[Senate Hearing 108-676]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:03 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Domenici,
Bond, McConnell, Shelby, Gregg, Hutchison, Burns, Inouye,
Hollings, Byrd, Leahy, Harkin, Dorgan, Durbin, Reid, and
Feinstein.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENTS OF:
HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY
GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF
DR. DAVID S. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PERSONNEL AND
READINESS)
ACCOMPANIED BY LAWRENCE LANZILLOTTA, COMPTROLLER
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Good morning, Secretary Rumsfeld, General
Myers. We welcome you back before our subcommittee at this
important time for our Nation and for the Department of
Defense. We also welcome the acting Comptroller, Larry
Lanzillotta.
The focus of our hearing today is the fiscal year 2005
Defense budget. This is our normally scheduled hearing, where
we ask the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to testify at the end of our hearing cycle and
provide their important perspectives on the budget and answer
questions that have come up in connection with the other
subcommittee hearings.
Last week, we learned a fiscal year 2005 request totaling
$25 billion is forthcoming. We plan to hold a separate hearing
on that request when more details are available. If it comes to
this committee, I urge members to defer their questions
concerning that request until we have it.
Sadly, we also have learned a lot over the past week about
the abuse of Iraqi inmates at the Abu Ghraib prison. These
actions were absolutely appalling and an embarrassment to our
great country, as you have said, Mr. Secretary. Congress must,
and we shall, investigate the matter thoroughly. It is our
view, however, that the primary jurisdiction of this issue lies
with the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate
Intelligence Committee, not the Appropriations Committee. This
committee needs to focus attention on funding required to train
and equip our men and women in uniform throughout the world.
Our military remains engaged in critical missions in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other areas around the world. It's imperative
for us to exercise our due diligence in reviewing the $401.7
billion in Defense spending requests that's already before us.
We're committed to ensuring the Defense Department is properly
resourced to win our global war on terrorism. Failure in this
endeavor is not an option for us, as you have stated, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Secretary and General Myers, we look forward to this
hearing today about your priorities in the current budget
request, as well as any other operational update you may wish
to provide. I understand you may have a time problem, Mr.
Secretary. Please keep us informed on that.
We will make--your full statements are already a part of
our record.
Each Member, without objection, will be limited to 5
minutes in the opening round of questions. Time permitting, we
will proceed with a second round of questioning.
Before you begin your opening statements, I'll ask my
colleague, my co-chairman from Hawaii, if he has comments.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. And
good morning, Mr. Secretary and General Myers. And I join my
Chairman and welcome you to our Subcommittee.
During our hearings this year, we received testimony from
the military departments, the Guard and Reserves, Missile
Defense Agency, and the Surgeons General. As we have examined
the testimony of these officials, it is very clear that most
are very supportive of your budget request. In our review, we
learned that, at the same time as our forces are fighting
overseas, your Department is engaged in many major and somewhat
controversial changes. The Navy and Marines are looking at
swapping crews overseas to save money and time for deploying
ships, a policy which could impact how many ships we need. The
Army is adding forces by reconstructing brigades, but there's
no agreement to permanently provide the end strength to achieve
this. The Air Force is preparing to introduce the F-22 to its
force structure, which dramatically increases combat
capability. And there are some who still question whether the
system is required. All the services are examining their forces
overseas to alter the global footprint while we prepare for
base closures domestically. And we are now aware that a budget
amendment will be forthcoming to help pay for the rising cost
of war in Iraq when for months we thought we could defer any
increase until next year.
So, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, we know these are very
challenging and critical times for the Defense Department. The
challenges have been heightened by the events coming to light
in recent weeks, and I'm sure I don't have to tell you that it
has been very difficult for all Americans to witness scenes of
torture and human-rights abuses.
Mr. Chairman, I know that many are likely to want to
discuss this today, but we should remember that our primary
jurisdiction is the budget of the Defense Department, not
investigating criminal acts. It is, nonetheless, very important
that the Congress and the administration continue to
investigate these incidents, and I'm certain they will.
Mr. Secretary, General Myers, I know you recognize the
gravity of this matter and the serious impact it is having on
our Nation's prestige and influence. I, for one, am very
concerned about the long-term effect it will have on our
military recruiting and retention. It is equally important that
we realize we're all in it together. I'm one of the few on this
committee that voted against going to war in Iraq. But now that
we are engaged in this policy, we must simply find a way to see
it through to a successful and swift conclusion.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Without objection, we're going to postpone
opening statements of other members and go right to the
Secretary's statement. As I said, it's printed in the record.
Mr. Secretary, we're happy to have you here with us today.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Inouye, members of the committee. I'd like to make a brief
statement, and I certainly thank you for this opportunity to
meet on the President's proposed budget.
First, I want to commend the men and women in uniform and
the civilians in the Department of Defense who support them.
It's important, in times like this, that we publicly indicate
that we value their service, we value their sacrifice. They are
doing a superb job for this country.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS SINCE 2001
When this administration took office 3 years ago, the
President charged us to try to prepare the Department to meet
the new threats that our Nation will face in the 21st century.
To meet that charge, we fashioned a new defense strategy, a new
force-sizing construct. We've issued a new unified command
plan, instituted more realistic budgeting so that the
Department now looks to emergency supplementals for the unknown
cost of fighting wars and not simply to sustain readiness. We
transformed the way the Department prepares its war plans, and
adopted a new lessons-learned approach during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. And we have undertaken a comprehensive review of our
global force structure.
The scope and scale of what has been accomplished is
substantial. Our challenge is to build on these activities even
as we fight the global war on terror. One effect of the global
war on terror has been a significant increase in the
operational tempo and an increased demand on the force. To
manage the demand, we must first be clear about the problems so
that we can work together to fashion appropriate solutions. We
hope the increased demand on the force we're experiencing today
will prove to be a spike driven by the deployment of some
138,000 troops in Iraq.
MANAGING DEMAND ON THE FORCE
For the moment, the increased demand is real, and we have
taken a number of immediate actions. We're working to increase
international military participation in Iraq, and have had good
success. More recently, we've lost two or three countries from
that coalition, which was unfortunate. We've accelerated the
training of Iraqi security forces, and we now have something
like 206,000 strong, heading toward 265,000. And our forces are
working to hunt down those who threaten Iraq's stability and
Iraq's transition to self reliance.
Another way to deal with the increased demand on the force
is to add more people, and we've already done so, a fact that
seems not to be fully recognized. Using the emergency powers
granted by Congress, we have already increased the active duty
force levels by something in the neighborhood of 30,000 to
35,000 above the pre-emergency authorized end strength. We've
done this over the past 2 years. If the war on terror demands
it, we will not hesitate to increase force levels still more
using the same emergency authority. But it should give us pause
that even a temporary increase in our force levels was and
remains necessary.
Think about it. At this moment, we have a pool of about 2.6
million men and women in the Active, Reserve, and Guard,
including the Individual Ready Reserve, yet the deployment of
135,000 out of a pool of 2.6 million has required that we
temporarily increase the size of the force by some 35,000. That
suggests that the real problem is not the size of the force,
per se, but rather the way the force has been organized over
the years and the mix of capabilities at our disposal. And it
suggests that our challenge is considerably more complex than
simply adding more troops.
General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, compares
the problem to a barrel of water on which the spigot is placed
near the top of the barrel, and you open the spigot and very
little comes out because all you can access is the top of the
barrel. The answer, at least from the taxpayer's standpoint, it
seems to me, is not to get a bigger barrel or more barrels;
it's to move the spigot down on the barrel so we can access all
of, in this case, the 2.6 million men and women that we should
have access to, and take full advantage of their skills and
their talents and the fact that every one of them is a
volunteer.
We have too few Active and Guard and Reserve forces with
the skill sets that are in high demand, and we have too many
Guard and Reserve with skills that are in too little demand.
Therefore, we urgently need to re-balance the skill sets within
the Reserve components, and also between the Active and the
Reserve components, so that we have enough of the right kinds
of forces available to accomplish the missions. And we need to
focus on transforming the forces for the future, making sure we
continue to increase the capability of the force and, thus, our
ability to do more with those forces. The services are working
to do just that.
In looking at our global force posture, some observers have
focused on the number of things--troops, tanks, ships--that we
might add or remove to one portion of the world or another. I
would submit that that may very well not be the best measure
for today. For example, the Army has put forward a plan that,
by using its emergency powers, we will increase force levels by
roughly 6 percent. But because of the way they will do it,
General Schoomaker estimates that the Army will add, not 6
percent, but up to 30 percent more combat power--that is to
say, go from 33 brigades up to 43 brigades, with a possibility
of going to 48 brigades. Instead of adding more divisions, the
Army is focusing on creating a 21st century modular army made
up of self-contained, more self-sustaining brigades that are
available to work for any division commander. As a result, 75
percent of the Army's brigade structure should always be ready
in the event of a crisis. The Army's plan will increase the
number of active brigades significantly. But because we will be
using emergency powers, we will have the flexibility to reduce
the number of active troops if the security situation permits.
SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Before highlighting the 2005 budget request, let me talk
briefly about the funding for the global war on terror. As the
year has unfolded, not surprisingly the security situation and
the requirements in Iraq have changed. As a result, General
Abizaid has requested additional combat capability for the
period ahead, and the President has approved that request. We
regret having to extend those individuals necessary to provide
that capability. They had anticipated serving in Iraq, or in
theater, for up to 365 days, and this extension will extend
their time in Iraq by up to 90 days. We have recently
identified, and are now preparing to deploy, other forces to
replace them.
Because our Nation is at war, we need to provide combat
forces with the resources they need to complete their missions.
While we do not yet know the exact cost of operations in 2005,
we do need to plan for contingencies so that there's no
disruption in the resources for the troops. The cost of
supporting these operations increases the chance that certain
accounts, such as Army operations and maintenance,
particularly, will experience funding shortfalls beyond
February or March 2005.
As Senator Inouye mentioned, the President has, therefore,
asked Congress for a $25 billion contingency reserve fund that
can be used for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq until we can
get a clearer picture of what will be necessary for a fiscal
year 2005 supplemental. This fund would be used primarily for
operation and maintenance requirements, such as personnel
support costs, combat operations, supplies, force protection,
and transportation.
I want to emphasize that this $25 billion proposed reserve
fund would not be all that would be needed in 2005. We are
anticipating submitting a full 2005 supplemental appropriation
request early next year, when we can better estimate the exact
cost.
HIGHLIGHTS OF FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST
Returning now to the 2005 budget request, we have requested
additional funds to strengthen intelligence, including
increases in human intelligence, persistent surveillance, as
well as technical analysis and information-sharing. We have
also strong funding for transformation and other acquisition
needs. The President's budget requests funds for pay and
quality-of-life improvements for the troops. These funds
properly focus on the men serving--men and women serving in the
Armed Forces. In recent years, Congress has, from time to time,
added entitlement-like changes beyond recommendations such as
these that have been, for the most part, concentrated on those
who have already served. We certainly applaud the desire to
honor that service. But I should point out that the effects of
these decisions, cumulatively, are important. They're
increasing substantially the permanent cost of running the
Department of Defense (DOD). By fiscal year 2009, they,
cumulatively, will add over $20 billion a year to the Defense
budget, with only modest effect on recruiting and retaining the
current active force.
I recognize there are legitimate questions and legitimate
differences about the best way to compensate the forces. For
this reason, I'm appointing an Advisory Committee on Military
Compensation to conduct a comprehensive review of military
compensation and benefits, with a view towards simplifying and
improving them. Before making further changes, I hope that you
will allow us to first develop a comprehensive and integrated
set of compensation proposals, which we would submit to you
next year.
SPECIAL LEGISLATION
One of the most important ways in which Congress can
support the global war on terror is to support three special
authorities that we have requested. First is $500 million to
train and equip military and security forces in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and friendly nearby regional nations to enhance
their capability to combat terrorism and to support U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a great deal cheaper
for the taxpayer if we are able to train and equip forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan than it is to maintain U.S. forces in
those countries.
Second, the Commander's Emergency Response Program, $300
million, to enable military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan--
U.S. military leaders--to respond to urgent humanitarian relief
and reconstruction needs. This has been a remarkably successful
program, with quick turnaround projects averaging in the
neighborhood of $5,000 to $10,000 each. Commanders not only
help people in their operations area, but they also gain
support in defeating terrorists and building themselves a
better future.
And third is increased drawdown authority--we're requesting
$200 million under the Afghan Freedom Support Act--to provide
additional help for the Afghan National Army. The President's
2005 budget does not request specific authorization for these
three authorities. Therefore, the Department would need to
reprogram funding to use them. This underscores the importance
of Congress increasing the Department's general transfer
authority to $4 billion, which would represent slightly under 1
percent of total DOD funding. Higher general transfer authority
would give us a needed ability to shift funds from less
pressing needs to fund must-pay bills and emerging requirements
as the circumstances on the ground change over time. As we've
seen in the last three years, such requirements have been a
constant feature of our military programs.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, the President has asked Congress $401.7
billion for fiscal year 2005. That is a very, very large amount
of money, the taxpayers' hard-earned money. Such investments
will likely be required for some years, because our Nation is
engaged in a struggle that could very likely go on for a number
of years. Our objective is to ensure that the Armed Forces
remain the best-trained, the best-equipped fighting force in
the world, and that we treat volunteers who make up that force
with the respect equal to their sacrifice and their dedication.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald H. Rumsfeld
introduction
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here to
discuss the progress in the global war on terrorism, our transformation
efforts, and to discuss the President's 2005 budget request for the
Department of Defense.
First, I want to commend the courageous men and women in uniform
and the Department civilians who support them. They are remarkable--and
what they have accomplished since our country was attacked 30 months
ago is impressive. In 2\1/2\ years, they have helped to: Overthrow two
terrorist regimes, rescued two nations, and liberated some 50 million
people; capture or kill 46 of the 55 most wanted in Iraq--including
Iraq's deposed dictator, Saddam Hussein; hunt down thousands of
terrorists and regime remnants in Iraq and Afghanistan; capture or kill
close to two-thirds of known senior al-Qaeda operatives; disrupt
terrorist cells on most continents; and likely prevent a number of
planned terrorist attacks.
Our forces are steadfast and determined. We value their service and
sacrifice, and the sacrifice of their families.
With your support, we have the finest Armed Forces on the face of
the Earth.
We have a challenge: to support the troops and to make sure they
have what they will need to defend the nation in the years ahead.
We are working to do that in a number of ways: By giving them the
tools they need to win the global war on terror; by transforming for
the 21st century, so they will have the training and tools they need to
prevail in the next wars our nation may have to fight--wars which could
be notably different from today's challenges; and by working to ensure
that we manage the force properly--so we can continue to attract and
retain the best and brightest, and sustain the quality of the all-
volunteer force.
Each represents a significant challenge in its own right. Yet we
must accomplish all of these critical tasks at once.
When this Administration took office three years ago, the President
charged us with a mission--to challenge the status quo, and prepare the
Department of Defense to meet the new threats our nation will face as
the 21st century unfolds.
We have done a good deal to meet that charge. Consider just some of
what has been accomplished:
--We have fashioned a new defense strategy and a new force sizing
construct.
--We have moved from a ``threat-based'' to a ``capabilities-based''
approach to defense planning, focusing not only on who might
threaten us, or where, or when--but more on how we might be
threatened, and what portfolio of capabilities we will need to
deter and defend against those new threats.
--We have fashioned a new Unified Command Plan, with a new Northern
Command, that became fully operational last September, to
better defend the homeland; the Joint Forces Command focused on
transformation; and a new Strategic Command responsible for
early warning of, and defense against, missile attack and the
conduct of long-range attacks.
--We have transformed the Special Operations Command, expanding its
capabilities and its missions, so that it cannot only support
missions directed by the regional combatant commanders, but
also plan and execute its own missions in the global war on
terror, supported by other combatant commands.
--We have taken critical steps to attract and retain talent in our
Armed Forces--including targeted pay raises and quality of life
improvements for the troops and their families.
--We have instituted realistic budgeting, so the Department now looks
to emergency supplementals for the unknown costs of fighting
wars, not to sustain readiness.
--We have reorganized the Department to better focus our space
activities.
--Congress has established a new Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense.
--We have completed the Nuclear Posture Review, and adopted a new
approach to deterrence that will enhance our security, while
permitting historic deep reductions in offensive nuclear
weapons.
--We have pursued a new approach to developing military capabilities.
Instead of developing a picture of the perfect system, and then
building the system to meet that vision of perfection--however
long it takes or costs--the new approach is to start with the
basics, roll out early models faster, and then add capabilities
to the basic system as they become available.
--We have reorganized and revitalized the missile defense research,
development and testing program--and are on track to begin
deployment of our nation's first rudimentary ballistic missile
defenses later this year.
--We have established new strategic relationships, that would have
been unimaginable just a decade ago, with nations in Central
Asia, the Caucasus, and other critical areas of the world.
--We transformed the way the Department prepares its war plans--
reducing the time it takes to develop those plans, increasing
the frequency with which they are updated, and structuring our
plans to be flexible and adaptable to changes in the security
environment.
--We adopted a new ``Lessons Learned'' approach during Operation
Iraqi Freedom, embedding a team with U.S. Central Command that
not only studied lessons for future military campaigns, but
provided real-time feedback that had an immediate impact on our
success in Iraq.
--We made a number of key program decisions that are already having a
favorable impact on the capability of the force. Among others:
--We are converting 4 Trident nuclear SSBN subs into conventional
SSGN subs capable of delivering special forces and cruise
missiles into denied areas.
--The Army has deployed its first Stryker brigade to Iraq, is
completing conversion of the second, and is replacing the
Crusader with a new family of precision artillery that is
being developed for the Future Combat System.
--We have revitalized the B-1 bomber fleet by reducing its size and
using the savings to modernize the remaining aircraft with
precision weapons and other critical upgrades.
--We have also undertaken a comprehensive review of our global force
posture, so we can transform U.S. global capabilities from a
structure driven by where the wars of the 20th century ended,
to one that positions us to deal with the new threats of the
21st century security environment.
--We have established a new Joint National Training Capability, that
will help us push joint operational concepts throughout the
Department, so our forces train and prepare for war the way
they will fight it--jointly.
--We have worked with our Allies to bring NATO into the 21st
century--standing up a new NATO Response Force that can deploy
in days and weeks instead of months or years, and transforming
the NATO Command Structure--including the creation of a new
NATO command to drive Alliance transformation.
--With the help of Congress last year, we are establishing a new
National Security Personnel System that should help us better
manage our 746,000 civilian employees, and we are using the new
authorities granted us last year to preserve military training
ranges while keeping our commitment to responsible stewardship
of the environment.
The scope and scale of what has been accomplished is remarkable. It
will have an impact on the capability of our Armed Forces for many
years to come.
We will need your continued support as we go into the critical year
ahead.
Our challenge is to build on these successes, and continue the
transformation efforts that are now underway. In 2004, our objectives
are to:
--Successfully prosecute the global war on terror;
--Further strengthen our combined and joint war fighting
capabilities;
--Continue transforming the joint force, making it lighter, more
agile and more easily deployable, and instilling a culture that
rewards innovation and intelligent risk-taking;
--Strengthen our intelligence capabilities, and refocus our
intelligence efforts to support the new defense strategy and
our contingency plans;
--Reverse the existing WMD capabilities of unfriendly states and non-
state actors, and stop the global spread of WMD;
--Improve our management of the force;
--Refocus our overseas presence, further strengthen key alliances,
and improve our security cooperation with nations that are
likely partners in future contingencies;
--Continue improving and refining DOD's role in homeland security and
homeland defense; and
--Further streamline DOD processes, continuing financial management
reform and shortening acquisition cycle times.
So, we have an ambitious agenda. But none of these tasks can be put
off.
Our task is to prepare now for the tomorrow's challenges, even as
we fight today's war on terror.
managing the force
One effect of the global war on terror has been a significant
increase in operational tempo, which has resulted in an increased
demand on the force. Managing the demand on the force is one of our top
priorities. But to do so, we must be clear about the problem--so we can
work together to fashion the appropriate solutions.
We hope the increased demand on the force we are experiencing today
will prove to be a ``spike,'' driven by the deployment of nearly
135,000 troops in Iraq. We hope and anticipate that that spike will be
temporary. We do not expect to have 135,000 troops permanently deployed
in any one campaign.
But for the moment, the increased demand is real--and we are taking
a number of immediate actions. Among other things:
--We are working to increase international military participation in
Iraq.
--Japan began deploying its Self-Defense Forces to Iraq in January--
the first time Japanese forces have been deployed outside their
country since the end of World War II.
--As more international forces deploy, we have accelerated the
training of Iraqi security forces--now some 200,000 strong--to
hasten the day when the Iraqis themselves will be able to take
responsibility for the security and stability of their country,
and all foreign forces can leave.
--And as we increase Iraq's capability to defend itself, our forces
are dealing aggressively with the threat--hunting down those
who threaten Iraq's stability and transition to self-reliance.
Another way to deal with the increased demand on the force is to
add more people. We have already done so. Using the emergency powers
granted by Congress, we have increased force levels by more than 35,000
above the pre-emergency authorized end strength.
--The Army is up roughly 11,400 above authorized end strength;
--The Navy is up roughly 3,600;
--The Marine Corps is up some 600, and
--The Air Force is up about 19,800.
If the war on terror demands it, we will not hesitate to increase
force levels still more using the emergency authorities. And because of
the emergency powers, we have the flexibility to increase or reduce
force levels in the period ahead, as the security situation permits,
and as the transformation efficiencies bear fruit.
But it should give us pause that even a temporary increase in our
force levels was, and remains, necessary. Think about it: At this
moment we have a force of 2.6 million people, both active and reserve:
1.4 million active forces; 869,000 in the Selected Reserve--that is the
guard and reserve forces in units; and an additional 286,000 in the
Individual Ready Reserves.
Yet, despite these large numbers, the deployment of 135,000 troops
in Iraq has required that we temporarily increase the size of the force
by some 35,000.
That should tell us a good deal about how our forces are organized.
It suggests that the real problem is not the size of the force, per
se, but rather the way the force has been organized over the years, and
the mix of capabilities at our disposal. And it suggests that our
challenge is considerably more complex than simply adding more troops.
General Pete Schoomaker, the Army Chief of Staff, compares the
problem to a barrel of water, on which the spigot is placed too high
up. When you turn it on, it only draws water off the top, while the
water at the bottom can't be accessed. The answer to that problem is
not a bigger barrel; rather, the answer is to move the spigot down, so
that more of the water is accessible and can be used.
In other words, our challenge today is not simply one of increasing
the size of the force. Rather, we must better manage the force we
have--to make sure we have enough people in the right skill sets and so
that we take full advantage of the skills and talents of everyone who
steps forward and volunteers to serve.
We have too few Guard and Reserve forces with certain skill sets
that are high demand--and too many Guard and Reserve with skills that
are in little demand.
Therefore, we urgently need to rebalance the skill sets within the
reserve component, and between the active and reserve components, so we
have enough of the right kinds of forces available to accomplish our
missions.
And we need to do a far better job of managing the force. That
requires that we focus not just on the number of troops available
today--though that is of course important--but on transforming the
forces for the future, making sure we continue to increase the
capability of the force, and thus our ability to do more with fewer
forces.
And the Services are working to do just that.
mass vs. capability
One thing we have learned in the global war on terror is that, in
the 21st century, what is critical to success in military conflict is
not necessarily mass as much as it is capability.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, Coalition forces defeated a larger
adversary. They did it not by bringing more troops to the fight, which
we were ready to do, but by overmatching the enemy with superior speed,
power, precision and agility.
To win the wars of the 21st century, the task is to make certain
our forces are arranged in a way to ensure we can defeat any
adversary--and conduct all of the operations necessary to achieve our
strategic objectives.
In looking at our global force posture review, some observers have
focused on the number of troops, tanks, or ships that we might add or
remove in a given part of the world. I would submit that that may well
not be the best measure.
If you have 10 of something--say ships, for the sake of argument--
and you reduce the number by two, you end up with fewer of them. But if
you replace the remaining ships with ships that have double the
capability of those removed, then obviously you have not reduced
capability even though the numbers have been reduced.
The same is true as we look at the overall size of the force. What
is critical is the capability of the Armed Forces to project power
quickly, precisely, and effectively anywhere in the world.
For example, today the Navy is reducing force levels. Yet because
of the way they are arranging themselves, they will have more combat
power available than they did when they had more people.
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Navy surged more than half the
fleet to the Persian Gulf region for the fight. With the end of major
combat operations, instead of keeping two or three carrier strike
groups forward deployed, as has been traditional Navy practice, they
quickly redeployed all their carrier strike groups to home base. By
doing so, they are resetting their force in a way that will allow them
to surge over 50 percent more combat power on short notice to deal with
future contingencies.
The result? Today, six aircraft carrier strike groups are available
to respond immediately to any crisis that might confront us. That
capability, coupled with the application of new technologies, gives the
Navy growing combat power and greater flexibility to deal with global
crises--all while the Navy is moderately reducing the size of its
active force.
The Army, by contrast, has put forward a plan that, by using
emergency powers, will increase the size of its active force by roughly
6 percent or up to 30,000 troops above authorized end strength. But
because of the way they will do it, General Schoomaker estimates the
Army will be adding not 6 percent, but up to 30 percent more combat
power.
This is possible because, instead of adding more divisions, the
Army is moving away from the Napoleonic division structure designed in
the 19th century, focusing on creating a 21st century ``Modular Army''
made up of self-contained, more self-sustaining brigades that are
available to work for any division commander.
So, for example, in the event of a crisis, the 4th Infantry
Division commander could gather two of his own brigades, and combine
them with available brigades from, say, the 1st Armored Division and
the National Guard, and deploy them together. The result of this
approach is jointness within the service, as well as between the
services. And that jointness--combined with other measures--means that
75 percent of the Army's brigade structure should always be ready in
the event of a crisis.
The Army's plan would increase the number of active brigades
significantly over the next four years. But because we will be using
emergency powers, we will have the flexibility to reduce the number of
troops if the security situation permits--so the Army would not be
faced with the substantial cost of supporting a larger force as the
security situation and the efficiencies permit.
Yet even if the security situation, and progress in transformation,
were to permit the Army eventually to draw down the force, the new way
they are arranging their forces will ensure the United States still has
more ground combat power--more capability.
So we have two different approaches:
--In one case, the Navy is reducing force levels while increasing
capability;
--In the other, the Army is increasing troop levels--but doing so in
a way that will significantly increase its capability;
--And in both cases, the increase in capability of each service will
be significant.
The point is: our focus needs to be on more than just numbers of
troops. It should be on finding ways to better manage the forces we
have, and by increasing the speed, agility, modularity, capability, and
usability of those forces.
dod initiatives
Today, using authorities and flexibility Congress has provided, DOD
has several dozen initiatives underway to improve management of the
force, and increase its capability.
Among other things:
--We are investing in new information age technologies, precision
weapons, unmanned air and sea vehicles, and other less
manpower-intensive platforms and technologies.
--We are working to increase the jointness of our forces, creating
power that exceeds the sum of individual services.
--We are using new flexibility under the fiscal year 2004 National
Defense Authorization Act to take civilian tasks currently done
by uniformed personnel and convert them into civilian jobs--
freeing military personnel for military tasks.
--This year, we will begin to move 10,000 military personnel out of
civilian tasks and return them to the operational force--
effectively increasing force levels by an additional 10,000
service members in 2004. An additional 10,000 conversions
are planned for 2005.
--We have begun consultations with allies and friends about ways to
transform our global force posture to further increase
capability.
We are already working to rebalance the active and reserve
components. We are taking skills that are now found almost exclusively
in reserve components and moving them into the active force, so that we
are not completely reliant on the Guard and Reserve for those needed
skills. And in both the active and reserve components, we are moving
forces out of low demand specialties, such as heavy artillery, and into
high-demand capabilities such as military police, civil affairs, and
special operations forces.
Already, in 2003, the services have rebalanced some 10,000
positions within and between the active and reserve components. For
example, the Army is already transforming 18 Reserve field artillery
batteries into military police. We intend to expand those efforts this
year, with the Services rebalancing an additional 20,000 positions in
2004, and 20,000 more in 2005--for a total of 50,000 rebalanced
positions by the end of next year.
We are also working to establish a new approach to military force
management called ``Continuum of Service.'' The idea is to create a
bridge between the Active and Reserve Components--allowing both active
and reserve forces greater flexibility to move back and forth between
full-time and part-time status, and facilitating different levels of
participation along that continuum.
Under this approach, a Reservist who normally trains 38 days a year
could volunteer to move to full time service for a period of time--or
some increased level of service between full-time and his normal
reserve commitment, offering options for expanded service that do not
require abandoning civilian life. Similarly, an active service member
could request transfer into the Reserve component for a period of time,
or some status in between, without jeopardizing his or her career and
opportunity for promotion. And it would give military retirees with
needed skills an opportunity to return to the service on a flexible
basis--and create opportunities for others with specialized skills to
serve, so we can take advantage of their experience when the country
needs it.
For example, Coalition forces in Iraq need skilled linguists--so
under the Continuum of Service approach we have recruited 200 Iraqi-
Americans into a special Individual Ready Reserve program, and are
deploying the first program graduates to Iraq.
The ``Continuum of Service'' would allow the Armed Forces to better
take advantage of the high-tech skills many Reservists have developed
by virtue of their private sector experience--while at the same time
creating opportunities for those in the Active force to acquire those
kinds of skills and experiences. It encourages volunteerism, and
improves our capability to manage the military workforce in a flexible
manner, with options that currently exist only in the private sector.
We have also been working to fix the mobilization process. We have
worked hard over the past year to add more refined planning tools to
the process, and make it more respectful of the troops, their families,
and their employers. Among other things:
--We have tried to provide earlier notifications, giving troops as
much notice as possible before they are mobilized, so they can
prepare and arrange their lives before being called up;
--We have worked to ensure that when they are called up, it is for
something important and needed--and not to replace someone in
task that could wait until a contingency is over;
--We have tried to limit tours, and give the troops some certainty
about the maximum length of their mobilization and when they
can expect to resume civilian life. We are doing better, but in
my opinion, the process is still not good enough.
And we are working each day to make the process better, and more
respectful of the brave men and women who make up the Guard and
Reserve.
As you can see, we have a number of initiatives underway that we
are confident will improve the management and treatment of the Guard
and Reserve forces.
The men and women who make up the Guard and Reserve are all
volunteers. They signed up because they love their country, and want to
serve when the country needs them.
A number of you on this Committee have served in the Guard and
Reserve, as have I. Each of us knew when we signed up, it was not to
serve one weekend a month and two weeks active duty. We signed up so
that if war were visited upon our country, we would be ready to leave
our work and family, and become part of the active duty force.
Well, on September 11th, war was visited on our country. Our nation
was attacked--more than 3,000 innocent men, women, and children were
killed in an instant. And at this moment, in caves and underground
bunkers half-a-world away, dangerous adversaries are planning new
attacks--attacks they hope will be even more deadly than the one on
September 11th.
We are a nation at war. If we were not to call up the Guard and
Reserves today, then why would we want to have them at all? Why were we
asking them to sacrifice time with their families every month to train?
And why are the taxpayers paying for postservice benefits, including
healthcare and retirement pay, that add up to between $250,000 and
$500,000 per reservist?
Availability for service is the purpose of the Guard and Reserve.
It is what they signed up for. And I know that a large number of them
have stepped forward and volunteered to be mobilized for service in
Iraq.
Our challenge--our responsibility--is to do everything we can to
see that they are treated respectfully, managed effectively, and that
they have the tools they need to win today's war, and to deter future
wars.
We are working to do just that--to better manage the force, and to
transform the force to make it more capable for the 21st century.
Today, with authority granted by Congress, DOD has the flexibility
to adjust troop levels as the security situation requires.
--We have authority to increase or decrease, as need arises.
--We are using that authority; and
--We are working on a number of new initiatives that will allow us to
better manage and transform the force.
However, we believe that a statutory end strength increase would
take away the current flexibility to manage the force:
--First, if the current increased demand turns out to be a spike and
if we are successful in the transformation and rebalancing
initiatives underway, the Department would face the substantial
cost of supporting a larger force when it may no longer be
needed--pay and benefits, such as lifetime healthcare, for each
service member added, not to mention the additional costs in
equipment, facilities, and force protection.
--Second, if Congress permanently increases the statutory end
strength, instead of using the already available emergency
powers, we would have to take the cost out of our top line.
That would require cuts in other parts of the defense budget--
crowding out investments in the very programs that will allow
us to manage the force and make it more capable.
None of us has a crystal ball to see into the future. You have
given us the authority to adjust the size of the force, and the
flexibility to deal with unknowns. We have been using that authority
over the past two plus years, even as we work to implement
comprehensive measures to better manage the force. I urge Congress to
not lock us into a force size and structure that may or may not be
appropriate in the period ahead.
Instead, help us to support the Armed Services with the
transformational initiatives they now have underway; help us rebalance
the active and reserve force, and give the troops more options to
contribute along an expanded continuum of service; help us add
capability, and transform the force for the future.
2005 budget
The President's 2005 budget requests the funds to do that.
Before highlighting the 2005 request, let me talk briefly about
funding the Global War on Terrorism.
As the year has unfolded, the security situation and requirements
in Iraq have evolved. General Abizaid has requested additional combat
capability for the period ahead, and I have approved his request.
We regret having to extend those individuals necessary to provide
that capability; they had anticipated being in country or in theater
for up to 365 days and this will extend their time there. We are
currently identifying and preparing to deploy other forces to replace
them.
We have been using emergency powers granted by Congress to increase
the overall number of U.S. military forces above statutory end strength
and will continue to use those authorities to adjust force levels as
necessary.
Because our nation is at war, we must provide our warfighters all
the resources they need to conduct operations and complete their
missions. While we do not yet know the exact costs for operations in
2005, we need to plan for contingencies so there is no disruption in
resources for our troops. The costs of supporting these operations
increase the chance that certain accounts, such as Army operations and
maintenance, will experience funding shortfalls beyond February or
March of 2005.
The President has therefore asked Congress for a $25 billion
contingency reserve fund that can be used for operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq until we can get a clearer picture on what will be necessary
for the fiscal year 2005 supplemental. This reserve fund would be used
primarily for operation and maintenance requirements such as personnel
support costs, combat operations, supplies, force protection, and
transportation. Specifics include:
--Fuel for helicopters, tanks, and other vehicles.
--Transportation costs for movement of personnel and equipment in and
out of the theater of operations.
--Equipment maintenance (such as lubricants, repair parts) and
logistics supplies.
--Clothing and individual equipment.
--Operation and maintenance of troop billeting, base camps, dining
facilities, airfields, and other logistics activities.
--Communications, such as leased telecommunications lines.
This $25 billion reserve fund will not be all that is needed for
2005. We are anticipating submitting a full fiscal year 2005
supplemental appropriation request early next year when we can better
estimate exact costs.
Returning now to the 2005 request, the President's first defense
budgets were designed while our defense strategy review was still
taking place. It was last year's budget--the 2004 request--that was the
first to fully reflect the new defense strategies and policies.
One of the key budget reforms we implemented last year is the
establishment of a 2-year budgeting process in the Department of
Defense--so that the hundreds of people who invest time and energy to
rebuild major programs every year can be freed up and not be required
to do so on an annual basis, and can focus more effectively on
implementation.
The 2005 budget before you is, in a real sense, a request for the
second installment of funding for the priorities set out in the
President's 2004 request.
We did not rebuild every program. We made changes to just 5 percent
of the Department's planned 2005 budget, and then only on high-interest
and must-fix issues--and then only when the costs incurred to mitigate
risks could be matched by savings elsewhere in the budget.
The President's 2005 budget requests continued investments to
support the six transformational goals we identified in our 2001
defense review:
--First, we must be able to defend the U.S. homeland and bases of
operation overseas;
--Second, we must be able to project and sustain forces in distant
theaters;
--Third, we must be able to deny enemies sanctuary;
--Fourth, we must improve our space capabilities and maintain
unhindered access to space;
--Fifth, we must harness our advantages in information technology to
link up different kinds of U.S. forces, so they can fight
jointly; and
--Sixth, we must be able to protect U.S. information networks from
attack--and to disable the information networks of our
adversaries.
In all, in 2005, we have requested $29 billion for investments in
transforming military capabilities that will support each of these
critical objectives.
A critical priority in the President's 2005 budget is the $10.3
billion for missile defense, including: $9.2 billion for the Missile
Defense Agency--an increase of $1.5 billion above the President's 2004
request; and $1 billion for Patriot Advanced Capability-3, the Medium
Extended Air Defense System, and other short and medium range
capabilities.
The budget also includes $239 million in funding for accelerated
development of Cruise Missile Defense, with the goal of fielding an
initial capability in 2008.
The 2005 budget request includes critical funds for Army
Transformation, including: $3.2 billion to support continued
development of the Future Combat Systems--an increase of $1.5 billion
over the 2004 budget; and $1.0 billion to fund continued deployment of
the new Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, such as the one now serving in
Iraq.
We have also requested additional funds to strengthen intelligence,
including increases for DOD human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities,
persistent surveillance, as well as technical analysis and information
sharing to help us better ``connect the dots.''
To enhance our communications and intelligence activities, we are
requesting:
--$408 million to continue development of the Space Based Radar (SBR)
which will bring potent and transformational capabilities to
joint warfighting--the ability to monitor both fixed and mobile
targets, deep behind enemy lines and over denied areas, in any
kind of weather. SBR is the only system that can provide such
capability.
--$775 million for the Transformational Communications Satellite
(TSAT) which will provide the joint warfighter with
unprecedented communication capability. To give you an idea of
the speed and situational awareness the TSAT will provide,
consider: transmitting a Global Hawk image over a current
Milstar II, as we do today, takes over 12 minutes--with TSAT it
will take less than a second.
--$600 million for the Joint Tactical Radio System, to provide
wireless internet capability to enable information exchange
among joint warfighters.
The budget also requests $700 million for Joint Unmanned Combat Air
Systems (J-UCAS)--a program that consolidates all the various unmanned
combat air vehicle programs, and focuses on developing a common
operating system.
The budget requests $14.1 billion for major tactical aircraft
programs, including: $4.6 billion for the restructured Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program; $4.7 billion to continue acquisition of the F/A-
22; $3.1 billion to continue procurement of the F/A-18E/F; and $1.7
billion to support development and procurement of 11 V-22 aircraft.
The budget requests funds for Navy fleet transformation, including
$1 billion to continue funding the new CVN-21 aircraft carrier, and
$1.6 billion to continue development of a family of 21st century
surface combatants including the DDX destroyer, the littoral combat
ship, and the CG(X) cruiser.
We have requested $11.1 billion to support procurement of 9 ships
in 2005. Fiscal 2005 begins a period of transition and transformation
for shipbuilding as the last DDG 51 destroyers are built, and the first
DD(X) destroyer and Littoral Combat Ship are procured. This increased
commitment is further shown in the average shipbuilding rate for fiscal
2005-2009 of 9.6 ships per year. This will sustain the current force
level and significantly add to Navy capabilities.
In all, the President has requested $75 billion for procurement in
2005 and $69 billion for Research, Development, Testing and
Evaluation--funds that are vital to our transformation efforts.
Another area critical to transformation is joint training. Last
year, Congress approved funding to establish a new Joint National
Training Capability (JNTC), an important initiative that will
fundamentally change the way our Armed Forces train for 21st century
combat.
We saw the power of joint war fighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Our challenge is to bring that kind of joint war fighting experience to
the rest of the forces, through both live and virtual joint training
and exercises. Thanks to the funds authorized in the 2004 budget, the
JNTC's initial operating capability is scheduled to come online in
October of this year. We have requested $191 million to continue and
expand the JNTC in 2005.
With your help, we have put a stop to the past practice of raiding
investment accounts to pay for the immediate operation and maintenance
needs. The 2005 request continues that practice. We have requested full
funding for the military's readiness accounts, providing $140.6 billion
for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) including $43 billion for training
and operations. These funds are critical to transformation--because
they allow us to pay today's urgent bills without robbing the future to
do so.
We have also requested funds to support pay and quality of life
improvements for the troops--including a 3.5 percent military base pay
raise. We have requested funds in the 2005 budget that will also help
the Department keep its commitment to eliminate 90 percent of
inadequate military family housing units by 2007, with complete
elimination projected for 2009. And we have requested funds to complete
the elimination of out-of-pocket housing costs for military personnel
living in private housing. Before 2001, the average service member had
to absorb over 18 percent of these costs. By the end of fiscal year
2005, it will be zero. These investments are important to the troops,
and also to their families, who also serve--and deserve to live in
decent and affordable housing.
These improvements properly focus on the serving men and women of
the armed forces. The recommendations are based on what is believed
necessary to attract, retain, and motivate the fine young Americans who
make up our All-Volunteer Force.
But in recent years, Congress has often added entitlement-like
changes beyond recommendations such as these, concentrated on those who
have already served. I applaud the desire to honor this service, but at
the same time I must point out the fiscal effects of these decisions.
They are increasing substantially the permanent costs of running the
Department of Defense. By fiscal year 2009, they cumulatively add over
$20 billion a year to the defense budget, with only modest effect on
recruiting and retaining the present generation of personnel. Put
another way, against a fixed topline for Defense, these decisions will
affect the Department's future ability to compensate properly those
then serving, and to procure the new systems and capabilities that are
so essential to our continued effectiveness.
I recognize there are legitimate questions, and legitimate
differences of opinion, about the best way to compensate our forces.
For this reason, I am appointing an Advisory Committee on Military
Compensation, to conduct a comprehensive review of military
compensation and benefits, with a view toward simplifying and improving
them. Today, we have too many pay categories that serve overlapping
purposes, or do not provide incentives where they are most needed.
Before making further major changes, I urge you to allow the Department
to first develop a comprehensive and integrated set of compensation
proposals, which we will submit to you next year.
We are also making progress in getting our facilities replacement
and recapitalization rate in proper alignment. When we arrived in 2001,
the Department was replacing its buildings at a totally unacceptable
average of once every 192 years. Today, we have moved the rate down for
the third straight year, though it is still too high--to an average of
107 years. The 2005 budget requests $4.3 billion for facilities
recapitalization, keeping us on track toward reaching our target rate
of 67 years by 2008. And we have funded 95 percent of facilities
maintenance requirements--up from 93 percent in fiscal year 2004.
The budget also supports our continuing efforts to transform the
way DOD does business. With the passage of the National Defense
Authorization Act last year, we now have the needed authority to
establish a new National Security Personnel System, so we can better
manage DOD's civilian personnel. Initial implementation will begin next
year.
Yet, while progress has been made, the Defense Department still
remains bogged down by bureaucratic processes of the industrial age,
not the information age. We are working to change that. To help us do
so, we have requested funds for a Business Management Modernization
Program that will help us overhaul DOD management processes and the
information technology systems that support them.
One of the most important ways in which Congress can support the
global war on terrorism is to support three special authorities we have
requested:
--(1) $500 million to train and equip military and security forces in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and friendly nearby regional nations to
enhance their capability to combat terrorism and support U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is critical that this
authority include security forces because the terrorism threat
in Iraq is inside its borders. Security forces--not the New
Iraqi Army--play the primary role in confronting this threat.
--(2) The Commanders Emergency Response Program ($300 million) to
enable military leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to
urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs. This has
been a remarkably successful program. With quick turnaround
projects averaging about $7,000 each, commanders not only help
people in their operations area, but also gain their support in
defeating terrorists and building themselves a better future.
--(3) Increased drawdown authority ($200 million) under the
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act, to provide additional help for
the Afghan National Army. During this pivotal year, this
authority is critical for advancing democracy and stability in
Afghanistan.
The President's fiscal year 2005 budget does not request specific
appropriations for these three authorities, and therefore the
Department would need to reprogram funding to use them. This
underscores the importance of Congress increasing the Department's
General Transfer Authority (GTA) to $4 billion--which would still
represent just one percent of total DOD funding. Higher General
Transfer Authority also would give us a greater ability to shift funds
from less pressing needs to fund must-pay bills and emerging
requirements. As we have seen in the past three years, such
requirements have become a constant feature of our military programs.
In an age when terrorists move information at the speed of an
email, money at the speed of a wire transfer, and people at the speed
of a commercial jetliner, it is critical that we have the ability to
shift funds between priorities.
We also need your continuing support for two initiatives that are
critical to 21st century transformation: the Global Posture Review, and
the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission round scheduled for
2005.
We need BRAC to rationalize our infrastructure with the new defense
strategy, and to eliminate unneeded bases and facilities that are
costing the taxpayers billions of dollars to support.
And we need the global posture review to reposition our forces
around the world--so they are stationed not simply where the wars of
the 20th century ended, but are arranged in a way that will allow them
to deter, and as necessary, defeat potential adversaries that might
threaten our security in the 21st century.
These two efforts are inextricably linked.
It is critical that we move forward with both BRAC and the Global
Posture Review--so we can rationalize our foreign and domestic force
posture. We appreciate Congress' decision to authorize a BRAC round in
2005--and will continue to consult with you as we proceed with the
global posture review.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, the President has asked Congress for a total of
$401.7 billion for fiscal year 2005--an increase over last year's
budget. Let there be no doubt: it is a large amount of the taxpayer's
hard-earned money. Such investments will likely be required for some
years--because our nation is engaged in a struggle that could well go
on for a number of years to come.
Our objective is to ensure that our Armed Forces remain the best
trained, best equipped fighting force in the world--and that we treat
the volunteers who make up the force with respect commensurate with
their service, their sacrifice, and their dedication.
Their task is not easy: they must fight and win a global war on
terror that is different from any our nation as fought before. And they
must do it, while at the same time preparing to fight the wars of 2010
and beyond--wars which may be as different from today's conflict, as
the global war on terror is from the conflicts of the 20th century.
So much is at stake.
Opportunity and prosperity are not possible without the security
and stability that our Armed Forces provide.
The United States can afford whatever is necessary to provide for
the security of our people and stability in the world. We can continue
to live as free people because the industriousness and ingenuity of the
American people have provided the resources to build the most powerful
and capable Armed Forces in human history--and because we have been
blessed with the finest young men and women in uniform--volunteers
all--that the world has known.
They are courageous, they are selfless, and they are determined.
They stand between this nation and our adversaries, those who wish to
visit still further violence on our cities, our homes and our places of
work. The men and women of the Armed Forces are hunting the enemies of
freedom down--capturing or killing them in the far corners of the
world, so they will not kill still more innocent men, women, and
children here at home.
We are grateful to them and proud of them. We stand ready to work
with you to ensure they are treated with the dignity they deserve, and
the respect they earn every day.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd be pleased to respond to questions.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS
Senator Stevens. Do you have a statement, General Myers?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I do have a short statement.
Senator Stevens. Would you pull that mic a little closer to
you, please?
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, I do have a short statement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, Senator Byrd,
members of the committee. Once again I thank you for your
unwavering support of our Armed Forces, and, more specifically,
our men and women in uniform as they fight this all-important
war on terrorism.
Recently, the world's attention has been focused,
understandably, on the horrendous incidents of detainee abuse
at Abu Ghraib prison. Let me, once more, restate that these
acts are absolutely unacceptable, and I assure you that
commanders at every level are taking prompt and decisive action
to ensure that the accused receive due process and that the
guilty are punished.
One of the United States (U.S.) military's greatest
strengths comes from the fact that we hold our servicemen and
women accountable for their actions. I am confident in our
military justice system, and I'm confident that our commanders
are doing the right things to prevent further compromise of
military standards and American values.
I can also assure you today we are as firm as ever in our
resolve to help create a free, prosperous, and democratic Iraq.
We are dealing deliberately and aggressively with the anti-
coalition forces in Fallujah, as well as Sadr's band of thugs,
to ensure they do not derail the progress that we're making.
The truth is, the majority of the Iraqi people want
democracy in Iraq to succeed, and they're positive about what
the future holds, thanks, in large part, to the efforts of our
servicemen and women. And I know our servicemen and women are
all suffering unfairly with a collective sense of shame over
what happened at Abu Ghraib.
I would like to quote a letter from a soldier in the 1st
Armor Division. He said that every time he eats in the dining
hall, he sees the prison abuse story on TV, and he says, quote,
``Everyone is so angry. It's as if those soldiers hurt us more
than the enemies here in Iraq have. My battalion has caught car
bombers, weapons smugglers, and those laying mines to kill us.
And, every time, we treated them with respect.''
This is the type of soldier who accurately, in my view,
represents the values of our military and our Nation. The
credibility of our troops will be restored day by day as they
interact with the Iraqi people, and I'm confident that our
servicemen and women will continue to prove worthy of the trust
and respect of our Nation and of the world. They are so
tremendously dedicated. They understand their mission very
well. And they understand what a huge difference they are
making. They've seen the enemy unload weapons from ambulances,
use mosques as operating bases, deliberately put children in
the line of fire as human shields, and attack innocent
civilians indiscriminately by firing mortars and grenades at
marketplaces, yet our servicemen and women are going to
extraordinary lengths to conduct the most humane operation they
possibly can. That means at times that we accept greater risk
in order to avoid civilian casualties.
I see the same kind of professionalism and compassion in
Afghanistan, as well. There are now 13 provincial
reconstruction teams working on security and civil affairs for
the Afghan people.
We are making great progress in the war on terrorism with
the help of more than 90 other nations. Despite Spain and three
other countries' decisions to depart Iraq, the coalition
remains very strong.
Recent events in Fallujah, Najaf, and other parts of
central Iraq have resulted in the decision to extend some
20,000 U.S. troops beyond their expected rotation date. We are
now working to backfill these troops. It's not 100 percent
clear what the security environment will be after 30 June and
beyond, but we will continue to support General Abizaid with
the number of forces that he needs.
What is clear is that we have not finished our task of
reviewing all our options for making better use of our
authorized forces. As Secretary Rumsfeld said, we're looking at
the stress on our forces from every possible angle. A cold war
approach to simply counting divisions or ships or fighter wings
will not help us refine our capabilities to meet the national
security environment of the future. All solutions need to be
flexible and, most importantly, transformational.
As the Secretary said, General Schoomaker's review of how
the Army structures their combat units, and Admiral Clark's new
approach to carrier strike group deployments, are two very
visible examples of this transformation.
We don't have time today to list all the significant
transformational issues we're working on, but these initiatives
span from Guard and Reserve mobilization, to our planning
processes, to deployable command and control systems. And with
your support, we will continue to transform our warfighting
capability.
Despite the significant stresses on our Armed Forces today,
readiness remains good. We are keeping a close eye on
recruiting and retention, and we can say that so far it's going
very, very well. We have the trained personnel and resources to
accomplish the military objectives outlined in the Department's
strategic planning guidance.
I support the President's request for a $25 billion
contingency reserve fund to support ongoing operations in the
war on terrorism. This money is vital to ensuring our troops
continue to be trained and resourced for the missions they are
assigned, and to avoid any decrease in readiness or capability
while they're deployed.
PREPARED STATEMENT
We still have a long way to go in this war, beyond the
transfer of sovereignty in Iraq and elections in Afghanistan,
but our troops are making a huge difference every day, and they
know it. We are truly blessed with amazing men and women to do
this very, very important work. I thank all of you for your
continued strong support of our men and women in the Armed
Forces.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of General Richard B. Myers
I am privileged to report to Congress on the state of the United
States Armed Forces.
As they were a year ago, our Nation's Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,
Marines and Coastguardsmen are currently operating within our borders
and around the globe with dedication, courage and professionalism,
alongside our Coalition partners, to accomplish a variety of very
demanding missions. Global terrorism remains a serious threat, and the
stakes in the Global War on Terrorism remain high.
Over the past year, I have told you that with the patience, will,
and commitment of our Nation we would win the War on Terrorism. The
support we have received from the Congress has been superb. From
Congressional visits to deployed personnel, to support for
transformational warfighting programs, to funding for security and
stability operations, to improved pay and benefits for our troops, your
support for our servicemen and women has enabled us to make significant
progress in the War on Terrorism.
In spite of the difficulties in Fallujah and the radical Sadr
militants, we are making progress in Iraq. Saddam Hussein no longer
terrorizes the Iraqi people or his neighbors; he is in custody awaiting
justice. The Iraqi people are on their way to establishing a prosperous
and peaceful future. It won't come easy. Freedom never does, and events
over the last month have been challenging. The list of important
accomplishments in every sector--education, medical care, business,
agriculture, energy, and government, to name a few--is long and
growing. We have made substantial progress in Afghanistan as well. The
Constitutional Loya Jirga is an encouraging example of democracy in
action. In both countries, as in the Horn of Africa and other areas,
United States and Coalition personnel work together to capture or kill
terrorists, while at the same time improving infrastructure and
economic conditions so that peace and freedom can take hold.
Despite the operational demands on our forces, we remain ready to
support the President's National Security Strategy and Secretary of
Defense's draft National Defense Strategy to assure our allies, while
we dissuade, deter and defeat any adversary. The draft National
Military Strategy (NMS), developed in consultation with the Service
Chiefs and Combatant Commanders describes the ways we will conduct
military operations to protect the United States against external
attack and aggression, and how we will prevent conflict and surprise
attack and prevail against adversaries. The strategy requires that we
possess the forces to defend the U.S. homeland and deter forward in
four critical regions. If required, we will swiftly defeat the efforts
of two adversaries in an overlapping timeframe, while having the
ability to ``win decisively'' in one theater. In addition, because we
live in a world marked by uncertainty, our forces must also be prepared
to conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies while maintaining
sufficient force generation capabilities as a hedge against future
challenges.
We appreciate your continued support giving our dedicated personnel
the warfighting systems and quality of life they deserve. Our challenge
for the coming year and beyond is to stay the course in the War on
Terrorism as we continue to transform our Armed Forces to conduct
future joint operations. We cannot afford to let our recent successes
cause us to lose focus or lull us into satisfaction with our current
capabilities. The war is not over, and there is still dangerous work to
do. To meet this challenge, we continue to focus on three priorities:
winning the War on Terrorism, enhancing joint warfighting, and
transforming for the future.
war on terrorism
Thirty-two months after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
defeating global terrorism remains our military's number one priority.
We will continue to fight this war on many different fronts, because
terrorism comes in many different forms. The stakes remain high, but
our resolve remains firm.
The more experience we gain in this fight, the more we recognize
that success is dependent on a well-integrated military, interagency
and coalition effort. This means the coordinated commitment of the
military, diplomatic, informational, economic, financial, law
enforcement, and intelligence resources of our Nation--all instruments
of our national power. On the international level, Coalition military
and interagency cooperation has been remarkable. In Iraq, Coalition
forces from over 30 nations are working hard to bring peace and
stability to a country brutalized for 3 decades. In Afghanistan, 41
nations are working to secure a democratic government and defeat al
Qaida and remnants of the Taliban regime, with NATO assuming an
increasing role in stability and reconstruction efforts.
We have made significant strides coordinating U.S. Government
efforts within the interagency and with our Coalition partners. One of
the ways we have been successful at coordinating interagency efforts is
through venues such as the Strategy Working Group, the Senior
Leadership Review Board and the Regional Combating Terrorism
Strategies. Continued success in this war will depend largely on our
ability to organize for a sustained effort and coordinate seamlessly
among all government agencies. An even more demanding task is
coordinating the efforts of our Coalition partners, now numbering more
than 90 nations. Coalition contributions have been significant, ranging
from combat forces, to intelligence, logistics and medical units. They
have complemented our existing capabilities and eased the requirement
for current U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Coordinating the
efforts of our Coalition partners is critical to combating the
remaining terrorist threat.
The al Qaida network, though damaged, remains resilient, adaptable
and capable of planning and executing more terrorist acts, such as the
attacks in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and most recently in Spain. Al Qaida
continues to receive support and recruit operatives from sympathizers
around the world. Al Qaida will increasingly focus on Iraq as today's
jihad. As the network consolidates its efforts in Iraq, the threats of
attacks will grow. In fact, four al Qaida audiotapes released in 2003
prominently mentioned Iraq, demonstrating Usama Bin Ladin's emphasis on
staging attacks there. Ansar al-Islam also remains a formidable threat
in Iraq, despite damage inflicted by Coalition forces during OIF. Its
key leadership remains at large and continues to plot attacks against
US and Coalition interests.
The ceasefire with anti-Coalition militants in and around Fallujah
is fragile. The Coalition is responding to attacks by militants who
frequently fire upon Coalition forces and hide among the populace, and
who fire from mosques and hospitals. The combatants in this area
apparently are a combination of former regime elements, Islamic
extremists, terrorists, foreigners, and other disenchanted Sunnis who
oppose Coalition efforts to reconstruct Iraq. Delegations of Iraqi
leaders continue efforts to mediate surrender and the turn-in of
weapons.
In the South, Muqtada al-Sadr's armed backers largely have been
forced by Coalition military pressure to coalesce within the city of An
Najaf. They continue to engage Coalition forces with mortars and small
arms, likely from inside or nearby shrines sacred to Shia. Al Sadr
continues to intimidate the citizens of An Najaf, the majority of whom
want to see this situation resolved and the shrines protected. Sadr has
convinced some impressionable Shia youth to fight to legitimize his
influence in Iraq. However, senior Shia intervention may push Sadr to
concede to a political settlement.
Other terrorist groups also pose significant threats to U.S.
interests, and we believe that some of these terrorist groups have
developed contingency plans for terrorist attacks against U.S.
interests abroad. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia continue
to conduct terrorist attacks throughout Colombia. They currently hold
three U.S. hostages captured in early 2003, and directly threaten
efforts to bring peace, stability and an end to the drug trade in
Colombia. Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia is another terrorist group
that shares al Qaida's goals and methods, adding to the transnational
terrorist threat. The intelligence that led to recent heightened alert
levels during the holidays in December show that the threat of a major
terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland remains very real.
Disturbingly, terrorist groups continue to show interest in
developing and using Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) weapons in terrorist attacks. Terrorists have attempted to
acquire military-grade materials, and interest in CBRN weapons and
materials by several groups is well documented.
The Coalition's efforts in the War on Terrorism (WOT) represent the
significant first step in curtailing WMD proliferation. Our strategy
for combating WMD calls for the Combatant Commanders to detect, deter,
deny, counter, and if necessary, interdict WMD and its means of
delivery. Combating WMD relies on a continuum of interrelated
activities, employing both defensive and offensive measures, and
confronting the threat through mutually reinforcing approaches of
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management.
This multi-tiered and integrated effort will greatly reduce the threat
of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists. Following the liberation
of Iraq and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's brutal regime, the
countries of Iran, and most recently, Libya have been more forthcoming
about their illegal WMD programs to the international community. This
should also help to apply international pressure on North Korea and its
nuclear declarations.
To counter the potential threat of the proliferation of WMD, the
President's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is the most far-
reaching attempt to expand our efforts to impede and interdict the flow
of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related
materials, between state and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
It is part of a larger effort to counter proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and missile-related technology by interdicting
shipments of these materials by air, land, and sea. To date, there are
14 partner nations actively participating in PSI operations and
exercises. Our goal is to expand PSI participation in order to be
postured to respond quickly to assist in the interdiction of the
proliferation trade. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540,
adopted by a vote of 15-0 on April 28, 2004, underscores the
international importance of this issue and enhances the legal basis for
PSI and related efforts to combat proliferation of WMD, related
materials, and their delivery systems.
oif and oef operations
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is still center-stage in the WOT,
and doing a magnificent job under difficult circumstances. The Iraqi
Governing Council unanimously approved its Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL) on March 8, providing the framework for elections and
transition to a permanent constitution and an elected, democratic
government in 2005. On June 30, a fully sovereign Iraqi interim
government will take office in Iraq. Iraqis recognized the need for a
security partnership with the Multinational Force (MNF), under unified
MNF command, in the TAL. The TAL provides that ``consistent with Iraq's
status as a sovereign state--the Iraqi Armed Forces will be a principle
partner in the MNF operating in Iraq under unified command'' and that
this arrangement will last ``until the ratification of a permanent
constitution and the election of a new government.'' Furthermore,
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 acknowledges the
responsibility and authority of the MNF for the security of Iraq.
Since the end of major combat operations, we have made steady
progress towards meeting our objectives. Essential services are being
restored, and a political transformation is already underway in Iraq.
We continue to train and equip Iraqi security forces. It is important
for the Iraqis to see Iraqi faces on their security forces, with the
Coalition forces remaining in the background. Although a few countries
are withdrawing their troops from Iraq, our Coalition remains strong,
with over 30 other countries directly supporting stability and security
in Iraq.
Today, Coalition forces continue to rout out remnants of the former
regime attempting a desperate last stand. Using intelligence provided
by Iraqi citizens, we are conducting thousands of raids and patrols per
week alongside Iraqi security forces. We have seized massive amounts of
ammunition, and captured or killed 46 of the 55 most wanted former
Iraqi leaders, as well as thousands of other Saddam loyalists,
terrorists and criminals. We have captured or killed all of the top 5,
most notably Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay.
The Iraq Survey Group is continuing its examination of Saddam's WMD
programs by interviewing Iraqi citizens, examining physical evidence,
and analyzing records of the old regime. We know that this process will
take time and patience, and must be able to stand up to world scrutiny.
Our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coastguardsmen in Iraq
are now supporting over 203,000 Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi police
continue to expand their training pipelines in Jordan and Iraq,
producing hundreds of trained officers each month. We are well on track
to meet our goal of 31,000 trained Iraqi police by August 2004, and a
fully trained force of 75,000 by June 2005. The Facilities Protective
Service has fewer training requirements and has already reached its
goal of 50,000 members. They have taken over security from Coalition
Forces at most fixed site locations, such as power lines and parts of
the oil infrastructure--key targets for sabotage. Our goal for the
Border Enforcement Force is to have 20,400 members by May 2005. They
will relieve Coalition forces guarding checkpoints along Iraq's border.
U.S. military forces continue to vet former members of the Iraqi
military and other security services for employment in the new Iraqi
security services, but Iraqis are formally in charge of de-
Ba'athification efforts and have established guidelines for that
process. The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and
for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan 2004 that Congress
approved last year was instrumental in enabling our planned accelerated
development of these security forces, and we are grateful for that
support.
The New Iraqi Army continues to train additional battalions. Iraq's
Army needs more than just military skills. They must have a deep-rooted
sense of professionalism, focused on protecting all Iraqis while
operating firmly under civilian control. The new army will reflect
Iraq's religious, regional, and ethnic mix, will be apolitical, and
indoctrinated in their role of defense and security. We will spend the
time and resources necessary to ensure the Iraqi Army is a well-trained
and highly capable force.
The linchpin of our security efforts during this transition period
is the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), currently planned to be a
fully trained force of 40,000 by September 2004. The ICDC is a light
military force, created to deal with the current stability issues in
Iraq. As we have done from the beginning, we continue to reassess the
security environment in Iraq. These security assessments could change
force goals for the various components of Iraqi security forces. ICDC
units' performance in recent counter-insurgency operations was mixed.
In almost every case, the units that performed effectively had
completed the prescribed training programs, were fully equipped, had a
history of close integration with Coalition forces, served under
effective chains of command, and had developed a high level of unit
cohesion from having worked together for some time. The units that
failed to perform well generally lacked several of these
characteristics.
CJTF-7, the Coalition Police Advisory Training Team and the
Coalition Military Advisory Training Teams, are all re-evaluating the
security force training programs in light of the mixed performance over
the last three weeks, and have identified a number of key enablers that
should produce a cadre of trained and capable forces. These include
acceleration of academy training programs, increasing the number of
coalition advisors embedded into units, increasing the involvement of
Iraqi security forces in Coalition operations and introducing former
Iraqi officers as liaison officers to coalition units.
Equipment shortages remain one of the greatest obstacles to
establishing capable security forces, but our recent efforts to
energize the equipment procurement process are beginning to pay off. We
should see the acceleration of equipment deliveries beginning in May.
Because of losses associated with operations in early April, we will
have to establish additional contracts for equipment above those
already in place to get the Iraqi Security Forces up to the 100 percent
equipped mark. If the additional contracts are awarded this month, we
expect most of the forces can cross the 50 percent required equipment
threshold in July, and 100 percent by September.
Fiscal year 2004 supplemental funds provided commanders with one of
the most successful tools in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi
and Afghan people, the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).
These funds provide commanders and the resourceful young troops they
lead with the means to respond to urgent humanitarian and stabilization
and reconstruction needs such as water and sanitation projects,
irrigation and small-scale agriculture assistance, school house repairs
and civic cleanup projects. This program is an invaluable tool for
establishing relationships with the Iraqi and Afghan people, assisting
in economic development, and creating a safer environment.
The United Nations and the international community are also playing
vital roles in the political and economic transformation of Iraq. Over
70 countries and international organizations including the United
States, pledged $33 billion at the Madrid Donors Conference. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1511 called upon Iraqis, initially through
the Iraqi Governing Council, to determine the course and speed of their
political reformation. In response, the Iraqi Governing Council has
submitted its plan and timetable for selecting a transitional National
Assembly and interim government, drafting a constitution and holding
elections. It is an ambitious schedule, but one that they can
accomplish with our help.
In addition to security and political progress, we continue to help
Iraq rebuild the infrastructure required for economic progress and a
stable democracy. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Gulf
Region Division-Restore Iraqi Electricity (GRD-RIE) are managing a
comprehensive maintenance and upgrade program designed to improve power
generation, transmission, efficiency and capacity to meet the future
needs of the Iraqi people. Through the coordinated efforts of the Army
Corps of Engineers and the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, we met the
initial October 2003 goal of 4,400 MW of peak power generation. The
next goal is 6,000 MW of power by June 1, 2004. In order to meet this
goal the CPA developed the Power Increase Plan to offset recent system
failures from severe weather and continuing sabotage and looting. This
plan increases electrical power generation through an increase of
generator rehabilitation and maintenance projects, the increase of new
power generators to the national power grid, increasing electrical
power imports from other nations, and improving system-wide power
transmission and distribution. Other progress continues throughout Iraq
in potable drinking water projects, supplying hospitals with medical
supplies, providing school supplies for Iraqi school children and
rebuilding classrooms. Living conditions are improving everyday in
Iraq, as many of you have seen for yourselves on recent trips to Iraq.
In Afghanistan, our military strategy combines both combat and
stability operations. U.S. and Coalition forces are conducting combat
operations to rid Afghanistan of al Qaida and Taliban remnants, and
stability operations to assist in building Afghan security
institutions, governing bodies, and economic prosperity. In January,
the interim Afghan government held their first Constitutional Loya
Jirga, approving a new constitution for Afghanistan. In September,
Afghanistan will hold its first presidential and parliamentary
elections in over three decades. This is extraordinary progress, by any
measure.
Security and stability operations are being conducted by 13
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating throughout
Afghanistan, with at least 5 more PRTs planned for this year. Coalition
and NATO PRT representatives are making great strides improving the
quality of life for the Afghan people by building schools, clinics,
wells, roads and other community infrastructure projects. Reopening the
Kabul-to-Kandahar road was a major success. Our efforts have increased
security and stability in Afghanistan.
In August 2003, NATO assumed responsibility for the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In October 2003 the
United Nations Security Council passed a resolution extending ISAF's
mission in Afghanistan for one year, and authorizing ISAF to operate
outside Kabul and its environs. In February 2004, a Canadian officer
assumed command of the NATO ISAF headquarters from the German
commander. NATO's role in Afghanistan is expanding. Germany now leads
the NATO PRT at Konduz. NATO is planning future ISAF expansion across
northern and western Afghanistan.
The Afghan National Army (ANA), now numbering over 8,000 trained
personnel, is at the forefront of efforts to improve security and
stability and establish a strong national identity among the Afghan
people. To date the ANA has performed well, fighting side-by-side with
United States and Coalition forces during recent successful combat
operations to capture or kill Taliban, Hezb-I-Islami-Gulbiddin, and al
Qaida elements. In January 2004 training capacity was increased to
graduate 10,800 ANA trained personnel per year. Most of the funding
provided in the Afghanistan portion of the fiscal year 2004 Emergency
Supplemental has strengthened ANA efforts, including the acceleration
of training and improved retention and recruitment.
Congress has demonstrated its commitment to the future of
Afghanistan, but there is still much more the international community
could and should contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The
Berlin Donor's Conference was a significant success with $4.5 billion
pledged for this fiscal year and $8.2 billion for the next 3 years. The
Afghan government, with the help of the U.S. government, is seeking
more donations for several infrastructure projects such as a new
Ministry of Defense headquarters, a hospital in Kabul, and a military
academy, as well as donations of certain equipment, weapons and
ammunition.
In neighboring Pakistan, working closely with President Musharraf,
we have been able to increase coordination among United States,
Coalition, Afghan and Pakistani forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border. The Pakistani government has taken some initiatives to increase
their military presence on the border, such as manned outposts, regular
patrols and security barriers. From time to time they have aggressively
confronted Taliban and al Qaida supporters in the areas of the Pakistan
Federally Administered Tribal Areas and suffered casualties in the
process. The Tripartite Commission consisting of United States, Afghan
and Pakistan representatives concluded its seventh session in mid-
April. Among the many accomplishments of the Tripartite Commission has
been the establishment of a sub-committee to investigate means to
prevent cross-border conflict. United States/Pakistani military
cooperation continues to improve, and we are helping Pakistan identify
equipment requirements for their counter-terrorism efforts.
Operations in the Horn of Africa remain an essential part of the
WOT. The Joint Task Force Horn of Africa at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti is
conducting counter-terrorist and civil affairs operations in Eastern
Africa. Although these operations have impacted al Qaida's influence in
the region, a continued military presence is essential to stop the
movement of transnational terrorists and demonstrating to the region
our resolve to wage the WOT in Africa.
In support of OEF--Philippines, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) used
congressionally approved funds this past year to continue counter-
terrorism training for the Armed Forces of the Philippines. A small
contingent of U.S. military personnel remains in the southern
Philippines managing these efforts and other humanitarian assistance
projects.
other overseas operations
U.S. European Command (EUCOM), in accordance with SECDEF guidance,
has developed a concept for the reduction of U.S. forces supporting
U.S. Stability Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. USEUCOM is closely
monitoring the stability of the Province of Kosovo, given recent
violence, to determine required U.S. force levels to support the U.S.
Kosovo Force. Any force reductions will be done in concert with the
North Atlantic Council's Periodic Mission Review recommendation for the
Balkans.
When EUCOM concludes the Georgia Train and Equip Program in May
2004, they will meet their objective of improving Georgia's ability to
confront transnational terrorism operating within Georgia. Training is
being provided for two staffs, four battalions and one mechanized/armor
company team. To build on this success and momentum, EUCOM is reviewing
a possible follow-on Georgia Capabilities Enhancement Program to
sustain and improve the Georgian military's newly acquired
capabilities, and demonstrate a continued U.S. commitment to the
Georgian Armed Forces' development.
Maritime Interdiction Operations took on a new global focus last
year, beyond the historical CENTCOM and EUCOM missions, when the
President approved Expanded Maritime Interception Operations to
interdict terrorists and their resources globally. Expanded Maritime
Interception Operations are now significant mission areas for every
deployed battle group, especially along maritime transit lanes and
choke points. Results from these maritime operations, such as in the
Mediterranean Sea, have produced lower insurance premiums in the
shipping industry, considerably less illegal immigration in countries
such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, and a reduction in crime at sea.
Maritime Interdiction Operations are a truly international effort.
German and Spanish led multi-national naval forces patrol the CENTCOM
area of responsibility, and this past year Coalition naval forces have
been responsible for boarding over thirty ships within EUCOM's area of
responsibility.
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) continues to support counter-
narcotics trafficking and counter-terrorism efforts in the Caribbean
and Central and South America. They are assisting the Colombian
military in its fight against designated terrorist organizations by
providing military advice, training, and equipment with an emphasis on
the pursuit of narco-terrorist leadership, counter-narcotics tactics,
and security for major infrastructure such as the Cano Limon pipeline.
SOUTHCOM supported the formation of the Colombian Army Special
Operations Command and is continuing its efforts to train the Commando
Battalion, and a Ranger-type unit. Training was successfully completed
for the first Colombian Commando Battalion, and training has begun for
the second battalion. The Colombian military has been very successful
over the past year in their fight against narco-terrorism. The Tri-
Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay is another focal
point for drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, document fraud
and Islamic terrorist-supported activities in South America. U.S.-
sponsored multilateral exercises are promoting security, improving
effective border control, and denying terrorist groups such as
Hizballah, Hamas and other Middle Eastern terrorist safe havens,
restricting their ability to operate.
SOUTHCOM is also providing nearly 2,000 military personnel to
manage detainee operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We operate in close
coordination with several U.S. agencies. We are constantly reviewing
the status of each detainee, and to date have transferred 128 of the
detainees who were determined to be of no intelligence or law
enforcement value, or no threat to the United States or its interests,
back to their countries of origin for release. 18 detainees have been
transferred back to their country of origin, under an agreement for
continued detention by that country. More await similar agreements to
allow for transfer or continued detention. A number of detainees have
been assessed as high intelligence and or law enforcement value, or
pose a significant threat to U.S. interests. These detainees will
remain for further exploitation. Other cases are being considered for
referral to the Military Commission, although no one has been referred
to date. Information gleaned from detainees, many of whom continue to
make threats against Americans, has already helped prevent further
terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies.
Furthermore, continued detention of those who pose a threat to U.S.
interests prevents those enemy combatants from returning to the
battlefield.
SOUTHCOM is also conducting security and stability operations in
Haiti following the departure of President Aristide, with a
Multinational Interim Force (MIF) of nearly 4,000 personnel. The
presence of the MIF has improved the security and humanitarian
situation in Haiti. The MIF is composed of approximately 2,000 U.S.
military personnel with the remainder from Canada, Chile and France.
Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1542, adopted unanimously on
April 30, SOUTHCOM and the Multinational Force will transition the
current Haiti operation to a new United Nations Stabilization Mission
in Haiti on or about June 1, 2004. The United Nations has authorized a
force of 6,700 troops and 1,600 police.
In accordance with the Unified Command Plan 2002 Change 2, on
January 1, 2004 U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) reported significant
progress in all of their new mission areas: global strike; missile
defense; DOD information operations; and command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance missions. Further, they are on schedule to achieve full
operational capability in each of the newly assigned mission areas this
year. SECDEF has already approved the Information Operations Roadmap,
which has 57 wide-ranging recommendations that aid Combatant Commanders
in planning and executing fully integrated information operations.
As we become more reliant upon information to conduct operations,
the defense of our network is paramount. This requires properly trained
people, common operating standards, and a well-stocked arsenal of
Information Assurance tools. We are working diligently to centralize
network operations and defense, and to formalize information sharing
policy, guidance and procedures. These steps, along with our
cryptographic modernization plan, will safeguard our vital information.
We are formalizing the role of U.S. Special Operations Command
(SOCOM) in the War on Terrorism. In the near future, we will be
recommending a change to the Unified Command Plan assigning SOCOM
specific responsibility to coordinate DOD actions against terrorist
networks. In March, SOCOM's trans-regional psychological operations
program was approved to unify existing programs, streamline approval
authorities and synchronize psychological operations across regional
boundaries in support of the War on Terrorism. These changes will
provide SOCOM and all of DOD improved focus in our global effort to
combat terrorism.
current homeland defense operations
Last year, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) reached full
operational capability in their mission to deter, prevent and defeat
threats and aggression aimed at the United States and its territories.
Upon SECDEF approval, NORTHCOM can now deploy Quick Response Forces
(company-sized units) and Rapid Response Forces (battalion-sized
forces) to support time-sensitive missions such as defense of critical
infrastructures or consequence management in support of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). To improve interagency collaboration, DOD
has been working with DHS to develop and implement the National
Response Plan, a national-level, all-hazards plan that will integrate
the current family of Federal Domestic Emergency Response Plans into a
single plan.
The Joint Staff has developed a CONPLAN for consequence management
operations, and NORTHCOM and PACOM have developed supporting plans.
NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force Civil Support maintains strong interagency
relationships to integrate command and control of DOD forces with
federal agencies to manage the mitigation of Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) incidents.
This past summer, DOD, Nevada National Guard and Reserve units, FEMA,
27 other Federal agencies, and Nevada State and local agencies
participated in a consequence management exercise in Nevada called
DETERMINED PROMISE 2003. I was thoroughly impressed by the coordination
and cooperation among active and reserve component forces, and Federal,
State and local authorities. We are conducting similar exercises across
the country.
In regards to anti-terrorism and force protection measures, the
Joint Staff is working to ensure that Combatant Commanders at home and
abroad have the resources to mitigate threats and respond to emergent
requirements through the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives
Fund. My staff is involved in developing and updating anti-terrorism
standards and policies to reflect current worldwide operations and
lessons learned so that we can address any vulnerabilities. We
coordinate with various agencies in the areas of training, planning,
operations and intelligence sharing, all essential for developing sound
anti-terrorism policies.
In an effort to improve the security of U.S. military installations
and personnel around the world, the Joint Staff has created the
Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal, an evolving web-based portal that
aggregates the resources and programs required to support the DOD
Antiterrorism Program. This portal is fast becoming DOD's one-stop
location for antiterrorism/force protection information.
A program that complements this portal capability is the Joint
Protection Enterprise Network (JPEN). Operated by NORTHCOM, this
network provides the means to share unclassified force protection
information rapidly between military installations in the Continental
United States, increasing their situational awareness and security
significantly. Although currently operating only on military
installations, JPEN has the potential to be expanded to share terrorist
information with Federal, State and local agencies as well.
The WOT requires collecting relevant data and turning it into
knowledge that will enable us to detect and preempt the plans of an
elusive, skilled enemy dispersed across the globe. Although many
obstacles remain, we are making significant progress in the area of
information sharing. The Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating
Terrorism (JITF-CT) at DIA is a prime example of effective intelligence
cooperation in the WOT. In the area of counterterrorism, we are making
significant progress toward transparency and full information sharing.
JITF-CT has experts from 12 intelligence and law enforcement
organizations, and JITF-CT personnel are embedded in 15 other
organizations, including some forward deployed personnel.
readiness for future operations
Our Nation's number one military asset remains the brave men and
women serving in our Armed Forces. This past year, they demonstrated to
the world their dedication, perseverance and compassion as they
liberated the Iraqi people and worked to bring peace and prosperity to
the region. The Administration, Congress and DOD have made raising our
military's standard of living a top priority. The 2004 budget provided
an average military pay raise of 4.15 percent and targeted increases of
up to 6.5 percent for some enlisted personnel. The 2005 budget's
proposed reduction of out-of-pocket housing expenses from 3.5 percent
to 0 is a sound investment, as are future pay increases based on the
Employment Cost Index plus .5 percent.
DOD has a focus group that continues to look at programs to enhance
the combat effectiveness and morale of service and family members
associated with OIF and OEF. Areas where we have made significant
progress are Rest and Recuperation Leave, danger area benefits to
include incentive options for extended tours of duty in Iraq and
Afghanistan, exchanges, childcare and communications initiatives.
All Services generally met or exceeded active duty and reserve
component recruiting and retention goals in both fiscal years 2002 and
2003 and are currently on target to meet fiscal year 2004 goals.
However, recruiting and retention of both active and reserve personnel
will continue to require attention and continued investment as we face
the challenges of an improving economy and the high operations tempo
associated with the war. I view all of the Quality of Life issues as
inseparable from overall combat readiness, and we greatly appreciate
Congressional support for all of these initiatives.
The overall readiness of our armed forces--whether forward
deployed, operating in support of contingency operations, or employed
in homeland defense--remains good. Our forces are the world's best
trained and, possess the requisite personnel, equipment, and resources
necessary to accomplish the military objectives outlined in the
Strategic Planning Guidance. Challenges do exist, especially with
regard to ground forces in Iraq. By mid-May, we will have completed the
movement of personnel and equipment to Iraq that rivals any such
military deployment in history. Coincident with this deployment of
forces is a corresponding redeployment back to home bases of our
service personnel after one year of service in Iraq. Some 20,000
personnel, mostly members of two Brigades of the 1st Armored Division,
the 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment and associated Combat Support and Combat
Service Support units, have been retained in theater past 365 days
because of the present security situation in central Iraq. We will
continue to examine force levels and size our combat forces
appropriately as the security situation dictates in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
We continue to rely heavily on our Reserve and Guard personnel, who
are playing critical roles in Homeland Defense, and serving with
distinction around the world in the War on Terrorism. Some missions
like the ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are almost exclusively
made up of Reserve and Guard units, and they are doing a magnificent
job. We are well aware of the strains on members, their families, and
their employers, and continuously seek better ways to support them.
There are several initiatives underway, collectively by DOD, the
Services, Combatant Commands, and the Joint Staff to reform the
mobilization process and to relieve the stress on the force. USJFCOM,
in conjunction with the Services, is leading the mobilization reform
effort by evaluating policy changes and identifying other solutions to
streamline the mobilization/demobilization process, and preliminary
recommendations are expected in early 2004. Two Operational
Availability sub-studies were conducted last year and identified the
Active Component/Reserve Component Mix and Low Density/High Demand
assets as two areas of immediate concern to relieve stress on the
Reserve Component forces. As an example, the Army has already begun
converting some Reserve Component artillery forces into Military Police
forces to meet one of the expected high demand roles of the foreseeable
future. This, and other ongoing rebalancing efforts will ensure that
active and reserve forces continue to complement each other. The
Services are actively engaged in reviewing how much of a given
capability they need for this new security environment, and which
capabilities belong in each component. Other key DOD areas of concern
are reducing the need for involuntary mobilization of the Reserve
Component early on in rapid response operations, establishing a more
rigorous process for reviewing joint force requirements, and ensuring
efficient use of mobilized Reserve Component personnel. A comprehensive
Rebalancing the Force Report by ASD (RA) will summarize these efforts,
while a study by ASD (HD) will define Reserve Component requirements
for Homeland Defense.
U.S. Armed Forces are capable of achieving all assigned objectives
in the draft National Military Strategy. However, current stresses on
the force remain considerable. The increased demands of the War on
Terrorism, sustaining post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and other global commitments are unlikely to change significantly in
the near-term. Moreover, while committed globally, our Armed Forces
must continue to defend the homeland, reconstitute forces returning
from contingency operations, transform to meet future challenges,
strengthen joint and combined warfighting capabilities, and maintain
readiness. Today, given these commitments and requirements, we are
carefully managing the risk in executing an additional major combat
operation.
When units return home from combat operations, they must undergo a
reconstitution process, which generally means a drop in their
readiness. However, this does not necessarily indicate that a unit is
either unavailable for or incapable of executing part or all of their
assigned wartime missions. We have initiated new measures in the
current readiness reporting system to identify Service and combatant
command requirements, determine the scope of required reset actions,
and develop appropriate solutions to mitigate shortfalls and manage
risk. Our workload remains high, but we remain prepared to accomplish
those missions assigned to us.
Army units returning from OIF I/OEF require focused maintenance
efforts to return them to pre-hostility readiness levels, while
continuing to meet Combatant Commanders' maintenance requirements. The
Army's goal is to return OIF I/OEF active duty units to pre-deployment
readiness within 6 months and reserves within 1 year after return to
home station. However, some critical aviation systems may require
additional time in order to complete depot level repairs. Funding was
programmed from the 2004 Supplemental for these organizational and
depot level maintenance requirements. Army Materiel Command is the lead
agency for developing a plan to repair major equipment items from OIF
I/OEF. The Army has developed repair estimates for all OIF I units. The
workload consists of approximately 1,000 aviation systems, 124,400
communications & electronics systems, 5,700 combat/tracked vehicles,
45,700 wheeled vehicles, 1,400 missile systems, 6 Patriot battalions,
and 232,200 various other systems are included in this repair plan. As
OIF II and beyond maintenance requirements are further defined, DOD
will refine estimates and update costs.
Combatant Commanders and the Services identified preferred
munitions as one of their risk areas of concern via periodic readiness
reporting. Supplemental funding, as well as augmented annual budget
requests, has allowed us to meet our requirement for Joint Direct
Attack Munitions and laser-guided bomb kit production. In the near
term, we are focused on improving how we determine our munitions
requirements. Over the long-term, we plan to field improved guided
munitions systems that build on our already superb precision-delivery
capabilities.
Our military training areas are facing competition from population
growth, environmental laws, and civilian demands for land, sea, and
airspace. The Services are proud of their success in protecting the
environment, endangered species and cultural resources. We are grateful
to Congress for their assistance in the fiscal year 2004 Defense
Authorization Act, which precluded designating certain DOD lands as
critical habitat, and preserved valuable Navy training while ensuring
protection of marine mammal species. Having the world's most
sophisticated weapons systems and simulators cannot substitute for our
most important military training activities, air, land and sea maneuver
and live-fire training. Some installations, ranges, and training areas
are losing critical military value because encroachment is impairing
their capability to provide useful readiness and operational support.
We will continue to seek Congressional support that balances
environmental concerns and readiness.
Our Nuclear Readiness continues to evolve. In December 2001, the
Nuclear Posture Review established a New Triad composed of Offensive
Strike capabilities (both nuclear and non-nuclear), Defenses (active
and passive) and Responsive Infrastructure in order to respond to a
wide range of contingencies. DOD is in the midst of a Strategic
Capabilities Assessment to assess the progress in fielding the New
Triad and determine the number and types of forces to meet the Moscow
Treaty commitment of reductions of 1,700 to 2,200 operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012.
We continue our efforts to ensure we can operate effectively in a
CBRN environment, since our potential adversaries, both nation states
and terrorists, seek to acquire and develop weapons of mass
destruction, including biological warfare agents. Vaccinations
represent an important countermeasure against biological threats and
provide our military personnel with the best available protective
measures. To date, approximately 695,000 military personnel have been
vaccinated against anthrax and more than 520,000 military personnel
have received smallpox vaccinations. The anthrax and smallpox
vaccination programs are very successful, and it is imperative to
develop effective countermeasures against other biological threats to
protect our warfighters.
While our warfighting team has always included contractors, their
involvement is increasing. The Joint Staff is leading a joint group to
develop overarching DOD policy and procedures for management of
contractor personnel during contingency operations.
We must also reexamine our ability to get to the fight. The
Mobility Requirements Study 2005, completed in 2000, is the current
baseline mobility requirements document. DOD is actively engaged in
conducting a new full-scale mobility study that reflects our current
defense strategy and incorporates lessons learned from OEF and OIF to
further clarify strategic lift requirements. The goal is to complete a
new Mobility Capabilities Study by March 2005, in time to influence
preparation of POM-08 and the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Sustaining our overseas presence, responding to complex
emergencies, prosecuting the global war on terrorism, and conducting
operations far from our shores are only possible if our ships and
aircraft are able to make unencumbered use of the sea and air lines of
communication. Our naval and air forces must be able to take advantage
of the customary, established navigational rights that the Law of the
Sea Convention codifies. We strongly support U.S. accession to the
Convention.
Although C-17 production is not planned to terminate until fiscal
year 2008, portions of C-17 production lines will begin to close in
fiscal year 2006. The Air Force and DOD are studying the benefits and
risks (including financial and war fighting) of continuing or
terminating the C-17 production lines, and plan to complete this
assessment in time to inform the fiscal year 2006 POM.
The significant age of our KC-135 fleet and the importance of air-
refueling capabilities dictate modernization of our aerial-refueling
fleet. Based on the results of ongoing investigations and studies, the
Air Force will recommend a cost-effective strategy for acquiring a
suitable replacement for the KC-135 fleet to meet joint warfighting
requirements to support our National Security Strategy.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) will be a giant leap over
existing attack/fighter capabilities. JSF is in the third year of an
11-year development program, and we have seen some design challenges.
The current design challenge for all three variants is weight, which
impacts performance requirements, particularly for the Short Takeoff
and Vertical Landing variant. Design teams are working diligently to
solve this issue, and we have moved the first planned production
procurement to the right one year, and added extra money to the
development. The weight issue is within normal parameters of design
fluctuation, and this issue will be worked out through the development
and design process.
Protection of our troops remains a top priority. Interceptor Body
Armor (IBA) was in the initial fielding phase at the start of OIF. The
DOD has been aggressively managing this critical item, and accelerated
fielding and production rates when CENTCOM identified the need due to
the threat situation. IBA consists of an Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and
a set of Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). Currently, there is
enough IBA (with SAPI) in theater to meet the CENTCOM military and
civilian requirements, for their entire area of operations, including
Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. We will continue to
work diligently to provide the best protective equipment for our
servicemen and women and DOD civilians.
The Up Armored version of the High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMVV) has proven to be effective at protecting our soldiers
against mines, improvised explosive devices (IED) and direct fire
weapons. Currently there is a shortfall in Iraq and worldwide. To fill
this shortfall, in the near term, the Joint Staff, the Services and the
Combatant Commanders are conducting an aggressive campaign to
redistribute worldwide inventories of UP Armored HMMVVs to Iraq. In the
longer-term, Congress' Emergency Supplemental and reprogramming have
provided funding to accelerate production of Up Armored HMMVVs to meet
CENTCOM requirements by October 2004.
OIF reaffirmed how critical the deployment and distribution process
is to joint warfare. The Joint Staff is working with DOD and the
Service logistics experts to develop an integrated end-to-end
deployment and distribution process that is responsive to rapid
projection of forces, the delivery and handoff of joint forces, and
worldwide sustainment in support of the Joint Forces Commander.
During the fiscal year 2004 budget cycle, Congress voiced concern
over the Department's overseas basing plans. Since then, our global
posture strategy has matured. We are now in the process of detailed
consultation with our allies and members of Congress. The overseas
portion of the fiscal year 2005 Military Construction budget submission
includes projects at enduring locations. These projects reflect our
Combatant Commanders' most pressing base and infrastructure needs. I
urge Congress to support our Combatant Commanders and fund the overseas
MILCON projects submitted in the fiscal year 2005 budget request. These
projects contribute directly to our readiness and the quality of life
our personnel deserve.
joint warfighting
Protecting the United States, preventing future conflicts, and
prevailing against adversaries require our military to sustain and
extend its qualitative advantage against a very diverse set of threats
and adversary capabilities. Maintaining our qualitative advantage
begins with improving education programs across the Services. We must
also adapt and transform organizations and functions to eliminate gaps
and seams within and between combatant commands, agencies at all levels
of government, and potential coalition partners. Information sharing is
at the forefront of this effort.
Recent operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and Africa
have demonstrated the impact timely sharing of intelligence has on
planning and executing military operations. Since this is a global war
requiring an international effort, we must also improve coalition
command and control capabilities, and consolidate the numerous networks
that exist today. These disparate networks hinder our ability to plan
in a collaborative environment and exercise timely and effective
command and control with our multinational partners.
We must also review policies and implement technology that
safeguard our vital sensitive information while ensuring critical
operational information is shared with all those who fight beside us.
JFCOM has been tasked to take the lead in identifying specific
multinational information sharing requirements and recommending policy
changes. Our goal is to establish a multinational family of systems
with common standards as part of the Global Information Grid enterprise
services. I view this as a top priority and ask for Congressional
support--information sharing with our allies is critical to winning the
War on Terrorism.
During OIF, our military forces benefited from unprecedented
situational awareness through a common operational picture. In
particular, one new system, Blue Force Tracker, was critical to the
success of our forces as they sped towards Baghdad. Some of the 3rd
Infantry Division, V Corps, and I MEF vehicles were equipped with
transponders that automatically reported their positions as they
maneuvered across the battlefield--greatly improving situational
awareness for our battlefield commanders, and reducing the potential
for blue-on-blue engagements. Despite significant improvements in joint
combat identification, challenges remain to reduce incidents of
friendly fire, and maximize the synergy of combined arms to provide all
front-line tactical units with friendly and threat information during
decisive engagements. To address these challenges, JFCOM has the lead
in the comprehensive effort to improve Joint Battle Management Command
and Control, which includes the integration of Common Operational and
Tactical Pictures, Combat Identification, and Situational Awareness
across the force.
We are taking command and control lessons learned from OIF like the
capability to track Blue Forces, and running them through the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System process to help shape
future systems requirements. The objective is to ensure all of the
critical considerations of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material,
Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) are
employed in an approach that synchronizes material and non-material
solutions.
We are also improving our military war planning process. The Joint
Staff has developed an Adaptive Planning process--whose key concepts
are agility and speed--to reduce the time to develop and update war
plans, while adding flexibility and adaptability to respond to the
rapid changes in the global strategic security environment. The goal is
to provide the President and SECDEF the best options possible. We have
also been developing a collaborative campaign-planning tool for crisis
action planning and execution. These tools should allow commanders the
ability to assess multiple courses of action, rapidly compressing plan
development time while increasing plan flexibility.
Our warfighting effectiveness is also enhanced by our Joint
Exercise Program, which provides Combatant Commanders with the means to
train battle staffs and forces in joint and combined operations,
evaluate their war plans, and execute security cooperation plans with
our allies and Coalition partners. In order to improve joint training
opportunities, JFCOM is developing a Joint National Training Capability
(JNTC), which will achieve Initial Operational Capability in October
2004. JNTC will combine live and virtual play at multiple locations.
The goal is to provide realistic joint combat training against an
adaptive and credible opposing force, with common ground truths, and
high quality exercise feedback.
Strategic airlift is available to exercises only on an as-available
basis, since it is prioritized for operational needs first. Providing
the personnel and assets to accomplish meaningful joint training during
this period of high OPTEMPO has also been challenging. To balance these
competing requirements, the Combatant Commanders are reviewing their
fiscal year 2004 exercise programs with a view to canceling, downsizing
or postponing exercises. We must continue to balance operational and
exercise requirements against OP/PERSTEMPO and available lift.
Prior to combat operations in Iraq, we established a process for
adapting OIF lessons learned for future operations as rapidly as
possible. JFCOM has the lead role in turning identified operational
level lessons learned into required capabilities through the Joint
Capabilities Integration and Development System. After completing the
OIF Strategic and Operational Lessons Learned reports, we are following
up with a specific report to the Congressional Defense Committees, the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. OIF
Strategic Lessons Learned require additional commitment at the
national-strategic level, including an improved deployment process,
redistributing specialties between the Active and Reserve Components,
Reserve Component readiness and mobilization, and improving the
planning and transition to post conflict operations.
Planning and transition to post conflict stability operations
require significant adjustments in how we plan, train, organize, and
equip our forces. We can expect future adversaries to attempt to offset
U.S. military strengths through asymmetric means, to include terrorist
insurgency, as combat operations transition to post conflict
operations. The lessons learned process continues during stability
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
considerations and recommendations for goldwater-nichols act
For the past 18 years, joint operations have been improving under
the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The act strengthened
civilian control of the military and facilitated better military advice
to the President, SECDEF, NSC and Congress. Today, the Armed Forces are
involved in a worldwide fight against terrorism, well beyond anything
envisioned by the framers of Goldwater-Nichols. Now, it is time to
consider new ideas for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of
the military instrument of power in today's new security environment.
The WOT and other recent military operations have demonstrated the
need for improved interagency cooperation, integration and execution of
National Security Council decisions. We also need to improve how we
coordinate the efforts of international, regional and non-governmental
organizations. I fully support initiatives to formalize a mechanism
that creates effective lines of authority and provides adequate
resources to execute interagency operations. For example, designating
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military
advisor to the Homeland Security Council would improve homeland defense
and prosecution of the WOT beyond our borders.
As new defense reform initiatives are considered, the Chairman must
retain a dedicated Joint Staff, with expertise across the full range of
military issues, to assist in formulating quality, independent military
advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense.
Joint Officer Management codified in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
legislation was based on the threats and force structure evident late
in the Cold War. We are developing a strategic plan to shape joint
officer management based on the type and quantity of officers needed to
perform current and future joint missions, and the education, training,
and experience joint officers require. This strategic approach will
ensure future joint officers meet the needs of joint commanders.
We are already taking some initiatives to improve our Joint
Professional Military Education system, with the goal of educating and
training the right person for the right task at the right time.
Historically, we waited until officers became majors and lieutenant
colonels before we provided them with joint education. We are finding
that the War on Terrorism requires noncommissioned officers and junior
officers from all Services to work in the joint environment more often
than they have before. We are developing courses tailored to the needs
of our younger troops that expose them to joint warfighting far earlier
in their careers. To improve joint officer management and education,
and prepare officers for joint duty earlier in their professional
careers, I request consideration to allow the Service War Colleges to
teach Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase Two and the
authority to determine the appropriate length of the Joint Forces Staff
College's JPME Phase II course. We also have pilot programs providing
joint education to Senior Noncommissioned Officers and our Reserve and
Guard component members. Additionally, we are reviewing our joint
general and flag officer training programs to ensure our senior
officers are prepared to command joint task forces and work effectively
with interagency and coalition partners.
Today, the Chairman remains well positioned to assist in providing
strategic direction to the Armed Forces, assess impacts on the long-
term readiness of the force, and evaluate current and potential levels
of risk associated with global military activities. Already, we are in
the process of transforming our internal processes to make them more
responsive in the current dynamic environment. In a similar vein, I
request we also reevaluate and streamline our current reporting
requirements to Congress, many of which seem of questionable utility. I
propose the formulation of a working group composed of members from the
HASC, SASC, HAC, SAC, OSD, OMB and Joint Staff to identify the best
means and frequency of communications to meet Congressional oversight
needs.
transformation of the u.s. armed forces
We cannot focus solely on the threats we face today and assume
there are not other, perhaps even more challenging threats on the
horizon. Maintaining our unchallenged military superiority requires
investment to ensure the current readiness of deployed forces while
continuing to transform military capabilities for the future. Our
adversaries will learn new lessons, adapt their capabilities, and seek
to exploit perceived vulnerabilities. Therefore our military must
transform, and must remain ready, even while we are engaged in war.
Before the events of September 11th, transforming the force was
viewed as DOD's greatest near-term challenge. Since then, we have had
to fight battles in the mountains of Afghanistan, in the cities of
Iraq, and around the world for the security of America. Putting
transformation on the back burner and focusing solely on the fight at
hand is simply not an option. We are fighting a war unlike any we have
fought before--it demands new ways of thinking about military force,
new processes to improve strategic agility, and new technologies to
take the fight to the enemy. DOD continues to invest heavily in
transformation, both intellectually and materially.
The draft National Military Strategy adopts an ``in-stride''
approach to transformation that balances transformation, modernization
and recapitalization to maximize our military advantages against future
challengers. In addition to describing how the Joint Force will achieve
military objectives in the near term, the strategy identifies force
employment concepts, attributes and capabilities that provide the
foundation for the force of the future. The goal is full spectrum
dominance--the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary
across the range of military operations. We must ensure our military
forces possess the capabilities to rapidly conduct globally dispersed,
simultaneous operations; foreclose adversary options; and if required,
generate the desired effects necessary to decisively defeat
adversaries.
We recently published the Joint Operations Concepts document that
describes a suite of concepts of how the joint commander will fight in
2015 and beyond. Joint Operations Concepts provide a framework for
developing capabilities and defining concepts to achieve full spectrum
dominance. Using this document as a foundation, the Joint Staff
completed development of five joint functional concepts to define how
joint warfighting will be conducted across the range of military
operations. These functions include force application, protection,
command and control, battlespace awareness, and logistics. Meanwhile,
the Combatant Commands have been working on four high-level operating
concepts that include strategic deterrence, stability operations,
homeland defense, and major combat operations.
Collectively, functional and operating concepts define how we want
to fight in the future, and will help us transform from the threat-
based force of the Cold War to a capabilities-based force postured to
respond to a wide variety of threats, some of which we cannot
confidently predict today. To aid the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council in determining warfighting needs with a capabilities-based
approach, we are developing joint integrating concepts. These concepts
are far more focused than functional and operating concepts, and define
specific tasks to be conducted. They are designed to bridge the gap
between how we want to fight and the capabilities we need. Examples
include urban operations, global strike operations, and forcible entry
operations. The functional, operating and integrating concepts will
continue to evolve over time. The first round of this very important
concept work should be done within the year.
For each functional concept area we have established a Functional
Capability Board to integrate the views of the Combatant Commands,
Services, Defense Agencies, Joint Staff, and OSD. These boards comprise
functional experts from across DOD who will provide the best advice
possible for our planning, programming, and acquisition processes.
Functional Capability Boards also support a new process called the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, which replaces
the previous Cold War-era Requirements Generation System. The new
system recognizes that less expensive programs can have a significant
impact on joint operations. Virtually all programs are reviewed through
the JROC process for potential joint impact before they get a green
light, ensuring all Service future systems are born joint.
Based on the recommendations of the Joint Defense Capabilities
Study--the Aldridge Study--we established the Strategic Planning
Council chaired by SECDEF, and composed of the Service Secretaries, the
Joint Chiefs, Principal Under Secretaries and the Combatant Commanders.
The first meeting was held January 28, 2004. To capture and disseminate
this top-down strategic direction, we will produce a new Strategic
Planning Guidance document as the mechanism to provide subordinates
with this strategic guidance. The first Strategic Planning Guidance
document was completed in March 2004.
We are also developing an Enhanced Planning Process that integrates
DOD-wide lessons learned, experimentation, concept development, study
results, capability gap analysis, and technology development into a
collaborative capabilities planning function. The goal is to offer
distinct and viable alternatives to senior leadership rather than a
consensus driven, single point solution, and implement their decisions
into the Joint Programming Guidance document, the first of which will
be issued in May 2004.
These three transformational process initiatives--Functional
Capability Boards, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System, and the Enhanced Planning Process--work together improving our
planning and programming agility for future joint capabilities. JFCOM
is working with the Functional Capability Boards to incorporate lessons
learned from OEF and OIF into a list of materiel and non-materiel
recommendations to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to turn
lessons learned into identified capabilities needs as quickly as
possible.
JFCOM is also coordinating with the Services, Combatant Commands,
other U.S. agencies, and coalition partners to ensure experimentation
efforts support the warfighter. One of JFCOM's key experimentation
initiatives is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, which will
provide Combatant Commanders a rapidly deployable command and control
team, along with supporting information systems and reachback
capabilities, that will enable us to respond to regional conflicts with
smaller and more effective joint operational headquarters. JFCOM is
establishing the prototype Standing Joint Force Headquarters this year,
and in fiscal year 2005 we will field the communications portion known
as the Deployable Joint Command and Control System to CENTCOM and
PACOM. EUCOM and SOUTHCOM receive follow on systems in fiscal year 2006
and fiscal year 2007. The Deployable Joint Command and Control System
will use state-of-the-art information technology to enhance Joint Force
command and control.
Communications systems are a prime target for transformational
ideas. The Joint Tactical Radio System is a software programmable radio
that will provide seamless, real-time, voice, data and video networked
communications for joint forces. It will be scalable allowing
additional capacity (bandwidth and channels) to be added, backwards-
compatible to communicate with legacy systems, able to communicate with
multiple networks, and able to accommodate airborne, maritime and land
based systems. It provides the tactical warfighter with net-centric
capabilities and connectivity to the Global Information Grid, and is
essential to meeting our 21st century joint communications warfighting
requirements.
Transformation also means developing multiple, persistent
surveillance capabilities that will let us ``watch'' situations and
targets by looking, smelling, feeling, and hearing with a variety of
long-dwell sensors from space, air, ground, sea and underwater and
integrating these capabilities into a ``system of systems.'' The
exploitation of Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), holds
great promise. MASINT collects information from many diverse sources to
detect, characterize and track a target or activity by its distinctive
properties, or ``signatures'' that are very difficult to conceal or
suppress. Last year, DIA created its Directorate for MASINT and
Technical Collection to develop new forms of technical collection and
integrate MASINT into collection strategies and operations.
Another example of the transformational technologies we have just
fielded is the Army's Stryker Brigade, which is centered on a new,
fast, and quiet vehicle that can deliver 11 troops to the fight. This
effort is far more than simply fielding a new vehicle; it is also a new
way to organize a brigade, and link that brigade to a networked command
and control system that shares intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance information. Our Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) are
organized and trained to take advantage of this new technology. The
first Stryker BCT is already proving its worth in Iraq.
To reduce our vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction, we have
made progress on providing missile defenses for our homeland, our
deployed forces, and our friends and allies. In the coming year, we
plan to deploy six ground-based interceptors in Alaska and four in
California to provide an initial capability to defend the United States
from ballistic missile attack. The PATRIOT missile defense system and
the emerging AEGIS-based SM-3 system will provide short and medium
range missile defenses, as well as critical surveillance and tracking
essential to our Ballistic Missile Defense System. Coupled with an
upgraded launch detection capability provided by the Space Based
Infrared (SBIRS) Family of Systems, our ballistic missile defenses will
continue to improve significantly over the next few years.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) offers an excellent example of
a system that transformed modern warfare. GPS delivers worldwide
positioning, navigation and timing data that provide U.S. and allied
forces an all-weather, precision engagement capability. Over the last
decade, the success of combat operations was largely due to GPS-aided
precision-guided munitions. We must continue to modernize GPS, improve
capabilities, protect U.S. and allied access to reliable military
positioning, navigation and timing information, and deny this
information to our adversaries, while minimizing impacts to peaceful
civil users. We are engaged with NATO and the European Union to resolve
our concerns with the proposed Galileo system, a civil satellite system
that puts at risk our programmed military enhancements to GPS. A U.S.
interagency team has made significant headway with some tough technical
issues over the past year, but continued negotiations are essential to
address the remaining technical, and more importantly, the political
issues. Once these issues are resolved, we can confidently move forward
with our vision of space superiority to support future joint and
coalition operations.
As recent military operations have demonstrated, space is a
critical dimension of the battlespace. Lessons learned from OEF and OIF
highlight our increasing reliance on space communication assets and our
demand for bandwidth. Our challenge is meeting future warfighter
requirements in the face of an aging satellite constellation. Despite a
planned 10-fold increase in capability through Advanced EHF and
Wideband Gapfiller Systems, projected capacity may not meet the growing
demand. This shortfall will potentially impact our ability to maintain
a technological advantage over our adversaries. Work on
Transformational Satellite Communications continues, which is designed
to improve communications for mobile systems, particularly those that
provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Our unmanned
aerial vehicles and the Army's Future Combat System place heavy demands
on bandwidth, particularly when real-time video feeds are required. The
frequency spectrum is critical not only to joint warfighting, but to
all federal, state and local agencies to ensure national security and
public safety. Military and civilian technology is rapidly moving to a
wireless medium. As pressures from commercial sources to free up more
federal spectrum mount, we must ensure our long-term spectrum
accessibility for our military forces.
These are just a few examples our ongoing transformation efforts.
We are working hard to integrate old systems with new, in innovative
ways. Interoperating between our own legacy and transformational
systems is a challenge for us, but it is an even greater challenge to
our coalition partners, who must participate in key decisions on how
transformation will enhance combined operations in the future.
Over the past year, NATO has achieved great success in progressing
toward a transformed military organization. The Alliance has developed,
approved, and begun implementing a new, more streamlined command
structure, which will make it viable in the 21st century global
security environment. The catalyst for modernization will be the new
Allied Command Transformation, which will maintain a close partnership
with JFCOM. Also, on the forefront of transformation, NATO has created
the NATO Response Force, a key enabler of NATO's new operational
concept. This expeditionary force is designed to be a multinational,
deployable, and lethal force intended for employment either within or
outside of the European AOR. It will be NATO's first responders, able
to react quickly to a crisis anywhere in the world. In a display of
NATO's new focus, on August 11, 2003, NATO assumed command of ISAF in
Afghanistan, the first out of area mission in the history of the
Alliance. To be an effective joint force in the future, we must ensure
that our allies keep pace with our transformation efforts.
conclusion
Responding to today's dynamic threat environment requires our Armed
Forces to be innovative, agile, and flexible. With Congress' strong
support, our military has made significant progress combating
terrorism, improving our joint warfighting capabilities, and
transforming our military into a 21st Century fighting force. We
appreciate your efforts to help us be responsive to a changing world,
and make that world a safer and better place.
Senator Stevens. Well, thank you very much.
You're right, some of us up here were part of what they
called ``The Greatest Generation.'' We now know that we have
been replaced. This is the finest bunch of men and women I've
ever seen in uniform.
Ladies and gentlemen, I want you to know, because of a
change in the Secretary's schedule, we moved this hearing up to
9 o'clock. I do apologize. Some of you may not have gotten that
word until late. But we have started off, Senator Inouye and I,
with a couple of minutes. I will have a couple of questions,
then Senator Inouye, then we'll recognize Senator Byrd, then
we're going to go down on each side by the seniority on the
committee. That's, I think, the fairest, under the
circumstances because of the change in the time.
FISCAL YEAR 2004 FISCAL STATUS
So let me ask just one question. Mr. Secretary, I am
concerned about the statements that I have heard of--including,
I think, some of yours, General Myers--that you may be some $4
to $6 billion short in the fiscal year 2004 operating accounts.
Now, if that is the case, you can move money, you can reprogram
it back and forth to meet those shortfalls, I hope, in order to
prevent us from having a supplemental for 2004. Can you give us
an update on your 2004 fiscal status? Do you think that that
kind of money will take you into the 2005 fiscal year, so that
we can concentrate on the 2005 bill, Mr. Secretary? Maybe Larry
could answer that.
SHORTFALL
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'm not familiar with the statement
that General Myers may have made. Do you want to respond?
Mr. Lanzillotta. Yes, Senator. Mr. Chairman, we're in the
process of finishing up our 2004 mid-year review, looking to do
exactly what you asked us to do: to move money in between the
accounts, because we are trying to move the money to where the
bills are right now. Right now, we're in the process. We
haven't quite finished it, but there's no indication of a
requirement for a 2004 supplemental.
What is a problem, or what will be a stress, is general
transfer authority. We have $2.1 billion worth of general
transfer authority, and we have approximately $500 million
left. We need to do our annual omnibus reprogramming just to do
exactly as you mentioned, move the money to the accounts. That
will be as stress-point for us. Is it a problem yet? We haven't
finished. I don't know. I can't give you a number at this time.
Senator Stevens. Any comment, General Myers?
General Myers. Senator Stevens, the comment I made was that
there is a--in 2004, there's approximately a $4 billion
shortfall, which I think is going to be close to what the
shortfall will be. But then I'll defer to the mid-year review
and acting Secretary Lanzillotta on how we might cover those
bills. I didn't make any comment on that. I didn't say we
wouldn't be able to cover them. But I would say that it will
take some authorities that we're going to have to get to
reprogram some of this money, and that there is likely to be
some impact on some parts of our Armed Forces. We just have to
hope it's not in the readiness areas and the training areas,
the ones we worry about. So that review is ongoing, and it
remains to be seen whether we can cover all of that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. From the meetings I've been in, my
impression is that the people who have accounts that are being
overspent are the ones that express the concern, and those that
have accounts that are being underspent are relatively quiet.
And so until the process is completed that the Comptroller's
Office and the Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) office
are engaged in, I think it's awfully hard to know precisely
whether or not there will be a shortfall and even to know
precisely how much money we will need to reprogram.
Senator Stevens. We would be pleased to work with the Armed
Services Committee to see if we need additional ad hoc transfer
authority before the end of this fiscal year. Perhaps we can
work that out on an ad hoc single-year basis to get it done
without trying to handle a supplemental when we're going to be
looking at the reserve account anyway. But I think the reserve
account may come too late. We'll have to see.
Senator Inouye, Co-chairman?
Senator Inouye. I wish to yield to Senator Hollings. He has
an emergency.
Senator Stevens. Senator Hollings, you're recognized for 5
minutes.
Senator Hollings. I thank the chairman, and I thank Senator
Inouye. I've got a friend who passed. I'm going to try to catch
a plane to his funeral--General Harry Cordes, General Myers,
who used to command the Strategic Air Command (SAC).
Unfortunately, Mr. Secretary, you've already, in your
opening statement, responded to my question. And my question
was how in the world we're ever going to get the troops out
unless we get more troops in. And you seem Shinseki-shy. You go
into all kind of rope-a-dope here about you've got to re-
balance the skills, we've got to transform the forces for the
future, we've got to not get a bigger barrel, but move the
spigot, and all that kind of nonsense.
I'll never forget when I visited General Westmoreland in
Vietnam in 1966, and in a country of 16 million he had 535,000
troops in there, and he spent until 2 o'clock in the morning
that first night in Saigon saying how he needed 35,000 more.
Now, in a country of 25 million, you're trying to secure it
with 135,000. And don't put me off with ``about 200,000.''
They're not strong. You've got 200,000, but, as General Abizaid
told Chairman Stevens and myself when we were over there just 1
month ago, that they needed far, far more training. So what
happens is that we all want to try to get the United Nations
(U.N.) and get the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Chairman Stevens and I listened to President Chirac, and he
says, ``We've got to have Western solidarity, we've got to have
solidarity in Iraq,'' and he says, ``When the United Nations
passes a resolution, you'll find French troops side by side
with you in Iraq,'' just like we have in Afghanistan, where
they are working NATO troops now. Now, he cautioned, he said,
about NATO, that the Arab countries weren't part of it, but,
``With a U.N. resolution cover,'' he says, ``you can get
there.'' My understanding is you all haven't even asked for the
NATO troops, on the one hand, and you go into this long
explanation about moving the spigot instead of having a bigger
barrel and everything.
You don't have security. In fact, we've bogged down. We're
building and destroying. We're trying to win the hearts and
minds as we're killing them and torturing them. And at least
General Westmoreland didn't have to ask the Viet Cong general
to take the town, like we have for Fallujah. We have asked the
enemy general to take the town.
We're in a mess there. And we keep hearing from the
Pentagon, ``Sure, the troops are superb.'' But the question is,
Are we superb back here in Washington?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you've covered a lot of ground
there, and I'd like to try to take a few of the pieces.
IRAQ TROOP LEVELS
With respect to the number of troops, U.S. troops--there
are also coalition troops and, as you point out, there are
Iraqi forces--the number of U.S. troops that we have in that
country is the exact number that General Abizaid requested. Is
it possible he's wrong? Sure, it's possible anyone could be
wrong. But he talks to his field commanders, the division
commanders, every week or two, and asks that question. And
every time I ask him, I say, ``Look, whatever you need, you
will get.'' General Myers' advice is that the number he has
requested is a number that's appropriate.
Now, all I can say is that the division commanders are
telling General Abizaid that's the right number. General
Abizaid is telling General Myers it's the right number. General
Myers is telling Rumsfeld and President Bush it's the right
number. You could be right----
Senator Hollings. Well, isn't it the case that----
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. But they all don't think
so.
Senator Hollings [continuing]. They're scared to death----
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, they're not. These----
Senator Hollings [continuing]. That they're going to get
disciplined----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Does he look scared to death?
Senator Hollings [continuing]. If they ask for more.
Secretary Rumsfeld. No, sir.
Senator Hollings. They're gone if they ask for more.
IRAQ
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely not. And you know that.
General Myers. In fact, Senator Hollings, let me just say
it's not just General Myers; it's the entire Joint Chiefs of
Staff. This is something we review regularly. We were just on
the video teleconference with General Abizaid the other day,
with the Joint Chiefs, General Abizaid, talking about this very
issue and looking at, you know, the pluses and minuses of more
versus less. And it's still the wisdom of General Abizaid and
his forces that more capability is not--there is no way to
militarily lose in Iraq. There's also no way to militarily win
in Iraq. This process has to be internationalized. The United
Nations has to play the governance role. That's how we're, in
my view, eventually going to win.
General Abizaid thinks that handing more of this over to
Iraqis, not doing the work for them, is what's key, and that's
why yes, is there training that needs to be done for Iraqi
forces? Absolutely. Are we slow in getting that going? You bet.
Until the Department of Defense got the mission, and General
Abizaid got the mission, for training the police and the rest
of the security forces, we were way behind. We're moving that
up very quickly right now. And their performance, while uneven,
is to be expected when the going gets tough, because they
just--some of them haven't been trained properly or equipped
properly. We're trying to fix that as fast as we can. But
that's certainly got to be part of the solution.
But----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I should add that----
General Myers [continuing]. We don't put anything on
General Abizaid's request going to the Secretary, I can tell
you that. And if we have a separate view, as the Joint Chiefs,
we would offer that, as well.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The idea that the four members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, four-star generals, and the division
commanders, General Abizaid and General Myers and General Pace,
are afraid to tell the truth is just plain wrong and
unfortunate to even suggest, in my view.
UNITED NATIONS AND NATO
Next, with respect to the United Nations and NATO, we went
to the United Nations and got a resolution. The Department of
State has been working with the United Nations to try to get
another resolution. We want it, the coalition countries in
there want it, and, you're exactly right, when we get it we
have a crack at getting some additional countries, beyond the
33 countries that are currently there.
Next, you asked that we--said we've not even asked NATO. We
asked NATO the first month of the war--went over to Brussels
and requested NATO assistance. NATO is assisting in the sense
that they have helped with the force generation for the Polish
division that's currently deployed there. I think, out of the
26 NATO countries, something like 17 have forces either in Iraq
or Afghanistan, or both. NATO has the same problem--you might
humor us about the spigot--the problem is that NATO has a worse
spigot problem. They've got about 2.4 million people in
uniform, and they can--they have trouble sustaining 50,000.
We're sustaining--if you take Iraq, Afghanistan, and the entire
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility--about
250,000 to 275,000 forces on a base of 2.6 million. They've got
about 2.4 or 2.5 or 2.6 million, and they're having trouble
sustaining 50,000. So the idea that the United Nations is some
sort of a solution to all this problem, or the idea that NATO
is the solution to all these problems, I think, misunderstands
the force capabilities of those countries.
Once you get a U.N. resolution, however, you do reach
beyond the NATO countries, and that's a big opportunity.
Senator Hollings. Thank you very much.
Senator Stevens. Please give the SAC General's family our
condolences. We remember him, too.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Secretary Rumsfeld, can you tell the
committee how the $25 billion request will be structured, what
appropriation accounts will be receiving increases.
Senator Stevens. Senator, we do not have that request.
Senator Byrd. I understand that. But do you have any idea
how the $25 billion request will be structured, what
appropriation accounts will be receiving increases in your
amendment, and what specific activities and programs will be
funded? Does the Defense Department intend to seek additional
legislative authorities with this request? Do you intend to
request additional flexibility in the use of allocation of
these funds?
Mr. Secretary?
STRUCTURING THE $25 BILLION RESERVE
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, sir. As I mentioned earlier, the
decisions as to how it ought to be structured and what it ought
to be called is a matter that's being discussed between the
White House, the Office of Management and Budget, and the
Congress. They're trying to work out something that makes sense
from your schedule and the flow of your legislation in both
houses.
The funds would be spent for operational costs and force-
protection costs. And I do not believe, at the moment, that
anyone anticipates that there would be additional authorities.
But it would be for personnel support costs, for combat
operations, supplies, force protection, transportation, those
types of things.
Senator Byrd. What assurances do we have that these funds
will be limited to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan only, and
not be diverted into some kind of dual-use activities that
could be used to prepare for another war?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The request will specify what they're
for. And, as always, the Department will see that the authority
that is provided by the Congress is adhered to. And they're
currently working out reporting procedures with the Congress
that will be, I believe, explicit at that point where the
request comes forward.
Senator Byrd. Well, I'm sure that Congress would want to be
sure that there's some limitations on these monies and that
this will not be a slush fund. I'm also confident that it will
not be limited to $25 billion. It'll probably be twice that
amount, or three times that amount, before it's over. I would
anticipate that.
STOP-LOSS POLICY
Mr. Secretary, America's military forces are stretched thin
throughout the world. Simply put, we have more military
commitments than we have the personnel to cover them without
taking extreme steps. The Army, for example, is dependent on
the stop-loss policy to retain soldiers and meet its
commitments in Iraq and elsewhere. How long has the stop-loss
policy been in effect?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's my understanding that stop-loss
has been a policy that's been in effect for years and years and
years, and it's been used by all of the services over time, and
it has a good military purpose. Possibly General Myers will
want to comment on it. But at that point where a unit--everyone
in the military, in the Guard, in the Reserve, is a volunteer.
Each one volunteered knowing that they were going to go on
active duty or they were going to go in the Guard and Reserve
and, as needed, they would be called. When a unit is deployed--
it has trained together, it's worked together, it's ready to
go, and suddenly it has to go--there are always some people in
that unit who are due to get out or due to be transferred at
any given moment. And so what the stop-loss does is, it assists
with unit cohesion. And if people are due to be deployed, and
they look at the unit, and they make a judgement at some cutoff
point and say, ``Anyone who was scheduled to get out, can't.''
And, therefore, that's the stop-loss.
Senator Byrd. So how many troops are currently affected by
the stop-loss order?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I can check with Dr. Chu, behind me,
and I'll bet you he knows. About 20,000, he tells me,
throughout the entire force.
Senator Byrd. And when would you expect to lift the stop-
loss order?
General Myers. Let me--as the Secretary said, Senator Byrd,
this is essentially the way we do business when we deploy
units, and it's not just stop-loss, it's also stop-moving, as
the Secretary said, if they were moving to another post, camp,
or station, or to school. And as units continue to deploy,
stop-loss and stop-move will be used in that way.
I would also say that if individuals are stop-loss'd that
were planning on getting out of the service, if they--there is
a process they can go through where they can appeal and say,
``Listen, I had something set up that I've just got to do,''
and I think, for the most part, very few are turned down. Is
that right, Dr. Chu?
Dr. Chu. That's correct.
General Myers. I mean, there's a--the percentage is very,
very high of those appealing on stop-loss if they have
something they just have to do. Their case is looked at, and
their----
Senator Byrd. General Myers----
Secretary Rumsfeld. It also varies--excuse me--it varies
from service to service. For example, at the present time, the
Air Force is not using stop-loss; whereas, the Army and the
Navy are.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, do you have any concern that
once you lift the stop-loss order, you will see a mass exodus
of experienced troops? And do you have any plan to cope with
such a contingency?
Senator Stevens. That would be the Senator's last question,
unfortunately, Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. All right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Byrd, I always worry about
things, and that's a fair question. At the moment, the way the
stop-loss works is, it's unlikely that it would lead to a mass
exodus, because it's sequential, and it doesn't affect large
numbers at a specific time point. It may affect, in the total
at the present, 20,000 people. But so far the recruiting and
retention in all of the services is, for all practical
purposes, meeting their targets. So we're not, at the moment,
seeing any adverse effect from the stop-loss, nor do people in
the service, as I understand it, think of it as unusual,
because it's been a policy that's been used for some time.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Cochran, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, you pointed out, in your opening statement,
your interest in restructuring National Guard forces to try to
get the most out of the forces that we have who are available
to our country in this time of need in Iraq and Afghanistan and
elsewhere. I applaud that, and I want to assure you that we'll
be happy to work with you to guarantee that the funds are there
to help you achieve this goal.
I happened to notice, in my briefing papers here, that, in
our State of Mississippi, National Guard and Air National Guard
units have been deployed. We have more than 3,000 troops from
our State that have been deployed since Operation Iraqi Freedom
began. This weekend, we're welcoming home a combat engineer
battalion, and that battalion, over 200 soldiers in the group,
were sent in right after the Tikrit Airport was taken over.
They built a perimeter around that airport, they built
structures for the defense of our forces throughout northern
Iraq. They haven't taken a single casualty. They're coming home
safe and sound. Thirty-two bronze-star medals are being
awarded, have been awarded, to the troops in that group. And it
makes me very proud of those troops in particular, but others
from throughout our State and across the country who have
responded to the call, carried out their missions with a
tremendous amount of professional skill and courage. And we owe
them a great deal. And I know that an effort is going to be
made to ensure that they are treated fairly. We have some that
have just gotten back from Bosnia, for example, who are now
being put on a list for possible deployment to Iraq. We have
others who have been to Guantanamo Bay.
So the National Guard and Reserve forces are really being
stretched, and I worry a little bit about whether or not we
have the incentives and the pay and benefits that are necessary
to guarantee that we can retain and continue to recruit members
of the Guard and Reserve in the future. There's a TRICARE
program, as an example, a health benefit program that Congress
has authorized, but it's not yet been implemented for National
Guard forces. I bring that to your attention because it may be
one example of what we can do to help make sure we're treating
those forces fairly.
What is your response to that general problem that we may
face and what the Department of Defense is doing to address it?
STRESS ON THE GUARD AND RESERVE
Secretary Rumsfeld. The problem you have mentioned is real.
You have units, and we look at their deployments--it may be
Bosnia, it may be Guantanamo, it may be Afghanistan or Iraq--
and then there are individuals that change in units. And so
someone may be coming back, and go to another unit, and end up
being deployed at some point. The planning tools in the Army
are imperfect, and they are being refined and improved. And
we're doing today, I believe, a vastly better job than we did a
year ago in having visibility into the circumstance of
individuals, as well as units.
When I sign a deployment order, I look at each unit and the
number of individuals, and how long since they've been
deployed. You're right, the Guard and Reserve has stepped up
and done a magnificent job. You're right, also, that the Guard
and Reserve have been stressed. But the fact is, it isn't
probably quite right to say the Guard and Reserve have been
stressed. Significant portions have. And other portions have
not, at all, been used. And that goes to the point you made at
the outset, that we've got to find a way to re-balance these
skill sets, both within the Guard and Reserve, and also with
the Active force.
MOBILITY REQUIREMENT STUDY
Senator Cochran. General Myers, one of the units in our
State, an Air National Guard unit, has been the first Guard
unit to have a C-17 fleet assigned for operation in Jackson,
Mississippi, and we're very proud of that honor, and the forces
there are working hard to do the training and maintain the
facilities that are necessary to carry out their
responsibilities. I noticed that a recent Congressional
Research Service report concluded that there is a need for
strategic lift capacity greater than that which we had earlier
expected. Currently, there's a procurement strategy for C-17s
of a total of 180 by 2007, and the Air Force is indicating now
they may have a requirement for more than 200. I wonder if the
aging of the C-17 fleet and the C-5 fleet, are causing you
concerns. Do you believe the budget requests that are before
the committee are sufficient to deal with the needs that we
have for strategic airlift?
General Myers. Senator Cochran, I believe that the request
that you have right now is sufficient for fiscal year 2005.
What we need to do, and what we are doing, is looking at our--
what we call our mobility requirements study. We do these, as
you know, periodically. It looks, not only at airlift, but
other modes of transportation. I think, coming out of that and
getting ready for the 2006 budget, you will probably see the
answer to the question on, Do we need more C-17s beyond what
are currently programmed? And I don't want to prejudice the
outcome of that. But the concerns you raise are serious
concerns, and we need to look at it.
By the way, the C-17 is performing magnificently. You can
remember it was, at one time, a maligned program, almost cut.
And it has been--it's kind of my primary mode of transportation
when I go back and forth to the Middle East, and I've come to
know it very well.
Let me just make a comment on the Reserve component. I
would like to echo what the Secretary says. You know, we're one
Armed Forces. We're the total force. When I go to visit troops,
you can't tell who the reservists are, who the Guard's people
are, or who the Active duty are. Everybody's in there together,
everybody is performing, in my view, magnificently.
We've got to worry as much about Reserve component
recruiting and retention as we do the Active piece, because
we're a total force. We could not be doing this without the
Reserve component, and they've really answered up.
On medical, there are a couple of things that--I know we
need help in medical--that don't break the bank. One is making
sure they get TRICARE benefits prior--earlier than they do now
when they are mobilized. They need that. They also need it
longer on the other end, when they are demobilized. And they
need transportability. Right now, if they have a private
insurance company, they can go to TRICARE. But TRICARE may
require they change providers. And when you have serious
medical problems in a family, that's not the thing to do for a
year or two, to change providers. We could mandate the same
thing we mandate for Medicare; if you take TRICARE, you know,
everybody's got to take it. And so there are some--I think,
some relatively inexpensive, and things we could do today, to
help our Reserve component mightily.
The other thing we ought to do, for sure, is make sure that
our Reserve component folks get annual physicals so we know
what kind of medical shape they're in, because we've discovered
a lot of problems. I mean, this sounds farfetched, but one
person was mobilized, needed a liver transplant. Okay? So we
ought to keep up with this on a yearly basis so we know what
the health of our force is.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Leahy is recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, yesterday in Iraq an American citizen was
brutally murdered by al Qaeda. Not long before that we saw the
dismembered corpses of brutally murdered Americans left hanging
from a bridge by jubilant Iraqis. Each of these brave Americans
were there to rebuild that country, and these despicable acts
illustrate, once again, the depravity, the determination of the
enemy we face.
I think we all agree on that, on this committee and on the
other side. The question is how to stop it. Now, you have said
you're sorry, and the President said he's sorry, everybody's
said they're sorry about the Iraqi prison scandal. It's
actually the first time in this long, protracted and rather
strange policy I've heard any administration official express
regret about any mistake.
So let me tell you a few things I'm sorry about. I'm sorry
that someone in the administration ``gave currency to a
fraud,'' to quote George Will, by putting, in the President's
State of the Union speech, that Iraq was trying to buy uranium
in Africa.
I'm sorry that this administration repeatedly, insistently,
and unrelentingly justified preemptive war by insisting that
Saddam Hussein not only had weapons of mass destruction, but he
was hell bent on using them against us and our allies.
And I'm sorry about administration officials, led by the
Vice President, repeatedly trying to link Saddam Hussein to 9/
11, when there never was any link. None. They were doing it to
build support for the war.
And I'm sorry that truth-tellers in the administration,
like General Shinseki and Lawrence Lindsey, were hounded out of
their job because they had the temerity to suggest realistic
numbers both for our troop level and for what this war is going
to cost.
I'm sorry there's no real plan, despite a year-long $5
million effort by the State Department, to stop the looting
that greeted our soldiers upon Saddam's fall, that set back
reconstruction efforts by months or years, left the gates open
to ammunition, weapons, and other things that are used against
our brave soldiers today.
I'm sorry that the President taunted Iraqi resistance
fighters to ``bring it on'' while our troops were still in
harm's way.
I'm sorry that some of our closest allies and friends, like
Mexico and Canada, even the countries that you dismissingly
called ``Old Europe,'' were alienated because they disagreed
with our strategy of preemptive war, countries whose diplomatic
and military help we need desperately today.
And I'm sorry that those that tried to find the truth about
allegations of prison abuse in Iraq and in Afghanistan and in
Guantanamo were ignored or brushed off for more than 1 year,
until all of a sudden the press published the lurid
photographs, and then we look at it and we have made apologies
through the whole administration.
Now, last October 13, in your memo entitled ``Global War on
Terrorism,'' you asked--I'm quoting what you said--``Are we
capturing, killing, or dissuading more terrorists every day
than the madrases and radical clerics are recruiting, training,
and deploying against us?'' Al Qaeda wasn't in Iraq when we
started this war. They are there now.
How do you answer the question you posed last October? Your
question was, again, ``Are we capturing, killing, or dissuading
more terrorists every day than the madrases and radical clerics
are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?'' How would
you answer that today?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, first I'd like to, Senator,
answer a few of the other comments you made.
Senator Leahy. Well, could we answer that one first?
Senator Stevens. Well, he has the full right to answer your
question.
Senator Leahy. I know, but could we answer the question,
the specific question I asked? That's the only question I
asked. Answer that, and then say all you want to say.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think it's fair that I be allowed to
answer your statement.
Senator Leahy. Well, I asked a question. You don't want to
answer my question?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'd be happy to answer your question.
Senator Leahy. Please do.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will.
IRAQ TROOP LEVELS
Let me start this way. The statement that General Shinseki
was hounded out of office is false. He served his entire term.
Everyone who knows anything about the military knows that fact.
Second, he had a different view, which is fair for anybody,
as to how many forces would be appropriate. To my knowledge, he
did not express it--well, I won't even say that. Forget that.
That was a private meeting. But the fact of the matter is,
every general there--on the ground, in the country, and on the
Joint Chiefs currently--believed that we have the right number.
If he disagrees, that's fair. He's a fine, honorable man, and
he can have a difference of opinion. But the fact is that the
number there is what the military believes is appropriate.
General Myers I'd like to comment on the caches that you
say were left unattended.
INVESTIGATING REPORTED ABUSES
And I think your statement that allegations of abuse were
``brushed off'' is unfair and inaccurate. There have been a lot
of fine people----
Senator Leahy. I'll show you the correspondence that I sent
to your office asking about these abuses about 1 month ago that
were never answered.
Secretary Rumsfeld. If there was a letter that wasn't
answered, I apologize. But the fact of the matter is that we
get repeated reports from people, of problems, and they are
checked, and they are worked on, and corrections are made, and
most of the investigation reports indicate----
Senator Leahy. Apparently not in Iraq----
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. That----
Senator Leahy [continuing]. Or Afghanistan, according to
the front page of papers this morning.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The fact of the matter is that in Iraq
there have been improvements made, and successive
investigations have seen that improvements were made, and they
were not brushed off. But I think saying that the military
chain of command was ``brushing off'' legitimate comments about
procedures being used with the detainees is just simply not
consistent. We're trying to find out precisely what happened,
and we're going to end up with six investigations going on, and
we'll know the extent to which things were or were not brushed
off.
Last, I don't know the answer to your question. I wish I
did. I posed it because it may be a question that's not
answerable except over time. But I do worry about it, which is
why I wrote the memo and why I sent it to General Myers. I
think that the world is facing a very dangerous threat in
international terrorism. They are capable--and, in fact,
already have killed tens of thousands of people in various ways
in different countries over time--3,000 in this country alone,
and attacks in Saudi Arabia, attacks in Turkey, attacks in
Indonesia. And we know these madrasa schools--not all madrases
are bad, but a small fraction of them do, in fact, get funded
for the specific purpose of training people to go out and kill
innocent men, women, and children and to do the kinds of things
you've cited in your opening statement. It is inhuman. It is
against any law of war. And it's a dangerous thing. And I don't
know of any way that one can calculate that. Our folks are
doing the best job they can.
MARK BERG
General Myers. Senator Leahy, let me just--let me talk a
little bit about the gruesome murder of Mark Berg. The best we
know--and I don't know that we know this for sure--but it looks
like the perpetrator, the lead perpetrator, might have been
this fellow, Zarqawi, who, while not al Qaeda, has been al
Qaeda-affiliated for a long, long time. Well before the war in
Iraq, he was in Iraq from time to time. If that's true, then
this is not Iraqis killing Americans, this is a--in fact, he
is, I think, a Jordanian citizen. But he's an extremist, most
of all. And the Zarqawi letter tells us all we need to know
about him. He will do anything to stop the progress in Iraq.
He's the one that suggested, ``We're losing to the coalition.
We have to do something dramatic, and maybe we need to start a
civil war between Sunni and Shia.'' So this act, if it is, in
fact, Zarqawi, as some allege, this is a further validation of
what his tactics are. I just make that point on the Mark Berg
thing.
Senator Leahy. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, we'll be
able to submit other questions----
Senator Stevens. Yes, on appropriations. This is not about
Iraq abuse.
Senator Leahy. We haven't even been given the request yet,
and we're having to----
Senator Stevens. We have the request for----
Senator Leahy. For $25 billion?
Senator Stevens [continuing]. Four hundred and one billion
dollars. That's what we're talking about this morning. We
haven't received the reserve request, that's true, but that's--
you know, I have no cork to put in Senators' mouths or
witnesses' mouths, but my hope----
Senator Leahy. Appreciate that.
Senator Stevens [continuing]. Is to pursue the information
we've gotten so far, on which we still need a lot of
information about the $401 billion.
Senator Domenici is recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Chairman, I will follow your
admonition. But I wish I had a few moments to tell this
committee what I'm sorry about. I'm sorry about 9/11, when
3,000 Americans were killed by terrorists. I'm sorry that
Saddam Hussein took over this country and killed thousands of
people and established one of the worst regimes ever. And
there's another long list of what we're sorry about, and
they're completely different than what Senator Leahy's sorry
about.
Now, having said that, we are only 42 days away from
turning over this country to the Iraqi leadership, whatever
that is. Mr. Secretary and General, I am very worried about how
prepared the Iraqis are to take over this responsibility, and,
secondly, what we have done to prepare ourselves and them to
work together to make this work.
I can envision that this situation will not work, and that
we won't have an organizational structure that will do anything
other than have Americans fighting and us supplying those
fighters with more and more money. Can you describe, as best
you can, where we are, what we're going to do, and how
confident you are that this turnover is going to be meaningful,
in terms of maintaining the peace and moving ahead with
America's commitment.
TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY IN IRAQ
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Senator.
It's a tough question. If you think back to Afghanistan, we
didn't know how that was going to work. We went in, the Taliban
was removed, the al Qaeda were put on the run, and what was
left were a series of warlords with militias, and no government
structure. And, lo and behold, out of the blue came something
called a loya jirga, and out came agreements that a fellow
named Karzai should be selected as interim president. And there
he is. And it's been wobbly, and he's worked his way along, and
he's made arrangements with other people, and, lo and behold,
it's survived. No one in the world could have predicted how
that would go. And now they're scheduled to have elections
later this year, they're scheduled to endorse their
constitution, and it might very well work. I've got confidence
that it will work.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Rumsfeld. But it was an Afghan solution.
Senator Domenici [continuing]. I have been fair, I think,
in my question, and I have been fair with you all, all the
time, but I don't want to hear about Afghanistan. It is
completely different----
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is.
Senator Domenici [continuing]. In my opinion. It has
nothing whatsoever to do with Iraq that has people like al Sadr
around, gathering up people, that we have cities that we are
abandoning to a bunch of thugs, and yet, at the same time,
we're saying we're going to form a new government and turn over
power to them. I believe that you have to be better prepared
for this transition than I have heard. And it may be you can't
tell us, but the transition is not something that's going to
work unless you have planned it, and the military has planned
it, and you're working with Iraqis. And, frankly, I think you
ought to tell us.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I'll do my best. The United
Nations representative, Brahimi, is--been working with us, with
the Coalition Provisional Authority, and with the Iraqi people,
the Iraqi Governing Council, and hundreds of others, Iraqis.
And he has come up with a formula, which is now being tested in
the marketplace there. People are describing it, talking about
it, analyzing it, recommending changes. And it may not be
exactly what he proposed, but it'll be something like that. My
guess is, there'll be a conclave, something like a loya jirga,
where governors and city councils and people like that will
come together, and they'll end up working out something that is
generally acceptable to the bulk of the people--not
permanently, but between June 30, when sovereignty is accepted
by the Iraqi government, whatever it looks like. The current
theory is, there'll be a president, a couple of vice
presidents, there'll be ministries, and they will assume that
responsibility for a period, and the period would be ended
after they have fashioned a constitution, voted on a
constitution by the Iraqi people, and then elected other people
to succeed that interim group.
Will it happen right on time? I think so. I hope so. Will
it be perfect? No. Will it be like Afghanistan? No. You're
right. It'll be an Iraqi solution, just like Afghanistan was an
Afghanistan solution. Is it possible it won't work? Yes. And is
it possible they'll stumble and wobble? Everybody stumbles and
wobbles.
RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ INFRASTRUCTURE
Senator Domenici. Mr. Secretary, let me just, for instance,
raise one question. It would appear to me that for this to
work, somebody has to have a plan for serious long-term
improvement of the infrastructure of that country. That's not
going to fall on our shoulders. Somebody has to put it
together. Somebody has to make sure that the monies coming into
that country are used to leverage long-term loans of a lot of
money, or there's no chance that the Iraqis are going to buy
this based on upon ``things will work out years from now.''
They've got to work out from the very beginning. And I wonder
who's working on that kind of infrastructure assurance, or are
we just expecting it to happen?
Senator Stevens. That's the Senator's last question. I'm
sorry.
Senator Domenici. I thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The conviction on the part of the
United States and the coalition countries has been that you
need to make progress on Iraqis taking over governance of their
own country, simultaneously make progress on security, and
simultaneously make progress on essential services, the
infrastructure, that one can't go ahead of the other. You're
not going to get infrastructure to proceed if, in fact,
security isn't sufficient to protect it. You're not going to
get the governance to go forward if there isn't some progress
on infrastructure and essential services. So that understanding
is there.
My personal view is that the critical ones are governance
and security, and that the infrastructure will be something
that will probably lag behind somewhat, and they're going to
have to pay for their improvements in their infrastructure. The
Congress has voted some money, the international community's
given some money. They've got oil revenues. They are going to
have to do that. It's going to take them time. There isn't any
reason that country can't be as prosperous as its neighboring
countries--Kuwait and--but that isn't going to come from us;
that's going to come from them. And these are intelligent
people, they're industrious people, they've got resources,
they've got water, they've got oil revenues, and they're going
to have to do that themselves.
What our task is, is to pass governance to them, have them
accept it. Will they be good at it at first? No. They're not
going to be good at it. They've been living under a
dictatorship. They don't know how--they're not going to be
instantaneously successful in negotiating, compromising,
putting their fate in a piece of paper called the constitution
that'll protect the rights of each religious group in there.
But they'll get it eventually, just like the Afghans are
getting it, it seems to me.
SECURITY FORCES IN IRAQ
With respect to security, it's our job to see, as General
Myers said, that we continue to invest in recruiting and
training and deploying and developing a chain of command so
that the Iraqis are able to take over security for themselves.
People can be quite dismissive of the 206,000 Iraqi security
forces. But 300 have been killed. They've not been killed
because they're sitting in their barracks with their fingers in
their ear; they've been killed because they've been out doing
the job of helping to provide security in that country. And, by
golly, we can help train 'em, we can help equip 'em, and we can
give them more responsibility, and they're going to have to
take it over, because the United States has no intention in
staying there. We're not going to make a career out of that.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
General Myers. Let me just----
Senator Stevens. Senator Myers, did you wish to comment?
General Myers. Yeah, just a--I've got a short comment, Mr.
Chairman, thank you.
Senator Stevens. General Myers. You're not a Senator yet.
General Myers. Thank you. On the security front, first of
all we're going to have 20,000 additional troops in there for
some time to come, as I mentioned in my opening statement. We
delayed some, and we're going to replace them. So we're going
to have in the neighborhood of 135,000 to 136,000 troops there
for the foreseeable future to deal with the security issues we
think we need to deal with, and that's been General Abizaid's
request.
Second, we're going to stand up a brand new headquarters
that'll deal, at the strategic level, with our chief of
mission, with other chiefs of missions, and, most importantly--
most importantly--with Iraqis. We want to go from a coalition
in that country to a partnership with Iraq, and this means
developing the ministry of interior, the ministry of defense,
and have Iraqis part of that whole chain. And we see it as a
mentoring program for a while, but eventually, as the Secretary
says, you've got to take the hand off the bicycle seat and see
how far they get, and if they fall over and bruise themselves
and get cut up, then you wipe 'em off, you dry, you put a Band-
aid on the knee, and off they go again.
We think an awful lot about how we're going to do that on
the security front, and the equip and training of the Iraqi
forces I won't go into again. But there's been a lot of thought
given to that structure that we're going to. We're going to try
to stand up that headquarters as quickly as we can, matter of
fact. We've been working that for a couple of months now.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Senator Harkin, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Let me inquire anybody wish a station-
break? Okay.
You're recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Harkin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CONTROL OF PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS
Mr. Secretary, on May 7, an Associated Press (AP) story
came out, that said a year before the Iraq invasion, the then
Army Secretary warned his Pentagon bosses that there was
inadequate control of private military contractors. Retired
Army Chief Thomas White said that, ``The recent events show the
Pentagon has a long way to go to fix the problems he identified
in March 2002. In a sign of continued problems with the
tracking of contracts, Pentagon officials, on Thursday,
acknowledged they have yet to identify which army entity
manages the multimillion dollar contract for interrogators like
the one accused in the Iraq prisoner abuse probe. I'm still
reading from the AP release--``Defense Secretary Donald H.
Rumsfeld also acknowledged his Department hasn't completed
rules to govern the 20,000 or so private security guards
watching over U.S. officials, installations, and private
workers in Iraq.'' Now, that's just 20,000 private security
guards. How many more, we don't know. This article goes on and
says, ``No single Pentagon office tracks how many people--
Americans, Iraqis, or others--are on the Department's payroll
in Iraq.''
I just find this disturbing that we don't know how many
people are on the payroll, or who they are. This says to me, we
might have a bunch of Rambos over there running around, and no
one's got control over them.
In a March 2002 memo, White complained to three Pentagon
Under Secretaries that, quote, ``Credible information on
contract labor does not exist internal to the Army
Department.'' The Army could not get rid of, quote,
``unnecessary, costly, or unsuitable contracted work,'' closed
quotes, without full details of all the contracts, White wrote.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Is this referring to Iraq or
Afghanistan, or what? Or just generally?
Senator Harkin. The article is on Iraq. This is just
basically on Iraq.
Senator Stevens. Senator, did you----
Senator Harkin. But then----
Senator Stevens [continuing]. What source are you quoting?
Senator Harkin. I've quoted from this AP article. It's an
AP article that came out on May 7. That's all I'm quoting.
So my question, again has to do with appropriations. How
much money is going to private contractors? We can't seem to
get an answer to that. In Iraq. How many people are we talking
about under these private contractors? Who screens them? Who
approves their contracts? I guess my bottom line is, Who's
responsible? Who's responsible for all these people?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Coalition Provisional Authority in
Iraq, headed up by Ambassador Bremer, tracks these people. We
track DOD people that are there, but they've reported to
Congress. The Army, the United States Army, is the executive
agent for contracting for the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA). And the CPA's--the Coalition Provisional Authority's
Program Management Office works for the United States Army.
Senator Harkin. So the Army's in charge.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Army is the----
Senator Harkin. Contracting----
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. Program Management Office
and executive agent. I would not say that the Army would be the
one making the decisions as to what contracts ought to be let
for what purposes. That would be the Coalition Provisional
Authority. But then they delegate to an existing institution,
the United States Army, to manage the contracting of it. In
some cases, it's been the Corps of Engineers; in some cases,
it's been the Agency for International Development (AID); in
some cases--the way our Government is organized is that those
responsibilities flow down different roads, and that's the way
the executive branch of the Federal Government's organized,
that's the way the Congress is organized. And there is not a
single person, I wouldn't think. Because if--AID reports up in
the Department of State area. Just a second here.
Senator Harkin. Could we know, Mr. Secretary, what's under
your jurisdiction? I mean, what is under--in terms of private
contractors and the jobs that are being done over there----
Secretary Rumsfeld. You bet. We can give you----
Senator Harkin [continuing]. I'd like to----
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. A complete report of it.
Senator Harkin. Huh?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We could give you a complete report of
who handles what types of contracts. Corps of Engineers handles
a whole series of contracts. And military intelligence, when
they hire contractors, for example--I think you mentioned
this--for the purpose of interrogation or for the purpose of
linguists to do translation, that would be through military
intelligence. It depends on what it is that's needed at any
given time.
Senator Harkin. Well, again, I'm just quoting from the
article, because I don't----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I haven't seen the article, so----
Senator Harkin. It says----
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. I apologize.
Senator Harkin [continuing]. No single Pentagon office
tracks how many people are on the Department's payroll in Iraq,
the Department of Defense payroll. How many civilians are on
your payroll over there? And I would be greatly----
Secretary Rumsfeld. We could certainly give you----
Senator Harkin [continuing]. Disturbed if this article is
true.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The reference--it wasn't a quote, but
it was a comment about--allegedly indicating something I had
said. I've never heard of that, what you've said the article
said I said. But we'd be happy to tell you how many there are,
and who they are hired by, and for what purposes.
Senator Stevens. Senator----
Senator Harkin. If you could provide for this committee how
much----
Senator Stevens [continuing]. Mr. Lanzillotta wished to
answer that question, I think.
REPORTING ON CONTRACTS
Mr. Lanzillotta. Senator, I may be able to help a bit. We
submit a quarterly report--it's called a 2708 report--that has
a lot of that information in there. As far as contracts go, for
the funding and the number of people, we track that on a weekly
basis. I get that information through CPA. It comes in an
obligation report of how much has been apportioned, how much
has been committed, how much has been obligated. And I see all
the funding documents that go through--on every contract, with
the number of people--that go through there, and I personally
sign off on those.
Senator Harkin. So you can provide to this committee how
much money goes through the Department of Defense to private
contractors, one. You could provide how many civilian people
are working under those contracts in Iraq at this time, and you
can provide also, to this committee, the chain of command who
is responsible for overseeing those contractors. You can
provide all that?
Mr. Lanzillotta. I can--let me clarify your last----
Senator Harkin. Well, I'm just----
Mr. Lanzillotta [continuing]. The chain of command----
Senator Harkin [continuing]. Citing, again, from this
article; I don't know if it's true--no single Pentagon office,
according to this writer, tracks how many people--Americans,
Iraqis, or other civilians--are on the Department's payroll in
Iraq.
Mr. Lanzillotta. If you're asking who let the contract----
Senator Harkin. Who tracks how many people there are there?
Mr. Lanzillotta. I can give you, and we'll provide for the
record, the obligation data, as of this hearing date, the
number of people that we have in the various categories,
working. And I will provide which office did the contract.
[The information follows:]
According to the CENTCOM Combatant Commander, on or about
May 12, 2004 there were approximately 12,900 U.S. contract
employees hired under DOD sponsored prime contracts in the
CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. Approximately 7,050 of these
contractors are deployed in Iraq. Please note that due to the
nature of the contract--DOD contracts for a service to be
performed--it is up to the contractor to provide the
appropriate number of people to perform the work. Therefore,
the numbers that are provided above are estimates of the number
of people that process through military entry points. This
number changes daily.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me put it this way also.
Senator Harkin. Fine.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We can provide that data. You keep
going back to the point, which is a fair point, Is there a
single office? And the answer is, no. For one, the way the
Congress is organized and the way the statutes that the
Congress has passed has organized the Department of Defense,
we've got Department of Army, Department of Navy--they do
things there, Air Force does things there. Each of the services
do--the Marines do, and other elements. So the only place that
information gets aggregated, the way the Congress has organized
the Department under Goldwater-Nichols, is through the
Comptroller's shop, where they take all of the things that
happen in the Department and try to pull them up, I think is
the answer to your question.
Senator Harkin. So there's no coordination?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course there's coordination. You
didn't ask that. You asked, Is there a single office? The
coordination takes place in the Comptroller's shop.
Mr. Lanzillotta. We coordinate--when a contract comes
through, we coordinate with all affected offices, to include
the general counsel, to ensure that there are no objections and
it is a legitimate contract.
CONTRACTORS
Senator Harkin. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but my
point is that we don't know how many civilian people are
contracted. We don't know how much they're being paid. And it
just seems that there's no real handle on all these civilians
over there. I just don't know. We can't seem to get a handle on
it.
Senator Stevens. Senator, I think that--we had a suggestion
from Mr. Lanzillotta they'll provide us with some information.
I think the problem is that I don't think it's all in one place
at any one time.
General Myers, did you wish to comment?
General Myers. Well, I have numbers, but I think I'll defer
to----
Mr. Lanzillotta. Well, I can----
General Myers [continuing]. Mr. Lanzillotta. But I have the
number of U.S. contractors, the number of--you remember it was
in the 1990s when we started downsizing. We cut our military by
one-third, roughly. And the cry then was, from many people, and
from people in the business sector, How about outsourcing a lot
of your work? So we did that, and you remember that. We saved
money, because we don't need a lot of folks to do dining halls
if we only need to do that during crisis. And so that's the
situation we are in now. We are contracting out a lot because
of previous decisions we made, encouraged, I think, for the
right reasons at the time. And one of the things I've asked one
of our staff entities to do is, let's take a look at
contracting out and see if those decisions we've made in the
last 10, 15 years are still right for this security
environment, because of the contractor issues we're finding on
the battlefield.
But I've got the numbers. I can give you down to the number
of host nation--Iraqi laborers. There's 17,834 that are----
Senator Stevens. General, if we may--Mr. Lanzillotta's
going to provide----
Mr. Lanzillotta. Yeah, I have it----
Senator Stevens [continuing]. That for the record.
General Myers. We'll provide it for the record, but I'm
just saying----
Senator Stevens. We'll review that and then have comments
later----
General Myers [continuing]. That I've got some pretty good
detail here.
Senator Stevens [continuing]. If that's agreeable with the
Senator.
Senator Harkin. That would be fine.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
The Department of Defense (DOD) policy is to rely on the
most effective mix of the Total Force, cost and other factors
considered, including active, reserve, DOD civilian, host
country and contract resources to fulfill peacetime and wartime
missions. One of the reasons contracts are attractive is their
flexibility and agility in meeting government requirements. The
government is also relieved of the cost of maintaining
permanent force structure while maintaining contract oversight
after contract award.
Generally, there are two types of DOD contractors currently
operating in OIF; those supporting DOD military efforts and
those supporting the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
efforts. There is no single office responsible for contractor
visibility. Instead, each individual government organization
with a requirement that can be satisfied by contract is
responsible for providing a contract statement of work/
objectives; funding; appropriate contract clauses, terms and
conditions; legal review at various stages of the acquisition
process; and contract oversight after award. This process
provides flexibility and an adequate level of review while also
meeting government requirements.
The U.S. citizen contractor personnel for DOD are accounted
for in basically the same manner as military personnel. The
military Services account for U.S. citizen contractor personnel
and report aggregate contractor personnel numbers monthly to
the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense using
the Joint Staff Personnel Status Report (JPERSTAT). Per the
JPERSTAT, there are 14,371 DOD U.S. citizen contractor
personnel (as of May 25, 2004) operating in the Central Command
area of responsibility. Approximately 7,386 of these contractor
personnel are operating in Iraq. The JPERSTAT only captures
U.S. citizen contractor personnel that process through DOD
entry points or are assigned to military units in theater. The
JPERSTAT does not capture all contractor personnel in the
theater. It does not capture contractor personnel hired under
non-DOD federal government contracts (e.g., CPA, Central
Intelligence Agency, State Department, United States Agency of
International Development). It also does not capture foreign
national contractor personnel or contractor personnel hired
under sub-contracts since it is the responsibility of each
prime contractor to determine the level and nature of manning
required to meet contract requirements (e.g., the prime
contractor may choose to outsource a portion of the effort
through various tiers of subcontracting relationships with
other U.S. civilians, third country nationals (TCN), or host
country (HC) personnel).
Although the JPERSTAT does not provide visibility of
foreign national or sub-contractor personnel, the Army's
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, which
is one of the largest contracts in theater, does offer some
visibility on the magnitude of DOD contractor personnel outside
of the JPERSTAT process. The LOGCAP contract currently has
approximately 1,166 TCN, 2,039 HC, and 20,462 sub-contractor
personnel (includes a combination of TCN, HC and U.S.
personnel).
Contractors in support of the CPA provide reconstruction
and other support in Iraq and protection of CPA facilities and
personnel. Contractors under CPA contracts have no specific
reporting requirement to account for contractor personnel
thereby providing greater flexibility as they organize as
necessary to perform the contract. However, through the process
for obtaining weapons permits, CPA reports that approximately
60 private security companies consisting of about 20,000
personnel are currently providing security in Iraq.
There are also private enterprise personnel operating
outside of the DOD and CPA contract efforts pursuing commerce
opportunities. As the theater evolves from a contingency
operation through stability operations to normal Iraqi
commerce, the role of private enterprise personnel will
increase. Like other mature countries, the accountability and
visibility of these private enterprise U.S. citizen contractor
personnel in the future will reside with the U.S. Department of
State working in coordination with the appropriate Iraqi
ministry through the visa process.
Senator Stevens. I'll now recognize Senator Bond.
Senator Bond. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I commend the Secretary and the chairman for your
great work. I think these have been very difficult times. The
leadership that you are providing is absolutely essential to
support our troops and the private contractors who are engaged
in a very important mission, and we are grateful for that.
I will have a lengthy statement for the record that
somebody may wish to read, but I will feel better for having
submitted it, because I have some strong views that I will
include in it.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Christopher S. Bond
Secretary Rumsfeld, General Meyers, Mr. Lanzillotta, thank you for
appearing before the committee this morning. We meet under challenging
circumstances by any measure. Military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan coupled with the nation's ongoing global war on terror
demand our constant attention and focus.
The Abu Ghraib prison investigation that has demanded much
attention recently has only added to the workload unfortunately. I have
read Major General Antonia Taguba's report and concur with statements
made by Major General Taguba; that the abuses at Abu Ghraib represented
a total breakdown in supervision, training, discipline and leadership
and were exacerbated by a shortage of trained personnel. The abuses at
Abu Ghraib that have been documented so vividly are not reflective of
the United States military that American's have come to revere and
respect.
As was viciously portrayed by yesterday's Al Qaeda video showing
the beheading of an American civilian and non-combatant, Nick Berg; our
enemy is the terrorist who targets innocent civilians and the terror
organizations and regimes who support terror as a legitimate political
tool. The beheading of Nick Berg is another wake-up call for all of us.
I am getting this sense, particularly in the wake of the Berg killing,
that we should be careful to manage the prison issue, and not overdo
it. Berg's murder demonstrated the stark contrast between the
wrongdoings at Abu Ghraib and the evil evident in the beheading of a
non-combatant civilian. We are once again reminded of the true nature
of the enemy and why we are fighting them. Unfortunately I fear the
continued political rhetoric here at home will have a detrimental
impact on troop moral. We need to focus our energies on the war on
terror, which we cannot afford to lose.
Recently, I received the United States Department of State's annual
report, Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2003. The report reveals that
the year 2003 saw the lowest annual level of terrorist attacks since
1969 which indicates that much progress has been made in combating
terrorism. Almost 70 percent of the senior al-Qaeda leadership, and
more than 3,400 operatives or associates, have been detained or killed
in over 100 countries. The global war on terror is not over, nor will
it be anytime soon. That is why we must focus our energies on winning
this battle. As was stated so clearly by a DefenseNews article,
Repercussions of Failure, April 19, 2004,
``A successful campaign by insurgents to drive coalition forces
from Iraq would constitute a shattering blow to the U.S.-led global war
on terrorism and jeopardize governments that have cast their lot with
Washington, according to U.S. officials and Arab analysts. `The price
of failure in Iraq would be catastrophic,' one senior U.S. State
Department official said. `Anything that defeats the expression of U.S.
and allied power against terrorism will create the impression of
weakness that terrorists worldwide will exploit.' ''
The Administration has indicated that it will forward a $25 billion
supplemental request for the incremental costs associated with ongoing
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand the defense
appropriations subcommittee will hold a separate hearing on the
supplemental. I look forward to reviewing the administration's request,
and will work with Chairman Stevens and Senator Inouye in providing
whatever funds and resources are necessary to support our warfighters
and the global war on terror.
The reliance on our National Guard and Reserve forces to prosecute
the war on terror is increasing. I understand Secretary Rumsfeld is
working with Lieutenant General Blum, Chief of the National Guard
Bureau and the Reserve Chiefs, to improve the predictability of
mobilizations for our nation's Reservists while re-balancing the active
duty-reserve force mix so as to improve the overall capabilities of our
military. As a co-chair of the Senate National Guard Caucus, along with
my colleague Senator Patrick Leahy, I am committed to working with the
Department of Defense to improve the capabilities of the National Guard
and its ability to support the nation's military strategy. Were it not
for congressional increases in accounts such as the National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Account I am certain that the gap in capabilities
between the active component and the Reserve component would widen.
Additionally I am concerned about the rising cost of modern weapons
systems as exemplified by aviation programs. Unconstrained cost growth
in the F/A-22 has limited the number of platforms available to fully
equip our aviation units under the current congressionally mandated
cost caps. The troubling cost growth in the F-35 so early in the
program threatens to duplicate the lesson of the F/A-22. The Army's
decision to cancel the Comanche light attack helicopter program further
illustrates what awaits a program that is unable to control costs. We
should not be held captive to rising and unconstrained development
costs. This is why I support a competitive industrial base through the
continued production of a limited number of F-15 aircraft so that the
warfighter, and the taxpayer, will have an alternative should the
desires of the U.S. Air Force not be met because of limited resources.
The need to transform the force while executing the global war on
terror is not an enviable task. It has been acknowledged that the
Department of Defense has an inordinate tail to tooth logistical load.
Unless we reverse this, our ability to field an efficient fighting
force will suffer. If segments of the bureaucracy within the Department
of Defense are not responsive to the needs of the warfighter then they
should be replaced, disbanded or its functions transferred to the
civilian sector. In my effort to improve military mail operations and
Voting Assistance Programs I have come to understand how a sluggish and
unresponsive bureaucracy can impact negatively support to our forces.
That is why I recently wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld to ascertain why the
recommendations of the Military Postal Service Task Force to out-source
some, or all, of MPS functions were not carried out.
Secretary Rumsfeld, General Meyers, our forces rely on your
leadership for their welfare and on the Congress for the resources
necessary to sustain a vibrant and effective fighting force. This is a
partnership that must flourish if our forces are to have the optimum
tools necessary to carry out their mission. We have the best fighting
force in the world. Our military forces deserve leaders and policy
makers who will put their welfare ahead of political or personal gain.
REBALANCING ACTIVE AND RESERVES FORCES
Senator Bond. Senator Cochran has already asked about the
OPTEMPO and increasing reliance on the Guard. As co-chairman of
the Guard Caucus, I'm very proud of the what the National Guard
is doing in answering the call to duty.
And I'd like to ask your comments on, How is the review on
re-balancing the forces, adjusting the mission and the force
structure--how is that progressing? And what is necessary from
this committee and this Congress to support our troops--not
just Guard and Reserve, but all of our troops--in seeing that
they can win a war which, once again, yesterday, we were
horribly reminded is a war against the forces that would
destroy civilization, that depend upon and act with pure evil
intent?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I would characterize broadly
the process of re-balancing the Guard and Reserve and the
Active components with the Reserve components as progressing
quite well. In fact, I've been quite impressed with the speed
that the--particularly the Department of the Army has
demonstrated in addressing it. And, of course, the Army is the
biggest place that this needs to be done. And they've been
addressing it with a good deal of, I thought, excellent work,
and the process is underway. They're doing that, simultaneously
with the task of increasing their combat capability from 33
brigades to 43 brigades, and moving to a more modular approach,
and all of that takes time.
We've overused military police. We have overused certain
civil affairs Reserves and Guard because of the way the total
force was structured. That's being shifted, and it'll take, I'm
going to guess--oh, goodness, it'll probably take 2, 3 years, 4
years, to get it done. David Chu, is that about right?
Dr. Chu. Yes, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But we've got a good start on it.
Senator Bond. One of the things that pundits are raising is
the problems that they see coming down the line with
recruitment and retention. I've heard, anecdotally, some very
good news on those subjects. What do you see, from the
Department level, about recruiting and retention?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, I look out there, and it's foggy,
it's blurred. I'm worried. On the other hand, the data we get
is very positive. We are clearly retaining and recruiting the
skill sets we need in the Armed forces. And that is enormously
encouraging. I have no idea how fast that could drop off. And
we have to constantly try to refine our ability to look out
there and to take steps in advance.
For example, when we had to extend some Guard and Reserve
people beyond the 365 days in Iraq to another 90 days because
of the situation on the ground, we didn't want to do it. But
General Abizaid said he needed an additional 20,000 forces. We
said, ``Fair enough. What's the best way to do it?'' And that
was the best way to do it. But we immediately stepped in and
provided some compensation for those individuals, who served
various portions of 3 months.
MAIL SERVICE
Senator Bond. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that. I know you
wouldn't be satisfied if I didn't raise one issue that I
brought to your attention before. It has to go to morale. It is
the question of military mail delivery. We've discussed this on
many occasions. I know you have many other issues of great
importance, like protecting lives, feeding our troops and
providing munitions. But I understand this is a very real
concern to the men and women over there. And having some
personal interest in that, as well, to which I confess, I
wonder if you had looked at outsourcing some of the mail-clerk
functions in working with the U.S. Postal Service to assure the
mail delivery is improved.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have not looked at that. I know that
the subject of mail delivery is, as you point out, an
enormously important one, and that the services and the Central
Command have all been working on it. I know they've even
particularly looked at it from the standpoint of the
difficulties they had with respect to all the elections that
are taking place this year. And coming over in the car, David
Chu briefed me that they have been working the--Department of
Defense has been working with the Postal Service to try to find
ways to improve that, and believe they've made progress.
General Myers. The reports I've seen, Senator Bond--and
I've seen--I get reports from time to time--shows that it's
getting better. I don't think it's where it needs to be yet,
and we have to continue to find ways to--but, you know, when I
was commander of U.S. forces in Japan, a fairly mature theater,
in the mid-1990s, we still had problems over there because of
just handling procedures, where all the mail would go into
Narita, and then it had to be brought to Yokota, and then it
had to be--and so it was--we were constantly working that
problem. It's obviously a worse situation in Iraq, and we've
got to find ways to work around that. And it's critical to
morale. We understand that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. They also have tried to find locations
where they could put phones and computers for e-mail access,
which is a part of the problem, and that's been working well.
Senator Bond. Thank you.
Senator Stevens. You should revive the V-mail. We used to
get V-mail. It would all go to one place, and then be sent by
telegram, and then they'd package it up on the other end. Isn't
that right, Dan?
Our next----
Senator Leahy. It's called the Internet now, Ted.
Senator Stevens. Senator Durbin.
No, it--e-mail is something different, because they would
take your letter that your mother wrote you, and they'd put it
into a telegram and send it over, and they kept the mother's
letter. It was a different thing.
Senator Durbin.
By the way, you're not that old, anyway.
We're going by seniority, then, Senator Feinstein, you're
first, if you'd wish to yield to her, Senator Durbin.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. That's very generous. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have just one quick question on Abu Ghraib for General
Myers, if I might, because I think it needs to be cleared up.
General Taguba testified yesterday, and let me just quote,
``Failure in leadership from the brigade commander on down,
lack of discipline, no training whatsoever, and no supervision
were the root of the problem.'' My question to you is, What
have you done to remedy this problem? If you could specifically
speak to each of those--lack of discipline, no training, no
supervision.
General Myers. On the discipline issue, quite frankly, what
was done was to replace the unit and put a unit in there that
was a better unit. And I hate to get into more specifics,
because it then starts to prejudice any action you may want to
take against any of the----
Senator Feinstein. I'm not asking you for that. I'm asking
you for the remedy.
General Myers. The remedy was another--the immediate remedy
was another unit, to put another unit in charge. This was, as
the Taguba report--now everybody has read it--this was a unit
that had issues with just adhering to the Army's standards.
Their uniform--they didn't have standardized uniforms, they
were allowed to carry guns in their civilian clothes when they
were off duty, they had things written on their cap, they
didn't particularly want to salute. This was a unit that had
those exact--so the first thing you do is, you replace the
leadership of the unit. They have done that.
Now, the Army Reserve and the Active Army, there are other
investigations and looks going on. General Helmly, the Chief of
the Army Reserve, is looking at other Reserve units to work the
training issues and the discipline issues to make sure
everybody's compliant with Army standards. So that process is
underway. We have not seen that review. We should get a
midcourse report on that here fairly shortly, and we'll be
happy to share that, because that's part of it. And that will
deal with both the training and the discipline part.
And then the last part you said was--you had----
Senator Feinstein. Supervision.
ABUSE
General Myers. Supervision, right. And there are a couple
of things going on in that regard. I think the General Helmly
Report will help. There's also the General Fay look at the role
that military intelligence played in this whole business, and
in detainee affairs. General Fay is looking at that. He's been
in Iraq. He's now in Germany. Part of the issue is that the
folks that he wants to talk to are now scattered. They're no
longer in Iraq. They're either in Germany or they're back in
the United States, or perhaps other places. So it'll take him
some time to go through that. We'll be getting an interim
report from him, as well. I'm sure the Secretary will make that
available if required. But that's what we're doing to remedy
those problems.
Senator Feinstein. And do you personally look at autopsy
reports of detainees who die in custody?
General Myers. No, I do not. What I look at is--I am--I
look at the allegations of abuse, and I look at what is being
done to investigate and correct the situation. I do do that.
Senator Feinstein. Just a suggestion, it might be a good
idea.
General Myers. Well, I do--I see--I mean, I see the
reports. I wouldn't call them autopsy reports. I see the
allegations of abuse. Usually in there is a description of the
abuse. I wouldn't call them autopsy reports, but I see the
words that talk about the type of abuse and the effect it had
on the individual.
Senator Feinstein. Right. I'd like to ask you--because
we've talked about this privately--I'd like to ask you a
question about the heroin--or the opium poppy production in
Afghanistan. And you've been very kind, you've reported back to
me, and I appreciate that. But I want to indicate my very deep
concern about the fact that tens or even hundreds of millions
of dollars have flowed from illegal heroin trade directly into
the hands of terrorist organizations, like al Qaeda. And today
Afghanistan is producing more poppy than ever. About 75 percent
of all of the heroin sold in the world is being produced today
in Afghanistan, $2.3 billion. It's my understanding that an
early harvest has produced as much as a 50 to 100 percent
increase in production from the 2003 estimates.
Now, here's my question. Are we protecting warlords in
Afghanistan who are growing poppy or producing heroin? Are we
holding back on eradicating crops for political reasons? So
what is the reason for the absence of military force to
eradicate the opium poppy in Afghanistan?
General Myers. Senator Feinstein, as we've discussed, and I
think you're focused on a very important issue--and I traveled
to Afghanistan--and now it's about 3 weeks ago, I guess. When I
talked to our Ambassador there, Ambassador Khalilzad, and our
military personnel, and the Ambassador's staff, they described
this issue as one of the big strategic issues for the future of
Afghanistan. As you know, the United Kingdom has the lead,
and--overall, for the international community, to deal with
this. The State Department has the U.S. Government lead for
this. I think what needs to be done is, we need to hear from
the Ambassador what kind of plan he would put in place to deal
with this effectively, and then we have to resource it. It's
going to require additional resources to what we have in
Afghanistan today. And I'm not talking now just with military
resources, but my understanding is we're going to need a lot
more of the type of resources that deal with drug issues, Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and others. And I think we'll
be hearing from the Ambassador on that, if they haven't
already, because we had a long talk about that when I was
there, based partly on our conversations, because that was--it
is a critical issue.
On the issue of warlords, I don't know that you can say one
way or the other. You'd have to guess, though, that probably a
lot of the warlords, or some of the people they support, are
involved in this. And that's why it's going to take more
resources to work this issue and come up with policies to work
this issue. That's a guess on my part. I have not--I'd have to
go back and research the intelligence. I'm sure there are some
that have to be involved. That's a way of life for some of
them, and you just have to assume it is.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, could I ask you a quick question? Last----
Senator Stevens. This will be the Senator's last question.
ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR
Senator Feinstein. Is my time--last question, I'll be fast.
Last year, I asked you, at this hearing, about the robust
nuclear earth penetrator, and you told me it was just a study.
Since that time, it's changed rather dramatically. The
Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports that the
administration's budget calls for spending $485 million over
the next 5 years just on the robust nuclear earth penetrator.
And the report says, and I quote, ``The study is examining
feasibility and cost, yet the 2005 request seems to cast
serious doubt on assertions that the robust nuclear earth
penetrator is only a study,'' end quote.
In light of this, are you still going to say to us that
this is just a study, or is the administration intent on the
development of a nuclear earth penetrator?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A decision to go forward with a earth
penetrator has not been made. A decision to determine whether
it's possible to have one that could help solve some potential
problems has been made. So that work is going forward, and the
money has been requested of Congress.
I don't--what I can do is--I don't believe the studies have
produced the kind of information that would enable one to say,
at this stage, that the development should go forward. But,
clearly, with the amount of underground activity that exists in
the world--and it's pervasive in country after country, that
people have tunneled underground--North Korea is a perfect
example, certainly Iran is, we have found this in country after
country. And the question is, If that is a problem, what might
be done about it? Your first choice would be to find some
obviously conventional way to do it. They've looked and looked
and looked, and this additional way is, at least in my view,
worth studying. And at that point where it migrates over into a
program, clearly the Congress would know and would have to make
a decision on it.
Senator Feinstein. Would you permit me just one quick
comment? Since we got into this, I've done my own study and
talked with physicists, and what they tell me is, there is no
known casing that can get a device deep enough--which would
have to be between 800 and 1,000 feet--to prevent huge nuclear
fallout. I'll just leave you with that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Maybe we ought to hire them.
Senator Feinstein. Sidney Drell, physicist, Stanford
University.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right, I know who he is. Right.
General Myers. Mr. Chairman, Senator Feinstein, if I may,
just one more comment. There is a lot more that Central
Command--I talked about the general problem--there's a lot more
that Central Command is doing, in terms of funding and in
instructions to the troops in Afghanistan that I'd like to
provide you for the record, if I may.
Senator Feinstein. I would appreciate that.
[The information follows:]
[Deleted].
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, General.
I'm going to go out of order and recognize Senator
Hutchison. I understand she has a problem.
Senator Hutchison, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Hutchison. Oh, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to add a story to the one that General
Myers told at the beginning of this hearing, and it is one
about which I know personally.
Senator Stevens. Pull your mic up, please, Senator. Just
pull it toward you.
Senator Hutchison. Okay.
Senator Stevens. They're all live.
Senator Hutchison. I want to----
Senator Stevens. All these mics are live.
Senator Hutchison. Okay. I want to add to your story,
General Myers. I went to college with a friend who was a great
football star at the University of Texas. He had one son. We
all thought he would follow his father's footsteps to the
University of Texas. But he only had one dream. The son wanted
to go to the U.S. Naval Academy. And because he was so
qualified, I was proud to give him my appointment.
That young man, a marine, participated in the march to
Baghdad, came home. He is now back in Iraq, somewhere around
the Fallujah area, doing his job, and wrote me a note saying,
``Thank you, Senator, for giving me the opportunity to do
this.'' So I do hope that we can put those and the stories of
Pat Tillman out there when we are going through this very hard
and difficult time.
The second thing I want to point out, that has been stated
in the media and by others, there continue to be questions
about whether al Qaeda and the war on terrorism are really
connected to Iraq. Well, I think we found out yesterday--and
something you added to today, General Myer--that an al Qaeda-
connected animal perpetrated a heinous crime on videotape in
Baghdad, because the body was found there, unfortunately.
Similar atrocity in Pakistan to a journalist named Danny Pearl,
videotaped. That reporter was reporting on al Qaeda at the
time.
So I think if anyone is going to question whether the war
in Iraq or Afghanistan, either one, are connected to the war on
terrorism and all these loosely affiliated organizations, that
they're answering that question for us as we speak.
I wanted to ask a question, and Senator Feinstein made
several of these points, but there was one other, and that is
regarding the prisons. One of the other reasons, or allegations
made, was that there weren't enough guards to guard the number
of people who were in those prisons. You, Secretary Rumsfeld
and General Myers, and others in this administration, started
looking at this situation apparently the very day you heard,
which I think you should be commended for doing. So you have
had the investigations, which started in January. Have you
determined that there are enough guards now? Has that situation
changed in any way? Or if that's not appropriate to answer
whether it's changed, do you feel that you have the funding or
the facilities and the number of guards needed to meet our
standards in the treatment of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Guantanamo Bay, or anywhere else that we may be needing to
hire--to watch, guard, and interrogate, properly, prisoners?
TROOPS IN ABU GHRAIB
General Myers. To go back to the beginning, we were in a
closed hearing yesterday in front of the House Appropriations
Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, and General Taguba was with
us, and the question was asked, Did the--you know, how many
troops did we have in Abu Ghraib, at that time, providing
security in detainee operations? And he said, ``Well, they
didn't have enough at the time, but the brigade could have
reallocated some of their forces to that situation, which was
not done.''
From what I know today--and I'll probably have to get you
an answer for the record--but from what I know today, that
situation has been corrected. We have made a lot of corrections
over time, over the last couple of months, to ensure that the
folks that are responsible for detention operations have the
people they need to do the job. But I'll double-check, and I'll
give you an answer for the record on that.
[The information follows:]
As of May 28, the number of MP guards vice detainees in Abu
Ghraib prison was 450 to 4,561 or approximately a 1:10 guard to
detainee ration.
As of June 22, the number of MP guards remains the same
with 450 guards, but the number of detainees is now 2,262 or
approximately a 1:5 guard to detainee ratio.
MANAGING DETAINEES IN IRAQ
Senator Hutchison. And do you have the facilities that you
need at this time for the number of prisoners we have----
General Myers. I think----
Senator Hutchison [continuing]. And the number of guards?
General Myers [continuing]. I think, for the most part, we
do. Now, we have--I think--yes, ma'am, we do. We have--right
now. But, you know, these are--this is a continuing issue,
where we get reports from the International Committee of the
Red Cross, of our own commanders looking at the situation, so
it's a matter of continuing improvement, which is appropriate,
and would have to change over time. But the situation that was
described in the Taguba report that he saw in the January/
February timeframe, those have been corrected.
Secretary Rumsfeld. May I just add that over the period of
time in Iraq, some 43,600 people have been captured and
detained for some period of time. Of those, 31,800 have been
released. And the remainder currently detained is about 11,800.
That is not a fixed population. It's constantly changing. There
isn't a week that goes by that our forces don't scoop up, you
know, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10 a day and move them into one of the
detention centers. And, simultaneously, there's a process, as
you can imagine--if we've already released 31,800 out of
43,000--our goal is to get as many out of there as fast as we
can, as soon as we believe that's the appropriate thing to do.
There's no one in the United States Government who wants to be
a jailer and hold people that we don't need to hold.
So there's constantly a group coming in, and constantly a
group going out. And currently the population is about 11,000.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for----
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Dorgan is recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I regret I was not here at the first part of this hearing.
But I welcome the Secretary and General.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 RESERVE FUND
Let me ask a question, if I might, about the $25 billion.
And I understand that you've been asked some questions about
that. There was a piece in the newspaper today, here on the
Hill, that said that the Senate majority leader's senior staff
was saying that there's a school of thought that Congress
should double the administration's request to amend its 2005
budget request by $25 billion, and so talking about increasing
it from $25 to $50 billion. I understand the request has not
even yet been made. So what I'm trying to understand a bit here
is, the $25 billion that has been discussed that I think the
chairman will ultimately hold a hearing on, is that money that
relates to this current fiscal year, or is that a reserve fund
for the next fiscal year?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The answer, sir, is that the White
House, the Office of Management and Budget, the leadership in
Congress in the House and Senate, and in the Appropriations
Committees are currently debating that. What they're doing is,
they're, at the moment, calling it a reserve, and the number
is--that the President proposed was $25 billion. And that was a
judgement that that would be appropriate to move us until such
time as a full 2005 supplemental could be passed by Congress
sometime next year, after Congress gets back, reorganizes, and
acts on it, probably sometime in the April period.
You want to say--I can't read your writing, I'm sorry.
Mr. Lanzillotta. Yes, Senator. It was based on what we
thought to alleviate the risk, or reduce the risk, in cash-
flowing the service operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts
for that period of time that the Secretary talked about.
Senator Dorgan. For what period of time, now?
Mr. Lanzillotta. Well, from the period of time from October
1 until the Congress could act on a supplemental request. So we
looked at our spend rates, decided that this reserve account
would help us reduce our risk of cash-flowing those accounts,
to have the services avoid reducing training or other type
activities.
Senator Dorgan. If I might ask, the $60 billion that we
previously appropriated was expected to last until a request
would come in next January, so that would have been money that
would have been available through this fiscal year, into the
next fiscal year, is that correct?
Mr. Lanzillotta. No, Senator. The money--the $65 billion
that was appropriated, that was for fiscal year 2004. That
money was never intended to last past October 1.
Senator Dorgan. So money for the costs of the prosecution
of the war in Iraq, and also activities in Afghanistan, would
have come from the regular Pentagon budget from October 1 until
some subsequent date, when the Congress would pass another
emergency supplemental, is that the case?
Mr. Lanzillotta. What the intent was--that we would cash
flow the accounts and put a supplement request in to cover
those costs.
Secretary Rumsfeld. The way I think of it is this, that we
were, in effect, asked by the Congress not to try to guess what
the war would cost and put it in the regular budget, which, of
course, the regular budget for 2005 was prepared last year, and
then submitted to the President in December, and then to the
Congress in February, and now we're into May, and it's for the
period starting October 1 for a whole 'nother year. So there's
no way to look into that future well, or precisely. And so the
judgement was made not to budget for it, but to come in with a
supplemental.
From a management standpoint, it is very tough on the
Department of Defense. When the world changes, as it has, we
have the higher level of forces there, it's a more difficult
situation, and, therefore, the amount of cash flowing that
would have to take, taking money out of money account, sticking
it into another account, has grown. And we looked at it, and
the President did not want to go up and ask for a $25 billion
reserve, but I went to him, as I have to, and told him the
truth, and the truth is, we need the money if we want to reduce
the amount of cash flow, robbing Peter to pay Paul and then
trying to correct it at the end.
BUDGETING FOR CONTINUING OPERATIONS
Senator Dorgan. Well, I would expect everyone on this
committee would feel that we don't want to withhold $1 that is
necessary for the safety of the troops that we've put in harm's
way. Whatever is necessary to protect them and provide for
them, that which we think is important for them, we want to
provide. But you indicated that you felt that the Congress had
asked that you not include these funds in the regular
appropriations request. I mean, my own feeling is, it's been a
bit frustrating, because we get the budget, and the budget for
the Department of Defense has zero in its request for Iraq and
Afghanistan. We know that there are ramped-up, continued
operations that----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Right.
Senator Dorgan [continuing]. Will be there for some long
while. And I understand there is a need, and will be a need,
for emergency supplementals, but I would--I think it would make
more sense, at least in the regular budget process, as well, to
recognize we're at a different level here, and these routine
and--not routine; I shouldn't say--the continuing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan ought to be at least accounted for, in
some measure, in the regular budget process.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's a fair comment. And I felt that
way, as well, 2 years ago, and tried to do it. And we were in
Afghanistan at that time, and it was clear that it was going to
cost some money, so we proposed $10 billion, and the Congress
rejected it all, 100 percent of it, and said--now, here's the
tension, the dilemma. The earlier you ask for the supplemental,
the less you know, and the less precise you can be. And,
properly, Senators that have the responsibility for managing
the taxpayers' money look at it and say, ``Well, it's not very
precise.'' And that's true. And the later you wait for a
supplemental, the greater knowledge you have, the more precise
it is, but the longer you've passed the time when you have to
begin doing this cash flowing and taking money out of here and
putting it in there. So the cycle is so long--the budget
cycle--when we have to prepare this last year, get it to the
President, get it up here, for a year that doesn't start until
October 1, it's just a difficult problem.
Senator Dorgan. Well----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I could do it either way, myself.
Senator Dorgan. Yeah, at least speaking for myself, I would
prefer that we try to recognize we're ramping up to a different
level and it's going to be continuing for some while, and see
at least a part of that, to the best extent we can estimate it,
in the regular process.
Just one final question. Do I have time for an additional
question, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Stevens. No, you don't. Sorry.
Senator Dorgan. Okay, thank you.
Senator Stevens. Our next Senator is Senator Specter, by
seniority.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ASSASSINATION OF NICHOLAS BERG
Mr. Secretary, Mr. Nicholas Berg, who was the victim of a
brutal assassination, as we all know, was a Pennsylvanian. And
in talking to his lawyer yesterday, I tried to get some of the
particulars about what happened to him when he was held in
detention--reportedly initially by Iraqis, and then later by
U.S. military--and a lawsuit was filed in the Federal court in
Philadelphia; and shortly thereafter, Mr. Nicholas Berg was
released. I would appreciate it if you would give your personal
attention to assist in answering some of the questions which
the family is now posing as to exactly what happened to him
during the detention period, why he was detained, and the
circumstances of his release. The case was never litigated, but
it was filed.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, we will be happy to ask
someone in the Department of the Army probably, and, if not,
the General Counsel's Office, to focus in on this and be in
touch with you.
[The information follows:]
Due to the fact that a number of different entities, including the
Iraqi police, had contact with Mr. Berg during his detention in Mosul,
it is not possible to provide a definitive account of his detention and
release. Nonetheless, the following is a summary of the facts as we now
understand them.
On March 25, the Iraqi police in Mosul detained Mr. Berg for
``suspicious activity'' and for his personal safety. He was taken to a
police office and placed in a spare break room typically used for
eating and resting, rather than a jail cell. He was placed in this room
because it was private and cleaner than the cells and because he had
expressed concern about being in a cell with Arab inmates and guards
due to the fact that he was Jewish. This break room is located in the
same building as the Iraqi police office, which is connected to the
Digala Police Station. Coalition forces, who were present in the Iraqi
police office to provide assistance to the police, provided Mr. Berg
with a cot, blanket, and food. The FBI interviewed him later that day
and took his fingerprints. The FBI interviewed him again on March 26.
On March 28, Mr. Berg was moved to a cell in Digala Police Station,
one that the Iraqi police had cleared specifically for him, because it
was no longer practical to keep him in the spare break room. After he
was moved to Digala, the Coalition forces' involvement with Mr. Berg
was minimal, although they did interpret directives to Mr. Berg.
On April 1, an officer of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
informed the U.S. Consular Officer in Baghdad that Mr. Berg was being
detained by the U.S. military. We note that this information, which the
U.S. Consular Officer provided to Mr. Berg's family at that time,
appears now to have been incorrect; it is our understanding that Mr.
Berg was, in fact, being detained by the Iraqi police. The U.S.
Consular Officer in Baghdad also notified Mr. Berg's parents that all
questions about Mr. Berg should be directed to the FBI.
On April 3, the FBI interviewed Mr. Berg for a third time. In
addition, the Iraqi police obtained his possessions from his hotel room
at his request, paid his hotel bill with his money, and stored his
possessions at the police station.
By April 4, the Iraqi police were prepared to release Mr. Berg, and
the FBI had finished interviewing him. FBI, U.S. military, and CPA
personnel were concerned, however, for his safety in Iraq if he were to
be released and remain there. On April 6, a CPA officer in Mosul, along
with a Public Administration Officer of the 416th Civil Affairs
Battalion posted with CPA-Mosul, met with Mr. Berg and did the
following:
--offered to provide him with financial assistance (which he
refused);
--asked him to sign a Privacy Act Waiver so that the CPA could
respond to his parents and his Member of Congress (he refused);
--counseled him to leave Iraq for his own safety and offered him
transportation assistance (he said he would go to Baghdad in a
few days because he wanted to spend more time in Mosul, and the
assistance we offered would have taken him out of Mosul on the
next MILAIR [military] flight and then to Jordan in the next
few days);
--asked him to check in with the U.S. Consular Officer in Baghdad (he
agreed);
--watched him inventory his possessions, taking account of his
concern that some money was missing; and
--had him sign a paper confirming that he received the above
information.
At that point, Mr. Berg was released from Iraqi police custody. Mr.
Berg indicated that he would not be leaving Iraq right away because the
road to Amman had been closed indefinitely.
At some point between April 8 and April 10, the U.S. Consular
Officer spoke by telephone with Mr. Berg and offered to assist him in
obtaining a seat on a charted Royal Jordanian Airlines flight from Iraq
to Jordan. We understand that he declined that offer and stated that he
would be traveling to Kuwait with a convoy of journalists. The U.S.
Consular Officer reminded him of the security risks of traveling in
Iraq and asked him to call his mother upon arrival in Kuwait. We
believe that this was the last contact the U.S. Consular Officer had
with Mr. Berg.
Senator Specter. I would appreciate it. And there's one
other request which the family has made. Mr. Berg's body is
being returned to Dover, and the family would like to meet the
body on arrival, and they have made a request to be with their
deceased son. But they are not permitted to come onto the base,
as I am told, unless there is a waiver. And I would appreciate
it if you'd take a look at that and see if we couldn't
accommodate their request.
General Myers. You bet.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Be happy to.
ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ: GRANT OR LOAN?
Senator Specter. Mr. Secretary, on the issue of the funding
in Iraq, when the $87 billion was requested some time ago an
issue arose as to whether some $10 billion ought to be in the
form of a loan to Iraq, on the consideration that Iraq has
enormous oil reserves and enormous potential resources. And it
is obviously a difficult matter to draw the line on what would
be appropriate for Iraq to pay for--rebuilding the country, for
example, or rebuilding their infrastructure. Where we have
costs of the military operation, that is something different.
But I think it would be very useful to this committee and the
Congress if we had an idea, with some particularization, as to
what money is being spent, and for what purpose, so that we
could try to make a judgment as to what would be appropriate to
have paid for by Iraqi resources which are obtained at some
later date, sort of on the analogy of a trustee in bankruptcy.
We're a trustee, and there are international aspects of it with
the United Nations and the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. So it would not be something that we would make
a judgment on, but at least if we knew what the accounts were,
we would then be in a position to try to make some
determination as to where we would like to see some of the
money in a loan form.
The President was very insistent on having it in the form
of a grant, and he met with a number of us, and ultimately we
made a decision--I did, personally--to honor what the President
wanted to do, to try to get it done faster in a critical
period, trying to get other countries to make loans. But as the
matter progresses and evolves, I think it is something we ought
to revisit.
Can you see any of those expenditures at this moment which
you think ought to be paid for by Iraq, as opposed to the
American taxpayers? We're getting a lot of comment as we--the
taxpayers are concerned, as we face a very tight domestic
budget--as to why those expenses are not being borne by Iraqi
resources.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I recall the debate, and it
was a perfectly appropriate thing to debate and discuss and
weigh. The President concluded that ``an amount'' ought to be a
grant, as opposed to a loan. There were complications, as
you'll recall, with debt forgiveness and other debts and
reparation requests from Kuwait for the 1991 war, and the like.
And he felt that it would be appropriate to take a single
amount, make it a grant, and use that to help jumpstart Iraq on
a path towards democracy and recovery.
No one believes that any additional money should go from
United States to Iraq for that purpose. For security, yes, for
the other things that we're doing, to be sure--governance,
assistance, and so forth. The United States also went out and
tin-cupped the world and raised additional funds to try to
assist the Iraqi people, and other countries have been giving
money, as well as assistance, humanitarian assistance, to Iraq.
The situation, I'm told--why don't you do it, Larry? Just
chime in.
USE OF IRAQI ASSETS
Mr. Lanzillotta. If I may, Senator, on Iraqi money, we have
an account that's called the Developmental Fund for Iraq. It
was $18.2 billion that's been in that account so far, basically
from oil revenues. And we've taken out $8 billion, so far, to
pay for Iraqi needs. And so that leaves a balance of $10
billion that will be continued to be used to pay for those type
of expenses.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But Iraqi oil revenues are paying for a
part of what's being spent today. Frozen assets that were found
around the world from the Saddam Hussein regime have been
retrieved, in some measure, and they are being used. Assets
that were discovered in the country, caches of money--there
were hundreds of thousands of dollars with Saddam Hussein when
he was pulled out of the hole--in that neighborhood, I should
say. So all of that is going toward this problem.
Senator Specter. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I want to submit,
for the record, questions on the Comanche helicopter, the base
closing issues, as they affect Pennsylvania, the V-22, future
combat systems, Bradleys, and the M1A1 tank.
Senator Stevens. We welcome those questions. We do not
welcome questions----
Senator Specter. I thank you, Mr. Secretary----
Senator Stevens [continuing]. Concerning other than----
Senator Specter [continuing]. And I thank you----
Senator Stevens [continuing]. Appropriations.
Senator Specter [continuing]. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Durbin, you're recognized for 5
minutes.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Secretary and
General.
It is unfortunate that a million acts of kindness and
goodwill and bravery by our troops have been overshadowed by
the shameful acts at the prison in Iraq.
I'd like to read to you an excerpt from an e-mail. This
comes from a career officer in Iraq, and it was received
yesterday. He wrote, ``I think that any soldier over here with
any moral clarity is appalled and ashamed by what has occurred.
Personally, I'm also ashamed of those that attempt to mitigate
what's happened by saying,' It's not as bad as what others have
done.' If we're not better than that, then I simply want no
part in what we're doing. Take away the Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD), the links to al Qaeda, and the singular
reason for being here was the prospect of disposing of a
ruthless dictator and bringing democracy to Iraq. And now we
are all left to simply wonder: At what cost? It seems to become
clearer every day that this is simply the beginning of the end
to any chance we may have had to achieve anything of substance.
June 30 looms, and most of us can see no achievable goal in
sight. Two-thirds of the Iraqis simply want us to leave as of
yesterday, and every battlefield success appears to be nothing
more than a Pyrrhic victory. Nobody wants to compare this to
Vietnam, but it's starting to feel that way on the ground.
Everybody just wants to finish their year, get the hell out,
and forget they were ever here. Finally, I would just simply
say that the issue here really is moral clarity. As soldiers in
the Army, it just seems a little implausible to a lot of us
that 7 to 12 people simply perpetrated unthinkable and
unconscionable acts over a period of several months without
knowledge of their superiors. These people will likely be
punished, and rightfully so. But the question is, Did they let
us down, or did the Army and their leaders let them down?
Because everyone knows that the entire chain of command, to the
very top, holds some level of responsibility for what has
occurred.''
Mr. Secretary, I voted against this war believing that we
needed a broader coalition and better preparation. The decision
was made to move forward and move quickly without the United
Nations' support, without giving time for inspection, without,
I'm afraid, the necessary calculation of the real cost of this
war. We are now being asked to consider a supplemental at a
later time here. We have appropriated some $90 billion for the
execution of this war. And I am told--at least you've
testified, or General Myers has testified--that force
protection will be one of the highest priorities.
But as we look back to the last 14 months, on the issue of
force protection, there are some very, very unsettling facts.
Nine months after our invasion, in December of last year,
nearly 1 year after the forces were deployed to the region,
more than one-third of our forces still lacked interceptor body
armor. A friend of mine with a son in a military police (MP)
unit, he and his wife went out and bought the appropriate armor
to send to their son to protect him. When we lost a Chinook
helicopter last year from the Illinois/Iowa Guard Unit, I came
to learn that the helicopters were deployed in Iraq without
necessary defensive equipment. And now we learn that perhaps 3
or 4 months from now, when they're supposed to be returning
home, they will finally be equipped as they should be.
And I suppose the worst part of it was the armoring of
Humvees. It's been estimated that one-fourth of the American
lives lost were lost because of lack of armor for these
Humvees, and we still are uncertain as to whether an adequate
number will be protected in the near future.
My question is this. Having appropriated all of this money,
and myself having voted for every penny of it, how can we
explain that we didn't meet the most basic requirement when it
came to body armor, helicopter equipment, and armored Humvees
to protect our troops?
DETAINEE ABUSE IN IRAQ
Secretary Rumsfeld. Let me comment, first, Senator, on the
statement you made, and then General Myers will discuss the
force protection issues, because they're very important.
With respect to what took place at Abu Ghraib, we will get
to the bottom of it. There are six or seven investigations
taking place, criminal prosecutions taking place, and people
will be punished at every level, I can assure you. I know
there's a--the Uniform Code of Military Justice works, and it's
operating, and I am confident that the facts will become known,
and people who did things that were illegal will be dealt with,
and those that--in the administrative chain that did things
that were seen to be inappropriate will also be dealt with in
non-criminal administrative ways.
Second, the e-mail you read is--I guess it's disturbing,
but it's not surprising, that an individual feels that way.
Senator Durbin. A career officer.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand. An individual. Doesn't
matter to me whether he's an officer or an enlisted person, but
he feels that way. And I can understand that. And we all go
through strong emotions when something like this occurs. We see
it, and we're shocked, and we're stunned, and we're disgusted,
and we know, in our hearts, we're better than that, and yet
that is what's being seen in the world as representing our
country. I know it doesn't represent our country. That isn't
America. We've got--we're a lot better than that. And it's been
true over many decades, and it'll be true over decades ahead.
And the conclusion that that young person came to, that we're
at the beginning of the end, I submit, will prove to be wrong.
And, the good Lord willing, I'll be right, and his
understandable concern and comment and emotional reaction, I
hope and pray, will be wrong.
Senator Durbin. Will you address the force protection
issues?
General Myers. You bet. I want to start with interceptor
body armor. The small arms protective insert (SAPI) plates were
relatively new technology. The Army had decided, earlier in
this century, in 2001/2002, to provide only to dismounted
infantry. As we got into 2002, it was clear that was not
sufficient, so they started to ramp up the production from 1600
sets per month to now 25,000 sets per month. Currently,
everybody in theater--military, civilian, contractors, anybody
who needs that kind of vest with the SAPI plates--has been
provided that.
Senator Durbin. General, excuse me.
General Myers. Yeah.
Senator Durbin. Fourteen months after the invasions?
Senator Stevens. The Senator's time for asking questions is
expired, but we permit General Myers----
HUMVEES
General Myers. Well, I'm just saying that it was new
technology, so it took time to ramp it up. I mean, we just--we
couldn't--as much as we wanted to wish it true and have it
ready immediately, that just wasn't technically or from a
manufacturing standpoint feasible. What we're looking at now--
--
Senator Durbin. But you weren't prepared, General.
General Myers. What we're looking----
Senator Stevens. General----
General Myers [continuing]. What we're looking at now is,
the SAPI plates are good, and you know they fit front and back.
We're looking for other protection now, on the sides and the
armpits, because there is technology there, and we're starting
to produce that, to provide those vests, as well.
Up-armored Humvees, that requirement was set by Central
Command and by the field commanders. It has consistently gone
up. We've tried to meet that with lots of different things and
ways. Currently, they need 4,454 up-armored Humvees. They're
currently on hand, 3,134. We're producing--we're ramping up
to--production rate up to 300--in fact, I think we're, this
month, at 220 to 225 per month. We've gathered all the up-
armored Humvees from all the services around the world, pushing
them into theater, only saving a few back here for the nuclear
security mission, and I mean just a handful. And we also have
some bolt-on armor that we've made for that, those Humvees and
the trucks, as well.
So we've tried to stay up with the demand as the
requirements come in from the field, and I think we're doing a
reasonably good job. I would like to have done all of that,
certainly, if we could have; if it had been physically possible
to do it all faster, we would have. I will say this, that the
support we got from the Congress on the funding has not been an
issue. The funding has been there when we've needed it.
Senator Stevens. I apologize to the Senator. We still have
several Senators to go on the first round.
Senator McConnell is next. You're recognized for 5 minutes.
General Myers. If I could just follow up that, you also
asked about helos. The information you provided on the
helicopters does not correlate with the information I've been
given on those helicopters--to include, you know, the
helicopter that was shot down where we lost so many people. My
information was that it did have countermeasures onboard, and
that nobody----
Senator Durbin. That one helicopter was properly equipped,
but the Army acknowledged that there is a new level ALE-47 that
was needed. Only five of the 13 helicopters in the unit are
currently equipped with it. It is said that they will receive
the equipment in 4 months, which is the time when they're
supposed to be leaving the country.
ACTIVE AND RESERVE
General Myers. It was--but it's true of Active duty and
Reserve helicopters, because there was a move at that time, and
I'll just make sure. I'll check my records, the facts here.
But, as I recall, that the Army was in the middle of upgrading
all that Active and Reserve, and that's what they were in the
middle of, so there are some units that have the newer
technology, or some that have the older technology.
Senator Stevens. Okay, Senator.
Senator McConnell is recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
After the prisoner abuse revelations over the last few
weeks, it's easy to lose perspective, and I'd like to begin by
congratulating you, Mr. Secretary and General Myers and your
entire operation, for the liberation of 50 million people over
the last 2\1/2\ years and for extraordinary success in the war
on terrorism.
It is no accident that we have not been successfully
attacked again here at home since 9/11. The reason for that is
clearly that we've been on offense, at the President's
direction. And you and the people that you command have done an
extraordinary job, and it's important to remember that when
things do go wrong, as they do occasionally in any complicated,
difficult task.
PAYING WAR COSTS
Now, we're going to have, Mr. Secretary, the Defense
authorization bill on the floor next week, and one of the
things I fear is that an awful lot of amendments are going to
be offered to try to take money away from arguably very
important tasks that you need to carry out, and direct them to
Iraq.
For example, we expect numerous amendments to cut important
programs such as missile defense in that bill. Over the last
decade, proliferators such as Iran and North Korea have made
dramatic and unexpected progress in their nuclear programs. If
we do not improve our ability to defend America and our troops
against ballistic missiles, and deter rogue regimes from using
them against us, by modernizing our weapons systems to hold
their deeply-buried nuclear or command and control facilities
at risk, we're likely to face a far greater danger than that
which reared its head on September 11. So I have a couple of
questions in that regard.
Would it be appropriate to reduce funding for important
programs in your fiscal year 2005 bill in order to pay for
operations and maintenance costs that the Department plans to
fund in an upcoming request for a contingency reserve fund?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We've made a judgment, Senator, that
the cash flowing for a long period is a bad management
practice, and that to the extent the amount is large it becomes
a very bad management practice.
In terms of the separate--therefore, we came up--despite
the fact the President didn't want to--when I went in and told
him I believed we needed $25 billion, he has made that proposal
as a reserve to reduce the damage, reduce the difficulties, the
management difficulties, that otherwise would have occurred.
The second question, as to whether we should simply take
money from one important account and put it in another and
change our priorities, my strong recommendation is that the
Congress not do that. The idea that we were asked not to fund
for the war in the budget, we allocated the budget, we're now
at a point where we believe that the priorities that have been
established in that budget are sound, they enable our country
to address the global war on terror, to see that the Armed
Forces of the United States are the most capable and most
deployable and best equipped on the face of the Earth, and I
don't think we ought to try to fund the war out of the
priorities that help rearrange our military for the 21st
century.
Senator McConnell. When I was in Iraq in October, I was
meeting, it won't surprise you to know, with General Petreas in
101st, since they're headquartered in my home State. And he
indicated that the reconstruction funds, which you and, I
think, Senator Specter were talking about earlier, were
extremely important to the success. And one of the things I
fear next week is that we may have amendments transferring
money out of the reconstruction fund, which we fought very hard
to make sure was a grant and not a loan, to help pay for the
military side of this. Do you share my view that the
reconstruction is extremely important in allowing us to
ultimately exit the country?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do.
TRAINING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
Senator McConnell. And, also, I'm curious--I know you've
sent General Petreas back to be in charge of the upgrading of
the Iraqi military. I want to commend you for that decision. I
don't think you could have picked a better person to do it. But
I would like to kind of get a report on how that's going and
this whole challenge of getting the Iraqi military up to speed,
which we all know is the best way to ensure our exit at some
time in the future.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Indeed. From the beginning, we've
focused on strengthening the Iraqi security forces. They, for
all practical purpose, had dissipated and didn't exist. The
police that were there were not the kind of police we have in
our country; they're the kind of people that went and arrested
people at night and threw them into prison. The military was a
mixture of some, I don't know, how many thousand generals,
mostly Sunni generals, and the large mass of Shia conscripts,
that just dissipated into the villages and towns of the
country. So we had to start pretty much from scratch.
We're up to about 206,000. You see reports in the press
that, in some cases, they didn't do a great job. They, some of
them, didn't engage the enemy in certain circumstances. Well,
my goodness, if a group of people had been trained for a few
weeks, and they're poorly equipped, and they're going up
against people with AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades,
they're smart not to. And they're doing pretty darn well. And
General Petreas is the right person to go in there and work
this problem.
And we're going to go from 206,000 to 265,000, we're going
to continue to improve their equipment, we're going to continue
to improve their training and their chain of command, and that
is, as you say, who we have to pass off security responsibility
for that country too. We've got to make that work, and then
we've got to pass it off, and we don't have to stay and do that
job for the Iraqis. The Iraqis have to do that job.
General Myers. If I may, Senator? Let me just----
Senator McConnell. Yeah. General?
General Myers [continuing]. Just add something. When I was
in Iraq 3 weeks ago, approximately, I looked at the line items
of the types of equipment needed by Iraqi security forces. I
think it's the first time that we've had specifically the types
of equipment needed, on contract, starting to deliver--this
month, matter of fact--to make up for that equipment problem
that we talked about, that, for a variety of reasons, to
include challenged contracts and, in fact, people just not
writing down the requirement, that is fixed, and we should see
these Iraqi security forces, from the police to the new Iraqi
army now, begin to receive the type of equipment that will
allow the things that the Secretary said needs to happen,
happen.
And, if I may, let me go back to your previous question,
where you talked about using other accounts to pay for the
operations and maintenance. As you know better than anybody,
one of our traditions--and all of us--I'd put all of us in this
group--is that we raid procurement accounts when we're short on
operations and maintenance, and readiness, and so forth. We
have had procurement holidays. We do not need to do that. We
have a chance to transform our military, and the thought of
raiding particularly the procurement accounts to make up for
maybe shortfalls in other places, I would think, would be a
very, very bad idea for the future of our Armed Forces.
Senator McConnell. One final question, if I have time, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Stevens. You don't have the time, Senator. I'm
sorry.
Senator McConnell. Okay, I don't have time. Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
First of all, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you, as others
have, for your service, and also General Myers, for your
leadership. And I want you to continue doing that, and I
believe you will. I have confidence in you.
I've got a couple of questions, and I'd like to get into
dealing with the budget.
I believe, first of all, Mr. Secretary, that the Army is
underfunded, given the overwhelming role that they're playing
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The issue that causes me some concern
here today is reset. The Army is struggling to sustain and
maintain its equipment. The 2005 budget, according to the
Army's own documents, only includes 72 percent of the regular
depot maintenance funding requirement. The 2005 shortfall is
compounded by the severe toll that Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) are taking on the
Army's equipment.
Mr. Secretary, first to you, and then to General Myers, Do
you support the Army's reset plan, and do you believe it's
properly resourced?
RESTRUCTURING THE ARMY
Secretary Rumsfeld. We're told by the Army that they
believe it is properly resourced. What it will require is that,
over the supplementals this year and next year and possibly 1
year into the future, the funds need to be made available to
allow the Army to have a higher level of forces so that they
can rearrange it and pull division capabilities down into the
brigades, so that they can multiply the number of brigades from
33 to 43, and that they can develop this greater modularity.
And it's, I think, a very innovative approach, it's exactly the
right thing to do. That, coupled with balancing the active
force with the Guard and Reserve, I think, will make us have a
vastly improved Army.
EQUIPMENT
General Myers. There is no doubt the Army is using their
equipment up at a very, very fast rate, whether it's tracks on
Bradleys or helicopter blades or parts. This is a very serious
issue for the Army.
Senator Shelby. Tanks, too.
General Myers. Tanks, the whole thing. I mean, it's every
piece of gear they have, they are using up at a much faster
rate than anticipated. In my view, this should be dealt with in
the supplemental as we look at a----
Senator Shelby. Okay.
General Myers [continuing]. A possible 2005 supplemental.
We just need to make sure that this kind of money is in there
to make them well. And, otherwise, we're going to have a
problem out there in the not-too-distant future if we don't
make them well.
Senator Shelby. Reset's important, isn't it?
General Myers. Reset is extremely important.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
PERFORMANCE OF STRYKER VEHICLES
Mr. Secretary, would you comment on the Stryker vehicle
performance in Iraq? Have you spoken with the troops about the
Stryker performance during your visits? And what are they
reporting? We've been hearing a lot of good things, but I'd
like to hear your comments, and then General Myers.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I've heard a lot more good than not
good.
Senator Shelby. Yeah.
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are those not in those Stryker
units that raise questions.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But--and it's early.
Senator Shelby. Well, we've always----
Secretary Rumsfeld. This is the first deployment.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's the first deployment. But my sense
is, net, that they're valuable, they provide mobility, they
provide--nothing provides the kind of armored protection that--
even a tank, they--you've seen pictures of tanks smoldering,
with their turrets off. I mean, there's no way to prevent
something from being badly damaged. But as a midrange leading
edge of what may very well evolve as the future combat systems,
I think this Stryker is doing well.
Senator Shelby. They've got a lot of fire power, too,
haven't they?
General Myers. They've got fire power, and they have good
battlespace awareness when they get there because they can be
connected to all sorts of other information sources, which is
powerful.
One thing, when I was--again, when I was in Iraq not too
long ago, a couple of weeks ago, one of the things that I heard
that I had not thought of, even though I've been around Stryker
and I've driven a Stryker and spent some time at Fort Lewis
looking them over, is that it's quiet. And quiet's important,
because they can arrive on the scene without a lot of notice,
and sometimes take adversaries by surprise. And they said that
happened on more than one occasion. So I think the report card
on the Stryker, so far, is A-plus.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Burns, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for this
appearance today.
I want to bring up a couple of things. Back in 1993 and
1994, it was obvious to me that, with the new plans of the
military, the force structure, and how it would appear, the
military complex was in for change. And knowing that, we've
seen more of our responsibilities moved into the Reserve and
the National Guard sectors. And I looked at the infrastructure
in my State of Montana, and we began rebuilding the
infrastructure there to train and to prepare our people for an
enemy and a mission that was quite different than anything they
had ever faced before. We were operating out of old World War
II structures, as you well know, using outdated material to
train for an enemy that had passed.
And I would suggest to my colleagues that we attend to our
facilities and infrastructure, and also how we train our
citizen soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen for an enemy
that is consistent with what we are seeing now, and the needs
that they're going to have to have in distance learning and
electronics and everything that we can gather to prepare our
people for a possible call up.
The Army has begun converting some Reserve component
artillery forces to military police, for instance. This has
been done to meet the high demand for MPs, which I think we can
expect to increase in the future.
CONVERSION OF FORCES
Can you give me an idea as to the number to be converted to
this type of duty? And do you have adequate resources to
continue this process and provide necessary training and
equipment that will meet this need, considering we might be
working with personnel who lack this type of training
experience.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's an important question, and it's
one that has to be reviewed continuously as circumstances
change. But, at the moment, we believe that, with the budget
and the additional requests that have been made, and with the
restructuring that's taking place, that, at least for the
foreseeable future, we're on the right track.
Senator Burns. Well, we have started our rebuilding in
Montana, and now we have the ability to retrain a four of five
State area. They're bringing them into Helena, Montana. Fort
Harrison now, for training on these new missions. General
Myers, we have something else to offer in Montana right now, in
terms of training and research and that's airspace. And we're
running out of airspace in which to train our pilots and even
some of our ground forces. And I would like to visit with you
on that someday, about our capabilities up there. We've got two
Air Force Bases now that are doing little, but could offer a
lot more, as far as our training's concerned.
And my next question is, the weapons caches that you've
discovered in Iraq, are we finding them, are we securing them,
and are we destroying their holdings?
WEAPONS CACHES
General Myers. Senator Burns, all the information I get
says yes to those questions on weapons caches. We continue to
find them. We find--we're up over 8,700 now, and tens are found
every week, so we keep adding to that number. The last number I
saw, none are unsecured. Some of the sites are secured 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week, continuously, when they have the sorts of
things that are being used by the bomb-makers for the
improvised explosive devices, or if the have the man-portable
surface-to-air missiles, or if they have mortars and grenades
and those sorts of--and small arms. Others, which have--can be
secured by bulldozing dirt up against bunkers that have 1,000-
pound bombs in them that have not been pilfered are maybe not
24 and 7, but secured with locks, with berms, with patrols.
I'm not satisfied. We know--I mean, this is a country that
we estimate has 660 shore tons of weapons in it. We've
destroyed under 130 shore tons. We've got 6,000 people, to
include contractors and Armed Forces personnel, on this all the
time, trying to do away with these arms caches. I'm not sure
that--I mean, I can't sit here and say that we know of every
one. But as we find them, we try to deal with them. And it's a
personal thing of mine to--because I get asked this question a
lot. Again, from what I'm told, we deal with them just like I
described. I think we need to be very curious about that and
continue to probe.
Senator Burns. Well, I'm concerned about that, because we
know that's the base of making these----
General Myers. You bet.
Senator Burns [continuing]. Individual weapons----
General Myers. You bet.
Senator Burns [continuing]. Used in roadside----
General Myers. The soldiers know that, you bet.
Senator Burns. And the quicker we eliminate that supply, I
think, the safer we will be in our----
General Myers. It's going to be--yes, sir--it'll be a long-
term job, but we've got to be at it with as much capability as
we need to put against it.
Senator Burns. Mr. Chairman, I have more questions, but I
will submit them in private, and thank you very much.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
We'll now--Senator Inouye has not asked questions in the
first round, so, Senator Inouye, do you have any questions?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
AIR FORCE TANKER LEASE
Mr. Secretary, we were advised that last week the Defense
Science Board was supposed to release a report on the Air Force
tanker lease deal. Has that been released?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have been briefed, and I'm sure we
can brief you. Whether they have formally released it, I just
don't know.
Senator Inouye. Can you provide us with----
Secretary Rumsfeld. In fact, here it is, they're briefing
staff directors here on your committee today.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION
Second, has the events of the past 2 weeks had any impact
upon recruiting and retention of Active, Reserve, and National
Guard?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I'm afraid that the systems we
use to track recruiting and retention may not be sophisticated
enough to give us good data that fast. Last month's worth that
I heard about, we were doing fine in both recruiting and
retention. What it'll be when the next data comes out remains
to be seen.
QUANTITY OF MILITARY INVESTIGATIONS
Senator Inouye. Last week on talk shows and at the hearing,
I believe three witnesses, including you, Mr. Secretary,
mentioned 18,000 military crimes being processed. And I believe
you indicated that about 3,000 resulted in court-martial. Can
you provide us--not at this moment, but--the nature and the
severity of these crimes, where they occurred and in what
services? We've tried to get some information, but no one seems
to know 18,000. So----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Of course, this kind of information is
not centralized in the Department. Each service manages itself.
The data I have is, as you suggested, that there were something
in--it's 17,000-plus criminal investigations opened. There were
about 72,000 non-judicial punishments that took place. In terms
of Article 32, we don't have the information from the Army--
it's not tracked--but the other services have about 400. In
terms of total court-martials, as you said, it's about 3,000.
And in terms of general court-martials, it's about 1,100. And
that was all 2003 data. So you can imagine the scope of that
all across the services. There's always--with the number of
people we have, there's always going to be these types of
things that occur, I'm afraid.
Senator Inouye. Of that number, about how many occurred in
Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, I have--am not able to provide that
answer.
Senator Inouye. Can you provide us with those?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We certainly will. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
SERVICES INVESTIGATIONS DATA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal Total
Investigations Criminal Criminal Total Investigations
Opened Investigations Investigations Investigations Opened in
Worldwide Opened Fiscal Opened Fiscal Opened in Iraq Afghanistan
Fiscal Year Year 2003 Iraq Year 2003 Since March Since
2003 Afghanistan 2003 September 2001
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army............................ \1\ 10,915 969 216 1,362 \2\ 59
Navy............................ \3\ 4,260 35 .............. 56 1
Air Force....................... \4\ 2,531 .............. .............. 16 ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CID ROI only.
\2\ Estimate.
\3\ NCIS only.
\4\ OSI only.
SERVICES JUSTICE DATA FISCAL YEAR 2003
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
General Courts- Criminal
Courts- martial Article 32s Nonjudicial Investigations
martial (GCM and Held Punishment Opened
SPCM)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Army........................................ 688 1,329 ( \1\ ) 43,084 \2\ 10,915
Navy........................................ 183 835 173 19,770 \3\ 4,260
Air Force................................... 351 935 248 9,164 \4\ 2,531
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Unknown. Information is not tracked.
\2\ CID ROI only.
\3\ NIS only.
\4\ OSI only.
Senator Inouye. Following up Senator Domenici's question,
in 7 weeks, when we have this transition, when do you consider
would be the time when we may be able to consider a Status of
Forces Agreement? When can we count upon the new government to
take over the water and sewer responsibilities?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The which responsibilities?
Senator Inouye. Water and sewer.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Ah.
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
Senator Inouye. And I'd like to know when you think would
be appropriate for them to take over the prison system.
Secretary Rumsfeld. First on the Status of Forces and our
arrangement with the current government, the lawyers for the
United States have concluded that the U.N. resolution that
exists already provides appropriate protection for U.S.
forces--coalition forces, I should say--between the time--
certainly now, and the time, going forward, between June 30,
when the sovereignty responsibilities are assumed by the
Iraqis, and the next government takes over. There are people
who debate that and discuss it, but my guess is that the Iraqis
are going to have to decide whether or not they want the
interim government or the permanent government to make those
arrangements. The permanent government, of course, would only
result after elections some time next year, in 2005. We,
needless to say, have to have confidence that our forces are--
have the right kinds of protections in that country. And I
believe that the current conviction is that we do and we will,
and that those detailed discussions were probably not
appropriate for the Iraqi Governing Council to engage in, nor
would they necessarily have been viewed as sufficient or final
for the other governments, so that that task is going to be
left for the government to come, which is after June 30, or
after the final Iraqi government is elected next year.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRISONS IN IRAQ
General Myers. On the prison system, the----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Oh, yes, I'm sorry.
General Myers [continuing]. Iraqis are currently
responsible for those picked up on criminal charges, so, at Abu
Ghraib, the Iraqis maintain the criminals in their part of that
prison. The U.S. forces have what we call our security
detainees, folks that are picked up that either have shot at
the Coalition or are involved in other operations that we think
are security related. So the Iraqis are in charge of their
operation. I would think, as times goes on, and as we become
more of a partnership, you can see this--more and more, this
burden probably shifting to the Iraqis, but it'll be over time.
Senator Inouye. So this prison, Abu Ghraib, was jointly
operated?
General Myers. Yes. Yes, sir. That's the information I
have.
Senator Stevens. We now approach the second round, and I am
told that the Secretary needs to be through with us, or we'd be
through with him, at noon. So what I propose to do is to ask
two questions I want to ask, primarily for the record, and then
we will recognize the balance of the five of you over the 25
minutes that's left.
Mr. Secretary, I've got to say that I--and General--I had
to--I didn't have to, but I did apologize to Senator Feinstein
because last year she raised a question of those munition
dumps, and I sort of downplayed it, because I said that that
had been taken care of. We later found, as we went over there,
that not only--they're still being found, which is an
interesting comment. In April, I was told there were--munitions
that we recovered were--is that on tons? In shore tons,
154,000-plus recovered, 124,000 destroyed. They found 8,756
caches, cleared 8,684. The remaining were either secured or
partially secured. I'm really concerned about the partially
secured.
So what I would like to ask you, for the record, if you
could update that chart that was given us on April 1 and to
assure Senator Feinstein we will pursue making sure that you
have adequate money to deal with those munitions, because one
of the contractors told me that when they wanted equipment just
to protect their convoy, they just went to one of those dumps
and picked them up--handheld weapons, et cetera. So if they can
pick' em up, anyone can pick' em up.
[The information follows:]
Weapons Cache Update
Purpose
To provide information on Weapon Caches in Iraq.
Bottom Line
Since September 11, 2003, (current as of June 18, 2004).
Short Tons destroyed--195,141.
Short Tons on-hand at depots--149,861.
Caches found--9,693.
Caches cleared--9,631.
Caches remaining--62.
Caches secured (24-hour presence)--21 of 62.
Caches partially secured (Periodic patrols, reconnaissance,
surveillance)--41 of 62.
Caches unsecured (No security)--0.
Background
There are over 6,000 soldiers and contractors dedicated to
securing, transporting, guarding, and destroying captured enemy
munitions.
The captured enemy ammunitions are evaluated to determine the best
disposal methods or reutilization potential.
The most dangerous munitions, such as rocket-propelled grenades,
mortar and artillery rounds (for IED making materials) and surface-to-
air missiles, are transported to six depots for safe, secure storage
and eventual destruction. There is one depot per divisional sector.
Partially secured sites contain ammunition that would be extremely
difficult to remove quickly, such as aircraft ordnance and large
caliber ammunition or missiles.
Senator Stevens. Second, I would like to ask a question
about--for the record--concerning the F-22. According to the
current plans, current--the procurement funding will increase
by 50 percent from fiscal year 2005 to 2009. That's required
for full-rate production of the F-22, and the continued
development of the Joint Strike Fighter fielding a future
combat system. We have additional commitments in Defense to
space surveillance and access. I worry about whether we can
afford these programs. Could you give us a projection out to
that same number, 2009, for all of the systems that are going
to be competing with the money here starting in 2006? We know
what the competition is in 2005--this is just for the record,
now.
[The information follows:]
There will be several procurement requirements competing
for valuable resources within the Air Force as we approach
2009. The larger programs include the Joint Strike Fighter, C-
17, C-130J, KC-135 Tanker Replacement, and Airborne Laser. All
of these programs, as well as the F/A-22, are currently covered
within the Air Force topline. In addition, funding is provided
for modification upgrades to the C-5, E-3, F-16, Predator and
Global Hawk aircraft.
IRAQ
Senator Stevens. And, based on that, I will call on Senator
Byrd for the second round for 5 minutes.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Myers, earlier you stated that there is no way that
we can militarily win or lose in Iraq. Does that mean that
there's no military solution possible?
General Myers. Senator Byrd, what I was saying is the same
thing the Secretary has said, that we need to win on the
security front, which has a strong military component; but not
just U.S. military. Iraqis have to be part of that, the
international community has to be part of that. We have to win
on the political or governance front. That has to go hand in
hand. And we have to win on the economic front. And the sub-
tick under that would be the infrastructure. So, I mean, we
could flood the country with U.S. Armed Forces and have a
soldier next to every house and every Iraqi, but we wouldn't
achieve our end objective, which is a free and democratic Iraq.
So these other pieces have to go with it.
Senator Byrd. Well, do we have an exit strategy?
General Myers. Senator Byrd, I believe we do, and it's
bound up in the things the Secretary has already talked about.
We've got the United Nations, and they're working the
governance piece, and that first piece, we should see here on
June 30. That is only a temporary piece until we get to
elections, in December or January--January 2005. And then
there's a further piece after that for the constitution. Then
there's further elections and a government. We've got our
security piece pretty well figured out. If we get--we're
working hard on a United Nations Security Council resolution,
and if that is successful, I think more of the international
community will be willing to be part of this.
I was just in NATO. I can tell you, at least among most of
my NATO military colleagues, that they feel there is a role for
NATO in Iraq. Whether there's political will in NATO, we won't
know yet, but we do have the Istanbul summit coming up, and I'm
sure that'll be one of the issues that's discussed. As the
Secretary said, there is already big NATO involvement, just not
a NATO mission. The NATO involvement is supporting the Polish-
led division with forces and equipment.
Senator Byrd. When do you think we can see the end of the
tunnel and our troops can come home?
General Myers. I think the next time we'll have a pretty
good picture will be in--and this is something I've talked to
General Abizaid about--is sometime this fall, maybe even early
winter, but after Iraqis are in charge, after June 30, see what
traction the political process gets, see if, in fact, it has
the effect of, for those that are opposed to progress in Iraq,
saying, ``Okay, it looks like we might as well join the team.''
And I think we can make that judgment this fall, and look at
the way forward. I think that's the next place where we'll have
a pretty good lens into what the way forward is.
Senator Byrd. This fall?
SOVEREIGNTY
General Myers. This fall. I think through elections--I
mean, we've provided testimony before--General Abizaid's, I
think, provided testimony on this subject--that certainly
through the transfer of sovereignty here on June 30, it's going
to get--it's going get worse before it gets better, and we're
seeing that. After June 30, it remains to be seen.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, you said that the, quote,
``Congress,'' close quote, asked you not to request the Iraq
supplemental in the President's February budget. I don't know
who, quote, ``the Congress'' is.
Senator Stevens. Senator, I can confess.
Senator Byrd. I beg your pardon?
Senator Stevens. I will confess. I made that request
because of the delay that's caused by the loss of 2, almost 3,
weeks for conventions, and I said we did not have time to do 13
bills and a supplemental before September 30 of this year.
Senator Byrd. Well, when the Senate passed the fiscal year
2004 appropriations bill last summer, we approved an
amendment--I believe it was my amendment--with over 80 votes
expressing the sense of the Senate that you should budget for
the war--that you should budget for the war in Iraq in the
President's request for the annual budget. Let me read the
exact language. Section 8139, ``It is the sense of the Senate
that, one, any request for funds for a fiscal year for an
ongoing overseas military operation, including operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, should be included in the annual budget
of the President for such fiscal year as submitted to Congress
under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code; and,
two, any funds provided for such fiscal year for such a
military operation should be provided in appropriations acts
for such fiscal year through appropriations to specific
accounts set forth in such acts.''
So we've asked that that be done, and I hope it will be
done. That was my amendment. Do I have time for any further----
Senator Stevens. I'm sorry, Senator, your time's expired.
Senator Byrd. I thank the chairman. I thank the Secretary.
Senator Stevens. Senator Domenici is recognized for 5
minutes.
Senator Domenici. What was the time?
Senator Stevens. Five--well, 4 minutes.
Senator Domenici. All right.
First, let me say, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, in my
first round of questions, typically I got excited and I didn't
tell you both that I congratulate you. I do.
IRAQI DEBT AND OIL FOR FOOD PROGRAM
Mr. Secretary, there's been a series of questions, not as
much as I would have hoped, about how we're going to
reconstruct the country, and whether we had a plan, and I want
to thank you both for at least telling the American people that
you have the plan. And in particular, General Myers, I think
what you described, in terms of the merging, the command
structure, of the Iraqi military with ours is tremendous. I
hope you proceed with dispatch.
General Myers. Yes, sir, we will.
Senator Domenici. I have also determined that there is not
very much Iraqi oil money that is currently available for the
payment of infrastructure. The reason is that Iraq owes a huge
amount of money to countries that they borrowed from, led by
Russia, France, and others. Now, Mr. Secretary, we have asked
Jim Baker to go around and see what can be done to minimize the
payment of those so we can get on with reconstruction. Is that
not correct?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is correct.
Senator Domenici. Now, second, we know that France and
Russia, two of the biggest creditors, have cheated immensely
with hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in the
Oil for Food Program. Now, frankly, it disturbs me that we're
working on making sure that their debt is paid, when, as a
matter of fact, they've taken money from the Oil for Food
Program and allocated it to themselves in what might be a giant
fraud. Now, I ask you, who is responsible for seeing that
something's done about that? Is that Jim Baker's job, or is
that the Secretary of State's job, or is that your job? Because
I think we ought not to be recognizing those debts if, in fact,
we have reason to believe that that program was pilfered the
way we understand it. Mr. Secretary and General, either one of
you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, there are several
investigations--at least two that I know of--of the Oil for
Food Program, and a lot of charges have been made. The
investigations are not complete.
With respect to the responsibility for dealing with Iraqi
debt, the President asked former Secretary of State Baker, as
you pointed out, to address that, and those are matters that
are being handled by the Department of State--the United States
Department of State, by the United States Department of
Treasury, not by the Department of Defense.
Senator Domenici. I thank you.
I have four or five questions that are more parochial and
don't fit this meeting, but I will submit them.
And, General, there's one--and that is on the border of the
United States, we have a very serious problem of the
infiltration of potential terrorists. Those borders have been
guarded by Reserve and National Guard people, and I am
concerned that--in our desire to solve Iraq, that we don't
minimize the protection of our borders by our military to
prevent terrorists. Can you just either address it now or
address it later?
General Myers. I'll say a couple of things. One is that the
stand-up of Northern Command was exactly the right thing to do,
because they, along with Department of Homeland Security, worry
very much about that. So I think it's good that we have a
military command that worries about that, as well, and works
with our neighbors to the north and to the south to help stem
that flow.
I am not aware, right now, of military augmentees that
other than on--occasionally we have reconnaissance forces that
help, but not like we did right after 9/11, where we had
military people, generally from the National Guard, augmenting
some of our border organizations.
Senator Stevens. General, I've got to--if I'm going to let
you go, I've got to----
Senator Domenici. Thank you.
Senator Stevens [continuing]. Stop you right there.
General Myers. Stop it.
Senator Stevens. Senator Leahy, you're recognized for 4
minutes.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was going to raise a question on the ammo dumps, but--
following up Senator Feinstein--but I appreciate what you said,
and I'll wait to see what we hear from that.
I was glad to hear the comment made about the value of
TRICARE for the National Guard. When I and several other
Senators on both sides of the aisle were trying to push through
TRICARE last year, we received a letter from the Secretary
saying the President would veto a bill that might have TRICARE
in it. So I'm glad that you have come around to our side, and I
compliment you on that.
So that Secretary Rumsfeld does not have to spend a great
deal of time checking his databanks, I want to make sure you
understand what I was saying earlier about the letters I have
written to you. I was not saying I didn't get an answer. I
meant a letter came back. The answer was questionable. For
example, one on June 25 of last year regarding treatment of the
Baghram Air Base; and, after what's been reported there, Abu
Ghraib, and Guantanamo, I suspected the answer was incomplete.
I will give you compliments, however. The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), when we asked them such questions, they never
responded. And, of course, as he usually does, Attorney General
Ashcroft didn't respond to my letters, or letters from
Republican Senators, or others.
I was going to bring up, and I will submit it for the
record, some of the specific funding questions.
PRISONER ABUSES IN IRAQ
But just because of some of the things said here today
about the concern that the prison abuses in Iraq are just the
work of a few bad apples, I look at this report that we have
had----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Who were you quoting that said
``they're just the work of a few bad apples''? Certainly not
me.
Senator Leahy. No, I'm not quoting you. I said for those
who have said this--suggested this at the hearing today. But if
I might get on with my point----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I didn't hear anyone say that.
Senator Leahy. Fine. Your recollection will be yours;
mine's mine.
If I might, let me go back--to those who have suggested
it's only a few people involved that were, sort of, out of the
chain of command, I have a copy of a March 2004 report by Human
Rights Watch--has corroborated such things as interrogation
techniques employed by U.S. personnel--sleep deprivation,
prisoners stripped naked and kept in freezing cells,
humiliating taunts by women, hoods placed over detainees' heads
during interrogations, forced standing/kneeling for hours, and
so on. Incidentally, Mr. Secretary, the reason I even raise
this, and to refute some who have suggested that it's only a
few, is that this report, of course, is about Afghanistan, not
about Iraq. But it appears to be exactly the same techniques
used in Afghanistan as were used in Iraq. Now, I don't think
they're getting techniques over the Internet. There is
obviously some systematic training.
And so I would suggest, especially about the report by
Major General Ryder, that we find out whether there is a
coordination between all of these so that nobody will have the
assumption that it may be just a few bad apples. Because I know
that the vast majority of our American men and women follow
orders, do it very professionally, and make every single Member
of the United States Senate proud, as they do you and General
Myers.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Leahy, first on the ammunition
dumps, we are discovering more every day. The country is filled
with them. Any number we give you--and we'll give you weekly
reports if you want--changes because of the number that are
found and the numbers we deal with.
Second, I know I don't know the extent of the abuse
problem. We've got, I believe, six investigations underway. I
am absolutely certain that there are more revelations to come.
The question as to whether or not there is something systemic,
as I believe you said is obvious, is not obvious to me. I'm
anxious to learn whether that's true. And the investigations
that are taking place, we hope and pray, will tell us whether
there is that.
TAGUBA REPORT
I do not recall, General Myers, anything in the Taguba
report that said that there is obviously systematic training to
do those things. Indeed, I am reasonably confident there isn't
anything in General Taguba's report that suggests that there
was training to do those things. Is that your----
General Myers. I think that's----
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. Recollection?
General Myers [continuing]. That's my recollection.
Secretary Rumsfeld. But the----
Senator Leahy. I think I was talking about General Ryder's
report, but that's okay.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I see.
Senator Stevens. Senator, could we move on to the other two
Senators----
Senator Leahy. Sure.
Senator Stevens [continuing]. So we can--we have--matter of
fact, we have three Senators. Do we?
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, you have run this hearing very,
very fairly, as you always do, and I appreciate that.
Senator Stevens. I'm trying.
Senator Durbin, you're recognized for 4 minutes.
Senator Durbin. I'd like to ask two questions, if I can
briefly. And the first follows up on this whole question of the
interrogation techniques. We have, I understand, one soldier
who has been captured--is it--a soldier, last name Maupin, if
I'm not mistaken----
General Myers. Right, Maupin.
Senator Durbin [continuing]. And we're uncertain of his
whereabouts.
General Myers. That's correct.
FOLLOWING THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Senator Durbin. And we certainly hope he is safe. I'd like
to ask, Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it help if there was clarity
from you and from this administration that we would abide by
the Geneva Conventions when it comes to civilian and military
detainees, unequivocally? Wouldn't that help to put to rest
concerns about our interrogation techniques in Guantanamo, at
Baghram, in Iraq? And wouldn't it also serve to protect any
Americans who become prisoners?
As I look at the interrogation rules of engagement, which
have been issued, there are, frankly, many of those which are
violative of the Geneva Convention standard, and these are
rules which have been issued by our Government. Wouldn't it be
good for us, at this moment in time, to clearly and
unequivocally state that we will follow the Geneva Convention
with civilian and military detainees?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, that is a question that's
being discussed widely in the press and editorial comment in
newspapers, and certainly that's a fair thing. Regrettably, the
discussion and the dialog and the editorials tend to be, in
many instances, inaccurate.
There is no ambiguity about whether or not the Geneva
Conventions apply in Iraq. There never has been any ambiguity.
From the outset, Iraq is a country, the United States is a
country. The Geneva Conventions apply to parties, nations. They
don't apply to terrorist networks. They do apply to nations.
Iraq's a nation, the United States is a nation. The Geneva
Conventions applied. They have applied every single day, from
the outset.
Now, where the confusion comes in--and it's understandable
to some extent--is this. And I'm very glad you raised it,
because it's something that's concerned me, and I have been
disappointed to see the lack of research that's taken place on
this subject. The Geneva Conventions apply to conflicts between
states, parties to the conventions. In the case of Afghanistan,
it is a state; and, therefore, the Geneva Convention applied to
Afghanistan as a state. It did not apply to the al Qaeda that
was using that state.
And a judgment was made by the President of the United
States, very simply, that to protect the Geneva Conventions and
to protect U.S. Armed Forces, it would be wrong to state that
the Taliban were--merited the benefits of the Geneva
Conventions; the reason being, that the Geneva Conventions
apply to people, and they get prisoner of war (POW) status only
if they satisfy certain criteria: Do they operate in the chain
of command? Do they wear uniforms? Do they carry arms openly?
Do they comply with the laws of war?
Terrorists don't comply with the laws of war. They go
around killing innocent men, women, and children.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Secretary, I----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Just a minute. Just a minute, Senator.
Senator Durbin. I want to have----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll stay late.
Senator Durbin [continuing]. A chance to follow up.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I'll stay. Listen, I'd like a chance to
follow up.
The situation is that the President not only said it should
not apply--the Geneva Conventions--under the law, to the
Taliban or the al Qaeda, although it does to Afghanistan, and
it always has to Iraq; but he said, notwithstanding that fact,
they would be treated as though those conventions applied.
Now, that's not a decision we made. That's a decision the
President made. In my view, the conventions are there to
protect people who obey the laws of war. To have--to do what
you're suggesting, simply regardless of what the convention
says, apply the conventions to anybody--terrorist, Taliban, you
name it--doesn't strengthen the Geneva Conventions, it weakens
them.
DOD INSTRUCTIONS CONSISTENT WITH GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Senator Durbin. Let me go specifically to Iraq, and let me
talk about the detainees that were held at Abu Ghraib and other
prisons. And let me tell you, your interrogation rules of
engagement, the ones that are published, go far beyond the
Geneva Convention. The things that we allow, with CJ's approval
here--stress positions, sleep management, dietary
manipulation--all of these things go far beyond a standard
which says, ``There will be no physical or mental torture, nor
any other form of coercion or that the people involved will be
exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind.'' That's the Geneva Convention. These rules of engagement
for interrogation issued by your Department are inconsistent
with those. And I'm not talking about the terrorists, al Qaeda
or the Taliban. We're talking about Iraq.
Secretary Rumsfeld. General Myers, correct me if I'm wrong,
but my recollection is that any instructions that have been
issued, or anything that's been authorized by the Department,
was checked by the lawyers in your shop, in the Department, in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and deemed to be
consistent with the Geneva Conventions.
General Myers. Absolutely. And you could read any one of
those--stress positions--you could read any of those--stress
positions for an excessive amount of time, or that would hurt
somebody, is not approved. I don't know if you--I don't have
that with me; I had it for the last hearing--I think, at the
bottom, it says, ``In all cases, they will be treated
humanely.'' I don't know if it's on that chart. Is it at the
bottom? What's it say at the bottom?
Senator Stevens. Well, gentlemen, this is a very
interesting conversation----
General Myers. We'll be happy to come brief you on this,
but that is not illegal according to the Geneva Convention or
the ways they were applied. Every time we have an
interrogation, we have an interrogation plan. Those are
appropriate, and that's what we're told by legal authorities
and by anybody that believes in humane treatment.
Senator Durbin. I will just conclude by saying I don't
believe what you have issued is consistent with the Geneva
Convention. And I think, now more than ever, in light of what
happened in that prison, in light of the fact that an American
serviceman is being held, we should be clear and unequivocal--
--
Senator Stevens. Senator, we've got to terminate this
sometime. I'm late for appointments myself.
Now, we have two other members who have 4 minutes each. One
of them is Senator Dorgan, for 4 minutes.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
CAPTURING OSAMA BIN LADEN
It seems to me that one of the major goals with respect to
our security here in this country is the apprehension of Osama
bin Laden. I'd like to ask you about that briefly. It has been
2\1/2\ years since Osama bin Laden perpetrated the attack
against our country. He communicates to us and to the world
through videotapes sent to al Jazeera and other outlets. It
seems to me, I'm sure in your mind and in the mind of all
Americans, that it is urgent that we find Osama bin Laden and
apprehend him. I'd like to know what is happening on that
front. What can you say publicly about it? What is new? What
should we understand about any progress that might or might not
be being made with respect to finding Osama bin Laden?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Department of Justice, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of State, working
with other countries, the Department of Defense, with military
intelligence, spends an enormous amount of time attempting to
develop information, frequently from detainees, that can lead
to information that conceivably might produce actionable
intelligence to capture him. We have not been successful. It's
the kind of thing where people ask me, ``Well, are you close?''
There is no ``close'' in this business. Either you have him or
you don't. And they are well financed, they're clever, they go
to school on us and watch what we do. And, thus far, we have
been successful in capturing a large number of the top al
Qaeda, we've been successful in capturing a large number of
Taliban, we have been successful in capturing a number--many of
the top 55 in Iraq, including Saddam Hussein, and attacking his
sons, but we haven't got Osama bin Laden.
Senator Dorgan. But, Mr. Secretary, you know, I understand
you and General Myers and others, all of us, have our hands
full with Iraq. We pray that that gets resolved. But would you
agree that another significant goal must be the apprehension of
Osama bin Laden? My expectation is if there is a terrorist
event, God forbid, in this country in the future, it----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think that's a good----
Senator Dorgan [continuing]. Will be directed by----
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. Reasonable----
Senator Dorgan [continuing]. Osama bin Laden.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That's a reasonable expectation. We see
threats to that effect consistently, for this country and for
other countries. And they're not just by Osama bin Laden. I
mean, as General Myers pointed out, Zawahiri is--he hasn't
sworn allegiance to Osama bin Laden, but he's running his own
network--but he's the next best thing. He's as close to Osama
bin Laden as you can get without having decided that he wants
to give up his own independence and swear allegiance to him.
General Myers. Zarqawi.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I mean Zarqawi. And----
General Myers. We have--this is something that we review
all the time, and let me just assure you that we have a great
deal of capability and resources put to this problem, and we're
trying to do it the best we can. I mean, we are--there is no
lack of resources. Nobody's asking for anything we don't have.
We're trying to, in a very difficult part of the world, where
the terrain is not only tough, but the people's allegiances to
any government are essentially nonexistent, that it's a very
tough place to operate. And there are other considerations, as
well, we can go into in a classified session. But we certainly
are putting a lot of resources to this issue.
Senator Dorgan. So you're saying, ``We're on the hunt, on
the move, we have resources directed.'' I know that, at one
point, substantial resources were directed to that goal. Is
that not----
General Myers. I would say we have substantial resources
directed to that goal. I would say it's correct.
Senator Dorgan. There were others who predicted that--
within this year, for example--we were getting close enough to
expect that within this year, that Osama bin Laden would be
apprehended.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think predictions like that are
difficult. It's like predicting what a war's going to cost, or
how long it's going to last, or how many people are going to be
killed. Anyone who does that ends up being embarrassed.
Senator Dorgan. All right. I'd just, finally, say, whatever
resources you need to do that job, I think this committee is
very interested in making those resources available if the
resources aren't, at this point, sufficient.
General Myers. You bet, sir.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Yes, Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much.
DETAINEES AND GENEVA CONVENTIONS
If I may, Mr. Secretary, I just want to venture an opinion
on the Geneva Convention. I think we always have to apply the
Geneva Convention, because, with our Nation, regardless of
whether it is state or non-state, we have a certain moral
imperative that we cannot escape, and that's everything that a
just nation believes in, and there's no escape from it. And so
my very strong view is that this nation should always observe
the protocols of the Geneva Conventions.
Now, a question, if I might.
Secretary Rumsfeld. May I comment on that?
Senator Feinstein. Surely.
Secretary Rumsfeld. That sounds so plausible and so
reasonable, and I'm told, by people who study these things,
that there's a danger to doing that. And the danger is that the
Geneva Conventions were put in place to try to protect innocent
civilians. And to the extent people behave in a way that's
inconsistent with the conventions, that is to say they attack
innocent civilians, they operate--they don't wear uniforms,
they don't carry arms openly, they carry them in concealed
basis, they mix themselves among civilian populations, putting
civilian populations at risk, as we see happening in Iraq
today, putting people in front of them, children and the like--
to the extent you say, ``That's okay. Let's give everybody the
benefits of Geneva Convention,'' then the worry was, when the
convention was developed--and I'm not expert on this, but I'm
told this--the worry was that it would lead people to put more
innocent people in jeopardy.
Do you want comment on that?
General Myers. Well, I think that's exactly right. And I
think the next point is, then, having said that, that the
Geneva Convention--that we will apply it in all cases, and we
have, faithfully, and, I think, to include our interrogation
techniques.
Senator Feinstein. Let me make my point. A large number of
detainees are innocent. They're in the wrong place at the wrong
time.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Sure.
Senator Feinstein. You just acknowledged, earlier, that
31,000 detainees were released, presumably because they were
innocent. And, you know, and you also said, General, a very
profound thing this morning. You said, ``There is no way we can
lose this war militarily, and there is no way we can win it
militarily,'' which I think makes the exact point of why this
nation's adherence to the Geneva Conventions, protocols--the
fourth, the fifth, and others--are so very important.
Now, let me just ask one other question. You also said that
your hope would be that, within a few months after the
transition, we would be able to withdraw. And we talked about
planning ahead----
Secretary Rumsfeld. I didn't say that.
Senator Feinstein. The General, I think----
General Myers. No, I said that we would--that the next time
we'd have a lens on what the requirement would be. We'd have to
see how the political track--that was what I hoped to----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Absolutely not. That would be a
terrible----
General Myers. Right.
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. Misunderstanding.
Senator Feinstein. All right----
Secretary Rumsfeld. There's no one I know who believes
that.
Senator Feinstein. So you're saying the next time to view
that would be within----
General Myers. Senator, because now--between now and June
30, we know it's going to get worse. We've said that for
months. And then we're going to have to see afterwards how the
Iraqi citizens behave once they have a government. And so
sometime this fall, I think, General Abizaid will feel
comfortable to say, ``Okay, here's the track we're on now.''
Senator Feinstein. Could I ask for your assessment, both of
your assessment, if I might, on another subject? What is your
assessment of the probability of civil war following a
transition, largely Sunni/Shi'ite?
PROBABILITY OF CIVIL WAR IN IRAQ
Secretary Rumsfeld. It's been a problem we've worried about
from day one. It's a problem we worried about on entering the
country, that it could happen. It hasn't happened. We do know
that terrorists and foreign people and former regime elements
and some other elements in the country have consciously
developed a plan to try to incite that and to attack various
elements and lead people to believe it was another element in
the country, in the hope that that could create anarchy and
chaos and cause the Coalition to leave. So it's a risk. It's a
risk.
The goal would be for us to stay there as long as we have
to, to have the Iraqi security forces sufficiently developed
that they would be able to deal with the overwhelming majority
of the kinds of problems that could occur--normal law
enforcement and the like.
Our role, one would think, would diminish as the government
stands up next year--this year and next year, in some way, as
soon as it's possible, but to, for a good period of time, be
available to be of assistance in the event it's necessary. And
the last thing in the world anyone wants to see is a civil war
in that country.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Feinstein. I thank you both very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Secretary, I think--I'm not sure about
history, but I know you've served this Department of Defense as
Secretary before, and I certainly congratulate you for the way
you're handling these terrible days right now. And, General
Myers, we have worked with a number of chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and you're the finest, and I really believe we
are very fortunate to have you where you are. We appreciate
your testimony today.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Could I make one last comment?
Senator Stevens. Yes, sir.
CLOSING COMMENTS
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman and members, these
events--these abuses, have been a body blow for the country.
I've heard a lot of comments today, and one citation that it's
the beginning of the end, and that kind of a feeling. I must
say, I don't believe that. I think that these abuses that took
place are terrible, they're inhumane, and they're inexcusable,
and they'll be punished, but they don't represent America. They
certainly don't represent Americans or the American military.
Iraq has made enormous progress, and it's getting ignored.
The schools are open, the hospitals are open, the oil is
pumping, they've got a new currency, the ministries have been
formed, there are governing councils for the provinces, there
are city councils for the cities, 80 to 90 percent of the
people in that country are being governed by local councils
over them. And all we hear about are the problems. And there
are problems.
And I've got to tell you, there are going to be more
revelations of abuse that'll come out in the days and weeks
ahead, because we've got six investigations looking into all of
this. And they will not come out because of the media being so
wonderful and investigating everything; they'll come out
because the United States military investigations will let them
out, and they'll announce them, and that's a good thing, and
that tells a whale of a lot about our country.
I've kind of stopped reading the press, frankly. I'm sure
you can understand why. I've been reading a book about the
Civil War and Ulysses Grant, and I think about the--and I'm not
going to compare the two, don't get me wrong, and don't
somebody rush off and say, ``He doesn't get the difference
between Iraq and the Civil War''--the fact of the matter is
that casualties were high, the same kinds of concerns that were
expressed here were expressed then. They weren't in e-mails,
they weren't in digital cameras; they were in diaries and
letters. They were by families, they were by soldiers,
politicians. And they were all across the spectrum. They were
despairing, they were hopeful, they were concerned, they were
combative. And, in the end, they were losing 1,000, 1,500,
2,000 casualties in a 3-day war. The carnage was horrendous.
And it was worth it.
And I understand concern. By golly, I've got it. But I look
at Afghanistan, 25 million people liberated, women voting, able
to go to a doctor. And I look at Iraq, and I--all I can say is,
I hope it comes out well. And I believe it will. And we're
going to keep at it.
Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Well, thank you very much, and we
appreciate your comments. And, God willing, we hope you're
right. We certainly pray you're right, as a matter of fact.
This hearing concludes our planned hearings on the fiscal
year 2005 Defense budget. I have stated that the subcommittee
will schedule a hearing on the forthcoming request when more
details are available. We will have to do that before we mark-
up.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
We thank you all for what you've done for us. We do have a
series of questions that have been submitted for the record, as
you heard. We appreciate if you'd submit those. We're in no
rush. We actually won't close this record until sometime the
end of the month.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
procurement bow wave
Question. The Department projects that military personnel costs
will grow from $104.8 to $120.4 billion during the same period absent
an increase in end strength. That may be optimistic given that basic
pay increased 29 percent from fiscal year 2000 to 2004. None of the
projected costs described above capture funding for on-going operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to current plans, procurement funding will increase by
fifty percent from fiscal year 2005 to 2009. This level of funding is
required if the nation is to fund full rate production of the F-22,
continued development of the Joint Strike Fighter, fielding of the
Future Combat System, our commitment to space surveillance and access,
and meet minimum levels of investment in the shipbuilding industrial
base. I worry that we can afford all of these programs while fighting a
war in Iraq and manning the force. Do you consider this level of
investment to be sustainable?
Answer. Yes, I believe the defense investment projected in the
President's budget for fiscal year 2005-09 is sustainable. Total
defense funding for these years includes only moderate real growth--
about 2.5 percent per year. Admittedly, we do not know the future costs
of possible military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or for other
contingency operations. But we would not want to allow those possible
costs keep us from prudent investments in the future--especially
investments to develop and field new capabilities most suited to 21st
century threats, most notably terrorism.
captured enemy ammunition in iraq
Question. The Committee provided an additional $165 million in the
fiscal year 2004 supplemental for the disposal effort. In total, the
Defense Department has awarded $285 million in fiscal year 2004
contracts for the demilitarization of captured enemy ammunition in
Iraq.
On my recent trip to Iraq, I was shocked to learn about the number
and size of munitions dumps in the country. I am especially concerned
about the sites that are partially secured. Could you please give us an
update on efforts to secure these sites and dispose of captured enemy
ammunition?
Answer. There are an estimated 600,000 short tons (ST) of munitions
from the Saddam era in Iraq. We have over 6,000 soldiers and
contractors dedicated to securing, transporting, guarding, and
destroying captured enemy munitions. As of June 18, we have located
9,693 weapons caches. Of those, 9,631 weapons caches have been cleared
and 195,141 ST of munitions have been destroyed. There are an
additional 149,861 ST on hand being evaluated to determine the best
disposal methods or their reutilization potential. There are 62 weapons
caches remaining to be cleared, of those 21 are classified as secured
and the remaining 41 are classified as partially secured. Secured
caches have 24 hour coverage by armed guards. Partially secured sites
contain ammunition that is extremely difficult to remove quickly, such
as aircraft ordnance and large caliber ammunition or missiles and are
monitored by periodic patrols, reconnaissance and surveillance.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
rdt&e budget
Question. I believe superior technologies can be applied to better
protect our forces.
To what extent does this budget fund high-energy laser solutions to
problems such as artillery and rocket attack?
Answer. As part of the on-going evaluation of high energy laser
technology for a range of potential missions, the Department of Defense
supports efforts to establish the technical feasibility and demonstrate
the military effectiveness of high energy laser systems in tactical
applications. Specific to the threat posed by artillery and rocket
attack, these efforts include both focused programs and more general
tactical high energy laser technology investigations that are also
relevant to this threat.
The Army continues to support field testing and evaluation of the
ground-based Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL), which is a deuterium
fluoride chemical laser-based high energy laser system jointly
developed and funded with Israel. The THEL system is located at the
High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility at White Sands Missile Range,
NM, and continues to be useful in assessing potential benefits of high-
energy laser systems on the tactical battlefield. Most recently, the
laser successfully detected, acquired, tracked, engaged and destroyed
155 mm artillery rounds fired from a howitzer.
On May 29, 2001, Israel requested the Department of Defense to
support the development of a complete Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser
(MTHEL) prototype by fiscal year 2007. The Army has committed $340.4
million in fiscal year 2004-09 to support the combined MTHEL prototype
development and testing effort. Israel is expected to match the United
States' research and development investment for the laser. The program
objective is to design, develop, fabricate, and test a working
prototype weapon system by fiscal year 2007 based on demonstrated high
energy deuterium fluoride (DF) chemical laser technology. MTHEL will be
the first mobile, integrated Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) system
capable of acquiring, tracking, engaging and destroying rocket,
artillery, and mortar (RAM) projectiles, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), cruise missiles, and theater ballistic missiles. No fielded
capability currently exists to counter the RAM threat. This prototype,
as the HEL pathfinder system, will enable the Army to develop an
operational understanding of the tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs) necessary to effectively employ this new weapon class. Results
of the prototype testing in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 will
be used to develop the pathway for future HEL weapon systems' evolution
into the Army's emerging Enhanced Area Air Defense System (EAADS).
Army, Air Force, and HEL Joint Technology Office S&T funding
supports the development and demonstration of enabling technologies to
provide options for improved performance, better efficiency, lighter
weight, lower costs, and improved operational suitability for future
tactical HEL systems. A significant initiative ($39.4 million in fiscal
year 2004-05) is the on-going Joint High Power Solid-State Laser
Program (jointly funded by the HEL Joint Technology Office, the Air
Force, and the Army), which has a goal to demonstrate laser power
scaling to 25 kW for three different technical approaches within the
next year and longer-term scaling to the 100 kW level. Development and
demonstration efforts are also addressing critical technologies for
tactical beam control, HEL optical components, and tactical target
effects and vulnerability assessment.
Question. What resources does this budget provide for new
technologies to help detect improvised explosive devices that have
killed and maimed too many of our troops?
Answer. Most of our efforts to date in developing technologies to
detect improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have resulted from internal
reprogramming actions and requests for supplemental funding. To date we
have invested about $10 million in technologies intended for IED
detection, with most of the efforts targeted to detecting changes in
the ground where IEDs are buried or in detecting concealed weapons such
as suicide bombers or vehicle-borne explosives. Specific project
details are classified and have been presented in closed forums.
Organizationally, the Force Protection Working Group and the Combating
Terrorism Technology Task Force are working directly with
representatives from the Central Command and Special Operations Command
to examine technology alternatives to address immediate operational
needs to support the Global War on Terrorism.
Within the Military Services, the Army's Rapid Equipment Force
(REP) and Army IED Task Force are helping focus Army investments in
detecting IEDs. Specifically, the IED Task Force focuses on counter IED
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, and compiles and disseminates
``Blue'' counter-IED TTPs and corresponding ``Red'' TTPs through their
cell at the Center For Army Lessons Learned. This TF maintains an
extensive classified website of TTPs and has recently produced an IED
training module. In addition, the Army continues to investigate
improved methods for Airborne IED/Mine Detection, with funding to
improve change detection software, cueing algorithms, and
identification of sensors that provide high resolution imagery at
typical aircraft (manned and unmanned) altitudes.
In deploying the 1MEF to Iraq, the Navy and Marine Corps are
currently reprogramming funds to deal with detection and defeat of
IEDs. In addition, the Navy is initiating a network-centric effort to
provide forces the means to detect, classify, and locate IEDs and other
tactical threats; and an initiative to exploit the properties of the
terahertz band for detection of IEDs. The goal is to achieve sufficient
precision, low false-alarm rate, and stand-off distance to permit
deployment of tactically useful countermeasures to IEDs and related
threats.
The Counter Bomb/Counter Bomber (CB\2\) Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) program will develop and assesses technologies
that can be deployed in a layered system of countermeasures that
assess, detect, identify, and mitigate the terrorist threat from an
IED. The threat operations of interest for this ACTD include human-
carried, vehicle-delivered, and leave-behind explosives.
Question. Finally, the urban environment of Iraq exposes our
personnel to the danger of snipers. Do you agree that new anti-sniper
systems that take advantage of high-energy laser and other cutting-edge
technologies should be a high priority?
Answer. There are a number of counter-sniper technologies being
assessed within the Department, including acoustic, infrared (IR), and
laser capabilities. Experience indicates the effectiveness of these
systems is driven by terrain and environmental conditions, with
fielding options based on operational scenarios. For example:
--The Naval Research Laboratory VIPER system detects the unique IR
signature of a muzzle blast and permits the precision location
of the source of gunfire. The gun may be fired on or off axis
with respect to the sensor. Gun firings within closed
structures having windows and in partially obscured
environments can also be detected. Detection and location is
limited to line of sight. A directed video sensor permits
zooming in on the firing location.
--The Overwatch Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration will
demonstrate an operational sensor and targeting system's
capability to detect, classify and accurately locate direct
fire weapons in real-time and transmit that information to a
command and control element in support of ground forces
operating in urban and complex terrain. The sensor targeting
system will provide a capability to ground forces to improve
target acquisition, detect multiple types of weapons firing,
locate snipers in real time, and decrease counterfire reaction
time.
--The Air Force Research Laboratory's Battlefield Optical
Surveillance System, or BOSS, is a grouping of lasers, optics,
sensors and communications equipment mounted on a High Mobility
Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle. While initially envisioned as a
mobile counter sniper platform, BOSS has evolved into a working
concept of a covert surveillance/detection system with the
ability to visibly--or invisibly--designate a battlefield
threat. BOSS utilizes forward looking infrared, an IR camera
illuminator to light up an area of interest, a visible laser to
designate a threatening individual, and a microwave relay to
transmit data to a command post.
--The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate is developing a new
concept that uses pulsed electromagnetic energy in the optical
spectrum to distract, deter and dissuade an adversary from
extended range. The object of the Pulsed Energy Projectile
(PEP) program is to develop and demonstrate the technology
necessary to produce a crew served, counter personnel non-
lethal directed energy weapon providing controllable bio-
effects to deter, disable, and distract individuals. The device
directs an invisible induced plasma pulse at a target that will
create a flash-bang near the intended target.
status of forces agreement
Question. Questions remain about the role of U.S. military forces
that will still be in Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty.
Can you describe status of forces agreement that will dictate how
our troops will be able to operate in Iraq after June 30th?
Answer. During the period of the Iraqi Interim Government (June 30,
2004 until the election of a Transitional National Assembly no later
than January 31, 2005), U.S. forces will operate under current
authorities, i.e., U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 and Coalition
Provisional Authority Order 17. After the election of the Assembly, we
expect to negotiate the role and status of United States and other
multinational forces with the Iraqi Transitional Government that will
be formed by the Assembly.
In addition to these authorities, the new Interim Government has
already stated its understanding that multinational forces must remain
in Iraq until Iraqi security forces can assume their full
responsibilities.
Question. Does the agreement provide adequate protections for our
service personnel should disputes arise over the propriety of their
actions?
Answer. The current authorities, under which United States and
other multinational forces will operate until early 2005, provide
adequate protection. We will require the same level of protection in
the agreement we will negotiate with the Iraqi Transitional Government.
chemical demilitarization
Question. I believe the Department must increase the top-line
funding for chemical demilitarization in order to keep its commitment
to the citizens who reside near America's chemical weapons stockpiles.
Neither my constituents nor I will tolerate continued mismanagement and
under funding of the efforts to get rid of these chemical stockpiles.
Please explain why the Department of Defense cut funding for
chemical demilitarization despite the Department's directive, signed by
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology
Pete Aldridge, for acceleration of demilitarization of chemical
weapons. Is the Aldridge directive in effect, and where does the
Department stand on maintaining its schedule for destruction of
chemical stockpiles?
Answer. The Department realigned funds in its fiscal year 2005
request to help ensure we meet the Chemical Weapons Convention extended
45 percent destruction deadline of December 2007. When the previous
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
USD (AT&L), directed the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons
Alternatives (PM ACWA) to accelerate the destruction of the Pueblo,
Colorado, chemical weapons stockpile, this was based on PM ACWA
pursuing four recommended acceleration options: (1) an accelerated
contract award; (2) an expedited permitting approach; (3) enhanced
reconfiguration of the assembled chemical munitions; and (4) offsite
treatment of secondary wastes. The first two acceleration options were
fully implemented and have reduced time and generated a cost avoidance
during this phase of the project. However, Colorado state regulators
indicated they require a separate permit for enhanced reconfiguration,
therefore eliminating the acceleration benefits of option (3).
Additionally, the Colorado Citizens Advisory Committee, in its capacity
as the voice for the Pueblo community, for the most part rejected
option (4). PM ACWA is therefore no longer pursuing these two
acceleration options. Regardless, the USD (AT&L) direction remains in
effect. Other acceleration options are always welcome for
consideration; however any option which requires additional resources,
such as major design changes, must also be validated by the Department.
The Department will continue to make every effort to comply with the
Chemical Weapons Convention destruction deadline requirements.
Question. The Department's cuts to the ACWA program have the
potential to slow demilitarization at certain sites by roughly a year.
How can the Department claim to support accelerate clean up while at
the same time cannibalizing the ACWA budget to pay for mismanagement
and cost overruns at incineration sites?
Answer. The Department realigned funds in its fiscal year 2005
request to help ensure we meet the Chemical Weapons Convention extended
45 percent destruction deadline of December 2007. Meanwhile, the full
effects of this internal realignment on the Pueblo Chemical Agent-
Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) project have yet to be quantified.
While design and construction of the process building may be delayed,
efforts are underway to begin construction of the support buildings.
Additionally, a recent analysis has found there are viable design
concept options less costly than the current design concept that can
complete destruction of the Pueblo chemical weapons stockpile by the
same time.
Question. Please explain why the Department cut the budget for
chemical demilitarization between the fiscal year 2005 estimate and the
submission of the fiscal year 2005 budget to Congress.
Answer. The Department did not cut the fiscal year 2005 budget. The
Chemical Demilitarization Program fiscal year 2005 estimate was
$1,456,876,000, and the overall fiscal year 2005 submission was
$1,453,876,000. Due to the concerns of the House and Senate
Authorization Committees that all funds for the Chemical
Demilitarization Program should be appropriated in a Defense-wide
account, the Department realigned the Military Construction request to
a separate DOD-wide account. Accordingly, $81.9 million was submitted
in the Chem Demil Construction, Defense account. Also, $3 million was
decremented in the fiscal year 2005 submission due to non-pay inflation
adjustments. Therefore, the difference between the two submissions was
$3 million.
Question. Please explain why the department transferred $147
million in funding from the ACWA program to fund cost overruns at the
Office of Elimination of Chemical Weapons' incineration sites?
Answer. While preparing the fiscal year 2005 President's Budget,
the Department moved $147 million of unexecutable funds from the ACWA
Program research and development budget activity to cover shortfalls in
other areas of the Chemical Demilitarization Program to help ensure we
meet the Chemical Weapons Convention extended 45 percent destruction
deadline of December 2007. This was not a punitive action and not
intended or expected to slow down our demilitarization actions at
Pueblo. Sufficient funds will be available in fiscal year 2005 to
proceed with the Pueblo effort, to include $45 million for Military
Construction projects.
Question. One of the great successes of the ACWA program has been
the robust involvement of the local community. ACWA's efforts to reach
out to local leaders and citizens have invested them in the project at
BGAD and help to build an unprecedented amount of trust in the Chemical
Demilitarization program. Why, then, am I hearing talk of cutting
funding to the citizen involvement programs underway at stockpile
communities such as the Chemical Destruction Community Advisory Board
in Kentucky?
Answer. The Department has no intention of cutting funding to the
Citizens Advisory Commissions (CACs) in any of the eight states
possessing chemical weapons stockpiles. The Department is required to
provide this funding under section 172(g) of Public law 102-484, and
fully intends to continue to comply.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Conrad Burns
Question. It is more important now than ever that Iraqis see other
Iraqis in military positions and other areas of law enforcement. Would
you provide this subcommittee with an update on progress in training
the Iraqi Police Force, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the Iraqi
Army? Are you finding that you have adequate facilities, equipment and
resources to precede with this training and then transition them into
operational forces?
Answer. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-
I), commanded by LTG Dave Petraeus, in coordination with the Iraqi MOI
and MOD, is responsible for manning, training, equipping, mentoring and
certifying the Iraqi Security Forces. Training, equipping and mentoring
programs are being aggressively implemented to develop internal and
external Iraqi security force capability.
As of July 25, 2004, the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) is gradually
and steadily developing increased capability to assume internal
security responsibility. Forces under the Minister of Interior include
the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) and the Department of Border Enforcement
(DBE). Thirty percent of the 89,000 man IPS have completed either an 8
week basic course for new recruits, at the Jordan International Police
Training Center or the Baghdad Police Service Academy, or the three
week Transition Integration Program (TIP) for veteran officers,
accomplished in provincial training facilities. Advanced training being
accomplished at the IPS Adnon Training Facility in Baghdad includes
Leadership and Criminal Investigation as well as specialty courses for
the Emergency Response Unit and Counter-Terrorism Unit. Equipment,
including weapons, body armor, communications and vehicles is being
delivered at a steady pace.
The Department of Border Enforcement is manned at 85 percent of the
desired end state. Equipment and training similar to the IPS programs
is being provided to the Iraqi Border Patrol (IBP) of the DBE.
Infrastructure improvements to border forts are also progressing with
contracts let to rebuild Class A and B entry and denial points along
the Syrian, Saudi and Iranian borders.
Under the current plan, 100 percent of the training required to man
the MOI forces will be completed by June 2005. Equipment deliveries
should be completed by April 2005.
Under the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Iraqi Civil Defense Force
has been renamed as the Iraqi National Guard (ING). There are 45 ING
Battalions operational, with 40 manned at over 75 percent of personnel
requirements. As with the MOI forces, ING equipment is flowing
steadily. All 45 Battalions will be fully operational by December 2005.
Five of 27 Brigades of the Iraqi Army (IA) are operational or in
training, including the 1st Brigade of the Iraqi Intervention Force
(IIF) currently operating in Baghdad. The IIF was created to conduct
internal security tasking after the events of April and May 2004 in
Fallujah and the Center South. Equipment is delivered to the IA
battalions as they complete training. Under the current schedule, 27
Battalions of the IA will be operational by February 2005.
The Iraqi Coastal Defense Force (ICDF) has recruited 71 percent of
the required manning and is equipped with 5 patrol boats and 10 Rigid
Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs). They are currently conducting supervised
daytime operations. They are on track for full operational capability
by October 2005.
The Iraqi Air Force will consist of a reconnaissance squadron, a C-
130 transport squadron and a UH-1 Huey helicopter squadron. Training is
underway or completed for 23 percent of the pilots and mechanics. Two
Seeker reconnaissance aircraft have been purchased and will be
operational by September 2004.
MNSTC-I is aggressively ensuring that Iraqis take responsibility
for developing the capability of their own forces. MNSTC-I, in
coordination with the Chief of Mission, provides mentoring to the
staffs of the Iraqi Joint Headquarters (JHQ), the MOD and the MOI to
develop command and control capability and implement Iraqi policy for
employment of the ISF. As C\2\ capability grows, combined with the
ongoing ISF training and equipping programs, the Interim Iraqi
Government (IIG) will be able to assume control of security
responsibilities at the local, then provincial, then national level
supported in the background by the Coalition. Finally, NATO has agreed
to provide additional training resources to the IIG. MNFI is
coordinating with NATO to determine the breadth and scope of that
assistance.
Question. Last year, the Air Force proposed a $21 billion lease of
100 Boeing 767's, which would be converted to KC-767 tankers. The Air
Force and conference reached a compromise last year, included in the
Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Authorization Act, allowing the Air Force to
lease 20 tankers from Boeing and buy 80 under a traditional procurement
program. However, negotiations for a final contract were put on hold at
the end of 2003, pending the outcome of the DOD Inspector General
investigation. Exactly where are we now in respect to the KC-767 tanker
issue and what is the plan moving forward?
Answer. In response to the tasking of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, and associated with the hold on the proposed 767 Tanker Lease/
Buy, the results of three studies have been provided to the Department.
The studies are: The Aerial Refueling Defense Science Board (DSB) Task
Force Study; the Analysis of Lessons Learned from the United States Air
Force Tanker Lease Program (TLP)-Industrial College of the Armed
Forces/National Defense University (ICAF/NDU); and the DOD Inspector
General Audit Report, ``Acquisition of the Boeing KC-767A Tanker
Aircraft.'' All three studies recommended that the Department readdress
how it implements and controls innovative acquisition processes,
including leasing. In light of this, the Acting USD(AT&L) directed the
President, DAU chair a working group to formulate recommendations based
on the results of these three studies that will result in changes to
the DOD 5000 Series, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)/Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), and other acquisition related
documents. Recommendations are due to USD(AT&L) not later than
September 1, 2004. In addition, an Analysis of Alternatives for Tanker
Recapitalization and the ongoing Mobility Capabilities Study have been
accelerated. The overall goal of these efforts is to more fully
understand the tanker requirements and options for meeting those
requirements, before recapitalizing the tanker fleet.
Question. This year, eight active duty, eight Air Force Reserve,
and 18 Air National Guard units provided 1,300 tanker sorties
offloading more than 32 million pounds of fuel for missions related to
Operation Noble Eagle (ONE). Last year, the Air Force brought personnel
and materiel into Iraq and Afghanistan via 7,410 sorties. Over 4,100
passengers and 487 tons of cargo were moved by airmen operating at
various Tanker Airlift Control elements in and around Afghanistan. Are
you finding that you're tactical and strategic airlift capabilities
adequate? Are tactical and strategic airlift funded adequately in the
fiscal year 2005 budget?
Answer. Tactical airlift capabilities as a whole are adequate to
prosecute the national defense strategy. Moderate areas of concern
still exist such as aircraft survivability in current and future
dynamic environments. However, fleet capability is currently adequate.
Strategic airlift capabilities present a different picture. The Air
Force can provide enough capability to meet the limited requirements
mentioned in your question, but lacks the capacity to fully prosecute
the national defense strategy. Given fiscal realities, the fiscal year
2005 budget adequately addresses the capability shortfall and a roadmap
is in place to improve. Finally, the Mobility Capabilities Study (MCS)
due for release in fiscal year 2005 will update the airlift
requirements.
Question. Can you give me an idea of when the Strategic
Capabilities Assessment (SCA) will be completed?
Answer. The term ``Strategic Capabilities Assessment'' refers to a
planned, periodic review of progress in implementing the findings of
the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The first of the planned
reviews was completed earlier this spring. The draft results are still
being reviewed by senior DOD officials.
______
Questions Submitted to General Richard B. Myers
Question Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
captured enemy ammunition in iraq
Question. Over 770,000 short tons of enemy ammunition have been
discovered in Iraq. Continued finds could increase the total number to
over 1 million short tons.
The captured ammunition is stored at 72 sites throughout the
country. Of these sites, there are 23 secured sites and 49 partially
secured sites. A secured site is defined as having a 24/7 Coalition
presence. Partially secured is defined as periodic patrolling/
surveillance and either fenced or bermed.
It has been reported and confirmed that weapons, ammunition and
explosives at many partially secured ammo dumps are easily available to
enemy combatants that has the means to load and transport them.
The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for processing and
demilitarizing captured ammunition in Iraq. Security is their top
priority. They plan to have all ammo secured by the end of September.
The Corps of Engineers is safely disposing of approximately 600 tons
per day. Under the best case scenario, it will take three years to
complete the disposal process.
The Committee provided an additional $165 million in the fiscal
year 2004 supplemental for the disposal effort. In total, the Defense
Department has awarded $285 million in fiscal year 2004 contracts for
the demilitarization of captured enemy ammunition in Iraq.
Soldiers and Marines are uncovering new weapons caches on almost a
daily basis. How are you securing and disposing of these recently
captured munitions?
Answer. Since January 1, 2004, we have found 2,281 weapons caches.
Those weapons caches are evaluated based on the type and quantity of
munitions. The most dangerous munitions, such as rocket-propelled
grenades, mortar and artillery rounds (used for making improvised
explosive devices) and surface to air missiles are transported to six
depots for safe secure storage and eventual destruction. There is one
depot per divisional sector. Munitions that are deemed unsafe or
potentially booby trapped are destroyed at the site of discovery.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
homeland security
Question. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National
Guard and Reserves have played an integral role in securing the
homeland. This has been particularly important to border states like
New Mexico where terrorist infiltration is a constant concern.
General Myers, do you expect that the National Guard will maintain
significant border protection responsibilities?
Answer. No. Our National Guard troops were only used in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks as a stopgap measure. There is no long-
term plan to engage them in border security operations. Border security
is not the primary responsibility of the military.
Question. What new roles and missions (such as UAV operations) will
they be assuming to enhance border protection?
Answer. The National Guard will not be engaged in border protection
operations.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Senator Stevens. We appreciate your concern. And, again, we
generally thank you. I mean, you've taken a lot of time with us
today. Did you know that every member of this subcommittee was
here and asked questions of you? And that's probably a record
for this subcommittee on these wrap-up hearings that we have.
Yes, as Senator Inouye says, it's the first time they all
came for the wrap-up.
Thank you very much.
General Myers. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Inouye.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., Wednesday, May 12, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]