[Senate Hearing 108-705]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 30, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Shelby, Byrd, Leahy,
and Murray.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENTS OF:
EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR., DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES
ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION
MICHAEL J. GARCIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
Today we continue our review of the President's fiscal year
2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. We
will specifically consider the request for programs and
activities of three of the department's agencies: Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection, and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
I am pleased to welcome the Director of Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Mr. Eduardo Aguirre; the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Mr. Robert Bonner;
and the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Mr. Michael Garcia. We thank you for
submitting copies of your statements in advance of the hearing.
These will be made a part of the record. And we invite you each
to make any comments you think would be helpful to the
committee's understanding of the budget request.
Before asking the witnesses to proceed, however, I am happy
to yield to Senator Byrd and other Senators who may wish to
make opening statements.
Senator Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, comrades on the
committee. You see, I am ahead of everybody else on the Hill.
Fifty-one years on the Hill entitles me to call my friends here
``comrades.''
Welcome to our distinguished witnesses. The men and women
under your direction have a great impact on the safety of
American citizens, as well as visitors to our country.
Secretary Ridge has promoted the concept of one face at the
border. And I support that concept. However, I remain concerned
that there are real vulnerabilities facing us Nation that
require immediate response.
Last December, Secretary Ridge said, ``The strategic
indicators, including al-Qaeda's continued desire to carry out
attacks against our homeland, are perhaps greater now than at
any point since September 11.'' On March 11, terrorists armed
with backpacks filled with explosives coordinated an attack
that resulted in the deaths of nearly 200 people in Madrid. I
would expect that the administration would anticipate these
kinds of threats and address such threats with a robust
defense.
REVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET
Yet, as I review the administration's budget, America's
defense is far too reliant on paper, on studies, and on
reports, rather than on the layered defense that the President
and the Secretary often describe in their homeland security
speeches. Let me just give a few examples.
Nearly 9 million commercial containers are brought into
this country each year through our ports. Yet, only 5 percent
of them are inspected. We have all heard these figures time and
time again.
On January 5, 2004, the new visa tracking system, known as
US VISIT, began operation at 115 airports and 14 seaports.
Customs and Border Protection inspectors are collecting data on
visitors entering our country, but the Bush Administration
still has no clear plan for confirming who is exiting the
United States. We have no way of knowing whether aliens, who
are supposed to have left the country, have in fact left the
country.
At the same time, we need to ensure that sufficient funds
are provided to integrate the various existing biometric
databases. We need to make sure that the US VISIT system and
the Border Patrol IDENT system are compatible with the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. At our
March 9 hearing, Secretary Hutchinson attempted to address this
issue, but I believe that he fell short in his response.
NEED FOR INTEGRATED SYSTEMS
We need to have integrated systems that can talk to each
other. We must know whether an alien trying to come into this
country, or already in this country, has a criminal history. By
integrating these systems, CBP would know if an alien is a
security risk and could refuse him entry into the country, or
remove him from the country, or imprison him. We simply cannot
be satisfied with the incompatible systems that result in
murderers and other criminals walking through holes in our
border security.
SHORTCOMINGS IN BUDGET REQUEST
The Federal Air Marshal Service does not have sufficient
resources this year to maintain the number of air marshals on
targeted domestic and international flights. And because the
Administration has proposed no increase for next year, a bad
problem could become even worse next year.
The President has proposed a sweeping amnesty for people
already residing illegally in this country. Yet, the
President's budget request includes only modest increases for
programs that attempt to cope with our growing illegal alien
population, and provides insufficient funds to robustly enforce
our existing immigration laws. When I inquired of Secretary
Ridge just how he would pay to implement the President's
amnesty program, he could not provide an answer.
I want to make sure that this subcommittee and this
Congress provide real homeland security to the American people,
not just assurances on paper. The President stubbornly has told
this agency not to seek supplemental appropriations this year.
Just last week we learned that, more than a year after setting
up the new department, there still is not a complete accounting
of the funds which have been made available for the operation
of your agencies.
HIRING FREEZES
The department has imposed hiring freezes so that the
department's accounts, along with its OMB overseers, can audit
the books. Air marshals are not being hired. Inspectors at our
ports of entry and criminal investigators are not being hired.
We are 6 months into the fiscal year. I simply do not
understand why the Administration has not proposed a solution
to this problem. Homeland security cannot wait.
THE NATION IS VULNERABLE
I have never claimed to be the Oracle at Delphi, but there
are many times these days when I feel like Diogenes. I am
looking for an honest man. I am seeking someone who can tell
this President that this Nation is vulnerable and that this
President leaves us vulnerable for another year.
Time and again, my colleagues and I have tried to provide
this department with the additional resources we believe it
needs to surely provide security to the homeland. And time and
again, this Administration has stiff-armed our efforts,
labeling amendments for border security, port security, air
cargo security, and rail security as wasteful spending.
ALLEGED BUDGET SHORTFALL
I hope we can get to the bottom of this alleged budget
shortfall for the department quickly. It is a problem not of
Congress's making. I will be discussing many of these issues. I
appreciate the fine work of our witnesses and the courageous
men and women who work for you. I look forward to hearing from
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator Leahy.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I could not help
but think as I listened to both your statement and to Senator
Byrd's statement, that the witnesses before us this morning all
bear great responsibility for keeping our Nation secure. All
three of you do. And we all thank you for your service.
HIRING FREEZES FOR ICE AND CBP
But when we come together here today, I am concerned about
the hiring freeze that is in place in part or in all of your
agencies. I understand that the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, ICE, the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, CBP, are facing a budget shortfall of more than 12
percent. It is really inexcusable to hear about a hiring freeze
in critical national security agencies, especially after the
administration has so stridently opposed efforts by Senator
Byrd and others, many others, in Congress to make homeland
security the priority that it needs in the national budget.
We know full well that the administration budget's
priorities ultimately is the White House prerogative and not
yours. My criticism is not directed at you. But this morning
the American people need to hear an explanation how this could
have happened and what this freeze will mean to the missions of
your agencies and what is being done in the meantime to protect
the security of the American people.
We ask these questions because, as Senator Byrd has pointed
out so many times, under the Constitution the question of
spending starts here in the Congress, not on the other end of
Pennsylvania Avenue. We hold the purse strings.
LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER IN WILLISTON, VERMONT
Now I am glad that ICE is making increased use of the Law
Enforcement Support Center, LESC, in Williston, Vermont. For
years the LESC has done an excellent job of providing
information to State and local police departments throughout
the Nation regarding the immigration status and identities of
aliens suspected, arrested, or convicted of criminal activity.
I had the pleasure of joining Mr. Garcia there last summer.
I recall at one point during the discussion we were talking
to somebody about that it is open 24 hours, 7 days a week. What
happened earlier that winter, one time we had a 3-foot snowfall
overnight. And this got kind of puzzled looks. Well, everybody
came to work, of course. I mean, what else would they do? It
was only 3 feet. It kind of screwed up the parking lot, but
everybody got to work.
But I think that when it is done, including this work at
ICE, Operation Predator, designed to catch sex offenders, I
think that is extremely important. But I am also concerned that
LESC may not receive the resources its needs to accomplish its
additional workload. I hope that will be addressed today.
TRIPS AROUND THE COUNTRY TO VARIOUS OFFICES
Incidentally, I know all of you make trips around the
country to the various departments. Those are meaningful. I
mentioned to Mr. Garcia earlier this morning, when I was coming
out of mass on Sunday, somebody came up to me and said that
they were there when he came through and was delighted that he
actually took time and asked them what they do and how they do
it, what is involved in their job. I am sure there were a whole
lot of other people he asked. But this particular person
remembered this. It was almost a year later.
CIS BUDGET REQUEST CONCERNS
Now turning to Mr. Aguirre's agency, I am concerned about
the President's proposed budget for Citizenship and Immigration
Services, CIS.. The budget calls for a 40-percent cut in the
amount of directly appropriated funds for CIS from the nearly
$235 million appropriated for the current year. They are
cutting it, Mr. Chairman, to $140 million for fiscal year 2005.
Now this cut comes at a time where we are way, way, way far
from fulfilling the President's own promise to reduce the
average wait time for applicants for immigration benefits to 6
months by 2006. It was a great speech. It was a great promise.
I agree with the President entirely. But after making the
speech, he did not cut the funds to make sure the promise could
be realized.
It also comes at a time when the President has proposed a
worker program that would significantly increase the CIS
workload. Yet another great speech, a large Hispanic
population. But I guess it proved unpopular with some in the
President's party, so we have not heard more about it. But we
know it is still floating out there.
In fact, I wrote to the President in January. I asked him
to submit a legislative proposal to Congress for implementing
his plan. He announced it with great fanfare. And I was curious
just how it is going to be done. We only have a few real
working days left in the Congress this year, and we have yet to
receive a response.
INCREASE CAP FOR THE H2B VISA PROGRAM
I would like to raise one other policy issue while Mr.
Aguirre is here. I hope the CIS and the administration as a
whole will support bipartisan efforts in Congress to increase
the cap for the H2B visa program. Your department recently
announced that the statutory cap for this program has already
been reached, if I am correct. It is causing tourism-dependent
businesses across the country to fear they will be unable to
serve their customers this summer.
prepared statement
I am enjoying with at least 13 of my colleagues, including
Senator Stevens, the chairman of the full committee, to
introduce S. 2252, the Save Summer Act of 2004. It would
increase the cap for the current fiscal year by 40,000. I would
urge the administration to support it.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony. I thank you
for your usual courtesy and giving me a chance to make a
comment.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy
The witnesses before us this morning all bear great responsibility
for keeping our Nation secure, and we thank you for your service. Yet
as we come together today, there is a hiring freeze in place at all or
part of each of your agencies.
I understand that the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) are facing
a budget shortfall of more than 12 percent. It is outrageous to hear
about a hiring freeze in critical national security agencies after the
Bush Administration has so stridently opposed attempts by the Ranking
Member and many, many others in Congress to make homeland security the
priority that it needs to be in the national budget. We know full well
that setting the Administration's budget priorities ultimately is the
White House's prerogative, and not yours. But this morning the American
people need to hear an explanation of how this could have happened,
what this freeze will mean to the missions of your agencies, and what
is being done in the meantime to protect the security of the American
people.
Meanwhile, I am glad that ICE is making increased use of the Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC), in Williston, Vermont. For years,
the LESC has done an excellent job of providing information to state
and local police departments throughout the nation, regarding the
immigration status and identities of aliens suspected, arrested, or
convicted of criminal activity. I had the pleasure of joining Mr.
Garcia last summer at the LESC to announce an expansion of its role,
including its work in ICE's Operation Predator, designed to catch sex
offenders. At the same time, I am concerned that the LESC may not
receive the resources it needs to accomplish its additional workload. I
hope that Mr. Garcia will address those concerns today.
Turning to Mr. Aguirre's agency, I am concerned about the
President's proposed budget for Citizenship and Immigration Services
(CIS). The budget calls for a 40 percent cut in the amount of directly
appropriated funds for CIS, from the nearly $235 million appropriated
for the current year, to $140 million for fiscal year 2005. This cut
comes at a time when we are still far from fulfilling the President's
promise to reduce the average wait time for applicants for immigration
benefits to 6 months by 2006. It also comes at a time when the
President has proposed a guest worker program that would significantly
increase the CIS workload. Of course, the guest worker program may have
simply fallen off the President's radar screen now that it has proven
unpopular with some in his party. I wrote to the President in January
and asked him to submit a legislative proposal to Congress for
implementing his plan. Despite the ever-shrinking legislative year
ahead of us, I have still not received a response.
I would like to raise one other policy issue with Mr. Aguirre while
he is here. I hope that CIS and the Administration as a whole will
support bipartisan efforts in Congress to increase the cap for the H-2B
visa program. Your department recently announced that the statutory cap
for this program had already been reached, causing tourism-dependent
businesses across the country to fear they will be unable to serve
their customers this summer. I have joined with at least 13 of my
colleagues--including the Chairman of the full committee--to introduce
S. 2252, the Save Summer Act of 2004. This bill would increase the cap
for the current fiscal year by 40,000. It is a necessary response to a
critical and unexpected problem, and I urge the Administration to
support it.
I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shelby.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Secretary, let me thank you for the bureau's
efforts to stop the exploitation of children. I have worked
with you and your predecessors for many years to ensure that
the people that would take advantage of and seek to prosper
from the exploitation of children are prosecuted to the fullest
extent of the law. I remain committed to working with you to
eliminate the threat to our children.
In addition, I know you have been working with our partners
at the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Let
me encourage you to maintain that partnership. I think it has
been very valuable and it works. The center is an invaluable
asset, I think, in our quest to protect our children in
America.
OPERATION PREDATOR
I understand that Operation Predator is underway. And
Senator Leahy alluded to that. I am interested in its progress
and what the funding requirements are to maintain this
important program in 2005. I am also interested in learning of
any additional programs that are dedicated to eliminating
crimes against children, I would appreciate it if you would
take the time to go over some of these in your testimony or
questions.
NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ALIENS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES
Among your many goals here is the charge to secure our
borders, Mr. Director, and to control illegal immigration. I am
told that the most current estimates place the number of
illegal aliens in our country at over 8 million. I believe it
is much more than that.
Gentlemen, what is your best estimate on the number of
illegal aliens currently residing in this country? How many new
illegal aliens entered the country last year? Is that an
increase or a decrease from the previous year? I fear that it
is an increase. If we are so uncertain about the numbers, does
that not seem to indicate that we are not doing enough to
secure our borders and our homeland?
OVERSTAYS
Another major problem with our immigration system is the
fact that many of these people currently counted as illegals
actually entered the country legally, but have overstayed their
visas. Do you have any recent numbers on visa overstays, given
that this makes up a large part of our illegal population?
Next, what is your agency doing right now, and what are you
planning to do in the future, to ensure that this does not
continue to be a problem? That is, they get a visa, they come
in, they do not go back, and you do not know where they are.
There must be a way to keep track of these folks.
STEMMING THE FLOW OF ILLEGAL ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES
I spent this past week conducting county meetings all over
the State of Alabama, my State. Without fail, at every meeting
I was asked what the Federal Government was doing to stem the
flow of illegal aliens into the United States. Unfortunately,
my answer to them was, ``obviously not enough.''
What is the directorate doing to make our borders more
secure and eliminate the influx of illegal aliens in this
country? How many aliens have been detained and deported in the
last year? I am asking these questions, and I hope you will
touch on all of them.
If a Mexican citizen looking for work can pay a fee to a
coyote to traverse our border, what is to keep terrorists that
will do us harm from doing the same thing? I have been told
many times, and I believe it, that rewarding bad behavior only
encourages more bad behavior. We learn that as children.
Currently, if you break the law entering the United States, you
get a job. Now that is not what the law provides, but it sure
seems to be what is happening.
I have serious concerns about the ramification of proposals
that sound a lot like the amnesty of 1986. If the current
proposals are put into effect, the criminal would not only get
a job, but social security and welfare benefits as well. I have
been told that the rate of illegal immigration actually
increased after the 1986 amnesty. Is there any truth to that
statement? Would you agree that we spend too much time and
money on the vetting process for those following the paths to
legal immigration, and not enough trying to catch those people
who are willing to break the law and pay $50 to be at work in
the States in a couple of days. What are we going to do, or
what are you going to do, to rectify the problem?
I know I have posed a number of questions here in a short
time. And I hope you will address them.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join all
of my colleagues in welcoming our witnesses today. You have a
tremendous task before you. And I want to thank you for your
service.
$1.2 BILLION SHORTFALL CAUSE OF HIRING FREEZE
I became increasingly concerned about the level of the
President's budget request when I read that, according to the
Wall Street Journal, a $1.2 billion shortfall has caused a
hiring freeze within your agency. So I hope your testimony will
clear up whether that is actually a computer glitch or an
accounting error resulting from combing budgets from legal
agencies or a real budget shortfall that this subcommittee will
need to deal with.
SECURING LAND AND SEAPORTS-OF-ENTRY
Mr. Chairman, my questions today will focus on the
administration's plan for securing our ports of entry, both on
land and our seaports. As we all know, many experts in the
security arena, including some in your own department, have
said that securing cargo coming into this country should be one
of our Nation's highest priorities. I could not agree more. We
absolutely need a coordinated plan for a nationwide cargo
security regime.
TURF BATTLES
However, I have been very disappointed with the turf
battles that have been going on between Customs, TSA, and the
Coast Guard as to who is in charge of cargo security. So I will
want to explore with Commissioner Bonner how he plans on
working under Secretary Hutchinson to implement each of the
Department of Homeland Security's port and security programs
into one coordinate regime.
CUSTOMS OFFICERS
I am also interested to hear how our Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) officers are being received overseas and the
level of cooperation foreign customs agents are provided within
programs like CSI and C-TPAT. I will also have questions about
the implementation of security technology, such as radiation
portal monitors at our ports of entry.
Mr. Chairman, as always, I look forward to an informative
hearing. I will have more specific topics to discuss with our
witnesses during the question and answer period.
Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have
come to hear the testimony. No questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
We are now ready to proceed. Mr. Aguirre, we will be glad
to hear from you any opening statement that you have or
comments in explanation of the President's budget request for
your agency.
STATEMENT OF EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR.
Mr. Aguirre. Good morning, Chairman Cochran and Ranking
Member Byrd and members of the subcommittee. My name is Eduardo
Aguirre. And I have the honor of serving as the first Director
of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services within the
Department of Homeland Security.
In previous congressional testimony, I have shared my story
of having arrived to the United States as a 15-year-old
unaccompanied minor from Cuba. My parents sent me here to
escape a repressive regime and to experience the freedoms and
opportunities found only in America. I became a product of the
legal immigration track, the very system that I am now charged
with fundamentally transforming.
We are a welcoming . And hard work and patriotism of our
immigrants has made our Nation prosperous. We seek to continue
to improve the administration of immigration benefits for the
more than 6 million applicants who legally petition USCIS every
year. Last year, upon creation of the USCIS, a team of 15,000
and I embraced a simple but imperative mission, making certain
that the right applicant receives the right benefit in the
right amount of time or preventing the wrong individuals from
obtaining our benefits.
THREE PRIORITIES
We established three priorities that guide every aspect of
our work: Eliminating the immigration benefit application
backlog, improving customer service, while enhancing national
security. As we mark our institutional 1-year anniversary, I am
particularly pleased with the progress we have made and the
professionalism exhibited by our employees day in and day out,
while mitigating security threats that we know to be real and
relentless.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE
To date, we have initiated online options for two
application types, as well as case status updates. And we will
be adding six more applications in May, which will account for
over 50 percent of our work. We have established the Office of
Citizenship. We have eliminated lines at some of our highest
volume offices, and much more.
USCIS is one of the largest fee-funded agencies in the
Federal Government, charging fees from a variety of benefits
from individuals seeking to enter, reside, or work in the
United States. Therefore, the actual cash flow for our business
operations vary from year to year with the number of
immigration benefit applications received.
BACKLOG REDUCTION
Mr. Chairman, as you know too well, backlogs from
immigration benefit applications began to grow during the
1990s, seeing an overall 77-percent increase from fiscal year
1993 to fiscal year 2001. Beginning with fiscal year 2002,
President Bush pledged and the Congress supported a multi-year
$500 million initiative to attain the universal 6-month
processing time standard by fiscal year 2006 for all
immigration benefit applications while providing quality
service to all customers.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request seeks an
additional $60 million in appropriated funds to boost the total
dedicated to backlog reduction efforts to $160 million. The
overall budget request for USCIS is $1.711 billion, which is
$140 million in discretionary appropriated funds and $1.571
billion in fees.
The old INS developed a comprehensive backlog elimination
plan prior to September 11, 2001, to achieve this goal. And we
initially realized significant improvements in fiscal year
2002. Processing times for applications averaged by type
between 3 and 72 months. By the end of the year, these same
averages were reduced to between 1 and 26 months. However, as
we all know, September 11, 2001, profoundly affected our
business operations, employees, and stakeholders. New guidance
was issued. Security background checks were enhanced. And new
processes were implemented. Already, many applications were
subject to fingerprint and background checks. The enhanced
checks instituted in July 2002 represents an additional set of
name checks against a variety of workout databases housed in
the Interagency Border Inspection System, which is also called
IBIS.
SECURITY CHECKS
Approximately 35 million security checks were performed
last year by our agency. This change in the way we process
immigration benefit applications has meant higher processing
costs for USCIS. We make no apologies for our commitment to the
integrity of the immigration system. And we will not cut a
single corner or compromise security to process an application
more quickly. We are making America safer against security and
criminal threats one background check at a time.
SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS
To ensure that our backlog does not increase further, we
are currently seeking to adjust our fee schedule through the
regulatory process by recovering costs associated with
comprehensive security enhancements instituted after September
11, 2001. The cost of these security enhancements is about $140
million annually or $21 per application.
NEW PRIORITIES
The fee adjustments will also support new priorities, such
as establishing a refugee corps and establishing the new Office
of Citizenship. In addition, USCIS will develop study materials
and teaching guides to ensure that the process of preparing for
naturalization is more meaningful, as well as developing
standardized testing procedures.
We fully realize that increased funding along will not
enable us to realize our goals. We are taking a hard look at
the way we currently conduct our business. We are aggressively
working to modernize our systems and increase our capacity
through the reengineering of processes to include developing
mechanisms to interact with customers in a more forward-
reaching manner.
NEW BACKLOG ELIMINATION PLAN
We are now in the process of finalizing a new backlog
elimination plan that will outline changes to our business
processes and which will set forth our revitalized mission of
delivering immigration service in the future.
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM
On January 7, as has been mentioned here before, President
Bush courageously confronted a broken system, one that has been
ignored for too long. From the East Room of the White House, he
called for Congress to deliver true reform and a new temporary
worker program that facilitates economic growth, enhances
national security, and promotes compassion. Many have asked how
USCIS would implement its part of the President's temporary
worker program should Congress pass the legislation.
One of the principles of the President's proposed program
is that it should be simple and user friendly, thus one that
can be effectively administered. The President's proposal calls
for aliens present in the United States as of January 7, 2004,
to pay a processing fee upon enrolling in the program. USCIS
anticipates recovering the cost of processing the applications
through collections of a processing fee, as it is done
currently with most immigration applications. The processing
fee will be set based on a full cost recovery.
prepared statement
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you
for your invitation to testify before this committee. And I
look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eduardo Aguirre, Jr.,
Good afternoon Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd and Members of
the Subcommittee. My name is Eduardo Aguirre and I have the honor of
serving as the first Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, within the Department of Homeland Security.
We are a welcoming Nation, and the hard work and patriotism of our
immigrants has made our Nation prosperous. We seek to continue to
improve the administration of immigration benefits for the more than
six million applicants who petition USCIS on an annual basis.
We continue to commit ourselves to building and maintaining an
immigration services system that provides information and benefits in a
timely, accurate, consistent, courteous, and professional manner; while
preventing ineligible individuals from receiving benefits. Put more
simply, it is our job to make certain that the right applicant receives
the right benefit in the right amount of time, while preventing the
wrong individuals from obtaining our benefits.
USCIS is one of the largest fee-funded agencies in the Federal
government--charging fees for a variety of benefits from individuals
seeking to enter, reside, or work in the United States. Therefore, the
actual cash flow for our business operations, including a network of
250 local offices, Application Support Centers, Service Centers, Asylum
Offices, National Customer Service Call (NCSC) Centers, Forms Centers,
and Internet portals, varies from year to year with the number of
immigration benefit applications received.
In any typical work day, our workforce of 15,500 (one-third of whom
are contractors) will:
--Process 140,000 national security background checks;
--Receive 100,000 web hits;
--Take 50,000 calls at our Customer Service Centers;
--Adjudicate 30,000 applications for immigration benefits;
--See 25,000 visitors at 92 field offices;
--Issue 20,000 green cards; and
--Capture 8,000 sets of fingerprints and digital photos at 130
Application Support Centers.
USCIS has established three priorities: (1) eliminating the
immigration benefit application backlog, (2) improving customer
service, while (3) enhancing national security. In our first year of
operation we have: initiated on-line options for a few application
filings and case status updates; established the Office of Citizenship;
eliminated lines at some of our highest volume offices; introduced a
toll-free customer service help line; streamlined the Certificate of
Citizenship process for internationally adopted children; developed a
more secure travel document for permanent residents; and fleshed out
our leadership team.
Backlogs of immigration benefit applications began to grow during
the 1990s. Overall, there was a 77 percent increase from fiscal year
1993 to fiscal year 2001. The primary factors contributing to the
backlogs were a dramatic increase in the number of applications and
petitions received, delays in securing funding and positions to process
this increasing number of applications, the lengthy 2 amount of time it
takes to recruit, hire and train adjudicators, and the lack of a
comprehensive approach to monitoring, supporting and maintaining timely
processing.
Beginning in fiscal year 2002, the President pledged, and the
Congress supported, a multi-year $500 million initiative to attain a
universal 6-month processing time standard for all immigration benefit
applications while providing quality service to all customers. We
developed a comprehensive Backlog Elimination Plan prior to September
11, 2001 to achieve this goal. The Plan called for improvements to
processes and expanded quality assurance efforts designed to achieve a
high level of performance. We initially realized significant
improvements. In fiscal year 2002, processing times for applications
averaged, by type, between 3 and 72 months. By the end of the year,
these same averages were reduced to between one and 26 months.
However, September 11, 2001 profoundly affected our business
operations, employees, and stakeholders. New guidance was issued,
security background checks were enhanced, and new processes were
implemented, including conducting interviews for the National Security
Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) Program.\1\ Additionally, since
July 2002, we formally enhanced our security background checks on the
processing of all immigration benefit applications to ensure that those
who receive immigration benefits have come to join the people of the
United States in building a better society and not to do us harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Program transferred to BTS in November of 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The process of performing enhanced security checks has been
designed to compare information on applicants, and other beneficiaries
as appropriate, who apply for an immigration benefit against various
Federal lookout systems. The enhanced check instituted in July 2002
represents an additional set of name checks against a variety of
lookout databases housed in the Interagency Border Inspection System
(IBIS). Already, many applications were subject to fingerprint and
background checks.
The purpose of conducting security checks is to help law
enforcement agencies identify risks to the community and/or to national
security and to prevent ineligible individuals from obtaining
immigration benefits. On the vast majority of applications, we perform
two checks; one when the application is initially received, and one at
the time of adjudication. Approximately 35 million security checks are
performed annually.
In most of these cases (some 97 percent), the checks take only a
few minutes. In the event of a ``hit'', however, we must hold that
application without resolution until the security issue at hand is
resolved. Last fiscal year, we processed a little over six million
immigration benefit applications. Approximately 7 percent of the
applications processed resulted in an initial security hit, and after
further scrutiny, 2 percent resulted in confirmed security or criminal
threat matches.
This change in the way we process immigration benefit applications
has meant higher processing costs for USCIS because the costs of
performing these checks were not factored into the existing fee
schedule. As a result, existing resources have been diverted to perform
the additional security checks until the fees could be adjusted to
cover these costs. Although the security enhancements have meant longer
processing times in some categories and a significant growth in the
application backlog, USCIS has taken the position that security
absolutely will not be sacrificed in our search for increased
efficiency. USCIS will continue to coordinate and identify suspected
benefit fraud cases and refer them to ICE for enforcement action.
Our intra-government coordination demonstrates that our approach
realizes the intended results. By way of example, within the last month
our background check procedures identified individuals wanted for
murder in Portland and sexual assault in Miami. We are making America
safer against security and criminal threats, one background check at a
time.
I believe that the President's fiscal year 2005 budget will set us
on the right path toward enhancing immigration services. The budget
includes a total for USCIS of $1.711 billion, $140 million in
discretionary appropriated funds and $1.571 billion in fees, and seeks
an additional $60 million to boost the total dedicated to backlog
reduction efforts to $160 million. Our overall goal is to achieve a 6-
month processing time standard for all immigration benefit applications
by fiscal year 2006.
To ensure that our backlog does not increase further, we are
currently seeking to adjust our fee schedule through the regulatory
process by recovering costs associated with comprehensive security
enhancements instituted after September 11, 2001. The annual cost of
these security enhancements are about $140 million or about $21 per
application.
The fee adjustments will also support new activities such as
establishing a refugee corps to improve the quality of refugee
adjudications and establishing the new Office of Citizenship \2\ to
promote instruction and training on citizenship responsibilities to
both immigrants and U.S. citizens. The Office of Citizenship is
developing initiatives to target immigrants at two critical points on
their journey toward citizenship: when they obtain permanent resident
status and as they begin the formal naturalization process. In the
past, the Federal government provided few orientation materials for new
immigrants. In contrast, CIS will reach out to new immigrants at the
earliest opportunity to provide them with information and tools they
need to begin the process of civic integration. In addition, CIS will
develop study materials and teaching guides to ensure that the process
of preparing for naturalization is meaningful, so that immigrants who
choose to become U.S. citizens have a real understanding of the
commitment they are making when they take the Oath of Allegiance to the
United States. The establishment of a Refugee Corps will provide a
strong and effective overseas refugee processing program able to
fulfill the U.S. Refugee Program's humanitarian objectives and more
efficiently identify inadmissible persons and those who are of national
security interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ As required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We fully realize that increased funding alone will not enable us to
realize our goals. We are taking a hard look at the way we currently
conduct our business. We are aggressively working to modernize our
systems and increase our capacity through the reengineering of
processes, the development and implementation of new information
technology systems, and the development of mechanisms to interact with
customers in a more forward-reaching manner. For example, USCIS has
recently eliminated the backlog of applications for the Certificate of
Citizenship on Behalf of an Adopted Child with a program that
proactively provides parents the certificate.
We are now in the process of finalizing a new Backlog Elimination
Plan that will outline changes to our business processes, and which
will set forth our revitalized vision of delivering immigration
services in the future.
Additionally, we are examining the standard of knowledge in the
current citizenship test to ensure that prospective and new citizens
know not only the facts of our Nation's history, but also the ideals
that have shaped that history.
The project management team for this initiative recently met with
over a dozen historians, civics experts, and adult educators to discuss
the redesign of the U.S. history portion of the naturalization test
with the goal of making the test more meaningful, substantive, and
fair. This group is examining the meaning of significant events that
occurred in our Nation's history, and is exploring ways in which
naturalization candidates may better retain the significance of these
events. Recognizing that many Americans have strong beliefs about what
our new citizens should know about our country, we plan to publish the
proposed test content in the Federal Register and ask for public
comment. We believe that many Americans would like to have a say in
what we are asking our new citizens to learn, and we are eager to hear
from them. We look forward to briefing you and other Members of
Congress on our proposed new citizenship test content and receiving
your feedback, as well.
In a related effort, this same team is working to redesign the
current citizenship testing methodology in an effort to ensure more
uniform results. Currently, a candidate in Los Angeles is, in all
likelihood, not tested the same way or asked the same questions as a
candidate taking the same exam on the same day in Boston. Therefore, we
are developing standardized testing procedures so that applicants can
be assured that they are experiencing an equitable testing process.
We do not want to make the test more difficult. We do not want to
make it less difficult. We want to make it more meaningful in a way
that does not have an adverse impact on any particular group of
applicants. Therefore, we will carefully pilot test the revised
English, history, and government tests before implementing them. And,
we will continue to consult with our stakeholders to solicit their
input.
Our plan is to implement the new test and testing process in 2006.
Given the importance of the ultimate benefit for those tested--U.S.
citizenship--this process is not one that can or should be rushed. We
are committed to improving the current process and to improving it in
the right way.
As we celebrate our institutional 1-year anniversary, USCIS has
stood up an organization of which we are very proud. We have
established a leadership team, improved many of our operational
processes, and continue to strive to make further improvements. The
funding requested in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request is
an important factor in continuing to improve the service we can offer
our customers.
This concludes my prepared remarks. I thank you for the invitation
to testify before this committee and I would be happy to answer any
questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Aguirre.
Mr. Bonner, we will be glad to hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROBERT C. BONNER
Mr. Bonner. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator Byrd,
other members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here to
discuss the Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, 2005 budget
request. Let me just make a couple of observations. First of
all, one of the most important ideas of the reorganization into
the Department of Homeland Security was to do, as Secretary
Ridge put it, create one face at the border, one agency for our
borders to manage and secure the borders of our country. And
that started on March 1, 2003, just over a year ago.
When all of the immigration inspectors of the former INS,
all the agriculture border inspectors from the Department of
Agriculture, all of the border patrol agents merged with the
bulk of the U.S. Customs Service to form the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection, an agency within the Department of
Homeland Security, responsible for managing and securing our
Nation's borders.
CBP is the largest and perhaps one of the most profound
actual mergers of people and functions taking place as a result
of the Department of Homeland Security reorganization. The
number of employees in CBP equals about one-fourth of all the
employees of the Department of Homeland Security. And that is
not particularly surprising when one considers the importance
of the security of our borders to the security of our homeland.
By unifying the border agencies we are, and we will be,
more effective and more efficient than we were when border
responsibilities were literally fragmented among four different
entities or agencies of our government, reporting to three
different departments of our government, which is the way we
were organized before March 1, 2003, before the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security.
And I will also report to this subcommittee that we have
made great progress towards successfully completing this
historic merger.
In the last year alone, I have selected one port director
for each and every one of the 300 plus ports of entry to the
United States. We no longer have two or three different port
directors for agriculture, immigration, and customs. We have
one port director at all ports-of-entry into this country.
CBP INSPECTORS
We have provided antiterrorism training for all CBP
inspectors and equipped all front line inspectors with
radiation detection devices. We have implemented unified
primary inspections at our international airports. So for the
first time, we are performing a primary inspection, not just
for immigration, but for all purposes, immigration, customs,
and agriculture purposes. No more running the gauntlet of three
different agencies when you enter the United States at one of
our international airports.
INTEGRATION OF PASSENGER ANALYSIS UNITS AND CONSOLIDATED ANTITERRORISM
SECONDARY EXAMINATIONS
We have integrated our passenger analysis units and
consolidated our anti-terrorism secondary examinations, so that
all of our customs and immigration expertise and authorities
are brought to bear, and are used in identification,
questioning, and searching of potential terrorists arriving at
our borders.
NEW CBP UNIFORM FOR ALL CBP INSPECTORS AND CREATED AN OFFICE OF THE
BORDER PATROL
We have rolled out a new CBP uniform for all of CBP
inspectors at our ports of entry. All 19,000 CBP inspectors
will be in this new uniform by July of this year. And many of
them already are. And we have integrated the border patrol in
CBP by creating an Office of the Border Patrol. We have revised
the border patrol's national strategy to reflect the priority
mission of CBP and the Department of Homeland Security. And we
have implemented portions of that by stationing now over 1,000
border patrol agents at our northern border sectors.
PRIORITY MISSION OF CBP
The priority mission of CBP is preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering our country, but we recognize
that to do that mission we need to carry it out without
stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so
vital to our country's economy and to our way of life. Those do
not have to be mutually exclusive and we are pursuing smart
border initiatives to make them mutually reinforcing.
For example, rather than physically inspecting the
approximately 23 million containers that arrive by sea, rail,
and truck into the United States yearly, which would be
tantamount to closing our borders down and shutting down our
economy, we have taken measures to identify the high-risk
containers and inspect them rapidly, using state-of-the-art
technology when they arrive at our seaports or our land
borders.
We are obtaining electronic data on virtually all shipments
that are coming to the United States. And we are using that
data in our automated targeting system to identify all
potentially high-risk containers, particularly for the
terrorist threat. And we are inspecting all high-risk
containers for terrorist weapons using our non-intrusive
inspection technology and our radiation detection technology.
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE
We are also, though, employing a layer defense which is an
extended border strategy. And that is through the Container
Security Initiative. We are pushing our zone of security beyond
our physical borders by placing our personnel overseas to work
with other governments to target, identify, and inspect their
high-risk containers destined for the United States, and
destined for our seaports before they are loaded aboard vessels
at foreign seaports.
I am not going to discuss this chart I put up here but that
chart indicates in a nutshell that already countries, 38
foreign ports, have agreed with us to deploy and implement the
Container Security Initiative. And we have already moved out
rapidly and have implemented, by stationing our personnel
overseas as CSI targeters at 18 foreign seaports. And, of
course, we are not stopping there. We are going to continue to
expand the container security initiative.
CUSTOMS TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM
We also, under the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism, we are working with the private sector to increase
the security of their supply chains, literally from the foreign
loading docks to our ports of entry into the United States.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
Our budget request, Mr. Chairman, for 2005 for program
increase is $190 million. That includes funding for the
container security initiative to continue its expansion,
funding to expand the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism. There is some significant funding for radiation
detection equipment to further expand our portal radiation
monitors and other detection equipment at our ports of entry
into the United States to better detect against radiological
and even nuclear weapons.
prepared statement
There is funding for the enhancements of our automated
targeting system, as well as for surveillance and sensoring
technology for the border patrol, and some funding for UAVs to
deploy and operate Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to better detect
illegal crossings at our borders.
So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this
committee, for the support you have given already to Customs
and Border Protection. And in working together, I am confident
that we will succeed in better securing our borders against the
terrorist threat.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. And I will
answer any questions at the appropriate time that you or this
subcommittee may have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert C. Bonner
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, Members of the Subcommittee,
it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) fiscal year 2005 budget request.
I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to the Committee on
Appropriations for the support it provided for important initiatives
implemented by CBP last year. That support enabled CBP to make
significant progress in protecting our country against the terrorist
threat. I also want to thank Congress for the support it provided in
creating the new Department of Homeland Security, and the new Customs
and Border Protection agency within that Department. As the head of
CBP, I look forward to working with you to build on these successes.
The priority mission of CBP is to prevent terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. That extraordinarily important
priority mission means improving security at our physical borders and
ports of entry, but it also means extending our zone of security beyond
our physical borders--so that American borders are not the first line
of defense.
And we must do this while continuing to perform our traditional
missions well. These missions include apprehending individuals
attempting to enter the United States illegally, stemming the flow of
illegal drugs and other contraband, protecting our agricultural and
economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, protecting American
businesses from theft of their intellectual property, regulating and
facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and
enforcing U.S. trade laws. In fiscal year 2003, CBP processed 26.1
million trade entries, collected $24.7 billion in import duties, seized
2.2 million pounds of narcotics, and processed 412.8 million
pedestrians and passengers and 132.2 million conveyances.
We must perform all of this important security and border-related
work without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is
so important to our nation's economy. In other words, we have ``twin
goals'': Building more secure and more efficient borders.
Our total program increase request for fiscal year 2005 is $223
million. These funds will help CBP fulfill its priority mission of
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States. As Commissioner, I will also devote needed funds to support the
automation and information technology programs that will improve
overall operations of the agency, and I will devote funds to support
the traditional missions for which CBP is responsible.
Mr. Chairman, although I will touch on each of these areas in my
statement, and outline the actions CBP has taken or is planning to take
in each, I want to point out that in many cases, funds spent in one
area have a direct and positive impact on other areas. For example,
funds spent on automation and information technology provide invaluable
assistance to our priority mission of preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States. Also, funds spent on
our priority mission often result in improvements in our effectiveness
and efficiency in carrying out our traditional missions, such as
interdicting narcotics, and vice versa.
By way of summary of the fiscal year 2005 budget for CBP, I can
tell you that the program increases we are requesting include:
--$25 million for the Container Security Initiative, which will
support the continued expansion of the program, including the
stationing of CBP personnel in additional key international
seaports to examine high-risk cargo before it is placed on
ships bound for the United States;
--$15 million for the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism to
increase supply chain security and expedite the clearance of
legitimate trade;
--$50 million for Radiation Detection and Non-Intrusive Inspection
Technology to detect weapons of mass destruction;
--$21 million for Targeting Systems Enhancements to identify high-
risk travelers and goods for inspection while allowing the vast
majority of law abiding travelers and commerce to continue
unimpeded;
--$64 million for Border Patrol Surveillance and Sensor Technology
for the expansion of the remote video system along the southern
and northern borders to detect illegal crossings and to
increase the effectiveness of agents responding to such
crossings;
--$10 million for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to develop, procure,
deploy, and operate a system of unmanned aerial vehicles to
support the Border Patrol by detecting and monitoring illegal
border crossings; and
--$5 million to support the International Trade Data System (ITDS) to
revolutionize the way international trade data is collected,
disseminated, and used.
In my statement, I will discuss these programs and others that CBP
has been working on during the past year. I would like to begin,
though, with a brief update for the Subcommittee on the status of CBP
after 1 year.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION AT 1 YEAR
On March 1st, the Department of Homeland Security celebrated its 1
year anniversary as a Department. The anniversary marked the successful
transfer of approximately 42,000 employees from the U.S. Customs
Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to the new Customs and Border
Protection agency in the Department of Homeland Security. CBP is the
largest actual merger of people and functions within the Department of
Homeland Security. Indeed, about one-fourth of the personnel of DHS are
housed within CBP. That is not surprising considering how important the
security of our borders is to the security of our homeland.
One Face at the Border
To create CBP, on March 1, we took a substantial portion of U.S.
Customs and merged that with all of the immigration inspectors and
Border Patrol from the former INS, and inspectors from the Department
of Agriculture's APHIS. This means that for the first time in our
country's history, all agencies of the United States Government with
significant border responsibilities have been integrated and unified
into a single Federal agency responsible for managing, controlling and
securing our Nation's borders.
At CBP, we are creating, as Secretary Ridge has called it, ``One
Face at the Border''--one border agency for our country. In the year
following its creation, CBP has made significant strides toward
unification. And America is safer and its border are more secure than
they were when border responsibilities were fragmented in three
different departments of government, as they were before March 1,
2003--before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.
On March 1, 2003, CBP designated one Port Director at each port of
entry and put in place a single, unified chain of command. This was the
first time there has ever been one person at each of our nation's ports
of entry in charge of all Federal Inspection Services. And in terms of
an immediate increase in antiterrorism security, on Day One, all
frontline, primary inspectors at all ports of entry into the United
States were equipped with radiation detection devices. Since March 1,
2003, all inspectors have also received antiterrorism training.
Last year, we began rolling out unified CBP primary inspections at
international airports around the country, starting with U.S. citizens
and Lawful Permanent Residents. Unified primary means that the CBP
inspector in the booth will conduct the primary inspection for all
purposes--immigration, customs, and agriculture. Launched at Dulles,
Houston, JFK, Newark, LAX, Atlanta, Miami, San Francisco, unified
primary is now operational at all major international airports. This is
a major step forward in eliminating the process of travelers
potentially having to ``run the gauntlet'' through three separate
inspection agencies. Although legacy customs and immigration inspectors
have assumed interchangeable roles at the land border ports of entry
for years, this is the first time unified primary has been done on a
national scale at our country's airports.
Along with unified primary, we have also developed and are
implementing combined anti-terrorism secondary which leverages the
expertise and authorities of both legacy customs and immigration to
conduct a joint secondary inspection of passengers deemed high-risk for
terrorism. CBP has also begun to coordinate and consolidate our
passenger analytical units--the units that identify potential high-risk
travelers for inspection. Again, this brings together the customs and
immigration experience and authority to more effectively and
efficiently identify and interdict individuals who pose a possible
terrorist risk.
Unifying Symbols and the CBP Officer Position
Since July 2003, we have begun rolling out a new CBP uniform and
patch for all CBP inspectors at our Nation's ports of entry. It will
replace the three different customs, agriculture, and immigration
inspectional uniforms and patches. The new uniform and patch represent
our most visible unifying symbols to the American public. The new
uniform is being implemented in four phases. In the first phase,
completed as of October 1, 2003, all CBP managers and supervisors
converted to the new uniform. Other CBP uniformed personnel will be
phased in at various points with implementation scheduled to be
complete by July of this year.
All of these actions are helping us unify and become more effective
as an agency. Perhaps our most significant step toward achieving ``One
Face at the Border,'' though, was announced by Secretary Ridge on
September 2, 2003: the rollout of the new ``CBP Officer'' position. As
of October, 2003, we stopped hiring and training legacy ``immigration''
or ``customs'' inspectors and began hiring and training a new group of
``CBP Officers,'' who will be equipped to handle all CBP primary and
many of the secondary inspection functions, in both the passenger and
cargo environments. We are also deploying CBP Agriculture Specialists
to perform more specialized agricultural inspection functions in both
these environments.
Integrated Training
Training is a very important component to the roll out of the CBP
Officer. We have created a new 14 week, 71-day basic course that
provides the training necessary to conduct primary processing and to be
familiar with secondary processing of passengers, merchandise, and
conveyances in all modes of transport--air, sea, and land. The new CBP
Officer course was built from the 53-day basic Customs inspector course
and the 57-day basic Immigration inspector course, with redundancies
removed, and with additions to address anti-terrorism and CBP's role in
agriculture inspection. The training also supports the traditional
missions of the legacy agencies integrated in CBP. Our first CBP
Officers were hired on September 22, 2003, and they immediately started
training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).
Enhanced Security Between Ports of Entry
We have also worked very hard to integrate the Border Patrol into
CBP and simultaneously to improve the security of our country between
the ports of entry. We have revised and refocused the Border Patrol's
National Strategy, which had previously been focused on preventing the
flow of illegal aliens and drugs between ports of entry on our border
with Mexico. It now includes an aggressive strategy for protecting
against terrorist penetration, at both our northern and southern
borders.
And we have started implementing this Strategy. On 9-11, there were
only 368 authorized positions for Border Patrol agents for the entire
northern border. In the last year, we have added almost 500 agents to
the northern border, giving us more than 1,000 total--exceeding the
goal I set soon after March 1, 2003. This staffing increase will better
secure our border against terrorist penetration.
But we are doing more than just adding staffing. We are adding
sensors and other technology that assist in detecting illegal crossings
along both our northern and southern borders, including Remote Video
Surveillance (RVS) systems. These RVS systems are real-time remotely
controlled force enhancement camera systems, which provide coverage
along the northern and southern land borders of the United States, 24
hours per day, 7 days a week. The RVS system significantly enhances the
Border Patrol's ability to detect, identify, and respond to border
intrusions, and it has a deterrent value as well.
And we have seen gains in security by integrating the Border Patrol
into CBP. For example, the Office of Field Operations and the Office of
the Border Patrol are now able to quickly and easily share equipment
and information to support one another, and have done so on many
occasions, whether it be the use of radiation detection equipment at
higher threat conditions, or the use of truck imaging equipment to
detect and deter human smuggling.
MEETING OUR TWIN GOALS: BUILDING MORE SECURE AND MORE EFFICIENT BORDERS
As the single, unified border agency of the United States, CBP's
mission is vitally important to the protection of America and the
American people. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
11th, we have developed numerous initiatives to meet our twin goals of
improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and
travel. Funds from the fiscal year 2005 budget will help us expand
those initiatives and to begin new ones to ensure further protection of
both the American people and the American economy. Our strategy in
implementing these initiatives involves a number of factors, including:
(A) constantly improving and expanding our targeting systems to better
screen more people and goods entering and departing the United States;
(B) pushing our ``zone of security outward'' by partnering with other
countries; (C) pushing our ``zone of security outward'' by partnering
with the private sector; (D) deploying advanced inspection technology
and equipment at our ports of entry to detect weapons of mass
destruction; and (E) deploying advanced detection and monitoring
equipment between our ports of entry to detect illegal crossings.
Enhancing our ability to identify high-risk people and cargo
Information is one of the most important keys to our ability to
increase security without stifling legitimate trade and travel. Good
information enables us to more accurately identify--or target--what is
``high risk,'' defined as a potential threat, and what is low risk or
absolutely no risk whatsoever. The separation of high risk from no risk
is critical because searching 100 percent of the cargo and people that
enter the United States would unnecessarily cripple the flow of
legitimate trade and travel to the United States. What is necessary and
advisable is searching 100 percent of the highrisk cargo and people
that enter our country. To do this, we need to be able to identify what
is high risk, and do so as early in the process as possible. CBP has
several programs and initiatives that help us accomplish that task.
Advance Electronic Information
Since September 11th, CBP has taken numerous steps to ensure that
it has the information it needs, at the right time, to identify all
high-risk people and shipments destined for the United States. As a
result of these efforts, and the strong support of the Congress, CBP
now has, among other authorities, the statutory authority to require
Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record data on all
people flying into and out of the United States, as well as advanced,
electronic manifest data on cargo destined for or departing the United
States. CBP has worked aggressively to promulgate and implement
regulations pursuant to these enabling statutes. For example, we are
currently implementing regulations requiring advance, electronic
manifest (or similar) data on virtually all cargo coming into the
United States by any mode (rail, truck, aircraft, vessel), whereas this
data was previously provided on a voluntary, and very limited basis.
These requirements should be fully implemented by early fiscal year
2005.
National Targeting Center (NTC)
The NTC began around the clock operations on November 10, 2001,
with a priority mission of providing tactical targeting and analytical
research support for Customs' anti-terrorism efforts. As personnel from
Customs, the INS, and the USDA came together on March 1, 2003, under
the umbrella of CBP, the NTC mission broadened commensurately with the
CBP role in support of Homeland Security.
The NTC is primarily staffed by CBP Officers and analysts that are
experts in passenger and cargo targeting for air, sea, and land
operations in the inbound and outbound environments. The NTC develops
tactical targets--potentially high-risk people and shipments that
should be subject to a CBP inspection--from raw intelligence, trade,
travel, and law enforcement data. NTC also supports CBP field elements,
including Container Security Initiative (CSI) personnel stationed in
countries throughout the world, with additional research assets for
passenger and cargo examinations.
In January 2003, the NTC staff relocated to a state-of-the-art
facility. The new facility is designed to accommodate representatives
from all CBP disciplines, including representatives from the Office of
Border Patrol, the Office of Intelligence, and the Office of
Information and Technology, as well as liaison staff from the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. The NTC has developed liaison
with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the U.S. Coast Guard via an
exchange of personnel with the National Marine Intelligence Center. NTC
has also exchanged personnel with the Transportation Security
Administration, the Department of Energy, and provided targeting
expertise to the DHS Operations Center.
The funding sought in fiscal year 2005 will enable the NTC to
continue to expand its infrastructure and personnel to meet the needs
of CBP as we see continued increases in passengers and commercial
shipments coming to the United States. It will also enable the NTC to
continue to play a central role in interagency activities related to
identifying highrisk people and cargo.
Automated Targeting System
The Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is used by NTC and
field targeting units in the United States and overseas, is essential
to our ability to target high-risk cargo and passengers entering the
United States. ATS is the system through which we process advance
manifest and passenger information to pick up anomalies and ``red
flags'' and determine what cargo is ``high risk,'' and therefore will
be scrutinized at the port of entry or, in some cases, overseas.
The funding increases sought for ATS in the fiscal year 2005 budget
will allow for the continued improvement of the system as well as
provide it with the capacity to process the electronic data related to
the ever-increasing number of people and goods entering the United
States. For example, the funding will allow us to develop and implement
a version of ATS that, for the first time, will be able to identify
potentially high-risk travelers in passenger vehicles. It will also be
used to upgrade our passenger targeting system by improving the amount
of government data that the system can access and analyze as well as
provide us with the capacity to train more people on the use of the
system. On the cargo side, the funding will permit ATS to increase its
capacity and upgrade its capabilities by utilizing cutting edge
information analysis technologies developed by CBP and the private
sector.
Pushing our Zone of Security Outward--Partnering with Other Countries
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
To meet our priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States, I believe CBP must ``push our
zone of security outward''--so that our borders are not the first line
of defense to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the United
States. We have done this by partnering with other countries on our
Container Security Initiative (CSI), one of the most significant and
successful homeland security initiatives developed and implemented
after 9-11.
Almost 9 million cargo containers arrive at U.S. seaports annually.
Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and the
opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized shipping is
uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attack. Under CSI, which is the first
program of its kind, we are partnering with foreign governments to
identify and inspect high-risk cargo containers at foreign ports,
before they are shipped to our ports and pose a threat to the United
States and to global trade.
The four core elements of CSI are:
--First, identifying ``high-risk'' containers, using ATS and the 24-
hour rule, before they set sail for the United States.
--Second, pre-screening the ``high-risk'' containers at the foreign
CSI port before they are shipped to the United States.
--Third, using technology to pre-screen the high-risk containers,
including both radiation detectors and large-scale imaging
machines to detect potential terrorist weapons.
--Fourth, using smarter, ``tamper-evident'' containers--containers
that indicate to CBP officers at the port of arrival whether
they have been tampered with after the security screening.
CSI continues to generate exceptional participation and support.
The goal for the first phase of CSI was to implement the program at as
many of the top 20 foreign container ports--in terms of volume of cargo
containers shipped to United States seaports--as possible. Those ports
account for nearly 70 percent of all cargo containers arriving at U.S.
seaports. Today, the governments representing 19 of the top 20 ports
have agreed to implement CSI, and I am confident that we will reach
agreement with the 20th port very soon.
We announced the second phase of CSI in June 2003. Under CSI Phase
II, we will implement CSI at other foreign ports that ship a
significant volume of cargo to the United States, and that have the
infrastructure and technology in place to support the program. We have
already signed CSI agreements with Malaysia, Sweden, South Africa, and
Sri Lanka. Once we have Phase II implemented, we anticipate that CSI
will cover approximately 80 percent of the containers coming to the
United States.
Right now, CSI is operational in the following locations:
Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Le Havre, France; Bremerhaven and Hamburg,
Germany; Antwerp, Belgium; Singapore; Yokohama, Japan; Hong Kong;
Gothenburg, Sweden; Felixstowe, United Kingdom; Genoa and La Spezia,
Italy; Busan, Korea; Durban, South Africa; and Port Kelang, Malaysia.
These locations account for nearly 70 percent of all cargo containers
destined for the United States.
I want to express my gratitude to the Committee members for their
support of CSI in fiscal year 2004. With the $25 million increase in
funding that we are requesting for CSI in fiscal year 2005, we will
have CSI in place and operational at as many as 40 seaports around the
world.
Immigration Control Officers (ICOs)
Over the last few years, we have also started applying the concept
underlying CSI, i.e., pushing our zone of security beyond our borders,
to the movement of people. This effort originated with the INS and its
Immigration Control Officer (ICO) program. Through CBP, this effort is
continuing, and being refined to better address the terrorist threat.
The roles and responsibilities of the ICOs are to: (1) seek to
prevent the onward movement of people positively identified as
presenting a security threat to the carrier or passengers on
international flights destined to the United States; (2) disrupt and
deter the smuggling of special interest aliens, or fraudulently
documented and otherwise inadmissible aliens destined to the United
States; (3) provide advance notice of passengers on onward transit
airports and destination airports whose true identity and purposes
warrant closer inspection; (4) collect law enforcement intelligence on
known and suspected smugglers and smuggling facilitators; (5) seek,
through cooperation with host government law enforcement agencies and
U.S. law enforcement agencies, the apprehension and prosecution of
smugglers, facilitators and other identified criminal aliens; and (6)
provide training in fraudulent detection, migration trends, passenger
assessment and related topics to United States and host government law
enforcement, immigration and carrier personnel. The ICOs carry out
their responsibilities in accordance with the Code of Conduct for
Immigration Liaison Officers of the International Air Transport
Association.
Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have ICOs
stationed around the world. In concert with our international partners,
the INS launched Operation Global Shield in October 2002 with the
deployment of officers to more than a dozen locations, including major
transit hubs in Central and South America, Europe and the Far East.
This was a very successful effort. Operation Global Shield resulted in
2,971 interceptions in a 5 month period.
CBP is now building on the lessons learned from Operation Global
Shield as well as the experiences of our international partners to
refine the ICO concept to better respond to the threat of international
terrorism. The United States currently has over 70 legacy immigration
personnel overseas, many of whom are engaged in ICO activities, but not
on a full time basis. At CBP, we will be working with these personnel
to refine their ICO work to ensure that we prevent potential terrorists
from boarding aircraft destined for the United States. We will also be
putting in place a new, refined ICO program in Warsaw, Poland in the
near term to test and refine our antiterrorist measures before
expanding the program to other locations.
Pushing our Zone of Security Outward--Partnering with the Trade
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a
voluntary partnership between CBP and industry to secure international
supply chains from end to-end. Through C-TPAT, participants develop and
maintain secure supply chains from the foreign factory floor to the
ultimate destination in the U.S. CBP, in return, offers C-TPAT
shipments expedited processing and provides C-TPAT participants with
other benefits.
The program is rigorous. In order to join C-TPAT, a company must
conduct a self-assessment of its current supply chain security
procedures using C-TPAT security guidelines developed in partnership
with logistics and security experts from the trade. A participant must
also commit to increasing its supply chain security by addressing any
vulnerabilities that exist. Perhaps most importantly, participants also
make a commitment to work with their business partners and customers
throughout their supply chains to ensure that those businesses also
increase their supply chain security. By leveraging the influence of
importers and others on different participants in the supply chain, C-
TPAT is able to increase security of U.S. bound goods at the time of
container stuffing. This reach--to the foreign loading dock--is
critical to the goal of increasing supply chain security.
Although C-TPAT is a partnership, we are not simply taking the
participants at their word when it comes to their supply chain
security. As a former President once said: ``Trust, but verify.''
Applying this lesson, we have created a cadre of specially trained
supply chain security specialists to validate the commitments made by
C-TPAT participants--to ensure that they are increasing supply chain
security as they have promised CBP. These specialists meet with
personnel from C-TPAT participants and their business partners and
observe the security of their supply chains, including security at
overseas loading docks and manufacturing plants. Through this process,
we work with C-TPAT participants to identify ways that they can further
increase their supply chain security and we ensure that companies that
are not honoring their commitments lose their C-TPAT privileges.
C-TPAT is currently open to all importers, cross-border air, sea,
truck, and rail carriers, brokers, freight forwarders, consolidators,
non-vessel operating common carriers (NVOCCs), and U.S. Marine and
Terminal operators. We are currently enrolling certain foreign
manufacturers in the C-TPAT program as well, and we will continue to
develop ways to include this important element of the supply chain in
the program. The intent is to construct a supply chain characterized by
active C-TPAT links at each point in the logistics process.
As of March 12, 2004, the C-TPAT participation and validation
numbers are as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oldest
Security Certified Insufficient Responses Security Validations Validations
Partners Profile Partners Security Sent Profile Not Initiated Completed
Received Profiles Reviewed
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Importers...................................... 3,519 2,434 1,580 277 1,857 41 305 65
Carriers....................................... 998 803 519 90 609 34 183 40
Brokers/Forwarders............................. 1,205 934 759 109 868 31 208 106
Foreign Manufacturers.......................... 118 58 45 1 46 21 0 0
Marine Port Auth. & Terminal Op................ 41 32 23 4 27 36 22 10
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................... 5,881 4,261 2,926 481 3,407 N/A 718 221
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
Building on C-TPAT, we have created the Free and Secure Trade
(FAST) program with Canada and Mexico. This program increases the
supply chain security of goods moving across our land borders and also
facilitates the movement of legitimate commerce by aligning customs
processes on both sides of the border and offering the most expedited
customs processing available on the land border. To be eligible for
FAST processing, importers, carriers, and manufacturers (on the
southern border) must participate in C-TPAT and must use a FAST-
registered driver. Because each participant must meet C-TPAT supply
chain criteria and the driver must be vetted by CBP (including
exhaustive database checks and a personal interview), the FAST program
substantially increases the security of supply chains across our
northern and southern borders. And because FAST relies on advanced
electronic data transmissions and transponder technology, CBP can offer
FAST shipments the most expedited clearance procedures available today.
With these procedures in place, CBP can focus its security efforts and
inspections where they are needed most--on high-risk commerce.
FAST is currently operational at 11 major northern border crossings
and 2 major southern border crossings. The program will expand to
additional locations in fiscal year 2005.
I would like to thank the Committee for its consistently strong
support for C-TPAT and FAST. The $15 million funding increase we have
sought for C-TPAT in fiscal year 2005 will enable us to continue to
expand both programs by enrolling additional participants. It will also
allow us to add a substantial number of supply chain security
specialists to our ranks, thereby ensuring that as the program grows,
we will be able to conduct an appropriate number of validations. As a
result, we will substantially increase the security of our
international supply chains.
Using Technology to Detect Weapons of Mass Destruction at our Ports of
Entry
As trade increases, CBP's reliance on Non-Intrusive Inspection
(NII) technology to secure the borders becomes more and more critical.
Only by using NII technology to speed the inspections process for
weapons of mass destruction and contraband can CBP meet its twin goals
of increasing security and at the same time facilitating trade.
CBP uses various technologies in different combinations to
substantially increase the likelihood that a nuclear or radiological
weapon or weapons grade material will be detected. In addition, CBP
uses NII technology to detect and interdict narcotics, currency and
other contraband secreted in large containers and commercial shipments.
Technologies deployed to our nation's land, sea and air ports of entry
include largescale X-ray and gamma-imaging systems--systems that can
image the contents of an entire container in seconds. These systems
include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS), Mobile VACIS,
Truck X-ray, Mobile Truck X-ray, Rail VACIS, Mobile Sea Container
Examinations Systems and the Pallet Gamma-ray System. In September
1996, our first large-scale NII system, a Truck X-ray, became
operational in Otay Mesa, California. Today, we have 145 large-scale
NII systems deployed.
In addition, we have developed and begun implementing a national
radiation detection strategy. Pursuant to that Strategy, we are
deploying nuclear and radiological detection equipment to include
personal radiation detectors (PRDs), radiation portal monitors (RPMs)
and next generation radiation isotope identifier devices (RIIDs). In
combination with our layered enforcement strategy--working overseas to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and to detect them
before they are shipped to the United States--and our use of multiple
inspection technologies, these tools currently provide CBP with
significant capacity to detect nuclear or radiological materials. Our
fiscal year 2005 request for $50 million would provide CBP with the
funding to continue to purchase and deploy the technologies needed to
implement its national radiation detection strategy.
Using Technology to Detect and Monitor Illegal Crossings Between our
Ports of Entry
Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)
ISIS is a critical part of CBP's strategy to build smarter borders.
By using remotely monitored night-day camera and sensing systems, the
Border Patrol can better detect, monitor, and respond to illegal
crossings. This, in turn, is critical to the Border Patrol's ability to
increase its apprehension capabilities, particularly along our northern
border. As a result, the deployment of ISIS is a critical component of
the Border Patrol's revised National Strategy to prevent terrorists
from entering the United States and to gain control of our nation's
borders.
ISIS consists of three independent components: (1) the remote video
surveillance (RVS) camera system; (2) sensors; (3) the Integrated
Computer Assisted Detection (ICAD) database. The RVS system integrates
multiple color, thermal and infrared cameras, which are mounted on
various structures, into a single remote controlled system. The network
of sensors consists of seismic, magnetic and thermal devices used to
detect and track intrusions. ICAD software components assist in the
coordination and data collection of agent deployment in response to
sensor alarms.
The $64.1 million in ISIS funding sought in 2005 would enable CBP
to broaden substantially its ISIS coverage of the northern and southern
borders--to deploy the system where no ISIS coverage currently exists.
This is important because Border Patrol experience has shown that in
locations where ISIS is deployed, fewer agents can do a better job of
securing the border. ISIS acts as an important force-multiplier that
allows Border Patrol agents to remotely monitor the border and respond
to specific illegal border crossings rather than having to exhaustively
patrol an area adjacent to the border. By contrast, Border Patrol
operations without ISIS support are not only less effective, they are
more resource-intensive and less safe for Agents.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
Like ISIS, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are both an important
part of the smarter border strategy and an essential element of the
Border Patrol's revised National Strategy. UAVs equipped with
sophisticated on-board sensors have the potential to provide
unparalleled surveillance capability. UAVs provide long-range
surveillance. As a result, they are especially effective force-
multipliers because they have the capacity to remain on station much
longer than other airborne assets, and are particularly useful for
monitoring remote land border areas where patrols cannot easily travel
and infrastructure is difficult or impossible to build.
UAVs will perform missions involving gathering intelligence on
border activities was well as conducting surveillance over open water
along the Gulf Coast, the Florida peninsula and the Great Lakes region
on the northern border. The high endurance of the larger classes of
UAVs permits uninterrupted overnight or around-the-clock coverage, and
the size and operating altitudes can make UAVs effectively undetectable
by unaided human senses. UAVs will also contribute to enforcement
effectiveness and officer safety by providing communications links for
coordinating multiple units on the ground is important in remote border
operating areas.
The $10 million in funding sought for UAVs will enable CBP to
capitalize more fully on the UAV research that has taken place in a
military context, and to apply UAVs in support of the Homeland Security
mission. The funding would allow CBP to deploy and operate a system of
unmanned aerial vehicles in support of the Border Patrol and other
components of Customs and Border Protection. The use of UAVs will
complement the other intrusion detection and intelligence gathering
components of the border surveillance network to meet the mission of
stopping the illegal entry of terrorists, smugglers and others into the
United States.
AUTOMATION/INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Mr. Chairman, no discussion of a successful strategy to protect the
American people and the American economy in the 21st century would be
complete without consideration of the central importance of automation
and information technology to CBP's mission.
Automated Commercial Environment
The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is an important project
for CBP, for the business community, for our country, and for the
future of global trade. If done properly, it will reform the way we do
business with the trade community. It will also greatly assist CBP in
the advance collection of information for targeting high-risk cargo to
better address the terrorist threat. And in doing so, it will help us
expedite the vast majority of low-risk trade.
The successful implementation of ACE has been and continues to be
one of my top priorities as Commissioner. Increasing support from
Congress and the Administration for ACE has been essential to the
development of the new system. Funding of $319 million in fiscal year
2004 has enabled us to continue development and begin to deliver on the
first installment of ACE benefits to the trade community. Indeed, since
my testimony last year, I can tell you that the development of ACE and
the efforts to put its capabilities to work on America's borders have
continued full throttle while CBP works with the Homeland Security
Investment Review Group to analyze the existing IT systems being used
by DHS agencies, identify redundant technology investments, and plan
for the DHS's IT architecture. Among many other accomplishments, this
past year brought ACE release to the public for the first time.
Currently, 50 importer accounts and related CBP personnel have access
to the ACE Secure Data Portal to conduct their CBP business
transactions on-line. This portal provides reliable, secure, highspeed
access to critical information. When fully deployed, this will be the
basic tool by which all users within the trade community and government
access ACE.
I want to thank Congress again for its past support of ACE. The
continued support of ACE with $322 million in funding for fiscal year
2005 will enable us to keep pace with our schedule for ACE releases in
2004 and 2005. Those include:
--Summer 2004.--Release 3 (Account Revenue: Periodic Statements and
Payments): Initial account revenue will be enabled, allowing
accounts to centralize payment processing and utilize periodic
statement and payment capabilities as well as ACH Credit and
Debit.
--Winter 2005.--Release 4 (Truck Manifest and e-Release): Cargo
Processing will be introduced with the implementation of
Automated Truck Manifest and Preferred & eRelease for trucks.
This will allow for quicker entry for pre-filed and pre-
approved cargo.
International Trade Data System (ITDS)
One important, fully integrated component of ACE is the
International Trade Data System (ITDS). The ITDS initiative is an e-
Government strategy being designed developed, and deployed jointly with
ACE that will implement an integrated, government-wide system for the
electronic collection, use, and dissemination of the international
trade transaction data required by the various trade-related Federal
agencies.
ITDS will simplify and streamline the regulation, promotion, and
analysis of international trade. It will also assist importers,
exporters, carriers, and brokers in complying with Federal trade,
transportation, and other regulations by streamlining business
processes. ITDS is customer focused and will serve as the government's
``single window'' into international trade data collection and
distribution.
In conjunction with ACE, ITDS will also improve risk assessment. By
centralizing and integrating the collection and analysis of
information, ACE will enhance CBP's ability to target cargo, persons,
and conveyances. The trade data will allow for advanced inter-agency
assessment of risks and threats to determine which goods and people
must be scrutinized. In addition, Through ACE, the ITDS will be capable
of linking the government's law enforcement and other databases into
one large-scale relational database that tracks all commerce crossing
our borders. ITDS thus extends the functionality of ACE by bringing
together critical security, public health, public safety, and
environmental protection agencies under a common platform.
The $5 million increase we are requesting in the fiscal year 2005
budget for ITDS will allow us to ensure integration of ITDS with key
Federal agencies, and keep us on schedule to have full functionality
rolled out by winter 2006-2007.
OTHER TRADITIONAL MISSIONS
Although CBP's priority mission is preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, we know that we
must--and will--accomplish that priority mission while continuing to
perform our traditional missions well. Included among those missions
are our responsibilities for interdicting drugs, apprehending 16
individuals who enter the United States illegally, regulating and
facilitating international trade, and protecting U.S. agricultural and
economic interests from harmful pests and diseases.
Drug Interdiction
Our counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions are not mutually
exclusive, and one does not necessarily come at the expense of the
other. The initiatives we have put in place to prevent terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States have enabled us to be
more effective in seizing other illegal contraband, including illegal
drugs. Indeed, one of the first results we saw after implementing ATS
for commercial trucks on the land border was a large narcotics seizure
from a targeted shipment. And, it is worth noting that the lessons we
have learned in our battle against international drug trafficking will
help us in the fight against international terrorism.
It would be a grave mistake for drug traffickers and other
criminals to misinterpret our focus on terrorism as a weakening of
resolve on other fronts. If anything, we have made life even more
miserable for drug smugglers as we have intensified our overall
presence along America's borders. Our heightened state of security
along America's borders has strengthened, not weakened, our
counternarcotics mission. As we have added staffing for both inspectors
at the ports of entry and Border Patrol Agents between the ports of
entry, acquired more inspection technology, conducted more questioning
of travelers, and carried out more inspections of passengers and goods
in response to the terrorist threat, we have seized greater amounts of
narcotics. In fiscal year 2003, for example, we seized more than 2.2
million pounds of illegal drugs, and made some of the largest
individual seizures ever recorded by officers safeguarding our borders.
Effective coordination between inspectors at the ports of entry and
agents who carry out investigative activities is essential to the
success of our counternarcotics mission. For that reason, CBP will
continue to cooperate closely with special agents from U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement to carry out this mission.
Apprehending individuals entering illegally between the ports of entry
The Office of the Border Patrol is specifically responsible for
patrolling the 6,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international land
borders and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida
Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico. Its primary task is securing
America's borders between official ports of entry by preventing the
illegal entry of people, goods, and contraband across our borders.
The Border Patrol relies on agents, enforcement equipment (such as
a fleet of specialized aircraft and vehicles of various types),
technology (such as sensors and night vision cameras), tactical
infrastructure (such as roads and vehicle barriers), and intelligence
to carry out its mission. Applied in the correct combination, these
resources can effectively deter, detect, monitor, and respond to
illegal border crossings, as we have seen in locations such as the San
Diego Sector and during operations such as Desert Safeguard.
In fiscal year 2003, the Border Patrol played a key role in
safeguarding the United States from the entry of terrorists, criminals,
and illegal immigrants. Among the 931,557 people apprehended by the
Border Patrol in fiscal year 2003 were:
--Two Indian aliens illegally in the United States who were wanted in
Canada for attempted murder after they allegedly tied-up,
tortured, doused in gasoline, and lit a person on fire;
--One of the ten most wanted criminals in Texas;
--An Iranian citizen illegally in the United States with an extensive
criminal history and who may have been involved in bomb making
and other serious illegal activity at the time of his arrest at
the San Clemente checkpoint;
--A Turkish citizen illegally in the United States who may have been
involved in serious illegal activity at the time of his arrest
at McAllen International Airport; and
--An alleged resident of the United Arab Emirates illegally in the
United States who may have been involved in serious illegal
activity at the time of his arrest in Louisiana.
Building on these gains, and drawing on the lessons we learned
during Desert Safeguard, CBP is working with other agencies and the
Mexican Government to implement the Arizona Border Control Initiative
this year. Under this initiative, CBP will substantially reduce the
number of illegal entries that occur in Arizona this year and, as a
result, will reduce the number of deaths that occur as aliens try to
cross the Arizona desert during the warmest months of the year.
Preventing individuals from entering illegally at the ports of entry
With respect to preventing individuals from entering the country
illegally at the ports of entry, CBP continues to stop hundreds of
thousands of people a year who are inadmissible into the United States
for a variety of reasons, including prior immigration violations,
criminal history, or the possession of false or fraudulent documents.
We are helped in this effort by our close work with the Department
of State to ensure CBP inspectors have the tools they need to verify
the identity of visa holders and the authenticity of visas issued by
the Department of State. Data on holders of immigrant visas is
transferred electronically to ports of entry. When the electronic
record is updated to reflect an immigrant's admission at a port of
entry, that data is transferred electronically to the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) for production of a
permanent resident card and creation of the immigrant file.
More importantly, with the successful implementation of US VISIT at
our international airports earlier this year, CBP officers now have
access to photographs and data transmitted electronically by the
Department of State relating to holders of nonimmigrant visas. This
permits officers on the primary line to review visa application data
and verify the identity of the holder. This has virtually eliminated
the possibility that a traveler could use a false or fraudulent visa to
enter the United States.
Regulating and facilitating international trade
CBP maintains responsibility for regulating and facilitating
legitimate international trade. As I mentioned earlier, many of the
initiatives CBP implements serve the twin goals of increasing security
and facilitating trade. With the right level of industry partnership
and the right combination of resources, we can succeed not only in
protecting legitimate trade from being used by terrorists, we can
actually build a better, faster, more productive system of trade
facilitation for the U.S. economy.
We have continued to work with the trade on these matters over the
past year, and we will continue to do so in the year ahead. For
example, we worked with all segments of the maritime trade to make
changes to the 24-hour rule and our computer systems to better
facilitate the movement of sea containers in our domestic seaports and
to inland destinations. We also worked very closely with the trade to
craft and implement our Trade Act regulations, and we will continue
this process during the rest of this year. Finally, we have partnered
with the trade and technology companies to design and test a smarter,
more secure sea container. More importantly, members of the trade are
using this container. Through C-TPAT, we have partnered with several
large importers to begin using these containers, and we expect to see
their use rise substantially in the months ahead.
Protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests and the food supply
CBP now overseas the enforcement of the laws and regulations
pertaining to the safe importation and entry of agricultural food
commodities into the United States. The traditional goals of the
Agriculture Inspections (AI) program have been to reduce the risk of
introduction of invasive species into the United States, protect U.S.
agricultural resources, maintain the marketability of agricultural
products, and facilitate the movement of lawabiding people and
commodities across the borders. Accordingly, inspecting potentially
high-risk travelers and cargo is critical to keeping the prohibited
items out of the United States, monitoring for significant agricultural
health threats, encouraging compliance with regulations, and educating
the public and importers about agricultural quarantine regulations.
With the creation of CBP, the AI program has expanded its focus to
include a new priority mission of preventing potential terrorist
threats involving agriculture. Indeed, the threat of intentional
introductions of pests or pathogens as a means of biological warfare or
terrorism is an emerging concern. To address this threat and to enhance
its traditional AI missions, CBP has already begun using the Automated
Targeting System, and its collective expertise regarding terrorism and
agriculture, to strengthen our ability to identify shipments that may
pose a potential risk to our agricultural interests.
In addition, CBP has worked closely with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to implement the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 to guard against
threats to the food supply. In the last several months, we have
modified our electronic data collection systems to collect data from
the trade required under the Bioterrorism Act, implemented a joint
risk-management system for food shipments with FDA that builds off or
Automated Targeting System, and commissioned CBP officers to utilize
FDA authorities in certain circumstances at the ports of entry. These
efforts have built on our priority and traditional missions to make the
food supply more secure, and will be supported in part by the targeting
funding sought in the fiscal year 2005 budget.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I have outlined a broad
array of initiatives today that, with your assistance, will help CBP
continue to protect America from the terrorist threat while fulfilling
our other traditional missions. Because of your support, and because of
the creation of DHS and CBP, we are far safer today than we were on
September 11th. But our work is not complete. With the continued
support of the President, DHS, and the Congress, CBP will succeed in
meeting the challenges posed by the ongoing terrorist threat and the
need to facilitate ever-increasing numbers of legitimate shipments and
travelers.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy
to answer any of your questions.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Garcia, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GARCIA
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Good
morning, Senator Byrd, distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today to discuss
the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. The request of just over $4 billion reflects the
vital role ICE plays in the Department's overall mission of
ensuring the security of the American people.
A little more than 1 year ago, ICE was formed by combining
the investigative and intelligence arms of the former INS and
the U.S. Customs Service, including Air and Marine operations,
as well as the Federal Protective Service and more recently the
Federal Air Marshal Service. By integrating these once-
fragmented resources, the Department of Homeland Security not
only created the second largest investigative agency in the
Federal Government, but it also created a dynamic and
innovative new law enforcement organization focused on homeland
security, specifically border security, air security, and
economic security.
Senator Byrd mentioned that we are looking at the
vulnerabilities facing this. And the primary mission of ICE and
the Department of Homeland Security is to detect and address
those vulnerabilities in our national security, whether those
vulnerabilities expose our financial systems to exploitation or
our borders to infiltration.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS WITHIN THE PAST YEAR
Earlier this month, the dedicated men and women of ICE
joined me in celebrating our 1-year anniversary and our many
accomplishments within the past year. I will highlight only a
few.
ICE is protecting U.S. economic security. And since last
March, ICE financial investigations have yielded more than
1,300 arrests and seized more than $150 million in assets.
In July, ICE launched Cornerstone, a comprehensive
initiative that forms a new partnership with the financial,
commercial, and trade sectors to identify and mitigate U.S.
economic vulnerabilities.
Last fall, ICE launched Ice Storm, a comprehensive
initiative to combat violent human smuggling organizations
along the southwest border, with particular focus on Arizona.
Ice Storm has resulted in more than 2,000 administrative and
criminal arrests, 170 indictments, and the seizure of more than
80 weapons and $2 million. Local police credit Ice Storm with
the more than 30-percent drop in homicides in the Phoenix area
in the last quarter of 2003 compared to the same period of a
year ago.
OPERATION PREDATOR
Senator Shelby mentioned Operation Predator. That is an
operation we launched last July with the secretary. We targeted
child sex predators worldwide under this operation, which fuses
the authorities and resources of virtually every ICE component
into a comprehensive campaign against child sex predators. To
date, Operation Predator has produced unprecedented results
with the arrest of more than 2,000 child sex predators
nationwide.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS SERVICE
The ICE Federal Air Marshals Service became a distinct ICE
division in November of 2003. ICE agents are being cross-
trained as Federal air marshals, giving ICE FAMS a cadre of
trained agents for use when needed. Since September 11, ICE
FAMS have provided security on hundreds of thousands of
flights, protected millions of passengers, flown millions of
miles. Their efforts have helped keep the U.S. civil aviation
sector free of terrorism since September 11, 2001.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget will continue to
strengthen ICE's efforts to protect the homeland through the
unique investigative and enforcement tools of this agency. The
proposed 2005 budget and plan to enhance the department's
commitment to securing the homeland is designed to build upon
the strong foundation I have just described. The President's
2005 budget request seeks over $4 billion for ICE, $320 million
more than 2004, an increase of 8 percent.
The requested increases include $186 million for ICE to
fund improvements in immigration enforcement both domestically
and overseas, including the more than doubling of current
worksite enforcement efforts, increased resources to combat
benefits fraud and investigate violations of the SEVIS and US
VISIT systems, and approximately $100 million increase for the
detention and removal of illegal aliens. Detention or removal
illegal aliens present in the United States is critical to the
enforcement of our immigration laws. And the requested funding
will expand ongoing fugitive apprehension efforts, the removal
from the United States of jailed illegal aliens, and additional
detention and removal capacity.
Critical to the removal process is ICE's ability to
effectively litigate cases before the immigration court. The
budget includes our request for $6 million enhancement to
provide additional attorneys to keep pace with an increasing
caseload. Our budget also seeks $14 million to support our
international enforcement efforts related to immigration,
including enabling ICE to provide visa security by working
cooperatively with U.S. consular offices to review these
applications.
The budget request also seeks $40 million in total
enhancement for Air and Marine operations, for long-range
radar, and increased P-3 flight hours.
RECONCILIATION OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET
Many challenges lie ahead, including reconciliation of the
2004 budget, as was mentioned earlier today, and the mapping
issues that go with that. These are serious issues, and this is
a serious undertaking. I very much appreciate the support of
the subcommittee members. It is a great responsibility. We are
committed to protecting the homeland with new approaches to old
problems and new approaches to the new challenges we face after
September 11.
PREPARED STATEMENT
We are committed to managing the transition, as
Commissioner Bonner mentioned, of the INS distribution of
assets, as well as the Customs breakup. This is a very complex
reorganization. And in it we are also committed to being
fiscally responsible.
I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman and
members of this subcommittee. This concludes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you might
have at this time.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Garcia.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Garcia
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished
Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today to
discuss the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). This $4.011 billion request reflects the vital role
ICE plays in the Department's overall mission of ensuring the security
of the American people and our way of life.
A little more than one year ago ICE was formed by combining the
investigative and intelligence arms of the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service, including
Air and Marine Operations, as well as the Federal Protective Service
and the Federal Air Marshal Service. By integrating these once
fragmented resources, the Department of Homeland Security not only
created the second largest investigative agency in the Federal
government, but it also created a dynamic and innovative new law
enforcement organization uniquely and exclusively focused on homeland
security--specifically border security, air security, and economic
security.
The primary mission of ICE and the Department of Homeland Security
is to detect and address vulnerabilities in our national security--
whether those vulnerabilities expose our financial systems to
exploitation or our borders to infiltration. With its enhanced ability
to investigate immigration and customs violation--for example our
ability to target human smuggling alongside of narcotics, weapons, and
other forms of smuggling and follow the illicit money trail wherever it
may lead--ICE is in a unique position to enforce our homeland security
missions in ways never before possible.
Earlier this month the dedicated men and women of ICE joined me in
celebration of our one-year anniversary and our many accomplishments
within the past year. This, of course, could not have been accomplished
without the support of Congress and the fiscal year 2004
Appropriations. Our accomplishments this year are many but I will only
highlight a few:
Targeting Child Sex Predators Worldwide.--Operation Predator fuses
the authorities and resources of virtually every ICE component into a
comprehensive campaign against child sex offenders. To date, Operation
Predator has produced unprecedented results with the arrest of more
than 2,057 child sex predators nationwide.
Protecting U.S. Economic Security.--Since last March, ICE financial
investigations have yielded more than 1,330 arrests and seized $154
million in assets. In July, ICE launched Cornerstone, a comprehensive
initiative that forms a new partnership with the financial, commercial
and trade sectors to identify and mitigate U.S. economic
vulnerabilities.
Tracking down Arms, Money, and Artifacts in Iraq.--ICE deployed the
first-ever civilian team of agents to Iraq in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The agents secured 75 silkworm missiles in Iraq that
could have been used against coalition forces. They recovered $32
million in cash withdrawn by Saddam Hussein's son just before the war
and recovered 39,400 manuscripts and more than 1,000 treasures looted
from the Iraqi National Museum.
Dismantling Violent Human Smuggling Organizations.--Last fall, we
launched ICE Storm, a comprehensive initiative to combat violent human
smuggling organizations along the Southwest border--with a particular
focus on Arizona. In its first 180 days, ICE Storm resulted in more
than 700 criminal and administrative arrests, 90 indictments and the
seizure of 46 assault weapons and nearly $2 million. Local police
credited ICE Storm with a more than 30 percent drop in homicides in the
Phoenix area in the last quarter of 2003, compared to the same period
the previous year.
Enhancing Civil Aviation Security.--The ICE Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS) became a distinct ICE division in November 2003. ICE
agents are being crosstrained as air marshals, giving ICE FAMS a cadre
of trained agents in times of need. ICE also signed an agreement with
the U.S. Secret Service that increases flight coverage. Since 9/11, ICE
FAMS have provided security on hundreds of thousands of flights,
protected millions of passengers and flown millions of miles. Their
efforts have helped keep the U.S. civil aviation sector free of
terrorism since 9/11.
Apprehending and Removing Criminal Aliens from the United States.--
Since March 1, 2003, ICE's Detention and Removal Office (DRO) has
removed more than 52,684 criminal aliens and 40,802 non-criminal
aliens. DRO detains more than 230,000 aliens each year. ICE's DRO has
more than 18 fugitive absconder teams across the Nation and created a
``Most Wanted'' list of the most dangerous criminal aliens. In the
first 2 weeks, ICE captured or confirmed the removal of all 10 of the
original 10 ``Most Wanted.''
Improving Security at U.S. Federal Facilities.--The transfer of the
Federal Protective Service to ICE has provided FPS with access to
information never before at its disposal, enabling it to perform its
mission more effectively. ICE FPS secures more than 8,800 federally
owned and leased facilities. In fiscal year 2003, ICE FPS seized or
stopped the entry of more than 108,800 weapons and other items. During
the same period, ICE FPS officers made more than 2,800 arrests and
covered more than 2,100 demonstrations.
Securing Critical Airspace in the U.S., While Protecting Land and
Sea Borders.--ICE's Air and Marine Operations (AMO) division has
dramatically increased its role in homeland security missions while
maintaining its traditional drug interdiction and law enforcement
efforts. AMO created a permanent National Capital Region branch that
provides 24/7 airspace security coverage over the Washington, DC area.
AMO provided airspace security coverage during ``Orange Alert'' threats
and events like the State of the Union address and Super Bowl. All the
while, AMO assets were involved in drug and alien smuggling operations
that seized more than 76,000 pounds of cocaine, 335,000 pounds of
marijuana, and arrested more than 980 individuals.
Harnessing Intelligence to Further Enforcement Efforts.--ICE's
Intelligence Division integrated the intelligence components of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs
Service into a robust force that supports the enforcement needs of all
ICE operational divisions. ICE Intelligence vetted roughly 60,000
commercial airline passengers and crewmembers through a multi-stage
process during the ``Orange Alert'' terror threat level during December
2003 and January 2004 period.
ICE continues to pursue its homeland security mission by building
upon the traditional missions, resources, authorities and expertise of
the legacy agencies it inherited. ICE is bringing new approaches to
traditional areas of law enforcement and creating enforcement programs
in response to its homeland security mission. The President's fiscal
year 2005 Budget will continue to strengthen ICE's efforts to protect
the homeland through its unique investigative and enforcement tools.
Budget Request for fiscal year 2005
The proposed fiscal year 2005 budget--a plan to enhance the
Department's commitment to securing the homeland--is designed to build
upon the strong foundation I have described. The President's fiscal
year 2005 Budget request seeks $4.011 billion for ICE, $302 million
more than fiscal year 2004, which represents an increase of 8 percent.
This request for ICE includes resources to support border, air and
economic security activities. These funds will also reduce
infrastructure vulnerability, promoting safe and secure Federal
properties for both employees and visitors. The remaining budget
discussion will cover the major program areas: Investigations,
Detention and Removal Operations, Air and Marine Operations, Federal
Protective Service and the Federal Air Marshal Service, as well as our
requested fiscal year 2005 budget enhancements.
The Office of Investigations.--Budget request includes $1.046
billion for the investigations and intelligence programs. These
resources will advance national security and homeland defense against
terrorist cells and their supporters in the United States through
enhanced cooperation and integration with other Federal law enforcement
agencies and the intelligence community. The Investigations program
protects our homeland by, among other things, dismantling terrorist
financing networks, by identifying and remediating vulnerabilities in
the financial system that could be exploited by terrorist
organizations, preventing the importation of weapons of mass
destruction and other instruments of terror into the United States,
disrupting narcotics smuggling and money laundering organizations,
enforcing embargoes, trade agreements, and sanctions imposed by the
U.S. government against foreign countries, and safeguarding children
against exploitation through crimes involving pornography, sex tourism,
and forced child labor.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget request seeks $78 million
in total enhancements for the Investigations Program. This includes:
--$23 million/200 FTE for Worksite Enforcement. Consistent with the
goals of the President's proposed new temporary worker program
to match willing foreign working workers with willing U.S.
employers, enforcement of immigration laws against companies
that break the law and hire illegal workers will increase. This
increase will more than double the level of resources devoted
to traditional worksite enforcement.
--$16 million/65 FTE for Compliance Teams. As part of its overall
immigration enforcement strategy, ICE will continue to analyze
data generated through the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System and US VISIT program in an effort to detect
individuals who are in violation of the Nation's immigration
laws. This enhancement will increase funding for ICE's SEVIS
and US VISIT compliance efforts by over 150 percent.
--$14 million/90 FTE for International Affairs. Pursuant to Section
428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Departments of Homeland Security and
State, ICE's fiscal year 2005 budget includes an increase of
$10 million to support a new Visa Security Unit (VSU). The VSU
and DHS staff stationed at overseas posts, including Saudi
Arabia, will work cooperatively with U.S. Consular Officials to
promote homeland security in the Visa process. In addition, an
increase of $4 million is requested to replace funding
previously provided through the Immigration Examinations Fee
Account.
--$25 million to support Benefit Fraud. Immigration fraud poses a
threat to national security and public safety because it
enables terrorists, criminals, and illegal aliens to gain entry
and remain in the United States and diverts resources and
benefits from legitimate claimants. In cooperation with the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), ICE's goal is
to detect, combat, and deter immigration fraud through
aggressive, focused, and comprehensive investigations. This
enhancement will provide stable funding to ICE's benefits fraud
program by replacing funding previously provided through the
Immigration Examinations Fee Account.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests $1.209 billion for
detention and removal activities, which represents an increase of $125
million from fiscal year 2004. Although this is an increase for the
detention and removal program, we project a decrease in revenue
collected in the Breached Bond/Detention Fund. Consistent with ICE's
10-year Detention and Removal Strategic Plan, these resources will be
used to enhance public safety and national security by ensuring the
departure from the United States of removable aliens.
The funding will also help ICE meet its detention needs. Since
1994, the average daily population of detainees has grown to more than
20,000, from less than 6,000. This rapid growth was a result of
expanded enforcement capabilities and changes in detention requirements
resulting from the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996. The fiscal year 2005 budget request will
support the use of state and local detention facilities, the eight
Service Processing Centers, the seven contract detention facilities,
and joint DHS/Bureau of Prison facilities to detain those aliens
subject to removal.
Our overall objective, however, is the removal of aliens unlawfully
present in the United States, not their detention. In fiscal year 2003,
ICE removed more than 140,000 individuals including 76,000 criminal
aliens.
ICE is also committed to aggressively tracking, apprehending, and
removing fugitive aliens, those who have violated U.S. immigration law,
been ordered deported by an immigration judge, then fled before the
order could be carried out. This budget request will allow ICE to
continue its efforts to fulfill that commitment through the Fugitive
Operations Initiative.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget request seeks $108.2
million in total enhancements for the Detention and Removals Program.
This includes:
--$30 million/140 FTE for the Institutional Removal Program (IRP).
The IRP is designed to ensure that aliens convicted of crimes
in the United States are identified, processed, and, where
possible, removed prior to their release from a correctional
institution. This enhancement will further ICE's plans to
expand the program nationally to all Federal, State, and local
institutions that house criminal aliens, while ensuring more
efficient processing and case management.
--$50 million/118 FTE for Fugitive Operations. The resources
requested are to continue the implementation of the National
Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP), established in 2002, which
seeks to eliminate the existing backlog and growth of the
fugitive alien population over the next six years.
--$11 million/30 FTE for Alternatives to Detention. This initiative
provides the resources to establish additional non-traditional
family and female detention settings and establish community
supervision operations. This will provide effective supervision
of persons released into the community during immigration
proceedings or while awaiting removal in certain circumstances
while reducing costs and ensuring compliance.
--$5 million/14 FTE for detention bed space. An increase in bed space
to accommodate the higher volume of apprehended criminal
aliens. With this additional funding, ICE will enhance its
ability to remove illegal alien--particularly those convicted
of crimes while in the United States.
--$6.2 million for Caribbean Region Interdiction. Pursuant to
Executive Order, the Department of Defense, Homeland Security
and State share responsibility for responding to the migration
of undocumented aliens in this region. The resources requested
will support the Department's share of the cost of housing
migrants as they await determination of any immigration claims.
--$6 million/40 FTE for the Legal Program Backlog Elimination. During
fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002, the Legal Program saw an
average increase of 19,200 cases in the backlog of matters in
Immigration Court. To keep pace with the increased number of
cases, additional attorneys and support staff are required.
This enhancement will provide a funding increase of more than
20 percent to ICE's backlog elimination program.
The fiscal year 2005 President's budget also seeks $373 million in
Air and Marine Operations (AMO) appropriations. AMO maintains a fleet
of 133 aircraft and 82 vessels to protect the Nation and the American
people against the terrorist threat and the smuggling of narcotics and
other contraband. Aircraft are also used in support of ICE's combined
investigation work.
An essential element of these deployments is the work carried out
by the Air and Marine Operation Center (AMOC), located in Riverside,
California. This state-of-the-art center is linked to a wide array of
civilian and military radar sites, aerostats, airborne reconnaissance
aircraft and other detection assets, which provide 24-hour, seamless
radar surveillance throughout the continental United States, Puerto
Rico, the Caribbean, and beyond. AMOC allows ICE to identify, track,
and support the interdiction and apprehension of those who attempt to
enter U.S. airspace with illegal drugs or terrorist objectives.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget request seeks $40.5 million
in total enhancements for Air and Marine Operations. This includes:
--$28 million for Increased P-3 Flight Hours. P-3 aircraft are
critical to interdiction operations in the source and transit
zones as they provide vital radar coverage in regions where
mountainous terrain, expansive jungles and large bodies of
water limit the effectiveness of ground-based radar. This
request will increase P-3 flight hours from 200 to 600 per
month.
--$12.5 million for Long Range Radar. Primary Long Range Radar
provides position information (geographic/altitude) of airborne
objects and flight data information to civil aviation, defense,
and law enforcement agencies. ICE uses the radar to receive
data for drug interdiction efforts along the southern border.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $478 million in
reimbursable authority for the activities of the Federal Protective
Service (FPS). The FPS provides for the security and related law-
enforcement functions at more than 8,800 Federal facilities/buildings
across the Nation. These funds will support several initiatives
designed to protect Federal facilities from terrorist attacks,
including a nationwide K-9 bomb detection program and another aimed at
improving our capability to respond to weapons of mass destruction. FPS
will also be able to improve its communication capabilities and enhance
its intelligence sharing processes.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $613 million in
Federal Air Marshals Service appropriations.\1\ The FAMS transferred
from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to ICE in
November 2003. This movement of the FAMS to ICE will significantly
increase the number of Federal law enforcement agents to deploy during
times of increased threats to aircraft ultimately providing a surge
capacity during increased threat periods or in the event of terrorist
attack. To date, 176 ICE agents have gone through FAMS training and we
anticipate training up to 800 by the end of the fiscal year. This
cross-training creates a ``surge capacity'' to effectively deal with
specific threats related to aviation security. And, on February 25,
2004, ICE and the U.S. Secret Service entered into an agreement that
will bolster U.S. aviation security by providing a ``force multiplier''
to ICE's FAMS. Under the terms of the agreement, the Secret Service
will provide the ICE FAMS with travel information for armed personnel
traveling on U.S. commercial flights during their normal course of
business and will enable the ICE FAMS the flexibility to deploy their
Federal Air Marshals to a wider range of flights, while providing
greater flexibility to conduct FAMS missions at maximum levels based on
its concept of operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The President's Budget reflects a transfer of $10 million from
the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS) program to Science and
Technology (S&T) for research and development. This consolidation of
research and development funding in S&T will provide for greater
oversight of research and development activities in the Department and
enhance service to FAMS. This funding will be devoted to FAMS air-to-
ground Communications project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the ICE supports the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security, the framework for
accomplishing our complex mission to protect the homeland, and ICE's
mission to enforce immigration and customs law, locate and remove
aliens unlawfully present in the United States, protect jobs for those
who are legally eligible to work, maintain a nationwide anti-smuggling
program, enforce laws against money-laundering and child pornography,
and protect Federal property and air security.
While many challenges lie ahead, we continue to build and foster a
premier law enforcement agency from the powerful tools and authorities
we have been given. The men and women of ICE stand ready to continue to
build a successful organization for the present and future. The fiscal
year 2005 budget request provides the resources to enable ICE to manage
its responsibilities and continue its work to secure the homeland to
protect and serve the American people.
I look forward to continuing to work with you to accomplish these
objectives while continuing to manage a world class law enforcement
organization to protect this Nation against anyone who would do it
harm. We are committed to preventing terrorist attacks and reducing
systemic vulnerabilities that threaten the security of the country.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
SHORTFALL IN FUNDING
Senator Cochran. I hope that during the first round of
questions we will be able to limit our time to 5 minutes each.
And that will give us all an opportunity to ask a second round
of questions, if that is the wish and pleasure of the senators
on the subcommittee.
Let me start by bringing up this issue of the shortfall in
funding. In the Congressional Quarterly yesterday, Monday,
March 29, there is an article that discusses this and carries
some quotations from administration officials, a spokesman from
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, which
suggested that there is not an actual shortfall in the funding.
And the official, Dennis Murphy, is quoted as saying, ``We're
projecting that the spending rate may need to be slowed down.
And we just need to take the foot off the accelerator a bit.''
My question is: Is that an appropriate assessment in the
judgment of this panel? I notice that it may be that not all of
your agencies are affected by this. But I think Mr. Bonner's
and Mr. Garcia's are.
Mr. Bonner, what is your reaction to that?
Mr. Bonner. First of all, I do not want to parse words
here, but, I mean, there is not an actual shortfall, but there
is a potential shortfall. Let me just say from the----
Senator Cochran. Press the button on your mike.
Mr. Bonner. Maybe it is just not close enough, Senator. Is
that better?
Senator Cochran. Yes.
Mr. Bonner. Okay. I was just saying that without trying to
parse words too carefully here, I think it is more appropriate
to characterize this as a potential shortfall, not an actual
shortfall. And the reason I say that is, I am going to speak
just from the perspective of Customs and Border Protection
here. And that is that as part of what I do as a manager of the
agency every year is to, at the end of the first quarter, I
take stock, I get a report from my budget office as to where we
stand. And I was concerned after the end of the first quarter
review that with the rate of spending as to whether or not we
were going to be within budget at the end of the year and not
be deficient.
And secondly, the possible impact of the reconciliation of
budget allocations between, potentially between, CBP and ICE,
which is something, by the way, I believe that will be
completed by the Department in the next several weeks. But I
was concerned about that. And as a prudent manager of Customs
and Border Protection, I directed that we curtail
nonoperational travel, that we curtail nonoperational overtime,
not overtime that is related to mission performance here. And I
also believe that we should have a temporary suspension of
hiring, except for Border Patrol agents at Customs and Border
Protection, so we could get a clear picture of our spending
rate and our budget.
And when I say temporary, I mean temporary. And that is
that we would suspend--and we are just starting this. It would
be a short suspension that could literally be several weeks.
And then I would be hopeful that we would be able to resume
hiring. I do not know. I mean, this will depend upon what our
budget picture looks like when we take stock in 3 or 4 weeks.
But on the positive side, I do want to tell this
Subcommittee that we did move out at the beginning of the year
aggressively in terms of hiring new employees at Customs and
Border Protection. And we have already hired, so any suspension
here does not affect what we have already hired. We have
already hired 2,700 employees. And these include 1,500
Inspectors, CBP Inspectors, 800 Border Patrol agents, and some
other personnel.
And we are also looking very closely at the attrition rate
here in terms of--right now, that looks pretty encouraging in
terms of both the Border Patrol agents and CBP Inspectors. The
attrition rates right now, if this holds up, are lower than
projected. They are as low, by the way, this year as 5.5
percent right now for Border Patrol agents. And I think some of
you know that the attrition at the Border Patrol was close to
20 percent just 2 years ago, when it was part of the INS.
So again, all that we are doing here is we are looking at
this very, very closely. And we are making some temporary
adjustments. And we will then have to make some decisions as to
whether or not we can resume hiring or whether we have to
suspend it further. But that would be my overall assessment,
Mr. Chairman.
ICE RESPONSE
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia, what about the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement that you are responsible for? What is the
effect of this on your agency?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Mr. Chairman. A similar effect to what
Commissioner Bonner was describing. We have imposed a temporary
hiring freeze. There is no category within ICE that is exempt
from that at the moment. We have been hiring up to the point of
the end of the first quarter and imposed this, again looking
down the road, looking at the spending rate.
But from the perspective of my agency, we are very much
concerned with mapping issues, distribution issues,
particularly in the IT context, services being provided, and
mapping funding to the provision of those services are very
complicated issues, if you look at the size of the legacy
agencies that were involved, the services that were provided,
and the split that we have accomplished very successfully. You
can appreciate the complexity of those issues.
We are very much watching that process, optimistic that we
will, working together, have firmer numbers within the next
several weeks, that we can then reassess, as Commissioner
Bonner said, again look at spending rates, look at the harder
numbers, and see what are the steps that we need to take to be
fiscally responsible, which may not, and we all hope will not,
include a hiring freeze.
POSTPONING OR DEFERRING OF ANY PROGRAM INITIATIVES
Senator Cochran. Have either one of you had to postpone or
defer any program initiatives, any activities that would defer
initiatives that you had already planned or put in place? Have
you postponed doing anything that you intended to do?
Mr. Bonner. We have not at CBP. And I hope we do not have
to. But we have not at this point.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Garcia, what about you?
Mr. Garcia. None of the new programs or operations. We have
not gone forward with the 2004 enhancements as of yet.
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Byrd. Our immigration system is underfunded and
understaffed. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
has just over 13,000 criminal investigators to locate and
remove 8 million to 11 million illegal aliens. This is one
among many responsibilities. Following the passage of the 1986
amnesty for 2.7 million illegal aliens, the INS had to open
temporary offices, hire new workers, and divert resources from
enforcement areas in order to process amnesty applicants. The
result was chaos that produced rampant fraud.
The backlog of immigrant applications is larger today, 6
million and rising. The President's amnesty proposal would dump
another 8 million immigrant applications onto an already
beleaguered immigration system. It took only 19 temporary visa
holders to slip through the system to unleash the horror of the
September 11 attacks. The President's amnesty would shove 8
million illegal aliens through our security system, many of
whom have never gone through any background check.
If there are no new resources in the budget to implement
the President's amnesty proposal, implementation of the reform
proposal would create incredible stresses on an already
stressed border security system. It is a recipe for disaster.
FUNDING FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
While I note that your budget has several modest proposals
to deal with the existing enforcement shortcomings, would you
inform the subcommittee how much additional money is included
in the President's budget to implement your enforcement
activities in support of the President's amnesty proposal?
This question is for Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator Byrd. As a starting point,
looking at the 2005 enhancements, we do have $23 million for
worksite enforcement related to the possibility of a temporary
worker program. But I think there is a much more complex
approach to whatever legislation, if any, is ultimately passed,
which would be, one, we have split the INS apart and now have a
mission focus on enforcement both at the border and in the
interior, and a separate services bureau focused on providing
that service.
We have made tremendous strides in that reorganization,
focusing a very powerful enforcement tool on the enforcement
mission within ICE and within CBP. We have reorganized within
ICE. We have moved, are in the process of moving, excuse me,
the Institutional Removal Program out of investigations and
into Detention and Removal, which will free up additional
investigative resources within that division.
All of these pieces moving forward look at how do we place
integrity within our immigration system? How do we enforce visa
security, US VISIT, our compliance enforcement operation, which
we have again asked for an enhancement for in 2005. This is a
complex, comprehensive approach to the shortcomings that you
have described, Senator. So I cannot point to you one place in
our budget where we would address any proposed legislation or
where we would address specific shortcomings of the past. We
are taking a comprehensive approach to those problems.
I would also add that we are very much alert to the
possibility of fraud within the immigration system. I have
taken steps to address that already. And we will very much look
to participate in the process of crafting legislation that can
ensure that whatever benefits or whatever program is designed
gets to the people it was intended to get to.
I was a prosecutor in the Nineties. I prosecuted cases
involving benefits fraud in some very unfortunate context. I
know the risks firsthand. And I would very much feel the
responsibility to participate in that process, to look at how
that program is crafted and what steps we can build into it to
make it less susceptible to fraud.
Mr. Aguirre. Senator, may I tag along to that, if I could?
Senator Byrd. Please.
BACKLOG
Mr. Aguirre. Just a couple of comments. One, the backlog,
Senator, is not 6 million. We have 6 million pending cases. But
of those, 3.6 are backlog. In other words, they are behind our
normal processing time. Now, that is plenty, but it is not 6
million.
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM
You mentioned the President's proposal as an amnesty. I do
not consider it so. In fact, I think it is not an amnesty. I
think it is a temporary worker program that would identify
these 8 million individuals and would put them within a legal
program where we would be allowed to do background checks.
Indeed, these individuals are not within our radar scope today,
but would be once they apply.
And there is mention about the fact that there is no
provision in our Bureau for the President's proposal. Of
course, there is not, because we are waiting for the Congress
to flesh out, if you will, the details of the proposed
legislation so that we can then put a fee that would be matched
against the cost of processing these applicants. So in other
words, once the Congress acts, and we certainly hope the action
will come forth, we will match whatever work is required behind
that legislation to charge the applicants for the cost of
processing that application.
Senator Byrd. I appreciate your comments. I am of the
opinion that the President's new alien amnesty program is quite
ill-advised. If you are requesting any new resources, how much
extra would be needed to implement this sweeping amnesty?
Mr. Aguirre. Senator, are you finished with your question?
Senator Byrd. Yes. Anyone.
Mr. Aguirre. I am sorry. I did not want to interrupt.
We are requesting additional resources, but not in relation
to the President's initiative on the temporary worker program.
The temporary worker program awaits congressional action. And
until such time as the Congress tells us exactly what the
Congress wants us to do, we really cannot build a program to
suit it. Once that program is identified, we will cost it out.
And there will be a fee associated with that. I expect that the
fee will be 100 percent covering the cost of the program.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Senator Byrd. As I mentioned earlier, we
have asked for $23 million in worksite enforcement really to
position ourselves, one, in an important area of enforcement
for us, but to also set the stage, so to speak, for working
with Congress on whatever legislation is passed and looking at,
again, that integrity of the system, the counter-fraud efforts,
that will match up with an effective temporary worker program,
whatever the scope of that program is ultimately decided upon.
Senator Byrd. My time is up.
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir.
Senator Leahy.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER BUDGET
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Garcia, to go back to the Law Enforcement Support
Center, and as I said, I am very happy with those areas,
especially Operation Predator among others, when I heard from
law enforcement agencies and others around the country of the
support they have gotten from that and how helpful it is to
them, I want to keep it helpful. Having begun my public career
in law enforcement, I am very sensitive to what their needs
are.
The President's budget proposal did not include a specific
budget for the LESC. I would assume that the base budget from
this year will be continued the upcoming year. But the demand
increases all the time. How do you make sure that--I mean, the
demand--the more--the LESC, success breeds success. The more
they accomplish, they more they are heard about from other law
enforcement, the more they get called upon, I think--I do not
have the exact figures here, but I know you would find that the
requirements and the requests continue to go up.
How are you going to do that? How are you--if the budget is
the same, how are you going to keep up with the requests?
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator Leahy. A number of points.
First, the obvious point is the LESC really is the crown jewel
of our State and local cooperation efforts, tremendous
facility, has seen an increase in responsibility, increase in
workload, and an increase in the incredibly important
information it puts out to the field.
You mentioned an increase in inquiries. They were up about
175,000 this year over the year before, an incredible number
showing, I think, the realization on the part particularly of
State and local officials of what a service the LESC can
provide. We are committed to continuing to provide that service
and enhancing our capability to do that.
You are right, the LESC budget is built into the base
budget for the Office of Investigations. We have also set aside
money, and I believe we have briefed some of your staff members
on enhancements for the facility itself of up to, I believe, $5
million for enhancements to that facility. We are also putting
new programs within LESC. We recently moved the Central States
Command Center from Chicago to Vermont, recognizing how
efficient it is to have that all under one roof.
As we move programs, we move money with them. We mentioned
Predator. We have set up the 800 hotline there in Vermont,
incredibly successful. And I will give one example. We got a
call into that hotline in Vermont, a citizen call, saying they
believed that somebody was abusing minors in a house and that
that person may have had AIDS. We responded with the local
officials--it was in Massachusetts--out of Vermont to the local
officials with our ICA agents, arrested the individual, charged
him with sexual offenses against minors. And we launched an
immigration detainer, because in fact he was an illegal alien.
An example of the capability of the LESC, the response
capability, and then the actual public safety benefit of that
response. We are committed to expanding upon that capability.
And I think the LESC is going to grow in importance.
And as you mentioned, Senator, as it does, we will look at
the OI budget, we will look at resources we have allocated for
these programs, and we will look at our ability to do that out
of the LESC in more effective ways.
The example I give of the LESC benefit all the time is, a
State trooper pulls somebody down, flags someone down on the
side of a road. He is by himself. He is approaching that car.
That trooper can call the LESC 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
and find out if that person in the car is a reentering felon.
Is that not information that trooper would want to know as they
approach a car in the middle of the night on the side of a
highway?
That is the type of service the LESC can provide. And
again, Senator, we are committed to working with you, with
Congress, to ensure that that center maintains a central role
in supporting our colleagues and in supporting those new
programs like Operation Predator.
Senator Leahy. Well, I appreciate that. It is a sad story
you tell of the situation in Massachusetts. Unfortunately, as
you know and I know, it occurs in too many places. We all wish
it did not occur at all. But to the extent it occurs, let us be
thankful we can move quickly to stop it from continuing.
GUEST WORKER PROGRAM CONCERNS
Mr. Aguirre, I heard your answer to the question--I am
still a little bit concerned--on this guest worker program of
the President. You said if we passed this, we will assume that
there will then be a request for funds to do it. But it is--I
think we are getting kind of the cart before the horse. We are
still waiting for the President's proposal. I mean, it is the
President's proposal. It is not a congressional proposal. The
President is the one who made the speech. It was done with a
great deal of fanfare.
Are we going to get a proposal from the White House? I
mean, I and others have asked for this for several months now.
Are we going to get a request for a proposed legislation, or
has the White House shelved this proposal?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, no, Senator, I think the White House has
not shelved this proposal. I think the White House was very
serious on January 7, when the President issued his call to the
Congress to act. Subsequent to that, during the State of the
Union and probably at least a dozen times that I can count, the
President has mentioned again and again that he expects the
Congress to act on his initiative.
Now the way I understand government, of course, I am coming
from the private sector only 3 years ago, I see the Congress as
enacting the legislation and I see the Administration as
administering the legislative----
Senator Leahy. Well, usually when the President has a
proposal, especially one that they announce with such great
fanfare, they actually send it up here. Other than the speech
and the press releases and the handouts at selected fund
raisers, we have not seen any legislation. Are we going to get
legislation?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, Senator, the legislation that I have
seen has been a number of bills that have been introduced by
various members of the Congress. My understanding is that the
legislation was expected to come from within the Congress, not
from the White House. But the point is, Senator, I guess if you
are looking to the substance----
BACKLOG REDUCTION ISSUE
Senator Leahy. If that is the case and the President has
also promised to reduce the average wait time for applicants
for immigration benefits to 6 months, if you have these two
goals, I mean, this is an enormous, enormous increase in work.
Why is there not any money being requested for either one of
these things, either to get rid of the backlog or for this
guest worker program of the President's?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, yes, Senator. If I may take them one at
a time, I think the backlog is one that we have finally begun
to get some traction on it. There will be a backlog reduction/
elimination plan that will be coming to the Congress in the
coming weeks. We expect to fulfill the President's commitment
that I have inherited to eliminate the backlog by September of
2006.
As you very well know, after 9/11, that took a serious
setback. And we are correcting that. And with the reallocation
or repatriation, if you will, of many of the adjudicators that
were sent on to do something else, I think we are going to get
some traction here. We have already found some of our district
offices meeting the backlog reduction. And we are continuing on
as well.
I separate the backlog reduction initiative from the
President's temporary worker proposal because I think they are
apples and apples. I think we will be able to implement the
program based on the Congress legislation that will be
innovative, that will be technologically efficient, that will
allow us to process people----
Senator Leahy. But you need more funds.
Mr. Aguirre. I think we will need more funds through the
fees that will be joining the application.
Senator Cochran. Senator, your time has expired.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Shelby.
Senator Leahy. I have some other questions for the next
round.
Senator Cochran. Absolutely. Sure.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NUMBER OF ILLEGAL ALIENS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES
Secretary Garcia and gentlemen, I asked this other in my
opening statement. What is your best estimate, Mr. Secretary,
of the number of illegal aliens currently residing in the
United States of America?
Mr. Garcia. Senator, you mentioned some of the numbers
earlier. The number, I think, that is posted on the website is
7 million. I have the 8 million number as well. I think it
again reinforces----
Senator Shelby. You do not really know, do you, honestly?
Mr. Garcia. I think, Senator, it again reinforces your
point that it is a very difficult number to identify because of
what you are trying to quantify.
Senator Shelby. Is that an increase or a decrease, say,
from the previous year?
Mr. Garcia. I could not give you that answer, Senator. I do
not mean to be evasive. I do not know. I think it would be
difficult to answer.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Bonner, do you have a judgment on that?
Mr. Bonner. My judgment is that the numbers of illegal
aliens that are successfully entering the United States has
marginally decreased.
Senator Shelby. And what do you base that on?
Mr. Bonner. I base that on the fact that the Border Patrol
apprehensions--most, of course, the illegal migration, the
spigot, if you will, is the southern border. The Border Patrol
apprehensions last year were 931,000 illegal aliens
apprehended. The vast, vast majority of that was at our border
with Mexico. I believe that that number is to some extent a
surrogate for the number of people that have successfully and
illegally crossed our border. And that apprehension number, has
been steadily declining for several years.
Now by the way----
Senator Shelby. How do you get to the high number of 7, 8,
perhaps 10 million? You know, we do not know the exact number.
Mr. Bonner. Yes. It is estimated between----
Senator Shelby. If you are stopping everybody at the
border, how are they getting in?
Mr. Bonner. We are certainly not stopping everybody at the
border.
Senator Shelby. I know that.
Mr. Bonner. No question about it. I mean, right now we have
the Arizona border, which is substantially where there is mass
migration taking place virtually every day. That is why we have
instituted the Arizona Border Control Initiative, to get
control of that.
But I would say this. If you look over the past number of
years, we have, through Border Patrol increases, Border Patrol
sensoring technology, I believe with the adding of UAVs and
some sensoring technology in this budget, we are getting
marginally better control over our border in terms of illegal
migration. Now does that mean nobody is getting through?
Senator Shelby. You used the word ``marginally.''
Mr. Bonner. Well, we need to do a lot better.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Bonner. And it is very difficult to estimate the
numbers of illegal aliens that have gotten through and that are
adding to that base of illegal aliens that are residing
illegally in the United States. But I would say that there is
some reason to believe that we have gotten somewhat better
control of the border. And I say this anecdotally.
Senator Shelby. Sure, you do.
Mr. Bonner. Let me just tell you that I know that if you
take significant parts, of the California border and the Texas
border, where there have been substantial increases in Border
Patrol staffing, improvements in the sensoring and technology
that is being used to detect illegal crossings, that we have
better control over a lot of the segments of our southern
borders than we did going back, say, 5 to 10 years ago.
We have to, by the way, we have to get better. I do not
mean to say this nirvana here.
Senator Shelby. I know that. I know that.
Mr. Bonner. So it is very hard to say. Probably 60 percent,
by the way, is the estimate of the----
ADEQUACY OF RESOURCES
Senator Shelby. Do you have enough resources? This was
asked by Senator Byrd and others. Do you have enough resources
to do the job to protect our borders considering that there are
probably 7 to 10 million illegal aliens in this country?
Mr. Bonner. If we cannot--do we have enough resources? We
have, by the way, through this subcommittee and through the
Congress and the President's request, we have been adding
resources. We have a request here for a very significant amount
of funding for better sensoring technology to control better
parts of our border.
I am very sanguine about the prospects through the use of
unmanned aerial vehicles. For the first time, the Border Patrol
is pioneering the use of UAVs. We will start that later this
year, I believe, at the Southwest border. But it will give us
much better detection capability against illegal migration
across our Southern border. Potentially, as you know, because
of the terrorist threat, we also need to be concerned about the
Northern border, as well.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely both.
IS THE CHALLENGE TOO GREAT?
Mr. Bonner. So we are moving in the right direction. But it
is an extremely difficult thing. I actually think, by the way,
if I could add, I think the President's temporary worker----
Senator Shelby. It is the challenge. I respect all three of
you. And I know you are dedicated here.
Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. But is the challenge too great to win?
Mr. Bonner. No.
Senator Shelby. In other words, we are losing. We are
losing the war on illegal aliens now, if there are 7 to 10
million people here illegally that never had a background
check, you do not know anything about them. And they are coming
here. They are staying here. They are working here. And what
does that say to the people who come here legally and go
through the hoops?
Mr. Bonner. Well, I think----
Senator Shelby. Like you did, sir.
Mr. Bonner. Well, perhaps Dr. Aguirre can respond to that.
But I just want to say, Senator, that we can do this. We are, I
believe, getting greater control over the border. We need to do
that. If we cannot cut off the spigot for illegal migration
coming in, well, we cannot ever address this problem seriously.
Then we have to figure out what to do with the 7, 8, or 10
million illegals that are here in this country and figure out
what is the best, from a point of view of practicality,
realism, and policy, what is the best approach to that problem.
OVERSTAYS ON VISAS
Senator Shelby. And what about--before my time expires,
maybe you can answer afterward. What about the overstay on
visas? People come here legally, millions of people come to
this country legally. What do you do to track those people once
they are here? How do you know they have gone back unless there
is a central system checking?
Mr. Bonner. Customs and Border Protection is to prevent
them from entering. And ICE has the responsibility----
Senator Shelby. Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. To remove them, if we have failed.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator. We have the enforcement
side of US VISIT that has been mentioned earlier. Last year,
when we stood up ICE, we created a compliance enforcement unit,
basically to put that integrity in the system. It looks at US
VISIT. It looks at SEVIS, where we have had problems with
students coming in, students not going to school, not
attending, dropping out.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Garcia. We have made tremendous progress on that.
Senator Shelby. That is how a lot of the terrorists got
here. They came here legally, did they not?
Mr. Garcia. One of the Trade Center----
Senator Shelby. Some of them overstayed their visas.
Mr. Garcia. The driver of the World Trade Center bombing of
the van in 1993 was a student who had come here on a student
visa, had never gone to school. We take that very seriously. We
have prioritized the leads using intelligence, using other
information. We vet those at Headquarters, and we send those
out into the field. We have been doing that for some time now.
We are seeking additional funding in 2005 for that program.
Asa Hutchinson and I both believe that it is incredibly
important in maintaining that integrity in the system, in
addition to its national security implications.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator Murray.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION SAFE COMMERCE
Senator Murray. Mr. Bonner, at the 2002 Western Cargo
Conference, you said, and I quote, ``The American people on the
global trading system are more secure, if we screen cargo
containers that present a high risk for terrorism as early as
possible and certainly before they reach U.S. shores.''
I really agree with that. And I am pleased that the two
most prominent cargo security programs within Customs, C-TPAT
and CSI, seek to push out our borders to foreign ports. Those
programs will eventually help expand our various cargo security
programs into a standard system for sending goods throughout
the world. But they are not going to get the job done alone. We
have now spent $58 million on a program called Operation Safe
Commerce, which is working to test the security of 19 different
supply chains running through 5 different ports, which
compromise the 3 largest load centers in the country. In fact,
more than 80 percent of our cargo goes through those ports.
I think it is really imperative that we are able to learn
from all of our port security programs. And we need to tie them
together and rapidly instituted a large-scale operationally
cargo security program in the United States.
Commissioner Bonner, would you tell the committee how you
are planning to implement the lessons that we have learned from
Operation Safe Commerce into an overall cargo security
standard?
Mr. Bonner. I would be happy to do that, Senator. You and I
have worked a lot on this issue. But first of all, Operation
Safe Commerce has been a very valuable test bed for different
kinds of technologies that would be useful in better securing
the movement of particularly ocean-going cargo containers from
various places in the world to the United States. And as you
indicated I think earlier, 8 to 9 million ocean-going cargo
containers arrive at our U.S. seaports annually, including some
of our major ports on the West Coast like Seattle and Tacoma.
But the approaches to take the lessons there to develop and
essentially to improve even more the supply chain security
regimen. And there are two key elements to that. One is, and I
believe we can do this through the Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, leveraging U.S. importers and foreign
suppliers to increase essentially the point of loading security
to meet best practices and standards at the point that the
containers are actually loaded at foreign manufacturers'
facilities, whether that is in Asia or Europe or elsewhere.
And secondly, using the lessons from Operation Safe
Commerce to develop best practices and minimal standards, if
you will, for a smarter, more secure container to be used in
terms of the movement of those goods to the U.S. seaports. And
when I say a smarter container, I mean one that, at the
minimum, can be read by U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Inspectors either upon arrival or at the CSI ports, as we
expand those to more and more ports overseas, to determine
whether it has been tampered with enroute.
So those are at least a couple of the things that we are
looking at to see if we cannot implement to improve the overall
security of global trade and movement of cargo to the United
States.
REPORT DUE AT THE END OF THE FISCAL YEAR
Senator Murray. So we expect a report from them by the end
of this fiscal year. And you are going to be using the
information that they have learned from that to get to some
kind of security standard.
Mr. Bonner. It is still being evaluated. But I certainly
intend to. I believe, based upon the preliminary reports I have
obtained, that there are some very useful things that have been
done that are going to inform us and help guide us to an
improved security of the movement of cargo.
Senator Murray. Okay. Well, I do want to work with you on
that. There is still $17 million to go out. They have spent a
great deal of time, our taxpayers dollars and money on this.
And I think we can learn a lot from them. We want to make sure
it is used and used wisely.
INSTALLATION OF RADIATION PORTAL DEVICES AT PORTS OF ENTRY
Commissioner, let me also ask you, Customs is beginning the
process of installing these radiation portal devices at ports
of entry throughout the Nation. It seems to me it is a little
bit late to check for radiation. Both the ports of Seattle and
Tacoma are located right next to our downtown businesses and
residential areas. And a ship bound for these ports travels
through the Puget Sound before they get there. They pass by a
major refinery compound, three Navy bases that each home port
nuclear powered vessels, and a major petroleum tank farm.
Why have you decided, at least initially, not to push out
the borders when it comes to this kind of technology? And can
you tell us if you plan on deploying these monitors to foreign
ports that are participating in C-TPAT?
Mr. Bonner. I think our objective and our intention is to
do both. In other words, we are talking about a layered defense
in-depth strategy. But we do want to do everything we can,
particularly given the catastrophic consequences of
radiological weapons, to improve our ability to detect them
when they are arriving at our borders. And this is, of course,
our land borders. We have already deployed now almost 250
radiation portal monitors, very sensitive radiation detection
equipment, along many places on our land border, particularly
Canada. We are now expanding to seaports and so forth.
But at the same time, we want to make sure that containers,
through the Container Security Initiative, as part of the
security screening of those containers that are identified as
posing potential risk for terrorist threat; and that is,
potentially risk that a terrorist organization like the al-
Qaeda could have concealed a weapon in those containers, that
they are not only run through the large-scale X-ray scanning
equipment, which is important to detect weapons, and
potentially weapons of mass destruction, but they are also run
through radiation detection. And that is part of CSI.
Now, part of radiation detection is radiation isotope
identifiers, handheld devices, and the like. We have at one
foreign port, working with the Department of Energy, we are
doing what I call ``CSI plus'', which is to deploy radiation
portal detection systems that have the capacity for being not
only very sensitive, but detecting potentially every container
moving into that foreign port, including all containers that
are ultimately outbound to the United States. And we have done
that, working with the Department of Energy. And I give the
Department of Energy much credit here but working in tandem
with our U.S. Department of Energy, we have done that at the
first CSI port, which is the Port of Rotterdam.
And I do not know that that has been implemented yet, but I
expect that it is going to be implemented within the next month
or so. And so we do see that is what we want to do. If we can
get these foreign seaports to install more sophisticated
radiation detection equipment, it is something we want to do.
We have started that. We have a long way to go.
PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY
Senator Murray. Okay. As you know, the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory is the contracting authority for installing
those devices. Can you give us a quick update of their
performance and how the project is progressing?
Mr. Bonner. Well, my assessment is that they have been
very, very helpful to us in terms of helping Customs and Border
Protection select the most appropriate and best radiation
detection equipment that makes sense for a port environment. In
the port environments, there are several port environments.
There is the land border port environment and there is the
seaport and the like.
So, they have been very helpful with us in terms of
assisting us in terms of the testing and the selection and the
actual installation of this equipment to make sure that we have
the kinds of protocols that resolve when you do get a radiation
hit. And we do get hits on these things, that we can determine
quickly whether it is an innocent radiation-emitting source or
whether it is something that we need to be concerned about.
Senator Murray. Well, that goes to another question I had.
Senator Cochran. Senator, your time has expired.
PORTS
Senator Murray. Could I just follow up on his last comment?
Because we have heard from a number of people in the ports that
they want to know what happens when there is a positive reading
from these devices and what the protocol is, you know, whether
the facilities shut down and who is in charge of making those
decisions. And if you could share with us what that is?
Mr. Bonner. There is a protocol and I will make sure that
all of our CBP port directors make sure they have had that
discussion within the context of the port security committees
that exist at each port with the Coast Guard.
Senator Murray. Good. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
REQUEST FOR DETENTION AND REMOVAL
Mr. Garcia, one of the largest increases requested by your
bureau is for detention and removal of people who are illegally
in the country. It is an increase of $108 million, just about
10 percent for this activity. Could you tell us what the
specific needs are here and how you will use those additional
funds?
Mr. Garcia. Certainly, Senator. Detention and Removal is a
very important program, a very important tool in enforcing
immigration laws and maintaining the integrity of that
immigration system that we were talking about earlier. A number
of programs, I believe, were neglected in the past,
particularly the Institutional Removal Program and the Alien
Absconder Program.
If you look at the funding enhancements for 2005, that is
about $80 million of the dollar amount that you were speaking
about. Institutional removal goes into the prison facilities,
Federal, State, and also local facilities, and makes sure that
we process illegal aliens or aliens subject to removal who are
in those facilities. They could be very violent inmates,
inmates with a history of violent criminal activity, predators,
child sex predators.
We have done a good job in the past of reaching the Federal
facilities, according to a GAO report, a fairly good job at the
State level, and a not very good job, and one we need to make
much improvement on, on a local level. We are looking to
transfer that program out of Investigations into the Detention
and Removal Division, where I strongly believe it belongs, and
increase our capability to place those inmates into the system
at an earlier time period so that we streamline the process and
make it more efficient, so we are holding those inmates for
less time before they are ultimately removed from the United
States.
In fiscal year 2003, ICE removed 140,000 people from the
United States. That is a very large number. It is a very large
system. It needs improvement. The money in this request for
enhancements will go towards that and making it more efficient.
Fugitive Operations. The number of fugitives estimated in
the country range up to 400,000. Those are people with final
orders of deportation who have not complied. A subset of that,
about 40,000, again an estimate, criminal aliens who have not
complied with final orders of removal.
We are very aggressively using fugitive alien teams to go
after those absconders. We are prioritizing again, looking at
the public safety value, going after those with a criminal
record. Again, the biggest public safety value, we have a top
ten list. We have been very successful advertising.
This money will go to increasing those Fugitive Operations
Teams, we call them, 30 additional teams across the United
States. So it is really again that comprehensive approach to
looking at integrity of the system and recognizing that an
important part of that is the detention removal system.
COOPERATION OF LOCAL AND STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Senator Cochran. Are you successful in getting the
cooperation of local and State law enforcement officials in
helping you achieve your goals?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, Senator. Again, you have to look at the
are. And there is a wide range of options available. At one
side of the spectrum is States that want to actively
participate in enforcement. And there is a provision, 287G it
is called, for doing that, where we provide training to local
officials. And we did it in Senator Shelby's State most
recently.
The LESC that I spoke about earlier provides another
opportunity for cooperation. Anti-gang work, we have been very
successful working in Chicago, L.A., Charlotte in anti-gang
work, working with State and local officials. So there is a
very wide spectrum to that cooperation.
I believe that the Institutional Removal context is an area
where we can do more working with the States. It is a benefit
to both. It makes our work more efficient, where the States
will flag or bring to our attention inmates who should be in
our system. And we can remove those criminal aliens from
probation or parole systems that cost the State money in terms
of supervisory dollars. So I think that is an area where we are
going to move much more aggressively in the State and local
cooperation area.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF HARD WORK AND SUCCESS
Senator Cochran. Well, I want to commend you for the hard
work and the good job you are doing, your bureau is doing. I
think we have seen a lot of new initiatives developed and a lot
of success stories that have not gotten the attention they
probably should have.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator.
UPDATING CITIZENSHIP PROCESSES AND LOOKING AT THE TEST THAT IS GIVEN TO
THOSE SEEKING CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre, I know that you are in the
process of updating citizenship processes and looking at the
test that is given those who are seeking to obtain citizenship
in our country. Could you tell us a little about what you are
doing in that area and whether there are any additional funds
requested to support those activities?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, yes, Senator. Thank you. As mandated by
Congress, we have instituted an Office of Citizenship, which is
actually responsible for the citizenship aspect of immigration
or, if you will, the naturalization aspect of immigration. That
office is looking at various aspects. One, we are trying to
make the test of citizenship a better process. It is a good
process now, but I think it can be improved.
We have gone through a pilot project last year to look at
better ways to deal with the English portion of the test and
see how we can have a more meaningful process. That pilot is
now back. We have had some very good reports from some of the
NGOs. And we are trying to fine tune and see how we can make it
better.
Additionally, there is a provision for history and civics,
which is also part of the test that an applicant must go
through before they are granted naturalization. We are looking
at ways to see if we can make it a more meaningful approach
where the questions are not the end, but the end is the
learning and the question is part of the component. And to that
end, sir, we are working with academicians. We are working with
historians. We are working with the Department of Education to
see how we can do the learning a more meaningful aspect,
particularly since many of these applicants are slow in their
English knowledge. We want to see how we can improve their
understanding of what it is to be an American, not only from an
historical standpoint, but also the civic responsibilities that
one assumes when they become a citizen. That is all part of the
element. And yes, sir, we do have an inclusion in our budget to
accommodate that.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
REQUEST FOR THE CUSTOMS TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM
Mr. Bonner, there is a request for an additional $15
million to expand the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism. Could you tell us how these resources are going to
be used and what the purpose of that program is?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, Senator, Mr. Chairman. It is essentially
twofold. One is to be able to expand the validation of the C-
TPAT partners. In other words, they enter into a commitment
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to take certain mission
measures, best practices, to improve their supply chain
security literally from their foreign vendors to our ports of
entry. And we want to, as the old saying of some former
President was ``trust, but verify.'' So we are expanding our
validation capability, so we are doing more validation.
And as we validate, more people understand that this is not
window dressing. This is serious stuff. If you are going to get
expedited treatment upon arrival, you need to take these
measures that you have committed to take. So part of it is for
that. Part of it is to further expand the base of C-TPAT
partners. We already have 5,900 companies, including many of
the major U.S. importers that are part of C-TPAT. In fact, the
importers alone are about 3,500. These are major importers that
account for over 40 percent or more of the all of the incoming
cargo coming into the United States. So it also will be funding
to expand and administer the program.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that this will
complete our series of hearings, will it not?
KUDOS FOR CHAIRMAN COCHRAN
I want to thank you Mr. Chairman for conducting these
hearings as you have. It should also be noted that the chairman
always calls on the other members of the committee to ask
questions, and then he allows a second go-around. He does not
ask his questions until the other members have asked their
questions, and sometimes it is 2 hours before he asks his
questions. So, that courtesy should not be overlooked. I have
observed it, and I thank the chairman for the courtesies that
he continually extends to the other members of the committee.
He is a good chairman. He is not only fair to his colleagues on
the committee, but he is also very fair and considerate of the
witnesses.
IS THERE MONEY IN THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET TO IMPLEMENT THE PRESIDENT'S
AMNESTY PROPOSAL?
Earlier, Senator Shelby asked whether there is money in the
President's budget to implement the President's amnesty
proposal. I do not believe that we got a complete answer, and
this is nobody's fault. Mr. Aguirre said that immigration
services would be paid for with the new fees. I accept that.
But we did not hear, I do not believe, from Mr. Garcia or Mr.
Bonner.
Certainly there would be higher costs for security
background checks, for guest worker enforcement, for removal of
aliens, for workplace enforcement, and for increased travel
across the borders. The modest increases in the budget will
barely keep up with current needs. What will the increased
costs be, if the President's amnesty program is approved? And
why are these funds not in the budget?
Mr. Bonner, do you want to take a shot at that question?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, you are right, Senator
Byrd. There are no funds, per se, in the CBP budget for the
Temporary Worker Program that has been proposed. And I would
make the comment that from a CBP perspective, and as the
President has indicated, that if there were to be a Temporary
Worker Program enacted, it would have to have a very strong
border enforcement for a security aspect to it.
And right now, we, of course, have a sizable Border Patrol.
I discussed with Senator Shelby that we have a ways to go here.
But I do think one thing that has been lost is that in the
Temporary Worker Program proposal, that it does hold the
promise, I think, as outlined, if you had a Temporary Worker
Program, it potentially could relieve some of the pressure at
the border in terms of illegal migration and give us a better
ability to control the border, Senator Byrd. And that has
always been important as a national objective of the United
States.
But let me tell you right now it is absolutely essential,
because we need to reduce the flow of mass migrations at our
Southern border in order to increase our prospects for
identifying and apprehending terrorists who may be attempting
to illegally enter our country. So I do think that there is a
policy aspect to this that could help us get a better and
firmer control of the border, which we need for homeland
security purposes.
But once if there were a bill that took final shape,
obviously I would like to have an opportunity to discuss
initially within the Administration what I think would be
needed to better control the intake spigot, because we ought
not to have a Temporary Worker Program and still have, whatever
it is, 300,000 or 400,000 illegal aliens entering our country
to both seek jobs or for other purposes.
Senator Byrd. Are you in a position at this moment to
submit an estimate as to the resources that would be needed?
Mr. Bonner. I certainly do not have it at my fingertips,
but I would certainly, if you requested it, I would take under
advisement as to how we might be able to get that information
to you.
Senator Byrd. Would you do that for the subcommittee?
Mr. Bonner. I will make every effort to do it. Obviously,
Senator, I will also have to work this through the Department
and through the Administration. But I will make every effort to
get you that information.
Senator Byrd. Very well. If you would, please.
ICE RESPONSE
Mr. Garcia, would you make an effort along those lines?
Mr. Garcia. Just to clarify, Senator, looking for a number
in terms of enforcement on the President's Temporary Worker
proposal? I would echo what Director Aguirre said in terms of
without the outline and without the participation and
structuring how that is enacted and how it rolls out, it would
be very difficult to speculate as to the resources needed to
enforce it. I think the most productive area to go here, again,
is to lend our expertise to the process.
And again, looking at the lessons learned, and I think you
mentioned a few in your earlier remarks, of other legislation
in the past to see how we can build in provisions that will
limit the amount of fraud, anti-fraud work investment we need
to make, and then again to look at what is the scope of the
legislation, how will that affect the population that is in the
United States in our ongoing enforcement efforts, and then to
calculate what do we need to ensure the integrity of the system
that we have all been talking about.
I think without concrete provisions or at least an outline
of where that legislation is going when enacted, it would be a
very difficult exercise to calculate the amount of money we
would need on the enforcement side.
Senator Byrd. Well, it sounds to me as if the President was
just posturing when he proposed an amnesty program. Nobody
seems to have in mind a figure as to what this is going to
cost. Certainly Congress is going to need to know more than you
are able to tell us. You do not seem to have the slightest idea
as to what this is going to cost. We are going to need to know
these things.
BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
All right. The budget request for the Federal Air Marshals
is essentially a flat-line request similar to last year's
funding level. Yet, on two occasions in less than a year, late
last summer and again over the recent winter holidays, the
threat level was raised to Code Orange, in large part because
intelligence and other indicators led the department to believe
that there were enhanced threats to the United States via
airplanes flying into or over this country.
However, based on budget briefings with my staff, I
understand that the resources directed to this program are not
sufficient to hire the number of air marshals needed to
maintain a more robust presence on targeted flights. On March
9, I wrote to Secretary Ridge expressing my concerns about the
potential that we may not have sufficient personnel to cover a
significant percentage of targeted flights this year, and that
this problem will only be compounded given the inadequate
funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget.
While we are unable to talk in specifics, I am concerned
about the inability of your agency to, at a minimum, replace
retiring air marshals. Are you aware, Mr. Garcia, of my letter
to Secretary Ridge?
Mr. Garcia. I became aware of it in preparation for this
hearing, Senator.
Senator Byrd. Do you know when I will get a response to my
letter, ensuring me that the Department will maintain a robust
staffing level of air marshals?
Mr. Garcia. I will follow up with that, Senator, and get
back to you. Obviously, you share, as the Department, your
concern, the importance you place on the air marshal program.
Senator Byrd. If my understanding of the Air Marshal budget
and the status of the Air Marshal program is even close to
being accurate, why are you not requesting more funding for
hiring additional Air Marshals, ensuring that they receive
advanced training, and increasing the tools at their disposal
for the protection of airplanes and their passengers?
Mr. Garcia. Senator, I think, as I mentioned earlier, the
Air Marshals are our newest division within ICE. They came to
ICE, I believe, in early November this past year. We are in the
process of looking at the Federal Air Marshal Service as a law
enforcement division within ICE, seeing how we can support
their mission and how they support the broader ICE goals.
We are looking at a number of different things. You
mentioned code orange. During the most recent threat level, the
raising of the threat level most recently, we in fact were able
to deploy ICE agents who had been trained as Air Marshals to
fly, I believe, more than 300 missions with the Air Marshals
and increase their capacity. So we are looking at a number of
different things.
One of the things we are looking at very closely, as you
know, and I believe you have been briefed, are our budget
issues and our future looking down the road at the FAMS and
what their capabilities are. That is an incredibly important
mission, as I mentioned earlier, in ensuring civil aviation
security. I look forward to working with this Subcommittee on
the very important issues facing the Air Marshals and
continuing to support that vital mission.
Senator Byrd. How is my time running?
Senator Cochran. Your time has expired.
Senator Byrd. All right. Thank you. I am glad I didn't ask
the question earlier.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Shelby.
VISA OVERSTAYS
Senator Shelby. Thank you. I want to go back on the visa
overstays. How many people come into this country legally each
year? That is, as a student, business, vacationing, so forth.
It has to be in the millions.
Mr. Bonner. Tens of millions.
Senator Shelby. Tens of millions. So they get a visa to
come to this country most of the time, do they not?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, Senator. They get a visa unless they are
traveling into the United States from a visa waiver country, in
which case they would not require a visa.
Senator Shelby. And how many countries do we have visa
waiver agreements with?
Mr. Bonner. The last time I checked it was about 16 or 17.
Do not hold me to the exact number, but in that ballpark.
Senator Shelby. Do any of those countries come out of the
Middle East?
Mr. Bonner. No, I do not believe there are any countries on
the Middle East that are visa waiver countries anymore.
Senator Shelby. Okay. Now how many--how do you keep up
with--let us say there are tens of millions. Is ten million too
few people?
Mr. Bonner. Oh, on an annual basis, there are more than
that that come in under visa----
Senator Shelby. Twenty million? Twenty-five million? Just
give your best shot.
Mr. Bonner. I think it is probably around 30 million.
Senator Shelby. Thirty million people.
Mr. Bonner. Let me do it this way: It is 30 million through
our international airports, more or less.
Senator Shelby. Thirty million people.
Mr. Bonner. When you talk about our land borders, you are
talking about even more gigantic numbers of people that are
coming in with temporary worker cards or with visas.
Senator Shelby. Okay. Now how do you keep up with this huge
number of people? Do you have the resources, one, to keep up
with it? Let us say I came in, and had a visa. How would you
keep up with me? And let us say I came from a country that did
not require a visa, and I come in and they stamp my passport.
How do you know if I ever leave, is what I am getting at.
Mr. Bonner. One of the great accomplishments of the
Department of Homeland Security has been that at our
international airports we have instituted the US VISIT program
and technology. And so we know everybody that is coming in with
a visa at the time they are presenting themselves to a CBP
inspector at our international airports. One, whether they have
been issued a visa. We actually have on the screen the visa
with their photographs. We take a biometric, which are the two
fingerprint scans. And we can determine with virtual certainty
that the person presenting themselves to us is the person who
was issued the visa in the first instance by the State
Department.
Now we did not have that capability before.
Senator Shelby. Sure. I know.
Mr. Bonner. By the way, we also have a 994 form, that has
some information in it that is not fully automated about the
person.
Senator Shelby. You are talking about tools. You are
getting better tools, I understand, to deal with.
Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. And that is good. And you are probably
going to need more. But my real thrust here is, if you have and
I will just use 30 million people coming to the United States,
and you have an entry stamp for them, you know that they come
in, do you have a correlation to when they leave? And is that
closed, in other words?
Mr. Bonner. Well, we have some correlation there, because
if they----
WHO IS IN THE COUNTRY LEGALLY AND OVERSTAYED?
Senator Shelby. You see what I am getting at. In other
words, do you really know who is in this country legally, that
come legally and over stay?
Mr. Bonner. Well, the answer to that one is that we do not
know everybody that has overstayed visas that has come into the
United States, because there is not a fully perfected automated
exit system at this point.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Bonner. We are starting the prototype of that through
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate of the
Department by trying to model that at airports. And then to
have a complete system, we will obviously have to include the
land borders. So the answer is--you know, by the way,
ultimately----
Senator Shelby. The answer is no, you do not have it.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. If they get into the country----
Senator Shelby. Is that fair?
Mr. Bonner. If they get into the country----
Senator Shelby. Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Bonner. Yes. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Is the answer, as we speak today, as you
speak today, the answer is no, you do not have the system in
place to really keep up with it.
Mr. Bonner. Not a foolproof system. We have a system.
Senator Shelby. Sure. We know you have a system.
Mr. Bonner. But it is not a system that tells us that
everybody that has entered on a visa for a period of time has
not overstayed that visa. And if they have overstayed, then we
have issues of identifying who they are, where they are. And
then, as Assistant Secretary Garcia was saying, ICE then has
the responsibility for essentially locating and removing. And
there are huge numbers we are talking about.
Senator Shelby. And how many? Let us assume of the 30
million that come in, that there are a lot of people that do
not go back. I do not know how many, but it has to be heavy.
Mr. Bonner. That overstay their visa.
Senator Shelby. Sure, overstaying their visa. What do you
do about it? And how many have you found and deported that have
overstayed their visa?
Mr. Bonner. I will give you a way of looking at that. And
that is and again, these are estimates.
Senator Shelby. No. I do not want to just look at it. We
want to know. Go ahead.
Mr. Bonner. Yes. But let us start with what are some
estimates.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Mr. Bonner. And that is, if you estimate that there are 8
million people that are illegally residing in the United
States, and the figure might be higher, but if it is 8 million,
the estimates are that about 40 percent of those are visa
overstays.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Mr. Bonner. So 3 million plus. And then the question is,
well, how do you prioritize that, particularly in light of the
terrorist threat, criminal aliens and the like, to devote
resources to go after them. And I do not think the resources
are necessarily sufficient to do that. But ICE is the one that
has the resources and the responsibility. And I do not mean to
pass the buck here in any sense, but it is an issue then as
to----
Senator Byrd. We do need to talk about the bucks. That is
what the senator is trying to find out.
Senator Shelby. We are trying to get to the bottom of this.
What are the real numbers? What are you doing about it? And if
you are not doing a lot about it, and obviously you are not
doing what you could, what do you need? Do you need resources
to do it?
Senator Cochran. Do you want to answer that?
ICE RESPONSE TO OVERSTAY QUESTION
Mr. Garcia. Yes. Thank you, Senator. To pick up, I guess,
where Rob left me, since the initiation of NCR or SEVIS, a
tremendous amount of information has been generated. You hit on
it, Senator, when you say our exit controls. And Commissioner
Bonner was talking about it. We get these leads in. We have had
20,000 NCR US VISIT now, SEVIS leads, resolved at headquarters.
Out of that group, we have sent 1,200 leads out into the field
to be resolved in our field offices.
We have to take the indications of overstay and violations.
And then we have to check the systems. We have to look at the
exit data. And we have to do follow-up. And we have to
prioritize.
Senator Shelby. Excuse me. If it is 40 percent of the
illegal aliens, just use that for an example, of 8 million,
that is 3 million, a little more than 3 million, if it was 8
million, 40 percent of that, 3 million overstays. It seems that
you are just overwhelmed. If there are 3 million illegal aliens
here because they overstayed their visas and you do not know
where they are--maybe you know who they are, because there is
no exit, or maybe you do not know that.
I am not here to call you down on it, because I know you
are sincere and you are competent. But I think you have a
tremendous problem, or we do in this country.
Mr. Garcia. A long time to get to that population, looking
at the past and the future. I had one particularly egregious
case last week where someone was in overstay from 1986,
committed a horrendous act against a 3-year-old child in
Maryland. So that shows you the scope of how far back we are
looking.
Going forward, which is a little bit different conversation
that we have been talking about here with the new US VISIT, the
new SEVIS system--I know, Senator, you are familiar with the
old systems and how much of an improvement this has been. We
are working with that prospectively to look at these 20,000
leads and the 1,200 we have sent out to put deterrence into the
system, which was not there before, I believe.
Then you look at the past. And you say: How do we
prioritize that child sex predator that has been here since
1986 and the other ones that pose a public safety risk? How do
we work with whatever legislations? How do we address that all
in a meaningful way? And I think that is what we are all
working towards here at the table.
DOES ICE HAVE ENOUGH RESOURCES TO HANDLE OVERSTAY?
Senator Shelby. But my real question, do you have enough
resources to do that?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, in where we are going. And if you look at
the initiatives we have asked for, there is compliance
enforcement enhancement there. We have been doing that,
building that out of base up till now. We are asking for $16
million coming here to look at processing more leads and
building a targeting system that is even more meaningful.
Because again, enforcement is partly deterrence. And we have to
send that message out.
Senator Shelby. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator, thank you.
I have two final questions and other senators may have
other questions. We are going to have a vote, I think, at about
12:15 on the Senate floor. So we are about through, if that is
any consolation to you.
$64 MILLION REQUEST FOR SENSOR AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
I notice in the budget request there is $64 million being
requested for sensor and surveillance technology. There is
technology currently deployed between the land ports of entry,
but you are developing a project plan for the $64 million
request, as I understand it. Do you have any idea what the
total cost of finishing the installation of sensor technology
is going to be? Mr. Bonner, I guess that is a question you
should answer.
Mr. Bonner. It is, because this is sensoring technology for
the Border Patrol to better control and detect against illegal
crossings by illegal migrants, drug smugglers, potential
terrorists. And the $64 million is going to help us immensely
in terms of expanding the things like the remote video system
and the ISIS system and the ground sensors that we use at
strategic places along the Southwest border. And of course,
unfortunately since 9/11, we have had to give more attention to
our Northern border with Canada, too, in terms of understanding
who and what may be crossing that border, so that the Border
Patrol is then able to respond and apprehend those that
illegally cross our borders.
But you are asking me what the total is. I do not have the
number. I mean, the goal is to have sensoring technology, which
could include ground sensors, the sophisticated camera
sensoring systems, plus UAVs, and we have funding for that. To
give us a more comprehensive picture, that is the goal, of
illegal penetration of our borders at the most vulnerable
areas. I mean, there are some areas of our border that are, for
example, I mean, in the Rocky Mountains on the Canadian border
during the winter it is virtually impassable. So we are looking
at it in terms of where the vulnerabilities are. The goal is to
expand the sensoring system to give us sufficient visibility
that we have substantial control over and detection
capabilities for people moving across the border.
Mr. Chairman, what the total number is, I do not have it
right now. It would be more than the $64 million that is being
requested in the 2005 budget request.
$10 MILLION REQUEST FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Senator Cochran. There is also an indication that you need
funding up to $10 million to develop a system of unmanned
aerial vehicles to support the Border Patrol and other
components of Customs and Border Protection. Are you proceeding
now to use funds from other sources under your control in order
to get moving on this program in connection with the Arizona
Border Control Initiative, for example?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, we are. And even in 2004 we are proceeding
to develop and actually deploy an unmanned aerial vehicle in
support of the Arizona Border Control Initiative to better
control the Arizona border. And I believe that we are going to
be able to do that sometime by the May/June time frame,
actually deploy a UAV that will cover and detect along a
significant portion of the Arizona border. The funding for this
is not in our budget. But we have identified funding through
Under Secretary Hutchinson and the Department of Homeland
Security through the Science and Technology area to essentially
pilot and determine how effective a UAV is in terms of
detecting. So that in 2005, we should be able to have a good
understanding of what we need to actually deploy on a more
permanent basis on the Southwest border at particular critical
segments, as well as on our Northern border with Canada.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Garcia, I think the Coast Guard and
Air Marine Program within your bureau have tested the concept
of unmanned aerial vehicles in their operations. Is your
experience going to be shared, or will this be communicated to
the other agencies so they will have the benefit of your
understanding and your experience?
Mr. Garcia. Absolutely, as far as the Air and Marine goes.
We are working down in Arizona. And I am working very closely
with Commissioner Bonner.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, those are my last two
questions.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. I yield to you for whatever time you need.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit most
of my remaining questions for the record. I do have two that I
will ask at this time. Then we will go to the floor for our
vote.
CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT TRADEOFF
On March 19, Commissioner Bonner, CBP issued its annual
report for 2003 on the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act
Trade law. This is a law that I helped to enact that allows
Customs and Border Protection to reimburse U.S. companies that
have been injured by unfair trade practices with funds that are
collected as import duties on unfairly traded imports. CBP's
report states that, while CBP should have distributed at least
$320 million in collected duties to eligible U.S. companies and
workers in 2003, it was able to distribute only $190 million.
CBP failed to collect $130 million from unfair traders.
Most of the uncollected $130 million consists of import duties
not collected by CBP on goods from China in particular. While
part of the problem is that Chinese companies are refusing to
pay these duties, it also appears that CBP is failing to
enforce the U.S. trade laws, because it is not diligently
pursuing the parties who are refusing to pay these duties. Why
is CBP not collecting millions of dollars in duties on unfairly
traded imports as required by U.S. law?
Mr. Bonner. First of all, we take very seriously at Customs
and Border Protection, Senator Byrd, our responsibilities under
the Byrd amendment. And I believe that the answer to that lies
in essentially three factors, most of which are beyond the
control of Customs and Border Protection. The first factor is
that when there is a preliminary proceeding against a Chinese
company, and these are mainly agricultural products, and it is
the then Commerce Department that determines what the
preliminary antidumping duty rate is going to be. And in many
instances, as I think you know, it has turned out that when
there is a final order, the antidumping duty rate is much
higher than the Commerce Department originally set.
So that means that the bonds, the Custom bonds, that were
to secure the payment of the antidumping and/or countervailing
duties in many instances were not adequate.
Secondly, the Chinese companies in many instances have
essentially not come in and defended the antidumping charges.
And therefore, that has resulted in punitive antidumping duties
being levied at a much higher rate.
The second factor is that once the antidumping duty final
order is entered by the Commerce Department, we have found that
the companies that were in China that were shipping the garlic,
the mushrooms, or the other agriculture products, those
companies simply fade into the woodwork and new companies
appear. So they are changing, essentially, new shippers. And
under the Commerce Department rules, unless you can show that
the new shipping company is, in fact, an alter ego of, owned or
controlled by the shipping companies that are subject to the
antidumping duty, they are not viewed as having to pay the
antidumping duty.
And the third thing, unbelievably, is that for the
inability to collect this $130 million more or less that you
have talked about is the fact that surety companies that have
been approved by Treasury Department, a number of them,
including one large one in Los Angeles, have essentially
defaulted. In other words, they were standing behind bonding
these shipments. And they are not in a position to pay.
So the long and short of it is, we clearly need to do
better. We are engaged with the Commerce Department to address
those two issues, and with the Treasury Department to address
the issue of the adequacy of the surety, to have a better
chance of recovering more of the antidumping duties.
That said, by the way, I still think, given the system, no
matter how hard we try to approach this issue, it is very
difficult for me to sit here and say that we are going to be
able to collect 100 percent of anti-dumping duties that are
ultimately assessed in final orders by the Commerce Department.
We are going to do our best, and we are doing our best to do
that.
WHY IS CHINA MORE OF A PROBLEM?
Senator Byrd. Why does the problem seem to involve more
imports from China than from any other country?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, I mean in one sense,
leaving aside Canada, more goods are imported from China than
any other country of the world to the United States. China went
into second place behind Canada in terms of volume of imports
into the United States last year, according to Customs and
Border Protection data. It surpassed Mexico, which had
surpassed Japan. So more of our imports are coming from China.
Secondly, we are concerned from an enforcement point of
view that, particularly in this area that you are describing,
at least some companies, particularly with agriculture
products--and we have also seen illegal trans-shipments of
textiles and that sort of thing through essentially other
countries from China. We are concerned that it probably is the
number one enforcement issues for both antidumping duties and
for evasion of U.S. trade laws that relate to textiles.
But part of it is, they are a major exporter. And part of
it is that we need to enforce the antidumping duty laws, which
ultimately under the Byrd amendment result in funds to the
injured U.S. industry. So we are committed to working on this.
And we clearly have some work to do to make sure that our rate
of recovery is higher than it is right now of the antidumping
duties.
Senator Byrd. All right. I hope that you will carry out
that commitment vigorously.
Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
INTEGRATED FINGERPRINT DATA BASES
Senator Byrd. I have one final question now, Mr. Chairman.
During our March 9 hearing with Secretary Hutchinson, the
issue of integrating fingerprint databases was raised by
subcommittee members of both parties. The ability of illegal
aliens and criminals to slip through our inspection and
investigation webs and do harm to U.S. citizens has been amply
documented. It is of the greatest concern to me and should be
one of the department's primary goals.
At one point, Secretary Hutchinson stated that the
fingerprint databases would be integrated by the end of the
year. At another point, he said that the department would find
the necessary $4 million or so to ensure that border patrol
agents had access to this information at all of the sites.
I want to make sure that what he said would be done can
actually be done. Earlier this year, the Department of
Justice's Inspector General said it would take several years to
achieve the goal of fully integrating the Justice Department's
two-fingerprint system, known as the Automated Biometric
Identification System, or IDENT, with the FBI's IAFIS
fingerprint database. But, Secretary Hutchinson said that it
was a priority and would be done in a matter of months.
Now who is right?
Mr. Bonner. Well, I think Under Secretary Hutchinson is
right here, if I understand what the issue is. And I believe
the issue is whether and how long it will take us to integrate
the IDENT and IAFIS system for at least our front line, which
is our border line, and at least at some of our ports of entry
for inspectors. And in that regard, Senator Byrd, there is an
integrated system that essentially permits the integration of
both IDENT and IAFIS. And that system allows, for example, at a
Border Patrol station, allows the ten prints that are taken to
be run against both the IDENT and the IAFIS system.
The IAFIS, of course, as you know, is the FBI's master
criminal fingerprint system in Clarksburg, West Virginia. And
also at the same time run against the IDENT database. So the
question is a deployment issue for CBP. And I am not talking
about State and local law enforcement here. I am just talking
about Customs and Border Protection.
And I believe right now, we have deployed some of these
integrated systems to Border Patrol stations. We have deployed
about 96 integrated systems to 31 border patrol stations. The
plan is to deploy 255 of these integrated systems, which would
be to all of the Border Patrol stations by the end of the year.
Now that might not be this fiscal year but it may be the end of
the calendar year.
And then secondly, we have had IAFIS systems at 48 of the
major ports of entry. Of those 48, 27 can do both, run against
the IDENT and the IAFIS system. And we plan to have the
integrated system, if you will, at all 48 of those ports also
by the end of the year. So we do have an integrated system.
Now the only thing I can tell you about the Justice
Department, is that it may be that for purposes of State and
local law enforcement having the capability of running prints
through both IAFIS and IDENT, it may be that that is going to
take longer. I do not know the answer to that. But perhaps that
is going to take several years.
But I know for CBP, which is the front line agency of the
U.S. Government at our borders, we are making excellent
progress in terms of rolling out that integrated system. With
the right procedures in place, it will give you a better means
of protecting against criminal aliens being able to get into
the United States.
Senator Byrd. I fully support the statement of the IG and
the Justice Department when he states as follows, ``This
integration is critical to identifying illegally entering
aliens on lookout lists or with criminal histories. But
progress has been slow.''
Mr. Chairman, I raised my concerns with Secretary Ridge
about fingerprint database integration in relation to his plan
for deploying the US VISIT system. I cannot stress enough the
importance of moving forward on this effort as expeditiously as
possible. The lives of our citizens are at stake.
The FBI tells us that the Hutchinson proposal does not
provide access for State and locals. This is a weakness that
must be met.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Thank you, all of our witnesses, for your cooperation with
our subcommittee. As you know, written questions may be
submitted to you for the record. And we ask you respond to them
within a reasonable time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
arizona border control initiative
Question. Under Secretary Hutchinson recently announced the Arizona
Border Control Initiative. The announcement mentioned 260 Border Patrol
agents, assigning 4 additional helicopters, $1 million for new sensor
technology, $2 million to house additional apprehended illegal aliens,
and other unspecified resources for detention. How are CBP and ICE
paying for the Arizona Border Control Initiative?
Answer. CBP has identified funding within the fiscal year 2004
appropriations for the placement of the 260 agents, new sensors
technology and the additional helicopters for the initiative. ICE is
funding its efforts associated with the Arizona Border Control
Initiative from within its fiscal year 2004 appropriations.
Question. Where are the funds coming from to pay for the permanent
transfer of 200 border patrol agents?
Answer. CBP and the Border Patrol will request approval of the
appropriations committees to use supplemental funds which remain
unspent after the completion of the relocation of the 400 agents to the
northern border in fiscal year 2004. CBP has met the mandate to triple
the number of agents on the northern border. Approximately $2.5 million
is required to move the 200 agents into the Arizona border area.
Question. What impact will these actions have on initiatives funded
by the fiscal year 2004 Appropriations Act and on base programs and
staffing needs?
Answer. The Arizona Border Control Initiative is a high priority
border enforcement operation to control illegal entry in these areas.
The impact of ABC on lower priority base programs will be minimal and
no changes in current border operations are anticipated. In addition,
there will be little or no staffing impacts along the other border
sectors due to the Arizona Border Control Initiative other than the
relocation of the 200 agents.
Question. Which border patrol sectors are losing agents and
helicopters to Tucson?
Answer. Four helicopters were transferred to Tucson from the San
Diego Sector. The transfer of 200 agents is pending receipt of a
selection list of qualified applicants. Applicants will in all
likelihood come from across the entire United States.
Question. Will this initiative need to be pulled back in light of
the funding problems within CBP and ICE which have initiated a hiring
freeze and other actions to slow down or stop spending? If not, why?
Answer. Securing our Nation's borders is a top priority of CBP. The
current emphasis of our enforcement strategy is gaining control of the
illegal traffic entering through the State of Arizona. It is
anticipated the ABC Initiative will continue as planned. This
initiative will not be affected by the temporary suspension of hiring
or by other steps being undertaken to address the budget issues to
which you refer. This initiative is a high-priority for the Department,
CBP, and ICE.
OVERSEAS STAFFING
Question. CIS, CBP and ICE each have overseas responsibilities,
some inherited from legacy agencies and some stemming from new
initiatives. The President's budget requests increased resources for
overseas staffing for CBP and ICE, while CIS has plans for a formal
Refugee Corps overseas. How will your organizations cooperate overseas?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary is conducting a detailed review
of the role of DHS overseas, including the management structure that
best advances the full range of the international liaison, enforcement,
inspection and services missions of the Department.
Question. Will each organization have separate overseas management
structures? If not, how will these resources be managed?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary is conducting a detailed review
of the role of DHS overseas, including the management structure that
best advances the full range of the international liaison, enforcement,
inspection and services missions of the Department.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)
BACKLOG REDUCTION PLAN
Question. What is the current size of the application backlog?
Answer. Information on the current backlog and USCIS plans to
eliminate it will be provided to Congress in the coming months in a
revised Backlog Elimination Plan.
Question. How does CIS define and determine the size of the backlog
of applications?
Answer. In developing the revised Backlog Elimination Plan, USCIS
is reviewing how it defines and thus quantifies the backlog.
Information on the current backlog and USCIS plans to eliminate it will
be provided to Congress in the coming months in a revised Backlog
Elimination Plan.
Question. What impact is the reduction in fee receipts currently
being experienced by CIS having on your ability to reduce the
application processing backlog? Answer. While it is true that overall
fee revenues are lower so far this fiscal year, this is due to a
decrease in new applications received. Thus, even though fee revenue
thus far this year is lower, it is important to note that workload is
lower, too--thus enabling us to better focus on backlog cases.
Question. Last week the Department announced the settlement of the
Catholic Social Services and Newman Legalization cases. What is the
estimate of the potential number of applications that will be filed as
a result of these settlements, and will those applications have any
impact on CIS's ability to reduce the backlog?
Answer. There is no way of predicting exactly how many people will
be able to apply during this new application period. However, many of
the possibly impacted individuals were also eligible to apply for two
previous programs set up by the legacy INS--the Questionnaire Program
and the LIFE Legalization program.
It is expected that many applicants who may be eligible to apply
for this new proposed settlement program did actually apply under the
other programs and may have applications already being processed.
So, since the total number who applied under those two programs
COMBINED is approximately 70,000--there is a good possibility that the
number of applicants who come forward with this latest program will be
less than 70,000.
GUEST WORKER PROGRAM
Question. While it is difficult to answer this question so early in
the process: how long do you anticipate it will take CIS to have a
Guest Worker program up and running after legislation is passed and
signed into law?
Answer. You are correct. It is difficult to answer this question.
The complexity of the final legislation that Congress passes will, in
turn, determine the complexity of implementing the program and any
subsequent regulations and field guidance that will need to be written
to support the plan. However, the key to processing temporary worker
petitions quickly and efficiently will be simplicity in the design of
the legislation.
Question. What impact will the addition of a Guest Worker Program
have on CIS's ability to reduce the application backlog? Answer. We
will meet the President's backlog reduction goals by 2006. As stated
above, the key to processing temporary worker petitions quickly and
efficiently is simplicity in the design. Based upon the legislation
that Congress passes, we will use fees to support applicant processing
and documentation.
REFUGEE SERVICES
Question. Since fiscal year 2001, we have seen a dramatic decrease
in the number of refugee admissions. In fiscal year 2001, the U.S.
Government admitted over 69,000 refugees from around the world, while
last fiscal year, only 28,000 refugees were admitted to the United
States. The ceiling was 70,000 admissions for fiscal year 2003. It is
very important that we ensure that the employees involved with Refugee
screening are kept safe, and that we are diligently screening those
refugees that are eligible for admission. What is CIS doing to ensure
that all qualified refugees are being screened and admitted to the
United States?
Answer. USCIS is committed to steadfast resettlement of refugees in
need. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 prompted significant
and more time-consuming changes in U.S. Refugee Program (USRP)
processing procedures. Increased attention is now being given to more
carefully screening applicants and more closely scrutinizing overseas
refugee processing sites to ensure the safety and security of our
officers. These procedural changes have enhanced the U.S. Government's
ability to prevent terrorists and other undesirable persons from using
the USRP to gain entry into the United States. However, they have also
slowed the pace of overseas processing and, in turn, contributed to the
reduction in refugee admissions. To address this, the USCIS is working
to improve and streamline refugee screening, security checks and
interview methods. USCIS is also working with the other implementing
partners to expand access to the USRP by identifying new groups
eligible for resettlement consideration. Consequently, from a low point
of 27,113 total admissions in fiscal year 2002, the Department of State
projects that admissions in fiscal year 2004 will significantly surpass
this figure.
Finally, USCIS has recently received resources through the revised
fee schedule to establish a Refugee Corps in fiscal year 2004. This
cadre of refugee-dedicated adjudicators will divide their time between
Headquarters and the various overseas processing sites. This will
result in a stronger and more effective overseas refugee-processing
program without compromising the USRP's humanitarian objectives. A
Refugee Corps will also help ensure more timely and satisfactory DHS
responsiveness to USRP commitments and admissions goals.
Question. The submitted testimony for CIS mentioned plans for the
formal establishment of a Refugee Corps. Please explain when you plan
to have this accomplished, what the expected annual costs will be, how
many people will be assigned to this Corps, and what goals and
objectives the program will have.
Answer. The establishment of a dedicated refugee corps is funded
through the recently announced fee adjustments. These fee adjustments
took effect on April 30, 2004. Implementation of the refugee corps will
take place shortly thereafter. This new structural and functional
arrangement will greatly improve the quality of refugee adjudications
and oversight, provide cost-effective immigration services, and
significantly improve the Nation's ability to secure our borders
without compromising humanitarian objectives. USCIS anticipates fee
revenues will fund 109 positions at an annual cost of $18.5 million.
Question. How will the Refugee Corps work with the ICE's Overseas
Visa Security Units and U.S. Consulates?
Answer. The refugee-dedicated resources of the Refugee Corps, as
supported and deployed by USCIS will work closely with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) overseas offices and U.S. Consulates on a
variety of refugee application fraud and security matters. For example,
the overseas ICE offices will assist deployed Refugee Corps
adjudicators in developing and implementing various refugee fraud
detection and deterrence methods. While at overseas refugee processing
locations, the Refugee Corps will, in turn, refer emergent fraudulent
refugee cases and cases having national security interest to ICE for
advice and possible investigation, as appropriate. The Corps will also
coordinate security check results such as Consular Lookout and Support
System (CLASS) and Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs) with ICE offices
and U.S. Consulates, as needed; and engage in mutual information-
sharing regarding refugee applicant civil registry documents and other
documentation to insure their validity and legality. Finally, the
Refugee Corps will work with ICE overseas offices and other U.S.
Embassy components to investigate and approve overseas refugee
processing sites thereby helping ensure the safety, security and health
of Refugee Corps adjudicators.
BENEFIT FRAUD
Question. The President's Budget proposes to replace the funds
provided to ICE for benefit fraud from the Examinations Fee Account,
with appropriated dollars. What resources does CIS plan to devote to
benefit fraud in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. USCIS is currently reviewing all of its business processes
as a part of the revised backlog elimination plan. Therefore, the
funding to support benefit fraud responsibilities in 2005 is under
review.
Question. What will CIS use the $25 million in Examinations Fee
Account funds for that it will retain in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. USCIS is currently reviewing all of its business processes
as a part of the revised backlog elimination plan. Therefore, the
funding to support benefit fraud responsibilities in 2005 is under
review.
Question. How many benefit fraud cases were investigated and
prosecuted in each of fiscal years 1998-2003? How many defendants were
involved in each of the cases in each year?
Answer: Statistical Response:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases
Fiscal year -------------------------------- Principals Aliens Defendants
Opened Completed Involved Involved Prosecuted
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003............................ 2,522 2,031 932 1,885 213
2002............................ 1,932 1,919 258 383 994
2001............................ 2,613 2,662 655 927 185
2000............................ 3,140 2,965 532 3,009 189
1999............................ 5,315 3,648 706 1,705 252
1998............................ 4,311 3,802 639 944 283
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The table above reflects the best available benefit fraud
statistics historically collected by the former INS. Some of the
statistics reflecting closed cases relate to cases opened in a previous
year.
Question. Of the applications that you receive annually, what is
the total estimated size of the fraud problem, by type of fraud?
Answer. GAO's January 2002 report on immigration benefit fraud
States that, ``Although the extent of the benefit fraud problem is not
known, internal and external reports indicate that the problem is
pervasive and significant.'' There is no current estimate of the fraud
problem.
CITIZENSHIP
Question. Please give the Committee a fuller understanding of why
today there is not uniformity across the country in the administration
of the current citizenship test.
Answer. The lack of uniformity actually dates back to 1790, when
the first Congress entrusted naturalization to the courts and let them
prescribe their own rules. From 1926-1990, the courts and INS shared
responsibility for naturalization processing. In 1936, INS directed
examiners to use uniform procedures and to determine applicants'
character and attitude towards the United States rather than testing
ability to memorize facts and phrases. The Immigration Act of 1990 gave
INS full responsibility for naturalization adjudication.
In 2000, INS issued a policy memorandum to its field offices to
standardize certain aspects of the testing process, such as which
sources officers should use when selecting test questions, the length
of the test, and passing scores. In 2001, INS awarded a contract to a
testing development company to assist it in the overall redesign of the
testing process. This project includes defining appropriate assessment
content and standards for the speaking, reading, writing, and U.S.
history and government tests; and developing a revised test process,
including test specifications/item content, item formats, equivalent
forms, appropriate delivery systems, scoring rules, and administration
procedures. It's important to not rush standardization at the expense
of creating a reliable, valid and fair test.
We are moving forward on all of these related goals. We completed a
pilot test of revised English test items (reading, writing and
speaking) in 2003. This year, we plan to finalize revised U.S. history
and government content; conduct studies including test format, and test
administration mode; and begin a pilot test of the complete revised
English, U.S. history and government test. We also have asked the
National Academies of Science to provide us with advice concerning the
reliability, validity and fairness of the proposed changes to the test.
These steps are all vital to ensuring that our revised test will meet
these requirements.
Question. Please provide a more detailed explanation of what the
Office of Citizenship is working on.
Answer. Established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the
Office of Citizenship is responsible for promoting public awareness of
the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Specifically, the
mandate of this office is to promote civic integration of immigrants
through training and development of educational materials.
The Office of Citizenship is targeting immigrants at two critical
points on their journey toward citizenship: upon arrival in the United
States and as they begin the formal naturalization process. The office
is in the process of developing a ``New Immigrant Orientation Guide''
which will be presented to the approximately one million immigrants
welcomed to permanent residence every year. In addition to the guide,
and in close coordination with community and faith-based based
organizations, the office will also host new immigrant orientation
sessions in communities across the country.
In the citizenship preparation arena, the office will develop new
educational materials that include study and teacher guides that
promote a deeper understanding of American history and civics. The
American history and civics content will be closely coordinated with
the Department of Education and the ``We the People'' initiative of the
National Endowment for the Humanities.
Our office is currently conducting focus groups in key cities
across the country in order to proactively identify the strengths and
gaps associated with their immigrant integration and citizenship
preparation initiatives. Finally, we plan to publish a report of our
findings in September when we host our first national civic integration
conference on the theme ``Celebrate Citizenship, Celebrate America.''
Question. How many people do you plan to have on the staff of the
Office of Citizenship? Will they all be located in DC or placed around
the country?
Answer. The Office of Citizenship is currently staffed by the Chief
of the Office, two Deputy Chiefs responsible for Program Development
and Outreach; eight senior Policy Analysts and Outreach Specialists
working in its DC Headquarters; and 18 Community Liaison Officers in
the following regional and field offices: Arlington, Atlanta,
Burlington, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles,
Laguna Niguel, Miami, New Orleans, New York, Phoenix, Portland, San
Antonio, San Diego and San Francisco.
Question. Will the Office of Citizenship work with organizations
outside of the Department to carry out its mission?
Answer. In order to fully realize its mandate, the Office of
Citizenship will work in partnership with Federal, State and local
agencies, community and faith-based groups and private organizations
that share an interest in civic engagement and involvement. Community
Liaison Officers in regional and field offices are primarily
responsible for establishing this important outreach portfolio and have
conducted hundreds of community meetings and forums in an effort to
build robust coalitions and long-term commitments around civic
integration initiatives. We are currently researching statutory and
legislative authorities to enhance our ability to partner with the
private sector.
ON-LINE FILING OF APPLICATIONS
Question. When is the next expansion of the on-line filing of
benefit applications planned?
Answer. The next group of forms that will be automated for on-line
filing is scheduled to complete testing on April 30, 2004 and is
planned to be available to the public during the first week of May
2004.
Question. Which applications do you plan to add next?
Answer. The group of forms that is planned to be available to the
public by the first week of May 2004 are:
Form I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker
Form I-131, Application for Travel Document
Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker
Form I-539, Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant Status
Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status
Form I-907, Request for Premium Processing
Question. What impact has on-line filing of applications had on the
processing time of applications?
Answer. Because receiving the data comprises only a small part of
the adjudicative process and e-filing is still in its infancy at USCIS,
e-filing has not yet resulted in significant processing time savings.
Results will improve as e-filing opportunities are expanded, processes
are changed to maximize the benefits of e-filing, and USCIS develops an
IT infrastructure capable of moving complete files electronically. At
present, e-filing is a customer service initiative with potential for
significant efficiency gains.
Question. Has on-line filing helped you to reduce the backlog of
applications?
Answer. As indicated above, e-filing, at this time, is primarily a
customer service initiative that provides our applicants with an
alternative to filing by mail or filing in person. It allows customers
to pay their fee on-line via credit card or transfer of funds; and
provides the applicant with instant evidence of their filing.
Electronic filing does not decrease the amount of effort or time
necessary to review an application or render a decision. In the future,
e-filing will be both a customer service program, as well as an
efficiency program when USCIS deploys an IT infrastructure capable of
moving complete files electronically.
RELATIONSHIP WITH IMMIGRATION OMBUDSMAN
Question. In July of 2003, Secretary Tom Ridge appointed Prakash I.
Khatri to serve as the first Citizenship and Immigration Services
Ombudsman for the Department of Homeland Security. What is the working
relationship between CIS and the Ombudsman's office?
Answer. The Director of USCIS meets periodically in common cause
with the Ombudsman to discuss issues, his recommendations, and their
feasibility. The Director established an Office of Customer Management
Relations (OCRM) led by a career senior executive who reports directly
to the Director, to provide counsel, access to USCIS operations,
facilitate the sharing of information, and coordinate responses to
issues raised by the Ombudsman's Office.
In addition, numerous field visits have been arranged for the
Ombudsman in gaining knowledge of operational challenges and in
collecting ideas from field staff. A collegial relationship is ongoing
between the two Offices.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
CONTAINER SECURITY
Question. What achievements has the Department made in increasing
cargo security? When will the new three-pronged strategy be completely
implemented?
Answer. The Department has made significant strides in improving
cargo security through programs such as the Container Security
Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), Free and Secure Trade (FAST), the National Targeting Center, the
deployment of non-intrusive inspection technology and radiological
detection cargo screening technology at our ports of entry. In
addition, implementation of the 24-hour rule for the transmission of
cargo manifests has all contributed to improved security in the cargo
environment.
Implementation of the three pronged strategy: pushing our borders
outward; advanced targeting and analysis of cargo and passengers before
arrival at our borders; and intensive inspection of cargo and
passengers at our borders is a process. Implementation of this process
continues through the fiscal year 2005 President's initiatives for the
Container Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism, Systems for Targeting, and Radiation and Nuclear Screening
Technology. Initiatives like these can be expected in the future in
accord with the level of threat.
Question. The budget requests over $105 million in enhancements to
improve the ability of inspectors to target, inspect, and screen
passengers and cargo at land, air, and sea ports. Having radiation
monitors and increasing our ability to use computers to target and
screen cargo and passengers is critical. Are there a sufficient number
of inspectors on the front lines to handle physical inspections of
cargo and passengers?
Answer. With the additional resources provided for in the fiscal
year 2002 Emergency Supplemental, the fiscal year 2003 appropriation
and Wartime Supplemental, and the fiscal year 2004 appropriation, as
well as the joining of the three agencies to form CBP, we believe we
have adequate staffing to handle physical inspections of current levels
of cargo and passengers.
Question. Are there any plans to extend a Container Security
Initiative-like project to bulk and break-bulk shipments?
Answer. At this time, CBP is not planning to extend a CSI-like
project to prescreen bulk and break-bulk shipments. CBP will continue
to collaborate with the U.S. Coast Guard on vessels of interest and
certain dangerous cargos at both a national and field level, and
conduct joint boardings when warranted.
CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM
Question. The budget requests an additional $15 million to expand
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). These new
resources will allow Customs and Border Protection to increase the
validation process within C-TPAT. According to the submitted testimony,
221 validations have been completed on 2,926 certified partners. How
many more validations will CBP be able to complete each year with the
new resources?
Answer. To date, over 700 validations have been initiated with over
240 completed. Our goal for the current calendar year is to have
completed a total of 400 validations. C-TPAT will continue to increase
the number of validations performed for calendar year 2005. The
increase will be guided by several factors including but not limited to
membership levels, number of supply chain specialists on board, and
threat level.
Question. How often does CBP plan to validate each of the
participants in the program?
Answer. A C-TPAT participant is selected for validation based on
risk management principles. Validations may be initiated based on
import volume, security related anomalies, strategic threat posed by
geographic regions, participation in expedited release programs, a
relative sampling of industry sectors (e.g. carriers, brokers,
forwarders, importers), and/or other risk related information.
Alternatively, a validation may be performed as a matter of routine
program oversight.
Question. None of the 188 initiated validations have been on any of
the 45 certified foreign manufacturers enrolled. When does CBP plan to
begin reviewing foreign manufacturers?
Answer. Foreign manufacturers will be included in the next group of
C-TPAT validations to be initiated in calendar year 2004.
Question. What performance measures have been developed to gauge
the success of the C-TPAT program?
Answer. Internal measures include program marketing and acceptance,
which is measured by the number of C-TPAT partners enrolled and
certified by CBP. The impact of enrollment is measured by identifying
the percentage of trade controlled by those C-TPAT companies. Another
internal measure is examination risk management, which involves
quantifying and measuring the impact C-TPAT has on cargo inspections
performed on ``known risk'' C-TPAT partners, compared to shipments
where the risk is unknown or targeted as high.
External measures include the C-TPAT validation process, which is
used to verify the participant's supply chain security processes. C-
TPAT Supply Chain Specialists identify strengths and weaknesses found
during the validation and recommend action items in the validation
report. The results of all validations are captured to measure the
overall performance of validated companies.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Question. The President's budget includes a request for $10 million
to develop, procure, deploy, and operate a system of unmanned aerial
vehicles to support the Border Patrol and other components of Customs
and Border Protection. According to the information we have been given
regarding the Arizona Border Control Initiative, this project will
begin in June with funding from the Science and Technology Directorate.
Are any of CBP's direct funds going to support this effort this fiscal
year?
Answer. No. All funding supplied for this effort has been provided
by the DHS Office of Science and Technology.
Question. Both the Coast Guard and the Air and Marine program
within ICE have tested the concept of using unmanned aerial vehicles in
their operations. Will CBP be working cooperatively with these
organizations during fiscal year 2005 on this test?
Answer. BTS and the Science and Technology Directorate co-chair the
DHS UAV Working Group which meets regularly and consists of BTS
component and U.S. Coast Guard managers responsible for aviation
assets. The working group provides a forum for collaboration and with
the DHS UAV Executive Steering Committee it will ensure that the needs
of CBP, ICE, TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard are addressed and deployments
and concepts of operations are coordinated within the DHS.
Question. What are the long-range plans for the use of UAVs along
the land border? Will this be a joint program with ICE's Air and Marine
Office?
Answer. DHS is exploring new technology to meet aerial border
security mission requirements. UAVs hold promise in some applications.
This mission will be supported through a variety of systems. Sensors
such as TARS, UAVs, rotary and fixed wing aircraft, and ground-based
equipment and personnel to operate and maintain these systems must be
coordinated by DHS and Department of Defense components, and aligned
against the highest critical vulnerabilities and threats. ICE AMO is an
integral part of the team that is developing and fielding this
capability.
SENSOR AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
Question. Staff from CBP have informed us that they are currently
working on a complete review of the sensor and surveillance technology
currently deployed between the land ports of entry and are developing
the project plan for the $64 million requested for this effort for
fiscal year 2005. When will the plan for the fiscal year 2005 resources
for Sensor and Surveillance Technology be made available to the
Committee?
Answer. The appropriations staff will receive a comprehensive
briefing on our plans for this system and its operational goals that
reflect the new anti-terrorism mission in the near future.
Question. When can we expect to have all of the Northern and
Southern border comprehensively covered by these systems? In fiscal
year 2006, or beyond that?
Answer. The appropriations staff will receive a comprehensive
briefing on our plans for this system and its operational goals that
reflect the new anti-terrorism mission in the near future.
Question. What is the total cost of finishing the installation of
all sensor technology?
Answer. At this time we are formulating a new strategic plan based
on the new anti-terrorism priority. More comprehensive information on
future program direction and requirements will be provided in the near
future.
Question. The request for enhanced surveillance technology in this
budget does not include any resources for additional law enforcement
communications assistants. If the number of remote video surveillance
systems is increasing, won't there be a need for more personnel to
monitor the cameras?
Answer. The ISIS program does not anticipate a need for additional
law enforcement communications assistants; we expect that the
successful integration of proven technologies will provide this real-
time intelligence directly to the agents in the field. This will reduce
the need for law enforcement communications assistants to process this
information.
AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Question. CBP has been working on modernizing the information
technology systems that it uses for some time. The most significant
project is the Automated Commercial Environment, known as ACE. CBP has
been working closely to resolve problems with the prime integrator on
ACE for the last year. Is the project back on track?
Will the project be completed on time, or does the overall project
timeline need to be revised and extended?
Is the project maintaining its projected budget? Is the project
continuing to experience cost overruns?
Answer. CBP continues to aggressively work to put ACE capabilities
to work on America's borders. The first deployment of ACE, completed in
the winter 2003, focused on the technical infrastructure. It provided
the foundation for a secure, reliable, high-speed access to critical
CBP information. The second release of ACE, deployed in summer 2003,
included an Enterprise Web portal that provides CBP Account Managers
and selected importers controlled access to information such as the
account's trade activity, and facilitates collaboration and
communication among the various groups.
Subsequent ACE capabilities will be fielded between June 2004 and
the end of ACE development, which includes; Periodic Payment (Release
3), e-Manifest Trucks (Release 4), ACE Selectivity Releases, End-to-End
e-Processing (Release 6), and ACE Wrap-Up (Release 7).
During the past year, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has worked
very closely with the e-Customs Partnership (eCP) to address
performance issues. This includes extensive analysis of the program to
incorporate process, planning, and organizational enhancements to help
contain costs and minimize schedule delays. The CBP efforts have also
included frequent meetings and dialogue with senior executives from
IBM, the leading eCP partner, to reinforce CBP high standards and
expectations. The response from IBM leadership has been positive, and
they have clearly indicated their commitment to the Automated
Commercial Environment (ACE) project. Meetings with IBM executives
continue monthly.
Based on intensified CBP oversight, the current estimated cost
variance for ACE is within 10 percent of the program baseline. Based on
benchmarks for similarly complex programs, the program variances are
within expected boundaries. The CBP continues to conduct cost
containment activities and have made great strides in improving our
ability to better forecast variances through Earned Value Management.
We have incorporated lessons learned into ACE development, including
improving the requirements definition process, and conducting more
comprehensive system development gate reviews based on refined
criteria.
Though CBP is developing schedule scenarios that result in ACE
completion dates ranging from 2009 to 2012, no formal change has been
made to the project schedule. A revised project schedule will be
published in the June 2004 update of the ACE Program Plan and in the
fiscal year 2006 OMB Exhibit 300 for ACE after the results of the
ongoing Global Business Blueprint (defining future CBP business
processes and the technology requirements) are known.
AGRICULTURAL INSPECTIONS
Question. How has CBP's ``Officer for the Future'' Plan been
developed to include additional training for the Agriculture Quarantine
Inspection function?
Answer. Consistent with the Homeland Security Act and subsequent
Memorandum of Agreement between USDA and DHS, it was agreed by both DHS
and USDA that USDA would supervise and provide educational support and
systems to ensure that DHS employees receive the training necessary to
carry out the USDA functions transferred to DHS. As a result, USDA has
linked with DHS in defining training module content specific to the
agriculture quarantine inspection mission. More specifically:
--The new hire CBP Officer will receive 12 hours of instruction in a
course titled Threat to Agriculture covering agriculture
fundamentals during the basic academy. This course is taught by
USDA instructors and covers: the importance of U.S.
agriculture; the impact of introduced pests; the agriculture
mission; statutory authorities; agricultural bioterrorism;
safeguarding; and agriculture secondary inspection referrals.
This training is mandatory.
--Current CBP Inspectors will receive a CD-ROM version of the same
course, titled Agriculture Fundamentals, covering the same
material. This training is mandatory for CBP Inspectors and
when issued to the field, will be completed within 120 days.
--A second component of mandatory agriculture quarantine inspection
training, titled Agriculture Procedures, will be developed over
the next few months by USDA and DHS. This mandatory course will
be taken by both the new hire CBP Officer and current CBP
Inspectors. USDA will direct course content and course delivery
will be conducted by DHS.
Question. What specific actions are being taken to train Customs
and Border Protection officers to detect potential illegal contraband
that may pose a risk of introducing a foreign animal disease into the
United States? Do you believe that this training is sufficient to
inform officers about the threats and potential damage, economic and
otherwise, to a huge sector of the U.S. economy that foreign animal
diseases pose?
Answer. All new hire CBP Officers are required to receive the USDA-
instructed course, Threats to Agriculture, while at the CBP Academy.
Current CBP Inspectors are required to take the same course, in a CD-
ROM format. The course was designed by USDA and includes an overview of
foreign animal diseases, including vectors, fomites, and impacts of the
diseases. The next phase of training, yet to be developed by USDA and
DHS, is the Agriculture Procedures course, which will provide more
specific training in the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection arena,
including additional training on foreign animal diseases.
Question. How many CBP Officers have completed the 12 to 16 hours
of Agriculture Quarantine Inspection training required to be a fully
certified CBP officer?
Answer. The number of hours of required (mandatory) training for
the CBP Officers is still not determined as the second component of
training, Agriculture Procedures, is not yet developed. The new hire
CBP Officers receive a total of 12 hours of training conducted by USDA
at the CBP Academy during their basic training. Current CBP Inspectors
will receive the same course as the new hire, but it will be delivered
in an electronic, CD-ROM format. All CBP Inspectors will be required to
take this course within 120 days of field delivery. The intent of this
training is to have the CBP non-agriculture workforce begin their
agriculture curricula from the same starting point. From October 2003
through April 13, 2004, a total of 823 CBP Officers have completed the
12-hour portion at the CBP Academy.
Question. What is the status of the former U.S. Department of
Agriculture Inspectors that were transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security in the middle of last year?
Answer. The former USDA Agriculture Inspectors have been placed
into a newly defined position description, the CBP Agriculture
Specialist. This position is in the 401 series with a full performance
level at the GS-11 level. The full performance level for the PPQ
Officer was a GS-9. The new duties incorporated in that position
description include:
--serving as an expert and technical consultant in the areas of
inspection, intelligence, analysis, examination, and law
enforcement activities related to the importation of
agricultural/commercial commodities and conveyances;
--applying a wide range of laws and regulations determining the
admissibility of agriculture commodities while preventing the
introduction of harmful pests, diseases, and potential agro-
terrorism into the United States;
--participating in special enforcement, targeting, or analysis teams
charged with collecting and analyzing information and
identifying high-risk targets;
--conducting visual and physical inspections of cargo, conveyances,
or passenger baggage;
--planning, conducting, and supervising remedial actions;
--participating in pre-arrival risk analysis; and
--serving as a training officer.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
Question. Please provide a chart with the total resources, FTE and
dollars, devoted to worksite enforcement for each of fiscal years 1998-
2003.
Answer. The worksite enforcement budget has always been part of the
base budget and has not been separately tracked. The FTE are provided
in the chart below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FTE Source: PAS................. 278 202 134 152 105
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VISA SECURITY UNIT
Question. The President's budget requests an increase of $10
million to support the Visa Security Unit. According to the budget,
this unit was established in fiscal year 2003, but is receiving its
current year funding from outside of ICE. Where is the funding for the
Visa Security Unit coming from for fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The Visa Security Program for fiscal year 2004 was an
unfunded mandate and ICE resources were used for the current TDY
deployment to Saudi Arabia of Visa Security Officers. The BTS
Directorate will be seeking reprogramming authority to address funding
requirements for sustainment of the Saudi deployment and expansion to
four other countries in fiscal year 2004. Financial support for this
Presidential priority will be from ICE and CBP operational funding.
Question. How many personnel have been hired for this program to
date?
Answer. No staff have been hired for this program to date. The
program has been operating with detailees at headquarters and in Saudi
Arabia.
Question. What is the expected staffing level for end of fiscal
year 2004?
Answer. The Saudi deployment would be 6 officers and ICE
Headquarters would have 10 at the end of fiscal year 2004.
Question. How many of the personnel in this program will be
stationed overseas?
Answer. As of April 30, 2004, there are 4 Visa Security Officers in
Saudi Arabia. New rotations are planned for the departing officers.
Question. What performance measures have been developed to gauge
the success of this program?
Answer. One of the key issues in the development of the Visa
Security Program is assuring that measures can be identified that
properly attribute the added value of DHS in the visa process. Measures
include the following: number of visa applications reviewed by DHS
officers; number referred for investigation and further analysis; and
numbers approved and denied in consultation with the Department of
State.
REDIRECTING THE BASE--OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS
Question. The President's Budget proposes important changes to the
funding of the Office of Investigations within ICE. The budget proposes
to replace $25 million in funding from the Examinations Fee Account
that currently funds benefit fraud with appropriated dollars. The
budget also proposes moving the responsibility for the Institutional
Removal Program from the Office of Investigations to the Detention and
Removals Program, but leaves the base funding within the Office of
Investigations. Why should appropriated dollars replace mandatory
dollars for benefit fraud?
Answer. The appropriated funds are requested for benefit fraud
investigations. The shift will allow the examinations fee to be used
solely for immigration services and provide appropriated resources for
enforcement activities. With respect to the institutional removal
program, the demands for Detention and Removal have increased
substantially and been met by investigators, which has had a negative
impact on the investigation program. The request provides less
expensive and more appropriate personnel resources to the Detention and
Removal Program, while at the same time preserving the original intent
and capacity requirements for the Office of Investigations.
Question. Will this shift increase the total resources devoted to
benefit fraud?
Answer. The approval of $25 million in appropriated funds would not
increase the resources devoted to benefits fraud but simply replace
funds previously provided from the Examinations Fee. These funds
provide the resources for approximately 140 existing ICE positions and
operational expenses. These resources enable ICE to maintain its
investigations of benefit fraud organizations and egregious fraud
violators.
Question. Under the budget proposal, the base funding for the
Institutional Removal Program remains within the Office of
Investigations. What investigative priorities will these resources be
redirected to?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 request is a result of a planned
realignment of the Institutional Removal Program (IRP) from OI to DRO.
Managing and executing the program in one office will prove more
effective and productive than in its current bifurcated state. Special
Agents within OI that will be freed up from IRP work they currently
perform will be able to dedicate much-needed investigative hours to
public safety and national security cases. There are renewed demands
for investigation of non-incarcerated criminal aliens and violent gang
enforcement.
LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER
Question. What are the base resources, FTE and dollars, for the Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC) for fiscal year 2004? What are the
requested resources for the LESC for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. General expense funding for fiscal year 2004 is budgeted at
$1.9 million, which includes $869,000 from the War Supplemental. In
fiscal year 2004, there are 287 positions authorized, of which 9 are
currently vacant. No increases are anticipated for fiscal year 2005.
Question. It is the Committee's understanding that there are
approximately $5 million in facility improvements that are needed at
the LESC. Is this accurate? If, yes please provide the Committee with
an itemized list for the $5 million.
Answer. Due to increased law enforcement inquiry workload and the
projected growth in the NCIC program, the LESC submitted an out-of-
cycle space request for 80,309 additional sq. ft of expanded facility
space at the LESC's present location in January 2002. That request was
subsequently approved and the one-time costs of $3.7 million associated
with expansion were approved and transferred to GSA.
Since the submission of the space request in January 2002, the
LESC's core workload has grown from 240,000 queries to a projected
744,000 queries per year in 2004. Additionally since establishment of
DHS and ICE, the LESC has taken on new, critical law enforcement tasks.
This growth combined with new tasks exceeded the projected growth that
was the basis of the original space request. Additionally, once the
80,000-sq. ft. expansion is completed, the current LESC site would not
allow for any additional facility expansion. The constraints of the
current site would eventually drive the LESC into a multi-site
operation to continue to expand workload and mission. For these and
other reasons, including physical security concerns, it was determined
not to proceed with the 80,000 sq. ft. addition, but instead pursue a
larger, more secure site that would not limit future expansion or the
LESC mission and ability to perform its important law enforcement work.
The $3.7 million transferred to GSA to fund the one-time costs
associated with the addition is on account with GSA for 5 years and can
be used at another LESC site or facility. That amount is in addition to
approximately $1.5 million that was previously on account with GSA for
internal reconfigurations at the current site for a total of
approximately $5.2 million that is available for LESC facility
expansion and improvement.
The LESC has completed necessary improvements at the current site.
Planning for a larger facility that will meet all of the current and
future physical infrastructure needs of the LESC's expanding workload
and mission is ongoing.
DETENTION AND REMOVALS
Question. The budget requests $5 million for additional detention
bedspace. What percentage increase in additional bedspace will this
provide?
Answer. Approximately 150 beds or less than 1 percent of current
bed space.
Question. Given the increased level of resources that the budget
proposes to devote to enforcement, as well as the increased vigilance
that US VISIT allows at ports of entry, are enough resources being put
towards detention?
Answer. DRO is currently funded for approximately 20,000 beds.
Question. Will ICE be working with the U.S. Department of Justice,
Detention Trustee, where appropriate, in the management of the
detention program? Has a Memorandum of Understanding been signed with
the Department of Justice?
Answer. Yes, DRO is working with DOJ, Office of the Federal
Detention Trustee (OFDT) in the management of the detention program. A
memorandum of understanding was signed with the Justice Department on
1/28/2004.
Question. How is the relationship with the Department of Justice
structured? Who will be responsible for procurement and contracting?
Answer. ICE and the OFDT signed an Inter-Agency Agreement on 1/28/
2004. The agreement establishes OFDT as a procurement service provider
to ICE for non-Federal detention requirements. Since establishment of
the agreement, ICE and OFDT have made substantial progress toward fully
implementing the service provider relationship. ICE has identified 5
non-Federal secure detention requirements for procurement action by
OFDT and both entities are cooperating to establish a schedule for the
transition of ICE inter-governmental service agreements and
administration of the non-Federal detention inspection program to OFDT.
FUGITIVE OPERATIONS
Question. The President's budget requests an increase of $50
million to create an additional 30 fugitive operations teams. It is
estimated that each of these teams will be able to apprehend and remove
up to 500 fugitive aliens a year. Of the approximately 400,000
absconders, how are you prioritizing which fugitives you pursue first?
Answer. National Security and criminal cases are the highest
priority, then cases that have a higher probability of removal, and
other non-criminal aliens. There are several initiatives being
implemented to help identify and locate our absconder population. ICE
has implemented an interface between ICE and CBP systems that
identifies fugitives when they return to the United States. Inspectors
will now be alerted when an ``absconder'' is identified at a port of
entry.
DRO entered into an agreement with Citizenship and Immigration
Services whereby DRO is notified when an alien applies for benefits and
is identified as an absconder. In these cases, CIS provides us with the
most current information such as home address.
Question. Based on the information provided in the budget, once
additional fugitive operations teams are fully deployed, ICE will be
able to locate and remove 23,000 aliens a year. Your testimony states
that the national Fugitive Operations program strategy calls for
eliminating the backlog of absconders in 6 years. Removal of 23,000
aliens a year for 6 years does not quite add up to 400,000. How will
ICE accomplish this goal?
Answer. Our strategic plan ``Endgame'' calls for the elimination of
the fugitive backlog within 10 years based on significant increases in
the fugitive program. This will require 300 teams over that time
period.
We are also implementing new initiatives targeting data integrity.
Through data dumps and systems analysis we are removing cases that are
incorrectly identified as fugitives (Self Deport, Benefits granted,
etc.)
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION
Question. What are the results so far of the Alternatives to
Detention program?
Answer. DRO began utilizing alternatives to detention, or community
based programs, in August 2002, with the opening of a community based
residential program for 250 non-criminal females that were previously
held in a local jail in South Florida.
DRO began testing the applicability of electronic monitoring
devices (EMDs) in May 2003 in six Field Offices (Anchorage, Miami,
Detroit, Portland, Seattle, & Chicago). Traditional EMDs have been
utilized with just over 100 illegal aliens as an alternative to secure
detention. Supervision of these cases was initially conducted as a
collateral duty and was found to be very staff intensive. Efforts are
underway to integrate the traditional EMD house arrest program into the
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (see below). Telephonic or
administrative reporting technology has been utilized as an automated
reporting device for just over 500 aliens that are living in the
community on Orders of Supervision. This technology has the potential
to assist DRO in effective case management. A summary report on the use
of these two technologies will be completed after 1 year of the pilot.
Additionally, DRO and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) are
exploring the possibility of utilizing FPS for monitoring of the EMD
program technology, currently being provided through a contract with an
EMD provider.
Pursuant to the Zadvydas v. Davis Supreme Court decision, there are
presently a significant number of Post Order Custody Review (POCR)
cases that are eligible for release, but are in need of rehabilitation
programs for substance abuse, mental health, anger management, sex
offender, etc. In September 2003, as an Alternative to Detention
initiative, a Condition of Release Program for POCR cases was developed
through our existing reimbursement agreement with the Division of
Immigration Health Services (DIHS). Through this Program, DIHS will
review POCR cases, and identify rehabilitative programs. As of March
2004, 53 POCR cases have been forwarded to DIHS for review and program
placement.
DRO recently announced the contract award selection of Behavioral
Interventions, Inc. (BI) of Boulder Colorado for the provision of
community-based supervision of 200 aliens in each of the following
eight Field Offices: Baltimore, Philadelphia, Miami, St. Paul, Denver,
Kansas City, San Francisco, and Portland. The program is designed to
supervise aliens that can be released into the community to ensure
their attendance at Immigration Court hearings and compliance with
Court orders.
The contractor will provide Intensive Supervision Appearance
Programs (ISAP) services for 200 aliens in the initial eight sites
during fiscal year 2005. ICE plans to expand the initial capacity to
400, and to add one additional site with a capacity of 200.
Question. What is necessary, besides just more funding, to see a
larger scale implementation of this alternatives program?
Answer. While community based sanctions has been utilized for over
30 years by the criminal justice system with proven results, there has
been very little application or research on these types of services for
illegal aliens. Staff, program research and development resources are
necessary to determine if these pilot programs would be effective with
illegal aliens and to develop replication models for expansion.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
Question. The budget request for the Federal Air Marshal Program
(FAMS) does not include any funds to provide pay raises, within-grade
increases, or any other adjustments to base in fiscal year 2005. What
resources are necessary to provide the FAMS with the same adjustments
to base as the other components within ICE as well as the Department of
Homeland Security? Please provide an itemized list of the necessary
adjustments to base for the FAMS.
Answer. The FAMS and DHS are working to determine how best to
manage FAMS' resources. FAMS is developing performance-based measures
that will determine the optimal number of Federal air marshals and
resources to provide the necessary aviation security.
Question. What impact will the fiscal year 2005 President's budget
request have on staffing within FAMS as compared to fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The FAMS will adjust its staffing as necessary to meet its
highest priority missions with available resources. In doing so, the
FAMS will consider other enhancements within the aviation security
system.
Question. Previously, there has been a problem with retention of
FAMS. What is the current attrition rate as compared to that in
previous years?
Answer. Since the start of the fiscal year 2004, Federal Air
Marshal attrition has been roughly 9.4 employees per pay period. This
attrition rate is down significantly from the fiscal year 2003 level,
when the Service's attrition averaged approximately 33 per month. In
turn, the fiscal year 2003 rate was well below the roughly 58 Federal
Air Marshals lost per month during the last quarter of fiscal year
2002. Although the FAMS' attrition rate remains in flux, the reduced
number of employees leaving the program is attributed to the progress
made towards completing the FAMS' stand up, stabilizing the workforce,
implementing quality of work life initiatives, and otherwise working to
improve procedures and management systems to encourage employee
retention.
AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS--NORTHERN BORDER AIRWING
Question. The Air and Marine Operations program has been stretched
very thin for the last 2 years. Long-term repetitive details of
personnel and assets are being used to protect the Northern Border and
the National Capital Region. The appropriation for fiscal year 2004
includes resources for the establishment of a permanent Northern Border
Airwing. What is the status of establishing the permanent Northern
Border airwing funded for fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The fiscal year 2003 War Supplemental provided $20.5
million to launch the Bellingham Air Branch, the first of five Northern
Border Branches. Planned allocation is as follows: $2.5 million for
personnel transfers, $12.6 million for medium lift helicopter
acquisition and $6.6 million for multi-role enforcement aircraft.
Staffing will be provided through a combination of new hires and the
transfer of experienced personnel from other AMO field locations.
In fiscal year 2004, AMO received $35.2 million in Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) funding to launch AMO's Northern Border Branch in
Plattsburgh, NY. Planned allocation is as follows: $10 million for
medium lift helicopter acquisition and $6.6 million for multi-role
enforcement aircraft, $9.7 million for facility and $2.7 million for
aircraft spares. An additional $5.4 million was appropriated in
Salaries and Expenses funding to cover the cost of 36 personnel.
Plattsburgh and Bellingham each will be equipped with three
aircraft, including one Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (Pilatus PC-12
fixed-wing), one Medium Lift Helicopter and one Light Enforcement
Helicopter.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget includes $35.2 million to
launch the third Northern Border Branch.
--The funds from these two appropriations were combined to purchase
one medium lift helicopter.
Question. How has the recently announced hiring freeze affected the
Northern Border airwing?
Answer. The recently announced hiring freeze did not affect our
build-up of the Northern Border air wing.
Question. When will the aircraft and other equipment be procured?
Answer. The procurement process has already begun for the aircraft
and other equipment. The four AS-350 A-Star helicopters are scheduled
to be delivered during the June-December 2004 timeframe. Taking into
consideration the 120-day communication and sensor installation
process, the first operational helicopter will be delivered in October
2004 with follow-on delivery of the remaining 3 helicopters at 1 every
60 days.
The first PC-12 (Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft) is scheduled for
delivery during May 2004. The second aircraft is scheduled for delivery
October 2004. Both aircraft will be configured with the Wescam
Integrated Situation Awareness Display System (ISADS) electro optic/
infrared.
Question. Even with the establishment of this airwing, to what
extent will ICE still have to rely on detailees to cover the Northern
Border and the National Capital Region?
Answer. The Northern Border will have to rely on detailee
augmentation during surge operations or designated heightened alert
postures.
We are currently maintaining the NCR Branch primarily through the
use of rotational detailee assignments. We are requiring aviation
personnel to travel on a temporary duty status, as well as, the
redeployment of aircraft from southern border locations to the
Washington, D.C. area in order to provide on-going mission critical
support. All costs for that operation have been covered using Air and
Marine Operations fiscal year 2004 Operations and Maintenance funding.
LONG-RANGE RADAR
Question. What is the total amount that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has in its fiscal year 2004 budget for operating
the Long-Range radar system?
Answer. Questions regarding FAA's distinct budget line items should
be addressed to the FAA.
Question. How much is being requested by other agencies for fiscal
year 2005 for the Long-Range radar system?
Answer. The Long-Range Radar (LRR) funding, a new fiscal year 2005
line item to help fund the FAA radar system that feeds information to
the AMOC, is a $12.5 million increase to the AMO base, ``other
services'' line item.
Question. Why are new resources being requested in the fiscal year
2005 budget to allow the Department to pay the FAA for this service, as
opposed to a transfer from the FAA budget?
Answer. FAA has indicated recently that to continue to maintain and
operate this system as mandated in past Federal legislation, it would
need to start charging user agencies for the data.
TETHERED AEROSTAT RADAR SYSTEM
Question. The information provided by the Tethered Aerostat Radar
System (TARS), known as TARS, is a critical component in the
Department's efforts to interdict illicit air traffickers. Do you
believe that the Department of the Defense is providing sufficient
support to the TARS program to enable the Air and Marine Program to
effectively carry out its mission?
Answer. The TARS program has declined from 14 operational sites to
8 operational sites (Lajas, Puerto Rico, is due back on-line in May
2004). Questions regarding costs for operating these sites should be
addressed to DOD, which maintains and operates the system. AMO is an
end user of the data provided by these valuable national assets.
Question. Is the Department of Homeland Security working with the
Department of Defense to ensure proper maintenance and upgrades of
TARS?
Answer. AMO is currently working closely with all the agencies
involved in the counter-narcotics and border security missions,
including USIC, ONDCP, DOD, and DHS to communicate the requirements for
the continued use of the TARS. Recent close coordination and meetings
between the Department of Homeland Security and the Deputy Assistant of
Defense for Counter Narcotics have resulted in frank and open
discussions related to TARS. The dialogue is productive and ongoing at
this time, and DHS' requirements have been acknowledged by DOD.
Question. Does ICE have the necessary expertise and personnel to
take over the management and maintenance of the TARS program?
Answer. TARS is now under the purview of DOD and should be operated
in line with DHS operational needs.
Question. What is the estimated funding needed for ICE to assume
management of the TARS program?
Answer. TARS is now under the purview of DOD and should be operated
in line with DHS operational needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
Citizenship and Immigration Services
IMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REFORM PLAN
Question. How many new petitions do you expect the President's
Immigration Reform Plan to generate?
Answer. This information will be available once Congress has
drafted the legislation and the specifics are known.
MACHINE-READABLE PASSPORT DEADLINE
Background: The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
of 2002, which President Bush signed into law on May 14, 2002,
established October 26, 2004, as the deadline by which the 27 existing
``visa waiver'' countries must have machine readable visas in order for
their citizens to enter the United States. Last week, Secretaries Ridge
and Powell sent a letter to various Congressional leaders urging that
the October 26, 2004 deadline be pushed back to December, 2006. The
countries which would be affected by this law have had nearly 2 years
to comply with this requirement. This is not something new which we
just pulled out of thin air.
I understand that certain lobbying organizations, such as the
Travel Industry Association of America, have praised this proposed
delay in the deadline. However, I predicted this outcome when the
Enhanced Border Security Act was on the Senate floor.
We know that terrorists have attempted to gain entry to the United
States through the visa waiver program. The December 2001 ``shoe
bomber'', Richard Reid, benefited from attempting to come to the United
States from a ``visa waiver'' country. We know that tens of thousands
of passports from visa waiver countries have been stolen in recent
years and sold on the black market. We know that machine-readable
passports can help to filter potential terrorists who try to enter the
United States through the visa waiver program. I do not want to
discourage legitimate tourists and other travelers from coming to visit
our country, but border security must remain one of the Department's
paramount priorities. The law was passed nearly 2 years ago. There has
been ample time for the Administration to work with the visa waiver
countries in meeting this deadline. The Administration's job was to get
these countries to meet the requirements of the law.
Question. How is it in the interest of our domestic security to
push back even further the deadline requiring machine-readable
passports from visa waiver countries? What steps did the Administration
take over the last 2 years to ensure that visa waiver countries would
be able to meet the deadline?
Answer: The EBSVERA requires that beginning on October 26, 2004,
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries must certify that they have a
program in place to issue their nationals machine-readable passports
that are tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric and document
authentication identifiers that comply with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards in order to continue to
participate in the VWP. The law also requires that visitors coming to
the United States under the VWP present machine-readable, tamper-
resistant passports that incorporate biometric and document
authentication identifiers, if the passports is issued on or after
October 26, 2004.
While most, if not all, VWP countries will be able to certify that
they have a program in place to issue biometric passports by the
October deadline, very few, if any, VWP countries will actually be able
to begin issuing biometric passports by that date. The issue is not
lack of will or commitment to achieving the standard by these
countries, but rather challenging scientific and technical issues. For
the same challenging technical reasons, DHS is also not currently in a
position to acquire and deploy equipment and software to biometrically
compare and authenticate these documents. It is not in any country's
interest, including our domestic security interest, to produce or
accept biometric passports with questionable standards and an immature
biometric technology.
DHS is encouraged by the progress that has been made by VWP
countries to meet the emerging ICAO standards. We believe that by the
fall of 2006, the technology required to implement successfully a
security system based on the ICAO standards will be much more settled
and allow DHS to derive the security benefits envisioned when the
original EBSVERA was enacted.
As you know, changing the deadlines requires Congressional action,
and a memorandum concerning this issue was forwarded to Congress signed
by Secretaries Ridge and Powell requesting an extension of the
deadlines until November 30, 2006. The Secretaries also testified
before Congress on this issue on April 21, 2004.
IMMIGRATION PROCESSING FEES AND THE BACKLOG (CIS)
Question. The number of immigrants awaiting decisions from CIS--
including citizenship and permanent resident status--increased 59
percent in the past 3 years. Despite $160 million appropriated in the
past 2 years to remedy the logjam, nearly 6.2 million applications were
pending at the end of September, according to a General Accounting
Office report. The GAO probe revealed that fees charged by Citizenship
and Immigrations Services are insufficient to cover the cost of
processing applications--in part due to expanding security costs.
According to the GAO, ``CIS knows neither the cost to process new
applications nor the cost to complete pending applications,'' the
report said.
In anticipation of President Bush's immigration overhaul, the GAO
recommended that Homeland Security Secretary Ridge direct CIS to study
the fees and determine how much money will be needed to remedy the
backlog. In an August interview with Government Executive magazine,
Director Aguirre, you vowed to significantly reduce wait times and
application backlogs for immigration benefits by increasing the
agency's efficiency through new information technology investments.
Based on the funding proposed by the President, how much of the
backlog will CIS be able to eliminate in 2005?
Answer. Information on the current backlog and USCIS plans to
eliminate it will be provided to Congress in the coming months in a
revised Backlog Elimination Plan. USCIS will meet the President's goals
of eliminating the backlog and achieving a 6-month processing standard
for all immigration applications by 2006.
Question. I understand that in order to meet the President's
backlog reduction goal by fiscal year 2006, your agency must achieve a
42 percent increase in productivity. Two questions--First, what
specific steps are you taking to produce 42 percent increase in
productivity? Second, it is essential that you ensure that security
background checks are done correctly. If a 42 percent productivity
improvement is not accomplished, what will the impact be on making sure
that security background checks are completed?
Answer. Information on the current backlog and USCIS plans to
eliminate it will be provided to Congress in the coming months in a
revised Backlog Elimination Plan. USCIS will meet the President's goals
of eliminating the backlog and achieving a 6-month processing standard
for all immigration applications by 2006.
USCIS will continue to explore ways of improving the efficiency of
our national security check processes, but will not place backlog
elimination requirements above national security requirements. Backlog
elimination will be achieved through efficiency efforts, through
development of information technology programs that automate manual
processes, and from reengineering processes to reduce adjudication time
without sacrificing the integrity of the adjudicative process.
PRESIDENT'S IMMIGRATION PROPOSAL
Question. What impact would the President's immigration proposal,
if enacted, have on the immigration application backlog and on efforts
to reduce the backlog? Would the temporary work permits envisioned in
the President's plan be issued before or after the benefits sought by
the 6.2 million applications in the backlog? What is the plan for
insuring that the backlog reduction program does not increase benefits
fraud by encouraging the rubber-stamping of applications?
Answer. USCIS will need to review specific legislative proposals
before it can comment on the potential impact on USCIS' capabilities.
Citizenship and Immigration Services and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
BENEFITS FRAUD
Question. Who is responsible for investigating benefits fraud? Both
CIS and ICE have asked for funding to investigate benefits fraud, but
neither seems to know which is actually responsible.
Answer. A January 2002 General Accounting Office (GAO) Report-02-66
entitled ``Immigration Benefit Fraud--Focused Approach is Needed to
Address Problems'' raised concerns about identifying immigration fraud.
As a part of the USCIS efforts to reengineer its business processes and
eliminate the backlog, the agency is also looking closely at ways to
identify and decrease benefits fraud. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement will continue to play a vital role in investigating
suspicious cases and/or prosecuting the participants in a scheme in
conjunction with Federal, state, and local prosecutors.
ICE will continue to perform those enforcement duties enumerated in
the OPM classification standards for an 1811 occupational series
criminal investigator.
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT (ICRA)
Question. What lessons from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) legalization programs have been applied to the President's
Immigration Reform Plan?
Answer. The IRCA planning teams developed a strategy that enabled
the Service to quickly expand its adjudicative capacity through the
establishment of temporary regional processing centers and local
interview offices. Temporary employees were hired and trained
specifically to adjudicate that workload. INS reassigned experienced
executives and managers at all levels to oversee operations, but relied
heavily on the skills or retired executives and managers (reemployed
annuitants). This strategy enabled the Service to continue its efforts
to process the normal casework plus handle the surge in workload caused
by the passage of IRCA.
Key components of IRCA were: the development of the regional
processing center concept, development of a modular office plan for
field interviewing sites, automated data systems to record
transactions, and receipt of authority from Congress to expedite
certain leasing and contracting requirements. In addition, INS received
authority to reemploy annuitants without salary offset. The reemployed
annuitant program was absolutely critical to the overall success of the
program.
INS worked closely with Congress prior to the passage of IRCA, and
that cooperation was also instrumental in INS being able to meet the
requirements for the legalization provisions of IRCA.
Question. What were the total costs of IRCA's two legalization
programs (please break down by main components) and how much revenue
was generated in total by the fees charged to process IRCA
applications?
Answer. The IRCA program was totally fee-funded. Therefore, the
number of applications filed and their respective fees determine the
total cost of the program. Our analysis to date of the program has
determined a total application workload of approximately 2.7 million,
with costs/fee revenues totaling $245 million. The breakdown of this
program is as follows: (1) Application for Permanent Residency (2.68
million applications/$241 million), and (2) Application for Status as a
Temporary Resident (6,700 applications/$3.7 million).
Question. How much will the President's Immigration Reform Plan
cost, and what components comprise the total cost?
Answer. It is expected that costs associated with the USCIS
workload would be covered with fees like all other application and
petition processing.
Question. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) personnel will be
necessary to implement the President's Immigration Reform Plan? What
level of fees or additional appropriations would be necessary to hire
those additional FTEs without further increasing the deficit?
Answer. This information will be available once Congress has
drafted the legislation and the specifics are known.
DATA BETWEEN 1996-2003
Question. Please provide a comparison of the size of the fugitive
alien population from 1996-2003. Please also provide the same
information regarding the backlog, as well as the backlog of matters
pending in the Immigration Court for the same period.
Answer. Below are the estimates of the number of fugitive aliens
based on the year that they received their order of removal, based on
information in the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Absconders
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996.................................................... 130,296
1997.................................................... 157,220
1998.................................................... 186,944
1999.................................................... 214,580
2000.................................................... 239,656
2001.................................................... 265,427
2002.................................................... 295,336
2003.................................................... 320,364
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE defers to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) to
respond to your question regarding the number of backlogs of matters
pending in the Immigration Court for the same period of time.
Customs and Border Protection
TERRORIST WATCH LIST INTEGRATION
Question. One of the most important items on the Department's list
of unfinished business is the integration of terrorist watch lists.
Earlier this year, Secretary Ridge said the list would be fully
functional ``by mid-May.'' Because the agencies you oversee--Customs
and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement--rely
daily on accurate information about the potential threats to this
country posed by individuals on these lists, I would expect that the
integration of this information would be a priority.
It is not clear to me whether the integration of the watch lists is
an FBI responsibility or that of the Department. Is it a DHS
responsibility or an FBI responsibility to integrate the watch lists
and when do you expect the integration to be complete?
Answer. Terrorist Watch Lists are the responsibility of the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC). CBP submits names for watch listing to the TTIC through
CBP's Office of Intelligence. Since the CIA, FBI and DHS have joint
responsibility for the TTIC (TSC is a subsidiary of the TTIC), the
responsibility lies with the TTIC as a whole. Currently, the Director
of the CIA oversees that operation of the TTIC.
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE
Question. An additional $25 million is requested for fiscal year
2005 to expand the Container Security Initiative. This innovative
program has placed CBP inspectors at numerous overseas seaports to work
with their host country counterparts at targeting potentially dangerous
containers for enhanced inspection prior to being loaded on U.S.-bound
ships.
In December, Subcommittee staff were able to see this program in
action in Asia. They spoke with the inspectors, discussed their working
relationships with the host country inspectors, and witnessed both the
physical inspection of individual containers. The U.S. inspectors were
quite enthusiastic about performing their duties. But both they and the
foreign counterparts expressed concern that our personnel were being
rotated through the countries on a temporary basis, as opposed to being
in country for extended tours of duty. In part because of cultural
differences in various countries, they stressed the importance of
remaining overseas to strengthen working relationships with the foreign
customs officials rather than starting from scratch with each new team
of U.S. inspectors.
Does your budget request provide for longer tours of duty for CSI
team members? Are you actively making CSI tours a career ``enhancer''
for your personnel--most of whom are not oriented to working overseas?
Are your people receiving the necessary support from U.S. ambassadors
in establishing and expanding the CSI presence overseas? Also, what
would be costs of fully funding all Phase II CSI ports?
Answer. Our budget includes funding for permanent overseas
positions. We are currently using TDY (temporary duty) personnel
overseas but have initiated the process for obtaining State Department
approval for the permanent positions. The embassy is providing the
necessary support to enable CSI to establish and expand its presence
overseas. That is evidenced by the State Dept's willingness to approve
NSDD 38's to establish permanent positions in the respective countries.
The NSDD38 (National Security Decision Directive) requests are
currently being processed at DHS and will be forwarded to Department of
State for final approval. We have also developed a comprehensive
training program for the permanent employees, which include
operational, administrative and cultural training. We are working
closely with the overseas posts to transition our temporary staff to
permanent staff.
Costs for funding the future ports are impacted by the opening date
of the port, infrastructure requirement, staffing and equipment, etc.
Our projected budget for fiscal year 2005 is sufficient to cover the
costs of our expansion ports that will open in fiscal year 2005.
OVERSEAS AIRLINE PASSENGER INSPECTION
Question. There have been press reports that your agency is
considering placing CBP inspectors at certain targeted overseas
airports to pre-screen passengers before they board flights to the
United States. I understand that the goal is to prevent potential
terrorists from boarding a plane and either hijacking it or blowing it
up. That is certainly a goal we all share.
However, because they screen passengers who board U.S.-originated
flights, is this not more properly a Transportation Security
Administration role? Will you be screening all passengers or only those
holding foreign passports?
If you are accessing passenger databases, which databases are they
and what privacy protections are you planning on implementing? Also,
when will Congress be notified of this program? We've only see reports
on it in the media.
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers will be
deployed overseas to perform a tactical function, the goal of which is
to prevent the onward movement of people identified as national
security threats. This program will replace the legacy INS Immigration
Control Officer (ICO) Program. The Immigration Security Initiative
(ISI) will also disrupt or deter the transportation of inadmissible
aliens and the proliferation of fraudulent documents. In the course of
these duties, the ISI will provide information to host countries, or
appropriate authorities regarding travelers of interest.
Although these efforts can result in the development of
intelligence information, the primary function of the ISI is to use
current targeting and passenger analysis information provided by the
National Targeting Center (NTC) and the Forensic Document Lab (FDL) to
focus on high-risk persons. These efforts may lead to the apprehension
and prosecution of criminals and persons of national security interest
by host countries, the disruption of attempts to smuggle aliens and
contraband, and the disruption of attempts to enter the United States
with fraudulent documents.
When an ISI Officer identifies a traveler that should be prevented
from boarding a flight to the United States, the ISI will work with the
host country's immigration and/or customs control authority and the air
carrier who will take the appropriate action to prevent the person from
boarding the flight. The ISI will not have any authority in the host
country to take such action. Information provided to the host country
on these types of individuals will be vetted through the appropriate
authorities before any information is released to the host country.
Both TSA and CBP perform important functions in ensuring the safety
and security of the United States. However, TSA does not have the
authority CBP holds to perform the particular targeting function of ISI
in another country. ISI is the tool that we propose to use in deterring
individuals that may pose a threat to the safety and security of the
United States from boarding U.S.-bound flights, not U.S.-originated
flights.
In fiscal year 2004, CBP will initiate a pilot of the ISI program
in Warsaw, Poland. We estimate the cost to be approximately $500K for
each ISI site. Once the pilot is evaluated we'll have better
information regarding the future of the initiative.
ISIS BORDER COVERAGE
Question. How much of the northern border and how much of the
southern border is covered by ISIS?
Answer: Currently the ISIS program covers the following:
--Northern land border: 99 miles
--Southern land border: 290.5 miles
--Total: 389.5 miles
BORDER PATROL STAFFING
Question. Have the USA Patriot Act's requirements for Border Patrol
staffing on the Northern Border been met? If so, when was this goal
achieved? Was this achieved through the transfer, on either a temporary
or permanent basis, of personnel from the Southwest Border or
elsewhere? If so, does your budget request provide sufficient funds to
restore staffing at those locations to their authorized levels? If not,
what additional funds and FTEs are required to reach that goal?
Answer. The number of agents on the northern border had been
increased to 1,006 as of the end of December 2003. This is triple the
number of agents that were assigned along the northern border prior to
9/11 and meets the Patriot Act's requirement for staffing on the
Northern border. The number of agents currently assigned to the
northern border remains at 1,006.
The agent increase was accomplished through the permanent
relocation of experienced agents from across the nine southern border
sector areas. The CBP budget has sufficient funds to backfill the agent
vacancies through a combination of new agent hires and the relocation
of agents among the southern border areas. Additional funds and FTEs
will not be required to restore the staffing levels at the southern
border
ALTERNATIVES TO VACIS
Question. My staff is aware of the existence of non-intrusive
inspection technology (such as back-scatter gamma ray devices) that
provides a higher degree of resolution when inspecting shipping
containers and other closed containers. In fact, they saw some of these
devices in use at a seaport in Asia late last year. Is CBP considering
the procurement of next-generation devices which provide enhanced
resolution either when replacing existing, aging systems or for
deployment at new locations? If so, what are the approximate costs of
the systems under consideration versus the costs of the existing
systems? Do these newer systems provide a significant improvement for
inspectors over existing systems? Conversely, if you are not
considering procuring new systems, why not? Is it due to cost, other
considerations, or both?
Answer. ``Back-scatter'' technology, which is associated with X-ray
systems and not gamma ray systems, was developed by American Science
and Engineering (AS&E) in the 1980's. For many years now, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has operated a large number of devices, which
have this capability, including large-scale truck/container imaging
systems. Back-scatter images can indeed provide information, which is
not available from a transmission X-ray or gamma ray image. Like any
technology though, it has its limitations--the amount of penetration
into vehicles or containers, and the resulting image, depends in large
part on the type and amount of commodity being scanned. CBP operates a
variety of X-ray and gamma ray imaging systems.
The costs of the back-scatter technology will vary depending on the
configuration of the system. There are back-scatter-only systems which
cost less than gamma ray imaging systems and there are transmission/
back-scatter X-ray systems which cost significantly more than gamma ray
systems. The requirements, which define what type of system is needed
to meet operational demands, are much broader than just this single
technical criteria. CBP recently purchased a new AS&E product, the ZBV
(back-scatter only) X-ray van, which is now being tested in Arizona. We
are preparing to field two new high (>6 MeV) energy, mobile sea
container X-ray systems later this summer to U.S. seaports. CBP also
recently upgraded an existing 2.5 MeV mobile X-ray system to 3.8 MeV,
and is now testing it at the Port of Baltimore. CBP continually
evaluates promising new technologies, which have the potential to
enhance or replace existing systems.
ENHANCING BORDER PATROL INTEGRATION INTO CBP
Question. During briefings with my staff it appears that
coordination and integration of certain Border Patrol activities,
programs, and systems has not gone as smoothly as it might otherwise be
expected. Sometimes it appears that inquiries made by staff come as a
surprise to Border Patrol and the CBP staff. For instance, we asked
questions about the procurement of high-endurance vehicles for the
Border Patrol only to learn that the CBP vehicle management team was
working on a longer-term vehicle management plan of which Border Patrol
was not a part. I understand there are growing pains and learning
curves when creating a new Department, but issues such as development
of a unified inventory of goods and activities seems rather basic. What
concrete steps have CBP and Border Patrol taken to ensure that each
entity knows what the other is doing?
Answer. With the merger of the U.S. Border Patrol into U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), the integration of border patrol
activities was established as one of our highest priorities. The Border
Patrol was established as an Office reporting directly to the
Commissioner with the Chief of the Border Patrol having equal status to
our Assistant Commissioners. Border Patrol Sector Chiefs participate in
all CBP Executive Leadership meetings. Representatives from the U.S.
Border Patrol have been included in all transition management
activities and in some instances have actually served as the leaders of
groups addressing integration and merger issues. The issues addressed
not only operation mission responsibilities, but mission support
operations as well.
Knowing that the Border Patrol's functions and responsibilities are
key to the security of our homeland, the following are examples of
integration activities in which the Border Patrol has been, and will
continue to be actively involved:
--Immediate participation in the CBP ``around the clock'' Situation
Room.
--Integration of border patrol agents into CBP's intelligence
structure.
--Identification of resources, staffing, and property transfers and
modifications to information systems necessary to stand up CBP
on October 1, 2003.
--Analysis of vehicle fleet requirements as part of CBP's replacement
and upgrade strategy.
--Participation in a procurement ``War Room'' to train and certify
border patrol employees in CBP contract and procurement
processes and reduce an inherited backlog of outstanding
procurement actions.
--Determining the process and infrastructure to consolidate the
tactical communications program in order to create more unified
communications structure and assure officer safety through
interoperability.
--Migration of and training for all border patrol employees to CBP's
administrative systems for processing travel, payroll,
procurement, and human resources.
--Identifying technologies to share and to use as force multipliers
to increase CBP's enforcement capacity.
--Designing a process for incident reporting to ensure clear
reporting for rapid notification to senior management of
significant incidents.
--Developing a strategy, policies and procedures for integrating the
processing of seizures, forfeitures, fines and penalties into a
consolidated process for all of CBP to assure property and
fiscal accountability.
--Proposing an integration plan for unifying operational policies,
resource management and best practices for the CBP Canine
program.
--Cross training Border Patrol agents in anti-terrorism concepts and
techniques.
BORDER PATROL VEHICLES
Question. What is the status of the review of the need for high-
endurance vehicles for the Border Patrol? What performance measures are
you using for determining the need to procure additional or different
high-endurance vehicles? Are there funds in the fiscal year 2005 budget
request to procure additional high-endurance vehicles?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently entered
into a contract with Nevada Automotive Transportation Center to conduct
a terrain mapping study. This is a joint effort between the Office of
Finance and the Office of Border Patrol Information Technology Unit.
Information obtained from the study will be used to evaluate the
terrain and recommend the type of high-endurance vehicles needed to
meet mission requirements and provide for Agent safety.
CBP will determine the correct vehicle to be procured based on life
cycle studies, performance measures and the out come of the terrain
mapping study. The performance measures will include, mission
requirements, life cycle costs, durability and downtime of vehicles.
Currently, there are no funds designated in the fiscal year 2005
budget to procure additional or replacement high-endurance vehicles.
LAND BORDER ``EXIT'' CONTROL OF US VISIT
Question. What impact will the ``exit'' component of US VISIT have
on the land borders? Do you anticipate that additional outbound
inspection lanes or other facilities modifications will have to be
created in the coming years? If so, when can we expect to receive an
estimated plan of those construction and other requirements? Is CBP an
active participant with the US VISIT program office?
Answer. The impact of the US VISIT exit program on land border
facilities, outbound lanes, and possibly staffing will depend on the
process/solution that is deployed. It will also depend upon the timing
of the rollout of the exit strategies.
After US VISIT awards a contract to their prime integrator for the
land border entry/exit system, expected in mid-fiscal year 2004, and
the integrator offers a more comprehensive solution, CBP will better
understand the extent of the impact to our operations. CBP will
continue to work closely with US VISIT to develop an exit solution. .
COBRA EXTENSION
Question. What is CBP currently doing to fix the COBRA overtime cap
issue which has caused Customs Inspectors and new CBP officers to lose
the ability to contribute $2,500 towards their base pay for calculating
their retirement annuity? The current overtime earning cap has been
reduced from $30,000 to $25,000 due to a legislative language drafting
issue in the fiscal year 2004 DHS Appropriations bill. Does your budget
request provide a legislative fix to this unintentional drafting error?
Answer. This unintentional oversight is being addressed through
various channels. The Department of Homeland Security is working on a
legislative change to equalize the overtime caps for all U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) employees, while CBP is investigating the
possibility of cap waivers that would allow officers to exceed the
$25,000 cap in fiscal year 2004.
Question. Does the fiscal year 2005 Budget assume the merging of
Customs/INS/Agriculture user fees? In addition, what does the fiscal
year 2005 budget estimate will be received in COBRA user fees for
fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 Budget does not assume that the
Customs/INS/Agriculture user fees will be merged. CBP is projecting
that $303 million will be received in COBRA user fees in fiscal year
2004.
Question. Does the fiscal year 2005 budget assume the
reauthorization of COBRA which is set to expire on March 31, 2005?
Answer. Public Law 108-121 reauthorized COBRA through March 1,
2005. The fiscal year 2005 budget assumes that COBRA will be
reauthorized beyond the March 1st expiration date.
SIXTH DAY OF FLETC TRAINING
Question. What is the Department doing to correct the problem of
the Department not paying legacy Customs Inspectors and new CBP
officers for their required work on the sixth day of basic training at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)?
Answer. We do pay employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) overtime while engaged in training at FLETC for 6 day weeks. The
Government Employee and Training Act (GETA) prohibits us from paying
non-FLSA employees under FLSA provision. Our COPRA covered front-line
personnel are not subject to FLSA. COPRA was specifically designed for
Customs Officers and is the exclusive pay act for our Customs legacy
personnel. Our agency position on this matter was recently sustained in
an arbitration decision.
CROSS-TRAINING
Questions: What amount of training dollars per officer (i.e.,
``modular costs'') is currently being spent for customs training vs.
immigration training?
Is CBP requiring both legacy Customs and legacy INS/Border Patrol
personnel to attend cross-training programs? What percentage of legacy
Customs vs. INS/Border Patrol personnel has actually completed such
training? Does CBP intend that all enforcement personnel will undergo
such cross-training, and if so, when is that training expected to be
completed?
Legacy immigration inspectors have said that compact discs (CDs)
are being used for training legacy Customs personnel in immigration
law, while legacy INS/Border Patrol personnel must attend in-person
training in Customs law. How does CBP ensure that the material on the
CDs is being learned? What evidence does CBP have that training at-home
training with a CD is as effective as in-person training?
Answer. The CBP Officer Training Modules are being developed by CBP
under one initiative using field subject matter experts with experience
in customs, immigration and agriculture for the determination of course
content. Each individual will receive the training needed to achieve
full competency as a CBP Officer. Costs are not allocated on a per-
officer basis as each officer receives a training package tailored to
meet their individual need.
CBP will require both legacy Customs and legacy INS inspectors to
attend cross training programs. There are many different audiences for
the different modules:
--New CBP Officers
--CBP Customs Inspectors
--CBP Immigration Inspectors
--CBP Agriculture Specialists
--New CBP Agriculture Specialists
Because of the differences in roles and geographic areas served,
Border Patrol personnel were not integrated into the CBP Officer
position and are not required to participate in the cross-training
initiatives.
Of the 21 training modules that have been developed to support CBP
Officer training priorities, 15 have been identified as cross-training
programs for legacy Customs inspectors, INS inspectors, or both.
Integrated training modules will be rolled-out and delivered over the
next 12-months.
Integrated training will be delivered in the field locations. There
are different delivery methods for the modules, ranging from classroom,
to computer-based, to video, to on-the-job. And, there is different
timing for delivery of the modules; for example, some will be taken by
new CBP Officers as soon as possible after their return from the
Academy. The integrated training for other CBP Officers will be
mandatory, and will be based on the operational needs of a given port.
Inspectors who are converted to the CBP Officer position will not be
expected to perform new functions until they have demonstrated the
knowledge and skills required for that function.
Compact Discs (CDs) are being used solely as a prerequisite to
classroom training. The CDs are a 6-hour course in Fundamentals of
Immigration, and a 10-hour course in Immigration Law. All CD self-study
training includes rigorous tests that are administered to ensure
students are prepared for the 5 days of intensive classroom training
that provides additional study and application of the law.
The classroom portion is followed by an extensive on-the-job
training requirement. Finally, additional classroom instruction will be
provided to prepare the Officers for more advanced tasks. Approximately
80 hours of instruction will be delivered to each Officer. The same
method of training is being developed for customs law.
Currently customs law is being delivered as a course at the CBP
Academy to new Officers.
Due to the complexity and immediate need to get this training to
the intended users, CBP determined that the best method for delivering
immigration law training to legacy Customs personnel was by Compact
Disc (CD). By using CD's, the officers could complete the training as
required and have a consistent, convenient, available, ready-reference
information to use. The completion of the CDs takes place during the
CBP Officers regular duty assignments; the CBP Officers do not complete
these CD's at home.
The Officer is evaluated by an examination at the end of each
module. If successful, the officer receives a certificate of completion
for that specific module of training. If unsuccessful, the Officer
receives feedback and information as to what areas of the training
requires more study. The Officer is required to repeat that module and
re-take the examination until the modules are completed at the required
knowledge level.
CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY ACT
Question. Please provide an update on CBP efforts to implement last
year's Treasury IG recommendations on how to improve administration of
the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act.
Answer. CBP has completed three fiscal year cycles under the CDSOA.
To date, CBP has disbursed over $750 million to affected domestic
producers. An additional $50 million in fiscal year 2003 duties is
currently being withheld pending the outcome of a court case. Total
number of claims processed to date is over 4,000. As a result of a
recent IG investigation into this program, CBP has added resources,
improved process controls, and transferred responsibility for the
program to the CBP Chief Financial Officer. CBP is currently in the
planning stages for the fiscal year 2004 disbursement process. We will
be publishing a Federal Register Notice in June or July, announcing our
Intent to Disburse fiscal year 2004 funds and inviting affected
domestic producers to file their certifications in a timely manner.
Under the existing statute, we are required to disburse the fiscal year
2004 funds no later than 60 days after the end of the fiscal year, or
November 29, 2004.
Question. How much was spent in fiscal year 2002-2004 to administer
the program? What is the estimated cost for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. From fiscal year 2002-2005, the estimated annual expenses
incurred by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to administer this
program are approximately 18 FTE and $1.9 million.
Question. On March 19, 2004, CBP issued its Annual Report (2003) on
the ``Byrd Amendment'' trade law. This is a law I helped enact that
allows CBP to reimburse U.S. companies that have been injured by unfair
trade with funds that are collected as import duties on unfairly traded
imports. The CBP report states that, while CBP should have distributed
at least $320 million in collected duties to eligible U.S. companies
and workers in 2003, it was able to distribute only $190 million
because CBP failed to collect $130 million from unfair traders. Most of
the uncollected $130 million consists of import duties not collected by
CBP on goods from China, in particular. While part of the problem is
that Chinese companies are refusing to pay these duties, it also
appears that CBP is failing to enforce the U.S. trade laws because it
is not diligently pursuing the parties who are refusing to pay these
duties.
Why is CBP not collecting millions of dollars in duties on unfairly
traded imports as required by U.S. law?
Answer. CBP is correctly assessing duties on all imports into the
United States as required by U.S. law. CBP charges importers for post
entry changes to this assessment. CBP vigorously pursues collection of
all outstanding debt liabilities.
Question. If the duties are not now being paid, what does CBP plan
to do to make certain that the duties are paid and collected in the
future?
Answer. CBP has developed a national trade strategy that
specifically addresses the high priority issues and risks in trade.
Anti dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) and revenue collection
are two priorities within the strategy. Action plans have been
developed to address specific risks to these issues. Included in the
plans are innovative approaches to establishing bonding limits,
specifically for anti-dumping imports, that are commensurate with the
financial risks of the transaction.
Question. Why, in your view, does the problem seem to involve more
imports from China than from any other country?
Answer. There are a number of possible factors. There are currently
more anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders in place for China
(54) than for any other country. In addition, China has been named in
half of the 16 petitions filed with the International Trade Commission
(ITC) in the last 7 months.
There is also volatility in the deposit rates issued by the
Department of Commerce (DOC) and administered and enforced by CBP for
dumping cases concerning China. DOC adopts the presumption that the PRC
is a nonmarket economy during their investigations. The success or
failure of a particular exporter/producer to satisfy DOC that they are
independent from the PRC government affects the rate they are subject
to. It is possible for deposit rates to fluctuate significantly during
the course of the DOC investigation as well as in the final rate
depending on their ability to respond to DOC.
Question. How does CBP specifically plan to address the fact that
the bulk of the problem concerns imports from China?
Answer. CBP currently has in place trade strategies that focus
specifically on anti-dumping/countervailing duty and revenue. Each of
these plans has a multi-office working group responsible for the
development, oversight and evaluation of the plans. These plans have
already developed and implemented a number of actions that address
dumping as a whole and by inclusion, China. These actions include
identification and clean up of outstanding dumping entries, increased
operational oversight of the dumping process, development of improved
mechanisms to ensure and monitor adequate bonding of dumping entries,
and improved communication with DOC.
Question. Some believe that, if it were not for the Byrd Amendment,
CBP would have no way of knowing that these millions of dollars in
duties were not being collected. If this is true, do you believe that
CBP should adopt additional ways to determine whether import duties are
being paid by importers and collected by the United States Government?
Answer. While CBP does have adequate controls in place to ensure
that collectible debt is collected, we are working to strengthen these
controls to help us identify potential uncollectible debt earlier in
the process.
CBP has standard reports that list all unpaid and overdue bills,
including those for unpaid anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Some
anti-dumping and countervailing duties have not been and will not be
collected when importers go out of business or go bankrupt, and bond
coverage is insufficient. As a part of the normal business process,
those amounts would not have been collected and deposited into general
fund receipts. Until the Byrd Amendment, these uncollected amounts were
not directly related to the injured parties involved with anti-dumping
and countervailing duty cases. The relationship that injured parties
now have regarding the anti-dumping and countervailing duty amounts
uncollected, as direct beneficiaries, makes this issue now especially
significant.
Question. In your response to my questions at today's hearing
regarding why Customs has been unable to collect duties on unfairly
traded imports--particularly from China--you indicated that there is a
need to address systemic problems at both the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Could you please
advise me of the specific actions, including regulatory reform, that
CBP is and will be asking these other agencies to undertake to better
enable CBP to collect duties on unfairly traded imports?
Answer. CBP and DOC have working groups which meet together on a
regular basis to identify the systematic problems and to develop action
plans to address these problems. CBP has also undertaken a national
bond review program which is increasing the monitoring of bond
sufficiency to ensure that sufficient bonds are in place at all times
to protect the revenue. Legislative proposals are also being considered
which would reinforce CBP's ability to require sufficient bonds.
Questions. CBP's Annual Report on the Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act (``CDSOA'') for fiscal year 2003 showed that CBP was unable
to collect over $130 million in antidumping duties in 2003. Of these
uncollected duties, over $100 million relate to Chinese imports. There
have been reports that these uncollected duties reflect active efforts
by Chinese parties and their U.S. affiliates to avoid paying U.S.
antidumping duties by, among other things, quickly importing large
amounts of goods, then filing for bankruptcy to avoid liability for
duties and engaging in other fraudulent conduct.
Answer. We don't know if these were fraudulent situations. However,
in these situations it is important to determine timely that an anti-
dumping or countervailing duty case is a factor in the importation.
When it is, adequate bond coverage should be required based on the
findings that anti-dumping and countervailing duties are warranted. In
addition, the bond amount should not be limited to the preliminary
determination rate, but at least set at 100 percent of the value of the
commodity involved on an entry by entry basis. This would resolve under
collection situations in the major portion of cases where preliminary
determination rates were understated and bond amounts were set
accordingly. In the event that an importer goes out of business or
bankrupt, then the bond amount would be sufficient in most cases (at
least where the final determination rate by DOC is not greater than 100
percent of the value of the imported merchandise).
Question. Has CBP seen evidence of such conduct with respect to
importations from China of goods subject to antidumping duty orders?
Answer. On a case-by-case basis, there appears to be instances
where importers of Chinese merchandise bring in a large volume subject
to anti-dumping duties and file bankruptcy prior to CBP's collection of
the full assessment of these duties.
Question. Is there evidence of an organized effort by China,
Chinese parties, affiliated U.S. parties and/or their representatives
to avoid these duties? Could you provide such evidence?
Answer. No, CBP has no evidence of a Chinese conspiracy in this
area.
Question. Please explain the various means by which these parties
are avoiding the payment of import duties. Please quantify the extent
to which these means contribute to CBP's inability to collect duties in
specific Chinese antidumping duty cases.
Answer. We know that bills have been issued to some importers who
filed for bankruptcy, therefore forcing us to collect outstanding debt
from the surety. This has caused financial problems for some surety
companies, which have then been forced into bankruptcy. Part of the
work being done within CBP includes the identification of the areas of
concern and then the quantification of these areas to prioritize them.
Question. To what extent does the ability of importers to post
bonds on imports by ``new shippers'' from China contribute to the
ability of Chinese parties and their U.S. affiliates to avoid paying
antidumping duties?
Answer. The ``new shipper'' designation allows for a deferral of
payment of potential AD/CVD if the party is indeed a new shipper.
Question. Does CBP have evidence that these parties are
fraudulently obtaining new shipper bonds? Please explain.
Answer. CBP has no evidence that these parties are fraudulently
obtaining ``new shipper bonds''. There is no ``new shipper bond'', just
the Customs Bond. ``New shipper'' is a status that certain parties can
claim, which is issued by Commerce.
Question. Are there steps that CBP has taken or can take to alert
bonding companies to the potential financial risks posed by Chinese
``new shippers'' and their U.S. affiliates?
Answer. No. Companies are granted bonding authority by the
Department of Treasury. The normal business process involving
importation has sureties bonding the importer of a record's entry
transactions based on possible duties, taxes and fees involved, and
other regulatory reasons that require an entry bond. When a preliminary
determination is published in the Federal Register, the public is
advised, and bond coverage is administered accordingly by CBP. This
public information and other information that a surety can require
(including the financial ability of the importer of record to pay their
duties, taxes and fees) should be sufficient.
Question. Current law permits importers of goods from ``new
shippers'' to pay deposits of estimated dumping duties by posting
bonds, rather than making cash deposits, as occurs in most other cases.
A longstanding agreement between the Department of Commerce and CBP
requires that such bonds be in the form of single entry bonds
(``SEBs''). In recent years there have been frequent reports that,
notwithstanding its agreement with the Department of Commerce, CBP has
not been obtaining SEBs for ``new shipper'' imports and in other
required instances.
To what extent does the amount of uncollected duties shown in the
2003 CDSOA report reflect CBP's failure to obtain required SEBs? For
each antidumping duty case for which there were uncollected duties in
fiscal year 2003, please quantify the extent to which CBP's inability
to collect duties was attributable to a lack of requisite SEBs or other
deficiencies in bonding.
Answer. Extensive research will be required to provide a response
to this question in consultation with the Committee.
Question. The CDSOA report for 2003 reports that there is over $283
million in antidumping duty-related bonds in individual antidumping
duty clearing accounts for unliquidated entries. To what extent are
these bonds the required SEBs as opposed to standard continuous bonds?
To the extent that these bonds are not the required SEBs, what, if
anything, can CBP do to require SEBs for these amounts?
Answer. CBP cannot determine which amounts are covered by SEB vs.
continuous bonds. CBP lacks authority to obtain retroactive SEBs.
Question. Please detail the steps being undertaken by CBP and the
Department of Commerce to require SEBs on all import entries for which
they are required? Please confirm that SEBs are being obtained in all
cases in which they are required and explain how CBP has verified this
conclusion. If SEBs are not being obtained in all required cases,
please explain why not and explain what CBP is doing to address the
problem.
Answer. DOC may also allow bonding in AD/CVD cases other than new
shipper reviews. In accordance with T.D. 85-145, CBP requires single-
entry bonds in instances where bonding is permitted and the deposit
rate is 5 percent or greater. Policy reminders have been issued to all
field locations and importers of their responsibility to secure a
single-entry bond in these instances to cover AD/CVD duties.
ACS (Automated Commercial System) has the capability to track the
existence of only one type of bond. The majority of importers have
continuous bonds to cover normal imports. CBP instituted a policy in
October 2003 that requires additional bond reporting requirements to
track single-entry bonds electronically. CBP monitors this requirement
on a monthly basis.
Question. Please explain how domestic producers can confirm that
imports of competing goods subject to antidumping duty orders are
secured by required cash deposits or SEBs. Who are the points of
contact at CBP on this issue?
Answer. Domestic producers cannot confirm this information. This
information is contained on CBP entry documents. CBP has long
considered information on entry documents exempt from disclosure
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). Furthermore, the Trade Secrets Act (18
U.S.C. 1904) prohibits Federal employees from disclosing such
information and imposes personal sanctions on employees who do so.
Question. Is there any way of advising when bonds are issued and
how they can be tracked from the point of issuance? What percent of
bonds are collectable? Why is it that in cases involving critical
circumstances, a very small portion is collectible? Is the problem one
of administration between the Commerce Department and Customs? Could an
importer be held liable if the exporter refuses to pay?
Answer. There is no way of advising when bonds are issued and
tracking them from the point of issuance. Data is not currently
available to determine what percent of bonds are collectable. In the
cases involving critical circumstances, a very small portion is
collectible because the bonds are issued at the time the goods are
released, based on the amount of duties/taxes/fees assessed when the
goods are released. CBP does not have the legal authority to demand an
increase in a bond retroactively (after the release of the goods),
which, in critical circumstances is when CBP becomes aware of the fact
that a higher bond amount is needed. CBP is working on legislative
initiatives, which may include a statutory change that would allow us
to demand a higher bond retroactively. The importer is always held
liable for payment of duties/taxes/fees.
Question. Finally, if there is a serious problem in cases where
bonds are permitted, wouldn't a logical solution be simply to require
cash deposits--at least in all new shipper reviews?
Answer. The Department of Commerce has jurisdiction in this matter
and can best address it.
Question. Explain and quantify the budgetary, manpower, technical
and other impacts on CBP of administering the bonding option for
imports from new shippers under antidumping duty orders.
Answer. While CBP is unable to quantify the manpower impact of
administering the bonding option for imports from new shippers under
anti-dumping orders, our inability to require the bonds post release
hinders our collection efforts drastically. If a party claims new
shipper status, then the determination is made at a later date that the
party actually was not eligible for new shipper status. CBP has no
legal authority to retroactively require a bond for those entries that
were released (and bonded) under the benefits of new shipper status.
Question. On December 4, 2003, the White House Office of
Communications issued ``The President's Determination on Steel,'' which
stated that President Bush ``is committed to America's steel workers
and to the health of our steel industry.'' It also stated that,
``[s]teel import licensing, established when the safeguard measures
were imposed, will continue to provide WTO-consistent data collection
and monitoring of steel imports. This will enable the Administration to
quickly respond to future import surges that could unfairly damage the
industry.''
The President's Proclamation of the same date similarly stated that
``the licensing and monitoring of imports of certain steel products
remains in effect and shall not terminate until the earlier of March
21, 2005, or such time as the Secretary of Commerce establishes a
replacement program.''
Secretary Evans made several comments to the media on December 4,
2003, regarding the Administration's commitment to the U.S. steel
import monitoring and licensing system and indicated that it would be
expanded to include steel products that were not subject to 201 tariffs
and quotas. I want to be certain that the Administration remains fully
committed to this effort.
Could you please advise me as to whether the Administration has a
plan to expedite the adoption of the new, expanded program?
Answer. In the President's Proclamation, the President stated that
``the licensing and monitoring of imports of certain steel products
remains in effect and shall not terminate until the earlier of March
21, 2005, or such time as the Secretary of Commerce establishes a
replacement program.'' The President has clearly assigned the authority
to establish a replacement program with the Secretary of Commerce and
therefore Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is not in a position to
offer comments on the Secretary's plans to expedite the adoption of the
new, expanded program. As the licensing system was established in March
2003, CBP's role in the system consists solely of the collection of the
licenses that have been issued by the Department of Commerce. All other
implementation and monitoring responsibilities lie with the Department
of Commerce.
Question. Could you also please advise me of when the
Administration intends to request public comment with respect to its
new import monitoring and licensing system?
Answer. The responsibility of the licensing system lies with the
Department of Commerce; CBP is not in a position to respond as to when
the Department of Commerce intends to request public comment with
respect to its new import monitoring and licensing system.
Question. When would you estimate that it will be up and running?
Answer. CBP is not in a position to estimate when the Department of
Commerce will implement the new import monitoring and licensing system.
CBP is committed to taking the necessary steps to implement programming
and operational changes needed to successfully enforce the licensing
program once the Department of Commerce has established it.
Question. What assurances can you provide that the system will be
operational by that date?
Answer. CBP will defer to the Secretary of Commerce on the
timelines for implementation of the new licensing and monitoring
system.
Question. The U.S. domestic steel industry and CBP have maintained
a mutually beneficial partnership since the mid-1960's. The keystone of
the Customs-Steel Partnership is a program of seminars and meetings
where experts from the U.S. steel industry train Customs officials in
the important aspects of steel identification, classification, trade
law, and commercial issues. The program also provides steel mill tours,
reference books, videos, sample kits, and other work tools for Customs
officials. Customs brokers, invited to the meetings at Customs'
request, serve as the link between importers. Customs also derives
significant benefits from the seminars.
When the President ended the Section 201 remedies for steel more
than a year before originally scheduled, he promised to continue to
focus on steel licensing, import monitoring, and the enforcement of our
trade laws. The Customs training program provides significant
enforcement education to this end. Congress appropriated $1.25 million
to fund the Customs Steel Partnership training programs in fiscal year
2003 and fiscal year 2004. We would like to see the same level of
effort in Customs training during the coming fiscal year and want to
work with the Administration to secure an appropriation of $500,000 for
fiscal year 2005.
Will the Administration support the continuation of funding for
this vital program as part of the Homeland Security appropriation in
the amount of $500,000 for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. The funding is provided as part of the Homeland Security
appropriations for fiscal year 2003 to enhance CBP's ability to train
and enforce steel trade laws was a key component in the agency's
ability to administer and enforce the Steel 201 Proclamation. The
President's fiscal year 2005 Budget for CBP addresses the
organization's highest priorities.
Question. Can CBP confirm the view expressed by many Customs
officials involved in the Customs Steel Partnership, that its benefits
are considerable? So much so that it and the Customs Steel Partnership
Training Program in particular serve as a model for the establishment
of other Industry/Customs Partnerships?
Answer. CBP can confirm that the Customs Steel Partnership Training
Program provided benefits to CBP as well as the importing community.
The training sessions continue to include Customs Brokers, importers
and exporters. While the Customs Steel Partnership has allowed CBP to
expand the size of the audience to be trained, there may perhaps be a
more efficient manner in which to fund and/or administer the funding
for said Customs Steel Partnership Training Program. Due to the
complicated procurement and budget procedures under which CBP operates,
it may be more beneficial for all parties involved if there is direct
funding provided by the Steel Industry. CBP could continue the
partnership with the Steel Industry, as we have since the mid-1960's,
but perhaps there is a more mutually beneficial avenue in which to
continue and enhance said partnership.
Question. Concerns exist about the adequacy of existing practices
surrounding the enforcement of the U.S. antidumping duty law against
imports from non-market economies, but particularly China. With the
extraordinary trade deficit that the United States is running with
China, can you provide details of what changes in the enforcement of
the U.S. dumping law are being considered for non-market economy cases
and when the agency will be implementing such changes?
Answer. This would be best addressed by the Department of Commerce.
Question. Last year, the Department of the Treasury's Office of the
Inspector General completed an audit of CBP compliance with the
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA). The OIG's report,
which was issued in August 2003, by the DHS IG, found a number of areas
in which CBP could improve its management of this program.
Specifically, it noted the need to (1) properly establish special
accounts, and (2) pay claimants within 60 days after the end of the
fiscal year. In addition, the OIG stated that CBP had not instituted
standard operating procedures and adequate internal controls for the
management of the CDSOA program. CBP said it had established a CDSOA
working group to address both the recommendations and management
considerations identified by the OIG.
What has the working group done to address the recommendations and
management considerations identified by the OIG? Has it established
special accounts? Are claimants paid within 60 days of the end of the
year? Are checks sent to proper addresses? Who is responsible for
preparing and sending the checks on time?
Answer. The working group recommended, and the Deputy Commissioner
approved, the consolidation of responsibility for most of the program
with the Office of Finance, National Finance Center (NFC). Once this
was done, procedures and controls could be strengthened. This included
the establishment of crosschecks to identify problems such as the
overpayments reported by the OIG.
Timely liquidation of entries and validation of claimants' costs
and production were not transferred to OF-NFC.
Special accounts were established at the beginning of the program
and remain in place and properly utilized. However, due to current
system limitations, CBP must make manual adjustments to the balances in
these accounts to determine the actual amounts available for
disbursement. This limitation will exist until full implementation of
the new Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system.
Question. How much was spent in fiscal years 2002-2004 to
administer the program? What is the estimated cost for fiscal year
2005?
Answer. All disbursements for 2003, which were not restricted by
pending litigation, were processed within the allotted time. We expect
to meet the time requirements for 2004 and future years.
Checks are sent to the addresses on the claims submitted to us. If
the claimants or their attorney inadvertently include the wrong
address, we have no way of knowing that.
The Office of Finance, National Finance Center processes the
disbursements. The actual checks are issued by Treasury's Financial
Management Service based on NFC certifications.
Actual costs for administering the program were not separately
collected for fiscal year 2002-2004, but are estimated to have
increased from approximately $500,000 in the first year to
approximately $1.2 million for 2004, and to an estimated $1.8 million
for 2005. The increase year by year is due to the increased complexity
and size of the program.
Question. What mechanisms are being used currently to ensure that,
when Commerce issues liquidation instructions to Customs, the
liquidations are timely made? There have been reports of numerous cases
recently involving Customs' failure to liquidate timely and, as a
result, the agency fails to collect duties lawfully owed.
Answer. CBP meets biweekly with Commerce concerning operational
issues related to dumping. These meetings address issues that include
the mechanisms and procedures by which liquidation instructions are
transmitted by Commerce to CBP.
An inventory of all unliquidated entries is created on a regular
basis and these entries are compared to liquidation instructions that
CBP has received from Commerce. Instances identified by CBP where
entries are being held but for which specific liquidation instructions
do not appear to have been issued are provided to Commerce for their
research and action.
Question. What mechanisms are being used currently to ensure that,
when bills are sent to importers, they are paid? The trade community
hears, unfortunately, that in many instances there is little or no
follow-up by Customs on outstanding bills. Even if single entry bonds
are required by Customs and proper proof of their existence is received
by Customs, it is still important that the bills be collected because
it is the importers who are required to pay, and if Customs merely
expects to collect from bonding companies, two things result: (a) the
amount of duties collected may be severely less than what is actually
due and (b) the bonding companies may themselves be unable to pay if
their exposure goes beyond their risk planning.
Answer. CBP takes the following actions to collect delinquent bills
from importers:
--Monthly bills are issued and interest is assessed against an
importer of record on unpaid billed amounts;
--Refunds scheduled for payment to an importer of record are offset
against open delinquent bills owed by that importer;
--Sanctions are administered against an importer of record, that
require payment of duties on merchandise currently being
imported before the release of merchandise into the commerce of
the U.S. permitted;
--Formal demand for payment notices are issued and collection
litigation actions are taken against any surety with a bond
contract covering respective delinquent duty liability amounts;
and
--Litigation actions are taken against delinquent importers of record
on any amounts remaining unpaid.
NOTICE AND PROTEST PROCESS
Bills issued to importers of record are not delinquent until
protest period authorized by law has expired or an applicable protest
has been denied. Throughout the collection process, monthly bills are
issued to the importer of record and in addition a formal office of any
billed amount covered by surety bonds that remain unpaid are issued to
the applicable surety. The importer of record can legally challenge
their bill, thus aggressive collection efforts do not commence at this
stage of the process until at least 90 days from the respective entry
liquidation date has passed (19 USC 1541). If protest is filed, no
aggressive collection action is taken until a final resolution of the
protest. A surety may also file protest. On average, 45 percent of duty
bills issued are protested. Interest charges are assessed throughout
the billing process.
AGGRESSIVE COLLECTION AGAINST DELINQUENT ACCOUNTS
When protest is filed, in addition to regular monthly billing
notices, dunning letters are sent to the importer of record demanding
payment. When a protest is not filed or denied, additional dunning
letters are sent to the applicable surety with appropriate background
documents (CF 7501 (formal entry), liquidation worksheets, etc.) as a
follow up to the monthly Formal Demand on Surety for Payment of
Delinquent Bills (612 Report). During any period of delinquency,
refunds payable to an importer of record are used to offset the
delinquent debt they owe. Importers with delinquent bills are
sanctioned, and accordingly must pay duties owed on current imports
before the release of merchandise into the commerce of the United
States is permitted. A surety bond serves as an additional security in
the event that an importer goes out of business, files for bankruptcy
or otherwise fails to timely a pay delinquent amount owed.
Joint Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
OVERSEAS OPERATIONS INTEGRATION
Question. I have heard various reports of how the division of labor
of formerly independent components now merged into DHS is working.
While the melding of functions is proceeding apace stateside, the same
personnel have no clear guidance as to how they are to operate
overseas. Who is in charge of your agencies overseas? Does it vary from
country to country? Does it make sense to have international affairs
offices in both agencies? Do the operational and informational
stovepipes, currently being eliminated here at home, still exist
overseas? If so, what steps are each of you taking to eliminate them?
Answer. The Office of the Secretary has initiated a detailed review
of the role of DHS overseas, including the management structure that
best advances the full range of the international liaison, enforcement,
inspection and services missions of DHS.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Question. The CBP budget includes a request of $10 million for
testing and development of a UAV program. At the same time, I
understand that ICE has been using its own funds to test the possible
deployment of a series of UAVs along the Northern and Southern Borders
to provide real time intelligence to inspectors and agents in the
performance of their duties. What are the unique needs of each agency
that would necessitate the need for development of two separate UAV
programs?
Answer. The Coast Guard operates primarily in the maritime domain
along the coast and well offshore; the Border Patrol operates close to
the border, between the ports of entry both in the maritime and
terrestrial domain, but primarily in the terrestrial domain; and AMO
operates in both areas but has additional requirements (e.g., airspace
security) within internal airspace. Some overlap in geographical and
mission requirements exits, and DHS is working to minimize those. All
operations that support border security require a detection capability,
and because of the operating environment, the platforms that provide
that detection capability may need to be different in order to best
meet the mission requirements. Therefore it makes sense that each
component, as well as Science and Technology, be involved in the
testing of UAVs.
Question. How do these programs relate to one another and would not
the Department's interests be best served by a joint program or one
program which would meet the needs of both agencies (as well as
potentially other DHS entities)?
Answer. BTS and the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorates co-
chair the working group that coordinate each components plans regarding
use and testing of UAVs. Through the Joint Requirements Council (JRC)
the Aviation Management Council, and the UAV Executive Steering
Committee in conjunction with the UAV working group, the Department
will ensure that UAVs will be tested, deployed and eventually procured
in a way that meets the needs of the Department jointly. The UAV
working group is currently participating in an analysis of alternatives
(AoA) for aerial surveillance needs within BTS. Once this report is
complete we will begin a process to establish a DHS-wide concept of
operations (CONOP). The CONOP will identify unique needs and ensure
that redundancy and overlaps are minimal and that systems procured and
deployed on behalf of the DHS are interoperable. At the conclusion of
the AoA, DHS will also determine the need for UAVs as a permanent asset
for its components. It is likely that UAVs could support other current
and emerging sensing technologies to monitor the U.S. borders between
ports of entry, and their acquisition will be considered and evaluated
in terms of cost and performance in view of all the other alternative
contemplated.
The data and results obtained in the component-specific deployments
and feasibility studies will be shared within BTS, and the U.S. Coast
Guard. The evaluations and tests already conducted by ICE/AMO the U.S.
Coast Guard have been shared within the context of the working groups.
Question. If not, please explain in detail how the Department can
justify development of separate programs given limited resources.
Answer. A coordinated effort for UAV development and testing is
being addressed within the Department of Homeland Security.
TETHERED AEROSTATS
Question. What is the value of the aerostat system to the DHS
interdiction and border security mandate?
Answer. At the lower altitudes in which many suspect aircraft
operate, the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) is the main source
of data, which the AMO uses to sort targets and determine operational
responses. The Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) for Border and
Transportation Security (BTS) is a critical component in the
interdiction of illicit air traffickers as well as our border security
system. It is the only fixed system that provides low-level radar
coverage (100-500 feet above ground level) of air targets with
altitude, speed, heading, and Identifier Friend or Foe (electronic
transponder) capability. The system also provides a platform for radio
relay equipment. Without TARS, radar coverage along the southern border
of the United States and Puerto Rico is severely diminished. Also,
modified TARS are able to provide surveillance of maritime targets in
coastal regions and limited land targets. The sea and land capabilities
of the system are not being employed.
Today, nearly all of our joint air interdiction efforts in Northern
Mexico are directly attributable to TARS. When TARS coverage is not
available, BTS (ICE AMO) must rely upon scarce and much more expensive
systems in an attempt to fill the resultant surveillance gaps.
Currently, the alternative is to use our airborne early warning (AEW)
aircraft (low density/high demand and high cost assets). AEW costs can
be 6-14 times higher than the cost per hour of TARS coverage and their
availability is limited since they are tasked with missions in the
source and transit zones, in addition to other homeland security
flights.
Question. Has there been an impact from the non-operational status
of the Lajas, PR TARS? If so, what are the impacts from the loss of
Lajas TARS?
Answer. Prior to the shutting down of the Lajas, PR, TARS site, the
vast majority of suspect air tracks avoided approaching or attempting
to land or over fly the land mass of Puerto Rico, opting instead to
transit to Hispaniola to the west and the Virgin Islands to the east.
Since Lajas was the primary tracking sensor for this area, the
impact of the loss of its information is difficult to assess. However,
until the site returns to operational status, AMO will continue to
monitor the changing threat picture through the use of limited tracking
information from FAA radar, intelligence assessments, and post-seizure
analysis of interdictions.
Question. Should this TARS remain in non-operational status, what
are the prospects for future drug interdiction efforts in Puerto Rico
and the Caribbean? Are there other locations where the aerostats had
existed and were removed (i.e. The Bahamas)? What was the impact to
drug interdiction resulting from the removal of those assets?
Answer. The system's greatest potential would be achieved as a
series of TARS sites linked to form a continuous radar detection
blanket that reaches 150 miles beyond the U.S. border. Maintaining a
complete ``radar fence'' is imperative for several reasons.
--An effective surveillance system of this type serves multiple
national objectives including:
--Homeland Security--counter illicit traffickers (air, land and
sea) and unauthorized border incursions
--Air sovereignty/Advanced Airborne Early Warning
--Air Traffic Control, flight safety
--The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator reports:
--Suspicious air tracks in the CENTAM corridor increased from 50 to
200 in 2003
--Air seizures increased ten-fold in 2003 over the 10-year average
--Maritime successes have forced drug traffickers to alter their
methods to air routes.
--The illicit trafficking and unauthorized border incursion threat
vectors continually change. Therefore, we need a system that is
effective against all threat vectors.
Question. There has been some discussion regarding the possible
transfer of the aerostat systems from the Defense to Homeland Security
departments. Though DOD is the owner of these assets, I understand that
DHS is the primary consumer of the intelligence they collect. Do you
feel that the Defense Department has adequately considered the needs of
DHS, or consulted with you, regarding the continued operation of these
aerostats? What is the Department's position on such a future transfer
of responsibility of these TARS systems?
Answer. DHS believes that this critical system supports homeland
security and provides a critical detection and monitoring capability.
That mission is a DOD responsibility. Operation of TARS should remain
in DOD.
CROSS-TRAINING
Question. Representatives of the Department of Homeland Security
Council (the union comprised of legacy INS employees) reported at a
press conference on March 3 that no more than 5 percent of Immigration
and Customs enforcement personnel have received cross-training. When
does DHS expect to complete cross-training of all existing personnel?
What percentage of all needed cross-training is funded in the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposal?
Answer. OI conducted a manual survey the last week of March 2004.
At that time 830 Special Agents had completed the cross-training. This
accounts for 19 percent of the 4,463 agents targeted for cross-training
in this fiscal year. The Automated Class Management System is expected
to be on-line shortly. At that time, training statistics will be more
readily available.
OI has established a target to complete the cross-training for all
non-supervisory Special Agents GS-05 through GS-13 by the end of fiscal
year 2004. This cross-training will be accomplished using a train-the-
trainer format with initial training being conducted at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).
Cross-training beyond this priority group will be completed in
fiscal year 2005 and will be funded out of base dollars.
PAY DISPARITY
Question. A pay disparity of a full grade exists between
Immigration Special Agents (GS-12) and Customs Special Agents (GS-13).
It appears that the new regulations proposed by the Administration
would hide this disparity within a pay scale, rather than addressing it
directly. Is this correct? If so, what impact is this disparity having
on morale within ICE
Answer. Issues regarding ICE Criminal Investigator pay parity have
been resolved. Over the last year, we gave careful thought to the many
variables involved in this matter prior to integrating the new duties
of the national security and counter-terrorism mission with the legacy
Customs and INS duties. During this time, we submitted proposals to
resolve the issues related to this integration to a sample of the CI
population and higher level ICE and DHS management to give this
sensitive matter the care and consideration it deserved, all of which
took time. All ICE CIs will be assigned to the new position
descriptions. Employees will be either reassigned at their current
grade level or promoted if all eligibility requirements are met with an
effective date of May 2, 2004. We believe this action will enhance
ICE's ability to fulfill its mission, which in turn can improve morale,
productivity and, ultimately, performance of crucial work in national
security and terrorism investigations. Based upon this action, all ICE
CIs will be similarly situated once the new HR system is finalized and
implemented.
ASSET FORFEITURE FUND
Question. Many of the programs now under the purview of ICE were
enhanced by a productive working relationship with the Treasury
Forfeiture Fund. This working relationship still exists today.
Typically, the agencies that contributed to the fund were able to draw
on the same funds to increase mission capabilities in many areas. This
process worked well.
I understand, however, that there are plans to cede control of this
Fund to the Department of Justice. Are you concerned about losing
access to the asset forfeiture fund? What impact would it have on your
investigations if your agency were not able to have access to the
resources that you have, in fact, contributed to the Fund?
Answer. As you note, the Administration has proposed to
consolidation of the Government's Asset Forfeiture Funds within the
Department of Justice. Consolidating operation of these funds offers
enormous opportunities for efficiency gains and reductions to overhead
costs.
If the consolidation proposal is approved by the Congress, DHS will
work with the Department of Justice to ensure that its proceeds from
the fund are maintained and disbursed appropriately. The Department
does not expect the proposed consolidation of the funds and their
administration to affect the availability of fund balances or its
future proceeds.
Question. Is consideration being given to creating a separate/new
Department of Homeland Security Asset Forfeiture Fund to which all DHS
components would contribute and have access?
Answer. The Administration has proposed to consolidate the
government's Asset Forfeiture Funds at the Department of Justice. There
is no current Administration proposal to establish a Department of
Homeland Security Asset Forfeiture Fund.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
Question. In its 1997 Executive Summary, the U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform found that ``reducing the employment magnet is the
lynchpin of a comprehensive strategy to deter unlawful migration.''
Despite this fact, worksite enforcement has been last on the list of
enforcement priorities. According to a Jan. 11, 2004 article published
in the San Diego Union-Tribune, arrests of illegal aliens at worksites
have dropped from 8,027 in 1992 to 1,254 in 2002, and the number of
Notices of Intent to Fine has dropped from 1,063 to 13. The explanation
for this drop in enforcement, according to Joe Greene, deputy assistant
director of ICE, is that employer sanctions don't work and that they
``didn't seem to be making a dent in changing the practices of
employers.'' Does Mr. Greene's statement represent the official policy
of the Bush Administration?
Answer. Since September 11, 2001, ICE's worksite enforcement role
has gone beyond that of merely reducing the job magnet. It has become a
matter of national security. As a measure of its role in national
security, the ICE Headquarters Worksite Enforcement Unit (now called
the Critical Infrastructure Protection unit) has been aligned under the
National Security Division. In the interest of national security, ICE
is increasing its worksite enforcement efforts and has instructed its
field offices to focus their worksite enforcement investigations on
Businesses of National Interest (BNI). ICE defines a BNI as a private
or public entity that provides goods or services vital to our national
security and economy, or whose infiltration would pose a serious threat
to our domestic security.
Question. Your proposed $23 million increase is just a drop in the
bucket. Do you believe that the failure to make worksite enforcement a
more important priority is one of the reasons that there are between 8
and 11 million aliens illegally present in the United States today?
Please provide a list of the number of worksite enforcement actions
undertaken each year between 1999-2003.
Answer. There are numerous overlapping factors contributing to the
Nation's illegal immigration problem. Worksite enforcement is just one
of the immigration enforcement programs that ICE administers.
Statistics show that ICE initiated more worksite enforcement/critical
infrastructure protection cases during fiscal years 2002 and 2003 than
there were in fiscal years 1999 and 2000.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
--------------------------------------------
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cases initiated.................................................... 2,834 1,766 856 3,428 1,547
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENCHMARKS
Question. The ICE budget requests increases for the detention and
removal and institutional removal programs. What benchmarks does the
agency use to determine the specific benefits which will be achieved
through these increases? What performance measures are used to
determine the effectiveness of these programs?
Answer. DRO is currently developing a new performance measure to
demonstrate the expected outcome of improved IRP management. This
measure shows the percentage of IRP removals that had received a final
order of removal prior to the completion of the criminal sentences and
prior to release into DRO custody. In numerical terms it will be
expressed as: number of cases with pre-release final orders/total
number of IRP removals.
Reaching 100 percent on this measure would mean that DRO does not
have to expend detention resources on IRP cases that are still awaiting
a decision from an immigration judge. All IRP cases would already have
a removal order when they complete their criminal sentence, and they
would only need to be detained by DRO for the time that it would take
to arrange and conduct the removal. This would mean a much more
efficient use of resources. Because this measure has not been used
before, it will be baselined at the end of fiscal year 2004.
Canine Teams Last week, as part of his rail and transit security
initiative, Secretary Ridge said that the Department will develop a
rapid deployment Mass Transit K-9 program by using existing Homeland
Security explosive K-9 resources, including those of the Federal
Protective Service.
Once again, it appears that the Department is robbing Peter to pay
Paul. It appears that the Department will be pulling K-9 teams away
from airports and the protection of Federal buildings and using them
for mass transit, thus degrading security in one transportation mode to
begin beefing up security in another mode. By refusing to seek
additional funds to address this very real threat it truly calls into
question the seriousness of this Administration in its effort to secure
the homeland.
Question. Does the initiative announced last week mean that you
will be pulling existing K-9 teams away from protecting Federal
buildings or from airports to use them for rail and mass transit
security?
Answer. In support of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts
to strengthen rail and transit security, the Federal Protective Service
was tasked to develop a plan for ensuring the availability of Explosive
Detector Dog (EDD) support, if and when required. The intent of the
initiative is to be ready to surge EDDs to an area needing heightened
security if that becomes necessary. The law enforcement elements of the
DHS have established EDD capability in support of their primary
missions. Most of these elements maintain existing cooperative
relationships with the state, local, and transit authorities within
their local jurisdictions whereby they participate in joint training
exercises, share information, and respond to requests for support and
assistance on an ad hoc basis. The plan for the EDD-RDF builds upon
these existing relationships and expands it to ensure that DHS EDD
support is available to all jurisdictions across the Nation. The
mission of the EDD-RDF will be to provide expanded capability to mass-
transit systems within the United States by assisting State, local, and
transit authorities in the event of an increased threat situation. The
EDD-RDF is designed to enhance security and explosive detection
capabilities, as well as to provide a strong psychological deterrence
to terrorist activities. The RDF consists of existing DHS EDD assets,
and will be available 24-hours a day, 7-days a week. The EDD teams
should be able to deploy to any location within the United States
within 24 hours. Deployments will be based on specific intelligence
developed within the DHS, response to specific requests for
augmentation, or actual incidents.
LIMITED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES
Question. Your budget request for fiscal year 2005 represents a
more than 9 percent increase over the funding level provided by
Congress for this year. While this is a step in the right direction,
the fact remains that limited budget resources constrain you in the
various types of activities your personnel can take to enforce existing
immigration laws--much less implement a sweeping alien amnesty law such
as the President has suggested. It calls into question the importance
the Administration places on immigration enforcement.
I realize that your budget requests incremental increases in
programs such as institutional removal, fugitive operations,
alternatives to detention, worksite enforcement, compliance teams, and
benefit fraud operations. But these increases are not sufficient.
I do not know what the budget resolution's topline discretionary
spending level will be, nor do I know what allocation this Subcommittee
will receive. However, if we were able to find additional resources for
immigration enforcement, where would you suggest we provide additional
funds?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget provides sufficient
resources for immigration enforcement by more than doubling the number
of worksite investigations currently performed by ICE.
CHIMERA
Question. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
requires all immigration databases to be made interoperable and,
eventually, combined into the Chimera data system, which is to include
all known immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence data on
aliens. What progress has been made thus far on creating the Chimera
data system? What roles are ICE and DHS playing in this process? Which
agency has the lead in ensuring that the Chimera system is created?
Answer. On the 28th of October 2002 the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service published an informational document regarding a
comprehensive information technology planning and infrastructure
modernization program called ``Atlas''. That document was entitled the
``Atlas Business Case'' and provided a concise high-level view that
demonstrated the INS' confidence in Atlas' strategic, technical, and
financial merits. The business case reflected investment principles,
emulation of industry best practices, and compliance with the Clinger-
Cohen Act of 1996, as well as with other related legislative and
government guidance.
Consistent with the urgencies of the Government's post-September 11
security agenda, the Atlas Business Case was subsequently socialized
and promoted within the Department of Justice and sent to the Hill for
budgetary consideration. It was understood that the Atlas Program would
be the fundamental IT infrastructure foundation on which INS business
applications would operate. In its business case, the former INS
illustrated that the successful Atlas transformation strategy would
hinge upon a robust IT infrastructure containing a secure, scalable
backbone that would support all INS business processes. Atlas, it was
shown, would also provide database interoperability at the
infrastructure level and support data sharing at the applications
level. From the beginning, the Atlas design strategy also supported
emerging Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requirements. Unlike the
previous environment, Atlas was proposed to reside within an integrated
Enterprise Architecture (EA) that would harmonize the following:
--System hardware, including mainframes and servers
--Data services, including data and voice circuits
--Data communication equipment, including servers, switches, local
area networks (LAN), wide area networks (WAN), routers, and
cabling
--Computer security, information assurance activities and enterprise
information. This, specifically, is the area that would later
come to be identified as the focus area for the suggested
Chimera project.
--Workstations, including personal computers and laptops and
enterprise-wide software (i.e., office automation, e-mail,
operating system, etc.)
--Operational support to maintain and operate the modernized IT
infrastructure
Perhaps in contemplation of partitioning and re-tasking of the
former INS and its resources, or perhaps in calculating the initial
complexity and cost of implementing Atlas, a counter-suggestion was
made in committee and transmitted back to the Department of Justice and
the former INS that certain specific information security and assurance
attributes of Atlas could be separately expedited and put into action
under a new initiative tentatively labeled ``Chimera''.
However, other program initiatives under way at former INS and the
new Department of Homeland Security were also addressing the same
security concerns. In particular, the ``US VISIT'' program had pursued
the same set of concerns and an active, high-precision approach for
addressing critical information security and assurance requirements.
Because of the US VISIT Program's ongoing and comprehensive
approach to information security and assurance requirements within the
DHS sphere of immigration-related operations, Chimera has been
suspended and is being revisited to determine its potential as a
duplicative effort.
ALIEN REMOVALS
Question. Please compare criminal and non-criminal alien removals
from 1990-2003.
Answer:
Removals: Criminal and Non-criminal
The following data were collected in the Deportable Alien Control
System (DACS). These data include expedited removals. The criteria for
categorizing criminal/non-criminal and the data system used to capture
the data have been consistent since fiscal year 1993. Prior to fiscal
year 1993 the criteria were slightly different. In addition, multiple
data systems were used to collect the data and not all those data
systems supported the 1993+ criteria (see separate table below).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal Non-criminal
Fiscal year Total removals removals removals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993............................................................ 42,542 29,458 13,084
1994............................................................ 45,674 32,512 13,162
1995............................................................ 50,924 33,842 17,082
1996............................................................ 69,680 38,015 31,665
1997............................................................ 114,432 53,214 61,218
1998............................................................ 173,146 60,965 112,181
1999............................................................ 180,948 70,417 110,531
2000............................................................ 186,056 72,114 113,942
2001............................................................ 177,818 72,434 105,384
2002............................................................ 150,237 71,636 78,601
2003............................................................ 188,292 80,355 107,937
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRE-FISCAL YEAR 1993 STATISTICS ON CRIMINAL/NON-CRIMINAL REMOVALS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal Non-criminal
Fiscal year Total removals removals removals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990............................................................ 30,039 8,971 21,068
1991............................................................ 33,189 14,475 18,714
1992............................................................ 43,671 20,098 23,573
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ARREST AUTHORITY
Question. As part of the 1990 Immigration Act, Congress authorized
general arrest authority for all immigration law enforcement officers.
INS never developed regulations to implement this authority. Has DHS
developed such regulations?
Answer. Yes, ICE issued a memo implementing general arrest
authority for the ICE Office of Investigations and Detention and
Removal in November 2003.
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT
Question. The President's budget proposal would increase funding
for worksite enforcement by $23 million. It also proposes the addition
of 150 ``work certification'' positions--a position that does not
currently exist. Does the inclusion of this additional funding mean
that worksite enforcement will become a higher priority for ICE? What
priority will DHS give the nationwide expansion of the workplace
verification pilot programs, as passed by Congress late last year?
Answer. Enforcement efforts targeting companies that break the law
and hire illegal workers will need to increase in order to ensure the
integrity of the temporary worker system. President Bush's Fair and
Secure Immigration Reform proposal provides for an enhanced worksite
enforcement program, and the $23 million requested for fiscal year 2005
for worksite enforcement will allow ICE to enhance its worksite
enforcement program and provide credible deterrence to the hiring of
unauthorized workers. ICE worksite enforcement investigations generally
involve a review of company employment records to verify the
immigration status of workers and to determine if the employer has
committed any violations. ICE special agents also conduct extensive
outreach initiatives to educate employers as to their legal
responsibilities.
Additionally, the Basic Pilot Program, an automated system
administered by USCIS, enables employers to verify the immigration
status of newly hired workers. It is currently available in six States
but, we understand, will be available to employers in all 50 States by
the end of this year. This is a voluntary program and is currently
provided at no cost to employers. Information on the Basic Pilot
Program is available to the public on the USCIS website.
Question. Does the President's budget proposal include sufficient
funding to meet the December deadline for nationwide expansion of the
pilots? Will the new ``work certification'' agents work exclusively to
enforce employer sanctions? What increase in ``Notices of Intent to
Fine'' can be expected from these 150 positions and the doubling of
funding?
Answer. If the new special agent positions are funded and
designated for the worksite enforcement program, it is anticipated that
they will be used in that capacity. It is difficult at this point to
project the increase in Notices of Intent to Fine that will be
accomplished by the enhancements due to factors such as the rate at
which the new personnel can be hired, trained and deployed. The budget
enhancement will enable ICE to place additional emphasis on a
traditional worksite enforcement program that offers credible
deterrence to the hiring of unauthorized workers while retaining its
focus on a Critical Infrastructure Protection program that has produced
national initiatives such as Operation Tarmac and Operation Glowworm.
Question. In May 1998, the Commissioner of the INS announced a new
internal policy on workplace enforcement efforts. This policy required
approval of a written ``operation plan'' by a District Director, a
Regional Director, the Public Affairs Office, and the Community
Relations Office before any worksite enforcement operation to arrest
``one or more unauthorized aliens'' could be undertaken. This policy
was reiterated in a memo to field agents at least as recently as Feb.
13, 2002.
Is this policy still in place?
If so, isn't it unlikely that there will be any increase in
worksite enforcement, considering the obstacles set up by this policy?
If not, what is the current policy?
Answer. No, the old policy is no longer in place. Current policy,
which went into effect on July 24, 2003, states that a Special Agent in
Charge (SAC) may approve a Worksite Enforcement Operation Plan that
targets a Business of National Interest (BNI). A SAC may, at his or her
discretion, delegate this authority to an Associate Special Agent in
Charge, or Acting. The Chief of the Headquarters Critical
Infrastructure Protection unit must approve any worksite enforcement
investigation or enforcement operation that targets an employer or
entity that is not a BNI.
Question. Has someone within DHS been tasked with the job of
reviewing all old policies and recommending changes to those that
actually deter enforcement?
Answer. Old policies are reviewed to assure they contribute to
enhancing enforcement rather than hindering it
Question. The State Criminal Alien Assistance Program provides
reimbursement to States for the costs of incarcerating alien murderers,
rapists, child molesters, drug smugglers and other criminal aliens. The
President's budget proposal eliminates all funding for SCAAP.
Is DHS proposing an alternative to States incarcerating these
criminal aliens or does it expect the costs of incarcerating criminal
aliens to drop dramatically in the next year? And if so, on what basis?
Answer. For fiscal year 2005, the Administration proposes
significant investments in border control and immigration enforcement
efforts. For U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the President
proposes in enhance Border Patrol Surveillance and Sensor Technology by
$64 million for the continued expansion of the Remote Video System
along the southern and northern borders thereby increasing the
effectiveness of Border Patrol Agents. The expanded system will provide
for significantly enhanced detection and monitoring capability between
the ports of entry and increase officer safety. In addition, the fiscal
year 2005 Budget seeks $10 million to develop, procure, deploy, and
operate a system of unmanned aerial vehicles to support the Border
Patrol and other components of CBP.
In addition, the fiscal year 2005 President's Budget proposes
enhancements for numerous immigration enforcement efforts of the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Funds sought will support enhanced
compliance teams, detention and removal efforts, and international
enforcement efforts related to immigration and visa security. These
efforts will enhance our border security and bolster our ability to
enforce our Nation's immigration laws.
INVESTIGATIVE EMPHASIS
Question. One area of concern that legacy immigration personnel
have is whether Customs personnel and issues are dominating the
immigration side of the equation in the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, so that enforcement of immigration laws is given
lower priority than enforcement of customs laws.
What is the number of ICE Special Agents in Charge who are ``legacy
Customs'' personnel? What is the number of ICE Special Agents in Charge
who are ``legacy INS'' personnel?
Answer. As of April 27, 2004, there are 27 SAC offices. Assignments
are as follows:
--16 have ``legacy Customs'' personnel permanently assigned as SACs.
--3 have ``legacy INS'' personnel permanently assigned as SACs.
--Of the 8 remaining, the acting supervisors are: 7 ``legacy
Customs'' and 1 ``legacy INS''.
--Permanent selections in progress: 2 have ``legacy Customs''
selectees and 1 has a ``legacy INS'' selectee.
Question. What is the number of ICE Senior Executive Service (SES)
positions in the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy
Customs'' personnel? What is the number of ICE Senior Executive Service
(SES) positions in the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by
``legacy INS'' personnel?
Answer. There are 22 SES positions in the Office of Investigations.
Seventeen (17) are filled with ``legacy Customs'' personnel and 5 are
filled with ``legacy INS'' personnel.
Question. What is the number of ICE GS-15 supervisory positions in
the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy Customs?''
What is the number of ICE GS-15 supervisory positions in the
Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy INS?''
Answer. As of April 27, 2004, there were 68 GS-1811-15s in the
Office of Investigations, 52 of which are ``legacy Customs'' and 16 are
``legacy INS''.
Question. What is the number of ICE HQ component or division chief
positions in the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy
Customs?'' What is the number of ICE HQ component or division chief
positions in the Investigations program occupied/encumbered by ``legacy
INS?''
Answer. There are 5 divisions at Headquarters in the Office of
Investigations. Three of those divisions are headed by ``legacy
Customs'' personnel and 2 are headed by ``legacy INS'' personnel.
Question. Some have indicated that ``legacy Customs'' personnel,
particularly in managerial positions, have not diligently attended to
their duty to enforce immigration provisions now under the ICE mandate,
essentially treating customs as more important than immigration
enforcement. What steps are being taken to ensure that former Customs
personnel do not neglect their duty to enforce immigration laws?
Answer. In ICE, legacy INS and Customs investigators are being
cross-trained to maximize law enforcement authorities and capabilities.
This force multiplier is intended to expand the capability of our newly
shared authorities in the area of investigations and intelligence. Each
individual ICE agent has a responsibility to utilize all of the tools
in his/her collective INS and Customs enforcement arsenal to identify,
investigate, prevent and deter criminals or terrorists from exploiting
vulnerabilities as a means of harming our country.
Question. What is the number of 1801-series Detention & Removal
Officers in ICE? Whereas the 1801s are responsible for carrying out the
administrative enforcement and removal provisions of the immigration
code, how are they distributed nationwide? How are they empowered to do
their duty more effectively and efficiently using technology and in
coordination and cooperation with State and local law enforcement?
Answer:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Immigration
District Deportation Enforcement
Officer Agent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anchorage............................... 5 4
Atlanta................................. 25 35
Baltimore............................... 21 23
Boston.................................. 32 45
Buffalo................................. 21 113
Chicago................................. 37 42
Cleveland............................... 4 3
Dallas.................................. 29 46
Denver.................................. 21 56
Detroit................................. 9 8
HQ...................................... 86 0
El Centro............................... 0 11
El Paso................................. 35 133
Helena.................................. 6 12
Honolulu................................ 8 9
Harlingen............................... 31 130
Houston................................. 41 50
Kansas City............................. 13 28
Los Angeles............................. 84 145
Miami................................... 57 178
Newark.................................. 42 43
New Orleans............................. 40 88
New York City........................... 59 158
Omaha................................... 7 23
Philadelphia............................ 35 42
Phoenix................................. 51 162
Portland, ME............................ 2 4
Portland, OR............................ 8 21
San Juan................................ 11 42
Seattle................................. 23 36
San Francisco........................... 44 85
San Antonio............................. 24 79
San Diego............................... 60 222
St. Paul................................ 9 16
Washington, DC.......................... 18 14
-------------------------------
Total............................. 998 2,106
===============================
Grand Total....................... 3,104
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DRO is directly involved with State and local law enforcement
agencies in the search and apprehension of fugitives. DRO continues to
expand the use of technology in an effort to apprehend fugitive aliens.
A recent example is providing the officers of the Miami Fugitive
Operations Team with Blackberry devices. A Blackberry device will
eventually enable Officers to search names in NCIC (criminal history)
and the Division of Motor Vehicles. In addition, we are entering into
an agreement with the United States Marshals Service to expand our
databases. The agreement will allow DRO and the USMS to compare
databases on warrants and select and search for fugitives of joint
interest. DRO is also planning to purchase laptop computers with
wireless modems so Officers can conduct field inquires. DRO is
expanding the use of commercial databases containing biographical
information on a person, such as last known address, in an effort to
locate and apprehend fugitives.
Question. What is the number of 1811-series Special Agent/Criminal
Investigator personnel in ICE? How are they distributed geographically?
Whereas 1811s are the ``detectives'' responsible for complex,
protracted investigative casework largely dealing with the criminal
provisions of the immigration code, how do they coordinate and
cooperate with both 1801s and with State and local law enforcement,
especially pursuant to cases where State or local officers encounter an
alien lawbreaker?
Answer. As of April 27, 2004, there were 5,464 special agents
assigned to the Office of Investigations, as follows.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Organizational Component On Board
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HQ--Office of Investigations............................ 289
SAC Atlanta, GA......................................... 181
SAC Baltimore, MD....................................... 78
SAC Boston, MA.......................................... 155
SAC Buffalo, NY......................................... 109
SAC San Juan, PR........................................ 128
SAC Chicago, IL......................................... 312
SAC Dallas, TX.......................................... 139
SAC Denver, CO.......................................... 109
SAC Detroit, MI......................................... 175
SAC El Paso, TX......................................... 220
SAC Houston, TX......................................... 206
SAC Los Angeles, CA..................................... 389
SAC Miami, FL........................................... 335
SAC Newark, NJ.......................................... 143
SAC New Orleans, LA..................................... 221
SAC New York, NY........................................ 382
SAC St Paul, MN......................................... 96
SAC San Antonio, TX..................................... 315
SAC San Diego, CA....................................... 330
SAC San Francisco, CA................................... 260
SAC Seattle, WA......................................... 216
SAC Tampa, FL........................................... 177
SAC Tucson, AZ.......................................... 143
SAC Phoenix, AZ......................................... 95
SAC Washington, DC...................................... 108
SAC Philadelphia, PA.................................... 107
SAC Honolulu, HI........................................ 46
---------------
TOTAL............................................. 5,464
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A key objective of DHS and ICE is to share information with our
State and local partners in law enforcement that contributes directly
to the security and safety of the United States and the American
people. The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) in Vermont is the
vital DHS and ICE point of contact with the entire law enforcement
community and is on the cutting edge of the Federal effort to share
critical enforcement information with state, county, local and even
international law enforcement officers. It is a national, single point
of contact, law enforcement center that provides timely immigration
status and identity information and real-time assistance to local,
state and Federal law enforcement agencies on aliens suspected,
arrested or convicted of criminal activity. The primary user of the
LESC continues to be State and local law enforcement officers seeking
information about an alien encountered in the course of their daily
duties.
Question. Is ICE requiring both legacy Customs and legacy INS
enforcement personnel to attend cross-training programs? What
percentage of legacy Customs vs. INS personnel has actually completed
such training? Does ICE intend that all enforcement personnel will
undergo such cross-training, and if so, when is it expected to be
completed?
Answer. Yes, all OI Special Agents will be cross-trained in both
legal and investigative blocks of instruction.
OI conducted a manual survey the last week of March 2004. At that
time 830 Special Agents had completed the cross-training. This accounts
for 19 percent of the 4,463 agents targeted for cross-training in this
fiscal year. Of the 830 who have completed the cross-training, 57
percent are legacy immigration agents and 43 percent are legacy customs
agents. The Automated Class Management System is expected to be on-line
shortly. At that time, training statistics will be more readily
available.
OI has established a target to complete the cross-training for all
non-supervisory Special Agents GS-05 through GS-13 by the end of fiscal
year 2004. This cross-training will be accomplished using a train-the-
trainer format with initial training being conducted at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).
Cross-training beyond this priority group will be completed in
fiscal year 2005.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. Mr. Bonner, Mr. Garcia, there is now a hiring freeze in
place at both your agencies, as well as at Mr. Aguirre's agency, and I
understand you are facing a budget shortfall of more than 12 percent.
It is outrageous to hear about a hiring freeze in critical national
security agencies after the Bush Administration has strongly opposed
attempts by the Ranking Member and many many others in Congress to
increase funding for DHS. How could this have happened, and what
funding does Congress need to provide so you can at least replace law
enforcement agents who resign from your agencies?
Answer. The budgets for our agencies have increased substantially
since fiscal year 2001 and we are not facing a budget shortfall. As a
result of budget reviews of our agencies and the Department, we
supported a hiring freeze as a prudent measure in the face of
uncertainties in budget allocation and adjustments in fee collection
forecasts.
The Department established a review team composed of staff from the
CFO's Office, BTS, CIS, and the Coast Guard to assess the situation.
The review team engaged in a detailed budget reconciliation effort
among the three Bureaus. The team examined the allocation of resources
and services throughout the three Bureaus, and this effort resulted in
an immediate internal realignment of $212 million. A subsequent
internal realignment of approximately $270 million is possible, pending
additional discussions and coordination of the final documentation and
billing.
The Congress has recognized that funds may need to be realigned
between ICE, CBP, and CIS. In the Joint Explanatory Statement (H. Rpt.
108-280) accompanying the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-90), the Congress recognized
that the budgetary resources may need to be realigned. Specifically,
the Congress noted: ``The conferees are aware that the Department is
conducting a comprehensive review of administrative and other mission
responsibilities, particularly as they affect ICE and other agencies
that have inherited multiple legacy missions. While funding provided by
this conference agreement is based on the best possible information
available, the conferees understand there may be a need to adjust
funding to conform to the decisions resulting from the review.'' A
similar statement was included under the heading discussing CBP.
Over the past year, these three Bureaus have undergone major,
successful reorganizations by incorporating programs, staff, and
resources from legacy programs at the Immigration and Naturalization
Service and the Customs Service (as well as the General Services
Administration and the Department of Agriculture) and a realignment of
functions to strengthen the security of the Nation. Through this
process, which included successful reassignment of over 50,000
employees from the legacy agencies, robust hiring continued to ensure
adequate staffing to accomplish mission objectives. However, the
transformation effort has not been without challenges and each Bureau
continues to integrate everything from budgets to uniforms to Standard
Operating Procedures in virtually every area. We have made great
progress to date.
During a review of the status of execution of the fiscal year 2004
budget, the ICE and CBP determined that implementation of hiring
restrictions was a prudent managerial measure not just to stay within
2004 appropriations, but for mission-related objectives. CIS had
already instituted hiring restrictions since the beginning of the year
due to lower than anticipated fee projections. Additional focus was,
and is required to work through funding realignments related to the
establishment of the three new Bureaus. This work recognized the
tremendous effort of the Administration and the Congress to establish
the Department but also acknowledged that some of the finer details on
funding and provision of support services required negotiations and
reconciliation between the three Bureaus. The work has been on-going,
but agreements have been recently reached to realign funds to cover
costs of services incurred by the Bureaus. Formal memoranda of
agreement will be implemented between the three Bureaus, which will
help ensure that funding is aligned with services rendered.
The Department is committed to the security of the Nation and we
will continue to work towards successful establishment of the three
Bureaus, CBP, CIS, and ICE. To that end, we will continue to work with
the Congress, in particular through the appropriations process, to
ensure that funds are aligned to mission objectives consistent with
Congressional intent.
Question. Mr. Garcia, I am pleased that you and other components of
the Executive Branch are making such good use of the Law Enforcement
Support Center, located in my home State of Vermont--including its role
in Operation Predator. The LESC provides information to State and local
police departments throughout the Nation, regarding the immigration
status and identities of aliens suspected, arrested, or convicted of
criminal activity. You joined me in Vermont last August to announce
expanded capabilities at the LESC. I look forward to continuing to work
with you to ensure that the LESC is as helpful as possible to law
enforcement officers throughout our Nation.
At the same time, I want to ensure that adequate funding is
available for the LESC to perform its various functions. The
President's proposal did not include a specific budget for the LESC,
leaving me only to assume that the base budget from this year will be
continued in the upcoming fiscal year. Considering the increased
demands on the LESC and their expanded capabilities, how will you
ensure that the LESC has the resources it needs to perform its vital
role of supporting Federal, State and local law enforcement?
Answer. All of the new or increased activity levels at the LESC
that are contributing significantly to national security and public
safety have been accomplished within existing resources. ICE has
clearly recognized the value of the LESC as demonstrated by the steps
taken to increase productivity and is determined to expand the role of
the LESC not only within the broader law enforcement community, but
also within DHS and ICE.
In order to ensure the LESC is properly positioned to address its
expanding workloads and roles within the law enforcement community, ICE
conducted a detailed analysis of current and projected operational
requirements and the resources that would be necessary to assure their
continuation and expansion. That analysis, which included examination
of staffing, facility and other resource needs, resulted in a
comprehensive, strategic document. Some of the recommendations have
already been implemented or are in the planning or implementation
process.
Question. Mr. Aguirre, the President's budget proposes a 40 percent
cut in the amount of directly appropriated funds for the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), from the nearly $235
million appropriated for the current year to $140 million for fiscal
year 2005. At the same time, the President has proposed a guest worker
program that would significant increase the CIS workload.
Why is the President proposing a 40 percent cut in an agency whose
workload he wants to increase dramatically?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget is not proposing a
cut in the USCIS budget. In fact, the President's budget includes a
$300 million increase over last years levels, including an additional
$60 million in discretionary funding towards backlog reduction efforts
aimed at achieving a 6-month processing time for all immigration
benefit applications by fiscal year 2006.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget reflects the recent changes
by USCIS to adjust its fee schedule. This fee adjustment includes
amounts for administrative support services ($155 million) previously
funded through appropriated funds (tax dollars). Thus, this proposal
has no impact on the USCIS budget except for the fact that the funding
source for these services will be by way of fees versus tax dollars.
With the exception of the $140 million in appropriated backlog
reduction funds, USCIS will be a wholly fee-funded agency in fiscal
year 2005.
Beginning in fiscal year 2002, USCIS has been receiving a total of
$100 million in funds for backlog reduction to achieve the 6-month
processing time. The $100 million is made up of $80 million in
appropriated funds and $20 million in premium processing fees. The
President is proposing a 60 percent increase for backlog reduction
efforts in fiscal year 2005, bringing the total backlog reduction funds
from $100 million to $160 million ($140 million in appropriated funds
and $20 million from the premium processing fees).
Question. Speaking of the guest worker program, I wrote to the
President in January and asked him to submit a legislative proposal to
Congress that would implement his plan. As you know, we have a short
legislative year ahead of us, but I have still not received a response.
Are the media reports suggesting the President has shelved his guest
worker program accurate? If not, why has he not submitted proposed
legislation? Will he do so?
Answer. On January 7, 2004, the President announced principles in
creating a new temporary worker program that would match willing
foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when no Americans can be
found to fill the jobs. We look forward to working with Congress to
develop legislation that incorporates the best ideas for the American
worker and our foreign visitors. Through the principles outlined by the
President, the best course to the end goal of opportunity, security,
safety, compassion, jobs and growth can be achieved.
Question. President Bush has promised to reduce the average wait
time for applicants for immigration benefits to 6 months by 2006. In
light of that goal, and the increased burden the President would place
on the CIS through the guest worker program, why did the President's
not seek increased funds for backlog reduction?
Answer. As stated above, the President is proposing a 60 percent
increase for backlog reduction efforts in fiscal year 2005, bringing
the total backlog reduction funds from $100 million to $160 million
($140 million in appropriated funds and $20 million from the premium
processing fees).
Question. Mr. Aguirre, I have joined with many other Senators in
writing to Secretary Ridge and opposing the potential outsourcing of
1100 Immigration Information Officers (IIOs). My colleagues and I
believe that these IIOs perform important work--including background
checks on applicants for immigration benefits--that we should not be
delegating to the private sector, especially at a time of continuing
threats of terrorism. (A) As the supervisor of these IIOs, do you
believe they are performing their jobs well? (B) Do you believe they
should be replaced by private contractors?
Answer. Many IIOs individually do an excellent job. But we have a
very significant customer challenge that we have yet to meet. INS was
known for long lines, and lengthy waits at its local offices, and was
not considered particularly responsive to written correspondence.
Clearly we need to make some changes. USCIS has already started the
process with expansions of our toll-free call center services, case
status on-line, InfoPass appointments, and initiatives to reduce lines
and improve customer service. Introducing an element of competition
through the A-76 process should further stimulate innovation and
improvements, with the current workforce being one of the competitors
in this process.
Question. Mr. Garcia, I have supported and helped to obtain funding
for Legal Orientation Proceedings for immigration detainees, with the
view that the immigration system works better for all parties when
detained aliens are informed as to whether they have a legitimate legal
case to stay in the United States. Congress appropriated $1 million for
orientation proceedings in fiscal year 2003, but DHS has still not
transferred that money to the Executive Office for Immigration Review
so the proceedings can take place. Can you tell me when that money will
be transferred, and why it has taken so long?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
attention and funding Congress has appropriated annually to fund the
Legal Orientation Program for Immigration Detainees. As you know, the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was abolished on
February 28, 2003, shortly after the fiscal year 2003 Appropriations
was signed into law on February 20, 2003. One of its successor
agencies, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), began to
manage the funding appropriated for the Legal Orientation Program. Late
in fiscal year 2002, the former INS transferred $1 million to the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for the Legal
Orientation Program. However, this transfer was not made in fiscal year
2003. Also, throughout fiscal year 2003, EOIR had fiscal year 2002
funding available to use for their Legal Orientation Program. In fiscal
year 2004, ICE has transferred $1 million to EOIR for the Legal
Orientation Program, under a reimbursable agreement that was signed on
February 2, 2004.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Senator Cochran. This concludes our scheduled hearings on
the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security. I appreciate the cooperation
and assistance of all members of the subcommittee, especially
the distinguished Senator of West Virginia, my friend, Senator
Byrd, as well as the dedicated hard work of the staff of this
subcommittee.
The hearing is recessed.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., Tuesday, March 30, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]