[Senate Hearing 108-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
[The following testimonies were received by the
Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2005 budget
request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]
Prepared Statement of the Association of American Universities
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to have
this opportunity to present the views of the Association of American
Universities (AAU) concerning the fiscal year 2005 budget proposal for
the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate. AAU is an organization of 62 leading public and private
research universities.
Let me begin by thanking Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and
members of the subcommittee for their efforts last year in helping the
new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) get up and running. I would
especially like to thank them for their recognition of the role that
universities can play in helping the Department fulfill its mission and
for your strong support of the university programs within the DHS S&T
Directorate. You all have done the nation a great service, and your
work to ensure the security of our homeland is very much appreciated.
AAU Urges Strong Support of Homeland Security S&T
AAU supports the $1.039 billion proposed in the President's fiscal
year 2005 budget request for the DHS S&T Directorate. The primary
interest of the university community continues to be with DHS
University Programs, which support the DHS scholarship, fellowship, and
university center programs. AAU requests $70 million for DHS university
programs in fiscal year 2005, the same level approved by Congress in
fiscal year 2004. This is $40 million more than the President's fiscal
year 2005 request.
AAU recommends that this additional $40 million be used to support
new DHS university-based centers and other innovative university-based
research programs. This is consistent with AAU's view that DHS S&T
programs should focus not only on the development of technologies with
near-term applications but also on helping generate the fundamental
knowledge, cutting-edge science, and human infrastructure needed to
meet the nation's future homeland security needs. AAU also supports
funding for S&T staffing and administration at a level that allows the
directorate to ensure that S&T funds are awarded to projects fairly and
competitively, based on scientific and technical merit.
The Role of Universities in Homeland Security
There are several reasons why AAU believes that continued strong
support for university research and training is needed and can greatly
assist the Department of Homeland Security. Let me briefly highlight
three of them:
Long-Term University-Based Research is Critical to Homeland
Defense.--Science and engineering research conducted on university
campuses is the foundation for many of the technologies now being
deployed to prevent, detect, and treat victims of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and conventional terrorist attacks. As with
university-based basic and applied defense research programs,
fundamental knowledge and research generated at universities will serve
as the ``seed corn'' from which future homeland security technologies
will grow.
Universities Are an Important Resource in the Domestic War on
Terror.--University medical facilities and personnel were critical in
providing medical care and emergency response services after the
September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. When
the anthrax attacks occurred on Capitol Hill, university researchers
were called on to help Americans better understand the threat posed by
biological agents and to provide critical information that enabled
federal agencies and Congress to respond effectively.
University researchers are actively exploring new methods to
safeguard the nation, including detection of, and response to, domestic
biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological attacks; risk
assessment; cybersecurity; protection of critical infrastructure; and
developing a better understanding of the behaviors and motivations of
those who engage in terrorist activities.
Universities Are Leading Homeland Security Training and
Coordination.--Universities continue to work with government officials
at all levels, industry and non-profit leaders, and first-responders to
develop coherent, effective homeland security strategies. Colleges and
universities are also developing new programs to train first responders
and educate students to address current and future homeland security
challenges.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that in addition to being able to assist
the Department of Homeland Security in fulfilling its science and
technology and training objectives, AAU and its member universities are
working to ensure safety and security on university campuses. This
includes compliance with the new biological and select agent
regulations and efforts to help ensure that new systems to track
foreign students--as required by law--are in place. AAU urges that in
addition to providing funding for homeland security S&T, Congress and
the Administration provide adequate funding to support university
efforts to respond to these new requirements for campus-based homeland
security. With your support, and working together, the nation's
research universities will be able to continue to help fight terrorism
and ensure domestic security.
Again, I appreciate your ongoing work in support of homeland
security. Thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony. Please let
me know should you have any questions.
______
Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written
testimony on the security and safety of public transportation systems.
We appreciate your interest in transportation security, and we look
forward to working with you as you develop the fiscal year 2005
appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security.
ABOUT APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
nonprofit international association of over 1,500 public and private
member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail
operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product
and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and
State departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public
interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services
and products. Over ninety percent of persons using public
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA
member systems.
OVERVIEW
Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our Nation's critical
infrastructures. We cannot over emphasize the importance of our
industry to the economic vitality of this country. Over 9.5 billion
transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit service.
People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million times each
weekday. This is more than 16 times the number of daily travelers
aboard the Nation's airlines, and 450 times the number of travelers on
Amtrak.
The American people rightfully expect that they can travel to work,
school, and any destination on public transit without fearing for their
safety and security. Our industry is fully engaged in meeting this
responsibility. However, the American people, and we also require the
full support of the Federal Government to effectively address this
challenge.
America's public transportation services are by design and
necessity an open environment. Safety and security are thus the top
priority of the public transportation industry. Transit systems took
many steps to improve security prior to the horrific terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, and have significantly increased efforts since
then by spending approximately $1.7 billion on security and emergency
preparedness programs and technology. These expenditures have been made
from local transit agency's own budgets with minimal Federal funding.
Recent terrorist attacks in Madrid only highlight the need to
strengthen security on public transit systems and to do so without
delay.
In a recent APTA survey transit systems identified both capital and
operating actions that would enhance transit security; transit agencies
around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in transit
security needs. State and local governments and transit agencies are
doing what they can to improve security, but it is important that the
Federal Government be a full partner in the effort to ensure the
security of the Nation's tens of millions of transit users.
We urge the Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of
the documented needs, we respectfully request Congress to provide $2
billion in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations bill
for transit security. Of that amount, we suggest that $1.2 billion be
provided for capital needs such as improved inter-operable radio
communications, strengthening access control to facilities, and
establishing emergency operations control centers, and that $800
million be provided for security related operating costs, including
threat assessments, planning, public awareness, training, and drills.
We further request that the existing process for distributing
Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Federal grant funding be modified
so that funds are distributed directly to transit agencies as was done
in fiscal year 2003, rather than through State Administrating Agencies
(SAA) as was done in fiscal year 2004.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mr. Chairman, transit employees are on the front line in our
Nation's effort against terrorism. They are the first responder
evacuation teams who will assist in getting the public out of critical
incident areas and our cities in the event of a terrorist attack. This
was evident on September 11, 2001, when public transportation systems
in New York City, New Jersey and Washington D.C. helped safely evacuate
citizens from center cities. Indeed, this same story was true around
the country as transit systems quickly and efficiently evacuated people
from closed airports and downtown areas. We remember that the
interstate highway program was begun by President Eisenhower as a
national defense interstate highway program. It is clear now that
public transportation too has a significant national defense component
and is a fundamental element in responding to terrorist attacks and
other community disasters and emergencies.
In that connection, APTA has played a critical role in
transportation security and works closely with a number of Federal
agencies in this regard, notably the Federal Transit Administration
(FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration of the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), and the Directorate of
Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security. At the program level, APTA works closely with
these agencies to administer an industry audit program that oversees a
system safety and security management plan for transit systems around
the country. Our safety audit program for commuter rail, bus, and rail
transit operations has been in place for many years and includes
elements specific to security planning and emergency preparedness.
Separately, in connection with Presidential Decision Directive Number
63, we are pleased to have been designated a Public Transportation
Sector Coordinator by the Department of Transportation, and as my
testimony notes below, we have established a Transit Information
Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC) that provides a secure two-way reporting
and analysis structure for the transmission of critical alerts and
advisories to transit agencies around the country. This ISAC is also a
mechanism for transit agencies to provide information to the DHS.
Since the events of 9/11, State and local public transit agencies,
like all State and local entities, have spent significant sums on
police overtime, enhanced planning and training exercises, and capital
improvements related to security. As mentioned in the overview, a 2004
APTA survey of transit agencies around the country has identified in
excess of $6 billion in added transit security needs. These include
both one-time capital investments and recurring operating expenses
related to security. It is important to note that these costs are above
and beyond the capital infrastructure needs we have identified under
the TEA 21 reauthorization effort.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Chairman, prior to and following September 11, 2001, the date
of the most devastating terrorist attack in U.S. history, American
public transportation agencies have taken significant measures to
emphasize their security and emergency preparedness to adjust to
society's new State of concern. Although agencies had a wide range of
security initiatives in place at the time of the World Trade Center and
Pentagon attacks and already had developed emergency response plans,
the September 11 incidents caused the agencies to focus, strengthen,
and prioritize additional security efforts.
Transit agencies have had an excellent safety record and have
worked for years to enhance their system security and employee security
training, partly responding to government standards, APTA guidelines,
and by learning through the attacks on transit agencies abroad. For
example, the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system caused
U.S. transit properties managing tunnels and underground transit
stations to go on high alert. The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
District, for instance, responded to the possible threat of chemical
weapons attacks by sending a police team to Fort McClellan, Alabama, to
learn response tactics from U.S. Army chemical weapons experts.
In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, transit
agencies of all sizes worked to identify where they might be vulnerable
to attacks and increased their security spending for both operations
and capital costs. The agencies subsequently upgraded and strengthened
their emergency response and security plans and procedures, taking
steps to protect transit infrastructure and patrons and increase
transit security presence while giving riders a sense of security.
Some initiatives around the country include:
--Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV
--Increased training for employees
--Hired more police, K-9 units added
--Chemical detection systems being tested
--Infrastructure design to eliminate hiding places
--Drills are routinely held with first responders
--Encouraging riders to be vigilant for suspicious activities or
items.
After September 11, many transit organizations worked to prevent
unauthorized entry into transit facilities. The need for employees and
passengers to stay alert and report suspicious occurrences became a key
goal of many agencies. These efforts are paying off. But while many
transit agencies are more secure than prior to September 11, more needs
to be done.
Since the attacks, APTA and the Federal Transit Administration have
emphasized the need for effective transit security and emergency
preparedness. FTA has sent security resources toolkits to transit
agencies; completed security-vulnerability assessments of the Nation's
largest transit systems; and provided technical support and grants of
up to $50,000 to fund agency emergency drills.
FTA continues to provide emergency preparedness and security forums
nationwide. In emphasizing the importance of enhancing transit
security, FTA Administrator Jennifer L. Dorn noted that thousands of
lives were spared on September 11 in New York City and Washington
``because of the quick action of first responders and transit
workers.''
APTA has launched additional efforts to further transit industry
security and preparedness, collaborating with FTA in developing
emergency preparedness forums, and sponsoring and organizing security-
related conferences and workshops. Moreover, APTA developed a list of
critical safety and security needs faced by the transit industry, which
it has provided to the Department of Transportation and the U.S.
Congress.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION INFORMATION SHARING ANALYSIS CENTER (ISAC)
Presidential Decision Directive Number 63 authorizes and encourages
national critical infrastructures to develop and maintain ISACs as a
means of strengthening security and protection against cyber and
operations attacks. APTA is pleased to have been designated a Public
Transportation Sector Coordinator by the U.S. Department of
Transportation, and in that capacity has received a $1.2 million grant
from the Federal Transit Administration to establish a transit ISAC.
APTA recently formalized an agreement with a private company to
implement the ISAC and make it available to public transit systems
around the country.
This ISAC for public transit provides a secure two-way reporting
and analysis structure for the transmission of critical alerts and
advisories as well as the collection, analysis and dissemination of
security information from transit agencies. The public transit ISAC
also provides a critical linkage between the transit industry, the U.S.
Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security
Administration, and the Office of Homeland Security. A request for
funding to continue this ISAC has been submitted to the Department of
Homeland Security's Directorate of Information Analysis &
Infrastructure Protection.
ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS
Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs.
Shortly after the September 11 events, the APTA Executive Committee
established a Security Task Force under the leadership of Washington
Metro's CEO, Richard A. White. The APTA Security Task Force has
established a security strategic plan that prioritizes direction for
our initiatives. Among those initiatives, the Task Force serves as the
steering group for determining security projects that are being
implemented through over $2 million in Transit Cooperative Research
funding through the Transportation Research Board.
Through this funding, APTA held four transit security workshop
forums for the larger transit systems with potentially greater risk
exposure. These workshops provided confidential settings to enable
sharing of security practices and applying methodologies to various
scenarios. The outcomes from these workshops were made available in a
controlled and confidential format to other transit agencies unable to
attend the workshops. The workshops were held in New York, San
Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago.
In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, the APTA
Security Task Force has also established two TCRP Panels that
identified and initiated specific projects developed to address
Preparedness/Detection/Response to Incidents and Prevention and
Mitigation. The Security Task Force emphasized the importance for the
research projects to be operationally practical.
In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, a generic Checklist For
Transit Agency Review Of Emergency Response Planning And System Review
has been developed by APTA as a resource tool and is available on the
APTA website. Also through the direction of the Security Task Force,
APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
on our respective security programs and directions and to continually
work towards raising the bar of safety and security effectiveness.
Within this concept of partnership and outreach, APTA also
continues in its ongoing collaboration with the Federal Transit
Administration to help in guiding and developing FTA programs. Among
these are regional Emergency Preparedness and Security Planning
Workshops that are currently being delivered through the Volpe Center
and have been provided in numerous regions throughout the United
States. The primary focus of such workshops has been to assist
particularly smaller transit systems in building effective emergency
response plans with first responders and their regional offices of
emergency management. Also within this partnership, APTA has assisted
the FTA and the National Transit Institute in the design of a new
program ``Security Awareness Training for Frontline Employees and
Supervisors.'' This program is now being provided by NTI to transit
agencies throughout the Nation.
Collaborative efforts between APTA, FTA, Volpe Center, and the
National Transit Institute are also underway to establish a joint
website that will specifically gather and disseminate effective transit
practices with initial emphasis on safety and security.
As you may be aware, APTA has a long-established Safety Audit
Program for Commuter Rail, Bus, and Rail Transit Operations. Within the
scope of these programs are specific elements pertaining to Emergency
Response Planning and Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping
with our industry's increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety
Audit Programs have similarly been modified to place added attention to
these critical elements.
APTA's Committee on Public Safety continues to provide a most
critical forum for transit security professionals to meet and share
information, experiences and programs and to also provide valuable
input to programs being developed by the FTA.
SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS
Mr. Chairman, after the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
invested some $1.7 billion in enhanced security measures building on
the industry's considerable efforts already in place. At the same time,
our industry undertook a comprehensive review to determine how we could
build upon our existing industry security practices. This included a
range of activities, some of which I discussed earlier in my testimony,
including research, best practices, education, information sharing in
the industry, surveys and the like. As a result of those efforts we are
now at a phase where we know what we can most effectively do in terms
of creating a more secure environment for our riders and have
accordingly identified critical security investment needs.
Our latest survey of public transportation security identified
needs of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million annually for
increased operating costs for security personnel, training, technical
support, and research and development have been identified, bringing
total additional transit security funding needs to more than $6
billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
which they required additional Federal investment for security needs.
Priority examples of operational needs include:
--Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
enforcement personnel
--Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
heightened alert levels
--Training for security personnel
--Joint transit/law enforcement training
--Security planning activities
--Security training for other transit personnel
Priority examples of security capital investment needs include:
--Radio communications systems, including operational control center
redundancy
--Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations
--Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas
--Automated vehicle locator systems
--Security fencing around facilities
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
devices.
To date the DHS has allocated some $115 million for public
transportation security through its Office of Domestic Preparedness.
While we appreciate this support from the Department, we must build on
those initial investments and begin to address the $6 billion in
critical needs the transit industry has identified. We believe that a
funding level of $2 billion in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
Appropriations bill would effectively begin the process of funding
those needs. Of that amount, we suggest that $1.2 billion be provided
for transit capital needs, and that $800 million be provided for
transit agencies for operating costs.
The Administration's fiscal year 2005 budget, however, does not
specifically call for investment in public transportation security. We
think it should. Currently ODP grants for transit systems are made
available through the States, which means that our transit systems do
not have a direct relationship with DHS, and which also means that the
process of getting the funds to the local transit systems can be
lengthy. Mr. Chairman, our Nation's transit systems have a direct and
cooperative working relationship with DOT's Federal Transit
Administration which allocates Federal capital investment directly to
them, and we believe this is an excellent model that we would like to
see developed with the DHS. We stand ready to help in any way we can in
that regard.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security concerns
post 9/11, and the bombings in Madrid, tens of millions of Americans
relying on public transportation expect the services they use to be
made more secure. Increased Federal investment in public transportation
security by the Congress and DHS is critical. The public transportation
industry has made great strides in transit security improvements since
9/11 but much more needs to be done. We look forward to building on our
cooperative working relationship with Congress and the Department of
Homeland Security to begin to address these needs. We again thank you
and the Committee for allowing us to submit testimony on these critical
issues and look forward to working with you on safety and security
issues.
______
Prepared Statement of the Association of State Dam Safety Officials
Dear Chairman Cochran and Members of the Subcommittee: The
Association of State Dam Safety Officials (ASDSO) is pleased to offer
testimony on the President's proposed fiscal year 2005 budget for the
Department of Homeland Security.
The Association of State Dam Safety Officials respectfully requests
that the Subcommittee increase the Administration's proposed budget of
$5.9 million to $8.6 million to fully fund the National Dam Safety
Program at its authorized level for fiscal year 2005. The Association
further requests that these funds be earmarked for the sole purpose of
carrying out mandates authorized in the National Dam Safety and
Security Act of 2002.
The Association of State Dam Safety Officials is a national
organization of more than 2,200 state, Federal and local dam safety
professionals and private sector individuals dedicated to improving dam
safety through research, education and technology transfer. ASDSO
represents the 50 state dam safety programs, as the state dam safety
officials are the governing body of the Association. Our goal is simply
to save lives, prevent property damage and to maintain the many
benefits of dams by preventing dam failures.
During the 1970s this country suffered devastating dam failures
that caused tragic loss of life and enormous property damage; and
focused national attention on the catastrophic consequences of dam
failures. Those historic failures and recent dam failures serve as a
constant reminder that dams must always be properly constructed,
properly designed and properly operated and maintained to provide vital
benefits and prevent failures.
Today our focus in not only on the safety of dams related to
maintenance issues but on security as the Nation faces a significant
challenge to protect our infrastructure from terrorist attacks.
Protection of U.S. dams is a major concern and focus of national
strategic planning efforts within the Department of Homeland Security.
National Dam Safety Program
The National Dam Safety Program Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-303)
created the first national program that focused on improving the safety
of the Nation's dams. Congress reauthorized the program through the Dam
Safety and Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-310) and made modest
increases in the authorized funds. This small, yet critical program
provides much needed assistance to the state dam safety programs in the
form of grant assistance, training and research; and through
facilitating the exchange of technical information between Federal dam
safety partners and the states. The program provides $6 million in
grant assistance to states based on the relative number of dams in each
state. The grants may be utilized to best suit the individual state's
needs. In addition, the National Dam Safety Program provides $500,000
each year to be used for training of state dam safety engineers and
$1.5 million annually for research. These research funds are used to
identify more effective methods of evaluating the safety of dams and
more efficient techniques to repair dams. And now, these research funds
can be used to develop better methods to assess and improve the
security of dams.
There are over 79,000 dams in the United States, but the
responsibility of assuring their safety falls on the shoulders of the
states, as they regulate 95 percent of the country's dams. Because of
limited staff and limited funding, most states are overwhelmed by that
challenge. Table 1 attached to this testimony provides state-by-state
data on the number of dams, the number of staff, the state budget and
the number of dams that are considered ``unsafe.'' Unsafe means that
they have identified deficiencies that make the dam more susceptible to
failure, which may be triggered by a large storm event, an earthquake
or simply through inadequate maintenance. Currently states have
identified over 3,300 dams as being deficient, or unsafe. In Kentucky
the state lists 88 unsafe dams including 36 that are classified as high
hazard potential. In Pennsylvania there are 531 unsafe dams and 98 of
these are classified as high hazard potential.
There are over 10,000 dams classified as high hazard potential
meaning that the consequences of the dam's failure will likely include
loss of human life and significant downstream property damage. Every
member of this Subcommittee has high hazard dams in their home state.
There are 217 high hazard potential dams in Kentucky, 861 high hazard
potential dams in Texas and 1,027 high hazard potential dams in North
Carolina. According to the National Inventory of Dams more than 53
percent of the high hazard potential dams have not been inspected in
the last ten years. High hazard potential dams should be inspected
every year.
The task for state dam safety programs is staggering; in Iowa where
there are over 3,300 dams there are only 1.25 full time employees
assigned to the dam safety program. Texas has over 8,000 dams with only
5 engineers in their dam safety program; and Minnesota, which has
almost 1,000 dams, only has a staff of 2.1 full time employees
The American Society of Civil Engineers' 2003 Progress Report for
America's Infrastructure listed a downward trend line indicating that
the condition of the Nation's dams continues to decline. The dams
across the United States are aging as 85 percent of the dams will be 50
years or older by the year 2020.
Downstream development within the dam failure flood zone places
more people at risk. When homes are built in the dam failure flood zone
below a low hazard dam, (low hazard: failure is not expected to cause
loss of life or significant property damage) the dam no longer meets
dam safety criteria as the potential consequences of a failure now
include loss of life.
Federal Leadership Role
There is a clear need for continued Federal leadership to provide
assistance in support of dam safety. This country suffered several
large and tragic dam failures in the 1970s that focused attention on
dams and prompted Congress to pass national dam safety legislation. In
1972, the Buffalo Creek Dam in West Virginia failed and killed 125
individuals; in 1976 the Teton Dam failure in Idaho caused $1 billion
in damages and 14 deaths; the Kelly Barnes Dam in Toccao Falls, Georgia
failed in 1977 killing 39 Bible college students; also in 1977 40
people died from the failure of the Laurel Run Dam in Pennsylvania; and
in 1996 the 38 foot tall Meadow Pond Dam in Alton, New Hampshire failed
killing one woman and causing $8 million in damage.
However, the recent failure of the Silver Lake Dam in Michigan in
May 2003 again demonstrated the enormous potential damages that dam
failures can produce. This dam failure caused more than $100 million in
damages including $10 million in damages to utilities, $4 million to
the environment, $3 million to roads and bridges and flooded 20 homes
and businesses. In addition, the Silver Lake Dam failure flooded a
major power plant, which in turn caused the closure of two iron mines,
putting 1,100 miners temporarily out of work.
Just last month on March 12, 2004, the Big Bay Lake Dam in
Mississippi failed destroying 48 homes, damaging 53 homes, 2 churches,
three businesses and a fire station and washing out a bridge. This dam,
which cost $2.5 million to construct, has caused many millions in
damages, will require downstream homeowners and businesses to rebuild,
caused significant loss of property values around the lake and has
resulted in $100 million lawsuit filed against the dam owner on behalf
of the homeowners.
Dam failures do not respect state boundaries, as a dam failure in
one state may cause loss of life and property damage in an adjacent
state. The Federal Government funds the recovery costs from the
President's disaster relief fund and through the Flood Insurance
Program, but the cost of one small dam failure can easily exceed the
annual costs of the National Dam Safety Program. Full funding of the
National Dam Safety Program is an investment in public safety that will
be repaid many times over in fewer dam failures, reduced Federal
expenditures for dam failure recovery and, most importantly, fewer
lives lost.
Benefits of the National Dam Safety Program
The National Dam Safety Program has been very successful in
assisting the state programs. The training program is created is one
aspect of this success ($500,000). This training provides access to
technical courses and workshops that states engineers could not
otherwise attend. Examples include Dambreak Analysis, Concrete
Rehabilitation of Dams, Slope Stability of Dams, Earthquake Analysis,
Emergency Action Planning and many others including recent training in
Dam Site Security. Training courses are also offered through FEMA's
training facility at their Emergency Management Institute in Maryland
where state dam safety inspectors receive training at no cost to the
states.
The Research Program is an important program to all within the dam
safety community. Its funds have been used to identify future research
needs such as inspections using ground penetrating radar or risk
analysis. In addition, these funds have been used to create a national
library and database of dam failures and dam statistics at the National
Performance of Dams Program at Stanford University as well as a
national clearinghouse and library of dam safety bibliographic data at
ASDSO.
Research funds are currently being used to provide security
training, security assessment tools and best management practices for
states to utilize in addressing potential terrorists actions against
the 75,000 non-Federal dams. The small increase ($500,000) in the
funding levels authorized by the 2002 act was intended to address dam
site security. Dam site security is now an urgent area of concern for
state dam safety officials both in training needs and in research to
better understand and respond to potential threats to dams.
The most valuable benefit to the state programs comes from the
State Grant Assistance Program. The grants are based on the number of
dams in each of the participating states and are used as an incentive
to encourage states to improve their program by meeting basic criteria
such as:
--State statutory authority to conduct inspections of dams;
--State authority to require repairs to unsafe dams; or
--State policies that address dam site security at non-Federal dams.
Use of these grants is left up to the state's discretion as each
state has its own unique challenges. States have utilized grant funds
to perform dam failure and dam stability analyses, to hire additional
staff to conduct inspections and to conduct owner education workshops.
In addition, grant funds have enabled states to provide additional
staff training, and to purchase equipment such as computers, field
survey equipment and software, and remote operated cameras for internal
inspections.
As we begin to realize the benefits of the grant assistance
program, dam safety inspections have increased and so has the number of
Emergency Action Plans, used to notify and evacuate downstream
populations in the event of a failure, it is disappointing to see that
appropriations over the past 2 years are well below the authorized
levels. They have remained at the previous level of $5.9 million.
Despite the increase in funding approved by Congress in the Dam Safety
and Security Act of 2002 to $8.6 million, the states have not realized
any increase in assistance. Moreover, budget reductions at have further
reduced the state grant assistance funds by almost 22 percent.
Table 2, attached to this testimony, provides information on the
amount of state grant assistance received for each state, the potential
grant funding if fully funded at authorized levels and the grant amount
each state will lose as a result of the reduced funding. The lost
grants come at a difficult time when development below dams creates
more high hazard potential dams, dams continue to age and, now,
security issues must be addressed by the states.
Dam Security of Non-Federal Dams
The horrific events of September 11, 2001 have focused
unprecedented attention on the security of our Nation's critical
infrastructure, including dams. Dams, in fact, have been identified by
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in specific threat alerts.
Federal agencies that own dams, such as the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, have been conducting
vulnerability assessments and security improvements on these Federally
owned dams. However, little has been provided by the Federal Government
in leadership or assistance to the states who have similar and equally
urgent dam security demands.
Security experts advise that it is very difficult to make a site
completely safe from intentional acts of terror. They offer that their
goal is to enhance security and effectively deter a potential attack at
a site so that the terrorist will seek another site with less security.
The improved security at federally owned dams makes non-Federal dams
more attractive targets. There are clearly thousands of non-Federal
dams that are potential targets based on type of construction, size,
purpose (water supply, hydro power, flood control); and on the
population and infrastructure at risk below the dam. Federal leadership
is urgently needed to provide technical and financial assistance to
states for training, for conducting vulnerability assessments and for
identifying and implementing security improvements on dams determined
to have an inadequate security program.
Conclusion
Dams are a vital part of our aging national infrastructure that
provide many vital benefits, but that also pose a threat to life and
property if they fail. The National Dam Safety Program is a valuable
program that offers assistance to states as an investment in public
safety. One dam failure alone, as evidenced by the Silver Lake Dam
failure in 2003, can easily exceed the $8.6 million authorized for this
program. The National Dam Safety Program, administered by FEMA, is a
modest and prudent investment protecting public safety.
Therefore, the Association of State Dam Safety Officials
respectfully requests that this Subcommittee increase the
Administration's proposed funding for the National Dam Safety Program
from $5.9 million to the full authorized level of $8.6 million; and
further earmark these funds to be used only for the National Dam Safety
Program in the Department of Homeland Security.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee for this
opportunity offer this testimony. The Association looks forward to
working with you and the Subcommittee staff on this important issue of
safe dams.
TABLE 1.--ASSOCIATION OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS--STATE-BY-STATE STATISTICS ON DAMS AND STATE SAFETY REGULATION--2004
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Dams in Dams Under State Regulation State-Determined Deficient Dams \3\ State Dam Safety State Staff Dedicated to Dam
National \2\ ------------------------------------------------ Budget ( thousand) ----------------------------------
(2002 NID) Total HH Total HH SH Total FTEs Dams Per FTE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama \4\................................ 2,102 0 171 NA .............. .............. $0 0 NA
Alaska..................................... 104 82 16 NR .............. .............. 105.5 1 82
Arizona.................................... 328 251 85 58 44 14 570.0 8 31
Arkansas................................... 1,225 407 102 24 22 1 331.0 4.6 88
California................................. 1,471 1,225 335 57 2 26 7,800.0 61 20
Colorado................................... 1,684 1,879 327 220 35 52 1,400.0 12 157
Connecticut \4\............................ 720 2,000 236 12 NR NR 472.0 4.3 465
Delaware \4\............................... 61 98 9 NR .............. .............. NR NR NR
Florida.................................... 724 \4\ 778 \4\ 100 >20 NR NR NR NR NR
Georgia \4\................................ 4,470 3,412 399 105 NR NR 682.0 10 341
Hawaii \4\................................. 122 129 56 0 0 0 135.0 2 65
Idaho \4\.................................. 393 439 106 NR .............. .............. 350.0 7.5 59
Illinois................................... 1,456 1,326 173 >22 13 9 345.0 5.5 241
Indiana.................................... 1,069 1,129 238 NR .............. .............. 340.0 5 226
Iowa....................................... 3,249 3,303 74 16 8 7 55.0 1.25 2,642
Kansas..................................... 5,634 5,890 192 23 13 10 271.0 7.58 777
Kentucky................................... 1,051 1,002 175 88 36 35 1,600.0 14 72
Louisiana.................................. 357 465 13 17 1 3 NR 9 52
Maine...................................... 641 843 \4\ 26 68 7 35 \4\ 46.0 1.5 562
Maryland................................... 291 355 63 10 1 5 416.6 5.5 65
Massachusetts.............................. 1,490 2,917 333 40 22 18 500.0 4 729
Michigan................................... 943 1,039 80 18 3 7 NR 4.8 216
Minnesota.................................. 986 1,442 40 250 2 20 250.0 2.1 687
Mississippi................................ 3,315 3,594 282 NR .............. .............. 137.8 4.5 799
Missouri................................... 4,854 640 445 15 11 4 192.9 4 160
Montana.................................... 2,885 2,874 101 >11 11 NR 330.0 5.25 547
Nebraska................................... 2,179 2,173 113 130 7 48 289.0 5.67 383
Nevada..................................... 469 599 128 >29 5 4 NR 2.25 266
New Hampshire.............................. 645 838 86 590 63 159 612.0 7 120
New Jersey................................. 792 1,680 194 567 50 317 1,251.0 18 93
New Mexico................................. 375 390 156 61 38 14 450.0 6 65
New York \4\............................... 1964 5,021 380 >54 NR NR 746.0 6.3 797
North Carolina............................. 2723 4,638 1,027 >61 NR NR 902.0 17 273
North Dakota............................... 685 1,758 20 19 5 11 200.0 4.5 391
Ohio....................................... 1,325 1,727 462 NR .............. .............. 1,020.0 11 157
Oklahoma................................... 4,610 4,485 184 5 3 1 185.0 1.8 2,492
Oregon \4\................................. 820 3,733 122 0 0 0 255.0 3.1 1,204
Pennsylvania............................... 1,442 3,044 770 531 98 23 2,039.0 24 127
Puerto Rico................................ 34 36 34 0 0 0 600.0 8 5
Rhode Island............................... 185 565 16 0 0 0 99.6 1.2 471
South Carolina............................. 2,447 2,312 153 3 NR NR NR 4.5 514
South Dakota............................... 2,377 2,328 47 >3 3 NR NR 2.5 931
Tennessee.................................. 1,051 638 148 5 3 1 275.0 7 91
Texas...................................... 7,025 8,133 861 NR .............. .............. 300.0 5 1,627
Utah....................................... 752 649 192 82 82 NR 460.0 7 93
Vermont.................................... 354 538 55 NR .............. .............. 215.0 2.2 245
Virginia................................... 1,586 521 112 54 31 13 475.6 7 74
Washington................................. 832 933 135 32 13 14 550.0 6.5 144
West Virginia.............................. 543 362 266 38 35 3 454.5 6 60
Wisconsin.................................. 1,097 3,748 243 NR .............. .............. 487.0 6.25 600
Wyoming.................................... 1,335 1,374 76 3 0 1 142.1 5.09 270
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL................................ 79,272 89,742 10,157 >3,341 645 837 28,337.6 359.24 20,576
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes dams of any size that are likely to pose a significant threat to human life or property in case of failure, and all other Federal and non-Federal dams > 25 high that impound > 15
acre feet; and dams > 6 high that impound > 50 acre-feet.
\2\ Estimated number of all dams under state regulatory control.
\3\ Dams with identified deficiencies by state definition (varies state to state) derived from state inventory in column 2.
\4\ 2003 data
NR-Not Reporting. Some states do not keep data on these categories.
Prepared Statement of the Association of State Floodplain Managers,
Inc.
The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. (ASFPM) is
pleased to share comments on four specific aspects of the fiscal year
2005 budget proposal for the Department of Homeland Security, Emergency
Preparedness and Response Directorate (FEMA):
--Restoration of 15 percent formula for Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program funding;
--Protection of NFIP funds from transfer for other purposes;
--Support for continued funding for modernization of flood maps;
--Urge increase in NFIP Community Assistance Program funds for state
technical assistance;
--Urge appropriation of funds to address the NFIP's repetitive loss
problem, given imminently pending authorizing legislation; and
--Continue to retain a separate account for the Flood Mitigation
Assistance Program.
--Monitor how the Department of Homeland Security addresses natural
hazards and mitigation.
The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. and its 19 state
chapters represent over 6,500 State, local, and private sector
officials as well as other professionals who are engaged in all aspects
of floodplain management and hazard mitigation. All are concerned with
reducing our Nation's flood-related losses and reducing the costs of
flooding.
RESTORATION OF 15 PERCENT FORMULA FOR HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM
ASFPM urges restoration of the 15 percent formula used to determine
amounts made available post-disaster for the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP) authorized by the Stafford Act as Section 404. States
across the country have evidence that the most effective time to garner
support for mitigation projects is in the aftermath of disasters. While
mitigation planning is a vital activity to identify hazards and
potential risks, only actual damaging events generate significant
public interest and State and local financial support. The fact is that
most cities, counties and towns across the country have many immediate
and pressing financial needs. Regardless of the statistical evidence of
the likelihood of future disaster occurrence, communities will not
place mitigation higher than today's demands for education, social
programs, local first responders, and the like. This is especially true
in smaller communities where financial resources are always tight.
On the proverbial ``sunny day,'' flooding is a low priority for the
millions of homeowners and business owners in the Nation's flood hazard
areas--regardless of the mounting evidence that future floods will
occur. Homeowners and business owners view offers for buyouts,
elevations, and retrofit floodproofing very differently when they are
shoveling mud, coping with toxic mold, or faced with collapsed
foundations. Restoring HMGP to the 15 percent formula will provide
resources to those who have just experienced damage and are most
receptive to change.
Pre-disaster funding should be directed to community-based planning
in order to prepare communities to undertake mitigation projects when
the disaster strikes. It would also be reasonable to make pre-disaster
mitigation funds available to support public projects that address at-
risk State and community buildings and public infrastructure--among the
more costly categories of public disaster assistance. These projects,
which do not require direct and voluntary participation of property
owners, can readily be designed and implemented in the pre-disaster
context and provide broad public benefits.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to restore the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program formula to 15 percent of certain Federal disaster
expenditures. The Disaster Mitigation Assistance Act of 2000
calls for communities to have pre-disaster local mitigation
plans in order to access HMGP. One result of this requirement
is that communities will be better prepared to identify
eligible activities after the next declared disaster, thus
further shortening the time needed to obligate and expend the
HMGP funds.
--ASFPM recommends that the Subcommittee fully investigate the
implications of the nationwide pre-disaster program funded in
fiscal year 2003. Initiated in 2002 as a pilot program, the
pre-disaster mitigation program was not, as originally
intended, evaluated prior to authorization of PDM in the
Disaster Mitigation Action of 2000. Particular attention should
be paid to citizen, community and State receptivity to
mitigation offers and how the ability to provide the non-
Federal cost share differs in the pre- and post-disaster
periods. Another critical aspect to attend to is whether and
how FEMA balanced different hazards, different geographic
areas, and communities of different sizes and capabilities.
PROTECT NFIP FUNDS FROM TRANSFER FOR OTHER PURPOSES
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) collects premiums and
policy service fees from just 4.4 million flood insurance
policyholders. These funds are authorized for specific purposes
directly related to administration of the NFIP. Certain Federal
employees are supported by these funds, as are such activities as the
Flood Mitigation Assistance grant program, grants to States to provide
technical assistance to local governments, and flood mapping. Because
these funds are not general taxpayer funds, it is vital that they are
used only for the specific purposes for which they are collected.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to require DHS to disclose funds
collected from NFIP policyholders that have been transferred
for other purposes. We further urge the Subcommittee to
prohibit the transfer of NFIP funds, and funds authorized and
appropriated for the Map Modernization Initiative, for other
purposes by DHS.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to require DHS to report on the use of
certain NFIP funds to support Federal employees, specifically,
the number of such positions, where they are located, how many
are vacant and for what period of time, and how those specific
positions directly support the NFIP.
CONTINUE SUPPORT FOR FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION
Good flood maps play a major role in disaster cost reduction
through wise floodplain management and are use for many purposes beyond
the immediate needs of the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA
estimates that local regulation of flood hazard areas, using the flood
maps, avoids property losses of over $1 billion each year. FEMA's
estimate does not count the benefits associated with using the maps to
guide development to less hazard-prone areas. Flood maps yield benefits
at all levels of government, including reducing the need for Federal
disaster assistance when people build elsewhere or build to minimize
damage.
Initiated with the fiscal year 2003 appropriation of $200 million
for the multi-year Flood Map Modernization effort, FEMA and States will
use current technologies to expedite cost-effective collection of
mapping data and to develop the models to identify flood-prone areas.
This will yield digitized map products that will be accessible on the
Internet and reduce future costs associated with ongoing map revisions
and updates.
--ASFPM strongly endorses the Administration's request for $200
million and urges the Subcommittee to request that FEMA report
on technical partnerships that are forming with States and
communities, incentives offered to foster those partnerships,
and to revisit the time and cost estimates for completion of
the initiative.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to express its expectation that FEMA
will address State-identified priorities and that quality data
and quality maps are the objective--rather than focus only on
the quantity or the average age of maps. High quality products
also serve as incentives and justification for investment of
State and local funds.
INCREASE NFIP COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUNDS FOR STATE TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
The Community Assistance Program (CAP), funded by 4.4 million NFIP
flood insurance policyholders, provides small, cost-shared grants that
provide partial support of State floodplain programs that, in turn,
provide technical assistance to nearly 20,000 local jurisdictions that
administer the NFIP's minimum floodplain management regulations. CAP is
critical because the best way to limit increases in future flood damage
is to build State capability to work with and train local officials to
ensure that developers comply with the rules and post-flood recovery is
undertaken properly. FEMA's staff is too small to provide this vital
assistance to nearly every community in the country, thus the
partnership with States was established. In 1995, CAP was funded at
$4.2 million which, even then, was insufficient to establish adequate
capacity in every State.
Currently, CAP stands at $7 million. Although the increased funding
has improved state capacity and capability to meet the demand, the
increased workload of state floodplain management offices has far
outstripped the increased funding. The increased state workload is due
to the following factors: more demand for technical assistance and
training of local officials; nationwide emphasis on pre- and post-
disaster planning and coordination; more communities participating in
the NFIP; significant increases in the number of properties insured by
the NFIP; and decreases in FEMA staff, which shifts even more
programmatic responsibilities to the States. Importantly, the FEMA Map
Modernization program is generating extreme demands for assistance and
coordination (implementation is expected to last at least 7 years). It
is reasonable to predict that Map Modernization program alone will
necessitate at least one additional full time employee in each State
floodplain management office, which would require approximately $3.75
million.
--ASFPM urges increasing CAP funding to $10 million in order to
increase the technical assistance and training the states
provide to the 20,000 communities in the NFIP as FEMA's
partners, and to successfully implement the Map Modernization
Program.
EXPECT AUTHORIZATION TO ADDRESS THE NFIP'S REPETITIVE LOSS PROBLEM
The National Flood Insurance Program's authorization is due to
expire on June 30, 2004. On November 20, 2003, the House of
Representatives passed the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2003 (HR 253)
and the Senate Subcommittee on Economic Policy recently marked up the
companion bill (S. 2238). FEMA has characterized the disproportionate
amount of claims paid on a very small percentage of NFIP-insured
properties as the most significant factor that drives increases in the
cost of flood insurance. Having more flood-prone homes and businesses
insured by the NFIP is an effective way to reduce the Federal burden of
disaster assistance.
Both the House and Senate bills authorize augmentation of the
existing Flood Mitigation Assistance grant programs to focus on
repetitive loss problem, and both bills authorize the transfer of funds
from the National Flood Insurance Fund (generated by premium and fee
income). The Flood Mitigation Assistance program is mature, with
virtually all states currently active to some degree, therefore new
funds can be used immediately. Because the NFIP must be reauthorized
and extended before June 30, 2004, action on the bills is expected
before work on appropriations is completed.
--ASFPM requests that the Subcommittee monitor progress on the Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2004. If the S. 2238 passes prior to
final action on the fiscal year 2005 budget, ASFPM urges the
Subcommittee to include in the fiscal year 2005 budget the
authorized transfer of funds from the National Flood Insurance
Fund to the National Flood Mitigation Fund.
--Continue to Retain A Separate Account for the Flood Mitigation
Assistance Program
The ASFPM appreciates direction in the fiscal year 2004
appropriations that FEMA maintain the Flood Mitigation Assistance
Program (FMA) funds separate from other mitigation funds. FMA was
authorized by the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which
also created the National Flood Mitigation Fund as a separate account.
FMA is not supported with general funds, but is funded entirely by a
portion of the service fee collected from the 4.4 million flood
insurance policies. Therefore, the ASFPM is concerned with the
Administration's proposal to combine FMA funds with other mitigation
funds, even to achieve accounting efficiencies. To ensure
accountability to the policyholders and to ensure that these funds are
used only for the explicit purposes authorized, the FMA funds are best
kept separate. In particular, how FMA is administered must not be
changed. FMA is specifically intended to support cost containment for
the NFIP, in part by addressing the problem characterized as repetitive
losses, but also to mitigate against severe flood damage and imminent
threats due to coastal erosion.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to clarify--again--that Flood
Mitigation Assistance Program funds in the National Flood
Mitigation Fund are not to be co-mingled with pre-disaster
mitigation funds.
MONITOR HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ADDRESSES NATURAL
HAZARDS AND MITIGATION
Millions of Americans are at risk--every day--of experiencing
floods, tornados, earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires, severe winter
storms, and other natural hazards. From a broad perspective, ASFPM is
disturbed that the Department of Homeland Security has deliberately
diminished focus on natural hazards. Despite continued verbal
assertions of commitment to FEMA's all-hazards mission, DHS has reduced
cohesiveness of programs and reduced staff who deal with hazards and
mitigation. The following are specific concerns: transferring FEMA
funds to areas of DHS that are not under the jurisdiction of the Under
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness & Response; detailing FEMA staff
out of that directorate; and reducing support for the vital network of
State and local public safety and disaster mitigation officials.
--ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to monitor DHS proposals and actions
that affect FEMA programs and staff to prevent unwise and
unnecessary reduction in FEMA's effectiveness, which in turn
will jeopardize State and local efforts to deal with natural
hazards and mitigation.
______
Prepared Statement of the International Association of Emergency
Managers
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to provide a statement
for the record regarding the fiscal year 2005 budget proposal for the
Department of Homeland Security.
My name is Daryl Lee Spiewak, and I am the emergency programs
manager for the Brazos River Authority in Waco, Texas. I am a certified
emergency manager, a certified Texas emergency manager, and a Texas
certified floodplain manager. I currently serve as the President of the
International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). Our over 2,000
members include emergency management professionals at the State and
local government levels, the military, private business and the
nonprofit sector in the United States and in other countries. Most of
our members are city and county emergency managers who perform the
crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the
local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and
recover from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks.
We respectfully submit suggestions on two particular issues
relating to the Department of Homeland Security budget for 2005.
Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)
--Reject administration request to cap at 25 percent amount which can
be used for personnel.
--Request that the funding cut be rejected and the amount increased.
--Request the program retain all hazards emphasis, including
terrorism.
--Urge that funding be specifically designated in the Appropriations
Bill and maintained as a separate account.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
--Urge the Committee to return the funding level to 15 percent of
certain eligible disaster costs.
In addition, we would like to offer our support for the
Administration's request for $200 million to continue the Map
Modernization program and for the $150 million request to continue the
PreDisaster Mitigation program.
Emergency Management Performance Grants
The Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) are pass-through
funds to State and local emergency management offices to provide a
foundation for basic emergency preparedness and response capabilities.
Congressional report language has referred to the program as ``the
backbone of the Nation's emergency management system.'' This funding
has existed in the past under several different names such as the
Emergency Management Assistance Program and State and Local Assistance
Program which were actually more appropriate names. This program is
different from most grants, in that it is a continuing program with
deliverables and requirements which must be met in order to receive
funding the following year.
We very much appreciated the support of the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees for EMPG in the fiscal year 2004 Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill. Congress specifically
designated funds in a separate account, increased the amount from the
fiscal year 2002 level to $179 million; specifically indicated the
funds could continue to be used for personnel costs and supported the
all hazards approach. The House Report recognized that ``State and
local emergency managers rely on these funds for a variety of expenses,
but predominately for personnel who plan, train, coordinate, and
conduct exercises and other functions essential to effective
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts.''
Reject Cap on Expenditures for Personnel.--Since the purpose of the
program is to provide support for State and local emergency management
personnel, the Administration's request to cap the amount of funds
which can be used for personnel at 25 percent of each grant is
puzzling. Since the functions of emergency management are almost 100
percent personnel driven, such as planning, coordinating, exercise
design, training, and public education, the effect of the 25 percent
cap would be devastating. States have estimated that this cap would
result in potential losses of up to 60 percent of their emergency
management staff. In some localities it would result in the elimination
of whole programs. We would be cutting capacity at the very time we
need to be building capacity.
Perhaps to put this proposed cap in perspective one could consider
the effect on the functioning of a Congressional office or a
Congressional Committee if directions were given to only spend 25
percent of the funds received for running the offices on personnel and
administrative costs.
Reject Funding Cut and Increase Funding.--Historically, funding for
EMPG has been inadequate. The program was intended to be 50 percent
Federal and 50 percent State or local funding. Currently many
jurisdictions receive 20 percent or less. Some jurisdictions do not
receive any EMPG monies due to inadequate funding levels. State and
local emergency management programs are in desperate need of financial
support if they are to continue to meet the requirements of all hazard
planning and coordination as well as implement the President's homeland
security strategy in States, counties, cities and neighborhoods across
America. The new security concerns arising from the current world
situation make the coordination and unifying role served by emergency
managers more important than ever. Given continued support and funding,
emergency managers have the skills, the expertise, and the willingness
to rise to the planning and coordinating challenges presented by the
full range of hazards affecting their communities.
We respectfully request that the $9 million reduction in the
President's request be rejected and that the funding be increased. A
2004 study by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA)
indicates that at the 50-50 shared cost level there is a $245 million
shortfall.
Maintain the All Hazards Approach.--Legislative language is
included in the Administration's 2005 request giving ``priority to
homeland security activities.'' The simple fact is that almost all
emergency management activity creates a generic capacity to deal with
crises. For nearly 50 years, the Federal Government has provided
funding assistance to State and local governments to support a
comprehensive national emergency management system. During that time,
the Federal emphasis has shifted on numerous occasions and our members
have adjusted programs accordingly. There is no doubt that ``homeland
security'' (currently, although we believe, incorrectly, defined as
terrorism) has priority today, but the proposed language certainly has
the potential to limit the ability of the emergency management system
to adjust to changes in the future and is therefore problematic.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
Restore Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) to 15 percent. The
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program in the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate provides post disaster mitigation funding. The
program is authorized in Section 404 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) and the monies
are provided from the President's Disaster Relief Fund. We appreciate
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees retaining the program
rather than terminating it as requested in the Administration's Budget
requests in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. However, the fiscal
year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill changed the formula used to
determine hazard mitigation funding from 15 percent to 7.5 percent of
eligible disaster costs. In order to reduce future disaster costs,
commitments must be made to both pre-disaster and post disaster
mitigation. Citizens and elected officials are most receptive to
undertaking projects and initiatives that reduce the impacts of future
disasters immediately after a disaster has occurred. Without the HMGP
funding, those opportunities will be missed.
The House unanimously passed H.R. 3181 in November of 2003 which
would have restored the funding to 15 percent. This bill is pending in
the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and at this time it
is not known if action will be completed given the limited time left in
this legislative session. We, therefore, urge that the HMGP program be
restored to 15 percent.
Flood map Modernization and PreDisaster Mitigation
IAEM supports the Administration's request for $200 million for
flood map modernization. Flood maps play a key role in disaster
reduction, mitigation, and community planning and development
activities. Many of the flood maps in place are 15 to 30 years old and
do not reflect recent development and may contain inaccurate
information about the floodplains as a result. FEMA estimated the cost
of a multi-year map modernization plan at $750 million over a 7-year
period. We support this multi-year effort.
IAEM supports the Administration's request for $150 million for
predisaster mitigation. We believe that both predisaster and post
disaster funds are important for reducing future disaster costs. We
support administrative funds being available to FEMA to administer the
program and urge that FEMA review and streamline the application
process.
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to provide this testimony.
We would welcome the opportunity to provide additional information to
the Subcommittee.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished
members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you
with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) fiscal year 2005 budget. I am Edward F. Jacoby, Jr., President of
the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the New
York State Emergency Management Office. In my statement, I am
representing the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA),
whose members are the state emergency management directors in the 50
States and the U.S. territories. NEMA's members are responsible to
their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland security,
mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural, man-made,
and terrorist caused disasters.
At this time, the Department of Homeland Security has been in place
for over a year and the state of emergency management in our Nation is
of grave concern. Each day, State and local governments are responding
to natural and man-made disasters, the threat of terrorism remains
elevated while fortunately, actual terrorism incidents remain sporadic
on U.S. soil. The multi-hazards emergency system continues to be the
means to practice and exercise for devastating acts of terrorism, while
at the same time preparing the Nation for hurricanes, tornadoes,
hazardous materials spills, and floods. Yet, all-hazards preparedness
may be a thing of the past as more focus is being placed on terrorism.
We must ensure that our capability to deal with many hazards, including
terrorism remains intact and that we do not shift our focus to
preparedness for a single peril.
The capability to coordinate an effective response to an event does
not change by the type of disaster. The all-hazards approach relies
upon the maintenance of plans, trained personnel to carry them out, and
supporting infrastructure in the form of emergency operations
facilities with inter-operable communications. We must continue this
approach in practicing and exercising for devastating acts of
terrorism, as well as day-to-day emergencies. We cannot afford to lose
the system we have in place to deal with all disasters in order to
build new infrastructure for homeland security's sake.
The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical
support to State and local emergency management programs through actual
dollars, grants, and program support. This year, NEMA would like to
address three main issues with the proposed Federal budget for
Department of Homeland Security.
--Extreme concern for the 25 percent cap on personnel use and the cut
to the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) program;
--Support for continuing and enhancing the Homeland Security Grants,
which must be coordinated and managed through the States; and
--Concern about the reduced formula for the post-disaster Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP).
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING
The Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is the single
all-hazards emergency preparedness grant program in support of capacity
building at the State and local level. While the State and local
government partnership with the Federal Government to ensure
preparedness dates back to the civil defense era, increased
responsibilities over the last decade have fallen on State and local
governments. With the recent expanded focus on terrorism and the
increased demands of the Federal Government to assist in the National
Strategy for Homeland Security, EMPG is the vital source of funding to
assist State and local governments in ensuring that the infrastructure
is in place to address all of the traditional hazards that threaten
communities--including terrorism.
More than any other intergovernmental program, emergency management
and disaster response are a joint and shared responsibility among all
levels of government. The increase or decrease in resources for one
level has a direct impact on the other partners. For example, a
decrease in the capability of local governments to respond to any
disaster automatically passes the burden of cost and long-term
redevelopment activities to the State, and then to the Federal
Government. Unfortunately, the consequences of such policies are much
more significant in terms of the effects of disasters on our citizens
and communities. The inability to respond to life-threatening
emergencies by the local government cannot be replaced by efforts at
the State and Federal levels. Likewise, the basic elements of
comprehensive emergency preparedness cannot be replaced by narrow
program funding for homeland security efforts.
The President's budget proposal will have a devastating impact on
the Nation's emergency management system at the same time that
responsibilities are increasing for new and emerging hazards. The
proposal decreases funding for the EMPG program by $9 million,
increases the focus on terrorism, and most destructively, the proposal
imposes a 25 percent cap on personnel uses of the EMPG grants. Over the
last 2 years, Congress has affirmed the importance of EMPG in
appropriations bills in language addressing the significance of the
program and increased the levels of funding for the program twice.
Prior to these increases in fiscal year 2003 and 2004, the program had
been straight lined for over a decade. NEMA is appreciative of
Congress' recognition of the EMPG program, but this year we
respectfully ask that Congress not only address the programs
shortfalls, but maintain the EMPG multi-hazard approach and the
program's flexibility to be used for personnel without arbitrary
constraints.
EMPG is the only all-hazards program that State and local
governments can use to build their emergency management capacity. The
grants can be used for personnel, planning, training, exercises,
warning systems, emergency operations centers, public outreach, and
interagency coordination. EMPG is a flexible program that allows State
and local governments to tailor funds to address the specific risks and
needs of their jurisdiction. While it is called a grant, EMPG is really
a cost-share system which ties together the emergency management system
of local, State, and Federal Governments. EMPG's modest Federal
increases in 2003 and 2004 helped the program grow, but the program
continues to be funded at greater levels by State and local
governments. States are continuing to increase their out of pocket
costs in order to ensure there is adequate funding for local programs.
In fact, a 2004 NEMA study found that there is approximately a $245.9
million shortfall in EMPG for all 50 States. This means that many
communities that would like to implement a full-time, professional
emergency management capability cannot do so because of shortfalls in
Federal funding. Further, EMPG is primarily used as a pass-through
program for local governments, so the shortfall affects our smallest
localities that are often those most in need of emergency preparedness
planning.
Changing the focus of the program to terrorism could severely
hamper the ability of State and local government capabilities to
respond to a wide range of events with a higher likelihood of occurring
such as natural disasters, non-traditional disasters like the Columbia
Space Shuttle explosion, Mad Cow disease, West Nile virus, civil
unrest, and hazardous material incidents. An increased homeland
security focus must be viewed as an enhancement to our basic emergency
management capacity. Success in building vigorous and robust
capabilities for homeland security will be sabotaged by taking away the
basic building blocks of the emergency management system. While
terrorism is a major focus at this time, we must balance preparedness
efforts by integrating terrorism as one of the many threats facing our
Nation, rather than the current approach of making all other
preparedness efforts a subset of terrorism. Further, Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8 States that, ``to the extent permitted by law,
Federal preparedness assistance will be predicated on the adoption of
statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness strategies.'' The all-
hazards approach cannot be dismissed based upon the assumption that one
threat is greater and more significant than the other. After all, no
one really has a crystal ball to predict what the next disaster or
emergency may be. However, last year there were no terrorism disaster
declarations and 56 major disaster declarations, 19 emergency
declarations, and 46 fire suppressions declarations. Our system for
day-to-day public safety and homeland security must be mutually
supportive and nimble enough to address any hazard.
The most significant attack on the way that emergency management
functions in this country is the proposal to cap personnel costs for
EMPG at 25 percent. The cap will result in immediate, near-term and
long-term degradations in the Nation's ability to effectively address
emergencies and disasters. Citizens and communities that handled
emergencies locally may no longer be able to do so and the
responsibility and costs will be passed to the next higher level of
government. But the costs will be greater, more frequent, and more
dramatic. A 2003 NEMA survey on EMPG found that 1,565.5 or 42.9 percent
of state level full time positions are supported in part by EMPG funds.
Eighty-three part-time state emergency management personnel are funded
in part or entirely with EMPG funds. At the local level, 2,172 full-
time positions and 1,184 part-time positions are supported by EMPG.
States are reporting to NEMA potential losses of up to 60 percent of
their emergency management personnel should this arbitrary cap be
imposed. A snap-shot of the impact in Mississippi shows that 75 percent
of state emergency management personnel and 95 percent of local
emergency management personnel are funded by the program and both
programs would have to sustain significant cuts under the proposal. In
West Virginia, the cap could cost the State 18 full-time employees from
emergency management and 38 full-time employees in local positions for
emergency management. While the Administration explains that this
measure would allow for more training and exercises, we find it hard to
understand how extra training and exercises could be accomplished with
less man-power. Emergency management personnel, particularly at the
local level, provide the coordination function for all disaster and
emergency response. How can we expect the response to terrorism to be
effective and efficient without proper coordination among responders?
The Federal Government must continue the commitment to ensuring
national security though all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate
numbers of State and local personnel to operate the all-hazards
emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse.
Congress must affirm the intent of the program and also ensure
predictable funding levels for the program.
HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM
Congress has made significant attempts to ensure that the Homeland
Security Grant Program is streamlined and provides greater flexibility.
We appreciate the attention and funding that the Congress has given to
ensuring emergency responders are adequately prepared for domestic
terrorism threats. Emergency responders are better prepared today to
face the various threats associated with terrorism because of the
Federal commitment to address the war on terrorism that is being played
out in our States, cities, and towns. States continue to take an all-
hazards approach to disaster preparedness as we have integrated our
domestic preparedness efforts into the proven systems we already use
for dealing with both man-made and natural disasters.
Funding Levels
This year, we are concerned about the President's budget proposal
for homeland security that would cut over $600 million in funding that
has been dedicated to improving emergency responder preparedness for
homeland security. The Federal Government must maintain its commitment
to ensure that homeland security preparedness continues and the
Constitutional responsibility to maintain a national defense is not
compromised. Continuity of effort can only be maintained by State and
local governments with adequate Federal support, especially when it
deals with the front line emergency responders. Reductions in funding
will immediately be translated into reductions in prevention,
protection, and preparedness activities. We cannot afford to lose the
strides that we have already made in protecting our country by limiting
funding, where more is still necessary to achieve the objectives in the
National Strategy for Homeland Security. The funding level must be
appropriately increased to address areas where shortfalls exist.
Further, continued or increased funding should not take away from
traditional all-hazards capacity building programs for public safety,
public health, and emergency management.
One Stop Shop for Grants Information
The Congressionally created and appointed Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction (known as the Gilmore Commission) initially said a
``Federal focal point and clearinghouse for related preparedness
information and for directing State and local entities to appropriate
Federal agencies is needed,'' in their first report to Congress on
December 15, 1999. NEMA affirmed the notion of a single visible point
of contact and coordination of information for State and local
governments in the August 25, 2000 Resolution on States' Principles for
a National Domestic Preparedness Strategy.
Congressional Legislation to Simplify the Grants Process
As Congress considers legislation to address and reform the
Homeland Security Grants, we ask that you take NEMA's suggestions into
consideration. The suggestions include the following:
--All efforts to increase emergency management capacity must be
coordinated through the states to ensure harmonization with the
state emergency operations plan, ensure equitable distribution
of resources, and to synthesize resources for intra-state and
inter-state mutual aid. Also, the Stafford Act, which governs
the way disaster assistance is allocated, successfully uses
States and Governors as the managers of Federal disaster relief
funds for local governments, which can become overwhelmed and
in need of assistance when disasters occur.
--States understand the need to get funding quickly to the first
responders and have long coordinated statewide and regionally
to ensure adequate state assistance to local governments for
emergency preparedness and response;
--Each State must have a base minimum level of funding to ensure the
capacity to respond to any event. Such capacity is necessary
for homeland security because of the changing nature of the
threat and also because of the importance our emergency system
places on mutual aid to respond to events;
--Traditional emergency management capacity building programs like
EMPG must be continued as separate and distinct from the
homeland security grants programs;
--Duplicative requirements in the grants process must be eliminated
and flexibility in the use of the grants must be enhanced; and
--Federal streamlining is necessary to consolidate the Federal grant
application process for homeland security funds in order to
ensure that funding can be provided faster to first responders.
The current application submission, review, and approval
process is lengthy and should be reviewed for efficiency.
Fiscal Conditions and Match Requirements
Further, because the war on terrorism is a national emergency and
States and local governments continue to be in the toughest fiscal
situations since the deep recession in the early 1980s, we must be wary
of programs that would require significant matches. In fact, for local
governments to meet the match would be even more difficult given their
fiscal constraints. If a significant match is required, the application
of this initiative will only go to those agencies and governments that
can fiscally afford the match and not necessarily where the need is
greatest. If a match is necessary, we would suggest that the match be
non-fiscal or in the form of a deliverable as opposed to soft or hard
dollars. We also recommend continuation of the current match
requirements for Emergency Operations Centers enhancements of 75
percent Federal and 25 percent State and local. Waivers may be a way
for the Federal Government to also address the lack of capital for a
match when State and local governments are experiencing fiscal
distress.
Flexibility for Personnel to Manage the Program
Greater flexibility to use some of the first responder grants for
personnel both at the State and local level to manage the programs is
critical to completing the preparedness mission. As an existing funding
stream, EMPG is used in part to fund State and local staff to manage
critical programs including the homeland security grants. The First
Responder Grants should recognize that personnel are necessary to
manage these programs, particularly when rigid deadlines are set for
obligating millions of dollars and accountability is paramount. State
and local government, emergency management, and responder organizations
are already working at a maximum capacity within existing resources and
need Federal support for more than the purchase of equipment.
Flexibility based on strategic approaches should be the norm, not
single-issue, narrowly focused grants.
Standards and Strategy
NEMA has long supported the development of standards to ensure
interoperability of equipment, communications, and training across
State, regional, and local jurisdictions. In terms of establishing
voluntary minimum standards for the terrorism preparedness programs of
State and local governments, NEMA offers itself as a resource in this
area. Our organization, along with other stakeholder groups such as the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, International Association of
Emergency Managers, National Governors' Association, National
Association of Counties, International Association of Fire Chiefs, and
others, has developed and implemented the Emergency Management
Accreditation Program (EMAP). EMAP is a voluntary standards and
accreditation program for State and local emergency management that is
based on NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 1,600 ``Standard
for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Operations''
(an ANSI or American National Standards Institute approved standard)
and FEMA's Capability Assessment of Readiness (CAR). EMAP is currently
conducting baseline capability assessments of all states, some of which
are pursuing accreditation in conjunction with this initial assessment.
The State of Florida and the District of Columbia were granted
accreditation through the program. NEMA suggests that these standards
already being collaboratively developed through EMAP be considered in
the development of minimum standards for training, exercises and
equipment. The EMAP baseline capability assessment process should also
be considered as a model when considering changes or refinements to
other assessment processes conducted by the Department of Homeland
Security.
Further, NEMA has called for a long-term strategy for our Nation's
homeland security that becomes the ``roadmap'' for the future of our
Nation on homeland security. Such an effort must define the ``new
normalcy'' and also address what State and local governments must
accomplish in order to be prepared for a homeland security event. NEMA
sees a role for the Gilmore Commission or a similar body to undertake
the development of such a National Long-Term Strategy for Homeland
Security. Such an effort must include input from State and local
stakeholders.
HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM & PREDISASTER MITIGATION
NEMA supports efforts by the Congress and the Administration to
continue both pre- and post-disaster mitigation activities. The two-
pronged effort can help to address Federal costs towards disasters,
because both programs can help to lower overall disaster costs. NEMA
calls on Congress to reauthorize the predisaster mitigation program
before December 31, 2004 and to also restore the post-disaster Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) formula to 15 percent.
Effective February 20, 2003, Congress changed the formula for post-
disaster mitigation grants from 15 percent to 7.5 percent. This change
limits the availability of funds for post-disaster mitigation and
prevents the lessons learned from disasters from being immediately
incorporated into mitigation projects to prevent losses of life and
destruction of property. As a result, State governments no longer can
offer property buy-outs or other mitigation measures to as many
disaster victims. The months immediately following disasters provide
unique opportunities to efficiently incorporate risk reduction measures
in a very cost-effective manner, in many cases lowering the overall
cost of the project by leveraging other funding sources including
insurance settlements. We ask that you restore the formula to 15
percent this year in order to address mitigation needs.
Some of the most vivid examples of projects that were not funded in
fiscal year 2003 because of the formula reduction include HMGP projects
from recent disasters. These properties and projects will remain
vulnerable with continued risk in future disasters. Some of these
include:
--3 acquisitions, 7 elevations, and 7 flood proofing projects for
properties flooded during Hurricane Isabel and Tropical Storm
Henri in Delaware;
--3 outdoor warning siren proposals, one acquisition project for 18
structures, and one stormwater handling system improvement
project as a result of a flood declaration in Kentucky;
--over 88 families who were flood victims remain untouched by post-
disaster mitigation in West Virginia because of the formula
change; and
--over $18.5 million in projects resulting from Hurricane Isabel will
remain unfunded in Maryland as a result of the lack of post-
disaster funds.
The HMGP has proven to be a highly effective tool in steering
communities toward risk reduction measures, in many cases breaking
repetitive loss cycles that have cost other Federal disaster relief
programs multiple times. Cost-benefit analysis is currently a
requirement for predisaster mitigation programs. We must not lose these
opportunities to initiate projects to enhance our communities and
reduce future disaster costs.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS
In fiscal year 2002, $56 million was appropriated to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to address Emergency Operations Centers
(EOCs) improvements. EOCs are the coordination point for State and
local government in the response and recovery of any disaster or
incident. After September 11, 2001, NEMA's members saw an implicit and
urgent need to upgrade the Nation's emergency infrastructure and to
make it more redundant. After all, the New York City EOC was destroyed
on that very day as it stood within the World Trade Center 7 Complex.
The coordinated response effort of the NY State Emergency Management
Office and the NY Office of Emergency Management was later moved to
Pier 92 in New York City as a temporary EOC. However, losing the NYC
EOC provided a valuable lesson to be learned by all States and
localities on redundancy. The $56 million was allocated to states to
begin the planning process to assess necessary infrastructure and
security improvements and security measures to be taken. Since then no
dedicated Federal funding has been provided for the implementation of
these plans. Many State and local facilities are out of date; do not
have the interoperable technology to coordinate with the Federal
Government or among State and local levels; and lack adequate security
features. Federal assistance is necessary to match State and local
commitments to upgrade their EOCs as an integral part of the Nation's
emergency response system. According to a 2003 NEMA survey, it is
projected more tan $1.6 billion will be needed to construct and
maintain State and local primary and alternate EOCS over the next 2 to
5 years. This includes the costs to consistently upgrade equipment and
software, train personnel, and conduct operations during emergency and
non-emergency situations.
CONCLUSION
As we continue to build national preparedness efforts through the
Department of Homeland Security, we must not forget about the multi-
hazard approach to incident management and the role it plays in
preventing the loss of life and devastation to our communities on a
daily basis. We must be prudent and thoughtful in addressing homeland
security enhancements to our exisiting emergency preparedness and
response system. In this year's appropriations process Congress will
make critical decisions that shape the future of emergency management
in this country. As you begin your consideration, we ask you to
recognize the importance of the EMPG program in building capacity
through people at the State and local level. I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your
partnership.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Flood Determination Association
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, The National Flood
Determination Association (NFDA) strongly supports the $200 million
requested in the President's most recent fiscal year 2005 budget for
map modernization. NFDA is a national nonprofit organization comprised
of flood determination companies, their vendors, re-sellers and other
industry associates involved in the making, distributing and reselling
of flood zone determinations.
The flood zone determination industry is a key stakeholder in the
map modernization initiative. By producing flood zone determinations
for the lending industry to assist them with the compliance
requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the
National Flood Insurance Reform Act, NFDA recognizes accurate flood
maps are an important part of compliance with requirements of the NFIP.
Today, FEMA paper flood maps are the maps of record for compliance, and
the flood zone determination industry is the single largest extensive
user of the maps. In 2001 and 2002, our industry completed 24,507,632
and 30,211,047 flood zone determinations respectively, related to newly
originated loans for the mortgage industry. In addition, we completed
another 5,472,532 and 4,906,743 determinations for the same years for
loans we were tracking on behalf of lenders that were affected by map
revisions.
Map modernization is a positive initiative, not only for the flood
zone determination industry, but for State and local communities as
well. By employing state-of-the-art technology, such as Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) and Geographic Positioning Systems (GPS),
communities can map their flood risk digitally. As a result, the
updated maps will be easier and more cost-efficient to update as
conditions change. In addition, digital flood maps are dynamic visual
tools for State and local officials, land-use planners, private
businesses, environmental protection organizations and emergency
management personnel to recognize and chart areas for future
development and plan for public safety.
NFDA has been given the opportunity to provide feedback on the
current FEMA maps, most of which are greater than 10 years old, in an
effort to improve the quality of the existing maps as well as create
some standards for the new maps to be published. These technical
mapping meetings provide a communication forum that enables the end
users of the maps, FEMA, and its contractors to identify practical
solutions to the daunting challenge of maintaining and enhancing the
accuracy and quality of the FEMA maps.
As a result of the success from the technical mapping meetings,
NFDA strongly encourages map modernization representatives to establish
an advisory committee comprised of stakeholders and FEMA and contractor
representatives as a means of ensuring regular, consistent
communication takes place regarding this initiative. In order for the
new maps to be truly effective, it is critical to emphasize quality
over quantity. The use of new flood studies to develop quality data
rather than re-use of possibly out-of-date data is key to achieving
truly accurate flood maps. Development of consistent mapping standards
for all communities is also important. An advisory committee modeled on
the technical mapping advisory council established for 5 years by the
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 would be able to review the metrics
used for establishing standards, as well as make recommendations for
enforcement of those standards in order to create and retain a quality
product.
As strong supporters of FEMA, the National Flood Determination
Association also strongly supports reauthorizing the National Flood
Insurance Program for 3 more years. Multi-year reauthorization is
important to the prevention of a program lapse similar to the one that
occurred in January of 2003 when the NFIP was unauthorized for 13 days.
Additionally, NFDA asks that important programs such as the natural
disaster programs remain within FEMA's jurisdiction. Removing such
programs is a threat to FEMA's effectiveness, and it is important that
FEMA is allowed to maintain its management without interruption.
In closing, our association has been an avid supporter of FEMA and
its map modernization initiative since its inception, and is pleased to
offer our continued support in the future. As a part of that support,
we ask that the Committee appropriate the $200 million requested for
map modernization and reauthorize the NFIP for 3 more years.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Treasury Employees Union
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, distinguished members of the
Subcommittee; I would like to thank the Subcommittee for the
opportunity to comment on the fiscal year 2005 budget for the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and specifically its impact on
the DHS Bureau of Customs and Border Security (CBP).
As President of the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), I
have the honor of leading a union that represents over 13,000 Customs
and Border Protection employees who are stationed at 307 ports-of-entry
across the United States. Customs and Border Protection officers,
canine enforcement officers, and import specialists make up our
Nation's first line of defense in the wars on terrorism and drugs as
well as the facilitation of lawful trade into the United States. In
addition, legacy Customs personnel are responsible for ensuring
compliance with import laws and regulations for over 40 Federal
agencies, as well as stemming the flow of illegal contraband such as
child pornography, illegal arms, weapons of mass destruction and
laundered money.
In 2003, legacy Customs Service employees seized over 2.2 million
pounds of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and other illegal narcotics.
Customs and Border Protection Officers also processed over 412 million
travelers last year, including over 1 million cars and trucks. These
numbers continue to grow annually. Over the last decade trade has
increased by 137 percent. Legacy U.S. Customs Service personnel
facilitate more trade, and interdict more drugs than any other agency
within the Customs and Border Protection Bureau. The legacy Customs
Service collects over $20 billion in revenue on over 26 million entries
involving over $1.2 trillion in international trade every year. The
legacy Customs Service also provides the Federal Government with its
second largest source of revenue. Last year, the legacy Customs Service
deposited over $24.7 billion into the U.S. Treasury.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests a funding level of
$40.2 billion for the Department of Homeland Security and from that
total $6.2 billion is requested for the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). The CBP includes the legacy inspection and border
security personnel of the Customs Service, INS, Border Patrol and
APHIS. The focus of the CBP is security at and in-between ports-of-
entry.
Unfortunately, the President's request for the CBP represents a
token increase from last year's appropriations for all of the agencies
transferred into the CBP. NTEU believes that this recommendation is
simply inadequate to meet the needs of Customs and other border
security personnel, especially in light of their additional homeland
security missions such as the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Container Security Initiative (CSI), U.S. VISIT
and the 24-Hour Rule that requires advanced transmission of accurate
cargo manifest information to the CBP.
In addition to annual appropriations, Customs also receives funds
from a user fee account known as the COBRA account. This user fee
account funds all inspectors' and canine enforcement officers' overtime
pay as well as approximately 1,200 Customs positions across the
country. The COBRA account is funded with user fees collected from air
and sea passengers entering the United States (except from the
Caribbean and Mexico), commercial vehicles, commercial vessels/barges
and rail cars. The COBRA fund was recently reauthorized and now will
expire on March 31, 2005. However, the President's fiscal year 2005
budget does not address the future reauthorization of COBRA or the
possible integration of the COBRA fees with other CBP user fees. The
COBRA fund must continue to be reauthorized or Congress must
appropriate additional funds to make up for the loss of the user fees
in the future.
Despite the increased threats of terrorism, the dramatic increases
in trade resulting from NAFTA, and new drug smuggling challenges, CBP
personnel has confronted its rapidly increasing trade workload and
homeland security missions with relatively static staffing levels and
resources. While staffing was increased in last year's supplemental and
fiscal year 2004 appropriations, in the last 10 years, there simply
have not been adequate increases in staffing and resource levels for
inspectional personnel and import specialists to successfully conduct
their missions. The events of September 11 brought attention to the
fact that the Northern border, and especially the Nations' seaports,
and the Southwest border are still in urgent need of additional
personnel and resources.
In fact, Customs' recent internal review of staffing, known as the
Resource Allocation Model or R.A.M., shows that the Customs Service
alone needed over 14,776 new hires just to fulfill its basic mission
and that was before September 11. In addition, in 2001 the Patriot Act
called for a tripling of the number of Northern Border personnel from
the roughly 2,300 personnel who were on the border in the fall of 2001
to 6,900 by the end of 2004, a number that DHS is far short of
reaching. According to the testimony of Commissioner Robert Bonner
before the 9/11 commission on January 28, 2004, the CBP currently has
approximately 3,900 CBP personnel on the northern border.
Traffic volume at U.S. land ports-of-entry has steadily increased
as our shared borders with Mexico and Canada have become more open as a
result of the NAFTA and other trade initiatives. The steady increase of
commercial and non-commercial traffic has led to increased wait times
at many land ports-of-entry, particularly those along the Southwest
border. Wait times along the Southwest border can often extend to 45
minutes or more during peak hours. Such lengthy delays can be both
irritating and costly to businesses and the traveling public.
The lack of resources at ports-of-entry is also a problem along the
Northern Border and at seaports. Port security, largely overlooked in
the Homeland Security Act, must also be a priority of this committee.
The fiscal year 2005 budget provides only $50 million for port security
grants as part of the Transportation Security Administration
appropriation, a reduction of almost $100 million in grant money for
ports from the President's fiscal year 2004 budget. Each year more than
16 million containers arrive in the United States by ship, truck and
rail. In the last 5 years alone, Customs has witnessed a 60 percent
increase in trade entries processed, and this rate is expected to grow
an average of 8 to 10 percent a year. Port security must remain a high
priority for the Department of Homeland Security.
With increased funding for resources, modern technologies, such as
Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS), which send gamma rays
through the aluminum walls of shipping containers and vehicles to
enable Customs inspectors to check for illegal drugs or weapons of mass
destruction, as well as decreasing the amount of time shipping
containers are out of the supply chain, could be acquired. Other
technologies, such as portable contraband detectors (a.k.a. Busters),
optical fiber scopes and laser range finders can be invaluable to
Customs personnel protecting our borders from terrorists and illegal
drugs. However, adequate and consistent funding for personnel to
operate these technologies has not been forthcoming. On a daily basis,
CBP officers are being tasked with additional anti-terrorism, trade,
immigration, agriculture and drug smuggling initiatives with little
increase in across the board staffing, leaving many ports of entry with
too few personnel to successfully carry out all of the DHS mission
priorities.
CBP PERSONNEL ISSUES
CBP Personnel Overtime Cap
An aspect of the consolidation of legacy Customs, INS and APHIS
inspectors into a single front-line border security position that needs
to be addressed immediately by this subcommittee is the correction of
the overtime cap language for all CBP employees. When legacy Customs
employees joined together last March to form the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection, the Department and Congressional appropriators
realized the differences in overtime systems between the various border
agencies. Unfortunately, the fiscal year 2004 DHS Appropriations bill
included a provision that, while intending to provide greater
consistency in overtime earnings among the front line CBP workforce,
has instead created additional problems for the CBP workforce, more
specifically, legacy Customs personnel and the new CBP officers.
Specifically, the fiscal year 2004 DHS Appropriations bill states
that all CBP employees are subject to a $30,000 annual overtime cap
(legacy Customs, INS, APHIS, & new CBP officers). However, the fiscal
year 2004 appropriations language does not address COPRA (Customs
Officer Pay Reform Act) overtime earnings for legacy Customs personnel
and new CBP officers. The original language of the COPRA law included a
$25,000 cap. However, for the past several years, the annual
appropriations bills specifically amended COPRA to provide for an
increase to $30,000 as an overtime cap. Unfortunately, this year's
(fiscal year 2004) appropriation does not contain this amendment and
has had the unintended effect of re-instituting a $25,000 cap for only
those employees covered by COPRA (legacy Customs personnel and the new
CBP officers).
Commissioner Bonner is well aware of this problem, as he indicated
in a November 2003 Commissioner's message to all CBP employees stating
that, ``we believe that this disparity was not intentional and we have
begun to take all necessary steps to correct it through the proper
channels. At my direction, the CBP Office of Congressional Affairs is
now working with the Department to address this inconsistency through a
legislative correction.'' NTEU hopes that the Commissioner, working
closely with the members of this subcommittee, can fix this situation
both retroactively for legacy Customs employees this year and
prospectively in the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations bill.
FLETC 6 Day Training Issues
On January 1, 2002, at the request of the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC), the legacy U.S. Customs Service implemented a
6-day a week training schedule for all basic training courses for
Customs officers in order to accommodate the higher volume of employees
being sent to FLETC as a result of the events of September 11.
Unfortunately, as a result of the 6-day a week basic training
schedule, the legacy U.S Customs Service, and now the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) have refused to compensate legacy customs
officers and the new CBP officers for their sixth day of basic training
at FLETC. Legacy Customs officers and the new CBP officers receive no
pay, either ``straight time'' or overtime pay for their work on the
sixth day of basic training. While there may be disagreement as to what
overtime system may be appropriate, it is outrageous that these
employees are required to work 1 day a week for no pay at all.
This inequity has become even more egregious for legacy Customs
inspectors due to a recent decision of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (BICE), that authorized the retroactive payment of
FLSA overtime to legacy immigration inspectors who, like legacy Customs
officers had been assigned to a 6-day workweek while attending their
basic training at FLETC since January 1, 2002. Again, by forcing
hundreds of newly trained legacy Customs inspectors and new CBP
officers to work a sixth day without any compensation while their
legacy INS counterparts receive FLSA overtime is certain to hinder the
esprit-de-corps and development of the Department of Homeland
Security's ``One Face at the Border Initiative'' which has merged the
legacy Customs and INS inspectional workforces into one border security
position within DHS. The committee needs to work closely with DHS and
the CBP bureau to immediately correct this training pay inequity for
legacy Customs employees and the new CBP officers.
One Face at the Border
As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003, Secretary Tom
Ridge announced the creation of a new CBP officer position and the
``One Face at the Border'' initiative. Under this plan, a new position,
the Customs and Border Protection Officer (CBPO) would combine the
duties of legacy inspectors from Customs, INS and APHIS into a single
front-line border security position at the 307 official ports-of-entry
across the United States.
NTEU believes that combining the border protection responsibilities
that were held by three highly-skilled specialists into a ``super
inspector'' raises some serious concerns. Each of the job
responsibilities from the three legacy inspection agencies is highly
specialized and distinct. By utilizing one employee to perform all
three primary and secondary inspection functions, will the agency lose
the expertise that has made the United States border inspection
personnel second to none?
NTEU believes that the CBP officer position was created with the
assumption that the basic skill sets for legacy Customs and INS
inspectors are similar and NTEU would have to agree with this statement
as far a primary inspection is concerned. However, it is in secondary
inspections where expertise is needed. It is in secondary inspections
where legacy Customs and INS experts ``drill down'' to seek the facts
they have been trained to find.
CBP Officer Training
Prior to the creation of the CBP officer position, legacy Customs
inspectors received 9 to 12 weeks of intensive basic training on
Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Now, the new CBP officer
will receive only 14 weeks of training for all Customs, INS, and APHIS
rules and regulations. Under the new CBP officer training guidelines,
legacy inspectors currently on the border will be transitioning into
the new position in the spring of this year by way of classroom
training, CD-ROM computer teaching and on-the-job training. While the
new training will lead to a broader knowledge of the INS, Customs and
APHIS rules and regulations of entry for passengers and goods entering
the United States, there is a concern as to whether it will provide the
specialized expertise necessary to ensure the successful accomplishment
of the critical missions of the Department of Homeland Security.
Another aspect of the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative that
needs more thorough scrutiny is the lack of details with regard to the
secondary inspection process at ports of entry. Currently, legacy
Customs and INS inspectors are ``cross-trained'' as to the most basic
Customs and INS procedures for entry into the United States for
passengers and goods. However, if a legacy Customs inspector is faced
with a complicated visa entry situation at an airport or land border
primary inspection station they have the ability to send the passenger
to a more intensive secondary inspection where an experienced legacy
INS inspector can make a determination as to the validity of a
particular visa. It is unclear whether experts in visa issues or other
specific Customs and INS border protection matters will continue to be
readily available for secondary inspection. This issue is even more
urgent in light of the fact that on January 5, 2004, DHS rolled out its
new entry/exit visa processing system known as U.S. VISIT. Operating at
115 airports and 14 seaports across the country, and eventually
expanding to the 50 largest land border ports of entry by the end of
2004, U.S. VISIT is currently being manned by only legacy INS
inspectors because legacy Customs inspectors do not have the on the job
experience to thoroughly determine the validity of a particular visa or
passport. NTEU feels strongly that if border initiatives such as U.S.
VISIT are to be successful, specific expertise must be maintained among
the CBP officer ranks as it relates to Customs and INS regulations.
Law Enforcement Officer Status
In addition, legislative action that would help to ensure the
retention of Customs and other CBP personnel could include granting law
enforcement status for legacy Customs Inspectors, Canine Enforcement
Officers and other border security personnel in the CBP. For example,
legacy Customs Service Inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers
continue to be the Nation's first line of defense against terrorism and
the smuggling of illegal drugs and contraband at our borders and in our
ports. Legacy Customs Service Inspectors have the authority to
apprehend and detain those engaged in terrorism, drug smuggling and
violations of other civil and criminal laws. Canine Enforcement
Officers and Inspectors carry weapons, and at least 3 times a year they
must qualify and maintain proficiency on a firearm range. Yet, they do
not have law enforcement officer status. They are being denied the
benefits given to other Federal employees who they have been working
beside to keep our country safe. Legacy Customs employees face real
dangers on a daily basis, granting them law enforcement officer status
would be an appropriate and long overdue step in recognizing and
retaining the Customs personnel who continue to protect our borders
from terrorism and drugs. There currently is a bill before the House HR
2442, which would grant law enforcement status to CBP personnel.
Representative Filner introduced this bill and it currently has 101
cosponsors. I would ask the members of this subcommittee to cosponsor
this very important legislation.
DHS Proposed Personnel Regulations
As the committee is aware, the Homeland Security Act of 2002
authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of OPM
to develop new human resources (HR) systems for Federal employees in
the Department of Homeland Security in the areas of pay, performance
management, job classification, labor-management relations, and
disciplinary matters. As part of the creation of the new DHS HR system,
a design team composed of DHS managers and employees, HR experts from
DHS and OPM, and representatives from the agency's three largest
unions, including NTEU, were assembled to develop a wide range of HR
options for consideration by Secretary Tom Ridge and OPM Director Kay
Coles James who will develop the new DHS HR system.
To support the effort to create the new DHS personnel system, the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget provides the department with $102.5
million to develop and implement a new performance-based pay system for
DHS personnel including funding for a pay for performance pilot program
within the Coast Guard. NTEU is strongly opposed to the $102.5 million
requested in the President's budget to fund the implementation of this
ill-conceived program and believes that this funding would be better
spent by this committee on additional staffing and equipment to protect
or borders from terrorism.
As a member of the DHS Human Resources Design Team NTEU has always
strongly advocated that in designing pay, classification and
performance management systems for DHS, that the principles of
credibility, transparency and accountability must be honored and
applied to the DHS HR options that were introduced by Secretary Ridge
and Director James in February. Unfortunately, the proposed DHS
personnel regulations neither honored nor applied the principles that
employees in the department deserve.
As the Committee is aware, the public comment period on the
proposed DHS personnel regulations, closed on March 22, 2004. It is our
understanding that DHS received over 2,000 comments during the past
month from DHS employees, Members of Congress, employee representatives
and the general public. From an initial review of the submitted
comments, it can be safely said that the vast majority of the comments
oppose the proposed pay and job classification system for DHS
personnel.
The proposed DHS personnel regulations propose to implement a
radical change to pay and job classification systems for DHS employees,
and to increase the linkage between pay and performance. However, no
reliable information exists to show that this system will enhance the
efficiency of DHS operations and promote homeland security. Indeed,
most of the key components of the system are not clearly determined in
the proposed regulations. The proposed regulations consist only of
broad statements concerning the creation of occupation clusters of
related positions in the department and the ability of DHS/OPM to
create a number of ``pay bands'' for each cluster that relates to skill
level. The ``pay band'' ranges will be set by an extremely complicated
formula of mission requirements, local labor market conditions,
availability of funds, and pay adjustments received by other Federal
employees.
The proposed pay system lacks the transparency and objectivity of
the General Schedule. Critical decisions on pay rates for each band,
annual adjustments to these bands and locality pay supplements and
adjustments will no longer be made in public forums like the U.S.
Congress or the Federal Salary Council, where employees can watch the
process and have the opportunity to influence its outcome. Rather,
these decisions would now be made behind closed doors by a group of DHS
managers (sometimes in coordination with OPM) and their consultants.
If the proposed system is implemented, employees will have no basis
to accurately predict their salaries from year to year. They will have
no way of knowing how much of an annual increase they will receive, or
whether they will receive any annual increase at all, despite having
met or exceeded all performance expectations identified by the
Department. The ``pay-for-performance'' element of the proposal will
pit employees against each other for performance-based increases.
Making DHS employees compete against each other for pay increases will
undermine the spirit of cooperation and teamwork needed to keep our
country safe from terrorists, smugglers, and others who wish to do
America harm.
One thing is clear. The proposed pay system will be extremely
complex and costly to administer. A new bureaucracy will have to be
created, and it will be dedicated to making the myriad, and yet-to-be
identified, pay-related decisions that the new system would require.
In the area of labor relations, NTEU is extremely disappointed by
the proposed DHS personnel system. Despite the congressional mandate to
protect an employee's right to collectively bargain, the proposed DHS
personnel regulations are drafted as such to minimize the influence of
collective bargaining so as to undermine the statutory right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively. When Congress included
provisions in the Homeland Security Act to protect employees'
collective bargaining rights, Congress could not have intended those
rights to be gutted as they are in the proposed regulations.
For example, the proposed regulations eliminate bargaining over
otherwise negotiable matters that do not significantly affect a
substantial portion of the bargaining unit, they eliminate a union's
right to participate in formal discussions between bargaining unit
employees and managers, and they drastically restrict the situations
during which an employee may request the presence of a union
representative during an investigatory examination. In addition, the
proposed regulations set and change conditions of employment and void
collectively bargained provisions through the issuance of non-
negotiable departmental regulations, assign authority for resolving
many labor-management disputes to the Homeland Security Labor Relations
Board, composed exclusively of members appointed by the Secretary, and
grant broad new authority to establish an entirely new pay system, and
to determine each employee's base pay and locality pay, and each
employee's annual increase in pay, without requiring any bargaining
with employee representatives.
The Homeland Security Act required any new human resources system
for DHS employee ``contemporary.'' Unfortunately, the labor relations
and performance management proposals are, however, remarkably
regressive. By proposing to silence front-line employees and the unions
that represent them, DHS/OPM appear to have decided that employees and
their representatives can make no contribution to the accomplishment of
the essential mission of protecting the homeland. This backwards-
thinking approach is at odds with contemporary concepts of labor
relations.
In the area of due process for DHS employees the proposed personnel
regulations make drastic changes. Included in the proposed regulations
are provisions that bar the Merit Systems Protection Board from
reducing or otherwise modifying any penalty selected by DHS, which
would deprive employees of a chance to challenge excessive or
unreasonable penalties, the proposed regulations eliminate the right of
a union to submit serious adverse actions imposed against bargaining
unit employees to an arbitrator, and they reduce an agency's burden of
proof in adverse actions cases to a standard that would require DHS's
decisions to be upheld even if they are more likely than not to have
been improper.
In addition, the proposed DHS regulations would allow the Secretary
of Homeland Security to determine an unlimited number of mandatory
removal offenses or ``deadly sins'' that require mandatory termination
for DHS personnel, without access to any independent review of the
charges; the only review would be by an in-house entity. These proposed
DHS ``deadly sins'' are even more Draconian that the IRS' deadly sins,
which are subject to independent review and are set by statute, not
subject to the whim of the current or future DHS Secretaries.
It is important to note that President Bush supports repealing the
mandatory termination provisions currently in effect at the IRS and
legislation drafted by the Administration to do this (H.R. 1528) has
passed the House with strong bipartisan Congressional, as well as,
Administration support. The Administration believes that the IRS needs
more flexibility in this area. Since flexibility has been the primary
goal of personnel changes at DHS, it is totally inconsistent to
introduce procedures that take away all discretion by requiring
mandatory penalties.
When Congress mandated that DHS employees be treated fairly and
afforded the protections of due process, and authorized only limited
changes to current appellate processes, Congress could not have
envisioned the drastic reductions in employee rights that are in the
proposed DHS personnel regulations. No evidence shows that current
employee due process protections or the decisions of an arbitrator or
the MSPB jeopardize homeland security. While there was support
expressed in Town Hall meetings and focus groups for speeding up the
adverse action and appeals process, there was no support for
drastically altering the process in favor of management or otherwise
reducing the likelihood of fair and accurate decisions.
Ideally, a new DHS human resource management system should promote
esprit-de-corps so as to enhance the effectiveness of the workforce.
Unfortunately, these proposals fall far short of that ideal. Instead,
they will result in a demoralized workforce composed of Federal
employees who feel as if they have been relegated to second-class
citizenship. This system will encourage experienced employees to seek
employment elsewhere and will deter qualified candidates from
considering a career in DHS.
Thank you for the opportunity to share NTEU's thoughts on a number
of extremely important issues concerning the Department of Homeland
Security, its fiscal year 2005 Budget and its front line employees.
______
Prepared Statement of the University of Miami
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to provide
testimony on the Disaster Resistant University initiative and to
request continued funding in the fiscal year 2005 appropriations bill
of your Subcommittee.
We very much appreciate the interest of Members of Congress in this
program. It is a modest program with great benefits.
Request for fiscal year 2005
We respectfully request the following language in the fiscal year
2005 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill Emergency
Preparedness and Response section of the bill under the Predisaster
Mitigation section.
The Committee directs Emergency Preparedness and Response (FEMA) to
continue the Disaster Resistant University Program by providing
continued support to the pilot universities and those selected in
fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to implement mitigation efforts
to reduce their vulnerabilities and improve protection of their
students, employees, and the Federal investment in vital research.
Program Background
The FEMA Disaster Resistant University (DRU) Initiative was created
to reduce the potential for large loss of life and hundreds of millions
of dollars in key Federal research and billions of dollars in damage
from natural disasters. The University of California at Berkeley was
the prototype and founding member of the program. In October 2000, FEMA
selected five additional universities to join Berkeley in the pilot
phase of the program: the University of Alaska at Fairbanks, University
of Miami, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Tulane
University, and the University of Washington at Seattle. The selected
universities have two elements in common: a vulnerability to disasters
and a commitment to improve protection of students, faculty and staff,
and one of our most valuable assets, intellectual property. The pilot
program was funded with $700,000 in grants from predisaster mitigation
funds and the U.S. Fire Administration.
Purpose of the Program
The purpose of the program is to help the Nation's colleges and
universities facing the threat of natural disasters and acts of
terrorism to assess their vulnerabilities and find ways to protect the
lives of their students, faculty, and staff; their research; and their
facilities. It will provide a framework and process for other
universities to do the same.
The intent of the program was to assist universities by first
providing a small grant for them to assess their vulnerabilities,
devise appropriate plans, and set priorities and then to provide grants
in following years of approximately $500,000 each for the universities
to take steps to reduce those vulnerabilities.
Need for the Program
The Federal Government funds $19.4 billion annually in university
research, according to the National Science Foundation statistics in
2001, the latest year available. This Federal investment in the vital
intellectual property of the Nation should be protected.
In addition, universities are critical to the economic health of
their surrounding communities. Their ability to resume operations
quickly following a disaster greatly speeds the recovery of the entire
community. For example, the University of Miami is the 3rd largest
employer in Miami-Dade County and has a $1.9 billion a year impact on
the community; the University of Washington is the 3rd largest employer
in the State of Washington and has a $3.4 billion impact; the
University of North Carolina at Wilmington is the 3rd largest employer
in the area and is a $400 million annual benefit to an eight county
area; the University of California at Berkeley is the 3th largest
employer in the Bay area and generates $1.4 billion annually in the Bay
area; Tulane University is the largest employer in Orleans Parish and
the 5th largest in Louisiana with a $1.5 billion gross impact on New
Orleans; and the University of Alaska at Fairbanks is the largest
civilian employer in the Tanana Valley. In addition, many universities
operate medical schools which provide essential clinical services to
the residents of their communities and adjacent areas.
Many recent events underscore the need for the program: the loss of
many years of research at the Texas Medical Center as result of
flooding from Tropical Storm Allison, the earthquake damage to the
University of California at Northridge and the University of California
at Los Angeles, the facility damage and loss of life at the University
of Maryland as result of a tornado, hurricane damage to the University
of North Carolina at Wilmington, the earthquake damage to the
University of Washington at Seattle, and the declaration by the FBI
that our universities are ``soft'' targets for terrorists.
Status of the Program
On December 31, 2003, FEMA published a Notice of Funds Availability
(NOFA) for grant applications. As directed by Congress, $500,000 is to
be available to the six existing DRUs and $100,000 each is to be
available for six new ones to start the process. The funds are from the
PreDisaster Mitigation Fund.
The applications were due to FEMA regions on March 1, 2004. The
FEMA regions have completed preliminary reviews and forwarded the
applications to FEMA headquarters. Panels will be reviewing the
applications in late April and awards are expected in early June.
Forty-four universities and four consortia applied. Applications
were received from six Historic Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU)
and one tribal school. Applications were received from universities
located in nine of the ten FEMA regions.
Although no additional funding has been made available since the
original small grants in 2000, great progress has been made by the
universities with the modest Federal investment. Participation in the
DRU brought high level commitment and a framework for disaster planning
and mitigation activities that helped universities focus and enhance
efforts to protect their students, faculty, staff, vital research, and
facilities.
Each university has made significant improvements in developing
awareness campaigns on campus; assessing their risks, vulnerabilities,
and mitigation options, prioritizing and implementing some of the
mitigation options; updating emergency operations plans; and developing
and implementing plans for business continuity. The universities have
improved disaster resistant design specifications for buildings and
their contents, incorporated disaster resistance into campus master
planning, and partnered more closely with governmental and private
entities.
These six pilot universities are making strong efforts to protect
their over 120,000 students, over 60,000 employees, 1,550 buildings
valued at over $11,820,458,000, and $1,600,710,000 in annual research.
The six participating Disaster Resistant Universities look forward
to continuing their progress and to mentoring the six new universities
which FEMA will be selecting soon.
Included in the applications from the six pilots for the fiscal
year 2003 funding were projects such as protecting windows, tying down
rooftop mechanical equipment, structural bracing for hurricane damage
protection for buildings housing major research projects; seismic
retrofit of the university police Department 9-1-1 dispatch center and
emergency operations center; developing emergency plans for campus
special needs populations; seismic evaluation of the power plant vital
for research facilities; and improving nonstructural hazard mitigation
in university laboratories, increasing data backup, and expanding
business resumption planning into departments and research units.
Streamlining the Process
We are grateful that the process of getting out the fiscal year
2003 funding is underway; however, the new application process for the
fiscal year 2003 funds was very time consuming. Some of the information
required seemed much more appropriate for communities than a
university. One pilot university estimated it took 200 hours of staff
time to prepare the application and several spent more than 150 hours.
One of the universities applying as a new selection for a $100,000
grant devoted 150 hours of staff time. In addition the process is time
consuming for State and local emergency management officials. We would
like to work with FEMA on suggestions for streamlining the process
while still maintaining high quality applications.
Summary of Congressional Interest
We very much appreciate the support Congress has given this
program.
Fiscal year 2002
The Conference Report on the VA, HUD and Independent Agencies
Appropriations bill for 2002 (House Report 107-272 ) contained the
following language:
The conferees believe that many of the Nation's universities are
vulnerable to disaster and urge FEMA to continue its Disaster Resistant
University program and expand the scope to include safe-guarding
university assets from acts of terrorism.
Fiscal year 2003
The Conference Report on the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus bill in the
FEMA section of the VA, HUD and Independent Agencies stated the
following:
The conferees are in agreement that FEMA should continue the
Disaster Resistant University program and direct FEMA to carry out the
direction contained in House Report 107-740.
House Report 107-740 stated the following:
Finally, the Committee notes that in September of 2000 FEMA
selected five universities to join the University of California at
Berkeley in the pilot phase of the Disaster Resistant University
program: University of Alaska/Fairbanks, University of Miami,
University of North Carolina/Wilmington, Tulane University, and
University of Washington/Seattle. The purpose of the program is to help
the Nation's colleges and universities facing the threat of natural
disasters to assess their vulnerabilities and find ways to protect
their research, facilities and the lives of students, faculty and
staff. The Committee directs FEMA to continue the Disaster Resistant
University Program with grants of $500,000 to each of the six pilot
Disaster Resistant Universities and $100,000 each to at least six
additional universities, including at least one HBCU, to join the
program.
Fiscal year 2004
The Senate Report on the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations bill (S. Report 108-86) included the following language
under the National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund which was funded at
$150,000,000.
The Committee encourages the Department to continue the existing
Disaster Resistant University program at the fiscal year 2003 level.
The House receded to the Senate in the conference agreement.
We again thank you for the opportunity to provide written comment
on the need for continued funding of this important program. We would
welcome the opportunity to provide additional information or to discuss
the program further with your staff.
______
Prepared Statement of the Upper Mississippi River Basin Association
The Upper Mississippi River Basin Association (UMRBA) is the
organization created in 1981 by the Governors of Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin to serve as a forum for coordinating
the five States' river-related programs and policies and for
collaborating with Federal agencies on regional water resource issues.
As such, the UMRBA has an interest in the budgets for the U.S. Coast
Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Both the Coast Guard and the FEMA have vital functions specifically
related to homeland security that must be adequately funded. But both
also have other traditional missions that are equally important to
public health and safety, economic well-being, and environmental
protection. For the Coast Guard, these include activities such as aids
to navigation, vessel and facility inspections, emergency response, and
mariner licensing. For FEMA, key traditional missions include the
National Flood Insurance Program, flood map modernization, hazard
mitigation, and response to floods and other natural disasters. Nowhere
are these services more important than on the Upper Mississippi River
System, which supports a vital link in the inland waterway
transportation system, some of the Nation's most productive
agricultural land, population centers ranging from small towns to major
metropolitan areas, and a nationally significant ecosystem.
COAST GUARD
Operating Expenses
A continuing priority for the UMRBA is the Coast Guard's Operating
Expenses account. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposal
includes $5.173 billion for this account, an increase of almost 10
percent from the fiscal year 2004 enacted level. However, this net
increase of $455 million for Operating Expenses is more than fully
consumed by specific increases tied to implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA); increased personnel costs; and
operating costs for new vessels, aircraft, and facilities related to
the Coast Guard's saltwater responsibilities. These initiatives are
important in their own right and will benefit a range of Coast Guard
missions. However, it is also true that the Coast Guard's non-security
missions will be under continued strain as the inflation-adjusted
resources for these missions remain static or shrink.
When the Department of Homeland Security was formed, the UMRBA
strongly supported the Coast Guard's stated objective of sustaining
traditional missions near their pre-9/11 levels. These traditional
missions are critical to the safe, efficient operation of the Upper
Mississippi River and the rest of the inland river system. Under these
mission areas, the Coast Guard maintains navigation channel markers,
regulates a wide range of commercial vessels in the interest of crew
and public safety, and responds to spills and other incidents. The
beneficiaries include not only commercial vessel operators, but also
recreational boaters; farmers and others who ship materials by barge;
and the region's citizens, who benefit enormously from the river as a
nationally significant economic and environmental resource.
Even prior to September 11, recent years had brought a number of
changes to the way the Coast Guard operates on the inland river system,
including elimination of the Second District; closure of the Director
of Western Rivers Office; decommissioning the Sumac, which was the
largest buoy tender on the Upper Mississippi River; and staff
reductions. While the States understand the need for efficiency, the
cumulative impacts of these changes must be carefully monitored,
particularly in light of the increased demands that we are now placing
on the personnel and assets that remain in the region. The UMRBA is
quite concerned that staff reductions and resource constraints have
combined to impair the Coast Guard's ability to serve as an effective,
proactive partner.
Specifically, increased security demands have reduced the staff
assigned to vessel inspections and limited the Coast Guard's
investigation of reported spills. Sending a single person to conduct
vessel inspections reduces the rigor of those inspections, and, in a
worst case scenario, potentially puts the inspector at risk. Similarly,
electing not to respond to reports of small spills means some of these
spills will go uninvestigated and puts increased demands on local
officials, who do not have the Coast Guard's expertise or resources.
Moreover, it could result in costly delays should a spill turn out to
be larger than first reported, an all-too-common occurrence. Temporary
adjustments initially made to accommodate immediate security needs are
now evolving into long term standard operating procedures. While
everyone recognizes the need to adjust to our new security environment,
it is essential for the Coast Guard to retain the capacity to perform
its traditional missions on the Upper Mississippi River. Toward that
end, the UMRBA supports the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request
for the Coast Guard's Operating Expenses account, but urges Congress to
ensure that sufficient resources from within this account are allocated
to the Coast Guard's inland river work.
Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
Through its Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
program, the Coast Guard conducts cutting edge research in several
critical areas, including oil spill prevention and response, risk
assessment, and mariner safety. Of particular note, researchers at the
Coast Guard's Groton, Connecticut Research and Development Center have
made invaluable contributions to state-of-the-art fast water spill
response, in situ burning, and human error reduction. However, the
President is now proposing to shift the Coast Guard's RDT&E funding to
the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate. This proposal represents precisely the kind of diminution
of the Coast Guard's non-security missions with which the UMRBA and
others have repeatedly expressed concern. Research on innovative oil
spill recovery equipment or new methods for combating crew fatigue will
simply be lost in the department-wide S&T Directorate, with its
overwhelming focus on homeland security issues. Moreover, the
President's proposal appears to be inconsistent with Section 888 of the
Homeland Security Act, which calls for ``the authorities, functions,
and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its missions . . . [to]
be maintained intact.'' The UMRBA urges Congress to provide adequate
and direct funding to the Coast Guard's multi-mission RDT&E program in
fiscal year 2005.
Reserve Training
The President is requesting $117 million for Coast Guard Reserve
Training in fiscal year 2005. The UMRBA States are keenly aware of the
importance of the reserve forces. During major flood events on the
inland rivers, reservists have consistently provided exemplary service,
augmenting the Coast Guard's capabilities and helping to protect public
health and safety. More recently, many reservists have been called to
active duty, enabling the Coast Guard to meet many new security-related
demands. On the inland rivers, this has included increased patrols near
critical facilities and development of security plans for key inland
ports. The UMRBA urges Congress to fund Reserve Training at $117
million in fiscal year 2005, thereby helping to maintain a Coast Guard
reserve that can effectively execute both homeland security- and
natural disaster-related missions.
Boating Safety Grants
The Coast Guard's boating safety grants to the States have a proven
record of success. The Upper Mississippi is a river where all types of
recreational craft routinely operate in the vicinity of 15-barge tows,
making boating safety all the more important. As levels of both
recreational and commercial traffic continue to grow, so too does the
potential for user conflicts. This is particularly true with major
events like the Grand Excursion 2004, during which flotillas of boaters
will retrace President Millard Fillmore's 1854 steamboat journey from
Rock Island, Illinois to the Twin Cities.
Boat safety training and law enforcement are key elements of
prevention. However, the future of this successful grants program is
uncertain. Following the pattern of recent years, the President has
requested $59 million in fiscal year 2005 funding for boating safety
grants to the States. This is the amount historically authorized
without annual appropriation from the Boat Safety Account, which is
funded by a tax on fuel for recreational motor boats. Successive
Administrations have not typically exercised their option to request an
additional $13 million in annual appropriations for the grants.
However, the authority for the funding from the Boat Safety Account has
expired and must be extended if the program is to continue in fiscal
year 2005. Such a provision is currently being considered as part of
the pending Highway Bill. The UMRBA urges prompt reauthorization of the
Boating Safety Program, and funding of this important work at $72
million annually.
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE DIRECTORATE)
Hazard Mitigation
UMRBA is particularly interested in FEMA programs that help
mitigate future flood hazards. Mitigation, which is the ongoing effort
to reduce or eliminate the impact of disasters like floods, can include
measures such as relocating homes or community facilities off the
floodplain, elevating structures, and practicing sound land use
planning. Mitigation planning and projects are essential to reducing
the Nation's future disaster assistance costs. Given the importance of
mitigation, UMRBA supports the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant
program, which was created in fiscal year 2003 and for which the
President is requesting $150 million in fiscal year 2005. While the PDM
grant program is still relatively new, it holds promise for enhancing
communities' ability to prevent future damages, particularly in areas
that have not experienced a major disaster and thus have not had access
to post-disaster mitigation assistance through the Disaster Relief
Fund. In addition, pre-disaster mitigation assistance is an effective
means of meeting the ongoing need in all communities to plan for future
floods and reduce their vulnerability before the next flood disaster.
FEMA is still in the process of awarding fiscal year 2003 grant
funds, and fiscal year 2004 grant guidance has not yet been released.
In fiscal year 2003, each State in the country was provided $248,375
for planning grants. The balance of the $150 million appropriated in
fiscal year 2003 is being allocated nationally as competitive grants,
in three phases. While fiscal year 2003 competitive grants have not yet
been awarded, the review process has concluded. A total of nearly $6
million in PDM competitive grants will likely be awarded, from fiscal
year 2003 funds, to communities throughout the five States of the Upper
Mississippi River Basin. Although the PDM grant program has gotten off
to a slow start, it holds promise. Thus, UMRBA supports the President's
fiscal year 2005 funding request of $150 million for the PDM program.
Flood Map Modernization
Flood maps are not only used to determine risk-based National Flood
Insurance Program premium rates, but also provide the basis for local
regulation of flood hazard areas and for State and local disaster
response planning. However, most flood maps are over 15 years old and
are rapidly becoming obsolete. Many flood maps are outdated by the
effects of land use changes in the watersheds. When outdated maps
underestimate flood depths, it can often lead to floodplain development
in high risk areas. It is therefore important that flood maps be
updated on an ongoing basis and in a timely way.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget proposes $200 million for
FEMA's Flood Map Modernization program. While funding for flood maps
has increased substantially since the Map Modernization initiative
began in fiscal year 2003, there are growing concerns about the
adequacy of the original time and cost estimates. For instance,
producing updated and accurate maps often requires that new studies be
conducted. However, the existing map modernization budget is only
sufficient to fund actual mapping costs and will not adequately cover
the costs of necessary associated tasks, such as new flood elevation
studies or levee certifications. In fiscal year 2004, FEMA Region 5 was
allocated $12 million for map modernization and Region 7 was allocated
$7.28 million. Given such constrained funding and the fact that mapping
needs are being prioritized based on population, rather than flood risk
or need, it is not clear when relatively sparsely populated counties
along the Mississippi River will be mapped. Ironically, the Federal
Government, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, recently spent
approximately $17 million to develop new flood profiles for the Upper
Mississippi and Lower Missouri Rivers. Unfortunately this updated
information cannot be fully utilized until sufficient funding is made
available to modernize and digitize the flood maps for river
communities. Thus, the UMRBA urges Congress to provide adequate funding
for map modernization, including sufficient funding to develop new maps
for the Upper Mississippi and Lower Missouri Rivers based on the new
flood profiles.