state jurisdiction, along with sample search warrants pertaining
    to the seizure and safe handling of computer-related evidence, drugs
    and weapons. Each scenario guides the trainee through crime scenes and
    enables him/her to interact with objects, individuals and situations
    they may encounter in real life. In fiscal year 2002, the Secret
    Service completed distribution of 20,000 copies of Forward Edge to
    local, state and Federal law enforcement agencies.
                                 counterfeiting
        Despite the inclusion of enhanced security features in the most
    recent designs of our currency, counterfeiters continue to take
    advantage of the latest digital technology to produce reasonably
    deceptive counterfeit notes. Desktop printers, color copiers, scanners
    and graphics software provide relatively unskilled counterfeiters with
    the basic tools to quickly and easily produce counterfeit United States
    and foreign currency, securities, bonds, checks and other obligations.
        Counterfeit currency produced using digital technology, such as
    computer printers and copiers, accounted for an estimated 39 percent of
    counterfeit notes passed on the American public in fiscal year 2002.
    The balance of notes passed in the United States were manufactured
    using traditional offset printing methods. Despite the fact that
    digitally-produced counterfeit currency accounted for just over one-
    third of domestic passing activity, this type of counterfeiting
    resulted in 86 percent of domestic counterfeit arrests and 95 percent
    of domestic counterfeit printing operations suppressed by the Secret
    Service.
        Digital counterfeiting presents a continuing challenge to law
    enforcement due to the widespread availability, ease of operation, and
    mobility of personal computers. The privacy and convenience of personal
    computer systems encourages experimentation, and permits the printing
    of counterfeit currency with considerably less risk and expense than
    traditional printing methods.
        The Secret Service has long believed that the best tool in the
    fight against the proliferation of counterfeit currency is an educated
    public. Just as we practice prevention in our protective mission, our
    proactive approach to investigations is hinged upon the education and
    training seminars provided to business owners, retail groups, the
    financial industry, and state and local law enforcement. These
    counterfeit currency detection seminars provide key sectors of our
    public with the information they need to effectively protect themselves
    and their businesses from becoming victims of counterfeiters. In
    addition to providing training and education, the Secret Service
    publishes and distributes public education brochures describing the
    security features used to authenticate genuine currency.
        From an international perspective, the Secret Service continues to
    send instructors to the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA),
    where we provide training to foreign police representatives in the
    detection of counterfeit U.S. currency and offer information on
    strategies useful in investigations of counterfeiting. Last year, the
    Secret Service offered currency identification training to law
    enforcement and banking officials from 47 countries.
        Our continued presence overseas and the training provided through
    the ILEAs is paramount in our ongoing efforts to suppress and seize the
    increasing amount of foreign-produced counterfeit U.S. currency being
    sold, shipped and trafficked throughout the world. The Secret Service
    estimates that nearly 50 percent of all counterfeit U.S. currency
    passed domestically originates overseas. As the continued suppression
    of counterfeit printing operations and seizures of counterfeit currency
    in Colombia indicate, that country remains the leading producer of
    counterfeit U.S. currency in the world. The Secret Service maintains a
    permanent presence in Colombia through our office in Bogota. While
    lacking law enforcement authority overseas, we work closely in an
    investigative liaison capacity with law enforcement, prosecutors and
    government officials throughout the region. These efforts include
    providing training and investigative support aimed at suppression,
    seizure, deterrence, education, and intelligence-gathering regarding
    the organized criminal networks involved in transnational
    counterfeiting. The culmination of these efforts is apparent in the
    achievements of ``Plan Colombia.''
        Since its inception in May of 2001, Plan Colombia has enjoyed
    tremendous success. As of last December, the combined efforts of our
    agents working in cooperation with the Colombian government have
    resulted in 109 arrests, 26 plant suppressions and over $92 million in
    counterfeit U.S. dollars seized in Colombia prior to distribution.
    Accordingly, in fiscal year 2002, there was a 22 percent decrease in
    Colombian-manufactured counterfeit U.S. dollars passed on the American
    public from the previous year.
        Increasingly, Colombian counterfeiters have targeted ``dollarized''
    economies. In December of 2001, the Secret Service and Colombian
    authorities intercepted a package of over $40 million in counterfeit
    U.S. dollars intended for distribution in Ecuador, which had previously
    adopted the U.S. dollar as its own currency. In July of 2002, the
    Colombian authorities, in cooperation with our own personnel, seized
    the first counterfeit $1 coin (Sacagawea or ``Golden Dollar'')
    production operation in Bogota. As of January, 2003, three additional
    counterfeit $1 coin plants had been suppressed in Colombia. In each
    case, the seized coins were intended for shipment and distribution in
    Ecuador where, according to the Federal Reserve, there are
    approximately $10 million in genuine $1 coins in circulation.
        Counterfeiters are keenly aware that the public, banks, and law
    enforcement in these dollarized countries are less familiar with
    counterfeit U.S. currency, and the punishment for smuggling,
    possessing, and passing counterfeit U.S. currency is generally far less
    than in the United States. Each of these factors decrease risk, lower
    costs, and thereby increases profits for the counterfeiter. Therefore,
    a continued Secret Service presence in this region is vital to
    maintaining both economic stability in these countries and confidence
    in the U.S. dollar.
        In August of 2002, the Secret Service and the Colombian National
    Police jointly hosted the ``International Conference on Counterfeit
    U.S. Dollars--Production, Distribution, and Criminal Prosecution'' in
    Bogota. The conference was attended by senior law enforcement officials
    and prosecutors from sixteen North, Central and South American
    countries, as well as representatives from Spain, Turkey, EUROPOL, and
    the Southern European Cooperative Initiative. This historic conference
    served to improve coordination, build new relationships, and enhance
    existing efforts within the international law enforcement community.
    The conference was yet another example of our emphasis on building and
    maintaining partnerships with foreign law enforcement officials; in
    this case with a focus on the production, distribution and trafficking
    of counterfeit U.S. currency.
                                 identity theft
        It remains an investigative priority of the Secret Service to
    promote a public education program and work with law enforcement at all
    levels in preventing identity theft. Public awareness constitutes our
    best defense against identity theft and provides guidance to consumers
    on how they can effectively safeguard their private information. A
    stolen identity can provide a criminal with the tools and information
    necessary to establish good credit and obtain things of value through
    illicit means. Personal information can be used to establish bank
    accounts, obtain credit or debit cards, or gain unauthorized access to
    financial accounts or other sources of capital. Not surprisingly, most
    financial crimes, including bank fraud and credit card fraud, involve
    identity theft.
        The Secret Service hosts identity theft forums involving
    businesses, civic groups, community organizations and local police
    departments, and shares our ``best practices'' for preventing such
    crime and protecting consumers. We participate in and organize such
    events in communities across the country.
        In cooperation with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
    IACP, the Secret Service is developing an identity crime video and CD-
    ROM. This project is designed to provide information to local and state
    law enforcement personnel that will assist them in investigating
    identity crimes at the local level. The video and CD-ROM will serve as
    an information and resource guide, providing downloadable materials
    such as State and Federal identity theft statutes, the FTC's Victim
    Assistance Guide and Sample Affidavit, a ``Best Practices Guide to
    Identity Crime,'' the local contact numbers for the Secret Service,
    Postal Inspection Service, FBI and other agencies, and credit card
    fraud and related information from our partners in the financial
    services industry. This valuable training tool should be available in
    the coming weeks, and the Secret Service will be distributing a copy to
    every police department in the United States.
                             global financial crime
        The professional and effective relationship we have developed with
    the Colombian government, and the similar success stories we have
    enjoyed among our other 19 foreign field offices, can be attributed to
    our long-term commitment to work with the host nation in a cooperative
    environment. This environment fosters relationships built on trust and
    mutual respect, and results in the sharing of information and
    expertise. Where permanent stations are not available, the Secret
    Service relies on temporary assignments to satisfy the requests for
    participation in overseas financial crimes and counterfeit task forces.
    Within the last 2 years alone, the impact of our work through temporary
    assignments in Lagos, Nigeria, Bucharest, Romania, and Frankfurt,
    Germany has resulted in the opening of permanent offices.
        In addition to the protection of our currency, the Secret Service's
    efforts abroad are directed at protecting the integrity of our
    financial infrastructure through responsiveness and timely assistance
    at the point of attack. Within our agency's existing resource levels,
    the Secret Service will seek to establish additional foreign offices in
    areas where there is a demand for our expertise, continued requests for
    partnerships, and in regions that make sense strategically and offer a
    high probability of a favorable return on the investment.
                         security of identity documents
        The heightened threat of terrorism within the United States
    reinforces the need to secure, authenticate, and trace identification
    documents. There are no current uniform standards for identification
    documents in the United States, and many identity documents today,
    particularly state drivers' licenses, were not designed with security
    in mind. They often include features that are either available on the
    Internet or can be easily simulated by amateur counterfeiters using
    widely accessible technologies. With over 300 different, yet
    legitimate, formats for state driver licenses in use today, it has
    become nearly impossible for law enforcement to authenticate a
    questioned document.
        The counterfeiting of documents continues even after a change in
    design or security features. For this reason, the Secret Service's
    Forensic Services Division sponsors the Document Security Alliance
    (DSA), comprised of business leaders from the credentialing and
    identity document industry. The DSA's goal is to focus the efforts of
    this multi-disciplinary group on improving the security and procedures
    associated with identity documents. This organization has discussed and
    explored various processes, methods, techniques and technologies that
    could be used to improve the forensic tracing of fraudulent documents.
        Our agency has investigated cases where individuals were in
    possession of multiple genuine driver licenses, each bearing that
    individual's photographs with different biographical information.
    Subsequent information revealed that state motor vehicle
    administrators, upon receipt of counterfeit ``breeder'' documents,
    issued the licenses. The notion that criminals can generate counterfeit
    breeder documents, such as birth certificates and Social Security
    cards, and obtain with little difficulty more secure documents such as
    passports, throws a spotlight on one of our most troubling
    vulnerabilities.
        The Secret Service maintains a database consisting of over 90,000
    counterfeit identity and monetary documents. These counterfeit
    documents include credit cards, travelers checks, bank checks, Social
    Security cards, immigration documents, birth records, work identities
    and drivers licenses. The database was created to allow for link
    analysis or data mining of records that would not normally be discerned
    through traditional investigative or forensic approaches. The current
    system has produced numerous investigative leads and is considered the
    largest database of its kind in the world. The ability to collect,
    analyze and catalogue documents relating to terrorist investigations,
    and to provide a forensic link analysis in tracking criminals and
    terrorists throughout the world, is critical. The Secret Service has
    developed and implemented a Web-based application that provides law
    enforcement agencies across the country with access to all genuine
    identification documents used in the United States. Within seconds, law
    enforcement personnel can request an image file of a specific document
    along with critical information necessary to examine the document
    effectively.
        The images can be enlarged, printed or used for comparison with the
    document in question. The application can assist the officer with step-
    by-step instructions to aide searches without the requirement for
    specific knowledge in the area of counterfeit documents. The program
    also provides additional instruction in detecting common defects in
    counterfeit documents as well as security features in genuine
    documents. A scanning feature will also be incorporated to allow a
    document to be submitted to our forensic lab. The anticipated
    turnaround time for a decision on the authenticity of the suspected
    document will be less than 60 minutes.
               national center for missing and exploited children
        The Secret Service derives enormous professional and personal
    fulfillment from our relationship with the National Center for Missing
    and Exploited Children (NCMEC), and continues to provide the valuable
    analytical, forensic and laboratory support, and other assistance that
    the Center has benefited from in recent years.
        Since the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
    Act of 1994, the Secret Service has provided forensic and technical
    support to the NCMEC, including the use of the Automated Fingerprint
    Identification System; the Forensic Information System for Handwriting;
    ink analysis and comparison; traditional handwriting and fingerprint
    comparison; polygraph examinations and consultation; visual information
    services such as image enhancement, suspect drawings and video and
    audio enhancement; graphic and photographic support; and age
    regression/progression drawings. In fiscal year 2002, the Secret
    Service conducted 29 polygraph examinations in direct support of the
    NCMEC's mission. The examinations for these cases involved missing,
    abused and murdered children.
        We also actively support the Center's Operation Safe Kids
    initiative--a national, community-based awareness effort. We utilize a
    computer-enhanced application known as the Children's Identification
    System (KIDS), to acquire a photograph, fingerprints and biographical
    data of a child that are then printed and provided to his or her
    parents. This program has been offered at public events throughout the
    country, and to date, we have fingerprinted more than 35,000 children
    under the KIDS program.
        The Secret Service is also developing a Forensic Investigative
    Response and Support Team (FIRST). FIRST will be comprised of forensic
    experts able to respond on short notice to requests for assistance from
    state, local, or other Federal law enforcement agencies, providing
    time-sensitive forensic support to requesting agencies in cases
    involving missing or exploited children. In essence, when the NCMEC is
    notified by a local law enforcement department of an abduction, the
    Secret Service will be capable of launching a FIRST team to respond
    within the first 8 hours of abduction, providing computer, forensic and
    ``real-time'' investigative support to a local police department that
    may lack the resources to respond in an effective manner during that
    critical period.
                               protective program
        Since 1901, the Secret Service has been responsible for protecting
    our nation's highest elected officials, visiting world leaders and
    other designated individuals. In addition, our current mission includes
    reducing threats posed by global terrorists and other adversaries, and
    providing the safest environment to those participating in events of
    national significance. We perform this mission by providing continuous
    protective operations that offer comprehensive security for our
    protectees and the facilities where they work and live, and, by
    coordinating, planning and implementing security plans at important
    events and functions designated by the President as National Special
    Security Events (NSSEs).
        In recent decades, our protective mission has expanded beyond the
    protection of the President, the Vice President and their immediate
    families. Today, we are also mandated to provide personal protection to
    the President-elect, the Vice President-elect and their immediate
    families; major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and their
    spouses; visiting foreign heads of state or governments; former
    Presidents, their spouses and children under the age of 16; and other
    government officials as designated by the President. We also provide
    security for the White House Complex, the Vice President's residence,
    and 519 foreign missions within the Washington, D.C., area.
        Mr. Chairman, we have witnessed a decade of well-planned and well-
    executed attacks, both at home and abroad, against Americans and
    American symbolic targets. Oklahoma City; Khobar, Saudi Arabia; the
    U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the U.S.S. Cole, and of course,
    the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. These tragic events
    remind us of our vulnerabilities and the changing threats our nation
    faces each and every day.
        The Secret Service continues, as a matter of practice, to assess
    these threats and evaluate the application of our protective
    methodologies. We have assumed new responsibilities in the form of
    additional protective details, and we continue to adjust the depth of
    coverage to enhance the Presidential, Vice-Presidential, and Former
    Presidential protective details. Today, the Secret Service provides
    full-time protective details for 27 individuals, a number that
    increased sharply following the September 11th attacks.
        Our protective mission was further expanded in 2000, when Congress
    authorized the Secret Service to plan, coordinate and implement
    security operations at designated events of national significance. This
    authority was a natural evolution for the Secret Service, as we have
    led security operations at large events involving the President dating
    back to our first protective mandate in 1901 and have developed an
    expertise at planning these events and coordinating security with our
    local, State and Federal law enforcement partners. Since 1999, the
    Secret Service has led security operations at 12 NSSEs, including the
    2000 Republican and Democratic National Conventions, the 2001 United
    Nations General Assembly, and, most recently, the 2002 Winter Olympics
    and Super Bowl XXXVI.
        The actual planning and coordination of these events requires an
    intensive, sustained effort, and the volume of both financial and human
    resources required to develop and execute a sound physical security
    plan for a NSSE can be immense. The 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake
    City, for example, involved an unprecedented interagency collaboration
    between Federal, State, and local law enforcement, as well as the
    military, working with the Salt Lake Organizing Committee, the
    International Olympic Committee, the State of Utah, and other entities.
    Security for the competition and ceremonies was provided for a 4-week
    period, 24 hours a day, for an estimated 65,000 daily spectators,
    including 2,500 athletes in 15 protected venues. These venues stretched
    over an area covering 900 square miles, slightly smaller than the state
    of Rhode Island. It was the largest and most comprehensive coordinated
    security event in the history of American law enforcement.
        In addition, the annual meeting of the United Nations General
    Assembly (UNGA) is held each year in New York City. On average, 50 to
    80 heads of state/government attend this event. It is important to note
    that each year, the UNGA is a manpower and resource intensive effort
    for the Secret Service.
        We consider the protective mission as an evolutionary process,
    essential to the security of our homeland. We apply that thought
    process when planning and executing security, and we analyze the actual
    and potential threats during increasingly complex protective
    operations. Adapting to changing situations in a changing environment,
    sound planning on all planes, and employing technology or other
    applications to our advantage is fundamental to our strategy.
        There is also a vibrant interrelationship between our protective
    and investigative responsibilities. Since 1865, the Secret Service has
    developed a unique capacity to build strong and trusted partnerships
    with local, county and state law enforcement in furtherance of our
    investigative mission. It is important to note that these are
    partnerships in their truest form. They are built over time, and
    involve information sharing, open communication, and, perhaps most
    critical, mutual trust.
        Building an atmosphere of trust and cooperation with local police
    is not only central to our criminal investigations and prevention-
    oriented partnerships, it is also the keystone to fulfilling our
    protective mission. For travel outside of Washington, D.C., the Secret
    Service executes our security plan with the cooperation and resources
    of the local police in the area, as coordinated by our field office.
        The cooperative atmosphere that has already been established
    between our field office and local law enforcement with regard to our
    investigative duties breeds successful interagency collaboration during
    Presidential and other protectee visits. Simply put, there is already a
    precedence of trust between the parties that need to cooperate and
    coordinate their efforts, and the Secret Service builds upon that
    relationship to prepare for and provide a seamless and secure
    environment for our protectee.
        Not only is there a connection between our investigative
    responsibilities and the protection of the President, but the strength
    of our protective capabilities is dependent on our investigative
    mission. Every agent currently assigned to a protective detail began
    their career in the Secret Service as a criminal investigator in a
    field office, where they spent considerable time developing their
    skills and expertise by investigating counterfeit cases, financial
    crimes, protective intelligence cases or protecting critical
    infrastructure.
        A Secret Service agent is among the most skilled law enforcement
    operatives in the world, largely due to their investigative training
    and experience. This extended field training provides an opportunity to
    apply analytical skills and various investigative techniques while
    testing their maturity and judgment. These are the building blocks
    necessary for the transition of our agents into the next phase of their
    careers--protecting our nation's highest elected leaders. Because of
    this investigative experience, our protective agents are multi-
    dimensional, relying on an array of skills and instincts to protect our
    nation's leaders. We draw upon those individuals who have years of
    experience in the field, who not only have acquired the requisite
    skills, but have been tried and tested under difficult circumstances,
    and have proven decision-making and other abilities that are crucial to
    protective missions. This investigative experience prepares our agents
    for the mental and physical challenges faced while planning and
    coordinating security, while always being ready to recognize and react
    instantaneously to a threat.
        As you can see, Mr. Chairman, our protective and investigative
    responsibilities are thoroughly intertwined and interdependent. They
    are the heart and soul of the Secret Service, and complement each other
    in a manner that is truly unique among law enforcement today.
                         office of protective research
                             intelligence division
        The protective research and intelligence programs continue to serve
    a critical role in support of the dual missions of the Secret Service.
    Our Intelligence Division coordinates all Secret Service investigations
    related to direct threats against our protectees and develops threat
    assessments related to protected individuals, facilities and venues.
    This process involves the identification, assessment, and management of
    all information and incidents directed toward our protective efforts,
    both at home and abroad. The division evaluates risk potential
    associated with specific and generalized threats; prepares analyses of
    protectee-specific threats; maintains liaison with other law
    enforcement and intelligence agencies; plans and reviews the case
    management for high risk subjects; and, through our National Threat
    Assessment Center, collaborates in the design and implementation of
    program evaluation studies and other risk assessment research designed
    to improve our understanding of violence directed toward public
    officials.
        During fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003, the Intelligence
    Division supported the development and implementation of the Department
    of Homeland Security, including the Information Analysis and
    Infrastructure Protection Directorate and related Working Groups, Sub-
    Working Groups, and Planning Committees. As the Secret Service
    continues its transition to the DHS, the Intelligence Division will
    take on increased responsibilities, including the staffing of the DHS's
    multi-agency Homeland Security Center (HSC). The HSC provides a 24-hour
    ``watch center'' and serves as the Department's single point of
    integration for information related to homeland security. The HSC is
    responsible for maintaining domestic situational awareness; detecting,
    preventing, and deterring incidents; and managing the response to all
    critical incidents, natural disasters and threats.
        In addition, the Intelligence Division will be uniquely involved
    with the Administration's new intelligence analysis initiative, the
    Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). The TTIC will merge and
    analyze terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad
    in order to form the most comprehensive threat picture possible.
        The Secret Service's active role in these new and enhanced
    intelligence initiatives will play an important role in the overall
    mission of the DHS. The Secret Service is committed to full and active
    participation in the protection of our homeland; and further, it is
    imperative that our agency always has access to information that is
    vital to our own protective and investigative missions.
        The Secret Service will provide full-time staff for the 24/7
    operation of the HSC and the TTIC from within our Intelligence
    Division. Our personnel assigned to the HSC and the TTIC will be
    responsible for receiving and disseminating incoming intelligence
    information, as well as providing DHS with a point-of-contact for
    Secret Service response capabilities.
        The Intelligence Division coordinates Secret Service participation
    in the Department of Justice-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).
    Currently, 58 Secret Service agents participate in JTTF programs in 51
    offices. In addition to collaborating in a combined and coordinated
    effort, the Secret Service provides and derives the benefits of sharing
    information on investigative matters that may be related to our
    protective mission.
        In addition to directing and performing such operational
    activities, the Intelligence Division continues to provide leadership
    for the Protective Detail Intelligence Network (PDIN), a consortium of
    Washington, D.C., area law enforcement, security, and public safety
    agencies with protective and security-related functions. Initiated in
    1999 by the Secret Service, the PDIN has emerged as an important forum
    for sharing intelligence information that affects security planning
    issues across agencies in the metropolitan area. PDIN meetings include
    briefings and training concerning significant and designated major
    security events coordinated by the Secret Service, and they facilitate
    cooperative partnerships among agencies who share protective and
    security responsibilities. Through the PDIN, the Secret Service has
    offered assistance in the preparation of security assessments for
    incoming Cabinet members and senior Administration officials.
                       national threat assessment center
        As part of the Secret Service's protective intelligence mission,
    our National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) continues to gain national
    attention through its training, outreach, consultation, and research
    efforts in the specialized field of targeted violence. Its principal
    goal encompasses the spectrum of threat assessment and targeted
    violence as it relates to our protective mission. As a natural
    extension of our protective intelligence methodology, we continue to
    share our knowledge and depth of experiences with the DHS,
    demonstrating the utility of Secret Service ``Best Practices'' for
    identifying, assessing, and reducing threats to homeland security.
        NTAC also continues to support the development of the new
    Department. NTAC has assisted the Information Analysis & Infrastructure
    Protection Directorate (IA&IP) in the development of a Competitive
    Analysis & Evaluation Office (CAEO), providing detailed personnel to
    ensure that the DHS has an operationally-sound quality assurance
    function. The purpose of the CAEO is to reduce the risk and
    consequences of domestic terrorist attacks by ensuring that the IA&IP
    Directorate's initiatives are tested and are of the highest quality and
    value. NTAC is also participating in ``Red Teaming'' exercises with the
    Department. Red Teaming is a risk assessment technique that tests an
    organization's methodologies and analyzes the vulnerabilities from the
    perspective of the threat.
        Following the attack at Columbine High School in 1999, NTAC entered
    into a partnership with the Department of Education and the National
    Institute of Justice to apply the methodology used in our traditional
    analysis of targeted violence, in the form of a study designed to
    examine if similar behavior was involved in school shootings. This
    study, known as the Safe School Initiative, reviewed 37 school
    shootings occurring in the United States in the preceding 25 years. The
    Safe School Initiative was completed in 2000, focusing on
    operationally-relevant information--information that law enforcement
    professionals, school personnel, and others could use to try to prevent
    future school shootings. The Initiative examined the pre-attack
    behavior and communications of school shooters, to identify information
    that might be discernible in advance of an attack, and could allow for
    intervention.
        NTAC staff has been able to communicate what we have learned in
    assessing threats on public officials and our findings in the Safe
    School Initiative with those with an interest in preventing school and
    workplace violence. In 2002, NTAC, in collaboration with the Department
    of Education, completed and published the final product of the Safe
    School Initiative: the study's Final Report, and a Guide to Threat
    Assessments in Schools. These materials suggest methods for school
    administrators, educators, law enforcement personnel, and mental health
    professionals to conduct threat assessments in their schools.
        The Secret Service and Department of Education have thus far
    conducted 46 Safe School Initiative presentations and 12 day-long
    training seminars around the country, providing thousands of school
    officials, law enforcement professionals and others information on how
    to respond to and manage threatening situations in our schools. NTAC
    was also involved in other seminars and forums in fiscal year 2002,
    including 28 Exceptional Case Study Project/Threat Assessment Training
    Presentations, five Field Protective Intelligence Briefings, and four
    Threat Assessment Seminars.
        Also noteworthy is the Insider Threat Study, a collaboration
    between the Secret Service and Carnegie Mellon University's Computer
    Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) focusing on
    insiders who attack critical information systems. This partnership
    seeks to strengthen critical infrastructure protection efforts and
    provide private industry and law enforcement with information to help
    prevent insider attacks. The Insider Threat Study uses operational
    methodology of previous NTAC studies to examine network compromise
    incidents committed by insiders, such as current or former employees,
    and seeks to identify discernible behaviors and communications that
    could assist in the prevention of future compromises.
        NTAC has also proposed the creation of an information-sharing
    system for agencies with protective responsibilities. This system,
    dubbed the Targeted Violence Information-Sharing System (TAVISS), would
    contain a repository of names of subjects with a known or suspected
    adverse direction of interest towards local, state, and Federal public
    officials. TAVISS would be directly accessed from remote sites by
    multiple law enforcement agencies with protective responsibilities for
    such public officials.
                          technical security division
        The Technical Security Division (TSD) is responsible for creating a
    safe and secure environment for Secret Service protectees and the
    facilities we protect. This includes the responsibility of managing all
    chemical/biological/hazardous materials countermeasures programs of the
    Secret Service that safeguard our protectees and facilities, and the
    mitigation of any threats of terrorism.
        As part of its ongoing support mission, TSD identifies and
    implements ways to improve its detection capabilities in and around the
    White House Complex, Naval Observatory and other protected locations.
    Outside of Washington, D.C., chemical/biological/hazardous material
    support is integral to any protective security plan during motorcade
    movements or at fixed locations, including all designated National
    Special Security Events.
        TSD has two significant programs of interest that demonstrate the
    Secret Service's ability to mitigate specific threats: the Radar
    Airborne Intrusion Detection System (RAIDS), and the Hazardous Agent
    Mitigation Medical Emergency Response Team (HAMMER).
        The RAIDS is a classified network of air intrusion detection
    equipment that allows the Secret Service to continuously monitor the
    airspace in the Washington, D.C. area. Segments of the system have
    recently been upgraded, and, at the recommendation of classified
    studies, additional subsystems will be incorporated to address existing
    and emerging threats.
        The HAMMER team was developed to provide rapid intervention to
    Secret Service protective details in the event of a chemical,
    biological or radiological incident. The HAMMER team consists of TSD
    personnel trained in hazardous materials identification, mitigation,
    decontamination, and basic life support. In the event that a hazardous
    environment incapacitates the protectee's primary medical support, the
    team can provide basic life support and decontamination prior to
    patient transport. The team will provide field tests and take samples
    for transport to remote laboratories for testing and identification.
    TSD has agreements in place for laboratory analysis of suspect
    materials. The HAMMER team will automatically deploy when a chemical,
    biological or hazardous materials release occurs and Secret Service
    protectees, or one of the facilities that we protect, are affected.
                   information resources management division
        The Information Resources Management Division (IRMD) continues to
    provide an information and communications infrastructure in support of
    the protective and investigative missions of the Secret Service. The
    Secret Service's move to the Department of Homeland Security has
    significantly increased IRMD's role and responsibilities. Management
    and staff from this division are engaged in many of the DHS Working
    Groups and Sub-Working Groups, including the CIO Investment Review
    Group, Technical Reference Model Working Group, Security Sub-Group,
    Network Sub-Group, Web Management Sub-Group, Directory Services E-Mail
    Sub-Group, Collaboration Sub-Group, Data Management Sub-Group, Records
    Management Sub-Group, Geospatial Sub-Group, Wireless Sub-Group, E-
    Learning Sub-Group, First Responders and Emergency Preparedness, CFO
    Council, and a Classified IT Technical Team.
        In fiscal year 2002, IRMD continued to upgrade and improve system-
    wide efficiencies in radio, telephone and wireless communications. The
    priority initiatives include the conversion of Legacy mainframe
    applications to a Web-based system and upgrading headquarters and field
    office voice/data capacity. IRMD also completed its test of the
    Treasury Smart Card Proof of Concept and is in the process of
    integrating this new technology into the workplace. There are two
    significant benefits driving the move to smart card use and acceptance:
    the ability to securely store Public Key Infrastructure certificates
    (part of an elaborate process to authenticate ones' identity over
    electronic interfaces such as the Internet), and the ability to use
    digital signatures to authorize government activities. This program has
    also been presented to the DHS Chief Information Officer for potential
    use at the new Department.
                      emergency preparedness program (epp)
        The EPP is responsible for coordinating the emergency preparedness
    programs of the Secret Service and concentrates its efforts on
    operations security, the continuity of government and critical
    infrastructure protection. The EPP staff coordinates with the White
    House Military Office, the Emergency Preparedness and Response
    directorate and other agencies regarding matters involving the
    continuity of government and emergency preparedness. Internally, EPP
    staff coordinates emergency preparedness exercises and provides
    frequent educational material and training to staff in all areas of
    emergency preparedness.
        In fiscal year 2002, EPP assisted the DHS with the development of
    the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, and participated
    in efforts to create an emergency preparedness database to be shared
    among all agencies in the DHS. EPP has also been involved in the
    Homeland Council on Domestic Threat Response and Incident Management,
    and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Management Policy Coordination
    Working Group.
        EPP actively participates in the National Capitol Region Planning
    Committee Working Group that coordinates emergency preparedness
    efforts, particularly Federal Emergency Decision and Notification
    Protocol in the District of Columbia region.
                          human resources and training
               workforce retention/workload balancing initiative
        The House and Senate Appropriations Committees should be commended
    for recognizing and supporting the priority of the Secret Service to
    confront the declining quality of life of our workforce caused by
    excessive overtime, out-of-district travel and other such factors. In
    fiscal year 2000, the Secret Service began our Workforce Retention/
    Workload Balancing Initiative with the goal of hiring 682 additional
    agents during a 3-year period. I am pleased to report that the Secret
    Service exceeded this goal by more than 60 percent, hiring a cumulative
    total of 1,098 special agents. In addition, the Secret Service enhanced
    the quality of life of all of our employees by hiring 545 Uniformed
    Division officers and 453 support personnel during the same period, far
    exceeding the original target under the Workforce Retention/Workload
    Balancing Initiative.
        Despite our impressive hiring achievement, we have experienced a
    higher than normal level of attrition, attributable largely to ongoing
    retirements and transfers. This attrition requires us to continue our
    aggressive hiring plan and to reinforce our ranks, whose unique skill
    set is in high demand both in the government and private sectors. The
    safety, morale and job satisfaction of our entire workforce are of
    paramount importance.
        For fiscal year 2003, in order to meet our strategic goals of
    protection, investigation, and providing a responsive support
    infrastructure, the Secret Service plans to hire 893 special agents,
    Uniformed Division officers, and support personnel.
                                   diversity
        It is the policy of the Secret Service to attract, develop, retain
    and maximize the potential of a diverse workforce in a changing and
    competitive environment. We are committed to this policy. As a means of
    fully achieving and emphasizing an organizational culture that
    recognizes the value added by a diverse workforce, the Secret Service
    has organized its Diversity Management Program under the direction of a
    Deputy Assistant Director for Recruitment, Employment and Diversity
    Programs (REDP). Through a coordinated process, the REDP develops and
    implements recruitment policies with our agency's Recruitment and
    Hiring Coordination Center, the Diversity Management Program, and the
    Chief of the Personnel Division.
        In support of the Secret Service's initiative to recruit, develop,
    and retain a diverse workforce, the Diversity Management Program hosts
    quarterly, interactive training conferences designed to address
    diversity issues throughout the agency. In fiscal year 2000, the Secret
    Service contracted with the Ivy Planning Group, a premier management
    consulting firm, whose skilled trainers have augmented our diversity
    conferences over the past two years. The Ivy Planning Group assists
    major organizations within the Federal Government and private sector in
    becoming more customer-driven by focusing on strategic and tactical
    planning, marketing and cultural diversity.
        Approximately 150 of our employees participated in these training
    sessions last year. The Diversity Management Program also offered a
    ``Conference on Supervisory Diversity Issues''. In support of President
    Bush's Management Agenda regarding the Strategic Management of Human
    Capital, this class was attended by ``middle'' management and focused
    on issues within the Secret Service.
        The Secret Service supports and encourages employee participation
    in conferences dedicated to minority interests. In addition to our
    internal diversity training, the Diversity Management Program sponsors
    employees who participate in the following national training
    conferences:
      --Women in Federal Law Enforcement
      --National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives
      --National Native American Law Enforcement Association
      --Hispanic American Police Command Officers Association
      --National Asian Peace Officers Association
      --Blacks in Government Training Conference
        In fiscal year 2002, approximately 120 employees attended the
    following conferences: the Women in Federal Law Enforcement Conference;
    the Hispanic American Police Command Officers Association Training
    Conference; the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement
    Executives Training Conference; the Blacks in Government Training
    Conference; and the National Native American Law Enforcement
    Association Training Conference.
        Last year, the Secret Service sponsored 14 recruiting seminars
    attended by 4,446 potential applicants for Uniformed Division and
    Special Agent positions. The Recruiting and Hiring Coordinating Center
    (RHCC) continued its liaison efforts with the Historically Black
    Colleges and Universities, the Hispanic Servicing Institutions and
    Women's Colleges by attending career fairs at many of these
    institutions. Additionally, the RHCC mailed out Special Agent and
    Uniformed Division officer brochures to each of these institutions
    highlighting career opportunities with the Secret Service.
        The RHCC also ran recruiting ``banner'' ads on Internet websites
    targeted towards specific ethnic minority groups, including Hispanic
    Online, BlackVoice.com, GoldSea.com, and WIFLE, and sponsored
    recruiting advertisements in several magazines targeted towards various
    minority groups.
        In the past year, the Service has developed a core training course
    curriculum for our Equal Opportunity Program to lay a foundation for
    highly-skilled personnel to work in special emphasis programs and
    provide EEO counseling services. Additionally, we have established
    collateral duty special emphasis program manager positions for
    Hispanic, African-American, Asian-Pacific Islander, Native American,
    Persons with Disabilities/Disabled Veterans and Federal Women's Program
    constituency groups.
                        james j. rowley training center
        The James J. Rowley Training Center (RTC) continues to evolve into
    a world-class education center with experienced staff, enhanced
    curriculum, and the development of facilities. Emphasis on overall
    quality and efficient operations has resulted in the enhanced
    integration of course content and streamlined scheduling of basic, in-
    service, and external training. With the transition of the Secret
    Service into the Department of Homeland Security, the RTC envisions an
    opportunity for circular growth as a ``law enforcement university,''
    offering training in physical security, site security, event security,
    counter terrorism studies, emergency preparedness, threat assessment,
    and protection of critical financial infrastructure.
        The Secret Service recognizes that the mission of our agency is
    extremely specific in nature and our advanced training cannot be
    provided anywhere else in the Federal law enforcement community.
    Physical security, site security, threat assessment and other
    components of our training are culturally unique to the Secret Service,
    and the curriculum and facilities we have developed at the RTC have
    significantly enhanced our ability to fulfill our protective and
    investigative missions.
        During fiscal year 2002, the RTC trained 350 special agents (15
    classes), 216 Uniformed Division officers (9 classes), and 26 special
    officers (2 classes). RTC also completed 23,874 in-service instances
    and re-qualification visits for the workforce. Review of course content
    remains a priority. The RTC has completed an evaluation and revision of
    the Uniformed Division's basic training curriculum review, eliminating
    duplication of effort at both the RTC and the Federal Law Enforcement
    Training Center (FLETC).
        The ``Beltsville Field Office'' at the RTC offers the special agent
    trainee a ``virtual'' performance-based program, exposing agents to the
    integration of elements relative to the missions of the Secret Service.
    This has included team-oriented, practical exercises in financial
    investigations, arrest procedures, protective intelligence, and site
    security.
        Strides in proactive protection methodology have produced and
    introduced new curriculum to address advanced counter surveillance
    measures and suicide bomber prevention. The canine program continues to
    explore the potential utilization of dogs beyond bomb detection to
    performing patrols and detecting personal explosive devices on humans.
        To more effectively meet the needs of the workforce, RTC continues
    to adopt technology-based training. The Center now houses two video-
    conferencing studios that have been utilized to broadcast legal
    training, CPR and first aid kit review, computer applications, and
    program and methodology training to Secret Service students at FLETC
    and field offices across the country.
        Other distance learning techniques are being researched, procured,
    and implemented, such as custom courseware via the Intranet and Web-
    based forums, electronic classrooms, and CD-ROMs. Such tools offer
    training opportunities to all employees anytime and anywhere, without
    the cost of time and travel.
        In the pursuit of academic excellence, the RTC established and
    continued an invaluable partnership with the Johns Hopkins University
    as part of an ongoing effort to assure that we develop and maintain the
    highest quality in our management ranks.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, the Secret Service is entering a new era. We are
    proud to be part of the Department of Homeland Security, and are eager
    to contribute in any way we can to the mission of protecting our
    citizens, our economy and our institutions. While still in its infancy,
    it is clear that the new Department will be built on the twin pillars
    of prevention and protection. These are the very words found throughout
    our own strategic plan. They have defined the mission and culture of
    the United States Secret Service for 138 years. It is the hope of each
    and every employee of the Secret Service that our agency can strengthen
    the new Department.
        On behalf of the men and women of the Secret Service, we stand
    ready to continue protecting our leaders, our infrastructure and the
    American people. We know how daunting a mission this is, but I assure
    this subcommittee that the Secret Service can and will meet this
    challenge. Our people have the skills, the experience, the training,
    and most importantly, the character, to rise to any occasion. They have
    dedicated their careers and their lives to making a safer America.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
    the subcommittee. This concludes my prepared statement. I will be
    pleased to answer any questions you or the other members of the
    subcommittee may have.

        Senator Cochran. Before proceeding to hear from the
    Commandant, I welcome the distinguished Senator from
    Washington, Senator Murray. If you have an opening statement at
    this point, we would be happy to hear from you.
        Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, and I know
    I speak for many of my colleagues when I say that we never
    cease to be impressed by the accomplishments of our men and
    women in the Coast Guard, and I am really proud of the role
    that the Coast Guard played in Operation Iraqi Freedom and
    really want to highlight the work of the Port Security Unit
    from Tacoma, Washington which was instrumental in restoring
    order when the coalition forces captured the fort of Umm Qasr.
        While the Coast Guard may be viewed by some as the fifth
    military service, the Coast Guard is actually the first
    military service when it comes to defending our homeland. Over
    and above its mission to keep our ports and waterways secure,
    the Coast Guard is charged with missions that no other military
    service or Federal agency could even begin to contemplate.
    Their missions include stopping illegal immigrants, protecting
    the marine environment, ensuring the safety of boaters and
    shipping operations, and stopping the flow of illegal drugs.
        As Admiral Collins knows, I and many of my colleagues in
    the House and Senate were concerned about the President's plan
    to merge the Coast Guard into the new Department of Homeland
    Security. Our biggest concern was that the Coast Guard's non-
    homeland security missions would continue to be deemphasized.
    We feared that the potential of catastrophic oil spills and
    illegal foreign fishing boats regularly encroaching on our U.S.
    fishing grounds would increase, and when the Department was
    established, the administration told us not to worry, that our
    concerns were ill-founded.
        Even so, just to be sure, Congress included language in the
    Homeland Security Act that states explicitly that the
    capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its missions shall
    be maintained intact and without significant reduction once the
    Coast Guard is transferred to the new Department.
        The language also prohibited the Secretary of Homeland
    Security from substantially or significantly reducing the
    missions of the Coast Guard.
        A great deal of credit goes to our Committee Chairman,
    Senator Stevens, for insisting on the inclusion of that
    language.
        The Senate Appropriations Committee report that accompanied
    the 2003 Appropriations Act directed the Commandant of the
    Coast Guard to ensure that with the historic funding increase
    it received in that bill, the Coast Guard returns its level of
    effort in its non-homeland security missions to the level that
    existed prior to September 11, 2001.
        Today, when we look at the actual record as to where the
    Coast Guard has been focusing its attention, it is clear that
    we were right to worry about a continuing decline in drug
    interdiction, fisheries enforcement, marine safety, and marine
    environmental protection.
        Two weeks ago, the subcommittee received the first of the
    quarterly reports that I mandated as part of that 2003 Act.
    That reports required the Coast Guard to display its mission
    hours for each of the quarters since September 11, 2001 as well
    as the eight quarters that preceded September 11.
        Mr. Chairman, I carefully reviewed the figures that were
    transmitted in that report, and the findings are very
    disturbing. In the area of drug interdiction, the Coast Guard's
    efforts over the last year stand 42 percent below the number of
    hours committed to drug interdiction prior to September 11,
    2002. In my own 13th District in the Pacific Northwest, drug
    interdiction efforts were reduced by 25 percent over that
    period.
        In the area of marine environmental protection, the Coast
    Guard's mission hours have declined 64 percent below the pre-
    September 11th levels, and in the Pacific Northwest, that
    reduction has equaled 82 percent.
        In the area of marine safety, the Coast Guard's level of
    effort over the last year stands 43 percent below the time
    prior to September 11.
        Of particular concern is the Coast Guard's greatly
    diminished efforts in the area of fisheries enforcement.
    Nationwide, the Coast Guard's level of effort has decreased a
    third.
        Let us remember that if Coast Guard vessels are enforcing
    fishing laws in the Bering Sea, they are also able to conduct
    quicker responses in search and rescue cases.
        When looking at this data, it is important to remember that
    the actual number of hours that the Coast Guard spends
    operating its cutters, boats, and aircraft has actually
    increased 20 percent since September 11. So all of these
    dramatic reductions have taken place at the same time that
    overall Coast Guard mission hours have increased.
        For example, prior to September 11, the Coast Guard spent
    12\1/2\ of every 100 hours on fisheries enforcement. That
    number is now down to less than 7 hours. That is a reduction of
    45 percent.
        In the area of drug interdiction, prior to September 11,
    the Coast Guard spent 15\1/2\ of every 100 hours keeping drugs
    off our Nation's streets. That number is down now to less than
    7.4 hours. That is a reduction of 52 percent.
        Many of these same observations were made recently by the
    GAO in testimony to the House of Representatives, but the GAO
    used less recent data than I just used. The lesson from all of
    this data for my colleagues is that when it comes to the Coast
    Guard, there is no free lunch. Despite a work ethic that is
    second to none both in the military and the entire Federal
    Government, and despite the tireless commitment of the
    thousands of hard-working men and women in the Coast Guard,
    they simply cannot be everywhere at all times.
        With that fact as our backdrop, I hope the Subcommittee
    will use this morning's hearing to really get to the truth as
    to what the President's budget for 2004 will or will not pay
    for when it comes to the Coast Guard and all of its critically
    important missions.
        In the formal testimony that the commandant will present to
    us this morning, he will tell us that one of the three primary
    objectives of his 2004 budget is ``to sustain non-homeland
    security missions near pre-September 11 levels.''
        The GAO, conversely, reviewed the President's 2004 budget
    and testified that the Coast Guard's 2004 budget request, and I
    quote, ``does not contain initiatives or proposals that would
    substantially alter the current distribution of levels of
    effort among mission areas.''
        Mr. Chairman, last year, this Subcommittee was successful
    in providing the Coast Guard with an historic funding increase,
    and that increase was well-deserved and long overdue. This
    year, the President is proposing yet another historic funding
    increase for the Coast Guard, and I commend him for that. But I
    think it is critical that this Subcommittee insist that if this
    agency's budget continues to grow by 20 percent in just 2
    years, we have a right to expect that this agency will return
    to its work of interdicting drugs, protecting our fishing
    grounds and our fishermen, and protecting our environment.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
        Admiral Collins, I am pleased to welcome you to this
    hearing. We appreciate very much your distinguished service as
    Commandant of the United States Coast Guard.
        The President's request for fiscal year 2004 proposes $6.77
    billion for the Coast Guard, approximately $700 million more
    than was enacted in fiscal year 2003, excluding the recently
    enacted supplemental.
        The Coast Guard has significant homeland security and non-
    homeland security responsibilities including the Integrated
    Deepwater System, maritime domain awareness, fisheries
    enforcement, and search and rescue.
        We have your written statement, and it will be made a part
    of the record. We encourage you to proceed to summarize it if
    you will and make any additional comments you think would be
    helpful to the Committee as we review this budget request.
        Mr. Commandant, you may proceed.

                     STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS

        Admiral Collins. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
    Murray. It is really an honor and a pleasure to be with you in
    our first session with this subcommittee.
        The Senate has been tremendously supportive of the Coast
    Guard over the years--``enduring support'' I think is the way
    to describe it. It has clearly enabled us to meet many of the
    challenges that we have faced over the years to provide for the
    maritime safety and security of the citizens of this country.
        That need has never been so evident over the past year-and-
    a-half, and the scope and scale of the changes of those 18
    months have been absolutely significant and dramatic.
        Here at home, the Coast Guard units have been patrolling
    vigilantly, working side-by-side with our partners in the
    Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, State, and
    local agencies to ensure the security of our Nation and the
    safety of our citizens.
        Coast Guard forces have also been valiantly engaged in
    support of component commanders abroad, in the Arabian Gulf and
    in the Mediterranean. We employed two high-endurance cutters,
    eight patrol boats, one buoy-tender, four port security units,
    and two maintenance support units, many of which, the good news
    is, will be returning home soon now that the hostilities are
    drawing to a close.
        In the midst of the increased operational tempo that we
    have experienced in the recent months, I am very pleased to
    report that we are making excellent progress in becoming an
    integral member of the new Department of Homeland Security
    effective March 1. I think the new Department is the right
    place, at the right time, for the Coast Guard to serve America.

                         PRIORITIES OF THE COAST GUARD

        Throughout the process of this transition, we have remained
    focused on three main priorities. Our first priority is to
    aggressively build our homeland security capabilities. Our
    maritime operations must reflect the changes brought by the
    increase of global terrorism by increasing the level of effort
    against it. Over 44 percent of our operating expense budget in
    this current budget under consideration is devoted to the
    homeland security mission.
        We have designed a full range of concentric maritime
    security measures, starting overseas and extending to the
    shores of the United States. We cannot accomplish this without
    the strength of relationships that we are continuing to build
    with our partners in government and industry, both at home and
    abroad.
        The second priority--as we improve our capabilities in
    homeland security, we must also sustain our full range of
    missions. The law that created the new Department, as Senator
    Murray noted, mandates the Coast Guard must remain intact and
    must be attentive to its full range of missions. We have an
    obligation to the American public to provide critical services
    to them without interruption. The fiscal year 2004 operation
    and expense budget request of $4.7 billion provides an increase
    in every one of our missions relative to the fiscal year 2003
    levels and continues a multi-year investment plan to
    significantly enhance our search and rescue program.
        Third, we must increase our capacity, especially by
    recapitalizing and modernizing our aging fleet of cutters and
    aircraft and communication networks that connect them. The
    ability to sustain our full range of missions and to build our
    homeland security capabilities also requires an increase in
    capacity.
        In short, we must improve capability, capacity, and
    partnerships in the coming years. And due in large measure to
    the support in the Senate, in 2003 and 2004, we are making real
    progress and real advances along these lines. The President's
    fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects steady progress on our
    objective to balance our full range of missions. Every homeland
    security dollar directed in our budget will help to distribute
    a careful balance between security and safety, both of which
    are important to the prosperity and safety and security of our
    Nation.
        If the budget is enacted, by the end of 2004 we will have
    grown by 4,100 personnel and increased our overall budget by
    $1.6 billion, over a 30 percent increase over 2002. That should
    come as welcome news to anyone with interest in our capacity
    and capability to conduct our many missions.
        The proposed budget will continue funding for the
    Integrated Deepwater System, which is an integral part of our
    strategy for homeland security, as well as the capacity to
    carry out the entire portfolio of our missions. The Deepwater
    project will recapitalize the Coast Guard's aging cutters,
    aircraft, and offshore command and control network to help push
    U.S. borders out and increase our maritime domain awareness. It
    is a flexible program, able to meet emerging requirements for
    all of our missions.
        Together with the proposed budget, the fiscal year 2003
    supplemental budget request will help to answer concerns about
    our capacity, and we are very grateful for the Senate support
    in appropriating those funds.
        The fiscal year 2003 supplemental provides $580 million for
    our participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
    Liberty Shield. It also provides an additional $10 million for
    increasing the security of our merchant mariner documentation,
    as well as $38 million for port security assessments. Both of
    those provisions are integral to our strategy for improving the
    maritime security of our Nation.
        The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, which
    calls for us to implement a comprehensive security regime for
    ports, facilities, and vessels in close alignment with
    international standards, is the central component of our ports'
    strategy. It is an extremely important law, both for the
    security of the global maritime transportation system and for
    the future of the Coast Guard. We are working aggressively to
    implement its key components.
        Our rulemaking is proceeding on a very fast-paced schedule.
    We anticipate issuing an interim final rule this mid-summer and
    a final rule next November. Within our reach is the opportunity
    to create a robust security regime for our ports and coastal
    waters.
        In the past year, much more than our rulemaking has been
    fast-paced. The demands of the American public for the missions
    that the Coast Guard performs every day have continued to grow,
    and as we strive to meet them, what will remain foremost in my
    mind as Commandant is the operational excellence of our service
    to America. That is our ultimate goal. In the end, it is the
    performance outcome. And I think we have some good news here.

                               prepared statement

        But operational excellence depends not only on careful
    partnership and teamwork within the Department of Homeland
    Security. My key message here, Mr. Chairman, is that our
    operational excellence depends upon having the right capacity
    and the right capability for the mission at hand. And I look
    forward to working with you to that end.
        Thank you very much.
        [The statement follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Collins

    Introduction
        Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
    Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
    the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2004 budget request and its impact on the
    essential daily services we provide the American public.
        The President has clearly indicated that protecting the homeland is
    the government's number one priority and the Coast Guard has a critical
    role in that effort. The President's National Strategy for Homeland
    Security (dated 16 July 2002) stated:

        ``The Budget for fiscal year 2004 will continue to support the
    recapitalization of the U.S. Coast Guard's aging fleet, as well as
    targeted improvements in the areas of maritime domain awareness and
    command and control systems. . .''

        To that end, the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2004 budget proposes
    budget authority of $6.77 billion and continues our effort to establish
    a new level of maritime safety and security operations. The Coast
    Guard's goal is to create sufficient capacity and capability to
    implement the maritime component of the President's National Strategy
    for Homeland Security while sustaining the traditional missions the
    American public expects.
        I appreciate your support in the fiscal year 2003 Emergency
    Supplemental Funding Bill. Coast Guard forces have been fully engaged
    in support to the component commanders overseas in the Persian Gulf. We
    have deployed the largest contingent of Coast Guard forces since the
    Vietnam War, including 2 high endurance cutters, 8 patrol boats, 1 buoy
    tender, 4 port security units and 2 maintenance support units. We
    firmly believe that success overseas will bring greater security at
    home. These deployed assets constitute only three percent of our entire
    force so we will still be able to strike an appropriate balance between
    our domestic homeland security and non-homeland security missions
    through an effective use of risk based strategies to target resources
    to the greatest threats, increased op-tempo of domestic assets and the
    use of 11 PC-170 Navy patrol boats.
    The Need to Sustain Growth in Fiscal Year 2004
        To implement the President's strategy, the Coast Guard must
    maintain our high standards of operational excellence. A convergence of
    several significant internal and external factors has emphasized the
    need for a continuing increase in capacity and capability for the U.S.
    Coast Guard to meet America's future maritime needs:
      --The move of the Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security;
      --The need to increase Maritime Homeland Security capability and
            capacity;
      --The need to sustain our performance across all Coast Guard
            missions; and
      --The requirement to quickly implement the comprehensive requirements
            of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.
    Building Capacity and Capability
        Immediately after the terrorist attacks on our nation, the Coast
    Guard established new port security zones, placed Sea Marshals on
    inbound merchant ships, conducted additional patrols off the coasts,
    established Maritime Safety and Security Teams to protect major ports
    and implemented new procedures to monitor vessel and crew movements
    within ports and coastal approaches. These increased responsibilities
    stretched already thin resources nearly to the breaking point and made
    it extremely difficult to continue serving other missions. To fill in
    the gaps, we activated nearly a third of our entire Selected Reserve
    force, and have quickly and effectively deployed the resources
    requested by the Administration and provided by Congress.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget provides for increased capacity that is
    necessary for the Coast Guard to provide the strength and security our
    nation requires. To fulfill its responsibility to the American public,
    the Coast Guard is attempting to use that increased strength to
    accomplish three primary objectives in fiscal year 2004:
      --Recapitalize legacy assets and infrastructure;
      --Increase Maritime Homeland Security Capabilities; and
      --Sustain non-Homeland Security missions near pre-9/11/01 levels.
    Re-capitalizing the Coast Guard
        President Bush has asserted that our aging assets and
    infrastructure must be re-capitalized. In addition to Rescue 21, which
    is on schedule for completion in fiscal year 2006, the Coast Guard's
    Integrated Deepwater System will meet America's future maritime needs.
    Based on the organization's current capacity levels and the required
    capabilities immediately needed for Homeland Security and the other
    missions the American public expects, the continued funding of
    Deepwater is imperative and makes both programmatic and business sense.
    The Coast Guard is requesting $500 million for the Integrated Deepwater
    System.
        Several programmatic considerations reveal why the Integrated
    Deepwater System is so essential for the safety and security of the
    American public:
      --Homeland Security necessitates pushing America's maritime borders
            outward, away from ports and waterways so layered, maritime
            security operations can be implemented.
      --Maritime Domain Awareness--knowledge of all activities and elements
            in the maritime domain--is critical to maritime security.
            Integrated Deepwater System will improve current Maritime
            Domain Awareness by providing more capable sensors to collect
            vital information.
      --A network-centric system of Command, Control, Communications,
            Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance is
            required for effective accomplishment of all Coast Guard
            missions.
      --Interdiction of illegal drugs and migrants and protection of living
            marine resources are important elements of Homeland Security
            and require capable Deepwater assets.
        The Deepwater Program will ensure the Coast Guard can continue to
    fulfill its mission of safeguarding the sovereignty, security, and
    safety of our homeland waters. New assets include five 110 patrol
    boats converted to more capable 123 patrol craft, seven Short Range
    Prosecutor small boats, the first National Security Cutter (to be
    delivered in fiscal year 2006), the an increased organization-wide
    Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance
    and Reconnaissance network including a Common Operating Picture,
    Command and Control System at four shore-based command centers and the
    establishment of an integrated logistics system.
        From a business perspective, the flexible Integrated Deepwater
    System framework was designed to adapt to changing conditions. The
    Integrated Deepwater System acquisition will replace or modernize
    obsolete and maintenance intensive assets that are not capable of
    meeting the current mission demand. The Integrated Deepwater System
    will provide the required capabilities the Coast Guard needs to perform
    an enhanced level of maritime security operations, sustain growing
    traditional missions and respond to any future crises, man-made or
    otherwise, that threaten America.
        The Rescue 21 project will dramatically improve the Coast Guard's
    command and control communications network in the inland and coastal
    zone areas for SAR and all other Coast Guard missions. The improved
    Rescue 21 system will meet safety requirements for growing maritime
    traffic, as well as International Convention for the Safety of Life at
    Sea treaty requirements. It will be also be a critical component of our
    homeland security operations as it facilitates more effective
    monitoring and control of coastal assets.
    The Challenge of Homeland Security
        The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for Maritime Homeland
    Security. As such, the Coast Guard's mission, in conjunction with joint
    and interagency forces, is to protect the U.S. Maritime Domain and the
    U.S. Marine Transportation System and deny their use and exploitation
    by terrorists as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population and
    critical infrastructure. The Coast Guard will prepare for, and in the
    event of an attack, conduct emergency response operations. When
    directed, the Coast Guard, as the supported or supporting commander,
    will conduct military homeland defense operations in our traditional
    role as one of the five Armed Services.
        This budget submission is aligned with the Strategic Goals and
    Critical Mission Areas in the President's National Strategy for
    Homeland Security. The Coast Guard has developed a Maritime Homeland
    Security Strategy that implements the maritime component of the
    President's plan and the fiscal year 2004 budget continues to support
    those goals. It addresses both event-driven and prevention-based
    operations through the following Strategic Objectives:
      --Prevent terrorist attacks within and terrorist exploitation of the
            U.S. Maritime Domain.
      --Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism within the U.S.
            Maritime Domain.
      --Protect U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime
            borders, ports, coastal approaches and boundaries and ``seams''
            among them.
      --Protect the U.S. Marine Transportation System while preserving the
            freedom of maritime domain for legitimate pursuits.
      --Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that may occur within
            the U.S. Maritime Domain as either the Lead Federal Agency or a
            supporting agency.
        The threats to the security of the United States extend beyond
    overt terrorism. Countering illegal drug and contraband smuggling,
    preventing illegal immigration via maritime routes, preserving living
    marine resources from foreign encroachment, preventing environmental
    damage and responding to spills of oil and hazardous substances are all
    critical elements of national and economic security. Every dollar
    directed to the Coast Guard will contribute to a careful balance
    between our safety and security missions, both of which must be
    properly resourced for effective mission accomplishment.
        Maritime Domain Awareness is the catalyst for effective Maritime
    Homeland Security and the fiscal year 2004 budget provides the
    resources to enhance the Coast Guard's ability to receive, fuse,
    disseminate and transmit intelligence data and leverage our recent
    inclusion in the National Intelligence Community. It includes new
    personnel, hardware and software to support the underlying information
    architecture for Maritime Domain Awareness, funds leased satellite
    channels and other connectivity solutions for our entire cutter fleet
    and establishes a prototype Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC) in
    Hampton Roads, VA, to provide surveillance as well as command and
    control capability for the critical infrastructure in this area.
        The fiscal year 2004 request also provides the capability and
    capacity to conduct layered maritime security operations. Six new,
    deployable Maritime Safety and Security Teams, for a total of 12 teams,
    and over 50 Sea Marshals will be added throughout the country to
    protect our most critical ports. To increase our organic presence in
    our ports and waterways, we are requesting 43 fully crewed and
    outfitted Port Security Response Boats, nine 87-foot Coastal Patrol
    Boats, and the commencement of the Response Boat Medium acquisition,
    which will replace our aging fleet of 41-foot utility boats. We are
    standing up Stations Boston and Washington D.C. to increase security
    and safety in these critical ports where more resources were needed. We
    will also establish two new Port Security Units, for a total of eight
    teams, used to support domestic and overseas operations.
    Balancing Our Missions
        The fiscal year 2004 budget restores the Coast Guard's multi-
    mission focus to near pre-September 11, 2001 levels. We will utilize
    performance and risk-based analysis to strike a careful balance between
    our safety and security. This delicate balance is critical to
    protecting America's economic and national security by preventing
    illegal activity on our maritime borders. It will also enable the Coast
    Guard to maintain its surge capability, which was evident before and
    after September 11, 2001. One of the Coast Guard's greatest attributes
    is the innate flexibility to immediately shift mission focus to meet
    America's greatest threat while maintaining other missions for the
    American public.
        While its primary focus is Search and Rescue, the Rescue 21 project
    will transform the Coast Guard's command and control capabilities for
    all mission areas. Coupling this major acquisition with a staffing
    increase of nearly 400 new personnel at our multi-mission, small boat
    stations and Command Centers will ensure Coast Guard shore-side command
    and control networks and response units are properly equipped and
    staffed for multi-mission effectiveness. We are also requesting funds
    for the Great Lakes Icebreaker to ensure delivery in fiscal year 2006.
    The Great Lakes Icebreaker will perform aids to navigation functions as
    well as break ice to keep this critical commerce route open year-round.
        This budget also requests funding to fully train, support, and
    sustain the Coast Guard's Selected Reserve Force. The Coast Guard
    increased the number of reservists from 8,000 to 9,000 in fiscal year
    2003 and now to 10,000 in fiscal year 2004. The Reserve is
    significantly more than an augmentation force. It is an integral part
    of Team Coast Guard and provides daily support of all Coast Guard
    missions. Today's Coast Guard depends on Reserve personnel for day-to-
    day activities in addition to a qualified military surge capacity. The
    Coast Guard Reserve fills critical national security and national
    defense roles in both Homeland Security and direct support of
    Department of Defense Combatant Commanders. The Coast Guard Reserve
    provides the nation's only deployable port security capability and a
    cost-effective surge capacity for Coast Guard operations, including
    quick response to natural or man-made disasters, such as floods,
    hurricane relief, major pollution cleanup efforts, and rapid response
    to major catastrophes. The Reserve is critical to the Coast Guards
    efforts to rebalance our mission execution.
    The Goal of Operational Excellence
        We are facing many challenges in the coming years, not the least of
    which are the obsolescence of our aging asset fleet; the complexity of
    recruiting, retaining, and training the talented workforce necessary to
    execute our missions; and integrating fully into the new Department of
    Homeland Security.
        The President's fiscal year 2004 budget provides immediate
    capability for our Homeland Security responsibilities and continues to
    build upon past efforts to restore service readiness and shape the
    Coast Guard's future. It also demonstrates strong support for both the
    Deepwater project and Rescue 21. This budget will enable the Coast
    Guard to maintain operational excellence across all mission areas to
    meet the America's future maritime safety and security needs.
        I close with a quote from the National Strategy for Homeland
    Security which crystallizes the need for a transformed, multi-mission
    capable Coast Guard: ``The United States asks much of its U.S. Coast
    Guard and we will ensure the service has the resources needed to
    accomplish its multiple missions.''
        The demands continue to grow for the missions that the Coast Guard
    performs every day. As we strive to meet them, what will continue to
    remain foremost in my mind as Commandant--even as I sit here before
    this subcommittee--is the operational excellence of our service to
    America. That is our ultimate goal.
        Operational excellence depends not only on careful partnership and
    teamwork within the Department of Homeland Security, but it depends
    also on having the right capacity and the right capability for the
    missions at hand.
        I look forward to working with you to that end.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
    be happy to answer any questions you may have.

        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Admiral Collins, for
    your testimony.
        I notice by the clock on the wall that the vote has begun
    now. We can recess and make that vote in the Senate, and then
    we will resume our hearing with questions of our panel after
    that.
        The subcommittee will stand in recess.
        Senator Cochran. The subcommittee will please come to
    order.

                                 PLAN COLOMBIA

        Director Basham, I appreciate very much your overview in
    your statement about the activities of the Secret Service and
    the challenges that you face. In reading your statement, I was
    attracted to the challenge that you have in Plan Colombia, the
    work that you are doing in Colombia that is discussed in your
    opening statement. It goes back to one of your earliest
    missions as a Service dealing with the integrity of currency,
    but it is broader than that.
        Could you tell us a little bit about the status of that and
    what your challenges are and how much money we are
    appropriating or being asked to appropriate in this budget for
    that activity.
        Mr. Basham. Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you a specific
    number at this point with respect to the funding that we are
    requesting for that activity, but I can tell you that just
    recently, we were able to recover prior to circulation about
    $41 million in U.S. currency due to our efforts there in
    Colombia.
        Colombia continues to represent----
        Senator Cochran. Was this counterfeit money?
        Mr. Basham. That is counterfeit currency that is produced
    there in Colombia which, as you are well aware, supports the
    drug activity. So that locale continues to represent one of the
    biggest challenges we have with respect to our international
    counterfeiting problems.
        We have, as you may well know, personnel who are assigned
    there, stationed there, who work very closely with the
    Colombian officials to assist them in suppressing the
    manufacture of counterfeiting.
        As you said before, our original mandate was to stop and
    prevent and protect the financial systems from attacks, and
    that is the same methodology that we apply there, and that is
    working with the local officials to identify plants and to
    suppress those plants prior to the currency getting into
    circulation.
        So we continue to work there. We are putting a lot of
    emphasis in some of the former Soviet Union countries where we
    are seeing some activity in the area of counterfeiting, but
    Colombia still represents one of the greatest challenges. I
    will get back to you, sir, with the information on what kind of
    funding we are requesting for that activity.

                                FOREIGN OFFICES

        Senator Cochran. I notice also that as you talk about
    global activities that may threaten the integrity of our
    national financial institutions and system, you have
    established offices or representation in some 19 different
    countries, I think your statement indicated.
        To what extent do you see these as permanent facilities or
    permanent assignments, or are they temporary in nature? What is
    your expectation with regard to that?
        Mr. Basham. We are constantly reviewing those foreign
    offices and the effectiveness of those foreign offices to make
    sure that we are getting the most out of those resources. On
    occasion, we will be changing the locations of those offices
    based upon what we are seeing in criminal activity coming from
    those countries.
        The great majority of those offices are permanent, and not
    only do they support the investigative mission of the Secret
    Service; they also support the protective mission of the Secret
    Service, which gives us sort of a first insight as to what
    activities may be going on in these relative to our protective
    role here.
        Senator Cochran. Is this role to protect high-ranking
    Federal officials who may be in those countries?
        Mr. Basham. Actually, it is not in just the foreign
    countries but also domestically, working with officials in
    those countries who may be able to give us some warning signs
    if there is activity being planned for an assault or an attack
    on people whom we protect here in the United States as well as
    having liaison with those countries when our visiting officials
    go there to get cooperation from those countries to work with
    us to provide protection for them overseas.

                       COUNTERFEITING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

        Senator Cochran. We recently saw in the press the report of
    the finding of a lot of money in Iraq, a lot of U.S. currency.
    There was one press report that I noticed that indicated it
    could be counterfeit, or it might be valid currency. Are you
    working with the Department of the Treasury or others in trying
    to determine something about that currency and whether it is an
    indication of a counterfeiting operation in Iraq?
        Mr. Basham. We were involved in the very early stages when
    that currency was discovered in Iraq. We did dispatch personnel
    there to look at that currency. It was determined early on that
    the currency was genuine U.S. currency, and therefore, we have
    sort of backed out of that issue now that it has been
    determined.
        I believe they are in the process now of just trying to
    figure out a way of counting the currency in country versus
    bringing that currency out of the country, but yes, that was
    early on that we were involved and determined it was not
    counterfeit.

                 AL QAEDA INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERFEIT ACTIVITIES

        Senator Cochran. Have you come across evidence that
    indicates that the al Qaeda terrorist network is involved in
    counterfeiting U.S. currency?
        Mr. Basham. I do not know that I can say, Mr. Chairman,
    that there has been any direct connection to the al Qaeda
    network with counterfeiting. We do know that the al Qaeda
    network has made attempts to get into other types of financial
    systems through electronics, through trying to tap into those
    financial institutions. But in terms of a direct connectivity
    between al Qaeda and counterfeiting, I do not believe we have
    made that connection.
        Senator Cochran. You can furnish that for the record if you
    have information about it that you think we need to know about.
        Mr. Basham. I will furnish it.
        Senator Cochran. We would appreciate that.
        [The information follows:]

        Due to the sensitive nature of the information requested by Senator
    Cochran, the Secret Service provided this information to the Senator
    under separate cover.

        Senator Cochran. I am going to yield now to my colleagues
    for any questions that they may have.
        Senator Murray, you may proceed to question the witnesses,
    either Commandant Collins or the Director of the Secret
    Service, as you please.
        Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I note that Senator Byrd is here, and I am happy to defer
    if he wants to go ahead of me.
        Senator Byrd. Walt Whitman said that the greatest thing
    upon the earth is woman. You were here before I was, so please
    go ahead.
        Let me say while I am talking that I am sorry to be tardy.
    We had a vote over on the floor, and rather than attempt to
    make two runs over here, which you might do at age 35, I
    thought I would just wait and make one.
        Thank you.
        Senator Murray. Well, thank you very much.

                         NON-HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS

        Admiral Collins, earlier, I recited the figures from your
    own quarterly mission hour report that indicate for the year
    that ended just 4 weeks ago, your efforts in the area of drug
    interdiction are 42 percent below the September 11 levels, and
    your efforts at fisheries enforcement are 33 percent below
    September 11 levels.
        In your formal testimony, you state that the President's
    2004 budget for the Coast Guard is built around the goal of
    returning your level of effort to these and other non-homeland
    security missions to pre-9/11 levels, but the GAO has reviewed
    the President's budget and does not agree that the enactment of
    the President's budget will enable you to get back to pre-9/11
    levels.
        We need to set the record straight, so I want to ask you if
    we enact the President's budget in full and provide you with
    the second year of historic increases for the Coast Guard, will
    your quarterly mission reports show us that drug interdiction
    and fisheries enforcement have returned to the levels that
    existed prior to September 11, 2001?
        Admiral Collins. Let me equivocate a little if you would
    allow me. I think it is relative to risk. Part of this
    accounting that we have had over the last 18 months relative to
    activity levels--and that is one way to measure mission
    balance; there is budget allocation, there are activity levels,
    and there is performance, and I think you have to look at all
    three--but if you look at activity, clearly, the snapshot was
    taken in a year, as I mentioned in my opening statement, of
    momentous change, of dramatic impact, of significant threat,
    and we were at many periods during the course of that time at
    orange threat conditions, obviously, and in the immediate
    aftermath of 9/11, the whole country was ramped up across the
    board. I would submit that if you looked at the activity level
    of every police department and every law enforcement
    organization in this country, you would find a similar spike
    given the scenario. And then, there were a couple of oranges
    and then Operation Liberty Shield, which was invoked in
    conjunction with Operation Iraqi Freedom.
        With all of those, it is a very unusual time to be doing
    this kind of accounting, so to have a spike in the homeland
    security mission I think is reasonable, appropriate, and I
    think a natural thing to do during that timeframe.
        Where did they come from? Most of that accounting is from
    redistributed major cutters from the fisheries mission and from
    the drug mission and from the migrant mission, and that is
    where they were taken from. We are maintaining our SAR posture.
        With the fiscal year 2002 supplemental, the fiscal year
    2003 budget, and the fiscal year 2004 budget, it is a 30
    percent increase, and by any standard, I think that is an
    unprecedented support by the administration and Secretary in
    terms of moving us up a glide slope that provides us the
    capability and the capacity to do our job.
        I am very happy with the level of support that they
    provided last year, this year and through the supplemental. I
    think we are going to close those gaps that we had, and we are
    going to get near pre-9/11 levels. I think there will still
    probably be some discontinuities in terms of exact level
    relative to particularly some of the law enforcement,
    fisheries, and drug mission in terms of the amount of activity
    we will be able to allocate, but we will be closing the gaps
    significantly. These are substantial increases that will allow
    us to return to normal.
        I would also stress that it assumes what we call Maritime
    Security Condition 1. We have three levels of security built
    into the International Code of Security for Ports and Vessels,
    and they are going to be built into our rulemaking that
    supports the Maritime Transportation Security Act. That is
    assuming a Maritime Security Level 1. If you go to 2 or 3, or
    if there is a sustained level of higher state of risk, then we
    are going to reallocate again. And I think that is what the
    American people want us to do is allocate our resources to
    risk.
        So I think we are going to be not exactly to levels. We
    will be approaching those levels at the MARSEC 1.
        Senator Murray. I agree that we need to allocate our
    resources to risk, but I also very strongly before homeland
    security passed, working with Senator Stevens and others,
    wanted to make it very clear that we cannot reduce our levels
    of effort in our other missions in order to accomplish this. We
    need to know what it is going to cost us to make sure that you
    can do all of your missions.
        So let me ask you, because in the past, the Coast Guard and
    other agencies in the administration have carefully estimated
    the amount of drugs entering our country and the number of
    illegal encroachments of foreign fishing vessels into U.S.
    waters. You have done that to measure the effectiveness of your
    efforts. So what have you observed regarding the likelihood of
    drugs entering our country and illegal encroachments on U.S.
    fishing grounds as a result of your greatly diminished efforts
    that we have seen in these two missions over the last year and
    a half?
        Admiral Collins. To answer that question, Senator, I think
    you would go to that third dimension of how you look at mission
    balance. And I mentioned budget, activity level, and
    performance. Our activity level over the last 18 months,
    because of the impact of homeland security, certainly our
    activity levels have been down for counter-drugs, and fish.
        The performance has been pretty consistent, however. If you
    look at our performance in terms of seizure rate, recovery
    rate--I am talking about drugs now--or, excuse me, removal
    rate, and that is both deterrents, those that were thrown over
    the side, or those we actually seized, we had last year the
    third highest cocaine seizures in U.S. Coast Guard history--
    72.2 metric tons--and our removal rate has been fairly
    consistent between 20 and 25 percent.
        So in terms of performance, I think we had a very, very
    credible performance even in the face of some of our cutters
    being pulled off that mission. Now, the question is how did you
    do that, and I think there are a couple of answers to that.
        One is tremendous partnering--I mentioned capacity,
    capability and partnering are key to balancing our mission--
    tremendous partnering with the United States Navy and with
    allies. If you look today, we have nine ships in the deep
    Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific right now, today, doing
    counter-drugs. And incidentally, we have 18 cutters underway
    today around the country. Fifteen of those 18 cutters are doing
    non-homeland security missions--15 of the 18. So as we speak
    today is an indication of how we are returning back to our
    normal posture.
        But let me get back to drugs, the reasons. We have a
    partnership with the United States Navy. We have Coast Guard
    law enforcement detachments on those Navy assets. We have Coast
    Guard law enforcement detachments on the allied ships, three,
    and our three vessels. That is a tremendous team, and those law
    enforcement detachments do not show up in the activity stats,
    but there is a tremendous outcome from that partnership.
        We had a British oiler down in the EASTPAC, allowing us to
    have a gas station far from anything, so we can get our ships
    refueled and staying in the game.
        So I think with better intel, great partnerships with the
    countries around the Caribbean Rim, we are getting better at
    this mission. We are putting metal on target, if you will, and
    getting great performance outcome.
        Having said that, if you had more capacity, could you get
    even more outcome? The answer is yes. But I think our
    performance is very, very, very credible, and we have tried to
    manage the dimensions of our mission so we can ensure the
    appropriate outcomes.
        If you switch to the migrants, if you look at the number of
    migrants seized over the last 3 years, it is consistent with
    previous patterns. We have interdicted 2,800 migrants to date
    in 2003. That will put us in a course above previous levels. We
    have been interdicting about 4,000.
        So we are not abandoning those missions, and the
    performance is still there.

                             FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT

        Senator Murray. What about fisheries enforcement, though?
        Admiral Collins. Fisheries enforcement is down, clearly.
    That is one of those areas that we have pulled cutters off of.
    We maintain minimums in certain areas. For example, the Bering
    Sea and the enforcement of the Maritime Boundary Line--we have
    a one-ship continuous presence in the Bering, and we have
    maintained that. That has not gone down. We have a half-ship
    presence, as we call it, in the rest of the Alaskan waters, and
    we have maintained that.
        So there are critical areas that we have maintained and
    other areas we have backed off. Is it where we want to be
    steady-state? No. We want to return to there, and as I have
    noted today, again, 15 of the 18 ships are back doing normal
    business, and nine of them are doing fisheries missions today.
        Senator Murray. My time is running out, but the GAO did
    quote Coast Guard office officials stating that the decline in
    both drug enforcement and fisheries enforcement can be
    attributable not only to your heightened homeland security
    requirements but also to the deployment of resources for
    military operations. I assume some of those ships are going to
    be coming home, but can you tell me when we expect to see the
    high-endurance cutters return?
        Admiral Collins. The exact dates are still up in the air
    and being decided, but it will be in the near term, not in the
    intermediate or far term. As to exact dates, there are
    logistics issues and other issues that we are working out, but
    they will be on their way home very, very shortly, and they
    will be turned back into non-homeland security missions.
        Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Admiral.

                           U.S. COAST GUARDS WORKLOAD

        Mr. Chairman, this is extremely important. We are asking
    the Coast Guard to do a tremendous amount of work. Obviously,
    they have been involved in the Iraqi efforts, and they are
    involved around the world. We are asking them to do fisheries
    enforcement, drug enforcement, search and rescue. We have given
    them more money, but I am deeply concerned that the numbers we
    are seeing coming back are saying that some of the critical
    missions that we are asking them to do are not taking place,
    and I think this Committee needs to look carefully at that and
    make sure that we budget the amount of money for the Coast
    Guard to do the homeland security jobs as well as all the other
    missions that we are asking them to do.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Murray.
        Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you.

                                     WOMEN

        Senator Murray, I mentioned Walt Whitman a little earlier.
    Walt Whitman said, ``Man is a great thing upon the earth and
    throughout eternity, but every jot and tittle of the greatness
    of man has unfolded out of woman.''
        Woodrow Wilson, who was the President of this country, a
    great President, when I was born, said he wouldn't give the
    snap of his finger for any young man who was not surrounded by
    a bevy of admiring females.
        Not many of the gentlemen in the audience laughed at that,
    did they? What is the matter with that crowd out there?
        Mr. Chairman, are you taking questions for both witnesses?
        Senator Cochran. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. All right. Very well.
        I guess the Secret Service is first, is it not, today?
        Senator Cochran. Yes, sir. They testified first.

                              U.S. SECRET SERVICE

        Senator Byrd. All right. I welcome Director Basham. You are
    going to be in for a tough time.
        The Secret Service has long been an agency focused on
    homeland security. Since its creation in 1865, the Secret
    Service has protected our financial infrastructure and later
    took on the protective mission to safeguard our Nation's
    leaders and leaders from other countries.
        As the Secret Service is new to the Homeland Security
    Department, its functions are new to many of the members on
    this Committee. And I have to say that with the inclusion of
    myself, although I have been on the Committee--this is my 45th
    year; I am the grand-daddy of them all when it comes to length
    of service on this Committee--and my mom used to say, ``A self-
    braggart is a half-scoundrel.''
        I was trying to think of that great athlete who said, ``It
    is all right to brag if you have done it.''
        Senator Cochran. Dizzy Dean.
        Senator Byrd. Dizzy Dean, right.
        So over the past 5 years, the Secret Service has grown
    substantially. Between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2003,
    the Secret Service has grown in size from 4,800 to 6,100
    employees, and its budget has grown from $564 million to just
    over $1 billion.
        The Secret Service has over 3,000 special agents and nearly
    1,200 uniformed officers all across the country, working on
    protective detail, on financial investigations, and protecting
    the White House complex and the Vice President's residence.
        September 11 resulted in a significant increase in your
    mission requirements. Protective detail assignments have
    increased. The number of National Special Security Events has
    increased. The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act set additional
    requirements to protect and prevent terrorist attacks aimed at
    our financial systems.
        And today you are presenting a budget of $1,123,000,000--
    that happens to be $1.12 for every minute since Jesus Christ
    was born. Can you compute that fast? It is pretty easy--
    reflecting many of those changes, and the Committee looks
    forward to discussing this request with you now and on a
    continuing basis as long as it is necessary, as well as your
    many homeland security activities.
        Now, as to the Coast Guard, I welcome the Coast Guard
    Commandant. The Coast Guard has a long tradition as protectors
    of our ports and waterways. At no time in its history has the
    Coast Guard relied on its assets more than it does today. With
    the expanded mission of homeland security, the Coast Guard has
    increased patrols, enhanced its port and waterway presence,
    increased vessel boardings, and pushed legacy assets to their
    limits.
        All of this happened at the same time that the Coast Guard
    started to modernize and replace an aging fleet. The Coast
    Guard is also supporting our efforts in the Middle East by
    providing eight patrol boats, two high-endurance cutters, and a
    buoy-tender.
        Admiral Collins, even with the substantial budget increases
    provided to the Coast Guard since September 11, many concerns
    remain about your operational capabilities. Maintaining your
    non-homeland security missions at pre-September 11 levels has
    been a struggle. The Coast Guard's first quarterly report on
    mission hour emphasis revealed that efforts have decreased
    significantly in areas such as drug interdiction, marine
    safety, fisheries enforcement, and marine environmental
    protection.
        The Deepwater Program is approximately $200 million behind
    and at current levels could slip to a 30-year program. If the
    Deepwater Program continues at current levels, the success of
    the program could be in jeopardy.
        In addition, to make room for the high cost of the
    Deepwater Program, funding for shore facilities and aged
    navigation projects has been eliminated.
        With regard to strengthening port security, the Coast Guard
    has estimated that it will cost $1.4 billion in the first year
    and $6 billion over 10 years. Although funding for this purpose
    is not a direct responsibility of the Coast Guard, it is a
    homeland security priority.
        One of the entities folded into the new Department of
    Homeland Security is entitled the ``Transportation Security
    Administration,'' not the Aviation Security Administration.
    Yet, within the $4.8 billion TSA budget, only $86 million is
    requested for maritime and land security activities, while over
    $4.3 billion is required for aviation security.
        So, Admiral Collins, as the leader in maritime security,
    the Subcommittee challenges you to work to ensure that port
    security is given greater emphasis in future funding requests.
        For port security assessments which are mandated by the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act, it took Congressional
    action and $38 million in the recent fiscal year 2003 Emergency
    Supplemental to ensure that these assessments will be completed
    in a timely manner. Under the President's budget, port security
    assessments would not be completed until 2009.
        Finally, Coast Guard employees do a tremendous job with the
    resources given to them, but I fear that they are stretched too
    thin. Secretary Ridge has said that another attack is
    inevitable. If the Coast Guard were to operate under a Code
    Orange scenario for an extended period of time, non-homeland
    security missions could be left unattended.
        Admiral Collins, I realize that you are doing everything
    you can with the resources at hand, but you and this
    Subcommittee needed to confront these issues head-on. Of
    course, Coast Guard employees do extraordinary work. They are
    the lifeblood of our ports and waterways, and millions of
    Americans depend upon them every day. But the Coast Guard needs
    the assets and a secure infrastructure to do their job as
    effectively and efficiently as possible.
        Mr. Chairman, do we proceed with questions?
        Senator Cochran. Senator, I suggest you proceed with
    questions, and you are recognized for that purpose. I have
    asked a few of the Secret Service. I have not asked any
    questions of the Commandant. We have heard opening statements
    from both of them, and Senator Murray has made a statement and
    asked some questions.
        You may proceed.
        Senator Byrd. Very well. Thank you.

                      NATIONAL VESSEL DOCUMENTATION CENTER

        Let us begin with Admiral Collins. Last year, the Coast
    Guard submitted a so-called competitive sourcing plan to the
    Office of Management and Budget that listed 99 full-time
    equivalent at the National Vessel Documentation Center, NVDC,
    in Falling Waters, West Virginia. Have you ever been there?
        Admiral Collins. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Well, I was there when we dedicated that
    function, and there came a heavy rain, a downpour, a huge
    storm. They had a huge tend there that would have seated
    several hundred persons. And this huge storm came up, and the
    winds blew--do you remember how the Bible describes, ``and the
    winds blew''--and several ladies were very kind to my wife, and
    they ushered her into a side door in the building that was
    there, so she was taken to safety. I watched carefully because
    I was concerned--after all, she will have been my best friend
    and my wife 66 years come 1 month from yesterday.
        So there was the wind and falling waters. So the place was
    appropriately named, you see, Falling Waters, West Virginia.
    The waters fell that day.
        One day, I was over in West Virginia, and there was a
    drought over in the central part of the State. There had been a
    drought, and I made a big speech--I do not make many big ones,
    but this was a great speech--and I came to a point, Mr.
    Chairman, where I said, ``and then the rains came.'' And don't
    you know that the Creator was cooperating with me that day, and
    the rain started falling at that moment, and the rain came.
        So Falling Waters is the place, Falling Waters, West
    Virginia.

                          COMPETITIVE SOURCING AT NVDC

        You proposed to convert the NVDC into a Government
    corporation, which was viewed by many Federal workers as a
    first step toward contracting out the work of the NVDC. I have
    serious concerns about the administration's efforts to contract
    out what are inherently governmental functions, and I stated
    those concerns yesterday when Secretary Ridge was before this
    subcommittee.
        The NVDC effectively bestows citizenship on vessels at sea
    which affects international trade, diplomacy, national
    security, and a host of issues that fall under the purview of
    the Federal Government. This is not a function that should be
    exercised by contractors or Government corporations which
    operate outside congressional oversight.
        I wrote to you last October about this issue, and you
    replied that the Coast Guard, after discussions with the OMB,
    was reconsidering the conversion of the NVDC.
        Now, in light of the fact that Secretary Ridge in testimony
    before the subcommittee yesterday said that he was unaware of
    any underlined--any current plan within the new Department to
    contract out security services, what are the Coast Guard's
    privatization plans with regard to the NVDC, and to what extent
    are these plans a result of the OMB competitive sourcing
    initiative?
        Admiral Collins. Senator, of course, all of our competitive
    sourcing programs are in support of the OMB and the President's
    Management Agenda. That plan has been in various forms and
    various things on that, as you correctly note, and initially,
    NVDC was on that.
        The current 2003 plan--and basically, the competitive
    sourcing plan-is a plan to conduct studies scheduled for
    completion here in late 2003 and early 2004 contained to three
    particular areas within the Coast Guard, none of which involves
    NVDC. There is one in a public works function out of the Coast
    Guard Academy. There is another study of a public works
    function at our support center in Elizabeth City, North
    Carolina, and there is another looking at our retired services,
    pay services, at our pay center in Topeka, Kansas. And it is
    basically not huge numbers of people being looked at--42 in the
    Academy--these are civilian positions--41 at the support center
    in Elizabeth City, and 36 in Topeka.
        So these studies will run their course, and they will
    determine what the recommendation is after doing the studies.
    The 2004 competitive sourcing plan is yet to be configured, and
    it depends on the planning guidance that we get from the Office
    of Management and Budget on direction from them on putting that
    together. That will be put together later this summer.
        So the news is three studies for those facilities that I
    have noted and NVDC not a part of that.
        Senator Byrd. And what does that mean?
        Admiral Collins. That means we will wait until the outcome
    of the studies to see what they say in terms of a
    recommendation on outsourcing or not. We cannot prejudge what
    the studies are going to say, but it is for those functions in
    those commands that I have noted.
        Senator Byrd. Are you saying that the jury is still out on
    the facility at Falling Waters?
        Admiral Collins. I do not know what the 2004 list is going
    to look like, and that will depend upon guidance from the
    Office of Management and Budget and how we configure our list.
        Clearly, they have given us some direction on some of the
    things to extract from the previous inventory of potential
    studies, and we have done that, and I would suspect they will
    be consistent with that going forward. But it is yet to be
    determined at this point.
        Senator Byrd. Would you say that the Office of Management
    and Budget is Mount Olympus in this Administration?
        Admiral Collins. I do not know if I----
        Senator Byrd. Does it strike you that the Office of
    Management and Budget is all that important in this
    Administration and that your guidance will down from on high
    from the ethereal atmosphere of Mount Olympus?
        Admiral Collins. Certainly I respect the guidance and the
    direction of OMB regardless of what Administration is at the
    time. They are involved with management issues, management
    initiatives, and coordinating that effort through the Federal
    Government, and we try to adhere as best we can to the
    guidelines that they give us.
        Senator Byrd. Do you feel that the testimony that you are
    giving in response to this question is parallel with the
    testimony of Secretary Ridge yesterday on this point, or do you
    think there is any point of difference?
        Admiral Collins. Because I was not here at the hearing
    yesterday, Senator, I----
        Senator Byrd. I stated a moment ago what he said.
        Admiral Collins. Yes, that he was not aware. I do not know
    what his level of knowledge was. I will take that statement as
    accurate, sir.
        Senator Byrd. So once again, how shall employees at NVDC
    understand what you have said here before the committee today?
        Admiral Collins. I think they have to take it at face
    value. They are not on the study list, they are not on the
    inventory list, they are not planned for an assessment, and
    that is the current state.
        Senator Byrd. The OMB scores agencies on how well they
    comply with the President's management agenda. Agencies are
    encouraged to submit management plans to the OMB and to meet
    the competitive sourcing targets outlined in the President's
    budget. The OMB has informed me that these plans, while
    submitted to the OMB for approval, can be released to the
    public at the discretion of the agency heads.
        This subcommittee is asked to appropriate $6.8 billion to
    the Coast Guard to employ 43,450 full-time equivalents. Before
    we do that, I expect that you would provide this subcommittee
    with a copy of any management plan or competitive sourcing plan
    that the Coast Guard submits to the OMB.
        Admiral Collins. Sure.
        Senator Byrd. When do you--when you say ``Sure,'' what does
    that mean?
        Admiral Collins. Yes, sir, we would be glad to submit that
    to you.
        Senator Byrd. Very well. When do you expect to submit your
    next management plan to the OMB, and how soon can you make that
    plan available to the Appropriations Committee?
        Admiral Collins. It is my understanding--and I will have to
    confirm the exact timing of this--I believe, Senator, it is in
    the late July/August timeframe.
        Senator Byrd. Tuesday's New York Times points out that
    there seems to be a revolving door at the new Department of
    Homeland Security, with former top Federal officials walking
    out the door 1 day only to walk in the door another day as a
    top corporate lobbyist.
        With growing concerns about the reach of special corporate
    interests in this Department and others, I urge you and others
    in the Department leadership, the top leadership, to find a way
    to board up that door as you possibly can.
        The motto of the Coast Guard is ``Semper Paratus''--
    ``Always Prepared.'' That is kind of like the Boy Scouts'
    motto, isn't it--``Be prepared.''
        Admiral Collins. Close, Senator.
        Senator Byrd. That motto is not ``Always Privatized.'' It
    is ``Always Prepared,'' not ``Always Privatized.''
        Admiral Collins, the Coast Guard is a key part of the
    Nation's homeland security network. You and the men and the
    women under your command have the task of guarding our seaports
    and coastlines. And this is not a mission that should be driven
    by a private company's profit margin.
        What I am saying is really an admonition to people out here
    in this room today, probably. This is not a mission that should
    be driven by a private company's profit margin. This is a
    mission that should be first, last, and always driven by the
    security needs of the Nation. While it may be important to
    receive high marks from the OMB--and I suppose you might gather
    that I do not have a great deal of love for the current top
    management of OMB--and to comply with its directives to
    contract our Government services, it is far more important that
    the Coast Guard receive high marks from the American people in
    the protection of this country. And you have received high
    marks. The Coast Guard stands at the apex of agencies and
    departments and functions within the Government that people on
    the Appropriations Committee have great admiration for and
    confidence in.
        I think I will just submit my questions on the Secret
    Service, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
        Senator Stevens, welcome.
        Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
        I am pleased to be here with you, Director Basham and
    Admiral Collins. I have some provincial questions, really,
    which should not be unanticipated.

                          INCURSIONS IN NORTH PACIFIC

        There has been a significant number of incursions in the
    North Pacific in the fishing grounds, as a matter of fact, an
    increasing number of foreign vessels coming across the maritime
    boundary line. There were in particular incursions of several
    Russian pollack factory trawlers that I am sure you recall had
    to be cut off in really hot pursuit concepts with the Coast
    Guard cutter Rush. I congratulate you for those activities.

                            UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

        However, I am concerned about that, and I wonder if it is
    not time to look at some high-tech concepts to increase the
    surveillance and decrease the potential for incursions. For
    instance, I have suggested the use of Predators to patrol the
    boundary line and to have on board warning capability to warn
    foreign vessels that they were now entering U.S. waters, and if
    they continued, that they would be pursued and arrested.
        Those are very inexpensive--they are even less expensive
    than the Global Hawk; the Global Hawk flies too high in my
    opinion to have really good aero-surveillance.
        Have you looked into that concept? Are we going to go into
    any new technology to make up for the decrease in effort we
    have from the Coast Guard in the North Pacific?
        Admiral Collins. Senator, we have maintained and intend to
    maintain the one-ship presence up on the boundary line that we
    have committed to. We have not moved away from that, and we
    continue to do that, and it is in our plans going forward.
        But clearly, you are absolutely right. I could not agree
    with you more that we can be increasingly effective with the
    increasing threat on the boundary line with technology. There
    is absolutely no question about it. And UAVs, I think we have
    seen around the planet how effective the UAVs are in other
    applications, and I think it is a wonderful application there.
        As you know, Senator, UAVs are an integral part of our
    Integrated Deepwater System Project. The national security
    cutter that we are building has embedded in those two vertical
    take-off UAVs as part of the design. Now, they are a few years
    out in terms of production and marriage with that new asset,
    but clearly, that is recognition in that project of how
    important UAVs will be for the Coast Guard now and into the
    future, and we really want to get that capability. It is a
    terribly important capability, and there is application in
    fisheries, there is application in migrant interdiction, there
    is application in counter drugs.
        So it is terribly important technology to go after. The
    current plan, of course, in getting that is our Integrated
    Deepwater Systems contract. The Predator I understand is a hot
    commodity, a high-demand commodity, and you have to wait in
    line in terms of production capacity to get one of these. I
    know the program manager for those is, of course, in the United
    States Air Force. But they are a high-demand asset, and
    currently we do not have funds in the budget to procure
    Predator other than our Deepwater Initiative, and there is this
    demand capacity issue associated with it.
        But I could not agree with you more, Senator. My opening
    statement was that we need capacity, capability, and solid
    partnership to have good mission balance, and part of the
    capability piece is using technology well, increasing our
    surveillance capability, and increasing surveillance capability
    is the heart and soul of our Deepwater project.
        Senator Stevens. Well, respectfully, Admiral, that is half
    the coastline of the United States, with more than 50 percent
    of the naturally-produced fish that Americans consume coming
    from that area, and we have one ship on half the coastline of
    the United States. We have the highest level of lives lost in
    any occupation in the country, and we have the greatest impact
    from foreign sources on the future of our product, of the
    species that we harvest ourselves.
        We have environmental groups now suggesting that we
    decrease our efforts because we have no way to control the
    foreign efforts. Now, somehow or other, a plan has to come
    forward. I am going to ask the committee to request that you
    present a plan to us for the modernization of the surveillance
    of these waters, and I think it would be cost-effective.
        I do believe that with what we are seeing now in Iraq and
    other places in the world, the military demand for Predators is
    going to go down. I assume that we are going to replace the
    ones that were lost, but I do not anticipate any expanded need
    for the Air Force or any of the military operations in the near
    future--and the line is up right now. I think you get a better
    price for Predators in the next 2 years than you will in the
    following 10 years, because they have their line expanded for
    increased production.
        I do hope that the committee will support that concept and
    that it will push you toward having the greatest use in new
    technology in surveillance of the maritime boundary.

                    FOCUS ON NON-HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS

        Second, I asked the GAO to look into the question of the
    decline in mission hours for drug interdiction, fisheries
    enforcement, marine environmental protection and marine safety.
    I am sure you have seen that report. It is my understanding
    that we all thought that that was the result of 9/11. The GAO
    report shows that beginning in 1998, the hours dedicated to
    resource protection started to decline, and they have been on a
    slippery slope downward ever since.
        So this is somewhat related to the marine boundary but not
    totally. This is a national problem on all of our shores for
    drug interdiction, fisheries enforcement, marine environmental
    protection, and marine safety.
        I would like to ask is there any way we can balance the
    demand for these non-defense missions so that there is not a
    continued decline now? With your new responsibilities in
    homeland security, it appears that the decline is becoming
    steeper, and I would like to reverse that or at least level it
    off.
        Can you give us any understanding of what is going to
    happen to the resources dedicated to these kinds of activities?
        Admiral Collins. Yes, Senator. Clearly in the 1998-1999
    timeframe, or pre-9/11, those resource hour drops were a direct
    reflection of a decreasing budget. In other words, we had
    budget cuts as we were laying up ships, if you recall, in those
    budgets. So there was the pressure of the budgets, and we were
    getting operational cutbacks, and we were laying up assets.
    That was part of the pre-9/11 problem.
        Post-9/11 clearly is the security demands of the Nation,
    and all law enforcement agencies across the country, armed
    services, pulsed into that issue in the immediate 9/11, and so
    did we--we surged into that area. And we have had a number of
    Orange alerts, clearly, since then, and they require a ramping
    up of diversion of our boat hours and ship hours and aircraft
    hours into that area, so we have done that. We had Liberty
    Shield, an operational order that was put into effect
    consistent with and concurrent with our war in Iraq.
        So this post-9/11 period, this 18 months, is a fairly
    unusual period, a snapshot. It is a period of very, very high
    threat in the homeland security arena, and the Coast Guard
    surging into that area over time to provide the protection that
    America needs.
        We did in fact have to take those cutters from other
    missions. They are now back--a good portion of those cutters
    are back--doing the non-homeland security mission.
        I noted earlier, Senator, before you came in, that today,
    if you took a snapshot, we had 18 cutters deployed this morning
    around the country, in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific and
    through Alaska, and 15 of those 18 are doing non-homeland
    security missions, and 9 of them are doing fisheries missions.
        So the message here is that we have now backed out from
    Liberty Shield, we are now off of Code Orange, and we are
    allocating cutters back into the non-homeland security missions
    as we should. So it is a dynamic process. We are allocating our
    resources to the risk.
        The other good part of the story is that we have through
    the fiscal year 2002 supplemental, the fiscal year 2003 budget,
    and the fiscal year 2004 budget, additional capacity that the
    Senate has provided and the House has provided, so we are
    building up our capacity to do both. The trend is a good one.
    We will not be exactly there at the end of 2004 to be exactly
    at the pre-9/11 allocation levels, but we will be pretty close.
    So the full intent is to balance our mission, build up our
    capability and capacity--capacity meaning more people, more
    assets, capability meaning things like technology and new types
    of units--to have the kind of mission balance we need in our
    waters.
        So our full intent is to balance, balance, balance, and we
    appreciate the Administration's support and Congress' support
    in helping us build up our capacity so we can do that.

                      RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEW DEPARTMENT

        Senator Stevens. One of the things we fought for--not only
    here in this committee but in the Governmental Affairs
    Committee when I participated in the homeland security bill--
    was to assure that we would maintain the independence of the
    Coast Guard. Tell us about the development of the relationship
    of your service to the new Department.
        Admiral Collins. I just think it is terrific, Senator. I
    could not be more pleased with the support of both the
    Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, the incredible
    collaboration across all of our agencies in the new Department.
        I just think it is again the right place for us to be and
    the right time for the Coast Guard to serve America. I remain a
    direct report to the Secretary. I am on a par with the other
    Undersecretaries in the Department. The Secretary is very
    cognizant of our full range of missions. I think every time he
    has come up to testify, he has said, ``We need to support the
    full range of Coast Guard missions,'' and I commit to that.
        So I think terribly supportive of the United States Coast
    Guard. I think our credibility is very, very high within the
    organization. We are committed team players, committed to the
    team's success.
        I am very, very pleased with where we are, Senator.
        Senator Stevens. I have just two more questions, Mr.
    Chairman.

                    IMPORTATION OF GAS FROM FOREIGN ENTITIES

        One item that has just come to my attention is the
    projection for the increased demand for natural gas from
    offshore. One of the think tanks up in Alaska has just given me
    a projection that we will soon see the increase occur on a
    steady basis and that places like Qatar will be the source of
    liquefied natural gas that will come more and more to our East
    Coast.
        I know you have the whole concept of your offshore ports
    and the concepts of deepwater, but are you planning ahead for
    what is going to be the problem of our country as we see--we
    are already importing about 56 percent of our oil; if this
    projection is correct, by 2015, we will be importing 40 percent
    of our natural gas, and it will be liquefied and coming into
    the same ports that the oil is coming into. You talk about
    homeland security and the terrorist problem, my God, as a
    matter of fact, there are two novels that have already been
    written on that, as I am sure you know.
        In your plans, are you looking ahead at not only the
    problems of security but also the problems of handling that
    much imported gas?
        Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. Of course, the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act that was just passed last fall and
    signed by the President in late November provides an extension
    of the deepwater ports regime to natural gas. It was heretofore
    crude. So we presently have two applications for Deepwater LNG,
    and we are processing that under the terms of the Act. In
    addition, there are additional ports throughout the country
    that are moving to that--of course, LNG has been delivered into
    Boston for some time; Cove Point in the Chesapeake Bay is
    another area to deliver to and has been recently on a track to
    be approved; Savannah receives gas, and there are ports in the
    Gulf. So there are additional ports, and in each case, we have
    looked through the safety and security dimension. Cove Point is
    an example. I know that Senator Mikulski was very intimately
    involved in overseeing the assessment both from a security and
    a safety perspective of LNG coming into Cove Point.
        We did an exhaustive assessment. We partnered like crazy
    with every stakeholder we could imagine in the area. We looked
    at it upside down, sideways, and every which way you can, in
    providing the necessary safety and security provisions, and I
    think we have that one right, and I think it has been agreed to
    across the board by almost everyone who looked at it that we
    have got that right, and that from a safety and security
    perspective, it is reasonable.
        Part of our rulemaking to support the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act--rulemaking that I mentioned
    earlier in my statement, the final rule by November--that
    rulemaking will address offshore dimensions, so we will have as
    part of that rulemaking from a security perspective how we
    provide for and what are the regulations associated with
    security in the offshore.
        It is an evolving thing, a dynamic thing, Senator, and you
    very correctly point out that it is tending to be a growth
    area, and we are following the terms of the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act.
        Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
        Thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman.
        That statistic he used that nine of the vessels are
    dedicated to fisheries enforcement, and one of them is in an
    area that is half the coastline of the United States, comes
    back to my original problem. I did go to the Predator factory,
    I talked to the Predator people, I asked them what the capacity
    of Predator was. They told me that we could have slings under
    the Predator that would carry life-saving devices. They told me
    they could carry buoys that could be dropped to a ship that is
    obviously sinking so that the follow-on rescue would not have
    to spend hours trying to find the location. They told me we
    could have loudspeakers that could be operated from the shore,
    as I said, to give a warning as people came in. They told me we
    could have photographic capability on board to take a
    photograph of them with a GPS marker so that we would have to
    have no more proof of the violation after you go back across
    the line in hot pursuit.
        In my judgment, the use of high-technology in the Predator
    will make up for that imbalance in terms of the assignment of
    your vessels. So I urge you to get us a plan, but moving
    forward in that area and using that kind of technology. It will
    not increase your manpower. It will not increase your costs
    except in terms of acquisition costs of new technology. And the
    people who operate those, as you know, could be sitting in San
    Diego and work on the Predators that are over the waters of
    Alaska.
        It is an entirely new concept of life-saving and protection
    of our resources that I think we have got to move into as
    rapidly as possible.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Collins. Thank you, Senator. We will take that for
    action. We are almost as enthused as you are, Senator, about
    that technology, and I would rather have it sooner than later.
    I think it is a tremendous force multiplier for us, and we will
    get busy with our pencils and develop a concept for you.
        Senator Stevens. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Stevens. We appreciate
    your contribution to the hearing.

                    COAST GUARD DEPLOYMENT OF ASSETS IN IRAQ

        In the supplemental, Admiral Collins, you received $400
    million for work in connection with the Iraqi war, and the
    Coast Guard deployed vessels to the theater. I assume you are
    in the process now of reclaiming some of those for their
    traditional functions closer to the United States.
        To what extent are you in transition, and do you intend to
    have other assets deployed to that region in the near future as
    part of the reconstitution of a government and making available
    whatever assistance our national interests indicate are
    appropriate?
        Admiral Collins. The existing resources that we sent over
    there, the two high-endurance carriers, the eight patrol boats,
    the buoy-tender and so forth, will all come back, and there are
    plans being discussed now with the joint staff on just how and
    when and what are the logistics associated with those. So we
    anticipate in the near term, they are coming back.
        I think it is likely--and I have talked in a conceptual way
    with the joint staff on this--that they will ask for us to
    support some of the maritime security initiative in a post-war
    setting. In other words, one of the things we have done around
    the world is to assist other nations in establishing coast
    guards. We have been doing that since World War II. The
    Japanese Coast Guard was set up by the United States Coast
    Guard as part of MacArthur's occupation.
        We have been doing that ever since in selected places. We
    are in Yemen, where we have an advisor establishing a Yemenese
    Coast Guard. So I think that, yes, in the long-term, the
    initial assets will be coming back that we sent over, and there
    is likely to be some assistance that we can provide in
    establishing maritime security there.
        We will probably rotate on a recurring basis in and out. We
    have, as you may know, Senator, in the last 10 years or so, had
    Coast Guard presence in the Arabian Gulf to enforce the UN
    resolution against Iraq in enforcing that embargo. So we have
    been there for a long time. What the future has in store is
    under development.

                           PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

        Senator Cochran. The supplemental bill also provided
    funding, $38 million, for the completion of the port security
    assessments here in the continental United States. To what
    extent is that funding available to you to fulfill your
    responsibilities? Do you have enough money to complete those
    assessments, and if so, when do you anticipate the completion
    will occur?
        Admiral Collins. Senator, we expect the completion no later
    than the end of calendar year 2004. We are very, very thankful
    for the support of the House and the Senate for that
    supplemental increase. That allows us to get those port
    security assessments on track and done in an expeditious way.
    It was the right call. We thank you for the support. We are, as
    we speak, aggressively making the contractual modifications to
    ensure that the contractor that we have--it is a partnership
    with Northrop Grumman; they are doing assessments--they can
    roll those out to ensure we get them done. But the game plan is
    to get that money on contract, and get them done by the end of
    calendar year 2004.
        Senator Cochran. Is there an order of priority? For
    example, I think about the naval station at Pascagoula on the
    Mississippi Gulf Coast, and Charleston, South Carolina--I know
    Senator Hollings has expressed concerns about that--and I have
    read reports about the challenges in Miami, Florida, with the
    large numbers of cruise ships that come in there as well as the
    containers. Are these areas of high priority, and do you
    foresee that there will be some kind of ranking or assessment
    of priorities as you proceed to do your work?
        Admiral Collins. Right, and we will be glad to provide to
    the committee, Senator, the full list of the 55 ports, in what
    order we are doing it and what the criteria were for that
    order. We will be glad to provide that for you.
        [The information follows:]

        The list of 55 ports has been classified as either For Official Use
    Only or Secret based on how the list is organized. The Coast Guard will
    provide the information separately in an appropriate forum.

        Admiral Collins. We are doing 55 what we call Tier 1 ports
    in terms of volume, critical infrastructure, and a whole host
    of other variables, and those are the ones that we will do
    within calendar year 2004. In addition, we have 47 captains of
    the port around the country, and they are designated by the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act as the Federal maritime
    security coordinators for those areas. Every one of those
    Captains of the Ports already has used what we call the port
    security risk assessment tool that was developed in conjunction
    with our Research and Development Center in Groton, Connecticut
    and American Bureau of Shipping. It is really a neat tool.
    Every captain of the port has used it in advance of these
    studies. So we did not want any dust to settle. We did not want
    to sit on our hands. We really wanted to have some kind of
    baseline assessment, as immediate after 9/11 as we could. So
    the captains of the ports have been busy partnering with all
    the stakeholders in the port, using this tool, identifying
    risk, determining intervention strategy even in advance of the
    rulemaking. I think it is really a positive thing, and what we
    are trying to do is do these things in parallel, not in series,
    and have things fold out so we have a robust position in our
    ports.

                          INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM

        Senator Cochran. I know that as a part of your
    modernization effort the Coast Guard has projected the
    Integrated Deepwater System to be a 20-year program to replace
    or modernize aging and technologically obsolete assets of the
    Coast Guard. That is a very sizeable undertaking and plan.
        I notice that some are saying that the funding is not at a
    level where it should be. Some have suggested $79 million in
    additional funding could have been used in this fiscal year to
    get the program moving.
        Do you think that in the 2004 budget request, you have
    sufficient funding requested for this program?
        Admiral Collins. We have funding that keeps very, very
    strong momentum going on this program. Five hundred million in
    a relative sense, looking over the past number of years for our
    capital account is a pretty sizeable chunk of money for one,
    single Coast Guard project.
        So I am very pleased that we have the support to move ahead
    aggressively on it, and of course, the more money you put on
    it, the faster you get the project done. The project was
    designed, Senator, under sort of boundary conditions so that
    all three teams that were competing, three consortia, could
    have the same planning factors. We said design a system that
    guarantees the operational output of the system at a certain
    level, baseline level--98 was the baseline--do it at the lowest
    total cost of ownership, and do it for a capital cost of $500
    million a year and $1 billion total operating cost for the
    system.
        Those were the design parameters. All three of them
    designed to those design parameters and presented those, and we
    awarded the contract. To keep with that notional design, you
    would have to get $500 million a year in fiscal year 1998
    dollars, plus project management costs. So if we are below that
    notional planning, the design of the system has to be morphed,
    and it is morphed by being stretched.
        So that is where we are. We did not get exactly that
    notional planning level, so the project is stretched a bit.
    Now, in the Homeland Security Act of last fall, that Act
    required that we submit a plan, the feasibility of accelerating
    Deepwater and moving it from a 20-year to a 10-year project.
    That report has been submitted--it was the first report
    submitted under the new Department--and that details the
    feasibility of acceleration and the pros and cons.

                           MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS

        Senator Cochran. You also have a program called Maritime
    Domain Awareness, and the request in the budget proposes $34
    million for funding of this program. Tell us a little bit about
    that program and whether you think that is a sufficient amount.
        Admiral Collins. I think it is a good start. It is, of
    course, a recurring effort. Maritime domain awareness is a
    concept. It is saying that for us to be truly effective as a
    law enforcement agency and a homeland security agency or a
    fisheries enforcement agency, you have to have transparency of
    your operating environment; you have to have domain awareness,
    and you have to have systems that allow you to get that so the
    scarce ships and planes you do have, you can put them on
    target, and you can push your borders out and have visibility
    of what is coming at you from a security perspective. That is
    sort of the general philosophy of that and I think the central
    feature of our maritime homeland security strategy that we
    published last December, and it is the central capability that
    is embedded in the Integrated Deepwater System.
        The $34 million helps us along the way with that by
    building communications, connectivity and the like, and
    building some prototype harbor operations surveillance systems
    around the country in partnership with the Navy.
        So I think it is a good step, and I think the priorities
    are right there, Senator.

                                   RESCUE 21

        Senator Cochran. Another program that I found interesting
    in my briefing papers here is ``Rescue 21''--that is also a
    modernization project--and in the budget request $134 million
    is proposed to be spent in fiscal year 2004 developing more
    cost-efficient towers and receivers for communication purposes.
        Tell us what your reaction to this budget proposal is? Is
    that enough for that program? What do you intend to accomplish
    in the next fiscal year with that money?
        Admiral Collins. That project is right on schedule with the
    funding profile. It is a project that has received a great deal
    of attention both in the Senate and the House. We are mandated
    by Congress to finish the project by 2006, so we have direction
    to not sit on our laurels on this one but to move out in a fast
    way.
        It is on schedule. That money will keep it on schedule. It
    is a tremendously important project. I see that project itself,
    Senator, as a subsystem of this MDA concept, because it gives
    you transparency, it has direction-finding capability in it
    that we do not have now, so when we get a search and rescue
    case, we can direction-find on the transmission; it is digital,
    not analog; multiple channels can be monitored simultaneously;
    it closes geographic coverage gaps around the country. It is a
    tremendously important project, and we are very appreciative of
    the support we have received on the Hill for this project--but
    we are on track with that one.

                           SEARCH AND RESCUE EFFORTS

        Senator Cochran. You mentioned search and rescue. I think
    $26 million is in the budget request for search and rescue. Is
    that sufficient for your purposes?
        Admiral Collins. Yes, Senator. That is part of a multiyear
    effort that we began several years ago to continue to reinvest
    in that. I think when most people think of the United States
    Coast Guard, they think of search and rescue first. We like
    that image, quite frankly, and I think we do it really well.
    But I think there is a time to reinvest, take our pulse in
    terms of our readiness posture there, and I think Congress has
    agreed. And we built this and have continued to invest in our
    search and rescue function over the last 2 or 3 years. In fact,
    from 2002 to 2004, if Congress approves the fiscal year 2004
    request, we will have added 1,000 billets to the search and
    rescue mission in the form of additional people at stations,
    additional people in our command and control nodes, and
    additional training infrastructure to increase and enhance the
    professionalism.
        So yes, I think we are on target, and it is consistent with
    where we have been going in the last couple years.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
        Director Basham, I want you to understand that we have not
    forgotten you. I know we have had a lot of questions directed
    to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, but there are some
    important questions that I have too about the sufficiency of
    the budget request for the Secret Service and the capacity that
    you have to fulfill your responsibilities.

                     FISCAL YEAR 2004 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

        We have an election campaign coming up. Some candidates are
    already out campaigning. Isn't that part of your responsibility
    in the Secret Service, to protect the security of Presidential
    candidates, and if so, do you have sufficient funding requested
    in this budget to do that?
        Mr. Basham. Mr. Chairman, in answer to that, I would say
    yes, I feel very comfortable that we do have sufficient funding
    identified in the fiscal year 2004 budget and some actually in
    the fiscal year 2003 budget to provide that security.
        One of the great benefits of our move into the Department
    of Homeland Security is that we are now going to be able to
    utilize some of those assets that are in that Department to
    assist us with that mission. As a matter of fact, we are
    starting as early as this summer to begin the training of some
    2,000 Federal special agents in other departments within the
    Department of Homeland Security to help us with that mission.
        But as you indicated, we are tasked with that
    responsibility, and there are processes in place which will
    identify those candidates who would receive Secret Service
    protection and then determine the time lines for when that
    would begin and, quite frankly, when it actually ends.
        Senator Cochran. I notice there is a $1.7 million request
    for new equipment to be used in connection with Presidential
    campaign candidate protection. What kind of new equipment are
    you planning to buy, and for what purpose will that equipment
    be used?
        Mr. Basham. I would like to submit that to you off the
    record if I could, Senator, but I can tell you that the
    majority of that would be additional equipment necessary to
    provide it to the other Federal special agents who will be
    assisting us, but primarily in the area of technology. I would
    like to provide that to you later.
        Senator Cochran. That will be fine.
        I notice that you have some reprogramming or reallocation
    of full-time equivalents--250 positions from the Service's
    investigative activity--to staff the Presidential campaigns.
    What happens to the functions that those people normally carry
    out? Who does that work? Is there a breakdown caused by that
    transfer of personnel?
        Mr. Basham. Well, there is somewhat of a temporary pause in
    the activities in our investigative responsibilities in order
    to move those assets to our protective mission.
        Quite frankly, I think the very thing that makes the Secret
    Service strong and gives it its strength is our dual mission of
    protection and investigation, but at times, it also represents
    our Achilles heel in that we do have to move assets from one of
    those missions to the other, and a campaign is an example of
    that.
        But over the years, we have had great success in partnering
    with the other Federal agencies to assist us in that activity.

                             RELATIONSHIP WITH DHS

        Senator Cochran. Do you think the Service has been
    strengthened by the inclusion of the Service in the new
    Department of Homeland Security? Are you better able to obtain
    information that is helpful to you in carrying out your
    mission, or has it become a problem for you?
        Mr. Basham. I would like to echo the comments of Admiral
    Collins on that point. The Secret Service feels that it was an
    excellent move for us to go to the Department of Homeland
    Security. We, as well as the Coast Guard, were moved over
    intact, with our resources and responsibilities, to report
    directly to the Secretary.
        What I think is pointed out here is that the very mission
    of the Secret Service, as I said in my statement, I believe
    mirrors the mission of the new Department of Homeland Security,
    and that is suppression and prevention and protection, and that
    has been for 138 years the methodology and the philosophy of
    the Secret Service, and I think it fits extremely well within
    the new Department.
        I would also like to say that there has been an early
    indication that the cooperation now within this Department as a
    result of this merger is becoming more and more evident as we
    move along.

                              CAPITAL ACQUISITIONS

        Senator Cochran. There is a request for capital
    acquisitions to be funded at an amount of $3.579 million. What
    is the purpose for this appropriation? What are you going to do
    with this money?
        Mr. Basham. I am not completely familiar with the $3.5
    million. If I could, I would like to get back to you with that.
        Senator Cochran. It would be good to know how you plan to
    spend that money.
        Mr. Basham. I will.
        [The information follows:]

        The request for $33 million in the fiscal year 2004 budget was
    developed based on limited understanding of the costs associated with
    the mail screening needs. The Service is currently in the process of
    studying the mail screening needs of certain high risk Federal
    Government agencies, such as, Congressional offices, FBI, CIA, and
    Homeland Security. With this study we will learn the best methods to be
    utilized to implement a central processing facility in lieu of the
    current individual mail processing centers for each agency. A full
    evaluation of methods, operations, technology and other issues related
    to establishing a fully operational mail facility for the White House
    Complex will be established with this study, and a full spend plan will
    be developed at that time.

                            REALIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL

        Senator Cochran. The budget justification indicates that
    the Service is developing a new hiring plan that will consider
    such things as the Service's realignment within the Department
    of Homeland Security. Is there any particular cost estimate
    that you have developed that is attributable to realignment?
    What do you mean by ``realignment''?
        Mr. Basham. As we move into the Department of Homeland
    Security, we are seeing that, particularly in the area of
    critical infrastructure or key asset protection of critical
    infrastructure, it is going to require that the Service
    redesign, and to some extent, it is our training of our special
    agents and Uniformed Division officers as well as our
    professional and technical personnel. Because we have been
    asked to participate in this key asset protection and critical
    infrastructure protection, it is going to require us to go
    about our business somewhat differently.
        I do not know that we identified a specific number or
    amount of money that is going to be necessary, but in our
    Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program which will be dealing
    in cyberspace, if you will, it is going to require that we do
    additional training which is quite expensive, but as of this
    point, we have been using moneys that we currently have to do
    that sort of training.

               NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN

        Senator Cochran. I found it interesting to note that there
    is an involvement by the Secret Service in the National Center
    for Missing and Exploited Children. I was not aware of this.
    Tell us a little bit about that and what the responsibilities
    of the Secret Service are that you have assumed using your
    protective expertise to help ensure the safety of America's
    children as well as our schools.
        Mr. Basham. Mr. Chairman, we have been involved with the
    National Center for quite some time to provide them with
    forensic and investigative expertise and to help and assist in
    identifying missing and exploited children.
        As a matter of fact, we just received within the last few
    weeks legislation which now actually gives us authority to work
    with the National Center to further develop this partnership.
        But quite frankly, we feel--and we are very proud of that
    relationship with the National Center and have applied
    resources toward assisting State and local communities in
    identifying and in some cases actually finding missing
    children--but we also found that there is an application of the
    Secret Service's expertise in protection in identifying and
    assessing threats, and we have worked with the Department of
    Education to come up with a training program where we have gone
    out to various school districts around the country, and we have
    tried to help them identify possible threats by, whether it is
    schoolchildren or others, directed toward those schools and
    have had success in actually thwarting what would have been
    some very, very disastrous events out there.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much for that information.
    I have some other questions that I am going to submit in
    writing for your consideration. We hope you will be able to
    respond in a reasonable time. And, Admiral Collins, we have
    other questions that we will probably submit to you as well,
    and we hope you will cooperate by submitting answers in writing
    in a reasonable time.
        Senator Byrd.

                              PORT SECURITY GRANTS

        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You mentioned earlier the signature by the President of the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act on November 25 of last
    year. On that day, the President said this, and I quote: ``We
    will strengthen security at our Nation's 361 seaports, adding
    port security agents, requiring ships to provide more
    information about the cargo, crew, and passengers they carry.''
        The Coast Guard has since estimated the cost of
    implementing the Act at $1.4 billion in the first year and $6
    billion in the next 10 years. Congress has worked diligently to
    establish a mechanism for direct Federal grants to assist the
    ports. Altogether, Congress has provided $348 million to help
    ports establish new security measures. Unfortunately, none of
    these funds--nothing was requested along this line by the
    Administration. In the most recent competition, ports sent in
    over $1 billion in applications for $105 million of funding.
        Just 2 months after signing the Act, the President sent to
    Congress a budget that did not include any funding for Social
    Security grants. Yet in his State of the Union, the President
    said that we have intensified security at ports of entry.
        Do you have any comment as to how one might reconcile these
    statements with the President's request?
        Admiral Collins. I think clearly, the approach to our
    rulemaking, which we are approaching aggressively, is that the
    investment is a shared burden approach. In terms of our budget,
    you can look at the Coast Guard's budget and see elements
    within that that represent a Federal investment in the
    increased security of our ports--the fact that by the end of
    2004, we will have 12 maritime safety and security teams around
    the country, we will have additional patrol boats, additional
    small boats. Those represent the Federal investment in the
    security of the ports.
        So that just in our budget alone, I think there are
    significant elements that will enhance the security of the
    Nation in our ports. The $1.4 billion and the $6 billion are
    estimates of the impact of the rulemaking on the private sector
    relative to the security enhancements which may be required as
    a result of the rulemaking, and it is our estimate in terms
    of--most of that, Senator, is on the vessel aspects of the
    rulemaking, and then there is the facility aspect of the
    rulemaking, and most of that estimate, close to $1 billion of
    the $1.4 billion, is on the facility end, the facility impact.
        It is a shared approach, and if you look through our
    budgets, particularly the Coast Guard budget, there is
    considerable investment in enhancing port security reflected in
    the additional assets that we are going to bring to bear to the
    issue.
        Senator Byrd. Let me try again. Congress provided $348
    million--that is an easy figure to remember. Do you remember
    what Andy Gump's license number was? Three-forty-eight. Perhaps
    you are not familiar with Andy Gump. That is an old comic strip
    that I saw a good many years ago when I was a boy.
        We provided $348 million to help ports establish new
    security measures. I am asking why you might construe the
    President's request--he sent a budget that did not include any
    funding for port security grants. Yet in the State of the
    Union, the President said we have intensified security at ports
    of entry. So there is a discrepancy here, it seems to me.
        What role have you taken in budget discussions to support
    additional funding for port security based on the new law?
        Admiral Collins. Part of the discussions, and they are
    still underway in terms of what it will take to implement the
    new law from our perspective and under the administrative
    oversight of the rulemaking, and the rulemaking is going to
    require plans, facility plans, security plans, which have to be
    reviewed and approved, and you have got to have capacity to do
    that. That dialogue is underway, and it is not reflected in the
    fiscal year 2004 budget. That is sort of an unfunded mandate,
    if you will, at this juncture in terms of actually
    administering the rule when it finally comes out--under
    discussion.
        Senator Byrd. Let me try it this way. We provided $348
    million to help ports establish new security measures. None of
    these funds were requested by the administration. In the most
    recent competition, ports sent in over $1 billion of
    applications for $105 million in funding.
        Were requests made to OMB for additional funding for port
    security based on the new law? Would you answer that?
        Admiral Collins. No, because of course, number one, the
    $1.4 billion is the estimate of the private sector costs
    associated with this. Of course, the rule is not even in effect
    yet and is not even published yet--it does not come out until
    this summer. The fiscal year 2004 budget was done about that
    same time, so a lot of these things did not find their way into
    the fiscal year 2004 budget because of timing for instance, the
    port security assessments gap that was addressed by the
    supplemental, so the supplemental addressed that.
        So it was a timing issue amongst other things, Senator.

                   WHITE HOUSE MAIL SCREENING AND PROCESSING

        Senator Byrd. I have a couple of questions which I will
    direct to Director Basham.
        You spoke of programmatic budget increases requested. The
    only programmatic budget increase requested for fiscal year
    2004 is $33 million for White House mail screening and
    processing. That function has historically been the
    responsibility of the White House Office of Administration.
        The Secret Service has been stretched in recent years to
    meet many new responsibilities. As a consequence, overtime
    rates have continued to be high, attrition rates have
    increased. Given these constraints in your traditional mission,
    what is the rationale for transferring the EOP mail processing
    function from the White House to the U.S. Secret Service?
        Mr. Basham. Senator, I believe the rationale was that the
    Administration felt that the processing of this mail, or the
    security surrounding the processing of this mail, would fall
    within the purview or the mission of the Secret Service. So
    what we are currently in the process of doing is a study to
    make a determination as to what is the best method for
    processing mail and identifying potential threats, whether
    there needs to be a Government-wide application of this
    processing to provide security to not just the White House but
    to any Government entity that may be threatened through the
    mail. The Service has agreed to work with the White House to
    come up with a plan as to how this should be applied.
        The Service at this point is providing technical expertise
    to this issue. We are not actually in the process of processing
    the mail, and the $33 million was a figure that was placed
    there as a placeholder, because we really do not know what the
    costs are going to be associated with the processing, whether
    it is going to require a facility, additional personnel,
    whether there should be contract personnel or Government
    personnel.
        So when we get the results of the study, we will have a
    better idea as to exactly what requirements there are going to
    be. But we agree that the Service should not be in the position
    of having to actually physically do that processing.
        Senator Byrd. If it was a placeholder, why was it not $30
    million or $35 million, rather than $33 million? What will $33
    million buy?
        Mr. Basham. We do not have any information as to why $33
    million was identified for that project. It is our
    understanding that it was merely an amount of money that was
    earmarked by OMB to do that, recognizing that there were going
    to be some costs associated with this. So I cannot tell you why
    it was not $30 million or $35 million but yet $33 million.
        Senator Byrd. Would you please provide for the record what
    the $33 million would buy?
        Mr. Basham. What it will buy--yes, sir.
        [The information follows:]

        The request for $33 million in the fiscal year 2004 budget was
    developed based on limited understanding of the costs associated with
    the mail screening needs. The Service is currently in the process of
    studying the mail screening needs of certain high risk Federal
    Government agencies, such as, Congressional offices, FBI, CIA, and
    Homeland Security. With this study we will learn the best methods to be
    utilized to implement a central processing facility in lieu of the
    current individual mail processing centers for each agency. A full
    evaluation of methods, operations, technology and other issues related
    to establishing a fully operational mail facility for the White House
    Complex will be established with this study, and a full spend plan will
    be developed at that time.

        Senator Byrd. In fiscal year 2003, $9 million was proposed
    to be transferred from the Office of Homeland Security to the
    Department of Homeland Security for the purpose of EOP mail
    processing. What is the status of the $9 million transfer, and
    will this funding to the Secret Service?
        Mr. Basham. The $9 million was, I believe, an amount that
    was assessed across the various agencies on a percentage basis.
    That happened to be the amount that the Service was requested
    to put forward from the 2004 budget request.
        So I will have to provide you with information as to how
    that is going to be applied and where it is coming from.
        Senator Byrd. All right.
        [The information follows:]

        This $9 million was transferred to the Service on March 17, 2003
    from the Office of Homeland Security pursuant to section 1516 of the
    Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296.
        This funding will be used to cover the cost of sustaining mail
    screening for the Executive Office of the President while designing an
    ideal mail processing facility. It will fund the utilization of an
    interim facility to handle and process all mail addressed to the White
    House Complex and screen it for selected chemical, biological,
    radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) contaminants. This
    screening function is undertaken as a means of facilitating the overall
    R&D effort. This research is being carried out by the U.S. Army Soldier
    and Biological Command, Department of Defense.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I have a few
    questions that I will submit also for the record.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

            Questions Submitted to the United States Secret Service

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

        Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request for capital
    acquisitions is $3.5 million. This budget activity covers operational
    costs at the James J. Rowley Training Center. The budget request for
    capital acquisitions proposes an increase of roughly $82,000 above the
    fiscal year 2003 appropriations level. Will capital acquisition funds
    also be used to perform facility upgrades to the recently acquired
    Webster school?
        Answer. The $3.5 million request for capital acquisitions in fiscal
    year 2004 would be dedicated to operational infrastructure repairs at
    the James J. Rowley Training Center. In fiscal year 2002, the Service
    did dedicate $442,000 to maintain the structural integrity of the
    Webster School, however, the Service obligated these funds from its
    base budget, not its capital acquisitions budget. None of the $3.5
    million requested for capital acquisitions in fiscal year 2004 will be
    used to perform facility upgrades to the Webster School.
        Question. The budget request identifies $1.7 million for security-
    related equipment to support Presidential Campaign protection. Has the
    Secret Service worked with the Science and Technology directorate to
    determine what types of equipment to use to protect against chemical,
    biological, and other attacks?
        Answer. The Secret Service's Technical Security Division maintains
    technical liaison with other agencies and private industry concerning
    current and future developments in state-of-the-art technologies to
    assist in developing concepts, equipment, etc. supporting research and
    development in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and
    nuclear detection and countermeasures. The Secret Service continues to
    expand on partnerships with other Federal agencies, universities, and
    industry to coordinate research and development in the areas of
    infrastructure protection; investigative support; physical security;
    explosives detection; and the evaluation, modification and procurement
    of off-the-shelf equipment. Recently, the Technical Security Division
    met with the Director of the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS.
    This meeting fostered a direct interchange with DHS concerning
    chemical/biological technology requirements and development.
        Question. The protection of our nation's critical infrastructure is
    a fundamental priority of the Department of Homeland Security. What
    collaborative efforts will take place between the Information Analysis
    and Infrastructure Protection directorate and the Secret Service?
        Answer. The Secret Service Intelligence Division collaborates
    directly with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    Directorate through the Homeland Security Center. This center is
    staffed with an Intelligence Division Special Agent on a 24-hour basis
    to serve as a conduit of information relating to threats against USSS
    protectees and National Special Security Events. The Secret Service
    provides immediate notification to DHS through the Center regarding
    incidents which may adversely affect our nation's critical
    infrastructure. This information can be compared with that from all
    agencies under IA&IP to indicate trends in threat behavior, and
    identify vulnerabilities.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                              budget presentation
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget justification includes
    $1,003,435,000 as the budget estimate for fiscal year 2003. In the
    fiscal year 2003 budget justification, the fiscal year 2003 estimate
    was $1,010,435,000, a $7,000,000 difference. Was this funding
    transferred to the Department of Homeland Security? If so, under what
    authority was this transfer made? If the funding was not transferred,
    please explain the $7,000,000 reduction.
        Answer. This $7,000,000 difference was not transferred to the
    Department of Homeland Security. To maintain 3-year comparability in
    the President's Budget, these funds were shown in the Departmental
    Management Operating Expenses account to represent the consolidation of
    managerial activities at the headquarters level and the savings
    associated with centralizing these functions in the new Department. The
    reallocation was made for budget presentation purposes only, with no
    loss of funding actually occurring in fiscal year 2003.
                             consolidation savings
        Question. Your prepared testimony states that ``These budget
    increases are offset by a $9,000,000 reduction in the base budget
    reflective of our reorganization into the Department of Homeland
    Security, and anticipated consolidation savings from integration with
    Department-wide processes and operations.'' The budget justification
    submitted to Congress doesn't appear to identify this reduction. Has
    the $9 million in savings been identified? If so, provide a detailed
    list of the anticipated savings. If the savings cannot be achieved,
    what is the impact on personnel and your future hiring plans?
        Answer. The $9 million identified above is made up of $7 million
    associated with consolidation of managerial activities at the
    Departmental level and $2 million in savings anticipated from
    integration with the Department-wide processes and operations. The
    Department of Homeland Security is currently reviewing operations
    across all entities to ascertain where efficiencies and cost savings
    can be achieved. One expense area believed to hold the most promise is
    consolidation of information technology expenses. For example, the
    buying of Enterprise licenses in bulk for the entire Department, rather
    than individually for each entity within the Department, is being
    carefully considered as one means to achieve cost savings.
                   white house mail screening and processing
        Question. The only programmatic budget increase requested for
    fiscal year 2004 is $33 million for White House Mail Screening and
    Processing. This function has historically been the responsibility of
    the White House Office of Administration. What is the rationale for
    transferring the EOP mail processing function from the White House to
    the United States Secret Service?
        Answer. The Service has a responsibility for ensuring that any
    potential threat to the safety and security of the White House is
    eliminated. This includes any threats that could arise from the
    delivery of mail addressed to the White House.
        Question. What responsibilities will the Secret Service have with
    regard to White House Mail Screening and Processing?
        Answer. The Secret Service is responsible for screening of all
    threats to those whom it has been directed to protect. The mail is just
    one aspect of this process. Secret Service employees check mail
    addressed to the White House for potential physical threats (such as
    munitions, and chemical, biological, and radiological material) and
    then allow the Office of Administration to sort and deliver the
    screened packages.
        Question. Provide a spend plan associated with the $33 million
    request.
        Answer. The $33 million request for mail screening activities in
    the fiscal year 2004 budget was developed based on limited
    understanding of the costs associated with the mail screening needs.
    The Service is currently in the process of studying the mail screening
    needs of certain high risk Federal Government agencies, such as
    Congressional offices, FBI, CIA, and DHS. With this study we will learn
    the best methods to be utilized to implement a central processing
    facility in lieu of the current individual mail processing centers for
    each agency. A full evaluation of methods, operations, technology and
    other issues related to establishing a fully operational mail facility
    for the White House Complex will be established with this study, and a
    full spend plan will be developed at that time.
        Question. In fiscal year 2003, $9 million was proposed to be
    transferred from the White House Office of Homeland Security to the
    Department of Homeland Security for the purpose of EOP mail processing.
    What is the status of the $9 million transfer and will this funding go
    to the Secret Service and for what purpose?
        Answer. The transfer of $9 million from the White House Office of
    Homeland Security to the Service has been completed. The Service has
    used this funding to contract with the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological
    Command, Department of Defense to handle and process all mail addressed
    to the White House Complex and screen it for selected chemical,
    biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) contaminants.
        Question. What is the status of the Secret Service's study on White
    House mail processing? When will the study be completed?
        Answer. We expect to award the contract for the study on White
    House mail processing on May 30, 2003, and have the study completed by
    November 30, 2003.
                 usss special agent workforce & quality of life
        Question. Over the past 3 fiscal years, Congress provided
    significant funding increases to the Secret Service to address
    workforce quality of life issues such as excessive overtime rates and
    excessive travel. According to your prepared testimony, the Service has
    hired 1,098 special agents over a 3 year period and 545 Uniformed
    Division officers and 453 support personnel during the same period. The
    intention of this initiative was to reduce overtime levels and achieve
    overall levels of overtime closer to fiscal year 1994 levels. According
    to information submitted by the Secret Service last year, average
    monthly overtime levels remained at levels close to the fiscal year
    2000 high of 80.06. What is the average monthly overtime level now and
    is the fiscal year 2004 budget request sufficient to achieve levels
    closer to fiscal year 1994 levels? If not, what funding level, above
    the President's request, would be necessary to achieve that goal?
        Answer. For the first 6 months of fiscal year 2003, overtime worked
    by field agents averaged 61.21 hours per month--this is below the 1994
    level of 62 hours per month. The Service recognizes the increased
    workload for the 2004 Presidential campaign and believes that it has
    sufficient funding budgeted for overtime.
                         usss uniformed division hiring
        Question. Over the past few years, the Secret Service has
    experienced a higher than average non-retirement attrition rate for
    Uniformed Division personnel. In 2001, the non-retirement attrition
    rate was 6.42 percent compared to 1.14 percent in 1995. In 2002, the
    attrition rate was 15.18 percent through the first half of the year.
    Most of the separations were due to the Transportation Security
    Administration's air marshals hiring program. Is the Uniformed Division
    staffed at a level you are comfortable with and if not, why doesn't the
    fiscal year 2004 budget request address this need?
        Answer. The Service is currently working with the Department of
    Homeland Security and the Administration to review staffing levels
    within the Uniformed Division. As discussed above, the fiscal year 2004
    budget includes appropriate levels to support the current staffing
    levels for the entire Secret Service.
        Question. What additional requirements need to be met and what is
    the funding level needed to meet your hiring demands in fiscal year
    2003 and fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. As discussed above, the Service is currently working with
    the Department and the Administration to review the Uniformed
    Division's staffing needs. Once appropriate decisions have been made,
    funding levels will be reassessed to ensure that revisions to current
    staffing levels can be accommodated within requested funds.
                                usa patriot act
        Question. The USA Patriot Act, Public Law 107-056, provided the
    Secret Service with additional authorities and mandates. Provide a list
    of requirements and expanded authorities given to the Secret Service as
    a result of that Act. Provide a list of activities, with associated
    funding levels, that have been undertaken as a result of that Act.
        Answer. The USA Patriot Act (``the Act'') included five sections
    specifically addressing Secret Service initiatives and investigative
    authorities.
      --Section 105 of the Act requires the Director to develop a national
            network of electronic crime task forces based on the New York
            Electronic Crimes Task Force model to prevent, detect and
            investigate various forms of electronic crimes.
      --Section 374 extends the reach of the domestic counterfeiting
            statutes (Chapter 25 of Title 18 U.S.C.) to include analog,
            digital or electronic images, and provides enhanced penalties
            for these offenses.
      --Section 375 extends the reach of the foreign counterfeiting
            statutes (Chapter 25 of Title 18 U.S.C.) to include analog,
            digital or electronic images, and provides enhanced penalties
            for these offenses.
      --Section 377 provides extra-territorial jurisdiction for violations
            of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029 committed abroad, to include fraud and
            related activity in connection with access devices.
      --Section 506 provides concurrent jurisdiction for the Secret Service
            to investigate computer-based crimes under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030,
            along with the FBI. This section also provides for the re-
            authorization of Secret Service jurisdiction for financial
            institution fraud under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1344. This authority was
            due to expire in 2004.
        Since 1984, and with the re-authorization contained in the USA
    Patriot Act, the Secret Service has been authorized to investigate
    crimes committed with the use of a computer.
        The Secret Service works closely with stakeholders in the financial
    services industry, electronics manufacturing sector, and information
    services, to provide feedback regarding the misapplication of advances
    in computer related products.
        The New York Electronic Crimes Task Force (NYECTF) task represents
    a strategic alliance of more than 661 regional members or groups
    including: prosecutors; local, state and Federal law enforcement;
    academia; and companies in private industry with interests in banking,
    financial services, brokerage, and telecommunications. The common
    denominator in the NYECTF is that each member, be it law enforcement or
    industry, is a stakeholder with a business or investigative interest in
    preventing electronic crime. Each member adds value through specialized
    knowledge or expertise in contributing to the common goal. As a
    testament to the resolve and adaptability of the agents and members,
    the NYECTF resumed operations within 48 hours of the loss of its base
    of operations in the New York Field Office. The NYECTF defines the
    Secret Service's priority on partnerships, and demonstrates the
    economies of scale inherent in the task force approach.
        Based on the mission and organization of the NYECTF, the Secret
    Service established eight additional electronic crimes task forces
    throughout the country, in locations with significant or specialized
    interests in the critical financial, banking or information
    infrastructures. These additional task forces are located in Boston,
    Washington, DC, Charlotte, Miami, Chicago, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and
    San Francisco.
        For fiscal year 2003 and beyond, we intend to follow-through with
    the development and implementation of additional specialized training,
    and pursue recently enacted legislative authority by forming electronic
    crimes task forces based on the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force
    model.
        Currently, the Service spends approximately $3 million to $4
    million per fiscal year on the operation of these task forces and their
    efforts to thwart cyber-crime.
                        national special security events
        Question. The Secret Service is required to be the lead agency for
    security at National Special Security Events (NSSEs). Depending on the
    size of the event, the associated costs can vary dramatically. Except
    for the 2002 Winter Olympics, which was paid for in the fiscal year
    2002 Emergency Supplemental, the costs associated with these events
    have been paid for through the Department of Treasury's
    Counterterrorism Fund. Not once has the Secret Service budgeted for a
    NSSE through the normal budget process, even though some events are
    known well in advance such as the annual State of the Union Address and
    the national political conventions every 4 years. Now that the Secret
    Service is part of the Department of Homeland Security, will the
    Department of Homeland Security Counterterrorism Fund pay for these
    events or will you be pursuing another mechanism?
        Answer. The use of the Department of the Treasury's
    Counterterrorism Fund to cover the extraordinary and unbudgeted costs
    of National Special Security Events worked very well for the Secret
    Service. It worked well because of the ad hoc nature of these events
    and the ongoing availability of funding provided with the
    Counterterrorism Fund. With the dissolution of Treasury's Office of
    Enforcement, Treasury's Counterterrorism Fund was transferred to the
    Department of Homeland Security as part of the determination order
    process. Unless a fund is specifically established to cover the costs
    of NSSEs, the Service anticipates that the DHS Counterterrorism Fund
    will be the source of funding for these events, and that processes at
    DHS will mimic those that worked well at the Department of Treasury.
                       national threat assessment center
        Question. Since fiscal year 2001, Congress has appropriated
    approximately $1.7 million and 4 FTE annually for the Secret Service's
    National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). The purpose of NTAC is to
    share Secret Service expertise in identifying, assessing, and reducing
    threats to homeland security. Following the school shooting in
    Columbine in 1999, the Secret Service started the ``Safe School
    Initiative.'' The purpose of this program is to share expertise in
    identifying threatening behavior and preventing violence. Through a
    partnership with the Department of Education, this program has reached
    thousands of teachers and law enforcement officers across the country.
    According to your prepared testimony, the Secret Service has conducted
    46 Safe School Initiative presentations and 12 day-long training
    seminars around the country.
        Now that the Secret Service is part of the Department of Homeland
    Security, NTAC's focus is also on assisting the Information Analysis &
    Infrastructure Protection Directorate to help focus on the risk and
    consequences of a domestic terrorist attack.
        With an annual budget of $1.7 million and 4 FTE, how is NTAC
    balancing these two needs?
        Answer. The National Threat Assessment Center is able to meet the
    demands of current research and training obligations under current
    budget allocations. Any increased demands related NTAC support of the
    Department of Homeland Security will be met within the current budget
    through careful prioritization of the program's workload and, as
    necessary a reallocation of existing resources. Currently the Center
    supports all feasible requests for seminar training, declining only
    those requests that are too costly for participants or those which do
    not have enough participants to conduct training cost effectively. The
    Center balances requests for service with resource availability in the
    areas of research, presenting findings, and training. Through this
    balancing we will be able to continue to deliver timely and accurate
    information to the law enforcement community and the public.
        Question. According to information provided by your agency last
    year, the Secret Service was able to meet approximately 60 percent of
    the written requests to present information from the Safe School
    Initiative in fiscal year 2001. What percentage of the demand was met
    in fiscal year 2002? Can you provide the funding needed to meet the
    unmet demand in fiscal year 2003? What funding level is necessary to
    respond to 100 percent of the written requests in fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. The Service met 69.4 percent of the requests it received to
    provide information on the Safe School initiative in fiscal year 2002.
    We conducted 50 training sessions with approximately 8,500 attendees.
    Twenty-two requests were declined. The decision to decline such
    requests was typically based on the very small number of attendees
    expected, scheduling conflicts, or because the organizers were charging
    unusually high fees for attending the presentation. The Service is not
    declining requests for presentation because of a lack of funding.
                                     ______

              Questions Submitted to the United States Coast Guard

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                               homeland security
        Question. The Homeland Security Act requires the continuation of
    all non-homeland security missions of the organizations transferred to
    the Department of Homeland Security. It directs that Coast Guard non-
    homeland security capabilities be maintained without significant
    reduction unless specified in subsequent law. What specific criteria
    would you apply if the Coast Guard was faced with a choice between
    carrying out a non-homeland security mission and a homeland security
    mission?
        Answer. As a military, maritime, multi-mission organization, the
    Coast Guard recognizes that its Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) and
    Non-Maritime Homeland Security (non-MHS) missions are not mutually
    exclusive. Resource obtainment and allocation efforts, at the strategic
    and tactical level, are made utilizing values, experience, training,
    judgment, and a keen eye toward balancing the risks involved in the
    situation at hand.
        Consider the tactical resource allocation example of a Coast Guard
    cutter and embarked helicopter patrolling the waters off the south
    coast of Florida. The multi-mission capabilities of these assets and
    the people who crew them result in a resource mix that on any given day
    might:
      --Respond to a call from a sinking sailboat (non-MHS mission--Search
            & Rescue);
      --Conduct a boarding on a commercial fishing vessel (non-MHS
            missions--Marine Safety, Living Marine Resources, and Marine
            Environmental Protection);
      --Interdict a ``go-fast'' approaching U.S. shores (MHS missions--
            Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security; Drug Interdiction; Migrant
            Interdiction);
      --Escort a Naval ship during a military out load operation (MHS
            missions--Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security; Defense
            Readiness).
        Should a situation unfold in which a MAYDAY call and ``go fast''
    sighting occur simultaneously, the Coast Guard Operational Commander
    would utilize the assets available and the aforementioned decision-
    making tools in crafting a response, keeping in the forefront of his or
    her mind the premise that human life takes precedence.
        A second example, this one in the realm of strategic resource
    obtainment, pertains to the President's fiscal year 2004 budget
    request. The funds requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget are
    critical to overall mission balancing efforts and to the sustainment of
    the Coast Guard's high standards of operational excellence across all
    missions. It is important to note that every MHS dollar directed to the
    Coast Guard will contribute to a careful balance between our safety and
    security missions, both of which must be properly resourced for
    effective mission accomplishment. The fiscal year 2004 budget reflects
    steady progress in a multi-year resource effort to meet America's
    future maritime safety and security needs. This new funding will
    positively impact performance in all assigned missions.
        In performance-based organizations, such as the Coast Guard,
    resource obtainment and allocation decisions are made with the
    overarching mission outcome in mind. Coast Guard decision-making
    criteria is focused on successful mission performance, and led by our
    values, training, experience, judgment, sense of balance, and risk
    management skills.
                           merchant mariner documents
        Question. After September 11, 2001, the need for tamper-resistant
    identification cards became a priority for all agencies of the
    government issuing these types of cards. The fiscal year 2003
    supplemental appropriations act provides $10 million to the Coast Guard
    for updating the Merchant Mariner Documents provided to certain
    qualified crew members. Please tell the subcommittee how you plan to
    use the supplemental appropriations provided.
        Answer. Fiscal year 2003 supplemental funding will be used to
    provide contractor support at the Regional Exam Centers (REC) in fiscal
    year 2003 and a portion of fiscal year 2004 to accommodate workload
    surges resulting from the enhanced security processes; to install
    technological improvements such as electronic fingerprinting
    capabilities to reduce processing time and upgrades to the database for
    mariner documentation tracking and record keeping; to provide more
    Investigating Officers in the field to adjudicate security issues
    discovered on mariner applicants; and, to centralize where possible
    those functions not requiring face-to-face contact with the applicant.

                 SPEND PLAN FOR $10 MILLION SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Planned
                Item Description                   Cost          Execution
                                                               (fiscal year)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additional personnel and equipment at         $5,000,000       2003/2004
     the RECs...............................
    Electronic Fingerprinting Equipment.....       1,000,000            2003
    Additional Investigating Officers.......         700,000       2003/2004
    Additional personnel for screening and         1,900,000       2003/2004
     evaluation support.....................
    Mariner credentials database upgrades...       1,000,000       2003/2004
    Additional program management and                400,000            2003
     project support........................
                                             -----------------
          Total.............................      10,000,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The upgrades for issuing credentials to mariners operating in the
    Marine Transportation System are intended to ensure that credentials
    are never issued to those who pose a threat to national security or
    marine safety. This new system includes a more robust vetting process
    for mariners and more personal interaction between the mariner and the
    REC to verify the applicant's identity. In addition, a more tamper-
    resistant card is being issued to minimize the chance of misuse. The
    Coast Guard will continue to work with other agencies, especially the
    Transportation Security Administration, to achieve a ``good
    government'' solution that is fast, accurate, and consistent.
        Question. Have you discussed with Secretary Ridge the possibility
    of working with other agencies of the Department of Homeland Security
    that are also in the process of developing more secure identification
    cards for employees, such as the Transportation Security
    Administration, Citizenship and Immigration Services, or the Bureau of
    Customs and Border Protection?
        Answer. Yes. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    responsible for developing the Transportation Workers Identification
    Credential (TWIC) for use as a transportation system common credential,
    used across all modes, for all transportation workers requiring
    unescorted access to secure areas of the transportation system. The
    Coast Guard has participated with the Department of Transportation and
    TSA in the development of the TWIC concept since its inception. The
    Coast Guard is working with the TSA Credentialing Office and monitoring
    their ongoing efforts to develop and implement the TWIC program. The
    Coast Guard will continue to work closely with TSA and DHS to ensure
    the Merchant Mariner credentialing process is aligned with the TWIC
    when finalized by TSA to provide the best government solution.
                                  war on iraq
        Question. You state in your prepared testimony that the Coast Guard
    deployed the greatest number of assets overseas during the War on Iraq
    since the Vietnam War, to include 2 high endurance cutters, 8 patrol
    boats, 1 buoy tender, 4 port security units and 2 maintenance support
    units. Does the Coast Guard plan to leave any assets overseas as part
    of the President's plan to assist the Iraqi people in rebuilding their
    country and developing a democracy? If so, which assets and what would
    be the responsibility of the Coast Guard regarding those assets and the
    cost incurred by the Coast Guard in support of those assets?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is awaiting information from the Combatant
    Commander on the exact needs for Coast Guard forces to assist in the
    rebuilding of Iraq. Over half of the Coast Guard forces deployed have
    already been released by the Combatant Commanders and are returning or
    have returned to the United States.
        Question. As the Coast Guard's deployed assets return home there
    are general maintenance and repair needed to restore equipment to its
    pre-war capacity. Does the Coast Guard have sufficient funding, either
    from the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution or the
    fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, to
    address those needs?
        Answer. The Department of Defense has been appropriated funds
    within the IRAQI FREEDOM Fund of the 2003 Emergency Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations Act of which ``up to'' $400 million may be
    transferred to the Coast Guard to cover the costs for supporting
    Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Coast Guard is working with the Department
    of Defense to effect the transfer of those funds to the Coast Guard.
    The Coast Guard expects to receive sufficient funds to cover the
    reconstitution of its deployed forces.
        Question. If not, do you have estimates of additional funding
    needed to cover the costs of reconstituting the Coast Guard assets?
        Answer. The Department of Defense has been appropriated funds
    within the IRAQI FREEDOM Fund of the 2003 Emergency Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations Act of which ``up to'' $400 million may be
    transferred to the Coast Guard to cover the costs for supporting
    Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The Coast Guard is working with the Department
    of Defense to effect the transfer of those funds to the Coast Guard.
    The Coast Guard expects to receive sufficient funds to cover the
    reconstitution of its deployed forces.
                        fiscal year 2004 budget request
        Question. The President's fiscal year 2004 budget requests $6.77
    billion for the Coast Guard, which is approximately $700 million over
    the fiscal year 2003 level. Do you believe this is adequate funding to
    support the homeland security and non-homeland security activities of
    the Coast Guard?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2004 budget reflects steady progress in our
    multi-year resource effort to meet America's future maritime safety and
    security needs. This new funding will positively impact our performance
    in all assigned maritime homeland security (MHS) and non-MHS
    performance goals. The multi-mission resources requested in the fiscal
    year 2004 budget are critical to overall mission balancing efforts and
    to the sustainment of the Coast Guard's high standards of operational
    excellence across all mission areas. It is important to note that every
    Homeland Security dollar directed to the Coast Guard will contribute to
    a careful balance between our safety and security missions, both of
    which must be properly resourced for effective mission accomplishment.
        From the fiscal year 2002 enacted budget to 2004 request, the Coast
    Guard has received over 32 percent budgetary growth. This includes
    personnel Growth of 800 in fiscal year 2002, 1,400 in 2003 and nearly
    2,000 in the fiscal year 2004 request. The Coast Guard's $6.7 billion
    request in fiscal year 2004, a 10 percent increase over the previous
    year's enacted budget, provides resources to perform increased MHS
    operations and sustain non-MHS missions. It will specifically enable us
    to accomplish three primary goals:
        Recapitalize Legacy Assets and Infrastructure: The Integrated
    Deepwater System is requesting funding for conversion of five 110
    patrol boats to more capable 123 patrol craft, seven Short Range
    Prosecutor small boats, the first National Security Cutter (to be
    delivered in fiscal year 2006), the continued development of a Common
    Operating Picture (COP), command and control system at four shore-based
    command centers and the continuation of the Rescue 21 command and
    control communications project which will be 35 percent complete at end
    of fiscal year 2004 (100 percent complete by end of fiscal year 2006).
        Build-Out Homeland Security Operations.--Increase our Maritime
    Domain Awareness by leveraging our recent inclusion in the National
    Intelligence Community and investing in communications capability that
    will enable us to remain interoperable with DOD, DHS modes, and other
    Federal, local and State agencies. The fiscal year 2004 request will
    also fund six new deployable Maritime Safety and Security Teams (for a
    total of 12 teams), 58 Sea Marshals, 43 Response Boats (Small) & 8
    Response Boat (Mediums), the stand-up of Stations Boston and Washington
    (D.C.), two new Port Security Units (for a total of 12 teams) and nine
    87 Coastal Patrol Boats.
        Sustain Non-HLS Missions.--Funding for 390 new personnel towards
    achievement of a 68-hour workweek at our multi-mission stations and a
    12-hour watch standard at command centers. Resources area also included
    for training enhancements at the National Motor Lifeboat School and
    Boatswainmate ``A'' school.
        Support of the President's fiscal year 2004 budget will enable the
    Coast Guard to meet the maritime safety and security challenges that
    America will face in the 21st century.
        Question. How much of the proposed funding is for homeland security
    related activities and how much is for non-homeland security related
    activities?
        Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2004 Operating Expenses (OE)
    budget is shown in both tabular and graphical form. This OE funding
    does not include Reserve Training (RT) or Environmental Compliance and
    Restoration (EC&R).

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Note.--Graph does not include Reserve Training and Environmental
    Compliance and Restoration (RT and EC&R).
        Question. The President's fiscal year 2004 budget proposes to
    consolidate several existing Coast Guard accounts: Operating Expenses,
    Environmental Compliance and Restoration, and Reserve Training into one
    Operating Expenses account; and Acquisition, Construction and
    Improvements and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation into one
    Capital Acquisitions account. Is this consolidation of accounts
    necessary? What is accomplished by combining these accounts?
        Answer. The Coast Guard fully endorses the Administration's plan to
    consolidate six of its major appropriations into two larger
    appropriations for more consistency, simplicity, and flexibility across
    all of the Department of Homeland Security components. This
    consolidation will improve clarity of the Coast Guard's budget requests
    to Congressional oversight committees and simplify financial
    accounting.
        Question. There is some concern that funding for the Reserve
    Training account may be used for other purposes if it is combined into
    the Operating Expenses account. This would be detrimental to Reserve
    readiness at a time when the Coast Guard is relying heavily on its
    Reserve units. Do you feel that funding for Reserve Training should
    stand alone to ensure that those funds are used for their intended
    purpose?
        Answer. The Coast Guard fully endorses the Administration's plan to
    consolidate the Reserve Training accounts into the Operating Expenses
    account. This consolidation will improve clarity of Coast Guard's
    budget requests to Congressional oversight committees and afford
    efficiency in financial accounting. Consolidation of accounts will
    improve the Coast Guard's capability to train the Reserve Forces.
                          integrated deepwater system
        Question. Some have suggested that Deepwater's 20-year duration
    should be cut in half. Such an action might increase costs by about $4
    billion in fiscal years 2005-2010, although it might save about $4
    billion in fiscal years 2010-2020. What would be the benefits of
    accelerating Deepwater and could the Coast Guard afford the increases
    associated with that acceleration?
        Answer. The Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) is an integral part
    of every element of the Coast Guard's maritime homeland security (MHS)
    strategy and in balancing our non-MHS missions. MHS necessitates
    pushing America's maritime borders outward, away from ports and
    waterways so layered, maritime operations can be implemented. IDS will
    provide a network-centric system of Command, Control, Communications,
    Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) that
    is critical for enhancing maritime domain awareness. Through common
    systems and technologies, common operational concepts, and a common
    logistics base, new and modernized IDS assets and equipment will
    provide increased capabilities, multi-mission readiness and
    availability, and interoperability with the Department of Defense and
    other Department of Homeland Security agencies.
        Per the Coast Guard's March 7, 2003 Report to Congress on the
    Feasibility of Acceleration IDS to 10 years, accelerating IDS is
    feasible and provides increased operational capability sooner. It would
    expedite the introduction of C4ISR on new and legacy assets, improve
    system readiness and asset availability, and provide approximately
    943,000 additional mission hours to support Maritime Homeland Security
    (MHS) and other Coast Guard non-MHS missions over a 20-year IDS
    implementation plan. The industrial base is more than sufficient for an
    accelerated build out of the IDS. Temporary workforce increases would
    be necessary to meet training and crew requirements associated with the
    accelerated plan but these are also manageable.
        As provided in the Coast Guard Report to Congress, the following
    are the estimated capital acquisition funding levels needed to fund the
    proposed IDS in 10 years. These figures reflect ``then-year dollars.''

                              [Millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Fiscal year                            10-Year
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2002....................................................            $320
    2003....................................................             478
    2004....................................................             500
    2005....................................................           1,892
    2006....................................................           1,663
    2007....................................................           1,506
    2008....................................................           1,472
    2009....................................................           1,428
    2010....................................................           1,226
    2011....................................................             988
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Some have suggested that the Deepwater program is already
    behind schedule in procurement because of insufficient funding and
    insist this program will be impossible to finish in 20 years. Do you
    think it's possible to complete Deepwater in 20 years at $500 million a
    year? If not, how do you think the plan should be revised?
        Answer. Although the Integrated Coast Guard Systems (IDS)
    contracting strategy was chosen based on its flexibility to adjust to
    budget variances, funding below notional funding levels will increase
    the time and cost necessary to fully implement the Deepwater solution
    and delay needed capability improvements that IDS provides.
        The March 7, 2003 Report to Congress on the Feasibility of
    Accelerating the Integrated Deepwater System provides a 20-year funding
    schedule that would complete the IDS initial build out approximately 2
    years after the last funds were received. This funding is reproduced
    below:

       CAPITAL ACQUISITION BUDGET EXPRESSED IN THEN YEAR (BUDGET) DOLLARS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Millions of
                           Fiscal year                            dollars
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2002....................................................             320
    2003....................................................             478
    2004....................................................             500
    2005....................................................             871
    2006....................................................             888
    2007....................................................             608
    2008....................................................             762
    2009....................................................             768
    2010....................................................             779
    2011....................................................             790
    2012....................................................             787
    2013....................................................             855
    2014....................................................             845
    2015....................................................             908
    2016....................................................             897
    2017....................................................             919
    2018....................................................           1,001
    2019....................................................           1,016
    2020....................................................           1,029
    2021....................................................           1,001
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. The Integrated Deepwater System was developed in 1998 and
    is therefore based on pre-September 11, 2001, Coast Guard mission
    requirements. Have you made revisions to the Deepwater plan since
    September 11, 2001, to coincide with the evolving mission of the Coast
    Guard? Please provide the Subcommittee with a comparison of the
    original (pre-9/11) and current (post-9/11) performance requirements of
    all Coast Guard assets included in the Deepwater program.
        Answer. After September 11th, 2001 an assessment of Integrated
    Deepwater System (IDS) requirements was conducted by the Coast Guard's
    Assistant Commandant for Operations to determine whether the
    requirements needed to be revised in reponse to the Coast Guard's
    enhanced emphasis on Homeland Security. Based on those findings, a
    change to the Request for Proposal (RFP) was not necessary. The IDS
    System Performance Specification in the RFP was developed based on the
    global mission task sequence of Surveil, Detect, Classify, Identify and
    Prosecute (SDCIP). This task sequence is used in performing every IDS
    mission and is essential to effectiveness in Maritime Homeland Security
    (MHS) missions, as well as all non-MHS missions.
        Consistent with the IDS acquisition strategy, potential operational
    requirements, including Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) requirements,
    are reviewed, identified, and evaluated for integration into the System
    Performance Specifications (SPS). Potential changes to the SPS, since
    September 11, 2001, are presently being assessed for associated
    performance, costs and schedule impacts, and the Coast Guard will work
    with the Department of Homeland Security to address these changes.
    Continual review and validation of requirements and incorporation of
    changes will occur throughout the course of the IDS program. The Coast
    Guard conducts regular briefs with our Congressional oversight
    committees, and if changes are being contemplated for final approval,
    Congress will be informed.
                           maritime domain awareness
        Question. Of the $34 million requested in the fiscal year 2004
    budget for Maritime Domain Awareness, how much funding will be directed
    toward satellite channels for large cutters and satellite handsets for
    smaller assets, the Automated Identification System, and the Joint
    Harbor Operations Center?
        Answer. Of the $34 million requested for Maritime Domain Awareness
    (MDA) in the fiscal year 2004 budget, $5.6 million will be provided for
    wireless communications for Coast Guard cutters, $4 million for
    Automatic Identification System (AIS) for cutters, and $1.1 million to
    provide permanent CG staffing for Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC)
    Hampton Roads. Additional information for each of these initiatives is
    provided below.
      --Wireless Communications--$5.6 million
      --This proposal requests $5.6 million in funding for wireless
            communications for Coast Guard cutters 65 feet and larger.
            Specifically, this initiative provides the following:
        --$3 million to install necessary satellite communications
                equipment on board Coast Guard cutters 210 feet and larger
                and lease dedicated satellite channels and terrestrial
                landlines to link the satellite land earth stations to
                Coast Guard data networks.
        --$2.6 million to design, install and support a wireless
                communications solution for Coast Guard cutters ranging in
                size from 65 to 180 feet in length. Commercial satellite
                communications, along with other types of wireless
                communications systems, will be evaluated as potential
                solutions to provide wireless connectivity to smaller
                cutters.
        --AIS for Cutters--$4 million. This proposal requests funding to
                equip cutters 65 feet and larger with the capability to
                transmit and receive AIS transmissions.
        --JHOC Hampton Roads--$1.1 million. This proposal requests funding
                to permanently staff JHOC Hampton Roads with 25 active duty
                military personnel and provide operation and maintenance
                funding for installed sensor equipment.
        Question. If the Joint Harbor Operations Center is a project the
    Coast Guard is conducting in conjunction with the Department of Defense
    (DOD), how are the costs being shared between the Coast Guard and DOD?
    Do you have a specific breakdown, or proposed estimates?
        Answer. Shortly after September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard Captain
    of the Port of Norfolk and the Commanding Officer of Naval Base Norfolk
    collaborated on the creation of a vessel monitoring system in the Port
    of Hampton Roads. This system was pieced together by integrating some
    existing Coast Guard test sensors (radar & cameras), a radar operated
    by the local Pilots, and some new equipment. A Joint Harbor Operations
    Center (JHOC) was established in an old degaussing tower at Naval Base
    Norfolk and staffed with Navy and Coast Guard reserve personnel to
    monitor all shipping that presented a potential threat to Naval assets
    or other critical infrastructure in the port.
        This system benefits the port by providing improved situational
    awareness to those who are responsible for security in the port. The
    center reconciles all vessel arrivals with the required Advanced Notice
    of Arrival (ANOA) reports and coordinates Navy and Coast Guard
    escorting responsibilities for High Interest Vessels and High Value
    Assets arriving and departing Hampton Roads.
        The Navy and Coast Guard are working together in a prototyping
    effort that seeks to enhance the JHOC in Hampton Roads and establish an
    additional JHOC in San Diego. The goal of these prototypes is to assist
    in refining our concept of operations and further specify requirements
    for a shared port security system that can be duplicated in other large
    Navy ports. The Coast Guard also anticipates using the knowledge gained
    through these prototypes to assist with development of similar robust
    surveillance system in strategic ports that do not have a significant
    Navy presence.
        The costs to implement and operate the JHOCs will be shared equally
    between the Navy and Coast Guard. The initial estimate to implement
    this prototype effort is approximately $5 million ($2.5 million per
    port). The Coast Guard's portion of follow-on operation, maintenance,
    and staffing of JHOC Hampton Roads is included in the Coast Guard's
    fiscal year 2004 budget request.
        Question. I am told that you plan to combine Coast Guard resources
    from the Automated Identification System (AIS) and Rescue 21 for a more
    cost-efficient placement of towers and receivers on land. If this is
    true, how do you plan to accomplish this goal? Was this plan taken into
    account when developing the fiscal year 2004 budget request?
        Answer. As part of our effort to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness
    (MDA), the Coast Guard is evaluating a project to install a nationwide
    shore-based Universal Automatic Identification System (AIS) system
    capable of capturing essential MDA information (AIS provides
    identification, position, heading, ship length, beam type, draft, and
    hazardous cargo information from any AIS equipped vessel) throughout
    the coastal zone. The nationwide shore-based AIS concept envisions
    displaying AIS data at regional command centers for use by operational
    commanders, as well as transmitting the data to District and Area
    Fusion Centers for analysis and monitoring. Any effort to install a
    nationwide shore-based AIS system will consider the ongoing Rescue 21
    project in order to leverage existing infrastructure and support to the
    greatest extent possible. The Coast Guard is currently evaluating the
    best approach to capturing AIS information throughout the coastal zone,
    thus funding for this system is not included in the Coast Guard's
    fiscal year 2004 budget request.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                                   deepwater
        Question. The Coast Guard awarded the Deepwater Contract to
    recapitalize, modernize and integrate all of their offshore ships and
    aircraft less than 1 year ago. That contract assumes a steady funding
    stream of $500 million per year for 20 years. Based in the funding
    appropriated to date, the Deepwater program is $202 million behind
    based on a $500 million per year level in fiscal year 1998 dollars.
    What is the shortfall to date if program management and inflationary
    escalators are factored in?
        Answer. Industry teams used a notional annual planning funding
    stream of $300 million in fiscal year 2002 and $500 million from fiscal
    year 2003 in fiscal year 1998 dollars until project completion. In
    addition to the Request For Proposal (RFP) notional annual funding
    level, Deepwater estimated $30 million per year for government program
    management to administer the program. The difference between planned
    Deepwater funding for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004 and
    appropriated funding results in a deficit of $202 million. This funding
    difference includes program management and inflationary escalators.
        Question. Is the Deepwater contract being reevaluated to take into
    account the Coast Guard's enhanced focus on homeland security? If so,
    when will the evaluation be completed?
        Answer. After September 11th, 2001 an assessment of Integrated
    Deepwater System (IDS) requirements was conducted by the Coast Guard's
    Assistant Commandant for Operations to determine whether the
    requirements needed to be revised in reponse to the Coast Guard's
    enhanced emphasis on Homeland Security. The system review indicated
    that the acquisition strategy and System Performance Specification
    (SPS) were still appropriate to address the spectrum of Deepwater
    missions. Based on those findings, a change to the Request for Proposal
    (RFP) was not required. However, it was also recognized that
    adjustments in system and individual asset capabilities and capacity
    would result as increased Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) and non-MHS
    mission demands emerged.
        Consistent with the IDS acquisition strategy, potential operational
    requirements, including MHS requirements, are reviewed, identified, and
    evaluated for integration into the SPS. Potential changes to the SPS,
    since September 11, 2001, are presently being assessed for associated
    performance, costs and schedule impacts, and the Coast Guard will work
    with the Department of Homeland Security to address these changes.
    Continual review and validation of requirements and incorporation of
    changes will occur throughout the course of the IDS program. The Coast
    Guard will keep our Congressional oversight committees informed if
    changes are being contemplated for final approval.
        Additionally, the Coast Guard is planning to evaluate the current
    implementation plan and work with the Department of Homeland Security
    to align as necessary capability and capacity with priorities and
    mission demand. An estimated time on when this evaluation will be
    complete has not been determined, however the Coast Guard will keep our
    Congressional oversight committees informed of its progress. This
    evaluation will take into account the enhanced focus on homeland
    security.
                               dolphin helicopter
        Question. Operational Air Station Commanders have identified the
    safety record and extensive maintenance requirements of the HH-65 Short
    Range Recovery ``Dolphin'' Helicopter as their number one safety issue.
    The Coast Guard currently operates 96 of these helicopters throughout
    the nation. What is the performance record of the Dolphin Aircraft and
    how does it compare to the Coast Guard's other aircraft? The
    President's Budget for fiscal year 2004 requests $67.7 million for
    Deepwater Aviation Contracts and Legacy Sustainment. How much of this
    amount will go toward the re-powering of the ``Dolphin'' Helicopter and
    how is the Coast Guard managing this legacy asset in light of its
    safety record?
        Answer. Since 1997, there have been 80 documented in-flight power
    losses/engine failures in the HH-65 fleet. The in-flight power loss
    trend for first half of fiscal year 2003 (6 months) is nearly twice the
    rate of the previous 6 years:

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The 7-year average engine mishap rate (average number of mishaps
    per 100,000 flight hours) of the HH-65 engine is 25.99. This year the
    mishap rate is 50.79. Comparatively, the 5-year average engine mishap
    rate for the HH-60 is 5.44 with no mishaps this year.
        There is no funding in the President's Budget for fiscal year 2004
    for re-powering the Dolphin Helicopters. In April, 2003, the Coast
    Guard and Honeywell executed a Letter of Instruction to jointly develop
    solutions to HH-65 engine safety, reliability and operational concerns
    to include detailed plans for engine improvement implementation,
    operational evaluation, and spend plans associated with funding already
    appropriated by Congress (approximately $10 million).
        The notional Deepwater Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH)
    solution is a converted HH-65 that includes new engines and extensive
    modifications to improve capability. We do not anticipate requesting
    funds for Deepwater's MCH until fiscal year 2005 with first delivery
    slated for fiscal year 2007. An engine decision for the MCH will also
    be made in fiscal year 2005.
        Question. Will it be necessary to re-power all 96 ``Dolphin''
    helicopters in the Coast Guard inventory? Have these costs been
    properly factored into the original Deepwater Contract? Is the Coast
    Guard evaluating an accelerated schedule to re-power the Dolphin
    Helicopter? If so, when will that evaluation be completed?
        Answer. The notional Deepwater Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter
    (MCH) solution is a converted HH-65 that includes new more powerful
    engines and extensive modifications to improve capability. The new
    engine for the MCH will be obtained using the ICGS Open Business Model
    to ensure the best value for the Coast Guard, and the implementation
    plan includes upgrading 93 Dolphin Helicopters to the MCH
    configuration. We do not anticipate requesting funds for Deepwater's
    MCH until fiscal year 2005 with first delivery slated for fiscal year
    2007. These costs are included in the Deepwater plan.
        There is no on-going evaluation to accelerate the upgrade of the
    Dolphin Helicopter to the MCH. However, the Coast Guard has researched
    and prototyped other appropriate helicopter engines and in April 2003,
    the Coast Guard and Honeywell executed a Letter of Instruction to
    jointly develop solutions to existing HH-65 engine safety, reliability
    and operational concerns. These include detailed plans for engine
    improvement implementation, operational evaluation, and spend plans
    associated with funding already appropriated by Congress.
                       110 foot cutter hull deterioration
        Question. The Coast Guard operates 49-110 foot Island Class
    Cutters. Many of these cutters are now operating past their intended 15
    year life span. However, as part of the Deepwater Contract all of these
    Cutters will be fitted with 13 foot inserts to increase the size of the
    aft deck and to accommodate a stern mounted rescue boat. At the same
    time, many of these cutters are also experiencing excessive hull
    corrosion that has resulted in significant repair costs. What is the
    status of the hull corrosion issues associated with the 110 foot Cutter
    fleet? What cost has the Coast Guard incurred to date in order to
    repair these vessels? What is the total anticipated cost of the repair
    program, and are these costs incorporated into the Deepwater Contract?
    What is the anticipated life expectancy of these Cutters?
        Answer. The service life of the Island Class 110 foot Patrol Boats
    is 25 years as a result of an early 1990s ship alteration to address
    hull stresses. A 2001 survey of each vessel showed that 22 of 49 110
    foot WPBs were experiencing extensive hull corrosion.
        To date, five cutters exhibiting the worst corrosion per the 2001
    survey have received extensive hull renewal maintenance external to the
    123 foot conversion project at an Operating Expense (OE) cost of $8.5
    million. Two additional 110 foot WPBs are currently in commercial
    facilities for emergent hull repairs. Emergent hull repairs will
    continue to be accomplished on 110 foot WPBs as required. Since these
    emergent hull repairs are accomplished on a case-by-case basis, the
    total cost of repairs has not been estimated at this time.
        The Deepwater 123 foot conversion plan does include renewal of
    corroded shell plate. The 123 foot Patrol Boat is estimated to have a
    15 year service life.
           coast guard activities new york operation tempo marsec ii
        Question. My staff was recently briefed on the level of resources
    needed to maintain a MARSEC II security level for Activities New York.
    How long has Activities New York been operating under a MARSEC II
    security level? Is Activities New York still operating under a MARSEC
    II security level? What impact does the recent decision by Secretary
    Ridge to lower the threat level from Orange to Yellow have on resource
    levels required for Activities New York? For Activities New York,
    provide the assets necessary, including personnel, to operate under
    MARSEC II level.
        Answer. Activities New York operated at MARSEC Level Two for
    operation LIBERTY SHIELD from March 18, 2003 until April 18, 2003.
    Since April 18, 2003 Activities New York has been at MARSEC Level One
    with additional Coast Guard Reservists still on hand assisting with
    security for military in-loads and out-loads in support of Operation
    IRAQI FREEDOM. The decrease from MARSEC Level Two to MARSEC Level One
    was executed in accordance with the conclusion of operation LIBERTY
    SHIELD and the shift from threat level Orange to threat level Yellow as
    directed by the Department of Homeland Security. Consequently, the
    shift from MARSEC Level Two to MARSEC Level One has reduced the number
    of operational resources required by Activities New York for security
    operations.
        Port-specific asset requirements for MARSEC Levels are classified.
    A classified briefing can be arranged if desired.
                         radiation detection equipment
        Question. The Coast Guard's Radiological Detection Working Group
    recently identified a suite of radiation detection equipment for use by
    Coast Guard forces. Provide, for the record, a list of recommendations
    by the working group. What is the Coast Guard doing to address these
    recommendations? Does the fiscal year 2004 budget include resources to
    purchase radiation detection equipment for Coast Guard employees? Is
    so, please describe the request.
        Answer. The Working Group has incorporated all of its
    recommendations into a draft Coast Guard Commandant Instruction
    (COMDTINST) for implementation Coast Guard wide. This COMDTINST is
    currently in the final review process and will be issued in the near-
    future.
        To briefly summarize, the COMDTINST intends to implement a layered
    approach for detecting illegitimate radioactive sources to prevent and
    deter their entry into the United States. Most Coast Guard personnel
    that conduct safety and law enforcement missions on board vessels will
    be designated as Level I teams, outfitted with basic pager-style
    radiation detectors, and given proper training for their use. If they
    encounter radiation readings that are not associated with legitimate
    cargoes or machinery, they will contact Level II teams for assistance.
    These Level II teams will be located on major cutters, Maritime Safety
    and Security Teams, Law Enforcement Detachments, Port Security Units,
    and Strike Teams. They will have more advanced searching and isotope
    identification equipment to further determine if the source is
    legitimate. If the Level II team is unable to determine whether the
    source is safe, procedures have been established to rapidly access
    Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams for
    final disposition.
        The Coast Guard is in the final procurement stages for an initial
    purchase of equipment. The fiscal year 2003 budget contains over $17
    million in funds for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological protection
    and detection equipment. The Coast Guard will use these funds to
    procure initial outfits of the equipment recommended by the Working
    Group.
                              mission requirements
        Question. The General Accounting Office has reported on several
    occasions that it is skeptical about the Coast Guard's ability to meet
    its responsibilities for all of its missions due to the increase in
    post 9/11 homeland security requirements. The Homeland Security Act
    clearly states that the capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its
    missions shall be maintained intact and without significant reduction.
    In light of that requirement, what would be the cost to return all law
    enforcement missions to 93 percent of pre-September 11th levels in
    fiscal year 2003? What funding level, above the President's Request for
    fiscal year 2004, would be necessary to return all law enforcement
    missions to 95 percent of pre-September 11th levels by the end of 2004?
    These estimates should assume that the Coast Guard will continue
    operate under various levels of maritime security.
        Answer. The Coast Guard is pursuing a multi-year resource effort to
    perform an enhanced level of Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) while
    sustaining our non-MHS missions near pre-9/11/01 levels. Although we do
    have capacity, capability and operational tempo challenges to
    sustaining mission balance, the Coast Guard will continue to emphasize
    all of our missions. At the end of the day, we are focused on
    performance-based results and not only resource hours. The perspective
    through the performance lens illustrates that our non-Homeland Security
    missions are not suffering. The fiscal year 2002 Performance Report/
    fiscal year 2004 Budget in Brief (BIB) provides documentation of the
    Coast Guard's high performance levels across our full mission spectrum.
    For example, in fiscal year 2002 the Coast Guard:
      --Seized the third highest cocaine total in service history,
      --Interdicted or deterred illegal immigration by sea at a rate of
            88.3 percent (which exceeded our target of 87 percent),
      --Reduced the volume of oil spilled per million gallons shipped to
            0.6 gallons (which was well below our target of 2.5 gallons),
            and
      --Further reduced the number of maritime worker fatalities to 4.3 per
            10,000 workers (which is below our target of 8.7).
        A necessary first step is base-lining our maritime Homeland
    Security (MHS) requirements to help balance our other missions. To
    accomplish this, the Coast Guard has focused on a Strategic Deployment
    Plan (SDP) for implementing the maritime component of the President's
    National Strategy for Homeland Security. Various components of our
    Maritime Security Strategy Deployment Plan are under development, with
    the first component to be completed in May of 2003.
        These MHS requirements will roll into a comprehensive blueprint to
    achieve overall mission balance. This blueprint will consider budgetary
    inputs, resource activity levels, multi-year mission targets and
    mission performance outcomes. Our existing strategic planning process
    and performance plans will serve as the cornerstone of an integrated
    approach emphasizing three general areas of effort: preserving non-MHS
    missions, conducting MHS missions, and maintaining military readiness
    to conduct Defense Operations when tasked. The planning process
    provides the ability to detail the difference between pre and post-9/11
    levels of effort and performance in missions. We anticipate completion
    of the comprehensive blueprint for mission balancing by the end of
    fiscal year 2003.
        The multi-mission resources requested in the fiscal year 2004
    budget are critical to overall mission balancing efforts and to the
    sustainment of the Coast Guard's high standards of operational
    excellence across all mission areas. It is important to note that every
    Homeland Security dollar directed to the Coast Guard will contribute to
    a careful balance between our safety and security missions (including
    law enforcement), both of which must be properly resourced for
    effective mission accomplishment. The fiscal year 2004 budget reflects
    steady progress in a multi-year resource effort to meet America's
    future maritime safety and security needs. This new funding will
    positively impact our performance in all assigned MHS and non-MHS
    goals.
                           port security assessments
        Question. Part of the Coast Guard's Maritime Homeland Security
    Strategy is to reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism within the
    U.S. Maritime Domain. The Maritime Transportation Security Act mandates
    that the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is
    operating conduct initial facility and vessel vulnerability
    assessments. These assessments are to be the basis for a new
    requirement for facility and vessel security plans. The Coast Guard has
    established a plan to conduct security vulnerability assessments for 55
    ports but has only completed 15 assessments to date with 4 more
    scheduled for this year. Based on the President's budget, when will
    these assessments be completed? Now that Congress has added $38 million
    in the fiscal year 2003 emergency supplemental, when will these
    assessments be completed and is the $38 million sufficient to complete
    them?
        Answer. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)
    requires two distinct assessments. The first is an ``initial
    assessment'' to determine which facilities and vessels are at high risk
    of being involved in a transportation security incident (TSI).
    Depending on the outcome of that initial assessment, the MTSA requires
    a ``detailed assessment'' of those vessels and facilities that may be
    involved in a TSI. The Coast Guard accomplished the ``Initial
    Assessments'' required by MTSA by providing Captains of the Ports
    (COTPs) with a Port Security Risk Assessment Tool (PS-RAT), which
    ranked relative consequence and risk within a port. These initial PS-
    RAT assessments were analyzed at the national level to assist in
    determining which vessels and facility types pose a higher security
    risk and will require a ``detailed assessment,'' and individual
    facility and vessel security plans.
        Port Security Assessments (PSAs) are conducted by a team of Coast
    Guard and contracted security experts and provide a level of detail
    that the port stakeholders cannot achieve on their own. PSAs will
    address various facets of the port not covered by individual facility
    and vessel assessments, and they will directly feed into the Area
    Maritime Security Plan required by the MTSA. Port Security Assessments
    (PSAs) have been completed at 13 of the 55 port complexes to date.
        The President's Budget included sufficient funding within the
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
    of DHS to complete all 55 assessments by the end of calendar year 2004.
    The $38 million provided in the Emergency Wartime Supplemental has
    allowed the Coast Guard to immediately initiate the contracting actions
    necessary to get assessment teams into the field. The $38 million will
    cover the contract costs for the remaining ports, but does not include
    funding for Coast Guard program support, personnel costs, or travel to
    support the PSAs. The Coast Guard will continue to work with IAIP to
    ensure the viability of the PSA program, and to provide a coordinated
    and consistent assessment effort across all critical infrastructures.
        Question. First, what conclusions can you share on the assessments
    that have been completed to date?
        Answer. The Assessments highlighted common deficiencies across all
    13 ports. Some general examples are:
      --Many commercial vessels, waterfront facilities and port areas do
            not have adequate security plans.
      --Inadequate security training for commercial vessel and facility
            operators.
      --Governmental Agencies do not conduct adequate security exercises to
            ensure coordinated consequence management and crisis response.
      --High consequence facilities often have adequate shore-side
            security, but lack adequate waterside protection against
            terrorist intrusion/attack.
      --A lack of communication links between responsible stakeholders, and
            a lack of real time Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
      --Local, state and Federal response/security/law enforcement
            organizations need more resources to maintain high level of
            security in ports.
      --Limited sharing of classified or Sensitive Security Information
            (SSI) observations.
      --No worker and visitor credentialing system.
      --Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement checks at first port
            of call only.
      --Facilities do not account for crews.
        Specific PSA results are designated as Sensitive Security
    Information.
        Question. Secretary Ridge testified that the $700 million
    appropriated for critical infrastructure in the fiscal year 2003
    Supplemental and the $829 million request in fiscal year 2004 for
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection will be available
    for the Coast Guard to conduce these assessments. Has any funding been
    provided to the Coast Guard from these accounts for the purpose of port
    security assessments? Do you know of any plans to utilize funding from
    these accounts for port security assessments?
        Answer. The Secretary of Homeland Security and Commandant of the
    Coast Guard have both stated the intent to have all 55 ports completed
    by the end of calendar year 2004 with funds contained in the
    Department's fiscal year 2004 budget request. The $38 million (from the
    fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental) will cover the
    contract costs for the remaining ports, but does not include funding
    for CG program support, CG personnel costs, or CG travel to support the
    PSAs. The Coast Guard will continue to work with the Information
    Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) to ensure the viability
    of the PSA program, and to provide a coordinated and consistent
    assessment effort across all critical infrastructures.
                            c-130s and mpa aircraft
        Question. In fiscal year 2001, Congress appropriated $468 million
    for six C-130J long-range maritime patrol aircraft. The language that
    accompanied this funding in fiscal year 2001 required that these planes
    meet defense-related and other elements of the Coast Guard's multi-
    mission requirements. What is the funding level is required to outfit
    these planes to fulfill the Coast Guard's Marine Patrol aircraft
    surveillance mission? What is the schedule to complete this requirement
    for the 6 planes?
        Answer. The Coast Guard needs $230 million to complete the C-130J
    missionization and make the aircraft fully mission capable, maritime
    patrol aircraft (MPA). This funding will be utilized to procure
    sensors, communications, computers and other systems necessary to
    missionize them for Coast Guard maritime patrol operations. The Coast
    Guard is working with DHS to determine the source and timing of this
    funding. Prior to becoming fully missionized, the aircraft will be
    flown for logistics purposes, testing, training and limited operational
    missions. Once the HC-130J's are fully mission capable, estimated in
    the summer of 2008, the Coast Guard plans to use them as replacements
    for existing HC-130H aircraft.
                         research & development funding
        Question. The budget request includes $22 million for the Coast
    Guard's Research and Development program to develop enhancements to
    homeland security functionality for U.S. ports. What systems are being
    developed to improve port, waterways and coastal security and to the
    extent you can, provide a schedule for deployment?
        Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2004 Research, Development,
    Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) request provides funding to develop
    techniques, equipment, and systems to enhance the Coast Guard's
    capabilities to perform the full range of Coast Guard missions.
    Investments will focus on improvements to maritime homeland security in
    the port domain while continuing research in other Coast Guard mission
    areas, including search and rescue, marine safety, marine environmental
    protection, aids to navigation, and ice operations.
        Specific planned RDT&E initiatives primarily focused on the
    performance of maritime homeland security missions (Ports, Waterways
    and Coastal Security and Enforcement of Laws and Treaties) are listed
    below.
    Improved Maritime Domain Awareness
        Develop a high frequency radar system that provides wide area
    surveillance of coastal zones. Anticipate completing preliminary
    operational evaluation during second quarter of fiscal year 2004.
        Demonstrate an operational Port Security System that combines
    surface search radar with visual and infrared cameras to detect and
    identify targets. Fiscal year 2003 efforts prompted a follow-on
    expanded demonstration that is planned for 3rd quarter of fiscal year
    2004.
        Evaluate portable thermal imaging technology to enhance all-
    weather, day/night surveillance capability on Coast Guard patrol boats
    and Multi-Mission Station assets. Prototype testing is expected to
    begin during the 1st quarter of fiscal year 2004. Model candidate port
    sensor systems to evaluate relative performance and develop concept of
    operations for consideration during future sensor acquisitions. Sensor
    modeling will be a continuous effort with frequent reports throughout
    fiscal year 2004.
        Monitor capabilities of unmanned and autonomous vehicles (air,
    surface and subsurface) through Department of Defense research
    partnerships and relationships with industry. Perform continuous
    evaluation of applicability of vehicles to enhance performance of Coast
    Guard missions.
        Enhanced Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Detection
    Capability: Develop and evaluate technology to provide standoff
    capability for detecting the presence of nuclear or radiation agents.
    Completion of initial testing is scheduled for the 4th quarter of
    fiscal year 2004.
        Develop a portable ``electronic nose'' device that will alert Coast
    Guard boarding personnel to harmful chemical warfare or toxic
    industrial agents at pre-debilitating levels. Anticipate initial
    prototype testing to be completed in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year
    2004.
    Improved Interdiction Capabilities
        Develop a helicopter-deployable entangling device to stop non-
    compliant high-speed craft. Anticipate completing testing during 2nd
    quarter of fiscal year 2004. Research and develop alternative methods
    and deployable devices to gain control/interdict non-compliant vessels.
    Anticipate reporting results during the 4th quarter of fiscal year
    2004.
        Question. Public Law 107-296, the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
    created the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
    (HSARPA) to support basic and applied research to help promote homeland
    security. The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget request for HSARPA
    is $365 million. The Homeland Security Act requires that at least 10
    percent of the funding be used in joint agreement with the Coast Guard
    to carry out research and development of improved ports, waterways, and
    coastal security surveillance and protection capabilities. What is the
    status of this agreement?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has not yet
    issued policy or directives regarding the execution of Homeland
    Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) funding. The Coast
    Guard is currently working with DHS to develop processes and policy for
    compliance with Section 307 of the Homeland Security Act.
                        automated identification system
        Question. The Maritime Transportation Security Act and the
    International Ship and Port Security Code require that an Automated
    Identification System (AIS) be installed on all vessels entering U.S.
    ports by December 31, 2004. How will the Automated Identification
    System enhance Homeland Security? In terms of implementation, can you
    explain the difference in requirements, those for the shipping
    companies and those for the Coast Guard?
        Answer. The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an information
    collection, processing and decision support system that will be a key
    data stream for achieving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), a
    cornerstone of the Coast Guard's maritime homeland security strategy.
    MDA is essentially a heightened state of awareness of the maritime
    environment and is built upon knowledge and understanding of the
    presence, identification, track, intentions and contents of vessels
    operating in U.S. ports, waterways and littoral seas.
        AIS contributes to MDA by means of an onboard transmitter/receiver
    that can operate in conjunction with a shore-side receiving and
    distribution network to produce a composite traffic image of all AIS-
    equipped vessels operating within its horizon (line-of-sight). The
    Coast Guard is currently working with the Department of Homeland
    Security and the Administration to promulgate regulations on specific
    AIS carriage requirements for vessels. The Coast Guard plans to outfit
    all Coast Guard cutters over 65 feet in length with AIS capability.
        Question. What ports are scheduled to receive this technology? What
    is the schedule, by fiscal year, to outfit these ports with the AIS and
    the associated cost?
        Answer. The acquisition and installation of Automatic
    Identification System (AIS) equipment in the ports of Sault Ste Marie
    and Berwick Bay is complete. AIS equipment installation has been
    contracted to begin in five additional Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
    ports as indicated in the following table.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Port                      Scheduled AIS Installation
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lower Mississippi River, LA...............  May 2003
    Prince William Sound, AK..................  July 2003
    Houston/Galveston, TX.....................  July 2003
    New York, NY..............................  October 2003
    Port Arthur, TX...........................  January 2004
    Puget Sound...............................  Not yet scheduled
    San Francisco Bay.........................  Not yet scheduled
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        To date, $22.9 million has been funded in the fiscal year 2002
    Supplemental Appropriation and $5 million in fiscal year 2003 for
    installation and implementation at the above listed ports.
        Long-term goals for enhancing maritime domain awareness include
    developing and installing a National AIS coverage system based on the
    technology and processes used at the VTS ports. This network would
    first be introduced in congested waterways and in ports with critical
    military or commercial infrastructure. The exact sequence of
    implementation has not been determined. These sites would be connected
    to a network that allows access to the AIS information. Each site
    requires a tower, an AIS base station unit, and an interface for data
    connectivity to the network. Currently, Coast Guard Program Managers
    responsible for the Rescue 21 and AIS projects are working closely to
    identify common requirements and strategies to best support both
    initiatives. Liaison areas include shared tower locations, commercial
    leases, and microwave bandwidth requirements.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray

    has operation iraqi freedom further diminished coast guard abilities in
                                  u.s. waters?
        Question. Admiral Collins, you pointed out that, for the first time
    since the Vietnam War, the Coast Guard has deployed a considerable
    number of ships and people overseas--in this case, to participate in
    Operation Iraqi Freedom. You went on to say that this deployment did
    not hinder your operational capabilities in the United States because
    it represented only three percent of your entire force. However, your
    statement failed to mention that in addition to deploying these ships
    overseas, you are taking additional patrol boats out of service--about
    one a month--for major modifications as part of your Deepwater program.
    And two the ships you have sent overseas are High Endurance Cutters--
    ships that are particularly well suited for high seas missions like
    fisheries patrols. The entire Coast Guard only has 12 of these ships.
    The General Accounting Office quoted a Coast Guard official as stating
    that the decline in both drug enforcement and fisheries enforcement can
    be attributable not only to your heightened homeland security
    requirements, but to the deployment of resources for military
    operations. Can you quantify what number of fisheries and drug
    interdiction patrols did not take place as a result of your deployment
    of floating assets to the Persian Gulf?
        Answer. The deployment of floating assets to the Persian Gulf has
    not in and of itself resulted in a decline in fisheries and drug
    enforcement patrols.
        Every year, two High or Medium Endurance Cutters (the Coast Guard
    has 42 high and medium endurance cutters in commission) participate in
    Department of Defense exercises and other out of hemisphere operations.
    This year those cutters were redirected to participate in Operation
    IRAQI FREEDOM, thus not directly impacting our counter-drug and fishery
    efforts.
        In addition to the High Endurance Cutter deployments, the Coast
    Guard deployed eight 110-foot patrol boats. To compensate for those
    patrol boats deployed overseas, undergoing a hull sustainment project,
    or undergoing modifications as part of the Deepwater program, the Coast
    Guard increased the operational tempo of remaining cutters to 125
    percent of their normal pace. Additionally, the Navy allowed our
    tactical control of 11 170 Patrols Coastals to augment stateside
    requirements.
        The net effect of the IRAQI FREEDOM operational decisions and
    corresponding risk mitigation measures is no reduction in fisheries or
    drug interdiction patrols. The Coast Guard has however, had slight
    reductions in these patrols due to the number of surge operations as a
    result of several ``orange'' Homeland Security Advisory System alerts.
    Although we do have capacity, capability and operational tempo
    challenges to sustaining mission balance, the Coast Guard will continue
    to emphasize all missions, and temporarily surge as timely intelligence
    dictates is appropriate. At the end of the day, we remain focused on
    performance-based results and not only resource hours. The perspective
    through the performance lens illustrates that our non-Homeland Security
    missions are not suffering. The fiscal year 2003 Report/fiscal year
    2004 Budget in Brief (BIB) provides documentation of the Coast Guard's
    high performance levels across our mission spectrum. For example, in
    fiscal year 2002 we seized the third highest cocaine total in our
    history, we interdicted or deterred illegal immigration by sea at a
    rate of 88.3 percent which exceeded our target of 87 percent, we
    reduced the volume of oil spilled per million gallons shipped to 0.6
    gallons which was well below our target of 2.5 gallons, and continued
    to reduce the number of maritime worker fatalities to 4.3 per 10,000
    workers which is below our target of 8.7.
        Question. Now that hostilities have largely ceased, what is your
    schedule for bringing back each unit that is deployed to assist in
    Operation Iraqi Freedom? When, for example should we expect the High
    Endurance Cutters to return? What about the Port Security Units?
        Answer. Deployed Coast Guard forces will be returned when the
    Combatant Commander determines their mission has been completed. Thus
    far, two high endurance cutters, four patrol boats, the buoy tender,
    and a variety of shore-side Coast Guard components have been released.
    BOUTWELL and DALLAS commenced their return trips on May 14th. DALLAS is
    escorting the four patrol boats that were deployed to the Mediterranean
    Sea. BOUTWELL is completing previously scheduled Theater Security
    Cooperation activities during her return transit. WALNUT also commenced
    her return trip on May 14th.
        The patrol boats BAINBRIDGE ISLAND, GRAND ISLE, KNIGHT ISLAND, and
    PEA ISLAND, all deployed to the Mediterranean, have been released and
    commenced a return trip to the United States in company with the
    DALLAS. Personnel from Port Security Unit 305, the Atlantic Strike Team
    Detachment, the Mediterranean Mobile Support Unit and Law Enforcement
    Detachments #204, 205 and 411 have already returned to the United
    States. Their equipment will follow by sealift.
        Coast Guard patrol boats, port security units, law enforcement
    detachments, and supporting structure remain in the Arabian Gulf
    fulfilling port and coastal security missions for the Combatant
    Commander.
        Question. Many of the patrol boats that were deployed to the Iraqi
    theater performed fisheries enforcement missions off of New England.
    When do you expect that all of those boats will be returned to their
    home ports?
        Answer. Four of the eight deployed patrol boats traditionally
    conducted fisheries enforcement missions off the New England coast. Two
    of those patrol boats, BAINBRIDGE ISLAND and GRAND ISLE, have started
    their return trip to the United States from the Mediterranean. Their
    estimated arrival at Norfolk VA is 11 June. After several weeks of
    necessary maintenance, they will return to their original homeports of
    Sandy Hook, NJ and Gloucester, MA.
        The other two patrol boats, ADAK and WRANGELL, are deployed to the
    Arabian Gulf and continue to perform duties for the combatant
    commander. No departure date has been established for these patrol
    boats.
        The Coast Guard temporarily relocated BLOCK ISLAND to Gloucester,
    MA upon the departure of the GRAND ISLE. The BLOCK ISLAND will return
    to its normal homeport of Atlantic Beach, NC upon the arrival of GRAND
    ISLE.
        Question. What has been the impact on your other Coast Guard units
    that have been required to ``pick up the slack'' for the units that
    have been deployed overseas? Is their higher operating tempo
    sustainable over the long term?
        Answer. To compensate for the patrol boats deployed overseas, the
    Coast Guard increased the operational tempo of remaining cutters by 25
    percent. This temporary surge capability is sustainable through the
    remainder of fiscal year 2003.
           will coast guard be able to handle a major migrant influx?
        Question. Admiral Collins, in your testimony, you point out the
    remarkable flexibility that the Coast Guard exhibits at times of
    national crisis. It is something that I and all senators should be
    immensely proud of. One of the areas where the Coast Guard has shown
    extraordinary flexibility in the past is when we have experienced a
    massive influx of migrants attempting to reach U.S. shores from Cuba or
    Haiti. We have all read with concern the heightened numbers of arrests
    as well as executions in Cuba. You, of course, get additional
    intelligence briefings on the instability in that country. Whenever we
    have had these massive influxes of migrants in the past, the Coast
    Guard effectively threw almost every floating asset they had to attack
    the problem. Given your current deployment of so many vessels overseas,
    as well as other patrol boats being sent to the shipyard for major
    overhauls, are you at all concerned about your ability to handle a
    sudden influx of migrants at this time?
        Answer. The Coast Guard continues to monitor migrant departures,
    and maintains an effective presence in the transit and arrival zones.
    The summer months typically yield higher maritime migrant flow, and the
    Coast Guard allocates additional resources to facilitate interdiction
    and timely repatriation in order to prevent future departures. In the
    event that migration numbers approached mass migration levels that
    exceed our capacity, the Coast Guard would look to the Department of
    Defense for additional assistance.
        Question. During major migrant influxes in the past, you have had
    the benefit of some Navy ships being brought under your command to
    assist in rescuing migrants. Given the current deployment of so many
    Navy ships overseas, are you confident that you will have the level
    support from the Navy that is needed if there is a major influx of
    migrants?
        Answer. In the event of a mass migration, the Coast Guard would
    receive assistance from the Navy as outlined in ``Operation Distant
    Shore--Mass Migration Emergency Plan.'' The Coast Guard has no
    indication that the Navy would not be able to provide the required
    assets if needed.
        Question. Migrant interdiction is another mission where your hours
    have declined considerably from pre-September 11th levels. What can you
    tell me regarding the impact of this declining effort on our ability to
    protect against illegal migrants being smuggled to the West Coast of
    the United States from Asia? Have you been able to follow up on all
    intelligence leads indicating that there may be illegal migrants aboard
    ships bound for the West Coast?
        Answer. While the Coast Guard's Abstract of Operations data
    indicated a reduction in resource hours attributed to the Migrant
    Interdiction mission in the two fiscal quarters following the September
    11, 2001 attacks, the data for the past three quarters indicates a far
    different picture. The Coast Guard is currently expending more effort
    in the Migrant Interdiction mission than before September 11, 2001.
        The direct arrival of Asian migrants on the West Coast of the
    United States has significantly declined since 1999. However, Asian
    migrant smugglers continue to use low profile methods to move their
    human cargo. While intelligence regarding Asian migrant smuggling
    events is rare, the Coast Guard has been able to respond to reported
    events with considerable success.
    how did the coast guard respond to the committee directive to rebalance
                                   missions?
        Question. Admiral Collins, as part of the 2003 Appropriations Bill,
    in which you were provided with a record increase in funds, the
    Committee directed you to seek to use this increased funding to
    rebalance your level of effort between missions and bring your non-
    homeland security missions to the maximum amount possible back to pre-
    September 11th levels. A review of the data that I discussed in my
    opening statement makes clear that that has not taken place. How
    precisely did the Coast Guard respond to the Committee's directive?
    Should we expect to see any progress over the remainder of 2003 in
    seeing drug interdiction, fisheries enforcement and marine safety
    returned to their pre-September 11th levels?
        Answer. Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the Coast Guard had committed
    less than 2 percent of its assets to active port security duty.
    Immediately after 9/11, the Coast Guard surged nearly 60 percent of its
    assets in immediate support of port security. Since then, we have
    rebalanced our assets to provide roughly 28 percent of our assets in
    coverage of port security. In so doing, we have used the additional
    funding provided by Congress to establish new security capabilities in
    critical ports, and we are in the process of adding those same
    capabilities to all critical ports, as funding allows. This added
    funding has permitted the Coast Guard to return its other assets to the
    non-Homeland Security mission portfolio.
        The results speak for themselves. In fiscal year 2002 we seized the
    third highest cocaine total in our history, we interdicted or deterred
    illegal immigration by sea at a rate of 88.3 percent which exceeded our
    target of 87 percent, we reduced the volume of oil spilled per million
    gallons shipped to 0.6 gallons which was well below our target of 2.5
    gallons, and continued to reduce the number of maritime worker
    fatalities to 4.3 per 10,000 workers which is below our target of 8.7.
    For a detailed record of actual resource hours across all missions for
    the first final quarters of fiscal year 2003, please see the report to
    Congress entitled Quarterly Abstract of Operations. In addition, our
    fiscal year 2003 Report/fiscal year 2004 Budget in Brief provides
    documentation of the Coast Guard's high performance levels across our
    mission spectrum.
        Our service remains fully committed to sustaining operational
    excellence across all our missions and to achieving the appropriate
    balance between non-homeland security and homeland security mission.
    The Coast Guard is pursuing a multi-year resource effort to perform an
    enhanced level of Maritime Homeland Security while sustaining our Non-
    Maritime Homeland Security missions near pre-9/11 levels.
        Although we do have capacity, capability and operational tempo
    challenges to sustaining mission balance, the Coast Guard will continue
    to emphasize all of our missions. At the end of the day, we are focused
    on performance-based results and not only resource hours. The
    perspective through the performance lens illustrates that our non-
    Homeland Security missions are not suffering.
      is deepwater patrol boat life extension program being reconsidered?
        Question. Admiral Collins, under your plans for the Deepwater
    Program, you intent to take your 110-foot patrol boats and extend their
    service life by adding an additional 13 feet to each boat and
    renovating the rest of the ship. I understand that early indications
    are that these patrol boats may be showing greater wear and tear and
    corrosion than was originally anticipated. This will add to the overall
    cost of extending the life of these ships and may call into question
    the wisdom of extending them for several more years. What can you
    report to us about these early indications that these patrol boats need
    a great deal more work than was originally anticipated? Is the Coast
    Guard currently reconsidering whether your entire fleet of 110-foot
    patrol boats should be restored in this manner? What alternatives are
    you contemplating?
        Answer. The 49 Island Class 110-foot patrol boats in the Coast
    Guard inventory have proven to be quite versatile, highly effective
    resources, which are employed for a wide range of Coast Guard missions.
    The demand for these workhorses has created an intense operational
    tempo that has resulted in a more rapid degradation of their material
    condition than was originally forecast in 1998 at Deepwater's
    inception.
        A 2001 survey of each vessel showed that 22 of 49 110-foot WPBs
    were experiencing extensive hull corrosion. To date, five cutters
    exhibiting the worst corrosion per the 2001 survey have received
    extensive hull renewal maintenance external to the 123-foot conversion
    project at an Operating Expense appropriation cost of $8.5 million. Two
    additional 110-foot WPBs are currently in commercial facilities for
    emergent hull repairs. Since these emergent hull repairs are
    accomplished on a case-by-case basis, the total cost of repairs has not
    been estimated at this time.
        The Coast Guard is currently evaluating the scope of the Deepwater
    123-foot conversion project. Emergent hull repairs will continue to be
    accomplished on 110-foot WPBs as required.
        Question. Admiral Collins, when it was originally conceived, the
    Deepwater program was anticipated to grow above the $500 million level
    by certain increments each year in order to achieve the total amount of
    recapitalization that the Coast Guard requires to execute its many
    missions. However, for the last two budget cycles, the President's
    budget has effectively frozen funding for the Deepwater program at $500
    million. What would be the long-term impact on the Deepwater program if
    funding remained frozen at $500 million for the next several years?
    Will the Coast Guard be able to recapitalize all its assets on its
    original schedule at this level of funding?
        Answer. The IDS contracting strategy was chosen based on its
    flexibility to adjustment to budget variances. Funding below notional
    funding levels will increase the time and cost necessary to fully
    implement the Deepwater solution and delay needed capability
    improvements that IDS provides. With a funding profile of $500 million
    annually in appropriated-year dollars, it would take at over 27 years
    to acquire the assets included in the IDS implementation plan.
        Question. One of the provisions included in the Homeland Security
    Act was a report on the feasibility of expediting the Deepwater Program
    in order to replace your aging assets more quickly. The report that was
    submitted to the Congress confirmed that it was feasible to expedite
    the Deepwater Program and that such an action would indeed save the
    taxpayer several billion dollars. To your knowledge, is any real
    consideration being given within the Administration to requesting funds
    to expedite the completion of the Deepwater program? We certainly don't
    see such an effort in the 2004 budget request.
        Answer. The Administration considers Integrated Deepwater System
    (IDS) funding in conjunction with all agency requests based upon
    national priorities. The President's fiscal year 2004 request of $500
    million for the IDS funds critical initiatives and is consistent with
    the fiscal year 2004 funding level reflected in the March 7, 2003
    Report to Congress on the Feasibility of Accelerating IDS to 10 years.
    The IDS contracting strategy provides the Coast Guard the flexibility
    to adjust the proposed implementation schedule depending on budget
    variances. The Coast Guard will continue to work with the
    administration on appropriate funding of Deepwater.
                   deficiencies in search and rescue program
        Question. Both in the 2002 and 2003 Appropriations Act, we
    statutorily required you to boost funding for your search and rescue
    program by $14.5 million and $15.7 million, respectively. The Committee
    took these action in response to reports from the DOT Inspector General
    that were extraordinarily critical of the overall readiness of your
    search and rescue boat stations; the condition of their equipment; and
    the inadequate training and experience levels that were found among
    your boat crews.
        The 2002 Appropriations Act required the DOT Inspector General to
    certify that you actually spent the money as the Committee intended.
    The 2003 Act requires the General Accounting Office do the same thing.
    Unfortunately, the Inspector General was not able to certify that you
    did spend the money specifically on Search and Rescue improvements.
    While there was a substantial increase in the number of people assigned
    to your small boat stations, the IG could not certify that these funds
    were specifically used to increase the readiness, training, or
    experience levels of the individuals serving at the boat stations.
    Needless to say, I was greatly disappointed by IG's report.
        Should we expect a similar report from the GAO regarding the Search
    and Rescue enhancement funds that we provided you for 2003? Will you be
    able to show the GAO as well as the Committee that you spent this $14.5
    million specifically to address your Search and Rescue shortfalls?
        Answer. In 2002, the Coast Guard spent in excess of $14.5 million
    to improve Search and Rescue and boat operation capabilities. The DOT
    IG audit agrees with that statement. The audit, however, was critical
    of our accounting practices rather than the actual amount of
    expenditure itself. The Coast Guard acknowledges we could have tracked
    specific expenditures better to allow greater transparency for the DOT
    IG Search and Rescue audit analysis, and we will work with GAO to
    account for direct expenditures against specifically appropriated
    budget initiatives.
        The Coast Guard's system provides reliable, repeatable correlations
    between mission activity and spending. The method, which was developed
    for the Coast Guard by KPMG Consulting (now BearingPoint, Inc.), is
    based on highly reliable cost data that is reconciled to our audited
    financial statements. It utilizes state of the market analytical tools
    and the latest activity-based costing protocols to apply organizational
    costs incurred by Coast Guard units against actual operational activity
    data to allocate costs across mission areas. For example, a Coast Guard
    Multi-Mission Station's mission allocation may result in 20 percent of
    operational activity tied to the performance of the Search and Rescue
    (SAR) mission over a set time period. Thus, based on standard activity
    based costing procedures, 20 percent of the organizational expenses
    associated with that Multi-Mission Station during that time frame are
    allocated as SAR expenses.

                              SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

        Senator Cochran. Director Basham, Admiral Collins, we
    appreciate your cooperation with our committee. We also
    appreciate your service to our country.
        We will continue our hearings to review the fiscal year
    2004 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security on
    Tuesday, May 6, at 10 a.m., in room 124 of the Dirksen Senate
    Office Building. At that time, we will hear the testimony of
    the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, the
    Honorable Asa Hutchinson.
        Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., Thursday, May 1, the
    subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday,
    May 6.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

                                  ----------

                              TUESDAY, MAY 6, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Cochran, Campbell, Byrd, Inouye,
    Hollings, Leahy, and Kohl.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    STATEMENT OF HON. ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY,
                BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
                DIRECTORATE

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

        Senator Cochran. The committee hearing will please come to
    order. This morning we continue our hearings on the fiscal year
    2004 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. We
    review this morning the programs and activities of the Border
    and Transportation Security Directorate. I am very pleased to
    welcome the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
    Security, Asa Hutchinson. I think the President and Secretary
    Tom Ridge have chosen a very able and experienced public
    servant for this very difficult and important undertaking.
        The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the United
    States Customs Service, the Office of Domestic Preparedness,
    the Transportation Security Administration, the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center, and the Federal Protective Service
    to this directorate. In addition, the directorate is
    responsible for integrating two-thirds of the former
    Immigration and Naturalization Service with the United States
    Customs Service and with quarantine inspection activities of
    the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. For fiscal year
    2004, the President's budget requests $16.2 billion in
    discretionary funds for border and transportation security,
    along with an additional $1.8 billion in offsetting
    collections.
        Mr. Secretary, we look forward to hearing from you. We have
    your prepared statement which we will make a part of the
    committee's hearing record, and we invite you to make any
    statement in explanation of the budget request which you think
    would be helpful to our committee's understanding of the budget
    request.
        At this time, I am pleased to yield to other Senators of
    this committee for any opening statements they may have.
        Senator Byrd.

                      STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

        Senator Byrd. There are two things they haven't developed
    yet, how to create a good public address system and how to
    fashion milk cartons so they will open as stated on the top of
    the carton.
        I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming Under Secretary
    Hutchinson. This is his first time appearing before the
    committee in his current capacity. We look forward to hearing
    from him and to working with him. There is no greater
    responsibility than that of making our Nation's borders and
    transportation system secure. It is our failure to do so prior
    to that tragic day in September 2001 that led to the loss of
    the lives of thousands of innocent Americans and others, and it
    was in reaction to those horrific events that the President and
    this Congress created the Department in which you now serve.
        Our role in Congress is to ensure that you and the many
    other dedicated employees of the Department of Homeland
    Security have the resources that you need to do your jobs, and
    to do your jobs well. In that regard I have questioned some of
    the requested funding levels for certain activities of the
    Department, such as the revised entry/exit visa system that we
    discussed last week with Secretary Ridge, and the appearance of
    a singular focus on aviation security in what is supposed to be
    an agency dedicated to the security of all forms of
    transportation. I and other Members will address these and
    other issues in our questions, and we look forward to your
    testimony.
        Thank you.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Campbell.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL

        Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will make my
    opening statement very brief and ask that my complete statement
    be included in the record.
        Senator Cochran. Without objection, so ordered.
        Senator Campbell. Welcome, Under Secretary Hutchinson. I
    guess what we're learning with this whole problem with homeland
    security is that those people who would do us some damage have
    learned how to use the very liberties that we cherish against
    us.
        The use of American money to be filtered to foreign
    operatives, the opportunity to enroll in our universities, in
    our flight schools, and to travel without documentation, all of
    the things that we sort of take for granted, they have learned
    how to use as weapons against us, and I think it was certainly
    a rude awakening September 11, and it has changed our world
    forever, but when we need to protect about 7,500 miles of land
    border and 95,000 miles of shoreline, or whatever it is, and at
    the same time make sure that we don't infringe on civil
    liberties or the rights of people that they have come to accept
    as the American way of lifestyle is a darned difficult thing,
    and all of us are fumbling along, I think, trying to do the
    best we can, and I just wanted, as one Senator, to say that I
    certainly support your efforts and look forward to a time when
    the Nation is safer, and we never get back to what we once
    thought of as total freedom in this country, but certainly we
    can find, I think, a better balance in protecting those
    liberties I mentioned, at the same time decreasing the amount
    of danger.
        Sometime ago, right after 9/11, I remember sitting in a
    hearing, and there was some discussion about those areas that
    seem to be pretty weak yet and would be an opportunity for the
    people who are going to do us some damage to attack, and having
    been a former private pilot myself, I thought at the time that
    we still had a weakness in general aviation.

                               prepared statement

        We've done an awful lot when it comes to the commercial
    aviation. The number of bag screeners and the number of things
    that we have to go through I think has made it a lot safer, and
    when I mentioned I thought there was still a weakness in
    general aviation I got an immediate call from the ALPA
    complaining that I would make such a terrible statement, but as
    I read just recently in the paper, that is certainly one of the
    alerts that we're facing now, the possibility of people using
    private planes, since they don't have the same degree, at FBOs,
    of security that they do at the terminals, that there still may
    be a possibility of that, so I'm interested in knowing maybe a
    little bit more of that as we proceed with the discussions.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The statement follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

        Thank you Chairman Cochran. I'd like to thank the Under Secretary
    for taking the time to come talk with us today.
        Security procedures in place prior to the tragic events of
    September 11th were obviously seriously flawed. While I realize that
    many steps have been taken to address these concerns, including the
    creation of the Department of Homeland Security, I wonder whether or
    not enough has been done. As I fly back to my home State of Colorado
    every weekend, and wait in line at the baggage screeners and walk
    through the metal detectors, I wonder if these procedures really ensure
    my safety.
        We need to protect the 7,500 miles of land border, and 95,000 miles
    of shoreline, in addition to our nation's transit systems and energy
    and power infrastructures. This is imperative to our country's economy
    that is dependent on travel and the mobility of commerce. Additionally,
    the people of the United States deserve the ability to move about our
    nation in a safe manner. I believe that the TSA, Customs Service, Coast
    Guard, and other agencies in the Department have made great strides in
    improving our sense of safety since September 11, 2001.
        I believe that we have made great advancements quickly by upgrading
    security procedures, response plans, and increasing security. There is
    no issue more important to me than the safety of the American people.
        Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the
    testimony of our guest, and I will have a number of questions to ask at
    the appropriate time.

        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished Senator is
    still a private pilot.
        Senator Campbell. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Of a Harley-Davidson.
        Senator Campbell. Still have an airplane, too, just not
    current.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Inouye.
        Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just
    wish to welcome Under Secretary Hutchinson. Welcome, sir.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Hollings.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNEST F. HOLLINGS

        Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, we have got a wonderful Border Patrol School
    down there now in Charleston. There was a heck of a contest in
    the midnineties when we had an immigration crisis and we were
    looking to train additional border patrol agents. Now some
    6,000 have graduated. Over half of your border patrol agents
    are graduates of that school. One, they're not paid enough.
    Incidentally, in the school they have about a 30 percent to 40
    percent dropout. There are about 55 in a class, and they have
    about 15 classes. They've got perfect facilities. They've got a
    driving range, they've got a rifle range and everything else
    down there, and they like it, but at $27,000, a GS-7 trained in
    speaking Spanish, trained in law enforcement, trained in
    computer programs, they leave and come over to the airline
    security because they get more pay, so by the time I'm training
    them in Charleston, they leave to train for the air marshall's
    job because they pay more. Let's look at that, because I want
    to write something in that bill to equalize your different
    security folks so you don't train for one function and all of a
    sudden lose too many of them to another function in the same
    agency.
        But it is an outstanding facility, and we invite you to
    come down and look at it, because we've got to expand the
    barracks facilities there to accommodate the increase in
    training.
        But thank you very much. We look forward to your testimony.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.

                     STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON

        Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and Senator Byrd,
    members of the committee, thank you for your welcome and your
    comments this morning. It is a pleasure to be with you to
    testify on the President's 2004 budget for the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate of the Department of
    Homeland Security. It was just a couple of months ago that the
    Department brought nearly 180,000 employees from 22 different
    agencies together into one new Department. I want to express
    the thanks of the men and women of Homeland Security to this
    committee for your support in this reorganization, and also for
    your support in the recently concluded operation, Liberty
    Shield. In our view, and as was stated by Senator Byrd, there
    is really not more of a serious job in all the land than
    stopping future terrorist incidents from occurring on American
    soil, and the Border and Transportation Security Directorate,
    along with the Coast Guard, really represent the operational
    front line of homeland security. We're the operations folks.
    We're the ones that not only play defense, but also offense.
    We're not alone in that effort. We have to rely upon our
    partnership with State and local governments, and part of my
    job is to make sure we enhance those partnerships, increase
    that coordination, and we're working very hard to do that.
        Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge, we have already
    accomplished a substantial amount in terms of reorganization.
    We have unified our border efforts under the Customs and Border
    Protection Bureau. We have created the new Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement that put our enforcement
    efforts under one chain of command that gives us a clearer
    focus, and the President's 2004 budget is the first complete
    new budget for the Department, and it is a good foundation for
    the future.
        I believe it is important we develop sound management
    principles and meaningful performance measures as we enact
    budget levels, and we are working hard to do that. If I might
    just comment briefly on the 2004 budget. First of all, for the
    directorate, it is a broad and a very expensive mission. It is
    an enormous challenge that we face. Each year, more than 500
    million persons, 130 million motor vehicles, 2\1/2\ million
    railroad cars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be
    processed, screened, or inspected at or even before they reach
    our borders. Security decisions by our inspectors must be made
    within seconds, and we need to be right every time. That is
    difficult, and as Senator Hollings pointed out, sometimes they
    do not get paid what they get paid in the private sector, and
    so their commitment is very important.
        The $18.1 billion requested for this directorate by the
    President does provide for greater accountability for a more
    integrated border and transportation security organization. I
    know that sounds like boilerplate language, but that really is
    what I see as the responsibility of my directorate, and the
    uniqueness of this directorate is that we have the
    transportation and border agencies together, and we can enhance
    that integration and cooperation and exchange of information.
    We are increasing the security of our international shipping
    containers. The budget will allow us to continue implementation
    of the congressional mandates that have been wisely provided.
        A few highlighted priorities in the budget. First, under
    the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. It provides for an
    increase of $1.7 billion over the 2002 budget, and this will
    allow us to support the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
    Terrorism program at a level of $18 million, which increases
    the supply chain security and expedites the clearance of
    international commercial cargoes and conveyances. In the budget
    we're also providing for the enhancement of the Container
    Security Initiative, with $62 million requested, which puts
    personnel in key international ports to examine high risk cargo
    before it is placed in U.S.-bound ships. This is a very
    important part of our overall strategy at Homeland Security.
        And then we have the capital improvements to our IT systems
    from the international trade data system to the automated
    commercial environment system, and if these requests are
    approved, it will be nearly $1.1 billion that have been
    dedicated since 2001.
        I am pleased also that there is $119 million for
    nonintrusive inspection equipment. This allows us not to just
    simply flood the border with people, but provide security at
    our borders wisely with technology and with better systems.
        As was mentioned, the budget also supports continued
    implementation of the comprehensive U.S. VISIT system. The goal
    is to track the entry and exit of visitors to the United
    States. It provides for $100 million in new resources, for a
    total of $480 million. This is an important objective that the
    Border and Transportation Security Directorate will engage in
    over the next couple of years.
        When it comes to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    arena, it has 14,000 employees, and a budget of $2.8 billion,
    which is a 16 percent increase over 2002. It will allow us to
    support our investigative activities, including immigration
    fraud, smuggling of illegal aliens, international money
    laundering, export enforcement, forced labor, trade agreement
    investigations, smuggling of narcotics, weapons of mass
    destruction and other contraband, illegal transshipment, and
    vehicle and cargo theft. That is a broad mandate for an
    investigative agency, but we will be prioritizing and working
    in those broad arenas. The budget will allow us to continue our
    traditional roles as well as enforcement of all of our
    immigration laws.
        The Transportation Security Administration has done a good
    job in increasing the professionalism of our screeners, and I
    am proud of the job that they have done. The budget requests
    $4.8 billion for TSA, $2.4 billion of that will be offset by
    collections from aviation passenger security fees and airline
    security fees. Collection of these fees will be suspended from
    June 1 to September 30 of this year, in accord with the
    provisions of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations
    Act.
        The total request, $4.3 billion, supports direct aviation
    security activities, including a professionalized passenger and
    baggage screening workforce and additional equipment to prevent
    weapons and other contraband on the aircraft. We will also be
    reimbursing our State and local law enforcement agencies for
    their work in providing now roving patrols and supporting our
    screeners. We will be funding the Federal Air Marshal Service
    and, in addition, enhancing our cargo and passenger screening
    methods and increasing our use of technology.
        One of the important new initiatives is the transportation
    worker identification credential, or the TWIC, that will allow
    us to have more security background checks of our
    transportation workers, and create a credential that will allow
    them to have access to various transportation security
    facilities.
        We also have the Office for Domestic Preparedness and the
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Both are essential for
    training first responders, training of our Federal law
    enforcement agencies, and I am pleased and proud of the work
    that they are doing.

                               prepared statement

        Finally, our directorate supports, through our operations,
    the President's national strategy for homeland security. This
    is a benchmark and a framework for our enforcement
    responsibilities. We want to be able to manage our
    responsibilities in coordination and integration with all of
    our Federal partners and our State and local efforts. These are
    the two benchmarks that guide us as we work in the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate.
        Thank you for your support. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The statement follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Asa Hutchinson

    Introduction
        Good morning Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, distinguished members
    of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today, and I am
    pleased to be here to discuss the President's fiscal year 2004 budget
    request for the Department of Homeland Security's Border and
    Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate and its component
    organizations.
        Just a couple of months ago, the Department of Homeland Security
    brought nearly 180,000 employees throughout the Federal Government
    together into one agency. I am grateful for the focus and support
    Congress provided in creating the Department, and I also wish to thank
    you for recently providing critical supplemental resources to support
    the Department's efforts in Operation Liberty Shield and the brave men
    and women serving in our military during this challenging time.
        The President's National Strategy for Homeland Security provides
    the framework for mobilizing and organizing the nation--the Federal
    Government, State and local governments, the private sector, and the
    American people--to undertake the complex mission of protecting our
    homeland. It makes the Department's strategic objectives abundantly
    clear: prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce
    America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and
    assist in recovery should a terrorist attack occur.
        There is no more serious job in all the land than stopping future
    terrorist incidents from occurring on American soil. This is especially
    true in light of recent world events. The Border and Transportation
    Security Directorate, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, serves as the
    front line operational force for the Department in achieving its
    objectives. But we are not alone in this effort. The President,
    Secretary Ridge, and I fully understand that our partnerships with
    State and local governments are critical for ensuring the success of
    our mission.
        Under the able leadership of Secretary Ridge, the BTS Directorate
    has already taken significant steps forward. We have reorganized the
    BTS Directorate's nearly 100,000 employees to unify border and
    transportation security activities, integrate our front line
    operational forces, and yet preserve the expertise and functional
    relationships BTS employees have developed over the years.
        This has resulted in the creation of two new bureaus within BTS.
    The inspection and border patrol functions of the former U.S. Customs
    and Immigration and Naturalization Services, and the Agriculture Plant
    Health Inspection Service now reside in the new Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection (BCBP). The investigation and enforcement functions
    of those agencies, along with the Federal Protective Service, now
    reside in the new Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE).
    We have also brought first responder resources in the Office for
    Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to improve assistance to our State and
    local partners as they do their part to protect the homeland.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget is the first ever for the new
    Department and the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) and
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). It is the foundation on
    which the Department and the BTS Directorate will be built. In laying
    this foundation, we have a valuable opportunity to develop sound
    management principles and meaningful performance measures. We will use
    these principles and measures to guide our efforts and gauge our
    progress in carrying out the President's Management Agenda.
    Budget Request for fiscal year 2004
        In his fiscal year 2004 budget, the President requested $18.1
    billion, including fees, and roughly 108,000 full-time equivalents
    (FTE) positions for the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.
    The request reflects the Administration's commitment to the mission and
    priorities of the Directorate.
        The Border and Transportation Security Directorate secures the
    nation's borders, transportation systems, points of entry, and points
    in between. This includes nearly 7,500 miles of land border, 95,000
    miles of shoreline and navigable rivers, and our Nation's airports,
    highways, rail, maritime, pipeline, and transit systems. This
    Directorate is responsible for preventing the illegal entry of people
    or goods, while at the same time facilitating the unimpeded flow of
    legitimate commerce and people across our borders and throughout the
    national transportation system. This presents an enormous task. Each
    year more than 500 million persons, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5
    million railcars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be processed,
    screened, or inspected at, or even before they reach, our borders.
        The $18.1 billion requested by the President for the BTS
    Directorate will: provide greater accountability through an integrated
    border and transportation security organization; create smart borders
    that are more secure; increase the security of international shipping
    containers; continue implementation of the Aviation and Transportation
    Security Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act; and ensure that our Nation's first
    responders are trained and equipped to address the threat of terrorism
    through efforts consolidated in the Office for Domestic Preparedness.
        The following sections detail the budget requests for the Border
    and Transportation Security Directorate components.
        The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection brings together
    approximately 42,000 employees including 11,000 Border Patrol Agents,
    and 19,000 inspectors from the Agriculture Plant Health and Inspection
    Service, and the former Immigration and Naturalization and U.S. Customs
    Services, including canine enforcement officers. The Bureau focuses its
    operations on the movement of goods and people across our borders to
    prevent the illegal entry into the United States of people or goods at
    or between ports-of-entry while facilitating the movement of legitimate
    trade and international travel.
        The budget includes $6.7 billion for the Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection, an increase of $1.7 billion (33 percent) above
    fiscal year 2002. These resources will support the Customs-Trade
    Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, which increases supply
    chain security and expedites the clearance of international commercial
    cargoes and conveyances. It also supports the expansion of programs
    such as the Container Security Initiative, which puts personnel in key
    international ports to examine high-risk cargo before it is placed on
    U.S.-bound ships. The request funds the International Trade Data System
    (ITDS) and the Automated Commercial Environment System (ACE), two
    capital projects for which, if the request is approved, nearly $1.1
    billion will have been dedicated since fiscal year 2001.
        The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection will ensure compliance
    with customs and immigration laws, determine the admissibility of
    persons to the United States, and prevent the admission of terrorists
    and other criminals. The Bureau will also focus on deterring illegal
    crossings, seizing illegal drugs, currency, and monetary instruments,
    processing $1.2 trillion in imports, and collecting $20 billion in
    duties on the same, while inspecting 147 million vehicles and more than
    one million aircraft. The budget also supports continued implementation
    of the comprehensive U.S. VISIT system to track the timely departure of
    visitors to the United States.
        The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement brings together
    the enforcement and investigative arms of the former Customs and
    Immigration and Naturalization Services, and the Federal Protective
    Service. The reorganization involves approximately 14,000 employees,
    including 5,500 criminal investigators, 4,000 employees for immigration
    and deportation services and 1,500 Federal Protective Service staff.
    The Bureau will address the full range of immigration and customs laws
    within the United States, in addition to protecting specified Federal
    buildings. The air and marine enforcement functions of the former
    Customs Service will also be a part of this Bureau.
        The fiscal year 2004 request for the Bureau of Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (BICE) includes $2.8 billion, an increase of nearly
    $400 million (16 percent) above fiscal year 2002. Nearly $1.1 billion
    of this amount will support investigative activities, including
    immigration fraud, smuggling of illegal aliens, international money
    laundering, export enforcement, forced labor, trade agreement
    investigations, smuggling of narcotics, weapons of mass destruction
    (WMD) and other contraband, illegal transshipment, and vehicle and
    cargo theft. Furthermore, the budget will continue our ability to
    apprehend, detain and remove illegal aliens, and strengthen visitor and
    immigrant arrival and departure control by facilitating timely
    enforcement actions against violators. These funds will also reduce
    infrastructure vulnerabilities, promoting safe and secure Federal
    properties for both employees and visitors.
        The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues its
    mission to protect and secure our nation's transportation systems,
    while ensuring the unencumbered movement of commerce and people. The
    President's budget requests $4.8 billion for TSA, approximately $2.4
    billion of which will be financed by offsetting collections from
    aviation passenger security fees and airline security fees. Collection
    of these fees will be suspended from June 1 through September 30, 2003
    in accord with the provisions of the fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations Act, with collections renewed on October 1,
    2003.
        Of the total request, approximately $4.3 billion supports direct
    aviation security activities, including a professionalized passenger
    and baggage screening workforce, and supporting equipment to prevent
    weapons and other contraband on aircraft. The budget also supports
    reimbursement to State and local law enforcement agencies, funding for
    the Federal Air Marshal Service to provide in-flight security, and it
    supports improvements in both air cargo and passenger screening methods
    and technology to reduce security risks.
        The request for TSA includes funding for new air cargo security and
    armed pilot initiatives, and it supports TSA's work to develop and
    implement security standards for non-aviation modes of transportation.
    Furthermore, it will advance the TSA's work on the Transportation
    Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) initiative.
        The Office for Domestic Preparedness will strengthen the readiness
    capabilities of State and local governments that play a critical role
    in the Nation's ability to prepare for and respond to acts of
    terrorism. ODP will manage the Department's First Responder initiative,
    providing grants for preparedness. ODP will award $3.5 billion to
    States to address the equipment, training, planning and exercise needs
    identified in their updated response plans. These State plans
    strategically outline goals and objectives for preparedness, State and
    local enforcement anti-terrorism initiatives, and Citizen Corps
    preparedness activities. ODP will also continue supporting a number of
    unique training facilities, and provide technical assistance for State
    and local planning efforts.
        The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) will continue
    to serve as a leading Government provider of high-quality law
    enforcement training to Federal, State, and local law enforcement
    officers. The fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center is $146.1 million, including capital
    acquisitions. With these funds, FLETC will provide cost-effective and
    contemporary law enforcement training, support the specialized training
    needs of State, local, and international agencies, and deliver
    preventive and investigative law enforcement methodologies and
    terrorism training.
    Conclusion
        The budget request for the Department of Homeland Security's Border
    and Transportation Security Directorate supports the President's
    National Strategy for Homeland Security, which is the framework for
    mobilizing and organizing the resources of the Federal Government,
    State and local governments, the private sector, and the American
    people to accomplish our unwavering and complex mission to protect the
    homeland. We have a good start on this work, but we are only at the
    beginning of what will be a long and difficult road. Many challenges
    lie ahead.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides the resources to
    enable the Border and Transportation Security Directorate to manage its
    responsibilities and continue its work to secure the homeland to
    protect and serve the American people. We are committed to preventing
    terrorist attacks, reducing America's vulnerability, and responding to
    and recovering from attacks that occur. I look forward to continuing to
    work with you to successfully accomplish these objectives.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Subcommittee, this
    concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any
    questions you may have at this time.

                     CHALLENGES OF UNDER SECRETARY'S OFFICE

        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your
    statement. The other day we had the Secretary of the Department
    of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, before our committee talking
    about the overall budget request for the Department and the
    challenges that face him and the President and all of you who
    are responsible for the individual directorates and carrying
    out the responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security
    Act.
        I wonder, as we celebrated the first 100 days just recently
    of the creation of this new Department, what you view as your
    most challenging responsibilities. You have had experience in
    other Federal offices, specifically the Drug Enforcement
    Administration, heading up that office. Tell us what your most
    difficult and challenging moments have been as Under Secretary.
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it has
    been challenging. I think any time you are setting up a new
    organization there exists an incredible organizational
    challenge. You overlay that with being in the Government, and
    then you overlay that being in a high threat environment, and
    our hostilities in Iraq enhanced our operational challenges,
    and so all of that together combined for a very challenging
    start.
        I have been pleased, quite frankly, with the momentum for
    the merging of the cultures between the 22 different agencies,
    and I think the reason we are having a better time than other
    Government reorganizations is because there is really a strong
    commitment to the homeland security effort. It gives our
    employees a tremendous sense of pride to be a part of this
    Department.

                                    STAFFING

        Senator Cochran. Has there been a very high turnover in the
    offices, particularly the principal offices of leadership in
    the enforcement agencies and the inspection services that now
    come under your jurisdiction? Have you had to go out and find
    new people to hire, or are you bringing over a lot of folks who
    worked in the offices and were in charge before the new
    Department was created?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, it has not been a particular
    problem with attrition or being able to recruit top-quality
    executives or middle-level management for the work we are
    doing. I think when you saw TSA created a couple of years ago,
    I was at the DEA at that time, and you saw a lot of changeover
    in Federal law enforcement. There was a lot of attraction to
    that new mission. There were some competitive advantages to TSA
    as they set up. I think the dust has settled since then, and
    stabilized in our Federal law enforcement workforce. We have
    people really knocking on our doors because they want to be
    engaged in this tremendous new mission, so I don't identify
    that as a problem.
        Senator Cochran. There is a specific amount in the budget
    request for you to hire employees and to staff up your own
    office. Have you completed that work now, and to what extent is
    the budget request sufficient to provide you with the number of
    employees in your office that you need to carry out your
    responsibilities?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, in the 2004 budget request for my
    operational team at the Under Secretary level it will be a part
    of the overall Department management budget, and in my judgment
    it has been adequate thus far. I believe it is adequate for the
    2004 time frame.
        We have budgeted for, I believe it is 67 personnel in the
    Under Secretary's Office. That is relatively small number to
    oversee 110,000 employees in the different agencies, but I
    think it is wise not to start up with a huge bureaucracy. We
    have detailed people from different agencies as part of that 67
    in the near term. That gives us support, and with the
    allocation we have I think that we've got a good team that
    we're putting together for that purpose.

                          STATE OF READINESS IN PORTS

        Senator Cochran. I know that when you mentioned the hiring
    of port directors, you've been traveling around the country
    meeting and getting to know some of the people that are in
    these offices throughout the country, including recently in our
    neighboring city of New Orleans. What do you consider to be the
    state of readiness to protect the security of our Nation's
    ports at this point in time?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all it is much improved, as
    compared to prior to September 11. We have made enormous
    strides and progress with our ports. There has been an
    increasing number of ports that have done vulnerability
    assessments. That is an ongoing process. In addition, the
    information systems have improved, where the inspectors on the
    front line have access to more databases to check cargo and
    people, and it has been a partnership with the private sector.
    They have invested a substantial margin in the security of our
    ports. We have a greater distance to go in the future, but I
    believe that the personnel are ready and the systems are
    getting into place.
        When I was there in New Orleans I saw some from your State,
    Biloxi, that came over, doing an outstanding job there, so I
    think that the state of readiness is good.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd. I am prepared to yield to
    you, sir.

    TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION RESOURCES FOR MARITIME AND LAND
                                    SECURITY

        Senator Byrd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, you have referred to the $4.8 billion TSA
    budget. Only $86 million is requested for maritime and land
    security activity while over $4.3 billion is requested for
    aviation security. This means that less than 2 percent of your
    transportation security budget request is for maritime and land
    security, less than $1 in $50. In fact, the budget request for
    administrative costs associated with TSA headquarters and
    mission support centers, $218 million, is two-and-a-half times
    greater than the request for maritime and land security. How do
    you explain that?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, Senator, of course, subsequent to
    September 11 and really prior to that there was a great focus
    on airport security, airline security. Much of that was--of
    course, all of that was based upon a mandate from Congress to
    have 100 percent checked baggage inspection, as well as
    screening of each passenger, so that's where the emphasis has
    come from. But as you noted, the TSA has a broader mandate than
    just airline security, and we are moving in that direction.
        I don't think we treat every mode of transportation the
    same. Whenever you're looking at rail, we want to act on best
    practices with strong relationships with the modal
    administrations at the Department of Transportation, so we are
    mindful of our responsibility there. We are moving forward with
    stronger efforts in the other modes of transportation, and we
    will do it based upon threats and the vulnerabilities that we
    assess.
        Senator Byrd. All right. You have introduced my next
    question, and you've partially answered it. Why has more
    funding not been requested for other, equally important modes
    of transportation?
        Last month, Secretary Ridge provided the committee with a
    written statement of his priority guidelines for addressing
    vulnerabilities to another terrorist attack. He included
    attacks on confined spaces, such as rail and air transportation
    systems, that could be used to spread contamination. He
    expressed concern about catastrophic economic damage that could
    come from an attack on transportation systems and on petroleum
    facilities at our ports, and, yet, the request for adequate
    resources is not there. We've concentrated on the $4.3 billion
    requested for aviation security.
        I'm all for that, but, the budget request for
    administrative costs associated with TSA headquarters and
    mission support centers is two-and-a-half times greater than
    the request for maritime and land security. Are port and
    maritime security lower priorities? They must be. Why? Is it
    because there hasn't been a terrorist attack here yet? The
    terrorist track record is to exploit vulnerabilities. The first
    attack on the World Trade Center used truck bombs.
        The attempted millennium attack in Washington State sought
    to exploit our porous borders. The 9/11 attack used airplanes.
    I think we should have learned from this track record to
    address all of our vulnerabilities, and not just those that the
    terrorists have used most frequently.

          PRIORITIES IN TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BUDGET

        Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, why is the security of our
    ports, why is the security of our bus and subway systems, why
    is the security of our rail systems, Amtrak, for example, why
    do they have such a lower priority in your budget?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, you're absolutely correct that we
    have to address the broad range of vulnerabilities in our
    transportation systems. Whenever you look at the airlines, we
    responded both to vulnerability but also an incident, and now
    we're conducting assessments, and it is important to conduct
    these assessments of the vulnerability of our transportation
    system so we know exactly how we're spending our money and
    where it should be invested.
        In the 2004 budget, $62 million is requested for the
    Container Security Initiative assessments. This also is an
    important part of our efforts to provide, both from the private
    sector and with our taxpayer partnership, greater security
    efforts in our ports. When it comes to other areas of critical
    infrastructure, we have the Directorate of Information Analysis
    and Infrastructure Protection. This directorate has requested
    $500 million to go toward critical infrastructure protection,
    and this has the broader arena of infrastructure.
        Part of it will be in the transportation sector, part of it
    will be in the petroleum or the energy sector, and there will
    be other aspects of critical infrastructure that have to be
    protected, so we'll go through the assessments, and then we
    will be assigning the responsibilities for the protection based
    upon those vulnerabilities.
        Senator Byrd. It appears to me from what you've said that
    you feel that the budget requests are inadequate. What would be
    an adequate request, in your judgment, to meet these
    vulnerabilities about which you have spoken?
        Mr. Hutchinson. With due respect, Senator, I believe the
    2004 budget request is appropriate. I think it is important not
    to measure success simply by the dollar amounts that are
    invested, but also by the strategy that is being implemented,
    and I think it is an appropriate strategy to logically go
    through the evaluations and the assessments and then put the
    money where the threats and greatest vulnerabilities are, so
    clearly down the road there is going to be additional money
    that is needed, but in terms of the 2004 budget, I think it is
    a correct strategy and the right amount to complete these
    assessments.
        Senator Byrd. How much did you request at the OMB level for
    these items?
        Mr. Hutchinson. I do not have that figure as to that
    discussion.
        Senator Byrd. You don't know what you requested at the OMB
    level?
        Mr. Hutchinson. I do not have that in front of me, sir.
        Senator Byrd. Will you supply it to the committee, please?
        Mr. Hutchinson. We will be glad to look at that and get the
    information to you.
        Senator Byrd. You will be glad to supply that information
    to the committee?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Provided there are not any issues there
    that I am unaware of at this time in terms of the
    communications that we had with OMB, but we will certainly want
    to support your request for that information and be able to
    answer you appropriately.
        Senator Byrd. Well, you have fuzzed up that response. I've
    been in Congress now more than 50 years, and I know when an
    answer, is a solid, firm, straightforward answer, and when it
    is not. So, please supply that information to this committee.
    It's our business to try to fund the needs to protect the
    people of this country, and on the basis of your testimony, I
    think that the budget request is inadequate. So, will you
    please supply that information so that this subcommittee can
    respond in an adequate fashion, as we are here to do and want
    to do? Do you understand that?
        Mr. Hutchinson. I understand, and will be happy to respond
    to your question.
        [The information follows:]

        A separate line item was not included in the fiscal year 2004 TSA
    budget for these items. Rather, budget requirements to address these
    needs and similar requirements across all sectors of the Department of
    Homeland Security were consolidated under the Directorate for
    Infrastructure Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.
        The budget requests that agencies send to OMB are part of the
    Executive Branch's deliberative process for developing the President's
    Budget submission to Congress. The longstanding Executive Branch
    position has been that agencies are to preserve the confidentiality of
    these internal deliberations and not release the funding requests that
    they send to OMB.

                      COAST GUARD GRANTS FOR PORT SECURITY

        Senator Byrd. I will just finish with one more question.
    The Coast Guard has estimated already the cost of improving
    port security at $1.4 billion for fiscal year 2004, and there
    are no dollars, none, in the budget request. Do you want to
    comment on that?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, an assessment was done by the Coast
    Guard. Obviously, when you look at needs for port security,
    part of it is borne by the private sector. A substantial part
    of that they are investing. In addition, we again are providing
    money to complete the assessments, and there are some grants
    that are available through TSA that would be broader than
    simply an assessment that would be grants for improvement of
    security.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I have further questions, but I
    will wait.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator Campbell.

             OFFICE FOR DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS GRANT-MAKING PROCESS

        Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have about,
    maybe 10 questions. Some of them I will submit in writing, too,
    with your permission.
        The portion of your budgets dedicated to managing the
    Department's first responder initiative providing for grants
    for preparedness, I think my office is like many of them here,
    and that is we have some disparity about how it ought to be
    administered at the State level. It seems like every town, at
    least major-sized towns in my State, would like to have their
    own Homeland Security office and their own network, their own
    system, and the States would prefer it go through the States.
    Could you explain very quickly how the process that's in place
    now, how it awards the grants?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, Senator. The broad overarching
    principle is that we want to go through the State Homeland
    Security directors to channel the money flow to the first
    responders at the local government level, and the reason is
    that we want to make sure that a security response is highly
    coordinated, that there is a multijurisdictional response to
    any terrorist incident or the planning for it. The only way to
    do that is to have a State coordinating body that will make
    sure that the local entities are coordinating and moving in the
    same direction.
        Senator Campbell. So the grant is given to the State and
    they, in turn, disseminate it to communities as they see fit?
        Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. Now, in reference to the
    most recent supplemental that was provided, over $2.2 billion,
    the bulk of that will go through the States, but Congress
    wisely put on a requirement that it has to go from the States
    to the local governments within 45 days. Sometimes in the past
    it has stayed there too long, and so that 45 days will move it
    in a more quick fashion to the local governments. There will be
    pressure from the bottom, and we will be putting pressure from
    the top.
        You also allowed, I think it was $10 million at least, for
    technical assistance, so ODP will be providing more technical
    assistance to the States to help them to get that money out to
    local governments. We recognize how important it is to get to
    the local governments. We are going to be working to accomplish
    that, but still, it's important to run that money through the
    State for coordination purposes.
        Senator Campbell. Okay, thank you.

      EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES RELEVANT TO BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

        There must be literally dozens of groups who have already
    come to you, and certainly they have come to us, that have some
    kind of a new, sophisticated technology that they think should
    be in the mix somewhere in trying to provide better security,
    particularly on airlines. I saw one about 6 months ago that
    was--I'm not a really high tech person, and it kind of amazed
    me. It was a very tiny monitor that could be put literally
    anywhere in the plane, in the cabin of the plane, and you
    almost couldn't see it. It was just like a little, small eye,
    and it was coupled with a screen on the ground so people on the
    ground at the appropriate agencies could actually watch what
    was going on inside the cabin of the plane and could
    communicate with the people on the ground, too. I thought that
    was really pretty advanced.
        Is there a process now in place in which these new emerging
    technologies, which are often done by very small groups around
    the country, is there a process in place now where they can get
    into the system and show their wares and have someone evaluate
    it?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, there is, and I was pleased that one
    of the directorates created at Homeland Security is the Science
    and Technology Directorate, which is--I equate it to an R&D
    shop in private industry, and Dr. Chuck McQueary, does an
    outstanding job there, and as we see either new emerging
    technologies or maybe even existing technologies in the private
    sector that may have an application for border security or
    transportation security, we will ask them to evaluate it, to
    test, pilot it, to see if it can work on the border, or we
    might give them an idea that they will go out in the private
    sector and solicit bids for a particular project.
        So they do the evaluation, the piloting of it, we do the
    request, and then the implementation of it if it does have that
    application. I have encouraged those in private industry to
    check our Web sites. They have ways in which they can present
    their ideas to Homeland Security.
        Senator Campbell. And along that line, before 9/11 there
    was very little way to be able to communicate from the air to
    the ground, other than the normal channel to the tower, and the
    air marshals, do they have a way of communicating with the
    ground now, when they are on the airplane, and by the way, if
    there is something you shouldn't say in public, or before the
    committee, that's fine.
        Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, let me get back with you on that
    answer, if I might.
        [The information follows:]

        Pursuant to House Conference Committee Report 107-593, TSA's
    Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was provided $15 million to begin
    implementation of an Air to Ground Communications program. TSA intends
    to utilize this funding to purchase a Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS)
    product, which includes hardware and software, for implementation of
    the Air to Ground communications system. This initial system will allow
    FAMS to utilize a portable, quickly deployable air to ground
    communications system which will seamlessly integrate existing FAMS
    wireless technology. This comprehensive wireless communications system
    may also be used by other local, State, and Federal agencies, and the
    Department of Defense, to achieve secure communications through a
    dedicated law enforcement network.

                         MONITORING UNTENDED AIRSTRIPS

        Senator Campbell. I mentioned in my opening statement, too,
    one of the weaknesses I saw, which raised some hackles of
    private aviation, but I know that there are literally hundreds
    and hundreds of runways around the country, many of them paved,
    by the way, that are on the FAA maps, but there's nobody
    around. They're just, literally abandoned.
        I know of two just within a few miles of my own home town,
    in fact, no towers, no FBOs, nothing on it, where people could
    land, and certainly the drug runners know most of these
    airports, and they are the ones who are using them.
        Is there anything that we are doing to catalog them, or
    monitor them, do something so that they would be less
    attractive as a place to put explosives on a private plane, as
    an example?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, there are a couple of things that
    we're doing. First of all, the general aviation industry has
    been very supportive in terms of, if they see something that is
    suspicious, they report that. We had a number of different
    reports that we've investigated based on their information, so
    they're really our eyes and ears out there if they see
    something strange or get an unusual request. The general public
    obviously is helpful.
        We have in the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement the Air and Marine Division, in which we monitor
    aircraft, in conjunction with other agencies that might be
    coming into our country. We, during Operation Liberty Shield,
    deployed many of those air assets to the Northern border. That
    helps us to track pilots that are unaccounted for, or might be
    operating under suspicious circumstances.
        So a combination of our own intelligence and law
    enforcement activities on the ground with our monitoring of our
    border air security gives us a pretty good idea of what's going
    on in that arena.
        Senator Campbell. Well, good luck in that arena, because I
    just think there's a huge weakness there yet.

                        PRIVATIZING AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

        Recently, President Bush issued an Executive order that
    deleted a clause in a previous order signed by President
    Clinton that described air traffic control as an inherently
    governmental function. The administration, this administration
    has proposed studying whether to hire a private company to take
    over the air traffic control system. What effect would that
    have? Do you think it would solve any problems, or would it
    help the current system, or hinder the current system?
        Mr. Hutchinson. If there were private contractors for air
    traffic control?
        Senator Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Hutchinson. I really wouldn't be in a position to
    comment from an expert standpoint on that. Obviously, we look
    at the private sector where appropriate. That is one that has
    to be closely integrated and we have to be careful about, but I
    would wait for the comments from the FAA before I would want to
    submit my own comments on that.
        Senator Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. Senator Inouye.
        Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

                    FURLOUGHING OF AIR PASSENGER INSPECTORS

        Mr. Secretary, recently TSA issued hundreds of yellow slips
    throughout the system, many to recently trained inspectors.
    Does that reflect itself on the budget, because I noticed,
    personnel, you have increased it?
        Mr. Hutchinson. It does, and the reason for that was
    twofold. One, there is a cap on the number of employees. This
    reduction, or right-sizing, as Admiral Loy calls it, will bring
    the screener workforce down to 49,000, and then secondly, there
    naturally needs to be an adjustment out there for efficiency
    purposes. The organization stood up very quickly. Not all of
    our personnel were allocated in the right way. We have to
    adjust it to allow for the traffic flow. There is going to be a
    reduction of 6,000, I think, in the next 6 months. It will be
    phased in.
        About half of those will happen through normal attrition.
    Others will be done through performance evaluations. There is
    some accommodation for those that have to be moved, so Admiral
    Loy is working closely with the workforce on that and with the
    management at TSA to do this in the best way, but it's
    something that was necessary from a budget standpoint and a
    management standpoint, and in answer to your question, it does
    save hundreds of millions of dollars by this reduction in
    force.
        Senator Inouye. Do you have similar caps in other areas?
        Mr. Hutchinson. In other areas of Homeland Security?
        Senator Inouye. Yes.
        Mr. Hutchinson. No. That is the only statutorily mandated
    limitation on numbers. Of course, others are fixed in terms of
    the amount that could be used for personnel, but that was a
    unique circumstance in which we had to stand it up so quickly.
    There was a limitation that was placed on it, and that is the
    only one that, because of budget constraints, TSA is the only
    one that had to do a right-sizing of the workforce.
        Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I
    submit my other questions?
        Senator Cochran. Senator, thank you. Certainly, and we hope
    you will be able to respond, Mr. Secretary, to the written
    questions within a reasonable time.
        Mr. Hutchinson. I would be pleased to do so.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Hollings.

                                 PORT SECURITY

        Senator Hollings. Mr. Chairman, on Senator Byrd's question
    of your request to OMB, add how much OMB cut your request, will
    you, please?
        Mr. Hutchinson. I will add that to the request.
        Senator Hollings. And this is friendly, because I'm with
    you, and I want to work with you, but you're way behind the
    curve when you intimate that, for example, the port security
    assessments are on course, and that security at ports is good.
    Let me--harken the actual facts.
        When we passed the port security bill in the United States
    Senate, it wasn't just an estimate. That was a determination of
    $4\1/2\ billion, and $1.4 billion immediately. That was voted
    on by every Republican and every Senator, 100 to nothing. When
    we got over on the House side, they bucked all year long, and
    we had to finally compromise just making an authorization bill
    in November.
        Again, in the emergency supplemental we had a billion in
    there that we could spend during the rest of this fiscal year.
    I know Senators, Republican Senators that wanted to cosponsor,
    wanted to vote for it, and word came from the White House,
    don't vote for that. There's no money.
        And when you intimate that money could come from the
    private sector, it won't come from the private sector. It won't
    even come from the public. Working with these folks you learn
    quickly, they don't want security. The name of the game at the
    port is to move it as fast as they possibly can, and so they're
    in competition, and they just cross their fingers and say,
    well, they'll blow up Houston, or they'll blow up Philadelphia,
    they won't come to mine, and I'm not going to spend my time and
    money on that particular story, and incidentally the law says
    the captain of the port is in charge of security, which means
    you, Mr. Secretary, the buck stops with you. We need that
    money. We need it right away.
        We do not have--for one, you testified, the transportation
    worker identification credentials. That's supposed to be
    available next month, in June, and these truck drivers coming
    on the port facility, they don't have credentials. They can't
    enforce it now, but that's what we said last year, that by June
    of this year we would have a card that you had approved in the
    Department of Homeland Security, and that Department would
    issue it, and then everybody would have an identification card.
        We have virtually no security whatever. I can identify
    every plane that approaches the coast of the United States. I
    cannot identify every ship. Now, we made the shipowners provide
    transponders, but we do not have the money for the channel
    towers. It just came out the other day when Secretary Ridge was
    here, and he testified that we don't have that money yet.
    You've got to get your Department on top of this particular
    problem, because Osama bin Laden has got 10 vessels that he
    owns. He used a rust bucket to go into Mombasa, the port of
    Kenya, to blow up U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania, and
    they could come up to Houston, or come up the Delaware River.
        They could come up on, not on one of those rust buckets,
    they could take over--like they did the planes, they could take
    over an Exxon tanker coming right up there, throw the captain
    overboard and run it into the tank farm there, blow the whole
    thing. That would close down the eastern seaboard for several
    months--we've got Booz-Allen studies. All of this has been, not
    just estimates, but studies showing the tremendous danger that
    we're in, but to come to say, we're on course and the port
    security is good? I want to work with you and get on with that.
    We need the money now, and your budget doesn't call for it.
        Otherwise, there's been an ongoing, trying to get an
    additional 500 Customs agents. We debated an old textile bill
    back when President Reagan was in. I tried to get the 500
    there. Then when we debated another bill, NAFTA, in 1994--he is
    now the ranking member of the Budget, but Congressman Spratt,
    that you know very well, he voted for NAFTA on the promise that
    he would get 500 Customs agents. He hasn't gotten them yet.
        Now we go to the Customs agency and say, look, you say the
    $5 billion in train shipments in violation of textiles, and the
    agent looks at you and says, Senator, you want me to check
    drugs or do you want me to check textiles? He said, I'm
    checking drugs as best I can. Now, the agent says, excuse me,
    I'm checking terrorists, then I'm checking drugs, then I might
    get to your textiles, so you're way behind the curve on Customs
    agents, so I just suggest that you get on top of that.
        I see according to my news reporter here on the right we're
    getting rid of Mitch Daniels in 30 days.
        Senator Leahy. Hallelujah.
        Senator Hollings. Hallelujah is right. Let's get the money
    and get on, because you're the one that's going to be in
    charge. The buck stops there.
        I appreciate you've got a difficult task, and a lot of old
    things like the Customs things and identification card and the
    Port Security money. The money hasn't been there on rail
    security, it's not there on port security.
        Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, I just want to thank you for your
    comments. You have been a very constructive partner in this,
    and I take your admonitions very seriously, and I certainly do
    not mean to represent that everything is perfect in the
    security realm. We understand the many challenges that we face.
        Senator Hollings. Your problem is money, and let's get it
    out of that crowd.
        Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you for your comments, Senator.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Leahy.
        Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I checked--any
    further news? I'm so tempted to say something, but I'm not
    going to do that. I don't get the Arkansas wire here.
        Mr. Hutchinson. You're a wise man.
        Senator Leahy. I only get the Vermont political wire.
        Mr. Hutchinson. I'm staying right where I am.
        I think.

                    RESTRUCTURING OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS

        Senator Leahy. Let me ask you a question. You and I have
    known each other and worked with each other for years, and I am
    thinking back to when you testified before the Judiciary
    Committee in March, and I asked you to make good use of the
    excellent former, now former INS employees from Vermont that
    you inherited. Vermont is home to the administrative offices
    for the INS that provides oversight administration for much of
    the eastern half of the United States. I mention them because
    the workers have always received the highest rankings for their
    work and efficiency, and most have felt it was a good bang for
    the buck, and you told me it was essential to get the facts and
    to communicate with them clearly.
        Now, since that testimony, the former INS and Customs
    employees of Vermont still want to know what the restructuring
    means to them. Of course, some confusion is inevitable. I was
    looking at the organizational chart of the Department of
    Homeland Security. It's a pretty daunting one, so could you
    tell me what is the current state of restructuring for the
    Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and how will
    that command structure differ from what the INS now has?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator, and first of all the
    Law Enforcement Service Center in Vermont does an outstanding
    job. Mike Garcia, the Acting Assistant Secretary in charge of
    ICE has been up there. I'm also aware of how critical a role
    they play in providing local law enforcement with information
    on alien absconders and other issues that they have to
    confront, so I'm very impressed with the work that they do in
    terms of our organizational structure with Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement. I call it ICE.
        This Bureau came into Homeland Security by simply linking
    the chain of command at the top, and so you had your
    immigration enforcement and you had your Customs enforcement.
    They just came up to the top. Now we're bringing those middle
    management structures together, and we're going to be moving
    forward in the next couple of weeks. The management of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement is ready for this unified
    leadership change. I do not see that this impacts the
    enforcement services there in Vermont. We do not plan to reduce
    the staff there. They're doing an outstanding job, and they're
    very needed in this mission, and they will remain a critical
    part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

        LEADERSHIP ISSUES IN REORGANIZATION OF BORDER SECURITY AGENCIES

        Senator Leahy. Thank you. I was just wondering. I don't
    envy you having to do this, but you have to integrate the old
    INS, Customs, other agencies into the Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection. If you've got overlapping personnel and
    administrative support staff and so on, how do you determine
    who takes the lead? Who is in charge? I mean, ultimately you
    are, I understand, but to make it function, how do you
    determine that?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it is a challenge whenever you're
    looking at whether it's immigration enforcement director or
    Customs traditional enforcement, SAC, that takes the lead, when
    you bring the management structure together you look at their
    experience, you look at their grade level, and things like
    that, put an interim person in charge. Then you will go to a
    merit-based selection process where everybody can present
    themselves for that, so it's a process we're going through
    that's working fairly smoothly.
        The biggest challenge is with the services side and
    splitting things off there, because you had support functions
    that supported both the enforcement side as well as the
    services side, as well as the inspection side, and so you've
    got some blend. That's more difficult to split, but
    Commissioner Bonner, Mr. Garcia, and Eduardo Aguirre, who is
    head of the services side, have a working group between them
    that work on these issues, and they're resolving them very
    well. It's a challenge, but they are making progress on it.
        One of the biggest challenges, by the way, is the overseas
    offices, because usually in a small overseas office they serve
    everyone, and they're funded in many instances by the services
    side fee collection, and that is a difficult issue we're
    wrestling with.
        Senator Leahy. I am sure it is. I have other questions
    about TSA staff reductions, certainly at the Burlington Airport
    and others. I will submit that for the record.
        And I will make the same invitation to you I made to
    Governor Ridge. The snow has gone out in Vermont. It has now
    melted. The maple syrup crop is in. Come to Vermont and talk to
    these people. I really wish you would. They are amazing. I have
    spent a lot of time both in South Burlington and St. Albans,
    where we have so many INS, Customs, others up on the border,
    and I use that term, INS, Customs, all just realizing that has
    changed, but to indicate who I'm talking about.
        These are remarkable people. They are highly dedicated
    people, alien tracking system that you referred to in law
    enforcement. I remember one time we had 20 inches of snow
    overnight. This had to stay open around the clock. Everybody
    showed up to work on time, and I said something and they said,
    well, there has to be somebody here, of course. I mean, there's
    just never any question.
        So come on up there sometime. I would love to show you
    around.
        Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. I'd be happy to do so.
        Senator Leahy. And I will submit my other question, if I
    might, for the record.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Leahy.

            ENFORCEMENT ROLES AND COORDINATION UNDER REORGANIZATION

        Mr. Secretary, in your directorate there are several sub-
    bureaus focused on enforcement of current law, specifically the
    Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation
    Security Administration. How do you intend to coordinate the
    policies and the investigations procedures of these different
    entities within your directorate? Will they be coordinated, or
    will they function more or less independent of each other?
        Mr. Hutchinson. They will be coordinated, and we're doing
    it in a couple of ways. First of all, every Friday we have a
    policy council, BTS policy council that meets. The heads of
    each of the agencies under the Border and Transportation
    Directorate meet and we work on this coordination every week,
    high level.
        For example, use of force. Whenever you have a multitude of
    different agencies coming from the Justice Department, the
    Treasury Department, Transportation coming over, everybody has
    a different policy. We want to unite them together. This
    afternoon I'll be meeting with the Deputy Secretary about the
    procurement of boats. Whenever you have Coast Guard, it's not
    in the BTS, but we're trying to coordinate that with our
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement procurement of some air and
    marine assets, so we're working at that level as well.
        Probably most importantly, though, is the IT architecture,
    the information infrastructure. We're working with Steve
    Cooper, our Chief Information Officer for the Department, and
    building it together. For example, TSA is proposing and trying
    to pilot the CAPPS-II program, which is an information-sharing
    system I also emphasize over and over again that ultimately we
    want to be able to collect information from our visa programs
    overseas and the consular offices, make sure that information
    is available to our inspectors at the airports and our land
    ports of entry. Furthermore the information that is collected
    must be Government-based, not any private databases there, but
    appropriate to be shared, can be shared, and so we want to
    integrate these functions together.
        It is a humongous challenge. I think there's almost 3,000
    different mission-oriented programs for our information
    infrastructure. That's a huge challenge, to coordinate those
    together, but we're working on it through policy development in
    our policy council.

                           CONSOLIDATED PROCUREMENTS

        Senator Cochran. In that connection, I think there could be
    opportunities for substantial savings if you bring together the
    procurement processes too. You mention the boats and ships that
    might be under the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard or some of
    the other agencies, but a number of automobiles and other
    vehicles like buses and helicopters are used by the Border
    Patrol, Investigations, Detention, and TSA. It seems to me that
    they could be consolidated in a procurement regime under your
    directorate, and you could end up saving money and become more
    efficient in the process. Is that your plan, and to what extent
    are you implementing that kind of plan?
        Mr. Hutchinson. That is the plan, and it will result in
    some savings. For example, the Canine Enforcement Divisions.
    TSA has a canine enforcement program, bomb-sniffing dogs. We
    have drug-sniffing dogs in terms of the border inspection, and
    we want to look at ways that we can bring these programs
    together, not just for cost savings, but also for better
    standards and better training, so that's one area.
        As you mentioned, there's a whole host of others.
    Helicopters is a good example, and not just in procurement but
    also in cross-training capabilities. I was in a meeting of
    employees where you had the Border Patrol having their
    helicopters, and then you had the Air and Marine Division of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement with their helicopters, and
    they said, you know, we'd have less down time if we were cross-
    trained, we could actually use the other's helicopters, so this
    is something that's being pushed at both the ground level and
    at a high level.
        In some instances we won't be able to have joint
    procurement. If we can't, we want to be able to explain why and
    check it out.

                      CONSOLIDATED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

        Senator Cochran. You mentioned information technology. Do
    you intend to consolidate hardware and software systems within
    your directorate so you eventually end up with one single
    technology platform, or will it be a combination of systems?
        Mr. Hutchinson. The ultimate goal is that they're
    integrated and that the information is shared. As to how you
    technically reach that goal, I will leave that to Steve Cooper,
    our Chief Information Officer, who has the technical
    capabilities, but I am working with him to accomplish that. It
    is not going to be--we can't stop every program development
    right now to say, wait till we get all this coordinated, but
    we're trying as we develop a program saying, make sure that
    this is going to be able to tie in to the other programs that
    we know have to be developed, so ultimately we will be measured
    by that, and we're committed to having success on that.
        Senator Cochran. Well, I wish you well. I think it is a
    very challenging responsibility that you face. To what extent
    do you try to impose your will on the agency heads within your
    directorate?
        I'm thinking about some of the specific requirements for
    security precautions at our Nation's airports. There still
    seems to be a good deal of controversy surrounding some of
    those things, whether they're needed or not, whether they take
    too long, do you have too many people as screeners, or not
    enough at some places. How much are you going to get involved
    in the details of those decisions?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, first of all I have a lot of
    confidence in the agency heads. They're good managers. They are
    very thoughtful, and certainly want to do a good job for the
    country, so I don't want to micromanage them. We give broad
    direction to them, but we do ask the tough questions, and
    that's my responsibility, and so that is one of the reasons I
    get out in the field. I see how it's working out there, I come
    back and push them on a number of these things, and then we
    have our own initiatives, some of those I have mentioned, to
    bring them together.
        The greatest challenge, but opportunity, we have is to
    bring these cultures and operations together in a way the
    American public expects. For example, the sharing of
    information, where a boat operator does not have to send the
    cargo information to three different agencies but can send it
    to one--a common sense approach, and we're doing that. Those
    are the kinds of initiatives we want to be able to drive with
    them. Good managers, though. They have a lot of flexibility,
    but we are working for Department objectives that they will
    implement, and we're going to make sure that happens.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you. Senator Byrd. Excuse me,
    Senator Kohl. Senator Byrd is willing to yield to you for any
    questions you might have. We've been operating under sort of a
    loosely determined 5-minute rule for questions.

                    REDUCTION OF AIRPORT SECURITY SCREENERS

        Senator Kohl. Thank you. I appreciate it very much.
        Mr. Secretary, recently the Administration announced that
    it intends to cut 6,000 security screeners at airports around
    the country. I do understand that some airports may well have
    more screeners than they need, and so I'm not opposing the
    reductions in their entirety. However, I'm concerned about a
    few airports in my State of Wisconsin that I believe will have
    a difficult time dealing with staff cuts.
        First, Dane County Airport is listed as going from 81 to 63
    screeners. I have been told that this is based on some
    misunderstanding about the number of security lines at that
    airport in Madison. TSA thought that Madison had only one
    security line when in fact it has three.
        I have also been informed that this confusion is in the
    process of being sorted out and that Madison should get an
    additional screener, which would bring it to a total of 82. Is
    my understanding correct, and can we expect a decision on this
    fairly soon?
        Mr. Hutchinson. There have been some--you know, in the
    process of adjustments there were errors made that have had to
    be reevaluated. Originally we had received some inaccurate
    information about the number of lanes in Wisconsin. The field
    resubmitted that information, and the numbers will be finalized
    in the next couple of weeks to reflect the added lane you
    mentioned. I will be glad to get back with you more
    specifically on your question to give you the commitment that
    you're asking for, but that is the information that I have
    right now, and we will continue to work on that.
        Senator Kohl. I appreciate it, and will stay in close
    touch.
        At another airport, at the Outagamie County Airport in
    Wisconsin, which serves the Appleton area, it's slated to go
    down to 29 screeners from its current level of 51. However,
    even with 51 screeners Outagamie County Airport is paying 10
    percent of its screeners' employment costs now in overtime, so
    the question is, why would screeners be reduced when TSA is
    currently paying overtime on a regular basis in this location?
        Mr. Hutchinson. I would have to look at that, too, and get
    back to you. The methodology for the changes that were made
    looked at passenger loads and the numbers of lanes, the use of
    part-time and seasonal employees. The split shifts were
    considered, but that doesn't answer the question that you're
    asking, and we will be glad to get back with you as to how the
    overtime that they were having to commit justifies the
    reduction that you refer to.
        Senator Kohl. Okay. Well, I would like to be able to stay
    in touch with you and the Department on that one.

                          SMUGGLING OF PSEUDOEPHEDRINE

        Mr. Secretary, in January of 2002 a trafficking operation
    operating in several U.S. cities was found to be smuggling
    pseudoephedrine, a precursor to meth, into the United States
    from Canada. Meth is a major problem in my own State of
    Wisconsin and throughout the Midwest, but what's even worse,
    the proceeds of that trafficking ring have been traced to
    Hezbollah and other terrorist groups operating in Yemen and
    Lebanon. In what ways has the Department of Homeland Security
    tightened its processes and procedures at the borders to stop
    the smuggling of illegal drugs or their precursors into the
    United States, in light of the link between drug trafficking
    and terrorism?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Excellent question, and I appreciate that
    both from my current standpoint of protecting the borders and
    the point I made when I was at the DEA. We are very concerned
    about these types of operations at Homeland Security. Illegal
    drugs constitute one of the biggest weapons of mass destruction
    that we suffer, and so it is appropriate that we protect our
    borders from both terrorist weapons and also drugs.
        What you refer to is Operation Mountain Express, a very
    successful investigation of the pseudo-traffickers, and as you
    mentioned, some of that money went to the Middle East, some of
    which went into the hands of some terrorist organizations. What
    we're doing at the border--and I was there at some of the ports
    of entry on the Northern border, and our inspectors are looking
    at shipments that may be suspect in terms of pseudoephedrine
    that would come from Canada.
        We're also certainly encouraging our Canadian counterparts
    to regulate pseudoephedrine so they do not have the legal
    capability of procuring it there and moving it through the
    Canadian commerce chain before it comes across our border. We
    are keeping an eye on that from an inspection standpoint at the
    borders, from an investigative standpoint through Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement, and finally working with the Canadian
    Government to regulate pseudoephedrine.
        Senator Kohl. Thank you.

                    SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS)

        A last question, Mr. Secretary. We can all be thankful SARS
    has not taken serious hold in our country. However, SARS has
    shown us that a deadly illness can be introduced and spread by
    visitors to our country, or upon the return of an American
    citizen who has traveled abroad. What is the Department of
    Homeland Security doing to ensure that visitors who come into
    the United States at border crossings or by airplane or by boat
    are not carrying SARS? What is the Department doing to prepare
    for and safeguard against other, possibly more lethal diseases?
        Mr. Hutchinson. It has been a wake-up call for all of us
    that have responsibility at our ports of inspection. In
    reference to SARS, we provided training information for our
    inspectors to know what SARS is about, how to identify the
    symptoms of that, and what to guard for.
        We certainly give them the protective equipment whenever
    they have reason to believe they might be exposed so they can
    protect themselves. We are closely working with the Center for
    Disease Control and Secretary Thompson's shop to make sure we
    have the right information.
        As we see passengers that come from areas of the world that
    have an outbreak of SARS we will give them information that CDC
    prepared, that they know that the passenger would be able to
    identify the symptoms and be able to check with a doctor if
    they encounter those symptoms.
        So it's training, it's information that we're providing for
    the passengers, and then we're looking down the road in the
    event it becomes more serious, or a greater concern, what
    additional steps we should take. That is difficult, difficult
    obviously when people are coming to our land borders
    particularly. There is very little that we can do, but we do
    want to be able to provide the training and the information,
    and to see if there's any additional action we can take in
    conjunction with CDC.
        Senator Kohl. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Byrd.

                               ENTRY/EXIT SYSTEM

        Senator Byrd. One crucial component of ensuring our
    homeland security is ensuring that we as a government know
    which foreigners are visiting our country, why they are here,
    and that they depart when they are required to do so. Our
    existing visa tracking systems are not doing the job. The
    budget before us requests $480 million for the new entry/exit
    visa tracking system. This is only a $100 million increase over
    last year's level of funding.
        A few days ago, Secretary Ridge announced a major change in
    the program, proposing to create the U.S. VISIT system. The
    Secretary has testified about the potential use of biometrics
    in the system, but he offered very few other details when he
    appeared before the panel last week.
        Many Members of Congress and outside experts are concerned
    about the lack of progress in implementing the previous system,
    much less this revised system. It's my understanding that the
    Department has not yet determined what technology will be used
    in developing the system. Do you have anything new on that
    point?
        Mr. Hutchinson. I believe Secretary Ridge set the goals and
    the direction for us in his testimony he presented to this
    committee. He has directed us to go through a review of the
    program that we inherited to see how we can meet the objectives
    that Congress set for us in their deadlines, but also the goals
    that Secretary Ridge has set. There are a number of policy
    decisions that have to be made in order to determine how we get
    to these objectives. We are due to provide the Appropriations
    Committee a report on this, and we look forward to getting that
    to you as soon as we can conclude this review.
        Senator Byrd. Considering the track record of the former
    INS in tracking foreign visitors, let alone identifying
    potential terrorists or even coordinating watch lists with
    other Federal agencies, I did not have much faith in that
    service's ability to get the job done. Shortcomings have
    plagued the INS, and are not far from plaguing the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate. There remain too many
    holes in our borders and not enough agents. There are millions
    of visitors to this country, and there is not even an ability
    to guarantee that they are who they claim to be.
        What steps are being taken to ensure that this system is on
    track, and that it can be deployed in a timely fashion?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all, the goal that was given
    to us in 2003 was to deploy, to have an entry/exit system for
    our airports and our seaports. As Secretary Ridge indicated,
    we're going to meet that congressionally mandated deadline.
    We're going to have that capability.
        In addition, really in my view further than the law
    requires, we're going to have the capability of capturing and
    reading biometric identifiers at that time in our airports and
    seaports, so we look forward to working with Congress to
    accomplish that goal.
        The second part of the mandate is to have the same type of
    system in the 50 land ports of entry by the end of 2004. We are
    moving forward aggressively to evaluate what has been done by
    the former INS in developing this system. As soon as we
    complete that review, we will report to the Congress as to
    where we will be in reference to the 2004 deadlines, but we're
    working very aggressively to accomplish that.
        When you talk about tracking visitors, a part of it is also
    getting better information on our visitors and checking them
    out at our consular offices overseas. We are working with the
    Department of State right now for a memorandum of understanding
    with them to transfer some of the oversight and training
    responsibilities on that from the Department of State to the
    Department of Homeland Security, which was a part of the
    legislation that created this Department.

                   TRACKING OF STUDENTS AND EXCHANGE VISITORS

        Senator Byrd. One of the criticisms of the former INS,
    Immigration and Naturalization Service, was and remains its
    inability to adequately track the entry and subsequent exit of
    non-U.S. citizens who come to the United States and for
    whatever reason overstay their visa. For instance, only last
    month, the Department of Justice's Inspector General released a
    report stating that there are significant deficiencies in the
    tracking of foreign students.
        Your Acting Assistant Secretary of the new Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement agreed with the IG's
    conclusion that they need more resources to properly manage one
    of the many tracking systems. What is your take on that? Are
    additional resources required to implement the new system?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the Department of Justice Inspector
    General report was on the SEVIS system, which was the tracking
    system for foreign students that come to our educational
    institutions, and this has been a very successful deployment,
    in my judgment, by the former INS, and now, the Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement responsibility. There were some bugs in it,
    as was pointed out by the Inspector General. Those we are
    attempting to address, and working with the universities to
    accomplish the very important goal of being able to track our
    students.
        You asked about the resources. What we are creating is a
    lot of information for us to evaluate. We know, for example,
    that the universities will call in foreign students who have
    foreign student visas but they do not show up for class. Now,
    why is that? Do they just get a job somewhere? Do they go back
    to their home? If we have over 2,000 names of people, students
    who do not show up for class, we have a responsibility to check
    those out, and we are trying to develop that capability.
        So we want to be able to get information but also to have
    an enforcement mechanism to investigate and to prosecute those
    who violate our law. That is a challenge for us. We are trying
    to meet that. Do we need more resources? That is part of the
    2004 budget that I think will be adequate. We are going through
    to see what greater capability we need. I would be happy to
    report back to you, because I want to make sure we do not just
    get information from all these different tracking systems, but
    we have a capability to follow up on that information.

                      COUNTERFEIT IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS

        Senator Byrd. Last year, the Senate Finance Committee
    tasked the General Accounting Office with sending agents out to
    try to enter the United States from Canada, from Mexico, and
    from Jamaica, using false names and counterfeit identification
    documents. In short, in each instance those GAO officials
    succeeded in using these fake documents to enter the United
    States. On at least one occasion, they were not even stopped as
    they crossed over at one point of entry.
        They created fictitious driver's licenses and birth
    certificates, using off-the-shelf computer graphics software
    that is available to any purchaser. Additionally, they obtained
    and carried credit cards in the fictitious names that were used
    in the test. The agents entered the United States from all
    three locations using the fake names and documents. Officials
    of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
    U.S. Customs Service whom the GAO agents encountered never
    questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and
    the GAO agents encountered no difficulty entering the country
    using the fake documents. On two occasions, INS officials did
    not ask for or inspect any identification documents when the
    GAO agents entered the United States. On another occasion, an
    agent was able to walk across a major border checkpoint without
    being stopped or inspected by any government official. The
    results of the exercise led the GAO to conclude that, (1)
    people who enter the United States are not always asked to
    present identification, (2) security to prevent unauthorized
    persons from entering the United States from Canada from at
    least one location is inadequate, and (3) inspectors from the
    former INS are not readily capable of detecting counterfeit
    identification documents.
        Now, what steps, Mr. Secretary, do you intend to have
    implemented in order to address the gaps, such as better
    training, more intense document scrutiny, and what additional
    resources do you need in order to accomplish these things?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator. First of all, we need
    to learn from those type of GAO reports and to take those
    lessons and apply them in the field. A couple of points there.
    In that GAO attempt to enter the country, they utilized, I
    believe, in most of the instances, State driver's licenses. Our
    inspectors, with 50 different States, are not as trained in
    identifying all the nuances of the different States' driver's
    licenses versus foreign passports, and so it can be addressed
    by more training. It can also be addressed by the States
    implementing more security in the issuance of their driver's
    licenses that are more resistant to forgery, so we need to
    approach it in both ways.
        Secondly, I would point out that these are American
    citizens that were reentering the country, and our law does not
    require American citizens who travel to Canada and back to have
    any travel document, other than simply their affirmation or
    perhaps a driver's license that they are an American citizen.
    If we required our American citizens to have passports when
    they leave the country and return, obviously that would be a
    greater security measure, but I'm not sure we want to do that
    yet.
        I would also point out that I was pleased that there was an
    instance, I believe it was in a Niagara point of entry, that an
    Iranian came across the border with fraudulent Australian
    passports, and who was apprehended at the time. So I think
    there's a difference between capability of our inspectors in
    picking up on false passports versus a driver's license from
    the different States. So we need to work on training, we also
    need to work with the States to enhance the security of their
    travel, a driver's license and other documents.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I have further questions, but I
    would be glad to await your questions.

       TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO SECURITY ALERT
                                     LEVELS

        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. In
    connection with the Transportation Security Administration,
    while you don't get involved in the minutiae of day-to-day
    administration responsibility, you do have the responsibility
    of providing guidance and supervision of those who do run that
    agency on a day-to-day basis, and I wonder about the impact of
    these different stages of alert, the red alert, yellow, orange,
    or all the rest. To what extent are you involved in helping to
    determine exactly what the Transportation Security
    Administration does when it changes from one state of alert to
    another?
        Mr. Hutchinson. I am substantially involved in that. In
    fact, when we brought on TSA from Transportation, other
    agencies from Justice, they had different ways of responding to
    the different alert levels, so one of the first things we did
    under my leadership was to ask for a review of the actions that
    were taken when we raised the alert level, and to make sure
    that they are complementary of each other. We are very much
    involved from a leadership standpoint in the actions that are
    taken by those agencies.
        We also, most recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
    developed our own operation, Liberty Shield, in which we
    provided the leadership to the agencies working with them as to
    what should be the response and the additional security
    measures that would be taken as a result of the hostilities
    overseas.

                          AIRPORT SCREENER REDUCTIONS

        Senator Cochran. Also, with respect to the Transportation
    Security Administration, we observed that Admiral Loy, who is
    the Administrator, has announced he plans to cut the number of
    airport screeners, 3,000 during this month and another 3,000 by
    the end of the fiscal year. How did the Transportation Security
    Administration get in the position of having such a large
    number of screeners--I have been advised the number is 55,000--
    when there is a statutory cap for full-time permanent positions
    at 45,000? Is this an indication that at least 10,000 of these
    were viewed as temporary employees, and it didn't violate the
    statutory cap?
        Mr. Hutchinson. That's correct, either temporary or part-
    time, so it either could be a contract or they could be part-
    time. The full-time equivalency, Admiral Loy submitted to
    Congress that those statutory caps were met, but
    notwithstanding that, the reduction of the screener force came
    about. We closely monitored this working with Janet Hale, our
    Under Secretary for Management, looking at it from a budget
    standpoint, knowing that there was going to be a shortfall in
    the TSA budget, and there is this need to be met.
        We worked with Congress, the Appropriations Committee with
    this, to know how we needed to address it, and as a part of
    that we were going to have this reduction in force. There were
    other components to meeting the budget requirements, but this
    was one phase of it.

                 COST OF SECURITY INVESTMENTS AT SMALL AIRPORTS

        Senator Cochran. One other issue in this airport security
    area that is troublesome is the cost of security investments
    for small airports. For many of us, we represent States that
    don't have large airports but do have substantial investments
    through local governments and airport authorities in air
    transportation facilities. These smaller airports are being
    held to the same standards as larger more financially able
    airports, they are required to make changes for explosive
    detection systems and many other things. It looks to me, that
    we're going to either put some of these smaller airports out of
    business or make it very, very expensive for local taxpayers to
    fund the changes that are being ordered at the airports.
        You mentioned Biloxi, Mississippi, a while ago when you
    were talking about your visit to the New Orleans port. Not only
    do we have ports along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but that's a
    rapidly growing area in our State. Air transportation demands
    are increasing enormously, and while they've done a good job of
    keeping pace, the airport now is being asked to relocate
    facilities for security purposes.
        They were asked to move the parking areas way beyond where
    they were, to shut down existing parking facilities, all at
    tremendous expense, and then some of those decisions were
    changed, actually repealed. I'm not complaining that they were
    repealed, but the fact is they went and incurred enormous
    expenses, and then they said well, we changed our mind, you
    really don't have to do exactly what we asked you to do before.
        Is there any plan for the administration to try to help
    meet the needs, the financial needs, of local airports, like
    the Biloxi, Jackson, Mississippi, Airports and others in our
    State, that are having to try to figure out how they're going
    to pay for all of this?
        Mr. Hutchinson. It is a burden that is shared by your
    airports in Mississippi but also my airports in Arkansas that
    I'm very familiar with that are under similar circumstances. It
    has been a burden, and it reminds us that we certainly need to
    have enhanced security, but it also creates a real mandate on
    the private sector and expense on their part. We did get the
    EDS equipment in, but it was in very awkward places, many times
    out in front of the ticket counters, and they needed to be
    moved. The airports wanted them moved, and so that's a process
    we're going through.

                         FUNDING FOR EDS INSTALLATIONS

        Approximately $1 billion in funding has been appropriated
    for EDS installations, $738 million in 2002, and $265 million
    in 2003. Of that, about half of that has been spent, and so
    there will be more that has been put out in the field based on
    that appropriation. The President's 2004 budget did not include
    additional funding for EDS employment in light of that $1
    billion that is already appropriated, but the most recent war
    supplemental did provide for the possibility of letters of
    intent to the airports for in-line EDS installations, and we
    are committed to utilize that mechanism if the airports believe
    that is appropriate and helpful.

                    AIRPORT MODIFICATION FUNDING PRIORITIES

        Senator Cochran. Do you have a procedure, or some kind of
    priority in mind for making these grants? How are you going to
    determine which airports are eligible, or which applications
    are going to be approved? I assume you can't approve every
    application for Federal funding assistance.
        Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct, and there is a ranking of
    priority. Part of it is first of all those airports which
    utilized alternative means of baggage screening, and so they
    would have a priority first for the EDS installation, and then
    there are other rankings in priority. I would be glad to answer
    that more specifically and get that back to you.
        [The information follows:]

        Funds will be utilized for modifications to airports in two ways.
    TSA will continue to fund through an existing contract with Boeing for
    completion of work already assigned to Boeing by TSA. Second, TSA
    expects to utilize these funds towards in-line EDS solutions. TSA is
    developing a plan to be completed in the near future which outlines the
    Federal Government's long-term commitment for this purpose.

        Senator Cochran. We would appreciate being informed about
    procedures and the priorities that the TSA is going to follow
    in making funds available to local airport authorities. We just
    hope the smaller ones don't get left out. That's the whole
    point.
        Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely.
        Senator Cochran. I know there are priorities for the larger
    airports, and maybe that's where the greatest threats occur and
    are. I have some other questions as well, but on other topics,
    but I'm happy to submit those to you.
        I think you've done an excellent job, coming in to the
    responsibility as you have with a lot of pressure, a lot of
    visibility. A lot of people want answers to questions that
    maybe can't be answered right away, and you have to work your
    way through a lot of these challenges. But I've been impressed
    with the way you've taken on the job and I appreciate the fact,
    just personally, that you've agreed to serve in this capacity.
    It is a very important responsibility, but you have a high
    level of energy and enthusiasm for it, and we appreciate your
    service very much.
        Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I agree with your statement and
    your assessments of the Secretary's authority and his
    dedication, and I want to echo the same.

                              PORT SECURITY GRANTS

        Earlier, we discussed port security. In February, the
    Congress approved $150 million in the Omnibus Appropriations
    Act for port security grants. Three months later, your agency,
    Mr. Secretary, had done nothing to make those funds available
    to the ports, where the dollars can actually make our homeland
    more secure. What are your comments on this? Will you commit to
    using the $150 million right away to meet some of the $1
    billion in applications that are sitting on your desk in
    response to the recent competition for the $105 million
    appropriated in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, you're absolutely correct that
    that money is needed out there, and that money needs to move.
    Clearly TSA, with its budget constraints, in which they have
    had many aspects of direction and demands placed on them both
    from reality, but also from Congress, has demands greater than
    the resources they have right now. I know they have to evaluate
    these demands in conjunction with the Under Secretary for
    Management and OMB, and hopefully that money will be available
    to be put out in the field in the near future. We are waiting
    for the completion of that review and determination by our
    management folks.
        Senator Byrd. On November 25, 2002, the same day the
    President signed the Homeland Security Act, he also signed the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act.
        The Coast Guard has estimated that it will cost $1.4
    billion in the first year and $6 billion over 10 years to
    implement the Act. The Congress has included in three separate
    emergency supplemental bills, as well as, in the fiscal year
    2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act, funding for port security
    grants, and a total of $348 million has been provided. However,
    none of this was requested by the administration.
        Only $93 million has been distributed to the ports to date.
    So, while the administration was eager to sign the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act, the administration has been
    somewhat silent on the costs associated with implementing it.
    Do you have any further comment, Mr. Secretary?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Simply that we value our partnership with
    Congress, and that certainly reflects that you all provide
    leadership as well in this arena. The Coast Guard is
    responsible for conducting the port security assessments at the
    top 55 of our Nation's military and economically strategic
    ports. This is what has been mandated by the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act.
        They have moved forward on this. The part of the funding
    out of the 2004 budget to complete this includes $62 billion to
    complete the assessments. They have done 20 of them. They have
    35 more to do. That is completed in the assessments out of the
    2004 budget, so the Coast Guard will be moving forward on this
    and will be working closely from the TSA perspective and the
    Customs and Border Protection perspective with the Coast Guard
    to accomplish that mandate.

           COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM (CAPPS II)

        Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, in the Transportation Security
    Administration's budget request, $35 million is for the new
    passenger screening program, known as the computer-assisted
    passenger pre-screening system number 2. This new system is
    designed to enhance airline passenger safety by mining
    commercial databases of personal information and using pattern
    analysis to predict which passengers might engage in terrorist
    activities. It seems to me that this is a dangerous path that I
    fear will delve into every nook and cranny of an individual
    American's life. Under this new system, as I understand it, the
    TSA will assign each passenger a risk level of green, yellow,
    or red, and they will use that determination to prevent certain
    passengers from boarding the plane.
        Now, you're walking on a tightrope. Remember in the old
    silent movies, but perhaps you don't go back that far, they had
    people walking on tightropes without a safety net. You may be
    on such a tightrope. I don't know whether you have a net or
    not. You're designing a new system to screen airline and
    airplane passengers that may run headlong into individuals'
    rights to privacy. Your effort to identify potentially
    dangerous passengers is a good goal, but your mechanism, the
    so-called CAPPS-II system, is frankly scary. I'm not sure there
    is a safety net out there.
        Mr. Hutchinson. I've heard of them.
        Senator Byrd. I was there, and I've heard that--well,
    perhaps do you want to comment at this point before I go
    further?
        Mr. Hutchinson. I would be pleased to. Let me start by
    saying I was traveling with my chief of staff the other day on
    a commercial airline, and whenever my chief of staff received
    her ticket, it had selectee there, and this was coming from the
    airline. So right now you have the airlines designating who is
    going to be subject to secondary inspection based upon a very
    inadequate system. The design of CAPPS-II is to put a little
    more rhyme and reason into who would be subject to a secondary
    screening, and it is important. I worked in Congress on privacy
    issues, and I'm very concerned about that aspect of it, and
    CAPPS will not collect personal data such as credit history.
    Information collected will come from already available
    commercial databases, but there will be a firewall so that it
    will not be collected by the Government or retained by the
    Government. That firewall is very, very critical, and it is
    important, as you point out, that that firewall not be
    breached.
        I'm pleased that Homeland Security has brought on board a
    privacy officer, Nuala O'Connor Kelly, who from a privacy
    standpoint will be reviewing this system, and we will work with
    her and other privacy groups in terms of making sure that their
    concerns are addressed, that the firewall is in place, that the
    Government will not retain data, and that we will not collect
    that data that would be offensive to Americans.
        Senator Byrd. I've heard that personal indebtedness is one
    of the criteria to be evaluated when looking at a passenger's
    risk potential. Can you confirm that?
        Mr. Hutchinson. That is not correct. There will not be a
    review of personal indebtedness and creditworthiness. The
    Government will not be doing that.
        Senator Byrd. Well, I'm glad to hear you say that. It would
    seem a bit odd, wouldn't it?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, it would.
        Senator Byrd. I fear that there's something there that
    would smack of elitism.
        Mr. Hutchinson. It would be inappropriate.
        Senator Byrd. There's a risk of abuse by the Government.
        Mr. Hutchinson. I might not qualify to fly if that was the
    case.
        Senator Byrd. That is frankly un-American, so I'm glad to
    hear you answer that question as you did.
        Congress built a number of safeguards into the Homeland
    Security Act to protect against privacy invasions, but to date
    the Department has not made available to the public any
    information about development of the system, nor has it
    confirmed that it will publish guidelines for the program. How
    is Congress to know that privacy rights will be respected?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I do believe that Admiral Loy has
    made an extraordinary effort to keep the public informed
    through communication with privacy groups, and he has met with
    groups from the ACLU to other privacy advocates going over what
    the CAPPS program is and what it is not, and listening to their
    concerns. I think there has really been an extraordinary amount
    of communication to the public through those groups of concern
    and a great deal of public comment on it. In fact, I think he's
    going to be testifying in a hearing on it very shortly.
        So actually contrary to the development of some databases,
    this has been done through education and communication with the
    privacy groups, and we hope to continue to do that and listen
    to their concerns.
        Senator Byrd. What data sources are being mined, m-i-n-e-d?
    CAPPS-II has raised privacy concerns that the Department has
    not yet addressed, so what data sources are being mined? Who
    has access to the data? What mechanisms will the Department use
    to verify the accuracy of the data?
        Mr. Hutchinson. The Government will not be looking at any
    of these data sources. It will be only looking at the
    Government databases such as the terrorist watch list, then
    there will be the firewall, in which the commercial databases
    will be looked at from a commercial vendor's standpoint, but it
    will not be retained or examined by the Government. That is
    where the firewall comes into place, and that goal is, of
    course, to verify the passenger's identity and therefore refine
    the security screening selectee process and eliminate the
    majority of mistaken identity situations.
        The personal data will not be collected by the Government,
    and will not be retained by the Government, and I think these
    are standards that are important in the development of this
    system.
        Senator Byrd. Will the appropriate congressional committees
    be given an opportunity to review the proposed CAPPS-II
    guidelines before they are finalized?
        Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely. We would be happy to make sure
    that you or your staff or any of the committee staff be
    briefed.
        Senator Byrd. Very well.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        Mr. Chairman, I believe I would submit the remainder of my
    questions for the record, and I thank you, and I thank the
    Secretary.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                           department start-up issues
        Question. Please provide the Committee with the dollars, positions,
    and full-time equivalents that have been allocated to the Under
    Secretary's office in fiscal year 2003, requested for fiscal year 2004,
    and under which appropriation has requested these resources have been
    requested.
        Answer. See below

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Fiscal year                            Fiscal year
                                             2003        Source Appropriation       2004        Source Appropriation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Funding...........................      $1,990,111  Departmental               $9,715,000  Departmental
                                                         Operations.                            Operations
    Positions.........................              67  .....................              67  .....................
    FTE...............................       39 (est.)  .....................              67  .....................
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Substantial additional support, including facilities costs, desktop information technology and telephony
      services, security, and postage costs are funded centrally.

        Question. Will there be a centralized Office of Legislative Affairs
    within the Under Secretary's office? Or do you plan to have legislative
    affairs responsibilities handled by each of your sub-bureaus?
        Answer. The Office of Legislative Affairs is centralized in at the
    Department with legislative affairs personnel assigned within our
    components to provide direct support.
        Question. What specifically has changed, and what has not yet
    changed for these agencies that transferred into your Directorate?
        Answer. Interim structures have been established, including interim
    port directors in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
    and interim District Directors within the Bureau of Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (BICE). The Transportation and Security
    Administration transferred as a whole entity and has maintained their
    management structure.
        Question. How are you mitigating the impacts of this transition on
    the capabilities of each of the transferring agencies to continue to
    perform their homeland security missions and their non-homeland
    security missions?
        Answer. Operational personnel that perform daily activities; have
    been maintained in respective geographic locations to ensure the level
    of expertise and continuity that existed prior to March 1, 2003 is
    continued.
        Question. What specific steps have you taken to integrate the
    chains of command and the personnel of these organizations without
    interfering with their current capabilities to perform their missions?
        Answer. Interim structures have been established, including interim
    port directors in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
    and interim District Directors within the Bureau of Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (BICE). This will provide the most effective
    consolidated organizational structure with the least disruption to
    operations and personnel.
        Question. The area that may present the most difficulty for
    integration are the three inspections services. After March 1, 2003,
    who assumed control of the inspections functions at each of the ports-
    of-entry? How were the decisions made in appointing the acting port
    directors?
        Answer. On March 1st, approximately 40,000 employees were
    transferred from the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration &
    Naturalization Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
    Service to the new Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) agency in the
    Department of Homeland Security. To address our priority mission of
    preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
    States, a single, clear chain of command was established. For the first
    time, there is one person at each of our nation's ports of entry in
    charge of all Federal Inspection Services. A group of senior managers
    from the legacy agencies (Customs, INS and APHIS) met to decide and
    apply criteria for identification of interim leaders. Designated
    interim port directors were identified by considering a number of
    factors including grade level, complexity of operational activity and
    size and variety of staff. A similar process to make the structure
    permanent will be completed in fiscal year 2003.
        Question. What concrete steps are you taking to meld the different
    cultures of these organizations in a way that preserves any unique,
    positive aspects while creating an overall ``Border and Transportation
    Security (BTS) Directorate'' culture?
        Answer. Our challenge is to convey to our over 170,000 employees
    that while the name of the agency has changed their mission remains the
    same. The success of BTS hinges on our men and women in the field and
    in our headquarters. When the Under Secretary and senior management
    travel they almost always have a roundtable or town meeting for all BTS
    employees in order to hear concerns and convey the Department's
    commitment to unify employees.
        Question. How do you intend to effectively and decisively respond
    to resistance to change from these separate ``cultures'' coming over to
    BTS?
        Answer. Through sound management practices and regular recurring
    meetings with BTS component senior staff, issues are addressed in a
    timely and effective manner. I also take every possible opportunity to
    hold town hall type meetings with employees to dispel misperceptions
    and reinforce the mission objectives of DHS/BTS. I have also instructed
    each of the respective agencies/bureaus within BTS to do the same.
        Question. When will you be able to provide more detailed transition
    plans to Congress that will outline more specific steps that are
    occurring to accomplish the transition?
        Answer. According to the Homeland Security Legislation, The
    Department of Homeland Security and the Border and Transportation
    Security Directorate (BTS) must report to Congress on a regular basis
    concerning the status of the transition and the reorganization. For
    example, 100 and 20 days after the legislation's enactment, DHS must
    report to Congress on the proposed division and transfer of funds
    between the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and the BTS.
    Furthermore, one year after the legislation's enactment, DHS must
    report to Congress on the implementation of visa provisions in the Act.
    We welcome this opportunity to report to you about our progress and the
    daily challenges that we confront during this tremendous undertaking.
                              coordination issues
        Question. What steps will you be taking to ensure that the three
    sub-bureaus focused on enforcement within your own organization, the
    Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation Security Administration,
    will be coordinating information, policy, intelligence, and
    investigations?
        Answer. Within the organizational structure of the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate are offices of Policy and Planning,
    as well as Operations. These offices will ensure continuity,
    coordination and direction within BTS.
        Question. As just one example, the Container Security Initiative,
    and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism are both being run
    by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), and Operation
    Safe Commerce is the responsibility of the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA). While one is focused on screening high risk cargo
    before it leaves the outgoing port, the other two operations are to be
    focused on total supply chain security. How will these projects be
    coordinated to ensure no duplication of effort and the best use of the
    funding provided?
        Answer. BCBP has the sole statutory and regulatory responsibility
    for container security on containers destined for the United States.
    Although this authority is clearly delineated through the
    implementation of enforcement programs like Container Security
    Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
    TPAT), BCBP strives to comply with its mission in coordination with
    other equally vital offices within the Department of Homeland Security
    which have statutory and regulatory responsibility over a segment of
    sea transportation.
        Coordination and communication with our department partners ensures
    an effective and streamlined security process. For example, BCBP has
    established a protocol with the United States Coast Guard to handle
    certain types of serious threats through the High-Interest Vessel
    program. Also, BCBP has shared interest with DOT and TSA in developing
    industry partnership programs that improve container security (and
    other types of transportation security) and are consistent for domestic
    and international shipping.
        BCBP and TSA are working together through a jointly chaired
    steering committee that makes the final project selection decisions for
    Operation Safe Commerce. The Federal Register notice that initiated the
    Operation Safe Commerce program makes specific references to C-TPAT and
    CSI as initiatives that may be considered as part of Operation Safe
    Commerce business practices and technology supply chain ``test bed''
    initiatives.
        As a voluntary government-business initiative, the C-TPAT
    complements the overseas targeting of the CSI and the development of
    new security techniques under Operation Safe Commerce. As of May 9,
    2003 C-TPAT membership includes over 3,000 companies that account for
    approximately 37 percent of all U.S. imports by value and approximately
    93 percent of all U.S.-bound sea-containerized cargo. By creating a
    significant network of reliable and secure companies, C-TPAT enables
    BCBP to direct its CSI targeting to areas of greater risk and
    establishes a mechanism for incorporating the best practices and new
    high-tech equipment identified by Operation Safe Commerce.
        Question. What steps have you taken to ensure that good
    coordination is established between your organization and the new
    Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS)?
        Answer. Working groups have been established to ensure proper
    coordination between BICE, BCIS as well as BCBP. These groups will
    address issues that affect all components and develop protocols to
    address these issues in a manner that satisfies the needs of all
    members of the working groups. Coordination on day-to-day issues is on-
    going between all components.
        Question. We are looking forward to getting the report on the
    implementation plan for the separation of personnel and funding between
    the BTS and the BCIS as called for in Section 477 of the Homeland
    Security Act. Please outline for us what steps you are taking to put
    this plan into place.
        Answer. On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization
    Service ceased operations and its functions were transferred to three
    new Bureaus within the Department of Homeland Security. Recognizing the
    complexity of this transition, the Department adopted a phased
    approach, which focused first on realigning the operational components
    and chains of command within the Department. To ensure continuity of
    operations, no changes were made on March 1 in the areas of shared
    corporate and administrative support functions. For the interim, the
    former INS support functions continue to support former INS components,
    and the former Customs support functions continue to support former
    Customs components. Work is currently underway to identify existing
    resources and options for organizing these functions in the longer-
    term. Transition offices have been established to coordinate and manage
    the transition process, and a number of working groups have been formed
    within the Department to address these issues, including a senior-level
    BICE, BCBP, BCIS group, which meets weekly. The Department will be
    forwarding a report with more specific information on the
    implementation plan later this month.
        Question. Another important Directorate within the Department of
    Homeland Security is that for Science and Technology. How will you
    ensure that the experience and knowledge of front-line employees is
    being used effectively by the Science and Technology Directorate in
    deciding research priorities?
        Answer. Science and Technology and Border and Transportation
    Security are developing a BTS technology strategy and plan. This would
    integrate the technology needs of the border and transportation
    security bureaus into one consolidated strategy, taking advantage of
    economies of scale, prioritize needs across mission areas, create
    synergistic opportunities among the bureaus and reduce unnecessary
    duplication. It would engender the confidence of the operational
    community, help demonstrate effective budget execution and justify the
    technology budget.
        Question. What plans do you have to ensure smooth coordination with
    the Department of Justice, in such areas as the Executive Office for
    Immigration Review and the Office of Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT)?
    Please provide a detailed description of how you plan to structure the
    relationship with the OFDT.
        Answer. The benefits of cooperation between law enforcement
    agencies are clear. To take advantage of existing efficiencies and
    economies of sale, and to avoid competition for detention space, the
    Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) pursued a service provider
    relationship with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Office of the
    Detention Trustee (OFDT). The DOJ/BOP/OFDT and DHS/ICE/DRO is
    developing and negotiating an Interagency Agreement that would allow
    DOJ to act as service provider for non-Federal detention services. At
    this time, the nature of support would include: the procurement of
    detention services; the inclusion of privately operated secure
    detention facilities and alternatives to detention; the establishment
    of intergovernmental service agreements with State and local entities
    for secure detention services; administration of contracts and
    agreements; management of Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation
    Program; and oversight of the detention standards program.
        Question. How do you plan to work with the Department of State to
    coordinate the policies governing the issuance of visas?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of
    State (DOS) currently are negotiating a memorandum of understanding
    (MOU) to implement section 428 of the Homeland Security Act (HLSA),
    which governs the visa issuance process. The MOU will address how DOS
    and DHS will issue regulations, policies, procedures, and other
    guidance that affect the visa process. Both agencies recognize there
    will be a need to develop standard operating procedures to further
    elaborate operationally on various aspects of the MOU. DHS and DOS,
    however, intend to work cooperatively and in a consultative manner to
    create an effective and efficient visa issuance process.
                         integration of physical assets
        Question. Virtually every individual program under your direction
    has a need and a budget for buying vehicles. What steps are you taking
    to review these budget items? What plans are there for consolidation of
    procurement, retrofitting, and maintenance?
        Answer. Within the Department we are working on these very issues
    as we develop our internal processes. We intend to look at requirements
    and find opportunities for economies and best value in procurements,
    improvements and maintenance support. In the interim we are seeking
    best practices and contract opportunities that offer efficiencies
    across components within the directorate as well as across the
    department and other partners.
        Question. The Border Patrol has helicopters and fixed wing
    aircraft, while the Customs' Air and Marine Interdiction program
    transferred to your Directorate has fixed wing aircraft and marine
    assets. How do you plan to review these programs to see if there are
    possibilities for merger? Do you have any estimated cost savings that
    could be seen from the integration of maintenance?
        Answer. While the priority will be to maintain the operational
    effectiveness of the Border Patrol and the BICE Air and Marine
    Interdiction program's, we will be reviewing the operational
    effectiveness and efficiency gains envisioned by the President when he
    submitted the proposal to create the Department of Homeland Security.
    BTS has already convened a group to look at the aircraft acquisition
    for BICE and the Coast Guard. As a result of the work group, the Deputy
    Secretary has directed the Department to establish procedures to ensure
    economies of scale for major procurements. This practice will be
    utilized in conjunction with the DHS investment review board.
        Question. Do you plan to sit down with the U.S. Coast Guard to see
    what potential there is in applying best practices to your procurement
    or maintenance programs? What potential is there in possibly
    integrating some of the physical assets operated by your Directorate
    with the Coast Guard?
        Answer. BTS has already convened a group to look at the aircraft
    acquisition for BICE and the Coast Guard. As a result of the work
    group, the Deputy Secretary has directed the Department to establish
    procedures to ensure economies of scale for major procurements. This
    practice will be utilized in conjunction with the DHS investment review
    board.
        Question. Do you plan to review all of the canine programs run by
    the various components of BTS? Do you have any estimated cost savings
    that could be seen from the integration of these various canine
    programs?
        Answer. BCBP has established a working group to review all of the
    canine programs, as well as to identify overlaps in missions. Output
    from this working group was provided to the Transition Team for the
    Commissioner's review and comments. The working group is waiting for
    direction on the final structure of the canine programs; however, the
    working group is being proactive in developing standards for like
    functions such as narcotics detection. Work is ongoing to standardize
    such things as evaluations, certifications, etc. At this time, the
    efforts would be budget neutral should they be implemented.
                         non-homeland security missions
        Question. What changes did you make in the fiscal year 2004 budget
    requests for these new entities to reflect the homeland security
    priorities of the new Department?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2004 budget represents an increase of
    nearly 100 percent from the fiscal year 2002 enacted level for the new
    entities. Compared to fiscal year 2002, the Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection request represents an increase of 33 percent, the
    Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement nearly 16 percent, and
    the Office of Domestic Preparedness request is 12 times greater than
    fiscal year 2002.
        Question. In deciding fiscal year 2004 budget allocations, did you
    change any of the allocations for non-homeland security missions and
    capabilities from the amounts appropriated in fiscal year 2003? If yes,
    what were those changes?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests allocations for non-
    homeland security missions and capabilities were made consistent with
    the fiscal year 2003 request and prepared in advance of the fiscal year
    2003 appropriations.
        Question. How do any changes in these fiscal year 2004 allocations
    represent compliance with the Homeland Security Act direction?
        Answer. The Department's primary mission is the protection of the
    American people. The fiscal year 2004 request focuses on consolidating
    border and transportation security functions, merging response
    activities, creating a central point to map terrorist threats against
    vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure. The Department also
    ensures that non-homeland security missions and capabilities are not
    diminished.
               information technology investments and integration
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget for BCBP requests $30.2
    million for an Information Technology Transformation to Homeland
    Security Fund, and has a separate request for $22.3 million for an
    Information Technology Infrastructure program called ATLAS. In the
    Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) budget request
    there is an additional $17.7 million for ATLAS. Are these separate
    program needs? If not, please explain in detail what each of there
    initiatives will accomplish and how they will be coordinated across the
    two bureaus. How do these two initiatives fit in with the request for
    $5.7 million for the International Trade Data System? How do they
    relate to the ongoing Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) project.
        Answer. The Information Technology Transformation to Homeland
    Security Fund creates a fund to address Information Technology (IT)
    compatibility and interoperability issues that will arise during the
    transition to the Department of Homeland Security, including, but not
    limited to: mission systems, electronic mail, networks, collaborative
    tools, and administrative capabilities. In addition, the transition
    creates an opportunity for broader sharing of border security and
    enforcement-related IT capabilities. This fund will be used to extend
    the enterprise architecture to provide expanded access to IT
    capabilities in support of the Homeland Security mission. This
    initiative is separate from the ATLAS request.
        The request for funding for the International Trade Data System
    (ITDS) will support the development of a Government-wide system that
    will provide the trade community with a single interface to file
    international trade data with the Government. The ITDS initiative is an
    e-Government strategy that will implement an integrated, government-
    wide system for the electronic collection, use, and dissemination of
    the international trade transaction data required by the various trade
    related Federal agencies. Development of ITDS functionality will be
    coordinated with the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) and the
    overall modernization effort, and will impact both border security and
    trade compliance within multiple Federal departments, agencies, and
    areas within the participating government agencies.
        ATLAS funding will allow the upgrade of legacy INS infrastructure
    to be compatible with existing Customs and Border Protection
    infrastructure, thus establishing a basis for interoperability.
        All information technology investments are reviewed for compliance
    with our enterprise architecture framework to ensure technical
    compatibility and alignment with business goals.
        Question. How do you plan to coordinate and integrate all of the
    information technology initiatives and legacy systems, like ACE?
        Answer. BCBP is sponsoring an interagency integration team with
    ICE, BCBP and APHIS to address the myriad of integration issues, and is
    also working with DHS on information technology investments and
    architecture to ensure alignment within the Department of Homeland
    Security.
        Question. What steps will you take to avoid the merger and
    integration problems that have been experienced by so many other
    agencies before you? Have you consulted with other agencies such as
    DOD, IRS, and the FBI for ``lessons learned'' from their unhappy
    experiences?
        Answer. The BCBPs experience with the ACE initiative has provided
    an effective model for the planning and management of large scale
    information technology management systems. This model, the interagency
    integration teams mentioned above, and the established BCBP enterprise
    architecture will guide this process. The ACE business plan is based on
    lessons learned by the DOD, IRS, and FBI among others.
                               personnel impacts
        Question. When will you have an estimate of potential job
    dislocations and job losses for your Directorate, and when will you
    inform the workers affected and the Congress?
        Answer. Program Managers within the Border and Transportation
    Security Directorate are currently reviewing the merged organizations
    to determine where consolidation of resources is appropriate.
    Competitive service employees within the Directorate will receive
    appropriate notification, as stated in the Reduction-In-Force
    regulations of Title 5, if and when a decision is made to close a
    facility or transfer a function to a new geographic location. We will
    ensure that Congress is notified in a timely fashion as soon as any
    decisions are made concerning worker dislocation.
        Question. What specific criteria are you establishing to determine
    who will be dislocated and who will lose their jobs, and will you
    provide affected employees a fair process in which they can appeal
    these decisions and the application of these criteria?
        Answer. Competitive service employees retain full rights under the
    Reduction-In-Force regulations in Title 5, to include appeal rights to
    the Merit Systems Protection Board. Any decision regarding which
    employees will be impacted will be based on the criteria as set out in
    these regulations to include creditable service, performance, and
    veterans' preference.
        Question. Secretary Ridge in his testimony last week mentioned that
    working groups have been created to allow current employees the
    opportunity to participate in the creation of the new system. How
    specifically is this working with your Directorate?
        Answer. The DHS Human Resources System design team has
    representatives from employee groups from throughout the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate. Employees and managers will also
    have an opportunity to participate at town hall meetings and focus
    groups that will be conducted in the field over the next 2 months.
        Question. At this point, what changes do you envision for your
    employees in terms of performance evaluations, compensation, and
    collective bargaining arrangements?
        Answer. The DHS Human Resources design team is currently reviewing
    a variety of alternatives in all of these functional areas, and will be
    creating a set of options to be reviewed by a Senior Review Committee.
    Ultimately, the Secretary and the Director of the Office of Personnel
    Management will determine the final set of options that compose the new
    HR System.
        Question. A central issue in the rank and file of the Inspections
    officers will be the reconciliation of the highly disparate pay and
    benefit systems with which they are compensated. How will you approach
    the resolution of these pay and benefit issues? Do you anticipate
    proposing a legislative package addressing pay reform? When will that
    proposal be sent forward?
        Answer. The DHS Human Resources Design team has been fully briefed
    on the disparities in pay and benefits for employees across DHS and
    specifically in the Inspector occupation. This team will be providing
    options (which may include recommendations for new legislation) to
    address these disparities to a Senior Review Committee (SRC) later this
    summer. The SRC will then review the options and make recommendations
    to the Secretary and the Director, OPM, who will make the final
    determination on which options will be implemented.
                       merging agency regional structures
        Question. What specific objectives have been established for
    creating a new regional structure for your Directorate, and what
    specific issues are being considered in developing this plan? Do you
    anticipate that each of your major sub-components, BCBP, BICE, and TSA,
    will maintain separate regional structures?
        Answer. The overarching objective is to fulfill the DHS mission in
    support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security; to provide for
    unity of purpose among agencies. True integration of mission and
    department-wide effectiveness would be jeopardized with significantly
    different regional structures among DHS agencies.
        Question. Which of the agencies transferring to your Directorate
    would you expect to be most affected by the regional restructuring
    plan? APHIS? Customs? INS? TSA?
        Answer. We are in the data gathering and baseline analysis process,
    and the regional structure has not been developed. Impacts to various
    Departmental components cannot be estimated yet.
        Question. Which is a more important objective for the plan--to save
    money or to increase operational effectiveness? How do you intend to
    make trade-offs between operational effectiveness and cost savings?
        Answer. Increased operational effectiveness is not incompatible
    with cost effectiveness. It will be important for the Department to
    develop a regional concept that optimizes key factors including cost
    while maintaining the highest level of operational effectiveness.
        Question. What specific criteria are you using to evaluate the pros
    and cons of the changes being considered, and which of these criteria
    do you consider most important and less important?
        Answer. DHS is evaluating the best way in which to merge the field
    operations of twenty-two legacy agencies, represented by nine different
    regional alignments. To accomplish this, the DHS directorates,
    including BTS, are working to: (1) develop a baseline understanding of
    the current regional structures in the component organizations; (2)
    develop the options for a regional concept to ensure day-to-day
    operations and incident responses are well coordinated and planned.
        Question. Do you have any preliminary estimates of the costs to
    implement the changes you are contemplating, and of the savings that
    might be made? When can we expect the costs to occur and the savings to
    be realized?
        Answer. No. The baseline analysis currently underway will provide a
    better sense of the magnitude of the effort required to harmonize the
    regional structures of the legacy agencies.
        Question. How long would you expect it to take to fully implement
    the plan should Congress approve it?
        Answer. We won't know until the baseline analysis is complete.
        Question. What specific progress are you making in developing the
    plan?
        Answer. BTS is working with other DHS components to analyze various
    data and develop a baseline understanding of the relevant issues
    associated with the creation of a new Department-wide regional
    structure. An initial round of data collection has been completed and
    been passed to DHS staff for analysis.
        Question. What schedule has been established to complete the
    restructuring plan and to inform Congress and the affected employees
    about your recommended course of action? Are you ahead, behind, or on
    that schedule?
        Answer. We intend to create an implementation plan upon completing
    the baseline analysis.
        Question. Please provide for the record the Statement of
    Objectives, Terms of Reference, Fiscal Guidance, Operational
    Assumptions, and mandated schedule that have been issued to guide the
    development of this plan.
        Answer. These elements could be developed as part of an
    implementation plan, which would follow completion of the baseline
    analysis. The overarching objective is to fulfill the DHS mission in
    support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security; to provide for
    unity of purpose among agencies. True integration of mission and
    department-wide effectiveness would be jeopardized with significantly
    different regional structures among DHS agencies.
                                 border patrol
        Question. Now that the Border Patrol is part of your Directorate,
    do you intend to keep the National Border Patrol Strategy that the
    former Immigration and Naturalization Service has attempted to
    implement over the past 9 years?
        Answer. The Border Patrol's national strategic plan was written in
    1994 with the focus of implementation in the areas with the highest
    level of illegal immigration. The plan is achieved with the ``forward
    deployment'' and proper balance of agents, equipment, technology, and
    border infrastructure (cameras, sensors, roads, lights, fences or other
    border barriers).
        Areas of operations that have become the focus of this plan have
    proved this to be an effective enforcement action. Participating
    sectors have seen a prolific change since the inception of their
    corresponding operations.
      --El Paso--Hold the Line (arrests down, crime reduced)
      --San Diego--Gatekeeper (29 year record low in apprehensions, crime
            reduced)
      --McAllen--Rio Grande (crime and arrests reduced)
        Changes have occurred since the strategy's implementation, most
    notably following the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States
    The strategy's Phase IV implementation was accelerated to respond to
    the potential threats on the northern border. The upgrades and
    application of technology for border deterrence and enforcement has
    also improved.
        Continuation of the proven and successful National Border Patrol
    Strategic Plan is warranted in order to respond to emerging threats and
    changes in the past trends of illegal border entries.
        Question. What changes might you consider making to the strategy to
    increase its effectiveness and reduce migrant deaths?
        Answer. Due to concentrated border enforcement efforts, organized
    smugglers have shifted their techniques and areas of operation from
    traditional unlawful entry points near the ports of entry to extremely
    remote and dangerous areas. The intense summer temperatures and arduous
    terrain associated with these areas account for the majority of
    documented deaths. BCBP has been increasing efforts to identify and
    prosecute smugglers who choose more dangerous methods and routes to
    smuggle unsuspecting aliens. Yearly enhancements allow for BCBP to
    apply resources where the deaths occur to effectively deter and disrupt
    illegal border traffic. BCBP is also expanding its Border Safety
    Initiative, which incorporates a multi-pronged approach to making the
    border a safer environment. BCBP is increasing the number of qualified
    medical/rescue agents and is cooperating with Mexican counterparts at
    an unprecedented level. For example, a meeting of field representatives
    has just concluded, which produced a collaborative strategic plan for
    reducing deaths on both sides of the international border. As the
    strategy evolves other initiatives will be developed and supported.
    BCBP leadership is convinced that when the proper balance of personnel,
    equipment, technology, and tactical infrastructure exists, the illegal
    crossings will decline, bringing a commensurate decline in deaths and
    injury.
        Question. Given the level of additional resources that have been
    put into the Northern Border will you be revising that portion of the
    strategy?
        Answer. Since its implementation in 1994, the Border Patrol's
    National Strategic Plan has been the basis for a multi-year, multi-
    phased approach for the deployment of additional personnel and
    resources, for the purpose of increasing control of our Nation's
    borders. The cornerstone of this strategy calls for ``prevention
    through deterrence'' as the means to restrict illegal entry attempts
    into the United States. Along the southwest border, the strategy has
    concentrated Border Patrol resources into those specific geographic
    areas experiencing the highest level of illegal activity. The key to
    the successful implementation of this strategy has been the deployment
    of the proper balance of personnel, equipment, technology and
    infrastructure into those areas.
        As originally written, the final phase of the National Strategic
    Plan calls for enhancing our enforcement posture along the northern
    border and coastal areas of the United States. Securing the northern
    border has traditionally presented many unique enforcement challenges
    for the Border Patrol. Our shared border with Canada is approximately
    4,000 miles long and is the longest non-militarized undefended border
    in the world. In the past, this vast expanse, coupled with an
    inadequate number of personnel and a lack of resources and
    infrastructure, has significantly limited the Border Patrol's deterrent
    effect upon illegal activity. In the wake of September 11, 2001,
    vulnerabilities and deficiencies along the northern border have
    received increased attention, which has caused the Border Patrol to
    accelerate its efforts in increasing our enforcement presence along the
    northern border.
        The current Northern Border Strategy encompasses interagency and
    international cooperation and coordination, effective technology
    development and deployment, and innovative resource allocation. The
    geographic and environmental conditions found on the northern border
    have led to the historic economic and cultural interdependence of the
    United States and Canada. In light of the long-standing cooperation and
    economic interdependency, the Border Patrol has conducted activities
    along the northern border with significantly fewer resources than were
    dedicated to the southwest border. For these reasons, the Border Patrol
    cannot simply replicate the same enforcement strategy implemented on
    the southwest border.
        The Northern Border Strategy relies upon maximizing existing
    resources in order to strengthen control of the border. The Northern
    Border Strategy also requires the proper balance of personnel,
    equipment, technology and infrastructure. To improve our effectiveness,
    the initial area of emphasis is the expansion of liaison and increased
    intelligence sharing with other Federal, State and local law
    enforcement agencies, as well as our counterparts within the Canadian
    government. The second emphasis is on the deployment of enforcement
    related technology along the border to act as a force multiplier,
    thereby increasing the area that can be adequately covered by available
    manpower. The final emphasis of the strategy calls for the deployment
    of additional personnel into our northern border sectors. As mentioned,
    subsequent to September 11, 2001, the Border Patrol accelerated into
    this phase by redeploying agents from the southwest border to the
    northern border.
      u.s. visitor and immigrant status indicator technology (u.s. visit)
        Question. BICE had been taking the lead on this project. Where will
    the responsibility for implementing the U.S. VISIT system lie?
        Answer. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) is
    establishing a program office to oversee the project for which funds
    are requested under BCBP in fiscal year 2004.
        Question. In his testimony last week, Secretary Ridge said the
    entire project is under review. When will this review by complete? Who
    is conducting this review?
        Answer. The preliminary review was provided to the Secretary on May
    16, with an internal review completed by May 30. The U.S. VISIT Office,
    in conjunction with the BTS and other Department stakholders, is
    conducting the review.
        Question. In your budget request the funds for this system were
    requested under BCBP. Is this appropriate place for those funds?
        Answer. The Secretary delegated the implementation of the U.S.
    VISIT program to the Under Secretary of BTS. The U.S. VISIT program
    will ensure that funds appropriated for this system will be spent in
    accordance with the Spending Plans which are required under the fiscal
    year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act and Emergency War Supplemental
    Act.
        Question. What is the Department's acquisition strategy for the
    U.S. VISIT system? Does the strategy include the development of a
    prototype? Will the final solution include the selection of a single
    prototype or selected aspects of multiple prototypes?
        Answer. The acquisition strategy will not be finalized until the
    Spending Plan has been reviewed and approved by the Secretary of DHS.
        Question. A recent report by the Justice and State Departments and
    the National Institute of Standards stated that implementation of the
    entry/exit system at land borders was at least 1 year behind schedule.
    What is your current timeline for fielding the U.S. VISIT system at
    land border ports of entry?
        Answer. The entry/exit system, now known as the U.S. VISIT Program,
    is expected to be delivered on schedule as required by the Data
    Management Improvement Act. The law requires that travel documents
    contain biometric identifiers not later than October 26, 2004. The DOS
    requested an extension of this requirement. This does not affect the
    implementation of the U.S. VISIT program at the land borders.
        Question. What is your Department's position on the Justice and
    State Department reports?
        Answer. The report stated that the Department of State will require
    an additional year to implement changes to their processes and systems.
    There is a conflict in the report between implementing the U.S. VISIT
    program and the requirement for biometric identifiers in travel
    documents.
        Question. The entry/exit system will likely require substantial
    increases in staff and infrastructure modifications at 150-some land
    ports, particularly for the departure component. What assessments has
    the Directorate performed to determine the extent of additional staff
    needed?
        Answer. Workforce analysis and workforce staffing issues have been
    identified as part of the U.S. VISIT 45-day Spending Plan.
        Question. What assessments has the Directorate performed to
    determine the physical infrastructure changes that might be needed and
    their associated costs?
        Answer. Estimated physical infrastructure, environmental, and
    construction costs have also been identified as part of the 45-day
    Spending Plan. The scope and unique nature of this program required
    extensive assessments of the physical infrastructure. A facilities
    project team has been dedicated to the program on a full time basis,
    since March 2002. The facilities team is an integral part of the U.S.
    VISIT Program. The U.S. VISIT Program facilities team partnered with
    the General Services Administration (GSA) in early April 2002 to
    prepare the foundation for facilities and infrastructure improvements
    related to the U.S. VISIT Program. The facility team is charged with
    the development and implementation of facilities and infrastructure in
    accordance with the program objectives and requirements. Direction and
    guidance to the facilities program team is provided by a Steering
    Committee staffed by Senior Executives from BICE, BCBP, and the General
    Services Administration.
        The work to date has included:
      --Collected basic facilities planning data in a Geographic
            Information System data base for all 165 Land Ports of Entry,
            including
        --environmental data from State and Federal resource agencies
        --high-resolution aerial photography of all Land Ports of Entry
                (POE)
        --operational data for all Land Ports of Entry
        --documentation on real estate ownership
      --Modeled traffic flows for the 50 largest Land Ports of Entry
      --Developed proto-type designs for the 60 small Land Ports of Entry
      --Completed Feasibility Studies for the 51 small Land Ports of Entry
      --Completed environmental baseline studies for each Land Ports of
            Entry
      --Initiated a Strategic Environmental Appraisal for each Land Ports
            of Entry
            student and exchange visitor information system (sevis)
        Question. Has that transition of authority from BCIS to your
    Directorate taken place? Who within the BICE will have formal
    responsibility for carrying out this program?
        Answer. Yes, authority for the Student Exchange Visitor Program
    (SEVP) has transitioned to BICE. The Director of SEVP will have
    responsibility for carrying out the program.
        Question. In March of 2003, the Department of Justice, Office of
    Inspector General (OIG) issued a report on SEVIS questioning whether
    the program has been fully implemented. What steps are you taking to
    remedy the problems in school certification that were found by the OIG?
        Answer. The Bureau is in the process of reviewing the issues raised
    in the OIG report and is preparing a response. We will make available
    our response to you as soon as it is completed and delivered to the
    OIG. We expect to have that reply completed by the end of May 2003.
        Question. Under the current timeline, the SEVIS system will not
    have complete information entered into it on every foreign student in
    the United States until August of 2003. This is 2 years after the
    events of September 11--some of those terrorists were on student
    visas--and 20 months after receiving full funding for the system. The
    Congressional mandate was to have the system completed by January 2003.
    Why is this taking so long? And what is being done to track these
    students in the meantime?
        Answer. The DHS worked hard to meet the aggressive deadline for
    SEVIS implementation (January 2003) set forth in the USA PATRIOT Act.
    On July 1, 2002, 6 months before the deadline, the SEVIS was initially
    deployed to begin preliminary enrollment of accredited schools on a
    volunteer basis. Also in July 2002, the core foreign student program
    functionality was made operational and schools began to utilize SEVIS.
    By January 1, 2003, the all facets of the SEVIS system, including
    exchange program and exchange visitor functionality, and all system
    interfaces were deployed. By regulation, all schools and exchange
    programs, certified to admit foreign students or exchange visitors,
    were required to utilize SEVIS for all new students as of February 15,
    2003. All continuing foreign students must be entered into SEVIS no
    later than August 1, 2003. The primary reason for a phased approach to
    collecting information on foreign students (e.g., entering students
    followed by continuing students) was to ensure program integrity. The
    schools needed adequate time to review and convert the considerable
    data on their continuing students to SEVIS.
        This multi-phase approach was described in proposed regulations
    published in May 2002 and highlighted in testimony before the U.S.
    House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
    Immigration, Border Security, and Claims (September 18, 2002) as well
    as before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education,
    Workforce Subcommittees on Select Education and 21st Century
    Competitiveness (September 24, 2002). Finally, the multi-phase approach
    was codified in DHS final regulations in December 2002.
        Until August 1, 2003, foreign students already in the United States
    continue to be monitored under the paper-based processes of former INS
    information systems. Schools are still required to maintain records and
    report updated information on these continuing students and are
    required to report violations of status to the DHS.
        Question. What steps have you taken to tighten the oversight and
    training of contractors who are out there actually doing the on-site
    reviews of schools? What steps are being taken to improve the training
    being provided to adjudicators and inspectors?
        Answer.
        Training of Contractors.--The primary role of contractors
    conducting the on-site review of schools is to gather information
    pursuant to a standardized questionnaire developed by BICE. Once the
    information is collected, it is forwarded to BICE adjudicators where it
    is incorporated with other information and used in the decision-making
    process with respect to a school's certification or denial to SEVIS.
        BICE has actively managed the on-site contractors. Initially three
    firms were employed by BICE for on-site reviews. Due to poor
    performance, one of the three firms was removed. The two remaining
    firms have demonstrated sufficient capacity to complete the on-site
    reviews without delay. Adjudicators have been instructed to bring
    deficient reports to the attention of the Contacting Officer's
    Technical Representative (COTR) so that these issues may be addressed
    with the relevant contractor. The COTR meets and communicates regularly
    with managers from the two contractors to discuss deficiencies as well
    as best practices. When fully staffed, BICE will use its compliance
    officers to perform many of the functions currently performed by the
    contractors.
        Training of Adjudicators.--Officers assigned to adjudicate I-17
    school certifications were provided with two separate group-training
    sessions in June and August of 2002. Since that time, we prepared and
    disseminated a comprehensive update to the Adjudicators Field Manual
    (the core guidance to adjudications officers of all benefit
    applications) that covers all adjudicative aspects of the foreign
    student regulations. Additionally, Headquarters has been conducting
    weekly regional conference calls with all officers adjudicating I-17s
    to keep them current on the status of on-site reviews and to answer any
    general questions regarding the adjudication of cases or to address the
    specifics of an actual case. Finally, Headquarters provides one-on-one
    training for officers newly assigned to this duty, on an as needed
    basis.
        Training of Inspectors.--In January 2003, the BCBP inspections
    branch trained more than 300 inspectors at over 100 ports-of-entry via
    a web-based, interactive teleconference system. A copy of the training
    materials was provided to each port for follow-up training, conducted
    locally. The BCBP inspections branch continues to update its SEVIS
    related training.
        Question. An important purpose of the SEVIS system is to allow for
    the tracking down of those students who have fraudulently entered this
    country with no intent to abide by their visa status. Have procedures
    been set up to identify and refer potential fraud for enforcement
    action?
        Answer. Yes, procedures have been set up to identify and refer
    potential fraud for enforcement action. Leads are received from
    schools, from a variety of sources including the SEVIS system. The
    leads are entered into a database and record checks are conducted by
    the Law Enforcement Support Center against a number of databases
    including the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force databases and the
    Non-immigrant Information System.
        When it is determined that a student or exchange visitor entered
    the United States, failed to comply with his or her status and then
    failed to depart, the lead is then deemed to be a viable lead which is
    referred for enforcement action. All viable leads are entered into
    immigration lookout databases. The leads are then prioritized based on
    national security concerns and, if appropriate, assigned to field
    offices for further investigation.
        With regard to the enforcement of SEVIS, approximately 3,000 leads
    have been received from schools since December 2002, resulting in over
    1,000 viable leads. All of these viable leads have been entered into
    automated lookout systems and 206 of these leads have been assigned to
    field offices based upon national security considerations. To date, 21
    arrests have taken place and 2 violators were denied entry into the
    United States. 84 cases are still pending in the field and the
    remaining cases were resolved without arrests.
                       integrated investigation strategy
        Question. The new Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    BICE brings together the investigation arms of the Customs Service, the
    investigative functions of the former Immigration and Naturalization
    Service, and the Federal Protective Service. This unification of
    investigative functions is intended to enhance information sharing
    between Federal bureaus and provide for more cohesive enforcement of
    immigration and customs laws within the interior of the United States
    in addition to protecting Federal institutions and interests. Can you
    describe in more detail the nature of the Bureau's functions and how
    you plan to delegate specific roles and responsibilities within the
    Bureau?
        Answer. The Bureau's functions will fully integrate the previous
    investigative responsibilities held by the Special Agents of the
    Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The
    investigative components of BICE will enforce the full range of
    immigration and customs laws of the United States. By unifying the
    previously separate investigative functions, the new Bureau will
    enhance information sharing with Federal, State and local law
    enforcement and develop stronger relationships with the U.S. Attorneys'
    Office.
        The American public will only be able to identify a former Customs
    or INS agent as a BICE agent. To this end, all agents will receive
    training in the disciplines of their new counterparts to facilitate a
    cohesive effort in furtherance of the investigative mission of BICE.
        BICE will accomplish its mission through effective leadership,
    cooperation and coordination with internal components, law enforcement,
    other governmental agencies and through the development of information
    technology and appropriate sharing and use of intelligence information
    to assess threats and prioritize targets. BICE will further develop and
    enhance partnerships with international, Federal, State, and local
    entities to help identify, prosecute, and/or dismantle criminal
    organizations and to locate, apprehend, prosecute, and/or remove
    individuals who threaten the peace and stability of the nation. The IIP
    will focus its resources on the issues and threats identified as most
    severe and will systematically identify and prioritize those activities
    and apply all available laws and tools to counter those threats.
        Question. When do you anticipate putting together an integrated
    investigations strategy that will blend the customs and immigration
    responsibilities of BICE and sharing it with the Committee?
        Answer. The challenges of the 21st century and the aftermath of the
    September 11, 2001 attacks demand an integrated investigations strategy
    that provides a highly organized global approach with regard to the
    customs and immigration enforcement responsibilities. The unique
    authorities possessed by BICE special agents will allow them to play an
    integral role in defending the United States and securing its borders.
        BICE is currently endeavoring to implement an integrated
    investigations strategy, which should be completed in the near future.
    Putting together an integrated investigations strategy means the
    recognition that BICE must partner with other law enforcement and
    intelligence agencies to protect and defend the United States. It will
    seek strong functional liaisons, and will formulate an aggressive,
    integrated investigations strategy and infrastructure with its
    partners. However, the process of integration takes time--not only to
    integrate several program specific investigations strategies--but also
    to ensure the compatibility with interdependent systemic
    infrastructures including information technology, human and budgetary
    resource options. For example, a new chain of command (integrating the
    two agencies) will be established, agents will be cross-trained in the
    disciplines of their counterparts at Customs or INS, differences in
    operational policies will be reconciled, and joint facilities may need
    to be secured. Currently, under the direction of the Assistant
    Secretary, we are ensuring steady progress toward addressing these
    issues, including the process of assembling an integrated, efficient
    and effective investigations strategy. The Bureau looks forward to the
    opportunity to share these developments with the Committee, as they
    occur.
        Question. BICE has responsibility for investigating everything from
    intellectual property to smuggling of contraband. How do you plan to
    ensure that non-homeland security investigations are maintained at the
    same level?
        Answer. Because law enforcement investigative priorities must
    concurrently evolve with the trends in criminal activity, each year
    BICE will review its investigative priorities and establish a
    comprehensive investigative strategy.
        BICE will continue to collaborate with other law enforcement
    agencies to identify, prioritize, and pursue threats to the homeland.
    In addition, BICE will continue constant coordination with the
    intelligence community and with private, public, State, local, and
    Federal law enforcement agencies. This coordination will be a key
    component of achieving the strategic approach to the full range of
    investigations for which BICE is responsible.
        Question. There are approximately 355,000 individuals who have been
    issued final deportation orders that have just walked away, absconded.
    The fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution included
    $10 million for increased investigative staff to pursue absconders.
    What is the status of bringing on these new investigators? How do you
    plan to tackle the absconder situation?
        Answer. BICE is planning to dedicate the $10 million in new funds
    to locating, apprehending and deporting criminal alien fugitives in
    fiscal year 2003. These new funds will be used to acquire equipment as
    well as hire and train 69 new officers solely devoted to the initiative
    to locate, apprehend and remove absconders. Eight new fugitive
    operations teams will be deployed in key strategic locations; Georgia/
    North Carolina, the Maryland/Washington DC/Virginia corridor,
    Massachusetts/New England, Mid-Atlantic, Illinois/Midwest, Central
    Texas, Pacific Northwest, and supplements to the existing Los Angeles
    team. Some of the positions will also be used to establish permanent
    staff at the Law Enforcement Support Center to aid in the entry of
    alien records into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) which
    is used as a force multiplier.
        The $10 million supplements the $3 million from the counter-
    terrorism supplemental the former INS received from the Patriot Act in
    fiscal year 2002. That $3 million was used to hire 40 new officers,
    deployed as 8 teams in 7 cities, devoted solely to fugitive operations.
    The locations included New York City (2 teams), Detroit, Miami, Newark,
    Chicago, Los Angeles and San Francisco.
        In order to provide a solid foundation to these teams, BICE has
    developed a new specialized training course for the members of the
    fugitive operations teams. The first class will begin training in July
    2003.
        Tackling the absconder problem will require an integrated system to
    arrest and remove current absconders in conjunction with programs
    designed to reduce the future absconder population. One element of this
    system will be the creation of new multi-agency task forces to focus on
    the problem of absconders. BICE has reached out to other Federal
    agencies, such as the U.S. Marshals, IRS, Social Security
    Administration and the Department of Labor as well as State and local
    law enforcement agencies, to expand the enforcement net and ensure that
    every tool available is utilized to find these aliens. Another key
    element of the system includes greater use of intensive supervision to
    ensure aliens show up for proceedings and removals, thus reducing the
    growth of absconders.
                          air and marine interdiction
        Question. What is the status of the modernization review of all air
    and marine assets?
        Answer. With respect to Air and Marine Interdiction assets, BICE
    has completed a review of all air and marine assets and expects to
    complete a revised modernization plan in late July 2003. We estimate
    delivering the plan to Congress in August 2003.
        The Border Patrol developed a replacement/enhancement plan for
    their air and marine assets in fiscal year 2000. The acquisition of new
    assets is based upon availability of funds for each fiscal year.
    Additional new aircraft and marine vessels acquisitions are planned for
    in fiscal year 2003.
        Question. Currently the base budget for Air and Marine Interdiction
    is spilt between BCBP and BICE, with the operations and maintenance
    budget in BCBP and a portion of the salaries and expenses of the
    personnel in BICE. What is the appropriate placement of this important
    program? Please provide the rationale for that decision.
        Answer. The Air and Marine Interdiction budget was deliberately
    placed in BICE. Some of the reasons for this decision are:
        Air and Marine staff and capital assets are deployed primarily for
    interdiction. The principal goals of interdiction are to enhance the
    BICE investigative process to prevent terrorist activity and to further
    investigations of major smuggling operations whether they be drug,
    alien, or terrorist in nature.
        As a key part of the BICE integration of the immigration and
    customs enforcement mission with other Federal agencies, OAMI will
    support investigative processes at Coast Guard, Secret Service,
    Emergency Management, TSA, and FPS. OAMI will support investigative
    processes at non-DHS agencies from DEA to FBI.
        The use of OAMI mission and assets must be closely connected to the
    BICE intelligence mission and operations to be effective. It is this
    connection that ensures that the limited air and marine assets are
    effectively deployed to specific targets over a vast sea or border
    resulting in maximum deterrence capability. BICE intelligence based
    operations must be the lynchpin of OAMI strategy.
        Operationally, OAMI is more identified with investigations than
    inspections or surveillance activity. OAMI has historically reported
    through the investigations division of Customs. In fiscal year 2002,
    approximately 60 percent of OAMI flight hours supported customs
    enforcement. With the integration of customs and immigration
    enforcement, we estimate that more than 80 percent of OAMI operational
    flight hours will directly support BICE investigations, foreign
    operations, border and maritime patrols. The remaining 20 percent will
    support transportation of people and assets, as well as training and
    maintenance, and other customers for support flights.
        Based upon the above factors, placement of OAMI within BICE
    accomplishes the objectives of intelligence-based operations; more
    effective support of DHS and inter-agency law enforcement missions; and
    furtherance of investigations of terrorists and other crime syndicates.
    Air and Marine support of border protection functions will continue
    under this placement and will be formalized in an upcoming management
    directive. The proper placement of all our programs remains subject to
    periodic review.
        Question. Please provide the fiscal year 2004 positions, FTE, and
    dollars for the following: operations and maintenance, to include the
    proper level of adjustments to base; salaries and expenses to, include
    the appropriate level of administrative overhead from the legacy
    appropriation and adjustments to base.
        Answer. In order to fund the authorized strength of 1,105 FTE, the
    legacy appropriation with adjustments to base includes $112 million for
    salaries and expenses in the fiscal year 2004 budget request. An
    additional $175.05 million is included in the fiscal year 2004 budget
    request for legacy operations and maintenance with adjustments to base.
    Appropriate levels of administrative overhead are pending the
    completion of administrative support and structures between BCBP and
    BICE.
                    federal law enforcement training center
        Question. How do you plan to balance the training needs of the
    Border and Transportation Directorate with the training needs of other
    Departments?
        Answer. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
    conducts training and provides training support services for 75 partner
    organizations from across all three branches of Federal Government.
    FLETC also provides training for international, State and local law
    enforcement agencies on a selective basis. In the President's fiscal
    year 2004 request, FLETC was projected to train 45,208 students for a
    total of 183,202 student weeks of training at Glynco, Georgia, Artesia,
    New Mexico and Charleston, South Carolina. In early fiscal year 2004, a
    fourth site in Cheltenham, Maryland, is anticipated to be fully
    operational for requalification training in the Washington, DC
    metropolitan area. Currently, training statistics for Cheltenham are in
    the developmental stage and are not part of the President's budget
    request. Of the projected student weeks of training, 65 percent will
    come from the nine law enforcement agencies transferred to the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        The fiscal year 2003 projections are unprecedented for FLETC. To
    meet the training needs, FLETC will continue a 6-day workweek, which
    was started in January 2002, at its largest site in Glynco. Further,
    FLETC has a priority training system, which ensures that all mandated
    entry level law enforcement training is given first scheduling
    priority. The FLETC has received updated projections for fiscal year
    2004. The new training projections have increased significantly and
    FLETC is currently evaluating the impact of the increased requests for
    training. If these requests are substantiated the FLETC will have to
    explore other options, including extended work days, realignment of
    training among sites under FLETC's scheduling control, and the use of
    other available Federal, State and local training resources on a
    periodic basis.
                        office for domestic preparedness
        Question. How does the Administration propose to allocate the $500
    million requested for firefighters and the $500 million proposed for
    law enforcement? For example, do you intend to retain the current grant
    programs now being managed by the Emergency Preparedness and Response
    Directorate (formerly FEMA) which provide emergency management
    performance grants to states or grants directly to fire departments
    through the Assistance to Firefighters Grant program?
        Answer. There are two separate allocations of $500 million in the
    fiscal year 2004 request. One $500 million allocation will be for the
    traditional Fire Act program being transferred from FEMA. Since its
    inception, DHS's Office for Domestic Preparedness has enjoyed a strong
    relationship with the nation's fire service. The planned transfer of
    the Fire Act program to ODP will not change the manner in which the
    program is administered nor is it an attempt to merge the program with
    ODP's formula grant program. The program will continue to be managed
    consistent with the statutory requirements as a direct, competitive
    grant program to address the health and safety of firefighters.
        The other $500 million allocation request for State and local law
    enforcement for terrorism preparedness and prevention activities which
    include: training and equipment for WMD events, support for information
    sharing systems, training of intelligence analysts, development and
    support of terrorism early warning methods, target hardening and
    surveillance equipment, and opposition force exercises.
        Question. There was controversy during consideration of the
    Homeland Security Act as to whether the Department's Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate or its Emergency Preparedness and
    Response Directorate should properly manage and oversee the first
    responders program. Do you believe that the Office for Domestic
    Preparedness is properly placed under the Department's Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate?
        Answer. I support moving ODP to the Office of State and Local
    Coordination. With ODP's ever-expanding responsibilities and broadening
    scope, I think it is important for the agency providing funding to
    States and locals to reside within the office assigned in acting as
    liaison to those very States and locals. Therefore, the proposition of
    moving ODP from BTS to the Office of State and Local Coordination will
    be a means to several ends. Moving ODP will enhance the Office of State
    and Local Coordination because of ODP's long standing relationships
    with State and local public safety agencies and responders. Perhaps
    most importantly, a move will give DHS a ``one-stop-shop'' for all
    first responder funding within the Department.
        Question. No additional funding is requested for fiscal year 2004
    for critical infrastructure protection grants (funded in the fiscal
    year 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act) or for
    high-threat urban areas (funded in the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated
    Appropriations Act and the fiscal year 2003 Emergency Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations Act). Do you foresee a need to continue
    funding for either of these grant programs in fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. The $200 million appropriated in the 2003 Emergency Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations Act was for reimbursement of states for
    expenses incurred protecting critical infrastructure during Operation
    Liberty Shield.
        Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) was developed and implemented
    after the fiscal year 2004 budget request was developed. We believe the
    states will find this program an integral part of their strategic
    planning, and continue to fund it with grant funds ODP allocates to
    them on an annual basis.
        Question. First responders funding has been awarded to states with
    a pass-through to local governments on the basis that statewide plans
    are developed to deal with the issues of terrorism preparedness,
    vulnerability assessments and the like, and that the funds be spent by
    the States and local governments consistent with this plan. How
    important do you believe the statewide plans are in assuring the proper
    expenditure of this assistance at the State and local level?
        Answer. The State Homeland Security Strategy is designed to give
    each state and territory one comprehensive planning document that
    includes response requirements for a WMD terrorism incident,
    irrespective of the sources of funding. It is developed based on
    assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities at both the State
    and local jurisdiction levels. It should serve as a blueprint for the
    coordination and enhancement of efforts to respond to WMD incidents,
    using Federal, State, local, and private resources within the State.
    Because of the importance of this information, the grants are awarded
    based on the submission of this state plan to ensure the state uses the
    funds according to the needs identified in the strategy.
        There have been many concerns from the government as well as first
    responders in the field regarding the grant funding reaching local
    jurisdictions in a timely manner. Therefore, the fiscal year 2003 State
    Homeland Security Grant Program I (SHSGP I) and SHSGP II incorporate a
    strict timeline to facilitate the release and obligation of this
    funding.
        The SHSGP I application kit was posted online on March 7, 2003.
    States had to submit their applications to ODP within 45, by April 22,
    2003. Applications were reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
    Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
    days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time the grant is
    awarded. As mandated by Congress, 80 percent of the equipment funds
    must be provided to local units of government. The required bi-annual
    Categorical Assistance Progress Reports must reflect the progress made
    on providing funds to the local jurisdictions.
        The SHSGP II application kit was posted online on April 30, 2003.
    States must submit their applications to ODP within 30 days, by May 30,
    2003. Applications will be reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
    Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
    days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time that the
    grant is awarded. As mandated by Congress, 80 percent of the total
    amount of the grant to each State must be provided to local units of
    government. The required bi-annual Categorical Assistance Progress
    Reports must reflect the progress made on providing funds to the local
    jurisdictions.
        Question. In testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee
    on the fiscal year 2003 supplemental request and again before this
    Subcommittee last week, Secretary Ridge indicated that there may be
    reason to rethink how we distribute future terrorism preparedness
    funding, whether the population-based distribution formula historically
    used by the Office for Domestic Preparedness is appropriate, or whether
    it should take into account such factors as threat, vulnerability,
    critical infrastructure needs, and the like. Does the Administration
    plan to propose a formula change for distributing this funding? What
    formula change will you be seeking?
        Answer. The current formula for the allocation of ODP funds to the
    States for the fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program
    (SHSGP) I and SHSGP II was computed on a base, pursuant to the Patriot
    Act, plus a population formula. Starting in fiscal year 2004, the
    Department will seek to make changes in how it distributes funding to
    the States. Each State and territory will continue to receive a base
    amount, but the balance of funds will utilize a multi-faceted formula,
    taking into account factors including threat and risk assessments,
    critical infrastructure of national importance, and population density.
        Until the overall formula is changed, each State must take into
    consideration needs and capabilities when allocating their State funds
    to local jurisdictions.
        Question. What formula was used to award the approximately $100
    million in fiscal year 2003 funds for grants to high-threat urban areas
    announced by the Department on April 8, 2003, for distribution to seven
    U.S. cities (New York City, N.Y.; Washington, D.C. and the National
    Capital Region; Los Angeles, CA; Seattle, WA; Chicago IL, San
    Francisco, CA; and Houston, TX)? Do you expect to use this same formula
    to award the additional $700 million provided in the fiscal year 2003
    Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act?
        Answer. While the specifics of the formula used to award the
    approximately $100 million, and subsequent $700 million, for the Urban
    Areas Security Initiative is classified, it includes a weighted linear
    combination of current threat estimates, critical assets within the
    urban area, population and population density, the result of which is
    used to calculate the proportional allocation of resources.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

     unmanned aerial vehicles at the las cruces, new mexico international
                                    airport
        Question. I was pleased to learn of Secretary Ridge's interest in
    using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for improved surveillance along
    our nation's borders. I strongly support such action to improve our
    nation's ability to patrol our borders, particularly in less-populated
    areas.
        Southern New Mexico is already the site of ongoing UAV flights out
    of the Las Cruces International Airport. This airport is the
    headquarters of New Mexico's emerging UAV Center of Excellence, the
    newly formed joint regional UAV Systems and Operations Validation
    Facility (USOVF), a partnership between the 46th Test Group at Holloman
    Air Force Base and the Physical Science Laboratory of New Mexico State
    University. The USOVF is pre-approved by the Federal Aviation
    Administration for file and fly in a regional flight area of 300,000
    square miles in the western United States. The Las Cruces International
    Airport is situated less than 40 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border, and
    in a central location among U.S. border states.
        I understand that Senator Stevens is interested in using UAV's to
    patrol the maritime border between Alaska and Russia in the Bering
    Straight. What do you anticipate will be the size and scope of the
    Department of Homeland Security's deployment of UAV's on our borders?
        Answer. BTS has asked the Science and Technology Directorate to
    evaluate the use of UAVs in a Border and Transportation Security
    environment. S&T was also asked to evaluate other potential
    applications.
        Question. What funding and facilities will the Department need for
    a UAV program?
        Answer. Until the requirements have been scoped to determine the
    feasibility and extent of a UAV program, we cannot predict what amount
    of funding and the type of facilities might be appropriate for the
    Department to implement a UAV program.
        Question. On what timeline will the Department implement this
    initiative?
        Answer. At this time, it is unknown what the timeline would be for
    the Department to implement this type of initiative. A proposed project
    plan including milestones and deliverables is expected to be ready for
    review by June 2003. The project plan will discuss the BTS-specific
    project as well as strategies in developing UAV initiatives in the
    near, mid, and long term for DHS venues such as borders and ports.
        Question. Based upon the characteristics of the Las Cruces, New
    Mexico International Airport, could you provide an assessment of its
    potential for utilization by the Department of Homeland Security for
    serving as a platform for the deployment of UAV's for Homeland Security
    purposes?
        Answer. Based upon the description of the Las Cruces, New Mexico
    International Airport, the facility appears to have potential for
    serving as a platform for UAV deployment for Homeland Security
    purposes. After UAV program feasibility, requirements and scope is
    determined a more detailed assessment on available testing and
    deployment facilities would need to be made.
                                 border issues
        Question. It has been 17 years since the Federal Government
    launched a major effort to upgrade U.S. borders and that effort focused
    only on the Southwest border.
        I have just sponsored the Border Infrastructure and Technology
    Modernization Act (S. 539). The new bill will focus on U.S. borders
    with Canada as well as Mexico. This bill has the dual goals of
    facilitating the efficient flow of trade while meeting the challenges
    of increased security requirements.
        This will include:
      --More funding for equipment at our land borders
      --Additional funding for personnel
      --Additional funding for training, and
      --Additional funding for industry/business partnership programs along
            the Mexican and Canadian borders.
        It is important for the border enforcement agencies to work with
    the private sector on both sides of the border and reward those
    partners who adopt strong internal controls designed to defeat
    terrorist access to our country.
        What are your thoughts on the importance of trade partnership
    programs along the Southwest border?
        Answer. Industry Partnership Programs (IPP) allow the BCBP to
    expand our influence beyond the borders and into Mexico, Central
    America, South America and the Caribbean. Under the umbrella of the
    Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), these priority
    initiatives include the Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP),
    the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC) and the Americas Counter
    Smuggling Initiative Program (ACSI). Each IPP enables the Trade to
    tighten our borders through the enhancement of supply chain security
    standards that deter smugglers from using conveyances and cargo to
    smuggle terrorist devices and narcotics. These complementary programs
    benefit both BCBP and the private sector by securing the integrity of
    shipments destined for the United States while promoting the efficient
    flow of trade.
        We are currently working on additional security requirements that
    take into account the additional terrorist and drug threat on the
    Southwest border for conversion of the LBCIP carriers to C-TPAT. BASC
    chapters have been established throughout Ecuador, Colombia, Costa
    Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela and most recently in Jamaica,
    where a chapter was founded in March 2003. The ACSI Teams continue to
    support BASC through security site surveys, briefings on smuggling
    trends and techniques and security and drug awareness training.
        The primary purpose of LBCIP is to prevent smugglers of illegal
    drugs from utilizing commercial conveyances for their commodities.
    Carriers can effectively deter smugglers by enhancing security measures
    at their place of business and on the conveyances used to transport
    cargo. By signing agreements with the BCBP, land and rail carriers
    agree to enhance the security of their facilities and the conveyances
    they use and agree to cooperate closely with BCBP in identifying and
    reporting suspected smuggling attempts.
        BASC is a business-led, BCBP supported alliance created to combat
    narcotics smuggling via commercial trade that was formed in March 1996.
    BASC examines the entire process of manufacturing and shipping
    merchandise from foreign countries to the United States, emphasizing
    the creation of a more security-conscious environment at foreign
    manufacturing plants to eliminate, or at least reduce, product
    vulnerability to narcotics smuggling. BCBP supports BASC through ACSI,
    which are teams of BCBP officers that travel to the BASC countries to
    assist businesses and government in developing security programs and
    initiatives that safeguard legitimate shipments from being used to
    smuggle narcotics and implements of terrorism.
        Question. What plans do you have to increase cooperation with the
    Mexican government on border issues?
        Answer. Under the C-TPAT programs consisting of the Americas
    Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), and the Business Anti-Smuggling
    Coalition (BASC), BCBP is engaging the Mexican trade community and
    Mexican Customs in a cooperative relationship against the smuggling of
    drugs and implements of terror. Meetings have been held with Mexican
    Customs through a bilateral U.S.-Mexican Government Working Group.
    Through this working group, the United States and Mexico can work
    jointly through these programs to establish a secure supply chain
    between our countries, while facilitating cross border trade. BCBP is
    also working with Mexican Customs to identify what areas in Mexico
    should be targeted for the establishment of new BASC chapters.
        Under the high-level United States and Mexico Customs Bilateral
    Working Group, a demonstration project to test a fast and secure lane
    at El Paso is underway. This bilateral program is designed to expedite
    and facilitate commercial truck crossings at the Ports of Entry (POEs)
    by implementing the mandated requirements of securing the flow of
    people, transportation, and goods under a secure infrastructure. This
    program is aimed at facilitating cross border trade, while improving
    and ensuring the supply chain security of the participants that range
    from manufacturing, to transportation, to importation.
        BCBP has two ACSI teams travelling throughout Mexico to work with
    the BASC Chapters in Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez and Mexico City to
    prevent drug smugglers and elements of terrorism from using legitimate
    cargo to enter their illegal merchandise into the U.S. BASC, which was
    initiated in March 1996, continues to be a private sector business-led,
    BCBP supported alliance under C-TPAT that complements and enhances our
    efforts to secure the supply chain. C-TPAT is an anti-terrorism
    response to the events of September 11, 2001 which engages the trade
    community in a cooperative relationship with Customs in the war against
    terrorism. C-TPAT will work with foreign manufacturers, exporters,
    carriers, importers and other industry sectors emphasizing a seamless,
    security conscious environment throughout the entire commercial
    process.
                federal law enforcement training center (fletc)
        Question. Congress created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center (FLETC) to be the consolidated training center for almost all
    law enforcement agencies. As the law enforcement training arm of the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) it seems logical that FLETC
    should develop and conduct standardized training for all Homeland
    Security law enforcement and inspection personnel.
        Such a training approach would ensure that all law enforcement
    personnel receive appropriate and consistent instruction. This is
    particularly important as you retrain and cross-train border agencies
    which have been merged under DHS (e.g. Customs, Immigration, and
    Agriculture Inspectors).
        Congress specifically created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Facility in Artesia, New Mexico to handle the advanced and special
    training of almost all Federal law enforcement personnel.
        In the past, Federal agencies have chosen not to use FLETC
    facilities for training and instead have contracted with non-Federal
    institutions. Over the past few years, Congress has provided over $30
    million for the FLETC Artesia facility, alone.
        When the need for Federal Air Marshal training arose after
    September 11, FLETC-Artesia answered the call to duty by developing and
    providing this training in a remarkably short period of time. By way of
    example, FLETC-Artesia brought in three 727 airplanes for use in
    training to go along with the 18 firing ranges and 3 shoot-houses.
        FLETC-Artesia boasts 683 beds, state-of-the-art classrooms, and a
    brand new cafeteria to accommodate approximately 700 students a day,
    yet it has been running at around 320 students during fiscal year 2003.
        FLETC-Artesia's close proximity to the Southwestern border,
    recently constructed facilities and optimal training conditions
    certainly suggest the center should be highly utilized by DHS.
        Question. How do you intend to provide training for the newly hired
    DHS personnel as continued training for existing DHS personnel in light
    of the new security challenges facing our country?
        Answer. As we enter a new era in law enforcement operations in the
    United States, the FLETC is a good example of the new government
    approach intended by the legislation creating the DHS: a means to
    harmonize the work of many law enforcement agencies through common
    training, while at the same time maintaining quality and cost
    efficiency. In fiscal year 2003, 65 percent of the FLETC's projected
    training workload will come from nine law enforcement agencies
    transferred to the new Homeland Security department. In fiscal year
    2004, this workload will continue to be above 73 percent of our
    estimated total Federal training workload.
        FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of DHS. Placing
    FLETC within the DHS will help to support the ``unity of command'' and
    the coordination and efficiency themes sought in the public law that
    created DHS. FLETC has a long history of service to many of the DHS
    components--the U.S. Secret Service, the former Customs and Immigration
    and Naturalization Services including the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP),
    the Federal Protective Service, and more recently, the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA).
        With the start-up of the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
    and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is ready to help
    facilitate, develop, and implement new training and cross training
    programs. We recognize that much of this effort and expertise will
    necessarily come from the agencies involved, but there likely will be
    significant adjustments made over time to all DHS-related training
    programs, basic and advanced. Already, an effort is underway to
    systematically review existing training for these new entities and to
    address whatever capabilities are needed to meld the duties of the
    participants. In the meantime, training will continue unabated to
    achieve all of the hiring expectations of our agencies.
        Question. How do you intend to use FLETC facilities for training
    DHS employees?
        Answer. The national ``war on terrorism'' precipitated by the
    events of September 11, 2000 placed new and increased demands on the
    nation's Federal law enforcement agencies. Officers and agents
    immediately began to work extended hours and many have been reassigned
    geographically and/or to expanded duties. Nearly all Federal law
    enforcement agencies made plans to increase their cadre of qualified
    officers and agents, and submitted urgent requests to the FLETC for
    basic law enforcement training far in excess of the FLETC's normal
    capacity. These requests were for increased numbers of graduates and
    for their speedy deployment to buttress the hard-pressed Federal law
    enforcement effort.
        The events of September 11 also increased the need for certain
    advanced law enforcement training conducted at the FLETC, especially
    classes associated with such issues as counter-terrorism, weapons of
    mass destruction, money laundering, etc. Likewise, the need for
    instructor training classes increased, to strengthen the cadre of
    instructors qualified to handle the training surge--at the FLETC and
    within the agencies.
        In addressing the unprecedented increase in training requirements,
    FLETC has conducted capability analyses to determine the set of actions
    most likely to result in optimum throughput without compromising the
    qualifications of graduating officers and agents, and maximizing the
    use of each of its training facilities. With the consultation and
    concurrence of its partner organizations (POs), FLETC leadership
    directed that training be conducted on a 6-day training schedule
    (Monday through Saturday), thus generating a 20 percent increase in
    throughput capability. More importantly, the 6-day training schedule
    drives a corresponding compression of the length of each training
    program, effectively delivering each class of new law enforcement
    officers to their agencies weeks sooner than under the conventional
    training schedule. Should the 6-day training schedule be insufficient
    to meet the demand, an extended work day will be considered.
        In addition to the 6-day training schedule, FLETC has expanded its
    staff with a supplemental cadre of re-employed annuitants (primarily
    retired Federal law enforcement officers) who are contributing their
    skills and experience as instructors to help sustain the surge in
    training operations. This is a 5-year authority provided by Congress in
    fiscal year 2002.
        Further, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
    tasked by BTS with establishing a Training Academy Committee to
    identify and assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS
    training academies. This study will be the basis for determining the
    schedule and priority for training elements of DHS in a coordinated
    manner.
        Question. How should DHS use FLETC Artesia's facilities and
    specialized training capabilities?
        Answer. FLETC intends to utilize its Artesia facility to its
    maximum potential. I have tasked the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center with establishing a Training Academy Committee to identify and
    assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS training academies.
    The Committee will use a two-phase methodology to identify the training
    assets and to develop a plan for operating the facilities employed by
    each of the Directorate's bureaus, and will also include the Coast
    Guard, Secret Service, and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
    Services. The operational plan will provide the framework for
    coordinating academy training in all BTS bureaus. The Committee will
    develop and submit a report at the conclusion of each phase. Once the
    Committee has identified all of the BTS training capabilities, FLETC
    can develop a more definitive utilization plan for Artesia and all
    other sites.
                         purchase of the town of playas
        Question. Approximately 1 week ago, I sent you a letter suggesting
    the Department of Homeland Security purchase the town of Playas for the
    training of state and local first responders.
        As you are aware, Playas is a deserted company town in Southern New
    Mexico that could be used as a real world anti-terrorism training
    center.
        Playas incorporates almost 260 homes, several apartment buildings,
    a community center, post office and airstrip, a medical clinic,
    churches and other typical small town structures.
        This town would cost the government $3.2 million dollars--a bargain
    that should not be passed up. While Federal law enforcement has access
    to modern training facilities at FLETC, state and local first
    responders do not have access to the same quality of facilities. Playas
    can meet this vital need in a cost-effective manner.
        Currently, New Mexico Tech, a member of Homeland Security's
    National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, has put together a proposal
    for the Department of Homeland Security through their Office of
    Domestic Preparedness to purchase Playas.
        Question. What role do you foresee Playas playing in the defense of
    our homeland?
        Answer. At this time, a decision as to the role of Playas is
    undetermined, although the site could have potential value in a
    national training architecture. Playas' usefulness as a location for
    homeland defense preparedness training must first be assessed through a
    feasibility study to determine if acquisition of the property will make
    a contribution to the national first responder training program.
        Question. Will you evaluate the feasibility of using Playas as a
    training site for State and local first responders before we lose this
    unique opportunity?
        Answer. A feasibility study to determine the potential use of
    Playas as a training center would be the first step in the decision-
    making process. If upon review of the completed feasibility study a
    decision is made to move forward with utilizing the property for a
    training facility, a detailed plan will be developed to determine the
    most advantageous manner in which to acquire the property. This would
    be a lengthy process given the many legal issues involved, particularly
    if the decision is for the Federal Government and ODP to purchase or
    lease the property.
                              national guard issue
        Question. I have been told that the Department of Defense has
    decided to terminate National Guard support to the Department of
    Homeland Security's border inspection operations. I believe that the
    National Guard has been an intricate partner with Customs for well over
    a decade, providing the extra hands necessary to help inspect cargo at
    our land borders, seaports, and mail facilities. I believe there are
    approximately 350 National Guardsmen working alongside Customs in this
    capacity, at any given time.
        This work is of particular importance to New Mexico on our border
    with Mexico. There are approximately 52 guardsmen along the New Mexican
    border supporting a total of 90 plus Customs, Immigration and
    Agriculture inspectors. It is my understanding that for every guardsman
    who works searching cargo or screening mail allows an extra Department
    of Homeland Security (DHS) inspector to be on the frontlines looking
    for terrorists.
        As I understand, the Defense Department would like to place these
    guardsmen in positions (along the U.S. border) that are more ``military
    unique'', such as intelligence collection.
        Is now the time for DOD to move these guardsmen from these critical
    positions?
        Answer. In September 2002, DOD officially informed the U.S. Customs
    Service, now Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), that they
    would discontinue funding National Guard counternarcotics support of
    BCBP's Cargo and Mail Inspection operations (the only BCBP operations
    supported by National Guard soldiers) effective September 30, 2003. DOD
    subsequently changed this date to September 30, 2004. The reason for
    discontinuing the National Guard support, as stated by DOD officials,
    is that they wish to phase out all National Guard counternarcotics
    support that does not require unique military skills.
        As a result of the September 2002 notification, aggressive hiring
    strategies to offset any negative impact of losing National Guard
    support were implemented. Through regular appropriations, supplemental
    funding and an overall increase in our inspector corps as a result of
    the March 1, 2003 transition to BCBP, our agency is prepared to do
    without National Guard support beginning October 1, 2004.
        Question. Shouldn't we be increasing the number of guardsman at our
    borders?
        Answer. As a result of the significant increase in BCBP staffing,
    as outlined above, it is not necessary to retain National Guard support
    at our borders, nor is it necessary to increase the number of National
    Guard soldiers at the border locations. BCBP welcomes National Guard
    support beyond September 30, 2004, but the support is not critical for
    BCBP to accomplish its mission.
        Question. If DOD pulls the Guard from the border will DHS need more
    funding to replace personnel?
        Answer. No. Through regular appropriations, supplemental funding
    and an overall increase in our inspector corps as a result of the March
    1, 2003 transition to BCBP, our agency is prepared to do without
    National Guard support beginning October 1, 2004.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

                                first responders
        Question. A portion of your budget is dedicated to managing the
    Department's First Responder initiative, and providing grants for
    preparedness. Within this initiative, you plan to award grants to
    states to address the equipment, training, planning and exercise needs
    (as recognized in their updated response plans, which identified goals
    and objectives for preparedness, State and local enforcement anti-
    terrorism initiatives, and Citizen Corps preparedness activities). What
    do you believe is the most efficient way to get funding into the hands
    of those first responders, who so desperately need it?
        Answer. There have been many concerns from the government as well
    as first responders in the field regarding the grant funding reaching
    local jurisdictions in a timely manner. Therefore, the fiscal year 2003
    State Homeland Security Grant Program I (SHSGP I) and SHSGP II
    incorporate a strict timeline to facilitate the release and obligation
    of this funding. Also, as mandated by Congress, 80 percent of the
    equipment funds in the SHSGP I, and 80 percent of the total amount of
    the grant to each state in the SHSGP II, must be provided to local
    units of government. The required bi-annual Categorical Assistance
    Progress Reports for both grant programs must reflect the progress made
    on providing those funds to local jurisdictions.
        Question. Can you explain to me the process in place for awarding
    the grant program?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program
    I (SHSGP I) application kit was posted online on March 7, 2003. States
    had to submit their applications to ODP within 45 days, by April 22,
    2003. Applications were reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
    Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
    days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time the grant is
    awarded.
        The SHSGP II application kit was posted online April 30, 2003.
    States must submit their applications to ODP within 30 days, by May 30,
    2003. Applications will be reviewed at ODP within 7 days of submission.
    Once approved by ODP, grants will be awarded to the States within 21
    days. States have 45 days to obligate funds from the time the grant is
    awarded.
                     transportation security administration
        Question. In the hours following the attacks on the Pentagon and
    the World Trade Center, it was clear that the lines of communication
    between everyone involved in air travel--the FAA, Federal authorities,
    airlines, and customers--was severely deficient, if not to say
    completely inadequate. What steps have been taken to improve this so
    that information moves quickly and accurately from the air traffic
    controllers to the airlines to the passengers, and most importantly, to
    the appropriate agencies in the event of another emergency?
        Answer. The communications flow between air traffic controllers,
    airline corporate headquarters and security divisions, Department of
    Defense, and other Departments occurs under processes established among
    the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security
    Administration, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
    Defense. In cases where there is a known threat to aviation security,
    the agency that identifies the threat establishes communications with
    the other agencies via established conference calls, at which time all
    command centers are brought into a coordination conference call. In
    addition to these interagency conference calls, each agency initiates
    calls within its own organization for coordination with internal
    response and information sources to build and maintain situational
    awareness. The Transportation Security Administration establishes
    direct links to internal and external agencies via secure and non-
    secure means for information gathering and direction. The communication
    systems are tested regularly to identify and correct glitches in the
    lines of communication so that we are confident there will not be any
    problems in a real emergency. At the end of every test, we conduct an
    outbrief to review the exercise and identify areas for improvement.
    These communications links encompass the full spectrum of agency
    capabilities to respond to any threat to aviation security. Additional
    details on the secure elements of the communication links can be
    provided in a classified setting.
                                  air marshals
        Question. On September 11th, it became apparent that our nation's
    protectors of the commercial skies, the U.S. Air Marshals, needed to be
    in better communication--not only with their superiors but also with
    each other. Who knows what could have been averted, and how many lives
    could have been saved had communications technology been available.
        I know that over the past year or so, the TSA has been working with
    technology companies in order to develop a communications system that
    allows the air marshals to communicate in real time with officials on
    the ground, as well as other air marshals stationed on other commercial
    aircraft. I think this is necessary so that our air marshals are not
    isolated at 30,000 feet.
        Do you have any knowledge of the progress of this technology
    development?
        Answer. Pursuant to House Conference Committee Report 107-593,
    TSA's Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was provided $15 million to
    begin implementation of an Air to Ground Communications program. TSA
    intends to utilize this funding to purchase a Commercial Off-the-Shelf
    (COTS) product, which includes hardware and software, for
    implementation of the Air to Ground communications system. This initial
    system will allow FAMS to utilize a portable, quickly deployable air to
    ground communications system which will seamlessly integrate existing
    FAMS wireless technology. This comprehensive wireless communications
    system may also be used by other local, State, and Federal agencies,
    and the Department of Defense, to achieve secure communications through
    a dedicated law enforcement network.
                               baggage screeners
        Question. The TSA recently announced plans to eliminate 3,000 more
    airport screening jobs by the end of September, coupled with 3,000
    others announced in March, amount to about 11 percent of the 55,600
    screeners employed.
        This plan will save the TSA an estimated $280 million. I applaud
    the TSA's effort to trim their budgetary needs, however, is a good idea
    to cut the work force and putting some workers on part-time hours? Do
    you believe this to be a wise decision at this time?
        Answer. TSA acknowledges the requirement to reduce and re-
    distribute some of the screener workforce. Getting the right number of
    screeners at airports will continue to be a management challenge. It
    will be essential for us to use our work force in a flexible manner if
    we are to avoid long lines after the reduction. Part time employees
    will be essential for staffing checkpoint lanes during peak periods.
    Through the implementation of good management principles and practices,
    TSA will be able to maintain its charter of world-class security with a
    more efficient, more effective screener workforce.
        Question. Will we still have enough workers to screen 100 percent
    of the bags?
        Answer. Yes. The resulting workforce, made up of full and part time
    employees, will be able to electronically screen 100 percent of the
    bags when the balance of baggage screening equipment is deployed to the
    remaining airports.
                            air traffic controllers
        Question. A year ago, we discussed the need for accountability in
    the security screeners and airport employees as a whole. Then Congress
    passed the Aviation and Transportation Act which federalized those
    employees. Recently, President Bush issued an executive order that
    deleted the clause in a previous order signed by President Clinton that
    described air traffic control as an ``inherently governmental
    function.'' The Administration has proposed studying whether to hire a
    private company to take over the air traffic control system. What
    effect will privatizing the Air Traffic Controllers will have on the
    current system?
        Answer. Because the safe operation of the Nation's air traffic
    control system is the responsibility of the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA), an agency within the Department of Transportation
    (DOT), this question is more appropriately addressed to that agency.
        Question. Do you believe it will solve current issues, or create
    problems?
        Answer. Because the safe operation of the Nation's air traffic
    control system is the responsibility of the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA), an agency within the Department of Transportation
    (DOT), this question is more appropriately addressed to that agency.
                       cross-check of passenger identity
        Question. When passing the Aviation and Transportation Act,
    Congress felt the need to include the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-
    screening System (CAPS II). CAPS II would scan government and
    commercial databases for potential terrorist threats when a passenger
    makes a reservation. Under this program, passengers will be required to
    provide their full name, address, telephone phone number, and date of
    birth. The airline computer reservation system will then automatically
    link to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for a computer
    background check that can include credit, banking history, and criminal
    background checks. The TSA will then assign a score to the passenger
    based on the agency's risk assessment of the traveler.
        However, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has doubts about
    the project and believes that there may be better use for the money
    slated for this project, and has the power to remove the project if
    they deem appropriate. Not to mention the potential infringement on
    personal privacy, and the possibility for mistakes effecting innocent
    people.
        Do you believe the CAPPS II program is necessary, and what are you
    doing to ease the OMB's worries regarding the program's effectiveness
    and operation?
        Answer. Yes, TSA believes that the CAPPS II program is necessary.
    Not only will it enhance security, but it will improve security
    resource allocation (including screeners and FAMs) and it will relieve
    the airlines of the burden of running the current CAPPS program
    (estimated at $150-200 million annually). TSA has submitted a Business
    Case for CAPPS II which is under review.
                      qualified antiterrorism technologies
        Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Sections 862) provided
    the Department of Homeland Security with authority to compile a list of
    ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' that would qualify or receive
    certain protection under that Act. Has this list been compiled? If not,
    why?
        Answer. The list of ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' has
    not yet been compiled. The regulations to govern implementation of the
    SAFETY Act must be completed before the SAFETY Act can be implemented.
    Promulgation of these regulations is a high priority, and DHS is
    working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to finalize an
    initial set of SAFETY Act regulations. We expect to publish these
    regulations for comment very shortly. Following the public comment
    period, the regulations will be finalized and issued. As soon as the
    regulations are issued, applications can be made to DHS for
    consideration of possible technologies that are determined to meet the
    criteria set forth in Subtitle G, Sec. 862.
        Question. If this list has been compiled, can Members of this
    Committee get a copy of this list?
        Answer. This list has not yet been compiled; please see answer to
    Question BTS-S56 for current status.
        Question. How would a company that has an antiterrorism technology
    be considered for approval?
        Answer. DHS has developed plans for both an immediate
    implementation path, and for a longer-term ``ideal state'' process, to
    implement the SAFETY Act. Public notification of the application
    process and of the select categories of technologies that will be
    considered for certification will be made through the DHS website after
    regulations are issued.
        Question. Do they need to wait for the rulemaking process to be
    completed to apply for approval?
        Answer. Yes, companies will need to wait until after the rulemaking
    process has been completed. DHS does not yet have an application or
    approval process in place. Final application and approval processes are
    contingent upon issuance of regulations. DHS wants to ensure that
    applicants are well informed about requirements so that they can make
    informed decisions regarding submitting their technologies for
    consideration
        Question. If so, when will that process be completed?
        Answer. Until DHS and OMB have completed their review and issued
    guidance for the actual implementation of the SAFETY Act, it is not
    possible to determine an actual date for completing the process.
    However, the Department does place a high priority on completing the
    necessary guidance and regulations and is prepared to act quickly after
    issuance of the guidance.
                                border security
        Question. This Directorate arguably has one of the toughest jobs in
    the Department. Ideally, if this Directorate performs its job to
    perfection, then the concerns of terrorists coming into our country to
    attack our citizens or our infrastructure are reduced to a great
    extent. With 7,500 miles of land borders with Canada and Mexico and
    95,000 miles of coastline to keep watch over, short of building a large
    wall around the country, how much success have you had in strengthening
    our border security?
        Answer. The priority mission BCBP is to detect and prevent
    terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States at and
    between Ports of Entry (POEs) while simultaneously facilitating
    legitimate trade and travel.
        In order to carry out its priority mission, BCBP has developed and
    is implementing Smart Border initiatives with other nations and with
    the private sector, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
    the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), NEXUS, and
    the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program, and will continue to push our
    zone of security outwards.
        Our layered inspection process and the components of a Smart Border
    include:
      --Advance electronic information
      --Automated targeting tools
      --Identifying and facilitating low-risk travelers and shipments
      --Non-intrusive inspection technology
      --Industry partnerships
      --Training
      --Pushing security beyond our borders
        BCBP uses various large-scale, portable and hand-held technologies
    in different combinations to substantially increase the likelihood that
    a nuclear or radiological weapon or weapons grade material will be
    detected. We have identified and are deploying nuclear and radiological
    detection equipment to include personal radiation detectors, portal
    radiation monitors and radiation isotope identifier devices.
        In combination with our layered enforcement process, these tools
    currently provide BCBP with significant capacity to detect nuclear or
    radiological materials.
        Additional initiatives include, but are not limited to:
      --Training to further develop a highly skilled and trained workforce;
      --Sensors to remotely monitor low volume ports of entry; and
      --Exchange of intelligence and information to identify potential
            nuclear and radiological smuggling threats.
        Our goal is to examine 100 percent of all high-risk cargo and
    conveyances and to screen all high-risk people, cargo and conveyances
    for radiation. The Border Patrol, a component of the Bureau of Customs
    and Border Protection, is responsible for preventing the illegal entry
    of any persons crossing between the ports of entry along the 8,000
    miles of international border with Canada and Mexico. To accomplish
    this enormous mission, there are currently over 10,000 agents deployed
    on the border to deter, detect, and apprehend any illegal entrants at
    the border. These dedicated agents have historically arrested in excess
    of 1,000,000 illegal entrants annually. In order to improve the
    enforcement effectiveness of these agents, the use of technology and
    enhanced detection systems are continuing to be deployed along the
    border. In addition to the technology, additional border barriers, high
    intensity lighting units and improved border roads have been used to
    assist the agents in providing the maximum in border security measures
    between the ports of entry. The success of these measures has recently
    lead to reductions in illegal entry arrests along certain major border
    areas, as well as the continued disruption of organized smuggling
    efforts on the border.
        Question. Are any of these projects visible to our country's
    citizens to make them feel safer?
        Answer. BCBP has developed a multi-layered process to target high-
    risk shipments while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and
    cargo. Our Smart Border initiatives include components that are
    invisible to a majority of the traveling public. These include
    cooperative efforts with other nations to push security beyond our
    borders, advance electronic information, automated targeting tools,
    intelligence and partnering with industry.
        Portions of our layered enforcement process are highly visible to
    the general public. These include our inventory of hand-held, portable
    and large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies deployed to
    our nation's air, land and seaports of entry, as well as the additional
    personnel and canine resources necessary to support the technology.
        Many of the Border Patrol's newest assets are visible to the
    citizens who reside in our many border communities. Those assets
    include the latest in state of the art helicopters, which frequently
    patrol over these communities. In addition, there are infrastructure
    improvements in fencing, checkpoint facilities and expanded canine
    units for locating persons and contraband hidden in vehicles and train
    boxcars. Also visible to our citizens is the increase in the number of
    agents patrolling in marked sedans and four-wheeled drive trucks along
    the border. In addition, every Border Patrol sector has a community
    out-reach program to educate and inform the local communities of the
    activities of the Border Patrol and to reassure the citizens of the
    Patrol's efforts in providing security along the border of the country.
    While many of the assets used by the Border Patrol are not readily
    visible to the public, such as surveillance and detection equipment,
    the results of the increased presence of agents along the border
    continues to be favorably noted by the local media and civic
    organizations in many border communities.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                            expiration of cobra fees
        Question. The COBRA fees--which fund nearly all overtime for the
    legacy Customs inspectors among others--expire at the end of this
    fiscal year. Have you submitted legislation to the appropriate
    authorizing committees and discussed with them the need for the
    extension of these fees? Also, what contingency plans, if any, do you
    have in place to cover the costs of the current COBRA-funded functions
    should the fees not be extended in time?
        Answer. We have briefed both the House Ways and Means Committee and
    the Senate Finance Committee staffs on the need for an extension of the
    COBRA fees, and both Committees have developed proposals to extend the
    fees. The expiration of the COBRA fees will present numerous problems
    for BCBP, as well as fee paying parties-in-interest. Other existing
    statutes require that airlines be billed for overtime services and
    preclearance (19 USC 267 and 31 USC 9701) and that foreign trade zones
    and bonded warehouses be billed for inspectional and supervision
    services (19 USC 81n and 19 USC 1555). Other charges, such as fees for
    reimbursement of compensation of boarding officers under 19 USC 261
    will also need to be reinstated. These statutes are held in abeyance
    while the COBRA fees are in effect (see 19 USC 58c(e)(6)). While the
    reimbursements from these other statutes would offset some of the
    losses from the expired COBRA fees, the amounts are not expected to be
    significant. If the COBRA fees expire, service to international
    passengers and the trade would need to be reduced to a level
    commensurate with available funding.
        It should also be noted that the failure to reauthorize the fees
    provided for under the COBRA statute (19 USC 58c) will result in an
    additional loss in collections of approximately $1 billion annually.
    This represents the Merchandise Processing Fees, which are deposited
    into the General Fund of the Treasury as an offset to the commercial
    operations portion of the BCBP budget.
     legacy custom service and immigration and naturalization service fees
        Question. A significant portion of the budgets of the new Bureaus
    of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement are based on the assumed collection of fees from the legacy
    Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service. What
    happens if these fees do not materialize or materialize at levels lower
    than estimated? How do you intend to bridge that funding gap should one
    occur?
        Answer. If funding shortages occur because of smaller fee receipts,
    BCBP will adjust the level of inspection services accordingly in order
    to function within available resources.
                     anti-dumping authority (bice and bcbp)
        Question. What is the expected cost in fiscal year 2003 of
    administering the anti-dumping authority in section 754 of the Tariff
    Act of 1930 (19 USC 1675c)?
        Answer. While enforcement of the Tariff Act is a major priority of
    the BCBP, its efforts to enforce this legislation cut across many
    different programs and organizations which are concurrently performing
    a variety of trade compliance functions within BCBP. Therefore, the
    cost of BCBP's enforcement efforts in this area is not easily tracked
    or monitored in a way that enables BCBP to provide a quick and easy
    answer to this question. Ultimately, any answer would be an estimate of
    BCBP's costs.
                                budget documents
        Question. The budget justification documents for BCBP and BICE do
    not include detailed legacy information on the agencies/accounts broken
    out in a manner similar to that which used to be provided by the former
    Customs Service. Was information provided to the Department by the
    former Customs Service staff prepared in that format? Please provide
    the Subcommittee with a copy of that submission to assist us in tracing
    the budgets from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. The former Customs Service did not provide a draft of the
    fiscal year 2004 budget to the Department in its traditional format.
                               dhs first 100 days
        Question. Secretary Ridge noted in his list of the Department's
    accomplishments for the 1st 100 days that BCBP had ``acquired and
    deployed additional ``A-STAR'' and ``HUEY'' helicopters to bolster
    enforcement efforts along the U.S. Southern border''. With what fiscal
    year funds were these aircraft purchased? Are other rotary or fixed-
    wing aircraft in the procurement pipeline? If so, where is their
    planned deployment?
        Answer. The purchase of the additional ``A-STAR'' helicopters was
    made in fiscal year 2002 with funding received from counter-terrorism
    supplemental appropriations in that year. The ``HUEY'' helicopters were
    obtained through the military on-loan program for special operations
    and tactical training requiring the mission capabilities of that
    aircraft. The deployment of the ``HUEY'' helicopters to bolster border
    enforcement operations occurred in fiscal year 2002.
                  national capitol region airspace protection
        Question. Last week, in his commemoration of the first 100 days of
    the new Department of Homeland Security, Secretary Ridge noted that the
    Department's Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of
    Air and Marine Interdiction has, ``provided 24-7 airspace security
    coverage over Washington, D.C.'' I understand that Blackhawk
    helicopters were transferred to this area to provide this ``airspace
    security''. How many assets have been assigned to this region and from
    which parts of the country are they being borrowed? How long are they
    expected to be assigned to this region? What are the impacts on the on-
    going operations at the other regions from which these assets have been
    borrowed? Is there a long term ``fix'' in the planning stages for this
    problem? Does the Department intend to establish an air security branch
    for the National Capitol Region?
        Answer. The Bureau of Customs and Immigration Enforcement (BICE),
    Office of Air and Marine Interdiction (OAMI) is providing two Blackhawk
    helicopters and two Citation Tracker aircraft with associated aircrews
    and support personnel for National Capital Region (NCR) air security
    operations. Additionally, OAMI is providing Detection Systems
    Specialists (DSSs) and four operator consoles from the Air and Marine
    Interdiction Coordination Center to establish and provide 24-7 law
    enforcement air surveillance to the NCR. These assets are drawn from
    throughout the OAMI program and are rotated on a regular basis to
    minimize the impact to any one sector. The impact on aircraft
    maintenance at the other regions is the reduction of man-hours. There
    is no expectation of this mission terminating.
        Question. Given the importance of all of these missions, as well as
    the limited number of Department air assets, why are no funds requested
    in your fiscal year 2004 budget for additional aircraft? Further, if
    you decide to create a National Capitol Region program, how much money
    is required to do so?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's fiscal year 2004
    budget will leverage existing assets to accomplish this mission.
                      restructuring air and marine program
        Question. What are the plans for updating and restructuring the Air
    and Marine program? Will pilots who train and graduate from the same
    academy as agents be eligible to become 1811's? Will there be any
    equipment upgrades? Will there be new offices set up in the New York
    Metro and National Capitol Region? Will new offices with assets in
    these areas be cost effective in the event of changing security levels?
        Answer. In addition to NCR coverage, OAMI has developed plans to
    expand air security and interdiction operations beyond the traditional
    southern focused alignment to include the Northern Border. Currently
    OAMI has a ``permanent'' temporary air unit in the Northwest and
    routinely deploys air units to other Northern Border locations. Also,
    in order to meet the increased demands from Northern Border operations,
    OAMI plans to increase the capacity of the OAMI national training and
    standardization center to include flight simulators. This will increase
    the safety and proficiency of OAMI personnel.
        BICE Special Agents, Pilots, Air Interdiction Officers, Air
    Enforcement Officers and Marine Enforcement Officers attend and
    graduate from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Graduation
    from this academy qualifies personnel as Criminal Investigators (1811).
        The OAMI Modification Plan is a living document and currently under
    revision. Previous versions have been forwarded to OMB and Congress for
    consideration. This includes equipment upgrades as well as
    recapitalization of aircraft and vessels. OAMI has a standing
    requirement to upgrade operational equipment to keep pace with
    technological advancements.
        Currently there are no plans to set up additional offices in New
    York City other than the existing Air Unit. However, AMI has
    established a communication and radar surveillance infrastructure for
    the New York City area that can be easily accessed and used for
    training or operational events. There is a plan for a National Capital
    Region Air Branch and NCR Coordination Center.
                              operation greenquest
        Question. By all accounts, the on-going anti-terrorism initiative
    known as ``Operation Greenquest'' is working quite well. However, there
    have been rumblings that the FBI may be attempting to take control of
    the Operation from the Department's Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement. Is this true? If so, does the Department support shifting
    control of the program from legacy Customs to the FBI? For what reason?
    What is the status of negotiations with other Departments and agencies
    regarding terrorism financing (Operation Greenquest) and Narcotics
    investigations (Title 21)? Are you pushing to ensure that ICE Agents
    retain this authority?
        Answer. In an effort to unify the U.S. Government's war against
    terrorist financing, the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice
    entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on May 13, 2003. This MOA
    assigns lead investigative authority and jurisdiction regarding the
    investigation of terrorist finance to the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI).
        Those cases that are determined to be ``terrorist financing'' cases
    will be investigated only through participation by the Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) in the FBI Joint Terrorism
    Task Forces (JTTF). All appropriate BICE-developed financial leads will
    be reviewed by the FBI, and if a nexus to terrorism or terrorist
    financing is identified, the leads will be referred to the JTTF under
    the direction of the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section
    (TFOS). There are no provisions in the current agreement between DHS
    and DOJ that allow for delegation of authority of terrorist financing
    investigations.
        In accordance with BICE's independent authority and jurisdiction
    relative to other financial crimes and money laundering investigations,
    BICE will be the lead investigative agency for financial investigations
    that are not specified as ``terrorist financing'' cases. BICE will
    continue to vigorously and aggressively proceed with its DHS mission to
    target financial systems that are vulnerable to exploitation by
    criminal organizations, and to protect the integrity of U.S. financial
    infrastructures.
                          aqi fumigation investigation
        Question. The Agriculture Department's Animal and Plant Health
    Inspection Service--Agriculture Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program was
    transferred by law to the Department of Homeland Security. However, the
    investigators who follow-up, review and investigate the importation of
    prohibited goods from prohibited countries remain part of the
    Agriculture Department. Similarly, the personnel responsible for
    fumigation, following the discovery of pests, remain at USDA. Does this
    make sense? Is the Administration considering a legislative fix to
    correct this contradiction?
        Answer. The separation of mutually dependent program functions,
    such as the USDA investigators and personnel responsible for
    fumigation, from the AQI program transferred to the DHS is problematic
    and requires high levels of cooperation, communication, and
    coordination at multiple levels. To facilitate this, DHS and USDA
    addressed issues early by including relevant Articles in a Memorandum
    of Agreement (MOA) required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
    Specifically, there are Articles for separating functions and then
    coordinating these functions once separated. Further, additional and
    more specific agreements are necessary and are being developed. The MOA
    will be periodically reviewed and modified as mutually agreed to by DHS
    and USDA. Through the MOA and additional, more specific agreements, DHS
    and USDA will have an opportunity to re-adjust the assignment of
    program functions and responsibilities to maximize collective ability
    to carry out respective missions. Program officials from both DHS and
    USDA are working together to accomplish this. Legislative fixes offer
    another means to accomplish necessary and beneficial re-adjustments and
    changes. DHS Agricultural Inspection Policy and Program staff is not
    currently working on developing legislative fixes.
       justice department's recent decision regarding illegal immigrants
        Question. On April 24, Attorney General Ashcroft announced that his
    agency has determined that broad categories of foreigners who arrive in
    the U.S. illegally can be detained indefinitely without consideration
    of their individual circumstances if immigration officials say their
    release would endanger national security. Apparently, Homeland Security
    officials appealed that decision but their objections were overruled by
    the Attorney General. There are significant costs that are born by
    detaining illegal immigrants until their eventual deportation. For
    instance, it is estimated that the detention of Haitians in Florida
    over a 6 month period has cost the Department $12.5 million. Given that
    the Justice Department decision could have a significant impact on the
    Homeland Security Department's budget, how will the costs of these
    policy decisions be paid and by whom? Is the Department making further
    appeals of the Justice Department's ruling in this case?
        Answer. BICE is fully supportive of the decision by the Attorney
    General to allow national security implications to be considered as
    part of bond determinations. This decision was requested by BICE in the
    face of a recent Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision which had
    ruled that bond determinations could only be based on individual
    circumstances.
                             detention and removal
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget request for detention and
    removal activities appears to be cut by $37.4 million below the level
    appropriated in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Act. Given Attorney
    General Ashcroft's decision to permit the detention--on national
    security grounds--of entire categories of aliens found entering or
    residing in the United States, as well as the already relatively
    crowded conditions at ICE detention facilities across the country, how
    can the Department justify any reductions in this activity? Will the
    Justice Department provide additional funds to bridge any potential
    resources gaps or will this just become yet another unfunded mandate?
        Answer. As stated previously, BICE is fully supportive of the
    decision by the Attorney General to allow national security
    implications to be considered as part of bond determinations. This
    decision was requested by BICE in the face of a recent Board of
    Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision which had ruled that bond
    determinations could only be based on individual circumstances.
        There were two significant reductions to the funding level for the
    fiscal year 2003 Detention and Removal budget. In the appropriate
    account, $615 million identified for the Office of the Federal
    Detention Trustee was reduced by $22 million in the Conference Report.
    In the User Fee account, Detention and Removal funds were reduced by
    $5.6 million due to a decrease in expected User Fee revenue. As a
    result, 1,081 beds would have to be reduced. If a reduction in beds is
    necessary, the result will be 9,729 fewer aliens being detained. For
    aliens in detention, approximately 92 percent are removed, while
    approximately 13 percent of aliens on the non-detained docket are
    removed. Thus, the reduction in 1,081 beds may result in 7,686 fewer
    removals.
                               letters of intent
        Question. The fiscal year 2003 Iraqi War Supplemental (Public Law
    108-11) included a provision allowing the Under Secretary for Border
    and Transportation Security to issue letters of intent to airports to
    provide assistance in the installation of explosive detection systems.
    What is the status of this issue? Is the Office of Management and
    Budget delaying the issuance of these letters?
        Answer. TSA has received OMB approval to begin using the LOI
    process. Once an LOI is established, TSA and the relevant airport
    development authority enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to
    outline the specific details of the work to be accomplished to complete
    an in-line explosive detection system (EDS) solution.
                            high threat urban areas
        Question. Just last week the Office for Domestic Preparedness
    released the application kit for the $100 million High Threat Urban
    Area program that Congress funded in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus
    Appropriations Act. The applications for the seven eligible cities are
    due June 16. By the time the funds get to the cities, it will have been
    at least 4\1/2\ months since the Omnibus bill was signed into law.
    Getting out this first round of money required a lot of work on the
    part of the Department. You had to develop a funding formula from
    scratch, and had to design an application kit. But I'm concerned about
    the next round of funding.
        In the fiscal year 2003 supplemental, Congress appropriated $700
    million for the high threat urban area program. I do not want cities--
    and this time it will be more than just seven eligible cities--to wait
    4 months to receive their grants. When will you award the $700 million?
    Congress required that the $700 million be allocated to high threat
    urban areas within 60 days of enactment, which is June 11, 2003. Given
    that applications for the first round of funding are due June 16, can
    the Department award all $800 million at that time? This would prevent
    cities from applying more than once for the same program, and would
    allow for coordinated planning and implementation.
        Answer. Due to concerns from the government as well as first
    responders in the field regarding the grant funding reaching local
    jurisdictions in a timely manner, the grant application for the
    approximately $100 million for the Urban Areas Security Initiative
    incorporates a strict timeline in order to facilitate the release and
    obligation of this funding. The application kit was posted online on
    April 30, 2003, with a deadline for applications due June 16, 2003. The
    additional $700 million referenced in Public-Law 108-11, The Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations, was not allocated by DHS before April 30,
    2003. On May 14, 2003, DHS announced how the $700 million was
    allocated, identifying the cities that are eligible to participate in
    the program. Therefore, the first application cannot be combined with
    the next application for the $700 million. To expedite the grant awards
    for the $700 million, ODP will again adhere to a strict timeline.
                    fire grants and first responder funding
        Question. Mr. Secretary, FEMA--in conjunction with the National
    Fire Protection Association--released a study on January 22, 2002,
    entitled ``A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service'' which reported
    that only 13 percent of our nation's fire departments are prepared
    handle a chemical or biological attack involving ten or more injuries.
    Last year, FEMA awarded $334 million in fire grants but received more
    than 19,000 applications that requested over $2 billion.
        Given the critical unmet needs of our nation's first responders, I
    simply do not understand the Administration's lack of commitment to
    this program. In fiscal year 2002, the President refused to spend $150
    million approved by the Congress for this program. For fiscal year
    2003, the President proposed to eliminate all funding for the program.
    For fiscal year 2004 you are proposing a 33 percent reduction to the
    fire grants program from the 2003 enacted amount of $745 million.
        Please explain to the Subcommittee why the Administration does not
    view this program as a critical part of our strategy to secure the
    homeland.
        Answer. ODP has been providing Federal assistance to State and
    local emergency responders through grant funding since 1998. Eligible
    disciplines for these grant funds include the fire service, law
    enforcement, emergency medical services, and other emergency services
    disciplines. While the allowable costs for these grants do not include
    hiring of operational personnel such as fire fighters, they do include
    many items related to prevention, response and recovery, such as:
    equipment, exercises, training and administrative staff and overtime
    costs. All of these items are crucial to the support and readiness of
    fire departments.
        The Department of Homeland Security budget request for fiscal year
    2004 includes at least an additional $500 million in grants that
    contribute to firefighter preparedness, as well as $2.5 billion for
    State domestic preparedness grants to provide equipment, exercises,
    strategic planning, and support to the national training and exercise
    program. This amount is in addition to the $566.295 million in State
    domestic preparedness grants available through the fiscal year 2003
    State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) I, and the $1.5 billion
    in State domestic preparedness grants that is available for the SHSGP
    II. Basic turn-out gear covered under the Fire Act is also equipment
    that would be used in response to a terrorist event, therefore funds
    that are available for the State homeland security grants can be used
    to provide much needed equipment and other direct services to the fire
    fighting community.
                      fiscal year 2003 tsa financial plan
        Question. The Transportation Security Administration advised the
    Congress that we would be provided with a spending plan for how you
    intend to obligate the funds appropriated to your agency for this
    fiscal year. We have now entered the 8 month of this fiscal year--and
    we have yet to be provided with such a spending plan. We are told that
    TSA faces a significant funding shortfall--perhaps in excess of $900
    million. We have not received a supplemental request from the President
    to meet this shortfall. The Administration opposed efforts to add
    funding to the recent supplemental to close the operating deficit. Do
    you believe that TSA can live within its current budget and, if so,
    what steps are you and they taking to live within that budget? Why has
    TSA waited 3 months since enactment of the Omnibus to deliver a plan?
        Answer. Since enactment of fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations
    Act (Public Law 108-7) in February and the Emergency Wartime
    Supplemental Appropriations Act (Public Law 108-11), TSA has been
    working with the assistance of the Department of Homeland Security and
    the Office of Management and Budget to develop a budget execution plan
    that will meet the needs of the agency within the funding provided.
        Since the establishment of TSA, the agency has confronted a series
    of unforeseen and extraordinary requirements as it worked to meet
    mandated deadlines and to establish normalized business practices. In
    addition, development of a fiscal year 2003 budget plan was
    particularly challenging since the Omnibus Appropriations Act contained
    a large number of earmarks that were not budgeted. The transfer of TSA
    from the Department of Transportation to the Department of Homeland
    Security on March 1 was another unusual dynamic.
        TSA has prioritized its spending needs for fiscal year 2003,
    resulting in a budget plan that has been transmitted to the Congress as
    a reprogramming notification. TSA will adhere to this plan and will
    closely monitor its execution for the remainder of the fiscal year.
                            ins construction backlog
        Question. Please provide the Subcommittee with details on the
    current INS construction backlog.
        Answer. The DHS will begin addressing these backlogs following a
    strategic, multi-year approach.
                   private mail radiation detection equipment
        Question. The Department has provided its employees who inspect
    U.S. Postal Service mail with radiation detection equipment. Does it
    also provide similar equipment for employees who inspect United Parcel
    Service and FedEx mail? If not, why not? Is there a plan to provide
    this equipment in the future?
        Answer. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
    personnel are equipped with radiation detection devices at FedEx and
    United Parcel Service (UPS) facilities. At the present time BCBP
    personnel use both Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD) and Radiation
    Isotope Identification Devices to screen cargo at both FedEx and UPS
    facilities.
        Both UPS and FedEx are in the process of procuring and installing
    company owned radiation detection devices at overseas locations. Once
    completely installed, this equipment will allow these companies to
    screen all incoming cargo and parcels before entering the commerce of
    the United States. Both companies will be relying on several types of
    equipment, such as Hand-Held Devices and Radiation Portal Monitors, at
    their overseas facilities. The types of radiation screening devices
    used will depend on the size of the facility and amount of cargo
    screened.
       bureau of immigration and customs enforcement: on-going operation
        Question. My staff recently was briefed on an on-going Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement activity referred to as ``Operation
    Blue Girard''. Is there money in the fiscal year 2004 budget request
    specifically designated for this activity? If so, how much and for what
    purposes?
        Answer. Operation Blue Girard is one part of a multifaceted port
    security program coordinated by the BICE SAIC/Miami, which falls under
    Operation Enduring Vigilance, which is a comprehensive multi agency
    approach to securing the seaports, cruise passengers and sea cargo in
    South Florida. Agencies from the Federal, State and local governments
    combine resources to address the threat to homeland security and from
    drug or alien smuggling. There is no funding in the fiscal year 2004
    budget request specifically designated for this activity. Funding for
    maritime port security operations such as Operation Enduring Vigilance
    is handled internally within the agency budget process to include
    special operations funding.
         wyden amendment to s. 165--air cargo security improvement act
        Question. During mark-up of S. 165 in the Commerce Committee,
    Senator Wyden won voice vote approval of an amendment requiring a
    report on plans by the Transportation Security Administration to gather
    data on plane passengers. He said he wanted to determine how the
    collection of data impacts civil liberties and privacy. Has the
    Administration taken a position on the Wyden provision? Does it share
    the same concerns about personal privacy and data mining issues?
        Answer. The Administration does not oppose the Wyden provision. TSA
    is committed to ensuring that personal privacy is protected in the
    CAPPS II program and welcomes the opportunity offered by Senator Wyden
    to demonstrate that commitment. With regard to data mining, while the
    Administration believes that it can be an important tool, the CAPPS II
    program will not be involved in data mining.
                           port security assessments
        Question. Have you reviewed the port security assessments that have
    been completed to date to determine if there are patterns in port
    vulnerability that ports generally should begin to address immediately?
        Answer. Review of the port security assessments completed to date
    has yielded valuable preliminary information regarding security
    enhancement requirements. These assessments have identified a number of
    physical security enhancements that were either non-existent or needed
    improvement, such as fencing, lighting, and closed circuit television
    systems. Other common recommendations included: standards for
    transportation worker identifications systems, security plans,
    communications systems, and screening equipment standards for cargo and
    passengers.
                   enforcement of intellectual property laws
        Question. The enforcement activities of the Customs Service are
    critical to the health, safety and well being of U.S. citizens and our
    economy. Historically, Customs has been our first line of defense and
    this is reflected by the responsibilities we have given Customs through
    the laws granting it powers to detain citizens and cargo and, if
    necessary, to seize and forfeit goods.
        In the 5 fiscal years from 1998 to 2002, Customs stopped over
    19,700 shipments because of trademark and copyright violations. Customs
    seized over $373.9 million of counterfeit and pirated product. Because
    of the public health and safety risks posed by counterfeits and the
    injury to our commercial enterprises, these enforcement activities
    should continue in order to protect our national economic security.
        In several well-publicized cases, millions of dollars made from
    cigarette smuggling were funneled to terrorist groups. Given that there
    may be numerous priority areas for our new bureaus with border
    responsibilities (Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement), where is the issue of product
    counterfeiting and piracy on your list of priorities?
        Answer. Customs and Border Protection's top priority is the
    detection and apprehension of terrorism and terrorism related material.
    Interdiction of counterfeiting and piracy remain a priority because of
    the potential use of money generated from the smuggling of
    counterfeited and pirated goods for terrorist activity
        Question. Also, the security of the United States has many
    dimensions. How are the new agencies--the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement--going
    to increase the needed protection of our commercial enterprises from
    those who bring counterfeit and illegal products into the United
    States?
        Answer. BCBP has increased protection of commercial enterprises by
    implementing stringent cargo manifest rules, increasing importation
    research, and conducting more high-risk shipment exams.
        Question. The enforcement responsibilities of the Bureau of Customs
    and Border Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement appear to be distinct; yet, overlapping. How will these two
    bureaus not only coordinate their enforcement efforts but also
    strengthen efforts to stop trafficking in counterfeit and illegal
    products in the United States?
        Answer. The combining of agencies and personnel under DHS will
    increase the research and examination capabilities of each agency. The
    increase of research and investigative personnel leads to a broader and
    more productive work force.
        Question. In fiscal year 2002, Customs stopped over 5,000 shipments
    that involved intellectual property theft, amounting to nearly $100
    million. Will this continue to be an area of enforcement in view of the
    magnitude of the violations?
        Answer. Due to the sheer volume and monetary value of BCBP seizures
    involving intellectual property theft, IPR will continue to be a
    priority. IPR will continue to be a focus for enforcement in order to
    protect the owners of intellectual property and prevent the movement of
    terrorist funds through this illegal activity.
        Question. The U.S. Customs Service has been split between the
    Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement. How will this new structure increase the number of
    inspections of containers?
        Answer. The restructuring of BCBP and BICE will potentially
    increase the number of inspections. It will allow for a greater amount
    of personnel dedicated to the research, exam and investigations leading
    to the apprehension of terrorists or others that commit violations of
    U.S. laws and regulations.
        Question. Given the terrorist link, how can the new Department
    better target containers and seize illegal products entering the United
    States?
        Answer. BCBP is able to update and implement targeting systems and
    research shipments related to entities associated with terrorism or
    commodities associated with acts of terrorism. Advanced technology and
    cooperation from foreign countries have increased the targeting and
    interdiction of illegal products from entering the United States.
        Question. In terms of budgeting and personnel and training, what is
    being proposed for fiscal year 2004 compared to the last several years?
        Answer. Current projections for fiscal year 2004 are to train
    approximately 5,000 new inspectors and 2,000 new Border Patrol agents.
    Past training workloads for new recruits are indicated in the table
    below.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Border Patrol        INS         Agriculture       OFO \1\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    2001............................................           2,100           1,110             192             460
    2002............................................           2,000           2,720             308           1,210
    2003............................................           1,980           2,960             334           1,830
    2004 (est.).....................................           2,000             N/A             432           5,000
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ With the establishment of DHS, legacy INS, Customs and Agriculture inspectors become part of the Office of
      Field Operations in Customs and Border Protection. Legacy Border Patrol becomes its own office in Customs and
      Border Protection.

        Question. In fiscal year 2002, U.S. Customs seizures of
    intellectual property reached a new record and eclipsed the previous
    year by over 33 percent. Illegal cigarettes shot up from the 5th
    largest commodity to the top commodity being smuggled into the United
    States. Is the large increase in tobacco smuggling due to operations
    run by foreign terrorists?
        Answer. Tobacco smuggling has not been linked solely to the funding
    of terrorist operations. Tobacco smuggling is known to be a profitable
    and highly lucrative cash commodity. However, through the use of BCBP
    databases tobacco shipments can be tracked and monitored for possible
    illicit or terrorist activity when linked to direct intelligence or
    derived from investigations.
        Question. What efforts are you taking to intercept cigarette
    smuggling?
        Answer. Efforts to intercept cigarette smuggling include greater
    scrutiny of imports from international sources known to be lenient to
    smuggling activity as well as importation trends, and the greater use
    of non-intrusive examinations. The use of automated targeting systems
    allows for efficient review of import information. Non-intrusive exams
    are utilized to uncover false compartments or other methods of
    concealment.
        Question. In the fiscal year 2002 appropriations, $800,000 was
    designed for ``tobacco smuggling task forces''? What have the task
    forces done to increase the number of seizures of illegal product?
        Answer. To combat cigarette smuggling, the U.S. Customs Service
    created a Tobacco Task Force at headquarters. Last fiscal year, two
    full time agent positions and one full-time intelligence research
    specialist position were filled. Additionally, one full time agent
    position in Brussels was filled. This agent serves as coordinator with
    related European entities as part of the Tobacco Task Force. The Task
    Force provides coordination and investigative expertise to numerous
    complex international tobacco smuggling investigations involving
    Federal, State and Foreign law enforcement agencies. The Task Force
    provided funding and training in support of joint State/Federal Tobacco
    Smuggling Task Force members and funded an International Cigarette
    Smuggling conference in September 2002 for all disciplines of the U.S.
    Customs Service, to several Federal prosecutors, and to some of our law
    enforcement counterparts from around the world. These efforts have lead
    to a large increase in tobacco related investigations and has
    contributed significantly to the increase in seizures as well. No
    additional appropriations were earmarked for the Task Force in fiscal
    year 2003.
        Question. In the fiscal year 2002 appropriations, $5 million went
    to the Intellectual Property Rights Center and Investigations
    Initiative. Could you please explain their activities and
    accomplishments? How does this investigative unit relate to the new
    bureaus--BCBP and BICE--and how will it increase the likelihood of
    seizures of illegal products?
        Answer. The enforcement of intellectual property rights was a high
    priority trade strategy for the U.S. Customs Service, Office of
    Investigations, throughout fiscal year 2002. Since the reorganization,
    BICE has retained its foremost position. The IPR Center provides
    coordination and expertise to the BICE field offices in IPR-related
    investigations. It is a centralized collection and analysis point for
    allegations of Intellectual Property crime and investigative leads
    generated by law enforcement agencies, industry associations, the right
    holders and the public.
        In fiscal year 2002, the IPR Center funded twelve Special Agent and
    nine Intelligence Research Specialists positions. The IPR Center funded
    positions have allowed the placement of investigative resources in
    Customs Attache offices located in Beijing, Hong Kong, Bangkok, and
    Singapore, as well as, field offices located in Houston, Los Angeles,
    Miami, San Francisco and New York. These resources provided the
    technical expertise and support, which facilitated successful outcomes
    in domestic and foreign investigations.
        During fiscal year 2002, the Center received over 200 incoming
    allegations and complaints from industry sources and right holders.
    After analyzing the information, multiple cases were referred to
    Customs field offices. During this period, the U.S. Customs Service
    initiated over 75 IPR related criminal investigations, which resulted
    in multiple arrests and convictions. In addition, over 85 IPR related
    seizures were effected by the Customs Service.
        During fiscal year 2002, the Center personnel conducted dozens of
    training and outreach activities to domestic and foreign law
    enforcement officials, industry groups and associations. The Center
    personnel are regularly called upon to present the enforcement programs
    in the IPR arena to foreign dignitaries and delegations, who visit the
    United States as part of the State Department's Foreign Visitor Program
    and on other initiatives.
        The Center is one of the leading members of the INTERPOL
    Intellectual Property Crime Action Group, which is a joint industry-law
    enforcement group designed to promote and coordinate IPR enforcement
    around the world. The IPR Center is now part of the Immigration &
    Customs Enforcement. The BICE and BCBP elements involved in the
    enforcement of Intellectual Property laws are continuing their
    respective duties and operational relationship. The Director of IPR
    Center continues to chair the BICE-BCBP IPR Trade Strategy Board
    meetings and represents BICE as the leading component of the joint
    effort in this area.
        Question. Could you provide this Subcommittee with a report
    detailing your plans in fiscal year 2004 for the interdiction of
    illegal products in the United States and how you would measure success
    in this critical area? I would appreciate having such a report within
    30 days for the Subcommittee's use in consideration of the fiscal year
    2004 budget request of the department.
        Answer. BCBP agrees to provide the report.
        Question. One example cited of a decrease in emphasis on
    intellectual property (IP) enforcement is the cancellation of training
    sessions. I am told that several ports of entry including Honolulu,
    Buffalo, Cleveland, Champlain (NY), Detroit, Port Huron (MI), St.
    Alban's (VT), San Francisco/Oakland, and Minneapolis have cancelled
    scheduled IP training sessions. The reason given is that a lack of
    resources and new mission priorities make IPR enforcement a non-
    essential activity. Are you aware of these cancellations and don't you
    believe these sessions remain important to the Department's overall
    mission? What figures do you have on the number of training sessions
    cancelled this fiscal year? Should such training be centralized through
    the Department or left to the individual ports?
        Answer. Port directors are free to accept or reject offers of
    product identification training offered by parties-in-interest. Given
    the fact that antiterrorism is, and must continue to be, our first
    priority, field resources have been reallocated to respond to this
    threat, leaving fewer resources available for IPR enforcement. In the
    case of the vast majority of the ports cited, they have not
    historically been major points of entry for IPR violating goods, thus
    the need for such training is not critical to these locations.
        Question. These same companies indicate that Customs inspectors
    familiar with IPR enforcement are being reassigned at alarming rates.
    For example, the Port of Newark, New Jersey reportedly had 40
    inspectors assigned to conduct IP investigations before the move the
    DHS, and now it has one. We have heard that Los Angeles has seen a
    similar reduction. Is this true? Have there been actions at other ports
    to divert agents from IP inspections to other functions?
        Answer. In order to respond to our antiterrorism mission, it has
    been necessary to reallocate resources at all locations.
        Question. What is the effect of changes in the Threat Advisory
    Level to Custom's mission priorities? Has DHS established enforcement
    or operations guidelines for the different security levels? What impact
    does a change from Code Yellow to Code Orange have on the enforcement
    of intellectual property rights?
        Answer. When the nation is at Code Orange, all cargo examination
    criteria which do not have an antiterrorism, national security, or
    public health and safety nexus are suspended.
        Question. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is designed in
    part to allow Customs to search more cargo containers, better target
    suspect shipments, and still facilitate trade. Will CSI also help in
    the detection of other nefarious products such as drugs and counterfeit
    merchandise, or is it restricted to protecting against weapons? What
    steps are you taking to ensure that programs such as the CSI aren't
    used against the United States to facilitate trafficking in illegal
    goods that don't pose an immediate threat to the public?
        Answer. The twin goals of the BCBP are to increase security and to
    facilitate trade. BCBPs obligation to make our borders and our country
    safer, includes making sure that legitimate goods continue to enter
    efficiently. In order to fulfill our twin goals, we have developed and
    implemented many important initiatives designed to carry out both of
    those goals effectively.
        In a standard CSI in-country team, BCBP officers target with the
    host nation cargo containers destined for, or transiting through, the
    United States. If during the course of the manifest targeting or
    container screening processes the BCBP officer discloses a shipment
    containing goods which violate a U.S. law or regulation, the
    information is transmitted to our National Targeting Center, the port
    of destination, and the appropriate Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement office for action.
        The CSI in-country team pre-screens and inspects commodities prior
    to lading in the host nation. Commodities rejected for potential
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or terrorist contraband will not be
    permitted to continue on its course to an U.S. port. Furthermore, that
    ship will not be allowed into U.S. territorial waters.
        If, on the other hand, a container is targeted for inspection for
    commercial reasons, and is not inspected in the foreign port, it will
    be inspected when it reaches the intended U.S. port of entry. Under
    this scenario, BCBP officers at the U.S. port of entry will initiate
    the appropriate enforcement and penalty against the member the chain
    supply (carrier, importer).
        Question. In an article posted on its website describing Operation
    Green Quest, Customs States that one of the many criminal enterprises
    used to fund terrorist organizations derive is the sale of counterfeit
    merchandise. To what extent has Operation Green Quest investigated or
    uncovered the connection between intellectual property theft and
    terrorist financing? To the extent that this link has been made,
    shouldn't Customs continue to focus on IP enforcement as a means to
    foreclose counterfeiting and piracy as a source of funding for
    terrorists?
        Answer. Operation Green Quest investigations have revealed that a
    variety of criminal activities serve as funding sources for various
    criminal elements, some of which are alleged to have ties to terrorist
    organizations. Among these are violations of laws protecting
    intellectual property rights and prohibiting the manufacture,
    trafficking and sale of counterfeit merchandise. The Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement is conducting several on-going
    investigations involving the use of proceeds derived from the sale and
    trafficking of counterfeit merchandise, alleged to support designated
    terrorist organizations. BICE is committed to investigating any
    violation of Federal law that may be used to fund criminal enterprises.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

                               airport screeners
        Question. I understand the TSA has finished assessing how many
    screener positions--full- and part-time--are needed at each airport
    around the country and that 6,000 airport security jobs will be trimmed
    by the end of this fiscal year. What is the average percentage of cuts
    taking place at airports nationwide? And what is the percentage of cuts
    you expect at the Burlington International Airport in Vermont? In
    addition, did the cuts planned for Burlington take into account that
    bomb-detection machines are not yet in place at the airport?
        Answer. Nationwide, the percentage reduction of passenger and
    baggage screeners is 11 percent. To screen passengers' baggage at BTV,
    all baggage screening equipment has been deployed and the screener
    workforce at the airport has been hired and fully trained to provide
    the proper operation of this equipment. TSA has taken into account
    BTV's recent receipt of twelve additional Electronic Trace Detection
    machines. TSA is concluding a second round of modeling to determine
    final screener staffing numbers for each airport.

                              SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate very much
    your cooperation with our subcommittee. We had planned to
    continue to review the fiscal year 2004 budget request for the
    Department of Homeland Security on Thursday, with witnesses
    being the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection, the Administrator of the Transportation Security
    Administration, and the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement
    Training Center, but because of schedule conflicts my intention
    now is to try to reschedule that hearing for next week. We will
    make an announcement about our next hearing as soon as
    possible.
        Senator Byrd. Senator, do I understand you, Mr. Chairman,
    to say that the Thursday meeting this week may be rescheduled?
        Senator Cochran. Yes, sir. We will try to reschedule that
    hearing for next week.
        Senator Byrd. I'm glad you're doing that, because the Armed
    Services Committee is marking up the DOD authorization bill at
    the same time Thursday morning that the subcommittee had
    planned that hearing.
        Senator Cochran. I thank you for advising me of that
    conflict. The subcommittee will stand in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., Tuesday, May 6, the subcommittee
    was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 13, 2003

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Cochran, Specter, Domenici, Byrd, and
    Murray.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    STATEMENTS OF:
            ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
                BUREAU
            ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
                ADMINISTRATION
            CONNIE L. PATRICK, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING
                CENTER

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

        Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
        Today our subcommittee on Homeland Security Appropriations
    continues its hearings on the President's budget request for
    fiscal year 2004 for the Department of Homeland Security.
        This morning, our panel consists of three components of the
    new Border and Transportation Security Directorate. These
    include the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the
    Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center.
        We are very pleased to welcome our witnesses this morning:
    the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection, the Honorable Robert C. Bonner; the Administrator
    of the Transportation Security Administration, Admiral James M.
    Loy; and the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center, Ms. Connie Patrick.
        There is another bureau of the Border and Transportation
    Security Directorate, which is going to be headed by Michael
    Garcia, but he has not yet been confirmed as the head of the
    Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. No witness was
    available for the Office for Domestic Preparedness which is
    also under the directorate.
        We appreciate your cooperation with our committee, and your
    being here this morning to discuss the budget request for those
    activities under the jurisdiction of your agencies. We
    appreciate the fact that this is a new undertaking for some of
    you in connection with the Department of Homeland Security.
    Others, such as Admiral Loy and Mr. Bonner, have had
    experiences in those agencies, and we appreciate the fact that
    the President and Secretary Ridge have attracted a very
    talented and capable team to run this new Department of
    Homeland Security.
        It is immensely important, the work that is to be done by
    this directorate and the Department, and we are going to
    carefully consider the President's request and hope that we
    will be able to make the correct judgments on allocating the
    limited amount of funding that is available to our
    subcommittee.
        The budget resolution that was adopted limits the amount of
    money that can be spent. And, it is our job to try to identify
    the priorities and to make sure that the money is being spent
    efficiently and in a thoughtful way to protect the security of
    our homeland.
        It is a pleasure, too, as we draw to a close with our
    hearings for this year to work with my good friend, Robert
    Byrd, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, who is the
    ranking member of the full Committee on Appropriations and
    chose to assume the responsibility as the ranking member on
    this subcommittee.
        I think it indicates the seriousness of the subjects that
    we are dealing with on this subcommittee, and we appreciate his
    assistance and work with us as we carry out our
    responsibilities.
        Senator Byrd.

                      STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your overly
    charitable remarks concerning me. I am grateful for the
    opportunity to serve with you on this committee. You run a
    tight ship. You are fair and I consider it a real privilege to
    be associated with you in this committee.
        I know of no Senator with whom I could have a greater
    rapport and a better working relationship. I join you in
    welcoming our witnesses to today's hearings. You represent
    three of the four major bureaus that comprise the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate. All of them have a
    critical role to play in securing our homeland and the
    subcommittee looks forward to hearing from them and to working
    with them.
        The terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia overnight are a grim
    reminder that there are people in this world who have as their
    aim the destruction of America and the death of its citizens.
    It is a sobering morning.
        These agencies, this department, and, in fact, this
    subcommittee share the duty to do everything possible to
    prevent such attacks from happening within these shores. This
    subcommittee will provide the resources to protect the Nation.
    It is the job of this department to carry out that mission to
    the best of its capabilities.
        Commissioner Bonner has performed ably in his leadership of
    the former U.S. Customs Service. I am pleased that he is
    continuing that performance at the Department.
        Director Patrick is relatively new to her role in leading
    the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, but she has
    demonstrated her appreciation of the task of training our
    varied law enforcement personnel.
        Admiral Loy did a superb job when he was at the Coast
    Guard, and I appreciate his taking on the daunting task of
    establishing a Transportation Security Administration. However,
    I am troubled that well into the 8 year--8 month of the fiscal
    year, despite a significant shortfall in funding, that Congress
    has yet to receive the spending plan for his agency for this
    fiscal year.
        How can we inquire about his agency's plans for the next
    fiscal year when we have yet to receive information about the
    current fiscal year? I am well aware that the agency is facing
    a budgetary shortfall for this year. And Admiral--and the
    admiral is being forced to make difficult decisions, including
    the laying off of thousands of airport screeners.
        Many members of this subcommittee, including myself, we are
    troubled by the allocation of those cuts. I am disappointed
    that the administration and the OMB have not supported our
    efforts to assist you, Admiral, in bridging your funding gap.
        However, this problem must not be fixed--and I put fixed--I
    say fixed with quotation marks around it. This problem must not
    be fixed by reallocating funds, which the Congress has directed
    to be spent on specific programs. Congressional direction must
    be respected.
        Congress passed several appropriation bills directing that
    this agency take certain steps. The President signed those
    bills into law. In addition, the Homeland Security Act directs
    that funds transferred to the new Department be used for the
    purposes for which they were appropriated. These laws must be
    respected.
        I understand that you are in a very difficult position. You
    have a demanding and important job to do. And we will do what
    we can on this subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator
    Cochran to provide you with the resources you need to meet your
    mission.
        I only hope that the green eyeshade set downtown is
    listening. We cannot secure the homeland on the cheap. Either
    we are serious about protecting our borders and our
    transportation systems, or we are merely engaged in a public
    relations exercise.
        In addition, as I expressed last week when Under Secretary
    Hutchinson was before this subcommittee, I am concerned that
    the budget for the Transportation Security Administration
    appears to focus the limited resources only on aviation
    security, virtually to the exclusion of other transportation
    systems. Our port, our rail, and other transportation systems
    are also vulnerable to attack.
        And I am committed to doing everything that I can to
    address each of these vulnerabilities. I look forward to the
    testimony this morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again.
        Senator Cochran. Senator Domenici, welcome to the meeting
    of this subcommittee.
        Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. I am happy to recognize you for any
    opening statement you would like to make.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

        Senator Domenici. I appreciate it, just a brief opening
    statement, if you would.
        First, I would like to welcome the commissioner, and
    Admiral Loy, and Director Patrick.
        We are all aware of the events of September 11, and now the
    more recent events, and we know we have a very difficult job
    ahead of us. We must rethink how we do business and how, in
    doing so, to reorganize our government to meet the challenges
    of the future. I believe we have accomplished the first two
    steps in passage of the homeland security bill.
        The next step will be--internal to the Homeland Security
    Department, to bring together all of the pieces of the puzzles
    to make sure that all of the pieces fit.
        It will be our job in this committee to supply you with any
    of the missing pieces, including personnel, equipment, and
    authorities to do your job properly. I look forward to working
    with you--with all three of you in this new Department.
        I would like to highlight just a few areas. First, the area
    I would like to touch upon is border operations. As a Senator
    from a border State, I will work with you, Commissioner Bonner,
    to make sure that you get the proper tools you need to do this
    job.
        It has been 17 years since the Federal Government launched
    a major effort to upgrade the United States' borders, and that
    effort focused only on the southwest border. I have just
    introduced, with many co-sponsors, a border infrastructure and
    technology modernization act.
        This new bill focuses on the borders of both Canada and
    Mexico. The bill has dual goals of facilitating the efficient
    flow of trade, while meeting the challenges of increased
    security requirements.
        It will include more funding for equipment at our land
    borders, additional funding for personnel, funding for
    training, and additional funding for industry-business
    partnership arrangements along the border.
        The future of our border successes lie in modernizing these
    ports of entry, including new modern technology so that they
    are the most modern; not the archaic, ancient border crossings
    that we now have in many places. It is important for the border
    enforcement agencies of the new Department to work with the
    private sector on both sides of the border and reward those
    partners who adopt strong internal controls designed to defeat
    terrorist access to our country.
        My second interest lies in the Federal Law Enforcement
    Training Center, FLETC. It was important that the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center was transferred to the new
    department. It is your job to make sure that the transition of
    that bureau of the Treasury Department to the Homeland Security
    Department goes smoothly. It is my understanding that there
    will be tremendous need for training new officers, as well as
    cross-training and advanced training of current employees.
        A few thoughts on FLETC. The DHS needs to catalog all of
    the Department training activities and facilities. It must
    develop short-and long-term plans and analyze agency needs and
    maximize the use of current facilities, and project future
    capacity needs.
        It is very important that Homeland Security use the proven
    resources of FLETC before using non-FLETC facilities. I know
    that FLETC has an ancillary facility in my State, and you know
    about it too, at Artesia, New Mexico. It is growing. It is new,
    and it is playing a very important role. I hope that it will
    continue to operate as an integral part of your mission.
        I have a third interest that I will just briefly mention
    and call it domestic air cargo security. I only mention it
    because I am hopeful that those in charge of it will make use
    of the great capacity of our national laboratories at Sandia
    and Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, in helping make this
    transport of domestic air cargo and security as easy as
    possible, and as modern as possible as quickly as possible.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator, for your statement and
    your contribution to the work of this subcommittee.
        Senator Murray, I am happy to recognize you for any opening
    statement that you would like to make.

                       STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

        Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just want to
    welcome all of our witnesses. Let me just say that this is a
    very important hearing, because we all know the importance of
    security since September 11 obviously, but we also know the
    economic impacts of the decisions we make in balancing that.

                               prepared statement

        And my State is extremely important. We are the number one
    trade State in the Nation and we want to make sure our borders
    are secure, that our ports are secure, but that we impact the
    flow of commerce as little as possible, because it is having a
    severe impact on our State as we struggle with the economy. So
    I do have a number of questions to ask both Mr. Bonner and
    Admiral Loy in that time period.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
        The subcommittee has received a statement from Senator
    Campbell which will be inserted in the record.
        [The statement follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

        Thank you Mr. Chairman and I'd like to thank our witnesses for
    taking the time to come talk to us today.
        My constituents in Colorado, as well as the entire Nation, are
    looking toward this Committee to provide the necessary funds to protect
    those who travel our country's skies, seas, railways, and roads. The
    three of you here today are responsible for ensuring the safety of our
    borders, the security of our skies, and for training the personnel
    needed to perform these duties. Not an easy task for any of you, but I
    look forward to working with all of you to meet these challenges and to
    ensure that our Nation's priorities are well balanced.
        While I commend you all for the advancements made in our Nation's
    security infrastructure, there are a few concerns I have about possible
    loopholes that remain in the security network. There have been many
    questions as to whether or not our focus on security is appropriately
    balanced in the right areas to prevent additional terrorist attacks.
    Our borders, for instance, while more closely watched than they were a
    few years ago, still need to be better patrolled, both in the north and
    the south.
        Security at airports nationwide has improved, though efforts have
    focused mainly on passengers and their luggage. Loopholes still exist
    in the air transportation of cargo. I also believe that loopholes still
    exist with fixed-base operations, or FBO's, as they are called. My
    concern is that literally just anyone can get on a private aircraft
    carrying whatever they want and go wherever they please.
        Port security is no less frightening. About 95 percent of U.S.
    imports come by container ship and there are over 2,500 of these ships
    at sea. Once these containers come off the boats, the can be driven
    anywhere by anyone with a CDL license or placed on a train to any point
    in the United States. While Colorado has no such ports, as the Senate's
    only CDL-licensed member, I know how easily these containers can move
    across the country as soon as they are off-loaded from the ships.
        The protection of our borders and shorelines is imperative to our
    country's economy which is dependent on travel and the easy mobility of
    commerce. Additionally, the people of the United States deserve the
    ability to move about our Nation in a safe and secure manner.
        I believe that we have made major advancements very quickly by
    upgrading our security procedures, response plans, and better training
    personnel to react and respond in times of need. This is very important
    as no issue is more paramount to me and this committee than the safety
    of the American people.
        Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the
    testimonies of our guests and I will have a number of questions to ask
    at the appropriate time.

        Senator Cochran. I think we will hear opening statements
    from each of the witnesses before we get into questions, and we
    would encourage you to make summary statements of your printed
    statements. We have those statements. We thank you for them and
    they will be printed in the record in full.
        Mr. Bonner, we will start with you. Mr. Bonner is the
    Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.

                   STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROBERT C. BONNER

        Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Chairman Cochran and Senator Byrd,
    Senator Domenici, Senator Murray. I am pleased to appear before
    you today to discuss the Customs and Border Protection and the
    President's 2004 budget request for this new agency within the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        As you know, on March 1, just 2\1/2\ months ago, customs
    inspectors of the former U.S. Customs Service, immigration
    inspectors of the former INS, agricultural inspectors formerly
    with the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the
    Agriculture Department, and the entire Border Patrol, merged to
    form the new Bureau of Customs and Border Protection within the
    Department of Homeland Security. This means, by the way, that
    about one-half of all the personnel of the former INS are now
    part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
        Customs and Border Protection is certainly the largest and,
    I believe, perhaps the most profound actual reorganization
    taking place as a result of the creation of the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        The creation of Customs and Border Protection means that
    now for the first time in our country's history, all agencies
    of the United States Government with significant border
    responsibilities are unified into one agency of our Government,
    into one border agency. When combined with the customs trade,
    revenue, and support functions, the new agency, Customs and
    Border Protection, has a requested budget of $6.7 billion and
    41,000 FTE, and that means that Customs and Border Protection
    personnel are over one-fifth of the entire personnel of the
    Department of Homeland Security, which is a reflection, I
    believe, of how important the security of our borders is to the
    security of our homeland.
        For the first time, we are now able to take a holistic view
    of our Nation's borders and to devise a comprehensive strategy
    for the ports of entry and, indeed, for the entirety of our
    Nation's border, because now one agency, not multiple agencies,
    is responsible for the management of our country's borders.
        By unifying the border agencies, a good government reform
    advocated in many studies over the past 30 years, I am
    convinced that we will be far more effective and efficient than
    we were when border responsibilities were fragmented among four
    different agencies and three different departments of our
    Government as they were prior to March 1 of this year.
        I have already moved to unify the management of all of the
    inspectional personnel at our border ports of entry by
    designating one port director to be in charge of all of the
    inspectional functions, customs, immigration, and agriculture
    at each of the 307 ports of entry of the United States. And I
    have put in place a full-time transition management office to
    focus on achieving a fully unified agency as rapidly as
    possible.
        I also have put into place a clear and understandable chain
    of command, from the port directors at all of our 300-plus
    ports of entry to Customs and Border Protection Headquarters,
    and similarly have established a clear and short chain of
    command for the Border Patrol into Customs and Border
    Protection Headquarters.
        The priority mission of Customs and Border Protection is
    homeland security. And for a border agency, that means nothing
    less than preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from
    entering our country. That is the priority mission of Customs
    and Border Protection, plain and simple.
        And we need to perform that priority mission without
    stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel. We do this,
    in part, by pushing our border out, extending our zone of
    security beyond our physical borders. We must also accomplish
    our priority mission while continuing to perform the many very
    important traditional missions of Customs and Border
    Protection.
        Support from Congress through the fiscal year 2002
    supplemental and the 2003 budget has put us in a very good
    position to carry out our priority and traditional missions.
    Our total program increase for fiscal year 2004 is $338
    million. And that funding will help us to develop and expand
    our ``smart border'' initiatives like the Container Security
    Initiative, our overseas program for identifying and
    prescreening high-risk containers before they leave foreign
    ports for ports of the United States. I want to thank the
    committee members for their support of this initiative in
    fiscal year 2003.
        Since I announced the Container Security Initiative just
    over a year ago, a total of 15 countries representing 18 of the
    top 20 foreign container ports have agreed to implement the
    Container Security Initiative with us.
        The 2004 funding we are requesting will enable us to expand
    the program to other foreign ports beyond the top 20. Our
    funding request will also support expansion of the Customs-
    Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a program in which we
    partner with the private sector to protect the entire supply
    chain against potential exploitation by terrorists.
        So, Mr. Chairman, this new agency, I can tell you, faces
    two great challenges. One is merging the border agencies, which
    we are in the process of doing; and secondly, fulfilling our
    priority and our traditional missions.
        But now that all the border agencies have been unified into
    Customs and Border Protection, we are in a better position to
    accomplish those goals. And with the continued support of the
    President, and the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under
    Secretary Hutchinson, and the support of this committee, and
    the Congress, I am confident that Customs and Border Protection
    will play a major role in the Department of Homeland Security
    by better securing our borders against the terrorist threat.

                               prepared statement

        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to testify
    and I would be happy to answer any questions that the members
    might have.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonner, for your
    statement.
        [The statement follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Robert C. Bonner

    Introduction and Overview
        Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, Members of the Subcommittee,
    it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss Customs and
    Border Protection's 2004 budget request--the first ever budget request
    for this new agency in the Department of Homeland Security.
        As you know, on March 1, 2003, immigration inspectors from the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), agricultural inspectors
    from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), customs
    inspectors from U.S. Customs Service, and the entire Border Patrol
    merged to form the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection--BCBP--
    within the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate of the
    Department of Homeland Security. Now, for the first time in our
    country's history, all agencies of the United States government with
    significant border responsibilities have been brought under one roof.
    With our combined skills and resources, we will be far more effective
    than we were when we were separate agencies. I was honored to be
    appointed by the President to serve as the Commissioner of U.S. Customs
    in September 2001, and now I have the great privilege of serving as the
    first Commissioner of BCBP.
        I want to thank Congress for the focus and support it provided in
    creating the new Department of Homeland Security, and the new Customs
    and Border Protection agency within that Department. As the head of
    BCBP, I look forward to working with you to ensure that BCBP
    successfully achieves its critical mission.
        The priority mission of BCBP is to prevent terrorists and terrorist
    weapons from entering the United States. That extraordinarily important
    priority mission means improving security at our physical borders and
    ports of entry, but it also means extending our zone of security beyond
    our physical borders--so that American borders are the last line of
    defense, not the first line of defense. And we must do this while
    continuing to perform our traditional missions well--the combined
    missions of Customs, immigration, and agriculture inspectional officers
    at our borders, as well as the Border Patrol. In sum, the BCBP's
    missions include apprehending individuals attempting to enter the
    United States illegally; stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other
    contraband; protecting our agricultural and economic interests from
    harmful pests and diseases; protecting American businesses from theft
    of their intellectual property; and regulating and facilitating
    international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing U.S. trade
    laws. We must perform our all important security mission without
    stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so important
    to our Nation's economy.
        Support from Congress through the fiscal year 2002 Supplemental and
    the fiscal year 2003 budget has put us in good stead to carry out our
    mission. The President's total program increase request for BCBP in
    fiscal year 2004 is $338,183,000. These funds will help BCBP fulfill
    its mission-critical responsibilities, first and foremost of which is
    preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
    States. These funds will continue to support the automation and
    information technology programs that will improve overall operations of
    the agency, and the traditional missions for which BCBP is responsible.
        Key program increases BCBP is requesting in its fiscal year 2004
    budget include:
      --$61,754,000 for the Container Security Initiative, which will
            support continued operation and expansion of the program,
            including the stationing of BCBP personnel in additional key
            international ports to examine high-risk cargo before it is
            placed on ships bound for the United States;
      --$16 million for the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and
            the Free and Secure Trade Program to increase supply chain
            security and expedite the clearance of legitimate trade; and
      --$57.8 million for deployment of additional Non-Intrusive Inspection
            (NII) technology to increase our ability to detect conventional
            explosives, nuclear weapons, radioactive components, and other
            weapons of mass destruction.
        In my statement, I will discuss these programs and others, and how
    BCBP uses and will continue to use them to accomplish its mission. I
    would like to begin, though, with a brief update for the Subcommittee
    on the status of the standup of BCBP.
    Standup of Customs and Border Protection
        On March 1st, approximately 40,000 employees were successfully
    transferred from the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration &
    Naturalization Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
    Service to the new Customs and Border Protection agency in the
    Department of Homeland Security. Each of the agencies merging into BCBP
    worked closely to effect the transfer. Prior to and after the standup
    of the agency on March 1st, Under Secretary Hutchinson and I both
    traveled around the country to talk with employees of BCBP. I am
    pleased to report that there is a high level of enthusiasm, dedication,
    and commitment to the Department of Homeland Security and to BCBP's
    mission. The men and women of BCBP are ready, willing, and able to do
    their part to protect our Nation.
        Secretary Ridge, Under Secretary Hutchinson and I have established
    clear, understandable chains of command for all BCBP personnel, and
    have directed that operations not be interrupted. To this end,
    effective March 1, 2003, twenty interim Directors of Field Operations
    (DFOs) were appointed, based on the twenty-office field structure of
    U.S. Customs, to exercise line authority over 317 ports of entry within
    their jurisdiction. At each of the ports of entry--land, sea, and air--
    interim Port Directors were appointed to be in charge of and
    responsible for all the BCBP inspection functions, customs,
    immigration, and agriculture. A clear chain of command was also
    established for the Border Patrol, with the Border Patrol's twenty-one
    Sector Chiefs reporting directly to the Chief of the Border Patrol, who
    reports to me.
        This is the first time there has been one person at each of our
    Nation's ports of entry in charge of all Federal Inspection Services.
    We are in the process of competitively selecting individuals to fill
    these DFO and Port Director positions on a permanent basis, and that
    process should be completed in the near future. In addition, a full-
    time Transition Management Office has been put in place to help address
    the challenges that come from the standup of any new organization. That
    office is staffed with representatives from all the incoming agencies.
    Responding to the Terrorist Threat
        As the single, unified border agency of the United States, BCBP's
    mission is vitally important to the protection of America and the
    American people. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
    11th, numerous initiatives were developed to meet our twin goals of
    improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and
    travel. Funds from the fiscal year 2004 budget will help us expand
    those initiatives to ensure further protection of both the American
    people and the American economy. Our strategy in implementing these
    initiatives--and accomplishing our twin goals--involves a number of
    factors, including (A) improving targeting systems and expanding
    advance information regarding people and goods, (B) pushing our ``zone
    of security outward'' by partnering with other countries, (C) pushing
    our ``zone of security outward'' by partnering with the private sector,
    (D) deploying advanced inspection technology and equipment, (E)
    increasing staffing positions for border security, and (F) working in
    concert with other agencies.
               targeting and the necessary of advance information
        Information is one of the most important keys to our ability to
    increase security without stifling legitimate trade and travel. Good
    information enables us to more accurately identify--or target--what is
    ``high risk,'' defined as a potential threat, and what is low risk or
    absolutely no risk whatsoever. The separation of high risk from no risk
    is critical because searching 100 percent of the cargo and people that
    enter the United States would unnecessarily cripple the flow of
    legitimate trade and travel to the United States. What is necessary and
    advisable is searching 100 percent of the high-risk cargo and people
    that enter our country. To do this, we need to be able to identify what
    is high risk, and do so as early in the process as possible. BCBP has
    several programs and initiatives that help us accomplish that task.
    National Targeting Center (NTC)
        The National Targeting Center (NTC), created last year with fiscal
    year 2002 Emergency Supplemental funding, has significantly increased
    our overall capacity to identify potential terrorist threats by
    providing centralized, national targeting of passengers and cargo for
    the first time. NTC inspectors and analysts use a sophisticated
    computer system to monitor, analyze, and sort information gathered by
    BCBP and numerous intelligence and law enforcement agencies against
    commercial border crossing information. By mining the information in
    that system, NTC personnel identify potential terrorists and terrorist
    targets for increased scrutiny at the border ports of entry. When NTC
    personnel identify potential threats, they coordinate with our officers
    in the field and monitor the security actions that are taken. Because
    multiple agencies both contribute information to the National Targeting
    Center and rely on it for information, the Center assures a coordinated
    and centralized response to potential threats.
    Automated Targeting System (ATS)
        The Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is used by NTC and
    field targeting units in the United States and overseas, is essential
    to our ability to target high-risk cargo and passengers entering the
    United States. ATS is the system through which we process advance
    manifest and passenger information to pick up anomalies and ``red
    flags'' and determine what cargo is ``high risk,'' and therefore will
    be scrutinized at the port of entry or, in some cases, at the foreign
    port of export.
        In fiscal year 2002, we implemented a domestic targeting initiative
    at all U.S. seaports using the Automated Targeting System. Under that
    initiative, all manifests for ocean going cargo destined for the United
    States are processed through ATS and reviewed by trained personnel.
    When high-risk shipments are identified, inspectional officers at U.S.
    seaports conduct standardized security inspections on those shipments.
    Importantly, the goal is to inspect 100 percent of the high-risk sea
    cargo. We are already working on putting the same system in place for
    cargo transported by truck through the land border ports of entry.
        Furthermore, in April 2002, USDA National Information Technology
    Center (NITC) received access to ATS. ATS now receives complete Customs
    data feed for all ports, with all bills and entries of agricultural
    interest.
    24-Hour Rule
        Common sense tells us that the earlier in the process that we have
    information, the more effective and efficient we can be in using that
    information to identify high-risk cargo and eliminate potential threats
    before they have a chance to reach our ports of entry.
        To that end, last year, a final advance manifest regulation--the
    so-called ``24-hour rule''--was issued to require the presentation of
    accurate, complete manifest information on oceangoing cargo destined
    for the United States 24 hours prior to loading of a container on board
    a vessel at the foreign port. The regulation also improves the quality
    of information presented by prohibiting the vague descriptions of cargo
    such as ``FAK'' (Freight All Kinds). The data is processed through the
    ATS system, and reviewed by the NTC to identify high-risk oceangoing
    cargo.
        On February 2, 2003, a strategy was undertaken to ensure compliance
    with the 24-hour rule, following a 90-day grace period to permit the
    trade to adjust its business practices. The compliance strategy has
    involved, for the first time, issuing ``no-load'' orders and denying
    permits to unlade in the event of non-compliance. Compliance with the
    rule is high, and we are receiving more and better information through
    our Automated Manifest System (AMS) significantly earlier in the
    process. This greatly improves our ability to detect, deter, and
    eliminate potential terrorist threats involving sea cargo before they
    become a reality.
    Trade Act of 2002--Advance Information on Other Modes
        Successful targeting of high-risk goods transported through other
    commercial modes is as important as successful targeting of high-risk
    goods transported by sea. As with oceangoing cargo, good information
    received earlier in the process is the key to that successful targeting
    and the application of sound risk management principles.
        In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress recognized the importance of
    such advance information by mandating presentation of advance manifest
    data on all commercial modes, both inbound and outbound. BCBP is in the
    process of working through the consultative process called for in the
    Trade Act of 2002 to determine the most appropriate advance cargo data
    requirements for land, rail, and air cargo. We held public hearings in
    January, launching a process of discussion and proposal preparation
    that will ultimately lead to our issuing rules later this year. During
    this process, we have met continuously with all segments of the trade.
    This process will help us ensure that the final rules meet the security
    objectives of BCBP while also taking into account the realities of the
    businesses involved in the different transport modes.
    Advance Passenger Information System
        Advance information is also critical to our efforts to identify
    individuals who may pose a security threat. Before September 11th,
    2001, air carriers transmitted information on international airline
    passengers in advance of their arrival to the Advance Passenger
    Information System (APIS) on a purely voluntary basis. Legislation
    enacted by Congress in late 2001 made submission of this information
    mandatory, and funds allocated from the fiscal year 2002 Supplemental
    and the fiscal year 2003 budget have enabled us to begin upgrading and
    expanding APIS and move to a mandatory program in a very short time. An
    informed, enforced compliance plan has resulted in 99 percent of all
    passenger and crew information (including those pre-cleared outside the
    United States) now being transmitted through APIS in a timely and
    accurate manner.
     pushing our zone of security outward /partnering with other countries
        BCBP must do everything possible to advance and improve on our
    smart border initiatives and push our zone of security outward--that
    is, to make our borders the last line of defense instead of the first
    line of defense. We have done this on a far reaching basis by
    partnering with other countries on our Container Security Initiative,
    one of the most significant and successful initiatives developed and
    implemented after 9-11. We are also extending our zone of security
    through partnerships with Canada, our neighbor to the north, and
    Mexico, our neighbor to the south. Those partnerships enable us jointly
    to better secure the North American perimeter.
    Container Security Initiative (CSI)
        Oceangoing sea containers represent the most important artery of
    global commerce--some 48 million full sea cargo containers move between
    the world's major seaports each year, and nearly 50 percent of all U.S.
    imports (by value) arrive via sea containers. Approximately 6 million
    cargo containers arrive at U.S. seaports annually. Because of the sheer
    volume of sea container traffic and the opportunities it presents for
    terrorists, containerized shipping is uniquely vulnerable to terrorist
    attack.
        In January, 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) was
    unveiled to address this threat. Under CSI, which is the first program
    of its kind, we are identifying high-risk cargo containers and
    partnering with other governments to pre-screen those containers at
    foreign ports, before they are shipped to our ports.
        The four core elements of CSI are:
      --First, identifying ``high-risk'' containers, using ATS and the 24-
            hour rule, before they set sail for the United States
      --Second, pre-screening the ``high-risk'' containers at the foreign
            CSI port before they are shipped to the United States
      --Third, using technology to pre-screen the high-risk containers,
            including both radiation detectors and large-scale radiographic
            imaging machines to detect potential terrorist weapons.
      --Fourth, using smarter, ``tamper-evident'' containers--containers
            that indicate to BCBP officers at the port of arrival whether
            they have been tampered with after the security screening.
        Since CSI was announced in January 2002, the program has generated
    exceptional participation and support. The goal for the first phase of
    CSI was to implement the program at as many of the top 20 foreign
    container ports--in terms of volume of cargo containers shipped to
    United States seaports--as possible, and as soon as possible. Those
    ports account for nearly 70 percent, over two-thirds, of all cargo
    containers arriving at U.S. seaports. Within 1 year of our announcement
    of CSI, the governments representing 18 of the top 20 ports agreed to
    implement CSI, and those governments where the remaining two ports are
    located have expressed support for the initiative and a desire to
    participate. CSI has been implemented and is already operational in Le
    Havre, France; Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Antwerp, Belgium;
    Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Felixstowe, England; Yokohama, Japan;
    and Singapore, the largest container transshipment port in the world.
    We are also operational at the Canadian ports of Halifax, Montreal, and
    Vancouver, and will be operational in Hong Kong this month. CSI will be
    operational at other CSI ports soon.
        We are in the process of formulating the second phase of CSI. Under
    CSI Phase II, we will implement the CSI program at other foreign ports
    that ship a significant volume of cargo to the United States, and that
    have the infrastructure and technology in place to support the program.
    We have already signed CSI agreements with Malaysia and Sweden,
    covering the two major ports of Malaysia and Gothenburg, Sweden, the
    main container port for the Nordic countries. To date, a total of 15
    countries (including Canada) have agreed to implement CSI with us, and
    at least 7 other countries that qualify have already expressed a desire
    to join. Once we have Phase II implemented, we anticipate that CSI will
    cover approximately 80 percent of the containers coming to the United
    States.
        I want to express my gratitude to the Committee members for their
    support of CSI in fiscal year 2003. With the $62 million increase in
    funding that we are requesting for CSI in fiscal year 2004, we will
    complete implementation in the top 20 ports, and expand CSI to other
    ports around the world. In fiscal year 2004, BCBP will also continue to
    pursue ongoing multilateral initiatives to enhance container security.
    Partnership with Canada
        Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we have worked
    closely with Canada to develop and implement initiatives that increase
    security and facilitate travel and trade at our shared 4,000 mile
    border. Many of these initiatives have been implemented under the Smart
    Border Declaration entered into between the United States and Canada in
    December 2001. This Declaration focuses on four primary areas: the
    secure flow of people; the secure flow of goods; investments in common
    technology and infrastructure to minimize threats and expedite trade;
    and coordination and information sharing to defend our mutual border.
    By benchmarking our security measures and sharing information, we are
    able to relieve pressure and congestion at our mutual land border.
    In-Transit Container Targeting Program
        One example is the In-Transit Container Targeting Program, which
    served as a model for the CSI program. Under this program, Canadian
    inspectors are stationed at our seaports in Newark and Seattle, and
    BCBP officers are stationed at Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver. Our
    personnel are helping to target and pre-screen cargo containers
    arriving at Canadian seaports that are in transit to the United States,
    and Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency inspectors are doing the same
    at U.S. seaports for shipments in transit to Canada. Approximately $2.4
    million in 2002 and 2003 funding has enabled us to develop and
    implement this program.
    Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
        Another of these initiatives is the Free and Secure Trade, or FAST,
    program. Through FAST, importers, commercial carriers, and truck
    drivers who enroll in the program and meet our agreed to security
    criteria are entitled to expedited clearance at the Northern Border.
    Using electronic data transmission and transponder technology, we
    expedite clearance of approved trade participants. The FAST program
    fosters more secure supply chains, and enables us to focus our security
    efforts and inspections where they are needed most--on high-risk
    commerce--while making sure legitimate, low-risk commerce faces no
    unnecessary delays.
        FAST was announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Chretien in
    Detroit in September 2002, and it is currently operational in 27 lanes
    at six major crossings along the northern border. Eventually FAST is
    projected to expand to all 25 commercial centers located throughout the
    northern border. The increase of approximately $3.9 million that we are
    requesting for the FAST program in fiscal year 2004 will enable us to
    expand FAST on the northern border, as well as develop and implement a
    pilot similar to FAST on the southern border with Mexico.
    NEXUS
        With Canada, we have also implemented a program that enables us to
    focus our resources and efforts more on high-risk travelers, while
    making sure those travelers who pose no risk for terrorism or
    smuggling, and who are otherwise legally entitled to enter, are not
    delayed at our mutual border. This is the NEXUS program, under which
    frequent travelers whose background information has been run against
    crime and terrorism indices are issued a proximity card, or SMART card,
    allowing them to be waived expeditiously through the port of entry.
    NEXUS is currently operational at six crossings located at four major
    ports of entry on the northern border: Blaine, Washington (3
    crossings); Buffalo, New York; Detroit, Michigan; and Port Huron,
    Michigan. We also recently opened a new NEXUS lane at the International
    Tunnel in Detroit. Some upcoming expansion sites for NEXUS include
    Niagara Falls, New York; Alexandria Bay, New York; and Pembina, North
    Dakota.
    Partnership with Mexico
        We have continued important bilateral discussions with Mexico to
    implement initiatives that will protect our southern border against the
    terrorist threat, while also improving the flow of legitimate trade and
    travel.
        With respect to cargo crossing our border with Mexico, for example,
    some of the fiscal year 2004 funds we are requesting for the FAST
    program would be used to implement a pilot FAST program on the southern
    border. We also continue to work on a possible joint system for
    processing rail shipments and on shared border technology.
        Another initiative is the SENTRI program. SENTRI is a program that
    allows low-risk travelers to be processed in an expedited manner
    through a dedicated lane at our land border with minimal or no delay.
    SENTRI is currently deployed at 3 southwest border crossings: El Paso,
    San Ysidro, and Otay Mesa, and expansion plans are being considered. In
    fact, our SENTRI team met with their Mexican counterparts last week to
    discuss expansion logistics.
          pushing security outward /partnering with the private sector
    Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
        Any effort to ``push our zone of security outwards'' and protect
    global trade against the terrorist threat must include the direct
    involvement of the trade community. The Customs-Trade Partnership
    Against Terrorism, C-TPAT, is an initiative that was proposed in
    November 2001 began in January 2002, to protect the entire supply
    chain, against potential exploitation by terrorists or terrorist
    weapons. Under C-TPAT, companies sign an agreement with BCBP to conduct
    a comprehensive self-assessment of their supply chain security and to
    improve that security--from factory floor to foreign loading docks to
    the U.S. border and seaports--using C-TPAT security guidelines
    developed jointly with the trade community.
        Companies that meet security standards receive expedited processing
    through our land border crossings, through our seaports, and through
    our international airports, enabling us to spend less time on low-risk
    cargo, so that we can focus our resources on higher risk cargo. C-TPAT
    is currently open to all importers, air, sea, and rail carriers,
    brokers, freight forwarders, consolidators, non-vessel operating common
    carriers (NVOCCs), and U.S. Marine and Terminal operators. As of
    October 1, 2002, C-TPAT eligibility for trucking companies along the
    U.S./Canada border has been made available through the Free and Secure
    Trade Program. (Participation in C-TPAT is a requirement for bringing
    goods from the United States into Canada through the FAST lane.) We are
    currently developing the mechanism and strategy to enroll foreign
    manufacturers and shippers into C-TPAT. The intent is to construct a
    supply chain characterized by active C-TPAT links at each point in the
    logistics process.
        To date, over 2,200 companies are participating in C-TPAT to
    improve the security of their supply chains. Members of C-TPAT include
    60 of the top 100 importers and 32 of the 50 largest ocean carriers. To
    make sure that C-TPAT is realizing its promise, BCBP is developing
    expertise in supply chain security. In December 2002, we began
    providing training in the security validation process to ten
    supervisory customs inspectors. In January 2003, these individuals
    started the validation process in cooperation with our C-TPAT partners.
        We used $11 million in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 funds
    to begin implementing C-TPAT. The $12.1 million funding increase we are
    requesting for C-TPAT in fiscal year 2004 will enable us to continue to
    expand the program, including adding new C-TPAT Security Officers and
    headquarters staff to help oversee the program.
                deployment of technology, equipment, and systems
        BCBP depends on a broad range of technology and other tools to
    effectively inspect people and goods entering the country, including
    technology for detecting weapons of mass destruction, explosives,
    chemicals, and contraband. We are requesting a funding increase of
    $119.2 million to enable us to deploy a variety of additional
    inspection technology and equipment that will increase the number of
    inspections, improve security, minimize risks to our personnel, and
    facilitate processing.
    Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology
        For example, non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology provides for
    a more effective and efficient, as well as less invasive, method of
    inspecting cargo, compared with drilling or dismantling of conveyances
    or merchandise. NII equipment includes large-scale x-ray and gamma-ray
    imaging systems, portal radiation monitors, and a mixture of portable
    and handheld technologies to include personal radiation detection
    devices that greatly reduce the need for costly, time-consuming
    physical inspection of containers and provide us a picture of what is
    inside containers.
        The Committees on Appropriations have generously funded NII in
    fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003. Along with the amounts funded in
    those years, the $57.8 million we are requesting for NII technology in
    fiscal year 2004 will enable us to add radiation detection systems and
    isotope identifiers on the southwest border, radiation detection
    systems and Mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS) on the
    northern border, Mobile VACIS at seaports, isotope identifiers and x-
    ray equipment for international mail, and isotope identifiers at
    Express Courier hubs, as well as additional inspector positions for
    deploying and operating this equipment. This technology will detect
    anomalies and the presence of radiological material in containers and
    conveyances, with minimal impact to port operations in a fraction of
    the time it takes to manually inspect cargo. It will give BCBP a
    tactical edge in keeping weapons of mass destruction and instruments of
    terrorism from entering the United States.
    Hardening of Northern Border
        After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, efforts were stepped
    up to ``harden''--to prevent unauthorized crossings of--the northern
    and southern land borders. In addition to staffing increases, the
    hardening of these ports of entry involved the installation of gates,
    signs, lights, and remote surveillance systems at ports of entry, many
    of them in remote locations, along the vast northern border with
    Canada. The Border Patrol also deployed additional agents to strategic
    locations along the northern border to aid in providing security and
    deterring future attacks.
        Funding from fiscal year 2003 is enabling us to continue to improve
    the northern border infrastructure by deploying additional barriers,
    gates, and bollard systems; security lighting; secure communications
    (voice/data/messaging capabilities); signage addressing operational
    security; and video security systems. We will also continue bolstering
    Border Patrol staffing and technology between the northern border ports
    of entry in fiscal year 2004.
                                    staffing
        As important as our efforts to improve targeting, build
    partnerships with other countries and industry, and deploy technology
    are to preventing terrorism, these efforts simply cannot be effective
    if we do not have adequate staffing and training of inspectors, canine
    enforcement officers, and Border Patrol Agents at and between the
    border ports of entry to carry out our mission. The most important
    component of BCBP's success in protecting America and the American
    people lies in the men and women who work directly on our Nation's
    frontlines.
        One need only recall that it was a Customs inspector, Diana Dean,
    who in December 1999 stopped and arrested an Al Qaeda terrorist from
    crossing into the United States from Canada with a trunk load of
    powerful explosives in his car. His mission, as we now know, was to
    blow up Los Angeles International Airport.
        Inspector Dean relied on nothing but her training to pick up on
    Ahmed Ressam's nervous behavior, his unusual travel itinerary, and his
    evasive responses to her questions. And thanks to her skill and
    professionalism, and the skill and professionalism of her fellow
    inspectors at Port Angeles, Ressam was arrested and a deadly Al Qaeda
    terrorist plot to do great harm to American lives was foiled.
        I am pleased to tell you that in fiscal year 2002, the number of
    new customs inspectors, canine enforcement officers, and special agents
    was more than doubled. Many of these new hires were able to relieve
    customs inspectors who had been sent to the northern border for
    temporary duty after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
    to ameliorate the huge amounts of overtime being put in by U.S. Customs
    inspectors at our ports of entry.
        1,025 new immigration inspectors were hired in fiscal year 2002,
    and the beginning of fiscal year 2003, 355 of whom have been
    specifically assigned to supplement northern border enforcement
    activities. The Border Patrol hired 2,050 new agents in fiscal year
    2002, and, as of February 2003, a total of 560 Border Patrol Agents
    have been deployed all along the Northern Border. It is also worth
    noting that 125 additional Border Patrol agents and 4 Border Patrol
    helicopters have been redeployed temporarily to the Northern Border in
    support of Operation Liberty Shield. We intend to have a total of 1,000
    Border Patrol Agents deployed to the northern border this year.
        Our fiscal year 2004 budget request includes an additional $13
    million to continue to fund journeyman-level pay upgrades for Border
    Patrol Agents and Immigration Inspectors. Attrition rates for these
    positions are reaching crisis proportions, so it is essential that BCBP
    provide to them the upgrade from journeyman-level GS-9 to GS-11 that
    became effective for Customs Inspectors in August 2002.
        I am extremely grateful for the strong support shown by Congress to
    implement critical staffing increases at and between our border ports
    of entry. I can assure you that because of them, our Nation is more
    secure. The standup of BCBP--and its integration of all the Federal
    Inspection Service (FIS) personnel under one roof--gives us the
    unprecedented opportunity to make America's frontline personnel even
    more effective and efficient in carrying out their duties. In fiscal
    year 2004, we will focus on achieving a unified agency and integrated
    operations at our ports of entry.
         partnership with bureau of immigration and customs enforcement
        In performing our priority homeland security mission, BCBP will
    foster cooperative efforts with other agencies. Because the mission
    facing us has components that reach broadly into other agencies both
    within and outside of the Department of Homeland Security, such
    cooperation is essential to our success. This includes cooperation
    with, among others, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    (BICE). Close cooperation between agents carrying out investigations
    and inspectors conducting inbound and outbound searches at the ports of
    entry is crucial for ensuring the continued success of operations that
    advance both our homeland security mission, and our traditional
    missions, including cooperation with respect to trade fraud,
    intellectual property rights violations, controlled deliveries of
    illegal drugs, and money laundering.
    Automation/Information Technology
        Mr. Chairman, no discussion of a successful strategy to protect the
    American people and the American economy in the 21st century would be
    complete without consideration of the central importance of automation
    and information technology to BCBP's mission. The Automated Commercial
    Environment (ACE) and International Trade Data System (ITDS) are BCBP's
    major automation/information technology efforts.
    Automated Commercial Environment
        ACE is an important project for BCBP, for the business community,
    for our country, and for the future of global trade. If done properly,
    it will reform the way we do business with the trade community. It will
    also greatly assist BCBP in the advance collection of information for
    targeting high-risk cargo to better address the terrorist threat. And
    in doing so, it will help us expedite the vast majority of low-risk
    trade.
        The successful and timely design, implementation, and funding of
    ACE is a priority of BCBP. It has been and continues to be one of my
    top priorities as Commissioner. Increasing support from Congress and
    the Administration for ACE has been essential to the development of the
    new system. Funding of $130 million in fiscal year 2001 and $300
    million in fiscal year 2002 allowed us to establish the fundamental
    design framework for ACE, and to begin developing user requirements for
    the new system, in concert with our prime contractor, the e-Customs
    partnership led by IBM. Funding of $307 million in fiscal year 2003
    enabled us to continue development and begin to deliver on the first
    installment of ACE benefits to the trade community.
        The development of ACE and the efforts to put its capabilities to
    work on America's borders has continued full throttle. Starting this
    year, BCBP and trade community users will receive initial online
    account capabilities. Ultimately, ACE will enhance border security and
    deliver efficiencies to the trade process by providing interagency
    information sharing, and real-time, cross-government access to more
    accurate trade information. By centralizing and integrating the
    collection and analysis of information, ACE will enhance BCBP's ability
    to target illicit cargo, illegal persons, and unsafe conveyances. The
    trade data will be analyzed prior to arrival, allowing advanced inter-
    agency assessment of risks and threats to determine which goods and
    people must be scrutinized. Results will determine if, upon arrival, a
    shipment is to be examined or cleared for release.
        I want to thank Congress again for its past support of ACE. The
    continued support of ACE with $307 million in funding for fiscal year
    2004 will enable us to keep pace with our schedule for ACE releases in
    2003 and 2004.
    International Trade Data System (ITDS)
        One important, fully integrated component of ACE is ITDS. The ITDS
    initiative is an e-Government strategy being designed, developed, and
    deployed jointly with ACE that will implement an integrated,
    government-wide system for the electronic collection, use, and
    dissemination of the international trade transaction data required by
    the various trade-related federal agencies. It is customer-focused and
    will serve as the government's ``single window'' into international
    trade data collection and distribution. Significantly, ITDS will also
    improve risk assessment by providing pre-arrival data that allows
    border enforcement agencies to perform selectivity and targeting prior
    to arrival to assess risk and deploy inspection resources. Over 100
    agencies will be integrated through ITDS with ACE, of which 48 have
    been identified as having admissibility and export control
    responsibilities at the border.
        Through ACE, the ITDS will be capable of linking the government's
    law enforcement and other databases into one large-scale relational
    database that tracks all commerce crossing our borders. ITDS extends
    the functionality of ACE by bringing together critical security, public
    health, public safety, and environmental protection agencies under a
    common platform. That platform will allow businesses to report data
    through the use of a single, harmonized data set.
        The $11.2 million we are requesting in the fiscal year 2004 budget
    for ITDS will allow us to continue to develop and implement ITDS, and
    keep us on schedule to have full functionality rolled out by winter
    2006-2007.
    Other Traditional Missions
        Although BCBP's priority mission is preventing terrorists and
    terrorist weapons from entering the United States, we know that we
    must--and will--accomplish that priority mission while continuing to
    perform our traditional missions well. Included among those missions
    are our responsibilities for interdicting drugs at borders and points
    of entry, apprehending individuals who enter the United States
    illegally, regulating and facilitating international trade, and
    protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests
    and diseases.
    Drug Interdiction
        Our counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions are not mutually
    exclusive, and one does not necessarily come at the expense of the
    other. The initiatives we put in place to prevent terrorists and
    terrorist weapons from entering the United States will enable us to be
    more effective in seizing other illegal contraband, including illegal
    drugs. And, it is worth noting that the lessons we have learned in our
    battle against international drug trafficking will help us in the fight
    against international terrorism. In many ways, our priority mission of
    preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from crossing our borders
    is a natural outgrowth of our interdiction role.
        Our heightened state of security along America's borders will
    strengthen, not weaken, our counternarcotics mission. As we add
    staffing for both inspectors at the ports of entry and Border Patrol
    Agents between the ports of entry, acquire more inspection technology,
    conduct more questioning of travelers, and carry out more inspections
    of passengers and goods in response to the terrorist threat, it should
    come as no surprise that drug seizures will increase as well. As an
    example heightened security along the southwest land border produced a
    dramatic rise in the amount of cocaine seized in fiscal year 2002,
    compared to fiscal year 2001. Overall the amount of cocaine seized rose
    76 percent at the southwest land border stations. In addition, in
    fiscal year 2002, total Border Patrol narcotics seizures included over
    1.2 million pounds of marijuana and over 14,000 pounds of cocaine.
        Some specific recent examples of our successes against drug
    smuggling include:
      --On March 23, 2003, BCBP inspectors seized 394 pounds of cocaine in
            Miami, Florida. The cocaine was found in false compartments in
            the plane walls and ceiling.
      --On March 10, 2003, BCBP inspectors seized more than five tons of
            marijuana in Laredo, Texas. The load was valued at over $10
            million.
      --On March 13, 2003, Border Patrol agents seized 83.5 pounds of
            cocaine and 3,141 pounds of marijuana in Laredo, with a
            combined value of over $5 million.
      --During the week of March 1, 2003, BCBP inspectors seized $2.4
            million of narcotics at the Hidalgo/Pharr Port of Entry,
            including 559 pounds of marijuana, 74 pounds of cocaine, and
            4.5 pounds of heroin.
        Effective coordination between inspectors at the ports of entry and
    agents who carry out investigative activities is essential to the
    success of our counternarcotics mission. For that reason, BCBP will
    continue to cooperate closely with special agents in BICE to carry out
    this mission.
    Apprehending individuals entering illegally between the ports of entry
        The Border Patrol, now part of BCBP, is specifically responsible
    for patrolling the 6,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international
    land borders and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida
    Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico. Their primary task is securing
    America's borders between official ports of entry. Foremost, the Border
    Patrol's mission is to provide for the national security of the United
    States by preventing the illegal entry of people, goods, and contraband
    across our borders. Secondly, Border Patrol operations are designed to
    detect, interdict, and apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter
    the United States or transport any manner of goods or contraband across
    our borders. The Border Patrol also maintains traffic checkpoints on
    highways leading from border areas, conducts city patrol and
    transportation checks, and carries out anti-smuggling investigations.
        The Border Patrol executes its mission through a proper balance of
    agent personnel, enforcement equipment (such as a fleet of specialized
    aircraft and vehicles of various types), technology (such as sensors
    and night vision cameras), tactical infrastructure (such as roads and
    vehicle barriers), and intelligence and liaison efforts. Often the
    border area in which these efforts are brought to bear is a barely
    discernible line in uninhabited deserts, canyons, or mountains.
        Although the scope of the Border Patrol mission has not changed
    since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, enforcement efforts
    have been accelerated, to enhance Border Patrol presence along the
    northern border and to make clear that its priority mission--like
    BCBP's--is keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the
    United States. As we expand that presence on the northern border, it is
    also essential that we expand control of the southwest border.
        In fiscal year 2001 and 2002, Border Patrol Agents apprehended a
    combined total of over 2 million people for illegally entering the
    United States. In fiscal year 2004, the Border Patrol will continue
    focusing on strengthening northern border security between the ports of
    entry; maintaining and expanding border enforcement capabilities on the
    southwest border, with primary focus on the Arizona corridor; and
    expanding and integrating technologies with other components of BCBP to
    support border control efforts.
    Preventing individuals from entering illegally at the ports of entry
        With respect to preventing individuals from entering the country
    illegally at the ports of entry, BCBP works with the Department of
    State to ensure BCBP inspectors have the tools they need to verify the
    identity of visa holders and the authenticity of visas issued by the
    Department of State. Data on holders of immigrant visas is transferred
    electronically to ports of entry. When the electronic record is updated
    to reflect an immigrant's admission at a port of entry, that data is
    transferred electronically to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
    Services for production of a permanent resident card and creation of
    the immigrant file.
        More importantly, beginning in 2002, immigration inspectors--now in
    BCBP--have had access to photographs and data transmitted
    electronically by the Department of State relating to holders of
    nonimmigrant visas. This permits inspectors to review visa application
    data and verify the identity of the holder. Senior BCBP and State
    Department staff met during the week of March 24 to reaffirm their
    commitment to these initiatives and to outline new goals for electronic
    data sharing that will expand the exchange of data between State and
    BCBP, and further enhance both the visa issuance and inspections
    process.
    Regulating and facilitating international trade
        BCBP maintains responsibility for regulating and facilitating
    legitimate international trade. With the right level of industry
    partnership and the right combination of resources, we can succeed not
    only in protecting legitimate trade from being used by terrorists, but
    also in actually building a better, faster, more productive system of
    trade facilitation for the U.S. economy. The Office of Trade Relations
    has helped ensure effective, extensive communication between U.S.
    Customs and all facets of the trade community. It remains a central
    point through which the trade community can convey issues to BCBP,
    especially the broad issues of how we do business together, and how we
    improve the security of our country against the terrorist threat.
    Protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests
            and diseases
        An important part of BCBP is the agriculture border inspection
    program formerly in the Agriculture and Plant Health Inspection Service
    (APHIS). Thus, a significant part of BCBP's mission is preventing
    agricultural pests and diseases from crossing U.S. borders, either
    through intentional--possibly terrorist--acts, or through unintentional
    means. BCBP minimizes the threat of invasive species entering the
    United States by conducting inspections of travelers and cargo at our
    ports of entry. We have revised the Customs Declaration as directed by
    the Committee. The global economy and free trade expansion have
    dramatically increased the volume of passengers and cargo arriving in
    the United States from foreign locations, and this has created an
    increased need for agriculture inspection resources. In addition,
    foreign animal diseases, such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD), that
    exist in other countries pose serious threats to our livestock industry
    and therefore require us to increase inspectional activities at our
    borders.
        The President's fiscal year 2004 funding request will provide
    additional inspections and canine teams that will increase our
    effectiveness in preventing dangerous diseases and pests from entering
    the United States.
    User Fees
        User fees make up a significant portion of BCBP's budget. In fact,
    combined, they represent over $1 billion of our overall budget. An
    additional $1.1 billion in Merchandise Processing Fees is collected as
    an offset to our appropriations. In fiscal year 2003, we expect to
    collect $991 million in user fees, $305 million of which comes from
    fees established under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
    Act (COBRA). We expect to collect $1.1 million in Merchandise
    Processing Fees in fiscal year 2003. The fiscal year 2004 budget
    request assumes that the fees established under COBRA, which expire at
    the end of the fiscal year 2003 will be reauthorized.
    Conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I have outlined a broad
    array of initiatives today that, with your assistance, will help BCBP
    to protect America from the terrorist threat while fulfilling our other
    traditional missions. We know that this new agency, BCBP, faces great
    challenges in merging the border agencies and in fulfilling both our
    priority and traditional missions. But, now that all the Federal
    Inspection Services and the Border Patrol have been unified in BCBP,
    under the Department of Homeland Security, we are in a far better
    position to meet those challenges and accomplish those goals. We will
    be far more effective working together, than we were as separate
    agencies in different departments. With the continued support of the
    President, DHS, and the Congress, BCBP will succeed in meeting the
    great demands placed upon it, and will play a key role--by better
    securing our border against the terrorist threat--in the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        With your support for BCBP's 2004 budget request, we will be able
    to build this new agency, continue and expand our counterterrorism
    initiatives, and improve our efforts to protect America, the American
    people, and the American economy.
        Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy
    to answer any of your questions.

        Senator Cochran. We will now hear from Admiral James M.
    Loy, Administrator of the Transportation Security
    Administration.

                       STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY

        Admiral Loy. Good morning, Senator Cochran, Senator Byrd,
    and members of the Subcommittee. First, let me offer my
    condolences to the Senate on the loss of Senator Long. I know
    that long-serving, distinguished member is on all of your minds
    this morning.
        Mr. Bonner and Director Patrick, they both work
    tremendously in our new Department of Homeland Security and I
    am proud to sit with them here this morning. I am pleased to
    testify this morning and allow me to congratulate each member
    on their assignment to this enormously important committee. As
    we work together today, we still are at war, both overseas and
    here at home as we try to understand and cope with this 9/11
    security environment.
        We need look no further than today's headlines, as Senator
    Byrd has reminded us, the truck bombs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
    let alone the TOPOFF exercise that is being run in Seattle and
    Chicago. This is today's business, and we are in the midst of
    it. Thank you, sir.
        The global war on terrorism is a frightening notion to many
    Americans, because we know so little about this new enemy with
    no flag and no borders, but with a hatred that truly seems to
    defy our comprehension. And I join you today, representing a
    TSA relocated into the Department of Homeland Security. It is
    clearly the right place for us, because our mission is 100
    percent homeland security.
        I can report to you that as a person, we at DHS are working
    hard to build the Department's capacity to secure America. Let
    there be no doubt it is very hard work.
        There seemed to be vulnerabilities everywhere. And the
    President has provided the vision, the Congress has provided
    the framework, and Secretary Ridge is leading the way to
    breathing life into DHS. We will get this right.
        I will be brief this morning, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
    mention just a couple of words on four things. First to look
    back over my shoulder for a moment. I spent 42 years in
    uniform. I went to war in Vietnam. I went to Valdez where there
    were 11 million gallons of crude oil in Prince William Sound. I
    commanded ships at sea. I directed operations that saved tens
    of thousands of lives, Haiti and Cuban migrant crises. And I
    can truthfully say that this past year has been the most
    challenging and rewarding leadership experience of my life. It
    continues apace today with no end in sight.
        The work is gratifying. The stakes are impossibly high. I
    am surrounded by deeply committed patriots and am enormously
    proud of what we have accomplished this past year. I am also
    enormously appreciative of the patience shown by the
    Administration and the congressional subcommittees who provided
    oversight and resources as we grappled to meet the 36 mandates
    outlined in ATSA.
        We literally re-baselined our budget a half-a-dozen times
    over the course of this past year, as we learned day by day
    what the price tag on one hand and the programmatic direction
    on the other should be for this new agency.
        We are really still doing that. Week by week, we juggle
    both the job description and the budget. I believe that is
    pretty normal, as the Congress and the Administration sort out
    the expectations that they have for this new agency.
        Even as we speak, we continue to sort out a spending plan
    for the rest of fiscal year 2003. I hope to have that to the
    committee shortly. We have certainly learned from this
    experience and want to work closely with you on our fiscal year
    2004 requirements so that we can avoid the significant
    adjustments necessary to accommodate the allocations not
    included in the President's request.
        The Congress has been particularly patient with me as we
    respectfully disagreed on the size of the screener work force
    needed to secure our airports. As you know, we are grappling
    with that now as part of our effort to make efficiency and
    effectiveness our trademarks at this agency.
        You have all heard many times the inventory of
    accomplishments this past year, so I will not repeat them. What
    I will repeat is the pride we all take at TSA in what we got
    accomplished.
        Were there holes and bad days and things we wish we did
    better? Of course. We were and we are at war. But even those
    things we did poorly are being systematically cleared up one by
    one. You have my pledge to complete that task. And in the
    meantime, we have done a lot of things well, on time, on
    budget, and against huge expectations that they simply could
    not be done.
        Second, the President's 2004 budget seeks $4.81 billion,
    about half of which is to be financed by the passenger and
    airline fees established in ATSA. This budget is dedicated to
    stabilizing and strengthening our essential missions.
        The request is some $350 million less than the budget
    enacted in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act.
    That is reasonable considering how much of our 2002 and 2003
    experience focused on one-time start-up costs, including $1
    million per machine and significant contractor outlays.
        The President's request seeks funding in five major areas:
    aviation security; maritime and land security; intelligence;
    R&D; and administration. And the documents submitted itemize
    specific dollars for all five areas, and I will gladly go into
    specifics during questions.
        Third, I would like to comment on a small but very
    important group of special projects that we have underway. Much
    has been written recently about CAPPS II. I certainly invite
    the Committee's questions, but let me just say it will be the
    most significant tool we build to contribute to both security
    and customer service. We have offered a number of briefs to the
    Congress, and they have all been well attended. And we will
    provide more as requested.
        I understand deeply the privacy implications of the
    project, and we are reaching out systematically to gain counsel
    and input from all as we build this project and its privacy
    strategy. I am absolutely committed to providing Americans a
    full measure of both security and privacy, and I ask for your
    informed support for this project.
        Our Transportation Worker Identification Credential project
    is now in its evaluation stage. It will offer efficient and
    effective leaps forward in identification and verification and
    access control for workers across the transportation system. I
    am appreciative of the Committee's support for TWIC and ask
    that it continue.
        These two projects, TWIC and CAPPS II, provide the
    foundation blocks for a ``Registered Traveler'' Program, which
    will expedite processing for those who volunteer to meet its
    specifications.
        Lastly, the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. We have
    trained and graduated our prototype class of 44 volunteer
    pilots, which we conducted at FLETC. We will learn from that
    experience and tweak the curriculum as necessary to press on to
    the full scope training that will add another dimension to our
    layered security system in aviation.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to address just three personal
    organizational goals, and I intend to focus on them until I get
    them right. The first is to finish the work we started at the
    Nation's airports. We crossed the country twice and left a wake
    behind us in many places. We must finish the checkpoint
    reconfiguration work where needed, and we must finish the
    explosives detection installations in many airports across the
    country.
        A few airports must still be brought to 100 percent
    electronic screening. Others must be kept in compliance as the
    busier flying season approaches. Equipment must be repositioned
    because it had to be installed often in haste and in lobbies to
    meet the 12/31/2002 deadline.
        There are some airports where simple efficiency and
    effectiveness suggest inline EDS installations as the only
    reasonable alternative. And my goal is to optimize the use of
    every dollar appropriated for this task to get as much of this
    work done as soon as possible.
        I thank the Congress for the provision of the Letter of
    Intent (LOI) tool. It will instantly enable us to negotiate
    with airport directors to leverage private sector capital to
    accomplish these projects and then reimburse those airports
    over multiple budget cycles.
        My second goal is hinged to the first. We will aggressively
    manage the size of our workforce. I have two staff projects
    underway to right-size the screener workforce. One in the short
    term, and one midterm, both based on risk management
    principles.
        I will challenge every position in the model used and
    insist the new standard pass the common sense test. I will also
    challenge every FSD, Federal security director, to optimize his
    or her management of the resulting screener force. That means
    we replace attrition over the next couple of months, even
    years. The focus as we do that will be on part-time hiring to
    provide the flexibility necessary at those airports. We will do
    this work with great respect to our workforce but we will meet
    the reduction goals and do so with the first skills-based
    retention program in this Government's history.
        My last focus, Mr. Chairman, will be on building an
    adequate administrative support structure in TSA. I must ensure
    that we have in place the structure to adequately deal with
    contract oversight, workforce administration, EEO complaints,
    customer inquiries, and those other classic support functions
    that we only talk about when they do not get done well.
        Our new H.R. contractors will be held accountable for what
    we expect of them. We brought aboard 55,000 people in very
    short order and are only now building the H.R. infrastructure
    they deserve. These are dedicated Americans employed to provide
    us the security we demand, and we owe them the model workplace
    that I have described.
        In closing, Mr. Chairman, allow me to follow up on the
    discussion the subcommittee had with Mr. Hutchinson last week.
    Several members asked him about transportation sectors other
    than aviation. ATSA is very clear that TSA is responsible for
    the security of the entire transportation system. And I take
    that charge quite seriously and am close to the first draft of
    a national transportation system security plan. We will deal
    with aviation, maritime, rail, transit, highways, and pipelines
    as the six critical elements of that system.
        Our intention is not to necessarily do security in those
    other five sectors in the people-intensive way that we were
    required to do so in aviation. But we must ensure the other
    modes are adequately security conscious.
        The Congress has expressed a keen interest in ports and
    rail, and I believe my charter is to be able to advise
    Secretary Hutchinson and Secretary Ridge as to the security,
    status and readiness of the entire system. I look forward to
    working with all the transportation stakeholders in the
    Congress to eliminate any weak links from our system and to
    integrate this work into the greater homeland security
    challenge being met by DHS.

                               prepared statement

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions,
    sir.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Admiral Loy.
        [The statement follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Admiral James M. Loy

        Good morning, Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, distinguished Members
    of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to testify before the Subcommittee on
    the fiscal year 2004 Budget request for the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA). I join you today representing TSA as part of the
    new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Our inclusion in this new
    department is both fitting and natural, because our mission is
    completely aligned with the mission of DHS. Secretary Ridge is deeply
    engaged in fusing together the 22 agencies contained in DHS, and TSA is
    proud to be a part of the DHS team working to find efficiencies, make
    management improvements, and coordinate the necessary protection of our
    homeland.
        In a little over a year of existence, TSA has achieved much. We
    have met 100 percent of the aviation screening mandates and all of the
    other statutory deadlines set by Congress. We have focused on getting
    the job done and done well. Although we are off to a great start, there
    is still more to do to successfully accomplish our transportation
    security mission. Much of this additional work is about understanding
    the bigger picture of our national transportation security system,
    which is intermodal, interdependent, and international in scope.
        We wish to thank you for addressing TSA's critical needs with
    additional funding in the War Supplemental. This funding represents
    much needed relief in continuing to achieve results that are critical
    to our mission. We appreciate the additional resources and are taking
    action to fulfill the direction set in the legislation. We are working
    with your staff to explain our revised fiscal year 2003 TSA spending
    plan. As I recently announced, TSA will be reducing its workforce--
    3,000 by May 31, 2003, and an additional 3,000 by September 30, 2003--
    in the months ahead. In addition, TSA will reduce the cost for law
    enforcement and move away from fixed point stationing of officers, all
    the while maintaining appropriate security requirements. TSA also is
    working rapidly to implement the provisions of the supplemental
    legislation providing assistance to airlines for strengthening cockpit
    doors and for TSA-mandated aviation security costs and foregone
    revenue. We fully intend to make these disbursements within 30 days as
    Congress directed.
        Now I would like to speak to you about where TSA is going and how
    our fiscal year 2004 budget will get us there. I urge you first to
    consider TSA's critical budget needs in the context of where we have
    been. We have had to use available resources to build our organization
    from the ground up at the same time we have been focused on
    accomplishing our mission.
        I can report to you today that TSA has produced significant results
    during its short existence:
      --On Saturday, April 19, 2003 the inaugural class of volunteer
            commercial pilots graduated from TSA's Federal Flight Deck
            Officer (FFDO) training. After 48 hours of intensive training,
            these pilots were sworn in as federal law enforcement officers,
            with jurisdiction limited to the flight deck, or cockpit. These
            officers add another layer of security to the skies.
      --We have identified, intercepted, and therefore kept off aircraft
            more than 4.8 million dangerous items, including 1,101
            firearms; nearly 1.4 million knives; 39,842 box cutters;
            125,273 incendiary or flammable objects; and 15,666 clubs.
      --We have put in place a Federalized passenger and baggage screener
            workforce, which has been widely complimented as professional,
            courteous, and competent.
      --We have recruited, trained, and deployed a professional cadre of
            Federal Air Marshals, who protect passengers and provide
            security on aircraft.
      --We have implemented 100 percent screening of checked baggage
            through EDS or Congressionally approved alternative means.
        I am personally committed to making TSA a model workplace as we
    achieve these and even greater results. This means building and
    maintaining carefully a professional culture across the organization to
    form a foundation for future success. This culture includes:
      --Aligning our operational programs with DHS and TSA threat-based
            risk management plan;
      --Close and constant communication with the entire TSA workforce and
            our stakeholders about our mission, vision, values, and goals
            and objectives;
      --A commitment to rigorous performance management, both at the
            organizational and individual levels;
      --Creating a diverse and inclusive workplace culture based on mutual
            respect, fairness, optimal communication, cooperative problem
            solving and teamwork, and enabling all TSA employees to perform
            at the highest level;
      --Continued targeted investments in critical training and information
            technology to reduce the size of the workforce while maximizing
            its impact;
      --Creating a streamlined and effective administrative infrastructure
            to support all our operations.
        A key aspect of a true learning organization is to learn from past
    mistakes. We had some missteps last fall as we moved rapidly to hire
    screeners to meet the Congressionally mandated deadlines for
    Federalizing passenger screening checkpoints and complete 100 percent
    checked baggage screening. We have learned from these challenges and
    will continue to improve in this fiscal year and fiscal year 2004. Over
    the past several months, we have implemented several acquisition,
    financial, and other management initiatives that address fiscal year
    2002 concerns raised by the Subcommittee.
        As we build our culture and the organization, we must constantly
    focus on our mission. TSA's mission is to protect the Nation's
    transportation systems to ensure the freedom of movement for people and
    commerce. Our vision is to continuously set the standard for excellence
    in transportation security through TSA's people, processes, and
    technologies. We have embraced the values of integrity, innovation, and
    teamwork as we pursue excellence in public service. TSA also strives to
    be efficient and effective in its use of resources.
        Our strategic goals provide a clear understanding of our security
    responsibilities, including awareness of the full scope of potential
    risks; deployment of comprehensive prevention, protection and response
    activities; and organizational mandates to optimize performance and
    stewardship requirements. We are building a system of performance and
    accountability that incorporates a clear line of sight linking every
    employee's role and responsibility to the central TSA mission and
    strategic goals.
        In establishing and communicating our mission, vision and values,
    and in identifying our strategic goals, we have given all TSA employees
    and the stakeholders we serve a clear agenda of purpose and excellence.
    Our budget identifies the programs and resources required to most
    effectively achieve TSA's goals.
        In accomplishing our mission, we are also acutely aware of the
    challenge of maintaining balance--between freedom and security, and
    between security and customer service. Our mission is to ensure freedom
    of movement for people and commerce, and our process is to meet the
    needs and expectations of the American people with the greatest
    consideration for their privacy and the least disruption to their
    routine behavior. Our top priority is providing maximum security with
    minimum intrusion. TSA's fiscal year 2004 Budget of $4.812 billion is
    dedicated to stabilizing and strengthening our essential mission. Our
    fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 budgets included many large
    start-up costs, including the purchase and installation of necessary
    explosives detection equipment. Although these costs will not recur in
    fiscal year 2004, savings are partially offset by recurring costs for
    maintenance and administration. Before I summarize the key elements of
    our fiscal year 2004 Budget request, I would like to highlight several
    programs that I know are items of interest to Members of the
    Subcommittee.
      --Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System.--Funding in the
            amount of $35 million is requested for development of the
            second generation Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening
            System (CAPPS II). CAPPS II is an automated threat assessment
            tool for airline passengers that can be modified based on new
            intelligence information and changing threat priorities. It
            will enhance aviation security, refine the passenger secondary
            screening selection process, and improve airport passenger
            flow. We are aware of privacy concerns with this system and are
            building strong privacy protections into the system to address
            those concerns. We will continue to work with key stakeholders
            as development of this system moves forward. As Secretary Ridge
            has committed to Congress, we will work closely with the
            Department's newly appointed Privacy Officer to ensure that
            CAPPS II respects the privacy rights of Americans. We have also
            held several briefings, both in closed and open session, for
            Members of Congress and their staffs and will work with
            Congress to create a better understanding of what CAPPS II is
            and is not.
      --Federal Flight Deck Officers.--A request of $25 million will
            support the first full year of implementation of federal flight
            deck officer training, which supports the recently passed
            legislation authorizing the arming of pilots. These pilots will
            complement the Federal Air Marshals deployed within the
            aircraft and will be authorized to act only if the cockpit is
            threatened. TSA has established an initial program for
            participant qualification and is planning for requalification
            certification. Our prototype class just graduated April 19, and
            it is expected that the training program will be ready for full
            deployment in late fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004.
      --Transportation Worker Identification Credential.--This initiative
            focuses on developing identification standards for documents to
            identify individuals for access purposes. Multiple types of
            technology are being evaluated to determine the best approach.
      --Registered Traveler.--TSA requests $5 million to develop a
            registered traveler program that will pre-screen low risk
            travelers so that available resources can focus on unknown and
            high-risk individuals.
      --Air Cargo Security.--The TSA budget requests $20 million to design
            and develop a random, threat-based, risk-managed freight
            screening process and continue the development of an automated
            and enhanced ``known'' shipper program. It is estimated that
            there are 12.5 million tons of cargo transported per year, 2.8
            million tons of which is now secured on passenger planes and
            9.7 million tons on cargo planes.
      --Explosives Detection System (EDS) Installation.--TSA is continuing
            to work with airports to install remaining EDS systems and will
            continue to ensure that all checked baggage is screened. As
            part of our effort to utilize letters of intent (LOI) to
            optimize these installations, TSA expects to amend its fiscal
            year 2004 request within the proposed funding level to finance
            LOI costs. We will do so in the near future.
        The five major components of the TSA budget are Aviation Security,
    Maritime and Land Security, Research and Development, Intelligence, and
    Administration.
    Aviation Security
        The majority of TSA's budget is centered on securing the air
    transportation system, as provided in the Aviation and Transportation
    Security Act. The September 11 terrorist attacks highlighted the need
    for vigilant aviation security, and there is every indication that
    aviation will continue to be an attractive target for terrorist groups.
        Our first priority is to protect air travelers by continuing to
    build on the aviation security measures now in place at all of the
    Nation's more than 400 commercial airports, maintaining a balance
    between world-class security and outstanding customer service. TSA has
    set into place a system of reinforcing rings of security to mitigate
    the risk of future terrorist or criminal acts. These security measures
    cover air traffic from curbside to cockpit, supported overall by
    intelligence and threat analysis. In full compliance with Congressional
    deadlines and mandates, passenger and baggage screening operations are
    federalized and meet established standards of screening 100 percent of
    checked and unchecked baggage. The screeners we have trained and
    deployed put a face on TSA and provide to the American public the most
    visible expression of our efforts. Their thoroughness, professionalism,
    and courtesy are key elements in restoring and maintaining the
    traveling public's confidence in the safety of aviation. We have also
    deployed state-of-the-art metal detectors and explosives detection
    machines.
        TSA has selected 158 Federal Security Directors to oversee air
    transportation security, and worked with State and local officials to
    post law enforcement personnel at passengerscreening checkpoints. I
    appreciate the authority provided by Congress for flexible stationing
    of law enforcement officers where we feel it is appropriate. TSA both
    performs background checks for TSA airport personnel, and also
    undertakes regulatory inspection and enforcement of agency security
    directives. We are providing these security measures with a workforce
    that is proud of its important work and that has won the respect of the
    traveling public.
        The $4.2 billion request for aviation security activities for
    fiscal year 2004 includes approximately $1.8 billion for passenger
    screening, $944 million for baggage screening, and $1.5 billion for
    airport support and enforcement.
        Fully funding the fiscal year 2004 funding request will allow TSA
    to ensure the safety of the traveling public in secure airport
    terminals and aboard aircraft. TSA will continue to implement
    efficiencies in screening operations, including both technological
    enhancements and cross training of passenger and baggage screeners, to
    further reduce the reliance on personnel. As a result, our 2004 request
    represents a staffing decrease of 3,000 screeners as compared to 2003
    levels.
        We are requesting $27 million to expand deployment of technologies
    to improve physical security at the passenger and baggage screening
    checkpoints. We will be augmenting existing surveillance systems
    currently in use or planned at many airports, sharing cost and
    information with airports.
        The President is requesting a total of $45 million for risk
    management initiatives to increase the effectiveness and efficiencies
    of the passenger screening process. This includes the $35 million for
    the CAPPS II project already described above, plus $5 million to
    support the creation of a registered traveler program to increase
    security while decreasing the hassle factor for travelers. The goal of
    such a program is to better utilize available resources by focusing on
    unknown and high-risk individuals. Another $5 million is requested to
    continue background checks for airport personnel and vendors operating
    in secure terminals of an airport to streamline the gate screening
    process.
        To provide baggage-screening security, TSA uses a combination of
    EDS; explosives trace detection machines (ETD), and where necessary
    other congressionally approved alternative methods of screening, such
    as passenger-bag match, canine teams, and physical search. EDS is
    deployed as a cost-effective screening process at many of the higher
    volume and high-risk airports, and ETD is deployed as a comparable
    screening system of acceptable effectiveness at those airports where
    operational factors do not warrant EDS deployment.
        In 2004, TSA will continue to improve the efficiency and
    effectiveness of baggage and cargo screening. We expect ``on-screen''
    resolution procedures to reduce many false alarms. We request $100
    million for in-service upgrades and maintenance of approximately 8,000
    explosives trace and detection devices at more that 400 commercial
    airports. TSA will continue to develop information on EDS performance
    to assure that our baggage screening equipment and procedures represent
    the most effective and reliable operations available.
        Consistent with our multi-layered approach, TSA requests $900
    million to provide strong security direction and enforcement presence
    on-site at the Nation's commercial airports. This funding will support
    a numbers of different activities. This includes the 158 Federal
    Security Directors and support staff, the required leasing of airport
    space and the development of IT infrastructure to support those
    offices. These funds will provide resources for working with State and
    local law enforcement personnel, where appropriate, to ensure passenger
    safety and national security. This funding will also continue the
    regulatory screening and enforcement program to monitor security
    measures performed by airport operators and air carriers. It is
    imperative that a standardized approach to physical aviation security
    measures be implemented at the Nation's airports. TSA field inspectors
    across the country will perform the regulatory screening and
    enforcement activities, which were previously administered by the
    Federal Aviation Administration's Civil Aviation Security program.
    Finally, this funding includes funds requested to expand the Federal
    Flight Deck Officer program to train and arm volunteer pilots.
        A request of $600 million will support the full complement of
    officer and support staff assigned to the Federal Air Marshal Service
    (FAMS). The Federal Air Marshals are an integral part of our layered
    rings of security for aviation, defending against on-board passengers
    intending to harm an aircraft and our aviation system.
    Maritime & Land Security
        As the prospect of further terrorist attack continues to loom, the
    security of maritime and land transportation systems merits additional
    consideration. TSA, as part of the Border and Transportation Security
    Directorate, is partnering with other DHS organizations, such as the
    Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
    and the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS, to address other
    surface and maritime transportation security responsibilities.
        The Memorandum of Agreement I have signed with the Federal Aviation
    Administration and correspondence I have exchanged with Secretary
    Mineta establish the framework for continued cooperation with the
    Department of Transportation. We continue to partner with the operating
    administrations of the Department of Transportation, that provide a
    vital link with the transportation providers to ensure that there is
    neither duplication nor are there gaps in critical federal
    transportation security initiatives. The framework provides a vehicle
    for continuing cooperation and collaboration, and paves the way for
    further security-related legislation, rulemaking, resource utilization,
    and administration of transportation security grants.
        TSA is proceeding on a number of fronts, including.--(1) awarding
    grants to improve the security of ports and cargo, (2) working with the
    IAIP Directorate and the Coast Guard to design a terrorism risk
    assessment tool tailored specifically to maritime and surface
    transportation facilities, and (3) working with our other federal
    partners to ensure intermodal consistency, where appropriate, in
    security regulations for the national transportation system, including
    requirements that will facilitate assessing and improving the security
    of transportation facilities and infrastructure.
        TSA's Maritime and Land operations are continuing to work with
    IAIP, the Coast Guard, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
    to develop security standards and regulations for all non-aviation
    modes of transportation. These efforts will include benchmarking to
    establish best practices, industry outreach, and extensive
    collaboration with Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies in order
    to leverage these agencies stakeholder contacts and transportation
    expertise. These standards will not displace or conflict with the
    security standards being developed by other federal agencies. Rather,
    they will complement the efforts of other federal agencies to ensure
    there are no gaps in the security of the national transportation
    system.
        Specific project funding included in the fiscal year 2004
    President's request includes $55 million for the Transportation Worker
    Identification Credential (TWIC), a sophisticated access control
    credential, and $2.5 million to complete work on our Operation Safe
    Commerce pilot program, to continue to learn the best approach to
    dealing with the container vulnerability threat.
    Research & Development
        TSA is requesting $20 million for aviation related research and
    development initiatives in 2004. This request includes initiatives
    related to Next Generation EDS ($10.0 million), and Air Cargo ($10.0
    million). The Next Generation EDS initiative aims to increase
    throughput and lower false alarm rates at equivalent or better
    detection performance capability. This program will perform simulation
    and modeling of alternative checked baggage-screening technologies, and
    expand systems testing of off-airport screening capability. This
    research will also explore EDS screening capabilities for small
    airports.
        The request of $10 million for the Air Cargo Pilot will support
    research and development of new performance methodologies in detecting
    threats to air cargo. The 2004 effort will continue to address how
    existing devices and procedures can best be applied to air cargo, and
    to investigate new air technology security concepts, including advanced
    sensors for effective cargo screening.
    Intelligence
        TSA is requesting $13,600,000 to continue to support 100 TSA
    intelligence positions in 2004. Included in the base funding request
    are base salaries and benefits, including locality pay, and data base
    access and equipment maintenance requirements. As part of DHS, TSA will
    work to integrate its analysis and products with other intelligence
    components of DHS while continuing to support its transportation
    customer base with analysis on transportation security and
    intelligence. DHS will disseminate information on possible threats as
    rapidly as possible to our Federal Security Directors, airport staff,
    and airline personnel, current and strategic warnings will be provided
    regarding threats to U.S. transportation modes, and trends and changes
    in targeting will be identified. TSA is working with IAIP to increase
    its intelligence capabilities increase in other transportation areas
    and to disseminate information to other key officials.
    Administration
        Funding in the amount of $421.2 million is requested for essential
    administrative support of program activities. This amount represents
    less than 10 percent of TSA's total budget request, and provides
    financial and human resources support; information technology support;
    policy development and oversight; performance management and e-
    government; communication, public information and legislative affairs;
    training and quality performance; internal conduct and audit; legal
    advice; and overall headquarters administration.
        Effective use of information technology (IT) is key to TSA's
    success, and $145.2 million of the administrative request supports
    information technology core requirements, which are being provided
    through a managed service contract.
        As a new organization, we have used the opportunity of our ``clean
    slate'' to create a lean administrative infrastructure that can serve
    as a model for other agencies. We have outsourced high volume
    administrative activities to streamline Government operations.
        TSA's management structure and business processes are fully aligned
    with the President's Management Agenda, and we are establishing a
    culture of management efficiency through initiative and innovation.
        In the human capital area, training and performance assessment will
    continue to receive high priority focus and resources, and in fiscal
    year 2004, TSA will address human capital planning, standards for
    internal accountability systems, and organizational development. We
    have stood up a large organization and now must concentrate on building
    the infrastructure to support that workforce.
        Competitive sourcing has been a key component of TSA since its
    inception, and TSA will continue to use the private sector to perform
    commercial functions whenever possible and appropriate. For example,
    TSA has outsourced the hiring, training, and servicing of screeners;
    the design and installation of explosives detection equipment; and the
    redesign and reconfiguration of passenger checkpoints. In fiscal year
    2004, TSA will continue to pursue contracting opportunities,
    particularly in the areas of equipment deployment and financial
    management, incorporating robust contract oversight into this process.
        Financial management is identified as a fundamental element of
    improving management of government programs. At its standup, TSA
    implemented the Department of Transportation's Delphi financial
    management system. Under the Department of Homeland Security, we are
    migrating to Oracle Financials, and exploring the use of Oracle and
    other financial systems to meet all Joint Financial Management
    Improvement Program requirements and to give managers budget and
    performance information on their program operations.
        The TSA budget request includes funding to continue to implement
    and maintain a comprehensive, enterprise-wide architecture to support
    TSA's mission and the President's E-Government initiative. This
    architecture will be the transport mechanism for data and will provide
    the necessary support services to TSA's major programs. TSA will also
    continue its e-government efforts through the implementation of the
    TSAWeb to provide public information as well as shared services and all
    mission-critical, operational and administrative applications for
    internal and external stakeholders.
        We will adopt budget and performance integration as the fundamental
    structure of TSA's program planning and execution to make sure we
    support and fund those programs that make American transportation
    systems more secure. We will establish accountability by linking how
    much we're spending with what we're achieving. TSA intends to implement
    full integration of cost accounting that links costs to performance
    goals and therefore to performance results.
        I have initiated a rightsizing project that will enable us to
    reduce the screener workforce as called for in both the fiscal year
    2003 and fiscal year 2004 budgets. Obviously, this will be done in a
    manner that is consistent with maintaining the security paradigm. We
    will use a riskbased approach to rightsize our workforce and
    demonstrate to the President and Congress that we are obtaining the
    maximum security and protection for the traveling public from the
    resources provided. That is our challenge and I intend to meet it.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, Members of the Subcommittee, we intend
    to meet our responsibility for providing security for the Nation's
    transportation systems with both sensitivity and common sense, by
    meeting core statutory requirements, by developing and implementing
    supplementary programs, and by partnering with Federal, State, and
    local agencies, and with private industry and other stakeholders, to
    advance the mission of protecting our homeland.
        The role of the Transportation Security Administration in meeting
    this challenge is unmistakable. The nine stars and eleven stripes that
    appear behind the American eagle on the TSA logo are a daily visual
    reminder of the ``Why'' of our organization. The programs and resources
    I have talked about today represent the ``How''. I appreciate the
    support TSA has received from this Subcommittee and look forward to
    working with you as we continue this important effort. I will be
    pleased to answer your questions.

        Senator Cochran. We will now hear from Ms. Connie Patrick,
    Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

                    STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR CONNIE L. PATRICK

        Ms. Patrick. Good morning, Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd,
    and the other distinguished members of the committee. It is a
    pleasure to be here with you today to discuss the President's
    fiscal year 2004 budget request, our first under the Department
    of Homeland Security.
        This marks our first opportunity to appear at--for me to
    appear before a Senate subcommittee since being appointed the
    Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in July
    2002.
        I want to extend my appreciation to Secretary Tom Ridge and
    Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson, who have already demonstrated
    their enthusiastic and unqualified support for the vital role
    of the FLETC and the role it is expected to play in the new
    Department of Homeland Security.
        I also want to acknowledge the support the Congress has
    long extended to the FLETC. I stand ready to work with you and
    direct the FLETC towards successful completion of the
    objectives set forth by the Administration and Congress in the
    protection of our national security and interests.
        The two pillars upon which FLETC was founded are quality in
    training and economy of scale. Neither of these can be achieved
    without the cooperation of our partner agencies. There are now
    75 partner agencies who train at the FLETC. And we all train
    under the concept of consolidated training, which means we
    share training knowledge and experience, funds, and law
    enforcement training uniformity and standardization to
    accomplish the mission.
        FLETC is now 33 years old. We have trained more than
    500,000 agents and officers across government, and have
    graduated them from both agent and officer training programs.
    Those programs include statutory requirements for law
    enforcement, as well as ethical training, firearms, physical
    training, investigative skills and techniques. I think it is
    important to mention that for every dollar given to training,
    it goes not directly to one agency, but to 75 agencies.
        Mr. Chairman, as we enter a new era in law enforcement
    operations in the United States, I believe that FLETC is a
    great example of a government approach intended by the
    legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security, a
    means to harmonize the work of many law enforcement agencies
    through common training, while at the same time maintaining
    quality and cost efficiency.
        In fiscal year 2003, 65 percent of the FLETC's projected
    workload will come from the nine law enforcement agencies
    transferred into Homeland Security. In fiscal year 2004, this
    work will continue to be above 50 percent of our estimated
    total Federal training workload. And within the last week those
    numbers have been reported to me to be approximately 73 percent
    of our workload, will come from the nine law enforcement
    agencies now in Homeland Security. In addition to that, we
    maintain robust State, local, and international law enforcement
    training activities, many of which will help further complement
    the mission to secure our homeland.
        Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary
    Hutchinson, FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of
    DHS. FLETC, as a member of DHS, will help support the unity of
    command and the coordination and efficiency themes sought in
    the public law that created the Department.
        FLETC has a long history of service to many of the DHS
    components, to include the Secret Service, the Customs and
    Immigration and Naturalization Services, including the Border
    Patrol, the Federal Protective Service, and most recently, the
    Transportation Security Administration.
        With the establishment of the Bureaus of Customs and Border
    Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is
    ready to help facilitate, develop, and implement new training
    and cross-training programs. We recognize that much of this
    effort and expertise will necessarily come from the agencies
    involved, and that there will be significant adjustments made
    over time to all DHS-related training programs, basic and
    advanced. We are already involved in a systematic review of the
    existing training for these new entities to address the need to
    meld the duties of the participants. In the meantime, training
    will continue unabated to achieve the expectations of our
    agencies.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

        In this fiscal year 2004 budget, the President submitted a
    budget request for the FLETC that included an operating
    expenses appropriation of approximately $122 million, and 754
    FTE. The request for the Capital Acquisitions appropriation is
    approximately $24 million, for a total request of just over
    $146 million.
        FLETC's overall fiscal year 2004 budget is $206.058 million
    based on an estimated $60 million in funds to be reimbursed by
    partner agencies for certain training and related services. As
    a matter of long-established fiscal policy, the FLETC
    operations are partially covered by agency reimbursements in
    addition to the appropriation authorized by Congress.
    Essentially, this has evolved to a point where FLETC funds the
    mandated entry-level training and facility development and
    operations, while the participating agencies reimburse us for
    certain training costs and support.

                             OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS

        As part of my discussion, I would like to provide you with
    a brief overview of the operations of FLETC. We conduct both
    basic and advanced training for the vast majority of the
    Federal law enforcement officers in the United States. We
    provide training for State, local, and international officers
    in specialized program areas and support the training provided
    by our partner agencies that is specific to their individual
    mission needs.
        In addition to our onsite training at the FLETC residential
    facilities, some advanced training, particularly for State,
    local, and international law enforcement, are exported to
    regional sites, many of which are in your States, and that
    provides a lower cost of training to our customers, as well as
    making it more convenient for them to obtain training.

                                    WORKLOAD

        As a result of the September 11 attacks, our partner
    agencies' workload have increased significantly. We are
    projecting the greatest increase in training requirements in
    our history. And to give you just a scale on that, before 2001,
    our highest training workload was about 25,000 students. This
    year we will train approximately 37,000, and the numbers
    projected for next year are somewhere around 55,000 students.
        Over the years, the FLETC has experienced a number of
    periods of sustained growth in the training requests by its
    partner agencies, and we have been able to accommodate those by
    being innovative in the use of our existing resources. To meet
    the training needs, the FLETC continues to work on a 6-day
    workweek at the Glynco facility, which we began in January of
    2002.
        This format allowed FLETC to accelerate training to get
    students on the streets more quickly. In fact, we have
    graduated about 2,000 more students this year than we would
    have had we not been on a 6-day work week, just to meet the
    needs of our agencies, primarily those in DHS.

                      FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION MASTER PLAN

        For future planning purposes, FLETC contracted with a
    private firm experienced in facility planning to conduct a
    study that will project future facility requirements. This
    study should be completed shortly. It is a three-phase plan
    that will place emphasis on eliminating capacity shortcomings
    at all FLETC sites.
        It is important to point out that as we consider the plan
    to be--that we consider this plan to be a living document that
    may still undergo significant changes in the future as the
    requirements of DHS agencies become clearer.

                        SELECTED ACHIEVEMENT HIGHLIGHTS

        Very briefly, I would like to discuss just a couple of the
    specific achievements based on the support Congress and the
    Administration have given us. We have exceeded all of our
    performance targets. We completed our third year of a financial
    audit with an unqualified opinion. We have begun partnering
    with the Office of Personnel Management to provide law
    enforcement training on the new GOLEARN site. This partnership,
    initiated on January 20th of 2003, provides the first-responder
    communities secured, encrypted access to both general and
    customized law enforcement training. We are very excited about
    the great opportunities that lie ahead in the field of
    technology through the use of blended learning, combining the
    best uses of distance learning and hands-on residential
    learning.
        And finally, I want to note the progress that has been made
    in the area of accreditation and standardization. This project
    is fully underway, working in collaboration with Federal
    agencies, including the FBI, DEA, and the U.S. Postal
    Inspection Service; private organizations; professional
    associations; and others to develop a format to accredit
    training facilities, the instructors, and programs and courses
    provided by every Federal law enforcement training
    organization. When this is fully implemented, it may prove to
    be one of the more far-reaching impacts that we have seen in
    law enforcement since the establishment of consolidated
    training itself.

                                   CONCLUSION

        In closing, let me assure you that we are ready to provide
    the highest quality law enforcement training at the lowest
    possible cost. Substantial savings is being realized through
    the operation of consolidated training sites. We are aware of
    the important opportunities and challenges that remain ahead. I
    want to publicly commend the remarkable people at FLETC and in
    our partner agencies who have contributed so much to the
    success of consolidated training. This concludes my prepared
    statement, and I would be pleased to answer any questions that
    you might have at this time.
        [The statement follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Connie L. Patrick

        Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished members of the
    Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today, and I am pleased
    to discuss the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)--its first under the
    Department of Homeland Security.
                                opening remarks
        This marks the first occasion that I am appearing before the
    Homeland Security Subcommittee since my appointment as Director of the
    FLETC in July 2002. I want to extend my appreciation to Secretary Tom
    Ridge and Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson, who have already demonstrated
    their enthusiastic and unqualified support for the vital role the FLETC
    is expected to play in the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I
    also want to acknowledge the generous support the Congress has long
    extended to the FLETC. I stand ready to work with you and direct the
    FLETC towards successful completion of the objectives set forth by the
    Administration and Congress in the protection of our national security
    and interests.
        The two pillars upon which the foundation of the FLETC was formed
    are quality in training and economy of scale. Neither of these can be
    achieved without the cooperation of our partner agencies. More than 75
    Federal agencies are now participating in the FLETC concept of
    consolidated training, which means shared training knowledge and
    experiences, better use of available funds, and law enforcement
    training uniformity and standardization. During its 33-year history,
    more than 500,000 agents and officers, across all three branches of
    government, have graduated from training conducted at FLETC, ranging
    from individual agency statutory enforcement responsibilities and the
    more common elements of training required for all agencies, including
    ethics, firearms use, physical training, and investigative skills and
    techniques. Furthermore each dollar provided to FLETC goes for the
    benefit and use of every partner organization.
        Mr. Chairman, as we enter a new era in law enforcement operations
    in the United States, I believe the FLETC is a good example of the new
    government approach intended by the legislation creating the DHS: a
    means to harmonize the work of many law enforcement agencies through
    common training, while at the same time maintaining quality and cost
    efficiency. In fiscal year 2003, 65 percent of the FLETC's projected
    training workload will come from nine law enforcement agencies
    transferred to the new Homeland Security department. In fiscal year
    2004, this workload will continue to be above 50 percent of our
    estimated total Federal training workload. In addition, FLETC maintains
    robust State, local, and international law enforcement training
    activities, many of which will help further complement the mission to
    secure the homeland.
        Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary
    Hutchinson, FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of DHS.
    Placing FLETC within the DHS will help to support the ``unity of
    command'' and the coordination and efficiency themes sought in the
    public law that created DHS. FLETC has a long history of service to
    many of the DHS components--the U.S. Secret Service, the former Customs
    and Immigration and Naturalization Services including the U.S. Border
    Patrol (USBP), the Federal Protective Service and more recently, the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
        With the start-up of the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
    and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is ready to help
    facilitate, develop, and implement new training and cross training
    programs. We recognize that much of this effort and expertise will
    necessarily come from the agencies involved, but there likely will be
    significant adjustments made over time to all DHS-related training
    programs, basic and advanced. Already, an effort is underway to
    systematically review existing training for these new entities and to
    address whatever capabilities are needed to meld the duties of the
    participants. In the meantime, training will continue unabated to
    achieve all of the hiring expectations of our agencies.
        Our experience with the TSA is evidence of our capability to work
    collaboratively, flexibly and quickly. For example, together our two
    agencies developed and implemented a new Federal Air Marshal (FAM)
    training program within days of the September 11, 2001 attacks. FLETC
    also assisted in the development of the security screeners prototype
    training and is currently assisting in the prototype of a Federal
    Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) training program.
                        fiscal year 2004 budget request
        In his fiscal year 2004 budget, the President submitted a budget
    request for the FLETC that included an Operating Expenses (OE)
    appropriation of $122,379,000 and 754 full-time equivalents (FTE). The
    request for the Capital Acquisitions (CA) appropriation is for
    $23,679,000 and provides funding for all of the cyclical maintenance
    and upkeep of our permanent sites, including renovation of several
    older facilities in Glynco, GA.
        Together, the OE and CA fiscal year 2004 requests total
    $146,058,000. FLETC's overall fiscal year 2004 budget is $206,058,000
    based on an estimated $60,000,000 in funds to be reimbursed by partner
    agencies for certain training and related services. As a matter of long
    established fiscal policy, the FLETC operations are partially covered
    by agency reimbursements in addition to the appropriation authorized by
    Congress. Essentially, this has evolved to a point where FLETC funds
    the mandated entry level training and facility development and
    operations, while the participating agencies reimburse us for certain
    training costs and support.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget also revises FLETC performance measures
    to align them with the organization's mission and funding, consistent
    with the President's Management Agenda for budget and performance
    integration.
                             overview of operations
        As part of my fiscal year 2004 budget discussion, I would like to
    provide the Committee with a brief overview of the operations of the
    FLETC and the resulting workload.
        The FLETC conducts basic and advanced training for the vast
    majority of the Federal Government's law enforcement officers. We also
    provide training for State, local, and international law enforcement
    officers in specialized areas, and support the training provided by our
    partner agencies that is specific to their individual mission needs.
    There are now more than 200 separate training programs offered through
    the FLETC and its partners. Twenty-three agencies maintain training
    academy operations at Glynco, GA, three are housed at Artesia, NM and
    one is located in Cheltenham, MD.
        The FLETC provides entry-level training programs in basic law
    enforcement for police officers and criminal investigators, along with
    advanced training programs in areas such as marine law enforcement,
    anti-terrorism, computer forensics, health care fraud, and
    international banking and money laundering. Training is conducted at
    Glynco, GA, Artesia, NM, and Charleston, SC facilities.
        The Charleston, SC site was established in fiscal year 1996 to
    accommodate a large increase in the demand for basic training,
    particularly the former USBP. The training workload increase over a
    period of years for the former USBP and other former Immigration and
    Naturalization Service (INS) training categories was the direct result
    of initiatives to control illegal immigration along the United States'
    borders. That training is expected to continue to be of substantial
    importance with respect to the integration of border personnel and
    functions.
        In addition to the training conducted on-site at the FLETC's
    residential facilities, some advanced training, particularly for State,
    local, and international law enforcement, is exported to regional sites
    to make it more convenient and affordable for our customers. The use of
    export sites for other types of training has proven to be highly
    successful. In using these sites, most of which are local police
    academies, the FLETC does not incur any capital expenditure
    obligations.
                                    workload
        During fiscal year 2002, the FLETC graduated 32,092 students,
    representing 160,677 student-weeks of training. This total included
    22,158 students who were trained at Glynco, GA; 5,952 students trained
    at Artesia, NM; 959 students trained at the training site in
    Charleston, SC; and 3,023 students trained in export programs. There
    were 19,881 basic students; 9,188 advanced students; and 3,023
    international students trained, providing for an average resident
    student population (ARSP) of 3,090.
        As a result of the tragic September 11th attacks, our partner
    agencies' workload projections increased significantly. FLETC is
    projecting the greatest increase in training requirements in its
    history. In fiscal year 2003, the FLETC will train 37,848 students
    representing 205,692 student-weeks of training. This total includes
    30,184 students to be trained at Glynco, GA; 3,423 students at Artesia,
    NM; 1,899 students in Charleston, SC; and 2,342 students in export
    programs. A total of 22,746 basic students; 12,760 advanced students;
    and 2,342 international students are projected for a total ARSP of
    3,956. Simply stated, this growth is unprecedented.
        Over the years, the FLETC has experienced a number of periods of
    sustained growth in the training requests by its partner agencies, and
    we have been able to accommodate most of these increases by being
    innovative in the use of our existing resources. To meet the training
    needs, the FLETC continues the 6-day workweek at Glynco, GA that was
    started in January 2002. By implementing this format, FLETC will be
    able to accelerate training to get students graduated more quickly and
    ``on the streets''. Our inclusion of an additional day of training
    resulting in a 6-day workweek in fiscal year 2002, and into fiscal year
    2003, has enabled us to graduate over 2,000 more law enforcement
    officers and agents than we could have graduated on the normal 5-day
    workweek. Through the use of a multi-year reemployed annuitant hiring
    authority granted by the Congress in the Supplemental Appropriations,
    fiscal year 2002 (Public Law 107-206); careful scheduling of
    instructors and programs; and other measures, good progress has been
    maintained in meeting requirements. The fiscal year 2004 budget request
    includes sufficient funding to provide the level of training being
    requested by our Partner Agencies.
                      facilities construction master plan
        I would also like to brief you on the status of the progress that
    has been made in expanding the FLETC's facilities. The FLETC initiated
    a multi-year facilities construction program at the end of the last
    decade in order to meet the training growth needs of our partner
    organizations. Following the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001,
    FLETC sites have been used nearly to capacity. For future planning
    purposes, FLETC contracted with a private firm experienced in
    facilities and site development to conduct a study that includes
    Artesia, NM; Glynco, GA; and Cheltenham, MD. The study, which should be
    completed in late spring, is a three-phase plan that places emphasis on
    eliminating the capacity shortcomings of Center facilities. With
    respect to facility construction, I also wanted to take a moment to
    discuss the Washington DC area site and some other accomplishments.
        Initial funds were appropriated in fiscal year 2001 for the
    development of a training site within the Washington, DC area,
    primarily for short-term requalification training and as a site for in-
    service U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) training. The site ultimately
    selected, following an extensive review of available Federal sites, was
    the former naval communications base in Cheltenham, MD. Since assuming
    ownership of the Cheltenham, MD property, excellent progress is being
    made in design and development work. A completely enclosed and
    environmentally-safe firearms complex is under construction and
    expected to be completed in the fall of 2003, and construction will
    begin on a vehicle training complex for non-emergency, obstacle and
    pursuit driving and related support facilities in the next month or so.
    Also, consistent with appropriations, FLETC placed the highest priority
    on completion of an in-service academy operation for the USCP, for
    which the dedication and opening ceremony was conducted in September
    2002. The new building contains classrooms, offices and support
    capabilities to train 50-100 officers at any one time.
        Also, design work already has been completed and construction begun
    for most of the remaining projects, the majority of which will be
    completed by late 2003. The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
    Department (MPDC) has transferred $4,000,000 to FLETC to help defray
    the cost of the firearms range complex. MPDC is one of the principal
    agencies specifically incorporated into the legislation as a partner
    organization at Cheltenham, MD. In total, the FLETC projects more than
    60 agencies in the Washington, DC area will receive requalification
    training at Cheltenham, MD when it is opened.
        With respect to other construction, I should note that in Artesia,
    NM the new Administration Building was completed this year. We expect
    to complete the new dining hall in June. Design has begun on a new
    classroom building that was funded in the fiscal year 2003
    appropriation. In Glynco, GA, the new Port-of-Entry Building became
    operational in March 2003. Later this year we plan to complete the
    renovation or construction of the Indoor Firearms Building, the
    Administrative Building and the Anti-Terrorism Building. Next year we
    plan to complete a Firearms Multi-Activity Building and an indoor
    Firearms range.
                     selected other achievement highlights
        I would also like to discuss briefly some of the FLETC's other
    specific achievements based on the past support of Congress and the
    Administration.
        In fiscal year 2002, the Center's overall performance against its
    most critical performance target, the Student Quality of Training
    Survey measure, was very good. A total of 99.3 percent of all
    graduating basic training students expressed satisfactory or higher
    rating of their training. Also, the FLETC's training costs measurement
    was below the cost figure established for the variable unit cost per
    basic student-week of training. The plan projected a weekly cost of
    $927, and the actual cost was $802. The volume of training conducted
    and the efficient management of facilities scheduling allowed us to
    realize reductions in costs.
        In fiscal year 2002, the FLETC had its third complete audit of its
    financial records and systems and received another ``unqualified
    opinion'' for its operations. By changing processes and procedures, the
    FLETC has been able to meet mandated goals. Systems standardization and
    integration played major roles in achieving fast-close and data quality
    end-of-year submissions.
        During fiscal year 2002, on behalf of U.S. law enforcement
    agencies, FLETC assumed the lead for the establishment of a United
    States International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) operation in
    Gaborone, Botswana, the first of its kind on the African continent. The
    official opening ceremonies were conducted in March 2003, with the
    President of Botswana and other African nation dignitaries
    participating. The academy, like similar sites in Europe and the Far
    East--under the joint direction of the Departments of State, Justice
    and now Homeland Security--is providing training to law enforcement
    officers from nations throughout that region, and is jointly funded by
    the Government of Botswana and the U.S. Department of State.
        The FLETC also has begun partnering with the Office of Personnel
    Management (OPM) to provide law enforcement training on the new OPM
    GOLEARN.gov training site. This partnership initiated on January 20,
    2003, provides the first responder communities (law enforcement,
    firefighter, public safety and health, and security personnel) secure,
    encrypted access to both general and customized law enforcement
    training. We are excited about the great opportunities that lie ahead
    in the field of this technology through the use of ``blended learning''
    --combining the best uses of distance learning and hands-on residential
    learning.
        Finally, I want to note the progress that is being made in the area
    of accreditation and standardization of Federal law enforcement
    training based on an fiscal year 2002 appropriation and other
    authorized funds. This project is fully underway. FLETC is working in
    collaboration with Federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Postal
    Inspection Service; private organizations; professional associations;
    and others, to develop a format to accredit training facilities,
    instructors, and programs and courses provided by every Federal law
    enforcement organization. When fully implemented over the next several
    years, this project may prove to have the most far-reaching impact on
    the way law enforcement training is conducted at the Federal level
    since the establishment of consolidated training itself.
                                    closing
        In closing, let me assure you that FLETC is committed to providing
    the highest quality law enforcement training at the lowest possible
    cost. Substantial savings are being realized through the operation of
    consolidated training sites. We are also aware of the important
    opportunities and challenges that lay ahead.
        The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides the resources to
    enable the FLETC to manage its responsibilities and continue to serve
    as a leading Government provider of high-quality law enforcement
    training to Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers. With
    the requested funds, the FLETC will provide cost-effective and
    contemporary law enforcement training, support the specialized training
    needs of State, local and international agencies, and deliver
    preventive and investigative law enforcement methodologies and
    terrorism training. I look forward to continuing to work with you and
    your support to successfully accomplish these objectives.
        I also want to publicly commend the remarkable people at FLETC and
    in our partner agencies who have contributed so much already to the
    success of consolidated training. Their talented assistance will
    continue to be of great benefit.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
    prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
    have at this time.

                                   COBRA FEES

        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Ms. Patrick.
        Mr. Bonner, I am going to ask each of you a question or two
    and--because we have several Senators here this morning, I am
    going to limit my initial round of questioning to 5 minutes and
    hope that other Senators will limit theirs to that time as
    well. We will continue to go around as long as Senators have
    questions to ask.
        In connection with the fees that are collected by your
    bureau, these are authorized by law. There are many different
    fees, as you know, immigration user fees, agriculture
    inspection fees. Some were authorized back in 1985 in the
    Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).
        The fees authorized by the COBRA expire as a matter of law
    at the end of this fiscal year. My question is, do you have a
    plan in place for making a recommendation to the Congress for
    new legislation authorizing the continued collection of fees,
    because well over $300 million worth of fees are going to be
    collected under that Act? It seems to me that if you have not
    started that process you need to start thinking about what you
    are going to recommend to the Congress in the way of new
    authority to collect fees.
        Mr. Bonner. Yes. Senator, you are absolutely right. A very
    important part of our funding comes from, and historically has
    come from, the so-called COBRA fees. And a large percentage of
    those are the air passenger user fees. Those have been used
    historically to fund virtually all of the U.S. Customs
    overtime, as well as approximately 1,100 to 1,200 actual FTE,
    in other words, Customs inspection positions.
        And those fees sunset, or expire, at the end of this fiscal
    year. The ideal plan would be that we would get appropriated
    funding to cover these, but I believe the plan that we are
    pursuing right now is to ask the Congress and this committee to
    extend these COBRA fees beyond the end of this fiscal year.
        And, in fact, if that does not happen, we will have a gap
    in the Customs and Border Protection budget of around $250
    million, because that is how much is generated right now
    primarily through air passenger user fees to support all of our
    overtime, and these 1,100 to 1,200 FTE.
        This is consistent with the Administration's request that
    when the budget came over the Administration has taken the
    position that it would be desirable to extend these COBRA fees,
    including the air passenger user fee.
        So that would be our plan. I am very hopeful that there
    will be an extension for 1 or more years of these user fees, so
    that we can continue to fund the overtime and inspectional
    positions that are supported by these user fees.

                            TSA SCREENER REDUCTIONS

        Senator Cochran. Admiral Loy, you recently announced that
    you were going to reduce the number of airport screeners, those
    who work looking at baggage and performing other security
    responsibilities at our Nation's airports. A lot of cutbacks
    are going to be made. I trust savings will be achieved in this
    effort.
        But, in doing that, you have established some categories in
    terms of size and employments at airports. One of our airports
    notified me that thinks it has been miscategorized. They have
    been put in a lower category than they think they ought to be
    in terms of the number of screeners. Specifically, this is the
    Biloxi/Gulfport or Gulfport/Biloxi airports depending on which
    town you are in, that is how you say that--you have got to be
    careful--on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, and it has been growing
    pretty rapidly down there in terms of the amount of business it
    handles. How would they go about appealing that decision, if
    they believe it is a factual miscalculation, and they are going
    to end up having to reduce screeners way beyond what they would
    have if they had been accurately categorized?
        Admiral Loy. Mr. Chairman, we are obviously after the truth
    and the right data to use for this enormously important
    calculation. We have challenged our Federal security directors
    responsible for all the 430 airports across our country to work
    with our airport directors in the aftermath of having received
    the figures that we provided. And should there be some
    structural error like you were just describing, we will work
    with that airport to get the right number.

                           FLETC FACILITIES EXPANSION

        Senator Cochran. Ms. Patrick, I heard you talk about the
    growth in the capacity that you are going to experience in
    terms of training Federal law enforcement officials. I assume
    this is going to require expansion of facilities or upgrading
    of facilities. Is there, in this budget, funding being
    requested for that purpose so you can accommodate the new
    responsibilities of the Center?
        Ms. Patrick. There are no capital acquisition items in this
    budget proposal. However, we are currently conducting a study
    to determine our capacities, not only at FLETC facilities, but
    at all of those facilities that are within DHS.
        And prior to coming into the Department of Homeland
    Security, we did not have jurisdiction over those facilities.
    And now that we are all co-located within DHS, Mr. Hutchinson
    has asked us to look at capacities to be gained for the benefit
    of all, at all those facilities, and that study is currently
    underway.
        We believe that we will be able to meet this year's goals
    and our master plan, 15-year master plan, will be completed
    this year, and we will have submissions for the fiscal year
    2005 budget that will have capital acquisition within it.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
        Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, members of the panel. We have a good audience
    this morning. Someone said something about looking over their
    shoulder. There are plenty of people watching you. I think it
    was Milton who said, ``They also serve who only stand and
    wait.''

                                   U.S. VISIT

        Commissioner Bonner, one crucial component of providing for
    homeland security is ensuring that we, as a Government, know
    which foreigners are visiting our country, why those foreigners
    are here, and that those foreigners depart when they are
    required to do so. Our existing visa tracking systems are not
    doing the job.
        According to your budget justification documents, the
    illegal alien population has risen to record levels. The
    undocumented alien population has grown from approximately 3
    million in 1990 to an estimated 9 million today. In other
    words, it has tripled in 10 years.
        Your department estimates that approximately 40 percent of
    those 9 million individuals are aliens who arrived in this
    country lawfully, but who had subsequently violated the terms
    of their non-immigrant status. These are the 3.5 million
    individuals that an effective entry/exit system should track.
        The budget before us requests $480 million for the new
    entry/exit visa tracking system. This is $100 million over last
    year's level of funding. Recently, Secretary Ridge announced a
    major change in the program proposing to create the U.S. VISIT
    system and to add biometric identifiers to the mix.
        An entry/exit system was originally authorized by the
    Congress in 1996. A September 1998 deadline to get the system
    up and running was not met. A March 2001 deadline was not met.
        Now, the Department is required to meet a December 2003
    deadline, 7 years after an entry/exit system was originally
    authorized. Why should this subcommittee--Commissioner Bonner,
    why should this subcommittee believe that the Department is
    going to be successful in meeting the deadline for getting this
    system up and running? It has not done very well thus far.
        Mr. Bonner. Well, I would say, Senator Byrd, the Government
    has not done very well in getting it up and running given the
    history, but it is a new era. That is number one.
        The agency that was responsible for implementing the entry/
    exit system was the INS. It was part of the Justice Department.
    I think there is some issue, by the way, historically as to
    whether and when that was funded. I do not think we need to go
    into that, but I would say this, it is a new era. There is a
    new department in government that is now responsible for taking
    on and implementing the entry/exit system, which I believe
    Secretary Ridge has renamed U.S. VISIT.
        And I know that this is among the highest priorities of the
    Department of Homeland Security--to implement an entry/exit
    system that will give us the ability to identify those
    individuals who have legally entered the country with visas but
    have either overstayed their visas or are no longer entitled to
    be in this country. We will have a system that will let us know
    that they have not exited the country and we will be able, with
    the appropriate resources, to locate and remove them from our
    country.
        Now, I believe that this is going to be done, because I am
    very much aware that Secretary Ridge himself and Under
    Secretary Hutchinson are personally involved and committed to
    making this happen, and obviously I and everybody else within
    the Department of Homeland Security will be contributing to
    that effort to see that it gets done.
        It is huge. If I said that this is not an extraordinary
    challenge to get this done within the timelines that have been
    set forth by the Congress, I would be less than candid with
    this committee, because----
        Senator Byrd. What----
        Mr. Bonner [continuing]. I think it is an enormous
    challenge. I actually personally----
        Senator Byrd. My time is short.
        Mr. Bonner. Yes.
        Senator Byrd. What time--if you will forgive me?
        Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. What specific steps are you taking to make
    this happen?
        Mr. Bonner. Well, number one, I understand that there has
    been a program review undertaken by the Department of Homeland
    Security. I further understand that the ownership, if you will,
    of this program is going to be vested in the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate, and that there is every
    intention, Senator, of meeting the ambitious timeline, which is
    by December of this year. We will do everything we can to have
    an entry/exit system deployed at least to certain of the
    international airports within the timeline.
        Customs and Border Protection is contributing to this,
    because the entry/exit system ultimately is going to have to be
    put at international airports, the land borders, every place
    that people move in and out of this country. And so we are
    contributing to what the infrastructure issues are, and the
    funding requirements. There is also obviously, as you know, an
    information technology and a biometric part of this.
        But it is a task that is being undertaken by the Department
    of Homeland Security, not just within Customs and Border
    Protection.
        Senator Byrd. You have referred to biometrics, are you
    working with the Defense Department in this regard?
        Mr. Bonner. Senator, I do not know, but I believe the
    Department of Homeland Security is. As I say, Customs and
    Border Protection has not been given ownership of this program.
    Nobody has come to me and said, ``Commissioner Bonner, I want
    you to make this happen.'' So I am not personally and directly
    involved in the actual development of the program at this
    juncture.
        Senator Byrd. The reason I ask, the Defense Department has
    a biometrics program, which the Appropriations Committee has
    been following and funding. You have referred to----
        Mr. Bonner. I will find out for you, Senator, and----
        Senator Byrd. Thank you. You have referred to your need for
    resources, financial resources. The budget requests $480
    million for the entry/exit system. In light of the recently
    announced biometrics component to the new U.S. VISIT system,
    will this request be enough?
        Mr. Bonner. I do not know the answer to that. I will have
    to----
        Senator Byrd. Is there anyone there who can help you on
    that question?
        Mr. Bonner. Well----
        Senator Byrd. Anyone that----
        Mr. Bonner. This is something that is going to have to be
    answered at the departmental level by the responsible program
    managers, Senator Byrd. I will pass it along and we will see if
    we cannot get you an answer.
        Senator Byrd. Well, we will hope for that.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST

        One crucial component of providing for homeland security is
    that you be provided with the--with adequate funding resources,
    and at our hearing with Under Secretary Hutchinson last week, I
    asked him how much he had requested of the OMB for his agencies
    for the coming fiscal year. He said that he did not have that
    information in front of him, and when I asked if he would
    provide the information to the committee I believe he fuzzed up
    the response a little bit.
        I understand the requirement that agency heads must support
    the President's budget request as submitted, but agency heads
    must also be responsive to the Congress, the elected
    representatives of the people. The military branches are not at
    all shy about providing information to the Congress on their
    original requests for funding. And this causes me to wonder why
    other agencies are more reluctant than the military.
        I believe that the budget request for most of the
    Department of Homeland Security agencies are insufficient. It
    would be valuable for the committee to know what the agencies
    that are actually defending the homeland think their budget
    requirements are, not just the final opinion of the budget
    personnel at the Office of Management and Budget.
        Commissioner Bonner, how much did you request in the way of
    funding in your fiscal year 2004 budget submission to the
    Office of Management and Budget?
        Mr. Bonner. Senator Byrd, first of all, just by way of
    process, this is an incredibly unusual year in one sense,
    because we are merging with Customs all of these other
    elements, the Border Patrol, all of the immigration inspection
    program, and so forth.
        I have absolutely no idea what was requested for Border
    Patrol or the Immigration Inspection. I had no part in how that
    was developed. When that budget was developed, INS was part of
    the Justice Department, and it went to the Attorney General.
    Something went forward from the AG to OMB.
        I obviously played a part in developing the U.S. Customs
    budget request, and processing that up through the Treasury
    Department.
        I can tell you that there was, of course, an unusual
    process this year in the sense that the Treasury Department
    looked at our budget, and I guess it is fair to say, they
    punted. They did not know what to do with it and so forth.
        I can tell you that I believe as a result of then Governor
    Ridge's capacity in the Office of Homeland Security, we did get
    a substantial initiative funding ultimately through OMB.
        As I sit here, I do not know exactly what our request was.
    I am very aware of the question you put to Under Secretary
    Hutchinson, and I do not want to give you, Senator, a fuzzy
    answer.
        At this point I think that prudence would dictate that if
    you are interested, and I think you are interested, in what
    request ultimately went to OMB with respect to, let us say, the
    Customs side of this budget, that is something I just have to
    tell you, I would need to consult with the Department
    leadership as to what position they are going to take with the
    request that you made of Under Secretary Hutchinson.
        And I do not know precisely what that position is, but I am
    just a mere Commissioner of the Customs and Border Protection,
    and I have a chain of command, which is I report to Asa
    Hutchinson as the Under Secretary, and he reports to Secretary
    Ridge.
        So I do not want to fuzz an answer here. I am just going to
    say that I will look into that question. I understand the
    request the Senator is making. If there is a way that we can
    affirmatively respond to that request, I will make every effort
    to see that we do that.
        Senator Byrd. Well, if you can, do that. The people have
    the right to know and the elected representatives of the people
    on this committee have a right to know. But we also need to
    know in order to adequately meet your funding needs. And you
    referred to the need for having adequate resources in your
    statement. And it would be very helpful to the committee--as a
    matter of fact having been on this committee now 45 years--I am
    in my 45th year on the Appropriations Committee, that is a
    rather, in a way, stunning response to a very legitimate
    question.
        Will you provide this subcommittee with that information
    for the record?
        Mr. Bonner. I will, if after discussions with the
    Department, it is okayed.
        Senator Byrd. You mean--are you meaning to say to me if it
    is okay that this committee has that information?
        Mr. Bonner. I----
        Senator Byrd. The reason we--the reason it helps the
    committee is because we really know then what you perceived as
    being the needs, the funding needs in order to meet your goal
    and carry out your responsibility. We really get a better
    insight if we have that information.
        Mr. Bonner. Senator, I know exactly what you are saying. I
    have been around, actually have testified before the
    Appropriations Committee and subcommittees, and I understand
    the important work that this committee has and must do, so I
    understand that. But you did put the request to Under Secretary
    Hutchinson, and I know that that is being looked at in terms of
    whether the Border and Transportation Security Directorate and
    the component agencies under the Border and Transportation
    Security Directorate can provide the information. The request
    essentially went to OMB.
        Senator, with all due respect to you, sir, and to this
    committee, I will make it very clear the importance that you
    attribute to this and, frankly, the importance for the
    committee itself, the subcommittee, in terms of its evaluation
    of the budget request to have this information. I will get an
    answer back to you, but it will have to be after consultations
    with the higher-ups in the Department of Homeland Security.
        Senator Byrd. Would you accept----
        Senator Cochran. Senator, your time has expired.
        Senator Byrd. Yes. I just have a P.S. here. Would you
    accept a slight modification to your own statement, ``and the
    importance to the Department''?
        Mr. Bonner. I will accept that as well.
        Senator Byrd. I thank the Commissioner.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Domenici.
        Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Well, let me stay with you, Mr. Bonner, for a little bit.

             U.S. BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS

        You heard me in my opening remarks talk about the borders
    of the United States between Mexico and Canada. I happen to
    know something about it because one of my early appropriations
    assignments, about 12 or 14 years ago, happened to be the
    subcommittee that had the border. That was the only time in the
    past 40 or 50 years that we did anything of a comprehensive
    nature in an effort to repair and modernize some of the border
    facilities.
        So I have a very serious interest in the condition of the
    border crossings and the equipment on the borders with Mexico
    and Canada--I know more about Mexico than Canada. I have
    introduced a bill, on which I think we will have a hearing
    soon.
        That says one of the shortcomings is that we do not have a
    master plan for how we go about bringing these border crossings
    current, which ones need to be reformed, remodeled, torn down,
    rebuilt, added to, et cetera, and in which order. We do not
    have any plan for what new technology there is and how we can
    implement the use of the new technology at our border
    crossings.
        I say to you there is nothing more important with reference
    to the control of our borders, both for trade and contraband
    and illicit crossings than that these borders be made modern.
    Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Bonner. I do. I am also familiar with a good many of
    the ports of entry, both on the northern and southern border,
    and we have some serious modernization we have to do, and
    infrastructure improvements to do that would permit better
    security with technology, and at the same time be able to
    better facilitate the movement of legitimate trade and people
    across----
        Senator Domenici. Sir, I believe that border crossings
    between Mexico and the United States in particular require a
    little bit of vision, require that somebody begin to think
    about the future.
        I can imagine a day when there would be a common border
    crossing manned by Mexicans and Americans, and that we would
    not go through two crossings, and that the technology be modern
    for both sides. I can imagine a couple of border crossings that
    would be built as now, within the next 18 months, as ultra-
    modern crossings with every modern type of technology
    available, sort of as a model to look at, to see what can be
    done for our borders to bring them into a better state of
    repair. This is not because we want them to look good or
    because I am a high-tech buff, but rather they will do a much
    better job.
        Could you talk to that and could you assure the committee
    that you are going to look into modernization of these ports of
    entry and implementation of modern technology at the crossings?
        Mr. Bonner. I will assure you right now that that is
    something that we are looking at, we will continue need to look
    at, and I would like to work with this committee and you,
    Senator, with respect to how that might best be done, where the
    priority areas are, and how we construct the infrastructure so
    that we are efficiently using the existing technology we have,
    detection technology and the like, radiation detection
    technology, and so on, in the best possible way.
        I think this is a very important issue. It is something
    that I have been discussing with Secretary Ridge over the last
    18 months or so. I have had discussions with the Canadians and
    the Mexican Government about how we might work better together.
        Senator Domenici. Yes.
        Mr. Bonner. Right now, we have maybe four or five very
    small ports of entry that are shared with the Canadians.
        Senator Domenici. Yes.
        Mr. Bonner. So it is not as if it has never been done. It
    can be done. We need to look at doing more of that.
        Senator Domenici. I wonder if you would take a look at
    Senate Bill 539 and tell the committee what you think about it
    in terms of whether it might help meet the needs that you are
    identifying together for the border.
        Mr. Bonner. Right. Is this the bill that you have
    recently----
        Senator Domenici. Yes, that I have alluded to.
        Mr. Bonner. Right. And as I think you may know, Senator,
    the Congressional Affairs Office has been working with members
    of your staff on that legislation. I have not studied it in
    depth yet.
        Senator Domenici. Yes, I understand.
        Mr. Bonner [continuing]. To be familiar with----
        Senator Domenici. I do not need a lot of explanation on it.
    I would just like you to take a look at it, and through your
    good office comment for the record on what parts of it you
    think you need, and whether it should be implemented.
        Mr. Bonner. I would be happy to do that. With your
    permission, Senator, is that something I can do and submit
    something for the record?
        Senator Domenici. Absolutely----
        Mr. Bonner. All right.
        Senator Domenici [continuing]. In due course. Is that
    correct, Mr. Chairman?
        Senator Cochran. We would appreciate the fact that you
    would do that. We will make that a part of the record.
        Mr. Bonner. All right. Thank you.
        [The information follows:]
                                     S. 539
        As requested, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
    has reviewed S. 539, the Border Infrastructure and Technology
    Modernization Act. The bill responds to the infrastructure issues
    facing many ports of entry. It would dramatically further address the
    requirements identified in the Ports of Entry Infrastructure Assessment
    Study completed by the U.S. Customs Service in consultation with GSA
    and other Federal Inspection Service agencies in June 2000. The agency
    appreciates the support of Senator Domenici and his cosponsors.

               ``FIRST USE'' ASSURANCE FOR FLETC-OWNED FACILITIES

        Senator Domenici. I will quickly go to my next question. It
    has to do with FLETC.
        Ms. Patrick, there are some people that know that this
    Senator has a genuine and longstanding interest in FLETC.
        That is why, Senator Byrd, quite by accident when I was a
    brand-new Senator, I attached a rider to a public works bill
    where FLETC was going to be built brand-new somewhere here in
    Maryland. I put a little rider on the bill and said, ``Do not
    build it for a year and look around the country and see if we
    happen to have a place we already own.''
        And guess what? In the 10 month of that study, they found
    this Navy base, which is where it is now, this giant facility
    in Georgia. It was found that way.
        And so since that time, I have had an interest in FLETC,
    and a piece of it is now in New Mexico at Artesia. It is
    growing. What I would like to know from you, ma'am, on the
    record, I would like your assurance that as you look at
    training needs that you will, in fact, use FLETC's facilities
    first for the required training that FLETC is expected to do
    under the law. Secondly, that people will not be sent to other
    kinds of training centers and facilities in preference to a
    FLETC-owned facility, if there is facility available for such
    training. Can we have that assurance?
        Ms. Patrick. You can.
        Senator Domenici. I believe you are already aware of that
    problem as it exists, as I have expressed it to you, in my
    office, are you not?
        Ms. Patrick. I am.
        Senator Domenici. Sometimes agencies want to move trainees
    off to some other place closer to a home or where they would
    like to be, miles away from where the training, original
    training is, and you are going to look at whether or not that
    is a practical thing for FLETC in the future, is that correct?
        Ms. Patrick. Yes, I am.

                            UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

        Senator Domenici. My last question has to do with the use
    of unmanned vehicles on the border. Who is the expert on that?
    Does that belong to you too, Mr. Bonner?
        Mr. Bonner. I may not be the expert on it----
        Senator Domenici. Yes.
        Mr. Bonner [continuing]. But it really belongs to me.
        Senator Domenici. Could you tell me if there is a plan
    being developed as to where we will use and what we will do
    with unmanned vehicles in an effort to assist us with
    ascertaining what is going on our borders?
        Mr. Bonner. Now, by unmanned vehicles, you mean the drone
    aircraft and that sort of thing----
        Senator Domenici. Yes.
        Mr. Bonner [continuing]. That have been used so
    successfully by our military----
        Senator Domenici. Yes.
        Mr. Bonner [continuing]. And--overseas?
        I know there is a lot of interest in this, and I do not
    mean to be unresponsive. I have asked for a briefing myself----
        Senator Domenici. All right.
        Mr. Bonner [continuing]. As to how unmanned vehicles or
    drones could be helpful. I think there is some potential there,
    but I want to make sure that it makes sense. There is potential
    in the sense that we have, as you know, on our southwest border
    with Mexico, we have a huge problem that remains, and that is
    that we do not totally control the borders of our country.
        Senator Domenici. Right.
        Mr. Bonner. And we have huge amounts, significant amounts
    of both illegal aliens and illegal drugs flowing across that
    border through the ports of entry and between the ports of
    entry. We do not have in my judgment a sufficient surveillance
    air capability in the Border Patrol at this juncture for that.
    So it sounds like something that might be very, very helpful,
    but I need to understand how it would work and how it would
    work in conjunction with, let us say, cueing the Border Patrol,
    Border Patrol agents to the situation and----
        Senator Domenici. Sir, would you take a look at it and, for
    the record, give us your best judgment of whether UAVs are
    going to be used, and how they might work, so we will have an
    understanding?
        Mr. Bonner. Happy to do that, sir.
        [The information follows:]
                        Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
        The Border and Transportation Security Directorate has asked the
    Science and Technology Directorate to evaluate the use of UAVs in a
    Border and Transportation Security environment. S&T was also asked to
    evaluate other potential applications.
        Until the requirements have been scoped to determine the
    feasibility and extent of a UAV program, we cannot predict either what
    amount of funding or type of facilities might be appropriate for the
    Department to implement a UAV program.
        At this time, it is unknown what the timeline would be for the
    Department to implement this type of initiative. A proposed project
    plan including milestones and deliverables is expected to be ready for
    review by early summer, 2003. The project plan will discuss a BTS-
    specific project as well as strategies in developing UAV initiatives in
    the near, mid, and long term for DHS venues such as borders and ports.
        After UAV program feasibility, requirements and scope are
    determined, a more detailed assessment on available testing and
    deployment facilities would need to be made.

        Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Domenici.
        Senator Murray.

                             24-HOUR MANIFEST RULE

        Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Commissioner Bonner, let me begin by just thanking you for
    all of your efforts on the 24-hour manifest rule for U.S.-bound
    container cargo. You and I discussed this in my office, and I
    shared with you my concerns that the economic implications and
    the security implications as cargo is being diverted to
    Vancouver--and I know you have worked hard with the Canadians
    and I understand that they have agreed to implement a similar
    rule, and I really applaud that decision.
        But I have to tell you I have real concerns that Canada is
    going to continue to use the time before implementing a rule to
    divert cargo and business from U.S. ports in the Pacific
    Northwest. This is really an important issue to us in Seattle
    and Tacoma, and I wondered if you could give me an update on
    your discussions with the Canadians on this issue, and
    specifically any information about when Canada will finally
    implement its 24-hour rule?
        Mr. Bonner. Right. Let me bring you up to date on that.
    First of all, the good news is that the Canadian Government--
    and this was the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency that was
    very much involved in this--has decided to adopt essentially
    the identical 24-hour rule, and to move quickly to do that.
    They need to get some regulations out just like we would for
    comment and the like.
        But I will continue, as I did at the shared border accord
    meeting with our Canadian counterparts in Halifax, Canada, just
    about 3 weeks ago, to prod them to move more quickly in terms
    of getting those regulations out and implemented.
        I am very concerned about the issue that we discussed with
    respect to the potential diversion of container traffic from
    any U.S. sea port including the port of Seattle-Tacoma and so
    forth to Vancouver. I think you have seen some public
    statements I have made, and that is to say that if we believe
    that any shipping line is attempting to evade the U.S. 24-hour
    rule by diverting containers to, let us say, a Canadian port or
    any other port, we are going to increase our inspectional
    efforts with respect to those containers in two ways.
        One, we have U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel
    right now at Vancouver, at the Canadian port, and so we will be
    increasing and asking the Canadians to work with us to increase
    the rate of inspections for anything that appears to be
    diverted, because by definition, it is a higher risk container
    if somebody is trying to evade our advance manifest reporting
    requirements.
        And secondly, we have a chance to examine it again when it
    reaches the U.S. border, either on a truck or by rail.
        So I made it very clear, if we see evidence of that--and I
    would be happy to have further discussions with you on this, if
    we see evidence of that, we are going to take some action, and
    I have talked to, as you know, the head of the port authority
    there in Seattle, and I will continue to monitor that
    situation.
        The best answer, though, is the Canadians adopt and
    implement their regulation that is identical to ours so there
    is no advantage by virtue of the advanced manifest information
    requirement by shipping cargo containers destined for the
    United States to Vancouver or to Halifax.
        Senator Murray. Thank you. I really appreciate that and
    appreciate your staying on top of it, because it is both an
    economic concern, but it is also a security concern. And we
    want to make sure that they do not just say they are
    implementing the rule and it takes forever, and we have cargo
    coming in and moving to the United States in other ports. So I
    really appreciate your answer to that question.

                               CONTAINER SECURITY

        Admiral Loy, I wanted to talk to you about container
    security. TSA received $28 million for Operation Safe Commerce
    back in 2002, and another $30 million for that in 2003. So far,
    not a penny of that money has been spent.
        This is an initiative that I authored to enable TSA to
    ensure the security of the 6 million containers that come into
    our ports every year by monitoring their movement from the time
    they are loaded to the time that they are unloaded.
        Now, TSA promised me that the 2002 funds for this
    initiative would be spent by February of this year. It was not
    done. Now, they are telling me it is going to be spent by June.
    I asked Secretary Ridge about this last week, and he promised
    to get back to me, but I have not heard from him yet on this.
    So can you explain to this subcommittee why TSA has not moved
    forward on Operation Safe Commerce that has now been funded in
    two separate fiscal years to address terrorist threats to
    global container traffic?
        Admiral Loy. Yes, ma'am. I will. You are absolutely right.
    The $28 million was a 2002 appropriation. For 2003 there was an
    amount of $30 million, and for 2004, we are asking for another
    couple of million dollars to sort of tidy up the program.
        As you know, we have made a broadcast announcement with
    respect to applications from the three major load centers that
    are associated with Safe Commerce. You and I had spoken about
    the notion of port of origin to point of destination in
    transit, supply chain transparency for the obvious value that
    that represents. And we have worked with the Coast Guard, with
    Customs, now BCBP, on a variety of these challenges associated
    with Safe Commerce.
        At the moment, there are implications in the spending plan
    that we will get to the Congress, I would hope, within days
    associated with Safe Commerce.
        I can say that the application package that solicited from
    the three major load ports almost a billion dollars' worth of
    applications for how best to use those funds are in hand, are
    being evaluated, and are staged for. As soon as that spending
    plan is blessed, they will go out the door, such that the
    appropriated dollars, and not only for the $30 million that we
    have in 2003. We want to make sure those dollars potentially
    can become appropriated against that same application package.
        Senator Murray. So can you assure me that all $58 million
    will be spent on this, and that it will not be diverted to some
    other program under TSA?
        Admiral Loy. I cannot assure you of that, as we speak here
    this morning, Senator Murray. I think the potential for fixing,
    as Senator Byrd was inferring, the structural shortfall in the
    TSA budget for 2003 offers us unfortunately the challenge of
    looking for funds in places that have the potential for
    reprogramming or have the potential for being found.
        Senator Murray. Well, I just have to say that is really
    disconcerting. We appropriated those funds properly through
    Congress, specifically for Operation Safe Commerce. The three
    ports that are involved, Seattle-Tacoma, Los Angeles, New York,
    have been working diligently now for almost 2 years to put
    together their requests. And we now have 6 million containers
    coming into this country that we do not know--and we have not
    tracked them, we do not know what is in them. This is a vital
    issue for all of us who have States that are close to these.
        It should be a vital interest for every State in this
    country because of the economic impact. I do not want to see
    any of that money diverted. This is what Congress said it was
    to be spent for.
        Admiral Loy. I understand.
        Senator Murray. Well, we will continue to follow that
    throughout the process.
        In fact, Commissioner Bonner, if you could respond. You are
    a member of the steering committee to implement Operation Safe
    Commerce. Can you tell me why, from your point of view, none of
    this funding has been spent yet?
        Mr. Bonner. I know that we are co-chairing with TSA and
    reviewing the applications for the funding that has been made
    available. And I understand that decisions with respect to
    funding are fairly close.
        I do not know whether it is the $28 million or the $30
    million. I think it is the first $28 million, but I could be
    mistaken.
        This is very, very important, as you know, and I know
    Admiral Loy agrees, that we test out smarter containers, more
    secure containers that are moving from foreign ports to the
    United States. And that is what this funding is going to do.
        I do not know that I can speak to the delay per se other
    than I know that there has been a process of getting
    applications from the various ports and the various parties in
    interest here, and making some decisions with respect to which
    proposals make the most sense in terms of giving us,
    potentially, at the end of the day something that would be
    useful to us for purposes of securing containers.
        Senator Murray. Well, let me just say that the ports all
    have their requests in, and if the delay is so that we can
    divert funds, that is not acceptable. We need to get this money
    out there.
        And, Admiral Loy, you said in your opening statement that
    you care about security in all modes of transportation. If we
    cut container security initiatives, we are not paying attention
    to all modes of transportation. So this is something that I am
    going to continue to follow and I want to have follow up
    conversations with you on this.
        I want to make sure this money goes to container security.
    We have ports in this Nation that are extremely vulnerable
    right now with all of these containers coming and we do not
    know what is in them. And I just simply think we cannot ignore
    this, and we cannot divert the funds that are supposed to go
    for that important initiative. So I will continue to have this
    discussion with you.
        Mr. Bonner. We do have information, Senator, in terms of
    what is in containers and that sort of thing. We have required
    that by regulation now, before those containers are even loaded
    on the foreign ports.
        So we do have information about what is in there. We are
    evaluating that information. We are making risk management
    decisions as to which containers pose a high risk for security,
    and need to be screened. And under CSI we are now doing
    targeting and screening at foreign ports in Singapore and so
    forth.
        Senator Murray. I understand that. But there is a
    difference between doing that at the port and doing it,
    tracking that container, knowing where it is and where it comes
    in. And not just at the port. In the Port of Seattle, it is
    loaded onto a truck or a train and it ends up being unloaded in
    Chicago or somewhere else. So knowing what is in that container
    and keeping track of that container is an important initiative
    in terms of security.
        Admiral Loy. Across the entire supply chain, as you
    describe.
        Senator Murray. That is correct.

                          EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS

        Admiral Loy, I am also very concerned with the delays in
    funding, the extraordinary costs of installing the explosive
    detection systems, EDS systems, at the new south terminal
    expansion at SeaTac Airport in my State. Over the last couple
    of years, I have worked to provide your agency almost $500
    million more for those airport modifications than your
    Administration requested of Congress. Both the 2002
    supplemental appropriations and the 2003 omnibus specifically
    cited the needs of the projects at SeaTac. And just a few days
    ago, you announced, I believe, your attention to sign letters
    of intent to fund these airport projects and said that Seattle
    would be one of them.
        But it is my understanding these letters have not been
    signed. Can you tell me when you expect to finally sign a
    letter of intent with the SeaTac Airport on that?
        Admiral Loy. Senator Murray, I hope we are able to do that
    within a week or two. Our whole capacity to fund what this
    organization is responsible for is bound up in this spending
    plan challenge that we have had for 2003. You know how
    difficult that has been from the very beginning. In the
    aftermath of the original request, which of course developed 4
    or 5 months' worth of CR challenges for those of us who had to
    live within that, including in the TSA's part that the first
    quarter, which was enormously capital intensive for us, because
    that is when we had hoped to purchase all the rest of the EDS
    equipment and pay an enormous amount of contractor support in
    the first quarter of fiscal year 2003.
        Living under the CR, there was an enormously difficult
    financial challenge for us. When it led to the omnibus bill,
    where the Congress then chose to allocate within the
    President's request over $1 billion worth of allocations, that
    has prompted this structural shortfall in terms of very
    important things the Congress wants to do, very important
    things the Administration wants to do, and literally trying to
    get $6 billion worth of work in a $5 billion kind of a
    framework.
        The war supplemental offered the Congress an opportunity to
    fix about half of that problem, which they did. And over these
    last weeks, we have been working diligently with DHS and OMB to
    fund the rest of that structural challenge.
        The LOI instrument that has now been blessed by the Office
    of Management and Budget, as well as the Congress, offers us a
    chance to break through with respect to these EDS installations
    and literally leverage $1 billion or more worth of private
    sector monies to do these security projects and then reimburse
    those airports over multiple budget cycles to come. I believe
    that is the right way to do this work. And we have those
    literally poised negotiated settlements with a number of the
    airport directors, including SeaTac, ready to go as soon as the
    spending plan is approved by the Hill.
        Senator Murray. Okay. I appreciate that. And just one other
    question. Is your letter--will your letter of intent commit
    some 2003 funds to this project, or are you going to be
    requiring SeaTac to do a future?
        Admiral Loy. I will have to call you on the specifics in
    the SeaTac piece. There are a number of these negotiated
    settlements with the airport directors where they preferred to
    gain the letter of intent but with the zero funding line for
    2003 to be then paid over 2004, 2005, 2006, as appropriate. I
    will call you with the specifics of the SeaTac LOI.
        Senator Murray. Thank you.

                            DELAY IN RELEASING FUNDS

        I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I would remind all of
    us that the President vetoed $480 million for this agency in
    the last request. And I am deeply concerned that we do not have
    the funds available today for many of these projects. And just
    on Operation Safe Commerce, let me just go back to that.
        If you are delaying the release of this money simply so
    that you can divert it to other causes, that is unacceptable.
    These ports have been working diligently to do this. It is
    extremely important that we get this done. And I will follow up
    on this with you later.
        Admiral Loy. I look forward to that follow-up, Senator
    Murray. And we are not delaying it for the sake of diverting
    the money. The challenge associated with this organization is
    to have the legitimate spending plan for the rest of the year.
    Where that involves DHS authorities and the use of them and
    where that involves the potential for reprogramming is to be
    notified to the Congress very shortly. That is the package that
    is keeping us from pressing on.
        We are staged to press on with all of this work as soon as
    this spend plan comes clear.
        Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Murray.

                      FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICER TRAINING

        Admiral Loy, the Homeland Security Act authorized the use
    of firearms by pilots to defend their aircraft against
    hijacking or other criminal activity that was life threatening.
    The Transportation Security Administration has recently
    completed the training of 44 pilots, who have been sworn in as
    Federal flight deck officers. We notice your budget request
    suggests that over $17 million for this training should be
    approved for the next fiscal year. It is a substantial increase
    over current-year funding.
        Let me ask you the question of whether or not TSA is going
    to continue to do this training. Do you intend to contract it
    out to private sector training centers or to use the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center for some or all of this
    training?
        Admiral Loy. Senator Cochran, as you know, the 44-student
    prototype was conducted at FLETC in Glynco, and tremendous
    support came from the facility manager and all the folks that
    were part of the training there. My intention is to certainly
    press forward with FLETC-based training for the FFDO program.
        There are, for example, however, midyear recertification
    requirements that do not necessarily, I believe, call for a
    trip to Glynco, Georgia, to get that work particularly done. So
    we are very much a part of the plan that Ms. Patrick was
    describing to you in terms of a 5-year game plan for how to
    optimize the use of FLETC not only in Glynco, but in Artesia,
    as well.
        I have encouraged a number of private sector training site
    owners to work with FLETC to get under the wing of what FLETC's
    wide reach might be to find the right place to do this training
    on down the road. But the basic original training we would like
    very much to continue to do within the FLETC organization, sir.
        Senator Cochran. Ms. Patrick, what is your assessment of
    the training program and the capacity of your center to carry
    out this responsibility?
        Ms. Patrick. The pilot program that was just conducted
    there, I believe that it is currently under review and that
    they are evaluating the program as we speak, in terms of making
    any modifications to the program that would enhance the skills
    of the pilots. So I think that they, the TSA, is doing the
    current review consistent with our methodologies and the way in
    which we conduct training.
        And the most important part of that training program is
    actually the review and the after action that follows any
    training course that we give. So I think that they are doing a
    very good job of that.
        In terms of conducting the training and the training needs,
    we do intend to accommodate their training requests. However,
    as Admiral Loy mentioned, as is true with all of the agencies
    that we train, every year they are required, especially in the
    area of firearms, to receive recertification training. And we
    will and continue to use export training sites located around
    the United States that our National Center uses to accommodate
    that training. And in those instances, we do contract for
    trainers to provide those services when there are no available
    FLETC resources to do that.

                               AIR CARGO SECURITY

        Senate Cochran. The Senate last week passed a bill called
    the Air Cargo Security Improvement Act. It would put into place
    several enhancements for security of cargo transported by air,
    particularly aboard passenger aircraft. The Transportation
    Security Administration is requesting $10 million for the
    research and development of an air cargo pilot program in this
    next budget year.
        The Act allows for pilots and crew members of air cargo
    aircraft to carry firearms, such as the way passenger aircraft
    pilots are permitted to operate now. There will also be funding
    needed to train Federal flight deck officers with the
    possibility of an additional 15,000 air cargo pilots being
    authorized. Do you feel that the Transportation Security
    Administration can carry out this responsibility with this
    amount of funding?
        Admiral Loy. We do, Mr. Chairman. The challenge, of course,
    is to attempt to project the number of volunteers from the
    greater pool of pilots, both commercial pilots for passenger
    aircraft, as well as the added number of air cargo pilots that
    will actually want to become Federal flight deck officers. We
    do not really have a very good feel for that. I have seen
    estimates that range from as low as 18 or 20 percent of the
    total population, which is pushing 80,000, as you know, to as
    many as half.
        We will just have to see how the volunteers step forward
    for the program. As it relates to the cargo pilots being
    included in the pool, I think TSA is basically silent on that
    question. If, in fact, that is the Congress's desire, that you
    add the pilots from air cargo to the pool, so be it.
        I have a couple of challenges with the bill, our thoughts
    with the bill, as it went down. And I look forward to working
    with the Committee as that continues on its way. For example,
    allowing any trained individual to be sitting in the jump seat
    and travel armed, whether or not it is an employee of that
    particular airline that is flying that plane. There are a
    couple of subtle things like that that are part of the bill, as
    I see it today, sir, that I would like to continue the dialogue
    with the committee on.
        Senator Cochran. I am sure others would join me in
    welcoming your input and observations on that. We would be glad
    to have the benefit of your suggestions.

                             AIR AND MARINE ASSETS

        Mr. Bonner, the Bureau that you are now in charge of has
    brought together a wide variety of physical assets, like
    planes, boats, and helicopters, that may now be the subject of
    new management efficiencies. Do you have plans for streaming
    the procurement or maintenance of these physical assets so that
    we derive some efficiencies and can also make our funds go
    further because of this consolidation of activity?
        Mr. Bonner. Well, let me say first of all that it is true
    that Customs and Border Protection, by virtue of having the
    Border Patrol, actually has a significant number of air assets.
    I think it is 100-plus, mainly helicopters, also some marine or
    small boat craft. On the other hand, as part of the
    reorganization, the U.S. Customs Air and Marine Interdiction
    Division, which also had aircraft and helicopters and some
    boats, it moved over to BICE. So to the extent there is----
        Senator Cochran. For those of us that cannot remember all
    the acronyms in this town, what is BICE?
        Mr. Bonner. BICE would be the bureau that is not here
    today. That is the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement. About 15 percent of the old U.S. Customs that
    represented the special agents, the criminal investigators, and
    the Air and Marine Interdiction Division that did air and
    marine interdiction, at or near our borders, went to BICE.
        So the upshot is that I have some air and marine assets
    still, from the Border Patrol, but I no longer have those
    formerly in U.S. Customs. I think there can be tremendous
    efficiencies here, both with respect to procurement and
    maintenance and, frankly, mission, that we ought to achieve.
        But it is going to be something that we have to figure out
    how to do at a higher level than Customs and Border Protection,
    because I do not control all of these assets or the budget for
    them. It is going to have to be done at the Border and
    Transportation Security level. We must figure out, one, how do
    we make the most efficient use of these assets to perform the
    border and the interdiction mission? And secondly, how do we do
    this in way that also achieves some economies and efficiencies
    with respect to procurement of aircraft, as well as maintenance
    and other issues?
        So we will be working on that issue. It is just a little
    bit more complex because it involves more than just Customs and
    Border Protection.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
        Senator Byrd.
        Senator Byrd. Well, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                         FISCAL YEAR 2003 SPENDING PLAN

        Admiral Loy, the Transportation and Security Administration
    advised Congress that we would be provided with a spending plan
    for how you intend to obligate the funds appropriated to your
    agency for this fiscal year. We are now in the 8 month of this
    fiscal year. We have yet to be provided with such a spending
    plan. We are told that your agency faces a significant funding
    shortfall, perhaps as much as $1 billion. We have not received
    a supplemental request from the President to cover that
    shortfall or to meet it.
        The administration opposed Congress's efforts to, or at
    least our efforts, to add funding to the recent supplemental to
    close the operating deficit. Do you believe that you can live
    within your current budget? And if so, what steps are you
    taking to do so?
        Admiral Loy. Thank you, Senator Byrd. As I described just a
    moment ago, answering Senator Murray's question, I believe,
    Senator, that we are in this classic challenge of trying to
    understand the job description on one hand and the budget
    envelope on the other that will facilitate that work to be
    done.
        This is a brand new agency, which was set out to
    accomplish, first of all, the enormous set of mandates that the
    Congress provided immediately in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy.
    And here we are, essentially a year-and-a-half later, grappling
    with, I will call it, the sticker shock associated with what it
    takes to get the work done that the Congress has stipulated in
    the original legislation, which founded the organization.
        Senator Byrd. This is about as I predicted.
        Admiral Loy. I am sorry, sir?
        Senator Byrd. This is about as I predicted----
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, it is.
        Senator Byrd [continuing]. When we had this legislation
    before the Senate.
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir, as is clearly the case. So we have
    gone over the course of time here literally with spending plans
    being briefed to the committees, the appropriating committees,
    over the course of the last year, a different committee, to be
    sure. But we brought forward a spending plan in September. We
    brought forward a new spending plan in December.
        Then we got on into the omnibus bill and the war
    supplemental that followed, all of which was a struggle between
    not only the agency trying to do the right thing, the Congress
    and the Administration also trying to do the right thing, and
    sorting the job description and the budget envelope necessary
    to do this work by this organization.
        As you just described it, as we walked away from the
    omnibus bill, we were in about a $1 billion hole. As we
    approached the war supplemental, the Congress was able to
    identify about half of that differential and make that
    significant assistance available in the war supplemental.
        These past weeks, I have been working day in and day out
    with both the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of
    Management and Budget to accept that war supplemental
    differential and then find in DHS authorities or
    reprogrammings, as appropriate, the wherewithal to close this
    spending gap for this organization for fiscal year 2003. That
    package is literally on the doorstep. I provided that to DHS
    and OMB a couple of weeks ago. And I believe it is literally
    about to be walked to the Congress almost as we speak, sir.
    That will define what we will try to do for the rest of fiscal
    year 2003.
        Senator Byrd. What was the reception at OMB?
        Admiral Loy. The reception at OMB was to recognize the
    authorities that the new Department of Homeland Security had in
    terms of finding monies within the structural authority that
    the new Secretary owns and to offer the notification back to
    the Congress of the intended reprogrammings necessary to make
    the agency whole for fiscal year 2003.

                        TSA SCREENER WORKFORCE REDUCTION

        Senator Byrd. On April 30, TSA announced a plan to
    eliminate 6,000 airport baggage screener positions. TSA took
    the action to bring total baggage screening staffing down
    closer to the limits in the fiscal year 2003 omnibus
    appropriations act and the 48,000-person level required in the
    President's fiscal year 2004 budget. As of March 31, TSA had
    55,600 screeners at the Nation's 427 commercial airports.
        Your plan would reduce staffing by 3,000 persons by the end
    of this month and an additional 3,000 by the end of the fiscal
    year. However, this action is expected to save approximately,
    is that $3 billion? How much is it that you expect to save?
        Admiral Loy. The annualized rate of those savings would be
    about $280 million next year, sir. But that is already
    internalized in the President's request.
        Senator Byrd. This is narrowing the nearly $1 billion
    funding gap, is it not?
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. I say hardly narrowing. Is that correct?
        Admiral Loy. That is correct, sir.
        Senator Byrd. TSA should provide Congress with a complete
    plan for closing the gap. On April 30, as I say, this plan was
    announced. This reduction of 6,000 positions by the end of the
    fiscal year is approximately 12.6 percent of the total screener
    workforce. Clearly, you must take difficult steps to get your
    agency's budget under control. And I would not want to try to
    second guess you, but I am concerned that screener reductions
    at some airports might be too steep.
        Of the Nation's 427 commercial airports, 12 airports are
    losing over 50 percent, more than half of their screeners,
    while 151 airports are actually gaining screeners. I am
    specifically concerned about the proposed reductions at
    Charleston, West Virginia's Yeager Airport, which is scheduled
    to experience a 54 percent reduction in baggage screeners. Your
    plan would reduce the number of screeners from 63 screeners to
    29, a 54 percent reduction.
        This is far in excess of the national average reduction of
    12.6 percent. And the Yeager Airport has not experienced a
    sharp reduction in the number of passengers using the airport.
    Your decision, as it relates to the Yeager Airport and the 11
    other airports just does not make sense. And I speak with, I
    think, considerable knowledge with reference to the Yeager
    Airport.
        Please explain why 12 airports would lose over 54 percent
    of their screeners and, in particular, why Yeager Airport is
    being cut by 54 percent.
        Admiral Loy. I will have to get back to you and will,
    Senator Byrd, on the specifics of the one airport you asked me
    about. Let me describe, though, that in a number of cases
    across the country we found that we were just an awful lot
    smarter 7 or 8 months later than we were when we originally put
    allocations at these respective airports. There were a number
    of places where they were simply over-hired by mistake by the
    contractor that we had doing that work for us in the turmoil of
    the first year of this organization's existence.
        Our challenge needs to be to focus on positions necessary
    to conduct the business at the airport, not the body count that
    might happen to be there at the moment. So in many instances--I
    do not know whether Yeager is among them, sir--we have found
    that there were hirings well in excess of the required work to
    be accomplished at the airport and are acting accordingly.
        This is not just a budget-induced adjustment. I believe
    that I owe this subcommittee, as well as my boss back in DHS, a
    notion of efficiency and effectiveness and good stewardship of
    the taxpayers' dollar in addition to the emotional thrust that
    we all took over the course of the first year by making
    judgments toward security virtually at every fork in the road
    that we came to.
        That is the effort that we have undertaken. It is now
    buttressed by several technological opportunities that we have.
    As we go from very people-intensive ETD machines and make the
    installations permanent of EDS equipment across the country,
    that will save an awful lot of money. When we have finished the
    information technology architecture at our respective airports,
    we will be able to get the right kind of management-scheduling
    software available to the Federal security directors to
    optimize the use of the people that he has there.
        So there are a number of things that play, Senator Byrd,
    with respect to why we are doing it and how we are doing it. I
    will get you a very solid review, sir, of the airport that you
    asked me about.
        Senator Byrd. Will you get that to the subcommittee?
        Admiral Loy. I will, sir.
        [The information follows:]
                              Screener Reductions
        An equitable process is being applied to the screener workforce
    reductions for all airports, using objective, fair, consistent, and
    pertinent factors in determining appropriate staffing levels regardless
    of airport size or location. There is no intention to single out West
    Virginia airports for larger reductions. Initial analysis revealed that
    Yeager Airport currently has a larger screener complement than
    necessary to operate the single passenger screening lane. As the
    process moves forward, TSA is inviting Federal Security Directors,
    community and airport leaders, and others to provide feedback in the
    form of airport specific information or other factors that are expected
    to drive TSA's upcoming refinement process. TSA will evaluate all the
    newly obtained information and will refine the preliminary numbers
    using this information and originating passenger data to arrive at a
    far more accurate reflection of the staffing needs at all airports. We
    will keep you apprised of the results of our on-going process to
    provide efficient, effective screening.

        Senator Byrd. It is important that the subcommittee know,
    as well as that I know.
        Now keep in mind here, I board a plane at Charleston, West
    Virginia. It has a straight, direct course to Washington, the
    capital of the country. I think we have to keep that in mind.
    It is not a large airport, like Chicago or Washington or New
    York. But it is on a direct course.
        So then you will--will you review your decision regarding
    these hard-hit airports?
        Admiral Loy. I absolutely will, sir. We are doing it
    routinely. I have asked my Federal Security Directors, as I
    said earlier, in consonance with the airport directors, the two
    of them getting together and thinking through very carefully
    the numbers involved in getting any challenges and their
    corrections back to us.

                   MARITIME AND LAND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

        Senator Byrd. Your agency is entitled the Transportation
    and Security Administration, not the Aviation Security
    Administration. Yet within your agency's $4.8 billion budget
    request for next year, only $86 million is requested for
    maritime and land security activities, while over $4.3 billion
    is requested for aviation security. Last week I asked Under
    Secretary Hutchinson why less than 2 percent of the
    transportation and security budget request is for maritime and
    land security. That is more than $1 in $50. And I asked him why
    the $218 million budget request for administrative costs
    associated with TSA headquarters and mission support centers is
    2.5 times greater than the request for maritime and land
    security. And I did not get a very convincing response.
        I say this with all due respect to Under Secretary
    Hutchinson. I am quite impressed with him as a man, man of
    ability. And I have great admiration for him. And I know that
    he has a big, huge responsibility here. But after all, we do
    have to try to get the answers to our questions. And in order
    to do a good job of adequately funding the agencies, we need
    the information that we ask for.
        I simply am not satisfied with the view, the apparent view,
    at least it seems that way, that port security is solely the
    responsibility of the ports. Ports focus on moving goods
    through the ports swiftly. The Federal Government must do more
    to direct the ports to focus on security and to provide
    resources to do so. Just 1 year ago this month, we were
    receiving reports that up to 25 Islamic extremists had entered
    the United States as stowaways in cargo ships. Our ports are
    vulnerable. And our ports need the funds to begin protecting
    them now.
        Over $1 billion in grant applications were received in
    response to the original $105 million appropriated for port
    security grants in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental. Last week
    I asked Under Secretary Hutchinson if he would commit to
    allowing the $150 million provided for port security grants in
    the omnibus appropriations act to be used to address the $1
    billion in grant applications sitting on his desk. Rather than
    run another competition for this next set of funds, does it not
    make more sense to use the additional $150 million provided by
    Congress just 3 months ago to address what is unarguably an
    urgent need for enhanced port security?
        Admiral Loy. I think it is absolutely the case that it is
    the right thing to do, Senator Byrd. And I think we can
    probably not only deal with that $150 million, but the
    additional $20 million that was appropriated in the war
    supplemental as well.
        So I think, based on the fact that we have, as you
    described, over a billion dollars worth of applicants, or
    applications in hand, we have every intention of distributing
    all the port security grant monies for 2003, including the 150
    and the 20 against those applications.
        Senator Byrd. Well, the Congress, let me just say for the
    record again, that the Congress has included in three separate
    emergency supplemental bills, as well as in the fiscal year
    2003 omnibus appropriations act, funding for port security
    grants. In total, $348 million has been provided. However, none
    of this was requested by the administration. And only $93
    million has been distributed to the ports to date. While the
    administration was eager to sign the Maritime Transportation
    Security Act, they have been silent on the costs associated
    with implementing it.
        I have just another brief question or so.

                COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING SYSTEM

        Admiral Loy, when Under Secretary Hutchinson testified
    before the subcommittee, I asked him about the Department's
    plans in regards to CAPPS II. Air travelers are very curious
    about this new system because it will examine information about
    people attempting to board a plane and will use that
    information to assign a threat level to each passenger. This is
    an important endeavor for Homeland Security, but there are many
    troubling questions raised by such a system, not least of which
    is what information will the Government use to determine threat
    level.
        I asked Secretary Hutchinson to tell us whether consumer
    debt history would be included in such information. He told us
    it would not. Secretary Hutchinson's answer did not quite set
    the record straight. Since his testimony, there have been
    numerous media reports that name credit history as one of the
    factors that CAPPS II may examine.
        On January 15, 2003, the Department of Transportation
    issued a notice in the Federal Register that named ``financial
    and transaction data'' as one of the categories of records for
    CAPPS II. You have not issued a new notice or a CAPPS II
    guideline since January 15. Will you issue new updated
    guidelines that reflect Mr. Hutchinson's assertion that credit
    history will not be part of the CAPPS II system?
        And I do not care if you check my credit history. I have
    been married now 66 years come Thursday, 2 weeks from now. And
    the only items that my wife and I have purchased on credit in
    those 60 years was a bedroom suite to begin with. And that was
    purchased at the coal company store. And I paid $7.50 every 2
    weeks on that.
        Admiral Loy. Is that paid off now, sir?
        Senator Byrd. How is that?
        Admiral Loy. Is that paid off now, sir?
        Senator Byrd. I did not understand you.
        Admiral Loy. Is the bedroom suite paid off at this point?
        Senator Byrd. Well----
        Admiral Loy. That is none of my business, sir. And I
    apologize.
        Senator Byrd. We are supposed to ask the questions here.
        And, of course, we had to go in debt for the first house we
    lived in, when we moved to Washington 50 years ago.
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
        Senator Byrd. But we paid that off just in a couple of
    years. And in debt for the present home. And I cannot remember
    any other item we have ever gone in debt for. We do not owe
    anybody. So I can ask these questions without any trepidation.
        What steps will you take--did I get an answer for the first
    question? Will you issue new updated guidelines that reflect
    Secretary Hutchinson's assertion that credit history will not
    be part of the CAPPS II system?
        Admiral Loy. Absolutely we will, sir. We intentionally put
    the Federal Register notice out literally as widely as we
    could. We recognized from the very beginning the importance of
    the privacy end of this project. If I may, sir, you have given
    me an opportunity to just describe a couple of things about
    CAPPS II that I believe are fundamental and critical to our
    doing a better job with passenger pre-screening.
        First of all, the system that is in place today is broken.
    It is run by the airlines in a wide variety of different ways,
    from hand-held mimeograph lists to sophisticated software on
    the other end with respect to name recognition. These are
    enormously high stakes. Our first and foremost challenge, as
    directed by the Congress, was to keep terrorists off airplanes.
        CAPPS II will become a very narrowly focused threat
    assessment tool that will allow us to do an infinitely better
    job of identification authentication so that the person who
    claims them to be Joe Jones we have some confidence level that
    they are actually that person.
        Secondly, they will use a much stronger list of foreign
    terrorists that has been developed principally by the Justice
    Department over the course of this last year-and-a-half, so
    that we have a firmly identified person being bounced off a
    firmly put-together list, not a haphazard list, not just a name
    only kind of recognition as to whether or not the person is who
    he claims to be.
        They will also have a system that will allow us to sort of
    rheostat it based on the intelligence that we have for that
    day. If the intelligence for that day is threatening about an
    airline, about an airport, about a region of the country, about
    a flight, we will be able to adjust resources, both in terms of
    Federal air marshals, screeners at our airports, or even
    potentially the Federal flight deck officers that we have just
    begun to put into our system.
        This is not about data mining. This is not about NCIC
    checks or credit checks on creditworthiness of a person one way
    or the other. There are many of us who perhaps would actually
    find that if our creditworthiness was not so hot, that would
    prove that we are Americans. But we are not going there in any
    case, as to checking creditworthiness as part of this process.
        There will be no data held on these travelers, with the
    exception of those that are determined to be potentially
    foreign terrorists or those who are hanging around with them.
    And there will be absolutely no racial or ethnic profiling as
    part of this project that we are building.
        I have personally conducted, and my team has conducted, an
    extensive outreach to the privacy community. We have held off-
    sites with privacy officers from the business world with the
    most strong advocates of the Fourth Amendment anywhere in this
    country. And we are learning from them as to what ought to be
    the privacy strategy that is in place as part of this project.
        We have briefed the Hill several times and look forward to
    any other opportunities to educate either the Committee members
    or their staffs as to why this project is so important to our
    future.

                                 PRIVACY RIGHTS

        Senator Byrd. Well, you have answered my next question, it
    being what steps will you take to protect air passengers'
    privacy rights? Are there any additional thoughts you have on
    that question?
        Admiral Loy. Only that as we have worked with the privacy
    advocates and communities, sir, they have four or five basic
    things that they want to be assured of. First of all, they want
    to be assured of an oversight of what we are doing that is
    ongoing in nature, not just a check in the box at the point we
    get the thing blessed and press on, but an ongoing oversight
    responsibility for making sure we do not allow mission creep to
    enter into that system.
        They want a protocol for redress, if they, any individual,
    American citizen, feels they have been wronged at the pre-
    screening process, that they have a means by which they can get
    redress to the system. They want to make sure that the
    information that they are offering, which is, by the way, a
    traveler-initiated information package, name, address, phone
    number, date of birth. Those are the four things that we will
    be asking for as part of the process. That the security
    associated with anything uncovered as a result of providing
    that information is very real. These are standards that we want
    to build into that next privacy notice to make sure all of
    America understands what this project is about.
        Senator Byrd. Will the new notice name the precise
    databases of information CAPPS II will collect about air
    passengers?
        Admiral Loy. I do not know that we have any reason not to
    name those in the privacy notice that will follow the rest of
    our review, Senator Byrd. But if you will, sir, I would be
    happy to get back to you, as we are about to formulate that
    second Register notice and advise you directly at that point.
        Senator Byrd. And how long will that be? I mean, how soon
    will that be?
        Admiral Loy. We are talking about weeks, perhaps a month.
    We are not talking about months or a year. We are anticipating
    that the developmental work on CAPPS II will proceed and that
    likely we will be at a point of having it online for America
    sometime in the spring of 2004.
        Senator Byrd. So you will supply the subcommittee with that
    information?
        Admiral Loy. I will, sir.
        [The information follows:]
                                    CAPPS II
        CAPPS II will use commercial and government databases. The new
    notice will identify all of the information that will be collected on
    passengers and brought into the government system of records. TSA will
    not, however, identify the commercial data providers in the notice
    because CAPPS II will merely obtain authentication scores from
    commercial data providers and the underlying data belonging to
    commercial data providers will not be brought into the CAPPS II system.
    Furthermore, for security reasons, the notice will not disclose the
    nature or details of government-owned intelligence or other data that
    will be in the system.

        Senator Byrd. Just another question or so, Mr. Chairman.
    And will the guidelines, in your opinion, be as clear as you
    have been today?
        Admiral Loy. They will be directly that clear, sir.
    Absolutely.
        Senator Byrd. Just a postscript with regard--well, I will
    hold that for a moment.
        Admiral Loy, you were the Administrator of TSA last fall
    when you transmitted through the Department of Transportation
    to the OMB your request for fiscal year 2004. As a former Coast
    Guard commandant and as the Administrator of TSA, I am
    interested in your specific views of the resource needs for
    TSA. Would you tell us how much was requested at the OMB level?
        Admiral Loy. Senator, I will be happy to stand right beside
    Judge Bonner when we report back to the Committee. But let me
    just say two things----
        Senator Byrd. Now the head of this pin is getting awfully
    narrow.
        Admiral Loy. I understand. And we are dancing and trying to
    keep both feet off the ground, sir.
        Two things. I think the judge hit directly on the head of
    that pin when he described the opportunity that must be present
    for the new Secretary to consider the kinds of dispersion of,
    for example, threat assessment monies that are important for
    the whole range of what the Department is now responsible for.
    So many of the dollars that we had identified, for example,
    outside of aviation for what we thought was important work for
    TSA to press on with have been momentarily gathered at the
    Secretary's level to allow him the benefit of making judgments
    as to where the most important dollars could be spent for the
    well-being of our homeland.
        I think that is an important step for him to take. And I
    think it was the right thing for the gathering of such things
    as vulnerability assessment dollars that had been requested to
    be centralized in the new directorate known as the Information
    Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and allow
    Secretary Ridge the first opportunity to disperse those funds
    in the right direction.
        I trust, and I have every confidence, that a lot of those
    dollars are going to find their way back to transportation
    issues in ports, in rail, in transit systems, and other such
    work as I have offered to the Secretary to get on with.
        Senator Byrd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    all members of the panel.
        May I just say in closing that my references to my own
    personal financial data were not intended to be bragging. My
    old mom used to tell me that a self-braggart is a half-
    scoundrel. But I think I want to make it clear for the record
    that my wife and I have always handled our business the old-
    fashioned way.
        Admiral Loy. As we all wish we could, sir.
        Senator Byrd. We all might do better if we tried.
        Admiral Loy. You bet.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

                               LETTERS OF INTENT

        Admiral Loy, the budget request submitted by the
    Transportation Security Administration does not include any
    requests for funds for installation of explosive detection
    systems. But I notice in your testimony you mention that there
    is an intent to amend the request to include funds associated
    with the Letters of Intent program.
        Do you have a plan or a timetable for when you are going to
    submit this or how much you will be requesting to carry out the
    Letter of Intent program?
        Admiral Loy. I think it is important for two things to be
    brought to this discussion, sir. First of all, I think it is so
    important for this program to press forward that my commitment
    to the Department of Homeland Security has been that I would
    find monies within the request already on the table to press on
    with the EDS installation program.
        I also see that in the reauthorization legislation
    associated with the air, what used to be Air-21, there is a
    notion of a substantial fund being established to provide for
    the funding of major security projects at airports. There was
    originally a discussion associated with whether that should be
    dealt with inside the Department of Transportation or within
    the Department of Homeland Security.
        I would hope that if they are truly, if the intent of that
    segment of the bill is to fund security projects for our
    country about aviation, that they would be in the Department of
    Homeland Security and made available to TSA to administer. That
    would be an appropriate means by which we could find those
    dollars to do that work.

                            LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

        Senator Cochran. There is, in the TSA's plans for this
    year, agreements with local airports and State agencies for
    uniformed officers at security checkpoints. Now there is an
    announcement, I understand, that has gone out that TSA will not
    reimburse local airports for law enforcement officers. We had a
    couple of airports in our State that had been counting on some
    funding to help pay the costs of providing uniformed officers
    at security checkpoints.
        What is the explanation, or is there any rationale, for
    changing your mind about reimbursement for the expense of local
    law enforcement officers at airports?
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. I will be happy to provide that. As
    you know, the original ATSA legislation required Federal law
    enforcement officers to be stationed at each checkpoint across
    our country. Those responsibilities were largely fulfilled by
    the National Guard in the immediate wake of the tragedies of 9/
    11. As the National Guard disbanded from the airports, State
    and local officials, law enforcement officials, filled the gaps
    with absolutely excellent performance across this last year.
        Our first recognition of whether or not the original law
    needed adjusted was to take out the word Federal. And we got
    the technical amendment associated with that accomplished. Just
    in the course of the last appropriations cycle, the requirement
    that they be stationed at the checkpoint was also eliminated.
    We felt, after having observed this and with the great counsel
    from the State and local people who have been doing this work
    for us, that there was an infinitely greater capacity for law
    enforcement to be done at the airport, if we went toward a
    flexible response kind of an approach, where they were not
    rigidly stationed at the checkpoint, rather could be roving to
    a standard of response to get back when necessary, if something
    happened at the checkpoint, but in the meantime could be doing
    excellent law enforcement surveillance work, counterdetection
    work, other very good things that those officers could be doing
    for us at the airport, not unlike they had actually done many
    times before 9/11/01.
        So my announcement on the end of this month will be that,
    A, it is no longer required for that officer to be rigidly
    stationed at that checkpoint. And we will adopt a flexible
    response approach.
        We will eliminate the existing memoranda of agreement
    associated with doing that and, where appropriate, renegotiate
    reimbursable agreements in airports across the country. We
    think we will probably be able to provide better security at
    far less money for the American taxpayer.

                      PROFESSIONALISM OF AIRPORT SCREENERS

        Senator Cochran. I appreciate that. And, in closing, I
    wanted to make an observation and ask for your reaction to it.
    Members of the Senate and Congress, as well as others, I am
    sure, travel a good bit on airplanes. We have an opportunity to
    observe the passenger screening procedures and the personnel
    conducting those operations at a number of airports throughout
    the country.
        These individuals are charged with doing the things
    necessary to assure that our airplanes are safe from hijackers
    and others who are likely to cause or engage in terrorist
    activities, hijackings, or commit crimes. It seems to me that
    there is a wide disparity between airports and among different
    individuals who are working to screen passengers. There ought
    to be some way to standardize and have a predictable level of
    competence and courtesy, building confidence among those who
    are traveling by air that the screeners know what they are
    doing and that we have good people, talented people, working
    throughout the air passenger system.
        But that is just not the case right now. I mean, there is a
    wide disparity from airport to airport. I was surprised and
    really very pleased this weekend, when I came across some
    airport screeners who were very courteous and almost treated us
    all as if we had not been convicted of a terrorist act as we
    were proceeding through the lines. Others tend to be pretty
    aggressive and some even mean-spirited, it seems.
        I wonder when we can expect to get to the point where we
    can count on a predictable level of competence and courtesy,
    that the air-traveling public can expect, as we go through the
    lines and are screened before we get on the airplanes?
        Admiral Loy. Actually, I am very disappointed to hear that
    report, Senator Cochran, because we had been working very
    diligently to gain passenger feedback by focus groups and
    asking questions of folks who are actually in the middle of the
    experience across the country. And on balance, our feedback had
    been that the courtesy, respect, professionalism of the
    federalized screening force that took the place of many of
    those screeners of the past, who unfortunately were more apt to
    be described as you just described them, and that we had
    actually done a very good job in that regard.
        Our training program was exactly the same from coast to
    coast. And to the degree there is a leadership challenge for
    that Federal Security Director to mandate from his workforce
    the descriptors you just described, that is exactly the
    standard that I want those screeners to deal with across the
    country. I will personally put out a message reinforcing that,
    because that is what we taught at the training. And if it is
    not there, I would actually like to know about that, so that I
    can fix it anywhere in the country, sir.
        Senator Cochran. Well, we appreciate that. I think it is a
    matter of leadership. And I am not suggesting that you are not
    a good leader. But somewhere down the line at some airports
    there is a breakdown in that.
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. We need that feedback so we can
    correct that where it is appropriate.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        Senator Cochran. We have another hearing that we had
    scheduled, where we were going to review the budget request for
    the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and
    Infrastructure Protection. The individual named to that
    position has not been confirmed, so that hearing is going to be
    postponed and hopefully will be rescheduled at a later date.
        As you know, Senators may submit additional questions to
    you to be answered for the record. And, we hope you will
    respond to those questions within a reasonable time. We
    appreciate very much your cooperation with our efforts to
    review your budget request. We look forward to continuing to
    work closely with you as we try to identify the priorities in a
    thoughtful way to help ensure our Nation's security.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

       Questions Submitted to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                                  fee revenue
        Question. Within your Bureau, there are multiple fees that are paid
    by air and sea passengers for inspections services. Are you reviewing
    the various fee structures with an eye towards rationalizing where,
    when, and how these various fees are paid? Do you plan to send a
    legislative proposal to the Congress?
        Answer. A working group composed of representatives from the legacy
    agencies is currently reviewing the various structures. The group is
    tasked with identifying solutions to address the varied issues to
    accomplish an integrated Bureau program. The critical objective of the
    group is to develop a legislative BCBP user fee proposal for the
    Congress to consider.
        Question. What is the current financial condition of the
    Immigration User Fee Account? Although additional hiring was
    authorized, what plans do you have in place to ensure that the
    Immigration User Fee will live within its means this fiscal year and
    next fiscal year?
        Answer. Fiscal year 2003 collections averaged 10.5 percent higher
    ($268.0 million) for the first two quarters than our projection of
    $243.6 million. In fact, this per quarter average increase has held
    since the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2002. During the first two
    quarters of fiscal year 2003, the immigration user fee collections
    reached just over 47 percent of the annual fiscal year 2003 projection
    of $567.8 million. Depending on the impact that severe acute
    respiratory syndrome (SARS) has on the normally robust summer
    international travel, we are cautiously optimistic about achieving the
    fiscal year 2003 projection.
        When immigration user fees for persons entering the United States
    through an air or sea ports-of-entry materialize at levels lower than
    estimated, as they did in fiscal year 2002 (-$85 million), we implement
    as many of the following cost reducing actions as are needed to bridge
    the funding gap.
      --Reduce discretionary overtime
      --Offset (to other accounts) or defer (to the next fiscal year)
            selected non-payroll spending
      --Delay hiring enhancement positions until late in the fiscal year
      --Don't fund servicewides associated with the number of enhancement
            positions not hired
      --Don't hire seasonal inspections staff
      --Freeze non-payroll spending
      --Implement a furlough
        The order listed is generally the order in which actions are
    considered; however, there are exceptions. For example, in fiscal year
    2002, overtime was required to operate at heightened threat levels.
    Therefore, steps taken to bridge the fiscal year 2002 gap skipped step
    1, and the gap was resolved by a combination of steps 2-4. Steps are
    implemented only as far as necessary to resolve the gap. Thus far, the
    gaps have not been serious enough to implement steps 5-7.
        Immigration user fee passenger volume has been recovering toward
    the pre-September 11, 2001 trend for the last 4 quarters but has not
    yet reached pre-September 11, 2001 levels. The fiscal year 2003
    projected collections ($568 million), although showing a $63 million
    increase over fiscal year 2002 collections, would still be $90 million
    below the fiscal year 2003 authorized spending authority ($658
    million).
        The steps taken in fiscal year 2002 are being repeated in fiscal
    year 2003 to bridge the fiscal year 2003 gap.
        Question. The Land Border Inspection Fee is also facing a deficit
    this fiscal year. What plans do you have in place to fix this
    situation?
        Answer. The immigration land border fees including nonimmigrant
    arrival/departure records and Canadian boat landing permit, as
    examples, have not been increased in many years and do not fully
    recover the cost of services. They are currently undergoing a cost
    review, and recommendations for fee increases are likely. Prior to
    fiscal year 2003, the $7-$8 million annual gap for 398 authorized
    positions was absorbed in the Exams Fee account where these fees were
    collected. With the transfer of these fees to the immigration land
    border fee account in fiscal year 2003, the gap between costs and
    collections has to be offset with appropriated funds. Our plan to fix
    the situation in fiscal year 2003 is to offset approximately $7.4
    million of payroll and non-payroll costs with appropriated Inspections
    funds.
        Question. The authority to collect a fee for land border
    inspections has been used successfully to fund commuter express lanes.
    In fiscal year 2002 the authority to run pilots was expanded from 6
    ports of entry to 96 ports of entry. Do you have any plans to study
    requiring all vehicles and pedestrians that use the land border to pay
    a fee for that service, not just express commuters? Have you considered
    requesting that the prohibition in Public Law 103-317 on assessing such
    a fee be lifted?
        Answer. We are not planning for a universal land border fee and are
    not planning to request that the prohibition be lifted. However, over
    the next 5 years, we are considering increasing the numbers of
    dedicated commuter lanes so that many land border ports will have more
    than one dedicated commuter lane available for pre-approved enrollees.
    We believe the increased lane access will encourage greater
    participation in the NEXUS and SENTRI programs and will increase the
    numbers of pre-cleared travelers, as well as begin the process of
    integrating the dedicated commuter lane concept with the U.S. VISIT
    entry--exit concept. Increasing the numbers of dedicated lanes at
    selected ports will provide for increased revenues to cover the cost of
    operating the dedicated commuter lane enrollment centers. The cost of
    increasing numbers of dedicated lanes would have to be paid from
    appropriated funds as they have been in the past.
                                physical assets
        Question. Virtually every individual program that has been merged
    into BCBP has a need and a budget for buying vehicles. What steps are
    you taking to review these budget items? What plans are there for
    consolidation of procurement, retrofitting, and maintenance?
        Answer. We are reviewing options for consolidating functions to
    include fleet management. We currently have one bureau with a very
    robust fleet management program that covers over 67 percent of the BTS
    fleet. They have three established vehicle retrofit factories through a
    partnership with Federal Prison Industries that provide over one
    million high-quality, low-cost, labor hours to retrofit our vehicles.
    The vehicle retrofit factories convert production line vehicles into
    customized law enforcement vehicles. They provide a complete vehicle
    replacement service to our customers that includes delivery of a
    turnkey vehicle, the disposal of the replaced vehicle, and the
    initiation of the vehicle file in our fleet maintenance management
    system. They are also implementing a state-of-the-art commercial off-
    the-shelf maintenance management system and fleet services. The new
    service will allow our fleet managers to analyze and compare vehicle
    life-cycle costs; in-house maintenance and commercial costs;
    performance of fleet vehicles by type, year, region, etc; and the
    status of vehicle and component warranties. It will allow our field
    personnel to focus on their core Homeland Security mission while
    improving the quality and economy of their vehicle fleet.
                                  canine units
        Question. The creation of the Customs and Border Protection Bureau
    brought together 1,210 canine teams--705 from the Customs Service, 334
    from the Border Patrol, 30 from the Immigration Inspections program,
    and 141 from the Animal Plant Health and Inspection Service. Are you
    reviewing the multitude of canine programs that are already in
    existence in your organization to look for overlaps in mission?
        Answer. Yes. The Legacy U.S. Customs Service, Legacy Border Patrol
    and Legacy Animal and Plant Health and Inspection Service have
    developed working groups to work with the transition team to identify
    overlaps in missions. Output from this working group was provided to
    the Transition Team for the Commissioner's review and comments.
        Question. Do you have any estimated cost savings from combining
    these programs? Are any assumed in the President's fiscal year 2004
    budget request?
        Answer. No. The working group is waiting for direction on the final
    structure, which was provided to the transition team. The working group
    is being proactive in developing standards for like functions such as
    narcotics detection. Work is ongoing to standardize such things as
    evaluations, certifications, etc. At this time, the efforts would be
    budget neutral should they be implemented.
                              consolidation issues
        Question. How are plans proceeding on the integration of the
    inspections programs and when do you anticipate seeing the cost savings
    from creating a consolidated inspections program?
        Answer. A plan is in place to roll out a unified primary
    inspections program as well as an improved counterterrorism secondary
    inspection program. For cargo, a working group has been established to
    develop a unified cargo inspections process. It is anticipated that
    consolidated facilities and systems will produce a cost savings once
    the unified programs are in place. The roll-out of the unified primary
    inspections program is projected to be completed by the end of fiscal
    year 2004 at land and in airports. Roll-out plans for seaports are in
    the process of being developed.
        Question. After March 1, 2003, who assumed control at each of the
    ports-of-entry? How were the decisions made in appointing the acting
    port directors?
        Answer. On February 27, 2003, Commissioner Bonner appointed 20
    interim Directors for Field Operations to oversee operations at
    approximately 300 ports of entry nationwide. These appointments became
    effective on March 1, 2003.
        The Interim Port Directors were recommended through an interagency
    process that involved senior managers from the Legacy organizations of
    Customs, Immigration and Agriculture. Current management officials at
    the ports, from the various legacy organizations, were considered in
    this process. The Interim Port Directors were then appointed by the
    Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations. Each of the
    Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCPB) Interim Port Directors
    report directly to one of the Interim Directors for Field Operations.
        Question. How are you approaching the reconciliation of the
    disparate pay and benefit issues? Have you received input from the
    Office of Personnel Management on this issue?
        Answer. We have established a transition working group to address
    the issues of the duties, pay and benefits of our workforce. This group
    has presented preliminary recommendations to the Commissioner regarding
    strategies to resolve these issues. We have plans to discuss these
    strategies with the Office of Personnel Management in the coming
    months.
        Question. When do you plan to send a legislative proposal forward?
        Answer. Once the personnel system flexibilities are determined, the
    pay disparities will be addressed. It is likely that they will require
    legislation. The Department of Homeland Security will be responsible
    for developing any required legislation.
                                    training
        Question. What type of guidance have you provided to the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center concerning cross-training for existing
    inspectors from the legacy agencies?
        Answer. When the Department of Homeland Security was created on
    March 1, 2003, all inspectors from legacy Customs, INS and Agriculture
    became part of a single agency, the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection (BCBP). The Commissioner of BCBP, the Honorable Robert C.
    Bonner, launched an immediate initiative to cross-train all existing
    inspectors in fulfillment of his statutory obligation as head of the
    agency to determine the training requirements of agency personnel.
        Currently anti-terrorism training is being delivered to all 17,000
    existing Inspectors and cross training on frontline primary inspections
    is being delivered to BCBP Inspectors at the ports of entry through CD-
    ROMs. This month, BCBP will begin training personnel to return to their
    duty stations and conduct live classes at the airports to prepare all
    inspectors to work in all primary areas. Closely following the airport
    rollout, land border and seaport inspectors will receive specialized
    training by trained trainers at their ports of entry. First line
    supervisors of the inspectors will also receive training. All
    inspectors will to receive monthly ``muster modules'' (short training
    sessions delivered at the ports on counter-terrorism topics). Training
    delivered on``)site is the most efficient and effective way to meet the
    immediate needs of the existing workforce while maintaining vital
    operations at the border.
        Question. What type of guidance have you provided to the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center for basic training for Customs and
    Border Protection inspector recruits?
        Answer. The Office of Training and Development (OTD) in the Bureau
    of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) is designing the new basic
    Inspector curriculum for its new recruits. This training will integrate
    the formerly separate elements of the legacy Inspector positions. This
    new training curriculum will meet all Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center (FLETC) standards.
        BCBP is working with the FLETC to coordinate their support of
    BCBP's projected training requirements in terms of the number of
    students to be trained, the approximate content and length of the
    proposed course, and the types of training that BCBP expects the FLETC
    to provide. While BCBP Instructors provide the majority of the training
    hours to its recruits, FLETC provides elements of training that are
    common to all law enforcement agencies such as training in Firearms,
    Arrest Techniques, Narcotics Identification and fingerprinting.
        Question. Where will these inspectors train? Will they train as a
    group or separately or a combination?
        Answer. All incumbent Inspectors for the Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection (BCBP) will receive training at their current ports
    using a combination of group training to foster unification and
    teamwork, self-study to enable rapid uptake of critical skills and
    knowledge, and apprentice-style, on-the-job training (OJT) that
    provides opportunities for legacy Immigration, Agriculture Quarantine,
    and Customs Inspectors to demonstrate field practices to each other.
        New recruits for BCBP Inspector positions will receive structured
    on-the-job training (OJT) at their duty station before and after they
    attend the classroom and practical exercise training at the Bureau of
    Customs and Border Protection Academy in Glynco, Georgia.
                                 border patrol
        Question. Now that the Border Patrol is part of your organization,
    do you intend to keep the National Border Patrol Strategy that INS has
    attempted to implement over the past 9 years?
        Answer. The Border Patrol's national strategic plan was written in
    1994 with the focus of implementation in the areas with the highest
    level of illegal immigration. The plan is achieved with the ``forward
    deployment'' and proper balance of agents, equipment, technology, and
    border infrastructure (cameras, sensors, roads, lights, fences or other
    border barriers).
        Areas of operations that have become the focus of this plan have
    proved this to be an effective enforcement action. Participating
    sectors have seen a prolific change since the inception of their
    corresponding operations.
      --El Paso--Hold the Line (arrests down, crime reduced)
      --San Diego--Gatekeeper (29 year record low in apprehensions, crime
            reduced)
      --McAllen--Rio Grande (crime and arrests reduced)
        Changes have occurred since the strategy's implementation, most
    notably following the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States.
    The strategy's Phase IV implementation was accelerated to respond to
    the potential threats on the northern border. The upgrades in
    technology and its application for border deterrence and enforcement
    has also improved.
        Continuation of the proven and successful National Border Patrol
    Strategic Plan is warranted in-order to respond to emerging threats and
    changes in the past trends of illegal border entries.
        Question. What changes might you consider making to the strategy to
    increase its effectiveness and reduce migrant deaths?
        Answer. Due to concentrated border enforcement efforts, organized
    smugglers have shifted their techniques and areas of operation from
    traditional unlawful entry points near the ports of entry to extremely
    remote and dangerous areas. The intense summer temperatures and arduous
    terrain associated with these areas account for the majority of
    documented deaths. BCBP has been increasing efforts to identify and
    prosecute smugglers who choose more dangerous methods and routes to
    smuggle unsuspecting aliens. Yearly enhancements allow for BCBP to
    apply resources where the deaths occur to effectively deter and disrupt
    illegal border traffic. BCBP is also expanding its Border Safety
    Initiative, which incorporates a multi-pronged approach to making the
    border a safer environment. BCBP is increasing the number of qualified
    medical/rescue agents and is cooperating with Mexican counterparts at
    an unprecedented level. For example, a meeting of field representatives
    has just concluded, which produced a collaborative strategic plan for
    reducing deaths on both sides of the international border. As the
    strategy evolves other initiatives will be developed and supported.
    BCBP leadership is convinced that when the proper balance of personnel,
    equipment, technology, and tactical infrastructure exists, the illegal
    crossings will decline, bringing a commensurate decline in deaths and
    injury.
        Question. Given the level of additional resources that have been
    put into the Northern Border, will you be revising that portion of the
    strategy?
        Answer. Since its implementation in 1994, the Border Patrol's
    National Strategic Plan has been the basis for a multi-year, multi-
    phased approach for the deployment of additional personnel and
    resources, for the purpose of increasing control of our Nation's
    borders. The cornerstone of this strategy calls for ``prevention
    through deterrence'' as the means to restrict illegal entry attempts
    into the United States. Along the southwest border, the strategy has
    concentrated Border Patrol resources into those specific geographic
    areas experiencing the highest level of illegal activity. The key to
    the successful implementation of this strategy has been the deployment
    of the proper balance of personnel, equipment, technology and
    infrastructure into those areas.
        As originally written, the final phase of the National Strategic
    Plan calls for enhancing our enforcement posture along the northern
    border and coastal areas of the United States. Securing the northern
    border has traditionally presented many unique enforcement challenges
    for the Border Patrol. Our shared border with Canada is approximately
    4,000 miles long and is the longest non-militarized undefended border
    in the world. In the past, this vast expanse, coupled with an
    inadequate number of personnel and a lack of resources and
    infrastructure, has significantly limited the Border Patrol's deterrent
    effect upon illegal activity. In the wake of September 11, 2001,
    vulnerabilities and deficiencies along the northern border have
    received increased attention, which has caused the Border Patrol to
    accelerate its efforts in increasing our enforcement presence along the
    northern border.
        The current Northern Border Strategy encompasses interagency and
    international cooperation and coordination, effective technology
    development and deployment, and innovative resource allocation. The
    geographic and environmental conditions found on the northern border
    have led to the historic economic and cultural interdependence of the
    United States and Canada. In light of the long-standing cooperation and
    economic interdependency, the Border Patrol has conducted activities
    along the northern border with significantly fewer resources than were
    dedicated to the southwest border. For these reasons, the Border Patrol
    cannot simply replicate the same enforcement strategy implemented on
    the southwest border.
        The Northern Border Strategy relies upon maximizing existing
    resources in order to strengthen control of the border. The Northern
    Border Strategy also requires the proper balance of personnel,
    equipment, technology and infrastructure. To improve our effectiveness,
    the initial area of emphasis is the expansion of liaison and increased
    intelligence sharing with other Federal, State and local law
    enforcement agencies, as well as our counterparts within the Canadian
    government. The second emphasis is on the deployment of enforcement
    related technology along the border to act as a force multiplier,
    thereby increasing the area that can be adequately covered by available
    manpower. The final emphasis of the strategy calls for the deployment
    of additional personnel into our northern border sectors. As mentioned,
    subsequent to September 11, 2001, the Border Patrol accelerated into
    this phase by redeploying agents from the southwest border to the
    northern border.
        Question. In December 2001, the Northern Border sectors of the
    Border Patrol were directed to create or expand Integrated Border
    Enforcement Teams or Integrated Maritime Enforcement Teams. What
    progress has been made in carrying out this directive?
        Answer. IBETs are intelligence driven/intelligence led enforcement
    teams comprised of Federal, State/provincial and local law enforcement
    personnel working together to enhance our shared border's integrity and
    security. They are multi-disciplinary in nature and work in land, air
    and marine environments along the Canadian/United States border,
    respecting the laws and jurisdiction of each nation. They identify,
    investigate and interdict persons and organizations that pose a threat
    to our national security or are engaged in other organized criminal
    activity.
        Since December 2001, the Northern Sectors of the Border Patrol have
    created and expanded the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)
    program to include participation by all Northern Border Sectors. There
    are 14 IBET locations along the Northern Border with 12 currently fully
    operational. All IBET regions should be staffed and operational by the
    autumn of 2003.
        BCBP/USBP has 17 assigned IBET intelligence sources. BICE has 60
    IBET resources, 4 of which are intelligence resources. Currently, the
    total number of RCMP IBET assets is 131, with 25 being intelligence
    resources. Canadian Customs Revenue Agency has 14 dedicated IBET
    intelligence resources.
        A multi-agency monthly report is what the IBET's are currently
    working towards. From this report, a national multi-agency monthly
    report/bulletin will be compiled and distributed to all partner
    agencies. A yearly Risk Assessment will be established for each IBET
    and a national Risk Assessment will be compiled. A weekly IBET
    Information Brief containing open source information is currently
    produced by the National RCMP IBET analyst and is distributed to all
    partner agencies through intelligence contacts that have been developed
    in those agencies.
        To ensure that all local, State and Federal participating IBET
    agencies are aware of the IBET program and concept, training has been
    established and conducted with Federal, State and local law enforcement
    agencies on both sides of the border to inform participants on IBET
    concepts and operations. Four 3 day IBET workshops have been completed
    in 4 locations with a total of 146 members from multiple government
    agencies participating. This training has been extremely successful.
        Present initiatives under development call for improving the IBET
    model. Current efforts include the co-location of intelligence
    resources in 4 locations and the dedication of full time resources to
    the Intelligence group from all participating agencies.
        Question. What is the current status of overall Border Patrol
    hiring? Do you expect to hire all of the new authorized positions this
    year? Please provide the committee with the total number of on-board
    agents as of the date of this hearing.
        Answer. Border Patrol hiring continues at a steady pace. Interest
    in the Border Patrol as a career remains high among our applicant
    market, with more than 37,000 applications received as far this fiscal
    year. Through our highly selective screening and processing, we project
    a net new hiring figure of 600 new agents for fiscal year 2003. This
    number will meet the additional 570 agents directed by Congress and
    will make significant progress towards overcoming the hiring shortfall
    of fiscal year 2002. As of May 13th, the date of the hearing, the
    Border Patrol had 10,381 agents on-board.
                           inspections--documentation
        Question. Current Federal regulation exempts certain persons, such
    as U.S. citizens, from presenting a passport when arriving into the
    United States from most countries in the Western hemisphere. Inspectors
    can allow a person to enter based upon only an oral claim of
    citizenship. Inspectors intercept thousands of aliens each year who
    falsely claim to be a U.S. citizen in order to unlawfully enter the
    United States. What policy changes, if any, would you recommend that
    would mitigate an alien's ability to successfully enter the United
    States by falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen?
        Answer. These issues have significant legal, domestic policy, and
    foreign policy implications, all of which must be analyzed and
    carefully weighed before a final recommendation and policy decision can
    be made.
        Question. Your Department is charged with developing a
    comprehensive Entry Exit system to track the arrival and departure of
    all aliens into this country. Given that, should the Western hemisphere
    exemption be reconsidered, such that everyone, U.S. citizen or Canadian
    will have to present a passport to gain entry into the United States at
    an international border crossing?
        Answer. These issues have significant legal, domestic policy, and
    foreign policy implications, all of which must be analyzed and
    carefully weighed before a final recommendation and policy decision can
    be made.
                         cargo and passenger processing
        Question. Over the years, the Customs Service and the former
    Immigration and Naturalization Service have recognized the natural
    tension between ``enforcement'' and ``facilitation'' when processing
    cargo and passengers entering the United States. Striking a balance
    between the two can be complicated by the fact that the cargo and
    passenger transportation networks are predominantly controlled by the
    private sector. What views and options will you bring to the Department
    of Homeland Security to help mitigate this tension?
        Answer. The need to facilitate the flow of cargo and the need for a
    strong security and enforcement posture is not mutually exclusive. The
    need for both underlines the importance of advanced, electronic
    information on goods before they arrive in the country. BCBP realizes
    that and is working towards that end in many programs, the 24-Hour
    cargo rule and the forthcoming proposed regulation under the Trade Act
    of 2002 being excellent examples. Both are efforts to capture cargo
    information from the Trade earlier in the transportation cycle so that
    security decisions on release or examination are made efficiently
    before goods actually arrive in the country.
        Question. Recognizing that it is a difficult proposition, how best
    can we gain reasonable assurance that laws will be enforced without
    unduly clogging supply chains and slowing the flow of passenger
    traffic?
        Answer. The best method is to work towards the acceptance of
    electronic information from all parties involved in the transaction who
    must report to BCBP as well as those who may offer additional
    information to facilitate cargo movement. Since BCBP is relying on this
    data for important decision-making, the sources of the data must be
    well known and, if necessary, regulated by the government. BCBP must be
    willing to expand its communications with various trade parties, and
    has acknowledged this with its C-TPAT program and its acceptance of
    Non-Vessel Operating Commercial carriers into the Vessel Automated
    Manifest Systems.
        Question. Given the fact that the cargo and passenger
    transportation networks are predominantly controlled by the private
    sector, how can the government and private sector work in a partnership
    to ensure that security becomes a natural and reinforced part of the
    supply chain in a cost-effective and operationally efficient manner?
        Answer. BCBP can ensure that it is able to communicate with all
    trading partners who need to supply data. It can also act to serve as a
    communication link between trade partners so that some or all of the
    necessary shipment data can be shared, thereby saving the trade from
    having many communications links to many different companies. In doing
    so, BCBP can also shield data that should not be seen by all the
    parties to a transaction.
                             information technology
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget for the Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection requests $30.2 million for an Information Technology
    Transformation to Homeland Security Fund, and has a separate request
    for $22.3 million for an Information Technology Infrastructure program
    called ATLAS. Please explain the differences between these two
    requests.
        Answer. The Information Technology Transformation to Homeland
    Security Fund is being created to address Information Technology (IT)
    compatibility and interoperability issues that arise during the
    transition including, but not limited to, mission systems, electronic
    mail, networks, collaborative tools, enforcement data integration,
    administrative capabilities and expanded services to other DHS
    components. It is imperative that IT operability remains stable in
    order to efficiently meet BCBP mission requirements. This fund will be
    used to extend the BCBP enterprise architecture to provide expanded
    access to IT capabilities in support of the Homeland Security mission.
        Legacy INS initiated the ATLAS program in 2001 to transform its
    stove-piped and aging IT infrastructure into an up-to-date environment
    that can provide improved data sharing and applications
    interoperability that will support the underpinning of all mission-
    critical, application development initiatives and all systems that are
    in an operations and maintenance mode.
        Question. With the consolidation of Customs and INS into DHS'
    Border and Transportation Security Directorate and DHS' associated
    effort to integrate border protection and immigration and customs
    enforcement, what are the implications for continuing ACE, the
    Modernization project, and ATLAS as separate projects?
        Answer. The Modernization Program and its first project, ACE, will
    support the overall mission of the Directorate of Border and
    Transportation Security (BTS) and, more specifically, enhance the
    operational effectiveness of the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection (BCBP). ACE will play a major role in enhancing both border
    security and border efficiency. It provides an integrated information
    base and IT platform that can be leveraged for border security.
        Starting this year, ACE will help enhance border security and
    deliver efficiencies to the trade process by providing interagency
    information sharing, and real-time, cross-government access to more
    accurate trade information. By centralizing and integrating the
    collection and analysis of this information, ACE will enhance BCBP
    ability to target illicit cargo, illegal persons, and unsafe
    conveyances. The trade data will be analyzed prior to arrival, allowing
    advanced inter-agency assessment of risks and threats to determine
    which goods and people must be scrutinized. Results will determine if,
    upon arrival, a shipment is to be examined or cleared for release.
        As noted above, the ATLAS program was initiated in 2001 to
    transform its stove-piped and aging IT infrastructure into an up-to-
    date environment that provides improved data sharing and applications
    interoperability that will support the underpinning of all mission-
    critical, application development initiatives and all current systems
    that are in an operations and maintenance mode.
                        international trade data system
        Question. What is the status of implementing the International
    Trade Data System? What will the request for $5.7 million in additional
    funding for fiscal year 2004 be used for?
        Answer. The ITDS initiative is currently in the process of
    integrating the first 9 agencies with responsibilities at the border
    including BCBP; U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC); Federal
    Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA); Bureau of Census; Federal
    Communications Commission (FCC); Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
    U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE).
        The original fiscal year 2004 budget request for ITDS was approved
    at $5.4 million prior to the identification and incorporation of agency
    inputs related to ITDS development. That original funding allowed the
    ITDS development contractor to perform only high-level requirements
    gathering. The request for the $5.7 million in additional funding in
    fiscal year 2004 will be used to perform detailed requirements
    gathering and analysis for incorporation into ITDS and will include
    integration plans and agency readiness review criteria. This effort
    will include the development of a consolidated and harmonized
    government-wide data requirements for all import and export
    transactions.
        Question. How many of the over 100 government agencies involved in
    ITDS have participated in identifying requirements?
        Answer. As of this date, over twenty of the over 100 government
    agencies have directly participated in the identification of
    requirements for ITDS. In addition, with the inclusion of Census in the
    list of participating agencies, numerous statistical agencies who
    currently receive their data exclusively or significantly through
    Census are considered to have their requirements addressed within the
    system. Through the on-going ITDS outreach efforts to the agencies and
    the system definition taking place within the ITDS Process Analysis
    Teams, additional agencies are being solicited to populate business
    process areas that align with an agency's mission.
        Question. How many of the over 100 government agencies involved in
    ITDS have initiated changes to their existing systems and processes so
    they will work with ITDS?
        Answer. Of the over 100 government agencies identified for
    inclusion in ITDS, at least nine have begun in earnest initiating
    changes in their systems and processes to work with ITDS. Numerous
    others have begun assessing the system and process changes that will be
    required once their integration begins. Agencies are coordinating their
    schedules for implementing change with the incremental delivery
    schedule of ITDS as functionality is deployed that best aligns with
    their mission needs.
        Question. What will be the impact on anticipated ITDS benefits if
    trade agencies do not position themselves to use ITDS?
        Answer. Benefits from ITDS fall into several categories: improved
    border and port security; improved port operations; improved data
    quality; reporting burden reduction to the international trade and
    transportation communities; and, streamlined operations post-entry.
        These benefits will be lessened if agencies do not participate in
    ITDS. Paramount to this is the failure to leverage the ITDS development
    efforts and meet the spirit of the President's Management Agenda and
    its five government wide goals. It is difficult to quantify the extent
    to which benefits will not accrue to the Government. However, it is
    possible, depending upon which agencies do not participate, that port
    inspectional personnel may have to use more than one system for
    processing goods or conveyances; some trade and transportation
    companies may have to provide information to the Government through
    multiple information systems; the Government will not have all of the
    information available to support a single, knowledge-based risk
    management system; and, data quality issues will remain as long as data
    is reported through multiple information systems.
        Question. What actions are planned to overcome any resistance trade
    agencies may have to positioning themselves for ITDS?
        Answer. The ITDS Board of Directors has recently completed a major
    effort to contact all agencies that are potential candidates for
    inclusion in ITDS. The agencies were offered an opportunity to meet
    with ITDS and BCBP personnel to discuss the mission and vision for
    ITDS, expected benefits, and steps that agencies should take to be
    included. As a result of those contacts, the number of agencies
    participating in the Government Support Network (a user group
    conference for Federal agencies) tripled over previous meetings and the
    number of agencies participating in the Program Support Group (an ITDS
    participant group) has increased.
        Commissioner Bonner will personally meet with heads of agencies
    that have resisted outreach efforts but which are important for
    homeland security, border operations, and trade facilitation or which
    are developing competitive or redundant systems. The list of specific
    agencies to be covered by these meetings is not finalized as of May 28,
    2003, but will be finalized shortly. A representative of the
    international trade community will participate in those meetings.
        Several meetings have been held with the Office of Management and
    Budget to solicit support for agency budget requests that include
    integration into ITDS and OMB support for the initiative. Another
    meeting is being scheduled with budget examiners from all of the
    departments that have agencies that are possible candidates for
    inclusion in ITDS.
                         container security initiative
        Question. While your organization has launched the Container
    Security Initiative and continues to operate the Customs-Trade
    Partnership Against Terrorism, there is also Operation Safe Commerce,
    which is the responsibility of the Transportation Security
    Administration. Operation Safe Commerce is working to identify and fund
    business driven initiatives to enhance security for the movement of
    cargo through the supply chain. While each of these projects has a
    particular focus, how will these be coordinated to ensure no
    duplication of effort and the best use of the funding provided?
        Answer. BCBP has the sole statutory and regulatory responsibility
    for container security on containers destined for the United States.
    Although this authority is clearly delineated through the
    implementation of enforcement programs like Container Security
    Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
    TPAT), BCBP strives to comply with its mission in coordination with
    other equally vital offices within the Department of Homeland Security
    which have statutory and regulatory responsibility over a segment of
    sea transportation.
        Coordination and communication with our department partners ensures
    an effective and streamlined security process. For example, BCBP has
    established a protocol with the United States Coast Guard to handle
    certain types of serious threats through the High-Interest Vessel
    program. Also, BCBP has shared interest with DOT and TSA in developing
    industry partnership programs that improve container security (and
    other types of transportation security) and are consistent for domestic
    and international shipping.
        BCBP and TSA are working together through a jointly chaired
    steering committee that makes the final project selection decisions for
    Operation Safe Commerce. The Federal Register notice that initiated the
    Operation Safe Commerce program makes specific references to C-TPAT and
    CSI as initiatives that may be considered as part of Operation Safe
    Commerce business practices and technology supply chain ``test bed''
    initiatives.
        As a voluntary government-business initiative, the C-TPAT
    complements the overseas targeting of the CSI and the development of
    new security techniques under Operation Safe Commerce. As of May 9,
    2003 C-TPAT membership includes over 3,000 companies that account for
    approximately 37 percent of all U.S. imports by value and approximately
    93 percent of all U.S.-bound sea-containerized cargo. By creating a
    significant network of reliable and secure companies, C-TPAT enables
    BCBP to direct its CSI targeting to areas of greater risk and
    establishes a mechanism for incorporating the best practices and new
    high-tech equipment identified by Operation Safe Commerce.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

                                 border issues
        Question. It has been 17 years since the Federal government
    launched a major effort to upgrade U.S. borders and that effort focused
    only on the Southwest border.
        I have just sponsored the Border Infrastructure and Technology
    Modernization Act (S-539). The new bill will focus on U.S. borders with
    Canada as well as Mexico. This bill has the dual goals of facilitating
    the efficient flow of trade while meeting the challenges of increased
    security requirements.
        This will include:
      --More funding for equipment at our land borders;
      --Additional funding for personnel;
      --Additional funding for training; and
      --Additional funding for industry/business partnership programs along
            the Mexican and Canadian borders.
        It is important for the border enforcement agencies to work with
    the private sector on both sides of the border and reward those
    partners who adopt strong internal controls designed to defeat
    terrorist access to our country.
        What are your thoughts on the importance of trade partnership
    programs along the Southwest border?
        Answer. Industry Partnership Programs (IPP) allow BCBP to expand
    our influence beyond the borders and into Mexico, Central America,
    South America and the Caribbean. Under the umbrella of the Customs-
    Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), these priority
    initiatives include the Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP),
    the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC) and the Americas Counter
    Smuggling Initiative Program (ACSI). Each IPP enables the Trade to
    tighten our borders through the enhancement of supply chain security
    standards that deter smugglers from using conveyances and cargo to
    smuggle terrorist devices and narcotics. These complementary programs
    benefit both BCBP and the private sector by securing the integrity of
    shipments destined for the United States while promoting the efficient
    flow of trade.
        We are currently working on additional security requirements that
    take into account the additional terrorist and drug threat on the
    Southwest border for conversion of the LBCIP carriers to C-TPAT. BASC
    chapters have been established throughout Ecuador, Colombia, Costa
    Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela and most recently in Jamaica,
    where a chapter was founded in March 2003. The ACSI Teams continue to
    support BASC through security site surveys, briefings on smuggling
    trends and techniques and security and drug awareness training.
        The primary purpose of LBCIP is to prevent smugglers of illegal
    drugs from utilizing commercial conveyances for their commodities.
    Carriers can effectively deter smugglers by enhancing security measures
    at their place of business and on the conveyances used to transport
    cargo. By signing agreements with the BCBP, land and rail carriers
    agree to enhance the security of their facilities and the conveyances
    they use and agree to cooperate closely with BCBP in identifying and
    reporting suspected smuggling attempts.
        BASC is a business-led, BCBP supported alliance created to combat
    narcotics smuggling via commercial trade that was formed in March 1996.
    BASC examines the entire process of manufacturing and shipping
    merchandise from foreign countries to the United States, emphasizing
    the creation of a more security-conscious environment at foreign
    manufacturing plants to eliminate, or at least reduce, product
    vulnerability to narcotics smuggling. Customs BCBP supports BASC
    through ACSI, which are teams of BCBP officers that travel to the BASC
    countries to assist businesses and government in developing security
    programs and initiatives that safeguard legitimate shipments from being
    used to smuggle narcotics and implements of terrorism.
        Question. What plans do you have to increase cooperation with the
    Mexican government on border issues?
        Answer. Under the C-TPAT programs consisting of the Americas
    Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), and the Business Anti-Smuggling
    Coalition (BASC), BCBP is engaging the Mexican trade community and
    Mexican Customs in a cooperative relationship against the smuggling of
    drugs and implements of terror. Meetings have been held with Mexican
    Customs through a bilateral U.S.-Mexican Government Working Group.
    Through this working group, the United States and Mexico can work
    jointly through these programs to establish a secure supply chain
    between our countries, while facilitating cross border trade. BCBP is
    also working with Mexican Customs to identify what areas in Mexico
    should be targeted for the establishment of new BASC chapters.
        Under the high-level United States and Mexico Customs Bilateral
    Working Group, a demonstration project to test a fast and secure lane
    at El Paso is underway. This bilateral program is designed to expedite
    and facilitate commercial truck crossings at the Ports of Entry (POEs)
    by implementing the mandated requirements of securing the flow of
    people, transportation, and goods under a secure infrastructure. This
    program is aimed at facilitating cross border trade, while improving
    and ensuring the supply chain security of the participants that range
    from manufacturing, to transportation, to importation.
        BCBP has two ACSI teams traveling throughout Mexico to work with
    the BASC Chapters in Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez and Mexico City to
    prevent drug smugglers and elements of terrorism from using legitimate
    cargo to enter their illegal merchandise into the U.S. BASC, which was
    initiated in March 1996, continues to be a private sector business-led,
    BCBP supported alliance under C-TPAT that complements and enhances our
    efforts to secure the supply chain. C-TPAT is an anti-terrorism
    response to the events of September 11, 2001 which engages the trade
    community in a cooperative relationship with BCBP in the war against
    terrorism. C-TPAT will work with foreign manufacturers, exporters,
    carriers, importers and other industry sectors emphasizing a seamless,
    security conscious environment throughout the entire commercial
    process.
     unmanned aerial vehicles at the las cruces, new mexico international
                                    airport
        Question. I was pleased to learn of Secretary Ridge's interest in
    using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for improved surveillance along
    our Nation's borders. I strongly support such action to improve our
    Nation's ability to patrol our borders, particularly in less-populated
    areas. Southern New Mexico is already the site of ongoing UAV flights
    out of the Las Cruces International Airport. This airport is the
    headquarters of New Mexico's emerging UAV Center of Excellence, the
    newly formed joint regional UAV Systems and Operations Validation
    Facility (USOVF), a partnership between the 46th Test Group at Holloman
    Air Force Base and the Physical Science Laboratory of New Mexico State
    University. The USOVF is pre-approved by the Federal Aviation
    Administration for file and fly in a regional flight area of 300,000
    square miles in the western United States. The Las Cruces International
    Airport is situated less than 40 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border, and
    in a central location among U.S. border states. What do you anticipate
    will be the size and scope of the Department of Homeland Security's
    deployment of UAV's on our borders?
        Answer. BTS has asked the Science and Technology Directorate to
    evaluate the use of UAVs in a Border and Transportation Security
    environment. S&T was also asked to evaluate other potential
    applications.
        Question. What funding and facilities will the Department need for
    a UAV program?
        Answer. Until the requirements have been scoped to determine the
    feasibility and extent of a UAV program, we cannot predict what amount
    of funding and the type of facilities the Department will need to
    implement a UAV program.
        Question. On what timeline will the Department implement this
    initiative?
        Answer. At this time, it is unknown what the timeline will be for
    the Department to implement this type of initiative. A proposed project
    plan including milestones and deliverables is expected to be ready for
    review by June 2003. The project plan will discuss the BTS-specific
    project as well as strategies in developing UAV initiatives in the
    near, mid, and long term for DHS venues such as borders and ports.
        Question. Based upon the characteristics of the Las Cruces, New
    Mexico International Airport, could you provide an assessment of its
    potential for utilization by the Department of Homeland Security for
    serving as a platform for the deployment of UAV's for Homeland Security
    purposes?
        Answer. Based upon the description of the Las Cruces, New Mexico
    International Airport, the facility appears to have potential for
    serving as a platform for UAV deployment for Homeland Security
    purposes. After UAV program feasibility, requirements and scope is
    determined a more detailed assessment on available testing and
    deployment facilities needs to be made.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell

        Question. In your testimony, you mentioned the significant success
    of the Container Security Initiative (``CSI'') in helping to eliminate
    the threat of terrorist attacks by means of oceangoing sea containers.
    Will the CSI also help in the detection of items such as illicit drugs
    and counterfeit merchandise in addition to cargo that could be a
    potential terrorist threat?
        Answer. BCBP screens the data and information for all cargo
    containers arriving in the United States each year; and closely
    scrutinizes and examines all shipments identified as high risk. BCBP
    has developed a multi-layered process to target high-risk shipments
    while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and cargo.
        Our multi-layered approach involves electronic manifest
    information, partnerships, Automated Targeting System (ATS), the human
    factor, and non-intrusive inspection technology.
        The BCBP goal is not to search a specific percentage of cargo. BCBP
    thoroughly screens and ultimately examines 100 percent of shipments
    that pose a risk to our country.
        Question. Do changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System
    Threat Level have an effect on the BCBP's mission priorities? If so,
    what effect do threat level changes have on the BCBP's enforcement of
    intellectual property rights?
        Answer. During times of ``ALERT LEVEL ORANGE'' or greater BCBP's
    main focus of operation will be that of detection and interdiction of
    terrorist entities and weapons of mass destruction. However, the BCBP
    continues to work hard on its other key mission priorities that include
    but are not limited to matters relative to intellectual property
    rights. The interdiction of counterfeit goods remains one of six
    priority trade areas for BCBP. The Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    continue our collaborative efforts of detection, interdiction and
    investigation of counterfeit goods. Through the collective efforts of
    employees at over 300 ports of entry, BCBP continues to target,
    intercept and seize shipments of goods that violate U.S. patent and
    trademark laws and regulations. A multi-disciplined IPR Working Group
    is currently working to improve the agency's targeting of shipments
    that may potentially contain counterfeit goods. This will be
    accomplished by identifying risk factors, focusing on high-risk
    products and implementing a coordinated targeting initiative of
    containerized freight to detect, deter and interdict the movement of
    counterfeit products.
        Question. I understand that the former Customs Service has
    participated in the Treasury Department's Operation Green Quest, which
    seeks to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the financial sources of
    terrorist funding. The findings of that investigation indicate that one
    of the many criminal enterprises used to fund terrorist organizations
    is the sale of counterfeit merchandise. Could you please describe what
    information you have about the extent of the connection between
    intellectual property theft and terrorist financing and what the BCBP
    is doing to counter this threat?
        Answer. Operation Green Quest investigations have revealed that a
    variety of criminal activities serve as funding sources for various
    criminal elements, some of which are alleged to have ties to terrorist
    organizations. Among these are violations of laws protecting
    intellectual property rights and prohibiting the manufacture,
    trafficking and sale of counterfeit merchandise. The Bureau of
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) is conducting several on-
    going investigations involving the use of proceeds derived from the
    sale and trafficking of counterfeit merchandise, alleged to support
    designated terrorist organizations. BICE is committed to investigating
    any violation of Federal law that may be used to fund criminal
    enterprises.
        Question. Some in industry fear that an unintended consequence of
    merging the Customs Service into the BCBP has been a reduction in the
    number of inspectors assigned to detect counterfeit merchandise. Have
    there been reassignments in the BCBP that have diverted personnel from
    intellectual property enforcement to other functions? If so, how does
    the BCBP plan to balance its traditional missions, including protecting
    American businesses from theft of their intellectual property, with the
    Bureau's primary mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons
    from entering the United States?
        Answer. Yes, there have been some reassignments of personnel due to
    the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's new primary mission of
    preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
    States. However, BCBP continues to work hard on its other key mission
    priorities that include but are not limited to matters relative to
    intellectual property rights. The interdiction of counterfeit goods
    remains one of six priority trade areas for BCBP. BCBP continues its
    collaborative efforts of detection, interdiction and investigation of
    counterfeit goods with BICE.
        Through the collective efforts of employees at more than 300 ports
    of entry, BCBP continues to target, intercept and seize shipments of
    goods that violate U.S. patent and trademark laws and regulations. A
    multi-disciplined IPR Working Group is currently working to improve the
    agency's targeting of shipments that may potentially contain
    counterfeit goods. This will be accomplished by identifying risk
    factors, focusing on high-risk products and implementing a coordinated
    targeting initiative of containerized freight to detect, deter and
    interdict the movement of counterfeit products.
        BCBP anticipates bringing on-board approximately 1,700 new
    Inspector hires by the end of fiscal year 2003. As these new Inspectors
    are brought on-board, trained and placed in ports of entry throughout
    the country they will increase the number of personnel BCBP will have
    at its disposal to focus on the important mission of counterfeit goods
    detection and interdiction. Under the IPR Trade Strategic Plan,
    developed by the former Customs Service's IPR Working Group, BCBP is
    providing its field personnel with the additional knowledge they
    require for IPR enforcement through advanced fraud and IPR law,
    procedures and enforcement training.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

                      qualified antiterrorism technologies
        Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Sections 862) provided
    the Department of Homeland Security with authority to compile a list of
    ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' that would qualify or receive
    certain protection under that Act. Has this list been compiled? If not,
    why?
        Answer. The list of ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' has
    not yet been compiled. The regulations to govern implementation of the
    SAFETY Act must be completed before the SAFETY Act can be implemented.
    Promulgation of these regulations is a high priority, and DHS is
    working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to finalize an
    initial set of SAFETY Act regulations. We expect to publish these
    regulations for comment very shortly. Following the public comment
    period, the regulations will be finalized and issued. As soon as the
    regulations are issued, applications can be made to DHS for
    consideration of possible technologies that are determined to meet the
    criteria set forth in Subtitle G, Sec. 862.
        Question. If this list has been compiled, can Members of this
    Committee get a copy of this list?
        Answer. The list of ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' has
    not yet been compiled. The regulations to govern implementation of the
    SAFETY Act must be completed before the SAFETY Act can be implemented.
    Promulgation of these regulations is a high priority, and DHS is
    working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to finalize an
    initial set of SAFETY Act regulations.
        Question. How would a company that has an antiterrorism technology
    be considered for approval?
        Answer. DHS has developed plans for both an immediate
    implementation path, and for a longer-term ``ideal state'' process, to
    implement the SAFETY Act. Public notification of the application
    process and of the select categories of technologies that will be
    considered for certification will be made through the DHS website after
    regulations are issued.
        Question. Do they need to wait for the rulemaking process to be
    completed to apply for approval?
        Answer. Yes, companies will need to wait until after the rulemaking
    process has been completed. DHS does not yet have an application or
    approval process in place. Final application and approval processes are
    contingent upon issuance of regulations. DHS wants to ensure that
    applicants are well informed about requirements so that they can make
    informed decisions regarding submitting their technologies for
    consideration
        Question. If so, when will that process be completed?
        Answer. Until DHS and OMB have completed their review and issued
    guidance for the actual implementation of the SAFETY Act, it is not
    possible to determine an actual date for completing the process.
    However, the Department does place a high priority on completing the
    necessary guidance and regulations and is prepared to act quickly after
    issuance of the guidance.
                                border security
        Question. This Directorate arguably has one of the toughest jobs in
    the Department. Ideally, if this Directorate performs its job to
    perfection, then the concerns of terrorists coming into our country to
    attack our citizens or our infrastructure are reduced to a great
    extent. With 7,500 miles of land borders with Canada and Mexico and
    95,000 miles of coastline to keep watch over, short of building a large
    wall around the country, how much success have you had in strengthening
    our border security?
        Answer. The priority mission BCBP is to detect and prevent
    terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States at and
    between Ports of Entry (POEs) while simultaneously facilitating
    legitimate trade and travel.
        In order to carry out its priority mission, BCBP has developed and
    is implementing Smart Border initiatives with other Nations and with
    the private sector, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
    the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), NEXUS, and
    the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program, and will continue to push our
    zone of security outwards.
        Our layered inspection process and the components of a Smart Border
    include:
      --Advance electronic information;
      --Automated targeting tools;
      --Identifying and facilitating low-risk travelers and shipments;
      --Non-intrusive inspection technology;
      --Industry partnerships;
      --Training; and
      --Pushing security beyond our borders.
        BCBP uses various large-scale, portable and hand-held technologies
    in different combinations to substantially increase the likelihood that
    a nuclear or radiological weapon or weapons grade material will be
    detected. We have identified and are deploying nuclear and radiological
    detection equipment to include personal radiation detectors, portal
    radiation monitors and radiation isotope identifier devices.
        In combination with our layered enforcement process, these tools
    currently provide BCBP with significant capacity to detect nuclear or
    radiological materials.
        Additional initiatives include, but are not limited to:
      --Training to further develop a highly skilled and trained workforce;
      --Sensors to remotely monitor low volume ports of entry; and
      --Exchange of intelligence and information to identify potential
            nuclear and radiological smuggling threats.
        Our goal is to examine 100 percent of all high-risk cargo and
    conveyances and to screen all high-risk people, cargo and conveyances
    for radiation.
        The Border Patrol, a component of the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection, is responsible for preventing the illegal entry of any
    persons crossing between the ports of entry along the 8,000 miles of
    international border with Canada and Mexico. To accomplish this
    enormous mission, there are currently over 10,000 agents deployed on
    the border to deter, detect, and apprehend any illegal entrants at the
    border. These dedicated agents have historically arrested in excess of
    1,000,000 illegal entrants annually. In order to improve the
    enforcement effectiveness of these agents, the use of technology and
    enhanced detection systems are continuing to be deployed along the
    border. In addition to the technology, additional border barriers, high
    intensity lighting units and improved border roads have been used to
    assist the agents in providing the maximum in border security measures
    between the ports of entry. The success of these measures has recently
    lead to reductions in illegal entry arrests along certain major border
    areas, as well as the continued disruption of organized smuggling
    efforts on the border.
        Question. Are any of these projects visible to our country's
    citizens to make them feel safer?
        Answer. BCBP has developed a multi-layered process to target high-
    risk shipments while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and
    cargo. Our Smart Border initiatives include components that are
    invisible to a majority of the traveling public. These include
    cooperative efforts with other Nations to push security beyond our
    borders, advance electronic information, automated targeting tools,
    intelligence and partnering with industry.
        Portions of our layered enforcement process are highly visible to
    the general public. These include our inventory of hand-held, portable
    and large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies deployed to
    our Nation's air, land and seaports of entry, as well as the additional
    personnel and canine resources necessary to support the technology.
        Many of the Border Patrol's newest assets are visible to the
    citizens who reside in our many border communities. Those assets
    include the latest in state of the art helicopters, which frequently
    patrol over these communities. In addition, there are infrastructure
    improvements in fencing, checkpoint facilities and expanded canine
    units for locating persons and contraband hidden in vehicles and train
    boxcars. Also visible to our citizens is the increase in the number of
    agents patrolling in marked sedans and four-wheeled drive trucks along
    the border. In addition, every Border Patrol sector has a community
    out-reach program to educate and inform the local communities of the
    activities of the Border Patrol and to reassure the citizens of the
    Patrol's efforts in providing security along the border of the country.
    While many of the assets used by the Border Patrol are not readily
    visible to the public, such as surveillance and detection equipment,
    the results of the increased presence of agents along the border
    continues to be favorably noted by the local media and civic
    organizations in many border communities.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                            expiration of cobra fees
        Question. The COBRA fees--which fund nearly all overtime for the
    legacy Customs inspectors among others--expire at the end of this
    fiscal year. Have you submitted legislation to the appropriate
    authorizing committees and discussed with them the need for the
    extension of these fees? Also, what contingency plans, if any, do you
    have in place to cover the costs of the current COBRA-funded functions
    should the fees not be extended in time?
        Answer. We have briefed both the House Ways and Means Committee and
    the Senate Finance Committee staffs on the need for an extension of the
    COBRA fees, and both Committees have developed proposals to extend the
    fees. The expiration of the COBRA fees will present numerous problems
    for BCBP, as well as fee paying parties-in-interest. Other existing
    statutes require that airlines be billed for overtime services and
    preclearance (19 USC 267 and 31 USC 9701) and that foreign trade zones
    and bonded warehouses be billed for inspectional and supervision
    services (19 USC 81n and 19 USC 1555). Other charges, such as fees for
    reimbursement of compensation of boarding officers under 19 USC 261
    will also need to be reinstated. These statutes are held in abeyance
    while the COBRA fees are in effect (see 19 USC 58c(e)(6)). While the
    reimbursements from these other statutes would offset some of the
    losses from the expired COBRA fees, the amounts are not expected to be
    significant. If the COBRA fees expire, service to international
    passengers and the trade would need to be reduced to a level
    commensurate with available funding.
        It should also be noted that the failure to reauthorize the fees
    provided for under the COBRA statute (19 USC 58c) will result in an
    additional loss in collections of approximately $1 billion annually.
    This represents the Merchandise Processing Fees, which are deposited
    into the General Fund of the Treasury as an offset to the commercial
    operations portion of the BCBP budget.
     legacy customs service and immigration and naturalization service fees
        Question. A significant portion of the budgets of the new Bureaus
    of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement are based on the assumed collection of fees from the legacy
    Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service. What
    happens if these fees do not materialize or materialize at levels lower
    than estimated? How do you intend to bridge that funding gap should one
    occur?
        Answer. If funding shortages occur because of smaller fee receipts,
    BCBP will adjust the level of inspection services accordingly in order
    to function within available resources.
                     anti-dumping authority (bice and bcbp)
        Question. What is the expected cost in fiscal year 2003 of
    administering the anti-dumping authority in section 754 of the Tariff
    Act of 1930 (19 USC 1675c)?
        Answer. While enforcement of the Tariff Act is a major priority of
    the BCBP, its efforts to enforce this legislation cut across many
    different programs and organizations which are concurrently performing
    a variety of trade compliance functions within BCBP. Therefore, the
    cost of BCBP's enforcement efforts in this area is not easily tracked
    or monitored in a way that enables BCBP to provide a quick and easy
    answer to this question. Ultimately, any answer would be an estimate of
    BCBP's costs.
                                budget documents
        Question. The budget justification documents for BCBP and BICE do
    not include detailed legacy information on the agencies/accounts broken
    out in a manner similar to that which used to be provided by the former
    Customs Service. Was information provided to the Department by the
    former Customs Service staff prepared in that format? Please provide
    the Subcommittee with a copy of that submission to assist us in tracing
    the budgets from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. The former Customs Service did not provide a draft of the
    fiscal year 2004 budget to the Department in its traditional format.
                               dhs first 100 days
        Question. Secretary Ridge noted in his list of the Department's
    accomplishments for the 1st 100 days that BCBP had ``acquired and
    deployed additional ``A-STAR'' and ``HUEY'' helicopters to bolster
    enforcement efforts along the U.S. Southern border''. With what fiscal
    year funds were these aircraft purchased? Are other rotary or fixed-
    wing aircraft in the procurement pipeline? If so, where is their
    planned deployment?
        Answer. The purchase of the additional `A-STAR' helicopters was
    made in fiscal year 2002 with funding received from counter-terrorism
    supplemental appropriations in that year. The `HUEY' helicopters were
    obtained through the military on-loan program for special operations
    and tactical training requiring the mission capabilities of that
    aircraft. The deployment of the `HUEY' helicopters to bolster border
    enforcement operations occurred in fiscal year 2002.
                          aqi fumigation investigation
        Question. The Agriculture Department's Animal and Plant Health
    Inspection Service--Agriculture Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program was
    transferred by law to the Department of Homeland Security. However, the
    investigators who follow-up, review and investigate the importation of
    prohibited goods from prohibited countries remain part of the
    Agriculture Department. Similarly, the personnel responsible for
    fumigation, following the discovery of pests, remain at USDA. Does this
    make sense? Is the Administration considering a legislative fix to
    correct this contradiction?
        Answer. The separation of mutually dependent program functions,
    such as the USDA investigators and personnel responsible for
    fumigation, from the AQI program transferred to the DHS is problematic
    and requires high levels of cooperation, communication, and
    coordination at multiple levels. To facilitate this, DHS and USDA
    addressed issues early by including relevant Articles in a Memorandum
    of Agreement (MOA) required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
    Specifically, there are Articles for separating functions and then
    coordinating these functions once separated. Further, additional and
    more specific agreements are necessary and are being developed. The MOA
    will be periodically reviewed and modified as mutually agreed to by DHS
    and USDA. Through the MOA and additional, more specific agreements, DHS
    and USDA will have an opportunity to re-adjust the assignment of
    program functions and responsibilities to maximize collective ability
    to carry out respective missions. Program officials from both DHS and
    USDA are working together to accomplish this. Legislative fixes offer
    another means to accomplish necessary and beneficial re-adjustments and
    changes. DHS Agricultural Inspection Policy and Program staff is not
    currently working on developing legislative fixes.
                            deployment of rail vacis
        Question. I understand that the Department has procured some rail
    VACIS systems that are awaiting deployment along the Northern Border.
    How many systems are procured (or are being procured with fiscal year
    2003 Omnibus and fiscal year 2003 Supplemental funds) and where are
    they planned to be deployed? How many rail VACIS systems are provided
    for in the fiscal year 2004 budget request?
        Answer. With budget requests made prior to fiscal year 2003, BCBP
    procured fourteen rail VACIS systems; however, only five have been
    installed (all along the Southern Border). The remaining nine rail
    VACIS systems will be installed later this year at the following
    locations:
      --El Paso (Rail), Texas
      --El Paso (Del Norte), Texas
      --Calexico (West Rail), California
      --Blaine, Washington
      --International Falls, Minnesota
      --Portal, North Dakota
      --Buffalo, New York
      --Noyes (#1), Minnesota
      --Noyes (#2), Minnesota
        BCBP is procuring five additional rail VACIS systems with the
    fiscal year 2003 Omnibus and fiscal year 2003 Supplemental funds. All
    five of these rail VACIS systems will be installed along the Northern
    Border. These rail VACIS systems will be deployed at the following
    Northern Border locations:
      --Eastport, Idaho
      --Walkersville, Canada (Detroit, Michigan)
      --Rouses Point, New York (Champlain)
      --Sarnia #2, Canada (Port Huron, Michigan)
      --Sarnia #1, Canada (Port Huron, Michigan)
        While no rail VACIS systems are scheduled for procurement via the
    fiscal year 2004 budget request, fourteen additional rail VACIS systems
    are planned for future deployment along the Northern Border pending
    available funding.
                              inspection personnel
        Question. The President's fiscal year 2004 budget proposal for the
    Bureau for Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) is $5.6 billion. How
    many new inspection personnel are requested within the President's
    Budget?
        Answer. BCBP has requested 1,142 inspection personnel FTE in the
    fiscal year 2004 President's Budget.
        Question. How many new Customs inspectors have been added (net)
    since September 11, 2001? How much increased border and port coverage
    have they provided?
        Answer. From September 11, 2001, to May 3, 2003, the number of
    Inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers on-board and stationed at
    ports of entry increased by 1,380 (+1,310 Inspectors and +70 Canine
    Enforcement Officers), increasing the overall port coverage by 16.9
    percent.
        Question. We have heard reports that many of the new hires are
    being assigned to work in place of senior inspectors, rather than to
    augment and increase border coverage across the country. Is this
    correct? If so, why are you deploying relatively inexperienced
    personnel at critical locations across the country?
        Answer. New hires are not being assigned to work in place of senior
    inspectors. New resources are being placed strategically to increase
    border coverage, meet workload demands and increase the utilization of
    technology. New hires work side-by-side with the more seasoned
    inspectors and receive formal, intensive training on all aspects of the
    position prior to being allowed to work independently. Additionally,
    management oversight is provided for each and every inspector.
                               staffing increases
        Question. The USA PATRIOT Act authorized a tripling of legacy
    Customs and Immigration staffing at our Nation's borders. Since passage
    of the Act, how many new personnel have been brought on board and how
    close have these hires come in meeting the authorization goal?
        Answer. As of May 1, 2003, the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection had 2,563 Inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers (CEOs)
    stationed at Northern Border Ports of Entry (POEs). This is an increase
    of 58.7 percent since September 11, 2001, at which time the agencies
    had 1,615 Inspectors and CEOs stationed at Northern Border Ports of
    Entry.
                  it transformation to homeland security fund
        Question. I note that $30.21 million is proposed in the fiscal year
    2004 budget request for a fund for Information Technology
    Transformation for the new Department. Is this in is essence a working
    capital fund? Are all DHS agencies contributing to it? If so, in what
    proportion? How was that level of contributed funding determined? What
    was the methodology used?
        Answer. The Information Technology Transformation to Homeland
    Security Fund is not a working capital fund. These appropriated funds
    will be used to extend the BCBP enterprise architecture to provide
    expanded access to Information Technology (IT) capabilities in support
    of the Homeland Security mission and to address IT compatibility and
    interoperability issues that arise during the transition including, but
    not limited to, mission systems, electronic mail, networks,
    collaborative tools, and administrative capabilities. It is imperative
    that IT operability remains stable in order to efficiently meet Customs
    and Border Protection (BCBP) mission requirements.
                                 new technology
        Question. Compromise is not an option when providing for the
    security of our Nation's ports and borders. With the advent of a new
    era where we must be on guard for car and truck bombs, weapons
    smuggling, and radiological and biological threats, it is imperative
    that we set a high standard of threat assessment, detection, and
    prevention. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, has BCBP
    increased the threat detection standards for security at our ports and
    borders, and if so, what new technologies are you using and how have
    they improved security?
        Answer. The priority mission of the Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection (BCBP) is to detect and prevent terrorists and terrorist
    weapons from entering the United States at and between ports of entry
    while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and travel.
        In order to carry out its priority mission, BCBP has developed and
    is implementing Smart Border initiatives with other nations and with
    the private sector, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
    the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), NEXUS, and
    the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program that will continue to push our
    zone of security outwards.
        Our layered inspection process and the components of a Smart Border
    include:
      --Advance electronic information;
      --Automated targeting tools;
      --Identifying and facilitating low-risk travelers and shipments;
      --Non-intrusive inspection technology;
      --Industry partnerships;
      --Training; and
      --Pushing security beyond our borders.
        BCBP uses various large-scale, portable and hand-held technologies
    in different combinations to substantially increase the likelihood that
    a nuclear or radiological weapon or weapons grade material will be
    detected. We have identified and are deploying nuclear and radiological
    detection equipment to include personal radiation detectors, portal
    radiation monitors and radiation isotope identifier devices.
        In combination with our layered enforcement process, these tools
    currently provide BCBP with significant capacity to detect nuclear or
    radiological materials.
                       legacy customs air-marine program
        Question. I understand that while the legacy Customs Air-Marine
    program has been transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement, your Bureau retains certain responsibility for parts of
    the program. Please explain how this has been divided.
        Answer. The Air and Marine Interdiction budget was deliberately
    placed in BICE. Some of the reasons for this decision are:
        Air and Marine staff and capital assets are deployed primarily for
    interdiction. The principal goals of interdiction are to enhance the
    BICE investigative process to prevent terrorist activity and to further
    investigations of major smuggling operations whether they be drug,
    alien, or terrorist in nature.
        As a key part of the BICE integration of the immigration and
    customs enforcement mission with other Federal agencies, OAMI will
    support investigative processes at Coast Guard, Secret Service,
    Emergency Management, TSA, and FPS. OAMI will support investigative
    processes at non-DHS agencies from DEA to FBI.
        The use of OAMI mission and assets must be closely connected to the
    BICE intelligence mission and operations to be effective. It is this
    connection that ensures that the limited air and marine assets are
    effectively deployed to specific targets over a vast sea or border
    resulting in maximum deterrence capability. BICE intelligence based
    operations must be the lynchpin of OAMI strategy.
        Operationally, OAMI is more identified with investigations than
    inspections or surveillance activity. OAMI has historically reported
    through the investigations division of Customs. In fiscal year 2002,
    approximately 60 percent of OAMI flight hours supported customs
    enforcement. With the integration of customs and immigration
    enforcement, we estimate that more than 80 percent of OAMI operational
    flight hours will directly support BICE investigations, foreign
    operations, border and maritime patrols. The remaining 20 percent will
    support transportation of people and assets, as well as training and
    maintenance, and other customers for support flights.
        Based upon the above factors, placement of OAMI within BICE
    accomplishes the objectives of intelligence-based operations; more
    effective support of DHS and inter-agency law enforcement missions; and
    furtherance of investigations of terrorists and other crime syndicates.
    Air and Marine support of border protection functions will continue
    under this placement and will be formalized in an upcoming management
    directive. The proper placement of all our programs remains subject to
    periodic review.
                             border patrol airwing
        Question. Your Bureau now includes all Border Patrol air assets.
    Please provide the Subcommittee with a breakout of the Border Patrol
    air assets and where they are located. Are any funds requested in the
    fiscal year 2004 budget for new aircraft? If not, what is the base
    level of funding in the budget for operation and maintenance of the
    existing assets?
        Answer. The BCBP/Border Patrol air wing has 111 aircraft (78
    Helicopters and 33 Fixed-wing) dedicated to patrolling the northern and
    southern border. Border Patrol aircraft are stationed at all Border
    Patrol sectors on the northern border, southern border, and Puerto
    Rico. There are no funds requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget for
    new aircraft. The base level of funding in fiscal year 2003 for
    operation and maintenance of aircraft is $21,491,000.
               adjustments to the fiscal year 2004 budget request
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 BCBP budget request includes
    reductions totaling over $301 million for ``Non-recurring costs for
    fiscal year 2003 Initiatives'' and ``Adjustments for discontinuing Low-
    Value Efforts''. Please break out in detail the specific, one-time
    fiscal year 2003 costs for non-recurring initial equipment costs and
    other items that you are reducing to achieve these savings.
        Answer. The following chart details the one-time fiscal year 2003
    non-recurring initial equipment costs and discontinued low-value
    efforts that achieve savings:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       NON-RECURRING COSTS                        AMOUNT
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Construction............................................    $145,000,000
    Border Patrol Transfer Costs............................      25,000,000
    Northern Border Hardening Equipment.....................      28,798,000
    Northern Border NEXUS Equipment.........................       4,760,000
    Northern Border NII Technology..........................      12,759,000
    mmigration Fees.........................................       9,107,000
    Maritime Port Security NII Technology...................      25,481,000
    Security Infrastructure Technology......................      11,454,000
    Helicopters.............................................       8,000,000
                                                             ---------------
          TOTAL NON-RECURRING COSTS.........................     270,359,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        During the fiscal year 2004 budget formulation process, the Bureau
    of Customs and Border Protection identified $31,540,000 in savings.
    These savings were realized by activities such as reforming and
    simplifying the Drawback process, redirecting field analyst specialist
    positions to border security, and realigning resources that support the
    Trade community. In addition, other program areas where savings were
    realized include the Intern Program, Labor and Employee Relations,
    Mandatory Fitness Program, Customs Health Enhancement Program,
    redistribution and cross servicing of field work, and the processing of
    anti-dumping/countervailing and harbor maintenance fee refunds.
                   private mail radiation detection equipment
        Question. The Department has provided its employees who inspect
    U.S. Postal Service mail with radiation detection equipment. Does it
    also provide similar equipment for employees who inspect United Parcel
    Service and FedEx mail? If not, why not? Is there a plan to provide
    this equipment in the future?
        Answer. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
    personnel are equipped with radiation detection devices at FedEx and
    United Parcel Service (UPS) facilities. At the present time BCBP
    personnel use both Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD) and Radiation
    Isotope Identification Devices to screen cargo at both FedEx and UPS
    facilities.
        Both UPS and FedEx are in the process of procuring and installing
    company owned radiation detection devices at overseas locations. Once
    completely installed this equipment will allow these companies to
    screen all incoming cargo and parcels before entering the commerce of
    the United States. Both companies will be relying on several types of
    equipment, such as Hand-Held Devices and Radiation Portal Monitors, at
    their overseas facilities. The types of radiation screening devices
    used will depend on the size of the facility and amount of cargo
    screened.
                         alternative shoulder holsters
        Question. Recently, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
    informed the employee representatives of Customs personnel (the
    National Treasury Employees Union) that the Department would no longer
    allow employees to use ``alternative firearms holsters'' as long as
    they are properly trained in the use of the holster. By and large,
    ``alternative firearms holsters'' have been used by women in the late
    stages of pregnancy. The shoulder holster enables them to continue to
    carry a firearm in the performance of their work. It seems that this 12
    year old alternative holster provision has provided a reasonable
    accommodation between the needs of the legacy Customs Service and the
    interests of women who desire to continue working while pregnant. Why
    has Department decided to not continue the use of the alternative
    shoulder holster for pregnant legacy Customs personnel?
        Answer. A single request was made through the Office of Field
    Operations (OFO) for an alternate firearms holster accommodation on May
    24, 2002. This request was forwarded to the Firearms and Tactical
    Training Division (FTTD). The FTTD conducted an evaluation of the
    Safariland model 1060 shoulder holster that was named in the request to
    determine its suitability for use by pregnant OFO uniformed personnel.
    The primary evaluation criteria used to determine suitability was
    safety and feasibility.
        There were numerous safety and training issues related to the
    shoulder holster. The shoulder holster is designed for the concealed
    carrying of firearms, and does not possess retention characteristics
    needed for officer safety for exposed carry. The weapon's grip is
    presented toward the front making it readily accessible to a subject
    during a physical confrontation, and the retention devices on this
    holster are easy to defeat. Also, the shoulder holster would not be
    feasible for wear with the authorized maternity uniforms such as class
    seven (7) maternity shirts and trousers, and the class seven (7)
    maternity jumper. This is because the suspender type clips could not be
    fastened to the belt or pants as the belt or pants would be under the
    maternity shirt.
        The FTTD concluded that given the inherent risks and difficulties
    associated with the use of this type of holster, they did not recommend
    the use of it for OFO officers in uniform with close interaction with
    the public.
                               transfer of funds
        Question. Has BCBP been required to transfer any funds to the
    Department? If so, how much and for what purposes? Are any future
    transfers to the Department anticipated?
        Answer. Yes, BCBP has transferred funds to the Department. BCBP
    transferred $30 million to DHS for start-up costs. We anticipate two
    future transfers to DHS as follows: $900,000 for Departmental
    enterprise architecture and $21 million to assist with the
    Transportation Security Administration shortfall.
                                personnel issues
        Question. The Department of Homeland Security has created a
    separation between Customs Agents and Inspectors who work at various
    ports of entry. Is there a plan in place for continuing the
    relationship between Inspectors and Agents? Will Agents continue to
    respond directly to airport seizures and arrests? Will the new
    reporting requirements hinder investigative and enforcement activity?
        Answer. Although the Department of Homeland Security created a
    separation between Agent and Inspector, the working relationship
    remains strong between BCBP and BICE and enforcement actions are being
    coordinated. Additionally, BCBP inherited the Senior Inspector Program.
    The Senior Inspector position was created for high-risk ports of entry
    to be responsible for the enforcement of the Immigration and
    Nationality Act and other criminal statutes by identifying,
    investigating, apprehending, and prosecuting persons who attempt and
    abet illegal entry into the United States. BCBP plans to maintain the
    Senior Inspector program to assist in meeting the challenges of
    coordinating the enforcement functions of three formerly distinct
    agencies, but BCBP will continue to refer customs-related
    investigations and arrests to ensure no disruption of enforcement and
    investigative activity.
        Question. I understand that the legacy Customs Special Agents who
    formerly conducted criminal investigations in the Internal Affairs (IA)
    Division, have also been transferred to ICE. Who will now conduct those
    investigations? Will this merger inhibit the response to internal
    affairs investigative matters? Are you concerned about the loss of this
    investigative expertise which has been used to ``clean up'' past
    corruption problems within the former Customs Service?
        Answer. The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland
    Security will be responsible for coordinating all investigations.
    Integrity has always been a cornerstone of the legacy BCBP
    organizations and will continue to be one in the future.
                        entry-exit visa tracking system
        Question. The vast majority of the $480 million in funds for the
    ``entry-exit'' system are proposed as part of the CBP budget request.
    It is my understanding, however, that you are not the bureau in charge
    of designing and implementing the system. Why? Which Bureau is supposed
    to be in charge of designing and implementing the program?
        Answer. The Undersecretary of the Border and Transportation
    Security has determined that the design and implementation of the
    ``entry-exit'' system will be managed at his level.
                                security detail
        Question. Given your past positions in government, as well as your
    heading up the agency most closely involved in tracking and stopping
    narco-terrorists, do you have a security detail? If not, why not? Has a
    threat assessment been done to determine whether you or other agency
    heads at your level require security details?
        Answer. The Commissioner does not now have a security detail.
    Regular risk assessments are conducted to determine if a security
    detail is required.
                                 national guard
        Question. The National Guard has played a critical role in
    assisting the former Customs Service in inspection activities at our
    borders--including inspecting shipping containers and operating VACIS
    equipment. This role has continued with the transformation to the new
    Department, however, I am concerned about reports that the Guard may
    soon cease its operations in this regard. What is the status of
    National Guard cooperation with your Bureau? Will they continue to
    assist the Bureau with inspection activities and, if so, for how long?
    Has the Defense Department attempted to curtail the Guard's role with
    the Bureau?
        Answer. In September 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD)
    officially informed the U.S. Customs Service, now Bureau of Customs and
    Border Protection (BCBP), that they would discontinue funding National
    Guard counternarcotics support of BCBP's Cargo and Mail Inspection
    operations (the only BCBP operations supported by National Guard
    soldiers) effective September 30, 2003. DOD subsequently changed this
    date to September 30, 2004. The reason for discontinuing the National
    Guard support, as stated by DOD officials, is that they wish to phase
    out all National Guard counternarcotics support that does not require
    unique military skills.
        As a result of the September 2002 notification, aggressive hiring
    strategies that will offset any negative impact of losing the support
    of the National Guard were implemented. Through regular appropriations,
    supplemental funding and an overall increase in our Inspector corps as
    a result of the March 1, 2003 transition to BCBP, our agency is
    prepared to do without National Guard support beginning October 1,
    2004.
                               personnel breakout
        Question. In your testimony at the hearing you stated that the
    Bureau was requesting funds for 41,000 FTE for fiscal year 2004. You
    also said that on March 1 approximately 6,000 legacy INS, 3,000 legacy
    APHIS and 11,000 Border Patrol personnel were incorporated into the new
    BCBP. Please provide the subcommittee with a breakdown for fiscal year
    2002-2004 of the approximate 41,000 FTE requested by function--both in
    a comparable breakdown from the legacy agencies as well as by current
    function (i.e. inspection activity, Border Patrol, etc.)
        Answer. The fiscal year 2004 President's Budget requests funding
    for the Department consistent with the enacted Homeland Security Act.

                           BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION INSPECTIONAL PERSONNEL FTE
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                       Inspectional
                                                                       Inspectional    Inspectional    FTE funded in
                                                                      FTE Authorized   FTE Expected     the fiscal
                                                                      in fiscal year     on Board        year 2004
                                                                           2003        September 30,   Appropriation
                                                                                           2003           Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Direct Appropriation............................................          19,780          20,070          20,298
    Reimbursable....................................................           1,664           1,664           1,664
                                                                     -----------------------------------------------
          TOTAL.....................................................          21,444          21,734          21,962
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION IMPORT AND ENTRY/LIQUIDATION FTE
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Import and
                                                                        Import and      Import and        Entry/
                                                                          Entry/          Entry/        Liquidation
                                                                        Liquidation     Liquidation    FTE funded in
                                                                      FTE Authorized   FTE Expected     the fiscal
                                                                      in fiscal year     on Board        year 2004
                                                                           2003        September 30,   Appropriation
                                                                                           2003           Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Direct Appropriation............................................           1,570           1,570           1,584
    Reimbursable....................................................              39              39              39
                                                                     -----------------------------------------------
          TOTAL.....................................................           1,609           1,609           1,609
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS FTE
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                       Intelligence
                                                                       Intelligence    Intelligence     Analyst FTE
                                                                        Analyst FTE     Analyst FTE    funded in the
                                                                       Authorized in    Expected on     fiscal year
                                                                        fiscal year        Board           2004
                                                                           2003        September 30,   Appropriation
                                                                                           2003           Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Direct Appropriation............................................              51              51              66
    Reimbursable....................................................               7               7               7
                                                                     -----------------------------------------------
          TOTAL.....................................................              58              58              73
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION COMPUTER SPECIALIST FTE
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                         Computer
                                                                         Computer        Computer     Specialist FTE
                                                                      Specialist FTE  Specialist FTE   funded in the
                                                                       Authorized in    Expected on     fiscal year
                                                                        fiscal year        Board           2004
                                                                           2003        September 30,   Appropriation
                                                                                           2003           Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Direct Appropriation............................................             298             298             298
    Reimbursable....................................................               6               6               6
                                                                     -----------------------------------------------
          TOTAL.....................................................             304             304             304
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FTE
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                      Administrative
                                                                      Administrative  Administrative        and
                                                                            and             and         Operational
                                                                        Operational     Operational     Support FTE
                                                                        Support FTE     Support FTE    funded in the
                                                                       Authorized in    Expected on     fiscal year
                                                                        fiscal year        Board           2004
                                                                           2003        September 30,   Appropriation
                                                                                           2003           Request
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Direct Appropriation............................................           5,225           5,225           5,225
    Customs Reimbursable............................................             116             116             116
                                                                     -----------------------------------------------
          TOTAL.....................................................           5,341           5,341           5,440
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            ins construction backlog
        Question. In your April 30 letter to me regarding the deployment of
    570 additional Border Patrol agents at our nation's borders, you stated
    that the fiscal year 2004 budget request pending before the Congress
    does not request ``new enhancement construction funds''. You further
    state that, ``Additional requirements related to construction projects
    for the Border Patrol will be addressed in future budget cycles''.
        On May 14, 2002, the President signed the Enhanced Border Security
    Act of 2002, authorizing significant improvements in our efforts to
    secure our borders. However, a congressionally mandated June 2000 study
    of our land border ports included a list of 822 projects totaling $784
    million. These projects ranged from overloaded electrical outlets at
    facilities built in the 1930s which are not equipped to accommodate
    21st century computers to a border station in Maine that is literally a
    trailer.
        Commissioner Bonner, the lack of funding for construction projects
    along the border deeply troubles me. Significant expansion of our
    border facilities is anticipated to meet the requirements and deadlines
    specified in the former ``entry-exit'' program. How can we meet these
    deadlines if the Administration does not request the funds to do so?
    Without these funds, how can you be successful? The bulk of the funding
    of this system resides within your Bureau. Do I have your assurance
    that the Department will meet the December 2003 deadline?
        Answer. Secretary Ridge recently outlined the Department's plan to
    create a new entry-exit system backed by 21st century technology called
    the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology system
    (U.S. VISIT). U.S. VISIT is a critical new border security and
    enforcement tool that will capture point of entry and exit information
    on visitors. U.S. VISIT is designed to make entering the United States
    easier for legitimate tourists, students and business travelers, while
    making it more difficult to enter the U.S. illegally through the
    implementation of biometrically authenticated documents. Development
    and deployment of this system will be coordinated by the Undersecretary
    for Border and Transportation Security. The system will be in its first
    phase of operation at international air and sea ports of entry by the
    end of 2003.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

        Question. Many former Customs and INS employees in Vermont and
    throughout the nation remain in a state of limbo, awaiting information
    about how their old agencies will be restructured and what it means for
    them. I think that they would appreciate hearing your perspective as to
    how the combination of your old agency with the INS and numerous other
    agencies is progressing. First, how would you describe the progress
    that has been made in creating the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement? What has been the most difficult aspect? How will the
    command structure differ from the framework that Customs used?
        Answer. The command structure of the Bureau of Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement is being determined by Michael Garcia, Assistant
    Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in
    conjunction with the Undersecretary of Border and Transportation
    Security and Secretary Ridge.
        Question. Second, can you give the Committee your impressions about
    the process of integrating the old INS, Customs, and other agencies
    into the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection? What has been the
    most difficult aspect there?
        Answer. BCBP is in the process of conducting both a merger and a
    divestiture of agencies and functions. This process is going well,
    employee morale is high, efficiency has increased and we have
    established a single chain of command to the port of entry level. As in
    any endeavor of this magnitude, the most difficult challenge is
    answering our employees questions and providing them with information
    at the appropriate time.
        Question. Third, in either bureau, where the old agencies bring
    overlapping personnel, such as administrative support staff, how is
    that being handled? Where INS and Customs personnel were performing the
    same task before March 1, what criteria do you think should be used to
    determine who should perform that task now?
        Answer. BCBP and BICE are working together to determine where
    common services can be shared in the future. We believe that there are
    opportunities to accomplish this.
                                     ______

       Questions Submitted to the Transportation Security Administration

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                               personnel cutbacks
        Question. On April 30, TSA announced the reduction of 6,000 airport
    screeners--3,000 by May 2003 and another 3,000 by the end of fiscal
    year 2003--as the Transportation Security Administration works to
    realign the screener workforce and to bring its budget into line. How
    will the reduction of screeners affect security? Does TSA have, or will
    it conduct, any assessment of current screening needs to verify that
    these reduced levels are appropriate?
        Answer. There will be no effect on security. TSA is working to
    optimize both its scheduling, utilizing a mix of full and part-time
    employees. TSA used several staffing models to meet the requirements of
    standing up the organization by late 2002. In early 2003, under the
    mandate of Congress, TSA developed an expedited Phase 1 Reduction
    Methodology which enabled us to start the reduction process as fast as
    possible. A second phase modeling methodology, which takes into account
    essentially all of the variables, is in process and scheduled for
    completion in early June. This second phase modeling effort assesses
    current needs to verify the reduction plans.
        Question. What analysis was initially conducted on what the needs
    would be for aviation security prior to the hiring of the screeners,
    and what did this analysis show, including the number of full-time and
    part-time screener positions that would be required?
        Answer. The initial analysis of screener requirements was based on
    TSA's assessment of the work requirements at each passenger-screening
    checkpoint. As the recruiting, hiring, and deployment process unfolded,
    TSA made adjustments to the number of screeners required to provide the
    necessary level of security at each airport. Although the initial
    workforce requirements analysis was based on a desire to create a
    workforce consisting of both full-time and part-time employees,
    initially TSA encountered a very low interest in part-time
    applications. As a result, TSA hired a preponderance of full-time
    employees to meet the level of security required at each airport, as
    well as to meet the ATSA-mandated screener deployment dates for the
    fully federalized screener workforce. TSA believes that making
    effective use of part-time screening personnel is in the best interest
    of both security and the taxpayer. Most airports have a peak time, or
    several peak times, during which a screening presence is needed beyond
    the normal throughput. The ability to use part-time or split-shift
    personnel during these focused periods is a policy with significant
    possibilities. With the implementation of improved scheduling tools,
    TSA expects to be able to optimize the workforce with the appropriate
    mix of full-time, part-time and split-shift personnel to better match
    travel patterns.
        Question. What other components are being considered to meet the
    budget requirements?
        Answer. All programs within TSA continue to undergo constant
    scrutiny and monitoring in order to align scarce resources to the
    highest priorities and realign anticipated availability to other
    underfunded requirements.
        Question. What will be the amount of the projected savings in
    fiscal year 2003 from the reduction of screeners?
        Answer. TSA's anticipated fiscal year 2003 savings is $32 million
    as a result of the reduction in screeners.
        Question. Concerns have been raised that in the rush to meet the
    statutory deadline of November 19, 2002, for the deployment of Federal
    screeners at all of the Nation's airports that all of the screeners
    hired did not receive a full background check, including a criminal
    history record check. Can you say for certain that all of the screeners
    working in the Nation's airports have received a full background check?
        Answer. More than 98 percent of TSA's current screener workforce
    has received, at a minimum, a fingerprint-based FBI criminal history
    records check. In addition, more than 98 percent of the current
    workforce has undergone the first phase of the ChoicePoint check, which
    includes a search of public records for an applicant's criminal
    history, credit history, and potential links to terrorist activity.
    This check exceeds what is required for nearly every Federal employee
    to begin working.
        Question. Can you describe to the Committee the process of deciding
    which airports would lose screeners, which airports would receive
    additional screeners, and which airports would not be affected?
        Answer. The methodology used in the first round of modeling
    consisted of applying a standard screening model applied to the number
    of screening points within a given airport. The model considered the
    number of screening lanes, and the presence of selectee checkpoint
    screening. Based on the model results, each airport requirement was
    compared with the screener population and the gain or loss was
    determined.
        As the process moves forward, TSA is inviting Federal Security
    Directors, community and airport leaders, and others to provide
    feedback in the form of airport specific information or other factors
    that are expected to drive TSA's upcoming refinement process. TSA will
    evaluate all the newly obtained information and will refine the
    preliminary numbers using this information and originating passenger
    data to arrive at a more accurate reflection of the staffing needs at
    all airports. We will keep you apprised of the results of our on-going
    process to provide efficient, effective screening.
        Question. How can an airport negotiate with TSA if it is believed
    that too many screeners have been cut and will affect the airport's
    ability to provide an adequate amount of security? Is there an appeals
    process that an airport can submit to?
        Answer. The airports and Federal Security Directors have been
    encouraged to highlight unique characteristics of their airports to the
    staffing team within TSA. This team consists of industrial engineers
    and senior management within Aviation Operations. Each appeal is
    carefully considered and the data provided, validated, is used to
    accomplish the final modeling. Specific information on enplanements is
    a major consideration in this modeling.
        Question. A concern among some of the smaller airports is that the
    classification of airports that determines the number of passengers
    handled annually has not been accurately assessed and therefore is
    losing screeners because of it. Will TSA conduct assessments of
    airports to determine that they are categorized correctly?
        Answer. TSA has just completed a preliminary re-categorization of
    all federalized airports. This effort has resulted in several proposed
    category changes that will affect the final screener allocation.
        Question. If an airport can accurately document that it has not
    been categorized correctly how steps can be taken to appeal?
        Answer. TSA welcomes any information that affects the
    categorization of a specific airport. The passenger origination and
    enplanements information is particularly important and is compared with
    DOT statistics to determine the validity of the claim.
                          tsa: increased threat level
        Question. When the National Threat Level is raised, as it was
    before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom from ``Yellow'' to
    ``Orange'', new security directives are issued to airlines and
    airports, such as random vehicle inspections, more stringent
    identification checks, and increased canine patrols to lessen the
    chance of any terrorist incidents. There have been concerns that enough
    guidance has not been given to airport managers to implement increased
    security when the terrorist threat level is raised. How does the
    Transportation Security Administration share threat information, not
    only with airports but also with port security managers, when an
    increase in security is necessary?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Intelligence Service has the
    ability to tailor dissemination based on the nature of the threat. Such
    information can be disseminated to a small, focused group of recipients
    if the threat is specific to a particular transportation asset or
    facility, or it can be provided to a wider audience if the threat could
    impact multiple transportation modes or modal interests.
        Information can be disseminated in the following manner:
      --Information Circulars (IC) inform the various modes (aviation,
            surface a/or maritime) of threat information and provide an
            analytical perspective regarding the credibility, timing,
            location and other available information.
      --Security Directives (SD) issued by TSA operations policy, direct
            air carriers and airports to take specific action designed to
            counter a known threat. Such threat information is provided by
            TSA Intelligence. TSA is currently reviewing the efficacy of
            issuing SDs for other modes at appropriate times.
      --Intelligence Notes
      --Response to Request for Information (RFI)
      --Telephone briefings may be conducted in situations where time is of
            the essence or where the threat is very narrowly focused to a
            particular carrier or geographic location.
      --E-mail Fax notification messages
      --Automated Message Handling System (AMHS)
      --Recipients include, among others, DHS Homeland Security Center, DHS
            Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, TSA Federal
            Security Directors, TSA Area Representatives at overseas
            locations, Federal Air Marshals Service, FAA, DOT, U.S. Coast
            Guard, as well as stakeholders and other elements of the
            aviation and maritime communities.
        Question. Is there a certain procedural checklist to follow in
    order to make sure all possible security precautions have been
    implemented?
        Answer. Each airport has a detailed security plan and its own
    checklist in accordance with its security plan. Specifically how a
    particular airport does this is dependent upon local conditions. The
    directives from TSA are in the context of these plans and current
    operations and are straightforward and easy to understand. TSA relies
    on Federal Security Directors (FSDs) to coordinate with airport
    authorities and to verify and report on airports' compliance with TSA
    directives.
        Question. Will the Transportation Security Administration reimburse
    airports and others for meeting additional requirements such as
    conducting random vehicle searches?
        Answer. TSA views airport security as a partnership between all
    stakeholders at the airport, including the airport authorities. TSA
    also believes that a true partnership implies shared responsibility for
    expenses. TSA continues to work closely with its aviation stakeholders
    in determining which specific types of safeguards are feasible and
    appropriate at each threat level. However, TSA is not planning on using
    its resources to reimburse airports for these costs.
        Question. Have you developed plans for what happens at airports if
    the threat level is elevated to ``Red?'' Will this result in the
    grounding of airliners?
        Answer. Yes. The specific actions to be taken in any increase or
    decrease of threat level are considered Sensitive Security Information
    (SSI) at the minimum. A specific threat may elevate that information to
    the Secret level. Without speaking to all actions that may be taken
    under increased security, there are many steps that can be taken prior
    to stopping air commerce. Each step will be threat based and risk
    managed to determine a level of security appropriate to the threat
    environment.
                  role within department of homeland security
        Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the
    Transportation Security Administration be maintained as a distinct
    entity within the Department of Homeland Security for 2 years from the
    date of enactment. How do you envision the Transportation Security
    Administration's role within the Department of Homeland Security after
    this 2-year period?
        Answer. TSA's mission is a vital component of the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate's responsibilities. To achieve its
    mission, TSA is developing a National Transportation System Security
    Plan (NTSSP) that will explain TSA's vision to complete the important
    task of ensuring the security of all modes of transportation. The NTSSP
    will also lay out how TSA, other DHS components, other Federal
    agencies, state and local authorities, and the private sector will work
    together to ensure system-wide security. The creation and
    implementation of the Plan will involve extensive interaction and
    cooperation with other involved agencies and the private sector.
        TSA's involvement in providing mode-specific security will vary
    across modes based upon assessed needs and determination of TSA's
    responsibilities relative to other DHS organizations. Currently, TSA
    plays a very active operational role in the aviation mode, while we are
    still establishing our capabilities and activities in other modes such
    as highway and mass transit.
        Within DHS, the cooperation and interaction that already exists
    between TSA and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), the
    Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (BICE), the U.S Coast
    Guard and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    Directorate (IAIP) will only grow over the next 2 years.
      --We expect to perform or facilitate a vast number of vulnerability
            assessments in the Transportation Sector under the overall
            oversight of and coordination with IAIP.
      --We expect to greatly increase our use of information and
            intelligence that will be provided by IAIP.
      --We will enhance the tactical cooperation with BCBP that exists now
            at major airports of entry, including joint screening and joint
            training programs--e.g., TSA screeners recognizing drug and
            money contraband.
      --We will continue and increase coordination with BCBP on major
            developing issues such as cargo security and collecting
            passenger name lists, to promote effective security and
            efficient commerce.
      --We will work with BICE where possible to further the investigation
            and enforcement of transportation security concerns and
            violations.
        Also within DHS, the transportation-focused specialists at the
    Transportation Security Labs (TSL) will share information and resources
    with the Science and Technology Directorate. This will leverage the
    efforts of both organizations, while maintaining the benefits of TSL's
    specialization and transportation security focus.
        Question. Do you feel that TSA would function best as a separate
    entity within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate or do
    you believe it should be merged into one of the other functions of this
    Directorate?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration serves a
    distinct need, particularly with respect to aviation. The
    characteristics and security needs of the transportation system are
    often unique from the characteristics and security needs of border
    protection, and from those of immigration and customs enforcement. For
    these reasons, we believe the Nation is best served by protecting the
    transportation system with a dedicated and distinct entity that
    provides the necessary expertise and focus to address the unique
    characteristics and security needs of the transportation system.
        Having said this, we fully agree that the security of the
    transportation system intersects significantly with the security of our
    borders, Ports of Entry, cargo and passengers and the security needs of
    Customs and Immigration. It is very appropriate that the TSA work
    closely and coordinate with the BCBP and the Bureau of Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (BICE), with oversight and guidance from the Under
    Secretary for BTS, as well as in coordination with other DHS
    directorates and agencies. As DHS evolves, the Secretary must continue
    to assess how to best manage our critical mission, including the
    organization of its functions.
                            tsa: guns in the cockpit
        Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the use of
    firearms by pilots in order to defend the flight decks of aircraft
    against criminal violence. The Transportation Security Administration
    has now begun to train pilots on a volunteer basis and recently 44
    pilots have completed training and have been sworn in as Federal flight
    deck officers. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests an increase of over
    $17 million for the training of arming pilots with firearms. What is
    the cost of training each pilot and is such a large increase feasible
    and achievable?
        Answer. The initial cost of training for a Federal Flight Deck
    Officer (FFDO) is approximately $2,000. In addition, the assessment of
    an individual's eligibility to be a FFDO costs approximately $3,000. To
    equip (firearm, holster, lockbox) a trained FFDO costs approximately
    $1,100. Therefore, the total cost to train and deploy an FFDO is
    approximately $6,200. Finally, semi-annual re-qualification is expected
    to cost about $700 per FFDO.
        Additional program costs include building and maintaining an on-
    line application system and providing new FTEs to facilitate program
    oversight, operations support, and internal investigation.
        With the funding requested for fiscal year 2004, TSA expects to be
    able to assess, train, equip and deploy thousands more FFDOs (the
    actual number is considered sensitive security information).
        Question. From learned efficiencies will there be one agency that
    will administer all of the training or is it more feasible for several
    agencies to carry out the training?
        Answer. TSA intends to conduct all initial (or basic) FFDO training
    at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) campuses in
    Glynco, GA and Artesia, NM. TSA is working in partnership with both
    locations to deliver this training. Use of these facilities ensures
    consistent and thorough training of new FFDOs.
        Question. Do the airlines incur any expense for the training of
    their pilots? If not, do you believe this should be a shared cost?
        Answer. APATA specifically states that air carriers should not bear
    the costs to train their pilots as FFDOs.
        Question. When will the Transportation Security Administration
    conduct the next training session and what criteria will be established
    to decide which pilots will receive the limited number of training
    positions if the interest is as large as expected?
        Answer. The next training class commences on July 21, 2003.
    Volunteers will be scheduled for training on a rolling basis as they
    complete the selection process. Applications will be viable for a
    period of 1 year; persons eligible but not scheduled for training in
    the remainder of the current fiscal year will be scheduled for training
    in fiscal year 2004. No additional applications will be solicited until
    the eligible volunteers from the current application period have been
    scheduled for training.
                           tsa: port security grants
        Question. For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, Congress has appropriated
    a total of $388 million for port security grants by TSA for this
    important program to better secure our Nation's ports. Included in the
    recently passed Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for
    fiscal year 2003, an additional $20 million was provided for port
    security grants in addition to the $150 million made available just
    three months ago by the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations
    Resolution. How soon will you be able to obligate these funds?
        Answer. TSA expects to announce a second round of Port Security
    grants in late May/early June 2003. TSA and the Department of Homeland
    Security are working with the Administration to finalize budget
    execution plans for the spending of fiscal year 2003 appropriated funds
    for port security grants.
        Question. How does the Coast Guard work with TSA to administer the
    grant-making process?
        Answer. The Coast Guard, as well as the Maritime Administration of
    the Department of Transportation, has worked collaboratively in all
    aspects of the Port Security grants process. This includes developing
    the Broad Agency Announcement; defining the eligibility requirement,
    evaluation criteria, and evaluation process; and participating in all
    levels of application review and award decision making.
        The Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and TSA jointly
    monitor the progress of all grants and collectively determine whether
    all grant requirements have been met.
                       explosive detection systems (eds)
        Question. Of the baggage screened at 429 commercial airports, TSA
    estimates that 90 percent of the baggage is screened electronically by
    either Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) or Explosive Trace Detection
    (ETD) machines. The President's budget provides $100 million only for
    the maintenance of these screening devices and does not provide any
    monies for the purchase of additional machines. How much of the $180
    million in funding for fiscal year 2003 and carryover funds available
    from fiscal year 2002 for Explosive Detection Systems has been
    obligated in order for airports to comply with statutory deadlines
    mandated by Congress? If no funds have been obligated, when do you
    intend on obligating the remainder of the funds for the purchase of
    additional Explosive Detection Systems?
        Answer. A total of $179,300,000 from fiscal year 2002 and fiscal
    year 2003 (including FAA funding) will be obligated by the end of May
    2003 for EDS/ETD purchases.
        Question. Do you believe if Congress appropriated funds for fiscal
    year 2004 for the purchase of additional Explosive Detection Systems
    that airports that are in the most need of these machines would be able
    to accommodate them and would this accelerate the electronic screening
    of all passenger baggage?
        Answer. TSA is in the final stages of developing a deployment plan
    for those in-line installations that will be supported by the Federal
    Government through appropriations funding and the Letter of Intent
    (LOI) program. Throughout this process we have updated the actual
    numbers of machines that TSA will have to purchase and deploy to
    accommodate in-line installations.
        Question. Now that the deadline to screen all checked airline
    baggage has passed and 100 percent of the checked baggage is now being
    screened for explosives, whether it be electronically or manually, what
    further efforts do you plan to implement to enhance the process of
    making sure all baggage that is checked for air travel is completely
    safe of explosives?
        Answer. TSA's Transportation Security Lab (TSL) is aggressively
    working with manufacturers of new technologies that show promise of
    meeting the TSA's certification standards within a 2-3 year window for
    producing viable systems to enhance the screening process. TSL is also
    working with current manufacturers to enhance performance of currently
    deployed EDS equipment to improve detection capabilities, reduce false
    alarm rates and increase throughput capacity.
        Question. It is reported that while improving, false alarm rates
    for baggage screening machines still occur too frequently. Can you
    address what new technologies are being pursued to address this problem
    and give us further detail on the $30 million proposed for fiscal year
    2004 for the next generation explosive detection systems?
        Answer. TSA has planned a two phase R&D program to identify and
    develop next generation EDS technology.
      --First Phase.--TSA will direct approximately 85 percent of allocated
            R&D efforts towards a program which addresses evolutionary
            growth of present technology. The project will focus on:
        --Life cycle extension of existing systems to include software
                enhancements that will lower the machine false alarm rates,
                increase baggage throughput and improve detection
                capabilities;
        --Combining technologies (such as a combination of X-ray with
                quadrupole resonance or X-ray diffraction technology); and
        --Emerging technology and products that are within a 2-3 year
                window for producing viable systems.
      --Second Phase.--TSA will direct approximately 15 percent of R&D
            efforts to a project which is a longer-range project with
            potentially greater payoff. This is a 5 to 10 year project that
            will challenge industry to develop the next generation of EDS
            technology.
                      airport security improvement project
        Question. TSA announced recently that Letters of Intent would be
    signed for about 20 airports to provide Federal assistance for
    permanent installation of explosive detection equipment. Which airports
    will receive this funding and when can we expect these monies to be
    obligated?
        Answer. TSA is currently working to develop a comprehensive plan
    for EDS in-line installations that will include an estimate of how many
    LOIs TSA intends to utilize. We will provide details on that plan when
    it is completed.
        Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget for TSA does not include
    additional monies for installation of explosive detection systems but
    in your prepared testimony you state that TSA expects to amend its
    budget request for costs associated with the Letter of Intent program.
    When can we expect a budget amendment from the Administration for
    additional funding?
        Answer. TSA is working with the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to determine what
    adjustments are needed to the TSA fiscal year 2004 Budget Request.
    These discussions include consideration of funds for the Letter of
    Intent program. When an Administration proposal is completed, TSA will
    provide details to the Congress.
        Question. The Nation's largest airports that handle the greatest
    passenger volume are most in need of money for terminal modifications.
    However, if Congress provides additional funding for fiscal year 2004,
    there is concern that these same airports will receive funding and the
    smaller airports will be left out. Under Secretary Hutchinson testified
    that there is a procedure, or a priority system, to determine which
    airports will receive funding. Can you explain the order of how
    airports are chosen to receive funding for security improvement
    projects?
        Answer. TSA has developed, and is applying, a prioritization
    process that provides for an objective method for determining which
    airports will be the first to move forward in the Letter of Intent
    (LOI) process to fund installations of in-line explosive detection
    system (EDS) equipment. The prioritization and complete plan for
    installations will be completed in the near future.
          computer assisted passenger pre-screening system (capps ii)
        Question. Under Secretary Hutchinson testified before the
    Subcommittee that firewalls would be established for the Computer
    Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System in order to prevent personal
    data from being collected by the government or retained by the
    government. What procedures are being put into place to prevent this
    firewall from being breached?
        Answer. The firewalls which are being incorporated into the CAPPS
    II system to protect privacy will themselves be protected through the
    use of the ``Radiant Trust'' system. This system will audit, in real
    time, the flow of all data into and out of the CAPPS II system and will
    also audit any access to or modification of the data in the system. The
    software used in the auditing component of the system is the same
    software trusted by intelligence agencies for the protection of highly
    classified information. In short, we believe that data processed by the
    CAPPS II system will be accorded the highest level of security
    available for such data in any system in the government.
        Question. Some Transportation Security Administration passenger
    screeners have repeatedly searched individuals who clearly do not fit
    the profile of possible terrorists. What is the Transportation Security
    Administration doing to cut down on these ``false alarms'' or ``wasted
    searches?''
        Answer. One of the advantages of the CAPPS II system will be that
    it will greatly reduce the type of unnecessary screening referred to in
    this question. Unlike the current prescreening system in place,
    currently administered by the airlines, TSA is developing CAPPS II to
    have a robust authentication function to help ensure that people who do
    not pose a threat to commercial aviation security and will not be
    confused with those who are identified as posing such a threat, and
    therefore will not be subjected to repeated and unnecessary additional
    scrutiny when they travel. Further, if such errors do occur under the
    CAPPS II system, TSA will have a ``Passenger Advocate'' who will be
    empowered to investigate any errors and assist in correcting repeated
    instances of misidentification.
        In sum, TSA agrees that repeated screening of the wrong person
    wastes resources and that once implemented, CAPPS II will be a useful
    resource allocation tool that will assist in ensuring more
    appropriately focused screening.
                        law enforcement officers (leos)
        Question. For fiscal year 2003, the Transportation Security
    Administration previously planned to negotiate long-term agreements
    with state and local law enforcement agencies to provide uniformed
    officers at passenger security checkpoints this year and in the future.
    Recently, TSA announced that local airports would not be reimbursed for
    law enforcement officers and the airports would now have to shoulder
    the burden for this mandate. What is the rationale behind elimination
    of reimbursing law enforcement officers at airports?
        Answer. TSA will continue to provide reimbursements for some law
    enforcement. However, the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill
    (Public Law 108-7) provided new authority for the Administrator of TSA
    to allow stationing of law enforcement personnel at places other than
    the airport screening checkpoints if TSA determines that such
    stationing will still provide adequate responsiveness to incidents
    (problems) at these locations. Flexible stationing enhances overall
    security by providing surveillance detection and visual deterrence at
    the airports. Roving patrols can cover more ground, will be observed by
    more passengers, will gain a better understanding of the airport domain
    and will lessen the manpower constraints on local jurisdictions. In
    addition to enhancing security, this provision will greatly affect the
    reimbursement program by significantly reducing funding requirements.
    TSA is reviewing the current and historical requirements of the
    security and law enforcement program for each airport. TSA Federal
    Security Directors are consulting with the Airport Operators and local
    law enforcement agencies to determine whether returning to a No-Cost
    Flexible Response Alternative Program as provided by the Airport
    Security Program (ASP) is sufficient to meet the needs for security at
    that particular airport.
        Question. How do you anticipate financially-strapped airports to be
    able to make up for this shortfall?
        Answer. Financial assistance in the form of a Reimbursement
    Agreement (RA) will be available in cases where a no-cost program would
    critically and adversely affect the financial resources and security
    staffing requirements of the host agency.
                transportation worker identification card (twic)
        Question. The Transportation Security Administration was provided
    $35 million in fiscal year 2003 to initiate a credentialing program for
    all transportation workers, such as dockworkers, truck drivers, and
    airline caterers, to carry Federal identification in order to provide a
    more secure work environment. The Transportation Security
    Administration is now in the process of carrying out a four-month pilot
    project where workers will be issued a transportation worker
    identification card (TWIC) with one of five technologies in order to
    determine the most appropriate, secure technology before a prototype is
    developed. Can you give us a status report on the pilot project and
    explain the different technologies that are being considered that will
    be incorporated in the prototype transportation worker identification
    card? Will biometric technologies, technologies that incorporate iris,
    facial, and fingerprint recognition, be incorporated in the pilot?
        Answer. A contract to conduct the Transportation Worker
    Identification Credential (TWIC) Technology Evaluation Phase pilot
    projects in the Philadelphia/Delaware Basin and Los Angeles/Long Beach
    areas was awarded to Maximus, with EDS (Electronic Data Systems) as a
    subcontractor, on April 23, 2003. The multi-modal pilot projects will
    include testing credentialing technologies in applications for
    aviation, highway, maritime, rail workers, and others.
        The intent of the Technology Evaluation Phase is to evaluate a
    range of potential access technologies for interoperability and
    performance at six facilities in each area. The test will include six
    different access control technologies including digital photographs,
    optical (laser) media stripes, microchips, magnetic stripes, and two
    different types of bar codes. As part of this phase, the benefits of
    employing a centralized card production and issuance center will be
    evaluated.
        Biometric technologies will be incorporated in the Prototype Phase
    of the TWIC program. During this next phase, a TWIC reference biometric
    will be incorporated into the credential and tested at the pilot sites.
    A specific reference biometric has not yet been chosen. In addition to
    the biometric technology selected for the reference biometric, the TWIC
    credential will have the capability to store other biometric
    information for use in various security applications as required by
    individual transportation facilities.
                             highway watch program
        Question. Does the Transportation Security Administration intend on
    any contractual agreements between the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Administration and the trucking industry for the Highway Watch program
    as recently directed by Congress?
        Answer. The Highway Watch Program is a joint government/industry
    program and TSA expects to build-on rather than replace this existing
    program as it defines future highway security needs. TSA is working
    with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to determine the
    requirements for expansion of the current Highway Watch Program.
                                     ______

             Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

                             lines of communication
        Question. In the hours following the attacks on the Pentagon and
    the World Trade Center, it was clear that the lines of communication
    between everyone involved in air travel--the FAA, Federal authorities,
    airlines, and customers--was severely deficient, if not to say
    completely inadequate. What steps have been taken to improve this so
    that information moves quickly and accurately from the air traffic
    controllers to the airlines to the passengers, and most importantly, to
    the appropriate agencies in the event of another emergency?
        Answer. The communications flow between air traffic controllers,
    airline corporate headquarters and security divisions, Department of
    Defense, and other Departments occurs under processes established among
    the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security
    Administration, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
    Defense. In cases where there is a known threat to aviation security,
    the agency that identifies the threat establishes communications with
    the other agencies via established conference calls, at which time all
    command centers are brought into a coordination conference call. In
    addition to these interagency conference calls, each agency initiates
    calls within its own organization for coordination with internal
    response and information sources to build and maintain situational
    awareness. The Transportation Security Administration establishes
    direct links to internal and external agencies via secure and non-
    secure means for information gathering and direction. The communication
    systems are tested regularly to identify and correct glitches in the
    lines of communication so that we are confident there will not be any
    problems in a real emergency. At the end of every test, we conduct an
    outbrief to review the exercise and identify areas for improvement.
    These communications links encompass the full spectrum of agency
    capabilities to respond to any threat to aviation security. Additional
    details on the secure elements of the communication links can be
    provided in a classified setting.
                                  air marshals
        Question. On September 11th, it became apparent that our Nation's
    protectors of the commercial skies, the U.S. Air Marshals, needed to be
    in better communication--not only with their superiors but also with
    each other. Who knows what could have been averted, and how many lives
    could have been saved had communications technology been available. I
    know that over the past year or so, the TSA has been working with
    technology companies in order to develop a communications system that
    allows the air marshals to communicate in real time with officials on
    the ground, as well as other air marshals stationed on other commercial
    aircraft. I think this is necessary so that our air marshals are not
    isolated at 30,000 feet. Do you have any knowledge of the progress of
    this technology development?
        Answer. Pursuant to House Conference Committee Report 107-593,
    TSA's Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was provided $15 million to
    begin the initial implementation phase of the Air to Ground
    Communications program. TSA intends to utilize this funding to purchase
    a Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) product, which includes hardware and
    software, for implementation of the Air to Ground communications
    system. This initial system will allow the FAMS to utilize a portable,
    quickly deployable air to ground communications system which will
    seamlessly integrate existing FAMS wireless technology. This
    comprehensive wireless communications system may also be used by other
    local, State, and Federal agencies, and the Department of Defense, to
    achieve secure communications through a dedicated law enforcement
    network.
                               baggage screeners
        Question. The TSA recently announced plans to eliminate 3,000 more
    airport screening jobs by the end of September, coupled with 3,000
    others announced in March, amount to about 11 percent of the 55,600
    screeners employed. This plan will save the TSA an estimated $280
    million. I applaud the TSA's effort to trim their budgetary needs,
    however, is a good idea to cut the work force and putting some workers
    on part-time hours? Do you believe this to be a wise decision at this
    time?
        Answer. TSA believes that making effective use of part-time
    screening personnel is in the best interest of both security and the
    taxpayer. Most airports have a peak time, or several peak times, during
    which a screening presence is needed beyond the normal throughput. The
    ability to use part-time or split shift personnel during these focused
    periods is a policy with significant possibilities. With the
    implementation of improved scheduling tools, TSA expects to be able to
    optimize the workforce with the appropriate mix of full-time, part-time
    and split shift personnel to better match travel patterns.
        Question. Will we still have enough workers to screen 100 percent
    of the bags?
        Answer. Yes, the screening force will not be cut below the level
    needed to screen 100 percent of the baggage.
                            air traffic controllers
        Question. A year ago, we discussed the need for accountability in
    the security screeners and airport employees as a whole. Then Congress
    passed the Aviation and Transportation Act which federalized those
    employees. Recently, President Bush issued an executive order that
    deleted the clause in a previous order signed by President Clinton that
    described air traffic control as an ``inherently governmental
    function.'' The Administration has proposed studying whether to hire a
    private company to take over the air traffic control system. What
    effect will privatizing the Air Traffic Controllers will have on the
    current system? Do you believe it will solve current issues, or create
    problems?
        Answer. Because the safe operation of the Nation's air traffic
    control system is the responsibility of the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA), an agency within the Department of Transportation
    (DOT), these questions are more appropriately addressed to that agency.
    However, it is our understanding that although DOT recently deemed the
    FAA's air traffic controllers to be ``commercial'' within the meaning
    of the required annual FAIR Act inventory of agency functions, the
    Secretary also decided that the non-contract tower functions are core
    capabilities of the agency and will not be subject to competition or
    contracted out.
                      qualified antiterrorism technologies
        Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Sections 862) provided
    the Department of Homeland Security with authority to compile a list of
    ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' that would qualify or receive
    certain protection under that Act. Has this list been compiled? If not,
    why?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is in the process of
    drafting regulations for implementation of Section G of the Homeland
    Security Act of 2002 and places a high priority on their issuance for
    public comment and implementation. These regulations will provide the
    basis for the Department to compile a list of qualified antiterrorism
    technologies in accordance with the criteria and provisions of the
    Homeland Security Act.
        Question. If this list has been compiled, can Members of this
    Committee get a copy of this list?
        Answer. A list of ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' has not
    yet been compiled because the regulations needed to implement Subtitle
    G of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 have not yet been issued.
        Question. How would a company that has an antiterrorism technology
    be considered for approval?
        Answer. At present, there is no process by which a company can
    submit its technology for consideration for approval as a qualified
    antiterrorism technology. Such a process will be available after the
    regulations needed to implement the provisions of Section 862 of the
    Homeland Security Act have been finalized and issued.
        Question. Do they need to wait for the rulemaking process to be
    completed to apply for approval?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If so, when will that process be completed?
        Answer. As indicated earlier, the process is currently in progress
    and will include a public comment period on the proposed regulations
    prior to their finalization and issue. At this time, it is not possible
    to provide a specific date for completion of the rulemaking process.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                       full-time equivalent screeners cap
        Question. The Congress has required your agency to achieve a cap on
    full-time screening employees of 45,000 individuals. Does this staffing
    limitation force your agency to make bad or inefficient management
    decisions?
        Answer. As a threshold matter, the cap referred to in the question
    applies to full time permanent employees throughout TSA and not just
    screeners. The cap affects, among others, TSA headquarters staff and
    Federal Air Marshals.
        TSA acknowledges the requirement to reduce and re-distribute some
    of the screener workforce. At some of the airports, we did not
    experience the voluntary attrition we expected, and at other airports,
    attrition has been greater than programmed. Getting the right number of
    screeners hired and trained at the right airports will continue to be a
    management challenge. It will be essential for us to use our work force
    in a flexible manner if we are to avoid long lines after the reduction.
    Part time employees will be essential for staffing checkpoint lanes
    during peak periods. Through the implementation of good management
    principles and practices, TSA will be able to maintain world-class
    security with a more efficient, more effective screener workforce.
                                  bus security
        Question. TSA has been given funds for a program to enhance motor
    coach security ($25 million total from the Supplemental and
    Transportation Appropriations bill). The first application period ended
    in March. When do you expect that your agency will announce those
    grants and what criteria have you used to award these funds?
        Answer. Request for applications for the initial round of bus
    security grants was published in the Federal Register on January 17,
    2003. The application period closed on March 19, 2003. Interagency
    national and executive review teams recently completed their
    evaluations of the proposals. TSA anticipates awarding the grants in
    June 2003.
        In developing funding recommendations, the national evaluation team
    used the evaluation criteria published in the Request for Applications,
    which included the following: relevance and importance, technical
    quality of the proposal, competence of the project team to perform the
    work, appropriateness and reasonableness of the budget, and corporate
    experience and capability.
        Question. With all your focus on the airlines and their security,
    when do you expect that you will turn to other modes of transportation
    and have you done any preliminary studies or have any ideas as to what
    can be done to protect rail and bus passengers?
        Answer. TSA, working through the Border and Transportation Security
    Directorate (BTS) and with the Information Analysis & Infrastructure
    Protection Directorate (IAIP), is currently working with Federal
    surface and maritime transportation modes, and governmental and
    industry stakeholders to better assess security vulnerabilities,
    identify security enhancements, and, where needed, establish best
    practices, national standards, and security plans and regulations.
        Additionally, TSA continues to assess security vulnerabilities and
    identify needed security enhancements to the rail and bus system and
    related infrastructure and is engaged in the following rail and bus
    security activities:
      --Coordinating information and threat sharing through the Surface
            Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC),
            which is managed by the Association of American Railroads,
            including deploying TSA personnel to the ISAC.
      --Studying (in collaboration with Amtrak and Federal Railroad
            Administration) the feasibility of prototyping the screening of
            both passengers and baggage in a rail environment.
      --Identifying the gaps in antiterrorism training among rail
            personnel.
        TSA also provided support to a study conducted by the Volpe
    National Transportation Systems Center entitled ``Security Enhancement
    Study for the U.S. Motor coach Industry.'' This study assesses the
    level of security threats within the motor coach industry, prioritizes
    industry vulnerabilities and identifies potential areas of opportunity
    to enhance security.
        Question. In your opinion, is it more important to enhance
    protection to transportation routes and corridors or significant
    transportation destinations?
        Answer. Both transportation routes and corridors and significant
    transportation destinations play a critical role in our economy.
    Enhancing protection of both of these areas will ensure the
    uninterrupted flow of commerce and maintain the confidence of the
    traveling public. Because the routes and corridors and destinations are
    economically interdependent, leaving one unprotected is not an
    acceptable alternative. Risk analysis does indicate however, that the
    greatest threat lies within the transportation destination, for it is
    there that those who would do us harm achieve the greatest impact
    (potential greatest loss of life, impact on critical infrastructure and
    economy, and access to major media markets).
        Question. Some bus operators (e.g. Greyhound Bus Lines) have begun
    ``wanding'' passengers in its largest terminals. Has TSA had any
    discussions with Greyhound or with the industry's trade association
    (American Bus Association) about the usefulness, cost and practicality
    of expanding such efforts?
        Answer. TSA has had broad discussions with both Greyhound Bus Lines
    and the American Bus Association (ABA) with regard to Greyhound's pilot
    project to perform random ``wanding'' of passengers at 32 cities across
    the Nation. Greyhound has found that ``wanding'' works well on several
    fronts, discouraging passengers from bringing drugs and dangerous or
    otherwise threatening items onboard as well as providing a tangible
    demonstration of enhanced security. Greyhound is exploring the
    feasibility of and identifying resources needed to expand their
    ``wanding'' program to include 50 percent of Greyhound's terminals. In
    addition, other bus operators are evaluating whether and how to
    incorporate ``wanding'' into their security protocols.
                     federal air marshals training location
        Question. Does TSA, in conjunction with FLETC, plan to consolidate
    training of Federal Air Marshals at one location (Artesia) as opposed
    to the expense of training in Atlantic City?
        Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAM) has no plans in
    conjunction with FLETC to consolidate the training of Federal Air
    Marshals (FAMs) at one location (Artesia).
        All FAMs are required to attend the FAMS 7-week Basic Training
    Course conducted at FLETC in Artesia, New Mexico and the 4-week FAMS
    Phase II Specialized Training Course conducted at the FAMS Training
    Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The training in Artesia consists
    primarily of basic police and law enforcement training that is aimed at
    providing a student the fundamental law enforcement training related to
    their positions. The training in Atlantic City is specialized training
    related directly to the FAMS mission. It takes place in facilities and
    on equipment that are designed to replicate the working environment
    that a FAM will encounter during a mission. In addition, instructors
    from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other outside
    entities that conduct some of the specialized FAMS training would not
    be available if the training were conducted at the FLETC-Artesia
    location.
        A recently held curriculum review conference was attended by
    representatives of the FAMs, TSA's Office of Training and Quality
    Performance, and FLETC-Artesia. A coordinated effort is underway to
    eliminate all duplicative training courses in each segment of the
    training to maximize the time FAMs spend in the specialized mission-
    related training facilities uniquely available in Atlantic City.
                      federal air marshals retention rates
        Question. Regarding the retention rate of Federal Air Marshals,
    does the turnover exceed training costs? What is being done to enhance
    retention? Is emphasis in hiring placed on Federal law enforcement
    officials--most of whom have already received FLETC-certified
    training--and whom we understand are relatively less costly to train
    than other recruits?
        Answer. In order to address the issue of retention, two points need
    to be addressed. First, looking at Federal Air Marshal (FAM) attrition
    over the year and a half since the program has undergone a significant
    build up, it is apparent that the attrition rate is no greater than
    that of the rest of the Federal Law Enforcement workforce. FAM
    attrition was initially very low, and then there was a spike noted late
    last summer. Since December 2002, the attrition rate has stabilized at
    half of a percent per month. Second, the build up to comply with the
    Congressional mandate resulted in hiring the FAM workforce without
    being able to sufficiently hire the warranted supervisory personnel.
    Since this past fall, when a cadre of experienced Federal Law
    Enforcement Supervisors and Managers were selected and deployed to each
    of the Field Offices, there has been a significant reduction in the
    number of resignations and a noted stabilization of the FAM workforce.
        Turnover does not exceed training costs. The cost of half of a
    percent per month attrition does not exceed the monthly budget
    allocation for training.
        The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) recruits from a variety of
    sources including those individuals with Federal law enforcement
    experience. It is the goal of the FAMS to select the best-qualified
    individuals for the workforce, following all applicable OPM
    regulations. Since September 2001, the FAMS has actively recruited
    individuals with prior Federal law enforcement experience, as have many
    other Federal, State, and local agencies with law enforcement
    responsibilities. Competition for those best-qualified individuals has
    been intense. During the emergency stand-up period running through July
    2002, approximately 50 percent of the FAMs hired had previous Federal
    law enforcement experience. Hiring personnel with former Federal law
    enforcement experience realizes cost savings; however, all personnel,
    regardless of their backgrounds, require specialized Federal Air
    Marshal Training.
         wyden amendment to s. 165--air cargo security improvement act
        Question. S. 165, as it passed the Senate, requires a report on
    plans by the Transportation Security Administration to gather data on
    plane passengers. He said he wanted to determine how the collection of
    data impacts civil liberties and privacy. Has the Administration taken
    a position on the Wyden provision? Does it share the same concerns
    about personal privacy and data mining issues?
        Answer. The Administration does not oppose the Wyden provision. TSA
    is committed to ensuring that personal privacy is protected in the
    CAPPS II program and welcomes the opportunity offered by Senator Wyden
    to demonstrate that commitment. TSA is developing CAPPS II in ways that
    protect personal privacy. Strict firewalls and access rules will
    protect a commercial air traveler's personal information from
    inappropriate use, sharing or disclosure. Also, CAPPS II will include
    real-time auditing capabilities in the system architecture to ensure
    compliance with domestic and international laws and the privacy
    policies of TSA and other Federal agencies. In addition, it is TSA's
    goal to listen to the views of our stakeholders, the traveling public,
    privacy advocacy groups and the Congress and to use the feedback to
    help create and develop the CAPPS II system. With regard to data
    mining, as understood by TSA, ``data mining'' means sifting through
    vast amounts of data to identify any possible patterns. CAPPS II starts
    with a known person, the air traveler, and seeks to authenticate his/
    her identity and to determine whether that person poses a terrorist
    risk to the aircraft, other passengers, or the public. It is not
    seeking out unknown patterns in vast quantities of data.
                            trusted traveler program
        Question. In conjunction with development of the CAPPS II program,
    there has been some discussion of also exploring development of a
    ``trusted traveler'' program similar to those in place at certain
    overseas airports for frequent, especially business, travelers. Has the
    Department explored piloting such a program in this country? If not,
    why not? If so, what has the Department learned in this regard?
        Answer. The concept of the Registered Traveler (RT), or ``trusted
    traveler,'' is still in its development stage. TSA is conducting a
    business-based feasibility study to examine the range of program
    alternatives, evaluate viable technologies and develop a range of
    funding and cost-sharing options. As TSA makes progress with CAPPS II
    and further defines the registered traveler concept, we will be in a
    better position to determine how a RT program might be implemented and
    identify other advantages for travelers who volunteer to participate.
        TSA is still in the process of developing CAPPS II to identify
    those persons who are involved with or linked to foreign terrorism and
    who pose a threat to aviation security. At the same time, TSA is
    reviewing the RT concept, per Section 109 of the Aviation and
    Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which provided TSA with the
    discretion to ``[e]stablish requirements to implement trusted passenger
    programs and use available technologies to expedite security screening
    of passengers who participate in such programs, thereby allowing
    security screening personnel to focus on those passengers who should be
    subject to more extensive screening.''
        The current thinking around RT is that passengers who apply to the
    RT program will voluntarily submit to background checks. Based on these
    checks, TSA would be able to assess whether the passenger presents a
    risk to aviation security. If it is determined that the passenger does
    not pose such a threat, they will be registered as a RT, or,
    alternatively, if they do pose a threat to aviation security, they
    would not be registered. Thus, there are no levels of clearance--people
    either participate in the program or they do not. If they are in the
    program, it is possible that this group of people could be entered into
    the CAPPS II system as individuals who do not present a risk to
    aviation security.
        In this situation it is envisioned that RTs would generally be
    exempt from secondary screening. For the majority of cases, RTs would
    only receive secondary screening if they trigger an alarm at the walk
    through metal detector (WTMD). The benefit to the RT is the potential
    for expedited security screening.
                           tsa: goals and management
        Question. A recent General Accounting Office report has given the
    Transportation Security Administration high marks, saying it is off to
    ``an impressive start'' in motivating its workforce to achieve
    performance goals. At the same time, the agency has focused the vast
    majority of its resources on the aviation side of the ledger almost to
    the exclusion of other modes of transportation. The budget request for
    fiscal year 2004 appears to continue this trend, with only $86 million
    planned for Maritime and Land Security out of a budget request of $4.82
    billion. There are reports that TSA is working on a national security
    plan that will address all modes of transportation, including the
    development of partnerships with the private sector. Can you give us
    some examples of what these might be? Do you anticipate modifying or
    realigning your budget request to accommodate these plans?
        Answer. We do not anticipate modifying the TSA request for this
    purpose. DHS, overall, has requested substantial resources in fiscal
    year 2004 across the Department outside of aviation, including
    resources in the Coast Guard for ports and maritime security; in BCBP
    for cargo security; in IAIP for vulnerability assessment, intelligence,
    and infrastructure protection for all sectors including transportation;
    and in EP&R for emergency response. ODP recently announced grants
    including $75 million for port security and $65 million for mass
    transit security in fiscal year 2003. TSA is continuing key standards-
    setting efforts, and will work closely with modal administrations of
    the Department of Transportation to help leverage resources of that
    agency, where appropriate, to accomplish security goals.
             tsa: business assistance in developing security plans
        Question. Transportation Security Administrator, Admiral Loy,
    recently told a group of business leaders that he needs their
    assistance in developing a national security plan for transportation
    systems. He said, ``This is an all-hands evolution. We are sort of in
    this together.'' What types of assistance is TSA looking for from the
    private sector? Is there a timetable for deliverables on this national
    transportation security plan? What measures are being used to determine
    whether the plan is working?
        Answer. Industry participation is vital to TSA's success and our
    security paradigm involves industry input at almost every step of the
    process. From domain awareness, where industry has the benefit of day-
    to-day observation, to prevention, protection, response, restoration
    and consequence management, TSA, its modal partners and industry will
    be essential to the establishment and effectiveness of a comprehensive
    transportation security plan.
        Specific measures of effectiveness will be developed as the plan is
    put in place and appropriate security standards are decided.
                               letters of intent
        Question. The fiscal year 2003 Iraqi War Supplemental (Public Law
    108-11) included a provision allowing the Under Secretary for Border
    and Transportation Security to issue letters of intent to airports to
    provide assistance in the installation of explosive detection systems.
    What is the status of this issue? Is the Office of Management and
    Budget delaying the issuance of these letters?
        Answer. OMB supports the use of LOIs as a tool for improving
    security, leveraging private sector resources and is working with TSA
    on its in-line installation plan and the use of LOIs in support of that
    plan.
                  tsa's cruise ship to airlines pilot project
        Question. My staff had the opportunity while in Miami to observe
    the operation of a temporary pilot project which has been instituted
    between a major cruise line and a major airline. In this pilot,
    disembarking cruise passengers who are immediately transiting through
    to the airline have their bags examined by Transportation Security
    Administration screeners at a dock-side facility and receive their
    boarding passes from airline representatives. Then their bags are
    transferred to the airport in a secure vehicle while the passengers
    take a bus to the airport and, upon arrival, proceed directly to the
    gate. Under this system, the passenger is able to avoid waiting in
    additional lines at the airport, while at the same time congestion is
    slightly reduced at the airport itself. By all accounts, this is a
    system that is working well and demonstrates a fresh approach to both
    security as well as passenger processing. How much does this pilot
    program cost and are funds included in the fiscal year 2004 budget for
    it to be continued? Are there other locations to which this project
    could be expanded? What other innovative ideas, if any, is your agency
    considering piloting in the coming year?
        Answer. The program mentioned in this question is called Synergy
    and is currently working well in Miami. There are no additional costs
    in this program, and it actually improves security by eliminating much
    of the congestion accompanying a cruise ship's passengers all arriving
    at the airport simultaneously. Other, similar programs are proposed for
    areas with hotel concentrations, as well as other major cruise ship
    embarkation points. TSA will pursue all avenues to allow air commerce
    to more freely move while maintaining the same high level of security.
                      transportation worker identity card
        Question. You have included in your budget request for the next
    fiscal year funds to begin implementing the Transportation Workers
    Identity Card program. Given that some transportation workers in
    certain locations often have criminal records, what will be some of the
    determining or prohibiting factors under which a worker will be
    provided or denied a card?
        Answer. At the present time, the determining factors for whether or
    not a person obtains any federally-based TWIC across transportation
    sectors have not been determined. Many considerations must be assessed
    and evaluated, and ultimately these may vary depending on the nature of
    an employee's work and risk to the transportation system. The three
    primary acts which guide our current policy on credentialing include
    the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT
    Act of 2001 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. The
    acts differ both in specificity and in the length and range of offenses
    that would be disqualifying for obtaining a credential.
                           port security assessments
        Question. Have you reviewed the port security assessments that have
    been completed to date to determine if there are patterns in port
    vulnerability that ports generally should begin to address immediately?
        Answer. Review of the port security assessments completed to date,
    both by the ports themselves using TSA port security grant funds and
    those completed by the Coast Guard, has yielded valuable preliminary
    information regarding security enhancement requirements. These
    assessments have identified a number of physical security enhancements
    that were either non-existent or needed improvement, such as fencing,
    lighting, and closed circuit television systems. Other common
    recommendations included: setting standards for transportation worker
    identification systems, creating security plans, enhancing
    communications systems, and establishing screening equipment standards
    for cargo and passengers.
                               support contracts
        Question. In response to questions at the hearing, you spoke to the
    difficulties TSA has experienced with a number of its contracted out
    functions--including screener training, human resources and the like.
    Please provide the Subcommittee with a list if the contracts that TSA
    has let for specific functions since its creation, the number of people
    hired to perform the contracts, the prices of each contract and if a
    contract has been terminated and a new contractor brought on to perform
    the same function.
        Answer. TSA has awarded 6 significant contracts for its
    ``contracted out services''. The six contracts and their associated
    information are listed in the attached document. None of these
    contracts have been terminated, although the period of performance for
    one contract has expired. Each of these contracts is a performance-
    based service contract (PBSC), where the contractor is required to
    deliver services in accordance with specific performance metrics. In
    general, TSA requires these contractors to achieve desired outcomes,
    and does not require them to adhere to non-performance standards (such
    as contract staffing levels). The contractor has the flexibility to
    achieve performance metrics utilizing innovative approaches that have
    not been restricted by procedural or resource requirements. TSA does
    not require these contractors to report the number of people employed.
        To this point, TSA has awarded contracts to Cooperative Personnel
    Services and Accenture to perform human resources management functions
    previously provided to TSA in part by NCS Pearson for the deployment of
    the aviation security workforce. The current contracts now cover the
    entire TSA workforce, not only the screener component. And, the
    recently awarded contract to Lockheed Martin services for security
    training services replaces the contract with Lockheed Martin Services
    for passenger screener training. In both situations the new contract
    requirements are for a broader range of services than those provided
    under the original contract.
                         s. 165--air cargo security act
        Question. The Senate recently passed this legislation. What new
    activities will this law impose on your agency? If enacted into law,
    what impact will this law have on your agency's budget? What additional
    resources--personnel, funds, etc. will be required?
        Answer. TSA generally does not believe it will be necessary to
    increase personnel and funding to meet the requirements of the Senate
    bill. Should this bill, or TSA's air cargo security strategy, suggest
    new resources are needed, these will be found in base TSA funding. TSA
    has already set up screening protocols for air cargo, is regularly
    inspecting air cargo facilities, and is working to complete its
    ``known'' shipper database. $30 million in requested fiscal year 2004
    funding will enable TSA to refine and improve its screening protocols,
    through development of a risk-based, freight screening process, and
    investigate cargo screening technologies.
        This legislation would also transfer responsibility for
    investigating foreign applicants for flight training from the Attorney
    General to the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security.
    TSA may assess fees for the cost of the investigations.
        The legislation further provides that TSA may establish a program
    to use identification verification technologies. The use of
    surveillance and recognition technology may ultimately proves useful in
    airport applications, but it would require maintenance of an
    appropriate photo watch-list based on intelligence and law enforcement
    resources from outside TSA.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

        Question. As you may know, law enforcement officials from New
    England and New York have been national leaders in establishing an
    initiative for cargo container security called Operation Safe Commerce
    Northeast (OSC Northeast). OSC Northeast represents a comprehensive
    coalition of Federal agencies, State governments and private sector
    businesses committed to the concept of enhancing border and
    international transportation security without impeding free trade and
    international commerce. Originally conceptualized a month before the
    tragic events of September 11, 2001, I commend Vermont U.S. Attorney
    Peter Hall and others for being such forward thinkers about the need to
    monitor the security of overseas freight that is coming into our
    country.
        On April 21, 2003 the Wall St. Journal carried an article warning
    that Canadian ports could provide a back door into the continent for
    terrorists targeting the United States. The Canadian Ports of Montreal
    and Halifax are among the principal seaports servicing much of the
    northeast and mid-west. For example: of the 1.2 million containers
    unloaded in Montreal last year, half (600,000) were destined for the
    United States. One billion U.S. dollars of trade is conducted daily
    between the United States and Canada, therefore, a disruption of trade
    between the two countries would be devastating to our respective
    economies.
        Last year (May 2002), OSC Northeast conducted a beta study of
    international container cargo entering the United States via Montreal.
    This project, involving both United States and Canadian participants,
    monitored, tracked and sealed a container from its point of origin in
    Eastern Europe through the Ports of Hamburg Germany to its final
    destination in Hillsboro, New Hampshire. To date, I believe this is the
    only group to have conducted and completed such a study and compiled a
    detailed report of findings and recommendations.
        This group, which is chaired by the Governor of New Hampshire and
    the U.S. Attorneys for Vermont and New Hampshire, is prepared to
    proceed with a Phase II initiative dealing with container verification
    and the transshipment of international cargo. Most recently they have
    partnered with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--one of the
    nation's premier applied science labs--to further examine international
    cargo entering the continent via Canada and then transshipped via rail
    and truck inland, or transshipped via feeder vessels for delivery along
    the Atlantic (New England) coast. This interesting initiative consists
    of a collaboration of State, Federal and private sector (United States
    and Canadian) partners prepared to assist the Nation and homeland
    security.
        Therefore, in light of the recognized disruption to the northeast
    and mid-west economies should a catastrophic event occur related to
    international trade corridors the TSA should better engage and utilize
    the resources of the OSC Northeast group. To replicate such a group
    would take a team one full year just to organize and prepare. I
    understand the TSA is preparing to provide funding awards to the three
    largest United States load centers, as prescribed in the fiscal year
    2002 Supplemental Appropriations Bill: Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/
    Tacoma and New York/New Jersey. And data from all these sources should
    be used to detect and analyze vulnerabilities in our supply chains. I
    hope the TSA will take a closer look at funding the OSC Northeast
    initiative too. We are very vulnerable along our Northern Border, and
    this group would enhance the safety of cargo entering the United States
    through New England and Canadian ports.
        What steps are TSA taking to incorporate the efforts of OSC
    Northeast into our national port security strategy? Will TSA be able to
    fund Phase II of the OSC Northeast initiative?
        Answer. OSC Northeast was a public-private partnership that yielded
    invaluable information regarding our Nation's port security strategy.
    TSA has incorporated lessons learned from OSC Northeast, as well as
    from other initiatives and experience in order to capture, analyze, and
    build further upon the knowledge base.
        Appropriated funding prioritized Operation Safe Commerce (OSC)
    pilot program funds to the three largest container Load Centers in the
    United States--the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the ports of
    Seattle and Tacoma, and the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey. One
    of the project criteria for the OSC grants is to consider a supply
    chain through the Load Centers, which includes feeder ports and supply
    chains to Canada. To date, no supply chains have been submitted to the
    OSC Executive Steering Committee for consideration that include
    Northeast U.S. ports, eastern Canadian ports, or truck or train
    shipments destined for eastern or central Canada. TSA expects to
    complete work on this pilot program during fiscal year 2004, which we
    hope will provide useful solutions for supply chain security.
                                     ______

       Questions Submitted to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

        Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's fiscal year
    2004 budget requests $146 million. This amount represents a decrease of
    roughly 13 percent. Will the 2004 funding request provide for
    sufficient instructor staffing, training, and facility upgrades?
        Answer. Yes, the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request
    provides sufficient funding for FLETC. It was based on levels of
    training requested by the partner agencies.
        Question. The fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations bill
    provided the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center with an additional
    $2 million to support Operation Liberty Shield activities. How were
    these funds used to support Operation Liberty Shield?
        Answer. The funding provided for additional training requested by
    our Partner Organizations and the security costs associated with the
    increased threat levels. As a result of increased security
    requirements, our partner agencies requested 35 additional mandatory,
    basic training programs, totaling 7,084 student weeks of training, in
    order to deploy 744 more agents and officers. The increased threat
    levels required the implementation of a roving security patrol at the
    Artesia training site and an increase to the roving patrol already in
    place at the Glynco training site.
        Question. When the Department of Homeland Security elevates the
    Threat Advisory System, how does the heightened readiness affect the
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and what impact does this
    elevated readiness have on the agency's budget?
        Answer. When the DHS elevates the threat advisory level, the
    following increased security measures are implemented in accordance
    with published directives:
                            threat level 4 (orange)
        This threat level will be implemented based upon anticipated needs
    or communicated threats and will encompass all previously applied
    security measures at security levels 1, 2, and 3. Additionally, a 100
    percent positive identification process, consisting of a valid FLETC-
    issued identification card and a second form of a state or federally-
    issued government identification with a full-face photograph, will be
    implemented. Both forms of official identification must be produced and
    displayed to FLETC Security Police by all incoming personnel seeking
    access to any FLETC facility. Access will be denied if these specific
    identification requirements are not met. Additionally, FLETC Security
    Police will conduct random verifications and examinations of displayed
    FLETC identification at the various facilities within the FLETC proper;
    as such display of FLETC identification is required of all persons on
    any FLETC facility.
                              threat level 5 (red)
        This threat level will be implemented based upon anticipated needs
    or communicated threats and will encompass all previously applied
    security measures at security levels 1, 2, 3, and 4. The facilities
    will be closed to all visitors and only essential personnel on official
    governmental business will be granted access. All non-essential
    contract personnel will be dismissed. A 100 percent search of all
    vehicles (commercial, government and privately-owned) entering FLETC
    facilities will be conducted and increased security police patrols of
    all areas will be implemented. At this threat level, all Partner
    Organizations will be tasked with providing security to their personnel
    at any off-facility housing areas in support of local police agencies.
    The FLETC Director may cancel any or all training within the affected
    bureau facilities.
        The security activities associated with the heightened threat
    advisory levels are ordinarily accomplished within the parameters of
    the Security Police contract at no additional cost to FLETC. However,
    if security threat situations dictate that the service contractor
    employ additional resources and/or authorize overtime to accomplish the
    required security activities, then additional fiscal resources will be
    necessary.
        Question. Since September 11, the training needs of Federal
    agencies with homeland security missions have increased substantially.
    What is FLETC doing to respond to increased training requests from its
    partner organizations?
        Answer. The near-term increased demand for law enforcement training
    has been accommodated by maximizing the use all available facilities
    and resources at Artesia, Glynco and Charleston. A FLETC management
    team worked systematically through a series of constraints analyses to
    optimize FLETC throughput capacity. As system constraints were
    identified, temporary measures/facilities were brought on-line to
    eliminate or reduce the constraint, increasing the FLETC overall
    training capacity. Additionally, FLETC has developed a number of
    creative scheduling solutions to accommodate the increased training
    demand (i.e. extended training week and extended training day).
        To accommodate the mid-term demand, FLETC is currently studying all
    available options to meet the fiscal year 2004 through 2006 training
    requests, including shifting some basic and/or advanced training
    normally conducted at Glynco, Georgia to alternate sites which may
    include Artesia, New Mexico, Charleston, South Carolina, or, the soon
    to be completed, Cheltenham, Maryland facilities. This option will only
    be employed after consultation with the affected partner organizations
    and consideration of response ramifications.
        Question. Many of the Federal agencies that rely on FLETC for
    training would prefer to establish their own training facilities. What
    additional steps does FLETC need to take to ensure partner
    organizations that coordinated Federal training is best for the agency
    and the taxpayers?
        Answer. H.R. 2590, enacted into law by President Bush on November
    11, 2001, provided appropriations in fiscal year 2002 to the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). A provision contained in this
    legislation directed the FLETC to initiate collaborative interagency
    efforts to establish written standards for the accreditation of Federal
    law enforcement training. As the principal source of consolidated
    Federal law enforcement training, the FLETC assists all Federal
    agencies. Currently, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Office of
    Accreditation, located at Glynco, is working to quantify what
    facilities exist and the capability of those facilities.
        In addition, at the request of the Under Secretary, Border and
    Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate, Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
    tasked with establishing a Training Academy Committee to identify and
    assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS training academies.
    The committee will use a two phased methodology to identify the
    training assets and to develop a plan for operating the facilities
    employed by each of the Directorate's bureaus, and will also include
    the Coast Guard, Secret Service, and the Bureau of Citizenship and
    Immigration Services. The operational plan will provide the framework
    for coordinating academy training. The Committee will develop and
    submit a report at the conclusion of each phase according to the
    timelines established by its charter. Once the committee has identified
    all of the BTS training capabilities, FLETC can develop a more
    definitive utilization plan of facility usage at all BTS sites.
        Question. On March 1, 2003, FLETC was transferred to the Department
    of Homeland Security. Is FLETC working to develop a cohesive training
    curriculum that will cross-train all Department of Homeland Security
    law enforcement personnel in counter terrorism practices?
        Answer. FLETC is currently working with the newly formed Department
    of Homeland Security (DHS) law enforcement organizations to modify,
    design, and develop appropriate training curricula to ensure their
    specific mission requirements are met, to include the cross-training of
    agency personnel. In the interim, all DHS law enforcement personnel
    attend either FLETC basic training programs (Mixed Basic Police
    Training Program, Criminal Investigator Training Program, Federal Air
    Marshal Training Program) or FLETC integrated basic programs and
    receive anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism training as part of their
    basic training, The same personnel also attend FLETC's advanced Anti-
    terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Training Programs.
        Question. The Congress intends for agencies within the Department
    of Homeland Security to improve information sharing. What training
    techniques is the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center utilizing to
    encourage information sharing among law enforcement personnel?
        Answer. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, through the
    Financial Fraud Institute (FFI), employs training techniques which
    encourage information sharing among law enforcement personnel in the
    following ways:
        First, FFI offers the Intelligence Analyst Training Program (IATP),
    which is a comprehensive 4-week training program designed for the law
    enforcement intelligence community. This program focuses on
    intelligence methodology, analytical skills, research techniques, and
    the processes necessary to support the effective collection, analysis
    and sharing of intelligence data. FLETC is currently proposing to
    expand this program to accommodate the training needs of the Department
    of Homeland Security.
        Second, in addition to the IATP, FFI offers twelve other advanced
    training programs to a cross-section of Federal, State, and local law
    enforcement. This training ranges in topics from International Banking
    and Money Laundering to Computer Forensics. FFI provides advanced Money
    Laundering and Financial Investigative training to High Intensity
    Financial Crime Areas and High Intensity Drug Traffic Areas Federal
    task forces to assist in the national effort to combat money laundering
    and terrorist financing. FFI also provides advanced training in the
    area of computer network security, computer intrusions, and internet
    forensics. These computer forensic training programs encourage law
    enforcement personnel to coordinate with and to interact among law
    enforcement agencies and the private sector to combat computer crimes.
    This cooperation is stressed as being vital to the effective
    investigation of advanced technology crimes.
        Third, FFI serves the international law enforcement community by
    exporting training in international money laundering and computer
    forensics to the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) training
    sites worldwide.
        Through the Criminal Investigators Training Program (CITP), the FFI
    introduces new criminal investigators to the information stored in a
    number of law enforcement data and intelligence resources, to include:
    NCIC/NLETS, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), El Paso
    Intelligence Center (EPIC), Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information
    System (NADDIS), and Interpol. FFI also trains law enforcement
    personnel in modern electronic information storage techniques which
    allow for the safe and efficient sharing of investigative materials.
        Finally, FFI exposes students through its Internet Investigations
    Training Program (IITP) to the Cybercop Secure Portal which provides an
    encrypted secure collaborative network where over 3,700 law enforcement
    and private sector security personnel share sensitive but unclassified
    information. This portal is sponsored by the Extranet Secure Portal
    Group and is used by many other personnel within the Department of
    Homeland Security.
        Question. As terrorists turn to the use of biological and chemical
    weapons to target America and our allies, what kinds of chemical and
    biological training has the training center developed to counter these
    activities?
        Answer. In response to terrorist attacks, as well as the threat of
    biological and chemical weapons that target our country, the FLETC's
    Security Specialties Division has developed courses and training
    programs to train law enforcement personnel to be prepared for the
    worst case scenario. One of the more effective actions taken was the
    development of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Training Program
    (WMDTP).
        The WMDTP is a 5 day train-the-trainer program. The program goal is
    to instruct the trainer on how to identify the characteristics and
    effects of chemical, biological and nuclear/radiological terrorist
    weapons. Furthermore, the students/trainers are trained as first
    responder officers to these terrorist attacks. As trainers, the
    students are given course materials and taught how to share this
    information and train other officers and administrators to better
    prepare this country should such an incident occur. This program is
    offered to any law enforcement officer in the United States.
        The course content of the WMDTP includes: Overview of Terrorism,
    Chemical Agents and Physiological Effects, Biological Agents and
    Radiological Weapons, Nuclear Devices, Delivery and Dissemination
    Devices, Principles of Decontamination, Conventional Explosives as WMD,
    Detection and Identification of CBR Agents Planning for WMD incidents,
    Personal Protective Equipment and Managing a WMD attack.
        Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has partnered
    with the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of Management
    and Budget to provide e-learning opportunities. Does the fiscal year
    2004 budget request provide funding for additional distance learning
    programs for law enforcement training?
        Answer. In September 2002, the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center (FLETC) sent the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) a Letter
    of Intent to partner in providing law enforcement e-Learning
    opportunities. This partnership included ``support for the creation and
    integration of robust custom law enforcement courseware based upon
    government and industry standards''. In OPM's fiscal year 2004 e-
    Learning Exhibit 300, OPM requested $585,000 in support of the FLETC.
    Of these monies, approximately $185,000 was to support additional
    distance learning programs for law enforcement training. Fiscal year
    2004 was the first budget submission that incorporated our partnership
    with OPM. The FLETC will continue to work through OPM's joint e-
    Learning initiative for future support of distance learning law
    enforcement content creation and hosting.
        Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provides
    training to State, local, and international law enforcement officers.
    How is FLETC responding to the increased number of requests from State
    and local law enforcement, especially for hazardous materials and
    weapons of mass destruction training?
        Answer. First response to terrorism or weapons of mass destruction
    incidents are normally handled by State and local officers. Federal
    agencies may be hours away from the scene and State and local law
    enforcement agencies need the training and equipment to respond to
    critical incidents. Some examples of Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center (FLETC) training programs available to State and local officers
    are the First Responder Training Program (FRTP), Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Training Program (WMDTP), Seaport Security Anti-terrorism
    Training Program (SSATP), and Critical Incident Response Training
    Program (CIRTP). Since September 11, 2001, the demand for these types
    of training programs has increased significantly.
        In fiscal year 2003, the FLETC received an additional $1 million in
    appropriations to expand its delivery of tuition-free training to Small
    Town and Rural (STAR) law enforcement agencies. When possible, the
    FLETC has increased student enrollment in the FRTP from 24 to up to as
    many as 70 students.
        Additionally, the FLETC is partnering with the Environmental
    Protection Agency (EPA) to coordinate delivery of hazardous materials
    training programs such as Advanced Environmental Crimes Training
    Program (AECTP). The FLETC is also developing a partnership with the
    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assist in the delivery of
    various training programs to include: incident command, emergency
    response to terrorism, public information and weapons of mass
    destruction programs.
        Question. Does FLETC have adequate capacity to meet Federal agency
    law enforcement training demands as well as those training needs of
    State, local, and international law enforcement agencies? Is there a
    priority?
        Answer. At this time, FLETC does not have the training capacity to
    meet all the Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement
    agencies training demands while utilizing a standard 8-hour day, and 5-
    day training week. However, given adequate scheduling flexibility and
    the use of non-traditional training sites, the FLETC does have the
    capacity to meet the short-term training demands of our Partner
    Organizations. The long-term solution to the training capacity issue is
    the development, refinement, funding, and completion of the FLETC
    Master Plan for facilities.
        Classes are scheduled on a priority basis as indicated below,
    allocating facilities to:
      --Basic Training Programs,
      --Agency Specific Basic,
      --Center Advanced,
      --Agency Advanced and
      --Others (i.e., State, Local, and International).
        Question. The Committee remains concerned about the security of
    power plants and nuclear facilities. Is the Federal Law Enforcement
    Training Facility working with the Office for Domestic Preparedness to
    develop best practices for first responders in protecting identified
    critical infrastructure and assets?
        Answer. The FLETC's Security Specialties Division offers a Critical
    Infrastructure Protection Training Program (CIPTP) which addresses
    protection for all critical infrastructure sectors and key assets as
    outlined in The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
    Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003. Power plants
    and nuclear facilities are included as assets in this document. It also
    addresses security measures for cyberspace, because cyberspace is what
    allows our critical infrastructure to work. The CIPTP is designed for
    those individuals who have the responsibilities to protect and manage
    critical infrastructures, key assets, resources or facilities. Though
    FLETC's priority is the Federal law enforcement community, when space
    is available, participants are accepted from all levels of law
    enforcement.
        The CIPTP provides the participants with an overview of critical
    infrastructure protection, a threat brief, a Critical Infrastructure
    Protection (CIP) Model, instruction related to the components of the
    CIP Model, a case study related to contemporary issues, and a practical
    exercise. Heavy emphasis is placed on two points: One, the fact that
    protecting critical infrastructure and key assets requires a multi-
    disciplinary approach involving many people from numerous disciplines;
    and two, the need to build public-private partnerships, because 85
    percent of the infrastructure is owned by the private sector.
        Question. Section 109 of the Maritime Security Act tasked the
    Secretary of Transportation with the development of standards and
    curriculum for the training and certification of maritime security
    professionals. What is the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's
    involvement in this process?
        Answer. FLETC has established a partnering relationship with the
    U.S. Coast Guard and the Global Maritime and Transportation School,
    U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA), in anticipation of legislation
    being passed directing the development of a Seaport Security Training
    Program. Preliminary discussions are on-going with regard to training
    site selection and curricula identification, but no funding or
    direction has been given for this activity to date.
        Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provides
    training to rural law enforcement personnel through its partnership
    with Minot State University and Southwest Texas State University. Does
    FLETC have plans to expand this program or develop other partnerships?
        Answer. Since 1991, the FLETC has developed many long-term
    partnerships with Federal agencies, training partners, State and local
    agencies, and universities. The FLETC, through its National Center for
    State and Local Training, serves on the International Association of
    Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA)
    Education and Training Committees, as well as the National Guard
    Counterdrug Training Advisory Counsel.
        In 1996 and 1999, the National Center partnered with Illinois State
    University, to conduct random sample training needs assessments of
    small town and rural law enforcement agencies. Over 2,200 law
    enforcement agencies--county, city, and Indian Country--were surveyed
    to determine their training needs. The results of the 1996 study
    provided the foundation for the development of the STAR training
    series. Since fiscal year 2000, the National Center has contracted with
    Minot State University (MSU), to conduct a training needs assessment of
    all Federal, tribal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the
    Northern Plains States Region (North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and
    Wyoming).
        In fiscal year 2003, Congress allocated $1,000,000 to the National
    Center to expand its contract with MSU for research and validation
    efforts in support of the STAR training series nationwide.
    Additionally, the National Center received $500,000 to contract with
    the MSU to provide a comprehensive evaluation/assessment of the
    effectiveness of law enforcement vehicle pursuit training, previously
    conducted nationwide with law enforcement executives. The MSU is to
    provide recommendations for curriculum revision, training delivery
    methods, and program policy modifications in fiscal year 2004.
        The National Center is currently partnering with Southwest Texas
    State University by providing assistance in the delivery of their
    Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Program (ALERRT). This
    program is designed to provide law enforcement officers the skills
    necessary to respond to active shooters.
        The National Center has been conducting a number of site visits to
    training facilities that submitted requests for consideration as hosts
    for National Center and/or FLETC training. Some of these locations are
    in Idaho, Louisiana, California, and Maryland. National Center staff
    evaluates each facility based upon accreditation standards, geographic
    location, demographic considerations, and the requirements to host a
    program.
        Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is
    responsible for management oversight of the International Law
    Enforcement Academy in Gabarone, Botswana, and will be responsible for
    another facility to be located in San Jose, Costa Rica. How do these
    facilities further FLETC's training mission?
        Answer. In the Department of Treasury's Strategic Plan for fiscal
    year 2000-fiscal year 2005, one of the objectives was to enhance basic,
    advanced, and in-service training programs to meet the changing needs
    and increasing demands of all law enforcement agencies.
        Following the attacks of September 11th, and in a world where there
    is increasing globalization of crime, U.S. law enforcement at all
    levels need to interact with foreign law enforcement organizations.
        For over 30 years, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
    (FLETC) has fulfilled its mandate to provide high quality, cost
    effective law enforcement training utilizing modern facilities, state
    of the art equipment and modern teaching methodologies and techniques.
        As the nation's leading organization for interagency law
    enforcement training, FLETC has become the expert in the development
    and management of training facilities, training needs assessment,
    course and curriculum development, instructor training, certification,
    program accreditation, testing, and evaluation.
        With facility management and academic responsibility for multiple
    locations in the United States, which trains a diversity of Federal,
    State, local and international students, FLETC offers a wealth of
    technical experience in the management of International Law Enforcement
    Agencies (ILEA). The ILEAs offer core programs focused on leadership,
    terrorism, white collar crime, drug enforcement, financial crimes,
    ethics, rule of law, police procedures, and the investigative process.
    All ILEA locations-Botswana, Budapest, Bangkok, and Roswell, NM-are
    under the Department of State's appropriation. The FBI, DEA and FLETC
    have leadership roles in administering these sites. Costa Rica's
    consideration as an ILEA site is still under review, so FLETC has not
    taken on the day-to-day operational oversight.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

        Question. Congress created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Center (FLETC) to be the consolidated training center for almost all
    law enforcement agencies. As the law enforcement training arm of the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) it seems logical that FLETC
    should develop and conduct standardized training for all Homeland
    Security law enforcement and inspection personnel.
        Such a training approach would ensure that all law enforcement
    personnel receive appropriate and consistent instruction. This is
    particularly important as you retrain and cross-train border agencies
    which have been merged under DHS (e.g. Customs, Immigration, and
    Agriculture Inspectors).
        Congress specifically created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
    Facility in Artesia, New Mexico to handle the advanced and special
    training of almost all Federal law enforcement personnel.
        In the past, Federal agencies have chosen not to use FLETC
    facilities for training and instead have contracted with non-federal
    institutions. Over the past few years, Congress has provided over $30
    million for the FLETC Artesia facility, alone.
        When the need for Federal Air Marshal training arose after
    September 11, FLETC-Artesia answered the call to duty by developing and
    providing this training in a remarkably short period of time. By way of
    example, FLETC-Artesia brought in three 727 airplanes for use in
    training to go along with the 18 firing ranges and 3 shoot-houses.
        FLETC-Artesia boasts 683 beds, state-of-the-art classrooms, and a
    brand new cafeteria to accommodate approximately 700 students a day.
        FLETC-Artesia's close proximity to the Southwestern border,
    recently constructed facilities and optimal training conditions
    certainly suggest the center should be highly utilized by DHS. How do
    you intend to provide training for the newly hired DHS personnel as
    continued training for existing DHS personnel in light of the new
    security challenges facing our country?
        Answer. As we enter a new era in law enforcement operations in the
    United States, FLETC is a good example of the new government approach
    intended by the legislation creating the DHS: a means to harmonize the
    work of many law enforcement agencies through common training, while at
    the same time maintaining quality and cost efficiency. In fiscal year
    2003, 65 percent of FLETC's projected training workload will come from
    nine law enforcement agencies transferred to the new Homeland Security
    department. In fiscal year 2004, this workload will continue to be
    above 73 percent of our estimated total Federal training workload.
        Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary
    Hutchinson, FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of DHS.
    Placing FLETC within the DHS will help to support the ``unity of
    command'' and the coordination and efficiency themes sought in the
    public law that created DHS. FLETC has a long history of service to
    many of the DHS components--the U.S. Secret Service, the former Customs
    and Immigration and Naturalization Services including the U.S. Border
    Patrol (USBP), the Federal Protective Service and more recently, the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
        With the start-up of the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
    and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is ready to help
    facilitate, develop, and implement new training and cross training
    programs. We recognize that much of this effort and expertise will
    necessarily come from the agencies involved, but there likely will be
    significant adjustments made over time to all DHS-related training
    programs, basic and advanced. Already, an effort is underway to
    systematically review existing training for these new entities and to
    address whatever capabilities are needed to meld the duties of the
    participants. In the meantime, training will continue unabated to
    achieve all of the hiring expectations of our agencies.
        Question. How do you intend to use FLETC facilities for training
    DHS employees?
        Answer. The national ``war on terrorism'' precipitated by the
    events of September 11, 2001 placed new and increased demands on the
    nation's Federal law enforcement agencies. Officers and agents
    immediately began to work extended hours and many have been reassigned
    geographically and/or to expanded duties. Nearly all Federal law
    enforcement agencies made plans to increase their cadre of qualified
    officers and agents, and submitted urgent requests to the FLETC for
    basic law enforcement training far in excess of the FLETC's normal
    capacity. These requests were for increased numbers of graduates and
    for their speedy deployment to buttress the hard-pressed Federal law
    enforcement effort.
        The events of September 11 also increased the need for certain
    advanced law enforcement training conducted at the FLETC, especially
    classes associated with such issues as counter-terrorism, weapons of
    mass destruction, money laundering, etc. Likewise, the need for
    instructor training classes increased, to strengthen the cadre of
    instructors qualified to handle the training surge--at the FLETC and
    within the agencies.
        In addressing the unprecedented increase in training requirements,
    FLETC has conducted capability analyses to determine the set of actions
    most likely to result in optimum throughput of students at each of its
    training sites without compromising the quality of training. With the
    consultation and concurrence of its partner organizations (POs), FLETC
    leadership directed that training be conducted on a 6-day training
    schedule, thus generating a 20 percent increase in throughput
    capability. More importantly, the 6-day training schedule drives a
    corresponding compression of the length of each training program,
    effectively delivering each class of new law enforcement officers to
    their agencies weeks sooner than under the conventional training
    schedule. Should the 6-day training schedule be insufficient to meet
    the demand, an extended work day will be considered.
        In addition to the 6-day training schedule, FLETC has expanded its
    staff with a supplemental cadre of re-employed annuitants (primarily
    retired Federal law enforcement officers) who are contributing their
    skills and experience as instructors to help sustain the surge in
    training operations. This is a 5-year authority provided by Congress in
    fiscal year 2002.
        Further, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
    tasked by BTS with establishing a Training Academy Committee to
    identify and assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS
    training academies. This study will be the basis for determining the
    schedule and priority for training elements of DHS in a coordinated
    manner.
        Question. How should DHS use FLETC Artesia's facilities and
    specialized training capabilities?
        Answer. FLETC intends to utilize its Artesia facility to its
    maximum potential. At the request of the Under Secretary, Border and
    Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate, Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
    tasked with establishing a Training Academy Committee to identify and
    assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS training academies.
    The Committee will use a two phased methodology to identify the
    training assets and to develop a plan for operating the facilities
    employed by each of the Directorate's bureaus, and will also include
    the Coast Guard, Secret Service, and the Bureau of Citizenship and
    Immigration Services. The operational plan will provide the framework
    for coordinating academy training in all BTS bureaus. The Committee
    will develop and submit a report at the conclusion of each phase
    according to the timelines established by its charter. Once the
    Committee has identified all of the BTS training capabilities, FLETC
    can develop a more definitive utilization plan of facility usage at
    Artesia and all other sites.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                               training curricula
        Question. Have provisions been formulated regarding possible
    curriculum changes due to the merger of departments and the eventual
    cross training of agency personnel?
        Answer. FLETC is currently working with the newly formed Department
    of Homeland Security (DHS) law enforcement organizations to modify,
    design, and develop appropriate training curricula to ensure their
    specific mission requirements are met, to include the cross-training of
    agency personnel.
                     federal air marshals training location
        Question. Does FLETC, in conjunction with TSA, plan to consolidate
    training of Federal Air Marshals at one location (Artesia) as opposed
    to the expense of training in Atlantic City?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    recently requested the FLETC conduct 3 weeks of their 4-week agency
    specific basic training program, which is firearms and physical
    training intensive, at our Artesia facility. It is our understanding
    that TSA will continue to conduct the final week of their agency
    specific training, which involves primarily tactics, at their Atlantic
    City facility.
                            master plan construction
        Question. When do you contemplate delivering to Congress the
    revised construction master plan? Does the plan include construction
    requirements at the FLETC-used facilities in Charleston, SC?
        Answer. The completed FLETC Master Plan project is expected this
    summer. FLETC has not included construction requirements of the
    Charleston, SC training facility in its master plan, nor has it
    estimated the cost of transforming the Charleston campus into a full-
    fledged, permanent facility. No cost estimates have been developed or
    reviewed by the Department of Homeland Security to date. A study group
    has been formed to examine the planning and decision making process on
    training program implementation for all of the new components in DHS.
    Once the study group formed by the Under Secretary for Border
    Transportation Security has completed its work and decisions made on
    the content, length and type of training needed by the agencies brought
    under the DHS legislation, a determination will be made on the future
    of the Charleston site.
                lack of construction funding in fiscal year 2004
        Question. What will be the impact on training from the lack of any
    construction funding in fiscal year 2004?
        Answer. Facility procurement, design and construction normally
    require 18 months to 2 years to complete. Any training facilities that
    cannot be appropriated and completed during this period will require
    the use of alternative approaches to training, including distance
    learning and use of available Federal, State and local training sites.
                         rural law enforcement training
        Question. How much is in the base budget for the on-going rural law
    enforcement training program at Minot State University?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2004 base budget does not provide for any
    on-going rural law enforcement training programs at Minot State
    University. The fiscal year 2003 enacted appropriation included $3.3
    million to support these programs. This funding is not continued in the
    fiscal year 2004 President's request.
                    planned usage of the cheltenham facility
        Question. What agencies have already made plans, and coordinated
    with FLETC, to use the facilities in Cheltenham, MD?
        Answer. The Cheltenham facility is currently utilized by seven of
    its 62 partner organizations. The primary users of the Cheltenham
    facility are the U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Park Police, the Washington,
    D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, the Prince George's County Police,
    Sheriffs, Fire/EMS Departments, and Pentagon Police. The U.S. Capitol
    Police conducts their basic follow-on, agency specific and advanced in-
    service training at Cheltenham on a daily basis. These agencies utilize
    the existing 13 building Cheltenham tactical village for in-service
    agency specific tactical team training, as well as the classroom and
    conference center for in-service chem-bio, emergency medicine, and WMD
    training sessions on a weekly basis. Other groups, such as the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Accreditation Group and FLETC Distance
    Learning program, have utilized classroom space in the Cheltenham
    conference center for day and week long seminars. Also, the Prince
    George's County Fire and EMS Training Academy utilize vacant FLETC
    buildings for recruit firefighter training on a regular basis.
        To date, 62 separate Federal law enforcement agencies in the
    metropolitan Washington, D.C. area, including the D.C. Metropolitan
    Police Department, have expressed their intention to use the indoor
    firing ranges and driver training range for requalification training.
        Cheltenham will be used by State and local law enforcement
    agencies. In fact, the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington,
    D.C., Maryland State Police, Prince George's County Police and Sheriffs
    Department are currently utilizing Cheltenham facilities on a weekly
    and monthly basis. However, with the exception of the D.C. Metropolitan
    Police Department, which was specifically identified in the legislation
    that created Cheltenham, Federal agencies will be given scheduling
    priority.

                             CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

        Senator Cochran. Until our next hearing, this subcommittee
    will stand in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., Tuesday, May 13, the hearings
    were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
    subject to the call of the Chair.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

                                  ----------

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                           NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

        [The following testimonies were received by the
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
    The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2004 budget
    request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]

      Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association

        Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written
    testimony on the security and safety needs of public transportation
    systems. We appreciate the subcommittee's interest in transportation
    security, and we look forward to working with the subcommittee as it
    develops the fiscal year 2004 appropriations bill for the Department of
    Homeland Security.
                                   about apta
        The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
    nonprofit international association of over 1,500 public and private
    member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail
    operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product
    and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and
    State departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public
    interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services
    and products. Over 90 percent of persons using public transportation in
    the United States and Canada are served by APTA member systems.
                       public transportation and security
        Mr. Chairman, we do not need to emphasize the critical importance
    of keeping our Nation's surface transportation infrastructure secure in
    this time of heightened national security. In that connection, APTA is
    honored to play a critical role in public transportation security. We
    work closely with a number of Administration security agencies, and
    administer an industry audit program that oversees a system safety and
    security management plan for transit systems around the country. Our
    safety audit program for commuter rail, bus, and rail transit
    operations has been in place for many years, and contains security
    planning and emergency preparedness elements. Separately, in connection
    with Presidential Decision Directive Number 63, we are pleased to have
    been designated a Public Transportation Sector Coordinator by the
    Department of Transportation, and as my testimony notes below, we are
    establishing a Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center that
    provides a secure two-way reporting and analysis structure for the
    transmission of critical alerts and advisories to transit agencies
    around the country.
        Since the events of 9/11, State and local public transit agencies,
    like all State and local entities, have spent significant sums on
    police overtime, enhanced planning and training exercises, and capital
    improvements related to security. In response to an APTA survey,
    transit agencies around the country have identified some $6 billion in
    transit security needs. These include both one-time capital investments
    and recurring operating expenses related to security. It is important
    to note that these costs are above and beyond the capital
    infrastructure needs we have identified under the TEA 21
    reauthorization effort. Mr. Chairman, my testimony summarizes these
    security needs in greater detail below in the ``Security Investment
    Needs'' section.
        We also note that Congress just concluded the conference agreement
    on the fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 1559)
    that funds a number of homeland security programs, including some $2.2
    billion for formula and discretionary grants to enhance the capability
    of State and local jurisdictions to prepare and respond to terrorist
    attacks. This measure includes funding for overtime expenses related to
    increased security by State and local entities. Transit agencies, as
    local public bodies, are expected to be eligible recipients for such
    funding, which will be administered by the Homeland Security
    Department's Office of Domestic Preparedness.
                                   background
        Mr. Chairman, prior to and following September 11, 2001--the date
    of the most devastating terrorist attack in United States history--APTA
    has been heavily involved in addressing the safety and security issues
    of our country. American public transportation agencies have also taken
    significant measures to enhance their security and emergency
    preparedness efforts to adjust to society's new state of concern.
    Although agencies were largely secure at the time of the World Trade
    Center and Pentagon attacks and already had emergency response plans in
    place, the September 11 incidents energized and prioritized security
    efforts throughout the industry.
        Transit agencies have had a good safety record and have been
    working for many years to enhance their system security and employee
    security training, partly responding to government standards, APTA
    guidelines, and attacks on transit agencies abroad. For example, the
    1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system caused United States
    transit properties managing tunnels and underground transit stations to
    go on high alert. The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District,
    for instance, responded to the possible threat of chemical weapons
    attacks by sending a police team to Fort McClellan, Alabama, in 1996 to
    learn response tactics from United States Army chemical weapons
    experts.
        In the months following September 11, transit agencies of all sizes
    worked to identify where they might be vulnerable to attacks and
    increased their security expenses for both operations and capital
    costs. The agencies subsequently upgraded and strengthened their
    emergency response and security plans and procedures, taking steps to
    protect transit infrastructure and patrons and increase transit
    security presence while giving riders a sense of security.
        Transit industry services are, by design and necessity, an open
    infrastructure. Over 9 billion transit trips are taken annually on all
    modes of transit service. This is more than sixteen times the level on
    domestic air travel trips and emphasizes the challenges for enhancing
    security within our transit environments.
        After September 11, many transit organizations worked to prevent
    unauthorized entry into transit facilities. The need for employees and
    passengers to stay alert and report suspicious occurrences became a key
    goal of many agencies. These efforts are paying off. Many transit
    agencies report being more secure than prior to September 11, but
    suggest that many improvements are still in the planning stages.
        Since the attacks, APTA and the Federal Transit Administration have
    emphasized the need for effective transit security and emergency
    preparedness. FTA has sent security resources toolkits to transit
    agencies; completed security-vulnerability assessments of the nation's
    largest transit systems; and provided technical support and grants of
    up to $50,000 to fund agency emergency drills.
        FTA continues to provide emergency preparedness and security forums
    nationwide. In emphasizing the importance of enhancing transit
    security, FTA Administrator Jennifer L. Dorn noted that thousands of
    lives were spared on September 11 in New York City and Washington
    ``because of the quick action of first responders and transit
    workers.''
        APTA has launched many additional efforts to further transit
    industry security and preparedness, collaborating with FTA in
    developing emergency preparedness forums, and sponsoring and organizing
    security-related conferences and workshops. Moreover, APTA developed a
    list of critical safety and security needs faced by the transit
    industry, which it has provided to the Department of Transportation and
    the United States Congress.
        public transportation information sharing analysis center (isac)
        Presidential Decision Directive #63 authorizes and encourages
    national critical infrastructures to develop and maintain ISACs as a
    means of strengthening security and protection against cyber and
    operations attacks. APTA is pleased to have been designated a public
    transportation Sector Coordinator by the U.S. Department of
    Transportation, and in that capacity has received a $1.2 million grant
    from the Federal Transit Administration to establish a transit ISAC.
    APTA recently formalized an agreement with a private company to
    implement the ISAC and make it available to public transit systems
    around the country.
        This ISAC for public transit provides a secure two-way reporting
    and analysis structure for the transmission of critical alerts and
    advisories as well as the collection, analysis and dissemination of
    security information from transit agencies. The public transit ISAC
    also provides a critical linkage between the transit industry, the U.S.
    Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security
    Administration, and the Office of Homeland Security.
                       ongoing transit security programs
        Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
    level of security alert, the leadership of APTA has been actively
    working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
    address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs.
    Shortly after the September 11 events, the APTA Executive Committee
    established a Security Task Force under the leadership of Washington
    Metro's CEO, Richard A. White. The APTA Security Task Force has
    established a security strategic plan that prioritizes direction for
    our initiatives. Among those initiatives, the Task Force serves as the
    steering group for determining security projects that are being
    implemented through over $2 million in Transit Cooperative Research
    funding through the Transportation Research Board.
        Through this funding, four transit security workshop forums were
    held for the larger transit systems with potentially greater risk
    exposure. These workshops were held in confidential settings to enable
    sharing of security practices and applying methodologies to various
    scenarios. The outcomes from these workshops were made available in a
    controlled and confidential format to other transit agencies unable to
    attend the workshops. The workshops were held in New York, San
    Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago.
        In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, the APTA
    Security Task Force has also established two TCRP Panels that
    identified and initiated specific projects developed to address
    Preparedness/Detection/Response to Incidents and Prevention and
    Mitigation. The Security Task Force emphasized the importance for the
    research projects to be operationally practical.
        In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, a generic Checklist For
    Transit Agency Review Of Emergency Response Planning And System Review
    has been developed by APTA as a resource tool and is available on the
    APTA web-site. Also through the direction of the Security Task Force,
    APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
    transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
    on our respective security programs and directions and to continually
    work towards raising the bar of safety and security effectiveness.
        Within this concept of partnership and outreach, APTA also
    continues in its ongoing collaboration with the Federal Transit
    Administration to help in guiding and developing FTA programs. Among
    these are regional Emergency Preparedness and Security Planning
    Workshops that are currently being delivered through the Volpe Center
    and have been provided in numerous regions throughout the United
    States. The primary focus of such workshops has been to assist
    particularly smaller transit systems in building effective emergency
    response plans with first responders and their regional offices of
    emergency management. Also within this partnership, APTA has assisted
    the FTA and the National Transit Institute in the design of a new
    program ``Security Awareness Training for Frontline Employees and
    Supervisors.'' This program is now being provided by NTI to transit
    agencies throughout the nation.
        Collaborative efforts between APTA, FTA, Volpe Center, and the
    National Transit Institute are also underway to establish a joint web-
    site that will specifically gather and disseminate effective transit
    practices with initial emphasis on safety and security.
        As you may be aware, APTA has long-established Safety Audit
    Programs for Commuter Rail, Bus, and Rail Transit Operations. Within
    the scope of these programs are specific elements pertaining to
    Emergency Response Planning and Training as well as Security Planning.
    In keeping with our industry's increased emphasis on these areas, the
    APTA Safety Audit Programs have similarly been modified to place added
    attention to these critical elements.
        APTA's Committee on Public Safety, chaired by Paul Lennon, Managing
    Director-Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Los Angeles County,
    Metropolitan Transportation Authority, will continue to provide a most
    critical forum for transit security professionals to meet and share
    information, experiences and programs and to also provide valuable
    input to programs being developed by the FTA.
                           security investment needs
        Mr. Chairman, APTA has conducted a nationwide survey of its transit
    system membership that sought information about the level of need for
    security and safety investments for the specific transit property. The
    survey was not intended to be an inclusive list of all needed security
    and safety projects. On the basis of the survey, APTA has identified
    areas of investment needs related to transit security. The areas and
    needs are--
        For personnel, $500 million for ongoing cost of staffing for
    increased security planning, surveillance, patrols, and response to
    alert notifications.
        For training, ongoing costs of $50 million for the development and
    delivery of internal security programs; participation in established
    security programs external to transit agencies; internal and inter-
    agency emergency preparedness drills; and for national and regional
    security workshops/symposiums through government, industry and
    partnered initiatives.
        For a one-time cost of technical support, $100 million for security
    and emergency preparedness plan development/refinement; comprehensive
    security needs assessments; and infrastructure security plan
    development.
        For a one time cost infrastructure and rolling stock security, $5.1
    billion for communications, surveillance, detection systems and
    equipment for enhancing security of rolling-stock, stations,
    facilities, rights-of-way, bridges tunnels, electronic and other
    systems.
        For emergency response support equipment, $100 million for personal
    protective and detection equipment for personnel; support vehicles and
    equipment for emergency response and recovery.
        In support of national defense, a one-time cost of $50 million for
    development/refinement of evacuation plans; and mobilization of public
    transit systems for evacuation needs.
        For aid for extraordinary expenditures not including New York City,
    or Washington, D.C., a one-time cost of $50 million for aid for
    extraordinary expenditures for transit agencies that have incurred
    significant expenses to date for costs associated with security and
    recovery initiatives that are in need of cost relief.
        For research and development, ongoing costs of $50 million for
    research and development of systems that will enhance detection of
    security; and for threats in mass transit environments.
        In sum, transit industry security investment needs result in
    capital and operational investment needs of some $6 billion.
        We respectfully ask that as the Subcommittee takes up the fiscal
    year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations bill it consider these
    critical needs for Federal investment in transit security. It is
    important to note that after September 11, 2001, the necessity has
    become apparent to appropriately fund a new state of heightened
    security to combat against potential threats to our nation's public
    transportation system. As noted earlier, these security needs are
    distinct from the infrastructure needs we have identified in connection
    with the TEA 21 reauthorization.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman, these are just some of the issues and Federal
    investments that we believe can be made to improve safety and security
    of transit services. We again thank you and the Subcommittee for your
    commitment to investing in the nation's transportation infrastructure
    and look forward to working with you on safety and security issues.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the Association of State Dam Safety Officials

        The Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) is pleased to
    offer testimony on the President's proposed fiscal year 2004 budget for
    the Department of Homeland Security.
        The Association of State Dam Safety Officials is a national
    organization of more than 2,200 State, Federal and local dam safety
    professionals and private sector individuals dedicated to improving dam
    safety through research, education and technology transfer. ASDSO also
    represents the 50 State dam safety programs, as the State dam safety
    officials are the governing body of the Association. Our goal is simple
    to save lives, prevent property damage and to maintain the many
    benefits of dams by preventing dam failures.
        During the 1970's this country suffered devastating dam failures
    that caused tragic loss of life and enormous property damage; and
    focused national attention on the catastrophic consequences of dam
    failures. Those failures serve as a constant reminder that dams must
    always be properly constructed, properly designed and properly operated
    and maintained to provide the benefits and prevent failures.
        Today our focus in not only on the safety of dams related to
    maintenance issues but on security as the Nation faces a significant
    challenge to protect our infrastructure from terrorist attacks. Dams
    are a major concern and focus of national planning within the
    Department of Homeland Security.
    National Dam Safety Program
        The National Dam Safety Program Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-303)
    created the first national program that focuses on improving the safety
    of the nation's dams. The Program was recently reauthorized by the Dam
    Safety and Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-310). This small, yet
    critical program provides much needed assistance to the State dam
    safety programs in the form of grant assistance, training and research;
    and through facilitating the exchange of technical information between
    Federal dam safety partners and the States. The program provides $6
    million in grant assistance to States based on the relative number of
    dams in each State. The grants may be utilized to best suit the
    individual State's needs. In addition, the National Dam Safety Program
    provides $500,000 each year to be used for training of State dam safety
    engineers and $1.5 million annually for research. These research funds
    are used to identify more effective methods of evaluating the safety of
    dams and more efficient techniques to repair dams. And now, these
    research funds go toward developing better methods to assess and
    improve the security of dams.
        There are over 79,000 dams in the United States, but the
    responsibility of assuring their safety falls on the shoulders of the
    States, as they regulate 95 percent of the country's dams. Because of
    limited staff and limited funding, most states are overwhelmed by that
    challenge. Table 1 attached to this testimony provides state-by-state
    data on the number of dams, the number of staff, the state budget and
    the number of dams that are considered ``unsafe.'' Unsafe means that
    they have identified deficiencies that make the dam more susceptible to
    failure, which may be triggered by a large storm event, an earthquake
    or simply through inadequate maintenance. Currently states have
    identified 2,332 dams as being unsafe. There are over 10,000 dams
    classified as ``high hazard'' meaning that the consequences of the
    dam's failure will likely include loss of human life and significant
    downstream property damage.
        Every member of this Subcommittee has high hazard dams in their
    home state. There are 757 high hazard dams in Pennsylvania, 277 high
    hazard dams in Mississippi and 245 dams in West Virginia whose failure
    will likely cause loss of life. According to the National Inventory of
    Dams more than 25 percent of the high hazard potential dams have not
    been inspected in the last 10 years. High hazard potential dams should
    be inspected every year. Many states do not regulate all of their dams.
    In Missouri, for example, there are 4,000 dams on the National
    Inventory, however, Missouri only regulates 638 dams.
        The task for state dam safety programs is staggering; in
    Mississippi there are over 3,300 dams yet there are only two engineers
    assigned to the state's dam safety program. Iowa has less than one
    staff person in their dam safety program to oversee 3,233 dams.
        The American Society of Civil Engineers' 2001 Report Card for
    America's Infrastructure gave a grade of ``D'' to dams. The dams across
    the United States are aging and showing signs of the lack of routine
    maintenance. 25 percent of the nation's dams are over 50 years old, and
    by 2020 85 percent of the dams will be 50 years or older.
        Downstream development within the dam failure flood zone places
    more people at risk. When homes are built in the dam failure flood zone
    below a low hazard dam, (low hazard: failure is not expected to cause
    loss of life or significant property damage) the dam no longer meets
    dam safety criteria as the consequences of a failure determine the
    hazard class and the minimum safety standards.
        In summary, adequate support for dam safety regulatory programs is
    lacking in many states. Insufficient regulatory authority, inadequate
    enforcement and staffing shortages combine to increase the probability
    of a tragic dam failure.
    Federal Leadership Role
        There is a clear need for continued Federal leadership to provide
    assistance in support of dam safety. This country suffered several
    large and tragic dam failures in the 1970s that focused attention on
    dams and prompted Congress to pass national dam safety legislation. In
    1972, the Buffalo Creek Dam in West Virginia failed and killed 125
    individuals. That failure also left 3,000 people homeless. In 1976, the
    Federally owned Teton Dam failure killed 14 people and cost $1 billion
    in downstream damages and cleanup costs.
        The Kelly Barnes Dam in Toccao Falls, Georgia failed in 1977
    killing 39 Bible college students. That same year, 40 people died from
    the failure of the Laurel Run Dam in Pennsylvania. The majority (58
    percent) of dams in the United States are privately owned, including
    the 38 foot tall Meadow Pond Dam in Alton, New Hampshire which failed
    killing one woman and causing $8 million in damage to the downstream
    town in the late 1990s.
        Dam failures do not respect state boundaries as a dam failure in
    one state may cause loss of life and property damage in an adjacent
    state. The Federal government funds the recover costs from the
    President's disaster relief fund and through the Flood Insurance
    Program, but the cost of one small dam failure can easily exceed the
    annual costs of the National Dam Safety Program. Full funding of the
    National Dam Safety Program is an investment in public safety that will
    be repaid many times over in fewer dam failures, reduced Federal
    expenditures for dam failure recovery costs and, most importantly,
    fewer lives lost.
        The Association of State Dam Safety Officials respectfully requests
    that Subcommittee increase the President's budget proposal of $5.9
    million to the full-authorized funding level of $8.6 million for the
    National Dam Safety Program for fiscal year 2004.
    Benefits of the National Dam Safety Program
        The National Dam Safety Program has been very successful in
    assisting the state programs through the training funds ($500,000) for
    training states dam safety engineers. This training has offered low
    cost technical courses and workshops that states could otherwise not
    attend. Examples include Dambreak Analysis, Concrete Rehabilitation of
    Dams, Slope Stability of Dams, Earthquake Analysis, Emergency Action
    Planning and many others including recent training in Dam Site
    Security. Training courses are also offered through FEMA's training
    facility at their Emergency Management Institute in Maryland where
    state dam safety inspectors receive training at no cost to the states.
        The Research funds have been used to identify future research needs
    such as inspections using ground penetrating radar or thermal
    tomography. In addition, these funds have been used to create a
    national library and database of dam failures and dam statistics in the
    National Performance of Dams Program at Stanford University as well as
    a national clearinghouse and library of dam safety bibliographic data
    at ASDSO.
        The Research funds will continue to provide technical assistance to
    the dam safety community and, now will be essential in identifying
    techniques and methods of assessing dam security as well as practical
    means to improve the security at critical dams. Dam site security is
    now an urgent area of concern for state dam safety officials both in
    training needs and in research to better understand and respond to
    potential threats to dams.
        The most valuable benefit to the state programs comes from the
    State Grant Assistance Program. The grants are based on the number of
    dams in each of the participating states and are used as an incentive
    to encourage states to improve their program by meeting basic criteria
    such as:
      --Statutory authority within the state to conduct inspections of
            dams.
      --Authority to require repairs to unsafe dams.
      --Authority to regulate all dams that meet the national dam
            definition.
        Use of these grants is left up to the states' discretion as each
    state has its own unique challenges. States have utilized grant funds
    to perform dam failure and dam stability analyses; hire additional
    staff to conduct inspections and to conduct owner education workshops.
    In addition, grant funds have enabled states to provide additional
    staff training, to purchase equipment such as computers, field survey
    equipment and software; and remote operated cameras for internal
    inspections.
        Mississippi received nearly $600,000 over fiscal year 1998 through
    fiscal year 2002 in grant assistance funds. Mississippi's dam safety
    program hosted dam safety workshops for engineers and dam owners. The
    grant assistance also enabled Mississippi to hire additional part time
    dam inspectors and to purchase needed field equipment.
        West Virginia, with their total $145,000 grant, was able to repair
    large capacity pumps, owned by the State, which are now strategically
    located and can be used in emergencies. West Virginia also used with
    their grant funds to update their dams inventory database and they will
    be seeking to hire summer interns to assist with emergency action
    plans.
        Iowa, which received $423,000 from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year
    2002, has hired four part time dam inspectors and has conducted 75 dam
    inspections in fiscal year 2002.
        In Pennsylvania, the $279,000 dam safety assistance grants have
    been used to purchase remote operated inspections cameras and global
    positioning equipment to improve their inspections. They have also used
    the funding to produce and distribute public awareness videos and
    Emergency Action Plan guidelines. Pennsylvania has hired an additional
    engineer to support the National Dam Safety Program efforts in
    Pennsylvania.
        Kentucky has received over $250,000 from fiscal year 1998 through
    fiscal year 2002 and has used these funds to purchase computer
    equipment and software for its dam inventory database and to provide
    specialized training for engineers in hydraulic evaluations of dams.
    Futures uses include training workshops for dam owners and the public.
        The grant assistance program has been very successful. The number
    of dam inspections has increased, the number of Emergency Action Plans,
    used for evacuation in the event of a dam failure, have increased; and
    states have better technical equipment to conduct inspections and
    perform safety analyses and dam failure modeling.
        Table 2 attached to this testimony provides information on the
    amount of state grant assistance received for each state over the 5-
    year program.
    Dam Security of non-Federal Dams
        The horrific events of September 11, 2001 have focused
    unprecedented attention on the security of our nation's critical
    infrastructure, including dams. Dams, in fact, have been identified by
    intelligence and law enforcement agencies in specific threat alerts.
    Federal agencies that own dams, such as the U.S. Army Corps of
    Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, have been conducting
    vulnerability assessments and security improvements on these Federally
    owned dams. While the Association certainly supports this necessary
    effort, little has been provided by the Federal Government in
    leadership or assistance to the states who have similar and equally
    urgent dam security demands.
        Security experts advise that it is very difficult to make a site
    completely safe from intentional acts of terror. They offer that their
    goal is to enhance security and effectively deter a potential attack at
    their site so that the terrorist will seek another site with less
    security. The improved security at Federally-owned dams makes non-
    Federal dams more attractive targets. There are clearly thousands of
    non-Federal dams that are potential targets based on type of
    construction, size, purpose (water supply, hydro power, flood control);
    and on the population and infrastructure at risk below the dam. Federal
    leadership is urgently needed to provide technical and financial
    assistance to states for training, for conducting vulnerability
    assessments and for identifying and implementing security improvements
    on dams determined to have an inadequate security program.
        The Association of State Dam Safety Officials respectfully requests
    that this Subcommittee appropriate $15 million in fiscal year 2004 for
    assistance to state dam safety programs to address security at critical
    non-Federal dams, which are regulated, by the states.
    Conclusion
        Dams are a vital part of our aging national infrastructure that
    provide many vital benefits, but that also pose a threat to life and
    property if they are unsafe. The National Dam Safety Program is a
    valuable program that offers assistance to states as an investment in
    public safety. We urge you to recognize its benefits and support full
    funding to continue the progress we have made.
        In addition, we strongly urge this Subcommittee to recognize that
    large non-Federal dams are also potential targets of terrorist attacks;
    and that people and critical infrastructure below these dams are also
    at risk. States need the leadership and support of Congress and the
    Administration to provide the necessary level of security at all
    critical dams.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee for this
    opportunity offer this testimony. The Association looks forward to
    working with you and the Subcommittee staff on this important issue of
    safe dams.

                                          TABLE 1.--STATE-BY-STATE STATISTICS ON DAM AND STATE SAFETY REGULATION--2003
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                               No. State
                                      Total Dams in    Total Dams      High-Hazard       State-       State Dam Safety   No. State Staff     Regulated Dams
                 State                  National       Under State      Potential      Determined        Budget (       Dedicated to Dam  Per FTE Staff (to
                                      Inventory \1\  Regulation \2\  State Dams \3\  Deficient Dams      thousand)      Safety Regulation    nearest whole
                                                                                           \4\                                                    no.)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Alabama \5\....................           1,570           1,704             184             150              $0                  0                >1,704
    Alaska.........................             112              81              16         ( \6\ )              98                  1                    81
    Arizona........................             335             261              87              59             564                  6                    44
    Arkansas.......................           1,290             427              98              25             264                  4.2                 102
    California.....................             523           1,213             335               0           7,900                 65                    18
    Colorado.......................           1,733           1,883             317             191           1,440                 12                   157
    Connecticut....................             707           2,000             236              12             472                  4.3                 465
    Delaware \5\...................              73              98               9         ( \6\ )         ( \6\ )            ( \6\ )               ( \6\ )
    Florida........................             778             778             100               8           5,000                 38                    20
    Georgia........................           4,977           3,412             399             105             682                 10                   341
    Hawaii.........................             129             129              56               0             135                  2                    65
    Idaho..........................             360             439             106         ( \6\ )             350                  7.5                  59
    Illinois.......................           1,226           1,311             173              20             345                  5.5                 238
    Indiana........................           1,472           1,129             238         ( \6\ )             340                  5                   226
    Iowa...........................           3,233           3,311              73         ( \6\ )              55                   .75              4,415
    Kansas.........................           5,859           5,821             192              34             250                  5.1               1,141
    Kentucky.......................           1,022             991             214               0           1,517                 14                    71
    Louisiana......................             391             304              12              11             261                  5                    61
    Maine..........................             845             841              26              68              46                  1                   841
    Maryland.......................             299             407              63               6             415                  5                    80
    Massachusetts..................           1,528           2,917             333              40             500                  4                   729
    Michigan.......................             873           1,156              83         ( \6\ )             400                  4.5                 257
    Minnesota......................             932             852              40         ( \6\ )             237                  2.2                 387
    Mississippi....................           3,303           3,550             277              53             268                  2                 1,775
    Missouri.......................           4,096             638             445              16             288                  6                   106
    Montana........................           3,522           2,871              97               7             170                  5                   574
    Nebraska.......................           2,155           2,155             107              10             284                  5.2                 414
    Nevada.........................             323             592             123              24             130                  2                   296
    New Hampshire..................             613           3,281              85               0             612                  7                   469
    New Jersey.....................             777           1,651             194              48             950                 16                   103
    New Mexico.....................             525             382             156         ( \6\ )             469                  5.5                  69
    New York.......................           1,891           5,021             380             54+             746                  6.32                795
    North Carolina.................           2,939           4,241             988              53             902                 14                   303
    North Dakota...................             772           1,779              27              3+             200                  4.5                 395
    Ohio...........................           1,727           2,709             471             450           1,100                 11.5                 235
    Oklahoma.......................           4,507           4,348             145               6             185                  1.8               2,415
    Oregon.........................             833           3,733             122               0             255                  3.1               1,204
    Pennsylvania...................           1,412           3,025             757              49           1,698                 22.5                 134
    Puerto Rico....................              36              36              33               2             466                  8                     5
    Rhode Island...................             185             528              16              98              78                  1.1                 528
    South Carolina.................           2,263           2,304             153               3         ( \6\ )                  4.5                 512
    South Dakota...................           2,469           2,328              47               3         ( \6\ )                  2.5                 931
    Tennessee......................           1,154             643             151              33             275                  7                    92
    Texas..........................           6,838           8,060             851             403             300                  5                 1,612
    Utah...........................             676           4,083             199              84             450                  7                   583
    Vermont........................             364             538              54         ( \6\ )             215                  2.2                 245
    Virginia.......................          1,603+          1,300+            150+             50+             400                  6                   217
    Washington.....................             653             903             128              31             550                  6.5                 139
    West Virginia \5\..............             537             350             245              40             335                  6                    59
    Wisconsin......................           1,291           3,402             192         ( \6\ )             486                  6.5                 523
    Wyoming........................           1,270           1,374              66               3             131                  3.4                 404
                                    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          TOTAL....................          79,001          97,290          10,049           2,252          33,214.00             380.17   26,639 (522 av.)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Includes dams of any size that are likely to pose a significant threat to human life or property in case of failure, and all other Federal and non-
      Federal dams > 25 high that impound > 15 acre-feet; and dams > 6 high that impound > 50 acre-feet.
    \2\ Estimated number of all dams under state regulatory control.
    \3\ High-Hazard by state definition derived from state inventory in column 2 Individual states' definitions may differ from the Federal (National
      Inventory of Dams) definition. * indicates figure taken from NID and based on NID definition.
    \4\ Dams with identified deficiencies by state definition (varies state to state) derived from state inventory in column 2.
    \5\ For Alabama and Delaware, this data precedes 2001. West Virginia data is from 2001.
    \6\ NR Not Reporting. Some states do not keep data on these categories.

             TABLE 2.--STATE GRANT AMOUNTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998-2002
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Total State
                                                Assistance     Annual State
                                                Grant (from     Dam Safety
                      STATE                     Fiscal Year       Budget
                                                1998-Fiscal   (excludes FEMA
                                                Year 2002)        grants)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Alabama.................................              $0              $0
    Alaska..................................         112,324              98
    Arizona.................................         130,843             564
    Arkansas................................         157,811             264
    California..............................         280,791           7,900
    Colorado................................         330,607           1,440
    Connecticut.............................         202,245             472
    Delaware................................          94,351              NR
    Florida.................................         183,005           5,000
    Georgia.................................         631,703             682
    Hawaii..................................         118,691             135
    Idaho...................................         159,357             350
    Illinois................................         280,257             345
    Indiana.................................         229,213             340
    Iowa....................................         423,456              55
    Kansas..................................         992,576             250
    Kentucky................................         247,527           1,517
    Louisiana...............................         144,942             261
    Maine...................................         192,198              46
    Maryland................................         152,106             415
    Massachusetts...........................         325,251             500
    Michigan................................         203,799             400
    Minnesota...............................         223,966             237
    Mississippi.............................         593,107             268
    Missouri................................         189,641             288
    Montana.................................         509,441             170
    Nebraska................................         395,736             284
    Nevada..................................         161,613             130
    New Hampshire...........................         212,013             612
    New Jersey..............................         307,762             950
    New Mexico..............................         165,560             469
    New York................................         430,227             746
    North Carolina..........................         651,658             902
    North Dakota............................         183,060             200
    Ohio....................................         351,921           1,100
    Oklahoma................................         745,806             185
    Oregon..................................         259,440             255
    Pennsylvania............................         279,410           1,698
    Puerto Rico.............................         105,329             466
    Rhode Island............................         135,981              78
    South Carolina..........................         424,436              NR
    South Dakota............................         396,560              NR
    Tennessee...............................         184,474             275
    Texas...................................       1,078,772             300
    Utah....................................         178,777             450
    Vermont.................................         149,160             215
    Virginia................................         178,087             400
    Washington..............................         174,066             550
    West Virginia...........................         145,062             335
    Wisconsin...............................         239,939             486
    Wyoming.................................         292,522             131
                                             -------------------------------
          Total.............................      14,936,579          33,214
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

    Prepared Statement of the Association of State Floodplan Managers, Inc.

        The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. (ASFPM) is
    pleased to share comments on four specific aspects of the fiscal year
    2004 budget proposal for the Department of Homeland Security, Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate (FEMA):
      --Oppose elimination of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program;
      --Preserve the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program;
      --Continue support for modernization of flood maps; and
      --Financial status of the National Flood Insurance Program.
        The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. and its 16 state
    chapters represent over 5,000 State, local, and private sector
    officials as well as other professionals who are engaged in all aspects
    of floodplain management and hazard mitigation. All are concerned with
    reducing our Nation's flood-related losses and reducing the costs of
    flooding.
    Oppose Elimination of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
        ASFPM opposes the suspension or elimination of the Hazard
    Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). HMGP has proven to be a very effective
    way to achieve mitigation. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 that
    requires communities to have mitigation plans in order to access HMGP
    assures that projects will be done according to pre-disaster plans. We
    object to the budget's proposal to replace HMGP entirely with a
    nationwide competitive grant program. We believe the logic behind this
    proposal is not sound: it ignores the realities of why individual
    citizens participate in mitigation; it ignores a multitude of benefits
    that are difficult to quantify; it ignores the recently authorized
    requirement for local mitigation planning; it ignores the leveraging of
    state and local funds that often are made available post-disaster; it
    ignores the complexities of project implementation; it ignores the
    distinct differences between hazards; and it ignores the needs of small
    communities.
        HMGP mobilizes financial and technical assistance in the aftermath
    of disasters--exactly the time when citizens and elected officials are
    most receptive to undertaking projects and initiatives that reduce the
    impacts of future disasters. The fact is that most cities, counties and
    towns across the country have many immediate and pressing financial
    needs. Regardless of the statistical evidence of the likelihood of
    future disaster occurrence, communities will not place mitigation
    higher than today's demands for education, social programs, local first
    responders, and the like. This is especially true in smaller
    communities where financial resources are always tight.
        On the proverbial ``sunny day'' flooding is a low priority for the
    millions of homeowners and business owners in the Nation's flood hazard
    areas--regardless of the mounting evidence that future floods will
    occur. Homeowners view offers for buyouts, elevations, and retrofit
    floodproofing very differently when they are shoveling mud, coping with
    toxic mold, or faced with collapsed foundations. The budget proposal
    will have many adverse consequences, not the least of which is that
    people who have just experienced damage and are most receptive to
    change are much less likely receive mitigation assistance since post-
    disaster HMGP will not be allocated to their states.
        ASFPM is greatly concerned about the criticism expressed by some
    people that a large percentage of HMGP projects do not appear to be
    cost effective. While shifting to a purely competitive program may mean
    ``the most cost-beneficial projects receive funding,'' it will turn
    mitigation into a numbers game that ignores the needs of many. A
    single-minded focus on the projects with the highest benefit:cost ratio
    will severely penalize many communities that have good projects that
    will reduce taxpayer costs, and thus are cost-effective for the Nation.
        There is an important conceptual distinction between cost-
    beneficial and cost-effective. The process for determining benefits and
    costs is less than perfect, and as currently structured it yields
    skewed results. Too often, projects that are more expensive to the
    taxpayer have higher benefit:cost ratios, even though a less costly
    project achieves the same objective of hazard reduction. This
    illustrates only one unintended consequence of relying on B:C to decide
    which projects get funded.
        ASFPM also urges consideration of another unintended consequence of
    the focus on the projects with the highest benefit:cost ratio. For
    years, other agencies with flood control responsibilities routinely
    dismissed non-structural measures (such as floodplain acquisition or
    elevation-inplace) even though these non-structural projects can be
    demonstrated to be cost-effective. Such projects tended to be dismissed
    in favor of structural measures (levees, dams, floodwalls), in large
    part because such projects often have a higher benefit: cost ratio, yet
    ignoring the long-term operation and maintenance costs often borne by
    communities. However, time and time again, there has been evidence of
    the multiple benefits of non-structural measures. A single focus on the
    benefit:cost ratio will result in fewer non-structural flood mitigation
    projects and increased long-term costs for government, as well as
    residual risk associated with structural projects.
        Pre-disaster funding should be directed to community-based planning
    in order to prepare communities to undertake mitigation projects when
    the disaster strikes. It would also be reasonable to make pre-disaster
    mitigation funds available to support public works projects that
    address potential damage to state and community buildings and public
    infrastructure--among the more costly categories of public disaster
    assistance.
        ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to retain the Hazard Mitigation Grant
    Program and restore its funding level to 15 percent of certain Federal
    disaster expenditures.--The Disaster Mitigation Assistance Act of 2000
    calls for communities to have pre-disaster local mitigation plans in
    order to access HMGP. One result of this requirement is that
    communities will be better prepared to identify eligible activities
    after the next declared disaster, thus further shortening the time
    needed to obligate and expend the HMGP funds.
        ASFPM strongly recommends that the Subcommittee focus the pre-
    disaster mitigation funds on support of cost-effective projects, as
    opposed to the most cost-beneficial projects.--This simple change will
    make a dramatic difference in supporting non-structural projects for
    floodplain management, while not detracting from projects that retrofit
    buildings to resist the effects of earthquakes and hurricane winds.
        ASFPM recommends that the Subcommittee direct FEMA to fully
    investigate the implications of the nationwide pre-disaster program
    funded in fiscal year 2003.--Particular attention should be paid to
    citizen, community and state receptivity to mitigation offers and how
    the ability to cost share differs in the pre- and post-disaster
    periods. Another critical aspect to attend to is how FEMA proposes to
    balance between different hazards, different geographic areas, and
    communities of different sizes and capabilities.
    Preserve the Flood Mitigation Assistance Program
        The Flood Mitigation Assistance Program (FMA) authorized by the
    National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 is funded entirely by flood
    insurance premium income that is paid by individual policyholders. It
    is not funded from general funds and therefore we are concerned with
    proposals to combine it with other mitigation funds, even to achieve
    accounting efficiencies. To ensure accountability to the policyholders
    and to ensure that these funds are used only for the explicit purposes
    authorized, the FMA funds are best kept separate. In particular, how
    FMA is administered must not be changed. FMA is specifically intended
    to support cost containment for the NFIP, in part by addressing the
    problem characterized as repetitive losses, but also to mitigate
    against severe flood damage and imminent threats due to coastal
    erosion.
        ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to clarify that Flood Mitigation
    Assistance Program funds are not to be co-mingled with other pre-
    disaster mitigation funds.--In addition, we urge that the Subcommittee
    direct that FMA continue to be administered as a separate program under
    existing procedures.
    Continue Support for Flood Map Modernization
        Good flood maps play a major role in disaster cost reduction
    through wise floodplain management. They also serve many purposes
    beyond the immediate needs of the National Flood Insurance Program.
    FEMA estimates that local regulation of flood hazard areas, using the
    flood maps, avoids property losses of nearly $1 billion each year.
    These savings accrue to property owners, communities, and taxpayers.
    FEMA's estimate does not count the benefits associated with using the
    maps to guide development to less hazard-prone areas. Flood maps yield
    benefits at all levels of government, including reducing the need for
    Federal disaster assistance when people build elsewhere or build to
    minimize damage. Since 1986, most of the funding for flood maps has
    been taken out of the National Flood Insurance Fund, which is funded by
    premiums and service fees from about 4.2 million flood insurance
    policyholders. Those funds are inadequate to the task of modernizing
    the inventory of over 100,000 flood map panels.
        The Flood Map Modernization effort will use current technologies to
    expedite cost-effective collection of mapping data, and to develop the
    models to identify flood-prone areas. This will yield digitized map
    products that will be accessible on the Internet. Digitized maps will
    also significantly reduce current outlays that are spent just to
    correct old maps in response to individual property owner concerns,
    thus allowing more of the base funding derived from policyholders
    (approximately $50 million/year) to be used more effectively.
      --ASFPM strongly endorses the Administration's request for $200
            million, and urge the addition of $200 million, to continue
            FEMA's map modernization initiative.--The continuance of this
            second year funding will ensure progress on the mufti-year
            effort that is now underway. The additional funding will
            shorten the overall timeframe and help state and communities
            that have had identified priorities for several years ago.
    Financial Status of the National Flood Insurance Program
        The Association of State Floodplain Managers believes that the
    National Flood Insurance Program is an exceptional example of the
    Federal Government working with state partners, community partners, and
    private sector partners. Established in 1968 in part to shift the
    burden of recovery to people who are at-risk (in the floodplain), the
    NFIP was carefully crafted by Congress to balance the need to pay
    insurance claims with concerns about financial impacts on homeowners
    and business owners who pay premiums on flood insurance policies. To
    that end, the NFIP establishes rates based on the ``average loss
    year,'' and thus intentionally does not build up substantial reserves
    for years when floods occur more frequently. To pay claims in those
    years, the NFIP borrows from the U.S. Treasury.
        ASFPM believes that criticism often heard when the NFIP goes into
    borrowing authority is unjustified. The Federal Insurance Administrator
    recently testified to the efficiency of this original Congressional
    mandate. Tropical Storm Allison hit the Gulf Coast in June of 2001, and
    continued inland to flood states across the southeast. It was the
    NFIP's first billion-dollar storm and prompted borrowing of $600
    million. In just 16 months, those funds were repaid, with interest. The
    NFIP is one of the government's best creditors.
        The NF1P is not supported in any other way by the United States
    taxpayer. A service fee charged on all policies pays for the program's
    administration, including: salaries and expenses of over 200 Federal
    employees; costs of contractors that support servicing policies and
    claims; a portion of flood mapping costs; the Flood Mitigation
    Assistance Program (described above); and grants to states to provide
    technical assistance to communities and property owners. Thus, only
    about 4.2 million citizens are paying for this program that serves the
    Nation as a whole. ASFPM believes this make it all the more important
    that the NFIP's funds be tracked separately so that accountability to
    the policyholder is clear.
        ASFPM understands that there will be a small increase in NFIP-
    funded Community Assistance Program in fiscal year 2004. This program
    is a good return to policyholders because it provides small, cost-
    shared grants to the states to provide partial support of state
    floodplain programs. CAP is critical to implementation of the NFIP
    because it facilitates direct technical assistance and training
    available to nearly 20,000 communities and millions of property owners.
    The best way to limit increases in future damage is to ensure that
    communities are properly administering their floodplain management
    regulations and that developers are complying with the rules. FEMA's
    staff is too small to provide this vital assistance to nearly 20,000
    communities, thus the partnership with states was established. ASFPM
    appreciates this recognition of the importance of CAP funding to
    continue the State-Federal partnerships.
      --ASFPM supports the increase in CAP funding in order to increase the
            technical assistance and training the states provide as FEMA's
            partners.
        For information about ASFPM and this testimony, contact Larry
    Larson, Executive Director, at (608) 274-0123, or email
    asfpm@floods.org.
                                     ______

              Prepared Statement of the Fleet Reserve Association

                 certification of non-receipt of federal funds
        Pursuant to the requirements of House Rule XI, the Fleet Reserve
    Association has not received any federal grant or contract during the
    current fiscal year or either of the two previous fiscal years.
                                  introduction
        Thank you Mr. Chairman and other distinguished members of the
    Subcommittee for the opportunity to submit the Fleet Reserve
    Association's views on funding the fiscal year 2004 Coast Guard
    request. The Fleet Reserve Association (FRA) is a Congressionally
    Chartered, non-profit organization, representing the interests of U.S.
    Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel with regard to pay,
    health care, and other benefits.
        Before addressing specific issues, the Association wishes to thank
    Congress for its tremendous support for pay and benefit improvements
    enacted during the 107th Congress. Across the board and targeted pay
    increases, higher housing allowances, reform of the PCS process and
    increased funding for health care are significant improvements and
    perceived as important recognition of the service and sacrifice of the
    men and women serving in the Coast Guard, and those who've served in
    the past.
        The Association notes the significant progress toward ensuring
    Coast Guard parity with all pay and benefits provided to DOD services
    personnel in recent years and restates it commitment to this goal.
                             pay and benefit parity
        The Fleet Reserve Association appreciates and thanks the
    Administration and Congress for continued support for the pay and
    entitlements of Coast Guard personnel. These include increases in base
    pay, target pay raises for senior enlisted personnel and some officer
    grades and annual housing allowance increases. (BAH).
        The fiscal year 2004 Budget supports an average military pay raise
    of 4.1 percent with pay levels ranging from 2 percent for E-1s to 6.25
    percent for E-9s. The majority of members will receive an increase of
    3.7 percent and out of pocket housing costs will be reduced from 7.5
    percent to 3.5 percent in keeping with a multi-year plan to reduce the
    average out of pocket expense to zero by 2006.
        FRA recommends full-funding of all pay and entitlements for Coast
    Guard personnel and seeks continuing strong support for benefit parity
    with the Department of Defense.
        As a footnote, the Association is extremely disappointed that the
    Administration is proposing to cap the pay of NOAA and USPHS officers
    at 2 percent for fiscal year 2004. FRA strongly objects to this
    disparate treatment of these members of the uniformed services and
    urges you to intercede in their behalf with colleagues on the
    appropriate oversight committees to halt this plan and ensure pay
    comparability for these personnel.
                          recruiting and end strength
        The Coast Guard is in a period of large personnel and mission
    growth. The service continues to balance mission requirements against
    workforce strength and asset availability to ensure a safe operational
    tempo is maintained and missions are completed.
        FRA strongly supports recently authorized increased end strengths
    and urges adequate funding for same in fiscal year 2004. This is
    especially important given the Coast Guard's broad and demanding
    mission requirements related to its key position in the new Department
    of Homeland Security. The President's budget authorizes 1,788 military
    and 188 civilian positions and includes six Maritime Safety and
    Security Teams, 53 Sea Marshalls, two Port Security Units, and new
    Coast Guard Stations in Boston and Washington, D.C. Also included is
    support for the Search and Rescue (SAR) Program and to allow the
    stations to meet readiness requirements with watch standers maintaining
    a maximum 68-hour workweek.
        Recruiting, training, and deploying a workforce with the skills and
    experience required to carry out the Coast Guard's many missions is a
    formidable challenge. The overall experience level of the workforce
    decreased since 9/11 and during this large growth period it will
    require a few years to come back to that 2001 level.
        Enlisted workforce retention is the best it has been since 1994
    having increased by 2.1 percent since fiscal year 2000. The Coast Guard
    met its active duty recruiting goal in fiscal year 2002 and is on
    target to meet it again in fiscal year 2003. However, Reserve
    recruiting fell slightly short of the fiscal year 2002 goal but is on
    target for fiscal year 2003. The fiscal year 2004 budget recommends
    funds to fully train, support and sustain the Coast Guard's Selected
    Reserve Force as an integral part of Team Coast Guard with growth to
    10,000 personnel (up from 9,000 in fiscal year 2003).
        The Coast Guard training system is operating effectively at maximum
    level in order to process the growing number of trainees. Additional
    contract instructors have been hired at the training centers and
    temporary classrooms accommodate day and night classes to increase
    capacity and efficiency.
        FRA supports funding all recruiting initiatives and incentives. The
    Coast Guard's robust recruiting system coupled with enlistment bonuses
    has ensured a steady flow of recruits entering the service. The Coast
    Guard also opened new recruiting offices to target diversity rich
    communities.
                                  health care
        FRA continues to work with Congress and DOD to ensure full funding
    of the Defense Health Budget to meet readiness needs and deliver
    services, through both the direct care and purchased care systems, for
    all uniformed services beneficiaries, regardless of age, status and
    location. The Association strongly supports TRICARE improvements
    recently enacted for active duty, Reserve and retired personnel and
    their families.
        Oversight of the Defense Health Budget is essential to avoid a
    return to the chronic under funding of recent years that led to
    execution shortfalls, shortchanging of the direct care system, and
    reliance on annual emergency supplemental funding requests. Even though
    supplemental appropriations were not needed last year, FRA is concerned
    that the current funding level only maintains the status quo.
    Addressing TRICARE provider shortfalls will require additional funding.
        Access to care is the number one concern challenging Coast Guard
    personnel assigned to duty in areas not served by military treatment
    facilities (MTFs). Some beneficiaries report that there are providers
    not willing to accept new TRICARE Standard patients. Areas most
    affected by this are: Alaska; Humboldt Bay/County, California (AIRSTA/
    Group Humboldt Bay); Novato, California, and other Bay Area locations
    (Pacific Strike Team/TRACEN Petaluma/ISC Alameda); and Santa Barbara,
    California.
        In areas away from MTFs, access can be especially challenging.
    Providers do not wish to take TRICARE patients mainly due to the low
    reimbursement rates. In the locations where TRICARE Prime is present, a
    trend is developing whereby providers are leaving the network. This not
    only affects active duty service members and their dependents but
    retirees and their dependents.
        The message sent by The TRICARE Management Activity ``selling'' the
    three TRICARE options (Prime, Extra or Standard) only applies to those
    fortunate to live near an MTF that has an established network. These
    members have choices. If assigned to a high cost or remote/semi-remote
    area where Prime is not available, the only option is Standard. In
    addition, it is unfair for Coast Guard personnel to have to absorb the
    higher costs associated with health and dental care, including
    orthodontics in assignment areas. In reality there is no uniform
    benefit at this time since the three TRICARE options are not available
    to all beneficiaries nationwide.
        FRA urges the Subcommittee to provide appropriations to enhance the
    ability of Coast Guardsmen to have access to and afford adequate health
    care for their families.
                                    housing
        FRA is concerned about Coast Guard housing challenges that include
    adequate appropriations for new construction and/or maintenance. While
    the objective is to ensure that all members have access to quality
    housing, whether for single personnel or personnel with families, the
    Commandant's people-oriented direction acknowledges the importance of
    quality of life, and the important role of housing in obtaining and
    retaining a productive workforce.
        During recent congressional testimony, Master Chief Petty Officer
    of the Coast Guard Frank Welch, stated that Coast Guard personnel and
    their families ``continue to face a lack of affordable and adequate
    housing in many of our assignment areas.''
        The following locations are deemed Critical Housing Areas (CHAs)
    for Coast Guard personnel.
      --Cape Hatteras, North Carolina (NC176)
      --Montauk, New York (NY218)
      --Cape May, New Jersey (NJ198)
      --Abbeville, Louisiana (ZZ553)
      --Port O'Connor, Texas (ZZ583)
      --Rockland, Maine (ME141)
      --Carrabelle, Florida (ZZ630)
      --Marathon/Islamorada, Florida (FL069)
      --Plus any area currently designated as a CHA by the U.S. Navy.
        The situation is exacerbated by assignment areas that are typically
    in or near remote, high-cost areas along the coasts.
        While housing allowances have increased, the availability of
    quality, affordable housing within a reasonable distance to work
    remains another challenge--especially for junior enlisted personnel. In
    certain areas, hyper increases in utility costs may also financially
    impact accompanied members residing on the economy and paying their own
    utilities. Although housing privatization initiatives are helping ease
    this challenge for the DOD Services and the Coast Guard's authority to
    participate in these ventures, FRA believes increased funds should be
    appropriated to address the Coast Guard's protracted housing problem.
                                   child care
        Having available and accessible childcare is a very important
    quality of life issue for Coast Guard personnel and their families and
    the Administration's fiscal year 2004 Budget supports an expansion of
    this service.
        While comparing Coast Guard childcare parity with the Department of
    Defense is difficult--the childcare needs of Coast Guard personnel and
    their families are no different than for DOD services personnel.
    Approximately 640 children are in Coast Guard childcare facilities and
    FRA believes that this program should be adequately funded to ensure
    parity.
                               education benefits
        FRA strongly supports increased funding for education benefits. For
    fiscal year 2003, tuition assistance is paid at 100 percent up to $250
    per semester hour with an annual cap of $4,500 for Coast Guard
    personnel. This puts the service on a par with the Department of
    Defense.
        With regard to the MGIB program, participants may receive a full-
    time student rate of $985/month or more, depending on whether they
    contribute to an increased benefit program. Recent enhancements are
    positive steps to improving this program, however FRA believes MGIB
    benefits should be benchmarked to the average cost of a four-year
    public college education.
        The Coast Guard adjusts discretionary funding to best address its
    particular needs. Hopefully, this Subcommittee will support the
    President's fiscal year 2004 budget recommending the Coast Guard to be
    fully competitive with DOD education benefits.
                                   conclusion
        The Association again appreciates the opportunity to present its
    recommendations on the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2004 Budget and is
    grateful to this Distinguished Subcommittee for its great work in
    support of the men and women serving in our Nation's fifth Armed Force.
        The broad range of services and support provided by the Coast Guard
    are not fully understood and recognized by the American public. FRA is
    working to broaden awareness of the incredible work done by Coast Guard
    men and women in support of the service's many missions and our
    national security. Hopefully the service's well deserved prominence
    within the new Department of Homeland Security will help increase
    recognition of the Coast Guard's tremendous service to our great
    Nation.
                                     ______

          Prepared Statement of the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority

        Chairman Cochran and distinguished members of the Senate
    Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security: The Greater Orlando
    Aviation Authority (``the Authority'') appreciates the opportunity to
    submit written testimony on the advancement of an in-line EDS baggage
    screening system for Orlando International Airport (OIA). The Authority
    recognizes and applauds the excellent and on-going assistance Congress
    has given in past efforts to obtain federal funding for critical
    capacity improvements at OIA.
        Orlando International Airport remains steadfast in its commitment
    to help restore public confidence and ensure the highest standard of
    security in air travel. The Authority has diligently developed and
    begun implementation of a comprehensive security enhancement program to
    meet the challenges resulting from the tragic events of September 11,
    2001.
        In addition, the Authority recognizes the importance in continuing
    support of enhanced security at OIA. The Authority supports the U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security's commitment to keep air travel
    security enhancement initiatives on track.
        The Authority respectfully requests your Subcommittee's
    consideration and support of our request for $50 million in funding
    which is essential to ensure the full and timely implementation of a
    Phase 2 Long-Term Checked Baggage Screening Solution using In-line EDS
    Equipment.
    TSA Phase 2 Long-Term Checked Baggage Screening Solution
        The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) approved a Phase 1
    short-term solution to enable Orlando International Airport to meet
    Congress December 31, 2002 100 percent checked baggage-screening
    requirements. Together, TSA and the Authority established the following
    goals for the checked baggage screening functions at OIA:
      --Create an experience the traveler and customer see as safe, secure,
            comfortable, efficient, and affordable.
      --Provide a well-studied recommendation to TSA on how to achieve 100
            percent checked baggage screening specific to OIA's operations
            and terminal layout.
      --Meet or exceed TSA checked baggage screening standards and
            procedural requirements while maintaining efficiency of
            passenger and baggage processing and flow.
      --Implement Phase 1 solution to meet the December 31, 2002 deadline
            with Phase 2 solution intended for the long-term, permanent
            solution.
        The temporary Phase 1 solution required the combined deployment of
    Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive Trace Detectors (ETD)
    equipment throughout public areas within the airport's main terminal
    building. It is manpower and space intensive, requiring over 200 ETD
    operators per shift and constricting passenger movement and circulation
    through the airport.
        Passenger baggage in some areas must be manually transported from
    ticket counters to EDS/ETD devices positioned along the passenger
    walkways for screening and then returned to the ticket counter to be
    loaded on the plane, resulting in longer bag processing times and
    interference in passenger movement.
        Due to these shortcomings and other factors, the Authority
    continues to work with TSA in developing a long-term Phase 2 checked
    baggage screening solution that is integrated with existing baggage
    systems. Phase II is an automated solution that relies primarily on EDS
    technology, supplemented with ETD for false alarm resolution. Phase 2
    will be less manpower intensive and passenger intrusive as it is
    integrated into the existing baggage conveyance system. Simply put, it
    will be more secure, more customer friendly, and more efficient. It is
    anticipated that the Phase 2 solution could be completed in 22 months
    at an estimated cost of $50 million.
        The Authority respectfully requests a specific line item in the
    fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland Security budget for $50 million
    to implement a Phase 2 Long-Term Baggage Screening Solution at Orlando
    International Airport.
    Funding Justification for Orlando International Airport
        Orlando International Airport remains steadfast in its commitment
    to help restore public confidence and ensure the highest standard of
    safety and security in air travel.
        Orlando International Airport is one of the Central Florida's
    primary assets and has been designated as an U.S. Security Category X
    airport. In 2001, OIA served approximately 28.3 million passengers
    making it the 15th busiest commercial service airport in the nation and
    the 24th busiest in the world. In terms of origin and destination (O&D)
    passenger traffic at domestic airports, OIA ranked 5th behind Los
    Angeles International and traditional airline hub airports such as Las
    Vegas' McCarran International, Chicago's O'Hare International, and
    Atlanta's Hartsfield International. Importantly, this means OIA faces a
    unique responsibility to safely and efficiently process a large volume
    of checked passenger baggage entering the sterile security environment
    for the first time. In fact, O&D passengers represent approximately 85
    percent of all passengers at OIA. This high level of O&D activity is
    expected to continue, as well as our heightened responsibility to
    process the disproportionately large volume of checked baggage related
    to O&D traffic as it enters the secured system for the first time.

            TOP TEN ORIGINATION AND DESTINATION AIRPORTS IN THE U.S.
                                  [In millions]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Rank                        Airport        O&D Passengers
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1.................................  Los Angeles (LAX)...            31.0
    2.................................  Las Vegas (LAS).....            25.8
    3.................................  Chicago (ORD).......            24.8
    4.................................  Atlanta (ATL).......            24.3
    5.................................  Orlando (MCO).......            22.2
    6.................................  Phoenix (PHX).......            20.1
    7.................................  New York (LGA)......            19.4
    8.................................  New York (EWR)......            18.4
    9.................................  Dallas (DFW)........            18.4
    10................................  Seattle (SEA).......           18.3
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: U.S DOT OD1A database.

        OIA has scheduled service to 70 non-stop service plus 14 True-
    Direct domestic and 14 non-stop and 10 True-Direct international
    destinations, promoting increased airline service and competitive
    fares. The largest rental car market in the world is located at OIA.
    The airport shares a unique relationship with the regional economy. A
    completed Economic Impact Study determined OIA generates a $14 billion
    annual economic impact on Central Florida and is responsible for 54,400
    direct and indirect jobs.
        The Authority is extremely fortunate to operate a commercial
    airport containing 13,297 acres of land. With these extraordinary
    resources, OIA is a critical component of the National Aviation System.
    Regional and Economic Development Facts
        The Orlando region has positioned itself as an international force
    in global business. Department of Commerce statistics show that this
    region leads the state's major markets in terms of export growth. With
    a population exceeding 1.7 million, metropolitan Orlando is one of the
    fastest growing population and employment markets in the country with a
    solid infrastructure in place to support major high-tech growth.
        The region's private/public sectors work hand-in-hand with higher
    education institutions to enhance the region's climate for high-tech
    growth. Orlando has one of the most advanced telecommunications
    infrastructures in the southeast and the area's utility services are
    noted for reliability. With a civilian labor force exceeding 845,000--
    more than 200,000 of whom possess a college degree--the region's
    residents are well educated. It is estimated that more than 1,100 new
    adult residents move to the metropolitan Orlando area each week,
    providing an additional pool of labor for companies. Metropolitan
    Orlando's median household income is higher than both Florida and
    national averages. Clearly, the metropolitan Orlando area exhibits the
    demographic and work force growth, prowess and potential that only the
    nation's very best business communities can offer.
        Orlando has become a world class meeting destination. The elegant,
    award-winning Orange County Convention Center, the second largest in
    the nation, will add one million square feet with its expansion,
    bringing the total exhibit space to a record 2.1 million square feet.
    This expansion, scheduled to open in 2003, will boost the center's
    space and services to accommodate meetings from mega-shows to smaller
    events. What's more, Orlando is transforming and enhancing its
    accommodations for meeting attendees with plans to add more than 23,000
    hotel rooms to the area's existing 99,000-room inventory.
        With its strategic geographical location within the Western
    Hemisphere, the state of Florida offers both a diverse culture and a
    flourishing business and industrial environment. With close to $370
    billion in gross state product, Florida's economy is ranked 5th largest
    in the Western Hemisphere and the 16th largest in the world--far
    outpacing other states in the Southeast. Florida's robust state economy
    provides nationally recognized support for business expansion, new
    investment and international trade. With an unparalleled multi-modal
    transportation network, Florida provides easy access to any global
    destination, thus providing the obvious solution for moving people,
    goods and services around the world--today, and continuing throughout
    the 21st century.
    In Summary
        The Authority expresses its gratitude for the opportunity to
    present this testimony to your Subcommittee. The Senate's past support
    and interest in the development of the Authority's commercial airport
    is greatly appreciated. The Authority looks forward to working with you
    in advancing safety and security initiatives that will benefit the
    National Aviation System. We believe our request for $50 million to
    fund our permanent, Long-Term Phase 2 Checked Baggage Screening
    Solution using In-Line EDS Equipment is such an initiative.
                                     ______

       Prepared Statement of the International Association of Emergency
                                    Managers

        Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to provide a statement
    for the record regarding the fiscal year 2004 budget proposal for the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        My name is J.R. Thomas, and I am the emergency management director
    for Franklin County (which includes Columbus), Ohio. I currently serve
    as the President of the International Association of Emergency Managers
    (IAEM), whose membership is comprised of more than 2,000 of my
    colleagues from across the United States. We are city and county
    emergency managers who perform the crucial function of coordinating and
    integrating the efforts at the local level to prepare for, mitigate the
    effects of, respond to, and recover from all types of disasters
    including terrorist attacks.
        We respectfully submit suggestions on three particular issues
    relating to the Department of Homeland Security budget for 2004.
        Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG):
      --Urge that funding be specifically designated in the Appropriations
            Bill
      --Request that funding be increased from $165 million in 2003 to $300
            million in 2004
      --Urge that this program be returned to the Emergency Preparedness
            and Response Directorate (FEMA)
        Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP):
      --Oppose the budget request to eliminate the 404 HMGP program
      --Urge Subcommittee to retain the program and return the funding
            level to 15 percent of certain eligible disaster costs
        Flood Map Modernization:
      --Support request for $200 million.
        Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG).--The Emergency
    Management Performance Grants are pass-through funds to state and local
    emergency management offices to provide a foundation for basic
    emergency preparedness and response capabilities. This funding has
    existed in the past under several different names such as Emergency
    Management Assistance and State and Local Assistance, but the dollars
    have always served the same purpose.
        The conferees on H.J.Res. 2, the Omnibus Appropriations Bill for
    fiscal year 2003, recognized the importance of this funding and
    specified $165,000,000 in legislative language for EMPG. In addition,
    the conference report (H. Report 108-10) stated the following:

        The conferees have taken this action because EMPG is the backbone
    of the nation's emergency management system, builds state and local
    emergency management capability, is the foundation for first responder
    activities, and because this important activity has been severely
    underfunded for many years. Now more than ever, the planning activities
    carried out in this program are of utmost importance.

        EMPG Not Specified in 2004 Budget.--The coordination function which
    EMPG supports faces an uncertain future within the Department of
    Homeland Security. What is certain is that the need for this grant
    program remains, and in fact, has dramatically increased due to recent
    Homeland Security efforts. We have been advised that state and local
    programs like EMPG are being consolidated into the Office of Domestic
    Preparedness under the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.
    However, no funding has been designated for this activity in the budget
    documents we have seen. The Budget in Brief for fiscal year 2004 for
    the Department of Homeland Security includes a request for $3.5 billion
    for the Office of Domestic Preparedness and specifies $500,000,000 for
    law enforcement grants, $500,000,000 for fire grants and $181,000,000
    for Citizen Corps, but contains no mention of the EMPG. In addition, in
    response to hearing questions from Members of Congress, Department of
    Homeland Security Officials have verified that no funding has been
    specified for this program.
        Importance of EMPG.--As America strives to promote homeland
    security and to advance first responder capability, several pressing
    needs are apparent, including:
      --Integrated comprehensive plans which involve stakeholders at all
            levels
      --Interoperable communications
      --Standardization and expansion of training and exercising programs
            which involve all response agencies
      --Regionalization of efforts to maximize effectiveness given limited
            funding
      --Comprehensive critical infrastructure planning including both
            public and private sectors
        It is the state and local emergency managers who orchestrate the
    efforts to meet these needs. The national emphasis on homeland security
    has generated major efforts requiring state and local governments to
    plan, train, exercise, and equip themselves for a variety of possible
    future emergencies, including those that result from terrorism. It is
    important to note that such planning and coordination does not
    generally emanate from the first responder agencies themselves, but
    from the efforts of state and local emergency managers. Given continued
    support and funding, emergency managers have the skills, the expertise,
    and the willingness to rise to the planning and coordinating challenges
    presented by the full range of hazards affecting their communities.
        Funding.--Historically, funding for EMPG has been inadequate. The
    program was intended to be 50 percent Federal and 50 percent state or
    local funding. Currently many jurisdictions receive 20 percent or less.
    State and local emergency management programs are in desperate need of
    financial support if they are to effectively implement the President's
    homeland security strategy in states, counties, cities and
    neighborhoods across America. Given the new security concerns arising
    from the War in Iraq, emergency management is more important than ever.
    It is imperative that adequate funding be allotted to EMPG so that
    emergency managers can continue to serve as a unifying force in the
    effort to preserve public safety and maintain homeland security as well
    as continue to meet the requirements of all hazard planning and
    coordination.
        We respectfully request the EMPG be increased from $165,000,000 to
    $300,000,000.
        Location of EMPG Program.--It is essential that the Directorate of
    Emergency Preparedness and Response and state and local emergency
    management offices continue to prepare and plan for floods, hurricanes,
    earthquakes, ice storms, tornadoes and other natural disasters as well
    as acts of terrorism. It is vital that the link between EMPG and those
    who integrate the programs on the Federal level be maintained. The
    focus of this particular grant program is much broader than training
    and purchase of equipment. It is a program that supports the foundation
    of emergency management for all hazards, including terrorism and for
    which deliverables are required. In order to maintain the critical
    federal, state and local emergency management infrastructure, the value
    of which has been demonstrated in hundreds of disasters over the past
    few years, the essential elements of that EMPG program should be moved
    back to Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate.
    Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
        The Administration's request for fiscal year 2004 would eliminate
    the 404 Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, which provides post-disaster
    funding and fund a pre-disaster mitigation program at $300 million per
    year. In order to reduce future disaster costs, commitments must be
    made to both pre-disaster and post disaster mitigation. Citizens and
    elected officials are most receptive to undertaking projects and
    initiatives that reduce the impacts of future disasters immediately
    after a disaster has occurred. Without the 404 funding, those
    opportunities will be missed. The fiscal year 2003 Omnibus
    Appropriations Bill reduced the 404 Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
    from an amount equivalent to 15 percent of eligible disaster costs to
    7.5 percent. We urge that the program be retained and that it be
    restored to the previous 15 percent.
    Flood map Modernization
        IAEM supports the Administration's request for $200 million for
    flood map modernization. Flood maps play a key role in disaster
    reduction, mitigation, and community planning and development
    activities. Many of the flood maps in place are 15 to 30 years old and
    do not reflect recent development, and may contain inaccurate
    information about the floodplains as a result. FEMA estimated the cost
    of a multi-year map modernization plan at $750 million over a 7-year
    period. We support this multi-year effort.
        Thank you for giving us the opportunity to provide this testimony.
                                     ______

           Prepared Statement of the International Loran Association

        Dear Chairman Cochran: On behalf of the International Loran
    Association (ILA), I am writing in conjunction with your work on the
    fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill.
    Specifically, the ILA is asking for your support in funding the U.S.
    Coast Guard (USCG) budget to continue the modernization of the Loran-C
    system. Because Loran is the only multimodal system we have that can
    support the global positioning satellite (GPS) system, which has
    recognized vulnerabilities affecting the security of our critical
    national infrastructure and the safety of tens of millions of American
    citizens, we believe completing Loran modernization has critical
    national importance. I respectfully request that this letter be made
    part of your hearing record in conjunction with the Subcommittee's
    work.
        In recent years, because of continued strong bipartisan support
    from the Appropriations Committee and the widespread recognition of
    national vulnerabilities associated with overdependence on GPS, nearly
    $100 million in resources have been provided to modernize the Loran-C
    infrastructure through an inter-agency agreement between the USCG and
    the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Coast Guard's move to
    the new Homeland Security Department now makes it imperative that
    funding be provided from the USCG budget to continue and complete the
    infrastructure modernization effort and to augment operations funds
    already provided through Coast Guard resources.
        With regard to the Subcommittee's objectives and its focus on
    national security issues, let me briefly summarize issues associated
    with GPS and Loran:
    GPS and Loran
        GPS and Loran are radionavigation and timing systems that operate
    in virtually identical ways but have extremely different properties--
    properties that make them uniquely synergistic systems. GPS is a
    satellite-based, high frequency, and very low signal level system,
    while Loran is a ground-based, low frequency, and a very high signal
    level system. Given their distinctly different properties, GPS and
    Loran do not share vulnerabilities, e.g. interference that may affect
    one system will not affect the other. Both GPS and Loran are multimodal
    (i.e. they can be used for aviation, marine, terrestrial and timing
    applications), and they are the only multimodal systems we have. Given
    its multimodal capabilities, Loran is the second most widely used
    navigation and timing system in the world.
        From approximately 1994-2001, the Department of Transportation and
    its agencies were driving towards a ``sole-means'' GPS system, in hopes
    of eliminating all other systems and relying totally on GPS.
    Fortunately, it is now generally acknowledged that a sole-means system
    cannot be justified on safety, security, technical, economic, or
    political grounds, and that integrated or hybrid systems provide the
    most robust, highest performance and do so in the most economic manner.
    Not only is Loran our least expensive system, it is also the most
    complementary system to GPS.
        The matrix below summarizes Loran's unique multimodal advantages,
    and graphically illustrates Loran is the only system we have that can
    provide an independent backup to GPS in the diverse roles that are
    critical to the national infrastructure and our nation's security. From
    a national perspective, it is clear that investments in the Loran
    infrastructure will result in a system that can support GPS in
    multimodal applications and that has considerable upside potential with
    regard to national security and safety, system performance, and user/
    provider/manufacturer/national economic benefits.

                                                      RADIONAVIGATION SYSTEMS AND GPS AUGMENTATION SYSTEMS
                                              [Applications and Performance--* = vehicles, railroads and personal]
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Terrestrial*       Aviation          Marine           Timing      GPS Independent
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Loran-C............................................................               +                +                +                +                +
    VOR/DME............................................................               -                +                -                -                +
    NDGPS..............................................................               +                -                +                -                -
    WAAS...............................................................               +                +                +                +                -
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    GPS Interference, Dependence, and National Security and Safety
        As a result of 9/11, the Volpe report on GPS vulnerabilities, the
    President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, and
    numerous other events/studies, Congress and the nation have become
    extremely focused on protecting the national infrastructure and safety
    of life, and seek practical, cost effective solutions to these very
    real concerns. Through these studies and reports, including the Volpe
    Center's ``Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation
    Infrastructure Relying on the Global Positioning System,'' overwhelming
    evidence has accumulated about the need for complementary systems,
    including Loran.
        Since virtually every aspect of our national infrastructure (e.g.
    transportation, telecommunications, and power) relies on GPS, and
    because GPS is an inherently fragile system, GPS dependence is a core
    national vulnerability. Basically, GPS is extremely vulnerable to
    intentional and unintentional interference, and neither can be
    completely controlled today or in the future, regardless of system
    augmentations/modifications or monies expended on those efforts. For
    example, intentional jamming is currently underway in Iraq, as reported
    by The Washington Post, Reuters, and other news sources, and while such
    acts are recognized tactics in modern war situations, recent history
    tells us that such tactics could easily be brought to our land. I will
    note that in the August 19, 2002 Colorado Springs Gazette, General
    Lance Lord, Commander of the Air Force Space Command, stated that the
    most likely attack on U.S. satellites would be GPS jamming attacks on
    the ground.
        There have also been numerous examples of unintentional jamming,
    and these incidents exemplify how easily GPS reception can be
    disrupted. For example, GPS World recently published an article about
    GPS jamming that inadvertently continued for well over 2 months,
    completely blocking Moss Landing Harbor in California. In this case,
    the ``jammers'' were commercially available TV antennas located on
    private boats, and the owners were completely unaware of the
    interference caused by these devices. One must only turn to personal
    experience with cell phones, AM/FM radios, TV reception etc. to
    recognize that wireless communications are not perfect, and will not
    become so in our lifetime. I believe it is also reasonable to assume,
    particularly given the huge popular migration to wireless communication
    technologies, that these conditions will only be exacerbated in the
    future.
        In summary, the reality is that our national transportation,
    telecommunications, and power infrastructure is totally reliant on GPS
    and our infrastructure is vulnerable. The reality is also that GPS can
    never be made to be invulnerable, and we cannot completely control our
    radio frequency environment today or in the future. Loran is the only
    system we have that can mitigate this vulnerability and provide an
    infinite backup to GPS.
    Economic and National Security Issues
        While it is clear that GPS dependence is a national vulnerability,
    it is also clear that the nation must seek the most cost-effective
    means to protect all modalities that compose the national
    infrastructure. In this regard, I think it is fair to state that
    Congress has shown exceptional, pragmatic leadership with regard to
    Loran and GPS, but in contrast, agencies and the DOT have been unable
    to formulate a cohesive policy that addresses national needs.
        For example, the FAA currently maintains the very high frequency
    omnidirectional range (VOR) and distance measuring equipment (DME)
    systems to backup GPS when GPS is unavailable. Neither system provides
    nearly the coverage or performance of Loran, and their annual O&M costs
    are roughly three times that of Loran's, which will drop to about $15
    million when the modernization is complete. In addition, VORs and DMEs
    are single modality systems (i.e. they can only be used by aviation),
    and cannot even be used in the future ``Free Flight'' system envisioned
    by the FAA. In contrast, the FAA's own studies have identified Loran as
    ``the best theoretical'' backup to GPS and point out that Loran will
    fit in their future Free Flight system. Lastly, Loran is a multimodal
    system that can provide similar benefits to millions of other
    Americans, and can do so much less expensively than the single modal
    VOR/DME system.
        Another example is the situation with the USCG, which has not
    formally identified a GPS backup that would enable continued port
    operations during a period of GPS denial or unavailability. The USCG
    currently states that radar with visual aiding is the backup that can
    be used during a GPS outage. On its face, this answer completely avoids
    the basic issue, as it assumes a GPS outage would only occur during
    daylight hours with good visibility. It eschews the fundamental concern
    of continuing operations during nighttime and storms or perhaps
    terrorist activity, the very situations where a backup system is
    absolutely required. Moreover, the USCG has not identified a GPS backup
    for the automatic identification system (AIS), which will be used to
    track and monitor vessels in and around U.S. ports, and relies
    completely on GPS. Fortunately, the USCG has initiated studies on Loran
    for these roles, and the modernization program will enhance Loran's
    ability to fulfill these roles. In this regard, I will also note that
    the United States Power Squadron (USPS) has recently joined the
    National Boating Federation (NBF) in endorsing Loran's continuation and
    modernization, and written the USCG Commandant to express these views.
        In summary, Loran is not only the most cost effective system we
    have that can backup GPS and protect our multimodal national
    infrastructure, it is the only system we have that can address these
    essential national requirements. At this point in our history, Loran is
    not only a national asset, but also a national requirement; its
    modernization is a necessity.
    Loran Modernization
        As indicated above, the Loran recapitalization effort has already
    yielded substantial benefits to the nation, which are reflected not
    only in national security and infrastructure enhancements across all
    modalities, but also in cost savings. For example, major progress has
    been made in replacing eleven old tube transmitters with modern, high
    efficiency transmitters and associated modern electronic systems. This
    modernization program has already enabled personnel reductions,
    increased reliability, and enhanced performance. These improvements
    will ultimately reduce Loran's annual O & M costs from $27 million to
    under $15 million, and do so while improving Loran's ability to
    complement GPS. Well into our future, Loran can act as a multimodal
    insurance policy for our national infrastructure for under $15 million
    annually.
        Last year, Congress approved $25 million for the Loran
    modernization program. The Coast Guard is effectively using those funds
    for important projects that simultaneously assist the modernization
    effort and advance security and safety benefits presented by Loran and
    GPS compatibilities. These projects are demonstrating that Loran and
    GPS uniquely work hand-in-hand, and cost-effectively benefit all modes
    of transportation users. In summary, it is hard to imagine how
    taxpayers' money could have been more productively spent to generate
    more security, safety, performance, and economic benefits for the
    nation. The Loran modernization program is indeed a wise and necessary
    investment in America's future, and I respectfully ask that the
    Committee continue this investment at its current level of $25 million.
        In conclusion, Loran is a national asset of inestimable value.
    Loran is the second most widely-used radionavigation system in the
    world; it is the most cost-effective, most complementary system to GPS;
    and it is the only other multimodal system available to meet our
    national security and transportation system objectives. The Loran
    modernization program is well underway, and already has provided
    multimodal benefits to the nation, and more will follow. I urge you to
    support fiscal year 2004 funding in the Coast Guard budget of no less
    than $25 million to continue a Loran modernization program that will
    help assure our nation's transportation safety and infrastructure
    security in the most cost effective manner for both government
    providers and private users.
                                     ______

            Prepared Statement of the Lummi Indian Business Council

        My name is Darrell Hillaire, Chairman of the Lummi Nation. The
    Lummi Nation, is located on the northern coastline of Washington State,
    and is the third largest tribe in Washington State serving a population
    of over 5,200. The modern Lummi government is heir to the traditional
    territories of the Lummi and Semiahmoo People, which covers lands
    rivers and marines areas in the United States (Washington) and Canada
    (British Columbia).
        On behalf of the Lummi Nation I want to thank you and the members
    of the Committee for the opportunity to express our concerns and
    requests regarding the fiscal year 2004 appropriation for the U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security. The following written testimony
    presents the Lummi Nation funding priorities, as well as regional and
    national concerns and recommendations for your consideration.
        The Lummi Nation's relationship with the United States of America
    means that it must also confront threats to the United States and the
    American people that are presented by World events that have occurred,
    at times, in distant lands and disturbingly in our own backyard. In
    January 2002 several members of the Lummi Nation Council and I attended
    the Tribal Homeland Security Summit. While that meeting did provide
    information is did not result in any increased security for our
    membership. Although isolated the Lummi Nation has witnessed major
    terrorist activities in our area.
      --A terrorist from the middle east was caught entering the United
            States less than 90 miles from the Lummi Nation with plans and
            equipment to bomb Los Angles International Airport.
      --Within the last 2 years the Federal government successfully
            prosecuted 5 residents of our County for involvement in
            American ``militia'' activities similar to those that led to
            the bombing in Oklahoma City. And finally the terrorist father
            and stepson, who held the Washington DC area in fear last year
            were living in the nearby city of Bellingham, prior to
            beginning their cross country shooting spree.
      --Tribal members routinely fish and hunt in remote areas of what is
            now known as northwest Washington State that are the scene of
            drug smuggling.
      --Tribal member routinely cross through the boarder stations into
            Canada to visit relatives, perform and participated in
            ceremonies and participate in Tribe to Tribe trade, tax free,
            under the Jay Treaty of 1789. These activities also take place
            in remote areas of British Columbia.
      --Lummi Tribal members are dependent of water resources that flow
            from reservation aquifers fed by surface water wetlands and the
            waters of the Nooksack river.
      --Lummi Nation's dwindling fisheries resources are also dependent on
            these water resources. All of which are open to contamination.
      --Tribal lands are not part of the State of Washington, Lummi Nation
            is a sovereign federally recognized Indian Government.
      --The Coastal Zone Management Plan of Washington State indicates
            Lummi Nation Lands as a blank space on their Plan Map. The
            Lummi Nation owns and manages 12 contiguous miles of Coastline.
        I, along with other tribal leaders, are concerned that the
    Department fully include and involve Tribal governments as it develops
    the programs services functions and activities that are designed to
    assist Tribal governments needs to meet the ever changing nature of
    terrorism. The Lummi Nation has an Office of Emergency Services, has
    developed Emergency Services Plans and works with Whatcom county and
    the State of Washington to insure that emergency services are ready and
    are provided as needed.
    Tribal Government Consultation
        On behalf of the Lummi Nation I am recommending that the
    Department, following the example of many other Federal departments,
    develop a policy of planning through consultation with Tribal
    governments on a government-to-government basis. This means
    consultation prior to developing plans meant to benefit tribal
    governments. Such a policy is needed due to the unique status of Tribal
    governments within the American system of government, their strategic
    location and isolation that present unique challenges for all law
    enforcement and security activities.
    Senate Bill 578 and Tribal Self-Governance
        The Lummi Nation fully supports proposed legislation to amend the
    Homeland Security Act of 2002 to include Indian tribes among the
    entities consulted with respect to activities carried out by the
    Secretary of Homeland Security, and for other purposes. The Lummi
    Nation is not only a Self-Governance Tribe--it is the first Self-
    Governance Tribe. The Lummi Nation is seeking to be a full, active and
    productive partner with the United States and the Department of
    Homeland Security. This can best be accomplished through the passage of
    this legislation.
    Emergency Domestic Preparedness
        Tribal governments must be part of the Department's efforts to
    strengthen America's first responder community and make our homeland
    safer from potential threats. The Lummi Nation needs financial and
    technical assistance to plan and develop its preparedness for terrorism
    as well as its coordinated terrorism prevention and security
    enhancement for first responders within Lummi reservation communities.
    The Lummi Nation needs financial assistance to develop preparedness
    plans, purchase equipment, develop and implement training, and support
    the costs of preparedness exercises to enhance our security: The Lummi
    Nation wants to be one of the ``critical infrastructure facilities as
    part of Operation Liberty Shield.''
        The Lummi Nation and other Tribal governments need the U.S.
    Homeland Security Department to recognize that there are significant
    security needs on reservations that are substantially different from
    those of metropolitan areas. There are unique needs for protection or
    preparedness of rural and isolated areas that attract infiltration
    activities.
    Counter-terrorism Programs, Services, Functions and Activities
        In the planning the Department will undertake I ask you to consider
    the role of the Lummi Nation and other Tribal governments in the
    counter terrorism activities of the United States the support expanded
    responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.
        The Lummi Nation can provide many trained officers and other who
    want work and training to support the increased transportation security
    operations including additional screening of visitors crossing the
    border, more secondary inspection of immigrants and visitors at ports-
    of-entry, increased inspection of high-risk goods and cargo at ports-
    of-entry, additional flight hours for airspace security.
        The Lummi Nation can provide the administrative support and the
    labor force to support the protection of Federal assets located in our
    area. The Lummi Nation is in an excellent position to provide increased
    security between ports-of-entry on the borders.
        The Lummi Nation can develop the facilities to support the pre-
    deployment of Federal emergency response assets and provide the labor
    force needed to support the activation of government emergency response
    plans.
                     tribal specific appropriation request
                   $160,000 tribal emergency response offices
        Lummi Nation request funding to support the development,
    implementation and operation of its Emergency Assistance Preparedness
    and Management Plan $50,000, Office Staffing $100,000 and start-up
    equipment $10,000.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Budget Period........................  2004...................  20O5...................  2006
    Funding Amount.......................  $160,000...............  $150,000...............  $150,000
    Project Activity.....................  Planning...............  Operations Support.....  Operations Support
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       $150,000 emergency communications
        The Lummi Nation needs assistance to plan develop, construct and
    operate reliable, real time, reservation wide emergency communication
    Dispatch services, and the problems with 911 and complaints in delays
    getting L&O officer response. Dispatch services.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Budget Period........................  2004...................  2005...................  2006
    Funding Amount.......................  $150,000...............  $50,000................  $50,000
    Project Activity.....................  Planning & Equipment...  Implementation.........  Operations Support
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     lummi nation first responders network
        The Lummi Nation is seeking financial assistance in planning
    developing implementing and operating a reservation-wide first
    responder network.
    Emergency Medical Service program
        Emergency Medical Services request funds for an Ambulance, staff
    training and assistance in establishing a 24/7 First Responder and
    Emergency Medical Technician Service. Construction of an Lummi Nation
    Emergency Services Facility that would house the ambulances and support
    reservation wide emergency services first responders.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Budget Period........................  2004...................  2005...................  2006
    Funding Amount.......................  $800,000...............  $5,000,000.............  $300,000
    Project Activity.....................  Planning & Training,     Construction...........  Operations Support
                                            Staffing Equipment
                                            $160,000 for 2
                                            ambulances.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fire Department (Development preparedness, training funds)
        A shrinking State Fire Department that is dependent on volunteers
    serves the Lummi Nation. Volunteers whose training is no longer
    supported by the State of Washington due to its own budget problems.
    The Lummi Nation is seeking to work with the State to develop this
    small service base into a effective tire and first respond department.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Budget Period........................  2004...................  2005...................  2006
    Funding Amount.......................  Planning $250,000......  $1,000,000.............  $300,000
    Project Activity.....................  Planning...............  Construction...........  Operations Support
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      lummi nation citizen watch programs
        Citizens of the Lummi Nation are as concerned about the potential
    for injury and death due to terrorist attacks. Our Tribal members want
    opportunities to get involved in the process of protecting themselves.
    They have information about unusual activities in areas that are remote
    for most non-Indian citizens. Because of their unique lifestyle our
    members travel both by land and sea to areas that are not regularly
    inhabited. Therefore the Lummi Nation is requesting funding to plan,
    develop, implement and operate the Citizen Watch Program.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Budget Period........................  2004...................  2005...................  2006
    Funding Amount.......................  Planning $250,000......  $150,000...............  $150,000
    Project Activity.....................  Planning Operations and  Operations Support.....  Operations Support
                                            Implementation.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       lummi natural resources department
        $230,000. Annual Recurring Funding Request to support the increased
    staff, support and equipment due to increased security needs and
    activities of the Lummi Nation Natural Resources Department.
    Protection of Natural Resources and the People who use these Resources
        The Lummi Natural Resource Officers have concentrated on bringing
    quality cases to the Tribal Court this year. These cases have been
    coordinated with other Tribes, Washington Fish and Wildlife and
    National Marine Fisheries Service in accordance with the sovereignty
    and jurisdiction of the Lummi Nation. Additional officers has made it
    possible to spend more patrol time in tideland and beach enforcement as
    well as in the usual and accustomed area by water and land patrol.
        The Lummi Tribe possess and exercises treaty rights that are
    protected and reaffirmed, by the U.S. Federal courts (Washington vs.
    U.S., (1974) Western District Court, Ninth Circuit Court and U.S.
    Supreme Court) to preserve the Lummi people's right to harvest salmon
    and other marine resources ``in common'' with the citizens of
    Washington in their ``usual and accustomed grounds'' inland or marine
    territories. The Lummi people possess--the right to catch up to 50
    percent of the harvestable salmon in their traditional fishing areas,
    located throughout Puget Sound's marine waters. These treaty rights
    extend beyond the harvesting of fish, or salmon to include other
    species including: hunting of deer, elk; gathering, harvesting shed
    ash, clams, oysters, scallops, mussels, sea urchins, shrimp, abalone,
    and squid.
        The preservation and management for these species and their
    continued survival is are essential function of LIBC tribal government.
    The Lummi people have traditional depended upon the harvesting of
    marine and natural resources for subsistence with many contemporary
    family households rely upon the annual harvest as the primary source of
    income. The development of offshore structures and increased vessel
    traffic in and/or near traditional fishing areas will present a
    hindrance to the Lummi peoples capability to sustain an income.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Budget Period........................  2004...................  2005...................  2006
    Funding Amount.......................  $400,000...............  $230,000...............  $230,000
    Project Activity.....................  Increased Staffing       Support for increased    Operations Support
                                            Increased Support        Operations.
                                            Equipment Start-up
                                            costs.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    lummi law and order (police) department
        The Lummi Law and Order Division is responsible to provide
    enforcement services to patrol the Lummi Nation Reservation and its
    ``traditional hunting and fishing'' territories. This geographic area
    is much larger and extends beyond the Lummi Indian reservation exterior
    boundaries. The Lummi Nation need for patrol and enforcement is a year
    round activity in order to protect the people, their property, their
    natural resources and preserve the tribe's Treaty Right. The Lummi
    Nation controls, regulates and manages over 6,000 acres of tidelands
    and shoreline properties surrounding the Lummi Indian Reservation.
    However the Lummi Nation is entitled to harvest shellfish over 15 miles
    of ``off reservation'' coastal areas that extend up to the Canadian
    Border and all along the western coastal boundaries of Whatcom and
    Snohomish Counties, Washington State.
        The Lummi Nation treaty right guarantees the tribe and its
    membership future access and use, of existing aquatic waterways,
    without obstruction or hindrance, and further to navigate, operate
    boats or harvesting equipment in traditional fishing grounds and
    corresponding marine water areas. The Lummi traditional fishing areas
    extend beyond the physical boundaries of the Lummi Indian Reservation.
    Marine water areas extend north of the Reservation to Pt. Robert's and
    the U.S./Canada border, and south of the reservation throughout the San
    Juan Islands The tribe's traditional ``Hunting'' territory includes all
    the ceded land identified in the Pt. Elliot treat and covers over Four
    Counties in the Pacific Northwest. The Lummi Law and Order Division
    needs additional officers, salaries and support funding to address the
    security needs of both on and oil reservation activities.
    $200,000 Lummi Nation Law and Order Patrol Boat
        The Lummi Nation Law and Order needs a new Patrol Boat. The costs
    for the Lummi Law and Order patrol boat are quoted to be $200,000.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Budget Period........................  2004...................  2005...................  2006
    Funding Amount.......................  $500,000...............  $300,000...............  $300,000
    Project Activity.....................  Increased Staffing       Support for increased    Operations Support
                                            Increased Support        Operations.
                                            Equipment Patrol Boat
                                            $200,000 Start-up.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Thank you for allowing us to submit this statement of testimony on
    the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations.
                                     ______

             Prepared Statement of the National Boating Federation

        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: I am writing to
    respectfully request that this letter be made part of your hearing
    record in conjunction with the Subcommittee's work on the fiscal year
    2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill and to request
    your support of funding in the United States Coast Guard budget to
    continue the modernization of the Loran-C system. On behalf of our 2
    million members nationwide, the National Boating Federation (NBF)
    strongly supports Loran as a backup operational system to GPS, and we
    urge continuation of the Loran modernization program. We understand
    other marine users and related groups, including the United States
    Power Squadrons (USPS), have also expressed strong support for Loran
    modernization and the need for it as an operational backup to satellite
    navigation.
        The move of the Coast Guard to the new Homeland Security Department
    now makes it essential that funding be provided from the Coast Guard
    budget to continue the Loran infrastructure modernization effort. The
    Appropriations Committee has provided nearly $100 million in resources
    in recent years to modernize the Loran infrastructure through an inter-
    agency agreement between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA).
        As a result of the Coast Guard recapitalization effort, substantial
    progress has been made and many efficiencies implemented. When
    complete, the modernization will reduce the Loran system's operation
    and maintenance (O&M) costs from $27 million to under $15 million
    annually. This is a remarkably low annual cost, particularly given
    Loran serves so many diverse user groups.
        Loran is serving as a multi-modal GPS backup not only because of
    the navigation it provides to marine users and other modes of
    transportation, but also because of its ability to provide precise time
    services to the nation. Moreover, Loran is the second most widely used
    radio navigation system in the world; it is a national asset that is
    the most cost-effective, most complementary system to the GPS; and it
    is the only other multi-modal radio navigation system available to meet
    many of our national security and transportation system objectives.
        It is imperative that Loran be part of the nation's long term
    navigation system mix because it is essential to marine and other users
    to meet ongoing navigation, timing and other requirements.
        Last year, $25 million was provided for Loran modernization because
    of overwhelming evidence that the technology offers cost-effective
    security, safety, efficiency and other benefits.
        The NBF urges you to support fiscal year 2004 funding in the Coast
    Guard budget of no less than $25 million in resources for continuation
    of the Loran modernization program.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association

    Introduction
        Thank you Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished
    members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you
    with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) fiscal year 2004 budget. I am Peter LaPorte, Co-Chair of the
    National Emergency Management Association Homeland Security Committee
    and Director of District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency. In my
    statement, I am representing the National Emergency Management
    Association (NEMA), who are the state emergency management directors in
    the 50 states and the U.S. territories. NEMA's members are responsible
    to their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland security,
    mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural, man-made,
    and terrorist caused disasters.
        This is a historic time as you have reorganized to consider the
    Department of Homeland Security's budget and the Federal Government's
    reorganization to stand-up the Department is in its infancy. It is
    critical that the fiscal year 2004 budget and future budgets do not
    lose sight of the all-hazards approach to emergency management. Our
    Nation cannot afford to build a new system for homeland security. We
    must utilize the pieces already in place to deal with natural hazards
    and other emergencies. Our most frequent opportunity to affirm our
    preparedness comes with recurrent natural hazards. In this year alone,
    the country has experienced ten major disasters, 15 emergency
    declarations, and one fire suppression declaration. While we continue
    to enhance our preparedness for domestic terrorism, we continue to
    prepare for and respond to frequent disasters of all sizes and impacts.
        The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical
    support to state and local emergency management programs through actual
    dollars, grants, and program support. This year, NEMA would like to
    address three main issues with the proposed Federal budget for
    Department of Homeland Security.
      --The first is our concern for the elimination and lack of attention
            to building and sustaining emergency management infrastructure
            capabilities. This has traditionally been accomplished through
            the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) program;
      --The second is our support for continuing and enhancing the First
            Responder Grant program and the intention to coordinate and
            manage these grants through the states; and
      --The third is our concern about the proposal to eliminate the Hazard
            Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) in order to finance a
            competitive predisaster mitigation grant program only.
    Emergency Management Infrastructure Funding
        More than any other intergovernmental program, emergency management
    and disaster response is a joint and shared responsibility among local,
    State, and Federal levels. The increase or decrease in resources for
    one level has a direct impact on the responsibility and impacts of
    disasters on the other partners. For example, a decrease in the
    capability of local governments to respond to any disaster
    automatically passes the burden of cost and activity to the state and
    Federal Governments. Unfortunately, the consequences of such policies
    are much more significant in terms of the effects of disasters on our
    citizens and communities since an inability to respond to life
    threatening emergencies at the local government level can not be
    replaced by efforts at the state and Federal levels. Additionally, the
    basic elements of comprehensive emergency preparedness cannot be
    replaced by narrow program funding for homeland security efforts.
        The President's budget proposal would eliminate the all-hazards
    focused Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) program and roll
    it into the domestic terrorism focused First Responder Grant program.
    After a decade of static funding for the program, EMPG received a
    modest increase of $29 million in fiscal year 2003. Additionally,
    Congress recently affirmed the importance of EMPG in the fiscal year
    2003 appropriations bill stating:

        ``EMPG is the backbone of the Nation's emergency management system,
    builds state and local emergency management capability, is the
    foundation for first responder activities, and because this important
    activity has been severely under funded for many years. Now more than
    ever, the planning activities carried out in this program are of utmost
    importance. The conferees believe that FEMA should consider an
    allocation system for these funds that takes into consideration not
    only population, but also risk and vulnerability assessments.''

        We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your
    support towards this important program and respectfully request that
    you not only prevent elimination of EMPG in the 2004 appropriations,
    but also address the program's shortfalls. While it is called a grant,
    EMPG is really a cost-share system which ties together the emergency
    management system of local, State, and Federal governments.
        This program was funded in fiscal year 2003 at $165 million, but a
    NEMA survey demonstrates an additional $200 million shortfall in basic
    state and local level program support in this joint effort to prepare
    the Nation's emergency management infrastructure for an adequate
    preparation and response to any catastrophe. The increased homeland
    security focus is an enhancement to our basic emergency management
    capacity and we will not succeed in building vigorous and robust
    preparedness for homeland security by taking away the basic building
    blocks of the emergency management system. An analogy for this is
    likened to the building of a second story on a house by using the very
    bricks that are integral to the foundation.
        The Nation is faced with an increased threat of terrorism and the
    necessity for increased planning and coordination with public health,
    law enforcement, agriculture and other state and local organizations.
    Further, significant grants management responsibilities with all
    response organizations cannot be accomplished effectively with current
    capabilities. An additional $200 million in funding for EMPG or other
    similar program in fiscal year 2004 is critical to addressing these
    immediate needs and sets the stage for future multi-year funding based
    upon national assessments of existing capabilities and needs.
        The elimination of this program will result in immediate, near-term
    and long-term degradations in the Nation's ability to effectively
    address emergencies and disasters. Citizens and communities that
    handled emergencies locally will no longer be able to do so and the
    responsibility and costs will be passed to the next higher level of
    government. But the costs will be greater, more frequent, and more
    dramatic. Straight-lining this funding in the current homeland security
    environment of increased programmatic activity without a commensurate
    increase in infrastructure will have a similar result. Therefore, an
    immediate increase and sustained program over the long term is
    necessary.
                         first responder grant program
        We appreciate the attention and funding that the Congress has given
    to ensuring first responders and emergency management is adequately
    prepared for domestic terrorism threats. Our emergency responders are
    better prepared today to face the various threats associated with
    terrorism because of the Federal commitment to address the war on
    terrorism that is being played out in our states, cities, and towns.
    States continue to take an all-hazards approach to disaster
    preparedness as we have integrated our domestic preparedness efforts
    into the proven systems we already use for dealing with both man-made
    and natural disasters.
        We have a great opportunity before us to build and sustain a
    national emergency infrastructure that addresses the needs of the
    entire emergency community (for example, fire, law enforcement,
    emergency medical services, emergency management, public health, and
    emergency communications) without taking away programs that are the
    basic building blocks of these components. We must seek to build
    baseline capabilities in each state that are adequately funded through
    reliable multi-year funding. NEMA continues to support Federal efforts
    to increase emergency management capacity building at the state,
    territory, and local level for personnel, planning, training,
    equipment, interoperable communications, coordination, and exercises. A
    significant Federal commitment must be made to give state, territorial,
    and local governments the tools to ensure adequate preparedness. While
    states have significantly increased their commitment to emergency
    management over the last decade, states are struggling with budgetary
    issues and the increased investments necessary to meet new demands.
    Critically important to the above is allowing funds for emergency
    responders to be used to pay for training, exercises, and security
    costs for critical infrastructure and key assets, as well as hardening
    defenses and security to these potential targets.
    State Coordination
        All efforts to increase emergency management capacity building must
    be coordinated through the states to ensure harmonization with the
    state emergency operations plan, ensure equitable distribution of
    resources, and to synthesize resources for intra-state and inter-state
    mutual aid. Also, the Stafford Act, which governs the way disaster
    assistance is allocated, successfully uses states and Governors as the
    managers of Federal disaster relief funds for local governments, which
    can become overwhelmed and in need assistance when disasters occur.
        States understand the need to get funding quickly to the first
    responders and have long coordinated statewide and regionally to ensure
    adequate state assistance to local governments for emergency
    preparedness and response. There has been some discussion of the
    states' effectiveness to coordinate these programs; our data shows that
    the criticism is exaggerated. An April, 2003 NEMA Report found that of
    the 1999-2002 funds provided by the Office of Domestic Preparedness
    Grants, 76 percent of the funding has been expended or obligated and
    that of the fiscal year 2002 supplemental funds to the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (now the Emergency Preparedness and
    Response Directorate), 69 percent of the funding has been obligated or
    expended. States continue to work to ensure the grants get out as
    quickly as possible to the localities. We suggest that the Department
    of Homeland Security provide quarterly reports on the status of Federal
    funds for State and local governments in detail to Congress and share
    those reports with key state and local government associations and
    first responder associations. We believe this would provide the
    opportunity for all interested parties to see the same data regarding
    homeland security grants as well to see where assistance is needed in
    getting grant funding distributed and most importantly, it would
    provide an ability to track our progress in protecting our communities
    from terrorism.
        Finally, Federal streamlining is necessary to consolidate the
    Federal grant application process for homeland security funds in order
    to ensure that funding can be provided faster to first responders. The
    current application submission, review, and approval process is lengthy
    and should be reviewed for efficiency.
    Fiscal Conditions and Match Requirements
        Further, because the war on terrorism is a national emergency and
    states and local governments are in the toughest fiscal situations
    since the deep recession in the early 1980s, we must be wary of
    programs that would require significant matches. In fact, for local
    governments to meet the match would be even more difficult given their
    fiscal constraints. If a significant match is required, the application
    of this initiative will only go to those agencies and governments that
    can fiscally afford the match and not necessarily where the need is
    greatest. If a match is necessary, we would suggest that the match be
    non-fiscal or in the form of a deliverable as opposed to soft or hard
    dollars. We also recommend continuation of the current match
    requirements for Emergency Operations Centers enhancements of 75
    percent Federal and 25 percent state and local.
    Flexibility for Personnel to Manage the Program
        State emergency managers need to have a commitment for sustained
    Federal resources and the flexibility to ensure the hiring and training
    of sufficient professional personnel to manage the expanding
    antiterrorism programs. We are concerned that an influx of funding
    programs from the Federal Government could detract from the ``all
    hazards'' approach and we will have to turn our focus away from natural
    disaster preparedness and response and thereby actually reduce overall
    preparedness and efficiency. Building a statewide emergency management
    capability is key to ensuring preparedness across the board.
    Flexibility to use some of the first responder grants for personnel
    both at the state and local level to manage the programs is critical to
    completing the preparedness mission. As an existing funding stream,
    EMPG is used in part to fund state and local staff to manage critical
    programs and build the incremental emergency management capacity to
    prepare for the first responder grants and the coordination that will
    be required to effectively execute the program. The First Responder
    Grants should provide the same flexibility. State and local government
    emergency management and responder organizations are already working at
    capacity and need Federal support for more than just purchasing pieces
    of equipment. Flexibility based on strategic approaches should be the
    norm, not single-issue, narrowly focused grants.
        Another area where flexibility is needed is to cover the overtime
    costs associated with training and exercising. In order to send a first
    responder to train on equipment, states and localities must pay
    overtime for that person's time, but also overtime for the person who
    takes their shift to replace them on duty. The current equipment and
    exercise grants do not cover such training costs.
    Standards
        Standards must be developed to ensure interoperability of
    equipment, communications, and training across state, regional, and
    local jurisdictions. In terms of establishing voluntary minimum
    standards for the terrorism preparedness programs of state and local
    governments, NEMA offers itself as a resource in this area. Our
    organization, along with other stakeholder groups such as the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency, the International Association of Emergency
    Managers, National Governors' Association, National Association of
    Counties, International Association of Fire Chiefs, and others, has
    developed and is implementing an Emergency Management Accreditation
    Program (EMAP). EMAP is a voluntary standards and accreditation program
    for state and local emergency management that is based on NFPA
    (National Fire Protection Association) 1600 ``Standard for Disaster/
    Emergency Management and Business Continuity Operations'' (an ANSI or
    American National Standards Institute approved standard) and FEMA's
    Capability Assessment of Readiness (CAR). Consequence management
    preparedness, response and recovery standards are being developed in
    conjunction with those for the traditional emergency management
    functions. NEMA suggests that these standards already being
    collaboratively developed through EMAP be considered in the development
    of minimum standards for training, exercises and equipment.
    Additionally, EMAP acceptance would provide the natural mechanism for
    Federal and state agencies to meet the requirements of the Government
    Performance Results Act (GPRA). EMAP has already completed a pilot
    phase in North Carolina and North Dakota is now conducting baseline
    assessments of all states, some of which wish to pursue accreditation
    in conjunction with this initial assessment.
    Specific Program Needs
        As you consider the appropriations bills this year, we ask that you
    consider other specific needs to: upgrade emergency operations centers;
    assess, plan, and provide interoperable communications equipment;
    address the lack of public safety spectrum and radio frequency; provide
    mutual aid planning assistance; provide Federal funding for state
    security clearances; provide effective warning systems for all
    citizens; complete fielding of one National Guard Civil Support Team in
    every state; and provide funding for upgraded Urban Search and Rescue
    Teams with Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities.
        NEMA is taking the initiative to develop solutions to some of the
    issues and concerns of state government related to homeland security
    with strategic partnerships. On April 1, 2003, NEMA, along with the
    Adjutants General Association of the United States and Mitretek Systems
    launched the Center for State Homeland Security. The Center will
    provide assistance for states in implementing their homeland security
    missions by facilitating access to the best available tools,
    information and facilities. The Center will provide direct support to
    states in key areas where assistance is needed including engineering,
    analysis, program planning, management, and procurement, in addition to
    identifying best practices. This project will help states navigate the
    vast web of information on homeland security and provide a framework
    for benchmarks to assist with spending accountability.
            hazard mitigation grant program & predisaster mitigation
        The Administration's budget proposal to eliminate the post-disaster
    Hazard Mitigation Grant Program in favor of funding a competitive pre-
    disaster mitigation program gives NEMA significant concern. While
    Federal costs towards disasters remain a concern, significant
    commitments must be made towards both pre-disaster and a fully funded
    post-disaster mitigation program in order to lower overall disaster
    costs.
        Last year, Congress changed the formula for post-disaster
    mitigation grants from 15 percent to 7.5 percent. This change limits
    the availability of funds for post-disaster mitigation and prevents the
    lessons learned from disasters from being immediately incorporated into
    mitigation projects to prevent losses of life and destruction of
    property. As a result, state governments no longer can offer buy-outs
    or mitigation projects to as many disaster victims. The months
    immediately following disasters provide unique opportunities to
    efficiently incorporate risk reduction measures in a very cost-
    effective manner, in many cases lowering the overall cost of the
    project by leveraging other funding sources including insurance
    settlements. We ask that you restore the formula to 15 percent this
    year and also prevent the program from being eliminated.
        The HMGP has proven to be a highly effective tool in steering
    communities toward risk reduction measures, in many cases breaking
    repetitive loss cycles that have cost other Federal disaster relief
    programs multiple times. Cost-benefit analysis is currently a
    requirement for predisaster mitigation programs. In a purely
    competitive grant program, lower income communities, often those most
    at risk to natural disaster will not effectively compete with more
    prosperous communities. Also, disasters graphically and vividly expose
    the need for and value of mitigation projects. We must not lose these
    opportunities to initiate projects to enhance our communities and
    reduce future disaster costs. Damage caused by disasters would go
    largely unrepaired thereby further impacting the economic and social
    recovery of particular areas. There are not enough mitigation dollars
    available to address all of the vulnerabilities that exist in this
    country.
        Making mitigation funds available only in a predisaster competitive
    environment will set this country's mitigation efforts back by removing
    the prime motivation factor, the disaster itself. The Administration's
    proposal to eliminate post-disaster mitigation programs is not a cost-
    savings initiative, because disaster costs to the Federal Government
    would significantly increase as a result of the absence of prevention.
    Pre-disaster mitigation is essential, but we need to ensure that pre-
    disaster mitigation corresponds with the Disaster Mitigation Act of
    2000 that was passed overwhelmingly by the House and Senate and signed
    into law.
        NEMA calls on Congress to maximize the benefits of both HMGP and
    predisaster mitigation, while including provisions for increased
    accountability. NEMA supports increased funding for predisaster
    mitigation, but maintains that HMGP should be retained as a separate
    and fully funded post-disaster program.
                                   conclusion
        As we work to implement a new Federal Department of Homeland
    Security, we must not forget about the all-hazards approach to
    emergency management and the role it plays in preventing our Nation
    from losing focus on the daily perils that we face in addition to new
    threats. We must be prudent and thoughtful in addressing the homeland
    security enhancements to our preparedness and not waste the
    opportunities we have before us today.
        Whether it is a flood in West Virginia, a hurricane in Florida, or
    tornadoes in Mississippi, states need a Federal commitment to recognize
    that each state and local government has unique disaster preparedness
    and response needs that require flexible, predictable, and adequate
    funding assistance that is coordinated with the state emergency
    management plan. I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf
    of NEMA and welcome any questions that you might have. Only through a
    partnership of Federal, State, local government, along with our
    citizens and businesses, can our country prepare and respond to
    emergencies and disasters. Thank you for your consideration.
                                     ______

     Prepared Statement of the National Institute for Agricultural Security

                   agricultural biosecurity in rural america
        There is a growing concern among security experts that acts of
    bioterrorism may be more likely than other forms of terrorist attack.
    America's farms, ranches, forests and our food production systems are
    vulnerable. In order to ensure continued public confidence in the
    safety of the food supply, immediate steps need to be taken to
    strengthen the technology and systems that will prevent and mitigate
    acts of bioterrorism. Local communities need to be prepared to work
    with State and Federal agencies to manage the consequences of an
    attack.
        The State Agricultural Experiment Stations and the State Extension
    Services have a long history of working with State and local
    communities to address issues of national concern. This Federal State-
    local partnership has been critical to address the needs of
    agricultural producers and food processors, and it will be essential to
    develop integrated and comprehensive national programs for addressing
    agricultural biosecurity. A series of activities and projects are
    proposed that address biosecurity concerns in rural America.
              securing agricultural research facilities and agents
        Agricultural research facilities contain a vast array of biological
    and chemical agents that can be accessed and abused. The Agricultural
    Experiment Stations must develop new practices and procedures for
    insuring that they can meet emerging university security requirements
    while coordinating with their Federal laboratory partners to meet a
    different set of Federal security requirements. Improved security must
    be developed in a manner that still allows for interaction with the
    public for whom the research is being performed.
    Preventing and Preparing for Agricultural Bioterrorism
        The critical time to deal with an act of bioterrorism is before it
    occurs. Potential vulnerabilities need to be assessed. Local, State and
    Federal emergency management communications networks need to be
    developed and tested for use in rural areas to address these new
    threats. Rural community leaders need to prepare management plans with
    public health, law enforcement, disaster management agencies. Farmers,
    ranchers, and foresters need education programs to recognize and
    respond to potential acts of terrorism, as well as to understand steps
    they can take to reduce their own vulnerability to attack. New vaccines
    and protective immunity needs to be developed for animals and crops.
    Quickly Detecting Toxic Biological and Chemical Agents
        New sensor technologies for plants, animals and microbes need to be
    developed for detecting specific and broad categories of potential
    bioweapons. These sensors need to be mobile, broadly distributed, quick
    in their detection and analysis, and inexpensive. Sensors need to be
    developed for monitoring farms, ranches and forests to detect and
    report on the movement and dispersion of biological agents. Sensors
    must also be developed for identifying food borne pathogens in the food
    production and distribution system.
    Interpreting the Appearance and Movement of Biological and Chemical
            Agents
        Once detected, the pattern of appearance and dispersion of
    biological agents and food borne pathogens needs to be quickly
    incorporated into Geographic Information Mapping systems and computer
    models to determine if a natural event or a terrorist attack has
    occurred. Mapping and modeling make it possible to determine in hours
    and days that an event has occurred, making it possible to respond
    quickly enough to contain and mitigate the attack. Moreover, mapping
    and modeling make it possible to anticipate the movement of bioweapons
    through the landscape and the food distribution system, enabling local
    leaders to take appropriate actions to protect their communities.
    Recognizing and Reporting Hazardous Events
        In addition to developing new equipment and computer technologies,
    people need to be trained to recognize the symptoms of biological
    attacks. Extension agents, veterinarians, and crop consultants need to
    be trained to recognize biological outbreaks and to know how to
    communicate appropriately with local and Federal officials. Reporting
    by individuals and mechanical sensors needs to be integrated into a
    comprehensive biosurveillance network.
    Responding to and mitigating an act of bioterrorism
        In the event of an attack, local leaders need to be prepared to
    make appropriate emergency management decisions. Local public health,
    law enforcement, and disaster response teams need to be coordinated
    with prepared processes for informing and managing the public response.
    Treatment and care must be implemented immediately and appropriately.
    Early detection and treatment may mitigate most acts of bioterrorism.
                the national institute for agricultural security
        The National Institute for Agricultural Security (NIAS) is a
    nonprofit corporation developed by the State Agricultural Experiment
    Station Directors in collaboration with the State Extension Services
    and in consultation with the Colleges of Agriculture. The Institute was
    developed to address bioterrorism as it impacts U.S. agricultural and
    food production systems.
    Partner Institutions
        In addition to working with all State Agricultural Experiment
    Stations, the NIAS works with and through lead universities to utilize
    their unique areas of technical and programmatic expertise to address
    national and regional biosecurity issues. NIAS is currently engaged in
    discussions regarding the development of specific pilot test projects
    with a number of universities. Federal Agencies and Appropriation
    Subcommittees All of the proposed programs described here will be
    developed in collaboration and coordination with the appropriate
    agencies within the Department of Agriculture. However, ongoing
    discussions with an array of agencies has made it clear that the
    proposed activities and projects should involve new collaboration and
    partnerships with a number of Federal agencies, including the
    Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. For
    example, the agricultural research community needs to build on the
    security expertise, computer modeling, and biological research
    capacities that are supported by these departments. The six areas of
    activity described in this testimony have been designed to complement
    emerging programs and projects being planned by the Department of
    Homeland Security's Office of Science and Technology. The intent is to
    build on the biological work of the Office of Science and Technology
    through the Federal laboratories and research network, by harnessing
    the state-based agricultural research network of the State Agricultural
    Experiment Stations and Colleges of Agriculture. The agricultural
    research community has expertise and detailed knowledge of local
    conditions that will be imperative for the new programs being developed
    within the Department of Homeland Security and ongoing programs in the
    Department of Defense. Therefore the Appropriations Subcommittees for
    Homeland Security and the Department of Defense are suggested as the
    appropriate Committees of jurisdiction.
    First Steps
        It is understood that there are many urgent and immediate homeland
    security concerns. However, it is also imperative that the security of
    our agricultural and food production system not be left unattended. The
    NIAS, the State Agricultural Experiment Stations, and the State
    Extension system offer a cost-effective mechanism for harnessing an
    existing infrastructure of local and state-based research, education
    and communications capacities that extends throughout the country. This
    research and extension system provides a trusted communications and
    facilitation network throughout rural America that should be linked to
    the emerging programs of the Department of Homeland Security.
        Detailed project proposals and budgets have been developed for each
    of the six areas of activity described previously in this testimony.
    More detailed resource documents are being provided to appropriate
    agency officials and will be provided to Congressional staff as
    appropriate. Each project begins with a developmental or pilot phase,
    which is then evaluated and adapted before being ramped-up for regional
    or national implementation.
        By way of example, the first area of activity includes the
    development of national guidelines for securing agricultural research
    facilities, followed by a national assessment of state-based
    facilities, to be followed by ``hardening'' state-based agricultural
    research facilities nationwide.
        Securing agricultural research facilities and agents Agricultural
    research facilities contain a vast array of biological and chemical
    agents that can be accessed and abused. The Agricultural Experiment
    Stations have a unique mix of field and laboratory research with a
    network of widely dispersed laboratory and field research sites within
    every State and territory--creating tremendous security challenges for
    research managers trying to respond to new biosecurity concerns.
    Several universities and agricultural research facilities have already
    been the targets of domestic terrorist attacks. Biological agents have
    been stolen from agricultural research laboratories. A comprehensive
    process for securing agricultural research facilities needs to be
    undertaken immediately. Research security requirements must be
    consistent nationally, but with flexibility for correct implementation
    given the unique characteristics of each site.
                AES Biosecurity Guidelines
        In order to quickly develop agricultural research security
    practices for the Agricultural Experiment Stations, the National
    Institute for Agricultural Security (NIAS) will convene panels of
    security and research experts to develop draft ``AES Biosecurity
    Guidelines.'' These guidelines will outline suggestions for (1)
    biosecurity site assessments, (2) policies for managing personnel
    access to research facilities and equipment, (3) developing new
    personnel training programs, and (4) managing access to sensitive
    research information. The expert panels and working groups will seek to
    include representatives from the appropriate Federal agencies. The
    workshops will include leaders from the Agricultural Colleges and the
    Agricultural Experiment Stations, but also field station and laboratory
    managers. The draft AES Biosecurity Guidelines will be shared with all
    Experiment Stations through web-based conferences, where each State
    will have the opportunity to gather the appropriate mix of specialists
    to review and evaluate the draft guidelines. Several States might be
    utilized as pilot sites for testing the new guidelines; the selected
    Experiment Stations would use test the proposed national guidelines to
    determine what final adjustments might be needed. After testing, all
    State Agricultural Experiment Stations could utilize the national
    guidelines to conduct site security assessments, develop new personnel
    guidelines, and to develop new training programs. After completing the
    site security assessments, each institution would be able to clearly
    define local security enhancements that would be needed to reach a
    consistent national standard of security for field and laboratory
    research facilities and equipment.
    Closing
        The National Institute for Agricultural Security will strive to
    facilitate collaboration between the state-based agricultural research
    and extension communities and our Federal partners to address
    biosecurity and agricultural security concerns. The Institute stands
    ready to provide any additional information that may be of interest to
    the appropriate Congressional Committees and offices.
                                     ______

        Prepared Statement of the Pilot Disaster Resistant Universities

        Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to provide
    testimony on the Disaster Resistant University initiative and to
    request continued funding in the fiscal year 2004 appropriations bill
    of your Subcommittee.
    Program Background
        The FEMA Disaster Resistant University (DRU) Initiative was created
    to reduce the potential for large loss of life and hundreds of millions
    of dollars in key Federal research and billions of dollars in damage
    from natural disasters. The University of California/Berkeley was the
    prototype and founding member of the program. In October 2000, FEMA
    selected five additional universities to join Berkeley in the pilot
    phase of the program: the University of Alaska/Fairbanks, University of
    Miami, University of North Carolina/Wilmington, Tulane University, and
    University of Washington/Seattle. The selected universities have two
    elements in common: a vulnerability to disasters and a commitment to
    improve protection of students, faculty and staff, and one of our most
    valuable assets, intellectual property. The pilot program was funded
    with $700,000 in grants from predisaster mitigation funds and the U.S.
    Fire Administration.
    Purpose of the Program
        The purpose of the program is to help the nation's colleges and
    universities facing the threat of natural disasters and acts of
    terrorism to assess their vulnerabilities and find ways to protect the
    lives of their students, faculty, and staff; their research; and their
    facilities. It will provide a framework and process for other
    universities to do the same.
    Need for the Program
        The Federal Government funds nearly $15 billion in university
    research annually. This Federal investment in the vital intellectual
    property of the nation should be protected.
        Universities are critical to the economic health of surrounding
    communities. Their ability to resume operations quickly following a
    disaster greatly speeds the recovery of the entire community. For
    example, the University of Miami is the 3rd largest employer in Miami-
    Dade County and has a $1.9 billion a year impact on the community; the
    University of Washington is the 3rd largest employer in the state of
    Washington and has a $3.4 billion impact; the University of North
    Carolina at Wilmington is the 3rd largest employer in the area and is a
    $400 million annual benefit to an eight county area; the University of
    California, Berkeley is the 5th largest employer in the Bay area and
    generates $1.1 billion annually in personal income in the Bay area;
    Tulane University is the largest employer in Orleans Parish and the 5th
    largest in Louisiana with a $1.5 billion gross impact on New Orleans;
    and the University of Alaska/Fairbanks is the largest civilian employer
    in the Tanana Valley. In addition, many universities operate medical
    schools which provide essential clinical services to the residents of
    their communities and adjacent areas.
        Many recent events underscore the need for the program: the loss of
    many years of research at the Texas Medical Center as result of
    flooding from Tropical Storm Allison, the earthquake damage to the
    University of California/Northridge and the University of California at
    Los Angeles, the facility damage and loss of life at the University of
    Maryland as result of a tornado, hurricane damage to the University of
    North Carolina/Wilmington, the earthquake damage to the University of
    Washington/Seattle, and the declaration by the FBI that our
    universities are ``soft'' targets for terrorists.
    Status of the Program and Accomplishments
        Although no funding was made available in 2002, great progress has
    been made by the universities with the modest 2001 Federal investment.
    Participation in the DRU brought high level commitment and a framework
    for disaster planning and mitigation activities that helped
    universities focus and enhance efforts to protect their students,
    faculty, staff, vital research, and facilities.
        Each university has made significant improvements in developing
    awareness campaigns on campus; assessing their risks, vulnerabilities,
    and mitigation options, prioritizing and implementing some of the
    mitigation options; updating emergency operations plans; and developing
    and implementing plans for business continuity. The universities have
    improved disaster resistant design specifications for buildings and
    their contents, incorporated disaster resistance into campus master
    planning, and partnered more closely with governmental and private
    entities.
        These six pilot universities are making strong efforts to protect
    their collective 120,567 students, 60,214 employees, 1,550 buildings
    valued at over $11,820,458,000, and $1,600,710,000 in annual research.
        In meetings in March with representatives of the DRUs, FEMA staff
    expressed strong interest in continuing to work on this program. The
    six participating Disaster Resistant Universities look forward to
    continuing their progress and to mentoring the six new universities
    which FEMA will be selecting soon.
    Congressional Interest
        We very much appreciate the support Congress has given this program
    the last 2 years. The Conference Report on the VA, HUD and Independent
    Agencies Appropriations bill for 2002 contained the following language:
    ``The conferees believe that many of the nation's universities are
    vulnerable to disaster and urge FEMA to continue its Disaster Resistant
    University program and expand the scope to include safe-guarding
    university assets from acts of terrorism.'' [House Report 107-272, page
    155]
        The Conference Report on the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus bill in the
    FEMA section of the VA, HUD and Independent Agencies stated the
    following: The conferees are in agreement that FEMA should continue the
    Disaster Resistant University program and direct FEMA to carry out the
    direction contained in House Report 107-740.
        House Report 107-740 stated the following: The Committee directs
    FEMA to continue the Disaster Resistant University Program with grants
    of $500,000 to each of the six pilot Disaster Resistant Universities
    and $100,000 each to at least six additional universities, including at
    least one HBCU, to join the program.
    Request for fiscal year 2004
        In fiscal year 2003, the program was funded through the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency section of the VA, HUD and Independent
    Agencies section of the Omnibus Appropriations Bill. In fiscal year
    2004, the program will be under Department of Homeland Security,
    Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response.
        We request your consideration of the following language in the
    fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill:

        The Committee directs the Department of Homeland Security
    Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (FEMA) to continue
    the Disaster Resistant University Program by providing continued
    support of $500,000 to each of the six pilot Disaster Resistant
    Universities to implement mitigation projects, $500,000 for each of the
    new universities added to the program in fiscal year 2003, and $200,000
    each to at least six additional universities to join the program in
    fiscal year 2004.

        We again thank you for the opportunity to provide written comment
    on the need for funding of this important program. We would welcome the
    opportunity to discuss the program further with your staff.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the Upper Mississippi River Basin Association

        The Upper Mississippi River Basin Association (UMRBA) is the
    organization created in 1981 by the Governors of Illinois, Iowa,
    Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin to serve as a forum for coordinating
    the five states' river-related programs and policies and for
    collaborating with Federal agencies on regional water resource issues.
    As such, the UMRBA has an interest in the budgets for the U.S. Coast
    Guard and the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate within
    the new Department of Homeland Security.
        Transition to the new department is an on-going process that will
    undoubtedly bring both challenges and opportunities. However, in the
    current national security environment, it has become more important
    than ever to ensure that the Coast Guard and the former Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have the resources they need to
    fulfill their multiple missions. Both have vital new functions and
    priorities specifically related to homeland security that must be
    adequately funded. But both also have other traditional missions that
    are equally vital to public health and safety, economic well-being, and
    environmental protection. For the Coast Guard, these include activities
    such as aids to navigation, vessel and facility inspections, emergency
    response, and mariner licensing. For the former FEMA, key traditional
    missions include the National Flood Insurance Program, flood map
    modernization, hazard mitigation, and response to floods and other
    natural disasters. Nowhere are these services more important than on
    the Upper Mississippi River System, which supports a vital link in the
    inland waterway transportation system, some of the nation's most
    productive agricultural land, population centers ranging from small
    towns to major metropolitan areas, and a nationally significant
    ecosystem.
                                  coast guard
    Operating Expenses
        A continuing priority for the UMRBA is the Coast Guard's Operating
    Expenses account. The President's fiscal year 2004 budget proposal
    includes $4.838 billion for this account, an increase of 10 percent
    from the fiscal year 2003 enacted level. However, much of this increase
    is targeted to homeland security and maritime projects, including new
    Maritime Safety and Security Teams, Sea Marshall positions, and
    increased search and rescue staffing. These initiatives are important
    in their own right, and some will undoubtedly help enhance other Coast
    Guard missions. However, it is also true that there will be increased
    demands on other mission areas to support security operations.
        The Coast Guard's stated objective is to sustain traditional
    missions near their pre 9/11 levels. These traditional missions are
    critical to the safe, efficient operation of the Upper Mississippi
    River and the rest of the inland river system. Under these mission
    areas, the Coast Guard maintains navigation channel markers, regulates
    a wide range of commercial vessels in the interest of crew and public
    safety, and responds to spills and other incidents. The beneficiaries
    include not only commercial vessel operators, but also recreational
    boaters; farmers and others who ship materials by barge; and the
    region's citizens, who benefit enormously from the river as a
    nationally significant economic and environmental resource.
        Even prior to September 11, recent years had brought a number of
    changes to the way the Coast Guard operates on the inland river system,
    including elimination of the Second District; closure of the Director
    of Western Rivers Office; decommissioning the Sumac, which was the
    largest buoy tender on the Upper Mississippi River; and staff
    reductions. The states understand that these decisions were driven by
    the need for the Coast Guard to operate as efficiently as possible, and
    the states support that goal. However, such changes must be carefully
    considered and their effects monitored, particularly in light of the
    increased demands that we are now placing on the personnel and assets
    that remain in the region. The UMRBA is quite concerned that staff
    reductions and resource constraints have combined to impair the Coast
    Guard's ability to serve as an effective, proactive partner.
        Specifically, increased security demands have reduced the staff
    assigned to vessel inspections and limited the Coast Guard's
    investigation of reported spills. Sending a single person to conduct
    vessel inspections reduces the rigor of those inspections, and, in a
    worst case scenario, potentially puts the inspector at risk. Similarly,
    electing not to respond to reports of small spills means some of these
    spills will go uninvestigated and puts increased demands on local
    officials who do not have the Coast Guard's expertise or resources.
    Moreover, it could result in costly delays should a spill turn out to
    be larger than first reported, an all-too-common occurrence. While
    everyone recognizes the need to adjust to our new security environment,
    it is essential for the Coast Guard to retain the capacity to perform
    its traditional missions on the Upper Mississippi River. Temporary
    adjustments have been necessary as the Coast Guard strives to meet
    immediate needs, but these should not become long term standard
    operating procedures. Toward that end, the UMRBA supports the
    President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the Coast Guard's
    Operating Expenses account and urges Congress to ensure that sufficient
    resources from within this account are allocated to the Coast Guard's
    inland river work.
    Priorities and Procedures in a New Environment
        The UMRBA calls on Congress to ensure that the Coast Guard's
    partners and stakeholders are consulted as decisions are made regarding
    how to execute traditional missions in the new security environment.
    For example, the Office of Management and Budget has called for a study
    of the Aids to Navigation Program to determine whether this function
    should be privatized. While the states do not oppose such a study per
    se, we do have reservations concerning the efficacy and efficiency of
    privatization in this instance. Moreover, it is absolutely essential to
    fully consider the perspectives of the navigation industry and others
    who rely on these aids before making any such decision. The states
    would oppose any fees for aids to navigation or other navigation
    assistance services. The nation's navigable waterways are a critical
    part of our transportation infrastructure, just as is the national
    highway system, and the benefits of the waterways system accrue quite
    broadly. Therefore, providing the basic services required to operate
    that infrastructure safely is a fundamental role of government.
        The Coast Guard is reportedly considering a range of other
    potential changes, such as reducing non-security contingency planning,
    suspending certain safety inspections, reducing some enforcement
    efforts, and suspending response to spills of up to 500 gallons from
    domestic vessels. These potential changes could have profound
    implications, including diminished public and worker safety, increased
    demands on state and local jurisdictions, and reduced environmental
    protection. They should not be undertaken without extensive
    consultation with potentially affected parties.
    Boat Safety Grants
        The Coast Guard's boat safety grants to the states have a proven
    record of success. The Upper Mississippi is a river where all types of
    recreational craft routinely operate in the vicinity of 15-barge tows,
    making boating safety all the more important. As levels of both
    recreational and commercial traffic continue to grow, so too does the
    potential for user conflicts. This is particularly true with major
    events, such as the upcoming commemoration of the Lewis and Clark
    expedition, which is expected to draw large numbers of boaters to the
    St. Louis area, and the Grand Excursion 2004, during which flotillas of
    boaters will retrace President Millard Fillmore's 1,854 steamboat
    journey from Rock Island, Illinois to the Twin Cities. Boat safety
    training and law enforcement are key elements of prevention. In fiscal
    year 2003, Congress recognized the importance of boating safety,
    providing $71 million for the state boat safety grants. Unfortunately,
    this year the Coast Guard continued its long-standing practice of
    requesting only $59 million for state grants. The UMRBA urges Congress
    to appropriate the full authorized amount in fiscal year 2004 to the
    Boat Safety account to support the states in this important mission.
                      emergency preparedness and response
    Hazard Mitigation
        Among those programs now administered by the Department of Homeland
    Security's Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, UMRBA is
    particularly interested in those that help mitigate future flood
    hazards. Mitigation, which is the ongoing effort to reduce or eliminate
    the impact of disasters like floods, can include measures such as
    relocating homes or community facilities off the floodplain, elevating
    structures, and practicing sound land use planning. Mitigation planning
    and implementation measures are essential to reducing the nation's
    future disaster assistance costs. Given the importance of mitigation,
    UMRBA supports the new Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant program for
    which Congress provided first-time funding of $150 million in fiscal
    year 2003 and for which the President has requested $300 million in
    fiscal year 2004. The UMRBA recognizes that there are concerns about
    how PDM grant funds will be allocated, including the effect of relying
    solely on benefit/cost analysis. In addition, there is limited
    experience in administering the new program. Applications for planning
    grants ($248,375 per state) are due April 30 and FEMA has yet to issue
    guidance for the competitive grants. Despite these growing pains of a
    new program, the PDM grant program holds promise for enhancing
    communities' ability to prevent future damages, particularly in areas
    that have--not experienced a major disaster and thus have not had
    access to post-disaster mitigation assistance through the Disaster
    Relief Fund. In addition, pre-disaster mitigation assistance is an
    effective means of meeting the ongoing need in all communities to plan
    for future floods and reduce their vulnerability before the next flood
    disaster.
        Unfortunately, the Administration's support for the new Pre-
    Disaster Mitigation program is based on the premise that the existing
    post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) will be
    eliminated. This would be a major mistake. Although the PDM program
    will be very useful, funding for that program should not come at the
    expense of the HMGP. The HMGP has been a particularly popular and
    enormously helpful program. Authorized under Section 404 of the
    Stafford Act, the HMGP provides grants to states and local governments
    to implement long-term hazard mitigation measures after a major
    disaster declaration. Because grant funds are made available during the
    immediate recovery from a disaster, it offers a particularly attractive
    option for communities that may not otherwise consider mitigation. It
    is critical to maintain this post-disaster option, in addition to
    creating a new pre-disaster mitigation option. Local communities need
    both. In addition, by retaining the HMGP, mitigation assistance
    specifically for flood damages would continue to be available to
    communities that experience disastrous flooding. In contrast, flood
    mitigation projects under the new pre-disaster program will need to
    compete for funding with mitigation projects for a wide variety of
    other potential disasters, thus diminishing the likelihood that flood
    mitigation needs will be met.
        Therefore, UMRBA supports funding of $300 million in fiscal year
    2004 for the Pre-Disaster Mitigation grant program and urges Congress
    to continue to make post-disaster mitigation funding available through
    the HMGP, by authorizing allocation of the full 15 percent of disaster
    relief funding to the HMGP.
    Flood Map Modernization
        UMRBA enthusiastically supports the Administration's proposal to
    provide $200 million to modernize and digitize Flood Insurance Rate
    Maps (FIRMs). Among other things, flood maps are used to determine
    risk-based National Flood Insurance Program premium rates and develop
    disaster response plans for Federal, State, and local emergency
    management personnel. However, most flood maps are over 15 years old
    and are rapidly becoming obsolete. Many flood maps are outdated by the
    effects of land use changes in the watersheds. When outdated maps
    underestimate flood depths, it can often lead to floodplain development
    in high risk areas. It is therefore important that flood maps be
    updated on an ongoing basis and in a timely way.
        The Corps of Engineers will soon complete its Flow Frequency Study,
    updating the discharge frequency relationships and water surface
    profiles for approximately 2,000 miles of the Upper Mississippi, Lower
    Missouri, and Illinois Rivers. This data will have a variety of uses,
    including updating Flood Insurance Rate Maps used by hundreds of flood
    prone communities along these rivers. The Corps and FEMA have estimated
    that 4,237 map panels in the 130 counties along these rivers will need
    to be revised at a cost of approximately $30 million. Using data from
    the Corps study will be a far more cost-effective way to update FIRMs
    than having FEMA independently study flood hazards and update the maps.
    UMRBA therefore urges Congress to designate funding specifically for
    the Upper Mississippi flood mapping project and direct FEMA and the
    Corps to coordinate their efforts to advance FIRM updates.

           LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    American Public Transportation Association, Prepared Statement...   439
    Association of:
        State Dam Safety Officials, Prepared Statement...............   442
        State Floodplan Managers, Inc., Prepared Statement...........   448

    Basham, W. Ralph, Director, U.S. Secret Service, Department of
      Homeland Security..............................................   185
        Opening Statement............................................   186
        Prepared Statement...........................................   188
    Bonner, Robert C., Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection
      Bureau, Department of Homeland Security........................   331
        Prepared Statement...........................................   338
        Statement of.................................................   336
    Brown, Hon. Michael, Under Secretary, Emergency Preparedness and
      Response Directorate, Department of Homeland Security..........     1
        Prepared Statement...........................................     5
        Statement of.................................................     3
    Byrd, Senator Robert C., U.S. Senator From West Virginia:
        Questions Submitted by....39, 74, 160, 238, 250, 320, 406, 424, 437
        Statements of...........................................1, 264, 332

    Campbell, Senator Ben Nighthorse, U.S. Senator From Colorado:
        Prepared Statements........................................265, 335
        Questions Submitted by...........................160, 316, 404, 422
        Statement of.................................................   264
    Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi:
        Opening Remarks..............................................   185
        Opening Statements......................................1, 263, 331
        Questions Submitted by....31, 65, 137, 237, 241, 296, 392, 415, 430
    Collins, Admiral Thomas H., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard,
      Department of Homeland Security................................   185
        Prepared Statement...........................................   207
        Statement of.................................................   205
    Craig, Senator Larry, U.S. Senator From Idaho:
        Prepared Statement...........................................    46
        Questions Submitted by.......................................    74

    Domenici, Senator Pete V., U.S. Senator From New Mexico:
        Questions Submitted by...........................156, 311, 401, 435
        Statement of.................................................   333

    Fleet Reserve Association, Prepared Statement....................   451

    Greater Orlando Aviation Authority, Prepared Statement...........   454

    Harkin, Senator Tom, U.S. Senator From Iowa, Questions Submitted
      by.............................................................   181
    Hollings, Senator Ernest F., U.S. Senator From South Carolina,
      Statement of...................................................   266
    Hutchinson, Hon. ASA, Under Secretary, Border and Transportation
      Security Directorate, Department of Homeland Security..........   263
        Prepared Statement...........................................   269
        Statement of.................................................   266

    Inouye, Senator Daniel K., U.S. Senator From Hawaii, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................    80
    International:
        Association of Emergency Managers, Prepared Statement........   456
        Loran Association, Prepared Statement........................   458

    Kohl, Senator Herb, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................   182

    Leahy, Senator Patrick J., U.S. Senator From Vermont, Questions
      Submitted by...................................42, 176, 330, 414, 429
    Loy, Admiral James M., Administrator, Transportation Security
      Administration, Department of Homeland Security................   331
        Prepared Statement...........................................   352
        Statement of.................................................   348
    Lummi Indian Business Council, Prepared Statement................   461

    McConnell, Senator Mitch, U.S. Senator From Kentucky, Questions
      Submitted by..................................................72, 403
    McQueary, Dr. Charles, Under Secretary, Science and Technology
      Directorate, Department of Homeland Security...................    45
        Prepared Statement...........................................    48
        Statement of.................................................    46
    Murray, Senator Patty, U.S. Senator From Washington:
        Questions Submitted by.......................................   257
        Statement of.................................................   335

    National:
        Boating Federation, Prepared Statement.......................   464
        Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement.........   465
        Institute for Agricultural Security, Prepared Statement......   470

    Patrick, Connie L., Director, Federal Law Enforcement Training
      Center, Department of Homeland Security........................   331
        Prepared Statement...........................................   361
        Statement of.................................................   357

    Ridge, Hon. Tom, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security......    83
        Prepared Statement...........................................    93
        Statement of.................................................    90

    Shelby, Senator Richard, U.S. Senator From Alabama, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................    73
    Stevens, Senator Ted, U.S. Senator From Alaska, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................39, 71

    Upper Mississippi River Basin Association, Prepared Statement....   474

                                 SUBJECT INDEX

                                  ----------

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                                                                       Page
    Activities.......................................................     6
    Additional Committee Questions..............31, 137, 296, 392, 415, 430
    Adjustments to the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request...............   410
    Agriculture......................................................   180
        Quarantine Inspection Program................................   182
    Air and Marine:
        Assets.......................................................   381
        Interdiction.................................................   308
    Air:
        Cargo Security...............................................   380
        Marshals...................................................317, 422
        Traffic Controllers........................................318, 423
    Airport:
        Modification Funding Priorities..............................   292
        Screener Reductions..........................................   291
        Screeners....................................................   330
        Security Improvement Project.................................   420
    All-Hazards Approach.............................................    31
    Alternative Shoulder Holsters....................................   411
    Anti-Dumping Authority (BICE and BCBP).........................321, 406
    Anti-Missile Defenses............................................   132
    AQI Fumigation Investigation...................................322, 407
    Assistance to Firefighters.......................................    43
        Grants...................................................13, 14, 32
    Baggage Screeners..............................................317, 423
    BioDefense Countermeasures.......................................    40
    Border:
        Issues................................................156, 312, 401
        Patrol.....................................................303, 395
            Airwing..................................................   410
        Security...................................................319, 405
            Gaps in Screening Entrants into the United States........   167
    Budget Documents...............................................321, 407
    Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement: On-Going Operation   326
    Bus Security.....................................................   424
    Canine Units.....................................................   394
    CAPPS II.........................................................   389
    Cargo and Passenger Processing...................................   398
    Cerro Grande.....................................................    41
    Challenges.......................................................     6
        Of Under Secretary's Office..................................   271
    Changing Agency Regional Headquarters............................   143
    Citizen Corps Initiative.........................................   177
    Coast Guard......................................................   150
        Grants for Port Security.....................................   275
    COBRA Fees.......................................................   364
    Code Yellow Terrorism Alert Level................................   164
    Collaboration With Civil Air Patrol..............................   117
    Community Emergency Response Teams...............................    20
    Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System.....166, 294, 386, 420
    Congressional Ability to React in Emergency Situations...........   129
    Consolidated:
        Information Technology.......................................   284
        Issues.......................................................   394
        Procurements.................................................   284
    Container Security...............................................   375
        Initiative.................................................111, 400
    Coordination Issues..............................................   298
    Cost of:
        Protecting Infrastructure....................................   116
        Security Investments at Small Airports.......................   291
    Counterfeit Identification Documents.............................   289
    Crisis Training for Elected Officials............................   182
    Critical Infrastructure:
        Grants.......................................................   101
        Information Requirements of the Homeland Security Act........   179
    Cross-Check of Passenger Identity................................   318
    Customs Import Specialists.......................................   170
    Delay in Releasing Funds.........................................   379
    Department Start-up Issues.......................................   296
        Investment Decisions.........................................   138
    Departmental Operations..........................................   145
    Deployment of:
        Rail VACIS...................................................   407
        Technology, Equipment, and Systems...........................   343
    Detention and Removal............................................   323
    DHS:
        Coordination with State Offices..............................   114
        First 100 Days.............................................321, 407
        Headquarters.................................................   144
    Disaster Relief Fund.....................................11, 13, 30, 39
    Drinking Water System Vulnerability..............................   165
    Emergency:
        Food and Shelter.............................................    41
        Management Performance Grants................................29, 38
        Operations Centers...........................................   177
        Preparedness and Response....................................   153
        Program......................................................    26
        Response and Support Teams...................................    28
    Emerging Technologies Relevant to Border and Transportation
      Security.......................................................   276
    Enforcement:
        Of Intellectual Property Laws................................   326
        Roles and Coordination under Reorganization..................   283
    Entry-Exit:
        System................................................104, 109, 287
        VISA Tracking System.........................................   412
    Equipment Standards and Guidelines...............................   182
    Expiration of COBRA Fees..................................161, 320, 406
    Explosive Detection Systems (EDS)..............................378, 419
    Facilities Construction Master Plan............................360, 363
    Federal Air Marshals:
        Retention Rates..............................................   425
        Training Location..........................................425, 437
    Federal:
        Employee Rights under DHS....................................   121
        Flight Deck Officer Training.................................   379
        Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)...............157, 309, 313
    Fee Revenue......................................................   392
    Fire Grants and First Responder Funding........................165, 324
    First Responders...............................................172, 316
    ``First Use'' Assurance for FLETC-Owned Facilities...............   372
    Fiscal Year:
        2002 Accomplishments.........................................     6
        2003 Spending Plan...........................................   382
        2003 TSA Financial Plan......................................   325
        2004 Budget Request...............................90, 359, 362, 368
    FLETC Facilities Expansion.......................................   366
    Flexibility of First Responder Funds.............................   176
    Flood Map Modernization..........................................23, 25
    FOIA.............................................................   171
        Rules and Exemptions.........................................   103
    Food Safety......................................................    24
    Formula for State and Local Preparedness Grants..................   112
    Freedom of Information Act.......................................   102
    Full-Time Equivalent Screeners Cap...............................   424
    Funding for:
        Departmental Management......................................   172
        EDS Installations............................................   292
        Entry-Exit...................................................   106
        Identified Homeland Security Vulnerabilities.................   135
    Furloughing of Air Passenger Inspectors..........................   278
    Hammer Training and Education Center.............................    19
    Headquarters Building............................................   127
    High Threat Urban Areas........................................118, 324
    Highway Watch Program............................................   422
    Homeland Security Advisory System................................    15
    Immigration's ``Entry-Exit'' Visa Tracking System................   168
    Information:
        Sharing......................................................   125
        Technology.................................................140, 398
            Investments and Integration..............................   300
    INS:
        Construction Backlog.......................................325, 414
        Employees....................................................   109
    Inspection:
        Documentation................................................   397
        Personnel....................................................   408
    Integrated Investigation Strategy................................   307
    Integration of:
        FEMA into DHS................................................    27
        Physical Assets..............................................   299
    Intelligence Issues..............................................   147
    Internal Reorganization..........................................    32
    International Trade Data System..................................   399
    Interoperable Communications.....................................21, 33
    IT Transformation to Homeland Security Fund......................   408
    Justice Department's Recent Decision Regarding Illegal Immigran163, 323
    Lack of Construction Funding in Fiscal Year 2004.................   437
    Law Enforcement Officers (LEOS)................................390, 421
    Leadership Issues in Reorganization of Border Security Agencies..   282
    Legacy Custom:
        Air-Marine Program...........................................   409
        Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service Fee161, 320, 406
    Letters of Intent....................................162, 324, 390, 427
    Lines of Communication...........................................   422
    Longer Term Information Technology Priorities & Milestones
      (Fiscal Year 2004-2005)........................................   142
    Management of First Responder Initiatives........................   118
    Maritime and Land Transportation Security........................   385
    Master Plan Construction.........................................   437
    Merging Agency Regional Structures...............................   302
    Mitigation.......................................................     8
        Division.....................................................    34
    Monitoring Untended Airstrips....................................   277
    Most Significant Vulnerabilities.................................   170
    National:
        Capital Region Airspace Protection.........................162, 321
        Guard........................................................   412
            Issue..................................................159, 315
        Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC)........   158
        Strategy on Training.........................................    18
    Near Term Information Technology Priorities & Milestones (Fiscal
      Year 2003).....................................................   141
    New Grant Program for ``Terrorism Activities''...................   176
    New Technology...................................................   409
    Non-Homeland Security Missions...................................   300
    Northern Border Ports of Energy Staffing.........................   180
    Office for Domestic Preparedness......................42, 154, 172, 309
        Grant-Making Process.........................................   276
    Office of Homeland Security......................................   169
    Operation:
        Greenquest.................................................162, 322
        Liberty Shield.............................................100, 178
        Of Emergency Response and Support Teams......................    21
        Safe Commerce..............................................110, 111
    Outsourcing Federal Jobs.........................................   122
    Overview of Operations.........................................359, 362
    Parallel Emergency Management Efforts............................   116
    Partnership with Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement...   345
    Pending Senate Legislation.......................................   171
    Personnel:
        Breakout.....................................................   412
        Cutbacks.....................................................   415
        Impacts......................................................   301
        Issues.......................................................   411
    Physical Assets..................................................   394
    Planned Usage of the Cheltenham Facility.........................   438
    Plum Island......................................................   181
    Port:
        Of Entry Construction Backlog................................   169
        Security.....................................................   279
            Assessments............................................326, 428
            Grants................................................ 163, 293
        Vulnerability Assessments....................................   107
    Pre- and Post-Disaster Mitigation................................    28
    Pre-Disaster Mitigation..........................................    42
    Preparedness.....................................................     7
    Preserving Agency Mission Focus..................................   137
    Priorities in Transportation Security Administration Budget......   274
    Privacy Rights...................................................   388
    Private Mail Radiation Detection Equipment................162, 325, 410
    Privatizing Air Traffic Control..................................   278
    Professionalism of Airport Screeners.............................   391
    Project Bioshield................................................   128
        Vaccine Acquisition Program..................................   150
    Projects Bioshield and Biowatch..................................    22
    Proper Funding Levels............................................   183
    Public Health Questions..........................................   126
    Purchase of the Town of Playas.................................159, 315
    Pushing:
        Our Zone of Security Outward/Partnering With Other Countries.   341
        Security Outward/Partnering With the Private Sector..........   343
    Qualified Antiterrorism Technologies......................318, 404, 423
    Rail Security....................................................   108
    Recovery.........................................................    10
    Reduction of Airport Security Screeners..........................   285
    Remote Video Inspection System...................................   171
    Response.........................................................     9
        Division.....................................................    35
    Restructuring:
        Air and Marine Program.......................................   322
        Of Immigration and Customs...................................   281
    Revised Department Pay Plan......................................   161
    Risk Management..................................................   138
    Role Within Department of Homeland Security......................   417
    Rural Law Enforcement Training...................................   437
    S. 165--Air Cargo Security Act...................................   429
    S. 539...........................................................   372
    Screener Reductions..............................................   384
    Security Detail..................................................   412
    Selected:
        Achievement Highlights.......................................   360
        Other Achievement Highlights.................................   363
    September 11 Response............................................    39
    Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)........................28, 287
    Smuggling of Pseudoephedrine.....................................   286
    Staffing.......................................................272, 344
        Increases....................................................   408
    Standard for Rating the Department...............................   170
    State of Readiness in Ports......................................   272
    Strategic National Stockpile.....................................    22
    Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)..........   305
    Support:
        Contracts....................................................   428
        Teams........................................................   166
    Targeting and the Necessary of Advance Information...............   339
    Technology Investment............................................   178
    Terrorist Threat Integration Center..............................   120
    Threat Level 4 (Orange)..........................................   430
    Threat Level 5 (Red).............................................   431
    Townhall Meetings with INS Employees.............................   114
    Toxic Substances--Cyanide........................................   182
    Tracking of:
        Foreign Visitors.............................................   131
        Students and Exchange Visitors...............................   288
    Training.........................................................   395
        Curricula....................................................   437
        Grants.......................................................    17
        Standards....................................................   111
    Transfer of Funds................................................   411
    Transportation:
        Resources for Maritime and Land Security.....................   273
        Response to Security Alert Levels............................   290
        Security Administration....................................164, 316
        Worker Identification Card (TWIC)..........................421, 428
    Treasury Forfeiture Fund.........................................   168
    Trusted Traveler Program.........................................   426
    TSA:
        Business Assistance in Developing Security Plans.............   427
        Cruise Ship to Airlines Pilot Project........................   427
        Goals and Management.........................................   427
        Guns in the Cockpit..........................................   418
        Increased Threat Level.......................................   416
        Port Security Grants.........................................   419
        Screener:
            Reductions...............................................   365
            Workforce Reduction......................................   383
    24-Hour Manifest Rule............................................   374
    2004 Funding Level...............................................    43
    2004 Highlights..................................................     7
    U.S.:
        Border Infrastructure and Technology Requirements............   371
        Fire Service.................................................    42
        VISIT........................................................   366
            System...................................................   131
        Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology System..148, 304
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.......................................373, 374
        At the Las Cruces, New Mexico International Airport........311, 402
    Use of Organized Labor...........................................    39
    Vulnerability of Chemical Plants.................................   134
    Watch Lists..........................................119, 124, 171, 181
    Workload.......................................................359, 362
    Wyden Amendment to S. 165--Air Cargo Security Improvement Act..326, 426

                       Science and Technology Directorate

    Additional Committee Questions...................................    64
    Adequacy of Existing Technologies and Capabilities...............    54
    Application of Department of Defense Technologies, Experience and
      Expertise to Meet Homeland Security Requirements...............    64
    Biometric Technologies...........................................    59
    Collaboration With National Laboratories.........................    57
    Comprehensive Entry Exit System..................................    58
    Concerns for Rural Areas.........................................    66
    Cooperation With DHS and Non-DHS Entities........................    52
    Criteria for Determining Centers Excellence......................    53
    Critical Infrastructure Protection...............................    74
    Defense Department's Biometrics Initiative.......................    60
    Department of Health and Human Services Coordination.............    67
    Development of Standards.........................................    65
    Educational Programs.............................................    48
    Fiscal Year:
        2003 Reprogramming Request...................................    62
        2004 Plans and Missions......................................    46
    Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency......47, 57, 61, 68
    Identification of Science and Technology Needs...................    55
    Manpad Strategy..................................................56, 60
    Performance Measures.............................................    61
    Radiological Attack..............................................    74
    Role of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center....................    53
    SAFETY Act.......................................................    71
    Science and Technology Directorate Goals.........................    47
    Standards for First Responder Equipment..........................    63
    Technology Clearinghouse.........................................    59
    Under Secretary for Science and Technology.......................74, 80
    University-Based Centers.........................................    59

                                U.S. Coast Guard

    Additional Committee Questions...................................   241
    Automated Identification System..................................   256
    C-130s and MPA Aircraft..........................................   255
    Coast Guard:
        Activities New York Operation Tempo MARSEC II................   252
        Deployment of Assets in Iraq.................................   227
    Competitive Sourcing at NVDC.....................................   219
    Deepwater........................................................   250
    Deficiencies in Search and Rescue Program........................   260
    Dolphin Helicopter...............................................   250
    Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request..................................   243
    Fisheries Enforcement............................................   215
    Focus on Non-Homeland Security Missions..........................   224
    110 Foot Cutter Hull Deterioration...............................   251
    Has Operation Iraqi Freedom Further Diminished Coast Guard
      Abilities in U.S. Waters?......................................   257
    Homeland Security................................................   241
    How Did the Coast Guard Respond to the Committee Directive to
      Rebalance Missions?............................................   259
    Importation of Gas from Foreign Entities.........................   225
    Incursions in North Pacific......................................   222
    Integrated Deepwater System....................................229, 247
    Is Deepwater Patrol Boat Life Extension Program being
      Reconsidered?..................................................   259
    Maritime Domain Awareness......................................229, 248
    Merchant Mariner Documents.......................................   242
    Mission Requirements.............................................   253
    National Vessel Documentation Center.............................   219
    Non-Homeland Security Missions...................................   213
    Port Security:
        Assessments................................................228, 253
        Grants.......................................................   234
    Priorities of the Coast Guard....................................   205
    Radiation Detection Equipment....................................   252
    Relationship With the New Department.............................   225
    Rescue 21........................................................   230
    Research & Development Funding...................................   255
    Search and Rescue Efforts........................................   230
    U.S. Coast Guards Workload.......................................   216
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.........................................   222
    War on Iraq......................................................   243
    Will Coast Guard be Able to Handle a Major Migrant Influx?.......   258
    Women............................................................   216

                              U.S. Secret Service

    Additional Committee Questions...................................   237
    Al Qaeda Involvement in Counterfeit Activities...................   212
    Budget Presentation..............................................   238
    Capital Acquisitions...........................................191, 232
    Computer Crime...................................................   191
    Consolidation Savings............................................   238
    Counterfeiting...................................................   192
        Operations in Iraq...........................................   212
    Diversity........................................................   200
    Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program..........................   187
    Emergency Preparedness Program (EPP).............................   200
    Fiscal Year 2004 Appropriation:
        Campaign.....................................................   231
        Request......................................................   190
    Foreign Offices..................................................   211
    Global Financial Crime...........................................   194
    Human Resources and Training.....................................   200
    Identity Theft...................................................   193
    Information Resources Management Division........................   199
    Intelligence Division............................................   197
    Investigative Program............................................   191
    James J. Rowley Training Center..................................   201
    Missions of the Secret Service...................................   186
    National:
        Center for Missing and Exploited Children..................195, 233
        Special Security Events......................................   240
        Threat Assessment Center...................................198, 240
    Office of Protective Research....................................   197
    Operating Expenses...............................................   191
    Plan Colombia....................................................   210
    Protective Program...............................................   195
    Realignment of Personnel.........................................   233
    Relationship With DHS............................................   232
    Secret Service Personnel.........................................   187
    Security of Identity Documents...................................   194
    Technical Security Division......................................   199
    U.S. Secret Service..............................................   217
    USA Patriot Act..................................................   239
    USSS:
        Special Agent Workforce & Quality of Life....................   239
        Uniformed Division Hiring....................................   239
    White House Mail Screening and Processing......................235, 238
    Workforce Retention/Workload Balancing Initiative................   200

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