[Senate Hearing 108-705]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Domenici, Byrd, Inouye,
and Murray.
Also present: Senator Reid.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENTS OF:
HON. ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST
GUARD
ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The committee hearing will please come to
order.
Today, we continue our review of the President's fiscal
year 2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland
Security, specifically, the programs and activities of the
United States Coast Guard and the Transportation Security
Administration. I am pleased to welcome to the hearing the
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Admiral Thomas
Collins, and the Acting Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration, Admiral David Stone.
We appreciate you submitting copies of your statements in
advance of the hearing. They will be made a part of the record,
and we invite you to make any comments you think would be
helpful to the Committee's understanding of the budget request.
I am happy to yield to Senator Inouye and other Senators
who may wish to make any opening statements.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I look forward to the hearing today. I represent a state
that relies more than any other state on the two agencies
represented this morning. As an island state, we have a unique
relationship with the Coast Guard. We enjoy the ocean year-
round for recreation and commercial fishing, and rely on it for
transportation of more than 90 percent of our goods. And in
Hawaii, we have a great appreciation for the search and rescue,
navigation, fisheries management, and the environmental
protection mission of the Coast Guard.
Aviation is also a lifeline for my state. Our tourism-based
economy is dependent on reliable and safe transportation of
passengers to and from our shores. So I am so committed to
working with both of these agencies to ensure that there are
resources necessary to improve upon their performance, and help
keep our traveling public and our transportation system safe,
so I welcome the testimony of these two gentlemen.
Senator Cochran. Admiral Collins, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS H. COLLINS
Admiral Collins. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Inouye. It is a privilege to be with you. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the fiscal year 2005 budget request and
the impact on the essential services we provide to the American
public.
The 2005 budget proposes a budget authority of $7.46
billion, a 9 percent increase over fiscal year 2004. I am
pleased to note that from fiscal years 2003 to 2005, our
operating expense budget has grown over 51 percent. This growth
supports the President's National Security Strategy for
Homeland Security, and it supports the full range of Coast
Guard missions.
HIGHLIGHTS OF SERVICE TO THE NATION OVER THE PAST MONTH
From my perspective, this budget growth is more than
justified. We continue to apply our budget both effectively and
efficiently, and often achieve extraordinary operational
outcomes for the American people. I have been a part of the
Coast Guard for 40 years now, and I continue to be amazed at
the performance of our men and women every day. In fact, our
operations just over the past month paint a clear and vivid
picture of the scope and the national importance of the
services we provide to the American public.
We responded to the distress calls from the burning and
sinking ship/tanker, Bow Mariner, just this month, 50 miles off
shore. Our rescue swimmer deployed in 44-degree, oil-covered
water to save six crewmen.
Our search and rescue response capability was sustained,
even though eighteen cutters, eight aircraft, and almost
fourteen-hundred personnel deployed between the coast of Haiti
and South Florida this month. And as conditions deteriorated in
Haiti, Coast Guard cutters intercepted over a thousand
Haitians, and safely repatriated them, thus fulfilling our
President's mandate to repatriate Haitian migrants and present
a deterrent to mass migration.
This week, the Coast Guard cutter, Midget, on patrol in the
Eastern Pacific, returning home to Puget Sound after this month
seizing over 27,000 pounds of cocaine in three boardings,
setting a record for the most cocaine seized by a cutter on a
single patrol.
Today, four 1410-foot cutters, two port security units, and
477 people are currently providing critical support to
operations in Iraq. And today, we have two polar ice breakers
returning home after the most successful resupply of McMurdo
Station in recent years. We were successful in implementing the
requirements for the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 and will be ready to commence aggressive compliance
oversight on July 1.
These are just the highlights of our service to the Nation
over this past month. The 2005 budget request provides the
resources necessary for the Coast Guard to continue this high
level of service to the American public. We have four
priorities embedded in this budget.
FOUR PRIORITIES EMBEDDED IN THE BUDGET REQUEST
First, is to recapitalize our operational assets. Our
greatest threat to mission performance continues to be that our
aircraft, our boats, and cutters are aging, technologically
obsolete, and require replacement and modernization. The
integrated Deepwater system, or Deepwater, is the answer to
these concerns.
My second priority is to ensure consistent performance
across all missions by ensuring the right force structure and
the right set of capabilities. The 2005 budget adds capability
and capacity to enable across-the-board mission performance,
including operational funding for additional eleven patrol
boats, these 87-foot patrol boats, and the transfer of five
179-foot PC patrol boats from the Navy, and overall, adding
over 1,300 people to our workforce in 2005.
My third priority is to aggressively implement the
comprehensive requirements of the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002. Over $100 million and 791 new personnel
support this critical security initiative.
My fourth priority reflected in the 2005 budget is to
expand what we have been calling Maritime Domain Awareness.
Expanding awareness of activities occurring in the maritime
domain is critical to enhancing our performance across all
mission areas. And we must identify and understand threats,
disseminate timely information to our operational commanders
and our homeland security partners in order to respond to
terrorist attacks, drug smuggling, illegal migration, and so
forth.
Of course, the Coast Guard people make our operational
excellence possible, and the successful operational tempo
demonstrated over the last month is testimony to the skill and
commitment of our personnel. They routinely put service to our
Nation above all else, and they are my highest priority. And
this budget request improves the quality of life of Coast Guard
men and women, by providing a pay raise, and improving basic
allowance for housing.
Most importantly, through Deepwater, through Rescue 21, and
other modernization efforts, our Coast Guard people will be
provided with the quality equipment they deserve to do their
job.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today, and I will be pleased to answer any questions that you
may have.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Admiral Collins.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Thomas H. Collins
Introduction Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget request, and its
critical importance in your Coast Guard being able to deliver essential
daily services to the American public.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget proposes budget authority
of $7.46 billion, a 9 percent increase over fiscal year 2004, and
continues our effort to enhance capability and competencies to perform
both safety and security missions. It supports the goals of the
President's National Strategy for Homeland Security to prevent
terrorist attacks, reduce our vulnerabilities, and minimize damage from
attacks that do occur.
Before I discuss our fiscal year 2005 budget, I would like to take
a few moments to discuss some of our accomplishments during the past
year. You deserve a quick report on how we have used the resources this
Subcommittee has provided us in the past and I am proud of the results
that Coast Guard men and women continue to deliver for the country.
During fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard:
--Interdicted over 6,000 undocumented migrants attempting to
illegally enter the country by sea.
--Prevented more than 136,800 pounds of cocaine, over 14,000 pounds
of marijuana and more than 800 pounds of hashish from reaching
U.S. shores.
--Aggressively conducted more than 36,000 port security patrols,
including 3,600 air patrols, 8,000 security boardings and over
7,000 vessel escorts.
--Deployed the largest contingent of Coast Guard personnel overseas
since the Vietnam War to support Operation Iraqi Freedom,
including 11 cutters, two shoreside support units, and over
1,200 personnel.
--Saved the lives of nearly 5,100 mariners in distress and responded
to more than 31,500 calls for assistance.
--Boarded more than 3,400 fishing vessels to enforce safety,
environmental and economic laws.
--Mobilized 64 percent of our reserve force to enhance protection of
our ports, waterways and critical infrastructure during
heightened states of alert, and to support the Combatant
Commanders.
--Kept critical shipping channels clear of ice in the Great Lakes and
New England ensuring the availability of critical energy
products.
--Maintained more than 50,000 Federal aids to navigation along 25,000
miles of maritime transportation highways.
--Responded to over 19,000 reports of water pollution or hazardous
material releases.
--Completed the most difficult re-supply of McMurdo Station
(Antarctica) during Operation Deep Freeze in 40 years. USCGC
Polar Sea and USCGC Healy smashed through 50 miles of ice more
than 13-feet thick to enable U.S. scientists to continue their
studies of the Earth's climate.
In addition, we have become a proud member of the Department of
Homeland Security that consolidated 22 agencies and nearly 180,000
employees. We are committed to working with our partner agencies as one
team engaged in one fight, and I truly believe having one Department
responsible for homeland security has made America more secure today.
An example of this one team-one fight motto is very evident in the
developing events in Haiti. Under the direction of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Task Force--Southeast was
stood-up as part of OPERATION ABLE SENTRY. Led by Coast Guard Rear
Admiral Harvey Johnson, the task force is comprised of many agencies
chartered to plan, prepare, and conduct migrant interdiction operations
in the vicinity of Haiti due to the escalation of violence in that
country and the threat of a mass exodus of undocumented migrants. In
the first days of interdiction operations, the task force demonstrated
impressive agility and synergy:
--Coast Guard cutters, with Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS)
asylum pre screening officers and interpreters aboard,
interdicted seven Haitian vessels with 1,076 undocumented
migrants,
--Coast Guard and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) aircraft
patrolled the skies throughout the operating area,
--Coast Guard, ICE, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) boats
conducted coordinated patrols off the Florida coast,
--Coast Guard and ICE conducted a coordinated boarding of a boat
suspected of being highjacked off the coast of Miami,
--Coast Guard, CBP, ICE, and the Transportation Security
Administration command center, public affairs, and intelligence
staffs fully engaged,
--Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) deployed three
Information and Planning Specialists to the task force in
support of contingency planning.
In addition, we have begun aggressively implementing the Maritime
Transportation Security Act thanks in large part to a herculean inter-
agency effort. Final Rules were published in October 2003 and security
plans from approximately 9,000 vessels and 3,200 facilities were due on
December 31, 2003. To date, approximately 97 percent have been
received. We will continue to aggressively pursue 100 percent
compliance, and have instituted a phased implementation of penalties to
ensure that all regulated facilities have implemented approved security
plans by the 1 July 2004 deadline. We completed eleven port security
assessments, and have established 43 Area Maritime Security Committees
to provide enhanced planning, communication and response for our
nation's ports. We have met with nearly sixty countries representing
the vast majority of all shippers to the United States., reinforcing a
commitment to the International Ship and Port Facilities Security
(ISPS) code. We have commissioned additional Maritime Safety and
Security Teams (MSSTs) and plan to have 13 teams by the end of CY 2004.
We are installing an Automatic Identification System (AIS) network in
nine coastal locations that have Vessel Traffic Services improving our
awareness of the maritime domain, and are simultaneously designing a
nationwide system.
The Need to Sustain Growth in fiscal year 2005
Despite these accomplishments, there is still much to do. The last
few weeks paint a clear and vivid picture of the breadth, scope and
national importance of all Coast Guard missions. Rescue personnel from
our mid-Atlantic units responded to the distress call from the burning
and sinking Singaporean tanker Bow Mariner, and six crewmen were saved
from 44-degree water. A Coast Guard cutter seized the entire catch from
a fishing vessel off the New England coast for having twice the legal
limit of lobster on board and more importantly having female egg
bearing lobsters that a biologist indicated had been scrubbed of eggs.
Our search and rescue and living marine resource response capability
was sustained even as 15 cutters, 6 aircraft, and approximately 1,550
personnel deployed south positioning from the coast of Haiti to the
approaches to South Florida as part of Homeland Security Task Force-
Southeast, and interdicted 1,075 Haitian migrants. Simultaneously, we
have four Patrol Boats, two Port Security Units, and 377 personnel
deployed in support of operations in Iraq. As you can see, demand for
Coast Guard resources continue to expand, while our ships and aircraft
continue to age. The Coast Guard is the nation's lead Federal agency
for maritime homeland security and marine safety. Critical new
resources are required to establish a new level of maritime security
while continuing to perform the full range of Coast Guard missions.
The budget requests resources that are necessary for the Coast
Guard to fulfill its responsibilities to the American public. For
fiscal year 2005, my priorities are:
--Recapitalize operational assets;
--Enhance performance across all missions by leveraging Coast Guard
authorities, capabilities, competencies and partnerships;
--Aggressively implement the comprehensive requirements of MTSA; and
--Expand awareness of activities occurring in the maritime domain.
Recapitalize Operational Assets
The Coast Guard's greatest threat to mission performance continues
to be that our aircraft, boats and cutters are aging, technologically
obsolete, and require replacement and modernization. The majority of
these assets will reach the end of their service life by 2008, and have
increasing operating and maintenance costs, which results in lost
mission performance, mission effectiveness, unnecessary risks, and wear
and tear on people. These assets are failing at an alarming rate.
Recent asset failures and their subsequent impact on operational
readiness exemplify the downward readiness spiral created by
increasingly aging capital assets coupled with a more demanding
operational tempo. Frankly, the existing system is failing in numerous
areas and I am concerned that we are reaching a ``declining readiness
spiral'' phenomenon. Deferred modernization results in reduced patrols
and readiness, corresponding increased maintenance needs and higher
total ownership costs. Recapitalization funds are then needed to keep
old assets operating, which only defers modernization starting this
declining cycle over again. The Coast Guard is faced with trading asset
modernization funding toward legacy asset maintenance and capability to
address immediate safety and reliability concerns. Some examples of why
I am so concerned:
--HH-65 Helicopter engine system casualties.--In-flight engine
partial power losses occurred at a rate of 63 per 100,000
flight hours in fiscal year 2003, and is significantly higher
so far in fiscal year 2004. This rate far exceeds the FAA
standard of one per 100,000 hours and the U.S. Navy Safety
Center guidelines of no more than 10 mishaps per 100,000 flight
hours. HH-65 helicopters are critical to Coast Guard operations
including ongoing efforts off the coast of Haiti.
--110-foot Patrol Boats.--To date, 20 hull breaches requiring
emergency dry docks. One cutter required emergency dry dock for
hull breach only 14 weeks after a 10-month hull renewal project
that had cost $2 million. The 110-foot fleet is the high-speed
workhorse during migrant interdiction operations such as the
ongoing events in the vicinity of Haiti, and has repatriated
927 Haitian migrants thus far.
--378-foot High Endurance Cutter.--3 out of total class of 12 ships
have recently missed operations due to unscheduled maintenance
to failing sub-systems. A 378-foot cutter is currently serving
as the on-scene command ship for Haitian operations.
All three of these asset classes (HH-65, 110, 378) are currently
supporting the Coast Guard missions such as migrant and drug
interdiction operations, ports waterways and coastal security,
fisheries enforcement, and search and rescue, and the Coast Guard
continues to be successful in spite of casualties and readiness levels.
This success comes through the extraordinary efforts of Coast Guard
personnel, and I'm concerned about our ability to continue this
performance in the future. Cocaine seizures to date in fiscal year 2004
total 38.9 metric tons, nearly double last year's pace which yielded
the second highest seizure total ever (62.1 metric tons). The threat of
a mass migration from Haiti, coupled with the flow of illegal drugs and
undocumented migrants from other countries towards the United States,
highlights the value that the U.S. Coast Guard provides our nation.
The Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) is the answer to these
concerns and entails far more than the progressive replacement of our
aging inventory. IDS is an integrated systems approach to upgrading
existing legacy assets through a completely integrated and
interoperable system. All of Deepwater's highly capable assets will be
linked with modern command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture.
The ability to link and network disparate platforms seamlessly over
vast distances is an essential aspect to providing the Coast Guard the
capability to detect and interdict potential threats prior to reaching
our shores and ports. Deepwater assets are America's first line of
defense to counter threats in the maritime domain, and thwart
catastrophes to vulnerable infrastructure (oil rigs, deepwater
channels, shipping). Funding for the Deepwater program is a critical
investment in homeland safety and security and means a more secure
United States of America.
The Coast Guard's deepwater assets are not the only capital assets
that desperately need replacement. The fiscal year 2005 budget also
requests resources for:
--Rescue 21 project, which will be the primary command and control
system to perform the functional tasks of detection,
classification, and command and control in the inland and
coastal zones for Search and Rescue. The existing National
Distress System is inadequate to meet the safety requirements
of growing marine traffic, and is not capable of meeting the
requirements of the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) treaty. Rescue 21 will expand existing
capability through greater area coverage, and improved
direction finding capability to enhance Coast Guard emergency
response;
--Great Lakes Icebreaker, which is scheduled to replace USCGC
MACKINAW in 2006 after 57 years of continuous service;
--Response Boat--Medium, which will replace the aging 41-foot Utility
Boat, and will meet mission requirements for search and rescue,
and emerging homeland security missions.
Enhance Mission Performance
To enhance mission performance the Coast Guard must optimize its
unique authorities, capability, competency, and partnerships; while
gaining the capacity in each to complete our full range of missions.
Due to the Coast Guard's multi-mission nature, resources provided will
assist in the performance of all missions. New assets will be used to
conduct fishery patrols and search and rescue cases as well as protect
the Nation against terrorist attacks.
Fiscal year 2005 budget initiatives that add capacity to enable
mission performance include:
--Operational funding for eleven 87-foot Coastal Patrol boats built
in 2004;
--Operational funding for five 179-foot Patrol Coastals being
transferred to the Coast Guard from the Navy;
--Safety configuration changes to the 47-foot Motor Life Boat, which
will allow crews to safely conduct missions in deteriorating
weather conditions.
Aggressively Implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
During the past year, the Coast Guard led the international
maritime community in adopting a new international security regime
requiring vessels and port facilities to develop security plans. This
effort paralleled the requirements this committee helped establish
through enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of
2002. These regulations require that United States ports, vessels, and
facilities each have a plan to protect against terrorist attacks.
Aggressive implementation of MTSA is essential if we are to maintain
the security of our ports and waterways at acceptable levels. To
implement and enforce these regulations, the Coast Guard has a
recurring requirement to develop, review, approve, and ensure vessels
and facilities are sustaining their own security responsibilities for
all aspects of maritime security. Approximately 97 percent of required
vessel and facilities have turned in security plans to date. We are
issuing notices of violation to the 10 percent that missed the
deadline, are starting the process of approving security plans, and
have commenced training of Coast Guard personnel to complete on-site
verification. Providing the Coast Guard with the resources necessary to
undertake this implementation and enforcement effort is a key step
toward enhanced port, vessel and facility security.
Maritime Domain Awareness
Expanding awareness of activities occurring in the maritime domain
is critical to enhancing Coast Guard performance in all mission areas.
The U.S maritime jurisdiction is enormous, covering some 3.5 million
square miles of ocean and 95,000 miles of coastline. In addition, the
Coast Guard projects a defense-in-depth presence in other areas such as
the Caribbean and eastern Pacific to deter, detect, and interdict drug
and migrant smugglers. The Coast Guard operates at times and in places
no United States forces operate. The ongoing events off the coast of
Haiti highlight the need for a robust maritime domain awareness
capability. The Coast Guard has minimal capability to monitor the
activities occurring within this maritime zone without the presence of
a cutter or aircraft. We must identify and understand threats, and
disseminate timely information to our operational commanders and our
homeland security partners in order to respond to emerging threats such
as terrorist attacks, drug smuggling, illegal migration, location of
distressed boaters, or illegal fishing before they reach our borders.
An intelligence and warning system that detects indicators of potential
terrorist activity before an attack occurs is necessary to take
preemptive and protective action. We are currently installing Automatic
Identification System (AIS) in our Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) ports,
and are formalizing the operational requirements to award a contract
for installation of a nationwide AIS network. $4 million is requested
in fiscal year 2005 to continue this important project. This budget
submission also includes 35 people to integrate all of our projects
that provide maritime domain awareness (MDA), including AIS, Deepwater
and Rescue 21, and these people will partner with the other Department
of Homeland Security agencies, the Navy, and other entities to unite
our joint efforts.
Conclusion
Thank you for your support in the fiscal year 2004 Emergency
Supplemental. Funding is ensuring Coast Guard forces remaining in Iraq
are properly resourced for the rest of fiscal year 2004.
None of what the Coast Guard has accomplished or is striving to
achieve is possible without our people--the bedrock of our service.
They routinely put their service above all else and I am convinced of
their unwavering dedication to the security of this Nation and the
safety of its citizens. They are our highest priority and most valuable
resource.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget request improves the
quality of life for Coast Guard men and women and their families by
providing a pay raise, and continuing improvements in Basic Allowance
for Housing (BAH) reducing out-of-pocket expenses from 3.5 percent to
zero, and gives them the equipment and assets that will allow them to
best contribute their time and talents to the safety and security of
our nation.
I have asked every member of the Coast Guard to continue to focus
intently and act boldly on the three elements of my direction: improve
Readiness; practice good Stewardship; and enhance the growth,
development and well being of our People. With this diligence we will
fulfill our operational commitment to America and maintain our high
standards of excellence.
I look forward to working with you to that end.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Cochran. Admiral Stone, you may proceed with your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE
Admiral Stone. Thank you, sir.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and members of
the Subcommittee. I am honored to appear before you this
morning to discuss the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request for the Transportation Security Administration.
First, I would like to take a moment to comment on the
tragic bombings in Madrid and Moscow. We are closely examining
these events so we may deter and prevent similar attacks in the
United States. Over the last 2 years, the Department of
Homeland Security has worked with Federal and State
counterparts to bolster the security of rail and mass transit
systems, conducting criticality assessments, coordinating
information sharing, and improving training.
Building on this foundation, yesterday, Secretary Ridge
announced additional measures to further strengthen our rail
and transit systems. We will develop a rapid-deployment mass
transit canine program and continue to partner with local
authorities to provide additional training and assistance for
local canine teams.
TSA will implement a pilot program to test the feasibility
of screening luggage and carry-on bags to detect explosives at
rail stations and aboard trains. Working with the Department,
we will engage industry, and State and local partners to
establish baseline security measures based on best practices,
and we will expand security education and awareness programs.
Security technologies will be examined for their potential
application in the intermodal environment.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
Turning to the President's budget proposal for fiscal year
2005, the $5.3 billion that is requested for TSA is $892
million more than the fiscal year 2004 level. The significant
portion of this funding would support and improve passenger and
baggage screening operations at the Nation's airports,
including $145 million to fully implement screening and
training programs, and $86 million to provide technological
support at passenger checkpoints.
TSA is right sizing and stabilizing screening operations,
investing more hiring authority with our Federal Security
Directors to provide more flexibility in addressing staffing
needs. Local hiring, local testing, and local training will be
the keys to our future.
We are assessing the expansion of contract screening; and
to help us make these decisions, a thorough evaluation of the
five private pilot programs is currently under way, with the
results expected in April of this year.
TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer Program adds another
important layer to our rings of aviation security. We are
seeking $25 million to support and expand training for pilots
who are volunteering to carry firearms to defend aircraft
flight decks. In January, TSA began doubling the number of FFDO
classes, and we plan to provide initial training and
qualifications for thousands of FFDOs by the end of this fiscal
year. We expect to conduct our first cargo FFDO prototype
program next month.
A total of $60 million is requested for the second-
generation Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System,
CAPPS II, in fiscal year 2005. Developed with the utmost
concern for individual privacy rights, there is a pressing need
to move forward with testing of CAPPS II. The current passenger
pre-screening system operated by air carriers is clearly not
adequate to address the asymmetric threats that confront us on
a daily basis.
To deny targets the opportunity to exploit our thriving air
cargo system, TSA has developed an air cargo strategic plan
within the $85 million requested for air cargo screening in
fiscal year 2005. TSA is requesting $55 million for an
aggressive R&D program to investigate technologies that will
improve our ability to screen high-risk air cargo.
prepared statement
In closing, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your support, and that of the Subcommittee members. I look
forward to answering your questions today.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Admiral Stone.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of of David M. Stone
I am pleased to testify before the Subcommittee on the President's
fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). TSA's mission, to protect the Nation's
transportation systems to ensure the freedom of movement for people and
commerce, is completely aligned with the mission of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and our objectives fully support the
Department's strategic goals.
The tragic bombings of March 11 in Madrid, Spain, are a great
concern to us all. Before I discuss the President's fiscal year 2005
budget request for TSA, I want to assure the Subcommittee that DHS is
supporting the investigation into the attacks with our international
partners and monitoring the investigation to learn more about how these
terrible attacks transpired. Although we have no specific indicators
that terrorist groups are planning such attacks in the United States,
DHS has reached out to state and local security, law enforcement, and
transit and rail officials to ensure vigilance in light of these
incidents.
I want to assure you that DHS is devoting significant attention and
resources on rail security across the Federal Government. Between
fiscal year 2003 and this year, DHS will have provided $115 million to
high-risk transit systems through the Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) in the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The Budget proposes to
double our total commitment to UASI, to $1.4 billion in fiscal year
2005. Our partners in the Department of Transportation (DOT) stepped up
inspection of rail lines and security requirements, and DOT is also
assisting Amtrak implement improved security measures. Under the
Budget, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) will award nearly $4
billion in grants to transit agencies, resources that can be used for
security improvements.
TSA is providing strong leadership in this effort and has the
resources it needs under the request to do its part. Over the last 2
years, DHS and DOT have worked with transit and rail operators to
significantly improve security. TSA has worked with the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and DOT's Federal
Railroad Administration and FTA to conduct criticality assessments of
rail and transit networks operating in high-density urban areas. As a
result, we have better information to focus current and future security
resources and transit systems are producing robust security and
emergency preparedness plans. In addition, DHS is coordinating
information and threat sharing through the Surface Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) managed by the
Association of American Railroads, including deploying TSA personnel to
the ISAC and hosting ISAC representatives at TSA's Transportation
Security Coordination Center (TSCC) in Virginia. We have held numerous
security exercises to bring together rail carriers, Federal and local
first responders, and security experts, and have addressed potential
gaps in antiterrorism training among rail personnel.
I hope to work with the Subcommittee to continue to determine how
best to strengthen rail and transit security within the resources
levels of our request.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget Request for TSA
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request will support key
initiatives to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of TSA's
efforts to secure our Nation's transportation system. TSA's top
priorities in fiscal year 2005 include:
--Strengthening aviation security.--We will stabilize and enhance our
system-ofsystems approach to aviation security, measure and
improve screening performance, develop advanced screening
technology, and expand the Federal Flight Deck Officer program.
--Upgrading access and inspection security.--TSA will continue to
develop and implement credentialing and background check
programs, continue to support local law enforcement at
airports, strengthen inspection, and enforce agency security
regulations.
--Improving air cargo security.--In partnership with air carriers and
other stakeholders, TSA will continue to implement the range of
initiatives encompassed in its Air Cargo Strategic Plan.
--Enhancing surface transportation security through intelligence,
stakeholder outreach, and integration.--TSA will work with our
colleagues in DHS and in the Department of Transportation to
assess the risk of terrorist attacks to all surface modes of
transportation and develop and implement security strategies to
thwart attacks while minimizing the impact on the flow of cargo
and mobility of passengers.
The President's fiscal year 2005 Budget Request of $5.296 billion
for TSA is dedicated to stabilizing and strengthening TSA's essential
mission. This request is $892 million more than the adjusted enacted
level for fiscal year 2004.
Strengthening Aviation Security
The majority of TSA funding in fiscal year 2005 is requested to
support and improve passenger and baggage screening operations at the
Nation's airports, an essential layer in TSA's rings of aviation
security. Today TSA is right-sizing and stabilizing screening
operations based on security requirements and opportunities for
increasing efficiencies in business processes so that at the end of
fiscal year 2004 an appropriate mix of full-time and part-time
personnel will represent no more than 45,000 full-time equivalents.
Supporting and enhancing the effectiveness of screening operations
requires a broad range of services and activities, from training and
supplies to performance management systems, from management and
headquarters support to human resources services and equipment
maintenance. As part of our long-term plan for stabilizing our
workforce, we are evolving to a business model that vests more hiring
authority at the local level with our Federal Security Directors
(FSDs). The original methods we used in centralizing recruitment,
assessment, hiring, and training of screeners were necessary in the
fastpaced environment to meet the original statutory deadlines. This
centralized model is not the right fit for sustaining an existing
workforce. This is a high priority item for TSA.
Information and data on TSA performance are critical to our ability
to make strategic decisions. TSA is implementing measures to assess
performance, including TSA's Passenger Screening Effectiveness Index,
Cost Per Passenger, Cost Per Bag, and Customer Service Index elements
of the Screening Performance Indices. This information will be used to
assess the impact of higher passenger volume on the effectiveness of
our security operations and the public's level of satisfaction. TSA's
Customer Satisfaction Index is based on feedback from passenger surveys
at airports, polls, and traveler comments. TSA's score for all airports
is 80 percent, indicating that overall, passengers are ``more than
satisfied'' with their experience at passenger security checkpoints.
Over 1.7 million passengers and 2 million bags are processed through
airport checkpoints on a daily basis, yet average wait times are still
low.
For fiscal year 2005, the President's budget requests $2.424
billion for 45,000 screener FTE and 1,210 terminal screening managers.
At the requested level, funding will support screener salaries and
management at all commercial airports. The screener workforce will be
cross-trained to perform duties both as passenger and baggage
screeners. Included in the requested level is $130 million for contract
screening airports. This funding is based on an estimate of resources
necessary to maintain the current five pilot project airports. However,
actual funding needs for contract screening operations may vary
depending on the current evaluation of contract screening, the
program's future deployment and management structure, and other
contract screening transitions at airports.
A total of $145 million is requested in fiscal year 2005 to fully
implement the passenger and baggage screening training programs
critical to maintaining high skill levels in our screener workforce.
This will support training for replacement screeners as well as support
recurrent and advanced training to the entire screener workforce to
meet and maintain proficiency and qualification standards. All
passenger screeners must meet annual recertification standards, passing
a Standard Operating Procedures Job Knowledge Test, an Image
Certification Test, and a Practical Skills Demonstration, and achieve a
fully successful performance rating. Recertification for 2003-2004
began on October 1, 2003, and will be completed this month.
As reported to this Subcommittee last fall, TSA recognizes that we
must continually work to maintain and sharpen screener capabilities.
TSA has made significant progress in implementing the Short-Term
Screening Improvement Plan, a series of integrated interventions that
include enhanced training and technology deployment, policy and process
reengineering, increased support to the field, and increased covert
testing.
TSA uses its Special Operations Program to provide ongoing and
immediate feedback to screeners, their supervisors, and TSA leadership
on screener performance. The Special Operations Program's overall
objectives are to test the security systems at the airports and to
introduce difficult, real-life threat items to the screener workforce.
Once covert testing is completed at a checkpoint, Special Operations
teams conduct post-test reviews with available screeners to reenact the
test and provide training.
As part of the Short-Term Screening Improvement Plan, Special
Operations teams have tested 68 airports between October 1, 2003, and
February 1, 2004. Testing between October 1 and December 31, 2003,
focused on increasing the number of airports tested for the first time,
to establish a performance baseline. In January 2004, Special
Operations teams began retesting airports to determine whether
performance improved once the screening performance initiatives had
been deployed. In January 2004, Special Operations teams retested 15
airports, with 11 airports improving overall checkpoint performance an
average of 21 percent.
These overall covert checkpoint tests are also showing improvement
in individual screener performance. Between September 2002 and February
1, 2004, TSA conducted 1,227 checkpoint tests at 171 airports.
Checkpoint test results have improved nearly 14 percent. During January
2004 testing, the pass rate for two of the checkpoint tests was nearly
90 percent or better.
To maintain high levels of screener proficiency, TSA's screener
improvement plan places a strong emphasis on recurrent screener
training and supervisory training. Over 700 inert Modular Bomb Set (MBS
II) and weapons training kits have been deployed to every airport in
the country as an integral part of TSA's recurrent training for
screeners, enabling them to see and touch the components of improvised
explosive devices and weapons. TSA is also developing protocols to help
FSDs conduct their own airport level screening testing. To blend
nationally and locally developed training, TSA has established the
``Excellence in Screener Performance'' video training series. The first
two videos, ``Hand Held Metal Detector/Pat Down Search'' and ``X-ray
Operator'' have been delivered to the field. Training videos on
physical bag search and screening persons with disabilities are now in
production. The third part of our recurrent training program is a
series of web-based and computer-based screener training. Eight
training products are in production, with the first due to the field in
March 2004. From the standpoint of training delivery, our most
significant accomplishment is the launching of our learning management
system, the TSA Online Learning Center (OLC). The OLC makes available
over 350 general training and development courses in addition to TSA
specific training.
Recognizing the need to provide our front line supervisors with the
tools they need to manage effectively the screener workforce, we have
sent more than 2,500 supervisors to introductory leadership training at
the Graduate School, United States Department of Agriculture. We will
continue to offer 10 sessions each week until all screening supervisors
have received this training. We are currently adding a customized
module to this training that includes airport-specific examples of
leadership issues they might encounter.
TSA also has begun training some of its senior screeners to
recognize patterns of unusual or suspicious behavior. This additional
skill set will further enhance aviation security.
TSA promptly investigates significant security incidents as they
are disclosed. Using teams of security specialists and investigators
who recreate the security breach, vulnerabilities in the system are
revealed, and TSA can immediately take corrective action. TSA has also
forged a working relationship with other Federal law enforcement
agencies and task forces when incidents require coordinated
investigative activities.
TSA's 158 FSDs form the backbone of security management and
leadership at the Nation's airports. Our budget requests $284 million
in fiscal year 2005 to support our FSDs and other airport security
management and staff positions nationwide. In order to streamline the
administrative operations at airports, larger airports have been
designated as hubs, providing security direction, administrative
support, and staff resources to smaller airports.
In fiscal year 2005, TSA will continue the deployment of electronic
explosive detection equipment at the Nation's airports and look for
efficiencies to improve passenger and baggage screening. The total
fiscal year 2005 discretionary funding request for explosives detection
systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD) equipment purchase
and installation is $150 million, with $250 million through the
Aviation Security Capital Fund, for a total resource level of $400
million. Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision
100), Public Law 108-176, established the Aviation Security Capital
Fund. The first $250 million of passenger fees authorized by the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Public Law 107-71, will be
deposited into this fund. Fund resources can be spent on projects to
replace baggage conveyer systems related to aviation security, to
reconfigure terminal baggage areas as needed to install EDS, to deploy
EDS in airport terminals, and for other airport security capital
improvement projects.
TSA's EDS/ETD equipment purchase and installation program is the
key to compliance with statutory requirements for full electronic
screening of checked baggage. TSA purchases and installs this equipment
through a variety of mechanisms, including congressionally authorized
Letters of Intent (LOIs), which provide a partial reimbursement to
airports for facility modifications required to install in-line EDS
solutions. TSA has issued eight airport LOIs, covering 9 airports. TSA
is also using resources to purchase and install EDS and ETD machines at
airports outside the LOI process.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes proposed language to
maintain policies which guide the current program cost share and
distribution of funding for LOIs, keeping the cost share at 75 percent
for large airports and 90 percent for all other airports and overriding
allocation formulas. TSA believes the current cost share is fair and
equitable and that revised allocation formulas could potentially
disrupt current LOI commitments and be detrimental to long-term
security effectiveness.
TSA is also requesting approximately $86 million to provide
technological support at passenger checkpoints. This funding would
support reconfiguration at a portion of the 34 remaining airports that
would benefit from reconfiguration and provide $30 million for purchase
of advanced checkpoint equipment. This funding also supports TSA's
continuing implementation of the Threat Image Projection (TIP) program,
an essential element of TSA's screening improvement program. TIP
superimposes threat images on X-ray screens during actual operations
and records whether or not screeners identify the threat object.
Through a tremendous example of private-public partnership, a
significantly enhanced 2,400-image Threat Image Projection (TIP)
library was uploaded to every TIP Ready X-Ray (TRX) in the country
during the height of winter holiday travel season without interrupting
service. This new TIP image library replaces the much smaller 200-image
library developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with
images that will continuously provide screeners exposure to the most
current threats, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Now 100
percent of checkpoint security lanes are equipped with TRXs with the
2,400-image TIP library, providing real-time data on screener
performance. Data is available quickly at the local level and reported
to headquarters for aggregated analysis and monitoring. Through this
combination of increased deployment of TRX machines and activation of
the expanded TIP image library, we are able to collect and analyze
significant amounts of performance data that has not been previously
available. TIP is an excellent tool for evaluating the skills of each
individual screener so that we can focus directly on areas needing
skill improvement. By regularly exposing screeners to a variety of
threat object images, TIP provides continuous on-the-job training and
immediate feedback and remediation.
TSA uses a wide range of interconnected information technology
solutions to maximize its security efforts. In the past, collecting TIP
data for analysis and reporting was a cumbersome task. Network
connectivity to checkpoints will be the ultimate answer to efficient
collection, analysis, and reporting of TIP data. This effort will
provide the capability for continuous training, including real-time
training on current threats; greater capacity for monitoring TIP
performance; connectivity with checked baggage areas; and a foundation
for planned implementations of additional administrative, surveillance,
CAPPS II, and other security enhancements. TSA is requesting
approximately $294 million in fiscal year 2005 to support its
Information Technology Core, which will provide the telecommunications
infrastructure support and services necessary for TSA to fully utilize
TIP capabilities.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget includes a request for $49
million for TSA applied Research and development (R&D) and $50 million
for Next Generation EDS. Working closely with the DHS Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate, we have established an ambitious program
to develop and deploy new security technologies and use technology to
enhance human performance. Technology can help us make our screening
operations more effective, more efficient, less time-consuming, and
less costly. TSA operates a state-of-the-art research laboratory, the
Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Several screening and other security technologies are under development
at the TSL, including an explosives detection portal to determine if
explosives are being carried on a passenger's person, document scanners
to detect trace amounts of explosive materials on items such as
boarding passes, and scanners for better screening of casts and
prosthetic devices. We are also developing EDS for carry-on baggage and
improving explosives detection technology for screening liquids.
We are continuing work on the Next Generation of EDS for checked
baggage screening to increase throughput capacity, improve detection
capabilities, and lower false positive alarm rates. Simultaneously, we
are collaborating with new and existing vendors to develop technologies
that will enable us to detect explosives in smaller amounts than are
currently established in our certification standard and that will
occupy a smaller footprint at airports. We have piloted an on-screen
alarm resolution protocol and will soon start the training that will
enable our screeners to more closely examine an image without opening a
traveler's luggage, resulting in clearing more false positive alarm
images without a drop in detection proficiency. Within the Next
Generation program, we are also looking at new applications of X-ray,
electro-magnetic, and nuclear technologies to probe sealed containers
for materials that pose a threat to aviation security.
We are planning fiscal year 2005 R&D efforts to combine expanded
technological capabilities in conjunction with sensor fusion
development. Unfortunately, the restricted space at airports and other
transportation facilities will not support continuing additions to the
footprints of our screening areas. Therefore, we must design systems
that will address multiple threats within very confined spaces. The
challenge of moving new technology from the laboratory to the real
world is significant.
TSA's R&D program also focuses on developing standards for
biometric systems through ongoing pilot programs and laboratory
efforts. TSA's efforts in this arena are being coordinated with the US
VISIT program office. Research in biometrics technologies continues to
be applicable and useful in supporting several TSA initiatives such as
the Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC) program,
the Registered Traveler program, infrastructure access control
programs, and employee screening.
TSA's Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program has now been in
place for more than 1 year, adding another important layer to our rings
of aviation security. The fiscal year 2005 budget proposes $25 million
to support and continue expansion of FFDO training for pilots at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Artesia, New Mexico. TSA
developed and implemented this program in close cooperation with
organizations representing airline pilots, such as the Air Line Pilots
Association and the Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations. Pilots
provided valuable insights to TSA during the formation of the FFDO
program and many of their suggestions are reflected today in the
initial qualifications, training, and standard operating procedures for
FFDOs; and training location and support facilities. In January 2004,
TSA began doubling the number of FFDO classes, and we plan to provide
initial training and qualification for thousands of FFDOs by the end of
this fiscal year. TSA has streamlined the process for pilots to become
FFDOs. The selection process consists of an on-line application, an
hour-long computerized assessment, an interview, and a background
check. FFDO assessments are administered at over 200 locations
throughout the United States, and more are being added. Classes are
available continuously except during certain holidays.
Pilots also must attend re-qualification sessions twice a year to
ensure that they maintain a high level of proficiency and familiarity
with program requirements. Ten private, state, and local government
sites are available for self-scheduling of re-qualification training.
Sites were selected in geographically diverse locations that would be
convenient to pilots. As the numbers of FFDOs grows, TSA will expand
the number of recurrent training sites to meet their needs.
With the enactment of Vision 100, the FFDO program has been
expanded to include cargo pilots and other flight deck crewmembers. TSA
is examining modifications to the current FFDO curriculum and operating
procedures to reflect the different environment in which cargo pilots
operate. TSA initiated the on-line application process for cargo and
other flight deck crewmembers in February 2004 and expects to conduct
its first cargo FFDO prototype program this April.
A total of $60 million is requested for fiscal year 2005 for the
second generation Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System
(CAPPS II). CAPPS II is a limited, automated prescreening system
authorized by Congress that will become a critical element in TSA's
system-of-systems approach to security. Developed with the utmost
concern for individual privacy rights, CAPPS II will modernize the
prescreening system currently implemented by the airlines. It will seek
to authenticate travelers' identities and perform risk assessments to
detect individuals who may pose a terrorist-related threat or who have
outstanding Federal or state warrants for crimes of violence.
Under CAPPS II, airlines will ask passengers for a slightly
expanded amount of reservation information, including full name, date
of birth, home address, and home telephone number. With this expanded
information, the system will quickly verify the identity of the
passenger using commercially available data and conduct a risk
assessment leveraging current intelligence information. The overall
process will result in a recommended screening level, categorized as no
risk, unknown or elevated risk, or high risk. The commercially
available data will not be viewed by government employees, and
intelligence information will remain behind the government firewall.
The entire prescreening process is expected to take as little as five
seconds to complete.
TSA is carefully reviewing the recent report on CAPPS II issued by
the General Accounting Office (GAO) and working diligently to resolve
all concerns. GAO generally concluded that in most areas that Congress
asked them to review, our work on CAPPS II is not yet complete. DHS has
generally concurred in GAO's findings, which in our view validates the
fact that CAPPS II is a program still under development. As we resolve
issues of access to data needed for testing CAPPS II, and the testing
phase moves forward and results in a more mature system, we are
confident of our ability to satisfy all of the questions that Congress
posed.
Vision 100 transferred the Alien Pilot Security Assessment Program
from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security.
The law requires that DHS conduct background checks on aliens seeking
flight training at U.S. flight schools, stipulating that checks must be
completed within 30 days. TSA is currently working with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to implement this program, and we estimate that
as many as 70,000 background checks will be required each year. TSA is
requesting funding for fiscal year 2005 at a level of $4.6 million,
which we estimate could be recovered in fees.
Upgrading Access and Inspection Security
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests $91.6 million in
overall funding to strengthen security credential programs, with an
estimated recovery of costs of $71.6 million in credential fees. This
requested funding would support activities to develop the Registered
Traveler program at a level of $15 million. TSA is analyzing whether a
Registered Traveler program can effectively reduce the ``hassle
factor'' in passenger and baggage screening without compromising
aviation security. TSA envisions that a fully implemented Registered
Traveler program would be voluntary in nature and could offer qualified
participants an expedited travel experience. A comprehensive risk
assessment would be conducted on Registered Traveler program applicants
to determine their eligibility. TSA is working on a proposed strategy
for implementing small-scale Registered Traveler pilot programs in
fiscal year 2004, and requests $15 million to expand contract support
and technology resources for the Registered Traveler program in fiscal
year 2005. TSA will analyze the results of the pilot programs to
determine the program's effects on security and customer service. TSA
is also exploring technology solutions associated with non-intrusive
positive identity verification at the passenger security checkpoint,
such as biometrics, that would further expedite security clearance for
registered travelers.
In addition to the Registered Traveler program, requested funding
for credential programs would support the Alien Pilot Security
Assessment Program discussed above, the TWIC at a level of $50 million,
the HAZMAT Driver License Endorsement Program at a level of $17
million, and Credentialing Enterprise Start-up at $5 million. Because
all Credentialing Enterprise programs involve the use of specific law
enforcement and antiterrorist databases, TSA is developing a common
platform of technology and contractor support to conduct appropriate
background checks. Although each credentialing program may involve
special requirements and adjudication, this common platform will
realize economies of scale through shared resources such as systems
equipment, database connectivity, contractor support space, and other
start-up costs that will not be recovered through fees.
We are developing a TWIC prototype and supporting measures to
mitigate the threat of insider attacks to transportation
infrastructure. During prototype, this credential will test the
feasibility of bringing uniformity and consistency to the process of
granting access to transportation workers entrusted to work in the most
sensitive and secure areas of our national transportation system. The
President's fiscal year 2005 request includes spending authority to
begin implementing the TWIC concept within parameters that will be
defined by the Administration after completion of the prototype
assessment.
TSA is requesting $120 million to support its contingent of
regulatory compliance inspectors in fiscal year 2005. These inspectors
ensure that airports, air carriers, and other regulated entities within
the airport property are in compliance with all Federal security
regulations. An additional $90 million will support reimbursements to
state and local agencies providing law enforcement support for airport
security checkpoints. An estimated 300 reimbursable agreements with
state and local law enforcement agencies are necessary to provide the
law enforcement support at levels deemed appropriate by TSA FSDs.
The President's budget requests $17 million in fiscal year 2005 to
support 354 K-9 units under the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team program. TSA-certified canine teams perform a critical role in
aviation security, performing multiple tasks throughout the entire
airport environment, such as screening checked baggage, searching
unattended bags, searching vehicles approaching terminals during
increased threat levels, screening cargo on a limited basis, screening
mail at certain pilot project locations, and responding to bomb
threats. TSA helps local law enforcement agencies by procuring and
training selected canines, training selected law enforcement officers,
and by partially reimbursing agencies for costs.
Improving Air Cargo Security
Each year, U.S. air carriers transport approximately 12.5 million
tons of cargo. To deny terrorists the opportunity to exploit our
thriving air cargo system, TSA has developed an Air Cargo Strategic
Plan that calls for the focused deployment of tools, resources, and
infrastructure that are available today, as well as creating a
foundation for future improvements as technology and resources become
available. For fiscal year 2005, a total of $85 million is requested
for TSA's aviation cargo screening program.
TSA has prohibited all ``unknown shipper'' cargo from flying aboard
passenger carriers since September 11, 2001, thereby limiting cargo to
packages from identifiable shippers under the TSA Known Shipper
program. TSA is rolling out an automated Known Shipper database that
will allow air carriers and indirect air carriers to verify immediately
the status of a specific shipper.
Under the Air Cargo Strategic Plan, TSA will establish a Cargo Pre-
Screening system that identifies which cargo should be considered
``high-risk,'' and work with industry and other Federal agencies to
ensure that 100 percent of high-risk cargo is inspected. We are also
partnering with stakeholders to implement enhanced background checks on
persons with access to cargo and new procedures for securing aircraft
while they are on the ground. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is in
development for enhanced screening of cargo on passenger aircraft,
along with stronger security measures for Indirect Air Carriers and the
establishment of a mandatory security program for all-cargo carriers.
TSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are working together on air
cargo initiatives through four established work groups, making plans
for future collaboration, leveraging of existing programs, and sharing
resources and technologies.
Within the $85 million requested for air cargo screening in fiscal
year 2005, TSA is requesting $55 million for an aggressive R&D program
to investigate technologies that will improve our ability to screen
physically high-risk air cargo. TSA will look at new technologies for
screening large cargo, including pallets and containerized cargo. In
January 2004, TSA issued a market survey requesting submissions and
participation of vendors of commercial off-the-shelf explosives
detection technology to support cargo inspection. A number of vendors
have been tentatively selected for laboratory evaluation of their
products against the current EDS certification criteria. We have issued
a request for proposals (RFP) for potential inventors of explosives
detection technology for the screening of containerized cargo and U.S.
Mail to be transported on passenger aircraft. This RFP will lead to the
award of R&D grants to assist in the development of promising
technologies. At TSL, we are conducting a cargo characterization study
to determine the feasibility of using currently deployed explosives
detection technology (EDS and ETD) to screen cargo while new systems
are under development.
Enhancing Surface Transportation Security Through Intelligence,
Stakeholder Outreach, and Integration
For modes of transportation other than aviation, TSA is developing
policies and programs to ensure proper coordination, integration, and
information exchange among our Federal, state, and local partners in
non-aviation modes of transportation and to unite disparate
transportation systems under a single security strategy. Our goal in
this regard is to ensure that efforts to provide security in non-
aviation modes are consistent, coordinated, and effective. As part of
this effort, DHS will issue a National Transportation System Security
Plan as part of its overall Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan,
which is currently under development. We are providing Departmental
leadership and guidance in this area, particularly with respect to
modal security plans, to ensure that they are integrated into an
effective concept of operations for management of the transportation
sector's security. TSA's fiscal year 2005 request includes $24 million
for personnel and operational resources dedicated to security in non-
aviation transportation modes and $17 million to support TSA's around-
the-clock TSCC, the same funding level as this year. The complex,
interdependent land transportation environment is especially
challenging. TSA will continue to assess the risk of terrorist attacks
on non-aviation transportation modes, assess the need for standards and
procedures to address those risks, and ensure compliance with
established regulations and policies.
This completes our highlights of key programs and initiatives for
fiscal year 2005.
TSA has achieved an unqualified audit opinion for fiscal year 2003,
its third consecutive clean audit. In fiscal year 2004, TSA is striving
to maintain its clean audit record and correct any internal control
weaknesses noted in audit reports. With passenger and baggage screening
rollouts complete and the transition to DHS behind us, TSA is well
poised to continue implementing more efficient and effective financial
management processes across the organization.
In closing, I want to convey how proud I am of TSA's security
screening workforce. They have carried out their responsibilities with
diligence and professionalism in a dynamic environment. The reality of
TSA's mission is that we must constantly be prepared to provide the
best level of security we can within the resources we have been
provided. The increased variety and sophistication of weapons and
communication tools available to modern terrorists presents a
significant challenge. We have seen all too vividly that successful
terrorist attacks can disrupt the United States and global economies.
With security strengthened and economic recovery underway, it is
imperative that TSA accommodate expected growth in air travel in the
years ahead. With preventive measures in place, the risk of terrorism
is reduced, not eliminated. TSA will continue to identify and
reevaluate threats and vulnerabilities and make decisions that both
facilitate transportation and improve its security.
I will be pleased to answer your questions.
Senator Cochran. Before proceeding to questions, I am happy
to yield to other Senators for any other opening statements
they may have.
Senator Byrd. Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join in
welcoming our two witnesses today. Two weeks ago, when
Undersecretary Hutchinson testified before this Subcommittee, I
stressed my concern that too many of the Department's efforts
to secure the homeland rely on paper exercises, such as studies
and certifications, rather than on the layered defense that the
President and the Secretary often describe in their homeland
security speeches.
Both the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security
Administration are on the front line of homeland defense, and I
commend both of your organizations for your dedication to your
missions. Regrettably, the President does not seek sufficient
resources for either the Coast Guard or the Transportation
Security Administration.
According to your own testimony, Admiral Collins, Coast
Guard assets, the ships, the planes, the helicopters that you
rely on to protect Americans are failing at an alarming rate.
In fact, you indicate that the Coast Guard assets are in a
``declining readiness spiral'', and yet, according to the
President's budget, the Coast Guard Deepwater program for
upgrading and replacing those assets will take 22 years to
complete. Twenty-two years. This is 2 years slower than the
capital improvement program envisioned when Deepwater was
conceived prior to the tragic events of September 11.
I am also concerned that while you have increased mission
hours for homeland security by 113 percent since 9/11, an
increase that I fully support, your non-homeland security
efforts, such as search and rescue, and fisheries enforcement
have fallen by 26 percent.
Admiral Stone, when Undersecretary Hutchinson testified
before this Subcommittee, I said to him that I was concerned
with the level of funding dedicated to non-aviation modes of
transportation, such as rail security, bus security, port
security. I questioned why the President was seeking no funding
for securing our mass transit systems and was proposing a 62
percent cut in port security grants.
I stressed my objections to the Department's plan to shift
responsibility for these programs out of TSA. I questioned why
it was that the President's budget for the Transportation
Security Administration was 97.3 percent for aviation security
and 2.7 percent for security for other modes of transportation,
such as rail security.
I questioned the wisdom of putting too much of a focus on
responding to the last terrorist attack and not preparing for a
different kind of attack in the future, a future that may not
be far away.
Since that hearing, terrorists have struck again. This
time, the terrorists killed over 200 innocent passengers on a
commuter train in Madrid, Spain. Following the attack in
Madrid, according to The Washington Post, the Department
released a law enforcement advisory warning about the terrorist
threat to our rail system here in America. It is saddening that
it took another terrorist attack for the Administration to wake
up to this threat.
In January of 2003, I offered an amendment to provide $300
million to State and local governments for securing mass
transit systems. The White House opposed the amendment, and it
was defeated. In April of 2003, I offered an amendment to add
$50 million for this purpose. Once again, it was defeated.
Being a persistent kind of fellow who comes from the mud
hills and the clay hills of southern West Virginia, I offered
another amendment for $57 million last July. Once again, the
White House called the amendment wasteful spending, and the
amendment was defeated.
Over 14 million people travel by rail every day in this
country, many more than travel by air. This is a glaring
vulnerability. While I am not suggesting that we should
establish a rail passenger screening system like the system we
have at our airports, we clearly can do more to help our rail
systems install chemical sensors, increase law enforcement
presence, and improve public awareness.
Frankly, Admiral Stone, Secretary Ridge's statement
yesterday that we will use existing resources to do more long-
term research on technological solutions, share information,
and distribute information on best practices just does not make
the grade with me.
The President is proposing to cut law enforcement grant
programs by $732 million, including elimination of the COP's
hiring program, and is also proposing to cut first responder
funding by $733 million. He is proposing to cut Amtrak by $318
million. Where, where, oh, where are State and local
governments and Amtrak supposed to get the money to actually
increase law enforcement at our train stations and on our
trains?
By any definition, the threat to U.S. citizens using our
rail systems is imminent. Imminent. Not 10 years away. Not 25
years away, but now. We need a clear plan that takes immediate
steps to make our people safer. The approach announced by
Secretary Ridge yesterday might make rail passengers safer in
2024, just about the time that the Coast Guard finishes buying
their ships and planes. Our citizens have a right to expect
their government to respond when they are threatened. We should
do more. We should do more. We should do more, and we should do
it now. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Collins and Admiral Stone, I want to join my
colleagues in welcoming you. Today, you have a tremendous task
before you, and I really want to thank you for your service.
Both of your organizations have done a tremendous job, with
limited resources, and what I believe is a lack of support from
the White House in terms of securing our Nation's ports and
cargo terminals. You should both be applauded for your efforts
in addressing the security issues facing our country today.
However, I remain concerned that the President's budget
request does not go far enough to provide you with the funding
and the tools necessary to get the job done. I often question
whether we are giving you the resources to help you work
smarter, or simply asking you to work harder. We need a
coordinated plan for a nationwide port security regime, but it
seems that despite your best efforts, securing our Nation's
ports and cargo terminals is a back burner issue, something
that, according to Secretary Ridge, the private sector should
figure out.
I am really concerned that the President's budget request,
which would place 90 percent of the Administration's so-called
Port Security Program under the Coast Guard, will take even
more attention away from the Coast Guard's other missions.
Admiral Collins, I am interested to hear how the Deepwater
and the response boat programs, the programs that provide our
men and women of the Coast Guard with the platforms they need,
would progress within the President's budget numbers. And I am
particularly interested in the status of the response boat
small contract, which has already been awarded, as well as the
status of the response boat medium contract, which is supposed
to be awarded this year.
We need to make sure that the Coast Guard has the ability
to modernize its vessel and aircraft fleet, and I look forward
to working with Admiral Collins and the rest of my colleagues
to ensure that we fund these priorities responsibly.
Admiral Stone, I'm interested in your perspective on the
relationship between TSA, Customs, and the Coast Guard, more
specifically, how this budget would help provide you with the
tools to achieve a truly coordinated approach to protect our
port facilities.
I am concerned with reports about the lack of coordination
within the Department of Homeland Security. It seems that TSA
and Customs are merely coexisting within the cargo security
area. Last week, I participated in an event celebrating the
arrival of the first operations safe commerce container into
the United States, and that is a TSA program. Unfortunately,
instead of actively participating in this program, designed to
test technologies, and prove best practices for private sector
supply chain security, Customs is moving forward with RFPs for
container security devices, without regard for the work already
in progress in the TSA.
So as I said earlier, we need to help you work smarter, not
just harder. We need a coordinated port security regime to
ensure the safe, efficient transport of cargo into the United
States, as well as protecting people who live and work near our
ports. It has to be a priority for this government.
So Mr. Chairman, I will have more specific questions for
our witnesses during the question and answer period. I thank
both of you for being here today.
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. The Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid.
Senator Reid. I am not a member of the Subcommittee, but I
am, of course--I have a very short statement, and I would ask
permission of the Chair to be allowed to----
Senator Cochran. You may proceed, Senator.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRY REID
Senator Reid. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, and especially members of the Subcommittee, Admiral,
I have appreciated very much working with you. As you are
aware, McCarran International Airport is the second, only to
the Los Angeles International Airport, in the number of
passengers that come through its security checkpoints. Only LA
International has more people coming. You can go to Atlanta,
and there are more people in the airport, but they are not
leaving the airport, while in Las Vegas, they get out and then
come back.
This arises, of course, as I have indicated, because
McCarran is a destination airport, unlike other large airports
that serve as hubs, where passengers simply connect to another
flight. I have been concerned, as you know, about the delays in
TSA's screening of passengers at McCarran, which may cause harm
to the economy in the Las Vegas region. But also we are
concerned for what it does to not only Las Vegas, but points
north, west, south, and east of there.
This frustrates passengers, makes Las Vegas, by some, a
less attractive choice for discretionary travel. These delays
arise because of the lack of an adequate number of screening
lanes at McCarran, as well as TSA security rules and procedures
that were not optimized for McCarran Airport.
To address these delays, there are more screening lanes
being built into McCarran, and I think we can count on TSA to
adequately staff them. In addition, and I appreciate this very
much, TSA instituted a pilot program at McCarran to optimize
screening rules and regulations during periods of heavy
passenger flow, while maintaining the highest levels of
passenger security and safety.
It is my understanding that delays at McCarran have been
reduced to 30 minutes, on average, in recent weeks, and that is
good, because it was up to 3 hours on some occasions. Credit
does go to TSA and your able Federal security director in Las
Vegas, Jim Blair, who is always available to answer questions
and be most helpful in many regards.
So I want to thank you personally for your efforts. And I
would like to ask how you think this pilot program is working
from a TSA perspective and whether you have plans to expand its
application to other airports. You do not need to answer that
now. You can do that in writing to me, if you would, please.
AVIATION SECURITY CAPITAL FUND
There is another issue that I would like to touch on. The
FAA bill passed by Congress last year mandates that 90 percent
of the cost of in-line screening systems at large airports were
to be paid by the Federal Government through the Aviation
Security Capital Fund. The language was definitely retroactive
to large airports that had already received letters of intent
for in-line screening systems. This was an increase from 75
percent to 90 percent, and for McCarran, represents almost $19
million. I note in TSA's fiscal year 2005 budget request for a
Federal share of only 75 percent of these projects. This
clearly was not the intent of Congress.
So, again, I would ask, with the permission of the
Chairman, that you respond to this in writing to all the
committee at your earliest possible date. Is the Federal share
cost 75 percent or 90 percent? By law, it is 90 percent. We
want to make sure that you live by that.
I would also ask, Chairman Cochran, if you would allow me
to submit a question in writing and ask the panelists to
respond to this at their earliest possible date.
Senator Cochran. The Senator has that right, and we will be
glad to make that a part of the hearing record.
Senator Reid. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. We would request the witnesses to respond
in a timely fashion.
IMPACT OF DETERIORATING SHIPS, COAST GUARD CUTTERS, HELICOPTERS AND
OTHER ASSETS ON COAST GUARD'S ABILITY TO CARRYOUT ITS MISSIONS
Senator Cochran. Admiral Collins, I notice that you start
off in your statement talking about the concerns you have about
the deterioration of your ships, Coast Guard cutters,
helicopters, and other assets that you need to carry out your
missions and fulfill your responsibilities as part of the
Department of Homeland Security, and also contributing to our
Nation's defense. I know you have forces that have been
deployed to the Persian Gulf region, and you also recently were
called upon to deploy assets to Haiti, to the area, and to the
approaches to South Florida, because of the activities in
Haiti.
Could you tell us to what extent this puts strain on the
overall responsibility you have for other activities in
maritime homeland security and marine safety? Were you able to
maintain your vigilance here in the homeland area to carry out
these missions as well?
Admiral Collins. Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to answer
that. I know that is clearly a concern of Senator Murray's as
well, based on her opening comments and previous hearings, is
how we balance across our missions when we have these surge
operations.
The good story is, we have the capacity to serve in the
national interests for high-risk events on a temporary basis
and surge back to normal lay-down of resources. I think that is
a strength that we as a Service have because of our multi-
mission character and our flexibility. So that is a good-news
story.
The question is: How do we continue to service all those
other missions as we surge to an orange alert condition, or a
Haiti, and so forth? I think there are a couple of answers to
that. One is we seek growth of our asset base where warranted.
And as I mentioned in my opening statement, we have realized a
51 percent increase in our operating expense budget, and we
have added additional capacity to our force structure.
If you look a the total number of hours available for
boats, cutters, and so forth, in 2003, they increased over 39
percent; and through 2005, there will be a net 68 percent
increase in the total number of boats, aircraft, and ship hours
available. And that is because additional resources have been
added. So that is the good story.
We still have OPTEMPO challenges and shortfalls and gaps to
meet everything, to be 100 percent everywhere at one time, and
we are not there yet.
But I would have to note that our performance goals
continue to be met across our missions. Let me just give you a
couple of data points. Despite some pressures in the past year,
orange alert and other conditions, we still maintain our SAR
readiness posture, and met all our search and rescue standards.
We saved 87.7 percent of mariners in distress, and our
performance goal is 85 percent.
We achieved a 97.1 percent compliance rate with fisheries
enforcement. Our goal is 97 percent. We have reduced the 5 year
average of collisions and groundings to a little over 1,500.
Our goal is a little over 2,100, and so forth. The point I am
making is that we have ensured we are meeting the highest risk
and attending to our performance goals, even despite these
pressures.
Senator Cochran. I want to commend you for the service you
are providing, and I think the evidence that you gave us in
your statement about the seizure of cocaine on the West Coast
is an example of your capability to continue to function at a
high level of readiness and competence to help protect us from
the ravages of the drug trade.
INTERDICTION AND SEIZURE OF ASSETS OF DRUG SMUGGLERS ON THE HIGH SEAS
OFF THE COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
To what extent is the Coast Guard deploying assets in the
region where the cocaine coming from? Are you able to interdict
and seize assets of the drug smugglers on the high seas off the
coast of South America or in the Caribbean?
Admiral Collins. That is where most of our assets are
provided to, or are deployed to Joint Interagency Task Force
South, out of Key West, which is a DOD joint command capably
lead by a Coast Guard flag officer, I might add. But a joint
command that targets and deploys a multiplicity of assets,
Coast Guard and others, puts metal on target, if you will,
based on Intel.
Most of the assets, all the CD assets almost exclusively,
that we field, are allocated to Joint Interagency Task Force
South for further deployment. And when we actually make the
interdiction, then we take Operation Control back and do the
boarding, do the arrest, and the seizure, and so forth. But we
are primarily down in the deep Caribbean. That is where the
greatest success is, off the West Coast of Colombia, off the
north coast of Colombia, as far west and south as the Galupa
Coast, and all the way up to the Gulf of Tijuanapeck, coming
into the Mexico-Guatemalan border. And that is where we have
had a lot of very, very good success, based on ever-increasing
use of Intel, Intel-queued actions. And that is why the Midget
was successful with 27,000 pounds of cocaine in three seizures
coming back this week.
So I think the interagency and the lay-down of forces has
been getting better and better as we have learned more about
this risk, about this threat.
Senator Cochran. But it seems strong evidence of the
success of interagency cooperation and another reason why the
Department of Homeland Security was a step in the right
direction to help protect the security and safety of the
citizens of the United States from drugs, as well as from other
acts of terror.
SCHEDULE OF NEEDS FOR DEEPWATER AND REFURBISHING OF HELICOPTERS
What can you tell us about the schedule that you would like
to see us fund, as far as your Deepwater modernization effort
and the refurbishing of helicopters that you say are now
dangerous to operate and have caused safety problems out in the
fleet?
Admiral Collins. Clearly, the 2005 budget gives us a
healthy funding profile, consistent with the plus-up that this
subcommittee, and others in Congress provided last year, in
2004. So we have a $678 million level, and that continues to
pursue the larger components of the Deepwater. So I think in
2005, the President's request will keep us on that momentum. It
is about a 22-year time frame. My biggest concern is how we
deal in the out-years, the total length of this project, as I
am faced with deteriorating readiness, and that is the issue,
Mr. Chairman.
We are running our assets hard in the national interest.
They are failing. They are failing at a sharper rate than we
first projected when the project was shaped and designed. And
so over the next several years, I am forced to make a tradeoff
between fixing the existing system versus putting that same
money into the replacement of those systems, and to keep
current readiness, today's readiness live and well. I have no
choice. I have to invest in those legacy systems to keep them
going; and as we push out the modernization, it complicates
that equation.
So that is that downward spiral phenomena; and as you
mentioned, it is particularly problematic, for the engine
system and the HH-65 are key assets for us. And we have had to
aggressively make decisions about re-engineering that platform
and invest in the legacy systems to keep that readiness where
it should be.
Senator Cochran. Well, I am confident this committee is
going to respond and provide the funds you need to move
aggressively to restore the capability of these assets and
build new systems for the future. We are just going to have to
do it. I do not think we have any choice.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SCREENING PROCESS
Admiral Stone, I know we are all concerned about the
effectiveness of the screening processes we have in trying to
help ensure the protection of the traveling public here in our
homeland. The airports and airlines have received the greatest
amount of attention. To what extent are you confident that the
procedures you have in place and the systems that you have
developed and are using now to protect the flying public, those
using our airlines and airports, are succeeding?
Admiral Stone. Senator, I am very confident that the layers
of security that we have in place today are continuously
improving, whether it is the growing size of our flight deck
officer cadre of personnel that we have that we train each
week, and graduate out of Artesia. In addition, our screening
covert testing results indicate continuous improvement. And in
a classified forum, we are keen to share that data, because we
see progress being made as a result of our investment in
training.
We also have online now what is called TIP, the Threat
Image Projection system, which is a file of about 2,400 images.
And we can now go and see each individual screener, how they
are doing. They have to punch in their pass code when they go
up to the X-ray machine, and so we can pull up now, San
Francisco-LAX, see what images in that file that are missed the
most.
So it also gives us an idea of where to refocus the
training. It gives us a percentage of hits that the screener
got on the image that came up. So this Threat Image Projection
really allows us to now measure the individual screener
performance, which is a very significant capability for us, and
when combined with the covert testing results, allows us to
better get our arms around the performance of our screener and
gives us metrics in which to judge not only the screener but
then the airport, and then trends throughout the country.
So we are very excited about now having TIP online, about
the improved scores on covert testing, and about the additional
FFDOs going out each week out into the field. And so across the
board on these layers, we see continuous improvement.
LEVEL OF ATTENTION TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF THREATS TO OTHER MODES OF
TRANSPORTATION
Senator Cochran. There are, of course, other threats that
we are aware. To the extent to which your intelligence shows
the likelihood of threats to other modes of transportation, how
would you assess that in terms of threat level? Are there other
modes of transportation that you consider likely targets of
terrorists that have your acute attention?
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir. In December, we started intermodal
operations Intel briefings. So each day now for an hour and a
half, we spend our time, the senior leadership is, on
intelligence and operations. I will just note that I have been
tracking to find where we are spending our time at the TSA
headquarters, in terms of meetings.
And over half of our time is spent on operations,
intermodal operations and intelligence, which is very pleasing
to me, because I want the focus of our headquarter's effort to
be on operations and Intel and connecting the dots in an
intermodal setting, so at that morning operations intelligence
briefing, we look at a whole range of threats, whether they be
the input that we get from the Coast Guard, from the maritime
perspective; or whether it be from our stakeholders in the land
area.
I will note that in December, one of the first people that
I was introduced to and a briefing was set up with, was Mr. Ed
Hamburger, the President of the American Association of
Railroads; followed by Bill Milar, for public transit
authorities; and Richard White, from the Washington Metro.
These individuals I was able to meet in December, because of
the importance, that right off the bat, I have an opportunity
to understand from their perspective what their challenges
were.
So this operations Intel assessment that we have each day
in which we review the intelligence for all intermodal
operations, I think is reflective of our focus and a sense of
urgency that we understand and are communicating with the field
in all of these areas.
I would say after the aviation threat, which our
intelligence indicates the Al Qaeda interest in being able to
use an aircraft as a weapon remains very high, that we are well
aware that whether it be at our ports or at various land
targets, that we have an intermodal responsibility at TSA to
monitor those threats and then take appropriate action in
coordination with other agencies.
Senator Cochran. Before recognizing other senators for
questions, I have noticed the presence of the distinguished
Chairman of the full committee, Senator Stevens. Do you have
any opening statement, Senator? We would be happy to have you
do that.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. As a matter of fact, Senator, I wish you
would just enter my questions for the record and let me make
one short comment.
Admiral Collins, Admiral Stone, I do want to thank you for
your recognition of the problems of Alaska. I note that we have
an increase in the budget for $102 million for the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002. Of that amount, with half
the coastline of the United States, $152,000 is going to be
spent in Alaska to implement the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002.
I am conscious of what you are doing, and I want to thank
you for what you are doing, testing the Predator A at King
Salmon and Predator B at Shimya. If those are capable
technologies, they could probably be substituted for vessels
and save the taxpayers of the United States a great deal of
money, but at the same time have knowledge of what is going on
along that enormous ocean border of ours.
You have agreed to work with our people on maritime safety
education. I thank you for that, because we are still losing a
considerable number of our vessels, despite everything we have
tried. And the cold water immersion education and the outreach
to the people who are out there without any chance of rescue
really is very important.
I thank you also for transferring the cutter, Long Island,
to Valdez, for its homeland security missions. We have come a
long way, and I know you have a tremendous job. I am pleased to
see that there is an increase for the Coast Guard's budget, a
total of $7.5 billion, an increase of $490 million this year.
And I want to join all of you gentlemen in supporting that. I
wish it was more. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd.
PROPOSED MOVEMENT OF GRANT MONEY FROM TSAT-ODP
Senator Byrd. On January 26th, Secretary Ridge announced
his intention to consolidate a number of grant programs within
the Offices of State and Local Government, Coordination and
Preparedness. On February 25, Representative Sabo and I wrote,
detailing our objections to moving TSA grants, such as port,
rail, and bus security from TSA, as well as the emergency
management grants from FEMA. House Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Rogers sent a similar
letter expressing his concern about moving the TSA grants.
I reiterated my objections during our hearings with
Secretary Ridge and Undersecretary Hutchinson, and I remain
strongly concerned that moving the funds from TSA will result
in a reduction of focus from your agency and the Department on
non-aviation modes of transportation.
That would be in direct contravention of the intent of
Congress when it passed the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act in November of 2001. That Act gives TSA the
responsibility for security over all modes of transportation.
Clearly, the Madrid train bombing should be a wake-up call to
the need for TSA to focus on non-aviation security risks.
Just 10 days ago, The Washington Post quoted from the
Homeland Security Advisory, saying, ``Trains and rail stations
remain potential targets for terrorist groups due to their
reduced security in comparison to airports.'' That is a very
significant statement. Let me read it again, this excerpt from
The Washington Post, just 10 days ago, ``Trains and rail
stations,'' that would include Amtrak, that would include MARC,
``Trains and rail stations remain potential targets for
terrorist groups due to their reduced security in comparison to
airports.''
America is clearly at risk of a terrorist attack to our
rail and mass transit systems, our seaports, and other non-
aviation modes of transportation.
Now, given the existing threat and the strong concerns that
have been raised by members of Congress, are you reconsidering
the proposed movement of these grants from TSA?
Admiral Stone. Senator Byrd, I fully share and understand
the sobering impact of Madrid and Moscow and what that means in
terms of us being required to have a true sense of urgency
about how we address these issues. The decision to move those
responsibilities, in terms of the funding being consolidated at
ODP, has been made very clear to us by the Department that the
subject matter experts, of which TSA relies heavily on to
ensure how the assessments are done and where that money goes,
and our ability, therefore, to impact those decisions, will be
maintained and that the subject matter experts will be part of
the TSA workforce and that we will then be able to interface
with ODP to ensure the proper decisions are made.
Senator Byrd. I am trying to understand as to whether or
not my question was answered. Are you saying you are
reconsidering, or you are not?
Admiral Stone. No, sir, we have received information from
the Department that the subject matter experts that make those
decisions on those monies will remain at the TSA; however,
those monies will go to ODP, along with some staff that will
administer those accounts. But that the decision to ensure that
the people that are transferred to the ODP do not impact on our
critical ability to be able to manage and assess those areas
that those grants apply to.
UNOBLIGATED GRANTS FUNDING
Senator Byrd. The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Act
was signed into law on October 1, 2003; yet, in the intervening
6 months, TSA has yet to obligate the $22 million that Congress
appropriated for trucking industry grants, the $17 million
Congress provided for Operation Safe Commerce, the $10 million
Congress provided for bus security grants, the $7 million
Congress provided for hazardous material grants, the $4 million
Congress provided for nuclear detection and monitoring.
Additionally, $50 million still remains unobligated from the
funds Congress provided for port security grants.
We are halfway through the fiscal year. Congress acted
expeditiously to provide the Department with the funds and the
flexibility to address real and pressing homeland security
requirements. We have been at Code Orange 2 times since August.
You work for the Department of Homeland Security. Explain
why this business-as-usual and go-slow approach to your job is
satisfactory.
Admiral Stone. Senator, the approach of the Department with
regard to the threat that we face has been, I believe, one that
is reflective of a sense of understanding of the threat and an
urgent need to ensure that operationally we are responding to
that. The actual particulars on those individuals' monies and
the time lines for how those are being distributed, I would
like to get back to you, sir, for the record on that.
Senator Byrd. Well now, what do you mean by what you just
said, that you would like to get back for the record. What does
that mean?
Admiral Stone. I would like to make sure that I give you an
answer on those each individual monies and what the time line
is for them to be going out to the field.
Senator Byrd. Very well. Now, you will do that for the
record?
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, what does that mean for us?
Will we see the record on that before we mark up?
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to join you in
the request that the witness submit an answer to you directly,
and we will also have a copy that will be printed in the record
of the Committee's proceedings.
CAPPS II SYSTEM
Senator Byrd. Very well. One of the concerns about the
testing of the proposed CAPPS II system has been the lack of
access to actual traveler data to test the system. Airlines
have been reluctant to voluntarily provide data because of the
very real concerns of privacy groups about how that data will
be used. There is some speculation that the Department is
planning to issue regulations to compel airlines to provide
data for the purposes of testing.
Can you confirm for the Subcommittee whether the Department
is planning to compel airlines to provide data on travelers for
the purposes of testing CAPPS II?
Admiral Stone. Our plan right now, Senator, is to ensure
that we meet all of the requirements that have been identified
both by us and by other entities, such as the GAO, regarding
privacy, oversight, and redress, and that currently is the
focus of our effort. We have recently hired this past week a
privacy officer for TSA. We have had a TSA nationwide privacy
education week in order to ensure that the core beliefs of our
agency are, indeed, shared throughout all of our employees.
Our intent is to ensure that once the privacy redress and
oversight measures are taken that we then work with the
Department on ensuring that a notice of proposed rule-making is
drafted and sent to the Department for review. And then
following that would be our recommendation, our intent, once
that notification goes out, so that the airlines and passengers
know what would be forthcoming, then to move forward with a
security directive for testing. So that would be the TSA
intent, that sort of a process, through the Department.
Senator Byrd. Of the funds requested for this program in
the fiscal year 2005 budget request, what is requested solely
for additional testing of the program, as opposed to
implementation and operation of the system?
Admiral Stone. For the funds that are proposed for fiscal
year 2005 for the $60 million, the actual breakdown of what is
for testing and what is for the actual operation of those
airlines that have actually transitioned to the operational
CAPPS II program, I would have to get that number exactly for
you, sir, and I will do so.
REWARDING OF DEEPWATER PRIME CONTRACTOR
Senator Byrd. Very well. Admiral Collins, the Coast Guard's
Deepwater program is a multi-billion dollar effort to modernize
and replace its aging ships, aircraft, and communications
systems. According to a recent report by the GAO, the Coast
Guard does not have the capability to assess the performance of
the program, and yet the Coast Guard awarded the prime
contractors with a $4 million bonus for work accomplished in
the first year of the contract.
I am concerned that the Coast Guard is rewarding the prime
contractor without first knowing if they are doing a good job.
For instance, the very first Deepwater asset to be delivered,
the 123-foot cutter, was delayed by 4 months. GAO reports that
the schedule for the maritime patrol aircraft has slipped as
well. Should we be rewarding this kind of performance with
bonuses to the contractor?
Admiral Collins. Currently, Senator, the GAO reviewed a lot
of our management processes and procedures, and clearly, the
focus on how we do award fees and how we deal with the systems
integrated was part of that review, how we assess their
performance and recognize their performance. We welcome those
comments, obviously, from the GAO, and we are interested in
continuing to refine our processes.
We are addressing the processes for evaluating the
contractor's performance. We did, in fact, evaluate five
specific areas of performance during the first term. We
followed very, very strict adherence to the Federal Acquisition
Regulations. It was an overriding principle in this review.
The contractor award fee score is, I would submit, much
lower than typical industry and integrator's averages, if you
look at averages for other type of contracts. We are confident
that the award fee level was fair and represented an accurate
assessment of the contractor's performance.
Is there room for enhanced performance of both us and the
contractor on this very, very complex project? Absolutely. We
are working very, very hard to improve that performance, but I
think in this particular case, it was done based upon a set of
criteria. It was done fairly. It was done accurately. We had
objective measures that were introduced into this awards fee
process. We have a performance measurement plan. We have a
balanced scorecard and all the other mechanisms that you use in
this kind of thing. And we will continue to refine it, review
it, assess it, and make it better as we go forward.
Senator Byrd. Well, that is all well and good, but I think
we--as you said, you can do better, and we should do better. I
think we ought to take the GAO report seriously. This is an arm
of the Congress. We are going to believe our agency, and we are
going to expect better from you. So please be aware of this,
and let us do better than this. This is the people's money.
Your money. My money.
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. Their money. So try to do better. I have
further questions. I will await my turn in the next round.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INCREASED REQUIREMENT FOR AIRLIFT CAPACITY SINCE 9/11
The mission of the Coast Guard has expanded immensely since
9/11. And since that time, thirteen maritime safety and
security teams and eight port security units have been
deployed. With these changes, has there been an increased
requirement for airlift capacity?
Admiral Collins. Yes, Senator, there is, and as you know,
the Deepwater solution that was initially designed. And, of
course, that is a 1998 requirement that the contractor's design
to and bid on, in post-9/11. I think there is a re-evaluation
needed to the strategic lift aspect that is embedded in our
Deepwater solution.
And we currently have a team looking at a revised baseline,
performance baseline, for our fixed-wing fleet mix to service
the lift requirement, because what is different in post-9/11 is
that we have these maritime safety and security teams that you
noted that require a strategic lift capability. We also need a
move our use-of-force helicopters when we need to. We moved one
up, incidentally, into Valdez in the last orange condition,
from Jacksonville. We are moving our strike teams as well, so
we see strategic lift as a very, very important part of the
overall aviation and functionality embedded in the Coast Guard
and for the Department, I might add.
So we are going to be reviewing that operational baseline,
Senator, and my expectations are that the C-130 aircraft, in
particular, will figure materially in the ultimate re-
baselining of the requirement.
HC-130JS COMPARED TO THE HC-130HS
Senator Inouye. Speaking of the HC-130J, pursuant to the
fiscal year 2001 allotment, you received six HC-130Js. Now, how
do they compare with the 130Hs?
Admiral Collins. They are a wonderful piece of technology,
Senator. They fly faster. They fly higher. They climb higher.
They have digitized cockpits. It is the latest technology,
versus the older technology. We have accepted all six, and we
had some funding appropriated last year, $60 million, to do the
engineering development and the missionization of those
aircraft. By that I mean putting Coast Guard-peculiar sensor
packages in so that they become true maritime patrol aircraft.
Right now, they are strategic lift and not maritime patrol
aircraft. So we are starting that process to put that
capability in those C-130Js, utilizing that $60 million
increment as a start.
MAKING PACIFIC FLEET ALL 130JS
Senator Inouye. Would it make sense to make your Pacific
Fleet all 130Js?
Admiral Collins. That clearly is in consideration, sir.
Hopefully, we will have greater clarity on that within a matter
of a couple of months. Later in the early summer, we will have
a redefined Fleet mix baseline for Deepwater. And it is going
to have to look at strategic lift. You know the Pacific better
than anyone, and you know the long sortie times that are
required to do our business all through the Western Pacific and
into the Bering Sea, and in the Southern Pacific, and in all of
those places.
So we have to take a very, very hard look at this Fleet mix
and clearly how we deal with the C-130 Fleet, whether
modernizing the H models or recommending additional J models
will be part of that decision process, Senator.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. I have several other
questions, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit to the Coast
Guard, if I may.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Inouye.
BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE PURCHASE AND INSTALLATION OF AN EXPLOSIVE
DETECTION SYSTEM
Senator Inouye. If I may now ask Admiral Stone: The budget
includes $400 million for the purchase and installation of an
explosive detection system, the EDS machines. Letters of intent
have been signed with eight airports, but it is my
understanding that the $250 million requested for installation
would only cover continued payment of existing LOIs. How many
airports are on the list for installation, and under the
current approach, how long would it take to install in-line EDS
machines in the remaining airports on your list?
Admiral Stone. Currently, sir, we have eight LOIs issued to
cover nine airports, and for fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year
2005, that is $800 million that has been apportioned for those
nine airports in support of those eight LOIs. We have another
list that we have gathered of airports that have requested
Letters of Intent to cover their capacity and growth needs.
That list is approximately 30 airports long.
We are currently meeting with the AAAE and the ACI to find
out if in fact that list is reflective of indeed those with the
greatest need. So that list is being refined of outstanding
airports that require LOIs to ensure it really encompasses the
airports around the Nation that have the requirement, rather
than have just those that have submitted the request.
For instance, Chicago O'Hare is not on the list of airports
that have an LOI pending. They have not submitted one, so we
are reaching out with the AAAE and ACI to get that list
corrected so that it reflects really the needs of the Nation,
rather than just those who have submitted the LOI request.
The $1.2 billion that we have in fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2005, of which $800 million covers the LOI process,
leaves us about the $400 million to cover those airports that
need EDSs installed in order to just remain 100 percent
electronically capable. Thus, the 75/25 split allows us to keep
those airports at 100 percent electronic. If in fact it was a
90/10 split, then we have an issue that we will need to address
regarding retaining compliance in fiscal year 2005.
[The information follows:]
We are currently assessing the structure and criteria of a long
term program, and therefore do not have a cost estimate. Implementing
EDS in-line systems at all airports is extremely costly and must be
considered in light of all the other transportation security needs.
While this multi-year effort progresses, TSA continues to use its LOI
criteria, based on achieving and maintaining compliance with the 100
percent electronic screening requirement at all airports, to determine
where resources will be allocated. TSA is working with airports that
will not be able to maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic
screening requirement because of increased passenger loads, increased
and/or additional air carrier service, and/or airport terminal
modifications and expansions. TSA also continues to evaluate situations
where an in-line solution makes sense from the standpoint of security,
efficiency, and reduced staffing needs.
Senator Inouye. If you have to accelerate your program in
the next 4 years, how much would it cost to cover all the
airports on your list?
Admiral Stone. I will have to get you a more concise
number, but I would say it has been estimated to be somewhere
in the area of $4 billion to $6 billion to meet the needs of
those other airports across the Nation that have the LOI
requirements.
LIMIT ON FULL-TIME EQUIPMENT, BAGGAGE AND PERSONNEL
Senator Inouye. At the present time, your agency operates
on a limit of 45,000 full-time equipment, baggage, and
personnel, but is this limitation a realistic one?
Admiral Stone. Currently, we are once again partnering with
the airports themselves on the issue of capacity, their
projected capacity for next year and the year after. We have
reached an agreement with the airports, as well as with the
ATA, under the United States Civil Aviation Partnership, in
which we will use a Boeing model. And the ATA, AAAE, ACI, and
TSA have all agreed to use this model to look at our Nation's
airports and come up with a figure that we think reflects the
screening total requirements.
Under the 45,000 cap that we are currently operating at
right now, we do not have a clear picture of what that means at
our Nation's airports because we still have not shaped
ourselves properly. We still have some airports that are
smaller airports with too many screeners there, and larger ones
that have too few. So we need, internally at TSA, to make that
adjustment here in the coming months to get a real view for
what 45,000 FTE looks like.
We are currently hiring screeners at those airports in
particular that need screeners in order to meet compliance for
100 percent electronic. We are currently at 43,600 FTE at TSA
for our screening force. We are hiring up to 45,000, with the
priority being those airports that need screeners to ensure
compliance with congressional mandates.
Senator Inouye. You have been hiring part-time employees
and screeners. How are they working out?
Admiral Stone. Currently, approximately 90 percent of our
screening force is full time, and 10 percent are part-time
screeners. However, because of our imbalance currently between
small airports and larger airports, and the fact that we have
not internally shaped ourselves correctly, what we have found
out that those part-time screeners are having to work more
hours than they signed up for. So we are pursuing this as a
high-priority item to ensure that we get the right numbers at
the right airports so we can have that efficiency and
effectiveness that the airports, the airlines, and TSA all
want.
Senator Inouye. As you know, I travel quite a bit, going
back and forth to Hawaii, and I must commend you and your team
for a good job.
Admiral Stone. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I have other questions I would like to----
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator. We expect you to be
able to be able to respond to those in a timely fashion
directly to the Senator----
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Cochran [continuing]. And to this committee.
Senator Murray.
IMBALANCE IN COAST GUARD SINCE 9/11
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Collins, I understand that given the circumstances
you believe the Coast Guard's mission is balanced responsibly.
But according to the recent analysis, the Coast Guard mission
hour analysis, it appears that since September 11th, the Coast
Guard is spending about 50 percent less time on drug
interdiction, environmental protection, and marine safety. And
there have also been drastic reductions in the hours spent on
search and rescue, aid to navigation, and enforcement of
fisheries laws and treaties. At the same time, I see on our
analysis that hours for homeland security has more than
doubled. I think it is at 1,130 percent.
I am really concerned that this additional budget pressure
on you to focus on homeland security just asks the men and
women under your charge to work harder in other areas. When do
you see this trend subsiding?
Admiral Collins. Obviously, if we go to an orange alert and
there is additional pressure on. If there is an expeditionary
war effort that is underway and we have additional pressures on
our ports as we did in Liberty Shield last spring, then that is
the priority of the Nation, to deal with that high-profile
risk.
So those are the kind of surges we have to deal with, and
we are prepared to deal with them as an organization and still
maintain an adequate profile to service the key issues, and
meet the minimum standards across the board.
I am very pleased that we have met all our search and
rescue standards. We have met all our search and rescue
performance goals.
Senator Murray. I have. I realize that we did well last
year, but I am really concerned--I want to ask you
specifically, does this budget request allow you to return to
your previous emphasis on the non-homeland security missions
and at the same time do homeland security?
Admiral Collins. By the end of 2005, compared to pre-9/11
levels, we will have increased our total aircraft, cutter, and
boat hours cumulatively by 68 percent from those previous
levels. That is a growth in those resource hours----
Senator Murray. That is our homeland security, correct?
Admiral Collins. That is across--that is the total for
all----
Senator Murray. Does that include fisheries, search and
rescue----
Admiral Collins. That is everything. The total available,
the total boat hours, the total aircraft hours, the total ship
hours available, as compared to pre-9/11 averages, will go up
by 68 percent. That is a very positive growth. That is
reflective, as I mentioned earlier, in that our operation
expense base went up 51 percent. That gives us greater capacity
to deal with these surges.
I do not know what is the normal any more, in terms of what
is the fixed level. I would rather look at whether we are
attaining performance, meeting the highest risks, meeting all
our service responsibilities, and search and rescue standards,
in particular.
Here is a case in point: Counter-drugs. Counter-drugs, we
were, last year, just a little bit, a scotch away, it is a
technical term a scotch away from setting a record on the
cocaine seized in the maritime, with fewer assets. Although we
had a surge, the Liberty Shield, orange, and whatever, the
seizure rate is up. Why? We are getting better about using
Intel.
We are partnering with coalition partners. We are using
technology better, and we are coordinating interagency better.
And all of those mean enhanced productivity. So there are ways
to try to accommodate a particular operation tempo, pressures
that we have, still get the performance the Nation needs.
I would predict this year, I will go out on a limb, that we
will seize over a hundred tons of cocaine this year, with less
resources, because of the effectiveness of our partnering, and
the use of Intel.
Senator Murray. And I congratulate you on that, but I am
particularly concerned about search and rescue, and marine
safety, and some of the other areas that are out there. And we
will be watching that very closely.
RESPONSE BOAT PROGRAM
You have already been asked about some of the Deepwater
programs and your ability to accelerate it. I am really
concerned about the aging fleet of cutters and aircraft, as
well as the status of the responsible program, and I appreciate
your previous response. But could you provide the committee
with an update regarding the response boat program and tell us
whether we are on target to receive the 700 RBS vessels that we
have previously contracted for and what the status of the RBS
contract is?
Admiral Collins. I will provide you with the response
boats, small, if I could provide you a direct response, and I
will give you a little matrix. It will show the flow of the
acquisition, the dollars allocated, how many we are buying each
year. But the short answer is, we are on schedule with it, and
I will give you a complete breakdown year by year on it.
Senator Murray. Okay. If you could submit that----
Admiral Collins. It is a tremendous asset, by the way, and
we are very, very pleased with that. Safe Boat is being a
terrific contractor.
The other issue, the response boat medium, as you know, we
have three vessels that were designed and built and delivered
to us. We are running them through their paces, through an
evaluation process. And we will be prepared to make a down
select and an award for a low-rate initial production, that is,
the second quarter fiscal year 2005.
Senator Murray. So a year from now.
Admiral Collins. We will be ready to make an award and
execute those funds that are in the 2005 request.
Senator Murray. Okay.
Admiral Collins. It will be six low-rate, initial
production, boats that we will fund. We are very pleased, by
the way, with all three candidates that we have. The good story
is that all three have provided us with high-quality boats, so
we will have great competition, as a good thing----
Senator Murray. Good. We will look forward to that.
Admiral Collins [continuing]. And we will have some good
products to choose from.
PORT SECURITY
Senator Murray. Okay. Good. Admiral Stone, as I mentioned
in my opening statement, port security is really important. For
me, it is a top priority, and it appears that we still have a
lot of work to do when it comes to coordinating the Federal
Government's efforts in this area. Can you help us understand
how the various port security programs within the Department of
Homeland Security interact and complement each other, and how
this budget will help in that effort?
Admiral Stone. Certainly. The Border and Transportation
Security, under Under Secretary Hutchinson, both Commissioner
Bonner and myself, and Admiral Collins' team worked very
closely with BTS to ensure that we have a coordinated and
integrated effort.
For instance, the best practices that will be gleaned from
Operation Safe Commerce with regard to locks, sensors, GPS
systems, when they are gathered up, will be coordinated very
closely with CBP, Commissioner Bonner's team, and also with the
Coast Guard, to ensure that that sort of integrated approach,
rather than a stove-piped one, in which those items are just
taken and then put out as new policies. I think is critical to
emphasize that we fully intend to take those best practices and
have that sort of a process.
Additionally, TSA, in partnership with the Coast Guard and
CBP, with regard to port security, regularly coordinates the
results of what the port captain has assessed down at the port
as being those areas of vulnerabilities and risk to ensure that
the port grant process reflects those needs. And then those
monies are then apportioned as a result, in large part due to
that coordinated effort of what the port captain on the scene
has evaluated are his needs.
[The information follows:]
Response Boat Program
The RB-S represents a significant improvement in the Coast
Guard's operational capability. Multi-Mission Stations, Marine
Safety Offices, and Maritime Safety and Security Teams use the
RB-S for a variety of missions. The boat is capable of 45 knots
and can be armed with two machine guns, making it an ideal port
security asset. However, its enclosed cabin and excellent sea-
keeping and maneuverability also lend it to being used on a
full-range of Coast Guard missions.
The first RB-S was delivered by Safe Boats International of
Port Orchard, Washington in May 2002, specifically intended for
homeland security use. By the end of fiscal year 2004, a total
of 285 boats will be ordered to enhance the Coast Guard's
homeland security capability and to recapitalize the Utility
Boat-Light fleet. To date, 155 boats have been delivered. The
Coast Guard is also analyzing how many of the 700 boats
authorized under contract are operationally required for future
purchases. The following table provides the number of boats
ordered by fiscal year and the associated funding:
[Million of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Funding for Number of
Fiscal year boats boats ordered
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 \1\................................ $8.2 40
2004.................................... 27.0 139
2003.................................... 15.2 84
2002.................................... 10.9 62
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on fiscal year 2005 Budget Request.
Admiral Stone. The TSA approach on the integrated
intermodal information system, which is a system that we
believe from point of shipment to point of destination provides
visibility on an intermodal level for us to, therefore,
coordinate with every partner that has to do with the security
of cargo. And how, wherever that originates in the world and
wherever it ends up in the United States, is another reflection
of our intent to ensure that from a transportation sector point
of view, all of our activities and how we monitor that are an
integrated effort, fully partnered with the CBP, Coast Guard,
and other organizations that are involved in monitoring those
shipments as they enter the United States.
So across the board, from an intermodal perspective, TSA,
and I know that it is BPS's view, that that has to be the way
to head if we are going to really be efficient and effective.
Senator Murray. Well, as you know, Operation Safe Commerce
is going to have a report by the end of this fiscal year that
will detail some of the private sector methodology, best
practices, and technology solutions. And I will be following
that closely to make sure that the agencies use that
information, because I think they have done a really good job
of putting that together. So I will be working with you on
that.
CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR THE FLOW OR COMMERCE DURING AN INCIDENT AT ONE OF
OUR PORTS
Let me ask you one other question, Admiral Stone, because
after September 11th, everyone knows we grounded all of our
aircraft for a number of days and saw devastating impacts on
the air transportation industry. My state was impacted,
obviously, with Boeing. All states were. But the shutdown of
the West Coast ports last summer during the strike offered us
kind of a glimpse of what would happen if we saw a similar
shutdown at any of our seaports. That could cost our economy as
much as a billion dollars a week.
I would like to know from you what kind of contingency
planning is happening within the Administration, and
specifically, who is in charge of an incident and who is in
charge of making sure the flow of commerce is not impeded
should we have some kind of incident at one of our ports.
Admiral Stone. TSA is charged with developing sector-
specific plans. And then in the area of maritime, for a port
scenario that you mentioned, the Coast Guard would be lead in
coordinating that effort from a maritime port point of view.
But it is TSA's responsibility for the transportation sector to
develop those plans. That is an ongoing effort with TSA and an
item of priority as well as the daily coordination with the
Coast Guard and other----
Senator Murray. Are those contingency plans developed now,
should something occur in one of our ports?
Admiral Stone. The sector-specific plans are still a work
in progress, and so the real-world events would be coordinated
by TSA, much like we did during the last threat level orange
when we had flights of interest, our coordination with the
Department of Transportation on that was daily and immediate,
via real-time communications on flights of interest. It would
be our intent to do similarly in a real-world operation with
the Coast Guard.
Senator Murray. Admiral Collins.
Admiral Collins. As you know, Senator, there is a family of
planes that is required to be built as part of the MTSA.
Senator Murray. Right.
Admiral Collins. We are reviewing thousands, literally
thousands of those for vessels and facilities, and those
vessels and facilities. And there are overarching port security
plans for each port, so over 40 of these. They are done
collaboratively with the Area Maritime Security Committee.
We are all major stakeholders in the port to provide an
overarching plan to respond to contingencies and deal with
security issues, not unlike the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
requirement for area contingency plans for oil pollution
response. The same thing is going to be done on the security
basis.
Those will be vetted in the other feeder, the government
document is the port security assessment that has been done for
each port. That is really the customer, that is, these
committees and the captain of the port, so they can take those
vulnerability assessments, along with threat assessments, and
develop the appropriate plans and the contingency plans. And
they will be embedded in each one of these captain of the port
area plans, all to be completed, by the way, by the end of
April, reviewed and approved, and in place by July 1 of this
year.
Senator Murray. That is all well and good, and I think you
have done a marvelous job. The ports have done a really good
job in responding to this. Mr. Chairman, what I am concerned
about is the budget request. Admiral Collins testified, when
was it, in the House last year that we would need $1.3 billion
this year, and we have a $100 million budget request. So we are
asking our ports to have these plans to be ready to go, and we
are not funding them. I will have more conversations about
this, Mr. Chairman, but I am deeply concerned about that.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Murray. Senator
Domenici.
FUNDING REAL NEEDS AND NOT WANTS
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First,
I apologize for being late. I apologize to the witnesses.
I would like to make a couple of observations and ask you
to respond. It is not necessarily totally your problem, but I
am unimpressed with the notion that everybody and every
community of any size that makes noise will get help from the
Department of Homeland Security.
I would like to suggest to you that I do not believe we
could ever afford to fund everybody that thinks they need a
fire engine, everybody that thinks they need some
transportation protection. But rather we have to conclude in
some reasonable way, what is at risk and then help secure what
is at risk.
I do not know if you know. I am not sure that the committee
members know, that well before this incident, Senators Lugar,
Nunn, and Domenici put an amendment on the floor of the Senate,
which passed overwhelmingly. It cost a lot of money, but it
picked 120 cities, from experts, that needed first responder
training. It did not pick 6,000. It picked 120.
Now, might I ask first, Admiral Stone, because it is more
relevant to you, and then with each hearing, I will ask all the
way to the top, ``What do you do to evaluate people's concerns,
versus the reality that we cannot do everything?'' There ought
to be some way to cover real risks--strike that word--the most
significant risks, rather than things that people think they
need.
Admiral Stone. Sir, I believe strongly, and we have this
discussion almost every morning when an issue comes up at our
operations and intelligence briefings, to look at an issue from
a risk-based decision point of view, looking at three things:
What is the threat? What is the criticality? And what is the
vulnerability?
Senator Domenici. What does ``criticality'' mean?
Admiral Stone. The criticality? For instance, when the
issue has come up about general aviation at Reagan Airport.
Senator Domenici. Okay.
Admiral Stone. What are the criticality of the assets
involved in that particular decision? What is the
vulnerability? There is a reduced reaction time. And then what
is the threat? Do we believe that Al Qaeda has an interest, and
terrorist organizations, in that particular modus operandi, to
do us harm. So whether it has to do with general aviation at
Reagan, that threat criticality and vulnerability, and then
making a risk-based decision, I think, is key.
Senator Domenici. So even though you are not the head of
the whole department, you are telling me and this committee
that you know enough to say to us, we are evaluating requests
versus risk----
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici [continuing]. All the time.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. I might just say, fellow Senators, I have
been observing and then trying to inquire when I see it, how
groups rally and seek to impose, through political force, the
needs of their organizations on the government. I do not think
you ought to yield to that. I note the other day, and I love
them, but the fire fighters had a big meeting. They wanted more
things. I asked them the kinds of things they wanted, it became
more obvious to me that there was a lot of the demand and the
requests that just had to do with the fact that they wanted new
equipment, not that they were at risk and needed new equipment.
I see a difference. I do not see how we can fund the first, but
we can the latter.
If we are going to fund the first, we need a new program to
say we are going to pay for the needs of the police and firemen
of America. But that would not be related to this, it would
seem to me. I could be wrong, and the Senate could say, yes, it
does, because we do not know what is at risk, so we will cover
everybody. But as of now, it is risk-oriented in terms of
granting and assessing needs, and then funding them.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir, risk-based decision making is at
the core of that decision process.
FLETC FACILITY AT ARTESIA, NEW MEXICO
Senator Domenici. Okay. I thank you for that. I just have
one parochial question, Mr. Chairman. I do not know if you
know, Mr. Stone, some senators know, because I have been
somewhat of an open advocate for a secondary FLETC facility
that is now 12 years old in Artesia, New Mexico. You trained
your air marshals there until 18 months ago, and then you got
into an argument and you went to New Jersey.
See, I do not win them all, Mr. Chairman, but I did not
think it was a very good idea, and I still do not. I have
talked to a lot of marshals, and it is interesting enough,
though, the idea not to put it there, it was just too far away.
The marshals that went there loved it. So I think it is a
pretty good training facility.
But now you have a new program, FFDO.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici. That is, Senator, if pilots want to carry
arms, they ask, and they become volunteers to become trained so
they can carry arms. Surprisingly, there are a lot of them,
well, you might say a lot of them do not want to, but
surprisingly, a lot of them do. We do not let them carry
firearms just because they used to be deputy sheriff and know
how to shoot a gun. They have to go through some pretty good
training.
Now, as I understand it, for the FFDO program the trainees
are being trained at FLETC, Artesia----
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir.
Senator Domenici [continuing]. Is that correct?
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir. The Federal Flight Deck Officer
Program is the trainees at Artesia.
Senator Domenici. Now, let me ask you, is the program
effective and efficient, and what do you think about it?
Admiral Stone. Extremely so. We are really proud of that
program. The pilots themselves give us tremendously good
feedback on the quality of the training in Artesia. Every week,
we are graduating. We have a queue of folks that are in line to
fill out all the quotas through the rest of this fiscal year.
So we could not be more pleased with the quality of the
training we see, the feedback from the pilots, and the extra
level of security that that gives us today.
Senator Domenici. From the standpoint of the Department, is
this seen as something good, to go ahead and grant these pilots
this permission and train them if that is what they want?
Admiral Stone. It is my understanding, yes, sir. When I
briefed this program up the chain into the Department, it is
very well received as an additional layer that we are quite
proud of.
Senator Domenici. Could I ask, if you know this, what kind
of feedback are you getting from the pilots with reference to
this program in the event they have volunteered?
Admiral Stone. The feedback on the critique sheets has all
been superb training in Artesia, much better than I had
thought, based on historical data for what they thought the
course would be, now to come here and find out that it is top-
shelf training. So all of those critiques that we get back from
the FFDO pilots have been very complimentary of the process.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS PROGRAM
Senator Domenici. Let me shift gears now. A sister
function, which is bigger in numbers and better known, is the
marshal program, air marshals. Could you tell me, is that
program working? Do you know what the morale is of those who
are in that program? Are you having a significant and sustained
mainstream or stream of applicants who want to do this?
Admiral Stone. Sir, I am partnered with ICE, Mike Garcia,
and his team, that now own the FAMs. However, since December,
ICE and the Federal Air Marshal Program have sent one of their
top people to sit in on every ops Intel brief, which we hold
every day at TSA, so that connectivity and teamwork and
partnership is reflected in everything that we do in aviation
now. I think that is a real success story for us.
From all the indications that I see, that program is being
run very well. And it is very flexible when we get threat
indications or we see things that come up, that we immediately
want to reprogram a FAM to a particular flight. That happens
instantaneously as a result of that operational focus that we
have with the FAM, so I would give it high scores as well.
Senator Domenici. Well, I understand they are paid well.
There is no question that they make very good money, and they
can thus afford the flexibility of sometimes working different
hours and being shipped around when they were not expecting to.
From talking to them, they understand that, but I have also
been told that there are more quitting than one would expect
for such a highly paid program. Is that true, and if so, do you
know why?
Admiral Stone. Sir, I do not have any visibility on that
particular issue.
Senator Domenici. Could you check that in some reasonable
way and relate it to some comparable program with high pay like
that, in terms of the staying power of the program and filling
the vacancies. And also, are you at full capacity, and if not,
why?
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir, I will be happy to look into that.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Domenici. Admiral
Collins, I noticed in the statement you submitted, in the part
where you are talking about the need to recapitalize our
operational assets, you point out that in your 110-foot patrol
boats there have been 20 hull bridges requiring emergency dry
docks.
AVAILABLE NEW TECHNOLOGIES THAT COULD BE USED FOR REPLACEMENT COAST
GUARD VESSELS
I am wondering to what extent are new technologies
available that could be used for replacement Coast Guard
vessels that offer greater efficiencies or other benefits?
Admiral Collins. Sir, first, let me give you a graphic
example of one of those bridges. This is an out-plating from
one of our recent 110s. You can see the corrosion, internal
corrosion, and a fairly substantial hole. This is typical of a
number of 110-foot cutters where failures were experienced.
That, obviously, gives a sense of urgency about getting on with
this patrol boat program.
Of the technologies that we are attracted to, one is the
composite technology. We are working with the Deepwater
contractor on the surface side of the program. Northrup Grumman
is exploring the use of a composite technology hull in
particular for this fast-response cutter, which is this 110-
foot cutter replacement.
It is attractive from two or three dimensions. Number one,
lower life-cycle costs. The maintenance and the haul-out cycle
are much more reduced. The life of the hull is much longer than
a comparable steel or aluminum hull. So we are looking at it
very, very eagerly and discussing with Northrup Grumman way
ahead if, in fact, we do choose to pursue composite technology.
Senator Cochran. Are there any existing ships that you know
of that have this technology now and have demonstrated its
capability?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. One of the leading shipyards in
the world in this technology is Kockums Shipyards, Karlskrona,
Sweden. Northrup Grumman is partnering with Kockums Shipyards
as their technical advisor, if you will, on moving ahead with
this composite technology. They have built a number of
minesweepers very successfully, and current frigate, the Visby
class, which I had the opportunity to go aboard 6 or 7 months
ago, to sort of kick the tires on this technology, if you will,
very, very impressive technology. And because of Northrup
Grumman partnering with one of the world's specialists and the
use of this technology, it appears to be a very potent team,
Senator.
AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Senator Cochran. There is also an indication in your
statement, in the section dealing with maritime domain
awareness, where you say, ``An intelligence and warning system
that detects indicators of potential terrorist activity before
an attack occurs is necessary to take preemptive and protective
action.'' You then go on to say you are currently installing an
automatic identification system in your vessel traffic service
ports and formalizing requirements to award a contract of a
nationwide AIS network, the Automatic Identification System.
Exactly how is that going to work? Is this a new technology
that is envisioned, or is it something that you feel
comfortable about moving forward? I notice you are requesting
$4 million to continue this project. How is that money going to
be spent?
Admiral Collins. One approach is to embed AIS technology
and all our nine VTSs around the country so there will be AID,
or Automatic Identification System-based vessel traffic
systems. That will all be completed by the end of this calendar
year for all those systems. So we will have AIS-based.
Also, another requirement for AIS is as a result of our
initiatives with the International Maritime Organization,
where, as you know, we pushed through an international standard
for shipping successfully, the international ship and port
security code, and also SOLAS, Safety of Life At Sea
amendments, that require AIS on all in-bound commercial ships
over 300 gross tons no later than 1 December 2004. These are
transponders that identify position and location and other
information. These AIS-equipped VTSs can take that signal.
We also need to be able to receive those VHFM-communicated
signals in other places beyond those ports. And we are looking
at all kinds of different options to put AIS equipment on off-
shore platforms. As you well know, in the Mississippi, there
are over 3,000 off-shore platforms. They could be a great
location for those systems, so we have the coverage. It is a
coverage issue. There is also the Rescue-21, which is the VHF
high-sites that we are putting around the country, is to hang
AIS systems off of those as well.
So we are looking at all that infrastructure, trying to
minimize the infrastructure burden by using existing locations
and infrastructure in order to get the coverage we want. So we
think it is a great way to go. We are optimistic about it.
The other dimension of AIS is long-range tracking, the idea
of how do you get long-range tracking, because this one is a
short range. How do you get like over 2,000 miles type of range
and reporting requirements? This is another program and
initiative that we are running through IMO to establish it as a
worldwide standard. We are looking at various options for long
range.
It gets complicated real quickly, Mr. Chairman, because it
has a lot of moving parts, but we are taking a very
comprehensive look at all of the pieces.
RESCUE 21
Senator Cochran. One other modernization effort, I
understand, is having some kind of identification system that
shows the location so that you will not have to guess where the
ship is.
Admiral Collins. That is our Rescue 21 project, Senator,
that is a fairly substantial feature of our capital request in
2005. It has been in previous years. We are focused to build
that system out by the 2006 time frame. That is the one that
establishes high towers around the country and monitors VHF,
FM, and other distress calls from emergencies at sea. It has
digital recording capability, and direction-finding capability
so we can hone in on the signal, fix the position, and take the
search out of search and rescue. It is a very, very, very, I
think, positive addition to our capability.
CAPPS II DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT
Senator Cochran. Thank you. Admiral Stone, we noticed that
your request is $892 million more than the adjusted and enacted
level for fiscal year 2004. And one of the additional requests
this year that you are making is for a second-generation,
computer-assisted passenger pre-screening system, the so-called
CAPPS II.
I know you envision this as a modern--more modern pre-
screening system than the one that is currently in use by the
airlines. How soon do you think the TSA will be able to develop
and deploy this system?
Admiral Stone. We are confident that we will be able to get
in place the privacy, redress, and oversight measures that we
know are key to ensuring that we have the trust and confidence
of the American people to put forth such a system that we think
significantly enhances security. The time line for that is we
hope to have in the spring, the NPRM, the Notice of Proposed
Rule-making out, and approved within the Department, as well as
the security directive that we need. So we are looking at being
able to have the oversight, redress, and privacy pieces, and
then forwarded to the Department this spring, the NPRM and the
SD. At that point, the Department will review it and make the
decision concerning forwarding for testing purposes.
Once we have the approval to conduct testing, we envision
that that process will be one in which we are going to want to
test historical data. So we are going to want to give the
airlines a couple of months to review the NPRM and the SD, and
then we will go back and look at a historical month. This is
our testing approach. So we are hopeful this summer that we
would be able at some point to be able to conduct that sort of
a test.
EXPEDITED REGISTERED TRAVEL PROGRAM
Senator Cochran. I was encouraged to know that you are
concerned about reducing the hassle factor in airports for
passengers and baggage screening, and that you are considering
a registered travel program to help accomplish this. Can you
tell us when you think you might have an expedited program in
place?
Admiral Stone. We are very excited about getting a pilot
going. That first step of actually doing a pilot and having a
voluntary program where we are looking at groups of individuals
that have volunteered, and then pairing that up with a
biometric so that we can then verify that individual and be
able to have a tailored process, either a dedicated lane,
depending on the airport, so that we can facilitate the
registered travelers through the checkpoint in a quicker
manner. Our goal is in June, to be able to start that pilot and
run it for about 90 days, and then glean the lessons from it
with an eye towards continuing into 2005 with a more advanced
program so that we can get on with the issue of registered
traveler.
UNQUALIFIED AUDIT OPINION
Senator Cochran. Finally, I think I should congratulate you
for achieving an unqualified audit opinion for the last fiscal
year. This is your third consecutive clean audit, I am advised,
and you are maintaining a clean audit record and correcting
control weaknesses that were noted in the audit reports. So I
congratulate you for that.
Admiral Stone. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
NON-INTRUSIVE SCREENING OF PASSENGERS FOR EXPLOSIVES
Senator Byrd. Admiral Stone, in December 2001, Richard Reed
was prevented from exploding his improvised shoe bomb due to
quick action on the part of the passengers and crew of an
American Airline flight from Paris to Miami. In the intervening
2 years, we appear to have increased the screening of checked
baggage for explosives, but there appears to be little effort
being made to enhance the screening of passengers themselves
for hidden explosives.
The technology and equipment exists to non-intrusively
screen passengers for explosives. What is TSA doing to address
this potential threat?
Admiral Stone. Senator, I just stopped at our Atlantic City
laboratory to review the explosive trace portal that is
undergoing testing and certification. We firmly believe at TSA
that we need to transform our checkpoints. The checkpoints that
we have today, in the wake of 9/11, got the job done for us.
The EDS systems that we have today, as well, were out there
to ensure that we had an extra measure of protection. But now,
in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security S&T
Division, we started to review the entire aviation security
role of TSA. Does the equipment match the threat, whether it be
sheet explosives or any other potential threat? We are keen to
ensure that we are investing and transforming our checkpoints
to reflect the threats that we see coming down the road and
experiencing today, rather than the box cutters that caused and
the scenarios that caused 9/11.
So our intent is to get that equipment certified, tested at
Atlantic City, and then expedited out into our checkpoints to
give us that explosive detection capability at our passenger
checkpoints that you mentioned.
Senator Byrd. How much of your fiscal year 2005 budget
request is devoted to enhanced screening of passengers for
explosives.
Admiral Stone. We have, for our checkpoint modification, I
think it is $44 million, or somewhere at $44 million or $46
million for checkpoint enhancements, of which allows us to
introduce to our checkpoints additional technologies.
SECURITY PLANS REQUIRED UNDER THE MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT
Senator Byrd. To meet the requirements of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act, vessel owners and port facility
owners were required to submit security plans to the Coast
Guard for review and approval by December 31, 2003. It was
reported earlier this year that only one-half of all vessels
and less than one-third of port facilities met the December 31
deadline.
According to your testimony, Admiral Collins, those numbers
have improved dramatically. How many penalties have you levied
against non-compliant companies?
Admiral Collins. Senator, we have had about 97 percent of
all the plans in, so we have really made some progress here
over the past several months. Total number of notices of
violations that were issued for the facility side of the plans
were 63 notices of violation, and for the vessels, were 89 that
have notices of violations for not meeting submittal
requirements, Senator.
But again, we have over 97 percent submitted this date. So
we are confident that we are going to get all of them in and
all of them reviewed and all of them approved, as appropriate,
or adjusted as we go back and work with the submitter to ensure
that they meet all the requirements of the rule and the law.
Senator Byrd. Have there been corresponding penalties
levied against non-compliant companies?
Admiral Collins. I do not have the exact figures on that,
Senator, with me today, but I will be glad to give you a prompt
response on exactly the adjudication of those notices of
violation.
Senator Byrd. Very well. If you will, please. How many
plans have you sent back for revisions? Would you supply that
information also?
Admiral Collins. I will provide you with that as well, sir,
yes.
[The information follows:]
Security Plans Required Under the Maritime Transportation Security Act
As of April 7, 2004, we have issued Notices of Violations (NOVs) to
95 vessels and 66 facilities. Each of those violations was for failing
to submit a completed security assessment and has a $10,000 civil
penalty associated with it. Subsequently, we have issued civil
penalties in the amount of $25,000 to four of these facilities for
failing to submit a completed security plan (for a total fine of
$35,000). These penalties were based on violations of 33 CFR Section
104.410 for vessels and 33 CFR Section 105.410 for facilities.
The security plan review and approval process consists of several
distinct stages.
For vessels there are two stages. Stage I review determines if a
plan contains all critical elements outlined in the regulations, and
Stage II review ensures that security measures specified in the plan
adequately address the vulnerabilities which are identified in the
security assessment. Vessel security plans receive final approval
(Stage 2) from the Coast Guard Marine Safety Center in Washington, DC.
For facilities there are three stages. Stage I and II review is
parallel with the vessel Stage I and II, which are completed at the
National Facility Plan Review Center in Kansas City, KS. Stage III
consists of a final review that is completed and approved by the local
Captain of the Port.
All vessel and facility security plans through Stage II and Stage
III have been completed.
The Coast Guard has also issued a total of 157 Notices of Violation
and civil penalties for failure to submit required security plans.
Senator Byrd. What are you learning about the security
needs of vessels and port facilities based on the plans that
have been submitted?
Admiral Collins. What we are learning is from the port
security assessments in terms of vulnerabilities. As required,
we are doing port security assessments for 55 of our major
ports around the country. We will complete them all by the end
of this calendar year, a lot of which is classified, by the
way.
But there are a lot of things that are coming out in that
in terms of vulnerabilities. Generally, I will state, for
example, underwater threats and how we are vulnerable in our
ports for underwater threats is just an example of some of the
things that we are finding in some of these assessments.
These port security assessments will provide a lot of the
solid information that we will use to craft these port-wide
security plans that are also to be completed this spring. But
all these assessments are sort of source documents to get a
hold of the vulnerability end of the risk equation that Admiral
Stone talked about and then match them up with a threat
assessment as well and to have a complete picture of what gaps
we need to fill.
The other interesting thing, Senator, the purpose these
serve is that when we do evaluate grant applications, that come
in for port. We are sort of one of the expert witnesses that
review those applications at the local level. We use all the
vulnerability assessment we have done as a yardstick against
which to measure this application as to whether it addresses a
number of the gaps that have been identified in these
assessments.
So I think it is a good system that we have, and a
comprehensive approach. And we are going to distill down the
results of these port security assessments into a geographic
information system display that is available for each one of
our port security committees around the country so a ready file
of information, very practical information that can be used by
the port security including all the stakeholders in the port to
make the right decisions about which risks and which gap to
address first, second, and third.
PORT SECURITY FUNDING
Senator Byrd. The Coast Guard estimates that $1.125 billion
is needed in the first year and $5.4 billion over the next 10
years for ports to comply with the Federal regulations that
have been mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
Until fiscal year 2005, the president never requested funding
to help ports implement security improvements, as outlined in
the MTSA, and his budget request for fiscal year 2005 is 62
percent lower than the amount Congress provided last year.
When Secretary Ridge testified before this subcommittee in
February, he said that he believes port facility owners should
bear most of the financial burden to harden security at our
seaports. What evidence do you have that these owners are
stepping up to the plate and investing their own resources in
port security?
Admiral Collins. Many of them have. Many of them have
security plans already in place. Some of them are exercising
those. They are aggressively pursuing grants, and use of grants
to meet the terms and conditions of the new standards. Over
$500 million, thanks, obviously, to the support of Congress in
making those funds available. But over $500 million has been
distributed to ports and port facilities to undertake some of
this hardening, as you put it. There is $46 million within the
2005 budget for additional source of grants for ports, and
ports have the ability to also apply through ODP.
The applications are reviewed by TSA, the Coast Guard, and
other expert witnesses to also apply for higher levels of
funding. There is over $3 billion worth of grant money that is
included in the overall Department of Homeland Security budget.
So there is $46 million dedicated and another ability to apply
for that larger pot, a general pot of grant money as well.
Senator Byrd. But the Administration is proposing to cut
those grants by 62 percent. Why?
Admiral Collins. I do not know exactly the way that final
pot was determined, Senator. It is about $3.4 billion, as it
stands now, submitted in the President's budget. Again, we do
not administer the overall money. But as I recall, $8 billion
overall has been given out in grant money by the Department of
Homeland Security. I might look at Admiral Stone to confirm
that number, but I believe it is $8 billion overall in the past
2 years. And this represents another $3.5 billion, so a
substantial amount of money, by anyone's accounting, that has
been distributed to first responders and other requirements
throughout the Department, including those port facilities.
Senator Byrd. I am advised that that $8 billion is for
first responders, not for port security.
Admiral Collins. Again, over $500 million was allocated for
ports and port facilities.
Admiral Stone. Yes, sir, and with regard--Senator, may----
Senator Byrd. Admiral Stone.
Admiral Stone [continuing]. I help on that, or----
Senator Byrd. Yes.
PORT SECURITY GRANT FUNDING
Admiral Stone. The comment on the $46 million for fiscal
year 2005 for port security grants is indeed reflective of the
Department's view that the private sector needs to step up to
the plate with regard to the security at our Nation's ports.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I hope there is some way we can
get our arms around this question as to whether or not port
facility owners are stepping up to the plate and investing
their own resources in port security, as the secretary
continues to advise as being the best way to solve this
problem.
We cannot seem to come to grips with it. The secretary says
port facility owners need to provide this security, rather than
the Federal Government, and yet we cannot seem to find out what
port facility owners are doing.
I have one more question. Do I have time to ask it, Mr.
Chairman?
Senator Cochran. Yes, sir, as long as Senator Inouye is not
inconvenienced.
Senator Byrd. Why do not I turn to Senator Inouye and let
him ask----
Senator Inouye. I have no questions.
Senator Byrd If I have time, I will ask another. Thank you.
DEEPWATER BUDGET REQUEST
The budget includes $678 million for Deepwater, the Coast
Guard's program to modernize and replace its aging ships,
aircraft, and communication systems. While this is a slight
increase over the $668 million provided in fiscal year 2004, we
believe that a significantly larger amount is needed to keep
pace with the Coast Guard's homeland security mission
requirements. It was conceived as a 20-year program, but the
President's request only keeps the program on a 22-year
schedule.
Deepwater was conceived prior to the 9/11 attacks. The
intention was to ensure that the Coast Guard had the assets to
maintain its overall capabilities. Following September 11th,
the Coast Guard's role in protecting the homeland increased
dramatically, but the Deepwater program has not been adjusted.
You state in your testimony that the Coast Guard's greatest
threat to mission performance continues to be aging assets that
are technologically obsolete. Why then are you only requesting
enough funding to keep the Coast Guard on pace to complete
Deepwater in 22 years when the majority of these assets will
reach the end of their service life by 2008? Admiral Collins,
please.
Admiral Collins. Clearly, we are pleased with the continued
support that we are getting from the Administration and from
Congress on Deepwater. Obviously, it is a major initiative for
us. We feel very, very important. The 2005 budget does keep
most of the major pieces on track for Deepwater, and I think
how fast we do Deepwater at this point probably falls in the
out-year category to continue to consider the flow of assets.
One year, of course, of funding does not continue the total
flow. It is how you program these assets over time to get on
the right time line.
Again, as the operational commander, I am confronted with
the dilemma to try to balance this number and try to balance it
between legacy systems, or those old systems that are wearing
out, and the new systems that have to replace them. And it is a
dynamic process that we are going to have to collectively deal
with.
My apprehension, Senator, is that it is going in the wrong
direction, that the readiness part, that downward spiral
phenomena is something that concerns me as an operational
commander, and the ability to deliver the services. So this is
a tough question that we have to continue to address.
Senator Byrd. Admiral, you have been a good soldier. You
have been a good soldier. You are sticking to the
Administration's request, but the Coast Guard submitted a
budget request for over $1 billion to OMB for fiscal year 2005.
You support the President's request, but I understand that you
requested $1.1 billion to OMB for approval. What would the
program time line be if your fiscal year 2005 Deepwater budget
were $1.1 billion?
Admiral Collins. That glide slope, Senator, of course, it
is more than 1 year a program makes, but that glide slope, if
it was funded at that kind of rate, would be basically a 15-
year program. And that is what that number, consistently
applied, plus or minus a bit each year customized to the year
over time, it would lead to a 15-year program.
Homeland Security Act required the Department and the Coast
Guard to submit a report to Congress on the feasibility of
accelerating Deepwater. That report was sent last year. It was
one of the first reports from the Department that identified
the feasibility of accelerating.
The requirement in the Act was to report on the feasibility
and desirability of accelerating to a 10-year program and so
forth.
So that particular report is a matter of record. It has
been sent to the House and the Senate, and it describes this
particular course of action as well, Senator.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Senator Inouye, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, Admiral Collins. Thank you, Admiral Stone.
You are both good soldiers.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to the United States Coast Guard
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM (``DEEPWATER'')
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes an increase
of approximately $10 million, for a total of $678 million, for the
Integrated Deepwater System initiative. Will the requested level of
funding for fiscal year 2005 put the Deepwater program back on track to
be completed within the original 20 year time-frame? If not, what level
of funding would be necessary to achieve this goal?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 budget request does not put the
Deepwater Program on track to be completed within a 20-year time frame.
To complete the acquisition in 20 years, the Coast Guard estimates the
Deepwater Program would require $795 million for fiscal year 2005, and
assumes continued funding at this level adjusted for inflation.
Question. The Coast Guard is revising the Deepwater program's
Mission Needs Statement (MNS) to coincide with a post September 11th
environment. What is the time line for the Department of Homeland
Security to approve the revised MNS and what impact will the revised
MNS have on Deepwater program costs and acquisition schedule?
Answer. The Deepwater MNS has been revised and is under final
review by Coast Guard leadership. Once complete, the MNS will be
forwarded to the Department of Homeland Security for review and
validation. A formal briefing before the Department's Joint
Requirements Council (JRC) is scheduled for May 25, 2004.
As approved by DHS, the Coast Guard will engage our Deepwater
system integrator to determine the most economical implementation plan
for those new requirements identified in the updated MNS. Some new
requirements, particularly those that emphasize DHS and DOD
interoperability, will potentially lead the system's integrator to
select alternate sub-systems or components in order to achieve any new
requirements.
The Integrated Deepwater Systems acquisition strategy and solution
remain sound. However, increased mission demands, legacy asset
capability obsolescence, and deterioration in legacy asset materiel
condition since 1998 have created a performance gap in both capability
and capacity. The updated MNS is projected to help close this gap. The
cost and schedule implications have not yet been determined. When new
requirements are approved, total owner cost estimates and the out-year
acquisition schedule will be modified as required.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Maritime
Patrol Aircraft (MPA) is $5.3 million, a decrease of approximately
$19.6 million from the fiscal year 2004 enacted level. Why is there
such a decrease for a program that was significantly funded in fiscal
year 2004, for which there is a contract to purchase at least four
aircraft? What impact will this proposed decrease have on the MPA
program? Will decreased funding for the MPA program delay the delivery
of these aircraft? What impact does this have on the Deepwater program
in general?
Answer. The Coast Guard is currently acquiring the CASA CN235-300M
as the Deepwater medium range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). The Coast
Guard does not have a contract to purchase four aircraft. The Coast
Guard funded the acquisition of two MPA in fiscal year 2003 and a third
in fiscal year 2004. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 budget request
funds the missionization of the third CASA aircraft. This
missionization includes the logistic complement required for Full
Operating Capability and partial spare parts used for the logistics
system start up. Delivery of the first two MPAs is scheduled for 2006,
with full operational capability in late 2006 or early 2007.
The Coast Guard is working to align the Deepwater Program with the
strategic goals and objectives of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The DHS Joint Requirements Council (JRC) reviewed DHS Aviation
Requirements in January 2004 at their first meeting. DHS decisions on
future aviation requirements will determine the exact mix of aircraft
in the Deepwater plan, at which time the funding and delivery schedule
will be adjusted, if necessary.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 funding request for the Vertical
Unmanned Air Vehicle (VUAV) is $43 million, to continue work that was
funded in fiscal year 2004 on two VUAV's; however, the requested
funding level is not sufficient to bring either of the two VUAV's into
full operational capability. What level of funding would be necessary
to make one, or both, of these VUAV's fully operational? If funding is
limited, would it not be better to provide the funds required to bring
one VUAV into full operation rather than to partially fund two VUAV's,
as proposed in the budget?
Answer. The $50 million in fiscal year 2004 provides for detailed
design of the VUAV and culminates in VUAV critical design review. The
$43 million in fiscal year 2005 is for production of 2 VUAVs and
associated ground control stations including developmental and
operational testing. However, the fiscal year 2004 & fiscal year 2005
funding of $93 million gets the Coast Guard VUAVs that are at Initial
Operating Capability (IOC). These VUAVs will not have the necessary
equipment for air space de-confliction and secure data link, which is
required for Full Operating Capability (FOC). The funding necessary to
bring both VUAVs to FOC (includes equipment for air space de-
confliction and secure data link, associated Non-Recurring Engineering
(NRE), and testing) is approximately $30 million. Bringing one VUAV to
FOC is not cost efficient, as the cost drivers are the design work, NRE
and testing, and not the production of the aircraft itself.
Additionally, two aircraft are needed for IOC testing.
Question. Re-engining of the HH-65 helicopter was initiated with
funds appropriated in fiscal year 2004 for other aircraft programs
within Deepwater. From which program lines have fiscal year 2004 funds
been moved to address the re-engining of the HH-65? How much funding
from each line has been reprogrammed? What impact does this shifting of
funds have on those programs in fiscal year 2004? Are changes to the
fiscal year 2005 budget request necessary to address the shortfalls in
fiscal year 2004 funding for the programs from which funds were shifted
for the HH-65 re-engining?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 Deepwater Appropriation has a $67.7
million Program Planned Activities (PPA Line Item) for ``Air Other
Contracts/Legacy Sustainment.'' The HH-65 re-engining is an aviation
legacy asset sustainment project, so it was appropriately funded from
the Air Other Contracts/Legacy Sustainment PPA and no reprogramming
from other PPA line items occurred.
Since the re-engining was not a planned sustainment project for
fiscal year 2004, the following legacy asset sustainment projects
previously planned for execution under the fiscal year 2004 Air Other
Contracts/Legacy Sustainment PPA were deferred in order to fund the
fiscal year 2004 portion of the HH-65 re-engining. These deferred
projects include: HH-65 Landing Gear Replacement, HH-65 Integrated
Radar/FLIR Upgrade, HH-65 Tail Rotor Recapitalization, HH-60 Integrated
Radar/FLIR Upgrade, HH-60 Service Life Extension, C-130 APS-137 Search
Radar Replacement, and C-130 Weather Radar Replacement. Additionally,
HH-60 Avionics upgrade projects was funded at a level lower than
planned due to the HH-65 re-engining.
The aviation legacy sustainment projects deferred in fiscal year
2004 will not require changes to the fiscal year 2005 budget to meet
shortfalls. Because it is a safety and reliability concern, HH-65 re-
engining remains the highest aviation legacy priority in the fiscal
year 2005 President's Budget. The aviation legacy asset projects
deferred in fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 are necessary and
will need to be funded in the future to ensure the sustainment of those
aviation legacy assets until replaced by new IDS assets but do not have
the immediacy of HH-65 re-engining.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the HH-65 re-
engining includes $75 million for approximately 25 aircraft. Will this
complete the re-engining effort? If not, what level of funding is
necessary to complete the re-engining of the Coast Guard's HH-65 fleet?
What is the projected time-frame for completing this re-engining
project?
Answer. The $75 million in the fiscal year 2005 budget request will
not complete the re-engining effort. Although the exact acquisition
costs of the HH-65 re-engining will not be known until receipt of ICGS'
proposal, the budgetary estimate is approximately $3 million per
aircraft for a total estimated project cost of $288 million. The 25
aircraft re-engined with fiscal year 2005 funds will bring the total
number of re-engined aircraft to 41, with 52 remaining to be re-
engined. The required funding for the remaining 52 aircraft is
approximately $156 million.
By June 2004, the Coast Guard plans to issue a Delivery Task Order
(DTO) for the identified solution. The planned implementation schedule
will be included as part of the final DTO. The Coast Guard estimates
the re-engining of the HH-65 fleet to take approximately 24 months.
Question. Once the Coast Guard has modified the HH-65 helicopters
and added more power to them, will all the safety and reliability
problems be resolved and will you be able to take the restrictions off?
If not, why not?
Answer. The HH-65 re-engining project was designed to address the
safety and reliability crisis arising from accelerating frequency of
power loss circumstances and restore the HH-65's operational
capability. The selected solution, the TurboMeca Ariel 2C2 is expected
to provide the safety and reliability required for the HH-65's multi-
mission roles. Once the solution is fully implemented, the Coast Guard
will be able to lift current operational restrictions.
Question. What is the Coast Guard's logic in using the Integrated
Coast Guard Systems for the replacement project? GAO reports that it
might have been faster and cheaper had the Coast Guard conducted the
acquisition. Could the Coast Guard have completed this project itself?
Answer. The Coast Guard directed Integrated Coast Guard Systems
(ICGS) to immediately re-engine the HH-65 after careful consideration
of other procurement options for the following reasons:
--The HH-65 is a Deepwater legacy asset. The Coast Guard hired ICGS
for the Deepwater project.
--Part of the re-engining requirement for safety and reliability of
this Deepwater asset included maximizing operational
effectiveness of Integrated Deepwater systems while minimizing
total ownership cost impacts. ICGS was best suited to make that
determination.
--The ICGS proposal was evaluated based upon cost, schedule and
performance.
--The Coast Guard has the advantage of utilizing Deepwater's existing
management and measurement systems to track cost, schedule and
performance. The safety and reliability crisis dictated that
the Coast Guard employ the best method to execute the re-
engining project. ICGS' corporate approach brings many talents
to the acquisition process (e.g. ability to negotiate volume
purchase or offer premiums to more expeditiously acquire
required stock of engines).
While the Coast Guard is capable of completing the project, the
risk associated with removing the HH-65 re-engining project from the
existing contract with ICGS to effect the MCH conversion was deemed to
be unacceptably high.
Question. What is the relationship between the HH-65 replacement
project and Deepwater? Can you provide us assurances that it won't be
necessary to re-engine the HH-65 a third time?
Answer. The Coast Guard has directed that a re-engining project be
immediately initiated to restore the HH-65 to unrestricted safe and
reliable operations. The project is designed to address the HH-65
engine system, the engine and engine control systems, to remedy this
safety and reliability crisis, and restore the HH-65's operational
capability.
The HH-65 re-engining project is a separate and distinct effort
from the Deepwater Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). In the long-
term, the Deepwater plan is still to convert the HH-65 to the Multi-
mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). While power increases were not the
focus of this acquisition, the engine chosen, while addressing the
safety and reliability concerns, also has sufficient power margins to
allow for that engine to be used in the continuation of the MCH. As
such, another re-engining should not be necessary.
Question. What appropriations are being used for the HH-65
replacement project, and how will this spending affect future spending
on helicopters for the Coast Guard?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 appropriation being used for the HH-65
engine replacement project is the ``Air Other Contracts/Legacy
Sustainment'' Program Project and Activities (PPA) line item. This PPA
line item is also projected to fund re-engining in the fiscal year 2005
President's budget request. The effect on future helicopter spending is
that the price of the Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) should
decrease to reflect the fact that engine replacement will no longer be
required when the HH-65 is converted to an MCH.
Question. What is the relationship between the HH-65 replacement
project, the future Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter acquisition, and
Hitron?
Answer. The HH-65 re-engining project is an effort to correct a
safety and reliability concern that is separate and distinct from both
the Deepwater Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) conversion project
and HITRON.
The Coast Guard directed the Deepwater acquisition program's
systems integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), a
partnership of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, to take immediate
and definitive action to re-engine the HH-65 fleet to ensure safe and
reliable operations. In the long-term, the Deepwater plan is still to
convert the HH-65 to the Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). While
power increases were not the focus of this acquisition, the engine
chosen, while addressing the safety and reliability concerns, also has
sufficient power margins to be used with the MCH. The HITRON Airborne
use of force mission is currently not a Deepwater requirement. There
is, however, the potential to include this requirement under future
contract modifications. The Turbomeca engine meets the anticipated
airborne use of force power requirements should these become part of
the future MCH mission profile.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $15 million
for capability enhancements for HH-60 avionics for one aircraft. How
many HH-60 aircraft are in the Coast Guard fleet? Does the Coast Guard
intend to provide these capability enhancements for each HH-60? Is the
anticipated cost $15 million per aircraft, or will this funding level
decrease after the first avionics upgrade is completed?
Answer. There are 42 HH-60 aircraft in the Coast Guard fleet, and
the Coast Guard intends to provide these capability enhancements to the
avionics suite of each HH-60. The $15 million request in fiscal year
2005 is for Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) work associated with the
avionics upgrades and does not upgrade any aircraft. The total project
cost to upgrade all 42 aircraft is estimated at $121 million. This
amount includes: long lead material, NRE, production, and operational
test and evaluation. The HH-65 re-engining project is the highest
priority aviation legacy asset sustainment project. The HH-60 avionics
upgrade may be deferred if these funds are required to meet an
accelerated re-engining solution.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $9 million
for capability enhancements for HC-130 aircraft radar in one aircraft.
How many HC-130 aircraft are in the Coast Guard fleet? Does the Coast
Guard intend to provide these capability enhancements for each HC-130?
Is the anticipated cost $9 million per aircraft, or will this funding
level decrease after the first radar upgrade is completed?
Answer. The Coast Guard currently has 27 total HC-130 ``Hercules''
aircraft, 22 of which are operational while 5 are storage or support
aircraft. In addition, the Coast Guard recently acquired six HC-130J
aircraft, which are not fully missionized. The $9 million in fiscal
year 2005 will upgrade the radar on one HC-130H and will also pay for
the Non-recurring Engineering and Operational Test and Evaluation of
the first upgraded aircraft. Coast Guard does intend to provide these
capability enhancements for each HC-130, once funding is available. The
average unit cost is approximately $3 million.
Question. Was the fiscal year 2004 funding for the National
Security Cutter (NSC) sufficient to complete the first NSC, or will a
portion of the fiscal year 2005 requested funding be needed for its
completion? The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the NSC is $274.5
million. Is this funding level sufficient to complete the first and
second NSC? If not, what additional funding may be necessary for
completion?
Answer. The funding for the National Security Cutter (NSC) in
fiscal years 2002 through 2004 is sufficient to achieve initial
operating capability for the lead ship. The Coast Guard anticipates
requesting additional funding in fiscal year 2006 to attain full
operating capability. Based on current cost projections, the fiscal
year 2005 budget of $274.5 million for the NSC will complete the second
NSC through full operating capability.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $5 million
for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC). Is this sufficient funding to
complete the design for the OPC? If not, how much funding is needed for
completion of the design phase? How much is needed to begin
construction? When does the Coast Guard anticipate completion of the
design, beginning construction, and delivery of the first OPC?
Answer. The $5 million requested in fiscal year 2005 will be
combined with the $20 million appropriated in fiscal year 2004 to
continue the requirements analysis, risk assessment and composite
component analysis associated with the design and development of the
Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC). Based on a current projected cost for the
OPC lead ship of $330 million, completion of the design would require
an additional $59 million and construction would require an additional
$246 million. The originally proposed implementation plan included
acquisition of the first OPC in 2012, but the Coast Guard accelerated
the design of the OPC to mitigate the risk of the deteriorating
condition of the Medium Endurance Cutter fleet. Once the design is
complete and the projected costs are refined, a business case analysis
will be conducted to determine the optimal time to start the OPC
construction, factoring in the latest information on the deteriorating
condition of the Medium Endurance Cutter fleet.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $60 million
for the 110-123 foot conversions and the Fast Response Cutter, but the
request does not specify how much funding is needed for each activity.
How many 110-123 foot conversions does the Coast Guard expect to
achieve in fiscal year 2005? How much funding is needed per vessel to
complete a conversion?
Answer. The Deepwater Program is conducting an analysis to
determine the appropriate number of 123-foot patrol boat conversions to
complete prior to switching to the Fast Response Cutter. A decision is
expected this fiscal year (2004), and the Business Case Analysis will
be provided at that time. The unit cost for the 110-foot to 123-foot
Patrol Boat conversion is approximately $8.2 million per asset.
Question. The design phase of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) was
started in fiscal year 2003. Does the Coast Guard anticipate completion
of the FRC design in fiscal year 2005? How much funding is necessary to
complete the design of the FRC? What is the anticipated completion date
for the design? When does the design phase end and construction begin?
Answer. The Coast Guard anticipates completion of the Fast Response
Cutter (FRC) design in fiscal year 2005. The Deepwater Program is
conducting an analysis to determine the appropriate number of 123-foot
patrol boat conversions to complete prior to switching to the FRC. A
decision is expected in fiscal year 2004, and the Business Case
Analysis (BCA) for accelerating the FRC and the number of 123
conversions will be provided at that time. Construction could begin as
soon as fiscal year 2006 if supported by the BCA.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes
approximately $2.3 million for one Long Rand Interceptor (LRI) and
three Short Range Prosecutor (SRP) small boats, but does not specify
how much funding is needed for each. How much funding is necessary for
one Long Range Interceptor? How much funding is necessary for three
Short Range Prosecutors?
Answer. In fiscal year 2005, approximately $1.37 million will
acquire the three Short Range Prosecutor small boats, and $0.92 million
will acquire the Long Range Interceptor lead boat.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $12.5
million for the surface capability sustainment and enhancement of the
medium endurance cutter class. This request is an increase of
approximately $5.5 million over the fiscal year 2004 funding level.
Please explain this increase.
Answer. This increase can be explained by the continuing
deterioration of the legacy surface fleet and the subsequent need to
recapitalize major subsystems to sustain their operability as projected
within the Integrated Deepwater System. The $12.5 million for Surface
Capability Sustainment/Enhancements in the fiscal year 2005 budget
request will fund a Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP) for the Medium
Endurance Cutter (WMEC) fleet. The equipment and machinery slated to be
replaced (e.g., evaporator replacement; propulsion control system
upgrade; oily water separator replacement; waste heat cooling system
modifications; and renewal of auxiliary pumps) is geared towards
extending the service life approximately 5-10 years and ensuring the
WMECs will remain serviceable until they are retired.
Question. Funding to begin the development and design phase of
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (C4ISR), increment 2, was provided in fiscal year
2004. Will the funding request for fiscal year 2005 complete the
development and design of C4ISR, increment 2? If not, how much
additional funding would be required to complete this phase of
development and design?
Answer. The two C4ISR increments have two design phases. The first
design phase is concept and preliminary design; the second design phase
is detailed design and development. The funding provided in fiscal year
2004 was for the detailed design and development for C4ISR Increment 1
(the second of the two design phases for Increment 1). The funding
requested in fiscal year 2005 is for concept and preliminary design for
C4ISR Increment 2. In order to complete Increment 2, the detailed
design and development portion must also be funded at approximately $30
million.
Questions. What is the division of program management
responsibility between the Coast Guard and Integrated Coast Guard
Systems (ICGS)? Is the Federal Government providing management funds to
ICGS? How much of the total management cost does ICGS provide? What
exactly is the fiscal year 2005 budget request of $45 million for
systems engineering and integration? Are program management funds
included within each Deepwater line item? If so, how is the Coast Guard
certain that there are not any duplications in payment to ICGS?
Answers. The Coast Guard is responsible for all Program Management
including oversight of the contract with the prime contractor, which is
the systems integrator in the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS)
Program. The systems integrator, Integrated Coast Guard Systems, LC
(ICGS) has the responsibility for Contract Management including the
subcontractors that execute the contract.
The Federal Government is providing Contract Management funds to
ICGS, just as it does on all major acquisitions where a systems
integrator is engaged to coordinate various subcontracted elements.
Contract Management funds are provided to ICGS through the Systems
Engineering and Integration delivery task order. The Coast Guard
receives Program Management funding through the Government Program
Management budget category. The division of the $83 million requested
for these two budget items is approximately 54 percent for ICGS and 46
percent for the Coast Guard. The $45 million budget request for Systems
Engineering and Integration represents approximately 8 percent of the
total contract value in fiscal year 2005, and approximately 6.6 percent
of the Total Capital Acquisition. It must be emphasized that the
Government Program Management and ICGS Contract Management are not the
same thing.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request for Systems Engineering and
Integration provides for the following activities:
--System of Systems Engineering including System Architecture
development, Operational Effectiveness analysis, Total
Ownership Cost management, and Enterprise level requirements
management.
--Enterprise level System Integration
--Enterprise level System Integrator Program Management
--Quality Assurance
--Integrated Product and Process Development
--Integrated Master Schedule maintenance and management
--Aviation, Surface Vessel, C4ISR, and Logistics System Integration
at the Enterprise level
--Contract Management
Delivery orders for each Deepwater asset include appropriate funds
to execute the delivery order, just as in any other government
acquisition. These funds would not typically be classified as Program
Management.
The Coast Guard ensures there is no duplication of payment by using
detailed statements of work at both enterprise and individual asset
levels to clearly distinguish between activities. Furthermore, ICGS'
first tier subcontractors maintain and report via timekeeping and
billing systems that are under the constant oversight of defense
auditing agencies.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes $38 million
for government program management. Does this request fully fund all
program management costs? Are additional program management costs
contained within other Deepwater line items? How many people does this
funding request support? Is this enough to support all of the necessary
personnel to manage the program properly?
Answer. The $38 million for government program management combined
with the government personnel (201 military and civilian positions)
supporting the program (funded from the AC&I Personnel line item) meets
the Deepwater government program management requirement in fiscal year
2005. None of the other line items support government program
management. Fifty percent, or $19 million, of the $38 million in
government program management provides funding for the equivalent of
approximately 124 contracted support personnel. The remaining 55
percent provides funding for such items as modeling and simulation,
operational test and evaluation, travel, training, studies, phones and
other administrative support materials. The funding provided in the
government program management line item and the Deepwater portion of
the AC&I personnel line item will support the necessary personnel to
properly manage the program at the requested funding level.
GAO DEEPWATER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT REPORT
Question. In 2001, GAO reported on risks facing the Coast Guard as
it went forward on Deepwater. Just this month, GAO again reported on
these same risks, in particular that key components the Coast Guard
needs to effectively manage the program and provide adequate contractor
oversight were either missing or not fully developed. What is the Coast
Guard's response to these criticisms?
Answer. The Coast Guard is dedicated to the continuous improvement
of Deepwater, welcomes GAO's expertise and guidance, and has responded
to these management concerns by developing a Plan of Action &
Milestones (POAM) to correct deficiencies. As part of our
``partnership'' with GAO we will regularly report back on the status of
this POAM and seek their feedback.
The specific quote in this month's GAO Report that references their
audit of 2001 states, ``Concerns about the Coast Guard's ability to
rely on competition as a means to control future costs contributed to
GAO's description of the Deepwater program in 2001 as `risky.' Three
years later, the Coast Guard has neither measured the extent of
competition among suppliers of Deepwater assets nor held the system
integrator accountable for taking steps to achieve competition.''
The Coast Guard has placed particular emphasis on the ability to
measure performance within the scope of the program. Over twenty
measurement items have been defined and measured in the approximate 20
months that ICGS has been under contract. Additional measures are in
the process of being defined and measured. This effort continues to
evolve as the program identifies measures and data sources and as the
system components mature from design to production, fielding, and
disposal.
All of the Integrated Deepwater System items in the first 5 years
of the contract were fully competed as part of the competition between
the three industry consortiums led by Litton/Avondale Industries,
Science Applications International Corporation, and Lockheed Martin
Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems. Going forward from contract
award, the Deepwater Program has included Competition as a factor for
determining if the contract should be approved for another term and how
long that term should be. The measures for Competition being proposed
for adoption include:
--Percentage of awards competed;
--Minimizing the number of teaming agreements;
--Number of advertisements publicizing supplier registration;
--Number of vendor outreach programs; and
--Percentage of first tier subcontracts that incorporate the intent
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52-244.5
``Competition in Subcontracting.''
The Coast Guard's systems integrator, ICGS, has also adopted the
Open Business Model, initially a Lockheed Martin philosophy, as an
official policy for ensuring competition. The process ensures full,
continuous, and open analysis of supplier alternatives throughout the
program's execution.
--This approach entails obtaining proposals/quotes from two or more
qualified suppliers, and then balancing the cost, quality and
delivery of the components after the qualified suppliers have
been identified to provide the required components. This model
provides the flexibility to capture commercial technology when
needed, and it is projected to provide better performance at
equal or lower cost.
--The Open Business Model has been approved by the ICGS Board of
Directors and is applicable to all Deepwater transactions.
--To enforce these regulations, ICGS has appointed a Competition
Advocate and Ombudsman tasked to draft implementation
procedures for regular reporting to ICGS.
--Visits by the ICGS Competition Advocate are also planned with
Deepwater's industry partners to examine ``make/buy'' decisions
and competition practices.
In addition to the issue of competition, the Coast Guard is
diligently incorporating GAO's recommendations, as well as other best-
business practices, into its operating procedures. The Coast Guard is
actively addressing those management practices not in place, and is
improving and maturing processes for those that are already in
existence. The following is a summary of recommendations by GAO for
executive action and the Coast Guard's mitigation strategies:
--Improve Deepwater program management--take the necessary steps to
make Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) effective; ensure adequate
staffing is addressed as outlined in the human capital plan
(HCP), and ensure operators and maintenance personnel are
prepared for the transition to new Deepwater assets.
--We have clarified IPT roles and responsibilities over the past 20
months and are improving processes to attain full
competency for each IPT.
--The personnel funding account did not allow for additional
personnel in fiscal year 2004. Several key military billets
have been civilianized and military personnel have been
brought onboard out of cycle.
--The HCP will be updated and necessary training billets will be
budgeted in sync with the fiscal year 2006 budget cycle.
--ICGS has recently added representatives at the key maintenance
and logistics sites to act as the POC for all maintenance
coordination issues.
--Improve contractor accountability by improving award fee criteria,
award fee assessments, system integrator accountability for IPT
effectiveness in award fee determinations, Total Ownership Cost
(TOC) baseline measuring cost, and criteria for TOC baseline
adjustments.
--We are addressing our processes for evaluating the contractor's
performance. Five specific areas of performance were
evaluated during the first term. Strict adherence to
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) was an overriding
principle in all accounts.
--The contractor award fee score is much lower than typical
industry averages. We are confident that the Award Fee
level was fair and represented an accurate assessment of
contractor performance.
--Objective measures are being introduced into the award fee
process.
--The Performance Measurement Plan, and in particular the Balanced
Scorecard (BSC) Strategy Map clearly articulate how the
objectives of the program's BSC identify input, process,
and output measures that provide leading indicators of
Operational Effectiveness, Total Ownership Cost, and
customer satisfaction. BSC metrics continually measure the
status of the program and allow for early course
corrections if required. Deepwater, as the largest
Performance-based acquisition in the Federal government is
firmly anchored to metrics and can demonstrate its value to
the taxpayer while meeting our customer's requirements.
--The program has taken a proactive approach to contractor
assessment to ensure that course corrections and
adjustments can be made before the Award Term assessment in
year four, prior to the end of the first term. An 18-month
performance assessment was completed on February 23, and
approved on March 4.
--Facilitate cost control through competition with system integrator
accountability for competition among second tier suppliers.
--For subcontracts over $5 million, notification to the Coast Guard
is required, to include an evaluation of the alternatives
considered, if ICGS subcontracts out to Lockheed Martin
and/or Northrop Grumman.
--The Open Business Model, initially a Lockheed Martin philosophy,
is now official ICGS policy and is applicable to all
Deepwater transactions. To ensure compliance, ICGS has
appointed a Competition Advocate and Ombudsman, who is
drafting implementation procedures for regular reporting to
ICGS and will examine Make/Buy and competition practices.
--The program will put additional processes in place to ensure
competitive forces are being used to manage costs. An
annual independent third party review of transactions will
be conducted. The Agency Acquisition Executive will review
any subcontract over $5 million awarded to Lockheed Martin
or Northrop Grumman.
--A review of ICGS' application of their Open Business Model vis a
vis accountability for ensuring competition will be
included in the Award Term Evaluation and measured
diligently as discussed earlier.
Question. Similarly, GAO has reported that while competition is
critical to controlling Deepwater program costs, the Coast Guard does
not have a system to measure the extent of competition among suppliers
of Deepwater assets nor has it held the system integrator responsible
for taking steps to achieve competition. What is the Coast Guard's
response to these criticisms?
Answer. All of the Integrated Deepwater System nominated items in
the first 5 years of the contract were fully competed as part of the
competition between the three industry consortiums led by Litton/
Avondale Industries, Science Applications International Corporation,
and Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems. The
Coast Guard, the DOT, and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
through review and approval of the Request for Proposal indicated that
this was appropriate competition for the first award term.
In the current phase of the Deepwater contract the Deepwater
Program, based on GAO's recommendations, has now included competition
as a factor for determining if the contract should be approved for
another term and how long that term should be. The measures for
competition being proposed for adoption include:
--Percentage of awards competed;
--Minimizing the number of teaming agreements;
--Number of advertisements publicizing supplier registration;
--Number of vendor outreach programs; and
--Percentage of first tier subcontracts that incorporate the intent
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52-244.5
``Competition in Subcontracting.''
The Coast Guard's systems integrator, ICGS, has also adopted the
Open Business Model, initially a Lockheed Martin philosophy, as an
official policy for ensuring competition. The process ensures full,
continuous, and open analysis of supplier alternatives throughout the
program's execution.
--This approach entails obtaining proposals/quotes from two or more
qualified suppliers, and then balancing the cost, quality and
delivery of the components after the qualified suppliers have
been identified to provide the required components. This model
provides the flexibility to capture commercial technology when
needed and it is projected to provide better performance at
equal or lower cost.
--The Open Business Model has been approved by the ICGS Board of
Directors and is applicable to all Deepwater transactions.
--To enforce these regulations, ICGS has appointed a Competition
Advocate and Ombudsman tasked to draft implementation
procedures for regular reporting to ICGS.
--Visits by the ICGS Competition Advocate are also planned with
Deepwater's industry partners to examine ``make/buy'' decisions
and competition practices.
SMALL BOAT STATIONS
Question. What challenges are small boat stations facing in
balancing search and rescue requirements with new homeland security
requirements?
Answer. Broadly, the Coast Guard will continue seeking the
appropriate balance among all its mission-programs while relentlessly
pursuing our stated performance goals. In so doing, the Coast Guard
will continue to focus not only on activity levels (hours), but also on
achieving the desired outcomes for each Coast Guard mission. Our
ability to achieve desired outcomes and performance goals have been
significantly enhanced through improved technology, tactics and
procedures making our activities that much more effective. Risk-based
decision-making by local commanders will continue to be the primary
driving factor behind the specific activity levels (hours) accrued in
the course of Coast Guard operations.
At the Station level, the biggest challenges in balancing search
and rescue (SAR) and homeland security (HLS) requirements are training
and maintaining the 68-hour workweek standard. There are two primary
factors that will improve training while maintaining the 68-hour
workweek standard at Stations: formal training programs and experienced
command cadre. In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the President
and Congress provided funding for the Coast Guard to improve both
areas.
Formal Training.--The Coast Guard's goal is to increase Boatswain
Mate ``A'' school throughput by 50 percent over the next 4 years. We
have also increased recurring proficiency requirements giving qualified
boat crewmembers more opportunities to practice necessary skills. In
addition, we have increased the throughput at our resident training
centers for Small Boat Coxswains, Heavy Weather Coxswains, and Surfmen
removing some of the training burden from the field units.
These formal training opportunities provide a strong basic
foundation for junior personnel. This strong foundation allows the
command cadre to spend less time teaching basic fundamentals and more
time teaching job specific tasks.
Experienced Command Cadre.--The Coast Guard used many of the new
billets provided by the President and Congress to upgrade senior
command cadre billets. Additional support billets were also provided at
both Stations and Groups to relieve the command cadre of administrative
burdens. These actions were focused on improving management and
leadership, and providing more time for the command cadre to conduct
training. Once all of the new billets are filled this year and
personnel are qualified in their assignments, we anticipate improved
training and reductions in the average workweek.
Question. What impact have the additional homeland security
requirements had on the small boat stations' ability to meet other
mission requirements, such as drug interdiction and fisheries
enforcement?
Answer. Immediately following 9/11, the Coast Guard surged
resources for homeland security activities. Over the past 2 years, the
President and Congress have funded the Coast Guard with additional
resources to address homeland security and all other mission
requirements.
As required by Congress, some of these initiatives supported
Station-level staffing, training, boat standardization, and readiness
for all missions. Other initiatives were geared specifically toward the
search and rescue program. The Coast Guard will continue to monitor the
operating tempo and workload at Stations, and we will work within the
Administration if additional resources are necessary. We will also use
all of the resources as intended by the Congress.
Fishery Enforcement.--Stations continue to contribute significantly
to the Coast Guard fishery enforcement mission. In fiscal year 2002,
Stations conducted 974 fisheries enforcement boardings. In fiscal year
2003, Stations conducted 1,313 fisheries enforcement boardings, a 35
percent increase over fiscal year 2002 levels. These boardings
contribute the Coast Guard's domestic fishery program goals.
Counter-Drug Operations.--The Coast Guard's overall counter-drug
strategy is to interdict drugs offshore, far from the U.S. border.
Coast Guard Cutters and Aircraft are primarily used for conducting
these offshore patrols, however, Stations continue to respond to both
counter-drug and migrant incidents when necessary.
Question. Given the increased operating tempo of small boat
stations following September 11th, do stations have the resources--i.e.
staff and boats--they need to fulfill all their mission needs? What
additional resources, if any, are most needed?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the President and
Congress provided funding for Stations to maintain a high level of
service in a busy operating environment. Funding was provided for the
Coast Guard to add or upgrade over 900 billets at Stations and the
training and support facilities that serve them. Additionally, over
$5.5 million of Personal Protective Equipment was provided for Station
personnel with earmark and supplemental funding. Over 200 Response
Boat--Smalls were also funded increasing operational capability. As
required by Congress, these initiatives supported Station-level
staffing, training, and readiness for all mission areas.
The President and Congress have also provided substantial funding
since 9/11 specifically for homeland security. The Coast Guard has used
some of this funding to purchase seventeen additional 87 foot Coastal
Patrol boats, 13 Maritime Safety and Security Teams, and over 100 Sea
Marshals. These new assets have helped reduce the high operating tempo
observed at Stations immediately following 9/11. The President's fiscal
year 2005 budget requests operating funds for five 179-foot Patrol
Coastals providing additional resources to the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard will continue to monitor the operating tempo and
workload at Stations, and we will work with the Administration if
additional resources are necessary.
Question. Inspector General reports have raised concerns about the
lack of senior personnel available at boat stations in recent years to
train new, or more junior personnel. As Coast Guard increases the
number of new personnel assigned to stations in fiscal year 2004, what
impact will this have on stations operations, including the ability of
senior personnel to train less experienced staff?
Answer. In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard
addressed the impact of senior personnel having to train less
experienced staff by upgrading many senior command cadre positions,
providing additional administrative support to Stations, and assigning
additional staff to Groups.
These actions are focused on improving management and leadership,
and reducing the administrative burden on the command cadre. In
addition, we have increased the throughput at our resident training
centers to remove some of the training burden from the field units. The
Coast Guard continues assessing the impact of these changes to
determine what actions, if any, are needed in the future.
The following highlights specific training efforts discussed above:
--Established one Ready Boat-Small Standardization (STAN)/Training
Team to improve training, professionalism and performance.
--Added a dedicated course developer/writer/instructor to Training
Center Yorktown Coxswain ``C'' School.
--Added Surfman Apprentices to the National Motor Life Boat School
(NMLBS) to reduce the training burden at surf stations and
increase the number of qualified Surfmen.
--Added 41 FTP for Boatswain Mate (BM) `A' School throughput
increases.
--Added 18 FTP for NMLB School Training throughput increases.
Question. What steps has the Coast Guard taken to address the issue
of its aging 41-foot utility boat fleet, which is reaching the end of
its service life?
Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 funding request includes
$12 million to begin a limited production of six Response Boats-Medium
(RB-M). The RB-M is the replacement for the aging 41-foot utility boat
fleet. After initial limited production, the Coast Guard currently
projects $140 million in additional funding needs for RB-M in the Five
Year Capital Investment Plan, which accompanied the President's fiscal
year 2005 Budget request for Coast Guard.
Question. What progress has the Coast Guard made in standardizing
its non-standard boat fleet?
Answer. Since fiscal year 2002, the Coast Guard has ordered 255
Response Boat--Smalls. A large majority of these boats were purchased
to enhance the Coast Guard's maritime homeland security capability in
critical ports; however, some have been purchased to replace non-
standard boats. By the end of fiscal year 2004, approximately 100 of
the 350 total Non-Standard Boats will be replaced. We expect to replace
approximately 12 percent per year thereafter until full replacement in
fiscal year 2010.
PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
Question. Is the Coast Guard on track to complete the Port Security
Assessments of the 55 most critical ports in the United States by the
end of this calendar year? Are additional funds necessary to complete
these assessments?
Answer. The Coast Guard has conducted PSAs at 16 of the 55 top
economically and militarily strategic U.S. ports. The remaining 39 port
assessments are on schedule, funded and scheduled for completion in
calendar year 2004.
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION
Question. Please explain the approximately $1.4 million decrease in
requested funding for the Coast Guard's research, development, test and
evaluation account?
Answer. Prior year CG Research & Development (R&D) appropriations
included project funds in addition to operating costs of the CG R&D
Center at Avery Point, CT. The $13.5 million requested in the fiscal
year 2005 Science and Technology (S&T) budget does not include any
project funds; the request is intended to fund only facility and
personnel (support and technical) costs at the CG R&D Center. This
level is consistent with prior year costs and does not represent a
decrease given its intent.
The fiscal year 2004 enacted level of $14.9 million was a
significant reduction from the fiscal year 2004 request of $22 million
and prior year appropriations causing a fiscal year 2004 imbalance
between support costs (facility and personnel) and project funding with
only approximately $2 million available for fiscal year 2004 project
support. The CG is working with S&T to restore a proper funding balance
in fiscal year 2005 and beyond and to develop a project portfolio that
supports the many maritime security needs as well as the CG's
``traditional'' non-security mission-programs. Additional project
funding will be critical to properly support mission needs and regain
the R&D momentum lost in fiscal year 2004, particularly in areas such
as Aquatic Nuisance Species and ballast water research. S&T and the CG
have already agreed upon a base level of additional project funding in
the amount of $5 million (for a total of $18.5 million) that will be
targeted toward non-security related projects including maritime
science and research.
Question. Will this line item for Coast Guard research and
development continue to be decreased in subsequent fiscal years until
there is one lump-sum research and development account within Science
and Technology for all of the agencies at the Department of Homeland
Security?
Answer. No. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and Coast
Guard (CG) are preparing a formal agreement that will detail the
coordination and funding mechanisms for future CG Research &
Development (R&D) capabilities. The foundation for that agreement is
the consolidation of funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget
($13.5 million). S&T and the CG have further agreed upon a base level
of additional project funding in the amount of $5 million that will be
specifically targeted toward non-security related projects including
maritime science and research. This funding will support CG mission-
programs such as Marine Environmental Protection, Living Marine
Resources, Search and Rescue, Aids to Navigation and Marine Safety. The
specific projects in support of these mission-programs will be prepared
annually for S&T concurrence.
In addition to this $18.5 million in funding, the Coast Guard will
submit security-related research requests through S&T for coordination
across all portfolios and DHS components. The Coast Guard has submitted
a maritime security R&D portfolio detailing approximately $50 million
in vital maritime security research initiatives. This portfolio has
been validated by S&T portfolio managers and will be considered in the
development of future spending priorities and commitments from S&T.
Project funding levels for CG and other DHS component requests will
depend on the risk and cost associated with the project, effect on
agency missions, linkage to S&T strategic objectives, and
executability.
Question. How will consolidating the research and development
account into the Science and Technology Directorate affect the Coast
Guard in general, in terms of control over research projects of
particular interest to the Coast Guard and access to all ongoing
research at the Department?
Answer. Through its portfolio manager at S&T, the CG will have
direct access to, and visibility of, all S&T research and initiatives.
While funding will be provided through S&T, the CG will retain control
of the projects in support of its non-Security mission programs. The
integration of funding and effort will go far to minimize redundancy
and maximize the effectiveness of Coast Guard R&D while ensuring that
all Coast Guard mission requirements remain a key part of S&T planning
and resource decisions.
Question. How will this consolidation directly affect the Coast
Guard Research and Development Center in Groton, Connecticut?
Answer. Unrelated to the funding consolidation, the CG is working
through the GSA to relocate its Research and Development Center from
Groton to a nearby, although not yet identified, location in
southeastern Connecticut. The lease for the current facility expires in
fiscal year 2006 and cannot be renewed. Even if the current lease could
be renewed, the existing facility is unsatisfactory (e.g. not meeting
OSHA code requirements) for a variety of reasons and would not be
renewed.
Science & Technology (S&T) has no current plans to make other
changes to the location or personnel staffing levels of the CG Research
& Development (R&D) Center.
ALTERATION OF BRIDGES
Question. Since the fiscal year 2004 funding did not complete the
ongoing bridge projects, how does the Coast Guard intend to continue
and begin to complete certain bridge projects without additional funds
in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. The Coast Guard's Alteration of Bridges request is zero in
fiscal year 2005, because the three bridges currently under
construction: the Florida Avenue Bridge in New Orleans, Louisiana; the
Sidney Lanier Bridge in Brunswick, Georgia; and, the Limehouse Bridge,
in Charleston County, South Carolina, are highway or combination
highway/railroad bridges, and are eligible for funding from the Federal
Highway Administration's Federal-Aid Highway program. Additionally,
there are five bridge projects with completed designs for alteration:
the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Bridge in Burlington, Iowa; the
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Bridge in Fort Madison, Iowa; the Chelsea
Street Bridge in Boston, Massachusetts; the EJ&E Bridge in Divine,
Illinois; and, the CSXT (14 Mile) Bridge in Mobile, Alabama. These
projects will not proceed to construction until approximately 75
percent of the total estimated cost to alter the bridge is available.
Question. If no additional funding is provided in fiscal year 2005
for the Alteration of Bridges, what will happen to the ongoing bridge
projects?
Answer. Depending on construction progress and the rate at which
billings are made against the projects, the funding for any one of
three bridges currently under construction: the Florida Avenue Bridge
in New Orleans, Louisiana; the Sidney Lanier Bridge in Brunswick,
Georgia; and, the Limehouse Bridge, in Charleston County, South
Carolina, may be depleted. At least 30 days prior to depletion of
funds, the Coast Guard would give written notice to the bridge owner of
such exhaustion of funds, consistent with the ``Order of Apportionment
of Cost''. After receipt of such notice, the owner may continue the
work with the understanding that no payment for such work will be made
by the Coast Guard until additional Federal funds become available. If
the owner elects not to bear the costs, the project would likely have
to come to a halt, resulting in contract disruption, increased
contractual costs, and the bridge potentially remaining a hazard to
navigation.
In addition, the remaining 11 bridges, for which an Order to Alter
has been issued, will not proceed to the next phase of development. The
following table provides a summary of the status of all active Truman-
Hobbs bridge alteration projects.
Question. Could the Coast Guard be forced, by a court of law, to
complete bridge projects which had been started because the bridges
were deemed to be an obstruction to navigable waters by law?
Answer. Although litigation is a possibility, the Coast Guard does
not have authority to fund bridge alteration absent a specific
appropriation from Congress. Therefore, the Coast Guard does not
believe a court could force it to complete a bridge project, absent an
appropriation. Also, the bridge owner cannot claim to have relied on
the Coast Guard funding any amount of the project above the amount
specified in the Order of Apportionment of Cost. The Order of
Apportionment of Cost further states: ``Should it become apparent that
appropriated funds will be exhausted before additional funds are made
available, the Coast Guard will give at least 30 days written notice to
the bridge owner of such exhaustion of funds.'' After receipt of such
notice, the owner may continue with the work with the understanding
that no payment for such work will be made by the Coast Guard until
additional Federal funds become available. Since Congress placed the
program under the Coast Guard's control in 1967, no bridge owner has
filed a lawsuit to compel the Coast Guard to complete a bridge
alteration project, because no project has been halted for lack of
funding.
OIL PLATFORMS
Question. How much does the Coast Guard spend each year conducting
emergency medical evacuations of personnel from oil platforms located
in the Gulf of Mexico? Does the energy industry share any of this cost?
If not, at what point should the energy industry bear some of the cost
and personnel burden to perform the medical evacuations of their
employees?
Answer. The Coast Guard is unable to determine how much it spends
each year conducting emergency evacuations to oil platform employees.
Many of the medical evacuations from oil platforms are persons injured
aboard vessels and brought to nearby platforms for evacuation. The
Coast Guard proposes this action when practicable, as it is often safer
to land on the platform to load the patient for transport than it is to
hoist the individual from a vessel, especially in poor sea conditions.
The Coast Guard does not record medical evacuation information
distinguishing between oil platform employees and persons injured at
sea who were brought to the platform.
Industry normally shares the cost when an injury occurs on an oil
platform and an industry supported or procured commercial helicopter at
the platform, or at a nearby platform, provides transportation to
medical facilities ashore. If a commercial helicopter is not available,
or is unable to fly due to poor weather conditions, the Coast Guard
generally provides the medical evacuation.
Medical evacuations from oil platforms make up a small percentage
of cases in this region. In the past 12 months, the Coast Guard has
conducted a total of 200 medical evacuations in that region, 13 of
which were from oil platforms. A medical evacuation at sea is
considered search and rescue, a traditional Coast Guard mission. The
Coast Guard does not charge or accept charges for search and rescue.
Lastly, on a purely voluntary basis, the oil platforms have allowed
Coast Guard helicopter to refuel at their platforms, which greatly
extends the range of the HH-65. This ``good Samaritan'' refueling
ability pays huge dividends, making Coast Guard operations possible at
much greater distance from shore.
Question. Are any critical Coast Guard missions set-aside or
overlooked in favor of medical evacuations from the oil platforms in
the Gulf of Mexico? How many man hours are devoted to this task?
Answer. No, there are no missions that are set-aside or overlooked
in favor of medical evacuations from oil platforms. The Coast Guard
performs a small number of medical evacuations from oil platforms. In
the past year, only 13 of the 200 medical evacuations that occurred in
this region were from oil platforms.
In most cases, when an injury occurs on an oil platform an industry
supported or procured commercial helicopter at either the platform or
at a nearby platform provides the transportation to medical facilities
ashore. However, in the event a commercial helicopter is not available,
or poor weather conditions preclude the use of commercial helicopters,
the Coast Guard will be contacted and will dispatch a resource to
provide the medical evacuation depending upon the seriousness of the
injury. A medical evacuation at sea is considered SAR and is a critical
Coast Guard mission.
The Coast Guard is unable to determine the man-hours devoted to
evacuating oil platform employees. Many of the medical evacuations are
persons injured aboard vessels and brought to nearby platforms for
evacuation. The Coast Guard proposes this action when practicable, as
it is often safer to land on the platform to load the patient for
transport than it is to hoist the individual from a vessel, especially
in poor sea conditions. The Coast Guard does note record medical
evacuation information distinguishing between oil platform employees
and persons injured at sea who were brought to the platform.
Lastly, on a purely voluntary basis, the oil platforms have allowed
Coast Guard helicopter to refuel at their platforms, which greatly
extends the range of the HH-65. This ``good Samaritan'' refueling
ability pays huge dividends, making Coast Guard operations possible at
much greater distance from shore.
GULF COAST MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS INITIATIVE
Question. There is a concern in the Gulf of Mexico with Maritime
Domain Awareness, as well as the need for developing a Common Operating
Picture for offshore energy facility security and protection of key
port and critical infrastructure. What are the Coast Guard's plans to
help address this concern?
Answer. The Coast Guard will install Automatic Identification
System (AIS) sensors on platforms that span the Gulf of Mexico from
Port Isabel to Mobile, AL. Partnerships will be created with the
platform owners to begin collecting AIS data by the end of fiscal year
2004. Plans for the second phase of this project include adding radar
and ancillary sensors. All sensor data will be integrated into the
Common Operational Picture (COP) that will be displayed at the Eighth
District Command Center in New Orleans, the Joint Harbor Operations
Centers, and Sector Command Centers along the Gulf Coast.
Further technological enhancements already planned to improve
interoperability and coordination include Rescue 21, implementation of
the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), and the Ship
Security Alert System.
Partnerships and teaming efforts are in place to create a community
of stakeholders with resources to help prevent security incidents in
ports and around platforms. Working through the Area Maritime Security
Committee (AMSC), a part of the Gulf Security Committee, we are
improving communication among offshore platform operators and the Coast
Guard. Outreach efforts with Homeland Security and Homeland Defense
partners to create coordinated response procedures are being devised.
Question. Does the Coast Guard support using existing technologies,
such as the Navy's Littoral Surveillance System, to demonstrate
potential dual use Homeland Security applications to help support the
mission?
Answer. The Coast Guard fully supports using existing technologies
to expand Maritime Domain Awareness where appropriate. We are
evaluating several existing technologies to expand MDA, including the
Littoral Surveillance System (LSS). Other systems under review include
Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) and Global Network-
Centric Surveillance and Targeting (GNCST).
Part of the Coast Guard's MDA effort includes the development and
fielding of a Common Operational Picture (COP). The COP operates with
the Global Command and Control System--Joint architecture. Any systems
adopted for homeland security, must be interoperable and compatible
with this architecture.
Overall, the LSS provides limited capability when compared to other
systems and it is not currently compatible with the Global Command and
Control System-Joint Architecture. There are other systems that provide
greater capability, such as, the planned Gulf of Mexico project (which
includes a NCCT component) and the Hawkeye system that provide port
surveillance and tracking functionality. The Coast Guard is partnering
with the Office of Naval Research to work on these initiatives.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
Question. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System provides 20 percent of
the Nation's domestic crude oil and 48 percent of the West Coast fuel
supply through the Port of Valdez. Does the Coast Guard have adequate
armed helicopter surveillance to protect the vessels moving through the
Prince William Sound? If the Coast Guard is intends to arm MH-60
helicopters with M-240 machine guns and sniper rifles, how will this be
achieved without negatively impacting the missions that these assets
are performing?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not currently have armed helicopter
surveillance of vessels moving through Prince William Sound. The Coast
Guard conducted a surge operation, during a period of increased
national threat (orange) to the Homeland, to protect tankers moving
thru Prince William Sound (PWS) and in and out of Valdez, AK. The Coast
Guard deployed a MH-68 Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron
(HITRON) helicopter to CG Air Facility Cordova. This short-term
deployment was in response to validated intelligence and not to an
increase in the national threat level.
The Coast Guard is also taking additional measures to protect
vessels transiting Price William Sound. Since 9/11/01, three response
boats have been located to Valdez. In August of 2003, the cutter LONG
ISLAND was relocated from San Diego, CA to Valdez, AK. Additionally, a
Marine Safety and Security Team will be established in Anchorage later
this year.
The Coast Guard's long-term plan is to add Airborne Use of Force
(AUF) capability to all organic helicopters. Arming HH-60 helicopters
doesn't detract from their ability to conduct all USCG missions.
Rather, it provides Coast Guard operational Commanders an additional
capability to counter imminent homeland security threats that currently
does not exist in the service's main-stream helicopter fleet.
Question. Alaska is slated to receive a Maritime Safety and
Security Team (MSST) by the end of fiscal year 2004. Will this team
require armed helicopter support for its missions?
Answer. Currently there are no plans for mandating that the
Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) have dedicated armed
helicopter support to perform their missions. The Coast Guard
recognizes the inherent advantage of Airborne Use of Force (AUF) and is
exploring this in conjunction with the development of enhanced law
enforcement counter terrorism capabilities. The Coast Guard requests
$1.8 million for armed helicopters in fiscal year 2005 to begin
prototyping AUF aboard the HH60J helicopters in Cape Cod, MA. The
intent is to arm all Coast Guard helicopters in the future. The HH65
helicopter will require upgraded engine power to accommodate the
increased weigh of AUF weapons and armor, which should be accomplished
coincident to a safety and reliability upgrade of the powertrain over
the next 18-24 months. The HH-60J has sufficient power margins to
execute the AUF mission now. HH60J units are located strategically
throughout the United States, including Kodiak and Sitka, Alaska.
Question. What steps is the Coast Guard taking to ensure that
necessary support facilities are available for the forward deployment
of C-130s to Shemya, Galena, or Cold Bay during the high threat season
along the MBL?
Answer. The Coast Guard regularly deploys C-130 aircraft to Shemya
and Galena for Maritime Boundary Line (MBL) and High Seas Drift Net
(HSDN) enforcement patrols. Similarly, HH-60 aircraft deploy to Cold
Bay for Bering Sea Crab for Search and Rescue (SAR) standby. These
airfields are also used periodically outside these deployments. All
three airfields are vital to mission performance.
The Coast Guard has found the facilities to be adequate over the
last several years. During regular deployments to these airfields,
Coast Guard aircrews evaluate the support facilities and work with the
air facility directly to address these issues. Prior to deploying,
facility assessments are conducted ensuring all requirements are met
for the upcoming deployment.
Question. The City of Valdez is currently in the process of
completing a feasibility study for constructing a new harbor basin.
Does the Coast Guard have shore side infrastructure needs that should
be incorporated into the City of Valdez's plan?
Answer. The Coast Guard has shore side and waterfront
infrastructure needs in Valdez for small boat forces and the USCGC LONG
ISLAND; a 110-foot patrol boat. The Coast Guard is currently evaluating
shore infrastructure alternatives at Valdez to meet current and
projected needs including construction on existing Coast Guard
property, as well as possible integration into the City of Valdez
Harbor Basin Project should the City of Valdez decide that a new harbor
basin is feasible. The Coast Guard will consider the timeliness and
overall cost of the various alternatives and related impacts to current
and projected Coast Guard missions prior to deciding on a preferred
alternative.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security budget request
provides $152,000 to begin implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) in Alaska. Will the Coast
Guard's implementation of the MTSA require commercial fishing vessels
and other vessels over 65 feet to purchase Automatic Identification
System equipment?
Answer. Yes. Automatic Identification System (AIS) equipment will
eventually be required onboard commercial vessels greater than 65 feet
in length with the exception of passenger vessels certified to carry
less than 151 passengers-for-hire (they will not be required to carry
AIS). AIS will also be required onboard towing vessels of 26 feet or
more in length and more than 600 horsepower, in commercial service,
while navigating in a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) area. With the
exception of fishing vessels greater than 65-feet in length, the above
vessels will be required to have AIS equipment not later than December
31, 2004. Fishing vessels greater than 65 feet in length will not be
required to carry the AIS equipment until December 31, 2005.
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget for Homeland Security
transfers the Coast Guard's research and development funding to the
Science and Technology Directorate. The fiscal year 2005 budget
proposes to reduce Coast Guard RDT&E to $13,500,000, a reduction of
$1,400,000 from fiscal year 2004 enacted levels. What impact will this
reduction and transfer have on the Coast Guard's ability to develop new
technologies to help maintain traditional missions in accordance with
Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and CG are
preparing a formal agreement that will detail the coordination and
funding mechanisms for CG R&D capabilities in fiscal year 2005 and
beyond. The foundation for that agreement will be the consolidation of
funding requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget. For fiscal year 2005,
the CG R&D center facility, personnel and maintenance expenses will be
funded through S&T in the amount of $13.5 million. In addition, S&T and
the CG have agreed upon a base level of additional project funding in
the amount of $5 million that will be specifically targeted to support
``traditional'' CG mission-programs such as Marine Environmental
Protection, Living Marine Resources, Search and Rescue, Aids to
Navigation and Marine Safety. The specific projects in support of these
mission-programs will be prepared annually for S&T concurrence.
In addition to this $18.5 million in funding, the Coast Guard will
submit security-related research requests through S&T for coordination
across all portfolios and DHS components. The Coast Guard has submitted
a maritime security R&D portfolio detailing approximately $50 million
in vital maritime security research initiatives. S&T portfolio managers
have validated this portfolio. While not yet funded, it will be
considered in the development of future spending priorities and
commitments from S&T.
Provided that CG mission requirements totaling $18.5 million are
adequately addressed and funded, the integration of funding and effort
within S&T will go far to minimize redundancy and maximize the
effectiveness of CG R&D while ensuring that all CG mission
requirements, as outlined in Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act,
remain a key part of S&T planning and resource decisions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
MISSION HOURS
Question. Based on the most recent quarterly report on mission
hours, the Coast Guard continues to dedicate less time to traditional
missions compared to pre-September 11, 2001 levels. However, the Coast
Guard continues to meet or exceed performance goals in those areas.
What are the reasons for maintaining or exceeding performance standards
in non-homeland security mission areas when mission hours dedicated to
those areas have decreased since September 11, 2001? Please include
specific technology that has improved performance, improved
intelligence mechanisms, and efforts to partner with other Federal,
State and local partners that have improved performance.
Answer. Based on measurements in fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard
met its performance goals in each non-homeland security program area.
In many mission program areas the Coast Guard is leveraging emerging
technology, intelligence, and partnerships with other Federal, State
and local governments to increase or maintain specific performance with
fewer dedicated resource hours than historical standards. Specific
examples include:
Emerging Technologies.--Night Vision Goggles used by cutter,
aircraft and maritime safety and security team personnel allow for safe
operations and enhanced ability to detect objects in the water during
nighttime Search and Rescue operations. Self Locating Datum Marker
Buoys used in the search and rescue program provide up to date data
that can be used to better determine where to begin a search. The Coast
Guard intends for this technology to improve both search effectiveness
and efficiency. Boarding officers and marine inspectors are using
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to conduct and record their work.
The Coast Guard expects that using PDAs will reduce redundant paperwork
and facilitate electronic database entries.
Intelligence Improvements.--The placement of Field Intelligence
Support Teams to provide tactical intelligence support to Coast Guard
operational commanders by collecting and reporting suspicious or
criminal activity, communicating with other agencies at the local
level, and rapidly disseminating intelligence to the Captain of the
Port other local commanders and the Coast Guard intelligence program.
New Intelligence Centers were created in 2003; two Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers have been sited in Atlantic and Pacific
Areas. These centers increase collection and analytical capabilities
enhancing the Coast Guard's ability to fuse intelligence from various
sources and improve the timeliness and quality of theater-level
intelligence support to Coat Guard operational forces. In 2001 the
Coast Guard joined the United States Intelligence Community (IC), a
federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work
separately and together in intelligence-gathering activities.
Partnerships.--Interagency Flight Schedules--In Miami, the Coast
Guard and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement office have developed
a combined flight schedule to integrate patrol schedules and assets,
which has led to less overlap in response efforts, saving time and
resources for both agencies. This not only provides efficiencies to
security patrols but also frees up Coast Guard assets for non-homeland
security missions. Partnerships with organizations such as the U.S.
Power Squadron and Boat United States enable the Coast Guard to
distribute information on safe boating practices to the recreational
boating public. These efforts also advocate for public boating
education, which has been shown to lead to improved boating safety. The
National Marine Fisheries Service is providing the Coast Guard access
to their National Vessel Monitoring System (N-VMS) data, enabling the
Coast Guard to better maintain surveillance of fishing fleets and
respond to illegal activity. This partnership is allowing the Coast
Guard to allocate enforcement resources more effectively.
Question. The Commandant testified that with the budget increases
received since fiscal year 2003 and with the increase included in the
fiscal year 2005 request, the Coast Guard will be close to levels in
place before September 11, 2001 in its traditional mission areas. Since
the Coast Guard is already meeting or exceeding performance goals in
traditional mission areas with less hours dedicated to those missions,
is the Coast Guard adjusting performance goals upward to accommodate
for the additional hours that will be dedicated to those areas? If so,
please be specific. If not, why?
Answer. The Coast Guard will continue to seek the appropriate
balance among all its mission-programs and relentlessly pursue our
stated performance goals. The Coast Guard will continue to focus not
only on activity levels (hours) but also on achieving the desired
outcomes for each Coast Guard mission. Our ability to achieve desired
outcomes and performance goals can be significantly enhanced through
improved technology, tactics and procedures making our activities that
much more effective. Risk-based decision-making by local commanders
will continue to be the primary driving factor behind the specific
activity levels (hours) accrued in the course of Coast Guard
operations.
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005-2009 budget request highlights
improvements in performance targets for most of the Coast Guard's non-
homeland security missions, again driven by desired outcomes and not
solely resource hours. For example:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAR (percent)................... 86 87 87 87 88
Marine Environmental Protection. 40 40 38 37 35
Aton............................ 1,831 1,748 1,664 1,600 1,535
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAR--Percent of mariners whose lives are in distress that are saved.
Marine Environmental Protection--Number of spills (>100 gallons) per 100 million.
Tons of Oils and Chemicals shipped.
Aton--5-year average number of collision, groundings, and allisions (striking a fixed object).
OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE
Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S.
military has been providing domestic air support for homeland defense
purposes. In public discussions, NORTHCOM General Ralph Eberhart said
that the Department of Defense was reviewing whether there should be a
similar function in place to support Coast Guard efforts in U.S.
waters. Is such a plan being discussed with the Coast Guard and what
benefits would be gained from U.S. military support?
Answer. Collaboration continues to grow in the area of Maritime
Domain Awareness. Several steps have been taken toward establishing a
cohesive national strategy to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, such
as establishing a Navy-Coast Guard steering group and the co-sponsoring
of an Assistant Secretary of Defense of Homeland Defense--DHS National
Maritime Domain Awareness Summit scheduled for May 7, 2004. Maritime
Domain Awareness is a mutual effort of the DHS, the DOD, and the entire
Intelligence Community. Inherent to our increased awareness will be
efforts to improve our national ability to respond to all threats in
the maritime environment. Much work has been done to streamline the
process of providing DOD assets to the Coast Guard when the situation
warrants. These efforts are ongoing and have not yet been fully
implemented. Also, an agreement that will allow Coast Guard forces to
execute defense missions quickly is close to implementation. Both of
these initiatives contribute to a growing integration of effort between
the DHS and DOD. Together, NORTHCOM, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Coast
Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Boarder
Protection, and Transportation Security Administration are working
collaboratively to fashion a more secure maritime environment for the
nation.
SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN IRAQ
Questions. The fiscal year 2004 supplemental appropriations act
provided $80 million to the Coast Guard for continued operations in
Iraq. The Coast Guard currently maintains four 110 foot patrol boats, a
port security unit, and other support personnel for operations in Iraq.
There are approximately 375 personnel dedicated to Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
What is the monthly cost to support and operate these assets? When
will the $80 million provided in the fiscal year 2004 supplemental be
depleted? The Secretary testified earlier this year that there will not
be a supplemental spending request this year for the Department. Will
the Coast Guard be able to cover operational expenses related to assets
dedicated to Operation Iraqi Freedom in fiscal year 2004? If Coast
Guard assets are needed to maintain support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
in fiscal year 2005, what will the total cost be to operate and support
those assets?
Answer. The average monthly cost to support and operate Coast Guard
Assets funded via the 2004 Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
supporting the Global War on Terrorism is approximately $6.7 million
per month.
The $80 million provided to the Coast Guard in the fiscal year 2004
Emergency Supplemental, via transfer from the Navy, will be completely
obligated by September 30, 2004.
The Coast Guard will be able to cover current operational expenses
related to missions, assets and personnel dedicated to the Global War
on Terrorism (including Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom) in fiscal year 2004.
At the current level of Coast Guard participation in term of assets
and personnel requirements, the Coast Guard estimates it will cost
between $95 million to $105 million to operate and support the Global
War on Terrorism (including Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM) in fiscal year 2005. The Coast Guard is continuing to
work with the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
Security to further refine fiscal year 2005 mission tasking in support
of the Global War on Terrorism and the overall resources required to
support these operations.
DEEPWATER AWARDS TO PRIME CONTRACTORS
Questions. According to a recent report by the General Accounting
Office, the Coast Guard does not have the capability to assess the
performance of the Deepwater program. Yet, the Coast Guard awarded the
prime contractors with a $4.0 million bonus for work accomplished in
the first year of the contract based on an 87 percent rating. The ICGS
received this rating despite schedule delays, such as the delivery of
the 123 foot cutter, which was delayed by 4 months. The schedule for
the Maritime Patrol Aircraft has slipped as well.
The Department of Defense recently renegotiated the contract for
the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower so that the prime contractor will receive
its bonus only if the project is completed on time and meets specified
targets. (1) Would the Coast Guard be willing to consider this approach
for the Deepwater contract? (2) What benefits do the taxpayers receive
by awarding bonuses to the contractor before the work is completed and
when specific targets have not been met? (3) What benefits do the
taxpayers receive if the contractor receives performance bonuses only
if the project is completed on time and meets specified targets?
Answers. Would the Coast Guard be willing to consider this approach
for the Deepwater Contract?
Yes--in fact, Deepwater has adopted part of this approach already
in the structure of the Award Term incentive. ICGS is only able to earn
additional award term periods if deliveries are timely. For instance,
in order to earn an additional 5 award term, they must receive a
performance rating of ``excellent.'' Under the award term plan an
``excellent'' rating is defined as: The Contractor's overall
performance record strongly supports its ability to manage risks and
actually deliver as planned.
At this time, the award fee that is tied to certain Delivery Task
Orders is being revised to focus more on schedule as compared to the
earlier award fee criteria. One feature of this incentive for an award
fee early in the contract to help reinforce the partnership approach,
which has been identified as a ``Best Practice.'' To wait until the
contract delivered a product before providing an incentive was judged
as not keeping with the intent to build a partnership early on between
industry and the government. The targets for the award fee that was
cited in the GAO report was an annual award fee for System Engineering
and Integration.
(2) What benefit does the taxpayer receive by awarding bonuses to
the contractor before the work is completed and when specific targets
have not been met?
Incentives for contractors serve many purposes. One purpose of
incentives is to motivate the contractor to focus on contractor
performance/behavior at critical times in the contract. One dimension
of the IDS contract incentive approach is to focus on partnership
between the Coast Guard and ICGS.
(3) What benefit does the Taxpayer receive if the contractor
receives performance bonuses only if the project is completed on time
and meets specified targets?
The benefit that the taxpayer receives is that the contactor
receives incentives only if the project is completed on time and meets
specified targets, is the best-case scenario. However, in a different
scenario where the contractor is behind on schedule and cannot make up
the time, this creates a situation where there is no additional
incentive for the contractor to try to make the delay as short as
possible. In this scenario, the contractor will, at the time, be
working only to the exact letter of the contract specifications, not to
the spirit of a partnership to reach mutually agreeable results. At
that time, any situation in which the government has even partial
responsibility will be seized on by the contractor to initiate a
contract claim; a claim that could have potentially been avoided if an
incentive was still in place. This is the reason that the IDS contract
strategy contains two types of incentives:
--Specific Short-Term Award Fee.--Results in a short-term (usually 1-
year period) award fee. This provides a dollar amount award fee
based on an Award Fee Determination is usually targeted at very
specific performance for the period.
--Long-Term Award Term.--Results in a longer term evaluation and in
the case of IDS, the term evaluation period is for the first 5
years and is determined during the last year. This incentive,
which if awarded, is for another award term from 1 to 5 years
allowing the contractor to keep performing under the contract
for the period of time awarded. The following four factors are
included in the Award Term Assessment:
--Operational Effectiveness
--Total Ownership Cost
--Customer Satisfaction
--Competition
If deliveries occur late, that performance will be reflected in
Total Ownership Coast and Customer Satisfaction. If specific targets
are not met, then Operational Effectiveness and Customer Satisfaction
will reflect that Performance.
If there is a continuation of late deliveries, the Deepwater
Program, which is measuring the schedule, will reflect that in it's
Award Term Assessment and the Award Term could be adjusted accordingly;
from zero to five additional years under the contract. Again, if ICGS
complete all other assets on time and meets all required targets, the
Award Term Assessment would reflect this overall performance and
balance the achievement of the rest of the deliverables with these
start up delays.
By continuing both short and long-term incentives, along with
robust performance measuring, Deepwater has the tools and methodology
in place to appropriately manage this Performance Based Acquisition,
yet respond to any changes in DHS priorities and changes in funding.
With respect to GAO's comments, the following is provided:
--GAO states the Coast Guard does not have the capability to assess
the performance of the Deepwater Program. The Coast Guard does
have the capability to assess performance. As stated in the GAO
report, the Coast Guard assessed the performance for the first
year to be 87 percent; since then we have documented and
evaluated ICGS' logistics system at 79 percent and their
service in providing HITRON at 90.6 percent. The process for
assessment does need improvement and more objectivity, which
the Coast Guard is currently implementing.
--The award fee that was cited was for the first year's System
Engineering and Integration and was not for the 123-foot cutter
or the Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
--Delaying any incentive until an approximate 20-year program is
complete would not allow the government to recoup the benefit
of having incentives consistently provided at smaller intervals
of time.
DEEPWATER MANAGEMENT
Question. As GAO states in its recent report on the management of
the Deepwater program, the two first tier subcontractors have sole
responsibility for determining whether to hold competitions for
Deepwater assets or to provide these assets themselves. The GAO said
that the Coast Guard does not have the mechanism in place to hold the
contractor accountable. What is the Coast Guard doing to ensure that
future contract decisions are made on a competitive basis?
Answer. The Deepwater Program, working with GAO, is now including
additional competition factors for determining if the contract should
be approved for another term and the length of a subsequent term. The
measures for competition being proposed for adoption include:
--Percentage of awards competed;
--Minimizing the number of teaming agreements;
--Number of advertisements publicizing supplier registration;
--Number of vendor outreach programs; and
--Percentage of first tier subcontracts that incorporate the intent
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52-244.5
``Competition in Subcontracting.''
The Coast Guard's systems integrator, ICGS, has also adopted the
Open Business Model, initially a Lockheed Martin philosophy, as an
official policy for ensuring competition. The process ensures full,
continuous, and open analysis of supplier alternatives throughout the
program's execution.
--This approach entails obtaining proposals/quotes from two or more
qualified suppliers, and then balancing the cost, quality and
delivery of the components after the qualified suppliers have
been identified to provide the required components. This model
provides the flexibility to capture commercial technology when
needed, and it is projected to provide better performance at
equal or lower cost.
--The Open Business Model has been approved by the ICGS Board of
Directors and is applicable to all Deepwater transactions.
--To enforce these regulations, ICGS has appointed a Competition
Advocate and Ombudsman tasked to draft implementation
procedures for regular reporting to ICGS
--Visits by the ICGS Competition Advocate are also planned with
Deepwater's industry partners to examine ``make/buy'' decisions
and competition practices.
DEEPWATER ESTIMATES
Question. How much would be required in fiscal year 2005 to put the
Deepwater program on track for completion in 20 years as originally
planned? Please provide the outyear costs to meet a 20 year schedule.
Provide estimates for completion in 15 years and 10 years as well.
Answer. This is a complex, multi-variable equation, and as such
developing comprehensive systems-wide analysis on various levels is
challenging. The table below is based on an approximate total
acquisition cost of the IDS project scoped out prior to 9/11 at
approximately $12 billion (in 1998 dollars).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Est. fiscal year 2005 funding level............................. $1,892 $1,105 $795
Est. number of years............................................ 10 15 20
Est. completion date............................................ 2011 2016 2021
Notes:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The estimated number of years to complete represents a rough order of magnitude estimation. These estimates will
be impacted by the materiel condition of legacy assets, deterioration trends, evolving Coast Guard missions/
demands within DHS and fluctuation in funding over the life of the project.
The estimated completion date assumes funding begins in 2002 and ends in year depicted. Actual full
implementation is approximately 2 years after end of procurement.
The estimated funding level for 20 and 15 years are in 2005 dollars and assume continued funding at this level
adjusted for inflation.
The estimated funding level for 10 years is in 2005 dollars and assumes the cash flows as provided in the March
07, 2003 Report to Congress on the feasibility of accelerating IDS.
Question. For each asset planned to complete the Deepwater program,
provide the total cost for each asset a functional description of the
use of each asset, and the number of each asset the Coast Guard
currently plans to acquire.
Answer. A table is shown below which includes the number and
projected unit cost for each major asset the Coast Guard plans to
acquire through the Integrated Deepwater System acquisition program.
[Dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average
Assets Lead Asset(s) Lead Asset(s) Projected Follow- Follow-on Qty
Projected Cost Qty on Cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Security Cutter (NSC) \1\.......... $475 1 $265 7
Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) \1\............ 330 1 175 24
Fast Response Cutter (FRC) \1\.............. 78 1 40 57
123 (110 to 123 Conversion)................. 16.5 1 8.2 \2\ 48
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA).............. 145 2 33 33
Vertical Take-off & Landing Unmanned Air 138 2 5.3 66
Vehicle (VUAV).............................
Multi-mission Cutter Helo (MCH)............. 82 1 6.2 92
Vertical Take-off & Landing Recovery & 110 2 15.0 32
Surveillance Aircraft (VRS)................
High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Air Vehicle
(HAE-UAV).................................. In accordance with the original IDS implementation plan, the HAE-
UAV will be leased starting in fiscal year 2016 using Operating
Expense Funding based on the ICGS Implementation Plan. The lease
will provide approximately 16,100 hours of surveillance per year
at an approximate cost of $4,000 per hour in fiscal year 2002
dollars. The average annual cost per year is approximately $64.5
million in fiscal year 2002 dollars.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes DHS Capability for CBR (Chemical, Biological and Radiological) capability, interoperability with
DHS and other Government Agencies (OGAs), selected counter measures and protection from certain terrorist
weapons.
\2\ The number of 123 conversions will be decided based on the Business Case Analysis (BCA) currently underway
on when to shift to the Fast Response Cutter (FRC).
At full implementation, the Integrated Deepwater System comprises
three classes of new cutters and their associated small boats, a
combination of new and upgraded fixed-wing manned aircraft, a
combination of new and upgraded helicopters, and both cutter-based and
land-based unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). All of these highly capable
assets will be linked with state-of-the-art Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, and will be supported by an integrated
logistics regime. The following are functional descriptions of each
asset listed above.
Upon departure for patrol, each NSC and OPC will be outfitted with
the small boat package and aviation detachment most appropriate for
that particular patrol. These cutters will have the capability to
deploy with two MCHs or four VTOL Unmanned Air Vehicles (VUAVs) or a
combination of these. Additionally, the NSC and OPC will be able to
land, launch, hangar, service, and replenish the VTOL Recovery and
Surveillance (VRS) helicopter.
Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) can be deployed independently in
support of law enforcement, port security, search and rescue, and
defense operations missions. Typical missions include near-shore
fisheries, choke point interdiction, barrier patrols, and providing a
show of presence in areas of concern.
The 123-foot Patrol Boat is a modification of the 110-foot Island-
Class Patrol Boat. The renovation extends the length 13 feet to allow
for the installation of a stern boat launch--enhancing small boat
launch and recovery. The renovation includes a new superstructure and
pilothouse, including a 360-degree bridge for increased visibility and
a large increase in available deck space. The renovation also includes
upgrades to the C4ISR suite to provide for increased capabilities in
communications, detection and prosecution.
The Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) is an upgraded version of
the legacy short-range recovery helicopter, the HH-65. The HH-65 will
undergo a Service Life Extension Plan (SLEP) that will yield a like-new
aircraft. The MCH will assist in the missions of search and rescue,
enforcement of laws and treaties, as well as maritime homeland security
missions.
The CASA CN 235-300M (Maritime Patrol Aircraft) is a transport and
surveillance, fixed-wing aircraft that will be used to perform search
and rescue missions, enforce laws and treaties including illegal drug
interdiction, marine environmental protection, military readiness, and
International Ice Patrol missions, as well as cargo and personnel
transport. It can perform aerial delivery of search and rescue
equipment such as rafts, pumps, and flares, and it can be used as an On
Scene Commander platform.
The AB-139 VRS (Vertical Take-off and Landing Recovery and
Surveillance Aircraft) is proposed as the Integrated Deepwater System
medium-range recovery aircraft, and would begin introduction in 2014.
These helicopters will be used as medium range responders for offshore
operations, and can provide shore-based aviation surveillance
capability.
The Bell HV-911 ``Eagle Eye'' Vertical Takeoff and Landing Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (VUAV) is a low maintenance shipboard deployable
unmanned aircraft. The VUAV will allow the Coast Guard to extend the
surveillance, classification and identification capability of its major
cutters through its speed, range, and endurance. This asset will be
used for maritime homeland security, search and rescue missions,
enforcement of laws and treaties including illegal drug interdiction,
marine environmental protection, and military preparedness.
The proposed High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Air Vehicle (HAE-
UAV), Northrop Grumman's RQ-4A Global Hawk, will bring even further
capability to the Coast Guard aviation solution. Providing an air
solution that is built on speed and endurance, the HAE-UAV can get on-
site quickly with an air speed up to 400 knots. With its 12,500
nautical mile range and 38 hour endurance combined with satellite and
line-of-sight communication links to other air and surface platforms
and operations centers ashore, the Global Hawk from a height of 65,000
feet can use its high-resolution sensors to conduct surveillance and
monitoring operations in adverse weather conditions, day or night, over
an area about the size of Illinois in 24 hours. HAE-UAVs will possess
the ability to transmit data and other imagery to shore-based Command
and Control (C2) centers as part of the Common Operational Picture
(COP).
Question. Provide the total cost that will be required for prime
contractor program management in fiscal year 2005 and over the life of
the Deepwater contract.
Answer. The table below provides enacted appropriation history for
the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) from fiscal year 2002 through
fiscal year 2004, including Total Capital Acquisition and Systems
Engineering and Integration (prime contractor program management). The
table also provides the funding at the President's Budget for fiscal
year 2005, and projections for the outyears until the acquisition is
built out.
[In Millions of Dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
System
Fiscal year Total capital engineering &
acquisition integration
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002.................................... 320.2 53.9
2003.................................... 474.9 43.4
2004.................................... 664.3 41.9
2005.................................... 678.0 45.0
2006.................................... \1\ 688.8 \3\ 41.8
2007.................................... \1\ 700.6 \4\ 40.4
2008.................................... \1\ 713.2 \4\ 38.7
2009.................................... \1\ 726.0 \4\ 37.4
2010.................................... \2\ 739.8 \4\ 37.0
2011.................................... \2\ 753.9 \4\ 38.0
2012.................................... \2\ 768.2 \4\ 38.4
2013.................................... \2\ 782.8 \4\ 37.0
2014.................................... \2\ 797.7 \5\ 36.9
2015.................................... \2\ 812.8 \5\ 38.2
2016.................................... \2\ 828.2 \5\ 38.9
2017.................................... \2\ 844.0 \5\ 40.1
2018.................................... \2\ 860.0 \5\ 39.7
2019.................................... \2\ 876.4 \5\ 39.6
2020.................................... \2\ 893.0 \5\ 40.0
2021.................................... \2\ 910.0 \5\ 40.7
2022.................................... \2\ 927.3 \5\ 41.6
2023.................................... \2\ 944.9 \5\ 39.3
-------------------------------
Total............................. .............. 887.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Then Year Dollars provided in the Coast Guard's Capital Investment
Plan.
\2\ Then Year Dollars, based on the final year of Capital Investment
Plan, inflated using a 1.9 percent inflation factor.
\3\ Systems Engineering & Integration amount based on proposal prices
provided in June 2002.
\4\ Then Year Dollars based on Systems Engineering & Integration amount
proposal prices provided in June 2002 and then inflated using OMB/USCG
Non-pay Inflation.
\5\ Then Year Dollars based on Systems Engineering & Integration amount
proposal prices provided in June 2002 and then inflated using a 1.9
percent inflation factor from 2014 through 2023.
DEEPWATER PATROL BOATS
Question. The Deepwater contract with the Integrated Coast Guard
Systems (ICGS) calls for the modification and conversion of 49 110 foot
patrol boats to 123 foot patrol boats. According to the Coast Guard,
the number of 123 foot conversions may change based on an ongoing
Business Case Analysis on when to shift to the Fast Response Cutter
(FRC).
What is the timeline to complete this analysis and how will it
affect resources appropriated to date and requested in fiscal year
2005?
Answer. The Business Case Analysis on accelerating the acquisition
of the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) is expected in fiscal year 2004. The
results of the Business Case Analysis will not affect resources
appropriated to date or requested for fiscal year 2005. The Coast Guard
will use this analysis to assist in determining the appropriate number
of 123-foot patrol boat conversions, while accelerating the FRC as
appropriated in the IDS Patrol Boat Line item.
SECURITY PLANS FOR VESSELS AND PORT FACILITIES
Question. To meet the requirements of the Maritime Transportation
and Security Act (MTSA), vessel owners and port facility owners were
required to submit security plans to the Coast Guard for review and
approval by December 31, 2003.
How many vessel and port facility owners failed to submit a
security plan? How many penalties have you levied against non-compliant
companies? How many plans have you sent back for revisions? Based on
the plans that have been submitted to the Coast Guard, what is being
learned about the security needs of vessels and port facilities?
Answer. As of April 7, 2004, the Coast Guard has issued Notices of
Violation to 95 vessels and 66 facilities. Each of those violations was
for failing to submit a completed security assessment and has a $10,000
civil penalty associated with it. Subsequently, the Coast Guard has
issued civil penalties in the amount of $25,000 (additional) to four of
these facilities for failing to submit a completed security plan. These
penalties were based on violations of 33 CFR Section 104.410 for
vessels and 33 CFR Section 105.410 for facilities.
The Coast Guard is following a three-step process to review and
approve facility security plans. The first-step is a broad overview,
the second-step is a detailed review, and the third-step is an on-site
inspection. On-site inspections have just recently commenced. Plans may
require revision during any stage of review or inspection.
The Coast Guard is following a two-step process to review and
approve vessel security plans. The two stages are similar to the first
two stages used for facility plans, but there is no on-site inspection
required. Also like facilities, vessel security plans may require
revision during either stage of review.
As of April 7, 2004, the Coast Guard had received 9,250 vessel
security plans. Of the total vessel security plans received, 1,884 are
being revised. The Coast Guard Marine Safety Center is currently
engaging these vessel owner/operators to ensure these vessels meet the
July 1, 2004 deadline.
As of the same date, the National Plan Review Center had received
3,181 facility security plans. Of the total facility security plans
received, 383 are being revised. The Coast Guard National Plan Review
Center is currently engaging these facility owners and/or operators to
ensure these facilities meet the July 1, 2004, deadline.
The Coast Guard has two concerns as plans are being reviewed: (1)
Assessment Reports required to go forward with the plans are often too
abbreviated and may require the COTP to read the entire assessment
prior to going forward with approval; and (2) regulations do not
require a layout of the facility which would help the plan reviewers.
The latter issue can be worked around with overhead images and prior
submissions from the facility that have layouts.
Question. When Secretary Ridge testified before this subcommittee
in February, he said that he believes port facility owners should bear
most of the financial burden to harden security at our seaports. What
evidence do you have that these owners are stepping up to the plate and
investing their own resources in port security?
Answer. The Federal Government is bearing most of the financial
burden to harden security at our seaports. Department of Homeland
Security spending on port security increases by $224 million (13
percent) in the President's Budget, from $1,661 million in 2004 to
$1,885 million in 2005. Within the 2005 total is $1,675 million for
Coast Guard port, waterway, and coastal security activities, including
over $100 million to implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA). The DHS port security total also includes $164 million in U.S.
Customs and Border Protection for the Container Security Initiative and
the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, and $46 million in the
Office for Domestic Preparedness for port security grants.
Port facility owners must also do their share. The owners/operators
of these regulated facilities realize that they must be fully compliant
with approved facility security plans by July 1, 2004 or face
suspension of operations. All indicators are that they are working hard
in preparation to meet the enforcement date. As of March 23, 2004,
3,205 facilities have submitted security plans to the National Plan
Review Center in Kansas City, KS. This represents approximately 99
percent of the facilities required to submit plans. In addition to
preparing their plans, facility owner/operators are purchasing and
installing physical security equipment and providing training to their
personnel. Coast Guard inspectors are observing improved access control
and personnel monitoring, fencing, security patrols, and signage during
facility security spot checks conducted in conjunction with other
required visits.
AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Question. The Maritime Transportation Security Act, which President
Bush signed on November 25, 2002, requires vessels entering U.S. ports
to have an automatic identification system (AIS) on board by the end of
2003 that will identify the ship, the size of the ship and the type of
cargo on the ship when they arrive at U.S. ports. Congress appropriated
$24 million in fiscal year 2004 to install towers at selected ports and
to initiate a plan to create a nationwide system for all major
seaports. Your fiscal year 2005 request includes only $4 million to
continue this effort. The Coast Guard indicates that by the end of
fiscal year 2004, only 9 seaports will be able to receive AIS signals
from vessels entering our ports. Of the 9 seaports, how many will have
full AIS coverage?
Answer. By December 31, 2004, all nine ports will have full AIS
capability installed as part of their Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
system:
--New York
--Houston/Galveston
--San Francisco
--Puget Sound (Seattle-Tacoma)
--Prince William Sound (Valdez)
--St. Marys River (Sault Ste. Marie, MI)
--Berwick Bay (Louisiana)
--Lower Mississippi River (New Orleans)
--Los Angeles-Long Beach
In addition, the Coast Guard is already operating basic (primarily
receive-only) AIS installations in the following locations:
--Miami and Florida Keys
--Long Island Sound (Groton, CT)
--Hampton Roads (Norfolk, VA)
By the end of CY 2004, the Coast Guard intends to have established
additional AIS capability (primarily receive-only, but possibly more
robust) at additional locations nationwide. These sites will be
determined based on a variety of criteria, including the expected
density of AIS-equipped vessels in the area, existing command and
control capability to put the data to use, compatibility and support
for the more extensive and capable system currently in the planning
stages, and coordination with other needs and assessments. These sites
will include use of offshore NOAA and other buoys and may include some
non-recurring investment in satellite capability. A more detailed plan
will be available by June 2004.
Question. The Coast Guard indicated that a contract award to
implement a nation-wide system would be made by the end of fiscal year
2004 or early fiscal year 2005. Is that information still accurate? If
the $4 million requested in fiscal year 2005 were approved, how many
additional ports would be outfitted with AIS technology?
Answer. The Coast Guard is currently developing a nationwide
implementation plan for AIS consistent with Coast Guard and Department
of Homeland Security requirements associated with major systems
acquisitions. We anticipate awarding a contract for this initiative in
late fiscal year 2004 or early fiscal year 2005. In the meantime, we
intend to deploy interim AIS capability in several ports during fiscal
year 2004. By December 31, 2004, the following ports will have full AIS
capability installed as part of their Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
system:
--New York
--Houston/Galveston
--San Francisco
--Puget Sound (Seattle-Tacoma)
--Prince William Sound (Valdez)
--St. Mary's River (Sault Ste. Marie, MI)
--Berwick Bay (Louisiana)
--Lower Mississippi River (New Orleans)
--Los Angeles-Long Beach
In addition, the Coast Guard is already operating basic (primarily
receive-only) AIS installations in the following locations:
--Miami and Florida Keys
--Long Island Sound (Groton, CT)
--Hampton Roads (Norfolk, VA)
Interim sites will include use of offshore NOAA and other buoys and
may include some non-recurring investment in satellite capability. A
more detailed plan will be available by June 2004.
The $4 million requested in fiscal year 2005 will be used to
continue building out the nationwide AIS system. Once the Acquisition
Project Baseline is developed, a total project cost estimate will be
known and we will be able to provide an estimate of the number of
additional ports that will be outfitted with AIS technology. It is
important to note that each port will have unique requirements so there
will be no standard AIS cost per port.
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
Question. Section 307 of the Homeland Security Act requires a joint
agreement between the Under Secretary of the Science & Technology
directorate and the Commandant on R&D spending for the Coast Guard. The
Homeland Security Act specifies 10 percent of funding for the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects be spent on Coast Guard related
mission areas. Last year, the Committee was notified that the ``Coast
Guard is working with DHS to develop processes and policy for
compliance with Section 307 of the Homeland Security Act.'' Has a
policy been developed to comply with Section 307 of the Act?
Answer. No. Subsequent to the Coast Guard reply cited, DHS and CG
legal counsel advised that without a specific (Homeland Security
Advanced Research Project Agency) HSARPA appropriation, no funds are
statutorily designated to be set aside for CG related mission areas as
outlined in Section 307. Although the Homeland Security Act provides
authorization to do so (Figure 1), there have been no funds
appropriated specifically for HSARPA since enactment of the Homeland
Security Act. HSARPA is not a line item in the S&T budget. Rather,
funds have been appropriated toward a number of specific portfolios
organized generally by threat. It has evolved into an execution means
by which S&T will award competitive, merit-reviewed grants, cooperative
agreements or contracts to public or private entities to meet S&T
requirements.
Nonetheless, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and CG
will develop a formal agreement that will detail the coordination and
funding mechanisms for CG R&D capabilities in fiscal year 2005 and
beyond. This agreement will not be limited to HSARPA but rather the
interaction of the Coast Guard/Maritime portfolio with all the
executing arms of S&T (e.g. HSARPA, Office of Research and Development
(ORD), etc).
----------------------------------------------------------------
``(2) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated $500,000,000 to the Fund for fiscal year 2003 and such
sums as may be necessary thereafter.
``(3) Coast Guard.--Of the funds authorized to be appropriated
under paragraph (2), not less than 10 percent of such funds for each
fiscal year through fiscal year 2005 shall be authorized only for the
Under Secretary, through joint agreement with the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, to carry out research and development of improved ports,
waterways and coastal security surveillance and perimeter protection
capabilities for the purpose of minimizing the possibility that Coast
Guard cutters aircraft, helicopters and personnel will be diverted from
non-homeland security missions to the ports, waterways and coastal
security mission.''
----------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1.--Excerpt from Section 307 of Homeland Security Act
Question. For fiscal year 2005, the Department proposes to move
funding for Coast Guard R&D to the Science & Technology (S&T)
directorate. The S&T request includes $13.5 million to operate the
Coast Guard's R&D Center in Groton, CT and an additional $5 million for
R&D activities for a total of $18.5 million. In addition to this
funding, how will the Coast Guard benefit from S&T research? What
specific technologies are being explored to support the Coast Guard's
mission?
Answer. Through its portfolio manager at S&T, the CG will have
direct access to, and visibility of, all S&T research and initiatives.
The integration of funding and effort will go far to minimize
redundancy and maximize the effectiveness of Coast Guard R&D while
ensuring that all Coast Guard mission requirements remain a key part of
S&T planning and resource decisions. For example, S&T has provided $7.1
million of fiscal year 2003/2004 funds for support of a project in
South Florida exploring communications, sensors, data fusion concepts,
and modeling and simulation (Project Hawkeye). The integration of these
technologies provides improved maritime security for Miami and Port
Everglades while providing a rapid prototyping prelude to potential
Coast Guard-wide installations.
As stated, S&T has also agreed upon a base level of project funding
of $5 million that will be specifically targeted toward non-security
related projects including maritime science and research. This funding
will be designed to support CG mission-programs such as Marine
Environmental Protection, Living Marine Resources, Search and Rescue,
Aids to Navigation and Marine Safety. The specific projects in support
of these mission-programs will be prepared annually for S&T
concurrence.
In addition to the $18.5 million in funding cited, the Coast Guard
will submit security-related research requests through S&T for
coordination across all portfolios and DHS components. The Coast Guard
has submitted a maritime security R&D portfolio detailing approximately
$50 million in vital maritime security research initiatives. While not
yet funded, this portfolio has been validated by S&T portfolio managers
and will be considered in the development of future spending priorities
and commitments from S&T. As the lead Federal agency for maritime
security, the CG is being afforded an important role within S&T to
construct and help prioritize research and development needs in the
maritime domain.
HH-65 HELICOPTER
Question. The Coast Guard is currently in the process of purchasing
LTS-101-850 engines for the HH-65 to address safety, reliability, and
engine power issues. This approach is intended to provide an interim
solution to documented power failures. How many of the LTS-101-850
engines have been purchased? How many of the LTS-101-850 engines are
needed to provide the interim solution for the HH-65 before full
reengineering is completed and what is the associated cost?
Answer. To date, the Coast Guard has purchased 61 LTS-101-850
engines at a cost of $5.9 million.
The only reason to purchase additional 850 engines (38 at $4
million) would be to provide an interim safety and reliability
enhancement throughout the approximate 24-month duration of Integrated
Coast Guard System's (ICGS) Turbomeca re-engining project. The LTS-101-
850 engine, while not equipped with electronic fuel controls, offers an
additional margin of safety in an emergency situation. We owe our
aircrews nothing less until the fleet is re-engined. Based upon current
schedule projections, there is a 10-14 month ``underlap'' where the
Coast Guard would directly benefit from the additional engines.
These engines require long-lead time component purchases that must
be accounted for in the procurement decision process. The Coast Guard,
however, will wait until the completion of the current field evaluation
and subsequent inspection of the LTS-101-850 engines that are installed
on two Coast Guard Air Station Miami Helicopters. One helicopter has
completed the initial 150 hour evaluation and is currently being
inspected, while the second aircraft still has 36 hours of evaluation
remaining prior to inspection. After completion of testing and
inspection, the Coast Guard intends to re-evaluate the need for
additional engines based upon the results and both LTS-101-850 and
Turbomeca installation schedule updates
Below is the latest draft installation schedule based on
information from the new engine system selected manufacturer,
Turbomeca. This schedule is not final. The Coast Guard is hopeful that
the new engine installations move further to the ``left.''
Question. At the same time, the Coast Guard recently announced the
selection of Turbomecca to re-engine the HH-65. The Coast Guard
estimates that this re-engining will cost $250 million over a 24 month
period. Will this engine be compatible with the Deepwater Multi-Mission
Cutter Helicopter or will another engine replacement be required?
Answer. The Coast Guard has directed that a re-engining project be
immediately initiated to restore the HH-65 to unrestricted safe and
reliable operations. The project is designed to address the HH-65
engine system, the engine and engine control systems, to remedy this
safety and reliability crisis, and restore the HH-65's operational
capability.
The HH-65 re-engining project is a separate and distinct effort
from the Deepwater Multi-mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). In the long-
term, the Deepwater plan is still to convert the HH-65 to the Multi-
mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH). While power increases were not the
focus of this acquisition, the engine chosen, while addressing the
safety and reliability concerns, also has sufficient power margins to
allow for that engine to be used in the continuation of the MCH.
HIGH INTEREST VESSEL BOARDINGS
Question. U.S. Customs and Border Protection use an automated
targeting system to identify shipments that pose a potential terrorist
risk. It is unclear if this information is shared with the U.S. Coast
Guard, which could be useful in identifying high interest vessels. Is
this information being shared with the Coast Guard? If not, would this
information be a useful tool for the Coast Guard to use?
Answer. Yes, Automated Targeting System information is shared
through an exchange of liaisons between the Coast Guard and the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's National Targeting Center (NTC). The
Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) and the NTC have
exchanged full-time liaisons to pass information each center develops
about suspect ships, people, and cargoes. This has been a highly
effective partnership and has given each center much greater visibility
into specific maritime cases and concerns as they arise, resulting in
better coordination of information flow and operational planning. ICC's
COASTWATCH program (a partnership with the U.S. Navy's Office of Naval
Intelligence) uses data collected via the ICC/NTC partnership, coupled
with the information received through our 96-hour Advanced Notice of
Arrival (ANOA) rules, intelligence, and other appropriate law
enforcement information, to identify Vessels of Interest, providing
crew, cargo, and vessel screening prior to a vessel's arrival in U.S.
ports.
At the local level, Vessels of Interest are factored into the
decision making process to determine which vessels should be designated
and or boarded as High Interest Vessels (HIVs). Additionally, because
of the U.S. Coast Guard's solid working relationship with Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), input provided by CBP at the local level is
also considered when determining which vessels should be boarded as
HIVs.
The Coast Guard is incorporating an option into our 96-hour vessel
ANOA requirements to permit the electronic submission of information
(e-NOA). The Coast Guard and CBP have been working together to
incorporate CBP's reporting requirements into the e-NOA system. This
consolidated e-NOA system will include the capability to capture crew,
passenger, cargo, and vessel arrival information for both agencies. It
is anticipated that e-NOA will be operational by the summer of 2004. By
allowing industry to submit Coast Guard and CBP reporting requirements
together, DHS will enhance its information sharing capabilities,
thereby significantly enhancing the processing and identification of
security and safety risks posed by vessels entering U.S. ports.
SHORE FACILITIES
Question. The Coast Guard's request for shore facility projects is
$5 million in fiscal year 2005. According to the Coast Guard, $146
million is needed on an annual basis for recapitalization needs to
support shore facility assets valued at $7.2 billion. With such
valuable assets, why does the Coast Guard continue to neglect shore
facilities? Does the Coast Guard have a plan in place to address the
needs of its shore infrastructure? Provide a list of projects in need
of shore facility funding in priority order.
Answer. The Coast Guard is deeply concerned about its entire
infrastructure, including shore facilities. However, funding priority
must be placed on recapitalization efforts of operational first
response platforms such as Deepwater and Rescue 21. Shore facility
sustainment will be managed by targeted maintenance practices,
increased use of leased facilities, and ensuring shore infrastructure
costs are included in major AC&I projects, such as Deepwater and the
Great Lakes Icebreaker replacement. Increases in the Basic Allowance
for Housing also help and reduce the need for Coast Guard owned housing
projects. Additionally, the Coast Guard is pursuing Public-Private
Venture housing opportunities authorized in the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002. Other Coast Guard initiatives currently being
developed that will assist in being good stewards of shore facilities
include enhanced real property authorities, such as the ability to
sublease and outlease property, exchange and sell property, and dispose
of excess property with sale proceeds being reinvested in the capital
plant. The Coast Guard is on budget in fiscal year 2005 for $151
million recurring OE shore facility maintenance costs and an additional
$5 million for shore AC&I projects.
Provided below is the budgeted Shore Facilities Requirements List
(SFRL) for fiscal year 2005, followed by a backlog of listing of fiscal
year 2005 unfunded projects. While the Coast Guard planning process
addresses projects that require funding beyond fiscal year 2005, these
projects have not been prioritized and are not included in the fiscal
year 2005 SFRL attached.
FUNDED SHORE FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS LIST (SFRL)--FISCAL YEAR 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENEFITTING UNIT PROJECT DESCRIPTION EST (000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAJOR AC&I: ISC Honolulu Small Arms Range.... $1,600
SURVEY AND DESIGN: Various Shore Operational & 1,000
Support Projects.
MINOR AC&I: Various Minor Construction 1,600
Projects.
WATERWAYS AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION: Various Locations... 800
Various
---------------
TOTAL....................... .................... 5,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNFUNDED SHORE FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS LIST (SFRL)--FISCAL YEAR 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BENEFITTING UNIT PROJECT DESCRIPTION EST (000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAJOR AC&I:
ISC Kodiak, AK................ Consolidate Support $8,500
Facilities.
AR&SC Elizabeth City, NC...... Consolidate 6,300
Facilities Phase I.
Base Galveston, TX............ Rebuild Station/ 6,400
Waterfront.
Group Woods Hole, MA.......... Replace ANT and 3,750
Admin Building
Phase I.
SURVEY AND DESIGN: Various Shore Operational & 4,000
Support Projects.
MINOR AC&I: Various Minor Construction 2,750
Projects.
WATERWAYS AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION: Various Locations... 4,200
Various
COAST GUARD HOUSING:
Cordova, AK................... Replace Cordova 4,000
Housing, Phase I.
USCGA, New London, CT......... Chase Hall Barracks 15,000
Renovation Phase I.
---------------
TOTAL....................... .................... 54,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT (MTSA) IMPLEMENTATION
Question. The budget request includes $101.7 million for the
implementation of the MTSA. What follow-on costs are necessary to meet
the requirements of the MTSA (specify by fiscal year)?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 budget request is designed to bring
MTSA implementation close to the annual recurring steady state for
personnel, associated support funds, and contract resources. These
resources will be used to address the permanent increase in workload
associated with MTSA. This workload includes continued verification of
domestic vessel and facility security requirements, a robust Port State
Control program to ensure compliance with international security
requirements, continuous updates and improvements to the National and
Area Maritime Security plans, and the assessment of domestic and
foreign ports for compliance. Additional follow-on costs of MTSA
initiatives are $12.9 million in fiscal year 2006.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
NON-SECURITY MISSIONS
Question. When the Coast Guard was moved to the Department of
Homeland Security, Congress included a provision in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 to ensure that the Coast Guard continued to carry
out its non-security missions. Section 888 of the Act states that the
Secretary, ``may not substantially or significantly reduce the missions
of the Coast Guard or the Coast Guard's capability to perform those
missions, except as specified in subsequent Acts.''
However, concern has been raised about the Coast Guard's ability to
maintain its non-security missions as the hours ships and aircraft are
used for these missions have not reached pre-September 11 levels. I was
concerned by a report to the Congress that several of the districts,
including Honolulu, have ``insufficient personnel'' for its search and
rescue missions.
It is my understanding that your performance measures were enhanced
through the assistance of other agencies. In addition, certain
performance goals are not reflective of the success of the maintenance
of your effort. I do not find it helpful that the performance measure
for compliance with domestic fisheries regulations is how many
fisherman, of those reviewed, were found to be in compliance. If the
Coast Guard interviewed one fisherman who was in compliance, the Coast
Guard would have 100 percent performance on this measure.
Can you tell me what you are doing to ensure that the non-security
missions that are so critical to my state are being met and that the
performance measures are a true reflection of your efforts?
Answer. Based on all measurements completed to date, the Coast
Guard met its performance goal in each non-homeland security mission-
program area including our goal for Search and Rescue for fiscal year
2003. Program performance is the most important element of the Coast
Guard Performance Management System. Program managers establish
measures to accurately portray organizational performance. The measures
are data-driven, fully documented, meaningful, and focus on outcomes.
Using the performance measures, and with an emphasis toward improving
effectiveness, the Coast Guard Commandant establishes long-term
performance outcome targets that are linked to the strategic intent of
the organization, including maintaining the balance between homeland
security and non-homeland security missions. While the Coast Guard has
been lauded in the past for its performance measurement efforts, it has
recognized and acknowledged that limitations in these measures
sometimes exist. The Coast Guard has been working with GAO through the
recent audit examining the relationship between resources and results,
and OMB through the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) reviews,
and other independent evaluation efforts to continually review and
improve program measures' clarity and objectivity. Examples of measures
that have recently been revised or are currently under review include:
Several years ago, the Search and Rescue program was measured by
the percent of persons in U.S. jurisdictional waters in distress that
were saved, after the Coast Guard was notified. This measure was
changed to include the percentage all persons in U.S. jurisdictional
waters in distress, with no restriction on Coast Guard notification.
This change occurred as program managers realized that communication
improvements and other non-Search and Rescue safety programs were
inputs to the measure of safety as well as that of a simple Search and
Rescue response measure.
Two years ago, the Short Range Aids to Navigation (AtoN) program
was measured by the statistic of Short Range Aid availability. While
this measure provided information on the percent of Coast Guard Aids to
Navigation that were working properly and on-station, there was little
connection to performance of these aids and benefit to the public. When
this was brought to the Coast Guard's attention through an Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
review, a change was made to measure the AtoN program by the number of
Collisions, Allisions and Groundings that occur in U.S. waterways.
The illegal drug interdiction measure was recently refined to
include not only cocaine seized by the Coast Guard but also to account
for cocaine thrown overboard or destroyed by smugglers. This refined
measure, which encompasses both the cocaine lost to the smuggler as
Coast Guard assets draw near, causing the smugger to jettison, burn,
and otherwise destroy their product, as well as the cocaine actually
seized by the Coast Guard, will more accurately reflect counter-drug
efforts and results.
With regard to the concern expressed in the question regarding the
domestic fisheries performance measure of a compliance rate; both the
Coast Guard and OMB, through its PART review, believe this rate to be a
sound measure. The observed compliance rate measure is the total number
of Coast Guard domestic fishing vessel boardings minus the boardings
that had significant violations divided by the total number of Coast
Guard fishing vessel boardings. Only boardings that have a significant
violation--a living marine resource violation that results in
significant damage or impact to the fisheries resource, significant
monetary advantage to the violator, or has high regional or national
interest--are counted.
Historically, domestic compliance rates, which are based on over
3,000 boardings (post 9/11 statistic) annually, have been within the
95-98 percent range and movement within this range is expected and
mostly beyond CG control as economic and social factors other than
enforcement presence motivates individuals to violate the law. As a
result, a floor has been established at 97 percent observed compliance
to evaluate if CG levels of enforcement are sufficient to ensure wide-
scale compliance with regulations.
Historical data illustrates Coast Guard enforcement presence does
in fact affect observed compliance rates and also that there is a delay
between enforcement presence/absence and fisheries compliance rates.
Although observed compliance rate will not perfectly indicate the
actual industry-wide compliance rate, it should serve as a reasonable
indicator of the actual compliance rate when enforcement resource
effort is sufficient to make performance tracking possible.
In regard to the comment concerning ``insufficient resources'' in
Honolulu, the Coast Guard is careful to distinguish between mission
performance measures and internal program standards put in place to
ensure the long-term maintenance of our resources, including our most
valuable asset, our people. As stated above the Coast Guard has
successfully met all mission performance goals for the search and
rescue mission. The Coast Guard has adequate resources to meet
performance and on-scene response standards for search and rescue in
Hawaii. However, the Coast Guard has recently adopted an internal
program standard, driven by requirements set forth in MTSA 2002,
requiring command center watchstanders responsible for search and
rescue to limit their watch length to 12 hours in duration, except in
emergency or unforeseen circumstances.
The Coast Guard measures and reports quarterly to Congress on our
ability to meet this standard. The Coast Guard has demonstrated
incremental improvement in achieving this standard, however, routine
personnel transfers and substantial training requirements for newly
assigned personnel continue to challenge the Coast Guard's ability to
meet the 12-hour standard at all times. The Coast Guard is reviewing
the staffing standards for our command centers, and is developing
recommendations to ensure our ability to meet and maintain a year-round
capability to meet the 12-hour watch requirement.
PORT SECURITY
Question. As part of the Maritime Transportation Security Act,
9,000 vessels and 3,500 facilities were supposed to have filed security
plans by December 31, 2004. It is my understanding that you have
received 97 percent of the security plans and that more than half of
them are in the second stage of review. Area security and contingency
response plans must be completed by July 1, do you anticipate a similar
compliance rate? How does the cost of implementation affect the
adequacy of the security plans submitted? On December 30, 2002, the
Coast Guard estimated the total cost of implementing security in our
seaports at $7.2 billion over the next 10 years. Is that estimate still
accurate and how much has been spent toward that total to date? The
President's budget requests $46 million for Port Security Grants. Will
that be sufficient to bring our vessels and facilities into compliance
with the security plans?
Answer. Each Federal Maritime Security Coordinator submitted an
Area Maritime Security (AMS) Plan to the respective Coast Guard
District Commander for initial review on April 1, 2004. In order to
meet the entry-into-force date of the new International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code and Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
amendments, the Coast Guard must review and approve all AMS plans by
June 30, 2004 and communicate U.S. port compliance with the ISPS Code
to the International Maritime Organization.
In the final MTSA regulations, the Coast Guard estimated the
industry cost for implementing Section 102 of the MTSA security
requirements as approximately $1.5 billion in the first year, and $7.3
billion over the next 10 years. The port security grants to date have
provided approximately $500 million.
The Coast Guard does not believe the cost of implementation
affected the adequacy of the facility and vessel security plans
submitted for review. The MTSA security regulations were specifically
developed to be performance based in order to provide owners/operators
the latitude to implement the most cost-effective security controls to
meet their specific circumstances.
The fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget
proposes a significant increase for port security activities. Grants to
facilities are a small part of DHS's total investment in port security.
Department of Homeland Security spending on port security increases by
$224 million (13 percent) in the President's Budget, from $1,661
million in 2004 to $1,885 million in 2005. Within the 2005 total is
$1,675 million for Coast Guard port, waterway, and coastal security
activities, including over $100 million to implement MTSA. The DHS port
security total also includes $164 million in U.S. Customs and Border
Protection for the Container Security Initiative and the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, and $46 million in the Office for
Domestic Preparedness for port security grants.
HC-130J
Question. The Coast Guard has expanded its mission since September
11, 2001 and has been transferred from the Department of Transportation
to the Department of Homeland Security. Thirteen Maritime Safety and
Security Teams and eight Port Security Units have been deployed. With
these changes, has there been an increased requirement for airlift
capacity?
Answer. Yes. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has redefined and expanded
organic lift requirements. The Coast Guard must be capable of providing
organic aviation transport of National Strike Force personnel and
equipment within 6 hours and must be capable of providing aviation
transport of MSSTs within 12 hours of notification. Ongoing efforts to
expand the Deepwater contract to reflect post-9/11 mission requirements
and DHS Aviation Council study efforts will shape our aviation heavy
lift and transport capability.
Question. Pursuant to funding provided in the fiscal year 2001
Military Construction bill, the Coast Guard recently received delivery
of the first of six HC-130J Super Hercules aircraft. Could you discuss
with us those aircraft, the benefits to DHS, and the advantages of the
new 130Js over the 130Hs currently in service? In your opinion, is the
HC-130J, the best aircraft available to replace your aging air fleet?
Answer. The HC-130J provides the USCG and DHS a modern long-range
patrol and heavy lift aircraft that will remain in the DHS inventory
well into the future. This capability will provide DHS the ability to
provide heavy-lift through a variety of mission profiles, and will
enable the Department to remain in the forefront of disaster response
and Homeland Security missions. The HC-130J is a completely new
aircraft enabling a substantially better level of performance. Even in
their current unmissionized state, the C-130J provides a substantially
greater heavy lift capability than the aging HC-130H. Missionization to
full capability as maritime patrol aircraft is scheduled to begin in
fiscal year 2004. The missionization suite was designed to reflect post
9/11 mission requirements, and will be fully interoperable with DHS,
DOD, and the Deepwater systems. Fully digitized and equipped with a
contemporary electronics suite, the missionized HC-130J will fly faster
and have greater range with a smaller crew. The legacy asset HC-130H is
increasingly more expensive to maintain and will be costly to modernize
to homeland security and Deepwater mission requirements. At Full
Operational Capability (FOC), the HC-130J will meet all current DHS/
USCG long range maritime patrol and heavy airlift requirements.
Question. The first six HC-130Js are planned to be based at the Air
Station in Kodiak, Alaska. This would leave the Coast Guard with a mix
of HC-130Js and Hs in your Pacific Fleet. What are the benefits of an
all HC-130J Pacific Fleet?
Answer. In the Pacific Area, C130s operate over some of the world's
largest expanses of water in the most arduous weather conditions. In
addition to the performance increases and modern replacement benefits,
an all C-130J fleet in the Pacific Area would allow the Coast Guard to
more rapidly grow an experienced operator cadre/community to operate
and maintain this aircraft. Additionally, the service would benefit
from reduced training costs, as some members would transfer from one C-
130J unit to another, eliminating qualification costs. Economies of
scale would produce parts and logistics support savings as well.
Question. What are your funding requirements to fully deploy and
maintain the first six HC-130Js? Is that request contained in the
President's budget?
Answer. Total additional funding required to missionize and achieve
Full Operational Capability (FOC) of HC-130Js by the end of fiscal year
2007 is $187 million. A funding request for missionization and full
system acquisition is not included in the President's budget.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
OVERALL COAST GUARD BUDGET REQUEST ONLY 6 PERCENT INCREASE
Question. The Commandant of the Coast Guard testified that the
Coast Guard was on track to restore resources and performance of non-
security missions, such as search and rescue of stranded mariners, to
pre-9/11 levels. However, a draft GAO report (non-public until mid-
March) finds that the resource hours dedicated to the search and rescue
mission search & rescue is down 22 percent from pre 9/11 levels. The
resource hours dedicated to many other non-security missions, such as
fisheries enforcement, living marine resources, and drug interdiction,
are all down as well.
Does this budget really fund the Coast Guard at sufficient levels?
The request is really only a 6 percent increase over what we enacted
last year, if you include the supplementals. Why is Coast Guard getting
so little of the increase when it has so many responsibilities related
to security and non-security missions?
Answer. Yes, the fiscal year 2005 budget request is sufficient to
fund Coast Guard operations. A 6 percent increase is not a fair
comparison since the fiscal year 2004 Coast Guard budget includes
supplemental funding provided for Iraqi Freedom and Hurricane Isabel.
Supplemental appropriations are for specific purposes and are non-
recurring. Therefore, the fiscal year 2005 Coast Guard budget would not
reflect this funding.
While the draft GAO report referenced in this question noted that
that the resource hours for non-homeland security programs decreased,
the report also had the following conclusion: ``The Coast Guard's
performance results--measures used to track each program's annual
progress--generally did not mirror the trends in resource use. Instead,
results for programs GAO reviewed were generally stable or improved
regardless of the resources applied, and nearly all of the programs
that GAO reviewed met their performance targets.'' (Draft GAO-04-043,
March 2004).
Search and Rescue (SAR) is a demand driven mission. While resource
hours for SAR are down, it is due to less distress calls than from lack
of resource hours. Also from the GAO report: ``the search and rescue
program's target for fiscal year 2003 was to save 85 percent of
mariners in distress and the program achieved this goal by saving over
87 percent of them.''
While resource hours are an important measure, the Coast Guard
relies on the judgment of the operation commander to apply available
resources based on the risks in the relevant area of operations. This
flexibility is critical to apply Coast Guard resources to the numerous
missions mandated in Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Question. I am hearing reports that the Coast Guard's resource
hours for most non-security missions are still down below pre 9/11
levels. For example, I've heard that the search and rescue mission is
down 22 percent from pre 9/11 levels. What can you tell me about that?
Answer. The Coast Guard will continue seeking the appropriate
balance among all its mission-programs while relentlessly pursuing our
stated performance goals. In so doing, the Coast Guard will continue to
focus not only on activity levels (hours), but also on achieving the
desired outcomes from those levels. Our ability to achieve desired
outcomes and performance goals have been significantly enhanced through
improved technology, tactics and procedures making our activities that
much more effective. Risk-based decision-making by local commanders
will continue to be the primary driving factor behind the specific
activity levels (hours) accrued in the course of Coast Guard
operations.
The number of resource hours utilized for search and rescue (SAR)
decreased by 22 percent in fiscal year 2003 from a pre-9/11 average
level. However, this decrease in resource hours was not indicative of a
decrease in service or performance. SAR is a demand driven mission, and
the Coast Guard continues to respond to all mariners in distress. In
fiscal year 2003, the Coast Guard met its 85 percent SAR performance
goal by saving 87 percent of all mariners in distress.
The Coast Guard's SAR program is a system with a variety of
components. Aircraft, cutters, and boats play a large role in the
response system, but overall SAR performance is not based on resource
hours alone. For example, maritime safety and prevention programs,
technology advancements for the boating public, enhanced communication
and tracking systems, and improved safety equipment are just a few of
the initiatives that factor into the Coast Guard's SAR program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Questions. The U.S. Coast Guard awarded General Dynamics Decision
Systems a $611 million contract to replace its outdated communications
system in a project titled Rescue 21. This is a massive Federal
investment in our maritime communications infrastructure. The Rescue 21
section of the Coast Guard's website, however, has not been updated
since May 9, 2003, so it is very difficult for the American public to
keep updated on the project's implementation process and schedule.
Could you please give me a status update on the project? I understand
there may be some questions about deficiencies in the design phase of
the project. Does the Coast Guard have adequate oversight of the
contractor and are financial controls in place to ensure that the
public investment is protected? When does the Coast Guard plan to
implement Rescue 21 on Lake Champlain and Lake Memphremagog to cover
these important border entry points into the United States? The Coast
Guard's mission on Lake Champlain can lead to simultaneous rescue calls
at opposite ends of the lake. First responders often have to rely on
either a Coast Guard helicopter from southern New England or a Vermont
Army National Guard helicopter to support them on search and rescue
missions. Both options take precious hours to implement and cut short
the window of opportunity for a successful rescue. With the Coast Guard
seeking a 9 percent increase in their budget this year, are there any
plans to post a Coast Guard helicopter on Lake Champlain?
Answers.
Status Update
While conducting Formal Qualification Testing (FQT) in January
2004, several significant software (SW) defects were discovered in
functional areas such as archive/restore, fault management, channel
performance, Group Command Centers/Station operations, vessels and
voice quality that required performance fixes and retesting. An
additional FQT test event was scheduled for March/April to retest
defects discovered in January 2004.
While conducting preliminary FQT testing in early March to prove
that previous issues had been resolved, GDDS discovered a new defect
that has a severe impact on the asset tracking functionality of the
system. This defect was hidden by an earlier problem and revealed by
the latest software fixes. GDDS is currently working with the equipment
manufacturer to analyze the defect and identify appropriate corrective
action. Until GDDS can fix this asset-tracking problem, the FQT
regression testing is necessarily on hold.
Consequently, Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and Full Operating
Capability (FOC) schedules will be impacted by the technical issues and
testing activities discussed. IOC will be delayed by approximately 1
year (to Sep 2004), and the Coast Guard anticipates the project being
45 percent complete by the end of 2005. Achieving FOC in 2006 is at
risk and is still being evaluated. The Coast Guard and GDDS have formed
a joint deployment team to streamline the regional deployment process
and identify tasks that can be performed concurrently or more
efficiently to complete the maximum number of regions by the end of
2006. The deployment team is using the experience of the first 6
regions to redefine processes and align activities to accelerate
deployment. Future deployment dates of Rescue 21 will depend upon
GDDS's ability to accelerate their work, deploy innovations and do
parallel deployments as the system is built out.
The Rescue 21 section of the Coast Guard's website was recently
updated on April 9, 2004. IOC and Low Rate Initial Program (LRIP)
region schedules were updated. Group schedule updates still pending.
Oversight
The Coast Guard has 54 staff members dedicated to the Rescue 21
project. Several of these staff members are dispersed throughout the
United States to ensure appropriate oversight of the nationwide
deployment.
Additionally, the Coast Guard has agreements in place with the
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego and U.S. Department
of Commerce National Telecommunication Information Administration
(NTIA)/ITS Institute for Telecommunication Sciences for technical/
quality assurance support and Booz Allen Hamilton for project
management and administrative support.
Finally, the Coast Guard has leveraged existing GSA contracts to
award blanket purchase agreements to a public relations firm to assist
with community/public outreach, an environmental consulting firm to
ensure compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations,
and an information technology firm to ensure contractor performance
metrics are properly developed, monitored and archived.
Financial Controls
Approximately 80 percent of the costs associated with the Rescue 21
deployment will be paid using fixed price delivery orders. These costs
were established during the proposal evaluation phase of the project
and are not expected to change. The remaining 20 percent of the work
will be paid for using cost plus incentive fee delivery orders for
which target prices were also established during the proposal
evaluation phase. Incentive fee contract structures provide motivation
for the contractor to remain within cost goals.
Lakes Champlain and Memphremagog
Lake Champlain will receive Rescue 21 as part of the Activities New
York deployment currently scheduled for 2005. Lake Memphremagog was not
identified as part of the Rescue 21 operational requirement, and is not
scheduled to receive Rescue 21.
Coast Guard Mission on Lake Champlain
Coast Guard Station Burlington, located at Burlington, VT conducts
search and rescue (SAR) on Lake Champlain and responds to approximately
200-300 cases annually, mostly during a the peak season for
recreational boaters between June through August. Lake Champlain's
shoreline includes portions of Vermont, New York and Canada, and
measures approximately 100 nautical miles (north and south) by eight
nautical miles (east and west). The Coast Guard's small boat response
station has 25 persons assigned for Coast Guard missions including
search and rescue, and also maintains aids to navigation on the lake.
Coast Guard aircraft from Air Station Cape Cod are capable of
responding to search and rescue cases on Lake Champlain within the
Coast Guard's SAR program standards. However, they do not normally do
so because of the other resources nearby which can provide a quicker
response. Considering the narrow characteristics of the lake and that
there are a large number of local responders, including local police
and fire departments in the cities surrounding the lake, and that
helicopters from the New York State Police, the Air National Guard, and
U.S. Customs & Border Protection agency provide search assistance, the
Coast Guard does not presently have any plans to post an aircraft at
Lake Champlain.
______
Questions Submitted to Transportation Security Administration
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS
Question. The Department requested a number of international
flights to be cancelled at the end of December and again in January due
to intelligence of possible terrorist activity. The cancellations
caused inconvenience and financial losses for airlines and passengers
alike and some aviation organizations have publicly questioned the need
to cancel flights without being made aware of what specific
intelligence was uncovered.
Do you feel the Department was justified in the cancellation of
these flights based on intelligence indicating that commercial
airliners continue to be at risk of highjackings?
Answer. The decision to cancel flights was made by the foreign
carriers and governments upon specific intelligence that warranted such
action. DHS shared information with our foreign counterparts and
foreign air carriers, which led to their decisions to cancel flights
and/or implement enhanced security measures.
Question. How would you describe the cooperation of commercial
airliners in the request to cancel these flights?
Answer. During the holiday period, DHS received specific
information and shared it appropriately with French and British allies,
resulting in their decisions to cancel these flights. DHS and our
European allies continue to work in close collaboration to share best
practices and enhance aviation security.
Question. Are passenger manifests being provided in a timely
fashion by the airlines to the Department of Homeland Security?
Answer. Air carriers as a general rule are fully compliant with
existing CBP requirements for advanced passenger information system
(APIS) transmissions, which must be submitted after takeoff. However,
to vet flights of interest over the holiday threat period, TSA required
that, upon request, airlines provide DHS with passenger manifests a
specified time in advance of departure. All such requests were
generally accommodated, and DHS continues to work closely with both the
State Department and foreign carriers to ensure that additional
requests are accommodated appropriately.
Question. With intelligence showing that terrorists have considered
a dirty bomb or a chemical or biological weapon release on airliners,
what precautions are in place at our Nation's airports to prevent a
possible radiological, nuclear, chemical or biological attack on an
aircraft?
Answer. TSA believes that existing operating procedures and current
technology in the area of explosives detection would enable TSA to
detect and interdict such a threat. In addition, the Department of
Homeland Security continues to fund an aggressive program to improve
the technology capable of detecting and mitigating such threats. As you
are aware, TSA is also working to replace its passenger prescreening
system to improve our ability to detect and stop any terrorist
attempting to board an aircraft, including one possessing
unconventional weapons.
Question. Secretary Ridge testified before this Committee that the
Executive amendment which directed the airlines to place Federal air
marshals on international flights should have more appropriately been
sent through diplomatic channels first. What new protocols or
procedures have since been implemented by the Transportation Security
Administration to communicate through diplomatic channels in the event
that future flights are determined to be at high risk of terrorist
attack?
Answer. The regulatory instrument that allows TSA to require
additional security of foreign air carriers is an emergency amendment
to the security program of the affected foreign air carrier. It is the
regulated party, (i.e. the air carrier) which must be the recipient of
that instrument. However, we are aware that issuance of emergency
amendments alone does not provide enough information to the foreign
authority (which may differ from country to country) responsible for
air marshals or other security functions involved in an emergency
amendment. To remedy this, TSA, under DHS leadership, will use
diplomatic channels, particularly in cases requiring immediate action
by foreign air carriers, to inform affected air carriers and the
foreign authority of their respective government concurrently. TSA will
work through the Department of State and the affected U.S. Embassies,
which will, in turn, reach out to the appropriate foreign authority to
ensure that the requirements of the emergency amendment are conveyed.
RAIL SECURITY
Question. Under Secretary Hutchinson testified before this
Committee previous to the terrorist train bombings in Madrid that the
Transportation Security Administration is working with other Federal
Departments and agencies within the Department of Homeland Security to
secure various transportation sectors including rail. The Department of
Homeland Security recently announced additional security initiatives to
further reduce vulnerabilities to transit and rail systems.
In light of the attacks that took place on light-rail, passenger
trains in Spain recently can you further elaborate on the luggage
screening pilot program announced recently to be carried out by the
Department of Homeland Security and coordinated with Amtrack and the
Federal Railroad Administration?
Answer. TSA, AMTRAK, and Federal Railroad Administration have
combined efforts to institute a passenger and carry-on baggage
screening prototype for explosives in a rail environment known as the
Transit and Rail Inspection Program (TRIP). Under this project, TSA
will seek to determine the feasibility of screening in a passenger rail
environment. TSA hopes that such a project will help identify measures
that would permit an appropriate level of screening that reflects the
individual characteristics of each type of passenger rail traffic. The
pilot project leverages present and prototype technologies and will
evaluate their feasibility in a rail environment. As the primary
stakeholder, AMTRAK is immersed in the review and implementation of
this project. This program is expected to commence by early May 2004.
Question. What new technologies and screening concepts will be
implemented?
Will explosive detection systems and/or explosive trace detection
which are used to screen luggage placed on airliners be used to screen
luggage placed on trains?
Answers. The pilot program will assess different types of screening
equipment already in use or being tested today.
Question. Will additional funding be requested by the
Transportation Security Administration for the additional rail security
measures announced yesterday either by a supplemental funding request
or by budget amendment?
Answer. TSA will fund the additional rail security initiatives that
were recently announced from within its fiscal year 2004 appropriation
for Maritime and Land Security. For fiscal year 2005, there are no
plans to seek additional funding for rail security above what is
included in the fiscal year 2005 President's Request.
Question. Can you provide further detail on how the Transportation
Security Administration is using the expertise of Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and Science and Technology (S&T)
assistance to prevent a terrorist attack on our railways and also on
our subway systems?
Answer. TSA staff and its parent directorate, the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, work closely and collaborate on a
daily basis with both S&T and the Information Analysis (IA) and the
Infrastructure Protection (IP) Divisions of the IAIP Directorate, on
issues related to rail and transit security. IA shares intelligence and
threat analysis daily with all DHS entities and other relevant
stakeholders. Since the Madrid bombings, DHS stood up a working group
to develop operational Courses of Action (COAs). Members of this
working group include representatives from BTS, TSA, IA, IP and the
Department of Transportation.
TSA has partnered with IP on several important issues in
safeguarding our nation's critical infrastructure including working
together to conduct vulnerability assessments and security reviews.
Moreover, IP has invited TSA to participate in site assistance visits
(SAV) to determine a baseline level of security for select elements of
the nation's critical infrastructure. One current example involves a
joint assessment of subway system ventilation shafts to determine
vulnerability to chemical or biological attack. Additionally, TSA, in
coordination with FRA, IP and industry representatives, is currently
conducting an in-depth assessment of the District of Columbia rail
corridor.
TSA has been communicating its operational requirements to the
Science and Technology (S&T) directorate. TSA has engaged S&T in an
effort to help meet the more immediate R&D needs of screening
passengers and their baggage in the rail and transit environment with
relevant technologies sensitive to the operational concerns of
throughput and high levels of detection.
TSA works closely with IA and S&T to better understand and prevent
terrorist attacks on our Nation's railroads. Our warning and
information products are vetted with IA and S&T representatives to
provide the best informed assessments possible. Additionally, vetting
and strong analyst-to-analyst coordination ensure strong positive
information sharing across the Department.
Question. Have vulnerability assessments been completed by
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection on high-density
urban areas to target resources toward the railways greatest weaknesses
or are these assessments still taking place?
Answer. On May 14, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security
awarded $65 million in Mass Transit Grants to help secure the 20
highest risk transit systems in the United States based on ridership.
The money may be used for the following: (1) the installation of
physical barricades; (2) area monitoring systems such as video
surveillance, motion detectors, thermal/IR imagery and chemical/
radiological material detections systems; (3) integrated communications
systems; (4) prevention planning, training and exercises; and/or (5)
operations activities conducted during ORANGE alert from January 2003
through April 2003. New York City Transit received $26.7 million, 41
percent of the $65 million. The Chicago Transit Authority, the second
largest transit agency by ridership, received $5.1 million.
On November 13, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security awarded
another $53 million to the top 30 transit agencies with heavy rail,
subway and commuter rail systems. A weighted average factoring both
ridership and system route miles was used to determine the amounts
received. Each qualifying system received no less than $800,000. Due to
the previous allocation of funds to New York City Transit, the MTA
subway system was capped at $10 Million, allowing for the allocation of
more funds to other properties.
The grants were administered by DHS's Office for Domestic
Preparedness (ODP). TSA provided modal expertise to ODP on the
allotment of this grant money to the mass transit industry.
TSA is currently conducting an assessment of critical mass transit
assets. The results will be used to identify locations for enhanced,
facilitated assessments. To-date, TSA has performed an assessment on
approximately 65 percent of critical subway assets. Approximately 30
percent of light rail critical assets have been assessed. The
criticality assessment of mass transit assets is scheduled for
completion by July 2004.
DHS has conducted Site Assist Visits (SAVs) of several rail
stations in high-density urban areas, including New York's Penn Station
and Grand Central Station and Washington D.C.'s Union Station. Teams of
security experts, along with the owner/operator of the site, identifies
vulnerabilities and suggest remediation actions. Thanks to these and
other visits to rail facilities, we have compiled Common
Characteristics and Vulnerability reports and Potential Indicators for
Terrorist Attack reports (CV/PI) for railroad yards and railroad
bridges and disseminated them to owners/operators, security planners,
and law enforcement agencies. The Department has also funded a study of
possible protective measures that can be applied to railcars
transporting chemicals and recommendations are expected shortly. In
addition we have received dozens of other rail and subway vulnerability
assessments, including those for the 30 largest systems in the country
and have included them in our database. We have also completed an
assessment of a 15 mile DC corridor for HAZMAT rail shipment and are
considering additional assessments in other major urban areas.
AIR CARGO
Question. Congress provided $85 million for fiscal year 2004 for
the Transportation Security Administration to hire additional screeners
to inspect air cargo and for research and development of explosive
detection systems in order to screen for explosives in air cargo, both
the larger palletized cargo and the individual pallets, or individual
boxes known as ``break bulk''.
With the increase in air cargo security funding provided for fiscal
year 2004, how many additional screeners have been hired to inspect air
cargo to date, and when do you expect to be fully staffed?
Answer. As of March 23, 2004, the funding provided in the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law
108-90) enabled TSA to hire 100 new cargo inspectors. All 100 cargo
inspector positions have been selected, and paperwork is being
processed by TSA Human Resources. We anticipate extending job offers to
these applicants and bringing them on board within the next 2 months.
Question. What is the status of laboratory testing of commercial
off-the-shelf explosive detection systems on air cargo?
How has the current technology performed on break bulk cargo?
When do you expect to issue a request for proposal for this
technology, and when will a pilot program begin at selected airports?
Answer. TSA, working with the air carriers, has screened cargo
using Explosives Detection System (EDS) technology currently deployed
at airports for checked baggage screening. TSA also issued a Market
Survey for vendors of currently available explosives detection
technology for break bulk cargo screening and is in the process of
conducting a lab evaluation and pilot test for the equipment that has
been offered by vendors for evaluation. The controlled study of
suitability of use of the currently available EDS technology is
scheduled to begin in June and will be completed by September 30. Once
that study is completed, TSA will determine to what extent the
technology is a feasible solution for some categories of cargo
screening. TSA is planning on issuing an RFP in the third quarter of
fiscal year 2004 to solicit additional vendors to participate in lab
evaluations and airport pilots for break-bulk cargo screening.
TSA has also issued an RFP for technology to screen containerized
cargo and U.S. mail. TSA is currently evaluating the proposals
submitted under that RFP and anticipates awarding grants for technology
development in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004.
Question. Can the Committee expect to receive by April 1, 2004, the
report directing TSA to provide options to inspect air cargo, the
associated costs, and timetable for pursuing technological solutions to
allow for the most efficient and targeted inspections of cargo being
carried on passenger aircraft?
Answer. TSA has prepared the report to Congress covering potential
technology solutions for cargo screening. Once review and coordination
is completed through DHS, the report will be delivered to Congress.
Question. What enhancements are being made to the current Known
Shipper program to guarantee the safety of air cargo?
Answer. Since 9/11, significant enhancements have been made to the
Known Shipper program. The requirements for new shippers applying for
Known Shipper status have been strengthened. In addition, methods for
confirming the authenticity of established Known Shippers have been
improved. In order to substantiate the legitimacy of known shippers
further, air carriers have been required to conduct site visits of
known shippers' facilities. Additionally, TSA is close to completing an
automated Known Shipper Database, which will allow TSA to vet
applicants to the program more thoroughly for legitimacy by comparing
data submitted by applicants against terrorist watch lists, other
government databases, and other publicly available information.
Eventually, TSA's Known Shipper Database will be one part of a larger
freight assessment database intended to target high risk cargo
shipments for additional screening.
Question. Would it currently be feasible to inspect 100 percent of
all air cargo being placed on aircrafts, as proposed by some in
Congress, and, in your opinion, how do you feel the flow of commerce
would be affected if air cargo was restricted from being placed on
aircraft unless 100 percent inspection of air cargo took place?
Answer. It is neither feasible nor optimal to physically inspect
100 percent of air cargo. The sheer volume of air cargo transported in
the United States and limitations on available technology render the
inspection of all air cargo infeasible without a significant negative
impact on the operating capabilities of the transportation
infrastructure of the United States and the national economy.
Limitations of technology and infrastructure make physical screening of
100 percent of air cargo impractical in terms of the flow-of-commerce.
This would also be an ineffective use of homeland resources.
TSA's goal is to ensure that all cargo is screened to determine
risk and that 100 percent of high-risk cargo is inspected. TSA is
aggressively pursuing next-generation technological solutions.
Meanwhile, TSA is taking steps to implement measures outlined in the
Air Cargo Strategic Plan and is doing everything possible to ensure
that cargo going on planes is secure, including requiring random
inspections of passenger air cargo, prohibiting the transport of cargo
on passenger aircraft by unknown shippers, and increasing the number of
TSA air cargo compliance inspectors.
Question. To date, what has been learned of the pilot program
conducted by the Transportation Security Administration, the United
States Postal Service, and air carriers to assess the feasibility of
using canine teams to screen certain classes of priority mail?
Answer. In early 2002, TSA, the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) and the
aviation industry agreed that additional security screening measures
needed to be identified and developed before resuming transport of mail
on passenger aircraft. We agreed that explosives detection
effectiveness, throughput capacity, and costs associated with the
screening were paramount considerations in identifying additional
measures. Protecting the privacy of mail was also a critical factor in
determining the least intrusive method to be used.
In June 2002, TSA conducted operational tests and evaluations
(OT&E) at six major airports with assistance from the USPS and airline
industry. The purpose of these tests was to determine and demonstrate
the ability of TSA-certified explosives detection canines to detect
explosives in packages that simulated Express Mail and Priority Mail
products and which were independently introduced into actual mail. We
also wanted to compare the throughput capabilities of both X-Ray and
canine resources under actual airline operational conditions.
The results were successful. In November 2002, TSA established
eleven major airport canine screening operations for priority mail
exceeding a certain threshold through partnership agreements with the
USPS and the airline industry. To date, over 17 billion packages have
been successfully screened by TSA-certified explosives detection canine
teams. Currently we are expanding our TSA Canine Pilot screening
efforts into various cargo and mail equipment configurations. TSA is
proceeding with OT&E in two phases:
--Phase I tested various explosive targets/distracters that were
introduced into multiple cargo configurations at six major
airports. All testing was conducted under actual cargo
operations and various weather conditions. The OT&E is complete
and the preliminary results are promising. The final report is
due at the end of April 2004.
--Phase II is tentatively scheduled to begin in May 2004 and to be
completed in July 2004. The tests will be conducted at six
major airports where we will expand explosives detection
investigation using multiple cargo airline containers, airline
ground support equipment and USPS rolling stock equipment
configurations under actual cargo/mail operations and
environments. Test results will be analyzed and recommendations
will be proposed to expand and streamline screening of cargo
and mail exceeding a certain threshold at other major airports
using TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams along
with other technologies for mail and cargo being transported on
passenger aircraft.
COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING SYSTEM (CAPPS II)
Question. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests a $25
million increase for the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening
System (CAPPS II) currently being tested by the Transportation Security
Administration. However, CAPPS II has been slow in developing because
of delays in obtaining passenger data needed for testing due to privacy
concerns by air carriers.
How is the Department working with the airlines to alleviate
privacy concerns in light of recent disclosures that air carriers have
shared passenger records with other government agencies and private
contractors without the passengers knowledge?
Answer. Comprehensive privacy training--in-person, online, and via
video, for all employees is underway and on track towards completion by
the end of calendar year 2004. TSA has already completed an initial
``privacy education week'' for all 55,000 employees that included live
and video privacy training. Many other components of DHS already have
systematic privacy education for employees--both upon hiring and
annually thereafter. The DHS Chief Privacy Officer, assisted by a
privacy compliance officer, has undertaken a DHS-wide review of
internal education programs to ensure that all employees are aware of
and tested on privacy practices and principles. The Privacy Office will
report on the progress of this program in its annual report to Congress
later this spring, and annually thereafter. Further, the DHS Chief
Privacy Officer proposed the implementation of rules in the public and
the private sector governing the use of private-sector data. The DHS
Privacy Office has already begun work with numerous private-sector
industry groups to facilitate that work. Organizations such as the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, the Council for Excellence in Government, the Air
Transport Association, the Markle Foundation, and others, are all
considering the evolution of public-private information partnerships.
Further, the Department is reviewing the need for a department-wide
Privacy Statement that would include principles for the use of private-
sector data. Again, many DHS components already have their own privacy
statements. We look forward to publishing a DHS Privacy Statement later
this summer.
Question. When will the Department issue a security directive to
mandate airlines to turn over passenger information to test the CAPPS
II system?
Answer. A timeframe for collection of passenger data for testing is
still under review.
Question. How can assurances be made to prevent identity theft by a
potential terrorist intent on using legitimate individuals information
to get around the CAPPS II background checks?
Answer. While no system can be 100 percent effective in preventing
identity theft, we believe that the CAPPS II system will represent a
quantum leap forward in efforts to defeat this growing problem. CAPPS
II will rely on an improved version of the best practices used by the
banking and credit industries to combat identity theft and fraud.
Where a legitimate identity is stolen, there is any number of
indicia, including errors or inconsistencies in the information as
transmitted by the thief, which could reveal the theft. Further, CAPPS
II will make use of a database containing up-to-date information about
stolen identities, which will further protect against terrorists who
use this means to conceal themselves.
Again, no system can be 100 percent effective, which is why CAPPS
II will be part of a layered ``system of systems'' involving physical
scrutiny, identity-based risk assessment, and other security
precautions on aircraft and at airports.
Question. Do you feel that such a funding increase is warranted for
CAPPS II with the delays that have been faced to date?
Answer. Yes, because we expect a new system to be put in place
during fiscal year 2005, which will require an increase in resources.
Question. The system currently operated by commercial airlines
since 1996, CAPPS I, continues to have problems with ``false
positives'' where passengers are erroneously delayed or prohibited from
boarding their scheduled flights due to having a similar name with
individuals that have been flagged by airlines as being a potential
terrorist.
With the problems faced in the current CAPPS I system, what method
of redress will be implemented with CAPPS II to resolve complaints of
passengers who believe they are erroneously selected for additional
security?
Answer. First, it is important to note that the ID authentication
portion of the CAPPS II program under development is expected to reduce
dramatically the percentage of individuals mistakenly flagged for
automatic additional security screening. In the instances where
individuals believe they have been mistakenly flagged under CAPPS II,
TSA is committed to providing a fair, comprehensive, and customer-
friendly redress process. As part of the development of the CAPPS II
system, we are designing a redress process to resolve complaints by
passengers who assert that they have been incorrectly prescreened or
consistently selected for enhanced screening. An essential part of the
redress process is the establishment of the CAPPS II Passenger
Advocate. The Passenger Advocate will act as a surrogate for passengers
who, for security classification reasons, will not have access to all
the information used by CAPPS II. When a passenger submits a complaint
and provides the Government with permission to observe and monitor the
results of the risk assessment during the complainant's future flights,
TSA will work with other government agencies and commercial data
providers to determine if the complaint is related to prescreening or
due to another part of the screening process (e.g., random selection),
and determine if selection by CAPPS II is related to data that may be
appropriately corrected. Passengers will be afforded the opportunity to
appeal these results to the TSA Privacy or Civil Rights Office and
then, if warranted, to the DHS Privacy or Civil Rights Office. The
redress program will be published and widely publicized before CAPPS II
is implemented.
Question. How does a passenger clear one's name if he or she
continues to be flagged as a flight risk?
Answer. Under the current system passengers may be required to
undergo secondary screening or be subject to other additional security
procedures due to random selection, CAPPS I selection, or the TSA-
administered No-Fly List. In addition, airlines may have their own
criteria for singling out travelers distinct and independent of the
current system. Since CAPPS I is administered by the airlines, TSA is
only in a position to address passengers flagged as a flight risk based
on the No-Fly List.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently has
established procedures within the Office of the Ombudsman to receive
and resolve complaints by any passenger denied boarding because the
individual's name appears on the No-Fly List. A traveler who contacts
TSA regarding possible discrepancies within the current system is asked
a series of questions to ascertain whether the issue is related to the
No-Fly List. If it is related to the No-Fly List, the traveler submits
a written description of the problems encountered and proof of
identity. Upon receipt, TSA will determine whether there is any threat
to aviation or national security that would prohibit the individual
from flying. TSA may conduct a background check in making this
determination. If the traveler is cleared to fly, air carriers and
other appropriate parties will be notified. The TSA Office of the
Ombudsman will forward a letter to notify the individual of the
results.
CAPPS II, if implemented, will improve this system considerably.
CAPPS II will reduce the number of persons requiring additional
screening by ending the use of outdated information and rules resident
in the CAPPS I system. Further, by using risk analysis and identity
authentication tools, CAPPS II should substantially reduce the number
of travelers automatically selected for secondary screening.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Question. The Congress made $154 million available for the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to conduct research and
development activities in an effort to improve current transportation
sector security technology. Of the funds provided for fiscal year 2004,
the Transportation Security Administration will target detection of
chemical, biological, or similar threats and devices that could be
released on or within an aircraft. With the testimony of Secretary
Ridge before this Committee last month that the Department does not
currently have the capability to screen for biological weapons that may
be carried on board a commercial airliner, significant concern is
warranted.
Will the Transportation Security Laboratory conduct separate
research on methods to detect chemical or biological weapons or will
this research be coordinated with the Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate and the work carried out currently within that
directorate's Biological Countermeasures Portfolio?
Answer. TSA will be working closely with the S&T Directorate to
identify technological solutions for screening to detect chemical and
biological weapons. The TSA's Transportation Security Laboratory will
play a critical role in identifying TSA's needs and specific
operational considerations that must be taken into account as potential
technologies are developed.
Question. The Transportation Security Laboratory previously focused
solely on the threat to civil aviation but has begun research and
development on threats against cars and trucks by explosives.
How will the Transportation Security Laboratory coordinate its
research on transportation targets with the Science and Technology
Directorate's High Explosives Portfolio?
Answer. TSA has a strong working relationship with the S&T
Directorate. We continue to meet with S&T personnel on a regular basis
to discuss ongoing projects to ensure no duplication of efforts and to
ensure projects undertaken are consistent with the overall goals of
DHS.
Question. Of the funds provided for fiscal year 2004, $45 million
has been made available to develop next-generation Explosive Detection
Systems (EDS) for the detection of explosive materials in passengers
checked baggage.
How has the research and development progressed to date to enhance
the performance of existing Explosive Detection Systems that are
currently deployed at airports and also with manufacturers of new
technologies and when will these new technologies be ready for
deployment in our nation's airports?
Answer. Advances including reductions in false alarms, improved
machine reliability, and reductions in operational expenditures have
sufficiently matured where they will begin to be deployed by no later
than next year based on currently-planned equipment deployments.
capability, increased throughput, and reduce the size of EDS solutions.
Some equipment will be best suited for smaller airports or checkpoints,
while other equipment is being designed for in-line deployment.
New technologies will be developed under TSA's Manhattan II
project. TSA will be posting a request for information in the third
quarter of fiscal year 2004. While TSA will explore the potential of
all relevant technologies, we expect promising technologies to include
the demonstration of novel x-ray sources, different geometry, and the
development of multi-spectral detector arrays. Combined technologies
may play a role, and nanotechnology may provide new elements for
detection strategies.
Question. Are there any new threat analyses that warrant a need to
expand the criteria for certifying Explosive Detection Systems that are
not currently included in the screening of passenger baggage?
Answer. TSA continually evaluates its certification criteria for
explosives detection technology to ensure both the types and amounts of
explosives that the technology can identify are reflective of the
threat. TSA has efforts underway to expand the types of explosives that
can be identified, while also reducing the amount of explosives that
would automatically trigger detection.
Question. The Presidents fiscal year 2005 budget proposes to
consolidate all research department-wide into the Science and
Technology Directorate, except for the research carried out by the
Transportation Security Administration's Laboratory. With the concern
of carrying out research in a parallel manner do you believe it would
best serve the Department if the Transportation Security Administration
research and development activities were consolidated with the Science
and Technology Directorate research activities?
Answer. TSA believes that the constant demand for improved
technology performance and the very specific detection capabilities
needed to support TSA's mission requires that TSA have a highly
specialized applied R&D program. As new weapons are developed, TSA must
be able to meet its immediate operational needs by refining and
enhancing current technologies to counter those threats and by
identifying gaps to ensure R&D is well focused on continually improving
capabilities. TSA must also be able to leverage its human factors
efforts to identify methodologies, training and operational tools, and
develop technology that will foster improved performance. TSA will
continue to coordinate closely with the S&T to ensure that we can adapt
to and address changing threats without duplicating S&T's efforts.
Question. In the search for new technology to detect and prevent
weapons and explosives from being carried onto airliners, the
Transportation Security Administration is evaluating technologies to
make the screening process more effective and less time-consuming. How
has the research and piloting of new passenger checkpoint technologies,
such as passenger body scanners and explosive trace detection portals,
made promising advances in detecting explosives and/or biological or
chemical weapons from being carried onto commercial airliners and when
do you believe the piloting of these new technologies at airports will
take place?
Answer. TSA has developed a roadmap for the operational testing and
evaluation of checkpoint technologies to improve TSA's ability to
detect explosives being carried on persons and in carry-on baggage.
Highlights from our Roadmap are as follows:
--Explosives Detection Portals.--Continued development and pilot
deployment in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Document Scanners.--Continued development and pilot deployment in
the 2nd or 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Cast & Prosthetic Device Scanners.--Continued deployment and pilot
deployment in the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for carry-on baggage.--Define
performance metrics and solicit vendor participation 2nd or 3rd
quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Explosives Detection Technology for screening liquids.--Establish
the performance metrics for this technology and solicit vendors
of existing technologies to participate in an evaluation
against this qualification standard.
LETTERS OF INTENT (LOI) FOR EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEM (EDS)
INSTALLATION
Question. The Congress has made available over $1.5 billion for the
installation of explosive detection systems and the Letter of Intent
(LOI) program to safeguard commercial airliners from a terrorist attack
by explosives.
What savings can be achieved on an airport-by-airport basis in
personnel costs by installing Explosive Detection Systems ``in-line''
as opposed to terminal lobby protocols?
Answer. The degree of costs vs. benefits will vary from airport to
airport because of differing airport configurations. TSA is in the
process of refining its return on investment analysis model at the same
time that it is revising its staffing model. TSA will continue to
assess the extent to which in-line systems benefit operational
efficiency.
Question. With the current cost share in place (90/10) and the
President's budget request of $250 million, how many Letters of Intent
does TSA intend on signing in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. TSA currently expects that all resources will be utilized
for currently-signed LOIs as well as other EDS integration activities.
However, TSA will assess the need for additional in-line integration
and resource availability on an ongoing basis.
Question. How much of the $1.5 billion made available by Congress
remains available for terminal modifications and what is the cost
estimate to meet the necessary terminal modifications required at all
commercial service airports across the country?
Answer. The $1.488 billion appropriated in fiscal years 2002, 2003
and 2004 has been used for the following requirements:
--$828 million to cover facility modification and equipment
installation costs to meet the Congressional mandate to provide
for and conduct 100 percent screening of all checked baggage
for explosives at over 440 airports,
--$259.4 million in support of the first eight completed Letters of
Intent (LOIs), including the 2 LOIs issued on February 15,
2004,
--$20 million for contract support to complete various tasks
associated with the installation of explosives detection
systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD) equipment,
including site acceptance testing of EDS and ETD equipment at
the time of delivery from the vendors and once installed at an
airport, engineering and installation services from equipment
vendors, and administrative and technical support work,
--$30 million to individual airports for completion of projects
associated with EDS/ETD equipment installation, including HVAC
installation, demolition work, and electrical work,
--The remaining $350 million of the fiscal year 2004 installation
funding will be allocated for direct contracts between TSA and
individual airports for in-line EDS installations, with a
portion to be carried over into fiscal year 2005 to use along
with fiscal year 2005 funding to make fiscal year 2005 LOI
reimbursement payments for the 8 existing LOIs.
Question. Will the agency fund terminal modifications at airports
outside of the LOI process?
Answer. At the current funding level, and applying the 75/25 cost
share formula, TSA can support the following:
--Reimbursement payments for the 8 existing LOIs;
--Installation and multiplexing of EDS technology at the LOI
airports; and
--EDS and ETD non-LOI installation work needed at 12 airports to
provide equipment capacity. The airports selected in this
category have a need for increased equipment capacity because
of increased passenger loads and airport terminal expansion
projects to support increases to air carrier service.
Question. With so many needs and limited resources, how is the
agency prioritizing on an airport-by-airport basis?
Answer. TSA continues to use its prioritization factors to
determine where limited resources will be allocated. TSA's first
priority is to achieve compliance with the 100 percent electronic
screening requirement at all airports. Simultaneously, TSA is working
with airports that will not be able to maintain compliance with the 100
percent electronic screening requirement because of increased passenger
loads, increased and/or additional air carrier service, and/or airport
terminal modifications and expansions.
PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENERS
Question. In a report issued last month reviewing the
Transportation Security Administration's process for conducting
background checks on Federal passenger and baggage screeners, the
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security made a list of
twelve recommendations to the Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration to improve its management of the background
check process for screeners. What procedures have been put into place
to guarantee all passenger and baggage screeners that are currently
employed and also individuals that are applying for a screening
position have a full background check?
Answer. TSA is aggressively implementing the Inspector General's
(OIG) twelve recommendations. A significant part of our actions have
been focused on ensuring that all screeners have had the necessary
background checks and that all screener candidates receive a background
check before they are hired.
Processes are in place to ensure that all screener candidates are
subject to a fingerprint based criminal history check that is
successfully adjudicated BEFORE they are hired. In addition, prior to
hiring, all screener candidates undergo a commercially conducted pre-
screen investigation that checks criminal history (based on an FBI
fingerprint check and a check of local criminal histories), credit
history and specific watch lists (TSA's No Fly and Selectee Lists).
Successful adjudication of both the fingerprint check and the
commercially conducted pre-screen investigation are absolute
requirements before hiring takes place. After hiring, all new screeners
undergo an Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Access National Agency
Check and Inquiries (ANACI) investigation.
This combination of background checks, both before and after
hiring, provides the best available process to ensure security while
maintaining a fully staffed screener workforce. The pre-employment
checks (the fingerprint check and the commercially conducted pre-screen
background check) take approximately 2-3 weeks to complete, thus
allowing timely hiring of screeners. The OPM-conducted ANACI is more
thorough but takes several months to complete; the ANACI provides a
more in-depth review of a person's background which further mitigates
security risk. TSA undertook a major effort in Q3/Q4 of fiscal year
2003 to complete and adjudicate the required background checks
(fingerprint, pre-employment and OPM ANACI) on all currently employed
TSA screeners. Since then, all newly hired screeners have been subject
to the processes and checks described above for screener candidates.
Question. The Transportation Security Administration is currently
in the process of an annual recertification of airport screeners to be
completed by the end of this month.
Can you explain the testing standards of the recertification
process and what contractor oversight TSA is performing to ensure
adequate testing the screeners for recertification is being carried
out?
Answer. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)
requires that TSA shall conduct an annual proficiency review of each
individual assigned screening duties.
TSA completed the 2003/2004 re-certification process in March 2004
for both Federal and private contract screeners. TSA is meeting this
requirement through a national re-certification program for
Transportation Security Screeners, Leads, and Supervisors. For the
2003/2004 re-certification cycle (October 2003 through March 2004), the
program consisted of a series of certification modules for either the
Passenger/Dual Function (Passenger and Checked Baggage) or Checked
Baggage screening function. The modules used were:
Passenger/Dual Function Screeners:
--Module 1.--Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Job Knowledge Test,
(Screener and Supervisor versions)
--Module 2.--X-Ray Image Interpretation Test, and
--Module 3.--Practical Skills Demonstration
Checked Baggage Screeners:
--Module 1.--SOP Job Knowledge Test (Screener and Supervisor
versions) and
--Module 3.--Practical Skills Demonstration
In addition, a screener must have a ``meets standards'' for his/her
annual Performance Rating by the FSD at his/her airport to be re-
certified.
The national re-certification program's objective is to ensure that
screeners demonstrated proficiency in the knowledge and skills that are
critical to a screener's ability to provide world class security and
world class service. As part of the development of this program, TSA
employed a rigorous technical process to develop the assessment content
and set proficiency requirements (i.e., passing scores) for each
module. TSA implemented a valid and fair assessment process with the
appropriate standards in place to certify that its screener workforce
is proficient and capable of providing the security and service
expected.
Modules 1 and 2 were administered by local FSD staff (in most cases
the airport Training Coordinator). Our training contractor, Lockheed
Martin, administered Module 3. TSA government employees conducted
quality assurance audits of the contractor throughout the re-
certification process and observed approximately 16 percent of the
airports re-certification practical demonstrations.
Question. Are the screeners being tested on TSA standard operating
procedures and what is the pass/fail rate of the screeners that have
been tested so far?
Answer. Yes, screeners were tested on the standard operating
procedures in Modules 1 (SOP knowledge test) and Module 3 (Practical
skills demonstration). Less than 1 percent of the screeners failed
fiscal year 2003-04 re-certification testing.
Question. Congress limited the number of screeners employed by TSA
to 45,000 full time-equivalents (FTE). Currently TSA is under that
threshold and intends on hiring more screeners to comply with the
45,000 cap. Do you believe that the 45,000 FTE limitation gives TSA an
adequate number of screeners to carry out passenger and baggage
screening?
Answer. TSA is managing to keep the workforce under the 45,000 FTE
level by creating a more flexible workforce. TSA is better coordinating
airline schedules and passenger load with staffing needs, is increasing
the proportion of part-time to full-time screeners, and is
strategically using its mobile national screener force to meet seasonal
fluctuations in workload. TSA expects to have a part-time screener
workforce of close to 20 percent by the end of the current fiscal year.
Part-time screeners create additional operational flexibility when
scheduling screeners to satisfy varying levels of demand. As a result
of reducing excess capacity at periods of lower demand, TSA is seeking
to make more FTEs available to the system as a whole during peak
periods.
Question. Is the 10 minute passenger screening standard wait-time
still in place or have new standards been implemented?
Answer. TSA is committed to providing world-class customer service
while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce by keeping
our nation's transportation systems secure. We have done research,
including focus groups, on customer satisfaction and devised a more
robust methodology to assess the passenger experience, focusing not
just on wait times, but on the totality of customers' interactions with
the full range of screening processes. We have found that wait time is
not a significant driver of the public's satisfaction with and
confidence in TSA. In fact, most respondents in focus groups said that
they would rather wait longer in line if security was better, and it is
more important that the security process be thorough, attentive, and
efficient than merely fast.
In light of feedback from our research, TSA has developed a
Customer Satisfaction Index for Aviation Operations (CSI-A). The CSI-A
is comprised of results from passenger surveys conducted at airports,
along with national poll results and complaints and compliments
received by TSA. Passenger survey results display a high level of
customer satisfaction, as 92 percent of the more than 15,000
respondents indicated they were satisfied'' or ``very satisfied'' with
their overall experience. National polls conducted by the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics bi-monthly support these findings of customer
satisfaction. Finally, airports show a downward trend in complaints
relative to compliments.
Nonetheless, TSA is committed to measuring wait time information at
Federalized passenger checkpoints. In 2002, initial wait time data was
collected at all 82 Category X and I airports (covering approximately
95 percent of annual originating enplanements). Wait times at the
remaining airports are predicted to be minimal, so we collect data from
a sampling of Category II, III and IV airports in order to identify
trends. We have found that most airports do meet the 10-minute standard
most of the time. TSA will continue to collect wait time data at all
major and a sampling of smaller airports to establish a good
understanding of wait times, as well as how our service and staffing
models impact wait times. We will continue to monitor wait times
system-wide--by collecting data at all major airports for a 2-week
period 3 times per year--to ensure that the same patterns hold over
time.
REGISTERED TRAVELER PROGRAM
Question. Congress provided $5 million for fiscal year 2004 for the
Registered Traveler program to conduct a pilot program at selected
domestic airports to expedite the security screening and check-in of
passengers that voluntarily submit their personal data for a background
check in order to be enrolled into a passenger registration and
identity verification system.
What has been accomplished to date on the Registered Traveler
program with the funds provided by Congress? What do you intend to
accomplish in the pilot program by the end of fiscal year 2004, and
what enhancements do you propose with the requested increase of $10
million for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. Over the past year, TSA, in coordination with both internal
and external stakeholders has developed a strategy for conducting a
limited number of Registered Traveler (RT) Pilots in 2004 that will
allow the Department to evaluate the merits of the program without
disrupting airport operations or compromising security.
TSA intends to conduct RT Pilots at a limited number of airports
beginning in June 2004. The Pilot programs will assess improvements in
security and enhancements in customer service for passengers. The
pilots will last approximately 90 days. Results of these pilots will be
analyzed beginning in October 2004 to determine the program's effect on
security and service.
Upon conclusion of the pilots, a determination will be made
regarding best practices and necessary enhancements required for a
larger implementation of the program. The fiscal year 2005 budget
request includes $15 million for additional start-up costs, such as IT
infrastructure and staffing for this program. TSA anticipates that
future operational program costs for the Registered Traveler Program
would be covered by fees incurred by participants. Thus, the Registered
Traveler Program would be self-funded.
Question. Will biometrics be the cornerstone of the Registered
Traveler program or will is it be just one component being considered
as the pilot program takes place?
Answer. During the RT Pilot, TSA will assess biometric technology
solutions to enhance identity verification capabilities at the
passenger security checkpoint. These biometric tools will be tested in
conjunction with business processes, including potential
reconfiguration of lines and lanes, to develop a secure and expedited
travel experience.
Question. Do you see Registered Traveler as a precursory test for
CAPPS II?
Answer. The Registered Traveler Pilot Program is purely voluntary
and will offer a secure and expedited travel experience for those who
wish to participate. In addition to submitting personal data, RT
participants will also be requested to submit biometrics (fingerprint
and iris scan) that will not be components of the CAPPS II program.
However, depending on the nature and structure of any deployable RT and
CAPPS II program, there may be clear functional synergies and
overlapping capability. TSA will work to ensure that these are
identified and assessed.
Question. In what airports will the pilot programs take place and
how will travelers voluntarily sign up?
Answer. Final decisions regarding specific locations for the
Registered Traveler Pilot have not yet been made. TSA envisions that
voluntary enrollment for the RT Pilot will likely take place at the
designated airport locations.
transportation security administration fiscal year 2004 shortfall
Question. Does TSA have adequate funding for fiscal year 2004 or is
it facing funding shortfalls in certain programs and activities?
Answer. The fiscal year Homeland Security Appropriations Act was
signed into law on October 1, 2003. In addition to these new
appropriations, TSA has carryover funding from fiscal year 2003 that is
available to be spent in fiscal year 2004. A spend plan has been
developed for fiscal year 2004 that allows TSA to meet its requirements
within available funding.
Question. What specific funding shortfalls do you anticipate for
fiscal year 2004?
Answer. TSA anticipates that it will meet its fiscal year 2004
requirements within available funding.
Question. How do you intend to address the funding shortfall
problems (better management and fiscal controls, a proposed
reprogramming of TSA funds, or other funds provided to the Department
from other programs and activities)?
Answer. TSA has been working to improve its fiscal controls and
management of the agency as it transforms itself from a start-up agency
to a maturing organization. In fiscal year 2004, TSA is requesting
$154.6 million in funding to be shifted among programs to meet emerging
requirements.
Question. If a reprogramming of funds will be necessary, when can
we expect that proposal to be submitted to the Committee?
Answer. The reprogramming was transmitted to Congress on April 23,
2004.
Question. Will an amendment to the fiscal year 2005 budget request,
as submitted, be required in light of these shortfalls?
Answer. The Administration does not intend to submit a fiscal year
2005 budget amendment for TSA.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
TSA: SECURITY CONTRACT
Question. We recently received notification of a security contract
for TSA facilities in Northern Virginia that totals a minimum of $5.3
million a year for 5 years. That appears to be an extremely large
amount of money to provide staff and equipment to screen people and
their belongings as they enter the two facilities.
Please justify for the record the number of security employees and
types of equipment that your agency will be obtaining under this
contract. If the response needs to be classified, please provide the
subcommittee with an appropriately classified response.
Answer. The contract security guard force at TSA Headquarters at
Pentagon City and the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC)
(formerly TSCC) in Chantilly, Virginia is responsible for protection of
the facilities and for processing the entry of employees and visitors
to both locations. The decision was made pursuant to guidance received
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and also to comply with
the guidelines established by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1995,
entitled ``Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities.'' Security
surveys and risk/threat assessments for both facilities confirmed the
level of security required. Both facilities house Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIF) within their space, as well
as other sensitive critical assets. Director of Central Intelligence
Directive (DCID) 6/9, effective 18 November 2002, requires an immediate
security response to an alarm in this facility. (DCID 6/9; 3.1.2.1)
Additional factors, including the fact that both facilities are
operational 24 hours a day, 7 days per week and the ongoing threat
environment, impacted the decision.
The TSA Protective Security contract was solicited on a competitive
basis among eight vendors. This acquisition was awarded utilizing those
contractors from the General Service Administration's Federal Supply
Schedule 98 (Law Enforcement--Security Facilities Management). Under
these guidelines, a 5-year firm-fixed labor hour Blanket Purchase
Agreement (BPA) was awarded. Each year, funded individual task orders
will be written and ordered against the BPA. After conducting market
research on the per hour cost for Security Guards in the DC Metro area,
it was determined that a single contract with one security guard
company managed by TSA would be the most cost effective. Among the
eight vendors bidding for the contract, the one chosen was the less
expensive of the two most qualified vendors, and the cost was well
within the Washington area average.
Under this contract, the security guard company will be providing
personnel with weapons and uniforms, obtaining clearances for the
guards, supplying associated security equipment and training for its
personnel, and providing on-site supervision. Security personnel
employed by the contractor to protect TSA's facilities are U.S.
citizens, and many of them are armed or possess Secret Security
Clearance, or both. The total man-hours worked by the Security Guard
personnel at both TSA Headquarters and TSCC is approximately 4,000
hours per week. Besides the screening of visitors and their belongings
prior to entering TSA facilities, duties include providing escort for
contractors, security for VIP visits, responding to alarms, patrolling
the grounds and staffing the control center at both locations for 24
hours, 7 days a week.
EXPLOSIVES DETECTION FOR PASSENGERS
Question. In December, 2001, Richard Reid was prevented from
exploding his improvised ``shoe bomb'' due to quick action on the part
of the passengers and crew of an American Airlines flight from Paris to
Miami. In the intervening 2 years, we appear to have increased the
screening of checked baggage for explosives, but there appears to be
little effort being made to enhance the screening of passengers
themselves for hidden explosives.
The technology and equipment exist to non-intrusively screen
passengers for explosives. What is TSA doing to address this potential
threat? How much of your fiscal year 2005 budget request is devoted to
enhanced screening of passengers for explosives? Of the requested
funds, how much are estimated to be used to procure the latest proven
explosive detection portals?
Answer. TSA has developed a roadmap for the operational testing and
evaluation of checkpoint passenger screening technologies to improve
TSA's ability to detect explosives being carried on persons and in
carry-on baggage. Below is a list of the technologies to be pilot
tested at airports and the timeframe in which that testing will be
accomplished:
--Explosives Detection Portals--continue development and pilot
deployment in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Document Scanners--continue development and pilot deployment in the
2nd or 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Cast & Prosthetic Device Scanners--continue development and pilot
deployment in the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2004;
--Explosives detection systems (EDS) for carry-on baggage--define
performance metrics and solicit vendor participation 2nd or 3rd
quarter of fiscal year 2004; and
--Explosives detection technology for screening liquids--establish
the performance metrics for this technology and solicit vendors
of existing technologies to participate in an evaluation
against this qualification standard.
AIRPORT FUNDING FORMULA CHANGES
Question. President Bush signed the FAA Reauthorization bill into
law in December, 2003. That law mandates that the Federal government,
through the TSA, cover 90 percent of the costs associated with airport
security improvements including the installation of explosive detection
devices. Less than two months later, however, the President submitted a
budget to the Congress that would increase the burden on airports for
meeting Federal security mandates. He proposes to change the amount of
the Federally-covered expenses from 90 percent to only 75 percent. This
appears to be yet another example of this Administration passing the
security buck to someone else. In this case it is the airports and
local taxpayer-funded airports. In other cases it is seaports or some
other transportation entity.
How can the Administration justify agreeing to fund 90 percent of
airport security costs in December and then provide funding for only 75
percent of the costs in February?
Answer. The 75 percent Federal funding level has been a long
established cost share formula with the aviation industry. Because
industry shares security responsibilities with the Federal Government,
and because airports and airlines receive efficiency benefits from in-
line systems, it is fair that they also share financial
responsibilities at this level for installation of systems that will
ease passenger flow and provide increased security levels at airports.
Additionally at the 75 percent cost share related, TSA can use it
allocated funding to support current LOI airports as well as those
airports that have not received LOI but were additional equipment
capacity is needed to accommodate increased passenger loads.
CARGO AND CONTAINER SECURITY
Question. Two years ago, Congress created and funded Operation Safe
Commerce. Late last year, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
announced a ``smart container'' initiative. And just 2 weeks ago, the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency issued a
solicitation for inexpensive container security technologies and
offered up to $2 million towards that effort. It appears to me that
there are too many cooks in this particular homeland security kitchen.
Who is in charge of the security of shipping containers? Which agency
is setting the standards and which one or ones is responsible for
implementing them?
Similarly, in regard to Operation Safe Commerce, what is TSA doing
to set shipping security standards and how is TSA working with CBP in
this effort? Once the various OSC shipping tests are completed and the
reports submitted, who will be in charge of implementing the ``lessons
learned'' and ensuring that they are implemented? Do you envision the
establishment of national standards in this regard?
Answer. Secretary Ridge delegated authority and responsibility for
implementing the Maritime Transportation Security Act's Secure Systems
of Transportation (SST) and performance standard sections to BTS.
In order to ensure that international and domestic approaches to
cargo security are coordinated and policies are consistent, under BTS
leadership, a working group consisting of TSA, CBP, USCG and S&T
personnel has been meeting regularly, and is conducting a gap analysis
on existing cargo security and intelligence programs, coordinate
existing containerized cargo security programs and R&D efforts to
identify synergies and coordinate existing DHS component activities in
the containerized cargo security environment.
The goal of this effort is to ensure effective cargo security from
point of origin to final destination. We will achieve this goal by
leveraging existing legacy programs like CSI and CTPAT, adding
enhancements, and setting minimum performance standards to close
identified vulnerabilities. We will also apply lessons learned from
Operation Safe Commerce and the SST interagency working group with CBP
and USCG.
AIRLINE PASSENGER SCREENING: WAIT TIMES
Question. Last summer, my staff asked TSA personnel for information
regarding wait times experienced by airline passengers at various
airports. We are concerned that the cap on passenger screeners might be
resulting in an increase in the time spent by passengers waiting in
lines to be screened. My staff has renewed that request at regular
intervals, and yet no information has been provided to them.
Last week, my staff went to Seattle on subcommittee business and
had meetings with TSA personnel at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport. They
were informed that records are kept every half hour of wait times at
the various checkpoints at SeaTac and that average wait time
information is submitted to TSA headquarters. Why have your
representatives been unable to provide my staff with the requested
information? When can we expect to receive this information?
Answer. Each month, TSA instructs approximately 26 U.S. airports to
conduct a wait time study covering two consecutive weeks. These
airports are selected according to geographical and size categories in
order to allow TSA to extrapolate across the full range of airport
diversity. All Category X and I airports--as well as select Category
II, III and IV airports--will be chosen to collect data at least three
times each over the course of the year. The monthly airport selections
are balanced in order to provide consistent data for headquarters
analysis.
In March, the average wait time for the sample of 26 airports was
3.1 minutes, with an average of 10.4 minutes at peak time. At Seattle,
average wait time was 4.2 minutes and the average at peak time was 16.5
minutes.
RAIL SECURITY
Question. Current events such as the subway and rail bombings in
Moscow and Madrid prove the point that we need an agency solely focused
on protecting all modes of transportation. Congress created the
Transportation Security Administration for just that purpose. In light
of the Madrid bombings, has TSA developed a broader-based plan that
would address the known threat to mass transit and rail security? Did
TSA request additional fiscal year 2004 funds from the Department to
assist in implementing this plan?
Answer. In the months preceding the Madrid and Moscow incidents,
DHS, in close coordination with our partners at the Department of
Transportation (DOT), State and local governments, and transit and rail
operators, took a number of steps to address vulnerabilities in the
rail and transit systems to improve our security posture against such
attacks. These efforts spanned the spectrum of security, from
information sharing and awareness through prevention, response and
recovery to a potential terrorist rail attack in the United States.
On March 22, 2004, Secretary Ridge announced additional measures to
strengthen security for our rail and transit systems. Most of these
measures were low or no-cost items and procedures funded out of
existing agency resources. DHS will build on many of the security
measures recommended during the past 2 years for implementation to mass
transit and passenger rail authorities by DHS, the Federal Transit
Administration and the Federal Railroad Administration.
Based on assessments from law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, specific threat assessments and analysis, and the use of risk
management principles, TSA continually evaluates, prioritizes and
targets the use of available funds to reduce or eliminate the security
threat.
Question. What is TSA doing to more systemically address these
threats rather than just reacting to them? Is TSA coordinating efforts
in this regard with other agencies in the Department of Homeland
Security?
Answer. Ensuring that our nation's transportation systems are
secure must be accomplished through effective partnering between
appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry entities. We
have consistently held that that this responsibility must involve the
coordination of appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry
partners, many of whom were already in the business of providing
security for their particular piece of the transportation puzzle. TSA's
main charge, both under ATSA and now as part of the DHS family, is to
help coordinate these efforts under the guidance of the Secretary and
the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, identifying
gaps and working with appropriate partners to ensure that existing
security gaps are filled. However, other entities within both the
Department and other agencies in the Federal Government have devoted
considerable resources to securing modes of transportation other than
aviation, including the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection for port, maritime and cargo security, the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate for critical
infrastructures; the Office of Domestic Preparedness in transit
security grants; DOT modal administrations; and State, local and
private sector partners.
TSA's efforts in non-aviation security over the past 2 years have
focused on greater information sharing between industry and all levels
of government, assessing vulnerabilities in non-aviation sectors to
develop new security measures and plans, increasing training and public
awareness campaigns, and providing greater assistance and funding for
non-aviation security activities. In partnership with other component
agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and in
coordination with the Department of Transportation (DOT), State, local
and private sector partners, TSA will continue to leverage existing
security initiatives, coordinate the development of national
performance-based security standards and guidance; identify areas where
regulations may be necessary to improve the security of passengers,
cargo, conveyances, transportation facilities and infrastructures; and
identify areas where better compliance with established regulations and
policies can be achieved. TSA will work with DHS components, modal
administrators within DOT, and its government and industry stakeholders
to continue these efforts, establish best practices, develop security
plans, assess security vulnerabilities, and identify needed security
enhancements.
CANINE TEAMS
Question. You mention in your testimony that you request $17
million in fiscal year 2005 to support 354 canine teams. Your prepared
statement on this funding seems solely focused on aviation security as
it relates to K-9 teams. Yesterday, as part of his rail and transit
security initiative, Secretary Ridge said that the Department will
develop a rapid deployment Mass Transit K-9 program by using existing
Homeland Security explosive K-9 resources.
Once again, it appears that the Department is robbing Peter to pay
Paul. It appears that you will be pulling K-9 teams away from airports
and the protection of Federal buildings and using them for mass
transit, thus degrading security in one transportation mode to begin
beefing up security in another mode. By refusing to seek additional
funds to address this very real threat it truly calls into question the
seriousness of this Administration in its effort to secure the
homeland.
Does the initiative announced yesterday mean that you will be
pulling existing K-9 teams away from protecting airports and Federal
buildings to use them for rail and mass transit security? Did TSA
request funds for the creation of new teams this fiscal year to address
the threat to mass transit? Do you anticipate receiving any new
resources this year for the creation of canine teams dedicated,
trained, and certified for the rail environment? If the Department
plans on waiting until the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
appropriations bill is signed into law, I would caution that
intelligence indicates the threat is imminent and the Department's
track record on obligating grant funding is spotty at best.
Answer. DHS will establish Rapid Response Teams (i.e., K-9 units)
for rail and mass transit security through the Federal Protective
Service (FPS). FPS will utilize dog team reasources from across the
government. TSA will not be pulling canine units out of the airports
unless, potentially, this is part of an action to respond to specific
incidents or intelligence which warrants use of a Rapid Response Team.
TSA will use its existing resources to provide dog team training
assistance to transit operators
THE THREAT FROM HAMAS
Question. On March 22, the so-called spiritual leader of Hamas,
Sheik Ahmed Yassin, was assassinated in an attack authorized by Israeli
Prime Minister Sharon. It was an attack about which the U.S. government
apparently had no advance knowledge. However, as a result of the
attack, Hamas has stated that it blames the United States and there are
some reports that it plans to bring its reign of terror to U.S. shores.
Not only was Sheik Yassin a spiritual leader, he was also known as
the ``father of the suicide bomber''. I am deeply troubled that the
``eye for an eye'' tactics of daily life in the Middle East may soon
arrive here at home. We have already witnessed backpacks exploding and
killing over 200 in Madrid. Based on the Secretary's statement of March
22 and the threat advisories we have seen, I fear that it will not be
long before suicide bombers begin detonating themselves in our public
places, our sidewalk cafes, our buses, or our subways.
What is the Department doing to prevent these types of suicide
attacks in this country? Are there plans prepared to address this
looming threat? Or does the Department just plan to wait for the
inevitable attack and then respond?
Answer. Suicide bombers usually look for crowded public locations
(shops, restaurants, clubs, etc.) to detonate themselves for the sole
purpose of killing and injuring as many people as possible. Public
transportation targets in other parts of the world have been subjected
to suicide bomber attacks, especially busses. Stopping suicide bombers
intent on detonating themselves on or near a bus, ferry or other mass
transit venue or terminal requires at minimum a multi-pronged approach
that includes: (1) good intelligence and law enforcement response; (2)
training operators to recognize the behavior patterns and mannerisms of
suicide bombers; (3) and educating passengers to do the same. We also
should explore physical inspection alternatives, as we are doing on a
test basis in New Carrollton, Maryland. It is not clear, however, if
this alternative is viable or effective.
TWIC
Question. The MTSA requires the creation of a national
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). Truck drivers,
airport employees and all other individuals requiring access to secure
transportation areas in the performance of their duties will be
required to carry this credential. Please provide the Administration's
views on the wisdom of using a centralized and existing card production
facility for the production of the TWIC cards, including an evaluation
of the associated costs and benefits. What is the status of the
prototype project?
Answer. During the development process, data, technical information
and lessons learned were gathered from a wide range of sources
including industry stakeholders and other Federal credentialing
projects. The RFP for the TWIC Prototype Phase will be released in the
immediate future. The proposed plan leverages the stakeholder
relationships established over the past 24 months and during the
Technology Evaluation Phase, as well as a partnership with the State of
Florida for the network of deep-water ports. The goal of the prototype
is to evaluate the full range of TWIC business processes within a
representative operational environment. The plan includes facilities
and workers from all transportation modes and is focused in three
regions, Philadelphia-Wilmington, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and the
Florida ports.
Various card production options were evaluated within the context
of system requirements. Centralized card production using existing
Federal card production facilities that meet all of the system
requirements was determined to be the most cost effective solution for
the prototype phase. Key factors in the evaluation included: physical
security and controlled access to the production process; secure supply
chains for card stock and special security features (e.g. holograms,
special inks, secret keys); standardization of training; and, economies
of scale with high capacity production machines. Centralized card
production will be further evaluated during the prototype, and the
final evaluation report will include a detailed analysis on all card
production options and a recommendation for DHS decision.
REGISTERED TRAVELER
Question. Last week TSA announced its plan to begin a registered
traveler program in which frequent airline travelers would pay a fee
and be provided expedited processing at airport security checkpoints.
Your budget request includes $15 million to ``expand contract support
and technology resources''. Please describe the planned registration
fee and the estimates of the total cost of the program. How much would
the fee need to be increased to cover the proposed $15 million proposed
expansion. How can the full cost of the program be recovered from
business travelers and others who voluntarily join the program as
opposed to passing on some of the costs associated with the program to
all taxpayers?
Answer. TSA intends to conduct RT pilots projects at a limited
number of U.S. airports beginning in June 2004. The pilot programs will
assess improvements in security and enhancements in customer service
for participating passengers. The pilots will last approximately 90
days. Results of these pilots will be analyzed beginning in October
2004 to determine the program's effect on security and service.
During the RT pilot, TSA will test technology in the form of
biometric tools to enhance identity verification at the passenger
screening checkpoint, in conjunction with business processes, including
potential reconfiguration of select checkpoint lines and lanes. TSA
will be testing a range of technology and operational variables. The RT
pilots will monitor and assess possibilities for a secure and expedited
travel experience for those who volunteer to participate in the
program. The number of participants in the RT pilots will be capped at
10,000 spread across a small number of airport locations. It is
anticipated that this small RT pilot test will not have a detrimental
effect on either those who do not volunteer or on the screener
workforce. Upon conclusion of the pilots, determinations will be made
regarding best practices and necessary enhancements required for a
larger implementation of the program.
The cost of the RT pilot programs will be funded by $5 million
earmarked for the Registered Traveler program in the Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-90). Contrary to what was
reported in the media, TSA is not planning to charge a fee to
passengers who participate in the 90-day RT pilots.
TSA will await the results of the pilot program prior to making any
decisions regarding the implementation of a Registered Traveler program
in fiscal year 2005, including what costs would be incurred by those
passengers who wish to participate in the voluntary program. TSA
anticipates that future operational program costs for the Registered
Traveler Program would be covered by fees incurred by participants.
Thus, the Registered Traveler Program would become self-funded.
HOLLYWOOD JOB
Question. I understand that TSA is looking to hire an individual to
serve as a liaison to the Hollywood film and television industry and
that the person would be paid at the GS-15 level. How many TSA
screeners could be hired with the $136,000 that the GS-15 Hollywood
liaison will be paid?
Answer. Public Affairs utilized an open, funded position from one
of its bureau offices to create the Director of Entertainment Liaison
position to represent the entire Department. By taking an FTE from an
office where reorganization had created efficiencies in workload, the
position utilized those efficiencies to create a position with value
added to the Department.
The Entertainment Liaison Office is a necessary addition to the
Office of Public Affairs. This person will work with television and
movie producers to ensure that they do not take ``editorial license''
with Homeland Security matters that could provide the public with false
impressions or inaccurate information. We spend a great deal of effort
to educate people to help them to be better prepared for any possible
disaster--natural or manmade. Millions of Americans get information
through the entertainment industry. This position will help to ensure
that these people get an accurate portrayal of the department's
mission, policies, and activities, while proactively working to help
the American public better identify DHS functions. The Entertainment
Liaison office will guide the direction of documentaries and law
enforcement ``reality'' shows to provide real information about how the
country is better prepared today.
This is not a unique position in government. Many other Federal
agencies already utilize a liaison with the entertainment industry. The
CIA has a Hollywood liaison, and the Department of Defense houses a
large staff to serve the same function.
This position hired at a salary level of $136,000 (GS-15) would be
comparable to hiring approximately 3 TSA screeners (see breakout
below.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Base salary............................................. $23,600
Locality pay (assumed Los Angeles area)................. +4,732
Benefits................................................ +8,260
Dual position training.................................. +3,130
---------------
Total............................................. 39,722
------------------------------------------------------------------------
$136,000/39,722=3.4 screeners.
MARITIME AND LAND: A LACK OF FOCUS
Question. I remain strongly concerned that moving the funds from
TSA will result in a diminishment of focus from your agency--and the
Department--on non-aviation modes of transportation. That would be in
direct contravention of the intent of Congress when it passed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act in November 2001. That Act
gives TSA the responsibility for ``security in all modes of
transportation.''
During the hearing, you indicated that upon further reflection in
regard to the movement of TSA's grant funds to ODP, the Department had
determined that TSA's ``subject matter specialists/expertise'' would
remain at TSA. Please confirm for the record that this statement is
accurate. If this is not the case, please explain why and please tell
the subcommittee when you learned that this would not be the case and
from whom. Also, please provide the Subcommittee with the number of
subject matter specialists TSA employs as of March 19, 2004, in the
areas of mass transit, seaports, rail, trucking, and buses.
Answer. It is anticipated that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) will continue to provide operational expertise on
the grant programs through participation in pre-award management
functions. These include determination of eligibility and evaluation
criteria, solicitation and application review procedures, selection
recommendations and post award technical monitoring.
As of April 21, 2004, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) surface transportation (i.e., maritime and land) had 120,
including 23 for rail and mass transit, and 14 for the maritime
environment TSA is reorienting its subject matter expertise as roles
and missions are better defined between itself and other DHS
components. As TSA expands its activities on in rail and mass transit
security, for example, we would expect to have additional subject
matter experts and few in other areas where such experts exist in other
DHS components.
CAPPS II--TESTING
Question. Also, of the funds requested for this program in the
fiscal year 2005 budget request, what is requested solely for
additional testing of the program--as opposed to implementation and
operation of the system?
Answer. There are two components to the plan for CAPPS II testing:
testing with historical PNR data and full system testing that will take
place once connectivity is established with an airline to test with
live data. TSA estimates the cost associated with completing system and
performance testing at $5 million. This involves testing the system
``end to end'' to validate the ability of the system to receive all of
the different types of records from the airlines and post the results
of the risk assessment on the boarding pass. Once system testing has
been completed, performance testing is required to verify that the time
required to complete each end-to-end transaction meets the system
performance standards.
AIR CARGO SECURITY
Question. On December 24th, 2003 six flights between Paris and Los
Angeles were cancelled due to security concerns. In the week following
the cancellation, U.S. officials ``significantly increased'' inspection
of air cargo on foreign flights--a source of widespread concern as a
potential mode of attack for terrorist.
The vast majority of cargo carried on passenger aircraft still is
not screened for potentially deadly threats. Their checked bags and
carry-on luggage are screened--even their persons are submitted to
oftentimes humiliating searches, but other forms of cargo carried in
the belly of the plane are not. In fact, according to a September 2003
report issued by the Congressional Research Service less than 5 percent
of cargo placed on passenger airplanes is screened.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that the
agency ``provide for the screening of all passengers and property,
including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and
other articles that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft,'' yet
TSA is primarily relying on an administrative process called the
``known shipper program'' to meet this requirement instead of
physically screening the cargo.
Sadly--even after this Committee and this Congress added funds in
last year's budget to enhance research and test methods of inspection
for air cargo--your budget fails to provide increased funds to address
this very real threat. Mr. Secretary, why have no funds above the $85
million Congress provided in fiscal year 2004 been requested for fiscal
year 2005? Does the Bush Administration believe that the threat to air
cargo is not real?
Answer. DHS is committed to a strong air cargo screening program
and its request bears this out. The Administration's fiscal year 2005
budget request represents a significant increase over the fiscal year
2004 request, and is consistent with the additional funds appropriated
last year by Congress in excess of the fiscal year 2004 request, which
are being used to accelerate TSA's air cargo security program. TSA has
already taken a number of significant steps to reduce vulnerabilities
in this arena, including prohibiting cargo from unknown shippers,
significantly increasing the number of physical inspections of air
cargo on passenger and all cargo aircraft, increasing its air cargo
inspections workforce, strengthening the criteria for consideration as
a known shipper, automating the validation of known shippers and
indirect air carriers, and expediting research and development efforts
to identify potential new technological solutions for the inspection of
air cargo on passenger aircraft. TSA is also working closely with CBP
to develop a targeting tool which will permit effective identification
of high risk cargo with the ultimate goal of requiring the inspection
of all such high risk cargo.
TSA is committed to a threat-based, risk-managed approach to air
cargo security. The Air Cargo Strategic Plan outlines a layered
security strategy that does not rely on any single solution, but
rather, includes measures that secure critical elements of the entire
air cargo supply chain, with the ultimate goal of assessing the
relative risk of air cargo and then focus existing resources on
inspecting 100 percent of cargo that is determined to be of higher
risk. Among the layers within the cargo security system are the Known
Shipper program, Indirect Air Carrier certification system, procedures
to secure cargo during transport to the airport, training of air
carrier and Indirect Air Carrier personnel, and screening directives
established in November 2003. TSA has expanded the Known Shipper
database by involving more companies and collecting more information. A
key change to the Known Shipper program will be the full deployment of
TSA's pilot Known Shipper Automated Database. TSA has already begun to
implement this automated database and expects full deployment by the
end of the calendar year. TSA is committed to advancing evolving ideas
and concepts that can be analyzed and implemented to make the cargo
security system even more secure. TSA is also aggressively pursuing
next generation technological solutions that will allow us to enhance
security for the entire air cargo supply chain.
Question. The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
called for the hiring of 100 new inspectors to begin a more rigorous
focus on air cargo security. We are now halfway into the fiscal year,
but I understand that TSA has only offered positions to five people.
Why has TSA made so little progress on this important program over the
last 5 months? Is hiring air cargo security inspectors not a high
priority for TSA?
Answer. The funding provided in the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004 (Public Law 108-90) enabled TSA to hire 100
new cargo inspectors. All 100 cargo inspector positions have been
selected, and paperwork is being processed by TSA Human Resources. We
anticipate extending job offers to these applicants and bringing them
on board within the next 2 months.
TSA: SLOW MOVEMENT OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS
Question. The fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Act was signed
into law on October 1, 2003. Yet in the intervening six months, TSA has
yet to obligate the $22 million Congress appropriated for trucking
industry grants, the $17 million we provided for Operation Safe
Commerce, the $10 million we provided for bus security grants, the $7
million we provided for hazardous material grants, nor the $4 million
we provided for nuclear detection and monitoring. Additionally, $50
million still remains unobligated from the funds Congress provided for
port security grants.
Please respond for the record on when we can expect these funds to
be obligated. The threat to these transportation modes is real and the
delay in getting these funds out to the intended recipients does not
lay with the Congress.
Answer. In the coming months, TSA plans to request proposals for
funding or announce awards for a number of programs. These include:
--TSA anticipates issuing a Request for Applications (RFA) for both
the fourth round of Port Security Grants Program ($50 million
remaining from fiscal year 2004) and Intercity Bus Security
grants by late spring, 2004, with final awarding of grants
expected in late summer.
--A fourth quarter fiscal year 2004 release of the RFA is anticipated
for both the Highway Watch Program and Operation Safe Commerce,
with final award anticipated in the fall.
--TSA intends to announce Request for Proposals for the Truck
Tracking Project in early summer. Final award is anticipated in
early fall, 2004.
--Award for Nuclear Detection and Monitoring is anticipated by mid-
summer, 2004.
TSA FUNDING: ADEQUACY OF FEES
Question. Your budget request for fiscal year 2005 assumes that you
will receive $750 million in air carrier fees. The Congressional Budget
Office estimates that only a total of $350 million of these fees is
expected to be collected during the fiscal year. If that is correct,
your budget request is already short by nearly $400 million. I
understand that you have the authority administratively to require the
collection of the total amount of $750 million of these fees. Do you
intend to use that authority?
If you do not intend to exercise your authority, this Committee
certainly does not have the resources to fill that kind of a gap in
funding. Will you be submitting a budget amendment to seek the
additional $400 million? If you do intend to exercise this authority,
please provide this Subcommittee with your schedule for announcing this
change.
Answer. The air carrier fee was established by Congress as a means
to allow the Federal Government to offset some of the costs it assumed
from the airlines when the responsibility for passenger and property
screening shifted from those airlines to the Transportation Security
Administration. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act set the
maximum level of this fee at the cost that the airlines incurred for
providing security screening in 2000.
To assist TSA with determining what the airlines had spent on
security screening prior to TSA assuming those functions, the agency
required airlines to complete an extensive cost questionnaire on the
costs the carriers incurred in 2000. Industry memorandums and
Congressional testimony both pre and post 9/11 indicated that the
airlines spent as much as $1 billion on security screening. Based on
that information, TSA conservatively estimated that the industry's
costs would be $750 million. However, the total reported by the airline
industry through the cost questionnaires was around $350 million.
Independent audits also could not validate the completeness of the
industry's reported costs. As the air carrier fees are currently being
paid based on the airline cost submissions, there is an approximately
$400 million difference between fees being paid and costs originally
reported by the industry.
TSA is continuing to review the results of the audits and is
working with the airlines to validate their cost data. Should the data
be substantiated, TSA will consider the use of its administrative
authority to allocate and obtain these fees. Other alternatives under
consideration are the resubmission of the legislation proposed by the
Administration early in the current Congress, as well as technical
adjustments to TSA appropriations language that would mandate fee
collections.
INSUFFICIENT USE OF SCREENING EQUIPMENT--GAO TESTIMONY
Question. On February 12, GAO's Director for Homeland Security and
Justice, Cathleen Berrick, testified before the House Subcommittee on
Aviation. In her testimony, she observed that while the TSA has made
progress in its checked baggage processes, ``it continues to face
challenges in attaining 100 percent screening using explosive detection
systems 100 percent of the time.'' She notes that, ``Of the airports
reporting that they were not screening 100 percent of checked baggage
the number of consecutive days that they were not conducting this
screening ranged between 1 to 371 days.''
Rear Admiral Stone, what steps are you taking to remedy the
deficiencies noted by the General Accounting Office? Is it the result
of a lack of screeners, a lack of equipment, or a lack of sufficient
funds to place the right number of screeners with the right equipment
in the right locations?
Answer. TSA is aggressively working to resolve both the equipment
and staffing issues to ensure that we are able to conduct screening of
100 percent of passengers' checked baggage for explosives at all U.S.
airports. To that end, we are deploying additional equipment at five
major airports and adding more than 1,400 baggage screeners to those
airports where some baggage is screened through alternative methods
allowed by law.
During the next several months, TSA will also complete the
development and deployment of a state-of-the-art modeling process that
will define the staffing requirements, including those associated with
baggage screening equipment, for each airport, as well as for the
Agency as a whole.
TSA: INJURY AND ILLNESS
Question. According to a Department of Labor study, workers at the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) suffered from more
injuries and illnesses than employees at any other agency in the
Federal Government last year. The TSA suffered more than 5 times as
many job related injury and illness events as did their counterparts at
other agencies. Nearly 20 percent of the 65,250 TSA employees at the
time were hurt or sickened in the workplace last year, compared with
only 3.7 percent of workers in the rest of the Federal Government. TSA
employees were only 3.3 percent of the Federal workforce at the end of
fiscal 2003. But their injuries and illnesses, 12,632 during that
period, comprise more than 15 percent of all such incidents among
government workers, according to the report.
What are you doing to modify your screener training program to
ensure that employees are protected from injuries in the work place?
What thought, if any, has been given to using different equipment that
might assist workers in screening baggage without the chance of serious
injury?
Answer. The Department of Labor reported that TSA had the highest
injury and illness rate among Federal agencies in fiscal year 2003,
measured by the number of employees injured filing claims with the
Office of Worker's Compensation.
About 70 percent of TSA's claims were related to baggage handling,
which is very different than the work undertaken by most Federal
agencies. TSA has compared its injury and illness rate with the rates
found in private sector companies performing closely related
activities, such as baggage and parcel handling, and found that the
rates for that type of work were similar to TSA's experience.
The high injury rate is partially attributable to the necessarily
short time frame in which TSA was required to become operational. TSA's
new baggage screening equipment had to be placed in airport space that
was not designed to accommodate the equipment. Some operations must be
performed in ergonomically unsuitable areas where there is insufficient
space to perform safely repetitive baggage handling work. Eighty
percent of claims related to baggage handling involved sprains and
strains primarily to the back, but also to shoulders, knees and wrists.
TSA is currently working to develop and promulgate a series of
safety related training topics as part of the screener recurrent
training program. A course on safe lifting techniques has already been
fielded. Training media will include video and Web-based training.
Specific courses in development include Bloodborne Pathogens Awareness,
Hazard Communications, Materials Handling and Lock-out/Tag-out, General
Safety, and Slips, Trips, and Falls. Safety Action Teams are being
established at every airport and programs are underway to identify and
train collateral duty safety and health representatives across the
agency. Finally, TSA has initiated a program to conduct hazard
assessments at all of its airports in order to identify additional
areas where accident prevention actions are necessary.
With the installation at some airports of new integrated baggage
conveyor, in-line explosives detection systems, that greatly reduce
manual baggage handling, some injury rates are already beginning to
fall. In time, TSA anticipates that its efforts to field a
comprehensive occupational safety and health program, establish a
safety culture, train supervisors and employees, and make baggage
handling system changes to minimize lifting, will result in significant
improvement in TSA's injury rates.
LETTERS OF INTENT
Question. In response to a question during the hearing, you
indicated that upwards of 30 airports are seeking letters of intent
(LOIs) with you. You also indicated that the Office of Management and
Budget had limited the number of LOIs that you are able to enter into
to eight. If your analysis of the 30 airports proves the validity of
these requests, how much additional funding would be required to fund
them?
Answer. While numerous airports have expressed interest in LOI
security funding TSA continues to use its LOI criteria, based on
achieving and maintaining compliance with the 100 percent electronic
screening requirement at all airports, to determine the allocation of
resources. TSA is working with airports that will not be able to
maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement because of increased passenger loads, increased and/or
additional air carrier service, and/or airport terminal modifications
and expansions. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2005 supports
previously issued 8 LOIs for 9 airports, and assumes a 75/25 cost share
formula as set forth in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003. TSA also supports airports that have not received an LOI, but
where additional funding for equipment is needed to accommodate
increased passenger loads and new air carrier service. TSA continues to
evaluate situations where an in-line solution makes sense from the
standpoint of security, efficiency, and reduced staffing needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Question. The budget request includes $400 million for the purchase
and installation of Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines. Letters
of Intent (LOI) have been signed with eight airports for the
reimbursement of construction costs associated with the integration of
the new EDS machines for in-line baggage screening. It is my
understanding that the $250 million requested for installation would
only cover continued payment of the existing LOIs.
How many airports are on your list for installation, and under the
current approach how long would it take to install in-line EDS machines
at the remaining airports on your list? What would it cost over the
next 4 years to accelerate the program and install in-line EDS machines
at all the airports on your list?
Answer. TSA continues to use its LOI criteria, based on achieving
and maintaining compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement at all airports, to determine where resources will be
allocated. TSA is working with airports that will not be able to
maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement because of increased passenger loads, increased and/or
additional air carrier service, and/or airport terminal modifications
and expansions. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2005 supports
previously issued LOIs for 9 airports, and assumes a 75/25 cost share
formula as set forth in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003. TSA also continues to evaluate situations where an in-line
solution makes sense from the standpoint of security, efficiency, and
reduced staffing needs.
Question. TSA currently operates under a statutory limit of 45,000
full-time equivalent baggage and personnel screening employees. How has
this limitation affected your ability to serve the flying public and
ensure short wait times? TSA is required by this limitation to hire
significant numbers of part-time employees. Has it been difficult to
hire and retain part-time employees for these screening positions?
Answer. TSA is managing to keep the workforce under the 45,000 FTE
level by creating a more flexible workforce. TSA is better coordinating
airline schedules and passenger load with staffing needs, is increasing
the proportion of part-time to full-time screeners, and is
strategically using its mobile national screener force to meet seasonal
fluctuations in workload. TSA now has in excess of 15 percent of its
screener workforce as part-time screeners, and TSA expects to have a
part-time screener workforce of close to 20 percent by the end of the
current fiscal year. Part-time screeners create additional operational
flexibility when scheduling screeners to satisfy varying levels of
demand. As a result of reducing excess capacity at periods of lower
demand, TSA is seeking to make more FTEs available to the system as a
whole during peak periods.
While TSA is highly conscious of customer service concerns, the
security of the nation's transportation system will always be our top
priority. Staffing standards, accordingly, should be determined based
on the goal of achieving the appropriate balance between world class
security and world class customer service in operating environments
unique at each airport. Throughout the workforce transformation
process, our screeners have continued to meet world class standards for
effectiveness and customer service. They have kept wait time consistent
with previous performance across the system, while providing a level of
courtesy that received an 86-percent approval rating according to the
most recent survey. TSA is proud of the professionalism and dedication
that its screeners demonstrate every day in the performance of their
duties.
Question. Section 1012 of the USA PATRIOT Act requires a background
investigation of holders of Commercial Driver's Licenses (CDL) who seek
to carry hazardous materials (hazmat). States must provide biographical
and criminal history information and fingerprints to TSA on CDL holders
seeking a state hazmat endorsement. The deadline for states to comply
has been moved from November 3, 2003 to April 1, 2004, and again to
December 1. However, to date, the TSA has not provided the states with
sufficient guidance, including technical standards for the collection
of fingerprints, to implement fingerprint-based background checks. In
addition, no funding has been made available to the states to implement
this program.
What steps has TSA taken to implement the requirements of Section
1012 and what is TSA's timeline to provide guidance to the states on
the process and standards for fingerprint collection and transmittal of
fingerprints to TSA by the states and notification of qualification by
TSA back to the states?
Answer. TSA has been working with the FBI to establish the
technical standards and processes for the collection and transmission
of driver fingerprints. Once these processes are finalized, they will
be transmitted to the States. We estimate that these standards and
processes will be provided to the States over the course of the next
month.
On April 1, 2004, Secretary Ridge sent a letter to each Governor
outlining the current status of the Hazmat Truck Driver Program. In
that letter, Secretary Ridge asked each Governor to provide TSA a State
Point of Contact (POC) for this Program to facilitate communications
between TSA and other organizations involved in this process. All
fingerprint standards and processes will be provided to the States
through their respective POCs.
TSA has also been working with the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) to develop a system for the transmission
of biographical data to TSA for use in the security threat assessment
process, and the subsequent results notification to the appropriate
State and Federal authorities. Initial information related to this
initiative has already been provided to the States. Additional
information related to this aspect of the program will be provided to
the States through their POC.
Question. Is funding included in your budget request, or the
request of any other agency to help states defray the cost of complying
with Section 1012?
Answer. TSA has identified limited funding in fiscal year 2004 to
support some of the necessary infrastructure to support the Hazmat
Truck Driver Program. However, an effective partnership between the
Federal Government, the States and industry is both necessary and is
currently being forged to develop and fund start-up solutions on a
State-by-State basis. Longer term, the Hazmat Truck Driver Program will
be fee based and TSA envisions that fees will support the program in
its entirety. We anticipate working with the States and industry to
develop the details of a fee rule, which will be published later in CY
2004.
Question. When will TSA be ready to accept and process State
submitted fingerprints of commercial drivers seeking a hazmat
endorsement?
Answer. TSA will be ready to accept and process State submitted
fingerprints no later than January 31, 2005 in accordance with the
existing final rule. However, we do anticipate a limited number of
pilot States beginning to submit fingerprints beginning in fiscal year
2005. Working with these pilot States will allow TSA to apply ``lessons
learned'' during the pilot to systems and processes associated with the
submission of fingerprints. We anticipate that this technique will
facilitate a much smoother start-up for the vast majority of States.
Question. The budget justification submitted by TSA includes
detailed information about the numbers and types of items confiscated
by TSA employees at airport security checkpoints. In the last year, TSA
has intercepted more than 2.8 million prohibited items and arrested 700
people. Can you help me put that in context and tell me how many how
many passenger screenings were performed last year? Also, of the 700
arrests, how many convictions have there been?
Answer. TSA performed approximately 500 million passenger
screenings last year. TSA's records in the period February, 2002-
February, 2004, show that 2,678 individuals were arrested for
possessing a prohibited item that was discovered at a passenger
screening checkpoint. The majority of arrests were made by State or
local law enforcement agencies; only a small number were performed by
Federal law enforcement authorities. The Department of Justice, along
with State and local prosecuting authorities, are in a better position
to ascertain the exact number of convictions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
Question. The budget for FTE's for full time positions was set at
220 for the Transportation Security Administration's Maritime and Land
Division, yet it is my understanding that to date, this Division is
only operating with 160.
You have a number of responsibilities, such as conducting criminal
background checks, that are languishing. What is taking so long in
hiring the remaining 60 Full Time Employee positions that, I understand
are budgeted for the Transportation Security Administration's Maritime
and Land Division but not yet hired?
Answer. TSA is hiring to the level proposed in the fiscal year 2005
President's Budget.
Question. Right now, TSA has absolutely no staffing standards at
airports. Wait times vary from nothing to hours, depending upon the
airport. On March 9, 2004 the Washington Post said small airport
security is no good and that you do not meet the 100 percent screening
requirements of the law--yet, classified submissions by TSA continue to
tell us that only a handful of airports have problems.
You continue to support a cap on screeners, dooming the process to
fail. When will you put in staffing standards that make senses (e.g., a
maximum 10 minute wait that Secretary Mineta promised us)?
Answer. TSA is managing to keep the workforce under the 45,000 FTE
level by creating a more flexible workforce. TSA is working with air
carries and airports to improve coordination of airline schedules and
passenger loads with staffing needs, is increasing the proportion of
part-time to full-time screeners, and is strategically using its mobile
national screener force to meet seasonal fluctuations in workload. TSA
expects to have a part-time screener workforce of close to 20 percent
by the end of the current fiscal year. Part-time screeners create
additional operational flexibility when scheduling screeners to satisfy
varying levels of demand. As a result of reducing excess capacity at
periods of lower demand, TSA is seeking to make more FTEs available to
the system as a whole during peak periods.
Throughout the workforce transformation process, our screeners have
continued to meet world class standards for effectiveness and customer
service. They have kept wait time consistent with previous performance
across the system, while providing a level of courtesy that received an
86-percent approval rating according to the most recent survey. Despite
the dynamics in the workload, even during the holiday rush season and
the recent Orange Threat Level period, our screeners have provided
world class security and world class service for effectiveness,
efficiency, and customer satisfaction. TSA is proud of the
professionalism and dedication that its screeners demonstrate every day
in the performance of their duties.
Question. You also committed to putting in explosive detection
systems--automated systems in line--when will that job be completed?
Answer. TSA's top priority is security, and consequently, TSA will
focus its available funds for EDS at those airports that require
additional funding in order to comply with the requirement to conduct
screening of all checked baggage using electronic means. Changes to
passenger throughputs, terminal modifications, and airport expansions
make fulfilling TSA's goal of 100 percent electronic baggage screening
a constantly moving target. TSA balances many competing priorities for
available funds and will continue to review its priorities to maximize
the utilization of the funds available.
Question. Airports are seeking long term letters of intent (LOI)
from you to fund reconstruction for security projects. You gave out
LOI's to 8 or 10 airports, but there are another 20 or so waiting. How
much money do you need to get the job done this year? Miami, for
example, is rebuilding the entire airport--a $4.8 billion project, that
needs $200 million for security systems, but there is no money in your
budget to meet that need.
Answer. TSA continues to use its LOI criteria, based on achieving
and maintaining compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement at all airports, to determine where resources will be
allocated. TSA is working with airports that will not be able to
maintain compliance with the 100 percent electronic screening
requirement because of increased passenger loads, increased and/or
additional air carrier service, and/or airport terminal modifications
and expansions. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2005 supports
previously issued LOIs for 9 airports, and assumes a 75/25 cost share
formula as set forth in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution,
2003. TSA also continues to evaluate situations where an in-line
solution makes sense from the standpoint of security, efficiency, and
reduced staffing needs.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. A recent GAO study concluded that the Computer-Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System, or CAPPS II, is not ready for prime
time. According to the report: ``The system as it currently exists
offers only limited functionality in a simulated environment.'' I am
concerned that the program's weaknesses may limit its effectiveness and
it lacks sufficient protections for the civil liberties of ordinary,
law-abiding travelers. I am also concerned by reports that the
administration plans to force the airlines to hand over passenger data.
Since I understand TSA plans to launch CAPPS II later this year and
has requested a total of $60 million in fiscal year 2005 for further
development of CAPPS II, I would like to know the following:
How much has been spent by TSA on CAPPS II development in each
fiscal year so far?
Answer. Commitments/obligations on CAPPS II development to date
(April 26, 2004) are as follows:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2002 & 2003................................. 58.4
Fiscal year 2004 (to date).............................. 28.1
---------------
TOTAL............................................. 86.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. How exactly does TSA plan to spend the additional $60
million in the fiscal year 2005 budget request should it be
appropriated by Congress?
Answer. TSA intends to spend the $60 million in the following
manner:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Facilities leases, Utilities and Maintenance............ 3.3
IT and Telecommunication................................ 5.2
Infrastructure support (security, FTEs, etc.)........... 10.8
CAPPS II Development and Operations..................... 40.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. What is TSA doing to address the shortcomings and
vulnerabilities of CAPPS II as described in the GAO study and outlined
in the January 14, 2004, letter Senator Feingold and I sent to
Secretary Ridge and copied you?
Answer. As indicated in the GAO report itself, the primary problem
faced by CAPPS II at the present time is the fact that we have not yet
been able to begin testing with actual data. The absence of this data
has hindered our ability to answer each of the answers sufficiently for
GAO, which uses strict auditing review procedures standards, to certify
that program development in those areas is complete. We are confident
that each of the points raised in the GAO report will be answered to
your satisfaction prior to implementation of the system.
Question. According to recent reports, the airline industry has
indicated a willingness to participate in CAPPS II, provided that TSA
complies with seven privacy principles. Has TSA agreed to these privacy
principles? If not, please explain.
Answer. TSA has no disagreement with the seven Passenger Privacy
Principles recently released by the Air Transport Association (ATA).
The principles are consistent with the Fair Information Principles that
TSA used to develop its privacy management program for CAPPS II and the
building block for the agency's privacy policies and practices.
Question. Presidential Directive 63 called for the creation of
private sector Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to protect our
critical infrastructures from terrorist attack. At the request of the
U.S. Department of Transportation, the Surface Transportation
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC) was formed. The ST-
ISAC collects, analyzes, and distributes critical security and threat
information from worldwide resources to protect its members' vital
information and information technology systems from attack.
Right now this valuable information is only available to paying
members of the ST-ISAC. With the TSA seeking an $892 million funding
increase for fiscal year 2005, why was funding not included in the TSA
request to make the ST-ISAC information available to all public transit
operators across the country--especially since most cannot afford new
equipment and operators much less afford to subscribe to the ST-ISAC?
Answer. DHS and TSA utilize numerous avenues for distributing and
receiving information for the various transportation sectors. TSA's
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) receives information
from ISACs as well as from multiple other sources. We provide
information to the ISACs for distribution to their members since they
have established communication methods with their members.
Additionally, TSA is committed to establishing effective lines of
communication to all stakeholders regardless of their membership with
any particular ISAC. TSA is developing contacts lists for all of the
non-ISAC stakeholders. As envisioned, all stakeholders would have
access to general information. Specific persons would have access to
sensitive information, provided they have signed non-disclosure
agreements.
Question. It has been reported that the Federal Government is
spending $4.5 billion on aviation security this year but only $65
million on rail security--even though 5 times more people take trains
everyday than planes. The catastrophic Madrid bombings reflect that
this reality is fraught with severe risks.
Senator Hollings introduced a bill last week to allot $515 million
for risk assessments and security improvements for our Nation's rail
system. Unfortunately, he has introduced the bill twice before and it
has gone nowhere.
Last year a survey of transit agencies by the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) identified some $6 billion in unmet
security needs that remain today.
What is TSA's position on the $6 billion in unmet security needs
described by APTA? And what does TSA expect to do to address those
needs?
Answer. Ensuring that our nation's transportation systems are
secure must be accomplished through effective partnering between
appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry entities. DHS is
charged with responsibility for working to protect all modes of
transportation, but it has consistently held that that this
responsibility must be shared with Federal, State, local and private
industry partners, many of whom were already in the business of
providing security for their particular piece of the transportation
puzzle. TSA's main charge, both under ATSA and now as part of the DHS
family, is to help coordinate these efforts under the guidance of the
Secretary and the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
Security, identifying gaps and working with appropriate partners to
ensure that existing security gaps are filled.
Recognizing this, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
requested substantial resources in fiscal year 2005 across the agencies
within the Department involved with securing transportation modes other
than aviation, including resources in the Coast Guard and CBP for ports
and maritime security; in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for cargo
security; in Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
for vulnerability assessments, intelligence, and infrastructure
protection for all sectors including transportation; and in Emergency
Preparedness & Response (EP&R) for emergency response to only name a
few. In addition to working with other DHS components, TSA works
closely with our sister Federal agencies outside of DHS to ensure that
all government resources are maximized. For example, under the
leadership of BTS and DHS, TSA is coordinating key standards-setting
efforts in areas such as transit and rail security, and is working
closely with modal administrations of the Department of Transportation
to help leverage their existing resources and security efforts to
accomplish security goals.
Specifically, funds provided for transit and rail security in
fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 total $215 million--$115 for
transit security grants under the Urban Area Security Program, and $100
million for upgrades to rail tunnels in the Northeast Corridor.
Question. As you may know, law enforcement officials from New
England and New York have been national leaders in establishing an
initiative for cargo container security called Operation Safe Commerce
Northeast (OSC Northeast.) OSC Northeast represents a comprehensive
coalition of Federal agencies, State governments, and private sector
businesses committed to the concept of enhancing border and
international transportation security without impeding free trade and
international commerce.
The economy will face a grave disruption should a catastrophic
event occur related to international trade corridors. We are very
vulnerable along our Northern Border, and the OSC Northeast group would
enhance the safety of cargo entering the United States through New
England and Canadian ports. Therefore, I believe the TSA should better
engage and utilize the resources of OSC Northeast.
In light of administration's budget proposal to cut in half the $58
million Operation Safe Commerce program--citing $28 million in unspent
funds already approved by Congress for the program that may be
redirected to overspending in other areas of TSA:
Will TSA use some of these funds to expand the program to OSC
Northeast since there are no restrictions on aiding just three ports in
the second round of appropriations?
Answer. First, it is important to note that TSA's final spend plan
submission for fiscal year 2003 included all $58 million earmarked for
Operation Safe Commerce. OSC Northeast was eligible to apply for OSC
fiscal year 2002-03 funding through any of the three Load Centers,
including the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, but did not do
so. OSC Northeast did apply for a port security grant, but its
application was not selected. The OSC program is nearing completion. We
expect to assess results starting this summer.
Question. What steps are TSA taking to incorporate the efforts of
OSC Northeast into our national port security strategy?
Answer. The OSC Executive Steering Committee carefully reviewed the
OSC Northeast report of November 2002. The review had a significant
impact in guiding the current OSC efforts, including examination of
security throughout entire supply chains, use of a systematic approach
to container security (including multimodal activities), coordination
with related initiatives, examination of costs and benefits of the
selected solutions and the need for solutions to work for all modes of
transportation.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Harry Reid
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION FUNDING
Question. Admiral Stone, the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security
appropriations law included $7 million for a hazardous material truck
tracking program. The University of Nevada, Las Vegas is working with a
national leader in truck tracking to establish a national center to
track commercial trucks carrying hazardous material and has submitted a
proposal to use a portion of this funding. When can we expect to hear
about the allocation of the $7 million?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) expects to
solicit proposals on a competitive basis for the truck tracking
initiative in the summer of 2004. All interested parties will be
invited to submit proposals in response to this announcement.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Admiral Collins and Admiral Stone, we
appreciate very much your cooperation with our subcommittee.
Our next hearing on the budget request for the Department of
Homeland Security will be held on Tuesday, March 30, in this
room, SD-124. At that time, the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, Robert Bonner; the Assistant
Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Michael Garcia; and the Director of the Bureau of Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Eduardo Aguirre, will be here to
discuss the budget for the programs and activities under their
jurisdiction. Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12 noon, Tuesday, March 23, the subcommittee
was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, March 30.]