[Senate Hearing 108-13]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-13
WMD DEVELOPMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 4, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State; accompanied
by Hon. James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 21
Bosworth, Hon. Stephen W., dean of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, former U.S. Ambassador to the
Republic of Korea, executive director of the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization, Medford, MA................... 53
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., former Assistant Secretary of Defense,
co-director, Preventive Defense Project, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, professor of Science and International Affairs,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.............................. 39
Prepared statement........................................... 44
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 12
Gregg, Hon. Donald P., president and chairman of the Korea
Society, former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea,
former Security Advisor to Vice President George Bush, New
York, NY....................................................... 48
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
(iii)
WMD DEVELOPMENTS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Alexander,
Sununu, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Rockefeller,
and Corzine.
The Chairman. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. We are privileged to have today
two distinguished panels, and we will ask that the members
respect the fact that Secretary Armitage must leave by 11:15.
So at the conclusion of his statement, we will gauge the number
of members who have appeared and try to make a calculation, in
terms of questioning time, so that each member will have an
opportunity and, at the same time, the Secretary can meet his
important commitments. Likewise, it is important that we
proceed in a way in which we have ample time for our
distinguished second panel, because members will want to
question them.
Senator Biden is detained for the moment. And when he
arrives, the Chair will recognize him for his opening
statement. I will make an opening statement at this point and
then recognize Secretary Armitage.
This is the first of a number of hearings pertaining to the
Korean Peninsula. In future hearings, we will review food
assistance, human rights concerns, economic reforms, peninsula
reunification, and other pertinent issues. Today's hearing will
review weapons of mass destruction [WMD] on the Korean
Peninsula.
In recent weeks, following admissions of North Korean
officials of their uranium-enrichment program, in violation of
the Agreed Framework of 1994 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, the level of public exchange between North Korea and
the United States has reached a new intensity.
Unfortunately, we have been at this juncture before. And in
1994, North Korea was removing spent fuel, which could be
reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons. Negotiation of the
Agreed Framework brought a halt to immediate prospects for war.
In 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile over
Japan. And while the United States had become distracted by
other international issues, North Korea remained focused on its
nuclear program. It appears that maintenance of the Agreed
Framework became policy in itself, its fragility demonstrated
by the 1998 missile launch by North Korea.
Last year, I outlined some of my thoughts regarding the
vulnerability of the United States to the use of weapons of
mass destruction, whether from terrorist organizations or from
rogue nations. I stand by my premise that every nation--every
nation--which has weapons and materials of mass destruction,
must account for what it has, spend its own money or obtain
international technical and financial resources to safely
secure what it has, and pledge that no other nation, cell or
cause will be allowed access or use. A satisfactory level of
accountability, transparency, and safety must be established in
every nation with a weapon of mass destruction program. When
nations resist accountability, or when they make their
territory available to terrorists who are seeking weapons of
mass destruction, our nation must be prepared to use force as
well as all diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal.
This doctrine, which I espouse, also applies to North
Korea. While the United States is and should be prepared to use
force related to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, we
must guarantee to the American public and to Americans serving
in Korea, that all diplomatic options are being pursued. The
stakes are high. We must not discount the horrific consequences
to American, Korean, and perhaps Japanese lives resulting from
a misunderstanding or a miscalculation on the part of either
side.
I would like to recall a partial text of a joint statement
that Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, and I issued in 1994 as part
of a Summary of Findings and Recommendations regarding the
crisis at that time. And our quote, ``Our policymaking and
coordination with our allies, the timing of our statements and
our actions, our responses to developments on the Korean
Peninsula, and our communication with our diplomatic and
military leaders in the field must all be sharpened and
strengthened in the days and weeks ahead. Korean developments
must be the subject of clear, frequent focus by top Clinton
Administration officials, including the President. The United
States should designate a single senior official with access to
the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense to help develop and coordinate United States policy and
action on Korea. We must speak with one voice on this sensitive
matter,'' end of quote.
This recommendation, in my judgment, still applies today.
While Americans have been deeply concerned about the war with--
potential war with Iraq, many have also considered the Korean
crisis a more serious situation. In fact, both are very
serious, both are very dangerous, and both need our full
attention.
It is apparent that North Korea has taken several
provocative actions recently, including steps which could lead
to production of nuclear weapons in the next few months. I
believe that United States officials should talk to North
Korean officials about ending North Korean nuclear weapons
programs with provisions of comprehensive international
inspections to ensure a successful clean-up procedure.
North Korea may mention in these talks its desire for
nonaggression guarantees, potential commercial relations with
other countries, and urgent humanitarian food and fuel
contributions through international agencies to assist the
North Korean people. We should be prepared to talk to North
Korea about all of this.
I ask the administration to address promptly not only the
importance of international multiparty diplomacy with North
Korea, but the importance of immediate United States
leadership, including direct talks between the United States
and North Korea.
[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar
This is the first of a number of hearings pertaining to the Korean
Peninsula. In future hearings we will review food assistance, human
rights concerns, economic reforms, peninsula reunification and other
pertinent issues.
Today's hearing will review weapons of mass destruction on the
Korean Peninsula.
In recent weeks, following admission by North Korean officials of
their uranium enrichment program, in violation of the Agreed Framework
of 1994 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the level of public
exchange between North Korea and the United States has reached a new
intensity.
Unfortunately, we have been at this juncture before. In 1994 North
Korea was removing spent fuel which could be reprocessed for use in
nuclear weapons. Negotiation of the Agreed Framework brought a halt to
immediate prospects for war. In 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic
missile over Japan. While the United States had become distracted by
other intemational issues North Korea remained focused on its nuclear
program. It appears that maintenance of the Agreed Framework became
policy in itself its fragility demonstrated by the 1998 missile launch
by North Korea.
Last year I outlined my thoughts regarding the vulnerability of the
United States to the use of weapons of mass destruction, whether from
terrorist organizations or rogue nations. I stand by my premise that
every nation which has weapons and materials of mass destruction, must
account for what it has, spend its own money or obtain international
technical and financial resources to safely secure what it has, and
pledge that no other nation, cell or cause will be allowed access or
use. A satisfactory level of accountability, transparency and safety
must be established in every nation with a weapons of mass destruction
program. When nations resist accountability, or when they make their
territory available to terrorists who are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, our nation must be prepared to use force as well as all
diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal.
This doctrine which I espouse also applies to North Korea. While
the United States is and should be prepared to use force related to
North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, we must guarantee to the
American public and to Americans serving in Korea that all diplomatic
options are being pursued.
The stakes are high. We must not discount the horrific consequences
to American, Korean, and perhaps Japanese lives resulting from a
misunderstanding or miscalculation on the part of either side.
I would like to recall partial text of a joint statement issued by
Senator Sam Nunn and me in 1994 as part of a ``Summary of Findings and
Recommendations'' regarding the crisis at that time.
Our policymaking and coordination with our allies, the timing
of our statements and actions, our responses to developments on
the Korean Peninsula and our communications with our diplomatic
and military leaders in the field must all be sharpened and
strengthened in the days and weeks ahead. Korean developments
must be the subject of clear, frequent focus by top Clinton
Administration officials, including the President. The United
States should designate a single senior official with access to
the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense to help develop and coordinate U.S. policy and action
on Korea. We must speak with one voice on this sensitive
matter.
This recommendation still applies today. While Americans have been
deeply concerned about war with Iraq many have also considered the
Korean crisis a more serious situation. In fact, both are very serious.
Both are dangerous. Both need our full attention.
It is apparent that North Korea has taken several provocative
actions recently including steps which could lead to production of
nuclear weapons in the next few months. I believe that United States
officials should talk to North Korean officials about ending North
Korean nuclear weapons programs with provisions of comprehensive
international inspection to insure a successful cleanup procedure.
North Korea may mention in these talks its desire for non-aggression
guarantees, potential commercial relations with other countries, and
urgent humanitarian food and fuel contributions through international
agencies to assist the North Korean people. We should be prepared to
talk to North Korea about all of this.
I ask the administration to address, promptly, not only the
importance of international, multi-party diplomacy with North Korea,
but the importance of immediate United States leadership including
direct talks between the United States and North Korea.
The Chairman. It is a pleasure, as always, to have you
before the committee, Secretary Armitage, and will you please
proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY HON. JAMES A. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your
permission, I will submit my prepared testimony for the record
and just make a few opening remarks.
Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity, following the
invitation of Senator Frist, to brief all Senators in S-407 on
16 January. I believe there were 53 or so Members there. But
for those who were not able to attend, let me briefly, in an
unclassified way, lay out how we got here and what we have done
since I met with you on the 16th of January, and then I will
stop and try to answer any questions.
The DPRK, North Korea, has desired for decades to have a
nuclear capability. And in the mid-1980s, following up on a
Russian technical design, they actually built one themselves, a
five-megawatt graphite moderated reactor. Also, in 1985, the
North Koreans decided to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty
[NPT]. But it took from 1985 to 1992 to complete the
negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]
surrounding the safeguard process and procedures in North
Korea.
The IAEA, after getting safeguard processes negotiated
successfully, started their look and their investigations into
Yongbyon and noticed, rather rapidly, an anomaly. That is,
there appeared to be more reprocessed fuel than the North
Koreans had noted in their report to the IAEA. The IAEA then
asked for the ability to have further investigations, which
drove, apparently, the North Korean Government into a paroxysm
of rage. As a result, they invited the IAEA inspectors to
leave, announced a withdrawal from the NPT, started a 90-day
clock, which is required in the NPT to remove oneself from the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, halted that clock with one day
remaining, began a series of intense--in fact, 16-month--
negotiations, intense negotiations, with the United States,
which culminated in the Agreed Framework of 1994.
During the time 1994 until the present administration, the
previous administration had further noticed some anomalies in
procurement patterns in North Korea, so much so that in 1999
our concerns were raised with the Nuclear Suppliers Group in
Vienna. This administration, in June 2002, had a National
Intelligence Estimate [NIE], which had, as its primary focus,
to make an assessment how many weapons North Korea could
possibly possess, and they came out with an estimate of one to
two weapons, possibly, based on the amount, as they understood
it, of unaccounted for fuel in 1992 which the IAEA had
identified. In a very small portion of that NIE in June 2002,
there was a few comments about a growing belief that North
Korea had engaged in at least an R&D project for highly
enriched uranium.
In July 2002, the administration received very good
intelligence which made us dramatically change our assessment
from the DPRK being involved in just an R&D program. And we
found, for instance, an order of magnitude difference in the
estimate that we had received of how many centrifuges they
might be obtaining, vice what we received in new intelligence,
which showed that they were receiving and acquiring many, many
more than was originally thought. And it led us to a rather
intensive study, which resulted, in September 2002, in a memo
to consumers from the intelligence community, which said that
in our view, the North Koreans had embarked on a production
program, no longer an R&D program.
This rather dramatically changed the presentation that my
colleague, Assistant Secretary James Kelly, was going to make
in Pyongyang from a rather bold approach that tried to address
all the security concerns on the Korean Peninsula in exchange
for a rather robust new relationship with North Korea, to an
absolutely necessity for us to confront the North Koreans with
this information that we had about their program for highly
enriched uranium, which, of course, Jim Kelly did. And, much to
our surprise, on the second day of his talks, the first Vice-
Foreign Minister came back and not only acknowledged that there
was this program, but he said that ``we have even more
developed weapons,'' which threw us into a bit of a tizzy. We
did not understand what those weapons might be.
We have subsequently learned, from foreign envoys who have
gone to Pyongyang and talked to the North Koreans about that,
that what they are referring to is the soul and the special
affection of the Korean people for the army-first policy,
united behind the direction of Kim Jong Il. So it just means
the will of the people is united to reject any sort of
aggression. That is how we got here.
Now, what have we done since January 16? As we continue to
say, and the President continues to say, that we believe there
is a way to solve this diplomatically. Well, the Australians,
the Russians, and the Republic of Korea have all sent various
envoys to Pyongyang and have engaged in different discussions.
A twice-rescheduled IAEA board of Governors is now scheduled
for 12 February. And Dr. ElBaradei, who is otherwise involved
for these few days, will be participating in that Board of
Governors meeting.
Under Secretary John Bolton and Assistant Secretary James
Kelly have gone to Seoul to make sure we shored up that
relationship. It is not a secret that we were experiencing a
rise, a spike, in anti-Americanism.
Additionally, the new government is in the process of
forming. One of the reasons we have been, in some minds, a
little slow to move off the mark is because, in fact, we do not
have a new government. President Roh in Seoul, he is busy
formulating it right now.
I went to Moscow to meet with the Deputy Foreign Minister
Losikov, who went to Pyongyang and spent 6 hours in talks with
Kim Jong Il. The DPRK condemned our President's State of the
Union Message. The North/South talks began and were completed.
President-elect Roh has sent an envoy yesterday and today to
meet with the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, and, this
morning, right now, with the Secretary of State. And, finally,
this afternoon, the Secretary is going to meet with Foreign
Minister Tang of China. And this evening, early evening, he is
scheduled to meet with Foreign Minister Ivanov to discuss both
his presentation tomorrow and the question of the North Korean
situation and the Korean Peninsula. And, finally, on Monday, I
am meeting in a trilateral meeting with Japanese and
Australians in a strategic meeting to try to figure out how we
should move ahead.
So that is kind of a precise of where we are, and I will
stop and try to answer your questions, Mr. Chairman,
colleagues.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of
State
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.
Thank you for inviting me to discuss recent developments on the
Korean Peninsula. Much has happened, even in the short space of weeks
since the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc
Grossman, briefed your colleagues in the House, and since I briefed
many of you and your fellow Senators on the 16th of January. I welcome
this opportunity to complement those closed sessions and to update you,
as well. We value, as always, your good counsel and will continue our
close consultation.
Mr. Chairman, in just a few months, we will mark the 50th
anniversary of the Armistice that effectively ended the Korean War,
which had by then claimed some 4 million Korean lives--and the lives of
more than 34,000 Americans. In the years since, the combined efforts of
the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) have
deterred further conflict and preserved the security of the South
Korean people.
The Republic of Korea has without question prospered in this time.
Indeed, today, we look to South Korea as a key partner in the region--
strategically, but also as a flourishing democracy and a free people.
Mr. Chairman, I have tremendous faith in the ineluctable force of
democracy and a liberal economy. I have faith in the basic human
longing to live free. I have no doubt that if we, working with the
international community, handle the current situation correctly, that
the people of Korea will prevail.
North Korea's (Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, or DPRK)
programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery are a fundamental obstacle to that appealing vision for the
future. They are also a threat to the international community, regional
security, U.S. interests, and U.S. forces, which remain an integral
part of stability in the region.
It is time for North Korea to turn away from this self-destructive
course. They have nothing to gain from acquiring nuclear weapons--and
much to lose. Indeed, every day, the people of that country are paying
a terrible price for these programs in international isolation and
misspent national resources.
Mr. Chairman, I know that your constituents and the constituents of
every Member of this Committee are deeply concerned about this
situation, particularly when juxtaposed with events in the Middle East.
So, I want to be clear today on how the President sees the situation
and the course he believes is correct for the United States.
President Bush and Secretary Powell have said repeatedly that when
it comes to defending our nation, all options must remain on the table.
Both have said that in this case, at this time, we believe that
diplomacy is our best option. We intend to resolve the threats posed by
North Korea's programs by working with the international community to
find a peaceful, diplomatic solution.
As President Bush said in his visit to South Korea last year, the
United States has no intention of invading North Korea. Secretary
Powell reiterated this point most recently in Davos, Switzerland, where
he also stated that we are prepared to communicate this position to the
North Koreans in a way that is unmistakable.
Indeed, we are prepared to build a different kind of relationship
with North Korea. Last summer, in consultation with South Korea and
Japan, the United States was ready to pursue a bold new approach with
Pyongyang. That approach entailed a number of steps toward normalcy in
our relationship, including political and economic measures to help
improve the lives of the North Korean people.
This bold approach was derailed, however, by our discovery of a
covert uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons, which North
Korea had been pursuing for years in egregious violation of its
international obligations.
We cannot change our relationship with the DPRK until the DPRK
changes its behavior. North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons
programs in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Specifically, North
Korea must return immediately to the freeze on activities at the
Yongbyon complex and dismantle the plutonium program there. Second,
North Korea must dismantle its program to develop nuclear weapons
through highly enriched uranium--and must allow international
verification that it has done so. Third, North Korea must cooperate
fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Finally,
North Korea must comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and adhere to the safeguards agreement that is part of that treaty.
The United States will not dole out any ``rewards'' to convince
North Korea to live up to its existing obligations. But we do remain
prepared to transform our relations with that country, once it complies
with its international obligations and commitments. Channels of
communication between our countries remain open, but ultimately, it is
the actions of North Korea that matter.
And North Korea needs to act soon, for the sake of its people.
Today, conditions in that country are appalling, and millions of North
Koreans are at immediate risk of starvation. The United States sees
this as a critical international humanitarian issue, and we are, in
fact, the most generous donor in the world of food assistance to the
DPRK. Since 1995, we have provided 1.9 million metric tons of food,
valued at $620 million. For the 2002 World Food Program (WFP) operation
in North Korea, the United States contributed 155,000 metric tons of
food commodities, valued at $63 million, over half of what the WFP
actually received last year.
President Bush has stressed that we will continue to provide this
emergency assistance to the people of North Korea--we will not use food
aid as a weapon. But we do have concerns and we do face challenges with
this assistance.
Specifically, the DPRK places onerous restrictions on the
distribution of food. The DPRK requires that the WFP provide six-day's
advance notice of visits to food distribution sites and does not allow
the WFP to employ Korean-speaking staff. The DPRK also denies access to
the WFP to about 20 percent of North Korean counties.
These restrictions prevent us from being certain that the food we
donate to North Korea is going to the people who actually need it. No
other nation in the world places such excessive restrictions on food
aid.
Mr. Chairman, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
estimates that as we sit here today, 800 million people around the
world are going hungry. 38 million people in Africa are facing a hunger
crisis. There are people here in our own nation who do not have enough
to eat.
In addition to meeting the needs of our own people, the United
States provides food aid to over 80 other countries. We will again
provide our share of food aid to the North Korean people, but these
competing demands naturally will have to factor into our decision about
exactly how much aid to give North Korea. We look forward to close
consultation with the Committee on this issue.
We will also keep in close contact with you on the issue of our
involvement with KEDO.
We are consulting with our KEDO partners--South Korea, Japan, and
the EU--about KEDO's future, including the fate of the light water
reactor project. In the meantime, the Administration has asked Congress
to appropriate $3.5 million in FY03 to fund the U.S. contribution to
KEDO's administrative account, should we decide it is in our national
interest to do so. I want to stress that no part of that funding would
go to heavy fuel oil shipments, which the KEDO Executive Board
suspended in October, or to light water reactor construction. But the
ability to make a contribution to the administrative account will give
us flexibility in working with our KEDO allies to achieve our shared
nonproliferation goals. Given the fluidity and dangers of the current
situation, flexibility is going to continue to be crucial.
Positive relations with our partners and allies in the region and
beyond will also continue to be crucial, because the bottom line is
that this is not a bilateral issue. While the United States is willing
to talk to North Korea about how to dismantle its nuclear weapons
program, this is not just a problem between our two nations.
The threat posed by North Korea's nuclear programs sends ripples of
instability across the region--and around the globe. The Republic of
Korea and Japan, but also China, Russia, Australia and the other
nations of this neighborhood have a direct and pressing interest in
this matter. We share a concern with all of these nations about North
Korea's programs and we share a commitment that the Korean Peninsula
remain free of nuclear weapons.
While the nations in the neighborhood must play a starring role in
resolving this problem, this is also an issue of international and
multilateral interest.
For example, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires
that states and organizations upholding it, notably the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), must be involved in this issue. We are
pleased that the IAEA and its Director, Dr. ElBaradei, continue to
stress this point.
Last month, the 35 member nations of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unanimously condemned DPRK
actions. Specifically, the Board issued a statement ``deploring'' North
Korea's suggestion that it will resume nuclear activities at the
Yongbyon complex, its disabling of the monitoring equipment installed
there, and its expulsion of IAEA inspectors.
The IAEA also announced that it is no longer able to ``exercise its
responsibilities under the safeguards agreement, namely, to verify that
the DPRK is not diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices . . .'' The IAEA called on the DPRK to act
urgently to restore international confidence by complying with
safeguards and resuming surveillance at Yongbyon.
Unfortunately, North Korea rejected the IAEA resolution, announcing
its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and suggesting
that the nation may resume flight testing of long-range missiles.
Unless North Korea takes some immediate action to reverse course,
the IAEA Board of Directors is likely to find at its next meeting that
the DPRK is in further noncompliance and report this to the UN Security
Council.
We are working with our international partners and allies to make
North Korea understand the potential consequences of these dangerous
and provocative actions. Secretary Powell speaks regularly to his
counterparts in the region, but also in the EU and the P-5, as well to
his counterparts in other governments. Without exception, they share
our concerns and our commitment for a nuclear weapons-free Korean
Peninsula.
Japan, in particular, has major interests at stake, and we
coordinate very closely on a bilateral basis, as well as trilaterally
with South Korea. Japan has stated that it will not complete
normalization with North Korea without an end to the nuclear weapons
program.
Of course, our consultation with South Korea is especially close.
We will continue to deepen and strengthen our alliance with the
Republic of Korea. We look forward to having a very close and effective
working relationship with the new South Korean administration of Roh
Moo-hyun, as we have had with President Kim Daejung. Indeed, today,
President-Elect Roh's special envoy, Mr. Chyung Dae Chul, is meeting
with senior Administration officials to discuss how we can best work
together to promote our share nonproliferation goals on the Korean
Peninsula.
Last month, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton and Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly both had extremely useful
meetings in South Korea--and in other nations in the region.
We have communicated consistently our support for dialogue between
South and North Korea as part of the international community's effort
to find a diplomatic solution. Most recently, we strongly supported the
visit to the DPRK by President Kim's Special Envoy, Lim Dong-won.
During his meetings with North Korean officials last week, Special
Envoy Lim emphasized the international community's grave concerns about
the North's nuclear weapons program, and he urged the North to respond
to those concerns.
We remain well aware that for South Korea, this is more than a
matter of contiguity, this is a matter of consanguinity. These two
nations share a border and blood ties, and we understand that South
Korea has much to lose from continued DPRK intransigence and
hostility--and much to gain if the North turns away from its present
course. We will continue to work closely and consult constantly with
our partners in the ROK, as well as Japan and our other friends and
allies in the region, who are most directly affected by North Korean
decisions and actions.
We will also continue to work closely with the Members of this
Committee as we seek a diplomatic solution to this situation. Our
interests as a country on a matter of such seriousness are best served
by a concerted U.S. policy, and we are committed to our ongoing
consultation with Congress.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
For the moment we will have a first round with 5 minutes
and ask the timekeeper to start on my time at this moment, and
we will go back and forth on both sides of the aisle.
Secretary Armitage, the description you have made of our
diplomacy is not only accurate, but it shows its vigor. And my
quarrel would not be with any of the steps that you have taken.
It just appears, as I had indicated in my opening statement,
that other nations are prepared to be helpful, some more so,
apparently, than others, and we would like to have an
international solution and a group around the table because of
the proximity of the neighbors, the danger to them, or the
potential good that might come from better relations.
There is a need for direct talks between the United States
and North Korea. And at least I believe that we ought to
discuss with the North Koreans the issues that, unfortunately,
did not get discussed with Secretary Kelly's mission, which
they might have discussed. It was fully appropriate they be
apprised of our knowledge that they had a program going.
Perhaps we should have not been surprised, but we were. But, in
any event, not much else occurred during that meeting. I would
hope it might be resumed, and the reason being that it appears
that, otherwise, while we are very much engaged in diplomacy in
the Iraq situation and elsewhere around the world with the war
on terror, North Korea may simply be on hold--at least that is
an impression that many Senators have, a hope that somehow
nothing precipitous occurs. But the North Koreans understand
that, apparently, and, therefore, announce actions
periodically, and we are left, it seems to me, in a more
difficult situation without an appreciable change on the part
of the Chinese or the Russians.
Perhaps, as you talk to the emissary today from the new
President, there may be plans of activity there that are
suggested, and we certainly welcome that emissary's coming to
the United States.
Let me just, without pursuing that, ask one more question,
and that is, What is the value of encouraging other nations to
receive North Korean refugees? Specifically, there are a great
number of people in anguish in North Korea. They take desperate
measures to leave that country. It is apparent that the Chinese
are taking equally vigorous measures to keep them in.
It has been apparent for a long time that South Korean
friends have said to us, ``Hang on. If, in fact, all of the
North Koreans who want to unite with us come to South Korea
now, it will be very upsetting to our economy, to our politics.
We want North Korea reformed inside of North Korea without too
many others with us, despite our kinship with North Korean
brothers.''
It is not clear that the United States has been
particularly eager to see North Korean refugees here, or made
provision for that. But my question today, without being
hopelessly provocative, is, why not? Why do we not recognize--
and the parallels are not precise or the same--that much
happened in Europe when people began to come out of East
Germany to West Germany or out of Hungary, out of Poland, out
of behind the Iron Curtain. This was a major factor in the
change of life and the change of negotiations and politics. It
recognized freedom and the fact that people who are suffering
deserve a chance to live.
So I would just respectfully ask, even as you are
considering the tough question of direct talks, which is a
difficult one, to be thinking about how we encourage countries,
including our own, to think about receiving North Koreans who
may come out seeking freedom. I think that might change the
equation and the conversations.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, sir.
First of all, of course we are going to have to have direct
talks with the North Koreans. There is no question about it.
Before we do that, we want to make sure, as I tried to indicate
on the 16th of January, that we have, one, a strong
international platform from which to have these talks, and,
two, we do not want this to become simply a problem between the
United States and the DPRK.
As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, there are regional good
friends of ours, allies of ours, plus two major powers, who are
intimately involved in this, and we want to make sure this
thing does not rub off entirely on us to come up with a
solution. We are part of it, and we are going to have to speak
to the North Koreans, and we shall, at a point in time when it
is considered efficacious to move forward.
In the closed briefing we had on the 16th, sir, Senator
Brownback made some very heartwarming and, I think, heartfelt
remarks about refugees in North Korea. And, further, there was
a rather riveting presentation on 60 Minutes on Sunday evening.
And, again, Senator Brownback was there.
Based on our discussions on the 16th, in room 407, I went
back to the State Department, and we have begun, with our
International Organizations Bureau, Population, Refugees and
Migration Bureau and East Asia Pacific Bureau, to work together
on how we can better manage refugee flows and handle them.
There are hundreds, who, I am told, have been resettled
this year in South Korea. We are working hard to--where we know
about it and find out about it--to stop the Chinese from
sending back people to God knows what in North Korea.
But you and I and some others here have been involved in
other refugee flows, not just Eastern European--in Vietnam,
where I have sponsored more than 40 of these folks.
Unfortunately, I was not able to sponsor more, because some
died on the way out. And we have to be careful what we start.
And we have got to make sure we are in a situation where we can
follow through correctly if we encourage greater refugee flows.
It is not something, I think, to be done just on a whim. And I
am not suggesting at all you are. But that is the downside that
worries me and that we have to figure out how to handle.
The Chairman. I thank you for that response.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing at this important time. And I thank, Secretary
Armitage, again, for all his cooperation with the committee.
I would like to follow on the chairman's comments. Some
statements from some in the administration suggest that the
United States is resigned to the reality of a nuclear-armed,
nuclear-weapons-producing North Korea. Given North Korea's
history of proliferation, I find this posture unacceptable, and
can you assure me that this is not the case?
Mr. Armitage. I can so assure you.
Senator Feingold. Now, when some in the Muslim world
suggest----
Mr. Armitage. Excuse me.
Senator Feingold. Yes, please.
Mr. Armitage. You will find, I think, that those who make
this comment are always unnamed. Maybe I am wrong. Maybe there
is someone out there who is uninformed, but they are generally
unnamed. And I can so assure you.
Senator Feingold. Very good.
When some in the Muslim world suggest that America appears
to have a higher level of tolerance for North Korean WMD
development than for Iraqi development, and then further
suggest that this evidence of hostility toward Islam, how are
we responding to this? And is this something we are hearing in
our posts in the Muslim world?
Mr. Armitage. I have not been informed that we are hearing
that analogy in the Muslim world, but I know what you are
talking about. Our view, which some question, is that we have
given over 12 years of time to try to resolve the situation
with Iraq, and we have been after finding out about the North
Koreans cheating on their 1994 agreement. We have only had a
few months of diplomacy, Senator.
Senator Feingold. So you have not heard anything from
Muslim or Arab countries that this is somehow a double
standard?
Mr. Armitage. I do not recall, personally. I will not say
that it has not come in, but I have not been, you know, hit up.
And I meet with our visitors from the Arab worlds, and I do not
recall seeing a cable on that. I do recall seeing a certain
editorial opinion here, more broadly, in the United States
about that, sir.
Senator Feingold. Well, I would appreciate any followup
from the Department on this point. I think, obviously, how we
are coming off in the Arab and Muslim world is a terribly
important thing and, as it relates to North Korea, is something
I am interested in following.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir.
[A classified response was subsequently received.]
Senator Feingold. Would you compare for me North Korea's
history of proliferation with that of Iraq? Which country has a
more worrisome record of proliferation?
Mr. Armitage. I think, in strict terms of proliferation, I
would say North Korea, as I think I indicated to you in our
briefing last week. It has been, to my knowledge, limited
entirely to the missile proliferation, and they have
proliferated to Yemen, to Pakistan, to Iran, Egypt, and other
places, and we have been very vigorous in trying to stop that
where we can find it, and we have had some real success in
Egypt.
In terms of chemical weapons [CW] and biological weapons
[BW] proliferation, we do believe that the North Koreans have a
program, but we have not seen them proliferate that. There are
technology suspicions that they have proliferated technology
about nuclear weapons. We have no knowledge and no information
about fissile material.
On the question of Saddam Hussein, we know where he was in
1993. If he had not been interrupted by the gulf war, I think
most feel that he would have had a weapon by 1993 or so, a
nuclear weapon. His BW and CW affection will be well documented
tomorrow, I believe, by Secretary Powell and I do not want to
overstate it, for the obvious reasons--some intersections with
various and sundry terrorist groups. And that is our real fear
with Iraq. I might add, plus the fact that he's used them. He
has invaded two of his neighbors in the last decade-and-a-half.
But--so he has had quite an active life.
Senator Feingold. Is it fair to say that, in terms of the
discussions we have had about Iraq, that proliferation of these
weapons is not, in particular, the leading modus operandi of
that regime? Perhaps the development, the threats, but I would
argue that we have not heard a lot about this as being a normal
modus operandi of Baghdad.
Mr. Armitage. No, you have heard from us, sir, I think,
that we believe he wants these weapons to dominate, to
intimidate, and to attack.
Senator Feingold. In your assessment, how badly damaged is
the U.S./South Korean relationship at this point? Is it
reparable?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, it is. It is clearly reparable. And both
the outgoing President, Kim Dae-Jung, and the incoming
President have taken great pains--as well as recent editorial
opinion--have taken great pains to note the closeness of our
relationship over the years.
I acknowledge that there was anti-Americanism, and it is
understandable. And you know the reasons probably better than
I. Generational change is part of it. But I think there is one
more subtle one, and I--we are trying to get a handle on it,
and it is this: South Korea is a country that has the tenth
largest economy in the world. They successfully have had the
Olympic Games. They successfully had the World Cup last year.
And they are tired of the big boys playing basketball over
their heads, whether it is China or Russia or the United
States. So I believe we have a lot of work to do in adjusting
our own, sort of, presentations and work with the Republic of
Korea, and I think we are getting it done.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for calling this
critically important hearing, and I thank all of the witnesses for
their time and their insight.
When it comes to North Korea, this administration's response to the
crisis has involved denial--claiming that there is no crisis--and then
lurching from one position to another by refusing to talk, then
offering to talk, then offering to talk and to provide incentives. The
administration has failed to unify key actors--South Korea, Japan,
China, and Russia--behind any coordinated response, and has failed to
defuse the crisis. What's more, I fear that the mixed messages the U.S.
is sending about North Korea have combined with the administration's
intense focus on Iraq, unintentionally creating a very dangerous policy
brew.
As I mentioned last week, in the State of the Union Address, the
President seemed to suggest that the lesson to be learned from the
recent history of the Korean Peninsula is that we must stop potential
proliferators before they have the means to blackmail the international
community. I wholeheartedly agree. But given the very different
approach being taken to Iraq and North Korea, I am concerned that the
rest of the world is starting to learn the following lesson about U.S.
policy: if you acquire nuclear weapons you can be free from the threat
of military action, but if you do not, you may be subject to preemptive
invasion. This scenario, with its emphasis on preemption, sets out real
incentives for proliferation and the pursuit of WMD as quickly as
possible. That cannot possible be in the interest of global stability
and in the interest of the security of the United States of America.
This is a terribly difficult and sensitive situation, and of
course, diplomacy does not lend itself to one-size-fits-all answers.
But while some may wish to set North Korea aside so that we can focus
on Iraq, I believe that the danger in this overall policy message is
growing greater every day. We need clarity now. I hope that we can
start finding some in this hearing today.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Let me mention, as I should have earlier, that mention has
been made of the diplomacy of Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly,
and he is immediately behind the Secretary, and I will call
upon you, Mr. Secretary, to ask him to help you whenever you
need to. But we are appreciative of your being here and of your
service to your country.
Mr. Armitage. I need plenty of help, Mr. Chairman. No
question about it.
The Chairman. I call now on Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, again Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel. It is always reassuring to have you up here
for your weekly briefing.
It is your pleasing personality that we respond to. You
enhance the dialog considerably with your charm.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, you took us through an
interesting timeframe, I think, beginning back in June of 2002,
as to what we knew, generally, when, and what we are doing,
where we are. But I want to go back to an earlier date that was
referenced in a Washington Post article, which you saw, this
weekend. And in the Post article, to paraphrase it, it says
that in November 2001, that we were aware of, according to the
Livermore National Laboratory people, that North Korea was up
to something, in fact moving rapidly on development of uranium
enrichment programs.
Was that an oversight that you did not mention that, or did
not it happen, or did you know about it, or did no one know
about it? Why did we not respond to that, if, in fact, that is
true?
Mr. Armitage. I was uninformed about it. I have asked about
it. I do not think it was true. I think what happened is the
Livermore Laboratory took part in or was part of a joint energy
intelligence assessment, and that their contributions, I have
been informed, confine themselves to research and development,
not a production of highly enriched uranium [HEU]. I can be
corrected, and we will research it further, but I--of course I
looked at that article and was very unhappy that it appeared.
Senator Hagel. So you do not put much stock in that
article.
Mr. Armitage. I do not put much stock in that part. And I--
if I may take advantage, sir, Senator Biden and Senator Levin
and Senator Daschle sent a letter to Dr. Rice, which, of
course, she will be answering. But, in it, I think that article
is referred to, as well as another unnamed administration
official, who alleged that the administration was keeping quiet
about recent developments concerning activity at Yongbyon.
I want to hasten to let the chairman know and let all of
you know that I called, immediately upon seeing that letter, to
the Deputy National Security Advisor, who said, ``Of course
that's not the case.'' And in my own investigations, I know
that the President's special representative to the DPRK, Jack
Pritchard, the day before that article came out, had already
briefed the general counsel to the Senate Budget Committee.
So I think there is nothing to it, and I want to put a
spike in it if I can.
Senator Hagel. So as far as you know, no senior officials,
from the President on down, were told of this report if, in
fact, it happened.
Mr. Armitage. I am uninformed that they were told anything
more than some suspicions about R&D, which followed on the 1999
anomalies in procurement, Senator.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. How much do we know about
Pakistan's involvement in helping the North Koreans with their
nuclear program?
Mr. Armitage. We know it is both ways, and we know a good
bit about a North Korean/Pakistan relationship. I, myself,
however, have had conversations, personally, direct with
President Musharraf, who has assured us these are over and they
were in the past.
But, beyond that, with your permission, I think it is a
classified matter.
Senator Hagel. Well, there has been an awful lot out in the
public on this and we should probably pursue this in a closed
forum.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, you absolutely should.
Senator Hagel. You have mentioned, in response to the
chairman, that we intend to have talks with North Korea. Am I
correct on what you said?
Mr. Armitage. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Hagel. Is there a timetable on that?
Mr. Armitage. No, there is not. I certainly--it is not
going to be, I think, before we get a steady government in the
Republic of Korea, but there is no question--I spoke to the
Secretary about it this morning--we are absolutely going to
have to talk with them, bilaterally. We acknowledge that.
Senator Hagel. Are you concerned that the North Koreans may
be on an accelerated program here to enrich uranium, and once
that plutonium is out it could most likely be irretrievable and
terrorists get their hands on this, far more dangerous maybe
than what Saddam Hussein may be doing or not doing and so is
the timeframe not important here?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, the timeframe is important. I am
concerned, and I do not think, given the poverty of North
Korea, that it would be too long after she had a good amount of
fissile material to do whatever she wanted to do with it,
first, that she would be inclined to engage with somebody, a
non-state actor or a rogue state.
However, I believe there is another major difference
between Iraq and North Korea. We think we know what Kim Jong Il
wants, at least the experience of our predecessors in the
previous administration indicate that he wants some economic
benefits and things of that nature in exchange for these
programs.
It is quite a different situation in Iraq, Senator, where
we feel that what he wants to do, as I have said, is
intimidate, dominate, and attack. And we are not quite sure
that is the motivation of Kim Jong-Il.
Senator Hagel. He just wants to sell it?
Mr. Armitage. Oh, I think he wants to use it for economic
benefit, sell, barter, whatever.
Senator Hagel. You do not see any connection to the danger
to the world? That is not a concern to you? Urgency to that?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, that is a concern. It is an absolute
concern. I have got several concerns in the world, and that is
one of them, and we are working it as best we can. I would just
say that we have been at this for several months, vice the
other situation where we have been at it for 12 years.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Secretary Armitage, welcome again. And I
know the burdens you bear, and I just want to thank you for
giving so much, because I know it is really hard. And you and I
have differences, but we are friends, and that is important to
me.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you.
Senator Boxer. I want to report to you, again, having gone
home again, that the people of my State are very anxious, and
they are anxious about the economy, they are anxious about
Iraq, they are anxious about North Korea, and then the horrible
tragedy where we all saw the faces of the best and the
brightest, and we worry, and we think, God, are we going to see
more of this? And it is a tough time.
I want to go back a little bit to a year ago, when the
President made his very strong, in a way, angry speech about
the ``axis of evil.'' Because I am thinking, as I sit here
today, that that was a mistake, and I want to talk to you about
it.
You know about North Korea's history--isolation, a little
paranoia, mistrustful, and the rest--and you are sitting in
North Korea, and the President of the only superpower in the
world lists three countries, and you are the second one on the
list, and the first one is about to be invaded--and certainly
some of us hope we can avoid this, but it certainly looks that
way--in an attack that probably we have not seen in recent
memory. Now, he is sitting there, and we know he is already
isolated. He has got horrible economic problems and the rest.
And he is thinking, ``I'm probably next.''
Now, he then is trying to escape this, what he considers,
perhaps, inevitable tragedy for his people, as he sees it, and,
of course, himself and his legacy, as he sees it. And so he
turns to this idea of getting the attention of the United
States and trying to avert this situation.
And I am just curious. Before the President put North Korea
into the ``axis of evil,'' did he bring everyone in from the
State Department? Did he say--because, you know, in diplomacy,
everything you say has a reaction. Did he talk about this, what
would be the impact? And, if so, what was the advice, if you
can tell it to us?
Mr. Armitage. Well, I have, in previous testimony, and I am
more than happy to talk about it. But there is one thing that I
think we have to get right on the record crystal-clear, and
that is the development of the HEU facility preceded the ``axis
of evil'' comments by our President. They preceded by a couple
of years. So let us be clear on that. He was cheating on his
agreement with our predecessors before the President ever said
anything about ``axis of evil.''
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Now, on the State of the Union Speech, the way we do it in
this administration is, the top echelons of the Defense
Department and the State Department do see the State of the
Union Speech. Secretary Powell and I sat in his office last
year, had several comments over the State of the Union Speech.
Both of us--I hesitate to tell you--both of us thought ``axis
of evil'' was a fitting comment. And the reason we thought it
was because the states abused--the three named, abused their
own populations, they were implacable foes of the United
States, and implacable foes of allies of ours--South Korea, on
the one hand, and Israel, in the case of Iraq and Iran--and,
finally, that we felt they, all three, were striving, and had
strived, historically, for weapons of mass destruction.
So I hesitate to report to you, but the Secretary and I----
Senator Boxer. That's all right.
Mr. Armitage [continuing]. Just passed right by that one,
and we had other comments.
Senator Boxer. Well, let me just say to you, I am not
arguing whether it is fitting, and I could fit some other
dictators in that list myself. That is not the point I am
making. I am asking if you discussed what reaction there might
have been to it, not that it was fitting. But, in diplomacy,
there are a lot of things we all want to say, and yet, you
know, you have got to think about how it sounds and how people
take it.
But you just felt it was fitting, and you did not really
get into the reaction.
Mr. Armitage. That is exactly correct, Senator.
Senator Boxer. OK, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr.
Secretary. It is good to see you again.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, sir.
Senator Chafee. I am curious about what has changed and
what happened since the optimistic 1994 Agreed Framework. It
seemed as though we were cooperating and there was a thaw in
our relationship. Even in 1999, I believe President Clinton
agreed to lift some sanctions. He said they were ``cheating.''
As we look back, what went wrong? What could we have done
better, as now we see a very difficult situation with nuclear
weapons there and the grave threat of proliferation? As we look
back, what could we have done different? It seemed as though
everything was so optimistic for awhile, even as recently as
1999, as I said, with the lifting of sanctions.
Mr. Armitage. That is a great question. I am not sure I
have a competent answer. I am going to try. First of all, there
are some good things that happened. I think it is quite clear
that, from 1994 to now, Yongbyon, itself, did not produce more
plutonium which could be turned into nuclear weapons. And so
there are dozens of nuclear weapons that North Korea does not
have because of the Framework Agreement. And we have to
acknowledge that, I believe.
I think, equally, as we have looked back--intelligence
hindsight, just like our hindsight, is clear--we find that the
North Koreans were, at least from February 2000, intent on
going to a full-up production program of HEU. And that, as
intelligence keeps looking back, they get more and more
granularity.
I am not sure what we could have done. Look what happened
to the South Koreans, who had, I think, the most well-disposed
leader of South Korea possible in Kim Dae-Jung, who leaned way
forward to try to accommodate Pyongyang and was basically
rebuffed. He did get one summit meeting.
So I think that my view is--and I would defer to my
colleagues on the following panel and Ash Carter, particularly,
who had something really to do with the Framework Agreement--I
think that Kim Jong Il was intent on having it both ways. He
wanted the economic benefits from the 1994 agreement, but he
also was intent in his own pace in developing these weapons.
That is the inescapable conclusion I come to.
Senator Chafee. And then, consequently, as we look ahead,
and assuming we will be negotiating future agreements with
other countries, with the possibility they might be cheating
also, trying to achieve what you just mentioned, both the
economic benefits and what is forbidden by the agreement,
what--you said, in February 2000, I believe was the first sign
of noncompliance. Looking back but also looking ahead, what do
we do when we find cheating? What is the proper pressure to try
and have a cooperative relationship where both sides can
achieve their aims?
Mr. Armitage. Well, in some cases, it is one in which we
simply jawbone and point out the inadvisability of a path that
is being followed. And I would say, in that regard, South
Africa springs to the fore, Brazil too. Taiwan, at one time,
was going to be engaged in a program of nuclear weapons
development, and they eschewed it because of a lot of
conversations that the late Gaston Sieger and others had with
the leadership of Taiwan for their own self-interest.
In other cases, such as ones that the Members of the
Congress are very well aware of, we have been able to retard
the development of these through sanctions and through various
legislation. Pakistan comes to mind in this regard.
So I think it is very much sui generis, and I know how
unsatisfying that is as an answer, but I think it is the case,
sir.
Senator Chafee. And, last, you mentioned some that are
cooperating--Brazil and others. Are there any countries out
there that we fear might be developing nuclear programs that
are hostile?
Mr. Armitage. We are always looking at Libya. I am unaware
right now, that Syria poses a concern in this regard, but we
keep our eye on her, but Libya is one.
Senator Chafee. And any advice on how we deal with that?
What are we doing to prevent a North Korea?
Mr. Armitage. Without trying to wiggle off the hook, I
would request to handle that in classified or closed session,
sir.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chafee.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent
that my opening statement be placed in the record as if read.
The Chairman. So ordered.
Senator Biden. And so I will just briefly refer to it. I
would suggest and highly commend to my colleagues the report
that Secretary Armitage--commend the Armitage report to my
colleagues. And the report--there are some key suggestions that
spark discussion.
``We have to regain the diplomatic initiative. The U.S.
policy toward North Korea has become largely reactive and
predictable, with U.S. diplomacy characterized by a cycle of
North Korean provocation or demand and American response.''
Good idea. But even now the Bush administration claims the ball
is in North Korea's court. North Korea says it is in our court.
From where I sit, the ball is sort of stuck in a net somewhere,
Mr. Secretary.
``A new approach,'' he went on to say, ``must treat the
Agreed Framework as the beginning of a policy toward North
Korea, not as the end of the problem. We should clearly
formulate answers to two key questions. First, what precisely
do we want from North Korea, and what price are we prepared to
pay? Second, are we prepared to take a different course if,
after exhausting all reasonable diplomatic efforts, we conclude
that no worthwhile accord is possible?'' Another great
question. You have answered. I think State has answered. But,
all due respect, I do not think the administration has answered
that question, at least I do not quite know the answer. You
also point out that ``The U.S. point person should be
designated by the President in consultation with congressional
leaders and should report directly to the President,'' another
good idea.
Mr. Kelly is a fine, fine guy, but I do not know that that
has been in consultation with us. I do not know how far that
has gone. And, in no way, Mr. Secretary, am I suggesting that
you are not fully up to the job. But it raises the profile, it
raises the issue here in this body, if, in fact, it has been
one that is more engaged at the front end. I think it is a
point being made by--I hope I am not mischaracterizing, but a
point made by Senator Hagel about this should be a little
higher profile, because we keep--we sound like we are
downplaying it.
I will not go through the rest of the report, but I really,
truly--I agree with what you say in the report. I know there
are--I should not say ``know''--it is my impression that there
is some--not disagreement, but some nuance differences--a word
I know the President does not like when I use it with him,
``nuance''--differences within the administration on how to
proceed.
Which leads me to the essence of my statement, which is
that, as I understand, the chairman indicated that we should be
talking, and talking now, and be prepared to discuss all issues
now, and need to have direct talks. I think he is dead right. I
have shared that view from the outset, enunciated it early on.
And I have a few questions, if my--start the clock ticking
on my 5 minutes now, since I did not make the whole opening
statement.
I am a little--let me just put it this way. How does the
equation change in the minds of the administration, in terms of
moving this from an important issue to a crisis, if it is--
would be moved by it? How does the equation change if North
Korea uncorks that stuff, reprocesses the material, gets the
additional plutonium, and goes from having one or two nuclear
weapons to having six to eight, which is, in the near term, a
capability they posses--how does that--how do we view that?
I mean, obviously, we do not view that as good. It is a bad
idea. But do we view that as materially changing our security
relative to North Korea? If the Lord Almighty came down and sat
in the middle of this room and said, ``Look, they're going to
eight, but that's all they're going to do,'' what is the change
between one to two, and six to eight?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir. First of all, thank you for the
comments on that bipartisan report, which I chaired, and even a
member of your staff participated in. And you will note that--
--
Senator Biden. I think he is the one that recommended I
read it.
Mr. Armitage. I thought he would.
That the basic recommendations in that bipartisan report
were the basis for the so-called ``bold approach'' that
President Bush authorized Assistant Secretary James Kelly to
convey to Pyongyang. And you will note that the so-called
Armitage report is not very far from the excellent job that
Bill Perry and Ash Carter--and they will speak about it more
astutely than I in a few minutes--engaged in, where you gave
North Korea a choice of two branches--one, good things follow;
and the other, bad things follow. He didn't necessarily say
that we were going to war, but that you would face a much more
negative military equation than you face at the present time.
The big change in going from two to eight weapons would be
on the danger of proliferation for the United States.
Senator Biden. Proliferation of the actual weapon.
Mr. Armitage. Of the fissile material, sir.
Senator Biden. The fissile material.
Mr. Armitage. Right now, the 8,000 fuel rods, if they were
reprocessed--if they are taken out of the ponds, if they move
to the reprocessing facility--you can harvest, as I understand
it, 25 to 30 kilos of plutonium, which would be enough for four
to six weapons, which would then add up to your eight. So I
think--in several months.
Senator Biden. All right. Now, so we worry that they would
divert the plutonium to some other source, whether it is a non-
state actor or a state actor, as opposed to putting it in new
nuclear warheads that they would produce.
Mr. Armitage. Let me explain my reasoning on this, Senator.
First of all, the Republic of Korea is already under as much
threat as they can stand, when they have 40 percent of their
population and 60 percent of the GDP under the guns and the
rockets of the forward-deployed army of North Korea. So I do
not think another nuclear weapon or two in that regard
dramatically changes their equation.
Where it's changed, in the first instance, is with Japan,
and this is where our equities are very high, and particularly
if the North Koreans continued to develop their missiles. So
it's the marriage of Taepo Dong capabilities, No Dong
capabilities, extended, where the threat to our allies comes
in, and then laterally. Right now, we know that their Taepo
Dong fired to 3,800 miles or so, based on the 1998 test. And if
that reached our shores, then, of course, the threat goes up to
us dramatically.
But we really are pushing back on the notion of ``crisis,''
not because it has anything to do with Iraq, but because why
tell the other guy he's gotten your attention so much?
Senator Biden. Well, the only reason is if he got your
attention because you are materially disadvantaged by what he
is about to do. But, OK, how--this notion of multilateral/
bilateral, I think we all agree--I may be wrong--that if we can
do this multilaterally, in talking with the North Koreans, it's
a much better way to do it. But, in my discussions with the
Japanese and the South Koreans, they're saying, ``Multilateral
is good, count us in, but don't wait. We recommend you do it
bilaterally.'' Now, am I wrong? Are they not recommending that?
Mr. Armitage. No, they are, indeed, suggesting that. And
our suggestion is not quite that we handle these talks
multilaterally, but we have a multilateral umbrella of any
sort.
Senator Biden. No, I understand that. No, I understand
that. But this is a matter of, maybe, form over substance right
now, and--but you're saying--so everybody understands, because
I do understand it, and the Secretary has been kind enough to
lay it out for me, as well--is that you're just looking for an
umbrella so that we--not ``just''--but looking for an umbrella
where you have the Chinese, the Russians, the South Koreans,
the Japanese, and anyone else, who--and us--who sponsors a
meeting somewhere, whether it's New York or wherever else, and
that that's the rationale for the meeting, but once in the
meeting, you and/or the Secretary or old Kelly back there are
going to sit down with these boys and talk turkey one to one.
Mr. Armitage. I suspect Mr. Kelly has blunted his lance
with the North Koreans for awhile.
Senator Biden. Yes, and----
Mr. Armitage. We might need someone else.
Senator Biden. But, seriously, I understand that's the
rationale. But what--the reason I pressed the first point--I
realize my time is up, and I'll cease, Mr. Chairman--but one of
the reason why I asked the first question about how,
materially, does--do things change, in terms of our flexibility
and our security and our concerns if we go from two to eight,
because that's what we're talking about there. Once they uncork
this, you have, as you point out, x number of kilos of
plutonium that not only can be used to build those weapons, but
also used to export to terrorists, if they were so inclined.
And that's going to happen pretty soon, based on--or it may
very well happen pretty soon, based on some intelligence data
that has been made public, as well as what hasn't been made
public.
And so I--we're not going to have a chance--I won't have a
chance in a second round, because you're going to have to go,
but I really hope we do not let, you know, form impact so
significantly on substance here.
Mr. Armitage. The Secretary told me about your phone
conversation with him over the weekend, sir. He took it very
seriously. We discussed it on Sunday.
Senator Biden. And I appreciate his----
Mr. Armitage. I know he laid out for you our views.
Senator Biden [continuing]. His point of view. Speaking for
myself, not him, there is always the chance that this is a
bluff, that they really aren't going to go forward and, to use
the phrase being used now, ``uncork'' this and that we have
time.
What I wanted to ask, and maybe someone else will, is, What
is the downside? What's the downside for us--for example, us
signing a nonaggression pact, for example? I mean, what is the
downside, if that's one of the demands? You don't have to
answer it now, because my time's up. Maybe someone else will
want to speak to that.
I thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Why don't you proceed to answer the question?
Mr. Armitage. I will try. I mentioned this in S-407. I got
a lot of nods from the Senators who were there assembled. I
said that our estimation was there was a zero chance, under the
present circumstances, of being able to get a treaty of
nonaggression through the U.S. Senate. And the North Koreans
had started out stating they just wanted to document it in some
fashion, a nonaggression pledge, and the Secretary responded
that we would be able to accommodate that. But now they're
saying they want a treaty that is ratified by the U.S.
Congress, and, of course, by the Senate is what they mean. And
it is our estimation today that there's zero chance of that
being possible.
Senator Biden. If the President of the United States said
he wanted it, I'll bet you a million dollars they would change.
But that's up to him.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, it's easy to have a feeling of deja vu today. North
Korea's pursuit of nuclear arms, in clear breach of its international
treaty obligations and bilateral commitments, has brought Pyongyang to
the edge of the same precipice it approached in 1994.
Our challenge is clear: we must stop North Korea from going into
serial production of fissile material and nuclear weapons.
If we do not, we will face many dangers:
The North could become a Plutonium or Uranium factory,
selling fissile material or weapons to the highest bidder. They
have an established track record as one of the world's worst
proliferators already, with customers like Iran, Libya and
Syria.
The North could spark a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia,
with Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan forced to reconsider
their own commitment to remaining non-nuclear states. That, in
turn, could cause China to add to its arsenal, and then India
and Pakistan to do the same.
And of course in the event of a war on the peninsula, we
would confront a much more dangerous enemy, with every nuclear
weapon magnifying the risks.
The threats are real, but our options are few.
Some support a military strike to take out the North's nuclear
facilities. I don't think we should ever rule out force, but in this
case it is hardly an attractive option--it must be a last option. Even
if we could destroy the North's nuclear facilities--and I would note
parenthetically that we don't even know where many of them are--the
risk of sparking a general war on the peninsula would be very real.
And that war would not be characterized by neat explosions viewed
through the gun camera of an F-15 Strike Eagle as broadcast on CNN. It
would be messy and bloody. The North's forward-deployed artillery tubes
can hit Seoul without warning from hardened firing positions.
There are also political obstacles to a military strike. U.S.
allies South Korea and Japan strongly oppose any attempt to use
military force to compel North Korea's nuclear disarmament.
As for sanctions, we don't have many arrows left in that quiver. We
have already cut off the North's access to international loans and to
U.S. technology. Moreover, the North's largest trading partners, China
and South Korea, are opposed to pressure tactics.
Wise handling of this evolving North Korean challenge must
therefore rely on diplomacy.
We must make every effort to convince North Korea's leader Kim
Jong-il that his pursuit of nuclear weapons makes him less secure, not
more secure. We must try to convince him that if North Korea behaves
responsibly, it will find true peace on the Korean Peninsula, and its
people will enjoy the benefits of that peace.
That's going to be a tough sell.
The Bush Administration has basically pursued a policy of malign
neglect of North Korea for the past two years. Its failure to
articulate a clear, consistent Korea policy, its skepticism of
President Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy, and its gratuitous rhetorical
broadsides against Kim Jong-il and the North Korean state, all have
diminished the prospects for a diplomatic solution.
North Korea is responsible for this crisis, but we are responsible
for doing everything we can to find a way out of it. If we fail, all of
us will have to deal with the repercussions, perhaps for generations to
come.
So what should we do? There is still time for the Administration to
adopt the core elements of the North Korea policy drafted by a working
group led by Deputy Secretary Armitage back in 1999. In addition to our
lead witness today, that group included current Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Peter Brookes, and current Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and
Research Carl Ford, among others.
Mr. Secretary, your report called for a policy of hard-headed
engagement developed in close coordination with our allies and backed
by a credible threat of military force--much like the Perry Initiative.
I highly commend the Armitage report to my colleagues who are
struggling, as I am, to figure out how we got into this mess and how we
might still get out of it. Let me quote a few of the reports key
suggestions to spark discussion:
``Regain the diplomatic initiative. U.S. policy toward North
Korea has become largely reactive and predictable, with U.S.
diplomacy characterized by a cycle of North Korean provocation
(or demand) and American response.''
Good idea. But even now the Bush Administration claims the ball is
in North Korea's court. North Korea says it is in our court. From where
I sit, the ball is stuck in the net and somebody better go get it
``A new approach must treat the Agreed Framework as the
beginning of a policy toward North Korea, not as the end of the
problem. It should clearly formulate answers to two key
questions: first, what precisely do we want from North Korea,
and what price are we prepared to pay for it? Second, are we
prepared to take a different course if, after exhausting all
reasonable diplomatic efforts, we conclude that no worthwhile
accord is possible?''
Great questions. But the Administration hasn't answered them yet.
``A U.S. point person should be designated by the President
in consultation with Congressional leaders and should report
directly to the President.''
Another good idea. But President Bush down-graded the special envoy
position and had him report to the Secretary of State, thereby assuring
that we could not gain access to Kim Jong-il--the only man in North
Korea who has the authority to cut a deal.
``Offer Pyongyang clear choices in regard to its future: on
the one hand, economic benefits, security assurances, political
legitimization, on the other, the certainty of enhanced
military deterrence. For the United States and its allies, the
package as a whole means that we are prepared--if Pyongyang
meets our concerns--to accept North Korea as a legitimate
actor, up to and including full normalization of relations.''
Good idea, but the Bush Administration has made clear that it
considers North Korea to be part of an ``Axis of Evil,'' and has all
but ruled out normalizing relations.
``The notion that buying time works in our favor is
increasingly dubious.''
How prophetic this was in 1999! How then, do we explain the
Administration's muted response to the world's worst proliferator
taking concrete steps that could permit it to build a nuclear arsenal?
We can't afford to put this problem on the back burner.
If we do all of these things, will it work? Will the North change
course? I don't know. It's impossible to know for sure until we try.
As we move ahead, I'm very concerned that the Administration has
not done an adequate job communicating critical information to
Congress. Consider what we have learned over the past few days thanks
to the New York Times and The Washington Post--and no thanks, as far as
I can tell, to briefings from the Administration.
On Friday, the Times reported and the Administration confirmed that
the U.S. Government has evidence that North Korea is moving its
stockpile of nuclear fuel rods out of storage, potentially in an effort
to produce additional nuclear weapons. Asked why the Administration had
not revealed this information, unnamed senior administration officials
told the Times it is because the Administration wants to avoid a crisis
atmosphere and avoid distracting international attention from Iraq.
On Saturday, the Post reported that the Administration knew in
November, 2001, that North Korea had begun construction of a uranium
enrichment plant and that key information was coming from Pakistan. Yet
the Administration did not brief Congress or confront North Korea with
this information until nearly a year later.
Our witnesses today have vast experience with the challenge posed
by North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons. I look forward to their
sage advice at this difficult hour.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Secretary Armitage, again, for appearing here and giving us
your perspective.
Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with your remarks
and comments as far as the refugees from North Korea. The
United States is a country that has always been on the side of
people escaping for freedom and finding a way to do it. And I
know the Secretary has personal experience in that regard.
This, Mr. Secretary, is a time of much concern across
America and all around the world. Today we're commemorating the
lives lost on the Columbia and continuing to comfort the
families, and we'll be making strategic decisions regarding
NASA. We're continuing a war on terrorism, in Afghanistan,
specifically. Your office and Secretary Powell are pursuing
action to disarm Saddam Hussein, who clearly does possess
weapons of mass destruction, specifically in the form of
biological and chemical weapons, as well as missile
capabilities, or trying to develop the missile capabilities to
deliver weapons of mass destruction. As well as their
association with terrorism.
Then we focus here in this hearing on North Korea, a
country that clearly has chemical weapons, has biological
weapons, clearly has developed nuclear capabilities as well as
the missile capabilities to hit U.S. interests and those of our
allies.
The point is not that you just focus on one or the other on
all these different things. We don't have to be standing there
without actions. We need to make specific plans that are
specific to the challenge or the danger to our country and our
interests. And I think that you're showing that capacity and
capability, and I know that the Senate has the ability to focus
on more than one crisis or one challenge.
In these tactics or challenges as we face North Korea,
these are not issues of first impression. The 1994 Agreed
Framework negotiations with North Korea, the United States
agreed to finance and supply North Korea with the two light-
water reactors in exchange for internationally monitored
freezes and dismantling of their nuclear infrastructure, as I
understand it. But notably absent from this agreement was any
restriction on North Korea's proliferation activity. And we've
mentioned here that North Korea, seemingly freely--has
transferred ballistic missile technology to belligerent,
dangerous countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya and Yemen. And,
in fact, the Defense Department's January 2001 report or
publication, ``Proliferation Threat and Response,''
characterize North Korea as a major proliferator of ballistic
missiles and related technologies and warned that the sale of
No Dong missile technology to Iran has created an immediate,
serious, and growing capability to target U.S. forces and our
allies in the Middle East.
Now, this clearly is a grave danger to the United States
and our allies. And given our President's commitment to resolve
the current standoff with North Korea through diplomatic means,
will you assure us that the United States will include the
suspension of North Korean missile sales in any negotiated
agreement that it has reached?
And, followup question to that, what are we doing, in
concrete tangible steps, to the extent that you can share that
with us, to make sure that this proliferation of missile
technology and nuclear capabilities is not transferred to
belligerents elsewhere?
Mr. Armitage. Senator, a slight tweak, if I may, on your
opening comments. In the 1994 Agreed Framework, you are correct
that in the opening paragraph, in fact, in the opening
sentence, we commit ourselves and the DPRK commits themselves,
to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the
Korean Peninsula. It does not mention missiles. However, we did
not commit to fund the light-water reactors. We committed to
form a consortium. And South Korea pays approximately 70
percent, Japan pays about 22 percent, and there is an 8 percent
funding gap in the light-water reactors.
We did commit to fund heavy fuel oil, sir, which was
estimated to be what would replace the energy development at
that Yongbyon reactor.
Senator Allen. Nevertheless, we allowed it to go forward,
and we were complicit in it.
Mr. Armitage. Well, I am just trying to lay out the facts
Senator. I do not want to confuse the issue.
Senator Allen. Right.
Mr. Armitage. I mean, whether we fund the light-water
reactors--I think there is some confusion on Capitol Hill about
that--and we don't.
Senator Allen. OK.
Mr. Armitage. And we haven't.
Senator, on the question of missiles, the whole essence of
the so-called bold approach that Mr. Kelly was going to present
not only tried to encompass the remaining nuclear issues and
the missile area, but the conventional area and human rights on
the peninsula. That was the essence of our approach for the
bold approach, to try to wrap them all up. Because, as I
indicated earlier, if you're threatened from a nuclear weapon
or you're threatened from approximately 11,000 tubes of
artillery forward-deployed, you're threatened in the same way.
You're going to die if the bubble goes up. So we wanted to
encapsulate all our concerns with North Korea, and that's what
Jim Kelly was sent to do. And, on the way to Pyongyang, it was
derailed by the revelations about the HEU.
I can assure you that we're not going to try to let that
slip again. I'm not making a criticism of the previous
administration. They went after the nuclear issue, and, as I've
indicated, they made a difference for a number of years in the
weapons that could be available to Pyongyang.
On the proliferation of which I'm aware of, North Korea is
primarily missile. There has been nuclear technology, but it's
primarily missile. We stop it where we can, and they are not
party to the MTCR. We sanction individual companies, which
we've done in North Korea, and to recipients, and we continue,
where possible, to break the linkages between certain countries
and North Korea, whether it's just on Scud missiles or on any
other development. And we can--and I'm happy to provide, in a
classified provision, to the members, a list of, country by
country, where we've done this.
[A classified response was subsequently received.]
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Some members have arrived, some have left, since we began
the hearing. Let me just indicate that Secretary Armitage will
be leaving us at about 11:15. Therefore the Chair, and now with
the concurrence of the ranking member, has declared a 5-minute
question time for each member, and each is being recognized in
order of seniority. I mention that because of, well, fairness
issues and timeliness issues.
And I want to call now on Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, welcome.
Mr. Armitage. Good morning, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. What am I to make of this story in the
Washington Post this morning with the headline, ``U.S. Bombers
Put On Alert For Deployment In Pacific''?
Mr. Armitage. That's a prudent military planning procedure,
and as far as I know, nothing has moved forward. It's an alert
to be available to move forward.
Senator Sarbanes. And what is the event it's designed to
address?
Mr. Armitage. A contingency that North Korea would, in some
fashion, try to take advantage of our focus on Iraq, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. What is the nature of the advantage you
would anticipate they might try to take?
Mr. Armitage. My understanding of this is that Admiral
Fargo has requested this and has not further specified whether
it would be conventional. We think it probably would. But we
have no further information. It's just prudent military
planning.
Senator Sarbanes. This would be a move against South Korea?
Mr. Armitage. If he moved against South Korea.
Senator Sarbanes. Is that what your answer----
Mr. Armitage. Yes, or other interests, like Japan. That's
right.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, what's the view of the South Koreans
on this issue, on the Korean Peninsula and the conduct of North
Korea?
Mr. Armitage. I think, given the fact that they were so
rebuffed recently, that there is some real soul searching going
in Seoul about just how to handle the North Korean situation we
have. The envoy of the President-elect Roh, who met with the
Secretary a few minutes ago, and he met with--he's meeting
with--the Vice President and the Secretary of Defense. And I
can't give you his reaction, but I know the editorial opinion
in Seoul.
Senator Sarbanes. Which is what?
Mr. Armitage. Which has been that South Korea was rebuffed,
and it's an embarrassment to the Republic of Korean Government,
and that North Korea is not playing fair at all after all the
efforts that the previous government and administration had put
forward to try to resolve the North/South issues.
Senator Sarbanes. Have the South Koreans indicated to us
what approach or course they would like to see the United
States follow as we deal with the North Korean situation?
Mr. Armitage. Yes. Generally, they have said they want us
to talk to the North Koreans directly. We have agreed with
them, and it is a question of when we're going to do it and
how.
Senator Sarbanes. And how long have we been agreed on the
notion that we will talk to them?
Mr. Armitage. For at least a month, perhaps more, we have
indicated to the South Koreans that we will talk to them, once
we're sure of our international base. And we are still, as I
answered earlier, sir, trying to not have this become simply a
bilateral issue. There are several nations in the world that
have real interest there, including two great powers, China and
Russia.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, this assurance of the international
base leads me to the next headline that's in this morning's
paper. It says, ``China's Reluctance Irks U.S., Beijing Shows
No Inclination To Intervene in North Korea Crisis.'' What's the
situation there?
Mr. Armitage. Secretary Powell will be meeting with Foreign
Minister Tang of China this afternoon in New York. I think it's
a fair description of their, sort of, schizophrenic approach to
North Korea. They are very unhappy with the possibility of
nuclear developments on the peninsula. They are also, they tell
us, quite aware of the North Korean paranoia, and they treat
things very gingerly.
It's very instructive to look at the Korean war period, and
particularly Chinese assistance to the North Koreans, where
Chinese veterans or Chinese military, the People's Army, in my
view, saved the situation for North Korea, and then the Chinese
were treated just horribly immediately thereafter by the North
Koreans, and it's something that China has never come to grips
with, and they are quite schizophrenic about.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, they are providing considerable
support to North Korea, are they not?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir. It's about half, I think, of their
foreign-aid budget goes to North Korea.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, before my time expires, let me
exhaust the other headline in this morning's paper, ``North
Korea Said To See Opportunity In Iraq Crisis.'' That's the
headline, and it reads, ``North Korea, convinced that the
United States is distracted by the prospect of war with Iraq,
is attempting to convert the situation into an opportunity to
force long-sought negotiations by intensifying its nuclear
weapons standoff with Washington.'' Is that how you see that
situation?
Mr. Armitage. I think that's a fair assumption, and I tried
to refer to in my answer to your question about military alert
orders, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. Would you regard the threat posed by
North Korea as greater than the threat posed by Iraq?
Mr. Armitage. Not at this point, I would not. It was--
potentially, it could be a very serious threat, particularly
the threat of proliferation.
The reason I do not see it in the same regard, Senator
Sarbanes, is because there has been a rough stability on the
peninsula of Korea, for 50 years, as unpleasant as that has
been and as much sacrifice as that has meant in South Korean
coffers and our own, that's quite a dramatically different
situation from Iraq, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. But it must have affected our thinking in
that regard when Ambassador Kelly got in effect, that outright
challenge when he went to North Korea in October, did it not?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, we realized we were dealing with a
problem, a big problem.
Senator Sarbanes. A big problem.
Mr. Armitage. A big problem.
Senator Sarbanes. Would you label it a ``crisis''?
Mr. Armitage. No, I wouldn't, Senator, and I spoke earlier
about that. And the reason I wouldn't label it a ``crisis,'' I
think we have got some time to work this. We have been working
it for several months, not 12 years, like in Iraq. It could
develop into a crisis, but it's not there now.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Alexander. We've been talking about this big
problem, mostly in terms of the direct effect of a North Korean
attack or action against someone else. I'd like to ask you to
help us understand, in a little different context this morning,
the long-term effect of nuclear arms in North Korea on all of
Asia. I mean, some of it, I suppose, is obvious.
What does North Korea have to do to cause Japan to change
its attitude about nuclear weapons, for example? And if Japan
were then to change its attitude about nuclear weapons, most of
us can imagine how the rest of Asia might feel, and then China
would take, possibly, further steps. There would be increased
pressure on the United States in connection with Taiwan. You
mentioned Taiwan a little earlier.
So it seems to me that this big problem that we're talking
about is perhaps not as big a problem as the long-term
possibility of a domino game that would turn into an Asian arms
race. And how are you evaluating that as you think about how to
deal with this big problem?
Mr. Armitage. In 1981, sir, the United States and Japan
decided on a roles-and-missions approach to our bilateral
alliance, and in that roles-and-missions approach, it was the
United States who took responsibility for the nuclear umbrella
over Japan.
And my view is that as long as the United States continues
to provide the nuclear umbrella, Japan will not arm in a
nuclear fashion. If, however, Japan begins to question our
affection or our alliance, then it would lead to the rather
destabilizing situation to which you refer.
I believe that the arms race in North Korea pales next to
the possibility of proliferation, which is our major fear, from
North Korea, that she would pass on fissile material and other
nuclear technology to either transnational actors or to rogue
states.
Senator Alexander. In the same kind of domino-game
connection, we haven't talked this morning about our troops in
South Korea. And how does the big problem in North Korea affect
the long-term planning of the American presence in South Korea?
Because what happens there seems to make more difference in
other countries than it might make in Korea itself.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, Senator, it refers back, I think, to
the, sort of, spike in anti-Americanism that exists. I know
that Secretary Rumsfeld and his colleagues are reviewing our
troop presence, not so much with an idea to moving them out of
South Korea, but perhaps to reconfiguring them and perhaps
moving them out of the capital a bit to, sort of, lower the
profile. But that's a work in progress that will take place
with the Korean Government and with the Government of Japan's
witting accomplice and knowledge.
If I may, I want to take the opportunity to point out that
we often talk about the 37,000 U.S. forces that are in Seoul.
We talk, much less, about the 30,000 businessmen, Americans who
are mainly in Seoul, but not entirely, or the average of 44,000
American tourists. And so, year by year, American visitors to
Seoul, month to month, go from 20,000 to a high of 66,000. So
we are really talking about citizens of the United States in
Seoul of about 120,000 to 140,000 people. So we have got a huge
investment.
And that brings into play what our former colleague,
General Tilelli, calls the ``tyranny of proximity,'' proximity
to the DMZ in the forward-deployed forces.
Senator Alexander. Very quickly, you've mentioned anti-
Americanism. As we look at South Korea and that phenomenon and
Europe in connection with Iraq today, do you see any echoes of
Europe in the early 1980s as we put nuclear-tipped weapons
there and the intense anti-American feeling that seemed to
develop there because of our forwardness in facing a threat?
Mr. Armitage. I think there is a little bit of difference.
I am not sure I am qualified--I am not a Europeanist, but I
know that the more recent reason for the spike in North Korea--
or South Korea, excuse me, sir--has to do with the generational
change, the fact that we had that terrible event where two
young schoolgirls were run over by U.S. military equipment--and
to the South Korean mind, there was not sufficient punishment
meted out in that regard; no one ``took responsibility,'' to
use the Asian phrase--and it also, I think, reflects a
frustration that the South is having in dealing with the North.
And, finally, what I referred to earlier, a country of
almost 50 million people who's got the tenth largest economy in
the world is a little frustrated in having others play, in my
words, ``basketball over their heads,'' making decisions that
really affect them and that they're not fully and totally a
part of, and I indicated we've got to do a better job in that
regard.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Alexander.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank you once again for holding these, what are very important
hearings, and the agenda you're got is a very, very good one.
I'd just like to ask quickly, if I could--the last time we
had before, Mr. Secretary--and I appreciate your being here
today----
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, sir.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. I raised the question of whether
or not we might hear from Secretary Powell prior to his
appearance tomorrow before the United Nations so that we would
at least be aware, and maybe in a closed-door session so as not
to get into the sources-and-methods issues. I wonder, Mr.
Chairman, if you might comment on what the situation is
regarding that briefing?
The Chairman. Well, certainly, those requests, including my
own, were conveyed to the Secretary. A decision was made that
the Secretary will brief the chairman, me, Senator Biden, the
ranking member, our counterparts in the House committee, and
leadership of the Senate, ten Members of the Congress and the
House in all, at 7 o'clock tomorrow morning at the White House
before Secretary Powell flies to the United Nations.
Mr. Armitage. If I may, Mr. Chairman, my understanding is a
little bit different. Mr. Powell is going to New York to meet
with Foreign Minister Tang and Foreign Minister Ivanov today,
and my understanding is the President and Dr. Rice are going to
hold that briefing for the leadership, sir.
The Chairman. Secretary Powell will, in fact, be in New
York, but the President will conduct the briefing?
Mr. Armitage. That is correct. That is my understanding,
sir.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I--let me
just, once again, express that I appreciate the chairman's
efforts, who, as early as last week, indicated he strongly felt
that we should hear from the Secretary prior to the
presentation. And I appreciate the time constraints and the
pressures the administration is under. And my only purpose in
raising the question, as you know, is just that I felt, since
many of us here need to answer questions we're getting
ourselves, that, in addition to briefing world leaders, that
Members of Congress ought to be fully briefed, as well, as to
what facts and information they're going to use to support the
administration's position regarding Iraq. And I will just
express my disappointment that we're not going to have that
chance before the presentation tomorrow. But possibly the
meeting with the President may help, Mr. Chairman, in that
regard in the morning, and I look forward to the briefing from
the Chairs of the committee.
Let me, if I can, quickly turn--I'd just like to pick up on
Senator Sarbanes' point here. The question he raised about how
you prioritize--and this is not just an academic exercise,
because obviously resources and attention are going to be
important. And, again, I'll restate the obvious here, at least
for my part. That is that I think Iraq does pose serious
threats. I've felt that from the very beginning, felt it for a
long time. I don't retreat at all from that position.
But as we try to compare the immediacy of these threats, I
look at Iraq and where it is in its accumulation of weapons of
mass destruction, and I look at where North Korea is, and I see
North Korea, where it's expelled the IAEA inspectors, it's done
all the necessary preparations for a nuclear facility--and
you're nodding your head in agreement with this.
As of this morning, the North Koreans may have already
begun, once again, to reprocess plutonium. The North Koreans
may well be on their way to building additional nuclear weapons
to destabilize the region. We know that they posses nuclear and
chemical weapons. And North Korea has one of the worst records
when it comes to selling ballistic weapons to other
governments.
How do you draw the conclusion--and I, by the way, to the
best of my knowledge, while Iraq may have some of these, or
we've all at least been told that the nuclear arsenal is--
might--may exist, but the ability to deliver is some time away,
and there's no record, that I know of, of them selling. Now, at
least there may be some the Secretary's going to present
tomorrow. But if you start comparing these two records--and I
acknowledge the threat posed by Iraq, and yet nothing like this
or similar to this, with regard to Iraq, has made accusations.
How do you draw the conclusion that the North Korean problem is
not a more serious crisis than Iraq?
Mr. Armitage. For several reasons you may, in fact, and I
suspect you will disagree with. One has to do with how long
we've been working diplomatically to try to resolve the North
Korean situation, months rather than years, as in Iraq. Second,
that although it's been unpleasant, there's been a rough
regional stability with North Korea that has not existed with
Iraq, who has invaded her neighbors twice. Third, we do believe
we have an understanding of what Kim Jong Il is after, and that
is some sort of economic relief and assistance, vice Saddam
Hussein, and we believe that is not at all his motivation; it's
domination, intimidation, and the ability to attack.
On the question of proliferation, you're right. I don't
think that Saddam Hussein has been a major proliferator. Our
fear has been, as we've tried to explain, the nexus of his
weapons, his bloody-mindedness, and terrorists, some of which,
as I indicated last week, Senator, the Secretary will lay out
tomorrow.
But that is not the major presentation of Secretary Powell
tomorrow. His major presentation, as I stated, is to try to
fill in the blanks in why Dr. Blix said what he said, and
denial, deception, and things of that nature.
Senator Dodd. Let me ask this on a--there's a couple of
very specific questions, but let me get the question out, so it
isn't just one question.
The Bush administration undertook a review of the U.S.
policy toward Korea shortly after it assumed office. I'd like
to know, sort of, when that review was completed. And following
that review, didn't the State Department hold out the
possibility of talks with North Korea as early as June of 2001?
The reason I raise that with you, because it was a year-
and-a-half later, almost a year-and-a-half later, when Mr.
Kelly went to North Korea, and I am curious that had the North
Koreans not announced during that visit--and maybe I should ask
Mr. Kelly. I don't know if he's going to be talking here or
not. I've got, sort of, questions for you, but I'm asking Mr.
Armitage.
What if that announcement had not been made in North Korea?
What was the intention of the administration as a result of
your review--why did it take so long, a year-and-a-half almost,
to then go? And then had they not made this announcement--what
was the point of your visit? I mean, you could have found out
the answer to the question of whether or not they were already
going to break these early agreements without having to travel
to North Korea, so I presume the visit in October of last year
had more significance than just merely going to be told
something that we probably were aware of already.
Mr. Armitage. The review of Korea policy was completed in
June 2001, Senator, and, almost immediately, the Secretary of
State indicated that we're ready to sit down and talk with the
North Koreans. It took them, by my recollection, until April
2002 to come forward and say they wanted to meet. Secretary
Powell then met at Brunei with the DPRK Foreign Minister and--
to set the groundwork for Mr. Kelly's subsequent visit.
It was about a month or so in front of Mr. Kelly's visit to
Pyongyang that we got what we felt was incontrovertible
evidence of a production program of highly enriched uranium,
which very much changed his presentation.
Mr. Kelly. I would just add, Senator, that in July--or,
rather, June 29, 2002, there was a naval shootout in the Yellow
Sea to the west of the Korean Peninsula, and so that
interrupted the prospect of talks for a month or a month-and-a-
half, so that most of the period of time between the
President's announcement of June 6, 2001 and when I went to
Pyongyang on October 3, 2002 was because the North Koreans
weren't ready to receive a group.
When I did go in October, it was to both describe the bold
approach that the President had approved, but also to note,
with sadness and in privacy and confidentially, that we knew
that North Korea had this uranium enrichment program going on
covertly and that we hoped that they would find some way to end
it, because this was a very serious impediment to all the
things that we felt that we could begin to do with North Korea.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Armitage, I want to begin by just getting a
little clarity on missile capacity, the ability to launch
ballistic missiles. Could you comment on the current range of
the North Korean's missile technology and what the implications
are for neighboring countries?
And then, second, what's your best thinking right now as to
the next generation of missile and how much additional range
that will give the North Koreans?
Mr. Armitage. There are, in an unclassified session,
primarily three missiles, Scud missiles, which are well known,
and we believe there are approximately 500 in their inventory;
No Dong missiles, which have, we believe, about a 1300-
kilometer range, so you can draw that arc, and that's the
longest-range ballistic missile that North Korea has deployed;
and then there's the Taepo Dong, which is a multiple-staged
ballistic missile that may actually be capable--may be
capable--of reaching some portions of the United States.
Senator Sununu. And I imagine this also causes concern
among the Pacific rim neighbors, whether it's China, Taiwan,
going so far south as Indonesia. And are you equally concerned
about the proliferation of this technology as you are about the
nuclear technology, or is this a genie out of a bottle?
Mr. Armitage. First of all, our major concern in this
regard is Japan, where we have such a heavily invested
relationship across the full range of cultural, political,
economic, and military aspects. But it is--the missiles have
been--the whole problem of missile proliferation has been one
of the major intersections of U.S. policy for successive
administrations, and we've spent a considerable amount of time
trying to subvert, interrupt, stop, and jawbone people out of
these type relationships with North Korea, with varying amounts
of success, sometimes quite successfully.
Senator Sununu. I want to come back to the issue of
proliferation and cooperation on proliferation. But first,
while you underscore that that's our greatest concern right
now, our national security concern here, and I would hope the
concern of other countries in the region, that's what makes it
a multilateral problem. That's what makes it the world's
problem, not just the United States' problem, is the
proliferation of--the nuclear technology, the proliferation of
ballistic missile technology. But from the perspective of those
in the Pacific rim themselves, do you believe they're more
concerned about proliferation, or are they more concerned about
a nuclear weapon changing the strategic profile of neighboring
countries?
Mr. Armitage. Clearly, Japan is more concerned about the
latter, changing the profile. I think the Russian and the
Chinese attitudes are slightly different. The last thing they
want is this paranoid, difficult neighbor which borders them to
be involved in a contretemps with the United States, or, at
worst, some sort of military conflict which might ultimately
end up with U.S. forces 25 or 30 kilometers from their border.
Now, I'm not suggesting that at all, and let me reiterate that
diplomacy is the preferred option, but it's that specter in the
back of the mind, I think, of Chinese and Russian political
leadership types that really bothers them. They're not as
concerned about proliferation.
Senator Sununu. Well, speaking of Russia and China,
specifically, and the issue of the proliferation of ballistic
missile technology, do you believe that those two countries
have truly been helpful in dealing with this area of
proliferation, or to what extent have they provided dual-use
technology to North Korea that's made dealing with ballistic
missile proliferation more difficult?
Mr. Armitage. If I may, Senator, that's, sort of, two
different questions. On the first half, generally, because of
fears of difficulty with the United States, China and Russia
have attempted to be helpful. Dual-use technology, however,
comes from a variety of sources and is not limited at all,
because of the dual-use nature, to Russia and China. There are
many, many countries who have been involved--Germany, for
instance.
Senator Sununu. Have we been successful in placing any
limitations or encouraging our allies to put limitations on the
technology that's provided that might fall into the dual-use
category, either for ballistic missiles or for nuclear?
Mr. Armitage. We have, indeed, when we catch folks involved
in this. And it's primarily a matter of intelligence giving us
information on who's doing this, and then we try, through
diplomatic means, to stop the transaction.
Senator Sununu. So those limitations are already in place--
--
Mr. Armitage. Yes.
Senator Sununu [continuing]. But they're being violated,
you believe, in Germany, they're being violated in Russia----
Mr. Armitage. No, I mean----
Senator Sununu [continuing]. They're being violated by the
Chinese?
Mr. Armitage. Well, our dual-use concerns, I'm saying there
are many, many countries who have been involved in the
provision of dual-use equipment. And, of course, by its very
nature, it can be used for a very benign situation or it can be
used for a less benign. And in some of the cases, we've found,
they're--the end users are listed as a benign end user, but,
indeed, they're subverted and converted to military use.
Senator Sununu. But the question on my mind would be
whether dual-use technologies are being provided in violation
of agreements that we might have with Germany. Germany was the
example that you gave.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, I do not believe so, Senator.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. I would yield to Senator Corzine.
The Chairman. We'll go momentarily to Senator Corzine, then
back to Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. And I
appreciate, Mr. Chairman, this hearing and the Secretary's
testimony.
I want to return to a line of questioning that was asked
earlier about the February 1 ``Nuclear Plans Were Held Secret''
that was in the Washington Post, and I want to restate--re-ask
the question. You are saying the Livermore report was not
delivered to the White House and was not exposed to the
administration?
Mr. Armitage. No, I didn't say anything about the White
House, sir. I said that it was not delivered to me. And my
understanding, after investigating over the last couple of
days, was that the Livermore effort was part of a more general
gathering of intelligence for the Energy Department, and it was
primarily, if not exclusively, limited to the R&D program,
which we and the previous administration had some concerns
about.
Let me hasten to add that I'm not going to hang my hat on
that, because I only know what I know, and that's what I've
found out thus far. And if there's a change in that, I'll
certainly get back to the committee.
Senator Corzine. When we were in the midst of debating the
use-of-force resolution with respect to Iraq, was the
information, as I'm led to believe, with regard to the efforts
to produce--or reprocess spent uranium, was that known? And was
that a concern to the administration in the kind of context
that you talk about, prudent military alert, today on the
Korean Peninsula, in light of the Yemeni's shipment of
missiles, in light of the battle that was spoken about in the
west of the peninsula? Why wasn't that information useful or at
least an important element with respect to our debates on what
our priorities should be?
And since the information was available, I'm concerned and
troubled by not having that as part of the considerations we
take into account when we're facing major issues about
allocation of military resources.
Mr. Armitage. Senator, the information about the production
program of HEU was available in a memo to consumers. It was
briefed, according to what the CIA tells me, to the
Intelligence Committee. I know Jim Kelly--I had some
conversations with some of the members of this committee
immediately after Jim's trip to Pyongyang, and Jim--and I have
met a whole host of contacts he had with members of the staff
of this committee, and others, where--we made it very clear our
view of the status of the HEU production program and what we
had heard in Pyongyang. It was prior to your consideration of
House Joint Resolution 114.
Senator Corzine. That's certainly a limited number, but
not, certainly, all of the Senate, I would presume.
Mr. Armitage. No, I don't believe all the Senate, but it's
quite a full list of staff and members who were briefed either
by me, Mr. Kelly, or others, sir.
Senator Corzine. Could you comment on a statement by, I
believe, Mr. Bolton, with regard to North Korea's chemical and
biological weapons, that they're using utmost efforts to
produce chemical weapons, has one of the most robust offensive
bio-weapons programs on earth, and how we feel about that as a
risk to the United States, since North Korea has shown its
proclivity for proliferation? And how do we compare that with
the risks that are associated with Iraq?
Mr. Armitage. We do believe that they--the North Koreans
have both a robust biological program as well as a chemical
program. We do not have good information about the
weaponization of those programs. We have a real gap in our
knowledge.
North Korea is a signatory to the Biological Weapons
Convention and not to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and I've
just exhausted the sum total of my knowledge of that subject,
sir.
Senator Corzine. I would repeat one of the, sort of,
framing of questions that I mentioned to you last week.
Disarming weapons of mass destruction seems to be one of our
policy objectives in Iraq. Proliferation is one of our policy--
or stopping proliferation is one of our policies that we are
espousing in Iraq. Efficacy of the United Nations in
international agreements under a law is one of those
connections to terrorists. One at least has a reason to
question why the analysis on one doesn't fit with the other and
where our priorities are.
Mr. Armitage. Sir, with all due respect, I think the only
difference we have between the Iraq situation and the North
Korea situation has to do with the nexus of terrorists and
terrorism, where it's much more pronounced in the Iraq
situation than it is in North Korea.
It is true, quite true, that North Korea is on the
terrorist list. And the reason that they're on the terrorist
list is because they have not provided or given up the Red Army
faction who has been hiding in Pyongyang--we have, and the
international community has a lot of questions about that in
the unique and very tragic situation of the abductees from
Japan.
But in terms of the rest of it, I think there's perfect
analogy--indeed, to include the United Nations--because if we
have the IAEA Board meeting on the 12th of February, as it is
scheduled, that Board will then report to the Security Council
their findings. So it's following a very similar track to the
question of Iraq, thus far.
Senator Corzine. Proliferation to Iran, as Senator Allen
spoke about in his question, and Iran's connections with other
terrorist organizations, transnational organizations, certainly
would lead one to infer that there may be greater risks.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir.
Senator Corzine. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, sir.
Senator Rockefeller. It's been posited a bit that the
Korean situation is disturbing, troubling, not necessarily a
crisis. I look at--you look back at what happened in 1994, when
Kim Il Sung--two extraordinary things--one, actually, he turned
to his wife and said, ``What do you think about the MIAs,'' and
she said, ``I think you ought to do it,'' and he said, ``It's
done.'' Now, that was some time ago.
In the meantime, things have gotten a lot worse in Korea,
economically--North Korea--and you know, the reports are that
soldiers coming back from--that are seen by our people, the
South Koreans, may be 100, 115 pounds, kids are half the size
of what they ought to be--and that the system is generally
breaking down. Now, you know, that's been said.
From that, you then have to compare the mind of Kim Il Sung
to Kim Jong Il, and that we can't do very well, because we
don't have, presumably, the assets on the ground to be able to
penetrate that kind of thinking.
I always think it's the better part of wisdom to assume
that he's desperate. Why wouldn't he be? He has the United
States putting him on the ``axis of evil.'' He has pressures
from all around. He has a fading economy. He is in his 60s; he
has a legacy to worry about. He's not in touch with the rest of
the world, watches CNN, video, et cetera, but that really
doesn't help the influence that his military brings upon him.
And so my general approach would be that if--would be to
start out--that it's safest, from the United States' foreign
policy, to start out by assuming that this is a real crisis,
which you said it was. You used the word ``crisis.'' Why not?
In other words, if the fuel rods are moved, and if they're
moved by truck, we won't detect it--who knows where they'll go.
That could be happening as we talk. It could be happening in
the next two or three things.
So, two things. One is, time is not on our side. We may
have a very, very short time window if Kim Jong Il is in a
certain state of mind, he feels threatened, rebuffs the South
Korean Foreign Minister for whatever reason, and, you know, the
Chinese aren't putting a lot of pressure on him, nobody's
putting a lot of pressure on him, such that we are, and he's
got the bomb. Now, that's--Iraq doesn't have the bomb, at least
as--reportedly. And he does. That's all he's got. That's all
he's got for his people. That's all he's got to leverage for
his people, what he desperately has always wanted.
And back in 1994, I think it was about $5 billion coming
from the South Koreans, the Japanese, and the European economic
community; now it's--and coming from the Japanese for previous
wrongdoings, and could be more. The prospect of a treaty with
the United States--I agree with Joe Biden, I think if the
President said this is important, if the American people began
to understand, which I think they could do pretty quickly,
particularly if those fuel rods are moved, the implications are
well understood, that this could develop very, very quickly,
perhaps on the same time track with Iraq, maybe just a little
bit afterwards, but, anyway, very uncomfortably for the United
States, not something to be put off.
So my instinct is always to try to open the box, make the
box larger, not smaller; give more opportunities, not fewer;
take risks of diplomacy, as opposed to, sort of, holding back
and saying we'll just wait, or we won't talk with them, or we
won't talk with them unless they do such and such.
Now, if you held out an agreement, a peace treaty
agreement, with them--you ask them to verifiably stop what they
are doing on a nuclear basis--but they had all of this economic
aid, world approval, a sudden change of their position, the
status that perhaps Kim Jong Il has sought all these years
privately--we don't know. We don't know what's in the mind of
either him or Hussein, in some respects, two of the people that
we know the least about.
Why is it not worth considering, sort of, a grander plan
once again? It might be rejected. On the other hand, in the
offering of it, we gain or we may cause him to think. And he
needs the money, and his people are starving, and that time is
running out for him.
Mr. Armitage. I think it is a very provocative and very
worthwhile question. If I can, however, I want to set the stage
a bit.
First of all, you are absolutely right, we have never seen
what's theoretically impossible; that is, production of Marxist
monarchy which we have here, as Kim Il Sung morphed into Kim
Jong Il. So we're dealing with a creature we haven't had any
experience with.
There is--and you would know from your Intelligence
Committee participation, sir--there's a very interesting
personality profile of Kim Jong Il, and I call it to you and
your colleagues' attention.
Having said that, there is nothing wrong with considering
the bold approach again. But this is not something--first of
all, to set the stage again, when he, Kim Jong Il, was in the
middle of his economic reform package, which he thought,
apparently, was going to reap some benefits for his nation, he
was also developing the HEU at the same time a previous
administration, in perfect good faith, was trying to move
forward with him.
So he is--I don't gainsay that he is desperate right now,
but part of the desperation has been he has failed, he has been
found out. We know what he was up to. He was trying to have it
both ways.
Now, having said--I'd like to set the stage there, at least
for my side--the question of whether to pursue a bold approach
or not again is certainly on the table. It is not something,
however, that an administration could do without setting a lot
of groundwork in motion, not the least of which is up here.
Because at the end of the day, there are real different views
up here about the proper way to move forward, at least as my
telephone logs would show. We get a lot of advice, all of it
well-meaning, all of it sincere, but it's not in one direction
or another.
You've offered a provocative question, which I think is a
good one, and it's not one that the administration is going to
push and dismiss out of hand at all, seeing last year we were
fully ready to have Jim Kelly move forward on just that type of
approach.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.
It is 11:15, and we appreciate very much your time, Mr.
Secretary. Likewise, on Thursday. You were very generous for
over 3\1/2\ hours discussing Iraq. We look forward to your
return.
Mr. Armitage. It's both our duty and an honor to be here,
Senator, and I thank you.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman? Sorry, you go ahead and finish
up.
The Chairman. I would just say, parenthetically, that a
comment has been made about taking the temperature of Capitol
Hill and the Senate and our views, and I think that is
important. Literally, if the thought that our negotiations, in
some way, are inhibited by an informal vote count that the end
result of this might not pass muster, that's a serious issue.
My guess is, listening at least to the 13 colleagues who
have addressed you this morning, that we are very concerned
about the success of diplomacy, and specifically the diplomacy
of our government and strongly backing what you and Secretary
Kelly, others who may be in the field, are attempting to do. So
please stay closely in touch, as I know you always do.
But I just make this comment having at least caught the
drift that perhaps Capitol Hill was an obstacle to this. I
think, for the moment, we are intent upon seeing this as a very
serious, very dangerous problem, without arguing its
equivalence with Iraq or other issues, something that really
has to be seized. And we appreciate your description of how
you're doing that.
Mr. Armitage. May I add--well, I want to correct the
record, but I'd like to try to be a tiny bit more articulate on
this. I agree with you that an informal poll of Capitol Hill
should not inhibit the development of good, sound policy, but I
want to hasten to make it clear that whatever course of action
the administration finally sets upon, it is incumbent upon us
to be very much in lockstep with the majority, and that takes--
with Members of the Congress--and that takes our willingness
and ability to consult rigorously and throughout with you and
your colleagues and on the House side, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
Back in the old days, when I was chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, after a couple of fairly high-profile hearings on
the Supreme Court a practice emerged whereby administrations,
successive administrations, Democrat and Republican, I am told,
would school the prospective nominees on how to appear before a
committee. And they would watch tapes of how the committee,
Judiciary Committee, functioned and witnesses before the
committee, nominees, and how they responded.
I respectfully suggest the administration should put out a
tape of how you respond to questions. It would be a very good
measure for the rest of the administration when they come and
testify.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you much, Senator.
The Chairman. A high compliment, well deserved.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you for you inspiration, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We call now upon our distinguished panel of Ashton Carter,
Stephen Bosworth, and Donald Gregg to come to the witness
table.
Gentlemen, we're very pleased that you are with us today.
Let me introduce this panel more completely. And I will ask you
to testify in the order that I introduce you and to please
limit your initial testimony to 10 minutes, if possible, and
then we'll proceed with questions of our Senate colleagues.
The first to testify will be the Honorable Ashton B.
Carter, who is now co-director of the Preventive Defense
Project. He is former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and
professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard
University in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
And let me just say, as a point of personal privilege, Ash
Carter was instrumental in providing to Sam Nunn and to me and
to other Senators information with regard to Russian nuclear
weapons, weapons of mass destruction, that formed the
foundation for our legislation that has become known as the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and Ash Carter, himself,
helped administrator that program in the Defense Department.
It's a real privilege to have him here before us today.
Our next witness will be the Honorable Stephen Bosworth,
who is now dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at
Tufts University. He is the former United States Ambassador to
the Republic of Korea, and, equally importantly, in my
judgment, our former Ambassador to the Philippines, and was the
instrumental official at the time of the Philippine election of
1986 in working with Secretary Schultz, with the President of
the United States, and with the visiting American delegation
that witnessed that election.
Let me say that our third witness--and he has temporarily
left us, but he will return, I suspect, shortly--is Donald
Gregg, who is president and chairman of the Korea Society. He
is our former United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
and former Security Advisor to Vice President George Bush.
Gentlemen, we welcome you, and we look forward to your
comments.
Secretary Carter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, CO-DIRECTOR, PREVENTIVE
DEFENSE PROJECT, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
PROFESSOR OF SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA
Dr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members. Mr. Chairman,
thank you for those kind words.
I would like to share my recollections of the previous two
crises involving North Korea, 1994, 1998, and some thoughts
about the crisis in which we find ourselves today.
I'm not an expert on North Korea. I'm fond of saying that
there are no real experts on North Korea. There are
specialists, but the specialists don't have much expertise.
My knowledge of North Korea and Korean affairs came in,
sort of, seat-of-the-pants fashion when I was serving as an
Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1994, when, very similarly to
now, North Korea was preparing, at that time, to remove from
the research reactor at Yongbyon, the fuel rods containing five
or six bombs worth of plutonium. The United States was trying
to deal diplomatically with that threat, but we were also, at
that time, considering military options.
The then-Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, ordered the
preparation of a strike plan on Yongbyon, and we prepared a
plan of that sort, which we were very confident would be
successful at destroying the research reactor, entombing the
plutonium at Yongbyon, destroying the reprocessing facilities
and the other facilities there with a strike of conventional
precision air-delivered weapons. We were, in fact, even
confident that we could destroy an operating nuclear reactor of
that kind while it was operating without creating a Chernobyl-
type radiological plume downwind, obviously an important
consideration. Such a strike, had we carried it out, would have
effectively set back North Korea's nuclear program many years.
But while surgical in and of itself, the overall effect of
a strike of that kind would hardly have been surgical. The
likely result of that, or certainly a possible result of it,
would have been the unleashing over the DMZ of North Korea's
antiquated but very large ground force, a barrage of artillery
and missile fire on Seoul and its suburbs.
We and our allies, South Korea and Japan, would very
quickly, in our estimation then, and I believe that's still
true now, within weeks, have destroyed North Korea's military
and destroyed its regime. Of that, we were as confident as we
were confident that we could destroy Yongbyon in the first
place.
But a war there would take place in the crowded suburbs of
Seoul, and the attendant intensity of violence and loss of
life--ours, South Korean, North Korean, combatant,
noncombatant--would have been greater than any the world has
seen since the last Korean war and I think would shock the
world with its violence and intensity.
Fortunately, at that time--now, this is 1994--that war was
averted by the negotiation of the Agreed Framework. Now, the
Agreed Framework was controversial, it remains controversial,
so it's important to know what it did and didn't do.
What it did do was freeze operations at Yongbyon for 8
years, until just a few weeks ago, verified by onsite
inspection. The six bombs worth of plutonium was not extracted
from the fuel rods then, and, for the subsequent 8 years, and
no new plutonium was created in the reactor during that period.
Had the freeze not been operating during that period, North
Korea would have been able to produce enough plutonium for an
additional 50 nuclear weapons.
The Agreed Framework did not eliminate Yongbyon, but froze
it. In later phases of the agreement, Yongbyon was to be
dismantled, but we never got to those phases. Nor could or
should the Agreed Framework be said to have eliminated North
Korea's nuclear weapons program. For one thing, while the
freeze was verified, there was no adequate verification going
on elsewhere in North Korea that there wasn't a Los Alamos-like
laboratory preparing the other wherewithal than fissile
material required to make a nuclear weapon or a hidden--a
uranium enrichment facility, which, as it turns out, there was.
In addition--this was mentioned by Secretary Armitage--way
back in 1989, North Korea extracted plutonium from some fuel
rods. The amount's unknown. It could be as much as two bombs
worth, as Secretary Armitage said. No one outside of North
Korea knows where that plutonium is or how much of it there is.
No technical expert, nobody in the physics community, my
community, would doubt that North Korea has the intellectual
wherewithal to make a bomb or two out of it if it had it. And,
therefore, it could have a starter kit toward a nuclear
arsenal. And, again, later phases of the Agreed Framework
called for North Korea to cough this material up, but we never
reached those later phases.
So from a threat perspective, the Agreed Framework produced
a profoundly important result for our security over 8 years, a
thaw that is disastrously--I mean, a freeze, which is
disastrously thawing as we speak. But it was an incomplete
result, as events 4 years later--that is, 1998--would show. In
that year, North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan.
President Clinton, I think rightly, concluded that the
United States, relieved, I suppose, over the freeze at
Yongbyon, had moved on to other crises, like Bosnia, Haiti, and
so forth. Not so, the North Koreans. And he judged that the
United States had no overall strategy toward North Korea,
toward dealing with this funny place. He asked Secretary of
Defense--former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to conduct an
overall policy review and come up with an overall strategy, and
Bill Perry asked me to be his senior advisor.
We looked--we did exactly what you all would do--we looked
at all of the logical alternatives. One alternative was to
undermine the North Korean regime and try to hasten its
collapse. And we looked at that very carefully. We could not
find evidence of significant internal dissent in this rigid
Stalinist state--however, certainly nothing like Iraq, let
alone Afghanistan--that could provide a U.S. lever for an
undermining strategy.
And then there was the problem of mismatched timetables.
Undermining seemed a long-term prospect, at best; whereas, our
weapons of mass destruction difficulties were near-term.
Finally, our allies would not support such a strategy.
Since an undermining strategy is precisely what North Korea's
leaders fear most, suggesting it is U.S. strategy without a
program to accomplish it seemed to us doubly counterproductive.
Another possibility we looked at was to advise the
President to base his strategy on the prospect of reform in
North Korea. Maybe Kim Jong Il would do in his country what
Deng Xiaoping did in China, open the country up and encourage a
more normal positioning in the international community for
North Korea. One can certainly hope that, but hope's not a
strategy. We needed a strategy. We needed a strategy for the
near term. So we set that aside, as well.
Summing up the first two options, our report, which is
available in unclassified form, stated, and I quote, ``U.S.
policy must deal with the North Korean Government as it is, not
as we might wish it to be.''
Another possibility was buying our objectives with economic
assistance, and our report said that we could not offer, I
quote again, ``North Korea tangible rewards for appropriate
security behavior. Doing so would both transgress principles
the United States' values and open us up to further
blackmail.''
In the end, we recommended that the United States, South
Korea, and Japan all proceed to talk to North Korea, but with a
coordinated message and negotiating strategy. After many trips
to Seoul, Tokyo, and even Beijing to coordinate our approaches,
in May 1999, Bill Perry and I and an interagency group, went to
Pyongyang and presented North Korea with two alternatives.
These are the two paths that Secretary Armitage, who was
working outside of government along the same lines at the same
time, referred to earlier.
On the upward path, North Korea would verifiably eliminate
its nuclear missile programs. And, in return, the United States
would take political steps to relieve its security concerns,
the most important of which was to affirm that we had no
hostile intent toward North Korea. We would also help to
dismantle its weapons facilities. Working with us and through
their own negotiations, South Korea and Japan would expand
their contacts and economic links.
On the downward path, the three allies would resort to all
means of pressure, including those that risked war to achieve
our objectives. We concluded the policy review in the summer of
2000, and I stepped down from my advisory role.
Over the next 2 years, North Korea took some small and
reversible steps on the upward path. Whether it would have
taken further steps on this path is history that will never be
written.
And, finally, Mr. Chairman, and in closing, that brings us
to today's crisis. News reports late last week indicated that
not only is the freeze no longer on at Yongbyon, but North
Korea might be trucking away the fuel rods where they can be
neither inspected nor entombed by an air strike. This is the
disaster we faced in 1994. But as this loose-nukes disaster
unfolds and the options for dealing with it narrow, the world
does nothing.
This is especially ironic as the world prepares to disarm
Iraq of chemical and biological weapons by force, if necessary.
What is going on at Yongbyon as we speak is a huge foreign
policy defeat for the United States and a setback for decades
of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Worse, 17 months after 9/11,
it opens up a prospect of nuclear terrorism.
There are no fewer than five reasons why allowing North
Korea to go nuclear with serial production of weapons is an
unacceptable threat to U.S. security. First, as has been
mentioned, North Korea might sell plutonium. Second, in a
collapse scenario, loose nukes could fall into the hands of
warlords or factions or whomever is around. Now, the half-life
of plutonium 239 is 24,400 years. What's the half-life of the
North Korean regime? Third, even if the bombs remain firmly in
the hands of the North Korean Government, they're a huge
problem. Having nukes might embolden North Korea into thinking
it can scare away South Korea's defenders--us--weakening
deterrence and making war on the Korean Peninsula more likely.
Thus a nuclear North Korea makes war more likely. Fourth, a
nuclear North Korea could cause a domino effect--this was said
also earlier--in East Asia as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan
ask themselves if their non-nuclear status is safe for them.
That's not a question we want them asking themselves or really
that they want to ask--or they wish to have to ask themselves,
but they might have to. And fifth and finally, if North Korea,
one of the poorest and most isolated countries in the world, is
allowed to go nuclear, serious damage could be done to the
global nonproliferation regime. So that's five reasons, any one
of which is riveting.
What should we do at this juncture? Let me sum up with some
suggestions--some factors that the administration might keep in
mind as it attempts, as we tried to do in 1999, to formulate an
overall strategy to head off this disaster.
The first is, of course, that we have to make clear to
North Korea that the concealment or a reprocessing of these
fuel rods poses an unacceptable risk to U.S. security.
The second thing we should bear in mind is that no American
strategy toward the Korean Peninsula can succeed if it's not
shared by our allies, South Korea and Japan. Their national
interests and ours are not identical, but our interests do
overlap strongly. And they can provide vital tools to assist
our strategy, and they can also undercut and undermine our
strategy if they're not persuaded to share it.
Third, the unfreezing of Yongbyon is the most serious,
urgent problem. In comparison to what they might have done back
in 1989 as the starter kit, this moves them to a new plateau of
serial production and a real arsenal. In comparison to the
uranium program, which is a dribbling out of material in the
years ahead, this is a big bang of immediate possession of a
substantial cache of nuclear weapons. So the freezing of
Yongbyon is the most serious problem.
Fourth, President Bush has indicated that he intends to
seek a diplomatic solution to this crisis. It's possible that
North Korea can be persuaded to curb its nuclear ambitions, but
we have to understand it might be determined to press forward.
So whatever we do on the diplomatic front I think we have
to view as an experiment. And in any diplomatic discussion, the
United States must ultimately--our goal must be to obtain the
complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear
program.
Now, there's much debate over what the United States should
be prepared to give in return and an aversion, which I share,
to giving North Korea tangible rewards that its regime can use
for its own ends. But it does seem to me that there are two
things that the United States should easily be prepared to do.
First, I indicated earlier that there's little reason to
have confidence that North Korea will collapse or reform or
transform soon, and little prospect that the United States can
accomplish either result in a timescale required to head off
loose nukes in North Korea.
That being the case, a U.S. decision not to undermine the
regime could be used as a negotiating lever. Much as we object
to its conduct, we can tell the North that we do not plan to go
to war to change it. Only the U.S. can make this pledge, which
is why direct talks are required. We can live in peace, but
that peace will not be possible if North Korea pursues nuclear
weapons. Far from guaranteeing security, building such weapons
will force a confrontation--that's what we need to argue to
them.
We can also argue that since North Korea has enough
conventional firepower to make war a distinctly unpleasant
prospect to us, as I noted earlier, it doesn't need weapons of
mass destruction to safeguard its security. This ``relative
stability''--and I believe that was a phrase the Secretary used
earlier--in turn, if restored, this relative stability on the
Korean Peninsula, can provide the time and conditions for a
relaxation of tension and eventually improved relations if
North Korea transforms its relations with the rest of the
world.
The second thing we should be able to offer is some
assistance, with dismantlement, because at some point, Yongbyon
has to be dismantled, as must the centrifuges for enriching
uranium, the ballistic missiles and their factories, and the
engineering infrastructure that supports them. The United
States can surely suggest to North Korea that we participate in
this process, both to hasten it and to make sure it takes
place. This assistance would be similar to the Nunn-Lugar
Program's historic efforts to prevent loose nukes after the
cold war.
Mr. Chairman and members, let me close with one final
thought. Once nuclear materials are made, either plutonium or
enriched uranium, they are exceedingly difficult to find and
eliminate. These are not visible or highly radioactive
materials. They last for thousands of years. In the case of
uranium, 715 million years is the half-life. There is no secret
about how to fashion them into bombs. They can fall into the
hands of unstable nations or terrorists for whom cold war
deterrence is a dubious shield, indeed.
These facts describe America's and the world's dominant
security problem for the foreseeable future. It's of the utmost
importance to prevent the production of nuclear materials in
the first place. Therefore, the main strategy for dealing with
the threat of nuclear war--weapons must be preventive. And our
most successful prevention program, such as Nunn-Lugar, have
been done in cooperation with other nations, and maybe there's
that possibility with North Korea. But, in exceptional cases,
and maybe that's the case with North Korea, it may be necessary
to resort to the threat of military force to prevent nuclear
threats from emerging.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive
Defense Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University
THREE CRISES WITH NORTH KOREA
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
thank you for inviting me to appear before this Committee to share my
recollections about two previous crises with North Korea, and my
suggestions regarding the current crisis.
1994
I am not an expert on North Korea. I am fond of saying that there
are no real experts on this strange place, only specialists, and they
don't seem to have much expertise. I became acquainted with Korean
affairs in seat-of-the-pants fashion when I was serving as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy in 1994, when
the first of the recent crises over North Korea sprang up.
That spring North Korea was planning to take fuel rods out of its
research reactor at Yongbyon and extract the six or so bombs' worth of
weapons-grade plutonium they contained. The United States was trying to
deal diplomatically with this threat, but in the Pentagon we were also
exploring military options. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
ordered the preparation of a plan to eliminate Yongbyon with an
airstrike of conventional precision weapons. We were very confident
that such a strike would eliminate the reactor and entomb the
plutonium, and would also eliminate the other facilities at Yongbyon
that were part of North Korea's plutonium infrastructure. In
particular, we were confident that we could destroy a nuclear reactor
of this kind while it was operating without causing any Chernobyl-type
radioactive plume to be emitted downwind--obviously an important
consideration. Such a strike would effectively set back North Korea's
nuclear ambitions many years.
While surgical in and of itself, however, such a strike would
hardly be surgical in its overall effect. The result of such an attack
might well have been the unleashing of the antiquated but large North
Korean army over the Demilitarized Zone, and a barrage of artillery and
missile fire into Seoul. The United States, with its South Korean and
Japanese allies, would quickly destroy North Korea's military and
regime--of that we were also quite confident. But the war would take
place in the crowded suburbs of Seoul, with an attendant intensity of
violence and loss of life--American, South and North Korean, combatant
and non-combatant--not seen in U.S. conflicts since the last Korean
War.
Fortunately, that war was averted by the negotiation of the Agreed
Framework. The Agreed Framework was and remains controversial, so it is
important to know what it did and did not do. It froze operations at
Yongbyon for eight years, verified through onsite inspection, until
just a few weeks ago. The six bombs' worth of plutonium was not
extracted from the fuel rods, and no new plutonium was created during
that period. Had the freeze not been operating, North Korea could now
have about fifty bombs' worth of plutonium. It is worth noting that
under the NPT, North Korea is allowed to extract all the plutonium it
wants provided it accounts for the amount to the IAEA. I felt strongly
in 1994 that the United States could not accept an outcome of
negotiations with North Korea that only got them back into the NPT,
still letting them have what would be in effect an inspected bomb
program. Our able negotiator's instructions in fact were to tell the
North Koreans they had to close Yongbyon. If they asked, ``Why can't we
just abide by the NPT and make plutonium, inspected by the IAEA, like
the Japanese do?'' the U.S. replied, ``Because you pose a special
threat to international security.'' So the Agreed Framework went well
beyond the NPT.
The Agreed Framework did not eliminate Yongbyon, but only froze it.
In later phases of the agreement, Yongbyon was to be dismantled. But we
never got to those phases. Nor could, or should, the Agreed Framework
be said to have ``eliminated North Korea's nuclear weapons program.''
For one thing, while the freeze was perfectly verified, there was no
regular verification that elsewhere in North Korea there was not a Los
Alamos-like laboratory designing nuclear weapons, or a hidden uranium
enrichment facility--which North Korea has in fact recently admitted to
having. In addition, way back in 1989 North Korea extracted plutonium
from some fuel rods. The amount is unknown but could have been as much
as one or two bombs' worth. No one outside of North Korea knows where
that plutonium is. No technical expert doubts that North Korea could
make a bomb or maybe two out of it--a ``starter kit'' towards a nuclear
arsenal. Again, later phases of the Agreed Framework called for North
Koreans to cough up this material, but these phases were never reached.
Finally, the Agreed Framework did not stop the development, deployment,
or sale of North Korea's medley of ballistic missiles.
So from a threat perspective, the Agreed Framework produced a
profoundly important result for U.S. security over a period of eight
years--the freeze that is disastrously thawing as we speak. But it was
an incomplete result, as events four years later would show.
1998
In August 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan
and into the Pacific Ocean. The launch produced anxiety in Japan and
the United States and calls for a halt to the implementation of the
Agreed Framework, principally the oil shipments that were supposed to
replace the energy output of the frozen reactor at Yongbyon (in actual
fact the Yongbyon reactor was an experimental model and was not used to
produce power). If we stopped shipping oil, the North Koreans would
unfreeze Yongbyon, and we would be back to the summer of 1994.
President Clinton recognized that the United States, relieved over
the freeze at Yongbyon, had moved on to other crises like Bosnia and
Haiti. Not so the North Koreans. The President judged, correctly in my
view, that the United States had no overall strategy towards the North
Korean problem beyond the Agreed Framework itself. He asked former
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to conduct a policy review, and
Perry asked me to be his Senior Advisor.
We examined several options.
One was to undermine the North Korean regime and hasten its
collapse. However, we could not find evidence of significant internal
dissent in this rigid Stalinist system--certainly nothing like in Iraq,
let alone Afghanistan--that could provide a U.S. lever. Then there was
the problem of mismatched timetables: undermining seemed a long-term
prospect at best, whereas the nuclear and missile problems were near-
term. Finally, our allies would not support such a strategy, and
obviously it could only worsen North Korea's near-term behavior,
prompting provocations and even war. Since an undermining strategy is
precisely what North Korea's leaders fear most, suggesting it is a U.S.
strategy without any program to accomplish it is doubly
counterproductive.
Another possibility was to advise the President to base his
strategy on the prospect of reform in North Korea. Perhaps Kim Jong Il
would take the path of China's Deng Xiaoping, opening up his country
and trying to assume a normal place in international life. But hope is
not a policy. We needed a strategy for the near term.
Summing up the first two options, our report--which is available in
unclassified form \1\--stated, ``U.S. policy must deal with the North
Korean government as it is, not as we might wish it to be.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings
and Recommendations,'' Office of the North Korea Policy Coordinator,
United States Department of State, October 12, 1999. [also available
at: http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&
ctypebook&item--id]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another possibility was buying our objectives with economic
assistance. Our report said the United States would not offer North
Korea ``tangible `rewards' for appropriate security behavior; doing so
would both transgress principles the United States values and open us
up to further blackmail.''
In the end, we recommended that the United States, South Korea, and
Japan all proceed to talk to North Korea, but with a coordinated
message and negotiating strategy.
The verifiable elimination of the nuclear and missile programs was
the paramount objective. Our decision not to undermine the regime could
be used as a negotiating lever: much as we objected to its conduct, we
could tell the North that we did not plan to go to war to change it. We
could live in peace. But that peace would not be possible if North
Korea pursued nuclear weapons. Far from guaranteeing security, building
such weapons would force a confrontation.
We could also argue that since North Korea had enough conventional
firepower to make war a distinctly unpleasant prospect to us, it didn't
need weapons of mass destruction to safeguard its security. This
relative stability, in turn, could provide the time and conditions for
a relaxation of tension and, eventually, improved relations if North
Korea transformed its relations with the rest of the world.
After many trips to Seoul, Tokyo and also Beijing to coordinate our
approaches, in May 1999 we went to Pyongyang. We presented North Korea
with two alternatives.
On the upward path, North Korea would verifiably eliminate its
nuclear and missile programs. In return, the United States would take
political steps to relieve its security concerns--the most important of
which was to affirm that we had no hostile intent toward North Korea.
We would also help it dismantle its weapons facilities. Working with us
and through their own negotiations, South Korea and Japan would expand
their contacts and economic links.
On the downward path, the three allies would resort to all means of
pressure, including those that risked war, to achieve our objectives.
We concluded the policy, review in the summer of 2000, and I
stepped down from my advisory role. Over the next two years, North
Korea took some small steps on the upward path. It agreed to a
moratorium on tests of long-range missiles. It continued the freeze at
Yongbyon. It embarked on talks with South Korea that led to the 2000
summit meeting of the leaders of North and South.
The North also began the process of healing its strained relations
with Japan, making the astonishing admission that it had kidnapped
Japanese citizens in the 1970's and 80's. And it allowed United States
inspectors to visit a mountain that we suspected was a site of further
nuclear-weapons work, a precursor of the intrusive inspections needed
for confident verification. Whether North Korea would have taken
further steps on this path is history that will never be written.
Today
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, that brings us to
today's crisis.
News reports late last week indicated that not only is the freeze
no longer on at Yongbyon, but North Korea is trucking the fuel rods
away where they can neither be inspected nor entombed by an airstrike.
This is the disaster we faced in 1994. But as this loose nukes disaster
unfolds and the options for dealing with it narrow, the world does
nothing. This is especially ironic as the world prepares to disarm Iraq
of chemical and biological weapons, by force if necessary. What is
going on at Yongbyon as we speak is a huge foreign policy defeat for
the United States and a setback for decades of U.S. nonproliferation
policy. Worse, seventeen months after 9/11 it opens up a new prospect
for nuclear terrorism. There are no fewer than five reasons why
allowing North Korea to go nuclear with serial production of weapons is
an unacceptable threat to U.S. security.
First, North Korea might sell plutonium it judges excess to its own
needs to other states or terrorist groups. North Korea has few cash-
generating exports other than ballistic missiles. Now it could add
fissile material or assembled bombs to its shopping catalogue. Loose
nukes are a riveting prospect: While hijacked airlines and anthrax-
dusted letters are a dangerous threat to civilized society, it would
change the way Americans were forced to live if it became an ever-
present possibility that a city could, disappear in a mushroom cloud at
any moment.
Second, in a collapse scenario loose nukes could fall into the
hands of warlords or factions. The half-life of plutonium-239 is 24,400
years. What is the half-life of the North Korean regime?
Third, even if the bombs remain firmly in hands of the North Korean
government they are a huge problem: having nukes might embolden North
Korea into thinking it can scare away South Korea's defenders,
weakening deterrence. Thus a nuclear North Korea makes war on the
Korean peninsula more likely.
Fourth, a nuclear North Korea could cause a domino effect in East
Asia, as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan ask themselves if their non-
nuclear status is safe for them.
Fifth and finally, if North Korea, one of the world's poorest and
most isolated countries, is allowed to go nuclear, serious damage will
be done to the global nonproliferation regime, which is not perfect but
which has made a contribution to keeping all but a handful of nations
from going nuclear.
Therefore, the United States cannot allow North Korea to move to
serial production of nuclear weapons. As the U.S. attempts to formulate
a strategy to head off this disaster, I would suggest that we keep four
factors in mind:
1. No American strategy toward the Korean peninsula can
succeed if it is not shared by our allies, South Korea and
Japan. Their national interests and ours are not identical, but
they overlap strongly. They can provide vital tools to assist
our strategy, or they can undermine our position if they are
not persuaded to share it. Above all, we must stand shoulder-
to-shoulder with them to deter North Korean aggression.
2. The unfreezing of Yongbyon is the most serious urgent
problem. North Korea also reprocesed fuel rods at Yongbyon way
back in 1989. In that period, it obtained a quantity of
plutonium that it did not declare honestly to the IAEA, as it
was required to do. How much is uncertain, but estimates range
as high as two bombs' worth. Whether North Korea has had a bomb
or two for the past fifteen years is not known. But for sure it
is today only a few months away from obtaining six bombs. The
North Koreans might reckon that's enough to sell some and have
some left over to threaten the United States and its allies.
North Korea also admitted last October that it aims to produce
the other metal from which nuclear weapons can be made--
uranium. It will be years, however, before that effort produces
anything like the amount of fissile material now being trucked
from Yongbyon.
3. President Bush has indicated that he intends to seek a
diplomatic solution to this crisis. It is possible that North
Korea can be persuaded to curb its nuclear ambitions, but it
might be determined to press forward. Therefore we need to view
diplomacy as an experiment.
4. In any diplomatic discussion, the United States must
ultimately obtain the complete and verifiable elimination of
North Korea's nuclear program. There is much debate over what
the United States should be prepared to give in return, and an
aversion, which I share, to giving North Korea tangible
rewards, that its regime can use for its own ends. But it would
seem to me that there are two things the United States should
be prepared to do.
First, I earlier indicated that there is little reason to
have confidence that North Korea will collapse or transform
soon, and little prospect that the U.S. can accomplish either
result in the timescale required to head off loose nukes in
North Korea. That being the case, a U.S. decision not to
undermine the regime could be used as a negotiating lever: much
as we object to its conduct, we can tell the North that we do
not plan to go to war to change it. We can live in peace. But
that peace will not be possible if North Korea pursues nuclear
weapons. Far from guaranteeing security, building such weapons
will force a confrontation. As noted above, we can also argue
that since North Korea has enough conventional firepower to
make war a distinctly unpleasant prospect to us, it doesn't
need weapons of mass destruction to safeguard its security.
This relative stability, in turn, can provide the time and
conditions for a relaxation of tension and, eventually,
improved relations if North Korea transforms its relations with
the rest of the world.
Second, at some point Yongbyon must be dismantled, as must
the centrifuges for enriching uranium, the ballistic missiles
and their factories, and the engineering infrastructure that
supports them. The U.S. can surely suggest to North Korea that
we participate in this process, both to hasten it and to make
sure it takes place. This assistance would be similar to the
Nunn-Lugar program's historic efforts to prevent loose nukes
after the Cold War.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, the terrorist attacks of
September 11 make clear that if nuclear weapons are controlled by a
country enmeshed in social and political turmoil, they might end up
commandeered, bought or stolen by terrorists. Who knows what might
happen to North Korea's nuclear weapons as that state struggles to
achieve a transformation, possibly violent, to a more normal and
prosperous nation.
Once nuclear weapons materials are made--either plutonium or
enriched uranium--they are exceedingly difficult to find and eliminate.
They last for thousands of years. There is no secret about how to
fashion them into bombs. They can fall into the hands of unstable
nations or terrorists for whom Cold War deterrence is a dubious shield
indeed. These facts describe America's--and the world's--dominant
security problem for the foreseeable future. It is of the utmost
importance to prevent, the production of nuclear materials in the first
place. Therefore the main strategy for dealing with the threat of
nuclear weapons must be preventive. Our most successful prevention
programs (such as the Nunn-Lugar program) have been done in cooperation
with other nations, but in exceptional cases it may be necessary to
resort to the threat of military force to prevent nuclear threats from
maturing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Carter, for that
very important testimony.
I understand that the witnesses have conferred and that
Ambassador Gregg should proceed at this point. And so I
recognize you, Ambassador. We're delighted that you are here
with us.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD P. GREGG, PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN OF
THE KOREA SOCIETY, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, FORMER SECURITY ADVISOR TO VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH,
NEW YORK, NY
Ambassador Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have submitted testimony, which I assume will be in the
record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record in full.
Ambassador Gregg. I listened with great interest to the
questions directed at Secretary Armitage, and I very much agree
with you, Senator Biden, that he's a terrific witness.
I wanted to address a question that Senator Chafee asked.
He's no longer here, but he said, ``What went wrong after
1994?'' And I may have a somewhat unusual perspective on that
since I went to North Korea twice last year, spent about 20
hours talking with both military and political leaders, and I
have some sense of what's on their minds.
First of all, I would say that I think, although Kim Jong
Il is in control, he has to work at that, and he works at it by
his military-first policy. I think his hope to eventually
develop North Korea into a more normal state is very much under
suspicion on the part of his military and the hardline
Communist/Marxist leaders.
The North Koreans were full of questions in April, when I
first went. ``Why is George Bush so different from his father?
Why does George Bush dislike Bill Clinton so much? Why does
this administration use such harsh rhetoric in describing us?''
Senator Biden. Are you going to tell us the answers?
I'm curious what you said.
Ambassador Gregg. Well, I had one rule in the talks, and
that was that I would not criticize my President any more than
I would expect them to criticize their chairman.
So my answer to the first question was, George W. Bush is a
Texan, and his father was a New Englander. And my answer to the
second question is that, George Bush doesn't like Bill Clinton
because Bill Clinton defeated his father in 1992, and how would
Kim Jong Il feel about somebody who had done something similar
to that to his father?
Why is the rhetoric so harsh? We're at war. We are very
angry. We have seen horrible things happen in our cities. And
that was really the reason that I wrote a letter to the
chairman and said, ``It's imperative that our two countries
talk.''
My take on what I heard from them is that, from their
signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework, they had hoped that this
would be the start of a new era, but that with the election
results of 1994, where there was a change in the leadership in
at least--I've forgotten, was it both in the House and the
Senate or both?
Senator Biden. I haven't forgotten.
The Chairman. Substantial.
Senator Biden. Substantial change.
Ambassador Gregg. There was a great deal of skepticism
voiced about the Agreed Framework by the newly ascendant
Republican leadership and some of the ancillary agreements
designed to improve the overall relationship between North and
South--North Korea and the United States were not--were not
followed up.
The terrific work that Dr. Carter and Secretary Powell did
in 1998 headed off a second crisis, and things progressed very
rapidly when North Korea sent Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to
Washington. He was invited to the White House. He went there in
uniform, which was quite a sight. He invited President Clinton
to visit North Korea, and President Clinton sent Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright to check that out.
She came back, invited about 30 Korean specialists to
dinner, and said, ``What do you think? Should President Clinton
go?'' Two of the members there said, ``No, under no
circumstances.'' About three said, ``Yes, you should, under any
circumstance.'' The rest of us were spread out in the misty
flats saying, ``Only go if certain things are settled.''
Well, President Clinton almost went. And I was approached
by his senior North Korean policy advisor in December 2000, who
asked my advice on that. And I said, ``Well, I won't give
advice, but I'll certainly listen to where you are.''
I said, ``Do you have a missile deal?'' And she said,
``Almost.'' She said, ``There were two or three very key
questions that we are trying to get out of the North Koreans in
Kuala Lumpur, but we can't get them to answer. We think they
know the answer, but they won't answer.''
I said, ``I think what Kim Jong Il is doing is holding
those in reserve to give as presents to President Clinton if he
goes.'' And the question, then, ``Does the American President
go hat in hand to North Korea with the hope and expectation
that he will get a missile deal?'' And I said, ``That's his
choice.'' And in the end, he decided that he would not go.
I think that the North Koreans had every expectation,
because their overt behavior had not changed in any way, that
there would be more continuity between Clinton and the incoming
Bush administration than there was. Kim Dae-Jung came to
Washington, I think in March 2001, had a very bad meeting, was
told that a policy review was going to be undertaken.
That was completed in June. The agenda from the policy
review had changed. It was a much more difficult one for the
North Koreans to come to grips with. Then came 9/11, which
changed the world. And then came the State of the Union speech
with the ``axis of evil'' rhetoric.
After that, Jim Kelly prepared a bold approach. That was
delayed by the sea skirmish between North and South Korea in
the western Yellow Sea in June. And then we learned of the
secret North Korean uranium enrichment program with the
Pakistanis. And there were those in the administration who
insisted that that be the No. 1 issue on Kelly's agenda when he
went to North Korea. So here were the North Koreans, who had
hoped for the start of a dialog, and all they got was
confrontation.
I'd like to say a word about the Pakistani connection. They
have had a long and intimate association with the Pakistanis.
They have dealt with Pakistani nuclear scientists and
technicians, and I think, from those men, they have gathered
the sense of security which Pakistan thinks it has accrued to
itself by acquiring nuclear weapons. And I think that that has
had a seductive impact on certain aspects of the North Korean
regime.
And so here we are. The hardest thing for me to explain is
why they cheated on the Agreed Framework. And the best answer I
can come up with is that they have not heard much support for
the Agreed Framework from the administration. Some of its
ancillary stipulations were not implemented. And the body
language from this administration was very tough.
I think they correctly assessed President Bush as a very
effective, tough wartime leader. I think they expect the war
with Iraq, if it comes, to be short. And I think that they have
a heavy expectation that they are next. And I think that that
accounts for their drive toward nuclear weapons.
Can it be stopped? Don Oberdorfer, who accompanied me on my
second trip, in November, is doubtful that it can be. I am more
optimistic, because on two occasions I have seen last-minute
interventions--the first by Jimmy Carter in 1994, which turned
around a very dangerous situation; and the second, the
intervention by Ash Carter and Bill Perry.
I think the North Koreans want a security guarantee from
the United States. They know that only we can give it, and that
is why they are insisting on talks with us. And I was very
relieved to hear that Secretary Armitage says these talks will
take place.
A word on South Korea. The South Koreans are, sort of, in
shock at looking at who have they elected for President. And as
Armitage said, it was a generational shift. Younger South
Koreans have forgotten that they are suppose to be eternally
grateful to us for 1950 and are more interested in their
relations with North Korea than they are in maintaining
relations with the United States which they feel have gone
stale.
Why do they feel that? I think they feel that, because
although we have absolutely legitimate global concerns about
proliferation, we have not been accurate in calibrating how
those concerns impact in a regional context. And the South
Koreans have heard much more about U.S. policy toward Asia from
proliferation specialists, who know a great deal about
proliferation, but know zero about Asia. They have seen far
less of Mr. Kelly than they should have, and far more of other
officials, who I think have not advanced our regional concerns.
So I still am somewhat optimistic. I think the meeting
between President Bush and the newly elected President Roh is a
very important one. I think the South Koreans very much want to
have our troops remain. I think they very much want to have us
perceived as being in favor of reconciliation on the Korean
Peninsula, and they have lost their clarity on that issue. So I
think if we are somehow able to reassure them that we are
interested in reconciliation, that we are not set on regime
change in the north, they will be very much reassured.
It's very difficult to sit here making any kind of a case
for Kim Jong Il. Those of you who saw 60 Minutes two nights ago
or saw the Newsweek cover 2 weeks ago, called Dr. Evil, I sort
of, feel almost like a Quisling in saying we ought to deal with
this guy. And yet I think that is our best option, and that, I
think, is the unanimous view of North Korea's neighbors, and I
think we ought to take that very seriously.
Thank you very much, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gregg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amb. Donald P. Gregg, President and Chairman of
the Korea Society, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea,
Former Security Advisor to Vice President George Bush
There is a ``perfect storm'' brewing near the Korean Peninsula--it
is not a typhoon but a political-military upheaval that is threatening
to turn a 50-year-old relationship with South Korea on its head, and to
bring about a radical change in the balance of military power in the
region through North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons.
In South Korea, where a presidential election was held in late
December 2002, the candidacy of Roh Moo Hyun was supported decisively
by younger voters who clearly showed that their top priority was the
improvement of relations with North Korea, not the maintenance of
longstanding ties to the U.S., which over the past several years have
seemed to grow stale. The over-fifty set who preponderantly voted for
Lee Hoi Chang are deeply upset by his defeat in this pivotal election,
but the broad outlines of the policies enunciated by the president-
elect are unlikely to be reversed.
I have never met president-elect Roh, but from what I hear he has a
natural instinct for politics that makes him acutely sensitive to the
changing dynamic on the Korean Peninsula. He is already positioning
himself to be taken seriously when he makes his first trip to the
United States following his inauguration later this month, and I feel
confident that the Bush administration understands the importance of
this visit and will treat him with all due courtesy. At the same time,
there is no gainsaying the fact that there are significant underlying
differences in perspective and strategy related to North Korea policy
between the Bush administration and the incoming Roh administration.
These differences will not be easily bridged without a concerted effort
by both sides to accommodate each other's views.
The challenge posed by North Korea is both very complex and highly
dangerous. North Korea has always been a very difficult intelligence
target, and our knowledge and understanding of the actions and
motivations of its leaders are seriously deficient. What we do know is
that they are deeply committed to their own world view and strongly
resistant to the countervailing world views of outsiders--including
those of their most immediate neighbors in the region. They also are
notoriously tough negotiators who seem almost to relish taking a
dangerous issue right to the brink.
I visited North Korea twice in 2002. My first visit took place in
early April after I had written directly to Chairman Kim Jong Il,
saying that in the wake of 9/11 the U.S. government's heightened
concerns about North Korea's weapons of mass destruction needed to be
discussed frankly to avoid the eruption of dangerous misunderstandings
between Pyongyang and Washington. During that visit I had about ten
hours of discussions with a vice minister of foreign affairs and a very
tough three star general posted along the DMZ. In the course of those
discussions, I formed a distinct impression that the general's world
view was notably different from that of the vice minister, which raises
at least the possibility of something less than a monolithic point of
view among the leadership of North Korea.
The North Koreans were full of questions, mostly about President
Bush. Why is he so different from his father? Why does he hate
President Clinton? Why does he use such insulting rhetoric to describe
our country and our leaders?
The general, in particular, was very cynical about the U.S. He
showed little trust in dialogue, and was harsh in his criticism of our
implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Still, at the end of our
meeting he thanked me for coming such a long way, and said our talks
had been, in part, beneficial.
The vice minister bemoaned the lack of high-level talks with the
U.S., such as had been held at the end of the Clinton administration.
He expressed regret that President Clinton had not visited Pyongyang,
asserting that a visit at that level would have solved many difficult
issues. He said to me: ``You and I cannot solve the problems between
our countries. Talks have to be held at a much higher level.''
Upon my return to Washington, I strongly recommended that a high-
level envoy carrying a presidential letter be sent to Pyongyang to get
a dialogue started. A Korean-speaking foreign service officer had
accompanied me, and was most helpful in assuring that information from
our visit was disseminated within the governmemt.
Later, on October 3, I received a written invitation to return to
Pyongyang. The invitation also indicated that the North Koreans had
accepted my suggestion, made in April, that the USS Pueblo be returned
as a good will gesture to the American people. The Pueblo was seized by
the North Koreans in 1968, and had been converted into a sort of anti-
American museum, moored along the bank of the Taedong River in
Pyongyang.
From mid to late October, the U.S. government released information
on Assistant Secretary of State Kelly's visit to Pyongyang that had
taken place in early October. The visit had not gone well from the
North Korean point of view as Kelly had confronted them about the
development of a secret highly enriched uranium program using equipment
acquired from Pakistan. I thought that this might mean that my visit
would be cancelled, but it held firm and I went into Pyongyang in early
November accompanied by the historian Don Oberdorfer, and Fred
Carriere, vice president of The Korea Society, who is proficient in
Korean.
Our opening meetings were with the same two officials. Both men
were deeply chagrined that the Kelly visit had been little more than a
confrontation, but seemed upbeat about the improvements in their
relations with South Korea and Russia. The general spoke effusively
about ``cutting down fifty year old trees'' in the DMZ to facilitate a
restoration of North-South rail connections, and said he was developing
amicable relations with his South Korean counterparts. The vice
minister told me that the return of the Pueblo was ``off the table.'' I
went down to the river to see it. It had been moved. An old man who was
exercising on the bank at the spot where the Pueblo had been moored
told us that it had been moved to Nampo for ``repairs.''
In all of our conversations, we made the point that the highly
enriched uranium program was a violation of several agreements North
Korea had signed with both South Korea and the U.S. When we asked the
general ``when and why'' the program had been started, he blandly
responded: ``I am not required to answer that kind of question.''
In our meetings with the vice minister, we stressed the need for
North Korea to stop its HEU program, which was of great concern to the
U.S. and to all of North Korea's neighbors. We were told that ``all of
the U.S.'s nuclear concerns will be cleared if the U.S. agrees to sign
a nonaggression pact, shows respect for our sovereignty and promises
not to hinder our economic development.''
Toward the end of our visit we also met with First Deputy Foreign
Minister Kang Sok Ju, who is probably Kim Jong Il's closest foreign
policy advisor. Minister Kang said that Chairman Kim had referred
positively to President Bush's statement in South Korea that the U.S.
has no intention of attacking North Korea, and urged that the United
States respond boldly to North Korea's requests as stipulated in our
previous discussion with the vice minister.
Don Oberdorfer and I reported directly to the White House upon our
arrival in the U.S. a few days later, after a brief stopover in Seoul.
We urged that a positive dialogue with North Korea be started. In
response, we were told only that initiating a dialogue would serve only
to ``reward bad behavior'' on the part of the North Koreans. On
November 15, the U.S. and its KEDO allies announced a cut-off of future
oil shipments to North Korea. North Korea was quick to respond by
evicting IAEA inspectors, shutting off surveillance cameras, announcing
its withdrawal from the NPT and making a number of other moves
suggesting that they may have decided to develop a nuclear weapons
capacity--most notably, the recent indications of a possible movement
of spent fuel rods from the containment pond at Yongbyon.
Why has this happened? I believe it is because the North Koreans
take seriously the harsh rhetoric applied to them by many prominent
Americans, including leading members of the Republican Party since the
congressional elections of 1994 and the Bush administration since 2000.
From their long association with Pakistani nuclear scientists and
technicians, the North Koreans have most probably observed the sense of
security that Pakistan derives from its nuclear weapons. In addition,
the North Koreans appear to perceive President Bush as a tough and
effective war leader, and probably assume that the Iraq war will be
short, leaving North Korea next in line for military action.
Can this North Korean lunge for nuclear weapons be stopped? Some
experts think it is too late. I am not quite so pessimistic. Less than
ninety days ago, the North Koreans wanted to talk. Today we are in the
bizarre position of saying ``we're not going to attack you, but we
won't negotiate with you.'' This gives North Korea no incentive to do
anything but proceed to build a nuclear weapons capacity.
The ``perfect storm'' I mentioned at the beginning of this
testimony may destroy the balance of power in Northeast Asia, or it may
escalate rapidly to a point of real danger as it did in 1994. I still
believe that it may be turned aside by the establishment of meaningful
dialogue with North Korea. We'll never know what might have been
avoided, unless we talk. In my view, it would be a miscalculation of
unprecedented proportions if we failed to pursue the only viable option
to change the course of a morally repugnant regime, and avoid a
catastrophe on the Korean Peninsula, solely out of an understandable
but ultimately shortsighted refusal to ``reward had behavior.''
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Gregg,
and I express, I am sure, the feeling of all the members of my
committee to you and your colleagues at the table that you have
been important friends of the South Koreans and, likewise,
important interlocutors with the North. And we appreciate the
wisdom from those experiences you've just told so well.
Ambassador Bosworth.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH, DEAN OF THE FLETCHER
SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY, FORMER U.S.
AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, MEDFORD, MA
Ambassador Bosworth. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, it is a pleasure to be here with the
committee. I look forward to having the opportunity, perhaps,
to respond to some of your questions.
I just, for the purpose of the record, I would note that,
in addition to my service in Korea as Ambassador, I was also
the first executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization, the body that was charged, for better
or for worse, with building light-water reactors in North
Korea, and I served in that position from 1995 to 1997, during
which time I had extensive contacts with North Korean
negotiators and learned how difficult they can be, which
tempers any remarks I might make here this morning.
This is an extraordinarily difficult problem. It has
bedeviled successive American administrations. And I think it
would be unfair for anyone to sit here before this committee
and say, ``Well, there is a simple solution to this,'' an
easily identifiable formula through which can deal with this
extraordinary complex of very tough and dangerous issues.
I am going to make just a few brief points about North
Korea, what might be its motivation, and then comment briefly
on South Korea and the U.S./South Korean relationship.
First of all, I think the best way to think about North
Korea and what it is doing is to bear very much in mind that
every act it takes has a connection to its desire to survive as
a regime. It has no friends. It, in its view, has no meaningful
connection with countries around it, nothing that it is not
willing to sacrifice, and it has no shame, nor any guilt. Its
only objective is regime survival.
Now, that means, on the one hand, that it is
extraordinarily desirous of economic assistance to take account
of the fact that its economy is not just collapsing; its
economy has collapsed. Industrial production is 20 to 30
percent of what it was 10 years ago. Energy output has fallen
by a similar measure. We know they cannot feed their
population. This is a country whose economy has collapsed.
However, at the same time, I think we should not
underestimate the extent to which a desire for a peculiar form
of international respect also motivates North Korea. And there
is, difficult as it may be for us to understand or, certainly,
to explain, a sense in North Korea that they want to be
respected. They want to be taken seriously by the outside
world. And I suspect that, to some extent, the nuclear program
is designed to ensure that they are taken seriously in one
measure or another.
I do not know what North Korea's goal is with regard to its
nuclear program. I have been of the view for some time, even
when the Agreed Framework was still in place, before we knew,
certainly, about the enriched uranium program--many of us had
suspected that North Korea had retained some vestige of a
nuclear-related program, if only as part of a hedging strategy.
And when the HEU program was first unveiled, that was my
assumption, that it was--we had found their hedge.
They have subsequently, of course, taken this step-by-step
process of breaking out of the Agreed Framework, and they are
now reactivating their plutonium program, which, as Dr. Carter
has pointed out, is a much more threatening activity, because
it is much more imminent.
But I do not know whether they really want to become a
nuclear power. Do they see that now as the key to their
regime's survival? Or is it possible that they still consider
this nuclear program, the Yongbyon program, as they did in
1994, something that they are willing to bargain away? The only
way we will know that is to talk to them and test it.
In dealing with North Korea, as has been said here, it is
absolutely essential that we do so in lockstep with the
Republic of Korea. We must have a common strategy, and we must
have an agreed allocation of responsibility in terms of how we
deal with North Korea in the negotiating, both through a mix of
carrots and sticks. Many of the carrots can only come from
South Korea. And, at the same time, many of the sticks must
come from South Korea in the form of withdrawn carrots, if you
will.
South Korea now has established a position of some economic
leverage over the North. And unless South Korea is willing to
put that out on the table, our effectiveness in dealing with
the North Korean regime is going to be very limited, indeed.
Now, what is the problem with South Korea? I think,
basically, the problem with South Korea is, first,
generational. Yes, it is true, as Ambassador Gregg has said and
others have said today, that those South Koreans under the age
of 50 have no acute memory of--firsthand memory of the Korean
war, and their sense of gratitude to the United States has
perhaps eroded a bit.
Moreover, I think there is no question that a large number
of South Koreans perceive that this administration has been
employing what they term politely a hard-line policy toward
North Korean. And that bothers them, because they see that as
being diametrically opposed to the efforts of their own
government, the ones still serving and the one they have just
elected, to pursue a policy of reconciliation toward North
Korea.
So they have come to view--some, and some have told me this
explicitly--come to view the United States no longer as just
part of the solution, but as, indeed, part of the problem. And
I think that is a matter that requires urgent consultation to
resolve.
There is also, I think, an asymmetry in terms of South
Korea's assessment of the threat and the risks of dealing with
that threat, as compared with our assessment of the
relationship between the threat and the risks of dealing with
it.
For us, the threat of North Korea as a nuclear power is a
global concern. It has to do with other states. It has to do
with non-state actors. It is, in some ways, the only
perceptible threat to American national security--not just from
North Korea, but weapons of mass destruction in the hands of
people who would threaten their use--is really the only, last
threat to American national security. So we are willing to pay
a very high price to ensure that that threat does not grow.
Indeed, the discussion of coercive diplomacy that some have
engaged in is simply a euphemism for saying, ``Yeah, we're
willing to use military force if absolutely necessary.''
For South Korea, the threat it not a global threat, and
many South Koreans do not perceive that their security would be
severely worsened by North Korea's development of nuclear
weapons. Yet they accurately perceive that an effort to deal
with that threat that went beyond diplomacy would impose a very
heavy burden on them. So they accept or incur what, from their
point of view, is an unacceptable level of risk in trying to
combat a threat, which they see also as a threat, but they do
not see it in the same way that we do. And we see the risk as
involving essentially the Korean Peninsula and northeast Asia.
So I think that it is essential that the administration,
that this government, reinforce its efforts to try to come to
grips with and tackle the differences between ourselves and the
Republic of Korea.
I am convinced that the new administration in South Korea
very much wants a stable, good relationship with the United
States. I think they are eager to begin a process of close
consultation with the objective of doing in 2003 what we did in
1998 in the exercise that Bill Perry led, and that is come to a
common assessment of the facts, come to an agreement on what a
desirable strategy would be for dealing with those facts, and
then allocate responsibilities between the two of us and with
other countries in the region.
But in order for that to happen, the United States, I
believe, has to move very quickly to engage directly with North
Korea. Yes, it is very desirable to have a multilateral
framework within which those bilateral contacts take place, but
there is no substitute in the current constellation of forces
in northeast Asia, nor, indeed, in the one that is likely to be
present in the future, for direct, active leadership by the
United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Bosworth.
Let me commence my line of questioning by indicating that
we welcome the special envoy of the incoming President of South
Korea, who is here visiting with Secretary Powell this morning,
even as we speak. It will be my privilege to see him this
afternoon, and I look forward to that opportunity. He will be
seeing other Senators, I am certain.
And in those conversations, I hope that we will be able to
convey to the incoming President, as well to the outgoing
President, that we are good listeners, we are partners, and we
are strong allies, but, likewise, try to discover, as all three
of you tried to illuminate, what has gone wrong in the
relationship, because it is extremely important that
relationship be made stronger and very, very promptly, in terms
of the interests of our two countries as well as others who are
counting upon us, the South Korean responsibility being that
which you have talked about, and ours, likewise.
I think the chairman and I and others today have tried to
emphasize our feeling that direct talks between North Korea and
the United States are important and urgent. And Secretary
Armitage pointed out that we have been waiting for the new
administration to come in, to get its feel of the situation,
and so forth. But as Secretary Carter pointed out, while that
wait proceeds, so may the nuclear proliferation threat which he
has described so accurately and which he has been describing
for the last decade, really, with very specific detail. That
may get beyond the point of control by either South Korea, the
United States, or our friends who are involved. So there is a
special urgency here.
My question, I suppose, to the three of you is, if you were
visiting, and you may, with the special envoy, how are we able
to make the point to the South Korean administrations, present
and future, that the urgency of hearing about trucks going
along the road, about the potential lifting of rods, the
building of weapons even as we think about this, why is that
that important?
As you have pointed out, Ambassador Bosworth, the South
Koreans could calculate that a North Korea with nuclear weapons
is certainly not a good thing, but, on the other hand, all
things considered, that our feelings, the United States'
feelings, about our security, weapons of mass destruction, the
intersection with terrorists, is our situation, and they may
sympathize with that, but they are not really clear that is all
that big of a deal as far as they are concerned.
I do not depreciate that, but I would suggest that we have
two different timetables going on here, I think. Those of us
who are genuinely worried, and I hope all of us are, about
weapons of mass destruction, or materials that bring about
those weapons falling in to the hands of terrorists of other
regimes, of trades and transactions, that this is our national
security, this is the ball game. Now, that is proceeding, even
day by day, and yet it seems to me, in terms of our diplomatic
strategy, the timetable is much less precise, and, as a matter
of fact, does not exist at all, except stability for the new
regime in South Korea. We hope somehow the Chinese come to a
different point of view, the Russians might be more helpful,
ditto for the Japanese, everybody, with the North Koreans, it
seems to me, precisely rebuffing each of these entrees,
indicating, ``We're not interested in you. We're interested in
the United States.'' That is the talk we want to have.
How do we get this together with the South Koreans quickly,
because for us to proceed in these direct talks, as all of us
are advising, we run the dangers still of perhaps not having
the sensitivity we need toward the South Korean viewpoint,
which may be distinctly different, or falling through the
transition of the administrations, or various other things.
And, as you pointed out, Ambassador Bosworth, from your own
experience with these negotiators from North Korea, it is very
discouraging.
It is all well and good for us to talk about having talks.
I have not had nearly so many with difficult people in the
world as the three of you have had, but we have talked to a lot
of very difficult people, dangerous people, people that are not
good people, people that are evil. And we have talked to all
these people because we thought, conceivably, something good
for the United States and the world might come from that.
Can you offer some more enlightenment, any of the three of
you, in response to this plea, really, for assistance?
Dr. Carter. I would just--two observations. It is an
excellent question, and it is a particularly timely one,
because, as I think everyone here has been emphasizing, we
cannot succeed with our objectives unless we are together with
the South----
The Chairman. With South Korea.
Dr. Carter [continuing]. Koreans. And the same thing is
true of them. So what is the basis? Our interests do not
coincide. They overlap, but they do not coincide.
I would make two arguments to the South Koreans in that
regard. The first one is that the pursuit of nuclear weapons by
North Korea does make war on the Korean Peninsula more likely.
It is not just a matter that they can fall into the hands of
terrorists or get out and, thereby, come back at the United
States, but not at South Korea. That is true, too, but it is
also true that South Korea has enjoyed, prospered, grown its
economy, democratized against a background of stable deterrence
on the Korean Peninsula. Pursuit of weapons of mass destruction
by North Korea can disrupt that stability which they have
enjoyed for decades by convincing North Korea that it has
something more than its conventional army, that it can change
the equation in some way. So that does threaten South Korea's
security.
But the other part of the answer, I think, has to be to
them--and this is something that we always try to remember in
talking to the South Koreans and the Japanese--when we go to
the table with the North Koreans, we cannot just go to the
North Koreans with what we want. We have to go to the table
with what the Japanese and the South Koreans want, also; and,
likewise, they, when they go to the table with the North
Koreans, need to go with what we want.
So when we talked to the North Koreans, we always mentioned
the abductee issue. That was not an American issue; it was an
allied issue. And if we want the Japanese to back us and want
what we want, we have to want what they want to some extent.
There has to be a common portfolio of desires and then a common
portfolio, as Ambassador Bosworth said, of carrots and sticks
put forward.
So they need to back us a little bit where our interests
overlap but do not coincide, and we need to do the same for
them.
The Chairman. Ambassador Bosworth.
Ambassador Bosworth. Very briefly. I think that, in terms
of South Korea, we need basically two things. One, we need a
process which does not appear to the South Korean public that
the United States is dictating to its new government.
This is a newly assertive South Korea, and the electorate
will insist, as they demonstrated during the election itself,
that its government stand up to the United States. Now, it is
sad to say that we are at that point, but they have a deep
suspicion that the United States is going to try to dictate a
policy to their new government which responds to American goals
and objectives and interests and does not respond to theirs. So
we need a process which avoids that. And I think, personally,
until we have gone a lot further in discussing these issues
with the new government in South Korea, it might be just as
well not to try to be precipitate about a meeting between the
two chiefs of state.
The other thing is that we need a U.S. policy. What is it
we are trying to convince South Korea to do? I mean, as someone
who follows this all very carefully, if I had to go back over
the last 2 years and say, ``This is what we've been attempting
to do,'' it would be very difficult for me. So I think that we
have to have a policy that we can ask the South Koreans to
coordinate with us on.
The Chairman. Do you have a further thought, Mr. Gregg.
Ambassador Gregg. Just a couple. I had breakfast yesterday
morning with the chairman of one of South Korea's leading
corporations. They make microchips, a multi-billion-dollar
success. They have some very basic concerns. One, they are
worried that--the new President, when he comes--will not be
received with the proper courtesy. I assured them that he would
be. Second, they are worried that our President is focused on
regime change rather than working with North Korea as it is, as
repulsive as it is. And this may be the voice of old Asia, to
paraphrase Secretary Rumsfeld's statement but they were saying
that if you want to remove a leader in Asia, if you want to
remove the mandate of heaven from him, that has to be done by
his own people. And so they said, ``Help us to open up the
windows in North Korea. And then if he still has the mandate of
heaven, we can work with him.''
And then, finally, they said Roh Moo Hyun is a lawyer and
that everything that the President says to him must stress
logic and evidence.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you, all three of you, for this
advice. I gleaned that you would say to the South Korean
emissary, first of all, that we believe that these talks
between our two countries are tremendously important. They need
to be constant. We really have to go into a crash course of
learning where we are now.
But as Secretary Carter has pointed out, make the point to
the South Koreans that nuclear weapons in North Korea probably
caused them a cause for alarm, in terms of their own stability
they may or may not have perceived--fully perceive this. But at
least I think that is an important point, that we are going to
talk, if we have these talks, for all three of us, the Japanese
abductees issue and others that may come into the thing. But
then to recognize that we have some work to do with our own
policy, as Ambassador Bosworth has pointed out.
We have to determine what we want. Now, I think what we
want is a termination of the weapons of mass destruction
program, really a cleanup of the whole lot, international
inspections so that we are convinced.
It seems to me that that is clearly what we want, but that
is--may be just a personal preference. I think it is such an
extraordinary point, though, with regard to our overall war
against terrorism, the overall security of the United States,
as we have talked about, that this may very well be a point
that others could agree upon.
And, finally, I appreciate the point that Secretary Carter
has made. Whether it is called a Nunn-Lugar program or not,
there may come a time in which the cleanup is expensive. If you
were to go about rendering safe all of this, the resources are
probably not there in North Korea to do it any more than they
are in the former Soviet Union. And we still have trouble
making that point annually with regard to chemical weapons or
other situations that we are working through. But it is
probably important to start, because if, in fact, there is to
be safety for the North Koreans, the South Koreans, for us, for
everybody else, that probably is going to require a very
concerted effort on our part, including technicians, finances,
and a multi-year training to get the job done.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. The Senator has a time constraint so I will
yield to Senator Dodd.
The Chairman. OK. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thanks, Senator Biden. Thanks to my
colleague, Joe, very, very much.
And I said at the outset of my remarks awhile ago, in front
of Secretary Armitage, how important these hearings were. And
let me say again Mr. Chairman, how much I appreciate it.
This has been an incredibly informative hour or so
listening to these three gentlemen, who I have known and dealt
with, to some degree, over a number of years. I remember being
in the Philippines, I think, with Ambassador Bosworth about the
same time you were, Mr. Chairman, going back to the mid-1980s
and the catastrophic events and the tremendous job you did
there. And, as well, Ambassador Gregg, your work over the years
and Secretary Carter, as well.
So I thank you immensely. This testimony has been
tremendously worthwhile.
I am disappointed more of our colleagues are not here to
hear this. There are reasons. Today there is a delegation on
its way to Houston to participate in the memorial services. And
so those watching this may wonder why more members are not here
to listen to what you had to say. That had something to do with
it.
But I would hope that members will pay attention to this
and to listen very carefully to what you had to say. Your
testimony has been tremendously informative.
Let me pick up the point that Senator Lugar was making,
again, and that is, I think all of us, at least those of us
here, I think agree that we need to have this conversation
pretty quickly, these talks with North Korea, and that any
delay in that is foolhardy.
But obviously, before that can happen, the point that
Senator Lugar was raising is, we have to decide what we want.
And I get the sense, once again, as I watched the debate going
on within the administration about Iraq, I have a sense that is
occurring. I think a debate within the administration is
healthy. I am not suggesting they should not be. But I am
concerned and I want to ask you about this.
In your mind, is this a significant debate that goes beyond
just what we want out of North Korea, but what we want, in a
larger sense, between the factions who advocate arms control or
a Nunn-Lugar approach, or those who advocate a missile defense
approach?
I am concerned that what I am watching here is this debate
that almost--and I use these words very guardedly--but almost
welcomes, to some extent, this renewed threat. It gives cause
and justification for a whole new approach to dealing with the
geopolitical problem, and that is of a proliferation of
weaponry and your response to it. And I am very worried that
there are those who--when I begin to look over the last couple
of years, I can accept the fact that some poor choice of words
is in a speech. Lord knows, every one of us on this side of the
table is engaged in that at one time or another. I can accept
the fact that you want to have a review of a policy decision. I
can accept a litany of these things. But after awhile, you
begin to wonder if there is not a pattern here that goes beyond
just, sort of, a series of accidents and begins to look like
something more planned and well thought out in terms of what
you are ultimately trying to achieve.
And I am worried, in a sense here, that those who advocate
an approach that would commit us to a massive missile defense
system are prevailing in this debate, and, hence, the
reluctance to have these kind of talks and to deal more
forthrightly with this problem.
And so what do we want? What does the administration want?
Are my suspicions about this debate accurate, in your view? Do
you think that there is a larger debate going on here beyond
North Korea that is holding up a decision on how to deal with
this? Or is that an exaggerated view of mine? And if it is, I
want you to tell me so.
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, Senator, for myself, I would
only say that having served in various administrations of both
parties, I am somewhat reluctant to comment on what may be
going on inside, because I think they are very much like a
marriage, and unless you are on the inside, you really do not
know. And even when you are on the inside, you may not know
everything that is going on.
My sense is that, at one point, perhaps, the arguments you
make or the observation you make may have been actually quite
correct. But I think when this goes beyond just a missile
problem and becomes a problem of, as Ash Carter says, ``loose
nukes'' in northeast Asia that that should, sort of, take care
of the argument about whether or not we use this as
justification for national missile defense.
It seems to me that there is a deeper sort of question
here, and that is the--how does this country, as powerful as we
are, how do we deal with bad things in the world and bad
people? And I think there is--as objectively as I can state
this, there is a tendency, on some issues, to approach them
from a perspective of what one might describe as moral
absolutism rather than from the perspective of how you can
manage the problem. And that brings you to things like regime
change as an ultimate goal.
I have no willingness or desire to see the regime of Kim
Jong Il continue any longer in North Korea, but I am concerned
about how you bring that about, and I think that is the
question that has to be constantly reexamined.
Senator Dodd. Secretary Carter.
Dr. Carter. Ambassador Bosworth just touched on the point--
a precise point I was going to make. In dealing with North
Korea, there is kind of a threshold question, given the
behavior of the government with respect to its own people. And
I remember the famine days of 1996 to 1998, and that was truly
upsetting, I think, to any human being who has children and
sees children in the condition that North Korean children were
in because of the inability of their own government to give
them what they need.
And we are talking about dealing, as I quoted from the
Policy Review report, with the government as it is, not as we
wish it was, and you really--I think that is a threshold for us
all. I got over that threshold by considering whether we had
any realistic prospect of changing it, and also by considering
the damage that it could do for the period when it lasts.
I think logic, human nature, all tell you that this cannot
go on forever, what you see in North Korea, but I cannot
produce for you the kind of evidence that you would require
that you can base your strategy on the prospect that they will
collapse before they cause lasting damage to our security. And
what that means is, you have to swallow hard and go deal.
And I do not have any insight, particularly, into the
administration, but I read the Bob Woodward book and so forth,
and I think that is a threshold question for any President, and
it is perfectly understandable that it is a threshold question.
It is one you have to reason your way through.
Ambassador Gregg. I think a coincidence contributed to what
you speak of, Senator, and that was the issue of the Rumsfeld
report on anti---or missile threats to the United States in
1998, and then, I think, within 60 days, the firing of the
North Korean Taepo Dong missile, which they claim was something
designed to launch a satellite that would have played music
praising Kim Jong Il. But whatever the case, it took us aback,
because it was more sophisticated and more long range than we
thought possible.
And so North Korea became the poster child for missile
defense, and I think that when the Bush administration came
into office, that that was certainly a mindset that applied
very strongly in certain parts of the administration to North
Korea.
I think the President--I have been very interested to see
how he--how consistent his statements have been on North Korea
since the Kelly visit. He has never wavered from saying we are
going to find a peaceful solution to this through dialog.
And I welcome that. I think he is realizing that some of
these ideological wish lists run afoul of reality in the world
and that the stakes are huge in northeast Asia. And so I think
he is very much now on the side of a diplomatic solution. It
just has to be worked out by the rest of the administration
what shape that takes.
Senator Dodd. Sooner the better. And let me say, by the
way, I am not--it is not a question. I think there is an
argument that can be made--in fact, a need--for us to develop a
missile defense system. I am not suggesting that it is
necessarily a choice between one or the other, but it sometimes
looks simplistic as I watch the pattern here and as time goes
by and as that clock continues to tick on this question. And it
is--and the longer we wait in engaging this in a diplomatically
aggressive way, it seems to me, then the greater the dangers
are, as all of you have pointed out here, as each day goes by.
And the notion--one of you made the point of having some
real specialists on Asia, some real experts on Asia, involved
in this--is going to be critically important, and I think there
is a bit of a vacuum on that particular point, as well.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you immensely. And I thank Senator
Biden for his generosity.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, I think this is some of the best
testimony I have heard in the long time I have sat here. You
each sort of--I do not know whether you got together, but you
each asked and spoke to and answered a different question that
is on the minds of all our colleagues.
Ash, you laid out how we got to where we are, in terms of
what actually was negotiated, was anticipated, the context in
which it was done, the decision process, which basically came
down to what you just said a moment ago--if there was a way to
change the regime, it was not going to be more catastrophic for
the short-term, and our friends around the region short-term
and maybe long-term, then that was an option that would warrant
being considered. But the conclusion was that that was not the
best option, and you chose another option, which I
wholeheartedly agree with.
And I should note, for those who may be listening, we are
not talking to, you know, a uniform group of three specialists
and experts who all come from the same political perspective
here.
Ambassador Gregg, I do not want to in any way damage your
credibility, but I thought your explanation and exposition on
what you think went wrong was brilliant, absolutely brilliant.
I mean, who knows for certain, but I was talking to Senator
Hagel--I think it is the single most succinct and accurate and
most probable explanation of us never being able to read
someone else's mind as to how a series of a chain of events and
circumstances brought us to this point, without in any way
making apologies for the regime in the North and being pretty
hard-baked about it.
And Ambassador Bosworth, you being in another
administration, and Ambassador Gregg, if I am not mistaken, not
that you speak for any Bush, but you had a fairly close
relationship with the first Bush, you are a very well-known
Republican.
So I just want the audience to know, who may be listening,
that this is not somehow a panel that we put together, or you
put together, Mr. Chairman, that was decided to come at it from
one political perspective. And I thought your explanation about
essentially what went wrong in the South, Mr. Ambassador,
Ambassador Bosworth, was equally as cogent.
But it leads me to a couple of questions and a few generic
observations. One is that I do believe that, early on, the
biggest issue that this administration occupied itself with in
terms of foreign policy, slash, strategic policy, slash,
defense policy its first year, was--and I, in turn, occupied
myself with it--was the issue of national missile defense, its
nature, how broad it would be, how necessary it was.
And to put it in raw political terms, if there had been a
fundamental transformation, if there had been a revolution in
the North and the present regime was overthrown and a
democratic republic was put in place, there would have been no
rationale for national missile defense based on what was being
suggested at the moment, in terms of its urgency. So we should
all not kid ourselves that whether or not that moved the
administration to be empathetic or sympathetic to a crisis
occurring, I am not suggesting that, but without North Korea,
there is a pretty lame--pretty lame--rationale of the urgency
for and the pitifully small but incredibly expensive national
missile defense program that has come forward from the
administration.
And then, on top of that, I do not think we--I mean, I have
been here for--well, I have been here as long as you guys. I
have been a United States Senator for 31 years. I have dealt
with seven Presidents. And I say ``dealt with.'' I have served
here with seven different Presidents, probably only dealt with
four in a real sense. And the fact of the matter is, I have
never seen an administration as fundamentally divided as this
administration is on our place in the world and how to deal
with it. And we are kidding each other.
I know you all say, and you are all diplomats, and you are
all not going to go in and suggest that you know what is his
thinking and the administration, how--but this is a fundamental
divide that exists, not on Korea, but on the issue of the moral
certitude and what response we take to that. And there is a
legitimate case.
And I think we all make a big mistake if we do not go back
and read the writings of the intellectual right on this notion
in the foreign policy establishment for the last 10 years.
There is a consistency. This is not something--I mean, we all
make a mistake of not reading, you know, the think-tank guys
downtown. There is a genuine consistency to a very different
road to be taken, a different path suggested, and has been
being suggested, since the late 1980s.
And we have an administration now that is divided as to
whether or not that path is the one to take, which I will, at
another time and place, not here, characterize in detail by
quoting and reading the people who have been your counterparts
on the other side of this equation who have been making a very
sound, from their perspective, and intellectually defensible
argument. I think they are wrong, but this is not something
that is just a little bit of a difference on tactics within
this administration.
The thing that has startled me is--``startle'' is the wrong
word--has interested me is, it tends to be a combination of the
civilian military, the civilian defense, and the politicos in
the White House exempting the President, because I do not think
he has made up his mind--at least I pray to God he has not made
up his mind yet--and, interestingly enough, the uniformed
military and the State Department. I mean, I find this an
unusual coalition in the way that things have broken down in
past Democrat as well as Republican administrations.
And so the reason I bother to suggest this is that I do not
think it is unreasonable for anyone--anyone--in any country who
loves us, hates us, fears us, has an incredibly warm feeling
about us, to not acknowledge that. They wonder whether or not
we have set upon a path of regime change, not just here, and
not just in Iraq or--how about Iran or North Korea? There is--
we would be lying to the American people--there are people in
this administration--and they are good people; they are bright
people, they are honorable people--they are acting out of what
they think is the best interest of the United States of
America. And there are our colleagues here who think regime
change is the only answer.
So for us to sit down and assume that all North Koreans are
stupid and they have not--they cannot detect that, is not to
suggest that that is the reason they have acted the way they
have, not suggesting they would have acted better if it did
not--if that were not part of the division of the
administration, but there are a lot of things that aid and abet
in the confusion.
My greatest worry, Ambassador Gregg, is that I do not think
that Kim Jong Il is as much of an imbecile as he is made out to
be, by any stretch of the imagination. Not by you, but, I mean,
you know, the caricature of him. But I do worry that he is
isolated. I do worry he will make the mistake that is often
made, as we make it as well, between U.S. policy and Asian
policy, generically, of misreading--misreading--miscalculating
what the response of the United States may be and/or the world
may be to his actions. I do not think he has a very keen
antennae for that part of--that requirement of a leader. I am
not sure he is accurately assessing what may happen.
And the only conflict worse than one's intent--one that is
intended is one that is unintended. And I see this as a--I was
thinking earlier, Mr. Chairman, of being a sophomore in
college, as a history major, listening to a professor talk
about how when the Russian army mobilized in World War II along
the border, it never intended that it was going to end up in a
war, and that--and Germany responded, and how we got very
rapidly to a point of no return very quickly that maybe history
could have avoided, depending on the misreading of one another
and our intentions. And that is my greatest concern with regard
to Kim Jong Il. That is my greatest concern, misreading us
here.
Now, none of us can divine--at least I cannot, and you have
all said you cannot, although you are more qualified to do it
than we are--what the final intention--if there has been a
final judgment made by Kim Jong Il now as to whether or not he
has concluded his security, if you will, his stability in power
rests upon the acquisition of more nuclear weapons, or whether
it is still not too late to work something out. I do not know
the answer to that question.
And I also do not know the answer to the question of how in
charge--is he in charge? One of you said you thought that he
was--he had to pay, he thought, significant--he is still
working out control--I think it was you, Mr. Ambassador--and
that the military is part of that issue, and they are not
particularly enamored with the prospect that there may be a
diplomatic way to maintain their present position.
And so this prelude here leads me to a couple of questions.
I had the privilege of the President, without revealing it,
confiding in me asking me what I thought went wrong with his
meeting with Kim Dae-Jung. And I was interested, genuinely, as
to the President's wondering why this went wrong, why things
did not go very well in that meeting.
Well, I think part of where we are now is that I think the
administration, if not the President, was betting that
President Roh was likely to lose, and they would have a very
different South Korea to deal with, Mr. Ambassador, which is
part of, I think, their being perplexed now as to how to
respond.
The one thing, Ash, you and Secretary Perry did so--I think
the single most underestimated contribution you made, beyond
the fact we don't want 50, 60, or 100 more, depending on the
calculations, nuclear bombs or weapons out there, is that you
made sure--I remember talking to you throughout this and to
Wendy and to the Secretary--you made sure that North Korea--I
mean, excuse me--South Korea, Japan, and us were on the same
page. As my recollection was there was no daylight. None. No
daylight.
And which leads me to why I am a little perplexed about one
aspect of your testimony, and that is that although I think you
think that should be reestablished if you can, Secretary
Bosworth points out that South Korea, particularly in light of
what they need to be--and I just returned from South Korea, as
well, with Senator Sarbanes and Senator Specter. We met with
the outgoing leadership. We went to the DMZ. We spent time
there. We met with the South Korean generals. And I got the
same questions you got, Ambassador Gregg, in the North, I got
those same questions in the South. And I share your commitment.
I have never abroad ever criticized the President, and I will
not do that. I think it is totally inappropriate. And my
answers were not as succinct and as insightful as yours were,
and as diplomatic. So I did not give many answers. I listened.
But we are in slightly different paths, Ambassador
Bosworth, in terms of what we view to be our--what is
inimicable to our interest and what is most inimicable to our
interest. And it is clear that it is going to be a little more
difficult to put Humpty-Dumpty back together here. He has not
fallen off the wall completely, but, boy, the cracks and
fissures are visible of him sitting up on the wall right now.
And so, Ash--I apologize, Mr. Secretary, for keep calling
you Ash--Mr. Secretary, I would like to----
Dr. Carter. That's fine.
Senator Biden [continuing]. To ask you, if, in fact, the
course of action which you broadly outlined and with some
specificity as to how you think we should proceed from here--if
that fails, either in its failure of not being initiated or
fails in its execution--it is initiated and is not able to be
executed--you talk about the need to have a--essentially a red
line here--my term, not yours.
In light of what Ambassador Bosworth said, I see no
realistic prospect in the near-term that we can credibly lay
out a red line, which is, ``If you do not ultimately, North
Korea, cease and desist, with legitimate consideration being
provided by the United States''--in a contract, you need
consideration on both sides--``if you do not cease and desist,
we keep the military option on the table.'' I think South Korea
has moved so far that how in the devil do you keep that
incredible option unless you first and fundamentally repair the
relationship with South Korea? That's my first question.
Dr. Carter. If I can take a crack at that, it is an
excellent question, and it is an issue of sequencing here. I
think they go hand in hand. In other words, we cannot repair
our relationship with South Korea until and unless--and I think
Steve Bosworth made this point--we show that we are on top of
this issue. ``On top of this issue'' means we have a strategy.
We have arrived at that strategy and are conducting that
strategy in a process that includes them in a respectful way as
befits the people who actually live there. And with that
strategy, we can then go forward to the North.
So these two things have to proceed in parallel. I do not
think we can repair our relationship with South Korea and say,
``Let's repair that first and then we'll go North.'' Part of
the repair is to be indicating that we have a strategy for the
North that includes them.
A final comment. I think red line is the right word. Red
line is the right word. I think North Korea needs to be made to
understand, and we need to understand, ourselves, that going
further than the freeze, taking those fuel rods out and putting
them where we cannot get at them, doing irreparable harm to the
status of the freeze----
Senator Biden. By definition----
Dr. Carter [continuing]. Is something the United States
cannot live with.
Senator Biden. Is, by definition, your definition of
``going beyond''--and that is to begin to reprocess?
Dr. Carter. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. That is a red line.
Dr. Carter. Yes.
Senator Biden. That is a fault line, right?
Dr. Carter. Correct.
Senator Biden. Now, I am going to ask you a question I
understand you may not wish to answer, because it is--I am
going to ask it in a way that I think that most Americans would
understand it--presumptuous of me to say that, but--
hypothetically, if the President of the United States, in his
State of the Union Message, in which he was very somber and
straightforward--if, in his State of the Union Message, he
said, ``Notwithstanding the fact that I do believe an `axis of
evil' exists, it is not my policy to change the regimes in
those countries. It is my policy to be prepared to act if those
evil regimes take actions inimicable to our interests,'' would
that have changed the mindset at all, or some version of that,
if the President were to enunciate and speak directly to it?
I just got back from Davos. Every world--I mean,
literally--I did not speak to every world leader who was there
and every head of state, but I spoke to one heck of a lot. You
guys have been there. And the phrase, as if it were equivalent
to the Monroe Doctrine, that everyone was familiar with,
whether it was an African Foreign Minister or the head of state
from a European country or the Middle East or Asia, was they
all knew the phrase ``regime change.'' They all believe,
whether--they either--they moved from either questioning,
wondering, and/or being certain that this administration is
driven by the notion that is borne out of an ideological
purity, a moral certitude, that regime change is its obligation
and mission, that it will not do it willy nilly, it will not do
it if the price is too high, but that is the goal.
Now, how does that play? I mean, it is one thing--am I
making any sense here? Can you speak to that a little bit? How
would it change if we were able--if the President articulated
that his policy dealt with--it is like, you know, the old
thing, ``love the sinner, but hate the sin''--I mean, if it is
shifted and if it is believed, what impact would that have?
Ambassador Bosworth. Well, I sometimes think, Senator, that
we spend too much time talking about what we will do ``if.''
And I think we--in the case of North Korea, for example, I
think in our consultation with South Korea, we should publicly
stress what we are prepared to do on what I would describe as
``the high road,'' how we are prepared to try to put this thing
back together.
We should probably talk quietly and privately with South
Korea about what we do if that does not work.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Ambassador Bosworth. But to the extent that we start
talking about it publicly, we undercut the effectiveness of
what we are trying to do on the high road.
Senator Biden. I agree.
Ambassador Bosworth. So, you know, I think sometimes we
allow the rest of the world to participate, at least orally, in
too much of our internal discussions over our role and purpose
in the world, and it makes them very nervous.
We are a very powerful country, and, since September 11, we
are also a rather frightened country. And that combination
really does upset people, because they are not very certain
about what we are going to do under certain circumstances.
So I think, in dealing with South Korea first and then
North Korea, I think we ought to stress publicly what we are
prepared to do, in a positive sense. To say explicitly that we
are not prepared to contemplate regime change, I would rather--
having said already what we have said in the past, I would like
to get something for that statement.
Senator Biden. Anyone else?
Ambassador Gregg. Your very interesting comments, Senator,
remind me of my early days in CIA when there was a decision to
undertake regime change by covert means, and then came
Guatemala, Iran, and the disaster in Cuba. And it came to a
stop. But an awful lot was lost out of that process, and we are
still alienated from Iran. So I'm very much against it.
I think some of the hard-line people in the administration
have no clear awareness of the consequences of what they are
suggesting. I think the President is coming to realize that,
and I take great hope from that.
Dr. Carter. Just one comment. I have been concerned, since
the freeze began to thaw and we have been so preoccupied with
other things and have a difficult relationship with South Korea
and are still formulating our strategy, that North Korea would
get the opposite of the message we should be sending. The
message I fear they get is, ``We're out to get you, but we're
not going to do anything about your nuclear weapons.''
I would prefer just the opposite, which is, ``We don't have
to be out to get you, unless you're after weapons of mass
destruction. We can `keep on keeping on' with you, much as we
dislike you''----
Senator Biden. That is sort of what I meant when I----
Dr. Carter [continuing]. ``but we cannot if you are going
after weapons of mass destruction.'' And that is where I
think--our willingness to make that statement really is
conditioned on their not pursuing weapons of mass destruction.
So I would not, also, give it unless we got back from them
the assurances we need that they are not going forward with
weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Biden. One of the reason why I, like Senator Dodd,
from a slightly different perspective, am a little skeptical
here about--and I agree with you, Ambassador Gregg, in my
experience with the President I think this is a work in
progress. I think he is working his way through this. I think
he is listening to both sides of the argument being presented
to him. And, so far--I get in trouble with my colleagues for
saying this on my side of the aisle--I think his instincts have
been pretty good. I think, at the end of the day, he has made
the right decisions, in my view. I think we waste a lot of the
good that could have come from those decisions by what it takes
to lead up to them, but, nonetheless, I think--so I have some
considerable faith, more than hope, that he will choose the
path that the three of you, and the chairman and I--I think we
are all basically on the same page--the generic path that we
are talking about here.
But what I worry about is--and I hope it has changed--I
think he--I don't--I don't think, at least at the outset, that
he, as former Presidents who have also been Governors at the
front end, fully appreciated that little nuances are read as
messages to change entire messages. When he said we were going
to reconsider and we were going to go back, we always add
something else into the mix, like the three things you set out,
Secretary Carter in what our objectives were, one of which was,
you hope to get to missiles, you hope to get to destruction of
the facilities, et cetera, but you never insisted that also
wrapped into this same agreement would be conventional. It
was--and when the President threw in conventional, I think a
lot of people around the world thought, ``Well, this means he
really does not want to proceed,'' because there is very strong
criticism on the center right of the whole Agreed Framework to
begin with. I mean, it was an uphill battle, once the Congress
changed, as the Ambassador pointed out.
So I hope when he reaches this next point, I hope, again,
we do not get to the point where it inadvertently or
advertently places the conditions on discussions that doom it
to failure from the outset because it causes us to question our
motives, or, I think, our motives to be questioned when the
offer is made, just as I hope the Secretary of State, when he
appears on Thursday, before the United Nations and makes his
case, my unsolicited advice is that he go with what we have
that is strong, and there is plenty there, and not overplay our
weak hand, which is terrorism, al-Qaeda, and nuclear weapons.
That may all be part of it, but I hope the devil we focus on
what is unassailable, quite frankly. And I would hope we do the
same thing as we get to this next point.
But I will conclude by saying--asking you--and I think
there is agreement, but I do not want to misunderstand--do all
of you believe that there is no way to accurately predict--
there is no reason to believe that in the near term there will
be a collapse in the North--that is that the leadership in
North Korea will collapse, will implode? I mean, is there any
reason for any of you to think that is a reasonable basis upon
which the President should be making near-term planning?
Ambassador Bosworth. I agree with what some of my friends
here have said, that waiting for a collapse is not a policy.
Now, at the same time, I would also observe that this is a
system that is under tremendous stress, and I would be
surprised, but not shocked, to wake up any morning and find
there had been a very cataclysmic change in North Korea. I
think that is always possible, but it is not a policy.
Ambassador Gregg. I do not think there is much likelihood
of a collapse in the near term.
Dr. Carter. I do not know what the likelihood is, but I
agree that you cannot base a strategy on it.
Senator Biden. And the last question I have is, would you
all elaborate slightly--I mean, for just a little bit, if you
would, in the interest of your time and the chairman's--on what
Ambassador Gregg touched on--I think he is the only one that
touched on it--and that is, who is in charge? Give us your best
assessment of the degree to which you think, and how much
latitude and flexibility, Kim Jong Il has in order to--assuming
we get to this point where there are bilateral--under whatever
umbrella--bilateral discussions with the North.
Ambassador Bosworth. My best analogy is perhaps the case of
Argentina during the Falklands war, when Secretary Haig was
engaged in shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires.
And he observed that when he went to Buenos Aires, he had to
consult with dozens of generals, even though it was a military
dictatorship. When he went to London, he had to consult with
only one person, and it was a democracy.
So I would suspect that Kim Jong Il has to, as Don Gregg
said, take account of the views of others. He cannot ride
roughshod over what the military sees as its interest or a
senior cadre in the party see as their interest. But I do not
think he is, from all evidence--and, again, I stress we are
doing all of this on the basis of three or four data points on
a big screen--from all evidence, I see no conclusion that he is
under any threat of being replaced or displaced.
Ambassador Gregg. The Chinese have told me that he took as
long as he did to assume full leadership in North Korea because
he took great care to make certain that he had real control
over the military. And his choice of Jo Myong Rok, to send to
Washington in the fall of 2000, was an indication of that, as
he reached down into the ranks to pull up a man whom he
trusted.
I think that the more we appear to threaten North Korea,
the more threatened the North Korean army and military acts and
the more claims they lay on Kim Jong Il. I think his ultimate
hope is to be able to have a special economic zone, like
Kaesung, filled with workers making widgets with which he can
buy food for his starving people. For that to happen, he has to
be able to disarm some of his conventional military forces, and
those guys do not want to be disarmed if they think that, by
disarming, that opens up an attack from us.
So that is how I see it, that he is in charge, but he has
to cater to the just absolutely imperative support of the
military.
Dr. Carter. A final thought. I agree with everything that
has been said. I am always struck, as I think about North
Korea, with the case of Albania. Albania was two generations
into Stalinism when it finally collapsed--the same kind of
xenophobic absolute control.
North Korea is now almost a generation beyond that. No
Stalinist regime has lasted as long as North Korea. North
Korean students--children have, if my information is right, 4
hours of political education a day. Their parents had it, and
their grandparents had it. That is a phenomenon--that is a
rigidity that I do not think humanity has experienced in a
dictatorship before. And therefore, I do not have any doubt--I
understand what is being said here about the need for any
leader to enjoy the respect of those around him.
But, in that kind of system, if Kim Jong Il gives the order
to go this way, they will go that way, at least for a time.
That means that if he gives the order to go cross the DMZ, they
will go across the DMZ. It also means that if he gives the
order to go in the direction of Deng Xiaoping or something
else, they will go in that direction also, for a time, a
critical time. So I do not know anybody on the North Korean
scene who does not think that he is absolutely the audience for
any message we send.
Senator Biden. Well, I thank you both. Thank you for the
time--all three of you--and, really, I cannot tell you how much
this committee appreciates having you. I wish the three of you
were running the policy.
The Chairman. Well, that is a high compliment.
Senator Biden. I have probably damned you by that comment
but I really do. It's first-rate.
The Chairman. Let me just conclude by--I am struck with the
two phrases that came up frequently, particularly in the last
panel, the ``what went wrong'' idea. This very room has been
filled with the joint intelligence committees in the last
Congress trying to determine what went wrong on September 11,
what went wrong in terms of our perceptions, our policy, our
preparedness, and our ability, really, to understand the
changes that ought to be made. And that work continues with the
special commission, with the intelligence committees having
been discharged from that.
But it brought to the fore, in another way, the work of
Bernard Lewis, ``What Went Wrong,'' the book that he wrote, as
to why we do not understand Islam and what happened in Islam
throughout this period, why they have got real problems that
they do not understand. These are really profound
circumstances.
And I would just submit that even given all the arguments
that might occur in this current administration, one thing that
went wrong for a long time was that the American people lost
interest in foreign policy, and so did many of their leaders in
this Congress. For many years, people were interested and
continue to be interested in healthcare and education for the
American people, the ups and downs of our economy and jobs
issues, and any one of us who is an elected politician needs to
understand that. This is what people want to talk about.
Senator Biden. This used to be the hardest committee to get
on, too.
The Chairman. Well, occasionally, you may have 15 minutes
at the end of the public forum to talk about what is going on
in the rest of the world.
So it is not just a question that Afghanistan fell off the
charts, and--Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, never were there, but
even with countries as important as Korea and Japan and so
forth. Many Americans lost track of what is going on out there.
Now suddenly we have reaped some of that problem, not just
with our leadership, but with a constituency that the President
must appeal to, that all of us must appeal to, to understand
why this is important and why we are not in the phase of the
Korean war, the last Korean war, or some other situation.
Now, it is a catch-up, but this is the purpose of the
hearing. It is not simply for Senators, but it is for the
American people who are interested in this. And we appreciate
your testimony, which will have a wider audience, I think, as
you appreciate.
The other thing that strikes me in the regime-change idea--
I came up, of all things, in a rather obscure piece of
legislation--I think it was obscure, because I do not remember
much debate--but in the Congress before President Bush got
here, or his group, the Congress said ``Regime change is our
policy.'' Now, President Bush latched onto that in a couple of
public statements early on, while all of the reviews are going
on. And when asked, in a flip way, maybe he would say ``regime
change, that's what we're about.'' Well, not necessarily.
But the problem is one--I think the historical mention by
Don Gregg of his work in CIA and regime change of the past and
why that became outmoded--is very, very helpful, and that is an
introduction today that is important for us to take a look at,
because now it is obviously apparent in the North Korean
situation, at least as I listen to the President, that is not
what he has on his mind.
But I thank the Senator for mentioning the fact that the
President does appear to be open to ideas, and as I mentioned
in response to Senator Dodd earlier, Senator Biden and I will
have another chance to visit tomorrow morning at 7, albeit an
early hour, a fairly small group on a rather fateful day in
American history, as our Secretary of State testifies. And I
mention, again, that the Secretary will testify there on
Wednesday. But, nevertheless, he will be here on Thursday. That
will be a rare privilege for the committee and, I think, the
American people, once again, to hear him, have a chance to
question him, as we will.
Senator Chafee, does your reappearance signal a desire to
question?
Senator Chafee. I want to apologize for having some
conflicts, but I happened to be back to hear the tail-end in
the ninth inning.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We thank the witnesses.
And the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject
to the call of the Chair.]