[Senate Hearing 108-206]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 13, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Specter, Domenici, Byrd, and
Murray.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
STATEMENTS OF:
ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
BUREAU
ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
CONNIE L. PATRICK, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING
CENTER
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN
Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
Today our subcommittee on Homeland Security Appropriations
continues its hearings on the President's budget request for
fiscal year 2004 for the Department of Homeland Security.
This morning, our panel consists of three components of the
new Border and Transportation Security Directorate. These
include the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the
Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center.
We are very pleased to welcome our witnesses this morning:
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, the Honorable Robert C. Bonner; the Administrator
of the Transportation Security Administration, Admiral James M.
Loy; and the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center, Ms. Connie Patrick.
There is another bureau of the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, which is going to be headed by Michael
Garcia, but he has not yet been confirmed as the head of the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. No witness was
available for the Office for Domestic Preparedness which is
also under the directorate.
We appreciate your cooperation with our committee, and your
being here this morning to discuss the budget request for those
activities under the jurisdiction of your agencies. We
appreciate the fact that this is a new undertaking for some of
you in connection with the Department of Homeland Security.
Others, such as Admiral Loy and Mr. Bonner, have had
experiences in those agencies, and we appreciate the fact that
the President and Secretary Ridge have attracted a very
talented and capable team to run this new Department of
Homeland Security.
It is immensely important, the work that is to be done by
this directorate and the Department, and we are going to
carefully consider the President's request and hope that we
will be able to make the correct judgments on allocating the
limited amount of funding that is available to our
subcommittee.
The budget resolution that was adopted limits the amount of
money that can be spent. And, it is our job to try to identify
the priorities and to make sure that the money is being spent
efficiently and in a thoughtful way to protect the security of
our homeland.
It is a pleasure, too, as we draw to a close with our
hearings for this year to work with my good friend, Robert
Byrd, the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, who is the
ranking member of the full Committee on Appropriations and
chose to assume the responsibility as the ranking member on
this subcommittee.
I think it indicates the seriousness of the subjects that
we are dealing with on this subcommittee, and we appreciate his
assistance and work with us as we carry out our
responsibilities.
Senator Byrd.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your overly
charitable remarks concerning me. I am grateful for the
opportunity to serve with you on this committee. You run a
tight ship. You are fair and I consider it a real privilege to
be associated with you in this committee.
I know of no Senator with whom I could have a greater
rapport and a better working relationship. I join you in
welcoming our witnesses to today's hearings. You represent
three of the four major bureaus that comprise the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate. All of them have a
critical role to play in securing our homeland and the
subcommittee looks forward to hearing from them and to working
with them.
The terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia overnight are a grim
reminder that there are people in this world who have as their
aim the destruction of America and the death of its citizens.
It is a sobering morning.
These agencies, this department, and, in fact, this
subcommittee share the duty to do everything possible to
prevent such attacks from happening within these shores. This
subcommittee will provide the resources to protect the Nation.
It is the job of this department to carry out that mission to
the best of its capabilities.
Commissioner Bonner has performed ably in his leadership of
the former U.S. Customs Service. I am pleased that he is
continuing that performance at the Department.
Director Patrick is relatively new to her role in leading
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, but she has
demonstrated her appreciation of the task of training our
varied law enforcement personnel.
Admiral Loy did a superb job when he was at the Coast
Guard, and I appreciate his taking on the daunting task of
establishing a Transportation Security Administration. However,
I am troubled that well into the 8 year--8 month of the fiscal
year, despite a significant shortfall in funding, that Congress
has yet to receive the spending plan for his agency for this
fiscal year.
How can we inquire about his agency's plans for the next
fiscal year when we have yet to receive information about the
current fiscal year? I am well aware that the agency is facing
a budgetary shortfall for this year. And Admiral--and the
admiral is being forced to make difficult decisions, including
the laying off of thousands of airport screeners.
Many members of this subcommittee, including myself, we are
troubled by the allocation of those cuts. I am disappointed
that the administration and the OMB have not supported our
efforts to assist you, Admiral, in bridging your funding gap.
However, this problem must not be fixed--and I put fixed--I
say fixed with quotation marks around it. This problem must not
be fixed by reallocating funds, which the Congress has directed
to be spent on specific programs. Congressional direction must
be respected.
Congress passed several appropriation bills directing that
this agency take certain steps. The President signed those
bills into law. In addition, the Homeland Security Act directs
that funds transferred to the new Department be used for the
purposes for which they were appropriated. These laws must be
respected.
I understand that you are in a very difficult position. You
have a demanding and important job to do. And we will do what
we can on this subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator
Cochran to provide you with the resources you need to meet your
mission.
I only hope that the green eyeshade set downtown is
listening. We cannot secure the homeland on the cheap. Either
we are serious about protecting our borders and our
transportation systems, or we are merely engaged in a public
relations exercise.
In addition, as I expressed last week when Under Secretary
Hutchinson was before this subcommittee, I am concerned that
the budget for the Transportation Security Administration
appears to focus the limited resources only on aviation
security, virtually to the exclusion of other transportation
systems. Our port, our rail, and other transportation systems
are also vulnerable to attack.
And I am committed to doing everything that I can to
address each of these vulnerabilities. I look forward to the
testimony this morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again.
Senator Cochran. Senator Domenici, welcome to the meeting
of this subcommittee.
Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. I am happy to recognize you for any
opening statement you would like to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI
Senator Domenici. I appreciate it, just a brief opening
statement, if you would.
First, I would like to welcome the commissioner, and
Admiral Loy, and Director Patrick.
We are all aware of the events of September 11, and now the
more recent events, and we know we have a very difficult job
ahead of us. We must rethink how we do business and how, in
doing so, to reorganize our government to meet the challenges
of the future. I believe we have accomplished the first two
steps in passage of the homeland security bill.
The next step will be--internal to the Homeland Security
Department, to bring together all of the pieces of the puzzles
to make sure that all of the pieces fit.
It will be our job in this committee to supply you with any
of the missing pieces, including personnel, equipment, and
authorities to do your job properly. I look forward to working
with you--with all three of you in this new Department.
I would like to highlight just a few areas. First, the area
I would like to touch upon is border operations. As a Senator
from a border State, I will work with you, Commissioner Bonner,
to make sure that you get the proper tools you need to do this
job.
It has been 17 years since the Federal Government launched
a major effort to upgrade the United States' borders, and that
effort focused only on the southwest border. I have just
introduced, with many co-sponsors, a border infrastructure and
technology modernization act.
This new bill focuses on the borders of both Canada and
Mexico. The bill has dual goals of facilitating the efficient
flow of trade, while meeting the challenges of increased
security requirements.
It will include more funding for equipment at our land
borders, additional funding for personnel, funding for
training, and additional funding for industry-business
partnership arrangements along the border.
The future of our border successes lie in modernizing these
ports of entry, including new modern technology so that they
are the most modern; not the archaic, ancient border crossings
that we now have in many places. It is important for the border
enforcement agencies of the new Department to work with the
private sector on both sides of the border and reward those
partners who adopt strong internal controls designed to defeat
terrorist access to our country.
My second interest lies in the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center, FLETC. It was important that the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center was transferred to the new
department. It is your job to make sure that the transition of
that bureau of the Treasury Department to the Homeland Security
Department goes smoothly. It is my understanding that there
will be tremendous need for training new officers, as well as
cross-training and advanced training of current employees.
A few thoughts on FLETC. The DHS needs to catalog all of
the Department training activities and facilities. It must
develop short-and long-term plans and analyze agency needs and
maximize the use of current facilities, and project future
capacity needs.
It is very important that Homeland Security use the proven
resources of FLETC before using non-FLETC facilities. I know
that FLETC has an ancillary facility in my State, and you know
about it too, at Artesia, New Mexico. It is growing. It is new,
and it is playing a very important role. I hope that it will
continue to operate as an integral part of your mission.
I have a third interest that I will just briefly mention
and call it domestic air cargo security. I only mention it
because I am hopeful that those in charge of it will make use
of the great capacity of our national laboratories at Sandia
and Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, in helping make this
transport of domestic air cargo and security as easy as
possible, and as modern as possible as quickly as possible.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator, for your statement and
your contribution to the work of this subcommittee.
Senator Murray, I am happy to recognize you for any opening
statement that you would like to make.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY
Senator Murray. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just want to
welcome all of our witnesses. Let me just say that this is a
very important hearing, because we all know the importance of
security since September 11 obviously, but we also know the
economic impacts of the decisions we make in balancing that.
prepared statement
And my State is extremely important. We are the number one
trade State in the Nation and we want to make sure our borders
are secure, that our ports are secure, but that we impact the
flow of commerce as little as possible, because it is having a
severe impact on our State as we struggle with the economy. So
I do have a number of questions to ask both Mr. Bonner and
Admiral Loy in that time period.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
The subcommittee has received a statement from Senator
Campbell which will be inserted in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
Thank you Mr. Chairman and I'd like to thank our witnesses for
taking the time to come talk to us today.
My constituents in Colorado, as well as the entire Nation, are
looking toward this Committee to provide the necessary funds to protect
those who travel our country's skies, seas, railways, and roads. The
three of you here today are responsible for ensuring the safety of our
borders, the security of our skies, and for training the personnel
needed to perform these duties. Not an easy task for any of you, but I
look forward to working with all of you to meet these challenges and to
ensure that our Nation's priorities are well balanced.
While I commend you all for the advancements made in our Nation's
security infrastructure, there are a few concerns I have about possible
loopholes that remain in the security network. There have been many
questions as to whether or not our focus on security is appropriately
balanced in the right areas to prevent additional terrorist attacks.
Our borders, for instance, while more closely watched than they were a
few years ago, still need to be better patrolled, both in the north and
the south.
Security at airports nationwide has improved, though efforts have
focused mainly on passengers and their luggage. Loopholes still exist
in the air transportation of cargo. I also believe that loopholes still
exist with fixed-base operations, or FBO's, as they are called. My
concern is that literally just anyone can get on a private aircraft
carrying whatever they want and go wherever they please.
Port security is no less frightening. About 95 percent of U.S.
imports come by container ship and there are over 2,500 of these ships
at sea. Once these containers come off the boats, the can be driven
anywhere by anyone with a CDL license or placed on a train to any point
in the United States. While Colorado has no such ports, as the Senate's
only CDL-licensed member, I know how easily these containers can move
across the country as soon as they are off-loaded from the ships.
The protection of our borders and shorelines is imperative to our
country's economy which is dependent on travel and the easy mobility of
commerce. Additionally, the people of the United States deserve the
ability to move about our Nation in a safe and secure manner.
I believe that we have made major advancements very quickly by
upgrading our security procedures, response plans, and better training
personnel to react and respond in times of need. This is very important
as no issue is more paramount to me and this committee than the safety
of the American people.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing the
testimonies of our guests and I will have a number of questions to ask
at the appropriate time.
Senator Cochran. I think we will hear opening statements
from each of the witnesses before we get into questions, and we
would encourage you to make summary statements of your printed
statements. We have those statements. We thank you for them and
they will be printed in the record in full.
Mr. Bonner, we will start with you. Mr. Bonner is the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ROBERT C. BONNER
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Chairman Cochran and Senator Byrd,
Senator Domenici, Senator Murray. I am pleased to appear before
you today to discuss the Customs and Border Protection and the
President's 2004 budget request for this new agency within the
Department of Homeland Security.
As you know, on March 1, just 2\1/2\ months ago, customs
inspectors of the former U.S. Customs Service, immigration
inspectors of the former INS, agricultural inspectors formerly
with the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the
Agriculture Department, and the entire Border Patrol, merged to
form the new Bureau of Customs and Border Protection within the
Department of Homeland Security. This means, by the way, that
about one-half of all the personnel of the former INS are now
part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.
Customs and Border Protection is certainly the largest and,
I believe, perhaps the most profound actual reorganization
taking place as a result of the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security.
The creation of Customs and Border Protection means that
now for the first time in our country's history, all agencies
of the United States Government with significant border
responsibilities are unified into one agency of our Government,
into one border agency. When combined with the customs trade,
revenue, and support functions, the new agency, Customs and
Border Protection, has a requested budget of $6.7 billion and
41,000 FTE, and that means that Customs and Border Protection
personnel are over one-fifth of the entire personnel of the
Department of Homeland Security, which is a reflection, I
believe, of how important the security of our borders is to the
security of our homeland.
For the first time, we are now able to take a holistic view
of our Nation's borders and to devise a comprehensive strategy
for the ports of entry and, indeed, for the entirety of our
Nation's border, because now one agency, not multiple agencies,
is responsible for the management of our country's borders.
By unifying the border agencies, a good government reform
advocated in many studies over the past 30 years, I am
convinced that we will be far more effective and efficient than
we were when border responsibilities were fragmented among four
different agencies and three different departments of our
Government as they were prior to March 1 of this year.
I have already moved to unify the management of all of the
inspectional personnel at our border ports of entry by
designating one port director to be in charge of all of the
inspectional functions, customs, immigration, and agriculture
at each of the 307 ports of entry of the United States. And I
have put in place a full-time transition management office to
focus on achieving a fully unified agency as rapidly as
possible.
I also have put into place a clear and understandable chain
of command, from the port directors at all of our 300-plus
ports of entry to Customs and Border Protection Headquarters,
and similarly have established a clear and short chain of
command for the Border Patrol into Customs and Border
Protection Headquarters.
The priority mission of Customs and Border Protection is
homeland security. And for a border agency, that means nothing
less than preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering our country. That is the priority mission of Customs
and Border Protection, plain and simple.
And we need to perform that priority mission without
stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel. We do this,
in part, by pushing our border out, extending our zone of
security beyond our physical borders. We must also accomplish
our priority mission while continuing to perform the many very
important traditional missions of Customs and Border
Protection.
Support from Congress through the fiscal year 2002
supplemental and the 2003 budget has put us in a very good
position to carry out our priority and traditional missions.
Our total program increase for fiscal year 2004 is $338
million. And that funding will help us to develop and expand
our ``smart border'' initiatives like the Container Security
Initiative, our overseas program for identifying and
prescreening high-risk containers before they leave foreign
ports for ports of the United States. I want to thank the
committee members for their support of this initiative in
fiscal year 2003.
Since I announced the Container Security Initiative just
over a year ago, a total of 15 countries representing 18 of the
top 20 foreign container ports have agreed to implement the
Container Security Initiative with us.
The 2004 funding we are requesting will enable us to expand
the program to other foreign ports beyond the top 20. Our
funding request will also support expansion of the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a program in which we
partner with the private sector to protect the entire supply
chain against potential exploitation by terrorists.
So, Mr. Chairman, this new agency, I can tell you, faces
two great challenges. One is merging the border agencies, which
we are in the process of doing; and secondly, fulfilling our
priority and our traditional missions.
But now that all the border agencies have been unified into
Customs and Border Protection, we are in a better position to
accomplish those goals. And with the continued support of the
President, and the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under
Secretary Hutchinson, and the support of this committee, and
the Congress, I am confident that Customs and Border Protection
will play a major role in the Department of Homeland Security
by better securing our borders against the terrorist threat.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to testify
and I would be happy to answer any questions that the members
might have.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonner, for your
statement.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert C. Bonner
Introduction and Overview
Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, Members of the Subcommittee,
it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss Customs and
Border Protection's 2004 budget request--the first ever budget request
for this new agency in the Department of Homeland Security.
As you know, on March 1, 2003, immigration inspectors from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), agricultural inspectors
from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), customs
inspectors from U.S. Customs Service, and the entire Border Patrol
merged to form the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection--BCBP--
within the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate of the
Department of Homeland Security. Now, for the first time in our
country's history, all agencies of the United States government with
significant border responsibilities have been brought under one roof.
With our combined skills and resources, we will be far more effective
than we were when we were separate agencies. I was honored to be
appointed by the President to serve as the Commissioner of U.S. Customs
in September 2001, and now I have the great privilege of serving as the
first Commissioner of BCBP.
I want to thank Congress for the focus and support it provided in
creating the new Department of Homeland Security, and the new Customs
and Border Protection agency within that Department. As the head of
BCBP, I look forward to working with you to ensure that BCBP
successfully achieves its critical mission.
The priority mission of BCBP is to prevent terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. That extraordinarily important
priority mission means improving security at our physical borders and
ports of entry, but it also means extending our zone of security beyond
our physical borders--so that American borders are the last line of
defense, not the first line of defense. And we must do this while
continuing to perform our traditional missions well--the combined
missions of Customs, immigration, and agriculture inspectional officers
at our borders, as well as the Border Patrol. In sum, the BCBP's
missions include apprehending individuals attempting to enter the
United States illegally; stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other
contraband; protecting our agricultural and economic interests from
harmful pests and diseases; protecting American businesses from theft
of their intellectual property; and regulating and facilitating
international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing U.S. trade
laws. We must perform our all important security mission without
stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so important
to our Nation's economy.
Support from Congress through the fiscal year 2002 Supplemental and
the fiscal year 2003 budget has put us in good stead to carry out our
mission. The President's total program increase request for BCBP in
fiscal year 2004 is $338,183,000. These funds will help BCBP fulfill
its mission-critical responsibilities, first and foremost of which is
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States. These funds will continue to support the automation and
information technology programs that will improve overall operations of
the agency, and the traditional missions for which BCBP is responsible.
Key program increases BCBP is requesting in its fiscal year 2004
budget include:
--$61,754,000 for the Container Security Initiative, which will
support continued operation and expansion of the program,
including the stationing of BCBP personnel in additional key
international ports to examine high-risk cargo before it is
placed on ships bound for the United States;
--$16 million for the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and
the Free and Secure Trade Program to increase supply chain
security and expedite the clearance of legitimate trade; and
--$57.8 million for deployment of additional Non-Intrusive Inspection
(NII) technology to increase our ability to detect conventional
explosives, nuclear weapons, radioactive components, and other
weapons of mass destruction.
In my statement, I will discuss these programs and others, and how
BCBP uses and will continue to use them to accomplish its mission. I
would like to begin, though, with a brief update for the Subcommittee
on the status of the standup of BCBP.
Standup of Customs and Border Protection
On March 1st, approximately 40,000 employees were successfully
transferred from the U.S. Customs Service, the Immigration &
Naturalization Service, and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service to the new Customs and Border Protection agency in the
Department of Homeland Security. Each of the agencies merging into BCBP
worked closely to effect the transfer. Prior to and after the standup
of the agency on March 1st, Under Secretary Hutchinson and I both
traveled around the country to talk with employees of BCBP. I am
pleased to report that there is a high level of enthusiasm, dedication,
and commitment to the Department of Homeland Security and to BCBP's
mission. The men and women of BCBP are ready, willing, and able to do
their part to protect our Nation.
Secretary Ridge, Under Secretary Hutchinson and I have established
clear, understandable chains of command for all BCBP personnel, and
have directed that operations not be interrupted. To this end,
effective March 1, 2003, twenty interim Directors of Field Operations
(DFOs) were appointed, based on the twenty-office field structure of
U.S. Customs, to exercise line authority over 317 ports of entry within
their jurisdiction. At each of the ports of entry--land, sea, and air--
interim Port Directors were appointed to be in charge of and
responsible for all the BCBP inspection functions, customs,
immigration, and agriculture. A clear chain of command was also
established for the Border Patrol, with the Border Patrol's twenty-one
Sector Chiefs reporting directly to the Chief of the Border Patrol, who
reports to me.
This is the first time there has been one person at each of our
Nation's ports of entry in charge of all Federal Inspection Services.
We are in the process of competitively selecting individuals to fill
these DFO and Port Director positions on a permanent basis, and that
process should be completed in the near future. In addition, a full-
time Transition Management Office has been put in place to help address
the challenges that come from the standup of any new organization. That
office is staffed with representatives from all the incoming agencies.
Responding to the Terrorist Threat
As the single, unified border agency of the United States, BCBP's
mission is vitally important to the protection of America and the
American people. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September
11th, numerous initiatives were developed to meet our twin goals of
improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and
travel. Funds from the fiscal year 2004 budget will help us expand
those initiatives to ensure further protection of both the American
people and the American economy. Our strategy in implementing these
initiatives--and accomplishing our twin goals--involves a number of
factors, including (A) improving targeting systems and expanding
advance information regarding people and goods, (B) pushing our ``zone
of security outward'' by partnering with other countries, (C) pushing
our ``zone of security outward'' by partnering with the private sector,
(D) deploying advanced inspection technology and equipment, (E)
increasing staffing positions for border security, and (F) working in
concert with other agencies.
TARGETING AND THE NECESSARY OF ADVANCE INFORMATION
Information is one of the most important keys to our ability to
increase security without stifling legitimate trade and travel. Good
information enables us to more accurately identify--or target--what is
``high risk,'' defined as a potential threat, and what is low risk or
absolutely no risk whatsoever. The separation of high risk from no risk
is critical because searching 100 percent of the cargo and people that
enter the United States would unnecessarily cripple the flow of
legitimate trade and travel to the United States. What is necessary and
advisable is searching 100 percent of the high-risk cargo and people
that enter our country. To do this, we need to be able to identify what
is high risk, and do so as early in the process as possible. BCBP has
several programs and initiatives that help us accomplish that task.
National Targeting Center (NTC)
The National Targeting Center (NTC), created last year with fiscal
year 2002 Emergency Supplemental funding, has significantly increased
our overall capacity to identify potential terrorist threats by
providing centralized, national targeting of passengers and cargo for
the first time. NTC inspectors and analysts use a sophisticated
computer system to monitor, analyze, and sort information gathered by
BCBP and numerous intelligence and law enforcement agencies against
commercial border crossing information. By mining the information in
that system, NTC personnel identify potential terrorists and terrorist
targets for increased scrutiny at the border ports of entry. When NTC
personnel identify potential threats, they coordinate with our officers
in the field and monitor the security actions that are taken. Because
multiple agencies both contribute information to the National Targeting
Center and rely on it for information, the Center assures a coordinated
and centralized response to potential threats.
Automated Targeting System (ATS)
The Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is used by NTC and
field targeting units in the United States and overseas, is essential
to our ability to target high-risk cargo and passengers entering the
United States. ATS is the system through which we process advance
manifest and passenger information to pick up anomalies and ``red
flags'' and determine what cargo is ``high risk,'' and therefore will
be scrutinized at the port of entry or, in some cases, at the foreign
port of export.
In fiscal year 2002, we implemented a domestic targeting initiative
at all U.S. seaports using the Automated Targeting System. Under that
initiative, all manifests for ocean going cargo destined for the United
States are processed through ATS and reviewed by trained personnel.
When high-risk shipments are identified, inspectional officers at U.S.
seaports conduct standardized security inspections on those shipments.
Importantly, the goal is to inspect 100 percent of the high-risk sea
cargo. We are already working on putting the same system in place for
cargo transported by truck through the land border ports of entry.
Furthermore, in April 2002, USDA National Information Technology
Center (NITC) received access to ATS. ATS now receives complete Customs
data feed for all ports, with all bills and entries of agricultural
interest.
24-Hour Rule
Common sense tells us that the earlier in the process that we have
information, the more effective and efficient we can be in using that
information to identify high-risk cargo and eliminate potential threats
before they have a chance to reach our ports of entry.
To that end, last year, a final advance manifest regulation--the
so-called ``24-hour rule''--was issued to require the presentation of
accurate, complete manifest information on oceangoing cargo destined
for the United States 24 hours prior to loading of a container on board
a vessel at the foreign port. The regulation also improves the quality
of information presented by prohibiting the vague descriptions of cargo
such as ``FAK'' (Freight All Kinds). The data is processed through the
ATS system, and reviewed by the NTC to identify high-risk oceangoing
cargo.
On February 2, 2003, a strategy was undertaken to ensure compliance
with the 24-hour rule, following a 90-day grace period to permit the
trade to adjust its business practices. The compliance strategy has
involved, for the first time, issuing ``no-load'' orders and denying
permits to unlade in the event of non-compliance. Compliance with the
rule is high, and we are receiving more and better information through
our Automated Manifest System (AMS) significantly earlier in the
process. This greatly improves our ability to detect, deter, and
eliminate potential terrorist threats involving sea cargo before they
become a reality.
Trade Act of 2002--Advance Information on Other Modes
Successful targeting of high-risk goods transported through other
commercial modes is as important as successful targeting of high-risk
goods transported by sea. As with oceangoing cargo, good information
received earlier in the process is the key to that successful targeting
and the application of sound risk management principles.
In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress recognized the importance of
such advance information by mandating presentation of advance manifest
data on all commercial modes, both inbound and outbound. BCBP is in the
process of working through the consultative process called for in the
Trade Act of 2002 to determine the most appropriate advance cargo data
requirements for land, rail, and air cargo. We held public hearings in
January, launching a process of discussion and proposal preparation
that will ultimately lead to our issuing rules later this year. During
this process, we have met continuously with all segments of the trade.
This process will help us ensure that the final rules meet the security
objectives of BCBP while also taking into account the realities of the
businesses involved in the different transport modes.
Advance Passenger Information System
Advance information is also critical to our efforts to identify
individuals who may pose a security threat. Before September 11th,
2001, air carriers transmitted information on international airline
passengers in advance of their arrival to the Advance Passenger
Information System (APIS) on a purely voluntary basis. Legislation
enacted by Congress in late 2001 made submission of this information
mandatory, and funds allocated from the fiscal year 2002 Supplemental
and the fiscal year 2003 budget have enabled us to begin upgrading and
expanding APIS and move to a mandatory program in a very short time. An
informed, enforced compliance plan has resulted in 99 percent of all
passenger and crew information (including those pre-cleared outside the
United States) now being transmitted through APIS in a timely and
accurate manner.
PUSHING OUR ZONE OF SECURITY OUTWARD /PARTNERING WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
BCBP must do everything possible to advance and improve on our
smart border initiatives and push our zone of security outward--that
is, to make our borders the last line of defense instead of the first
line of defense. We have done this on a far reaching basis by
partnering with other countries on our Container Security Initiative,
one of the most significant and successful initiatives developed and
implemented after 9-11. We are also extending our zone of security
through partnerships with Canada, our neighbor to the north, and
Mexico, our neighbor to the south. Those partnerships enable us jointly
to better secure the North American perimeter.
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
Oceangoing sea containers represent the most important artery of
global commerce--some 48 million full sea cargo containers move between
the world's major seaports each year, and nearly 50 percent of all U.S.
imports (by value) arrive via sea containers. Approximately 6 million
cargo containers arrive at U.S. seaports annually. Because of the sheer
volume of sea container traffic and the opportunities it presents for
terrorists, containerized shipping is uniquely vulnerable to terrorist
attack.
In January, 2002, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) was
unveiled to address this threat. Under CSI, which is the first program
of its kind, we are identifying high-risk cargo containers and
partnering with other governments to pre-screen those containers at
foreign ports, before they are shipped to our ports.
The four core elements of CSI are:
--First, identifying ``high-risk'' containers, using ATS and the 24-
hour rule, before they set sail for the United States
--Second, pre-screening the ``high-risk'' containers at the foreign
CSI port before they are shipped to the United States
--Third, using technology to pre-screen the high-risk containers,
including both radiation detectors and large-scale radiographic
imaging machines to detect potential terrorist weapons.
--Fourth, using smarter, ``tamper-evident'' containers--containers
that indicate to BCBP officers at the port of arrival whether
they have been tampered with after the security screening.
Since CSI was announced in January 2002, the program has generated
exceptional participation and support. The goal for the first phase of
CSI was to implement the program at as many of the top 20 foreign
container ports--in terms of volume of cargo containers shipped to
United States seaports--as possible, and as soon as possible. Those
ports account for nearly 70 percent, over two-thirds, of all cargo
containers arriving at U.S. seaports. Within 1 year of our announcement
of CSI, the governments representing 18 of the top 20 ports agreed to
implement CSI, and those governments where the remaining two ports are
located have expressed support for the initiative and a desire to
participate. CSI has been implemented and is already operational in Le
Havre, France; Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Antwerp, Belgium;
Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Felixstowe, England; Yokohama, Japan;
and Singapore, the largest container transshipment port in the world.
We are also operational at the Canadian ports of Halifax, Montreal, and
Vancouver, and will be operational in Hong Kong this month. CSI will be
operational at other CSI ports soon.
We are in the process of formulating the second phase of CSI. Under
CSI Phase II, we will implement the CSI program at other foreign ports
that ship a significant volume of cargo to the United States, and that
have the infrastructure and technology in place to support the program.
We have already signed CSI agreements with Malaysia and Sweden,
covering the two major ports of Malaysia and Gothenburg, Sweden, the
main container port for the Nordic countries. To date, a total of 15
countries (including Canada) have agreed to implement CSI with us, and
at least 7 other countries that qualify have already expressed a desire
to join. Once we have Phase II implemented, we anticipate that CSI will
cover approximately 80 percent of the containers coming to the United
States.
I want to express my gratitude to the Committee members for their
support of CSI in fiscal year 2003. With the $62 million increase in
funding that we are requesting for CSI in fiscal year 2004, we will
complete implementation in the top 20 ports, and expand CSI to other
ports around the world. In fiscal year 2004, BCBP will also continue to
pursue ongoing multilateral initiatives to enhance container security.
Partnership with Canada
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, we have worked
closely with Canada to develop and implement initiatives that increase
security and facilitate travel and trade at our shared 4,000 mile
border. Many of these initiatives have been implemented under the Smart
Border Declaration entered into between the United States and Canada in
December 2001. This Declaration focuses on four primary areas: the
secure flow of people; the secure flow of goods; investments in common
technology and infrastructure to minimize threats and expedite trade;
and coordination and information sharing to defend our mutual border.
By benchmarking our security measures and sharing information, we are
able to relieve pressure and congestion at our mutual land border.
In-Transit Container Targeting Program
One example is the In-Transit Container Targeting Program, which
served as a model for the CSI program. Under this program, Canadian
inspectors are stationed at our seaports in Newark and Seattle, and
BCBP officers are stationed at Halifax, Montreal, and Vancouver. Our
personnel are helping to target and pre-screen cargo containers
arriving at Canadian seaports that are in transit to the United States,
and Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency inspectors are doing the same
at U.S. seaports for shipments in transit to Canada. Approximately $2.4
million in 2002 and 2003 funding has enabled us to develop and
implement this program.
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
Another of these initiatives is the Free and Secure Trade, or FAST,
program. Through FAST, importers, commercial carriers, and truck
drivers who enroll in the program and meet our agreed to security
criteria are entitled to expedited clearance at the Northern Border.
Using electronic data transmission and transponder technology, we
expedite clearance of approved trade participants. The FAST program
fosters more secure supply chains, and enables us to focus our security
efforts and inspections where they are needed most--on high-risk
commerce--while making sure legitimate, low-risk commerce faces no
unnecessary delays.
FAST was announced by President Bush and Prime Minister Chretien in
Detroit in September 2002, and it is currently operational in 27 lanes
at six major crossings along the northern border. Eventually FAST is
projected to expand to all 25 commercial centers located throughout the
northern border. The increase of approximately $3.9 million that we are
requesting for the FAST program in fiscal year 2004 will enable us to
expand FAST on the northern border, as well as develop and implement a
pilot similar to FAST on the southern border with Mexico.
NEXUS
With Canada, we have also implemented a program that enables us to
focus our resources and efforts more on high-risk travelers, while
making sure those travelers who pose no risk for terrorism or
smuggling, and who are otherwise legally entitled to enter, are not
delayed at our mutual border. This is the NEXUS program, under which
frequent travelers whose background information has been run against
crime and terrorism indices are issued a proximity card, or SMART card,
allowing them to be waived expeditiously through the port of entry.
NEXUS is currently operational at six crossings located at four major
ports of entry on the northern border: Blaine, Washington (3
crossings); Buffalo, New York; Detroit, Michigan; and Port Huron,
Michigan. We also recently opened a new NEXUS lane at the International
Tunnel in Detroit. Some upcoming expansion sites for NEXUS include
Niagara Falls, New York; Alexandria Bay, New York; and Pembina, North
Dakota.
Partnership with Mexico
We have continued important bilateral discussions with Mexico to
implement initiatives that will protect our southern border against the
terrorist threat, while also improving the flow of legitimate trade and
travel.
With respect to cargo crossing our border with Mexico, for example,
some of the fiscal year 2004 funds we are requesting for the FAST
program would be used to implement a pilot FAST program on the southern
border. We also continue to work on a possible joint system for
processing rail shipments and on shared border technology.
Another initiative is the SENTRI program. SENTRI is a program that
allows low-risk travelers to be processed in an expedited manner
through a dedicated lane at our land border with minimal or no delay.
SENTRI is currently deployed at 3 southwest border crossings: El Paso,
San Ysidro, and Otay Mesa, and expansion plans are being considered. In
fact, our SENTRI team met with their Mexican counterparts last week to
discuss expansion logistics.
PUSHING SECURITY OUTWARD /PARTNERING WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
Any effort to ``push our zone of security outwards'' and protect
global trade against the terrorist threat must include the direct
involvement of the trade community. The Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, C-TPAT, is an initiative that was proposed in
November 2001 began in January 2002, to protect the entire supply
chain, against potential exploitation by terrorists or terrorist
weapons. Under C-TPAT, companies sign an agreement with BCBP to conduct
a comprehensive self-assessment of their supply chain security and to
improve that security--from factory floor to foreign loading docks to
the U.S. border and seaports--using C-TPAT security guidelines
developed jointly with the trade community.
Companies that meet security standards receive expedited processing
through our land border crossings, through our seaports, and through
our international airports, enabling us to spend less time on low-risk
cargo, so that we can focus our resources on higher risk cargo. C-TPAT
is currently open to all importers, air, sea, and rail carriers,
brokers, freight forwarders, consolidators, non-vessel operating common
carriers (NVOCCs), and U.S. Marine and Terminal operators. As of
October 1, 2002, C-TPAT eligibility for trucking companies along the
U.S./Canada border has been made available through the Free and Secure
Trade Program. (Participation in C-TPAT is a requirement for bringing
goods from the United States into Canada through the FAST lane.) We are
currently developing the mechanism and strategy to enroll foreign
manufacturers and shippers into C-TPAT. The intent is to construct a
supply chain characterized by active C-TPAT links at each point in the
logistics process.
To date, over 2,200 companies are participating in C-TPAT to
improve the security of their supply chains. Members of C-TPAT include
60 of the top 100 importers and 32 of the 50 largest ocean carriers. To
make sure that C-TPAT is realizing its promise, BCBP is developing
expertise in supply chain security. In December 2002, we began
providing training in the security validation process to ten
supervisory customs inspectors. In January 2003, these individuals
started the validation process in cooperation with our C-TPAT partners.
We used $11 million in fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 funds
to begin implementing C-TPAT. The $12.1 million funding increase we are
requesting for C-TPAT in fiscal year 2004 will enable us to continue to
expand the program, including adding new C-TPAT Security Officers and
headquarters staff to help oversee the program.
DEPLOYMENT OF TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS
BCBP depends on a broad range of technology and other tools to
effectively inspect people and goods entering the country, including
technology for detecting weapons of mass destruction, explosives,
chemicals, and contraband. We are requesting a funding increase of
$119.2 million to enable us to deploy a variety of additional
inspection technology and equipment that will increase the number of
inspections, improve security, minimize risks to our personnel, and
facilitate processing.
Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology
For example, non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology provides for
a more effective and efficient, as well as less invasive, method of
inspecting cargo, compared with drilling or dismantling of conveyances
or merchandise. NII equipment includes large-scale x-ray and gamma-ray
imaging systems, portal radiation monitors, and a mixture of portable
and handheld technologies to include personal radiation detection
devices that greatly reduce the need for costly, time-consuming
physical inspection of containers and provide us a picture of what is
inside containers.
The Committees on Appropriations have generously funded NII in
fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003. Along with the amounts funded in
those years, the $57.8 million we are requesting for NII technology in
fiscal year 2004 will enable us to add radiation detection systems and
isotope identifiers on the southwest border, radiation detection
systems and Mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS) on the
northern border, Mobile VACIS at seaports, isotope identifiers and x-
ray equipment for international mail, and isotope identifiers at
Express Courier hubs, as well as additional inspector positions for
deploying and operating this equipment. This technology will detect
anomalies and the presence of radiological material in containers and
conveyances, with minimal impact to port operations in a fraction of
the time it takes to manually inspect cargo. It will give BCBP a
tactical edge in keeping weapons of mass destruction and instruments of
terrorism from entering the United States.
Hardening of Northern Border
After the terrorist attacks of September 11th, efforts were stepped
up to ``harden''--to prevent unauthorized crossings of--the northern
and southern land borders. In addition to staffing increases, the
hardening of these ports of entry involved the installation of gates,
signs, lights, and remote surveillance systems at ports of entry, many
of them in remote locations, along the vast northern border with
Canada. The Border Patrol also deployed additional agents to strategic
locations along the northern border to aid in providing security and
deterring future attacks.
Funding from fiscal year 2003 is enabling us to continue to improve
the northern border infrastructure by deploying additional barriers,
gates, and bollard systems; security lighting; secure communications
(voice/data/messaging capabilities); signage addressing operational
security; and video security systems. We will also continue bolstering
Border Patrol staffing and technology between the northern border ports
of entry in fiscal year 2004.
STAFFING
As important as our efforts to improve targeting, build
partnerships with other countries and industry, and deploy technology
are to preventing terrorism, these efforts simply cannot be effective
if we do not have adequate staffing and training of inspectors, canine
enforcement officers, and Border Patrol Agents at and between the
border ports of entry to carry out our mission. The most important
component of BCBP's success in protecting America and the American
people lies in the men and women who work directly on our Nation's
frontlines.
One need only recall that it was a Customs inspector, Diana Dean,
who in December 1999 stopped and arrested an Al Qaeda terrorist from
crossing into the United States from Canada with a trunk load of
powerful explosives in his car. His mission, as we now know, was to
blow up Los Angeles International Airport.
Inspector Dean relied on nothing but her training to pick up on
Ahmed Ressam's nervous behavior, his unusual travel itinerary, and his
evasive responses to her questions. And thanks to her skill and
professionalism, and the skill and professionalism of her fellow
inspectors at Port Angeles, Ressam was arrested and a deadly Al Qaeda
terrorist plot to do great harm to American lives was foiled.
I am pleased to tell you that in fiscal year 2002, the number of
new customs inspectors, canine enforcement officers, and special agents
was more than doubled. Many of these new hires were able to relieve
customs inspectors who had been sent to the northern border for
temporary duty after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
to ameliorate the huge amounts of overtime being put in by U.S. Customs
inspectors at our ports of entry.
1,025 new immigration inspectors were hired in fiscal year 2002,
and the beginning of fiscal year 2003, 355 of whom have been
specifically assigned to supplement northern border enforcement
activities. The Border Patrol hired 2,050 new agents in fiscal year
2002, and, as of February 2003, a total of 560 Border Patrol Agents
have been deployed all along the Northern Border. It is also worth
noting that 125 additional Border Patrol agents and 4 Border Patrol
helicopters have been redeployed temporarily to the Northern Border in
support of Operation Liberty Shield. We intend to have a total of 1,000
Border Patrol Agents deployed to the northern border this year.
Our fiscal year 2004 budget request includes an additional $13
million to continue to fund journeyman-level pay upgrades for Border
Patrol Agents and Immigration Inspectors. Attrition rates for these
positions are reaching crisis proportions, so it is essential that BCBP
provide to them the upgrade from journeyman-level GS-9 to GS-11 that
became effective for Customs Inspectors in August 2002.
I am extremely grateful for the strong support shown by Congress to
implement critical staffing increases at and between our border ports
of entry. I can assure you that because of them, our Nation is more
secure. The standup of BCBP--and its integration of all the Federal
Inspection Service (FIS) personnel under one roof--gives us the
unprecedented opportunity to make America's frontline personnel even
more effective and efficient in carrying out their duties. In fiscal
year 2004, we will focus on achieving a unified agency and integrated
operations at our ports of entry.
PARTNERSHIP WITH BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
In performing our priority homeland security mission, BCBP will
foster cooperative efforts with other agencies. Because the mission
facing us has components that reach broadly into other agencies both
within and outside of the Department of Homeland Security, such
cooperation is essential to our success. This includes cooperation
with, among others, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(BICE). Close cooperation between agents carrying out investigations
and inspectors conducting inbound and outbound searches at the ports of
entry is crucial for ensuring the continued success of operations that
advance both our homeland security mission, and our traditional
missions, including cooperation with respect to trade fraud,
intellectual property rights violations, controlled deliveries of
illegal drugs, and money laundering.
Automation/Information Technology
Mr. Chairman, no discussion of a successful strategy to protect the
American people and the American economy in the 21st century would be
complete without consideration of the central importance of automation
and information technology to BCBP's mission. The Automated Commercial
Environment (ACE) and International Trade Data System (ITDS) are BCBP's
major automation/information technology efforts.
Automated Commercial Environment
ACE is an important project for BCBP, for the business community,
for our country, and for the future of global trade. If done properly,
it will reform the way we do business with the trade community. It will
also greatly assist BCBP in the advance collection of information for
targeting high-risk cargo to better address the terrorist threat. And
in doing so, it will help us expedite the vast majority of low-risk
trade.
The successful and timely design, implementation, and funding of
ACE is a priority of BCBP. It has been and continues to be one of my
top priorities as Commissioner. Increasing support from Congress and
the Administration for ACE has been essential to the development of the
new system. Funding of $130 million in fiscal year 2001 and $300
million in fiscal year 2002 allowed us to establish the fundamental
design framework for ACE, and to begin developing user requirements for
the new system, in concert with our prime contractor, the e-Customs
partnership led by IBM. Funding of $307 million in fiscal year 2003
enabled us to continue development and begin to deliver on the first
installment of ACE benefits to the trade community.
The development of ACE and the efforts to put its capabilities to
work on America's borders has continued full throttle. Starting this
year, BCBP and trade community users will receive initial online
account capabilities. Ultimately, ACE will enhance border security and
deliver efficiencies to the trade process by providing interagency
information sharing, and real-time, cross-government access to more
accurate trade information. By centralizing and integrating the
collection and analysis of information, ACE will enhance BCBP's ability
to target illicit cargo, illegal persons, and unsafe conveyances. The
trade data will be analyzed prior to arrival, allowing advanced inter-
agency assessment of risks and threats to determine which goods and
people must be scrutinized. Results will determine if, upon arrival, a
shipment is to be examined or cleared for release.
I want to thank Congress again for its past support of ACE. The
continued support of ACE with $307 million in funding for fiscal year
2004 will enable us to keep pace with our schedule for ACE releases in
2003 and 2004.
International Trade Data System (ITDS)
One important, fully integrated component of ACE is ITDS. The ITDS
initiative is an e-Government strategy being designed, developed, and
deployed jointly with ACE that will implement an integrated,
government-wide system for the electronic collection, use, and
dissemination of the international trade transaction data required by
the various trade-related federal agencies. It is customer-focused and
will serve as the government's ``single window'' into international
trade data collection and distribution. Significantly, ITDS will also
improve risk assessment by providing pre-arrival data that allows
border enforcement agencies to perform selectivity and targeting prior
to arrival to assess risk and deploy inspection resources. Over 100
agencies will be integrated through ITDS with ACE, of which 48 have
been identified as having admissibility and export control
responsibilities at the border.
Through ACE, the ITDS will be capable of linking the government's
law enforcement and other databases into one large-scale relational
database that tracks all commerce crossing our borders. ITDS extends
the functionality of ACE by bringing together critical security, public
health, public safety, and environmental protection agencies under a
common platform. That platform will allow businesses to report data
through the use of a single, harmonized data set.
The $11.2 million we are requesting in the fiscal year 2004 budget
for ITDS will allow us to continue to develop and implement ITDS, and
keep us on schedule to have full functionality rolled out by winter
2006-2007.
Other Traditional Missions
Although BCBP's priority mission is preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, we know that we
must--and will--accomplish that priority mission while continuing to
perform our traditional missions well. Included among those missions
are our responsibilities for interdicting drugs at borders and points
of entry, apprehending individuals who enter the United States
illegally, regulating and facilitating international trade, and
protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests
and diseases.
Drug Interdiction
Our counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions are not mutually
exclusive, and one does not necessarily come at the expense of the
other. The initiatives we put in place to prevent terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States will enable us to be
more effective in seizing other illegal contraband, including illegal
drugs. And, it is worth noting that the lessons we have learned in our
battle against international drug trafficking will help us in the fight
against international terrorism. In many ways, our priority mission of
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from crossing our borders
is a natural outgrowth of our interdiction role.
Our heightened state of security along America's borders will
strengthen, not weaken, our counternarcotics mission. As we add
staffing for both inspectors at the ports of entry and Border Patrol
Agents between the ports of entry, acquire more inspection technology,
conduct more questioning of travelers, and carry out more inspections
of passengers and goods in response to the terrorist threat, it should
come as no surprise that drug seizures will increase as well. As an
example heightened security along the southwest land border produced a
dramatic rise in the amount of cocaine seized in fiscal year 2002,
compared to fiscal year 2001. Overall the amount of cocaine seized rose
76 percent at the southwest land border stations. In addition, in
fiscal year 2002, total Border Patrol narcotics seizures included over
1.2 million pounds of marijuana and over 14,000 pounds of cocaine.
Some specific recent examples of our successes against drug
smuggling include:
--On March 23, 2003, BCBP inspectors seized 394 pounds of cocaine in
Miami, Florida. The cocaine was found in false compartments in
the plane walls and ceiling.
--On March 10, 2003, BCBP inspectors seized more than five tons of
marijuana in Laredo, Texas. The load was valued at over $10
million.
--On March 13, 2003, Border Patrol agents seized 83.5 pounds of
cocaine and 3,141 pounds of marijuana in Laredo, with a
combined value of over $5 million.
--During the week of March 1, 2003, BCBP inspectors seized $2.4
million of narcotics at the Hidalgo/Pharr Port of Entry,
including 559 pounds of marijuana, 74 pounds of cocaine, and
4.5 pounds of heroin.
Effective coordination between inspectors at the ports of entry and
agents who carry out investigative activities is essential to the
success of our counternarcotics mission. For that reason, BCBP will
continue to cooperate closely with special agents in BICE to carry out
this mission.
Apprehending individuals entering illegally between the ports of entry
The Border Patrol, now part of BCBP, is specifically responsible
for patrolling the 6,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international
land borders and 2,000 miles of coastal waters surrounding the Florida
Peninsula and the island of Puerto Rico. Their primary task is securing
America's borders between official ports of entry. Foremost, the Border
Patrol's mission is to provide for the national security of the United
States by preventing the illegal entry of people, goods, and contraband
across our borders. Secondly, Border Patrol operations are designed to
detect, interdict, and apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter
the United States or transport any manner of goods or contraband across
our borders. The Border Patrol also maintains traffic checkpoints on
highways leading from border areas, conducts city patrol and
transportation checks, and carries out anti-smuggling investigations.
The Border Patrol executes its mission through a proper balance of
agent personnel, enforcement equipment (such as a fleet of specialized
aircraft and vehicles of various types), technology (such as sensors
and night vision cameras), tactical infrastructure (such as roads and
vehicle barriers), and intelligence and liaison efforts. Often the
border area in which these efforts are brought to bear is a barely
discernible line in uninhabited deserts, canyons, or mountains.
Although the scope of the Border Patrol mission has not changed
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, enforcement efforts
have been accelerated, to enhance Border Patrol presence along the
northern border and to make clear that its priority mission--like
BCBP's--is keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the
United States. As we expand that presence on the northern border, it is
also essential that we expand control of the southwest border.
In fiscal year 2001 and 2002, Border Patrol Agents apprehended a
combined total of over 2 million people for illegally entering the
United States. In fiscal year 2004, the Border Patrol will continue
focusing on strengthening northern border security between the ports of
entry; maintaining and expanding border enforcement capabilities on the
southwest border, with primary focus on the Arizona corridor; and
expanding and integrating technologies with other components of BCBP to
support border control efforts.
Preventing individuals from entering illegally at the ports of entry
With respect to preventing individuals from entering the country
illegally at the ports of entry, BCBP works with the Department of
State to ensure BCBP inspectors have the tools they need to verify the
identity of visa holders and the authenticity of visas issued by the
Department of State. Data on holders of immigrant visas is transferred
electronically to ports of entry. When the electronic record is updated
to reflect an immigrant's admission at a port of entry, that data is
transferred electronically to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services for production of a permanent resident card and creation of
the immigrant file.
More importantly, beginning in 2002, immigration inspectors--now in
BCBP--have had access to photographs and data transmitted
electronically by the Department of State relating to holders of
nonimmigrant visas. This permits inspectors to review visa application
data and verify the identity of the holder. Senior BCBP and State
Department staff met during the week of March 24 to reaffirm their
commitment to these initiatives and to outline new goals for electronic
data sharing that will expand the exchange of data between State and
BCBP, and further enhance both the visa issuance and inspections
process.
Regulating and facilitating international trade
BCBP maintains responsibility for regulating and facilitating
legitimate international trade. With the right level of industry
partnership and the right combination of resources, we can succeed not
only in protecting legitimate trade from being used by terrorists, but
also in actually building a better, faster, more productive system of
trade facilitation for the U.S. economy. The Office of Trade Relations
has helped ensure effective, extensive communication between U.S.
Customs and all facets of the trade community. It remains a central
point through which the trade community can convey issues to BCBP,
especially the broad issues of how we do business together, and how we
improve the security of our country against the terrorist threat.
Protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests
and diseases
An important part of BCBP is the agriculture border inspection
program formerly in the Agriculture and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS). Thus, a significant part of BCBP's mission is preventing
agricultural pests and diseases from crossing U.S. borders, either
through intentional--possibly terrorist--acts, or through unintentional
means. BCBP minimizes the threat of invasive species entering the
United States by conducting inspections of travelers and cargo at our
ports of entry. We have revised the Customs Declaration as directed by
the Committee. The global economy and free trade expansion have
dramatically increased the volume of passengers and cargo arriving in
the United States from foreign locations, and this has created an
increased need for agriculture inspection resources. In addition,
foreign animal diseases, such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD), that
exist in other countries pose serious threats to our livestock industry
and therefore require us to increase inspectional activities at our
borders.
The President's fiscal year 2004 funding request will provide
additional inspections and canine teams that will increase our
effectiveness in preventing dangerous diseases and pests from entering
the United States.
User Fees
User fees make up a significant portion of BCBP's budget. In fact,
combined, they represent over $1 billion of our overall budget. An
additional $1.1 billion in Merchandise Processing Fees is collected as
an offset to our appropriations. In fiscal year 2003, we expect to
collect $991 million in user fees, $305 million of which comes from
fees established under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (COBRA). We expect to collect $1.1 million in Merchandise
Processing Fees in fiscal year 2003. The fiscal year 2004 budget
request assumes that the fees established under COBRA, which expire at
the end of the fiscal year 2003 will be reauthorized.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I have outlined a broad
array of initiatives today that, with your assistance, will help BCBP
to protect America from the terrorist threat while fulfilling our other
traditional missions. We know that this new agency, BCBP, faces great
challenges in merging the border agencies and in fulfilling both our
priority and traditional missions. But, now that all the Federal
Inspection Services and the Border Patrol have been unified in BCBP,
under the Department of Homeland Security, we are in a far better
position to meet those challenges and accomplish those goals. We will
be far more effective working together, than we were as separate
agencies in different departments. With the continued support of the
President, DHS, and the Congress, BCBP will succeed in meeting the
great demands placed upon it, and will play a key role--by better
securing our border against the terrorist threat--in the Department of
Homeland Security.
With your support for BCBP's 2004 budget request, we will be able
to build this new agency, continue and expand our counterterrorism
initiatives, and improve our efforts to protect America, the American
people, and the American economy.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy
to answer any of your questions.
Senator Cochran. We will now hear from Admiral James M.
Loy, Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY
Admiral Loy. Good morning, Senator Cochran, Senator Byrd,
and members of the Subcommittee. First, let me offer my
condolences to the Senate on the loss of Senator Long. I know
that long-serving, distinguished member is on all of your minds
this morning.
Mr. Bonner and Director Patrick, they both work
tremendously in our new Department of Homeland Security and I
am proud to sit with them here this morning. I am pleased to
testify this morning and allow me to congratulate each member
on their assignment to this enormously important committee. As
we work together today, we still are at war, both overseas and
here at home as we try to understand and cope with this 9/11
security environment.
We need look no further than today's headlines, as Senator
Byrd has reminded us, the truck bombs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,
let alone the TOPOFF exercise that is being run in Seattle and
Chicago. This is today's business, and we are in the midst of
it. Thank you, sir.
The global war on terrorism is a frightening notion to many
Americans, because we know so little about this new enemy with
no flag and no borders, but with a hatred that truly seems to
defy our comprehension. And I join you today, representing a
TSA relocated into the Department of Homeland Security. It is
clearly the right place for us, because our mission is 100
percent homeland security.
I can report to you that as a person, we at DHS are working
hard to build the Department's capacity to secure America. Let
there be no doubt it is very hard work.
There seemed to be vulnerabilities everywhere. And the
President has provided the vision, the Congress has provided
the framework, and Secretary Ridge is leading the way to
breathing life into DHS. We will get this right.
I will be brief this morning, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
mention just a couple of words on four things. First to look
back over my shoulder for a moment. I spent 42 years in
uniform. I went to war in Vietnam. I went to Valdez where there
were 11 million gallons of crude oil in Prince William Sound. I
commanded ships at sea. I directed operations that saved tens
of thousands of lives, Haiti and Cuban migrant crises. And I
can truthfully say that this past year has been the most
challenging and rewarding leadership experience of my life. It
continues apace today with no end in sight.
The work is gratifying. The stakes are impossibly high. I
am surrounded by deeply committed patriots and am enormously
proud of what we have accomplished this past year. I am also
enormously appreciative of the patience shown by the
Administration and the congressional subcommittees who provided
oversight and resources as we grappled to meet the 36 mandates
outlined in ATSA.
We literally re-baselined our budget a half-a-dozen times
over the course of this past year, as we learned day by day
what the price tag on one hand and the programmatic direction
on the other should be for this new agency.
We are really still doing that. Week by week, we juggle
both the job description and the budget. I believe that is
pretty normal, as the Congress and the Administration sort out
the expectations that they have for this new agency.
Even as we speak, we continue to sort out a spending plan
for the rest of fiscal year 2003. I hope to have that to the
committee shortly. We have certainly learned from this
experience and want to work closely with you on our fiscal year
2004 requirements so that we can avoid the significant
adjustments necessary to accommodate the allocations not
included in the President's request.
The Congress has been particularly patient with me as we
respectfully disagreed on the size of the screener work force
needed to secure our airports. As you know, we are grappling
with that now as part of our effort to make efficiency and
effectiveness our trademarks at this agency.
You have all heard many times the inventory of
accomplishments this past year, so I will not repeat them. What
I will repeat is the pride we all take at TSA in what we got
accomplished.
Were there holes and bad days and things we wish we did
better? Of course. We were and we are at war. But even those
things we did poorly are being systematically cleared up one by
one. You have my pledge to complete that task. And in the
meantime, we have done a lot of things well, on time, on
budget, and against huge expectations that they simply could
not be done.
Second, the President's 2004 budget seeks $4.81 billion,
about half of which is to be financed by the passenger and
airline fees established in ATSA. This budget is dedicated to
stabilizing and strengthening our essential missions.
The request is some $350 million less than the budget
enacted in the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act.
That is reasonable considering how much of our 2002 and 2003
experience focused on one-time start-up costs, including $1
million per machine and significant contractor outlays.
The President's request seeks funding in five major areas:
aviation security; maritime and land security; intelligence;
R&D; and administration. And the documents submitted itemize
specific dollars for all five areas, and I will gladly go into
specifics during questions.
Third, I would like to comment on a small but very
important group of special projects that we have underway. Much
has been written recently about CAPPS II. I certainly invite
the Committee's questions, but let me just say it will be the
most significant tool we build to contribute to both security
and customer service. We have offered a number of briefs to the
Congress, and they have all been well attended. And we will
provide more as requested.
I understand deeply the privacy implications of the
project, and we are reaching out systematically to gain counsel
and input from all as we build this project and its privacy
strategy. I am absolutely committed to providing Americans a
full measure of both security and privacy, and I ask for your
informed support for this project.
Our Transportation Worker Identification Credential project
is now in its evaluation stage. It will offer efficient and
effective leaps forward in identification and verification and
access control for workers across the transportation system. I
am appreciative of the Committee's support for TWIC and ask
that it continue.
These two projects, TWIC and CAPPS II, provide the
foundation blocks for a ``Registered Traveler'' Program, which
will expedite processing for those who volunteer to meet its
specifications.
Lastly, the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. We have
trained and graduated our prototype class of 44 volunteer
pilots, which we conducted at FLETC. We will learn from that
experience and tweak the curriculum as necessary to press on to
the full scope training that will add another dimension to our
layered security system in aviation.
Mr. Chairman, I want to address just three personal
organizational goals, and I intend to focus on them until I get
them right. The first is to finish the work we started at the
Nation's airports. We crossed the country twice and left a wake
behind us in many places. We must finish the checkpoint
reconfiguration work where needed, and we must finish the
explosives detection installations in many airports across the
country.
A few airports must still be brought to 100 percent
electronic screening. Others must be kept in compliance as the
busier flying season approaches. Equipment must be repositioned
because it had to be installed often in haste and in lobbies to
meet the 12/31/2002 deadline.
There are some airports where simple efficiency and
effectiveness suggest inline EDS installations as the only
reasonable alternative. And my goal is to optimize the use of
every dollar appropriated for this task to get as much of this
work done as soon as possible.
I thank the Congress for the provision of the Letter of
Intent (LOI) tool. It will instantly enable us to negotiate
with airport directors to leverage private sector capital to
accomplish these projects and then reimburse those airports
over multiple budget cycles.
My second goal is hinged to the first. We will aggressively
manage the size of our workforce. I have two staff projects
underway to right-size the screener workforce. One in the short
term, and one midterm, both based on risk management
principles.
I will challenge every position in the model used and
insist the new standard pass the common sense test. I will also
challenge every FSD, Federal security director, to optimize his
or her management of the resulting screener force. That means
we replace attrition over the next couple of months, even
years. The focus as we do that will be on part-time hiring to
provide the flexibility necessary at those airports. We will do
this work with great respect to our workforce but we will meet
the reduction goals and do so with the first skills-based
retention program in this Government's history.
My last focus, Mr. Chairman, will be on building an
adequate administrative support structure in TSA. I must ensure
that we have in place the structure to adequately deal with
contract oversight, workforce administration, EEO complaints,
customer inquiries, and those other classic support functions
that we only talk about when they do not get done well.
Our new H.R. contractors will be held accountable for what
we expect of them. We brought aboard 55,000 people in very
short order and are only now building the H.R. infrastructure
they deserve. These are dedicated Americans employed to provide
us the security we demand, and we owe them the model workplace
that I have described.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, allow me to follow up on the
discussion the subcommittee had with Mr. Hutchinson last week.
Several members asked him about transportation sectors other
than aviation. ATSA is very clear that TSA is responsible for
the security of the entire transportation system. And I take
that charge quite seriously and am close to the first draft of
a national transportation system security plan. We will deal
with aviation, maritime, rail, transit, highways, and pipelines
as the six critical elements of that system.
Our intention is not to necessarily do security in those
other five sectors in the people-intensive way that we were
required to do so in aviation. But we must ensure the other
modes are adequately security conscious.
The Congress has expressed a keen interest in ports and
rail, and I believe my charter is to be able to advise
Secretary Hutchinson and Secretary Ridge as to the security,
status and readiness of the entire system. I look forward to
working with all the transportation stakeholders in the
Congress to eliminate any weak links from our system and to
integrate this work into the greater homeland security
challenge being met by DHS.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions,
sir.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Admiral Loy.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral James M. Loy
Good morning, Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to testify before the Subcommittee on
the fiscal year 2004 Budget request for the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). I join you today representing TSA as part of the
new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Our inclusion in this new
department is both fitting and natural, because our mission is
completely aligned with the mission of DHS. Secretary Ridge is deeply
engaged in fusing together the 22 agencies contained in DHS, and TSA is
proud to be a part of the DHS team working to find efficiencies, make
management improvements, and coordinate the necessary protection of our
homeland.
In a little over a year of existence, TSA has achieved much. We
have met 100 percent of the aviation screening mandates and all of the
other statutory deadlines set by Congress. We have focused on getting
the job done and done well. Although we are off to a great start, there
is still more to do to successfully accomplish our transportation
security mission. Much of this additional work is about understanding
the bigger picture of our national transportation security system,
which is intermodal, interdependent, and international in scope.
We wish to thank you for addressing TSA's critical needs with
additional funding in the War Supplemental. This funding represents
much needed relief in continuing to achieve results that are critical
to our mission. We appreciate the additional resources and are taking
action to fulfill the direction set in the legislation. We are working
with your staff to explain our revised fiscal year 2003 TSA spending
plan. As I recently announced, TSA will be reducing its workforce--
3,000 by May 31, 2003, and an additional 3,000 by September 30, 2003--
in the months ahead. In addition, TSA will reduce the cost for law
enforcement and move away from fixed point stationing of officers, all
the while maintaining appropriate security requirements. TSA also is
working rapidly to implement the provisions of the supplemental
legislation providing assistance to airlines for strengthening cockpit
doors and for TSA-mandated aviation security costs and foregone
revenue. We fully intend to make these disbursements within 30 days as
Congress directed.
Now I would like to speak to you about where TSA is going and how
our fiscal year 2004 budget will get us there. I urge you first to
consider TSA's critical budget needs in the context of where we have
been. We have had to use available resources to build our organization
from the ground up at the same time we have been focused on
accomplishing our mission.
I can report to you today that TSA has produced significant results
during its short existence:
--On Saturday, April 19, 2003 the inaugural class of volunteer
commercial pilots graduated from TSA's Federal Flight Deck
Officer (FFDO) training. After 48 hours of intensive training,
these pilots were sworn in as federal law enforcement officers,
with jurisdiction limited to the flight deck, or cockpit. These
officers add another layer of security to the skies.
--We have identified, intercepted, and therefore kept off aircraft
more than 4.8 million dangerous items, including 1,101
firearms; nearly 1.4 million knives; 39,842 box cutters;
125,273 incendiary or flammable objects; and 15,666 clubs.
--We have put in place a Federalized passenger and baggage screener
workforce, which has been widely complimented as professional,
courteous, and competent.
--We have recruited, trained, and deployed a professional cadre of
Federal Air Marshals, who protect passengers and provide
security on aircraft.
--We have implemented 100 percent screening of checked baggage
through EDS or Congressionally approved alternative means.
I am personally committed to making TSA a model workplace as we
achieve these and even greater results. This means building and
maintaining carefully a professional culture across the organization to
form a foundation for future success. This culture includes:
--Aligning our operational programs with DHS and TSA threat-based
risk management plan;
--Close and constant communication with the entire TSA workforce and
our stakeholders about our mission, vision, values, and goals
and objectives;
--A commitment to rigorous performance management, both at the
organizational and individual levels;
--Creating a diverse and inclusive workplace culture based on mutual
respect, fairness, optimal communication, cooperative problem
solving and teamwork, and enabling all TSA employees to perform
at the highest level;
--Continued targeted investments in critical training and information
technology to reduce the size of the workforce while maximizing
its impact;
--Creating a streamlined and effective administrative infrastructure
to support all our operations.
A key aspect of a true learning organization is to learn from past
mistakes. We had some missteps last fall as we moved rapidly to hire
screeners to meet the Congressionally mandated deadlines for
Federalizing passenger screening checkpoints and complete 100 percent
checked baggage screening. We have learned from these challenges and
will continue to improve in this fiscal year and fiscal year 2004. Over
the past several months, we have implemented several acquisition,
financial, and other management initiatives that address fiscal year
2002 concerns raised by the Subcommittee.
As we build our culture and the organization, we must constantly
focus on our mission. TSA's mission is to protect the Nation's
transportation systems to ensure the freedom of movement for people and
commerce. Our vision is to continuously set the standard for excellence
in transportation security through TSA's people, processes, and
technologies. We have embraced the values of integrity, innovation, and
teamwork as we pursue excellence in public service. TSA also strives to
be efficient and effective in its use of resources.
Our strategic goals provide a clear understanding of our security
responsibilities, including awareness of the full scope of potential
risks; deployment of comprehensive prevention, protection and response
activities; and organizational mandates to optimize performance and
stewardship requirements. We are building a system of performance and
accountability that incorporates a clear line of sight linking every
employee's role and responsibility to the central TSA mission and
strategic goals.
In establishing and communicating our mission, vision and values,
and in identifying our strategic goals, we have given all TSA employees
and the stakeholders we serve a clear agenda of purpose and excellence.
Our budget identifies the programs and resources required to most
effectively achieve TSA's goals.
In accomplishing our mission, we are also acutely aware of the
challenge of maintaining balance--between freedom and security, and
between security and customer service. Our mission is to ensure freedom
of movement for people and commerce, and our process is to meet the
needs and expectations of the American people with the greatest
consideration for their privacy and the least disruption to their
routine behavior. Our top priority is providing maximum security with
minimum intrusion. TSA's fiscal year 2004 Budget of $4.812 billion is
dedicated to stabilizing and strengthening our essential mission. Our
fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2003 budgets included many large
start-up costs, including the purchase and installation of necessary
explosives detection equipment. Although these costs will not recur in
fiscal year 2004, savings are partially offset by recurring costs for
maintenance and administration. Before I summarize the key elements of
our fiscal year 2004 Budget request, I would like to highlight several
programs that I know are items of interest to Members of the
Subcommittee.
--Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System.--Funding in the
amount of $35 million is requested for development of the
second generation Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening
System (CAPPS II). CAPPS II is an automated threat assessment
tool for airline passengers that can be modified based on new
intelligence information and changing threat priorities. It
will enhance aviation security, refine the passenger secondary
screening selection process, and improve airport passenger
flow. We are aware of privacy concerns with this system and are
building strong privacy protections into the system to address
those concerns. We will continue to work with key stakeholders
as development of this system moves forward. As Secretary Ridge
has committed to Congress, we will work closely with the
Department's newly appointed Privacy Officer to ensure that
CAPPS II respects the privacy rights of Americans. We have also
held several briefings, both in closed and open session, for
Members of Congress and their staffs and will work with
Congress to create a better understanding of what CAPPS II is
and is not.
--Federal Flight Deck Officers.--A request of $25 million will
support the first full year of implementation of federal flight
deck officer training, which supports the recently passed
legislation authorizing the arming of pilots. These pilots will
complement the Federal Air Marshals deployed within the
aircraft and will be authorized to act only if the cockpit is
threatened. TSA has established an initial program for
participant qualification and is planning for requalification
certification. Our prototype class just graduated April 19, and
it is expected that the training program will be ready for full
deployment in late fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004.
--Transportation Worker Identification Credential.--This initiative
focuses on developing identification standards for documents to
identify individuals for access purposes. Multiple types of
technology are being evaluated to determine the best approach.
--Registered Traveler.--TSA requests $5 million to develop a
registered traveler program that will pre-screen low risk
travelers so that available resources can focus on unknown and
high-risk individuals.
--Air Cargo Security.--The TSA budget requests $20 million to design
and develop a random, threat-based, risk-managed freight
screening process and continue the development of an automated
and enhanced ``known'' shipper program. It is estimated that
there are 12.5 million tons of cargo transported per year, 2.8
million tons of which is now secured on passenger planes and
9.7 million tons on cargo planes.
--Explosives Detection System (EDS) Installation.--TSA is continuing
to work with airports to install remaining EDS systems and will
continue to ensure that all checked baggage is screened. As
part of our effort to utilize letters of intent (LOI) to
optimize these installations, TSA expects to amend its fiscal
year 2004 request within the proposed funding level to finance
LOI costs. We will do so in the near future.
The five major components of the TSA budget are Aviation Security,
Maritime and Land Security, Research and Development, Intelligence, and
Administration.
Aviation Security
The majority of TSA's budget is centered on securing the air
transportation system, as provided in the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act. The September 11 terrorist attacks highlighted the need
for vigilant aviation security, and there is every indication that
aviation will continue to be an attractive target for terrorist groups.
Our first priority is to protect air travelers by continuing to
build on the aviation security measures now in place at all of the
Nation's more than 400 commercial airports, maintaining a balance
between world-class security and outstanding customer service. TSA has
set into place a system of reinforcing rings of security to mitigate
the risk of future terrorist or criminal acts. These security measures
cover air traffic from curbside to cockpit, supported overall by
intelligence and threat analysis. In full compliance with Congressional
deadlines and mandates, passenger and baggage screening operations are
federalized and meet established standards of screening 100 percent of
checked and unchecked baggage. The screeners we have trained and
deployed put a face on TSA and provide to the American public the most
visible expression of our efforts. Their thoroughness, professionalism,
and courtesy are key elements in restoring and maintaining the
traveling public's confidence in the safety of aviation. We have also
deployed state-of-the-art metal detectors and explosives detection
machines.
TSA has selected 158 Federal Security Directors to oversee air
transportation security, and worked with State and local officials to
post law enforcement personnel at passengerscreening checkpoints. I
appreciate the authority provided by Congress for flexible stationing
of law enforcement officers where we feel it is appropriate. TSA both
performs background checks for TSA airport personnel, and also
undertakes regulatory inspection and enforcement of agency security
directives. We are providing these security measures with a workforce
that is proud of its important work and that has won the respect of the
traveling public.
The $4.2 billion request for aviation security activities for
fiscal year 2004 includes approximately $1.8 billion for passenger
screening, $944 million for baggage screening, and $1.5 billion for
airport support and enforcement.
Fully funding the fiscal year 2004 funding request will allow TSA
to ensure the safety of the traveling public in secure airport
terminals and aboard aircraft. TSA will continue to implement
efficiencies in screening operations, including both technological
enhancements and cross training of passenger and baggage screeners, to
further reduce the reliance on personnel. As a result, our 2004 request
represents a staffing decrease of 3,000 screeners as compared to 2003
levels.
We are requesting $27 million to expand deployment of technologies
to improve physical security at the passenger and baggage screening
checkpoints. We will be augmenting existing surveillance systems
currently in use or planned at many airports, sharing cost and
information with airports.
The President is requesting a total of $45 million for risk
management initiatives to increase the effectiveness and efficiencies
of the passenger screening process. This includes the $35 million for
the CAPPS II project already described above, plus $5 million to
support the creation of a registered traveler program to increase
security while decreasing the hassle factor for travelers. The goal of
such a program is to better utilize available resources by focusing on
unknown and high-risk individuals. Another $5 million is requested to
continue background checks for airport personnel and vendors operating
in secure terminals of an airport to streamline the gate screening
process.
To provide baggage-screening security, TSA uses a combination of
EDS; explosives trace detection machines (ETD), and where necessary
other congressionally approved alternative methods of screening, such
as passenger-bag match, canine teams, and physical search. EDS is
deployed as a cost-effective screening process at many of the higher
volume and high-risk airports, and ETD is deployed as a comparable
screening system of acceptable effectiveness at those airports where
operational factors do not warrant EDS deployment.
In 2004, TSA will continue to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of baggage and cargo screening. We expect ``on-screen''
resolution procedures to reduce many false alarms. We request $100
million for in-service upgrades and maintenance of approximately 8,000
explosives trace and detection devices at more that 400 commercial
airports. TSA will continue to develop information on EDS performance
to assure that our baggage screening equipment and procedures represent
the most effective and reliable operations available.
Consistent with our multi-layered approach, TSA requests $900
million to provide strong security direction and enforcement presence
on-site at the Nation's commercial airports. This funding will support
a numbers of different activities. This includes the 158 Federal
Security Directors and support staff, the required leasing of airport
space and the development of IT infrastructure to support those
offices. These funds will provide resources for working with State and
local law enforcement personnel, where appropriate, to ensure passenger
safety and national security. This funding will also continue the
regulatory screening and enforcement program to monitor security
measures performed by airport operators and air carriers. It is
imperative that a standardized approach to physical aviation security
measures be implemented at the Nation's airports. TSA field inspectors
across the country will perform the regulatory screening and
enforcement activities, which were previously administered by the
Federal Aviation Administration's Civil Aviation Security program.
Finally, this funding includes funds requested to expand the Federal
Flight Deck Officer program to train and arm volunteer pilots.
A request of $600 million will support the full complement of
officer and support staff assigned to the Federal Air Marshal Service
(FAMS). The Federal Air Marshals are an integral part of our layered
rings of security for aviation, defending against on-board passengers
intending to harm an aircraft and our aviation system.
Maritime & Land Security
As the prospect of further terrorist attack continues to loom, the
security of maritime and land transportation systems merits additional
consideration. TSA, as part of the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate, is partnering with other DHS organizations, such as the
Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate
and the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS, to address other
surface and maritime transportation security responsibilities.
The Memorandum of Agreement I have signed with the Federal Aviation
Administration and correspondence I have exchanged with Secretary
Mineta establish the framework for continued cooperation with the
Department of Transportation. We continue to partner with the operating
administrations of the Department of Transportation, that provide a
vital link with the transportation providers to ensure that there is
neither duplication nor are there gaps in critical federal
transportation security initiatives. The framework provides a vehicle
for continuing cooperation and collaboration, and paves the way for
further security-related legislation, rulemaking, resource utilization,
and administration of transportation security grants.
TSA is proceeding on a number of fronts, including.--(1) awarding
grants to improve the security of ports and cargo, (2) working with the
IAIP Directorate and the Coast Guard to design a terrorism risk
assessment tool tailored specifically to maritime and surface
transportation facilities, and (3) working with our other federal
partners to ensure intermodal consistency, where appropriate, in
security regulations for the national transportation system, including
requirements that will facilitate assessing and improving the security
of transportation facilities and infrastructure.
TSA's Maritime and Land operations are continuing to work with
IAIP, the Coast Guard, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
to develop security standards and regulations for all non-aviation
modes of transportation. These efforts will include benchmarking to
establish best practices, industry outreach, and extensive
collaboration with Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies in order
to leverage these agencies stakeholder contacts and transportation
expertise. These standards will not displace or conflict with the
security standards being developed by other federal agencies. Rather,
they will complement the efforts of other federal agencies to ensure
there are no gaps in the security of the national transportation
system.
Specific project funding included in the fiscal year 2004
President's request includes $55 million for the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC), a sophisticated access control
credential, and $2.5 million to complete work on our Operation Safe
Commerce pilot program, to continue to learn the best approach to
dealing with the container vulnerability threat.
Research & Development
TSA is requesting $20 million for aviation related research and
development initiatives in 2004. This request includes initiatives
related to Next Generation EDS ($10.0 million), and Air Cargo ($10.0
million). The Next Generation EDS initiative aims to increase
throughput and lower false alarm rates at equivalent or better
detection performance capability. This program will perform simulation
and modeling of alternative checked baggage-screening technologies, and
expand systems testing of off-airport screening capability. This
research will also explore EDS screening capabilities for small
airports.
The request of $10 million for the Air Cargo Pilot will support
research and development of new performance methodologies in detecting
threats to air cargo. The 2004 effort will continue to address how
existing devices and procedures can best be applied to air cargo, and
to investigate new air technology security concepts, including advanced
sensors for effective cargo screening.
Intelligence
TSA is requesting $13,600,000 to continue to support 100 TSA
intelligence positions in 2004. Included in the base funding request
are base salaries and benefits, including locality pay, and data base
access and equipment maintenance requirements. As part of DHS, TSA will
work to integrate its analysis and products with other intelligence
components of DHS while continuing to support its transportation
customer base with analysis on transportation security and
intelligence. DHS will disseminate information on possible threats as
rapidly as possible to our Federal Security Directors, airport staff,
and airline personnel, current and strategic warnings will be provided
regarding threats to U.S. transportation modes, and trends and changes
in targeting will be identified. TSA is working with IAIP to increase
its intelligence capabilities increase in other transportation areas
and to disseminate information to other key officials.
Administration
Funding in the amount of $421.2 million is requested for essential
administrative support of program activities. This amount represents
less than 10 percent of TSA's total budget request, and provides
financial and human resources support; information technology support;
policy development and oversight; performance management and e-
government; communication, public information and legislative affairs;
training and quality performance; internal conduct and audit; legal
advice; and overall headquarters administration.
Effective use of information technology (IT) is key to TSA's
success, and $145.2 million of the administrative request supports
information technology core requirements, which are being provided
through a managed service contract.
As a new organization, we have used the opportunity of our ``clean
slate'' to create a lean administrative infrastructure that can serve
as a model for other agencies. We have outsourced high volume
administrative activities to streamline Government operations.
TSA's management structure and business processes are fully aligned
with the President's Management Agenda, and we are establishing a
culture of management efficiency through initiative and innovation.
In the human capital area, training and performance assessment will
continue to receive high priority focus and resources, and in fiscal
year 2004, TSA will address human capital planning, standards for
internal accountability systems, and organizational development. We
have stood up a large organization and now must concentrate on building
the infrastructure to support that workforce.
Competitive sourcing has been a key component of TSA since its
inception, and TSA will continue to use the private sector to perform
commercial functions whenever possible and appropriate. For example,
TSA has outsourced the hiring, training, and servicing of screeners;
the design and installation of explosives detection equipment; and the
redesign and reconfiguration of passenger checkpoints. In fiscal year
2004, TSA will continue to pursue contracting opportunities,
particularly in the areas of equipment deployment and financial
management, incorporating robust contract oversight into this process.
Financial management is identified as a fundamental element of
improving management of government programs. At its standup, TSA
implemented the Department of Transportation's Delphi financial
management system. Under the Department of Homeland Security, we are
migrating to Oracle Financials, and exploring the use of Oracle and
other financial systems to meet all Joint Financial Management
Improvement Program requirements and to give managers budget and
performance information on their program operations.
The TSA budget request includes funding to continue to implement
and maintain a comprehensive, enterprise-wide architecture to support
TSA's mission and the President's E-Government initiative. This
architecture will be the transport mechanism for data and will provide
the necessary support services to TSA's major programs. TSA will also
continue its e-government efforts through the implementation of the
TSAWeb to provide public information as well as shared services and all
mission-critical, operational and administrative applications for
internal and external stakeholders.
We will adopt budget and performance integration as the fundamental
structure of TSA's program planning and execution to make sure we
support and fund those programs that make American transportation
systems more secure. We will establish accountability by linking how
much we're spending with what we're achieving. TSA intends to implement
full integration of cost accounting that links costs to performance
goals and therefore to performance results.
I have initiated a rightsizing project that will enable us to
reduce the screener workforce as called for in both the fiscal year
2003 and fiscal year 2004 budgets. Obviously, this will be done in a
manner that is consistent with maintaining the security paradigm. We
will use a riskbased approach to rightsize our workforce and
demonstrate to the President and Congress that we are obtaining the
maximum security and protection for the traveling public from the
resources provided. That is our challenge and I intend to meet it.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, Members of the Subcommittee, we intend
to meet our responsibility for providing security for the Nation's
transportation systems with both sensitivity and common sense, by
meeting core statutory requirements, by developing and implementing
supplementary programs, and by partnering with Federal, State, and
local agencies, and with private industry and other stakeholders, to
advance the mission of protecting our homeland.
The role of the Transportation Security Administration in meeting
this challenge is unmistakable. The nine stars and eleven stripes that
appear behind the American eagle on the TSA logo are a daily visual
reminder of the ``Why'' of our organization. The programs and resources
I have talked about today represent the ``How''. I appreciate the
support TSA has received from this Subcommittee and look forward to
working with you as we continue this important effort. I will be
pleased to answer your questions.
Senator Cochran. We will now hear from Ms. Connie Patrick,
Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR CONNIE L. PATRICK
Ms. Patrick. Good morning, Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd,
and the other distinguished members of the committee. It is a
pleasure to be here with you today to discuss the President's
fiscal year 2004 budget request, our first under the Department
of Homeland Security.
This marks our first opportunity to appear at--for me to
appear before a Senate subcommittee since being appointed the
Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in July
2002.
I want to extend my appreciation to Secretary Tom Ridge and
Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson, who have already demonstrated
their enthusiastic and unqualified support for the vital role
of the FLETC and the role it is expected to play in the new
Department of Homeland Security.
I also want to acknowledge the support the Congress has
long extended to the FLETC. I stand ready to work with you and
direct the FLETC towards successful completion of the
objectives set forth by the Administration and Congress in the
protection of our national security and interests.
The two pillars upon which FLETC was founded are quality in
training and economy of scale. Neither of these can be achieved
without the cooperation of our partner agencies. There are now
75 partner agencies who train at the FLETC. And we all train
under the concept of consolidated training, which means we
share training knowledge and experience, funds, and law
enforcement training uniformity and standardization to
accomplish the mission.
FLETC is now 33 years old. We have trained more than
500,000 agents and officers across government, and have
graduated them from both agent and officer training programs.
Those programs include statutory requirements for law
enforcement, as well as ethical training, firearms, physical
training, investigative skills and techniques. I think it is
important to mention that for every dollar given to training,
it goes not directly to one agency, but to 75 agencies.
Mr. Chairman, as we enter a new era in law enforcement
operations in the United States, I believe that FLETC is a
great example of a government approach intended by the
legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security, a
means to harmonize the work of many law enforcement agencies
through common training, while at the same time maintaining
quality and cost efficiency.
In fiscal year 2003, 65 percent of the FLETC's projected
workload will come from the nine law enforcement agencies
transferred into Homeland Security. In fiscal year 2004, this
work will continue to be above 50 percent of our estimated
total Federal training workload. And within the last week those
numbers have been reported to me to be approximately 73 percent
of our workload, will come from the nine law enforcement
agencies now in Homeland Security. In addition to that, we
maintain robust State, local, and international law enforcement
training activities, many of which will help further complement
the mission to secure our homeland.
Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary
Hutchinson, FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of
DHS. FLETC, as a member of DHS, will help support the unity of
command and the coordination and efficiency themes sought in
the public law that created the Department.
FLETC has a long history of service to many of the DHS
components, to include the Secret Service, the Customs and
Immigration and Naturalization Services, including the Border
Patrol, the Federal Protective Service, and most recently, the
Transportation Security Administration.
With the establishment of the Bureaus of Customs and Border
Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is
ready to help facilitate, develop, and implement new training
and cross-training programs. We recognize that much of this
effort and expertise will necessarily come from the agencies
involved, and that there will be significant adjustments made
over time to all DHS-related training programs, basic and
advanced. We are already involved in a systematic review of the
existing training for these new entities to address the need to
meld the duties of the participants. In the meantime, training
will continue unabated to achieve the expectations of our
agencies.
FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST
In this fiscal year 2004 budget, the President submitted a
budget request for the FLETC that included an operating
expenses appropriation of approximately $122 million, and 754
FTE. The request for the Capital Acquisitions appropriation is
approximately $24 million, for a total request of just over
$146 million.
FLETC's overall fiscal year 2004 budget is $206.058 million
based on an estimated $60 million in funds to be reimbursed by
partner agencies for certain training and related services. As
a matter of long-established fiscal policy, the FLETC
operations are partially covered by agency reimbursements in
addition to the appropriation authorized by Congress.
Essentially, this has evolved to a point where FLETC funds the
mandated entry-level training and facility development and
operations, while the participating agencies reimburse us for
certain training costs and support.
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS
As part of my discussion, I would like to provide you with
a brief overview of the operations of FLETC. We conduct both
basic and advanced training for the vast majority of the
Federal law enforcement officers in the United States. We
provide training for State, local, and international officers
in specialized program areas and support the training provided
by our partner agencies that is specific to their individual
mission needs.
In addition to our onsite training at the FLETC residential
facilities, some advanced training, particularly for State,
local, and international law enforcement, are exported to
regional sites, many of which are in your States, and that
provides a lower cost of training to our customers, as well as
making it more convenient for them to obtain training.
WORKLOAD
As a result of the September 11 attacks, our partner
agencies' workload have increased significantly. We are
projecting the greatest increase in training requirements in
our history. And to give you just a scale on that, before 2001,
our highest training workload was about 25,000 students. This
year we will train approximately 37,000, and the numbers
projected for next year are somewhere around 55,000 students.
Over the years, the FLETC has experienced a number of
periods of sustained growth in the training requests by its
partner agencies, and we have been able to accommodate those by
being innovative in the use of our existing resources. To meet
the training needs, the FLETC continues to work on a 6-day
workweek at the Glynco facility, which we began in January of
2002.
This format allowed FLETC to accelerate training to get
students on the streets more quickly. In fact, we have
graduated about 2,000 more students this year than we would
have had we not been on a 6-day work week, just to meet the
needs of our agencies, primarily those in DHS.
FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION MASTER PLAN
For future planning purposes, FLETC contracted with a
private firm experienced in facility planning to conduct a
study that will project future facility requirements. This
study should be completed shortly. It is a three-phase plan
that will place emphasis on eliminating capacity shortcomings
at all FLETC sites.
It is important to point out that as we consider the plan
to be--that we consider this plan to be a living document that
may still undergo significant changes in the future as the
requirements of DHS agencies become clearer.
SELECTED ACHIEVEMENT HIGHLIGHTS
Very briefly, I would like to discuss just a couple of the
specific achievements based on the support Congress and the
Administration have given us. We have exceeded all of our
performance targets. We completed our third year of a financial
audit with an unqualified opinion. We have begun partnering
with the Office of Personnel Management to provide law
enforcement training on the new GOLEARN site. This partnership,
initiated on January 20th of 2003, provides the first-responder
communities secured, encrypted access to both general and
customized law enforcement training. We are very excited about
the great opportunities that lie ahead in the field of
technology through the use of blended learning, combining the
best uses of distance learning and hands-on residential
learning.
And finally, I want to note the progress that has been made
in the area of accreditation and standardization. This project
is fully underway, working in collaboration with Federal
agencies, including the FBI, DEA, and the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service; private organizations; professional
associations; and others to develop a format to accredit
training facilities, the instructors, and programs and courses
provided by every Federal law enforcement training
organization. When this is fully implemented, it may prove to
be one of the more far-reaching impacts that we have seen in
law enforcement since the establishment of consolidated
training itself.
CONCLUSION
In closing, let me assure you that we are ready to provide
the highest quality law enforcement training at the lowest
possible cost. Substantial savings is being realized through
the operation of consolidated training sites. We are aware of
the important opportunities and challenges that remain ahead. I
want to publicly commend the remarkable people at FLETC and in
our partner agencies who have contributed so much to the
success of consolidated training. This concludes my prepared
statement, and I would be pleased to answer any questions that
you might have at this time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Connie L. Patrick
Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be with you today, and I am pleased
to discuss the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request for the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)--its first under the
Department of Homeland Security.
OPENING REMARKS
This marks the first occasion that I am appearing before the
Homeland Security Subcommittee since my appointment as Director of the
FLETC in July 2002. I want to extend my appreciation to Secretary Tom
Ridge and Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson, who have already demonstrated
their enthusiastic and unqualified support for the vital role the FLETC
is expected to play in the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I
also want to acknowledge the generous support the Congress has long
extended to the FLETC. I stand ready to work with you and direct the
FLETC towards successful completion of the objectives set forth by the
Administration and Congress in the protection of our national security
and interests.
The two pillars upon which the foundation of the FLETC was formed
are quality in training and economy of scale. Neither of these can be
achieved without the cooperation of our partner agencies. More than 75
Federal agencies are now participating in the FLETC concept of
consolidated training, which means shared training knowledge and
experiences, better use of available funds, and law enforcement
training uniformity and standardization. During its 33-year history,
more than 500,000 agents and officers, across all three branches of
government, have graduated from training conducted at FLETC, ranging
from individual agency statutory enforcement responsibilities and the
more common elements of training required for all agencies, including
ethics, firearms use, physical training, and investigative skills and
techniques. Furthermore each dollar provided to FLETC goes for the
benefit and use of every partner organization.
Mr. Chairman, as we enter a new era in law enforcement operations
in the United States, I believe the FLETC is a good example of the new
government approach intended by the legislation creating the DHS: a
means to harmonize the work of many law enforcement agencies through
common training, while at the same time maintaining quality and cost
efficiency. In fiscal year 2003, 65 percent of the FLETC's projected
training workload will come from nine law enforcement agencies
transferred to the new Homeland Security department. In fiscal year
2004, this workload will continue to be above 50 percent of our
estimated total Federal training workload. In addition, FLETC maintains
robust State, local, and international law enforcement training
activities, many of which will help further complement the mission to
secure the homeland.
Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary
Hutchinson, FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of DHS.
Placing FLETC within the DHS will help to support the ``unity of
command'' and the coordination and efficiency themes sought in the
public law that created DHS. FLETC has a long history of service to
many of the DHS components--the U.S. Secret Service, the former Customs
and Immigration and Naturalization Services including the U.S. Border
Patrol (USBP), the Federal Protective Service and more recently, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
With the start-up of the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is ready to help
facilitate, develop, and implement new training and cross training
programs. We recognize that much of this effort and expertise will
necessarily come from the agencies involved, but there likely will be
significant adjustments made over time to all DHS-related training
programs, basic and advanced. Already, an effort is underway to
systematically review existing training for these new entities and to
address whatever capabilities are needed to meld the duties of the
participants. In the meantime, training will continue unabated to
achieve all of the hiring expectations of our agencies.
Our experience with the TSA is evidence of our capability to work
collaboratively, flexibly and quickly. For example, together our two
agencies developed and implemented a new Federal Air Marshal (FAM)
training program within days of the September 11, 2001 attacks. FLETC
also assisted in the development of the security screeners prototype
training and is currently assisting in the prototype of a Federal
Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) training program.
FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST
In his fiscal year 2004 budget, the President submitted a budget
request for the FLETC that included an Operating Expenses (OE)
appropriation of $122,379,000 and 754 full-time equivalents (FTE). The
request for the Capital Acquisitions (CA) appropriation is for
$23,679,000 and provides funding for all of the cyclical maintenance
and upkeep of our permanent sites, including renovation of several
older facilities in Glynco, GA.
Together, the OE and CA fiscal year 2004 requests total
$146,058,000. FLETC's overall fiscal year 2004 budget is $206,058,000
based on an estimated $60,000,000 in funds to be reimbursed by partner
agencies for certain training and related services. As a matter of long
established fiscal policy, the FLETC operations are partially covered
by agency reimbursements in addition to the appropriation authorized by
Congress. Essentially, this has evolved to a point where FLETC funds
the mandated entry level training and facility development and
operations, while the participating agencies reimburse us for certain
training costs and support.
The fiscal year 2004 budget also revises FLETC performance measures
to align them with the organization's mission and funding, consistent
with the President's Management Agenda for budget and performance
integration.
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS
As part of my fiscal year 2004 budget discussion, I would like to
provide the Committee with a brief overview of the operations of the
FLETC and the resulting workload.
The FLETC conducts basic and advanced training for the vast
majority of the Federal Government's law enforcement officers. We also
provide training for State, local, and international law enforcement
officers in specialized areas, and support the training provided by our
partner agencies that is specific to their individual mission needs.
There are now more than 200 separate training programs offered through
the FLETC and its partners. Twenty-three agencies maintain training
academy operations at Glynco, GA, three are housed at Artesia, NM and
one is located in Cheltenham, MD.
The FLETC provides entry-level training programs in basic law
enforcement for police officers and criminal investigators, along with
advanced training programs in areas such as marine law enforcement,
anti-terrorism, computer forensics, health care fraud, and
international banking and money laundering. Training is conducted at
Glynco, GA, Artesia, NM, and Charleston, SC facilities.
The Charleston, SC site was established in fiscal year 1996 to
accommodate a large increase in the demand for basic training,
particularly the former USBP. The training workload increase over a
period of years for the former USBP and other former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) training categories was the direct result
of initiatives to control illegal immigration along the United States'
borders. That training is expected to continue to be of substantial
importance with respect to the integration of border personnel and
functions.
In addition to the training conducted on-site at the FLETC's
residential facilities, some advanced training, particularly for State,
local, and international law enforcement, is exported to regional sites
to make it more convenient and affordable for our customers. The use of
export sites for other types of training has proven to be highly
successful. In using these sites, most of which are local police
academies, the FLETC does not incur any capital expenditure
obligations.
WORKLOAD
During fiscal year 2002, the FLETC graduated 32,092 students,
representing 160,677 student-weeks of training. This total included
22,158 students who were trained at Glynco, GA; 5,952 students trained
at Artesia, NM; 959 students trained at the training site in
Charleston, SC; and 3,023 students trained in export programs. There
were 19,881 basic students; 9,188 advanced students; and 3,023
international students trained, providing for an average resident
student population (ARSP) of 3,090.
As a result of the tragic September 11th attacks, our partner
agencies' workload projections increased significantly. FLETC is
projecting the greatest increase in training requirements in its
history. In fiscal year 2003, the FLETC will train 37,848 students
representing 205,692 student-weeks of training. This total includes
30,184 students to be trained at Glynco, GA; 3,423 students at Artesia,
NM; 1,899 students in Charleston, SC; and 2,342 students in export
programs. A total of 22,746 basic students; 12,760 advanced students;
and 2,342 international students are projected for a total ARSP of
3,956. Simply stated, this growth is unprecedented.
Over the years, the FLETC has experienced a number of periods of
sustained growth in the training requests by its partner agencies, and
we have been able to accommodate most of these increases by being
innovative in the use of our existing resources. To meet the training
needs, the FLETC continues the 6-day workweek at Glynco, GA that was
started in January 2002. By implementing this format, FLETC will be
able to accelerate training to get students graduated more quickly and
``on the streets''. Our inclusion of an additional day of training
resulting in a 6-day workweek in fiscal year 2002, and into fiscal year
2003, has enabled us to graduate over 2,000 more law enforcement
officers and agents than we could have graduated on the normal 5-day
workweek. Through the use of a multi-year reemployed annuitant hiring
authority granted by the Congress in the Supplemental Appropriations,
fiscal year 2002 (Public Law 107-206); careful scheduling of
instructors and programs; and other measures, good progress has been
maintained in meeting requirements. The fiscal year 2004 budget request
includes sufficient funding to provide the level of training being
requested by our Partner Agencies.
FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION MASTER PLAN
I would also like to brief you on the status of the progress that
has been made in expanding the FLETC's facilities. The FLETC initiated
a multi-year facilities construction program at the end of the last
decade in order to meet the training growth needs of our partner
organizations. Following the terrorist incidents of September 11, 2001,
FLETC sites have been used nearly to capacity. For future planning
purposes, FLETC contracted with a private firm experienced in
facilities and site development to conduct a study that includes
Artesia, NM; Glynco, GA; and Cheltenham, MD. The study, which should be
completed in late spring, is a three-phase plan that places emphasis on
eliminating the capacity shortcomings of Center facilities. With
respect to facility construction, I also wanted to take a moment to
discuss the Washington DC area site and some other accomplishments.
Initial funds were appropriated in fiscal year 2001 for the
development of a training site within the Washington, DC area,
primarily for short-term requalification training and as a site for in-
service U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) training. The site ultimately
selected, following an extensive review of available Federal sites, was
the former naval communications base in Cheltenham, MD. Since assuming
ownership of the Cheltenham, MD property, excellent progress is being
made in design and development work. A completely enclosed and
environmentally-safe firearms complex is under construction and
expected to be completed in the fall of 2003, and construction will
begin on a vehicle training complex for non-emergency, obstacle and
pursuit driving and related support facilities in the next month or so.
Also, consistent with appropriations, FLETC placed the highest priority
on completion of an in-service academy operation for the USCP, for
which the dedication and opening ceremony was conducted in September
2002. The new building contains classrooms, offices and support
capabilities to train 50-100 officers at any one time.
Also, design work already has been completed and construction begun
for most of the remaining projects, the majority of which will be
completed by late 2003. The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department (MPDC) has transferred $4,000,000 to FLETC to help defray
the cost of the firearms range complex. MPDC is one of the principal
agencies specifically incorporated into the legislation as a partner
organization at Cheltenham, MD. In total, the FLETC projects more than
60 agencies in the Washington, DC area will receive requalification
training at Cheltenham, MD when it is opened.
With respect to other construction, I should note that in Artesia,
NM the new Administration Building was completed this year. We expect
to complete the new dining hall in June. Design has begun on a new
classroom building that was funded in the fiscal year 2003
appropriation. In Glynco, GA, the new Port-of-Entry Building became
operational in March 2003. Later this year we plan to complete the
renovation or construction of the Indoor Firearms Building, the
Administrative Building and the Anti-Terrorism Building. Next year we
plan to complete a Firearms Multi-Activity Building and an indoor
Firearms range.
SELECTED OTHER ACHIEVEMENT HIGHLIGHTS
I would also like to discuss briefly some of the FLETC's other
specific achievements based on the past support of Congress and the
Administration.
In fiscal year 2002, the Center's overall performance against its
most critical performance target, the Student Quality of Training
Survey measure, was very good. A total of 99.3 percent of all
graduating basic training students expressed satisfactory or higher
rating of their training. Also, the FLETC's training costs measurement
was below the cost figure established for the variable unit cost per
basic student-week of training. The plan projected a weekly cost of
$927, and the actual cost was $802. The volume of training conducted
and the efficient management of facilities scheduling allowed us to
realize reductions in costs.
In fiscal year 2002, the FLETC had its third complete audit of its
financial records and systems and received another ``unqualified
opinion'' for its operations. By changing processes and procedures, the
FLETC has been able to meet mandated goals. Systems standardization and
integration played major roles in achieving fast-close and data quality
end-of-year submissions.
During fiscal year 2002, on behalf of U.S. law enforcement
agencies, FLETC assumed the lead for the establishment of a United
States International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) operation in
Gaborone, Botswana, the first of its kind on the African continent. The
official opening ceremonies were conducted in March 2003, with the
President of Botswana and other African nation dignitaries
participating. The academy, like similar sites in Europe and the Far
East--under the joint direction of the Departments of State, Justice
and now Homeland Security--is providing training to law enforcement
officers from nations throughout that region, and is jointly funded by
the Government of Botswana and the U.S. Department of State.
The FLETC also has begun partnering with the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to provide law enforcement training on the new OPM
GOLEARN.gov training site. This partnership initiated on January 20,
2003, provides the first responder communities (law enforcement,
firefighter, public safety and health, and security personnel) secure,
encrypted access to both general and customized law enforcement
training. We are excited about the great opportunities that lie ahead
in the field of this technology through the use of ``blended learning''
--combining the best uses of distance learning and hands-on residential
learning.
Finally, I want to note the progress that is being made in the area
of accreditation and standardization of Federal law enforcement
training based on an fiscal year 2002 appropriation and other
authorized funds. This project is fully underway. FLETC is working in
collaboration with Federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service; private organizations; professional associations;
and others, to develop a format to accredit training facilities,
instructors, and programs and courses provided by every Federal law
enforcement organization. When fully implemented over the next several
years, this project may prove to have the most far-reaching impact on
the way law enforcement training is conducted at the Federal level
since the establishment of consolidated training itself.
CLOSING
In closing, let me assure you that FLETC is committed to providing
the highest quality law enforcement training at the lowest possible
cost. Substantial savings are being realized through the operation of
consolidated training sites. We are also aware of the important
opportunities and challenges that lay ahead.
The fiscal year 2004 budget request provides the resources to
enable the FLETC to manage its responsibilities and continue to serve
as a leading Government provider of high-quality law enforcement
training to Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers. With
the requested funds, the FLETC will provide cost-effective and
contemporary law enforcement training, support the specialized training
needs of State, local and international agencies, and deliver
preventive and investigative law enforcement methodologies and
terrorism training. I look forward to continuing to work with you and
your support to successfully accomplish these objectives.
I also want to publicly commend the remarkable people at FLETC and
in our partner agencies who have contributed so much already to the
success of consolidated training. Their talented assistance will
continue to be of great benefit.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have at this time.
COBRA FEES
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Ms. Patrick.
Mr. Bonner, I am going to ask each of you a question or two
and--because we have several Senators here this morning, I am
going to limit my initial round of questioning to 5 minutes and
hope that other Senators will limit theirs to that time as
well. We will continue to go around as long as Senators have
questions to ask.
In connection with the fees that are collected by your
bureau, these are authorized by law. There are many different
fees, as you know, immigration user fees, agriculture
inspection fees. Some were authorized back in 1985 in the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA).
The fees authorized by the COBRA expire as a matter of law
at the end of this fiscal year. My question is, do you have a
plan in place for making a recommendation to the Congress for
new legislation authorizing the continued collection of fees,
because well over $300 million worth of fees are going to be
collected under that Act? It seems to me that if you have not
started that process you need to start thinking about what you
are going to recommend to the Congress in the way of new
authority to collect fees.
Mr. Bonner. Yes. Senator, you are absolutely right. A very
important part of our funding comes from, and historically has
come from, the so-called COBRA fees. And a large percentage of
those are the air passenger user fees. Those have been used
historically to fund virtually all of the U.S. Customs
overtime, as well as approximately 1,100 to 1,200 actual FTE,
in other words, Customs inspection positions.
And those fees sunset, or expire, at the end of this fiscal
year. The ideal plan would be that we would get appropriated
funding to cover these, but I believe the plan that we are
pursuing right now is to ask the Congress and this committee to
extend these COBRA fees beyond the end of this fiscal year.
And, in fact, if that does not happen, we will have a gap
in the Customs and Border Protection budget of around $250
million, because that is how much is generated right now
primarily through air passenger user fees to support all of our
overtime, and these 1,100 to 1,200 FTE.
This is consistent with the Administration's request that
when the budget came over the Administration has taken the
position that it would be desirable to extend these COBRA fees,
including the air passenger user fee.
So that would be our plan. I am very hopeful that there
will be an extension for 1 or more years of these user fees, so
that we can continue to fund the overtime and inspectional
positions that are supported by these user fees.
TSA SCREENER REDUCTIONS
Senator Cochran. Admiral Loy, you recently announced that
you were going to reduce the number of airport screeners, those
who work looking at baggage and performing other security
responsibilities at our Nation's airports. A lot of cutbacks
are going to be made. I trust savings will be achieved in this
effort.
But, in doing that, you have established some categories in
terms of size and employments at airports. One of our airports
notified me that thinks it has been miscategorized. They have
been put in a lower category than they think they ought to be
in terms of the number of screeners. Specifically, this is the
Biloxi/Gulfport or Gulfport/Biloxi airports depending on which
town you are in, that is how you say that--you have got to be
careful--on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, and it has been growing
pretty rapidly down there in terms of the amount of business it
handles. How would they go about appealing that decision, if
they believe it is a factual miscalculation, and they are going
to end up having to reduce screeners way beyond what they would
have if they had been accurately categorized?
Admiral Loy. Mr. Chairman, we are obviously after the truth
and the right data to use for this enormously important
calculation. We have challenged our Federal security directors
responsible for all the 430 airports across our country to work
with our airport directors in the aftermath of having received
the figures that we provided. And should there be some
structural error like you were just describing, we will work
with that airport to get the right number.
FLETC FACILITIES EXPANSION
Senator Cochran. Ms. Patrick, I heard you talk about the
growth in the capacity that you are going to experience in
terms of training Federal law enforcement officials. I assume
this is going to require expansion of facilities or upgrading
of facilities. Is there, in this budget, funding being
requested for that purpose so you can accommodate the new
responsibilities of the Center?
Ms. Patrick. There are no capital acquisition items in this
budget proposal. However, we are currently conducting a study
to determine our capacities, not only at FLETC facilities, but
at all of those facilities that are within DHS.
And prior to coming into the Department of Homeland
Security, we did not have jurisdiction over those facilities.
And now that we are all co-located within DHS, Mr. Hutchinson
has asked us to look at capacities to be gained for the benefit
of all, at all those facilities, and that study is currently
underway.
We believe that we will be able to meet this year's goals
and our master plan, 15-year master plan, will be completed
this year, and we will have submissions for the fiscal year
2005 budget that will have capital acquisition within it.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, members of the panel. We have a good audience
this morning. Someone said something about looking over their
shoulder. There are plenty of people watching you. I think it
was Milton who said, ``They also serve who only stand and
wait.''
U.S. VISIT
Commissioner Bonner, one crucial component of providing for
homeland security is ensuring that we, as a Government, know
which foreigners are visiting our country, why those foreigners
are here, and that those foreigners depart when they are
required to do so. Our existing visa tracking systems are not
doing the job.
According to your budget justification documents, the
illegal alien population has risen to record levels. The
undocumented alien population has grown from approximately 3
million in 1990 to an estimated 9 million today. In other
words, it has tripled in 10 years.
Your department estimates that approximately 40 percent of
those 9 million individuals are aliens who arrived in this
country lawfully, but who had subsequently violated the terms
of their non-immigrant status. These are the 3.5 million
individuals that an effective entry/exit system should track.
The budget before us requests $480 million for the new
entry/exit visa tracking system. This is $100 million over last
year's level of funding. Recently, Secretary Ridge announced a
major change in the program proposing to create the U.S. VISIT
system and to add biometric identifiers to the mix.
An entry/exit system was originally authorized by the
Congress in 1996. A September 1998 deadline to get the system
up and running was not met. A March 2001 deadline was not met.
Now, the Department is required to meet a December 2003
deadline, 7 years after an entry/exit system was originally
authorized. Why should this subcommittee--Commissioner Bonner,
why should this subcommittee believe that the Department is
going to be successful in meeting the deadline for getting this
system up and running? It has not done very well thus far.
Mr. Bonner. Well, I would say, Senator Byrd, the Government
has not done very well in getting it up and running given the
history, but it is a new era. That is number one.
The agency that was responsible for implementing the entry/
exit system was the INS. It was part of the Justice Department.
I think there is some issue, by the way, historically as to
whether and when that was funded. I do not think we need to go
into that, but I would say this, it is a new era. There is a
new department in government that is now responsible for taking
on and implementing the entry/exit system, which I believe
Secretary Ridge has renamed U.S. VISIT.
And I know that this is among the highest priorities of the
Department of Homeland Security--to implement an entry/exit
system that will give us the ability to identify those
individuals who have legally entered the country with visas but
have either overstayed their visas or are no longer entitled to
be in this country. We will have a system that will let us know
that they have not exited the country and we will be able, with
the appropriate resources, to locate and remove them from our
country.
Now, I believe that this is going to be done, because I am
very much aware that Secretary Ridge himself and Under
Secretary Hutchinson are personally involved and committed to
making this happen, and obviously I and everybody else within
the Department of Homeland Security will be contributing to
that effort to see that it gets done.
It is huge. If I said that this is not an extraordinary
challenge to get this done within the timelines that have been
set forth by the Congress, I would be less than candid with
this committee, because----
Senator Byrd. What----
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. I think it is an enormous
challenge. I actually personally----
Senator Byrd. My time is short.
Mr. Bonner. Yes.
Senator Byrd. What time--if you will forgive me?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. What specific steps are you taking to make
this happen?
Mr. Bonner. Well, number one, I understand that there has
been a program review undertaken by the Department of Homeland
Security. I further understand that the ownership, if you will,
of this program is going to be vested in the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate, and that there is every
intention, Senator, of meeting the ambitious timeline, which is
by December of this year. We will do everything we can to have
an entry/exit system deployed at least to certain of the
international airports within the timeline.
Customs and Border Protection is contributing to this,
because the entry/exit system ultimately is going to have to be
put at international airports, the land borders, every place
that people move in and out of this country. And so we are
contributing to what the infrastructure issues are, and the
funding requirements. There is also obviously, as you know, an
information technology and a biometric part of this.
But it is a task that is being undertaken by the Department
of Homeland Security, not just within Customs and Border
Protection.
Senator Byrd. You have referred to biometrics, are you
working with the Defense Department in this regard?
Mr. Bonner. Senator, I do not know, but I believe the
Department of Homeland Security is. As I say, Customs and
Border Protection has not been given ownership of this program.
Nobody has come to me and said, ``Commissioner Bonner, I want
you to make this happen.'' So I am not personally and directly
involved in the actual development of the program at this
juncture.
Senator Byrd. The reason I ask, the Defense Department has
a biometrics program, which the Appropriations Committee has
been following and funding. You have referred to----
Mr. Bonner. I will find out for you, Senator, and----
Senator Byrd. Thank you. You have referred to your need for
resources, financial resources. The budget requests $480
million for the entry/exit system. In light of the recently
announced biometrics component to the new U.S. VISIT system,
will this request be enough?
Mr. Bonner. I do not know the answer to that. I will have
to----
Senator Byrd. Is there anyone there who can help you on
that question?
Mr. Bonner. Well----
Senator Byrd. Anyone that----
Mr. Bonner. This is something that is going to have to be
answered at the departmental level by the responsible program
managers, Senator Byrd. I will pass it along and we will see if
we cannot get you an answer.
Senator Byrd. Well, we will hope for that.
FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST
One crucial component of providing for homeland security is
that you be provided with the--with adequate funding resources,
and at our hearing with Under Secretary Hutchinson last week, I
asked him how much he had requested of the OMB for his agencies
for the coming fiscal year. He said that he did not have that
information in front of him, and when I asked if he would
provide the information to the committee I believe he fuzzed up
the response a little bit.
I understand the requirement that agency heads must support
the President's budget request as submitted, but agency heads
must also be responsive to the Congress, the elected
representatives of the people. The military branches are not at
all shy about providing information to the Congress on their
original requests for funding. And this causes me to wonder why
other agencies are more reluctant than the military.
I believe that the budget request for most of the
Department of Homeland Security agencies are insufficient. It
would be valuable for the committee to know what the agencies
that are actually defending the homeland think their budget
requirements are, not just the final opinion of the budget
personnel at the Office of Management and Budget.
Commissioner Bonner, how much did you request in the way of
funding in your fiscal year 2004 budget submission to the
Office of Management and Budget?
Mr. Bonner. Senator Byrd, first of all, just by way of
process, this is an incredibly unusual year in one sense,
because we are merging with Customs all of these other
elements, the Border Patrol, all of the immigration inspection
program, and so forth.
I have absolutely no idea what was requested for Border
Patrol or the Immigration Inspection. I had no part in how that
was developed. When that budget was developed, INS was part of
the Justice Department, and it went to the Attorney General.
Something went forward from the AG to OMB.
I obviously played a part in developing the U.S. Customs
budget request, and processing that up through the Treasury
Department.
I can tell you that there was, of course, an unusual
process this year in the sense that the Treasury Department
looked at our budget, and I guess it is fair to say, they
punted. They did not know what to do with it and so forth.
I can tell you that I believe as a result of then Governor
Ridge's capacity in the Office of Homeland Security, we did get
a substantial initiative funding ultimately through OMB.
As I sit here, I do not know exactly what our request was.
I am very aware of the question you put to Under Secretary
Hutchinson, and I do not want to give you, Senator, a fuzzy
answer.
At this point I think that prudence would dictate that if
you are interested, and I think you are interested, in what
request ultimately went to OMB with respect to, let us say, the
Customs side of this budget, that is something I just have to
tell you, I would need to consult with the Department
leadership as to what position they are going to take with the
request that you made of Under Secretary Hutchinson.
And I do not know precisely what that position is, but I am
just a mere Commissioner of the Customs and Border Protection,
and I have a chain of command, which is I report to Asa
Hutchinson as the Under Secretary, and he reports to Secretary
Ridge.
So I do not want to fuzz an answer here. I am just going to
say that I will look into that question. I understand the
request the Senator is making. If there is a way that we can
affirmatively respond to that request, I will make every effort
to see that we do that.
Senator Byrd. Well, if you can, do that. The people have
the right to know and the elected representatives of the people
on this committee have a right to know. But we also need to
know in order to adequately meet your funding needs. And you
referred to the need for having adequate resources in your
statement. And it would be very helpful to the committee--as a
matter of fact having been on this committee now 45 years--I am
in my 45th year on the Appropriations Committee, that is a
rather, in a way, stunning response to a very legitimate
question.
Will you provide this subcommittee with that information
for the record?
Mr. Bonner. I will, if after discussions with the
Department, it is okayed.
Senator Byrd. You mean--are you meaning to say to me if it
is okay that this committee has that information?
Mr. Bonner. I----
Senator Byrd. The reason we--the reason it helps the
committee is because we really know then what you perceived as
being the needs, the funding needs in order to meet your goal
and carry out your responsibility. We really get a better
insight if we have that information.
Mr. Bonner. Senator, I know exactly what you are saying. I
have been around, actually have testified before the
Appropriations Committee and subcommittees, and I understand
the important work that this committee has and must do, so I
understand that. But you did put the request to Under Secretary
Hutchinson, and I know that that is being looked at in terms of
whether the Border and Transportation Security Directorate and
the component agencies under the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate can provide the information. The request
essentially went to OMB.
Senator, with all due respect to you, sir, and to this
committee, I will make it very clear the importance that you
attribute to this and, frankly, the importance for the
committee itself, the subcommittee, in terms of its evaluation
of the budget request to have this information. I will get an
answer back to you, but it will have to be after consultations
with the higher-ups in the Department of Homeland Security.
Senator Byrd. Would you accept----
Senator Cochran. Senator, your time has expired.
Senator Byrd. Yes. I just have a P.S. here. Would you
accept a slight modification to your own statement, ``and the
importance to the Department''?
Mr. Bonner. I will accept that as well.
Senator Byrd. I thank the Commissioner.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Domenici.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Well, let me stay with you, Mr. Bonner, for a little bit.
U.S. BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS
You heard me in my opening remarks talk about the borders
of the United States between Mexico and Canada. I happen to
know something about it because one of my early appropriations
assignments, about 12 or 14 years ago, happened to be the
subcommittee that had the border. That was the only time in the
past 40 or 50 years that we did anything of a comprehensive
nature in an effort to repair and modernize some of the border
facilities.
So I have a very serious interest in the condition of the
border crossings and the equipment on the borders with Mexico
and Canada--I know more about Mexico than Canada. I have
introduced a bill, on which I think we will have a hearing
soon.
That says one of the shortcomings is that we do not have a
master plan for how we go about bringing these border crossings
current, which ones need to be reformed, remodeled, torn down,
rebuilt, added to, et cetera, and in which order. We do not
have any plan for what new technology there is and how we can
implement the use of the new technology at our border
crossings.
I say to you there is nothing more important with reference
to the control of our borders, both for trade and contraband
and illicit crossings than that these borders be made modern.
Do you agree with that?
Mr. Bonner. I do. I am also familiar with a good many of
the ports of entry, both on the northern and southern border,
and we have some serious modernization we have to do, and
infrastructure improvements to do that would permit better
security with technology, and at the same time be able to
better facilitate the movement of legitimate trade and people
across----
Senator Domenici. Sir, I believe that border crossings
between Mexico and the United States in particular require a
little bit of vision, require that somebody begin to think
about the future.
I can imagine a day when there would be a common border
crossing manned by Mexicans and Americans, and that we would
not go through two crossings, and that the technology be modern
for both sides. I can imagine a couple of border crossings that
would be built as now, within the next 18 months, as ultra-
modern crossings with every modern type of technology
available, sort of as a model to look at, to see what can be
done for our borders to bring them into a better state of
repair. This is not because we want them to look good or
because I am a high-tech buff, but rather they will do a much
better job.
Could you talk to that and could you assure the committee
that you are going to look into modernization of these ports of
entry and implementation of modern technology at the crossings?
Mr. Bonner. I will assure you right now that that is
something that we are looking at, we will continue need to look
at, and I would like to work with this committee and you,
Senator, with respect to how that might best be done, where the
priority areas are, and how we construct the infrastructure so
that we are efficiently using the existing technology we have,
detection technology and the like, radiation detection
technology, and so on, in the best possible way.
I think this is a very important issue. It is something
that I have been discussing with Secretary Ridge over the last
18 months or so. I have had discussions with the Canadians and
the Mexican Government about how we might work better together.
Senator Domenici. Yes.
Mr. Bonner. Right now, we have maybe four or five very
small ports of entry that are shared with the Canadians.
Senator Domenici. Yes.
Mr. Bonner. So it is not as if it has never been done. It
can be done. We need to look at doing more of that.
Senator Domenici. I wonder if you would take a look at
Senate Bill 539 and tell the committee what you think about it
in terms of whether it might help meet the needs that you are
identifying together for the border.
Mr. Bonner. Right. Is this the bill that you have
recently----
Senator Domenici. Yes, that I have alluded to.
Mr. Bonner. Right. And as I think you may know, Senator,
the Congressional Affairs Office has been working with members
of your staff on that legislation. I have not studied it in
depth yet.
Senator Domenici. Yes, I understand.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. To be familiar with----
Senator Domenici. I do not need a lot of explanation on it.
I would just like you to take a look at it, and through your
good office comment for the record on what parts of it you
think you need, and whether it should be implemented.
Mr. Bonner. I would be happy to do that. With your
permission, Senator, is that something I can do and submit
something for the record?
Senator Domenici. Absolutely----
Mr. Bonner. All right.
Senator Domenici [continuing]. In due course. Is that
correct, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Cochran. We would appreciate the fact that you
would do that. We will make that a part of the record.
Mr. Bonner. All right. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
S. 539
As requested, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
has reviewed S. 539, the Border Infrastructure and Technology
Modernization Act. The bill responds to the infrastructure issues
facing many ports of entry. It would dramatically further address the
requirements identified in the Ports of Entry Infrastructure Assessment
Study completed by the U.S. Customs Service in consultation with GSA
and other Federal Inspection Service agencies in June 2000. The agency
appreciates the support of Senator Domenici and his cosponsors.
``FIRST USE'' ASSURANCE FOR FLETC-OWNED FACILITIES
Senator Domenici. I will quickly go to my next question. It
has to do with FLETC.
Ms. Patrick, there are some people that know that this
Senator has a genuine and longstanding interest in FLETC.
That is why, Senator Byrd, quite by accident when I was a
brand-new Senator, I attached a rider to a public works bill
where FLETC was going to be built brand-new somewhere here in
Maryland. I put a little rider on the bill and said, ``Do not
build it for a year and look around the country and see if we
happen to have a place we already own.''
And guess what? In the 10 month of that study, they found
this Navy base, which is where it is now, this giant facility
in Georgia. It was found that way.
And so since that time, I have had an interest in FLETC,
and a piece of it is now in New Mexico at Artesia. It is
growing. What I would like to know from you, ma'am, on the
record, I would like your assurance that as you look at
training needs that you will, in fact, use FLETC's facilities
first for the required training that FLETC is expected to do
under the law. Secondly, that people will not be sent to other
kinds of training centers and facilities in preference to a
FLETC-owned facility, if there is facility available for such
training. Can we have that assurance?
Ms. Patrick. You can.
Senator Domenici. I believe you are already aware of that
problem as it exists, as I have expressed it to you, in my
office, are you not?
Ms. Patrick. I am.
Senator Domenici. Sometimes agencies want to move trainees
off to some other place closer to a home or where they would
like to be, miles away from where the training, original
training is, and you are going to look at whether or not that
is a practical thing for FLETC in the future, is that correct?
Ms. Patrick. Yes, I am.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Senator Domenici. My last question has to do with the use
of unmanned vehicles on the border. Who is the expert on that?
Does that belong to you too, Mr. Bonner?
Mr. Bonner. I may not be the expert on it----
Senator Domenici. Yes.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. But it really belongs to me.
Senator Domenici. Could you tell me if there is a plan
being developed as to where we will use and what we will do
with unmanned vehicles in an effort to assist us with
ascertaining what is going on our borders?
Mr. Bonner. Now, by unmanned vehicles, you mean the drone
aircraft and that sort of thing----
Senator Domenici. Yes.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. That have been used so
successfully by our military----
Senator Domenici. Yes.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. And--overseas?
I know there is a lot of interest in this, and I do not
mean to be unresponsive. I have asked for a briefing myself----
Senator Domenici. All right.
Mr. Bonner [continuing]. As to how unmanned vehicles or
drones could be helpful. I think there is some potential there,
but I want to make sure that it makes sense. There is potential
in the sense that we have, as you know, on our southwest border
with Mexico, we have a huge problem that remains, and that is
that we do not totally control the borders of our country.
Senator Domenici. Right.
Mr. Bonner. And we have huge amounts, significant amounts
of both illegal aliens and illegal drugs flowing across that
border through the ports of entry and between the ports of
entry. We do not have in my judgment a sufficient surveillance
air capability in the Border Patrol at this juncture for that.
So it sounds like something that might be very, very helpful,
but I need to understand how it would work and how it would
work in conjunction with, let us say, cueing the Border Patrol,
Border Patrol agents to the situation and----
Senator Domenici. Sir, would you take a look at it and, for
the record, give us your best judgment of whether UAVs are
going to be used, and how they might work, so we will have an
understanding?
Mr. Bonner. Happy to do that, sir.
[The information follows:]
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
The Border and Transportation Security Directorate has asked the
Science and Technology Directorate to evaluate the use of UAVs in a
Border and Transportation Security environment. S&T was also asked to
evaluate other potential applications.
Until the requirements have been scoped to determine the
feasibility and extent of a UAV program, we cannot predict either what
amount of funding or type of facilities might be appropriate for the
Department to implement a UAV program.
At this time, it is unknown what the timeline would be for the
Department to implement this type of initiative. A proposed project
plan including milestones and deliverables is expected to be ready for
review by early summer, 2003. The project plan will discuss a BTS-
specific project as well as strategies in developing UAV initiatives in
the near, mid, and long term for DHS venues such as borders and ports.
After UAV program feasibility, requirements and scope are
determined, a more detailed assessment on available testing and
deployment facilities would need to be made.
Senator Domenici. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Domenici.
Senator Murray.
24-HOUR MANIFEST RULE
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Commissioner Bonner, let me begin by just thanking you for
all of your efforts on the 24-hour manifest rule for U.S.-bound
container cargo. You and I discussed this in my office, and I
shared with you my concerns that the economic implications and
the security implications as cargo is being diverted to
Vancouver--and I know you have worked hard with the Canadians
and I understand that they have agreed to implement a similar
rule, and I really applaud that decision.
But I have to tell you I have real concerns that Canada is
going to continue to use the time before implementing a rule to
divert cargo and business from U.S. ports in the Pacific
Northwest. This is really an important issue to us in Seattle
and Tacoma, and I wondered if you could give me an update on
your discussions with the Canadians on this issue, and
specifically any information about when Canada will finally
implement its 24-hour rule?
Mr. Bonner. Right. Let me bring you up to date on that.
First of all, the good news is that the Canadian Government--
and this was the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency that was
very much involved in this--has decided to adopt essentially
the identical 24-hour rule, and to move quickly to do that.
They need to get some regulations out just like we would for
comment and the like.
But I will continue, as I did at the shared border accord
meeting with our Canadian counterparts in Halifax, Canada, just
about 3 weeks ago, to prod them to move more quickly in terms
of getting those regulations out and implemented.
I am very concerned about the issue that we discussed with
respect to the potential diversion of container traffic from
any U.S. sea port including the port of Seattle-Tacoma and so
forth to Vancouver. I think you have seen some public
statements I have made, and that is to say that if we believe
that any shipping line is attempting to evade the U.S. 24-hour
rule by diverting containers to, let us say, a Canadian port or
any other port, we are going to increase our inspectional
efforts with respect to those containers in two ways.
One, we have U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel
right now at Vancouver, at the Canadian port, and so we will be
increasing and asking the Canadians to work with us to increase
the rate of inspections for anything that appears to be
diverted, because by definition, it is a higher risk container
if somebody is trying to evade our advance manifest reporting
requirements.
And secondly, we have a chance to examine it again when it
reaches the U.S. border, either on a truck or by rail.
So I made it very clear, if we see evidence of that--and I
would be happy to have further discussions with you on this, if
we see evidence of that, we are going to take some action, and
I have talked to, as you know, the head of the port authority
there in Seattle, and I will continue to monitor that
situation.
The best answer, though, is the Canadians adopt and
implement their regulation that is identical to ours so there
is no advantage by virtue of the advanced manifest information
requirement by shipping cargo containers destined for the
United States to Vancouver or to Halifax.
Senator Murray. Thank you. I really appreciate that and
appreciate your staying on top of it, because it is both an
economic concern, but it is also a security concern. And we
want to make sure that they do not just say they are
implementing the rule and it takes forever, and we have cargo
coming in and moving to the United States in other ports. So I
really appreciate your answer to that question.
CONTAINER SECURITY
Admiral Loy, I wanted to talk to you about container
security. TSA received $28 million for Operation Safe Commerce
back in 2002, and another $30 million for that in 2003. So far,
not a penny of that money has been spent.
This is an initiative that I authored to enable TSA to
ensure the security of the 6 million containers that come into
our ports every year by monitoring their movement from the time
they are loaded to the time that they are unloaded.
Now, TSA promised me that the 2002 funds for this
initiative would be spent by February of this year. It was not
done. Now, they are telling me it is going to be spent by June.
I asked Secretary Ridge about this last week, and he promised
to get back to me, but I have not heard from him yet on this.
So can you explain to this subcommittee why TSA has not moved
forward on Operation Safe Commerce that has now been funded in
two separate fiscal years to address terrorist threats to
global container traffic?
Admiral Loy. Yes, ma'am. I will. You are absolutely right.
The $28 million was a 2002 appropriation. For 2003 there was an
amount of $30 million, and for 2004, we are asking for another
couple of million dollars to sort of tidy up the program.
As you know, we have made a broadcast announcement with
respect to applications from the three major load centers that
are associated with Safe Commerce. You and I had spoken about
the notion of port of origin to point of destination in
transit, supply chain transparency for the obvious value that
that represents. And we have worked with the Coast Guard, with
Customs, now BCBP, on a variety of these challenges associated
with Safe Commerce.
At the moment, there are implications in the spending plan
that we will get to the Congress, I would hope, within days
associated with Safe Commerce.
I can say that the application package that solicited from
the three major load ports almost a billion dollars' worth of
applications for how best to use those funds are in hand, are
being evaluated, and are staged for. As soon as that spending
plan is blessed, they will go out the door, such that the
appropriated dollars, and not only for the $30 million that we
have in 2003. We want to make sure those dollars potentially
can become appropriated against that same application package.
Senator Murray. So can you assure me that all $58 million
will be spent on this, and that it will not be diverted to some
other program under TSA?
Admiral Loy. I cannot assure you of that, as we speak here
this morning, Senator Murray. I think the potential for fixing,
as Senator Byrd was inferring, the structural shortfall in the
TSA budget for 2003 offers us unfortunately the challenge of
looking for funds in places that have the potential for
reprogramming or have the potential for being found.
Senator Murray. Well, I just have to say that is really
disconcerting. We appropriated those funds properly through
Congress, specifically for Operation Safe Commerce. The three
ports that are involved, Seattle-Tacoma, Los Angeles, New York,
have been working diligently now for almost 2 years to put
together their requests. And we now have 6 million containers
coming into this country that we do not know--and we have not
tracked them, we do not know what is in them. This is a vital
issue for all of us who have States that are close to these.
It should be a vital interest for every State in this
country because of the economic impact. I do not want to see
any of that money diverted. This is what Congress said it was
to be spent for.
Admiral Loy. I understand.
Senator Murray. Well, we will continue to follow that
throughout the process.
In fact, Commissioner Bonner, if you could respond. You are
a member of the steering committee to implement Operation Safe
Commerce. Can you tell me why, from your point of view, none of
this funding has been spent yet?
Mr. Bonner. I know that we are co-chairing with TSA and
reviewing the applications for the funding that has been made
available. And I understand that decisions with respect to
funding are fairly close.
I do not know whether it is the $28 million or the $30
million. I think it is the first $28 million, but I could be
mistaken.
This is very, very important, as you know, and I know
Admiral Loy agrees, that we test out smarter containers, more
secure containers that are moving from foreign ports to the
United States. And that is what this funding is going to do.
I do not know that I can speak to the delay per se other
than I know that there has been a process of getting
applications from the various ports and the various parties in
interest here, and making some decisions with respect to which
proposals make the most sense in terms of giving us,
potentially, at the end of the day something that would be
useful to us for purposes of securing containers.
Senator Murray. Well, let me just say that the ports all
have their requests in, and if the delay is so that we can
divert funds, that is not acceptable. We need to get this money
out there.
And, Admiral Loy, you said in your opening statement that
you care about security in all modes of transportation. If we
cut container security initiatives, we are not paying attention
to all modes of transportation. So this is something that I am
going to continue to follow and I want to have follow up
conversations with you on this.
I want to make sure this money goes to container security.
We have ports in this Nation that are extremely vulnerable
right now with all of these containers coming and we do not
know what is in them. And I just simply think we cannot ignore
this, and we cannot divert the funds that are supposed to go
for that important initiative. So I will continue to have this
discussion with you.
Mr. Bonner. We do have information, Senator, in terms of
what is in containers and that sort of thing. We have required
that by regulation now, before those containers are even loaded
on the foreign ports.
So we do have information about what is in there. We are
evaluating that information. We are making risk management
decisions as to which containers pose a high risk for security,
and need to be screened. And under CSI we are now doing
targeting and screening at foreign ports in Singapore and so
forth.
Senator Murray. I understand that. But there is a
difference between doing that at the port and doing it,
tracking that container, knowing where it is and where it comes
in. And not just at the port. In the Port of Seattle, it is
loaded onto a truck or a train and it ends up being unloaded in
Chicago or somewhere else. So knowing what is in that container
and keeping track of that container is an important initiative
in terms of security.
Admiral Loy. Across the entire supply chain, as you
describe.
Senator Murray. That is correct.
EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS
Admiral Loy, I am also very concerned with the delays in
funding, the extraordinary costs of installing the explosive
detection systems, EDS systems, at the new south terminal
expansion at SeaTac Airport in my State. Over the last couple
of years, I have worked to provide your agency almost $500
million more for those airport modifications than your
Administration requested of Congress. Both the 2002
supplemental appropriations and the 2003 omnibus specifically
cited the needs of the projects at SeaTac. And just a few days
ago, you announced, I believe, your attention to sign letters
of intent to fund these airport projects and said that Seattle
would be one of them.
But it is my understanding these letters have not been
signed. Can you tell me when you expect to finally sign a
letter of intent with the SeaTac Airport on that?
Admiral Loy. Senator Murray, I hope we are able to do that
within a week or two. Our whole capacity to fund what this
organization is responsible for is bound up in this spending
plan challenge that we have had for 2003. You know how
difficult that has been from the very beginning. In the
aftermath of the original request, which of course developed 4
or 5 months' worth of CR challenges for those of us who had to
live within that, including in the TSA's part that the first
quarter, which was enormously capital intensive for us, because
that is when we had hoped to purchase all the rest of the EDS
equipment and pay an enormous amount of contractor support in
the first quarter of fiscal year 2003.
Living under the CR, there was an enormously difficult
financial challenge for us. When it led to the omnibus bill,
where the Congress then chose to allocate within the
President's request over $1 billion worth of allocations, that
has prompted this structural shortfall in terms of very
important things the Congress wants to do, very important
things the Administration wants to do, and literally trying to
get $6 billion worth of work in a $5 billion kind of a
framework.
The war supplemental offered the Congress an opportunity to
fix about half of that problem, which they did. And over these
last weeks, we have been working diligently with DHS and OMB to
fund the rest of that structural challenge.
The LOI instrument that has now been blessed by the Office
of Management and Budget, as well as the Congress, offers us a
chance to break through with respect to these EDS installations
and literally leverage $1 billion or more worth of private
sector monies to do these security projects and then reimburse
those airports over multiple budget cycles to come. I believe
that is the right way to do this work. And we have those
literally poised negotiated settlements with a number of the
airport directors, including SeaTac, ready to go as soon as the
spending plan is approved by the Hill.
Senator Murray. Okay. I appreciate that. And just one other
question. Is your letter--will your letter of intent commit
some 2003 funds to this project, or are you going to be
requiring SeaTac to do a future?
Admiral Loy. I will have to call you on the specifics in
the SeaTac piece. There are a number of these negotiated
settlements with the airport directors where they preferred to
gain the letter of intent but with the zero funding line for
2003 to be then paid over 2004, 2005, 2006, as appropriate. I
will call you with the specifics of the SeaTac LOI.
Senator Murray. Thank you.
DELAY IN RELEASING FUNDS
I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I would remind all of
us that the President vetoed $480 million for this agency in
the last request. And I am deeply concerned that we do not have
the funds available today for many of these projects. And just
on Operation Safe Commerce, let me just go back to that.
If you are delaying the release of this money simply so
that you can divert it to other causes, that is unacceptable.
These ports have been working diligently to do this. It is
extremely important that we get this done. And I will follow up
on this with you later.
Admiral Loy. I look forward to that follow-up, Senator
Murray. And we are not delaying it for the sake of diverting
the money. The challenge associated with this organization is
to have the legitimate spending plan for the rest of the year.
Where that involves DHS authorities and the use of them and
where that involves the potential for reprogramming is to be
notified to the Congress very shortly. That is the package that
is keeping us from pressing on.
We are staged to press on with all of this work as soon as
this spend plan comes clear.
Senator Murray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Murray.
FEDERAL FLIGHT DECK OFFICER TRAINING
Admiral Loy, the Homeland Security Act authorized the use
of firearms by pilots to defend their aircraft against
hijacking or other criminal activity that was life threatening.
The Transportation Security Administration has recently
completed the training of 44 pilots, who have been sworn in as
Federal flight deck officers. We notice your budget request
suggests that over $17 million for this training should be
approved for the next fiscal year. It is a substantial increase
over current-year funding.
Let me ask you the question of whether or not TSA is going
to continue to do this training. Do you intend to contract it
out to private sector training centers or to use the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center for some or all of this
training?
Admiral Loy. Senator Cochran, as you know, the 44-student
prototype was conducted at FLETC in Glynco, and tremendous
support came from the facility manager and all the folks that
were part of the training there. My intention is to certainly
press forward with FLETC-based training for the FFDO program.
There are, for example, however, midyear recertification
requirements that do not necessarily, I believe, call for a
trip to Glynco, Georgia, to get that work particularly done. So
we are very much a part of the plan that Ms. Patrick was
describing to you in terms of a 5-year game plan for how to
optimize the use of FLETC not only in Glynco, but in Artesia,
as well.
I have encouraged a number of private sector training site
owners to work with FLETC to get under the wing of what FLETC's
wide reach might be to find the right place to do this training
on down the road. But the basic original training we would like
very much to continue to do within the FLETC organization, sir.
Senator Cochran. Ms. Patrick, what is your assessment of
the training program and the capacity of your center to carry
out this responsibility?
Ms. Patrick. The pilot program that was just conducted
there, I believe that it is currently under review and that
they are evaluating the program as we speak, in terms of making
any modifications to the program that would enhance the skills
of the pilots. So I think that they, the TSA, is doing the
current review consistent with our methodologies and the way in
which we conduct training.
And the most important part of that training program is
actually the review and the after action that follows any
training course that we give. So I think that they are doing a
very good job of that.
In terms of conducting the training and the training needs,
we do intend to accommodate their training requests. However,
as Admiral Loy mentioned, as is true with all of the agencies
that we train, every year they are required, especially in the
area of firearms, to receive recertification training. And we
will and continue to use export training sites located around
the United States that our National Center uses to accommodate
that training. And in those instances, we do contract for
trainers to provide those services when there are no available
FLETC resources to do that.
AIR CARGO SECURITY
Senate Cochran. The Senate last week passed a bill called
the Air Cargo Security Improvement Act. It would put into place
several enhancements for security of cargo transported by air,
particularly aboard passenger aircraft. The Transportation
Security Administration is requesting $10 million for the
research and development of an air cargo pilot program in this
next budget year.
The Act allows for pilots and crew members of air cargo
aircraft to carry firearms, such as the way passenger aircraft
pilots are permitted to operate now. There will also be funding
needed to train Federal flight deck officers with the
possibility of an additional 15,000 air cargo pilots being
authorized. Do you feel that the Transportation Security
Administration can carry out this responsibility with this
amount of funding?
Admiral Loy. We do, Mr. Chairman. The challenge, of course,
is to attempt to project the number of volunteers from the
greater pool of pilots, both commercial pilots for passenger
aircraft, as well as the added number of air cargo pilots that
will actually want to become Federal flight deck officers. We
do not really have a very good feel for that. I have seen
estimates that range from as low as 18 or 20 percent of the
total population, which is pushing 80,000, as you know, to as
many as half.
We will just have to see how the volunteers step forward
for the program. As it relates to the cargo pilots being
included in the pool, I think TSA is basically silent on that
question. If, in fact, that is the Congress's desire, that you
add the pilots from air cargo to the pool, so be it.
I have a couple of challenges with the bill, our thoughts
with the bill, as it went down. And I look forward to working
with the Committee as that continues on its way. For example,
allowing any trained individual to be sitting in the jump seat
and travel armed, whether or not it is an employee of that
particular airline that is flying that plane. There are a
couple of subtle things like that that are part of the bill, as
I see it today, sir, that I would like to continue the dialogue
with the committee on.
Senator Cochran. I am sure others would join me in
welcoming your input and observations on that. We would be glad
to have the benefit of your suggestions.
AIR AND MARINE ASSETS
Mr. Bonner, the Bureau that you are now in charge of has
brought together a wide variety of physical assets, like
planes, boats, and helicopters, that may now be the subject of
new management efficiencies. Do you have plans for streaming
the procurement or maintenance of these physical assets so that
we derive some efficiencies and can also make our funds go
further because of this consolidation of activity?
Mr. Bonner. Well, let me say first of all that it is true
that Customs and Border Protection, by virtue of having the
Border Patrol, actually has a significant number of air assets.
I think it is 100-plus, mainly helicopters, also some marine or
small boat craft. On the other hand, as part of the
reorganization, the U.S. Customs Air and Marine Interdiction
Division, which also had aircraft and helicopters and some
boats, it moved over to BICE. So to the extent there is----
Senator Cochran. For those of us that cannot remember all
the acronyms in this town, what is BICE?
Mr. Bonner. BICE would be the bureau that is not here
today. That is the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. About 15 percent of the old U.S. Customs that
represented the special agents, the criminal investigators, and
the Air and Marine Interdiction Division that did air and
marine interdiction, at or near our borders, went to BICE.
So the upshot is that I have some air and marine assets
still, from the Border Patrol, but I no longer have those
formerly in U.S. Customs. I think there can be tremendous
efficiencies here, both with respect to procurement and
maintenance and, frankly, mission, that we ought to achieve.
But it is going to be something that we have to figure out
how to do at a higher level than Customs and Border Protection,
because I do not control all of these assets or the budget for
them. It is going to have to be done at the Border and
Transportation Security level. We must figure out, one, how do
we make the most efficient use of these assets to perform the
border and the interdiction mission? And secondly, how do we do
this in way that also achieves some economies and efficiencies
with respect to procurement of aircraft, as well as maintenance
and other issues?
So we will be working on that issue. It is just a little
bit more complex because it involves more than just Customs and
Border Protection.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Well, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 SPENDING PLAN
Admiral Loy, the Transportation and Security Administration
advised Congress that we would be provided with a spending plan
for how you intend to obligate the funds appropriated to your
agency for this fiscal year. We are now in the 8 month of this
fiscal year. We have yet to be provided with such a spending
plan. We are told that your agency faces a significant funding
shortfall, perhaps as much as $1 billion. We have not received
a supplemental request from the President to cover that
shortfall or to meet it.
The administration opposed Congress's efforts to, or at
least our efforts, to add funding to the recent supplemental to
close the operating deficit. Do you believe that you can live
within your current budget? And if so, what steps are you
taking to do so?
Admiral Loy. Thank you, Senator Byrd. As I described just a
moment ago, answering Senator Murray's question, I believe,
Senator, that we are in this classic challenge of trying to
understand the job description on one hand and the budget
envelope on the other that will facilitate that work to be
done.
This is a brand new agency, which was set out to
accomplish, first of all, the enormous set of mandates that the
Congress provided immediately in the wake of the 9/11 tragedy.
And here we are, essentially a year-and-a-half later, grappling
with, I will call it, the sticker shock associated with what it
takes to get the work done that the Congress has stipulated in
the original legislation, which founded the organization.
Senator Byrd. This is about as I predicted.
Admiral Loy. I am sorry, sir?
Senator Byrd. This is about as I predicted----
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, it is.
Senator Byrd [continuing]. When we had this legislation
before the Senate.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir, as is clearly the case. So we have
gone over the course of time here literally with spending plans
being briefed to the committees, the appropriating committees,
over the course of the last year, a different committee, to be
sure. But we brought forward a spending plan in September. We
brought forward a new spending plan in December.
Then we got on into the omnibus bill and the war
supplemental that followed, all of which was a struggle between
not only the agency trying to do the right thing, the Congress
and the Administration also trying to do the right thing, and
sorting the job description and the budget envelope necessary
to do this work by this organization.
As you just described it, as we walked away from the
omnibus bill, we were in about a $1 billion hole. As we
approached the war supplemental, the Congress was able to
identify about half of that differential and make that
significant assistance available in the war supplemental.
These past weeks, I have been working day in and day out
with both the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of
Management and Budget to accept that war supplemental
differential and then find in DHS authorities or
reprogrammings, as appropriate, the wherewithal to close this
spending gap for this organization for fiscal year 2003. That
package is literally on the doorstep. I provided that to DHS
and OMB a couple of weeks ago. And I believe it is literally
about to be walked to the Congress almost as we speak, sir.
That will define what we will try to do for the rest of fiscal
year 2003.
Senator Byrd. What was the reception at OMB?
Admiral Loy. The reception at OMB was to recognize the
authorities that the new Department of Homeland Security had in
terms of finding monies within the structural authority that
the new Secretary owns and to offer the notification back to
the Congress of the intended reprogrammings necessary to make
the agency whole for fiscal year 2003.
TSA SCREENER WORKFORCE REDUCTION
Senator Byrd. On April 30, TSA announced a plan to
eliminate 6,000 airport baggage screener positions. TSA took
the action to bring total baggage screening staffing down
closer to the limits in the fiscal year 2003 omnibus
appropriations act and the 48,000-person level required in the
President's fiscal year 2004 budget. As of March 31, TSA had
55,600 screeners at the Nation's 427 commercial airports.
Your plan would reduce staffing by 3,000 persons by the end
of this month and an additional 3,000 by the end of the fiscal
year. However, this action is expected to save approximately,
is that $3 billion? How much is it that you expect to save?
Admiral Loy. The annualized rate of those savings would be
about $280 million next year, sir. But that is already
internalized in the President's request.
Senator Byrd. This is narrowing the nearly $1 billion
funding gap, is it not?
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. I say hardly narrowing. Is that correct?
Admiral Loy. That is correct, sir.
Senator Byrd. TSA should provide Congress with a complete
plan for closing the gap. On April 30, as I say, this plan was
announced. This reduction of 6,000 positions by the end of the
fiscal year is approximately 12.6 percent of the total screener
workforce. Clearly, you must take difficult steps to get your
agency's budget under control. And I would not want to try to
second guess you, but I am concerned that screener reductions
at some airports might be too steep.
Of the Nation's 427 commercial airports, 12 airports are
losing over 50 percent, more than half of their screeners,
while 151 airports are actually gaining screeners. I am
specifically concerned about the proposed reductions at
Charleston, West Virginia's Yeager Airport, which is scheduled
to experience a 54 percent reduction in baggage screeners. Your
plan would reduce the number of screeners from 63 screeners to
29, a 54 percent reduction.
This is far in excess of the national average reduction of
12.6 percent. And the Yeager Airport has not experienced a
sharp reduction in the number of passengers using the airport.
Your decision, as it relates to the Yeager Airport and the 11
other airports just does not make sense. And I speak with, I
think, considerable knowledge with reference to the Yeager
Airport.
Please explain why 12 airports would lose over 54 percent
of their screeners and, in particular, why Yeager Airport is
being cut by 54 percent.
Admiral Loy. I will have to get back to you and will,
Senator Byrd, on the specifics of the one airport you asked me
about. Let me describe, though, that in a number of cases
across the country we found that we were just an awful lot
smarter 7 or 8 months later than we were when we originally put
allocations at these respective airports. There were a number
of places where they were simply over-hired by mistake by the
contractor that we had doing that work for us in the turmoil of
the first year of this organization's existence.
Our challenge needs to be to focus on positions necessary
to conduct the business at the airport, not the body count that
might happen to be there at the moment. So in many instances--I
do not know whether Yeager is among them, sir--we have found
that there were hirings well in excess of the required work to
be accomplished at the airport and are acting accordingly.
This is not just a budget-induced adjustment. I believe
that I owe this subcommittee, as well as my boss back in DHS, a
notion of efficiency and effectiveness and good stewardship of
the taxpayers' dollar in addition to the emotional thrust that
we all took over the course of the first year by making
judgments toward security virtually at every fork in the road
that we came to.
That is the effort that we have undertaken. It is now
buttressed by several technological opportunities that we have.
As we go from very people-intensive ETD machines and make the
installations permanent of EDS equipment across the country,
that will save an awful lot of money. When we have finished the
information technology architecture at our respective airports,
we will be able to get the right kind of management-scheduling
software available to the Federal security directors to
optimize the use of the people that he has there.
So there are a number of things that play, Senator Byrd,
with respect to why we are doing it and how we are doing it. I
will get you a very solid review, sir, of the airport that you
asked me about.
Senator Byrd. Will you get that to the subcommittee?
Admiral Loy. I will, sir.
[The information follows:]
Screener Reductions
An equitable process is being applied to the screener workforce
reductions for all airports, using objective, fair, consistent, and
pertinent factors in determining appropriate staffing levels regardless
of airport size or location. There is no intention to single out West
Virginia airports for larger reductions. Initial analysis revealed that
Yeager Airport currently has a larger screener complement than
necessary to operate the single passenger screening lane. As the
process moves forward, TSA is inviting Federal Security Directors,
community and airport leaders, and others to provide feedback in the
form of airport specific information or other factors that are expected
to drive TSA's upcoming refinement process. TSA will evaluate all the
newly obtained information and will refine the preliminary numbers
using this information and originating passenger data to arrive at a
far more accurate reflection of the staffing needs at all airports. We
will keep you apprised of the results of our on-going process to
provide efficient, effective screening.
Senator Byrd. It is important that the subcommittee know,
as well as that I know.
Now keep in mind here, I board a plane at Charleston, West
Virginia. It has a straight, direct course to Washington, the
capital of the country. I think we have to keep that in mind.
It is not a large airport, like Chicago or Washington or New
York. But it is on a direct course.
So then you will--will you review your decision regarding
these hard-hit airports?
Admiral Loy. I absolutely will, sir. We are doing it
routinely. I have asked my Federal Security Directors, as I
said earlier, in consonance with the airport directors, the two
of them getting together and thinking through very carefully
the numbers involved in getting any challenges and their
corrections back to us.
MARITIME AND LAND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Senator Byrd. Your agency is entitled the Transportation
and Security Administration, not the Aviation Security
Administration. Yet within your agency's $4.8 billion budget
request for next year, only $86 million is requested for
maritime and land security activities, while over $4.3 billion
is requested for aviation security. Last week I asked Under
Secretary Hutchinson why less than 2 percent of the
transportation and security budget request is for maritime and
land security. That is more than $1 in $50. And I asked him why
the $218 million budget request for administrative costs
associated with TSA headquarters and mission support centers is
2.5 times greater than the request for maritime and land
security. And I did not get a very convincing response.
I say this with all due respect to Under Secretary
Hutchinson. I am quite impressed with him as a man, man of
ability. And I have great admiration for him. And I know that
he has a big, huge responsibility here. But after all, we do
have to try to get the answers to our questions. And in order
to do a good job of adequately funding the agencies, we need
the information that we ask for.
I simply am not satisfied with the view, the apparent view,
at least it seems that way, that port security is solely the
responsibility of the ports. Ports focus on moving goods
through the ports swiftly. The Federal Government must do more
to direct the ports to focus on security and to provide
resources to do so. Just 1 year ago this month, we were
receiving reports that up to 25 Islamic extremists had entered
the United States as stowaways in cargo ships. Our ports are
vulnerable. And our ports need the funds to begin protecting
them now.
Over $1 billion in grant applications were received in
response to the original $105 million appropriated for port
security grants in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental. Last week
I asked Under Secretary Hutchinson if he would commit to
allowing the $150 million provided for port security grants in
the omnibus appropriations act to be used to address the $1
billion in grant applications sitting on his desk. Rather than
run another competition for this next set of funds, does it not
make more sense to use the additional $150 million provided by
Congress just 3 months ago to address what is unarguably an
urgent need for enhanced port security?
Admiral Loy. I think it is absolutely the case that it is
the right thing to do, Senator Byrd. And I think we can
probably not only deal with that $150 million, but the
additional $20 million that was appropriated in the war
supplemental as well.
So I think, based on the fact that we have, as you
described, over a billion dollars worth of applicants, or
applications in hand, we have every intention of distributing
all the port security grant monies for 2003, including the 150
and the 20 against those applications.
Senator Byrd. Well, the Congress, let me just say for the
record again, that the Congress has included in three separate
emergency supplemental bills, as well as in the fiscal year
2003 omnibus appropriations act, funding for port security
grants. In total, $348 million has been provided. However, none
of this was requested by the administration. And only $93
million has been distributed to the ports to date. While the
administration was eager to sign the Maritime Transportation
Security Act, they have been silent on the costs associated
with implementing it.
I have just another brief question or so.
COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING SYSTEM
Admiral Loy, when Under Secretary Hutchinson testified
before the subcommittee, I asked him about the Department's
plans in regards to CAPPS II. Air travelers are very curious
about this new system because it will examine information about
people attempting to board a plane and will use that
information to assign a threat level to each passenger. This is
an important endeavor for Homeland Security, but there are many
troubling questions raised by such a system, not least of which
is what information will the Government use to determine threat
level.
I asked Secretary Hutchinson to tell us whether consumer
debt history would be included in such information. He told us
it would not. Secretary Hutchinson's answer did not quite set
the record straight. Since his testimony, there have been
numerous media reports that name credit history as one of the
factors that CAPPS II may examine.
On January 15, 2003, the Department of Transportation
issued a notice in the Federal Register that named ``financial
and transaction data'' as one of the categories of records for
CAPPS II. You have not issued a new notice or a CAPPS II
guideline since January 15. Will you issue new updated
guidelines that reflect Mr. Hutchinson's assertion that credit
history will not be part of the CAPPS II system?
And I do not care if you check my credit history. I have
been married now 66 years come Thursday, 2 weeks from now. And
the only items that my wife and I have purchased on credit in
those 60 years was a bedroom suite to begin with. And that was
purchased at the coal company store. And I paid $7.50 every 2
weeks on that.
Admiral Loy. Is that paid off now, sir?
Senator Byrd. How is that?
Admiral Loy. Is that paid off now, sir?
Senator Byrd. I did not understand you.
Admiral Loy. Is the bedroom suite paid off at this point?
Senator Byrd. Well----
Admiral Loy. That is none of my business, sir. And I
apologize.
Senator Byrd. We are supposed to ask the questions here.
And, of course, we had to go in debt for the first house we
lived in, when we moved to Washington 50 years ago.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
Senator Byrd. But we paid that off just in a couple of
years. And in debt for the present home. And I cannot remember
any other item we have ever gone in debt for. We do not owe
anybody. So I can ask these questions without any trepidation.
What steps will you take--did I get an answer for the first
question? Will you issue new updated guidelines that reflect
Secretary Hutchinson's assertion that credit history will not
be part of the CAPPS II system?
Admiral Loy. Absolutely we will, sir. We intentionally put
the Federal Register notice out literally as widely as we
could. We recognized from the very beginning the importance of
the privacy end of this project. If I may, sir, you have given
me an opportunity to just describe a couple of things about
CAPPS II that I believe are fundamental and critical to our
doing a better job with passenger pre-screening.
First of all, the system that is in place today is broken.
It is run by the airlines in a wide variety of different ways,
from hand-held mimeograph lists to sophisticated software on
the other end with respect to name recognition. These are
enormously high stakes. Our first and foremost challenge, as
directed by the Congress, was to keep terrorists off airplanes.
CAPPS II will become a very narrowly focused threat
assessment tool that will allow us to do an infinitely better
job of identification authentication so that the person who
claims them to be Joe Jones we have some confidence level that
they are actually that person.
Secondly, they will use a much stronger list of foreign
terrorists that has been developed principally by the Justice
Department over the course of this last year-and-a-half, so
that we have a firmly identified person being bounced off a
firmly put-together list, not a haphazard list, not just a name
only kind of recognition as to whether or not the person is who
he claims to be.
They will also have a system that will allow us to sort of
rheostat it based on the intelligence that we have for that
day. If the intelligence for that day is threatening about an
airline, about an airport, about a region of the country, about
a flight, we will be able to adjust resources, both in terms of
Federal air marshals, screeners at our airports, or even
potentially the Federal flight deck officers that we have just
begun to put into our system.
This is not about data mining. This is not about NCIC
checks or credit checks on creditworthiness of a person one way
or the other. There are many of us who perhaps would actually
find that if our creditworthiness was not so hot, that would
prove that we are Americans. But we are not going there in any
case, as to checking creditworthiness as part of this process.
There will be no data held on these travelers, with the
exception of those that are determined to be potentially
foreign terrorists or those who are hanging around with them.
And there will be absolutely no racial or ethnic profiling as
part of this project that we are building.
I have personally conducted, and my team has conducted, an
extensive outreach to the privacy community. We have held off-
sites with privacy officers from the business world with the
most strong advocates of the Fourth Amendment anywhere in this
country. And we are learning from them as to what ought to be
the privacy strategy that is in place as part of this project.
We have briefed the Hill several times and look forward to
any other opportunities to educate either the Committee members
or their staffs as to why this project is so important to our
future.
PRIVACY RIGHTS
Senator Byrd. Well, you have answered my next question, it
being what steps will you take to protect air passengers'
privacy rights? Are there any additional thoughts you have on
that question?
Admiral Loy. Only that as we have worked with the privacy
advocates and communities, sir, they have four or five basic
things that they want to be assured of. First of all, they want
to be assured of an oversight of what we are doing that is
ongoing in nature, not just a check in the box at the point we
get the thing blessed and press on, but an ongoing oversight
responsibility for making sure we do not allow mission creep to
enter into that system.
They want a protocol for redress, if they, any individual,
American citizen, feels they have been wronged at the pre-
screening process, that they have a means by which they can get
redress to the system. They want to make sure that the
information that they are offering, which is, by the way, a
traveler-initiated information package, name, address, phone
number, date of birth. Those are the four things that we will
be asking for as part of the process. That the security
associated with anything uncovered as a result of providing
that information is very real. These are standards that we want
to build into that next privacy notice to make sure all of
America understands what this project is about.
Senator Byrd. Will the new notice name the precise
databases of information CAPPS II will collect about air
passengers?
Admiral Loy. I do not know that we have any reason not to
name those in the privacy notice that will follow the rest of
our review, Senator Byrd. But if you will, sir, I would be
happy to get back to you, as we are about to formulate that
second Register notice and advise you directly at that point.
Senator Byrd. And how long will that be? I mean, how soon
will that be?
Admiral Loy. We are talking about weeks, perhaps a month.
We are not talking about months or a year. We are anticipating
that the developmental work on CAPPS II will proceed and that
likely we will be at a point of having it online for America
sometime in the spring of 2004.
Senator Byrd. So you will supply the subcommittee with that
information?
Admiral Loy. I will, sir.
[The information follows:]
CAPPS II
CAPPS II will use commercial and government databases. The new
notice will identify all of the information that will be collected on
passengers and brought into the government system of records. TSA will
not, however, identify the commercial data providers in the notice
because CAPPS II will merely obtain authentication scores from
commercial data providers and the underlying data belonging to
commercial data providers will not be brought into the CAPPS II system.
Furthermore, for security reasons, the notice will not disclose the
nature or details of government-owned intelligence or other data that
will be in the system.
Senator Byrd. Just another question or so, Mr. Chairman.
And will the guidelines, in your opinion, be as clear as you
have been today?
Admiral Loy. They will be directly that clear, sir.
Absolutely.
Senator Byrd. Just a postscript with regard--well, I will
hold that for a moment.
Admiral Loy, you were the Administrator of TSA last fall
when you transmitted through the Department of Transportation
to the OMB your request for fiscal year 2004. As a former Coast
Guard commandant and as the Administrator of TSA, I am
interested in your specific views of the resource needs for
TSA. Would you tell us how much was requested at the OMB level?
Admiral Loy. Senator, I will be happy to stand right beside
Judge Bonner when we report back to the Committee. But let me
just say two things----
Senator Byrd. Now the head of this pin is getting awfully
narrow.
Admiral Loy. I understand. And we are dancing and trying to
keep both feet off the ground, sir.
Two things. I think the judge hit directly on the head of
that pin when he described the opportunity that must be present
for the new Secretary to consider the kinds of dispersion of,
for example, threat assessment monies that are important for
the whole range of what the Department is now responsible for.
So many of the dollars that we had identified, for example,
outside of aviation for what we thought was important work for
TSA to press on with have been momentarily gathered at the
Secretary's level to allow him the benefit of making judgments
as to where the most important dollars could be spent for the
well-being of our homeland.
I think that is an important step for him to take. And I
think it was the right thing for the gathering of such things
as vulnerability assessment dollars that had been requested to
be centralized in the new directorate known as the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and allow
Secretary Ridge the first opportunity to disperse those funds
in the right direction.
I trust, and I have every confidence, that a lot of those
dollars are going to find their way back to transportation
issues in ports, in rail, in transit systems, and other such
work as I have offered to the Secretary to get on with.
Senator Byrd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
all members of the panel.
May I just say in closing that my references to my own
personal financial data were not intended to be bragging. My
old mom used to tell me that a self-braggart is a half-
scoundrel. But I think I want to make it clear for the record
that my wife and I have always handled our business the old-
fashioned way.
Admiral Loy. As we all wish we could, sir.
Senator Byrd. We all might do better if we tried.
Admiral Loy. You bet.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
LETTERS OF INTENT
Admiral Loy, the budget request submitted by the
Transportation Security Administration does not include any
requests for funds for installation of explosive detection
systems. But I notice in your testimony you mention that there
is an intent to amend the request to include funds associated
with the Letters of Intent program.
Do you have a plan or a timetable for when you are going to
submit this or how much you will be requesting to carry out the
Letter of Intent program?
Admiral Loy. I think it is important for two things to be
brought to this discussion, sir. First of all, I think it is so
important for this program to press forward that my commitment
to the Department of Homeland Security has been that I would
find monies within the request already on the table to press on
with the EDS installation program.
I also see that in the reauthorization legislation
associated with the air, what used to be Air-21, there is a
notion of a substantial fund being established to provide for
the funding of major security projects at airports. There was
originally a discussion associated with whether that should be
dealt with inside the Department of Transportation or within
the Department of Homeland Security.
I would hope that if they are truly, if the intent of that
segment of the bill is to fund security projects for our
country about aviation, that they would be in the Department of
Homeland Security and made available to TSA to administer. That
would be an appropriate means by which we could find those
dollars to do that work.
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
Senator Cochran. There is, in the TSA's plans for this
year, agreements with local airports and State agencies for
uniformed officers at security checkpoints. Now there is an
announcement, I understand, that has gone out that TSA will not
reimburse local airports for law enforcement officers. We had a
couple of airports in our State that had been counting on some
funding to help pay the costs of providing uniformed officers
at security checkpoints.
What is the explanation, or is there any rationale, for
changing your mind about reimbursement for the expense of local
law enforcement officers at airports?
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. I will be happy to provide that. As
you know, the original ATSA legislation required Federal law
enforcement officers to be stationed at each checkpoint across
our country. Those responsibilities were largely fulfilled by
the National Guard in the immediate wake of the tragedies of 9/
11. As the National Guard disbanded from the airports, State
and local officials, law enforcement officials, filled the gaps
with absolutely excellent performance across this last year.
Our first recognition of whether or not the original law
needed adjusted was to take out the word Federal. And we got
the technical amendment associated with that accomplished. Just
in the course of the last appropriations cycle, the requirement
that they be stationed at the checkpoint was also eliminated.
We felt, after having observed this and with the great counsel
from the State and local people who have been doing this work
for us, that there was an infinitely greater capacity for law
enforcement to be done at the airport, if we went toward a
flexible response kind of an approach, where they were not
rigidly stationed at the checkpoint, rather could be roving to
a standard of response to get back when necessary, if something
happened at the checkpoint, but in the meantime could be doing
excellent law enforcement surveillance work, counterdetection
work, other very good things that those officers could be doing
for us at the airport, not unlike they had actually done many
times before 9/11/01.
So my announcement on the end of this month will be that,
A, it is no longer required for that officer to be rigidly
stationed at that checkpoint. And we will adopt a flexible
response approach.
We will eliminate the existing memoranda of agreement
associated with doing that and, where appropriate, renegotiate
reimbursable agreements in airports across the country. We
think we will probably be able to provide better security at
far less money for the American taxpayer.
PROFESSIONALISM OF AIRPORT SCREENERS
Senator Cochran. I appreciate that. And, in closing, I
wanted to make an observation and ask for your reaction to it.
Members of the Senate and Congress, as well as others, I am
sure, travel a good bit on airplanes. We have an opportunity to
observe the passenger screening procedures and the personnel
conducting those operations at a number of airports throughout
the country.
These individuals are charged with doing the things
necessary to assure that our airplanes are safe from hijackers
and others who are likely to cause or engage in terrorist
activities, hijackings, or commit crimes. It seems to me that
there is a wide disparity between airports and among different
individuals who are working to screen passengers. There ought
to be some way to standardize and have a predictable level of
competence and courtesy, building confidence among those who
are traveling by air that the screeners know what they are
doing and that we have good people, talented people, working
throughout the air passenger system.
But that is just not the case right now. I mean, there is a
wide disparity from airport to airport. I was surprised and
really very pleased this weekend, when I came across some
airport screeners who were very courteous and almost treated us
all as if we had not been convicted of a terrorist act as we
were proceeding through the lines. Others tend to be pretty
aggressive and some even mean-spirited, it seems.
I wonder when we can expect to get to the point where we
can count on a predictable level of competence and courtesy,
that the air-traveling public can expect, as we go through the
lines and are screened before we get on the airplanes?
Admiral Loy. Actually, I am very disappointed to hear that
report, Senator Cochran, because we had been working very
diligently to gain passenger feedback by focus groups and
asking questions of folks who are actually in the middle of the
experience across the country. And on balance, our feedback had
been that the courtesy, respect, professionalism of the
federalized screening force that took the place of many of
those screeners of the past, who unfortunately were more apt to
be described as you just described them, and that we had
actually done a very good job in that regard.
Our training program was exactly the same from coast to
coast. And to the degree there is a leadership challenge for
that Federal Security Director to mandate from his workforce
the descriptors you just described, that is exactly the
standard that I want those screeners to deal with across the
country. I will personally put out a message reinforcing that,
because that is what we taught at the training. And if it is
not there, I would actually like to know about that, so that I
can fix it anywhere in the country, sir.
Senator Cochran. Well, we appreciate that. I think it is a
matter of leadership. And I am not suggesting that you are not
a good leader. But somewhere down the line at some airports
there is a breakdown in that.
Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. We need that feedback so we can
correct that where it is appropriate.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Cochran. We have another hearing that we had
scheduled, where we were going to review the budget request for
the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection. The individual named to that
position has not been confirmed, so that hearing is going to be
postponed and hopefully will be rescheduled at a later date.
As you know, Senators may submit additional questions to
you to be answered for the record. And, we hope you will
respond to those questions within a reasonable time. We
appreciate very much your cooperation with our efforts to
review your budget request. We look forward to continuing to
work closely with you as we try to identify the priorities in a
thoughtful way to help ensure our Nation's security.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
FEE REVENUE
Question. Within your Bureau, there are multiple fees that are paid
by air and sea passengers for inspections services. Are you reviewing
the various fee structures with an eye towards rationalizing where,
when, and how these various fees are paid? Do you plan to send a
legislative proposal to the Congress?
Answer. A working group composed of representatives from the legacy
agencies is currently reviewing the various structures. The group is
tasked with identifying solutions to address the varied issues to
accomplish an integrated Bureau program. The critical objective of the
group is to develop a legislative BCBP user fee proposal for the
Congress to consider.
Question. What is the current financial condition of the
Immigration User Fee Account? Although additional hiring was
authorized, what plans do you have in place to ensure that the
Immigration User Fee will live within its means this fiscal year and
next fiscal year?
Answer. Fiscal year 2003 collections averaged 10.5 percent higher
($268.0 million) for the first two quarters than our projection of
$243.6 million. In fact, this per quarter average increase has held
since the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2002. During the first two
quarters of fiscal year 2003, the immigration user fee collections
reached just over 47 percent of the annual fiscal year 2003 projection
of $567.8 million. Depending on the impact that severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) has on the normally robust summer
international travel, we are cautiously optimistic about achieving the
fiscal year 2003 projection.
When immigration user fees for persons entering the United States
through an air or sea ports-of-entry materialize at levels lower than
estimated, as they did in fiscal year 2002 (-$85 million), we implement
as many of the following cost reducing actions as are needed to bridge
the funding gap.
--Reduce discretionary overtime
--Offset (to other accounts) or defer (to the next fiscal year)
selected non-payroll spending
--Delay hiring enhancement positions until late in the fiscal year
--Don't fund servicewides associated with the number of enhancement
positions not hired
--Don't hire seasonal inspections staff
--Freeze non-payroll spending
--Implement a furlough
The order listed is generally the order in which actions are
considered; however, there are exceptions. For example, in fiscal year
2002, overtime was required to operate at heightened threat levels.
Therefore, steps taken to bridge the fiscal year 2002 gap skipped step
1, and the gap was resolved by a combination of steps 2-4. Steps are
implemented only as far as necessary to resolve the gap. Thus far, the
gaps have not been serious enough to implement steps 5-7.
Immigration user fee passenger volume has been recovering toward
the pre-September 11, 2001 trend for the last 4 quarters but has not
yet reached pre-September 11, 2001 levels. The fiscal year 2003
projected collections ($568 million), although showing a $63 million
increase over fiscal year 2002 collections, would still be $90 million
below the fiscal year 2003 authorized spending authority ($658
million).
The steps taken in fiscal year 2002 are being repeated in fiscal
year 2003 to bridge the fiscal year 2003 gap.
Question. The Land Border Inspection Fee is also facing a deficit
this fiscal year. What plans do you have in place to fix this
situation?
Answer. The immigration land border fees including nonimmigrant
arrival/departure records and Canadian boat landing permit, as
examples, have not been increased in many years and do not fully
recover the cost of services. They are currently undergoing a cost
review, and recommendations for fee increases are likely. Prior to
fiscal year 2003, the $7-$8 million annual gap for 398 authorized
positions was absorbed in the Exams Fee account where these fees were
collected. With the transfer of these fees to the immigration land
border fee account in fiscal year 2003, the gap between costs and
collections has to be offset with appropriated funds. Our plan to fix
the situation in fiscal year 2003 is to offset approximately $7.4
million of payroll and non-payroll costs with appropriated Inspections
funds.
Question. The authority to collect a fee for land border
inspections has been used successfully to fund commuter express lanes.
In fiscal year 2002 the authority to run pilots was expanded from 6
ports of entry to 96 ports of entry. Do you have any plans to study
requiring all vehicles and pedestrians that use the land border to pay
a fee for that service, not just express commuters? Have you considered
requesting that the prohibition in Public Law 103-317 on assessing such
a fee be lifted?
Answer. We are not planning for a universal land border fee and are
not planning to request that the prohibition be lifted. However, over
the next 5 years, we are considering increasing the numbers of
dedicated commuter lanes so that many land border ports will have more
than one dedicated commuter lane available for pre-approved enrollees.
We believe the increased lane access will encourage greater
participation in the NEXUS and SENTRI programs and will increase the
numbers of pre-cleared travelers, as well as begin the process of
integrating the dedicated commuter lane concept with the U.S. VISIT
entry--exit concept. Increasing the numbers of dedicated lanes at
selected ports will provide for increased revenues to cover the cost of
operating the dedicated commuter lane enrollment centers. The cost of
increasing numbers of dedicated lanes would have to be paid from
appropriated funds as they have been in the past.
PHYSICAL ASSETS
Question. Virtually every individual program that has been merged
into BCBP has a need and a budget for buying vehicles. What steps are
you taking to review these budget items? What plans are there for
consolidation of procurement, retrofitting, and maintenance?
Answer. We are reviewing options for consolidating functions to
include fleet management. We currently have one bureau with a very
robust fleet management program that covers over 67 percent of the BTS
fleet. They have three established vehicle retrofit factories through a
partnership with Federal Prison Industries that provide over one
million high-quality, low-cost, labor hours to retrofit our vehicles.
The vehicle retrofit factories convert production line vehicles into
customized law enforcement vehicles. They provide a complete vehicle
replacement service to our customers that includes delivery of a
turnkey vehicle, the disposal of the replaced vehicle, and the
initiation of the vehicle file in our fleet maintenance management
system. They are also implementing a state-of-the-art commercial off-
the-shelf maintenance management system and fleet services. The new
service will allow our fleet managers to analyze and compare vehicle
life-cycle costs; in-house maintenance and commercial costs;
performance of fleet vehicles by type, year, region, etc; and the
status of vehicle and component warranties. It will allow our field
personnel to focus on their core Homeland Security mission while
improving the quality and economy of their vehicle fleet.
CANINE UNITS
Question. The creation of the Customs and Border Protection Bureau
brought together 1,210 canine teams--705 from the Customs Service, 334
from the Border Patrol, 30 from the Immigration Inspections program,
and 141 from the Animal Plant Health and Inspection Service. Are you
reviewing the multitude of canine programs that are already in
existence in your organization to look for overlaps in mission?
Answer. Yes. The Legacy U.S. Customs Service, Legacy Border Patrol
and Legacy Animal and Plant Health and Inspection Service have
developed working groups to work with the transition team to identify
overlaps in missions. Output from this working group was provided to
the Transition Team for the Commissioner's review and comments.
Question. Do you have any estimated cost savings from combining
these programs? Are any assumed in the President's fiscal year 2004
budget request?
Answer. No. The working group is waiting for direction on the final
structure, which was provided to the transition team. The working group
is being proactive in developing standards for like functions such as
narcotics detection. Work is ongoing to standardize such things as
evaluations, certifications, etc. At this time, the efforts would be
budget neutral should they be implemented.
CONSOLIDATION ISSUES
Question. How are plans proceeding on the integration of the
inspections programs and when do you anticipate seeing the cost savings
from creating a consolidated inspections program?
Answer. A plan is in place to roll out a unified primary
inspections program as well as an improved counterterrorism secondary
inspection program. For cargo, a working group has been established to
develop a unified cargo inspections process. It is anticipated that
consolidated facilities and systems will produce a cost savings once
the unified programs are in place. The roll-out of the unified primary
inspections program is projected to be completed by the end of fiscal
year 2004 at land and in airports. Roll-out plans for seaports are in
the process of being developed.
Question. After March 1, 2003, who assumed control at each of the
ports-of-entry? How were the decisions made in appointing the acting
port directors?
Answer. On February 27, 2003, Commissioner Bonner appointed 20
interim Directors for Field Operations to oversee operations at
approximately 300 ports of entry nationwide. These appointments became
effective on March 1, 2003.
The Interim Port Directors were recommended through an interagency
process that involved senior managers from the Legacy organizations of
Customs, Immigration and Agriculture. Current management officials at
the ports, from the various legacy organizations, were considered in
this process. The Interim Port Directors were then appointed by the
Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations. Each of the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCPB) Interim Port Directors
report directly to one of the Interim Directors for Field Operations.
Question. How are you approaching the reconciliation of the
disparate pay and benefit issues? Have you received input from the
Office of Personnel Management on this issue?
Answer. We have established a transition working group to address
the issues of the duties, pay and benefits of our workforce. This group
has presented preliminary recommendations to the Commissioner regarding
strategies to resolve these issues. We have plans to discuss these
strategies with the Office of Personnel Management in the coming
months.
Question. When do you plan to send a legislative proposal forward?
Answer. Once the personnel system flexibilities are determined, the
pay disparities will be addressed. It is likely that they will require
legislation. The Department of Homeland Security will be responsible
for developing any required legislation.
TRAINING
Question. What type of guidance have you provided to the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center concerning cross-training for existing
inspectors from the legacy agencies?
Answer. When the Department of Homeland Security was created on
March 1, 2003, all inspectors from legacy Customs, INS and Agriculture
became part of a single agency, the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (BCBP). The Commissioner of BCBP, the Honorable Robert C.
Bonner, launched an immediate initiative to cross-train all existing
inspectors in fulfillment of his statutory obligation as head of the
agency to determine the training requirements of agency personnel.
Currently anti-terrorism training is being delivered to all 17,000
existing Inspectors and cross training on frontline primary inspections
is being delivered to BCBP Inspectors at the ports of entry through CD-
ROMs. This month, BCBP will begin training personnel to return to their
duty stations and conduct live classes at the airports to prepare all
inspectors to work in all primary areas. Closely following the airport
rollout, land border and seaport inspectors will receive specialized
training by trained trainers at their ports of entry. First line
supervisors of the inspectors will also receive training. All
inspectors will to receive monthly ``muster modules'' (short training
sessions delivered at the ports on counter-terrorism topics). Training
delivered on``)site is the most efficient and effective way to meet the
immediate needs of the existing workforce while maintaining vital
operations at the border.
Question. What type of guidance have you provided to the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center for basic training for Customs and
Border Protection inspector recruits?
Answer. The Office of Training and Development (OTD) in the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) is designing the new basic
Inspector curriculum for its new recruits. This training will integrate
the formerly separate elements of the legacy Inspector positions. This
new training curriculum will meet all Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) standards.
BCBP is working with the FLETC to coordinate their support of
BCBP's projected training requirements in terms of the number of
students to be trained, the approximate content and length of the
proposed course, and the types of training that BCBP expects the FLETC
to provide. While BCBP Instructors provide the majority of the training
hours to its recruits, FLETC provides elements of training that are
common to all law enforcement agencies such as training in Firearms,
Arrest Techniques, Narcotics Identification and fingerprinting.
Question. Where will these inspectors train? Will they train as a
group or separately or a combination?
Answer. All incumbent Inspectors for the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (BCBP) will receive training at their current ports
using a combination of group training to foster unification and
teamwork, self-study to enable rapid uptake of critical skills and
knowledge, and apprentice-style, on-the-job training (OJT) that
provides opportunities for legacy Immigration, Agriculture Quarantine,
and Customs Inspectors to demonstrate field practices to each other.
New recruits for BCBP Inspector positions will receive structured
on-the-job training (OJT) at their duty station before and after they
attend the classroom and practical exercise training at the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection Academy in Glynco, Georgia.
BORDER PATROL
Question. Now that the Border Patrol is part of your organization,
do you intend to keep the National Border Patrol Strategy that INS has
attempted to implement over the past 9 years?
Answer. The Border Patrol's national strategic plan was written in
1994 with the focus of implementation in the areas with the highest
level of illegal immigration. The plan is achieved with the ``forward
deployment'' and proper balance of agents, equipment, technology, and
border infrastructure (cameras, sensors, roads, lights, fences or other
border barriers).
Areas of operations that have become the focus of this plan have
proved this to be an effective enforcement action. Participating
sectors have seen a prolific change since the inception of their
corresponding operations.
--El Paso--Hold the Line (arrests down, crime reduced)
--San Diego--Gatekeeper (29 year record low in apprehensions, crime
reduced)
--McAllen--Rio Grande (crime and arrests reduced)
Changes have occurred since the strategy's implementation, most
notably following the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States.
The strategy's Phase IV implementation was accelerated to respond to
the potential threats on the northern border. The upgrades in
technology and its application for border deterrence and enforcement
has also improved.
Continuation of the proven and successful National Border Patrol
Strategic Plan is warranted in-order to respond to emerging threats and
changes in the past trends of illegal border entries.
Question. What changes might you consider making to the strategy to
increase its effectiveness and reduce migrant deaths?
Answer. Due to concentrated border enforcement efforts, organized
smugglers have shifted their techniques and areas of operation from
traditional unlawful entry points near the ports of entry to extremely
remote and dangerous areas. The intense summer temperatures and arduous
terrain associated with these areas account for the majority of
documented deaths. BCBP has been increasing efforts to identify and
prosecute smugglers who choose more dangerous methods and routes to
smuggle unsuspecting aliens. Yearly enhancements allow for BCBP to
apply resources where the deaths occur to effectively deter and disrupt
illegal border traffic. BCBP is also expanding its Border Safety
Initiative, which incorporates a multi-pronged approach to making the
border a safer environment. BCBP is increasing the number of qualified
medical/rescue agents and is cooperating with Mexican counterparts at
an unprecedented level. For example, a meeting of field representatives
has just concluded, which produced a collaborative strategic plan for
reducing deaths on both sides of the international border. As the
strategy evolves other initiatives will be developed and supported.
BCBP leadership is convinced that when the proper balance of personnel,
equipment, technology, and tactical infrastructure exists, the illegal
crossings will decline, bringing a commensurate decline in deaths and
injury.
Question. Given the level of additional resources that have been
put into the Northern Border, will you be revising that portion of the
strategy?
Answer. Since its implementation in 1994, the Border Patrol's
National Strategic Plan has been the basis for a multi-year, multi-
phased approach for the deployment of additional personnel and
resources, for the purpose of increasing control of our Nation's
borders. The cornerstone of this strategy calls for ``prevention
through deterrence'' as the means to restrict illegal entry attempts
into the United States. Along the southwest border, the strategy has
concentrated Border Patrol resources into those specific geographic
areas experiencing the highest level of illegal activity. The key to
the successful implementation of this strategy has been the deployment
of the proper balance of personnel, equipment, technology and
infrastructure into those areas.
As originally written, the final phase of the National Strategic
Plan calls for enhancing our enforcement posture along the northern
border and coastal areas of the United States. Securing the northern
border has traditionally presented many unique enforcement challenges
for the Border Patrol. Our shared border with Canada is approximately
4,000 miles long and is the longest non-militarized undefended border
in the world. In the past, this vast expanse, coupled with an
inadequate number of personnel and a lack of resources and
infrastructure, has significantly limited the Border Patrol's deterrent
effect upon illegal activity. In the wake of September 11, 2001,
vulnerabilities and deficiencies along the northern border have
received increased attention, which has caused the Border Patrol to
accelerate its efforts in increasing our enforcement presence along the
northern border.
The current Northern Border Strategy encompasses interagency and
international cooperation and coordination, effective technology
development and deployment, and innovative resource allocation. The
geographic and environmental conditions found on the northern border
have led to the historic economic and cultural interdependence of the
United States and Canada. In light of the long-standing cooperation and
economic interdependency, the Border Patrol has conducted activities
along the northern border with significantly fewer resources than were
dedicated to the southwest border. For these reasons, the Border Patrol
cannot simply replicate the same enforcement strategy implemented on
the southwest border.
The Northern Border Strategy relies upon maximizing existing
resources in order to strengthen control of the border. The Northern
Border Strategy also requires the proper balance of personnel,
equipment, technology and infrastructure. To improve our effectiveness,
the initial area of emphasis is the expansion of liaison and increased
intelligence sharing with other Federal, State and local law
enforcement agencies, as well as our counterparts within the Canadian
government. The second emphasis is on the deployment of enforcement
related technology along the border to act as a force multiplier,
thereby increasing the area that can be adequately covered by available
manpower. The final emphasis of the strategy calls for the deployment
of additional personnel into our northern border sectors. As mentioned,
subsequent to September 11, 2001, the Border Patrol accelerated into
this phase by redeploying agents from the southwest border to the
northern border.
Question. In December 2001, the Northern Border sectors of the
Border Patrol were directed to create or expand Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams or Integrated Maritime Enforcement Teams. What
progress has been made in carrying out this directive?
Answer. IBETs are intelligence driven/intelligence led enforcement
teams comprised of Federal, State/provincial and local law enforcement
personnel working together to enhance our shared border's integrity and
security. They are multi-disciplinary in nature and work in land, air
and marine environments along the Canadian/United States border,
respecting the laws and jurisdiction of each nation. They identify,
investigate and interdict persons and organizations that pose a threat
to our national security or are engaged in other organized criminal
activity.
Since December 2001, the Northern Sectors of the Border Patrol have
created and expanded the Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET)
program to include participation by all Northern Border Sectors. There
are 14 IBET locations along the Northern Border with 12 currently fully
operational. All IBET regions should be staffed and operational by the
autumn of 2003.
BCBP/USBP has 17 assigned IBET intelligence sources. BICE has 60
IBET resources, 4 of which are intelligence resources. Currently, the
total number of RCMP IBET assets is 131, with 25 being intelligence
resources. Canadian Customs Revenue Agency has 14 dedicated IBET
intelligence resources.
A multi-agency monthly report is what the IBET's are currently
working towards. From this report, a national multi-agency monthly
report/bulletin will be compiled and distributed to all partner
agencies. A yearly Risk Assessment will be established for each IBET
and a national Risk Assessment will be compiled. A weekly IBET
Information Brief containing open source information is currently
produced by the National RCMP IBET analyst and is distributed to all
partner agencies through intelligence contacts that have been developed
in those agencies.
To ensure that all local, State and Federal participating IBET
agencies are aware of the IBET program and concept, training has been
established and conducted with Federal, State and local law enforcement
agencies on both sides of the border to inform participants on IBET
concepts and operations. Four 3 day IBET workshops have been completed
in 4 locations with a total of 146 members from multiple government
agencies participating. This training has been extremely successful.
Present initiatives under development call for improving the IBET
model. Current efforts include the co-location of intelligence
resources in 4 locations and the dedication of full time resources to
the Intelligence group from all participating agencies.
Question. What is the current status of overall Border Patrol
hiring? Do you expect to hire all of the new authorized positions this
year? Please provide the committee with the total number of on-board
agents as of the date of this hearing.
Answer. Border Patrol hiring continues at a steady pace. Interest
in the Border Patrol as a career remains high among our applicant
market, with more than 37,000 applications received as far this fiscal
year. Through our highly selective screening and processing, we project
a net new hiring figure of 600 new agents for fiscal year 2003. This
number will meet the additional 570 agents directed by Congress and
will make significant progress towards overcoming the hiring shortfall
of fiscal year 2002. As of May 13th, the date of the hearing, the
Border Patrol had 10,381 agents on-board.
INSPECTIONS--DOCUMENTATION
Question. Current Federal regulation exempts certain persons, such
as U.S. citizens, from presenting a passport when arriving into the
United States from most countries in the Western hemisphere. Inspectors
can allow a person to enter based upon only an oral claim of
citizenship. Inspectors intercept thousands of aliens each year who
falsely claim to be a U.S. citizen in order to unlawfully enter the
United States. What policy changes, if any, would you recommend that
would mitigate an alien's ability to successfully enter the United
States by falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen?
Answer. These issues have significant legal, domestic policy, and
foreign policy implications, all of which must be analyzed and
carefully weighed before a final recommendation and policy decision can
be made.
Question. Your Department is charged with developing a
comprehensive Entry Exit system to track the arrival and departure of
all aliens into this country. Given that, should the Western hemisphere
exemption be reconsidered, such that everyone, U.S. citizen or Canadian
will have to present a passport to gain entry into the United States at
an international border crossing?
Answer. These issues have significant legal, domestic policy, and
foreign policy implications, all of which must be analyzed and
carefully weighed before a final recommendation and policy decision can
be made.
CARGO AND PASSENGER PROCESSING
Question. Over the years, the Customs Service and the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service have recognized the natural
tension between ``enforcement'' and ``facilitation'' when processing
cargo and passengers entering the United States. Striking a balance
between the two can be complicated by the fact that the cargo and
passenger transportation networks are predominantly controlled by the
private sector. What views and options will you bring to the Department
of Homeland Security to help mitigate this tension?
Answer. The need to facilitate the flow of cargo and the need for a
strong security and enforcement posture is not mutually exclusive. The
need for both underlines the importance of advanced, electronic
information on goods before they arrive in the country. BCBP realizes
that and is working towards that end in many programs, the 24-Hour
cargo rule and the forthcoming proposed regulation under the Trade Act
of 2002 being excellent examples. Both are efforts to capture cargo
information from the Trade earlier in the transportation cycle so that
security decisions on release or examination are made efficiently
before goods actually arrive in the country.
Question. Recognizing that it is a difficult proposition, how best
can we gain reasonable assurance that laws will be enforced without
unduly clogging supply chains and slowing the flow of passenger
traffic?
Answer. The best method is to work towards the acceptance of
electronic information from all parties involved in the transaction who
must report to BCBP as well as those who may offer additional
information to facilitate cargo movement. Since BCBP is relying on this
data for important decision-making, the sources of the data must be
well known and, if necessary, regulated by the government. BCBP must be
willing to expand its communications with various trade parties, and
has acknowledged this with its C-TPAT program and its acceptance of
Non-Vessel Operating Commercial carriers into the Vessel Automated
Manifest Systems.
Question. Given the fact that the cargo and passenger
transportation networks are predominantly controlled by the private
sector, how can the government and private sector work in a partnership
to ensure that security becomes a natural and reinforced part of the
supply chain in a cost-effective and operationally efficient manner?
Answer. BCBP can ensure that it is able to communicate with all
trading partners who need to supply data. It can also act to serve as a
communication link between trade partners so that some or all of the
necessary shipment data can be shared, thereby saving the trade from
having many communications links to many different companies. In doing
so, BCBP can also shield data that should not be seen by all the
parties to a transaction.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget for the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection requests $30.2 million for an Information Technology
Transformation to Homeland Security Fund, and has a separate request
for $22.3 million for an Information Technology Infrastructure program
called ATLAS. Please explain the differences between these two
requests.
Answer. The Information Technology Transformation to Homeland
Security Fund is being created to address Information Technology (IT)
compatibility and interoperability issues that arise during the
transition including, but not limited to, mission systems, electronic
mail, networks, collaborative tools, enforcement data integration,
administrative capabilities and expanded services to other DHS
components. It is imperative that IT operability remains stable in
order to efficiently meet BCBP mission requirements. This fund will be
used to extend the BCBP enterprise architecture to provide expanded
access to IT capabilities in support of the Homeland Security mission.
Legacy INS initiated the ATLAS program in 2001 to transform its
stove-piped and aging IT infrastructure into an up-to-date environment
that can provide improved data sharing and applications
interoperability that will support the underpinning of all mission-
critical, application development initiatives and all systems that are
in an operations and maintenance mode.
Question. With the consolidation of Customs and INS into DHS'
Border and Transportation Security Directorate and DHS' associated
effort to integrate border protection and immigration and customs
enforcement, what are the implications for continuing ACE, the
Modernization project, and ATLAS as separate projects?
Answer. The Modernization Program and its first project, ACE, will
support the overall mission of the Directorate of Border and
Transportation Security (BTS) and, more specifically, enhance the
operational effectiveness of the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (BCBP). ACE will play a major role in enhancing both border
security and border efficiency. It provides an integrated information
base and IT platform that can be leveraged for border security.
Starting this year, ACE will help enhance border security and
deliver efficiencies to the trade process by providing interagency
information sharing, and real-time, cross-government access to more
accurate trade information. By centralizing and integrating the
collection and analysis of this information, ACE will enhance BCBP
ability to target illicit cargo, illegal persons, and unsafe
conveyances. The trade data will be analyzed prior to arrival, allowing
advanced inter-agency assessment of risks and threats to determine
which goods and people must be scrutinized. Results will determine if,
upon arrival, a shipment is to be examined or cleared for release.
As noted above, the ATLAS program was initiated in 2001 to
transform its stove-piped and aging IT infrastructure into an up-to-
date environment that provides improved data sharing and applications
interoperability that will support the underpinning of all mission-
critical, application development initiatives and all current systems
that are in an operations and maintenance mode.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE DATA SYSTEM
Question. What is the status of implementing the International
Trade Data System? What will the request for $5.7 million in additional
funding for fiscal year 2004 be used for?
Answer. The ITDS initiative is currently in the process of
integrating the first 9 agencies with responsibilities at the border
including BCBP; U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC); Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA); Bureau of Census; Federal
Communications Commission (FCC); Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE).
The original fiscal year 2004 budget request for ITDS was approved
at $5.4 million prior to the identification and incorporation of agency
inputs related to ITDS development. That original funding allowed the
ITDS development contractor to perform only high-level requirements
gathering. The request for the $5.7 million in additional funding in
fiscal year 2004 will be used to perform detailed requirements
gathering and analysis for incorporation into ITDS and will include
integration plans and agency readiness review criteria. This effort
will include the development of a consolidated and harmonized
government-wide data requirements for all import and export
transactions.
Question. How many of the over 100 government agencies involved in
ITDS have participated in identifying requirements?
Answer. As of this date, over twenty of the over 100 government
agencies have directly participated in the identification of
requirements for ITDS. In addition, with the inclusion of Census in the
list of participating agencies, numerous statistical agencies who
currently receive their data exclusively or significantly through
Census are considered to have their requirements addressed within the
system. Through the on-going ITDS outreach efforts to the agencies and
the system definition taking place within the ITDS Process Analysis
Teams, additional agencies are being solicited to populate business
process areas that align with an agency's mission.
Question. How many of the over 100 government agencies involved in
ITDS have initiated changes to their existing systems and processes so
they will work with ITDS?
Answer. Of the over 100 government agencies identified for
inclusion in ITDS, at least nine have begun in earnest initiating
changes in their systems and processes to work with ITDS. Numerous
others have begun assessing the system and process changes that will be
required once their integration begins. Agencies are coordinating their
schedules for implementing change with the incremental delivery
schedule of ITDS as functionality is deployed that best aligns with
their mission needs.
Question. What will be the impact on anticipated ITDS benefits if
trade agencies do not position themselves to use ITDS?
Answer. Benefits from ITDS fall into several categories: improved
border and port security; improved port operations; improved data
quality; reporting burden reduction to the international trade and
transportation communities; and, streamlined operations post-entry.
These benefits will be lessened if agencies do not participate in
ITDS. Paramount to this is the failure to leverage the ITDS development
efforts and meet the spirit of the President's Management Agenda and
its five government wide goals. It is difficult to quantify the extent
to which benefits will not accrue to the Government. However, it is
possible, depending upon which agencies do not participate, that port
inspectional personnel may have to use more than one system for
processing goods or conveyances; some trade and transportation
companies may have to provide information to the Government through
multiple information systems; the Government will not have all of the
information available to support a single, knowledge-based risk
management system; and, data quality issues will remain as long as data
is reported through multiple information systems.
Question. What actions are planned to overcome any resistance trade
agencies may have to positioning themselves for ITDS?
Answer. The ITDS Board of Directors has recently completed a major
effort to contact all agencies that are potential candidates for
inclusion in ITDS. The agencies were offered an opportunity to meet
with ITDS and BCBP personnel to discuss the mission and vision for
ITDS, expected benefits, and steps that agencies should take to be
included. As a result of those contacts, the number of agencies
participating in the Government Support Network (a user group
conference for Federal agencies) tripled over previous meetings and the
number of agencies participating in the Program Support Group (an ITDS
participant group) has increased.
Commissioner Bonner will personally meet with heads of agencies
that have resisted outreach efforts but which are important for
homeland security, border operations, and trade facilitation or which
are developing competitive or redundant systems. The list of specific
agencies to be covered by these meetings is not finalized as of May 28,
2003, but will be finalized shortly. A representative of the
international trade community will participate in those meetings.
Several meetings have been held with the Office of Management and
Budget to solicit support for agency budget requests that include
integration into ITDS and OMB support for the initiative. Another
meeting is being scheduled with budget examiners from all of the
departments that have agencies that are possible candidates for
inclusion in ITDS.
CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE
Question. While your organization has launched the Container
Security Initiative and continues to operate the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism, there is also Operation Safe Commerce,
which is the responsibility of the Transportation Security
Administration. Operation Safe Commerce is working to identify and fund
business driven initiatives to enhance security for the movement of
cargo through the supply chain. While each of these projects has a
particular focus, how will these be coordinated to ensure no
duplication of effort and the best use of the funding provided?
Answer. BCBP has the sole statutory and regulatory responsibility
for container security on containers destined for the United States.
Although this authority is clearly delineated through the
implementation of enforcement programs like Container Security
Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), BCBP strives to comply with its mission in coordination with
other equally vital offices within the Department of Homeland Security
which have statutory and regulatory responsibility over a segment of
sea transportation.
Coordination and communication with our department partners ensures
an effective and streamlined security process. For example, BCBP has
established a protocol with the United States Coast Guard to handle
certain types of serious threats through the High-Interest Vessel
program. Also, BCBP has shared interest with DOT and TSA in developing
industry partnership programs that improve container security (and
other types of transportation security) and are consistent for domestic
and international shipping.
BCBP and TSA are working together through a jointly chaired
steering committee that makes the final project selection decisions for
Operation Safe Commerce. The Federal Register notice that initiated the
Operation Safe Commerce program makes specific references to C-TPAT and
CSI as initiatives that may be considered as part of Operation Safe
Commerce business practices and technology supply chain ``test bed''
initiatives.
As a voluntary government-business initiative, the C-TPAT
complements the overseas targeting of the CSI and the development of
new security techniques under Operation Safe Commerce. As of May 9,
2003 C-TPAT membership includes over 3,000 companies that account for
approximately 37 percent of all U.S. imports by value and approximately
93 percent of all U.S.-bound sea-containerized cargo. By creating a
significant network of reliable and secure companies, C-TPAT enables
BCBP to direct its CSI targeting to areas of greater risk and
establishes a mechanism for incorporating the best practices and new
high-tech equipment identified by Operation Safe Commerce.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
BORDER ISSUES
Question. It has been 17 years since the Federal government
launched a major effort to upgrade U.S. borders and that effort focused
only on the Southwest border.
I have just sponsored the Border Infrastructure and Technology
Modernization Act (S-539). The new bill will focus on U.S. borders with
Canada as well as Mexico. This bill has the dual goals of facilitating
the efficient flow of trade while meeting the challenges of increased
security requirements.
This will include:
--More funding for equipment at our land borders;
--Additional funding for personnel;
--Additional funding for training; and
--Additional funding for industry/business partnership programs along
the Mexican and Canadian borders.
It is important for the border enforcement agencies to work with
the private sector on both sides of the border and reward those
partners who adopt strong internal controls designed to defeat
terrorist access to our country.
What are your thoughts on the importance of trade partnership
programs along the Southwest border?
Answer. Industry Partnership Programs (IPP) allow BCBP to expand
our influence beyond the borders and into Mexico, Central America,
South America and the Caribbean. Under the umbrella of the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), these priority
initiatives include the Land Border Carrier Initiative Program (LBCIP),
the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC) and the Americas Counter
Smuggling Initiative Program (ACSI). Each IPP enables the Trade to
tighten our borders through the enhancement of supply chain security
standards that deter smugglers from using conveyances and cargo to
smuggle terrorist devices and narcotics. These complementary programs
benefit both BCBP and the private sector by securing the integrity of
shipments destined for the United States while promoting the efficient
flow of trade.
We are currently working on additional security requirements that
take into account the additional terrorist and drug threat on the
Southwest border for conversion of the LBCIP carriers to C-TPAT. BASC
chapters have been established throughout Ecuador, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela and most recently in Jamaica,
where a chapter was founded in March 2003. The ACSI Teams continue to
support BASC through security site surveys, briefings on smuggling
trends and techniques and security and drug awareness training.
The primary purpose of LBCIP is to prevent smugglers of illegal
drugs from utilizing commercial conveyances for their commodities.
Carriers can effectively deter smugglers by enhancing security measures
at their place of business and on the conveyances used to transport
cargo. By signing agreements with the BCBP, land and rail carriers
agree to enhance the security of their facilities and the conveyances
they use and agree to cooperate closely with BCBP in identifying and
reporting suspected smuggling attempts.
BASC is a business-led, BCBP supported alliance created to combat
narcotics smuggling via commercial trade that was formed in March 1996.
BASC examines the entire process of manufacturing and shipping
merchandise from foreign countries to the United States, emphasizing
the creation of a more security-conscious environment at foreign
manufacturing plants to eliminate, or at least reduce, product
vulnerability to narcotics smuggling. Customs BCBP supports BASC
through ACSI, which are teams of BCBP officers that travel to the BASC
countries to assist businesses and government in developing security
programs and initiatives that safeguard legitimate shipments from being
used to smuggle narcotics and implements of terrorism.
Question. What plans do you have to increase cooperation with the
Mexican government on border issues?
Answer. Under the C-TPAT programs consisting of the Americas
Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), and the Business Anti-Smuggling
Coalition (BASC), BCBP is engaging the Mexican trade community and
Mexican Customs in a cooperative relationship against the smuggling of
drugs and implements of terror. Meetings have been held with Mexican
Customs through a bilateral U.S.-Mexican Government Working Group.
Through this working group, the United States and Mexico can work
jointly through these programs to establish a secure supply chain
between our countries, while facilitating cross border trade. BCBP is
also working with Mexican Customs to identify what areas in Mexico
should be targeted for the establishment of new BASC chapters.
Under the high-level United States and Mexico Customs Bilateral
Working Group, a demonstration project to test a fast and secure lane
at El Paso is underway. This bilateral program is designed to expedite
and facilitate commercial truck crossings at the Ports of Entry (POEs)
by implementing the mandated requirements of securing the flow of
people, transportation, and goods under a secure infrastructure. This
program is aimed at facilitating cross border trade, while improving
and ensuring the supply chain security of the participants that range
from manufacturing, to transportation, to importation.
BCBP has two ACSI teams traveling throughout Mexico to work with
the BASC Chapters in Monterrey, Ciudad Juarez and Mexico City to
prevent drug smugglers and elements of terrorism from using legitimate
cargo to enter their illegal merchandise into the U.S. BASC, which was
initiated in March 1996, continues to be a private sector business-led,
BCBP supported alliance under C-TPAT that complements and enhances our
efforts to secure the supply chain. C-TPAT is an anti-terrorism
response to the events of September 11, 2001 which engages the trade
community in a cooperative relationship with BCBP in the war against
terrorism. C-TPAT will work with foreign manufacturers, exporters,
carriers, importers and other industry sectors emphasizing a seamless,
security conscious environment throughout the entire commercial
process.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AT THE LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
Question. I was pleased to learn of Secretary Ridge's interest in
using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for improved surveillance along
our Nation's borders. I strongly support such action to improve our
Nation's ability to patrol our borders, particularly in less-populated
areas. Southern New Mexico is already the site of ongoing UAV flights
out of the Las Cruces International Airport. This airport is the
headquarters of New Mexico's emerging UAV Center of Excellence, the
newly formed joint regional UAV Systems and Operations Validation
Facility (USOVF), a partnership between the 46th Test Group at Holloman
Air Force Base and the Physical Science Laboratory of New Mexico State
University. The USOVF is pre-approved by the Federal Aviation
Administration for file and fly in a regional flight area of 300,000
square miles in the western United States. The Las Cruces International
Airport is situated less than 40 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border, and
in a central location among U.S. border states. What do you anticipate
will be the size and scope of the Department of Homeland Security's
deployment of UAV's on our borders?
Answer. BTS has asked the Science and Technology Directorate to
evaluate the use of UAVs in a Border and Transportation Security
environment. S&T was also asked to evaluate other potential
applications.
Question. What funding and facilities will the Department need for
a UAV program?
Answer. Until the requirements have been scoped to determine the
feasibility and extent of a UAV program, we cannot predict what amount
of funding and the type of facilities the Department will need to
implement a UAV program.
Question. On what timeline will the Department implement this
initiative?
Answer. At this time, it is unknown what the timeline will be for
the Department to implement this type of initiative. A proposed project
plan including milestones and deliverables is expected to be ready for
review by June 2003. The project plan will discuss the BTS-specific
project as well as strategies in developing UAV initiatives in the
near, mid, and long term for DHS venues such as borders and ports.
Question. Based upon the characteristics of the Las Cruces, New
Mexico International Airport, could you provide an assessment of its
potential for utilization by the Department of Homeland Security for
serving as a platform for the deployment of UAV's for Homeland Security
purposes?
Answer. Based upon the description of the Las Cruces, New Mexico
International Airport, the facility appears to have potential for
serving as a platform for UAV deployment for Homeland Security
purposes. After UAV program feasibility, requirements and scope is
determined a more detailed assessment on available testing and
deployment facilities needs to be made.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mitch McConnell
Question. In your testimony, you mentioned the significant success
of the Container Security Initiative (``CSI'') in helping to eliminate
the threat of terrorist attacks by means of oceangoing sea containers.
Will the CSI also help in the detection of items such as illicit drugs
and counterfeit merchandise in addition to cargo that could be a
potential terrorist threat?
Answer. BCBP screens the data and information for all cargo
containers arriving in the United States each year; and closely
scrutinizes and examines all shipments identified as high risk. BCBP
has developed a multi-layered process to target high-risk shipments
while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and cargo.
Our multi-layered approach involves electronic manifest
information, partnerships, Automated Targeting System (ATS), the human
factor, and non-intrusive inspection technology.
The BCBP goal is not to search a specific percentage of cargo. BCBP
thoroughly screens and ultimately examines 100 percent of shipments
that pose a risk to our country.
Question. Do changes in the Homeland Security Advisory System
Threat Level have an effect on the BCBP's mission priorities? If so,
what effect do threat level changes have on the BCBP's enforcement of
intellectual property rights?
Answer. During times of ``ALERT LEVEL ORANGE'' or greater BCBP's
main focus of operation will be that of detection and interdiction of
terrorist entities and weapons of mass destruction. However, the BCBP
continues to work hard on its other key mission priorities that include
but are not limited to matters relative to intellectual property
rights. The interdiction of counterfeit goods remains one of six
priority trade areas for BCBP. The Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
continue our collaborative efforts of detection, interdiction and
investigation of counterfeit goods. Through the collective efforts of
employees at over 300 ports of entry, BCBP continues to target,
intercept and seize shipments of goods that violate U.S. patent and
trademark laws and regulations. A multi-disciplined IPR Working Group
is currently working to improve the agency's targeting of shipments
that may potentially contain counterfeit goods. This will be
accomplished by identifying risk factors, focusing on high-risk
products and implementing a coordinated targeting initiative of
containerized freight to detect, deter and interdict the movement of
counterfeit products.
Question. I understand that the former Customs Service has
participated in the Treasury Department's Operation Green Quest, which
seeks to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the financial sources of
terrorist funding. The findings of that investigation indicate that one
of the many criminal enterprises used to fund terrorist organizations
is the sale of counterfeit merchandise. Could you please describe what
information you have about the extent of the connection between
intellectual property theft and terrorist financing and what the BCBP
is doing to counter this threat?
Answer. Operation Green Quest investigations have revealed that a
variety of criminal activities serve as funding sources for various
criminal elements, some of which are alleged to have ties to terrorist
organizations. Among these are violations of laws protecting
intellectual property rights and prohibiting the manufacture,
trafficking and sale of counterfeit merchandise. The Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) is conducting several on-
going investigations involving the use of proceeds derived from the
sale and trafficking of counterfeit merchandise, alleged to support
designated terrorist organizations. BICE is committed to investigating
any violation of Federal law that may be used to fund criminal
enterprises.
Question. Some in industry fear that an unintended consequence of
merging the Customs Service into the BCBP has been a reduction in the
number of inspectors assigned to detect counterfeit merchandise. Have
there been reassignments in the BCBP that have diverted personnel from
intellectual property enforcement to other functions? If so, how does
the BCBP plan to balance its traditional missions, including protecting
American businesses from theft of their intellectual property, with the
Bureau's primary mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States?
Answer. Yes, there have been some reassignments of personnel due to
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's new primary mission of
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States. However, BCBP continues to work hard on its other key mission
priorities that include but are not limited to matters relative to
intellectual property rights. The interdiction of counterfeit goods
remains one of six priority trade areas for BCBP. BCBP continues its
collaborative efforts of detection, interdiction and investigation of
counterfeit goods with BICE.
Through the collective efforts of employees at more than 300 ports
of entry, BCBP continues to target, intercept and seize shipments of
goods that violate U.S. patent and trademark laws and regulations. A
multi-disciplined IPR Working Group is currently working to improve the
agency's targeting of shipments that may potentially contain
counterfeit goods. This will be accomplished by identifying risk
factors, focusing on high-risk products and implementing a coordinated
targeting initiative of containerized freight to detect, deter and
interdict the movement of counterfeit products.
BCBP anticipates bringing on-board approximately 1,700 new
Inspector hires by the end of fiscal year 2003. As these new Inspectors
are brought on-board, trained and placed in ports of entry throughout
the country they will increase the number of personnel BCBP will have
at its disposal to focus on the important mission of counterfeit goods
detection and interdiction. Under the IPR Trade Strategic Plan,
developed by the former Customs Service's IPR Working Group, BCBP is
providing its field personnel with the additional knowledge they
require for IPR enforcement through advanced fraud and IPR law,
procedures and enforcement training.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
QUALIFIED ANTITERRORISM TECHNOLOGIES
Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Sections 862) provided
the Department of Homeland Security with authority to compile a list of
``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' that would qualify or receive
certain protection under that Act. Has this list been compiled? If not,
why?
Answer. The list of ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' has
not yet been compiled. The regulations to govern implementation of the
SAFETY Act must be completed before the SAFETY Act can be implemented.
Promulgation of these regulations is a high priority, and DHS is
working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to finalize an
initial set of SAFETY Act regulations. We expect to publish these
regulations for comment very shortly. Following the public comment
period, the regulations will be finalized and issued. As soon as the
regulations are issued, applications can be made to DHS for
consideration of possible technologies that are determined to meet the
criteria set forth in Subtitle G, Sec. 862.
Question. If this list has been compiled, can Members of this
Committee get a copy of this list?
Answer. The list of ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' has
not yet been compiled. The regulations to govern implementation of the
SAFETY Act must be completed before the SAFETY Act can be implemented.
Promulgation of these regulations is a high priority, and DHS is
working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to finalize an
initial set of SAFETY Act regulations.
Question. How would a company that has an antiterrorism technology
be considered for approval?
Answer. DHS has developed plans for both an immediate
implementation path, and for a longer-term ``ideal state'' process, to
implement the SAFETY Act. Public notification of the application
process and of the select categories of technologies that will be
considered for certification will be made through the DHS website after
regulations are issued.
Question. Do they need to wait for the rulemaking process to be
completed to apply for approval?
Answer. Yes, companies will need to wait until after the rulemaking
process has been completed. DHS does not yet have an application or
approval process in place. Final application and approval processes are
contingent upon issuance of regulations. DHS wants to ensure that
applicants are well informed about requirements so that they can make
informed decisions regarding submitting their technologies for
consideration
Question. If so, when will that process be completed?
Answer. Until DHS and OMB have completed their review and issued
guidance for the actual implementation of the SAFETY Act, it is not
possible to determine an actual date for completing the process.
However, the Department does place a high priority on completing the
necessary guidance and regulations and is prepared to act quickly after
issuance of the guidance.
BORDER SECURITY
Question. This Directorate arguably has one of the toughest jobs in
the Department. Ideally, if this Directorate performs its job to
perfection, then the concerns of terrorists coming into our country to
attack our citizens or our infrastructure are reduced to a great
extent. With 7,500 miles of land borders with Canada and Mexico and
95,000 miles of coastline to keep watch over, short of building a large
wall around the country, how much success have you had in strengthening
our border security?
Answer. The priority mission BCBP is to detect and prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States at and
between Ports of Entry (POEs) while simultaneously facilitating
legitimate trade and travel.
In order to carry out its priority mission, BCBP has developed and
is implementing Smart Border initiatives with other Nations and with
the private sector, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), NEXUS, and
the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program, and will continue to push our
zone of security outwards.
Our layered inspection process and the components of a Smart Border
include:
--Advance electronic information;
--Automated targeting tools;
--Identifying and facilitating low-risk travelers and shipments;
--Non-intrusive inspection technology;
--Industry partnerships;
--Training; and
--Pushing security beyond our borders.
BCBP uses various large-scale, portable and hand-held technologies
in different combinations to substantially increase the likelihood that
a nuclear or radiological weapon or weapons grade material will be
detected. We have identified and are deploying nuclear and radiological
detection equipment to include personal radiation detectors, portal
radiation monitors and radiation isotope identifier devices.
In combination with our layered enforcement process, these tools
currently provide BCBP with significant capacity to detect nuclear or
radiological materials.
Additional initiatives include, but are not limited to:
--Training to further develop a highly skilled and trained workforce;
--Sensors to remotely monitor low volume ports of entry; and
--Exchange of intelligence and information to identify potential
nuclear and radiological smuggling threats.
Our goal is to examine 100 percent of all high-risk cargo and
conveyances and to screen all high-risk people, cargo and conveyances
for radiation.
The Border Patrol, a component of the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, is responsible for preventing the illegal entry of any
persons crossing between the ports of entry along the 8,000 miles of
international border with Canada and Mexico. To accomplish this
enormous mission, there are currently over 10,000 agents deployed on
the border to deter, detect, and apprehend any illegal entrants at the
border. These dedicated agents have historically arrested in excess of
1,000,000 illegal entrants annually. In order to improve the
enforcement effectiveness of these agents, the use of technology and
enhanced detection systems are continuing to be deployed along the
border. In addition to the technology, additional border barriers, high
intensity lighting units and improved border roads have been used to
assist the agents in providing the maximum in border security measures
between the ports of entry. The success of these measures has recently
lead to reductions in illegal entry arrests along certain major border
areas, as well as the continued disruption of organized smuggling
efforts on the border.
Question. Are any of these projects visible to our country's
citizens to make them feel safer?
Answer. BCBP has developed a multi-layered process to target high-
risk shipments while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and
cargo. Our Smart Border initiatives include components that are
invisible to a majority of the traveling public. These include
cooperative efforts with other Nations to push security beyond our
borders, advance electronic information, automated targeting tools,
intelligence and partnering with industry.
Portions of our layered enforcement process are highly visible to
the general public. These include our inventory of hand-held, portable
and large-scale non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies deployed to
our Nation's air, land and seaports of entry, as well as the additional
personnel and canine resources necessary to support the technology.
Many of the Border Patrol's newest assets are visible to the
citizens who reside in our many border communities. Those assets
include the latest in state of the art helicopters, which frequently
patrol over these communities. In addition, there are infrastructure
improvements in fencing, checkpoint facilities and expanded canine
units for locating persons and contraband hidden in vehicles and train
boxcars. Also visible to our citizens is the increase in the number of
agents patrolling in marked sedans and four-wheeled drive trucks along
the border. In addition, every Border Patrol sector has a community
out-reach program to educate and inform the local communities of the
activities of the Border Patrol and to reassure the citizens of the
Patrol's efforts in providing security along the border of the country.
While many of the assets used by the Border Patrol are not readily
visible to the public, such as surveillance and detection equipment,
the results of the increased presence of agents along the border
continues to be favorably noted by the local media and civic
organizations in many border communities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
EXPIRATION OF COBRA FEES
Question. The COBRA fees--which fund nearly all overtime for the
legacy Customs inspectors among others--expire at the end of this
fiscal year. Have you submitted legislation to the appropriate
authorizing committees and discussed with them the need for the
extension of these fees? Also, what contingency plans, if any, do you
have in place to cover the costs of the current COBRA-funded functions
should the fees not be extended in time?
Answer. We have briefed both the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee staffs on the need for an extension of the
COBRA fees, and both Committees have developed proposals to extend the
fees. The expiration of the COBRA fees will present numerous problems
for BCBP, as well as fee paying parties-in-interest. Other existing
statutes require that airlines be billed for overtime services and
preclearance (19 USC 267 and 31 USC 9701) and that foreign trade zones
and bonded warehouses be billed for inspectional and supervision
services (19 USC 81n and 19 USC 1555). Other charges, such as fees for
reimbursement of compensation of boarding officers under 19 USC 261
will also need to be reinstated. These statutes are held in abeyance
while the COBRA fees are in effect (see 19 USC 58c(e)(6)). While the
reimbursements from these other statutes would offset some of the
losses from the expired COBRA fees, the amounts are not expected to be
significant. If the COBRA fees expire, service to international
passengers and the trade would need to be reduced to a level
commensurate with available funding.
It should also be noted that the failure to reauthorize the fees
provided for under the COBRA statute (19 USC 58c) will result in an
additional loss in collections of approximately $1 billion annually.
This represents the Merchandise Processing Fees, which are deposited
into the General Fund of the Treasury as an offset to the commercial
operations portion of the BCBP budget.
legacy customs service and immigration and naturalization service fees
Question. A significant portion of the budgets of the new Bureaus
of Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement are based on the assumed collection of fees from the legacy
Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service. What
happens if these fees do not materialize or materialize at levels lower
than estimated? How do you intend to bridge that funding gap should one
occur?
Answer. If funding shortages occur because of smaller fee receipts,
BCBP will adjust the level of inspection services accordingly in order
to function within available resources.
ANTI-DUMPING AUTHORITY (BICE AND BCBP)
Question. What is the expected cost in fiscal year 2003 of
administering the anti-dumping authority in section 754 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (19 USC 1675c)?
Answer. While enforcement of the Tariff Act is a major priority of
the BCBP, its efforts to enforce this legislation cut across many
different programs and organizations which are concurrently performing
a variety of trade compliance functions within BCBP. Therefore, the
cost of BCBP's enforcement efforts in this area is not easily tracked
or monitored in a way that enables BCBP to provide a quick and easy
answer to this question. Ultimately, any answer would be an estimate of
BCBP's costs.
BUDGET DOCUMENTS
Question. The budget justification documents for BCBP and BICE do
not include detailed legacy information on the agencies/accounts broken
out in a manner similar to that which used to be provided by the former
Customs Service. Was information provided to the Department by the
former Customs Service staff prepared in that format? Please provide
the Subcommittee with a copy of that submission to assist us in tracing
the budgets from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2004?
Answer. The former Customs Service did not provide a draft of the
fiscal year 2004 budget to the Department in its traditional format.
DHS FIRST 100 DAYS
Question. Secretary Ridge noted in his list of the Department's
accomplishments for the 1st 100 days that BCBP had ``acquired and
deployed additional ``A-STAR'' and ``HUEY'' helicopters to bolster
enforcement efforts along the U.S. Southern border''. With what fiscal
year funds were these aircraft purchased? Are other rotary or fixed-
wing aircraft in the procurement pipeline? If so, where is their
planned deployment?
Answer. The purchase of the additional `A-STAR' helicopters was
made in fiscal year 2002 with funding received from counter-terrorism
supplemental appropriations in that year. The `HUEY' helicopters were
obtained through the military on-loan program for special operations
and tactical training requiring the mission capabilities of that
aircraft. The deployment of the `HUEY' helicopters to bolster border
enforcement operations occurred in fiscal year 2002.
AQI FUMIGATION INVESTIGATION
Question. The Agriculture Department's Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service--Agriculture Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program was
transferred by law to the Department of Homeland Security. However, the
investigators who follow-up, review and investigate the importation of
prohibited goods from prohibited countries remain part of the
Agriculture Department. Similarly, the personnel responsible for
fumigation, following the discovery of pests, remain at USDA. Does this
make sense? Is the Administration considering a legislative fix to
correct this contradiction?
Answer. The separation of mutually dependent program functions,
such as the USDA investigators and personnel responsible for
fumigation, from the AQI program transferred to the DHS is problematic
and requires high levels of cooperation, communication, and
coordination at multiple levels. To facilitate this, DHS and USDA
addressed issues early by including relevant Articles in a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Specifically, there are Articles for separating functions and then
coordinating these functions once separated. Further, additional and
more specific agreements are necessary and are being developed. The MOA
will be periodically reviewed and modified as mutually agreed to by DHS
and USDA. Through the MOA and additional, more specific agreements, DHS
and USDA will have an opportunity to re-adjust the assignment of
program functions and responsibilities to maximize collective ability
to carry out respective missions. Program officials from both DHS and
USDA are working together to accomplish this. Legislative fixes offer
another means to accomplish necessary and beneficial re-adjustments and
changes. DHS Agricultural Inspection Policy and Program staff is not
currently working on developing legislative fixes.
DEPLOYMENT OF RAIL VACIS
Question. I understand that the Department has procured some rail
VACIS systems that are awaiting deployment along the Northern Border.
How many systems are procured (or are being procured with fiscal year
2003 Omnibus and fiscal year 2003 Supplemental funds) and where are
they planned to be deployed? How many rail VACIS systems are provided
for in the fiscal year 2004 budget request?
Answer. With budget requests made prior to fiscal year 2003, BCBP
procured fourteen rail VACIS systems; however, only five have been
installed (all along the Southern Border). The remaining nine rail
VACIS systems will be installed later this year at the following
locations:
--El Paso (Rail), Texas
--El Paso (Del Norte), Texas
--Calexico (West Rail), California
--Blaine, Washington
--International Falls, Minnesota
--Portal, North Dakota
--Buffalo, New York
--Noyes (#1), Minnesota
--Noyes (#2), Minnesota
BCBP is procuring five additional rail VACIS systems with the
fiscal year 2003 Omnibus and fiscal year 2003 Supplemental funds. All
five of these rail VACIS systems will be installed along the Northern
Border. These rail VACIS systems will be deployed at the following
Northern Border locations:
--Eastport, Idaho
--Walkersville, Canada (Detroit, Michigan)
--Rouses Point, New York (Champlain)
--Sarnia #2, Canada (Port Huron, Michigan)
--Sarnia #1, Canada (Port Huron, Michigan)
While no rail VACIS systems are scheduled for procurement via the
fiscal year 2004 budget request, fourteen additional rail VACIS systems
are planned for future deployment along the Northern Border pending
available funding.
INSPECTION PERSONNEL
Question. The President's fiscal year 2004 budget proposal for the
Bureau for Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) is $5.6 billion. How
many new inspection personnel are requested within the President's
Budget?
Answer. BCBP has requested 1,142 inspection personnel FTE in the
fiscal year 2004 President's Budget.
Question. How many new Customs inspectors have been added (net)
since September 11, 2001? How much increased border and port coverage
have they provided?
Answer. From September 11, 2001, to May 3, 2003, the number of
Inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers on-board and stationed at
ports of entry increased by 1,380 (+1,310 Inspectors and +70 Canine
Enforcement Officers), increasing the overall port coverage by 16.9
percent.
Question. We have heard reports that many of the new hires are
being assigned to work in place of senior inspectors, rather than to
augment and increase border coverage across the country. Is this
correct? If so, why are you deploying relatively inexperienced
personnel at critical locations across the country?
Answer. New hires are not being assigned to work in place of senior
inspectors. New resources are being placed strategically to increase
border coverage, meet workload demands and increase the utilization of
technology. New hires work side-by-side with the more seasoned
inspectors and receive formal, intensive training on all aspects of the
position prior to being allowed to work independently. Additionally,
management oversight is provided for each and every inspector.
STAFFING INCREASES
Question. The USA PATRIOT Act authorized a tripling of legacy
Customs and Immigration staffing at our Nation's borders. Since passage
of the Act, how many new personnel have been brought on board and how
close have these hires come in meeting the authorization goal?
Answer. As of May 1, 2003, the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection had 2,563 Inspectors and Canine Enforcement Officers (CEOs)
stationed at Northern Border Ports of Entry (POEs). This is an increase
of 58.7 percent since September 11, 2001, at which time the agencies
had 1,615 Inspectors and CEOs stationed at Northern Border Ports of
Entry.
IT TRANSFORMATION TO HOMELAND SECURITY FUND
Question. I note that $30.21 million is proposed in the fiscal year
2004 budget request for a fund for Information Technology
Transformation for the new Department. Is this in is essence a working
capital fund? Are all DHS agencies contributing to it? If so, in what
proportion? How was that level of contributed funding determined? What
was the methodology used?
Answer. The Information Technology Transformation to Homeland
Security Fund is not a working capital fund. These appropriated funds
will be used to extend the BCBP enterprise architecture to provide
expanded access to Information Technology (IT) capabilities in support
of the Homeland Security mission and to address IT compatibility and
interoperability issues that arise during the transition including, but
not limited to, mission systems, electronic mail, networks,
collaborative tools, and administrative capabilities. It is imperative
that IT operability remains stable in order to efficiently meet Customs
and Border Protection (BCBP) mission requirements.
NEW TECHNOLOGY
Question. Compromise is not an option when providing for the
security of our Nation's ports and borders. With the advent of a new
era where we must be on guard for car and truck bombs, weapons
smuggling, and radiological and biological threats, it is imperative
that we set a high standard of threat assessment, detection, and
prevention. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, has BCBP
increased the threat detection standards for security at our ports and
borders, and if so, what new technologies are you using and how have
they improved security?
Answer. The priority mission of the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (BCBP) is to detect and prevent terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States at and between ports of entry
while simultaneously facilitating legitimate trade and travel.
In order to carry out its priority mission, BCBP has developed and
is implementing Smart Border initiatives with other nations and with
the private sector, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), NEXUS, and
the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program that will continue to push our
zone of security outwards.
Our layered inspection process and the components of a Smart Border
include:
--Advance electronic information;
--Automated targeting tools;
--Identifying and facilitating low-risk travelers and shipments;
--Non-intrusive inspection technology;
--Industry partnerships;
--Training; and
--Pushing security beyond our borders.
BCBP uses various large-scale, portable and hand-held technologies
in different combinations to substantially increase the likelihood that
a nuclear or radiological weapon or weapons grade material will be
detected. We have identified and are deploying nuclear and radiological
detection equipment to include personal radiation detectors, portal
radiation monitors and radiation isotope identifier devices.
In combination with our layered enforcement process, these tools
currently provide BCBP with significant capacity to detect nuclear or
radiological materials.
LEGACY CUSTOMS AIR-MARINE PROGRAM
Question. I understand that while the legacy Customs Air-Marine
program has been transferred to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, your Bureau retains certain responsibility for parts of
the program. Please explain how this has been divided.
Answer. The Air and Marine Interdiction budget was deliberately
placed in BICE. Some of the reasons for this decision are:
Air and Marine staff and capital assets are deployed primarily for
interdiction. The principal goals of interdiction are to enhance the
BICE investigative process to prevent terrorist activity and to further
investigations of major smuggling operations whether they be drug,
alien, or terrorist in nature.
As a key part of the BICE integration of the immigration and
customs enforcement mission with other Federal agencies, OAMI will
support investigative processes at Coast Guard, Secret Service,
Emergency Management, TSA, and FPS. OAMI will support investigative
processes at non-DHS agencies from DEA to FBI.
The use of OAMI mission and assets must be closely connected to the
BICE intelligence mission and operations to be effective. It is this
connection that ensures that the limited air and marine assets are
effectively deployed to specific targets over a vast sea or border
resulting in maximum deterrence capability. BICE intelligence based
operations must be the lynchpin of OAMI strategy.
Operationally, OAMI is more identified with investigations than
inspections or surveillance activity. OAMI has historically reported
through the investigations division of Customs. In fiscal year 2002,
approximately 60 percent of OAMI flight hours supported customs
enforcement. With the integration of customs and immigration
enforcement, we estimate that more than 80 percent of OAMI operational
flight hours will directly support BICE investigations, foreign
operations, border and maritime patrols. The remaining 20 percent will
support transportation of people and assets, as well as training and
maintenance, and other customers for support flights.
Based upon the above factors, placement of OAMI within BICE
accomplishes the objectives of intelligence-based operations; more
effective support of DHS and inter-agency law enforcement missions; and
furtherance of investigations of terrorists and other crime syndicates.
Air and Marine support of border protection functions will continue
under this placement and will be formalized in an upcoming management
directive. The proper placement of all our programs remains subject to
periodic review.
BORDER PATROL AIRWING
Question. Your Bureau now includes all Border Patrol air assets.
Please provide the Subcommittee with a breakout of the Border Patrol
air assets and where they are located. Are any funds requested in the
fiscal year 2004 budget for new aircraft? If not, what is the base
level of funding in the budget for operation and maintenance of the
existing assets?
Answer. The BCBP/Border Patrol air wing has 111 aircraft (78
Helicopters and 33 Fixed-wing) dedicated to patrolling the northern and
southern border. Border Patrol aircraft are stationed at all Border
Patrol sectors on the northern border, southern border, and Puerto
Rico. There are no funds requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget for
new aircraft. The base level of funding in fiscal year 2003 for
operation and maintenance of aircraft is $21,491,000.
ADJUSTMENTS TO THE FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET REQUEST
Question. The fiscal year 2004 BCBP budget request includes
reductions totaling over $301 million for ``Non-recurring costs for
fiscal year 2003 Initiatives'' and ``Adjustments for discontinuing Low-
Value Efforts''. Please break out in detail the specific, one-time
fiscal year 2003 costs for non-recurring initial equipment costs and
other items that you are reducing to achieve these savings.
Answer. The following chart details the one-time fiscal year 2003
non-recurring initial equipment costs and discontinued low-value
efforts that achieve savings:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NON-RECURRING COSTS AMOUNT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Construction............................................ $145,000,000
Border Patrol Transfer Costs............................ 25,000,000
Northern Border Hardening Equipment..................... 28,798,000
Northern Border NEXUS Equipment......................... 4,760,000
Northern Border NII Technology.......................... 12,759,000
mmigration Fees......................................... 9,107,000
Maritime Port Security NII Technology................... 25,481,000
Security Infrastructure Technology...................... 11,454,000
Helicopters............................................. 8,000,000
---------------
TOTAL NON-RECURRING COSTS......................... 270,359,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the fiscal year 2004 budget formulation process, the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection identified $31,540,000 in savings.
These savings were realized by activities such as reforming and
simplifying the Drawback process, redirecting field analyst specialist
positions to border security, and realigning resources that support the
Trade community. In addition, other program areas where savings were
realized include the Intern Program, Labor and Employee Relations,
Mandatory Fitness Program, Customs Health Enhancement Program,
redistribution and cross servicing of field work, and the processing of
anti-dumping/countervailing and harbor maintenance fee refunds.
PRIVATE MAIL RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPMENT
Question. The Department has provided its employees who inspect
U.S. Postal Service mail with radiation detection equipment. Does it
also provide similar equipment for employees who inspect United Parcel
Service and FedEx mail? If not, why not? Is there a plan to provide
this equipment in the future?
Answer. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP)
personnel are equipped with radiation detection devices at FedEx and
United Parcel Service (UPS) facilities. At the present time BCBP
personnel use both Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD) and Radiation
Isotope Identification Devices to screen cargo at both FedEx and UPS
facilities.
Both UPS and FedEx are in the process of procuring and installing
company owned radiation detection devices at overseas locations. Once
completely installed this equipment will allow these companies to
screen all incoming cargo and parcels before entering the commerce of
the United States. Both companies will be relying on several types of
equipment, such as Hand-Held Devices and Radiation Portal Monitors, at
their overseas facilities. The types of radiation screening devices
used will depend on the size of the facility and amount of cargo
screened.
ALTERNATIVE SHOULDER HOLSTERS
Question. Recently, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
informed the employee representatives of Customs personnel (the
National Treasury Employees Union) that the Department would no longer
allow employees to use ``alternative firearms holsters'' as long as
they are properly trained in the use of the holster. By and large,
``alternative firearms holsters'' have been used by women in the late
stages of pregnancy. The shoulder holster enables them to continue to
carry a firearm in the performance of their work. It seems that this 12
year old alternative holster provision has provided a reasonable
accommodation between the needs of the legacy Customs Service and the
interests of women who desire to continue working while pregnant. Why
has Department decided to not continue the use of the alternative
shoulder holster for pregnant legacy Customs personnel?
Answer. A single request was made through the Office of Field
Operations (OFO) for an alternate firearms holster accommodation on May
24, 2002. This request was forwarded to the Firearms and Tactical
Training Division (FTTD). The FTTD conducted an evaluation of the
Safariland model 1060 shoulder holster that was named in the request to
determine its suitability for use by pregnant OFO uniformed personnel.
The primary evaluation criteria used to determine suitability was
safety and feasibility.
There were numerous safety and training issues related to the
shoulder holster. The shoulder holster is designed for the concealed
carrying of firearms, and does not possess retention characteristics
needed for officer safety for exposed carry. The weapon's grip is
presented toward the front making it readily accessible to a subject
during a physical confrontation, and the retention devices on this
holster are easy to defeat. Also, the shoulder holster would not be
feasible for wear with the authorized maternity uniforms such as class
seven (7) maternity shirts and trousers, and the class seven (7)
maternity jumper. This is because the suspender type clips could not be
fastened to the belt or pants as the belt or pants would be under the
maternity shirt.
The FTTD concluded that given the inherent risks and difficulties
associated with the use of this type of holster, they did not recommend
the use of it for OFO officers in uniform with close interaction with
the public.
TRANSFER OF FUNDS
Question. Has BCBP been required to transfer any funds to the
Department? If so, how much and for what purposes? Are any future
transfers to the Department anticipated?
Answer. Yes, BCBP has transferred funds to the Department. BCBP
transferred $30 million to DHS for start-up costs. We anticipate two
future transfers to DHS as follows: $900,000 for Departmental
enterprise architecture and $21 million to assist with the
Transportation Security Administration shortfall.
PERSONNEL ISSUES
Question. The Department of Homeland Security has created a
separation between Customs Agents and Inspectors who work at various
ports of entry. Is there a plan in place for continuing the
relationship between Inspectors and Agents? Will Agents continue to
respond directly to airport seizures and arrests? Will the new
reporting requirements hinder investigative and enforcement activity?
Answer. Although the Department of Homeland Security created a
separation between Agent and Inspector, the working relationship
remains strong between BCBP and BICE and enforcement actions are being
coordinated. Additionally, BCBP inherited the Senior Inspector Program.
The Senior Inspector position was created for high-risk ports of entry
to be responsible for the enforcement of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and other criminal statutes by identifying,
investigating, apprehending, and prosecuting persons who attempt and
abet illegal entry into the United States. BCBP plans to maintain the
Senior Inspector program to assist in meeting the challenges of
coordinating the enforcement functions of three formerly distinct
agencies, but BCBP will continue to refer customs-related
investigations and arrests to ensure no disruption of enforcement and
investigative activity.
Question. I understand that the legacy Customs Special Agents who
formerly conducted criminal investigations in the Internal Affairs (IA)
Division, have also been transferred to ICE. Who will now conduct those
investigations? Will this merger inhibit the response to internal
affairs investigative matters? Are you concerned about the loss of this
investigative expertise which has been used to ``clean up'' past
corruption problems within the former Customs Service?
Answer. The Inspector General of the Department of Homeland
Security will be responsible for coordinating all investigations.
Integrity has always been a cornerstone of the legacy BCBP
organizations and will continue to be one in the future.
ENTRY-EXIT VISA TRACKING SYSTEM
Question. The vast majority of the $480 million in funds for the
``entry-exit'' system are proposed as part of the CBP budget request.
It is my understanding, however, that you are not the bureau in charge
of designing and implementing the system. Why? Which Bureau is supposed
to be in charge of designing and implementing the program?
Answer. The Undersecretary of the Border and Transportation
Security has determined that the design and implementation of the
``entry-exit'' system will be managed at his level.
SECURITY DETAIL
Question. Given your past positions in government, as well as your
heading up the agency most closely involved in tracking and stopping
narco-terrorists, do you have a security detail? If not, why not? Has a
threat assessment been done to determine whether you or other agency
heads at your level require security details?
Answer. The Commissioner does not now have a security detail.
Regular risk assessments are conducted to determine if a security
detail is required.
NATIONAL GUARD
Question. The National Guard has played a critical role in
assisting the former Customs Service in inspection activities at our
borders--including inspecting shipping containers and operating VACIS
equipment. This role has continued with the transformation to the new
Department, however, I am concerned about reports that the Guard may
soon cease its operations in this regard. What is the status of
National Guard cooperation with your Bureau? Will they continue to
assist the Bureau with inspection activities and, if so, for how long?
Has the Defense Department attempted to curtail the Guard's role with
the Bureau?
Answer. In September 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD)
officially informed the U.S. Customs Service, now Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (BCBP), that they would discontinue funding National
Guard counternarcotics support of BCBP's Cargo and Mail Inspection
operations (the only BCBP operations supported by National Guard
soldiers) effective September 30, 2003. DOD subsequently changed this
date to September 30, 2004. The reason for discontinuing the National
Guard support, as stated by DOD officials, is that they wish to phase
out all National Guard counternarcotics support that does not require
unique military skills.
As a result of the September 2002 notification, aggressive hiring
strategies that will offset any negative impact of losing the support
of the National Guard were implemented. Through regular appropriations,
supplemental funding and an overall increase in our Inspector corps as
a result of the March 1, 2003 transition to BCBP, our agency is
prepared to do without National Guard support beginning October 1,
2004.
PERSONNEL BREAKOUT
Question. In your testimony at the hearing you stated that the
Bureau was requesting funds for 41,000 FTE for fiscal year 2004. You
also said that on March 1 approximately 6,000 legacy INS, 3,000 legacy
APHIS and 11,000 Border Patrol personnel were incorporated into the new
BCBP. Please provide the subcommittee with a breakdown for fiscal year
2002-2004 of the approximate 41,000 FTE requested by function--both in
a comparable breakdown from the legacy agencies as well as by current
function (i.e. inspection activity, Border Patrol, etc.)
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 President's Budget requests funding
for the Department consistent with the enacted Homeland Security Act.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION INSPECTIONAL PERSONNEL FTE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspectional
Inspectional Inspectional FTE funded in
FTE Authorized FTE Expected the fiscal
in fiscal year on Board year 2004
2003 September 30, Appropriation
2003 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Appropriation............................................ 19,780 20,070 20,298
Reimbursable.................................................... 1,664 1,664 1,664
-----------------------------------------------
TOTAL..................................................... 21,444 21,734 21,962
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION IMPORT AND ENTRY/LIQUIDATION FTE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Import and
Import and Import and Entry/
Entry/ Entry/ Liquidation
Liquidation Liquidation FTE funded in
FTE Authorized FTE Expected the fiscal
in fiscal year on Board year 2004
2003 September 30, Appropriation
2003 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Appropriation............................................ 1,570 1,570 1,584
Reimbursable.................................................... 39 39 39
-----------------------------------------------
TOTAL..................................................... 1,609 1,609 1,609
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS FTE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intelligence
Intelligence Intelligence Analyst FTE
Analyst FTE Analyst FTE funded in the
Authorized in Expected on fiscal year
fiscal year Board 2004
2003 September 30, Appropriation
2003 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Appropriation............................................ 51 51 66
Reimbursable.................................................... 7 7 7
-----------------------------------------------
TOTAL..................................................... 58 58 73
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION COMPUTER SPECIALIST FTE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Computer
Computer Computer Specialist FTE
Specialist FTE Specialist FTE funded in the
Authorized in Expected on fiscal year
fiscal year Board 2004
2003 September 30, Appropriation
2003 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Appropriation............................................ 298 298 298
Reimbursable.................................................... 6 6 6
-----------------------------------------------
TOTAL..................................................... 304 304 304
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FTE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrative
Administrative Administrative and
and and Operational
Operational Operational Support FTE
Support FTE Support FTE funded in the
Authorized in Expected on fiscal year
fiscal year Board 2004
2003 September 30, Appropriation
2003 Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Appropriation............................................ 5,225 5,225 5,225
Customs Reimbursable............................................ 116 116 116
-----------------------------------------------
TOTAL..................................................... 5,341 5,341 5,440
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INS CONSTRUCTION BACKLOG
Question. In your April 30 letter to me regarding the deployment of
570 additional Border Patrol agents at our nation's borders, you stated
that the fiscal year 2004 budget request pending before the Congress
does not request ``new enhancement construction funds''. You further
state that, ``Additional requirements related to construction projects
for the Border Patrol will be addressed in future budget cycles''.
On May 14, 2002, the President signed the Enhanced Border Security
Act of 2002, authorizing significant improvements in our efforts to
secure our borders. However, a congressionally mandated June 2000 study
of our land border ports included a list of 822 projects totaling $784
million. These projects ranged from overloaded electrical outlets at
facilities built in the 1930s which are not equipped to accommodate
21st century computers to a border station in Maine that is literally a
trailer.
Commissioner Bonner, the lack of funding for construction projects
along the border deeply troubles me. Significant expansion of our
border facilities is anticipated to meet the requirements and deadlines
specified in the former ``entry-exit'' program. How can we meet these
deadlines if the Administration does not request the funds to do so?
Without these funds, how can you be successful? The bulk of the funding
of this system resides within your Bureau. Do I have your assurance
that the Department will meet the December 2003 deadline?
Answer. Secretary Ridge recently outlined the Department's plan to
create a new entry-exit system backed by 21st century technology called
the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indication Technology system
(U.S. VISIT). U.S. VISIT is a critical new border security and
enforcement tool that will capture point of entry and exit information
on visitors. U.S. VISIT is designed to make entering the United States
easier for legitimate tourists, students and business travelers, while
making it more difficult to enter the U.S. illegally through the
implementation of biometrically authenticated documents. Development
and deployment of this system will be coordinated by the Undersecretary
for Border and Transportation Security. The system will be in its first
phase of operation at international air and sea ports of entry by the
end of 2003.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. Many former Customs and INS employees in Vermont and
throughout the nation remain in a state of limbo, awaiting information
about how their old agencies will be restructured and what it means for
them. I think that they would appreciate hearing your perspective as to
how the combination of your old agency with the INS and numerous other
agencies is progressing. First, how would you describe the progress
that has been made in creating the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement? What has been the most difficult aspect? How will the
command structure differ from the framework that Customs used?
Answer. The command structure of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement is being determined by Michael Garcia, Assistant
Secretary of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in
conjunction with the Undersecretary of Border and Transportation
Security and Secretary Ridge.
Question. Second, can you give the Committee your impressions about
the process of integrating the old INS, Customs, and other agencies
into the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection? What has been the
most difficult aspect there?
Answer. BCBP is in the process of conducting both a merger and a
divestiture of agencies and functions. This process is going well,
employee morale is high, efficiency has increased and we have
established a single chain of command to the port of entry level. As in
any endeavor of this magnitude, the most difficult challenge is
answering our employees questions and providing them with information
at the appropriate time.
Question. Third, in either bureau, where the old agencies bring
overlapping personnel, such as administrative support staff, how is
that being handled? Where INS and Customs personnel were performing the
same task before March 1, what criteria do you think should be used to
determine who should perform that task now?
Answer. BCBP and BICE are working together to determine where
common services can be shared in the future. We believe that there are
opportunities to accomplish this.
______
Questions Submitted to the Transportation Security Administration
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
PERSONNEL CUTBACKS
Question. On April 30, TSA announced the reduction of 6,000 airport
screeners--3,000 by May 2003 and another 3,000 by the end of fiscal
year 2003--as the Transportation Security Administration works to
realign the screener workforce and to bring its budget into line. How
will the reduction of screeners affect security? Does TSA have, or will
it conduct, any assessment of current screening needs to verify that
these reduced levels are appropriate?
Answer. There will be no effect on security. TSA is working to
optimize both its scheduling, utilizing a mix of full and part-time
employees. TSA used several staffing models to meet the requirements of
standing up the organization by late 2002. In early 2003, under the
mandate of Congress, TSA developed an expedited Phase 1 Reduction
Methodology which enabled us to start the reduction process as fast as
possible. A second phase modeling methodology, which takes into account
essentially all of the variables, is in process and scheduled for
completion in early June. This second phase modeling effort assesses
current needs to verify the reduction plans.
Question. What analysis was initially conducted on what the needs
would be for aviation security prior to the hiring of the screeners,
and what did this analysis show, including the number of full-time and
part-time screener positions that would be required?
Answer. The initial analysis of screener requirements was based on
TSA's assessment of the work requirements at each passenger-screening
checkpoint. As the recruiting, hiring, and deployment process unfolded,
TSA made adjustments to the number of screeners required to provide the
necessary level of security at each airport. Although the initial
workforce requirements analysis was based on a desire to create a
workforce consisting of both full-time and part-time employees,
initially TSA encountered a very low interest in part-time
applications. As a result, TSA hired a preponderance of full-time
employees to meet the level of security required at each airport, as
well as to meet the ATSA-mandated screener deployment dates for the
fully federalized screener workforce. TSA believes that making
effective use of part-time screening personnel is in the best interest
of both security and the taxpayer. Most airports have a peak time, or
several peak times, during which a screening presence is needed beyond
the normal throughput. The ability to use part-time or split-shift
personnel during these focused periods is a policy with significant
possibilities. With the implementation of improved scheduling tools,
TSA expects to be able to optimize the workforce with the appropriate
mix of full-time, part-time and split-shift personnel to better match
travel patterns.
Question. What other components are being considered to meet the
budget requirements?
Answer. All programs within TSA continue to undergo constant
scrutiny and monitoring in order to align scarce resources to the
highest priorities and realign anticipated availability to other
underfunded requirements.
Question. What will be the amount of the projected savings in
fiscal year 2003 from the reduction of screeners?
Answer. TSA's anticipated fiscal year 2003 savings is $32 million
as a result of the reduction in screeners.
Question. Concerns have been raised that in the rush to meet the
statutory deadline of November 19, 2002, for the deployment of Federal
screeners at all of the Nation's airports that all of the screeners
hired did not receive a full background check, including a criminal
history record check. Can you say for certain that all of the screeners
working in the Nation's airports have received a full background check?
Answer. More than 98 percent of TSA's current screener workforce
has received, at a minimum, a fingerprint-based FBI criminal history
records check. In addition, more than 98 percent of the current
workforce has undergone the first phase of the ChoicePoint check, which
includes a search of public records for an applicant's criminal
history, credit history, and potential links to terrorist activity.
This check exceeds what is required for nearly every Federal employee
to begin working.
Question. Can you describe to the Committee the process of deciding
which airports would lose screeners, which airports would receive
additional screeners, and which airports would not be affected?
Answer. The methodology used in the first round of modeling
consisted of applying a standard screening model applied to the number
of screening points within a given airport. The model considered the
number of screening lanes, and the presence of selectee checkpoint
screening. Based on the model results, each airport requirement was
compared with the screener population and the gain or loss was
determined.
As the process moves forward, TSA is inviting Federal Security
Directors, community and airport leaders, and others to provide
feedback in the form of airport specific information or other factors
that are expected to drive TSA's upcoming refinement process. TSA will
evaluate all the newly obtained information and will refine the
preliminary numbers using this information and originating passenger
data to arrive at a more accurate reflection of the staffing needs at
all airports. We will keep you apprised of the results of our on-going
process to provide efficient, effective screening.
Question. How can an airport negotiate with TSA if it is believed
that too many screeners have been cut and will affect the airport's
ability to provide an adequate amount of security? Is there an appeals
process that an airport can submit to?
Answer. The airports and Federal Security Directors have been
encouraged to highlight unique characteristics of their airports to the
staffing team within TSA. This team consists of industrial engineers
and senior management within Aviation Operations. Each appeal is
carefully considered and the data provided, validated, is used to
accomplish the final modeling. Specific information on enplanements is
a major consideration in this modeling.
Question. A concern among some of the smaller airports is that the
classification of airports that determines the number of passengers
handled annually has not been accurately assessed and therefore is
losing screeners because of it. Will TSA conduct assessments of
airports to determine that they are categorized correctly?
Answer. TSA has just completed a preliminary re-categorization of
all federalized airports. This effort has resulted in several proposed
category changes that will affect the final screener allocation.
Question. If an airport can accurately document that it has not
been categorized correctly how steps can be taken to appeal?
Answer. TSA welcomes any information that affects the
categorization of a specific airport. The passenger origination and
enplanements information is particularly important and is compared with
DOT statistics to determine the validity of the claim.
TSA: INCREASED THREAT LEVEL
Question. When the National Threat Level is raised, as it was
before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom from ``Yellow'' to
``Orange'', new security directives are issued to airlines and
airports, such as random vehicle inspections, more stringent
identification checks, and increased canine patrols to lessen the
chance of any terrorist incidents. There have been concerns that enough
guidance has not been given to airport managers to implement increased
security when the terrorist threat level is raised. How does the
Transportation Security Administration share threat information, not
only with airports but also with port security managers, when an
increase in security is necessary?
Answer. The Transportation Security Intelligence Service has the
ability to tailor dissemination based on the nature of the threat. Such
information can be disseminated to a small, focused group of recipients
if the threat is specific to a particular transportation asset or
facility, or it can be provided to a wider audience if the threat could
impact multiple transportation modes or modal interests.
Information can be disseminated in the following manner:
--Information Circulars (IC) inform the various modes (aviation,
surface a/or maritime) of threat information and provide an
analytical perspective regarding the credibility, timing,
location and other available information.
--Security Directives (SD) issued by TSA operations policy, direct
air carriers and airports to take specific action designed to
counter a known threat. Such threat information is provided by
TSA Intelligence. TSA is currently reviewing the efficacy of
issuing SDs for other modes at appropriate times.
--Intelligence Notes
--Response to Request for Information (RFI)
--Telephone briefings may be conducted in situations where time is of
the essence or where the threat is very narrowly focused to a
particular carrier or geographic location.
--E-mail Fax notification messages
--Automated Message Handling System (AMHS)
--Recipients include, among others, DHS Homeland Security Center, DHS
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, TSA Federal
Security Directors, TSA Area Representatives at overseas
locations, Federal Air Marshals Service, FAA, DOT, U.S. Coast
Guard, as well as stakeholders and other elements of the
aviation and maritime communities.
Question. Is there a certain procedural checklist to follow in
order to make sure all possible security precautions have been
implemented?
Answer. Each airport has a detailed security plan and its own
checklist in accordance with its security plan. Specifically how a
particular airport does this is dependent upon local conditions. The
directives from TSA are in the context of these plans and current
operations and are straightforward and easy to understand. TSA relies
on Federal Security Directors (FSDs) to coordinate with airport
authorities and to verify and report on airports' compliance with TSA
directives.
Question. Will the Transportation Security Administration reimburse
airports and others for meeting additional requirements such as
conducting random vehicle searches?
Answer. TSA views airport security as a partnership between all
stakeholders at the airport, including the airport authorities. TSA
also believes that a true partnership implies shared responsibility for
expenses. TSA continues to work closely with its aviation stakeholders
in determining which specific types of safeguards are feasible and
appropriate at each threat level. However, TSA is not planning on using
its resources to reimburse airports for these costs.
Question. Have you developed plans for what happens at airports if
the threat level is elevated to ``Red?'' Will this result in the
grounding of airliners?
Answer. Yes. The specific actions to be taken in any increase or
decrease of threat level are considered Sensitive Security Information
(SSI) at the minimum. A specific threat may elevate that information to
the Secret level. Without speaking to all actions that may be taken
under increased security, there are many steps that can be taken prior
to stopping air commerce. Each step will be threat based and risk
managed to determine a level of security appropriate to the threat
environment.
ROLE WITHIN DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the
Transportation Security Administration be maintained as a distinct
entity within the Department of Homeland Security for 2 years from the
date of enactment. How do you envision the Transportation Security
Administration's role within the Department of Homeland Security after
this 2-year period?
Answer. TSA's mission is a vital component of the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate's responsibilities. To achieve its
mission, TSA is developing a National Transportation System Security
Plan (NTSSP) that will explain TSA's vision to complete the important
task of ensuring the security of all modes of transportation. The NTSSP
will also lay out how TSA, other DHS components, other Federal
agencies, state and local authorities, and the private sector will work
together to ensure system-wide security. The creation and
implementation of the Plan will involve extensive interaction and
cooperation with other involved agencies and the private sector.
TSA's involvement in providing mode-specific security will vary
across modes based upon assessed needs and determination of TSA's
responsibilities relative to other DHS organizations. Currently, TSA
plays a very active operational role in the aviation mode, while we are
still establishing our capabilities and activities in other modes such
as highway and mass transit.
Within DHS, the cooperation and interaction that already exists
between TSA and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), the
Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (BICE), the U.S Coast
Guard and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate (IAIP) will only grow over the next 2 years.
--We expect to perform or facilitate a vast number of vulnerability
assessments in the Transportation Sector under the overall
oversight of and coordination with IAIP.
--We expect to greatly increase our use of information and
intelligence that will be provided by IAIP.
--We will enhance the tactical cooperation with BCBP that exists now
at major airports of entry, including joint screening and joint
training programs--e.g., TSA screeners recognizing drug and
money contraband.
--We will continue and increase coordination with BCBP on major
developing issues such as cargo security and collecting
passenger name lists, to promote effective security and
efficient commerce.
--We will work with BICE where possible to further the investigation
and enforcement of transportation security concerns and
violations.
Also within DHS, the transportation-focused specialists at the
Transportation Security Labs (TSL) will share information and resources
with the Science and Technology Directorate. This will leverage the
efforts of both organizations, while maintaining the benefits of TSL's
specialization and transportation security focus.
Question. Do you feel that TSA would function best as a separate
entity within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate or do
you believe it should be merged into one of the other functions of this
Directorate?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration serves a
distinct need, particularly with respect to aviation. The
characteristics and security needs of the transportation system are
often unique from the characteristics and security needs of border
protection, and from those of immigration and customs enforcement. For
these reasons, we believe the Nation is best served by protecting the
transportation system with a dedicated and distinct entity that
provides the necessary expertise and focus to address the unique
characteristics and security needs of the transportation system.
Having said this, we fully agree that the security of the
transportation system intersects significantly with the security of our
borders, Ports of Entry, cargo and passengers and the security needs of
Customs and Immigration. It is very appropriate that the TSA work
closely and coordinate with the BCBP and the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (BICE), with oversight and guidance from the Under
Secretary for BTS, as well as in coordination with other DHS
directorates and agencies. As DHS evolves, the Secretary must continue
to assess how to best manage our critical mission, including the
organization of its functions.
TSA: GUNS IN THE COCKPIT
Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the use of
firearms by pilots in order to defend the flight decks of aircraft
against criminal violence. The Transportation Security Administration
has now begun to train pilots on a volunteer basis and recently 44
pilots have completed training and have been sworn in as Federal flight
deck officers. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests an increase of over
$17 million for the training of arming pilots with firearms. What is
the cost of training each pilot and is such a large increase feasible
and achievable?
Answer. The initial cost of training for a Federal Flight Deck
Officer (FFDO) is approximately $2,000. In addition, the assessment of
an individual's eligibility to be a FFDO costs approximately $3,000. To
equip (firearm, holster, lockbox) a trained FFDO costs approximately
$1,100. Therefore, the total cost to train and deploy an FFDO is
approximately $6,200. Finally, semi-annual re-qualification is expected
to cost about $700 per FFDO.
Additional program costs include building and maintaining an on-
line application system and providing new FTEs to facilitate program
oversight, operations support, and internal investigation.
With the funding requested for fiscal year 2004, TSA expects to be
able to assess, train, equip and deploy thousands more FFDOs (the
actual number is considered sensitive security information).
Question. From learned efficiencies will there be one agency that
will administer all of the training or is it more feasible for several
agencies to carry out the training?
Answer. TSA intends to conduct all initial (or basic) FFDO training
at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) campuses in
Glynco, GA and Artesia, NM. TSA is working in partnership with both
locations to deliver this training. Use of these facilities ensures
consistent and thorough training of new FFDOs.
Question. Do the airlines incur any expense for the training of
their pilots? If not, do you believe this should be a shared cost?
Answer. APATA specifically states that air carriers should not bear
the costs to train their pilots as FFDOs.
Question. When will the Transportation Security Administration
conduct the next training session and what criteria will be established
to decide which pilots will receive the limited number of training
positions if the interest is as large as expected?
Answer. The next training class commences on July 21, 2003.
Volunteers will be scheduled for training on a rolling basis as they
complete the selection process. Applications will be viable for a
period of 1 year; persons eligible but not scheduled for training in
the remainder of the current fiscal year will be scheduled for training
in fiscal year 2004. No additional applications will be solicited until
the eligible volunteers from the current application period have been
scheduled for training.
TSA: PORT SECURITY GRANTS
Question. For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, Congress has appropriated
a total of $388 million for port security grants by TSA for this
important program to better secure our Nation's ports. Included in the
recently passed Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for
fiscal year 2003, an additional $20 million was provided for port
security grants in addition to the $150 million made available just
three months ago by the fiscal year 2003 Consolidated Appropriations
Resolution. How soon will you be able to obligate these funds?
Answer. TSA expects to announce a second round of Port Security
grants in late May/early June 2003. TSA and the Department of Homeland
Security are working with the Administration to finalize budget
execution plans for the spending of fiscal year 2003 appropriated funds
for port security grants.
Question. How does the Coast Guard work with TSA to administer the
grant-making process?
Answer. The Coast Guard, as well as the Maritime Administration of
the Department of Transportation, has worked collaboratively in all
aspects of the Port Security grants process. This includes developing
the Broad Agency Announcement; defining the eligibility requirement,
evaluation criteria, and evaluation process; and participating in all
levels of application review and award decision making.
The Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and TSA jointly
monitor the progress of all grants and collectively determine whether
all grant requirements have been met.
EXPLOSIVE DETECTION SYSTEMS (EDS)
Question. Of the baggage screened at 429 commercial airports, TSA
estimates that 90 percent of the baggage is screened electronically by
either Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) or Explosive Trace Detection
(ETD) machines. The President's budget provides $100 million only for
the maintenance of these screening devices and does not provide any
monies for the purchase of additional machines. How much of the $180
million in funding for fiscal year 2003 and carryover funds available
from fiscal year 2002 for Explosive Detection Systems has been
obligated in order for airports to comply with statutory deadlines
mandated by Congress? If no funds have been obligated, when do you
intend on obligating the remainder of the funds for the purchase of
additional Explosive Detection Systems?
Answer. A total of $179,300,000 from fiscal year 2002 and fiscal
year 2003 (including FAA funding) will be obligated by the end of May
2003 for EDS/ETD purchases.
Question. Do you believe if Congress appropriated funds for fiscal
year 2004 for the purchase of additional Explosive Detection Systems
that airports that are in the most need of these machines would be able
to accommodate them and would this accelerate the electronic screening
of all passenger baggage?
Answer. TSA is in the final stages of developing a deployment plan
for those in-line installations that will be supported by the Federal
Government through appropriations funding and the Letter of Intent
(LOI) program. Throughout this process we have updated the actual
numbers of machines that TSA will have to purchase and deploy to
accommodate in-line installations.
Question. Now that the deadline to screen all checked airline
baggage has passed and 100 percent of the checked baggage is now being
screened for explosives, whether it be electronically or manually, what
further efforts do you plan to implement to enhance the process of
making sure all baggage that is checked for air travel is completely
safe of explosives?
Answer. TSA's Transportation Security Lab (TSL) is aggressively
working with manufacturers of new technologies that show promise of
meeting the TSA's certification standards within a 2-3 year window for
producing viable systems to enhance the screening process. TSL is also
working with current manufacturers to enhance performance of currently
deployed EDS equipment to improve detection capabilities, reduce false
alarm rates and increase throughput capacity.
Question. It is reported that while improving, false alarm rates
for baggage screening machines still occur too frequently. Can you
address what new technologies are being pursued to address this problem
and give us further detail on the $30 million proposed for fiscal year
2004 for the next generation explosive detection systems?
Answer. TSA has planned a two phase R&D program to identify and
develop next generation EDS technology.
--First Phase.--TSA will direct approximately 85 percent of allocated
R&D efforts towards a program which addresses evolutionary
growth of present technology. The project will focus on:
--Life cycle extension of existing systems to include software
enhancements that will lower the machine false alarm rates,
increase baggage throughput and improve detection
capabilities;
--Combining technologies (such as a combination of X-ray with
quadrupole resonance or X-ray diffraction technology); and
--Emerging technology and products that are within a 2-3 year
window for producing viable systems.
--Second Phase.--TSA will direct approximately 15 percent of R&D
efforts to a project which is a longer-range project with
potentially greater payoff. This is a 5 to 10 year project that
will challenge industry to develop the next generation of EDS
technology.
AIRPORT SECURITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
Question. TSA announced recently that Letters of Intent would be
signed for about 20 airports to provide Federal assistance for
permanent installation of explosive detection equipment. Which airports
will receive this funding and when can we expect these monies to be
obligated?
Answer. TSA is currently working to develop a comprehensive plan
for EDS in-line installations that will include an estimate of how many
LOIs TSA intends to utilize. We will provide details on that plan when
it is completed.
Question. The fiscal year 2004 budget for TSA does not include
additional monies for installation of explosive detection systems but
in your prepared testimony you state that TSA expects to amend its
budget request for costs associated with the Letter of Intent program.
When can we expect a budget amendment from the Administration for
additional funding?
Answer. TSA is working with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to determine what
adjustments are needed to the TSA fiscal year 2004 Budget Request.
These discussions include consideration of funds for the Letter of
Intent program. When an Administration proposal is completed, TSA will
provide details to the Congress.
Question. The Nation's largest airports that handle the greatest
passenger volume are most in need of money for terminal modifications.
However, if Congress provides additional funding for fiscal year 2004,
there is concern that these same airports will receive funding and the
smaller airports will be left out. Under Secretary Hutchinson testified
that there is a procedure, or a priority system, to determine which
airports will receive funding. Can you explain the order of how
airports are chosen to receive funding for security improvement
projects?
Answer. TSA has developed, and is applying, a prioritization
process that provides for an objective method for determining which
airports will be the first to move forward in the Letter of Intent
(LOI) process to fund installations of in-line explosive detection
system (EDS) equipment. The prioritization and complete plan for
installations will be completed in the near future.
COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING SYSTEM (CAPPS II)
Question. Under Secretary Hutchinson testified before the
Subcommittee that firewalls would be established for the Computer
Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System in order to prevent personal
data from being collected by the government or retained by the
government. What procedures are being put into place to prevent this
firewall from being breached?
Answer. The firewalls which are being incorporated into the CAPPS
II system to protect privacy will themselves be protected through the
use of the ``Radiant Trust'' system. This system will audit, in real
time, the flow of all data into and out of the CAPPS II system and will
also audit any access to or modification of the data in the system. The
software used in the auditing component of the system is the same
software trusted by intelligence agencies for the protection of highly
classified information. In short, we believe that data processed by the
CAPPS II system will be accorded the highest level of security
available for such data in any system in the government.
Question. Some Transportation Security Administration passenger
screeners have repeatedly searched individuals who clearly do not fit
the profile of possible terrorists. What is the Transportation Security
Administration doing to cut down on these ``false alarms'' or ``wasted
searches?''
Answer. One of the advantages of the CAPPS II system will be that
it will greatly reduce the type of unnecessary screening referred to in
this question. Unlike the current prescreening system in place,
currently administered by the airlines, TSA is developing CAPPS II to
have a robust authentication function to help ensure that people who do
not pose a threat to commercial aviation security and will not be
confused with those who are identified as posing such a threat, and
therefore will not be subjected to repeated and unnecessary additional
scrutiny when they travel. Further, if such errors do occur under the
CAPPS II system, TSA will have a ``Passenger Advocate'' who will be
empowered to investigate any errors and assist in correcting repeated
instances of misidentification.
In sum, TSA agrees that repeated screening of the wrong person
wastes resources and that once implemented, CAPPS II will be a useful
resource allocation tool that will assist in ensuring more
appropriately focused screening.
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS (LEOS)
Question. For fiscal year 2003, the Transportation Security
Administration previously planned to negotiate long-term agreements
with state and local law enforcement agencies to provide uniformed
officers at passenger security checkpoints this year and in the future.
Recently, TSA announced that local airports would not be reimbursed for
law enforcement officers and the airports would now have to shoulder
the burden for this mandate. What is the rationale behind elimination
of reimbursing law enforcement officers at airports?
Answer. TSA will continue to provide reimbursements for some law
enforcement. However, the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill
(Public Law 108-7) provided new authority for the Administrator of TSA
to allow stationing of law enforcement personnel at places other than
the airport screening checkpoints if TSA determines that such
stationing will still provide adequate responsiveness to incidents
(problems) at these locations. Flexible stationing enhances overall
security by providing surveillance detection and visual deterrence at
the airports. Roving patrols can cover more ground, will be observed by
more passengers, will gain a better understanding of the airport domain
and will lessen the manpower constraints on local jurisdictions. In
addition to enhancing security, this provision will greatly affect the
reimbursement program by significantly reducing funding requirements.
TSA is reviewing the current and historical requirements of the
security and law enforcement program for each airport. TSA Federal
Security Directors are consulting with the Airport Operators and local
law enforcement agencies to determine whether returning to a No-Cost
Flexible Response Alternative Program as provided by the Airport
Security Program (ASP) is sufficient to meet the needs for security at
that particular airport.
Question. How do you anticipate financially-strapped airports to be
able to make up for this shortfall?
Answer. Financial assistance in the form of a Reimbursement
Agreement (RA) will be available in cases where a no-cost program would
critically and adversely affect the financial resources and security
staffing requirements of the host agency.
TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CARD (TWIC)
Question. The Transportation Security Administration was provided
$35 million in fiscal year 2003 to initiate a credentialing program for
all transportation workers, such as dockworkers, truck drivers, and
airline caterers, to carry Federal identification in order to provide a
more secure work environment. The Transportation Security
Administration is now in the process of carrying out a four-month pilot
project where workers will be issued a transportation worker
identification card (TWIC) with one of five technologies in order to
determine the most appropriate, secure technology before a prototype is
developed. Can you give us a status report on the pilot project and
explain the different technologies that are being considered that will
be incorporated in the prototype transportation worker identification
card? Will biometric technologies, technologies that incorporate iris,
facial, and fingerprint recognition, be incorporated in the pilot?
Answer. A contract to conduct the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) Technology Evaluation Phase pilot
projects in the Philadelphia/Delaware Basin and Los Angeles/Long Beach
areas was awarded to Maximus, with EDS (Electronic Data Systems) as a
subcontractor, on April 23, 2003. The multi-modal pilot projects will
include testing credentialing technologies in applications for
aviation, highway, maritime, rail workers, and others.
The intent of the Technology Evaluation Phase is to evaluate a
range of potential access technologies for interoperability and
performance at six facilities in each area. The test will include six
different access control technologies including digital photographs,
optical (laser) media stripes, microchips, magnetic stripes, and two
different types of bar codes. As part of this phase, the benefits of
employing a centralized card production and issuance center will be
evaluated.
Biometric technologies will be incorporated in the Prototype Phase
of the TWIC program. During this next phase, a TWIC reference biometric
will be incorporated into the credential and tested at the pilot sites.
A specific reference biometric has not yet been chosen. In addition to
the biometric technology selected for the reference biometric, the TWIC
credential will have the capability to store other biometric
information for use in various security applications as required by
individual transportation facilities.
HIGHWAY WATCH PROGRAM
Question. Does the Transportation Security Administration intend on
any contractual agreements between the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration and the trucking industry for the Highway Watch program
as recently directed by Congress?
Answer. The Highway Watch Program is a joint government/industry
program and TSA expects to build-on rather than replace this existing
program as it defines future highway security needs. TSA is working
with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to determine the
requirements for expansion of the current Highway Watch Program.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Question. In the hours following the attacks on the Pentagon and
the World Trade Center, it was clear that the lines of communication
between everyone involved in air travel--the FAA, Federal authorities,
airlines, and customers--was severely deficient, if not to say
completely inadequate. What steps have been taken to improve this so
that information moves quickly and accurately from the air traffic
controllers to the airlines to the passengers, and most importantly, to
the appropriate agencies in the event of another emergency?
Answer. The communications flow between air traffic controllers,
airline corporate headquarters and security divisions, Department of
Defense, and other Departments occurs under processes established among
the Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of
Defense. In cases where there is a known threat to aviation security,
the agency that identifies the threat establishes communications with
the other agencies via established conference calls, at which time all
command centers are brought into a coordination conference call. In
addition to these interagency conference calls, each agency initiates
calls within its own organization for coordination with internal
response and information sources to build and maintain situational
awareness. The Transportation Security Administration establishes
direct links to internal and external agencies via secure and non-
secure means for information gathering and direction. The communication
systems are tested regularly to identify and correct glitches in the
lines of communication so that we are confident there will not be any
problems in a real emergency. At the end of every test, we conduct an
outbrief to review the exercise and identify areas for improvement.
These communications links encompass the full spectrum of agency
capabilities to respond to any threat to aviation security. Additional
details on the secure elements of the communication links can be
provided in a classified setting.
AIR MARSHALS
Question. On September 11th, it became apparent that our Nation's
protectors of the commercial skies, the U.S. Air Marshals, needed to be
in better communication--not only with their superiors but also with
each other. Who knows what could have been averted, and how many lives
could have been saved had communications technology been available. I
know that over the past year or so, the TSA has been working with
technology companies in order to develop a communications system that
allows the air marshals to communicate in real time with officials on
the ground, as well as other air marshals stationed on other commercial
aircraft. I think this is necessary so that our air marshals are not
isolated at 30,000 feet. Do you have any knowledge of the progress of
this technology development?
Answer. Pursuant to House Conference Committee Report 107-593,
TSA's Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) was provided $15 million to
begin the initial implementation phase of the Air to Ground
Communications program. TSA intends to utilize this funding to purchase
a Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) product, which includes hardware and
software, for implementation of the Air to Ground communications
system. This initial system will allow the FAMS to utilize a portable,
quickly deployable air to ground communications system which will
seamlessly integrate existing FAMS wireless technology. This
comprehensive wireless communications system may also be used by other
local, State, and Federal agencies, and the Department of Defense, to
achieve secure communications through a dedicated law enforcement
network.
BAGGAGE SCREENERS
Question. The TSA recently announced plans to eliminate 3,000 more
airport screening jobs by the end of September, coupled with 3,000
others announced in March, amount to about 11 percent of the 55,600
screeners employed. This plan will save the TSA an estimated $280
million. I applaud the TSA's effort to trim their budgetary needs,
however, is a good idea to cut the work force and putting some workers
on part-time hours? Do you believe this to be a wise decision at this
time?
Answer. TSA believes that making effective use of part-time
screening personnel is in the best interest of both security and the
taxpayer. Most airports have a peak time, or several peak times, during
which a screening presence is needed beyond the normal throughput. The
ability to use part-time or split shift personnel during these focused
periods is a policy with significant possibilities. With the
implementation of improved scheduling tools, TSA expects to be able to
optimize the workforce with the appropriate mix of full-time, part-time
and split shift personnel to better match travel patterns.
Question. Will we still have enough workers to screen 100 percent
of the bags?
Answer. Yes, the screening force will not be cut below the level
needed to screen 100 percent of the baggage.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS
Question. A year ago, we discussed the need for accountability in
the security screeners and airport employees as a whole. Then Congress
passed the Aviation and Transportation Act which federalized those
employees. Recently, President Bush issued an executive order that
deleted the clause in a previous order signed by President Clinton that
described air traffic control as an ``inherently governmental
function.'' The Administration has proposed studying whether to hire a
private company to take over the air traffic control system. What
effect will privatizing the Air Traffic Controllers will have on the
current system? Do you believe it will solve current issues, or create
problems?
Answer. Because the safe operation of the Nation's air traffic
control system is the responsibility of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), an agency within the Department of Transportation
(DOT), these questions are more appropriately addressed to that agency.
However, it is our understanding that although DOT recently deemed the
FAA's air traffic controllers to be ``commercial'' within the meaning
of the required annual FAIR Act inventory of agency functions, the
Secretary also decided that the non-contract tower functions are core
capabilities of the agency and will not be subject to competition or
contracted out.
QUALIFIED ANTITERRORISM TECHNOLOGIES
Question. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Sections 862) provided
the Department of Homeland Security with authority to compile a list of
``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' that would qualify or receive
certain protection under that Act. Has this list been compiled? If not,
why?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security is in the process of
drafting regulations for implementation of Section G of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and places a high priority on their issuance for
public comment and implementation. These regulations will provide the
basis for the Department to compile a list of qualified antiterrorism
technologies in accordance with the criteria and provisions of the
Homeland Security Act.
Question. If this list has been compiled, can Members of this
Committee get a copy of this list?
Answer. A list of ``qualified antiterrorism technologies'' has not
yet been compiled because the regulations needed to implement Subtitle
G of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 have not yet been issued.
Question. How would a company that has an antiterrorism technology
be considered for approval?
Answer. At present, there is no process by which a company can
submit its technology for consideration for approval as a qualified
antiterrorism technology. Such a process will be available after the
regulations needed to implement the provisions of Section 862 of the
Homeland Security Act have been finalized and issued.
Question. Do they need to wait for the rulemaking process to be
completed to apply for approval?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, when will that process be completed?
Answer. As indicated earlier, the process is currently in progress
and will include a public comment period on the proposed regulations
prior to their finalization and issue. At this time, it is not possible
to provide a specific date for completion of the rulemaking process.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT SCREENERS CAP
Question. The Congress has required your agency to achieve a cap on
full-time screening employees of 45,000 individuals. Does this staffing
limitation force your agency to make bad or inefficient management
decisions?
Answer. As a threshold matter, the cap referred to in the question
applies to full time permanent employees throughout TSA and not just
screeners. The cap affects, among others, TSA headquarters staff and
Federal Air Marshals.
TSA acknowledges the requirement to reduce and re-distribute some
of the screener workforce. At some of the airports, we did not
experience the voluntary attrition we expected, and at other airports,
attrition has been greater than programmed. Getting the right number of
screeners hired and trained at the right airports will continue to be a
management challenge. It will be essential for us to use our work force
in a flexible manner if we are to avoid long lines after the reduction.
Part time employees will be essential for staffing checkpoint lanes
during peak periods. Through the implementation of good management
principles and practices, TSA will be able to maintain world-class
security with a more efficient, more effective screener workforce.
BUS SECURITY
Question. TSA has been given funds for a program to enhance motor
coach security ($25 million total from the Supplemental and
Transportation Appropriations bill). The first application period ended
in March. When do you expect that your agency will announce those
grants and what criteria have you used to award these funds?
Answer. Request for applications for the initial round of bus
security grants was published in the Federal Register on January 17,
2003. The application period closed on March 19, 2003. Interagency
national and executive review teams recently completed their
evaluations of the proposals. TSA anticipates awarding the grants in
June 2003.
In developing funding recommendations, the national evaluation team
used the evaluation criteria published in the Request for Applications,
which included the following: relevance and importance, technical
quality of the proposal, competence of the project team to perform the
work, appropriateness and reasonableness of the budget, and corporate
experience and capability.
Question. With all your focus on the airlines and their security,
when do you expect that you will turn to other modes of transportation
and have you done any preliminary studies or have any ideas as to what
can be done to protect rail and bus passengers?
Answer. TSA, working through the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate (BTS) and with the Information Analysis & Infrastructure
Protection Directorate (IAIP), is currently working with Federal
surface and maritime transportation modes, and governmental and
industry stakeholders to better assess security vulnerabilities,
identify security enhancements, and, where needed, establish best
practices, national standards, and security plans and regulations.
Additionally, TSA continues to assess security vulnerabilities and
identify needed security enhancements to the rail and bus system and
related infrastructure and is engaged in the following rail and bus
security activities:
--Coordinating information and threat sharing through the Surface
Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC),
which is managed by the Association of American Railroads,
including deploying TSA personnel to the ISAC.
--Studying (in collaboration with Amtrak and Federal Railroad
Administration) the feasibility of prototyping the screening of
both passengers and baggage in a rail environment.
--Identifying the gaps in antiterrorism training among rail
personnel.
TSA also provided support to a study conducted by the Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center entitled ``Security Enhancement
Study for the U.S. Motor coach Industry.'' This study assesses the
level of security threats within the motor coach industry, prioritizes
industry vulnerabilities and identifies potential areas of opportunity
to enhance security.
Question. In your opinion, is it more important to enhance
protection to transportation routes and corridors or significant
transportation destinations?
Answer. Both transportation routes and corridors and significant
transportation destinations play a critical role in our economy.
Enhancing protection of both of these areas will ensure the
uninterrupted flow of commerce and maintain the confidence of the
traveling public. Because the routes and corridors and destinations are
economically interdependent, leaving one unprotected is not an
acceptable alternative. Risk analysis does indicate however, that the
greatest threat lies within the transportation destination, for it is
there that those who would do us harm achieve the greatest impact
(potential greatest loss of life, impact on critical infrastructure and
economy, and access to major media markets).
Question. Some bus operators (e.g. Greyhound Bus Lines) have begun
``wanding'' passengers in its largest terminals. Has TSA had any
discussions with Greyhound or with the industry's trade association
(American Bus Association) about the usefulness, cost and practicality
of expanding such efforts?
Answer. TSA has had broad discussions with both Greyhound Bus Lines
and the American Bus Association (ABA) with regard to Greyhound's pilot
project to perform random ``wanding'' of passengers at 32 cities across
the Nation. Greyhound has found that ``wanding'' works well on several
fronts, discouraging passengers from bringing drugs and dangerous or
otherwise threatening items onboard as well as providing a tangible
demonstration of enhanced security. Greyhound is exploring the
feasibility of and identifying resources needed to expand their
``wanding'' program to include 50 percent of Greyhound's terminals. In
addition, other bus operators are evaluating whether and how to
incorporate ``wanding'' into their security protocols.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS TRAINING LOCATION
Question. Does TSA, in conjunction with FLETC, plan to consolidate
training of Federal Air Marshals at one location (Artesia) as opposed
to the expense of training in Atlantic City?
Answer. The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAM) has no plans in
conjunction with FLETC to consolidate the training of Federal Air
Marshals (FAMs) at one location (Artesia).
All FAMs are required to attend the FAMS 7-week Basic Training
Course conducted at FLETC in Artesia, New Mexico and the 4-week FAMS
Phase II Specialized Training Course conducted at the FAMS Training
Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The training in Artesia consists
primarily of basic police and law enforcement training that is aimed at
providing a student the fundamental law enforcement training related to
their positions. The training in Atlantic City is specialized training
related directly to the FAMS mission. It takes place in facilities and
on equipment that are designed to replicate the working environment
that a FAM will encounter during a mission. In addition, instructors
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other outside
entities that conduct some of the specialized FAMS training would not
be available if the training were conducted at the FLETC-Artesia
location.
A recently held curriculum review conference was attended by
representatives of the FAMs, TSA's Office of Training and Quality
Performance, and FLETC-Artesia. A coordinated effort is underway to
eliminate all duplicative training courses in each segment of the
training to maximize the time FAMs spend in the specialized mission-
related training facilities uniquely available in Atlantic City.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS RETENTION RATES
Question. Regarding the retention rate of Federal Air Marshals,
does the turnover exceed training costs? What is being done to enhance
retention? Is emphasis in hiring placed on Federal law enforcement
officials--most of whom have already received FLETC-certified
training--and whom we understand are relatively less costly to train
than other recruits?
Answer. In order to address the issue of retention, two points need
to be addressed. First, looking at Federal Air Marshal (FAM) attrition
over the year and a half since the program has undergone a significant
build up, it is apparent that the attrition rate is no greater than
that of the rest of the Federal Law Enforcement workforce. FAM
attrition was initially very low, and then there was a spike noted late
last summer. Since December 2002, the attrition rate has stabilized at
half of a percent per month. Second, the build up to comply with the
Congressional mandate resulted in hiring the FAM workforce without
being able to sufficiently hire the warranted supervisory personnel.
Since this past fall, when a cadre of experienced Federal Law
Enforcement Supervisors and Managers were selected and deployed to each
of the Field Offices, there has been a significant reduction in the
number of resignations and a noted stabilization of the FAM workforce.
Turnover does not exceed training costs. The cost of half of a
percent per month attrition does not exceed the monthly budget
allocation for training.
The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) recruits from a variety of
sources including those individuals with Federal law enforcement
experience. It is the goal of the FAMS to select the best-qualified
individuals for the workforce, following all applicable OPM
regulations. Since September 2001, the FAMS has actively recruited
individuals with prior Federal law enforcement experience, as have many
other Federal, State, and local agencies with law enforcement
responsibilities. Competition for those best-qualified individuals has
been intense. During the emergency stand-up period running through July
2002, approximately 50 percent of the FAMs hired had previous Federal
law enforcement experience. Hiring personnel with former Federal law
enforcement experience realizes cost savings; however, all personnel,
regardless of their backgrounds, require specialized Federal Air
Marshal Training.
WYDEN AMENDMENT TO S. 165--AIR CARGO SECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT
Question. S. 165, as it passed the Senate, requires a report on
plans by the Transportation Security Administration to gather data on
plane passengers. He said he wanted to determine how the collection of
data impacts civil liberties and privacy. Has the Administration taken
a position on the Wyden provision? Does it share the same concerns
about personal privacy and data mining issues?
Answer. The Administration does not oppose the Wyden provision. TSA
is committed to ensuring that personal privacy is protected in the
CAPPS II program and welcomes the opportunity offered by Senator Wyden
to demonstrate that commitment. TSA is developing CAPPS II in ways that
protect personal privacy. Strict firewalls and access rules will
protect a commercial air traveler's personal information from
inappropriate use, sharing or disclosure. Also, CAPPS II will include
real-time auditing capabilities in the system architecture to ensure
compliance with domestic and international laws and the privacy
policies of TSA and other Federal agencies. In addition, it is TSA's
goal to listen to the views of our stakeholders, the traveling public,
privacy advocacy groups and the Congress and to use the feedback to
help create and develop the CAPPS II system. With regard to data
mining, as understood by TSA, ``data mining'' means sifting through
vast amounts of data to identify any possible patterns. CAPPS II starts
with a known person, the air traveler, and seeks to authenticate his/
her identity and to determine whether that person poses a terrorist
risk to the aircraft, other passengers, or the public. It is not
seeking out unknown patterns in vast quantities of data.
TRUSTED TRAVELER PROGRAM
Question. In conjunction with development of the CAPPS II program,
there has been some discussion of also exploring development of a
``trusted traveler'' program similar to those in place at certain
overseas airports for frequent, especially business, travelers. Has the
Department explored piloting such a program in this country? If not,
why not? If so, what has the Department learned in this regard?
Answer. The concept of the Registered Traveler (RT), or ``trusted
traveler,'' is still in its development stage. TSA is conducting a
business-based feasibility study to examine the range of program
alternatives, evaluate viable technologies and develop a range of
funding and cost-sharing options. As TSA makes progress with CAPPS II
and further defines the registered traveler concept, we will be in a
better position to determine how a RT program might be implemented and
identify other advantages for travelers who volunteer to participate.
TSA is still in the process of developing CAPPS II to identify
those persons who are involved with or linked to foreign terrorism and
who pose a threat to aviation security. At the same time, TSA is
reviewing the RT concept, per Section 109 of the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which provided TSA with the
discretion to ``[e]stablish requirements to implement trusted passenger
programs and use available technologies to expedite security screening
of passengers who participate in such programs, thereby allowing
security screening personnel to focus on those passengers who should be
subject to more extensive screening.''
The current thinking around RT is that passengers who apply to the
RT program will voluntarily submit to background checks. Based on these
checks, TSA would be able to assess whether the passenger presents a
risk to aviation security. If it is determined that the passenger does
not pose such a threat, they will be registered as a RT, or,
alternatively, if they do pose a threat to aviation security, they
would not be registered. Thus, there are no levels of clearance--people
either participate in the program or they do not. If they are in the
program, it is possible that this group of people could be entered into
the CAPPS II system as individuals who do not present a risk to
aviation security.
In this situation it is envisioned that RTs would generally be
exempt from secondary screening. For the majority of cases, RTs would
only receive secondary screening if they trigger an alarm at the walk
through metal detector (WTMD). The benefit to the RT is the potential
for expedited security screening.
TSA: GOALS AND MANAGEMENT
Question. A recent General Accounting Office report has given the
Transportation Security Administration high marks, saying it is off to
``an impressive start'' in motivating its workforce to achieve
performance goals. At the same time, the agency has focused the vast
majority of its resources on the aviation side of the ledger almost to
the exclusion of other modes of transportation. The budget request for
fiscal year 2004 appears to continue this trend, with only $86 million
planned for Maritime and Land Security out of a budget request of $4.82
billion. There are reports that TSA is working on a national security
plan that will address all modes of transportation, including the
development of partnerships with the private sector. Can you give us
some examples of what these might be? Do you anticipate modifying or
realigning your budget request to accommodate these plans?
Answer. We do not anticipate modifying the TSA request for this
purpose. DHS, overall, has requested substantial resources in fiscal
year 2004 across the Department outside of aviation, including
resources in the Coast Guard for ports and maritime security; in BCBP
for cargo security; in IAIP for vulnerability assessment, intelligence,
and infrastructure protection for all sectors including transportation;
and in EP&R for emergency response. ODP recently announced grants
including $75 million for port security and $65 million for mass
transit security in fiscal year 2003. TSA is continuing key standards-
setting efforts, and will work closely with modal administrations of
the Department of Transportation to help leverage resources of that
agency, where appropriate, to accomplish security goals.
TSA: BUSINESS ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING SECURITY PLANS
Question. Transportation Security Administrator, Admiral Loy,
recently told a group of business leaders that he needs their
assistance in developing a national security plan for transportation
systems. He said, ``This is an all-hands evolution. We are sort of in
this together.'' What types of assistance is TSA looking for from the
private sector? Is there a timetable for deliverables on this national
transportation security plan? What measures are being used to determine
whether the plan is working?
Answer. Industry participation is vital to TSA's success and our
security paradigm involves industry input at almost every step of the
process. From domain awareness, where industry has the benefit of day-
to-day observation, to prevention, protection, response, restoration
and consequence management, TSA, its modal partners and industry will
be essential to the establishment and effectiveness of a comprehensive
transportation security plan.
Specific measures of effectiveness will be developed as the plan is
put in place and appropriate security standards are decided.
LETTERS OF INTENT
Question. The fiscal year 2003 Iraqi War Supplemental (Public Law
108-11) included a provision allowing the Under Secretary for Border
and Transportation Security to issue letters of intent to airports to
provide assistance in the installation of explosive detection systems.
What is the status of this issue? Is the Office of Management and
Budget delaying the issuance of these letters?
Answer. OMB supports the use of LOIs as a tool for improving
security, leveraging private sector resources and is working with TSA
on its in-line installation plan and the use of LOIs in support of that
plan.
TSA'S CRUISE SHIP TO AIRLINES PILOT PROJECT
Question. My staff had the opportunity while in Miami to observe
the operation of a temporary pilot project which has been instituted
between a major cruise line and a major airline. In this pilot,
disembarking cruise passengers who are immediately transiting through
to the airline have their bags examined by Transportation Security
Administration screeners at a dock-side facility and receive their
boarding passes from airline representatives. Then their bags are
transferred to the airport in a secure vehicle while the passengers
take a bus to the airport and, upon arrival, proceed directly to the
gate. Under this system, the passenger is able to avoid waiting in
additional lines at the airport, while at the same time congestion is
slightly reduced at the airport itself. By all accounts, this is a
system that is working well and demonstrates a fresh approach to both
security as well as passenger processing. How much does this pilot
program cost and are funds included in the fiscal year 2004 budget for
it to be continued? Are there other locations to which this project
could be expanded? What other innovative ideas, if any, is your agency
considering piloting in the coming year?
Answer. The program mentioned in this question is called Synergy
and is currently working well in Miami. There are no additional costs
in this program, and it actually improves security by eliminating much
of the congestion accompanying a cruise ship's passengers all arriving
at the airport simultaneously. Other, similar programs are proposed for
areas with hotel concentrations, as well as other major cruise ship
embarkation points. TSA will pursue all avenues to allow air commerce
to more freely move while maintaining the same high level of security.
TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTITY CARD
Question. You have included in your budget request for the next
fiscal year funds to begin implementing the Transportation Workers
Identity Card program. Given that some transportation workers in
certain locations often have criminal records, what will be some of the
determining or prohibiting factors under which a worker will be
provided or denied a card?
Answer. At the present time, the determining factors for whether or
not a person obtains any federally-based TWIC across transportation
sectors have not been determined. Many considerations must be assessed
and evaluated, and ultimately these may vary depending on the nature of
an employee's work and risk to the transportation system. The three
primary acts which guide our current policy on credentialing include
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, the USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. The
acts differ both in specificity and in the length and range of offenses
that would be disqualifying for obtaining a credential.
PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS
Question. Have you reviewed the port security assessments that have
been completed to date to determine if there are patterns in port
vulnerability that ports generally should begin to address immediately?
Answer. Review of the port security assessments completed to date,
both by the ports themselves using TSA port security grant funds and
those completed by the Coast Guard, has yielded valuable preliminary
information regarding security enhancement requirements. These
assessments have identified a number of physical security enhancements
that were either non-existent or needed improvement, such as fencing,
lighting, and closed circuit television systems. Other common
recommendations included: setting standards for transportation worker
identification systems, creating security plans, enhancing
communications systems, and establishing screening equipment standards
for cargo and passengers.
SUPPORT CONTRACTS
Question. In response to questions at the hearing, you spoke to the
difficulties TSA has experienced with a number of its contracted out
functions--including screener training, human resources and the like.
Please provide the Subcommittee with a list if the contracts that TSA
has let for specific functions since its creation, the number of people
hired to perform the contracts, the prices of each contract and if a
contract has been terminated and a new contractor brought on to perform
the same function.
Answer. TSA has awarded 6 significant contracts for its
``contracted out services''. The six contracts and their associated
information are listed in the attached document. None of these
contracts have been terminated, although the period of performance for
one contract has expired. Each of these contracts is a performance-
based service contract (PBSC), where the contractor is required to
deliver services in accordance with specific performance metrics. In
general, TSA requires these contractors to achieve desired outcomes,
and does not require them to adhere to non-performance standards (such
as contract staffing levels). The contractor has the flexibility to
achieve performance metrics utilizing innovative approaches that have
not been restricted by procedural or resource requirements. TSA does
not require these contractors to report the number of people employed.
To this point, TSA has awarded contracts to Cooperative Personnel
Services and Accenture to perform human resources management functions
previously provided to TSA in part by NCS Pearson for the deployment of
the aviation security workforce. The current contracts now cover the
entire TSA workforce, not only the screener component. And, the
recently awarded contract to Lockheed Martin services for security
training services replaces the contract with Lockheed Martin Services
for passenger screener training. In both situations the new contract
requirements are for a broader range of services than those provided
under the original contract.
S. 165--AIR CARGO SECURITY ACT
Question. The Senate recently passed this legislation. What new
activities will this law impose on your agency? If enacted into law,
what impact will this law have on your agency's budget? What additional
resources--personnel, funds, etc. will be required?
Answer. TSA generally does not believe it will be necessary to
increase personnel and funding to meet the requirements of the Senate
bill. Should this bill, or TSA's air cargo security strategy, suggest
new resources are needed, these will be found in base TSA funding. TSA
has already set up screening protocols for air cargo, is regularly
inspecting air cargo facilities, and is working to complete its
``known'' shipper database. $30 million in requested fiscal year 2004
funding will enable TSA to refine and improve its screening protocols,
through development of a risk-based, freight screening process, and
investigate cargo screening technologies.
This legislation would also transfer responsibility for
investigating foreign applicants for flight training from the Attorney
General to the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security.
TSA may assess fees for the cost of the investigations.
The legislation further provides that TSA may establish a program
to use identification verification technologies. The use of
surveillance and recognition technology may ultimately proves useful in
airport applications, but it would require maintenance of an
appropriate photo watch-list based on intelligence and law enforcement
resources from outside TSA.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Question. As you may know, law enforcement officials from New
England and New York have been national leaders in establishing an
initiative for cargo container security called Operation Safe Commerce
Northeast (OSC Northeast). OSC Northeast represents a comprehensive
coalition of Federal agencies, State governments and private sector
businesses committed to the concept of enhancing border and
international transportation security without impeding free trade and
international commerce. Originally conceptualized a month before the
tragic events of September 11, 2001, I commend Vermont U.S. Attorney
Peter Hall and others for being such forward thinkers about the need to
monitor the security of overseas freight that is coming into our
country.
On April 21, 2003 the Wall St. Journal carried an article warning
that Canadian ports could provide a back door into the continent for
terrorists targeting the United States. The Canadian Ports of Montreal
and Halifax are among the principal seaports servicing much of the
northeast and mid-west. For example: of the 1.2 million containers
unloaded in Montreal last year, half (600,000) were destined for the
United States. One billion U.S. dollars of trade is conducted daily
between the United States and Canada, therefore, a disruption of trade
between the two countries would be devastating to our respective
economies.
Last year (May 2002), OSC Northeast conducted a beta study of
international container cargo entering the United States via Montreal.
This project, involving both United States and Canadian participants,
monitored, tracked and sealed a container from its point of origin in
Eastern Europe through the Ports of Hamburg Germany to its final
destination in Hillsboro, New Hampshire. To date, I believe this is the
only group to have conducted and completed such a study and compiled a
detailed report of findings and recommendations.
This group, which is chaired by the Governor of New Hampshire and
the U.S. Attorneys for Vermont and New Hampshire, is prepared to
proceed with a Phase II initiative dealing with container verification
and the transshipment of international cargo. Most recently they have
partnered with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--one of the
nation's premier applied science labs--to further examine international
cargo entering the continent via Canada and then transshipped via rail
and truck inland, or transshipped via feeder vessels for delivery along
the Atlantic (New England) coast. This interesting initiative consists
of a collaboration of State, Federal and private sector (United States
and Canadian) partners prepared to assist the Nation and homeland
security.
Therefore, in light of the recognized disruption to the northeast
and mid-west economies should a catastrophic event occur related to
international trade corridors the TSA should better engage and utilize
the resources of the OSC Northeast group. To replicate such a group
would take a team one full year just to organize and prepare. I
understand the TSA is preparing to provide funding awards to the three
largest United States load centers, as prescribed in the fiscal year
2002 Supplemental Appropriations Bill: Los Angeles/Long Beach, Seattle/
Tacoma and New York/New Jersey. And data from all these sources should
be used to detect and analyze vulnerabilities in our supply chains. I
hope the TSA will take a closer look at funding the OSC Northeast
initiative too. We are very vulnerable along our Northern Border, and
this group would enhance the safety of cargo entering the United States
through New England and Canadian ports.
What steps are TSA taking to incorporate the efforts of OSC
Northeast into our national port security strategy? Will TSA be able to
fund Phase II of the OSC Northeast initiative?
Answer. OSC Northeast was a public-private partnership that yielded
invaluable information regarding our Nation's port security strategy.
TSA has incorporated lessons learned from OSC Northeast, as well as
from other initiatives and experience in order to capture, analyze, and
build further upon the knowledge base.
Appropriated funding prioritized Operation Safe Commerce (OSC)
pilot program funds to the three largest container Load Centers in the
United States--the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, the ports of
Seattle and Tacoma, and the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey. One
of the project criteria for the OSC grants is to consider a supply
chain through the Load Centers, which includes feeder ports and supply
chains to Canada. To date, no supply chains have been submitted to the
OSC Executive Steering Committee for consideration that include
Northeast U.S. ports, eastern Canadian ports, or truck or train
shipments destined for eastern or central Canada. TSA expects to
complete work on this pilot program during fiscal year 2004, which we
hope will provide useful solutions for supply chain security.
______
Questions Submitted to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran
Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's fiscal year
2004 budget requests $146 million. This amount represents a decrease of
roughly 13 percent. Will the 2004 funding request provide for
sufficient instructor staffing, training, and facility upgrades?
Answer. Yes, the President's fiscal year 2004 budget request
provides sufficient funding for FLETC. It was based on levels of
training requested by the partner agencies.
Question. The fiscal year 2003 supplemental appropriations bill
provided the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center with an additional
$2 million to support Operation Liberty Shield activities. How were
these funds used to support Operation Liberty Shield?
Answer. The funding provided for additional training requested by
our Partner Organizations and the security costs associated with the
increased threat levels. As a result of increased security
requirements, our partner agencies requested 35 additional mandatory,
basic training programs, totaling 7,084 student weeks of training, in
order to deploy 744 more agents and officers. The increased threat
levels required the implementation of a roving security patrol at the
Artesia training site and an increase to the roving patrol already in
place at the Glynco training site.
Question. When the Department of Homeland Security elevates the
Threat Advisory System, how does the heightened readiness affect the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and what impact does this
elevated readiness have on the agency's budget?
Answer. When the DHS elevates the threat advisory level, the
following increased security measures are implemented in accordance
with published directives:
THREAT LEVEL 4 (ORANGE)
This threat level will be implemented based upon anticipated needs
or communicated threats and will encompass all previously applied
security measures at security levels 1, 2, and 3. Additionally, a 100
percent positive identification process, consisting of a valid FLETC-
issued identification card and a second form of a state or federally-
issued government identification with a full-face photograph, will be
implemented. Both forms of official identification must be produced and
displayed to FLETC Security Police by all incoming personnel seeking
access to any FLETC facility. Access will be denied if these specific
identification requirements are not met. Additionally, FLETC Security
Police will conduct random verifications and examinations of displayed
FLETC identification at the various facilities within the FLETC proper;
as such display of FLETC identification is required of all persons on
any FLETC facility.
THREAT LEVEL 5 (RED)
This threat level will be implemented based upon anticipated needs
or communicated threats and will encompass all previously applied
security measures at security levels 1, 2, 3, and 4. The facilities
will be closed to all visitors and only essential personnel on official
governmental business will be granted access. All non-essential
contract personnel will be dismissed. A 100 percent search of all
vehicles (commercial, government and privately-owned) entering FLETC
facilities will be conducted and increased security police patrols of
all areas will be implemented. At this threat level, all Partner
Organizations will be tasked with providing security to their personnel
at any off-facility housing areas in support of local police agencies.
The FLETC Director may cancel any or all training within the affected
bureau facilities.
The security activities associated with the heightened threat
advisory levels are ordinarily accomplished within the parameters of
the Security Police contract at no additional cost to FLETC. However,
if security threat situations dictate that the service contractor
employ additional resources and/or authorize overtime to accomplish the
required security activities, then additional fiscal resources will be
necessary.
Question. Since September 11, the training needs of Federal
agencies with homeland security missions have increased substantially.
What is FLETC doing to respond to increased training requests from its
partner organizations?
Answer. The near-term increased demand for law enforcement training
has been accommodated by maximizing the use all available facilities
and resources at Artesia, Glynco and Charleston. A FLETC management
team worked systematically through a series of constraints analyses to
optimize FLETC throughput capacity. As system constraints were
identified, temporary measures/facilities were brought on-line to
eliminate or reduce the constraint, increasing the FLETC overall
training capacity. Additionally, FLETC has developed a number of
creative scheduling solutions to accommodate the increased training
demand (i.e. extended training week and extended training day).
To accommodate the mid-term demand, FLETC is currently studying all
available options to meet the fiscal year 2004 through 2006 training
requests, including shifting some basic and/or advanced training
normally conducted at Glynco, Georgia to alternate sites which may
include Artesia, New Mexico, Charleston, South Carolina, or, the soon
to be completed, Cheltenham, Maryland facilities. This option will only
be employed after consultation with the affected partner organizations
and consideration of response ramifications.
Question. Many of the Federal agencies that rely on FLETC for
training would prefer to establish their own training facilities. What
additional steps does FLETC need to take to ensure partner
organizations that coordinated Federal training is best for the agency
and the taxpayers?
Answer. H.R. 2590, enacted into law by President Bush on November
11, 2001, provided appropriations in fiscal year 2002 to the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). A provision contained in this
legislation directed the FLETC to initiate collaborative interagency
efforts to establish written standards for the accreditation of Federal
law enforcement training. As the principal source of consolidated
Federal law enforcement training, the FLETC assists all Federal
agencies. Currently, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Office of
Accreditation, located at Glynco, is working to quantify what
facilities exist and the capability of those facilities.
In addition, at the request of the Under Secretary, Border and
Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
tasked with establishing a Training Academy Committee to identify and
assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS training academies.
The committee will use a two phased methodology to identify the
training assets and to develop a plan for operating the facilities
employed by each of the Directorate's bureaus, and will also include
the Coast Guard, Secret Service, and the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services. The operational plan will provide the framework
for coordinating academy training. The Committee will develop and
submit a report at the conclusion of each phase according to the
timelines established by its charter. Once the committee has identified
all of the BTS training capabilities, FLETC can develop a more
definitive utilization plan of facility usage at all BTS sites.
Question. On March 1, 2003, FLETC was transferred to the Department
of Homeland Security. Is FLETC working to develop a cohesive training
curriculum that will cross-train all Department of Homeland Security
law enforcement personnel in counter terrorism practices?
Answer. FLETC is currently working with the newly formed Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) law enforcement organizations to modify,
design, and develop appropriate training curricula to ensure their
specific mission requirements are met, to include the cross-training of
agency personnel. In the interim, all DHS law enforcement personnel
attend either FLETC basic training programs (Mixed Basic Police
Training Program, Criminal Investigator Training Program, Federal Air
Marshal Training Program) or FLETC integrated basic programs and
receive anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism training as part of their
basic training, The same personnel also attend FLETC's advanced Anti-
terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Training Programs.
Question. The Congress intends for agencies within the Department
of Homeland Security to improve information sharing. What training
techniques is the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center utilizing to
encourage information sharing among law enforcement personnel?
Answer. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, through the
Financial Fraud Institute (FFI), employs training techniques which
encourage information sharing among law enforcement personnel in the
following ways:
First, FFI offers the Intelligence Analyst Training Program (IATP),
which is a comprehensive 4-week training program designed for the law
enforcement intelligence community. This program focuses on
intelligence methodology, analytical skills, research techniques, and
the processes necessary to support the effective collection, analysis
and sharing of intelligence data. FLETC is currently proposing to
expand this program to accommodate the training needs of the Department
of Homeland Security.
Second, in addition to the IATP, FFI offers twelve other advanced
training programs to a cross-section of Federal, State, and local law
enforcement. This training ranges in topics from International Banking
and Money Laundering to Computer Forensics. FFI provides advanced Money
Laundering and Financial Investigative training to High Intensity
Financial Crime Areas and High Intensity Drug Traffic Areas Federal
task forces to assist in the national effort to combat money laundering
and terrorist financing. FFI also provides advanced training in the
area of computer network security, computer intrusions, and internet
forensics. These computer forensic training programs encourage law
enforcement personnel to coordinate with and to interact among law
enforcement agencies and the private sector to combat computer crimes.
This cooperation is stressed as being vital to the effective
investigation of advanced technology crimes.
Third, FFI serves the international law enforcement community by
exporting training in international money laundering and computer
forensics to the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) training
sites worldwide.
Through the Criminal Investigators Training Program (CITP), the FFI
introduces new criminal investigators to the information stored in a
number of law enforcement data and intelligence resources, to include:
NCIC/NLETS, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information
System (NADDIS), and Interpol. FFI also trains law enforcement
personnel in modern electronic information storage techniques which
allow for the safe and efficient sharing of investigative materials.
Finally, FFI exposes students through its Internet Investigations
Training Program (IITP) to the Cybercop Secure Portal which provides an
encrypted secure collaborative network where over 3,700 law enforcement
and private sector security personnel share sensitive but unclassified
information. This portal is sponsored by the Extranet Secure Portal
Group and is used by many other personnel within the Department of
Homeland Security.
Question. As terrorists turn to the use of biological and chemical
weapons to target America and our allies, what kinds of chemical and
biological training has the training center developed to counter these
activities?
Answer. In response to terrorist attacks, as well as the threat of
biological and chemical weapons that target our country, the FLETC's
Security Specialties Division has developed courses and training
programs to train law enforcement personnel to be prepared for the
worst case scenario. One of the more effective actions taken was the
development of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Training Program
(WMDTP).
The WMDTP is a 5 day train-the-trainer program. The program goal is
to instruct the trainer on how to identify the characteristics and
effects of chemical, biological and nuclear/radiological terrorist
weapons. Furthermore, the students/trainers are trained as first
responder officers to these terrorist attacks. As trainers, the
students are given course materials and taught how to share this
information and train other officers and administrators to better
prepare this country should such an incident occur. This program is
offered to any law enforcement officer in the United States.
The course content of the WMDTP includes: Overview of Terrorism,
Chemical Agents and Physiological Effects, Biological Agents and
Radiological Weapons, Nuclear Devices, Delivery and Dissemination
Devices, Principles of Decontamination, Conventional Explosives as WMD,
Detection and Identification of CBR Agents Planning for WMD incidents,
Personal Protective Equipment and Managing a WMD attack.
Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has partnered
with the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of Management
and Budget to provide e-learning opportunities. Does the fiscal year
2004 budget request provide funding for additional distance learning
programs for law enforcement training?
Answer. In September 2002, the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) sent the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) a Letter
of Intent to partner in providing law enforcement e-Learning
opportunities. This partnership included ``support for the creation and
integration of robust custom law enforcement courseware based upon
government and industry standards''. In OPM's fiscal year 2004 e-
Learning Exhibit 300, OPM requested $585,000 in support of the FLETC.
Of these monies, approximately $185,000 was to support additional
distance learning programs for law enforcement training. Fiscal year
2004 was the first budget submission that incorporated our partnership
with OPM. The FLETC will continue to work through OPM's joint e-
Learning initiative for future support of distance learning law
enforcement content creation and hosting.
Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provides
training to State, local, and international law enforcement officers.
How is FLETC responding to the increased number of requests from State
and local law enforcement, especially for hazardous materials and
weapons of mass destruction training?
Answer. First response to terrorism or weapons of mass destruction
incidents are normally handled by State and local officers. Federal
agencies may be hours away from the scene and State and local law
enforcement agencies need the training and equipment to respond to
critical incidents. Some examples of Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) training programs available to State and local officers
are the First Responder Training Program (FRTP), Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training Program (WMDTP), Seaport Security Anti-terrorism
Training Program (SSATP), and Critical Incident Response Training
Program (CIRTP). Since September 11, 2001, the demand for these types
of training programs has increased significantly.
In fiscal year 2003, the FLETC received an additional $1 million in
appropriations to expand its delivery of tuition-free training to Small
Town and Rural (STAR) law enforcement agencies. When possible, the
FLETC has increased student enrollment in the FRTP from 24 to up to as
many as 70 students.
Additionally, the FLETC is partnering with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to coordinate delivery of hazardous materials
training programs such as Advanced Environmental Crimes Training
Program (AECTP). The FLETC is also developing a partnership with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assist in the delivery of
various training programs to include: incident command, emergency
response to terrorism, public information and weapons of mass
destruction programs.
Question. Does FLETC have adequate capacity to meet Federal agency
law enforcement training demands as well as those training needs of
State, local, and international law enforcement agencies? Is there a
priority?
Answer. At this time, FLETC does not have the training capacity to
meet all the Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement
agencies training demands while utilizing a standard 8-hour day, and 5-
day training week. However, given adequate scheduling flexibility and
the use of non-traditional training sites, the FLETC does have the
capacity to meet the short-term training demands of our Partner
Organizations. The long-term solution to the training capacity issue is
the development, refinement, funding, and completion of the FLETC
Master Plan for facilities.
Classes are scheduled on a priority basis as indicated below,
allocating facilities to:
--Basic Training Programs,
--Agency Specific Basic,
--Center Advanced,
--Agency Advanced and
--Others (i.e., State, Local, and International).
Question. The Committee remains concerned about the security of
power plants and nuclear facilities. Is the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Facility working with the Office for Domestic Preparedness to
develop best practices for first responders in protecting identified
critical infrastructure and assets?
Answer. The FLETC's Security Specialties Division offers a Critical
Infrastructure Protection Training Program (CIPTP) which addresses
protection for all critical infrastructure sectors and key assets as
outlined in The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003. Power plants
and nuclear facilities are included as assets in this document. It also
addresses security measures for cyberspace, because cyberspace is what
allows our critical infrastructure to work. The CIPTP is designed for
those individuals who have the responsibilities to protect and manage
critical infrastructures, key assets, resources or facilities. Though
FLETC's priority is the Federal law enforcement community, when space
is available, participants are accepted from all levels of law
enforcement.
The CIPTP provides the participants with an overview of critical
infrastructure protection, a threat brief, a Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) Model, instruction related to the components of the
CIP Model, a case study related to contemporary issues, and a practical
exercise. Heavy emphasis is placed on two points: One, the fact that
protecting critical infrastructure and key assets requires a multi-
disciplinary approach involving many people from numerous disciplines;
and two, the need to build public-private partnerships, because 85
percent of the infrastructure is owned by the private sector.
Question. Section 109 of the Maritime Security Act tasked the
Secretary of Transportation with the development of standards and
curriculum for the training and certification of maritime security
professionals. What is the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's
involvement in this process?
Answer. FLETC has established a partnering relationship with the
U.S. Coast Guard and the Global Maritime and Transportation School,
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA), in anticipation of legislation
being passed directing the development of a Seaport Security Training
Program. Preliminary discussions are on-going with regard to training
site selection and curricula identification, but no funding or
direction has been given for this activity to date.
Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provides
training to rural law enforcement personnel through its partnership
with Minot State University and Southwest Texas State University. Does
FLETC have plans to expand this program or develop other partnerships?
Answer. Since 1991, the FLETC has developed many long-term
partnerships with Federal agencies, training partners, State and local
agencies, and universities. The FLETC, through its National Center for
State and Local Training, serves on the International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the National Sheriffs' Association (NSA)
Education and Training Committees, as well as the National Guard
Counterdrug Training Advisory Counsel.
In 1996 and 1999, the National Center partnered with Illinois State
University, to conduct random sample training needs assessments of
small town and rural law enforcement agencies. Over 2,200 law
enforcement agencies--county, city, and Indian Country--were surveyed
to determine their training needs. The results of the 1996 study
provided the foundation for the development of the STAR training
series. Since fiscal year 2000, the National Center has contracted with
Minot State University (MSU), to conduct a training needs assessment of
all Federal, tribal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the
Northern Plains States Region (North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and
Wyoming).
In fiscal year 2003, Congress allocated $1,000,000 to the National
Center to expand its contract with MSU for research and validation
efforts in support of the STAR training series nationwide.
Additionally, the National Center received $500,000 to contract with
the MSU to provide a comprehensive evaluation/assessment of the
effectiveness of law enforcement vehicle pursuit training, previously
conducted nationwide with law enforcement executives. The MSU is to
provide recommendations for curriculum revision, training delivery
methods, and program policy modifications in fiscal year 2004.
The National Center is currently partnering with Southwest Texas
State University by providing assistance in the delivery of their
Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training Program (ALERRT). This
program is designed to provide law enforcement officers the skills
necessary to respond to active shooters.
The National Center has been conducting a number of site visits to
training facilities that submitted requests for consideration as hosts
for National Center and/or FLETC training. Some of these locations are
in Idaho, Louisiana, California, and Maryland. National Center staff
evaluates each facility based upon accreditation standards, geographic
location, demographic considerations, and the requirements to host a
program.
Question. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is
responsible for management oversight of the International Law
Enforcement Academy in Gabarone, Botswana, and will be responsible for
another facility to be located in San Jose, Costa Rica. How do these
facilities further FLETC's training mission?
Answer. In the Department of Treasury's Strategic Plan for fiscal
year 2000-fiscal year 2005, one of the objectives was to enhance basic,
advanced, and in-service training programs to meet the changing needs
and increasing demands of all law enforcement agencies.
Following the attacks of September 11th, and in a world where there
is increasing globalization of crime, U.S. law enforcement at all
levels need to interact with foreign law enforcement organizations.
For over 30 years, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC) has fulfilled its mandate to provide high quality, cost
effective law enforcement training utilizing modern facilities, state
of the art equipment and modern teaching methodologies and techniques.
As the nation's leading organization for interagency law
enforcement training, FLETC has become the expert in the development
and management of training facilities, training needs assessment,
course and curriculum development, instructor training, certification,
program accreditation, testing, and evaluation.
With facility management and academic responsibility for multiple
locations in the United States, which trains a diversity of Federal,
State, local and international students, FLETC offers a wealth of
technical experience in the management of International Law Enforcement
Agencies (ILEA). The ILEAs offer core programs focused on leadership,
terrorism, white collar crime, drug enforcement, financial crimes,
ethics, rule of law, police procedures, and the investigative process.
All ILEA locations-Botswana, Budapest, Bangkok, and Roswell, NM-are
under the Department of State's appropriation. The FBI, DEA and FLETC
have leadership roles in administering these sites. Costa Rica's
consideration as an ILEA site is still under review, so FLETC has not
taken on the day-to-day operational oversight.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
Question. Congress created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) to be the consolidated training center for almost all
law enforcement agencies. As the law enforcement training arm of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) it seems logical that FLETC
should develop and conduct standardized training for all Homeland
Security law enforcement and inspection personnel.
Such a training approach would ensure that all law enforcement
personnel receive appropriate and consistent instruction. This is
particularly important as you retrain and cross-train border agencies
which have been merged under DHS (e.g. Customs, Immigration, and
Agriculture Inspectors).
Congress specifically created the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Facility in Artesia, New Mexico to handle the advanced and special
training of almost all Federal law enforcement personnel.
In the past, Federal agencies have chosen not to use FLETC
facilities for training and instead have contracted with non-federal
institutions. Over the past few years, Congress has provided over $30
million for the FLETC Artesia facility, alone.
When the need for Federal Air Marshal training arose after
September 11, FLETC-Artesia answered the call to duty by developing and
providing this training in a remarkably short period of time. By way of
example, FLETC-Artesia brought in three 727 airplanes for use in
training to go along with the 18 firing ranges and 3 shoot-houses.
FLETC-Artesia boasts 683 beds, state-of-the-art classrooms, and a
brand new cafeteria to accommodate approximately 700 students a day.
FLETC-Artesia's close proximity to the Southwestern border,
recently constructed facilities and optimal training conditions
certainly suggest the center should be highly utilized by DHS. How do
you intend to provide training for the newly hired DHS personnel as
continued training for existing DHS personnel in light of the new
security challenges facing our country?
Answer. As we enter a new era in law enforcement operations in the
United States, FLETC is a good example of the new government approach
intended by the legislation creating the DHS: a means to harmonize the
work of many law enforcement agencies through common training, while at
the same time maintaining quality and cost efficiency. In fiscal year
2003, 65 percent of FLETC's projected training workload will come from
nine law enforcement agencies transferred to the new Homeland Security
department. In fiscal year 2004, this workload will continue to be
above 73 percent of our estimated total Federal training workload.
Under the leadership of Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary
Hutchinson, FLETC intends to work closely with all segments of DHS.
Placing FLETC within the DHS will help to support the ``unity of
command'' and the coordination and efficiency themes sought in the
public law that created DHS. FLETC has a long history of service to
many of the DHS components--the U.S. Secret Service, the former Customs
and Immigration and Naturalization Services including the U.S. Border
Patrol (USBP), the Federal Protective Service and more recently, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
With the start-up of the Bureaus of Customs and Border Protection
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FLETC is ready to help
facilitate, develop, and implement new training and cross training
programs. We recognize that much of this effort and expertise will
necessarily come from the agencies involved, but there likely will be
significant adjustments made over time to all DHS-related training
programs, basic and advanced. Already, an effort is underway to
systematically review existing training for these new entities and to
address whatever capabilities are needed to meld the duties of the
participants. In the meantime, training will continue unabated to
achieve all of the hiring expectations of our agencies.
Question. How do you intend to use FLETC facilities for training
DHS employees?
Answer. The national ``war on terrorism'' precipitated by the
events of September 11, 2001 placed new and increased demands on the
nation's Federal law enforcement agencies. Officers and agents
immediately began to work extended hours and many have been reassigned
geographically and/or to expanded duties. Nearly all Federal law
enforcement agencies made plans to increase their cadre of qualified
officers and agents, and submitted urgent requests to the FLETC for
basic law enforcement training far in excess of the FLETC's normal
capacity. These requests were for increased numbers of graduates and
for their speedy deployment to buttress the hard-pressed Federal law
enforcement effort.
The events of September 11 also increased the need for certain
advanced law enforcement training conducted at the FLETC, especially
classes associated with such issues as counter-terrorism, weapons of
mass destruction, money laundering, etc. Likewise, the need for
instructor training classes increased, to strengthen the cadre of
instructors qualified to handle the training surge--at the FLETC and
within the agencies.
In addressing the unprecedented increase in training requirements,
FLETC has conducted capability analyses to determine the set of actions
most likely to result in optimum throughput of students at each of its
training sites without compromising the quality of training. With the
consultation and concurrence of its partner organizations (POs), FLETC
leadership directed that training be conducted on a 6-day training
schedule, thus generating a 20 percent increase in throughput
capability. More importantly, the 6-day training schedule drives a
corresponding compression of the length of each training program,
effectively delivering each class of new law enforcement officers to
their agencies weeks sooner than under the conventional training
schedule. Should the 6-day training schedule be insufficient to meet
the demand, an extended work day will be considered.
In addition to the 6-day training schedule, FLETC has expanded its
staff with a supplemental cadre of re-employed annuitants (primarily
retired Federal law enforcement officers) who are contributing their
skills and experience as instructors to help sustain the surge in
training operations. This is a 5-year authority provided by Congress in
fiscal year 2002.
Further, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
tasked by BTS with establishing a Training Academy Committee to
identify and assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS
training academies. This study will be the basis for determining the
schedule and priority for training elements of DHS in a coordinated
manner.
Question. How should DHS use FLETC Artesia's facilities and
specialized training capabilities?
Answer. FLETC intends to utilize its Artesia facility to its
maximum potential. At the request of the Under Secretary, Border and
Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate, Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has been
tasked with establishing a Training Academy Committee to identify and
assess the training capabilities of all of the BTS training academies.
The Committee will use a two phased methodology to identify the
training assets and to develop a plan for operating the facilities
employed by each of the Directorate's bureaus, and will also include
the Coast Guard, Secret Service, and the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services. The operational plan will provide the framework
for coordinating academy training in all BTS bureaus. The Committee
will develop and submit a report at the conclusion of each phase
according to the timelines established by its charter. Once the
Committee has identified all of the BTS training capabilities, FLETC
can develop a more definitive utilization plan of facility usage at
Artesia and all other sites.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd
TRAINING CURRICULA
Question. Have provisions been formulated regarding possible
curriculum changes due to the merger of departments and the eventual
cross training of agency personnel?
Answer. FLETC is currently working with the newly formed Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) law enforcement organizations to modify,
design, and develop appropriate training curricula to ensure their
specific mission requirements are met, to include the cross-training of
agency personnel.
FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS TRAINING LOCATION
Question. Does FLETC, in conjunction with TSA, plan to consolidate
training of Federal Air Marshals at one location (Artesia) as opposed
to the expense of training in Atlantic City?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
recently requested the FLETC conduct 3 weeks of their 4-week agency
specific basic training program, which is firearms and physical
training intensive, at our Artesia facility. It is our understanding
that TSA will continue to conduct the final week of their agency
specific training, which involves primarily tactics, at their Atlantic
City facility.
MASTER PLAN CONSTRUCTION
Question. When do you contemplate delivering to Congress the
revised construction master plan? Does the plan include construction
requirements at the FLETC-used facilities in Charleston, SC?
Answer. The completed FLETC Master Plan project is expected this
summer. FLETC has not included construction requirements of the
Charleston, SC training facility in its master plan, nor has it
estimated the cost of transforming the Charleston campus into a full-
fledged, permanent facility. No cost estimates have been developed or
reviewed by the Department of Homeland Security to date. A study group
has been formed to examine the planning and decision making process on
training program implementation for all of the new components in DHS.
Once the study group formed by the Under Secretary for Border
Transportation Security has completed its work and decisions made on
the content, length and type of training needed by the agencies brought
under the DHS legislation, a determination will be made on the future
of the Charleston site.
LACK OF CONSTRUCTION FUNDING IN FISCAL YEAR 2004
Question. What will be the impact on training from the lack of any
construction funding in fiscal year 2004?
Answer. Facility procurement, design and construction normally
require 18 months to 2 years to complete. Any training facilities that
cannot be appropriated and completed during this period will require
the use of alternative approaches to training, including distance
learning and use of available Federal, State and local training sites.
RURAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING
Question. How much is in the base budget for the on-going rural law
enforcement training program at Minot State University?
Answer. The fiscal year 2004 base budget does not provide for any
on-going rural law enforcement training programs at Minot State
University. The fiscal year 2003 enacted appropriation included $3.3
million to support these programs. This funding is not continued in the
fiscal year 2004 President's request.
PLANNED USAGE OF THE CHELTENHAM FACILITY
Question. What agencies have already made plans, and coordinated
with FLETC, to use the facilities in Cheltenham, MD?
Answer. The Cheltenham facility is currently utilized by seven of
its 62 partner organizations. The primary users of the Cheltenham
facility are the U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Park Police, the Washington,
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, the Prince George's County Police,
Sheriffs, Fire/EMS Departments, and Pentagon Police. The U.S. Capitol
Police conducts their basic follow-on, agency specific and advanced in-
service training at Cheltenham on a daily basis. These agencies utilize
the existing 13 building Cheltenham tactical village for in-service
agency specific tactical team training, as well as the classroom and
conference center for in-service chem-bio, emergency medicine, and WMD
training sessions on a weekly basis. Other groups, such as the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Accreditation Group and FLETC Distance
Learning program, have utilized classroom space in the Cheltenham
conference center for day and week long seminars. Also, the Prince
George's County Fire and EMS Training Academy utilize vacant FLETC
buildings for recruit firefighter training on a regular basis.
To date, 62 separate Federal law enforcement agencies in the
metropolitan Washington, D.C. area, including the D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department, have expressed their intention to use the indoor
firing ranges and driver training range for requalification training.
Cheltenham will be used by State and local law enforcement
agencies. In fact, the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington,
D.C., Maryland State Police, Prince George's County Police and Sheriffs
Department are currently utilizing Cheltenham facilities on a weekly
and monthly basis. However, with the exception of the D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department, which was specifically identified in the legislation
that created Cheltenham, Federal agencies will be given scheduling
priority.
CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS
Senator Cochran. Until our next hearing, this subcommittee
will stand in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., Tuesday, May 13, the hearings
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]