[Senate Hearing 108-705]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
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TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:09 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Stevens, Gregg, Byrd, and Leahy.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENT OF ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY, BORDER
AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY DIRECTORATE
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
Today we continue our review of the President's fiscal year
2005 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security.
We're specifically considering at this hearing the programs and
activities within the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate. Our objective is to provide the resources the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate requires to
manage its responsibilities and to carry out its mission
successfully.
The President is requesting a total of $14.4 billion in
discretionary funding for programs and activities managed by
the directorate, which includes the US VISIT project, Customs
and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the
Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center.
I'm pleased to welcome to this hearing the Under Secretary
for Border and Transportation Security, Mr. Asa Hutchinson.
Before calling on him, I'm happy to yield to Senator Byrd and
other senators who may wish to make opening statements. Senator
Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, you are very kind to
delay the hearing until I arrived, and I say this with respect
to the other senators as well. I have a problem some mornings
in getting to my station on time. I hope that in the future you
will not delay the hearings on my account. Please go ahead, and
I will understand. You are always punctual, and I would prefer
that you not delay hearings on my account.
Welcome, Mr. Under Secretary. Last week, the Department of
Homeland Security celebrated its first anniversary. Much has
been accomplished. The integration and restructuring of the 22
agencies continues. The hard-working men and women of your
Department continue to perform their important jobs. But I
remain concerned that there are real vulnerabilities facing
this Nation that require immediate responses.
Last December, Secretary Ridge said, quote, ``The strategic
indicators, including al Qaeda's continued desire to carry out
attacks against our homeland, are greater now than at any point
since September 11th.'' So Mr. Chairman, I would think that the
Administration would want to address such a threat with a
robust front line of defense. Yet, as I review the budget, I
find numerous examples of a defense that relies more on paper,
more on studies, more on reports, rather than on the layered
defense that the President and the Secretary often describe in
their homeland security speeches.
Let me just give a few examples. More than 5.7 million
containers are brought into this country each year through our
ports. Yet, we inspect only 5 percent of these. Most American
air passengers would be shocked to learn that, while they and
their baggage are subjected to often rigorous inspections, the
vast majority of the cargo carried in the belly of the plane in
which they are flying is not inspected. The Department claims
that they have a so-called known-shipper program that is secure
for air cargo, but this is a paper process. TSA personnel
review paperwork from the shippers rather than the actual
cargo.
TSA has yet to even initiate a pilot program for air cargo
inspection. We approved funds last September to hire 100 air
cargo inspectors to carry out real inspections and yet, 6
months later, very few inspectors have been hired.
On January 5, 2004, the new visa tracking system known as
US VISIT began operations at 115 airports and 14 seaports. As
envisioned when first mandated in 1996, this system is supposed
to track the entry and exit of visa holders and other visitors
to our country. It has been declared a success by the
Department, except few realize that, while we are capturing
data on people entering this country at the 115 airports, we
are getting voluntary information on people exiting the United
States at only one airport. We need to do a better job in order
to know exactly who is exiting, as well as entering, the United
States.
At the same time, we need to ensure that sufficient funds
are provided to integrate the various existing biometric
databases. We need to make sure that the US VISIT system and
the Border Patrol IDENT system are compatible with the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System.
Last year, pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security
Act, U.S. ports were required to submit security plans to the
Department. But to actually make this country safer, money must
be provided to help the ports implement those plans. Instead,
the President is proposing to cut port security grant funding
by over 60 percent.
The Federal Air Marshal Service did not have sufficient
resources this year to maintain the number of air marshals on
targeted domestic and international flights, and because the
Administration has proposed no increase for next year, a bad
problem could become worse next year.
I want to make sure that this subcommittee and this
Congress provide real homeland security to the American people,
not just assurances on paper. The President has told his
agencies not to seek supplemental appropriations this year, but
I don't think that homeland security can wait. To this end I
will be sending a letter to the Secretary today urging him to
propose a reallocation of existing resources from nonessential
pay accounts to increase funding for port security grants and
for the Federal Air Marshals Program right away. I will be
discussing these issues today and I'm looking forward to
hearing from our witness on these and other issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd. Senator Leahy.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know I've served
with both of you for well over a quarter of a century on this
committee, and I couldn't help but think at the beginning of
it, it's nice to know that there are a few of us who still show
senatorial courtesies, and both the senior senator from
Mississippi and the senior senator from West Virginia
constantly show those courtesies, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Secretary, I enjoyed chatting with you this morning
earlier. Sometimes people forget that, along with all the
serious matters, we have even more serious matters, like how
are the children, how are the grandchildren, and a lot of
things like that to catch up on. And of course, I see the Under
Secretary both in this committee and also in the Judiciary
Committee. And I told you before, you have one of the most
challenging jobs in the Department of Homeland Security, and I
am grateful for your accessibility to Congress during the
Department's first year. There were some who thought when you
formed the new department you would no longer want to be
accessible, and I think your own experience here on the Hill
does you well, because you have always been accessible.
I told you when you first took the job you were lucky
because you would be inheriting a number of fine employees in
my home State of Vermont where we have a very substantial
presence. You told me at that time you would make good use of
them, and you have kept your word. I am particularly pleased
that you and Michael Garcia, who also traveled with you to
Vermont, have recognized the tremendous value of the Law
Enforcement Support Center, LESC, in South Burlington, Vermont.
This LESC provides information to State and local police
departments throughout the Nation regarding immigration status
and identities of aliens suspected, arrested or convicted of
criminal activity, and operates 24 hours a day 7 days a week.
I was over there after a large snowfall and someone said,
what do you do in a case like this where you have close to 3
feet of snow that fell in the last 24 hours. And they said,
well, you know, what do you do about getting to work? And they
said what do you mean, this shift comes in at this time and
this shift comes in at this time. I think it took them a while
to realize that the people from out of State were asking what
do you do about the snow. Well, you shovel it and you go to
work. But, the other thing that was most interesting was that
they accept the dedication and responsibility for the country,
and I know it makes me very happy and I'm sure it does you and
the others.
I joined Mr. Garcia last August to announce expanding
capabilities in the LESC and I look forward to continue working
on this project.
I have a couple concerns and I will submit some questions
on the record. I'm concerned about the Department's response to
those who fled Haiti in recent weeks. I think Haitians
intercepted at sea receive entirely different screening. All
interdicted Cubans are individually interviewed regarding fear
of persecution. I understand that only those Haitians who
loudly protest, the so-called shout test, receive such an
interview. And when you see on the television news every night
Haitians being shot down in the street, you have to have some
concern. I understand also the Department intends to continue
regular deportation proceedings against Haitians in the United
States, notwithstanding the strife and basic lack of law and
order in Haiti. I join with Senators Kennedy and Durbin and
will have some questions on that.
Secondly, I know Congress has set an October deadline for
Nations who take part in the visa waiver program to include
biometric identifiers in their passports. It is a very helpful
thing to have but I understand that only a small handful of the
27 countries that are participating in the program are expected
to meet the deadline. As a result, visitors from these
countries will need to either obtain visas, which would
dramatically increase the workload here and abroad for our
officials and certainly would dramatically impact tourism, and
might lead to reciprocal action against American travelers. One
of my questions will be whether we should extend that deadline,
or whether you think such an extension would compromise our
security.
And lastly, I know that you're working to meet another
deadline that Congress has established, the December 31st
deadline for screening travelers in our 50 busiest land port of
entries. Many worry whether that can be done, and whatever you
want to add on to that I would appreciate.
Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned, very soon I have to go to
another committee, but again, the Under Secretary has always
been responsive in questions and so with your permission, I
will insert something for the record.
Senator Cochran. Without objection, it will be printed in
the record. We appreciate you being here and your work for this
committee.
The subcommittee has received statements from Senators
Campbell and Hollings which will be placed in the record.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Thank you Mr. Chairman and I'd like to thank our witnesses for
taking the time to come talk to us today.
My constituents and the entire Nation are looking to this Committee
to provide the necessary funds to protect those who travel our
country's skies, seas, rails, and roads. It is your directorate that is
responsible for making sure that law enforcement officials and first
responders have the technology they need to ensure our country's
safety.
This country is the world leader in technology development and that
is to our advantage when protecting the nation. But as I fly back to
Colorado every weekend, and wait in line at the baggage screeners and
walk through the metal detectors, I wonder if these procedures really
ensure my safety. I wonder if we are really using the best technology
available.
Colorado is the home of many small technology companies that, in my
view, have developed a number of cost-effective, time saving, and life
saving technologies that I am certain have not yet gotten into the
right hands. I have done my best to send them to meet with your
directorate, but I don't know the extent of their success. I hope that
you will elaborate on how you work with small technology firms.
I also know that with some of the technology chosen, that you are
doing your best to watch the bottom line. But when you are doing the
job of equipping those who protect us, shouldn't they have the best
technology available, not just the cheapest?
I support every dollar that Congress has given to the Department of
Homeland Security. I believe that we have made great advancements
quickly by upgrading security procedures, response plans, and better
training personnel to react and respond in times of need. But I think
that we need to pay more attention to whether this money is being put
to the best use possible.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the
testimonies of our guests and I will have a number of questions to ask
at the appropriate time.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Ernest F. Hollings
I am pleased that the Department of Homeland Security has taken
administrative control of the Federal training facility in Charleston.
As you know, a temporary overflow training facility for basic training
of Border Patrol recruits started in 1996 at the old Navy Base in
Charleston. Legislation we passed here in Congress drastically
increased the Border Patrol training needs, as it significantly
increase the number of agents deployed to protect our borders. The
Charleston facility was due to close in 2004, but through the fiscal
year 2003 Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations Bill, we
officially designated Charleston as a permanent Federal training
center.
We also secured funding--over $14 million--for the Charleston
Border Patrol Academy to improve the infrastructure for the training
center. After we committed to these improvements, the Department of
Homeland Security took ownership of the facility through the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), which suited me.
After a year of cooperation, coordination and our support the Coast
Guard Maritime Law Enforcement Academy was officially established in
February 2004 at FLETC-Charleston by the Coast Guard Commandant. We
have been able to direct some important functions to Charleston, and
this is one of them.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, we have your prepared
statement, which we appreciate your submitting to the
committee. It will be printed in the hearing record, and we
invite you to make any remarks you think will be helpful to the
committee's understanding of this budget request. You may
proceed.
STATEMENT OF UNDER SECRETARY ASA HUTCHINSON
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senators Byrd
and Leahy, thank you for your gracious comments this morning.
We appreciate what I view as a partnership with this committee,
your counsel, advice, and admonitions from time to time are
helpful, and certainly we receive those with appreciation. I
also want to thank the committee for most recently approving
the US VISIT fiscal year 2004 spend plan that allows us to move
forward. Thank you for your prompt action on that request and
again, the admonitions that you gave.
With your support, I believe we have made some significant
progress toward meeting our congressional mandates for homeland
security and for meeting the expectations of the American
people. The $16 billion budget request for BTS marks a 10
percent increase over the 2004 budget and is a reflection of
this President's commitment to border security, transportation
security, and other areas of enforcement within my arena.
BTS, as you know, has a number of agencies within it. It
comprises the largest directorate with 110,000 employees that
are doing an outstanding job day in and day out. If you look
back over the last year, one of the major initiatives that we
have carried out would be strengthening our border security
through the one face at the border initiative--training
officers to perform three formerly separate inspection
functions. We've also expanded the container security
initiative, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
program provides security in the global supply chain.
I believe that we have increased the safety of air travel
by increasing the effectiveness of the Federal Air Marshal
program, establishing a Federal flight deck officer program,
increasing the baggage screening efforts, developing a
comprehensive air cargo security plan, and new requirements in
that regard. We have developed new technologies such as US
VISIT and the SEVIS, or the program that identifies and tracks
foreign visitors and students. We have pursued and increased
our investigatory capabilities for identifying, apprehending
and removing those who violate our immigration laws, illegally
employ undocumented workers, and traffic in human cargo.
So, we have done a number of things through the last year,
including increasing our training capabilities through the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. If you look at the
2005 budget that the President has submitted, it continues to
build upon this foundation by increasing our efforts to secure
our borders and our transportation systems.
Under the Customs and Border Protection budget we seek an
overall increase of $223 million, including a $25 million
increase for the container security initiative that allows us
to do a more expansive job of prescreening cargo before it
reaches our shores. It provides for a $15 million increase in
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program. A $20
million increase for improvements in the National Targeting
Center, which has been a very effective risk assessment tool
for arriving international air passengers and shipment of goods
to our country. Our US VISIT program will continue to work to
complete the first increment of US VISIT, as well as expand its
capabilities to the 50 busiest land ports, and the budget that
has been submitted for fiscal year 2005 is consistent with the
development of that program.
To date, the program has had a significant amount of
success in increased security with 125 criminal watch list
alerts, 51 criminal apprehensions, and we have processed over 2
million visitors since January 5.
Across BTS agencies over $100 million has been requested
for detection systems between our ports of entry, including
expansion of the P-3 aircraft which provide important detection
and monitoring capabilities. We've continued to build on our
aviation security with a TSA budget that has an increase of
$892 million, which is 20 percent over the comparable 2004
level, and includes $20 million for credentialing systems such
as the transportation worker identification card, hazardous
materials transporters, and foreign student pilots. It includes
funding for the CAPP II program and very importantly, $159
million to enhance the training programs for our screener
personnel.
I'm very pleased with the submission on the ICE budget that
provides an increase of $300 million over 2004 that will allow
us to enhance our enforcement efforts, including $10 million to
support the new Visa Security Unit program that will help us
overseas to add a security perspective to the visa issuance in
working with the State Department. We've enhanced by $23
million our capability for investigations performed by special
agents devoted to immigration enforcement, including
establishing stronger work site enforcement, consistent with
the President's proposal for a temporary worker program. It
also includes $100 million for increase in detention and
removal of illegal aliens, a very important part of our
efforts.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Finally, the Department's infrastructure is supported by
the investment in the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
to support our security and training programs, not just for
homeland security agencies, but for a broader range of Federal
law enforcement agencies that utilize its services. The budget
request provides for a $5 million increase in funding for that
agency.
So with that outline, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the
discussion this morning and look forward to the continued
cooperation with this committee.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Asa Hutchinson
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd and Members of the Subcommittee: I am
honored and pleased to appear before the Committee to present the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget for the Border and Transportation
Security (BTS) Directorate. I want to thank you for your strong support
of BTS components, especially for the resources you provided in fiscal
year 2004, and look forward to working with you in the coming months on
our fiscal year 2005 budget.
The $16 billion BTS request represents a 10 percent increase in
resources over the comparable fiscal year 2004 budget, and reflects the
Department's strong and continued commitment to the security of our
homeland. The fiscal year 2005 budget is a $1.5 billion increase over
fiscal year 2004, and it includes funding for new and expanded programs
in border and port security, transportation security, immigration
enforcement, and training.
The Border and Transportation Security Directorate made great
strides during the first year of operations. Over 110,000 employees and
a budget of $14 billion were reassembled and brought under BTS. The
Directorate was quickly established and successfully began operations
on March 1, 2003--bringing together the legacy agencies and programs
that now make up BTS--Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and the United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US VISIT)
program. Customs, border, immigration, transportation security and
training activities have been rejuvenated under their new agencies,
increasing the effectiveness of our dedicated employees. BTS continues
to create new ways to enhance security by sharing information and
intelligence and by coordinating operations within the Department among
levels of governments, and horizontally across agencies and
jurisdictions. Through the hard work of our dedicated and talented
employees, America is more secure and better prepared than we were 1
year ago.
In addition to the stand-up of the Directorate, we have achieved
many results since our creation, including:
--providing fused and enhanced security coordination among our
components and other Federal, State and local security
providers and stakeholders, especially during Operation Liberty
Shield and the recent holiday season, including the
establishment of the Transportation Security Coordination
Center (TSCC) to coordinate intelligence sharing and command
and control activities for our national transportation sector;
--strengthening border security through the ``One face at the
border'' initiative, which is cross-training officers to
perform three formerly separate inspections--immigration,
customs, and agriculture--allowing us to target our resources
toward higher risk travelers;
--expanding the container security initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to provide improved
security to the global supply chain;
--instituting new cutting edge systems, like US VISIT, to identify
and track foreign visitors and students, recording the entry
and exit of foreign visitors to strengthen our immigration
system;
--safeguarding air travel from the terrorist threat by: increasing
the presence of Federal Air Marshals, establishing a Federal
Flight Desk Officer program, instituting 100 percent checked
baggage screening, issuing new regulations for enhanced air
cargo security, expanding the use of explosives detection
canine teams, checking names of master cockpit air crew lists,
and streamlining and training Federal passenger and baggage
screeners deployed at airports across the Nation;
--eliminating potential weaknesses in security by suspending transits
without visa (TWOV);
--negotiating an agreement with the European Union with respect to
Passenger Name Record (PNR);
--negotiating a memorandum of understanding with the Department of
State to ensure a coordinated and increasingly effective visa
issuance process; and
--establishing a visa security office to provide oversight and
guidance on Section 428 of the Homeland Security Act, including
establishing two offices in Saudi Arabia to review 100 percent
of visa applications;
--standing up a SEVIS tiger team to process foreign students during
the summer 2003 back-to-school season; and
--effecting improvements in security capabilities, capacity,
training, and infrastructure.
Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request
The fiscal year 2005 budget for the Directorate builds upon the
significant investments and accomplishments effected and in progress.
Strengthening Border and Port Security
Securing our border and transportation systems continues to be an
enormous challenge. Ports-of-entry (POE) into the United States stretch
across 7,500 miles of land border between the United States and Mexico
and Canada, 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable rivers, and an
exclusive economic zone of 3.4 million square miles. Each year more
than 500 million people, 130 million motor vehicles, 2.5 million
railcars, and 5.7 million cargo containers must be processed at the
border and POE.
In fiscal year 2003, CBP processed 412.8 million passengers and
pedestrians arriving in the United States--327 million at land borders,
70.8 million at international airports, and 15 million at sea ports.
The fiscal year 2005 CBP budget seeks $2.7 billion for border security
inspections and trade facilitation at ports of entry and $1.8 billion
for border security and control between ports of entry.
During fiscal year 2005, we will continue to strengthen our border
and port security. The CBP budget seeks an overall increase of $223
million to maintain and enhance border and port security activities,
including the expansion of pre-screening cargo containers in high-risk
areas and the detection of individuals attempting to enter the United
States illegally.
Specifically, the budget includes an increase of $25 million for
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) which focuses on pre-screening
cargo before it reaches our shores, and an increase of $15.2 million
for Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). C-TPAT
focuses on partnerships all along the entire supply chain, from the
factory floor, to foreign vendors, to land borders and seaports. As of
late January 2004, nearly 3,000 importers, 600 carriers, and 1,000
brokers and freight forwarders are participating in C-TPAT, surpassing
the Department's original goal of participation of the top 1,000
importers.
As well as continuing development for secure trade programs, the
budget also seeks an increase of $20.6 million to support improvements
for the National Targeting Center and for multiple targeting systems
that focus on people, cargo and conveyances. These systems use
information from diverse sources to provide automated risk assessments
for arriving international air passengers, shipments of goods to our
country, and land border passenger traffic.
The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US VISIT) program's goals are to enhance the security of our citizens
and our visitors; facilitate legitimate travel and trade across our
borders; ensure the integrity of our immigration system; and respect
the privacy of our welcomed visitors. US VISIT represents a major
milestone in our efforts to reform our borders. We deployed the first
increment of US VISIT on time, on budget, and met the mandates
established by Congress, including biometric capabilities ahead of
schedule. The budget seeks a total of $340 million in fiscal year 2005,
an increase of $12 million over the fiscal year 2004 level for the
program. As of late February, over 1.5 million foreign nationals had
been processed for entry, generating 125 watch list alerts, and
resulting in 51 criminals apprehended. The 2005 funding will further
strengthen border security, and enable modernization of border
management systems and capabilities. Specifically, funding will be used
to expand the entry system to 115 land POEs, beyond the busiest 50 that
will be covered by the US VISIT program in fiscal year 2004. Funding
will also be used to expand implementation of an exit solution at our
air and seaports. Alternatives are being developed and tested, and will
be implemented at 80 airports and 14 seaports in fiscal year 2004.
Within the BTS component budgets, over $100 million is included for
detection systems, a critical element in the war on terrorism. The CBP
budget seeks an increase of $64.2 million to enhance land-based
detection and monitoring of movement between ports, and $10 million to
deploy and operate unmanned aerial vehicles. In order to protect the
homeland against radiological threats, the CBP budget seeks $50 million
for radiation detection monitors and equipment. The ICE budget request
includes an increase of $28 million to increase the flight hours of P-3
aircraft by 200 percent. In addition to providing vital detection and
monitoring capabilities in the source and transit zones containing
mountainous terrain, thick jungles and large expanses of water, the P-3
provides an important capability for domestic airspace security
missions.
Improving Aviation Security
We have made great strides in rebuilding and reinvigorating of our
aviation transportation security system. We have made significant
investments in baggage screening technology--over $2 billion to
purchase and install Explosives Detection Systems machines (EDS) and
Explosives Trace Detection machines (ETD) to the nation's airports--and
established a robust technology research and development program. We
have deployed 45,000 Federal passenger and baggage screeners at the
Nation's airports, expanded the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team program, and trained pilots to be Federal Flight Deck Officers.
The fiscal year 2005 TSA budget seeks an increase of $892 million
to enhance transportation security, a 20 percent increase over the
comparable fiscal year 2004 level. Specifically, to strengthen
interwoven, concentric layers of transportation security, the budget
requests increases of $20 million for credentialing systems (i.e.,
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, Hazardous Materials
transporters, and foreign student pilots); $25 million for operating
the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening II System; and $113
million to and improve screener performance through training and the
deployment of information technology. A substantially improved air
cargo security and screening program was implemented last year, and the
$85 million request sustains funding to continue program enhancements
and associated air cargo screening technology research and development.
We are providing another $400 million for EDS equipment to improve
airport operational efficiency.
Enhancing Immigration Security and Enforcement
The ICE budget request of $4 billion, which is an increase of $300
million over the fiscal year 2004 level, seeks to strengthen
immigration security and enforcement. Comprehensive immigration
security and enforcement extends beyond efforts at and between the
ports-of-entry into the United States. It extends overseas, to keep
unwelcome persons from arriving in our country, and removing persons
now illegally residing in the United States. Pursuant to section 428 of
the Homeland Security Act, and the Memorandum of Understanding between
the Departments of Homeland Security and State, the ICE fiscal year
2005 budget request of $14 million includes an increase of $10 million
to support a new visa security unit (VSU). The BTS personnel stationed
at overseas posts, including Saudi Arabia, will continue to work
cooperatively with U.S. Consular Officials to enhance security and the
integrity of the visa process.
As announced on January 7, 2004, the Administration is committed to
enhanced immigration integrity and border security. My Directorate will
be working to implement a program that meets those goals, while
benefiting the economy. Current ICE immigration enforcement programs
and the enhancements in the fiscal year 2005 ICE budget request support
and are consistent with a number of elements in this initiative,
particularly worksite enforcement. Specifically, the fiscal year 2005
request includes an increase of $23 million to more than double the
number of investigations currently performed by ICE--providing an
additional 200 investigators. With these resources, ICE will be able to
facilitate the implementation of the President's temporary worker
program initiative by establishing a traditional worksite enforcement
program that offers credible deterrence to the hiring of unauthorized
workers.
The request also includes nearly a $100 million increase for the
detention and removal of illegal aliens. Detention and Removal of
illegal aliens present in the United States is critical to the
enforcement of our immigration laws, and the requested funding will
expand ongoing fugitive apprehension efforts, the removal from the
United States of jailed illegal aliens, and additional detention and
removal capacity.
As part of our overall immigration enforcement strategy, ICE will
continue to analyze data generated through the Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and US VISIT program to detect
individuals who are in violation of the Nation's immigration laws and
pose a threat to homeland security. The fiscal year 2005 budget
requests $16 million to support these compliance efforts.
Immigration fraud poses a severe threat to national security and
public safety because it enables terrorists, criminals, and illegal
aliens to gain entry and remain in the United States. An aggressive,
focused, and comprehensive investigations and prosecutions program will
detect, combat and deter immigration fraud. The $25 million included in
the fiscal year 2005 budget will provide stable funding to the benefits
fraud program by replacing funding previously provided through the
Immigration Examinations Fee Account.
Building Departmental Infrastructure
The fiscal year 2005 request includes an increase of $5 million for
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to support our security
program enhancements and capability sustainment. The FLETC not only
serves Federal client groups, but also provides training to State and
local law enforcement providers. In addition, to enhance global law
enforcement efforts, FLETC develops and offers a curriculum that
includes international applications.
Conclusion
Our homeland is safer and more secure than it was a year ago,
thanks in part to the dedicated and talented team we have in BTS which
excels at coordinating and effecting cross-component activities.
Through their efforts, and with the support of our partners in
government and the public and private sectors, we will continue to
substantially improve our nation's security. I thank the Congress for
its support, which has been critical to bringing us to this point. With
your continued support for our fiscal year 2005 budget, we will
continue to improve the security of our nation.
I am grateful to be here today to outline our efforts for a safer
and more secure America. Thank you for inviting me to appear before you
today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
US VISIT
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Last week President Bush met with President Vicente Fox of
Mexico and announced that citizens of Mexico who hold border
crossing cards and are frequent visitors will not have each
entry recorded into the US VISIT database. Can you tell us more
about how this new policy will be implemented by your
directorate?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would emphasize
that for those who have a border crossing card, we already have
their fingerprints in our database and they have undergone a
terrorist screen or a security screen in order to be able to
receive this border crossing card. And, if they would utilize
this card for long-term visa purposes they would be enrolled in
US VISIT just like our visitors are at the airports. It will
take us a little bit longer to develop a program in which we
can record each entry and exit and we hope to utilize radio
frequency technology to pilot and to develop that capability.
Our concern, of course, would be that with over 100 million
crossings of Mexicans using this laser visa or border crossing
card, it would be difficult to enroll each one of them in US
VISIT under the current circumstances. So, that is the
consideration for not tracking them in that fashion but rather,
using it as we have at our airports and seaports, for those who
would utilize it as a regular visa to stay in our country for a
longer period of time.
Senator Cochran. The budget states that an exit capability
is expected to be deployed at up to 80 airports and 14 seaports
this year. Can you give us a report on the exit pilots that are
currently running as a part of US VISIT?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and before I answer that
specifically, I want to emphasize that we have an exit
capability for all our airports and seaports through the APID
or advanced passenger information database, transmitted from
the airlines. So, we have a record of the departure of those
people who would be foreign citizens leaving our country.
Therefore, we could track whether they have overstayed their
visas or not. So we have that capability biographically. What
we are piloting in the Baltimore International Airport is an
exit capability that will also biometrically confirm their
departure from this country.
It is being piloted in Baltimore and thus far, it has been
a very successful program. I heard testimony from the airport
director there who applauds the program and the cooperation we
have had, and particularly the fact that we have personnel
there that will help a foreign visitor to utilize the system.
We are piloting other different ways to implement an exit
procedure. Those will be developed and put into place by June
of this year, so by the end of this year we hope to have a
complete evaluation of what is the best exit procedure for our
airports that would expand upon our current biographical
capability.
Senator Cochran. The US VISIT program office is reviewing
the proposals for the prime integration contract. What are the
plans to meet the deadline for deploying the entry and exit
capabilities to the 50 busiest land ports by the end of this
calendar year?
Mr. Hutchinson. We do anticipate that the integrator
contract would be awarded in the May time frame. That still
leaves us a significant amount of time to utilize their
capabilities. But in the meantime, through our US VISIT program
office we're able to continue to deploy to the 50 busiest land
ports our exit solution that would be used as secondary,
similar to what we're doing at our airports. And so a great
deal of work can be done to fulfill the mandate this year even
before the integrator is brought on board. What they will
primarily focus on would be looking at the radio frequency
technology and how that can be used to quickly track the entry
and exit without clogging those borders. We have some
preliminary ideas, but the integrator support will be very
critical in developing a final solution on that.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, I'm prepared to yield to you
for any questions you have. I noticed the presence of the
distinguished senator from New Hampshire. Before proceeding, I
was wondering if you could yield to him for any opening
statement.
Senator Byrd. Yes, I would like to hear his opening
statement.
Senator Gregg. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
TSA
Senator Byrd. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, your TSA budget
proposal for 2005 requests just $143 million out of a total
request of $5 billion for non-aviation related activities. The
Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that the TSA
protect all modes of transportation, not just aviation. Take
mass transit for an example.
On February 6, individuals opposed to policies of the
Russian government exploded a bomb deep inside a tunnel of the
Moscow subway system, killing more than 40 people. The Tokyo
subway was attacked with sarin gas in 1995. Subsequent analysis
of the attack concluded that up to 8,000 deaths could have
occurred if the attack had been executed as planned. We should
not focus all of our attention on the threats posed by the 9/11
attacks. There continues to be significant threats to the New
York City Subway System, the Washington Metro, the Chicago
Transit Authority, and other mass transit systems.
In testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee on
February 24, FBI Director Mueller stated that our
transportation systems across the country, particularly the
subways and bridges in major cities, as well as airlines, have
been a continual focus of al Qaeda targeting. Despite this
reality, there is a huge disparity between what you have
requested for aviation, compared to what you have requested for
the other modes of transportation.
You have made no proposal for mass transit security grants,
no request for bus security grants, no request for truck
security grants, and port security grants, have been reduced
from the $124 million which Congress provided to only $46
million, and the Department proposed to transfer away from TSA
that remaining grant program to an agency with no
transportation security expertise.
Now, how can you fulfill the mandate of protecting all
modes of transportation without requesting funds for this
purpose? Given what you are proposing, how do you intend to be
accountable to the American people for ensuring transportation
security?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator Byrd, and we agree with
your concerns about the other modes of transportation and that
they should not be neglected. We are looking at a different
type of relationship and solution for the other modes of
transportation versus our 100 percent inspection regime, a
focus in aviation security. And so at TSA, we do have a
relationship with the different modes of transportation. We are
working on assessments and standards setting. We're working
with other directorates and other agencies to accomplish the
security that you highlighted.
For example, the subways, that is a transportation system
with a number of players in that arena, including the IAIP
directorate, or Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection directorate, and our Science and Technology
directorate, looking for some technological solutions to help
detect and prevent those type of harmful attacks. And so we are
coordinating our efforts with them, as well as working with our
TSA officials who have that standard setting responsibility. We
will continue to develop that relationship and seek additional
funding as is necessary to expand that mission.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, you haven't answered my
question. I'm concerned about the lack of funding for the
security of those other modes of transportation. I listened
very carefully, but I didn't get an answer to my question.
Mr. Hutchinson. Would you like me to proceed again, Senator
Byrd?
Senator Byrd. Yes. Would you like me to ask the question
again?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think I got the gist of the question. We
have a staff at headquarters of 120 inspectors. They are
charged with the responsibility of looking at these other modes
of transportation, working with local communities, setting
standards for them, and working with other agencies--for
example, the Department of Transportation. We are protoneuron
with the industry stakeholders as well for information sharing
with regards to threats to these different modes of
transportation. We are looking to the Science and Technology
Directorate to identify the security threat and developing the
technology that would help detect those hazardous materials
threats to our subway systems. And the same is true for the
other modes of transportation that you mentioned.
Senator Byrd. I don't think I got the answer yet. I'll ask
the question again. You may not want to answer it, and I say
this respectfully to you.
Your TSA budget proposal for fiscal year 2005 requests only
$143 million out of a total request of $5 billion for non-
aviation related activities. The Aviation and Transportation
Security Act requires the TSA to protect all modes of
transportation, not just aviation. How can you fulfill the
mandate of protecting all modes of transportation without
requesting funds for this purpose? Given what you are
proposing, how do you intend to be accountable to the American
people for ensuring transportation security?
I believe it is a mistake to weaken the non-aviation
functions of TSA. On February 25, Congressman Sabo and I wrote
to Secretary Ridge and urged him not to transfer the TSA grant
programs, port security grants, truck security grants, bus
security grants, and Operation Safe Commerce, as well as FEMA's
Emergency Management Performance grants from TSA to the offices
of State and local government coordination. The deadline for
making that transfer could be as early as March 26th, and I
want to personally make the same points to you. I urge you and
the Secretary to give serious consideration to the concerns
expressed in our letters.
Mr. Hutchinson. And Senator Byrd, I very respectfully agree
with your concerns and clearly you could look at this as a
comprehensive solution to security, we're looking at a shared
responsibility in that regard, and not exclusively that of TSA.
And we are still sorting through some of that division of
responsibility. But we believe that the budget allows
sufficient support from a headquarters level of the standard
setting, the regulations that need to be looked at, and the
partnership that we might have with the Department of
Transportation and with the Coast Guard, who has a major role
in the mission of port security.
Now, I realize that there has been some concern expressed
about the transfer of the grant programs from TSA to the State
and local administration within the Department, but I have been
assured and feel confident that we are implementing the steps
necessary to make sure that the TSA expertise on port security
is utilized for the administration of those grants.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, may I ask another question at
this point or do you wish to proceed?
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd, we've taken up just about
between 10 and 15 minutes in this round, and I was going to
recognize Senator Gregg for any questions, and then we have a
chance for another round.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Senator Gregg.
US VISIT
Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Byrd, for your courtesy. Mr. Secretary, the US VISIT
program is obviously the core to your effort to try to get some
control over who's coming into the country and you have already
explained the program. As I understand the program, basically
there will be two fingerprints taken, the thumb and----
Mr. Hutchinson. Two index.
Senator Gregg. The index fingers of both hands, and that
will be electronically and digitally taken. And here's my
question. We spent in another committee, CJS, which I chair,
and it's a fabulous facility up in West Virginia, a huge amount
of money, literally hundreds of millions if not billions of
dollars on developing a fingerprint database for the Nation
called IAFIS, which is under the control of the FBI. It's my
understanding that the US VISIT fingerprints will not be
compatible with that database, that the manner in which the
fingerprints are being taken is not compatible, without a
significant amount of increased work load. In other words, the
turnaround time on an IAFIS fingerprint is very brief. If
you're fingerprinted under the IAFIS system it's almost an
instantaneous turnaround time. If you're fingerprinted under
your system it's 35 times longer, assuming you can do the
workload at all to get that fingerprint confirmation back, and
really the two systems aren't compatible, they simply aren't
compatible.
I guess my question to you is why would we set up--I can
understand that you don't want to make getting into and out of
the country too complicated and that's why you probably went to
the two-finger fingerprinting and a flat screen versus a rolled
approach, which is what the IAFIS was built on. But why did we
spend all this money to create this database if you folks
aren't going to structure a system that takes advantage of it?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator Gregg. And first, I have
had numerous conversations with the FBI and the head of their
fingerprint division, and we certainly want to move in
coordination with each other. But for example, the IAFIS system
has 44 million prints in it, most of them of U.S. citizens,
many of them whose crimes have expired, and just a whole host
of reasons that they might be in there. As our US VISIT program
is developed, it is not designed for U.S. citizens but for
foreign visitors. So we take a slice of what is in the IAFIS
database and put it in our IDENT system so that it can be
checked, so there is that limited capability. Now as we expand
our program, hopefully there will be more connectivity there.
But in addition right now, to connect to IAFIS you have to
have 10 rolled prints, and we cannot have 10 rolled prints at
our ports of entry because of processing time as people come
in. As the technology develops so that we can perhaps have 10
or 8 scanned prints in a quick fashion, then we hope to be able
to gravitate to that, so we can then interconnect with the
IAFIS. But it is a problem not just for the US VISIT, but also
the State Department, because they have deployed technology
overseas for the two index fingers since that was the agreement
between the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
So it is a process issue because of the time constraints.
It is a systems issue in terms of what it takes to interact
with the IAFIS program. And it's a technology problem that we
hope technology will be able to help us with in the coming
years. In terms of the processing time, it takes us 8 seconds
for our two digital fingerprints to get a response from our
system. It would not be any different if we were connecting it
to the IAFIS system. And if there is a question where we
connect with secondary, where we can connect with IAFIS, we can
take the rolled prints as to any additional information that we
need from them.
Senator Gregg. What you're saying is that we're building
from scratch a new system which is going to be essentially
independent of IAFIS in that they won't be able to access IAFIS
directly. Yes, there are 44 million fingerprints in IAFIS,
which is one heck of a database, and obviously the vast
majority of them are American citizens who have somehow come
into a position where they would be subject to that scrutiny.
But a huge percentage, a huge number are international
fingerprints, and I just, it's going to be hard for me as a
legislator if we have an event in this country and an
individual comes into this country who went through the US
VISIT program, got fingerprinted, but didn't show up because
your program doesn't have a big enough database yet to pick the
person out. We find out after the person has done some
destructive event in this country that that person's
fingerprints are sitting there at IAFIS and we knew that he was
a bad guy.
So I understand the technology problem. I understand the
practical problem of having to roll everybody coming into the
country. And I can see where you made the decision and that you
know, you're going to have to start from scratch building a
database. But there's got to be a better answer here to getting
these two converged. If it takes dollars in order to do the
technology conversions in order to get IAFIS to a digital
capability where it can handle your type of needs, we'll do it.
Because quite honestly, your issue is a heck of lot bigger than
any other issue the FBI has today.
That fingerprint database of 44 million should be used to
protect this country against terrorism. That should be its
primary purpose today. Granted, it was created to protect us
and deal with criminal events in this Nation, but that isn't
what it should be used for. It is a huge resource sitting there
that should be used to protect us from people coming into this
country to do us harm, and it should be integrated with your
system, totally integrated.
And so, I guess your answer to me was, well, we can't
integrate because we're not there yet. My question to you is
what do we need to get there and how quickly can we get there?
Mr. Hutchinson. And that's the right approach to it,
Senator. We, first of all, are wanting to gravitate to 8
scanned prints, which would be, I believe compatible for entry
into the IAFIS system. That will take us some time because
that's something the State Department has to work on as well,
and we have to partner with them on the technology.
Senator Gregg. We can bring the State Department along.
Mr. Hutchinson. The other suggestion that I would have is
that we utilize the services of the National Institutes of
Standards, NIST, that evaluated our system, what its
capabilities were, and I think that their counsel would be
helpful in not just looking at what we need to do to make these
compatible, but who needs to make some adjustments. For
example, should IAFIS develop a system that does not just
simply have to take 10 rolled prints. Can they develop a system
that is interacting to the 8 scanned prints or the 10 scanned
prints. I hope they would look at that solution as well.
Senator Gregg. That's fine, NIST is a wonderful technical
agency and I suppose we could hold a hearing on this, we could
have CJS and maybe do a joint hearing, and bring all the
different parties to this fingerprint issue together and try to
get movement. But we shouldn't have to do that. This
administration should have a game plan which is in place and
which is signed off on by the three key parties, State,
yourself and the FBI, and which says this is the time frame,
this is the technology changes we have to make, and this is
what it's going to cost us. You should be coming to us with
that plan so that we can fund it and we can hold you
accountable to that time frame. Saying that we should call NIST
and say well, NIST, will you tell FBI to straighten out, IAFIS
is not the answer. The answer is that you folks, because you
are the administration, should be doing this. I mean, that's
what administrations do. Congresses shouldn't have to do that.
And I'm really discouraged about this. We spent so much
time getting this--database up and running and now it's being
marginalized in the most singly important thing we have to do
as a country, which is defend ourselves from people coming in
who are our enemies. It's just very hard for me to figure out
why we aren't more aggressively pursuing a resolution of those
issues, rather than you're going your way setting up your
database and saying well, we can't get into IAFIS because we
can't roll 10 prints, and the FBI is out there saying they
can't do it with digital and they aren't going to do two
prints, and they aren't going to convert their system because
it's too expensive and too complicated for them to do it. And
then we're supposed to go call NIST up and say really, who has
the answer here. You guys should have the answer and it should
be given to us.
So what I'm going to ask you for is for you to gather the
Secretaries of Homeland Security and State and the Attorney
General, and get us a statement of policy as to how you're
going to get the FBI fingerprinting databases coordinated so
that they all are integrated and can communicate with each
other in a time frame that's going to occur before we're
attacked again.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator. That's a fair request
and we will certainly be delighted to work and develop that
joint strategy.
Senator Gregg. Thank you.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Secretary, just as a way of following
up on Senator Gregg's questions, I'm curious to know what funds
the Department intends to dedicate to this project, the
integration of the systems during fiscal year 2004 and what
account is being used to fund the project. Do you have that
information or would you like to submit that for the record?
Mr. Hutchinson. We probably will supplement the answer that
I will give now. But first, and as Secretary Ridge testified--I
believe it was before you, but it might have been the House
Appropriations subcommittee, is the existing need for
integration so that the Border Patrol agents can access IAFIS.
The funding is in place to do that and it is pledged to be
accomplished by the end of this year, and I think the Secretary
indicated that we will scrounge around if there needs to be a
few extra dollars to achieve that goal, but we're committed to
making sure the information integration with IAFIS is
accomplished.
In reference to Senator Gregg's comments and questions,
that integration will be funded out of the $340 million in 2004
for US VISIT. That's the budget that we have to work with to
accomplish objectives of 2004, as well as moving toward any
integration, and of course, any other funding would come from
the State Department's budget and the Department of Justice.
[The information follows:]
Integration of Database Systems in Fiscal Year 2004
Therefore, to accelerate the implementation of IDENT/IAFIS
capability within the Department, we intend to reallocate $4 million of
the remaining funds provided in Public Law 107-117. The $4 million,
when combined with fiscal year 2003 funds already provided ($3.5
million obligated for IDENT/IAFIS as part of increment 1 Entry-Air/
Sea), will allow BTS to implement IDENT with 10 print capabilities in
secondary processing areas at 115 airports, 14 seaports and 50 of the
largest land border ports. In addition, this funding will support
implementation of the IAFIS/IDENT 10 print capability at 70 percent of
the Border Patrol stations. The remaining land ports of entry, 30
percent of the Border Patrol stations and major ICE locations (to be
identified) will receive this capability in 2005.
Senator Cochran. One observation is that if this project is
not receiving the support and attention required to get it to
completion, should a separate project office be set up to
implement the program?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would not suggest so. We have a very
effective project office in US VISIT that has the capability.
And I don't mean simply to recite challenges in this effort,
but you know, we had a choice this year of recognizing that we
could have an added security value by putting our fingerprint
scanners at our primary ports of entry and we did this, and
we're looking at when we change it down the road to a broader
capability, we probably lost a million dollars for those
fingerprint scanners. So for the added security value, it was a
good decision to make, but we recognized at the time that we're
going to have to gravitate to probably 8 prints at a minimum,
for a number of reasons. So we recognize the need to move to
that standard and that will be a part of the US VISIT oversight
responsibilities.
Senator Cochran. Is there a final deployment schedule to
roll out version two of the integration project to all Border
Control facilities or when can these facilities expect the
roll-out to be completed?
Mr. Hutchinson. There is, and that will be completed by the
end of this year. I believe we have IAFIS at 20 Border Patrol
stations. I think we have about another hundred that are on
schedule to be given the connectivity to IAFIS, and so that
should be completed on schedule by the end of the year.
Senator Cochran. Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you. I particularly was interested in
Senator Gregg's and your questions, and the answers.
Last month a few days after the Democratic primary, the
President went to Charleston, South Carolina, to crow a little
about his efforts to improve the security of the ports. I must
say that I found this kind of a political event to be somewhat
disingenuous. The President signed the Maritime Transportation
Security Act on November 14, 2002. That law authorized
initiatives to improve security at our ports, but I'm not
convinced that the Administration has done that much since then
to actually make our ports safer. Given the huge demand for
port security funds, why is this Administration only requesting
$46 million to actually secure our ports?
PORT SECURITY
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator Byrd, it's because we believe that
there is a shared responsibility, both in terms of the private
sector, and the port authorities, and the Federal Government
spurs that on, sets the example, funds a significant portion of
the projects, which I believe that we have done. Last year I
think there were two rounds of port security grants, so there
was a very substantial amount that was invested last year, and
it was a combination of grants to port authorities but also to
the private sector. But, we do not believe it's exclusively a
Federal Government responsibility to do all of the port
security investment, the private sector has a responsibility,
as well as the governmental port authorities.
Besides the port grants, we are also investing
substantially in port security in terms of the activities of
the Coast Guard, the Customs and Border Protection, and the
other agency responsibilities related to the ports.
Senator Byrd. Well, I know that we are going to continue to
hear that answer. We still inspect less than 5 percent of the
5.7 million containers that come into our ports each year. The
President took credit for making available $179 million this
year in funding for grants for port security. He failed to
mention that he did not request a dime of those funds. He
failed to mention that the Coast Guard port directors, who
actually have responsibility for safety, estimated that $1.25
billion would be needed in the first year and $5.4 billion
would be needed over the next 10 years to comply with the new
Federal regulations mandated by the Maritime Transportation
Security Act. He failed to mention that last year he opposed my
amendment to provide $460 million in port security grants. He
failed to mention that his budget for fiscal year 2005 proposed
to cut port security grants by 60 percent, from $124 million to
$46 million, when the last competition for grants resulted in
over $987 million in applications from ports nationwide.
Now I'm afraid something terrible is going to happen one of
these days, and then what will be said? Our ports must compete
with other ports, including ports in other countries. If these
security costs result in higher prices, assuming the costs are
going to have to be borne by industry, are you and the
President not concerned that business may go elsewhere, costing
U.S. jobs?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I think that first of all, we've
discussed significantly the port security grants and the
philosophy behind the amount that is requested. You also raised
the question of the fact that only 5 percent of the 6 million
sea containers are inspected that come into our ports. I think
this is, again, a philosophical question as to whether you
inspect 5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, or 100 percent. And
I suppose if we inspected 20 percent of all the cargo, there
would be those who would argue it ought to be 100 percent, that
argument exists right now. I think it's a better decision to
try to make sure we inspect the right 5 percent or right 10
percent, or whatever that number is, and that we inspect all of
those, 100 percent of those containers that indicate a risk to
our Nation.
So that is the strategy that we're developing. We are not
underestimating your concerns and what we know as threats to
our ports. We take that very seriously, and that's why the
Coast Guard has conducted more than 36,000 port security
patrols. That's why we have imposed the regulations that
require the security plans by the vessel operators and the port
authorities, all to enhance the security, in addition to the
partnership that we have in the cash investments for port
security.
CAPPS II
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2004
Appropriations Act included a provision requiring the General
Accounting Office to review the privacy and security of the
proposed CAPPS II airline system. The GAO recently submitted a
report to us that stated that your Department has met only one
of the eight criteria set out by Congress before you could move
ahead with deployment of the system. I understand that the
Department concurs with the GAO's findings. Where is DHS now in
testing of the CAPPS II system?
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, we are actually months away from
actual testing data for CAPPS II. We are obviously aware of the
airlines' concern about voluntarily sharing data, so we're
looking to find a vehicle of having the data that we need to
query out the testing, and my best estimate would be that we
are still a number of months away from doing the testing to the
CAPPS II.
Senator Byrd. Now that the GAO concluded that your
Department has not met the requirements of the law, I encourage
you not to deploy the CAPPS II system until you have satisfied
for this subcommittee that the requirements of the law have
been met.
I have several questions, Mr. Chairman. I could submit
several of these for the record at your pleasure.
Last week the Department celebrated its 1-year anniversary.
To commemorate the event, Secretary Ridge released a list
touting the Department's major accomplishments in its first
year and, indeed, much has been accomplished. For instance, his
press release notes that a seal has been developed to establish
an identity for the Department. Good. You know who you are and
for whom you are working. The release also noted that employees
received a lapel pin signed by the Secretary and featuring the
new Department seal.
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
Sadly, no mention is made in the list of the Department's
accomplishments for the enhanced enforcement of our immigration
laws. At best, there is a passing reference to the new
Department's reorganization of the immigration enforcement
functions. Especially in light of the President's sweeping
amnesty proposal, I'm surprised that the Department has nothing
to report as an accomplishment in enforcing our existing
immigration laws. Many members who were opposed to the creation
of the Department, like myself, were concerned that the focus
of the Department and its personnel would shift from
traditional duties to terrorism. Why is the Department unable
to point to significant improvements and successes in
enforcement of existing immigration laws? What specifically is
your director doing to enhance immigration enforcement?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator, and I'm grateful for
the opportunity to reflect on significant achievements in the
area of immigration enforcement. It is estimated, as you know,
that there are 8 million illegal workers in this country at the
present time. It's estimated that 40 percent of those are here
because of visa overstays. And so whenever you talk about what
we've done with US VISIT and being able to have a better
control of those who come into the country and overstay their
visas, that system is a significant accomplishment in
immigration control. It produces information on people who
overstay their visas and stay here in the country illegally.
We have created an office of compliance within the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement that is responsible for
receiving the information and providing leads to the field in
order to determine who should be processed for removal from the
country. So, that is a huge step forward in immigration
enforcement.
In addition, we have successfully implemented the SEVIS
program, which tracks our foreign visitors coming into this
country, and in one fall semester, as over 200,000 students
came into our country, we apprehended over 200 that came in
here who were not properly accepted into a university. I think
our country is safer because of that effort.
We have also, of course, put 1,000 more patrol agents on
our northern border, and we have increased our resources on the
southwest border. The chief of police of Phoenix attributed
immigration enforcement in Arizona and our Operation Ice Storm
to a successful reduction of violent crime in the Phoenix area.
And so at every level, from the fugitive operations to
Operation Predator to Operation Ice Storm, I think we have done
a very, very significant amount of work in immigration
enforcement.
Senator Byrd. Do you miss being in your old job?
Mr. Hutchinson. Every once in a while I miss being up there
on the House side.
Senator Byrd. I think you did a good job. I watched you
very carefully during the impeachment procedures.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Byrd. I thought you kept a level head on your
shoulders. I thank Senator Gregg for raising the issue of
compatibility between US VISIT and the FBI databases. Chairman
Cochran and I raised the issue with Secretary Ridge almost a
year ago.
BORDER PATROL: IDENT
On a related matter, last week the Department of Justice
Inspector General released a report that examined the case of a
Mexican citizen who had been detained by the Border Patrol on
two occasions in January 2002 for illegally entering the United
States. On each occasion, Border Patrol agents returned him
voluntarily to Mexico. They did this because IDENT, the
immigration agency's automated fingerprint identification
database and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's automated
fingerprint identification database were not integrated and the
Border Patrol agents who apprehended him did not learn of his
extensive criminal record or past deportation. If his full
history had been learned, according to Border Patrol policies,
he should have been detained and subjected to prosecution.
Instead, he was returned to Mexico. Subsequently, he again
crossed the board illegally, and made his way to Oregon in
September of 2000 where he raped two nuns and killed one.
In the report, the Inspector General again found delays in
the effort to integrate the IDENT and IAFIS databases. While he
found some progress in deploying an integrated version of
IDENT-IAFIS, full integration of the two systems remains years
away. Current projections are that the two systems will not be
fully integrated until at least August 2008, almost 2 years
behind the original scheduled completion date. Both the
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security
say they recognize that the databases need to be integrated.
However, the IG report found uncertainty as to who is
responsible for the overall management of the integration
project. It states that Justice and Homeland have yet to enter
into a memorandum of understanding delineating the specific
roles and responsibilities of each agency in the project.
Can you give us an update on your plans for developing a
memorandum of understanding with the Justice Department so that
this project can move forward?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, sir, and that certainly points out
that there is much work that remains to be done, and I'm
grateful for the opportunity to recite some of the efforts that
we have implemented, but we are the first to acknowledge that
there is much more to be done and this is certainly a perfect
example of it. The IG is correct, to wait until 2008 would be
absolutely wrong and intolerable, so under Secretary Ridge's
leadership we are going to get it done this year. We want to
avoid this type of tragic circumstance in the future, and it
was a tragic circumstance of this particular case, and it shows
the extraordinary cost of not having all of the information
needed for our Border Patrol agents.
We have that system at 20 sites now, and we're going to add
100 this year and get them connected. And if there's a few left
after that, we'll find the money to get it done. We have
accelerated the schedule to get it done this year. We want to
look at more opportunities to give our agents in the field, and
inspectors, all the tools they need, particularly this type of
access to the FBI database.
Senator Byrd. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
TRADE ENFORCEMENT
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
Mr. Secretary, something that your State and my State is
interested in is our domestic fish industries, catfish and
other activities relating to the production of aquaculture
resources. I was recently informed that the Customs and Border
Protection officials took 6 months to review and comment on a
request for new tariff codes for Vietnamese exports of fish
into the United States. I've written to Secretary Ridge about
this issue, but I would like to bring this to your attention
personally and receive any comment that you have about a
commitment to trade enforcement, which in my view should remain
a high priority for the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate. I hope you will look into the problems that may
exist in the Department regarding catfish dumping or trade
rules that need to be enforced aggressively by the directorate.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and I certainly share the same
concern, coming from Arkansas, in reference to the enforcement
of our trade laws on this commodity as well as others. I don't
know the specific answer on why it took 6 months to review that
tariff code and I would be happy to provide a specific answer
to you. We have made a commitment not to reduce our resources
and commitment to trade enforcement, and we have a good
partnership with the Department of the Treasury to carry on
those trade enforcement efforts. I'm co-chairman of the Coe
Act, which is the partnership with industry in their advisory
committee on how we handle our trade rules, so we will get a
specific answer to you on that question.
[The information follows:]
Vietnamese Exports of Fish into the United States
CBP processing time for 484(f) requests varies depending on
the complexity of the request and the purpose of the request.
While most requests are processed within the 6-month period,
exceptional requests have taken longer. (As a comparison, the
484(f) committee received a request for a statistical breakout
for low-melt polyester fiber on June 30, 2000, which was not
approved until May of 2001 for implementation on July 1, 2001.
While rare, these situations do occur.) The request for these
fish breakouts was one of these exceptional requests.
The 484(f) request received by CBP was submitted in advance
of the Federal Register Notice published on August 12, 2003,
referenced in the requestor's submission, and the instructions
to CBP issued on September 12, 2003. Those documents needed to
be reviewed in conjunction with the requestor's submission
because CBP is the agency responsible for collecting the
antidumping duties under the order and identifying attempted
evasion of the order. This 484(f) request was also intended to
allow the domestic industry to monitor specific foreign
competition.
The first problem was that CBP (and the ITC, based on their
report) did not agree with the requestor as to the proper
classification of the imported species of fish and therefore,
the proposed breakouts. This is not an unusual occurrence.
Since the 484(f) committee usually tries to meet the purpose of
the request even if the committee does not technically agree
with the request, the issue for CBP was how to meet the
requestor's goals.
CBP found that the specific imported fish were more subject
to misclassification than other commodities for which breakouts
have been requested. This fact meant we needed to be able to
segregate these fish from the other fish properly classified in
the various subheadings.
CBP also had to reconcile the recent change to the FDA
labeling requirements with CBP import laws, regulations, and
policies and enforcement capabilities.
CBP needed to take into consideration our informed
compliance responsibilities to importers under the MOD ACT
followed by our enforcement capabilities. We also considered
our ability to physically identify non-compliant fish, our
ability to target shipments for sampling and maintain the
physical integrity of the perishable sample through the
laboratory analysis process, and whether other agency
requirements would be effected by any of the breakouts. We also
took into consideration concurrent work being done by the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Finally, we
applied our knowledge of certain techniques that have been used
to avoid payment of higher duties on other perishable
commodities.
All of these considerations are not routinely necessary
during our review of 484(f) requests and required information
from multiple CBP offices and time to correlate the elements
into a plan. Once the facts were finalized, CBP responded to
the other 484(f) members with our proposal.
Note that CBP met with the requestor's representatives on
February 27, 2004 and were able to come up with a new proposal
that will meet their needs for trade data and allow CBP to more
easily enforce the current antidumping order and verify trade
data. At the same time, this proposal will allow implementation
prior to the resolution of the classification issue. The
requestor will provide some additional information to CBP at
which point we will forward the proposal to the other committee
members (Census and the ITC.) We anticipate that our proposal
will be satisfactory to the other committee members and the new
breakouts will be implemented no later than July 1, 2004.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much. In connection with
Federal air marshals, I notice that the budget request is
essentially flat for the Air Marshals program. Is this a
concern to you? Do you think an adequate level of resources are
available under the budget request to fund pay raises and other
inflationary costs that may occur with this program?
Mr. Hutchinson. We did get hit with the pay increases that
are built into the budget that had to be absorbed. We have a
strong commitment to the Federal Air Marshals program. That's
one of the reasons we took a number of steps to add some
additional capabilities to supplement the air marshals with
other Federal agents who travel, including cross-training
additional ICE agents and a partnership with the Secret
Service. We believe that with those force multipliers out
there, and with the continued commitment to the air marshals,
that the President's budget is sufficient in that area.
We are, you know, for this year, looking at a number of
different areas to make sure that there is no any significant
diminishing of our commitment to the air marshals.
NORTHERN BORDER AIR WING
Senator Cochran. The Air and Marine Operations program has
been stretched pretty thin for the last 2 years. Long-term
repetitive details for personnel and assets are being used to
protect the northern border and the national capitol region.
The appropriations for fiscal year 2004 included resources for
the establishment of a permanent northern border air wing. Will
you tell us what the status of establishing this air wing is,
when will there be permanent employees on board, and when will
aircraft be purchased, for example. Are you going to have to
continue to rely on detailees to cover the northern border and
the national capitol region if you go forward with the
establishment of this air wing?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think it's important that we have that
air wing capability on the northern border, and we are actively
pursuing it. The assets that are deployed, you know, are from
our existing resources, but the 2005 budget does request $28
million for P-3 aircraft surveillance that will help in regard
to our interdiction efforts, and also the assets that we need
for the CAPP or the protection of our air space. So there are
some funds designated in the 2005 budget for this purpose.
As to the exact time frame on the deployment and the
establishment of the air wing for the northern border, Senator,
I will have to get back to you.
[The information follows:]
Exact Timeframe on the Deployment and Establishment of the Northern
Border Air Wing
The fiscal year 2003 War Supplemental provided $20.5 million to
launch the Bellingham Air Branch, the first of five Northern Border
Branches. Planned allocation is as follows: $2.5 million for personnel
transfers, $12.6 million \1\ for medium lift helicopter acquisition and
$6.6 million for multi-role enforcement aircraft. Staffing will be
provided through a combination of new hires and the transfer of
experienced personnel from other AMO field locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Funds from these two appropriations were combined to purchase
one medium lift helicopter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fiscal year 2004, AMO received $35.2 million in Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) funding to launch AMO's Northern Border Branch in
Plattsburgh, NY. Planned allocation is as follows: $10 million \1\ for
medium lift helicopter acquisition and $6.6 million for multi-role
enforcement aircraft, $9.7 million for facility and $2.7 million for
aircraft spares. An additional $5.4 million was appropriated in
Salaries and Expenses funding to cover the cost of 36 personnel.
Plattsburgh and Bellingham each will be equipped with three
aircraft, including one Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (Pilatus PC-12
fixed-wing), one Medium Lift Helicopter and one Light Enforcement
Helicopter.
The two PC-12 Pilatus aircraft have already been purchased and
delivery is expected in May 2004/early fiscal year 2005, respectively.
Contracts have not yet been awarded for the two Medium Lift Helicopters
and Light Enforcement Helicopters required for full activation of
Bellingham and Plattsburgh. Currently, the UH-60 Black Hawk is
fulfilling the MLH role and the AS350 is fulfilling the LEH role at
other AMO branch locations.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget includes $35.2 million to
launch the third Northern Border Branch.
AMO will continue to rely principally on detailees to execute the
ongoing National Capital Region (NCR) Airspace mission. AMO has
sustained the NCR mission by transferring funding, personnel and
equipment from other missions and requirements.
LONG-RANGE RADAR SYSTEM
Senator Cochran. We are looking forward to getting a report
from the Air and Marine Operations officials on the current
radar situation around the country. What is the total amount
that the FAA had in its budget for operating the long-range
radar system? Can you tell us how much is being requested by
other agencies across the government by agency, and is there
any particular reason that new resources are being requested in
the fiscal year 2005 budget to allow the Department to assume
this FAA responsibility, as opposed to a transfer from the FAA
budget?
Mr. Hutchinson. You're not speaking of our TARS, you're
speaking of the long-range----
Senator Cochran. The long-range radar system.
Mr. Hutchinson. I don't know the answer as to why that is
not being transferred from the FAA, but clearly that is a
priority to have that capability for the protection of our
borders.
TSA: PORT SECURITY GRANTS
Senator Cochran. The Transportation Security
Administration's budget has 54 percent of the request dedicated
for aviation passenger and baggage screeners pay, benefits,
training and human resource services. There are other grant
programs administered by the TSA dealing with trucking
security, port security grants, and operation of safe commerce
that are slated to be moved to the Office for Domestic
Preparedness under the reorganization of the Department. The
2005 budget proposes to reduce or terminate funding for these
programs. My question is, will the Transportation Security
Administration continue to have responsibility for security
over all sectors of transportation or will aviation security
continue to be the main focus of the agency?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, in terms of budget, clearly aviation
would be the main focus of the agency, but in terms of
responsibilities and partnerships, the other modes of
transportation are very important to us. I know that for
example, in reference to Amtrak, there is a close partnership
there, we have some pilot projects where we are working with
Amtrak to enhance security, and we believe that we would
exercise this through standard setting, best practices and
regulation if necessary.
In reference to the grant programs, the expertise still
resides in TSA. And even though the grant program is being
transferred to the Office for Domestic Preparedness in Homeland
Security, we will be connected in terms of evaluating those
grants, and helping to set the priorities for those in terms of
security, and that would be true for the other grants in the
transportation modes.
Senator Cochran. So there will be coordination and an
active role for the Transportation Security Administration in
coordinating with the Office for Domestic Preparedness for the
administration of those programs?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. That's essential
and that was the understanding when that transfer was made.
Senator Cochran. Is there an indication that additional
funds may be made available within the existing grant programs
for port security grants in the Office for Domestic
Preparedness?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think that the grant level is as
suggested in the 2005 budget, but I know that in 2003 there
were a number of rounds that had built up and been announced
for the port security grants. I don't know exactly the layout
planned for 2004, but as far as I know, that amount of grant
money is fixed based upon the allocation in the 2004 budget.
TSA: SCREENERS
Senator Cochran. The Aviation and Transportation Security
Act provided that the Federal Government be responsible for
screening operations for airline passengers at airports
throughout the country, and there was a pilot program
established at five airports to utilize private screeners in
place of Federal screeners. One of these is located in
Mississippi. The law provides for the ability of airports to
apply to the Department of Homeland Security to opt out of
using Federal screeners and to use qualified private screening
companies at the end of a 3-year period, and that will be
coming up in November of this year. When do you anticipate
results of the Department's study on the private screening
companies to be made available from these five airports that
have been participating in the program?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think there are two things I would
emphasize. One, it is important to get the results from those
five airports that were the subject of that pilot for private
screening. I would expect that information within the coming
months so it can be evaluated. The second part of the equation
is the criteria that we would use for determining how we
respond to those airports that might request to opt out. And, I
have asked for that plan and that program to be developed and
reported back to me for review. With both of those issues
resolved, I think in the coming months we should have an
indication as to the results and the direction we can go.
Senator Cochran. There is some indication that the funding
might not be sufficient to provide additional airports with the
funds to use private screeners. There is $119 million in this
year's appropriated account for private screening programs, but
only a $10 million increase requested for 2005. Do you
anticipate a need for additional funding if airports apply to
use private screeners?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would think the assumption is that it
would be a level costing. I don't think we would anticipate a
private screening capability or authorization to be based on an
increase in funding for that airport.
FLETC
Senator Cochran. The Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center was given responsibility for the Charleston, South
Carolina training facility in this fiscal year 2004. This
facility was previously operated and maintained by the Border
Patrol. Has the Department of Homeland Security developed the
level of funding that should be transferred to the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center to operate this location, and if
so, when will this transfer take place?
Mr. Hutchinson. The transfer has effectively taken place.
The FLETC has taken over the responsibility for that facility
and the Border Patrol operations. It is being handled out of
the regular portion of the budget. I am not aware of any
specific needs that would require increased funding.
TRANSIT WITHOUT VISA PROGRAM
Senator Cochran. Senator Stevens, I appreciate your being
able to come to the hearing. You're recognized for any
statements or questions you may have of the witness.
Senator Stevens. I'm here, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
Senator Byrd, primarily because my staff has told me that there
is an intent of Homeland Security to implement new regulations
to replace the transit without visa program. This, I'm told
it's called the TWOV program, falls apart every time the alert
status is raised, and has led numerous carriers to bypass U.S.
airports, particularly our Anchorage airport, which is the
largest cargo landing airport in the United States today. There
is significant loss of revenues for the airports because the
foreign carriers will not respond as quickly as the changes
come about in our programs.
And we had significant capability for intelligence
gathering opportunities when those flights came through. As a
matter of fact, our people cooperated totally with the
intelligence people to make sure that we gained all the
information we possibly could get from any activity with regard
to the shipments.
But we have had one international carrier that has
suspended its stop in Anchorage three times now since 9/11.
Every time the TWOV program is raised because of risk status,
they just cancel out. We want to join with you, and with the
whole country in terms of homeland protection, but it does seem
to me that we ought to have some sort of regimen that will take
into account the necessity to maintain these flights on a
regular schedule.
Right after 9/11, as you know, many of them cancelled in
Alaska altogether and went to Canada. Those same flights left
Canada and put the burden for checking the flights on the
carriers in the interior of the midwest, rather than in the
area of Alaska where we have substantial qualified people for
that activity. Because it's such a large airport and handles so
much volume of cargo, it can get the job done quickly, much
more quickly than a smaller airport which does not have that
volume and is not used to doing the check as the first stop in
the United States. Are you familiar with this at all?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, sir. In reference to the transit
without visa program, it was suspended because of specific
threat information that we had. It was suspended. We recognized
the adverse economic consequences that this had on the
Anchorage airport, which has a significant transit without visa
passenger load. We immediately started working with the
airlines to determine what security measures could be put into
place that would allow us to reinstitute a similar type of
program that would not have the security vulnerabilities.
We have developed an answer and a program that we could put
into place, which would reinstitute similar portions of that
type of program, and would allow the transiting of some of the
international passengers through our airports again. We are
circulating that plan in the interagency process, and we do
hope that we will be able, in the near future, to have a
resolution of that. We understand the economic consequences, we
do want to have the security measures in place before it is
reinstituted.
And you're right, Senator, it was complicated by the fact
that over the holidays we did have a specific threat to the
aviation industry, which would not have been a good time to
redeploy that program or a similar one.
Senator Stevens. These are the so-called ATP regulations?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Will they be promulgated in a way that
they will not change on an orange alert?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. These would be designed so
that they provide the security measures that are necessary and
they would allow for a constant program. Now I can tell you
that, you know, if we have a specific threat information and we
see there is a vulnerability that we didn't even think about,
it's within the realm of possibility that we might have to take
an additional security step in orange that would impact that
program. But that is not the design, the design is that it
would have a constant flow because it has the security measures
in place.
Senator Stevens. On the last recess I went to Anchorage and
I went through the whole new wing of the airport that has been
designed in total compliance with your Department. As a matter
of fact, we have a problem because your Department requested
and received over some $40 million from the amount of money
that was put up to build the terminal. For the Homeland
Security facilities within the new addition, they had to be
finished before the terminal could be finished. And so they all
agreed, and I now have the task of getting another $40 million,
and that's another fight down the road.
But the problem is that it was designed to handle the
regulations that were in effect, and now those regulations, if
they are changed, will require an additional kind of management
of the cargo. We're not talking about a very heavy passenger
load internationally. This is primarily cargo. There are very
few passengers on those planes and in many instances none. What
we're looking at is the cargo problem. I'm told that there are
6.5 miles of tracks that are suspended from the ceiling that
carry this cargo so it has a chance to be inspected, and then
it can go back on the plane. I don't think anywhere else in the
United States has that design.
But, by the changes in this ATP, what happens is that they
go to Vancouver or go to another place, Calgary, and then they
go to land in some podunk that doesn't have any facility at
all. So we are over intensifying regulation in an area that, I
believe, has the most modern baggage and cargo inspection in
the country today, and should have with the volume of cargo we
have coming through there. I urge you to consider what the
change in regulations does to that installation. It puts cargo
into places ultimately, if it's going to continue on to the
United States, if it's destined for what we call the South 48,
it's going to completely disrupt this process and put enormous
burdens on small airports when we're prepared to take the total
burden but for the continued change in the regulations.
Mr. Hutchinson. We'll certainly look at the concern that
you raise, and recognize the investment in security that has
already been made. I think the proposed plan, that again is in
interagency circulation, looks not just at the physical
security arrangement, but addresses some other vulnerabilities
dealing with the passengers that would travel under that
program. So, there are really two parts to the security
concerns. One would be the passengers who transit themselves,
and the other part would be the physical security measures that
would be placed at the airports. Obviously there has been a
substantial investment in Anchorage and that should be taken
into consideration.
Senator Stevens. I know you must travel a lot, but have you
traveled to Alaska since this new position you've got?
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, I have not had that privilege. I
know my brother has at your invitation, but I have not been
there, and I look forward to that opportunity.
Senator Stevens. I would hope that you would see fit to
make that trip soon because these facilities are almost
completed now and this new addition is almost completed, and I
just think it's going to be unfortunate if we have invested all
this money and then find out it will not comply because of a
change in regulations.
As a matter of fact I just might arrange, Mr. Chairman, for
a little extracurricular activities for our friend from
Homeland Security if you come up soon. The sooner the better.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator, for that invitation.
Senator Stevens. I do hope you will come, I'm serious.
Mr. Hutchinson. I will say that if you have any concerns
when we put these regulations out, I will then make sure I go
up there to ensure everything is taken into consideration. I
will say we don't want to have an adverse impact on what's
already been done up there.
Senator Stevens. I'd like to go with you. I'd like to show
you these things and get the people out there who designed them
in compliance with existing regulations, and see if the
regulations must change, how we can quickly meet those
regulations without taking more of the AIP money.
Mr. Hutchinson. We will be glad to work with you and your
staff to make sure that that's handled in the proper way.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Stevens. Senator Byrd,
do you have anything further?
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, your budget request for the
Federal Air Marshals is essentially a flat line request similar
to last year's funding level. Yet, on two occasions in less
than a year, late last summer and again over the recent winter
holidays, you increased the threat level to code orange, in
large part because intelligence and other indicators led you to
believe that there were enhanced threats to the United States
via airplanes flying into or over this country.
However, based on budget briefings with my staff, I
understand that the resources directed to this program are not
sufficient to hire the number of air marshals that should be
hired to maintain a more robust presence on targeted flights.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, I wrote to
Secretary Ridge today urging him to propose to this committee a
transfer of excess salary funds to the Federal Air Marshals
Program. I urge you to make that proposal soon.
Mr. Hutchinson. Senator, we're happy to receive your
letter, evaluate it and make an appropriate response. We
recognize the importance of Federal air marshals and I know
that last year, wherever there was a concern expressed about an
adverse impact on their work force, we did find the funds to
make sure that didn't happen, and certainly this year we will
make sure that there is a robust commitment there, and we look
forward to receiving your letter.
Senator Byrd. I have further questions for the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Hutchinson, we appreciate very much your excellent
service in the Department of Homeland Security and your
cooperation with our subcommittee. Senators may submit written
questions, I have some that I will submit, as does Senator
Byrd, and there may be others. We ask that you respond to the
questions within a reasonable time.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Byrd. I thank Secretary Hutchinson for his
appearance, for his good work, and hope that he will come to
West Virginia on his way to Alaska.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Senator. I have been to West
Virginia.
Senator Byrd. We have a beautiful place down there called
the Greenbrier.
Mr. Hutchinson. I have enjoyed those rooms.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
U.S. VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY (US VISIT)
Question. Last week, President Bush met with President Vicente Fox
of Mexico and announced that citizens of Mexico who hold border
crossing cards and are frequent crossers of the border will not have
each entry recorded into the US VISIT database. Please provide a more
detailed explanation of this policy?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is committed to
developing a solution for the processing of Border Crossing Card (BCC)
holders.
--Most Mexican citizens who travel to and from the United States
regularly may apply for a multi-use travel document, B1/B2
Visa/BCC also known as a ``laser visa'', which serves as either
a BCC or a B1/B2 visa. Mexican citizens who use the travel
document only as a BCC will not initially be subject to US
VISIT processing during primary inspection inasmuch as their
biometric data (fingerscans and photographs) have already been
captured during the BCC issuance process. This is an interim
solution for the land border while the Department explores the
long term solution to record the entry and exit of persons
crossing our land ports of entry.
--When admitted under the BCC program, Mexican citizens may stay in
the United States for up to 72 hours and travel within the
``border zone'' (within 25 miles of the border in Texas,
California and New Mexico, and 75 miles of the border in
Arizona). Approximately 6.8 million Mexican nationals today
utilize a BCC to make approximately 104 million crossings per
year when using the card as a BCC card only.
--Prior to issuing a BCC to a Mexican citizen, the Department of
State conducts biographic and biometric checks on the
individual. The fingerscans and photograph of the Mexican
citizen are then embedded into the BCC. A holder of a BCC is
inspected to determine that he or she is the rightful bearer of
the document when crossing through a U.S. port of entry.
--As the next phase of US VISIT is implemented at southern land ports
of entry by the end of 2004, if a Mexican citizen chooses to
use the BCC as a B1/B2 visa (traveling outside the ``border
zone'' and/or staying longer than 72 hours in the United
States), he or she will undergo US VISIT processing at the land
border secondary inspection areas.
Question. Customs and Border Protection is in the process of
deploying readers for the border crossing cards. What will be the
policy as to when border crossing cards are read? Will the readers be
integrated into US VISIT eventually?
Answer. In certain circumstances, Homeland Security's Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) officers may have reason to believe the person
presenting the BCC is not the person to whom it was issued. At that
point, the individual is sent to secondary inspection to determine if
there are any problems with the BCC, which could include running the
BCC through a biometric reader or processing the person through US
VISIT.
IDENT/IAFIS INTEGRATION PROJECT
Question. The Department of Justice Office of Inspector General
issued a report on the progress made in integrating the biometric
systems of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Justice. While the report does not make specific recommendations to the
Department of Homeland Security, it does state that the IDENT/ENFORCE
project team reports through the US VISIT program office. Further, it
indicates that some of the delay in implementing the integration is due
to the emphasis that is being placed on the roll-out of US VISIT. Is
this project receiving enough support and attention? Should a separate
project office be set up to implement this program?
Answer. The implementation of IDENT/IAFIS is a top priority at both
DHS and DOJ, and a working group has been developed of representatives
from DOJ, FBI, CBP, ICE, USCIS and US VISIT to define plans for
completion of IDENT/IAFIS implementation at all 115 Air, 14 Sea, 165
Land Border POEs, as well as all Border Patrol Stations and specified
ICE locations.
Question. Have you finalized a deployment schedule to roll-out
Version 1.2 of the IDENT/IAFIS integration project to all Border Patrol
facilities? When will the Version 1.2 roll out be completed?
Answer. Currently a comprehensive plan to complete implementation
of Version 1.2 of the IDENT/IAFIS integration project is being
developed including components from FBI, DOJ, CBP, ICE, USCIS and US
VISIT. The implementation of 70 percent of Border Patrol Facilities is
scheduled for the end of this year, and the remaining 30 percent by the
end of next year.
Question. What consideration is being given to rolling out the Real
Time Image Quality software developed for US VISIT to other IDENT
stations in order to improve the quality of the fingerprint being
captured?
Answer. The use of the real time image quality capture inside of US
VISIT has been a significant enhancement to US VISIT. This capture
improvement has really enhanced US VISIT and expanding this to IDENT is
currently a system change request for the contractors to implement.
Question. What funds will the Department be dedicating to this
project in fiscal year 2004, and what account will fund this project?
Answer. US VISIT is working to obtain approval to utilize $4
million (which remains unexpended) from the $10.1 million received as
part of the 2002 Counter Terrorism funding (Public Law 107-117).
Question. What funds are requested for fiscal year 2005?
Answer. $3 million from base resources will be used in fiscal year
2005 to complete IDENT/IAFIS deployment.
72-HOUR RULE--SOUTHWEST BORDER
Question. As the Border and Transportation Security Directorate
moves forward with implementing the US VISIT system, what is the
Department's position on revising the 72-hour rule to allow Mexican
citizens that have been cleared to possess a border crossing card to
stay in the United States for a longer period of time?
Answer. While the Department of State adjudicates the application
for a Border Crossing Card (BCC), DHS is responsible for establishing
the policy surrounding the use and eligibility of such a visa document.
Many Mexican citizens who travel to and from the United States
regularly apply for a multi-use travel document, also known as a
``laser visa,'' which serves as either a BCC or a B1/B2 visa. Mexican
citizens who use the travel document only as a BCC will not initially
be subject to US VISIT processing during primary inspection inasmuch as
their biometric data (fingerscans and photographs) is captured during
the BCC issuance process. This is an interim solution for the land
border while the Department explores the long term solution to record
the entry and exit of persons crossing our land ports of entry. As the
next phase of US VISIT is implemented at southern land ports of entry
by the end of 2004, if a Mexican citizen chooses to use the BCC as a
B1/B2 visa (traveling outside the ``border zone'' and/or staying longer
than 72 hours in the United States), he or she will undergo US VISIT
processing at the land border secondary inspection areas. Readers for
BCC's will be deployed at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by the end
of June 2004.
Question. When does the Department plan to move forward with
revising the rule?
Answer. We hope to complete our review soon. Once the review of the
BCC document is complete, we'll be able to make a more informed
decision regarding this rule.
STAFFING OF UNDER SECRETARY'S OFFICE
Question. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate
oversees 20 percent of the entire Department's budget--with such
disparate areas as trade enforcement, airport screening, protection of
Federal facilities, and training inspectors. Not only is the
responsibility wide, but it includes arguably the organization with the
most difficult management problems. For the last year, the Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security's office has relied
heavily on detailees from within the Department and even from
organizations outside of the Department of Homeland Security.
Currently, 56 percent of the filled positions in the office are staffed
by detailees. Have you been able to move ahead with hiring permanent
employees? Do you expect the office to be fully staffed by permanent
employees by the end of fiscal year 2004?
Answer. We have aggressively pursued the permanent staffing for the
Office of the Under Secretary. We have entered into an interagency
agreement with the Office of Personnel Management to provide dedicated
position classification and staffing services to this office and fully
expect to have selections made for all permanent staff by the end of
fiscal year 2004.
Question. Is the Under Secretary's office staffed properly to allow
it to oversee and coordinate such a board reach of programs?
Answer. The Under Secretary's office is properly staffed to oversee
the Directorate's programs. We appreciate your recognition of the
challenges within the first year: forming the new bureaus of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE); fielding US VISIT system requirements on time and within budget;
maturing the Transportation Security Administration; and reorienting
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's mission focus to meet the
needs of the new Department. The Department continually assesses its
effectiveness and efficiency, and we will promptly communicate any
additional resource requirements, as necessary, to ensure we can meet
our mission requirements.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDING
Question. The budget proposes to transfer additional research and
development programs out of the components within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate to the Science and Technology
Directorate, but it does not transfer all of the programs. Have all of
these research and development programs been identified? Are there more
programs that should be transferred to the Science and Technology
Directorate, such as the Transportation Security Lab within the
Transportation Security Administration, or the Research, Evaluation and
Development Branch within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection?
Answer. The budget proposes to transfer some Border and
Transportation Security Directorate research and development programs
to the Science and Technology Directorate to help improve the
effectiveness and efficiency for certain programs. The other programs
have synergies or considerations that require additional consideration
before change is recommended.
Question. Do you feel that good working relationships have been
established between the Border and Transportation Directorate and the
Science and Technology Directorate? Are the needs of the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate being met?
Answer. Yes. Since the start up of the Department, we have worked
hand in hand with the Science and Technology Directorate. The Science
and Technology Directorate has established a Border and Transportation
Security Portfolio Manager. We also have a joint BTS and S&T Technology
Working Group that is developing a technology roadmap for BTS to ensure
we leverage technology in the most appropriate manner.
PERFORMANCE-BASED PAY SYSTEM
Question. The Department's budget for fiscal year 2005 includes
resources to implement the performance-based pay system. Did the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate play a role in creating the
framework for this system? Will the needs of the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate be served by this new system?
Answer. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate did play
a role in creating the framework for this system which is being
designed to meet the needs of all components of the Department. In
April 2003, the Secretary and the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management established a DHS/OPM HR Systems Design Team composed of DHS
managers and employees, HR experts from DHS and OPM, and professional
staff from the agency's three largest Federal employee unions. The DHS
employees on this 48 member team represented a cross-section of the
Department including employees from the following components within the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate: the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center; the Transportation Security Administration; and the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
During April and July of 2003, this team entered a research and
outreach phase, examining promising and successful practices and
conducting a series of town hall meetings and focus groups across the
country in order to inform employees about the design process and to
solicit employee's perceptions of current HR policies. These outreach
sessions included employees from across DHS, including a representative
sample of employees from the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate.
As a result of the work of the Systems Design Team, 52 options were
presented to a Senior Review Committee whose members included two top
officials from the Border and Transportation Security Directorate:
Robert Bonner, Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection; and James
Loy, then Administrator, Transportation Security Administration.
One of the roles of this Committee was to discuss the work of the
Design Team and to express views that would inform decisions to be made
subsequently by DHS Secretary Ridge and OPM Director James regarding
which systems should be implemented within DHS. The Committee members
agreed that any new HR system for DHS must be mission-focused and that
its design must facilitate mission performance and that HR options
might need to be tailored to specific parts of DHS.
The proposed regulations published in the Federal Register on
February 20, 2004, reflect the thoughtful review and consideration by
Secretary Ridge and Director James of all input received during the
process as outlined above. It was determined that the regulations, as
proposed, would best meet the needs of the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, as well as the Department as a whole.
Question. What are the estimates for how much it will cost to
implement the new performance-based pay compensation system within the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate?
Answer. $102.5 million requested in the President's Budget for
implementation of the new HR system Department wide. BTS' share of
implementation costs is covered in this request. Costing for design and
deployment of the new HR system was identified based on independent
government cost estimates that were developed to plan for the
anticipated systems integration contract. Other agencies of similar
size and complexity, notably Treasury, were benchmarked in projecting
team size and skill levels and associated labor rates. Cost breakouts
were estimated based on detailed GSA labor category descriptions and a
skill analysis of the types and levels of contract employees that will
be needed to support this effort. Major breakdown of costs includes:
$27 million for program management, oversight and evaluation; $31
million for training and communications to support system
implementation; $42 million for detailed systems design and
implementation support (business process reengineering, compensation
expertise, etc.); and $2.5 million to fund the HQ performance pool.
As additional background for each of the major funding categories:
Centralized program management funding is required to manage
appropriate cost, schedule, and control activities at the Departmental
level, ensuring that the system investment is managed appropriately and
at a good value. Program management funding will also provide for OMB-
required earned value management, as well as risk management and
evaluative activities. A centralized program management philosophy,
rather than each component attempting to manage their own
implementation, is critical in keeping program costs down and in
ensuring consistency of deployment across the enterprise.
Training funds are absolutely essential in ensuring that the new HR
flexibilities achieve the desired results. Funding is provided to
adequately train all DHS executives, managers and supervisors on
aspects of the new system and their responsibilities as leaders in the
DHS environment. Training funding will also provide for awareness and
change management activities to ensure that all DHS employees
understand system changes. Funding will support a comprehensive HR
certification program to ensure that DHS HR professional are prepared
for system changes and new job responsibilities.
Funding for detailed systems design and implementation support is
required to provide access to experts that will assist in designing the
particulars of the new DHS performance management system, job
evaluation system (including the creation of job clusters),
compensation system (including new pay ranges and market pay
processes), linkages for pay and performance, and development of
competencies for DHS positions. This detailed expertise is required to
ensure that DHS designs a program that appropriately links pay,
competencies and performance and through that linkage DHS performance
is enhanced.
We are projecting fully loaded life cycle costs of $408.5 million
for complete system implementation. It is important to note that the
$102.5 million is requested for full implementation of the new system
(including project management, systems design, training and
communications, etc.), not just the training aspects of system
implementation. Major components of this figure include $102.5 million
for system implementation, $10 million for Coast Guard performance
pool, an estimated $165 million for other component performance pools,
and a 6-year life cycle cost of $131 million for human resources
information technology.
Question. Is there a timeline as to when each of the components of
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate will transition to
this new compensation system? If so, what is it?
Answer. Current plans provide for all components of the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, which are covered by the proposed
regulations, to be converted to a new compensation system in January of
2006.
TETHERED AEROSTAT RADAR SYSTEM
Question. The information provided by the Tethered Aerostat Radar
System, known as TARS, is a critical component in the Department's
efforts to interdict illicit air traffickers. Do you believe that the
Department of the Defense is providing sufficient support to the TARS
program to enable the Air and Marine Program to effectively carry out
its mission?
Answer. The TARS program has declined from 14 operational sites to
8 operational sites (Lajas, Puerto Rico, is due back on-line in May).
Recent close coordination and meetings between the Department of
Homeland Security and the Deputy Assistant of Defense for Counter
Narcotics have resulted in frank and open discussions related to TARS.
The dialogue is productive and ongoing at this time, and DHS'
requirements have been acknowledged by DOD. DHS believes that this
critical system supports homeland security and provides a critical
detection and monitoring capability. That mission is a DOD
responsibility. The DHS position is that Congress properly assigned the
mission to DOD and funded TARS to meet the mission requirements.
Question. Does the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
have the necessary expertise and personnel to take over the management
and maintenance of the TARS program?
Answer. That mission is a DOD responsibility. The DHS position is
that Congress properly assigned the mission to DOD and funded TARS to
meet the mission requirements.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY FOR ALL MODES
Question. Three major grant programs currently administered by the
Transportation Security Administration involving trucking security,
port security grants, and Operation Safe Commerce are slated to be
moved to the Office for Domestic Preparedness under the Department's
announced reorganization of grant programs. The fiscal year 2005 budget
proposes to reduce or terminate funding for these programs.
What funding will be available within the Maritime and Land
Security operations for fiscal year 2005 to increase security for
railways, roadways, and all other modes of transportation in light of
the Administration's proposal to terminate funding for intercity bus
and trucking grants?
Answer. The responsibility of securing our Nation's rail and mass
transit systems is a shared one. DHS, DOT, and other Federal agencies
are working together to enhance rail and transit security in
partnership with the public and private entities that own and operate
the Nation's rail and transit systems. The DHS grant program for
improving rail and transit security in urban areas has awarded or
allocated over $115 million since May 2003. Additionally, the
Administration has requested $24 million for TSA to advance security
efforts in the maritime and surface transportation arenas, and has
requested that $37 million of the Federal Transit Administrations Urban
Security Bus grants be available for security related projects. In
addition, DHS will conduct the following activities and initiatives to
strengthen security in surface modes:
--Implement a pilot program to test new technologies and screening
concepts to evaluate the feasibility of screening luggage and
carry-on bags for explosives at rail stations and aboard
trains;
--Develop and implement a mass transit vulnerability self-assessment
tool;
--Continue the distribution of public security awareness material
(i.e., tip cards, pamphlets, and posters) for motorcoach,
school bus, passenger rail, and commuter rail employees;
--Increase passenger, rail employee, and local law enforcement
awareness through public awareness campaigns and security
personnel training;
--Ensure compliance with safety and security standards for commuter
and rail lines and better help identify gaps in the security
system in coordination with DOT, with additional technical
assistance and training provided by TSA;
--Continue to work with industry and State and local authorities to
establish baseline security measures based on current industry
best practices and with modal administrations within the DOT as
well as governmental and industry stakeholders, to establish
best practices, develop security plans, assess security
vulnerabilities, and identify needed security enhancements; and
--Study hazardous materials (HAZMAT) security threats and identify
best practices for transport of HAZMAT.
Question. How will the Transportation Security Administration
coordinate with the Office for Domestic Preparedness on the grant
programs (trucking security, port security grants, intercity bus
grants, and Operation Safe Commerce) that will be moved pursuant to the
reorganization?
Answer. It is anticipated that TSA will continue to provide the
necessary operational expertise for the grant programs through
participation in pre-award management functions. These functions
include determination of eligibility and evaluation criteria,
solicitation and application review procedures, selection
recommendations and post award technical monitoring. TSA will also
continue to leverage existing transportation expertise by working with
industry stakeholders and DOT modal administrations to ensure that
Federal security grants facilitate the seamless integration of security
planning activities by industry stakeholders and governmental
stakeholders at the regional, State, and local levels.
Question. In addition to the $169 million made available for the
port security grant program by the Transportation Security
Administration, $75 million was made available in fiscal year 2003 by
the Office for Domestic Preparedness for the same purpose. Do you
anticipate that funds will be made available once again for port
security grants within the existing grant programs in the Office for
Domestic Preparedness?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 President's budget requests $46
million for Port Security Grants under the Office for Domestic
Preparedness.
TSA'S ROLE WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Question. Over 54 percent of the President's budget request for the
Transportation Security Administration for fiscal year 2005 is
dedicated for aviation passenger and baggage screeners' pay, benefits,
training, and human resource services. Last year, Admiral Loy testified
that the Transportation Security Administration was developing a
National Transportation System Security Plan (NTSSP) to explain ``its'
vision to complete the important task of ensuring the security of all
modes of transportation, not just the aviation sector''.
Will the Transportation Security Administration continue to have
responsibility for security over all sectors of transportation or will
aviation security continue to be the main focus for TSA?
Answer. Ensuring that our Nation's transportation systems are
secure must be accomplished through effective partnering between
appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry entities.
Although TSA was created in the wake of the September 11 attacks and
charged with responsibility for ensuring that all modes of
transportation are secured, the Administration has consistently held
that that this responsibility must involve the coordination of
appropriate Federal, State, local and private industry partners, many
of whom were already in the business of providing security for their
particular piece of the transportation puzzle. TSA's main charge, both
under ATSA and now as part of the DHS family, is to coordinate these
efforts under the guidance of the Secretary and the Under Secretary for
Border and Transportation Security, identifying gaps and working with
appropriate partners to ensure that existing security gaps are filled.
Recognizing this, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
requested substantial resources in fiscal year 2005 across the agencies
within the Department involved with securing transportation modes other
than aviation, including resources in the Coast Guard and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) for ports, maritime security, and cargo
security; in Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
for vulnerability assessments, intelligence, and infrastructure
protection for all sectors including transportation; and in Emergency
Preparedness & Response (EP&R) for emergency response to only name a
few. In addition to working with other DHS components, TSA works
closely with our sister Federal agencies outside of DHS to ensure that
all government resources are maximized. For example, under the
leadership of BTS and DHS, TSA is coordinating key standards-setting
efforts in areas such as transit and rail security, and is working
closely with modal administrations of the Department of Transportation
to help leverage their existing resources and security efforts to
accomplish security goals.
Question. When can we expect the National Transportation System
Security Plan and what role will the Transportation Security
Administration play in securing all modes of transportation?
Answer. TSA's role in securing the transportation system begins at
the system or sector-wide level, across the individual modes, thus
ensuring consistency and consideration of inter-modal issues (such as
assets, incidents, or supply chains that straddle multiple modes, and
inter-modal exercises). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
assigned TSA primary Sector Specific Responsibility (SSR) for the
Transportation Sector as DHS implements Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which directs the establishment of ``a national
policy for Federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize
United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect
them from terrorist attacks.'' In accordance with DHS's HSPD-7
implementation plan, TSA is developing the Transportation Sector
Specific Plan (SSP). A first draft of the SSP is due to DHS by early
summer, 2004 (at the same time when SSPs from the other 12 sectors of
critical infrastructure are also due). In developing the transportation
SSP, TSA is working under BTS guidance and with partners in the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Department of Transportation (DOT). The SSP will
discuss how Federal and private-sector stakeholders will communicate
and work together; how important assets in the transportation sector
will be identified, assessed, and prioritized; how protective programs
will be developed; how progress in reducing risk will be measured; and
how R&D will be prioritized in the sector. In the Transportation
Sector, the SSP will further these efforts currently underway and help
ensure that they are systematic, complete, and consistent with the
efforts in the other 12 sectors.
Prior to the issuance of HSPD-7, TSA was TSA was developing the
National Transportation System Security Plan (NTSSP). Its purpose was
to provide a systematic sector-wide approach to Transportation
Security, to pull all Federal partners into the effort together, and to
provide guidance to the writers of Modal Security Plans. Now HSPD-7 is
driving an economy-wide systematic approach to Infrastructure
Protection, including the Transportation SSP described above. The SSP
will be expanded into a ``new'' NTSSP, by adding additional chapters
(some already drafted in the ``old'' NTSSP) to complete the original
intent of the NTSSP. This includes guiding development of Modal
Security Plans, providing explicit links to other Federal plans such as
the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management
System (NIMS), and other operational guidance. On behalf of DHS and in
conjunction with other Federal agencies, the completed NTSSP will guide
and integrate a family of security plans to prevent, mitigate, and
respond to intentional disruption of the Nation's transportation
systems while ensuring freedom of movement for people and commerce.
Parts of the draft ``old'' NTSSP are already in use, as the USCG
drafts the MTSA-mandated Maritime Transportation Security Plan, and as
other modal security plans begin development. A draft of the ``new''
NTSSP should be completed by the end of summer, 2004.
TSA's role within each sector will vary from mode to mode. In
aviation security, TSA has the operational and regulatory lead role.
TSA's efforts in non-aviation security over the past 2 years have
focused on greater information sharing between industry and all levels
of government, assessing vulnerabilities in non-aviation sectors to
develop new security measures and plans, increasing training and public
awareness campaigns, and providing greater assistance and funding for
non-aviation security activities. In partnership with other component
agencies of DHS and in coordination with DOT, State, local and private
sector partners, TSA will continue to leverage existing security
initiatives, coordinate the development of national performance-based
security standards and guidance; identify areas where regulations may
be necessary to improve the security of passengers, cargo, conveyances,
transportation facilities and infrastructures; and identify areas where
better compliance with established regulations and policies can be
achieved. TSA will work with DHS components, modal administrators
within DOT, and its government and industry stakeholders to continue
these efforts, establish best practices, develop security plans, assess
security vulnerabilities, and identify needed security enhancements.
Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the
Transportation Security Administration be maintained as a distinct
entity within the Department of Homeland Security for 2 years from the
date of enactment with the sunset of the Transportation Security
Administration as a distinct entity within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate to occur November 2004. How do you
envision the Transportation Security Administration's role within the
Department of Homeland Security if not maintained as a separate
distinct entity in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate?
Answer. The Homeland Security Act requires that TSA be maintained
as a distinct entity for 2 years after enactment. As an integral part
of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, TSA is currently
providing a robust security framework in the aviation environment and
coordinating closely with other DHS and DOT partner agencies both to
identify security vulnerabilities in other modes of transportation and
identify appropriate mitigation strategies to reduce those
vulnerabilities. Further, TSA is coordinating Federal efforts to
develop the transportation chapter of the National Critical
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NCIP) being developed as a result of
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) number 7. At this time
there are no plans to alter TSA's status as a distinct entity within
the BTS Directorate; however, the Secretary continually reviews the
missions and programs of each DHS component to ensure that they
complement, rather than duplicate the missions of any other. In the
event that the Secretary decides, under authority conferred upon him by
Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act, to reorganize any of the
components of the Department including the TSA, appropriate
notification will be provided to relevant Congressional committees by
the President.
FEDERAL SCREENER OPT-OUT PROGRAM
Question. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed
shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provided for
the ability of airports to apply to the Department of Homeland Security
to opt-out of using Federal screeners and to use qualified private
screening companies at the end of a 3-year period which occurs this
November 2004.
When do you anticipate the results of the Department's study on the
private screening companies that have been providing passenger
screening at the five airports participating in the pilot program will
be made available?
Answer. TSA hired BearingPoint to conduct an independent
performance evaluation of the private contractor screening compared to
Federal screening. The study evaluated performance in security,
compared costs, and analyzed customer/stakeholder satisfaction. It
concluded that TSA has succeeded in developing and executing a pilot
program that both meets the Congressional requirements and ensures
outstanding security. Results of the study were made public on April
22, 2004 and are available on TSA's web site at http://www.tsa.gov/
interweb/assetlibrary/Summary_Report.pdf.
Question. Do you feel that there will be a large number of airports
that will apply to use private screeners rather than continue to use
Federal screeners?
Answer. Under ATSA, individual airports may, starting on Nov 19,
2004, submit proposals to ``opt out'' of having Federal passenger and
baggage screening and to return to private companies providing those
security services under contract to and close oversight by TSA. TSA
continues to work with its key stakeholders for the development of an
application process for airports who are interested in opting out. TSA
is in the early stages of developing an efficient, understandable, and
effective procedure for opt-out applications and is currently drafting
the specific contents of the opt-out guidance. At this time, it is
still unclear how many airports will seek to opt out. Most airports are
awaiting additional details regarding the application process and
parameters of the program before making a decision. Should an airport
request to opt out, its application must be assessed and approved by
the TSA Administrator. TSA is committed to ensuring a fair, supportive
transition program that recognizes the outstanding skills of TSA's
current work force.
Question. With the opt-out date approaching rapidly, when do you
anticipate providing guidelines, application procedures, and approval
criteria for the airports that are trying to decide whether or not to
apply to use private screening companies?
Answer. TSA is currently working to develop guidelines for the opt-
out program. TSA hopes to release initial guidance in late May or early
June. This guidance will consist of an overview of issues such as,
indemnification and reimbursement to contractors, the application and
award process, and delineating clear roles and authority for TSA
headquarters, the Federal Security Directors and their staff, and the
airports and contractors, that will help airports gauge their level of
interest in the opt-out program.
Question. With $119 million provided this year for the private
screening pilot programs and only a $10 million increase requested for
fiscal year 2005, how do you anticipate providing funding for
additional airports that may apply to use private screeners?
Answer. The Administration did not request a separate funding line
item for private screening for precise reason that we cannot predict in
advance what airport interest will be in an opt-out program. All
funding requested was rolled up into one screener line, and it is
critical that the Congress provide maximum flexibility to allocate
resources. Supporting budget documents showed a level of $130 million
purely for display and comparability purposes. This amount will provide
sufficient resources to maintain contract screener operations at the
five pilot airports through the end of fiscal year 2005. Actual funding
needs for contract screening operations may be higher or lower
depending on a variety of factors such as the current evaluation of
contract screening, the program's future deployment and management
structure, the level of interest garnered from the airport community,
and the time it takes to smoothly transition airports into and/or out
of contract screening. TSA will adjust resources between Federal and
contract screeners as necessary.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
Question. The United States Coast Guard and the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center recently announced plans to transfer the
United States Coast Guard's Maritime Law Enforcement School to the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Charleston, South Carolina.
What impact will this proposed change have on the Department of
Homeland Security and what additional fiscal year 2005 funding will
this consolidation require?
Answer. At the U.S. Coast Guard's request, the Maritime Law
Enforcement School located at Coast Guard Training Center Yorktown, VA,
and the Boarding Team Member School located at Coast Guard Training
Center Petaluma, CA, will be merged, relocated and commissioned as the
Coast Guard Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) Academy at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center in Charleston, SC, by October 1, 2004. Both
the Coast Guard and the entire Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
will benefit by this consolidation of law enforcement training
functions. To reflect the increase in Coast Guard mission capabilities
and training requirements, the MLE Academy will be established to
provide expanded training for their personnel in support of maritime
homeland security and law enforcement. The MLE Academy will provide for
the training of maritime law enforcement capabilities central to all
Coast Guard maritime security missions. The MLE Academy will also
provide training to local and State law enforcement personnel in
support of the Federal Boat Safety Act. It will cost approximately $4
million to relocate the Coast Guard MLE Schools to the FLETC
Charleston. This includes one new building, a personal defensive
tactics building. The FLETC will fund $2 million for construction and
renovations. The U.S. Coast Guard will fund approximately $2 million
for transportation of existing equipment, relocation of personnel,
dependents and household goods, boarding platform training aids,
installation of a simunitions lab and telecommunications
infrastructure.
The Coast Guard will move 50 positions (FTP) to Charleston, SC. The
positions come from the USCG training centers at Yorktown, VA (36) and
Petaluma, CA (14).
The Coast Guard estimates it will train 1,872 students annually.
The affiliation and co-location with of the Coast Guard with the
FLETC provides them a first step towards standardization. It will
enhance their law enforcement training and promote better coordination
among field activities with their sister agencies. Both the Coast Guard
and the entire Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will benefit by
this consolidation of law enforcement training functions. The Homeland
Security Act consolidated 22 agencies in creating the Department of
Homeland Security, and established Law Enforcement as one its core
missions. The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) directed the
integration of standards and training curriculum for ``maritime
security professionals.''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Question. Over the last two funding cycles, Congress has provided
$85 million to the TSA for development, tech evaluations, pilot
programs, and rollout of a Transportation Worker Indentification Card
(TWIC). How many TWIC cards have been issued to date? What has the TSA
spent this $85 million on?
Answer. The Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, provided
$35M for the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and
Registered Traveler (RT) programs. Of this total, $25 million was
initially assigned to TWIC, and $10 million was assigned to RT. TWIC
spent a total of $15 million on planning and executing the Technology
Evaluation Phase. TSA internally reallocated $5 million and returned
the remaining $5 million to the Treasury. The $10 million for RT was
subsequently reallocated internally. The fiscal year 2004 Appropriation
Act provided $50 million to TWIC to support planning and execution of
the Prototype Phase. Our most recent analysis indicates that $50
million is sufficient for this task. To date no operational TWIC cards
have been issued. It is estimated that up to 200,000 cards may be
issued during the Prototype Phase.
Question. When Congress tasked TSA and the Department of
Transportation with developing a plan to protect our transportation
infrastructure, Secretary Mineta moved forward with a vision for how a
transportation credential should work. Unfortunately, implementation
appears to have been hindered by poor leadership and a shifting idea of
what TWIC should be and how it should be implemented. Where is the
problem?
Answer. TWIC development continues to move forward as planned.
During the early stages of the development process, data, technical
information and lessons learned were gathered from a wide range of
sources including industry stakeholders and other Federal credentialing
projects. The RFP for the TWIC Prototype Phase will be released in the
immediate future. The proposed plan leverages the stakeholder
relationships established over the past 24 months and during the
Technology Evaluation Phase, as well as a partnership with the State of
Florida for the network of deep-water ports. The goal of the prototype
is to evaluate the full range of TWIC business processes within a
representative operational environment. The plan includes facilities
and workers from all transportation modes and is focused in three
regions, Philadelphia-Wilmington, Los Angeles-Long Beach, and the
Florida ports.
Various card production options were evaluated within the context
of system requirements. Centralized card production using existing
Federal card production facilities that meet all of the system
requirements was determined to be the most cost effective solution for
the prototype phase. Key factors in the evaluation included: physical
security and controlled access to the production process; secure supply
chains for card stock and special security features (e.g. holograms,
special inks, secret keys); standardization of training; and, economies
of scale with high capacity production machines. Centralized card
production will be further evaluated during the prototype, and the
final evaluation report will include a detailed analysis on all card
production options and a recommendation for DHS decision.
Question. According to your written testimony, you have combined
the credentialing under one program and have requested $20 million for
that line item. I am told that this request is nearly $100 million
below the level TSA needs to implement the program for only the highest
risk areas and fully $150 million below the level needed for full and
timely implementation system wide. How do you plan to make up this
shortfall?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 President's Request includes $50
million in fee spending authority for the TWIC program. As prototype
planning continues, we have continued to explore questions surrounding
the population size, technological requirements, and methods for
achieving rapid implementation. This planning will be shared with
Congress once completed.
Question. It is my understanding that while the fiscal year 2003
bill required a thorough evaluation of all technologies, the $85
million would be adequate to evaluate and establish a basic framework
and prototype for a TWIC. Why now are you asking for more money to
complete this part of the project?
Answer. The funds that have been provided by Congress have enabled
TSA to complete the planning and technology evaluation phases and will
enable TSA to execute the Prototype Phase. In anticipation of a
successful completion of the prototype with positive results, TSA is
requesting $50 million in fiscal year 2005 to begin TWIC
implementation.
Question. Does TSA anticipate establishing a fee for the access and
administration of the TWIC? If so what will this fee fund? When can we
expect these programs to be fully underway?
Answer. The TWIC concept is a Federally-led public-private
partnership to improve security across the transportation system.
Accordingly, as authorized by Congress, TSA envisions that a fee would
be collected for each credential issued and would fund the cost of
enrollment, card production and issuance, identity management, network
infrastructure, and revocation alerts. Transportation facilities will
be responsible for access control systems and any modifications that
they choose to make in accordance with their own security plans.
The Prototype Phase is planned to be implemented over 7 months.
Upon completion of Prototype, DHS will review the data and decide how
best to implement the findings. TSA anticipates that we could begin
shortly thereafter to execute that decision.
Question. As I remember the original timetable, our ports and
greater transportation system should now be operating under a
credentialing system that will provide increased security through use
of a TWIC card and the requisite card readers and databases. The TSA
TWIC website outlines the three goals of the program as to: improve
security, enhance commerce, and protect personal privacy. Has the
lengthy process in some way increased the potential of accomplishing
these goals? What are we getting for increased costs and missed
deadlines?
Answer. The evolution of the program will result in a more robust
Prototype Phase that incorporates a process for collecting data that
will allow the exploration of multiple options for TWIC implementation,
including detailed cost-benefit analysis, assessment of feasibility of
use by facilities multiple disparate business practices, and more
inclusive, in-depth consultations with stakeholders.
Question. What have you done to ensure the security of the card?
Can you offer me assurances that the security efforts you have taken
will stand up to the test?
Answer. TWIC views security from a system perspective. TWIC is not
just a secure ID card, but it is also an identity management solution
that leverages advanced security technology and procedures to deliver
an overall chain of trust. Both the Technology Evaluation Phase and the
upcoming Prototype Phase include extensive evaluation of security
features, and security testing and evaluation will be an ongoing part
of the TWIC program.
For the card specifically, TWIC is using advanced security features
that leverage the strength of the core technology. The surface-based
technology will include special inks, security overlays and complex
visual design features that will counter attempts to forge or tamper.
The Integrated Computer Chip (ICC) is based on the NIST Government
Smart Card Specification and complies with a number of security
protocols and validations. The ICC includes encryption, secret keys,
and active defenses. TWIC will also use a biometric securely embedded
in the ICC to link the individual positively to the completed
background check and to updates to that background check.
Question. Concerns have been raised that TWIC will hinder rather
than enhance commerce. Can you provide data on what kind of delays will
occur due to TWIC access requirements?
Answer. One of TWIC's three goals is the enhancement of commerce.
The TWIC architecture was developed using extensive stakeholder inputs.
The TWIC Integrated Project Teams (IPT) have been working with regional
stakeholders to develop site level implementation plans, which will
enhance commerce at these sites. During the Technology Evaluation
Phase, access control transaction times were measured using a range of
technologies. These results were incorporated into the planning for the
Prototype Phase, which will further refine the process. The Prototype
Phase evaluation report will include extensive data on all aspects of
access control transactions, including time and impact to the
commercial process.
Question. Delays are causing problems down the line for my, and I
am sure many other senators, constituents. Recently, I was asked by one
of my constituents whether they should move forward with their own
credentialing system upgrades. I was remiss to inform him that it did
not appear TWIC would be available for use in the foreseeable future.
My constituent informed me that because of these delays he would be
forced to move forward with upgrades of his own that may or may not
work within the TWIC system. It seems ridiculous to force constituents
committed to security to invest in multiple technologies. Mr.
Secretary, that does not appear to enhance commerce to me, does it to
you? Are we supposed to have a seamless system?
Answer. TSA shares your determination to maximize the benefits of
TWIC while minimizing financial or technological burdens on
stakeholders. Consequently, a guiding principle in the design of TWIC
is that the credential be interoperable with existing security systems.
TWIC envisions a secure identity management tool that can be used in
existing access control systems. TSA is communicating with stakeholders
in order to update them on the direction of our work and thereby assist
them to make informed decisions about security investments.
Question. In addition, I am always concerned about the privacy of
individuals. Many have raised concerns about the TWIC and its
relationship to a national ID system. How will you protect the
information? How will you guarantee the security of the personal
information required to attain the TWIC?
Answer. Protection of personal privacy is one of the program's key
goals, having been seamlessly integrated in planning from the initial
system design. The DOT lead privacy advocate was a member of the
original design team. The TWIC team has and will continue to work with
the DHS and TSA Privacy Officers to ensure that TWIC remains faithful
to our stated goals.
TWIC recognizes that acceptance of the credential is inexorably
linked to the holder's confidence that his or her privacy will be
respected. TWIC is designed to operate on the minimum amount of
personal information, which will be securely stored and encrypted.
Access to personal information will be controlled and auditable. All
information that will be gathered is subject to a formal privacy impact
assessment.
Question. The focus of TSA and the Directorates funding is towards
Airline Security. As I understand it, the TWIC will increase security
across the transportation system as a whole. In fact, at some point
Admiral Loy characterized TWIC as a ``Flagship Program''. If this is a
``Flagship Program'', what is the delay in implementation? What are you
doing to fix this problem?
Answer. TWIC remains an important initiative for DHS and TSA. The
longer timeline is indicative of the need to explore different options
on how best to implement an identity management system for
transportation workers across multiple facilities, consultation with
stakeholders, and to incorporate learning into the development process.
Question. Mr. Secretary, what have you done to ensure that
evaluation of TWIC moves forward in a manner that does provide the tax
payer with a safe and secure transportation system, while improving the
flow of commerce and constantly ensuring our citizens privacy?
Answer. We recognize the urgency of the advancing this program. The
Prototype Phase is scheduled to begin in the summer of 2004 and last 8
months. We are committed to a fast track process for review of the
results of the Prototype Phase and making final decisions on
implementation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
CAPPS II--AIRLINE PASSENGER INFORMATION SYSTEM
Question. Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act included a provision requiring the General
Accounting Office (GAO) to review the privacy and security of the
proposed CAPPS II airline passenger pre-screening system. Last month,
the GAO submitted a report to us that stated that your Department has
met only one of the eight criteria that we set out before you could
move ahead with deployment of the system.
I understand that the Department concurs with GAO's findings. Where
is DHS now in testing of the CAPPS II system? What is your timeframe?
How long do you expect to test the system?
Answer. Seven of the eight areas identified by the Congress could
not be certified by the GAO as having been completed, as they are
contingent on testing of CAPPSII. System testing can only begin once
TSA obtains a significant quantity of PNR data from airlines or from
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under the terms of an
agreement DHS reached with the European Commission for CBP's use of
such data. However, the agreement has not yet been ratified by the
European Parliament. Once PNR data is received for testing purposes, 30
days is required for evaluation of the data. Testing will then be
conducted for 30 days, followed by 30 days for analysis of the test
results. Once testing is complete, the seven remaining areas of
interest to the Congress can be certified by the GAO.
CAPPS II--TESTING
Question. One of the concerns about the testing of the proposed
CAPPS II system has been the lack of access to actual traveler data to
test the system. Airlines have been reluctant to voluntarily provide
data because of the very real concerns of privacy groups about how that
data will be used. Some have stated that this lack of data for testing
is one of the reasons why some of the specific criteria laid out in the
Appropriations Act have not been met. There is some speculation that
the Department is planning to issue regulations to compel airlines to
provide data for the purposes of testing.
Can you confirm for the Subcommittee whether the Department is
planning to compel airlines to provide data on travelers for the
purposes of testing CAPPS II? Will you provide this Subcommittee notice
of your plans prior to making any public notice? Also, of the funds
requested for this program in the fiscal year 2005 budget request, what
is requested solely for additional testing of the program--as opposed
to implementation and operation of the system?
Answer. TSA plans to use the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
vehicle to seek public comment on the collection of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) data for the operation of the CAPPS II program, and would
likely issue an order compelling the collection of historical PNR data
for testing purposes simultaneously with publication of that NPRM. Each
of these documents would require regulated parties to take reasonable
steps to ensure that passengers are provided notice of the purpose for
which the information is collected, the authority under which it is
collected, and any consequences associated with a passenger's failure
to provide the information.
As mentioned above, system testing can only begin once TSA obtains
a significant quantity of PNR data from airlines or from U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) under the terms of an agreement DHS reached
with the European Commission for CBP's use of such data. However, the
agreement has not yet been ratified by the European Parliament.
There are two components to the plan for CAPPS II testing: testing
with historical PNR data and full system testing that would take place
once connectivity is established with an airline to test with live
data. TSA estimates the cost associated with completing system and
performance testing at $5 million. This involves testing to the system
``end to end'' to validate the ability of the system to receive all of
the different types of records from the airlines and post the results
of the risk assessment to the boarding pass. Once system testing has
been completed, performance testing is required to verify that the time
required to complete each end-to-end transaction meets the system
performance standards.
fingerprint database integration: vastly delayed and dangerous
Question. Last week, Department of Justice Inspector General Glenn
A. Fine released a report that examined the case of a Mexican citizen,
Victor Manual Batres, who had been detained by the Border Patrol on two
occasions in January 2002 for illegally entering the United States.
Both the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security
say they recognize that the databases need to be integrated, however
the IG report found uncertainty as to who is responsible for the
overall management of the integration project. It states that Justice
and Homeland have yet to enter into a memorandum of understanding
delineating the specific roles and responsibilities of each agency in
the project. It also finds that the integration project recently has
been slowed by the attention placed by Homeland on other technology
projects, such as US VISIT. You may recall that I raised this issue
with Secretary Ridge last year when he met with Senator Cochran and me
to discuss fingerprint database integration as it related to US VISIT.
Last week, Secretary Ridge acknowledged this problem and pledged to
find $4 million this year to begin to ``fix'' it. From which sources
will you find these funds and when can we expect to receive a
reprogramming or transfer proposal?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is committed to
accelerating implementation of IDENT/IAFIS 10 fingerprint capability
for enforcement processing at ports of entry, and at Border Patrol
locations and Immigration and Customs Enforcement offices.
While we begin planning our implementation plan, we plan on using
$4 million of the remaining funds provided in Public Law 107-117
(fiscal year 2002 counter-terrorism funding) for IDENT/IAFIS
implementation. The $4 million, when combined with fiscal year 2003
funds already provided ($3.5 million obligated for IDENT/IAFIS), will
allow BTS to implement IDENT with 10 print capabilities in secondary
inspection at 115 airports, 14 seaports and 50 of the largest land
border ports. In addition, this funding will support implementation of
the IAFIS/IDENT 10 print capability at 70 percent of the Border Patrol
stations. The remaining land ports of entry, 30 percent of the Border
Patrol stations and major ICE locations (to be determined) will receive
this capability early in calendar year 2005. Funding for fielding these
capabilities is estimated to be approximately $3 million, including the
implementation of IDENT/IAFIS at Border Patrol stations will provide
the capability to biometrically identify and/or perform status
verifications on individuals suspected of illegally crossing the
border. Implementation at ICE offices will support investigation of
individuals apprehended for overstays and/or watch list hits.
Question. The IG report made a series of recommendations to
expedite integration of IDENT/IAFIS. Does this mean that your
Department will take the lead responsibility in merging these data
bases so that similar tragedies can be prevented in the future? How
long will a full integration take and how much is it likely to cost?
Answer. Yes, the Department of Homeland Security will work with the
Department of Justice to accelerate our integration into the FBI's
IAFIS (10 print, criminal history) and the legacy INS IDENT (2-print,
immigration) systems. An integrated workstation has already been
developed. It has been deployed to a limited number of sites. DHS
intends to complete deployment of this capability in 2005. The total
cost for fielding the capability is expected to be $7 million and will
be funded within existing resources.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS: STAFFING
Question. Your budget request for the Federal Air Marshals is
essentially a flat-line request similar to last year's funding level.
Yet on two occasions in less than a year--late last summer and again
over the recent winter holidays--you increased the threat level to Code
Orange--in large part because intelligence and other indicators lead
you to believe there were enhanced threats to the United States via
airplanes flying into or over this country.
However, based on budget briefings with my staff, I understand that
the resources directed to this program are not sufficient to hire the
number of Air Marshals that should be hired to maintain a more robust
presence on targeted flights. If that is indeed accurate, why are you
not requesting more funding for hiring additional air marshals,
expanding their training, and increasing the tools at their disposal
for protection of airplanes and their passengers?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to view
the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) as a fundamental component of
our national security plan and overall counter-terrorism efforts. The
services provided by the FAMS are integral to our efforts to instill
and sustain public confidence in our civil aviation system and for
providing an expanded law enforcement capability in our skies that
previously did not exist. In fact, within the span of roughly two and a
half years the FAMS has fielded a trained work force of literally
thousands of Federal Air Marshals to protect America's citizens and
interests in our commercial air transportation system.
In this same time, DHS has also worked with the Congress to invest
in, develop and implement a layered security plan that encompasses the
coordinated efforts of an entire spectrum of Federal, State and local
agencies. These agencies are working together to provide an array of
intelligence, enforcement and protection services to our civil aviation
system, our borders and to other areas vital to the Nation. Under this
strategy, we have established mechanisms and programs designed
specifically to complement one another within the limited resources
afforded to the Department. For example, DHS has invested in cutting
edge technology to airport and baggage screening activities; we have
hardened cockpit doors; we have established a Federal flight deck
officer training program; and we are continuously working to apply the
latest intelligence information in shaping our decision-making and
response to terrorist threats.
The Department has also evaluated how to best use Federal Air
Marshals to expand their effectiveness and overall impact. The FAMS was
recently transferred from the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This
fusion of the FAMS into ICE not only establishes an integrated
enforcement presence in the aviation sector; it enhances ICE's overall
capabilities and resources to enforce its mission, which is to detect
and prevent vulnerabilities or violations that threaten the Nation's
homeland security. Furthermore, this realignment has made possible
other initiatives such as the Mission Surge Program, which will pair
Federal Air Marshals with ICE agents during peak threat periods, such
as the Code Orange alerts or other such events.
In addition to Mission Surge, the Department is also evaluating
ways to capitalize on the presence of thousands of Federal law
enforcement personnel using the civil aviation system to travel on a
daily basis. Although these personnel cannot replace a Federal Air
Marshal, they are armed and capable of providing a level of security in
the case of an in-flight event. This initiative, known as the Force
Multiplier Program, is in its infancy.
Through this layered approach, the Department continues to make
significant progress in our counter-terrorism efforts and capabilities.
The Department will continue to work with you and other members of the
Congress towards addressing your concerns and best meeting the Nation's
homeland security requirements.
US VISIT: FULL DISCLOSURE
Question. Last year Secretary Ridge took the old visa tracking
system known as ``entry-exit'' and as one of his first acts he gave it
a snazzy new name befitting the new Department--US VISIT--or the United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology. He also
committed that US VISIT would be operational at all of our Nation's
international airports and seaports by January 1, 2004. After some
lobbying by the airlines, who were concerned about possible problems
standing up the system--and leery of the prospect of long lines of
weary holiday travelers, he pushed back the operational day to January
5. By all accounts, the system worked, there were few technical
glitches and, as you noted in your testimony, some bad actors have been
caught by the new system. That is all to the good--as we want to know
who is entering and existing our country. Indeed, Congress first
started calling for an ``entry-exit'' system back in 1996.
But there seems to be a disconnect. There seems to be a bit of
over-selling of this program by the Secretary and the Department and
the Administration. It is true that we are capturing information and
checking fingerprints and photos with visa holders who are entering our
country at 115 airports and 14 seaports--but do not pop the champagne
just yet. At how many airports are we currently capturing information
to verify who is exiting the country? One. At only one airport out of
115 are we learning who is exiting our country. The same holds true of
exit information at our seaports--one out of 14.
Secretary Hutchinson, this troubles me. I am troubled that an
extremely important security program--and one that I support--is being
inaccurately represented. It is being presented as more than it truly
is. And I am concerned that if the Secretary and the Department can
make the claim that they met the deadline to get this program started--
when only half of the job is done for this first phase, how can we and
the American people know that the next deadline is truly met? And, if
you cannot meet your own self-imposed deadline for a relatively-easy
system in a controlled environment (people waiting to board a plane),
how can we be certain that you will meet your next deadline which we
understand is verifying the entry and exit of visa holders at our 50
largest land border ports-of-entry?
Answer. As stated in the record, the first Congressional mandate
for an electronic entry and exit system was in 1996. In 2000, the
Immigration and Naturalization Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA)
fully amended and replaced section 110 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Under the provisions
of the DMIA, the Administration is required to integrate all authorized
or required alien arrival and departure data that are in electronic
format in existing systems maintained (at that time) by the Department
of Justice and the Department of State. The DMIA also set forth
timelines for this integration and deployment effort.
On January 5, 2004, the deployment of the newly integrated systems
containing alien entry and departure data was successfully launched to
all of our Nation's international airports of entry, as well as to 14
of the Nation's largest sea ports at which international travelers
arrive. Although, not required by statute, the Secretary sought to
improve on the mandate and requested that all non-immigrants with non-
immigrant visas entering at these locations should also have their
fingerprints scanned so that checks of additional databases containing
information on aliens could also be made. We are also piloting the
capture of biometric data at the point of departure. The collection of
data from the pilot sites is expected to continue until early in fiscal
year 2005, with plans to initiate exit installation in fiscal year 2005
based upon the solutions identified.
Building upon these successes, US VISIT functionality will be
deployed to the top 50 land border ports of entry in accordance with
the timelines set forth in DMIA. US VISIT will work with the to-be-
awarded prime contractor to develop the processes, infrastructure and
technology required to capture similar data upon entry and exit at the
land borders in a way that will minimize any deleterious effect on the
flow of goods and peoples across our borders.
TERRORIST WATCHLIST INTEGRATION
Question. One of the most important items on the Department's list
of unfinished business is the integration of terrorist watchlists.
Earlier this year, Secretary Ridge said the list would be fully
functional ``by mid-May.'' Because many of the agencies you oversee--
such as the Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border
Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement--rely daily on
accurate information about the potential threats to this country posed
by individuals on these lists, I would imagine that the integration of
this information would be a priority.
What is the status of the watch list integration and what are you
doing to ensure that rapid progress is being made on this important
national security project?
Answer. Integration of terrorist watchlists is proceeding. The
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) has been established with its own
consolidated database comprising information from the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). TTIC is collecting information from all the
agencies holding watchlists to verify the information and add names and
data to TSC's list.
INTEROPERABILITY GRANTS
Question. According to ``A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire
Service'', a report conducted by FEMA in conjunction with the National
Fire Protection Administration, only one-fourth of all fire departments
can communicate with all of their rescue partners. The Council on
Foreign Relations' June, 2003 study on Homeland Security Needs
estimated that the need for interoperable communications equipment
funding was $6.8 billion over the next 5 years. The February 2003
National Task Force on Interoperability report entitled ``Why Can't We
Talk'' found that ``in many jurisdictions radio communications
infrastructure and equipment can be 20-40 years old. Different
jurisdictions use different equipment and different radio frequencies
that cannot communicate with each other. There are limited uniform
standards for technology and equipment.''
Last year, the Administration proposed and Congress agreed to drop
homeland security funding specifically for interoperability grants.
Once again, the President has proposed no specific funding for
interoperable grants and the $85 million Department of Justice program
for law enforcement interoperable grants is proposed for elimination.
The Secretary recently announced a very modest interim solution to the
interoperable problem. Yet, the Administration assumes that State and
local governments will use their first responder grants for this
purpose and requests no specific funding for the estimated $50 million
cost for the interim solution.
The President is proposing to reduce first responder grants by over
$700 million and government-wide by $1.5 billion. With these cuts, why
do you believe States will be able address both the interoperable
communication problem as well as the funding shortfall in first
responder requirements?
Answer. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request provides
significant support for the mission and programs administered by the
Office for Domestic Preparedness. As you know, The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) designated ODP as the principal
Federal agency responsible for the preparedness of the United States
for acts of terrorism, including coordinating preparedness efforts at
the Federal level, and working with all State, local, tribal, parish,
and private sector emergency response providers on all matters
pertaining to combating terrorism, including training, exercises, and
equipment support.
The President's request includes $3.561 million, which is a $3.3
million increase from the fiscal year 2004 request. With these
resources, ODP will be able to maintain its role in enhancing the
security of our Nation. The two primary means through which ODP
provides funds to States and the Nation's emergency prevention and
response community are the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and
the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). The President's fiscal year
2005 budget request includes $750 million for HSGP and more than $1.4
billion for UASI. With these funds, states, urban areas, and other
units of local government can undertake a wide range of domestic
preparedness activities, including the purchase of specialized
equipment. Interoperable communications equipment is an allowable
expense and falls within the HSGP and USAI funding requirements. In
fact, to facilitate communications interoperability, ODP strongly
encourages all new or upgraded radio systems and new radio equipment
purchased with these funds be compatible with a suite of standards
called ANSI/TIA/EIAA-102 Phase 1 (Project 25). These standards have
been developed to allow for backward compatibility with existing
digital and analog systems and provide for interoperability in future
systems.
Overall, though, I think it is important to remember that we are
operating in a fiscal and security environment where we must ensure
maximum security benefits are derived from every security dollar. To do
that, we must be able to take a new look at the way in which we
allocate resources. Additionally, given the Department's improved
ability to analyze risks, threats, and vulnerabilities, the Department
is better able to provided targeted funds to increase the security of
the Nation. The Department will continue to work with the States and
territories to provide the resources they need--equipment acquisition
funds, training and exercise support, and technical assistance--to
deter, prevent, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
GRANT CONSOLIDATION WITHIN ODP
Question. On January 26, your Department exercised authority
granted to you under Sec. 872 of the Homeland Security Act which
permits the movement and consolidation of functions without
congressional approval. Your proposal would consolidate the
administration of 24 grant programs into a single office. During
briefings for my staff, your aides justified this move as a way to
address a strong interest by the States in a ``one-stop shopping''
center for all grants. I have serious concerns about the decision to
transfer ALL Transportation Security Administration grant programs from
TSA to the Office of Domestic Preparedness.
Many of us in Congress have been concerned that while we passed
legislation creating the Transportation Security Administration--this
Administration has treated it as the Aviation Security Administration.
TSA was created to focus on securing ALL modes of transportation--
buses, and trucking, and seaports--not just aviation. Aviation security
is a primary concern, of course, but it cannot be the only concern. We
on this Committee have had to cajole and wheedle and scrape together
what few precious resources we could find to fund grant programs to
address port security, and bus security, and trucking security and the
safe flow of commerce traveling by sea. Now, you are shifting those
programs to another agency with little expertise in transportation
issues and proposing to eliminate funding for several of the programs.
If these TSA grant funds are moved out of TSA's budget and away from
its operational control, the President might just as well abolish the
agency. Change the agency's name to the Only Aviation Security
Administration.
Why do you want to move these TSA grant funds to the ``one-stop
shop''? Are you not concerned that TSA will lose its ``all
transportation'' focus if its grant funds are removed from its budget?
Answer. The move to create a one stop shop for grants is based upon
input from the user or grantee community and is designed to enhance
coordination of the multitude of preparedness and security grants
currently administered by the Department (ODP, FEMA and TSA). The one-
stop shop consolidation will allow DHS to gain a global perspective on
all of the grants to ensure that redundancies are minimized, funds are
directed to the highest best use and DHS can proactively make
recommendations to States, localities and other recipients on mutual
aid and dual use opportunities.
Moving the TSA grants to SLGCP will provide DHS with concrete
benefits. First, it will allow the substantial bulk of the TSA
personnel who are not impacted by the consolidation to focus on their
core mission of transportation security. Next, it creates internal (to
DHS) and external (to recipients) improved efficiencies because only
one DHS team (SLGCP) will interact with grant recipients rather than
two separate teams (one at SLGCP and one at TSA) and, more importantly,
recipients who apply for more than one type of grant (e.g. a UASI and a
TSA grant) will only need to deal with one DHS team (SLGCP).
Final policy responsibility for grant guidance and grant
distribution will reside with the Office of State and Local Government
Coordination & Preparedness. However, overall hazards and
transportation security policy input will remain with FEMA, TSA, as
well as the Coast Guard, and MARAD. And, to ensure the continuing
involvement of TSA in the grant process, ODP will create a distinct
office dedicated specifically to transportation related grants. This
office will work closely with TSA in developing transportation security
grant policy.
STATE FORMULA GRANTS
Question. Mr. Secretary, State formula grants have been the largest
source of homeland security money for State and local governments. In
fiscal year 2003, Congress provided $2.1 billion for State formula
grants, and in fiscal year 2004 provided nearly $2.2 billion for this
purpose.
Your 2005 budget request drastically changes the scope of State
formula grants. You request only $1.2 billion for the program, choosing
instead to invest $1.4 billion into the urban areas security
initiative, which targets specific cities. Your request also changes
the way in which State formula grants are distributed. Your budget does
not distribute funds according to the PATRIOT ACT requirement that all
States get a portion of funds, but rather according to ``terrorism risk
factors.'' I am sympathetic to your proposal to shift money from the
State grant program to grants to high threat urban areas. Most of the
funds should be targeted to the areas where the risk is highest.
However, for the funds that remain in the State grant program, I
believe the PATRIOT ACT formula should be retained. Will you keep the
small State minimum for State grants as required by the PATRIOT ACT?
This proposal effectively turns the State homeland security grants
into an extension of the Urban Areas Security Initiative. I agree that
it is important to target resources to areas at greatest risk, but it
is equally important that we ensure that every State has they resources
needed to build up a basic homeland security infrastructure. This
budget does not achieve both goals.
Answer. I strongly support the idea that homeland security is a
national responsibility shared by all States, regardless of size. That
is why I firmly believe that there should be a minimum level of
preparedness across the county and that every State should receive some
level of assistance from the Department of Homeland Security.
Further, I strongly support the President's fiscal year 2005 budget
request that provides for additional factors to be considered when
making determinations on how to distribute homeland security funds to
States and localities. While I support the concept behind the PATRIOT
Act--that every State should receive minimum levels of support--I
firmly believe that funding allocations decisions should be based on a
number of other factors not included in the PATRIOT Act formula,
including the presence of critical infrastructure and other significant
risk factors. With the input that the Department is receiving from the
States through their updated homeland security strategies, and with the
more robust intelligence analysis and data collection capabilities
within the Department, the Department will be better able to prioritize
support for your efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to
terrorist incidents. The President's fiscal year 2005 request
recognizes this enhanced ability, and provides the Secretary of
Homeland Security the latitude and discretion to determine appropriate
funding levels to the States.
GRANT APPLICATIONS
Question. Please provide the Subcommittee with a list of the number
of applications (and the total amount requested) for port security, bus
security, truck security, Operation Safe Commerce, hazmat security and
fire grants per grant-making round and the amounts awarded on State by
State basis.
Answer. The following table provides the number of applications
received and the total amount requested for port security, bus
security, truck security and Operation Safe Commerce per grant round:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Applications/ Total Amount
Grant Program Proposals Requested
Received
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Port Security Round 1................... 856 $696,957,362
Port Security Round 2................... 1,112 995,905,305
Port Security Round 3................... 1,042 987,282,230
Intercity Bus Security.................. 84 45,611,455
Truck Security.......................... 16 70,984,782
Operation Safe Commerce................. 33 97,966,809
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following table provides the dollar amount of grants awarded by
State:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODP Port Truck Security--
State Name Port Security Port Security Port Security Security Intercity Bus Highway Watch Operation Safe
Round 1 Total Round 2 Total Round 3 Total Grants Total Security Total Total Commerce Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALABAMA.............................. $0 $948,000 $1,098,571 $0 $0 $0 $0
ALASKA............................... 1,344,929 4,086,255 758,569 250,000 0 0 0
AMERICAN SAMOA....................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARIZONA.............................. 0 0 0 0 99,950 0 0
ARKANSAS............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CALIFORNIA........................... 17,152,573 28,017,757 33,704,614 9,076,700 177,116 0 13,697,053
COLORADO............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CONNECTICUT.......................... 296,636 2,201,337 3,825,565 0 0 0 0
DELAWARE/PENNSYLVANIA................ 1,925,000 5,512,369 1,830,700 3,730,555 342,765 0 0
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA................. 0 27,356 0 0 773,614 0 0
FED. STATES OF MICRONESIA............ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FLORIDA.............................. 19,572,606 17,654,425 7,625,747 10,947,378 141,580 0 0
GEORGIA.............................. 2,305,400 2,629,643 4,237,611 0 265,003 0 0
GUAM................................. 0 0 518,900 0 0 0 0
HAWAII............................... 802,523 7,005,561 4,247,966 0 0 0 0
IDAHO................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ILLINOIS............................. 0 872,250 7,025,300 0 51,278 0 0
INDIANA.............................. 0 68,800 353,760 0 113,813 0 0
IOWA................................. 0 0 51,600 0 226,272 0 0
KANSAS............................... 0 0 221,540 0 0 0 0
KENTUCKY............................. 0 55,136 1,439,578 0 0 0 0
LOUISIANA............................ 4,968,207 19,991,897 23,552,896 6,650,200 0 0 0
MAINE................................ 175,000 2,054,000 621,200 0 0 0 0
MARSHALL ISLANDS..................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MARYLAND............................. 3,764,000 4,518,532 5,586,150 0 338,482 0 0
MASSACHUSETTS........................ 3,789,669 4,333,651 3,005,829 0 1,173,875 0 0
MICHIGAN............................. 135,000 409,000 897,263 0 0 0 0
MINNESOTA............................ 0 0 813,100 0 335,102 0 0
MISSISSIPPI.......................... 555,132 705,444 2,245,740 0 0 0 0
MISSOURI............................. 0 125,000 50,000 0 0 0 0
MONTANA.............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NEBRASKA............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NEVADA............................... 0 0 0 0 320,791 0 0
NEW HAMPSHIRE........................ 200,000 80,000 1,570,203 0 73,182 0 0
NEW JERSEY........................... 0 5,493,067 5,129,950 7,613,106 2,454,220 0 0
NEW MEXICO........................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NEW YORK............................. 8,013,360 9,847,792 6,699,713 4,477,768 172,130 0 13,818,770
NORTH CAROLINA....................... 250,000 4,870,000 3,224,114 0 566,591 0 0
NORTH DAKOTA......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS............. 0 0 1,379,577 0 0 0 0
OHIO................................. 550,622 777,000 3,100,127 0 44,408 0 0
OKLAHOMA............................. 0 725,000 0 0 0 0 0
OREGON............................... 623,000 1,185,000 1,024,970 0 9,900 0 0
PALAU................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PUERTO RICO.......................... 3,000,000 637,000 3,585,870 23,490 0 0 0
RHODE ISLAND......................... 261,500 435,000 1,498,563 0 0 0 0
SOUTH CAROLINA....................... 1,819,072 1,845,389 5,225,019 5,124,554 35,263 0 0
SOUTH DAKOTA......................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TENNESSEE............................ 198,052 639,655 768,285 0 123,375 0 0
TEXAS................................ 8,345,366 18,814,061 31,960,813 12,158,057 10,755,138 0 0
UTAH................................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VERMONT.............................. 0 0 0 0 217,542 0 0
VIRGIN ISLANDS....................... 0 1,873,245 869,275 1,582,468 0 0 0
VIRGINIA............................. 6,044,618 5,068,358 1,681,280 6,600,000 841,330 19,300,000 0
WASHINGTON........................... 5,179,974 14,895,156 7,030,942 6,765,724 26,407 0 27,528,219
WEST VIRGINIA........................ 750,000 522,000 565,000 0 0 0 0
WISCONSIN............................ 0 0 0 0 120,873 0 0
WYOMING.............................. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND TOTALS................... 92,022,239 168,924,136 179,025,900 75,000,000 19,800,000 19,300,000 55,044,042
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIR CARGO: PILOT PROGRAM
Question. I understand that the bulk of air cargo carried on
narrow-body aircraft is broken down--as opposed to being containerized
in larger containers. What percentage of U.S. flights carrying air
cargo are made on narrow-body aircraft? Has TSA started physically
screening these broken-down forms of air cargo using explosive
detection devices--even if only in a pilot program as strongly urged by
the Congress in the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Act? If not, why
not? When do you intend to initiate such a program--given that the bill
was signed into law on October 1, 2003--over 5 months ago?
Answer. TSA does not compile statistics regarding the percentage of
U.S. flights carrying air cargo utilizing narrow-body aircraft. Last
November, TSA instituted mandatory cargo screening requirements for air
carriers. The screening requirements apply to cargo transported on both
wide body and narrow body aircraft--including ``break bulk'' shipments
transported on narrow body aircraft. TSA is finalizing a protocol,
which will allow the air carriers to utilize Explosive Trace Detection
equipment to screen cargo. TSA is also currently conducting a pilot
program of Explosive Detection Systems ability to screen cargo for
explosives. As TSA's cargo screening requirements continue to evolve
TSA will continue to test and analyze the feasibility of using
additional explosive detection capabilities for cargo.
FLETC BUDGET: CHARLESTON
Question. For many years, the FLETC has used facilities at the
former Navy base in Charleston, SC as a satellite training location for
training law enforcement personnel from the Border Patrol and other
agencies because it was unable to accommodate them at its two main
training facilities. Last year, prior to the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security and the consolidation and reorganization of
numerous agencies, Congress appropriated and the President signed into
law approximately $14 million for the Border Patrol Academy at
Charleston. I understand that FLETC proposes to move all Border Patrol
training to its main facility at Glynco, GA and use the Charleston
location for training for other agencies. However, that move is not
likely to occur for nearly 2 more years. There is considerable
confusion over the use of the funds provided by Congress for
construction activities at Charleston. It is clear that the Congress
intended for these funds to be used in Charleston. Will you commit that
these funds will be spent in Charleston as directed by Congress and
provide the Subcommittee with a plan for allocating those funds?
Answer. The FLETC will use the funds in the amount of
$13,896,000.00 for projects in Charleston. The Core of Engineers spent
approximately $104,000 for design prior to the administrative transfer
of Charleston to the FLETC. A summary of the projects are:
--Construction of Tactical Training Mat Rooms for defensive tactics
training for the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of new wing in Building 654 for administrative space for
the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of four classrooms in building 61 for classroom space
for the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of old wing in Building 654 for administrative,
conferencing and training space for the FLETC and Partner
Organizations' training management and operations staffs;
--Construction of Indoor Firing Range to provide training and re-
qualifying students in firearms proficiency; and
--Construction of Security/Communications system that will allow the
FLETC Charleston to provide efficient and cost effective
training while utilizing the latest state of the art
technologies.
FLETC BUDGET: FACILITIES OPERATING FUNDS
Question. I am a strong supporter of consolidated Federal law
enforcement training--in part because of the budgetary savings which
can be achieved. During site visits by my staff to the FLETC facilities
in SC and GA, they were told that the Border Patrol's training budget
for activities at Charleston was $34 million in fiscal year 2004 and is
proposed to be $42 million in fiscal year 2005. Is that correct? If so,
where will these funds come from? Are the agencies going to transfer
funds to FLETC or will FLETC bill them for training? Without clear
indications of funding streams to pay for the operation of the facility
in Charleston being placed in the FLETC budget--or in the budgets of
the agencies attendant at these facilities--how can you ensure that
consolidated training will work efficiently and that these facilities
will operate robustly and effectively?
Answer. The Border Patrol has been providing the funding to operate
the Charleston facility since the late nineties. The amounts provided
by the Border Patrol included resources for TDY of agents that are not
applicable to the operations of Charleston by the FLETC. The final
amount has not been determined but the current estimate is
approximately $21 million to operate Charleston. In addition, 25 FTE
will be necessary to operate the facility and the source of those FTEs
are being determined. A transfer of funds from the Border Patrol to the
FLETC will be necessary to align responsibilities with Federal
appropriations. The FLETC is currently evaluating the resources
required for the additional basic training programs to be conducted in
Charleston for three new Partner Organizations. These new agencies are
United States Coast Guard Marine Law Enforcement Academy, The
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the Defense Logistics
Agency. The FLETC will not be able to operate the Charleston training
site without these resources.
FLETC: CAPITOL POLICE TRAINING COSTS
Question. What are the costs FLETC has borne for non-basic training
conducted at the Cheltenham facility for the United States Capitol
Police for fiscal years 2002-2004 and what are the anticipated costs
for the same training for fiscal year 2005? What are the annual basic
training costs?
Answer. The Capitol Police have historically provided some follow-
on basic training for their officers at locations in the Washington DC
area. This training was not done at a FLETC location, was never paid
for by the FLETC, and therefore is not in the FLETC's base funding.
This is consistent with other Partner Organizations such as the United
States Secret Service which provides its follow-on basic training at
their Beltsville location. Now that the Capitol Police is conducting
agency specific basic training at a FLETC location, namely Cheltenham,
for consistency purposes, this funding could be included as part of
FLETC's annual workload projections. The precise amount of funding
would need to be negotiated with the U.S. Capitol Police.
U.S. CAPITOL POLICE OPERATIONAL EXPENSES AT FLETC'S CHELTENHAM FACILITY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Building 3 Building 31 Buildings 31,
Service Fiscal year Fiscal year 231, 40 Fiscal
2003 2003 year 2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Electricity..................................................... $5,554 $49,365 $52,364
Fuel Oil........................................................ 5,361 21,259 25,516
Security........................................................ 1,908 16,960 17,990
Telephone Service............................................... 10,106 .............. ..............
Telephone Service............................................... .............. 11,731 ..............
Telephone Service............................................... .............. .............. 10,169
Telephone Lease................................................. .............. 84,844 84,844
Refuse Disposal................................................. 600 900 900
Water/Sewer..................................................... 1,636 14,537 15,420
General Janitorial.............................................. 7,326 65,113 69,069
Additional Trash Pulls (Daily).................................. .............. 5,172 5,172
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 32,491 269,880 \1\ 281,445
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimate.
FLETC: OTHER ISSUES
Question. Approximately 60 percent of the FLETC workforce is
comprised of contract employees. From perimeter security guards and
role players used in training scenarios to food service workers and the
maid service, these employees word hard and perform much needed
services. Given the exceedingly high percentage of contract employees,
does the Department expect FLETC to conduct further efforts to contract
out yet even more work?
Answer. The FLETC has developed a plan for competitive sourcing to
be in compliance with the A-76 circular. At this time, the positions
planned for study include 13 Automotive Mechanics in fiscal year 2005;
21 Media Support positions and 30 Facilities Management positions in
fiscal year 2006; 4 Critical Incident Stress Management positions and 9
Property Management positions in fiscal year 2007; and 20 Human
Resources positions and 36 IT/Training Devices/AV positions in fiscal
year 2008.
Question. The horrific events of 9/11 resulted in a massive
increase in hiring of Federal law enforcement personnel. These new
hires required training and Congress provided temporary authority to
re-hire retired Federal annuitants to assist in training activities. I
am told that these annuitants are providing FLETC and the Department
excellent and valuable service based on their years of skill and real
life experience. However, this authority will soon expire and I
understand that a significant portion of FLETC's training would be
negatively affected if it lost this authority. Do you plan to request
that Congress extend this authority either permanently or for another 5
years?
Answer. The FLETC intends to recommend to the Administration an
extension to its rehired annuitant hiring authorization and waiver to
dual compensation. Historically, it has been very challenging for FLETC
to recruit highly qualified law enforcement instructors with a Federal
criminal investigative, GS-1811, background because the FLETC has no
authority to pay law enforcement availability (LEAP) compensation. Any
current Federal criminal investigator interested in an instructor
position at the FLETC must be willing to take a 25 percent cut in his/
her annual salary when accepting a FLETC position. In addition,
retaining their law enforcement ``6c'' retirement status sometimes
becomes an issue, and they also lose their privileges to use government
vehicles for response necessities.
Prior to the tragic events of 9/11, the FLETC had been working
vigorously with its former department, Department of the Treasury, and
Office of Personnel Management officials to gain approval to implement
the rehired annuitant hiring flexibilities contained within the Federal
personnel management system. As mentioned above, the FLETC had been
seeking this approval in order to overcome the recruitment and
retention challenges associated with staffing Law Enforcement
Specialist (Instructor), GS-1801, positions with applicants possessing
extensive Federal criminal investigative backgrounds. Furthermore, the
FLETC intended to maximize the provisions of the program by recruiting
recent 1811 retirees who could share the latest law enforcement
techniques and practices being utilized in the field.
The need for the majority of FLETC instructors to possess a
criminal investigative background has been and continues to be
validated through management studies and student feedback surveys.
Instructors having this background gain instant credibility with their
students because they are able to share real world experiences and
demonstrate the application of skills and information being taught. In
addition, the FLETC's mission has continued to expand post 9/11 into
areas such as counterterrorism, antiterrorism and transportation
security training which require attracting even more specialized
expertise in a highly competitive market. Therefore, it is essential
that the FLETC continue to take advantage of this proven hiring
flexibility in its efforts to maintain a highly qualified law
enforcement training instructor workforce. Reverting back to
traditional instructor recruiting and staffing practices would
adversely impact and unduly hamper this effort.
TSA: SLOW MOVEMENT OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS
Question. In the fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations
Act, Congress provided $7 million for hazardous materials security and
the truck tracking program, $10 million for intercity bus security
grants, and $22 million for the trucking industry security program.
That bill was signed into law in October. Nearly 6 months later those
funds have not yet been released. Since security for these other modes
of transportation are so important, why has TSA been sitting on these
funds?
Answer. In the coming months, TSA plans to request proposals for
funding or announce awards for a number of programs. These include:
--TSA anticipates issuing a Request for Applications (RFA) for both
the fourth round of Port Security Grants Program ($50 million
remaining from fiscal year 2004) and Intercity Bus Security
grants by late spring, 2004, with final awarding of grants
expected in late summer.
--A fourth quarter fiscal year 2004 release of the RFA is anticipated
for both the Highway Watch Program and Operation Safe Commerce,
with final award anticipated in the fall.
--TSA intends to announce Request for Proposals for the Truck
Tracking Project in early summer. Final award is anticipated in
early fall, 2004.
--Award for Nuclear Detection and Monitoring is anticipated by mid-
summer, 2004.
PORT SECURITY
Question.The deputy assistant director of the FBI's
counterterrorism office stated in January that our Nation's seaports
remain vulnerable targets for attack. ``The intelligence we have
certainly points to ports as a key vulnerability. I can't be more
specific about the threats of attacks. We have received information
that indicates there is an interest.''
If there is an ``interest'' in attacking our ports, why does the
Administration continue to refuse to give our seaports the resources
they require to secure our ports? Why is only $46 million requested for
port security grants when the port directors tell us that $1.125
billion will be needed in the first year and $5.4 billion will be
needed over the next 10 years to comply with the new Federal
regulations mandated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
Additionally, during the most recent port security grant
competition (December 2003), over half of the funding for port security
grants was awarded to private companies. A tremendous need for port
security funding also exists for port authorities and State and local
agencies. What approach are you taking to allocate the funding between
these different entities? Additionally, what type of checks and
balances do you have in place to ensure that private companies are not
receiving a disproportionate share of this port security funding?
Answer. In Port Security Grants Round 3, consistent with provisions
of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Transportation
Security Administration, U. S. Coast Guard and the Maritime
Administration determined that regulated facilities should receive
preference. The vast majority of regulated facilities are private
companies. However, public entities were well represented with awards
totaling 45.3 percent of the available funds.
In general, port security grant funds are dispersed through a
competitive grant process. The multi-level, interagency review ensures
that these funds go to the highest national security needs.
--Eligible grant applicants are limited to critical national seaports
as stipulated in the fiscal year 2002 DOD Supplemental
Appropriations (Public Law 107-117) and referred to in
subsequent appropriations. This designation included:
--Controlled ports--Ports which have access controls for vessels
from certain countries due to national security issues
--Strategic ports, as designated by a Maritime Administration port
planning order
--A nationally important economic port or terminal responsible for
a large volume of cargo movement or movement of products
that are vital to U.S. economic interests as required for
national security
--Ports, terminals, and U.S. passenger vessels responsible for
movement of a high number of passengers
--Ports or terminals responsible for the movement of hazardous
cargo.
--All grant applicants must have a completed security assessment and
tie the vulnerabilities identified in the assessment to the
mitigation strategies requested in the application.
--Subject matter experts from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the
Maritime Administration (MARAD), and TSA conduct a multi-level
review of all port security grant applications.
--Field level review is conducted by the USCG Captain of the Port
and MARAD Regional Director to validate applicant
eligibility and prioritize all proposals within their zone,
utilizing the CG Port Security Risk Assessment Tool
(PSRAT).
--National level review is conducted by representatives from the
USCG, MARAD, and TSA based upon published evaluation
criteria. All eligible proposals from the field level
review are prioritized on a national level.
--Executive level review board of agency representatives examines the
recommended proposals from an overarching national
perspective.
--Senior level selection board (currently TSA Administrator or his
representative, USCG Commandant or his representative,
MARAD Administrator) provides the final approval of the
proposed grantees/projects.
INTEGRATED FINGERPRINT SYSTEMS
Question. Mr. Secretary, Senator Cochran and I met last year in the
Capitol to discuss our concerns about the plans for obtaining only two
fingerprints of visitors to the United States as a means to fulfill the
biometric component portion of the entry-exit visa tracking system you
have named US VISIT. I suggested that I was concerned that capturing
only two fingerprints might make it more difficult to compare these two
new prints with more extensive existing fingerprint databases such as
the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS). In fact your own Department's Inspector General report dated
December 31, 2003 noted that the Department of Justice has worked for
several years to integrate your Department's two-print system--known as
the automated biometric identification system, or IDENT--with the FBI's
IAFIS system.
The IG states that, ``This integration is critical to identifying
illegally entering aliens on lookout lists or with criminal histories,
but progress has been slow.''
What is the status of the integration of these systems? Can you
give the Committee a progress report on the integration of these
systems?
Answer. Prior to the establishment of the Department on Homeland
Security, DOJ, working with the FBI and INS, began work on a project to
integrate the FBI's IAFIS (10 print, criminal history) and the INS'
IDENT (2-print, immigration) systems.
Since that time, an integrated IDENT/IAFIS workstation has been
developed. DHS intends to accelerate deployment in 2004 and complete
deployment by the end of calendar year 2005. To accelerate the
implementation of IDENT/IAFIS capability within the Department, we
intend to seek a reallocation of $4 million of the remaining funds
provided in Public Law 107-117. The $4 million, when combined with
fiscal year 2003 funds already provided ($3.5 million obligated for
IDENT/IAFIS), will allow BTS VISIT to implement IDENT with 10 print
capabilities in secondary processing areas at 115 airports, 14 seaports
and 50 of the largest land border ports. In addition, this funding will
support implementation of the IAFIS/IDENT 10 print capability at 70
percent of the Border Patrol stations. The remaining land ports of
entry, 30 percent of the Border Patrol stations and major ICE locations
(to be identified) will receive this capability in 2005. The
implementation of IDENT/IAFIS at Border Patrol stations will provide
the capability to biometrically identify and/or perform status
verifications on individuals suspected of illegally crossing the
border. Implementation at ICE offices will support investigation of
individuals apprehended for overstays and/or watch list hits.
IMMIGRATION
Question. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
requires all immigration databases to be made interoperable and,
eventually, combined into the Chimera data system, which is to include
all known immigration, law enforcement, and intelligence data on
aliens. What progress has been made thus far on creating the Chimera
data system?
Answer. On the 28th of October 2002, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service published an informational document regarding a
comprehensive information technology planning and infrastructure
modernization program called ``Atlas''. That document was entitled the
``Atlas Business Case'' and provided a concise high-level view that
demonstrated the INS' confidence in Atlas' strategic, technical, and
financial merits. The business case reflected investment principles,
emulation of industry best practices, and compliance with the Clinger-
Cohen Act of 1996, as well as with other related legislative and
government guidance.
Consistent with the urgencies of the Government's post-September 11
security agenda, the Atlas Business Case was subsequently socialized
and promoted within the Department of Justice and sent to the Hill for
budgetary consideration. It was understood that the Atlas Program would
be the fundamental IT infrastructure foundation on which INS business
applications would operate. In its business case, the INS illustrated
that the successful Atlas transformation strategy would hinge upon a
robust IT infrastructure containing a secure, scalable backbone that
would support all INS business processes. Atlas, it was shown, would
also provide database interoperability at the infrastructure level and
support data sharing at the applications level. From the beginning, the
Atlas design strategy also supported emerging Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) requirements. Unlike the previous environment, Atlas was
proposed to reside within an integrated Enterprise Architecture (EA)
that would harmonize the following:
--System hardware, including mainframes and servers
--Data services, including data and voice circuits
--Data communication equipment, including servers, switches, local
area networks (LAN), wide area networks (WAN), routers, and
cabling
--Computer security, information assurance activities and enterprise
information. This, specifically, is the area that would later
come to be identified as the focus area for the suggested
Chimera project.
--Workstations, including personal computers and laptops and
enterprise-wide software (i.e., office automation, e-mail,
operating system, etc.)
--Operational support to maintain and operate the modernized IT
infrastructure
Perhaps in contemplation of partitioning and re-tasking of the INS
and its resources, or perhaps in calculating the initial complexity and
cost of implementing Atlas, a counter-suggestion was made in committee
and transmitted back to the Department of Justice and the INS that
certain specific information security and assurance attributes of Atlas
could be separately expedited and put into action under a new
initiative tentatively labeled ``Chimera''.
However, other program initiatives under way at INS and the new
Department of Homeland Security were also addressing the same security
concerns. In particular, the ``US VISIT'' program had pursued the same
set of concerns and an active, high-precision approach for addressing
critical information security and assurance requirements.
Because of the US VISIT Program's ongoing and comprehensive
approach to information security and assurance requirements within the
DHS sphere of immigration-related operations, Chimera has been
suspended and is being revisited to determine its potential as a
duplicative effort.
Question. As part of the 1990 Immigration Act, Congress authorized
general arrest authority for all immigration law enforcement officers.
INS never developed regulations to implement this authority. Has DHS
developed such regulations?
Answer. Yes, ICE issued a memo implementing general arrest
authority for the ICE Office of Investigations and Detention and
Removal in November 2003.
Question. Representatives of the Department of Homeland Security
Council (union of legacy INS employees) reported at a press conference
on March 3 that no more than 5 percent of Immigration and Customs
enforcement personnel have received cross-training. When does DHS
expect to complete cross-training of all existing personnel? What
percentage of all needed cross-training is funded in the President's
budget proposal?
Answer. OI conducted a manual survey the last week of March 2004.
At that time 830 Special Agents had completed the cross-training. This
accounts for 19 percent of the OI workforce of 4,463 which is targeted
for cross-training in this fiscal year. The Automated Class Management
System is expected to be on-line by the end of April, 2004. At that
time, training statistics will be more readily available.
OI has established a target to complete the cross-training for all
non-supervisory Special Agents GS-05 through GS-13 by the end of fiscal
year 2004. This cross-training will be accomplished using a train-the-
trainer format with initial training being conducted at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center.
Cross-training beyond this priority group and into fiscal year 2005
will be funded out of base appropriations.
Question. A pay disparity of a full grade exists between
Immigration Special Agents (GS-12) and Customs Special Agents (GS-13).
It appears that the new regulations proposed by the Administration
would hide this disparity within a pay scale, rather than addressing it
directly. Is this correct and, if so, what impact is this disparity
having on morale within ICE
Answer. On April 13, 2004, Mr. Garcia announced that new Criminal
Investigator (CI) position descriptions had been classified and all ICE
GS-1811 series employees would be assigned to them by May 2004. The new
journey-level position, which is established at the GS-13 level, will
be applied at that time to all qualifying criminal investigators. As a
result, the approximately 1,200 former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) personnel affected by this pay gap will be eligible for
immediate promotion to GS-1811-13 on May 2, 2004.
OTHER ISSUES
Question. Does the fiscal year 2005 budget assume the
reauthorization of COBRA which is set to expire on March 31, 2005?
Answer. Public Law 108-121 reauthorized COBRA through March 1,
2005. The fiscal year 2005 budget assumes that COBRA will be
reauthorized beyond the March 1st expiration date.
Question. What is the net increase in discretionary funding
(excluding supplemental appropriations) for the Department of Homeland
Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Salaries & Expenses
between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005? Looking at the fiscal
year 2005 budget it appears that the increase is just over 4 percent
barely enough to cover for inflation.
Answer. There is a $210 million net increase in discretionary
funding for CBP's Salaries and Expenses between fiscal year 2004 and
fiscal year 2005. This net increase includes $185 million in program
increases and $350 in increases for annualizations of prior year pay
raises and other inflation related costs. These increases are offset by
a $23.7 million decrease for a DHS-wide savings initiative, termination
of one-time costs associated with fiscal year 2004 program increases
and the fiscal year 2004 rescission.
Question. What is the Department doing to correct the problem of
the Department not paying legacy Customs Inspectors and new CBP
officers for their required work on the 60 day of basic training at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)?
Answer. We do pay employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) overtime while engaged in training at FLETC for 6-day weeks. The
Government Employee and Training Act (GETA) prohibits us from paying
non- FLSA employees under FLSA provision. Our COPRA covered front-line
personnel are not subject to FLSA. COPRA was specifically designed for
Customs Officers and is the exclusive pay act for our Customs legacy
personnel. Our agency position on this matter was recently sustained in
an arbitration decision.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Question. Recently, a week-long convention of Asian life insurance
providers and sales representatives scheduled to convene in Honolulu
this August was cancelled. The convention was expected to produce more
than $17 million in visitor spending, $1.41 million in State taxes, and
rent 6,500 hotel room nights. The cancellation was not due to lack of
interest by prospective attendees, but instead was due to the problems
caused by the extended visa issuance process. Your Department has been
working with the State Department to enhance security and the integrity
of the visa process. Your budget requests an increase of $10 million to
support a new visa security unit. How will this unit help to ensure
that visas are processed quickly to ensure that Hawaii will be able to
host similar conventions in the future?
Answer. BTS is working with the State Department to assure that the
provisions of the law known as Section 428 are implemented. The ICE VSU
will be deploying Visa Security Officers to selected foreign posts;
will be working to enhance State Department Consular officer training;
will be working to improve the Visa Security Advisory Opinion (SAO)
process; and develop with the State Department the appropriate employee
performance plan oversight of Consular Officers by DHS. All of these
efforts will improve the integrity of the visa issuance process and
assure that visa applicants receive the appropriate level of review.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) visa security
operations are located exclusively in Saudi Arabia at this time. Since
beginning our operations in Saudi Arabia, thousands of visas
applications have been reviewed by DHS officers. From over 3,500
applications, approximately 27 have been delayed for reasons of
security. Most visa applications in Saudi Arabia are acted upon within
48 hours. This is in compliance with congressional language as to 100
percent review of visa applications in Saudi Arabia.
It is anticipated, DHS will dedicate staff to the SAO process,
which in turn will further aid to expedite requests and ensure timely
security screening on behalf of our officers in the field.
Question. The budget justifications for the US VISIT program
discuss the deployment plan for the full program. In furtherance of
complete implementation, a Request for Proposals was published last
November with bids due this January. How many proposals were received?
In light of the proposals you received, is the budget request
sufficient for full implementation of the program, including the
meeting of your statutory deadlines for deployment to the 165
identified points of entry?
Answer. We received three bids for the Prime integrator contract.
With the resources in the fiscal year 2004 appropriation, and
provided approval of the fiscal year 2005 President's request, US VISIT
will have the resources necessary to the meet the statutory deadline
(US VISIT functionality in secondary) for the 50 largest land border
ports by December 31, 2004 and the 115 remaining land sites by December
31, 2005.
Question. The budget request includes an increase of $23 million
for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This increase is intended to
more than double the number of investigators and facilitate the
implementation of the President's proposal for a temporary worker
program. According to your testimony, in furtherance of the President's
proposal, you would establish a traditional worksite enforcement
program to deter the hiring of unauthorized workers. What efforts are
currently being undertaken to detect, deter, and punish employers who
hire undocumented workers?
Answer. Enforcement efforts targeting companies that break the law
and hire illegal workers will need to increase in order to ensure the
integrity of the temporary worker system. The President's Immigration
proposal provides for an enhanced worksite enforcement program, and the
$23 million requested for fiscal year 2005 will allow ICE to enhance
its worksite enforcement efforts and provide credible deterrence to the
hiring of unauthorized workers. ICE worksite enforcement investigations
generally involve a review of company employment records to verify the
immigration status of workers and to determine if the employer has
committed any violations. ICE agents also conduct extensive outreach
initiatives to educate employers about their legal responsibilities.
Additionally, the Basic Pilot Program, an automated system
administered by USCIS, enables employers to verify the immigration
status of newly hired workers. It is currently available in six states,
but is planned for availability to employers in all 50 states by the
end of this year. This is a voluntary program and is provided at no
cost to employers. Information on the Basic Pilot Program is available
to the public on the USCIS website.
Question. The Visa Waiver Program is a critical element of the
Hawaii tourism industry as it allows citizens of 27 countries to enter
for non-immigrant purposes without a visa. However, by October 26, all
Visa Waiver countries must certify that the new passports they are
issuing contain biometric identifiers. How many of the 27 countries are
currently expected to meet this deadline? Would you support extending
the biometric passport deadline in order to avoid major disruptions in
travel to the United States from key tourism markets in Europe and
Asia? What is the Directorate doing to work with the foreign
governments in the visa waiver program to encourage compliance?
Answer. Due to a variety of factors, the Departments of Homeland
Security and State have requested a 2-year extension for the October
26, 2004 deadline for machine readable, biometric passports. The
problem is not lack of will or commitment, but challenging scientific
and technical issues. Due to technical challenges that include the
durability of chip technology and the feasibility of facial recognition
technology in an operational environment, few, if any, of the 27
countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) will be able
to meet the October 26, 2004 deadline. In fact, the standards have not
yet been set. Therefore, a 2-year extension is being requested to make
it possible for countries to comply with this mandate.
The Department of Homeland Security has been working very closely
with foreign governments to develop the optimum solution that enhances
security for all without impeding legitimate travel and tourism. All
citizens traveling under the Visa Waiver Program will be enrolled in US
VISIT upon entry through an air or sea port after/on September 30,
2004.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ernest F. Hollings
SEAPORT SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION COSTS
Question. Commissioner Bonner announced with much fanfare, that we
would sign agreements with major foreign ports, under the ``Container
Security Initiative'', so that we could inspect containers in foreign
seaports. It is my understanding, that while this sounds quite smart,
there are a lot of practical problems. For instance, foreign nations
use their own security equipment for security to protect their own
ports, and they have not been all that forthcoming in providing their
security equipment for our use.
Can you tell me, how many marine containers underwent physical
inspection, in foreign ports as a result of the ``Container Security
Initiative''? What does this represent as a portion of the total that
was physically inspected?
What is the budget for the implementation of non-intrusive
inspection equipment at U.S. ports, and how does it compare with the
budget for the ``Container Security Initiative''?
Answer. All cargo moving through a CSI port is screened by CBP
using our multilayered targeting and risk analysis systems. All high-
risk cargo is inspected for weapons of mass destruction before being
laden on a vessel bound for the United States in a CSI port. Physical
inspection statistics for containers will be provided by the General
Accounting Office in the forthcoming review of the CSI program.
As of April 23, 2004, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has
deployed approximately $73.9 million worth of large-scale, non-
intrusive inspection systems and radiation portal monitors to U.S.
seaports. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) was appropriated
$61.7 million in the President's 04 budget, of which approximately $12
million has been allocated for non-intrusive inspection equipment for
the CSI overseas ports.
Question. The budget for FTE's for full time positions was set at
220 for the Transportation Security Administration's Maritime and Land
Division, yet it is my understanding that to date, this Division is
only operating with 160.
You have a number of responsibilities, such as conducting criminal
background investigations, that are languishing. What is taking so long
in hiring the remaining 60 Full Time Employee positions that, I
understand are budgeted for the Transportation Security
Administration's Maritime and Land Division but not yet hired?
Answer. The Office of Maritime and Land Security (MLS) within the
Transportation Security Administration currently has 169 full-time
employees on board. We do not anticipate at this time hiring additional
FTE.
With reference to criminal background check responsibility, since
security threat assessments of certain individuals within the
transportation system are a critical component of our mission, TSA
created a Credentialing Program Office (CPO) to consolidate TSA
background check activity across all modes of transportation. The CPO
has established processes for conducting background checks,
adjudicating results and for follow-on coordination with the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. TSA is already required to
conduct criminal history records checks on airport security screening
personnel, individuals with unescorted access to secure areas of
airports, and other security personnel--pursuant to Section 114(f)(12)
of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Public Law No. 107-71,
115 Stat. 587 and 49 USC 44936 (a)(1)(A). In addition to the
extensive background checks that TSA currently undertakes in aviation
security, TSA has been delegated responsibility for conducting security
threat assessments on commercial drivers seeking hazardous material
endorsements for transporting hazardous materials in commerce pursuant
Section 1012 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act, Public Law 107-56, October 25, 2001, 115 Stat. 272.
Implementing the Alien Flight Student Program will be consistent with
work already underway by TSA through the CPO.
ARMING PILOTS
Questions. Last week, Denver news stations were reporting that
commercial airline pilots that have been armed with semi-automatic
pistols through the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) program were
misplacing or losing weapons at an alarming rate. According to Channel
9 News, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Airline
Pilots Security Alliance were the source of information indicating that
in the last 60 days approximately 300 weapons had been misplaced by
FFDOs.
My understanding is that a Southwest Airline Pilot lost his weapon
while it was being transported in the lockbox system that is designed
to protect it while traveling, and that most of the guns reported as
``misplaced'' came under similar circumstances.
Are the reports of misplaced and lost weapons by FFDOs accurate? Do
you believe the current procedures for FFDO firearm transport are
proper? How many FFDOs have actually lost or misplaced their weapons
since the program began? What steps need to be taken to responsibly
ensure that armed pilots do not lose or misplace their guns?
Answer. TSA takes seriously its obligation to ensure that FFDO
firearms and lockboxes do not fall into the hands of individuals not
authorized to handle such items. The FFDO program office works closely
with carriers to ensure that training is provided to crewmembers and
baggage handlers to ensure proper handling and storage of lockboxes. In
some instances, lockboxes have been identified as not placed in the
precise location expected, but with the exception of the one reported
incident, the lockbox has always been quickly retrieved without
endangering the traveling public.
There has only been one incident involving an FFDO firearm that was
lost and not recovered. TSA takes this incident very seriously and is
pursuing an investigation. It must be considered in light of the
thousands of FFDO missions flown every week and the number of incidents
where weapons are lost or stolen in law enforcement activities.
COCKPIT DOORS
Questions. For 2 years, I was repeatedly told that it was not
possible to devise an affordable system that would properly allow a
pilot to leave the flight deck without also potentially allowing a
terrorist to have access to the cockpit. Now, United Airlines has come
forward and announced a ``Secondary Barrier Project'' that they have
committed to install fleet-wide.
United Airlines has committed to install--fleet-wide--barriers that
have already been certified to help prevent a potential terrorist
access to the cockpit. They will be cheap (under $10,000) and quick to
install (overnight). I believe they will provide a much greater degree
of security, and apparently it was shown to the TSA with great
enthusiasm.
Are you aware of United's effort? Do you believe the installation
of second doors or barriers improve the security on commercial
airliners? Has TSA considered requiring all commercial airlines to
install similar devices? Would their installation allow TSA to change
other security directives and perhaps lower the cost of aviation
security?
Answer. TSA is aware of and applauds United's initiative in this
effort. TSA will work closely with the air carriers to better
understand the security effectiveness, structural feasibility, and
costs associated with installing similar devices throughout the
commercial aviation fleet. Once a thorough examination in these areas
has been completed, TSA will assess the appropriateness of requiring
installation of secondary cockpit doors relative to existing security
measures and determine what, if any, alterations should be made to the
overall aviation security program.
RAIL SECURITY
Question. Border and Transportation Security Directorate is charged
with, ``securing our Nation's transportation systems.'' How much
funding is planned in your Directorate's fiscal year 2005 budget for
rail security?
Answer. The responsibility of securing our Nation's rail and mass
transit systems is a shared one. DHS, DOT, and other Federal agencies
are working together to enhance rail and transit security in
partnership with the public and private entities that own and operate
the Nation's rail and transit systems. The DHS Urban Area Security
Grant program has awarded or allocated over $115 million to improve
security for mass transit and rail systems since May 2003.
Additionally, the Administration has requested $24 million for TSA to
advance security efforts in the maritime and surface transportation
arenas, and has requested that $37 million of the Federal Transit
Administrations Urban Security Bus grants be available for security
related projects. In addition, DHS will conduct the following
activities and initiatives to strengthen security in surface modes:
--Implement a pilot program to test the new technologies and
screening concepts to evaluate the feasibility of screening
luggage and carry-on bags for explosives at rail stations and
aboard trains;
--Develop and implement a mass transit vulnerability self-assessment
tool;
--Continue the distribution of public security awareness material
(i.e., tip cards, pamphlets, and posters) for motorcoach,
school bus, passenger rail, and commuter rail employees;
--Increase passenger, rail employee, and local law enforcement
awareness through public awareness campaigns and security
personnel training;
--Ensure compliance with safety and security standards for commuter
and rail lines and better help identify gaps in the security
system in coordination with DOT, with additional technical
assistance and training provided by TSA;
--Continue to work with industry and State and local authorities to
establish baseline security measures based on current industry
best practices and with modal administrations within the DOT as
well as governmental and industry stakeholders, to establish
best practices, develop security plans, assess security
vulnerabilities, and identify needed security enhancements; and
--Study hazardous materials (HAZMAT) security threats and identify
best practices for transport of HAZMAT.
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER
Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
established a temporary overflow training facility for basic training
of Border Patrol recruits in 1996 at the old Navy Base. Border Patrol
training needs drastically increased due to legislation passed by
Congress to significantly increase the number of agents deployed.
The facility was due to close in 2004, however Congress included a
provision in the fiscal year 2003 Commerce, Justice and State
Appropriations Bill which officially designated Charleston as a
permanent Federal training center absolving the end date of the
Charleston site as a temporary facility. Congress also secured $14
million in the fiscal year 2003 Commerce, Justice and State
Appropriations Bill for the Charleston Border Patrol Academy to improve
the infrastructure for the training center.
Since the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) has taken
administrative control of the site in Charleston, how much of the $14
million has being transferred from Customs and Border Protection to
FLETC for use in Charleston?
Answer. A Reimbursable Agreement (RA) between the FLETC and
Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) has been prepared in the
amount of $13,896,000. The FLETC has signed the agreement with a
statement of work attached and forwarded to ICE for approval. The Core
of Engineers spent approximately $104,000 for design prior to the
administrative transfer of Charleston to the FLETC. A summary of the
Charleston projects are:
--Construction of Tactical Training Mat Rooms for defensive tactics
training;
--Renovation of new wing in Building 654 for administrative space for
the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of four classrooms in building 61 for classroom space
for the USCG Marine Law Enforcement Academy;
--Renovation of old wing in Building 654 for administrative,
conferencing and training space for the FLETC and Partner
Organizations' training management and operations staffs;
--Construction of Indoor Firing Range to provide training and re-
qualifying students in firearms proficiency; and
--Construction of Security/Communications system that will allow
FLETC Charleston to provide efficient and cost effective
training while utilizing the latest state of the art
technologies.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
TSA
Question. I am very concerned about numerous reports of
mismanagement I have heard with TSA Human Resources and its
contractors, currently Accenture. I am aware of one Burlington,
Vermont, Screener Manager and as many as 80 Screener Managers at Dulles
who were promoted to their positions on February 9, 2003, yet they have
still not received the full back pay for their promotions.
I have been waiting since November 6, 2003, for a written
explanation as to why the Burlington, Vermont, employee has not
received any back pay. Apparently, the Office of Chief Counsel is still
reviewing the matter.
The best explanation I have heard so far--just informal, nothing in
writing--was that the airports were not authorized to make all of the
promotions on February 9, 2003, but went ahead and made them anyway. At
best, this sounds to me like a big communications problem between TSA,
its HR contractor, and the airports. At worst, this sounds like the
employees were misled. Unfortunately, it is the people who have been
performing the work who are getting the raw end of the deal.
Could you please update me on this situation and explain what is
being done to remedy the back pay issue?
Answer. A reply to your letter regarding the constituent in
Burlington was sent to you in March 2004. A copy of the letter, dated
March 19, 2004, was faxed to your office on April 21, 2004. To
summarize what TSA stated in the letter, we could not backdate your
constituent's promotion because TSA policy stipulates that promotions
do not become effective until they receive final approval by the
necessary TSA officials. This policy is based in part on a U.S.
Comptroller General precedent.
Taking care of our employees is a very high priority for TSA. It is
very important to TSA that its employees receive the compensation for
the jobs that they are performing and that those who were promoted to
the Lead and Supervisory Screener positions were promoted
appropriately. At Dulles, all appropriate promotions were made, and all
one-time awards were paid. TSA believes that all of these issues at
Dulles have now been fully resolved.
The issues involving lead and supervisory positions at Dulles
resulted when screeners were offered promotions inappropriately. At the
time this situation occurred, TSA was transitioning from its initial
human resources service contractor to the current contractors and was
building a fully functioning human resources organization, including
program management of the contractors. Dulles posted job announcements
internally for the positions of Lead Screeners and Supervisory
Screeners with a closing date of December 20, 2002. Unfortunately, at
that time, the FSD organization at airports did not have delegated
authority to conduct recruitment and assessment processes, which
includes the authority to promote existing employees at the airport.
TSA's Office of Human Resources did not become aware of the issue
until May, 2003. TSA worked expeditiously to develop a solution whereby
all individuals who were inappropriately promoted at Dulles were
provided compensation with a one-time monetary award, consisting of the
difference between their screener salary and the salary that they would
have received for the period they were ``promoted.'' Additionally, TSA
``re-announced'' the supervisory screener positions, and screeners who
were inappropriately promoted were afforded full and fair opportunity
to compete for the positions. TSA provided affected screeners the one-
time award regardless of whether they succeeded or not in being
promoted under the valid procedure.
HAITI
Question. I am concerned by the Department's response to those who
have fled Haiti in recent weeks. Haitians intercepted at sea have
received entirely inadequate screening for asylum. For example, while
all interdicted Cubans are individually interviewed regarding their
fear of persecution, only those Haitians who loudly protest their
return--the so-called ``shout test''--receive such an interview. I
joined with Senators Kennedy and Durbin in writing to the President
last week to protest and seek changes in this and other policies. (A)
Will you provide individual interviews to all Haitians interdicted at
sea? (B) Will you suspend deportations against Haitians currently in
the United States until the political situation in Haiti improves?
Answer. Haitians manifesting a fear of return are and will continue
to be interviewed by a USCIS Asylum Pre-Screening Officer (APSO). In
accordance with Department of State direction, DHS will continue to
conduct non-criminal Haitian removals.
DATABASE INTEGRATION
Question. The Washington Post yesterday editorialized about a
report Inspector General Fine issued last week on the slow pace of the
integration of IDENT and IAFIS, the fingerprint identification
databases of the former INS and the FBI. The report examined the case
of Victor Manual Batres, a Mexican national with a criminal history who
was twice simply returned to Mexico by Border Patrol agents whose
database did not identify him as a wanted man. Batres eventually
entered the country illegally, and then raped two nuns in Oregon,
killing one. The Inspector General reported that the integration that
would give Border Patrol agents access to the FBI database was 2 years
behind schedule, and was not expected to be completed until 2008. Last
week's report is the third OIG report in the last 4 years to highlight
various aspects of this problem. (A) Why has progress on this issue
been so slow? (B) When can we expect that Border Patrol agents will
have access to the immigration and criminal histories in one database?
(C) When will DHS enter into an MOU with DOJ about how this integration
will happen?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is committed to
accelerating implementation of IDENT/IAFIS 10 fingerprint capability
for enforcement processing at ports of entry, Border Patrol locations,
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement offices.
While we begin planning our implementation plan, we plan on using
$4 million of the remaining funds provided in Public Law 107-117
(fiscal year 2002 counter-terrorism funding) for potential use for
IDENT/IAFIS implementation. The $4 million, when combined with fiscal
year 2003 funds already provided ($3.5 million obligated for IDENT/),
will allow BTS to implement IDENT with 10 print capabilities in
secondary processing areas at 115 airports, 14 seaports and 50 of the
largest land border ports. In addition, this funding will support
implementation of the IAFIS/IDENT 10 print capability at 70 percent of
the Border Patrol stations. The remaining land ports of entry, 30
percent of the Border Patrol stations and major ICE locations (to be
determined) will receive this capability early in calendar year 2005.
Funding for fielding these capabilities is estimated to be
approximately $3 million, but a clearer estimate will be provided as
the planning and implementations proceed. Completing the implementation
of IDENT/IAFIS at Border Patrol stations will provide the capability to
biometrically identify and/or perform status verifications on
individuals suspected of illegally crossing the border. Implementation
at ICE offices will support investigation of individuals apprehended
for overstays and/or watch list hits.
The Department of Homeland Security will work with the Department
of Justice to accelerate our integration into the FBI's IAFIS (10
print, criminal history) and the legacy INS IDENT (2-print,
immigration) systems. An integrated workstation has already been
developed. It has been deployed to a limited number of sites. DHS
intends to complete deployment of this capability in 2005.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
Question. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I'm pleased to join you, Senator Byrd, and the rest of our
colleagues in welcoming Mr. Hutchinson today.
He has been handed a tough task in a very difficult time. I know he
is committed to keeping our country safe, and I thank him for his
leadership.
Mr. Hutchinson, the Federal Government--and specifically your
Department--has done an admirable job of providing resources and
training to help secure the threats to our Northern Border. As a result
of increased activity on the border, more individuals are being
apprehended for crimes at or near the border but handed over to local
law enforcement.
However, the prosecution, defense, court and detention costs are
very high. And, our local governments have been left with the
responsibility for providing law enforcement services to most areas at
and near the international border.
One example from Washington State is Whatcom County and the City of
Blaine--the areas that rests on the Northern Border of Washington State
on Interstate 5. This community is responsible for 112 miles of border,
including 89-miles of a shared land border with Canada and a 23-mile
coastal border.
As you know, the Department of Homeland Security operates five land
points-of-entry within the county. Additionally, there are three
international airports and several marine ports of entry within Whatcom
County's jurisdiction.
Mr. Hutchinson, terrorists, armed drug and weapons smugglers, and
wanted fugitives regularly traverse residential neighborhoods at or
near the border, creating huge threats to public safety and demands on
local law enforcement.
In Whatcom County, more than 85 percent of all criminal
apprehensions made by Federal law enforcement agents at or near our
border are turned over to the county. In fact, last year Whatcom County
spent approximately $3 million on Federal deferred cases, and this year
they estimate their costs will rise to $4 million.
In these difficult fiscal times for local communities these extra
burdens are having serious impacts on their budgets. But unlike the
communities of Buffalo and Detroit, my small, rural county is
staggering under the increased pressure on its budget.
Mr. Hutchinson, the Southwest Border Initiative provides financial
support to communities along the southern border who are experiencing
this very problem. However, Whatcom County, which is the least
populated northern border county with a major crossing has seen no such
relief.
I can't stress to you enough the impact $4 million has on a
community of this size.
I believe a similar program should be established for Northern
Border States, particularly those State that have high traffic volumes,
such as Washington State.
Mr. Hutchinson, are you aware of this inequity between southern and
northern border communities, and how is your Department prepared to
help?
Answer. Senator Murray, thank you for bringing this important issue
to my attention. As you know, some of the initiatives undertaken to
improve homeland security have produced unintended consequences.
Tighter border security should lead to more interdictions and arrests.
But, while the National Strategy for Homeland Security specifies that
costs and performance are to be a shared responsibility, we certainly
are not advocating that local jurisdictions take on a disproportionate
share of the burden in that regard. Therefore we welcome your reports
that outline these potential inequities. I understand that the U.S.
Attorney and our ICE officers have met with your county officials to
find a more balanced approach to performing this important workload,
including the prospects that the arrestee's initial appearance occur in
the Bellingham Magistrate's Court. While those potential solutions may
not lead to the full relief sought, they are a step in the right
direction while the Federal budget addresses this increased workload.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Cochran. Our next hearing of the subcommittee on
the budget request for the Department of Homeland Security will
be held on Tuesday, March 23 in this same room. At that time
the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, Admiral Thomas
Collins, and the Acting Administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration, Mr. David Stone, will be here to
discuss the budget request for the programs under their
jurisdictions.
Until then this subcommittee will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., Tuesday, March 9, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday,
March 23.]