[Senate Hearing 108-650]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:32 p.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V. Domenici (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Domenici, Bennett, Craig, Reid, and
Feinstein.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS, UNDER
SECRETARY
ACCOMPANIED BY:
ADMIRAL FRANK L. BOWMAN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NAVAL REACTORS
PROGRAM
DR. EVERET H. BECKNER, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, DEFENSE PROGRAMS
PAUL M. LONGSWORTH, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, DEFENSE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. Good afternoon. This hearing will come to
order.
Today, the subcommittee will take testimony on the fiscal
year 2005 budget request for the National Nuclear Security
Administration. We will receive testimony from Under Secretary
and Administrator of NNSA, Ambassador Linton Brooks; Deputy
Administrator for Naval Reactors, Admiral Frank Bowman; Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs, Dr. Everet Beckner; Deputy
Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Paul Longsworth.
It is a pleasure to have all of you here. I look forward to
your testimony today.
For the NNSA, the President has requested $9 billion, an
increase of 4.4 percent from the current year funding level of
$8.6 billion. As a percentage, this is a considerable increase
above the 1.2 percent growth in discretionary funding for
Department of Energy.
Ambassador Brooks, your responsibilities include the
important job of maintaining our shrinking nuclear stockpile
and to ensure that it serves its essential mission of
deterrence. Funding priorities in this account include
continuation of the stockpile refurbishment activities as well
as conducting important stewardship activities to ensure safety
and reliability, a vital necessity in the absence of
underground testing.
Your budget also continues to make the National Ignition
Facility, NIF, a top priority. I am deeply concerned that the
fiscal year 2005 budget has slipped the target date for
ignition back to 2014 as a result of numerous technical
challenges, including the cryogenic targets. To date, we have
spent $2.5 billion with another $4 billion that will be spent
over the life of the program. I don't believe it is prudent to
continue to throw good money after bad. I will do everything in
my power to ensure that program managers deal with the most
pressing technical issues before we allow the program to go any
further. In addition, I will work to ensure there are clear and
verifiable programmatic milestones.
I was surprised to see the request that nearly $500 million
is provided for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. The
Department should not assume such large sums in its budget
without Congressional approval or direction. What we are really
talking about is a stockpile plan. A successful report
validates design feasibility and need and does not force the
inclusion of such a large amount of money. I want it explained
to this committee, unequivocally, so what we are doing and what
we are authorizing and what we are not doing and what we are
not authorizing. Because nobody on this committee is voting to
do this. We are voting to study it if it wins but not to do it.
To study it is a small amount of money. If we do it it is a lot
of money.
The budget also provides $124 million, a 21 percent
increase above current year funding in the safeguards and
security accounts to respond to the new design basis threat.
That new security requirements, that these new ones are driving
costs to such a high level it is diverting limited resources
from other cash-strapped programs within DoE. While I recognize
the need to protect this special nuclear material I fear that
there is not a plan to consolidate the nuclear material across
NNSA complex in order to lower our security costs and at the
same time minimize terrorist threats.
Ambassador Brooks, I am somewhat disappointed that the
administration has failed to provide the nuclear stockpile
report that was required in the 2004 Energy and Water Bill.
This is an important priority within this bill and I would
appreciate it if you would take the message back to the
Forrestal Building and to the Pentagon that we are eagerly
awaiting that report. Soon this committee will begin developing
our budget priorities. Failure to produce the stockpile report
will have serious consequences for your funding priorities next
year. I need not spend any more time; you had better answer it,
acknowledging that what I am talking about is right and you had
better promise us to fix it or we will have big troubles
between you and this committee, I assure you. This should have
already been done.
Finally, I am very discouraged with the funding cuts
proposed in 2005 for the Mesa Facility at Sandia and the CMR
replacement facility at Los Alamos. Shortfalls of a serious
budget nature will delay these construction projects, adding to
the costs and limiting the lab's ability to perform critical
stockpile work.
Now, I understand you are short of money. You get told by
the OMB what to do but some of this, you know, we are not going
to do what you ask us just because OMB let you, we are going to
do what we think and not let you do some of the things that
they have told you that you can do. I will have my turn on
these laboratories when I ask you the questions.
I will just make a statement ad lib now, that everything
that I can now read about America in the globalization and jobs
would indicate that what this country needs more than anything
else is new technology breakthroughs. And we need them quick.
We need new things that follow on the computer with new
technologies. And if I understand correctly, those come in the
fields of micro-engineering, probably, and nano-science, and
the center for those should have been Mesa. Maybe it still will
be but if we delay it so long it will not be.
In addition to maintaining the nuclear stockpile, you at
the NNSA also have the important challenge of preventing the
spread of nuclear material, technology and expertise that could
be used to develop and use weapons of mass destructions. The
Office of Nuclear Non-Proliferation works very hard to secure
weapons-grade material and prevent the sale of technology used
by countries to develop nuclear weapons.
Mr. Ambassador, I must compliment you and Mr. Longsworth
and his staff for the role DoE played in disarming Libya, as
well as uncovering the proliferation activities operated by
Pakistan's top nuclear weapons scientist, Abdul Khan. We
congratulate you on that. And we only fail to understand how
Abdul Khan, with what we know he has already done, is still
free. If somebody else in the world had done that, God knows
what would have happened.
Another top priority for the office is to ensure the
success of the U.S./Russian MOX program that will dispose of 34
tons of plutonium from each of the Russian and U.S. stockpiles.
I am very pleased, Senators, to have been part of that. Senator
Reid, you remember when I helped put it together and went to
Russia with President Clinton, but I am very, very concerned
about the lack of progress in these negotiations. How long ago
did this start? 1998. U.S. negotiations to work with the
Russians where we to try to find an acceptable solution so we
can break ground on this project and we are hung up over what I
think are trivial negotiating issues. I recently told the White
House that maybe they ought to put some bigger people in the
position of negotiating. How a little issue of indemnification
can hold this up is beyond me. Now I find that indemnification
has occurred between Russians and us and some other program
where the liability potential might have been more severe than
this, and the Russians came to the table. They would not have
got that one done, if I would have had anything to do with it,
until they get this one done. This is a way to get rid of a
huge chunk of nuclear-grade plutonium.
Admiral Bowman, thank you for your participation in what
may be your last hearing before the subcommittee. I appreciate
your steady hand. The Naval Reactors Program continues to serve
as the world's gold standard for safe and reliable operations
of nuclear power. I am interested to know how your office has
been handed the responsibility of producing the next generation
of space reactors. Traditionally this has fallen to the Office
of Nuclear Energy, which has developed some expertise in these
unique engineering systems. I surmise that part of the reason
it went where it did is that you have more expertise than they
had in the area.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Dr. Beckner and Mr. Longsworth, I appreciate your
participation and welcome your input.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici
Good morning--this hearing will come to order.
Today, the subcommittee will take testimony on the fiscal year 2005
budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration.
We will receive testimony from Under Secretary and Administrator of
the NNSA, Ambassador Linton Brooks; Deputy Administrator for Naval
Reactors, Admiral Frank Bowman; Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs, Dr. Everet Beckner; and Deputy Administrator for Nuclear
Nonproliferation, Paul Longsworth.
You have all testified before this subcommittee before and it is a
pleasure to have you here again. I look forward to your testimony
today.
For the NNSA, the President has requested $9 billion, an increase
of 4.4 percent from the current year funding level of $8.6 billion. As
a percentage, this is a considerable increase above the 1.2 percent
growth in discretionary funding for Department of Energy.
Ambassador Brooks, your responsibilities include the important job
of maintaining our shrinking nuclear stockpile and to ensure that it
serves its essential mission of deterrence. Funding priorities in this
account include continuation of the stockpile refurbishment activities
as well as conducting important stewardship activities to ensure safety
and reliability--a vital necessity in the absence of underground
testing.
Your budget also continues to make the National Ignition Facility
(NIF) a top priority. I am deeply concerned that the fiscal year 2005
budget has slipped the target date for ignition back to 2014 as a
result of numerous technical challenges, including the cryogenic
targets. To date, we have spent $2.5 billion with another $4 billion
that will be spent over the life of the program. I don't believe it is
prudent to continue to throw good money after bad. I will do everything
in my power to ensure that program managers deal with the most pressing
technical issues before we allow the program to go any further. In
addition, I will work to ensure there are clear and verifiable
programmatic milestones.
Like many of my colleagues, I was surprised to see in the budget
request that nearly $500 million is provided for the Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator (RNEP) in out-year funding. I want be absolutely
clear, without a stockpile plan and a successful report that validates
design feasibility and need; the Department should not assume such
large sums in its budget without Congressional approval or direction.
This budget also provides a $124 million increase (21 percent above
current year funding) in the Safeguards and Security Account in order
to respond to the new Design Basis Threat. The new security
requirements are driving costs to such a high level, it is diverting
limited resources from other cash-strapped programs within DOE. While,
I recognize the need to protect this special nuclear material, I fear
that there is not a plan to consolidate special nuclear material across
the NNSA complex in order to lower our security costs and eliminate
potential terrorist threats.
Ambassador Brooks, I am disappointed that the administration has
failed to provide the nuclear stockpile report that was required in the
fiscal year 2004 Energy and Water bill. This is an important priority
within this bill and I would appreciate it if you would take the
message back to the Forrestal building and to the Pentagon that we are
eagerly awaiting that report. Soon this subcommittee will begin
developing our budget priorities. Failure to produce the stockpile
report will have serious consequences for your funding priorities next
year.
Finally, I am discouraged with the funding cuts proposed for fiscal
year 2005 for the MESA facility at Sandia and the CMR Replacement
facility at Los Alamos. Serious budget shortfalls will delay these
construction projects adding to the overall cost and limiting the labs
ability to perform critical stockpile work.
In addition to maintaining the nuclear stockpile, the NNSA also has
the important challenge of preventing the spread of nuclear material,
technology and expertise that could be used to develop and use weapons
of mass destruction. The Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation works very
hard to secure weapons-grade material and to prevent the sale of
technology used by countries to develop nuclear weapons.
Ambassador Brooks, I must compliment you, Mr. Longsworth and his
staff for the role DoE played in disarming Libya as well as uncovering
the proliferation activities operated by Pakistan's top nuclear weapons
scientist Abdul Khan.
Another top priority for that office is to ensure the success of
the U.S./Russian MOX program that will dispose of 34 tons of excess
plutonium from each of the Russian and U.S. stockpiles. This is an
important project from a proliferation standpoint, but I am concerned
about the lack of progress in negotiations. I have worked hard to push
U.S. negotiators to work with the Russians to find an acceptable
solution that will allow us to break ground on this important project
and forever dispose of the plutonium.
Admiral Bowman, thank you for your participation in what may be
your last hearing before this subcommittee. I appreciate your steady
hand on the rudder. The Naval Reactor program continues to serve as the
world's gold standard for safe and reliable operations of nuclear
power.
Admiral, I am interested to know how your office has been handed
the responsibility of producing the next generation of space reactors.
Traditionally, this responsibility has fallen to the Office of Nuclear
Energy, which has developed an expertise in designing these unique
energy systems.
Dr. Beckner and Mr. Longsworth, I appreciate your participation in
this hearing and welcome your input.
Now, I will yield to Senator Reid for any opening statement he
would like to make.
Senator Domenici. Now I yield to Senator Reid for comments
and then we will proceed. Senator Reid.
Senator Reid. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome
you back after the recess. I hope your recess went well.
Senator Domenici. Thank you. It did.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR HARRY REID
Senator Reid. Ambassador Brooks, by and large I believe you
and your team are doing a good job. I have met with you on
occasion and you have always been forthcoming in spite of the
rocky start that you and I had regarding your confirmation. I
think you have been candid with me and I have tried to be with
you. I have, as with Senator Domenici, a long tenure on this
subcommittee; we go back to the days of Dr. Victor Reis where
we were trying to come up with a stockpile stewardship program.
And I think we came up with one to have a safe and reliable
nuclear stockpile, clearly the safest and most secure of any in
the world. And even though I fought Senator Domenici initially
on establishing the entity which you lead, Senator Domenici was
right; I think it has been a tremendous step forward. And
General Gordon did such a remarkably good job, he has very
large shoes to fill, as you know. He had a commanding
personality and his great record, I think, added the prestige
needed to get this new entity started.
So, I have reviewed your testimony, budget request, and I
will bet there is not a hearing that I have attended, or will
attend during this budget cycle, that they would not love to
have OMB sign off on what you have gotten. I do not know of an
entity that has been treated better than yours that I have seen
this whole year. Your problem is not an inadequate budget
request, your problem is going to be holding on to what you
already have. This subcommittee may be as much as $1.7 billion
in the hole due to a combination of inadequate funding
requests, especially the Corps of Engineers, budget gimmicks
that certainly are just amateurish and the budget committees
have chosen not to accept these gimmicks.
Holding NNSA harmless may not be possible unless the
subcommittee is given a sizeable increase in its allocation. I
read an article during the recess that suggests, Mr. Chairman,
you have secured a commitment from the Majority Leader and the
Chairman of the Budget Committee that our subcommittee will
remain healthy at the end of the budget process. I certainly
hope so. It is not just this subcommittee, it is the entire
Senate that benefits. And having said that, the entire country
benefits from giving us a better budget mark than what we have.
And if that is the case, Senator Domenici, you deserve every
accolade that you can get, and I would be the leading
cheerleader for this if your efforts are successful.
Second, Ambassador Brooks, you are going to hear a lot, as
you already have heard, from the chairman of this subcommittee
about a number of things. One of the things I know he is
frustrated about is the National Ignition Facility. And as we
look back at the ability of that project to go forward, I have
to say that project would not have gone forward but for Senator
Domenici. I was ready to can that whole thing. But Senator
Domenici and I try to work together on this subcommittee as
much as we can and as a result of our working together we let
this project go forward. And Senator Domenici, having been the
lead person on this, I on a number of occasions will set aside
my personal feelings about what is going on because of his
initial involvement in this. So what I am saying is that I
think you are going to have to take a closer look at NIF
because Senator Domenici certainly is going to take a close
look at it. We know there have been some problems in the latest
snafu, and I think that this is something that we have to look
at closely because I know the chairman is going to look at it
closely. NIF has a large number and unless we get our budget
allocation changed we are going to have to look there for some
of the money to take care of other things.
Third, you are requesting expanded funding for a number of
very controversial items: Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,
Modern Pit Facility, Advanced Nuclear Concepts Program. Last
year, the House of Representatives, without a word of dissent
to be heard anywhere in the House, slashed funding for these
programs. The Senate bill fully funded them; there was an
amendment offered on the Senate floor to cut the funding. It
failed although it had support of most of the Democratic
Caucus. The point I am making is that you need to tread very
carefully here. Congressional support for these programs is not
very strong and I would encourage you to be very candid on a
regular basis with your plans and intentions for all these
programs. The memo you sent the laboratories regarding the
Advanced Concepts Program last year, the one that seemed to
indicate that it was okay to move forward as planned regardless
of Congressional guidance, concerns us all. I am willing to
give you the benefit of the doubt that you are not encouraging
your contractors to ignore our intent but I strongly suggest
that you and your staff work very closely with us up here on
these initiatives.
I am a little concerned, maybe even put off, by the notion
that you have included a half-a-billion dollars in your out-
year spending plan as what you call a ``placeholder'' for
bunker busting pending White House and Congressional decisions.
I am not sure that we can allow this to go forward. This is a
large ``placeholder.'' Many of us remain unconvinced that this
is an appropriate path.
Finally, on the subject of working with us here in
Congress, our Conference directed you to submit the Revised
Stockpile Plan to us with fiscal year 2005 budget request. We
carried these words because we were beyond being fed up with
waiting for the Plan half-a-year ago. The budget request has
been here for nearly 2 months and we still have no sign of the
Revised Stockpile Plan. We set that date in consultation with
your staff so we can use that document to assist our financial
decision-making. I am not interested in the story about how
complicated it is to get such an important document signed or
how many people over at the White House or NNSA need to read
it, polish it, refine or rewrite it; it is just way overdue and
we need to get the document up here. I might even suggest that
we write a bill that fences off every dollar above current year
levels for NNSA until this is provided. And I hope this gets
the White House's attention. And I am convinced, Ambassador,
that this is not you personally holding this up and you need
not comment on that. But sometimes we get a little put-off by
someone who is a Secretary or an Administrator such as you are
who comes here and says to us privately, well, I'm not the one
holding this up. And you are the person that we look to.
So, I want to thank each of your deputies for being here;
Dr. Beckner, Admiral Bowman, Mr. Longsworth, we appreciate that
very much.
The chairman's not here so the acting chairman, Senator
Bennett, I would ask permission of the chair to be able to
submit questions in writing and would ask that you, the
witnesses, get back to the subcommittee within 10 days. We have
a little parliamentary problem on the floor that I am going to
work on.
Senator Bennett [presiding]. Without objection.
Senator Reid. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Senator Reid, very much.
When the Chairman returns I will make it clear that I hope
to have more than a single round of questioning because I have
a number of concerns that I want to raise and a number of
issues that I think have to be made very clear for the record.
I assume you know the history of southern Utah with respect
to nuclear testing in Nevada. It goes back to the 1950's and
the 1960's, and Utahans were not only let down by their
government, quite frankly, Utahans were lied to by their
government. Things that were done in those periods in
retrospect are incomprehensible. Students were let out of
school and taken out to the schoolyard to stand in the open air
and look for the flash of the above-ground test and then watch
the cloud as it went over. And the incidence of cancer and
other problems that occurred among people who lived down-wind
from the Nevada testing site has been well documented and
Congress has taken actions with it and I will not review all of
that past. But I think if you are not familiar with that past
you should be and therefore understand why the people of
southern Utah, in particular, are very suspicious of anything
the government says about nuclear testing, above-ground or
below-ground, and for that reason, Mr. Chairman, I intend to
use this opportunity to ask a number of questions, quite
pointed. I expect that I will get direct answers so that they
will be firmly on the record and there will be no ambiguity
about some of this.
Now, while I speak with that background as the Senator
representing Utah, I want to make it clear that my concern for
the safety of the people of Utah is not limited to Utah. I, as
a Senator, must be concerned about the safety of all of the
people who will be down-wind from any test that will occur, and
that would include not only everybody in the United States but
given the jet stream and the way we now understand the weather
goes around the world, accidents or sloppiness in testing in
Nevada can affect far more than just Utah. So while I speak
here as the Senator for Utah I want to make it clear that I
want to be sure that health and safety for everyone in America,
and to the degree it gets beyond our shores, to the rest of the
world becomes the primary concern. And I know that none of you
were involved in the things that were done back in the 1950's
and 1960's when the government lied to its citizens in that
part of the world and that is fine.
But that means that we must be even more circumspect and
more penetrating in our attempts to make sure that this
administration does not repeat, in any way, either
inadvertently or deliberately, the things that have happened in
the past. There is still a great deal of skepticism among those
who live in southern Utah about any government pronouncement on
this issue and that is why, Mr. Chairman, I intend to be fairly
penetrating in the question period. And I said before you came
I hope we will have more than one round so that I will have
time to explore all of this properly.
Senator Domenici [presiding]. Senator, if we do not finish
and you need some more, we would turn the committee over to you
and you can spend the whole afternoon.
Shall we proceed? Do you need to make an opening statement,
Senator?
Senator Feinstein. I do, Mr. Chairman. I hate to tell you.
Senator Domenici. Well, we were not going to have them but
I got out of here and it got started. So we have got to let
you.
Senator Bennett. When you relinquished the gavel for 30
seconds I took advantage of it.
Senator Domenici. Go ahead.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Senator Domenici. We want to be brief.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN
Senator Feinstein. I will try very hard to be brief but I
think as Mr. Brooks knows I have very strong views on the
proposed nuclear program and I wanted to make a couple of
comments about it. Ambassador Brooks was nice enough to spend
some time with me in my office, and I appreciate that very
much, and went over his views of what the program is. The more
I read about the program the more I believe it is something
else and I would characterize that something else by saying it
is a reopening of the nuclear door.
Just where you sit last year Secretary Abraham sat. He said
we have no intentions of proceeding with new nuclear weapons.
Secretary of Defense, at a Defense Appropriations hearing, came
before us and said that the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator is
a study, it is nothing more and nothing less. And then, if you
look to follow the money, I think you see that it is much more
than that. This year's budget request includes the $27.5
million for the Earth Penetrator, the $9 million for the so-
called Advanced Weapons Initiative, and the $30 million for the
Modern Pit Facility to make up to 450 new pits, which as you
know we discussed and you said there was no way of knowing
whether we need this kind of improvement in the Pit Facility.
And the Revised Stockpile Plan has not yet been presented to
the best of my knowledge. But if you look at the Congressional
Research Service, they now report that the administration's own
long-term budget plan includes $485 million for the Robust
Nuclear Earth Penetrator between 2005 and 2009. I think that
number casts doubts on the contention that this is just a study
and that all we are doing is just a study. Because I do not
believe there can be a commitment of nearly $500 million for
just a study. And I think it means that the administration is
determined to develop and field a new generation of nuclear
weapons. And this Senator is strongly opposed to that.
I think by seeking to develop new nuclear weapons, and as
indicated in the Nuclear Posture Review, a new doctrine that
considers nuclear weapons in the same category as conventional
weapons, the United States is sending a message that nuclear
weapons have a future battlefield role and utility. And by
doing so I believe we are going to make our Nation and our
allies less secure, not more secure. And if the United States
opens the door to the development, testing and deployment of
new nuclear weapons. So I am just here to kind of follow this
thing along and I am going to try to oppose it at every step of
the road because I do not believe the American people want to
support a new generation of nuclear weapons.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LARRY CRAIG
Senator Domenici. Senator Craig has also submitted a
prepared statement which will be included in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Larry Craig
The DOE's nuclear weapons programs are of great interest to the
Nation and to this subcommittee. DOE is a significant national security
agency. Both the Chairman and Ranking Member of the subcommittee have
parts of the nuclear weapons complex located in their States.
Idaho has a stake in these programs, too. As Admiral Bowman is
aware, there isn't a single element of nuclear fuel that gets
discharged from a Naval reactor that does not end up in Idaho. The fuel
is examined in Idaho and then stored there for the long term. This work
is the reason why Navy cores now last ``the life of the ship.''
Naval Reactors is now being tasked to provide this kind of
expertise to space nuclear reactors. Idaho can bring much more to this
enterprise than simply being the resting place for the Navy's spent
fuel. I ask our witnesses to consider that, as they go about deciding
how to approach this new space nuclear mission.
DOE also has the job of stopping the proliferation of nuclear
materials which is an important one in the world we face. I believe
that DOE should more closely coordinate its nuclear nonproliferation
missions with those of DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy. People around
the world want cheap, abundant energy. They might decide nuclear energy
is the way to get there. If they decide to build nuclear reactors, I am
confident that this country can design reactors that do not cause the
spread of enriched materials around the globe. Scientists at the Idaho
National Lab can contribute to solving this challenge.
Finally, I would ask all of our witnesses to consider the issue of
economic security. A prosperous world will be more secure. A world
where resources are scarce and people are in conflict will be a more
dangerous world. Energy security is a key part of national security of
global security. I challenge each of you to think more broadly about
the role of energy technology in our national security. It is an
essential element, and we need to devote the resources to it.
Greater support for energy technology should be part of the
appropriations bill we craft. For our national security, we also need
to pass a comprehensive energy bill as soon as possible. The chairman
of the subcommittee has worked diligently on that, as have I. We will
continue to do so.
Senator Domenici. Well, let me first say, so there is no
misunderstanding, I do not favor a new round of the development
of nuclear weapons. I think I am just as firm on that as is the
distinguished Senator from California. But I do believe
research is not static with reference to nuclear activity. And
so we will go into this a little more and ask whether we can
actually ask our great scientists to just close their minds to
these issues and say they cannot study them even if they fall
right before their face. So we will have our arguments. The
California Senator can contend we are building new weapons; I
will contend we are researching them. She can contend we are
paying for $500 million worth; I will say we are going to vote
for a small number and no more in the language of dollars, and
the language will say what it is for and no more. So with that,
I would like to proceed.
What is your pleasure? Shall we start with the Ambassador?
All right, Mr. Ambassador, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS
Ambassador Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
the Members for their support for our national security
efforts. I have prepared some detailed written testimony I
would like to submit for the record, and I would like to
summarize that now. And I would like it if Admiral Bowman could
follow me and talk about the Naval Reactors portion which I
will not cover.
Senator Domenici. On the record.
Ambassador Brooks. As you said in your opening statement,
the fiscal year 2005 request totals just over $9 billion, which
is a 4 percent increase over 2004 and is consistent with the
long-range plan presented to the Congress last year. For
weapons activities we're seeking $6.5 billion. That will
maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile, enhance stockpile surveillance in the engineering
base, refurbish and extend the service life of warheads,
maintain an R&D base and support the required facilities and
infrastructure. I am pleased with the ability of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program to certify the safety, security and
reliability of our aging nuclear weapons and I'm pleased that
we can do that without having to consider returning to
underground nuclear testing. And, the cutting edge scientific
and engineering tools that we are requesting in this budget
will let us continue these certification efforts with the same
kind of confidence.
We are extending the life of several existing weapons; that
life-extension program is proceeding well. This year, we will
complete the life-extension for the W87 ICBM warhead and we
expect to meet DOD schedules for the submarine launched
ballistic missile W76, the B61 bomb and the W80 cruise missile.
The National Ignition Facility will perform its first Stockpile
Stewardship experiment this year using four of its eventual 192
laser beams. We have recently devised a strategy that will
ensure ignition experiments begin in 2010 as previously
planned. During the question and answer period we can explain
technically why that now appears feasible.
Our Advanced Simulation Computing Program will deliver two
new machines, one this year, one next year, which will be the
fastest computers in the world and, more importantly, will help
us provide important data on the health of the stockpile.
The Nuclear Posture Review gave infrastructure equal
priority with offensive and defensive forces. We have two
accounts in the budget that are essential to our ability to
maintain such an infrastructure. Readiness in Technical Base
and Facilities provides the funding to operate and maintain our
facilities over the long-term. In contrast, there's a
Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program which is
a get-well program the Congress authorized designed to
eliminate maintenance backlogs this decade. We expect to meet
our goal of eliminating those backlogs and have the so-called
FIR-program go out of existence shortly after the end of the
decade. These two programs are fixing the backlog and restoring
the weapons complex. They're crucial and I urge the committee
to fully support them.
Now, these programs will allow us to maintain the stockpile
for the next decade. Nuclear Posture Review recognized the need
over the long-run to design and build a Modern Pit Facility.
That's a poor term, it might better be called a Pit Rework
Facility. It'll support the pit remanufacturing needs of the
stockpile. It's important to understand we need this facility
even if the United States never produces another nuclear weapon
of any kind. All existing plutonium pits will ultimately need
to be rebuilt due to aging effects caused by the radioactive
decay of plutonium. Last year's conference requested that we
delay issuing the Final Environmental Impact Statement in
selecting a site for the Modern Pit Facility pending the
submission of the Revised Stockpile Plan that was referred to
in several of the Members' opening statements. This decision to
delay site selection doesn't affect our very limited efforts at
Los Alamos to manufacture a W88 pit nor to reestablish the
capability that we've not had in almost 15 years. We're on
schedule to produce a War Reserve pit for our Trident-2 missile
by 2007.
Now, I have no reason to doubt the ability of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program to continue to ensure the safety, security
and reliability of the enduring stockpile. But we must maintain
our ability to carry out a nuclear weapons test in the event of
some currently unforeseen problems that can't be resolved by
other means. Our fiscal 2005 request allows us to meet the
requirements of the Defense Authorization Act to achieve by
October 2006, a readiness to conduct an underground test within
18 months. The President has made it very clear we have no
intention of resuming testing. Our plan is to improve test
readiness posture, a prudent hedge against the possibility of a
problem arising in the stockpile that can't be confirmed or
fixed or certified without a nuclear test. I also want to make
it clear that much of the money that we are requesting goes to
ensure, through very detailed analysis, the absolute safety of
any hypothetical future nuclear test. We are extremely
conscious of our safety responsibilities and intend to ensure
that if it ever becomes necessary to resume nuclear testing we
can do so safely.
ADVANCED CONCEPTS
The programs I have described let us maintain the stockpile
and correct unforeseen problems. The Nuclear Posture Review
also highlighted the importance of ensuring the weapons complex
can adjust to changing requirements of nuclear deterrence in
the coming decade. We're requesting $9 million, about one-tenth
of 1 percent of our budget, for research on advanced concepts
and we're requesting, as has been mentioned by several Members,
$27 million to continue the Nuclear Earth Penetrator
feasibility study.
There's been a great deal of discussion on the implications
of these programs and I'd like to comment on them in a little
more detail. Some of the discussion has been based on a
misunderstanding of our intent. In his opening statement, the
Ranking Member specifically noted one reason for that, a poorly
written memorandum that I sent in December. I'd be delighted to
submit, for the record, that memorandum, a criticism of it by
another committee and my response, in order to make it clear
that what we have here is poor drafting and not an attempt to
thwart the will of the Congress.
We intend to use our Advanced Concepts funds to
investigate----
Senator Domenici. Are you going to make those a part of the
record?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir, if I may.
Senator Domenici. Yes, please do.
[The information follows:]
Department of Energy,
National Nuclear Security Administration,
Washington, DC, December 5, 2003.
Pete Nanos,
Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Michael Anastasio,
Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
C. Paul Robinson,
President, Sandia National Laboratory.
On November 24, 2003, President Bush signed the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. Section 3116 of this law
repealed the 1994 law prohibiting the Secretary of Energy from
conducting research and development that could lead to the production
of a new, low-yield nuclear weapon (i.e., Section 3136 of Public Law
103-160--the so-called PLYWD restriction). The administration had
sought to remove this restriction because of the chilling effect it has
had on nuclear weapons research and development.
On behalf of the administration, I would like to thank you and your
staff for helping to support this important effort, we are now free to
explore a range of technical options that could strengthen our ability
to deter, or respond to new or emerging threats without any concern
that some ideas could inadvertently violate a vague and arbitrary
limitation. (Of course, testing, acquisition or deployment of any
nuclear weapon--low-yield or otherwise--or commencement of weapons
engineering development or subsequent phases, requires authorization by
Congress).
Along these lines, I expect your design teams to engage fully with
the Department of Defense to examine advanced concepts that could
contribute to our nation's security. Potentially important areas of
such research include agent defeat and reduced collateral damage.
In addition, we must take advantage of this opportunity to ensure
that we close any gaps that may have opened this past decade in our
understanding of the possible military applications of atomic energy--
no novel nuclear weapons concept developed by any other nation should
ever come as a technical surprise to us.
Repeal of the PLYWD restriction on nuclear weapons research and
development represents, in part, an endorsement by Congress of our
efforts to begin to address the nuclear weapons stockpile in accordance
with the recommendations of the administration's Nuclear Posture Review
to meet the security needs of the 21st century. We should not fail to
take advantage of this opportunity.
Linton F. Brooks,
Administrator.
______
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC, January 22, 2004.
The Honorable Linton F. Brooks,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, 1000
Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20585.
Dear Ambassador Brooks: We are deeply concerned by the tenor and
substance of your December 5, 2003, memorandum to the directors of the
three National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) weapons
laboratories. You are well aware of our reservations about embarking on
significant new nuclear weapons design initiatives under the advanced
concepts proposal, and this issue was a significant point of
disagreement with the Senate during the Energy and Water Development
conference negotiations last fall. These issues continue to command
much of our attention and will do so in our consideration of the
Department's fiscal year 2005 budget request.
Therefore, we were troubled to read your guidance that the weapons
laboratories are now ``free to explore a range of technical options
that could strengthen our ability to deter, or respond to new or
emerging threats, without any concern that some ideas could violate a
vague and arbitrary limitation.'' Your memo also encourages your
``design teams to engage fully with the Department of Defense'' and
``to take advantage of this opportunity to ensure that we close any
gaps that may have opened this past decades in our understanding of the
possible military applications of atomic energy . . .''.
You should be very well aware of our concerns about this advanced
concepts work on new nuclear weapons, and of the language in the fiscal
year 2004 conference report for Energy and Water Development
Appropriations that fences two-thirds of the advanced concepts funding
pending submission to Congress and Congressional review of a revised
nuclear weapons stockpile report. However, your guidance memo to the
weapons laboratories contained no mention of this funding restriction--
the only message conveyed to the weapons laboratories is that of
unbridled enthusiasm for new weapons designs and for seeking new
military missions for nuclear weapons.
Having had several discussions with you on advanced concepts, we
took you at your word that you were willing to redefine the scope of
the Advanced Concepts work to address our concerns. Unfortunately, it
is now apparent to us that those were hollow assurances and that the
NNSA is determined to charge forward with unrestricted efforts on
advanced nuclear weapons concepts. Nothing in your direction to the
weapons researchers communicates any sense of the measured and
thoughtful steps that must be taken by the NNSA before Congress is
comfortable with the direction the Department is proposing. In
addition, your memo also makes us question the sincerity of your
commitment to address our concerns regarding the schedule and sizing of
the proposed new Modern Pit Facility.
Although we find your actions unhelpful, they are at least
instructive in gauging the actual intent of the Advanced Concepts work
proposed by the Administration; we will view future proposals from the
Department with this memorandum in mind.
Sincerely,
Peter J. Visclosky,
Ranking Minority Member.
David L. Hobson,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.
______
Department of Energy,
National Nuclear Security Administration,
Washington, DC, January 27, 2004.
The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Mr. Visclosky: Thank you for your letter of January 22, 2004,
which expresses concerns over my December 5, 2003, memorandum to the
Directors of the three National Nuclear Security Administration weapons
laboratories. Your letter clearly conveys that, in your view, my
memorandum fails to take into account the concerns of the Congress with
regard to advanced concepts development.
I have reviewed the memorandum in question and agree some of the
wording could lead to misinterpretation of my intent. I regret any
misunderstanding. The memorandum was sent to document the removal of
the prohibition on conducting research and development that ``could''
lead to development of a new, low-yield nuclear weapon. As my
memorandum stated, the removal of this provision in the fiscal year
2004 Defense Authorization Act allows us to explore advanced concepts
without an artificial constraint. Repeal of this restriction was
strongly supported by the House Armed Services Committee.
My memorandum did not direct the conduct of specific research aimed
at developing new weapons. We intend to use the advanced concept money
to investigate new ideas, not necessarily new weapons. For example, the
first two million dollars of the fiscal year 2004 funding will be used
for examining the feasibility of adapting an existing weapons carrier
and existing nuclear warheads to achieve a delivery system with greater
assurance that the intended nuclear mission could not be compromised by
either component failure or adversary attack; i.e., greater reliability
for nuclear missions. Because the remaining funds will not be available
until we have submitted a revised nuclear weapons stockpile report and
the Congress has had time to review that report, we have not yet
determined how the remaining funds will be used. We will, as my
December memorandum states, be engaging closely with the Department of
Defense on how best to use these funds. Appropriate uses might include
examining the feasibility of improving design margins of existing
warheads in order to ensure still greater reliability in the absence of
nuclear testing or examining other features to improve safety further.
In your letter, you expressed two additional concerns. First, you
noted that I did not indicate that two-thirds of the advanced concepts
money is fenced until we submit a revised nuclear weapons stockpile
report and the Congress has had time to review that report. I did not
include that provision because I had personally delivered to each of
the laboratory directors a copy of both the bill and the committee
report and had highlighted that provision to them.
You also expressed doubt about the Administration's plans with
respect to the Modern Pit Facility. To remove any doubt on our plans, I
have enclosed a draft press release for your consideration which will
be released on Wednesday, January 28, 2004, indicating our intent to
delay issuing the final Environmental Impact Statement and, thus, our
intent to delay identifying a preferred site for the facility. At the
same time, I respectfully repeat what I have said in previous
conversations on this matter which is, if the United States never
develops another nuclear weapon, a Modern Pit Facility will still be
required. I would welcome the opportunity to review my reasoning with
you or to arrange a briefing with your staff.
Finally, I want to make it absolutely clear that it was not my
intent to mislead the Committee, and I regret any inference you may
have drawn that I have done so. You and other members of the
Subcommittee have concerns with some of the approaches that the
Administration is advocating. Such disagreements are inherent in the
process of developing an overall U.S. position on these important
issues. I strongly support the President's program for nuclear
deterrence and believe that the proposals we have made in the nuclear
area are overwhelmingly in the national interest. But, I also
understand the importance of not misleading Congress. I regret that the
wording of my December 5, 2003, memorandum may have led to the
incorrect assumption that I had done so in this case. I have not. I
appreciate your bringing this matter to my attention and will ensure
that future correspondence does not lead to similar misunderstandings.
I would be happy to discuss any of these points with you personally
at your convenience. If you have any further questions, please feel
free to contact me or C. Anson Franklin, Director of Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs.
Sincerely,
Linton F. Brooks,
Administrator.
Ambassador Brooks. We intend to use Advanced Concepts funds
to investigate new ideas, not necessarily new weapons. For
example, with that portion of the Advanced Concepts money which
is not held in abeyance pending the Stockpile Plan, we will
begin to examine the feasibility of adapting an existing
nuclear weapon to provide a Cruise Missile capability that
involves enhanced safety and use control. We are also looking
at improving warhead design margins in order to ensure high
confidence in warhead reliability. We're also in discussion
with the Air Force on examining the utility of nuclear weapons
against chemical and biological agents, although we've made no
decisions to study this area. Specific uses of the proposed
2005 funds will be determined jointly with the Department of
Defense.
Perhaps the single most contentious issue in our budget is
continued funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
study. The study is to determine whether existing warheads,
either the B61 bomb or the B83 bomb, could be adapted without
nuclear testing to improve our ability to hold at risk hardened
and deeply buried facilities. I want to make several points
about this effort.
First, there's a clear military utility to this weapon. A
classified Defense Department report was submitted to the
Congress last year on this subject and remains valid.
Secondly, despite this obvious utility to the capability,
we will move beyond the study stage only if the President
approves and if funds are authorized and appropriated by
Congress. We included funds in our out-year projections only to
preserve the President's option. There won't be any decision
made until the study is completed. What we are asking the
Congress to do this year is approve the continuation of the
study. The law is extremely clear that beginning development
and engineering requires Congressional approval and there's no
one in the administration who has any doubt about that feature
of the law.
Finally, even if the study shows that it's feasible and the
President decides to pursue it and the Congress decides to fund
it, this weapon does not represent a change from our policy of
deterrence. Deterrence requires that we be able to hold at risk
something that an adversary values. Now, I refer you once again
to the classified report where we and the Department of Defense
speak in specific detail on the potential deterrent benefits of
this weapon.
As the Congress evaluates our request it's important to
understand that while there have been press accounts of
administration plans to develop low-yield weapons, there are no
such plans. Further, nothing we will do is intended to lower
the nuclear threshold or blur the distinction between nuclear
and non-nuclear weapons. Indeed, the intent of the Nuclear
Posture Review is to place greater emphasis on conventional
weapons rather than nuclear weapons.
I repeat, as I have said to this committee before, only the
President can authorize the use of nuclear weapons and no
President would make that decision except in the gravest of
circumstances.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Let me turn now to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. We're
asking for $1.35 billion to support activities to reduce the
global danger. We're not doing this alone; our G8 partners have
committed to spend $10 billion to help decrease the global
proliferation threat over the next 10 years. The largest
program in this area involves the disposition of surplus U.S.
and Russian plutonium. As you mentioned in your opening
statement, Mr. Chairman, one of the key obstacles we
encountered is a disagreement with Russia regarding liability
protection for plutonium disposition work performed in that
country. At the present time, this disagreement has resulted in
a 10-month delay in the start of construction of the Mixed
Oxide, or MOX, Fuel Facility in Russia as well as the facility
in the United States. This issue is being worked at the highest
levels of the administration; the President's 2005 budget
request supports construction of both MOX facilities starting
in May of next year and I am hopeful that we will resolve the
liability issue shortly, as soon as the new Russian government
is fully organized.
Senator Domenici. Who is your negotiator?
Ambassador Brooks. The Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control, John Bolton, has been the primary lead; the Secretary
of State has also been involved.
In addition to disposing of existing stocks of surplus
weapons-grade plutonium, we're working hard to stop more from
being produced by shutting down the last three plutonium
production reactors in Russia and replacing them with fossil
fuel plants. That will result in halting annual production of
about 1.2 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium, roughly a
bomb a day. We are preparing preliminary designs for the fossil
fuel replacement plants, and validating cost estimates and we
expect to complete these designs by the end of the calendar
year, at which time we'll be able to provide the Congress with
revised and firm cost estimates.
Given recent threats to the United States, it has become
increasingly clear that protecting and securing nuclear
materials and detecting nuclear materials destined for the
United States at foreign ports, airports, and border crossings
is a high priority. Our budget request for material protection,
control, and accounting, which includes our Second Line of
Defense Program and our Mega-Ports Program, is $238 million. Of
that, $15 million will go toward moving ahead with our Mega-
Ports Program to train law enforcement officials and equip key
international ports with radiation detection equipment. We
expect to complete work at ports in Greece and The Netherlands
by late summer in 2004. In addition, also under Material
Protection, we have made a number of improvements in the
security of the Russian Nuclear Navy and are now focused on
improving security at Strategic Rocket Forces sites.
In fiscal year 2005, we will assume, NNSA will assume,
responsibility for the Off-site Source Recovery Project. The
requested program funding is $5.5 million, with a total cost of
about $40 million to substantially reduce the risk of source
materials within the United States being used for radiological
dispersion devices. And, we're working closely with the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Our budget reflects our continued support for the
International Atomic Energy Agency and it reflects a renewed
emphasis on retrieving material with weapons potential from
research reactors worldwide. We've been working to secure
materials in Russia and Eurasia for over a decade and our
programs have now expanded worldwide. We've worked to return
both U.S.- and Russian-origin highly enriched uranium to
convert civilian reactor cores to use low-enriched uranium,
which is of less proliferation concern, and to secure and
remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials. Our
efforts are paying off. By the end of this year almost half of
the 98 targeted reactors will have been converted to use low-
enriched uranium fuel. In 2002, the Department assisted in the
removal of vulnerable nuclear material from Yugoslavia. In
2003, we helped return 17 kilograms of Russian-origin highly-
enriched uranium from Bulgaria, and 14 kilograms of Russian
highly-enriched uranium from Romania. We're now working with
Libya and have recently helped remove highly-enriched uranium
from that country as well. In Iraq, the Department is securing
and disposing of vulnerable radiological sources. To help
coordinate all this, last year we established a Nuclear and
Radiological Threat Reduction Task Force to combat the threat
posed by so-called dirty bombs. This task force is identifying
and securing high risk radiological materials and developing an
action plan to mitigate these vulnerabilities overseas.
Senator Domenici. Who will lead that committee?
Ambassador Brooks. Mr. Longsworth will be in overall
charge.
In all this we have strengthened the security of our Nation
and I believe we're making the world safer.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Ambassador, I know you have a lot to
say but you told us you were going to be brief.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir, I've got two more points to
make and then I'll quit, if I may.
Senator Domenici. All right.
Ambassador Brooks. I want to just mention safeguards and
security. That's one of Secretary Abraham's and my highest
priorities. Our request includes an increase over the past to
deal with the safeguards and security consequences of the
Design Basis Threat and I believe that we are well on track to
meet the Secretary's guidance to have improvements in place by
the end of next year.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Finally, let me just say that our budget is consistent with
the President's policy to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.
It supports continued progress in certifying our nuclear
deterrent and reducing the danger from proliferation. And it
will enable us to continue to maintain the safety and security
of the stockpile through the 21st century.
This concludes my statement. After you've heard from
Admiral Bowman I'm ready for your questions, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Fiscal Year 2005
Budget Request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
This is my second appearance before this committee as the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security, and I want to thank all of the Members
for their strong support for our important national security
responsibilities.
OVERVIEW
The NNSA has four fundamental and unique responsibilities for U.S.
national security:
--Stewardship of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile,
--Reducing the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction,
--Providing reliable and safe propulsion for the U.S. Navy,
--Management of the national nuclear security complex, which includes
both security for our facilities and materials to protect our
employees and our neighbors, and sustaining the facilities
infrastructure.
In the fourth year of this administration, with the strong support
of the Congress, the NNSA programs have achieved a level of stability
that is required for accomplishing our long-term missions. As the post-
Cold War era evolves, the NNSA is managing the Nation's nuclear
warheads according to the guidance in the Nuclear Posture Review. The
Department of Energy (DOE), through the NNSA, works to assure that the
Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, reliable, and
ready, and to extend the life of that stockpile in support of
Department of Defense (DOD) military requirements. Our Nation will
continue to benefit from the security that results from an effective
nuclear deterrent, with confidence that the nuclear weapons complex is
ready and prepared to respond rapidly and effectively if required.
Stockpile Stewardship activities are carried out without the use of
underground nuclear testing, continuing the moratorium initiated by the
United States in 1992. I am pleased with the continuing ability of the
Stockpile Stewardship Program to certify to the President, through the
Annual Certification Assessment Report, the safety, security, and
reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile using science-based
judgments using cutting edge scientific and engineering tools as well
as extensive laboratory and flight tests. We are gaining a more
complete understanding of the stockpile each year. Computer codes and
platforms developed by our Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI)
program are now used routinely to address three-dimensional issues in
weapons performance, contributing to continuing certification, baseline
studies, as well as supporting the upcoming refurbishment workload.
The NNSA maintains a robust infrastructure of people, programs, and
facilities to provide specialized scientific and technical capability
for stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This past year, Los
Alamos National Laboratory manufactured the first certifiable W88 pit
since the closure of Rocky Flats in 1989. Los Alamos remains on-track
to certify a war reserve W88 pit by 2007. Also, in the past year, we
began the irradiation of Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber Rods in a
TVA reactor, restoring a key nuclear manufacturing technology. We also
continue our facilities recapitalization effort. There is a notable
improvement across the nuclear weapons complex, and NNSA is delivering
on our promise to the Congress to stabilize our deferred maintenance in
fiscal year 2005.
The Nation continues to benefit from advances in science,
technology and engineering fostered by the national security program
activities, including cutting edge research and development carried out
in partnership with many of the Nation's colleges, universities, small
businesses and minority educational institutions. The University of
Rochester's Omega laser is a key facility in NNSA's Inertial
Confinement Fusion program. It provides experimental capability for
Stockpile Stewardship as well as a user facility for training
tomorrow's scientists and engineers. Overall, the NNSA programs,
including three national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and the
production facilities across the United States employ nearly 2,300
Federal employees and approximately 35,000 contractor employees to
carry out this work.
In June 2002, the United States championed a new, comprehensive
nonproliferation effort known as the Global Partnership. World leaders
committed to raise up to $20 billion over 10 years to fund
nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. The NNSA
contributes directly to this effort by carrying out programs with the
international community to reduce and prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, materials and expertise. The security of our Nation
and the world are enhanced by NNSA's ongoing work to provide security
upgrades for military and civilian nuclear sites and enhanced border
security in Russia and the Former Soviet Union. In the past year, we
have completed comprehensive materials protection control and
accountability upgrades at 17 Russian nuclear facilities, and began
efforts to install security upgrades at vulnerable Russian Federation
Strategic Rocket Forces sites. With the support of the Congress, we are
implementing an aggressive Megaports initiative to enhance global
nuclear material detection at 15 major seaports shipping large volumes
of container traffic to the United States. We are reducing the world's
stocks of dangerous materials such as plutonium through NNSA-sponsored
Fissile Materials Disposition programs in the United States and Russia
as well as through elimination of Russian plutonium production.
The Nation benefits from NNSA's work in partnership with the
Department of Homeland Security to develop and demonstrate new
detection technologies to improve security of our cities. Perhaps the
most tangible benefits to the Nation following the 9/11 terrorist
attacks are the ``first responder teams'' of highly specialized
scientists and technical personnel from the NNSA sites who are deployed
across the Nation to address threats of weapons of mass destruction.
These teams work under the direction of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to respond to nuclear
emergencies in the United States and around the world. In the past
year, these teams have provided support to such diverse groups and
locations as New York City, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Olympic Planning
in Athens, and the Government of Thailand. Our teams have participated
in major training and exercise events in the United States and
overseas. They have developed new capabilities, including Triage, that
enables our first responders to rapidly determine if an item of
interest includes special nuclear material in yield-producing
quantities.
The NNSA also works in partnership with the DOD to meet their needs
for reliable and militarily effective nuclear propulsion for the U.S.
Navy. In the past year, the Naval Reactors Program has completed 99
percent of the reactor plant design for the VIRGINIA-class submarine,
and supported ``safe steaming'' of another 2 million miles by our
nuclear-powered ships. They have continued their unsurpassed record of
``clean up as you go'', including remediating to ``green grass'' the
former S1C prototype Site at Windsor, Connecticut, and completing a
successful demonstration of the interim naval spent fuel dry storage
capability in Idaho.
NNSA BUDGET SUMMARY
[In Millions of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2003 2004 Fiscal Year 2004 Fiscal
Comparable Original 2004 Comparable Year 2005
Appropriation Appropriation Adjustments Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator................ 330 340 -3 337 334
Weapons Activities......................... 5,961 6,273 -39 6,234 6,568
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation........... 1,224 1,328 +6 1,334 1,349
Naval Reactors............................. 702 766 -4 762 798
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, NNSA.......................... 8,217 8,707 -40 8,667 9,049
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fiscal year 2005 budget request totals $9.0 billion, an
increase of $382 million or 4.4 percent. We are managing our program
activities within a disciplined 5-year budget and planning envelope. We
are doing it successfully enough to be able to address emerging new
priorities and provide for needed funding increases in some of our
programs within an overall modest growth rate--notably Safeguards and
Security, Nuclear Weapons Incident Response, and Facilities and
Infrastructure Recapitalization--by reallocating from other activities
and projects that are concluded or winding down.
The NNSA budget justification contains the required 3 years of
budget and performance information, as well as similar information for
5 years as required by Sec. 3253 of the NNSA Act, as amended (Title
XXXII of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000,
Public Law 106-65, 50 U.S.C. 2453). This section, entitled Future-Years
Nuclear Security Program, requires NNSA to provide to Congress each
year at the time the budget is submitted the estimated expenditures
necessary to support the programs, projects and activities of the NNSA
for a 5-fiscal-year period, in a level of detail comparable to that
contained in the budget. Since the inception of NNSA, the Future Years
Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP) has been provided as a separate
document supporting the budget request. Starting with this budget, NNSA
will meet this statutory requirement by including outyear budget and
performance information as part of a fully integrated budget
submission.
FUTURE YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM (FYNSP)
[In Millions of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
Year Year Year Year Year Total
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator............................... 334 340 347 353 360 1,734
Weapons Activities........................................ 6,568 6,881 7,216 7,353 7,492 35,510
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.......................... 1,349 1,381 1,410 1,441 1,465 7,046
Naval Reactors............................................ 798 803 818 834 850 4,103
-----------------------------------------------------
Total, NNSA......................................... 9,049 9,405 9,791 9,981 10,167 48,393
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUDGET AND PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS
There are three areas of the NNSA budget where mission priorities
require us to request significant increases in funding for fiscal year
2005.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY/DESIGN BASIS THREAT
Protecting NNSA people, information, materials, and infrastructure
from harm or compromise is one of our most serious responsibilities and
highest priorities. The fiscal year 2005 budget request for NNSA's
Safeguards and Security Program is $706.9 million, an increase of 21
percent over the fiscal year 2004 enacted level, that is needed to
implement a new Design Basis Threat (DBT) at all NNSA sites and
facilities. The Secretary of Energy issued the new DST in May 2003, as
a result of a post-September 11 analysis of the threats against which
we must protect DOE sites and materials across the country.
Implementation plans based on vulnerability assessments for each of the
sites are in final preparation. These will delineate the upgrades and
associated costs plan to upgrade service weaponry, extend explosive
impact zones, consolidate nuclear material, and make additional
improvements of a classified nature to bring NNSA facilities into full
compliance with the new DBT by the year 2006. The fiscal year 2005 NNSA
budget includes $107.9 million ($89.6 in Safeguards and Security and
$18.3 million in Secure Transportation Asset) to address the new DBT.
NNSA will shortly submit a request for fiscal year 2004 reprogramming
and appropriation transfer to allow this important work to continue on
schedule. The fiscal year 2006 funding request for DBT implementation
will be addressed during this spring's programming process.
In recent months we have had some highly publicized occurrences at
some NNSA sites. In each instance, NNSA and DOE have taken immediate
and aggressive actions to address these occurrences and to ensure that
any potential vulnerability is mitigated as soon as possible and that
longer term fixes are put into place as appropriate. Because of these
problems, we have chartered two external review groups to provide an
independent assessment of our management of security. While I am
confident that there has been no compromise of classified material and
that no nuclear material is at risk, I believe security can and should
be improved. The Secretary and I have both made it clear that we will
not tolerate any reduction, perceived or real, in our protective force
readiness or in our ability to protect the complex. Funding for
Safeguards and Security in NNSA has increased over 70 percent during
this administration, which is strong indicator of the priority we place
on this responsibility. The Secretary and I join together in making it
well known that we will not tolerate any reduction, perceived or real,
in our protective forces and our abilities to protect the complex.
FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE RECAPITALIZATION
The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP)
is essential to NNSA's ability to maintain a responsive robust
infrastructure. I am pleased to note that its mission and performance
is commended in the recent preliminary assessment by the National
Research Council on DOE's facility management. The fiscal year 2005
budget request for FIRP is $316.2 million. This increase follows a 2-
year period of flat funding. The request restores the program to our
previously requested FYNSP levels; it places the program back on our
previously planned schedule and reflects our commitment to fulfill the
direction of the Congress to end the program by 2011.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCIDENT RESPONSE
The third growth area in the fiscal year 2005 budget request is the
Nuclear Weapons Incident Response Programs. The fiscal year 2005
request of $99.2 million reflects an increase of 11 percent over the
fiscal year 2004 level, recognizing the greatly increased number of
deployments of these assets within the United States and abroad. The
long term sizing of this effort in terms of dollars and people
continues to evolve along with its critical role in homeland security.
We have relocated this account separately within the Weapons Activities
appropriation to provide additional visibility into these programs and
funding request.
At this time, I would like to focus on the remainder of the
President's budget request for NNSA Weapons Activities including
Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors, and
the Office of the Administrator accounts.
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES
The fiscal year 2005 budget request for the programs funded within
the Weapons Activities appropriation is $6.568 billion, an increase of
5.4 percent over fiscal year 2004 due largely to the increase in
security and facilities infrastructure. Within Weapons Activities, the
budget structure has been changed in response to Congressional concerns
to align Directed Stockpile Work funding with individual weapon
systems, and to highlight Nuclear Weapon Incident Response as a
separate line.
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) guidance directed that NNSA
maintain a research and development and manufacturing base that ensures
the long-term effectiveness of the Nation's stockpile; and, support the
facilities and infrastructure that are responsive to new or emerging
threats. The NPR also directed NNSA to begin a modest effort to examine
concepts that could be deployed to further enhance the deterrent
capabilities of the stockpile in response to the national security
challenges of the 21st century.
The United States is continuing work to refurbish and extend the
life of the B61, W76 and W80 warheads in the stockpile. Within the
fiscal year 2005 request of $1.4 billion for Directed Stockpile Work
(DSW), funding for the life extension programs increases by 7 percent
to $477.4 million. This reflects the expected ramp up in the three
systems with First Production Units scheduled in fiscal year 2006-2009,
and the completion of life extension activities for the W87. In fiscal
year 2005, DSW funding will support research and development of
advanced weapon concepts to meet emerging DOD needs that will enhance
the nuclear deterrent, and to ensure a robust and capable NNSA for the
Future. The NPR highlighted the importance of pursuing advanced
concepts work to ensure that the weapons complex can provide nuclear
deterrence for decades to come. In fiscal year 2005, $9.0 million is
requested to support the modest research and development effort in the
Advanced Concepts Initiatives (ACI) to meet emerging DOD needs and to
train the next generation of nuclear weapons scientists and engineers.
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) is the most mature concept
being studied in this program. Funds for the RNEP study are included in
the fiscal year 2005 budget as a separate line item from the rest of
the advanced concepts study activity. A request for $27.6 million is
also included for the continuing RNEP feasibility, design definition
and cost study. The RNEP study was requested by the Nuclear Weapons
Council in January 2002.
The RNEP study is to determine whether either of two existing
warheads--the B61 or the B83--can be adapted without resuming nuclear
testing to improve our ability to hold at risk hardened, deeply buried
facilities that may be important to a future adversary. The request for
advanced concepts funding is to investigate new ideas, not necessarily
new weapons. For example, we are currently examining the feasibility of
adapting an existing weapons carrier and existing nuclear warheads to
achieve a delivery system with greater assurance that the intended
nuclear mission could not be compromised by either component failure or
adversary attack, thus giving greater reliability for nuclear missions.
Appropriate uses for additional work in advanced concepts might include
examining the feasibility of warheads with improved design margins,
easier manufacturing, greater longevity and improved safety. Any of
these ideas would only be pursued for future development if directed to
do so by the President and the Congress.
Progress in other parts of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
continues. The fiscal year 2005 request for Campaigns is $2.4 billion,
essentially level with fiscal year 2004. This request funds a variety
of Campaigns, experimental facilities and activities that continue to
enhance NNSA's confidence in moving to ``science-based'' judgments for
stockpile stewardship, and provide cutting edge technologies for
stockpile certification and maintenance.
While there is no reason to doubt the ability of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program to continue to ensure the safety, security, and
reliability of the nuclear deterrent, the Nation must maintain the
ability to carry out a nuclear weapons test in the event of some
currently unforeseen problems that cannot be resolved by other means.
Within the guidance provided by the Congress, we are beginning to
improve our readiness posture from the current ability to test within
24 to 36 months to an ability to test within approximately 18 months.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request of $30 million supports achieving
an 18-month readiness by September 2005. But let me be clear, there are
no plans to test.
National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) remains on budget and schedule. The fiscal year 2005
request of $130.0 million continues construction installation and
commissioning of laser beams. Once complete in 2008, the 192-laser beam
facility will be capable of achieving temperatures and pressures found
only on the surface of the sun and in exploding nuclear weapons. We are
anticipating the first Stockpile Stewardship experiments in 2004 using
four laser beams. As a result of recent technical advances in capsule
design, target fabrication and computer simulations, we expect to begin
the fusion ignition campaign in fiscal year 2009 with a goal of
achieving fusion ignition in fiscal year 2010. The Advanced Simulation
and Computing Campaign request for fiscal year 2005 is $741.3 million,
an increase of nearly 3 percent over fiscal year 2004. Working with IBM
and Cray Research, the program expects delivery of Red Storm in fiscal
year 2004 and Purple in fiscal year 2005. These will be the world's
fastest machines, operating at 40 and 100 Teraops, respectively, and
they will continue to revolutionize supercomputer capabilities and
three-dimensional modeling. Having these machines on-line will begin to
redress the capacity and capability issues raised in the September 2003
JASONs report required by the Congress.
The NPR recognized a need, over the long run, for a Modern Pit
Facility (MPF) to support the pit manufacturing needs of the entire
stockpile. NNSA's fiscal year 2005 request for the Pit Manufacturing
Campaign is $336.5 million, an increase of 13 percent over fiscal year
2004, but with some changes since the last budget request. We delayed
the final environmental impact statement (EIS) for the MPF in order to
address Congressional concerns that it is premature to pursue further
decisions on an MPF at this time. The decision to delay the final EIS
also delays identification of a preferred site for constructing the
MPF.
This decision will in no way affect the W88 pit manufacturing and
recertification program underway at Los Alamos, which is reestablishing
the technological base to manufacture pits and which thereby will
inform many of the technology decisions which will be contained in the
eventual MPF design.
Readiness Campaigns are requested at $280.1 million in fiscal year
2005, a decrease of about 14 percent. The decrease is attributable
mainly to continuing progress in construction of the Tritium Extraction
Facility that is funded within this account.
NNSA's Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities activities
operate and maintain current facilities and ensure the long-term
vitality of the NNSA complex through a multi-year program of
infrastructure construction. About $1.5 billion is requested for these
efforts, a slight decrease from fiscal year 2004 that is attributable
to a 20 percent decline in funding needed to support line-item
construction project schedules. Three new construction starts are
requested.
In fiscal year 2005 the President's budget provides a total of
$201.3 million for the Office of Secure Transportation, which is
responsible for meeting the Department's transportation requirements
for nuclear weapons, components, special nuclear materials and waste
shipments.
The remainder of the Weapons Activities appropriation funding is
for Nuclear Weapons Incident Response, Facilities and Infrastructure
Recapitalization, and Safeguards and Security, discussed earlier in
this statement.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program works to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorist organizations and
rogue states. The administration is requesting $1.35 billion to support
activities to reduce the global weapons of mass destruction
proliferation threat, about a 1 percent increase over comparable fiscal
year 2004 activities. This reflects a leveling off of growth in these
important programs that have increased over 60 percent in the past 4
years.
Given recent threats to the United States, it has become
increasingly clear that protecting and securing nuclear materials and
detecting nuclear and radioactive material at foreign ports, airports,
and border crossings is a very high priority. The administration's
leadership in the Global Partnership is one way that we are trying to
address these issues. The fiscal year 2005 request for programs
supporting the Partnership is $439 million. This includes a fiscal year
2005 request of $238 million for the International Nuclear Material
Protection and Cooperation (MPC&A) Program, which supports Second Line
of Defense activities and the Mega-ports Program. The Mega-ports
Program was jump-started with $99 million appropriated in fiscal year
2003. Progress is continuing, and with the $15 million requested in
fiscal year 2005, we will have work underway or complete at 9 of the 15
planned international ports. The $15 million in fiscal year 2005 is
requested to train law enforcement officials and equip key
international ports with radiation detection equipment to detect,
deter, and interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear and other
radioactive materials. We are scheduled to complete work at ports in
Greece and the Netherlands by the summer of 2004. We have made a number
of security improvements to Nuclear Navy sites in Russia and we are now
focusing resources on securing Strategic Rocket Forces sites. In
addition to this work, we are also pursuing a dialogue with countries
we believe are of particular concern. We hope that these activities
will lead to broader MPC&A cooperation in the coming years.
The largest activity funded by this appropriation is the Fissile
Materials Disposition program. We are working to design and build
facilities to dispose of inventories of surplus U.S. weapons-grade
plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, and supporting concurrent
efforts in Russia to obtain reciprocal disposition of similar
materials.
One of the key obstacles encountered this year is a disagreement
with Russia regarding liability protection for plutonium disposition
work performed in that country. This has resulted in a 10-month delay
in the planned start of construction of a MOX Facility in Russia as
well as a similar facility in the United States. The liability issue is
being worked at high levels of the administration. The President's
fiscal year 2005 budget request seeks $649 million for this program to
begin construction of both the U.S. and Russian MOX facilities in May
2005, as we work to resolve the liability issue by this spring. Our
outyear funding profiles reflect the administration's full commitment
for proceeding with plutonium disposition.
Not only are we pursuing the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium
but also we are working hard to stop more from being produced. NNSA has
assumed the responsibility from the DOD for shutting down the last
three plutonium production reactors in Russia and replacing them with
fossil fuel plants by 2008 and 2011. This will result in the cessation
of the annual production of 1.2 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium.
Under the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program, we
have selected the Washington Group International and Raytheon Technical
Services to provide oversight for Russian contractors who will actually
be performing the work. The fiscal year 2005 request for this effort is
$50.1 million.
In fiscal year 2005, NNSA assumes responsibility for the Off-site
Source Recovery Project from the Office of Environmental Management.
The requested program funding is $5.6 million, with a projected cost of
about $40 million over the next 5 years to substantially reduce the
risk of these source materials being used for radiological dispersion
devices. The program works closely with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to prioritize source recovery.
The Russian reactor safety efforts under the International Nuclear
Safety Program were completed successfully in 2003. The remaining $4
million for emergency management and cooperation efforts was shifted to
the Nonproliferation and International Security Program. These funds
provide for the orderly shutdown of the BN 350 reactor in Kazakhstan
($1.5 million) and continue activities to strengthen international
emergency cooperation and communications ($2.5 million). The
Accelerated Materials Disposition initiative was not supported by the
Congress in fiscal year 2004 and in consideration of overall NNSA
priorities, is not requested in the fiscal year 2005 budget or
outyears.
NAVAL REACTORS
The NNSA is requesting $798 million for the Naval Reactors Program
in fiscal year 2005, an increase of about 4 percent. This program
continues to be a prime example of how to manage unforgiving and
complex technology. The Naval Reactors Program provides safe and
reliable nuclear reactors to power the Navy's warships. It is
responsible for all naval nuclear propulsion work, beginning with
technology development, through reactor operations, and ultimately to
reactor plant disposal. The budget increase will support 70 percent
completion of the design of the next generation nuclear reactor on an
aircraft carrier, and continue work on the Transformational Technology
Core, which will deliver a significant energy increase to future
submarines, resulting in greater operational ability and flexibility.
The request includes $6.2 million for a new construction start, the
Materials Development Facility Building, in Schenectady, NY. The TTC
facility is estimated at $20.4 million, and it is expected to be
completed in 2008.
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR
NNSA is in the final implementation phase of a re-engineering
effort that follows the principles of the President's Management Agenda
to modernize, integrate, and streamline operations. As a result, at the
end of fiscal year 2004, NNSA will achieve its goal of a 15 percent
reduction in Federal personnel since fiscal year 2002. It is likely
that the Congress will receive a request for reprogramming in fiscal
year 2004 to fund the remainder of these realignment and reengineering
activities.
The fiscal year 2005 budget request of $333.7 million is about 1
percent below the fiscal year 2004 appropriation. This reflects cost
avoidance due to reduction of about 300 positions since 2002, and no
further request for incremental funding needed to accomplish re-
engineering in NNSA HQ and field organizations. The budget request
assumes that personnel reductions are achieved, restructuring finished,
and associated employee transfers are complete at the end of fiscal
year 2004.
The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NN) and Nuclear Weapons
Incident Response programs have been excluded from staff reductions due
to increased program requirements in those areas. NNSA is not
requesting a separate funding control for the Office of Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation because it is no longer necessary to assure that
Federal hiring goals are met for these activities that are experiencing
rapid mission growth. Based on hiring to date in fiscal year 2004, it
is projected that this organization will meet or exceed its managed
staffing plan goal of 244 by fiscal year 2005. A single funding control
for the appropriation is necessary to facilitate NNSA's corporate
efforts to rebalance the NN's office transition from reliance on
support service contractors to permanent Federal staff.
MANAGEMENT ISSUES
I would like to conclude by discussing some of NNSA's management
challenges and successes. We are all aware of the management
difficulties that beset the weapons laboratories last year. The
contractors and NNSA/DOE have made many changes to the laboratories'
management and reporting/oversight requirements in response to the
problems. Soon their contracts are coming up for renewal. Secretary
Abraham has outlined the Department's strategy for competing the
Management and Operating contracts for our nuclear design labs in
accordance with Section 301 of the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-137). On April 30,
2003, the Secretary announced that we intend to compete the Los Alamos
National Laboratory contract on a full and open basis to have a
contract in place by September 30, 2005, when the old contract expires.
On January 21, 2004, the Secretary reiterated his decision
concerning Los Alamos National Laboratory. At that time, he also
announced his decision to compete the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory contract, as well as three other DOE laboratories, but
indicated that the precise timing and form of these competitions were
under consideration.
NNSA, with the concurrence of the Secretary, is establishing a
Source Evaluation Board (SEB) for the Los Alamos competition. I have
named Tyler Przybylek as the Chairman of that SEB and he is in the
process of identifying members and advisers to the SEB. We see no
obstacle to meeting the Secretary's schedule for competing and awarding
a new contract or managing Los Alamos.
On the ``success'' side, I am proud that the Department of Energy
was ranked first among cabinet-level agencies in the most recent
scorecard to assess implementation of the President's Management
Agenda. The scorecard, which evaluates agency performance in the areas
of human capital, competitive sourcing, financial management, e-
Government, and budget/performance integration, was issued by OMB. We
at NNSA take very seriously the responsibility to manage the resources
of the American people effectively and I am glad that our management
efforts are achieving such results.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I am confident that we are headed in the right
direction. Our budget request will support continuing our progress in
protecting and certifying our nuclear deterrent, reducing the global
danger from proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, and
enhancing the force projection capabilities of the U.S. nuclear Navy.
It will enable us to continue to maintain the safety and security of
our people, information, materials, and infrastructure. Above all, it
will meet the national security needs of the United States of the 21st
century.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. A statistical appendix
follows that contains the budget figures supporting our request. My
colleagues and I would be pleased to answer any questions on the
justification for the requested budget.
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION APPROPRIATION AND PROGRAM SUMMARY
[In Millions of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2003 2004 Fiscal Year 2004 Fiscal
Comparable Original 2004 Comparable Year 2005
Appropriation Appropriation Adjustments Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator............... 330 340 -3 337 334
Weapons Activities........................ 5,961 6,273 -39 6,234 6,568
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.......... 1,224 1,328 +6 1,334 1,349
Naval Reactors............................ 702 766 -4 762 798
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, NNSA......................... 8,217 8,707 -40 8,667 9,049
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FUTURE YEARS NUCLEAR SECURITY PROGRAM (FYNSP) SCHEDULE
[In Millions of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
Year Year Year Year Year Total
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator............................... 334 340 347 353 360 1,734
Weapons Activities........................................ 6,568 6,881 7,216 7,353 7,492 35,510
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.......................... 1,349 1,381 1,410 1,441 1,465 7,046
Naval Reactors............................................ 798 803 818 834 850 4,103
-----------------------------------------------------
Total, NNSA......................................... 9,049 9,405 9,791 9,981 10,167 48,393
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WEAPONS ACTIVITIES APPROPRIATION
[In Thousands of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2003 2004 Fiscal Year 2004 Fiscal Year
Comparable Original 2004 Comparable 2005
Appropriation Appropriation Adjustments Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Weapons Activities:
Directed Stockpile Work.............. 1,259,136 1,340,286 -13,630 1,326,656 1,406,435
Science Campaign..................... 260,867 250,548 +23,300 273,848 300,962
Engineering Campaign................. 270,502 344,387 -79,472 264,915 242,984
Inertial Confinement Fusion and High 499,230 517,269 -3,018 514,251 492,034
Yield Campaign......................
Advanced Simulation and Computing 674,453 725,626 -4,250 721,376 741,260
Campaign............................
Pit Manufacturing and Certification 261,807 298,528 -1,738 296,790 336,473
Campaign............................
Readiness Campaign................... 270,147 247,097 +81,819 328,916 280,127
Readiness in Technical Base and 1,480,872 1,664,235 -123,590 1,540,645 1,474,454
Facilities..........................
Secure Transportation Asset.......... 168,548 162,400 -948 161,452 201,300
Nuclear Weapons Incident Response.... 81,114 0 +89,167 89,167 99,209
Facilities and Infrastructure 235,474 240,123 -1,368 238,755 316,224
Recapitalization Program............
Safeguards & Security................ 558,161 585,750 -3,280 582,470 706,991
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal, Weapons Activities....... 6,020,311 6,376,249 -37,008 6,339,241 6,598,453
Use of Prior Year Balances........... -29,981 -74,753 -2,000 -76,753 0
Security Charge for Reimbursable Work -28,985 -28,985 +0 -28,985 -30,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Weapons Activities.......... 5,961,345 6,272,511 -39,008 6,233,503 6,568,453
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION APPROPRIATION
[In Thousands of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2003 2004 Fiscal Year 2004 Fiscal
Comparable Original 2004 Comparable Year 2005
Appropriation Appropriation Adjustments Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Nonproliferation and Verification 256,092 231,997 0 231,997 220,000
Research and Development..............
Nonproliferation and International 130,873 110,107 +3,977 114,084 124,000
Security..............................
International Nuclear Materials 333,029 258,487 0 258,487 238,000
Protection and Cooperation............
Russian Transition Initiatives......... 39,081 39,764 0 39,764 41,000
HEU Transparency Implementation........ 17,118 17,894 0 17,894 20,950
International Nuclear Safety........... 33,570 3,977 -3,977 0 0
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium 49,221 49,735 +15,300 65,035 50,097
Production............................
Accelerated Material Disposition....... 894 0 0 0 0
Fissile Materials Disposition.......... 445,528 652,818 0 652,818 649,000
Offsite Source Recovery Project........ 2,172 0 +1,961 1,961 5,600
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal, Defense Nuclear 1,307,578 1,364,779 +17,261 1,382,040 1,348,647
Nonproliferation....................
Use of Prior Year Balances............. -84,125 -45,000 -3,000 -48,000 .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Defense Nuclear 1,223,453 1,319,779 +14,261 1,334,040 1,348,647
Nonproliferation....................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVAL REACTORS APPROPRIATION
[In Thousands of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2003 2004 Fiscal Year 2004 Fiscal
Comparable Original 2004 Comparable Year 2005
Appropriation Appropriation Adjustments Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Reactors Development (NRD):
Operations and Maintenance............. 666,927 723,100 -4,264 718,836 761,211
Program Direction...................... 24,043 26,700 -148 26,552 29,500
Construction........................... 11,226 18,600 -110 18,490 7,189
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal, Naval Reactors Development. 702,196 768,400 -4,522 763,878 797,900
Less Use of prior year balances........ 0 -2,000 ........... -2,000 0
Subtotal Adjustments................... 0 0 0 0 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, Naval Reactors................ 702,196 766,400 -4,522 761,878 797,900
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR APPROPRIATION
[In Thousands of Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2003 2004 Fiscal Year 2004 Fiscal
Comparable Original 2004 Comparable Year 2005
Appropriation Appropriation Adjustments Appropriation Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Administrator Program 330,314 339,980 -3,154 336,826 333,700
Direction.................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FUNDING BY GENERAL GOAL
[Dollars in Millions]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Percent Fiscal Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
Year 2003 Year 2004 Year 2005 $ Change Change Year 2006 2007 2008 2009
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Goal 1, Nuclear Weapons
Stewardship:
Directed Stockpile Work.............. $1,259 $1,327 $1,406 +$79 +6.0 $1,521 $1,648 $1,778 $1,812
Science Campaign..................... 261 274 301 +27 +9.9 301 308 328 341
Engineering Campaign................. 271 265 243 -22 -8.3 268 226 284 237
ICF and High Yield Campaign.......... 499 514 492 -22 -4.3 521 535 437 441
Advanced Simulation and Computing 674 721 741 +20 +2.8 782 826 834 848
Campaign............................
Pit Manufacturing and Certification 262 297 336 +39 +13.1 324 314 155 158
Campaign............................
Readiness Campaign................... 270 329 280 -49 -14.9 331 307 357 376
Readiness in Technical Base and 1,481 1,541 1,474 -67 -4.3 1,600 1,753 1,839 1,916
Facilities..........................
Nuclear Weapons Incident Response.... 81 89 99 +10 +11.2 100 101 98 101
Secure Transportation Asset.......... 169 161 201 +40 +24.8 185 186 190 195
Facilities and Infrastructure 235 239 316 +77 +32.2 373 426 472 476
Recapitalization Program............
Safeguards and Security.............. 529 553 677 +124 +22.4 575 586 580 591
Office of the Administrator.......... 279 283 277 -6 -2.1 282 288 293 299
Use of PY Balances................... -30 -77 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Goal 1, Nuclear Weapons 6,237 6,513 6,845 +332 +5.1 7,163 7,504 7,646 7,791
Stewardship.......................
==============================================================================================================
General Goal 2, Control of Weapons of
Mass Destruction:
Nonproliferation and Verification 256 232 220 -12 -5.2 229 235 246 248
Research & Development..............
Nonproliferation and International 131 114 124 +10 +8.8 119 120 120 120
Security............................
International Nuclear Material 333 258 238 -20 -7.8 244 250 258 260
Protection and Cooperation..........
Russian Transition Initiative........ 39 40 41 +1 +2.5 42 43 43 44
HEU Transparency Implementation...... 17 18 21 +3 +16.7 21 21 20 20
International Nuclear Safety......... 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Elimination of Weapons-Grade 49 65 50 -15 -23.1 56 59 60 67
Plutonium Production................
Accelerated Materials Disposition.... 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fissile Materials Disposition........ 382 653 649 -4 -0.6 661 673 685 697
Offsite Source Recovery Project...... 2 2 6 +4 +200.0 9 9 9 9
Office of the Administrator.......... 54 57 57 0 0 58 59 60 61
Use of PY Balances................... -20 -48 0 .......... .......... 0 0 0 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Goal 2, Control of Weapons of 1,278 1,391 1,406 +15 +1.0 1,439 1,469 1,501 1,526
Mass Destruction..................
==============================================================================================================
Goal 3, Defense Nuclear Power (Naval 702 762 798 +36 +4.7 803 818 834 850
Reactors)...............................
==============================================================================================================
Total, NNSA........................ 8,217 8,667 9,049 +382 +4.4 9,405 9,791 9,981 10,167
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NNSA Program Direction expenditures funded in the Office of the Administrator appropriation have been allocated in support of Goals 1 and 2. Goal 1
allocation includes Federal support for programs funded by the Weapons Activities appropriation, as well as NNSA corporate support, including Federal
staffing at the site offices. Goal 2 allocation includes Federal support for all Nuclear Nonproliferation programs. Program Direction expenditures for
Naval Reactors, supporting Goal 3, are funded within the Naval Reactors appropriation.
FUNDING SUMMARY BY SITE
[In Millions of Dollars]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 2005 Office Fiscal Year 2005 Fiscal Year Total
2003 2004 of the 2005 Weapon Nuclear 2005 Naval Fiscal Year
Admin Activities Nonprolif React 2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chicago Operations Office:
Ames Laboratory.......................................... 0.2 0.2 ........... ........... 0.2 ........... 0.2
Argonne Nat. Laboratory.................................. 24.7 19.2 ........... 1.9 20.5 ........... 22.4
Brookhaven National Laboratory........................... 25.4 44.5 ........... 1.6 33.3 ........... 34.9
Chicago Operations Office................................ 209.5 428.4 ........... 25.2 446.3 ........... 471.5
New Brunswick Laboratory................................. 1.5 1.1 ........... ........... 1.1 ........... 1.1
Idaho Operations Office:
Idaho National Laboratory................................ 59.5 58.0 ........... ........... 2.0 56.0 58.0
Idaho Operations Office.................................. 1.4 1.1 ........... 1.4 ........... ........... 1.4
Kansas City Site Office:
Kansas City Plant........................................ 390.3 403.8 ........... 378.0 1.4 ........... 379.5
Kansas City Site Office.................................. 6.2 6.2 6.0 ........... ........... ........... 6.0
Livermore Site Office:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory................... 1,048.7 1,004.1 ........... 963.3 70.4 ........... 1,033.7
Livermore Site Office.................................... 12.8 16.1 16.5 ........... ........... ........... 16.5
Los Alamos Site Office:
Los Alamos National Laboratory........................... 1,410.0 1,415.6 ........... 1,395.6 123.6 ........... 1,519.2
Los Alamos Site Office................................... 12.0 14.6 15.9 ........... ........... ........... 15.9
National Engineering Technology Laboratory................... 1.7 0.0 ........... ........... ........... ........... 0.0
NNSA Service Center:
Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd............................. 2.4 1.2 ........... ........... 1.2 ........... 1.2
General Atomics.......................................... 10.8 11.0 ........... 13.1 0.2 ........... 13.3
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.................... 5.2 4.0 ........... ........... 4.1 ........... 4.1
Naval Research Laboratory................................ 22.3 13.3 ........... 11.0 ........... ........... 11.0
NNSA Service Center (all other sites).................... 487.8 467.2 98.7 232.2 83.4 ........... 414.4
Nonproliferation and National Security Institute......... 0.1 ........... ........... ........... ........... ........... ...........
University of Rochester/LLE.............................. 46.8 62.6 ........... 45.5 ........... ........... 45.5
Nevada Site Office:
Nevada Site Office....................................... 104.1 92.5 17.5 45.7 7.4 ........... 70.6
Nevada Test Site......................................... 247.7 285.4 ........... 282.9 1.0 ........... 283.9
Oak Ridge Operations Office:
Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Engineering.......... 7.8 8.8 ........... 7.1 ........... ........... 7.1
Oak Ridge National Laboratory............................ 110.6 95.8 ........... 7.5 136.9 ........... 144.4
Office of Science and Technical Information.............. 0.1 0.1 ........... 0.1 ........... ........... 0.1
Y-12 Site Office......................................... 9.6 16.3 11.7 ........... ........... ........... 11.7
Y-12 National Security Complex........................... 734.3 728.2 ........... 727.0 61.0 ........... 788.0
Pantex Site Office:
Pantex Plant............................................. 413.0 431.1 ........... 463.5 10.3 ........... 473.8
Pantex Site Office....................................... 9.9 10.8 11.6 ........... ........... ........... 11.6
Pittsburgh Naval Reactors Office:
Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory........................... 351.6 396.2 ........... ........... ........... 401.2 401.2
Pittsburgh Naval Reactors Office......................... 7.8 8.2 ........... ........... ........... 8.7 8.7
Richland Operations Office:
Richland Operations Office............................... 0.4 0.8 ........... 1.3 ........... ........... 1.3
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.................... 132.5 85.6 ........... 4.4 70.1 ........... 74.5
Sandia Site Office:
Sandia National Laboratories............................. 1,306.8 1,376.7 ........... 1,167.7 144.3 ........... 1,312.0
Sandia Site Office....................................... 8.6 12.1 12.5 ........... ........... ........... 12.5
Savannah River Operations Office:
Savannah River Operations Office......................... 14.0 26.5 ........... ........... 32.4 ........... 32.4
Savannah River Site Office............................... 3.5 3.1 2.9 ........... ........... ........... 2.9
Savannah River Site...................................... 305.3 303.3 ........... 238.9 55.5 ........... 294.4
Schenectady Naval Reactors Office:
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory........................... 269.5 282.0 ........... ........... ........... 308.2 308.2
Schenectady Naval Reactors Office........................ 6.3 6.7 ........... ........... ........... 7.0 7.0
Washington DC Headquarters................................... 501.3 688.2 137.9 577.5 41.9 13.8 771.1
Other........................................................ 5.7 7.0 2.4 ........... ........... 3.0 5.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal, NNSA......................................... 8,360.4 8,842.0 333.7 6,598.5 1,348.6 768.4 9,078.7
Adjustments.................................................. -143.5 -176.2 0.0 -30.0 0.0 0.0 -30.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total, NNSA............................................ 8,216.9 8,665.8 333.7 6,568.5 1,348.6 768.4 9,048.7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL FRANK L. BOWMAN
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much. Are you next,
Admiral?
Admiral Bowman. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. Please proceed.
Admiral Bowman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thank you very much for the opportunity to testify, as you
said, Mr. Chairman, maybe one last time before this committee
in my last 8 years as Director of Naval Reactors.
Sir, with your permission I would like to submit a detailed
statement for the record.
Senator Domenici. Please do.
Admiral Bowman. And also the normal environmental,
radiation and occupational safety health reports.
[Clerk's Note.--The reports referenced above will be
retained in committee files.]
Admiral Bowman. Let me begin by thanking you and the
committee for the support you've continued to provide the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program, and Senator Domenici, especially,
on a personal note, your support of me and my program for these
years. Many of the impressive capabilities of our nuclear-
powered ships were developed with funding that was supported by
you. As you know, nuclear propulsion provides the mobility, the
flexibility and the endurance that today's Navy needs to meet a
growing number of important missions with fewer and fewer
ships.
Today our 10 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers continue to
be the centerpiece of U.S. military presence worldwide in
support of our interests and commitments. In war they deliver
strike sorties, protect friendly forces and engage in sustained
combat operations.
Our 54 operational attack submarines are the envy of navies
around the world. Because of their stealth, endurance,
mobility, firepower and multi-mission flexibility they
guarantee access to the world's oceans and littorals, monitor
those who may act counter to our interests and conduct
reconnaissance in preparation for conflict. In the event of
hostilities they conduct Tomahawk strike missions, deploy and
support special operations forces, and destroy enemy ships and
diesel submarines.
Our 14 Trident ballistic missile submarines, down from 18
as a result of the last NPR, are the most survivable and
efficient leg of our strategic deterrent arsenal and continue
to represent a cornerstone of our national security.
And then finally, the deep-diving, nuclear-powered research
submarine, NR-1, provides unique military mission support to
the Navy and valuable oceanographic research to the scientific
community.
When I testified before this committee last year, Mr.
Chairman, our Armed Forces had been engaged in Operation Iraqi
Freedom for 3 weeks. I reported then that our nuclear-powered
warships were playing a leading role in combat operations. My
written, detailed statement reports more details of the superb
performance of our ships and their crews. Today our nuclear-
powered fleet is deployed around the world, protecting our
interests, deterring aggression and continuing to fight
terrorism. At the center of this new surge Navy, our nuclear-
powered warships are ready for any and all missions our
Nation's leaders may direct.
As we look to the near future, the first of the Virginia-
class attack submarines will be delivered this summer,
remarkably close to the schedule established over a decade ago.
You recall that the operational requirements document for that
Virginia-class was approved some 4 years after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. As such, the Virginia-class is the first submarine
designed specifically for post-Cold War missions. It's designed
to prevail in both the littorals and the open ocean.
Our work also continues on the design of the nuclear
propulsion plant for the CVN-21, the next generation class of
aircraft carriers. The modern technologies of this design will
enable increased war fighting capability and operational
availability with lower life cycle costs.
We're also continuing work on the Transformational
Technology Core (TTC). It will use new core materials, new
reactor materials, to achieve a greater energy density, more
energy in the reactor without increasing the size, weight or
space and at a reasonable cost for future Virginia-class
submarines. That TTC core is a direct outgrowth of the Programs
advanced reactor technology work, funded by this committee. It
will also be a stepping stone for future reactor development.
Though new designs are important, Naval Reactors' number
one priority is ensuring that the men and women at sea
defending our Nation are operating safe, effective and reliable
nuclear propulsion plants. Most of Naval Reactors' funding is
devoted to this.
With your vital support, I'm confident we will continue to
build on our success. Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2005 DOE
budget request is for about $798 million, an increase of 3
percent after inflation compared to fiscal year 2004. The
funding increase mainly supports the continued development of
the Transformational Technology Core.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, as the Director of Naval Reactors for the
last 7\1/2\ years, I can assure you that the ongoing support of
your committee is one of the most important factors in our
success story. The unique capabilities inherent in nuclear
power have played a vital role in our Nation's defense over the
past 50 years. This legacy is as strong and vibrant today as
ever. Our Navy continues to face a growing need for power
projection and forward presence far from home, which places
even greater demands on our nuclear fleet. With your continued
support Naval Reactors' success will continue far into the
future. Our record is strong, the work is important, and the
funding needs have been very carefully scrubbed by me
personally.
Mr. Chairman, other members of the committee, I thank you
very much for your continued support.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Frank L. Bowman
Thank you for inviting me to testify today on Naval Reactors'
Fiscal Year 2005 Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
Administration budget request in what will be my last of 8 years as
Director, Naval Reactors.
Let me also thank you for the faith you continue to demonstrate in
the Naval Reactors Program. Through your steadfast support, our nuclear
fleet remains deployed around the world today, prosecuting the Global
War on Terrorism while protecting our interests and deterring
aggression. Nuclear propulsion continues to prove itself essential by
providing the flexibility, speed, endurance, and multimission
capability required for the United States Navy to meet its global
commitments. The nuclear propulsion plants, developed with funding
supported by this subcommittee, enable many of the impressive
capabilities our nuclear-powered ships possess. Let me begin by
discussing the capabilities and accomplishments of the nuclear-powered
Fleet--the Program's principal product.
TODAY'S NUCLEAR-POWERED FLEET
Our nuclear fleet includes 10 of our Nation's 12 aircraft carriers,
each of them providing 4\1/2\ acres of sovereign U.S. territory from
which we can rapidly begin and sustain continuous combat operations,
without having to negotiate basing rights on--and overflight rights
across--foreign soil. Nuclear power enhances the capability of these
warships to surge and to sprint where needed and arrive on station
ready for round-the-clock power projection and other combat operations.
Sustained high-speed capability enables a rapid response to world
circumstances, giving the Combatant Commanders the ability to surge
these ships from one crisis to the next without dependence on slower
fleet tankers.
Our 54 operational attack submarines (SSN's) possess the inherent
characteristics of stealth, endurance, mobility, firepower, and
multimission flexibility. They provide guaranteed access to the world's
oceans and littorals, monitor those who may act counter to our
interests, and conduct reconnaissance in preparation for conflict. Our
SSN's can covertly monitor an adversary's actions without the risk of
political or military escalation--a particularly valuable capability
since adversaries understand and can sometimes avoid other methods of
reconnaissance. If tensions escalate, these SSN's can provide Tomahawk
strikes or deliver special operations forces from their undisclosed
locations without warning, inside an adversary's defensive umbrella.
Our ``high-tech'' SSN's make our Navy the envy of other navies
throughout the world.
This summer, the Navy will deliver the first-of-the-class USS
VIRGINIA to the Fleet, close to the shipyard's schedule that was
established over a decade ago. Float-off and christening occurred in
August 2003 and the reactor was taken critical for the first time on
January 27, 2004. Final construction work is being completed, and
shipboard acceptance testing is ongoing. When the reactor went critical
for the first time, the actual control rod position was virtually the
same as predicted by our analysis over 6 years ago--within 0.2 percent.
The VIRGINIA Class Operational Requirements Document, approved in
September 1993, called for the ship to be the first nuclear-powered
submarine designed for post-Cold War missions. Specifically, VIRGINIA
is built to dominate the littorals without sacrificing undersea
dominance in the open ocean. In a single platform, the VIRGINIA class
will combine a unique mix of stealth, endurance, agility, and firepower
to fulfill vital national security roles, even in areas denied to other
U.S. assets. There are nine follow-on VIRGINIA-class submarines under
contract, five of which are in the multiyear contract authorized by
Congress last year.
The remaining ships in the nuclear fleet include 14 strategic
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's), four former SSBN's being
converted to guided missile/multimission submarines (SSGN's), and one
deep submergence vehicle (NR-1). Our 14 TRIDENT ballistic missile
submarines are the survivable leg of our strategic deterrent arsenal
and therefore provide the cornerstones of our national security at the
lowest cost. The four TRIDENT submarines now undergoing conversion to
SSGN's will exploit the submarine's tremendous mission volume and 22
large interfaces with the sea to deploy futuristic payloads and special
operations forces. These multi-mission stealth platforms will provide
the combatant commanders with littoral warfare and land-attack
capabilities that will be truly transformational. The deep-diving,
nuclear-powered research submarine NR-1 provides unique military
mission support to the Navy and valuable oceanographic research to the
scientific community.
Now I'd like to discuss our work in a little more detail. Naval
Reactors' No. 1 priority has always been and continues to be providing
safe, effective, and reliable nuclear propulsion to the men and women
who are at sea, defending our national interests. Most of our funding
goes to that purpose.
Today, Naval Reactors supports 104 reactor plants (one more than
the number of commercial reactors in the United States) in 83 nuclear-
powered warships, the NR-1, and 4 training and test reactor plants. The
ships are welcomed in more than 150 ports of call in more than 50
countries. In all, we have operated safely for more than 5,500 reactor
years and steamed over 130 million miles.
Naval Reactors' technical support for these ships is more important
than ever. Today, the average age of a nuclear-powered warship in our
Navy is 18 years, but it will increase to more than 24 by 2012. As
these ships age, the technical work necessary to maintain their
performance places a greater demand on Naval Reactors' DOE budgets.
This challenge is my primary concern. As I said earlier, your support
remains vital, and I am confident we will continue to build on our
successes.
On March 8 of this year, the Secretary of Energy assigned to Naval
Reactors a project to develop, design, deliver, and operationally
support a civilian nuclear reactor for space exploration missions under
NASA's Project Prometheus. Since this work is exclusive of our core
naval nuclear propulsion work and is assigned as a DOE civilian project
to NR, NASA will budget for and fund this work throughout the effort.
Our initial work will begin this year to establish a working
relationship with our new partners at NASA and to define the elements
of the reactor design.
FISCAL YEAR 2005 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET REQUEST
Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2005 DOE budget request is $797.9
million, an increase of about 3 percent (after inflation) compared to
fiscal year 2004. One of the major activities enabled by this modest
increase is continued development of the Transformational Technology
Core. Additionally, this increase supports continuing development of a
production-line system for the preparation of dry storage of spent
nuclear fuel. This production-line system is needed to meet a court-
ordered obligation to move all spent fuel stored in Idaho into dry
storage by 2023 and to be among the early shipments of fuel to the
national spent fuel repository. Finally, this increase supports ongoing
facility upgrades at Program sites.
The majority of the Naval Reactors fiscal year 2005 DOE budget
request funds our work in sustaining 104 operational reactors. This
work involves continual testing, analysis, and monitoring of plant and
core performance especially as these plants age. The nature of our
business demands a careful, measured approach to developing and
verifying nuclear technology; designing needed components, systems, and
processes; and implementing them in existing and future plant designs.
Demanding engineering challenges and long lead times to fabricate the
massive, complex components require many years of effort before
technological advances can be introduced into the Fleet.
Most of this work is accomplished at Naval Reactors' DOE
laboratories. These laboratories have made significant advancements in
extending core lifetime, developing robust materials and components,
and creating an array of predictive capabilities. These advancements
allowed the Navy to extend the service life and intervals between major
maintenance periods for nuclear-powered warships to reduce ship offline
time for maintenance. Increasing ship availability also increases the
Navy's warfighting capabilities and supports the Navy's ability to
surge when needed.
For example, a recent Navy decision to delay a major overhaul and
refueling of the aircraft carrier, USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70), was made
possible in part by our continual monitoring of core performance and
subsequent analysis to establish that the ship had sufficient nuclear
fuel remaining to safely operate during this extended period. This
decision enabled the Navy to fund nearer term priorities without
adversely impacting the Fleet.
New plant development work at the Program's DOE laboratories is
focused on continuing the reactor design for the CVN-21 aircraft
carrier. Design for the CVN-21 nuclear propulsion plant is well
underway. CVN-21 is the first new aircraft carrier designed since the
1960's NIMITZ class. The CVN-21 reactor plant will build on technology
developed for the three generations of submarines designed since
NIMITZ. Compared to the NIMITZ-class propulsion plant, the CVN-21
propulsion plant will provide three times the electrical generation and
distribution capacity, and will require about 50 percent fewer Reactor
Department personnel. This modern technology will enable increased
warfighting capability and operational availability, while lowering
life-cycle costs.
Another aspect of DOE laboratories' development work is the
Transformational Technology Core (TTC). The TTC is a direct outgrowth
of the Program's advanced reactor technology work. The TTC will use new
core materials to achieve a significant increase in core energy density
(that is, more energy in the core without increasing reactor size,
weight, or space). The TTC will be forward-fitted into the VIRGINIA-
class submarines, which will be the mainstay of the submarine fleet for
future decades, without the need to redesign the ship. The importance
of TTC is becoming more evident as we depend on our SSN's more in the
current national security environment. The goal is to achieve at least
a 30 percent increase in energy.
We are also prudent stewards of the environment. The four prototype
reactors at the Naval Reactors Facility (NRF) in Idaho are defueled and
in an environmentally benign, safe layup condition; site and reactor
plant dismantlement work is planned for future years. The two shutdown
prototype reactors at the Kesselring site in New York have been
inactivated and defueled, and major dismantlement work was completed in
fiscal year 2003. Other dismantlement work at Kesselring Site is
continuing. Dismantlement work and unrestricted radiological release at
the Windsor site in Connecticut are complete, and approval from the EPA
and the State for chemical release for unrestricted future use and
property transfer is expected later this year.
NAVAL REACTORS FISCAL YEAR 2005 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BUDGET DETAIL
Naval Reactors' technical budget request is categorized into four
areas of technology: Reactor Technology and Analysis; Plant Technology;
Materials Development and Verification; and Evaluation and Servicing.
This approach supports the integrated and generic nature of our DOE
research and development work. The results of Naval Reactors' DOE-
funded research, development, and design work in the following
technology areas will be incorporated into future ships and retrofitted
into existing ships.
--The $232.1 million requested for Reactor Technology and Analysis
will continue work on the design for the new reactor for CVN-
21. These efforts also support a portion of the design of the
TTC, a new high-energy core that is a direct outgrowth of the
Program's advanced reactor technology work. TTC will support
national security demands by providing additional energy for
one or a combination of:
--Extended ship life,
--More operating hours per operating year,
--Higher ship transit speed,
--Increased available energy to enable future innovations, such as
the ability to recharge off-board undersea and air
autonomous vehicles, or any other use for energy yet to be
conceived.
The increasing average age of our existing reactor plants, along
with future extended service lives and reduced maintenance
periods, place a greater emphasis on our work in thermal-
hydraulics, structural mechanics, fluid mechanics, and
vibration analysis. These factors, along with longer-life
cores, mean that for years to come, both the reactor plants and
the reactor cores will be operating beyond our previously
proven experience base. To counter this, our improved analysis
tools and understanding of basic nuclear data will allow us to
predict performance more accurately and thereby better ensure
safety and reliability throughout the extended life.
--The $155.5 million requested for Plant Technology provides funding
to develop, test, and analyze components and systems that
transfer, convert, control, and measure reactor power in a
ship's power plant. Reactor plant performance, reliability, and
safety are maintained through a full understanding of component
performance and system condition over the life of each ship.
The request supports both the goal of enhancing steam generator
performance and the goal of reducing lifecycle costs by
eliminating the need for expensive inspection and maintenance.
In addition, development work for improving VIRGINIA steam
generator performance is needed for the plant to exploit the
additional energy available from the TTC. Naval Reactors is
developing components to address known limitations or to
improve reliability of instrumentation and power distribution
equipment by replacing obsolete equipment that is increasingly
difficult to support. Additional technology development in the
areas of chemistry, energy conversion, plant arrangement, and
plant components will continue to improve reactor performance
and support Fleet operational requirements.
--The $150.8 million requested for Materials Development and
Verification funds material analyses and testing to provide the
high-performance materials necessary to ensure that naval
nuclear propulsion plants meet Navy goals for extended warship
operation and greater power capability. More explicitly,
materials in the reactor core and reactor plant must perform
safely and reliably for the extended life of the ship. Testing
and analyses are performed on the fuel, poison, and cladding
materials to verify acceptable performance, as well as to
develop materials with increased corrosion resistance and
lifetime capability. Testing and development of reactor plant
materials also leads to improvements such as more resilient
materials that we are incorporating into our newest designs.
Funds in this category also support a portion of Naval Reactors'
work at the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), a specialized
materials testing facility operated by the DOE Office of
Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology that we use to test
reactor core and plant materials specimen. The specimen are
subsequently examined at the Expended Core Facility (ECF) at
NRF or the Radioactive Materials Laboratory at Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory to obtain data used to support both core and
plant materials development. This enhanced knowledge of
materials performance has been key to technical breakthroughs
in extending core life. Although Naval Reactors is not
responsible for ATR, it is important to our continued efforts
to understand material behavior. ATR is more than 35 years old
now, and I understand that the Department of Energy's Office of
Nuclear Science and Technology has identified a need for
increased funding to keep it viable for years to come. I
support this funding.
--The $172.0 million requested for Evaluation and Servicing sustains
the operation, maintenance, and servicing of land-based test
reactor plants and part of Naval Reactors' share of ATR
operations. Reactor core and reactor plant materials,
components, and systems in these plants provide important
research and development data and experience under actual
operating conditions. These data aid in predicting and
subsequently preventing problems that could develop in Fleet
reactors. With proper maintenance, upgrades, and servicing, the
two operating test reactor plants and the ATR will continue to
meet testing needs for quite some time.
Evaluation and Servicing funds also support the implementation of
a dry spent fuel storage production-line that will allow us to
put naval spent fuel currently stored in water pits at the
Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center and at ECF into
dry storage. Additionally, these funds support ongoing cleanup
of facilities at all Naval Reactors sites to minimize hazards
to personnel and reduce potential liabilities due to aging
facilities or changing conditions.
program infrastructure and administrative requirements
In addition to the budget request for the important technical work
discussed above, infrastructure and administrative funding is required
for continued support of the Program's operation and infrastructure.
Specifically, the fiscal year 2005 budget request includes:
Facility Operations.--Fifty-point-eight million dollars are
requested to maintain and modernize the Program's facilities, including
the Bettis and Knolls laboratories and ECF, through Capital Equipment
purchases and General Plant Project upgrades.
Construction.--Seven-point-two million dollars are requested to
refurbish and replace Program facilities. This includes funding for the
construction of the ECF Dry Cell project in Idaho, a project that will
significantly improve Naval Reactors' ability to process naval spent
fuel for dry storage. The requested funding also supports construction
of a replacement industrial facility building at the Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory to consolidate non-irradiated material development
fabrication and characterization (i.e., determining material
properties) activities, which are currently located in five separate,
aging buildings.
Program Direction.--Twenty-nine-point-five million dollars are
requested to fund Naval Reactors' DOE personnel at Headquarters and the
Program's field offices, including salaries, benefits, travel, and
other expenses. This staff maintains oversight of the Program's
extensive day-to-day technical and administrative operations, while
continuing to ensure compliance with environmental, safety, and other
regulatory requirements--all of which, notwithstanding our excellent
record, necessitate substantial effort.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS, GOALS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Naval Reactors has a long history of operating with the highest
levels of integrity and operational accountability. The Naval Reactors
Program has always been dedicated to continual improvement. We use
semiannual reviews of short and long-range plans to adjust and refine
work priorities. Work is broken up into thousands of discrete
``deliverables,'' each assigned to an individual responsible for
completion of the task on schedule. Monthly financial reports from
contractors are used to compare actual performance against projected
performance. Additionally, Naval Reactors Headquarters closely oversees
its management and operating contractors through periodic reviews,
formal audits, performance appraisals, and close integration with our
resident field offices.
For the fiscal year 2003 end-of-year performance results, my
Program met or exceeded all major performance targets. We ensured the
safety, performance, reliability, and service life of operating
reactors for uninterrupted support of the Fleet. We exceeded 90 percent
utilization availability for our training and test reactor plants. As
of today, U.S. nuclear-powered warships have safely steamed over 130
million miles. Naval Reactors developed new technologies, methods, and
materials to support reactor plant design, which included attaining the
fiscal year 2003 goal of 99 percent design completion of the next-
generation submarine reactor. We continued design of the propulsion
plant for the next-generation aircraft carrier, which is on schedule to
meet the planned ship construction start in fiscal year 2007.
Additionally, Naval Reactors maintained its outstanding radiation
protection program and its environmental performance: no Program
personnel have ever exceeded the applicable annual or lifetime Federal
limits for radiation exposure, and Program operations had no adverse
impact on health or on the quality of the environment.
Naval Reactors has met or expects to meet or exceed all fiscal year
2004 performance targets, which are to achieve 90 percent utilization
availability for operation of our training and test reactor plants; to
safely steam on nuclear power about 2 million more miles; to complete
the next-generation submarine reactor design deliverables (design is
complete); to complete 60 percent of the CVN-21 reactor plant design;
to have no personnel exceed the annual Federal limit for radiation
exposure; and to have no adverse impact on human health or the quality
of the environment.
CONCLUSION
The ongoing support of the Senate Appropriations Committee
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development is one of the most
important factors in our success story. The subcommittee has recognized
the requirements and demands the Program confronts daily: a continuing
need for power projection and forward presence far from home, which
strains our limited number of nuclear ships; an aging nuclear fleet;
and the funding required to meet these commitments today and in the
future.
The unique capabilities inherent in nuclear power have played a
vital role in our Nation's defense over the past 50 years. With your
support, this legacy will continue far into the future as the Nation
meets each new threat with strength and resolve. Naval Reactors' record
is strong, the work important, the funding needs modest.
Thank you for your support.
Senator Domenici. Well Admiral, I'll just tell you the
truth. We serve around here as elected officials and we meet
people who give their lives to the government and do services
for our people. And sometimes we run into some that we do not
know what to tell them in terms of how much we appreciate them.
We use the typical words but they are not enough. But we really
think the United States Navy's use of nuclear power is one of
the most fantastic achievements of mankind. And when they have
done it since Nautilus without one single nuclear mistake and
have had as high as 123, I think, nuclear reactors floating
around the oceans of the world, it is tremendous. And you are
in charge of that and you made it go along just like it had
been, or better. We do not need any accolades or thanks from
you because they all run the other direction.
Admiral Bowman. Thank you, sir.
Senator Domenici. Now, who is next? The other two do not
need to testify?
Ambassador Brooks. No sir, that's why I was so long, I was
doing for all three of us.
Senator Domenici. All right. Well, I am going to ask a few
questions and yield to you two Senators and if we do not finish
we will submit the rest of them.
ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR
Mr. Brooks, I do not have this question written up but I
would like you to do something again for me. I have been a
budgeteer, until this year, part of the budget process for 28
years, Chairman 10 times, maybe. Now, you are asking us to
approve how much money for the research on the penetrating
warhead?
Ambassador Brooks. Twenty-seven-point-five million dollars.
Senator Domenici. Now, the Senator from California says
that you have $500 and some million.
Senator Feinstein. Four-hundred-and-eighty-four.
Senator Domenici. Four-hundred-and-eighty-four million
dollars that you are going to spend and she says that is why
she will not vote for it, among the reasons, because that is
what you are going to spend, that is what you are going to do.
Tell me why that number is in there at all.
Ambassador Brooks. One of the things we tried to do
starting 3 years ago was to get to true 5-year budgeting so
that when we submitted a budget to the Congress we submitted a
5-year plan that really meant something. That's important for
the Congress and it was also important for us because otherwise
you would start things that you couldn't finish. When we
prepared this 5-year plan we had no idea, and we don't know
now, whether the research will show this is feasible or whether
the President will decide to pick it up. But if he does, we
wanted to have the wedge to support the funding in the out-
years. So we put the money in there because it was our
interpretation of the right thing to do in terms of making sure
the Congress knew the implication of the research that we were
doing and making sure that if the President did so choose,
after the completion of the study, that we had preserved his
options financially. It was not intended to suggest that we
made a decision, let alone that we think that you've made a
decision.
Senator Domenici. Well I'll tell you, Mr. Ambassador, you
get hit both ways. If you leave it out somebody says you are
underselling the program and it costs a lot more than 27 or 24.
And if you put it in as the outside you get beat over the head
because that is what you are going to spend. But we have to
figure out a way, in the next 5 or 6 weeks, 7, to make the case
that putting that number in does nothing with reference to this
program in terms of its future, that its future is capsulized
in the funding as described to be used that you ask for right
now. I am willing, in this bill, to fight it out. If we lose,
we lose, if we win, I am willing to put any kind of language in
that says that is it. There is no other expenditure. You do it
and no more. And before you do anymore you must get
concurrence. Now, that is all right with you, right?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir. That's completely what the law
says.
NIF
Senator Domenici. Okay. Now, let me move to Dr. Beckner. I
understand, Dr. Beckner, that NIF is still at least 6 years and
$1 billion away from completion of this project. Is it accurate
to say that NIF is both the largest laser and the most
expensive diagnostic tool in the NNSA stockpile? When we
develop any technology, we need to ask ourselves, is this
outcome worth the cost? Right?
Dr. Beckner. A fair question.
Senator Domenici. If you do not achieve ignition, the
American people have purchased a laser that is 25 times more
expensive than the Z Machine, which proved its worth 1 year too
late. It came into existence one year after we started funding
NIF. It is proceeding along as a much cheaper machine but I
think we need to understand that the project is viable before
we spend billions more on the life of this program.
So my question to you, how much money are you willing to
spend above ignition? Excuse me, how much money are you willing
to spend to achieve ignition and at what point do you say, we
have spent too much?
Dr. Beckner. Our present plan shows the expenditures out
through the year 2010 in the budget that we've submitted, and
it's close to a billion dollars, as you've said. I believe we
need to get to that point in order to, in any sense, have a
chance at achieving ignition. You can't do it with a smaller
laser, based on everything that we know today. That's only part
of the answer, however. The second part really is that absent
ignition, we require this laser for a large number of
applications that are specific to the sustenance and the study
of phenomena associated with nuclear weapons themselves. In
other words, it is a very significant element of Stockpile
Stewardship. Ignition, of course, is important, make no mistake
about it, and we will use it aggressively to achieve that goal.
But we do have this additional reason to need NIF. And I don't
want us to forget that.
Senator Domenici. Do you mean for the Stockpile
Stewardship?
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. Well of course, that is why we put it in
there.
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. But if it does not work it does not
matter where we put it, right?
Dr. Beckner. Well, there are many things you can do with a
laser without achieving ignition, that's my point. We will use
it for those other things.
Senator Domenici. But will those help with Stockpile
Stewardship?
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. And would we need $5 or $6 billion to
achieve that?
Dr. Beckner. No, I think we would not have embarked upon
this mission if we did not believe we had a reasonable
opportunity to achieve ignition.
Senator Domenici. Ignition.
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. So let me go on. If the 2005 budget
specifies that NIF ignition has been delayed until 2014, that
gives me great concern regarding the project. Delaying the
ignition start date is contrary to news that the project is
ahead of schedule. I understand that the laser installation is
18 months ahead of schedule and the beam light infrastructure
was achieved nearly 3 years ahead of schedule. As a result of
these conflicting statements, I am very skeptical as to the
actual status of NIF. To date, $2.5 billion has been spent and
another billion required before we know whether or not this
project will work. I do not share this all or nothing attitude
because the costs are very high and the budget is very slim. So
I believe we need a more measured approach to address the
significant technical measures and technical challenges that
lie ahead.
George Miller, the NIF Associate Director, is he here
today?
Dr. Beckner. Not to my knowledge.
Senator Domenici. Is he still doing this job?
Dr. Beckner. Yes he is.
Senator Domenici. Did he move out there?
Dr. Beckner. Yes. George is an employee of Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory.
Senator Domenici. Well, whoever sees him, give him my
regards. Thank you.
Dr. Beckner. I'll do that.
Senator Domenici. Terrific guy. He is the Associate
Director, he stated that the most significant technical
challenge he has is the full ignition of the lasers. I believe
the first cluster, which is 48 lasers, or one-quarter of the
total, would certainly give a clear indication of whether
ignition is feasible. Is that what you think?
Dr. Beckner. I believe it's more complicated than that.
Senator Domenici. You what?
Dr. Beckner. It's more complicated than that.
Senator Domenici. Okay.
Dr. Beckner. Let me back up to your earlier statement.
First of all, I've met with the staff of this committee as well
as the other three committees to clarify our recent decisions
to change course on some of the milestones in order to pull
back the ignition target to 2010, as opposed to 2014. And we've
done that because of our realization that this committee and
the other committees as well have a very strong view that we
must maintain that schedule. We had allowed it to move out
because of priorities in other elements of the program and
without the full understanding that this was unacceptable. So
we have changed that plan and we've done it also because we've
had some technical progress in target design which makes it now
possible to do that. So we are very much aware of the
committee's determination that we stay on target with ignition.
That's the first part.
Secondly, we agree with you that we need more milestones
for this committee and the other committees of the Congress to
track. We're going to put those in place; we will provide them
to you annually; and we'll report to you at regular intervals
to be sure that you are satisfied with the progress of the
program.
Now, the third part of your question regarding
demonstration of significant events at the time we have one
cluster operational, I think is not likely to be--we would not
want to see that as an end point. That's my concern. We
certainly see that as a very important target in program
progress and we have that as a goal.
Senator Domenici. Well, I am going to yield here shortly
because I understand these Senators have more interest than
just NIF. But I am not finished with you, even if we have to do
it another day. I have two questions. First, I want everybody
here to know that I know him very well; he worked in my State
and, you know, I have been with him many times when he was not
in such a hard position. And he smiles no matter what, when he
was doing the other work or this so, I guess it does not really
matter. He has got a good brain.
Dr. Beckner, I would like you to put together a budget and
a schedule that will accelerate the installation and testing of
the first cluster in fiscal year 2005. Can you do that?
NIF PLAN
Dr. Beckner. I can certainly put together the plan. I don't
know the results of your instructions but we'll certainly be
responsive to your request.
[The information follows:]
It is not possible to complete the first cluster milestone in
fiscal year 2005 without a significant increase in the Total Project
Cost. Procurement logistics and lead times limit our ability to
complete the scope of work required to accelerate the first cluster
into fiscal year 2005. The ability does exist to marginally accelerate
the first cluster and project completion dates if the funding profile
is changed without increasing the Total Project Cost (TPC).
The first cluster milestone is currently scheduled for completion
in June 2006 with Project completion in September 2008. We believe it
is possible to accelerate these dates by modifying the funding profile
for the project beginning in fiscal year 2005. The first cluster
milestone could be accelerated by 1 to 3 months, and the project
completion date could be accelerated by 3 to 5 months, by moving $59
million from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006.
Of the $59 million total, $27 million would be required in fiscal year
2005 and $32 million required in fiscal year 2006.
Please let me know if you would support such a change in the
funding profile in order to achieve the schedule acceleration
described. This would allow the ignition campaign to begin sooner and
support the goal of ignition in fiscal year 2010. I ask you to
recognize that if we must achieve the change within the FYNSP plans, it
will likely be at the expense of other activities which are vital to
the Stewardship mission. We will not proceed with additional planning
until we receive your input.
Senator Domenici. Now, I want to state, and then I yield
and will come back for a number of questions. I want to say,
you know how I feel right now, Dr. Beckner, is that I have been
hoodwinked. And not a little hoodwink, a big one. Because I
think what we are going to get out of this is a big civilian
tool that can be used at that laboratory for a lot of research.
And we are going to run around saying that is the best research
laser facility the world has ever seen. And I tell you, if I
see that coming, they better not be asking me for any money
because I would close it down. Because that is not fair. We
never intended to spend $5 to $6 billion to build a laser
facility for a laboratory that would provide civilian research
and visitations from around the world. So I know you all look
at this and say well, it is going to do something. And it is
sure going to be extraordinary. But that is not why I agreed to
pay for it.
Dr. Beckner. I understand.
Senator Domenici. I agreed in a very, very highly debated,
that this was going to reach ignition and that would be the
best part of science-based stewardship. Think of that. The best
part. Now right now we are moving with Z also.
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. And we are.
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. And nobody is going to stop us from doing
that. It may do three-quarters of the work but it is a little
tiny weeny $100 million project and it may do three-quarters of
your work, or more. So, in any event, we will make sure that
everybody understands that.
Now, Senator Bennett, you are next. We are going on time of
arrival, and then the Senator from California.
NUCLEAR TESTING
Senator Bennett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Brooks, I think I heard the answers to my questions
in your statement but let us go over them again so that they
are very clear.
There is a moratorium currently in place. Is that correct?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Bennett. And testing is not imminent, is that
correct?
Ambassador Brooks. That's correct.
Senator Bennett. You said that there is no anticipation of
testing at any foreseeable time in the future. Is that correct?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes.
Senator Bennett. None that you can now foresee?
Ambassador Brooks. That's correct.
Senator Bennett. And that the testing will not happen
unless the President makes a very public finding and the
Congress acts in funding that finding. Is that correct?
Ambassador Brooks. That's correct.
Senator Bennett. So the newspaper stories, I think I heard
you say, are not correct? That say that nuclear testing is now
imminent as a result of the vote we took last year?
Ambassador Brooks. I haven't seen stories that blamed me
for that one, but in any event, if there are such stories
they're not correct.
Senator Bennett. Not you, they blame us. So there is no
testing pending at the present time?
Ambassador Brooks. No sir.
Senator Bennett. Or in the future circumstances that you
currently can see?
Ambassador Brooks. No sir.
Senator Bennett. All right.
Ambassador Brooks. But I don't want to mislead the
committee. If I find a problem that can only be verified
through testing I would not hesitate to recommend to the
Secretary and he would not hesitate to recommend to the
President that we test. I have no reason to believe I'm going
to find that problem, but it is a hedge against the possibility
of finding that problem that we've asked for the money to
ensure that we are ready if that contingency occurs. We have no
reason to believe it's going to occur.
Senator Bennett. All right. Here is a postcard that is
currently circulating. I am sure you have seen it. I get copies
of it. I cannot respond to most of them because they do not put
return addresses on them, they just send them in. And it says,
for those that are not familiar with it, ``This is an
underground nuclear test.'' And it shows an obvious spew into
the atmosphere. Would you comment on that, because it has great
currency right now.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir. The United States started doing
only underground tests following the Limited Test Ban Treaty in
1963. In 1970, a test called Baneberry vented. That is to say,
although we thought it would all be contained, it was not.
Radioactivity was spread off the test site to an area north and
west of the site, all within Nevada; there was no radioactivity
above background levels detected in Utah, although there had,
obviously been fallout in Utah and indeed worldwide and from
the atmospheric tests of the 1950's and 1960's. After
Baneberry, we took a 6-month moratorium on underground tests.
Now, in the context of today, when we haven't tested for over
10 years, that doesn't sound like much but in the 1970's when
we had a very robust test program that was a significant step.
We made a number of both analytic and technical corrections.
What had happened was, there was a fissure, a crack in the
Earth that we had not detected. So first, we required that for
future tests we drill more exploratory holes to make sure we
find fissures. We put together an evaluation panel that
included both testing experts and geologic experts to evaluate
the containment design of each test and then we required that
those findings be peer-reviewed, in accordance with standard
scientific procedures. We set up a series of environmental
monitoring stations and those networks operated continuously.
Now, that was a long time ago. But we have not had a repeat
of Baneberry. We had some far less significant events, three I
believe, in the 20-some odd years following that, two of which
resulted in nothing leaving the test site. We are confident
that with the combination of the corrective actions we put in
place then and the greater scientific understanding that we
have now of geology and hydrology, and the greater formality
that we build into all aspects of nuclear safety, and the
funding that the Congress has given us in the last 2 years to
make sure we do careful safety analysis, that if, at some
future date, the President decides we need to do an underground
test there will be a policy debate, but there won't be any
public health issue because we are confident that we will make
sure that we do not have a repeat of that 1970 event.
Senator Bennett. So just to summarize what you have told
me, since this occurred in 1970, for the intervening quarter of
a century, there has never been a reoccurrence of something
like this postcard?
Ambassador Brooks. There certainly has been nothing like
that. As I said previously there has been minor venting, but
nothing like Baneberry.
Senator Bennett. How many tests are we talking about? If we
had three occasions, is that three out of thirty or?
Ambassador Brooks. Between 1970, in 22 years, oh, I don't
know. I'd have to give you that for the record, a couple
hundred.
Senator Bennett. Couple hundred?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir. Let me supply that for the
record to make sure I'm giving you the right answer.
NUCLEAR TESTS SINCE BANEBERRY
Senator Bennett. I would appreciate knowing that, for the
record, so that, we are within 1 percent?
Ambassador Brooks. I think so sir, yes sir.
Senator Bennett. And I would like to know the date of the
last one.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir. I'd be more than happy to
supply that.
[The information follows:]
There were 384 underground nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site
since the 1970 Baneberry test.
The last underground nuclear test was conducted at the Nevada Test
Site on September 23, 1992.
Senator Bennett. So that if it was 15 years ago there is a
little bit higher sense of confidence than if it was 5 years
ago, when the last leak.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Bennett. I would appreciate it.
Ambassador Brooks. It was more than 11 years ago because
we've done no testing in the last 11 years.
NUCLEAR RESEARCH
Senator Bennett. Okay. You say you want to do research,
that there is no pressing indication now that that research
would lead to testing, indeed, there is nothing you have in
your mind that would suggest that it would lead to testing. But
you want to do the research anyway. Are you aware of research
that is being done outside of the United States that you feel
you want to catch up with? Is that part of the impetus here?
Ambassador Brooks. There are multiple impetuses. We don't
want to be surprised by developments outside of the United
States. That's one reason for looking at advanced concepts and
making sure that you understand what the laws of physics will
allow. But I think we also want to make sure that we are paying
attention to maintaining the safety and reliability of the
existing stockpile. So I think there are multiple reasons why
we want to look. I don't rule out that someday the President
will want us to have a capability that we don't have. Nuclear
Earth Penetrator, in my view, both as a matter of practice and
as a matter of law, is a capability we sort of have now, we're
just trying to make it better. So that's a somewhat special
case. But the principle reason for advanced concepts and the
projects that we have looked at are primarily, I think,
motivated by making sure we're not overlooking an opportunity
to improve safety, security and reliability. There's a
secondary motivation to make sure that we are not subject to
technological surprise by someone outside this country. We know
that there is a vigorous program in Russia. We don't understand
everything we'd like to and I can't, in an open hearing go into
what we do understand. Some of the things they're doing we
don't completely understand so it would be useful to make sure
we understood the technology. But I think we're more motivated
by safety, security, and reliability than by sort of a
technological keeping up with others.
Senator Bennett. All right. But I want to get back to one
of the things you said when you outlined the reasons for
looking at existing warheads to see if they can be adapted.
Clear military utility would move only if the President
approves and Congress funds. And number three caught my
attention because I have not seen it before. Maybe I have not
been paying attention. When you say this is not a change in our
policy, that this is deterrence.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Bennett. If that is the case, that means, for
example, this would not have been used in Iraq. Let's assume
there was a circumstance where this particular weapon that you
are researching, or this adaptation, let me get the words
right, that this adaptation of a weapon that you are
researching, might strike the Joint Chiefs as being a good
weapon to use in Iraq. Under no circumstances would that be
considered a deterrent to anyone else who might attack us. So
you are saying it is the position of this administration that
the weapon would not be used in that circumstance, even if it
were available.
Ambassador Brooks. We have, as a matter of policy, in every
administration I am familiar with, been very careful not to
make dogmatic statements about what a President will or will
not do in support of national security. And I don't want to be
the one to break that tradition. Let me explain what I did
mean.
Senator Bennett. Okay. I will accept that. You do not need
to go any farther than that.
Ambassador Brooks. Okay.
Senator Bennett. But, just to make the comment, that if
indeed this President or some future President, we are going to
decide who is going to be President, come November, this
President or some future President were to come to Congress
while I was sitting in Congress and say, okay, we have done the
research, we think this is a viable weapon, we want now to fund
it and we are going to use it in a situation quite like Iraq,
this Senator would not vote in favor of that. My view of a
deterrent and the use of the nuclear stockpile through the Cold
War, is that it is never used unless the other side puts you in
a position where you do it. You never use it as an offensive
weapon, you never use it in order to project American power.
You use it held in reserve as part of the deterrent capacity of
the United States of America, which is the Polaris submarines
and their nuclear weapons and all of the rest of them. The
Polaris submarine has never fired a nuclear weapon in an
offensive way and it is there to say to a potential aggressor,
if you proceed with your aggression, this is what awaits you.
Ambassador Brooks. That's correct.
Senator Bennett. And just for the record, that is how I
would view, if such a weapon at some point by some future
President were ever proposed. In the context of what you have
said I would view that as having to have that same kind of
restriction that I currently see on Polaris weapons, Polaris
missiles and so on. I will not put you into that box. I
understand that you cannot make that firm statement because you
are a member of the administration. But I can make that
statement because I am answerable to the people of Utah, all of
whom have a very great concern, which I most thoroughly share,
that we do not want to disarm this country, we do not want to
do anything that will harm our national security. But in the
end we want to make sure that as we move down the road to
protect our national security we do not, in any way, endanger
the health and safety of any of our citizens, regardless of the
state in which they live. I am assuming you could support that.
Ambassador Brooks. I'm confident I can speak for the
President on this one. We agree with that. We have no interest
in harming the health and safety of anybody, sir.
Senator Bennett. We just may give you a little help
legislatively at some future point. I have not made up my mind
firmly as to what I might do in terms of legislation that I
will offer. But I appreciate your assurance and we want to do
everything we can on this side to make sure that that assurance
is not forgotten by whomever replaces you in whatever kind of
administration that might come along.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Senator. I do not know how
long you are going to stick around but I have some different
views than you. I am not going to make them until it is my
turn. Senator?
ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Brooks, I just want to get some of the figures. I
think we have anticipated that the Nuclear Earth Penetrator
figure, 5-year figure, is $484 million. Does that take us up to
phase 6.3?
Ambassador Brooks. Actually I think it takes us beyond 6.3.
So those numbers assume decisions we can't make without your
permission.
Senator Feinstein. Okay, at 6.3, according to the Defense
Authorization Bill, the Earth Penetrator needs authorization
from Congress?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes ma'am.
FUNDING SCHEDULE FOR DIRECTED STOCKPILE WORK
Senator Feinstein. So it is somewhere, I would like to know
for the record, how much will be spent up to that point. What
is the 5-year figure on the battlefield low-yield nuclear
weapons?
Ambassador Brooks. Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Well, give me the advance concepts.
Ambassador Brooks. Do you remember? Is it $9 million a
year?
Senator Feinstein. Number for 5 years?
Dr. Beckner. I think it actually goes a bit beyond that.
Ambassador Brooks. I'll get it for the record, Senator.
[The information follows:]
FUNDING SCHEDULE BY ACTIVITY
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2003 2004 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directed Stockpile Work:
Stockpile Services Advanced Concepts........................ .............. 6,000 9,000
Stockpile Services Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.......... 14,577 7,435 27,557
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FYNSP SCHEDULE
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal FYNSP
Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stockpile Services Advanced Concepts.......... 9,000 14,425 14,874 14,595 29,472 82,366
Stockpile Services Robust Nuclear Earth 27,557 94,955 145,371 128,431 88,416 484,730
Penetrator Research and Development..........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FUNDING SCHEDULE FOR PIT MANUFACTURING AND CERTIFICATION CAMPAIGN
Senator Feinstein. Okay. And the 5-year figure for the pit
facilities.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes ma'am. May I get that for the record
as well? Although I may have that here.
[The information follows:]
FUNDING SCHEDULE BY ACTIVITY
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2003 2004 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign Modern Pit Facility 4,242 10,810 29,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FYNSP SCHEDULE
[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal FYNSP
Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign 29,800 43,291 94,570 101,434 105,168 374,263
Modern Pit Facility..........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Feinstein. Okay. Now, as I understand it, the
Advanced Weapons Concept will not require Congressional
approval prior to going into the engineering phase. Is that
correct?
Ambassador Brooks. I'm always reluctant to give away
prerogatives but I didn't think so.
Senator Feinstein. Defense Authorization Bill, page 855.
Ambassador Brooks. I mean.
Senator Feinstein. And it is just the, unfortunately, just
the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.
Ambassador Brooks. The Advanced Concepts work is really
less far along. I mean, as a practical matter for us to take
something that came out of an Advanced Concept and do something
significant with it, at a minimum we would require
Congressional line-item funding. Whether we would need, I mean,
you're correct that the National Defense authorization bill
speaks specifically of 6.3, other legislation speaks of
production. That unambiguously requires a separate decision by
Congress. If you're asking a technical, legal question I'd like
to get back to you for the record. If you're asking a practical
question, of course nothing that we do in Advanced Concepts can
move into any sort of meaningful program without the Congress
because we have to come back to you for money.
Senator Feinstein. I am trying to find out is how much are
we going to spend, up to the point of engineering build on
these programs. What is the total 5-year cost up to that point
of these three programs, RNEP, Advanced Concepts, Pit?
Ambassador Brooks. All right. May I provide that for the
record to make sure I'm precise?
[Clerk's Note.--See preceding tables.]
Senator Feinstein. I would appreciate it. Now, we have
discussed this and----
Senator Domenici. Senator, would you yield for a moment?
Senator Feinstein. Of course.
Senator Domenici. First step, I would like to make the
point and seek your thoughts, Senator. Here we have the
Penetrator and whatever we are doing with reference to its
research, and we are going to look carefully at building a
plant to make pits. If this idea had never been invented we
would still be doing this.
Senator Feinstein. You mean the pit?
Senator Domenici. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. Yes.
Senator Domenici. It has nothing to do with it.
Senator Feinstein. To field old warheads that are in stock,
right.
Senator Domenici. Yes. So, you know, when we talk about and
add them up, the public assumes that they are in some way
related so that all this money that we're spending for the Pit
is related to this work for the Penetrator, they are unrelated.
I mean, you are out there thinking about how many more years
can we not have a Pit, right? It has nothing to do with whether
we build Penetrators, right?
Ambassador Brooks. That's correct.
Senator Feinstein. You are correct, Mr. Chairman, as
always. However, there is one thing. The money for the Pit is
huge. And it is based on 450.
Senator Domenici. Correct. It might be too much.
Senator Feinstein. And it may well be very much too much
because a study has not been completed yet to let us know
whether it is 30 or 40 years or whatever we would need the Pit.
Ambassador Brooks. May I make a correction?
Senator Feinstein. Of course, please.
Ambassador Brooks. We are required, under the National
Environmental Policy Act, and we do an analysis, we have to be
able to look everybody in the eye and say there's no plausible
alternative that has been excluded. So, the Environmental
Impact Statement that we've now suspended work on, analyzes
between a capability of 125 pits a year and 450 pits a year. I
think it would be, I don't want to prejudge decisions that
haven't been made, but it's very hard for me to see, based on
what we know, that we're going to be anywhere near that upper
limit. But I've got to make sure that the analysis is broad
enough, because if there's an option that's outside this
analysis, I'm in violation of the law because I haven't
examined all analyses. So I would urge you not to look at the
upper limit of what we're analyzing under the National
Environmental Policy Act and assume that that's a program. The
lower level is probably roughly right. I could explain why now
but it would be easier if you'd let me send you a paper.
Senator Feinstein. I would appreciate that. For somebody
like me, when you indicate a capacity of 450 pits, you send a
major signal that a whole major new program is going into
place. At 125, it may be a servicing unit, you know, based on
what you need to do to replenish and fix old stock. But I am
very suspicious. I think I know where you are going and I think
it is a wolf in sheep's clothing. I think to spend all this
money on the Nuclear Earth Penetrator, which as I understand it
will produce 1.5 million tons of radioactive debris that is
going to spew out with no present way of controlling it is
beyond sanity. I mean, I do not know why anyone would even want
to do that.
FALLOUT
Let me ask you this: is there any known way, from a physics
point of view, because I have spent some time now, with Dr.
Drell, of containing the radioactive fallout from 100 kiloton
nuclear bunker buster?
Ambassador Brooks. There's no way that I know of. I don't
know of anyone in the administration who advocates that and
nothing in our proposal for the Earth Penetrator or for the
previous B61-11, which was the previous administration's less
robust penetrator, was ever intended to suggest that you can
contain fallout; you can't. I have no idea how you would do
that. And, as I think you and I have discussed before, if I
have said or anyone in this administration has said, anything
that suggests that we believe that nuclear use is anything
other than absolutely horrible and a decision a President would
only take in the most severe circumstances, then we have
misspoken. The issue that we have is, there are facilities in
the world that are beyond our ability to threaten except with
nuclear weapons. We think it is possible that the country may
decide it wants to threaten those facilities anyhow. We think
we ought to spend some money to find out if this country can
have that option by finding out whether I can take an existing
weapon and threaten those facilities.
Senator Feinstein. All right. Just for the sake. But you
know you cannot contain the fallout.
Ambassador Brooks. That's correct.
Senator Feinstein. And you know how big you have got to get
to get down deep enough let alone have the sufficient casing to
enable the weapon to go down that deep. Therefore you are going
to have tremendous radioactivity.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. So why does it become even a viable
option? If used in North Korea you jeopardize Japan, you
jeopardize South Korea. Who in their right mind would ever do
this?
Senator Domenici. Senator, would you yield?
Senator Feinstein. Of course.
Senator Domenici. Senator, the problem with the argument
is, I have heard you here and I do not think you are for
disarmament, are you, of our nuclear weapons? Do you want to
get rid of them all?
Senator Feinstein. Well, I will tell you, I am for no first
use.
Senator Domenici. That is not my question. Do you want us
to have some or not have some?
Senator Feinstein. I am not for the Nuclear Posture Review.
You asked a question.
Senator Domenici. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. That cites seven nations against whom we
would countenance a first use of nuclear weapons. I am not for
that.
Senator Domenici. I understand.
Senator Feinstein. Therefore, when we are going to spend a
half-a-billion dollars up to engineering to develop a 100-
kiloton nuclear bunker buster, which you cannot contain the
radiation, I have got to wonder well, who is smoking something?
Why are we doing this if you cannot contain the radiation?
Senator Domenici. Senator, I do not know who is smoking it,
but let me tell you. There is more radiation exposure,
uncontrollable, from existing nuclear weapons than from the
underground bunker possibility. So the logic is, we should not
have any of those because there is no way to control a nuclear
explosion, the radioactivity, from the hydrogen bombs we have.
And I do not know today how many we have but down from many
thousands to a controllable number. But the issue is not an
issue of damaging the world. Because if that is the issue, we
have got to get rid of all of our nuclear weapons in the event
that we are saying we do not want to harm anything. They are
there so that nobody will ever use them. That is why they are
there.
Senator Feinstein. But that is not the issue. The issue is,
these are new classes of nuclear weapons.
Senator Domenici. But the argument that they are going to
pollute the world more than the weapons we have is not a valid
argument. The rest of your arguments are valid but not the
pollution argument.
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
Senator Feinstein. You were out of the room when Senator
Bennett made a very interesting point, and the point was one of
deterrence, and what is, in effect, a deterrent. And a nuclear
arsenal of missiles may well be some form of deterrent. A
nuclear Earth Bunker Buster, I do not see as a deterrent. And
if we are going to build tactical battlefield nuclear weapons,
God help our sons and daughters that go on that battlefield. So
I become very upset. And Ambassador, you say the included out-
year funds are only to preserve a President's option. And then,
if you think about the option, how would a President ever, ever
say, use a 100-kiloton--Hiroshima was 15 kilotons--use a 100-
kiloton nuclear Earth Penetrator and have no way to control the
nuclear fallout, the radioactive fallout?
Ambassador Brooks. May I try it?
Senator Feinstein. Of course.
Ambassador Brooks. First of all, part of the problem in
open hearings is that we can't talk about specific yields. But
let me just make the technical point that if there is a bunker
that you want to hold at risk, it takes far more energy if it
bursts in the air to hold that at risk than it does if you can
get it just a little way into the ground. So it is quite
possible that a penetrator can be of lower yields. But the more
general point, I think, is the problem we've always had with
nuclear deterrence, Senator. On the one hand, nobody can think
of a situation in which a rational human being would want to
use nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in order to deter, we
have to tell people who think differently than we that if they
did something that was so serious that it would warrant
retaliation, we're capable of doing it. It is the case that
increasingly, we believe, facilities can be put where we cannot
reach them with existing nuclear or conventional capabilities.
It is the case, we believe, that at least some dictators--I
don't want to suggest any country, I would simply point out
that the popular countries to talk about lately are countries
in which it's clear the leadership, whatever else they value,
doesn't care about the suffering of their people. And their
people are, in fact, victims. So we need to be able to tell
those leaders there is nothing you can do that is beyond the
reach of American power. And, a whole different Department is
spending a whole different set of money on working to improve
that. My job is to say, suppose conventional doesn't work, can
we do something with a nuclear weapon and then, if we can, then
there's the question is it worth both the financial and the
policy cost? It's a perfectly fair debate but I guess I don't
accept the view that it's only worth spending this money if
we're prepared, as soon as we have this, to go out and start
using it casually. I think this is an example of improving the
deterrent, just like the various things, many of them
contentious at the time, that we did during the Cold War, as an
example, of improving deterrent.
Senator Feinstein. I will not belabor it. I appreciate the
time. I profoundly differ with you.
Senator Domenici. You what?
Senator Feinstein. I profoundly differ. I think morally,
ethically, to create weapon systems that are so bizarre and so
catastrophic goes beyond the moral code. I really do.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes ma'am, with the greatest respect,
and I think to have only the ability to destroy cities and kill
people has its own set of problems.
Senator Domenici. Let us proceed. Let us make sure we
understand here where some of us are. But I am profoundly
concerned if we have nuclear weapons at all. I wish we could
get rid of them all. I wish we could find a way that we do not
need them and that we could prove that nobody else would ever
have them, which is going to be the issue, so that we could get
rid of them. I am terribly concerned that the damage that one
of them might do, that we do have, and I am not supporting
anything, ever, that says we should have more nuclear weapons
in our arsenal. I should not say ever but right now we are
building them down, not upward. In fact, we are having a
terrible time building them down as fast as we can because we
cannot get rid of the pollution that is coming out of them. I
mean, we cannot get rid of plutonium fast enough as we destroy
Russian nuclear weapons. We cannot find a way to do it. You are
in charge of one now, we cannot even get them to agree on
something so we can get rid of them, right?
MOX
I am going to just close by saying the biggest change in
American policy, overruling policy since President Carter said
we will build a MOX refinery in America. And we had said no,
never, never. He said, we will build it if the Russians will
build it because we will both get rid of plutonium that way.
Right?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. So we made a profound change in our
policy. I would have never been against the MOX but I mean, the
President's decided against it, I would give you the reasons, I
think you would not agree that his reasons were right. The
reason was to build MOX you enhanced the production of fissile
material to produce bombs. Turned out nobody in the world ever
did it, so probably the fear was not there. So here we come
along and what changes it? The Russians change it because they
are going to do it, we say we will do it. Now we cannot get it
done because we cannot get an agreement, right? That is a tough
one for you.
Ambassador Brooks. That's right, sir.
Senator Domenici. Okay. So, I am on the side of trying to
get rid of this stuff. I do not want them to use it again, I do
not want us running around, leaking around, being transferred
around. So, my record is pretty good on that.
Now, I want to just be parochial and I want to tell you
that I do not like the idea of the Los Alamos schools being
treated differently all of a sudden than they have been for a
long time. If you want to treat them differently, Mr.
Ambassador, then we ought to start treating them differently
and give them an opportunity to be treated differently over a
long period of time. Either buy them out or something be done
elsewhere but just say this year they do not get funded and so
you did not put it in the budget, you know I have to find it
somewhere so I will. But I am just telling you I do not think
it is the right way to do it. And you have to get a team and
let us get started finding out how do we solve this problem,
not just the budget issue.
Z MACHINE
The Z Machine, very quickly, I just want to make sure that
I am correct, that it is being maintained and the little bit of
money that is needed for it is going to be there and that is
moving ahead?
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. And everybody is satisfied with its
performance?
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. Is it a good piece of equipment for the
price?
Dr. Beckner. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. Will not take the place of what we
expected NIF to do, right?
Dr. Beckner. No sir. It is not of adequate size to do that.
Senator Domenici. But if NIF fails it may do what a failed
NIF will do?
Dr. Beckner. That's a possibility and we certainly intend
to continue to support that program and to have milestones in
that program so that we can measure its progress.
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
Senator Domenici. Mr. Longsworth, have you read the ``Wall
Street Journal'' article, how the Pakistani nuclear ring
managed to skirt export laws?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes, I have.
Senator Domenici. Are you receiving adequate international
cooperation in stopping the activities outlined in this
article?
Mr. Longsworth. We are working very diligently on that. In
fact, we've asked for an increase in our budget this year to
address those kinds of issues.
Senator Domenici. You haven't got everything you need yet?
Mr. Longsworth. Well, we hope to if we get this increase
we've asked for in our budget, yes sir.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Ambassador, what is the likelihood
that the liability issue will be resolved in a timely fashion
so we can move ahead with construction so we can get rid of
some of that plutonium that is sitting around in Russia and
America?
Ambassador Brooks. I am hopeful that we will get it
resolved soon but the last 12 years have told me predicting
Russia is risky. And I just don't know. The problem is not in
this country; the problem is in the Russian Federation.
Senator Domenici. Okay. So it is high enough that we ought
to encourage our President, if we can, to ask the Kremlin to
get with it on this one?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. This Libya situation. We added $5
million, I think, in the Senate to initiatives focused on
removing nuclear weapons useable material from volatile sites
around the world. I understand your office was able to make use
of this earmark to quickly respond in the Libyan situation?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes sir. Let me just say, we would not have
been able to respond quickly without that authorization.
Senator Domenici. I am glad we did it. The role your office
and the Department played in removing the nuclear materials,
can you explain that in a minute or two?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes sir. We had three missions into and out
of Libya. The first mission was using the money you just
referred to to immediately remove the core of their nuclear
weapons capability; their nuclear fuel cycle capability. We
removed key components, not all of the components, but the
components that would, if we had not been invited back, have
posed the most serious proliferation concern. The second
shipment was a fairly large shipment which has just arrived
back in the United States of the remaining centrifuge parts.
The third shipment was to remove the HEU fuel, fresh fuel, from
the Tajura reactor. That was sent back to the Russian
Federation. That material was under IAEA safeguards, so it was
accounted for and they were legally allowed to have it, but
they agreed to remove it at our request and it went back to
Russia. It will be recycled back into civilian low-enriched
fuel.
Senator Domenici. Good. Well, Senator, do you have any
other questions?
Senator Feinstein. I have one quick question. When we
discussed, and I will just put it in a general category, the
warhead redesign, the general fixing that may have to be done,
does that come out of any of these programs' budget? The
Advanced Concepts, the Pit, the Earth Penetrator?
Mr. Longsworth. If we look at problems with fixing an
existing warhead that's usually done as part of the Life
Extension Program, which is a separate line item.
Senator Feinstein. That is in another?
Mr. Longsworth. Yes ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. So nothing in this goes for that?
Mr. Longsworth. In general that's correct, ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Domenici. That is a very good hearing because you
came. Thank you.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Senator Domenici. We will have another big fight, huh?
Senator Feinstein. Oh, I welcome it.
Senator Domenici. The thing is, we get a second round, they
may win it before.
Senator Feinstein. You never know, you never know.
Senator Domenici. See and then ours might not be terribly
relevant because they already won in Armed Services. If they
lose----
Senator Feinstein. Well, we will try with the House.
Senator Domenici. We lose in Armed Services we are in
terrible shape. You will win.
NUCLEAR STOCKPILE REPORT
Nuclear Stockpile Report.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. Mr. Ambassador, I noted in the opening
statement that you talked about it and I am very disappointed
that the Departments of Defense and Energy have not produced
the Stockpile Report as requested. I think the distinguished
Senator who is here because of what she worries about, ought to
be very concerned that we do not have that report. Priorities
of the future seem to be very much dependent upon it. So, Mr.
Ambassador, it is the fault of the government of the United
States that we do not have it, right?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. Should have been done.
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. Will it be done?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes sir.
Senator Domenici. When?
Ambassador Brooks. I don't know.
Senator Domenici. Well, that is not good enough.
Ambassador Brooks. I don't want to make promises to the
Senator that I can't keep.
Senator Domenici. Okay. But give me some talk. Are you
working on it? Who is holding it up?
Ambassador Brooks. The Secretary of Defense said it would
be submitted in the spring. Spring started 2 days ago. It is
being worked on, literally, as we speak, but because of the
importance I think this will have to be personally approved by
the President and I can't predict how long that will take.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Domenici. Okay. I am going to wrap up the hearing
in just a minute. And Senators that are here or not here that
want to submit questions, please do so. Thank you.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
REVISED NUCLEAR STOCKPILE PLAN
Question. I noted in my opening statement, I am disappointed that
the Department of Defense and Department of Energy have not produced
the stockpile report requested in the fiscal year 2004 Energy and Water
Development bill. I believe this report is critical in establishing the
priorities of the administration. This report was requested to be
delivered with the President's budget. However, that deadline has come
and gone and we still don't have our report. When do you expect that
this committee will receive a copy of this report?
Answer. The Departments of Defense and Energy understand the
importance of completing this plan promptly and providing it to the
Congress. Both departments are working together to complete this
complex task. I anticipate that the plan will be forwarded to the Hill
in the Spring.
Question. We are beginning to put together our budget priorities
and the failure to produce the report will have significant
consequences for your budget priorities. Will you convey that message
back to the Department?
Answer. Yes, sir. I have already done so.
ROBUST NUCLEAR EARTH PENETRATOR
Question. I was surprised to see in the budget request that nearly
$500 million is provided for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)
in out-year funding. I believe many members are concerned that you have
already made a decision on the need for this type of weapon without any
input from Congress. Would you like to clarify what the President's
budget provides for this project and outline the role Congress will
play in the future development of this weapon?
Answer. We have not decided whether to proceed with the Robust
Nuclear Earth Penetrator beyond the 6.2/2A study that is currently
underway. Our fiscal year 2006-2009 funding estimates are only
placeholders within the FYNSP, based on predecisional data and in no
way represent a signal that we intend to proceed with the RNEP. That
study will be competed by the end of fiscal year 2006, and will cost an
estimated $71 million from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006.
Consistent with section 3143 of the fiscal year 2003 National
Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 108-314, and section 3117 of the
fiscal year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 108-
136, the administration may request congressional approval to proceed
with phase 6.3 (engineering development) in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2007. This request is contingent on the identification of a
feasible and affordable design using either the B61 or B83; the
determination by the Department of Defense that the design meets
military requirements; and the approval of the joint DOD/DOE Nuclear
Weapons Council.
SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY
Question. Ambassador Brooks the new Design Basis Threat has
elevated the security requirements at DOE and NNSA sites. The
President's budget requests a $106.9 million increase (8.6 percent) in
the Safeguards and Security budget. As a result of the increased
security requirements, we are able to spend less on important research.
TA-18 in Los Alamos is a good example of the need for the NNSA to
consolidate the special nuclear material in safer, better defended
areas. I would like the NNSA to undertake a study that will be the
basis for a plan to develop a clear understanding of our future
security needs and the benefit of consolidating the special nuclear
material across the complex. Can you do this study and report to me on
your findings?
Answer. We have already begun the study you requested on the
benefits of consolidating nuclear materials with a focus on security.
This effort is being conducted jointly by the NNSA and the Office of
the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and Environment and should be
completed in Fall 2004. I will provide you with the report of this
effort by December 31, 2004. We're also not waiting for the results of
the reports to take action to consolidate nuclear materials as we
identify opportunities to do so for increased security, on efficiency
of security arrangements.
Question. How are you planning to handle the transfer of TA-18 at
Los Alamos?
Answer. The Secretary has directed the NNSA to begin a near term
shipping campaign that will move approximately 50 percent of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory Technical Area (TA-18) Category I and II
Special Nuclear Material to Nevada. This campaign will begin in
September and last approximately 18 months. NNSA will immediately start
preparing the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) to support storage of
these nuclear materials while scheduling packaging and transportation
resources. The movement of these materials will be handled by NNSA's
Office of Secure Transportation. In parallel, the design modifications
to DAF to assume program responsibilities will continue, and the
modifications will be made in the next several years to receive the
additional material to support the associated missions.
Question. What is the timetable for this decision?
Answer. We will begin the shipping campaign this September. Between
now and then Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Office of Secure
Transportation and Nevada personnel will identify, characterize and
pack materials in approved shipping containers for transfer to the
Device Assembly Facility in Nevada.
Question. If TA-18 is moved from Los Alamos, will Los Alamos still
maintain the mission associated with this facility?
Answer. Yes, Los Alamos will continue to perform the vital Category
I and II mission work associated with TA-18 at the Device Assembly
Facility at the Nevada Test Site. LANL will retain security Category
III and IV missions at Los Alamos and TA-18 program personnel will
remain on-site. These people will relocate to DAF, as necessary to
conduct experiments with Category I and II materials. Experiments with
Category III and IV will occur at another LANL location. NNSA and LANL
are working to identify locations for these activities and will issue a
separate ROD pending completion of this assessment.
LOS ALAMOS SCHOOLS
Question. I would like an answer as to why the budget has failed to
provide the necessary and authorized funding for the Los Alamos School
system. You may be interested to know that the $8 million that has been
included in previous budgets makes up a third of the total school
budget. I would also point that many of the scientists who support your
stewardship programs also have strong views about the education of
their children. If you hope to continue to recruit top people to this
Lab, this funding will help achieve your goal. What was the
justification for not funding the Los Alamos Schools or the Los Alamos
Foundation?
Answer. I understand and appreciate the importance that a high
quality education system provides for the recruitment and retention of
quality scientists and engineers at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The
administration however doesn't feel that the President's budget for
stockpile stewardship activities is the proper funding vehicle for this
activity. NNSA recently submitted a report to the Congress on Los
Alamos schools and funding options that could take the place of the
annual authorization and appropriations approach. Option 1 would rely
on the State of New Mexico and the citizens of Los Alamos County to
ensure that adequate funding is available for the schools. Option 2
would reestablish a charitable foundation funded by annual
appropriations for a limited period of time so that Los Alamos Schools
would receive approximately $8 million annually from the endowment.
Finally, Option 3 would allow the M&O contractor for LANL to support
the school system by modifying the provisions in Appendix N of the
contract. Currently under Appendix N, Los Alamos provides a few million
dollars to the school systems in the vicinity of Los Alamos County.
RUSSIAN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU)
Question. Mr. Longsworth, the administration has consistently
identified the need to reduce the hundreds of metric tons of Highly
Enriched Uranium stocks in the Russian Federation as a critical part of
our non-proliferation efforts. In fiscal year 2003, the committee
provided $14 million for the Accelerated Materials Disposition (AMD)
Program to meet those commitments. However, no progress has been made
since that appropriation and your fiscal year 2005 request eliminates
funding for the AMD Program. Therefore, the only current U.S./Russian
program to address the dangerous stockpiles of HEU is the existing HEU
agreement and the research reactor initiatives. This later projects
result in the equivalent of one-tenth of a metric ton per year.
Unfortunately, this will not have the address the long-term strategic
objectives of HEU disposition. Has the administration abandoned its
efforts to accelerate reduction in Russian HEU stockpiles beyond what
is covered in the HEU deal?
Answer. No, the administration has not abandoned its efforts to
accelerate the reduction of Russian HEU stockpiles. Several initiatives
were identified by the Experts Group on Nuclear Materials, with two
initiatives approved for immediate action that are being pursued: (1)
Purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from HEU to be used as a
U.S. strategic LEU reserve, and (2) Purchase of HEU for use in U.S.
research reactors. We have been pursuing these initiatives with varied
success, and some progress has been made.
For the first initiative, we have been advocating expansion of the
HEU disposition from Russia by blending down additional HEU to LEU and
then using this LEU to establish a U.S. Strategic LEU Reserve so as not
to adversely affect the current enrichment market. Because of House
budget concerns regarding the up-front cost of the strategic reserve
approach, Congress did not fund this initiative in fiscal year 2004.
Following the guidance of the Appropriations Committee, the funding for
these initiatives has been subsumed into the base program for Reactor
Fuel return. Concurrently, in order to address Congressional concerns,
DOE is developing a more comprehensive approach that would make these
initiatives acceptable as separate line items. As part of this
development, we are also addressing the long-term strategic objective
that Ambassador Brooks has requested that includes both a follow-on
strategy for negotiating the extension of the HEU purchase agreement
beyond 2013 as well as interim strategies for expanding beyond the 500
MTs included in the current agreement.
With respect to the second initiative, the contract with the
Russians for the purchase of HEU for the research reactor initiative
has been negotiated with only two points of contention remaining: (1)
the price to be paid for the HEU material; and (2) transportation
method. The price problem exits because there is no commercial market
basis for HEU sales that can be used to establish a fair price.
Currently negotiations are underway to establish a fair price. The
transportation concerns should be resolved without much delay once
price is agreed upon.
In addition to the specific purchase contract for HEU for U.S.
research reactors, we are still engaging the Russians in developing the
framework for accelerated disposition of HEU in the form of a
Memorandum of Understanding that would act as an umbrella agreement for
additional purchases or other initiatives. It should be noted that, in
addition to our direct actions on these initiatives, we are also
cooperating with and providing appropriate support to other
organizations to engage the Russians in identifying other options that
are acceptable both to the Russian Federation and the United States.
As you can see, we have not abandoned our efforts to accelerate
reduction of Russian HEU stockpiles, but we have encountered obstacles
associated with the economics of these approaches that we are working
to resolve. We appreciate the continued support of Congress in these
endeavors.
In addition to the two programs you have mentioned, my office also
includes the Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) Project, which
supports the conversion of HEU, which is not from weapons, to LEU. This
HEU is excess to the needs of the sites where it is currently located
and is transferred to one of two down blending sites in Russia for
conversion to LEU. The MCC Project began in fiscal year 1999 and to
date has supported the down blending of almost 5 metric tons of HEU. We
are currently engaging the Russian Federation in discussions to
increase the rate of conversion under the MCC Project.
Question. Could more be done to remove more HEU material from
poorly defended facilities in Russia?
Answer. Yes, more can be done to remove additional HEU material
from poorly defended facilities in Russia. One part of this effort
would be to attempt to purchase more material. This aspect was
discussed in the previous question.
The MPC&A and MCC programs are other avenues that could be
followed. The MCC Project was designed to support the transfer of HEU
from less secure sites in Russia to more secure sites and to down blend
that material to LEU. We are actively engaged with the Russian
Federation to try to accelerate that process.
MOX PROGRAM
Question. I am deeply concerned about the future of the Russian/
U.S. MOX program that will remove 34 metric tons of plutonium from the
respective stockpiles. I have personally contacted Secretary Powell to
urge the State Department to find an acceptable resolution in order to
keep this program on track.
It is my understanding that negotiations regarding the liability
concerns have yet to be resolved. What is the likelihood that the
liability issue will be resolved in a timely fashion allowing the
construction of the Russian and U.S. facilities to go forward in the
near future?
Answer. The United States and Russia have yet to resolve liability
protections that will be needed for the U.S. Government and its
contractors for plutonium disposition work in Russia. If this issue
cannot be resolved in the near future, the start of construction of the
Russian MOX program will be further delayed. Because the United States
and Russian programs are to proceed in parallel, any further delays in
the Russian effort will mean additional delays in the U.S. program as
well. However, this would in no way indicate a lessening of the
administration commitment to this effort.
Question. How will the recent reelection of President Putin affect
these negotiations?
Answer. Given that President Putin will not fully stand-up his new
government until May 7, it is too early to comment definitively on how
the reorganization of the Russian Government will affect these
negotiations.
Question. Ambassador Brooks, are you aware of any changes within
the administration including the State Department or within the White
House that might indicate a change in policy or a reluctance to
finalize this deal?
Answer. I believe that the administration is committed to moving
forward with this important nonproliferation program. The liability
issue is being addressed at the highest levels of the government.
LOWER LIABILITY STANDARD
Question. I understand that Russia has signed a liability agreement
with our G-8 partners that does not provide the same level of
protection as the United States is seeking as part of the Cooperative
Threat Reduction plan. How is this affecting the negotiations?
Answer. Russia and some of our G-8 partners have accepted, in
another context, a less comprehensive liability provision than what the
United States has under the Cooperative Threat Reduction plan.
Specifically, this provision does not cover the liability of an
individual who intentionally causes a nuclear accident or the liability
resulting from a non-nuclear accident. Russia has been insisting on a
similar reduced scope for the liability provisions for the MOX program.
EMERGING THREAT--PAKISTAN
Question. The Nonproliferation budget seems to assume a general
status quo in future funding. It reflects an expectation that our
primary nonproliferation concern will remain Russia and its former
republics. However, in light of the news over the past several months
regarding Libya, Iran and Pakistan, are you concerned that this budget
places too great a focus on Russian stockpiles and doesn't adequately
fund efforts to address proliferation in other countries?
Answer. The budget appropriately focuses on Russia where most of
the weapons-usable material of proliferation concern is located.
However, it also includes funds for activities in other countries. As
those latter activities develop we will revisit the appropriate balance
between work in Russia and work outside of the former Soviet Union
(FSU).
Question. Does this budget adequately provide for this new reality
and how will your office respond to these threats?
Answer. We are working very carefully to develop prudent and
effective activities that address proliferation concerns outside of the
FSU, and will carefully monitor these activities to ensure that they
are adequately funded.
Question. Would additional resources accelerate your ability to
contain the emerging proliferation threats?
Answer. As our work outside of the FSU develops, we will certainly
keep you informed about its progress and whether additional funding
would be helpful. We will continue to work with the administration and
Congress to assess priorities and develop budgets.
Question. Mr. Longsworth, on the front page of the Wall Street
Journal this morning is an article that explains how Pakistani
officials were able to avoid export laws that prohibit the sale of
material and technology that can be used in the development of nuclear
weapons. This article details a very complicated scheme that took
advantage of weak export controls in various countries to avoid
detection. It is obvious from this article your job of tracking and
preventing the proliferation of technology and material is a terrific
challenge.
Mr. Longsworth, have you read this article and do you agree with
the characterization of the Pakistani efforts?
Answer. Yes. It is a fair characterization of what occurred, as far
as we know it. Though it's clear that A.Q. Khan was deeply involved
with the procurement and supply effort, it is not known if his actions
were in some way associated with his official duties or if he was
abusing his official position, knowledge, and connections for personal
benefit only. In any event, the United States and Pakistan are now
dismantling the A.Q. Khan network responsible for proliferating nuclear
weapons-related technologies, and we are working with our interagency
colleagues and Pakistan on steps to bring its export control system in
line with international standards.
Question. Also, are you receiving adequate international
cooperation in stopping the activities outlined in this article?
Answer. Yes. We have underway an increasingly coordinated
international effort to detect and destroy these proliferation
networks. We are working in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to tighten up
controls on sensitive materials and technologies. We are also working
on enhanced targeting techniques and more in-depth training of
inspection and enforcement personnel and conducting more industry
outreach to sensitize the private sector on the importance of some of
these technologies.
In addition, we have recently started export control assistance to
the government of Pakistan.
LIBYA
Question. Last year the Senate added $5 million for initiatives
focused on removing nuclear weapons-usable material from vulnerable
sites around the world. I understand that your office was able to make
use of this earmark to quickly respond to Libya's decision to open
their weapons program to outside review. Please explain the role your
office and the Department of Energy played in removing the nuclear
threat from Libya.
Answer. The Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) is participating in an interagency effort to
remove materials and equipment from Libya and assist the Libyan
government with its efforts to eliminate its weapons of mass
destruction programs. We have been involved in three removal missions
to date. For the first two missions, a U.S. team composed of
representatives from DOE/NNSA headquarters staff, our National
Laboratories, and the interagency community helped remove nuclear
materials, equipment (such as finished components for centrifuges,
specialized materials and manufacturing equipment for centrifuge
construction, as well as components for a uranium conversion facility),
and highly sensitive nuclear weapons design documents from Libya.
The third mission in Libya repatriated to Russia approximately 17kg
of unirradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel from a research
reactor in Libya. Coordinated with the Russian Federation and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Russian Research
Reactor Fuel Return program, this effort has been, and continues to be,
a crucial part of our efforts to secure at-risk weapons usable nuclear
materials around the world.
The funding Congress provided to NNSA was critical for our work in
Libya. It gave my organization the flexibility and capability needed to
support the mission to assist Libya in its effort to rid itself of
weapons of mass destruction and the ability to create them. We continue
to need authority and flexibility to carry out our mission outside the
former Soviet Union and not constrain our ability to address the
threats at targets of opportunity.
This swift movement suggests the seriousness with which the U.S.
Government treats proliferation threats. Congressional support is
fundamental to the success of these efforts. The expedited removal of
this material from Libya certainly advanced the U.S. national security
goals and represents a tremendous success for our nonproliferation
efforts.
RUSSIA--UNCOSTED BALANCE & ACCESS ISSUES
Question. It appears from your budget that there remain large
amounts of uncosted balances associated with the Russian programs. I
assume that these balances remain due to the fact that your Russian
counterparts are unenthusiastic about allowing U.S. teams in to either
dispose of or secure their precious nuclear stockpile. A GAO report
from last year noted that DOE was having better luck than DOD in
gaining access to sites that contain special nuclear material. Has
there been any improvement with relations that will allow you to secure
Russian material?
Answer. We have made significant progress with the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy (MinAtom), especially at ``civilian'' facilities with
less stringent access restrictions imposed by MinAtom. Barring any
unanticipated delays, we expect to complete the security upgrade phase
of our cooperation at four sites within the next 16 months Novosibirsk
Chemical Concentrates Plant (NCCP), Institute of Physics and Power
Engineering (IPPE), Research Institute for Atomic Reactors (RIAR),
Lytkarino. This will mark a significant step forward for our program.
We are making progress at some of these sites--contracts for
upgrades have and will continue to be signed at places like Tomsk,
Krasnoyarsk-26, and Mayak. We will continue to focus our efforts on
providing upgrades to sites containing materials of concern to which we
have access in order to reduce the threat as quickly as possible, while
we negotiate access to or a suitable alternative assurance for the
remaining weapons sites. Additionally, we are working on a pilot
project that could improve our access to sensitive MinAtom facilities.
With the Ministry of Defense, we have signed comprehensive
contracts for the last two Navy warhead sites, which finish the major
contracts upgrading 50 Navy-related sites--39 warhead sites and 11 fuel
sites. We are cooperating with the Strategic Rocket Forces to upgrade
the security of a total of 17 approved nuclear sites located at 11
different Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) bases. Currently,
we have contracts in place (varying from vulnerability assessments to
rapid upgrades) for the first 13 sites. We have had fewer access issues
with the Ministry of Defense and cooperation continues to be very good.
These improvements in our relations with the Russians are allowing
our work to proceed and begin a drawdown of our uncosted balances as
security upgrades to the Ministry of Defense and MinAtom facilities are
completed over the next several years.
Question. How and when do you expect to commit the available
appropriated balances?
Answer. As a result of a number of recent successful contractual
negotiations, we expect to commit the majority of International Nuclear
Materials Protection and Cooperation (MPC&A) non-Megaport appropriated
balances by the end of this fiscal year. With the Russian Ministry of
Defense, we have signed comprehensive contracts for the last two Navy
warhead sites, which finish the major contracts upgrading 50 Navy-
related sites--39 warhead sites and 11 fuel sites. We are cooperating
with the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces to upgrade the security of a
total of 17 approved nuclear sites located at 11 different ICBM bases.
Work at sensitive MinAtom facilities continues, but the pace is limited
mostly by the need to negotiate access to facilities. We are making
progress at some of these sites. Contracts for upgrades have and will
continue to be signed at places such as Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk-26, and
Mayak. Agreement has been reached with Greece and we are nearing
agreement with Kazakhstan to implement a Second Line of Defense program
in those countries. In Kazakhstan alone we expect to complete
installations of radiation detection equipment at approximately 20
sites over the next year.
The ability to commit funds for the Megaports program has so far
been limited by the pace of successful negotiations with host
countries. We are currently negotiating with several countries and
expect those negotiations to result in a number of agreements, which
will allow us to commit funds for the installation of radiation
detection equipment at these ports.
As of March 31 the current total funding for the MPC&A program with
carryover, is $655 million. This consists of Start of Year uncosted
balances of $378 million plus Year to Date Approved Funding Profile of
$277 million. Of the $655 million in MPC&A, $124 million is allocated
to the Megaports program and $75 million to the Radiological Threat
Reduction (RTR) Program (Radiological Dispersion Devices and MPC&A
Activities in Iraq). Both Megaports and the RTR programs are less than
2 years old, and are working feverishly to ramp up.
We consider that the real measure of funding is commitments to
contractors, that is, signed contracts should be considered ``costed''
as the U.S. Government has ``committed'' to provide funding for
deliverables that are underway. Given the length of time it takes to
complete sensitive nonproliferation work in foreign countries, we have
begun to track funds that have been committed but not yet costed as a
more accurate measure of true requirements. We have made changes to the
DOE accounting system to track these obligations and expect our first
preliminary report of uncosted commitments in coming weeks. We expect
that the April 2004 report to Congress on uncosted ``commitments'' will
show that our true uncosted balances are under control.
Question. Are there alternatives that the Russians have suggested,
other than providing full access to sensitive facilities, which may
accomplish U.S. objectives?
Answer. We are currently working with the Russians on a pilot
project that could improve our access to sensitive MinAtom facilities.
This project incorporates a new strategy for access that was negotiated
by the MPC&A acceleration working group, convened by Secretary Abraham
and Minister Rumyantsev last year. If this pilot effort is successful,
it is anticipated that this will allow MPC&A upgrades to be carried out
at Russian sites that were previously too sensitive to support
cooperative work with the Department of Energy to improve nuclear
material security. The first site visit of this project has been
completed and contracts have been signed. A second visit will take
place early this summer.
COOPERATION WITH OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
Question. The current light water reactor fuel cycle in widespread
use was developed prior to today's emphasis on safeguards to prevent
proliferation from the civil nuclear energy cycle. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been forced to establish new safeguards
into an existing cycle and into the existing facilities. The AFCI
program is exploring new options for fuel cycles that would reduce
waste, enhance more efficient use of nuclear fuel and reduce
proliferation concerns.
Do you concur that review of proliferation aspects of new fuel
cycles should be coordinated among the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Office of Nuclear Energy and the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) Nuclear Nonproliferation?
Answer. Yes, in fact we are coordinating just such an effort
between Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, and the
National Nuclear Security Administration. Our joint Proliferation
Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) Working Group is an excellent
example of our coordination. Under PRPP, we are bringing together
experts from all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle. Beyond the
safeguards and physical protection experts, we also are engaging the
engineers who design all the components and processes of the entire
fuel cycle. Such an approach will ensure that the ideas to enhance PRPP
actually will be applied and used to reduce proliferation concerns.
REMOVAL OF ADDITIONAL HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU)
Question. There are a number of programs within your office
including the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program
charged with developing technologies to reduce the threat of
proliferation and increase the amount of low enriched uranium that is
used in research reactors worldwide. What barriers exist to more rapid
progress on removing HEU from research reactors?
Answer. The Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR)
Program has a number of technological and political limitations that
slow the speed by which progress can be accelerated, regardless of the
amount of funding provided for the program. The development of low
enriched uranium (LEU) fuels suitable for conversion of reactors
requires the following steps, which comprise the primary challenges
facing the program: analyses of the performance and safety
characteristics of research reactors undergoing conversion;
determination of the detailed technical specifications of the LEU fuel
assemblies for each reactor; and regulatory approval of the
conversions.
Once LEU conversions are determined to be technically feasible,
adequate incentives need to be identified to make the conversions
happen. Countries that have HEU fuel stockpiles are often aware that
they have a ``valuable'' commodity and it can be difficult to persuade
them to release the fuel. Incentives are often case-dependent and could
include, for instance, removal of spent fuel, supply of fresh LEU fuel,
or facility upgrades. Negotiated government-to-government agreements
may be required to implement the incentives.
Question. Are you resource constrained?
Answer. Yes, in that the facilities, equipment, and trained
personnel that can perform the necessary fuel development are limited.
We are actively addressing this situation through international
collaboration to study the characteristics of the new LEU fuels to
determine if there are any limitations to the use of the proposed fuel.
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT (R&D) FUNDING
Question. The Proliferation and Verification R&D account has been
reduced by $11 million. This account performs a critical role in
developing nuclear detection technologies, including space-based
surveillance. Our ability to detect, monitor and verify the transfer,
production or testing of special nuclear material will be critical to
preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and putting
U.S. citizens at risk. Why has this account been reduced and will this
budget cut allow for the research, testing and deployment of new
detection technology?
Answer. Our budget request for the Nonproliferation and
Verification R&D Program is, in fact, $16 million higher than our
request in fiscal year 2004. This reflects, in particular, the need to
begin the development of new space-based nuclear explosion monitoring
sensors to replace the capability on the Defense Support Program
satellites which are due to be retired before the end of the decade.
In the appropriation for fiscal year 2004, the Congress added $29.5
million to our request for the R&D program for critical research in
nuclear and radiological national security and for particular projects
important to the members. Our fiscal year 2005 budget request was
formulated last fall, before we knew the details of the Congressional
action on our fiscal year 2004 request. Consequently, that result did
not figure into the baseline level for fiscal year 2005 funding
request. We appreciate the confidence expressed by the Congress in the
importance of our R&D program.
Question. If this account received level funding at the fiscal year
2004 level, how would you spend the additional funding and how would it
assist in detection?
Answer. We agree that the need to improve the Nation's ability to
detect proliferation and testing of nuclear weapons and materials is
becoming ever more important in the world today given the proliferation
challenges facing us. If the level appropriated by the Congress for our
R&D program in fiscal year 2004 were continued, we would be able to
pursue further demonstration of new detection methods and begin to
realign our program to address the expanding proliferation threat. We
would focus our research to develop methods to more confidently detect
and characterize enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of plutonium in
areas of concern around the world. We would also increase our effort to
provide the scientific basis for attributing the source of any detected
nuclear materials.
We would also seek to accelerate our nuclear explosion monitoring
R&D program by achieving our goals to calibrate new seismic monitoring
stations sooner and enable our partnering agencies to meet their
monitoring requirements. We also anticipate a change to those
requirements in the near future, to achieve a much lower threshold of
yield to detect any nuclear explosions. At this time, this challenge
would be addressed only at a lower level of effort until the seismic
calibration program is completed.
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL MARKETS
Question. There are a number of utilities that are concerned about
the amount of available nuclear fuel there is in the international
market. Recently, several companies have found their contracts with
Russian suppliers are not being honored and they are forced to find
other sources to meet their fuel needs. As a result of this tight
market, fuel prices are rising and there are few opportunities to
increase production. In fact, the limited number of nuclear fuel
vendors makes OPEC look like a free and open market. Are you familiar
with these concerns and, if so, are there any opportunities in either
the U.S. or Russian stockpiles of HEU that would provide an opportunity
to down blend in order to add more supply to the market?
Answer. We are familiar with these concerns and have been
monitoring the situation closely. I believe the question should address
the supply situation for natural uranium, not fuel-grade low enriched
uranium, of which there is no shortage. Tight supplies of natural
uranium feed are responsible for the price increases. The connection is
that utilities must provide natural uranium feed to the fuel supplier
in order to get fuel.
Supplies into the natural uranium market were interrupted when the
Russian supplier Techsnabexport (Tenex) cut off supplies of natural
uranium to Globe Nuclear Services and Supply (GNSS) as of January 1,
2004. The problem was not only the cut-off of supply to GNSS but the
short notice provided by Tenex. Tenex notified the world on November 3,
2003, just 2 months prior to the cutoff, that supplies under contract
to GNSS would not be honored. As a result, beginning in January 2004
GNSS has been unable to supply natural uranium under contracts to U.S.
utilities.
The Department of Energy and the U.S. Government have communicated
to Russia our concern on the possible supply shortfalls to U.S.
utilities. In that regard, Secretary of Energy Abraham was informed by
former Minister, now Director Rumyantsev of the Russian Atomic Energy
Agency, that Tenex is now in negotiations with several U.S. utilities
to supply uranium with a view to resolving the GNSS shortfall. DOE also
understands that the uranium would be provided at the same prices and
delivery times as under original contracts with GNSS.
Unfortunately, the Honeywell facility in Metropolis, IL, which is
the only U.S. facility for converting uranium to the gaseous form for
the next stage of uranium processing (i.e. enrichment), had to cease
production on December 22, 2003, due to an accident. It appears that
Honeywell has implemented procedures and other changes at the plant, so
that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission could allow the plant to resume
operations, which have already begun the process of re-starting. With
that and the supply of natural uranium now being negotiated with Tenex,
we expect balance to be restored to the natural uranium market.
Nevertheless, it appears that the market is coping with the
temporary supply shortfall. We suspect that utilities have exercised
provisions for supply flexibilities in their contracts with uranium
vendors to alleviate at least some of the shortfall. The Department, of
course, continues to closely monitor the situation.
Since this is primarily a commercial, not a non-proliferation,
issue, I would suggest that the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science &
Technology or the Office of the Undersecretary could provide further
details.
NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY
Question. Dr. Beckner, I understand that NIF is still at least 6
years and over $1 billion away from completion of this project. It is
accurate to say that NIF is both the largest laser, and the most
expensive diagnostic tool in the NNSA stockpile. When we develop any
technology, we need to ask ourselves--is the outcome worth the cost? If
you don't achieve ignition, the American people have purchased a laser
that is it 25 times more expensive than the Z machine at Sandia. I
think we need to understand that the project is viable before we spend
billions more over the life of this program. How much money are you
willing to spend to achieve ignition and at what point would you say we
have spent too much?
Answer. The NIF Project is on schedule for completion at the end of
fiscal year 2008. Our plan, as outlined in the project data sheet,
shows the funding required in fiscal years 2005-2008 to complete the
project is approximately $867 million, a figure that has not changed
since the present baseline was approved in September 2000.
NNSA is developing an integrated activation and early use plan for
NIF that provides for first ignition experiments in 2010. This advance
in the ignition date has been made possible by the strong technical
advances in the Inertial Confinement Fusion program. Recent simulations
have shown that it is possible to develop capsules that can be filled
using a simple fill tube instead of a high pressure diffusion system.
The fill tube system is simpler and less costly than the currently
planned diffusion method, and can be developed sooner. Hence fusion
ignition can be attempted earlier with this new fill tube approach. A
1995 review of the ignition program concluded the probability of
ignition on NIF was 50 percent or greater. Our confidence in
demonstrating ignition on NIF has increased since then. The NIF
activation and early use plan will be reviewed by the Defense Sciences
Board.
Completing the NIF Project is a key step in achieving ignition. In
order to pursue the experimental campaign needed to support pursuit of
our goal of obtaining ignition in fiscal year 2010, there are many
program activities that must be conducted. Our total budget for
Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Program activities (not including the
project), as outlined in the FYNSP, is approximately $2,046 million
over the period fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010. Of this
amount, approximately half is directly related to national efforts
aimed at our goal of achieving ignition utilizing the NIF. The balance
supports operation of other facilities (such as Z) and our non-ignition
stewardship activities.
We fully recognize the magnitude of the investment we are making in
the ICF area, and are convinced that it is the appropriate course of
action to achieve our ignition and stewardship missions.
We would be pleased to supply additional details on the break out
of the inertial fusion budget elements for fiscal year 2005.
Preliminary plans also exist for fiscal year 2006-2010.
Question. Would you be willing to focus on solving the most
challenging technical problems such as the cryogenic targets and
perform a thorough testing on a full cluster of 48 lasers before you go
forward as currently planned?
Answer. In pursuing the goal of ignition in 2010, we must address
many challenges. Among these are the design and manufacture of the
ignition targets, development of cryogenic target handling capability,
and completion of the NIF in fiscal year 2008. Our current plans
provide the correct balance, within the FYNSP budget, for addressing
each of these challenges. In addition, we are currently developing a
NIF Activation and Early Use Plan that will define the specific path
towards ignition in more detail. We anticipate having this plan
reviewed by the Defense Science Board this summer, and will finalize
the document after receiving their input.
The performance of the NIF laser system is being continuously
evaluated. Data from the initial quad of four laser beams has already
demonstrated that on a per-beam basis, the facility meets its design
requirements. In addition, we have used the diagnostics and target
systems that are being developed in parallel with the NIF laser project
to successfully demonstrate the facility's capability of performing
sophisticated experiments, and to make progress toward the Stockpile
Stewardship Program's important high energy density physics and
ignition goals. We intend to continually test facility's performance as
additional beams are activated, and perform increasingly more difficult
experiments with those laser beams.
While having a full cluster of 48 beams operating on NIF will be
useful to high energy density physics, the placement of the beams will
not allow many important ignition experiments to be conducted. All the
beams from the same cluster enter the NIF target chamber from the same
quarter of the chamber, essentially coming from the same direction.
This is desirable for high energy density physics, and enables
important experiments to be performed in this area. For example, planar
hydrodynamics experiments will be performed in late 2004 to support
validation of 3D ASC computer codes; equation of State experiments will
be performed in late 2005; and radiation hydrodynamics experiments will
be performed in late 2006. However, this configuration does not provide
the symmetrical target illumination required to do the compression
experiments required to investigate ignition. Consequently, we do not
foresee any added value to placing a hold point at the completion of
the first cluster of 48 beams. In fact, such a hold point would likely
lead to schedule delays and cost increases while making the goal of
ignition in 2010 impossible to achieve.
FIRST CLUSTER-LASER INTEGRATION
Question. The fiscal year 2005 budget specifies that NIF ignition
has been delayed until 2014 gives me great concern regarding this
project. Delaying the ignition start date is contrary to news that the
project is ahead of schedule. I understand that laser installation is
18 months ahead of schedule and the Beam Light Infrastructure was
achieved nearly 3 years ahead of schedule. As a result of these
conflicting statements, I am very skeptical of actual status of NIF. To
date, $2.5 billion has been spent and another $1 billion is required
before we know whether or not this project will work. I don't share
this all-or-nothing attitude, because the costs are too high. I believe
we need a more measured approach to address the significant technical
challenges that lie ahead. George Miller, the NIF Associate Director,
has stated that the most significant technical challenge he has is the
full integration of the lasers. I believe the first cluster, which is
48 lasers or one-quarter of the total, would certainly give a clear
indication of whether full integration is feasible. Dr. Beckner I would
like you to put together a budget and schedule that will accelerate the
installation and testing of the first cluster in fiscal year 2005. Can
you do that?
Answer. I am very much aware of the committee's determination that
the program to achieve ignition remains on target. I've met with the
staff of this committee as well as the other three committees to
clarify our recent decisions to change course in order to pull back the
ignition target to 2010, as opposed to 2014. We've done that because
all of the committees have a very strong view that we must maintain
that schedule. We had allowed the target date for ignition to move out
because of funding priorities in other elements of the program not
because of a reduced commitment to ignition.
Successful completion of the NIF project on its current baseline
schedule is only one of the elements necessary to achieve our goal of
ignition in 2010. The project has re-sequenced some of its work to both
accomplish it more efficiently, and to allow early activation of a quad
of four laser beams. This re-sequencing has resulted in several major
project milestones being completed well ahead of schedule, while the
performance of the first quad of beams has provided us with a
demonstration that the fundamental design is sound, as well as
providing a basis for fine tuning component designs prior to initiating
large procurements. We continue to monitor the project closely, and are
satisfied that it is on schedule for successful completion in
accordance with its approved baseline.
I have discussed the feasibility of accelerating completion of the
first cluster of 48 laser beams into fiscal year 2005 with Dr. Miller.
At this stage in the project and within the current baseline and
funding profile, procurement logistics, and lead times limit our
ability to further re-sequence work and selectively accelerate
milestones. Further we do not see any way to pull the first cluster
milestone back as far as fiscal year 2005. However, if the committee
would like to see an alternative schedule which accelerated
installation and testing of the first cluster, which includes a modest
suite of ``proof of principles'' experiments and which minimizes but
could not eliminate impact to the ignition campaign schedule, we will
develop such a schedule for your consideration.
CRYOGENIC TARGETS
Question. The cryogenic target for the NIF system is a component
the Department has deferred working on for several years. The
University of Rochester has been working on the only cryogenic target
in the world and it has been an enormous challenge. As I understand it,
your office is currently considering two technology options. One is
similar to the Omega Laser target developed at Rochester and a second
is a theoretical option you believe will save NIF tens of millions of
dollars and 4 years using a beryllium capsule. However, until this
problem is solved, ignition will not become reality. Like laser
integration, I believe you should focus your staff and budget on
resolving the enormous challenges associated with the cryogenic
targets. What is your plan and timetable to address the challenges
associated with cryogenic targets?
Answer. A cryogenic ignition target consists of a capsule filled
with fusion ``fuel'', and a surrounding cryogenic system which holds
the capsule accurately at temperatures near absolute zero. Research on
cryogenic ignition targets has been a major component of the ICF
Program since its inception. We have developed a wide variety of
ignition capsule designs, and numerous aspects of the performance of
these capsules have been validated via experiments on the Nova and
Omega lasers and elsewhere. We have made strong progress on cryogenic
systems. We have demonstrated much of the required technology, and a
complete, integrated cryogenic system is operational at Rochester. The
Rochester system provides valuable insight for NIF. The Rochester
cryogenic system uses a high-pressure chamber to diffuse gas into the
capsule.
Our plan for NIF cryogenic ignition targets has three major
components. First, we will continue our national cryogenic target
technology development program. This program has demonstrated
impressive results in the past several years, particularly in the areas
of target fabrication and characterization. Secondly, we are planning a
cryogenic system for NIF that uses a thin tube to fill the capsule with
fusion fuel. This ``fill-tube'' cryogenic system will be completed in
2009 and used for ignition experiments in 2010. A simpler pre-ignition
cryogenic system will be completed in fiscal year 2006. This fill-tube
system will ultimately be modified to allow operation with all types of
ignition targets, including the diffusion filled targets used at
Rochester. Finally, we are planning experiments and calculations to
refine the design for fill-tube ignition targets. Note the fill-tube
effort is not based on theory alone; fill-tubes have been used
extensively in other areas of the ICF Campaign and the stewardship
program, and we will draw upon this experience in preparing the first
ignition experiments.
Question. Are you planning to draw on the available expertise at
the national labs to solve this problem and will you seek to have one
of the labs validate the technology and design?
Answer. Yes, as part of the national planning process for the ICF
Program, all ICF participants are committed to leading technical
efforts within the context of participation in an integrated program.
This will continue to be the case for the cryogenic ignition target
program. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory will lead the
construction of the NIF cryogenic target system and play a major role
in ignition capsule design. Los Alamos National Laboratory will do
independent calculations of the fill-tube approach, and in addition the
material science capabilities at Los Alamos will be brought to bear on
key questions related to ignition target fabrication. The University of
Rochester will provide valuable input to the NIF cryogenic system via
cryogenic experiments at OMEGA, and with the Naval Research Laboratory
will also examine fill-tube target designs applicable to ``direct
drive'' inertial fusion. General Atomics is focused on specific aspects
of target fabrication and has experience in cryogenic systems. This
national approach has proven very effective in advancing the
technological state-of-the-art and providing innovative solutions as
well as effective peer review.
OMEGA
Question. Will you begin to test the beryllium target design on the
OMEGA system as soon as possible to get initial data to know if you
have a viable target?
Answer. Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia have been
conducting an extensive series of ignition-related experiments at OMEGA
since the 1999 shutdown of Livermore's Nova laser. We expect that the
OMEGA laser and the early experimental capability available at NIF will
continue to be of great benefit as we move toward ignition. Experiments
at OMEGA and NIF will be an integral part of our risk mitigation
strategy. Both beryllium and plastic targets will be examined. These
experiments will be used to validate advanced simulation tools and
thereby refine our target designs for the 2010 ignition campaign.
ESTABLISHING SCIENTIFIC MILESTONES
Question. Dr. Beckner, following the re-baselining of the NIF
program in 2000, DOE agreed to specific milestones for the construction
project. The Defense Authorization for 2002 requires that the
Administrator of the NNSA notify Congress for every level 1 and level 2
milestones that are achieved and a full report if a milestone is
missed. However, that reporting requirement is only for construction
and assembly milestones and doesn't apply to any scientific or
programmatic milestones. In fact, there aren't any programmatic
milestones by which to base NIF's success or failure as a scientific
tool. I believe it is important that NNSA develop specific milestones
by which Congress can judge this project. This document should also be
peer-reviewed complex-wide for input on the scientific and research
goals. Can you develop these scientific R&D milestones and provide to
Congress such goals by this June?
Answer. I fully agree a defined set of R&D milestones will provide
insight into the success of NIF as a scientific tool. Experiments which
could only be performed on the NIF have already been conducted and will
continue to be performed during the commissioning of subsequent laser
beams. In addition, we are currently developing a NIF Activation and
Early Use Plan that will define the specific path towards ignition in
more detail, including the scientific milestones we will achieve. We
anticipate having this plan available in draft by the June time frame
so that it can be reviewed by the Defense Science Board this summer. We
will be pleased to provide you with the draft document, but request
that you allow us to complete the external peer review process and
incorporate the input from that review prior to finalizing the plan and
beginning to report to you on our progress against it.
Z MACHINE
Question. Dr. Beckner, Sandia National Labs currently operates the
most powerful energy source of X-rays in the world. I think that anyone
familiar with this machine would agree that Z has been a very cost-
effective workhorse of the stockpile stewardship program providing
important data from high energy density experiments as well as
possessing great potential for inertial confinement fusion research. We
are turning away important research, because we haven't provided the
financial support. I can certainly think of a project that could be
used to provide the needed funding to expand the research operations
and capabilities of this important scientific tool. Do you share my
belief that the Z-machine is underutilized and that we are foregoing
important research by not expanding to a second shift and increasing
operational funding?
Answer. The Z pulsed-power facility has been very successful, and I
agree with you that more shots on Z could be effectively used. The
amount of shots requested annually on Z is more than twice the number
available under single-shift, 5-day-per-week operations. NNSA has added
significant additional funds to Z over the past few years via the Z-
refurbishment Project. This approximately $60M activity will further
expand Z's capabilities and ensure that it remains a vital part of the
stewardship program.
While we have funded the refurbishment of Z, we unfortunately have
not been able to implement additional operations due to funding
limitations and competing program demands. In fact, many large
Department of Energy and NNSA scientific facilities are oversubscribed;
indeed, one of the hallmarks of a successful facility is strong demand
from the scientific community. We have attempted to balance the
experimental, computational and engineering demands of Stockpile
Stewardship within the FYNSP. There are a number of critical
experiments on Z required to support life-extension program and other
critical activities which have the highest priority. We recognize that
some important experiments will be delayed given the current single-
shift operational status of Z.
Question. What is the justification for remaining with one shift,
when so much more could be accomplished?
Answer. NNSA is committed to funding all stewardship activities
within the existing FYNSP. Additional facility operations at Z would
require the addition of funds to the Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF)
Campaign from other parts of the stockpile stewardship program or the
shifting of funds within the ICF campaign; in my judgment neither has
been the right course to pursue given other funding pressures in the
ICF Campaign and the stewardship program.
The NIF Project is a major commitment by NNSA and DOE and a key
element of the stewardship program, and hence we are committed to
delivering it on schedule. Demonstration of ignition is the major
purpose of NIF, and with respect to demonstrating fusion in the
laboratory, it is our first priority. Success on NIF ignition is
essential to the future of the ICF Program. The situation is similar in
the NIF diagnostics, cryogenics, and supporting technologies area. As I
noted earlier, we have decided to fund the refurbishment of the Z
machine. We also have major commitments to additional operations and
the Extended Performance project for the OMEGA laser at the Laboratory
for Laser Energetics at the University of Rochester, which also has had
recent outstanding results.
Question. Do you support expanding the opportunity to do more
research in inertial confinement fusion at Z?
Answer. The technical progress on inertial fusion at Z has been
impressive, and if it were possible to do more under the constraints we
face I would support it. However, given the FYNSP, I do not support the
diversion of resources from elsewhere within the ICF Campaign or other
stewardship accounts to fund additional ICF research at Z. We do have
several important challenging milestones in the Z research plan during
fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006 and success in achieving or
exceeding these milestones could cause us to change some of our
procurement priorities. As documented in National Academy of Sciences
and other reviews, the demonstration of ignition is the essential next
step forward for the ICF Program. Demonstration of ignition is the
major purpose of NIF, and with respect to demonstrating inertial fusion
in the laboratory, it is our first priority. Success on NIF ignition is
essential to the future of the ICF Program. The NIF ignition program is
tightly constrained and we must stay focused upon it to succeed.
Question. What can NNSA do to facilitate such research?
Answer. The primary way NNSA can facilitate this research is by
adding additional operations to Z and successfully completing the Z
refurbishment project.
NNSA is proceeding with the refurbishment of the Z machine. This
refurbishment will replace original components that date back to the
early 1980's. This refurbishment will: extend the lifetime of Z,
increase its precision and reproducibility, reduce the maintenance
required between experiments thereby facilitating double-shift
operations should the additional funds become available, and
significantly enhance its technical capabilities. For example, the
refurbished Z facility will produce nearly double the X-ray energy for
stockpile stewardship and ICF research. It will also greatly expand the
utility of Z to address fundamental material properties by including
the flexibility of pulse shaping in order to double the experimental
pressures achieved.
NIF OTHER OPTIONS
Question. Dr. Beckner, if we pulled the plug on NIF today I
estimate we could save between $3 and $5 billion over the life of this
project. A lot of very promising work could be done with this money
including a variety of experiments using pulse power and laser power to
test our weapons systems. Also, the Japanese have had tremendous
success with petawatt lasers at a fraction the cost of NIF. I know you
are very much aware that the French are pursuing a similar laser system
slightly larger than NIF that hopes to have ignition within a decade.
Is there any reason why we shouldn't look at other options before we
spend another $3 to $5 billion?
Answer. The NIF is a unique element of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program (SSP), providing the capability to pursue the goal of ignition
and create conditions of matter similar to those found in nuclear
weapons. We believe NIF is the only facility in the world capable of
getting ignition by 2010. At that time, it will have been nearly 20
years since the last U.S. nuclear test. NIF will enable the study of
issues that affect an aging or refurbished stockpile. It will also
advance critical elements of the underlying science of nuclear weapons
that will play a major role in validation of ASC codes. NIF will be
important in helping to attract and train the exceptional scientific
and technical talent needed to sustain stockpile stewardship over the
long term. While we are constantly evaluating all options to obtain the
capabilities and information required to support the SSP, we have not
identified any U.S. facilities that can support the vital needs of the
Stewardship program as well as NIF.
We do not believe it prudent to rely on foreign nations to satisfy
our requirements. While it is true that the French are pursuing a laser
similar to NIF, their project has just broken ground, something we did
for NIF in 1997. Thus, we believe the French are 6 to 7 years further
from ignition than we are. In addition, the French project is dependant
on optical components jointly developed with NIF for success. If NIF is
cancelled, the French laser project will also be impacted. The Japanese
results, partially based on target designs and laser technology from
Livermore, is scientifically exciting but in its infancy. Their next
step, not anticipated for another 5 years, will use NIF laser
technology, is only a proof of principle, and will not achieve
ignition. In addition, current evaluations require a NIF-scale facility
of petawatt and long pulse lasers for ignition success. We believe that
the current FYNSP is the appropriate funding approach to our
Stewardship mission.
MESA/CMR FACILITIES
Question. Your fiscal year 2005 budget provided only half of the
funding necessary to complete the MESA project at Sandia National Lab
by 2007. This delay will unnecessarily increase the overall cost and
delay critical work on engineering solutions that will benefit the
weapons stockpile. This budget, also fails to provide adequate funding
to complete the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Facility (CMR) at Los
Alamos. It is my understanding that the planned end-life of the
existing 50-years-old facility will expire 4 years before a new CMR
replacement will be ready for use. What is the justification for
delaying the completion of these important facilities--especially when
delays will drive up the overall cost?
Answer. The fiscal year 2005 request for MESA is consistent with
the Performance Baseline approved by the Secretary of Energy on October
8, 2002, with a Total Project Cost of $518.5 million and a completion
date of May 2011. The Performance Baseline reflects construction of the
MESA facility in a sequenced approach that brings the MESA Complex on-
line in phases to meet NNSA's priority mission requirements, while at
the same time being affordable within the confines of the Future Years
Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP). Critical microelectronic integrated
circuits are already being produced in the retooled Microelectronics
Development Laboratory portion of the MESA project and have met the
initial needs of the life extension program.
As a result of the congressional appropriation increase provided
for MESA in fiscal year 2003, the Performance Baseline was changed to
reflect a revised completion date of May 2010. The appropriation
increase in fiscal year 2004 will result in further acceleration of the
project; the actual schedule impact is being evaluated as part of the
fiscal year 2006 budget process. The fiscal year 2005 request was then
adjusted due to overall priorities within the constraints of the FYNSP,
and to reflect a favorable bidding environment that allowed for shifts
in the project funding profile that had no impact on project
completion.
The CMR Replacement Project continues to be a high priority for the
Stockpile Stewardship Program. Based on the fiscal year 2004
appropriation reducing the CMR Replacement Project funding by
approximately 50 percent (from $20.5 million to $9.9 million after the
rescission), it was necessary to reassess the project's path forward
within the confines of the Future Years Nuclear Security Program
(FYNSP). We re-scoped the project realizing that it would not be sound
management to move from a fiscal year 2004 appropriation of $9.9
million to our original plan of $75.0 million for fiscal year 2005.
MODERN PIT FACILITY
Question. Dr. Beckner, the President's budget provides a $19
million increase for conceptual design for the Modern Pit Facility. I
assume, based on this funding request, that the Department is intent on
moving forward with the construction of a $4 billion facility. What is
the proposed timetable for the Secretary of Energy to make a final
decision to site the Modern Pit Facility?
Answer. A secretarial decision to move forward with planning that
includes a site selection for a Modern Pit Facility is currently
pending. All documentation required by the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) to support a final Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) and associated siting decision is complete. NNSA Administrator
Linton Brooks announced on January 28, 2004, ``I intend to have further
consultations with Congress before we proceed to a final EIS.''
Construction start for an MPF is currently scheduled for 2012 with full
operations in 2021. The Congress will be consulted at major planning
decision points prior to the start of construction.
Question. Is the Carlsbad region or elsewhere in New Mexico still a
viable option for this facility?
Answer. Yes, the Carlsbad region, the Los Alamos site along with
the three other sites evaluated in the draft environmental impact
statement are still viable options to host the Modern Pit Facility.
Question. Has the Department undertaken a study to evaluate the
condition of the existing plutonium pits to verify the need for this
facility?
Answer. The Department has an extensive study to evaluate the
condition of existing plutonium pits in the stockpile. NNSA is also
conducting an extensive set of aging studies to confirm the minimum pit
lifetime. While some results from these studies are expected in 2006,
the result of additional work to confirm current pit lifetime estimates
will become available prior to 2012 when construction of a Modern Pit
Facility (MPF) is scheduled to start. Because of the uncertainty in pit
lifetimes and the long-lead time to design and construct an MPF,
continued planning for an MPF is prudent risk management.
Question. Will the nuclear stockpile report that was requested by
this committee impact the Secretary's decision to site a new pit
facility?
Answer. As noted in the report (``An Enhanced Schedule for the
Modern Pit Facility (MPF)'') provided by the Secretary of Energy on
March 1, 2004, continued planning for a new pit facility is appropriate
for all future stockpiles under consideration. The NNSA has evaluated
capacity requirements for an MPF based on the following parameters: (1)
size of the future stockpile, (2) numbers and types of weapons in the
stockpile, (3) pit lifetime, (4) start date for quantity production,
and (5) length of time between shutdown of Rocky Flats and start of new
production. We have concluded from these analyses that if the number of
weapons in the U.S. stockpile is consistent with NPR/Moscow Treaty and
if pit lifetimes are assumed to be about 60 years, the Nation will need
a production capacity of some 125 pits per year beginning in about
2021.
SPACE REACTORS
Question. Admiral Bowman, I understand that Secretary Abraham has
recently assigned the responsibility for the development of a civilian
space nuclear reactor as part of project Prometheus. The mission NASA
has identified for this project is the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter.
Traditionally, this activity has been the responsibility for DOE's
Office of Nuclear Energy. How is it that the Naval Reactor program has
secured this responsibility?
Answer. The NASA Administrator asked the Secretary of Energy to
assign my Program the responsibility to develop, design, deliver, and
operationally support civilian space nuclear reactors. On March 8,
2004, the Secretary of Energy assigned Naval Reactors these
responsibilities in support of Project Prometheus. The Secretary of the
Navy concurred in this assignment.
In the NASA press release, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe is
quoted as saying, ``NASA sought this partnership because NR has an
enduring commitment to safety and environmental stewardship that is a
requirement for an undertaking of this magnitude. This partnership will
help ensure the safe development and use of a space-fission reactor to
enable unparalleled science and discovery as we explore the solar
system and beyond. This work is an integral piece of the President's
exploration agenda and without it the exploration agenda is
compromised.''
The DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) will retain responsibility
for various space nuclear technology efforts, including long-term space
reactor science and technology development not associated with work
assigned to NR. NE will also continue its responsibility for all
aspects of space radioisotope power systems.
STAFFING AND TECHNICAL CHALLENGES
Question. How do you plan to meet this challenge from a staffing
and technical capability?
Answer. Because the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is a lean
organization, accepting a role in Project Prometheus requires that I
increase the size of my staff and my DOE laboratory staffs to prevent
any noticeable impact on the core mission of supporting the nuclear
fleet. Because we are still early in the planning phase, we have not
yet determined how much of the Project Prometheus effort will be done
in house and how much will be subcontracted. The analysis we've done so
far indicates that this year I should increase my Headquarters staff by
a few people and my two DOE laboratory staffs by about 60 people
(combined increase). Because I intend to subcontract some of the
Project Prometheus work, my staff will be reviewing the specialized
expertise and facilities of industry, academia, and other DOE
laboratories to inform my decision. All of my staff and DOE laboratory
increases will be fully funded by NASA.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Larry Craig
TECHNICAL AREA 18 LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
Question. Last June, the Department of Energy halted work on the
project to relocate nuclear material and functions from the Los Alamos
National Laboratory's Technical Area 18 to the Nevada Test Site because
of an excessively high increase in the cost to complete the relocation.
At that time, it was reported that the cost estimate for the
modifications to the facility at NTS had risen to more than $200
million over the original estimate of $100 million. The DOE had further
indicated its intent to conduct an independent cost review.
What is the current cost of this project? What has been done to
reduce the cost? Has project scope or facility functionality been
reduced or changed and what effect has this had on cost?
Answer. NNSA is finalizing its review of the conceptual design for
the NTS Device Assembly Facility (DAF) option. The initial conceptual
design for DAF was submitted to NNSA Headquarters on January 20, 2004
with an estimated project range of $219 million to $255 million with a
schedule for completing the project in 2011.
As part of this submission, the project schedule had special
nuclear material (SNM) shipments from TA-18 to DAF in 2009. After
reviewing this package and assessing options for accelerating
activities, I announced on March 31, 2004 that NNSA would accelerate
movement of TA-18 programmatic SNM to DAF. The initial goal is to move
approximately 50 percent of the programmatic SNM from TA-18 to DAF by
March 2006. At this time, NNSA anticipates it will need access to a
subset of the TA-18 SNM to support ongoing mission commitments during
transition in the areas of emergency response, nuclear
nonproliferation, and criticality safety.
On April 9, 2004, Dr. Beckner, directed that the early move of SNM
occur outside of the project. The original project submission
identified approximately $22 million related to transportation costs of
SNM, including the design, development, and testing of new SNM shipping
containers. Accelerating transportation activities will allow for NNSA
to use existing shipping containers, avoiding approximately $7-8
million for designing new containers. Current estimates related to SNM
move are $1.22 million in fiscal year 2004 and $3 million in fiscal
year 2005. On April 30, 2004, I directed my staff to prepare a closure
plan for TA-18 that will identify the schedule and cost for moving the
rest of the SNM to DAF.
Based on this direction and input provided by other NNSA program
managers, the project team revised the CD-1 submission and provided
information to NNSA Headquarters for review and approval on May 7,
2004. While the final range is under validation by NNSA, it is expected
to be in the low- to mid-$100 millions with project schedule for
completion in late 2009. In addition to removing transportation
activities at $22 million, NNSA is removing the design and construction
of a new low scatter building within the DAF PIDAS based on discussions
with NNSA programs and security experts. Design and construction of the
low scatter building was estimated at approximately $30 million. NNSA
is now exploring options to conduct the activities proposed for this
new facility. In addition, NNSA is deferring upgrades to the critical
assemblies at a cost of approximately $10 million; only new control
systems and instrumentation for the critical assemblies are contained
within the project to support installation at DAF.
Question. Please provide an ``apples to apples'' comparison of cost
among the options that the DOE considered and explain the rationale for
concluding that the NTS option is the option with the lowest cost and
highest probability of success.
Answer. During the CD-0 phase of the project, NNSA evaluated the
proposed action of relocating TA-18 capabilities and materials
associated with Security Category I/II materials to a new location.
Location alternatives included sites: (1) a different site at LANL at
Los Alamos, New Mexico; (2) Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) at
Albuquerque, New Mexico; (3) NTS near Las Vegas, Nevada; and (4)
Argonne National Laboratory--West (ANL-W), near Idaho Falls, Idaho. The
No Action and Upgrade in Place Alternatives were also evaluated. These
alternatives are discussed in detail in the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the Proposed Relocation of Technical Area 18
Capabilities and Materials at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, DOE/
EIS-0319, August 2002. The preferred alternative in the Final EIS was
the DAF.
As a result of CD-0 Phase 1, each alternative developed a concept
and rough order of magnitude cost estimate. These estimates were
analyzed by NNSA and adjusted to provide equal comparison as shown in
Table 1. It is important to note that the transportation cost estimates
at this time were anticipated to exceed $50 million and there were
concerns regarding the system's ability to support TA-18 SNM relocation
in addition to other requirements.
TABLE 1.--CD-0 PHASE 1 ALTERNATIVE COST ASSESSMENT
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LANL NTS SNL ANL-W
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEC......................................................... 130.6 76.7 129.2 92.7
TPC......................................................... 148.9 95.0 147.6 111.0
Transportation.............................................. 4 52 50 53
---------------------------------------------------
TOTAL................................................. 152.9 147.0 197.6 164.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on this cost information and program considerations, former
NNSA Administrator John Gordon approved the original CD-0 Phase 2 for
this project on July 27, 2001 to proceed with designing a new
underground facility at LANL. While not completed, preliminary
information from conceptual design activities for this underground
facility in conjunction with the events of September 11, 2001,
warranted a re-examination of the NTS option (DAF). The AE chartered a
group to update the initial NTS concept on April 15, 2002 and to assess
life cycle costs. The group completed a special study ``TA-18 Mission
Relocation Project Special Study: Revisit the DAF Concept'' on June 25,
2002. The results showed that the DAF alternative was now a more cost
effective option in terms of construction and SNM transportation (see
Table 2). As a result of new information, the AE approved the revised
CD-0 Phase 2 on August 8, 2002, for the DAF.
TABLE 2.--TA-18 MISSION RELOCATION PROJECT SPECIAL STUDY RESULTS
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LANL NTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Design, Construction and Start-up............. 162.0 96.7
PIDAS Requirements............................ 16.0 ( \1\ )
Transportation................................ 4.0 30
-------------------------
TOTAL................................... 182.0 126.7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ N/A.
At NTS, only DAF was determined to be suitable and capable of
adequately supporting the TA-18 missions. This decision was based on
the fact that other NTS locations would require new construction at a
substantially higher base cost than re-modeling DAF. In addition, the
DAF has long been recognized as under-utilized and it maintains
substantial excess capacity. A decision was made based upon an option
analysis to utilize existing office space at the NTS control point
rather than build new offices near the DAF (with resulting cost
avoidance).
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray
PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LAB (PNNL)
Question. Ambassador Brooks, a draft plan for accelerated cleanup
of the Hanford Site, and the 300 Area in particular, would force
evacuation by 2007 of several buildings within the Pacific Northwest
National Lab (PNNL)--buildings that currently host work for the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of
Homeland Security. Adequate replacement facilities cannot be in place
by the 2007 deadline, making this the first time in the history of the
Environmental Management program that cleanup would require active
facilities to be demolished, and capabilities discontinued and/or lost.
During a House Armed Services Committee hearing last week, you said
the Office of Science, which serves as steward of PNNL, had not yet
asked for NNSA help in addressing the potential loss of national
security capability at the lab. Is that still true?
Answer. The Office of Science has asked NNSA to inventory its
activities at Area 300. NNSA has conducted this assessment and
submitted it to the Office of Science.
Question. Has the Department sought input from your office in
finding a solution to the problems posed by the draft cleanup schedule
for 300 Area?
Answer. The Department has raised the problems posed by the draft
cleanup schedule for the 300 Area with NNSA but has not yet asked NNSA
for solutions.
Question. If the Department or the Office of Science seeks help
from the NNSA, is your office prepared to contribute to the cost of
replacing the facilities lost to 300 Area cleanup?
Answer. We are currently assessing whether or not the NNSA
activities that would be lost at Area 300 justify the considerable cost
of replacing the 300 Area facilities.
Question. Are you confident that the Department is on track to find
a solution that preserves the important capabilities at PNNL?
Answer. PNNL supports the national security of the United States in
a variety of ways and should be commended for its efforts. However,
given that PNNL's 300 Area capabilities only account for roughly 17
percent of NNSA's nonproliferation budget at PNNL, NNSA must evaluate
all available options before it can support the construction of a new
facility to replace PNNL's 300 Area facilities.
Senator Domenici. I want to share something with you just
before we close this hearing. I do not know if I should be
talking about this issue of America with you, but it is going
to be science that is going to make the breakthrough, be it one
or ten, that will once again start creating jobs in America, so
that when productivity increases we will see jobs instead of
what we are seeing now as productivity and no jobs. Most crazy
arrangement of economics we have ever seen. It would seem to me
the breakthrough with brand new technology and innovative
things is going to do it. Where it will come from, I do not
know. I have been pondering what we could do in the Federal
Government as an incentive to have it happen quicker but that
is too tough for me. But I have some people thinking about it.
But frankly, I think you have more to do with it than people
think, because you have the greatest array of scientists and
engineers, when you add your three labs up, of anywhere in the
world. And when you take the Mesa Facility and the CMR
facilities, and those are needed for the stockpile, but
everybody knows that nano-science and micro-engineering,
somewhere from those is going to come that breakthrough. And
the center for it was supposed to be Sandia National
Laboratories in a facility we started because of some things
that nano-science may do for the nuclear weapons. Now, we can
let an institution see and live its day and not do what it is
supposed to do because we do not fund it on time. Or we can
think it is important enough and fund it. So I am complaining
to you that your budget will cause a very big delay in
providing the facilities that are not there, that you cannot
expect great scientists to work in. If you ever saw what they
are working in, they are not going to make the innovative
breakthroughs that we are talking about there. And so I think
the 50 percent reduction in the expected continuation of the
building is not right. I urge that you be considerate of our
efforts to move it back on a path, that it might get built
sooner. Now, that is enough. If you want to comment, fine. If
not.
Ambassador Brooks. I think yes sir is the appropriate thing
for me to say.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Domenici. Okay. With that, we have a number of
hearings for this subcommittee this year and they will be
interesting, but we stand recessed.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., Wednesday, March 23, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]