[Senate Hearing 108-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENTS OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
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THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher S. Bond (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Bond, Shelby, Stevens, and Mikulski.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENT OF SEAN O'KEEFE, ADMINISTRATOR
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND
Senator Bond. Good morning.
This hearing of the Senate VA, HUD, and Independent
Agencies Subcommittee will come to order.
Today we welcome NASA Administrator, Sean O'Keefe who is
with us today to testify on the President's fiscal year 2005
budget for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Mr. Administrator, it has been quite a roller coaster ride
since you joined NASA in December of 2001. We have gone from
the tragedy of losing the Columbia, to the uncertainty and
perseverance in its aftermath, to the renewed purpose instilled
by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report, and
finally the excitement of a Presidential vision for the future
that includes returning to the Moon and looking towards sending
humans to Mars.
This is an ambitious plan which could generate similar and
even greater excitement to that which we are seeing with the
current rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, that are working on
Mars today.
At the beginning of the year, it looked like NASA was on
its way to a budget that would be relatively unchanged. That
all changed on January 14 with the announcement by the
President about a new vision for NASA which has since
translated into a budget request for fiscal year 2005 of over
$16 billion, an increase of nearly $900 million from fiscal
year 2004. Unfortunately, this impressive increase raises more
questions at this time in my mind than excitement.
The Senate fiscal year 2005 Budget Resolution is being
debated on the floor as we speak, and the budget numbers
contemplated by the President's budget request and in the
Senate Budget Resolution currently will mean unacceptable
shortfalls for a number of key VA/HUD programs, including VA
Medical Care and Section 8 Housing Assistance, as well as the
EPA Clean Water State Revolving Fund.
These shortfalls have to be addressed before we provide
increases to new programs in other accounts. NASA better hope
we get a good 302(b) allocation, above the funding included in
the Budget Request. Now, I don't mean to do this to pick on
NASA, this is the same message that you will be hearing as I
welcome each of the agencies coming before us that administer
VA/HUD programs.
The funding for NASA's new Moon/Mars vision is troubling
for a number of reasons. As a practical matter, the NASA budget
for the fiscal year 2005 through the fiscal year 2009 time
period for the Moon/Mars vision is $12.6 billion, of which only
$1 billion is in new funds and $11.6 billion is from other NASA
activities. Fortunately, many of these activities, such as the
Space Launch Initiative, appear to be appropriate sacrifices
for the Moon/Mars vision.
However, as part of this redirection of funds, other
programs and facilities projects are being deferred, the Hubble
telescope is to be retired, and aeronautics spending will
remain relatively flat over the next 5 years.
I am sure my colleague from Maryland will have a few things
to say about Hubble, but I know that world class science is
being done, and can be done, for years to come with this famous
telescope, and we should be sure that we are not giving up on
it too soon.
I also have joined my colleague in asking for a
comprehensive review of the proposed Hubble decision before the
implementation of a final decision is made. In the case of
aeronautics, we made it clear in the fiscal year 2004 NASA
appropriation that we in Congress expected a greater investment
by NASA.
It is not an earmark, it is a Congressional investment and
Congressional priority. Instead, the fiscal year 2005 budget
request proposes $919 million for aeronautics, a reduction of
11 percent from fiscal year 2004. This is a big problem. Europe
has declared that they are going to dominate the commercial
market in the next decade, yet this technology driven
manufacturing industry gets little support from the one agency
that can help keep America competitive in this industry.
Given the problems that we are having in the Nation, I
don't think this is the time to be cutting back on that
investment. It has been those who contended that the Moon/Mars
vision is affordable, and at the outset, that could be the
case. Yet I am concerned that this new vision will become the
next space station, consuming resources as costs begin to rise.
Let me assure you that I have had a little experience
dealing with NASA and these costs will go up, and they will go
up. Some components of this vision are already in place. Some
of the plans for future research on Mars is already underway
and can easily be incorporated into the vision, yet the plans
for the human vehicle and heavy lift capabilities that will be
needed are just now being placed on the drawing board.
Please forgive me if I question if now is the time to begin
the full implementation, or if it would be more prudent to wait
a year and let NASA decide what is needed to accomplish the
goals set out by the President.
I know the Aldridge Commission was created to provide
recommendations for the implementation of the Moon/Mars mission
and that these recommendations are due in early June. This will
be needed and valuable information, but it will, at best,
scratch the surface of what we need to know and only begin to
outline some of the challenges we face.
I am especially troubled by the proposed phase-out of the
Shuttle and the reduced attention to role of the International
Space Station in NASA's mission. We have already spent some
$33.5 billion on the ISS, and the redirection of space policy
calls into question the value of this investment since the role
for the ISS will be severely reduced under the new vision.
In addition, the shuttle is targeted to be decommissioned
by 2010, and the next U.S. manned space vehicle, the Crew
Exploration Vehicle, is not scheduled for flight until 2014.
You will have to go a long way to convince me that a 4-year gap
in U.S. manned space flight is sound policy. More importantly,
I am convinced that this time schedule is too optimistic, in
which case the gap could grow significantly. This raises
serious questions as to cost, shuttle recertification, and
related shuttle safety issues, as well as obligations to our
international partners.
Let me turn now to our international partners. I am
gratified that our partners in the international community have
responded to the needs of the International Space Station since
the Columbia tragedy. The international cooperation has been,
and can continue to be, crucial to the success of the endeavors
of the space station.
Under the President's vision, we will be completely
dependent on other vehicles, most likely Russian, for our human
transport to space for at least 4 years starting in 2010. There
is a hope that the cooperation we have enjoyed with our
partners will continue as we prepare to negotiate the future
plans for the space station.
Count me as a skeptic. If we do not maintain a good
relationship with our partners to the International Space
Station, how can we expect the international community to join
in future activities like the proposed missions to the Moon and
Mars?
Again, this raises serious questions as to how our
obligations to our international partners have changed, how the
costs will be borne and what it means for the use and
maintenance of the International Space Station. What are they
getting for what we're asking from them?
In addition, if the shuttle cannot be certified for a
return to flight until next year, what steps has NASA taken to
ensure that the Soyuz meets the minimum safety requirements
that are now expected for manned space flight since we are
trusting our astronauts to these vehicles? Are we demanding the
same safety standards that we would demand of the shuttle from
the Soyuz? Has this been done? Has this been reviewed?
I understand that there is inherent risk in all of the
activities that NASA undertakes, and with that risk comes the
possibility for failure or reward. Part of the difficulty
involved is in choosing what should be done with limited
resources. The problem is that the future budgets for this
vision have many points where, if something does not work
right, then there will be significant costs to keep us on the
path that is being proposed.
There are those who suggest that the private sector may
step forward. Well, frankly, the experience of the private
sector in trying to work with space has not been good. There
have been problems. There have been failures. And I don't see
an overwhelming cry in the commercial sector for people to step
up and be able to participate in these adventures when past
ones have turned out rather sour.
Now, Mr. Administrator, since you took the helm of NASA, I
have been impressed consistently with your efforts and
commitment to making NASA a better agency. And any concern or
criticism I have with regard to the NASA budget is intended as
no reflection on the deep regard and the high confidence I have
in your leadership. But what really bothers me is I am afraid
you are being asked to do too much with too little, in not
enough time. And then you have the bad luck of asking for more
money for a new program in a time of severe budget constraints.
Nevertheless, we commend your strong leadership and I look
forward to working with you in the months to come. NASA is one
of the most publicly-recognized agencies within the government.
Everyone knows of something that is going on at NASA, be it
stunning pictures of the universe, or the surface of a
neighboring planet. This high visibility can be powerful in
inspiring the future scientists and engineers of this country.
We need new engineers and scientists. We need more young people
in the United States choosing math, science and engineering
curriculums, and I applaud your efforts in keeping NASA
exciting and in attracting the young people of this Nation to
these careers.
I will have a number of questions on these issues and other
concerns that I will either raise today or submit as questions
for the record.
Now, it is my pleasure to turn to my colleague, and close
working partner, the Senator from Maryland, Senator Mikulski.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Senator Bond, and
good morning, Mr. O'Keefe.
The Committee welcomes you and I know we're going to have a
very robust exchange today about a variety of issues.
I so admire NASA because NASA is about discovery,
exploration, science and technology. These are fundamental to
who we are as a Nation. We are a nation of explorers and
discoverers. Human space flight, scientific exploration has
been the foundation of our space program for generations.
My goal as the ranking member of this subcommittee is to
maintain a balanced space program. That means striking a
balance between safe and reliable space transportation, space
science and human exploration. I want to congratulate NASA on
some of its most recent successes. Certainly, we're all so
pleased with the great job with the Mars rover and the great
images we expect to see from your video.
NASA has been able to confirm that water did exist on Mars
and we've seen unprecedented photographs of the Martian
surface, inspiring the Nation and a new generation of kids in
science. I understand the since January 2, there has been more
than 8 billion hits on the NASA website on this topic.
And at the same time they have also had an enormous success
once again with the Hubble telescope. Hubble is NASA's most
successful program since Apollo, and in fact, many say that
Hubble is the greatest scientific instrument since the Galileo
telescope. Since 1993, Hubble has traveled over a billion
miles, taken 330,000 photographs, 25,000 targets, and it
accounted, I understand last year, for 40 percent of the NASA's
discoveries.
Over there is a picture from Hubble. When you look at it,
it looks like a lot of colored dots, but it is a picture of the
universe 13,000,000,000 years ago. It is also a picture of the
universe with 10,000,000 galaxies, that have been discovered
through Hubble. This is a phenomenal achievement.
This extraordinary photograph was made possible thanks to
the astronauts and to the space shuttle. We couldn't have
Hubble without our astronauts and our space shuttle to make
sure that it was launched, fitted with a contact lens, and
service it on many occasions. Each time, though, Hubble has
been serviced by the astronauts through the shuttle, it has
increased Hubble's power by the factor of 10.
There is proposed a fourth and final servicing mission
which would extend the life of Hubble. Remember Hubble is not a
piece of techno-junk that's creaky, tattered and worn. What it
does need though, is like a lot of motors, new batteries and
new gyroscopes. And if we put on it the new technology that is
waiting to be installed, it would once again improve the factor
of Hubble by 10. So extending the life isn't putting Hubble on
a respirator, it is giving us a wider view of the origins of
the universe.
That's why when I received your call, Mr. Administrator,
about the cancelling of the Hubble service mission, I was
shocked and surprised. I know that you cited very clearly that
you were concerned about the cost of Hubble servicing mission
as well as possible danger to the astronauts.
I want you to know that I absolutely agree with you that
astronaut safety has to be our highest priority. It has to be
our highest priority whether we service the Hubble or whether
we complete the space station. We owe it to our astronauts and
I believe that's the history of this panel. But at the same
time the recommendation to cancel Hubble I viewed as surgery,
irrevocable surgery. And I asked you if we could get a second
opinion citing that any prudent person when they're facing
major surgery that is irrevocable would seek the same.
I want to thank you for your cooperation then to seek that
opinion and that's why we turned then, at your request, to
Admiral Gehman who chaired the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board.
Mr. Chairman, we now have the Gehman letter, and I ask
unanimous consent that the Gehman letter be included in the
record.
Senator Bond. Without objection.
Senator Mikulski. We have the letter here.
Now, what Admiral Gehman says in the letter is no matter
what, the use of the shuttle involves risk, whether we go to
the station, whether we go to Hubble, whether we do both, that
using the shuttle involves risk. He also says, that no matter
what mission is undertaken by the astronauts on the shuttle
there must be absolute compliance with the full implementation
of the CAIB.
This is, I think, a major policy and funding decision that
I believe we're ready to commit to today, no matter what we've
got to do, to make sure that the CAIB recommendations are fully
implemented and fully funded, and I'll be asking you questions
along those lines.
At the same time, he then goes into commenting about
Hubble. What Admiral Gehman says, is that complying with the
CAIB return to flight, and I am quoting now, ``NASA has been
challenged when factoring in the International Space Station.
The CAIB allowed more latitude in complying with their
recommendations for non-space station missions.
He then goes on to say, that the Hubble servicing mission
may be slightly, slightly more risky taking into account only
the debris threat from the orbiter. He also called in his
letter for additional study. What he says, then is fully
implement, no matter what, the CAIB. Second, that risk is
slightly more than other missions.
Then he goes on to say, I suggest only a deep and rich
study of the entire gain-risk equation can answer the question
of whether an extension of the life of the Hubble. He says the
life of the wonderful Hubble telescope is worth the risk. So
essentially the Gehman report says slightly more risk and it
needs more study.
I really want to thank Admiral Gehman for what he's done
both for the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, as well as
for this. He is a man of great integrity.
Now, I wholeheartedly concur with the Gehman
recommendations. And when he talks about the additional need
for more study, I reached out to my colleague, Senator Bond,
and am asking you today to cooperate with us for asking the
National Academy of Sciences to study the Hubble servicing
mission. And also, we will be asking for a study from the
General Accounting Office to look at the cost of the servicing
mission.
So we have got to be concerned about Hubble. We have got to
be concerned about the astronauts, and we have to be concerned
about the taxpayer, in order to make a prudent decision.
The National Academy of Sciences, the most prestigious
organization of its kind in the world. Its expertise in science
and engineering make it uniquely qualified to study risks,
mitigation factors, and scientific benefit.
Let's make it clear I will stand up for the Hubble, but I
will always place the priority of our astronauts first. At the
same time, I want the best minds in science and engineering to
tell us what are the risks. And at the same time, look at what
it would cost to decommission the Hubble and not use the $167
million worth of instruments.
GEHMAN LETTER
There are a lot of questions to be asked here, and I look
forward to engaging in a conversation with you about this,
about the NASA priorities as well as the future of our space
program. As well as the use of the station, that has been
raised by my colleague, as well as the future of the Hubble.
Thank you very much.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Harold W. Gehman, Jr.
March 5, 2004.
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski,
Suite 709, Hart Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC, 20510.
Dear Senator Mikulski: In his January 28th letter to you regarding
the cancelled servicing mission to the Hubble telescope, NASA
Administrator Sean O'Keefe indicated he had asked me to provide to you
my views ``. . . regarding safety and risk factors identified in the
report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.'' from my
perspective as Chairman of the Board. The purpose of this letter is to
provide you my views on this matter.
I am pleased to undertake this task because it is fully consistent
with the goals of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). At
the very front of our report, in the ``Board Statement'', we expressed
our belief that:
``The loss of COLUMBIA and her crew represents a turning point,
calling for a renewed public policy debate and commitment regarding
human space exploration. One of our goals has been to set forth the
terms for this debate.''
Whether to fly another mission to the Hubble is one of the public
policy debates this Nation should have, thus I am pleased to add
whatever clarity I can to the terms of the debate.
As you are aware, the CAIB no longer exists; therefore, these views
are my own. They are, however, based on the extensive investigation
into the Columbia accident. Members of the Board are aware of my
efforts, and while the Board is split on the merits of flying this
mission, the Board's characterization of the risks as noted in our
report are fully agreed. This letter is based on our work and insights
gained during the most of careful study of the manned space flight
program ever conducted, as well as recent consultations with the
Stafford-Covey Return to Flight Task Group and others.
How Risky Are Current Shuttle Flights?
The introduction to Chapter Nine, Implications for the Future of
Human Space Flight, is an excellent place to start:
``In this report we have documented numerous indications that
NASA's safety performance has been lacking. But even correcting all
those shortcomings, it should be understood, will not eliminate risk.
All flight entails some measure of risk, and this has been the case
since before the days of the Wright Brothers. Furthermore, the risk is
not distributed evenly over the course of the flight. It is greater by
far at the beginning and end than during the middle.
``This concentration of risk at the endpoints of flight is
particularly true for crew-carrying space missions. The Shuttle Program
has now suffered two accidents, one just over a minute after takeoff
and the other about 16 minutes before landing. The laws of physics make
it extraordinarily difficult to reach Earth orbit and return safely.
Using existing technology, orbital flight is accomplished only by
harnessing a chemical reaction that converts vast amounts of stored
energy into speed. There is great risk in placing human beings atop a
machine that stores and then burns millions of pounds of dangerous
propellants. Equally risky is having humans then ride the machine back
to Earth while it dissipates the orbital speed by converting the energy
into heat, much like a meteor entering the Earth's atmosphere. No
alternative to this pathway to space are available or even on the
horizon, so we must set our sights on managing this risky process using
the most advanced and versatile techniques at our disposal.
``Because of the dangers of ascent and re-entry, because of the
hostility of the space environment, and because we are still relative
newcomers to this realm, operation of the Shuttle and indeed all human
spaceflight must be viewed as a developmental undertaking. Throughout
the COLUMBIA accident investigation, the Board has commented on the
widespread but erroneous perception of the Space Shuttle as somehow
comparable to civil or military air transport. They are not comparable;
the inherent risks of spaceflight are vastly higher, and our experience
level with spaceflight is vastly lower. If Shuttle operations came to
be viewed as routine, it was, at least in part, thanks to the skill and
dedication of those involved in the program. They have made it look
easy, though in fact it never was. The Board urges NASA leadership, the
architects of the U.S. space policy, and the American people to adopt a
realistic understanding of the risks and rewards of venturing into
space.''
In other words, for now and for the foreseeable future, by far most
of the risk in space flight is in the launch, ascent, entry and landing
phases, with a small portion of the total risk associated with the
actual on-orbit mission. One could say that, within reasonable bounds,
whatever one does once on orbit; it doesn't change the total risk
factor very much. The conclusion from this observation, therefore, is
to launch the fewest possible number of Shuttle missions. Indeed, the
bottom line of the ``Future'' part of our Report is to replace the
Shuttle as soon as possible, and to keep this risk equation in mind
when developing the replacement system.
It was one of the CAIB's goals to help national policy makers
understand the risks of Shuttle flights by putting space flight as we
presently conduct it into context. We as a Nation need to understand,
as best we can, the amount of risk we accept while accomplishing our
goals of space exploration. In Chapter Five, we quote the 1989 Office
of Technology Assessment:
``Shuttle reliability is uncertain, but has been estimated to range
between 97 and 99 percent. If the Shuttle reliability is 98 percent,
there would be a 50-50 chance of losing an Orbiter with 34 flights . .
. The probability of maintaining at least three Orbiters in the Shuttle
fleet declines to less than 50 percent after flight 113.'' (STS-107,
the ill-fated Columbia flight, was the 113th Shuttle mission).
And we quote the 1990 Augustine Commission Report:
``And although it is a subject that meets with reluctance to open
discussion, and has therefore too often been relegated to silence, the
statistical evidence indicates that we are likely to lose another Space
Shuttle in the next several years . . . probably before the planned
Space Station is completely established on orbit.''
To put these very accurate predictions into today's context, we
should use figures we know are accurate. We have flown 111 out of 113
Space Shuttle missions safely, for a 98.23 percent reliability rate.
The chance that we will be able to fly 25 future missions using this
reliability figure without a loss is 64 percent. The more missions we
fly, the more that 64 percent number goes down. It is my opinion that
implementing all the Return to Flight recommendations made by the CAIB
raises the reliability number somewhat, although no one knows for sure
what it is. A reliability number more like 99 percent seems reasonable
to me, giving a 78 percent chance we will fly the 25 missions without
loss. Once again, more missions cause that 78 percent number to go
down. Flying one more mission, 26 in all, reduces the probability of
series success by about 1 percentage point.
The bottom line: Shuttle flights are dangerous and we should fly
the minimum number necessary. Almost all the risk is concentrated in
the front and back of the mission, where one goes on orbit makes little
difference.
What Can Be Done To Mitigate the Risk?
The recommendations contained in the Columbia Accident
Investigation Report pertaining to return to flight are specifically
designed to break the coupling or linkage between the propensity of the
Shuttle external tank to shed ice and debris and the loss of crew and
vehicle. To increase the chances of mission success and decrease the
chances that future shedding events, which are inevitable in our view,
will result in a catastrophic outcome, four measures are required. The
Board feels all four are required; picking and choosing from among the
four does not meet our intent.
First, measures must be taken to more fully understand why foam
shedding in particular occurs and what steps must be taken to reduce
it. This recommendation requires research and development activity as
well as some sub-element re-design steps. NASA is well along in
implementing this recommendation.
Second, measures must be taken to more fully understand the true
strength of the parts of the Orbiter that are most likely to be
damaged. The CAIB found, for example, no agreement, backed by test
data, on the current strength of the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon wing
leading edge components. This recommendation will allow NASA to
understand the true nature of the risk to the Orbiter from debris
shedding events.
Third, measures must be taken to image the Orbiter both during
launch and on-orbit to characterize any hits and to essentially ``re-
certify'' the Orbiter for entry. This recommendation includes much
better launch complex camera systems, range imaging systems and an
ability to thoroughly inspect the exterior TPS of the Orbiter in space
prior to entry.
Fourth, measures must be taken to develop and deploy a capability
to make emergency, on-orbit repairs to the TPS to any damage that is
deemed threatening to successful entry. This step cannot be
accomplished unless steps two and three above are done.
In the view of the Board, all four steps are required, and
selecting from among them is not sufficient. While we studied and
deliberated these Return to Flight recommendations, it became apparent
to us that missions to the ISS had a significant advantage in
implementing our recommendations over those that were not going to the
ISS. Consequently we decided to differentiate RTF recommendations
between missions to the ISS and non-ISS missions. Our report refers
only to ISS missions or non-ISS missions. We did not specify what non-
ISS missions might be flown (Columbia's final mission was, of course, a
non-ISS mission). In our view, missions to the ISS allowed a more
complete and robust inspection and repair capability to be developed.
However, knowing that there are situations where docking to the ISS
may not occur, we required that ultimately NASA must develop an
autonomous on orbit inspection and repair capability. Very frankly, we
called for a less technically challenging inspection and repair
capability, by stating:
``For non-Station missions, develop a comprehensive autonomous
(independent of Station) inspection and repair capability to cover the
widest possible range of damage scenarios''.
In other words: ``Do the best you can''. We knew we were
essentially REDUCING the requirements. Reducing the rigor of our
requirements INCREASES the risk. It cannot be seen any other way. If
fully complying with the CAIB RTF technical requirements decreases the
risk, complying with lesser requirements must increase the risk. The
risk difference is probably not knowable in advance, and knowing the
technical capabilities involved the risk difference is probably small,
but it is not zero.
It is important to remember the CAIB is talking about risk to the
Orbiter from debris shedding events. There are many other factors
involved that influence the total risk equation, sometimes very
significantly. One of the more significant factors is the heavy cargo
loads that are frequently carried to the ISS at high inclinations,
which creates risk factors of their own. We did not look at total
mission risk and I am not prepared to analyze the total risk equation
for all possible Shuttle missions. Further, the CAIB specifically used
the generic term ``non-ISS'' missions to avoid any judgments regarding
the relative value of one mission over another.
Bottom line: Complying fully with the CAIB's RTF recommendations is
less a challenge when factoring in the ISS. The CAIB allowed more
latitude in complying with our recommendations for non-ISS missions,
which may be slightly more risky, taking into account only the debris
shedding threat to the Orbiter.
Senator, in Chapter Nine of our Report, titled: ``Implications for
the Future of Human Space Flight'', we made the declarative statement
that: ``It is the view of the Board that the present Shuttle is not
inherently unsafe''. We were under no pressure to conclude either way
on this issue. But I always like to point out that there are two
negatives in that quote. We are not saying the Shuttle is ``safe'', it
certainly is not by any common understanding of the word ``safe''. Nor
are we saying it is unsafe and should be abandoned. Our study and
report are designed to help NASA manage the substantial risks involved.
I suggest only a deep and rich study of the entire gain/risk equation
can answer the question of whether an extension of the life of the
wonderful Hubble telescope is worth the risks involved, and that is
beyond the scope of this letter. What I have attempted to do is offer a
very frank review of the risks to all Shuttle operations, Hubble or
non-Hubble, as we understand them.
I hope this letter is useful, and as always, I am prepared to
answer any questions you or your committee may have.
Very respectfully,
Harold W. Gehman, Jr.,
Admiral, USN (Ret.).
Senator Bond. Thank you, Senator Mikulski.
I appreciate your very thoughtful comments. I now turn to
Senator Shelby, our colleague from Alabama.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to ask
that my entire written statement be made part of the record.
Senator Bond. Without objection.
Senator Shelby. And I will be brief.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself
with your remarks. I thought you, as chairman of the committee,
laid out a lot of our concerns, as well as did the former
chairman and now ranking Senator Mikulski. A lot of our
concerns and a lot of our questions.
And I had the pleasure, yesterday, of meeting with Mr.
O'Keefe. I, like you, hold him in high regard, but there are a
lot of serious questions that we've got to probe here. We've
got to figure out what we can do, and why we're abandoning--or
should we abandon some things that are very important to the
future. And I think that Senator Mikulski's idea about dealing
with the National Academy of Sciences and getting their opinion
on a lot of things is very sound.
Other than that, Mr. Chairman, I am awaiting the remarks of
Mr. O'Keefe.
Thank you.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Shelby.
Mr. Administrator, please go ahead.
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR SEAN O'KEEFE
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to be here and I thank you very
much for the opportunity to return to very familiar grounds,
having served on the Appropriations Committee staff in a prior
life. I am always delighted to be back before this forum. If
you permit me, sir, I will submit for the record my prepared
statement and be very brief in my summary of it.
Senator Bond. Without objection. We will be happy to have
your comments.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First and foremost, I think the debate that was launched as
the consequence of the CAIB report to establish a national
vision, to have a focus and a set of objectives that would be
articulated for the Nation's space policy, is an element that
certainly after the CAIB report, was engaged in vigorously in
all the appropriate oversight committees of Congress, as well
as in broader fora within the space community. Those calls for
a vision were answered.
The President responded to that. On January 14, he
established very firmly, through a long, extensive inter-agency
process that involved many other agencies of the Federal
Government in addition to NASA, a collaborative position, that
he forwarded on that date, that very clearly articulated a new
direction, a new focus, and a new strategy for our space
exploration objectives.
It is a destiny as explorers as opposed to about a
destination. There is a very clear statement that he made that
establishes that explorations are our primary focus and
objective as opposed to trying to set individual destinations
milestones. So when those calls for a vision were made, it was
received and that's precisely what he ultimately stated.
Interestingly, the National Academy of Sciences on a
different matter entirely endorsed that particular approach in
a study they just released here from the National Academy of
Sciences and Engineering, through the National Research
Council, where it very clearly articulates the proposal of a
broader exploration and discovery agenda for the purpose of
developing the technologies to achieve those tasks.
In that regard, we're gratified to see the National Academy
of Sciences' view that helps us move in the direction of
implementing the strategy, I think in very constructive ways.
In addition to what we will see from the Aldridge Commission,
that as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, will be convening and
devising implementation strategies as well.
Secondly, it is about the Earth. It is about the moon. It's
about Mars. It's about beyond. It's one stepping stone at a
time. A very specific strategy the President laid out that
identifies the approaches on how we would achieve that by
degrees and by increments, as opposed by destinations and by,
you know, breakneck type of crash programs that have typified
the approaches we have taken in the past. That's not what he
articulated here.
Indeed, the Mars successes you've referred to in your
statements, are one of first steps in that direction, an
advanced guard, if you will, that establishes those precursor
missions necessary to inform subsequent missions that would
follow.
Thirdly, it is about, as he articulated, an impact to all
of our lives here on Earth. For every dollar expended for NASA
related activities, $7 are spun-off into the economy in a
variety of different ways of technology developments that would
not have occurred were it not for those approaches. They affect
a broad range of things beyond the aerospace and aeronautics
community, also a range of medical advances that certainly have
benefitted as a result of those activities.
To your point, I think raised by Senator Mikulski, people
really care. Eight billion hits to the website in a span of no
more than 2 months is a phenomenal testimony to the interest
that folks have. It isn't just Mars. About 30 percent of those
hits have been to the Mars-related kinds of websites. The other
70 percent is the range of all other activities that we're
engaged in. By comparison, all of last year, the websites
received hits of 2.8 billion, all of last year. So, this has
been a factor of 3-plus over the levels we have already seen,
just in the span of 60 days. There is no question that the
interest level is high. People care about what we're engaged
in, and are excited and inspired by the notion of it.
Finally, it is about, as has been traditionally a nature of
the debate, not just about people, or human space flight, or
about robotics, it is about both. It's a combination of both
efforts. I think Senator Mikulski, you summarized that very
well, in one of the stellar successes of how that capability
between humans and robotic capabilities, as demonstrated by the
Hubble Space Telescope, for example, over the years, some
extraordinary achievements in that regard.
It's a precursor or effort, if you will, of establishing
how that can be done and set the precedent in so many ways of
what the strategy that the President articulated. In this
particular case, it would apply for each successive venture
that we follow from here on.
Let me just summarize and conclude by asking that the video
be keyed-up at this point that articulates what that direction
is. It's a short discussion, but it moves through the very
specific objectives and agenda of what is involved in this
strategy, in words that the President articulated and
established on the 14 of January.
If we could.
Mr. Chairman, as the President summarized, it is a journey,
not a race and we have designed the budget in order to assure
that it is that way. The approach that we have taken to this as
illustrated by this one graph, is based on long term
affordability, not a balloon payment. Something that
progressively builds on successes before we move ahead to the
next stage.
PREPARED STATEMENT
And again, I would ask your consent, sir, to insert for the
record the National Academy of Sciences' study on these efforts
and what these objectives should be, and we will certainly
debate the question of how deliberately we are in the process
of implementing it.
I thank you, sir.
Senator Bond. It will be accepted for the record, and I
thank you very much.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Administrator Sean O'Keefe
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA's fiscal year 2005 budget
request. On January 14th, the President visited NASA Headquarters and
announced his Vision for U.S. Space Exploration. In his address, the
President presented a vision that is bold and forward-thinking, yet
practical and responsible--one that explores answers to longstanding
questions of importance to science and society and develops
revolutionary technologies and capabilities for the future, while
maintaining conscientious stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
The vision forms the basis of the new U.S. space exploration
policy, ``A Renewed Spirit of Discovery,'' a copy of which is appended
to this testimony as Enclosure 1. This policy is the product of months
of extensive and careful deliberation. The importance of these
deliberations increased with the findings of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board, which emphasized the importance of setting clear,
long-term goals for the Nation's human space flight program. Inputs
from Members of Congress informed the administration's deliberations.
Many others contributed ideas for the future of the space program.
These deliberations were also the basis for formulating the President's
fiscal year 2005 budget request for NASA. A commission appointed by the
President will advise NASA on specific issues for implementation of the
policy's goals within 4 months.
Today, I will summarize the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request for NASA, discuss the goals set forth in the new U.S. space
exploration policy, outline the major implementation elements and their
associated budget details, explain the implications of this directive
for NASA's organization, and describe what the Nation's future in
exploration and discovery will look like in the coming years.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET SUMMARY
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for NASA is $16.244
billion, a 5.6 percent increase over fiscal year 2004, as reflected in
Enclosure 2. The NASA budget request is designed with four key
principles in mind:
Compelling.--The budget fully supports the Vision for U.S. Space
Exploration, and provides for ongoing NASA mission priorities such as
Aeronautics and Earth Science.
Affordable.--The budget is fiscally responsible and consistent with
the administration's goal of cutting the Federal deficit in half within
the next 5 years. NASA's fiscal year 2005 budget will increase by $1
billion over 5 years, when compared with the President's fiscal year
2004 plan; that is an increase of approximately 5 percent per year over
each of the next 3 years and approximately 1 percent for each of the
following 2 years.
Achievable.--The budget strategy supporting the vision for
sustainable exploration will not require large balloon payments by
future Congresses and administrations. Unlike previous major civil
space initiatives, this approach is intentionally flexible, with
investments in sustainable exploration approaches to maintain
affordability. After fiscal year 2009, the budget projects that the
exploration vision can be implemented within a NASA budget that keeps
pace with inflation.
Focused.--The budget begins the alignment of NASA's program
structure with the exploration vision. We now have the needed compass
with which to evaluate our programs and make the required tough
decisions.
VISION GOALS
The fundamental goal of this new policy is to advance U.S.
scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space
exploration program. In support of this goal, NASA will:
--Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to
explore the Solar System and beyond;
--Extend human presence across the Solar System, starting with a
human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for
the human exploration of Mars and other destinations;
--Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures
both to explore and to support decisions about destinations for
future human exploration; and
--Promote international and commercial participation in exploration
to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.
IMPLEMENTATION ELEMENTS AND BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS
To achieve these goals, NASA will plan and implement an integrated,
long-term robotic and human exploration program, structured with
measurable milestones and executed on the basis of available resources,
accumulated experience, and technology readiness. The policy envisions
the following major implementation elements:
Space Shuttle.--NASA will safely return the Space Shuttle to flight
as soon as practical, based on the recommendations of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board. The budget includes $4.3 billion for the
Space Shuttle, a 9 percent increase above fiscal year 2004. Included in
this total is an estimated $238 million for Return to Flight (RTF)
activities in fiscal year 2005. The RTF activities are under evaluation
to confirm the estimated cost and associated out year phasing. The
focus of the Space Shuttle will be finishing assembly of the
International Space Station (ISS). With its job done, the Space Shuttle
will be phased out when assembly of the ISS is complete, planned for
the end of the decade. NASA will determine over the next year how best
to address the issues associated with the safe retirement of the Space
Shuttle fleet.
International Space Station.--NASA plans to complete assembly of
the International Space Station by the end of the decade, including
those U.S. components that will ensure our capability to conduct
research in support of the new U.S. space exploration goals, as well as
those elements planned and provided by foreign partners. The budget
provides $1.9 billion for ISS assembly and operations, a 24 percent
increase above fiscal year 2004. This increase forward funds $100
million in reserves to partially restore planned near-term reserve
levels following the $200 million congressional cut to Space Station in
fiscal year 2004 and provides $140 million in new funding for
transportation services to the Space Station. We will separate, to the
maximum extent practical, crew and cargo transportation for both ISS
and exploration missions. NASA will acquire ISS crew transport as
required and will acquire cargo transportation as soon as practical and
affordable. NASA envisions that commercial and/or foreign capabilities
will provide these services.
The administration is also prepared to address issues associated
with obtaining foreign transportation services to the Space Station,
including provisions of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, but, until the
ISS Partnership adopts a specific implementation strategy, it is
premature to identify specific issues.
U.S. research activities aboard the ISS will be focused to support
the new exploration goals, with an emphasis on understanding how the
space environment affects astronaut health and capabilities, and on
developing appropriate countermeasures to mitigate health concerns. ISS
will also be vital to developing and demonstrating improved life
support systems and medical care. Consistent with this focus, the
budget provides $343 million, a 61 percent increase above the fiscal
year 2004 request, for bioastronautics research to understand and
mitigate risks to humans on exploration missions. Over the next year,
the Biological and Physical Research Enterprise will conduct a thorough
review of all research activities to ensure that they are fully aligned
with and supportive of the new exploration vision.
New Space Transportation Capabilities.--The budget provides $428
million to begin a new Crew Exploration Vehicle, named Project
Constellation, which will provide crew transport for exploration
missions beyond low-Earth orbit. The current budget planning is based
on formulation concept studies to be conducted in fiscal year 2004,
preliminary design activities conducted in fiscal year 2005-2006, a
System Design Review in fiscal year 2005, and a Preliminary Design
Review in fiscal year 2006. NASA plans to develop Project Constellation
in a step-by-step approach, with an initial unpiloted test flight as
early as 2008, followed by tests of progressively more capable designs
that provide an operational human-rated capability no later than 2014.
Project Constellation may also provide transportation to the Space
Station, but its design will be driven by exploration requirements.
NASA does not plan to pursue new Earth-to-orbit transportation
capabilities, except where necessary to support unique exploration
needs, such as those that could be met by a heavy lift vehicle. The
budget discontinues the Space Launch Initiative, although knowledge
gained on the Orbital Space Plane will be transferred to Project
Constellation.
Lunar Exploration.--NASA will undertake lunar exploration and
demonstration activities to enable the sustained human and robotic
exploration of Mars and other destinations in the Solar System.
Beginning no later than 2008, NASA plans to launch the first in a
series of robotic missions to the Moon to prepare for and support human
exploration activities. The budget provides $70 million for these
robotic lunar test beds, increasing to $420 million by fiscal year
2009. The policy envisions the first human expedition to the lunar
surface as early as 2015, but no later than 2020. These robotic and
human missions will further science and demonstrate new approaches,
technologies, and systems--including the use of space resources--to
support sustained human exploration to Mars and other destinations.
Exploration of Mars.--The stunning images we have received since
January 2004 from Mars, and the recent findings by the Opportunity
Rover of evidence of water on the Meridiani Planum, lay the foundation
of the Vision for U.S. Space Exploration. NASA will enhance the ongoing
search for water and evidence of life on Mars by pursuing technologies
in this decade to be incorporated into advanced science missions to
Mars in the next decade. Also starting in the next decade, NASA will
launch a dedicated series of robotic missions to Mars that will
demonstrate greatly enhanced capabilities and enable the future human
exploration of the Red Planet. The budget provides $691 million for
Mars Exploration, a 16 percent increase over fiscal year 2004, and will
double Mars Exploration funding by fiscal year 2009. NASA will conduct
human expeditions to Mars and other destinations beyond Earth orbit on
the basis of available resources, accumulated experience, and
technology readiness.
Other Solar System Exploration.--Over the next two decades, NASA
will conduct an increasingly capable campaign of robotic exploration
across the Solar System. The budget provides $1.2 billion for Solar
System Exploration missions to Jupiter's icy moons, to Saturn and its
moon Titan, to asteroids and comets, and to other Solar System bodies.
These missions will search for potentially habitable environments,
evidence of life, and resources, and help us to understand the history
of the Solar System.
Extrasolar Planets.--NASA will launch advanced space telescopes
that will search for Earth-like planets and habitable environments
around other stars. The budget includes $1.1 billion for the
Astronomical Search for Origins, a 19 percent increase over fiscal year
2004, to support the recently launched Spitzer Space Telescope, James
Webb Space Telescope development, as well as several future
observatories. This funding also supports investments to extend the
lifetime of the Hubble Space Telescope to the maximum extent possible
without a Shuttle servicing mission and to safely deorbit the
observatory when its science operations cease.
Enabling Capabilities.--NASA will pursue a number of key
capabilities to enable sustainable human and robotic exploration across
the Solar System. Among the most important of these capabilities is
advanced power and propulsion, and the budget provides $438 million for
Project Prometheus to develop these technologies for future robotic and
human exploration missions. The budget also includes $636 million in
other Human and Robotic Technology funding to pursue sustainable
approaches to Solar System exploration, such as reusable and modular
systems, pre-positioned propellants, space resource utilization,
automated systems and robotic networks, and in-space assembly. These
technologies and techniques will be demonstrated on the ground, in
orbit, and on the Moon beginning in this decade and extending into the
next to help inform future exploration decisions. The budget projects
that funding for these Human and Robotic Technology investments will
grow to $1 billion by fiscal year 2009.
The budget also includes innovative opportunities for U.S.
industry, academia, and members of the public to help meet the
technical challenges inherent in the new space exploration vision. The
budget includes $20 million for the new Centennial Challenges program,
which will establish competitions to stimulate innovation in space and
aeronautical technologies that can advance the exploration vision and
other NASA missions. The budget also provides $10 million for NASA to
purchase launch services for its payloads from emerging launch vehicle
providers. And as previously mentioned, the budget includes $140
million for Space Station transportation services.
Ongoing Priorities.--The budget supports the Vision for U.S. Space
Exploration, while maintaining NASA commitments in other important
roles and missions.
NASA continues its commitment to understanding our changing global
climate. The budget makes NASA the largest contributor to the
interagency Climate Change Science Program with $100 million for the
Climate Change Research Initiative. The budget includes $560 million
for Earth System Science research, a 7 percent increase above fiscal
year 2004, to support research on data from 80 sensors on 18 satellites
currently in operation. Work also continues on Earth observation
missions in development or formulation, including $141 million (a 36
percent increase from fiscal year 2004) for the National Polar Orbiting
Environmental Satellite System Preparatory Project, and $240 million (a
37 percent increase from fiscal year 2004) for missions in formulation,
such as the Orbiting Carbon Observatory, Aquarius, and Hydros, as well
as the Landsat Data Continuity Mission.
NASA maintains planned Aeronautics Technology investments to
improve our Nation's air system. The budget includes: $188 million, a 4
percent increase above fiscal year 2004, for technology to reduce
aircraft accidents and improve the security of our Nation's aviation
system against terrorist threats; $72 million, an 11 percent increase
above fiscal year 2004, for technology to reduce aircraft noise and
improve the quality of life for residents living near airports; $209
million for technology to reduce aircraft emissions and improve
environmental quality; and $154 million for technologies to increase
air system capacity and reduce delays at the Nation's airports.
NASA will continue to make fundamental advances in our knowledge of
the Sun and the Universe. The budget provides $746 million for Sun-
Earth Connection missions, including the Solar Dynamics Observatory and
the Solar-Terrestrial Relations Observatory. The budget also provides
$378 million for Structure and Evolution of the Universe missions,
including the Chandra X-ray Observatory and three major missions
currently under development.
NASA maintains its role in science, engineering and math education.
The budget includes $10 million for the newly authorized Science and
Technology Scholarship program, which will help attract the Nation's
best college students to NASA science and engineering careers. The
budget also provides $14 million for the NASA Explorer Schools program,
which seeks to attract students to mathematics and science during the
critical middle school years. The Explorer Schools program is entering
its third phase and will be selecting 50 new schools for a total of 150
participating schools.
NASA's education programs are, and will continue to be imbedded and
directly linked to our vision for space exploration. Students now have
unprecedented opportunities to engage in NASA flight programs, the
observation of distant galaxies, and the robotic exploration of distant
planets. Mission experiences link students and classrooms to NASA's
diverse personnel, research facilities, telescopes, and planetary
probes. Our successful efforts to ``inspire the next generation of
explorers'' sustain a continuous pipeline of scientists, technologists,
engineers, mathematicians, and teachers to carry forward our Nation's
exploration goals.
Management of Human Capital, Facilities and Institution.--NASA has
the distinction of being the only Federal agency to earn top grades for
the Human Capital and Budget and Performance Integration initiatives
under the President's Management Agenda. Congress recently passed the
NASA Flexibility Act of 2004. NASA is grateful for the hard work of
this committee in shaping this legislation to provide the necessary
flexibilities to better manage the NASA workforce. These flexibilities
will be critical to implementing the exploration vision. The budget
includes $25 million in fiscal year 2005 to begin to address critical
workforce skill and aging issues. NASA ratings have also improved in
the Competitive Sourcing and E-Government initiatives, resulting in
more total improvements than in any other agency. Although we received
a disclaimed opinion on our recent audit statement, we are determined
to pursue the right path in Financial Management bringing on a new
financial system that will standardize accounting across the Agency and
provide the tools necessary for improved program management. NASA
remains committed to management excellence and believes it is essential
to implementing the new exploration vision.
The budget includes funding for critical institutional
capabilities, including $77 million for the NASA Engineering Safety
Center and $27 million for our software Independent Verification and
Validation facility. The budget also provides $307 million, a $41
million increase versus fiscal year 2004, for facilities maintenance.
ORGANIZING FOR EXPLORATION
To successfully execute the exploration vision, NASA will re-focus
its organization, create new offices, align ongoing programs,
experiment with new ways of doing business, and tap the great
innovative and creative talents of our Nation.
The President has issued an Executive Order establishing a
commission of private and public sector experts to advise us on these
issues. Pete Aldridge former Undersecretary of Defense and Secretary of
the Air Force, is Chair of the Commission. The President has named
eight other commissioners to join Mr. Aldridge. The commission will
issue its report within 4 months of its first meeting, which was held
on February 11, 2004.
Immediately following the President's speech, we established an
Exploration Systems Enterprise, which will have the responsibility for
developing the Crew Exploration Vehicle and other exploration systems
and technologies. Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Craig Steidle, former
manager of the Defense Department's Joint Strike Fighter Program, is
heading this new organization. Relevant programs of the Aerospace
Technology, Space Science, and Space Flight enterprises are being
transferred to the Exploration Systems Enterprise. The Aerospace
Technology Enterprise has been renamed the Aeronautics Enterprise to
reflect its new focus.
As human explorers prepare to join their robotic counterparts,
coordination and integration among NASA's diverse efforts will
increase. The Exploration Systems Enterprise will work closely with the
Space Science Enterprise to use the Moon to demonstrate new approaches,
technologies, and systems to support sustained human exploration.
NASA's Space Science Enterprise will have the responsibility for
implementing early robotic testbeds on the Moon and Mars, and will also
demonstrate other key exploration technologies--such as advanced power
and communications--in missions to Mars and Jupiter's moons. NASA's
Space Science Enterprise will eventually integrate human capabilities
into exploration planning for Mars and other destinations.
Many other elements of the NASA organization will be focused to
support this new direction. NASA's Biological and Physical Research
Enterprise will put much greater emphasis on bioastronautics research
to enable the human exploration of other worlds. NASA's Office of the
Space Architect will be responsible for integrating the exploration
activities of NASA's different Enterprises and for maintaining
exploration roadmaps and coordinating high-level requirements.
As we move outward into the Solar System, NASA will look for
innovative ideas from the private sector and academia to support
activities in Earth orbit and future exploration activities beyond.
Many of the technical challenges that NASA will face in the coming
years will require innovative solutions. In addition to tapping
creative thinking within the NASA organization, we will leverage the
ideas and expertise resident in the Nation's universities and industry.
In his speech, the President directed NASA to invite other nations
to share in the challenges and opportunities of this new era of
exploration and discovery, and he directed us to fulfill our standing
international commitments on ISS. We are discussing the impact of our
vision implementation plans on the ISS with our partners, and as I have
already indicated, we will complete the assembly of the ISS. The
President called our future course of exploration ``a journey, not a
race,'' and other nations have reacted positively to the Vision;
several have already contacted us about joining in this journey.
Building on NASA's long history and extensive and close ties with the
space and research agencies of other nations, we will actively seek
international partners in executing future exploration activities
``that support U.S. goals'' or ``wherever appropriate''.
NASA will also invigorate its workforce, focus its facilities, and
revitalize its field centers. As exploration activities get underway,
NASA anticipates planning, reviews, and changes to align and improve
its infrastructure. In order to achieve the exploration vision, we will
be making decisions on how to best implement new programs. While some
of these necessary actions will be difficult, they are essential to
achieving the goals of the overall effort before us. I urge you to
consider the full context of what we will be proposing rather than any
isolated, specific action. Such a perspective will allow us to move
forward in implementing the vision.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Much of the NASA's future ability to achieve the new space
exploration vision is predicated on NASA's many previous
accomplishments. The most visible NASA successes over the past year are
the Spirit and Opportunity rovers currently on Mars. Already, the
landscapes imaged by these twin rovers and their initial science
returns are hinting at fundamental advances in our understanding of
early environmental conditions on Mars; last week's announcement
regarding the discovery of evidence that there was once liquid water on
Mars' surface is a dramatic example of such an advance.
However, Spirit and Opportunity are not the only recent NASA
mission successes. NASA and its partners successfully launched seven
new Space Science missions (including the two Mars rovers), three new
Earth Science missions, one new NASA communications relay satellite,
and completed two Space Station deployment missions. Operating missions
have achieved a number of notable successes, including the Stardust
mission's successful flight through the tail of Comet Wild-2, initial
images from the recently launched Spitzer Space Telescope, a 10- to
100-fold improvement in Earth's gravity map from the GRACE satellite,
the most accurate maps of Earth temperatures to date from the Aqua
satellite, and new insights into space weather and solar activity from
Sun-Earth Connection missions.
NASA exceeded or met 83 percent of its annual performance goals for
fiscal year 2003. Among these accomplishments were demonstrations of
new systems to improve air traffic control and to combat aircraft
icing, improvements in battery, telescope sensor, and life support
technologies; fundamental advances in understanding states of matter
(from Space Station research); and the implementation of new remote
sensing tools for tracking diseases and wild fires.
THE NATION'S FUTURE IN EXPLORATION AND DISCOVERY
As the President stated in his speech, we are embarking on a
journey, not a race. We begin this journey of exploration and discovery
knowing that many years of hard work and sustained effort will be
required, yet we can look forward to achieving concrete results in the
near term. The vision makes the needed decisions to secure long-term
U.S. space leadership. It provides an exciting set of major milestones
with human and robotic missions. It pursues compelling science and
cutting-edge technologies. It invites new ideas and innovations for
accomplishing these bold, new endeavors. And it will provide the
opportunity for new generations of Americans to explore, innovate,
discover, and enrich our Nation in ways unimaginable today. This
challenging Vision provides unique opportunities for engaging students
across the country, ``as only NASA can,'' to enter careers in science,
engineering, technology, and math.
I sincerely appreciate the forum that the subcommittee has provided
today, and I look forward to responding to your questions.
______
Enclosure 1
A Renewed Spirit of Discovery
THE PRESIDENT'S VISION FOR U.S. SPACE EXPLORATION--PRESIDENT GEORGE W.
BUSH, JANUARY, 2004
Background
From the Apollo landings on the Moon, to robotic surveys of the Sun
and the planets, to the compelling images captured by advanced space
telescopes, U.S. achievements in space have revolutionized humanity's
view of the universe and have inspired Americans and people around the
world. These achievements also have led to the development of
technologies that have widespread applications to address problems on
Earth. As the world enters the second century of powered flight, it is
time to articulate a new vision that will define and guide U.S. space
exploration activities for the next several decades.
Today, humanity has the potential to seek answers to the most
fundamental questions posed about the existence of life beyond Earth.
Telescopes have found planets around other stars. Robotic probes have
identified potential resources on the Moon, and evidence of water--a
key ingredient for life--has been found on Mars and the moons of
Jupiter.
Direct human experience in space has fundamentally altered our
perspective of humanity and our place in the universe. Humans have the
ability to respond to the unexpected developments inherent in space
travel and possess unique skills that enhance discoveries. Just as
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo challenged a generation of Americans, a
renewed U.S. space exploration program with a significant human
component can inspire us--and our youth--to greater achievements on
Earth and in space.
The loss of Space Shuttles Challenger and Columbia and their crews
are a stark reminder of the inherent risks of space flight and the
severity of the challenges posed by space exploration. In preparation
for future human exploration, we must advance our ability to live and
work safely in space and, at the same time, develop the technologies to
extend humanity's reach to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. The new
technologies required for further space exploration also will improve
the Nation's other space activities and may provide applications that
could be used to address problems on Earth.
Like the explorers of the past and the pioneers of flight in the
last century, we cannot today identify all that we will gain from space
exploration; we are confident, nonetheless, that the eventual return
will be great. Like their efforts, the success of future U.S. space
exploration will unfold over generations.
Goal and Objectives
The fundamental goal of this vision is to advance U.S. scientific,
security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration
program. In support of this goal, the United States will:
--Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to
explore the solar system and beyond;
--Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a
human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for
human exploration of Mars and other destinations;
--Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures
both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations
for human exploration; and
--Promote international and commercial participation in exploration
to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests.
Bringing the Vision to Reality
The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration will be responsible for the plans, programs, and
activities required to implement this vision, in coordination with
other agencies, as deemed appropriate. The Administrator will plan and
implement an integrated, long-term robotic and human exploration
program structured with measurable milestones and executed on the basis
of available resources, accumulated experience, and technology
readiness.
To implement this vision, the Administrator will conduct the
following activities and take other actions as required:
Exploration Activities in Low Earth Orbit
Space Shuttle
--Return the Space Shuttle to flight as soon as practical, based on
the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board;
--Focus use of the Space Shuttle to complete assembly of the
International Space Station; and
--Retire the Space Shuttle as soon as assembly of the International
Space Station is completed, planned for the end of this decade;
International Space Station
--Complete assembly of the International Space Station, including the
U.S. components that support U.S. space exploration goals and
those provided by foreign partners, planned for the end of this
decade;
--Focus U.S. research and use of the International Space Station on
supporting space exploration goals, with emphasis on
understanding how the space environment affects astronaut
health and capabilities and developing countermeasures; and
--Conduct International Space Station activities in a manner
consistent with U.S. obligations contained in the agreements
between the United States and other partners in the
International Space Station.
Space Exploration Beyond Low Earth Orbit
The Moon
--Undertake lunar exploration activities to enable sustained human
and robotic exploration of Mars and more distant destinations
in the solar system;
--Starting no later than 2008, initiate a series of robotic missions
to the Moon to prepare for and support future human exploration
activities;
--Conduct the first extended human expedition to the lunar surface as
early as 2015, but no later than the year 2020; and
--Use lunar exploration activities to further science, and to develop
and test new approaches, technologies, and systems, including
use of lunar and other space resources, to support sustained
human space exploration to Mars and other destinations.
Mars and Other Destinations
--Conduct robotic exploration of Mars to search for evidence of life,
to understand the history of the solar system, and to prepare
for future human exploration;
--Conduct robotic exploration across the solar system for scientific
purposes and to support human exploration. In particular,
explore Jupiter's moons, asteroids and other bodies to search
for evidence of life, to understand the history of the solar
system, and to search for resources;
--Conduct advanced telescope searches for Earth-like planets and
habitable environments around other stars;
--Develop and demonstrate power generation, propulsion, life support,
and other key capabilities required to support more distant,
more capable, and/or longer duration human and robotic
exploration of Mars and other destinations; and
--Conduct human expeditions to Mars after acquiring adequate
knowledge about the planet using robotic missions and after
successfully demonstrating sustained human exploration missions
to the Moon.
Space Transportation Capabilities Supporting Exploration
--Develop a new crew exploration vehicle to provide crew
transportation for missions beyond low Earth orbit;
--Conduct the initial test flight before the end of this decade in
order to provide an operational capability to support human
exploration missions no later than 2014;
--Separate to the maximum practical extent crew from cargo
transportation to the International Space Station and for
launching exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit;
--Acquire cargo transportation as soon as practical and affordable
to support missions to and from the International Space
Station; and
--Acquire crew transportation to and from the International Space
Station, as required, after the Space Shuttle is retired
from service.
International and Commercial Participation
--Pursue opportunities for international participation to support
U.S. space exploration goals; and
--Pursue commercial opportunities for providing transportation and
other services supporting the International Space Station and
exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit.
______
Enclosure 2
[Clerk's Note.--The additional information referred to has
been retained in Committee files.]
Senator Bond. We've been joined by the chairman of the full
committee. Mr. Chairman, would you have any comments?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. I welcome the Administrator, and I
congratulate him on the success of his mission so far, and look
forward to working with him in the years to come.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
Senator Stevens. I think we ought to each put in a little
reservation for some space on that trip in 2015.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure to
see you.
Senator Bond. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to defer to
you. You can have my slot.
Senator Stevens. Well they sent something up. I think it
was 80 years of age, and I think I will put in for my
reservation when I'm 90 years of age.
SHUTTLE RETIREMENT
Senator Bond. If you want to go, we will work it out.
Mr. Administrator, at this time, the shuttle is the only
U.S. vehicle capable of taking astronauts to and from space.
Under the new vision for NASA, the shuttle would be retired and
the space station constructed and completed in 2010. That's
optimistic.
A new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) would be developed and
fully operational for orbital missions by 2014. What will be
the consequences of a 4-year and possibly longer hiatus, in
U.S. flown human space flights. And how many staff will we lose
and how will we restart the manned-space flight program after a
4-year hiatus?
Mr. O'Keefe. That's a fair point and one that really
devoted an awful lot of attention during this inter-agency
process towards that kind of gap period. Because as you recall,
in our efforts to develop the Orbital Space Plane (OSP), last
year, of which the Crew Exploration Vehicle, Project
Constellation, is a natural evolution and derivative of that.
And builds on everything we did on the Orbital Space Plane
program.
The earliest we could attain a full-up, human-rated system
based on all the trade studies in the industry assessment, was
by the 2010 time frame. So the approach that we've taken here
with the Crew Exploration Vehicle and Project Constellation, as
articulated in the Vision for Space Exploration, is to use the
spiral development approach to demonstrate the capability as
early as 2008, on the first spiral that needs to be done.
So you would build each of the respective components and
parts and launch as necessary, and as ready, to demonstrate
that capability. That will give us time to assess this question
of what kind of a gap might actually exist. It could occur, if
it were successful, that we could move this much earlier. The
catch is we're not building this on a success-driven strategy
that inserts schedule pressure in that process and makes it a
demand, so that you can't retire before the time.
CREW TRANSFER REQUIREMENTS
Senator Bond. What are we going to have to pay Russia for
taking U.S. astronauts to and from the ISS? And how is NASA
going to pay for such services given the Iran Non-Proliferation
Act prohibiting NASA from paying Russia for ISS related
activities.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, sir----
Senator Bond. What are they getting for it?
Mr. O'Keefe. Sir, so far it's part of their agreement and
so we have paid not a dime more for their efforts in the last
year to fully complement the crew transfer requirements to the
International Space Station, to and from, given the grounding
of the shuttle since February 1, 2003, in the wake of the
Columbia tragedy.
They have fulfilled the commitment. That is due to expire
in 2006. We're in the works of negotiating with them what
additional challenges, among all of us as partners, of what
those additional costs will be in expanding the number of crew
expedition missions. Because now, at this point, we can expand
the crew size beyond three once we reach U.S. core complete
configuration in a year, or so, after we return to flight.
From there, debating exactly what number of flights would
be necessary from Soyuz vehicles, or after return to flight how
many crew transfer requirements would be taken on the shuttle
as part of our ongoing negotiations. So, in the course of that,
I wouldn't want to predict right now what that may import. But
so far it has cost nothing extra and nothing different. I
associate myself entirely with your remarks, sir, that the
partners have stepped up in this past year and demonstrated the
real depth of this partnership by following through on their
commitments and it hasn't taken any additional costs on the
part of the United States in order to sustain the International
Space Station capabilities thus far.
SOYUZ CAPABILITIES
Senator Bond. Would the Soyuz meet the test that the Gehman
Committee applied to the shuttle?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Bond. Has there been a similar examination of the
safety of the Soyuz?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Bond. To make sure that we're sending them up on a
safe vehicle?
Mr. O'Keefe. The approach that we have used now
consistently, and have really intensified, certainly in this
period, that is the only means of transfer to and from the
station, and return capability in the event of an emergency is
by Soyuz, is to commission at every single flight a joint
Russian-U.S. team of folks that were used.
As a matter of fact, during the shuttle/Mir days, which was
represented by Professor Amfimov, from the Russian
Rosaviakosmos and Tom Stafford, an Apollo astronaut, with a
team of folks who certify each and every flight as a prior
flight readiness review effort, roughly a month before each of
the expedition's crews depart.
They come up with a comprehensive assessment of the safety
standards that comport with that. We have insisted and the
Russians have been extremely cooperative on this, of
understanding the same parameters of medical, as well as
technology standards that we adhere to, and they have been
extremely helpful in working through that. So we have adjusted
crews, we have made changes, and we have done all kinds of
things as a consequence of the Stafford-Amfimov certification
that occurs each and every flight. They will be meeting again
here in about 3 weeks' time in preparation of the Expedition 9
crew which is due to launch in the middle of April.
Senator Bond. Senator Mikulski.
HUBBLE SERVICING MISSION
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I know my colleagues are here and so I will get right
to my Hubble questions.
Mr. O'Keefe, you have now received the Gehman letter
containing his analysis of the Hubble servicing mission. Could
you tell me your reaction to the Gehman letter, particularly
the aspect where he recommends that we get additional advice.
And our request to you that we go to the National Academy of
Sciences for a more amplified analysis.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. Indeed, I associate myself
entirely with your comments that Admiral Gehman issued a
typical characteristically thoughtful commentary and review,
and did in fact follow through on what I had suggested to you
in our previous conversations, was for him to offer his unique
view and perspective on this particular question. I think he
offered that in addition to your comments, in a way, in which
he said, by the changes in the non-station missions. We knew
we're essentially reducing the requirements. Reducing the rigor
of our requirements increases the risk and can't be seen any
other way.
That's in large measure looking at the Return to Flight
challenges that we have been examining to comply with every one
of those recommendations. Again, I am delighted to hear that
your view, and I believe that of Congress, has been to say,
yes, we are embracing the actions of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board's recommendations. It is our intent to
implement them for each and every flight to assure that we do
this to mitigate the risk to as low as we possibly can.
Any further examination beyond that I think is welcomed.
And to be sure, to the extent that on the Hubble servicing
mission, and all of the alternatives that we have now, I think
are excited by a Request for Information we issued in the early
part of February, to ask what other approaches would we use to
extend the battery life? What would we do to de-orbit in the
early part of the next decade? What would we do to boost the
capability, if need be?
All of those factors, if we could include that in the
equation--to look at what is, I believe, the broader objectives
of what we all agree to, which is to get the maximum service
life out of Hubble that we can--would be an acceptable approach
to it.
So asking the National Research Council through the
National Academy of Sciences to examine that broader question
of the range of alternatives and approaches that we use in
order to maximize the service life of Hubble is something I
have already engaged in discussions with Len Fisk, who runs the
National Research Council, to determine their interest. They're
very interested in pursuing that. As I understand you've done
the same.
We would welcome any ideas in terms of the broader scope of
it in order to extend beyond the service life that we had
anticipated of 2005. We're already going to exceed that. Let's
figure out how we can do even better than that, short of
encountering the risks that would be involved in a servicing
mission.
That ought to be included as well, and that's why the
determination and judgment that I reached is that this is a
higher risk. But if they look at the full plan and range of
options, that's an approach that I think could be extremely
beneficial for us all.
SERVICE MISSION RISK
Senator Mikulski. First of all, that's a very constructive
response, and I am going to thank you.
Let's be sure that we understand the response. Number one,
what Gehman recommended was a look at risk versus value. In
other words, look at the value. Now what we asked for in the
Mikulski-Bond, or Bond-Mikulski letter is for the National
Academy of Sciences to look at the risk involved in a service
mission, and what could make it as safe as possible, et cetera.
What we want is, No. 1, implement what Gehman said he
wanted studied. What you're saying, in addition to what Gehman
wanted studied, and what I want studied on should we have a
servicing mission, you're also wanting the National Academy to
look at what else would be needed to extend the life of the
Hubble. Is that correct?
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely, Senator. I think that--oh, I'm
sorry, please go ahead.
Senator Mikulski. And then the third could be alternative
methods for servicing. You know, there's a save the Hubble
website. There's ideas coming in from all over the world. I am
not asking the National Academy of Sciences to look at all of
them. These ideas are what space scientists are all about, it
is wild and creative. I wonder if you would also want them to
look at alternative servicing methods, or----
Mr. O'Keefe. Exactly. I think that's the approach. Let's
go, and again, in the spirit of your comment, let's be sure
that we're in full agreement on what the objectives would be
here. The first one is, if we could fully agree that the
objective is to comply with every recommendation of the CAIB
for every shuttle flight, that's what NASA has embraced and
that's what we intend to do.
Senator Mikulski. And we're on the same broadband on that.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, and I am very grateful to you, Senator,
because that's the part that really worries me most.
Senator Mikulski. So no matter what, because in the Gehman
letter, he says this, the bottom line, says Admiral Gehman,
shuttle risks are dangerous, and we should fly the minimum
number necessary to complete mission. Almost all of the risk is
concentrated in the front and the back of the mission. Where
one goes into orbit makes little difference. That's one item.
But in his final paragraph, he says, I suggest only a deep
and rich study of the entire gain-risk equation can answer the
questions of whether an extension of the life of the wonderful
Hubble telescope is worth the risk. That's what I would like
the National Academy of Sciences to look at.
Your proposal, in addition to that, not in lieu of, would
be to look also at should we not have a servicing mission, then
how could we extend the life of the Hubble in its continued
ability to discover while we're waiting. And I am now also
wondering about your reaction to assessing alternative
servicing methods as well.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, as you suggested----
Senator Mikulski. Is that----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, ma'am. As you suggested, the approach we
used in our Request for Information because of this flood of
interest in various ways of looking at the challenge of moving
the Hubble closer to the station, there are a number of
different ideas that are potentially very interesting, and
could be workable. And then there are others that are really
kind of interesting.
As a consequence, the approach that we took to separate the
wheat from the chaff, I think is really critical. The two
things that I think would really guide this approach is first
and foremost, and inviolate, proposition that we have to comply
with every recommendation of the CAIB report.
So, independent of the return question, what I cannot abide
the notion of, and what my judgment has been driven on, is the
idea of commissioning a servicing mission that isn't in comport
with every one of those requirements. That's the part that I
want to be sure of that they're extremely focused on.
Therefore, they'll have to delve into the full range of Return
to Flight challenges, everything that we're doing in order to
comply with every single recommendation. Because anything that
says, it close but it's not close enough, is in my judgment not
acceptable as a means to do this.
The second matter would be, I think that we're all in
agreement on, what can we do to extend the service life. And
the ways that we can do that, beyond servicing, is to draw
battery power at a much different rate, which therefore changes
the operational protocols of how we utilize Hubble.
FINAL SERVICING MISSION STUDY
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Administrator, the red light is
blinking. We're going to wait for your opinions and also the
Academy on this.
While I would suggest that our staffs meet and make sure
that we're all clear in the direction we're going in. And I
believe we are.
The last paragraph, though, to this which says, we request
that you take no action to stop, suspend, or terminate any
contracts or employment in connection with the final servicing
mission until this study is completed.
Mr. O'Keefe. Let me offer to you this proposition which
is--I don't know what the answer to that one is. Having just
received your letter this morning, I don't know what the result
would be of each of those contracts.
It falls into at least three categories that I was able to
eyeball quickly. First, is those efforts that have already been
completed, and therefore would naturally wind down, whether we
had pursued a servicing mission or not. Second, category would
be the instruments and how those would be employed for other
purposes as well. How we could use them in the future, and
we're committed to doing that. The third, would be to focus on
the range of other options to extend battery power, to change
operational protocols. To do all of those things to get the
maximum service life we can beyond fiscal year 2005, which was
the design date for the Hubble to begin with. Those are the
three things that I would look to, and if you would give me an
opportunity to go examine these----
Senator Mikulski. Well, I think that is a fair request on
your part.
First of all, I want to thank you for responding to my
initial request for a second opinion, to our request for
additional study from the National Academy of Sciences, knowing
that you just got our response, just as we just got the Gehman
response.
And we look forward to making sure that we do not lose
time, or talent with what we have by premature cancelling of
anybody's job or anybody's contract.
Mr. O'Keefe. I understand.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much.
Mr. O'Keefe. If I could give one final comment or
observation on this. Again, the judgment call that this turns
on is whether or not we believe we can mitigate the risks and
comport with all of the recommendations of the Board. And do it
at a time that is timely enough in order to actually complete
the servicing mission. And that's the part that's in doubt.
Because once the batteries go, the Hubble survives for about 6
to 10 hours and then that's it. It goes cold.
So, as a consequence, putting all of our eggs in that one
basket doesn't work. It is not something that I think is an
acceptable risk. As a consequence looking at the full range of
what we do to get the service life is what our commitment is,
and that's what we've been pursuing. We would be delighted to
get the Academy's view of what else they think we could be
looking at in order to pursue that common objective in comport
with the CAIB recommendations.
And it's got to be done expeditiously in order to get
through this.
Senator Bond. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe. So, I am in agreement with you, and we will
work through what the immediate challenges would be from the
contractual standpoint in the immediate period--and that's
something we'll get back to you very, very expeditiously in
terms of what the combination will be.
You know that some of it is going to wind down, because the
work is finished. Some of its going to be towards instruments
that we could employ for other activities. And some of it may
well be towards other alternatives we can look to extend the
service life.
Senator Bond. Thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. All three of those would be acceptable with
NASA.
Senator Bond. Thank you, Mr. Administrator.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you.
Senator Bond. Let me turn now to----
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you.
Senator Mikulski. I think our battery just ran out.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate your
willingness to do that.
Senator Bond. Senator Stevens.
NON-SPACE NEEDS OF THE PROGRAM
Senator Stevens. Well, Administrator O'Keefe, you make us
all proud of the job that you're doing with NASA and I want you
to know that I personally have great confidence in what you're
doing. I hope you don't misunderstand my question.
My question is, with this vision, and I appreciate that you
brought the President's comments to us this morning. With this
vision, what is going to happen with the other non-space needs
of the programs that NASA is involved in during this period of
growth?
Mr. O'Keefe. Sir.
Senator Stevens. Are we going to see a change in the other
missions?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, if anything, one of the things that I
have found absolutely amazing is the organizational response to
this. This now forces us to integrate, to think about
applications on a much broader basis than we ever did before.
One of the absolute indictments that the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board offered, that others have offered, and lots
of commentators and critics have suggested, is that the Agency
has been stove-piped. It has been looking at different
categories and never inter-relates activities.
So if anything, what we're seeing is a consequence of this.
And we've been motivated to move in the direction of how do we
apply all of those capabilities towards this central set of
objectives and direction that the President has granted, and
sent to us and said, that's what I expect you to do.
Therefore, applying all of those capabilities for earth
sciences, aeronautics, biological and physical research, space
flight and space science, in addition to the education and
inspiration of the next generation of explorers, this is
something that now I think is a much more integrated
collaborative effort in that direction.
I don't see a big diminution. In those central mission
objectives in what the Agency has been chartered to go do.
There will be differences of view over whether or not we should
do a little more or a little less in one area or another.
That's something, I think, that's well within the range of
manageable as a discussion.
But for the purposes of this objective it is a central
focus. It's a much greater level of clarity than the Agency has
had in decades. As a consequence, that's what I think the
enthusiasm will be rallied around. There are modifications that
can be made as we move along, because nothing is so intractable
as to preclude any one of those options.
Senator Stevens. Well, I would be precluded from discussing
some of the missions, but are there classified missions of NASA
going to be diminished because if the activities that you have
described?
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bond. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, during the months of the extensive and
careful deliberations which led to the President' new space
vision, would you tell us what input, if any, was sought from
industry during this process. We've been told that there was
none sought.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, the process that we employ, that the
President sent us off on, is an inter-agency process. In other
words, public servants engaged in the activity. What we were
all charged to do, from the Defense Department, the State
Department, the Commerce Department, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and certainly NASA, and through the process
that was put together of the National Security Council and the
Domestic Policy Council, was to bring in all of those external
views that were being debated in these broader fora. Both
within the oversight committees of Congress as well as the
broader conferences and symposia that were conducted after the
CAIB released its position.
So, therefore the industry views, positions and thoughts
were brought into that equation in order to reach the range of
options. And at one point, we looked at so many options, we
could hardly keep tabs on them all, in terms of which approach
we should take. The President's engagement on this point was to
consistently solicit that broader range of views, and that's
where we ended out, is in concert with all of those
perspectives as well.
Senator Shelby. We have to use foreign launch systems now.
The budget it seems chooses to use them in the future, which is
troubling to some of us.
Mr. O'Keefe. I couldn't comment one way or the other, sir.
I understand your point, but I am not--I don't think we have
any greater or lesser international involvement or engagement
in the activities that the President has directed us to proceed
with than what we have been encountering now for several years.
So I don't anticipate or see any intensification of that
effort.
EXPLORATION SYSTEMS
Senator Shelby. Could you briefly explain the process on
going within code ``T'' to engage industry as you formulate
requirements, definitions and program planning decisions in the
new space exploration program. And particularly Project
Constellation.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. No, thank you for the question. The
approach that we were taking, and the organizational code that
you've referred to is the Office of Exploration Systems.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Mr. O'Keefe. It was announced the day after the President's
speech. The objective was, and we had been working for the
previous few months in pulling together all of the components
of what we do around NASA, to look at large scale systems
integration challenges. The engineering challenges of
delivering on a set of programs that require lots of
integration.
So again, in my response to Senator Stevens, this is one of
the consequences, one of the amazing developments as the result
of the President's charge, is to start looking at the full
range of activities that we have in the Agency and applying
them towards common solution.
So what the Office of Exploration Systems is now looking to
under Project Constellation, under Project Prometheus, and a
number of others, is to kind of pull together all of those
efforts to integrate independently of the mission objectives so
that we get a common solution.
We are out engaging the industry very actively, to look at
a number of different approaches that would call for
acquisition strategies like spiral development that I referred
to earlier for the Crew Exploration Vehicle. As well as
engagement with the broader industry community on Project
Prometheus on how to generate power and propulsion, something
we've never had in a spacecraft that now could be used as a
means to inform those broader acquisition strategies.
So, we are out there soliciting in a much broader case, as
is Craig Steidle, our new Associate Administrator for
Exploration Systems, to include all of those industry interests
that were basically pulled together as the result of the
exceptional efforts during the Orbital Space Plane effort was
engaged in last year.
CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE
Senator Bond. Mr. Administrator, how much will the Crew
Exploration Vehicle build on the work already done for the
orbital space plane? And would you discuss the benefits?
In other words, I hope that you're not going to try and
reinvent the wheel.
Mr. O'Keefe. No, sir. No, I think that you're right on. In
many ways, a lot of what we engaged in a year ago for the
Orbital Space Plane, we would have to do now, had we not
engaged in it over the previous year. Because it really defined
some of the fundamental requirements of what is necessary for
developing a capability using existing launch capacity for what
would be beyond low-Earth orbit. Because, as you know, shuttle
is restricted to low-Earth orbit by virtue of its
characteristics.
Much of what we derived from that experience evolved over
that time towards an adaptability towards capabilities that
could go beyond low-Earth orbit. So much of what we did in the
Orbital Space Plane, I would say, is at least two-thirds common
with the kinds of challenges we would meet. Because much of
what is challenging about these efforts is getting off this
planet and going anywhere.
The thermal protection system requirements, all of those
things, then become gradients of that as well as the capacity
you want to bring with you for wherever it is you want to go,
for whatever duration or length of time.
So, in many ways, a lot of these hard questions were very,
very professionally run to ground during the course of that OSP
effort a year ago. As a result, we're able to launch right from
that to this next level. We have got a running start as a
result of that engagement.
Senator Shelby. I know that my time is almost up, but I
want to ask one more question, if I could.
FUNDING REDUCTIONS IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Senator Bond. Without objection.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
Mr. Administrator, I am concerned as a lot of other people
are about this significant reduction in funding for physical
science research. This is a big departure.
Three distinguished professors in research science recently
wrote to me to share the following sentiment regarding this
dramatic cut to physical research.
And I just want to share with you excerpts.
While NASA has the mission of planetary exploration it also
has the goal of improving life on Earth. Towards that goal it
is the only American agency with the unique capability to
conduct physical science research in the virtual absence of
gravity, which we all know. Now, I'll skip on down a little
bit.
As you're aware, NASA since you're the Administrator, is
planning to further reduce all physical science research on the
ISS and the shuttle, in particular research on material
science. It is our understanding that the already reduced
number of materials, science flight investigations from 24 to
12, will be further reduced to only a couple of principal
investigators.
And then, I'm going to turn to crew health. This is another
excerpt of the letter. Crew health is not just biological-
astronautics. Both Challenger and Columbia crashed due to
materials failure, not motion sickness, bone loss or radiation
exposure. Improvements in materials have powered all industrial
revolutions. A balanced research portfolio will be critical to
success in NASA's exploration thrust.
I hope you will look at this letter. And we've talked about
this already.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Privately, but these are some of my
concerns and I believe they are the concerns of a lot of people
on the committee.
Mr. O'Keefe. I would be delighted to take a look at it,
Senator. And I thank you for raising the issues. It is about
priorities. There is no question.
Senator Shelby. Priorities.
Mr. O'Keefe. They're very difficult to do, but in that
respect, the President's clear direction to us is that we look
at utilizing the capacity of the station and focus our research
endeavor towards understanding expedition missions. That's
largely life sciences, physiology.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. O'Keefe. But it also includes material sciences kinds
of activities too, to sustain activities for long periods of
time.
Senator Shelby. We've got so much to learn there to benefit
us.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir. Without question.
Senator Shelby. I know that Senator Mikulski and Senator
Bond have been in the forefront of all of this. That we have
benefitted so much from NASA back here as well as out in space.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other
questions that I want to submit for the record for the
Administrator. And I appreciate your indulgence.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Shelby.
We're going to have a number of questions for the record,
otherwise we would be here all day.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
AERONAUTICS FUNDING
Senator Bond. Mr. Administrator, following on Senator
Stevens' question, and sort of related to what Senator Shelby
asked, what role do you see for NASA in the vitally important
national industry in aeronautics? Did aeronautics take a hit in
this budget? Is aeronautics going to become a poor stepchild?
Mr. O'Keefe. Not at all, sir. No, I think that there are
two major areas that we need to continue to concentrate on, and
part of what I think you're seeing in the budget projections is
the need for greater definition as we move along and work
through each of these successes in terms of applications.
But the two areas that I think are most profound are, No.
1, there are a lot of capabilities that we have seen in the
aeronautical system side that are so important for the purpose
of continuing our activities on shuttle, and a number of other
space science-related activities through the NASA Engineering
and Safety Center (NESC), which has been set up as part of the
aeronautics enterprise, part of that function, in order to pull
together all of those capabilities.
This is one of the organizational legacies of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board report to pulling together those
inter-disciplinary skills necessary to look and inform the
kinds of challenges we have on trend analysis and a number of
those kinds of things that were called out in that report. So
there is a very dominant role in those skill areas that will
now have applications.
For example, it is not by accident, that now the Deputy
Director of the Kennedy Space Center is a guy who came from an
aeronautics background. So here he is looking at launch
operations activities, and he has also got a tremendous amount
of skill and background in aeronautics functions.
Second area is to look at those kinds of things that look
at air space management and a range of aviation security and
safety-related activities. That is a dominant focus and
priority of what we have now concentrated on in the aeronautics
area.
To your broader point, I think, in raising your opening
statement, how we look at inter-relationships, for example,
with the Defense Department, through hypersonics, and a number
of other approaches of developing next generation kinds of
propulsion power, and design requirements is what we intend to
do very closely in comport with the Defense Department.
So all of those factors together, I think, are guiding us,
adjustments that may need to be made will be informed by our
successes in all three of those areas.
Senator Bond. I appreciate your answer. I have the feeling
that it may be incidental for the benefit for aeronautics and I
think we need to explore further whether there is going to be
the kind of directed investigations that would be needed for us
to maintain a healthy aeronautics industry, domestic and
international civilian industry in the United States.
What upgrades to the shuttle should NASA continue to
pursue? And what new launch vehicle or vehicles may need to be
developed to carry cargo up? If we're going to have the
International Space Station, they're going to need cargo.
And if we're going to go to the Moon and set up a launch
facility, we've got to haul a lot of stuff. We're going to need
some big trucks. What are your plans for those?
Senator Mikulski. Good point.
Mr. O'Keefe. Well, the first part of your question, I think
relates very clearly, Mr. Chairman, and I agree with, is what
upgrades and capabilities or modifications to the shuttle do we
need to continue with. The focus that we're now vectoring from,
that was a Service Life Extension Program focus prior to last
year, is now towards how do we maintain this capability,
upgrade it and use it with all the safety modifications
necessary in order to mitigate risk through the end of this
decade.
That's how long we intend to operate shuttle. We're going
to continue on those upgrades, and we've got two out of the
three orbiters that are in major modification right now. So
during this period of time while the shuttle is grounded, while
we're implementing all of these recommendations, we want to
include those upgrades in order to improve this dramatically.
The second area is, I think, the requirements to Return to
Flight--an immediate task right now. We're including those
upgrades and, I think in your opening comments, you asked what
are the costs and challenges of doing that. That's what is
included in the Operating Plan that was just submitted to you,
that can continue the activity, to incorporate those upgrades
necessary.
CARGO CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS
The third dimension is, in the latter half of your
question, focused on what kind of cargo capacity requirements
we're looking to. Well, there are two basic areas that we're
looking at there.
The first one is to develop and continue to build on the
capabilities of our international partners, who have had the
requirement to follow through for the International Space
Station. It's a lot of lift, a lot of logistics requirements
for the station, that will now be off of the space shuttle in
the future, so that we can get the components up there and
finish the construction of the station.
Second area would be to look at cargo lift capacities;
frankly, some of them will be explored as a consequence of this
earlier understanding we've reached and discussed on Hubble
servicing, for example, robotically, autonomously, that could
also inform that. So I think that may be an acceleration of
what kind of launch requirements we would need to have, for
what kind of lift requirements, in order to install what
autonomously, robotically, over that span of time, that will
give us a much deeper understanding of it.
So we will be building on existing capabilities and
exploring other opportunities for lift capabilities for cargo
in order to comply with the CAIB report to separate the crew
from the cargo is our objective.
Senator Bond. Maybe I'm not quite clear, but all of these
things that we're exploring are assuming, No. 1, either we have
the shuttle, and if you're going to save money by not doing the
shuttle recertification in 2010, I am gathering that there
won't be a shuttle after 2010 to do the heavy lift. That leaves
us dependent upon international partners or somebody else to do
the heavy lift after 2010?
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, no, sir. Not at all.
That certainly is, there are competing options and
alternatives there as well, within the United States, for our
capability.
The capabilities we have for heavy lift vehicles are
through the EELV with the Defense Department, the Atlas and
Titan Programs that they maintain. Plus we are looking at how
we might employ, for example, the shuttle shack--the solid
rocket boosters, the external tanks, all of those things give
us some lift capacity. We may need to reassemble, short of
including the orbiter on that. There are all kinds of
capabilities we have and we have got to look to for launch
capacity.
What is important about the way and the direction the
President has given is that it lets us look at existing
capabilities which are right now underutilized through the
Defense Department.
So in working with them for launch services requirements,
for the heavy lift, for expendable launch vehicle capability
they have, plus what we are already using right now to lift
shuttle are derivatives thereof, we have the kinds of existing
capabilities that are right here in the United States, that
certainly will have traction and capability in terms of
whatever lift requirements we have for Project Constellation,
as well as any cargo capacity that may be required in the
future.
Senator Bond. I think that we will need to be hearing more
specifics on which options you're pursuing.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure.
Senator Bond. Because I know there are a lot of
possibilities out there.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes.
Senator Bond. But facing the end of the shuttle in 2010 we
ought to be thinking now.
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely.
Senator Bond. About how we're going to get all of this
equipment up there.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
RETURN TO FLIGHT--CAIB RECOMMENDATIONS
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Administrator, could you tell us, and I want to talk
now about fully implementing the CAIB's recommendation on how
to return to flight.
How much do you anticipate fully implementing the CAIB's
recommendations. And what is your timetable on doing that? Do
you hope to be able to do this all in one year?
Mr. O'Keefe. Okay. Thank you, Senator. That's a very--it's
an issue----
Senator Mikulski. Is it one orbiter a year? Or----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, it is an issue that is consuming a lot of
our focus and attention now, because again there is no day
light on the commitment that we're going to implement those
recommendations. Absolutely. There is not a day that goes by
that I am not reminded of exactly what the consequences are of
not doing that and why Columbia was lost.
Senator Mikulski. We all feel the same way.
Mr. O'Keefe. So we're pursuing that. There are 29
recommendations, as you're aware, and 15 of which must be done
before the Return to Flight.
We have a group we assembled last summer of roughly 25 or
30 experts in all kinds of disciplines and fields who are
overseeing our activities in this. There is a regular update
that we've been issuing since September, on a monthly basis, on
every single step to comply with those 15 and that broader 29
recommendations overall.
That's publicly released. It's on the website, it's been
released to all the committees of Congress, and we will
continue to do that, not only up to Return to Flight, but
thereafter. We're going to continue this open effort all the
way through.
RETURN TO FLIGHT COST
Senator Mikulski. Cost?
Mr. O'Keefe. Sorry.
Senator Mikulski. Cost?
Mr. O'Keefe. Cost right now in 2004 is established at $265
million, of which that has become a real serious challenge for
us to implement this year, in light of the Congress's direction
to reduce the International Space Station by $200 million.
We've had to cover that reserve as a result, and we have to
find $265 million within funds available in order to pursue
this, because no additional funds were appropriated this past
year. So we're scrambling to do that, in the operating plan.
You have that. It was submitted here, identifies the kinds of
resources to do that. A year ago, in 2003, we absorbed about
$93 million in order to proceed with that.
Senator Mikulski. But Mr. Administrator----
Mr. O'Keefe. I'm sorry.
Senator Mikulski. We're looking at how to be your partner
to do this. So what do you need in fiscal year 2005 to do this?
Mr. O'Keefe. Well----
Senator Mikulski. And what we also, in addition to that,
have to look at reprogramming in fiscal year 2004 for you to
stay the course in fiscal year 2004.
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, Senator.
Senator Mikulski. So you need more in fiscal year 2004 in
some variation of coming up with a supplemental to implement
this. This is the anchor from which all floats.
Mr. O'Keefe. Okay.
Senator Mikulski. So that's one.
So what do we need to make sure? Do you have enough money
in fiscal year 2004, or do we need to be ready to do something
in partnership with you.
And No. 2, how much will you need for fiscal year 2005 to
continue to make, to implement the $15 million we need to
Return to Flight, but then the other $14 million----
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes.
Senator Mikulski [continuing]. To make the $15 million
workable.
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely.
Senator Mikulski. And sustainable.
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely. Now, in fiscal year 2004, as I
mentioned, $265 million is how much we're absorbing now. Your
assistance and support of that activity through our operating
plan would be most appreciated now while we work through that.
In fiscal year 2005, the projections that we put in the
budget involved here and covers about a $374 million increase
in the fiscal year 2005 request that will implement all of
these recommendations and continue along in that direction. It
covers the broader area, not just the 15 recommendations, it's
all 29 recommendations.
For example, the costs to operate, run NASA Engineering and
Safety Centers. It's part of the expense involved in this, and
other organizational changes that we have advanced. So let me
give you a complete list for the record of all of the things
that's included in that, that's part of----
Senator Mikulski. But, roughly, it's about $375 million to
$400 million.
Mr. O'Keefe. In 2004.
Senator Mikulski. And you know how these things tend to go
up.
Mr. O'Keefe. In fiscal year 2005, as an increase. Yes,
ma'am.
Senator Mikulski. Yes.
And do you need additional funds in fiscal year 2004?
Mr. O'Keefe. Two hundred sixty-five million dollars is the
amount we've proposed to reallocate and shift, and that's the
operating plan that you have before the committee for your
consideration.
Senator Mikulski. I see.
And when do you anticipate those 15 recommendations for
Return to Flight to be done? Do you anticipate that they will
be done in calendar 2004, or will this take us also into
calendar 2005?
Mr. O'Keefe. I anticipate, based on our current assessment
of Return to Flight challenges that we should see
implementation of all of those recommendations, 15, prior to
Return to Flight, in this calendar year. That will be necessary
in order to facilitate that prospect of any Return to Flight in
the early part of next, if we're going to go the way----
Senator Mikulski. If you could furnish to the committee
essentially a sequencing of the calendar if you will, so that
we can get a sense of time frame.
Mr. O'Keefe. If I could, Senator, that's part of a last
update that we last submitted. And we're going to update it
again here in about 2 weeks' time. So we will positively
provide that for you.
[The information follows:]
NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Senator Mikulski. Alright. That's terrific.
Now, this also goes to Senator Bond. One of the things that
I think we both admire about NASA is not only the exploration
of what's out there, but the invention of technology, the new
ideas that then lead to new products, that also benefit the
larger American community. We come up with new products, we're
more competitive, we have jobs.
As you're looking at the development of a new vehicle,
we'll call it the crew exploration, is that part of the intent
to be looking at these whole new concepts like nanotechnology,
et cetera?
And along the way, do you anticipate that this will accrue
to our knowledge to, No. 1, aeronautics because we're competing
with Airbus? No. 2, new kinds of materials, because won't they
have to be lighter, more resilient, in order to be able to go
out there?
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely.
Senator Mikulski. Whenever we go?
Mr. O'Keefe. Absolutely.
Senator Mikulski. And is this part of the thinking that
along the way to getting to Mars, when we get there, that part
of this will be the inventing of new technologies, new
products, new materials?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely.
Senator Mikulski. New ways of monitoring the health of the
astronauts as they go?
Mr. O'Keefe. Positively. That's precisely it. Again, so
much of what drove the President to select this configuration
for the vision statement, for the strategy, for the
Presidential directive, for the first time ever it has got that
level of detail to it, is an assumption of that technology
development that's going to advance our capabilities to do
this.
Absolutely that is the intent. That's how we're proceeding.
Part of what the Aldridge Commission is going to be working
with is the challenge of thinking about implementation
strategies to achieve that precise outcome. So we're looking
forward to their input as to how they're going to do that. And
we're due to receive that by this summer.
Senator Mikulski. Well, Mr. Administrator, what I see is
not competing visions. But competing demands for revenue.
I believe the vision is an exciting one, it is what has
excited humankind every since Icarus tried to go, and why the
Wright Brothers got off the ground a hundred years ago. And why
we had our first launch to the Moon in 1968, et cetera.
So the vision is exciting. The idea of inventing new
technologies and products which will benefit both our country
and mankind is exciting.
And then, we have here the challenges of completing the
work that we have, which is specific, immediate, and
achievable. The International Space Station, the future of
Hubble. So we see that what we have here is not a competing
vision, but very serious stresses on the NASA program.
And, what concerns me with the President's recommendation
and vision is that there is not enough money to do it. And what
is being proposed in the President's budget would enable us to
stay the course, and work with you for a return to flight.
But I think this is going to have very serious challenges.
And also, we're going to have to look at the consequences of
deferring new space and earth science missions, freezing
spending, eliminating research, these are pretty tough choices.
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, I agree, Senator.
It is and I think that two things apply here. The first one
is that with this strategy, it is about priorities and which
focus do we want to take to them. That is not to say that the
research and activities that may not be of the highest priority
to support this are irrelevant. But it, nonetheless, has to be
focused towards these activities, lest it becomes maintenance
of status quo.
Secondly, I would seek and I hope to convince you at some
point, yes, this is affordable. Yes, what is in this resource
base is what the President, the administration, believes is
necessary to build on these technologies and do these things.
Along the way, it's based on achievement of success and an
adjustment thereafter, as opposed to some crash program that is
designed towards some final solution at the end of the day.
So it is an approach I think that lays out very
methodically that journey, not the race, that's necessary in
order to achieve these. But at the same time, our abilities to
achieve those outcomes along the way and see the results as we
move along, to accomplish that.
In the process, I think it is revectoring some of those
capabilities towards specific goals as opposed to for its own
sake. What we're really trying to do here is put more focus to
it.
SPACE SCIENCE DEVOTION
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions that
I will put into the record.
But I think we have covered a lot today. And I look forward
to more conversations with you. And again, I want to thank you
for the courtesies that you have extended to me, personally,
and to all who were concerned about Hubble.
We can't do space science without our astronauts and we
know that. So we're always on the side of the astronauts.
Thank you.
Mr. O'Keefe. I appreciate that, Senator. If you would
permit me to, Mr. Chairman, I have got a short paper, Senator
Mikulski--we had talked about this too--that kind of outlines
the rationale, as well as, the considerations that go into the
servicing missions. I would like to insert that for the record,
that does define them.
Senator Bond. Without objection. We welcome it.
[The information follows:]
Cancellation of the Fifth (SM-4) Hubble Servicing Mission
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was originally launched aboard the
Space Shuttle in 1990, with an as designed mission lifetime of 15
years. Since then the telescope has been serviced or upgraded four
times, each requiring a very complex, dedicated Space Shuttle mission
and unique HST servicing support equipment. Even before its repair
mission in 1993, the HST had generated significant scientific
discoveries. The science return from HST has already vastly exceeded
the original expectations.
NASA plans continued operation of the HST until it can no longer
support scientific investigations anticipated to occur in the 2007-2008
time frame. The telescope's life may, in fact, be extended if NASA is
successful in employing operational techniques to preserve battery and
gyroscope functions. Meanwhile, NASA is aggressively investigating
innovative ways to extend the science lifetime of the HST for as long
as possible, including robotic servicing to provide extension of power
storage. Current plans are to safely deorbit the HST by a robotic
spacecraft by approximately 2013.
Although the HST deployment mission and four subsequent servicing
missions were successfully conducted, the Columbia tragedy underscored
the inherent risk in each and every Space Shuttle mission and
reinforced the need for increased ability to deal with all potential
contingencies, particularly catastrophic damage to the Orbiter's
thermal protection system (TPS).
Without the benefit of docking at the ISS many new tools,
processes, and techniques would be required for inspection and possible
repair of the TPS. More significant would be the requirement to
dedicate two Space Shuttles to the mission to ensure astronaut safety.
In the event of a significant problem with no safe haven for the
astronauts to wait as in ISS missions, a second Shuttle would have to
be launched and employ untried and uncertified techniques to perform a
rescue. Hence, a Shuttle based HST servicing mission presents known
additional risks, and offers few options to respond to serious problems
in orbit.
Recognizing the increased risks involved in all Shuttle flights
following the tragic loss of the Columbia and crew NASA elected to
reduce its planned Shuttle manifest to only missions to the
International Space Station (ISS). The decision was also made, on the
basis of risk, to not pursue a final servicing mission to the HST, but
instead to investigate other options to extend the life of the Hubble.
COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD FINDINGS AND IMPACT ON FUTURE
MISSIONS
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board presented NASA with 29
recommendations, 15 of which were required to be completed before the
Space Shuttle could return to flight. Highlights of these flight-
critical recommendations included elimination of damaging insulation
shedding from the external tank--the cause of the Columbia tragedy--
ascent imaging, on-orbit inspection, and thermal protection system tile
and Orbiter leading edge repair. NASA will satisfy all of these
recommendations before it launches STS-114, the next Shuttle mission.
The Board stressed that the Space Shuttle is still a developmental
vehicle and that risk and risk mitigation must be treated accordingly.
NASA's original vision was to fly the Shuttle to mid-decade or 2020 for
a total of 75-80 more flights. NASA fully accepts the Board's
recommendation and balancing mission criticality against possible loss
of crew and vehicle, consciously decided to retire the Space Shuttle
after the completion of the International Space Station (ISS),
recognizing that the best risk mitigation strategy is to fly less.
In addition, NASA realizes that a ``safe haven'' in space
capability is required. This ``safe haven'' capability goes beyond
compliance with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
recommendations and is designed to increase crew safety during the
remaining Space Shuttle missions. Should damage occur to the Shuttle
thermal protection system that can not be repaired and that would
preclude safe reentry, the crew will be able to shelter at the ISS
until another vehicle can be readied for rescue. Agency policy will
require each Space Shuttle mission to have backup rescue capability.
``Safe haven'' is the ultimate recognition that, while NASA will make
the Space Shuttle as safe as possible, the Columbia tragedy has taught
us that there are still significant risks inherent in Space Shuttle
launch, orbit operation, and reentry.
UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS AND INCREASED RISK IN THE HUBBLE SERVICING MISSION
Whereas tools, techniques, and procedures would be similar on each
ISS mission; e.g., inspection, thermal protection system repair, safe
haven readiness, and rescue scenario, an HST servicing mission would
have unique requirements, both on-orbit and in ground processing.
Options for dealing with an on-orbit emergency are reduced and
decisions for reacting to any emergency would have to be made quickly.
These two considerations, and the attendant schedule pressure on the
flight crews and support teams, add considerable additional risk.
Lack of Significant Safe Haven
The areas of additional risk relate to the ability to provide
``safe haven'' while inspection, repair and potential rescue are
undertaken, and to the procedures for inspection and repair themselves.
It has been projected that a typical Space Shuttle flight crew of seven
astronauts could stay aboard the ISS for up to 90 days, if warranted,
due to an emergency situation on the Space Shuttle. This safe haven
capability allows the flight crew and ground teams to consider all
options, determine the best course of action, take the time required to
understand the cause of the failure and affect repairs, or send the
appropriate rescue vehicle with the right equipment to bring the crew
home. Clearly, rushing this process would introduce considerable new
risk and in the worse case result in the loss of another vehicle.
In the case of a Hubble servicing mission, the amount of stay time
on orbit is significantly shorter due the limited stores of cryogenic
oxygen on the Orbiter. Therefore, other measures would be required.
Specifically, a second Space Shuttle on an adjacent launch pad would
have to be specially prepared, uniquely configured to launch
expeditiously if required to perform a rescue mission. This scenario
raises several concerns, addressed in the paragraphs below.
Unprecedented Double Workload for Ground Launch and Processing Teams
Two vehicles would be processed for essentially the same launch
date. Any processing delays to one vehicle would require a delay in the
second vehicle. The launch countdown for the second launch would begin
before the actual launch of the first vehicle. This short time period
for assessment is a serious concern--it would require a highly complex
process to be carried out in parallel, and it would not permit thorough
assessment by the launch team, the flight control team, and the flight
crew.
No Changes to Cargo or Vehicle Feasible
Because of the very short timeframe between the launch of the first
vehicle and the requirement for a rescue flight, no significant changes
could reasonably be made to the second vehicle or the cargo. This means
that it would not be feasible to change the cargo on the second Space
Shuttle, to affect a repair to the first Shuttle, add additional rescue
hardware, or make vehicle modifications to avoid whatever situation
caused the need for a rescue attempt in the first place. Not having
sufficient time to make the appropriate changes to the rescue vehicle
or the cargo could add significant risk to the rescue flight crew, or
to crew transfer. The whole process would be under acute schedule
pressure and undoubtedly many safety and operations waivers would be
required.
Rescue Mission
Space Shuttles routinely dock with the ISS; Soyuz evacuation
procedures are well trained. These represent the normal operations mode
today supported by extensive training, analysis and documentation. A
rescue from the ISS, with multiple hatches, airlocks, and at least one
other vehicle available (Soyuz), is much less complex and risky than
that required by a stranded Space Shuttle being rescued by a second
Space Shuttle.
In response to a question by the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board, NASA analyzed a hypothetical rescue mission between two Space
Shuttles and found that the effort would have required many unproven
techniques, such as emergency free-space crew transfer in space suits
while performing Space Shuttle to Space Shuttle station-keeping while
traveling 17,500 mile per hour above the earth. These major safety
risks are not incurred during rescue from the ISS.
Tile Survey (Expanded Inspection Requirements) and Thermal Protection
System Repair
The current inspection method for acreage tile, gear door seals,
and the elevon cove is to photograph these areas from the ISS during
rendezvous. To support an HST servicing mission, NASA would have to
develop a new method for inspecting these critical areas using an
Orbiter boom. Unvalidated autonomous boom operations represent an
unknown risk. NASA's current planned TPS repair method for an ISS-based
repair uses the ISS robotic arm to stabilize an EVA crew person over
the worksite. These assets are not available for an HST servicing
mission, so NASA would have to develop a single-use alternate method
for stabilizing the crewmember. This method would have to provide
greater stability than the current ISS option under development to
protect both the crewmember and the other TPS areas from additional
damage. Such a concept represents a challenging undertaking, which
could take months or years to develop in order to meet safety and
mission assurance standards/requirements.
RETURN TO FLIGHT AND ISS U.S. CORE COMPLETE TIMELINE
In the process of addressing the Columbia Accident Investigation
Board recommendations and implementing additional improvements to
achieve the safest flight possible, NASA has uncovered a number of
problems that had previously gone undetected. The removal and
replacement of unsafe hardware has deferred Space Shuttle launch
milestones. NASA projects the first opportunity for a Space Shuttle
launch to the ISS to be in March 2005. Eight flights are scheduled to
meet our international commitments, the assembly of the U.S. core
segments of the ISS. Given the ISS assembly schedule, the earliest NASA
could launch a servicing mission to the HST, based on requirements for
daylight launch to fully assess ascent conditions by imagery and
thermal constraints when docked to ISS, would be Spring 2007.
Based on the evaluation of the engineering data on the HST, the
lifetime of the Observatory on orbit is ultimately limited by battery
life, which may extend in to the 2007-2008 timeframe. Scientific
operations are limited by gyroscope lifetime that is more difficult to
predict. If all of the NASA effort is concentrated on a Shuttle
servicing mission, every step in the process must be successful with no
allowance for schedule slips. Before launch all of the recommendations
of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board must be met. The launch
conditions must be perfect, and all tailored HST mission unique
components must be in place with very tight schedule constraints. If
any of the many elements do not develop as planned, the telescope may
cease operations before a successful mission could be mounted.
HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE'S SCIENTIFIC LEGACY
Not since Galileo turned his telescope towards the heavens in 1610
has any event so changed our understanding of the universe as the
deployment of the Hubble Space Telescope. From its orbit above Earth's
atmosphere, the HST is free from the atmospheric turbulence that all
ground-based telescopes must contend. Thus, HST has been able to return
images of astounding clarity and sensitivity. HST imaging and
spectroscopy have resulted in remarkable scientific achievement,
including the determination of the changing rate of expansion of the
universe and detailed studies of forming galaxies, black holes, galaxy
hosts of gamma-ray bursts and quasars, active galactic nuclei,
protostars, planetary atmospheres, and the interstellar and
intergalactic medium. Scientific results have significantly surpassed
original expectations. By 2005, the HST will have fulfilled every one
of its scientific objectives and top-level technical requirements.
Moreover, the Hubble will continue to collect observations for several
more years. Even after the HST is no longer in service, the rich
archive of HST data (already more than 100,000 observations of 20,000
unique targets) will continue to provide new discoveries for the years
to come, with full support by NASA for both archive operations and
research grants.
FUTURE PLANS FOR HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE AND ASTRONOMY
Astronomy is a critical part of the NASA's exploration initiative.
NASA is aggressively investigating innovative ways to extend the
science lifetime of the HST for as long as possible, including a
possible robotic servicing option. We are receiving several responses
to our recently released Request For Information (RFI) on HST End of
Mission Alternatives soliciting concepts for robotically-provided
battery power extension. Indeed, this option appears to have greater
likelihood of success than the possibility of accomplishing all the
recommendations of the Board in time for a successful Hubble servicing
mission.
HST is not NASA's only portal to the stars. It is one of many
telescopes used by astronomers to study the universe using various
apertures and wavelength bands. Hubble, primarily used for observations
of visible light, is one of the four orbital ``Great Observatories''
designed for use across the spectrum. The other three include the
Compton Gamma-Ray Observatory (1991-2000), the Chandra X-Ray
Observatory, and the infrared Spitzer Space Telescope. In the years
since Hubble was launched with its 2.4-meter aperture, many new ground-
based telescopes have been built with larger apertures that enable
observations with increasingly higher angular resolution, though
subject to the blurring effects of Earth's atmosphere.
The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) program has been strengthened
to assure a 2011 launch date. Once on orbit, this advanced technology
infrared telescope will provide insight into the a region of the
spectrum where we will be able, like never before, to view the
formation of the earliest galaxies. The JWST will build on the
successful science of the Hubble via the most advanced instrumentation
and a larger 6.5 meter aperture.
The following table lists larger optical telescopes now or soon to
be available along with Hubble and also several examples of large
telescopes available or in development for observations at other
wavelengths.
EXAMPLES OF LARGE TELESCOPE FACILITIES AVAILABLE OR IN DEVELOPMENT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Optical +IR
Radio/MM Infrared (aperture, Ultraviolet X-Ray Gamma Ray
meters)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VLA Spitzer SALT (11.0) HST Chandra GLAST
GBT SOFIA Keck I, II GALEX XTE SWIFT
(10.0)
ALMA JWST Hobby-Eberly ............... XMM-Newton
(9.2)
Arecibo HST LBT (8.4 x 2) ............... Astro-E2
FCRAO .............. Subaru (8.3) ............... SWIFT
VLBA .............. VLT (8.2 x 3)
CSO .............. Gemini (N & S)
(8.1)
HST (2.4)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The HST program has provided a significant amount of funding
support for U.S. astronomers; in fact, it is currently providing
approximately 20 percent of all direct grant support. After HST
observations have ceased, NASA plans to continue to support ongoing
grants and to offer new grant support for HST archival research until a
similar grant program is in place for the upcoming James Webb Space
Telescope program. This will ensure stability to the research community
and full use of the rich HST data archive throughout this period of
transition.
CONCLUSION
The cancellation of HST-SM4 was a difficult decision. HST is
producing world-class science. However, NASA cannot justify the
additional risk that such a unique mission would entail, based on what
must be done to assure greatest protection to the crew. It is
increasingly apparent that our choice is to either fully comply with
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report or conduct the
servicing mission, but not both. We must be responsible on all future
flights and be fully compliant. NASA will continue to aggressively
pursue options to extend the science lifetime of the Hubble by means
other than Shuttle servicing. NASA will continue to be a major
supporter of astronomy in the future as the Agency continues to explore
the universe.
Mr. O'Keefe. We appreciate it very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
Thank you, Senator for your courtesies as well. I
appreciate that.
SHUTTLE RETIREMENT
Senator Bond. Mr. Administrator, as my colleague from
Maryland has indicated, we're not just going to keep the record
open for further questions. This is just the beginning of a
dialogue because these questions are very serious, they're very
extended.
I want to step back. I am still concerned about the
retirement issue. In the fall of 2002, NASA said that they were
going to continue operating the shuttle until 2015 or perhaps
2020. Now, with the CAIB report, saying that the shuttle must
be recertified by 2010. And the costs there, I see this as the
deadline to retire the shuttle.
But I am concerned, given the reality that ambitious
schedules are almost never met by NASA or any other entity on
the cutting edge of technology and science.
Are we going to be tempted to force more missions in to get
the space shuttle, to get the International Space Station fully
established by 2010 as the President indicated? Are we going to
be taking or running too many missions at a risk?
If the shuttle has to be flown past 2010, due to possible
schedule slips, or the unavailability of either other
international partner vehicles, or commercial vehicles, what
would be the costs of recertification of these shuttles? What
are the fall back numbers and prospects?
Mr. O'Keefe. Yes. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. The
approach we've taken in this strategy, which is clearly
enunciated in the President's directive, is to complete the
International Space Station. Senator Mikulski, both you and the
Chairman have enunciated it here. Our objective is to minimize
the number of flights necessary to achieve that task. Because
that's a driving philosophy that does that. You're right, Mr.
Chairman. The approach we used a year and a half ago, of
looking at service life extension, was to try and operate the
shuttle for as long as we could sustain its service life. The
Columbia accident changed all of that.
It opened everybody's eyes to what the risks are of doing
this. It is not an operational vehicle. It's an experimental
one. It will be experimental to its last flight and last
landing when it's retired. That milestone, not date, that
milestone will be the completion of the International Space
Station. The President's directive is very clear on that. Our
task is to try to achieve that by the end of this decade. Based
on the flight manifest, if we're able to return to flight in a
timely manner here, next year, we can achieve that without a
break-neck schedule that would be required to do that.
What we're working with our international partners on right
now is developing exactly what are the modules and components
that we absolutely intend to deploy to get the full science
yield and research capability out of the International Space
Station for years to come. That's what is going to drive our
considerations rather than the calendar.
Senator Bond. Well, will the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board report based on 2010 as the time we needed
the recertification, or was it based on a certain number of
flights that the shuttle would take before it would need to be
recertified?
Mr. O'Keefe. Okay.
Senator Bond. I mean, you got two different numbers.
Mr. O'Keefe. Right.
Senator Bond. We're going to retire it in 2010, but then
we're not going to retire it until we complete the space
station.
Mr. O'Keefe. Right.
Senator Bond. What is the driving deadline--when the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board said we had to recertify
the shuttle?
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am not aware of what drove the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board to pick an arbitrary date. If anything, I
found it kind of baffling.
Senator Bond. Maybe we should seek some clarification on
that, because is time wearing it out? Is the number of flights
wearing it out?
Mr. O'Keefe. Oh, I would----
Senator Bond. Do we need to have more flights? I mean,
there are some questions here that need to be addressed.
Mr. O'Keefe. Sure. But the approach that we're using,
rather than trying to delve into what may be in the psyche of
13 members and why they picked that date----
Senator Bond. No, not psyche. But what was that reason?
Mr. O'Keefe. I understand.
Senator Bond. Foundation?
Mr. O'Keefe. The approach we've taken to it is what big
milestones have driven this, and that's the completion of the
International Space Station. We believe we can do that by the
end of this decade.
I will know a better answer to that once we have convened
with our international partners to look at what that final
configuration looks like. That then tells me how many flights
you actually have to conduct. Based on the preliminaries here,
we're not talking about a number that is going to surprise
anybody. We're looking at something in the range of, certainly
20 to 30 flights is the maximum number that could be obtained
in that time. That outer edge is really larger than what we
might have anticipated. So, we'll know the answer to that one a
lot better once we get the final configuration in place. And
that's what the President's directive is to do.
The certification question is something that we're going to
have to enjoin at some point to figure out whether or not that
butts up against the milestone objective of completion of the
station.
ALDRIDGE COMMISSION
Senator Bond. We've talked about the Aldridge Commission.
If it turns out that the Aldridge Commission has
recommendations that contradict what NASA is asking for in
fiscal year 2005, are you going to come back to us, or are you
doing some back channeling? Are they going to be on target with
your recommendations? Or what happens if we get a surprise?
Mr. O'Keefe. I don't anticipate a surprise. In every
discussion that I've heard that the Commission has engaged in,
their terms of reference, if you will, the charter that the
President gave them, is to go out and look at implementation
strategies. One of the earliest understandings that I have had
with all of the commission members is that the way this
particular strategy has been developed, it gives us ample
opportunities to make adjustments based on successes as we move
along, rather than some finite set of goals that must be
achieved by date certain. So I don't see a lot of daylight in
terms of what approach they will take.
What I do see from them is a lot of creative ideas about
how we should go about implementing this, as it pertains to
commercial and industry involvement, what degree of
international participation and how we should do it,
acquisition strategies on the spiral development that I talked
about a little bit.
There is a whole range of things that they've put in their
``to do'' list, if you will, that I think is going to help
inform us how to implement this properly, efficiently, and at
affordable costs. So I don't see a lot there. And we're
spending a lot of time engaging with them on their findings
thus far.
VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION
Senator Bond. Okay, let me ask one last question that
concerns all of us. I think we have touched on it a number of
ways. Both Project Prometheus and implementing that new NASA
vision, are going to consume lots of funds in the next 5 to 10
years. Prometheus itself could cost $3 billion over 5 years.
And the vision is obviously redirecting a whole slew of
funds with large known program costs, and other costs
uncertain. How is NASA going to fund the many opportunities
that present themselves in the future that fall outside the
vision. They've already been raised.
Senator Shelby mentioned material science. Senator Mikulski
and I are very concerned about that. We're also concerned about
Hubble. Is NASA going to be unable to continue commitments to
current activities to meet these goals?
We're going to have some real squeezing out on some things
that we think have been very vital scientific breakthroughs by
these two major projects. What's your thought on those?
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My thinking is that
the President's direction and vision that he has articulated is
completely in line with the directions we're moving, in terms
of what our mission requirements are for the agency. If
anything, it clarifies. It defines what it is we should be
doing with much greater precision.
So it is not here are all of our mission objectives and
here is another thing glued on top of it. It is very much in
concert with the direction we're going, and lends greater
precision to what that result should be. In many ways his
direction answers some of the broader questions. Part of what
we're intent on doing is integrating those capabilities. To
assure that it is not what is inside and what is outside the
vision objectives. It is what is within our mission to go carry
out this strategy. And how do we employ that best.
So along the way, to the extent that there are adjustments
required in order to better fulfill that objective, or to meet
other mission requirements of the agency, we intend to do that
full range approach of an integrated direction of where we're
headed.
I don't see things falling outside of it. There are
priorities. There are going to be differences on that. On the
sciences, for example, no question understanding the
expeditionary nature of long term space flight, power
generation requirements and so forth, are the kinds of things
that we must do if we're going to obtain this broader strategy
objective. But that's fully in concert with what the mission of
this Agency should be, and that's greater clarity than we've
had in at least a couple of decades.
Senator Bond. Well, Mr. Administrator, thank you very much
for your time and for your exposition of the vision and how
you're going to meet it.
I will have quite a few questions for the record about the
cost of the Moon/Mars vision, the international partners, and a
number of other things.
And as I said, there are quite a few things on which we're
going to need to follow up with you, and continue to work with
you as we try to figure out how we can get the job done with
what. Frankly, it looks like inadequate resources from here. I
am hoping we can find the resources to carry out all of these
wonderful things.
But looking at the budget and what we're seeing, as
available for this committee, I am very much concerned.
Senator Mikulski, any closing thoughts?
Senator Mikulski. I know that we're going to be having an
on-going conversation. I'll just put out some flashing lights.
No. 1, in terms of the replacement for the shuttle, it has
been, and I caution you that it's been the history of NASA to
over promise both in terms of what it can deliver, when it can
deliver, and when it could deliver it.
We watched the development of the shuttle. Again, it was
going to be the answer to everything, and it's been a
remarkable vehicle. But at the same time, it was over promised,
over budget, et cetera. Just know that's what we worry about.
Mr. O'Keefe. I do, too, Senator.
Senator Mikulski. The second thing that I think that
applies to this is that impact on personnel and morale.
Senator Bond and I are very concerned about the fact where
are the scientists and engineers coming from, and how to get
young people excited in this. But if they devote their whole
life preparing for research in a particular area, then all of a
sudden things start to be cancelled because of budget or
shifting priorities, that is going to have an impact.
But we know that NASA faces aging technologies and an aging
workforce. And we're interested in where are you going to get
what you need when you need it, but we're concerned that
shifting sands could have a negative impact on morale.
These are things for additional conversations, but I think
that we've covered the core issues today.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Mr. O'Keefe. If I could very quickly, Senator.
I want to thank you and the committee and the Senate for
enacting the Workforce Flexibility Act just here a month ago
for NASA. That's a big advance. S. 610 is going to help us to
achieve and conquer the kinds of challenges that you've talked
about. That's a very, very significant move forward and we
appreciate the support of that.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Administration for response subsequent to
the hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Christopher S. Bond
IMPLICATIONS FOR TERMINATING THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM IN 2010
Question. At this time, the shuttle is the only U.S. vehicle
capable of taking astronauts to and from space. Under the new vision
for NASA, the shuttle would be retired when space station construction
is completed in 2010. A new Crew Exploration Vehicle would be developed
and fully operational for Earth orbital missions by 2014.
What would be the consequences of a 4-year, and possibly longer,
hiatus in U.S.-flown human spaceflights?
Answer. NASA expects to utilize the ISS through at least 2016.
Following retirement of the Shuttle upon completion of ISS assembly,
NASA envisions using a combination of vehicles from Russia, the
European Space Agency, Japan, and potential commercial initiatives to
deliver crew and cargo to the ISS. Currently, NASA anticipates that
using these vehicles instead of the Shuttle will limit cargo return and
may restrict the size of certain logistical re-supply elements. The ISS
operators and users are currently evaluating each of these limitations
in order to ensure ISS productivity is maintained during this U.S.
transition period in space transportation. The retirement of the
Shuttle fleet would allow the Shuttle's resources to be redirected to
support other human spaceflight and exploration activities necessary to
achieve the goals of the Vision for Space Exploration.
Question. How much would Russia charge for taking U.S. astronauts
to and from ISS, and how would NASA pay for such services given that
the Iran Nonproliferation Act prohibits NASA from paying Russia for
ISS-related activities?
Answer. We have not discussed this issue with Russia. We are aware
of the provisions of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, and the
administration will work with Congress to resolve issues related to ISS
support, as necessary.
Question. Would China be considered as an alternative now that it
can launch people into space?
Answer. The new Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to
consider foreign and commercial options for servicing the ISS. No
options have been selected or ruled out for either crew transfer or
cargo at this time.
Question. What upgrades to the shuttle should NASA continue to
pursue? What new launch vehicle, or vehicles, may need to be developed?
Answer. NASA will continue to pursue Space Shuttle upgrades to
systems mitigate risks and assure safe flight as we complete assembly
of the International Space Station. The Space Shuttle Service Life
Extension Program (SLEP) is the current vehicle for determining these
upgrades, and its focus will transition to safety and reliability
initiatives. The SLEP team is currently working to review and
prioritize upgrades in light of the Vision for Space Exploration. NASA
will look to the Office of Exploration Systems to determine new launch
vehicles requirements to support the Vision for Space Exploration.
WORKFORCE INVOLVED WITH HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
Question. What will happen to this skilled workforce as the shuttle
program ends?
Answer. NASA's contractors have the requirement to hire
appropriately skilled personnel or train them to meet all the
conditions of the contracts. They have been hiring or training to meet
and maintain our skill level requirements, and this trend is
anticipated to continue. As the Space Shuttle program nears retirement,
we fully anticipate that aerospace technician employment opportunities
will continue after completion of ISS assembly, with NASA, driven in
part by the Vision for Space Exploration and the continuing need to
support the International Space Station.
Question. How can we guarantee that as workers begin to leave an
ending program for other activities that the final flights will have
the same amount of associated risk?
Answer. NASA understands the challenges of maintaining an
enthusiastic workforce as the Space Shuttle program phases down. We are
beginning to develop a plan to ensure that the skills required to
maintain a safe and reliable fleet are in place until the last Space
Shuttle flight has completed its mission.
Question. How will NASA retain the skills necessary for human space
flight while the country's space program is taking a flight hiatus for
at least 4 years?
Answer. The retirement of the Space Shuttle is not the end of the
space program but rather the beginning of an opportunity to transition
a highly skilled workforce into programs requiring their skills and
challenging their creativity. We believe, at the appropriate time,
these workers who have Shuttle experience will be able to continue work
with NASA on new programs requiring their unique skills.
FUNDING OF ISS RESUPPLY MISSIONS
Question. What is the status of discussions with the other
International Space Station partners regarding how to fund Russian
production of a sufficient number of Progress cargo spacecraft to keep
the space station operating while the shuttle fleet is grounded?
Answer. To date, FKA has continued to fully support ISS operations
based on additional Russian government funding. On November 13, 2003,
Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov authorized a 1.5 billion ruble
(approximately $50 million) budget supplement for FKA to meet ISS
operational needs. In the context of the overall Russian Federal Space
Budget for 2003, this supplemental was a 19 percent increase in
spending authority. The 2004 Russian Federal Space Budget included a 20
percent increase (over the supplemented 2003 figure) to the ISS budget
line.
Question. Will the other partners be able to provide the needed
funding, or do you expect that you will need to ask for a waiver from
or amendment to the Iran Nonproliferation Act so that NASA can provide
some of that funding?
Answer. We are discussing all aspects of the future configuration
and support of the ISS with the partners at this time. No decisions
have been reached.
TIMELINE FOR ENHANCE USE LEASE
Question. In 2003, we provided NASA with the ability to enter into
EULs. The EUL authority was an issue that NASA had wanted for all of
the centers but was limited to two centers in order to see how NASA
would utilize this authority. I am interested in the progress of the
selection process, and how this new authority has been utilized.
Can you please give me an update on the status of this program, and
any insight as to the infrastructure needs at NASA centers that have
become known because of the selection process?
Answer. Public Law 108-7, the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus
Appropriations Bill, authorized NASA to conduct a demonstration program
for Enhanced Use Leasing (EUL). Congress limited the demonstration
program to two (2) NASA Centers. NASA conducted a formal process to
select the 2 demonstration sites. All NASA Centers were requested to
submit detailed proposals to include a description of the purpose and
marketing potential of the property(ies), a description of the lease(s)
including the proposed term(s), and a description of the value to
Center. The selection criteria were also sent to all NASA Centers, and
included overall benefit to Center, overall value of the business plan
to NASA, opportunity for success, including the readiness of the EUL
projects, and marketability of the property(ies).
Six NASA Centers submitted proposals. All six proposals exhibited
significant merit and benefit to NASA. The proposals were evaluated and
ranked by a panel consisting of NASA Headquarters planning and real
estate specialists and a real estate specialist from the General
Services Administration. The rankings were reviewed and approved by the
NASA Headquarters Institutional Committee and Executive Council.
Through this process, the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and the Ames
Research Center (ARC) were selected as the EUL demonstration sites in
July 2003.
In the period since the selection of the two demonstration sites,
NASA Headquarters has worked closely with KSC and ARC to develop EULs.
This is a new initiative for NASA, and we have proceeded cautiously and
meticulously.
As of April 2004, ARC has executed 17 small EUL agreements for an
approximate total of $300,000 anticipated annual revenue, which
includes monthly rent and common service charges for support services
provided by the Center. These leases are short-term (1-5 years). They
include a lease of the existing NASA fuel storage and distribution
system, a lease of building space for research and development of
commercially viable fuel cells, leases of historic buildings for
education and research, and leases of office and laboratory space for
nanotechnology research. KSC has developed an out lease of Center land
for use by a telephone service provider (Verizon) to place a trailer
and a cell tower to enhance Verizon cellular telephone service across
the Center. This KSC lease has been approved but has not yet been
signed.
A summary of planned activities for ARC and KSC follows:
ARC's NASA Research Park (NRP) is envisioned to be a privately-
funded initiative to develop available under-utilized land at ARC into
an active research park with tenants performing space- and aeronautics-
related study and research. ARC completed a Final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision in November 2002
including the NASA Research Park. This was finalized before EUL was
authorized for NASA. The NRP will be executed through an EUL land-use
agreement. Several leases have been approved and entered into for
tenants in the first phase of the NRP. These leases are for existing
facilities that the tenants will use in their own research and
development activities. ARC also has a wide variety of future proposals
under consideration for implementation in fiscal year 2004, including:
--lease of an existing historic building with Clark University;
--leases of existing under-utilized office and laboratory space for
the Nanostellar Corporation, and the Northern California
Nanotechnology Initiative; and,
--potential long-term lease of land and existing buildings for a
Training and Conference Center; Requests for Qualifications for
prospective lessors was released in April 2004; response are
due in May 2004.
KSC is working on the development of the International Space
Research Park (ISRP). The ISRP will be developed by the Florida Space
Authority (FSA) through an EUL agreement and Space Act agreement. The
ISRP will develop approximately 400 acres of under-utilized land on
KSC. The term of the EUL agreement is envisioned to be 50 years, with a
25-year option. The early stages of this effort have been focused on
developing appropriate language for the operation of the EUL and
assuring NASA receives proper fair-market consideration. KSC has also
prepared a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), a key and
necessary element for establishing the research park. The Draft KSC EIS
was released for public review and comment through March 2004. NASA
anticipates release of the Final EIS and Record of Decision later this
spring. The EUL agreement is anticipated to be executed by December
2004.
KSC also anticipates a wide variety of future proposals, as
existing leases for land at KSC expire and are converted into EUL
agreements. These include: leases to news and wire services for areas
used to report on launches; and, leases of Center land for use by a
telephone and communication service providers.
WEBB TELESCOPE
Question. The follow on to the Hubble Telescope is the James Webb
Space Telescope. While this telescope it is not a true replacement of
Hubble, it will continue the mission of looking back in time to some of
the early events in the creation of the universe. This is the number
one priority in this decade for the astronomy and astrophysics
community.
What, if any problems are being encountered with the James Webb
Space Telescope project that could affect its proposed launch date or
achieving its scientific goals?
Answer. Currently, JWST is in the preliminary design phase
(Formulation) and it faces no significant technical or budgetary
problems. Progress toward an August 2011 launch is on-track and
proceeding according to plan. The program has passed independent
reviews of its conceptual design, its top-level requirements and most
of its lower-level requirements. While JWST is a technically
challenging endeavor, there have been no compromises in its baselined
scientific performance or launch date.
ALDRIDGE COMMISSION
Question. As I mentioned in my statement, the President created the
Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy,
or Aldridge Commission, to provide recommendations to the President on
implementation. This commission will provide these recommendations in
June of this year, yet NASA appears to be already making their plans
ahead of the recommendations.
Once the recommendations are made, how will NASA address the
recommendations if they contradict what NASA is asking for in fiscal
year 2005?
Answer. NASA submitted its fiscal year 2005 Budget request earlier
this year and took into account the President's vision in order to
begin implementation as quickly as possible. There is sufficient
flexibility in our planning to accommodate the advice of the Aldridge
Commission, which we recently received.
Question. To what extent has there been communication between the
Commission and NASA about what recommendations can be expected?
Answer. The Commission worked independently. NASA provided
administrative support and responded to the Commission's requests for
information and briefings. Some commissioners conducted fact-finding
visits to NASA centers. The Commission did not provide recommendations
to NASA: their recommendations were transmitted to the President as
part of their report on June 16, 2004.
HUBBLE TELESCOPE
Question. A short time after the announcement of the President's
exploration vision, NASA indicated that it would be canceling any
further shuttle missions to Hubble. NASA has cited safety concerns as
the primary reason for having an early end to the life of a truly
amazing instrument.
In making the decision to cancel the SM4 servicing mission, did
NASA perform a risk analysis in which the risks were quantified and
evaluated rigorously? What tools were used to assess the risk involved,
what were the results, and what alternatives were discussed? Aside from
the plans for deorbiting Hubble, what are the plans for the fiscal year
2004 funding that would have been used for the SM4 servicing mission?
Answer. The decision to cancel the Hubble SM4 servicing mission was
made after evaluating the requirements that came from safety
recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)
report. NASA rigorously examined the on orbit inspection techniques and
repair methods that are required to ensure adequate mission safety.
NASA determined that safe inspection techniques and repair methods
could be developed for use on the Shuttle while docked at the
International Space Station (ISS) because of the safe haven
capabilities of the ISS and because the Space Station Remote
Manipulator System (SSRMS) would be available to assist with inspection
and repairs.
For the scenario of the Shuttle in a non-Station orbit (like the
HST servicing mission), NASA determined that it would have to develop
unique, single use technologies and tools in order to be able to
accomplish the needed inspection techniques and repair methods. It is
unlikely the new technology needed to service Hubble would be ready
before critical Hubble systems fail (Gyroscopes will probably fail by
late 2006; the battery is expected to fall below needed capacity in
about 2008).
NASA would also have to dedicate two Shuttles for a servicing
mission to comply with safety recommendations of the CAIB for a non-
Station mission. NASA would need a second Shuttle positioned for
launch, which would require an unprecedented double workload for ground
crews. The rescue, if required, would involve a Shuttle-to-Shuttle crew
transfer with unproven techniques. All this would have to be done under
extreme schedule pressure, because Shuttle life support, food and water
are limited. On a non-Station autonomous mission, the crew would only
have 2 to 4 weeks before the rescue Shuttle would have to arrive.
NASA issued a formal ``Request for Information'' (RFI) on February
20, 2004, to solicit from industry academia or anyone who may have
useful information bearing on how to extend the useful scientific
lifetime of the Hubble. NASA received 26 responses, which are being
evaluated at this time. A plan will be developed when a decision is
made as to the approach the Agency will take to prolong the life of
Hubble.
NASA has also formally requested a study by the National Academy of
Sciences to ensure we have fully considered all reasonable alternatives
to finding the best way to extend the lifetime of the Hubble Space
Telescope.
SHUTTLE RETIREMENT AT 2010
Question. In the fall of 2002, NASA announced plans to continue
operating the space shuttle until 2015, and perhaps to 2020 or beyond.
Now the plan is to retire the shuttle fleet by 2010. A key component to
making the President's vision affordable in the long term is the
avoidance of a recertification of the fleet in 2010, which is called
for in the CAIB report.
If the shuttle must be flown past 2010, due to possible schedule
slips beyond those that have already happened this year, what would be
the cost of recertification?
Answer. NASA is currently reassessing the ISS assembly sequence to
ensure that the Shuttle can be safely retired following assembly of the
International Space Station, planned for the end of the decade. To
prepare for the contingency that the Shuttle may need to operate beyond
2010, NASA is assessing the need to recertify Space Shuttle systems,
subsystems, or components consistent with the Vision for Space
Exploration and in line with the recommendations of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board. The technical work required to determine
when and if recertification would be needed will continue into this
summer. Once the technical definition of the recertification tasks is
completed, cost estimates will be developed on the items we need to
recertify and made available for discussion.
Question. If the Moon/Mars goal is not adopted, or delayed
significantly, what will the future be for the shuttle?
Answer. NASA has adopted the goal and objectives established in the
Vision for Space Exploration, and is transforming itself to meet those
objectives, and the Agency has revised its program accordingly.
Consistent with the Vision for Space Exploration, NASA intends to phase
out Shuttle operations following the completion of the International
Space Station, planned for the end of the decade.
BIG PROJECTS CROWDING OUT OTHER RESEARCH
Question. Both Project Prometheus and implementing the new NASA
vision are going to consume a large amount of funds in the next 5 to 10
years. By some estimates, Project Prometheus could cost $3 billion over
5 years, and the vision is causing a large redirection of funds for
years to come.
With large known program costs, and other costs currently
uncertain, how is NASA going to fund the many opportunities that may
present themselves in the future that fall outside the vision?
Answer. NASA will continue to invest in priorities such as
Aeronautics and Earth Science that may contribute to, but are not
completely focused on, the vision for exploration. There are always
many more opportunities than funding available, and NASA will continue
to assess potential investments against priorities in the exploration
vision and other important areas of our vision and mission. There is a
natural turnover in projects as they are completed, and NASA will also
continue to assess priorities for how to make new investments that will
best achieve our vision and mission.
Question. Is NASA going to be unable to continue the commitment to
current activities in order to meet the new goals?
Answer. No. NASA will continue to invest in current activities,
including priorities in Aeronautics and Earth Science. We will achieve
the goals of the exploration vision with increased funding at the
Agency level ($1 billion over 5 years above what was planned in the
fiscal year 2004 budget request), as well as through a realignment of
many ongoing activities that do not support the vision.
FAILED FINANCIAL STATEMENT
Question. NASA has finally achieved an integrated financial
management system, yet NASA did not receive a clean audit on its
financial statement. Instead, the auditors deemed the books have a
reportable condition when faced with being handed records from two
different financial systems for last year.
What is the status of addressing this situation and when will we be
able to see progress towards correcting it?
Answer. For fiscal year 2004, NASA is operating an Agency-wide,
single integrated core financial management system. However, throughout
most of fiscal year 2003, NASA was implementing, in 4 separate phases,
the new system that replaced 10 disparate accounting systems in
operation at our Centers for the past two decades. This conversion
effort created some complex accounting issues for fiscal year 2003,
which significantly impacted the timeliness and quality of the
information required in preparing NASA's interim and year-end financial
statements.
NASA had anticipated that fiscal year 2003, being a conversion year
to this new Agency-wide accounting system, was going to be an
especially challenging time for its external financial reporting
activities. Eight of 10 Centers went through this conversion process
during the fiscal year 2003 and, accordingly, required NASA to use
``blended'' data from each Center's legacy accounting system and the
new core financial system to ultimately prepare our consolidated fiscal
year 2003 financial statements.
NASA expects improvements this fiscal year. There are no more NASA
Center legacy systems in operation, and all financial data will be
emanating from the one single Agency-wide core financial system. That
said, there are numerous challenges ahead both in addressing the issues
raised in the fiscal year 2003 audit as well as improving the IFM
system based on GAO and internal working group recommendations.
EDUCATION PROGRAMS
Question. It is my understanding that the NASA website has had
nearly 8 million hits since the landing of Spirit. Ed Weiler stated
yesterday that 20 percent of those hits are coming from children and
young adults in the K-12 range.
What is being done to make sure K-12, and even college age
students, take this interest and keep the excitement going to become
the next engineers and scientists that NASA and the country will
continue to have a demand for in the future?
Answer. Background.--NASA is confronted with the convergence of
three trends that put future U.S. advancements in science, aeronautics,
and space technology at risk: (1) reduction in the number of science
and engineering graduates; (2) increased competition from the private
sector and academia for technical expertise; and, (3) retirement of
approximately 25 percent of the current science and engineering
workforce within 5 years.
--NASA is implementing a 5-year Corporate Recruitment Initiative, a
collaborative effort among the offices of Education, Equal
Opportunity Programs, and Human Resources, to focus on the
recruitment of, and outreach to, young people from diverse
backgrounds who are skilled in high-demand competencies
required by NASA, including those necessary for implementation
of the long-term Vision for Space Exploration.
--All Education Enterprise initiatives and programs are consistent
with NASA's Agency-wide approach to human capital management,
and are instrumental in attracting and maintaining a workforce
representative of the Nation's diversity to enhance NASA's
current and future competencies.
--NASA's commitment to workforce development and future human capital
needs is demonstrated by four Pathfinder initiatives:
Educator Astronaut Program.--Provides opportunities for
outstanding teachers to become permanent members of the
Astronaut Corps. Using the educational expertise of Educator
Astronauts and innovative technology of our Edspace website,
Earth Crew members from K-12 will be inspired to greater
Science, Technology, Education, and Mathematics (STEM)
achievement and will be encouraged to pursue STEM careers. An
intended outcome of this program is raising the esteem of
teachers in the eyes of the public. (Fiscal year 2005 budget
request: $2.1 million)
NASA Explorer School (NES) Program.--Establishes a 3-year
partnership between NASA and school teams serving grades 4-9,
consisting of teachers and education administrators from
diverse communities across the country. Focusing on underserved
populations, NES engages educators, students, and families in
sustained involvement with NASA's research, discoveries, and
missions to promote science, mathematics, and technology
learning and career explorations. (Fiscal year 2005 budget
request: $13.7 million)
NASA Explorer Institutes Program.--Broadens NASA's reach to
students, their families, and the general public for STEM
learning outside of formal classroom environments through
media, exhibits, and community-based programming. Provides
instructional materials and resources for use by the informal
education community (including science centers, museums,
planetariums, libraries, parks, aquaria, nature centers,
botanical gardens, and community-based organizations) and
professional development opportunities for informal education
professionals. (Fiscal year 2005 budget request: $2.1 million)
Science and Technology Scholarship Program.--Provides college
tuition to highly qualified students who, in return, will
commit to work at NASA. Established by the NASA Flexibility Act
of 2004 (Public Law 108-201). (Fiscal year 2005 budget request:
$9.5 million)
--While the Pathfinder Initiatives are directly related to workforce
recruitment and the new Vision for Space Exploration, all
Education programs support the strategic objectives of
increasing the number of students pursuing science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) disciplines.
BUDGET (FISCAL YEAR 2004-2009)
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
Budget Authority Year Year Year Year Year Year
2004 \1\ 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Education Programs....................................... 230.4 168.5 169.4 170.6 169.6 170.3
Education................................................ 138.6 77.7 77.9 78.8 78.3 78.4
Base Program......................................... 77.7 77.7 77.9 78.8 78.3 78.4
Congressionally Directed............................. 60.9 ....... ....... ....... ....... .......
Minority University...................................... 91.8 90.8 91.5 91.8 91.3 91.9
Base Program......................................... 90.8 90.8 91.5 91.8 91.3 91.9
Congressionally Directed............................. 1.0 ....... ....... ....... ....... .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Represents budget as presented in NASA's Initial Fiscal Year 2004 Operating Plan.
Additional Background.--Pathfinder Initiatives highlights for
fiscal year 2005 budget:
--Educator Astronaut Program.--Earth Crew allows the development of
ongoing relationships between NASA and adult-led groups of
students (educator/class, parent/family, etc.) for the purpose
of exposing students to unique NASA content, careers related to
NASA, and the people and mission of NASA. As of March 25, 2004,
the total Earth Crew Membership was 92,487. Membership will
likely continue to increase, especially after the formal
announcement of the newly selected 2004 Educator Astronauts,
scheduled for May 6, 2004.
--NASA Explorer School Program.--School needs that will be addressed
by this program include communication, professional
development, partnerships, web-based education resources, and
curriculum integration tools. Fifty 2004 NASA Explorer Schools
were selected recently. In fiscal year 2005, an additional 50
schools will be added, bringing the total number of partner
schools to 150.
--NASA Explorer Institutes Program.--Focus group conferences will be
held to identify the needs of the informal education community.
Plans for a national program of Explorer Institutes for all
ten-field Centers will be completed, with 4 institutes being
operational in fiscal year 2005.
--Science and Technology Scholarship Program.--The first cohort of
undergraduate students, jointly selected by Agency personnel
and university faculty, and chosen for service in NASA, will be
selected.
COST OF THE MOON/MARS VISION
Question. According to your documents, current budget projections
assume it would cost $64 billion to return humans to the Moon by 2020,
not including the cost of robotic missions. The $64 billion consists of
$24 billion to build and operate the Crew Exploration Vehicle from
fiscal year 2004-2020, plus $40 billion for fiscal year 2011-2020 to
build and operate the lunar lander. This is a significant investment
and only captures the lunar portion of the vision. There is also the
build up of additional missions to Mars.
My question is, how much is the current estimate for implementing
all aspects of the Moon/Mars vision in fiscal year 2005, and from 2005
through 2020?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request includes
funding for all aspects of the vision during this time period,
including exploration of the Moon, Mars, outer moons and beyond
including the search for extrasolar planets that might harbor life.
NASA is still developing architectures for human and robotic
exploration of the Moon and Mars. Estimates that were used in the
budget represent a bounding estimate based on experience and actual
costs from relevant elements of the Apollo program. The estimates do
not reflect architecture studies, design analysis, new technologies,
and innovative approaches yet to be undertaken. They also do not
reflect that the exploration vision, unlike Apollo, views the lunar
landing not as an end in itself, but as one step in a sustained human
and robotic program to explore the solar system and beyond. The lunar
exploration will reduce the risks and prepare for Mars exploration, and
many of capabilities developed for lunar exploration may be used for
Mars exploration as well.
Question. To what extent can robotic spacecraft accomplish these
exploration goals instead of humans, at less cost and risk to human
life?
Answer. NASA has undertaken a recent analysis of the benefits and
cost associated with human space flight, and this response reflects
some of the findings of that analysis. Neither robotics nor humans
alone could accomplish these exploration goals. Robots cannot
discover--they are simply a smart set of sensors and effectors that act
as surrogates for and inform human presence elsewhere. Humans cannot
explore alone either--the space environment does not allow humans to
operate without robotic support--this is often true today on Earth as
well. In practice, humans and robots act symbiotically to complete
tasks.
Human presence for in situ exploration is both high value and high
cost. Humans missions will occur after extensive characterization of
the environment and areas of high interest are identified with the
assistance of robots. Human presence will lead to huge increases in the
speed and quality of the measurements taken, and creates unparalleled
ability to observe and make discoveries through the unique capabilities
of the human brain. The result is dramatic increases in the pace of
discovery and reliability of scientific returns. This comparative
advantage was aptly demonstrated by Apollo where human presence
quickened the pace of discovery by producing a large quantify of high
quality material for analysis that led to dramatic discoveries about
the Moon.
Finally, as the President stated on January 14, ``human beings are
heading into the cosmos.'' One of the four primary objectives of the
new space exploration vision is ``to extend human presence across the
solar system.'' This endeavor, intended to improve our lives and lift
our national spirit, cannot be accomplished using only robots.
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS IN THE MOON/MARS VISION
Question. In the President's policy directive, it states that NASA
will ``pursue opportunities for international participation to support
U.S. space exploration goals.'' We currently have an international
partnership with the space station, and our own participation is taking
a dramatic change, even before the construction is even completed.
Will other countries be willing to participate if the United States
does not live up to its obligations to the space station program, and
if the United States insists on directing how the Moon/Mars program is
to be conducted?
Answer. The President directed NASA to fulfill our commitments to
our partners on the ISS, and we plan to do so. Initial interest by
other countries in the vision has been positive, and we expect there
will be many opportunities for international cooperation over the
course of implementation.
SPACE STATION CREW/CARGO
Question. In your proposed budget, there is $140 million proposed
for space station crew and cargo services. This funding will be for
launch, delivery, and return services for cargo, and the purchase of
human-rated launch and return capabilities.
Why is this money needed at this time, when the anticipated need
for such services will not be until 2010? Is this an indication that
this will be a recurring cost for the next 5 years?
Answer. NASA will retire the Space Shuttle after completing
assembly of the International Space Station, planned for the end of
this decade. Even prior to retiring the Shuttle, there is a need for
additional cargo capability in order to achieve fuller utilization of
the Space Station for conducting research. Offloading some ISS cargo
transfer tasks onto commercial services may be key to completing the
ISS by the end of the decade, an important step in enabling the New
Vision for Exploration. Hence, funding to begin to acquire cargo and
crew services is requested in fiscal year 2005. NASA is beginning to
discuss options for meeting cargo/crew delivery and return requirements
in both the near term and post-Shuttle. As early as fiscal year 2006,
NASA anticipates a need to augment Shuttle and partner-provided
services to improve utilization by purchasing cargo/crew services
commercially using a full and open competitive acquisition process.
Currently, no commercial capability exists that could meet the
requirements but there appears to be commercial interest. NASA has no
plans to fund the development of this capability and plans to acquire
services. However, technology risk reduction demonstrations are under
consideration to reduce the risk of development for any potential
service provider. The phased funding plan for ISS Cargo/Crew Services
is shown in the following table.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year 2005 Request 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISS Cargo/Crew Services......... $140,000,000 $160,000,000 $160,000,000 $160,000,000 $500,000,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Whom do you expect to provide these services? As you well
know, it is currently against the law for us to provide funding to the
Russians for vehicles that are doing this type of work for us now.
Answer. NASA is refining projected requirements for ISS cargo and
crew delivery and return consistent with the Vision for Space
Exploration and existing law and policy. NASA is developing an
integrated ISS strategy that considers the full range of domestic and
international partner transportation options. These options include:
U.S. commercial capability; ISS International Partner assets, such as
the European Automated Transfer Vehicle, Japanese Transfer Vehicle, and
the Russian Progress and Soyuz spacecraft; and, Transition to
capability presently under definition from the NASA Constellation
Program, when available, after the retirement of the Space Shuttle in
2010.
NASA recognizes there are unique challenges associated with each of
these space access options and is committed to assuring safe, reliable
and affordable access and operation to the International Space Station.
ARBITRARY DATE OF 2010 FOR SHUTTLE RETIREMENT
Question. During the hearing, it was contended that the 2010
recertification date mentioned in the CAIB report might have been an
arbitrary date picked by the CAIB.
If NASA is going to comply with the CAIB report 100 percent, as has
been stated numerous times before this subcommittee, how can a specific
date within the report for recertification be determined to be
arbitrary?
Answer. The Space Shuttle Orbiters were designed with an
operational life of 100 flights. Given that no Orbiter in the current
fleet has been flown more than 30 missions, the Shuttle is potentially
capable of flying until 2020 or beyond. Mid-life certification was
projected for approximately 2010. This target date became the logical
point for completing recertification. Since the Space Shuttle fleet
will now retire after completion of assembly of the International Space
Station (ISS), currently planned for the end of the decade, NASA is
appropriately readdressing recertification norms.
The CAIB report was written when the Space Shuttle was expected to
play a major role in ISS logistics, science and crew exchange following
full assembly. Given that the Vision for Space Exploration calls for an
end to the Space Shuttle program at the completion of ISS assembly,
planned for the end of this decade, the purpose and need for
recertification is less clear. The Shuttle Service Life Extension
Program (SLEP) has been tasked to address this CAIB report
recommendation, and reviews are currently in progress.
Question. What documentation can you provide that indicates that
such a date was, in fact, arbitrarily made?
Answer. Given that the 2010 date for recertification reflects the
projected mid-life certification date, the Orbiters' design
certification documentation support the CAIB's decision. However, since
the subsequent Vision for Space Exploration calls for the Space Shuttle
to retire in this timeframe, recertification must be reevaluated.
HEAVY LIFT CAPABILITY BEYOND SHUTTLE
Question. Assuming that the shuttle is retired in 2010, there will
be no heavy lift capability available for NASA. The military has chosen
to end Titan program with the final launch in early 2005, leaving
virtually no options for the necessary cargo transport services that
will be needed for the Moon/Mars vision.
What is NASA doing to ensure that reliable heavy lift capability is
available to NASA once the shuttle is retired?
Answer. Consistent with the Vision for Space Exploration, NASA
seeks to safely return the Space Shuttle to flight, currently planned
for March 2005. Over the remainder of the decade, the Space Shuttle
will be used to complete assembly of the International Space Station
(ISS). NASA utilizes a mixed fleet launch strategy that takes advantage
of both domestic and International Partner launch capabilities across a
full spectrum of performance ranges.
NASA is developing a Shuttle retirement strategy that will assure
space access for required U.S. support to the ISS and future Space
Exploration requirements. Ongoing NASA assessments consider use of both
domestic Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) capability to meet
higher performance requirements as well as International Partner launch
capability. The first EELV launch of the Boeing Delta IV-Heavy vehicle
configuration, with a similar performance capability as the Space
Shuttle and soon-to-retire Titan IV ELV, is planned for this summer.
In parallel with the architecture planning and requirements
definition for space exploration, NASA has initiated a number of
studies to evaluate future heavy lift demand and potential domestic
capabilities beyond that of current systems, which could meet yet-to-be
defined requirements. As the architecture planning, requirements
definition, and study results mature, NASA will continue to evaluate
and plan for all its launch requirements, including heavy lift, in
coordination with the Department of Defense to assess requirements in
this class from a National perspective.
Question. Will NASA need to develop a new heavy lift capability
that is not yet a part of the Moon/Mars plan, and at what cost?
Answer. As stated above, NASA has initiated a number of studies to
evaluate future heavy lift demand and potential domestic capabilities
beyond that of current systems, which could meet yet-to-be defined
requirements. As the architecture planning, requirements definition,
and study results mature, NASA will continue to evaluate and plan for
all its launch requirements, including heavy lift.
RUSSIAN SOYUZ SAFETY
Question. NASA recently announced a further slip of the shuttle's
return to flight until March or April of 2005. NASA should be commended
in taking its time to ensure that all the necessary CAIB
recommendations are implemented properly. However, in the meantime, we
are relying on Soyuz to deliver and return crews to and from the ISS.
This begs the question of whether the Soyuz meet the same expectations
of safety that we now expect of our own vehicles after the tragic loss
of Columbia.
Can you explain what steps NASA has taken to ensure that the Soyuz
vehicles meet the basic safety requirements that are embodied in the
CAIB recommendations?
Answer. NASA has significant interaction with the Russian Federal
Space Agency (FKA) and the vehicle manufacturer (RSC-Energia) regarding
safety of the Soyuz vehicles. On the basis of this interaction and the
historical record of Soyuz and Soyuz-derived vehicle performance, NASA
is confident that the Soyuz is among the safest spacecraft ever flown.
The continued use of the expendable Soyuz spacecraft does not
present a ``new'' certification requirement. Each vehicle is operated
within the design, certification and experience of our Russian
partners. Under the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding
between NASA and Rosaviakosmos (now the Russian FKA) concerning
cooperation on the International Space Station (Article 10.2), FKA is
responsible for meeting or exceeding the overall Space Station safety
and mission assurance requirements and plans established by NASA and
the Partnership. (``In support of NASA's overall responsibilities to
assure safety and mission assurance, FKA will be responsible for
certifying that the Russian Segment and the FKA-provided elements,
including cargo, are safe and ready for operation using jointly agreed
documentation and processes.'') The Soyuz has been certified under
these conditions. Under the provisions of the MOU, NASA is not
responsible for certifying Russian vehicles for flight and FKA is not
responsible for certifying NASA vehicles for flight.
In addition, each Soyuz mission undergoes a number of joint Russian
and U.S. expert reviews. Prior to each mission, the U.S.-Russian
Stafford-Anfimov Joint Commission conducts an in-depth joint assessment
of the operational readiness of the mission. The resulting report is
one of the inputs to the detailed NASA technical reviews that culminate
in a Flight Readiness Review for each mission.
The certification under the MOU, our technical and safety history
with Soyuz vehicles, and current processes for joint Station operations
combine to ensure the safety of future use of Soyuz.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Conrad Burns
EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM TO STIMULATE COMPETITIVE RESEARCH (EPSCOR)
Question. The NASA Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive
Research (EPSCoR) program was authorized in 1993 to help develop
academic research in space science, aerospace technology and aerospace-
related research in 19 States and Puerto Rico that have historically
been less successful in obtaining NASA research funding. NASA EPSCoR
has been extremely successful in my State of Montana. Montana and the
other EPSCoR States are currently in the fourth year of 5-year research
grants from NASA. Since fiscal year 1999, some $10 million has been
available for this program annually. However, the fiscal year 2005
budget request is $4.6 million. Without additional funding, Montana
will not be able to complete its 5-year research program. Can you help
us find the funding for EPSCoR, which has been so helpful to Montana?
Answer. Awards under the current NASA EPSCoR program were granted
in 2001 for a 3-year period with an option for a 2-year extension based
on a competitive review of progress made. Review of those continuation
requests will be conducted later this year. The most competitive
programs that demonstrate successful progress will be granted
continuation awards in accordance with the available budget.
Question. Since fiscal year 1999, Congress had funded the NASA
EPSCoR program at $10 million annually but each year the budget request
seems to revert to $4.6 million. This is an on-going, authorized
program with important results in the participating States. Why do we
see this constant push back?
Answer. NASA has requested funding for the program in the
President's budget request every fiscal year since the NASA EPSCoR
legislation was authorized and considers the program a vital part of
the Agency's education portfolio. The NASA budget request for EPSCoR is
at a level that reflects the importance of the EPSCoR program balanced
against other program priorities.
NASA is committed to the EPSCoR program. The program is a strong
component of the Office of Education workforce development and research
capacity building strategy. The NASA EPSCoR Program provides seed
funding that enables eligible States to develop an academic research
enterprise directed toward long-term, self-sustaining, nationally
competitive capabilities in space and Earth science and applications,
aeronautical research and technology, and space research and technology
programs. This capability contributes not only to the State's economic
viability but to the Nation as a whole.
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
Question. As I mentioned previously, it is critical for NASA to
attract private sector dollars to the space field. I know that private
corporations working in conjunction with the Inland Northwest Space
Alliance in Missoula, Montana, have made a huge financial investment in
expandable space structures, a technology that NASA did some work on
under the auspices of the Transhab project. What is NASA doing to
leverage these corporations funding of this new technology and to
encourage other entrepreneurs to make similar investments?
Answer. Two fundamental goals of the Vision for Space Exploration
are to: develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and
infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the
destinations for human exploration; and promote international and
commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific,
security, and economic interests.
To achieve these goals, NASA is undertaking two new approaches to
systems and technology development: Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs),
and a competitive prize program called Centennial Challenges. In
addition, NASA's existing Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships
and Enterprise Engine programs will work to build relationships with
private industry and NASA will ensure that open, competitive processes
are used throughout our Human and Robotic Technology (HRT) development
programs.
To solicit private sector inputs on how to best frame future
systems development and procurement decisions, NASA's Office of
Exploration Systems is employing Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs).
BAAs have been previously used by the Department of Defense to obtain a
wide range of company, government lab, and university views on what
systems, technologies, and expertise are needed to achieve a particular
operational capability. This will be the first time that NASA has
employed BAAs, and it should allow companies, both large and small, the
opportunity to put forth innovative ideas that could have a profound
impact on how NASA and the Nation implement future exploration
activities, such as Project Constellation (the Crew Exploration
Vehicle).
To ensure that NASA reaches the broadest segment of innovators
possible, NASA's Office of Exploration Systems has also started a new
program of prize competitions called Centennial Challenges. Instead of
soliciting proposals for a grant or contract award, NASA will set a
challenge, the prize amount to be awarded for achieving that challenge,
and a set of rules by which teams will compete for that prize. By
specifying technical goals but not pre-selecting the best way to
achieve them, NASA intends to stimulate innovation in ways that
standard Federal procurements cannot. Centennial Challenge winners will
be judged and earn awards based on actual achievements, not proposals.
Using this approach, NASA's research will be enriched by new innovators
that do not normally work on NASA issues. Through Centennial
Challenges, NASA intends to reach new innovators and find novel or low-
cost solutions to NASA engineering problems that would not be developed
otherwise.
NASA's Office of Exploration Systems has inherited NASA's ongoing
Innovative Technology Transfer Partnerships (ITTP) program. In recent
years, the focus of the ITTP programs has been rebalanced to include
both ``spin-off'' (transferring NASA-developed technologies to the
private sector) as well as ``spin-in'' (leveraging private sector
technologies for NASA missions). Through ITTP, NASA also plans to
undertake novel new joint research and development projects with the
private sector.
In addition to the programs within the Office of Exploration
Systems, the Office of Biological and Physical Research Space Product
Development division (SPD) manages the Research Partnership Center
(RPC) program. This program brings industry, academia and government
together to create new technology having application to both NASA and
the private sector. In this way the RPCs are creating benefits to the
public through their research directed toward NASA's needs. These
centers are engaged in a wide range of areas of applied research,
including advanced materials, agribusiness, biotechnology,
communications, imaging, medical informatics, telemedicine, spacecraft
technology and space resource utilization.
Finally, NASA's Office of Exploration Systems will be making
significant investments in new technologies to support the development
of future exploration systems through the Human and Robotic Technology
(HRT) Program. The Office of Exploration Systems is committed to
ensuring that HRT programs use open and competitive processes for
selecting and awarding grants and contracts. This will help ensure a
level playing field between private sector and public sector R&D
organizations seeking HRT awards.
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
Question. After the International Space Station is ``phased out''
in 2016, what do you plan to do with the facility? Could the private
sector potentially have a role in managing the Station?
Answer. In the broad context of the Vision for Space Exploration,
the ISS will be utilized through at least 2016. It will serve as a
significant test bed for the research and technical development needed
to fulfill the objectives of the Vision. It is premature to comment on
any determination regarding what will happen to the ISS beyond 2016.
While there are no specific plans for private management of the
Station, such a proposal would have to be thoroughly evaluated at the
appropriate time in the future. Future management of the ISS will need
to be fully coordinated with our International Partners in accordance
with our ISS agreements.
There is a plan for the safe and orderly de-orbit of the Station
when it has reached the end of its service life.
CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE (CEV)
Question. Currently, the only avenue for the private sector to
purchase a crewed spaceflight opportunity is aboard the Russian Soyuz.
Is NASA anticipating the development of a version of its Crew
Exploration Vehicle that could some day carry non-NASA personnel?
Answer. The CEV is expected to be dedicated to executing the new
Vision for Space Exploration. It is doubtful that NASA would itself
develop a version of the CEV to carry paying customers, since entering
the commercial market is not an appropriate role for government.
However, NASA will consider following the model from its aeronautical
history, whereby the technologies developed for the CEV could be made
available to commercial interests that could then develop a vehicle to
meet market driven requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
SPACE NUCLEAR
Question. I am excited that the space nuclear mission for the
production of the ``RTG''--the plutonium generators that power many
space probes--has now been successfully transferred to Idaho--and
production of these nuclear generators is now taking place at Argonne
West.
I think this work is a success. I understand that the Department of
Energy and NASA are both happy with this work in Idaho. I hope to build
on this mission.
I notice that the budget request includes $438 million for Project
Prometheus and for furthering NASA's efforts in advanced nuclear
propulsion systems--to move beyond the RTG to actual nuclear fission
reactors in space.
With your Navy background, you know that the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion program safely travels throughout the oceans and all around
the globe--powered by nuclear reactors. This program provides a good
analogy for the potential of nuclear in space--the ability to travel
great distances and a long time between re-fueling. In fact, Navy
reactor cores now last the ``life of the ship''.
One of the reasons this is possible is because Naval Reactors has a
large operation in Idaho--located on the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory. Every element of Navy fuel, discharged from
its ships, is sent to Idaho for destructive examination and testing.
The Navy has developed all its fuel, based on testing done in Idaho's
Advanced Test Reactor.
DOE seeks to establish a nuclear energy center of excellence for
civilian nuclear power in Idaho. I think NASA's space nuclear efforts
and those of the Navy fit well into this center.
Given the importance of advanced nuclear propulsion to achieving
the new vision for U.S. space exploration laid out by the President,
could I have your commitment to come to Idaho--to see the capabilities
of the Idaho lab and to see the Naval Reactors work there?
Answer. NASA has been in touch with your staff regarding this
matter.
ADVANCED MICROELECTRONICS
Question. In fiscal year 2004, Congress provided $1 million of
additional funding for advanced work in radiation hardened, ultra low
power micro-electronics work associated with a research center in Post
Falls, Idaho. This additional funding was intended as an increase to
some ongoing work that NASA Goddard was doing in Idaho--not as a
substitute for that work--which had already been competitively awarded.
In other words, these items were not meant to cancel each other out. I
understand that NASA is still engaged of a review of Congressional
earmarks and will finish that review by the end of the month.
Could you please look into the status of release of this funding,
and have your staff report back to my office?
Answer. NASA has been in touch with your staff regarding this
matter.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Harry Reid
JOINT DARK ENERGY MISSION (JDEM)
Question. I was recently pleased to learn that NASA and the
Department of Energy are collaborating on the Joint Dark Energy Mission
(JDEM) in an attempt to answer the most fundamental science questions
of the day--of what is the universe made and why is the universe
expanding at an ever increasing rate. Unfortunately, although the
Department of Energy requested around $7.6 million in its budget
request for JDEM, it appears that NASA failed to meet its commitment to
this program and did not include funding in its fiscal year 2005 budget
submittal. What does this lack of resources mean for the program and
for the collaboration that NASA entered into with DOE? There is wide
agreement within the scientific community that this program is critical
and in need of immediate funding to ensure that it remains robust and
productive--could you please explain why NASA chose not to include JDEM
in its budget request? Please keep the committee abreast of the
Department's actions and intentions regarding JDEM.
Answer. NASA has not abandoned its desire to participate in the
NASA-DOE mission called JDEM. NASA and DOE have agreed on an outline of
the joint mission. The principle investigator-led science investigation
will be competitively selected jointly by NASA and DOE. The science
investigation and mission operations will be jointly funded. NASA will
take responsibility for the project, prime contractor, launch, general
observer program, and data archive.
DOE is funding research that is applicable to JDEM. NASA is funding
mission concept studies by potential proposers ($500K/yr in fiscal year
2004 and fiscal year 2005). NASA Centers are spending advanced project
funds on studies as well ($800K to $1M in fiscal year 2004). NASA is
evaluating five mission concepts (from Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory;
JPL; GSFC; Arizona State University; and Conceptual Analytics, LLC)
looking at a variety of architectures, instruments, and technologies.
NASA finds the JDEM mission scientifically compelling; however, as
an agency, we must always prioritize among competing research programs.
Whenever possible, we enlist the aid of our advisory committees and the
guidance of the National Research Council (as outlined the most recent
Decadal Survey). This approach ensures that the opinions of the
scientific community remain important considerations in NASA decisions.
While it is true that NASA will not begin full JDEM development
this year, important precursor activities are being undertaken to
ensure that we will be prepared to begin, should the decision be made
to proceed with JDEM.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Administrator.
Mr. O'Keefe. Thank you, sir.
Senator Bond. The meeting is recessed.
[Whereupon at 11:42 a.m., Thursday, March 11, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]