[Senate Hearing 108-676]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:08 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Cochran, Shelby, Burns, Inouye,
Dorgan, and Feinstein.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Missile Defense Agency
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD T. KADISH, U.S.
AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Good morning, General Kadish. We're
pleased to have you here. Pardon me for being a few minutes
late.
This is your 5th year before us, General, and we think
you've done a tremendous job in helping to secure a reliable
missile defense system for our Nation. You've provided the
leadership and vision to achieve that goal and we're grateful
and thankful for your service. And I'm pleased that I've been
able to travel with you and to understand your plans. We know
this is your last appearance before the subcommittee and we do
wish you the very best in whatever your endeavors may be. But
just keep in mind, my friend, my first father-in-law said that
the English language is the only language in which retire means
other than go to bed.
On December 16, 2002, President Bush stated the Department
of Defense (DOD) shall proceed with plans to deploy a set of
Initial Missile Defense capabilities beginning in 2004. By the
end of this year the United States will in fact have Initial
Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities and we're proud that you
chose Alaska to have a role in that development. Having such a
system will hopefully mean that we'll never have to use it in
the future. So we look forward to hearing about what you've
done to date and to giving us an update on the overall Missile
Defense program that you have fashioned and led so well.
Before I open, let me turn to my colleague, my co-chairman
for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much. I wish to associate
myself with the remarks of the Chairman and to say to General
Kadish I thank you very much for your tireless dedication to
your country, to the Missile Defense program, and DOD. I wish
to congratulate you and best wishes on your future endeavors.
Thank you, sir.
May I have the rest of the statement made part of the
record?
Senator Stevens. Without objection, so ordered.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Today I am pleased to join our chairman in welcoming to the
committee Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency.
General, I understand that this will be your last time
testifying before us. You have held this position for nearly
five years--much longer than most agency Director tours. You
have certainly demonstrated your tremendous dedication and
stamina, and I thank you for your tireless dedication to the
missile defense program, to the Department of Defense, and to
our country--congratulations and best wishes on your upcoming
retirement.
Through your five years of service, General, you understand
better than anyone that missile defense is a program of great
interest to many, and one with plenty of controversy.
This September the Department plans to deploy a limited
national missile defense system. This is an exciting
achievement following decades of work in the field. Some of
your critics, however, argue that the system is not yet ready,
and more operational testing needs to be done to ensure that
this limited system actually works. I look forward to hearing
your response to these critics during our discussions today.
Missile defense is, by its very nature, a complex program.
Despite successes in recent tests--and for that I commend you--
there are still many technological hurdles to overcome, and
much work remains to be done.
This year's budget request continues the growth we have
seen in recent years for the missile defense programs. Over $10
billion is in the President's budget for missile defense
activities, an increase of $1 billion over last year's
appropriation. Sustaining this magnitude of increases in the
out-years will be challenging.
Despite these challenges, the missile defense program is
one of the most critical national security issues of today and
for the foreseeable future. The ballistic missile threat to the
United States, to our troops deployed overseas, and to our
allies and friends around the world will continue to
proliferate.
This committee understands the importance of a strong
missile defense to our national security, and we will do our
best to continue to support your efforts. Nevertheless, given
the risks and rising costs of this program we will remain ever
vigilant in our oversight.
General, I look forward to our discussions today on the
fiscal year 2005 budget request and the priorities and
challenges of the missile defense program.
Senator Stevens. Senator Shelby.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I just want to echo what you
and Senator Inouye have said about General Kadish. He served
with great distinction and he served in this post for 5 years.
That's extraordinary, General, and we wish you the best and we
all hope to see you before you actually retire.
Senator Stevens. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Senator Burns was here before I was.
Senator Stevens. He's a stealth Senator. Senator Burns.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CONRAD BURNS
Senator Burns. The day I become a stealth, that will become
a great day. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to offer my
statement for the record today, and I also want to associate my
words with the chairman. General Kadish, we have traveled
together and 5 years is a long time, especially in the work
that you were doing and you've done it well. I don't know what
you're going to do in retirement and you know what? I don't
care. But we hope it's, you know, the last, General Fogelman
retired, you know, why, he thought he went from chief, you
know, he's got one of the great businesses there is in
Southwestern Colorado. And he's really enjoying it very much;
Ron's Johns. So retirement means many things to many people.
But I will tell you we see him every now and again and we want
to continue to see you around here every now and again too,
because we rely on your advice and your good sense about this
very important issue. So feel free to drop by any time and if
you're going to retire, why, just have a great retirement.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Conrad Burns
General Kadish, it appears you have come to brief this
Committee on the Missile Defense Agency budget for the last
time. Thank you for your service to our great Nation. You have
been critical to the continuing success of the Missile Defense
Agency. I wish you luck in your future endeavors.
I read daily of our forces in the field using American
ingenuity to develop unconventional solutions to solve problems
they face. I appreciate your efforts to pursue innovation in
technology, acquisition processes, and deployment strategy, to
meet the challenges of the evolving ballistic missile threat.
As we move into the phase of what you are calling ``Initial
Defensive Operations'', to provide an initial capability to
defeat an incoming ballistic missile threat, I look forward to
the growth of this capability to allow us to defeat
increasingly complex, and numerous missile threats launched
against our homeland, our fleet, and our deployed forces
overseas.
The technical challenges you face are formidable, but the
stakes are high for our Nation. We must counter the threat of
ballistic missile proliferation. I hope you are right in
stating that the deployment of the layered missile defense
program could persuade rogue states to forego their plans to
develop ballistic missiles, but I reserve a sense of skepticism
of this possibility.
We centralized missile defense system development with the
formation of your agency in DOD to synergize the service
solutions, which, at the time, competed for defense dollars
within and between the services. I look forward to the layered
system that leverages this centralization to develop open
architectures, common interfaces, and standardized subsystems,
minimize the system operational costs, and increase competition
among the Industry providers of these systems.
While I support the flexibility provided by the new
acquisition approach, this flexibility brings with it greater
exposure to risks. The budgetary classification of the
resources within the Missile Defense Agency, which are
primarily advanced technology development, do not require the
customary depth of oversight, which comes from Defense
Acquisition Boards making recommendations to transition between
budget resource types. I caution you to be judicious with the
resources we provide your agency.
You are developing international partnerships with some of
our allies, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan. I
support this effort to share the development burden and benefit
with our key allies in the war on terror. They have remained
part of our coalition in these difficult times, and our shared
values will keep our alliance strong.
Again, I thank you for being here today and look forward to
the discussion this morning. Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Senator Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. General Kadish,
congratulations to you on your successful tenure as Director of
the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). And your skill has been quite
obvious in how you have helped mobilize the resources of our
Defense Department and our Government to carry out the
provisions of the National Missile Defense Act that the
Congress passed, and was signed by the President several years
ago. We think you've done a magnificent job and we appreciate
very much your hard work over this long period of years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Thank you, Senator.
General, we've all been around the military long enough to
know you made a real sacrifice in sticking to this job. You
could have moved on and had four stars but you have finished
this job and we congratulate you and we admire you and we're
thankful that you did it. Thank you, sir.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RONALD T. KADISH
General Kadish. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye,
members of the committee. I would like to express my
appreciation for the help of this committee in making the 5
years that I served as the Director of the Missile Defense
Agency as productive and pleasant as they have been. My
association with this committee has been one of the highlights
of my tenure in the Missile Defense Agency, and I'd just like
to point out for Senator Burns' benefit that I look at it as
leaving active duty, not retiring. But it is a change.
We have made tremendous progress in the Missile Defense
Technology Program over the last 5 years and certainly over the
last year. And if I might, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to just have
a very brief statement this morning and I'd like for my full
statement to be entered into the record, if you so choose.
Our direction from the President and the Congress is to
develop the capability to defend the United States, our allies
and friends and deployed forces against all ranges of missiles
in all phases of flight. And I'm pleased to report today that
we're on track to do that just this year.
Beginning in 2001, we proposed building over time, a single
integrated ballistic missile defense system of layered
defenses, and we structured the program to deal with the
enormity and the complexity of that task. Our budget request
allows us to continue our aggressive research and development
effort to design, build and test elements of the system in an
evolutionary way, and it provides for modest fielding over the
next several years.
With an evolutionary capability based acquisition approach
and our aggressive research, development, test and evaluation
(RDT&E) program we can put capability into the field, we can
test it, we can train with it, we can get comfortable with it,
we can learn what works well and what does not and improve it
as soon as we can. That is, in a nutshell, what our program
does.
We are working routinely with Admiral Ellis from STRATCOM
and the war-fighting community. Once the system is placed on
alert we'll continue to conduct tests to gain even greater
confidence in the operational capability that we have. We are
working very closely with Mr. Christie and the operational test
community. The thousands of tests we have conducted in the air,
on the ground and in the laboratory with our modeling and
simulations help identify problems so we can fix them and
highlight any problems so we can address them directly.
The RDT&E program is working. We are focused on the
development of the most promising near-term elements, namely
the ground-based midcourse and Aegis ballistic missile defense
(BMD). But the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD,
is progressing very well and will add capabilities to engage in
the late midcourse and terminal layers very soon.
In this budget we increased the investment and development
of the boost phase layer, which we believe can offer a high
payoff improvement to the system. Two program elements, the
Directed Energy Laser Program and the Kinetic Energy
Interceptor Program for hit-to-kill capability, represent
parallel paths and complement each other.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, thanks to the tens of
thousands of talented and dedicated people across this country,
America's missile defense program is on track. The Missile
Defense Agency is doing what we told the Congress we would do,
and your support, in particular this committee's support, has
been critical to the progress we've made.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'm ready to answer any
questions you might have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is an
honor to be here today to present the Department of Defense's fiscal
year 2005 Missile Defense Program and budget.
Today, I would like to outline what we are doing in the program,
why we are doing it, and how we are progressing. I also will address
why we proposed taking the next steps in our evolutionary development
and fielding program. Then I want to emphasize the importance of the
acquisition strategy we are using and close with some observations
about testing and the Department's approach to Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) management.
Our National Intelligence Estimates continue to warn that in coming
years we will face ballistic missile threats from a variety of actors.
The recent events surrounding Libya's admission concerning its
ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction programs remind us
that we are vulnerable. Ballistic missiles armed with any type warhead
would give our adversaries the capability to threaten or inflict
catastrophic damage.
Our direction from the President is to develop the capability to
defend the United States, our allies and friends, and deployed forces
against all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight. This budget
continues to implement that guidance in two ways.
First it continues an aggressive Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) effort to design, build and test the elements of a
single Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in an evolutionary way.
Second, it provides for modest fielding of this capability over the
next several years.
We recognize the priority our nation and this President ascribe to
missile defense, and our program is structured to deal with the
enormity and complexity of the task. The missile defense investments of
four Administrations and ten Congresses are paying off. We are
capitalizing on our steady progress since the days of the Strategic
Defense Initiative and will present to our Combatant Commanders by the
end of 2004 an initial missile defense capability to defeat near-term
threats of greatest concern.
ballistic missile defense system
Layered defenses help reduce the chances that any hostile missile
will get through to its target. They give us better protection by
enabling engagements in all phases of a missile's flight and make it
possible to have a high degree of confidence in the performance of the
missile defense system. The reliability, synergy, and effectiveness of
the BMD system can be improved by fielding overlapping, complementary
capabilities. In other words, the ability to hit a missile in boost,
midcourse, or terminal phase of flight enhances system performance
against an operationally challenging threat. See Chart 1.
Chart 1.--BMD System Engagement Phases
All of these layered defense elements must be integrated. And there
must be a battle management, command and control system that can engage
or reengage targets as appropriate. And it all must work within a
window of a few minutes. We believe that a layered missile defense not
only increases the chances that the hostile missile and its payload
will be destroyed, but it also can be very effective against
countermeasures and must give pause to potential adversaries.
So, beginning in 2001 we proposed development of a joint,
integrated BMD system. Yet such unprecedented complexity is not handled
well by our conventional acquisition processes. At that time, the
Services had responsibility for independently developing ground-based,
sea-based, and airborne missile defenses. The Department's approach was
element- or Service-centric, and we executed multiple Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).
Today, as a result of defense transformation and a streamlined
process instituted by the Secretary of Defense in 2001 to enhance
overall integration, we are managing the BMD system as a single MDAP
instead of a loose collection of Service-specific autonomous systems.
We have come to understand over the years, though, that no one
technology, defense basing mode, or architecture can provide the BMD
protection we need. Redundancy is a virtue, and so we established a
system-centric approach involving multiple elements designed,
developed, and built with full integration foremost in our minds. When
we made this change, we instituted a ``capability-based'' acquisition
process instead of a ``threat-based'' process. Let me explain why this
is important.
Most defense programs are developed with a specific threat--or
threats--in mind. Twenty years ago, the ballistic missile threat was
pretty much limited to Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic missiles. But today we have to
consider a wide range of missile threats posed by a long list of
potential adversaries. And those threats are constantly changing and
unpredictable. Our potential adversaries vary widely in their military
capabilities and rates of economic and technological development. Many
of them have a tradition of political instability.
Weapon systems developed using a threat-based system are guided and
governed by Operational Requirements Documents (ORDs). These documents
establish hard thresholds and objectives for the development and
deployment of every component. ORDs may be entirely appropriate for
most development programs because they build linearly on existing
systems. For example, aircraft program managers understand lift and
thrust from previous programs going all the way back to the Wright
brothers.
Not so for missile defense. Most missile defense development takes
place in uncharted waters. Any ORD developed for an integrated, layered
missile defense system would be largely guesswork. ORDs rely on very
precise definitions of the threat and can remain in effect for years,
making this process all the more debilitating for the unprecedented
engineering work we are doing. The reality that we may have to
introduce groundbreaking technologies on a rapid schedule and also deal
with threats that are unpredictable render the threat-based acquisition
structure obsolete.
A capability-based approach relies on continuing and comprehensive
assessments of the threat, available technology, and what can be built
to do an acceptable job, and does not accommodate a hard requirement
that may not be appropriate.
Perhaps the most telling difference between the two acquisition
approaches is that our capabilities to perform are updated every four
to eight months to reflect and accommodate the pace of our progress. We
are no longer compelled to pursue a one hundred percent solution for
every possible attack scenario before we can provide any defense at
all. We are now able to develop and field a system that provides some
capability that we do not have today with the knowledge that we will
continue to improve that system over time. We call this evolutionary,
capability-based development and acquisition.
initial defensive capability--the beginning
On December 16, 2002, President Bush directed that we begin
fielding a missile defense system in 2004 and 2005. The President's
direction recognizes that the first systems we field will have a
limited operational capability. He directed that we field what we have,
then improve what we have fielded. The President thus codified in
national policy the principle of Evolutionary, Capability-Based
Acquisition and applied it to missile defense.
The President's direction also builds on the 1999 National Missile
Defense Act. Under this Act, deployment shall take place ``as soon as
technologically possible.'' The fact is that ballistic missile defense
has proven itself technologically possible. Not only have most of the
well-publicized flight tests been successful, but so have the equally
important computer simulations and software tests. Those tests and
upgrades will continue for a long time to come--long after the system
is fielded and long after it is deemed operational. After all, this is
the heart of evolutionary, capability-based acquisition. This is not a
concept designed to trick or mislead. It is simply the logical response
to the following question: Defenseless in the face of unpredictable
threats, which would we rather have--some capability today or none as
we seek a one hundred percent solution?
When we put the midcourse elements (GMD and Aegis BMD) of the BMD
system on alert, we will have a capability that we currently do not
have. In my opinion, a capability against even a single reentry vehicle
has significant military utility. Even that modest defensive capability
will help reduce the more immediate threats to our security and enhance
our ability to defend our interests abroad. We also may cause
adversaries of the United States to rethink their investments in
ballistic missiles. Because of this committee's continued support we
will have some capability this year against near-term threats.
I must emphasize that what we do in 2004 and 2005 is only the
starting point--the beginning--and it involves very basic capability.
Our strategy is to build on this beginning to make the BMD system
increasingly more effective and reliable against current threats and
hedge against changing future threats.
We have made significant strides towards improving our ability to
intercept short-range missiles. Two years ago we began sending Patriot
Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) missiles to units in the field. Based on
the available data, the Patriot system, including PAC-3, successfully
intercepted all threatening short-range ballistic missiles during
Operation Iraqi Freedom last year. Today, it is being integrated into
the forces of our allies and friends, many of whom face immediate
short- and medium-range threats. We believe it is the only combat-
tested missile defense capability in the world.
This year we are expanding our country's missile defense portfolio
by preparing for alert status a BMD system to defend the United States
against a long-range ballistic missile attack. Chart 2 provides a basic
description of how we could engage a warhead launched against the
United States.
Chart 2.--Engagement Sequence
Last year, we made it clear that this initial capability would be
very basic if it were used. We also emphasized that instead of building
a test bed that might be used operationally, we would field more
interceptors and have them available for use while we continue to test.
Because the test bed provides the infrastructure for this initial
capability, the additional budget request for the twenty Block 2004
interceptors and associated support was about $1.5 billion in fiscal
year 2004 and fiscal year 2005.
Forces to be placed on alert as part of the initial configuration
include up to 20 ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg AFB, an upgraded Cobra Dane radar on Eareckson Air Station
in Alaska, and an upgraded early warning radar in the United Kingdom.
We are procuring equipment for three BMD-capable Aegis cruisers with up
to ten SM-3 missiles to be available by the end of 2005. The Navy is
working very closely with us on ship availability schedules to support
that plan. Additionally, ten Aegis destroyers will be modified with
improved SPY-1 radars to provide flexible long-range surveillance and
track capability of ICBM threats by the end of 2005, with an additional
five destroyers with this capability by 2006, for a total of 15 Aegis
BMD destroyers and three Aegis BMD cruisers.
The fiscal year 2005 request funds important for Block 2006
activities to enhance those capabilities and system integration, which
I will discuss in a moment.
The Missile Defense Agency, the Combatant Commanders, the Joint
Staff, the Military Services, and the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E) are working together to prepare for Initial
Defensive Operations (IDO). Using the core capability provided by
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) and augmenting it with the
appropriate Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications
(C\2\BM/C) infrastructure between Combatant Commanders and exploiting
the Aegis contribution in a surveillance and track mode, we have
created an initial capability from which we can evolve.
Our current fielding plans have been built on the Test Bed
configuration we proposed two years ago and are within 60 days of our
schedule. Silo and facility construction at Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California is proceeding well.
Preparations at Eareckson Air Station in Shemya, Alaska are on track.
Over 12,000 miles of fiber optic cables connecting major communication
nodes are in place, along with nine satellite communications links. We
are in the process of upgrading the Early Warning Radar at Beale Air
Force Base and are well underway building the sea-based X-band radar.
Our brigade at Schriever Air Force Base and battalion fire control
nodes at Fort Greely are connected to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations
Center. The C\2\BM/C between combatant commanders, so essential to
providing situational awareness, is progressing well and is on
schedule. Upgrades to the Cobra Dane Radar are ahead of schedule. The
Chief of Naval Operations has identified the first group of Aegis ships
to be upgraded with a BMD capability, and the work to install the
equipment on the first of these ships has begun.
Once the system is placed on alert, we will continue to conduct
tests concurrently to gain even greater confidence in its operational
capability. Additionally, we plan activities to sustain the concurrent
test and operations and support of the system. We are laying in the
infrastructure to build, test, sustain, and evolve our system as a part
of the capabilities-based approach inherent in our strategy.
An integral working relationship with the warfighter, the BMD
system user, is critical to the success of this mission. We are working
together to ensure that we field a system that is militarily useful and
operationally supportable and fills gaps in our defenses. The support
centers we are establishing will provide critical training to
commanders in the field. The necessary doctrines, concepts of
operation, contingency plans, and operational plans are being developed
under the lead of U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and in
cooperation with U.S. Northern Command, Pacific Command, European
Command, and United States Forces in Korea.
improving fielded capability through evolutionary acquisition
The system's evolutionary nature requires us to look out over the
next three or four years and beyond in our planning. Although it is not
easy, we have laid out a budget and a plan to shape the missile defense
operational architecture beyond the Block 2004 initial defensive
capability.
In this budget, beginning with Block 2006 we will increase GMD
Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) and Aegis SM-3 interceptors, deploy
new capabilities (such as THAAD), expand our sensor net (with a second
sea-based midcourse radar and forward deployable radars), and enhance
the C\2\BM/C system integration. The fiscal year 2005 request begins to
fund important Block 2006 activities to enhance existing capabilities
and system integration. Our improvement plan is to add up to ten GBIs
to the site at Fort Greely and possibly initiate long-lead acquisition
of up to ten more for fielding at a potential third site or at Fort
Greely. We will continue to augment our sea-based force structure with
additional SM-3 interceptors and BMD-capable Aegis-class ships.
Much of this system augmentation effort involves extending and
building on capabilities that we have been working on over the past
several years, so I am confident that what we are doing is both
possible and prudent and in line with our missile defense vision.
The confidence we achieve through our entire test program is
reinforced by the fact that many missile defense test articles fielded
in the existing test bed are the same ones we would use in an
operational setting. Except for interceptors, which are one-time use
assets, we will use the same sensors, ships, communications links,
algorithms, and command and control facilities. The essential
difference between an inherent capability in a test bed and the near-
term on-alert capability is having a few extra missiles beyond those
needed for testing and having enough trained operators and logistics on
hand and ready to respond around the clock. Once we field the system,
we will be in a better position, literally, to test system components
and demonstrate BMD technologies in a more rigorous, more operationally
realistic environment. Testing will lead to further improvements in the
system and refinement of our models, and the expansion and upgrades of
the system will lead to further testing.
The system we initially will put on alert is modest. It is modest
not because the inherent capabilities of the sensors and interceptors
themselves are somehow deficient, but rather because we will have a
small quantity of weapons. The additional ten missiles for Fort Greely
will improve the overall system by giving us a larger inventory. Yet
today, and over the near-term, we are inventory poor. Block activities
throughout the remainder of this decade will be focused in part on
improving the system by delivering to the warfighter greater
capabilities with improved performance.
Why is this important? In a defense emergency or wartime engagement
situation, more is better. A larger inventory of interceptors will
handle more threatening warheads. Our planning beyond the Block 2004
initial configuration has this important warfighting objective in mind.
There are no pre-conceived limits in the number of weapon rounds we
should buy. We will build capabilities consistent with the national
security objectives required to effectively deter our adversaries and
defend ourselves and our allies.
We also must think beyond the initial defensive capability if we
are to meet our key national security objective of defending our
friends and allies from missile attack. In Block 2006, we are preparing
to move forward when appropriate to build a third GBI site at a
location outside the United States. Not only will this site add synergy
to the overall BMD system by protecting the United States, but it will
put us in a better position to defend our allies and friends and troops
overseas against long-range ballistic missiles. For the cost of ten
GBIs and associated infrastructure, we will be able to demonstrate in
the most convincing way possible our commitment to this critical
mission objective. The location of this site is still subject to
negotiation with no final architecture defined nor investment committed
until fiscal year 2006.
As I have said all along, we are not building to a grand design. We
are building an evolutionary system that will respond to our technical
progress and reflect real world developments. We added about $500
million to last year's projected fiscal year 2005 budget estimate to
begin funding our Block 2006 efforts. As you can see, the system can
evolve over time in an affordable way in response to our perception of
the threat, our technical progress, and our understanding of how we
want to use the system. Yet even as it does evolve, our vision remains
constant-to defeat all ranges of missiles in all phases of flight.
testing missile defenses--we need to build it to test it
Another key question surrounds the nature of missile defense
systems themselves. How do you realistically test an enormous and
complex system, one that covers eight time zones and engages enemy
warheads in space? The answer is that we have to build it as we would
configure it for operations in order to test it. That is exactly what
we are doing by building our test bed and putting it on alert this
year.
By hooking it all up and putting what we have developed in the
field, we will be in a better position to fine-tune the system and
improve its performance. Testing system operational capability in this
program is, in many ways, different from operational testing involving
more traditional weapon systems. All weapon systems should be tested in
their operational environments or in environments that nearly
approximate operational conditions. This is more readily accomplished
for some systems, and is more difficult to do for others.
For example, an aircraft's operational environment is the
atmosphere. Similarly, when we conduct rigorous operational tests of
our Navy's ships, we do so at sea--in their environment. The BMD
system's operational environment is very different. It is a
geographically dispersed region that is also a test bed. For both
missile defense testing and operations, geography counts. After we have
gone through the simulations, the bench tests, and the flybys, we want
to test all missile defense parts together under conditions that are as
nearly operationally realistic as we can make them--with sensors
deployed out front, with targets and interceptors spaced far enough
apart to replicate actual engagement distances, speeds and sequences,
with communication links established, and with command and control
elements in place. We in fact have conducted a number of events that
exercise the projected communication and command and control paths
required to link elements of the BMD system in what we call
``Engagement Sequence Groups,'' building our confidence that we can
combine threat data from different systems across a third of the globe
to allow for the engagement of ballistic missiles threats to the entire
United States.
One of the key questions that we have to answer is: What is the
role of operational testing in an unprecedented, evolutionary,
capability-based program? The answer is that the Director, Operational
Test and Evaluation, and the Operational Test Agencies play a critical
role in missile defense. Since evolutionary, capability-based processes
do not fit the traditional ORD-based operational test methodology, we
have applied an assessment approach that provides for a continuous
assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the BMD system. Since
testing is central to our RDT&E program and our operational
understanding of the system, we are continuing to modernize and improve
our test infrastructure to support more operationally realistic
testing.
We are working very closely with Mr. Christie, the DOT&E, and the
operational test community. As our tests are planned, executed, and
evaluated, the BMD system Combined Test Force, which brings together
representatives from across the testing community, is combining
requirements for both developmental and operational capability testing.
Wherever possible we are making every test both operationally realistic
and developmental. We have been working daily with the appropriate
independent operational test agencies (OTA) to ensure they are on board
with our objectives and processes. There are approximately 100
operational test personnel embedded in all facets of missile defense
test planning and execution who have access to all of our test data.
They have the ability to influence every aspect of our test planning
and execution.
Now, how much confidence should we have in using this test bed in
an alert status? The full range of missile defense testing--from our
extensive modeling and simulation and hardware-in-the-loop tests to our
ground and flight testing--makes us confident that what we deploy will
work as intended. We do not rely on intercept flight tests to make
final assessments concerning system reliability and performance. Our
flight tests are important building blocks in this process, but the
significant costs of these tests combined with the practical reality
that we can only conduct a few tests over any given period of time mean
we have to rely on other kinds of tests to prove the system. System
capabilities assessed for IDO will be based on test events planned for
fiscal year 2004 as well as data collected from flight and ground tests
and simulations over the past several years.
The missile defense test program helps define the capabilities and
limitations of the system. The thousands of tests we conduct in the
air, on the ground, in the lab, and with our models and simulations in
the virtual world predict system performance and help identify problems
so that we can fix them. They also highlight gaps so that we can
address them. This accumulated knowledge has and will continue to
increase our confidence in the effectiveness of the system and its
potential improvements. None of our tests should act as a strict
``pass-fail'' exercise telling us when to proceed in our development or
fielding. We can approximate realistic scenarios, though, after we have
put interceptors and sensors in the field and integrated them with our
C\2\BM/C network.
We conduct other kinds of tests that provide valuable information
about the progress we are making and the reliability of the system.
Integrated ground tests, for example, are not subject to flight test
restrictions and can run numerous engagement scenarios over the course
of a few weeks. Our modeling and simulation activity is an even more
powerful system verification tool. It is important to understand that
in the Missile Defense Program we use models and simulations, and not
flight tests, as the primary verification tools. This approach is
widely used within the Department, especially when complex weapon
systems are involved.
Currently, we have very good models for each one of our system
components, and we are able to use these together to run scenarios so
that we can understand the environments within which we operate and
characterize the margin we have in the system design. Missile defense
ground and flight tests anchor the data we produce in our models, which
in turn enhance our confidence regarding the operational capability we
can achieve, because we can understand the system's behavior in many
hundreds of test runs. These models are regularly updated using test
data from our ground and flight tests. Over time we are building up our
modeling and simulation capability at the system level to approximate
more closely the type of end-to-end testing we would like to have to
verify that the system is doing what we want it to do.
For example, our modeling and simulation capabilities are very
accurate and allow us to mirror the achieved outcome of a flight test.
The graphic below provides an example of why we believe our simulation
capabilities to be the most powerful tools for projecting the
reliability of the initial BMD system. In Figure 1 we have mapped out
the predicted performance of the Integrated Flight Test 13B interceptor
and matched it up with performance data we collected during the flight.
The match up is nearly exact, and it shows that the Exo-atmospheric
Kill Vehicle Mass Simulator was very close to the predicted insertion
point velocity.
Figure 1. Booster Velocity/IFT 13B
Generally, when we deploy a weapon system in a traditional mission
area, it is appropriate to conduct initial operational testing to
ensure that the replacement system provides a better capability than
the existing system. Put another way, there is a presumption that the
deployed system should be used until a better capability is proven. In
the current situation, where we have no weapon system fielded to defend
the United States against even a limited attack by ICBMs, that
presumption must be re-examined. With the provision of a militarily
useful capability, even if it is limited, it is presumed that the
capability can be fielded unless it is determined that operating the
initial capability is considered to be an unacceptable danger to the
operators, or any other similar reality.
USSTRATCOM will factor in all available test information into its
military utility assessment of the fielded condition.
ballistic missile defense system research and development program
We have requested $7.6 billion in fiscal year 2005 to continue our
investment in missile defense RDT&E. Why do we need this level of
investment in RDT&E? We need to press forward with our missile defense
research and development if we are to improve the system by integrating
upgraded or more advanced components and by exploiting new basing modes
to engage threat missiles in, for example, the boost phase of flight.
We have to lay the RDT&E foundation for evolutionary improvements to
the BMD system. We intend to improve the capability of the midcourse
phase while adding additional layers.
The RDT&E program is working. The ability to make trade-offs among
our development activities has allowed us to focus on the development
of the most promising near-term elements, namely, GMD, Aegis BMD and
PAC-3. GMD and Aegis BMD make up elements of the midcourse defense
layer while PAC-3 provides capability in the terminal layer. The GMD
fiscal year 2005 budget request is $3.2 billion; the request for Aegis
is $1.1 billion.
In this budget we increase investment in the development of a boost
layer. Two program elements, a high energy laser capability and a new
kinetic energy interceptor (KEI) or ``hit to kill'' capability,
represent parallel paths and complement each other. Achieving
capability in the boost phase as soon as practicable would be a
revolutionary, high-payoff improvement to the BMD system. Although the
technologies are well known, the engineering and integration required
to make them work are very high risk. Therefore, having parallel
approaches, even on different timelines, is a very prudent program
management approach. We expanded our efforts in the boost phase as soon
as we were able after withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty, which specifically prohibited boost phase development
against long-range missiles.
The Airborne Laser (ABL) program has been in development since
1996. Development of an operational high energy laser for a 747
aircraft is a difficult technical challenge. Although we have had many
successes in individual parts of the program, we have not been able to
make some of our key milestones over the past year. The last 20 percent
of the program effort has proven to be very difficult, and some of the
risks we took early in the program have impaired our present
performance. Consequently, I reviewed the program late last year and
directed a restructure that focused on our near-term efforts, delaying
the procurement of the second aircraft until we could gain more
confidence in our ability to meet schedules. I have adjusted the
resources accordingly.
We no longer plan for ABL to deliver a contingency capability in
Block 2004. There have been, nevertheless, several technical
accomplishments to date. We have demonstrated the capability to track
an ICBM in the boost phase using ABL technologies and improved beam
control and fire control technologies. At this time there is no reason
to believe that we will fail to achieve this capability. This is such a
revolutionary and high payoff capability; I believe we should again be
patient as we work through the integration and test activities. But the
risks remain high. The fiscal year 2005 budget request is $474 million
for ABL.
We undertook the KE boost effort in response to a 2002 Defense
Science Board Summer Study recommendation. In December 2003 we awarded
the contract for development of the KEI boost effort. This was the
first competition unconstrained by the ABM Treaty. It was also the
first to use capability-based spiral development as a source selection
strategy. The contract requires development of a boost phase
interceptor that is terrestrial-based and can be used in other
engagement phases as well--including the midcourse and possibly exo-
atmospheric terminal phases. In other words, it could provide boost
phase capability as well as an affordable, competitive next-generation
replacement for our midcourse interceptors and even add a terminal
phase capability should it be required. In 2005, we will begin
conducting Near-Field Infrared Experiments to get a close-up view from
space of rocket plumes to support the development of the terrestrial-
based interceptor seeker and provide additional data needed for the
development of a space test bed.
We have budgeted about $500 million for the KE boost effort for
fiscal year 2005. I believe this funding is necessary for a successful
start. Those who would view this amount as a significant increase that
is unwarranted for a new effort do not understand the importance of
prudent programming and the preparatory work required to make such a
program ultimately succeed. There are many examples of an under-funded
systems engineering effort, where engineering costs sky-rocketed
because adequate upfront work was not done. Mr. Chairman, I urge the
committee to look carefully at our proposal and allow us to get a solid
start on this essential piece of the layered BMD system.
other budget highlights
Funding in the fiscal year 2005 request supports the Block 2004
initial configuration as well as activities to place the BMD system on
alert. It also lays the foundation for the future improvement of the
system. We are requesting $9.2 billion to support this program of work,
which is approximately a $1.5 billion increase over the fiscal year
2004 request. The increase covers costs associated with fielding the
first GMD, Aegis BMD, sensor, and command, control and battle
management installments and will allow us to purchase long-lead items
required for capability enhancements in Block 2006.
We have made a successful transfer of the PAC-3 program to the Army
and remain convinced that the Department made the right decision in
doing so. In the Patriot system, missile defense and air defense are so
intertwined that attempting to manage them separately would be
difficult if not futile. We continue to believe that the Army is in the
best position, given the maturity of the PAC-3, to manage future
enhancements and procurements. Meanwhile MDA remains fully cognizant of
the Army's efforts and maintains the PAC-3 in the BMD system as a fully
integrated element, with interfaces controlled by our configuration
management process. PAC-3 is part of our ongoing system development and
testing.
The fiscal year 2005 funding request will buy equipment to ramp up
the testing of THAAD, which, once fielded, will add endo-atmospheric
and exo-atmospheric terminal capabilities to the BMD system to defeat
medium-range threats. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is
progressing well and will add capabilities to engage in the late
midcourse and terminal layers. THAAD recently completed the Design
Readiness Review, and development hardware manufacturing is underway.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request is $834 million for THAAD. Delivery
of the THAAD radar was completed ahead of schedule and rolled out this
month. Flight testing is scheduled to begin in the first quarter of
fiscal year 2005 at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.
We will be able to begin assembly and integration of two Space
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites. The fiscal year
2005 budget request for STSS is $322 million.
We will continue development of the C\2\BM/C ``backbone'' to
provide real-time sensor-netting to the warfighter for improved
interoperability and decision-making capability. Additional BMD system
C\2\BM/C suites and remote capability will be deployed to Combatant
Commanders as the system matures.
We also have several Science and Technology initiatives to increase
BMD system firepower and sensor capability and extend the engagement
battle space of terminal elements. One of our main efforts is to
increase BMD system effectiveness in the midcourse phase by placing
Multiple Kill Vehicles on a single booster, thus reducing the
discrimination burden on BMD sensors. We also are conducting important
work on advanced systems to develop laser technology and laser radar,
advanced discrimination, improved focal plane arrays, and a high-
altitude airship for improved surveillance, communication, and early
warning. In support of this, we have requested about $200 million in
the fiscal year 2005 budget request for the development of advanced
systems.
international partnerships
In December 2003, through a formal Cabinet Decision, the Government
of Japan became our first ally to proceed with acquisition of a multi-
layered BMD system, basing its initial capability on upgrades of its
Aegis destroyers and acquisition of the SM-3 missile. In addition,
Japan and other allied nations will upgrade their Patriot units with
PAC-3 missiles and improved ground support equipment. We have worked
closely with Japan since 1999 to design and develop advanced components
for the SM-3 missile. This project will culminate in flight tests in
2005 and 2006 that incorporate one or more of these components. These
decisions represent a significant step forward with a close ally and we
look forward to working together on these important efforts.
We are undertaking major initiatives in the international arena in
this budget. Interest among foreign governments and industry in missile
defense has risen considerably over the past year. We have been working
with key allies to put in place mechanisms that would provide for
lasting cooperative efforts.
We will begin in fiscal year 2005 to expand international
involvement in the program by encouraging international industry
participation and investment in the development of alternative boost/
ascent phase element components, such as the booster, kill vehicle,
launcher, or C\2\BM/C. This approach reduces risk, adds options for
component evolution for potential insertion during Block 2012, and
potentially leads to an indigenous overseas production capability. We
intend to award a contract for this effort this year.
In 2003 the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
Ballistic Missile Defense with the United Kingdom and an annex enabling
the upgrade of the Fylingdales early warning radar. We are continuing
our consultations with Denmark regarding the upgrade of the Thule radar
site in Greenland. Australia has announced plans to participate in our
efforts, building on its long-standing defense relationship with the
United States. Canada also has entered into formal discussion on
missile defense and is considering a BMD role for the U.S.-Canadian
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Our North Atlantic
Treaty Organization partners have initiated a feasibility study for
protection of NATO territory against ballistic missile attacks, which
builds upon ongoing work to define and develop a NATO capability for
protection of deployed forces.
We are continuing work with Israel to implement the Arrow System
Improvement Program and enhance its missile defense capability to
defeat the longer-range ballistic missile threats emerging in the
Middle East. We are also establishing a capability in the United States
to co-produce specified Arrow interceptor missile components, which
will help Israel meet its defense requirements more quickly and
maintain the U.S. industrial work share. We are intent on continuing
U.S.-Russian collaboration and are now working on the development of
software that will be used to support the ongoing U.S.-Russian Theater
Missile Defense exercise program.
We have other international interoperability and technical
cooperation projects underway as well and are working to establish
formal agreements with other governments. Our international work is a
priority that is consistent with our vision and supportive of our
goals.
world-class systems engineering--the key success factor
The President's direction to defeat ballistic missiles of all
ranges in all phases of flight drove us to develop and build a single
integrated system of layered defenses and forced us to transition our
thinking to become more system-centric. We established the Missile
Defense National Team to solve the demanding technical problems ahead
of us and capitalize on the new engineering opportunities created by
our withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The National Team brings together
the best, most experienced people from the military and civilian
government work forces, industry, and the federal laboratories to work
aggressively and collaboratively on one of the nation's top priorities.
No single contractor or government office has all the expertise needed
to design and engineer an integrated and properly configured BMD
system. Let me give a perspective on why the National Team is so
important.
What we have accomplished is an unprecedented integration of
sensors communications infrastructure, and weapons that cut across
Service responsibilities on a global scale. Even our first engagement
sequence involves an unparalleled accomplishment.
The BMD system will engage a long-range ballistic missile threat
across 9,500 miles. Threat messages sent by an Aegis destroyer will
pass this data across eight BMD system communication nodes. System data
travels across approximately 48,000 miles of communication lines. The
engagement takes place 3,500 from Fort Greely at an altitude of 100
kilometers. At no time in history has there been an engagement
performed by detection and weapon engagement systems separated by such
distances. Over the past year and a half, we have rapidly built
confidence in this weapon engagement capability through the use of
proven systems and technologies coupled with robust integrated tests
and exercises.
The National Team's job has not been easy. System engineers work in
a changed procurement and fielding environment, which in the missile
defense world means making engineering assessments and decisions based
on technical objectives and goals and possible adversary capabilities
rather than on specifications derived from more traditional operational
requirements documents. This unified industry team arrangement does not
stifle innovation or compromise corporate well-being. There is firm
government oversight and greater accessibility for all National Team
members to organizations, people, and data relevant to our mission. We
accomplished this without abandoning sound engineering principles,
management discipline, or accountability practices.
Significant benefits have resulted from this unique approach. Early
on, this team brought to the program several major improvements,
including: system-level integration of our command and control network;
adoption of an integrated architecture approach to deal with
countermeasures; development of a capability-requirement for forward-
based sensors, such as the Forward Deployable Radar and the Sea-Based
X-Band Radar; and identification of initial architecture trades for the
boost/ascent phase intercept mission. The National Team also developed
and implemented an engagement sequence group methodology, which
optimizes performance by looking at potential engagement data flows
through the elements and components of the system independent of
Service or element biases. If we had retained the traditional element-
centric engineering approach, I am doubtful that any one of the element
prime contractors would have entertained the idea of a forward-based
radar integrated with a ``competing'' system element. The National Team
is central to this program.
responsible and flexible management
Congressional support for key changes in management and oversight
have allowed us to execute the Missile Defense Program responsibly and
flexibly by adjusting the program to our progress every year, improving
decision cycle time, and making the most prudent use of the money
allocated to us.
One of the key process changes we made in 2001 was to engage the
Department's top leadership in making annual decisions to accelerate,
modify, or terminate missile defense activities. We take into account
how each development activity contributes to effectiveness and synergy
within the system, technical risk, schedules, and cost, and we then
assess how it impacts our overall confidence in the effort. We have
successfully used this process over the past three years.
Today's program is significantly different from the program of
three years ago. In 2001 and 2002 we terminated Space-Based Laser
development in favor of further technology development; restructured
the Space-Based Infrared Sensors (Low) system, renaming it the Space
Tracking and Surveillance System, to support more risk reduction
activities; cancelled the Navy Area program following significant cost
overruns; and accelerated PAC-3's deployment to the field. We also
proposed a modest beginning in fielding the BMD system and put Aegis
BMD and its SM-3 interceptor on track to field.
This year we have restructured the ABL program to deal more
effectively with the technical and engineering challenges before us and
make steady progress based on what we know. We also decided to end the
Russian-American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) project because of
rising levels of risk. After eight years of trying, RAMOS was not
making the progress we had expected in negotiations with the Russian
Federation. So we are refocusing our efforts on new areas of
cooperation with our Russian counterparts.
These periodic changes in the RDT&E program have collectively
involved billions of dollars--that is, billions of dollars that have
been invested in more promising activities, and billions of dollars
taken out of the less efficient program efforts. The ability to manage
flexibly in this manner saves time and money in our ultimate goal of
fielding the best defenses available on the shortest possible timeline.
Such decisive management moves were made collectively by senior
leaders in the Department and in MDA. I believe these major changes are
unprecedented in many respects and validate the management approach we
put in place. The benefits of doing so are clearly visible today. When
something is not working or we needed a new approach, we have taken
action.
closing
Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the many talented and
dedicated people across this country who have made, and are continuing
to make, our efforts successful. I have met with people from
manufacturing facilities, R&D centers, and test centers. I have met
with people from many different parts of the world who are working on
our international efforts. Our fellow citizens should be proud of the
talent, commitment, and dedication that every one of these people
provides.
We take our responsibilities very seriously. We have an obligation
to the President, the Congress, and the American people to get it
right. With the continued strong support of Congress and this
committee, we will continue our progress in defending the United
States, our troops, and our allies and friends against all ranges of
ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. I will turn to
Senator Inouye first.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, if I may, may I submit my
questions?
Senator Stevens. Yes sir.
Who was first? Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Yes sir. Thank you.
EXOATMOSPHERIC KILL VEHICLE (EKV) REPAIRS
General, could you give us the progress update on the EKV
repairs as we approach IFT-13C.
General Kadish. Yes Senator, I'd be glad to. I'd like to go
back in history just a little bit. About 1 year ago we decided
that some design changes were needed to both the kill vehicle
and our booster to make it better. And that was a result of a
number of flight tests that we'd done prior to that time.
Senator Shelby. What have you learned here?
General Kadish. We've learned, I guess the biggest thing
we've learned is, it's pretty hard to make some major changes
in less than 1 year. But we've done it. And we made those
changes, we put it into the workflow and there's about seven or
eight kill vehicles in work right now for the balance of this
year. But in the process of doing that we discovered a circuit
board that was not manufactured properly. And when we found
that particular effort we not only decided to fix that circuit
board, which would have taken about 3 or 4 weeks, or a month,
of a delay. But we decided that it was in the best interest of
quality and mission assurance practices to go back and put a
team of experts--and we put about 40 or 50 people on this
effort--and we went through each and every aspect of the design
of the kill vehicle, to make sure that we didn't make any of
those mistakes that we didn't know about. And we have completed
that effort, we are in the process of changing a few things
that we found and that has resulted in a little bit more of a
delay to the flight tests this year. But I am confident that
when we complete that process and we actually do the flight
tests we will have done everything we could possibly do to make
that kill vehicle work properly.
GROUND-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE (GMD) FUNDING
Senator Shelby. General, the ground-based midcourse defense
segment, the multiple kill vehicle program and the Kinetic
Energy Interceptor program I think are very important. In the
2005 funding request it's increased to $9.2 billion, $1.2
billion over 2004. There's some concerns, though, that GMD is
underfunded due to greater internal competition for funds. MDA,
I believe, must find the proper funding balance to accomplish
its goals and beyond for the Ballistic Missile Defense System
architecture. I know that you've requested a significant
increase in funding for the MDA programs, but I'm concerned
about the health of GMD and success there. Are you trying to do
too much with too little? I know you never have enough funds.
Do you want to speak on that?
General Kadish. Well Senator, that's a problem we deal with
every day, internally. And you're right. We never have enough
funds for what we would like to do in any program.
Senator Shelby. Do you have enough funds to meet your GMD
development testing and deployment objectives at this point?
General Kadish. We believe when we balance everything out
we will have enough resources to do that. I think the GMD part
of this is about $3.2 or so billion this year, a little bit
less than that next year, and I think we're working on $2
billion the following year. In fact, we've added about $1.5
billion for fiscal year 2004, most of that goes to GMD in the
sense of further building out missiles and doing the test
program that we need to do. And we'll continue to look at the
other aspects of what we need to do and whether it's the multi-
kill vehicle or the Kinetic Interceptor (KI) boost or Aegis,
and make sure that we do the best we can with the money we
have. And so far----
MDA FUNDING
Senator Shelby. If you had more money it wouldn't hurt
anything, would it?
General Kadish. Senator, I'd never turn down more money.
But I think it's incumbent on us, internally MDA, to make sure
that we get the most out of every dollar that we get. And we're
trying to do that, and it's a constant balancing of effort in
the process.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, General.
Senator Stevens. Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. General, the Missile Defense Agency's annual
budget requests are somewhere between $8 and $10 billion. Does
this funding cover only development, and how are the
traditional acquisition procurement wedges incorporated with
the Ballistic Missile Defense System? In other words, have you
changed anything in there, in that process?
General Kadish. Yes we have, Senator, and the $8 to $10
billion request, at least for 2004, 2005, 2006 and part of 2007
right now includes about anywhere from $1 billion to $2 billion
a year of money for fielding equipment. Now, I didn't use the
word procurement here because it has very defined meaning in
the way the Department talks about procurement money versus
RDT&E and so forth. Because the Congress has allowed us to use
research and development money, we're able to do very modest
procurement or fielding of these types of equipment in the
beginning. Now, one of the problems we have with the Missile
Defense in general, is trying to fit it into the mold that the
Department uses, in that typically we posture a force
structure. For instance, we might say that there's a need for
100 or 200 or 300 ground-based interceptors. And we would go
and we'd fund those, fully fund them in a procurement account
and we'd have a major growth in the overall process. We're not
doing that, primarily because it is not clear what mix of
interceptors we're going to ultimately need for the threats
that we're going to face. So it is a non-standard approach.
We're taking it a step at a time. Somewhere in the neighborhood
of $1 to $2 billion a year right now is programmed to actually
field equipment out of the RDT&E effort and make it better over
time, and then when we reach a point where we reach clarity
with the threat and how many pieces of the system we need,
we'll go ahead and transition to the normal mode. That's the
plan that we have.
HIGH ALTITUDE AIRSHIP
Senator Burns. There was another part of what you're doing
that sort of caught my attention too, and that's high altitude
airship. I can't help but think that this, if successful, they
call it the Airship Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration,
you cut back a little bit on its funding but I happen to think
that, you know, when we started to talk about space and
shuttles and we started talking about reuseables and unmanned
reuseables, I think this program has application, both military
and commercial, in the civilian end of the world. Is this
program adequately funded, do you think, to move forward with
this new technology?
General Kadish. Senator Burns, I share your desire for this
type of program because I believe it could be a more affordable
approach for persistent high altitude and not go to space in
some cases. I believe it is adequately funded because there are
big risks in making an airship of this nature to fly at the
altitudes that we're talking about. So, the program's
structured to actually reduce those risks by demonstrating we
can do this initially, and if we can demonstrate we're doing it
then I wouldn't hesitate to come to you and ask for money to go
ahead and take it to the full production of those types of
systems. It's so revolutionary that it could be a major change.
Senator Burns. It sure is, and I think it has spillover
into our fuels and the kind of composites and different
materials that we'll need. It affords a lot of possibilities
for commercial application as well.
General Kadish. It certainly does.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Cochran.
BMD FIELDING ACCELERATION
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. General Kadish, I
understand that your plans for fielding the Ballistic Missile
Defense capability later this year are proceeding and that
eight of the planned 20 ground-based interceptors will be
available for initial defense operations later this year. Can
you give us some specific current time line expectations for
this program and whether or not we can help accelerate that
with additional funding in your budget request?
General Kadish. Senator, about 1\1/2\ weeks ago we went to
Huntsville and did what we call 180-day review; 180 days to our
planned internal MDA dates that we're using for September. And
I came away from that review very encouraged that we were
within 30 to 60 days of those schedules right now, and more on
the on-time than not being on-time. It's still a major
challenge for us over the next 6 months to do this but right
now what I see is that we will, in fact, have up to 8 ground-
based interceptors by the end of this calendar year and 12 the
following year, available for alert capability. As far as
accelerating anything, I think we set a few years ago the
schedule and we've actually been meeting it fairly well. So I
don't see over the next 6 months or even the next 12 months
that we're going to be able to accelerate anything over and
above the schedules that we have. I think the major success
criteria that I'm using is to do it on time, in the process,
and as quickly as we set up the schedules a few years ago,
because it was a major challenge to accomplish it. So as much
as it pains me to say this, but I don't think extra money will
accelerate the process. It would help us in other areas but not
necessarily in acceleration.
Senator Cochran. One of the important----
General Kadish. And I would not recommend trying to
accelerate.
SPACE BASED SENSORS--SPACE TRACKING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (STSS)
Senator Cochran. Right. One of the important elements in
our Missile Defense System is space-based sensors, terrestrial
sensors. In your statement you mention assembling and
integrating two space tracking and surveillance system
satellites, and I understand that these could be launched in
tandem in 2007. What is your view of where this program is
headed and how will it contribute to an effective Ballistic
Missile Defense?
General Kadish. The space tracking and surveillance system
is what we used to call SBRS-Low, and we changed the name
because we got confused with SBRS-High, which was a different
program, among other things. But the way this would contribute
is it would provide a low Earth-orbiting set of satellites to
continuously watch for missile launches and once they're
launched, track it through the entire phase of flight. If we
could do that then our ability to engage those ballistic
missiles and warheads and destroy them would be greatly
enhanced. I'd like to point out that over the years this
program has morphed into different aspects and I think the last
count was that we had 85 separate studies on whether or not to
do STSS-like constellations or not. And what we decided to do
was to, rather than do another study, was to put two satellites
in orbit, get the data that we need to confirm whether or not
we're going to be able to make this work as we intended, and
then make a decision subsequent to that on whether or not we'll
recommend the full constellation of these satellites. We're on
track to do just that. And the tandem launch in 2007, the
program activity we have to do that, is on schedule and on
budget and doing very well.
Senator Cochran. Is there any particular risk or high risk
associated with the tandem launch?
General Kadish. Well, I wouldn't normally like to do a
tandem launch of this type but it is the most efficient use of
money and what we found is that if we launched them separately
and then we lost one satellite we wouldn't be able to do the
mission anyway. Because these are stereo-viewing satellites;
you need two of them to accomplish this. So we figured that the
tandem launch was the best balance of risk and benefit.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I have several other
questions. I think my time may be expired and I'll reserve my
other questions for later in the round.
Senator Stevens. Senator Feinstein.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
General. I know you're under the weather and I don't want to
aggravate your condition, so if I could submit my statement for
the record I will confine my questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein
I believe National Missile Defense is one of the key
foreign policy and national security issues that we will face
in the coming decades. The Administration's decisions on this
issue should be made in a deliberate and thoughtful manner and
in close consultation with our allies, and, most importantly,
the United States Congress.
Previously, I have stated that my concerns about NMD
revolve largely around four issues: the nature of the threat;
the implications for arms control and the international
security environment; the feasibility of the technology; and
the cost.
Given the high cost and the still uncertain and untested
technology, I found it surprising that President Bush has
declared his intention to deploy a nation-wide missile defense
this year. Given our mounting budget deficit, the threats to
United States national security interests around the world and
the numerous problems facing our military such as aging
helicopters, aircraft with high accident rates, and a lack of
bullet proof vests, the Administration's decision to seek $10.2
billion for a largely untested and unproven missile defense
program raises serious concerns.
While we no longer fear the threat of all-out nuclear war,
the likelihood that America will be attacked with a nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapon has increased. The proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and the increasing availability
to other nations as well as transnational groups such as
terrorist organizations, to the technology and material
necessary to develop and deliver WMD is perhaps the most
serious threat to U.S. national security today.
We need to spend our resources wisely to make sure that we
can protect our nation from these threats. But the odds that
terrorists or non-state actors will use ballistics missiles to
attack the United States in this manner remains, in my
estimation, relatively low. Missile defense would have done
nothing to stop 9/11. And missile defense would do nothing to
stop a bomb smuggled into this country on a container ship or
through another ``soft'' point of entry.
National Missile Defense is not and should not be seen as a
one-size-fits-all substitute for an effective non-proliferation
strategy. The United States must have a balanced program to
effectively safeguard our interests and clearly calibrate and
allocate resources to meet the real challenges that face U.S.
national security interests including providing for effective
strategies for non-proliferation activities, deterrence,
homeland defense, and counter-proliferation.
I believe it would be folly and far too costly to place too
much of an emphasis on missile defense and to unilaterally
develop and deploy NMD before we even know what defensive
systems are feasible. And likewise I am greatly concerned that
even as we spend large sums on missile defense, we are not
doing enough to make sure that resources are allocated to such
areas as port security. We simply cannot afford to gamble with
a national security strategy based on cultivating a missile
defense system of unknown effectiveness on one hand with a less
stable and less secure world on the other.
SYSTEM READINESS AND A RUSH TO DEPLOYMENT--WHY?
Senator Feinstein. I am still puzzled, well, I was puzzled
last year and I'm still puzzled this year by the rush to deploy
this system. In March, on the 11th, Senator Jack Reed asked
this question. At this time we cannot be sure that the actual
system would work against a real North Korean missile threat.
And Tom Christie, the director of the Pentagon's Office of
Operational Tests and Evaluation, replied, I would say that's
true. There are enormous technical difficulties with
deployment. The booster rocket has suffered problems; the
ground-based X-band radar, needed to enhance satellite
tracking, isn't scheduled to be fielded anytime soon; the sea-
based X-band radar is not scheduled to be fielded until 2005;
the infrared satellite system, which discriminates warheads
from decoys and helps guide the interceptor won't be in place
for many years, and the system can't deal with decoys and
countermeasures, as I understand the reports. And yet it's
going to be deployed. My question is why?
General Kadish. Senator Feinstein, I guess I'd like to go
back and address specifically those things that you pointed out
as being apparent deficiencies.
Senator Feinstein. Good.
General Kadish. And I use the word ``apparent'' because I'm
not sure that we have the right description of the problems
that we're facing. When we say we cannot be sure that we would
be able to destroy the warheads, I don't think in any of the
procurements that I've done in the DOD that were 100 percent
sure of anything. So if 100 percent sure is the standard we're
not going to meet it so we might as well stipulate that at the
beginning. However, where we do not have missile defense
capability today against long-range missiles and that's been
for 40 years or more now, if we have greater than zero chance,
and I mean substantially greater than zero, I'm not going to
tell you exactly what we think it is right now.
Senator Feinstein. Is it over 50 percent?
General Kadish. I think that--I'd rather not get into the
percentage but we have very high odds of engaging and
successfully destroying the threats that we think we're going
after right now.
Now, in the case of the booster and the kill-vehicles and
the technical challenges, I think you're absolutely right. I
mean, 4 years ago, almost 5 now, I began testifying in front of
this committee saying that fiscal year 2005 was the earliest we
were going to be able to do anything along these lines. And I
think that has turned out to be true right now. So it's not
like we, over the last year or two or three this is a rush to a
particular effort. When we were doing the old National Missile
Defense (NMD) program, we were saying that fiscal year 2005 was
probably the earliest, with some risk. We have reduced that
risk tremendously and we believe we're going to make fiscal
year 2005 in the process.
Now, we set internal dates, September that you hear about
from time to time, but those are MDA dates, they're not
mandated or dates ascertained by the Department of Defense. So,
we believe that the sensors that we have on orbit today, the
Defense Support Program, the radars that we intend with Cobra
Dane and Fylingdales and then the addition of the X-band radar
later on will give us the sensors we need. The booster, the
kill vehicle, they're coming along and we should be flight
testing them over the next few months to prove out our modeling
and simulation.
So, things are going all in the right direction. And I
guess the best way to characterize the effort, in terms of its
performance, may sound a little trite, but if someone shoots at
us we're going to be able to shoot back, whereas we couldn't do
that today.
Senator Feinstein. Even if we don't hit anything?
General Kadish. There's a good chance we're going to hit it
and we can come talk to you about that in some detail and more
classified setting. And if I was on the other side right now
I'd be very worried whether or not the systems that they are
producing would work against our system. And we're going to
only make it better after that. The idea that the radar comes
in in 2005, we've got other plans for further activities as we
test and make it better that, over time, the countermeasure
issues and the things that we're dealing with, we're going to
be very good at.
COST JUSTIFICATION OF A BMDS
Senator Feinstein. One last question. Because you've been
very straight with us and I really appreciate that. I think
you're really a class act. I just want you to know that. I
mean, this is so much money, $10.2 billion a year for what, 7
years? That's a lot of money to deploy a system that really
hasn't been really tested in its complete form and at a time
when our best case for war is asymmetric and non-State and not
likely to be waged with Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
(ICBMs) but with something coming in in a container. Do you
really think, in view of what the next 10 years looks like,
that a ballistic missile system is the best way to spend our
money in terms of guaranteeing the safety of our people?
General Kadish. Well, I can give you a personal opinion on
that issue; it has two parts to it. The first is that, from
where I've sat for a number of years, it is a very difficult
job to know what's likely and unlikely and what our adversaries
are going to do to defeat us. And we make those judgements but
we've got to do it with the idea that there's risk involved.
And I had the unfortunate experience on September 11, sitting
in my office in the Missile Defense Agency, watching the
Pentagon burn as a result of the airlines. And, you know, I
know there's a big debate over whether folks could have
anticipated that or not, but the likelihood equations of one
thing over another is a very risky business for us to determine
in the Missile Defense Agency. But there's one thing I do know,
and that is we have no missile defense capability except for
Patriot today against short-range missiles. And that didn't
happen except with the support of this committee for many
years, and we struggled with that effort. We had some failures;
it was a difficult technology but it worked very well in the
last war. And we're building up. And I believe that the same
will occur with the systems that we're talking about at Fort
Greely and Vandenberg, Aegis and THAAD and the ones that we're
building. Because that $10 billion is not only for the ground-
based program effort at Fort Greely and Vandenberg this year,
it's for airborne laser, the THAAD program, the Aegis program
and the radars that support all that. So it's very expensive
but it's also very comprehensive and complex.
I don't know if that helped in terms of the answer but it's
a tough business for us to say, in the missile defense business
anyway, that we ought to choose to leave ourselves vulnerable
to missiles anymore now that we can do something about it.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks, General. And I'd appreciate that
briefing. Thank you very much.
General Kadish. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Dorgan.
DEVELOPMENT OF BMDS WITHOUT ADEQUATE TESTING
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I share
some of the same concerns expressed by my colleague from
California. Most of the significant new weapons programs that
we've been discussing with the Department of Defense I support.
I think they are important for this country and for its
defense. But the Senator from California asked questions that I
think need to be asked. Are we rushing to deploy a system that
has not been adequately tested, that has not been subject to
the same rigorous testing strategies that other weapons
programs have been required to meet? And, you know, there's so
much, with respect to the more urgent, immediate threats that
we know exist, there is so much as yet undone because we can't
afford it. The question I think the Senator from California
poses is in the rear view mirror of 5 years, will we look back
and say we would have better used that $10 plus billion in
another area for a more urgent threat? I think the answer
probably will be yes, but none of us know for sure.
Let me ask the question. You talked about the booster and
the kill vehicle and in answer to the question posed by my
colleague from California, no one can be 100 percent sure. I
understand that and no one is asking, with respect to any of
these systems, that we are 100 percent sure. But will this
system be deployed without the same kind of rigorous testing
that is applied to other systems? Because we are rushing here
to deploy it, as you know.
CONCURRENT TESTING
General Kadish. Well Senator Dorgan, I guess I would
characterize what we're trying to do here as not a rush to
deployment. What it is is building the system so we can test it
in its operational configuration and since we've done that it
has the capability to defend the country so we will use it in
that role simultaneously, or concurrently. So one of the things
I have to point out, and I have a very hard time explaining
this because it gets to be very technical in terms of the rules
that we use within the Department, but let me try it this way.
When we do operational testing, what that means is we want the
people who are going to use it to push the buttons and do all
the things that we need to do so that in an operational
environment, day to day, we can be sure it works. And you might
want to ask the question, well, why do we do that? Well, 99
percent of the time we do that because we're replacing another
system, and what we want to do is make sure good management
practice is that what we're replacing, the system that we're
replacing something with can work better or at least as good
as, in the operational environment, after having spent a lot of
money. So these things usually occur after a very long
development cycle. We do an operational test, we check some
boxes, make sure that things work better than what we have in
the field and we move on. In the case of missile defense, we
don't have a system in the field today against long-range
missiles. So we have to build it in order to test it in its
operational configuration. We get criticized a lot about not
having the radars in the right spot and that type of thing. I
can go on at length, but the simple answer to that is we need
to build it to test it in its operational configuration and
therefore we can actually use it as well.
Senator Dorgan. Well, building it and deploying are
different circumstances, but General Kadish, the only anti-
ballistic missile program that has ever been deployed was
deployed in my State back in the early 1970s and was moth
balled almost immediately, I believe within 30 days after being
declared operational, for a number of reasons.
RUSH TO DEPLOY OR POSTPONE?
But I have received a letter that was sent around on this
program from 49 generals and admirals who call for postponing
missile defense. They say the Pentagon has waived the
operational testing requirements essential to determine whether
the highly complex system is effective and suitable, and they
make the case that this money, the billions of dollars, should
be spent on other defensive systems, which are more urgent.
If I might just make the case, I think there is a threat of
nuclear weapons against this country. I think the least likely
threat, by the way, is from an intercontinental ballistic
missile. Perhaps the most likely threat is from a suitcase
nuclear weapon in a rusty car on a dock in New York City. But
if you take the threat meter, which many of us have seen,
regarding what are the likely threats against this country, the
threat of a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile
is perhaps the least likely of those threats. It would be
deadly, were we attacked by someone with such a weapon. But
such an attack is deterred because we, of course, know the
return address of the missile, and whoever attacks us will be
vaporized quickly. I mean, I think the question that the
Senator from California asked is a critical one; is this the
most urgent defensive system for which we should be spending
$10 billion at this point, and I don't think any of us know the
answer to this. My own impression, I just might say, is that we
are rushing to deploy a system that is costing a great deal of
money and one which we do not know whether it will work. And
I'm concerned about that because there are so many other things
as yet undone.
Let me add, however, my compliments to your service,
General Kadish. I've been in briefings that you've been
involved in for many years; you served this country with great
distinction. I know you care about this program and nurture
this program with great skill and professionalism; I want to
say that and thank you very much, General, for your service.
General Kadish. Thank you, Senator Dorgan.
Senator Stevens. General, are we about ready to wind this
up?
General Kadish. I'm fine, Senator.
Senator Stevens. Are you? All right.
I will submit my questions.
Senator, do you have any further questions?
Senator Shelby. Let me be brief if I can. I know we need to
let General Kadish go.
General Kadish. Yes sir.
SYSTEM TEST AND EVALUATION PLANNING ANALYSIS
Senator Shelby. General, you might want to answer these
questions for the record, that would be fine. That is, I've
been impressed with the systems test and evaluation planning
analysis lab. How will system-integrated flight testing help
meet the architecture integration challenge in the future? How
rigorous will this testing be? Do you want to answer that for
the record?
General Kadish. It will become more and more rigorous,
without a doubt. I think that if we--I'd like to take the
specifics of the systems tests analysis lab for the record.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely.
[The information follows:]
The System Test and Evaluation Planning Analysis Lab
(STEPAL) is the Missile Defense Agency's choice for in-depth
analyses and credible flight test planning. We currently use
STEPAL resources to perform vigorous pre-mission analysis that
includes supportability, evaluation of test requirements,
flight safety, and other factors necessary for the successful
execution of integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
test scenarios. The support provided by the STEPAL has provided
MDA with a quick look capability that allows us to observe
additional important mission aspects such as safety, debris
effects; telemetry coverage; as well as the adequacy of test
range assets.
General Kadish. But I'd like to point out that because
we're able to build it like we are, calendar year 2005 is going
to be a very, very interesting year in missile defense from a
test standpoint because we'll be able to do an awful lot of
flight testing and ground testing that we haven't been able to
do before.
SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (SETA) CONTRACTORS
Senator Shelby. General, for the record, would you give us
your views on the importance of SETA contractor support and how
valuable their contributions have been to MDA?
General Kadish. The SETA contractors, the support
engineering? It's been invaluable to MDA from across the
country, especially from the State of Alabama and Huntsville,
which is a major center for missile defense. But we couldn't do
it without the talented people that we have across the country,
especially the SETA contractors, the prime industrial partners
and the Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDCs) and folks.
Senator Shelby. You made some cuts there. Is that wise? I
know you're constrained by your budget from time to time. Will
you address that some?
General Kadish. Well, what we've been doing is trying to
balance out the skills that we need at any given time. And that
can look like a cut in certain areas but basically we're trying
to balance the skills that we need in the process.
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY FUNDING
Senator Shelby. General, advanced technology funding; I
think you've got to invest for the future. You know, some
people, and I at times ask about money, and we're spending a
lot of money but if we don't spend for the future we'll be
shortchanged, I believe. Development funding for sensor
improvement, better software, faster communication systems,
improved propulsion systems, lighter and strong structures,
better thermal control, enhanced signature discrimination,
decoy concepts and detection techniques are vital to all of us
and for this program. Does MDA have an adequate technology
development budget to support spiral development here or will
you need more money?
General Kadish. Well, I think that we can get the specifics
for you for the record but overall I'm satisfied with where we
are on the deep technology activities. Because when I look at
what's happening in the THAAD program and the GMD program and
the other efforts that we have, we're doing an awful lot of
that work in the application of technology right now. And it's
a tough balance but I think the balance is right, right now.
SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND (SMDC) AND MDA RELATIONSHIP
Senator Shelby. General, lastly, I'm just going to touch on
the relationship between SMDC and MDA. You can do this for the
record. What are your thoughts on this relationship and the
importance of SMDC to supporting MDA's mission?
General Kadish. I can expand for the record but the bottom
line, Senator, is that it's a great relationship now, and we
have people working together on some very tough problems.
[The information follows:]
The relationship between MDA and SMDC is strong. The
success of my organization is dependent on the technology
support that SMDC provides. As the Army's proponent for the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System and operational
integrator for global missile defense, the Army's Space and
Missile Defense Command (SMDC) plays a key role in supporting
MDA to develop, field, and test a fully integrated and
operational Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capability
for the nation. SMDC is a strong and effective advocate for
global missile defense and works closely with MDA to ensure our
national goals of developing, testing and deploying an
integrated missile defense system are met. SMDC conducts
research and develops and matures new and emerging technologies
to enable missile defense capabilities. SMDC's Reagan Test
Facility on Kwajalein Atoll supports missile defense testing.
SMDC participates in deploying and operating the GMD System,
including oversight of GMD Brigade and subordinate GMD
Battalion operations. SMDC also works closely with MDA to focus
attention on improving Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD)
Systems. The long legacy and continuing research and
development by SMDC in the missile defense arena has made
possible the recently fielded missile defense systems and will
provide the means for future enhancements and new weapon
systems.
Senator Shelby. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
indulgence. General, I hope you feel a little better today.
General Kadish. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Cochran.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions that
I'll be happy to submit, particularly one relating to the
capability for Aegis destroyers and cruisers to play an active
role in missile defense and what your plans are for
coordinating the operations with the Navy and helping to offset
costs associated with these modifications and other questions
as well. I'd be happy to submit those, Mr. Chairman, and
express our appreciation for the continued good work of General
Kadish.
Senator Stevens. General, I think that Senator Inouye and I
have been privileged to spend probably more time with you than
other members of this committee and we thank you for the time
you've spent with us to keep us posted on the developments. I
have a series of questions that I would like to send to you for
the record.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, could I just mention, we have
a Major General sitting behind General Kadish, General Obering,
here today, and I think we'll probably see more of him in the
future, will we not, General Kadish?
General Kadish. Yes sir, he's been nominated to the Senate
to replace me and he's a great guy.
Senator Shelby. And Mr. Chairman, he's from Birmingham,
Alabama, it just happened to happen that way.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Stevens. Well, since he wasn't from Alaska I didn't
introduce him but I knew he was there. Thank you.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
ground-based missile defense program
Question. General Kadish, can you assure the Committee that the
Missile Defense Agency will continue to improve the ground-based
missile defense system? I am concerned about technical obsolescence of
the program--technology will continue to move forward--how will you
deal with this?
Answer. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program will
continue to improve well beyond the Initial Defense Capability that is
being fielded this year. We are planning upgrades to the current
system, and our upcoming budget submissions will include funding for
these upgrades. For example, the processor on the Exoatmospheric Kill
Vehicle (EKV) will be upgraded to avoid obsolescence. This upgrade will
be ready to be included in Ground Based Interceptors that are scheduled
for fielding in the 2006-2007 timeframe. We are also planning upgrades
to the GMD Fire Control (GFC) system as additional sensors are fielded.
We have several programs to develop software upgrades to provide more
advanced discrimination capability, and our testing will become
increasingly more challenging to validate our progress in this area.
Question. Once this program is fully fielded in Alaska and at
Vanderburg Air Force Base over the next several years, how will you use
the concepts of spiral development and block upgrades to improve the
program five years from now?
Answer. The program for spiral upgrades to the GMD components of
the Initial Defensive Capability include an enhanced EKV (an upgrade to
the processor), additional GMD Fire Control capability as a result of
additional sensor capability such as the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX),
a program to mitigate potential countermeasures, multi-sensor fusion
improvements, and advanced discrimination capabilities. All of these
efforts are currently programmed within the FYDP.
airborne laser program
Question. General Kadish, the airborne laser program was
restructured earlier this year. Please explain some of the progress
that has been made on this program and some of the remaining
technological challenges?
Answer. The Airborne Laser (ABL) program has made significant
technical progress to date. We have successfully modified and conducted
initial flight-testing of the Boeing 747-400F which will accommodate
the lasers and optical control systems. We have completed the
manufacturing, optical coating, and end-to-end testing of the beam
control system and have begun integration of this system into the
aircraft. The six-module high power laser has been fully installed in
the System Integration Laboratory (SIL) at Edwards AFB and is currently
undergoing initial testing. Finally, we have successfully demonstrated
our capability to safely mix and handle the chemical laser fuel and we
are making steady progress towards the first firing of the high power
laser.
The program was restructured to improve the focus on two near term
efforts that will give us a better indication of the ABL's viability:
(1) first flight of the beam control system during late 4th qtr CY 2004
and (2) first light of the six-module high power laser in the Systems
Integration Laboratory (SIL), during December 2004.
Apart from these two milestones, there are a few other remaining
technological objectives for the ABL program, to include integration of
the turret ball on the front of the aircraft, integration of the target
acquisition/tracking lasers onboard, and finally demonstration of the
entire system with the shoot down of a ballistic missile. These
technological objectives are significant, but at present we do not
foresee any showstoppers.
Question. I note that the 2005 budget reflects this restructuring.
Are you concerned about losing momentum in the program and that we have
a clear way ahead on directed energy programs?
Answer. It is true that the technical challenges we are working to
resolve have delayed fielding the first ABL aircraft and that the
restructure has delayed acquisition of the second aircraft. However, we
will maintain program momentum by resolving the pacing technical
challenges and achieving laser ``first light.'' The record of technical
achievement by ABL is cause for confidence that we will solve these
challenges. Only decreased funding could cause a loss of momentum at
this time. Funding stability will be critical for resolving the
remaining technical challenges and moving forward with fielding this
capability.
fort greely missile defense facilities
Question. General Kadish, could you explain the importance of the
2005 budget request to the ground-based midcourse system? What would be
the consequences to the Fort Greely program and the overall system
effectiveness if this funding is not provided?
Answer. Fiscal year 2005 funding is essential to continue
development of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) capability and
to put the Ballistic Missile Defense System on alert. Decreased funding
would impact development and procurement of hardware necessary for the
GMD element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, including
procurement of additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs), the Sea-
Based X-Band radar (SBX), and upgrades to existing Early Warning
Radars. Testing of new systems would be impacted. A funding decrease
could cause a break in production and cause distress in the industrial
base, potentially forcing the smaller vendors out of business. The time
and cost to develop and qualify a new vendor base would be prohibitive.
Decreased fiscal year 2005 funds would also impact our ability to
sustain the Initial Defensive Capability. Included in the fiscal year
2005 budget is funding for the Sustainment Development Program. The
Sustainment Development Program pays for spares and technical support
from the GMD prime contractor. Without this effort the existing GMD
hardware cannot be maintained.
Question. Please provide us a status report on how the construction
at Fort Greely is proceeding?
Answer. The following is a look at some of the wide variety of GMD
facilities at Fort Greely that will support IDO, and their status for
alert.
--Six Fort Greely silos complete;
--Alaska fiber optic ring complete;
--Battalion Fire Control Node at Fort Greely: tested satisfactorily;
--SATCOM links (nine total): tested satisfactorily;
--Fort Greely In-Flight Interceptor Communications System (IFICS)
Data Terminal (IDT) complete and tested satisfactorily;
--Fort Greely buildings: 10 complete; five on schedule; one behind
schedule (no impact).
Question. Are there any significant issues as you deploy an initial
operating missile defense capability later this year?
Answer. There are no significant issues, but challenges remain. Our
schedule to begin Initial Defensive Operations is aggressive and
depends on many interdependent activities proceeding as expected. We
are attempting to remain as agile as possible to account for unforeseen
events. Additionally, the outcome our flight tests this year will be
important. Overall, however, we expect to remain on schedule.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. General, I understand Aegis destroyers and cruisers will
play a key role in the missile defense of the United States and our
allies. Could you summarize the capability to be fielded by the Navy
and tell us how you coordinate operations with the Navy and help offset
their costs?
Answer. The Aegis BMD element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) builds upon the mature, operationally-proven, globally
deployed Aegis Combat System (ACS) to detect, track, intercept, and
destroy Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) to Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in the midcourse (spanning ascent to early
terminal) phase of flight while deployed in defense of the nation,
deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies.
The heart of the Aegis BMD system is the Aegis Weapon System (AWS),
including the AN/SPY-1 radar. The AWS detects, tracks, and identifies
the ballistic missile target, and guides the SM-3 close enough to the
target for the SM-3's Kinetic Warhead (KW) to close for intercept. The
KW tracks the target with its Long Wavelength Infrared seeker and uses
its propulsion system to divert to complete a hit-to-kill intercept. A
total of three Aegis Cruisers (CGs) and 15 Aegis Destroyers (DDGs) will
be Aegis BMD capable by the end of CY 2006.
Aegis BMD will evolve through spirally developed block improvements
as part of the MDA's block upgrade strategy. Block 2004 will be a
spiral development, with the Initial Defensive Capability (IDC) (Aegis
BMD 3.0E) completed, verified, and tested for Initial Defensive
Operations (IDO). This capability will provide long-range surveillance,
detection, and tracking of long range ballistic missiles in support of
the BMDS. It will be fielded initially on two Aegis destroyers by
September 30, 2004, quickly expanding to four DDGs before the end of
calendar year 2004.
The test bed version of the engagement capability (Aegis BMD 3.0
plus SM-3 Block I) will be available for ship installation by December
2004 and flight tested in early CY 2005. This capability is not
intended for operational employment, but could be available for
emergency use. There will be five SM-3 Block I missiles available by
December 2004 and BMD 3.0 will be installed on two Cruisers in CY 2005.
The final Block 2004 capability (Aegis BMD 3.1 plus SM-3 Block IA)
will be delivered in December 2005 and certified by April 2006 for
Fleet use against SRBMs and MRBMs, as well as contingency to provide
Long Range Surveillance and Track (LRS&T) data to the BMDS. This
configuration also includes the integration of basic Anti-Air Warfare
(AAW) self-defense that will be installed in three Cruisers and up to
15 Destroyers by the end of Block 2006. Installation schedules are
based on ship deployment and maintenance schedules
The Aegis BMD element builds upon the existing Aegis Weapon System
(AWS) and STANDARD Missile infrastructure already deployed in Aegis
TICONDEROGA class Cruisers, ARLEIGH BURKE class Destroyers, and Japan's
KONGO class Destroyers.
MDA is funding the development, integration, and testing of Aegis
BMD upgrades to the existing STANDARD Missile, AWS, and command and
control systems. MDA funding also covers the cost of BMD specific ship
equipment sets, initial installation, missile purchases, establishing
integrated logistics support (ILS), including initial training and
spare parts, and developmental flight tests. MDA continues technical
and logistic support until six months after the delivery of the block,
when sustaining funding responsibility transfers to the Navy, and MDA
pursues the next block upgrade. The Navy pays for ship operations and
support (O&S) costs and Manpower and Personnel (MPN) costs for the
crews throughout development and operational phases.
For developmental tests, Aegis BMD coordinates closely with
Commander, Third Fleet (C3F) to assign ships to test events,
particularly USS LAKE ERIE, the assigned BMDS test ship. C3F also
provides Destroyers to participate in test events, as appropriate. MDA
funds marginal costs for these test events, such as fuel.
Operational employment of the ships in support of BMDS will be
under the Commander, Pacific Fleet (CPF), in coordination with NORTHCOM
and STRATCOM. CPF will fund the marginal costs for ship operations.
This approach fully leverages the U.S. investment in the Aegis fleet to
provide an affordable missile defense capability.
Question. General, I see that you have requested funding for boost
phase development for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor. With the next
generation Navy Cruiser, the CG(X), in the early planning stages, I am
interested to know what discussions you are having with the Navy for
sea-basing options for this interceptor and what would be the fielding
timeframe?
Answer. The KEI program office commissioned the Navy to conduct a
CONOPS study to determine what interim platforms are feasible for the
KEI mission until the CG(X) is fielded. The results of the study may be
available as soon as September 2004. The projected fielding timeframe
for sea-based KEI is in Block 2012 on an interim platform. The Navy
CG(X) will be ready for fielding around 2020. The Navy can provide more
specific dates for the CG(X) fielding.
Question. General, I understand that there is an industry proposal,
supported by our Japanese allies, to develop a sea-based interceptor
that would fit in existing Navy missile launchers. Given the
Administration's desire to involve the international community in
missile defense and the fact that this proposed missile would not
involve modifying existing ships, what is your opinion of spiral
developing the SM-3 missile to a 21 inch missile instead of using the
36 inch Kinetic Energy Interceptor?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has initiated a
comprehensive Joint Analysis with Japan to evaluate future ballistic
missile defense options for the defense of Japan and the United States.
This analysis will allow Japan and the United States to make informed
decisions regarding the development, production, deployment and
enhancement of interoperable missile defenses. Enhancements to the SM-3
will be addressed as part of the Joint Analysis.
Question. General Kadish, in your statement you indicate you have
experienced some difficulties with the Airborne Laser as that system
has moved from the drawing board to actual flyable hardware. For
example, I have been informed the aircraft is somewhat heavier than had
been hoped and that the testing of the system has faced numerous
delays. Would you characterize the challenges you've encountered as
something expected for a program of this sort or are they what some
might call ``showstoppers?''
Answer. The challenges we have faced to date are typical for a
program of this nature, which is the first of its kind. However, we
have encountered nothing to date, which we would categorize as a
showstopper. In fact, you could say we have achieved some unique
successes since beginning the development of the ABL to include work in
the areas of chemical and solid-state lasers, precision optics, and
even aircraft design and modification. Given the advanced nature of the
technology we are using to produce the ABL, we have really made
tremendous progress. Furthermore, I am confident that we can complete
the remaining technical requirements in order to successfully
demonstrate this system.
Question. General Kadish, I understand the Terminal High Altitude
Air Defense (THAAD) radar was completed ahead of schedule and delivered
last month and the THAAD program is scheduled to have its first flight
test late this year. However, I am told that it will not achieve
operational capability for several years. General, how would you assess
the program's risk at this point, and is there anything that can be
done to move this program along a little faster?
Answer. The overall program risk assessment for the THAAD program
is moderate. For the first flight (December 2004), the missile
component has moderate technical and schedule risks. For the first
intercept (June 2005), the launcher component has moderate schedule
risk. All risks will be retired by ground testing prior to first flight
and intercept, with the exception of schedule risk for a production
booster motor and thrust vector assembly source.
The recent incidents at the boost motor supplier (Pratt & Whitney)
have put enormous pressure on the fiscal year 2004/fiscal year 2005
program. The additional cost to recover from these incidents and bring
on an alternate boost motor supplier is projected to be $120 million
through fiscal year 2007. This has resulted in a significant deferral
of activities out of fiscal year 2004 into later years, with an
immediate impact of $95 million in fiscal year 2005 ($45 million to
recover the necessary deferred activities and $50 million for the boost
motor supplier alternate source issues).
The current THAAD program includes the first Fire Unit for which
fabrication will begin in fiscal year 2007, with delivery for
operational assessments and potential deployment scheduled for mid-
fiscal year 2009. The Fire Unit cost is $483 million, with a current
funding plan for Fielding based on $360 million in fiscal year 2007 and
$123 million in fiscal year 2008. There are three options for
accelerating the availability of this equipment.
Option 1: To accelerate the Fire Unit by six months, the current
approved $483 million for THAAD fielding would be required to start in
fiscal year 2006 (vice fiscal year 2007). This includes $75 million in
fiscal year 2006 for radar long lead items, with the additional $309
million is fiscal year 2007, and $99 million in fiscal year 2008. This
is a low risk option that moves the Fire Unit availability from mid-
fiscal year 2009 to late-fiscal year 2008.
Option 2: To accelerate the Fire Unit by 12 months, the current
approved $483 million for THAAD fielding would be required to start in
fiscal year 2006 (vice fiscal year 2007). This option would move the
$360 million from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2006 and the $123
million in fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2007. This is a low risk
option that moves the Fire Unit availability from fiscal year 2009 to
fiscal year 2008.
Option 3: To accelerate the Fire Unit by 18 months, the current
approved $483 million for THAAD fielding would be required to start in
fiscal year 2005 (vice fiscal year 2007). This includes $75 million for
radar long lead items, with the additional $360 million in fiscal year
2006, and $48 million in fiscal year 2007. This is a more aggressive
option that increases risk and requires an early decision on the
purchase of hardware prior to an intercept flight test. It moves the
Fire Unit availability from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2007.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Question. General Kadish, the Missile Defense Agency plans include
funding for 10 ground-based interceptors at a third missile site
overseas. What is the benefit of having an additional site overseas,
and what are the candidate countries that you are looking at to house
this site? Do you expect that there will be international contributions
for a third ground-based intercept site, or will the United States have
to assume the entire bill?
Answer. We have included funding in fiscal year 2005 for long-lead
items for an additional 10 GBIs that could be deployed at a potential
third site, or at Fort Greely. No determination has been made as to the
actual location of this third site. In our analysis we have examined
potential third sites in the United States as well as overseas. The
benefit of an overseas site is that it provides additional protection
to the United States as well as protection to our allies and friends.
Several overseas regions, including Europe, are potential candidates
for a GBI site from a performance perspective. There are, however, many
other factors that would determine whether a particular site is viable.
If a determination was made that an overseas site is desirable, in
addition to the many domestic considerations, we would expect the
nature of non-U.S. contributions to factor into a final decision.
Question. General Kadish, your budget request includes nearly $80
million for space-based weapons-related research and development. $68
million of the request is for launching a short-range kill vehicle into
space for the Near-Field Infrared (N-FIRE) program. What is the goal
for the ``N-Fire'' program, and could you use alternatives to a kill
vehicle in space to collect data for this program?
Answer. The Near Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE) is a major risk
reduction project for the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program. The
primary NFIRE objectives are: Collection of near field rocket plume and
rocket hardbody IR data for model validation and algorithm
verification; and near term KEI kill vehicle development and testing
(hardware and software).
Yes there are other methods to collect IR data however NFIRE is the
only method that will provide near field IR data.
Aircraft observations using a variety of sensors allow us to
collect IR data at aircraft altitude and speed, but do not provide the
near field resolution we need because the distance to the target is
typically 150-250Km. Range safety prohibits aircraft from getting
closer than that.
Sub orbital tests, simultaneously launching a one use sensor and a
target, require both rockets to fly to the same point time in space.
This approach is a one shot opportunity with a specific sensor.
An orbital based test, like NFIRE, uses the highly predictable
nature of a satellite to reduce the risk for both objects to arrive at
the same point time in space. An orbital platform allows us to have
multiple opportunities to collect near field data in various wavebands
at a variety of engagement ranges and geometries.
Question. I understand that the reason the kill vehicle portion of
the Near-Field Infrared Experiment is not considered a space weapon is
that it is restricted from moving forward or backward. How difficult is
it to put this forward-backward movement back into the kill vehicle?
Answer. Including an axial stage (forward-backward movement) was
never part of the NFIRE kill vehicle. Consequently, to add an axial
stage to the current NFIRE kill vehicle would require a redesign of all
portions of the experiment (satellite, KV, launch vehicle, ground
support). This redesign would be difficult, costly, negatively affect
the schedule, and prevent our delivery of near field rocket plume and
rocket hardbody IR data in time to reduce the risk to Block 10 KEI kill
vehicle development.
Adding an axial stage to the kill vehicle does not contribute to
the primary NFIRE objectives: Collection of near field rocket plume and
rocket hardbody IR data for model validation and algorithm
verification; and near term KEI kill vehicle development and testing
(hardware and software).
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Stevens. But continuing on, we hope that you will
feel free to keep in touch with us and be a Monday morning
quarterback for us, and we invite you to return to our States
and be treated as you should be, as one of our favorite people
in military uniform, whether you're wearing the uniform or not.
Thank you very much and thank you for continuing on under
difficult circumstances, General. But since this is your last
meeting here, let me again repeat what I said to you. We
congratulate you and thank you on behalf of the people of the
United States for your commitment to the system, and your
willingness to spend the hours you have spent, long days away
from your family, to make certain that it is the best system we
can devise today. And I hope it will continue to improve with
your guidance. Thank you very much, General.
General Kadish. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., Wednesday, April 21, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
April 28.]