[Senate Hearing 108-705]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
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TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, and Byrd.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENTS OF:
DR. CHARLES E. McQUEARY, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANK LIBUTTI, UNDER SECRETARY, INFORMATION
ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The meeting will please come to order.
We appreciate very much the attendance of our witnesses at
today's hearing. We continue our review, today, of the fiscal
year 2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland
Security, with specific consideration being given to the
programs and activities of the Science and Technology
Directorate, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate.
I am pleased to welcome the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Dr. Charles E. McQueary, and the Under Secretary
for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,
Lieutenant General Frank Libutti.
The President is requesting $1.04 billion for Science and
Technology, and $865 million for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection.
We appreciate the witnesses submitting their statements in
advance. They will be printed in the hearing record and we
invite you to make any remarks that you think would be helpful
to the Committee's understanding of the budget request. But
before proceeding, I want to yield to my distinguished friend
and colleague, Senator Robert C. Byrd, for any opening
statement that he may wish to make.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Under Secretary McQueary and Mr. Under
Secretary Libutti.
Oh, by the way, Happy Birthday. Happy Birthday.
Dr. McQueary. Thank you.
HOW IAIP FUNDS ARE BEING SPENT
Senator Byrd. Over 1 year ago, the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate was established to
enhance the sharing of threat information amongst all levels of
Government and the private sector, to assess vulnerabilities of
our critical infrastructure sectors, and to provide resources
to protect them. However, it has been quite difficult for this
subcommittee to receive information on what your budget is
being spent on, or how the funding is being awarded.
I understand that our staffs had a constructive meeting
yesterday, and I hope that this cooperation will continue. Not
only do we hope it, but we expect it to continue.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
When it comes to protecting this Nation's critical
infrastructure, the Administration tells us that the private
sector is taking care of it. Yet, there is no mandate on the
private sector to make investments in security. Their
involvement is voluntary. There are no benchmarks for Congress
to use in assessing the private sector's role in critical
infrastructure protection.
And so that is why, today, I am sending a letter asking the
General Accounting Office, which is an arm of the Congress, to
provide this subcommittee with an assessment of private sector
investments to improve the security of our critical
infrastructure such as chemical plants and ports since
September 11, 2001.
INFORMATION ANALYSIS
Regarding information analysis, it is a mystery to me why
this Administration, which celebrated the creation of this new
department as a great success, has gone to great lengths to
splinter its functions in the area of intelligence.
The President created the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center, but gave primary responsibility to the CIA. He followed
up this decision by establishing the Terrorist Screening Center
within the FBI, creating further confusion about this
Department's role in intelligence sharing.
Experts who follow this situation are concerned. The
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, better known
as the Gilmore Commission, concluded in December that the IAIP
directorate ``does not have significant analytical power'' to
do what it takes, to analyze and disseminate intelligence
information.
IAIP STAFFING
In the area of staffing, the IAIP directorate is barely
keeping its head above water. After a year in existence, IAIP
is struggling to meet its staffing goals. My understanding is
that very few of the authorized intelligence analysts are on
board.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BUDGET
Let me turn now to Science and Technology. The Science and
Technology Directorate's budget is the eighth largest R&D
budget in the Federal Government. The budget request for fiscal
year 2005 is just over $1 billion. There is concern whether
this budget is sufficient to address the various threats that
we face, such as a biological, chemical or radiological attack.
Last year this subcommittee received hundreds of requests
from members for research and technology projects at major
universities. Rather than earmark projects, the subcommittee
significantly increased the university account and allowed the
department to select projects through a competitive process.
Unfortunately, the President responded to this approach by
proposing to substantially reducing funding for this purpose
next year.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on why this
cut is appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, I beg you to pardon my tardiness and I thank
you for allowing me to proceed with my opening statement.
Senator Cochran. Dr. McQueary, we have a copy of your
statement and we invite you to make any comments and remarks
about the budget request which you think would be helpful to
our understanding of the request that you're making.
You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES E. MC QUEARY
Dr. McQueary. Thank you, Chairman Cochran. And Senator
Byrd.
It's been several months since I have appeared before you
and I welcome the opportunity to do so again.
It is a pleasure to be here today and have a chance to talk
about the research and development activities of the Department
of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
The Nation's advantage in science and technology is key to
securing the homeland. The most important mission for the
Science and Technology Directorate is to support the efforts of
the dedicated men and women who protect and secure our
homeland.
HIGHLIGHTS OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS
When I first reported to you about activities last year, we
had just begun our work. The Directorate has accomplished much
since its inception last March. And I would like to give you a
few brief highlights, and several others are included in the
written testimony that I have submitted.
First, we have deployed monitoring systems that operate
continuously to detect biological pathogens in approximately 30
cities in the United States. We have also set up test beds to
provide accurate radiation and nuclear warnings at air and
marine cargo points, ports in cooperation with the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. We have established the
first series of interoperability guidelines for the Nation's
wireless emergency communications network.
In another effort, we have greatly reduced the time it
takes to develop national standards for technologies to protect
the homeland.
Our new standards for radiation detection equipment will
help put needed technologies into the hands of first responders
quickly. And, our Homeland Security Advance Research Project
Agency, or HSARPA, has started extensive research for next
generation biological and chemical, as well as radiological and
nuclear detectors.
We have awarded the first round of 100 Homeland Security
fellowships and scholarships to build U.S. leadership in
science and technology. And we have also established the first
university-based Homeland Security Center of Excellence to
address both the targets and means of terrorism. And, we have
become active contributors in numerous inter-agency working
groups throughout the Federal Government.
In accomplishing this, we have doubled the staff of this
directorate with some of the country's brightest and most
dedicated people. We started the Directorate on March 1, last
year, with 87 people and 53 of those were transferred in bulk
from the Environmental Measurements Laboratory in Manhattan,
New York. So the basic staff was quite small for carrying the
program that we had responsibility for forward. Today, we are
at about 210 people, which is exactly where we had hoped to be
on our plan of adding staff to the organization.
However, as we all know, the threats to our homeland remain
diverse and daunting. We must constantly monitor current and
emerging threats, and assess our vulnerabilities to them. And
we must develop new and improved capabilities to counter them,
and be prepared to respond to and recover from a potential
attack.
PRIORITIZATION OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
The Science and Technology Directorate has prioritized its
research and development efforts based on the directives and
recommendations of many sources, including the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, President Bush's National Strategy and
nine Homeland Security Presidential Directives as well as the
report of the National Academies of Science on making the
Nation safer, and reports from the Gilmore, Bremer, and Hart-
Rudman Committees.
We have identified and integrated the information in these
sources for review and evaluation by our scientific staff, and
it provides the basis for determining the Research and
Development needed to meet our mission.
We recognize that many organizations are contributing to
the Homeland Security's Science and Technology base. Congress
recognized this as well and the Homeland Security Act of 2002
directed the Under Secretary of Science and Technology to
coordinate the Federal Government's civilian efforts to
identify and develop countermeasures to current and emerging
threats. We take this responsibility very seriously.
We began this coordination process by evaluating and
producing a report on the Department of Homeland Security
research and development activities underway that were not
under the direct cognizance of the Under Secretary for Science
and Technology. Where appropriate, Science and Technology will
absorb these research and development functions in this fiscal
year.
We are now initiating the effort needed to coordinate
Homeland Security research and development across the entire
United States Government. Discussions are ongoing with the
Federal departments and agencies, as well as the Office of
Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and the Homeland Security Council to ensure the best
possible coordination.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 PLANS
At this time, I would like to briefly describe our fiscal
year 2005 plans. We have an overall budget request of $1.04
billion, which you identified, which is an increase of $126.5
million or about 14 percent over fiscal year 2004. With these
funds Science and Technology will continue to make progress in
securing the homeland.
For example, under President Bush's new biological-
surveillance initiative, which accounts for most of the
increase in funding, additional capability will be implemented
quickly in the top-threat urban areas to provide more than
twice the current capability.
We will continue to provide the science and technology
capabilities and enduring partnerships needed to develop
methods and tools to test and assess threats and
vulnerabilities to protect our critical infrastructure and
enhance information exchange.
We will continue to work in cyber security both through
partnerships and by creating low-cost and high impact solutions
to identified cyber security challenges. And of course, this is
done in concert with my good friend, General Libutti.
We will wrap-up our work in counter-MANPADS to improve
technology to protect commercial aircraft from the man-portable
air defense systems or the shoulder-fired missiles, which
present a vulnerability to our commercial aircraft industry.
We will award contracts in fiscal year 2005 for integrating
commercial prototype equipment on selected commercial aircraft
and conduct test evaluation including a live-fire range test.
In conclusion, this year the scientists and engineers in
the Science and Technology Directorate have accomplished more
than I could have expected. I am proud to have shared some of
these success stories with you today. We have appended a more
comprehensive summary of the accomplishments to date for the
record.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Yet, we also recognize that there is much more to do and we
will be working just as hard in fiscal year 2005. I look
forward to working with you, with my colleagues in other
Federal agencies, and with private industry and academia to
continue this work and improve our ability to protect our
homeland and our way of life.
This concludes my prepared statement, and I will be
prepared to answer questions at the appropriate time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Charles E. McQueary
INTRODUCTION
Good morning. Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be with you today to
discuss the research and development activities of the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.
The Nation's advantage in science and technology is key to securing
the homeland. The most important mission for the Science and Technology
Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies and new
capabilities so that the dedicated men and women who serve to protect
and secure our homeland can perform their jobs more effectively and
efficiently--these men and women are my customers.
When I last reported to you about our activities, we had just
started our work. Since its inception less than a year ago, the Science
and Technology Directorate has:
--deployed continuously operating biological pathogen detection
systems to approximately 30 United States cities;
--set up testbeds for radiation and nuclear warnings at air and
marine cargo ports in cooperation with the Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey;
--established the first series of interoperability guidelines for the
Nation's wireless emergency communications network;
--established the first national standards guidelines for radiation
detection equipment;
--awarded the first Homeland Security Fellowships and Scholarships;
--established the first Homeland Security University Center of
Excellence;
--transferred the Plum Island Animal Disease Center from the
Department of Agriculture to the Science and Technology
Directorate;
--engaged private industry in bringing innovative and effective
solutions to homeland security problems through the interagency
Technical Support Working Group and issuance of HSARPA's first
two Broad Agency Announcements and a Small Business Innovative
Research Program solicitation;
--initiated a development and demonstration program to assess the
technical and economic viability of adapting military
countermeasures to the threat of man portable anti-aircraft
missiles for commercial aircraft;
--collaborated with and assisted other components of the Department
to enhance their abilities to meet their missions and become
active contributors in interagency working groups--all while
staffing this Directorate with some of this country's brightest
and most dedicated people.
I continue to be energized by and proud of the scientists,
engineers, managers, and support staff in the Science and Technology
Directorate. We have accomplished a great deal in a short amount of
time and are positioning the Directorate to make continuing
contributions to the homeland security mission of the Department.
However, the threats to our homeland remain diverse and daunting.
We must constantly monitor current and emerging threats and assess our
vulnerabilities to them, develop new and improved capabilities to
counter them, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks should they
occur. The Science and Technology Directorate must also enhance the
conventional missions of the Department to protect and provide
assistance to civilians in response to natural disasters, law
enforcement needs, and other activities such as maritime search and
rescue.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION
Because our Department is relatively new, I'd like to describe the
way we are structured. We have four key offices in the Science &
Technology Directorate, each of which has an important role in
implementing the Directorate's RDT&E activities. Individuals with
strong credentials have been appointed to head each office and we
continue to strategically add highly skilled technical, professional
and support staff. These offices are: Plans, Programs and Budgets;
Research and Development; Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency; and Systems Engineering and Development. In addition, we have
created the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations and
Incident Management to offer scientific advice and support.
Crosscutting the four key offices, the Science and Technology
Directorate is implementing its activities through focused portfolios
that address biological, chemical, high explosives, radiological and
nuclear, and cyber threats; support the research and development needs
of the operational units of the Department; support the development of
standards; develop an enduring R&D capability for homeland security;
and receive valuable input from private industry and academia as well
as national and Federal laboratories. I will talk about the offices
first and then about the portfolios.
Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets
The Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets operates under the
supervision of Dr. Penrose Albright. He has organized this office into
the portfolios I just mentioned, each of which is focused on a
particular discipline or activity; taken together, these portfolios
span the Directorate's mission space. As I will cover the portfolios in
detail later in this testimony, I will limit myself here to a summary
explanation. The staff of each portfolio is charged with being expert
in their particular area; with understanding the activities and
capabilities extant in Federal agencies and across the broad research
and development community; and with developing a strategic plan for
their particular portfolio, to include near-, mid-, and long-range
research and development activities. In addition, we have staff that is
charged with understanding the threat from a technical perspective,
with integrating the various portfolios into a coherent overall plan,
and with developing the corresponding budget and monitoring its
financial execution.
Finally, the Office of Plans, Programs and Budget is responsible
for executing the Directorate's implementation responsibilities for the
SAFETY (Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies)
Act.
Office of Research and Development
We are fortunate to have Dr. Maureen McCarthy as our Director of
Science and Technology's Office of Research and Development (ORD). Dr.
McCarthy has served as Chief Scientist for the National Nuclear
Security Administration and the Department of Energy (DOE) and was
previously DOE's senior representative to the Homeland Security
Transition Planning Office. She will lead the office as it strives to
provide the Nation with an enduring capability in research,
development, demonstration, testing and evaluation of technologies to
protect the homeland. This office also plans to provide stewardship to
the scientific community and to preserve and broaden the leadership of
the United States in science and technology.
Activities within ORD address the resources that can be brought to
bear to better secure the homeland through the participation of
universities, national laboratories, Federal laboratories and research
centers. Directors have been appointed to lead efforts in each of these
areas and staff is being added rapidly.
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
Dr. David Bolka joined us in September 2003 as director of the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as HSARPA.
Dr. Bolka made significant contributions in advancing technical and
scientific projects in his prior work with Lucent Technologies and Bell
Laboratories, following a notable career in the United States Navy.
HSARPA is the external research-funding arm of the Science and
Technology Directorate. It has at its disposal the full range of
contracting vehicles and the authority under the Homeland Security Act
to engage businesses, federally funded research and development
centers, universities and other government partners in an effort to
gather and develop viable concepts for advanced technologies to protect
the homeland.
HSARPA's mission, as stated in the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
is to support basic and applied homeland security research to promote
revolutionary changes in technologies that would promote homeland
security; advance the development, testing and evaluation, and
deployment of homeland security technologies; and accelerate the
prototyping and deployment of technologies that would address homeland
security vulnerabilities. Its customers are State and local first
responders, and Federal agencies that are allied with homeland security
such as the United States Coast Guard, United States Secret Service,
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and others.
About 60 percent of the Science and Technology Directorate's
appropriation in fiscal year 2004 will be executed directly through the
private sector with HSARPA managing about half of that. At least 5 to
10 percent of HSARPA's funds are dedicated for revolutionary, long-
range research for breakthrough technologies and systems.
Office of Systems Engineering and Development
Mr. John Kubricky joined us in early October 2003 as our Director
of the Office of Systems Engineering and Development (SE&D). He is
tasked with leading the implementation and transition of large-scale or
pilot systems to the field through a rapid, efficient and disciplined
approach to project management. Mr. Kubricky previously served as
Advanced Program Development Manager for Northrop Grumman and has held
senior positions with California Microwave and Westinghouse Defense.
One of the Science and Technology Directorate's challenges is to
evaluate a wide spectrum of military and commercial technologies so
rapid, effective and affordable solutions can be transitioned to the
Department's customers that include first responders and Federal
agencies. In some cases, military technologies could be candidates for
commercialization, but rigorous systems engineering processes need to
be applied to ensure a successful transition. SE&D's role is to
identify and then, in a disciplined manner, retire risks associated
with such technologies to ready them for deployment to the field. In
doing so, the office must view each technology through the prism of
affordability, performance and supportability--all critical to end-
users.
SE&D must weigh considerations such as the urgency for a solution,
consequences of the threat, safety of the product, and lifecycle
support as new products are introduced. Products must be user friendly,
have a minimum of false alarms, require little or no training and
consistently provide accurate results. SE&D will demonstrate and test
solutions before they are released to the field, and will validate that
those solutions meet user expectations.
Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations and Incident
Management
We created the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations and
Incident Management to serve as the Science and Technology
Directorate's technical support for crisis operations. The office
provides scientific advice and support to the Office of the Secretary
of Homeland Security in assessing and responding to threats against the
homeland. This office's activities are primarily focused on the
biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear threats.
results from current research and development (r&d) spending and fiscal
YEAR 2005 PLANS: PORTFOLIO DETAILS
As I have mentioned, the Science and Technology Directorate has
organized its efforts into research and development portfolios that
span the set of product lines of the Directorate.
Four portfolios address specific terrorist threats:
--Biological Countermeasures
--Chemical Countermeasures
--High Explosive Countermeasures
--Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
Four portfolios crosscut these threats:
--Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment--this portfolio
includes our support to the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate, including our critical
infrastructure protection and cybersecurity activities.
--Standards
--Emerging Threats
--Rapid Prototyping
We also have portfolios that support the operational units of the
Department (Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness
and Response, United States Coast Guard and United States Secret
Service) in both their homeland security and conventional missions.
Our University and Fellowship Programs portfolio addresses the need
to build an enduring science and technology capability and support
United States leadership in science and technology.
Our most recent program, Counter-MANPADS, is seeking to improve
technologies to protect commercial aircraft from the threat of MAN-
Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).
In addition, the Science and Technology Directorate is responsible
for the management of one of the United States government's E-Gov
Initiatives, the SAFECOM Program. There are tens of thousands of State
and local public safety agencies, and 100 Federal law enforcement
agencies that depend on interoperable wireless communications. The
SAFECOM (Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable COMmunications) program
is the umbrella initiative to coordinate all Federal, State, local, and
Tribal users to achieve national wireless communications
interoperability. The placement of SAFECOM in the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate allows it full
access to the scientific expertise and resources needed to help our
Nation achieve true public safety wireless communications
interoperability.
At this time I would like to briefly describe some of our
accomplishments to date and our fiscal year 2005 plans. As can be seen
in the following chart, we have an overall fiscal year 2005 budget
request of $1.039 billion, which is an increase of $126.5 million (13.9
percent) over the fiscal year 2004 levels. The request includes $35
million for construction of facilities. In addition, the increase
includes President Bush's request for an additional $65 million to
enhance and expand the BioWatch Program.
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increases/Decreases from
Fiscal year Proposed fiscal year 2004 to 2005
Budget activity Fiscal year 2004 less fiscal year -------------------------------
2003 Amount rescission 2005 Amount Percent
Amount Amount increase
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget Activity M&A............. $0.0 $44.2 $52.6 $8.4 19.1
Salary and expenses......... 0.0 44.2 52.6 8.4 19.1
Budget Activity R&D............. 553.5 868.7 986.7 118.0 13.6
Bio Countermeasures (incl. 362.6 285.0 407.0 122.0 42.8
NBACC).....................
High-Explosives 0.0 9.5 9.7 0.2 2.1
Countermeasures............
Chemical Countermeasures.... 7.0 52.0 53.0 1.0 1.9
R/N Countermeasures......... 75.0 126.3 129.3 3.0 2.4
TVTA (incl. CIP & Cyber).... 36.1 100.1 101.9 1.8 1.8
Standards................... 20.0 39.0 39.7 0.7 1.9
Components.................. 0.0 34.0 34.0 0.0 0.0
University & Fellowship 3.0 68.8 30.0 -38.8 -56.4
Programs...................
Emerging Threats............ 16.8 21.0 21.0 0.0 0.0
Rapid Prototyping........... 33.0 73.0 76.0 3.0 4.1
Counter MANPADS............. 0.0 60.0 61.0 1.0 1.7
R&D Consolidation 0.0 0.0 24.1 24.1 ..............
transferred funds..........
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total enacted 553.5 912.8 1039.3 126.5 13.9
appropriations and budget
estimates................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biological Countermeasures
Biological threats can take many forms and be distributed in many
ways. Aerosolized anthrax, smallpox, foot and mouth disease, and bulk
food contamination are among the threats that can have high
consequences for humans and agriculture. Our Biological Countermeasures
portfolio uses the Nation's science base to prevent, protect, respond
to and recover from bioterrorism events. This portfolio provides the
science and technology needed to reduce the probability and potential
consequences of a biological attack on this Nation's civilian
population, its infrastructure, and its agricultural system. Portfolio
managers and scientists are developing and implementing an integrated
systems approach with a wide range of activities, including
vulnerability and risk analyses to identify the need for vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostics; development and implementation of early
detection and warning systems to characterize an attack and permit
early prophylaxis and decontamination activities; and development of a
national bioforensics analysis capability to support attribution of
biological agent use.
In fiscal year 2003 and 2004, the Biological Countermeasures
portfolio:
Deployed BioWatch to approximately 30 cities across the Nation.
BioWatch consists of air samplers that detect the release of biothreat
pathogens, such as anthrax, in a manner timely enough to allow for
effective treatment of the exposed population. In addition, with
additional funds provided by Congress in fiscal year 2004, we were able
to integrate environmental monitoring data with biosurveillance to
provide early attack alerts and assessments. The environmental
monitoring activities include not only BioWatch, which provides
continuous monitoring of most of our major metropolitan areas, but also
targeted monitoring that is temporarily deployed for special national
needs, such as a Homeland Security Elevated Threat Level. While serving
the primary function of mitigating attacks, both BioWatch and
environmental monitoring systems also play a significant deterrent
role, since terrorists are less likely to attack when they know that
defensive systems prevent them from attaining their goals.
Established the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center, which provides scientific support for intelligence activities,
prioritizes biothreats, and conducts bioforensic analyses for
attribution and hence deterrence.
In fiscal year 2005, we will build upon our past work and continue
to deploy and improve wide area monitoring systems for urban areas.
Under President Bush's new Biosurveillance Initiative, which accounts
for most of the fiscal year 2005 increase in funding, additional
capability will be implemented quickly in the top threat urban areas to
more than twice the current capability. We will be working on
decontamination technologies and standards for facilities and outdoor
areas, and a National Academy of Science study characterizing
contamination risks will be completed in fiscal year 2005. At a smaller
scale, we will define requirements for expanded technology in detect-
to-warn scenarios relevant to facilities monitoring. At the same time,
we will be building our capabilities in the National Biodefense
Analysis and Counterterrorism Center (NBACC) and at Plum Island Animal
Disease Center (PIADC). At the NBACC, we are focusing first on
bioforensics and development of a biodefense knowledge center; for
agro-bioterrorism, we are prioritizing countermeasures to foreign
animal diseases. We are requesting additional funding in fiscal year
2005 for Plum Island to improve the facilities and security of this
important research and development site.
Chemical Countermeasures
The National Research Council Report Making the Nation Safer points
out that ``chemicals continue to be the weapon of choice for terrorist
attacks.'' The large volumes of toxic industrial chemicals and
materials along with the potential for chemical warfare agents and
emerging threat agents constitute a broad range of threats that may be
applied to virtually any civilian target.
Our Chemical Countermeasures portfolio provides the science and
technology needed to reduce the probability and potential consequences
of a chemical attack on this Nation's civilian population. The
portfolio places high priority on characterizing and reducing the
vulnerability posed by the large volumes of toxic industrial materials
in use, storage or transport within the Nation. The research and
development activities include prioritization of efforts among the many
possible chemical threats and targets, and development of new detection
and forensic technologies and integrated protective systems for high-
value facilities such as airports and subways. These activities are
informed by end-user input and simulated exercises.
Over the past year, our Chemical portfolio completed Project
PROTECT--Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for
Chemical/Biological Terrorism--a program conducted in collaboration
with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).
PROTECT, an operational chemical agent detection and response
capability, significantly decreases response time, which in the event
of an attack will save human lives. PROTECT is deployed in Metro
stations and is operated by the WMATA.
In fiscal year 2005, our focus will be on protecting facilities
from chemical attacks and controlling the industrial chemicals that may
be used for such attacks. Our scientists, working with the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), will
complete a detailed end-to-end study of three reference scenarios, to
culminate in recommendations for top-level architectures,
identification of key gaps, and a ``report card'' showing present, mid-
term (3-year), and long-term (5-plus year) capabilities. We will
qualify candidate off-the-shelf sensors for demonstration in an
application to facilities protection. We will also address response and
recovery. Working with the user community, we will develop first-
generation playbooks for responding to the three reference scenarios
and develop technical requirements for personal protection equipment.
High Explosives Countermeasures
The High Explosives Countermeasures portfolio addresses the threat
that terrorists will use explosives in attacks on buildings, critical
infrastructure, and the civilian population of the United States. The
Science and Technology Directorate's portfolio is closely coordinated
with the activities ongoing in the Transportation Security
Administration to ensure that research and development (R&D) activities
are complementary, not duplicative. R&D priorities in this portfolio
have focused on the detection of vehicle bombs and suicide bombers, and
on providing the science and technology needed to significantly
increase the probability of preventing an explosives attack on
buildings, infrastructure and people.
This portfolio in fiscal year 2005 will develop and field
equipment, technologies and procedures to interdict suicide bombers and
car and truck bombs before they can reach their intended targets while
minimizing the impact on the American way of life. We will complete
testing and evaluation of known procedures and commercial off-the-shelf
devices applicable to indoor or outdoor interdiction of suicide
bombers, and develop a training package for local law enforcement,
including recommended equipment and procedures. In addition, we will
support the development of new devices to interdict suicide bombers and
study the feasibility of using existing detectors to identify
explosives in trucks. Finally, we will analyze the costs and benefits
of hardening aircraft cargo containers, cargo bays, and overhead bin
storage compartments to better withstand the effects of an explosion.
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
Potential radiological and nuclear threats range from the
deliberate dispersal of small amounts of radioactive material to the
detonation of an improvised or stolen nuclear weapon to an attack on
our nuclear power industry. Our Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures portfolio provides the science and technology needed to
reduce both the probability and the potential consequences of a
radiological or nuclear attack on this Nation's civilian population or
our nuclear power facilities.
On August 19, 2003, our Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
portfolio formally assumed management of the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey radiation detection test bed. The test bed was
previously managed by the United States Department of Energy. Following
the transfer, we have broadened the project scope beyond testing and
evaluating individual pieces of technology to a systems approach,
including response protocols and operational concepts. As part of the
Science and Technology Directorate's effort, radiation detection
sensors will be deployed and operated by Federal, State, and local
inspectors and police at land, maritime and aviation venues. By judging
the efficacy of deployed systems over time, we will be able to inform
future decisions on detection technology R&D investment, deployment of
urban monitoring systems, configurations best able to enhance security,
and viable ways to defend against a radioactive dispersal device or an
improvised nuclear device.
For fiscal year 2005, we plan to leverage our previous technology
and capability successes and place a high priority on providing the
end-user community with the most appropriate and effective detection
and interdiction technologies available to prohibit the importation or
transportation and subsequent detonation of a radiological or nuclear
device within U.S. borders. Specifically, we will do the following:
--Integrate at least five Federal, State, and local sites into an
operational detection system architecture to detect
radiological and nuclear threats;
--Establish a test and evaluation capability, and test and evaluate
90 percent of the fiscal year 2005 prototype technologies
developed in the portfolio's programs;
--Demonstrate two advanced characterization technologies for crisis
response; and
--Demonstrate a prototype for automatic radiological imaging analysis
that enhances current imaging systems at one pilot site.
Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment
Our Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment (TVTA)
portfolio is one of our largest portfolios, and includes our scientific
and technical support to the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection (IAIP) Directorate. TVTA includes our R&D activities in
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity. Activities in
this portfolio are designed to help evaluate extensive amounts of
diverse threat information; detect and document terrorist intent;
couple threat information with knowledge of complex, interdependent
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities; and enable analysts to draw
timely insights and distribute warnings from the information. This
portfolio provides the science and technology needed to develop methods
and tools to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities to protect
critical infrastructure and enhance information exchange; this
portfolio also includes a Biometrics Program and a Cybersecurity
Program.
In fiscal year 2004, TVTA:
--Developed and installed an operational component, the Threat-
Vulnerability Mapper (TVM), as part of the Threat and
Vulnerability Integration System for the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. The TVM provides
counterterrorism analysts with a simple, straightforward way
not only to depict the geographic distribution of threats
across the United States, but also to search the underlying
databases for information on the possible actors, agents,
potential severity of attacks, and extent of the
vulnerabilities to and effects of such attacks.
--Co-funded the Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research
(``DETER'') Network with the National Science Foundation, a
$5.45 million, 3-year research project to create an
experimental infrastructure network to support development and
demonstration of next-generation information security
technologies for cyber defense. This is a multi-university
project led by the University of California at Berkeley.
--Developed a Decision Support System focused on prioritizing
investment, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery
strategies related to Critical Infrastructure Protection. The
initial proof-of-concept began in August 2003 and a case study
is being conducted in February 2004. The prototype model will
include representation of all 14 critical infrastructure
sectors/assets and their interdependencies.
--Developed advanced algorithms for speeding the creation of DNA
signatures for biological pathogen detection through the
Advanced Scientific Computing Research and Development program.
These discoveries will result in cheaper, faster and more
reliable bio-detectors for homeland security.
In fiscal year 2005, TVTA will provide the science and technology
capabilities and enduring partnerships needed to develop methods and
tools to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities to protect
critical infrastructure and enhance information exchange. The Threat-
Vulnerability Mapper is only one component of a large Threat and
Vulnerability Information System that we will continue to build,
drawing upon advances in the information and computer sciences as well
as innovative analytic techniques. Our objective is to continually
improve an analyst's capability to answer threat-related questions. The
Science and Technology Directorate will contribute to the capability to
produce high-quality net assessments and assessments of weapons of mass
destruction.
We will develop advanced computing algorithms in support of
improved aerosol dispersion models, blast effects calculations, neutron
interrogation models, bioinformatics, and scalable information
extraction; improved algorithms make more accurate information
available faster. We will continue to provide, in collaboration with
other relevant organizations, the science and technology and associated
standards needed in the development of biometrics for precise
identification of individuals and develop instrumentation to aid
authorized officials in detecting individuals with potentially hostile
intent. In the cybersecurity area, the DETER Network testbed will be up
and running, and we will competitively fund several low-cost, high-
impact solutions to specific cybersecurity problems.
Standards
Ensuring that standards are created and adopted is critically
important for homeland security. We need consistent and verifiable
measures of effectiveness in terms of basic functionality,
appropriateness and adequacy for the task, interoperability,
efficiency, and sustainability. Standards will improve the quality and
usefulness of homeland security systems and technologies. Our Standards
portfolio cuts across all aspects of the Science and Technology
Directorate's mission and all threats to improve effectiveness,
efficiency, and interoperability of the systems and technologies
developed, as envisioned in the Homeland Security Act.
Our Standards portfolio continues to actively engage the Federal,
State, and local first responders to ensure that developed standards
are effective in detection, prevention, response, management, and
attribution. This portfolio also conducts the essential activities in
order to meet the requirement of the SAFETY (Support Anti-Terrorism by
Fostering Effective Technologies) Act in developing certification
standards for technologies related to homeland security.
In fiscal year 2004, our Standards portfolio:
--Created initial standards guidelines, with formal standards nearing
completion, for radiation pagers, hand-held radiation dosimetry
instruments, radioisotope identifiers and radiation portal
monitors. These standards were developed under the auspices of
the American National Standards Institute's Accredited American
Standards Committee on Radiation Instrumentation.
--Published guidelines for interoperable communications gear. Common
grant guidance has been developed and incorporated in the
public safety wireless interoperability grant programs of both
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security;
--Launched the SAFETY Act process for evaluating anti-terrorism
technologies for potential liability limits.
In fiscal year 2005, the Standards portfolio will continue to work
on many fronts and with many partners to establish needed standards for
technologies (including equipment), processes, and systems. We will
especially focus on two major milestones. First, we will establish
technical standards and test and evaluation protocols for
decontamination technologies and analysis across the ranges of weapons
of mass destruction. Second, we will publish a ``Consumer's Report'' on
radiation and bioagent detection devices for Federal, State, and local
users.
Emerging Threats
It is truly the threats we do not yet know that are often the most
terrifying. Our Emerging Threats portfolio addresses the dynamic nature
of terrorist threats, as science and technology advancements enable new
agents of harm and new ways to employ them. This portfolio places high
priority on developing the capability to use innovative, crosscutting,
out-of-the-box approaches for anticipating and responding to new and
emerging threats. Successful identification of emerging threats will
permit capabilities to be developed to thwart these emerging threats
before they are used.
Relevant R&D is underway at other agencies and organizations; thus,
partnerships in this area hold great potential for synergistic focus on
homeland security. Work is being done and will continue to be pursued
in partnership with the Departments of Energy, Defense, Justice, and
Agriculture, the intelligence community, and the National Institutes of
Health.
In fiscal year 2003 and 2004, our scientists in the Emerging
Threats portfolio established informal partnerships with the
intelligence community and with the United States Secret Service in
order to leverage ongoing activities in support of over-the-horizon
assessment.
In fiscal year 2005, we will leverage the activities started during
fiscal year 2004, and continue to focus on developing the capability to
use innovative, crosscutting, out-of-the-box approaches for
anticipating and responding to new and emerging threats and to develop
revolutionary technologies to combat them.
Rapid Prototyping
By accelerating the time needed to develop and commercialize
relevant technologies, the Science and Technology Directorate will
ensure that operational end-users will be better able to prevent
terrorist attacks, reduce the Nation's vulnerability, and minimize the
damage and assist in recovery if attacks occur. Our Rapid Prototyping
portfolio advances the Directorate's mission to conduct, stimulate and
enable research, development, test, evaluation and timely transition of
homeland security capabilities to Federal, State and local operational
end-users.
In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the Rapid Prototyping
portfolio provided funding of $30 million each year through our
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) to the
interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to solicit ideas,
concepts and technologies for 50 requirement areas of interest to both
the Department and TWSG; initial contracts have been made and HSARPA
will provide the programmatic monitoring of those efforts for the
Science and Technology Directorate. This portfolio also provided
support through HSARPA for a joint port and coastal surveillance
prototype testbed designated ``HAWKEYE'' with the United States Coast
Guard. Funding has been made available to support the creation of a
Technology Clearinghouse as required in the Homeland Security Act of
2002.
In fiscal year 2005, this program will continue to provide a
mechanism for accelerated development of technologies relevant to
homeland security in a process driven by technology developers. Through
rapid prototyping and commercialization, these technologies will be
made available to operational end-users as quickly as possible, thus
increasing their capability to secure the homeland.
Support to Department of Homeland Security Components
As I have mentioned, the operational components of the Department
are my customers. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate supports the missions of the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate, Border and
Transportation Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness and Response
(EP&R), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and United States Secret
Service (USSS). Our TVTA portfolio supports the mission of the IAIP
Directorate as previously indicated. This portfolio places high
priorities on high-risk, high-reward research and development relevant
to homeland security that might not otherwise be conducted in support
of the missions of BTS, EP&R, USCG, and the USSS.
In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, we continued to support
the conventional missions of these operational components. Ongoing
activities within BTS, USCG and USSS focus on preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons (particularly weapons of mass destruction) from
entering the United States, on detecting and preventing cyber attacks,
supporting maritime transportation, safety and economy (Port and
Channel navigation, Search and Rescue, and Aquatic Nuisance Species
Remediation), and on preventing attacks on United States Secret Service
protectees and high-visibility venues.
Support to Border and Transportation Security
The Science and Technology Directorate supports all elements of BTS
enforcement and facilitation processes through identifying operational
requirements, developing mission capabilities-based technological needs
and implementing a strategic plan. We are providing systems engineering
support to various BTS programs including US VISIT and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles.
The Science and Technology Directorate's support to the BTS
Directorate is accomplished by implementing a capabilities-based
technology planning process. The capabilities-based approach
establishes the scope of effort and framework for a technology plan.
Through a series of user conferences and technology opportunity
conferences, requirements are developed and prioritized for new and
improved capabilities. Operational personnel identify capabilities and
technology personnel identify potential development opportunities.
Capability gaps and possible technology solutions are proposed, and a
budget is developed to distinguish between both funded and unfunded
needs.
The Science & Technology Directorate co-chairs with BTS, the
Department's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Working Group, which is
currently focused on developing the Border and Transportation Security
operational requirements for UAVs and related technologies, e.g.,
aerostats, blimps, lighter than air (LTA) ships, and fixed and mobile
towers. The starting point for the requirements generation process is
six BTS capability objectives we have identified that could benefit by
the utilization of UAVs: surveillance and monitoring communications,
apprehension, targeting, intelligence, deterrence, and officer safety.
Functional capabilities that could be filled or improved through the
application of UAVs and other technologies have been identified. Based
on these high-level requirements, the Science and Technology
Directorate is developing concepts of operations and assumptions that
will be used in conducting an Analysis of Alternatives that will
include UAVs and other technologies.
In fiscal year 2005 we will be involved in a wide range of
activities supporting the components, based upon their needs. For BTS,
we will focus on discovering and implementing technologies that include
improved screening and inspection, access control, document
verification and validity, and data compression and analysis.
Support to Emergency Preparedness and Response
The Nation has more than 750 regionally accredited community
colleges. Community colleges train more than 80 percent of our
country's first responders; these first responders are critical for
homeland security. The Science and Technology Directorate has a
responsibility to ensure that these first responders have the necessary
tools available to them to perform their jobs effectively and safely on
a daily basis. This portfolio has a key role in our meeting that
responsibility.
The scope of our EP&R portfolio includes research, development,
test and evaluation for State, local and Federal emergency responders
and emergency managers. Particular emphasis is placed on technology
integration at all levels of government, technology insertion for
weapons of mass destruction detection and monitoring systems, and long-
term sustained performance and interoperability to enhance State and
local preparedness.
Our work in the EP&R portfolio focuses on three major areas:
--Technology development for first responders
--Scientific and technical support to Federal response
--Technology integration--Safe Cities
The Safe Cities Program, a new initiative in fiscal year 2004, is
focused on implementing technology and operational system solutions in
local communities/regions. This program is being piloted in a select
number of cities in fiscal year 2004 and will be conducted in close
cooperation with State and local emergency managers and city planners
to identify capability needs and gaps that advanced technologies being
developed by the Science and Technology Directorate can meet. The Safe
Cities Program seeks to provide technology and operational solutions
that are sustainable by the communities in which they are implemented.
The Safe Cities Program will enable us to better understand the
operational context into which new technologies will be inserted. The
Program will result in the creation of an infrastructure that
facilitates the evaluation of new technologies in real-world operating
environments as well as providing a venue for integrating these
technologies with existing State and local systems.
In fiscal year 2005 the EP&R portfolio will continue its focus on
technology development and technical guidance for first responders
(State and local), scientific and technical support to the EP&R
Directorate; and expansion of technology integration--Safe Cities.
Support to United States Coast Guard
The Science & Technology Directorate is integrating a major
research program into a United States Coast Guard operational testbed
in south Florida. The HAWKEYE program injects technologies (such as
Surveillance, Command & Control, Sensor Fusion, and Communications)
allowing simultaneous evaluation of technology performance as a direct
impact on mission execution.
Support to the United States Secret Service
We have coordinated with the United States Secret Service and
established its first direct-funded R&D program. Based upon
appropriated funding, four initiatives have been identified and
prioritized, and are underway in fiscal year 2004. In addition, there
will be joint activities in support of the assessment of emerging
threats.
Homeland Security University and Fellowship Programs
In this portfolio we seek to develop a broad research capability
within the Nation's universities to address scientific and
technological issues related to homeland security. The portfolio places
high priorities on developing academic programs and supporting students
in order to build learning and research environments in key areas of
Departmental interest.
In fiscal year 2004, this portfolio established the Department of
Homeland Security's first University-based Center of Excellence, for
Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events. The Center, based at
the University of Southern California, will assess the level of risk
associated with various terrorist scenarios, in particular the
potential economic consequences. A request for proposals has been
issued for the next two Centers of Excellence, which will focus on
Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense and Post-Harvest Food
Protection and Defense.
Last fall, we awarded our 2003-2004 academic year DHS Scholarships
and Fellowships, and welcomed our new Scholars and Fellows with a
reception in Washington, DC. The solicitation for this program received
just under 2,500 applications for 100 Scholarships and Fellowships.
Besides making immediate contributions to homeland security-related
R&D, these students will be part of the development of a broad research
capability within the Nation's universities to address scientific and
technological issues related to homeland security.
During fiscal year 2005, another 100 Scholars and Fellows will be
supported for the academic year of 2004-2005, bringing the total of
supported students to 200. We will also continue to support the
Homeland Security University Centers of Excellence established in
fiscal year 2004, each with a different subject expertise focused on
reducing the terrorist threat on the United States. Each Center of
Excellence is awarded an initial 3-year contract whose annual cost we
account for in our planning.
Counter-MANPADS
The Counter-MANPADS program is focused on identifying, developing,
and testing a cost-effective capability to protect the Nation's
commercial aircraft against the threat of man-portable, anti-aircraft
missiles. This program also provides the science and technology base
needed to reduce the vulnerability of commercial aircraft to terrorist
attack using man-portable anti-aircraft missiles.
Over the past year, we have had a successful solicitation
announcing a program to address the potential threat of MANPADS to
commercial aircraft. White papers responding to the Counter-MANPADS
program solicitation were reviewed by technical experts from the
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, and other
government agencies; proposals were evaluated; and awards were made to
three contractor teams to perform the first of two program phases,
which began in January, 2004. The first phase will result in a
preliminary design and a test plan to demonstrate missile
countermeasure equipment on selected commercial aircraft.
The second program phase is an 18-month effort beginning in August
2004, with the one or two contractors that produced the most promising
results in Phase One. During this phase, the commercial prototype
countermeasure equipment will be integrated on selected commercial
aircraft, and live-fire range tests will be accomplished with extensive
data collection and analysis. Results of this second phase will be
presented to the Administration and Congress to aid in formulating an
informed decision on how best to address the protection of commercial
airlines from the MANPADS threat.
SAFECOM
The SAFECOM (Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable COMmunications)
program is the umbrella initiative to coordinate all Federal, State,
local, and Tribal users to achieve national wireless communications
interoperability. The placement of SAFECOM in the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate allows it full
access to the scientific expertise and resources needed to help our
Nation achieve true public safety wireless communications
interoperability.
Since the Science and Technology Directorate formally assumed
responsibility for the management of the SAFECOM program barely 7
months ago:
--SAFECOM has been established as the one umbrella group in the
Federal Government for the management of public safety wireless
interoperability programs;
--Common grant guidance has been developed and incorporated in the
public safety wireless interoperability grant programs of both
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security;
--A Federal coordinating structure has, for the first time, been
created to coordinate all Federal public safety wireless
interoperability programs;
--The first catalog of national programs touching on public safety
wireless interoperability has been developed and published; and
--The ten major State and local organizations concerned with public
safety wireless interoperability--the Association of Public-
Safety Communications Officials (APCO), International
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP), Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCC),
National Sheriffs' Association (NSA), Major County Sheriffs'
Association (MCSA), National Association of Counties (NACO),
National League of Cities (NLC), National Public Safety
Telecommunications Council (NPSTC), and the United States
Conference of Mayors (USCM)--released a statement in support of
the SAFECOM program which declared that ``With the advent of
the SAFECOM Program . . . Public safety, State and local
government finally have both a voice in public safety
discussions at the Federal level and confidence that the
Federal Government is coordinating its resources.''
PRIORITIZATION
The Science and Technology Directorate has prioritized its research
and development efforts based on the directives, recommendations and
suggestions from many sources, including:
--Homeland Security Act of 2002;
--The fiscal year 2004 Congressional Appropriations for the
Department of Homeland Security;
--President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland Security, the
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets, the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace, and the National Security Strategy;
--President Bush's nine Homeland Security Presidential Directives;
--Office of Management and Budget's 2003 Report on Combating
Terrorism;
--Current threat assessments as understood by the Intelligence
Community;
--Requirements identified by other Department components;
--Expert understanding of enemy capabilities that exist today or that
can be expected to appear in the future; and
--The report from the National Academy of Science on ``Making the
Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering
Terrorism,'' and the reports from the Gilmore, Bremer and Hart-
Rudman Committees.
Identifying and integrating the information contained in these
sources has not been a small task, but the result, coupled with expert
evaluation and judgment by our scientific staff, is the basis for
determining the research and development needed to meet our mission
requirements.
DIVISION OF EFFORT AMONG THE DHS S&T DIRECTORATE AND RESEARCH EFFORTS
AT OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
One of the accomplishments of which I am personally most proud is
the emphasis our new Directorate has put on interacting with other
Federal departments and agencies. Knowledge of other science and
technology programs and their results, appropriate collaboration
between agencies, coordination of relevant programmatic activities, and
information sharing are essential for us to best meet our mission
requirements. Science and Technology Directorate cybersecurity
personnel and those at the National Science Foundation and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology have already established
collaborative and coordinated programs to ensure no duplication of
effort. Our biological and chemical countermeasures staff have
partnered with the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) to plan and execute the BioNet program and
roadmap the biological countermeasures R&D programs in both agencies to
understand capabilities and shortfalls. They work with the National
Science Foundation on pathogen sequencing. The BioWatch program,
although led by the Science and Technology Directorate, was
accomplished through collaboration with personnel from the Department
of Energy's National Laboratories, contractors, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
We work with DOD's Office of Homeland Defense to ensure the effective
transfer to the Department of relevant DOD technologies.
Our high explosives scientists are working with the interagency
Technical Support Working Group, managed by the Department of State, to
evaluate commercial off-the-shelf systems with capabilities against
suicide bombers. The Director of the Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency is a member of the TSWG Executive Committee.
Our staff are in frequent contact with the Office of Science and
Technology Policy on a range of issues, and several are members and co-
chairs of the Office of Science and Technology Policy's National
Science and Technology Council. Our Office of Research and Development
works closely with the Department of Agriculture to ensure that the
Plum Island Animal Disease Center facility is operating smoothly and
fully meeting its mission. The Office of Research and Development also
interfaces with the Department of Energy to keep the Office of Science,
as well as the National Nuclear Security Administration, apprised of
our long-term homeland security requirements.
The Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology
Directorate recognizes that many organizations are contributing to the
science and technology base needed to enhance the Nation's capabilities
to thwart terrorist acts and to fully support the conventional missions
of the operational components of the Department. Congress recognized
the importance of the research and development being conducted by
numerous Federal departments and agencies, and, in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, directed the Under Secretary of Science and
Technology to coordinate the Federal Government's civilian efforts to
identify and develop countermeasures to current and emerging threats.
We take this responsibility very seriously.
We are now initiating the effort needed to coordinate homeland
security research and development across the entire United States
Government. It will come as no surprise to the members of this
Subcommittee that good, solid, effective research and development
relevant to homeland security is being conducted by the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice, Health and Human
Services, State, and Veteran's Affairs; within the National Science
Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency and other Federal
agencies; and by members of the Intelligence Community.
Several interagency working groups already exist that are
addressing issues important to homeland security. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been, and continues to be, an active
participant in these working groups, and in most cases has taken a
leadership role. These fora foster an active exchange of information
and assist each participating agency in identifying related needs and
requirements, conducting research and development of mutual benefit,
and avoiding duplication of effort.
We also continue to have discussions at multiple levels of
management with Federal departments and Agencies, as well as with the
Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy, and the Homeland Security Council. These discussions ensure
that the strongest possible links are made and the best possible
coordination occurs between our Department and those who are conducting
sector-specific research. By the autumn of 2004, all Department of
Homeland Security research and development programs will be
consolidated and all United States Government research and development
relevant to fulfilling the Department's mission will have been
identified and coordinated as appropriate. It is important to note that
this identification and relevant coordination does not imply the
Department of Homeland Security should have the responsibility and
authority for these programs within other Federal agencies; it does
recognize that science and technology advances can have many
applications, including homeland security.
OUTSIDE INPUTS TO THE S&T BUDGET
The Science and Technology Directorate's budget is built to meet
the Department's and our mission requirements. As previously discussed,
we identify and prioritize our efforts using multiple national sources
and the sharing of information relevant to homeland security among
government organizations. Our Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee will hold its first meeting February 26-27, 2004,
and this group will also provide input to the scope, priority and level
of effort needed to meet our objectives.
metrics developed by the science and technology directorate
The success of the Science and Technology Directorate depends on
its ability to identify, develop and transition capabilities to end-
users that enhance the Nation's ability to protect itself. Appropriate
goals and performance measures must be identified and used to measure
our progress. The following table identifies the programmatic metrics
developed by the Science and Technology Directorate's portfolio
managers; these metrics will be used to measure our performance.
ST0001 Biological Countermeasures
Long term performance goal.--The United States will have a high-
performance and well-integrated biological threat agent warning and
characterization system that will include sustainable environmental
monitoring capability for metropolitan areas; a national special
security event system for the Nation at large; and identification of
needs for vaccines and therapeutics for people and animals. Longer term
research will support the development of biological threat warning and
characterization systems that address both current and future threats.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability to detect and assess biological FAR=10EE-4, Multiplex 10
threats, measured by a set of attributes: assays
increase sensitivity by decreasing false
alarm rate (FAR), and increase multiplex
samples.
Fiscal year 2005 milestones: Milestones will be achieved
Decontamination technologies and
standards for facilities and outdoor
areas. National Academy of Science study
characterizes contamination risks.
Fiscal year 2005 milestones: Establishment Milestones will be achieved
of a national capability in biodefense
analysis and agro-bioterrorism
countermeasures. Research operations
begin; phased construction continues.
BioForensics Analysis Center Hub
operational.
Improved capabilities to detect threats in Milestone will be achieved
urban areas (Urban Monitoring Program),
measured by increased sampling coverage
and frequency, and capability to detect
additional threats. Fiscal year 2005
milestone: increase coverage in top
threat cities.
Integrated field demonstrations of next- 2 Demos operational
generation solutions (Domestic
Demonstrations and Applications Program).
Validated human and agricultural bioassays 10
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0002 Chemical Countermeasures
Long term performance goal.--Develop and deploy a broad capability
to prevent and rapidly mitigate the consequences of chemical attacks.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2005 milestone: Development of Milestone will be achieved
protocols for the highest priority toxic
industrial chemicals (TICs) and toxic
industrial materials (TIMs).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0003 Chemical High Explosives
Long term performance goal.--The Chemical High Explosives portfolio
will improve explosives detection equipment and procedures for all
forms of transportation as well as fixed facilities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2005 milestone: Pilot tests of Milestone will be achieved
standoff detection technologies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0004 Radiological & Nuclear Countermeasures
Long term performance goal.--By fiscal year 2009, an effective
suite of countermeasures against radiological and nuclear threats will
be developed with capabilities in detection, intelligence analysis,
response, and preparedness.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal, State and local sites that are 5
integrated into an operational secondary
reachback architecture to resolve
radiological and nuclear alarms.
Performance measures associated with Test Milestone will be achieved
and Evaluation (T and E) of developmental
prototypes of Radiation Detectors.
Establish a long-range plan for T and E
capability.
Progression on planned capability Milestone will be achieved
development for Nuclear Incident
Management and Recovery. Demonstrate 2
advanced detection technologies.
Progression on pre-planned product Milestone will be achieved
improvement of deployed technologies.
Perform critical design reviews for Phase
One technology improvements for projects
awarded in fiscal year 2004.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0005 Threat and Vulnerability, Testing & Assessments
Long term performance goal.--Provide measurable advancements in
information assurance, threat detection and discovery, linkages of
threats to vulnerabilities, and capability assessments and information
analysis required by Departmental missions to anticipate, detect,
deter, avoid, mitigate and respond to threats to our homeland security.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improvement in the national capability to Improvement in 7 categories
assess threats and vulnerabilities to
terrorist attacks: 10 categories to be
assessed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0006 Standards
Long term performance goal.--Establish an integrated infrastructure
for determining and developing standards, and test and evaluation
protocols for technology used for detecting, mitigating, and recovering
from terrorist attacks and also to support other Departmental
components' technologies. Provide consistent and verifiable measures of
effectiveness of homeland security-related technologies, operators, and
systems in terms of basic functionality, interoperability, efficiency,
and sustainability. Facilitate the development of guidelines in
conjunction with both users and developers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long-term implementation of SAFETY Act.... Certifications
Fiscal year 2005 milestones: Technical Milestones will be achieved
standards and test/evaluation protocols
will be established for WMD
decontamination technologies and analysis
tools. ``Consumer's report'' on radiation
and bioagent detection devices for
Federal, State, and local users will be
published.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0008 Homeland Security Fellowship Programs/University Programs
Long term performance goal.--Significantly increase the number of
U.S. students in fields relevant to homeland security including the
physical life and social sciences; and engineering.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
To increase the nation's science and 200 students 3 centers
technology workforce and research
capability on issues related to homeland
security. Fiscal year 2005: students
supported/Centers of Excellence
established.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0009 Emerging Threats
Long term performance goal.--To develop effective capabilities to
characterize, assess, and counter new and emerging threats, and to
exploit technology development opportunities as they arise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Performance measures Fiscal year 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved capability to prevent terrorist Baseline
attacks through annual emerging threat
assessment report (percent of responding
recipients indicating the report is
valuable).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0010 Rapid Prototyping
Long term performance goal.--Support the development of innovative
solutions to enhance homeland security and work with Federal, State,
and local governments; and the private sector to implement these
solutions. In partnership with the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG), operate an effective and efficient clearinghouse that will
develop, prototype, and commercialize innovative technologies to
support the homeland security mission.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance measures 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technologies prototyped or commercialized............... 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0011 SAFECOM
Long term performance goal.--Provide public safety agencies with
central coordination, leadership and guidance to help them achieve
short-term interoperability and long-term compatibility of their radio
networks across jurisdictions and disciplines.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance measures 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increased interoperability across local, tribal, State, 3
and Federal public safety jurisdictions and
disciplines. Fiscal year 2005: Based on fiscal year
2004 baseline, improvements in 3 categories............
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST0012 Counter Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS)
Long term performance goal.--The Nation will have effective
capabilities to defeat the threat to commercial aircraft of man-
portable anti-aircraft missiles.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance measures 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effective technology/technologies for commercial 2
aircraft to defeat man-portable anti-aircraft missiles
identified. Fiscal year 2005: Technologies identified,
and prototypes developed and tested....................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ST007 Support to Department of Homeland Security Components
Long term performance goal.--Increase the capabilities of mission-
focused operational components (BTS, EP&R, Coast Guard, and Secret
Service) to secure the homeland and enhance their ability to conduct
their missions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance measures 2005 target
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improved capability of DHS Components to secure the Baseline
homeland as measured by assessment of customer
organizations in accomplishing agreed-upon areas of
assistance.............................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM RESEARCH
In the 11 months that this Department has been in existence, the
Science and Technology Directorate has focused its initial efforts on
near-term development and deployment of technologies to improve our
nation's ability to detect and respond to potential terrorist acts.
However, we recognize that a sustained effort to continually add to our
knowledge base and our resource base is necessary for future
developments. Thus, we have invested a portion of our resources,
including our university programs, toward these objectives. The
following table indicates our expenditures in basic research, applied
research, and development to date, excluding construction funding.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE R&D INVESTMENTS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Fiscal year Fiscal year 2004 2005
(actual (estimated) (proposed)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic........................................................... 47 117 80
Applied......................................................... 59 56 229
Developmental................................................... 398 608 643
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 504 781 952
-----------------------------------------------
Percent basic................................................... 9.3 15.0 8.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our initial expenditures in basic research are heavily weighted by
our investments in university programs. These university programs will
not only provide new information relevant to homeland security, but
will also provide a workforce of people who are cognizant of the needs
of homeland security, especially in areas of risk analysis, animal-
related agro-terrorism, bioforensics, cybersecurity, disaster modeling,
and psychological and behavioral analysis.
We expect to gradually increase our total percentage of basic and
applied research to the level needed for sustaining our role as a
research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) organization.
rationale for budget increases: biowatch and the national biodefense
analysis and countermeasures center
President Bush's fiscal year 2005 budget request includes a $274
million Bio-Surveillance Program Initiative to protect the Nation
against bioterrorism and to strengthen the public health
infrastructure. Included in this request is an increase of $65 million
for the Science and Technology Directorate to enhance current
environmental monitoring activities. This requested increase is a
direct outgrowth of the recently completed joint Homeland Security
Council--National Security Council (HSC-NSC) Bio-Defense End-to-End
study which identified the need for an integrated, real-time, human-
animal-plant surveillance system as a top priority national need. The
DHS BioWatch system, which currently provides a bio-aerosol warning for
most of this nation's large metropolitan areas, figures prominently in
the integrated Biosurveillance initiative. This initiative would
entail: (1) Expanding BioWatch coverage in the top ten threat cities;
and (2) Piloting of an integrated attack warning and assessment system
known as BWICS (BioWarning and Incident Characterization System).
Currently the ``average'' BioWatch city has about 10 collectors per
city. Systems studies and city feedback provide a more needs based'
guide to the optimal number of collectors in our large, high threat
cities. The systems studies show that about 40-60 collectors provide
optimal outdoor coverage for a city, while the cities themselves have
requested additional collectors for key facilities (transit systems,
airports, stadiums). Alternate labor contracting processes, simplified
sample handling techniques, and the introduction of additional
automation in analyses will allow us to do this expansion in a cost
effective manner.
The BWICS pilot will integrate real-time bio-surveillance and
environmental monitoring data with plume hazard predictions,
epidemiological forecasts, population and critical infrastructure
databases, and other available resources in two of the highest threat
cities.
We also will accelerate R&D on next generation environmental
monitoring systems. New classes of detectors, that can identify bio-
agents in 2 minutes or less with incredibly low false alarm rates will
make it possible to do detect-to-protect for key facilities--allowing
one to reroute air flow or evacuate a facility so as to minimize
exposure and not simply begin the onset of early treatment. And
tailoring of existing and emerging detection systems to monitoring key
high volume nodes in our food processing will be critical to the
development of proposed food shields.
The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
provides scientific support for intelligence activities, prioritizes
biothreats, and also conducts bioforensic analyses contributing to
attribution and hence to deterrence. Specifically, the NBACC (both
facilities and programs) will support public and agricultural health,
law enforcement, and national and homeland security by providing hub
laboratory capabilities for:
--Dedicated and accredited bio-forensic analysis capabilities to
support attribution of the use of bio-threat agents (BTA) by
criminals, non-State, and State-sponsored actors
--Laboratory-based, scientific data from the analysis and assessment
of biological threats to human health and agriculture to
support a national bio-defense net assessment--fundamental to
development of national plans, risk assessment evaluations and
priorities to deter, detect, mitigate and recover from BTA
attack
--Applied models, materials, and validation processes to evaluate BTA
countermeasures
--Evidenced-based subject matter expertise to integrate, analyze and
distribute critical bio-defense and related information
assembled from multiple sources through a high security and
open clearinghouse.
transfer of r&d budgets and activities from other directorates
The Science and Technology Directorate is both a generator and a
consumer of scientific and technological advances resulting from basic
and applied research and development. We also have a responsibility for
testing and evaluating capabilities to ensure that their deployment
results in improved operational systems. Standards are needed to assist
first responders and operational components of the Department in
evaluating, procuring, and deploying new capabilities. This is a broad
range of responsibility and one we take seriously. The Department has
defined R&D activities as follows:
Activities associated with R&D efforts include the development of a
new or improved capability to the point where it is appropriate for
operational use, including test and evaluation. R&D activities include
the analytic application of scientific and engineering principles in
support of operational capabilities, concept exploration, systems
development, proof of principle demonstration and pilot deployments,
standards development, and product improvement including application
and integration of technologies. For mission (non-management) systems,
resources associated with developing technology to provide new
capabilities (including systems engineering, research, development,
testing and prototyping) are covered under the R&D category.
This definition encompasses all of the research, development, test,
and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts of the Science and Technology
Directorate. It also encompasses RDT&E efforts currently existing in
other parts of the Department of Homeland Security. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been tasked to consolidate these activities
from elsewhere within the Department into our directorate.
We have begun this coordination process by evaluating and producing
a report on the research, development, testing, and evaluation work
that was being conducted within the Department of Homeland Security but
was not already under the direct cognizance of the Science and
Technology Directorate. Where it is appropriate, the Science and
Technology Directorate will absorb these R&D functions. In other cases,
the Science and Technology Directorate will provide appropriate input,
guidance, and oversight of these R&D programs.
Research and Development activities are ongoing in fiscal year 2004
within the following departmental elements: Border and Transportation
Security (BTS), Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR), United
States Coast Guard (USCG), and United States Secret Service (USSS). The
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
reported no fiscal year 2004 R&D activities.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget contains three programs
that have been identified to transfer to the Science and Technology
Directorate. They are United States Coast Guard RDT&E activities
conducted at their Groton, CT laboratory ($13.5 million); Emergency
Preparedness and Response RDT&E activities supporting the U.S. Fire
Administration ($0.65 million); and ICE-Federal Air Marshall's RDT&E
activities supporting the development of their Air-to-Ground
Communication System ($10 million).
The transfer of these three RDT &E Programs is only the start and
not the complete identification of the potential programs to review for
consideration. S&T will be working throughout the year with the
Department and with Congress to identify other existing programs and
transfer them consistent with direction.
BUDGET AND ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CYBERSECURITY R&D
The cybersecurity program within the Science and Technology
Directorate is conducted by the Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and
Assessment portfolio. The approach of this program includes addressing
areas not currently addressed elsewhere in the Federal Government. An
example of this is developing tools and techniques for assessing and
detecting the insider threat. The cybersecurity budget request for
fiscal year 2005 is $18 million.
An important component of the cybersecurity program is coordination
with others who are performing cyber research and who are responsible
for cybersecurity. For example, our staff have engaged in a series of
meetings with staff members from the Department's Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), both the National
Cyber Security Division and National Communications System. These
meetings provide an venue for general exchanges of information about
each organizations' respective plans for cybersecurity, as well as
specific discussions focused on IAIP technical requirements to feed
into cybersecurity R&D programs funded by the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Further, we are coordinating with the National Institute for
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Science Foundation
(NSF) to plan our respective roles. We are funding two projects with
NIST, Secure Domain Name System and Secure Border Gateway Protocol,
which are protocols that the Internet relies on to function. We are co-
funding two projects with the NSF: a research project to create an
experimental infrastructure network to support development and
demonstration of next generation information security technologies for
cyber defense, called Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research
(``DETER'') Network; and a project called Evaluation Methods in
Internet Security Technology (EMIST), a testing framework that will
include attack scenarios, attack simulators, generators for topology
and background traffic, data sets derived from live traffic, and tools
to monitor and summarize results.
BASIS FOR POLICY ON THE USE OF THE NATIONAL LABORATORIES
The Science and Technology Directorate has identified separate
mechanisms to access the capability base at the DOE national
laboratories and sites to guard against organizational conflicts of
interest and inappropriate use of inside information in responding to
competitive private sector solicitations. Five national laboratories
(Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia) have
been identified as Intramural Laboratories. These labs will help S&T
set research goals and requirements and formulate R&D road maps. This
level of engagement would give the intramural labs unfair advantage if
they were permitted to compete for funding awarded through open
solicitations.
All other DOE laboratories and sites have been identified as
Extramural Laboratories. Because the Extramural Laboratories will not
be involved in internal DHS research planning, they are eligible to
compete in Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
and Systems Engineering and Development (SED) funding, such as the
Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) valued at $50 million for radiological/
nuclear technologies that was recently issued. The majority of the
Science and Technology Directorate's funding will be executed through
HSARPA and SED. These labs may also freely team with industrial
partners to seamlessly commercialize technologies they have developed.
BUDGET FOR UNIVERSITY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE AND FELLOWS PROGRAMS
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request of $30 million will
sustain the current scholars and fellows program and a total of three
Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. Each additional Center of
Excellence would require a sustained investment of $5 million per year.
If more than a total of three Centers of Excellence are desired without
increasing the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request, a reduction
in the scholars and fellows program would be required.
STAFFING
When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stood up on March 1,
2003, the Science and Technology Directorate had a total staff of about
87, including the 53 staff transferred from the Department of Energy's
Environmental Measurements Laboratory. The balance was comprised of
permanently assigned personnel, employees detailed from within and
without the Department, Intergovernmental Personnel Act assignments,
and personnel support from the National Laboratories.
By January 6, 2004, we more than doubled our staff. In January
2004, we had a total staff of 212, including 100 DHS employees, six
Public Health Service Officers, 21 Intergovernmental Personnel Act
employees, 26 individuals on assignment from other agencies, and 59
contractors.
We continue to be active in staffing our Directorate with well-
qualified individuals whose skills support the full breadth of our
responsibilities and RDT&E activities. We continue to actively seek
additional staff in accordance with our approved staffing plan.
CONCLUSION
With less than a full year under the Department's belt, the
scientists and engineers in the Science and Technology Directorate have
accomplished more than I could have expected. I am proud to have shared
with you today some of those success stories. We have appended a more
comprehensive summary of accomplishments to date for the record.
And yet, we also recognize that there is much to do, and we will be
working just as hard in fiscal year 2005.
I look forward to continuing to work with you on the Cybersecurity,
Science, and Research & Development Subcommittee; other Federal
departments and agencies; the academic community; and private industry
to continue the work begun and continually improve our ability to
protect our homeland and way of life.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Subcommittee, this
concludes my prepared statement. I thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this committee and I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
APPENDIX
accomplishments of the science and technology directorate
Biological and Chemical Countermeasures
Biowatch: National Urban Monitoring for Biological
Pathogens
The Biowatch program has been established and deployed to cities
across the nation. The program--developed, funded, and managed by the
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate--is executed in cooperation
with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It employs environmental sampling
devices to quickly detect biological pathogens, such as anthrax, in
time to distribute life-saving pharmaceuticals to affected citizens.
The S&T Directorate is now focusing its efforts on piloting the next
generation of environmental samplers, which will reduce the amount of
labor required and the response time needed for detection while keeping
the detection probability high and false alarm rates low. These devices
will take advantage of the latest advances in micro-chemistry, commonly
referred to as ``chemistry on a chip.''
PROTECT (Program for Response Options and Technology
Enhancements for Chemical Terrorism): Chemical
Defense and Response Capability for Transportation
Facility
The S&T Directorate, in collaboration with the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), completed PROTECT (Program
for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/
Biological Terrorism). PROTECT, which is an operational chemical agent
detection and response capability, is deployed in Metro stations and
operated by the WMATA. PROTECT is a team effort that owes its success
to the scientific and engineering talent from Argonne, Sandia, and
Livermore National Laboratories and operational expertise from WMATA
and the First Responder community (the District of Columbia; Arlington,
VA; Montgomery County, MD; and others). Also contributing significantly
to the project are private industry partners, including LiveWave Inc.,
ManTech Security Technology, the detector manufacturer (name withheld
for security reasons); and Federal partners, including the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA), Department of Transportation (DOT),
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS's) Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The system
integrates chemical detector data and video feed and transmits the
integrated information to the Operation Control Center (OCC), where the
information is analyzed and an event confirmed. The information is then
transmitted to the first responders who access it in both their OCC and
through the use of wired jacks on the scene to facilitate response and
recovery. PROTECT also has application in other areas, including fire
and emergency response, security, and forensics. Upon completion, the
system will be totally owned and operated by WMATA and expanded to
approximately 20 stations. FTA is working with WMATA and Argonne
National Laboratory to transfer the technology nationally. The
information gleaned from PROTECT will have direct application to
facility protection and response. A related effort is being piloted in
the Boston subway system.
Joint Urban 2003: Experimental Atmospheric Transport and
Modeling
In June 2003, the S&T Directorate, in coordination with the
Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of
Energy, and University of Oklahoma sponsored a month-long atmospheric
dispersion study in Oklahoma City, OK. Nearly 150 scientists,
engineers, and student assistants were dedicated to this study, which
tracked the air movement of safe, non-toxic tracer gases in and around
city buildings. The resulting data is being used to enhance and develop
urban-specific atmospheric dispersion computer models that will allow
emergency management, law enforcement and other personnel to train for
and respond to potential chemical, biological, and radiological
terrorist attacks.
ProACT (Protective and Response Options for Airport Counter
Terrorism): Chemical and Biological
Counterterrorism Demonstration and Application
Program
The S&T Directorate and its partners at the San Francisco
International Airport are involved in a pilot program that couples
biological and chemical detection with vulnerability analysis,
response, and restoration. This program integrates networked sensors
with the operation of ventilation systems, allowing redirection of
contaminated air and effective evacuation should an event occur.
Guidance for the airport facility operators to manage biological and
chemical crises will be finalized soon for distribution throughout the
applicable community. Protocols and concepts of operation for
restoration also are under development. This program is designed to
serve as a template for deployment of these capabilities to other
similar facilities.
LINC (Local Integration of National Atmospheric Release
Advisory Center (NARAC) with Cities): Hazard
Assessment Tool for Operational Event Management
LINC demonstrates the capability for providing local government
agencies with advanced operational atmospheric plume prediction
capabilities that can be seamlessly integrated with appropriate Federal
agency support for homeland security. LINC's approach is to integrate
NARAC capabilities with local emergency management and response
centers. In the event of a chemical or biological release, NARAC
predictions can be used by emergency managers and responders to map the
extent and effects of hazardous airborne material. Prompt predictions
are provided to guide front-line responders in determining protective
actions to be taken, critical facilities that may be at risk, and safe
locations for incident command posts. LINC provides response teams from
multiple jurisdictions with tools to effectively share information
regarding the areas and populations at risk. To date, several cities
have participated in the project. New York City used LINC to help
inform and manage an explosion and fire at a Staten Island refinery in
the Spring of 2003.
BioNet: Integrated Civilian and Military Consequence
Management
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of
Defense's Defense Threat Reduction Agency have initiated the BioNet
program to address joint civilian-military consequence management
issues for localities near military bases. Upon completion of BioNet, a
seamless consequence management plan that incorporates concepts of
operation, information products, area monitoring, population health
monitoring, and sample analysis laboratory will be developed that can
be used nationally.
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)
The S&T Directorate assumed responsibility for the operations of
the ``facilities and liabilities'' of PIADC in June 2003. A 60-day
review of security and operations resulted in immediate improvements
and a plan for enhancements to security and operational maintenance.
Dr. Beth Lautner has become new Center Director for PIADC. Dr. Lautner
was with the National Pork Board for 13 years, most recently serving as
the vice-president of Science and Technology. Highly respected
throughout animal agriculture for her work on numerous issues, she
pioneered the establishment of the Pork Quality Assurance (PQA) Program
and has worked extensively with the USDA and other organizations on
national agricultural security issues. In 1994, she was awarded the
prestigious Howard Dunne Memorial Award by the association. In
addition, DHS announced on December 9, 2003, the selection of Field
Support Services, Inc. (FSSI), as the new contractor for maintenance at
PIADC. FSSI is a subsidiary of Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, an
Alaskan Native corporation, headquartered in Barrow, Alaska.
TOPOFF2 Exercise
In May 2003, leadership and staff members of the Science and
Technology Directorate served as members of the Secretary's Crisis
Assessment Team (CAT) and the interagency Domestic Emergency Support
Team (DEST) and provided expert technical advice on understanding,
communicating and responding to the hypothetical radiological and
plague events during the TOPOFF2 exercise.
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Programs
Radiation Detection in Metropolitan Areas
The Science and Technology division formally assumed management of
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's radiation detection
test bed on August 2003. The test bed was previously managed by the
U.S. Department of Energy. The transfer will broaden the project scope
beyond testing and evaluation of individual pieces of technology to a
systems approach including response protocols and operational concepts.
Radiation detection equipment will be installed at tunnels, bridges,
ports, and airports in the New York City metropolitan area, and all
functions associated with their operational use will be evaluated. By
judging the efficacy of fielded systems over time, the Science and
Technology division will be able to influence future decisions on
detection technology R&D investment, deployment of urban monitoring
systems, configurations best able to enhance security, and viable
solutions for protecting the Nation from radiological and nuclear
threats.
Determined Promise Exercise
In August 2003, staff members of the S&T Directorate participated
in Determined Promise, a Department of Defense (DOD) exercise held in
Las Vegas, NV. The exercise demonstrated the military's capability to
assist in the response to a natural disaster, a bioterrorism event, and
a number of other emergency situations nationwide. The exercise also
provided a forum for initiating discussions that will foster
interagency cooperation between DHS and USNORTHCOM.
Nuclear Threat Assessments
The S&T Directorate has provided eight rapid nuclear threat
assessments for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
approximately two dozen assessments on reports of illicit trafficking
in nuclear materials for the Department of State and other customers.
The Department of Homeland Security has been leading the interagency
Nuclear Trafficking Focus Group, which regularly brings together the
operational players of all agencies involved in response to and
understanding of nuclear smuggling events.
Secondary ``Reach Back''
In August 2003, the S&T Directorate's Nuclear Assessment Program
stood up a system to provide secondary ``reach back'' support to
operational DHS entities employing radiation detection systems in the
field. Secondary reach back provides inspectors with an additional
information resource to utilize for the resolution of radiation
detection alarms that draws upon experience in the analysis of nuclear
smuggling incidents and threat analysis.
Standards
Radiation Detection
The S&T Directorate has developed a suite of four radiation
detector standards under the auspices of the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI)'s Accredited American Standards Committee on
Radiation Instrumentation. The four standards deal with radiation
pagers, hand-held dosimetry instruments, radioisotope identifiers and
radiation portal monitors. The S&T Directorate has formed three writing
groups to prepare Test and Evaluation (T&E) protocols for hand-held
radiation detectors, radionuclide identifiers and radiation portal
monitors. The writing groups have met in working sessions in San Diego,
CA (July 2003) and Las Vegas, NV (September 2003) and have prepared
draft T&E protocols. Benchmark testing against these draft protocols
has been initiated at four National Laboratories.
Biopathogen Identification
The Science and Technology Directorate has partnered with the
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense to fund a
contract with the Association of Analytical Communities International
to develop Reference Methods and Official Methods for bulk assay of
bacillus anthracis. This work will also permit the comparison of
commercially available rapid identification methods (hand-held assays)
for B. anthracis.
SAFETY Act
On October 10, 2003, Secretary Ridge signed an interim final rule
implementing the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective
Technologies (SAFETY) Act which was a requirement of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. The SAFETY Act is designed to encourage the
development and rapid deployment of life-saving, anti-terrorism
technologies by providing manufacturers and sellers with limited
liability risks. The Department is now accepting applications for
designation under the Act and evaluating the proposed technologies.
Interoperability of Communications
SAFECOM: E-Gov Initiative to Improve Interoperability of
Wireless Communications
The Department of Homeland Security is taking steps to boost the
ability of the approximately 44,000 local, tribal and State entities
and 100 Federal agencies engaged in public safety to communicate
effectively with one another, particularly during an emergency. SAFECOM
is a Federal umbrella program under the S&T Directorate that is
dedicated to improving public safety response through enhanced
interoperable wireless communications. The goal is to enable public
safety agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio
communications systems, exchanging voice or data with one another on
demand and in real time. SAFECOM is providing seed money for the
Department of Justice's Integrated Wireless Network program, which will
create interoperability among local, State and Federal public safety
agencies in 25 cities. In addition, technical guidance for
interoperable communications that was developed under SAFECOM is
included in this year's Office of Domestic Preparedness grants.
Summit on Interoperable Communications for Public Safety
In June 2003, the S&T Directorate, Project SAFECOM, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute
of Justice hosted a Summit on Interoperable Communications for Public
Safety. The event focused on familiarizing attendees with programs that
assist public safety practitioners, including first responders, and is
the first national effort ever undertaken to convene all the players.
In addition, it provided insight on Federal resource needs, how
government can leverage existing program successes and resources in the
area of standards development, approaches, and products and services.
The Summit results provided help in formulating a coordinated approach
toward nationwide communications interoperability.
SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day
In August 2003, the Science and Technology Directorate held its
first SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day, with an overwhelmingly positive
response from technology providers. Due to the increasing number of
vendor requests to present their technologies to the SAFECOM Program,
the S&T Directorate is holding a vendor demonstration day on the last
Friday of every month. These Friday sessions will offer a chance for
SAFECOM to learn about new technologies for interoperability, provide a
clear process for managing vendor requests, and ensure that every
vendor has a fair opportunity to participate.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Programs
Addressing Threats and Vulnerabilities in the Oil and Gas
Industries
The S&T Directorate sponsored and delivered a prototype system to
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
Directorate to perform Graphical Information System (GIS) based
computer assisted threat and vulnerability mapping of the oil and gas
infrastructure in the American Southwest. S&T is also in the process of
delivering to IAIP cutting edge visualization, data searching, data
correlation, and all-source analytic aids to provide IAIP advanced
analytic capabilities integrated with vulnerability information.
Advanced Algorithms for Biodetectors
Researchers funded by the S&T Directorate's Advanced Scientific
Computing Research & Development program achieved an important
milestone in the speed acceleration of software used to develop
advanced biodetectors. Scientists have made a pair of related
algorithmic advances that will speed the creation of DNA signatures for
pathogen detection at considerably reduced cost. These discoveries will
result in cheaper, faster, and more reliable bio-detectors for homeland
security.
Threat-Vulnerability Mapper
Part of the Threat-Vulnerability Information System, the Threat-
Vulnerability Mapper (or TVM), was installed in the analysis center of
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate in
December 2003 and is already in constant use. Developed by the S&T
Directorate, the TVM provides counterterrorism analysts with a simple,
straightforward way to not only depict the geographic distribution of
threats across the United States, but also to search the underlying
databases for information on the possible actors, agents, potential
severity of attacks, and extent of the vulnerabilities to and effects
of such attacks. A second TVIS component was delivered to IAIP in
January 2003 and should be installed and operational by the end of
February 2004.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System
On December 24, 2003, S&T's Critical Infrastructure Protection
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS) team was asked to conduct a rapid
analysis of potential consequences following discovery of a cow in
Washington State with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly
known as Mad Cow disease. An analysis was developed within hours using
available open literature, past historical data, and the results from
an early stage, Dynamic Simulation agriculture model.
Cybersecurity
Experimental Infrastructure Network for Cyber Defense
Led by the S&T Directorate, DHS is co-funding with the National
Science Foundation a $5.45 million, 3-year research project to create
an experimental infrastructure network to support development and
demonstration of next generation information security technologies for
cyber defense. This project supports national-scale experimentation on
emerging security research and advanced development technologies.
Called Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research (``DETER'')
Network, this is a multi-university project led by the University of
California, Berkley.
Evaluation Methods in Internet Security Technology
DHS is co-funding with the National Science Foundation, a second
cyber security project called Evaluation Methods in Internet Security
Technology (EMIST). EMIST is a testing framework that can be adapted to
simulators, emulation facilities, other testbeds, and hardware testing
facilities. The framework will include attack scenarios, attack
simulators, generators for topology and background traffic, data sets
derived from live traffic, and tools to monitor and summarize results.
EMSIT is a 3-year, $5.6 million, multi-university research project that
includes Penn State; University of California, Davis; Purdue; and the
International Computer Science Institute.
United States Coast Guard
Maritime Surveillance Testbed Prototype
In September 2003, S&T's Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency and the United States Coast Guard planned and funded
the South Florida Coastal Surveillance Prototype Testbed, a port and
coastal surveillance prototype in Port Everglades, Miami, and Key West
areas. The prototype is an evolutionary testbed that:
--Provides an initial immediate coastal surveillance capability in a
high priority area
--Offers the Coast Guard and other DHS agencies the means to develop
and evaluate CONOPS (Concept of Operations) in a real world
environment
--Implements and tests interoperability among DHS and DOD systems and
networks such as the U.S. Navy/Coast Guard Joint Harbor
Operations Center (JHOC).
--Tests and evaluates systems and operational procedures
--Becomes the design standard for follow-on systems in other areas
and integration with wider area surveillance systems. The
program has two phases; an initial prototype development phase,
and an improvements and update phase. The program is expected
to begin operations in June 2004 and is funded at $2.4 million
for fiscal year 2003 and $5 million for fiscal year 2004.
Partnerships
Workshop on Scientific Computing in Support of Homeland
Security
The Science and Technology Directorate brought together experts
from academia, private industry and the national laboratories with
staff from various organizations within the Department to understand
how the S&T Directorate's advanced scientific computing (ASC)
capabilities, centered at the national laboratories, can help address
needs across the Department. This workshop, held October 8-9, 2003, has
resulted in identifying several areas of potential high payoff for the
use of these unique capabilities; two examples are advanced research in
data management and information extraction, and research and
development of computational simulation tools. The workshop will
produce a formal report identifying relevant ASC capabilities and
matching them up with identified needs within the Department of
Homeland Security for improved operational capabilities.
Infrastructure Subcommittee of the National Science and
Technology Council
Staff members of the Science and Technology Directorate had a major
role in drafting the first charter for the National Science and
Technology Council's (NSTC's) Infrastructure Subcommittee; the
Subcommittee's first Co-Chairs are from the S&T Directorate and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy. The Subcommittee serves as a
forum within the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) for
developing consensus and resolving issues associated with coordinating
R&D agendas, policy, and programs to develop and protect the nation's
infrastructure. The Subcommittee will also be the vehicle used by the
Department of Homeland Security and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy to develop the National R&D Plan for Critical
Infrastructure Protection.
Homeland Security Standards Panel
The S&T Directorate worked with the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) to establish a Homeland Security Standards Panel (HSSP) that
would coordinate the development of consensus standards among the 280
different standards development organizations. On June 9-10, 2003, the
inaugural meeting of the ANSI Homeland Security Standards Panel was
held at NIST. Plenary session presentations were given by four S&T
Directorate staff members to outline the needs in Department for
standards. The panel selected a small list of topics to address with
focus workshops. The first of these occurred in September 2003 with a
focus on needs for standards in biometrics.
Joint DHS/USDA National Strategy for Foreign Animal Disease
At the request of the Congressional Appropriations Committees for
both DHS and the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the two departments
have coordinated a report on a national strategy for foreign animal
disease. Participants in the joint study included DHS (S&T), USDA (the
Agricultural Research Service and the Agriculture and Plant Health
Inspection Service), and stakeholder groups. The joint study has
prompted an end-to-end review of the national response strategy
following the identification of a case of foot-and-mouth disease,
including the R&D requirements and gaps for assays, diagnostics,
vaccines, and antivirals. Comprehensive roadmaps have been developed
for these research areas, in 1-, 3-, and 5-year timeframes. These
roadmaps are important elements of program planning for S&T.
National Security Council Attribution Working Group
The S&T Directorate initiated and leads the National Security
Council Attribution Working Group, which is revisiting national
capabilities to rapidly perform forensic analysis in cases of nuclear
and radiological events of any size. This effort is expected to lead to
a robust and completely coordinated forensic capability for
attribution.
Workshops on Comparative Analysis
S&T's Office of Comparative Studies has sponsored two workshops on
identifying analysis techniques and information sources crucial for
analyzing the interaction of the terrorist threat with S&T activities.
These workshops brought together participants from two DHS
directorates, other government entities, academia and private industry
and have helped to improve communication between these groups.
Important analytical techniques and sources of information were
identified and have been utilized. The workshops were also used to
establish a set of topics which the office could profitably study. A
proposal is being prepared which will solicit work on several of these
topics.
Homeland Security Institute, and Homeland Security Science and
Technology Advisory Committee
Homeland Security Institute
A formal solicitation was issued in December for the Homeland
Security Institute (HSI), and proposals were received in January 2004.
Those proposals currently are being evaluated with an expected 5-year
award by early May 2004. However, current legislation states that the
Institute's operation will terminate in November 2005; this issue is of
concern to the bidders.
The HSI was mandated by the Homeland Security Act to assist the
Secretary and the Department in addressing important homeland security
issues that require scientific, technical, and analytical expertise.
The Institute will provide a dedicated, high-quality technical and
analytical support capability for informing homeland security decision
making at all levels. This capability will consist of an extensive
program of operational assessments, systems evaluations, technical
assessments, and resource analyses comparable to the capability
developed and used for decades by the Defense establishment. The
Institute will also provide analytical and technical evaluations that
support DHS implementation of the SAFETY Act. Finally, the Institute
will create and maintain a field operations program that will help
further introduce real-world needs and experiences into homeland
security is a disciplined and rigorous way.
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
(HSSTAC) was formally established in December 2003 and holds its first
meeting in February 2004. The HSSTAC was mandated by the Homeland
Security Act to be a source of independent, scientific and technical
planning advice for the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. The
committee will (1) advise the Undersecretary on the mission goals for
the future; (2) provide advice on whether the policies, actions,
management processes, and organization constructs of the Science and
Technology Directorate are optimally focused on mission objectives; (3)
provide advice on whether the research, development, test, evaluation,
and systems engineering activities are properly resourced (capital,
financial, and human) to accomplish the objectives; (4) identify
outreach activities (particularly in accessing and developing, where
necessary, the industrial base of the Nation); and (5) review the
technical quality and relevance of the Directorate's programs.
Countermeasures to Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
The S&T Directorate has selected three firms to provide analyses of
the economic, manufacturing and maintenance issues needed to support a
system to address the potential threat of MAN-Portable Air Defense
Systems (MANPADS) to commercial aircraft. The next phase of the program
will include development of prototypes using existing technology which
will be subjected to a rigorous test and evaluation process. This
initiative is not intended to develop new technology, but rather to re-
engineer existing technology from military to commercial aviation use.
University and Fellowship Programs
Fellowships and Scholarships
In September 2003, the S&T Directorate named 100 students to the
inaugural class of the Department of Homeland Security's Scholars and
Fellows Program. The program, which received more than 2,400
applications, supports United States students who choose to pursue
scientific careers and perform research in fields that are essential to
the homeland security mission. The first class consists of 50
undergraduate students and 50 graduate students who are attending
universities across the country majoring in the physical, biological,
and social and behavioral sciences including science policy,
engineering, mathematics, or computer science. The Directorate has
already issued a notice inviting applications from students for the
2004-2005 academic year. The website is http://www.orau.gov/dhsed/.
University Centers of Excellence
The Science and Technology division has created the Homeland
Security Centers Program that supports university-based centers of
excellence dedicated to fostering homeland security mission critical
research and education. The program has established the first Center of
Excellence focused on risk analysis and modeling related to the
economic consequences of terrorism at the University of Southern
California, partnering with the University of Wisconsin at Madison, New
York University and the University of California at Berkeley. A request
for proposals has been issued for the second and third Centers of
Excellence, which will focus on animal-related and post-harvest food
agro-terrorism.
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
Near-Term Technologies
In May 2003, the Science and Technology Directorate's Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) released a Broad
Agency Announcement through the Technical Support Working Group for
near-term technologies that can be rapidly prototyped and deployed to
the field. A total of 3,344 responses as received in the following
broad categories: chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear
countermeasures; personnel protection; explosives detection;
infrastructure protection; physical security; improvised device defeat;
and investigative support and forensics. The first contract award went
to North Carolina State University for the development of the next-
generation of structural fire fighting personal protective equipment.
Detection Systems
The S&T Directorate reviewed and selected proposals for funding in
response to its Research Announcement for Detection Systems for
Biological and Chemical Countermeasures, which was published through
the Technical Support Working Group. In September 2003, the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) held its first
Bidders Conference in Washington, DC. Approximately 420 private sector
and university representatives attended the event and over 500 white
papers were submitted. Finalists have been selected for negotiation,
and work has already begun in a number of the more important areas.
Virtual Cyber Security Center
On December 13, 2003, a Request for Proposals and Statement of Work
for technical and administrative support for the virtual Cyber R&D
Center was published to seven capable performers listed on the GSA
schedule. The deadline for response was December 15, 2003, and two
responsive proposals were received. A three million dollar technical,
management, and administrative contract was awarded to SRI
International on February 2, 2004, to support the functions of the
HSARPA Cyber R&D Center. The Cyber R&D Center will be the primary S&T
interface with the academic and industrial cyber security research
communities.
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program
Solicitation
On November 13, 2003, the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) issued a Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) Program Solicitation. The purpose of this solicitation was to
invite small businesses to submit innovative research proposals that
address eight high-priority DHS requirements:
--New system/technologies to detect low vapor pressure chemicals
(e.g., Toxic Industrial Chemicals)
--Chemical and biological sensors employing novel receptor scaffolds
--Advanced low cost aerosol collectors for surveillance sensors and
personnel monitoring
--Computer modeling tool for vulnerability assessment of U.S.
infrastructure
--Ship compartment inspection device
--Marine Asset Tag Tracking System
--Automatic Identification System tracking and collision avoidance
equipment for small boats
--Advanced Secure Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
and related distributed control systems.
By the December 15, 2003, deadline 374 proposals had been received.
The evaluation is complete and 66 proposers entered negotiation for
Phase I contracts beginning February 11, 2004.
SAFECOM Vendor Demonstration Day
SAFECOM held a Vendor Demonstration Day on January 30, 2004.
SAFECOM's Vendor Day allows several communications equipment and
service providers to present their products and/or technologies for
SAFECOM. Responses from the SAFECOM Request for Information in November
2003 were used to select vendors for this event. Each vendor selected
represents a different approach to solving the communications and
interoperability problems facing first responders.
International Programs
Agreement with Canada on Border and Infrastructure Security
On October 3, 2002, Secretary Tom Ridge and Canadian Deputy Prime
Minister John Manley initialed an agreement on Science and Technology
Cooperation for protecting shared critical infrastructure and enhancing
border security. The S&T Directorate is participating in a Working
Group to develop near-term deliverables and projects to protect shared
critical infrastructure such as bridges, dams, pipelines,
communications and power grids; to develop surveillance and monitoring
technologies to enhance the ability to disrupt and interdict
terrorists; and to develop technologies for detecting the illicit
transportation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
weapons.
weapons of mass destruction and incident management
Between March and December of 2003, the Office of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Operations and Incident Management (WMDO-IM) provided
surveillance and operational incident response to the Homeland Security
Operations Center and law enforcement officials on 24 separate
occasions. In addition, the WMDO-IM provided operational support to the
Homeland Security Operations Center during Hurricane Isabel and the
Northeast blackout.
The WMDO-IM established a scientific reach-back and rapid decision
support capability through the Scientific and Technical Analysis and
Response Teams (START). In addition to activating the START teams
during the Code Orange time period in December 2003, WMDO-IM provided
technical expert consultations on threats to the nation's water
resources and responded to concerns about impacts of solar flares.
WMDO-IM helped develop the Initial National Response Plan (INRP)
and its National Incident Management System; the INRP represents a
significant first step towards an overall goal of integrating the
current family of Federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response,
and recovery plans into a single all-discipline, all-hazards plan.
WMDO-IM provided technical support to the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC), assessing vulnerabilities and actions the
HSOC can take to improve the ability to resist a chemical or biological
terrorist attack.
WMDO-IM, with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, developed curriculum for a week-long training
workshop on weapons of mass destruction for the Central Intelligence
Agency University. Also in the area of education and training, WMDO-IM
established a homeland security medical executive training course.
Senator Cochran. Thanks, Dr. McQueary.
General Libutti, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL FRANK LIBUTTI
General Libutti. Good morning, Chairman Cochran, and
Senator Byrd.
I am delighted to appear before you today to discuss the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Department
of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. And I look forward to a meeting with
you soon to discuss the classified portion of the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection budget, specifically,
the intelligence side of business.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection is the
focal point for intelligence, analysis, and infrastructure
protection operations and information sharing within the
Department of Homeland Security. Within a single Directorate,
IAIP merges capability to identify and assess a broad range of
intelligence and information concerning threats to the
homeland, maps the information against the Nation's
vulnerabilities, issues timely and actionable warnings, and
takes appropriate preventive and protective action to protect
our infrastructure and key assets.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE IAIP DIRECTORATE
As we mark the first anniversary of the Department, I would
like to highlight for you some of the many accomplishments of
our IAIP Directorate.
Since March 2003, IAIP has launched the Homeland Security
Information Network, a comprehensive interactive information
sharing program that expands access to and use of a joint
regional information exchange system. The roll out includes all
of our partners at the State and local levels, as well as
private sector partners.
Next, we have implemented the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive HSPD-7 which addresses critical
infrastructure identification, prioritization and protection.
And as you know this was signed by President Bush in December
of 2003.
To the National Cyber Security Division, the NCSD, we have
established the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, or
USCERT, and launched the National Cyber Alert System, America's
first coordinated cyber security system for identifying,
analyzing and prioritizing emerging vulnerabilities and
threats. This system provides the first nation-wide
infrastructure for relaying actionable computer security
updates and warning information to computer users in the
Government, the private sector, business, and home users as
well.
We've assumed the responsibility for the Homeland Security
Operation Center, which maintains and shares real-time domestic
situation awareness, coordinates security operations, detects,
prevents and deters incidents, and facilitates response and
recovery for all critical incidents and threats.
In addition, we have conducted detailed vulnerability
studies of the banking and telecommunication industries to
better understand the inter-dependencies therein, and
prioritization regarding vulnerability reduction.
We formally executed the Protected Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Program. This is pursuant to the
provisions of the Critical Information Infrastructure
Information Act of 2002.
Even with these accomplishments there is much more work to
be done. IAIP's budget relies on the expectation of two
emerging trends. First, the nature and complexity of the
threats which will increase. And second, our national
infrastructure components which will become more complex and
more interdependent. These trends will result in more demands
on the department and IAIP to anticipate terrorist intentions,
tactics and capabilities, and to mitigate risks and
vulnerabilities for the protection of the United States of
America and its citizens.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST FOR IAIP
For these reasons, the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request for IAIP is structured around the following major
programs: Threat determination and assessments; Infrastructure
vulnerabilities and risk assessments; Information warnings and
advisories; Remediation and protective actions; Outreach and
partnerships; National Communication System; Competitive
analysis and evaluation; National plans and strategies; and the
Homeland Security Operation Center.
Let me discuss several of the initiatives associated with
each of the mission areas of the fiscal year 2005 request for
$864 million.
THREAT DETERMINATION AND ASSESSMENT
First, threat determination and assessment. Funding in this
area is targeted to increase the IAIP directorate's technology
competencies by training analysts and equipping IAIP with the
most advanced technologies and tools.
The training tools and technology will be utilized to
develop a detailed understanding of terrorists' organizational
capabilities with supporting materials and conductivity to
interpret and predict threats.
Next, is to expand cooperation and fusion efforts from
Homeland Security to our internal components and out to
external customers, and increase cooperation efforts among the
intelligence community.
INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITY AND RISK ASSESSMENT
Next, the infrastructure vulnerability and risk assessment
piece. This funds the development of comprehensive national
infrastructure risk analysis and profile. There we are talking
about high-value target sets, the development of analytic tools
to evaluate critical infrastructure and key assets, and the
coordination of a national threat vulnerability and asset
database to assess, integrate, collaborate and store threat
vulnerability information.
Next, information and warning advisories. In addition to
continuously operating a 24/7 Capable Operations Center, the
information and warning program will provide search capability
for our HSOC, our operation center, and for other directorates
during heightened states of alert or in response to specific
incidents.
Funding in this area supports submission of collection
requests for threat information of the intelligence community,
the law enforcement, and dissemination guidance to Homeland
Security components, developing analysis on the nature and
scope of the threat, and identifying potential terrorists'
targets within the United States.
Another priority is the need to establish threat
advisories, bulletins and warnings at different levels of
classification to relevant stakeholders. The threat
publications are detailed and disseminated in a timely fashion
portraying the nature, scope and target of the threat.
REMEDIATION AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
Next, remediation and protective actions. Through this
program the IAIP directorate provides a broad range of services
including on-site planning advice, technical and operational
training programs, assistance in identifying vulnerabilities
and development of sharing and best-practices. Activities in
this area also include security efforts to protect
infrastructure and key assets from cyber attacks.
Specifically, the $345.783 million for remediation and
protective actions is divided into the following five
categories: Critical infrastructure and key asset
identification; Critical infrastructure of vulnerability field
assessments; Infrastructure and key asset protection; Cyber
security; and last, protection standards and performance
matrixes.
OUTREACH AND PARTNERSHIP
The next broad category is outreach and partnership. The
fiscal year 2005 President's budget requests $40.829 million to
build and maintain a sound partnership foundation. To be
successful in information sharing, strong relationships must be
maintained with State and local governments, private sector,
academia, advisory bodies and the international community.
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Next, the national communication system. This allows NCS to
ensure priority use of telecommunication services during times
of national crisis, including the government emergency
telecommunication service, GETS. The funding enhances these
programs and supports the development of wireless priority
services, which provide a nationwide priority cellular service
to key national security and emergency preparedness users.
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Next, competitive analysis and evaluation. The competitive
analysis and evaluation program ensures that IAIP products and
services are tested and accurate based on sound assumptions and
data, and ultimately offers the highest quality, depth and
value to the IAIP customers.
NATIONAL PLANS AND STRATEGIES
Next is our national plans and strategies. Critical to
ongoing national efforts to protect and ensure the homeland,
our actions support updating, coordinating and monitoring the
implementation of national plans and strategies.
HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATION CENTER
Homeland Security Operation Center, $35 million. The HSOC
or Homeland Security Operation Center maintains and shares
domestic situational awareness, coordinates security
operations, protects, prevents and deters incidents, and
facilitates the response and recovery of all critical
incidents.
The HSOC is the focal point for sharing information across
all levels of government, the private sector and our friends at
the State and local levels as well.
PREPARED STATEMENT
In summary, the fiscal year 2005 budget request provides
the resources to enable IAIP to manage and grow in its mission
of securing the homeland. I look forward to working with you to
accomplish the goals of this department and the goals of IAIP.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, this concludes my prepared
statement and I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank Libutti
Introduction
Good morning Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee. I am delighted to appear before you today
to discuss the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate.
IAIP is the focal point for intelligence analysis, infrastructure
protection operations, and information sharing within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Within a single directorate, IAIP merges the
capability to identify and assess a broad range of intelligence and
information concerning threats to the homeland, map that information
against the nation's vulnerabilities, issue timely and actionable
warnings, and take appropriate preventive and protective action to
protect our infrastructures and key assets. IAIP is currently comprised
of three primary components: the Office of Information Analysis (IA),
the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), and the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC).
Fiscal Year 2004 Accomplishments
As we mark the first anniversary of the Department, I would like to
highlight for you some of the many accomplishments of the IAIP
Directorate, one of the newest parts of the Federal Government. The
formation of IAIP has created for the first time a unique, integrated
capability to not only map the current threat picture against the
nation's vulnerabilities, but to also assess the risk of a terrorist
attack based upon preventive and protective measures in place. That is,
IAIP is enabling us to move from a reactive posture in the homeland to
a risk management and mitigation posture. Let me give you some
examples.
Since March, 2003, IA has:
--Launched the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), a
comprehensive information sharing program that expands access
to and use of the Joint Regional Information Exchange System
(JRIES). The HSIN will provide secure real-time connectivity in
a collaborative environment with States, urban areas, counties,
tribal areas, and territories to collect and disseminate
information between Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies
involved in combating terrorism.
--Coordinated Operation Liberty Shield and the rapid enhancement of
security at more than 145 national asset sites at the outset of
the war in Iraq. Following that, IAIP transitioned the
protection of the sites from National Guard and law enforcement
to a more cost effective and permanent set of physical
protective measures.
--Enhanced protection, by assisting local communities with conducting
vulnerability assessments and implementing protective measures,
of the nation's highest risk chemical sites, thereby improving
the safety of over 13 million Americans.
--Implemented Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7,
``Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and
Protection,'' which was signed by President Bush in December
2003. The HSPD assigned the Department of Homeland Security
responsibility for coordinating the overall national effort to
enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key
resources of the United States and the development of an
integrated cyber and physical protection plan.
--Implemented Wireless Priority Service, to ensure the continuity of
cellular networks nationwide, registering over 3,000 Federal,
State, local and private users.
--Established the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) to
coordinate the implementation of the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace and serve as the national focal point for the
public and private sectors on cybersecurity issues, and
developed a process for handling cyber incidents, successfully
managing a number of major cyber events.
--Through the NCSD, established the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness
Team (US-CERT) through an initial partnership with the Computer
Emergency Response Team Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon
University. US-CERT is building a cyber watch operation,
launching a partnership program to build situational awareness
and cooperation, and coordinating with U.S. Government agencies
to predict, prevent, and respond to cyber attacks.
--Launched the National Cyber Alert System under the auspices of US-
CERT, America's first coordinated cyber security system for
identifying, analyzing, and prioritizing emerging
vulnerabilities and threats. This system provides the first
nationwide infrastructure for relaying actionable computer
security update and warning information to computer users in
the government, in private industry, and small business and
home users.
--Assumed responsibility for the Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC), which maintains and shares real time domestic
situational awareness; coordinates security operations;
detects, prevents, and deters incidents; and facilitates
response and recovery for all critical incidents and threats.
As of February 2004, 26 Federal and local law enforcement
agencies and Intelligence Community members are were
represented in the HSOC, providing reach back capability into
their home organizations to continuously inform the current
threat picture, and to provide key decision makers with real
time information.
--Conducted detailed vulnerability studies of the banking and
telecommunications industry to better understand the
interdependencies and prioritize vulnerability reduction.
--Initiated an intra-Department and interagency review and analysis
of information obtained in detainee briefings to assess
specific terrorist capabilities, work that subsequently became
the subject of several advisories disseminated to a variety of
homeland security partners regarding terrorist planning,
tactics and capabilities.
--Co-chaired with the Border and Transportation Security Directorate
(BTS) the DHS Intelligence Activities Joint Study charged with
reviewing the mission, responsibilities and resources of DHS
Intelligence component organizations. The study was chartered
for the purpose of making recommendations to the Secretary as
to the optimal utilization of the Department's analytical
resources.
--With the Homeland Security Council (HSC), initiated an ongoing
interagency review of the Homeland Security Advisory System
(HSAS), for the purpose of refining the system to make it more
efficient and more beneficial for States and localities and the
private sector.
--Formally executed the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
(PCII) implementing regulation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Critical Infrastructure Information ACT of 2002. The
purpose of the PCII Program is to encourage private entities
and others with knowledge about our critical infrastructure to
voluntarily submit confidential, proprietary, and business
sensitive critical infrastructure information to the Department
through IAIP. Information submitted to IAIP that qualifies for
protection under the provisions of the Act and the PCII
implementing regulation will be exempted from public
disclosure, providing a significant opportunity for private
entities to assist in homeland security without exposing
potentially sensitive and proprietary information to the
public. The Department will use information that qualifies for
protection primarily to assess our vulnerabilities, secure the
nation's critical infrastructure and protected systems, issue
warnings and advisories, and assist in recovery.
Fiscal Year 2005
Even with these accomplishments, there is much more work that must
be done. The United States remains at risk, despite the continuing work
to assess and mitigate vulnerabilities. Our interdependent critical
infrastructures enable Americans to enjoy one of the highest standards
of living in the world, provide the backbone for the production of
goods and services for the world's largest economy, provide over 60
million jobs, and ensure the United States can protect its national
security interests. Infrastructure will remain one of the top priority
targets for terrorists desiring to damage the nation's economy and
incite fear in the minds of the American people.
While the possibility of large-scale attacks similar to 9/11 remain
significant, it is also possible likely that terrorists will employ
smaller scale operations such as the suicide bombings prevalent in
Israel. Terrorists understand that the cumulative effect of many small-
scale operations--that are easier to plan and conduct--can be just as
effective as large-scale attacks in their overall impact on Americans'
sense of security in their own country and, especially, at United
States facilities overseas.
IAIP's budget relies on the expectation of two emerging trends:
First, the nature and complexity of threats will increase; and, second,
our national infrastructure components will become more complex and
interdependent. These trends will result in more demands on the
Department and IAIP to anticipate terrorist intentions, tactics and
capabilities, and to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities for the
protection of the United States and its citizens.
For these reasons, the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request
for IAIP is structured around the following major program areas: Threat
Determination and Assessments, Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Risk
Assessments, Information Warnings and Advisories, Remediation and
Protective Actions, Outreach and Partnerships, National Communications
System, Competitive Analysis and Evaluations, National Plans and
Strategies, and the Homeland Security Operations Center.
Threat Determination and Assessment ($21.943 Million)
IAIP's Threat Determination and Assessment program is designed to
detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States
homeland; assess the nature and scope of these terrorist threats; and
understand terrorist threats in light of actual and potential
vulnerabilities within critical infrastructures and/or key assets.
Addressing these issues requires the IAIP Directorate to improve on its
existing set of threat analysts and analytical tools by hiring and
training additional highly skilled threat analysts; acquiring and
fielding new analytical tools and technologies to assist in assessing
and integrating information; and deploying secure communications
channels that allow for the rapid exchange of information and
dissemination of analytical results.
These improvements will be used for multiple purposes, including:
(1) providing analysis and assessments of the current threat picture as
it relates to critical infrastructure; (2) developing actionable
intelligence for Federal, State, and local law enforcement; (3) issuing
warnings at all levels from the Federal Government to the private
sector; and (4) supporting efforts to identify and coordinate effective
countermeasures.
The President's Budget requests $21.943 million for continued
support of on-going activities to continually form terrorist threat
situational awareness, execute the functions outlined above, and focus
on information sharing and coordination within DHS as well as in the
Intelligence Community and other external stakeholder communities.
These capabilities enhance the performance of two critical functions in
protecting the homeland. First, it offers the United States Government
the ability to integrate, synchronize, and correlate unique sources of
information relating to homeland security, emanating from traditional
and non-traditional (e.g., State and local governments, private
industry) sources. Second, the IAIP Directorate is positioned to
integrate knowledge of potential terrorist threats with an
understanding of exploitable infrastructure vulnerabilities, resulting
in a value-added profile of national risk that transcends traditional
threat and vulnerability assessments.
Funding in this area is targeted to increase the IAIP Directorate's
technical competencies by training analysts and equipping IAIP with the
most advanced technologies and tools. The training, tools and
technologies will be utilized in four primary areas:
--Model Terrorist Organization.--Developing a detailed understanding
of terrorist organization capability with supporting materials
and connectivity to interpret and predict threats.
--Develop Terrorist Capabilities Baseline.--Developing a detailed
understanding of terrorist capabilities baseline with
supporting materials and connectivity to interpret and predict
threats.
--Collaboration and Fusion.--Expanding collaboration and fusion
efforts from DHS to internal components, and out to an extended
customer base.
--Analysis Coordination.--Spearheading the effort to build a
collaborative and mutually supporting analysis coordination
schematic for DHS, and ensure that it incorporates others
(TTIC, TSC, and the Intelligence Community) into a ``community
of interest'' approach for understanding domestic terrorist
threats.
Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk Assessment ($71.080 million)
The Homeland Security Act directs the IAIP Directorate to carry out
comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the critical
infrastructure and key assets of the United States. As such, the IAIP
Directorate serves as the focal point for coordination between the
Federal Government, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and
State and local governments for the sharing of information and the
planning for response to crisis events affecting infrastructures.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $71.080 million to
fund the development of a comprehensive National infrastructure risk
analysis and profile (e.g., high value/high probability of success
targets); development of analytic tools to evaluate critical
infrastructure and key assets; and the coordination and development of
a National threat vulnerability and asset database to access,
integrate, correlate, and store threat and vulnerability information.
These mission areas will be enable IAIP to identify potential risks
caused by infrastructure interdependencies, and determine the potential
consequences of an infrastructure failure due to a terrorist attack.
Ultimately, the intent of these efforts is to strengthen the
capabilities of the IAIP Directorate and each critical infrastructure
to provide near real-time notification of incidents; enhance the
ability of the IAIP Directorate to assess the impact of incidents on
critical infrastructure and key assets; to assess collateral damage to
interdependent infrastructure; and create tools and processes to
enhance infrastructure modeling and risk assessment capabilities.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request for infrastructure
vulnerability and risk assessment is divided into three areas:
--National Infrastructure Risk Analysis.--Funding in this area
supports the development of comprehensive risk and
vulnerability analyses on a national scale. These analyses are
cross-sector in nature, focusing on problems affecting multiple
infrastructures, both physical and cyber-related. As assigned
in the Homeland Security Act and HSPD-7, the IAIP Directorate
will continue to leverage and develop new techniques to map
data provided by threat analyses, provide consequence analysis,
and create vulnerability assessment teams based on the nature
of the indicators or incidents. The goal is to produce timely,
actionable information that is more meaningful to industry. A
portion of this funding also supports the direct involvement of
critical infrastructure sector experts to supplement risk
analysis efforts and to gain a better understanding of the
sector's core business and operational processes. In addition,
a portion of this funding is utilized for exploration and to
pilot innovative methodologies to examine infrastructure
vulnerabilities and interdependencies.
--Analytic Tools Development and Acquisition.--The IAIP Directorate
will continue to collaborate with the Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate to acquire the most advanced tools and
database designs available to better understand the
complexities of interdependent systems and for translating vast
amounts of diverse data into common and usable information for
decision-makers, analysts, and infrastructure operators. Such
capabilities include data-logging systems, modeling and
simulation, data mining, and information correlation. Funding
is targeted toward developing dynamic and multi-faceted tools
designed to expand access to needed information.
--National Threat/Vulnerability/Asset Databases.--The funding level
requested for this activity in the fiscal year 2005 budget is
based on the recognition of the data intensive nature, scale
and complexity of analyzing infrastructure vulnerability
issues. The intent is to develop and maintain databases that
allow the IAIP Directorate to provide its stakeholders with up-
to-date information on threats and vulnerabilities.
Specifically, the IAIP Directorate is continuing to coordinate
and direct the development of the primary database of the
Nation's critical infrastructures through a collaborative
process involving all stakeholders; maintain data on the risks
posed to specific facilities and assets (and the probability of
attack and associated consequences for homeland, national, and
economic security should an attack occur); and develop,
operate, and manage integrated data warehouses--in full
compliance with the Department's privacy policies--that contain
comprehensive all-source threat, vulnerability, and asset data.
Information and Warning Advisories ($59.807 Million)
One of the most visible aspects of the DHS mission lies in the
management and administration of the Homeland Security Advisory System,
the communications of threat condition status to the general public,
and the continuous around-the-clock monitoring of potential terrorists
threats. Specifically, there are three key information and warning
activities that help support the Homeland Security Advisory System and
other efforts to alert key Departmental leadership, national leaders
and the general public: (1) tactical indications and warning and the
associated warning advisory preparation and issuance; (2) information
requirements management; and (3) integrated physical and cyber
infrastructure monitoring and coordination.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $59.807 million to
maintain the information and warning program. In addition to
continuously operating a 247 capability, the information and
warning program area will provide surge capabilities for the HSOC and
with other Directorates during heightened states of alert or in
response to specific incidents. The relevant fiscal year 2005 budget
request is divided into three primary areas:
--Tactical Indications and Warning Analysis/Warning Advisory
Preparation and Issuance.--Funding in this area supports
submission of collection requests for threat information to the
Intelligence Community and law enforcement, disseminating
guidance to DHS components, developing analyses on the nature
and scope of the threats, and identifying potential terrorist
targets within the United States. A program priority is the
continued to development of tools and technologies to assist
our analysts to interpret, integrate, and catalogue indicators,
warnings, and/or actual events and to provide Departmental and
national leaders situational awareness. Another priority is the
need to publish threat advisories, bulletins, and warnings at
different levels of classification prior to distribution to the
relevant stakeholders. Threat publications are detailed and
disseminated in a timely fashion, portraying the nature, scope,
and target of the threat. Ultimately, this information provides
the basis for determinations to change the threat condition.
--Information Requirements Management.--Information related to
threats and critical infrastructure vulnerabilities are
collected, stored, and protected within a diverse set of
locations and sources, spanning all levels of government
(Federal, State, and local) and including intelligence,
proprietary and public sources. Funding in this area supports
the technologies necessary to search within those diverse
databases to identify, distill, and/or acquire mission-critical
information. Program funding supports efforts to coordinate
information requests and tasks emanating from within other
parts of IAIP, other DHS Directorates, the Intelligence
Community, law enforcement, State and local governments, and
the private sector. In addition, a portion of these funds is
used to supplement the information technology structure to
accomplish these tasks efficiently and effectively through the
use of leading-edge capabilities. This effort ensures that all
information users are able to access all available and relevant
data.
--Integrated Physical and Cyber Infrastructure Monitoring and
Coordination.--Intelligence and warning staff monitoring and
coordination efforts ensure that threat and critical
infrastructure issues are adequately addressed and represented.
In addition, these efforts coordinate incident response,
mitigation, restoration, and prioritization across critical
sectors in conjunction with the other relevant DHS components
(e.g., Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate).
Remediation and Protective Actions ($345.738 Million)
The IAIP Directorate has established a national Critical
Infrastructure Protection program that leverages stakeholder input at
the Federal, State, and local level and across the private sector to
provide the best and most cost-effective protective strategies for ``at
risk'' infrastructure and facilities. Through this program, the IAIP
Directorate provides a broad range of services including on-site
planning advice, technical and operational training programs,
assistance in identifying vulnerabilities, and development and sharing
of best practices. Activities in this area also include security
efforts to protect infrastructure and assets from cyber attacks (e.g.,
malicious software, distributed denial-of-service attacks).
Specifically, the fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests
$345.738 million, for remediation and protective actions divided into
the following five areas:
--Critical Infrastructure and Key Asset Identification.--The Homeland
Security Act directs the IAIP Directorate to recommend measures
necessary to protect the critical infrastructure of the United
States. One key step in this process is funding a national
program focused on identifying critical infrastructure and
assets and assessing potential risks of successful attacks to
those assets. By understanding the full array of critical
infrastructure facilities and assets, their interaction, and
the interdependencies across infrastructure sectors, IAIP is
able to forecast the national security, economic, and public
safety implications of terrorist attacks and prioritize
protection measures accordingly. Moreover, the process of
identifying and prioritizing assets in this manner creates a
common overarching set of metrics that consist of the
individual attributes of specific infrastructure sectors.
--Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Field Assessments.--The
Directorate coordinates with all relevant Federal, State and
local efforts to identify system vulnerabilities and works
closely with the private sector to ensure vulnerability field
assessment methodologies are effective, easy to use, and
consistently applied across sectors. Funding is targeted at the
need to conduct and coordinate specialized vulnerability
assessments by DHS teams, in conjunction with teams from other
Federal or State agencies and private sector companies as
appropriate, for the highest priority critical infrastructures
and assets. The intent of these efforts is to catalogue
specific vulnerabilities affecting the highest priority
terrorist targets, thereby helping guide the development of
protective measures to harden a specific facility or asset. A
nationwide vulnerability field assessment program is currently
underway leveraging the expertise of the IAIP Directorate,
other agencies, and the private sector to ensure cross-sector
vulnerabilities are identified and that sound, informed
decisions will be reached regarding protective measures and
strategies.
--Infrastructure and Key Asset Protection Implementation.--Due to the
vast geographic size of the United States and diverse operating
environment for each infrastructure sector, protection
strategies must start at the local level and then be applied
nationally as needed. Priorities for protection strategies are
based on regional, State, and local needs and on the need for
cross-sector coordination and protective actions within those
geographic boundaries. The budget request reflects the need for
the IAIP Directorate to continue the development of a flexible
set of programs to assist in the implementation of protective
measures. Examples include coordinating with other Federal and
State agencies and the private sector to: (1) ensure the
detection of weapons of mass destruction material is considered
in the development of protection plans; (2) disrupt attack
planning by taking low cost actions that make information
collection and surveillance difficult for terrorists; (3)
defend the most at risk critical infrastructure facilities and
key assets throughout the country above the level of security
associated with industry best practices; and (4) develop a
nationally-integrated bombing response capability similar to
that of the United Kingdom. DHS funding in these areas focuses
on high value, high probability targets and will take the form
of ``joint ventures'' with State and local governments,
regional alliances, and the private sector.
--Cyberspace Security.--Consistent with the Homeland Security Act and
the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, a key element of
infrastructure protection, both in the public and private
sectors, is to ensure the continued healthy functioning of
cyberspace, which includes the cyber infrastructure and the
cyber dependencies in the critical infrastructure sectors. The
IAIP Directorate recognizes that cyberspace provides a
connecting linkage within and among many infrastructure sectors
and the consequences of a cyber attack could cascade within and
across multiple infrastructures. The result could be widespread
disruption of essential services, damaging our national
economy, and imperiling public safety and national security.
The budget request supports efforts to capitalize on existing
capabilities of the Directorate, and investing in new
capabilities to monitor, predict, and prevent cyber attacks and
to minimize the damage from and efficiently recover from
attacks. As the manager responsible for a national cyber
security program, the IAIP Directorate provides direct funding
to support: (1) creating a national cyberspace security threat
and vulnerability reduction program that includes a methodology
for conducting national cyber threat and vulnerability risk
assessments; (2) strengthening a national cyberspace security
readiness system to include a public-private architecture for
rapidly responding to and quickly disseminating information
about national-level cyber incidents-including the Cyber Alert
Warning System; (3) expanding and completing the warning and
information network to support crisis management during cyber
and physical events; (4) implementing a national cyberspace
security awareness and training program; (5) developing
capabilities to secure the United States Government in
cyberspace that include guidelines for improving security
requirements in government procurements; (6) strengthening the
framework for national security international cyberspace
security cooperation that focuses on strengthening
international cyber security coordination and; (7) the Global
Early Warning Information System, which monitors the worldwide
health of the Internet through use of multiple data sources,
tools, and knowledge management to provide early warning of
cyber attacks.
--Protection Standards and Performance Metrics.--Working in
collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology as appropriate, the IAIP Directorate is developing
objective data for systems protection standards and performance
measures. Several sectors currently use threat-based exercise
approaches to validate key elements of their protection
efforts. The budget request in this area will focus on
continually improving and validating sector plans and
protective programs and providing training and education
programs for public and private sector owners and operators of
critical infrastructure and/or key assets.
Outreach and Partnership ($40.829 Million)
The private sector and State and local government own and operate
more than 85 percent of the Nation's critical infrastructures and key
assets. Consequently, public-private cooperation is paramount, and
without such partnerships, many of our Nation's infrastructures and
assets could be more susceptible to terrorist attack. The IAIP
Directorate is responsible for cultivating an environment conducive for
public and private partnerships, developing strategic relationships
underlying those partnerships, and coordinating and supporting the
development of partnerships between the Directorate and State and local
government, private industry, and international communities for
national planning, outreach and awareness, information sharing, and
protective actions.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $40.829 million to
build and maintain a sound partnership foundation. It is imperative
that the Department is familiar with the issues confronting the private
sector, State and local governments, Federal sector specific agencies
for critical infrastructure, and our international partners.
Specifically, strong relationships must be maintained with the
following communities of interest:
--State and Local Governments.--Establishing and maintaining
effective working relationships with State and local officials
is a fundamental part of the DHS mission to effectively share
information at unprecedented levels. IAIP is working with DHS'
Office of State and Local Government Coordination to assess the
information sharing and dissemination capabilities that exist
nationwide in order to leverage existing capabilities and
supplement capacity where needed.
--Private Sector.--The Private Sector is another key partner in
developing a nationwide planning, risk assessment, protective
action, and information sharing strategy. Engaging the business
community and making a business case for investment in
protective and remedial strategies is key to our success.
--Academia.--DHS will continue to develop, coordinate, and support
partnerships with academic and other educational institutions.
These partnerships will encourage and coordinate academic and
other workforce development to assure availability of quality
IT security professionals, and encourage curriculum development
to integrate critical infrastructure protection (security) as
normal elements of professional education.
--Advisory Bodies.--DHS will also provide support to Presidential
advisory bodies and cross-sector partnerships (including the
National Infrastructure Advisory Council and the Partnership
for Critical Infrastructure Security.)
--International.--This funding will also support and enhance
partnerships with the international community, working with and
through DHS Office of International Affairs and the State
Department, collaborating with the United States State
Department on infrastructure protection activities. This
includes bilateral discussions and activities on risk
assessment and protective actions, information sharing,
exercises and training. Of particular focus is the IAIP
component of the Smart Borders implementation with Canada and
Mexico. We will continue our role as the lead Federal Agency
Role for the Information and Telecommunications Sectors. The
Directorate will continue to partner with representatives from
those industries composing the Information and
Telecommunications sector and to educate members of the sector,
develop effective practices, develop and implement intra-sector
and cross-sector risk assessments, and work with other sectors
on identifying and addressing risks associated with
interdependencies.
--Cyber.--We will expand the platform established by the Cyber Alert
Warning System to include awareness and education programs for
home users of computers and computer professionals in
partnership with other Federal agencies and industry.
Additionally, within private industry, our partnership and
outreach efforts will involve the engagement of risk management
and business educational groups to implement strategies to
elevate senior management understanding of the importance of
investment in cyber security.
National Communications System ($140.754 Million)
The national telecommunications infrastructure supports multiple
mission-critical national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP)
communications for the Federal Government, State and local governments,
and the private industry. The security and availability of the
telecommunications infrastructure is essential to ensuring a strong
national, homeland, and economic security posture for the United
States. The National Communications System (NCS) is assigned NS/EP
telecommunications responsibilities through Executive Order 12472,
Assignment of National Security and Emergency Telecommunications
Functions, which include: administering the National Coordinating
Center for Telecommunications to facilitate the initiation,
coordination, restoration, and reconstitution of NS/EP
telecommunications services or facilities under all crises and
emergencies; developing and ensuring the implementation of plans and
programs that support the viability of telecommunications
infrastructure hardness, redundancy, mobility, connectivity, and
security; and serving as the focal point for joint industry-government
and interagency NS/EP telecommunications planning and partnerships.
The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $140.754 million
for the capabilities and analytic tools necessary to support the
expansion of NS/EP telecommunications programs and activities. The
fiscal year 2005 funding level ensures a continuation of the NCS
mission and legacy NS/EP telecommunications programs and assets.
Specifically, the fiscal year 2005 budget request for the NCS is
divided into four areas:
--Industry-Government and Interagency Processes.--The NCS has
cultivated and expanded its relationships with the
telecommunications industry and other Federal agencies to
promote joint planning, operational activities, coordination,
and information sharing. The primary industry partnership is
the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC), which is comprised of 30 industry leaders
representing various elements of the telecommunications
industry. The NSTAC and its subordinate body, the Industry
Executive Subcommittee (IES), provides industry-based analyses
and perspectives on a wide range of NS/EP telecommunications
issues and provides policy recommendations to the President for
mitigating vulnerabilities in the national telecommunications
infrastructure. Paralleling this industry relationship is the
interagency process involving the NCS Committee of Principals
and its subordinate body, the Council on Representatives, which
facilitate the NS/EP telecommunications activities of the 23
Federal agencies constituting the NCS.
--Critical Infrastructure Protection Programs.--Leveraging the
industry relationships described above, the NCS manages several
network security and CIP-related programs, including: (1) the
National Communications Center (NCC), a joint industry- and
Government-staffed organization collocated within the NCS and
serves as the operational focal point for the coordination,
restoration, and reconstitution of NS/EP telecommunications
services and facilities; (2) the Telecommunications Information
Sharing and Analysis Center, which is the focal point for the
generation, compilation, and sharing of cyber warning
information among the telecommunications industry; (3) the
Government and National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee Network Security Information Exchanges (NSIEs), which
meet regularly and share information on the threats to,
vulnerabilities of, and incidents affecting the systems
comprising the public network; (4) the Critical Infrastructure
Warning Information Network (CWIN), which is designed to
facilitate the dissemination of information and warnings in the
event of a cyber attack; (5) Training and Exercises, which
helps ensure the readiness and availability of qualified staff
to perform the operational duties of the NCS associated with
Emergency Support Function #2--Telecommunications of the
Federal Response Plan; (6) Operational Analysis, which develops
and implements tools and capabilities to conduct analyses and
assessments of the national telecommunications infrastructure
and its impact on NS/EP services; (7) NCS also supports the
Global Early Warning Information System, which monitors the
worldwide Internet health through use of multiple data sources,
tools, and knowledge management to provide early warning of
cyber attacks, (8) Shared Resources (SHARES) High Frequency
(HF) Radio Program, developed by the NCS and in continuous
operation since being approved by the Executive Office of the
President in the NCS Directive 3-3 of January 1989. The SHARES
program makes use of the combined resources and capabilities of
existing Federal and federally affiliated HF radio stations on
a shared, interoperable basis to provide critical backup
communications during emergencies to support national security
and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) requirements.
--Priority Telecommunications Programs.--The NCS is continuing a
diverse set of mature and evolving programs designed to ensure
priority use of telecommunications services by NS/EP users
during times of national crisis. The more mature services--
including the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
(GETS) and the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP)--were
instrumental in the response to the September 11th attacks.
Fiscal year 2005 funding enhances these programs and supports
the development of the Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program
and upgrade to the Special Routing Arrangement Service (SRAS).
Specifically, priority service programs include: (1) GETS,
which offers nationwide priority voice and low-speed data
service during an emergency or crisis situation; (2) WPS, which
provides a nationwide priority cellular service to key NS/EP
users, including individuals from Federal, State and local
governments and the private sector; (3) TSP, which provides the
administrative and operational framework for priority
provisioning and restoration of critical NS/EP
telecommunications services; (4) SRAS, which is a variant of
GETS to support the Continuity of Government (COG) program
including the reengineering of SRAS in the AT&T network and
development of SRAS capabilities in the MCI and Sprint
networks, and; (5) the Alerting and Coordination Network (ACN)
which is an NCS program that provides dedicated communications
between selected critical government and telecommunications
industry operations centers.
--Programs to Study and Enhance Telecommunications Infrastructure
Resiliency.--The NCS administers and funds a number of programs
focusing on telecommunications network resiliency, security,
performance, and vulnerabilities, including: (1) the Network
Design and Analysis Center, which is a set of tools, data sets,
and methodologies comprising the Nation's leading commercial
communications network modeling and analysis capability that
allows the NCS to analyze the national telecommunications and
Internet infrastructures; (2) the NS/EP Standards program,
which works closely with the telecommunications industry to
incorporate NS/EP requirements in commercial standards and
participates in national and international telecommunications
standards bodies; (3) the Converged Networks Program, which
investigates vulnerabilities and mitigation approaches in
future technologies and networks (specifically Internet
Protocol-based networks); (4) the Technology and Assessment
Laboratory, which provides the ability to evaluate penetration
testing software, modeling tools, various operating systems and
protocols, hardware configurations, and network
vulnerabilities, and; (5) the Routing Diversity effort, which
is developing a communications routing diversity methodology to
analyze a facility's level of routing diversity and is
evaluating alternative technologies which can provide route
diversity, and (6) the NCS, through various associations and
other activities is involved in a variety of International
Activities (NATO, CCPC, CEPTAC, and Hotline) which provides
technical subject matter expertise, guidance, and coordination
on CIP issues affecting the telecommunications infrastructure
in numerous international forums on behalf of the United States
Government.
Competitive Analysis and Evaluation ($18.868 Million)
The Competitive Analysis and Evaluation program ensures that IAIP
products and services are tested, accurate, based on sound assumptions
and data, and ultimately, offer the highest quality, depth, and value
to IAIP customers. The fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests
$18.868 million to provide for the unbiased, objective analyses and
evaluation of IAIP findings, assessments, and judgments through three
functional areas: Risk Assessment Validation, Evaluation, and Exercises
and Methodologies.
--Risk Assessment Validation.--Funding is used to establish and field
physical and cyber target risk analysis teams that employ ``red
team'' techniques to evaluate measures taken by other IAIP
components to protect key assets and critical infrastructure.
The red teams emulate terrorist doctrine, mindsets, and
priorities and employ non-conventional strategies to test and
evaluate IAIP planning assumptions.
--Evaluation.--Funding supports several initiatives, including the
IAIP Product and Process Evaluation, which involves conducting
independent, objective evaluations of IAIP products and
processes and to assist IAIP divisions to develop products that
offer value to IAIP customers. The second is IAIP Customer
Satisfaction, which evaluates customer satisfaction with IAIP
products and services to ensure they are responsive to current
customer needs. Funding in this area provides for electronic
and non-electronic feedback surveys, field visits, and
conferences.
--Exercises and Methodologies.--Coordinate and manage interagency
exercises and tabletops that test both DHS and IAIP policies,
processes, procedures, capabilities, and areas of
responsibilities. Participating in and conducting after action
reviews of exercises provides invaluable experience and
feedback related to capabilities, connectivity, and information
sharing during a crisis event. Investment in this area informs
the Department's decision as to where improvements are needed.
This funding also supports examining and instituting advanced
methodologies such as alternate hypotheses, gaming, modeling,
simulation, scenarios, and competitive analyses to ensure IAIP
products are accurate, sophisticated, and of the highest
quality and value to customers.
National Plans and Strategies ($3.493 Million)
Critical to ongoing national efforts to protect and secure the
homeland are updating, revisiting, coordinating the development, and
monitoring the implementation of National Plans and Strategies. The
fiscal year 2005 President's Budget requests $3.493 million to support
activities by coordinating, developing, and publishing contingency
planning documents for critical infrastructures (as called for in the
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace), monitoring progress against
those documents, and producing an annual report.
Homeland Security Operations Center ($35.0 Million)
The HSOC maintains and shares domestic situational awareness;
coordinates security operations; detects, prevents, and deters
incidents; and facilitates the response and recovery for all critical
incidents. The HSOC is the focal point for sharing information across
all levels of government and the private sector.
The HSOC facilitates the flow of all-source information and
develops products and services including: (1) the daily Homeland
Security Situation Brief for the President, (2) reports and briefs to
law enforcement, the Intelligence Community, other Federal and State
agencies and industry partners, (3) warnings and alerts to individual
responder agencies and the public as appropriate, and (4) coordinated
response when crises do occur. The HSOC concept is to draw from the
many distributed systems and centers that are currently dedicated to
different missions and optimize their contribution to homeland
security.
HSOC funding will help with the time efficiency of issuance of
information and warning advisories through increased operations
efficiency brought about by facility improvements.
New Programs
In the fiscal year 2005 IAIP budget, as a part of an interagency
effort to improve the Federal Government's capability to rapidly
identify and characterize a potential bioterrorist attack, the
President requst $11 million for a new biosurveillance iniative. This
increase provides for real-time integration of biosurveillance data
harvested through the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
and DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate with terrorist threat
information analyzed at IAIP. Currently, a finding from one source of
surveillance exists in isolation from relevant surveillance from other
sectors, making it difficult to verify the significance of that finding
or to recommend appropriate steps for response. Integrating the
information in IAIP, and analyzing it against the current threat
picture will inform effective homeland security decision-making and
speed response time to events.
This interagency initiative, includes DHS's ongoing BIOWATCH
environmental biodetection program, Health and Human Services' (HHS)
proposed BIOSENSE program, HHS' and United States Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) ongoing joint separate food security surveillance
efforts, and USDA's agricultural surveillance efforts. This DHS-led
effort will promote data sharing and joint analysis among these sectors
at the local, State, and Federal levels and also will establish a
comprehensive Federal-level multi-agency integration capability to
rapidly compile these streams of data and preliminary analyses and
integrate and analyze them with threat information
Conclusion
In summary, the fiscal year 2005 budget request provides the
resources to enable the IAIP Directorate to manage and grow in its
mission of securing the homeland. I look forward to working with you to
accomplish the goals of this department and the IAIP directorate.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
NATIONAL BIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE
Senator Cochran. Thank you, General Libutti.
Now, looking at the budget request, I noticed that in the
case of the National biological-surveillance program, the
budget proposes to establish a group lead by the Department of
Homeland Security and including the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Department of Agriculture, to create a
National biological surveillance system. Funding for this
initiative is $279 million Government-wide. The Department of
Homeland Security's request for this initiative is $129 million
for the roles carried out by these directorates that you
manage.
Secretary Libutti, how will the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate work to coordinate its
efforts with the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Department of Agriculture to integrate biological
surveillance data, and verify a chemical or biological attack?
General Libutti. Thank you, sir.
Let me start by simply highlighting the IAIP funds and
support of this inter-agency effort. And I will tell you that
my partner sitting here with me, to my right, Dr. McQueary, is
certainly a partner for me in this effort.
For us, it's about $11 million. And you touched on a
critical point. Our job in support of this major inter-agency
effort is to work as a repository to gather the data heretofore
across the Federal Government, which is not indeed gathered,
and looked at it with a view towards providing situational
awareness, and as an extension, actions that need to be taken
by the Federal Government, and by extension to partners at the
State and local level.
So the bottom line for me in terms of how we do this, is I
do it in complete support and cooperation with Dr. McQueary,
and in concert with other members of the inter-agency effort.
The bottom line is it's about gathering the information or data
in a collaborative way, and in a way that represents what is
going on across the Federal Government.
Senator Cochran. What would happen to this initiative if
funding is not provided to the Department of Agriculture or
Department of Health and Human Services? Would there be a
serious breakdown in the capabilities of our government to deal
with these threats?
General Libutti. My sense, sir, is that if there were
indeed a breakdown, it wouldn't be in the execution piece of
their mission or their responsibility. It would be more broadly
speaking, in what we have all learned is very critical in this
fight against terrorism, and that is to truly work in concert
to look at the information or databases that are available and
simply haven't been collected in a cohesive way. To look at
them and to ask, what does that mean in terms of assessing the
threat, assessing our own capability, and then taking
appropriate action.
Certainly, the mission would still be accomplished, I
simply think it would not be a wise move in terms of the
greater value added when you look at all of this data, and then
there is one person responsible for bringing it together.
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING
Senator Cochran. Secretary McQueary, your directorate's
role in biological surveillance includes an increase of $65
million to expand environmental monitoring activities in the
cities determined to be at the highest risk of terrorist
attack. Can you give us any further details about the chemical
and biological warning activities that are in place now, and
what this increased funding will be used for if it is made
available to you by the Congress?
Dr. McQueary. The increased funding will permit us to
increase the number of sensors in high-risk urban areas, to be
able to make the biological detections using a system called
BioWatch. That system has been in place since about a year ago
in January, when we first began deploying those systems.
And of course, you know we work very closely with EPA, as
well as Health and Human Services, in being able to do that
work.
Senator Cochran. What do you think you will be able to
accomplish if you get this increased funding, in terms of new
advances or the development of new technologies or systems?
Dr. McQueary. The $65 million is to allow more deployments
of the capabilities than we currently have, thereby increasing
the number of monitoring stations in the various urban areas
where we have these systems already deployed, as well as
increasing the number of locations, city locations, if you
will, where we have them deployed.
So it fundamentally gives us a better, real--not real time-
but a better monitoring capability so that we can make a
determination should there be a biological attack of some sort.
We have approximately, I would say, an average of ten
sensors per geographical location. Now that is an estimate but
I can give you precise numbers if you need them. With the
increase we will effectively be able to double the number of
sensors where we are and provide better coverage, if you will.
COUNTERMEASURES
Senator Cochran. There is also the BioShield initiative,
which is involved in deploying countermeasures against
biological terror attacks. How is the Science and Technology
Directorate participating in the development of
countermeasures?
Dr. McQueary. Well, of course, the development of
countermeasures is in our charter, and we work in the chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosives areas.
So in each of those areas we have ongoing research being
managed either in the national laboratories, or in private
industry or universities, which are three components of the
country's scientific support that we call upon regularly. So,
we do have broad agency announcements that have been put out
through the HSARPA organization, for chemical, and biological
sensors, as well as in the radiological and nuclear area.
And, if I may, the primary focus in all of the sensor
development is to do things faster. Because, for example,
BioWatch, we do a sample every day, but it takes perhaps a day
to be able to do the assays on that sample, and therefore there
could be 48-hours. The ultimate system that we would someday
want to get to, and, some of our research, I think will lead in
that direction, is to be able to do the sampling at the site,
be able to do the assays, and then telemetry the information
from that site to a central command control area. They would be
working, obviously, very closely with General Libutti's people
to make a determination that something has happened, and
therefore, corrective action would be taken.
Senator Cochran. Does this budget request include research
and development of medical countermeasures across the agencies
portfolios, or does the Science and Technology Directorate
serve only in an advisory role?
Dr. McQueary. The medical countermeasures is the
responsibility of Health and Human Services. We serve in an
advisory role in that area, and have people that meet regularly
with people in Health and Human Services to discuss programs
that should be implemented.
Senator Cochran. What assessments have been carried out by
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate of our vulnerability to biological attacks that
will guide decisions regarding the investments that should be
made to develop, produce and purchase vaccines or other
medications for the Nation's biological defense.
General Libutti. The work that we have done since I have
been on board, since late June or early July, sir, has been to
work with Dr. McQueary and his folks, conduct surveys and
visits across the country to key high-threat areas, to get as
smart as we can relative to the threats posed by the biological
and chemical threats, and to conduct appropriate analysis
including developing models to give us a strong indication of
what the impact of such an attack would be.
We have recently developed a program that we have briefed
to high officials in our government, in the Administration,
that outlines across the board threats in aviation,
transportation, and biological, and chemicals weapons. What we
have developed is still a work in progress. But it is a good
model. We've looked at the impact and consequences of various
events particularly across major urban areas.
So those are the kinds of activities that we have been
engaged in, in concert with Dr. McQueary and other members of
the inter-agencies; specifically, Health and Human Services,
CDC, and others who have a primary interest in the impact of
such an attack.
INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS AND SAFECOM
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Ridge has laid out the department's goals, and he
stated that one of his highest priorities was interoperable
communication and equipment. And he set a deadline of December
2004, for implementing a short-term solution, that will allow
first responders to communicate with each other during a
disaster. Dr. McQueary, your directorate is in charge of
coordinating and promoting interoperable communications for
public safety.
The President's budget proposes to eliminate funding in the
Justice Department for interoperability grants. When my staff
asked the Justice Department why the funds were dropped from
the budget, my staff was told that interoperability is a
Homeland Security responsibility. Yet the President's budget
sets aside no funds for this purpose in the Department of
Homeland Security budget. So I ask, can you explain the short-
term solution and why no funds are requested to address this
problem?
Dr. McQueary. We actually do have funds requested to
support the SAFECOM program, which is the program for which the
Science and Technology Directorate has direct responsibility.
Senator Byrd. How much is the request?
Dr. McQueary. I believe, sir, $20--if I am not mistaken,
its $22 million. I'll check behind me, and make sure I give you
the correct number. But I believe it's $22 million for that
effort.
And what we expect to come out of that effort, as Secretary
Ridge had indicated, is a set of standards that State and
local, can use to acquire equipment, and to provided
interoperability on what we're referring to as the penultimate
solution, because what we will be providing is not the ultimate
solution in interoperability. I will try to be precise in what
I mean by that.
There are technical capabilities today that exist in some
companies. For example, if you think of a point electronic box,
a box that can receive signals from many different types of
radios, and that box can in effect convert signals from one
radio into a protocol or a format that would be needed by
another radio it is trying to talk to in order to permit those
two to be able to have a communication. And, similarly, you can
create conference calls, if that were the objective. Obviously,
there are limits to the number of possibilities of different
kinds that can be implemented.
The ultimate solution, I believe, will be to move into
software defined radios, and a considerable amount of research
work has gone on in that area. That would be a system in which
new radios, as they are purchased, would permit people to
communicate with one another based upon the radio itself being
able to recognize the different types of communication
protocols and accomplish that.
Senator Byrd. The SAFECOM money is not money for State and
local governments.
Dr. McQueary. That's----
Senator Byrd. SAFECOM is for standards setting. To actually
fix the problem, State and local governments need money to buy
the interoperability equipment.
Dr. McQueary. Excuse me.
Senator Byrd. Yes.
Dr. McQueary. I did not mean to imply that the $22 million
that we have in our budget is to be used to purchase equipment.
It is indeed the necessary effort to establish the standards.
Of course, the State and locals will have access to grant money
that will be provided by the Office of Domestic Preparedness.
And what we will do, and have already done in some cases, is
provide guiding standards by which we would expect them to
purchase new equipment in the expenditure of that money. We see
that as the vehicle to permit State and locals to be able to
transition into having more interoperable capability.
Senator Byrd. The President is proposing a cut of over $700
million of first responder programs in the Department, and a
cut of $1.5 billion for first responders government wide.
The interoperability problem is yet another reason why we
should not be cutting funding to first responders. How does the
Department justify cutting first responder grants when the
short term solution that the Secretary announced will cost
several million dollars to implement?
Dr. McQueary. If you're proposing that to me, sir, I was
not a participant in that, and therefore, I am not in any
position to answer the question, but I am sure that my people
will be pleased to provide an answer to the question that you
proposed.
[The information follows:]
Justification for Cutting First Responder Grants
The President's fiscal year 2005 request includes more than $3.5
billion to support ODP programs and activities. This represents a $3.3
million increase over the Fiscal year 2004 request. The fiscal year
2005 request includes funds to continue the Homeland Security Grant
Program which includes the State Homeland Security Program at $1.4
billion; the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program at $500
million; and the Citizen Corps Program at $50 million. Funds are also
provided for the continuation of the Urban Areas Security Initiative at
$1.4 billion; the Fire Act Program at $500 million; the Emergency
Management Performance Grants at $170 million; as well as for ODP's
training, exercise, and technical assistance efforts.
The continuation of these efforts, and the $3.3 million increase in
ODP's overall request, coupled with the President's request for a 10
percent increase in funding for DHS as a whole, provides ODP, and the
entire Department, with the resources we require to help secure the
Nation from acts of terrorism. The Administration and Department remain
committed to providing our Nation's emergency prevention and response
community the resources they need to continue to secure our Nation from
future acts of terrorism.
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS
Senator Byrd. Your budget request includes a $38.8 million
reduction for Homeland Security University and Fellowship
Programs. In fiscal year 2004, this subcommittee provided $69
million for this program, $60 million more than the President
requested. The subcommittee expects the academic community to
play a major role in identifying and solving problems facing
the homeland.
The White House has criticized Congress for earmarking
funds for Science and Technology, and so this subcommittee
decided not to earmark funds last year. Instead of reinforcing
this decision, the President is proposing to cut university
research by over 50 percent. Could you tell the subcommittee
what the rationale may be for such a drastic cut to this
program in fiscal year 2005?
Dr. McQueary. This is an area in which I can assure you we
had considerable internal debate and discussion. I would have
to hasten to say, sir, that at some point we all work for
someone and it was time for me to salute and say, yes, sir, I
will try to do as much as we possibly can with the proposed
amount of budget, and that is what we will do.
Senator Byrd. Your budget justification notes that three
Homeland Centers of Excellence will be selected by the end of
fiscal year 2004. How does this funding reduction affect your
ability to select other university centers of excellence.
Dr. McQueary. First, the $30 million that's proposed is
ample funding to support three University Centers of
Excellence. We have, of course, selected one. And we plan to
select two more this fiscal year. In fact, the necessary
activity is well underway in order to accomplish that.
We fund the University Centers about $5 million each, minus
a little bit of overhead associated with managing that process.
The balance of $15 million is completely adequate to support
not only the hundred fellows and scholars that we have already
approved. But also to add another hundred to that.
In summary, $30 million supports three Centers, as well as
200 scholars and Fellows.
Senator Byrd. So you're saying, are you, that there will be
two additional centers selected at the President's funding
level?
Dr. McQueary. I am sorry, sir.
Senator Byrd. Are you saying that there will be two
additional centers selected at the President's funding level?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir, there will be two additional,
bringing us to a total of three. One is in animal diseases. The
other is in post-harvest food safety.
CHEMICAL DETECTORS
Senator Byrd. In your written statement you list as an
accomplishment of your directorate that you worked with the
D.C. Metro System to deploy chemical detectors in the D.C.
subway system. This is an excellent system to give Metro the
capacity to immediately determine that the subway has been
exposed to a chemical agent, so it knows how to effectively
respond to the attack.
I understand that this system is now in operation and you
view it as an accomplishment. After the attacks of 9/11, the
Senate approved $15 million for this pilot project. This
funding was included at Congress's initiative, it was not
requested by the President. In fact, the White House
specifically objected to this funding, describing it as
excessive.
Is there any funding in the President's request to either
complete the D.C. chemical detector system, or to take
advantage of the lessons learned from this pilot program to
deploy the chemical detectors in other large subway systems
around the country?
Dr. McQueary. Well, at this time we have proven the concept
of operation for that system, and it is something we are
extremely proud to have been a part of, I can assure you. So, I
compliment the Congress on appropriating the funding necessary
to get it launched.
We do have the measurement system, both chemical
measurement as well as video capability, tied into a central
control station in downtown D.C., as you probably know, I am
sure you know. We view it as a responsibility of Washington,
D.C. to carry the program forward, for example, if there is a
need or desire to expand to more stations within the
Washington, D.C. area.
MANPADS SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE COUNTER MEASURES
Senator Byrd. Your budget includes $61 million to determine
whether a viable technology exists to address the threat
shoulder-fired missiles pose to commercial aircraft. This
funding request followed $60 million approved by Congress in
fiscal year 2004. The details of this threat are well
documented. The Congressional Research Service estimates there
are as many as 700,000 of these missiles globally. Some of
which are on the black market, selling as low as $5,000 apiece.
CRS also estimates that there have been 29 instances in
which civilian planes have been hit by shoulder-fired missiles,
none of which occurred in the United States.
However, in May 2002, the FBI warned law enforcement
agencies to be alert to the potential use of surface-to-air
missiles against U.S. aircraft. If such a missile was fired at
a commercial aircraft here in the United States, it would wreak
havoc on our economy.
How soon do you believe that we can begin to outfit
commercial aircraft with a system to counter surface-to-air
missiles?
Dr. McQueary. I believe that we expect by the end of
calendar year 2005 the Administration and the Congress will be
in a position to have scientific information from which to make
a decision as to whether we should outfit planes, commercial
aircraft, in this country.
Science and Technology, as an organization, will not be
recommending one way or the other. Rather, that is a decision
for the Administration and the Congress to make, we believe.
Senator Byrd. How realistic is it to convert to existing
technology on military aircraft to our commercial fleet?
Dr. McQueary. We believe that it is in the category of,
what I would call, an engineering problem, rather than needing
a scientific breakthrough in order to do this. There are really
two or three issues that drive the commercial airline fleet. Of
course, one is that certifications necessary to get approval to
put anything on an aircraft is perhaps more stringent for
commercial aircraft.
Also anything we do to an aircraft that would add air drag
will increase fuel costs, and so there are multiple issues to
be dealt with as one decides which technology would be
appropriate. Regarding the technologies themselves, we do
believe that it is eminently feasible to put them on commercial
aircraft. And, we have three contractors that are in the early
stages of studies that will lead to a down selection of one or
two contractors to go into the development of such a system.
The other important factor is that reliability must be such
that we can afford to have them on the planes. The military can
actually carry its support system with it wherever the planes
fly. But, if you consider all of the airports into which our
planes go, just in this country alone, the idea of trying to
have a support system at each one would be extremely expensive.
So the reliability of the systems need to be greater than
what we are seeing with the military versions right now.
Senator Byrd. Do I have time for one more?
Senator Cochran. Senator Stevens has come in and we want to
include him.
Senator Byrd. I shall desist.
Senator Cochran. Senator Stevens.
TSA DETECTION SYSTEMS
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
I was enjoying the Senator's questions, as a matter of
fact. I, gentlemen, have spent quite a bit of time with the
aviation community trying to figure out where we're going in
terms of some of the homeland security activities. And, I am
impressed with comments that I have received from many of them
that our systems are designed to deal with metal and not with
substances. How would you answer that?
Dr. McQueary. Our systems are designed to deal with----
Senator Stevens. Metals rather than substances.
Dr. McQueary. Metals rather than . . .? I'm afraid I don't
understand the question, sir.
Senator Stevens. Well, we're looking for guns, we're
looking for knives, we're not looking for chemicals, we're not
looking for biological weapons. We're zeroing in on what was
used in 9/11 and not what the terrorists might be using in the
future. Is that correct?
Dr. McQueary. Now, I understand the question. Within the
Science and Technology Directorate we do have some research
work that we're funding this year to be able to make detections
of explosive devices at range, if you will. This is in the very
early stages, and I would not for a moment try to tell you that
I think that we have a solution to that problem.
The Israelis have, of course, worked on this in great
detail. We have had many interactions with them. It's a hard
problem, but it is an area which we think is important towards
being able to do the things necessary to make the airports,
airlines and travel safer. It is a very important area.
Senator Stevens. Well, over the past recess, I went through
major airports, and I asked to be shown the TSA systems. And, I
must say they are very impressive systems, but all of them are
designed for what I said, to locate knives, to locate metals
that might be in the baggage. Are we looking towards trying to
ascertain the presence of chemical substances, bacterial
substances, and explosive substances?
Dr. McQueary. I will tell you, the area where I do not
believe we have a satisfactory answer to in the bacterial area.
It's very complex, very difficult, to deal with what a person
can do to bring something in a handkerchief into the country.
It would be very, very difficult to detect a bacterial
substance, unless one were to get into some sort of invasive
type of measurement system. So far, we have not chosen to get
into that level. We as a country, have not chosen to go that
far.
In chemicals, there are many different types of detectors
that can indeed detect chemical components that would make up
explosive systems or any kind of liquids that you might have.
But you have to be able to get a sufficient signal, if you
will, a sufficient amount of the chemical being put forth into
the air so that it could be detected, unless we go to some kind
of invasive system. And right now, our focus is on what we
might be able to pick up from the air, if you will, the general
air surrounding a passenger in that area.
Senator Stevens. Well, Doctor what about the President's--
--
Dr. McQueary. We are not ready to--I'm sorry.
Senator Stevens. I beg your pardon.
Dr. McQueary. Please continue.
Senator Stevens. What about the presence of detonators?
We're watching daily in Iraq bombs go off by someone dialing a
cell phone.
Dr. McQueary. Right.
Senator Stevens. And alerting, you know, energizing a
detonator. Are we trying to discover the presence of detonators
in baggage?
Dr. McQueary. I can't answer the question. I don't know off
hand--I simply don't know. I should know the answer, but on
that particular question, I don't know. I will be happy to look
into it and find out exactly what we are doing for you.
[The information follows:]
Discovering Presence of Detonators in Baggage
Reliable detection of detonators in baggage is important to the
security of the transportation infrastructure. The responsibility for
this security measure currently remains with the Transportation
Security Administration. Additional information can be provided in a
classified briefing.
Senator Stevens. Alright.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONSOLIDATION
Let me shift to the Coast Guard, if I may. Are any one of
you involved in the changes that are taking place in research
and development funding. That's in the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Dr. McQueary. That's right.
Senator Stevens. That's yours, is it Doctor?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. When we approved the transfer of the Coast
Guard to the new Homeland Security Department, it was my
understanding, and I think that it was in the basic law and in
the report, that the department was to be left as a complete
unit. I am informed now that the budget proposes to transfer
the research and development funding in units of the Coast
Guard to your directorate. Is that right?
Dr. McQueary. That is correct. But, I need to be precise on
what we mean by transfer. That unit will never lose its close
ties with its parent organization. We will assume research and
development oversight for it.
As you are probably aware, the Congress actually cut the
research and development budget for the Coast Guard laboratory
last year. So they entered this year with no money other than
support for the people that are in that laboratory. They have
had no research and development program in this fiscal year. We
do have money in our Science and Technology budget for fiscal
year 2005 to support the Coast Guard, not only the people at
the laboratory, but also a modest research and development
program.
SHIFT OF $13.5 MILLION FROM THE COAST GUARD TO THE SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
Senator Stevens. My information was that the budget
proposes to shift $13.5 million from the Coast Guard to your
directorate. Is that wrong?
Dr. McQueary. No, that's not incorrect. The $13.5 million
is basically the operational costs for the labs that are in
Connecticut. And we're putting in another $5 million for
research and development work.
Senator Stevens. Are you taking over direction of it, and
taking it from the Coast Guard?
Dr. McQueary. That's harsher language than I would choose
to use.
Senator Stevens. The language. The legislation is very
harsh. I drew it.
Dr. McQueary. Okay. We have responsibility, we had
responsibility in the Science and Technology Directorate to
advise and direct the Coast Guard on what scientific work they
needed. However, I would say directly, that in order to
accomplish the determination of what we must do, we have Coast
Guard people on our staff, we have a Coast Guard Captain who is
in residence with my Science and Technology group. His job is
to make sure that we're representing the needs of the Coast
Guard in the scientific work that we undertake. And that's the
same thing we do for each and every one of the operational
units within the Department of Homeland Security.
We're not an independent island on research and
development. We're a service organization intended to provide
the very best science and technology to these operational units
which stand at the ready each and everyday to do the job the
Department of Homeland Security has to do.
Senator Stevens. Well, it's a technicality I imagine, but
when Congress declares war, the Coast Guard becomes a part of
the Department of Defense.
Dr. McQueary. Right.
Senator Stevens. You're familiar with that?
Dr. McQueary. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. The legislation we passed to authorize the
transfer of the Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland
Security was done in a fashion so that, if that transfer to the
Department of Defense was triggered, it would be a whole unit.
It appears to me that slowly but surely you're taking away
from the Coast Guard the things that make it a whole unit,
namely research and development.
Dr. McQueary. I spent my entire career in research and
development, and my experience tells me that small pockets of
research and development can never be as effective as being a
part of a larger research and development organization. We
believe that by transferring the Coast Guard's research and
development into the Science and Technology Directorate, and
giving them more day-to-day interaction with the scientific
work that is going on, that we will actually end up doing a
better job, not only for the department, but also for the Coast
Guard itself.
Senator Stevens. Are you prepared to do that for the
Department of Defense when it becomes a part of the Department
of Defense?
Dr. McQueary. I----
Senator Stevens. I don't think you get my point. You have
no authority to do that.
Dr. McQueary. We have----
Senator Stevens. I would urge you to check with your legal
department and determine what authority you have to transfer
anything from the Department of Defense, from the Coast Guard,
without our approval.
Dr. McQueary. Well, I am sure that if we don't have the
authority to do it, we do not propose to do it without your
approval, if that's the case.
Senator Stevens. Sometimes people are ignorant of the law.
Dr. McQueary. Well, that could very well be the case here,
too.
Senator Stevens. Well, I don't think.
Dr. McQueary. But I can assure you that there is no
intention----
Senator Stevens. I don't mean to be abrupt with you Doctor,
but I do believe that it is essential that if and when the
Coast Guard becomes a part of the Department of Defense, it be
a total unit.
Dr. McQueary. Yes.
Senator Stevens. An integral, operational unit that is just
transferred and not leaving portions of it somewhere else. That
was the debate that we had, and I hope that we will pursue that
and you will take a look at it for us.
Now, let me ask you----
Dr. McQueary. I will do that.
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS/ENERGY SECURITY
Senator Stevens. One other thing if I may. Well two really.
I see that you have got these Homeland Security Centers of
Excellence, and I congratulate you. The Senator from West
Virginia was talking about one in terms of the Center for
Excellence with regard to food programs. And one, I understand,
will be combating animal related agro-terrorism, and the other
focuses on post-harvest food security.
What about energy production and energy security. Are you
focusing on that?
Dr. McQueary. For the areas of energy production and energy
security is a combination of General Libutti and myself, as
well as the Department of Energy. I believe one of the Homeland
Security Presidential Directives clearly spells out that the
Department of Energy has responsibility for energy. So the work
that we do would be to work with General Libutti from an
infrastructure protection standpoint. And, perhaps I would let
him comment rather than be presumptive about saying what he
would be doing.
Senator Stevens. General, are you pursuing that?
General Libutti. Sir, the effort that we make in the main,
in terms of our mission profile, is the risk assessment
vulnerability piece of any part, large or small, of the
national infrastructure. So in terms of chemical site security
surveys, we are working with our friends at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, working with other members in the inter-
agency, and our job remains principally to advise relative to
the threat.
We recommend preventive actions in concert with the rest of
the community, that ought to be taken immediately or that have
a long-term proposition relative to protecting America. So,
we're about the threat, vulnerability and risk assessment piece
of all of these programs. And we share that information with my
friend, Dr. McQueary, and other members of Health and Human
Services, Center of Disease Control, the Department of
Agriculture, or the Department of Energy.
So we're a player at the table. I might add, and this is
not a marketing piece, but we are the newest members of the
National Intelligence community, and we are full players. We
have connected very well with all the major elements within the
Federal Government, as well as State and local communities that
deal with information sharing, analysis, and simply stated the
threat.
I tell you that just for a sense of what our directorate is
all about and how we interact with other members of the
intelligence community, including TTIC, CIA, and the FBI, who
principally has responsibility on the law enforcement side.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
I will be delighted to try and understand what you just
said. For instance, in terms of our oil pipeline, do you review
that pipeline for threat?
General Libutti. We do when we gleam specific intelligence
from looking at all of the sources, which indicates that it is
a target set. We absolutely look at it in the broader
infrastructure requirements that bring us to a situation which
causes us to look at it with other members of that community.
Senator Stevens. And do you----
General Libutti. And we do that across all of the
infrastructure.
Senator Stevens. Do you review the ports through which we
import 57 percent of our oil?
General Libutti. Again, we work in concert with our friends
in the Coast Guard and in the industry, the container shipping
folks, to look very hard at the threat and the risk associated
with that threat, in a specific port, city, or State.
So the answer is, yes, sir, we do.
Senator Stevens. Okay.
ENERGY SECURITY
Well, let me give you one that I think you ought to take a
look at then. And the Department of Commerce can verify this.
By 2015, we will be importing 40 percent of our natural gas
in the form of LNG. We do not have a LNG port in the United
States. We have authorization. Years ago we passed legislation
to have off-shore ports, but none were ever built. I think that
in your department you ought to be looking at the planning for
the future, how are we going to ensure the security of that,
and how will it be relevant to the importation of oil and other
substances.
Should we separate those ports from existing ports by
having them all come into one port? Obviously, that would
increase the possibility of the threat.
But, I haven't heard anyone talk about planning for the
national security, or homeland security on the access of
natural gas in liquefied form.
General Libutti. Sir, you're absolutely right. When that is
tee-ed up as a critical issue, and I think from your
perspective we ought to be teeing it up right now, we would be
very much involved in looking at that. Not from an engineering
standpoint, or the physical lay-down standpoint, but from the
threat perspective.
And you're absolutely right, we should be involved in that,
and I will take your note back and we will take a look at it to
see what we need to do right now.
Senator Stevens. Don't put me down as an advocate, I would
just assume bringing Alaska's gas down. But it seems that other
gas is going to get here first, sir.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS
Let me follow up with a comment about a question Senator
Byrd asked on the Centers of Excellence, the university
programs that we were talking about with Dr. McQueary.
Last year, we appropriated about $69 million and it was
intended to support these programs. Just because the
Administration is requesting only half of that, $39, $30
million, doesn't mean that you shouldn't spend the $69 already
appropriated. There are provisions for deferring expenditures
or rescinding expenditures, but there is no provision for not
spending it.
So, what I am suggesting is that money is in the pipeline
and it may very well support more than three university
centers.
Dr. McQueary. If I may, it will support more than three
universities. And in fact, what we have determined already,
sir, is that we can create five universities when we reach the
limit of the money that you have authorized us in fiscal year
2004. But, when that is gone, we would be faced with having to
cut back to the three.
I have asked for a plan already as to how we would
implement a total of five, recognizing that we could be faced
with having to eliminate two of those at the end of their 3-
year period, which is what we're looking at right now.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
NOAA WARNING ADVISORY SYSTEM
I am going to yield, again, for questions from Senator
Stevens. And then we will go back to you, sir.
Senator Stevens. If I may just ask one.
I forgot to ask a question about the NOAA Weather Radio. We
asked that the Department prepare a report by December 15, of
last year, on the use of NOAA Weather Radio as a component of a
national warning system measure to expand consumer access to
the warning systems in efforts to inform and educate the public
about national security.
Currently we rely upon the radio for the old national
warning system. We have tried to expand so that all forms of
communication would receive the warning, particularly of a
terrorist event. And all portions of the country could be
alerted to that immediately. As I said, currently, that would
only go out by radio, but it does not use NOAA Radio. NOAA
Radio hooks into almost every radio station, television, and
weather program that there is in the country. I particularly
would favor some national legislation to mandate carrying such
messages, or to include putting them into the internet
directly. But, that hasn't been done yet.
However, we did ask for the NOAA Weather Radio to be used
as a component of the warning system. Who is working on that in
your Department?
Dr. McQueary. Sir, I don't know.
General Libutti. Sir, we have the lead to look at that in
terms of how it fits into our broad responsibilities, as I
outlined in my presentation of information sharing and alert
advisory systems. So we are indeed looking at that, and that is
still a work in progress.
Senator Stevens. Well respectfully, General, we asked in
2002 for a report by December 15, 2003. When will we see your
report?
General Libutti. Sir, I will take that on board as an
action and get back to you and your staff.
[The information follows:]
NOAA Alert System Report
The congressional report has been cleared by OMB and the
Department. The report was approved for transmission to the Hill on May
28, 2004, and delivered on June 1, 2004.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd.
General Libutti. If I may, sir, as a continuation, I will
get back to you as soon as I can within the next couple of
days. But a staff note to me reminds me that we were going to
come to grips with your question very, very soon. And I will
define what soon means when I respond to you.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
General Libutti. Yes, sir.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last year, General Libutti, I asked Secretary Ridge about
the role of the Federal Government in protecting chemical
facilities from terrorist attack. He said that he believes
chemical companies should be conducting their own assessments
and paying for security improvements.
At the Secretary's budget hearing last month, Senator
Murray asked Secretary Ridge about port security funding. And
the Secretary again held the view that port owners should be
responsible for security investments.
Now General Libutti, if you were the CEO of a chemical
company, your highest priority would, probably be creating a
quality product at a price that would create profits. If you
were the director of a private port, your first priority would,
in all likelihood, be that of maximizing the number of
containers or passengers that would use the port.
And so with all due respect, I have very little confidence
that chemical company CEOs or port directors would have
defending against a terrorist attack at the top of their list
of things to spend money on. Yet, the Department clearly
believes that, when it comes to protecting our critical
infrastructure the private sector should bear the financial
burden.
Can you provide the subcommittee, today, with any
benchmarks that you have established to show the private sector
is making the necessary investments to secure our critical
infrastructure and key assets?
General Libutti. Sir, I appreciate the question because,
like you, chemical site security for the Nation is a priority
for IAIP and the Department. I would tell that I believe the
right answer to how we move forward with our chemical site
partners in the private sector, the Federal Government, and my
Directorate is the key word partnership.
I think the industry overall needs to belly-up to deal with
improved security across their industry, especially in
particularly high-threat areas. As a subset of that, I would
emphasize the high-threat areas near large populated areas
across the country.
Over the last several months we have conducted site surveys
where folks from my office have visited top priority target
sets involving the chemical site areas. We have worked with
them, and we have seen them demonstrate a great spirit of
cooperation in dealing with assessing the risks of their
facilities, and taking actions to improve the readiness of
those facilities, in terms of both preventative and recovery
activities.
I cannot, sir, tell you the kind of money that they have,
as an industry, put toward this effort. I will look into that
and provide you our best estimate and judgments. But I cannot
answer that question right now.
I think what is important, I might add to share with you
sir, is that during the visits we worked to improve readiness,
we highlighted protective measures, standoff distances, buffer
zones, cameras, and command and control systems, all which they
took on in a very positive way.
We have also sent out to all sites, not just the sites that
we have visited, several different documents or what I would
call aids in improving their readiness. We have sent out the
following: characteristics and common vulnerabilities of
chemical sites/facilities; potential indicators of terrorists
attack activities for chemical facilities; and buffer zone
protection planning templates for chemical facilities.
We have really looked at this in the same way that you
have. This is a critical priority because it is a critical
target site for potential terrorist attacks.
We have looked at the highest areas of concern because of
the relative impact on the community, if indeed an event
occurred. And we have a plan over the next year to look at an
additional 360 sites or facilities across the country. I might
also add that the focus is to look at this in a realistic way
not in terms of eliminating all threats, but dealing with this
based on what I call risk management across our country. That
is to say that we have to establish priorities, and indeed, the
Federal Government in concert with our friends in the community
have to attack this thing on a single front.
I didn't mean to be so long winded, but that captures my
concerns and the actions we're taking.
Senator Byrd. Well General, could you provide the
subcommittee with any benchmarks that you have established to
show that the private sector is indeed making the necessary
investments to secure our critical infrastructure and key
assets?
In other words, Secretary Ridge says, it's up to the
private sector. So have you established any benchmarks that
show that the private sector is indeed making the necessary
investments to secure this critical infrastructure and key
asset?
General Libutti. Sir, as I indicated earlier in my first
statement of my presentation here, I don't have specifics
relative to the financial investments. If my staff has those,
I'll provide them as quickly as possible. If not, we will do
the research to get that to you.
I would say, just spinning off the Secretary's comment, and
based on my experience, since I have been on board from late
June or early July, I have seen not only a willingness and
spirit of cooperation, but an understanding on the part of the
chemical site industry and other industries, which we call key
critical industries, a willingness to move out smartly, to do
what needs to be done to protect their equities, to improve the
security to their physical sites, etcetera, etcetera.
So the attitude is there. We will continue to capitalize on
that, and I will get you the information you have asked for,
sir.
[The information follows:]
Securing Our Critical Infrastrucure and Key Assets
As part of a wide effort to facilitate rather than mandate, DHS
continues its effort to develop ``best practices'' for industry by
working with the private sector and professional associations. DHS
believes that the private sector, which controls over 85 percent of the
nation's critical infrastructure and key assets (CI/KA), must be
involved in setting national protection standards. By partnering with
associations and groups, DHS plans to create realistic, proactive
protection practices to bolster the physical hardening of the nation's
CI/KA.
One example of DHS working closely with industry is the ASME
Guidance on Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection.
This important effort is intended to demonstrate that industry can not
only provide DHS leadership with information, but can also help create
industry-based guidance for risk analysis and risk management. This
document will establish common terminology and a common basis for
reporting the results of risk studies, helping the protection community
and the private sector streamline and standardize risk analysis
reporting. Such standardization provides government agencies and
private industry a framework from which to collect, report, and respond
to potential terrorist threats.
The ASME effort highlights how DHS is working closely with the
private sector to develop baseline best practices and protective
measures. Our plan is for these guidelines to mature into sector-wide
protection standards that will be adopted industry-wide. The initial
phase of the ASME effort is to focus on Nuclear Power Plants, Spent
Nuclear Facilities, Chemical Plants, Petroleum Refineries; LNG Storage
Facilities, Subway Systems (including bridges and tunnels), Railroad
Systems (including bridges and tunnels) and Highway Systems (including
bridges and tunnels). Depending on the success of the initial effort,
it may be expanded to encompass other infrastructure categories.
Another important DHS initiative to assist private industry in the
protection of their facilities is the preparation and distribution of
analytic products such as Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities
and Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activities reports. These
products identify those vulnerabilities and threat indicators that are
sector-specific. Such information, when used by industry, allows
intelligent investments to be made to eliminate or mitigate specific
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, DHS is in the process of fielding a
network of Protective Security Advisors and establishing regional
offices that will assist State and local governments, as well as the
private sector, in their protective planning efforts.
Senator Byrd. Alright.
As I said in my opening statement I will be asking the
General Accounting Office to conduct an independent review of
the private sector's role in securing our critical
infrastructure.
It will be essential in assessing the need for investments,
for Federal investments, to secure our critical infrastructure.
So, it will be essential for Congress to have measurable
benchmarks of private sector investments in such
infrastructure, such as investments in chemical facilities,
port security, and cyber security.
Do you agree that having this information would be useful
to determine if the private sector is meeting its obligation to
protect our critical infrastructure?
General Libutti. I can't see how it wouldn't be supportive
and an indicator of their commitment. But as I said earlier,
this is a partnership in my opinion, sir. So the Federal
Government needs to provide advice, and education, in concert
with Dr. McQueary and his folks and other members of the inter-
agency, and share with them best practices, and cutting-edge
technology. That's all part of this movement forward. So I
don't see how that could hurt.
I would be concerned if it became a weapon to be held up
against them. Again, I think as we move forward we need to
determine the right balance. But, I hear you loud and clear,
and we will do our homework and get back to you, sir.
TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER (TTIC)
Senator Byrd. Alright, General.
One of the most important issues affecting the public's
assessment of the Department of Homeland Security performance
involves its record of sharing Homeland Security threat
information with other Federal agencies, as well as with State
and local governments, the private sector and the public.
The Gilmore Commission, in its December 15 report, noted
that the Department of Homeland Security had ``little power and
capability to do this.'' In fact, the Commission concluded that
the Department of Homeland Security faces significant
competition from other agencies in disseminating information to
State and local authorities, the private sector and other
areas.
Part of the problem, the panel said, is that the CIA was
granted control over the Terrorist Threat Information Center,
or better known as TTIC, which opened in May as a central
repository for information from the CIA, the Department of
Defense, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, and
other intelligence agencies.
But Congress, in writing the Homeland Security Act,
envisioned giving the Department of Homeland Security the role
of collecting, analyzing and sharing intelligence information.
Putting TTIC at the CIA, the Gilmore Commission said, has
largely sidelined the Department of Homeland Security and left
it with a paucity--that's a good word--and left it with a
paucity of competent intelligence analysts.
While intelligence professionals have been much more
willing to go to the CIA, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Defense, or the State Department, this seems to
have caused confusion at all levels of government regarding the
respective roles of the TTIC and the Department of Homeland
Security.
CONCERN REGARDING TTIC BEING UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CIA
Could you explain please, how it came about that the CIA
was given the leadership of this intelligence function. And
second, how it is that our homeland is made more secure by
having such a confusing hierarchy of intelligence sharing
agencies?
General Libutti. Sir, as always, you ask the toughest
questions and the ones that strike at the heart of what we're
all about. And what we're all about, as I said earlier, is
information sharing and infrastructure protection.
The instrumental organization within IAIP that is charged
with the backbone, the nerve center, the communications channel
for sharing information, is the Operations Center. And then in
support of that separate calls, conferences, and meetings
attended by General Hughes who runs the IA side, and Bob
Liscouski who runs the IP side.
So, let me first say to you, we are very clear on what our
mission is. I am very clear what my customer base is, it's the
private sector, it's State and local authorities, extending
beyond that, but not involved in, the police work. That's the
FBI, and the people at the Department of Justice.
But having said that, let me now turn to TTIC, IAIP and
what you elude to as being a challenging approach towards
dealing with intelligence.
TTIC was established by the Administration and indeed by
the President. It was done to integrate intelligence from
overseas and foreign sources. It was done to incorporate
intelligence and information that is provided by those who
focus on intelligence/law enforcement within the domestic
scene.
Now, what I am saying to you, or mentioning to you,
involves the CIA, the FBI, and by extension the local police
forces across the country that have tens of thousands of great
cops, who do great things for their community and country
everyday.
Now, I am going to try to draw a wiring diagram here, and
if I miss the mark, I know that you won't hesitate to pull me
back and let me talk in straight and plain English.
You have TTIC here, which is not controlled by CIA, but by
the DCI. Now we don't need to, if I may sir, get into an
argument about the differences between George Tenet's two hats,
but he does indeed wear two hats. And the responsibility that
the DCI has is to provide supervisory overview responsibility
for TTIC. And indeed, the director at TTIC is a gentleman, who
was, or is, in the CIA.
But TTIC is an organization to integrate, fuse, analyze and
share domestic and overseas or foreign intelligence. IAIP is
both a customer and contributor at TTIC. So is the FBI. So if
you say to me, what about this TTIC group, I would say I am
part of TTIC and it is sort of like in a religious setting when
you talk about the body of Christ and the Catholic Church, that
means every Catholic across the face of the globe. We are part
of TTIC.
And indeed, on occasion, we challenge and task TTIC who
then goes out to its customer base to look at requirements and
collection efforts. I'll take a breath and try to move forward,
and try to be as organized in my expression as possible.
So TTIC is here. Members of the Department of Homeland
Security are part of TTIC. And by extension, that information
in a very simplistic diagram, is passed to IAIP. It goes to
General Pat Hughes, in the main, and to other members that are
part of TTIC. For example, in Customs and Border Patrol, or
whatever, it is shared with their parent unit as well. And that
is all part of what we're trying to do. There should be an
effort to take walls down and not put walls up.
Information comes from TTIC to IA, and IA shares it with
IP, because IP can't do the threat assessment risk analysis
piece looking at critical infrastructure unless they know what
that intelligence picture indicates. IA in the Department of
Homeland Security, my operational directorate, looks at sharing
information with other members of the customer base; private
sector leadership, and State and local authorities.
ORGANIZATION AND STANDUP OF THE TTIC AND ITS FUNCTION
I'm talking there about advisors to the Governors, the
homeland security advisors to the Governors. They get that
information as well as local authorities. What that means is
mayors and their leadership in the intelligence/counter
terrorist operations. In most cities across the country, those
are the senior police chiefs.
I don't see, Senator Byrd, a conflict in the organization
and standup of TTIC and its function. It's function is to
integrate. My function and focus is on passing information to
my customer base.
I support the FBI who is a partner in this national effort.
And they're in the law enforcement business. Fueled by and
supported by the same intelligence that's coming out of TTIC. I
don't see a conflict. We're improving the way we communicate
everyday, we're sharing databases everyday, at a very highly
classified level. And we're working more in concert with one
another than we ever have.
Leadership in the FBI, the CIA, and the leadership of my
organization get it. They understand there needs to be a
cultural metamorphosis in terms of information sharing. And
we're going to keep working on that so young people in these
organizations understand it is one team, one fight, as the Army
says. And we need to understand that in terms of information
sharing.
I don't see a problem with the current intelligence
organization. As always, I work everyday to improve it.
Senator Byrd. Well, General, I understand plain English.
But I am not sure that I understand everything that you have
said here today. And I am not embarrassed to confess it.
Let me ask a simple question.
General Libutti. Sir.
SECURITY OF THE HOMELAND
Senator Byrd. How is it that our homeland is made more
secure by having such a confusing hierarchy of intelligence
sharing agencies?
General Libutti. I think that the homeland is much more
secure. And I will talk only from my perspective in IAIP,
Senator.
We have shared over 70 advisories and alert bulletins in
concert with other members of the Homeland Security team. We
get threat information from the agency, our friends in the FBI,
and, out of TTIC. Then, we look at that, conduct competitive
and comparative analysis.
Again, our focus is on our customer base, which includes
other members of the Federal Government. So, we take that
information, and we pass it on a secure backbone to customers
that have clearances. For those who don't have clearances, we
take the information that's classified, clean it up, and create
what is called the tear line. Then, we coordinate the bulletin
or advisory with our friends in the other intelligence
agencies, and we send it out through our Homeland Security
Operations Center.
We have sent out many of those advisories. We normally
follow up with phone calls to appropriate customers. We call
industry leadership to amplify an important point. We send
executive teams to places like New York, LA, and Las Vegas, as
we did during the holiday period, to share with leadership what
we know, and make recommendations on corrective action.
I think, again, as you know, sir, I am sure your staff has
briefed you, after 30 years in the Marine Corps and a couple of
months at the Department of Defense, I spent a year and a half,
as the Commissioner for counter-terrorism in the NYPD. When I
finished that job, I came down and was proud to take this job.
If it doesn't work on the streets of our great cities and
small towns, it doesn't work for America. And I'm telling you
now, sir, we have made a difference.
Senator Byrd. Alright, let us suspend while the reporter
changes his tape.
May I ask him another question, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir.
VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY: CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
Senator Byrd. The Department of Homeland Security continues
to take a hands-off approach with regard to chemical security
by relying on the chemical plant industries. So here we go
again, to assess vulnerabilities and take protective actions.
We know that the EPA has estimated that if attacked, over 100
plants located all over the country could affect over one
million people each.
We know that the Department of Justice released a study in
April of 2000, concluding that the risk of terrorists
attempting in the foreseeable future to cause an industrial
chemical release is both real and credible.
We know that in February 2003, the National Infrastructure
Protection Center, which is now a part of the Department of
Homeland Security, issued a threat warning that Al-Qaeda
operatives also may attempt to launch conventional attacks
against the U.S. nuclear, chemical, and industrial
infrastructure to cause contamination, disruption, and terror.
When Secretary Ridge testified last year he said that the
chemical industry was better suited to assess vulnerabilities
and take appropriate security measures than the Federal
Government.
Just last week, the General Accounting Office sounded
another siren in testimony saying that, in spite of the
industry's efforts, the extent of security preparedness at U.S.
chemical facilities is unknown.
Do you maintain the position that the chemical industry is
better suited than the Federal Government to assess
vulnerabilities and take protective actions to secure chemical
plants?
General Libutti. It can't be done alone or independently,
sir. It is back to the point that I made earlier, it has to be
done in partnership. And I think the Federal Government, being
gentlemanly in their approach, from time to time, needs to be
also muscular. We need to demand standards and guidelines to be
adhered to. We need to be there, prepared to support them in
developing their security programs that reinforce their safety
programs.
I'm with you 100 percent, sir. I can only tell you that
it's a combined effort and everybody needs to pull his or her
own weight.
Senator Byrd. Does your budget request address this issue
in any way?
General Libutti. Yes, sir, it does.
Senator Byrd. It is so? You said it does. How much is in
the budget for this?
General Libutti. In terms of chemical sites security we're
talking about $35 million.
Senator Byrd. And now you're talking about hardening
security at chemical plants?
General Libutti. Sir, I'm talking about visits,
interaction, working to develop guidelines and the way ahead.
We're talking about recommendations for how they can harden
their target as we say in the military; standoff distances,
excuse me, buffer zones, security plans. We're there to advise,
educate, and help them develop their plants. As you know there
are tens of thousands of these plants, large and small across
the country. And as I said earlier, we looked at and visited
over the last few months many of the facilities that we thought
were key critical, meaning, if they were hit as centers of
gravity, they would cause potentially the greatest impact in
the surrounding area.
I am very comfortable that we're taking the right approach
on this. And we're going to look at several hundred additional
sites or facilities over the next year.
Senator Byrd. What more can you do to make sure that the
chemical industry responds with a robust program to secure
their plants?
General Libutti. We need to demand excellence across the
board. We need to be both their advocate and their coach
relative to ensuring that they adhere to standards and best
practices. We need to demand excellence in terms of security
and should not let them off the hook.
Senator Byrd. You bet. We have lots of work to do in this
area.
General Libutti. Yes, sir, we do.
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
Senator Byrd. Now, Mr. Chairman, I shall have further
questions perhaps.
Senator Inouye, who could not attend today's hearing,
requested that the attached question be asked on his behalf. I
ask that it be inserted in the record.
He is concerned that the Department of Homeland Security is
charging outside groups that wish to attend a March 8, 2-day
forum, that will provide industry with information about
homeland security research and technology requirements.
For example, small businesses would be charged $525, and
universities would be charged $425. Senator Inouye believes
this information should be provided free of charge. I ask that
his question be made part of the record.
Senator Cochran. That objective is so ordered.
Senator Byrd. And I thank both Dr. McQueary and General
Libutti.
Dr. McQueary. Thank you, Senator.
General Libutti. Thank you, Senator.
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER (NISAC)
Senator Cochran. Senator Domenici is attending another
meeting of his committee, the Energy Committee which he chairs,
this morning. And he asked me to propound a question on his
behalf. And it is this:
The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
had approximately $23 million for NISAC. That's the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center. Would you please
give the subcommittee the status of the allocation of the
fiscal year 2004 funding? I think that's to General Libutti.
General Libutti. Yes, sir, it is.
I'll try to cut to the chase and cover the key points, sir.
As you know this responsibility transferred the Department of
Homeland Security from the Department of Energy in March 2003.
Primary contractors are the Sandia and Los Alamos labs in New
Mexico.
The Senate Appropriations Committee provided approximately
$30 million in 2003, and the House provided $20 million. Extra
dollars from the Senate were dedicated for NISAC building at
Kirkland Air Force Base in New Mexico. The joint conference
provided $27.5 million; but there was no specific language for
building. But with respect to what the Senator and your
colleague had asked for, what we have done most recently, is
that we retained sufficient funds to complete the survey and
selection process. The date of ground breaking will be
dependent upon site surveys and identification of a suitable
site for the NISAC.
So we're very attuned to the issue and concern of Senator
Inouye. I am happy to provide additional details or perhaps
visit with him to provide amplifying information.
Senator Cochran. We will submit questions in addition for
the record, and if you could respond to those.
General Libutti. I would be happy to, sir.
Senator Cochran. For the record, we would appreciate
additional detail regarding the fiscal year 2005 budget request
for NISAC and activities envisioned in the budget for that
Center.
General Libutti. I would add, sir, that our department is
preparing a letter to the Department of Defense regarding
building of a facility on the Department of Defense property,
et cetera, et cetera. So, we'll be happy to provide response
and detail.
Senator Cochran. Thank you.
MANPADS/AIR MISSILE COUNTERMEASURES
Following up on another issue that was raised by Senator
Byrd. Is it feasible to accelerate the shoulder-fired missile
defense program to make the technology available at an earlier
date? Or, is the time line you have considered the most cost
effective, or reasonable in terms of the needs for a cost
efficient method of protecting commercial aviation?
Dr. McQueary. We believe that the time line is a very
aggressive time line, and in fact, we're certainly aware that
there is great interest in the country about the very issue
that you raised. When we met with each of the three contract
winners, posed to them the following question: Would you like
to come in and recommend a shorter schedule. None of the three
agreed that they would be willing to take on, or would want to
take on, a schedule that was shorter than the one that we had
originally proposed.
So, I think it is an aggressive schedule, and I think a
careful examination of what we have to do in the alloted time
period would conclude that is the case.
Senator Cochran. Has there been any decision made or
discussion of who's actually going to pay the costs of
procuring and outfitting the airliners with this defense
system? I understand that they estimated costs could be up to
$10 billion.
Dr. McQueary. There are a number of factors that go into
that. We have not attempted to address, however, who would pay
for it. We have attempted to address how much it would cost,
though. So those decisions can be made. As I indicated earlier
in the testimony, we view our responsibility as providing the
scientific basis on which the Administration and the Congress
can decide the approach the country will take in implementing
such systems, if that is what we should do.
We put target costs in of about $1 million each, but that's
up front hardware costs. And anytime you field large systems,
operation and maintenance typically dominates the overall long
term costs of such systems. And I would expect that is the case
on this one.
CYBER SECURITY
Senator Cochran. We know that you have recently developed a
national cyber alert system to acquaint home computer users,
and business and government agencies, with ways to better
secure their computer systems from viruses. How would you rate
the performance of the new national cyber alert system's
response to the most recent computer virus outbreaks?
Dr. McQueary. That was done by General Libutti's
organization. I'll defer to him if I may.
Senator Cochran. Sure.
General Libutti. Sir, I would give you an estimate on a
scale of 1 to 10, at 8.5 or 9. And that's a relative
evaluation. Let me give you some additional information that
perhaps would help understand where we are. This roll out of
the alert system has just been done very recently.
We have over 250,000 subscribers. Those who have subscribed
to that system, are working that system across industry, home
users and government. We think, I believe, it is the first
great move to educate, inform and make people aware in a pro-
active way, of viruses that may be coming our way.
So I give it a pretty high grade, and we will continue to
monitor that as time goes by, and improve on how we communicate
with our customer base.
Senator Cochran. What's the relationship between the cyber
security division and TTIC; if any? Is there any collaboration?
General Libutti. I mean in terms of a wiring diagram, if I
may, there is no direct linkage. There is always within the
Federal Government, particularly the inter-agency, there's
linkages and pathways that permit people who work in the cyber
business to communicate with people who have that interest, or
that particular functional area of responsibility within TTIC.
That is, there are people in TTIC who not only look at
infrastructure protection from a threat perspective, but also
can consider cyber concerns. The key point that I leave with
you is, that the lead in terms of cyber security is within IAIP
at the Department of Homeland Security.
If we have issues that present themselves, then we will
orchestrate appropriate meetings. There was an initiative taken
by some of my folks in the cyber world to take a hard look at
what I call a lower level inter-agency grouping between the
communication folks, the national communication security guys,
or guys in cyber security, and the Department of Defense. They
met on a regular basis to review potential threats, and to look
globally at the kind of activity that needs, to in my words,
give us a warning and indicator that we need to do something.
So we're trying to be as pro-active as possible, and we're
trying to educate and make people aware of the threat to the
cyberspace area.
CYBER SECURITY
Senator Cochran. How is the national cyber security
division working with the private sector companies, such as
Symantec, McAfee, and Norton, that specialize in anti-virus
software and internet security.
General Libutti. I think it's safe to say they're working
very well with them. Briefings I have received have indicated
no serious problems in terms of our linkage and cooperation
with the business community overall.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. What law enforcement agency has primary
jurisdiction in enforcing cyber crimes?
General Libutti. I suspect again across law enforcement,
and that's not my area of expertise, that it is both Secret
Service and FBI.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to the Science and Technology Directorate
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
BIOSURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
Question. Science and Technology's role in the Biosurveillance
Initiative includes an increase of $65 million to expand environmental
monitoring activities in cities determined to be at the highest risk of
a terrorist attack.
Can you give further details about the chemical and biological
warning activities currently in place in these cities?
Answer. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) BioWatch
initiative has been successfully operating in approximately 30 of the
Nation's urban centers since early 2003. BioWatch is an early warning
system that can rapidly detect trace amounts of biological materials in
the air whether they are due to intentional release or due to minute
quantities that may occur naturally in the environment. Routine air
samples are collected on a daily basis and more frequently if
necessary. To date, BioWatch has analyzed well over half a million
samples. Several hundred specialized air sampling devices, developed by
the Department, have been placed at key locations nationwide. The air
samplers are supported by the infrastructure set up by the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Air Quality Monitoring
Network sites in partnership with State, local and tribal environmental
agencies. Additional partners in the program include the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Department of Energy (DOE)
National Laboratories. The CDC provides technical expertise through its
Laboratory Response Network on the laboratory analysis methods and
serves as the liaison for laboratory analyses with State health
departments. The DOE National Laboratories, specifically Los Alamos and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, provide technical expertise
in biological sampling systems, laboratory analysis, and training
assistance to State and local agencies.
Question. If the requested increase in funding is provided, will
the monitoring be expanded to other cities that are currently being
monitored or just in these high-threat areas? What about other high-
threat areas designated under the Office for Domestic Preparedness
grant programs?
Answer. The current planning calls for significantly increasing the
number of air samplers in the top ten high-threat BioWatch cities only.
Given availability of funds some modest addition of other cities may be
possible in the future.
The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate coordinates with the
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to insure integration of
BioWatch capability with cities listed on the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI). The DHS S&T BioWatch Program fully funds the
installation, operation, and sustainment of the BioWatch system in each
city. The ODP grants program is complimentary to BioWatch and funds
first responder initiatives and other local high priority requirements.
Question. What promising new advances do you anticipate with the
requested increase in funding for the acceleration of research and
development on next generation environmental monitoring systems?
Answer. Accelerated research and development on next generation
detection systems fall into two categories: (1) outdoor wide area
environmental monitoring (i.e., BioWatch replacement) and (2) indoor
facility protection. Research and Development (R&D) programs for the
wide area environmental monitoring focus on autonomous networked
detectors. This is a self-contained on-site collection and analysis
system. To address indoor facility protection the R&D plan calls for
research to develop Rapid Identifiers--portable highly sensitive
bioagent detectors with very low false alarm rates.
COUNTER MAN PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS (MANPADS)
Question. The Science and Technology Directorate is currently in
the early stages of a 2-year, $120 million program to develop
countermeasures to protect against the threat of shoulder-fired
missiles on civilian commercial aviation.
What progress is being made by the three teams selected for the
Counter-MANPAD Program, and is the first phase on schedule to be
completed this summer?
Answer. In early October, 2003, the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate released a solicitation
announcing a ``call for proposals'' to address this potential threat.
The solicitation is the first step in the Department's two-phase
systems development and demonstration program for anti-missile devices
for commercial aircraft.
Phase I began in January, 2004, with the selection of three
contractors--BAE Systems, Northrop Grumman, and United Airlines. Phase
I of the program will provide a detailed design and an analysis of the
economic, manufacturing, operational, and maintenance issues needed to
support a system that will be effective in the commercial aviation
environment. This phase will last approximately 6 months and will end
in the selection of one or two contractors moving on to the next phase.
The Counter-MANPADS program is on track. The DHS Special Project
Office (SPO) conducted meetings with all three contractors in late
January, 2004, and early February, 2004, to establish firm direction
and expectations. The SPO completed System Requirements Reviews with
all three contractors by March 18, 2004. An Interim Design Review will
be conducted in early May, 2004. These reviews establish a firm
baseline of requirements against which the contractors can apply their
designs.
Phase I will conclude with a Preliminary Design Review in July,
2004, at which time the DHS will select one or two of the initial three
contractors to proceed into Phase II.
Phase II will include development of prototypes, integration onto
commercial aircraft, and demonstrations of system operation and
performance. These prototypes will also be subjected to a rigorous test
and evaluation process. Phase II will last approximately 12-18 months
followed by a recommendation to the Administration and Congress.
Question. What obstacles do you face in safely applying
technologies developed for and currently in use on military aircraft
and adapting a countermeasure system to operate in the environments of
civilian aircraft?
Answer. Technologies developed for military or other specialized
purposes are currently incompatible with commercial air fleet
operations. Although underlying military technologies will be
leveraged, the systems must be adapted to meet commercial operational
conditions and environments.
Military missile countermeasures exist in various stages of
development and initial fielding. However, these technologies are
generally utilized by military and Heads-of-State aircraft that have
the operations and maintenance infrastructure to support such systems.
While it is conceivable that existing military countermeasures
units could be re-engineered for civilian aircraft use, many technical
and operational tradeoffs have not been previously performed to address
risks of such approach. For example, there is an established military
logistics infrastructure that serves airborne countermeasure equipment,
spanning functions from pilot training and routine maintenance to spare
parts and depot repair. A similar infrastructure would be costly and
time-consuming to replicate in the commercial airline industry.
It would be premature to integrate currently available military
countermeasures equipment aboard civilian aircraft due to numerous
issues concerning aircraft modification and certification, maintenance
and supportability, and operational employment. The current Counter-
MANPADS Program aims to resolve such issues and to provide alternatives
to the Administration for a decision on equipping commercial aircraft
with Counter-MANPADS capabilities.
Additional details can be provided if desired in accordance with
the appropriate security for the information.
Question. Is it feasible to accelerate the Counter-MANPAD Program
in order to make the technology available at an earlier date, or is the
timeline proposed the safest and most cost-efficient method?
Answer. Given the challenges of migrating Department of Defense
(DOD) technology into the commercial aviation environment, the DHS
program is the most cost-efficient approach to implementing an
affordable system. The program is an aggressive 24-month analysis,
prototype demonstration and testing program. At the conclusion, the
Department of Homeland Security will provide the Administration and
Congress with a recommendation for the most viable solution to
integrate Counter-MANPADS technology into commercial air fleet
operations.
CYBER SECURITY
Question. The Science and Technology Directorate serves a role in
the Nation's cyber security efforts by addressing cyber threat
characterization, cyber threat detection, and cyber threat origination.
With the large increase provided to the Science and Technology
Directorate by Congress for cyber security research and development,
what advances can we expect during this fiscal year?
Answer. The funding increase provided by Congress is enabling the
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate to undertake cyber security
programs that would not have been possible otherwise. As fiscal year
2004 is the first complete fiscal year of the Department of Homeland
Security's existence, funding investments this fiscal year emphasize
infrastructure and foundational needs associated with cyber security.
Because such needs are generally not associated with short-term
problems, most of these investments will not result in deployable
advances in the same year in which efforts are undertaken. However,
several key areas are being addressed and are briefly described in the
following text.
In order to address infrastructure needs identified in the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the Cyber Security R&D Portfolio in the
S&T Directorate has initiated activities aimed at securing some of the
key basic communication protocols on which the Internet relies, but
which are presently vulnerable to cyber attacks. A program focused on
the domain name infrastructure is working to advance the diffusion and
use of the Secure Domain Name System (DNSSEC) protocol as a replacement
for the traditional domain name infrastructure. A second program aimed
at secure routing infrastructure is working to address vulnerabilities
in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the protocol associated with the
Internet's underlying routing infrastructure.
A second infrastructure need identified in the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace involves the need for improving the security of
process control systems, such as supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems and digital control systems (DCS). The
Cyber Security Portfolio is coordinating planning for these areas with
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Portfolio. These portfolios
expect to initiate joint activities in this area later this fiscal
year.
The S&T Directorate is also working to provide foundations for
enhancing the capability of a variety of cyber security research
communities. The Cyber Security R&D Portfolio is co-funding two multi-
university test bed projects with the National Science Foundation
(NSF). The first is a test bed project focused on creating a large-
scale physical test bed network to support testing activities, and the
second test bed project focused on developing a testing framework and
conducting experiments on the physical test bed. These activities will
result in the ability to conduct attacks, develop an understanding of
those attacks, and test existing and new technological cyber security
concepts, all in a large-scale operational network environment that is
kept isolated from the ``public'' Internet.
A separate effort aimed at supporting cyber security research and
development communities is a program that is working to develop large-
scale data sets for cyber security testing. This will address the need
that researchers and operational users have for realistic data that can
be used to test the capabilities of current and emerging cyber security
technologies. Although the S&T Directorate does not expect to play a
role in the area of testing, evaluating, or certifying commercial
technologies, the general approach to constructing and making available
data sets for testing have the potential for secondary benefits by
catalyzing the emergence of commercial testing services provided by and
for the private sector.
Another area of emphasis is the area of economic assessment. This
activity is focused on two important priorities. The first is
developing a general model for assessing the economic impact of cyber
events and attacks. We do not believe that widely touted figures (such
as $38 billion for a single Internet worm attack) are realistic
estimates of cost associated with those attacks. Unrealistic figures do
the private sector a disservice because they do not allow people to
make reasonable assessments of their security needs and associated
investment requirements. The second area of interest is the development
of tailored business cases aimed at different types of stakeholder
communities. General awareness campaigns aimed at widespread
improvements in cyber security have not been as successful as one would
like. We believe that one of the reasons for this is that the rationale
for supporting cyber security investments needs to be tailored to
different types of stakeholder perspectives (large enterprises,
critical infrastructure sector company, small businesses, home users,
etc.). It is our hope that such tailored business cases will provide
better rationale for technology investments both among today's
commercial cyber security technologies, as well as those of the future.
The activities described above fit into a coherent plan for long
term cyber security needs. It is our hope that the test bed/testing
framework projects and the program focused on large-scale data sets
will provide insights to support the development of cyber security
metrics, although additional work in this area is expected to emerge
from NSF-funded basic research programs. In the long term, the general
areas of cyber security metrics and economic assessment models will
provide two key components in developing a foundation for cyber
security risk assessment, and risk-based decision-making in this field.
Although the emphasis of fiscal year 2004 activities is on
infrastructure and foundational needs, this is not to the exclusion of
other activities. We do have plans for a number of other focused
activities, including conducting a pilot test of new-generation
intrusion detection technology with participation from the banking and
finance sector, and holding a workshop in the area of government needs
for wireless security to gather input for future R&D activities. In
fiscal year 2005, with the infrastructure and foundational programs
already in motion, we expect to expand our activities aimed at more
specific cyber security technology R&D needs.
Question. How will the Science and Technology Directorate
coordinate its activities with the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate?
Answer. The Director of Cyber Security R&D in the S&T Directorate
is working closely with counterparts in the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate to coordinate the
Directorates' relevant activities in the important area of cyber
security. The two components of IAIP that S&T has been working with are
the National Cyber Security Division (working with the Director of the
Division and other senior staff members) and the National
Communications System (working with the Chief of the Technology and
Programs Division and other senior staff members).
Interactions between the two Directorates include an ongoing series
of meetings between senior-level technical managers to provide a bi-
directional flow of information between the organizations as well as
coordination of technical activities. These meetings are aimed at
ensuring that DHS operational requirements feed into S&T programs, and
to help identify paths for diffusion of technology back out to end
users, as outcomes of these programs begin to emerge. On a more ad hoc
basis, the S&T and IAIP Directorates exchange invitations to attend
meetings or workshops when they involve areas of common interest.
The IAIP Directorate has been developing a written document to
identify its S&T requirements, and expects to provide this document to
the S&T Directorate upon its finalization. In the longer term, a
Science and Technology Requirements Council (SRC) is being established
within DHS to provide a more formal avenue for IAIP and other DHS
components to communicate requirements to the S&T Directorate across
all of the technology portfolios.
Question. Have other agencies within the Department of Homeland
Security, such as the Secret Service, the Coast Guard, and the
Transportation Security Administration, begun to outline their cyber
security requirements?
Answer. The Director of Cyber Security R&D has been informed of
several information technology-related requirements related to the
Secret Service's mission via IAIP and via the Secret Service Portfolio
Manager in the S&T Directorate. While related to information
technology, several of these requirements have been identified as
having a law enforcement component being outside of the scope of cyber
security.
The S&T Directorate has not been approached by the Coast Guard or
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regarding their cyber
security requirements. We have had discussions with the Federal
Aviation Administration regarding their cyber security R&D priorities,
which are focused on securing the aviation infrastructure (e.g., air
traffic control networks), in contrast to TSA's focus on passenger and
cargo security.
HOMELAND SECURITY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE
Question. The Nation's universities have begun to join the
Department of Homeland Security to combat terrorism with the selection
in December of the first Homeland Security Center of Excellence which
will focus on the risk analysis related to the economic consequences of
terrorist threats and events. The process of selecting the next two
Homeland Security Centers of Excellence to focus on agro-terrorism is
currently in progress.
How many additional Homeland Security Centers of Excellence do you
envision with the $69 million provided for fiscal year 2004 and with
the $30 million requested in the President's budget to accompany the
three mentioned?
Answer. Fiscal year 2004 funding for University Programs will
include approximately $10 million for the DHS Scholars and Fellows
Program, with the balance dedicated to University-based Homeland
Security (HS) Centers. In addition to the risk analysis and agro-
terrorism centers referenced in your question, we anticipate two more
solicitations for University-based Homeland Security Centers this
fiscal year.
Question. How will the Science and Technology Directorate
coordinate the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence research and
findings among each participating university?
Answer. Lead universities are required to develop a management plan
that demonstrates that partners will be communicating and reporting
results and findings on a regular basis. DHS requires regular written
reports and assigns a program manager to each HS Center of Excellence.
Additionally, lead universities are required to form Science Advisory
Panels, to conduct progress meetings with their partners, and to
participate in review meetings with DHS senior managers. As new HS
Centers are added, DHS envisions a system of centers that it will
coordinate. Findings from these centers will be coordinated and
consolidated by DHS.
BIOLOGICAL COUNTERMEASURES
Question. In addition to the national biosurveillance initiative
proposed in the President's budget in the biological countermeasures
portfolio, additional funding is requested for infrastructure
improvements at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
How is the Department of Homeland Security currently working with
the United States Department of Agriculture to coordinate research
being carried out in regard to biological diseases?
What countermeasures are being prioritized for agro-bioterrorism?
As this committee makes recommendations to fund infrastructure
improvements at the Department's research facilities, what intentions
do you see for the long-term use of Plum Island as part of Science and
Technology's National BioDefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center?
Answer. DHS is totally committed to enhancing the Nation's
agricultural security by complementing the mission of United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and bringing a new sense for urgency and investments to enhance
the Nation's capability to anticipate, prevent, detect, respond to, and
recover from the intentional introduction of foreign animal disease,
especially scenarios of high-consequence. As defined in Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-7 (HSPD-7) and HSPD-9, the Secretary of
Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall national
effort to enhance the protection of the critical infrastructure and key
resources of the United States, including the defense of agriculture
and food.
Agriculture and food security are important priorities for DHS, as
are its working relationships and interactions with key sector-specific
agencies. DHS utilizes high-consequence reference scenarios for
strategic planning for its programs and activities on biological and
chemical countermeasures and these areas are most relevant to
protecting the agriculture and food sectors. DHS works closely with the
respective sector-specific agencies in planning and execution of its
R&D programs for each scenario. Of seven scenarios currently under
study, two of the four biological scenarios concern agriculture and
food security: foreign animal disease (with an initial focus on foot-
and-mouth disease), and bulk food contamination. We will be working
extensively with the USDA on response to those scenarios.
A Joint DHS and USDA Working Group on Agricultural Biosecurity has
developed a partnership and national strategy to provide the best
possible protection against the intentional or accidental introduction
of a foreign animal disease. The strategy builds on the strengths of
each agency to develop comprehensive preparedness and response
capabilities.
USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) has traditionally
excelled in basic and fundamental science and early disease discovery
research. USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has
provided diagnostic services for a wide range of foreign animal
diseases. In the partnership strategy, USDA will continue its basic and
early discovery work in the areas of foot-and-mouth disease and other
high priority foreign and emerging diseases, diagnostic development,
and maintenance of the vaccine bank.
DHS's program at Plum Island Animal Disease Center will focus on
strengthening the Nation's ability to predict and respond to the
intentional introduction of a foreign animal disease into U.S.
agriculture. DHS is focusing its efforts on:
--Advanced development which evaluates the efficacy of vaccines and
therapeutics (antivirals) derived from ARS's discovery work and
moves them into readiness for application in the event of an
outbreak;
--Agricultural agent bioforensic analysis capability to support
attribution, working in conjunction with APHIS's diagnostic
laboratory and law enforcement agencies;
--Disease assessment capability to include risk, threat assessment,
and epidemiologic resources to augment knowledge about specific
strains of foreign animal diseases for use in decision making
and predictive disease modeling; and
--Supporting the functions of the core scientific units such as
pathology, microscopy, sequencing, animal studies, strain
repositories, and bioinformatics.
The combined programs of DHS and USDA at Plum Island Animal Disease
Center will enhance the Nation's defense by building on the strengths
of each agency to increase capacities for both research and diagnostic
technology development.
As part of DHS's extensive commitment to agricultural security, it
is also establishing two University Homeland Security Centers in this
area: one in foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and one in post-
harvest food security. These new HS Centers were awarded to Texas A&M
University and the University of Minnesota respectively. Additionally,
DHS is coordinating with USDA on a review team for high-consequence
reference scenarios for strategic planning for DHS's programs and
activities on biological and chemical countermeasures. DHS is also
conducting end-to-end system studies to help define the requirements
for detection and surveillance for agricultural outbreaks and for the
protection of critical nodes of high consequence in the food production
chain.
DEPARTMENT-WIDE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Question. Currently, Science and Technology provides mission
support for several agencies within the Department of Homeland Security
to coordinate research and development throughout the Department to
prevent redundancies and to provide overall management and oversight of
ongoing research. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposes
further consolidation of research and development within Science and
Technology.
How do you feel the consolidation of research and development of
nearly all agencies in the Department of Homeland Security into Science
and Technology will provide for better coordination of research and
more efficient use of the funds provided?
Answer. Consolidation of the research and development functions of
the Department's components will significantly improve the Department's
overall ability to meet its mission. With consolidation, we can ensure
that operational end-user requirements and needs are being met by the
best science and technology that can be brought to bear on the problem,
whether that expertise comes from internal or external sources. We will
enhance our ability to avoid duplication of effort in the R&D areas,
and we fully expect to find synergies develop: what is created to meet
the requirements of one component may be able to be fielded to support
the needs--stated or not yet recognized--of another.
Question. What examples can be given of different agencies
benefiting from another agency's research that can be attributed to the
centralization of these efforts?
Answer. The Department's consolidation process has truly just
begun. Our experience to date has been in supporting other components
of DHS at the portfolio level. We have staff in the S&T Directorate who
are liaisons with other DHS components; specifically the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, the United States Coast Guard, the
Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, the United States
Secret Service, and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. These liaisons bring forward the requirements
from these other components, which allows us to factor their needs into
the S&T Directorate's RDT&E planning and budgeting and they also serve
as a communication link at the portfolio level.
The consolidation of the Standards efforts earlier in DHS has
already resulted in a more effective and efficient process to identify
and implement standards relevant to the entire DHS mission. The results
to date include:
--Created initial standards guidelines, with formal standards nearing
completion, for radiation pagers, hand-held radiation dosimetry
instruments, radioisotope identifiers and radiation portal
monitors. These standards were developed under the auspices of
the American National Standards Institute's Accredited American
Standards Committee on Radiation Instrumentation.
--Adopted its first set of standards regarding personal protective
equipment developed to protect first responders against
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents. These
standards, which will assist State and local procurement
officials and manufacturers, are intended to provide emergency
personnel with the best available protective gear. These
standards result from an ongoing collaboration with the Office
of Law Enforcement Standards at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
--Published guidelines for interoperable communications gear. Common
grant guidance has been developed and incorporated in the
public safety wireless interoperability grant programs of both
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security;
--Launched the SAFETY Act process for evaluating anti-terrorism
technologies for potential liability limits.
Question. How does the Transportation Security Administration's
laboratory coordinate its efforts with Science and Technology, and,
more specifically, the High Explosives Countermeasures portfolio, and
do you anticipate the consolidation of the Transportation Security
Administration's research and development into Science and Technology?
Answer. For fiscal year 2004 the S&T Explosives Countermeasures
Portfolio has initiated research, development, testing and evaluation
(RDT&E) to counter the explosives threat to the general population and
to critical infrastructure posed by suicide bombers and vehicle bombs,
respectively. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
conducting RDT&E to counter the explosives threat to the transportation
sector, including land and maritime transport as well as civil
aviation. S&T and TSA keep each other aware of activities being
performed; thus, redundancy is minimized. The activities are currently
not coordinated, however, and priorities are set independently.
Information exchange between the S&T Explosives Portfolio and the TSA
laboratory is coordinated through the TSA office of the Chief
Technology Office. Each group calls upon the expertise of the other
when warranted, including participation in selected project reviews and
advisory panels It is anticipated that the RDT&E activities currently
conducted within TSA will be consolidated within Science and Technology
commencing in fiscal year 2005 following administrative actions and
agreements that are in progress. Program planning documents for the
Explosives Countermeasures Portfolio reflect an integration of current
S&T and TSA mission areas, priorities, and funding profiles.
Question. How does Science and Technology prioritize research
across all Departmental agencies?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate prioritizes its
research and development efforts based on the directives,
recommendations and suggestions from many sources, including:
--Homeland Security Act of 2002;
--The fiscal year 2004 Congressional Appropriations for the
Department of Homeland Security;
--President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland Security, the
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets, the National Strategy to Combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace, and the National Security Strategy;
--President Bush's nine Homeland Security Presidential Directives;
--Office of Management and Budget's 2003 Report on Combating
Terrorism;
--Current threat assessments as understood by the Intelligence
Community;
--Requirements identified by other Department components;
--Expert understanding of enemy capabilities that exist today or that
can be expected to appear in the future; and
--The report from the National Academy of Science on ``Making the
Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering
Terrorism,'' and the reports from the Gilmore, Bremer and Hart-
Rudman Committees.
Identifying and integrating the information contained in these
sources has not been a small task, but the result, coupled with expert
evaluation and judgment by our scientific staff, is the basis for
determining the research and development needed to meet our mission
requirements. As consolidation continues to occur, these same sources
will be used to prioritize requirements and needs.
We will continue to improve our ability to garner customer
requirements through the newly-formed Science and Technology
Requirements Council (SRC). The SRC will vet RDT&E requirements from
the other components of the Department and has Assistant Secretary
level representation from those components.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION OF HOMELAND SECURITY RESEARCH EFFORTS
Question. What type of coordination is occurring with other
Departments in their research and development efforts, and how do you
plan to expand this coordination in the future?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security fully recognizes that
many organizations contribute to the science and technology base needed
to enhance the nation's capabilities to thwart terrorist acts and to
fully support the conventional missions of the operational components
of the Department. Congress recognized the importance of the research
and development being conducted by numerous Federal departments and
agencies, and in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, directed the Under
Secretary of Science and Technology to coordinate the Federal
Government's civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures
to current and emerging threats.
We take this responsibility very seriously.
We have begun this coordination process by evaluating and producing
a report on the research, development, testing, and evaluation work
that was being conducted within the Department of Homeland Security but
was not already under the direct cognizance of the Science and
Technology Directorate. Where it is appropriate, the Science and
Technology Directorate will absorb these R&D functions. In other cases,
the Science and Technology Directorate will provide appropriate input,
guidance, and oversight of these R&D programs.
We are now working to identify gaps in homeland security programs
across all relevant Federal Departments and agencies. We are
participating in--and in some cases, leading--committees,
subcommittees, and working groups of the National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC). Through formal and informal conversations at
NSTC meetings, gaps are being identified and are starting to be
addressed.
In addition, staff from the S&T Directorate are actively involved
with the Counterproliferation Technology Coordinating Committee (CTCC).
The CTCC's role is to look across the U.S. Government to identify
counterproliferation activites, identify gaps and shortfalls, and make
recommendations to address the shortfalls. Many of the technologies
relevant to Counterprolifertion also are relevant to Homeland Security
needs. The CTCC is co-chaired by the National Security Council,
Homeland Security Council and Office of Science and Technology Policy.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) gives us budgetary
direction and develops a yearly report on Combating Terrorism. This
document is one of the sources cited above as guidance for program
prioritization. We have frequent interactions with OMB for guidance in
budgeting in accordance with identified priorities.
Question. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is one
of our most important connections in the Administration. Our personnel
meet with OSTP staff frequently on issues of interest to both groups.
Most importantly, OSTP runs the National Science and Technology Council
and its committees, subcommittees and working groups as mentioned
above. These groups are instrumental in helping us achieve our goals of
protecting the Nation and its infrastructure.
The Homeland Security Council, (HSC) which was stood up in October
2001, meets frequently to ensure coordination of all homeland security-
related activities among executive departments and agencies and promote
the effective development and implementation of all homeland security
policies.
Has their been any thought given to creating a multi-agency
initiative, or working group, perhaps under the auspices of the
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), to foster better
coordination of Homeland Security Research efforts across government
agencies (e.g. DOD, NIH, NSF, DOE, Transportation, EPA, USDA, Dept. of
Justice, etc)?
Answer. As discussed above, the Science and Technology Directorate
is working with the NSTC and the CTCC to look across the entire Federal
Government at homeland security-relevant science and technology.
RAPID PROTOTYPING
Question. The Congress made $75 million available for fiscal year
2004 for the rapid prototyping and deployment of near-term technologies
for the end-user, whether it is a Customs agent or a first responder,
to have the best technology and equipment available to combat
terrorism.
How do you propose to better streamline the process of working with
industry to make technology available to the end-user in a more
expeditious manner than currently available?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate actively promotes a
close relationship with industry to produce the new, improved
technologies that emergency responders will purchase. Since March 1,
2003, there have been four solicitations directly to industry in 63
high tech areas related to protection, equipment, sensors, and other
gear for emergency responders, agents, detection and tracking systems.
Industry sent in more than 4,500 responses to these solicitations. Our
partner, the interagency Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) is
awarding $60 millions in contracts now in these areas. Our Office of
Systems Engineering and Development (SED) is already at work with three
industry teams on technology for commercial aircraft to counter
shoulder-fired missiles. The Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) has been able to shorten the time required for
a complete, multimillion dollar competitive solicitation to just 120
days. HSARPA is also using ``industry-friendly'' Other Transactions for
Research and Prototype contracting authority permitted by the
authorizing legislation to speed award of contracts to companies that
have not done business with the government before.
Question. Of the industry response to the Department's request for
proposals, what technologies have proved to be the most beneficial to
homeland security?
Answer. DHS S&T is in the earliest stages of research and
development for almost all of these efforts and it would be premature
to judge which of these technologies will be most beneficial.
Question. What future technology solicitations do you anticipate to
better serve the end-user in protecting the homeland?
Answer. DHS S&T is actively pursuing additional technology
solicitations in several areas relevant to protecting the homeland.
Currently HSARPA has a solicitation entitled ``Detection Systems for
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures'' which is now active and
industry is responding. Eight other solicitations planned for this
year:
--Bioinformatics and Assay Development Program
--Threat Vulnerability, Testing, and Assessment
--Automated Scene Understanding
--Advanced Container Security Device
--Bomb Interdiction for Truck and Suicide Threats
--Biological Warfare Architectures Study (Food & Agriculture)
--Biological Warfare Decontamination
--Low Vapor Pressure Chemical Detection System
Question. Of the funds provided for and the flexibility given to
Science and Technology for rapid prototyping, how much is provided for
the Technology Clearinghouse, and how much is provided for the
Technical Support Working Group?
Answer. For fiscal year 2004, the Technology Clearing House will
receive $10.5 million. For fiscal year 2004, DHS S&T provided $30.0
million to the Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) for Rapid
Prototyping projects.
STANDARDS
Question. Congress transferred the development of standards from
the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) to Science and Technology
and therefore expects all standards development in the Department to be
centralized in the Science and Technology Directorate.
How is Science and Technology coordinating with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in developing standards
Department-wide?
Answer. The standards development work in ODP was managed by the
NIST Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES). There has been a
smooth transition of this program in fiscal year 2004 as NIST/OLES is
still managing the program for the Science and Technology Directorate.
The S&T Directorate is also working with NIST to coordinate development
of additional standards in other areas, such as biometrics, cyber
security and detection methods for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Question. How are the State Homeland Security Advisors providing
input for the end-users in developing standards?
Answer. The DHS Office of State and Local will provide points of
contact for specific standards development efforts. Also, the
Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) has been
involved in user requirements for the first set of radiation detector
standards.
Question. Do you anticipate Science and Technology will publish a
``Consumers Report'' on all technologies and equipment for Federal,
State, and local users, such as the report that will be published for
radiation and bioagent detection devices?
Answer. It is our intention to publish user guides to available
technologies in something like a ``Consumers Report'' format for
critical equipment for emergency responders. These guides will address
personal protective equipment as well as detectors for chemical,
biological, radiological/nuclear and high explosive agents.
THE WIRELESS PUBLIC SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY COMMUNICATIONS (SAFECOM)
PROGRAM
Question. The problem of communications interoperability for first
responders, so important since September 11th, remains a difficult nut
to crack. How much will be needed to fund the solution? When will
technical standards be completed? What should the States and locals do?
The Science and Technology Directorate plays a lead role for the
Federal Government for finding the way through all of the technical
questions. The Wireless Public Safety Interoperability Communications
Program--known as SAFECOM--is in the Science and Technology
Directorate. Yet, no funds are directly requested in the Science and
Technology Directorate budget for this very important program. All of
the funding comes either from other Federal agencies or from the
Department-wide Technology appropriations within the Department of
Homeland Security.
Answer. There is no simple solution for communications
interoperability. To ensure that our emergency responders' wireless
communications are fully interoperable will require years of hard work
on the part of the Federal Government as well as cooperation from State
and local entities. The Wireless Public Safety Interoperability
Communications Program, SAFECOM, is managed by the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate, allowing the
program full access to the scientific expertise and resources needed to
help our Nation achieve true public safety wireless communications
interoperability.
Current estimates of total funding required for complete
interoperable wireless communications run into the billions of dollars
when procurement grants are included in these estimates. Full wireless
communications interoperability is currently estimated to be complete
by 2023.
Technical standards are critical to the development of
interoperable systems. With input from the user community, portions of
the Association of Public Safety Communications Officers (APCO) Project
25's existing, but still incomplete, suite of standards have been
developed. However, adoption has been slow, and standards completed to
date address only part of the problem.
SAFECOM will dedicate funding to the implementation of its
standards plan, calling for a common set of standards, policies, and
procedures to drive the migration of systems towards advanced,
interoperable equipment and processes in the future. SAFECOM recognizes
that the Nation cannot wait for a complete suite of standards. In the
interim, local and State agencies must make investments that improve
their communications and interoperability capabilities. To support the
practitioner community in the short term, SAFECOM will begin a number
of initiatives to better inform public safety agencies when upgrading
or replacing current communications systems.
Question. Should the funding for SAFECOM within the Department of
Homeland Security be appropriated directly to the Science and
Technology Directorate?
Should funding be provided by Science and Technology for research
being carried out for SAFECOM?
Should the funding provided by other agencies be permanently
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. In an effort to coordinate the various Federal initiatives,
SAFECOM was established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and approved by the President's Management Council (PMC) as a high
priority electronic government (E-Gov) initiative. As an e-Gov
initiative, it is appropriate for funding to be provided by the
partnering agencies that will benefit from the results of the
initiative.
Question. The progress being made on setting the technical
standards for various communications technologies seems to be
progressing very slowly. Project MESA which will govern broadband
technology is in its infancy, and Project 25 governing Land Mobile
Radios has yet to complete even half of the standards necessary. What
more can be done to ensure the speedy completion of these projects by
the private industry and public safety community stakeholders?
Answer. At a strategic planning session in December 2003, public
safety stakeholders from the local, State, and Federal levels convened
to determine the most important next steps for the improvement of
public safety communications and interoperability. These stakeholders
felt that a process to promote standards is critical. To meet this
demand, SAFECOM has developed a plan to accelerate the development of
critical standards for public safety communications and
interoperability, including the Project 25 suite of standards (P25). As
mentioned above, SAFECOM will dedicate funding to the implementation of
its standards plan, calling for a common set of standards, policies,
and procedures to drive the migration of systems towards advanced,
interoperable equipment and processes in the future. In addition,
SAFECOM will fund the testing and evaluation of interim technologies
that can assist public safety agencies in making existing legacy
equipment interoperable with other neighboring systems.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
Question. What types of research and development support will the
Science and Technology Directorate provide to the Coast Guard for its
non-homeland security missions?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate and United States
Coast Guard (USCG) are in the midst of preparing a formal agreement
that will detail the coordination and funding mechanisms for USCG R&D
capabilities. The foundation for that agreement will be the
consolidation of funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget. For
fiscal year 2005, the USCG R&D center facility, personnel and
maintenance expenses will be funded through S&T in the amount of $13.5
million. In addition, S&T and the USCG have agreed upon a base level of
additional project funding in the amount of $5 million that will be
specifically targeted toward non-security related projects including
maritime science and research. This funding will be designed to support
USCG mission-programs such as Marine Environmental Protection, Living
Marine Resources, Search and Rescue, Aids to Navigation and Marine
Safety. The specific projects in support of these mission-related
programs will be prepared annually for S&T concurrence.
In addition, the USCG will submit security-related research
requests through S&T for coordination across all portfolios and DHS
components. The Coast Guard has submitted a maritime security R&D
portfolio detailing approximately $50 million in vital maritime
security research initiatives. This portfolio has been validated by S&T
portfolio managers and will be considered in the development of future
spending priorities and commitments from S&T.
Question. Will the Department of Homeland Security develop a
Homeland Security Center dedicated to energy production security and
pipeline infrastructure protection?
Answer. The Department of Energy (DOE) is designated as the lead
agency for security issues specific to the energy sector (except for
commercial nuclear power plants, for which DHS and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission are designated as responsible lead agencies) in
the National Strategy for Physical Protection of the Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets and in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-7 (HSPD-7).
DHS has the lead for transportation systems security which includes
pipelines. DHS has overall homeland security responsibility and
recognizes that the energy sector is especially vital to the quality of
life and the economy of this Nation. DHS is sponsoring Critical
Infrastructure Protection research and development programs in the
energy and pipeline security area with emphasis on Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and electronic control systems. These
efforts will increase this fiscal year. In addition, DHS asked the
National Academy of Science to host a workshop to provide DHS with
advice and guidance on future University-based Homeland Security R&D
Centers. The results of that workshop did not place energy production
security and pipeline security infrastructure in the top three areas
recommended as additional areas for potential University-based Homeland
Security Centers. This result certainly does not imply these
infrastructures and their security is are not important, and, as stated
previously, work is being done to address their security. In addition,
the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
Directorate in DHS does work closely with DOE and with the Energy
Sector owners and operators on operational security issues and the
Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate in DHS works with
the Department of Transportation to ensure that the Nation's pipelines
are safe and secure.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FUNDING
Question. Secretary Ridge, the Department of Homeland Security has
a significant research budget to develop new technologies to secure the
United States against terrorist attacks. I know that the Department has
made significant progress in setting up the mechanisms to allocate
science and technology funding to industry, universities, and national
laboratories. This is a vital mission of your Department.
I understand that the Department is still in the process of
allocating fiscal year 2003 science and technology funding. What is the
current time line for completing this allocation of funding?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate has ``execution
plans'', that is identified scope of work, for all remaining fiscal
year 2003 funds and fully expects to have all remaining funds allocated
by the end of fiscal year 2004.
Question. The Department is now engaged in the allocation of fiscal
year 2004 science and technology funding. How do you plan to allocate
fiscal year 2004 funding in a more timely manner?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has existed now for
just over a year. Like the rest of the Department, the Science and
Technology Directorate has been working hard to develop effective and
efficient procedures and policies, including those necessary for
selection of performers of the work to be done and the subsequent
contractual processes and allocation of funds. As these procedures get
established, projects will be awarded and funded in a more timely
manner. I am pleased to say that in the last 3 months, the Science and
Technology Directorate has made significant progress in allocating its
available funding into the hands of those researchers who are
developing and transitioning the vital technologies and tools to make
the Nation safer. Both the Under Secretary for Science and Technology
and I will continue to monitor the status of project selection and
funding, and expect to see continued progress.
Question. I note that this year, the Department's budget submission
is improved over last year as one would expect. Although there are
security considerations, could you describe your plans to ensure
transparency in the Department of Homeland Security budget? Both the
Departments of Defense and Energy make their supporting budget
documents public. Will you follow suit?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate prepares its annual
Congressional Justification in an open and unclassified manner and will
continue to do so as long as programs do not move into the sensitive
realm. In addition, the Science and Technology Directorate prepares its
written testimony for the record for each of its budget-related
hearings in an unclassified document. This written testimony contains
the supporting documentation for its budget request and becomes
publicly available.
Question. One of the biggest challenges in the science and
technology area has to be coordinating the allocation of funding
between near-term and applied technology and basic, long-term R&D
funding.
What level of coordination is being provided by your office, Mr.
Secretary, to ensure an appropriate split between near-term and long-
term R&D?
Answer. I have delegated the responsibility for determining the
appropriate split between near-term and long-term research and
development to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and he
keeps me and others informed, although the final responsibility is
mine. In the approximately 1 year that this Department has been in
existence, the Science and Technology Directorate has focused its
initial efforts on near-term development and deployment of technologies
to improve our Nation's ability to detect and respond to potential
terrorist acts. However, we recognize that a sustained effort to
continually add to our knowledge base and our resource base is
necessary for future developments. Thus, we have invested a portion of
our resources, including our university programs, toward these
objectives. The following table indicates the Science and Technology
Directorate's expenditures in basic research, applied research, and
development to date, excluding construction funding.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE R&D INVESTMENTS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Fiscal year Fiscal year 2004 2005
2003 (actual) (estimated) (proposed)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic........................................................... 47 117 80
Applied......................................................... 59 56 229
Developmental................................................... 398 608 643
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 504 781 952
-----------------------------------------------
Percent basic................................................... 9.3 15.0 8.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our initial expenditures in basic research are heavily weighted by
our investments in university programs. These university programs will
not only provide new information relevant to homeland security, but
will also provide a workforce of people who are cognizant of the needs
of homeland security, especially in areas of risk analysis, animal-
related agro-terrorism, bioforensics, cybersecurity, disaster modeling,
and psychological and behavioral analysis. In addition, the Science and
Technology Directorate is allocating a portion of its resources to
high-risk, high-payoff technologies and expects to gradually increase
its investments in long-term research and development to a level
appropriate for its mission and the Department.
Question. What do you envision as the role of the Department of
Homeland Security in investments in future R&D to meet homeland
security requirements?
Answer. At the current time, the Science and Technology Directorate
is working hard with available funds to fill critical gaps in our
Nation's ability to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover
from potential terrorist attacks; however, we are all well aware that
it is only with a strong investment in long-term research that we can
we feel confident we are maintaining a robust pipeline of homeland
security technologies to keep us safe for the decades to come.
Successful businesses reinvest 10-15 percent of their total budget in
research and development; the Science and Technology Directorate will
strive in future years to invest a similarly significant portion of its
resources into long-term research.
INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION
Question. Mr. Secretary, the Department of Homeland Security
combines the programs and personnel for many Federal agencies. Creating
a culture as one department is a real challenge, but there are
capabilities throughout the Federal Government that can assist your
Department in meeting homeland security threats.
I would encourage the Department to develop strong positive
relationships with other Federal departments and agencies where there
is opportunity for collaboration and cooperation to make your job
easier.
Is it correct that your Department has worked with both the
Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) as
it develops its programs to meet homeland security threats?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has worked very closely
with the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA from the very early stages
of the development of the Science and Technology (S&T) program. The DOE
laboratories provided extensive technical expertise and advise
regarding the S&T program development.
Question. How would you characterize these interactions?
Answer. The Department's interactions with DOE and NNSA have been
very positive. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) S&T staff
has an open communication relationship with DOE senior managers as well
as with the DOE field personnel. Since some of the S&T staff came from
DOE, there are close ties and good relationships that facilitate
developing the processes of how DOE and DHS work together. When issues
arise, they are quickly elevated so that communication occurs between
the appropriate parties in both Departments and a resolution achieved.
Question. What potential do you see for future collaborations?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security fully expects to
continue and enhance its collaborations with the DOE and NNSA, as well
as other Federal agencies conducting work of relevance to homeland
security. For example, the S&T Directorate is committed to utilizing
the extensive capabilities of all DOE laboratories and to engage them
in all aspects of our research, development, testing and evaluation
(RDT&E) program. The Directorate's Office of Research and Development
is developing an enduring RDT&E capability through stewardship of the
homeland security complex. To meet the Federal stewardship goal, the
DOE laboratories will play a significant role in assisting in the
strategic planning of the threat-based programs such as radiological/
nuclear and biological countermeasures programs. The DOE laboratories
also have significant existing capabilities and facilities for
addressing terrorist threats, thus DHS will contribute support for some
existing DOE facilities and reach-back into these unique capabilities.
In addition, the DHS University Scholars and Fellows program is working
with the DOE laboratories to place students with DOE mentors.
Question. The science and technology directorate at the Department
has had discussions with the DOE national laboratories in such areas as
radiological and nuclear and bioterrorist threats. The labs have
significant capabilities to assist the Department of Homeland Security.
Do you envision these collaborations continuing? Are there any barriers
to such activities? If so, can Congress assist in addressing these
issues?
Answer. The Department's Science and Technology Directorate will
continue to utilize the DOE laboratories to address S&T requirements
including key threat areas such as radiological, nuclear and biological
countermeasures. Collaborations between DHS and DOE have been very
successful to date, and the Science and Technology Directorate plans to
continue these collaborations well into the future. There are currently
no barriers to these collaborations. If circumstances change, the
Department will bring this to the attention of Congress.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Question. Over the last couple of years, I have worked to provide
funding to the Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) for an in-flight
communications system. I believe that this system would provide the
FAMs with the communications they need to safeguard our airlines and
the millions of passengers who fly on them each year.
I know that you are constantly going through reorganizations over
at DHS and I have learned that the Office of Science and Technology may
be proceeding to equip only those airlines that already have seatback
phones with these communications for the FAMs.
But it is my understanding that many airlines do not have seatback
phones. How can we ask Americans to fly on these airlines if they don't
have the same level of security that is being provided to others?
Answer. Current Status. With reference to ``may be proceeding to
equip only those airlines that already have seatback phones with these
communications for the FAMS'', the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)
currently has access to the commercially available Verizon Airfone
service, only when FAMs fly on aircraft with such a system installed.
Recent statistics indicate that this system is installed on
approximately 40 percent of the aircraft on which FAMs fly. This
limited access includes voice only, via a tethered handset and does not
provide for data, wireless, or pre-emption of service during an
emergency situation. While the FAMS will conduct tests utilizing this
technology, additional testing will be performed on other developing
technologies with other service providers.
Phase I--Commercially Available Field Evaluation
The Federal Air Marshal Service is on the verge of conducting a
field evaluation, which will focus on foundational and component
testing; as well as, evaluation of FAMS applications over a
commercially available communication system.
The foundational testing will seek to determine the most
appropriate wireless communication protocol(s) for the FAMS to use for
the Air-to-Ground Communication System (AGCS). This test will look at
IR (infra-red), RFs (radio-frequencies), 802.11x, and Bluetooth
technologies. The test will evaluate all of the technical and security
aspects of the protocols, as well as aviation related aspects such as,
compatibility with aircraft systems. General market trends and
industry's development of wireless communications protocols will also
be studied.
The component testing will seek to evaluate the transmission and
reception of voice and data across an existing commercially available
communication system, and measure the ability of the system to handle
the current FAMS applications--including the Surveillance Detection
Report and other applications.
AGCS Strategic Planning
Additionally, the FAMS has been working in concert with the
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology, to rigorously
identify the needs, scalability, and interoperability of the future
AGCS. As a result of joint efforts of DHS S&T and the FAMS, an AGCS
strategic plan is scheduled to be completed in September 2004.
AGCS Working Group
At the request of Congress in HR 108-169, the FAMS is chairing an
AGCS Working Group to develop a technical implementation plan, as well
as, develop a business/government partnership for the implementation of
this system.
To date, the FAMS have hosted two working group meetings, which
were attended by: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
Glenn Research Center; Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NEXCOM
(Next Generation Communications) and FAA GCNSS (Global Communication,
Navigation, and Surveillance System); the JPDO (Joint Planning and
Development Office); U.S. Special Operations Command; U.S. Northern
Command/NORAD/CONR; United States Air Force; Department of Homeland
Security; and others.
Milestones
January 2003.--Air to Ground Charter signed by Adm. Loy, then TSA
Administrator.
Jan-Mar 2003.--FAMs participate in multiple air to ground
demonstrations.
September 2003.--FAMS managed services provider selected, work
begun on air to ground field evaluation.
November 2003.--Managed services provider issues RFP's for AGCS
field evaluation.
December 2003.--RFPs returned, scored--recommendations made.
April 2004.--FAMS issues AGCS field evaluation final
recommendation. DHS S&T begins working with FAMS on long-term strategic
planning. NASA offers strategic alliance with FAMS.
May-August 2004.--AGCS field evaluation conducted.
July 2004.-- Aviation and communications industries invited to
review draft AGCS strategic plan and participate in AGCS Working Group
September 2004.--AGCS Strategic Plan briefed to Congress
September 2004.--AGCS Strategic Plan completed.
Goals to be achieved
--FAMS finalize contract modifications in order to move forward on
field-testing and evaluation.
--Attain FAA approval for FAMS in-flight wireless communications
protocols.
--Attain FCC approvals for same, focusing on aviation and broadband
technologies.
--Attain Airlines approval and determine investment strategy for in
cabin-aviation communication (AGCS) system(s).
--Complete FAMS AGCS strategic plan.
--Agency review of field evaluation recommendations.
Program Summary.--The FAMS is evaluating currently installed
technology for immediate application and use by operational FAMS while
continuing to pursue a long-term solution to FAMS AGCS needs, which may
include developing technologies not associated with current in-flight
communications. This long-term solution is encompassed by the AGCS
Working Group, law enforcement and aviation communities and promotes
confidence in our Nation's civil aviation system to detect, deter and
defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers,
and crews.
SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTING
Question. As I said in my statement, Colorado is home to a number
of small companies that have developed cutting edge technologies to
keep not only us safe, but law enforcement officials and first
responders safe as well.
I am just curious as to the number of small companies, those with
100 or less employees, that you are working with to provide us with
their technology?
Answer. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program
defines a small business as one with 500 employees or less. At the time
of contract award, DHS determines if the winner is a small business
under this size criterion, as well as checking other criteria of the
program such as U.S. ownership, location in the United States,
employment of principal investigator, etc. DHS does not keep records of
actual company size under 500 employees.
The first DHS SBIR solicitation requested proposals from small
businesses in eight topic areas. Altogether, 374 responses were
received and 66 were selected to enter negotiations for contract award
in the first Phase. Three of these businesses are located in Colorado.
Question. What percentage of your procurement dollars is being
awarded to small businesses?
Answer. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is
funded at 2.5 percent of extramural R&D funds. This equates to $19.6
million in fiscal year 2004 for the Small Business Innovation Research
Program, all with small businesses. In addition, small businesses are
participants in our open solicitations, such as the one issued last
fall for Detection Systems for Biological and Chemical Countermeasures.
Among the 40 winning individual companies (or their teammates) in that
fully competitive, $76 million solicitation, there were 35 small
businesses.
Question. How do you define what is a small company?
Answer. DHS uses the SBIR definition of 500 employees or less.
Question. Can you discuss with me where we are with liability
protections for all contractors?
Answer. As part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law
107-296, Congress enacted the several liability protections for the
sellers of anti-terrorism technologies. The Support Anti-terrorism by
Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act) provides
incentives for the development and deployment of anti-terrorism
technologies by creating a system of risk and liability management. The
purpose of the SAFETY Act is to ensure that the threat of liability
does not deter potential manufacturers or sellers of anti-terrorism
technologies (ATT) from developing and commercializing technologies
that could significantly reduce the risks or mitigate the effect of
large-scale terrorist events. Therefore, the SAFETY Act creates certain
liability limitations for ``claims arising out of, relating to, or
resulting from and act of terrorism'' where a qualified anti-terrorism
technology (QATT) has been deployed. The SAFETY Act does not limit
liability from harms caused by an anti-terrorism technology when no act
of terrorism has occurred.
The definition of a qualified anti-terrorism technology is very
broad and includes products, equipment, services (including support
services), devices, or technology (including information technology)
that is designed, developed, modified, or procured for the specific
purpose of detecting, identifying, preventing, or deterring act of
terrorism, or limiting the harm that such acts might otherwise cause.
Sellers of ATTs may apply for SAFETY Act protection on line at
www.safetyact.gov, or they may submit their application electronically
or in hard copy. Each application will be reviewed in accordance with
the criteria set forth in the SAFETY Act to assess its technical
capabilities and to determine if SAFETY Act protection is necessary in
order to deploy the technology more broadly. To date there are 19 full
applications in various stages of review as well as 61 pre-
applications. The pre-application process is optional and is designed
to provide early feedback to the applicant regarding whether the
technology would be considered for SAFETY Act protection.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
Question. I believe that you have heard from Members of Congress
from Illinois, New York, and Idaho about their concerns in excluding
DOE national laboratories in those three States from playing on the
same field as your designated ``intramural'' laboratories. I was under
the impression that DHS had understood Congress's desire in creating
your department, that DHS would approach the DOE national labs on a
level playing field. When visiting with you prior to your confirmation,
I had felt I had your assurance to that effect.
I have made clear to you my concerns about the process your office
used in establishing the intramural/extramural laboratory system. I
have concerns about the validity of this approach and its outcome for
both the country and the extramural laboratories. These concerns
include: The reduced ability of DHS to bring the best talents and
capabilities to bear on some of our most significant national security
threats. The practicality and propriety of setting up a system that not
only encourages, but requires the extramural laboratories to compete
against industry and universities in order to contribute to the
solutions of important homeland security challenges. This is of
particular concern since the work designated for HSARPA and SED is work
that your staff has already indicated can be performed without unique
capabilities that exist in the national laboratories. The thin
reasoning and basis that has been put forward by DHS as a rationale for
selecting the intramural labs just doesn't appear to hold up.
Please provide the precise criteria used for selection of
intramural and extramural labs. Also provide the explanation of why
Argonne National Lab, Brookhaven National Lab, and Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Lab do not meet the criteria for being
intramural laboratories.
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, through Section 309 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, is provided access to the national
laboratories and sites managed by the Department of Energy to carry out
the missions of DHS.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, wishing to make the
best use of each of these laboratories and sites in consonance with
statute, regulation, and policy, asked laboratories and sites to make a
decision regarding their desired mode of interaction with the
Directorate--to participate in S&T's internal strategic planning and
program development processes, or, if otherwise permissible under
applicable law, regulation, contract, and DOE policy, to respond to
certain types of S&T solicitations open to the private sector.
On March 31, 2004, the following national laboratories and sites
communicated their decision to Under Secretary McQueary to participate
in S&T's internal strategic planning and program development processes:
Argonne National Laboratory, Bechtel Nevada, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
and the Sandia National Laboratories.
A consequence communicated to the national laboratory directors in
advance of their decision is that, as a result of such participation, a
national laboratory will be ineligible to participate in open
solicitations to the private sector for a period of 3 years after it
ceases engagement in the S&T strategic planning and program development
processes.
S&T will give the laboratories access to internal DHS strategic
planning information. DHS policy is that if any non-DHS entity,
including a national laboratory, receives that kind of information, DHS
considers that entity to have an ``organizational conflict of
interest'' that makes the entity ineligible to participate in any
solicitations open to the private sector issued by S&T.
Question. Do you think that it is appropriate for national labs to
be in direct competition with universities and industries for HSARPA
work?
The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)
solicitations seek to the maximum extent possible to capture the best
ideas and solutions. To achieve this end, Broad Agency Announcements
(BAAs) are used. Under a BAA, teams are not in direct competition; each
team is judged on the basis of the unique ideas proposed to solve the
broadly defined technology challenge. DOE Order 481.1B provides the
guidance DOE uses for the national laboratories regarding participation
in BAAs with universities and industries.
The DHS Science and Technology Directorate, wishing to make the
best use of each of these laboratories and sites in consonance with
statute, regulation, and policy, asked laboratories and sites to make a
decision regarding their desired mode of interaction with the
Directorate--to participate in S&T's internal strategic planning and
program development processes, or, if otherwise permissible under
applicable law, regulation, contract, and DOE policy, to respond to
certain types of S&T solicitations open to the private sector.
On March 31, 2004, the following national laboratories and sites
communicated their decision to Under Secretary McQueary to participate
in S&T's internal strategic planning and program development processes:
Argonne National Laboratory, Bechtel Nevada, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
and the Sandia National Laboratories.
A consequence communicated to the national laboratory directors in
advance of their decision is that, as a result of such participation, a
national laboratory will be ineligible to participate in open
solicitations to the private sector for a period of 3 years after it
ceases engagement in the S&T strategic planning and program development
processes.
Should we assume that cost will not be a primary factor in
selecting winners for HSARPA and SED contracts? If it is a primary
factor, do you expect any national laboratories to be able to compete
on a cost basis?
Answer. The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(HSARPA) and the Office of Systems Engineering and Development (SED)
consider other criteria, such as technical approach, performance
improvement if successful, value to the DHS user, program management
strategy, and capabilities of researchers to perform proposed work,
more important than the total cost of the research. The S&T Directorate
looks at the total cost of the research to confirm that it is
reasonable, but it is only a deciding criterion if the costs are too
high or too low. The eventual cost of the fielded system and its
operation are frequently considered under the value to DHS user
criterion; this should differ by technical approach, but not by
category of proposer.
Costs can also enter the final evaluation of proposals in a
determination of ``best overall value to the government.'' Under best
value, all factors are simultaneously evaluated looking to create out
of the family of selected proposals the best diversified programmatic
solution for the government against the total available funding.
S&T program solicitations seek to the maximum extent possible to
capture the best ideas and solutions. To achieve this end, Broad Agency
Announcements (BAAs) are used. Under a BAA, teams are not in direct
competition; each team is judged on the basis of the unique ideas
proposed to solve the broadly defined technical challenge.
Question. Wouldn't it be reasonable to have a system where all of
your critical R&D requirements were met through competitive processes
in order to assure access to the broadest array of talent in a cost
efficient way? Do you believe that this is what Congress intended?
Answer. DHS recognizes the unique talents at each of the DOE
national laboratories, and is committed to maximizing opportunities for
all the DOE laboratories in support of homeland security. We believe
that by allowing the national laboratories to support S&T either
through programmatic partnerships or project-based work, maximum
efficiency in resource utilization may also be achieved.
S&T conducts full and open competitions for a majority of its
research, development, testing and evaluation programs through Broad
Agency Announcements. The Office of Research and Development will
continue to conduct performance-based work with the national
laboratories.
Question. Knowing that Congress debated and rejected proposals for
folding one or more national labs into DHS when it was creating the new
department, under what authority does DHS now proceed with this same
concept, but administratively instead of legislatively?
Answer. The research, development, testing and evaluation
capabilities needed to support the missions of the Department of
Homeland Security are being defined and institutionalized within the
Department. Support of those needs now and in the future requires the
establishment and support of an enduring capability that includes
scientists and engineers who are well-versed in the requirements and
technologies associated with homeland security, and dedicated to the
mission of the Department, as well as physical facilities that support
their efforts. The legislation creating the Department of Homeland
Security and the Science and Technology Directorate recognized that
many of these needed capabilities exist within the Department of
Energy's laboratories and sites and provided for access to them in
support of the Department's mission.
The existing DOE laboratories have critical mass and expertise
across multiple disciplines to perform the necessary threat assessments
and, thus, to participate in DHS's and the S&T Directorate's internal
systems and analyses, associated trade studies, and long-range planning
that will form the basis for the architectures that are ultimately
developed and deployed to secure the homeland. These scientists will be
intimately involved in assisting the S&T Directorate in setting
research goals and requirements and formulating the research and
development roadmaps.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
R&D CONSOLIDATION
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request proposes to
consolidate R&D budgets from the Coast Guard, Emergency Preparedness
and Response Directorate, and from the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement bureau. Other research budgets, such as $154 million for
the Transportation Security Administration were not included in this
consolidation. What plans are there to consolidate all the Department's
research budgets within the Science & Technology Directorate? If so,
what is the timeline for completing the consolidation? What are the
benefits of consolidating R&D budgets under one Directorate? What
savings are anticipated by consolidating the Department's research
budgets under one roof?
Answer. We have begun the consolidation process by evaluating and
producing a report on the research, development, testing, and
evaluation work that was being conducted within the Department of
Homeland Security but was not already under the direct cognizance of
the Science and Technology Directorate. Where it is appropriate, the
Science and Technology Directorate will absorb these R&D functions. In
other cases, the Science and Technology Directorate will provide
appropriate input, guidance, and oversight of these R&D programs. We
expect to have this process completed by the end of fiscal year 2004 in
accordance with the Congressional directive.
Consolidation of the research and development functions of the
Department's components will significantly improve the Department's
overall ability to meet its mission. With consolidation, we can ensure
that operational end-user requirements and needs are being met by the
best science and technology that can be brought to bear on the problem,
whether that expertise comes from internal or external sources. We will
be able to enhance our efforts to avoid duplication of effort in the
R&D areas, and we fully expect to find synergies develop: what is
created to meet the requirements of one component may be able to be
fielded to support the needs--stated or not yet recognized--of another.
The specific cost savings expected will be identified as part of the
process of R&D consolidation.
DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
Question. When Secretary Ridge testified before the subcommittee in
February, he said that if a passenger wanted to board a plane with a
biological weapon, the Department does not currently have the capacity
to detect it. He said that acquiring such a capability is a top
priority for the science and technology directorate. How does your
budget address this issue?
Answer. The Biological Countermeasures portfolio in the S&T
Directorate is currently initiating systems studies to better define
needs and options for detection of a biological agent release aboard an
aircraft. Detection of a biological pathogen during the passenger
security screening process remains a difficult problem, but we are also
investigating potential detection options. It is possible that
modifications to current technology can provide interim capability
while the detection efforts described above can provide an improved
future capability.
UNIVERSITY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE
Question. In fiscal year 2004, Congress appropriated $68.8 million
for University programs under the Science and Technology Directorate.
When Under Secretary McQueary testified on March 2, he said that the 3
centers would be selected in fiscal year 2004 and the fiscal year 2005
budget request would be sufficient to maintain three centers. How many
centers would be selected in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 if
the budget request maintained the current level of funding instead of
cutting the program by $39 million?
Answer. In addition to the risk analysis and agro-terrorism centers
already selected in fiscal year 2004, we anticipate two more
solicitations for University-based Homeland Security Centers this
fiscal year. If the fiscal year 2004 level of funding were maintained
for fiscal year 2005 and beyond, an additional five Centers could be
selected. SAFECOM
The budget request for SAFECOM is $22.105 million. The Department's
budget justification states that this program is a cost-share program
and anticipates receiving $12.5 million from within DHS and $9.55
million from other Federal departments. Please provide the specific
contributions from each DHS component and from each of the other
Departments contributing to this program.
Question. How much was anticipated for SAFECOM in fiscal years 2003
and 2004 versus the amount reimbursed from other agencies? Please
provide the specific contributions from each DHS component and from
each of the other Departments contributing to this program.
On February 23, the Secretary said that ``the Department has
identified technical specifications for a baseline interoperable
communication system.'' Please describe these technical specifications
and how it will benefit first responders. What is the timeline to
implement these specifications? What is the cost impact of these
specifications? Will the Department establish a separate funding
mechanism to assist first responders pay for this short-term solution?
Answer. The chart below outlines the funding for SAFECOM expected
for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, and the actual amount
collected by the program in fiscal year 2003. It is the current
expectation that all fiscal year 2004 funding provided by DHS is from
the Chief Information Officer's wireless account.
SAFECOM FUNDING
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Actual fiscal Anticipated
year 2003 fiscal year
Agency Funds 2004 Funds
Contributed Contributed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA.................................... 1.431 1.520
DOD..................................... 3.345 1.770
DOE..................................... 1.431 1.430
HHS..................................... 1.431 1.520
DHS..................................... .............. 12.520
DoI..................................... .............. 2.951
DoJ..................................... .............. 4.312
Treasury................................ 9.500 ..............
-------------------------------
Total............................. 17.138 26.023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department will require certain minimum specifications relating
to interim interoperable solutions, such as cross-band repeaters and
patching units. These specifications will allow public safety
practitioners to clearly articulate what technical requirements must be
met by vendors of communications equipment so that purchases made in
the short term are successfully targeted at equipment that meets their
immediate needs. Since many commercial units are already capable of
meeting these requirements, the cost of these units should be
unaffected.
The Department is still exploring options for funding and will
release an implementation timeline accordingly.
GRANTS & CONTRACTS
Question. Of the funds appropriated in fiscal year 2004, provide a
table that shows the number of grants provided, the amount for each
grant, the recipient, and the purpose. Provide the same information for
contractual agreements.
Answer. See table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type Amount Project Title/Purpose Performer Procurement Agent
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BAA.................................. $30,000,000 Technical Support Working Group, Rapid Prototyping..... Multiple Awards Pending................................ Naval System Management
Activity
BAA.................................. 6,045,595 Fund for RA 03-01, Detection Systems for Biological and Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Chemical Countermeasures (DSBCC), TTA-3 and TTA-5.
BAA.................................. 5,710,000 Scene Understanding (NRL BAA 55-03-02 Artificial Multiple Awards Pending................................ Navy Research Lab
Intelligence Technologies & BAA 55-03-05 Advanced
Intelligence Technologies).
BAA.................................. 5,230,000 Threat Vulnerability, Intelligence and Information Multiple Awards Pending................................ Navy Research Lab
Analysis, and Warning Capabilities of DHS (BAA 04-02).
BAA.................................. 6,196,909 Detection Systems for Biological and Chemical Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Countermeasures (RA 03-01 TTA-4).
BAA.................................. 2,070,000 Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) (Air Force Multiple Awards Pending................................ Air Force Research Lab
Research Lab/Information Grid System BAA 03-18-IFKA
Cyber Defensive & Offensive Operations Technology).
BAA.................................. 54,589,000 Funds for BAA 04-01 (Rad/Nuc Countermeasures Systems Multiple Awards Pending................................ U.S. Navy Space and Air
Architectures Analysis) and BAA 04-02 (Rad/Nuc Warfare Center (SPAWAR)
Detection Systems),.
BAA.................................. 2,050,000 Large Scale Network Security Test & Evaluation Datasets Multiple Awards Pending................................ DOI/NBC
Program (DOI/NBC BAA 03-05-FH).
BAA.................................. 10,000,000 Fund for RA 03-01, Detection Systems for Biological and Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Chemical Countermeasures (DSBCC), TTA-5.
BAA.................................. 102,000 Evaluation Plan for BAA 04-02, Detection Systems for Oak Ridge National Laboratory.......................... DOE
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures (DSRNC)
HSARPA Review Support.
BAA.................................. 7,000,000 Phase II B Funding for RA 03-01, Detection Systems for Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Biological and Chemical Countermeasures (DSBCC) TTA-2.
BAA.................................. 896,600 Live Agent Testing Evaluation (RA 03-01 TTA 3/4/5-- Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Portable High-Throughput Integrated Laboratory
Identification System, Lightweight Autonomous Chemical
Identification System, Autonomous Rapid Facility
Chemical Agent Monitor).
--------------
BAA Total...................... 129,890,104
==============
Contract............................. 6,000,000 Counter MANPADS Development and Demonstration Phase.... Awards Pending......................................... DHS
Contract............................. 60,000 Support for Model OT Agreement Analyses................ Logistics Management Institute (LMI)................... DHS
Contract............................. 4,678,601 Counter MANPADS Program Support........................ SRS Technologies....................................... Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Contract............................. 859,873 Operational and Support Staffing for Office of Weapons ANSER Corp............................................. DHS
of Mass Destruction (WMDO).
Contract............................. 208,750 Enhancing International Travel Security................ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.. Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
Contract............................. 5,058 Additional Funding for Goods Used ISO Biowatch......... VWR International...................................... CoastGuard
Contract............................. 371,440 Bio Watch Operations Support........................... Booz Allen Hamilton.................................... Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
Contract............................. 57,120 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Analysis Support............... SRA International...................................... Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
Contract............................. 90,000 ORION--GPS Integration................................. Orion Electronics (Award Pending)...................... Department of Interior,
Gov Works
Contract............................. 900,000 Support of Civil Aviation Security Systems Engineering Center for Naval Analysis Corporation (CNAC)........... DHS
Study.
Contract............................. 282,951 Programmatic and Technical Management Support to the SPARTA, Inc............................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
Director, ORD.
--------------
Contract Total................. 13,513,793
==============
Grant................................ 3,310,826 DHS Scholarship/Fellowship Program..................... Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE). DOE
Grant................................ 4,000,000 University of Southern California--University Programs University of Southern California...................... DHS/FEMA
Grant.
--------------
Grant Total.................... 7,310,826
==============
RA................................... 270,000 IDA Chemical Hazard Analysis........................... Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)................... DOD Washington
Headquarters Service
(WHS)
RA................................... 161,998 South Florida Hawkeye Project fiscal year 2004, BTS.... Coast Guard HQ......................................... DHS/USCG
RA................................... 1,131,679 DHS Cyber Security Testbed............................. UC Berkeley, USC, UC Davis, Penn State, Purdue, ICIR.. National Science
Foundation (NSF)
RA................................... 2,300,000 South Florida Hawkeye Project fiscal year 2004, BTS.... United States Coast Guard.............................. DHS/USCG
RA................................... 230,000 Study of Emerging Threats and Evolving Technologies.... Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)................... DOD Washington
Headquarters Service
(WHS)
RA................................... 390,750 Recognizing Emotion In Speech.......................... Columbia Univ.......................................... National Science
Foundation (NSF)
RA................................... 382,500 Automated Intent Determination (AutoID)................ Dr Mark Adkins, Univ of Arizona........................ Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
RA................................... 624,196 VACIS Image Processing and Projection (IPP)............ SAIC................................................... DHS
RA................................... 64,600 Perimeter Security System.............................. NAVSEA................................................. NAVSEA
RA................................... 500,000 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Security Analysis and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). National Institute of
Evaluation of Large Scale BGP Attacks. Standards and Technology
(NIST)
RA................................... 2,500,000 Surveillance--RODS Decision Enhancements for The RODS-U of Pitt......................................... NAVSEA
BioWatch System.
RA................................... 3,000,000 Surveillance--ESSENCE Implementation of ESSENCE Johns Hopkins.......................................... NAVSEA
Biosurveillance Systems.
RA................................... 200,000 Technical Advisory Group (TAG) to HSARPA on Bioaerosol Multiple Awards Pending................................ Edgewood Chemical and
sensor testing and evaluation methodology. Biological Center
RA................................... 10,853,444 PSITEC, technology clearinghouse....................... Public Safety and Security Institute for Technology.... U.S. Navy Space and Air
Warfare Center (SPAWAR)
RA................................... 390,750 Recognizing and Understanding Emotion in Speech Navy Research Lab......................................
Columbia University.
RA................................... 382,500 Automated Intent Determination (AutoID)................ University of Arizona.................................. Navy Research Lab
RA................................... 3,450,000 Bioinformatics and Assay Development Program........... Multiple Awards Pending................................ Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
RA................................... 6,000,000 Rapid Prototyping...................................... Multiple Awards Pending................................ Navy Research Lab
RA................................... 50,000 Provides funding for Evaluation Plan for BAA 04-02, Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
Detection Systems for Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures (DSRNC).
RA................................... 76,000 Evaluation Plan for BAA 04-02, Detection Systems for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures (DSRNC).
RA................................... 6,888 Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction--Computer DHS/GSA Schedule....................................... DHS
Equipment.
RA................................... 2,500,000 Evaluation of a Deployed Biosurveillance System........ Potomac Institute...................................... Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
RA................................... 539,720 Port Authority NY/NJ Testbed--PNNL..................... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 500,000 Port Authority NY/NJ Testbed--SRTC..................... Savannah River Technology Center....................... DOE
RA................................... 1,000,000 Port Authority NY/NJ Testbed--EML...................... Environmental Measurements Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 506,452 DHS Industry Forum..................................... Center for Technology Commercialization (CTC).......... DOJ, Office of Justice
Programs
RA................................... 412,988 Port Authority NY/NJ Test Bed PNNL: Sys Analysis....... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 13,000,000 Radiological /Nuclear Test and Evaluation Complex...... Bechtel Nevada......................................... DOE
RA................................... 175,000 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Nuclear Camp Peary AFETA....................................... Armed Forces Experimental
Assessment Training. Training Activity
(AFETA)--Camp Peary
RA................................... 66,570 Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction--Secure Portable DHS.................................................... DHS
Phones.
RA................................... 5,000 DHS Facilities/GSA Support of S&T, letterhead, etc..... General Services Administration........................ DHS
RA................................... 250,000 Interagency Board...................................... Battelle supporting Interagency Board (IAB)............ DHS
RA................................... 13,244,400 Bio Watch Operations Support........................... Environmental Protection Agency........................ EPA
RA................................... 262,500 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Analysis of AssumptionGeneral GSA....................................................
Services Administration.
RA................................... 41,680 Second Intelligence and Security Informatics Symposium National Science Foundation (NSF)...................... National Science
(ISI 2004). Foundation (NSF)
RA................................... 2,500,000 DHS Facilities/GSA Support of S&T Relocation........... General Services Administration........................ DHS
RA................................... 8,500,000 Homeland Security Institute............................ Award Pending.......................................... Ft. Detrick, USAMRAA
RA................................... 103,079 TDY Support to Chemical Countermeasures Portfolio U.S. U.S. Army..............................................
Army Edgewood Center.
RA................................... 5,000,000 USCG Research & Development............................ U.S. Coast Guard....................................... USCG
RA................................... 80,000 Point Defense Against Aircraft Attack.................. Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)................... DOD Washington
Headquarters Service
(WHS)
RA................................... 18,965 John Rein 90 Day Extension............................. NETC................................................... Naval Education and
Training Center
RA................................... 489,322 Strategic Planning..................................... Award Pending.......................................... Gov Works
RA................................... 170,500 Professional & Engineering Services.................... Award Pending.......................................... Department of Interior,
Gov Works
RA................................... 480,000 Support for Planning Documents......................... Touchstone Corp........................................ Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
RA................................... 2,601,000 Border Safe Integrated Feasibility Experiment Phase II. Corporation for National Research Initiatives (CNRI)... Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
RA................................... 25,000 Support of International Meeting of Biometrics Experts. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). National Institute of
Standards and Technology
(NIST)
RA................................... 100,000 Enhanced International Travel Security Support......... Asian Technology Information Program (ATIP)............ Office of Naval Research
RA................................... 100,000 DHS Canada Collaboration............................... Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
RA................................... 86,400 Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Workshop........... Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
RA................................... 216,250 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Argonne National Laboratory............................ DOE
Continuation Program--ANL.
RA................................... 5,820,000 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
Continuation Program--LLNL.
RA................................... 2,589,500 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
Continuation Program--LANL.
RA................................... 2,188,750 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
Continuation Program--SNL.
RA................................... 598,875 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
Continuation Program--PNNL.
RA................................... 567,500 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.................. DOE
Continuation Program--LBNL.
RA................................... 75,000 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Oak Ridge National Laboratory.......................... DOE
Continuation Program--ORNL.
RA................................... 62,500 Chemical Biological National Program (CBNP) Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory DOE
Continuation Program--INEEL.
RA................................... 4,215,475 Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)--First Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).............. DHS
Quarter fiscal year 2004 Continuation Funding.
RA................................... 10,166,544 Plum Island Animal Disease Center O&M.................. Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).............. DHS
RA................................... 1,060,400 Environmental Measurements Lab......................... Environmental Measurements Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 6,930,000 Threat Vulnerability Integration Systems Pilot (TVIS)-- Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
LLNL.
RA................................... 3,870,000 Threat Vulnerability Integration Systems Pilot (TVIS)-- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
PNNL.
RA................................... 1,480,050 Yarrow Behavioral Analysis Technical Support Nuclear Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
Assessment Program.
RA................................... 250,409 PNNL Support to Emergency Preparedness and Response Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
Program.
RA................................... 800,000 Weapons of Mass Destruction--Nuclear Assessment Program Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
(NAP).
RA................................... 100,000 Weapons of Mass Destruction--Nuclear Assessment Program Oak Ridge National Laboratory.......................... DOE
(NAP).
RA................................... 4,525,000 Nuclear Assessment Program, Credibility Assessment..... Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 320,000 Nuclear Assessment Program, Forensic Tech Support...... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 1,900,000 EPR Scientific Support to FEMA......................... Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 2,229,225 ARS Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).............. DHS
Scientific Support.
RA................................... 45,980 ARS Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) Admin PLUM/Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)......... DHS
Support.
RA................................... 1,200,000 Developing a Critical Infrastructure Protection Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS).
RA................................... 1,200,000 Developing a Critical Infrastructure Protection Argonne National Laboratory............................ DOE
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS).
RA................................... 400,000 Developing a Critical Infrastructure Protection Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS).
RA................................... 1,200,000 Developing a Critical Infrastructure Protection Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
Decision Support System (CIP/DSS).
RA................................... 1,500,000 BioWatch--Orange Alert Expanded Sample Analysis........ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 1,514,000 RadNuc Countermeasures--PNNL........................... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 3,313,000 Rad-Nuc Countermeasures PEP--LANL...................... Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
RA................................... 101,900 NRC Workshop Conference................................ National Research Council (NRC)........................ DOE
RA................................... 700,000 Advanced Scientific Computing--SNL..................... Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
RA................................... 4,776,000 Advanced Scientific Computing--LLNL.................... Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 85,811 Advanced Scientific Computing--ORNL.................... Oak Ridge National Laboratory.......................... DOE
RA................................... 2,500,000 National & Regional Visual Analytics Centers........... Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................. DOE
RA................................... 250,000 Environmental Measurements Laboratory Second Qtr Environmental Measurements Laboratory.................. DOE
Funding for fiscal year 2004.
RA................................... 1,298,500 CBNP fiscal year 2003 Continuation and New Start Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
Funding.
RA................................... 4,833,500 CBNP fiscal year 2003 Continuation and New Start Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
Funding.
RA................................... 1,500,000 Photofission-Based Nuclear Material Detection and Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory DOE
Characterization.
RA................................... 1,600,000 (Tri-Lab) Threat-Capability Assessments--LANL.......... Los Alamos National Laboratory......................... DOE
RA................................... 1,600,000 (Tri-Lab) Threat-Capability Assessments--LLNL.......... Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DOE
RA................................... 1,600,000 (Tri-Lab) Threat-Capability Assessments--SNL........... Sandia National Laboratory............................. DOE
RA................................... 15,300,000 First Responder CBRNE Protective and Operational National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). DHS
Equipment Standards Development Program.
RA................................... 280,000 RADNUC Attribution Advisor............................. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................. DHS
RA................................... 255,000 Border Safe Phase II................................... SPAWAR................................................. DHS
RA................................... 2,257,098 Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) O&M Services Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).............. DHS
Contract--Remainder of funding.
RA................................... 1,199,370 ORISE Merit Review for HS Centers...................... Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE). DOE
--------------
RA Total....................... 186,199,518
==============
SBIR................................. 17,170,000 Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR)...... Multiple Awards Pending................................ Department of the
Interior National
Business Center/Fort
Huachuca
--------------
SBIR Total..................... 17,170,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question Submitted By Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Question. I continue to have constituent businesses contact my
office to ask for information about grant opportunities from the
Department of Homeland Security. My staff has requested a briefing from
the Science and Technology Directorate. However, the requested briefing
has so far not been provided. Upon researching on the website, my staff
came upon an invitation to attend a Department of Homeland Security
Industry Forum. Mr. Chairman, I request that a copy of this notice be
placed in the record.
I would like to quote from this announcement:
This two-day forum will provide industry the opportunity to hear,
first-hand, what technology needs and requirements DHS will have in the
coming years. DHS staff will provide detailed briefings on technology
R&D and T&E requirements for the Department, as well as, where and when
to apply for DHS funding.
A brief itinerary and list of speakers, including several members
of your staff, is attached. This sounds like a great forum that my
staff and constituents would be interested to attend. However, a list
of registration fees is also included. The fees range from $425 for
members of the government to $625 for private industry. I was surprised
to learn of the high cost to attend this government briefing. Why are
government employees required to pay $425 to learn about these funding
opportunities? Why is DHS charging other entities for this information?
Answer. Fees for this conference were maintained at levels as low
as we believed feasible. In accordance with standard government
practice, fees were set to help offset the costs of conducting a public
forum rather than supporting the conference with public funds.
______
Questions Submitted to Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
BIODEFENSE COUNTERMEASURES (BIOSHIELD)
Question. The President's budget proposes to transfer the Strategic
National Stockpile back to the Department of Health and Human Services
but not project Bioshield. IAIP's role in the project BioShield is to
make the threat assessments necessary to determine proper BioShield
investments which is the rationale for the Department of Homeland
Security having responsibility for this program.
What assessments have been carried out by Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection of our vulnerabilities to biological attacks
to guide decisions as to the investments which should be made to
develop, produce and pre-purchase vaccines or other medications from
BioShield?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has been assigned a
role in several bioterror initiatives. One such initiative, Project
BioShield, specifies DHS work with the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and several other Federal agencies to ensure resources
are available to combat a sudden chemical or biological attack. The
central premise for this program is the government must prepare for
such attacks by acquiring the best vaccines/drugs for pathogens such as
smallpox, anthrax and botulinum toxin. To do so, current Project
BioShield guidelines require DHS evaluate likely biological/chemical
threats and identify promising bioresearch R&D to best address such an
attack.
DHS is currently involved in an initiative designed to protect the
Nation against bioterrorism. This initiative, known as the Bio-
Surveillance Program, has been in operation since 2003. This program
not only enhances on-going surveillance in areas such as human health,
hospital preparedness, State and local preparedness, vaccine research
and procurement, animal health, food and agriculture safety and
environmental monitoring but will integrate these data streams with
intelligence data in a comprehensive fashion.
IAIP's role in the Bio-Surveillance Program is developing a real-
time system for harvesting data on the health of our population,
animals, plants, and food supply, as well integrating this information
with environmental monitoring and intelligence data. This integration
can enable better decision-making and a more rapid Federal, State, and
local response. Coordination between DHS and the Department of Health
and Human Services and the Department of Agriculture is ongoing. This
data exchange will help DHS, HHS, and other Federal agencies evaluate
potential health threats and guide bioterrorism preparedness resource
investments.
CYBER SECURITY
Question. The National Cyber Security Division, as part of the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate,
recently unveiled the National Cyber Alert System which intends to
deliver information to home computer users and technical experts in
business and government agencies to better secure their computer
systems from the latest computer viruses.
What progress has been made by the National Cyber Security Division
to prevent the spread of this computer virus as well as future virus
and worm outbreaks?
Answer. The lynch pin to preventing the spread of computer viruses
and worm outbreaks is a robust and mutually beneficial relationship
with the private sector. Cyber security is often a reactive process
because the initiative rests with hackers and malicious agents.
Developing and maintaining a partnership with the private sector is
therefore a crucial means to both responding quickly to emerging
threats and taking proactive measures to forefend against potential
threats. The DHS/US-CERT Partner Program is composed of members that
recognize their responsibility to their organizations and the Nation to
improve the current and future state of cyber security. Members
collectively and individually realize the need to take action and abide
by principles and practices that are appropriate as critical
infrastructure operators, communities of interest, vulnerability
researchers, educators, and software vendors. The Partner Program
consists of participants from various sectors of the cyber community
who must agree to meet certain criteria in order to achieve the
designation of DHS/US-CERT partner. These criteria are designed with
the aim of preventing occurrences such as the spread of computer
viruses and worms and other malicious activities.
Another important tool for the prevention of worms and viruses is
the National Cyber Alert System. Americans are exhibiting a keen
interest in the alert system. On day one of the National Cyber Alert
System launch, we had more than one million hits to the US-CERT
website. Today, more than 250,000 direct subscribers are receiving
National Cyber Alerts to enhance their cyber security. Through the
alert systems, Americans are able to receive information that is
accurate and actionable. It is our goal to inform the public about the
true nature of a given incident, what the facts are, and what steps
they can and should take to address the problem. The offerings of the
National Cyber Alert System provide that kind of information. To date,
we have issued seven security tips, six security bulletins, ten
technical alerts, and six non-technical cyber alerts in response to
cyber security incidents through the National Cyber Alert System. We
strive to make sure the information provided is understandable to all
computer users, technical and non-technical, and reflect the broad
usage of the Internet in today's society. As we increase our outreach,
the National Cyber Alert System is investigating other vehicles to
distribute information to as many Americans as possible.
Question. What is the relationship of the National Cyber Security
Division with the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (T-TIC) on
combating computer viruses by terrorists?
Answer. NCSD, in partnership with DHS/IAIP/IA works intensively
with the law enforcement and intelligence communities including the
TTIC in order to develop a comprehensive threat, risk, attribution
assessment and response capability.
Question. What law enforcement agency has primary jurisdiction in
enforcing cyber crimes?
Answer. No single law enforcement agency has primary jurisdiction
in the investigation of cyber crime. The FBI and Secret Service are the
most visible, pervasive agencies, but other organizations, such as the
IRS' Office of the Inspector General or ICE's Cyber Smuggling Division,
have specialized areas of responsibility in the areas of enforcing
cyber laws.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM
Question. The Homeland Security Advisory System has evolved from a
nationwide threat level status to more specific targeted areas since
the latest threat level decrease in January. While the threat level is
currently at an ``Elevated Condition'', or code yellow, specific cities
and the aviation sector remain at the ``High Condition'', or code red.
This more targeted threat level status helps focus limited resources on
the most credible threat areas and at the same time allows law
enforcement and first responders in other parts of the country to
``stand down'' while remaining vigilant. In recent testimony, Secretary
Loy testified that the Department was ``very close'' to unveiling a
system that would allow specific threat warnings to about a dozen
economic sectors.
With the improvement of intelligence that has included detailed
specific terrorist threats for certain metropolitan areas and specific
sectors of industry, what further enhancements do you envision for the
Homeland Security Advisory System?
Answer. With each raising and lowering of the Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS), the Department of Homeland Security learns new
lessons and improves its notification process. As the system has
evolved, it has come to reflect the need for certain metropolitan areas
and/or specific areas of industry to be notified at different times or
at different levels than others. As such, DHS has become adept at
providing information to such specific audiences as states and sectors
through Homeland Security Information Bulletins and Advisories.
Additionally, Department officials speak personally with
representatives and officials of threatened States and industries, when
the need arises. This personal communication, along with the ability of
the system to allow DHS to communicate to certain areas what their
alert level should be embody the enhancements that have been needed
this far.
Question. Are you looking to enhance or improve upon any of the
eight existing Federal warning systems that are currently being
operated nationwide?
Answer. Yes. With the $10,000,000 provided to IAIP in last year's
Homeland Security Appropriations Conference Report (108-280) we plan to
enhance and upgrade NOAA Weather Radio and the Emergency Alert System
(EAS), and possibly other systems. A few vital efforts have been
identified for immediate funding. Those include improving the coverage
and survivability of the EAS by (1) installing a satellite-based
message delivery capability and (2) by adding EAS stations to all 50
States (to include State Emergency Operations Centers) and U.S.
territories. Also, there are pilot projects planned to: (1) examine how
reverse 911 can be used to help disseminate alert and warning
information; and (2) demonstrate how new technologies such as digital
TV broadcasts/datacasting using spectrum offered by public TV can be
used to improve our ability to alert the American public. These three
projects represent a portion of the $10,000,000, but the bulk of the
funding will be allocated after completion of a study of available and
planned alert and warning systems to develop integrated, capabilities-
based architecture recommendations. This study will be completed by the
end of summer.
HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION NETWORK
Question. Another enhancement being made by the Department in the
area of information sharing is the new Homeland Security Information
Network which will be able to disseminate threat information to
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies.
Is the Department on schedule to complete the first phase of the
network this summer, and what is the targeted deadline to complete the
flow of real-time information to all relevant end-users throughout the
country?
Answer. The Department is on schedule to meet the summer deadline.
We plan to begin expansion of HSIN to the county level, in conjunction
with the each State's individual rollout plans, by the end of year. By
the beginning of next year, we plan to be actively engaged with other
homeland security partners, such as the private sector, to support
further real time, secure collaborative information flow.
Question. How will the Homeland Security Information Network be
different from the Joint Regional Information Exchange System and
Regional Information Sharing Systems which are already in place and in
use?
Answer. The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is the
overarching network for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
provide information exchange and real time collaboration between
Federal, State, and municipal authorities. Within the initial program
there will be four HSIN areas: HSIN/DM (Decision Maker-used by Federal,
State and Urban area homeland security advisors); HSIN/EOC (used
primarily by Federal, State and urban emergency operations centers);
HSIN/NG (used primarily by the NGB and the State adjutant generals);
and the HSIN/JRIES (used primarily by law enforcement and intelligence
agencies). This summer, other areas within HSIN, like the Secret and
DHSInfo areas will be activated. HSIN is the umbrella program under
which all of these virtually private networks are contained.
While there is a need to be able to disseminate intelligence
information across the full spectrum of the HSIN system, the primary
HSIN tools to be used for intelligence dissemination will be the HSIN/
JRIES (Law Enforcement and intelligence information) area and the HSIN/
Secret network (JRIES at the Secret level). This will initially run on
the National Guard (SIPRNet) backbone then migrate to the HSDN network
once the DHS classified system becomes operational.
The goal of HSIN is to have an integrated system that uses the same
tools and applications. These applications will run on separate areas
of the HSIN network defined by the user group's clearance, need to
know, and need to act as approved by DHS.
CYBER SECURITY
Question. The Department's new initiative ``Live Wire'' will test
civilian agencies' security preparedness and contingency planning by
staging cyber attack exercises to evaluate the impact of widespread
computer disruptions. Recent instances, such as the power outages in
the Northeast this past August, are an example of how an attack on our
critical infrastructures, such as a cyber attack by terrorists on our
Nation's utility industry, could cascade across a wide region if the
proper precautions are not taken immediately.
What was learned from previous simulated terrorist attacks on the
Nation's cyber infrastructure, and how will ``Live Wire'' build upon
current programs?
Answer. Strategically, Livewire demonstrated the impact of a cyber-
based attack on critical infrastructures. The exercise highlighted the
interdependencies among our critical infrastructures and underscored
the requirement for enhanced cross-sector cooperation. At the tactical
level, Livewire demonstrated the need to enhance processes for
communicating cyber protection information to the public and for two-
way information sharing with the private sector. Livewire prompted us
to enhance our vulnerability identification and reduction capabilities.
This drove us to create the Cyber Interagency Incident Management Group
(Cyber IIMG) to coordinate intergovernmental preparedness and response
operations. It also spurred us to expand the reach of emergency
communications capabilities using a technologically advanced, secure
network. In addition, we launched the National Cyber Alert System as a
dissemination mechanism to provide the broadest population of public
stakeholders with accessible, relevant, actionable alerts and
information.
Question. How do you coordinate ``Live Wire'' exercises with
private industry to test their cyber infrastructure vulnerabilities,
and what gaps in coordination have been revealed between government
agencies and the private sector?
Answer. Whereas the first responder and emergency management
communities have been exercising at national, regional, and local
levels for many years, the cyber response community has only formed
over the past decade or so. There have been very few cyber-focused
exercises at any level. Efforts to coordinate an effective cyber
response capability across State and local jurisdictions and economic
sectors are only beginning.
The Federal Government cannot by itself defend cyberspace from
current or future threats. Acknowledging this, NCSD collaborates with
industry and public-sector stakeholders across the country to define,
develop, and exercise the major elements of a national cyber-space
security response system. Its goals for the National Exercise Program
(NEP) are to:
--Sensitize a diverse constituency of private and public-sector
decision-makers to a variety of potential cyber threats
including strategic attack;
--Familiarize this constituency with DHS' concept of a national cyber
response system and the importance of their role in it;
--Practice effective collaborative response to a variety of cyber
attack scenarios, including crisis decision-making;
--Provide an environment for evaluation of inter-agency and inter-
sector business processes reliant on information
infrastructure;
--Measure the progress of ongoing United States efforts to defend
against an attack;
--Foster improved information sharing among government agencies and
between government and industry;
--Identify new technologies that could provide earlier warning of
attacks;
--Sort roles and responsibilities of government agencies and
industry.
NCSD's involvement in the NEP will be guided by two principles: (1)
Cyber is only one element of a multifaceted NEP; cyber elements must be
closely coordinated with other elements of that program to ensure
efficient use of limited resources and the most effective return on
exercise investments; (2) Cyber exercise elements must not be sidelined
or relegated to an ``afterthought'' category within the NEP.
Although the NEP is the responsibility of the Office of Domestic
Preparedness (ODP), the NCSD will retain overall responsibility for
planning and execution of adequate cyber response exercises. The NCSD
shall identify a NEP cyber exercise program manager, ensure adequate
resources are available for cyber elements of the NEP, including
personnel, define NEP cyber exercise objectives and metrics, prioritize
NEP cyber exercise events, solicit Federal agency and department
participation in cyber-focused elements of the NEP, and initiate or
approve Statements of Work for contracted cyber exercise activities.
Wherever appropriate, the NCSD will coordinate ODP on funding and
personnel issues.
The NCSD requires a set of cyber-focused exercises that build
grassroots cyber response capabilities quickly while also elevating the
concept of strategic cyber attacks and maturing a national cyberspace
security response system capable of dealing with them. Cyber-focused
exercises must include a series of regularly scheduled ``Building
Block'' exercises followed by a culminating, nationally scoped exercise
similar to Livewire, also the continuation of tabletop events hosted by
the USSS (Electronic Crimes task Forces).
We also require that cyber be included as an important element in
targeted NEP events that do not have a cyber focus. Examples are
TOPOFF, FEMA (EP&R) readiness exercises, and policy-focused seminars
for senior officials. Each of these exercise events should include
cyber scenarios and cyber responders.
NATIONAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
Question. Recently published was the interim final rule for the
voluntary submittal of critical infrastructure information by private
industry to the Department of Homeland Security with assurances that
the proprietary data submitted would be safe from public disclosure.
What level of cooperation with private industry do you anticipate
as you gather information on the Nation's critical infrastructures?
Answer. It is difficult to forecast the extent to which private
industry will voluntarily share critical infrastructure information
with DHS. We only know that private industry has consistently stated in
the past that two barriers to sharing information with the government
were concerns that (1) the information would be released to the public
under the Freedom of Information Act and (2) the disclosure could
create a civil liability for the company sharing the information. The
Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 and the Interim Final
Rule which implements it, we believe, removes these two barriers to
information sharing with the government.
Question. How will the publishing of this rule help the Department
in its effort to safeguard the country's privately-held critical
infrastructures?
Answer. The CII Act and implementing regulations provide private
industry assurances that critical infrastructure information they
voluntarily share with the government will be protected from release to
the public and from use in civil litigation. We believe the PCII
Program will enable the Department to receive critical infrastructure
information that would not have previously been available to the
government, thereby allowing for a better understanding of threats.
Question. What incentive is there for private industry to volunteer
information to the Federal Government?
Answer. Private industry realizes they can assist in efforts to
improve homeland security by volunteering information. What was needed
was a means for them to share information that is usually considered
proprietary and shielded from competition here and abroad. With the
protection from FOIA disclosure offered by the CII Act, we believe the
private sector can now share sensitive and confidential information
that we can be analyzed to identify threats and vulnerabilities. Such
analysis will provide the basis not only for developing measures to
deter the threats and mitigate the vulnerabilities to which the
critical infrastructure is exposed, but also for improving Federal,
State, and local governments' emergency preparedness posture to respond
to any attacks more effectively.
Question. In December of last year, a Homeland Security
Presidential Directive was issued to produce a comprehensive,
integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
Protection for all Federal departments and agencies to outline national
goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives to be completed
within 1 year.
With various departments and agencies previously conducting
assessments of their vulnerabilities, do you believe this directive can
be completed earlier than the deadline of December of this year?
Answer. The President intends that we meet the requirement to
develop the NIPP by December 2004, but, given the urgency of the need,
we will complete it earlier if possible.
Question. Has funding been requested in other departments' and
agencies' budgets outside of the Department of Homeland Security to
carry out the Presidential directive, or will the Department of
Homeland Security be requested to assist other agencies in the
assessment of critical infrastructures?
Answer. Under HSPD-7, Sector-Specific Agencies shall, among other
things, ``conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments'' of their
respective sectors in accordance with guidance provided by the
Department of Homeland Security. Each department and agency will need
to budget for efforts to carry out their HSPD-7 responsibilities and
provide that information to the President and the Congress.
Question. The Congress made available over $343,000,000 for
Remediation and Protective Actions for fiscal year 2004 for critical
infrastructure identification, to conduct vulnerability field
assessments of critical infrastructures, and to create a database of
vulnerabilities affecting the highest priority terrorist targets in
order to develop better security measures for the protection of
facilities and national assets.
What is the timeline of your Directorate for identifying our
Nation's critical infrastructures, and what progress has been made in
field assessments of the critical infrastructures that have already
been identified?
Answer. We have built the National Asset Database (NADB). It is a
comprehensive database designed to catalogue the Nation's critical
infrastructure and key assets (CI/KA). The central purpose for
constructing this database is to identify assets that may be attractive
targets to terrorists so measures can be taken to help mitigate risk.
There are now approximately 33,000 sites listed on the NADB, and DHS
continues to receive additional nominees from States and territories.
We view the NADB as a living database, therefore sites will be added or
removed as warranted by ongoing assessments. Inputs continue to be
received and from private industry as well as Federal, State and local
governments.
In regards to field assessments of identified critical
infrastructures, over the past 6 months DHS has conducted approximately
89 Site Assistance Visits (SAVs) for the highest priority sites and
produced 25 Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities (CCVs) reports
on vulnerabilities for specific classes of CI/KA.
We anticipate completing another 74 CCVs by the end of the fiscal
year and conduct any necessary SAVs.
Question. Who will retain the database of vulnerable critical
infrastructures, and who will have access to it?
Answer. DHS will retain the NADB. As we receives additional input
from States, territories, and other Federal agencies it will update/
maintain the NADB and share asset information with other DHS entities,
such as the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), to help prioritize
resource allocation for the implementation of protective measures to
safeguard our Nation's critical infrastructure and key assets. State-
specific information will also be shared with State Homeland Security
Advisors as appropriate both to solicit comments and to identify State
priorities. Appropriate access will be and is grant to private industry
concerning their data and assets.
Question. What type of security procedures for our Nation's
identified critical infrastructures have been implemented?
Answer. As priority assets are identified, we conduct risk analyses
and consequence of attack analyses to help determine which sites are at
greatest risk. PSD then develops plan templates and other tools to
assist owners and operators in developing Buffer Zone Protection Plans
(BZPPs) and site security protection plans. The BZPP helps develop
effective preventive measures that make it more difficult for
terrorists to conduct surveillance or launch attacks from the immediate
vicinity of a possible target.
office for domestic preparedness use of database information
Question. In recent testimony, Secretary Ridge cited that the
``maturity and growth'' of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate is allowing for better targeting of resources
for the Office for Domestic Preparedness in the decision-making process
for the distribution of grants to high threat areas across the country.
What improvements have been made over the past year by the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate to
assist the Office for Domestic Preparedness in making sure that Federal
funds are going to the areas where the threat of a terrorist attack is
the greatest?
Answer. IAIP assisted ODP in the identification of a set of
critical assets from the NADB that most warranted additional resources
to enhance their security for fiscal year 2004. This resulted in the
identification of approximately 1,700 assets onto a fiscal year 2004
list of assets warranting special attention for fiscal year 2004 funds.
Future development of the NADB and our efforts to identify and
prioritize national critical infrastructure and key assets will, we
believe, help us ensure the best protection of critical infrastructure
and best use of Federal resources.
Question. How will the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate work to share information catalogued in the
database of critical infrastructures with the Office for Domestic
Preparedness to target grants to the country's highest threat areas?
Answer. Similar to fiscal year 2004, an analytical framework will
be used to identify and prioritize assets on the expanded NADB, and
this information will be shared with ODP to help develop its lists of
assets that may require grant assistance in fiscal year 2005.
Intelligence capabilities 10. The President's budget proposes a
$19,300,000 decrease in funding for the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate in order to centrally fund the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (T-TIC) with other intelligence
programs and also to centrally fund the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center with Department of
Justice programs.
Question. Without the contribution of funding that the Department
of Homeland Security currently makes to the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center, do you believe that the Department will have an
adequate intelligence presence in T-TIC?
Answer. Yes. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will provide
10 percent, or 30 personnel, to the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center's (TTIC's) end goal of 300 personnel. This, as well as the close
working relationship that TTIC and the DHS Office of Information
Analysis (IA) have developed ensures an initial intelligence presence
at TTIC.
Question. What will the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection's role be in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the
Terrorist Screening Center without providing any funding of its own?
Answer. Per the explanation above, the DHS Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate's role in both TTIC and
the Terrorist Screening Center is the physical presence of personnel at
each location. DHS analysts will inform the TTIC's work. Conversely,
TTIC analysts will inform DHS' analysis. In addition to analytical
personnel, DHS senior leadership will retain their presence at each
center.
Question. How do you prevent a duplication of intelligence
gathering and intelligence analysis with the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center?
Answer. Terrorism analysis is a complex issue. It is an area where
a certain amount of multiple analyses from different perspectives is
preferred. To ensure no vital piece of intelligence is missed, the
analysis of terrorist information is a shared responsibility.
DHS' Office of Information Analysis (IA) analytical intelligence
mission is to protect the American homeland against terrorist attack.
To do so, IAIP maps terrorist threats and capabilities against assessed
vulnerabilities. IA also communicates information to State, local,
tribal, major city, and private sector officials. TTIC's primary
responsibility is the analysis of all international terrorism threat
information whether collected domestically or abroad.
Question. Without a request for funding within the Department of
Homeland Security for the integration of the multiple terrorist
watchlists, how will the Department of Homeland Security participate in
consolidating various agencies' terrorist lists?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is participating in the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) through physical location of personnel
in the center.
Question. Please distinguish the functions of T-TIC from the
intelligence functions of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate.
Answer. As a Directorate, IAIP enables, develops, and sustains the
capability to continuously identify, assess, and prioritize current and
future threats to the homeland, map those threats against
vulnerabilities, issue timely warnings, provide the basis from which to
organize protective measures to secure America, and assist in
coordinating the response and restoration of critical infrastructure
functions. Currently, IAIP is moving forward in carrying out our
statutory responsibilities which include:
--Providing the full range of intelligence support to senior DHS
leadership and component organizations and to State and local
and private sector respondents.
--Mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against assessed
vulnerabilities to drive our efforts to protect against
terrorist attacks
--Conducting independent analysis and assessments of terrorist
threats, including competitive analysis, tailored analysis, and
``red teaming''
--Assessing the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States
--Merging the relevant analyses and vulnerability assessments to
identify priorities for protective and support measures by the
Department, other government agencies, and the private sector
--As a full member of the Intelligence Community, the Office of
Information Analysis partnering with other IC members, TTIC,
law enforcement agencies, State and local partners, and the
private sector, as well as DHS' components to manage the
collection and processing of information involving threats to
the Homeland into usable, comprehensive, and actionable
information.
--Disseminating time sensitive warnings, alerts and advisories to
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments and private
sector infrastructure owners and operators
TTIC is an interagency joint venture of its partners. The TTIC
members include, but are not limited to, the Department of Justice/FBI,
DHS, CIA, National Security Agency, National Imagery and Mapping
Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State.
Through the input and participation of these partners, TTIC merges and
analyzes terrorist threat-related information, collected domestically
and abroad, in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat
picture, and disseminate such information to appropriate Federal
Government recipients. TTIC draws on the particular expertise of its
participating members--such as DHS' focus on homeland security and
CIA's focus on terrorism information collected overseas--thereby
ensuring that the terrorist analytic product takes advantage of, and
incorporates, the specialized perspectives of relevant Federal
agencies. TTIC provides comprehensive, all-source terrorist threat
analysis and assessments to U.S. national leadership.
Currently, DHS representatives are located at TTIC, working day-in-
day-out, participating in processing and analyzing terrorist threat-
related information, developing, shaping, and disseminating TTIC
products, assessing gaps in the available information, and ensuring
that TTIC products reach appropriate DHS Headquarters elements. Through
DHS, the necessary information, including threat descriptions,
suggested protective measures, and locations of additional information,
then reaches the appropriate State, local, tribal, major city and
private sector officials. Analysts assigned to TTIC ensure that TTIC's
work directly supports DHS' unique mission to protect the homeland. The
threat information integration and analysis that is the beginning, not
the end, of DHS' protective mission, will most effectively be carried
out, as Congressional and other reviews have recommended, when all
terrorism threat-related activities of the U.S. Government work
together seamlessly.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER
Question. Mr. Libutti, the Department of Homeland Security has
taken ownership of the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center, or NISAC. NISAC was developed by Sandia and Los Alamos National
Laboratories to simulate and analyze various events and the cascading
effects on critical infrastructure in the United States. Following the
September 11th terrorist attacks, NISAC took on added importance as the
Administration and Congress focused on homeland security. The fiscal
year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act had approximately
$23,000,000 for NISAC. Would you please give the Subcommittee the
status of the allocation of the fiscal year 2004 funding?
Answer. The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2004 did not
contain a specific line item for services to be provided by the
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC).
However, the Department has set aside $20,000,000 in October 2004 for
NISAC programmatic efforts to be performed by Los Alamos National
Laboratory ($10,000,000) and Sandia National Laboratory ($10,000,000).
Some of the planned NISAC activities include chlorine industry studies,
analyses of rail system and electric power disruptions, assessments of
Hurricane Isabel impacts on infrastructure, port and inland waterway
modeling, as well as urban infrastructure modeling.
Question. How much is in the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request to support activities by NISAC?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 request for the NISAC is $27,000,000.
Question. What are some of the activities envisioned in the fiscal
year 2005 budget for NISAC?
Answer. NISAC fiscal year 2005 activities are expected to include
expansion of the Center's developing National and Regional Tools into
additional regions and cities of the Nation. Additionally, NISAC will
begin developing consequence analysis and decision support tools to
support the following:
--Expansion of the urban infrastructure suites models for
transportation, telecommunications, water, public health and
energy to additional high threat urban areas.
--Expansion of the dynamic simulation models to selected east and
west coast ports.
--Expansion of the interdependent energy infrastructure simulation
system.
--Expansion and testing of the waterways asset prioritization tool in
concert with the U.S. Coast Guard and Army Corps of Engineers.
--Continued expert analysis and support to short term actions for the
Department's primary missions using the Center's developing
infrastructure models.
One of the items that transferred from the Department of Energy to
the Department of Homeland Security with NISAC was an appropriation of
$7,500,000 for the construction and equipping of a NISAC facility at
Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, which is adjacent
to Sandia National Lab. Those funds have not been released for their
intended purpose.
Question. What is the delay in moving forward on this important
facility?
Answer. IAIP continues to move forward with the plans to build the
facility, giving full consideration to the elements of the program and
our obligation to comply with NEPA and other Federal statutes
applicable to Federal construction projects.
Question. What is the status of the $7,500,000 appropriation
specifically for the NISAC facility? Are those funds being held for the
intended purpose?
Answer. IAIP continues to move forward with the plans to build the
facility, giving full consideration to the elements of the program and
our obligation to comply with NEPA and other Federal statutes
applicable to Federal construction projects.
Question. When can the Subcommittee expect the Department of
Homeland Security to break ground on the NISAC facility in New Mexico?
Answer. IAIP continues to move forward with the plans to build the
facility, giving full consideration to the elements of the program and
our obligation to comply with NEPA and other Federal statutes
applicable to Federal construction projects.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
Question. Gen. Libutti I would like to compliment you on your
approach to working with the national laboratories. It is clear that
your management team is committed to using the best capabilities
available in the most efficient way. In that vein, I would like to
invite you to visit the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory to learn more about how INEEL can contribute to your
engineering, testing, and evaluation needs. The INEEL is in the process
of standing up its national Critical Infrastructure Protection Test
Range. Your organization is now using some of the resources that exist
there. I think you will find it valuable to learn first hand the
breadth of capabilities they have to offer your organization and their
abilities to help you accelerate the implementation of many of your
programs.
In the longer term, I presume that testing and evaluating
technologies before deployment by IAIP will be an important part of
your mission.
How much value do you see in having a national critical
infrastructure protection test range available to you to accomplish
your mission?
Answer. I see great value in a facility that gives DHS the ability
to test and evaluate infrastructure protection Technologies. As you
noted, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(INEEL) provides just such a Test and Evaluation (T&E) and modeling
capability to DHS to help guide the development of critical
infrastructure protection systems.
INEEL has functional electrical grids, nuclear power plants and
chemical processing facilities on its premises. INEEL engineers have
been using this facility to conduct vulnerability and risk assessments
on critical infrastructure for years. Furthermore, the test range
itself is located in a remote and isolated area, giving the INEEL staff
the freedom to conduct real world, hands-on vulnerability assessments
without placing a local population at risk.
As you may know, the Protective Security Division (PSD) of IAIP
already is working with INEEL to address the vulnerabilities of our
Nation's critical infrastructure by developing a National SCADA Testbed
and a Process Control Security and Vulnerability Reduction Center. This
new and important partnership between DHS and INEEL will help protect
the Nation's critical infrastructure systems from both inadvertent
failures and malicious attacks.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Question. The budget for remediation and protection of critical
infrastructure includes the identification of critical infrastructure
and assessing vulnerabilities in addition to implementing remediation
and protection measures. For fiscal years 2004 and 2005, please
estimate, by critical infrastructure sector, the amounts actually spent
or planned to be spent on identifying critical infrastructure and
assessing vulnerabilities versus the amount spent on remediation or
protection of critical infrastructure. For protective measures, please
distinguish between investments made for ``buffer zones'' versus
investments made to harden security ``on site.''
According to the Department, 85 percent of the critical
infrastructure is owned by the private sector. In assessing the need
for Federal investments to secure our critical infrastructure, it will
be essential for Congress to have measurable benchmarks of private
sector investments in such infrastructure, such as investments in
chemical facilities, port security, and cyber-security. Please provide
the subcommittee with any benchmarks that have been established that
show the private sector is making the necessary investments to secure
our critical infrastructure and key assets.
Please explain in detail how the $19,900,000 appropriated in fiscal
year 2004 and the $19,900,000 requested in fiscal year 2005 will be
spent for ``Protective Security Centers.'' How many centers have been
established or planned to date and where are they located? How much
funding is needed for each center? What purpose does each center serve?
Answer. As a result of a mid-year review, two Protective Security
Centers are planned for fiscal year 2004; one is linked to NYPD and
another to LAPD. These centers, at a total cost of $10 million, will
assist DHS to (a) identify critical assets in metropolitan areas for
inclusion in national databases; (b) create partnerships between the
police departments and protective security officials in the private
sector to focus on combined protective activities; (c) reinforce
Federal-State-local incident management procedures; and (d) develop
training and exercise programs focused on protection vice response.
Additional centers may be established in fiscal year 2005 and
strategically located across the country to best serve law enforcement
agencies. Funds are being used for the physical build-out and
furnishing of the Centers with required infrastructure, computers and
other necessary equipment and supplies. The respective police
departments will staff the Centers.
CHEMICAL PLANT SECURITY
Question. The General Accounting Office recently testified that
``despite the industry's voluntary efforts, the extent of security
preparedness at U.S. chemical facilities is unknown.''
Explain IAIP's role in assessing vulnerabilities and taking
protective at chemical security plants? How much of IAIP's fiscal year
2004 and fiscal year 2005 budget, respectively, is dedicated to
chemical plant security. For each fiscal year, please specify the
amount spent or planned for vulnerability assessments, the number of
chemical plants IAIP will provide vulnerability assessments for in
fiscal years 2004 and 2005, and provide the amount planned for
protective actions. Please specify, in detail, the protective actions
IAIP will take in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to secure chemical plants.
Provide the amount of funding that is being spent to secure the area
surrounding chemical plants versus funding being spent to harden
security at the chemical plants themselves.
Due to the dynamic threat environment combined with the ongoing
effort to identify and prioritize the Nation's critical infrastructure
and key assets (CI/KA), IAIP budgets reflect efforts to reduce
vulnerabilities across all sectors to maximize flexibility in
responding to emerging threats. That said, in fiscal year 2004 over
$38.5 million of PSD's budget was dedicated to collecting, cataloging,
and analyzing vulnerability assessment information across all sectors.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget has dedicated $38.7 million
towards these efforts, enabling us to continue to reduce the
vulnerabilities of our Nation's CI/KA.
DHS has conducted approximately 19 Site Assistance Visits (SAVs)
specifically to chemical facilities to assess their common
vulnerabilities. The data collected during these site-specific visits
is used to produce tools to help critical infrastructure owners and
operators bolster protective measures.
One such tool is the Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities
(CCVs) report series on vulnerabilities for classes of critical
infrastructure and key assets (CI/KA). A CCV report for chemical
facilities and a separate CCV for chemical storage facilities have been
produced by PSD, and both are available to owners and operators of
these facilities.
Answer. We also are assisting State and local authorities, as well
as private industry, in developing Buffer Zone Protection Plans (BZPPs)
for areas immediately adjacent to the ``fence line'' of critical
infrastructure. The approximately 1,700 BZPPs completed by the end of
2004, included roughly 360 chemical sites warranting special attention.
For fiscal year 2004 we allocated up to $50,000 per CI/KA site for
vulnerability reduction. A data call is currently underway to support
the identification of sites for attention in fiscal year 2005 and
Protective Security Division (PSD) is excepting to complete roughly
2,000 BZPPs next year.
Building upon a program initiated in fiscal year 2004 (funded at
$3.25 million), the DHS fiscal year 2005 budget request has
approximately $10.8 million dedicated to the acquisition of web cam
monitors for the chemical sector. These monitors will be installed
adjacent to designated critical chemical sites to extend their buffer
zones and enhance protective measures. DHS' plan is to provide this
equipment to local law enforcement agencies to install on public right
of ways to monitor the security of these facilities.
DHS also has established a protection, training, and planning
program for State homeland security personnel, local law enforcement,
chemical facility operators and site security personnel. Periodic
drills among the protective community will be conducted to exercise
chemical facilities' response plans in case of a terrorist attack. PSD
will continue to work with the Office for Domestic Preparedness to
incorporate chemical plant security into national exercises.
We are also in the process of developing plans for and deploying
Protective Security Advisors (PSAs). Each PSA will have responsibility
for a specific region of the county and will maintain a close
relationship with the chemical plant owners and operations in their
specific area of responsibility. PSAs will facilitate information
sharing, organize protective security training, assist in emergency
coordination, and represent DHS in the communities in which they are
posted. Security Augmentation Teams (SATs) are also being developed.
SATs will consist of about 25 personnel who are drawn primarily from
major urban SWAT units. These SATs will focus on protecting high-value
sites, including critical chemical facilities, will develop working
relationships with the site's permanent protective security team, and
will become familiar with the site's specific vulnerabilities. The PSA
and SAT programs, still in their early stages and are being actively
pursued.
The activities described above in fiscal year 2004 and continued in
fiscal year 2005 will not only greatly increase chemical site security
and across all other sectors, but will increase our Nation's general
protective capacity.
INTEGRATED TERRORIST WATCH LIST
Question. What resources, if any, are being used in fiscal year
2004 and planned for fiscal year 2005 to integrate lists of terror
suspects held by different agencies? What is the timeline for having a
fully functional integrated watch list? What role will IAIP play in the
Terrorist Screening Center?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is allocating
approximately $8,000,000 to the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for
fiscal year 2004. In fiscal year 2005, DHS will not contribute funds to
the TSC, but will provide personnel detailed from DHS to the center.
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
personnel will continue DHS' contribution to this effort by maintaining
ongoing communication and coordination with the center. The Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) is fully operational now. On December 1, 2003
the TSC began 24/7 call center operations, coordination of the U.S.
Government response, ensuring information collected was distributed to
the appropriate entities, and established a process for addressing
outdated and erroneous terrorist records and misidentifications. The
database, TSDB, is currently limited to use at the TSC and will undergo
several enhancements between now and the end of the (calendar) year. At
that time, agencies will be able to electronically query the TSDB
directly and get a systematic response within seconds. Because the TSC
now maintains the terrorist information in the multiple systems used,
it can ensure all the information appropriate for these systems is
included.
IAIP STAFFING
Question. According to information the IAIP directorate provided to
the subcommittee, only 263 of 729 authorized positions were on board at
the end of February, 2004. IAIP projects that only 543 positions will
be filled by the end of fiscal year 2004. It would appear that IAIP
will be lapsing millions of dollars that Congress approved for
staffing. Do you intend to send the Committee a plan for reallocating
these funds? If so, provide a detailed plan for spending these excess
funds in fiscal year 2004.
Answer. A memorandum requesting reprogramming/transfer actions has
been submitted to congressional committees. This request notifies the
committees that IAIP will redirect $23,500,000 from salaries object
classes to other object classes for securing space to meet IAIP
requirements.
OBLIGATED FUNDING
Question. On March 1, the IAIP directorate provided the
subcommittee with an estimate of $426,077,292, which represented the
amount of fiscal year 2004 appropriated funds that either have been
obligated or committed. Please provide the amount obligated versus
committed. In addition, provide the amount of funding planned to be
spent via contract in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 versus in-house.
Answer. As of March 1 (February 29 accounting report), IAIP
obligations were $199,255,217. The remainder of $226,822,073 was
commitments on March 1 that are not yet signed contracts. As an update
to this answer, IAIP obligations as of March 31 were $364,419,840, and
as of April 30 were $382,475,764.
All of the IAIP Assessment and Evaluation funding of $711,085,630
will be spent via contract or intergovernmental payment. In house
salaries and expenses are in a separate Salaries and Expenses
appropriation.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Let me thank both of you for your
cooperation with our subcommittee and your attendance at the
hearing this morning. We hope that we will continue to be able
to work closely with you as we work our way through the budget
process, and that we provide the funds you need to do your job
and carry out your mission successfully.
I don't think we have any more important responsibility in
government than what we're doing here in the Department of
Homeland Security and in this subcommittee that provides the
funding for these activities.
We will stand in recess until the next hearing of our
subcommittee when we will continue our review of the 2005
budget request. We will have a hearing on March 9, in this same
room. Our witness at that time will be the Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security, the Honorable Asa
Hutchinson.
Until then we stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., Tuesday, March 2, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday,
March 9.]